The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics (Oxford Handbooks) 0198825102, 9780198825104

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   

MODERN GREEK POLITICS

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    ................................................................................................................................................................................................

MODERN GREEK POLITICS ................................................................................................................................................................................................

Edited by

KEVIN FEATHERSTONE and

DIMITRI A. SOTIROPOULOS

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford,  , United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press  The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in  Impression:  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press  Madison Avenue, New York, NY , United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number:  ISBN –––– Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon,   Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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P ......................................

Like others in this series, this volume aims to provide an authoritative reference appropriate to both current specialists in the field and those delving into the subject for the first time. The chapters here speak to those trained in the social sciences and/or those who have a contextual knowledge. As such, it is aimed at both a Greek and an international audience. The contributors are leading experts in their field and, as such, they are highly informed guides to Modern Greek politics. The authors are from a number of disciplines and their insights will be of value to those working in the cognate fields of law, economics, history, sociology, etc. The volume focusses on the years from  to the present: what has been termed the ‘Metapolitefsi’ period since the fall of the Colonels’ junta. This is not a chronological history, however; rather, it is a reflective commentary and analysis across the key themes of development that have shaped Greece’s politics, institutions, and policies. As reflective essays, they critically assess the existing literature in specific fields and outline agendas for future research to build up knowledge and awareness—they identify themes and seek to shape research terrains. Analytically, they comprise conceptual and empirical dimensions to deepen the appreciation of developments and to connect them to a wider, international literature. The chapters address key changes over time: post- and the impact of the recent debt crisis, to assess change and continuity. While the chapters are able to reflect on the changes that have occurred, they were completed before the outbreak of the COVID- pandemic. The book, thus, offers no speculation on its still uncertain impact and, in general, covers the period to mid-. The individual chapters are structured in order to provide clarity and thematic coherence. The Introduction identifies the Greek case in comparison to other systems, attempting to highlight key distinguishing features of the state in relation to its institutional strength; its relations with the economy, society, and the party system; and, the complementarities and imbalances therein. The chapters in Section I explore further the features that frame the Greek case: its punctuated historical development (Kalyvas); the complex relationship between the Church, the State and ‘Hellenism’ since the early nineteenth century (Kitromilidis); its path as a developmental state and its model of capitalism (Pagoulatos); state–society relations (Sotiropoulos); and, the domestic impacts of ‘Europeanization’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou). Later sections—constituting the bulk of the volume—examine developments in specific areas against this backdrop: political institutions; party political traditions; politics, social interests and change; politics and policy-making; external relations and foreign policy; and, the impact of political leaders and their legacies. The volume complements the structure of similar ‘country’ volumes in the Handbook series.

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

The focus on Greece is apt for a number of important reasons. While there has been a sizeable literature on the history, politics, society, and foreign conflicts of modern Greece, there remains no single and authoritative source—in any language—that offers a comprehensive guide, bringing the ‘jigsaw’ together. Moreover, even in its distinct parts, the jigsaw is incomplete: there are significant gaps in crucial areas of understanding, such as institutions and public policy, if not others. Further, the recent debt crisis in Greece has drawn the attention of an international audience in seeking to understand its domestic causes and its capacity for exit. The Greek crisis was the first such eurozone crisis, proving much deeper in its loss of economic output and social pain, while continuing for a longer period. Such exceptionalism underscores the need to provide the international reader with a penetrating analysis of key areas, in order to understand the constraints on reform. Though, by reputation, Greece is a society that is deeply politicized and, although its debt crisis has created intense conflicts of interpretation, this volume does not adopt a common, collective stance on its current position. The contributors to this volume offer their expertise, drawn from diverse conceptual and disciplinary perspectives, to provide informed scholarly critiques that enable the reader to build up his/her own picture and to draw appropriate intellectual conclusions. They comprise a set the like of which has never before been brought together to make sense of the Greek ‘reality’. We hope that this volume may realize our original and essential purpose: to provide an informed and comprehensive guide to the politics of contemporary Greece that serves the needs of both an international and a Greek audience. In doing so, the volume is a platform for a rich scholarship that is not always readily accessible to the foreign reader. We cannot know when, or if, a similar volume such as this may be produced in the future, but if and until it is, we hope that this volume fulfils these objectives. A volume of this magnitude and ambition has been a major challenge and we are grateful for the help we have received. Dominic Byatt and his colleagues at Oxford University Press have supported us from the start, with encouragement and professionalism. The many contributors to the volume have accepted the demands of the venture and its schedule, while tolerating our numerous requests and edits. Michael Cottakis has been an excellent editorial assistant, ready to meet the challenges of a volume of this size and scope. The LSE’s Hellenic Observatory has provided support and funding for this project. Both Ismini Demades and Areti Chatzistergou have helped with administrative matters. We are very appreciative of all such support and assistance—the production of this volume could not have been realized without each such element. Finally, Kevin Featherstone wishes to dedicate this volume to his family and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos to his daughters for their continued love and support. Kevin Featherstone London School of Economics and Political Science Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

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List of Figures List of Tables List of Abbreviations List of Contributors

xi xiii xv xxi

INTRODUCTION . Introduction: Identifying Greece K F



S E C T I O N  T H E FR A M E . The Developmental Trajectory of the Greek State



S N. K

. State–Society Relations in Greece



D A. S

. State–Market Relations



G P

. The Politics of Europeanization



K F  D P

. Church, State, and Hellenism



P M. K

SECTION  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS . Greek Constitutionalism and Patterns of Government



N C. A

. The Judiciary M I



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

. The Prime Minister and the Core Executive



K F  D P

. The Parliament



G G

. Public Administration



C S

. Local Government and Regional Administration



N-K H

. The Electoral System



E D

. The Party System



Y T

S E C T I O N  P O L I T I C A L TR A D I T I O N S . The Far Right



V G

. The Conservatives



M A

. The Centre



S R

. The Socialists



C L

. The Radical Left



Y K

. The Communists



G C

SECTION  POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTERESTS . Political Culture S V  D H



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. Civil Society

ix



A H

. Social Movements



M S

. Interest Group Politics



S Z

. Voting Behaviour



S K

. The Media



S P

. Terrorism



G K

SECTION  P O L I C Y - M A K I N G . Government Policy-Making



S L

. The State and Economic Development



T G

. The Politics of the Public Finances



V T. R  G K

. Pensions in the Greek Political Economy



P T

. Health Policy and Politics



M P

. Poverty and the Social Safety Net



M M

. Education



T E

. Migration in Greece A T



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

SECTION  E X T E R N A L R E L A T I O N S . Defence and Security Policy



T D

. Greece and the European Union: Strategic Vision, Diplomatic Finesse and Poor Domestic Delivery



L T

. Greek Foreign Policy since the Metapolitefsi



S E

. Greek–Turkish Relations



I N. G

SECTION  LEADERS . Constantine Karamanlis



E H

. Andreas Papandreou



A P

. Costas Simitis



P. N D

. Alexis Tsipras



M T

Index of Names Subject Index

 

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L  F .......................................................................

. The effective number of parties over time, Greece vs OECD



. Cumulative vote share of the two first parties over time, Greece vs OECD



. Party system institutionalization indicators, –



. Electoral results of LAOS and Golden Dawn



. The Greek communist organizational model



. Proportion of Greek voters feeling close to a specific political party



. Economic voting in Greece, –



. Expenditure on health by type of financing



. Poverty rates (–)



. Stay permits by gender and purpose



. Defence spending as a percentage of GDP



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L  T ...................................................................

. Union Density in Greece in the Comparative Perspective of Southern Europe (% of salaried employees)



. Prime-ministerial power and the Greek core executive: A matrix of analysis



. The Greek core executive, –



. Number of parliamentary statutes per category (–)



. Contents of primary laws on the basis of the number of ministers signing the statutes



. Deconcentrated state administrations, regions (population, GDP, EU regional funding per capita –) and municipalities



. The evolution of the Greek party system, –



. Elections in Greece, from the restoration of democracy until the outbreak of the economic crisis (%)



. Crisis Elections in Greece (%)



. Voters’ attitudes towards far Right parties



. Synaspismos electoral results – (national elections)



. The performance of the KKE in Greek parliamentary elections, –



. Average annual growth rates or average values per period, in percentages (–)



. Periodization of the pension challenge and of pension reforms –



. Key indicators for primary providers following different ‘logics’ 



. Bailout era pension changes



. Health expenditure



. Stock of foreign population in Greece, 



. Citizenship acquisition (–)



. Public opinion on immigration in Greece (–)



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L  A .........................................................................................................

N

 Νοέμβρη The Revolutionary Organization ‘ November’

AADE

Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή Δημοσίων Εσόδων Independent Authority for Public Revenue

ADAE

Αρχή Διασφάλισης του Απορρήτου των Επικοινωνιών Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy

ADEDY

Ανώτατη Διοίκηση Ενώσεων Δημοσίων Υπαλλήλων Supreme Directorate of Unions of Civil Servants

AED

Ανώτατο Ειδικό Δικαστήριο Supreme Special Court

AKEL

Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού Cypriot Party of the Working People

AKOA

Ανανεωτική Κομμουνιστική Οικολογική Αριστερά Communist Renewal

ANEL

Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες Independent Greeks

ANTARSYA

Αντικαπιταλιστική Αριστερή Συνεργασία για την Ανατροπή Anti-capitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow

AP

Άρειος Πάγος Court of Cassation

APDPX

Αρχή Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα Hellenic Data Protection Authority

ASEP

Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Επιλογής Προσωπικού Independent Authority for the Selection of Personnel

CCF

Συνωμοσία των Πυρήνων της Φωτιάς Conspiracy of Cells of Fire

DAKE

Δημοκρατική Ανεξάρτητη Κίνηση Εργαζομένων Independent Democratic Movement of Workers

DHANA

Δημοκρατική Ανανέωση Democratic Renewal

DHSY

Δημοκρατική Συμπαράταξη Democratic Alliance

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  

DIKKI

Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα Democratic Socialist Movement

DIMAR

Δημοκρατική Αριστερά Democratic Left

DPE

Δημοκρατική Περιφερειακή Ένωση Democratic Regional Union

EAM

Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο National Liberation Front

EAP

Ενιαία Αρχή Πληρωμής Unified Authority for Disbursements

EAR

Ελληνική Αριστερά The Greek Left

EDA

Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά Unitified Democratic Left

EDIK

Ενωση Δημοκρατικού Κέντρου Union of Democratic Centre

EFEE

Eθνική Φοιτητική Ένωση Ελλάδας National Student Association of Greece

EPEK

Εθνική Προοδευτική Ένωσις Κέντρου National Progressive Centre Union

EGE

Ένωση Γυναικών Ελλάδας Union of Greek Women

ΕΚ

Ένωσις Κέντρου Centre Union

ΕΚΕΜ

Ελληνικό Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκών Μελετών Hellenic Centre for European Studies

EKF

Ελληνικό Κοινωνικό Φόρουμ Greek Social Forum

EKKE

Εθνικό Κέντρο Κοινωνικών Ερευνών Hellenic National Center for Social Research

EK-ND

Ένωση Κέντρου-Νέες Δυνάμεις Centre Union-New Forces

ELA

Επαναστατικός Λαϊκός Αγώνας Revolutionary Popular Struggle

ELDYK

Ελληνική Δύναμη Κύπρου Military Force in Cyprus

ELIAMEP

Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Ευρωπαϊκής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

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   ELSTAT

Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή Hellenic Statistical Authority

EOPYY

Εθνικός Οργανισμός Παροχής Υπηρεσιών Υγείας National Organization for the Provision of Health Services

EPEK

Εθνική Προοδευτική Ένωσις Κέντρου National Progressive Centre Union

ERE

Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις National Radical Union

ERT

Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία Τηλεόραση Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation

ES

Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο Court of Auditors

ESR

Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Ραδιοτηλεόρασης Greek National Council for Radio and Television

ESSD

Εθνική Σχολή Δημόσιας Διοίκησης National School of Public Administration

ESY

Εθνικό Σύστημα Υγείας National Health System

FF

Φιλελεύθερο Φόρουμ Liberal Forum

GD

Χρυσή Αυγή Golden Dawn

GGK

Γενική Γραμματεία της Κυβέρνησης General Secretariat of the Government

GGP

Γενική Γραμματεία του Πρωθυπουργού General Secretariat to the Prime Minister

GGSK

Γενική Γραμματεία Συντονισμού General Secretariat for the Coordination of the Government

GGYS

Γενική Γραμματεία του Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου General Secretariat of the Cabinet

GLK

Γενικό Λογιστήριο του Κράτους General Accounting Office of the State

GSEE

Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδας General Confederation of Workers of Greece

GYP

Γραμματεία Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου Secretariat of the Cabinet

IKA

Ίδρυμα Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων Social Insurance Fund

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IME

Ινστιτούτο Μικρών Επιχειρήσεων Institute of Small Enterprises

INE

Ινστιτούτο Εργασίας Labour Institute

IOBE

Ίδρυμα Οικονομικών και Βιομηχανικών Ερευνών Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research

ISTAME

Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών και Αναπτυξιακών Μελετών Institute of Strategic and Developmental Studies

KDG

Κίνηση Δημοκρατικών Γυναικών Movement of Democratic Women

KEP

Κίνημα Ελευθέρων Πολιτών Movement of Free Citizens

KEP

Κέντρα Εξυπηρέτησης Πολιτών Citizens’ Service Centres

ΚEPE

Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών Centre of Planning and Economic Research

KIDISO

Κίνημα Δημοκρατών Σοσιαλιστών Movement of Democratic Socialists

KKE

Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας Communist Party of Greece

KPEE

Κέντρο Πολιτικής Έρευνας και Ενημέρωσης Centre of Political Research and Information

KYSEA

Κυβερνητικό Συμβούλιο Εξωτερικών και Άμυνας Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence

LAE

Λαϊκή Ενότητα Popular Unity

LAOS

Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός People’s Orthodox Rally

ΜΑS

Μέτωπο Αγώνα Σπουδαστών Students’ Militant Front

ND

Νέα Δημοκρατία New Democracy

OAE

Οργανισμός Ανασυγκρότησης Επιχειρήσεων Organization for the Reconstruction of Enterprises

OGA

Οργανισμός Αγροτικών Ασφαλίσεων Social Security Fund for Farmers

OGE

Ομοσπονδία Γυναικών Ελλάδας Federation of Greek Women

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   OKE

Οικονομική και Κοινωνική Επιτροπή Economic and Social Committee

OP

Οικολόγοι-Πράσινοι Ecologist-Greens

PAK

Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Panhellenic Liberation Movement

PAME

Πανεργατικό Αγωνιστικό Μέτωπο All Workers Militant Front

PASEBE

Πανελλαδική Αντιμονοπωλιακή Συσπείρωση Pan-Hellenic Militant Rally of Professionals, Artisans, Merchants

PASEGES

Πανελλήνια Συνομοσπονδία Ενώσεων Γεωργικών Συνεταιρισμών Panhellenic Confederation of Farmers’ Cooperatives

PASKE

Πανελλήνια Αγωνιστική Συνδικαλιστική Κίνηση Εργαζομένων Panhellenic Militant Labour Union Movement

PASOK

Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα Panhellenic Socialist Movement

PASY

Παναγροτική Αγωνιστική Συσπείρωση All Peasants Militant Rally

PBO

Γραφείο Προϋπολογισμού του Κράτους στη Βουλή State Budget Office in the Parliament

PEDY

Πρωτοβάθμιο Εθνικό Δίκτυο Υγείας National Primary Health Care Network

PESY

Περιφερειακά Συστήματα Υγείας Regional Health Systems

POLAN

Πολιτική Άνοιξη Political Spring

RS

Επαναστατικός Αγώνας Revolutionary Struggle

SASOEΕ

Σύνδεσμος Αγροτικών Συνεταιριστικών Οργανώσεων και Επιχειρήσεων Ελλάδας Association of Farmers Cooperatives and Enterprises

SOE

Συμβούλιο Οικονομικών Εμπειρογνωμόνων Council of Economic Experts

StE

Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας Council of State

SYDASE

Συνομοσπονδία Αγροτικών Συλλόγων Ελλάδας Confederation of Democratic Farmers Associations

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SYN

Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς και της Προόδου Coalition of the Left and Progress

SYRIZA

Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς Coalition of the Radical Left

TEI

Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα Technological Education Institutes

TOMY

Τοπικές Μονάδες Υγείας Local Units of Primary Health Care

YPE

Υγειονομικές Περιφέρειες Health Care Regional Authorities

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L  C ......................................................................................................

Manolis Alexakis Assistant Professor of Political Sociology, University of Crete Nicos C. Alivizatos Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Giorgos Charalambous Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Nicosia P. Nikiforos Diamandouros Emeritus Professor of Political Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Elias Dinas Associate Professor in Comparative Politics, University of Oxford Thanos Dokos Director General, ELIAMEP Spyros Economides Associate Professor in International Relations and European Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science Theofanis Exadaktylos Senior Lecturer in European Politics, University of Surrey Kevin Featherstone Eleftherios Venizelos Chair of Contemporary Greek Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science Vasiliki Georgiadou Associate Professor of Politics, Panteion University George Gerapetritis Professor of Constitutional Law, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Tassos Giannitsis Emeritus Professor of Economics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Ioannis N. Grigoriadis Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies, Bilkent University Daphne Halikiopoulou Professor in Comparative Politics, University of Reading Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Professor of Post-War History, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Nikolaos-Komninos Hlepas Associate Professor of Administrative Science and Public Law, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Asteris Huliaras Professor in Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of the Peloponnese

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  

Michael Ioannidis Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Stathis N. Kalyvas Gladstone Professor of Government, University of Oxford Georgia Kaplanoglou Associate Professor in Public Finance and Sociology, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens George Kassimeris Chair in Security Studies, University of Wolverhampton Yiannos Katsourides Political Science, University of Nicosia Paschalis M. Kitromilides Emeritus Professor of Political Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Spyros Kosmidis Lecturer in Quantitative Methods, University of Oxford Stella Ladi Senior Lecturer in Public Management, Queen Mary, University of London Christos Lyrintzis Professor of Political Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Manos Matsaganis Professor of Public Finance, Politecnico di Milano George Pagoulatos Professor of European Politics and Economy, Athens University of Economics and Business Andreas Pantazopoulos Associate Professor of Political Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Dimitris Papadimitriou Professor of Political Science, University of Manchester Stylianos Papathanassopoulos Professor of Management and Media Policy, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Maria Petmesidou Professor of Social Policy, Democritus University of Thrace Vassilis T. Rapanos Emeritus Professor of Economics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Sotiris Rizas Director of Research, Centre for the Study of Modern Greek History, Academy of Athens Marilena Simiti Associate Professor of Political Sociology, University of Piraeus Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos Professor of Political Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Calliope Spanou Professor of Administrative Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Platon Tinios Associate Professor of Economics, University of Piraeus

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Anna Triandafyllidou Canada Excellence Research Chair on Migration and Integration, Ryerson University, Toronto Myrto Tsakatika Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Glasgow Yannis Tsirbas Lecturer in Social Theory and Sociology, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Loukas Tsoukalis Jean Monnet Professor of European Organization, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Sofia Vasilopoulou Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of York Stella Zambarloukou Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Crete

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 .............................................................................................................

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  ......................................................................................................................

:  

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I ‘Greece’ has often challenged scholars from different disciplines. No other contemporary European state seemingly requires the epithet ‘Modern’ to avoid confusion over the intended focus. Modern Greece has been equated with Europe’s south, the Balkans, or the Near East, whilst the weight of its historical inheritance has more generally placed it at the very core of understandings of what constitutes ‘Europe’ or, indeed, the ‘West’. It has been a case to define the divisions of the Cold War and, latterly, the vulnerabilities of the ‘eurozone’. Defining it from within or from without has elicited contestation. So, how might Greece be identified in the present? To introduce the volume, this chapter adopts a broad, comparative perspective. It does so across three sections. Firstly, it briefly outlines why Greece is of a wider interest to scholars, highlighting aspects of its history where it has appeared of larger significance than its size might normally warrant. Secondly, it proceeds to identify Greece’s development along a set of dimensions that serve to place it within comparative frames, addressing the question, ‘What type of case is Greece?’. These dimensions are necessarily selective, but still probably over-ambitious. Across each aspect, ‘headline’ identifications are given—and they stand as previews to the more detailed analyses that follow in this volume, setting their context. To draw these different aspects together, the third section attempts to identify ‘imbalances’ within the Greek system that give it its distinctive character and to sketch how these aspects are, in fact, interlinked. Their complementarities sustain a set of constraints that structure the system’s developmental path. The latter has been of continuing international interest: its capacity to exit the recent debt crisis has been the subject of much debate. The Conclusion reflects on this comparative perspective for future research on Greece.

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

 

. G   F

.................................................................................................................................. Political, economic, and social change in Greece represents a fascinating focus (Beaton, ; Koliopoulos and Veremis, ; Clogg, ). Historians would properly begin with the establishment of the Modern Greek state in the s, following its War of Independence from subjugation under the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the legacies of Ottoman rule and the extent of shared Balkan traits, consequent upon it, constitute rich seams of contemporary socio-cultural inquiry. Today, foreign readers are more likely to be aware of Greece fighting valiantly against the Axis Occupation during the Second World War (–) and of its subsequent descent into a bloody civil war (–). For Greece has been of strategic importance disproportionate to its own size, making it an exceptional case of vulnerability. Churchill fought Stalin at Yalta to keep it as part of the West, while Washington invented the ‘Truman Doctrine’ (), and its concomitant Marshall Plan, to rescue it (and others) from a communist-led takeover. It had passed from the protection of Britain to the US and it became a bulwark against the spread of communism in the Balkans. Its disputes with Turkey and its imbroglio over Cyprus from the s onwards, emphasized the tensions within the eastern Mediterranean part of the NATO alliance (see Section  in this volume). Others will know of Greece having experienced periods of dictatorial rule—most recently, the Colonels’ junta ( April  to  July )—which prompted comparative studies of its post-authoritarian transition. In reality, modern Greece has endured only a limited number of years of dictatorship—as Alivizatos records in Chapter —and it was at the forefront of establishing parliamentary democracy, with universal male suffrage introduced in the Constitution of . Indeed, by the prevailing international standards of the time, it was primarily the authoritarianism of the Metaxas period (–) and of the Colonels, which set Greece apart. Yet, Greece’s political development had been marked over the twentieth century by challenges of polarization, instability, and contested legitimacy that have raised questions as to its systemic identity. An early schism had counterposed ‘royalists’ and ‘Venizelists’, when Eleftherios Venizelos, as prime minister, and King Constantine I clashed in  over which side to ally with in the First World War. Venizelos triumphed and Greece joined the Anglo-French Entente. It was a schism that came to mark domestic political identities to the junta period and the  referendum vote to abolish the monarchy. Foreign escapades and instability also came when Venizelos and his followers had taken up the ‘Megali Idea’, the irredentist ambition to unite all Greeks in a Greek state. Two Balkan Wars (–) doubled the nation’s size and territory in the space of two years. The ‘Megali Idea’ was abandoned, however, after an overambitious (Royalist) Greek army, trying to emulate Venizelos’ earlier successes, was routed in Asia Minor in  at the hands of the forces of Kemal Ataturk’s newly emergent Republic of Turkey (Milton, ). The  ‘Catastrophe’ led to the influx

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

of some one and a half million refugees into mainland Greece, dispossessed and forming new settlements around her cities. Later, a questionable system legitimacy arose in the aftermath of the Civil War, when the pro-American/anti-communist regime was illiberal and non-inclusive—domestically, an ‘exclusivist political system’ (Diamandouros, : ). It is the return to parliamentary democracy in  after the Colonels’ junta that marks the main starting-point for much of this volume. The transition—the ‘Metapolitefsi’ (Μεταπολίτευση: literally, polity or regime change)—represents a benchmark for the country’s development. The post- transition sought to overcome the longterm legacies of conflict and instability and the present is an appropriate point at which to assess its achievements. Greece’s entry into the then European Community (EC) on st January , later the European Union (EU), was an important milestone in the consolidation of this transition. It joined as the EC’s tenth member, before Spain and Portugal. By January , when the drachma was replaced by the ‘euro’ single currency, Greece had become a mainstream EU member, participating in all its major policies, and this was a period of ‘modernization’ as ‘Europeanization’ (see Chapter ). The hosting of a very successful Olympic Games that summer seemed to symbolize its new spirit. Yet, Greece hit the news headlines around the world in  for a debt crisis that risked her defaulting on her loans and falling out of the eurozone. The crisis represented the biggest challenge to Greece in the period since : indeed, it wreaked havoc in the economy, society, and polity. The recession it engendered involved the loss of some  per cent of its GDP, a magnitude comparable to that of the Wall Street crash in . In August , Greece exited the ‘bailout’ programmes established by institutions of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), overseen by their monitors in an ad hoc agency; for most of the period, the ‘Troika’. But Greece would continue to be subject to its loan agreements, with their conditions attached. While  is the main starting point for this book, the impact of the crisis—its likely legacy—constitutes the conclusion of the period examined in the chapters of this volume. Authors address the twin themes of change and continuity over time, with special attention to how far the crisis disturbed the prior patterns of post- evolution. That throughout its severe debt crisis, the Greek political system remained open and democratic is testament to its post- strength. Beyond this realm, however, there are many unresolved issues to explore. For much of its modern history, the course taken by Greece has prompted a varied and complex set of questions about where it belongs (to the West? to Europe?) and its ability to converge and be a reliable partner. That Greece has received so much foreign attention over the years is symptomatic of the country looming large on many important strategic agendas (see Chapter ). At the same time, the expectations placed upon it—and the aspirations of some of its domestic elites—have conflicted with the realities of its own constraints. This capability–expectations gap—reminiscent of the disappointments of early foreign travellers to the new Greek state in the nineteenth century—has sustained a mix of ambition, frustration, and embarrassment on the part

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

 

of those Greeks equating ‘modernity’ with emulating (Western) Europe. Those who, alternatively, have felt threatened by such modernization and sought solace in a separate Greek identity have constituted the other side of what Diamandouros () has identified as a long-term ‘cultural dualism’ within Greek society. It thus becomes a matter of identifying the constraints—internal and/or external— that have seemingly held the country back, and their malleability (Allison and Nicolaidis, ). The limits of economic resources may be relatively easily identified, but many would place these within a domestic context of socio-cultural norms, institutional weaknesses, and political choices. Added to these, may be the ill-fitting policy frames of the EU or, earlier, of impositions from a changing international system. These competing considerations feed into psychologies of irresponsibility or of victimhood. Further, national successes are apt to be identified with great leaders raising the country’s ambition; failures with a descent into the ‘populism’ of the masses. As such, the interplay of these different dimensions constitutes a fascinating case—a veritable Greek drama—of almost limitless depth and regression to better understand its potential and constraints.

. I G

.................................................................................................................................. Set against this varied and complex background, the core question becomes— crudely—‘What is Greece a case of?’ More substantively, how can Greece—in its key components across politics, society, and economy—be most accurately identified for comparative purposes? Some would find recourse in its exceptionalism: contextual factors set it apart and the task of locating it in international comparisons is foolhardy. Contemporary social science sets a higher ambition: the act of comparison delineates the key conditions of greatest significance, leading to a leaner and more robust explanatory frame. This short introduction must be selective—to clarify system-defining characteristics of particular relevance for the foreign or lay reader. The later chapters will give much greater depth and differentiation. Inevitably, the choice here interprets the Greek system in ways that others may not share. Indeed, from this selection I seek to further characterize the Greek system, its imbalances, and its scope for change. First, Greece can be identified within a comparative literature: • Political economy: Greece is akin to the ‘state capitalist’ (Schmidt, ); ‘mixed market economy’ (Molina and Rhodes, ); and southern European capitalism (Amable, ) models of capitalism—a complex hybrid Hall and Soskice () found difficult to distinguish. • The state and its institutions: Greece has lacked a distinct ‘state tradition’ (Dyson, ); its institutions display different influences: Napoleonic, Roman law, and German legalism (Herzfeld, ); the emerging administrative culture was

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•

•

•

•



distorted by a socio-political encroachment (Spanou, ), however; in addition, Greece scores low on ‘quality of government’ measures (Rothstein and Teorell, ) and the operation of its state institutions has been marked by clientelism and corruption (). State–society relations: the Greek state is ‘a colossus with feet of clay’ (Sotiropoulos, ); there is a distrust of the state and its institutions; ‘rentierism’ reflects the lack of separation between state and society; and, social capital is weak, social trust low—indeed, its ‘social capital index’ has been estimated as the lowest amongst the older member states of the EU (Paraskevopoulos, ). Identity politics: before the establishment of the new Greek state, the social basis for Greek identity was the Church and this was sustained by the new nation. An ‘Helleno-Christian’ identity became nativist and exclusionary: to be ‘Greek’ was to be Orthodox (see Chapter ). This involved some ‘illiberal’ social features that are evident today (see Chapter ) in the ‘othering’ of certain minorities, for example. The sense of identity went with that of the subjugation of the people under the Ottoman Empire, creating a cultural sense of victimhood at the hands of external ‘Great Powers’, a feature that also lingers in the present. A sense of a threatened identity was exhibited by Greek opposition to the singular name ‘Macedonia’ for the former Yugoslav Republic of that title. Moreover, in recent years, Greece has been obliged to adapt to being less homogeneous, with the influx of migrants, and less religious, in terms of Church attendance. Interest mediation: with problematic institutions and ‘rentier’ social pressures, Greece approximates the ‘weak state, strong society’ contrast of Migdal (). Civil society has traditionally been weak (except for the Church)—a victim of the ‘partitocracy’, with parties colonizing the associational sphere (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ); relations between government–business–trade unions have reflected a ‘disjointed corporatism’ (Lavdas, ); and sociopolitical conflict has been high, rendering decision-making by a broad social consensus elusive. This is far from notions of consociationalism (Lijphart, ) brought about by being a ‘small state in (a) world market’ (Katzenstein, ). Party system: the post- period has seen the modernization of the political parties, the supplanting of earlier systemic conflicts and, latterly, the eruption of a new ‘crisis politics’. Traditionally, parties were organizationally weak, as was classbased voting—given the stronger conflicts of ‘identity’ (royalist-republican; Venizelist/anti-Venizelist; conservative-liberal/communist)—but the post- regime saw the rise of parties with a stronger internal organization and a Left–Right polarization that supplanted other cleavages (e.g. the socialist PASOK’s ‘antiRight’ discourse). For much of the post- period, Greece had a stable twoparty system. Over time, the shift of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) towards the Centre reflected a period of centripetal politics. The impact of the debt crisis was the collapse of PASOK, however, and its apparent replacement by the more radical leftist/populist Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) party, producing a

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  greater ideological distance with the Centre-Right New Democracy party, which in the wake of the crisis also suffered electoral decline. Voter loyalties had weakened, while disaffection with ‘the system’ had increased. • External vulnerability: this has veered over foreign intervention (penetration) in its domestic politics (Couloumbis, ); ‘Europeanization’ (Featherstone and Radaelli, ; Graziano and Vink, ); and, latterly, a debt bail-out dependency on the European Union. Greece’s fate after the Second World War had been determined at Yalta and US influence in domestic Greek politics was profound in the s. Later, perceptions of Washington’s complicity with the junta’s emergence and sustainability led to a popular anti-Americanism and the questioning of NATO’s role post-. Greece’s interests vis-à-vis Turkey and also Cyprus had long been structured by US hegemony (see Chapters  and ). As these legacies abated, of much greater salience has been Greece’s adaptation to the EU, following its accession to the then European Community in . The receipt of large amounts of EU ‘structural funds’ boosted its domestic economic growth. Greece’s external vulnerability was exposed again, however, with its difficulties in living with the demands of the ‘eurozone’ and the onset of the Greek debt crisis—a development that resonated with it being part of a ‘semiperiphery’ (Mouzelis, ).

These are ‘headline’ portrayals, indicative of a larger whole. Indeed, the causal linkages between these dimensions need to be kept in mind, as in fact, individual, cultural, and institutional features mesh together in system complementarities, to be discussed in Section .. First, the identifications made in this section need some selective elaboration.

. S-E

.................................................................................................................................. Seen within international comparison, the political economy of Greece has been denoted by its inherited statism, its flat pyramid of market actors (a plethora of small and very small business enterprises counterposed to relatively few large private firms and state-owned enterprises), its internal protectionism, and its ‘insider–outsider’ differentiation of social privileges. Modern Greece has exhibited a historical contradiction between its early adoption of political liberalism in its constitutional freedoms and elections and suffrage, on the one hand, and the lack of a social constituency for economic liberalism, with open and competitive domestic markets, on the other (Tsoukalas, ; Mouzelis, ). The definition of ‘liberal’ became context-specific. The contradiction was created by a nineteenth-century elite aspiration to be part of an avante-garde European modernity set against the reality of a poor, largely agrarian economy whose overall size was such as to put in doubt its long-term sustainability (Tsoucalas, ). Even with the geographical expansion of Greece—with the

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

incorporation of the Ionian Islands and Thessaly in the nineteenth century; Crete, the eastern Aegean Islands, southern Epirus, and Macedonia on the eve of the First World War; Western Thrace thereafter; and, finally, the Dodecanese in —its sustainability, let alone its cohesion, remained a relevant question. The state thus assumed a developmental role, responsible for ‘modernizing’ the economy so that it might meet domestic needs and face international competition (Pagoulatos, ; Chapter  here). The domestic market structure—of being a flat pyramid—did not prove to be one favourable to economic liberalism: notably, the few large firms had an interest in protectionism and barriers to entry, while the small lacked political voice (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). The economic impulse towards a developmental state spilled over into an internal protectionism, with heavy market regulation. And, the compatibility of interests between the public and the private spheres underscored a set of social norms and values that supported clientelism and, at times, corruption.

. T S   I

.................................................................................................................................. The notion of Greece having a ‘state tradition’, defining the relationship between the citizen and its institutions and placing the state above society, with its sectional interests, has been almost non-existent, especially by comparison to the republican tradition in France or the ‘Rechtstaat’ conception in Germany (Dyson, ). Traditionally, the expectation of favouritism and nepotism from those in public office has reinforced the ‘distrust of the state as an institution’; in contemporary Greece ‘loyalty is rarely accorded to national institutions’, but to human relationships (Legg, : , ). Like other Balkan societies, Greece has exhibited social encroachment on the state, with rent-seeking behaviour, seeking its spoils. Even before the imposition of austerity measures during the recent debt crisis, economic liberalism was an anathema, neo-liberalism a most potent political insult. The international indicators paint the picture of how this historical inheritance has impacted on the present. While the robustness of specific indicators may be questioned, the general picture is indicative. The heavy market regulation was evident in the World Bank’s index of the ‘Ease of Doing Business’: in , Greece ranked sixtyseventh in the world, below all other EU member states (bar Malta) and even Albania and Azerbaijan (World Bank, ). ‘Starting a business’ had become much easier (exceptionally, Greece ranked thirty-seventh) as the ‘bail-out’ interventions appeared to have an effect. But, on other, more specific scores, it ranked ninetieth in getting credit; one hundred and thirty-first in enforcing contracts; one hundred and thirtyfourth in resolving insolvency; and, one hundred and forty-fifth in registering a property. Such regulatory barriers took their toll: in the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Competitiveness Index’ for –, Greece was ranked eighty-seventh in the

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 

world, again the lowest of any EU member state. Before the crisis, Greece had ranked sixty-seventh (–). The modern Greek state adopted the Napoleonic model in its organization—with a system of administrative law; a centralized administration; and local prefects—though the sociopolitical conditions were not conducive to it achieving the efficiency or prestige of the French prototype (Spanou, : ). Increasingly, in recent times, political attention has focussed on the inability of state institutions to deliver public goods. Public administration in Greece has been widely identified as rigid, beset by a suffocating legalism; hierarchical and slow (with even small items requiring the signature of the minister); low-skilled and low-tech; suffering from low morale; lacking performance incentives; and, with many staff appointed via party clientelistic politics (see Dimitrakopoulos, ; Makrydemetres and Michalopoulos, ; Spanou and Sotiropoulos, ). Staff are not expected to be problem-solvers, but rather to implement rules for reasons of consistency (Dimitrakopoulos, ); and the lack of discretion reflects a lack of trust and obviates the need to incentivize innovative performance. Within the domestic society, few had an interest in a liberalism that might follow Anglo-Saxon notions of ‘freedom from the state’, carving out spheres of relative autonomy for enterprise. Clientelism, rentierism, and corruption suffused the operation of the public administration. Rothstein and Teorell () define the ‘quality of government’ as the impartiality of the state from such social pressures and, by that measure, Greece has scored low. In the post- regime, parties distributed the spoils of office in a new ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis, ; Mavrogordatos, ). PASOK was accused of suddenly filling some , posts and promising many others in a pre-election spree in  (Featherstone, ). Successive elections after  were fought around changing how the public administration performed. The discourse was of ‘catharsis’, ‘modernization’, and, the ‘re-foundation of the state’—each of them focussed on efficiency and a protection from social pressures. Yet, the World Bank’s ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ showed that in  Greece ranked twentyseventh amongst the twenty-eight EU member states on ‘government effectiveness’; twenty-eighth on ‘regulatory quality’; and, twenty-seventh on the ‘rule of law’.

. S  S

.................................................................................................................................. The social need was for the support and protection by the state and its resources channelled to a fragile economy that left many vulnerable to vicissitudes beyond their realm. Immigrants and refugees from Asia Minor after  were an overwhelming challenge for the state and society to accommodate. But, over a longer time span, many others were in need of support and craved petty privileges from any patron on the horizon.

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

Even in recent times, Greece failed to develop much in the way of welfare support. It has not developed a ‘welfare state’ in anything like the same vein as Western Europe, for example. With limited resources, the state found it cheaper to offer heavy legal protection for those in employment, especially in the public sector. The mobility of labour was circumscribed: those in-between jobs faced little state support. Public-sector unions, during the debt crisis, flexed their political strength to fight redundancies, in the knowledge that the unemployed received little compensation. Historically, state protection and support has displayed an insider–outsider differentiation, a ‘Janus’-like system. The ‘outsiders’ were those in temporary and irregular employment, in the informal sector and the unemployed (Katrougalos and Lazaridis, : ). The social regime was heavily skewed in its provisions: approximating Ferrera’s southern European model with ‘unparalleled peaks of generosity reserved for the protected core of the labour market’ on the one hand, and ‘vast gaps of protection’ on the other (Ferrera, : , ). As Matsaganis explores in Chapter , the social regime was ill-prepared for the crisis and it was forced to erase the ‘peaks’, with some lesser shifts of type of provision. Historically, these asymmetries were also reflected in the system of interest mediation. Lavdas has defined the post- regime as one of ‘disjointed corporatism’: one in which there was ‘a combination of a set of corporatist organizational features and a prevailing political modality that lacks diffuse reciprocity and remains incapable of brokering social pacts’ (: ). The enclaves of sectoral corporatism were ‘the result of mutations’ of the state corporatist model (:). Attempts at a ‘tripartite social dialogue’ in  and  were widely regarded as failures (Zambarloukou, : – and Chapter  here) and have not been repeated. The inability of this ‘disjointed corporatism’ to produce consensual outcomes was reflected in the relatively high level of strikes, pre-crisis. Comparative data are incomplete, but figures from the ILO indicate a difference in terms of the average number of workdays lost. In , Greece ranked fourth in the entire OECD area, in absolute terms; in , it came first; and, in , it was fifth. By way of comparison, across the same years, Portugal was th, th and nd, respectively. The Greek figures were also higher than those for Italy or Spain. The debt crisis from  onwards elicited widespread protests and strikes. There are no official figures for strikes in recent times and no ILO data to compare. Separate data from the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE, Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδας) the main union confederation, report that it organized twentyeight general strikes from May  to the end of  (mostly one-day); with, in addition,  sectoral-level strikes in  and  in , falling to  in ,  in , and ninety-seven in . This separate data is suggestive of a continuing problem of labour market conflict, with institutional structures militating against social consensus. The Greek state has a long history of legal intervention in labour relations, but also within the operation of trade unions, dating back to Venizelos in the s (Mavrogordatos, ). After , political parties (beyond the Communist Party)

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 

sought to strengthen their union links, both to expand their support and to control union activities. Indeed, under Andreas Papandreou’s leadership, this was one of PASOK’s earliest achievements. By contrast, despite its rise with the crisis, SYRIZA has struggled to emulate this level of engagement. The consequences for the upcoming period are unclear, but the politicization of the unions has become deeply-ingrained.

. T S   P S

.................................................................................................................................. The polarization of the party system itself has also been pronounced. A convergence towards the centre was most marked during the period of Costas Simitis as prime minister (–), defining a more moderate, social democracy for PASOK in a period when the opposition, New Democracy, had ameliorated its earlier flirtation with a (partial) neo-liberal programme. Before that, after  and into the s, party politics had been highly emotive and conflictual in a system of ‘extreme and polarized pluralism’ (Seferiades, ). Indeed, in the s and the s some of the election rallies in Athens often drew around a million in a flag-waving campaign shown live on state TV, with cameras and lights in helicopters above to record the extent of the massed crowds in the evening. Andreas Papandreou, in particular, had the rhetorical skills to create a rapport with such crowds, with highly polarizing speeches. A similar demonization of opponents (the elite ‘kleptocracy’) marked SYRIZA’s campaigning during the crisis, with critics characterizing its leader, Alexis Tsipras, as a firebrand and populist. Thus, with the interregnum of mostly the Simitis years, the party system has stood as polarized, undoubtedly one of the most such in Europe (Pappas, ; Ladner, ; Patkos, ). The post- system has been ‘modernized’ in the sense of having stronger political party organizations, and in earlier cleavages being supplanted, but the degree of conflict has been high. Within the context of the severe economic impacts of the debt crisis, a divided politics is hardly surprising. Thus, the  elections in Greece were calculated to be one of the most polarizing of the decade across Europe (Dalton, ), and those of  surely even more so. The debt crisis had certainly unleashed a new crisis politics. PASOK practically imploded, reduced to less than  per cent of the vote in the January  election. A new party system cleavage emerged: pro- or anti-Memorandum (‘Μνημόνιο’), in favour or opposing the successive bailout programmes. New Democracy crossed this axis, having opposed the first Memorandum in May , but then accepting the need for a second and joining a coalition government at the end of the following year (in November ). A small right-wing breakaway party from ND—the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS, Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός)—joined this broad coalition (headed by Professor Lucas Papademos), but then suffered electorally for having done so. Another right-wing party—the Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες)—made strange bedfellows with SYRIZA, when both came to power in January  opposing the bailouts. The rise of SYRIZA mirrored the decline of

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

PASOK: having received just . per cent of the vote in , SYRIZA won  per cent in January  and almost the same per cent in September . But, perhaps the most novel manifestation of the new crisis politics was a new street politics: the ‘Indignant Citizens Movement’ (Κίνημα Αγανακτισμένων Πολιτών) began organizing demonstrations across the country in May  (see Chapters  and ). This emulated the ‘Indignados’ movement that began in Spain the same month. A particular focus for the Athens protest was in Syntagma Square, opposite the parliament. While nationalists tended to congregate at the top of the square, leftists gathered at the lower end. The open and participatory format of the debates fostered by the latter were seen by their supporters as a manifestation of ancient Greek democracy and a fundamental challenge to the ruling elite. Critics saw them as an orgy of left-wing populism, which later led to SYRIZA’s rise to power. They were paralleled by separate street protests—indeed, riots, shown across the world’s TV screens. The new activism—especially on the part of an increasingly disaffected youth—stood in contrast to the tradition of weak social activism (Economides and Monastiriotis, ). Moreover, the crisis unleashed a wider cultural politics of austerity impacting on conceptions of identity (Tziovas ).

. T S   C

.................................................................................................................................. Indeed, to some, the crisis seemed likely to represent the ‘nemesis’ of the post- system. The denuded resources of the government and the conditions imposed by the three ‘bailouts’ would emasculate the old ‘party-state’, with its clientelism and corruption. Karamanlis had taken Greece into the European Community, in part, to modernize the country, and Simitis later also promoted ‘Europeanization’ as ‘modernization’. Public support in Greece for the EU by the mid-s into the new century was one of the highest to be found anywhere. This was also a period in which the economic growth rate in Greece was second only to that of Ireland, lauded as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. The two dimensions seemed to be related. The onset of the crisis changed that: Greece experienced the biggest fall in support for the EU ever recorded by the ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys of the European Commission. By , Greek perceptions of the EU were the most negative of any country (only  per cent were ‘positive’, down from  per cent in ). Greece formally exited its ‘Third Economic Adjustment Programme’ on  August . An EU deal the previous June was set to ease Greece’s debt situation: it would have very low repayments until after . At the same time, Greece’s fiscal discretion would be severely curtailed: it was to be kept to maintaining a primary government surplus equivalent to . per cent of GDP up to  and then . per cent until . Critics saw this as stymieing her economic recovery, keeping growth rates lower than necessary. But the debt provisions seemed likely to keep Greece out of Europe’s financial headlines.

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 

While the conditionality of the bail-out programmes—and their monitoring by the ‘Troika’ and, later, the ‘institutions’ (the European Stability Mechanism joined the EU Commission and the European Central Bank from the third rescue package in )— was certainly intrusive, how far they tackled problems in the domestic system remained open to serious doubt. Between  and , the bailouts prompted some liberalization of product markets; strengthened tax revenue services; revised company law; reduced the costs of the pension system on the state; engendered some, albeit incomplete, internal reforms of public administration; and, encouraged the privatization of state assets (see Chapter  in this volume; also Featherstone ). But across each of these areas, both the EU and the OECD urged Greece to make much more progress after . Despite the reforms to the public sector, it still lacked a proper system of ‘performance-related’ pay; clientelistic appointments continued under successive governments, including SYRIZA; the privatizations of public enterprises remained limited and contested; and, universities remained, more or less, as distant as ever from audits of performance and the economic needs of the domestic market. The external constraint of the bailouts had involved an unprecedented reform effort—the pace of Greece’s reform effort was ahead of the rest of the OECD on the latter’s supply-side agenda between  and  (OECD, )—but their frenzied nature belied some shallowness of institutional impact. Soon after the first ‘bail-out’ of , there was a lack of political ownership of the mandated reforms. Resistance to the reforms—severe as they were—kindled political opportunism on the part of the main opposition party and a recurrent public sense of victimhood. The reform agenda was not owned domestically—unlike in Ireland or Portugal. Successive bailout programmes seemed clumsily crafted and too severe: their impositional nature further militated against a domestic sense of assuming ownership of a programme or model for the future.

. S C  I

.................................................................................................................................. The identification of the Greek case across the different comparative frames noted above prompts a discussion of the domestic system’s complementarities and imbalances. This can serve to indicate both the resilience of the system—its deep endogeneities—and its vulnerabilities in the face of new challenges. Both are relevant to an assessment of its reform capacity. The foregoing has signalled the superiority of partisan and sectional interests over institutions, crafting institutional outputs to their priorities and advantage. Papakostas () draws a telling contrast with Sweden: the latter had developed strong and relatively efficient state institutions prior to the onset of universal suffrage and partisan mobilization; the reverse was effectively the case in Greece, where the separation of

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

politics from other spheres was far weaker. The meshing of interests has had consequences for Greece’s reform capacity. Drawing upon the notion of ‘institutional complementarities’ in the comparative political economy literature, ‘one set of institutions may be said to be complementary to another when its presence raises the return available from the other’ (Hall and Gingerich, : ; Hall and Soskice, ). Adapted to our focus here, the premise is that reforms in one sphere may have limited yield if unaccompanied by parallel reforms in other spheres. Moreover, complementarities provoke ‘a particular politics of institutional defence’ (Hall and Gingerich, : ). The cross-sector complementarities in Greece are readily apparent, with intuitive causal linkages. The heavy state regulation of markets has provided barriers to entry that serve the interests of political leaders appealing to the few large players in the domestic market (and vice versa); the weakness of state institutions rests, in significant part, on the prevalence of clientelism; the clientelistic habits of parties (the ‘partitocracy’) has squeezed the space for civil society institutions (apart from the longerestablished Church); the peaks and gaps of social policy provision reflect the insider– outside differentiation of the power of trade unions, etc.; and, as elsewhere, low trust and income inequality promote political polarization (Grechyna, ). Little wonder, then, that before and into the crisis Greece appeared ‘une société bloquée’ (Featherstone,  and ). The reform capacity of the system well into the crisis seemed low, inimical to a ‘game-changing’ moment or transformation.

. S S, D S

.................................................................................................................................. In highlighting the subversion of institutions and regulations for particularistic networks and institutions, something akin to Ernest Gellner’s concept of a ‘segmentary society’ comes to mind (Gellner, ). Indeed, Veremis () has argued that, from the beginning, the Modern Greek state reflected such a society. This is a concept of a (pre-modern) society where extreme familism, splinter groups, and clans stand against modernization, subverting state institutions and penetrating governments, militating against the formation of a civil society (Koliopoulos and Veremis, : ). It is a different dimension from the class-based politics of an industrializing society. Like the US, modern Greece at the time of its creation lacked an aristocracy and it also embraced liberal rights (Hartz, ). But whilst the US sought limited and decentralized government, in the name of freedom, Greece needed a strong state to integrate the nation and to build up its resources. To overcome their vulnerabilities, Greeks sought to capture those resources, disavowing a wider socio-economic liberalism, in the name of protecting familial and personal networks. There is a link here with the fusion of the public and the private, the nepotistic and clientelistic aspects of a neo-Sultanistic

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

 

leadership model of power, as identified by Diamandouros (, ). But the notion of being segmentary can also be expanded, in the present day, to cover the asymmetries and exclusions of its political economy and social provisions, with the barriers to consensus or coordination already noted. This is a case very distant from that of a ‘liberal’ or ‘coordinated market economy’ (Hall and Soskice, ). The segmentary society lay behind the trappings of a largely political modernity and was managed by a relatively small, mostly western-oriented, elite. As an early ‘late modernizer’ (Lipset ; see Chapter  of this volume), it struggled to catch up with its key référentiels: the ‘West’, ‘Europe’. The ambition was greater than its seeming capacity. A ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie in Athens drew upon foreign financing to develop sectors such as banking, commerce, and shipping (Mouzelis, : –). Greece lacked autonomy in its economic progress: a core-periphery theme underscores much of its development (Tsoukalas, ; Mouzelis, ). Consistent with earlier modernization theory, it was a penetrated system divided in how it responded to the outside world. This is a syndrome that can be extended: a semi-peripheral state has a skewed economic development; its state institutions are weak and encroached upon; its peculiar class-structure and ‘insider–outsider’ exclusions sustain a segmentary society; and, a recurring external vulnerability reinforces a domestic cultural dualism over how Greece should, or should not, adapt. The adaptation gap is, once again, a pronounced one with the EU and the debt bail-outs. At the same time, the gap itself reflects the absence of those domestic conditions most conducive to its amelioration. Analytically, there is a risk here of adding too many conditions that appear to cause the blockages to reform and to over-emphasize their relative importance. The debt crisis is still in the present. It has created uncertainty and it may yet prompt a more profound domestic response to overcome old practices and shibboleths. The scope for change may be enlarged beyond the over-deterministic picture suggested above. The question is, thus, when and how the system changes or reforms. As Kalyvas has argued (see Chapter ), as a small and vulnerable nation, Greece’s past progress has often depended on benign foreign intervention. In the present, breaking through the domestic logjam still appears most likely with the appropriate external intervention and support. Domestic reform leaders need external support—a long-term feature of the ‘weak state, strong society’ syndrome mentioned earlier. For its part, the eurozone in its  deal for Greece exhibited a scepticism that future Greek governments would stick with the intended reforms, while putting in place fiscal strictures that sustained the assumption that Greece will repay its loans. The latter assumption appears not only draconian, but self-defeating. Further, the fiscal constraints do little to abate the opposition to reform or to make longer-term adjustments easier. Thus, this semiperipheral, segmented, divided society with weak state institutions that struggle to deliver may be trapped in its post-crisis trajectory—caught in an expectations– capability gap, one that straddles both the domestic and European levels. As such, it is a case that once again speaks to a larger agenda: enabling us to understand matters of wider European import—what appears at present as the less than benign norms and operation of its current EU patron.

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:  



. C

.................................................................................................................................. The sketch offered here serves as an introduction to the more detailed analyses that follow in this volume, enabling a variety of readers to access them against a common background. It could not be a full overview of the range of topics covered across all chapters; rather, it has been selective and has sought to establish certain structural contours, as reference points. A modern political system does not have a singular definition, but a set of features that help the reader deal with its complexity. In offering a comparative perspective, this chapter has strived to overcome the temptation to assert a Greek exceptionalism, a risk with a single-country focus. Comparative frames allow a case to be identified alongside others, providing a point of entry and a basis for further exploration of conditions that were critical, as opposed to merely contextual—to avoid overloading the hypothesis. The discussion here has sought to identify when and how Greece might be a relevant case in a comparative research ‘puzzle’. In J. S. Mill’s terms, for example, a divergent case with a similar outcome or a similar case with a contrasting conclusion. Overall, the volume is an exploration of a system that continues to be relevant on a larger canvas: in its structural features, a case by which to compare, inter alia, ‘semiperipherality’; an incomplete ‘modernity’; a southern European capitalism and welfare regime; limited reform capacity with weak institutions and social capture; and, crisis and post-crisis politics. Indeed, identifying Greece remains a rich resource for comparative research.

REFERENCES Allison, G. and Nicolaidis, K. (). The Greek Paradox: Promise vs Performance. Cambridge, MA: Centre for Science and International Affairs. Amable, B. (). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press. Beaton, R. (). Greece: Biography of a Modern Nation. London: Allen Lane. Clogg, R. (). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Couloumbis, T. (). The US, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle. Westport, CT: Praeger. Dalton, R. J. (). ‘Party System Polarization Index for CSES Modules –’. Available at: http://www.cses.org/datacenter/usercommunity/usercommunity.htm/ (accessed  January ). Diamandouros, N. (). ‘Ελληνισμός και Ελληνικότητα’ [Hellenism and Greeknes]. In Tsaousis, D. (ed.) Ελληνισμός - Ελληνικότητα’ [Hellenism and Greekness] Athens: Estia, –. Diamandouros, N. (). Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios y Investigaciones. Diamandouros, N. (). ‘Politics, Culture, and the State: Background to the Greek Crisis’. In Anastasakis, O. and Singh, D. (eds.) Reforming Greece: Sisyphean Task or Herculean Challenge? Oxford: South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX).

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Diamandouros, N. (). ‘Postscript: Cultural Dualism Revisited’. In Triandafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., and Kouki, H. (eds.) The Greek Crisis and European Modernity. London: Palgrave, –. Dimitrakopoulos, D. (). ‘Learning and Steering: Changing Implementation Patterns and the Greek Central Government’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Dyson, K. (). State Tradition in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press. Economides, S. and Monatiriotis, V. (). The Return of Street Politics? Essays on the December Riots in Greece. London School of Economics Research, The Hellenic Observatory. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The “Party-State” in Greece and the Fall of Papandreou’. West European Politics,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘Introduction’. West European Politics, Special Issue: The Challenge of Modernisation—Politics and Policy in Greece. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The JCMS Annual Lecture: The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’, Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘External Conditionality and the Debt Crisis: The ‘Troika’ and Public Administration Reform in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). The Limits of Europeanization. Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. M. (). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press. Ferrera, M. (). ‘The Southern Model of Welfare States in Social Europe’. Journal of European Social Policy,  (): –. Gellner, E. (). Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and its Rivals. London: Hamish Hamilton. Graziano, P. and Vink, M. (). Europeanization: New Research Agendas. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Grechyna, D. (). ‘On the Determinants of Political Polarization’. Economic Letters, , Issue C: –. Hall, P. A. and Gingerich, D. W. (). ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy’. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. . Hall, P. A. and Soskice, J. (). Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press. Hartz, L. (). The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt. Herzfeld, M. (). The Social Production of Indifference: Explaining the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Katrougalos, G. and Lazaridis, G. (). Southern European Welfare States: Problems, Challenges, and Prospects. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Katzenstein, P. J. (). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Koliopoulos, J. and Veremis, T. (). Modern Greece: A History since . Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Ladner, A. (). ‘The Polarization of the European Party Systems—New Data, New Approach, New Results’, ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, September. Lavdas, K. A. (). The Europeanization of Greece. Interest Politics and Crises of Integration. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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

Legg, K. R. (). Politics in Modern Greece. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lijphart, A. (). ‘Consociational Democracy: Types of Western Democratic Systems’. World Politics,  (): –. Lipset, S. M. (). The Social Bases of Politics. New York City: Doubleday and Company. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of “Bureaucratic Clientelism”?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). Μεταξύ Πιτυοκάμπτη και Προκρούστη: Οι επαγγελματικές οργανώσεις στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα [Between Pitiokamptis and Procroustis: Professional Associations in Today’s Greece] Athens: Odysseas. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). ‘From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Makrydemetres, A. and Michalopoulos, N. (). Expert Essays on the Public Administration –. Athens: Papazisi. Migdal, J. S. (). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Milton, G. (). Paradise Lost: Smyrna . New York City: Basic Books Molina, O. and Rhodes, M. (). ‘Conflict, Complementarities and Institutional Change in Mixed Market Economies’. In Hancke, R., Rhodes, M. and M. Thatcher (eds.) Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complimentarities in the European Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mouzelis, N. (). ‘Class and Clientelistic Politics in Greece: The Case of Greece. The Sociological Review,  (): –. Mouzelis, N. (). Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouzelis, N. and Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece’. Athens: AUEB Discussion Paper. OECD (). ‘Economic Policy Reforms  - Going for Growth Interim Report’. Paris: OECD. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance, and Growth from Postwar to EMU. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Papakostas, A. (). ‘Why is There no Clientelism in Scandinavia?’ In Piattoni, S. et al. (eds) Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparatve Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, –. Pappas, T. (). Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Paraskevopoulos, C. J. (). ‘Social Capital and Public Policy in Greece’. GreeSE—Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe , Hellenic Observatory, LSE. Patkos, V. (). ‘Measuring Country-level Partisanship with ESS Data—a New Approach’. Third International ESS Conference, –th July, Lausanne, Switzerland. Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (). ‘What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions’. Governance,  (): –. Schmidt, V. A. (). Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seferiades, S. (). ‘Polarization and Non-Proportionality: The Greek Party System in the Postwar Era’. Comparative Politics,  (): –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-Authoritarian Greece’. In Psomiadis, H. and Thomadakis, S. B. (eds) Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order. New York City: Pella Publishing.

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  .............................................................................................................

THE FRAME .............................................................................................................

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  ......................................................................................................................

             

......................................................................................................................

 . 

. I: T G P

.................................................................................................................................. W the great Greek crisis broke out in earnest in , a well-known New York Times editorialist reminded his readers of the long catalogue of disasters experienced by the modern Greek state during the twentieth century: ‘Let’s begin with the wars of – that wrested northern Greece from Ottoman control. Then came the massive population exchange, or ‘ethnic cleansing’, negotiated at Lausanne in  under which about , Muslims were forced to move from Greece to Turkey and at least . million Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey to Greece. That upheaval was followed by the s’ dictatorship of General Metaxas; the brutal German occupation of –; and a devastating civil war in the late s that bequeathed an ideological struggle between Left and Right whose visceral quality endures. The rightist military dictatorship of – that rounded up and exiled leftists fanned the embers of the civil war. The ongoing conflict with Turkey over Cyprus, involving its own ‘population exchanges’, ensures the memory of  has not been entirely laid to rest. Greece, Cohen () concluded, ‘has had an awful past century’. The litany of Greece’s failures was echoed in varying versions by many commentators and served as a convenient explanatory shortcut for Greece’s travails. Although this assessment can be easily criticized on grounds of superficiality, it is not fundamentally incorrect. The disasters Cohen enumerates are all too real, unfortunately. Indeed, its intuition is refined and driven home more rigorously by two economic historians, Carmen M. Reinhart and Chirstoph Trebesch, who state (: ), that ‘the history of Greece is a narrative of debt, default, and external dependence’, a paradigmatic failure that ‘serves as a broader precautionary note for other countries that are “addicted” to foreign savings’ (Reinhart and Trebesch, : ).

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

 . 

However, the accounts of Greece’s exemplary failures raise a striking puzzle. If Greece’s modern history is the kind of unqualified chain of disasters highlighted by these observers and scholars, how can we explain the fact that even after almost a decade of crisis and an a concomitantly enormous GDP loss, Greece still manages to rank among the top forty countries worldwide on a broad number of indicators tracking its level of economic and political development? To wit, in  Greece ranked thirty-first on the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), twenty-ninth on the  Social Progress Index, and thirty-seventh on the  Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) of V-Dem. In , during the crisis’s darkest moments, the Economist Intelligence Unit placed Greece in the thirty-fourth place on the list of countries in which it would be best to be born. In short, although Greece could have performed better, it is clear that its serial failures have not resulted in the kind of systemic failure one would naturally have expected. Why? The reason is that alongside the ‘Greek failures’ narrative, there exists another story, one that is both counterintuitive and much less well known. It is best captured in a passage written by world-famous historian William H. McNeil during the s. He noted that ‘if satisfaction of human wants and aspirations is taken as the criterion, then the development of Greece across the last thirty years must be viewed as an extraordinary success story. Things that seemed impossible in  have in fact come true for millions of individual Greeks.’ He went on to conclude that ‘the metamorphosis of human life that has been taking place is without historic parallel in Greece’s past. It has affected the entire population within a single generation’ (McNeill, : ). To reconcile these two narratives, namely the dominant tale of failure and the less known one of success, I propose a historical interpretation of the Greek developmental trajectory that draws from, and revises a neo-Marxist political economy literature formulated primarily during the s and s and builds on recent studies that focus more on domestic institutional processes (Kalyvas, ). The former, inspired by the dependency school of thought, stress the ‘semi-peripheral’ position of Greece in the global economy and explain its persistently backward status by way of its dependence on dominant foreign powers (Amin and Vergopoulos, ; Mouzelis, ; Tsoukalas, ). In contrast, a more recent research stream has highlighted the domestic institutional constraints to development (Pagoulatos, ; Dertilis, ; Iordanoglou, ; Kostis, ). My account extends, qualifies, and adapts these recent insights into an overarching, coherent argument.

. U  P

.................................................................................................................................. The essence of my account is the description of Greece as an ‘early late modernizer’. To borrow Seymour Martin Lipset’s () felicitous formulation, Greece was one of the first ‘new nations’ to appear in Europe’s periphery, establishing itself as an independent state well before the bulk of contemporary postcolonial nations emerged out of the

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      



decolonization process. As such, it faced the considerable challenges of nation- and state-building early on, while embarking on an the ambitious, trail-blazing political project of ‘modernization’. In other words, like postcolonial states, Greece was a late modernizer, but it preceded most of them. The ‘early late-modernizer’ lens allows us to make sense of an intriguing observation advanced by the historian Mark Mazower (), who argues that for the past two hundred years, ‘Greece has been at the forefront of Europe’s evolution’, where it has ‘paved the way for Europe’s future’. Mazower bases his claim on five episodes of Greek history. First is the Greek War of Independence in the s, which ‘became an early symbol of escape from the prison house of empire’ and introduced a ‘radically new combination of constitutional democracy and ethnic nationalism’ that ‘spread across the continent, culminating in the First World War’. Second is the mass population displacement of the early s, which was the largest organized refugee movement in history up to that point, serving as ‘a model that the Nazis and others would point to later for dis-placing peoples in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and India’. Third is the resistance to the Nazis during World War II, which was among the most visible such efforts. Fourth is the Greek Civil War, which became the ‘frontline of the Cold War’. And, fifth, is Greece’s democratization in , which ‘prefigured the global democratisation wave of the s and s, first in South America and Southeast Asia and then in Eastern Europe’. Although Mazower is right to highlight these internationally pioneering dimensions of Greece’s historical trajectory, he does not provide an explanation for why it might have been so, nor does he link this ‘pioneering narrative’ to the tale of Greece’s constant failures. I argue, instead, that it is the early late-modernizer dimension of modern Greek history that helps us make sense of both its significant successes and its devastating failures; it does so through a key dimension: their international impact, both in terms of the attention, but also action they provoked. To understand exactly how, we must return to Reinhart’s and Trebesch’s () account. Their -year overview of the Greek cycles of debt and default highlights four episodes of external sovereign default following which the country lost access to external borrowing: in  Greece defaulted on the loans that financed the Greek war for independence; in , it defaulted for the second time on loans raised to finance infrastructure construction and military build-up; in , it defaulted as a result of the economic shock caused by the Great Depression; and lastly, although in  it did not default technically, it was unable to refinance its debt, thus losing market access. It turns out, a point missed by Reinhart and Trebesch, that these four default episodes are broadly associated with four major modernizing projects: Greece’s bid for independence, its bid for infrastructural capacity, its bid for institutional and economic modernization, and its bid for monetary stability. Each default was followed by an external bailout. For Reinhart and Trebesch, these bailouts underscore the country’s political dependence on foreign powers: ‘in each of the four default episodes in Greece’, they note (: –), ‘foreign governments stepped in with “rescue” loans, typically in the form of tranches that were conditional on achieving certain fiscal or reform targets. Foreign governments also succeeded with

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

 . 

their demand to impose fiscal and economic policies that assured primary surpluses and a steady flow of debt servicing to private and official creditors abroad.’ While this observation is correct, it underplays two crucial dimensions. First, these bailouts helped preserve an important part of what had been gained from the initial borrowing, namely formal independence, infrastructural and military capacity, modernized institutions, and eurozone membership. Without these bailouts, Greece would have arguably suffered much greater damage. Second, precisely because they entailed external pressure, these bailouts put the country on a trajectory of fiscal discipline that was necessary for the country to launch subsequent ambitious projects. Along with grants (like the Marshall Plan), these bailouts help explain how Greece was ultimately able to reach its present top- global position despite what was a very inauspicious beginning as a backwards Ottoman province devoid of capital and resources. In short, for all its obvious drawbacks, the external dependence induced by the foreign bailouts was not the unmitigated negative outcome assumed by Reinhart and Trebesch. It is true that long debt overhangs perpetuated external dependence and impeded a ‘fresh start’ for Greece, yet it is also the case that a ‘fresh start’ of that kind ran the risk of causing perhaps insurmountable, deterioration of the country’s institutions and living conditions. Take the example of the  crisis: although debt relief is often associated with higher subsequent growth compared to softer forms of debt relief like maturity extensions (Reinhart and Trebesch, : ), the kind of massive debt relief that Greece needed was not a politically palatable option in . Absent debt relief, Greece faced the prospect of outright sovereign default followed by economic collapse of the kind experienced by Argentina in . Furthermore, Greece’s dearth of domestic capital and significant natural commodities would have likely deprived it of the rebound experienced by Argentina. As things stand, Greece was able to obtain a softer form of debt relief through maturity extensions and low interest rates, though at a level that failed to meet its preferences. Neither a ‘fresh start’, nor a catastrophic collapse, in other words. In short, both Reinhart and Trebesch’s ‘four defaults and bailouts’ and Mazower’s ‘five breakthroughs that paved Europe’s future’ combine important insights with obvious limitations. As such, they pave the way for the formulation of a historical interpretation of Greece’s developmental trajectory that takes into account both (a) failures as well as successes, and (b) political as well as economic cycles. More specifically, the interpretation I put forward calls for two analytical moves. First, I combine the economic boom and bust cycles highlighted by Reinhart and Trebesch with a series of parallel and partially overlapping political boom and bust cycles. Second, I link the internationally pioneering dimension of the Greek modernization projects highlighted by Mazower with the critical consequences of international bailouts. The theoretical ‘glue’ that binds these two analytical moves is the description of Greece as an ‘early late-modernizer’. As one of the early ‘new nations’ on the European stage, Greece attempted a number of highly visible and risky modernization leaps intended to reduce the gap that separated it from the more advanced states of the continent. Predictably, these leaps and their failures generated considerable

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      



international attention, a fact that helps explain the major bailouts that followed in the wake of their failure. An exercise in ‘inductive fitting’ meant to operate as a heuristic tool, the interpretation proposed herein disaggregates modern Greek history into seven, intertwined, political and economic ‘boom, bust, and bailout’ cycles. I discuss each of them briefly. Two caveats are in place here. First, describing the Greek developmental trajectory as successful overall does not imply of course that Greece has performed well across every dimension. Being among a top- state is consistent with a variety of shortcomings. Second, this interpretation remains a hypothesis requiring additional confirmation. It can be further refined to stress the role of domestic elites and domestic reform coalitions that helped turn ‘busts’ into ‘booms’.

.. Seven Booms The history of the modern Greek state is characterized by its unrelenting focus on the twin related goals of modernization and westernization. Each cycle begins with the articulation and implementation of a very ambitious modernizing project—one that often struck contemporary observers as being highly unrealistic. Nevertheless, the proponents of these projects were able to generate enough enthusiasm to launch them. Initially, these projects met with success, thus garnering more domestic and international approval and support. . The first of these projects was the conception and creation of an independent Greek state which got off to an auspicious start in , despite an adverse international environment dominated by the status-quo oriented Concert of Vienna and a dreadful military balance of forces with the Ottoman Empire. This auspicious start generated considerable popular enthusiasm among European publics who saw in the Greek War of Independence a romantic rebirth of an ancient civilization. Official support soon emerged in Great Britain where it also took the form of access to substantial loans for the fledging Greek cause (Dakin, ). . The second project, begun immediately after independence was achieved, consisted of the construction of a modern-style European state that stood in stark contrast to the Ottoman institutions and practices that had held sway in this part of the world for almost four centuries. This new state aimed to forge a cohesive nation, a task made even harder by the extensive destruction caused by the War of Independence, the effective lack of a centralized state authority following its conclusion (expressed, among other things, in the assassination of Greece’s first head of state), and the financial default of . Despite this inauspicious beginning, western-style institutions were quickly designed by Bavarian statebuilders, the central state was able to assert its authority, a cohesive nation was formed, and a parliamentary system accompanied by quasi-universal male

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suffrage soon followed on. This fledging state was also able to expand territorially without having to fight wars (Skopetea, ). The third project, popularly known as the ‘Great Idea’, was initially formulated during the nineteenth century but forcefully and effectively executed in the first two decades of the twentieth century, following a few false starts. Greece sought to expand territorially and become the powerhouse of the Balkans. This goal was fulfilled in considerable part in the wake of stunning military victories achieved during the Balkan wars of –, when Greece was able to double its territory (Mazower, ). The fourth project, launched during the interwar years on the heels of Greece’s Anatolian defeat, began with the integration of more than one million refugees who arrived in the country following the Greco-Turkish War of –, and focused on institutional and economic modernization. The Greek state launched a massive and highly successful land reform programme that entailed the redistribution of about  per cent of all arable land in the country, creating some , small family farms; By ,  per cent of all rural households owned the land they cultivated, turning Greece into a nation of small property-owning peasants; between  and , Greece implemented a vigorous ‘developmentalist’ programme driven by the newly founded Bank of Greece (in ) and the Agricultural Bank of Greece (in ) (Hirschon, ; Mavrogordatos, ). The fifth project, launched in the midst of the still-smoking ruins inherited from the Second World War and the Greek Civil War, consisted of a great economic leap forward, a bid to turn Greece into an economically developed nation on a par with its western European counterparts. It was a wildly successful project, as the country achieved unprecedented rates of growth. Between  and , the economy attained average yearly growth rates of . per cent; between  and , Greece grew at an astounding average of . per cent, placing the country among the top economic achievers globally (McNeill, ; Pagoulatos, ; Fragiadis, ). The sixth project was the successful management of the transition from the autocratic regime of the Colonels to democracy in  and the establishment of modern, fully inclusive democratic and liberal political institutions, matching those of Western Europe, which Greece aspired to join as a full member of the European Economic Community (EEC). Both transition and accession met with full success (Diamandouros, ; Karamouzi, ). Lastly, the seventh project was the bid towards full economic integration within the most advanced economies of Europe, during the opening of the twenty-first century via the adoption of the euro in , a goal initially crowned with success as the Greek economy stabilized and returned to growth. Greece’s borrowing costs dropped from . per cent of GDP in the mid-s to  per cent of GDP in the mid-s and the country averaged an annual growth rate of . per cent between  and , the second highest in the eurozone and twice the rate of the average eurozone member country (Kazakos, ). The Athens  Olympic Games were an expression of unbridled optimism about the future.

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

All these projects shared a common overarching objective: to unleash Greece from the shackles of history and geography. Underscoring this visceral desire, was the fiercely held belief that Greece ‘belonged to the West’ and had to reclaim its rightful place among western European nations. Nevertheless, the likelihood that any of these projects could succeed initially struck observers as rather faint. The concept of a Greek independent state hatched by diaspora communities of merchants and intellectuals and influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution reeked of romantic delusion; the idea of a modern, western-European-style state emerging in one of the most backward provinces of the Ottoman Empire seemed just bizarre; the prospect of Greece turning into the powerhouse of the Balkans was closer to dream than reality; the idea that Greece could acquire modern political and economic institutions sounded like an impossibility—and so did rapid economic development in the aftermath of a terribly destructive occupation and civil war; as was the establishment of liberal, democratic institutions in the aftermath of a dictatorship or the country’s ability to thrive within the eurozone. Yet, defying the odds, most of these projects ultimately met with considerable success—which is not to say, of course, that they were fully or optimally realized. What is more, the road to success was tortuous and passed through catastrophic failure.

.. Seven Busts Greece’s modernizing ambition outstripped its capacity. In spite of the strength and vigour with which these modernizing projects had been articulated and pursued, they were all part of an elite vision that got little initial traction within Greek society. Where elites overestimated their capacity, the great majority of ordinary people, initially at least, remained either indifferent to this vision or were openly hostile to it; they did not partake in, or even understand, these grand projects, which were often disruptive of traditional practices and demanded exceptional sacrifices. Typically, the costs were immediate and the benefits future and uncertain. Even when these projects were eventually embraced by the population at large, they overtaxed its capacity beyond what was often reasonable to expect. As a result, they met with considerable pushback, limiting the capacity of modernizing elites to deliver what they had envisioned. It was thus that outsize ambition bred equally outsize disaster. Indeed, every boom was followed by a catastrophic bust that seemed to totally doom the entire project. . Despite its initial success, the War of Independence was militarily defeated as a result of both internecine war and, especially, a successful Ottoman counterinsurgency. By , only a few islands of resistance persisted and the cause seemed all but lost (Dakin, ). . State-building during the nineteenth century was a patchy affair at the very best. The state was perpetually poor and weak; its monopoly of violence was

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challenged by persistent banditry and elections were often tampered with. The main modernizing thrust, led by the reformist Harilaos Trikoupis during the s, ended with a massive sovereign default in  followed by international receivership (Koliopoulos, ; Dertilis, ). The territorial expansion of Greece, embodied in the so-called ‘Great Idea’ hit a wall for the first time in , when Greece’s army collapsed in a humiliating way during a poorly planned and insanely ambitious war against the Ottoman Empire. But it was the Anatolian debacle of  that signalled its termination; it was then that the Greek presence in Asia Minor ended with the forced departure of over one million Greeks from their ancestral homes (Divani, ; Kontogiorgi, ). The modernization effort undertaken during the interwar period under the leadership of the great reformer Eleftherios Venizelos, was cut short by the Great Depression, which produced yet one more sovereign default in , followed by considerable social unrest. The advent of an authoritarian regime in , the brutal occupation of Greece by Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria in , and a destructive civil war until  seemed to suggest that Greece was caught in a vicious and intractable conflict and poverty trap (Mavrogordatos, ; Kalyvas and Marantzides, ). The post-war developmental take-off was almost nipped in the bud by a communist insurgency and became eventually tainted by the exclusionary politics that followed its conclusion; what is worse, it ended in military autocracy in  (Nikolakopoulos, ; Hatzivassiliou, ). The democratic institutions that emerged following the collapse of the military regime in  were soon perverted by populist rent-seeking and abetted by a growing stream of EEC transfers that acted as a resource curse. The combination of overborrowing, inflation, and economic stagnation almost caused an economic collapse during the early s (Pappas, ; Siani-Davies, ). Greece’s membership in the eurozone led to the  financial crisis. Greece’s deficit and debt skyrocketed leading to marked panic. As a result, the country lost market access, becoming unable to refinance its debt. Faced with the prospect of a catastrophic default, it was forced to accept a draconian bailout co-supervised by the European Union and the IMF. With its economy in shock mode and its politics upended, it looked as if the country was about to crash out of the eurozone and plunge into chaos (Siani-Davies, ; Meghir et al., ).

Writing about Greece’s post-war economic leap, William McNeill (: ) pointed out that ‘for nearly all of the people involved, whatever has been lost or thrust to the margins of life, while sometimes regretted, does not begin to counterbalance the gains’. Although McNeill was referring to traditions lost on the path to development, it is possible to generalize his observation to all seven projects: despite the disastrous busts, many of the gains made during the booms were preserved. This critical observation is often lost in the failure narrative.

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

Consider the record: despite its military defeat in the War of Independence, Greece emerged as an independent state––the first one in the Balkans. The initial statebuilding efforts may have looked pathetically inadequate, leading to a Potemkin Village–style state, but they did lay the foundations for a functioning state, a cohesive nation, and a surprisingly inclusive parliamentary democracy. Greece might have failed to replace the new Ottoman Empire as the regional hegemon as some of its most ambitious leaders had imagined, but it did double its territory and became a more viable state. Its Anatolian adventure, a classic example of misguided territorial overreach if ever there was one, ended in disaster and human tragedy, but it also rejuvenated the country through the infusion of a large, dynamic, hard-working refugee population, and refocused its energy toward institution-building, social reform, and industrialization, rather than territorial aggrandisement. The ambitious modernization effort undertook during the interwar period was clipped by economic depression, world war, and civil war, but it bequeathed significant infrastructural improvements that set the stage for the post-war take-off. The Civil War caused terrible bloodshed and material destruction but, alone among all its Balkan neighbours, Greece avoided the calamity of communism. The advent of the Cold War contributed to the formation and maintenance of an exclusionary political regime, but it also kick-started Greece’s remarkable leap out of economic backwardness and poverty. The democratization and liberalization of the country’s political institutions following the collapse of the military regime may have paved the way for the advent of populist politics and appalling rent-seeking institutions, but they also guaranteed the emergence of stable democratic politics along with unprecedented freedom and inclusion for all. It was the democratic transition that also paved the way for Greece’s accession to the European Community. In turn, Greece’s participation in the process of European integration and the adoption of the common European currency did exacerbate the domestic distortions of Greece’s political and economic institutions, leading to the  crisis. However, it was the European integration process that also made possible an era of unprecedented prosperity and future promise. Overall, the busts failed to destroy Greece’s modernization projects.

.. Seven Bailouts What explains this outcome? The answer, I argue, is that every instance of major bust was matched by an equally major international bailout. To use Michael Llewellyn Smith’s (: xiv) eloquent point: ‘The contrast between the greatness of Greece’s ambitions and the poverty of her resources put a special premium on outside support.’ Again, consider the record: . As soon as the Greek rebellion petered out, Greece was rescued by the Great Powers of the day (Great Britain, Russia, and France). Their decisive military intervention resulted in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet in the naval battle of

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. .

. .

Navarino in  and the end of the Ottoman counter-insurgency campaign; along with a Russian land attack in , this intervention forced the hand of the reluctant Ottomans, imposing the recognition of the Greek rebels into an independent state (Bass, ; Rodogno, ). The establishment of the new state’s institutions was assisted by foreign missions, including the Bavarian regency, while foreign-policy disasters were often mitigated by favourable international interventions. Indeed, by aligning itself with the Great Powers in opportune times, Greece was able to expand territorially without having to fire a shot, first by acquiring the Ionian Islands from Britain in  and then by annexing the agriculturally rich region of Thessaly in  (Koliopoulos and Veremis, ). The foreign financial control imposed in the late s following Greece’s military defeat and sovereign default helped avert a more catastrophic collapse and contributed to the reform of Greek fiscal and military institutions that paved the way for the victorious outcome in the Balkan wars (Dertilis, ). Foreign humanitarian assistance by the League of Nations proved essential in helping the country absorb the shock of the Anatolian disaster in  and integrate over a million refugees (Kontogiorgi, ; Mavrogordatos, ). Greece might have not escaped a communist takeover or geographic dismemberment along the lines of Germany, Korea, or Vietnam if it were not for the  British military intervention in Athens or the massive US foreign assistance after  which took the form of the economic assistance of the Marshall Plan and the military assistance that followed the Truman doctrine. The remarkable post-war economic take-off was possible because Greece found itself on the right side of the Cold War (McNeill, ; Hatzivassiliou, ). Although the transition to democracy in  was a domestic achievement, support by the European Economic Community was critical to ensure the stability and endurance of the new democratic institutions (Karamouzi, ). Lastly, without the massive bailout of  (unprecedented in terms of size and accompanied by an equally unprecedented debt ‘haircut’), Greece would have likely faced a catastrophic default along with a chaotic exit from the eurozone (Meghir et al., ).

The review of these international bailouts brings us to the last question: if international interventions were crucial in salvaging the successive Greek modernization projects from the jaws of disaster, what explains these favourable interventions in the first place? For this is a feature that appears to separate the Greek experience from that of the other Balkan nations, not to speak of the postcolonial experience more generally. The answer is related to the fact that most of Greece’s projects and subsequent travails attracted considerable global attention, way out of proportion to the country’s size, resources, or strategic importance. This, I believe, is the broader insight contained in Mark Mazower’s observation about the ‘pioneering’ dimension of the Greek projects

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      



and disasters. Yet, this begs the question: why did Greece manage to receive such outsize attention?

. K I: E L M

.................................................................................................................................. Modernization has been a key political driver everywhere—it is hardly a feature unique to Greece. The historical success of European nation-states engendered similar aspirations in almost every new nation. In fact, the political and economic project that came to be known as modernization took on massive proportions in the aftermath of World War II, especially in the wake of the great wave of decolonization. Modernization continues to inspire to this day, even though the term has lost most of its cachet and has been replaced by concepts such as ‘development’ or ‘growth’, among others. Greece is rather unusual, however, in that it embarked on this modernization drive very early in its class: it is one of the earliest ‘late modernizers’, one of the first new states to try to emulate the European political and economic recipe.¹ What is more, Greece’s unique connection to classical antiquity, widely perceived as Europe’s civilizational cradle, provided critical symbolic and rhetorical resources. To this one must add the ability of Greek leaders to pick the right foreign allies. The deep personal connection of key Greek leaders with powerful European counterparts was a significant factor in this respect—in particular, the relationships of Venizelos and Lloyd George or Karamanlis and Giscard d’ Estaing (Llewellyn Smith, ; Kitromilides, ). The same holds about the interactions between cosmopolitan Greek intellectuals and prominent international figures (e.g. Adamantios Korais and Thomas Jefferson) or the adoption of the Greek cause by prominent international figures (e.g. Byron). These factors help explain why Greece was the one nation among the early late modernizers with the capacity to grab so much international attention. Indeed, the formulation and ‘marketing’ of the Greek modernizing projects required a considerable degree of initiative and self-confidence, which Greek elites possessed in excess. Often products of an international diaspora with a cosmopolitan outlook, they were worldly and bold. It is impossible to overlook the intellectual trends and ideological traditions that shaped a religiously defined community of Greek-speaking people into a modern nation-state. It is no coincidence that the Greek merchant class emerged from a historical process that was dominated by the Orthodox Church of the Ottoman

¹ The new nations of South America emerged at about the same time as Greece and embarked on a similar modernization drive, facing similar challenges. What they lacked however, was the type of foreign bailouts that played a key role for Greece. Being located in Europe proved a key attribute for Greece.

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

 . 

Empire, a powerful institution that helped bridge antiquity and modernity through its stewardship of the Greek language. Seen from this perspective, the trials and tribulations Greece underwent in the process of importing and implanting Western institutions in its soil helped generate the outsize international attention that set the stage for the interventions that followed. To wit: • The Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire captured the hearts of both European liberals, who saw it as a noble struggle for freedom, and romantics, who were enthralled by the reappearance of Greece on the world stage. A Greek defeat struck them as a great tragedy that had to be averted (Bass, ). • The creation of the modern Greek state was often seen as part of Europe’s civilizational mission: an attempt to push European and Christian boundaries in the East; setbacks for Greece were typically framed as a western European setback (Divani, ). • As a huge humanitarian catastrophe, Greece’s defeat in Anatolia and its aftermath, became one the first tests for the newfound League of Nations which had to demonstrate that it could handle this type of challenge (Kontogiorgi, ). • In , Greece was the only remaining ally of Great Britain in its fight against the triumphant forces of the Axis. Intervening in Athens to prevent a communist takeover in December  was not only a strategic move by Great Britain, but also a personal wager for Winston Churchill (Koliopoulos and Veremis, ). As for the Greek Civil War, it was seen as a potential trigger of a domino effect at the beginning of the Cold War. It quickly became a test for the new theory of containment, as expressed in the Truman doctrine (McNeill, ). • A successful transition to democracy in  was seen as signalling the end of military regimes in non-communist Europe and prefiguring the advent of a new wave of democratic tide (Karamouzi, ). • The Greek  crisis was perceived by the European Union (and also the United States) as both a global financial watershed as well as a critical test for the future of the eurozone and the European integration project that had to be tackled somehow (Siani-Davies, ). In short, the global attention showered on Greece was largely a function of the perception that its modernization effort was deeply intertwined with processes of much broader historical and global significance; the stakes were high, hence the need for some sort of intervention. That these foreign interventions ultimately turned out to be favourable to Greece should not detract us from the fact that they were often perceived negatively in Greece. Either because they were accompanied by painful immediate effects or because they were seen as humiliating, they naturally caused a sense of wounded pride. Greeks did not shy from expressing negative feelings vis-à-vis Great Britain during the nineteenth century, the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, and Germany

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      



following the  crisis. Indeed, the feeling of lacking agency has become a part of Greek identity (Divani, ). In addition to the emotional cost, these interventions have bred a sense of moral hazard and recklessness since risk-taking is facilitated by the expectation that outsiders will eventually step in and correct Greek mistakes. Yet in turn, this expectation has helped fuel the ambition of Greek elites and the successive boom–bust–bailout cycles that have recurred during Greece’s modern history.

. C: W N?

.................................................................................................................................. The  crisis was the latest episode in the boom–bust–bailout cycles that have characterized the Greek developmental trajectory. In retrospect, Greece’s decision to join the European Monetary Union looks like a classic case of excessive ambition. There is no doubt that this decision was based on an overestimation of Greece’s real capacity. Sharing a currency with more developed economies was bound to be risky. Most Europeans suspected as much. Yet they gave in, because Greece was seen as posing too small a risk and the Greeks very much wanted in. We now know the consequences of this decision. However, it just might be too early to reach a definitive conclusion about the overall impact of this decision. Indeed, if the past can serve as a guide, the future assessment of Greece’s decision to join the eurozone could be different from present estimates. If Greece’s bailout is followed by a significant rebound and yet another ambitious project, then the  bust may not come to be perceived as a terrible and unmitigated failure. If Greece rebounds and if the European Union keeps on integrating further, then the Greek crisis will come to be seen in a very different light— one that would add out-of-sample validity to the historical interpretation proposed here.

R Amin, S. and Vergopoulos, K. (). La Question Paysanne et le Capitalisme. Paris: Anthropos-Idep. Bass, G. (). Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. New York: Alfred Knopf. Cohen, R. (). ‘The Great Greek Illusion’. The New York Times,  June. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com////opinion/iht-edcohen.html/ (accessed  January ). Dertilis, G. (). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Κράτους, – [History of the Greek State, –)]. Athens: Estia. Diamandouros P. N. (). ‘Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, –: A Tentative Assessment’. West European Politics,  (): –. Divani, L. (). Η εδαφική ολοκλήρωση της Ελλάδας, – [The Territorial Completion of Greece, –]. Athens: Kastaniotis.

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

 . 

Divani, L. (). Η ύπουλος θωπεία; Ελλάδα και Ξένοι, – [Devious Caress: Greece and Foreigners, –]. Athens: Kastaniotis. Dakin, D. (). The Greek Struggle for Independence: –. London: Batsford. Fragiadis, A. (). Ελληνική οικονομία: Από τον αγώνα της ανεξαρτησίας στην οικονομική νομισματική ένωση της Ευρώπης [The Greek Economy: From the Independence Struggle to the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe]. Athens: Nefeli. Hatzivassiliou, E. (). Greece and the Cold War: Front Line State, –. London: Routledge. Hirschon, R. (). Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Iordanoglou, C. (). Κράτος και ομάδες συμφερόντων. Μια κριτική της παραδεδεγμένης σοφίας [State and Interest Groups: A Critique of Conventional Wisdom]. Athens: Polis. Kalyvas, S. N. (). Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kalyvas, S. N. and Maratnzidis, N. (). Εμφύλια πάθη [Civil War Passions]. Athens: Metaichmio. Karamouzi, I. (). Greece, the EEC and the Cold War –: The Second Enlargement. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kazakos, P. (). Από τον ατελή εκσυγχρονισμό στην κρίση [From Incomplete Modernization to the Crisis]. Athens: Patakis. Kitromilides, P. (). Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Koliopoulos, J. S. (). Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, –. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Koliopoulos, J. S. and Veremis, T. M (). Greece: A Modern Sequel. New York: NYU Press. Kontogiorgi, E. (). Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kostis, K. (). History’s Spoiled Children: The History of the Modern Greek State. London: Hurst and Company. Lipset, S. M. (). The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective. New York: Basic Books. Llewellyn Smith, M. (). Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor –. London: Hurst and Company. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, –. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). ‘The  Exchange of Populations: An Ongoing Debate’. Paper presented at the Gennadius Library. Mazower, M. (). The Balkans: A Short History. New York: Modern Library. Mazower, M. (). “Democracy’s Cradle, Rocking the World.” New York Times,  June. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com////opinion/mazower.html/ (accessed  January ). McNeill, W. H. (). The Metamorphosis of Modern Greece since World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meghir, C., Pissarides, C. A., Vayanos, D., and Vettas, N. (). Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Mouzelis, N. (). Modern Greece. Facets of Underdevelopment. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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

Nikolakopoulos, I. (). Κόμματα και βουλευτικές εκλογές στην Ελλάδα –: H εκλογική γεωγραφία των πολιτικών δυνάμεων [Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece –: The Electoral Geography of Political Forces]. Athens: EKKE. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. New York: Palgrave. Pappas, T. S. (). Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Reinhart, C. M. and Trebesch, C. (). ‘The Pitfalls of External Dependence: Greece, –’. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  (): –. Rodogno, D. (). Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, –. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Siani-Davies, P. (). Crisis in Greece. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skopetea, E. (). Το πρότυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα (–) [The ‘Exemplary Kingdom’ and the Great Idea (–)]. Athens: Polytypo. Tsoukalas, K. (). Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή: ο κοινωνικός ρόλος των εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα [Dependence and Reproduction: The Social Role of Educational Mechanisms in Greece (–)]. Athens: Themelio.

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  ......................................................................................................................

–   

......................................................................................................................

 . 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. S– relations have been a topic of extensive comparative political analysis, along several different lines of inquiry. First, comparative political scientists examine the extent to which states are autonomous from social interests, how the latter influence public policy-making, how states structure social relations and are constrained by them (Stepan, ; Hall, ), and to what extent some states—compared to their respective societies—are weak or strong (Midgal, ). With regard to contemporary Greece, major aspects of this approach are elaborated in this volume (Huliaras, Chapter ; Zambarloukou, Chapter ). Second, an alternative way is to analyze state–society relations in the context of relationships between citizens and public administration (Sternberg, ; Villeneuve, ). This approach also informs other contributions to the present volume (Chapter  and Chapter ). A third way, followed in this chapter, is to discuss how social interests and citizens actually associate with the state. Suggesting such a bottom-up perspective in the context of a modern organization, A. O. Hirschman has claimed that individual and collective actors have three options: ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ (Hirschman, ). Actors do not take up the available options once and for all, but do so depending on constraints and opportunities which they encounter such as, for example, the outbreak of an economic crisis. This chapter applies Hirschman’s scheme of three options in a scale larger than an organization, namely in the relations between state and society and asks the following question: which of the three afore-mentioned options did Greek individuals and collective actors, such as interest groups and collective movements, use to employ vis-à-vis the state before the crisis and did they change their behaviour towards the state after the crisis erupted in –?

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–   



. T S  F

.................................................................................................................................. The state in Greece has been the focus of different approaches to the Greek crisis (Featherstone, ; Lyrintzis, ; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, ; Giannitsis and Zografakis, ; Tsebelis, ). The derailment of the Greek economy has been attributed to a combination of adverse effects of the global financial crisis of  and the long-term decline of competitiveness and the state’s finances (Featherstone, ; Alogoskoufis, ). The Greek crisis would not have been as long and deep, if it had occurred in the context of a less aggravated international economic crisis. Yet in Greece fiscal mismanagement in the period before the eruption of the crisis was evident in the drop of tax revenue, in the rise of government expenditure and the extensive public borrowing from abroad. Problematic fiscal management, combined with asymmetries of the eurozone, manifested in differences in the performance of more and less competitive economies (e.g. current accounts deficits). In other words, the Greek crisis, albeit to an extent owing to external factors, was in fact exacerbated, if not provoked, by concrete domestic policy choices. However, policy choices reflected longer-term patterns, preceding the crisis period of the second decade of the twenty-first century. In historical institutionalist terms, it can be argued that the crisis may be understood in the context of the development of state– society relations in Greece after the fall of the Colonels’ regime in . In the postauthoritarian period, the Greek state became larger in size without becoming stronger in terms of administrative capacity (Sotiropoulos, ; Iordanoglou, ). Meanwhile, historical legacies of patronage-based relations between the state and citizens (Mouzelis, ) and particularistic state–corporatist relations between the state and interest groups (Mavrogordatos, ) were reproduced over the last four decades. Such relations acquired an uneven or ‘disjointed’ character (Lavdas, , ) and were eventually transformed under the impact of the economic crisis (Sotiropoulos, a). In this context, before the crisis and with a few notable exceptions discussed shortly, Greek civil society had been weak in its interaction with the state and extremely segmented (Sotiropoulos, ). Overall, apart from selected strongly organized interests, discussed further below, civic associations were not strong enough to limit, let alone influence, the manner in which the state intervened in the economy and society. Social relations evolved around one’s extended family, while the country’s industrial base never reached West European proportions, and political parties traditionally dominated the public sphere, including state organizations, public debates, and most social mobilizations. However, selected interest groups, such as, for example, unions of state-owned employees, banking employees, construction workers, the liberal professions, industrialists and shipowners, were integrated into the system in a clientelist manner which was very favourable to their interests. Frequent strikes, pressure on ministers and members of parliament belonging to the same professions, and threats of disinvestment were typical means used by the aforementioned groups. After repeated rounds of

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

 . 

pressure which such groups exerted on the state and waves of favours (e.g. early retirement with full pension rights) granted to them by the state, each group carved out for itself a particularistic regime; depending on the interest group in question, there were tailor-made rules of entry to a profession, access to a market niche, salary levels, tax breaks, social security contributions and welfare benefits. Favours were granted in a clientelistic fashion, not only to interest groups, but also to selected individual business enterprises, groups of companies or business sectors as a whole. This type of clientelism fitted Greece’s growth model, which was characterized by heavy state interventionism (see in this volume, Chapter ). Since , in addition to a mushrooming public sector, a business class dependent on state subsidies, loans from state-controlled banks and tax breaks has thrived in the context of close clientelistic ties between government and business elites. In view of the above, the focus of the present chapter is on the relations between the state on the one hand and individual and collective actors (interest groups and collective movements) on the other. In order to interpret such complicated state–society relations in Greece, I will discuss state–citizen relations and state–interest group relations, highlighting three patterns: citizens and interest groups associated with the state through political clientelist and corporatist linkages; second, citizens and interest groups challenging and mobilizing against the state; and third, citizens and interest groups becoming detached and alienated from the state. The first pattern may be understood as an example of Hirschman’s ‘loyalty’ option; the second, as an example of the ‘voice’ option; and the third, the ‘exit’ option. In parallel with past contributions emphasizing the clientelist and state corporatist nature of relations between state and society in Greece (Mavrogordatos ; Mouzelis ; Pagoulatos ), this chapter develops the complementary view that, owing to the relatively recent Greek economic crisis, two other modes of state–society relations unfolded: first, the mode of ‘voice’: citizens, individually and also collectively through their associations, opposed the austerity policies and engaged in typical and more often atypical ways of political participation (repeated violent demonstrations and sit-ins); in addition, after welfare state spending was deeply cut, hiring in the public sector froze and salaries were cut (even though cuts affected much less the strongest among the categories of state officials and public sector employees than the rest). And second, the mode of ‘exit’: as persistently high unemployment and massive closures of small and medium enterprises dominated the private sector, citizens detached themselves from the state, by seeking the support of close relatives and social solidarity networks. All three modes through which society related to the state (integration into the state through clientelism and state corporatism, mobilization against the state, and detachment from and avoidance of the state) preceded the eruption of the crisis and had existed in different mixes, but the crisis created new conditions, fertile for the development of the latter two modes. The main argument of this chapter is as follows: clientelism and corporatism used to serve as the basis of ‘loyalty’ of society to the Greek state, for as long as the state could selectively distribute resources to citizens and interest groups. The chapter will focus on

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

selected examples to highlight the argument rather than offer a more comprehensive bird’s eye-view of the multiple ways through which the state actively benefited multiple interests. It did so through its actions, such as convenient regulations or policy measures, or even through refraining from acting (e.g. refraining to implement legislation that would negatively affect selected interests). ‘Loyalty’ of society to the state is understood in this context to be something different from the affective relations between citizens and the nation-state. Rather it is taken to be an adherence to basic principles and institutional arrangements on which socioeconomic life is structured in a certain state, even if strong actors may periodically try to adapt them to their own interests. Adherence to principles and arrangements does not mean that the former and the latter are the best possible but rather that they constitute patterns, which are more or less accepted. To put it better they are not actively resisted by state and societal actors alike. For instance, since Greece’s transition to democracy in , the tax-raising capacities of the state have been slim (Thomadakis ; Iordanoglou ) and they declined even further in –, just before the economic crisis. Tax-raising incapacity resulted both from lack of appropriate regulatory frameworks, inspection mechanisms, and technical skills of tax authorities, and from the propensity of governments to adapt to pressures of the strongest among the interest groups. In the meantime, governments had refrained from pressing large businessmen who had obtained bank loans from state-controlled banks or had not fulfilled past obligations to pay taxes and social security contributions. Such phenomena of impunity were large-scale and frequent, indicating the existence of underlying webs of corruption which involved politicians, businessmen, and civil servants. As public borrowing opportunities diminished, a severe economic crisis broke out in –, and along the way society shifted from ‘loyalty’ to ‘voice’ through mass political mobilization. As the crisis evolved into the s, ‘voice’ coexisted with ‘exit’: middle- and old-age citizens under economic hardship abandoned hope of being rescued by the state and fell back on family and solidarity networks, while the most skilled among younger Greeks started literally exiting the country (the phenomenon of brain drain).

. S A   S T P C  S C

..................................................................................................................................

.. Rampant Political Clientelism The concept of political clientelism, used for the purposes of this chapter interchangeably with ‘political patronage’, refers to a dyadic, informal relationship of dependence between a patron, such as a minister or a parliamentarian, and a client, that is, a citizen

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

 . 

and his or her family (Eisenstadt and Roniger, ). Typically, politicians exchange the distribution of spoils for electoral support. Although both sides of the relationship may benefit from the exchange, the relationship is asymmetrical, particularly under conditions of scarce resources or periods of crisis (e.g. periods of high unemployment), rendering the client weak and dependent on the patron. In Greece, voters were traditionally integrated into the political system, as Nicos P. Mouzelis put it, in a ‘vertical’ way (Mouzelis, : and ), as they were unable or reluctant to forge ‘horizontal’ linkages with others of comparable social status and/or class position and they resorted to more powerful actors standing above them in the social hierarchies. In Modern Greece, political party notables for the better part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and party cadres in the post- period acted as intermediaries between clients and patrons. In exchange for their vote, patrons provided clients with preferential treatment in their contacts with the public administration, public hospitals, and welfare services, convenient transfers for male conscripts during their military service, access to bank loans, or other types of selective discrimination. After the transition to democracy (), the transformation of traditional parties into mass parties also influenced patronage relations as traditional clientelism became ‘bureaucratic’ (Lyrintzis, ). Starting with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), political parties developed strong bureaucratic organizations. The conservative party, New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), followed suit, as did parties of the Left whenever they became government coalition partners (in –, – and again in –). Instead of individual patrons, clients turned to party bureaucracies. Local, regional, and national political party organs played the role of intermediaries between party voters and state authorities and provided party supporters with public-sector jobs as well as state subsidies and welfare benefits (Featherstone, ; Sotiropoulos, ). Such clientelist tendencies were partially curbed after , with the establishment of an independent administrative authority in charge of recruiting tenure-track public employees to the public sector, the Supreme Council for Personnel Selection (ASEP, Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Επιλογής Προσωπικού). However, the relevant legislation was repeatedly amended after  to suit ministers of successive governments who hired permanent personnel without adhering to ASEPs’ standardized procedures, while the Council itself was not involved in the hiring of temporary personnel. Thus, parties in government continued opening public-sector job posts to their political clienteles in the form of short-term renewable job contracts or project-based contracts which were awarded on politically biased grounds. Further on, after completing several such temporary job contracts, public employees mobilized to demand the change of their job status from temporary to permanent. With the help of either PASOK or ND governments temporary employees were eventually successful in this endeavour (e.g. in  and  when in total a few hundred thousand public employees obtained a permanent job status in the public sector).

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

Clientelism was not only rampant in citizen–administration relations but also within the public administration (Spanou ). The party which had won the most recent elections proceeded to staff the top ranks of ministries and state agencies with political advisors and hand-picked civil servants who were governing-party supporters. The career of civil servants was (and still is) influenced by decisions of intra-ministerial civil service councils. These councils consisted of five members, three of whom were appointed by the competent minister who normally selected council members on the basis of their political affiliation. The remaining two council members were elected by civil servants who normally chose from among candidates of the party-based collateral organizations of labour unions such as PASKE, associated with the PASOK party, and DAKE, associated with the ND party. Thus, depending on whether the minister in charge was a PASOK or a ND minister, the majority of the decision-making body belonged to one of the two parties. Consequently, the preferences of governing-party supporters among the civil servants were accordingly accommodated (a pattern which continues to the present day). It would be an exaggeration to claim that all interactions between citizens and the state passed through clientelist channels. Citizens had at their disposal the usual means of applications or petitions and also could resort to the courts to protect their rights. Moreover, they could rely on unions or associations representing their interests. Yet, one cannot help noticing that, regardless of changes in government, clientelism continued to dominate state–society relations. In terms of Hirschman’s interpretive scheme, individual actors, by subscribing to age-old, politically biased ways of interacting with political patrons, chose loyalty, over voice and exit, to Greece’s clientelist state.

.. Particularistic State Corporatism At the level of collective actors, the linkages between society and the state were both clientelist and reminiscent of non-democratic corporatism. The Greek system of interest group representation resembles that of authoritarian or ‘state corporatism’ (Schmitter, ). It has survived transition from authoritarian rule and has since then evolved in a post-authoritarian, democratic setting (Mavrogordatos, ). In detail, Greek interest groups have traditionally been under the tutelage of state authorities, while at the same time they had been penetrated by strong political parties. Since the  transition to democracy, ND and PASOK alternated in power, forming single-party majority governments and pursuing policies of control over labour unions. The government used to control the unions ‘from above’, through making them dependent on funds channelled from the Ministry of Labour to the confederations of such unions, namely the GSEE confederation (representing salaried workers and employees of private companies and State Owned Enterprises—the SOEs) and the Supreme Directorate of Unions of Civil Servants (ADEDY, Ανώτατη Διοίκηση

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

 . 

Table 3.1 Union Density in Greece in the Comparative Perspective of Southern Europe (% of salaried employees) Year Greece Italy Portugal Spain OECD average

2003

2007

2011

2013

25 34 21 16 20

24 34 21 16 18

23 36 19 17 18

22 37 19 (year: 2012) 17 17

Source: OECD, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN.

Ενώσεων Δημοσίων Υπαλλήλων) confederation (representing civil servants, including employees of public schools and public hospitals). There was also organizational dependence of interest groups on the strategies and skills of political party cadres acting as labour union activists. The fact that political parties staffed and controlled unions probably explains relatively high union density (Table .). Compared to other OECD countries and countries of southern Europe, Greece shows a comparatively high union density (with the exception of Italy; Table .). This trend owes on the one hand to the aforementioned political party penetration of unions, and on the other to the large number of SOEs and the very high union density of unions of SOEs (see also in this volume Chapter ). There were huge salary differentials between employees of SOEs and the rest of public-sector employees, owing, among other things, to the clientelist practices mentioned above and to the fact that other public-sector employees did not have the strong labour mobilization capacities of their colleagues working in SOEs. The result, however, was that only some specific categories of workers and employees could identify with these two peak associations (GSEE, ADEDY) because of the composition of the confederations’ decision-making organs. In detail, both confederations were dominated by mostly middle- or old-age, male, well-paid labour market insiders, such as employees of SOEs and banks, in the case of GSEE, and teachers of primary or high schools and public hospital and municipal employees, in the case of ADEDY (Matsaganis, ). In that sense, Greek state corporatism was and remains very much particularistic. Such trends of state corporatism and over-representation of selected interests in unions reflected long-term historical legacies of the period after the end of the Civil War () and of course the period of authoritarian rule (–) when unions were completely controlled by state authorities. As Philippe Schmitter writes, comparing Greece to the rest of South European countries in the early s: ‘Greece . . . still has the characteristics of older, pre-democratic systems of state corporatism and has yet to be fully affected by the usual norms of associational freedom, voluntary contract, and collective bargaining’ (Schmitter, : ). There were several reasons for this continuation of pre-democratic forms of interest representation in an otherwise democratic polity after . First, as already noted, the

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

two confederations were financially dependent on the state. Second, the industrial working class in Greece was rather small, given that the self-employment and employment in the public sector were preponderant in the labour market in the post-war period (Iordanoglou, ). Thus, there was no critical mass of workers, independent of the public sector, who could have constructed alternative channels of interest representation. Third, as already noted, not only ADEDY, the confederation of civil service unions, but also the GSEE confederation is dominated by employees who essentially are on the state’s payroll. In GSEE’s higher organs there is an over-representation of representatives of labour unions of SOEs and banks controlled by the state. These representatives construct their own power bases within the bureaucracy of the confederations and cultivate their relations with successive leaders of major parties (ND, PASOK), so as to keep the old-fashioned, but convenient for them, system of labour representation intact (Sotiropoulos, a). However, a reverse trend has also developed since . Instead of governing parties dictating to interest groups what should be their response to government policy, through using collateral organizations as transmission belts of government’s wishes, interest groups have been able to capture public policy-making (Iordanoglou, ). Policy capture has occurred with regard to income, labour, pension, and taxation, among other policy fields. Analysts have noted that strong interest groups have impeded the Europeanization of Greece’s public sector and change of growth model (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). Further on, less strong unions, such as unions of fixed-term workers and temporary workers, have enjoyed much less protection of their rights. The same is true for associations of women and migrants who have not been able to influence policy-making. While regulations in some of these policy fields serve the interests of the strongest among the unions and associations, it is probably more precise, particularly since the mid-s, to regard relations between parties and interest groups not as predetermined by one or the other side, but as a periodic tug-of-war between the two. Indeed, there has been a shift in state–interest group relations over time (Zambarloukou, ). Already in – a dramatic shift in the then governing PASOK’s incomes policy towards macroeconomic stabilization, provoked a split within PASKE, the PASOK party’s collateral organization in labour unions (Mavrogordatos, ). The alienation of some labour union activists from the government of the day was facilitated after the s, when new legislation streamlined collective agreements, based on negotiations between representatives of labour and capital (Zambarloukou, ). As Greece strived to meet the Maastricht criteria in order to enter the eurozone, more instances of reform occurred in the s, provoking the further alienation of once closely monitored interest groups from the state. A major case in point was the partial privatization of the state-owned Public Power Corporation (DEI) and the state-owned National Telecommunications Organization (OTE). Strikes took place, but the unions of such SOEs, and consequently GSEE which these unions

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

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controlled, were appeased with generous salary increases and early retirement packages offered to affected employees. However, the next shift in government policy, namely pension reform, created a larger divide between the governing party (PASOK) and union representatives belonging to PASKE. In  Tassos Giannitsis, the socialist party’s minister of labour and social security, tried to control and rebalance the runaway expenditure on pensions and the uneven structure of pension funds, which disproportionately benefited insiders of the labour market in comparison with outsiders, and the older at the expense of the younger employed people. Immediately a quasi-revolt occurred which pitted most interest groups against the government. Eventually the socialist government retreated from the attempt to reform the pension system (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). To sum up this section, the interaction of interest groups with successive governments was more dynamic and unpredictable than a straightforward model of state corporatism would entail. Thus, one could speak of ‘disjointed corporatism’ (Lavdas, ) or even ‘parentela pluralism’ (Pagoulatos, ). The representation and aggregation of interests was characterized by the presence of multiple associations (e.g. several professional specialty-based unions of civil servants within each ministry), the extreme fragmentation of interest groups, and the simultaneous absence of nationwide social pacts between such groups and the state (except for collective agreements on wages, Lavdas, : ). In brief, since the early s, interest groups, including the two aforementioned confederations and also chambers of merchants and engineers and the associations of liberal professions, have started disengaging from the state and political parties in a more visible way.

. S M A  S

.................................................................................................................................. The economic crisis which erupted in Greece in – brought a sea change at many levels, including state–society relations. A dramatic shift of economic, incomes, and pension policies towards austerity sparked waves of popular mobilization against the state. The hiring of public employees almost ceased, salaries and pensions froze and were then reduced (at least until the end of ), and taxes were abruptly raised. Greeks had mobilized against the state even before the crisis and in fact did so in a comparatively excessive manner. It is telling that thirty-three out of all seventy-one general strikes which took place in EU- in – took place in Greece (about  per cent of all strikes;—Hamman et al., ). In the wake of the crisis this pattern was intensified: in –, that is, in the span of five years, forty-two general strikes were launched in Greece (press release of GSEE,  January ). Strikes were not always

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–   



directed towards reversing austerity policies, but they were also organized to preserve the preferential treatment by the state towards particular interest groups. For instance, in the autumn of , owners of trucks resisted the government’s decision to provide new licences for trucks (thus opening what was a ‘closed shop’ occupation), by parking their trucks along national highways and causing extensive traffic congestion. Similarly, owners of pharmacies rejected the government’s plan to grant licences for new pharmacies, thus opening another ‘closed shop’ occupation. Pharmacists closed their shops a few days each week, causing the appearance of long lines in front of their shops. In July–August , taxi owners resisted the government’s decision to grant new taxi licences to new prospective owners, by blocking access to ports and airports all around the country (Sotiropoulos, b: –). The mobilization of the two confederations, GSEE and ADEDY, against austerity reflected categories of the population larger than the interest groups just noted which saw their market niches being threatened. The rejection of austerity policies came not only from the collateral organizations of the parties of the Left and the Centre-Left (e.g. PASKE), but also from the corresponding collateral organization of the Right (DASKE), the representatives of which participated in GSEE and ADEDY. Meanwhile, protests (known as the movement of the ‘indignant’ people) occupied the largest square of Athens between May and July , organizing demonstrations every single evening (Rüdig and Karyotis, ; Diani and Kousis, ; Simiti, , Kousis, ; Karyotis and Rüdig, ; Georgiadou et al., ). The movement of the ‘indignant’ people did not last long and thus cannot be understood as a typical social movement. However, it was quite big in terms of size as every evening in the early summer of , movement participants would gather in the large square located in front of the parliament of Greece. They protested, debated policy measures, and employed direct democracy procedures, in order to reach decisions which were variations on the themes of anti-capitalism, anti-globalization, and Euroscepticism. The ‘indignant’ people expressing hostile attitudes towards the state mostly belonged to the far Right or to the radical Left, and interpreted the crisis in Greece through a narrative which became hegemonic. This was a narrative which blamed foreigners, such as foreign governments and foreign banks, for the crisis, and also national political elites, mainly the elites of PASOK and ND which had alternated in power since the  transition to democracy. Another similar, short-lived, but popular movement was the ‘won’t pay’ movement which flourished between October and December . It consisted of citizens who refused to pay a new tax on landed property which was suddenly imposed on taxpayers in autumn  in order to reduce Greece’s exorbitant budget deficit. Sudden increases in toll fees sparked a similar reaction as drivers using national highways refused to pay such fees at toll booths, lifted bars on their own, and drove through in the period between November  and February . Even though such collective initiatives of citizens did not become proper social movements with an organizational structure and a set of policy goals, they contributed to widespread alienation from the two-party system (PASOK, ND) which eventually

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

 . 

collapsed in the two consecutive elections of May and June , allowing for the emergence of a new major party on the Left, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς). After all, local networks of citizens against austerity and SYRIZA party cells had been the protagonists of confrontation between state and society since the start of the crisis in May  (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, ). The confrontation took violent turns as some anti-austerity protesters physically attacked politicians of PASOK and ND as well as journalists who did not toe the line of the dominant anti-austerity narrative. Moreover, throughout  the confrontation with the state took the form of occupations of government buildings, including the central headquarters of ministries and universities. In sum, sudden and large-scale austerity measures provoked various reactions, ranging from subdued disaffection with the state to violent outbursts against representatives of state authority. The state periodically responded with brutal police violence against protesters. While some may interpret violent protest acts as expressions of justified anger by victims of austerity, others may see in them the reproduction of longstanding features of state–society relations in Greece, namely a diffuse distrust of state institutions, a propensity to circumvent the law and a recurrent defiance of authority. Such defiance was a left-over trait of the post-war era when liberal democracy malfunctioned with regard to the preservation of individual and collective rights, while the state was identified with institutions of the army, the king, and the Christian Orthodox Church (Mouzelis, ). In terms of the interpretive scheme used in this chapter, the post- large-scale protest was a clear example of ‘voice’, the actual manifestations of which frequently violated the limits of legality, when citizens took the law in their hands, attacked politicians, and stormed government buildings.

. S’ D   A   S

.................................................................................................................................. As the crisis did not subside but continued well into the s, state–society relations were transformed once more. The mobilization of citizens against the state lost steam, but also became further politicized through the convergence of protesters with cadres of the SYRIZA party and—far less so—parties of the far Right, namely the nationalist Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες) and the neo-nazi Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή). A new element, however, was that regardless of their political preferences, citizens adversely affected by the crisis turned away from the state and joined local and national networks of social solidarity. The third sector stepped in to partly cover loopholes in the provision of social protection (Clarke et al., ). The provision of social assistance and social care partly slid away from the hands of the state, as NGOs and informal

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–   



social solidarity networks, which before the economic crisis used to cater to the needs of migrants and refugees, now shifted their attention to Greek citizens in need. Various groups were barred from accessing hospital care (other than emergency aid) and receiving pensions or social assistance. Examples included the long-term unemployed who were no longer entitled to receive any welfare benefits, and small and medium businessmen and professionals, who owing to the sharp decrease in the demand for their products or services, did not pay for their social insurance contributions. In detail, in the poorest neighbourhoods, people organized into informal networks and started exchanging goods covering basic needs, such as needs for food, clothes, and shoes. These were non-monetary exchanges, as in fact were larger-scale exchange activities taking place in some cities (e.g. Volos) on a weekly basis. Such social solidarity networks included soup kitchens, some of which were organized in local churches; ‘social groceries’, housed in and organizationally supported by local municipal offices where citizens could find various products at low prices; time banks created to help people with household chores and repairs; the provision of blankets and food to homeless people; and community work, including the cleaning of and care for public spaces. Producers of food stuffs bypassed intermediaries (e.g. supermarket chains) and established local markets in cities, selling their products at very low prices. In addition, medical doctors and nurses organized makeshift clinics (‘social clinics’) in rooms provided by municipal authorities in order to provide health care free of charge; pharmacists collected and provided medicines (in ‘social pharmacies’), which uninsured patients would otherwise be unable to obtain; and high school teachers provided free tutorials (in ‘social preparatory schools’) to pupils, the families of whom could not afford the cramming schools preparing candidates for university entrance examinations (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, ). The aforementioned groups and networks not only mobilized to assist victims of the economic crisis but also played a political role. They developed a political discourse which was distinctly left-wing, counterposing the people to the state, and diffusing themes of Euroscepticism and anti-capitalism (Leontidou, ; Vathakou, ; Simiti, ). Members of such groups and networks became affiliated with parties of the radical Left, including SYRIZA. There was in fact a schism between these civil society associations and the traditional civil society associations, such as NGOs and public benefit foundations which during the crisis also engaged in the provision of goods and services, in parallel with the above anti-statist groups. The former espoused ideas of direct democracy, keeping as far as possible a distance from the state, while NGOs and foundations did not oppose the state but supplanted it on many occasions when welfare services were unable to meet the social needs provoked by the economic crisis. In other words, the informal social solidarity groups and networks combined ‘voice’ with ‘exit’ as far as their relations with the state were concerned.

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

 . 

. C

.................................................................................................................................. In this chapter, following Hirschman’s interpretive framework, relations between state and society in Greece since  have been analysed. The analysis has proceeded along the lines of loyalty, voice, and exit, showing that Greeks were ‘loyal’ to the state as long as clientelism and corporatism were available as channels of individual and collective involvement with the state. At times, even before the economic crisis of  struck, Greeks began opting for ‘voice’, participating in recurrent strikes, a phenomenon which grew after the negative effects of the crisis were felt in the middle- and low-income groups of the population. After the crisis started unfolding, Greeks combined ‘voice’ with ‘exit’, as informal social solidarity groups and networks grew and started supplanting the state in the provision of social welfare. Moreover, having shifted to the Left (as the government turnover of  showed, when SYRIZA rose to power), many Greeks opposed the state along the lines of Euroscepticism and anti-capitalism. Compared to state–society relations in mid-s, this was quite a dramatic change. After the transition to democracy in , Greek political parties developed organizationally, and soon the traditional person-to-person clientelism, through which individual voters had been selectively associated with state authorities, was replaced by bureaucratic clientelism. Τhis was a new way of associating selected citizens to the state, through the bureaucratic organization of political parties which facilitated the dissemination of favours by the state to governing party supporters. Meanwhile, organized interests were used to pursue the cultivation of selective, preferential relationships with the state, while the state continued to subsidize Greece’s nationwide labour confederations. In this kind of idiosyncratic state corporatism, in which legacies of authoritarian involvement in interest representation were continued in the postauthoritiarian time period, strong interest groups, such as associations of employees of SOEs, carved out privileged relations with the state in terms of labour relations and welfare rights. In a different vein, associations of businessmen and the liberal professions also enjoyed benefits owed to special regulations regarding taxes, loans, and other benefits such as pensions. The economic crisis shook these uneven and fragmented differentiated arrangements of state–society relations. Austerity measures, adopted and implemented after , provoked large-scale reactions of citizens against the state. Anti-state mobilization took the form of recurrent strikes, sit-ins, occupations of government buildings and protests in squares of large urban centres. ‘Loyalty’ to the state was replaced by ‘voice’ against the state, even though political party clients remained attached to the public sector, where job dismissals and pay cuts were not as grave or massive as in the private sector in the s. Later, informal groups and networks of social solidarity supplanted the state in the provision of goods and services to the victims of the crisis. In this phase, citizens opted in favour of an ‘exit’ from the state, not understood in the literal sense of the word, but

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–   



in terms of disaffection and alienation from the state. What is left after the transformation of state–society relations, which has been brought about by the economic crisis, is a mix of loyalty, left over from the pre-crisis period, and voice and exit, which have emerged as alternative arrangements since the eruption of the economic crisis. Further research on state-society relations in Greece may examine the ways in which, during the crisis, citizens and collective actors engaged in patterns of resistance against austerity policies in parallel with traditional tactics of law circumvention, such as tax avoidance. Moreover, comparative research could map differences and similarities in the transformation of state–society relations across countries of the European periphery which underwent a similar economic crisis in the beginning of the twentyfirst century.

R Alogoskoufis, G. (). ‘Greece and the Euro: A Mundellian Crisis’. CGK Working Paper,  April. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Available at https:// alogoskoufis.files.wordpress.com///cgk-wp-no---greece-and-the-euro-april.pdf/ (accessed  January ). Clarke, J., Huliaras, A. and Sotiropoulos, D. A. eds. (). Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. Surrey: Ashgate. Diani, M. and Kousis, M. (). ‘The Duality of Claims and Events: The Greek Campaign against the Troika’s Memoranda and Austerity, -’. Mobilization,  (): –. Eisenstadt, S. N. and Roniger, L. (). Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The Party-State in Greece and the Fall of Papandreou’. West European Politics,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). The Limits of Europeanization. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hall, P. A. (). Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Georgiadou, V., Kafe, A., Nezi, S., and Pieridis, C. (). ‘Plebiscitarian Spirit in the Square: Key Characteristics of the Greek Indignants’. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society,  (): –. Giannitsis, T. and Zografakis, S. (). Ανισότητες, φτώχεια και οικονομικές ανατροπές στα χρόνια της κρίσης [Inequalites, Poverty, Economic Reversals during the Crisis Years]. Athens: Polis. Hamman, K., Johnston, A., and Kelly, J. (). ‘Unions against Governments: Explaining General Strikes in Western Europe, –’. Comparative Political Studies,  (): –. Hirschman, A. O. (). Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

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Iordanoglou, C. (). Η ελληνική οικονομία στη μακρά διάρκεια, – [The Greek Economy in the Longue Duree, –]. Athens: Polis. Iordanoglou, C. (). Κράτος και ομάδες συμφερόντων [State and Interest Groups]. Athens: Polis. Karyotis, G. and Rüdig W. (). ‘Three Waves of Anti-Austerity Protest in Greece, –’. Political Studies Review,  (): –. Kousis, M. (). ‘The Spatial Dimensions of the Greek Protest Campaign Against the Troika’s Memoranda and Austerity, –’. In Ancelovici M., Dufour, P. and Nez, H. (eds.) Street Politics in the Age of Austerity. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, –. Lavdas, K. (). The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration. London: Palgrave. Lavdas, K. (). ‘Interest Groups in Disjointed Corporatism: Social Dialogue in Greece and European ‘Competitive Corporatism’. West European Politics,  (): –. Leontidou, L. (). ‘Urban Social Movements in Greece: Dominant Discourses and the Reproduction of ‘Weak’ Civil Societies’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. Surrey: Ashgate, –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis’. GreeSE paper No., Hellenic Observatory Working Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science. Matsaganis, M. (). ‘Union Structure and Pension Outcomes in Greece’. British Journal of Industrial Relations,  (): –. Mavrogordatos, G. (). ‘Civil Society under Populism’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece –: The Populist Decade. London: St. Martin’s Press, –. Midgal, J.S. (). Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mitsopoulos, M. and Pelagidis, T. (). Understanding the Crisis in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouzelis, N. (). Politics in the Semi-Periphery. London: St. Martin’s Press. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s Political Economy: State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Rüdig, W. and Karyotis, G. (). ‘Beyond the Usual Suspects? New Participants in AntiAusterity Protests in Greece’. Mobilization,  (): –. Schmitter, P. C. (). ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ The Review of Politics,  (): –. Schmitter, P. C. (). ‘Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe’. In Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N., and Puhle, H. J. (eds.) The Politics of Democratic Consolidation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, –. Simiti, M. (). ‘Rage and Protest: The Case of the Greek Indignant Movement’. GreeSE Paper No. , Hellenic Observatory Working Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science. Simiti, M. (). ‘Civil Society and the Economy: Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis’. Journal of Civil Society,  (): –.

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

Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-authoritarian Greece’. In Psomiades, H. J. and Thomadakis, S. B. (eds.) Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order. New York: Pella Publishing, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Populism and Bureaucracy: The Case of Greece Under Pasok Rule, –. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Η ελληνική κοινωνία πολιτών και η οικονομική κρίση [Greek Civil Society and the Economic Crisis]. Athens: Potamos. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (a). ‘Political Party—Interest Group Linkages in Greece before and after the Onset of the Economic Crisis’. Journal of Mediterranean Politics, published online ... Sotiropoulos, D. A. (b). ‘A Fragmented but Strengthened Civil Society?’ In Katsikas, D., Sotiropoulos, D. A. and Zafeiropoulou, M. (eds.) Socioeconomic Fragmentation and Exclusion in Greece under the Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. and Bourikos, D. (). ‘Economic Crisis, Social Solidarity and the Voluntary Sector in Greece’. Journal of Power, Politics & Governance,  (): –. Spanou, C. (). ‘Penelope’s Suitors: Administrative Modernization and Party Competition in Greece’. West European Politics,  (): –. Stepan, A. (). The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sternberg, C. W. (). ‘Citizens and the Administrative State: From Participation to Power’. Public Administration Review,  (): –. Thomadakis, S. B. (). ‘Democratic and Economic Consolidation in Southern Europe’. In Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Tsakatika, M. and Elefhteriou, C. (). ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsebelis, G. (). ‘Lessons from the Greek Crisis’. Journal of European Public Policy.  (): –. Vathakou, E. (). ‘Citizens’ Solidarity Initiatives in Greece During the Financial Crisis’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A. and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. Surrey: Ashgate, –. Villeneuve, J.-P. (). “Citizens’ Roles in Their Relationship with Public Administrations: The Premises of a Debate’. Journal of Public Administration and Policy,  (): –. Zambarloukou, S. (). Κράτος και συνδικαλισμός στην Ελλάδα [State and Trade Unionism in Greece]. Athens: A. Sakkoulas.

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  ......................................................................................................................

– 

......................................................................................................................

 

. I: T E  S–M R

.................................................................................................................................. A the post-war decades, Greece relied on changing mixes of policies and instruments and an evolving balance between state and market, in the effort to elicit economic growth and catch up with the advanced European economies. The state of scholarship on state–market relations in Greece has developed over time, reflecting both the evolution of the international academic debate and the predominant issues and challenges emanating from the Greek political economy. An early stream, in the s and s, tended to employ neo-Marxist perspectives, core-periphery or dependency theoretical frameworks, focusing among others on the state as a reflection of a constellation of class interests (Tsoukalas, ), or as a driver of industrialization in a late-late developing economy of the semi-periphery, in which a ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie pursued activities such as commerce, shipping, and banking, at the expense of manufacturing (Mouzelis, ). The political economy of the post-authoritarian period, culminating in the first half of the s, reinvigorated state interventionism, and with it bloomed a scholarly literature that focused on ‘statism’ under PASOK (Kazakos, ), and more broadly on the structure and nature of the Greek state, one of pervasive influence, serving as an extension of political clientelism, yet weak, rigid and ineffective (Featherstone, ). Over the s and increasingly into the s and s, the transformative power of European integration became of distinct focus, with state–market relations viewed through the conceptual lenses of Europeanization, market liberalization, privatization, and globalization. In that framework, Europeanization as an external reform push has substituted for the lack of sufficient domestic pull for state and market reform, or has

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

run into obstacles and resistance posed by resilient status quo interest coalitions (Lavdas, ; Kalyvas et al., ). Finally, the devastating experience of the great crisis of the s, apart from catapulting Greece into the international limelight, has also given birth to a broad literature delving into the reasons for its abject failure, a failure that also burdens the eurozone itself (Meghir et al., ; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, ; Pagoulatos, ). Comparative accounts have stressed the similarities and parallel paths of the Greek case with other European countries, especially of the southern European periphery (Maravall, ). Greece has been viewed through the lenses of ‘convergence’ or ‘adjustment’, highlighting the project of the catching up of Greek institutions, policies, and economic outcomes with those of the advanced western European core, or the subjection to common external pressures and constraints, or the parallel paths with the rest of southern Europe (Gunther et al., ): a struggle that has been summarized as an oscillation between adjustment and marginalization (Kazakos, ). Over recent decades, the state–market balance has been shaped by three main forces, corresponding with overarching political and policy imperatives, market and institutional context, and ideological realignments respectively: a. The ‘objective’ institutional constraints and political expediencies and priorities produced by the domestic political economy, or the critical junctures which defined key policy choices, that generated path-dependent processes. b. The external pressure, exercised by global and European market integration, the latter incorporated in the institutional imperatives and constraints of the single market or the EMU or the debt markets or the conditionality imposed by the institutional lenders. c. The shift of the ideological pendulum from state to market (and back?), reflecting global and European ideological trends, from which Greece has generally been a policy receiver rather than an autonomous agenda setter. Tracing the impact of these factors allows one to assess patterns and instances of similarity or dissimilarity of the Greek case in its comparative political economy framework.

. E C  C F

.................................................................................................................................. While exposing facets of persistent divergence, the Greek political economy has been nested in its surrounding and evolving historical context. Four conceptual frameworks are singled out, each corresponding to successive stages of evolution of the Greek political economy: (i) developmentalism (up to the  final collapse of the Bretton

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

 

Woods system), a context driven by the primacy of economic development; (ii) democratization ( up to roughly the mid-s), where the paramount objective of consolidation of democracy led both politics and economic policies; (iii) Europeanization (from the mid-s to the s), when catching up with the advanced EU countries (economic, institutional, structural) became Greece’s hegemonic political project; (iv) the eurozone crisis, when the accumulated weaknesses and failures, at both domestic and the EMU level, led the Greek economy to crash and subsequently to a forced adjustment under the bailout programmes. These frameworks allow for the cross-national comparison of the Greek case, as we observe similarities and dissimilarities regarding the changing nature of state–market relations.

.. Developmentalism The Greek version of the post-war developmental state lacked the strategic thinking or policy-making capacity or the integrity of other typical developmental states (as in France, Spain, Japan, or South Korea) (Pagoulatos, ). With the notable exception of the Bank of Greece, absent was the kind of bureaucratic elite of France or even Spain, that would ensure the bureaucratic influence in the exercise of systematic state activism. Instead, the state’s powerful developmental armoury (special licences and restrictions, ad hoc exemptions, selective tax and other incentives, direct and indirect subsidies, interventionist financial policies) was inherently susceptible to particularism, and instrumentalized in the service of clientelistic political objectives. Under this Greek version of developmentalism, interventionist economic policies predominantly aimed to confront short-term problems, with low regard for the longer-term repercussions, while exhibiting only limited consistency over time in the administrative design and implementation of industrial policy (Giannitsis, : ff). Thus, the post-war ‘developmental state’ was weak and incomplete, characterized by widespread instances of submission to political infringements, lack of assertiveness vis-à-vis private interests, inconsistency and discontinuity in its goals, and inefficacy regarding their implementation, all such features coexisting with pockets of competence, integrity, and commitment to the developmental mission (Pagoulatos : ).

.. Democratization The  transition to democracy and the overarching project of democratic consolidation had an important impact on redrawing the state–market boundary, by affirming government presence in the economy. The project of democratic consolidation includes the  rise of the socialist party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα)

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– 



to power, as the first left-of-centre government, terminating the post-Civil-War exclusion of the Left from power. Statism is a central theme during this democratization period (Kazakos, ). The primacy of politics over policy in the southern European ‘new democracies’ (Maravall, ) meant, in the case of Greece, that the New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) government of – intensified state interventionism in order to both stabilize the economy and define itself in sharp distinction from the pre- Right. The ideological shift to statism was strengthened after PASOK’s  rise to power. Economic policy now carried a stronger focus on the demand-side of the economy, supported by large budget deficits and (after the s) copious EU budget inflows. Industrial protectionism could no longer be relied upon, as the economy was gradually acceding to the European common market. Sociopolitical democratization intensified the countercyclical, protectionist, redistributive, clientelistic, and overall political use of economic interventionism. Financial interventionism engendered a soft budget constraint, providing cheap working capital to crisis-ridden industrial firms and easy finance for government consumption spending, including a steep rise in wider public-sector employment. While government and welfare spending increased to catch up with West European levels, the tax revenue side did not follow. Fiscal deficits grew steadily over the s and early s, leading to the accumulation of a large public debt which was never effectively curtailed. Interventionist policies (including credit and monetary policy) were instrumentalized with the purpose of protecting specific sectors and industries, while the loss of the state’s authoritarian levers opened the way to long-repressed societal demands for an immediate improvement of income and welfare standards. State interventionism coexisted with a politically subservient, weak, and mostly ineffective state. From the s, de-industrialization and the rising trade deficit were the joint outcome of opening up to the common European market and the sharp rise of publicand private-sector wage costs, combined with stagnant or negative labour productivity growth (Iordanoglou, ). The – period marked the greatest progress in the reduction of poverty and inequality. But the wage–price cycle eroded the competitiveness of the Greek economy, and opened the way to successive stop–go episodes. Between  and  inflation remained at double-digit levels. Such was the unenviable record of monetary autonomy under the ‘crawling peg’ regime of currency depreciation. This explains why Greek reform-minded elites were positively disposed to the stability benefits of a fixed exchange rate system and accession to the single European currency, the flagship project of the s. In rhetoric, the first PASOK government subscribed to a ‘structuralist’ developmental policy, subordinating monetary stability to the goal of promoting manufacturing, public investment, regional development, agricultural protection, and small–medium enterprises (Tsakalotos, ). In reality, the demand stimulus failed to generate growth, instead producing deficits and inflation, leaking into imports, and in the end consolidating a stop–go cycle where wage gains obtained in the electorally driven expansionary phases were cancelled in the next stabilization programme (, –, , etc).

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/9/2020, SPi



 

The relatively moderate unemployment rates and the weak supply side of the economy did not justify the extent of the demand stimulus on Keynesian grounds either. The result of fiscal expansion in the s was not just underinvestment compared to consumption, but the significant crowding out of the private sector by government. The economic legacies of the democratization period (large budget deficits and public debt, an extensive general government and public-enterprise sector, decline of competitiveness, inflation) would necessitate the long macroeconomic adjustment effort of the s.

.. Europeanization Macroeconomic stabilization led the convergence process, closely interwoven with the EU single market programme. Stabilization was initiated in –, interrupted in –, relaunched after , but really began to deliver after . As the ND government returned to power in –, the effort of acceding to the EU core projects (single market and subsequently EMU) became a driving objective, to which all subsequent governments under PASOK would also vehemently subscribe. The ND government initiated a market-liberal programme of privatizations, and prioritized budget deficit reduction and disinflation, following up on the brief stabilization programme of –. The same policy continued after the re-election of PASOK in , , and , focusing mainly on macroeconomic adjustment, as privatization would (modestly) return to the government agenda in the second half of the s. The objectives of coping with the single market (culminating in the  liberalization of the capital account) and fulfilling the EMU nominal convergence targets, implied a rigorous framework within which Greece should achieve macroeconomic stabilization, market liberalization, and institutional modernization. In that constraining framework, inflation de-escalated, fiscal discipline was restored, and from the mid-s the government began to produce consistent primary budget surpluses. Economic adjustment in the s, identified with ‘Europeanization’, transformed state–market relations by expanding the scope of the market (Lavdas, ). Over the s, the EU provided the external constraint (Dyson and Featherstone, ) that repeatedly allowed the Greek economy to summon a stabilization and reform impetus that its electorally minded political class, unwilling societal coalitions, and weak state and economic governance system, were incapable of autonomously generating. As part of the single market programme, the financial system was gradually liberalized over the second half of the s and into the s, in view of the  scheduled liberalization of the capital account. Under financial interventionism, the general government had enjoyed ‘repressed’ financing costs and a soft budget constraint. The cost of government borrowing rose sharply in the early s, interest rates adjusting to market levels, which pushed the public debt/GDP ratio upwards. Over the

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– 



s, financial liberalization led macroeconomic adjustment and disinflation. It allowed monetary policy to become assertive as interest rates rose to market levels, aligned behind the Bundesbank after . Financial liberalization brought about a consequential shift of balance between state and market, at the former’s expense. It allowed a greater role for private investors in budget deficit financing, imposing market discipline in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy (Pagoulatos, ). With hindsight, this market discipline was only epiphenomenal, as debt markets would later underprice risk on euro-denominated Greek public debt. Thus, over the s, control over finance was shifted from the state to the globalized markets, followed by the transfer of monetary policy (under the euro) from the national central bank to the ECB. Financial liberalization generated its own perverse effects. It brought about a significant reallocation of resources from sectors traditionally favoured for developmental or redistributive purposes (manufacturing industry, small- and medium-sized enterprises, agriculture), to increasingly modernized and internationalized non-tradable sectors (banking, real estate, constructions, media, retail trade) that corresponded to the strong demand for consumption created by trade and capital liberalization. Financial liberalization allowed private-sector creditors and financial institutions to expand and fuel consumption-driven growth. High real interest rates in the mid-s, combined with the Maastricht-induced fiscal discipline, collaborated in reducing inflation and suppressing government budget deficits, allowing Greece to narrowly satisfy the EMU accession criteria and join the single currency with the second wave on //. Euro participation allowed Greek government borrowing costs to decline, the bond yield converging to that of the German government. Low-interest borrowing encouraged both access to globalized debt markets and fiscal immoderacy—primary budget deficits re-emerged after . The government (whose debt was becoming increasingly held by foreign investors) became subject to the formidable power of global capital and money markets, prone to generating manias, panics, and self-fulfilling debt crises at the first serious sign of financial vulnerability. This came with the  crash.

.. From Nationalization to Privatization As in most Western economies, the public-enterprise sector in Greece was built gradually during the twentieth century through successive waves of state consolidation. The post- democratization wave involved the nationalization by the Karamanlis government of Olympic Airways, major firms such as refineries, and the country’s second largest banking group, including its industrial subsidiaries. The subsequent socialist wave of nationalizations, in the first half of the s, was led by the Andreas Papandreou government during its first term in office, and represented an ideologically minded government strategy of assuming control over certain ‘strategic’ sectors of the

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

 

economy, including major companies in mining and minerals exploitation, the munitions industry, and cement (Pagoulatos, ). The state took over many ailing key firms to save jobs and avert the failure of important industrial sectors. These firms were nationalized through the state-controlled banks and a state holding company which hence recorded huge losses. The operation of these loss-making entities was mainly sponsored by transfers, subsidies, and support schemes by the state budget, contributing generously to the high budget deficits and public debt well into the s. The privatization wave of the s amounted to a substantial redrawing of the public–private boundary at the former’s expense. Privatization concerned either the sale of state-owned firms as a whole or in majority stakes (mainly in –); or it concerned partial privatization (equitization) that was accompanied by improvements in the institutional and governance framework, supporting the objective of allowing public firms to access capital markets and introducing private management criteria in their operation (–). The main focus of partial privatization remained on the fiscal revenue, rather than the structural side. Privatization resulted from a confluence of converging pressures and incentives: - The fiscal incentive, associated with the constraining Maastricht rules combined with a high public debt that urgently called for reduction, and also the need to cut losses produced by the ailing state-owned firms. The most decisive fiscally driven boost to privatization was delivered under the post- bailout programmes, when far-reaching privatizations were targeted for explicit debt reduction purposes. - Legal-institutional pressures emanating from the EC/EU single market programme, imposing national-level deregulation (and EU-level reregulation) in sectors such as finance, energy, telecommunications, or air transport. In these areas the state owner had to surrender monopoly position. The gradual privatization of the Greek Telecom monopoly (OTE) was driven by the  EU deadline set for the complete liberalization of the telecoms sector, and the official abolition of the state monopoly in the electricity sector in  led the process for the part privatization of the Public Electricity Company (DEH). Market opening, for example, included licences granted by the regulator to private-sector companies operating in various segments of the telecoms sector. Adjustment to technological progress was a major driver of privatization and EU regulatory reform. Finally, EU competition rules also demanded the termination of illegal state aid, which forced government to dispose of several heavily indebted manufacturing firms. - Broader microeconomic incentives, involved the expectation of positive economic spill-over effects from the productivity gains of privatized enterprises, forced to operate under the efficiency-enhancing incentive structures and market constraints of the private sector. - Adherence to the new pro-market economic orthodoxy represented a paradigm shift in the Western world and the EU over the s and s, from state interventionism to market liberalization and from public ownership to privatization.

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– 



.. EMU Crisis and Forced Adjustment At first sight, EMU offered a much-anticipated framework of imported stabilization. Low financing costs and ample supply of capital provided the Greek economy with the opportunity to build productive capacity, address structural deficiencies, and expand in a rules-based macroeconomic environment. A peripheral economy with weak economic governance, a long tradition of deficits, inflation and an unstable currency— Greece had good reasons to aspire to the advantages of externally imported discipline. However, the flip side of irreversibly binding to an external anchor as the hardest form of demonstrating a ‘credible commitment’ is that the loss of monetary autonomy might be difficult to compensate in the face of an external financial shock, if the state capacity is weak and the currency union is highly imperfect (Dellepiane-Avellaneda et al., ). In effect, cheap capital inflows ended up a factor of macroeconomic divergence rather than convergence, by funding a steadily expanding current account deficit. The economy grew through foreign debt-fuelled financial and credit expansion. Demonstrating the financialization of the economy, between  and , private-sector debt (which had been low, consumer and mortgage debt at negligible levels) almost tripled as GDP share, funded by annual credit expansion rates higher than the European average, though the stock of private debt always remained lower than the EU average. Contrary to the debt creation of the s (which was funded mainly by domestic banks and general government entities), debt-driven growth after the late s was financed predominantly by external capital inflows. Inside the euro, reflecting the deficient EMU structure, the external deficits reached levels hitherto unseen, as they would have otherwise necessitated an adjustment via exchange rate depreciation or devaluation. Indicating the economy’s overall net exposure to foreign creditors, the net foreign debt grew as GDP ratio from single digit in the mid-s to well over  per cent on the eve of the debt crisis. Financialization in the eurozone periphery had created a far-reaching distortion (though less extreme in the Greek case compared to Spain or Ireland), that is, an inflation of the non-tradable sectors (banks, public enterprises, imports, constructions, telecoms, services, retail trade, media, etc) at the expense of exports and tradables. Higher returns on capital and labour (given the ample possibilities for private-sector deficit financing) directed resources to these sectors, away from manufacturing where global competition compressed profits. Traditional local industrialists became financiers or investors in real estate, where prices and returns rallied every year. The significant increase of wages in the sheltered, non-tradable sectors (led by public sector, utilities, and banks, all heavily unionized and over-represented in the national confederation of labour unions—GSEE) passed on their higher prices to the rest of the economy, undercutting competitiveness. Under the euro, the Greek state proved incapable of taking advantage of the propitious environment of low interest rates, monetary stability and rapid growth to undertake long-postponed productivity-enhancing structural reforms, or even to

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

 

sustain primary budget surpluses and reduce the public debt/GDP. While public spending grew, tax revenues remained stagnant. For their part, the EMU authorities failed not only to prevent the extremely destabilizing consequences of asymmetric financial flows, but even (in the case of Greece) to impose fiscal discipline. The EMU proved incapable of sufficiently disciplining fiscally profligate Greek governments, especially after the hard constraint of the Maastricht framework was replaced with the ‘soft’ and politicized Stability and Growth Pact (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, ). Thus, the Greek state ended up crashing under its own extreme financial vulnerability, even though the Greek crisis was part of a broader eurozone financial crisis associated with intra-eurozone current account imbalances. The construction defects of the EMU were amplified by the spectacular failure of the Greek state, which peaked in the years directly preceding the  crash (Featherstone, ). Failure to adjust in good times necessitated immensely painful adjustment under crisis. The  debt crisis terminated the illusive pursuit of debt-driven growth. Following a wide array of reforms, the budget and current account deficits were eradicated, and the welfare state was transformed from a typical Mediterranean case into one containing significant liberalized features. In addition to the fiscal consolidation, incomes policy became very restrictive, aiming to sharply reverse the unit labour cost increases of the previous period and restore cost competitiveness. Credit contraction made it impossible even for the most efficient Greek firms to access credit at reasonable terms, while the looming country risk (the currency redenomination risk, popularized as ‘Grexit’) drove away prospective investors, froze economic activity, and pushed the economy deeper into the vortex of recession. Greek GDP lost over a quarter of its  level, and unemployment surged to . per cent at its peak (in ). The sharply declining denominator of the debt/nominal GDP ratio soon rendered the public debt glaringly unsustainable. Reluctantly and belatedly after  the eurozone lenders agreed to consecutive rounds of negotiated debt restructuring and reprofiling, to obtain debt serviceability. The debt crisis, combined with the recession, engulfed the domestic banking system, which also underwent successive recapitalizations. As unfolded the process of private debt turning into public debt (non-performing bank loans necessitating bank recapitalizations that raised the public debt) the reverse process also took place. Excessive public debt forced such a steep fiscal consolidation path that the tax burden for a wide array of taxpayers became impossible to service. Thus, public debt was effectively converted into private debt, owed by failing enterprises and distressed taxpayers and households. The crisis led to a new redrawing of the state–market boundary. Certain markets were liberalized, most notably the labour market and (after the second programme, adopted in ) a number of product and services sectors. Public spending was cut in every domain (wages, pensions, welfare spending, public investment), and taxes (both direct and indirect) rose sharply, to close the gap between spending and revenues. Farreaching privatizations were initiated for the purpose of debt reduction, including plots

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– 



of land, airports, ports, and utility companies. Ironically, privatizations were expanded and accelerated during the SYRIZA-led coalition government of –. Under the third bailout programme of , the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (HCAP) was established, jointly controlled by the Greek government and the EU creditors, for an operational horizon of ninety-nine years. The HCAP took over the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) (see below), the -established Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, and the Public Properties Company, covering the full range of state-owned assets, with the purpose of developing them towards their selective eventual privatization. This amounted to the largest privatization programme in the country’s history; the privatization proceeds were partly earmarked for the repayment of the ESM-held public debt. Despite the opening up of the economy during the s, foreign direct investment (FDI) remained relatively subdued, mainly because of poor institutional quality, legal and administrative impediments discouraging foreign firms from investing and producing in Greece. In the s and through the crisis, state regulation and policies remained the principal deterrent of foreign investment and business endeavours, sustaining oligopolistic market structures that benefit domestic incumbents hostile to reforms (Meghir et al., : ; Arkolakis et al., ). The sovereign debt crisis and debt restructuring of  necessitated an extensive consolidation and recapitalization of the banking system, which was funded by the second bailout programme. In  the country’s main banks came under state majority control, exercised by the HFSF on behalf of Greece’s official EU creditors. The purpose was to return the banks to the private sector at a profit or at least at minimal loss for the public shareholder. Indeed, during  their market value increased, and a second recapitalization was funded by (mostly foreign) private investors. However, at the end of , following the June imposition of capital controls and stock market collapse, a third round of recapitalization diluted the HFSF share, which shrank to a small minority stake in all four systemic banks, at huge loss to the taxpayer. Thus, as a cumulative result of bank recapitalizations, privatizations, and distressed asset purchases between  and , foreign ownership of Greek assets expanded. Through most the duration of the bailout programmes, Greece remained outside the debt markets, and since July  also isolated through capital controls. Probably the most visible shift in terms of state–market balance was the transfer of state control, not to the globalized markets (as was the case from the second half s until the  crash), but to the eurozone institutions. In this case, Greece surrendered significant further degrees of national autonomy in order to remain within the EU core of a stable common currency, and to eschew the most catastrophic implications of a disorderly default and euro-exit. The experience of the crisis management under the troika or quartet of lender institutions, expediting or circumventing normal parliamentary democratic procedures, has raised serious issues of governability and legitimacy, while vulnerability in the face of a next crisis has been far from eradicated (Featherstone, ; Pagoulatos, , ).

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

 

. G E   L

.................................................................................................................................. The Greek case has often featured as an extreme case or an outlier in the eyes of a scholarship that tends to view Greece in terms of a standard divergence from West European patterns, carrying unique and exceptional features. Mainstream political economy accounts have emphasized Greek ‘exceptionalism’ when it comes to the inefficient and corrupt public sector, clientelism, rent-seeking, the particularistic fragmentation of socio-economic interests, as explanatory factors for Greek economic policy failure, reform avoidance, and finally the  crash. The explanatory role of rent-seeking coalitions for policy and reform failure has been prominent in the politics and political economy literature (Iordanoglou, ; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, ). Accounts of Greek divergence or ‘exception’ have focused on the persistently high budget deficits and inflation up to well into the s, and again loss of fiscal control after EMU accession, leading to the fiscal derailment of . In the s Greece overall diverged not only from Western Europe but also from the southern European new democracies of Spain and Portugal by pursuing heavily expansionary economic policies (with the brief exception of the – stabilization programme). Pagoulatos () has argued that underlying historical, cultural, and ideological factors privileged a politically expedient discourse of national exceptionalism upon which policies divergent from the EU mainstream were legitimized and developed in the s. In that sense, exceptionalism was cultivated and politically engineered, rather than being an inherent feature of the way in which the state–market relationship evolved across time. Greece is also shown to be an extreme case of failure in reforming the welfare state and the pension system, a failure that critically contributed to the  debt crisis (Matsaganis ). The combination of the above failures underlie Greece’s exceptional fiscal and financial vulnerability, as the first and the weakest among all the economies that were bailed out in . The same weaknesses, including the lack of domestic sociopolitical consensus and government ‘ownership’ of the reforms, have been outlined as principal reasons for what is broadly regarded as Greece’s failure to successfully implement the bailout conditionality in the s (Zahariadis, ). Indeed, affirming stereotypical accounts of Greek ‘exceptionalism’, Greece was the first to be bailed out, the last to graduate, and the only eurozone economy to have required not one but three consecutive bailout programmes, lasting from  to . In addition, compared to Ireland, Spain, or Portugal, the Greek economy registered the least impressive improvement of exports, despite the fact that wages in Greece dropped much more than in any of the other bailout programme countries (Meghir et al., : ). Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos () have blamed government effort to shield public-sector clients by allowing privatesector wages to carry a heavier brunt of adjustment compared to the public sector.

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– 



Afonso et al. () have also attributed the Greek crisis to governments’ reluctance to undertake fiscal retrenchment to their clientelistic linkages. More dispassionately, Meghir et al. () have explained the paradox of low export growth by pointing out the crippling impact of the Grexit uncertainty that depressed investment, lack of access to finance, the limited product market reform, and the tax hikes on key business inputs. Aggravating divergence, Greece remained the only programme country faced with euroexit speculation during most of the crisis period, peaking in –, and again in .

. ‘V  C’  G

.................................................................................................................................. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) literature offers a useful framework for integrating the Greek case in a broader comparative project. The legacies of developmentalism entailed weak, closed, and underdeveloped markets. Characterized by an overwhelmingly small/micro-size and family-based low productivity enterprise sector, extensive self-employment and a low share of wages to GDP, pervasive state interventionism in economic activity, low exports of relatively low added value and complexity, and a high cost of red tape to GDP, Greece’s variety of capitalism has been located neither among the liberal market economies (LMEs) nor among the coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, ). Featherstone (: ) has summarized the unease of southern European scholars over the ‘varieties of capitalism’ polarization between LMEs and CMEs: its focus on companies as agents of change tends to downplay the centrality of the state in SE economies; neglects other forms of non-market relationships such as clientelism and corruption; insufficiently accounts for the fragmented welfare regimes of Southern Europe; and understates the importance of the EU as driver of domestic state and market reform. Greece has been part of the variety of a southern European or Mediterranean market economy that could also be labelled as statist, state involvement being the source of coordination among strategic institutions and actors—not the market (LMEs), nor strategic partnership (CMEs). Gradually, after accession into the era of Europeanization via single market integration, state involvement in Greece incorporated some market-oriented characteristics, whose presence was amplified under the bailout adjustment programmes. The withdrawal of state involvement and protection in various sectors of the economy and the market was prone to lead to a more liberal environment, given the absence of previously established institutions and logics promoting strategic coordination between stakeholders. This institutional equation gradually resulted in a less efficient mixed version of capitalist economy, identified as mixed market economies or (more descriptively) as Mediterranean market economies (Hall, ). This included liberal features following the adoption of market-oriented reforms, cohabiting with patterns of coordination secured by the actions and policies

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

 

of the interventionist state. The lack of coordination between collective actors, the incapacity to sustain concertation, carries important explanatory power, as it accounts, among others, for the inability of the Greek economy to deliver Lisbon-agenda productivity-enhancing reforms, or, in other words, its problematic ‘reform capacity’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). The Greek case contains some of the typical features of the southern European or Mediterranean variety of capitalism (Amable, ): product market competition is mostly price- rather than quality-based, there is little ‘non-price’ coordination, and moderate protection against foreign trade or investment. Financial sector characteristics continue to include high banking concentration (which increased in the s, as several smaller banks were either acquired by larger ones or resolved), bank-based corporate governance, low-activity market for corporate control (takeovers, mergers, and acquisitions), low sophistication of financial markets, underdeveloped capital market, a limited presence of venture capital. The labour market has been traditionally dualistic, offering job protection to the insiders employed in large firms (predominantly in the wider government and public-enterprise sector and banks) cohabiting with the outsiders, employed in temporary, flexible and part-time jobs and the informal economy, with centralization of wage bargaining and scarce active labour market policies. These latter features of the labour market have been reformed drastically under the three consecutive economic adjustment programmes implemented between  and , the labour market now corresponding to the liberalized type. Kornelakis and Voskeritsian () have singled out certain specific features of the Greek VoC (predominance of small firms, extensive informal sector, low technology and value-added) arguing that labour market reforms are transforming Greece into a dysfunctional LME, combining the ‘worst of both worlds’: suboptimal economic performance and diluted social cohesion. The eurozone crisis has challenged the limits of the Mediterranean variety of capitalism and its compatibility with the EMU framework. From the standpoint of a Mediterranean economy, the eurozone crisis represented the crisis of a demand-led economy, that had been used to adjusting (with highly questionable results) through currency depreciation and was now incapable of resorting to the exchange rate instrument (Hall, ). The eurozone crisis raises important questions regarding the growth model of a Mediterranean economy like Greece, which until the s was used to relying heavily (and unsustainably) on a combination of budgetary expansion and EU budget inflows, and from the late s added rapid credit growth and external debt financing to the expansionary policy mix. Post-crisis, demand-led growth is not an option for a peripheral economy that will need to maintain a balanced current account position and to generate large and consistent primary budget surpluses. Clearly there arises the need to shift to a greater reliance on exports, higher value-added tradable activities, and private investment, foreign and domestic, areas, however, in which Mediterranean economies are less well equipped compared to export-led CMEs (Regan, ).

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– 



. C  C  F R

.................................................................................................................................. This account of the Greek state–market nexus over recent decades substantiates a case of continuity through adaptation. Structural rigidity and path dependency define the enduring features of the Greek political economy and state–market relations, yet the relationship is an evolving one, adjustment and change being either domestically driven or (most powerfully) externally forced. While long-lasting features of the Greek ‘variety of capitalism’ have persisted, others have mutated in the face of an evolving international political economy context. The pursuit of economic development drove institutional and policy engineering in a postwar international environment that favoured developmental interventionism. The political primacy of the post- democratization, followed by the ideological ascendancy of PASOK, released a new wave of statist policies and institutions, which peaked at the end of the first PASOK government term. Then, from the second half of the s began the gradual accession to the flagship EU projects of the single market and monetary unification, under which the ‘hard’ constraints of market liberalization, integration, and globalization began to affect the state–market balance by increasing the importance of European and global markets. The year  represented the swan song of a national ‘growth’ trajectory that had become in many ways unsustainable. The magnitude of the crisis, combined with the limited availability of national economic instruments and subjection to the severe bailout conditionality, brought about a far-reaching transformation of the state–market balance, at the expense of the former. Primary government spending was rolled back, the labour market and (subsequently) products and services markets were liberalized, a wide array of state assets came under the private sector, while the suasion of European creditors and the presence of foreign investors in the Greek economy increased substantially. The power of the external constraint brought about important productivity-enhancing and financially required reforms, which the domestic sociopolitical system over the years had been incapable of autonomously engineering; but the underlying implications for state sovereignty are hard to ignore. The post- crisis has been the most consequential and profoundly transformative experience for the Greek political economy in the post-authoritarian era. From an academic point of view, it poses engaging questions pertaining not so much to the real causes of the crisis (for there is no mystery wrapped up in an enigma waiting to be unwrapped) but to its broader implications. Future research should address the crisis implications regarding the role of the state, and the exact state–market configuration that may better support Greece’s post-crisis near-existential pursuit: the new ‘growth model’ that can allow the economy and incomes to expand despite the tight fiscal framework through greater reliance on exports, private investment, higher value-added activities, and productivity-enhancing reforms. In broader terms, the question remains:

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

 

what becomes of a Mediterranean state and the surrounding political economy inside an imperfect European single-currency regime, with a strict institutionally prescribed and market-imposed fiscal framework, a limited ability to rely on foreign borrowing, and the need to maintain competitiveness by means other than resorting to the exchange rate fix? Such questions exploring the political economy of the changing state–market configuration in a post-crisis eurozone will no doubt guide future research and deepen our understanding of state–market relations in challenging times of complex interdependence.

R Afonso, A., Zartaloudis, S., and Papadopoulos, Y. (). ‘How Party Linkages Shape Austerity Politics: Clientelism and Fiscal Adjustment in Greece and Portugal During the Eurozone Crisis’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Amable, B. (). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press Arkolakis, C., Doxiadis, A., and Galenianos, M. (). ‘The challenge of trade adjustment in Greece’. In Meghir, C., Pissarides, C. A., Vayanos, D., Vettas, N. (eds.) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Blavoukos, S. and Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘The Limits of EMU Conditionality: Fiscal Adjustment in Southern Europe’. Journal of Public Policy,  (): –. Dellepiane-Avellaneda, S., Hardiman, N., Pagoulatos, G., and Blavoukos, S. (). ‘Pathways from the European Periphery: Lessons from the Political Economy of Development’. Studies in Comparative International Development,  (): –. Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (). ‘Italy and EMU as a ‘Vincolo Esterno’: Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Featherstone K. (). ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and the Greek case: Explaining the constraints on domestic reform?’ GreeSE Paper No , Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe. London: London School of Economics. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and the EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). The Limits of Europeanisation: Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Giannitsis, T. (). H ελληνική βιομηχανία [Greek Industry]. Athens: Gutenberg. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N. and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) (). Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, P. (). ‘Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro Crisis’. West European Politics,  (): –. Hall, P. (). ‘Varieties of Capitalism in Light of the Euro Crisis’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Hall P.A. and D. Soskice (eds) (). Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Iordanoglou, C. (). Η ελληνική οικονομία στη μακρά διάρκεια [The Greek Economy in the Longue Duree]. Athens: Polis. Iordanoglou, C. (). Κράτος και ομάδες συμφερόντων [State and Interest Groups]. Athens: Polis.

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

Kalyvas, S., Pagoulatos, G. and Tsoukas, H. (eds.) (). From Stagnation to Forced Adjustment: Reforms in Greece, –. London: Hurst/Oxford University Press. Kazakos, P. (). Η Ελλάδα μεταξύ προσαρμογής και περιθωριοποίησης [Greece between Adjustment and Marginalization]. Athens: Diatton. Kazakos, P. (). Μεταξύ κράτους και αγοράς [Between State and Market]. Athens: Patakis. Kornelakis A. and Voskeritsian, H. (). ‘The Transformation of Employment Regulation in Greece: Towards a Dysfunctional Liberal Market Economy?’ Industrial Relations,  (): –. Lavdas, K. (). The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Maravall, J-M. (). ‘Politics and Policy: Economic Reforms in Southern Europe’. In Bresser Pereira, L. C., Maravall, J. M., and Przeworski, A. (eds.) Economic Reforms in New Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, –. Matsaganis, M. (). ‘The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece’. Journal of European Social Policy,  (): –. Meghir, C., Pissarides, C. A., Vayanos, D., and Vettas, N. (). ‘The Greek Economy Before and During the Crisis’. In Meghir, C., Pissarides, C.A., Vayanos, D., Vettas, N. (eds.) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Mouzelis, N. (). Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment. New York: Holms and Meier. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘Believing in National Exceptionalism: Ideas and Economic Divergence in Southern Europe’. West European Politics  (): –. Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘The Politics of Privatization: Redrawing the Public-Private Boundary’. West European Politics,  (): –. Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘State-Driven in Boom and in Bust: Structural Limitations of Financial Power in Greece’. Government and Opposition,  (): –. Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘Greece After the Bailouts: Assessment of a Qualified Failure’. GreeSE Paper No., Hellenic Observatory Working Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Pagoulatos G. (). ‘EMU and the Greek crisis: testing the extreme limits of an asymmetric union’ Journal of European Integration,  (): –. Pelagidis, T. and Mitsopoulos, M. (). ‘Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-start an Export Led Growth?’ In Pelagidis T. and Mitsopoulos, M. (eds.) Who’s to Blame for Greece? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Regan, A. (). ‘The Imbalance of Capitalisms in the Eurozone: Can the North and South of Europe Converge?’ Comparative European Politics,  (): –. Tsakalotos, E. (). Alternative Economic Strategies: The Case of Greece. Aldershot: Avebury. Tsoukalas, C. (). Κράτος, κοινωνία και εργασία στη μεταπολεμική Ελλάδα [State, Society and Labour in Postwar Greece] Athens: Themelio. Zahariadis, N. (). ‘Leading Reform Amidst Transboundary Crises: Lessons from Greece’. Public Administration,  (): –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

           

......................................................................................................................

    

. I

.................................................................................................................................. ‘E’, ‘Europeans’, and ‘Europeanness’ have been crucial themes in the history of modern Greece, from the creation of the new state in  to the sovereign debt crisis of . As elsewhere, these notions have served as référentiels in questions of national identity, progress, capability, legitimation, and strategic interest (Featherstone, ). In the Greek case, the European dimension to these questions has been felt acutely. Indeed, a national angst has often been evident: ‘Europe’ has highlighted and penetrated Greece’s vulnerability and, as such, on occasions it has prompted elite embarrassment over popular failings. These have taken their cue from the often romanticized and inflated expectations of some foreign observers, reminiscent of the ‘Fair Greece, Sad Relic’ mantra at the birth of the new nation (Spencer, ). Individual Greek political leaders have self-identified as ‘Europeanizers’, proclaiming a national destiny and slaying the forces of inertia and sectional interest. To add further complication, Greece’s relationship with ‘Europe’ has also been one of deference to European ideals matched by a national pride in claims to ‘copyright’ over so much of their content and importance. In recent decades, the benchmarks for Greece’s economic progress have been largely set by its membership of the European Union (EU), which it joined in . The extent of its adaptation to the demands of the EU’s single market and single currency (the ‘euro’), amongst other policy areas, are typically interpreted as the core test of aspiration and performance. This chapter¹ considers Greece’s political development in the context of its membership of the EU, assessing the extent to which the latter has prompted domestic ¹ Parts of this chapter draw upon Featherstone () and Featherstone and Papadimitriou ().

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   



reform. The academic literature on the nature and extent of Greece’s ‘Europeanization’ has grown considerably in recent times, though its focus has favoured certain sectors and it has tended towards areas of greater, rather than lesser, adaptation. Both tendencies typify much of the wider, international literature on Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli, ). A general theme that emerges from the scholarly literature in this area is of Greece’s uneven adaptation across different sectors, a feature that provokes interesting research contrasts, but also challenges in interpreting the differential impacts on society as a whole. To understand how EU pressures for adaptation have been received domestically, the chapter opens with a discussion of the changing images and meanings of ‘Europe’ in Greece. This is followed by an assessment of the range and significance of the domestic adaptation of policies and regulations to EU legislation, as established by existing academic studies and policy papers. Here, we exclude foreign policy as that is covered elsewhere in this volume (see Section  of this volume), and for similar reasons we only touch lightly on the wider domestic political context of parties and elections. We note the current state of knowledge of Europeanization impacts on Greece, the implications of the findings, and pointers for future research. The unevenness of adaptation is an essential lens for analysis.

.       

.................................................................................................................................. The notion of member (or associated) states of the EU experiencing processes of ‘Europeanization’ grew in academic importance from the late s onwards, with the deepening of the European integration process, and in linking EU initiatives with responses at the domestic political level, the agenda served to highlight the disparities in how the EU is viewed and how it impacts. ‘Europeanization’ as a term has often been used without explicit definition. When it has been conceptualized, it has typically been in a broad manner, to encompass the range of domestic effects arising from EU membership. The early definition of Ladrech set the path: Europeanization, he argued, was ‘a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that (EU) political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (: ). As already signalled, ‘Europe’ has had a strong role in how Greece has seen itself and how it has developed. It has been part of what Diamandouros (), in his now classic interpretation, has depicted as a ‘cultural dualism’ in the development of the modern Greek state. This dualism has deep roots, reflecting divided identities and interests, between ‘modernizers’ and ‘traditionalists’ as to the path Greece should take. An ‘underdog culture’—amongst those feeling threatened by external competition and

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

    

penetration—has been in tension with those seeking greater international engagement. The differentiation is akin to earlier studies of modernization in comparative politics (by David Apter, Lucien Pye, Dankwart A. Rustow, and others), with economic development creating cleavages and an unevenness of impact. Historically, Greek social development may have displayed a greater complexity than is conveyed by a duality (Chrysoloras ), but its depiction of what constituted ‘modernity’ is surely valid. For the latter has been synonymous, in the Greek case, with ‘Europe’—as has been commonly found across southern Europe. More particularly, to Diamandouros, Greece’s EU membership has been ‘the single most important force’ in her processes of rationalization and reform (: , ). Modern Greece’s perspective has been summarized as ‘Europe Othered, Europe Enlisted, Europe Possessed’ (Pagoulatos and Yataganas, ). ‘Othered’ includes the fear of Greece being marginalized by Europe; ‘enlisted’ refers to Europe as a source of empowerment; and ‘possessed’ signals Europe’s debt to Greece’s glorious past. Europe has also exerted a normative influence within Greek politics. In obliging Greece to enact economic reforms, it has also shaped and legitimized the advocacy of ‘modernizing’ or market liberalizing reforms. The latter would not have had the same content if derived from solely domestic pressures: the economic philosophy of supply-side flexibility, market competitiveness, and stable monetary policies were alien imports. More deeply, the normative discourse that Greece should be part of Europe’s core, avoiding the consequences of marginalization, has been strong and—even amidst the debt crisis—ultimately determinant. Yet, even during the ‘high point’ of Greece’s Europeanization in the s and into the new century, there were contradictions between the rhetoric and reality of her EU membership. This paralleled wider debates on the ‘Greek paradox’ (e.g. Allison and Nicolaidis, ). According to Ioakimides, Greece’s adaptation to EU membership evolved across two distinct phases—– and –—and in , he was noting the risks of the system continuing to perform in an ‘un-European manner’ (: ). Ioakimides () identified what he termed ‘asynchronic’ and ‘autarkic’ forms in Greece’s Europeanization. The first (involving a Diamandouros-type dualistic clash between modern, Europeanized elites and Helleno-centric opponents) drew attention to the disparities in the extent of EU-adaptation across the political system—areas that had and had not adapted to the demands of membership—and was a means of highlighting the tensions and conflicts between them. At the same time, Greece’s Europeanization was autarkic in the sense that, while political elites espoused the language of adaptation, they agreed to ‘scarcely any change in the fundamental structural architecture of the system’, ‘fiercely’ resisting ‘even quite severe pressures’ (Ioakimides, : ). This was the period of Prime Minister Simitis’ ascendancy and his explicit linking of modernization and Europeanization, a project Ioakimides favoured. The Europeanization process ultimately rested on the voluntarism of the key actors—notably, the elites of parties and interest groups—to choose ‘Europe’ in its full mission.

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   



The onset of the debt crisis was to shake Greek perspectives on Europe to their roots (Triantafyllidou et al., ). The crisis occurred at the end of a period when support for the EU had dropped to lower levels across most of Europe. Greek voters had generally been amongst the most favourable to the EU for the previous two decades, though their support had also fallen. The impact of the crisis was evident in the Eurobarometer polls: Greece displayed the biggest-ever fall in support for the EU found amongst any member state. Between  and , the number of Greek voters having ‘positive’ perceptions of the EU fell from  per cent to  per cent (Eurobarometer, , Spring ). Domestically, the toxic public discourse combined popular disillusionment with significant blame-shifting, particularly towards Germany and the IMF (Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou, and Exadaktylos, ). References to government ministers and MPs as ‘quislings’ enforcing orders by Greece’s ‘occupiers’ became widespread in the media, inducing frequent incidents of political violence. In the runup to the  election, Yanis Varoufakis, one of the most high-profile critics of the bailout (later to become Minister of the Economy under Tsipras) had described Greece as a ‘debt colony’ (Papadimitriou et al., : ). Yet, at the same time public support for the single currency in Greece (at  per cent) remained above the eurozone’s average, presumably out of fear of what a return to the drachma would entail (Eurobarometer, ). Cause and effect were not difficult to surmise, with the harsh impact of the austerity measures contained in the ‘bailout’ packages. The link between the EU and the economic recession challenged Diamandouros’ previous association of Europe with modernity. Diamandouros, himself, has argued () that the crisis reinforced the analytical utility of his cultural dualism notion. Papadimitriou et al. () mapped the evolution of European elite discourses on Greece over a sevenyear period (–), arguing that these centred mostly around notions of Greek exceptionalism (see also Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis, ). By contrast, in their analysis of ‘op-eds’ in the Greek press, Capelos and Exadaktylos () reported ‘the stereotypical characterizations of Germany and Merkel, the ambivalent stance towards France and its leaders, and the adopted self-victimisation discourse that expanded to south European neighbours’ (: ). Street protests in Athens portrayed Merkel with a Swastika, while the German Bildt newspaper exhorted Greece to sell-off the Acropolis. How well these images may be overcome after the crisis is difficult to forecast (Sternberg et al., ). The impacts of the crisis domestically within Greece, at a subterranean level are still largely to be worked out. Early research focussed on the ‘Crisis Generation’ (those becoming young adults with the onset of the crisis) finding that: they felt trapped in a social and political reality which was not formed by them, were far from being passive or apathetic, and saw themselves as creating an identity beyond the crisis (Chalari et al., ). A wave of popular street protests by angry Greek youth had already occurred before the crisis, in response to the killing of a schoolboy, Alexis Grigoropoulos, by police—a harbinger of later disaffection (Economides and Monastiriotis, ). Clearly, there is an important research agenda evident here for the future.

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

    

. T I  E

.................................................................................................................................. Against this background, what has been the impact of EU membership on Greek policy and processes at the domestic level? The academic literature on Greece—as a single case or in international comparison—has depicted an uneven adaptation across sectors and institutions. Asymmetry in the domestic impact of EU membership is by no means unusual: the EU’s stimuli to domestic adjustment vary across different forms of obligation, conditionality, incentives, and peer pressure. But the Greek case can actually be portrayed as something of a ‘least likely’ or ‘critical’ case by which to test the impact of Europeanization (Flyvbjerg, ; Eckstein, ). What is the evidence, then, of how far Greece has responded to these different stimuli? The most basic obligation is for member states to transpose and implement EU laws. Official EU data before the crisis consistently showed Greece to have one of the worst records in terms of infringement referrals. Indeed, ‘Greece was involved in a significant percentage—. per cent on average—of the total number of cases that reached the European Court of Justice (ECJ) between  and ’ (Dimitrakopoulos, : ). Explanations for Greece’s performance have contrasted cultural factors and the quality of institutions. Falkner et al. () developed a cultural perspective on how EU states respond to the application of EU laws. She identified Greece with a ‘world of neglect’ when it came to the transposition of EU employment law. With the conditionality of the ‘bailout’ programmes, however, Greece improved its transposition record to be better than the EU average (Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis, ). Greece had also been a laggard in the adoption of the provisions of the Lisbon Programme of  on socio-economic structural reform (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, : –). Again, the bailouts have enforced such reforms since . Moving to impacts on policy and processes serves to highlight the unevenness of Greece’s EU adaptation. There is an extensive literature on Europeanization effects in Greece—a reflection, perhaps, of the desire of researchers to find positive effects—and, of course, analysing impacts is more straightforward than identifying their absence. Here, we must be selective in the review of the literature in order to merely illustrate the variation, range, and type of EU effects. In order to reflect the progression of impacts, we follow them across a temporal dimension. It makes sense to distinguish the nature of Greece’s Europeanization across four periods: pre-accession (s); the first period of PASOK in government (–); Greece’s response to the deepening of EU integration (s–); and, then the impact of the ‘bail-out’ programmes after . It is tempting to identify Greece pre- as adjusting to the, then EEC’s, preaccession demands primarily on the basis of the rational interests for entry. Constantine Karamanlis, as prime minister (–), had set EEC entry as the national priority, with the purpose of consolidating the transition to democracy and securing an embrace to defend Greece against Turkey. Karamanlis had negotiated faster entry for Greece (than Spain or Portugal would face); and, he felt, acutely, the potential

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   



threats to Greece from delayed accession, but also the size of the prize once entry had been obtained. Greece’s negotiations to enter the EEC in January  have now been well documented (Tsalicoglou, ; Karamouzi, ; Tsoukalis, ; Verney, ). Greece’s transition to full EC membership was phased and would be subject to later adjustment. This involved, for example, its participation in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), its budget contributions, and social policy. The domestic controversy over EC membership involved PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνηνημα) first opposing entry and, then, seeking to renegotiate its terms, after it came to power in . By the end of the decade, bedevilled by scandals and political weakness, the party had become an enthusiastic EC supporter. Turning points had occurred in –. At an EC Summit in Dublin in December , Papandreou threatened to veto the accessions of Spain and Portugal unles he received guarantees as to the levels of funding to Greece under the IMPs. The following July in Milan, he joined the UK and Denmark in trying to block the calling of a new inter-governmental conference to negotiate EC treaty changes, but the other EC governments forced this through. By October, however, the PASOK Government— newly re-elected—was obliged to introduce a package of austerity measures and to secure an economic loan via the EC Commission. In December, Papandreou was in from the cold and accepted the Single European Act (), with its major single market programme of economic liberalization and de-regulation. Reporting on the Luxembourg agreement to parliament in Athens, he asked his party whether a move towards a united Europe was ‘so opposed to the basic provisions supported by [our] movement and government?’ and suggested the alternative was the ‘Albanian model’ (Featherstone, : ). The remaining part of the s saw Greece begin to feel the economic benefit of its EC membership and experience processes of adjustment (Tsoukalis ). With respect to governance, ministries in Athens underwent a learning process as to how to coordinate Greece’s EC policies (via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs creating a new unit, the ENYEK) and implement EC provisions, across departments (Ioakimides, ; Makrydimitris and Passas, ; Dimitrakopoulos, ). From the start, the government ‘machinery found it immensely difficult both to comprehend and deal with a political system like that of the EC’, given its own over-centralized operation and lack of institutionalized coordination (Ioakimides, : –). The approach of the EC Commission itself has been identified as contributing to domestic organizational change in the late s (Dimitrakopoulos, : ). For example, in the area of public procurement, the PASOK government had ‘refused to transpose EC public procurement legislation and used existing legislation to protect domestic suppliers’ in an overt policy of ‘Hellenization’ (Dimitrakopoulos, : ). After the EC Commission took action via the ECJ, the government in Athens instituted organizational changes, creating special EC units across ministries to coordinate policy implementation. Thus, Dimitrakopoulos () argues that the central administration did exhibit learning, but not a shift in institutional strategies and values.

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

    

Similarly, the impact of the IMPs, and the EC’s other structural funding to Greece, was identified as a stimulus towards decentralization. EC funding was dependent on an institutionalized capacity for regional economic planning, involving consultation process with a range of non-governmental actors. The IMPs and the ‘Community Support Frameworks’ (CSF) prompted ‘the first concrete examples in policy planning in modern Greek history’ (Ioakimides, : ). Greece responded to the pressures on process by allocating new responsibilities to its pre-existing ‘prefecture councils’, to enable the funding to flow (Papageorgiou and Verney, ; Verney and Papageorgiou, ). In , new legislation provided for the direct election of both prefects and prefecture councils. The autonomy of these structures from Athens became increasingly doubtful, however, with confusion over their competences vis-à-vis both central and local government, as well their envelopment within intra-party politics. Indeed, much of Greece’s European funding in the s was wasted on clientelisticallydesigned and poorly executed projects (Hlepas, ). Again, environmental policy had barely existed prior to Greece adjusting to the relevant EC policies; consumer protection similarly (Ioakimidie, ; Kazakos, ). Moreover, this had a spill-over effect on civil society as the strengthening of EC environmental policy empowered NGOs in Greece by providing them with unprecedented opportunities to enter the policy process (Koutalakis, ) and ‘social learning’ would emerge in the creation of new networks (Paraskevopoulos, ). The transition to the ‘single European market’ targeted state aids; the opening-up of the heavily-regulated banking and financial markets; the reform of state enterprises (notably in the telecommunications and energy sectors, both fiefdoms of the ‘partystate’); and, later, the liberalization of capital flows (Featherstone, ; Featherstone, ). Greece found itself between the shocks of a deepening European integration process and the risk of marginalization, as the state–society relationship at home faced unprecedented pressures (Ioakimides, ; Kazakos, ). The pressure from Europe was to intensify further with the Maastricht Treaty. Featherstone et al. () have explored the strategy of the Mitsotakis government during the negotiation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), arguing that Greece’s ability to upload its preferences onto the European stage was severely compromised by domestic weaknesses, not least the poor state of the country’s economy and chronic problems of inter-departmental coordination in the Greek government. In this context, Mitsotakis’ strong rhetorical commitment to the macroeconomic discipline enshrined in the Maastricht agreement never materialized into a viable programme of economic stabilization, leading Greece to diverge from its self-declared target for EMU qualification by the end of the decade (Lyberaki, , Papademos, , Pelagidis,  Pagoulatos, ). The return of Papandreou’s PASOK to power in  was accompanied by a strong commitment to EMU membership, and this was attenuated much further under his successor, Costas Simitis. Indeed, Simitis had made Europe the centrepiece of his modernization project, with membership of the eurozone as its foremost priority, but also involving a range of initiatives on economic, social, and institutional reform

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   



(Simitis, ). Of all of the premierships of the Metapolitfsi, the eight-year tenure of Simitis has attracted the most systematic academic scrutiny, particularly in relation to the bourgeoning scholarship on Europeanization (for an overview, see Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). On the macroeconomic front, Greece’s nominal convergence with the Maastricht criteria had been impressive, with the Simitis government successfully mobilizing EMU as an external constraint, vincolo esterno (Dyson and Featherstone, ), to bypass domestic opposition to reform and eventually securing Greece’s entry in the Eurozone in  (Liagrovas, , Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). Against the backdrop of rapid economic growth and de-escalating inflation rates, however, the underlying logic of Greece’s economic model sustained contradictions (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, ; Pelagidis and Toay, , Christodoulakis ) and idiosyncrasies that made difficult to frame it by reference to existing typologies of varieties of capitalism (see Amable, ; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). Some of these weaknesses were to become all the more evident in the run-up to the country’s economic meltdown in  (see later in this section). In his work on privatization, Pagoulatos (, ) chartered the shifting private/ public boundaries of Greece political economy, from an entrenched tradition of statism in the early s to the deregulating spirit of Simitis’ ‘de-nationalizations’ (i.e. the listing of previously state-owned companies to the Athens Stock exchange), particularly during his second term in office (–). Yet, this process has been neither linear nor complete. Featherstone and Papadimitriou () discussed how the attempts of successive Greek governments to bail out the hugely indebted stateowned Olympic Airways (OA) fell foul of EU competition rules and brought the authorities in Athens on a collision course with European regulators. Eventually, EU pressure forced the sale of OA to private investors in , one of the very few privatization successes of the Centre-Right government of Costas Karamanlis, who succeeded Simitis in . Here, despite the proliferation of national regulatory agencies and some high-profile regulatory failures, our scholarly insights are rather limited, with a few notable exceptions (Pagoulatos, ; Koziris and Megelidou, , Spanou, ). Such gaps complicate our understanding of the unevenness of Greece’s EU adaptations. By contrast, Greece’s welfare and employment landscape has attracted more attention, both in connection to its ‘fit’ to existing typologies, most notably Ferrera’s () Mediterranean welfare model (see also Taylor-Gooby, ) and in the context of aborted reform initiatives at the domestic level (Sotiropoulos, , Matsaganis, , Venieris, ). Although the impact of the EU in these fields has been rather diffused, the emerging picture is one of uneven Europeanization mediated by entrenched domestic blockages (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). Thus, despite the overall expansion of social policy spending (from . per cent of GDP in  to . per cent in ) during Simitis’ years, Greece’s welfare state regime remained fragmented, with peaks of generosity and major gaps in provision, demonstrating acute insider/outsider problems and a skewed allocation of resources

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

    

driven by clientelism and short termism (Petmesidou and Mossialos, ). The pathologies of Greece’s welfare state manifested themselves in a variety of ways, most notably in an increasingly unaffordable pension system, which remained remarkably resilient to reform (Featherstone et al., , Tinios, , Featherstone and Papadimitriou, , Matsaganis, ), persistently high levels of inequality and poverty (Matsaganis, Papadopoulos, and Tsakloglou, ; Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, ), poor activation labour policies (Papadimitriou, , Zartaloudis, , Zartaloudis and Kornelakis, ), and a universal healthcare system, riddled with corruption and mismanagement (Davaki and Mossialos, ). Such distortions are reflective of skewed processes of social consultation and interest mediation that have developed domestically over decades (Mavrogordatos, ; Lavdas, , Pagoulatos, ; see also Chapter ). They have also been compounded by wider public-policy weaknesses centred around low levels of social capital (Paraskevopoulos, , Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ) and the availability of independent expertise (Ladi, , Monastiriotis and Andoniades, ). Yet, Simitis’ tenure could also demonstrate major successes, both in terms of institutional innovation and an improving ‘goodness of fit’ between EU prescriptions and the domestic setting. The EU causality on such processes of adaptation varied. Ladi (), for example, has argued that the introduction of the Greek Ombudsman (in ) capitalized on softer mechanisms of Europeanization and policy transfer from across the EU, but, ultimately, it was the alignment of domestic interests and skilful political agency that led to its significant empowerment. Paraskevopoulos () has also chartered the improvement of the management of the EU’s structural funds in the early s, arguing that domestic actors were motivated by both the scale of the available EU resources (i.e. the logic of consequentialism), but also learning from previous mistakes and engaging in policy learning from other EU member states. Despite the improvement in delivery, however, the nature of multi-level governance in Greece did not go through paradigmatic change, particularly with regards to the incorporation of a wider set of stakeholders in policy design and implementation. Andreou () argued that the Europeanization effect on Greek regional policy has been more visible as a process of ‘institutional layering’, in which new institutions and practices were created outside ‘established’ administrative networks, producing diverse and asymmetrical effects on capacity building and delivery standards. In other policy fields, the scholarship on Europeanization has made more limited inroads. Greece’s recent environmental policy, for example, has not yet been adequately studied. Hence, earlier diagnoses of Greece as a laggard of environmental standards within the EU (Pridham et al., ) have been followed up by larger comparative studies in which the case of Greece has only been examined in passing (for example, Boerzel, ). More recently, Ladi () has sought to explain how, despite considerable judicial activism in this field, the pace of adaptation to EU environmental rules has been slowed down by executive weaknesses and the relatively poor incentive structures at the domestic level. A notable gap of coverage in the existing literature is the investigation of Europeanization dynamics in the field of education

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   



(especially the reform of the university sector), despite the fact that a number of highprofile reforms have been attempted (and thwarted) over the past four decades. By contrast to attention given to the Simitis years, our understanding of the tenure of his successor, Costas Karamanlis (–) is considerably poorer. The ‘fiscal audit’ ordered by the Karamanlis government in  challenged the statistical evidence upon which Greece entered the eurozone in . Featherstone () has highlighted the distinctiveness (in the pre-crisis period) of Greece as a case of the ex post politicization of eurozone membership. Μplavoukos and Pagoulatos () also examined the limits of post-EMU conditionality as a driver of fiscal adjustment. Featherstone and Papadimitriou () chartered the timidity of the first Karamanlis government over pension and labour market reform, arguing that the resilience of domestic veto points against ‘softer’ mechanisms of Europeanization (in this case the EU’s Lisbon Agenda) is more pronounced. But significant gaps of coverage remain in other important policy areas, not least asylum and immigration, which was rapidly Europeanized in the s (though see Triantafyllidou, ; Papageorgiou ). The same also holds true for the conflict between Athens and Brussels over the flagship anti-corruption legislation of the Karamanlis government (forbidding majority stakeholders in media groups form bidding for public contracts), in which the European Commission effectively acted as a veto-player on the grounds of upholding EU competition rules. The onset of the economic crisis in  opened up new research trajectories for the impact of Europeanization on Greece. The design and policy goals of the EU/IMF bailout programmes have attracted considerable scholarly attention, articulated as new forms of coercive Europeanization. Featherstone and Papadimitriou () contrasted the intrusive nature of bailout conditionality with that elaborated in the context of the EU’s enlargement policy, arguing that the former left very little space for the emergence of sustainable reform coalitions at the domestic level. In a similar vein Featherstone () has argued that the ‘incentives model’ behind the bailout programmes has been undermined by the sheer breadth of the reform agenda and low levels of social learning, thus constraining the scope of the administrative rebooting of the Greek state from the ‘outside’. Similar conclusions were mirrored in the studies by Ladi () and Spanou (). The crisis impact in other policy areas has been documented without explicit reference to the Europeanization literature (see, for example, Matsaganis and Leventi, ; Chardas, ; and Angelaki, ). Of more direct relevance here is the work of Triantafyllidou () mapping processes of de-Europeanization in Greece’s migration policy whereby liberal reforms, introduced in –, were subsequently reversed amidst the crisis. Papadimitriou and Zartaloudis () have also discussed the unevenness of Greece’s adaptation record in the context of the immigration crisis that swept Europe in , during which the Greek government was able to upload some of its preferences onto the EU level, but struggled to align its domestic policy regime in order to accommodate EU strategies of crisis management in this field.

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

    

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Understanding contemporary Greece depends, in significant part, on an appreciation of its relationship with ‘Europe’. There is a deep historical and cultural layer to this that pre-dates the European Union, but one that has been reinforced by it. ‘Europe’ penetrates a Greek angst over its identity, progress, legitimation, and strategic interest and can serve as a yardstick by which to gauge patterns of disparity and evolution. Consistent with this background, Greece has displayed an enduring unevenness in its adaptation to the demands of EU membership. While the range of EU obligations have expanded greatly since , the significance of these obligations and the depth of adjustment has varied considerably. Much of the EU’s economic frame—the liberalization of the single market, the ordo-liberalism of the ‘euro’ regime—are alien to established Greek traditions and thus the base of adjustment is all the greater. As such, this EU frame is confronted by a domestic market structure and a set of sociopolitical interests antithetical to economic liberalism (see the Introduction to this volume). As a small, peripheral EU member with this kind of state tradition, Greece can be seen as something of an outlier or as a ‘critical’ test for assessing the reach of processes of Europeanization. Scholarship on Greece’s Europeanization has assessed the extent of Greece’s adaptation in a number of areas. Prior to the crisis, case studies had a positive tone: the empirical findings were often those seemingly hoped for. Post-crisis, there is a need for research to extend the purview across different fields, but also to critically engage with the domestic impediments to adaptation. Further, the conceptual frame can usefully embrace not only the post-crisis interests of key actors, but also the cultural and ideational frames they have concerning ‘Europe’. For Greece has passed from Europe being synonymous with modernity and economic growth to one enwrapped in austerity and exclusion, and this transition is still unfolding. ‘Europe’ remains a gateway to understanding change and continuity in Greek politics and society.

R Allison, G. and Nicolaides, K. (eds.) (). The Greek Paradox: Promise Vs. Performance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Amable, B. (). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Andreou, G. (). ‘The Domestic Effects of EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: Islands of Europeanization in a Sea of Traditional Practices’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,  (): –. Angelaki, M. (). ‘Policy Continuity and Change in Greek Social Policy in the Aftermath of the Sovereign Debt Crisis’. Social Policy and Administration,  (): –. Boerzel, T. (). ‘Why There Is No “Southern Problem”: On Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –.

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   

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Spanou, C. (). ‘Ανεξάρτητες Αρχές: κρίση, μετεξέλιξη ή αναβάθμιση του πολιτικού συστήματος;’ [Independent Authorities: Crisis, Advancement or Enhancement of the Political System]. In Kondiades, X. ad Anthopoulos, Ch. (eds). Κρίση του πολιτικού συστήματος; [Crisis of the Greek Political System?]. Athens: Papazisis, pp. –. Spanou, C. (). ‘External Influence on Structural Reform: Did Policy Conditionality Strengthen Reform Capacity in Greece?’ Public Policy and Administration,  (): –. Spencer, T. J. B. (). Fair Greece, Sad Relic: Literary Philhellenism from Shakespeare to Byron. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Sternberg, C., Gartzou-Katsouyanni, K. and Nicolaidis, C. (). The Greco-German Affair in the Euro Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Taylor-Gooby, P. (). ‘Greek Welfare Reform in a European Context’. In Petmesidou, M. and Mossialos, E. (eds.) Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate, –. Tinios, P. (). ‘Pension Report in Greece: Reform by Instalments’—a Blocked Process’. West European Politics,  (): –. Triantafyllidou, A (). ‘Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the st Century: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?’ European Journal of Migration and Law,  (): –. Triantafyllidou, A. (). ‘Greek Migration Policy in the s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis’. Journal of European Integration,  (): –. Triantafyllidou, A., Gropas, R., and Kouki, H. (). The Greek Crisis and European Modernity. London: Palgrave. Tsakloglou, P. and Mitrakos, T. (). ‘Inequality and Poverty in the Last Quarter of the th Century’. In Petmesidou, M. and Mossialos, E. (eds.) Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate, –. Tsalicoglou, I. S. (). Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece to the European Community. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Tsoukalis, L. (). Greece and the European Community. London: Saxon House. Tsoukalis, L. ed. (). Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adjustment. Athens: EKEM/Papazisis. Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D., and Exadaktylos, Th. (). ‘Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Venieris, D. (). ‘The Virtual Reality of Welfare Reform’. In Petmesidou, M. and Mossialos, E. (eds.) Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate, –. Verney, S. (). ‘To Be or Not to Be Within the European Community: The Party Debate and Democratic Consolidation in Greece’. In Pridham, G. (ed.) Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. London: Routledge, –. Verney, S. and Papageorgiou, F. (). ‘Prefecture Councils in Greece: Decentralization in the European Community Context’. Regional Politics and Policy,  (): –. Zartaloudis, S. (). The Impact of European Employment Strategy in Greece and Portugal: Europeanization in a World of Neglect. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Zartaloudis, S. (). “Greek Elections : The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning?”, LSE blog The Euro Crisis in the Press. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ greeceatlse////greek-elections--the-beginning-of-the-end-or-the-end-of-thebeginning/ Zartaloudis, S. and Kornelakis, A. (). ‘Flexicurity between Europeanization and Varieties of Capitalism? A Comparative Analysis of Employment Protection Reforms in Portugal and Greece’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

, ,  

......................................................................................................................

 . 

I

.................................................................................................................................. A extensively held conventional view considers the issue of Church–State relations in Greece as particularly complex and fraught with idiosyncrasies on account of the power of religion in Greek society and the weight of history in the life of the country. In what follows an attempt will be made to appraise the accuracy of this conventional view and to clarify the complexities and idiosyncrasies, if any, in Church–State relations in the country. It would perhaps be relevant in this connection to address the question of a supposed Greek ‘exceptionalism’ and to attempt to recover the character of Orthodoxy as a religious tradition in order to dispel many misconceptions. It should be recalled that the problem of Church–State relations is neither a Greek peculiarity nor an invention of Greek history. The question was already prominent in John Locke’s political philosophy in the seventeenth century, while the extent of Church–State problems remained an important source of friction and concern in European history in subsequent centuries. At the time of Greece’s emergence as an independent state in the nineteenth century, serious problems in Church–State relations were preoccupying public life in Britain, France, Italy, and Germany (Sykes, ). There was nothing peculiar or idiosyncratic, therefore, if statecraft in modern Greece had to come to terms with the question of Church–State relations. Inevitably, this chapter must adopt a longer historical perspective than others in this volume. An attempt will be made to draw the contours of the critical issue of ‘Church’ and ‘State’ in Greece by considering, firstly, the institutional context of the establishment of a national or autocephalous Church in the independent Greek state. This is a deeply political issue in the Orthodox world, as is being made dramatically clear by the question of Ukrainian autocephaly currently. The question of Greek autocephaly in the nineteenth century posed all the critical issues of religion and politics that were to resurface and reopen repeatedly in successive Orthodox contexts during the following

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, ,  



two centuries. Secondly, the chapter considers the complex ecclesiastical geography of contemporary Greece, which constitutes an important feature of the Greek political and administrative landscape, with implications for political life that from time to time emerge with urgency in public debates. Finally, the chapter considers the ecclesiastical consequences of the transformation of the Orthodox Church in Greece into a national church and the implications of its own lively self-understanding as a national church for Church–State relations in the country.

. A  N-B

.................................................................................................................................. The question of Church and State was posed immediately in the Greek context following the outbreak in  of the Greek Revolution and during the War of Independence in the s. The question was posed on the level of practice as a component of revolutionary action and on the level of theory as an object of reflection on the status of the Church in the new political community claiming its freedom and independence. On the level of practice the question of the Church was literally incarnated in the participation of several bishops and other clergymen in revolutionary action. Some of them fell in battle, others were executed by the Ottoman authorities at the capital or in the provinces in reprisal for the rising of their flock, still others died in prison as it happened with most of the bishops of the Peloponnese who were held hostages by the local Ottoman governor while the capital city Tripolitsa was under siege by the revolutionaries in the course of the year . The new role assumed by the Church in the revolutionary situation also involved a serious administrative upheaval with grave implications from the point of view of canon law. The episcopate in the revolutionary territories and many other bishops who had fled their dioceses for fear of Ottoman reprisals and had taken refuge in areas under the control of the revolutionaries, stopped commemorating their canonical ecclesiastical head, the Patriarch of Constantinople, who had remained subject, or captive, as they considered him, of the oppressor of their people. This was a very critical ecclesiastical development because it meant interruption of communion of the Orthodox Church in revolutionary Greece with the canonical order in the Orthodox Church at large. This too was an important step on the way to the construction of a national church. The situation on the ground stimulated some serious reflection on the question of Church and State on the theoretical level. The most unequivocal statement of the need to think and put in place a modern arrangement concerning the Church in the new political order-in-the making, came from the foremost liberal thinker in the Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios Korais. In the very first year of the Revolution, , in the prolegomena to his edition of Aristotle’s Politics, Korais argued that the Orthodox Church in liberated Greece should be declared independent of the Patriarchate of

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

 . 

Constantinople and be placed under the governance of a synod of clergymen to be elected by clergy and laity together (Kitromilides, : –). This was a very radical proposal, which revolutionary authorities did not take up, and thus the question of the status of the Church in the new state was left unclear. The revolutionary assemblies at Epidauros, Astros, and Troezen, nevertheless, in the constitutional documents they voted in , , and  respectively, proclaimed unequivocally by their very first article the doctrine of the Orthodox Church as the ‘dominant religion’ in the new state, at the same time recognizing the principle of religious toleration and freedom of worship in regard to all other ‘known’ confessions and faiths. The recognition of a state religion elicited Korais’s strong criticism in his Notes on provisional constitution of Greece and this essentially opened the debate on Church– State relations in Greek political thought—a debate that still goes on (Korais, : –, –). This debate, however, and the important issues of toleration and religious freedom immanent in it, were somehow overshadowed by another debate that was soon to emerge over the administrative condition of the Orthodox Church in Greece. This second debate developed with much greater intensity and ignited strong passions, which obscured the more fundamental issues of religious freedom and freedom of conscience that were preoccupying the broader European debate on Church–State relations for most of the nineteenth century. The issue of the administrative status of the Church, left unresolved by the revolutionary assemblies and by the first head of state of free Greece, Governor Ioannis Capodistria, for the most part out of respect for the Patriarchate of Constantinople, was taken up by the Bavarian regency that arrived in Greece with the new King Otho in January  and ruled the country during the young sovereign’s minority until . The architect of the solution to the ecclesiastical problem of the new state was the member of the regency Professor G. L. von Maurer, a scholar trained in law at Heidelberg and a Calvinist, who judged as the appropriate model for the resolution of the ecclesiastical question in Greece the adoption of the pattern of Church–State relations prevailing in the Protestant German states. This fundamentally meant the establishment of a state church, under the control of secular authority and completely independent administratively from its former canonical reference to Constantinople. This is how autocephaly was introduced in the Church of Greece by a royal degree dated  July  and with total disregard to the formalities of canon law (Petropulos, : –; Frazee, : –). Inevitably, there was an important if unstated diplomatic dimension to the ecclesiastical question. Of Greece’s so called ‘protecting powers’, which had guaranteed the country’s independence, Russia was hesitant and viewed autocephaly rather reluctantly for fear of weakening Orthodox feeling in the country (Frary, : –). On the contrary, Britain favoured autocephaly as one more factor conducive to the containment of Russian influence in Greece (Troianos and Dimakopoulou, : –). The announcement of autocephaly provoked an intense and wide-ranging debate in Greek public life, a debate that went much beyond the substantive ecclesiastical issues

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, ,  



connected with the administrative status of the Church of Greece and touched upon truly existential worries and sensitivities over the prospects of the Greek nation and its identity. The debate proved passionate and enduring over the following two centuries and was often rekindled, suggesting that the option of autocephaly exercised by the regency in  did not really address the deeper issues in Church–State relations in the country. As late as the second decade of the twenty-first century the debate is still going on and it invites a critical and rational appraisal of the full range of issues posed by the relation of religion and politics in Greek society. The most vociferous supporter among the Orthodox clergy of the ecclesiastical settlement introduced by the Regency was Theoklitos Pharmakidis, a theologian trained at Göttingen, deeply influenced by the thought of the Enlightenment and a follower of Korais. Pharmakidis had been the strategic mind on the committee set up by Maurer to advise him on the ecclesiastical question and he was the main architect of the solution that was finally adopted and imposed on the Greek Church. The major motivation of his attitude on the ecclesiastical question was its significance for the independence of the country rather than the subtleties of canon law. Pharmakidis’s views were not, of course, shared by all. The significant conservative part of Greek society, in fact a majority in the country, perceived the settlement imposed on the ecclesiastical question as a serious breach in the traditions of Orthodoxy and a threat to the sense of identity defined in these terms. The response was articulated with great power by the other leading theologian in nineteenth-century Greece, Constantine Oikonomos. A follower of the Enlightenment in his early career like Pharmakidis, Constantine Oikonomos was an accomplished scholar not only of religion but of the classics as well. He returned to Greece after a long residence in Russia in the s during the Greek War of Independence and brought back with him a deepened Orthodox conviction and devotion to tradition. This attitude led him to oppose the ecclesiastical settlement. To the claim of liberating the Greek Church, Oikonomos argued that the new regime imposed on the Church in fact meant a worse form of subjection and enslavement by the secular state. Furthermore, Oikonomos objected to the drastic change in Greece’s ecclesiastical regime because he considered it a mechanism for imposing Western models on the Orthodox Church and through them exposing the Orthodox community to all the pathologies of the West (Papaderos, : –; Troianos and Dimakopoulou, : –; Stamatopoulos, ). To a contemporary observer, familiar with cultural debates in Greece in the early twenty-first century these arguments will not sound strange or arcane. It becomes thus evident that the ecclesiastical question posed a whole range of issues, not simply of a religious nature, but referring to much broader concerns, cultural and political, connected with historical and social change, which still preoccupy Greek social and cultural thought. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, from whose jurisdiction the regency had unilaterally detached the Greek Church, refused to recognize these actions and the ecclesiastical entity that emerged from them. Communion was interrupted and the autocephalous

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

 . 

Church of Greece was considered schismatic by Constantinople. Conciliatory openings by the hierarchy of the Church of Greece were rejected by successive patriarchs, until in the early months of  the formalities required by canon law were finally followed by the government of the Kingdom of Greece, which appealed to Patriarch Anthimos IV through the Greek ambassador to the Sublime Porte, to accept a letter from the Greek Council of Ministers asking for restoration of communion and recognition of the Church of Greece. The Russian minister to the Porte also lent the support of the Tsar to the request for recognition (Frary, : –). Eventually, the Synod of Constantinople accepted the request of Greece for the recognition of its Church as autocephalous and the restoration of the unity of Orthodoxy. Thus on  June , the feast day of Apostles Peter and Paul, after the celebration of the liturgy in the patriarchal Cathedral of Saint George, a Synodal Tomos was signed and officially read, re-establishing relations between the Orthodox Churches and the Church of Greece and recognizing it as autocephalous under its own Holy Synod to be presided by the Metropolitan of Athens (Metallinos, : –, –). What emerges from the story of the question of Greek autocephaly is obviously the deeply political nature of ecclesiastical issues in Greece since the earliest history of the Greek state. That is why Church–State relations have remained a sensitive subject which needs to be handled with great political delicacy and with a broader historical and cultural understanding. The subject has received extensive attention by canon lawyers and theologians, and some of this literature is quite enlightening, both for understanding the intricacies of the Greek case and for placing it in a comparative European perspective of state- and nation-building.

. O N-S, M E J

.................................................................................................................................. Autocephaly restored the unity of Orthodoxy and strengthened religious feeling in Greece. The expected liberation of the Church from its administrative subjection to the State, however, as required by the Tomos of autocephaly, was not achieved. The tight control of the State over the Holy Synod and over the administration of the Church was reasserted by two laws passed in  (Laws Σ΄ and ΣΑ΄). These elicited strong criticism from proponents of the autonomy of the Church and of the canonical order provided by Orthodox tradition (Papadopoulos, : –). This has remained the main issue in Church–State relations in Greece ever since. Although subsequent legislation and constitutional provisions have repeatedly revised the structure of Church–State relations and on the basis of a new (late twentieth century) consensus have attempted to move the relation from one in which ultimate control rests in the hands of the state (νόμῳ κρατοῦσα πολιτεία) to a system of a ‘mutual solidarity’ (συναλληλία),

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, ,  



guaranteeing the autonomy of the Church under canon law, problems, tensions, and conflicts have often arisen, either as a consequence of ecclesiastical intervention in politics on critical occasions or as a result of attempts by the state to impose its own policies and options on the Church. Autocephaly and the restoration, to a significant degree, of Orthodox canonicity and administrative homogeneity in the internal life of the Church contributed to another important development in the Church of Greece. It made possible the introduction and cultivation of uniformity in ecclesiastical life which became part of the broader process of social and cultural integration that was an essential component of the nationbuilding process in the Greek state (Kitromilides, : –). The Church of Greece was organized in a network of twenty-four administrative units covering the whole territory of the Kingdom of Greece, that is the Peloponnese (Morea), continental Greece (Rumeli), the islands of Euboia, Cyclades, and Northern Sporades (Papadopoulos, : –). When the frontiers of the kingdom were extended with the cession of the British protectorate of the seven Ionian islands in  upon the accession of King George I and again in  with the cession of Thessaly and the area around the city of Arta in southern Epirus by the Ottoman Empire following the Congress of Berlin, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, under Patriarchs Sophronios III and Joachim III respectively, on its own initiative transferred the dioceses of these regions to the autocephalous Church. Thus, by  the Church of Greece reached its definitive geographical coverage that has remained unchanged ever since. Further expansion of the borders of the Kingdom of Greece after the Balkan wars of – and after the First and Second World Wars brought considerable new territories into the Greek state covered by ecclesiastical jurisdictions belonging to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. These new ecclesiastical jurisdictions included the dioceses of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace and those of the large islands of the Eastern Aegean, Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Icaria. These formed the so-called ‘New Lands’. The new territories also included the semi-autonomous Church of Crete and the monastic republic of Mount Athos. The Greek defeat in Asia Minor and the subsequent exchange of Greek-Turkish populations imposed by the Lausanne Convention of  January , which meant the depletion of its flock in the Turkish Republic, further led the Patriarchate of Constantinople to handle differently the status of its territorial jurisdictions which had latterly passed to the Greek state. With a ‘Patriarchal Act’ (Praxis) of  September , the administration of the dioceses of the ‘New Lands’ was transferred to the Church of Greece, but the spiritual dependence of these dioceses, which included very important sees like Thessaloniki and Ioannina, was retained by Constantinople. This new hybrid administrative status meant that the dioceses of the ‘New Lands’ would participate on an equal footing in the governing organs of the Church of Greece (having six members in the twelve-member permanent Synod governing the autocephalous Church), but their incumbent bishops would commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch at services along with the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (Troianos, : –).

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

 . 

The status of the semi-autonomous Church of Crete had been determined under the transitional period when Crete was an autonomous principality (–). The architect of that ecclesiastical regime was Eleftherios Venizelos, the future prime minister of Greece. The Cretan ecclesiastical regime provided for autonomy and selfgovernment under the local Synod, which elected the bishops of the island, while the metropolitan, later archbishop, of Crete was to be selected from a three-person list by the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Patriarchate retained its spiritual authority over the Church of the island, which has remained a devoted patriarchal territory to this day (A. Nanakis in Kitromilides, ed., a: –; Troianos, : –; Konidaris, : –). The monastic republic of Mount Athos, the beacon of Orthodoxy, with its twenty self-governing sovereign monasteries, came under Greek sovereignty in  with a unanimous vote of its governing body, the ‘Holy community’, composed of the representatives of the sovereign monasteries. The representative of the Russian monastery of Saint Panteleimon was absent on that occasion, but the representatives of the Serbian monastery of Hilandar and the Bulgarian monastery of Zographou duly signed the document of union of Mount Athos with the Kingdom of Greece. Thus, the historic monastic republic, which in the later part of the twentieth century went through a remarkable revival, came under Greek sovereignty, while ecclesiastically remaining directly dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Troianos, : –; Konidaris : –). A fifth ecclesiastical regime emerged in the Greek state with the incorporation of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese islands in . The dioceses of the islands had remained directly dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople during the period of Italian occupation (–) and the same regime continued following union with Greece. The five local metropolitans are elected by the Synod of the Patriarchate and they participate periodically in that Synod (Konidaris, : –). On the face of it, the five jurisdictions that make up the ecclesiastical geography of the Greek state today might be seen as a cause of occasional confusion and tension in the public role of religion in the country. It is true that occasional tensions have sprung up, especially over the administration of the dioceses of the ‘New Lands’ and the respect of the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as set out by the Patriarchal Praxis of  and recognized by the Greek constitution. The Patriarchate is particularly zealous of its rights and this from time to time has caused problems with the autocephalous Church of Greece, most recently during the reign of Archbishop Christodoulos (–), when things got to the point of temporarily interrupting communion between the two Churches in . On the level of Church–State relations, the multiple ecclesiastical jurisdictions in the Greek state have not in fact in any way obstructed national and political integration. On the contrary, the fact that all ecclesiastical entities, regardless of jurisdictional dependence, are public institutions under Greek law and have to abide by constitutional rules, has contributed to the cultivation of uniformity and homogeneity in the various expressions of religious life.

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, ,  



. T C  G   N C

.................................................................................................................................. The emergence of autocephalous national churches in south-eastern Europe, following the Greek precedent, marked a major turning point in the history of the Orthodox tradition and posed many challenges to the Orthodox communion. These issues have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Kitromilides, b). Here the focus is on the broader issues posed for the critical relation of politics and religion by looking at the consequences of nationalization for the Orthodox Church in Greece. Turning the Church into a component of the public sector in the national state essentially meant subjecting it to the vagaries of secular politics and the disorders and indignities this meant for ecclesiastical life. Three examples from the relevant experience of the Church of Greece could illustrate this claim. In , Greece experienced the so called ‘national schism’, that is to say the conflict between royalist and anti-royalist forces over Greece’s participation in the First World War that incited former Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to set up in October  a splinter Greek government at Thessaloniki that eventually took the country into the war on the side of the ‘Entente’ powers. These developments immediately made plain how susceptible the Church had become to pressures from secular politics. The autocephalous Church of Greece, under Metropolitan of Athens Theoklitos Minopoulos, was dominated by royalist feelings and, under the extreme pressure of royalist paramilitary groups, especially the organization of reserve officers, proceeded to pronounce an ecclesiastical censure on Venizelos for his political actions. This took the form of excommunication which escalated further on  December  with a demonstration in which clergy and a religiously motivated populist multitude heaped a mass of stones at the Athens Champ de Mars as a protest against Venizelos. Matters took a different course when Venizelos and the Thessaloniki Government, with the support of the Western allies, managed to oust King Constantine and take over the government of the country in . The new government, through a special ecclesiastical tribunal, brought the protagonists of excommunication to trial for uncanonical actions and dethroned the Metropolitan of Athens Theoklitos in July . A new Venizelist bishop, Meletios Metaxakis, a Cretan prelate of the Church of Cyprus, was elected as Metropolitan of Athens in February . Metropolitan Meletios did not last very long either. He was outsted by the royalist government that emerged from the election of  November  and Metropolitan Theoklitos was restored only to be definitely removed in December  following Greece’s Asia Minor disaster and the overthrow of the king and the royalist government during that eventful year (Tsironis, : –). All these disorders in ecclesiastical life caused by political intervention in the operation of the Church involved very serious costs for religious life and for the credibility of the official Church in Greek society. That was a major factor in the growth of religious

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

 . 

brotherhoods outside the direct control of the official Church as agencies of an alternative religiosity. The brotherhoods developed important activities in religious education and catechism of the laity and gradually assumed very influential roles in the religious, but also in the political, life of Greek society. Eventually, they even managed to exercise influence in the Church, especially over the election of bishops and archbishops. The most important such brotherhood was ‘Zoi’, which had been founded in  but grew exponentially in public influence following the protracted crisis in the Church during the second decade of the century. ‘Zoi’ cultivated a conservative ideology and promoted a system of values expressed by the slogan ‘MotherlandReligion-Family’ as a bulwark against social change and as a means of instilling pietism, puritanism, discipline, and docility toward entrenched forms of inequality in Greek society (Gazi, : –). The need for reconstruction was deeply felt in the official Church as well, and motivated the hierarchy to attempt to bring the Church out of the crisis by electing a new leader of impeccable ecclesiastical credentials and free of political attachments. This led to the election of a great scholar of theology and ecclesiastical history and professor in the University of Athens, Archimandrite Chrysostomos Papadopoulos, as Metropolitan of Athens on  March . Under Archbishop Chrysostomos (–)—so retitled under the new Charter—the Church of Greece entered a period of moral recovery and reconstruction. A new Charter of the Church, voted on  December , attempted to restore canonical order and peace and to free the Church from the tight grip of the state. The Pangalos dictatorship two years later, however, brought back in force the old laws  and  of  which solidified state control on the Church. Despite the constructive work of Archbishop Chrysostomos in many domains, including the economics of the Church and the clergy and popular religious education and evangelization, the basic problems in Church–State relations remained unresolved. The Church remained exposed and vulnerable in periods of political anomalies, which punctuated the Greek twentieth century. It is characteristic that all cases of deviation from the rule of law in the country were also marked by crises in Church–State relations expressed specifically with the emergence of ‘archiepiscopal questions’. Thus, the drama of the period of national schism was re-enacted twice in later periods. In  the dictatorial regime of General I. Metaxas intervened and forced the newly elected Archbishop Damaskinos out of office through a decision issued under duress by the Council of State rather than by a canonically constituted ecclesiastical organ. Damaskinos was a man of democratic convictions and thus undesirable to the dictatorship. He was replaced by a distinguished prelate, the Metropolitan Chrysanthos of Trebizond, who enjoyed the trust of the dictator. Chrysanthos did not last very long either because he was forced out of office in April  for refusing to swear in the quisling government established by the German occupation. Damaskinos was restored by a major Synod later that year and through his activity during the occupation and as regent after liberation emerged as a major national leader during a very difficult period in Greek history.

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, ,  



Major archiepiscopal questions also arose in connection with the other period of deviation from the rule of law, the dictatorship of  April  (Andreopoulos ). Wishing to bring the Church under its control, the dictatorship forced the resignation of Archbishop Chrysostomos II (–) and engineered an obviously uncanonical election of the royal chaplain Archimandrite Ieronymos Kotsonis by a special synod handpicked by the government. Archbishop Ieronymos I, who acted as a loyal agent of the dictatorship, was in turn displaced by the counter-coup of November . In this case, however, the dictators took the precaution to have a new head of the Church elected by a Synod of canonical bishops and thus the new Archbishop Seraphim, formerly Metropolitan of Ioannina, managed to hold on to the throne after the collapse of the dictatorship on  July . Archbishop Seraphim ruled the Church of Greece until his death in , and his tenure of the throne, which coincided with a period of major political change, ushered in a sustained effort to restore canonical order and normalcy in the Church and heal the wounds of the past. In the aftermath of the dictatorship and of the calamities it had brought to the country, both State and Church seemed to be learning their lesson that respect for the rule of law and the ways of democratic government offered the only outlet in view of the multiple problems facing the nation. Against this background, in almost half a century since the restoration of democracy, Church and State relations have been transacted in the constitutional framework provided by the  Constitution of the Hellenic Republic and the new Charter of the Church of Greece adopted by Law  in . The  Charter, after more than a century since autocephaly, established on a secure legal basis the autonomy and self-government of the Church according to the holy canons and Orthodox tradition. This is also guaranteed by Article  of the Constitution. Article  provides for the status, autonomy, and self-government of the monastic republic of Mount Athos under Greek sovereignty. The new conditions of normality and respect in Church–State relations were reflected in the two archiepiscopal elections, in  and  respectively, which were impeccably conducted by the hierarchy of the Church of Greece without any form of political interference. While the state and the political world have generally treated the Church with respect and abstained from intervention in its internal affairs, occasional tensions in Church–State relations in this period have arisen on account of pronouncements and interventions by ecclesiastical leaders or even by the Church of Greece as an organized body in public affairs and debates. The attitudes adopted and voiced by members of the hierarchy or even officially by the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece on these issues have been generally conservative and marked by a broad concern over the dangers for the integrity of Orthodox tradition or of the Greek nation, dangers seen to emanate from all initiatives or policies in the direction of modernization. Whenever such issues arise, the most audible public pronouncements usually tend to come from some of the most conservative members of the hierarchy, who tend to voice extreme anti-liberal views on various national or social questions. This in turn creates the misleading impression of a monolithic opposition of the Church to the modernization of Greek society and its identification with

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

 . 

anachronistic positions, which appear to turn religion and ecclesiastical institutions into brakes on social change. The impression is inaccurate because, in the ranks of the hierarchy and in the ecclesiastical communion more generally, there have been dissenting voices and alternative perceptions of what is needed and should be done for the renewal of faith and religious life. These dissenting voices and attitudes tend to be overshadowed by the vociferousness of the arch-conservatives, abetted by popular media. The phenomenon has shaped the public image of the Church on many occasions since  and especially since  when political change in the country and the policies and rhetoric of the socialists (PASOK) appeared to confirm the concerns and insecurities of the most conservative elements in the hierarchy, in the monastic communities and also among the laity. These attitudes were reflected in reactions to initiatives to modernize family law with the introduction of civil marriage in  under the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou, and again in reactions to legislation recognizing gay rights under the government of the Left in . On both occasions, the Synod of the Church of Greece issued statements expressing reservations and appealing to the traditions of a Christian society, but despite individual reactions on the part of members of the clergy and laity, both issues were defused in large measure thanks to the moderation shown by the top leadership of the Church. Greek society has been learning to live with the pluralism of values required by the times and membership in the European community of nations. Events appeared to take a different turn in Church–State relations on only one issue, which escalated in a major public confrontation. The conflict arose over the issue of the statement of religion on identity cards and came to a head in the year . The issue had arisen originally as a consequence of the Schengen Convention of  on the free movement of persons within the EU, a development which posed the requirement of issuing new bi-lingual identity cards. The subsequent introduction in  of the privacy protection law, which prohibited the inclusion of sensitive personal data, including religion, on state documents added further urgency to the need to issue new ID cards. When in the year , following its re-election, the socialist (PASOK) government announced its intention to issue new ID cards removing religion from them, a major reaction was precipitated on the part of the Church under Archbishop Christodoulos. Initially, the Church demanded that the inclusion of religion on ID cards should be maintained as a means of protecting Greek national identity. In the course of the debate, the Church modified its position and demanded that the inclusion of religion on ID cards should be made optional to enable all Greek citizens who so wished to publicly declare their faith. In order to affirm its position, the Church of Greece organized public rallies in Athens and elsewhere in the country that drew huge crowds protesting against threats to the Christian identity of the country. To add drama to the rally in Athens, the sacred standard of the Greek Revolution was brought from the Monastery of Agia Lavra near Kalavryta in the Peloponnese and was raised by the archbishop in a gesture of great symbolic significance regarding the role the Church was claiming in national life.

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, ,  



Beyond the rallies and the official statements of the Holy Synod, which insisted on the need to safeguard the ‘special national psysiognomy’ of the Greek people, the Church also organized a form of national referendum with the collection of signatures at parishes in the dioceses under its jurisdiction. More than three million people signed, demanding the optional declaration of religion on ID cards. All this constituted a dynamic show of strength on the part of the Church of Greece. The government, however, stood firm and responded that the issue was closed and that the law of the state was going to be applied. The president of the republic and the Council of State upheld the policy of the government as constitutional. Senior members of the hierarchy, such as the Metropolitan Theoklitos of Ioannina and others, also disagreed with the Archbishop and counselled obedience to the laws of the state. By September , the Holy Synod in a statement invited the government to collaborate with the Church for the protection of the distinctive national personality of the Greek people and their cultural tradition, called for national unity and, while stating that for the Church the issue was not closed in view of the millions of citizens who had signed the appeal, it made clear that its foremost priority was the avoidance of confrontation between the top institutions of the nation. In retrospect, the ID cards crisis appears as in fact the only major conflict in Church– State relations in the post- period. As such it can be seen as rather exceptional, but at the same time characteristic of another political phenomenon that had been sweeping Greek politics since : the rise of populism. The ID card crisis acquired the intensity that characterized it for more than a year exactly because Archbishop Christodoulos gave in unconditionally to the temptations of populism in the belief that in this way he was enhancing the power of the Church and serving the authentic Orthodox tradition of Greek society (Alivizatos, ; Makrides, ). In a period in which all other major political leaders appeared to be taking their distances from populism, the archbishop, himself a warm and expansive personality, appeared as the genuine successor to Andreas Papandreou in the public life of the country —with the difference that while Papandreou’s tactical acumen had prevented him from a head on conflict with the Church over family law and over the controversial law transferring Church and monastic landed properties to state ownership in  (Konidaris, ), Christodoulos with his fiery rhetoric against globalization and secularization was identified with unrealistic positions which had a very serious cost to the Church and himself (as the rumours about scandals and corruption in  made clear). The flirtation with populism on the part of senior members of the hierarchy surfaced as well in reactions to the question of the official name of Greece’s northern neighbour, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. When that country acceded to independence upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in  and claimed as its official denomination the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’, there were strong reactions in Greece, motivated by fears of irredentism at the expense of Greek Macedonia. These fears were recorded in a statement by the Holy Synod on  June . Huge public rallies in Athens but especially in Thessaloniki offered fora to senior members of the hierarchy to voice their objections to the use of the geographical term ‘Macedonia’ in

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

 . 

the name of the new country as a threat to the heritage of the Greek nation. The issue has remained very sensitive in northern Greece and two successive metropolitans of Thessaloniki have repeatedly criticized the governments as not being militant enough on the subject. When the issue resurfaced with urgency on the occasion of negotiations between the two countries in early  on the name and related questions, the Holy Synod issued a statement repeating the objections of the Church to the concession of the name Macedonia to the country’s northern neighbour. No major tension between Church and State arose, however. When the Prespes agreement was signed in June  there had been symbolic protests and rallies in Athens, Thessaloniki, and elsewhere in northern Greece at which bishops and other clergymen spoke, but no crisis in Church and State relations broke out, primarily because the government had kept the archbishop, Ieronymos II, informed, and secured his support in keeping things under control. The archbishop abstained from rallies or other manifestations of protest. These interventions of the Church in politics represent residual expressions of a selfunderstanding of its role as guardian of national identity and of the integrity of the Greek nation, an attitude that had been deeply ingrained by the whole process of the nationalization of the Church connected with autocephaly. There are, of course, voices of dissent within the Church and the hierarchy on these and similar questions, visualizing a modernized role for the Church of Greece in the broader context, and consonant with the principles of European integration, but these views have remained minority opinions and are expressed with considerable timidity. Serious public and academic debate on the role of the Church and on Church–State relations in contemporary Greece focuses primarily on two issues: the issue of separation of Church and State and the issue of religious freedom. Separation of Church and State is not officially favoured by the Church for political and financial reasons, primarily the continued inclusion of the clergy on the payroll of the state, but also because of its self-understanding as a national church and guardian of Hellenism. There are minority voices in the Church and in theological scholarship, however, which argue for separation as a final and necessary step in the definitive liberation of the Church from state tutelage and in the recovery of its authentic spiritual traditions, which are considered to have been adulterated by the long years of state dominance. On the secular side, separation is favoured naturally by all those who judge it necessary for the final construction of a modern liberal democratic state in Greece. Dissenting voices and reservations are heard on this side too, inspired by concern lest the disestablishment of the Church, as an institution of the public sector and the removal of some form of public accountability under the constitution, might make the Church vulnerable and more receptive to the pressures of populism and fundamentalism, which are not absent from its ranks. The debate on religious freedom arises from the juxtaposition of Article  of the Greek Constitution, which asserts the complete freedom of conscience, religion, and worship for all to Article  which affirms the place of Orthodox Christianity as the ‘dominant’ religion in the country. The recognition of Orthodoxy as the ‘dominant’ (ἐπικρατοῦσα) religion has been present in all Greek constitutions since the very first

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, ,  



constitution of revolutionary Greece. As noted above, the constitutional provision of a ‘dominant’ religion was severely criticized by Adamantios Korais as incompatible with the principle of religious freedom. The debate is still going on and it has given occasion for the expression of very interesting suggestions and subtle distinctions that fundamentally converge on an appeal to strengthen the institutional foundations and moral temper of civil society in Greece by disentangling religion from the public sphere (Stathopoulos, : –). The appeal for strengthening civil society includes the fuller integration of the Church and religious life into the broad space of the private sector, in which individuals and groups engage in pursuits that make their existence meaningful and free from state control or political interference. Arguments for religious liberty as a decisive condition of the liberation of the Church itself from various forms of state bondage, are basically supporting this position. In its history, the Church of Greece has proven its strength, tenacity, and moral authority as a fundamental constituent of civil society and, most recently, it has done so by basically managing almost single-handedly through its network of dioceses and philanthropic organizations and bringing under tolerable control the humanitarian crisis that resulted from the economic collapse following the financial crisis and the influx of large numbers of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. This achievement and its noticeably replenished spiritual resources at the dawn of the twenty-first century point to a promising new phase in the millennial history of an ancient tradition of culture and faith with an inexhaustible potential to adjust, survive, and renew itself.

R Alivizatos, N. (). ‘A New Role for the Greek Church?’ Journal of Modern Greek Studies, : –. Andreopoulos, C. (). Η Εκκλησία κατά τη δικτατορία – [The Church during the dictatorship –]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro. Frary, L. (). Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity –. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frazee, C. A. (). The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece –, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gazi, E. (). Πατρίς θρησκεία οικογένεια. Η ιστορία ενός συνθήματος – [Homeland, Religion, Family. The Story of a Slogan]. Athens: Polis. Kitromilides, P. M. (ed.) (a). Eleftherios Venizelos. The Trials of Statemanship. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Kitromilides, P. M. (b). ‘The Legacy of the French Revolution: Orthodoxy and Nationalism’. In Angold, M. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Christianity, Vol. V: Eastern Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, –. Kitromilides, P. M. (). Enlightenment and Revolution. The Making of Modern Greece. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. Kitromilides, P. M. (). Religion and Politics in the Orthodox World. The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Challenges of Modernity. London and New York: Routledge.

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

 . 

Konidaris, I. M. (). Ο Νόμος / και η πρόσφατη κρίση στις σχέσεις Εκκλησίας και πολιτείας [Law / and the Recent Crisis in Church–State Relations]. Athens: Sakkoulas Publications. Konidaris, I. M. (). Ιδιαίτερα εκκλησιαστικά καθεστώτα στην ελληνική επικράτεια [Special Ecclesiastical Regimes Within the Territory of the Greek State]. Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications. Korais, Adamantios (). Σημειώσεις εις το Προσωρινόν Πολίτευμα της Ελλάδος [Notes on the Provisional Constitution of Greece], P. M. Kitromilides (ed.), Athens: Hellenic Parliament Foundation. Makrides, V. N. (). ‘Between Normality and Tension: Assessing Church-State Relations in Greece in the Light of the Identity (Cards) Crisis’. In Makrides, V. (ed.) Religion, Staat und Konfliktkonstellationen im Orthodoxen Ost-und Südosteuropa. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, –. Metallinos, G. D. (). Ελλαδικού αυτοκεφάλου παραλειπόμενα [Omissions from the Story of Greek Autocephaly]. Athens: Domos. Papaderos, A. (). Μετακένωσις. Ελλάδα-ορθοδοξία-διαφωτισμός κατά τον Κοραή και τον Οικονόμο [Transfusion. Greece-Orthodoxy-Enlightenment according to Korais and Oiconomos]. Athens: Akritas. Papadopoulos, Chrysostomos. (). Η Εκκλησία της Ελλάδος [The Church of Greece]. Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia. Petropulos, J.A. (). Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, –, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stamatopoulos, D. (). ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’. In Leustean, N. (ed.) Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe. New York: Fordham University Press, –. Stathopoulos, M. (). Μελέτες —I [Studies—I]. Athens-Komotini: A. N. Sakkoulas. Sykes, N. (). ‘Religion and the Relations of Churches and States’. In Crawley, W. (ed.) The New Cambridge Modern History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, –. Troianos, S. (). Παραδόσεις εκκλησιαστικού δικαίου [Lectures on Ecclesiastical Law]. Athens-Komotini: A. N. Sakkoulas. Troianos S. and Dimakopoulou, C. (). Εκκλησία και πολιτεία [Church and State]. (–), Athens-Komotini: A. N. Sakkoulas. Tsironis, T. (). Εκκλησία πολιτευομένη [A Church Involved in Politics]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro.

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  .............................................................................................................

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS .............................................................................................................

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  ......................................................................................................................

     

......................................................................................................................

 . 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I , in the third edition of his three-volume System of Constitutional Law, N. N. Saripolos, at the time the most eminent constitutional scholar in Greece, characterized the Greek form of government as ‘cabinet government’ (Saripolos, ). Surprisingly for a German- and French-educated author, whose English was rather poor, he invoked Walter Bagehot. Saripolos claimed that, as in London, the prevailing constitutional conventions in Athens gave the ‘supreme power’ to the cabinet and, in particular, to the prime minister (PM). The latter, although constitutionally appointed by the king and accountable to parliament, resembled the US president since, in practice, the British PM was elected by the people. The only difference between the two sides of the Atlantic was that, while in the United States the head of the executive was elected directly by the people, in Britain and Greece, the PM was elected by the people’s representatives. In Walter Bagehot’s words, behind the appearance of a divided government, the ‘efficient secret’ of the British system of government—of the ‘English Constitution’ as he preferred to call it—was ‘the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers’ (Bagehot, ). That fusion between the two powers has also been the fundamental characteristic of Greek constitutionalism, since it was first introduced in the mid-nineteenth century. The winner of the elections was ‘getting it all’, that is, the absolute majority of seats in the single chamber of the Greek parliament. That was the case even if, owing to the electoral system, the winner obtained substantially fewer than  per cent of all votes cast.

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

 . 

Since then, cabinet government in Greece has had to cope with two apparently conflicting challenges. On the one hand, there was the disastrous propensity of Greek monarchs to intervene in day-to-day politics, either on their own or as proxies of foreign powers (Alivizatos, ). On the other hand, the cabinet government system has had to deal with instances of discord, that is, the longstanding habit of Greek politicians of fighting among themselves even when there is no substantial issue dividing them. In spite of this, cabinet government has survived most major crises, including the most recent (the  economic crisis), the devastating effects of which brought about the collapse of the Greek party system in . How can one explain that fundamental characteristic of Greek constitutionalism, that is the remarkable endurance of cabinet government before and after ? And what are the challenges that Greek constitutionalism is called upon to overcome, such as the menace of ‘illiberalism’ in European democracies of the twenty-first century? In this chapter, the term ‘constitutionalism’ is used not only in its conventional meaning as limited government under the rule of law but in a broader sense. As Jeremy Waldron has put it, it includes ‘the empowerment of ordinary people in a democracy’, with the aim of ‘allowing them to control the sources of the law and harness the apparatus of government to their aspirations’ (Waldron, ). In what follows, the analysis starts with the strengths of modern Greek constitutionalism, which prevail in my opinion over its deficiencies or negative aspects. A discussion of constitutionalism under the economic crisis follows, and the chapter ends with considerations on the scope for constitutional reform and conclusions.

. T S A   P

.................................................................................................................................. Universal suffrage, that is, the right to vote for all male citizens, was introduced in Greece precociously, in . At the time only one British subject out of twelve and only , citizens in France out a total population of  million could vote. Moreover, thanks to Charilaos Trikoupis, a politician who knew the British system of government very well, parliamentary government was introduced in Greece as early as . Not surprisingly, by the end of the nineteenth century Greece was referred to in many constitutional law textbooks throughout Europe, as a unique case whereby the parliamentary system of government was practised outside the countries where it was originally born, in Western and Northern Europe (Esmein, ). There has been an academic debate in Greece on the deeper causes of that precocious development: criticizing the prevailing romantic interpretation of history, which praises the allegedly ‘democratic DNA’ of Greeks since the classical era of ancient Athens, John Petropulos, in a path-breaking book (Petropulos, ), claimed that constitutions and universal suffrage enjoyed a widespread popularity not only among the people but also among the elites. Owing to the absence of distinct social classes and other major cleavages in a rarely homogenous society, and confident about their power

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     



to manipulate the people’s vote through clientelism, Greek local elites relied on the Constitution, universal suffrage, and the parliamentary system to maintain the reins of government. Indeed, in their effort to establish a modern Western, centralized state, Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first Greek head of state (–), and thereafter the monarchy, evicted Greece’s leading families from their traditional strongholds after the proclamation of national independence in . In other words, contrary to what had been the case in Britain, France, and other European constitutional monarchies in the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century, the demand for a constitution and for suffrage did not arise only from among the popular classes, but was shared by the elites as well. It is important to note that after the proclamation of independence (), the first Greek National Assembly was elected in , following the revolt of the guard of Athens on September  of the same year against the monarch, King Otto. Subsequently, the latter was obliged to grant a written Constitution, modelled on the French and Belgian archetypes of constitutional monarchy. Since , sixty-seven parliamentary elections have been held, out of which more than fifty have been assessed by all parties as fair. In other words, modern Greece’s electoral record is positive, to the extent that the people have been invited to vote at regular intervals. Moreover, as a rule, elections have functioned as a safety valve for the peaceful settlement of political disputes. Elections, therefore, which were in principle free, are the first pattern or regularity of modern Greek constitutionalism. The second regularity is closely linked to the first. Throughout those years, the winning party obtained and controlled the majority of seats in parliament, after having gained no more than – per cent of the total vote. Thus, as a rule, the Greek Chamber of Deputies was dominated by single-party majorities, rotating at regular intervals, in a typically majoritarian model of parliamentary government. This model should be contrasted with the so-called consensual model. The afore-mentioned model is usually referred to in constitutional terms as the Westminster type, since it resembles the British archetype of cabinet government. Better known as ‘δικομματισμός’ (two party system, understood as exclusive conflict between two contenders to power), the nineteenth-century Greek political party competition involved the struggle between Trikoupis’ New (Νεωτεριστικόν) party and his adversary, Theodoros Diligiannis’ National (Eθνικόν) party. Bipolar party competition in the first third of the twentieth century involved royalists on the one side and republicans (Venizelists) on the other. Thereafter, in the s Konstantinos Karamanlis’ (see Chapter ) National Radical Union (ERE, Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις) competed with the Center Union (ΕΚ, Ένωσις Κέντρου) and, after the fall of the Colonels’ junta () New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα). Since  the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) has sought to succeed PASOK as the alternative to ND. Mainly due to the electoral systems in force during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which favoured catch-all parties to the detriment of other parties, the succession of single-party majorities was interrupted only for short periods of time,

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

 . 

that is, from  to , in , from  to , in  and, more recently, since . During those short breaks, coalitions or unstable governments ruled. The lack of clear-cut majorities in parliament has had negative, if not devastating, effects on Greek democracy and facilitated in some cases (in  and in ) the advent of dictatorships. Not surprisingly, these comparatively short periods of coalition government were considered an exception to the single-party ‘normality’. Majoritarian parliamentarism, is therefore, the second feature of modern Greek constitutionalism. The enjeu of the elections was important, because the winner ‘took it all’. The winning party was expected to use state funds wantonly, to appoint political supporters, friends, and relatives to public-sector roles, and to pursue a range of clientelistic practices, better known as ‘favours’ (‘ρουσφέτια’). These were criticized heavily by the opposition forces, only for them to pursue similar practices upon their assumption of power. From an institutional point of view, it is interesting to note that the Constitution and relevant laws were designed if not openly to serve, at least not to impede the functioning of the bipolar Greek party system. Moreover, the judiciary is afforded neither the strength nor the independence to hold election-winning parties to account. In general, one may say that checks and balances, which in theory could prevent what Alexis de Toqueville termed long ago ‘the tyranny of the [elected] majority’, have always been underused, if not absent in Greece. Thus, the outcome of elections has been essential in determining policy both in the field of domestic politics and in the country’s international orientation. Decisions lay almost exclusively in the hands of election-winners, that is, the party forming a singlemajority government, which would enjoy very limited political opposition, as well as few other state institutions to grapple with. The importance of elections in Greece is not lost on the wider public, placing elections at the centre of public life. Turnout in Greek elections has generally been high (reaching – per cent of those registered to vote), while the last days of the electoral period have long been considered a major social event, mobilizing huge crowds at party rallies. The perceived importance and surprising appeal of elections to the popular mentality therefore constitutes the third pattern or regularity. A fourth pattern concerns the fate of anti-systemic parties. Except for very short periods of time since , the two systemic parties (ND and PASOK) have always prevailed at national elections. Between them the two parties jointly obtained vote shares as high as – per cent of total votes cast. The consequence has been that antisystemic parties, both on the Right and on the Left, have seldom surpassed the  per cent threshold of votes cast. No doubt, following the liberation from the Nazi regime (), were free elections to have taken place, the Communist Party (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας), would have obtained a much higher share, very probably somewhere between  and  per cent of the total vote. However, its spectacular increase in support was due to the exceptional circumstances of World War II, in which Greek communists, along with their counterparts in other occupied European countries, excelled themselves in guerilla warfare in resistance to Nazi occupation.

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     



To sum up, the four patterns or regularities which have marked constitutionalism and political party competition in Greece were the holding of genuine elections at regular intervals, the majoritarian type of parliamentary government and ‘winner takes all’ model, the high popularity of elections, and, finally, the attraction exerted by systemic parties on the electorate, to the detriment of extremist forces. Let us turn now to the grey pages of that trajectory, namely to the aberrations which have rigged the rules of the game.

. T D A  G C’ H T

.................................................................................................................................. Straightforward abolition, more than once, of parliamentary government constitutes no doubt the most important and obvious aberration in the trajectory of Greek constitutionalism. However, the total length of the three dictatorships in the Greek twentieth century (i.e. the dictatorships of Pangalos, Metaxas, and the Colonels) did not exceed fourteen years. Should one add the one year of divided government of – (Venizelist rule in Thessaloniki vs. royalist rule in Athens) and the three and a half years of Greece’s occupation by the Nazis (–), then the total number of years during which Greece lived without elections and without a parliament does not exceed eighteen years. This amounts to less than  per cent of total years from the election of the First National Assembly in  to the time of writing (). No doubt, these eighteen years of non-parliamentary rule constitute a significant period of time. However, one should be careful to view the period against the long duration of parliamentary rule. Moreover, if one compares those eighteen years with the thirteen years of Hitler’s rule in Germany (which had become a genuine parliamentary democracy only in ), the twenty-three years of Mussolini’s rule in Italy, the fifty years of Salazar’s rule in Portugal and the forty-odd years of communist rule in Eastern Europe, one obtains a more accurate picture of Greek constitutionalism’s achievement. Greece’s parliamentary record notwithstanding, it is important to note that the remaining  years of parliamentary life in Greece involved bumps in the road. Five deficiencies marred Greece’s parliamentary record: First, there were five instances in which major opposition parties abstained from the elections, as a sign of protest against the ruling majority (in , , , , and ). These abstentions were all a prelude to acute political crises that followed. Second, it has been a common practice that the winner of national elections initiates criminal investigation proceedings against leading personalities of the previous

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

 . 

governing majority. From Poniropoulos, who had been accused in , in his capacity as king Otto’s minister of finance and ultimately acquitted, to the case of George Papakonstantinou, PASOK’s minister of finance, who received a short sentence in , there have been more than twenty cases in which former ministers, including prime ministers such as Charilaos Trikoupis, Eleftherios Venizelos, the elder Karamanlis, Andreas Papandreou, and Constantine Mitsotakis, have been the targets of criminal investigations initiated by the parliamentary majority, under instructions of an incoming government (Soilentakis, ). Even though not all these persecutions led to trials, even less to convictions, this relevant practice of incoming governments is very significant, in view of the fact that there is probably no other European democracy with a similar record. Α third deficiency is the longstanding ineptitude and inefficiency of the Greek public administration, whose successive reforms were almost all unsuccessful. Mainly due to clientelism and to the catastrophic involvement of the major political parties in the selection and appointment of civil servants, the Greek civil service has failed to provide for the necessary infrastructure to create the appropriate climate to attract foreign and domestic investment and promote productivity and job growth in a competitive European and world context. A fourth deficiency is the underdevelopment of civil society. Since so much depends on the ruling (or the ruling to be) party, it is perhaps unsurprising that the average citizen ignores or even disdains initiatives from below (such as involvement in civic associations and voluntarism), that aim to influence decision-making. Although some important steps forward were made in the early s, when citizens mobilized to help address the negative social effects of the economic crisis and since  to face the refugee influx, there is still much to be done regarding the strengthening of civil society. A last deficiency is the widespread tolerance of ‘soft’ political violence. This is a type of violence which rarely reaches the threshold of causing deaths or major injuries, but still, during frequent riots, causes damage to private and public property and risks the safety of bystanders. For that phenomenon, which since the outbreak of the economic crisis of  has become a constant characteristic of day-to-day life and characterizes campus life in the most important Greek universities, it is the Left in particular which bears a major responsibility. To conclude this section, Greece has a long and positive parliamentary record, thanks to which it surrendered neither to the fascist nor the communist challenge during the twentieth century. Contrary to what has been the case in neighbouring countries of south-eastern Europe, elections have, as a rule, functioned as a safety valve for the peaceful resolution of political conflicts. However, by being so acutely divisive, patterns of government in Greece have come at a very high cost for the economy. The exorbitant public debt and the enduring budget and trade deficits, which made headlines around the world in , were indeed closely linked to the chronic lack of continuity in government action and to the lack of consensus even over the main lines of economic, social, and other public policies.

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     



. G   E C

.................................................................................................................................. There are two different ways to understand how the Greek political system reacted to the disastrous financial crisis that began in : first, to consider how the economic repercussions of the crisis affected voting behaviour; and second, to assess the functioning of the Constitution. Contrary to what was the case after the Great Depression in the s, political reactions to the crisis of the s in Greece were sharp and sometimes violent. Beginning from spring  and culminating in the summer months of the same year, huge demonstrations, usually leading to violent clashes with the police, became commonplace in the centre of Athens and other major Greek cities. For months, if not years, the tension was considerable. Up until the ascent of SYRIZA to power in  and contrary to other countries affected by the – recession (Bermeo and Bartels, ), radical reactions to the crisis were mostly linked with the socio-economic repercussions of the recession. Accordingly, the behaviour of the Greek voters was itself profoundly affected. The outcome of the May and June  general elections (two elections in a row, as the first was inconclusive) best illustrate new political trends in the wake of the economic crisis. The aggregate vote of the two systemic parties, that is, PASOK and ND, fell from . per cent in the  elections to . per cent in the May  election and to . per cent in the June  election. Obtaining only . per cent of the total vote (in May) and . per cent (in June) respectively, PASOK was the main victim of the party system’s downfall. In terms of party system competition and dynamics, PASOK was succeeded by SYRIZA which became the main competitor to ND, as it obtained . per cent of the vote in the May  election. This meant that SYRIZA obtained four times the percentage share of the vote which it had obtained in the  election. Moreover, winning . per cent in the June  election, SYRIZA came second, just behind ND (. per cent) and confirmed its role as the main opposition party. The above tendencies were confirmed in the elections of January and September . With . per cent and . per cent of the total vote respectively, SYRIZA obtained  and  seats in the -strong Greek parliament. Thanks to the unexpected support of a small right-wing party, the Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες), SYRIZA was able to form coalition governments both in January and in September . In many respects, SYRIZA’s second victory was more important than the first, because it occurred after almost one fifth of SYRIZA MPs dissented following Tsipras’ pro-European shift, in July , and formed their own party, Popular Unity (LAE, Λαϊκή Ενότητα); it did not pass the  per cent threshold and did not enter parliament. Although by far outnumbered in parliamentary seats, ND obtained . per cent of the votes in January , and . per cent in September , thus retaining the bulk of its voters. On the contrary, the electoral decline of PASOK was confirmed, with the party winning only . per cent of the votes (in January) and . per cent (in September).

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

 . 

As far as the smaller parties are concerned, the River party (Potami), a newly founded liberal party, obtained . per cent and . per cent of the votes respectively in January and September . Thus, it succeeded in entering parliament, but since then has been unable to consolidate its presence at the centre of the political spectrum. Lastly, Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή), an openly neo-Nazi party, obtained . per cent and . per cent of the votes in the two  elections and was represented in parliament by a substantial number of MPs. In the  election, it failed to enter Parliament. In view of this, at first sight one may conclude that in  the Greek party system was literally turned upside down: not only did a new protagonist, SYRIZA, replace one of the party system’s founding pillars, PASOK, which almost disappeared in electoral terms, but the far-Right extremist segment of the electorate entered the forefront of the country’s political stage on the shoulders of the neo-Nazi GD party. However, such a conclusion is rather superficial, as behind appearances continuity prevailed over change before and after the peak of the crisis in Greece. First, in spite of the setback it suffered in May , the ND party succeeded in preserving the largest share of its electoral base and remaining the main Centre-Right Greek party. Second, since its advent to power in January , and particularly since it signed an austerity-driven third Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July of that year, SYRIZA has in practice become a systemic party which, as the years go by, openly adopts a proEuropean rhetoric. In other words, SYRIZA is gradually becoming a new PASOK. At the same time, GD failed to improve on its electoral performance, although, under the successive MoUs in –, conditions were ideal for the further rise of all kinds of extremism. The situation is almost the same on the extreme Left, where KKE’s performance has been stagnant, oscillating between  per cent and  per cent of the vote, while the other left-wing extremist groups, including the far-Left Mutiny Party (Andarsya), have not reached the  per cent threshold which is required for parliamentary representation. To sum up, considering the huge salary and pension cuts, which amounted to the loss of approximately  per cent of Greek national income in less than five years, one is impressed by the endurance of the structural characteristics of the Greek political system. In other words, majoritarian politics in the form of cabinet government, has survived the recent economic crisis and, save some party-system adjustments to the post-crisis realities, is likely to remain unchanged (Contiades and Tassopoulos, ; Mantzoufas, ).

. T S  C R

.................................................................................................................................. In light of the above analysis, the fundamental constitutional dilemma in Greece may be summarized as follows: how can a minimum degree of continuity in government action be achieved, since some continuity is a prerequisite for reforms necessary to

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     



modernize the country? How can that reform task be reconciled with the divisive pattern of Greek constitutionalism? These issues have periodically been debated in Greece over the last two decades. For example, in April  and in May  the then leader of ND, Antonis Samaras, publicly made proposals for constitutional reforms, which he did not later pursue. Constitutional reform became topical again with the announcement of sixteen proposals for constitutional reform made by the SYRIZAANEL government in November . To put this last proposed reform into context, one must start with a brief interpretation of the political scene in Greece in the last phase of the economic crisis. At first glance, one may observe that, since SYRIZA’s pro-European shift in , the desirable continuity in government action has been achieved, not so much through reconciliation inside the country as through external constraints imposed by Brussels and the pressure exercised by the country’s creditors. This was the price that SYRIZA, ANEL, and the old systemic parties (ND, PASOK) agreed to pay in order for Greece to remain in the eurozone. No doubt, regarding the country’s finances and economic policy, that assessment is accurate. As one may easily observe, even after August , marking the formal end of the Third Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (–), no decision with important economic and financial implications can be taken in Athens, without the previous approval of the country’s creditors. However, in other policy sectors of cardinal importance, such as health system, education, and public order, it would be wrong to deny that there exist significant ‘degrees of freedom’ for important decisions to be taken at the national level. The issue, therefore, of how to enhance a minimal continuity in government action, to carry out long-needed deep reforms, remains pertinent. Perhaps the answer to the question of government continuity, which first comes to mind, is none other than the introduction of proportional representation as a permanent electoral system. Duverger’s theory of political parties suggests that, as opposed to majoritarian electoral systems, proportional representation favours small parties and coalition governments (Duverger, ). In that way, the electoral system enhances negotiation between future government coalition partners and, once a ruling majority is formed, the system almost imposes consensus among coalition partners. Basically, unless agreement at least on the essentials is reached, no decisions can be taken. Is that solution realistic in a country like Greece, where no tradition of straightforward and honest negotiation exists, and where notions of consensus and compromise are considered by large numbers of people as equivalent to treason and betrayal? Of course, one may object that traditions are not eternal; in a different context, they may themselves evolve and ultimately change. In Greece itself, for example, all governments since  have been coalition governments, consisting of ministers from at least two parties. However, this electoral system approach must be rejected not only on cultural grounds (absence of legacy of consensus on almost any policy issues), but also since in Greece’s contemporary fragile state of affairs, constitutional and electoral reforms should aim first at facilitating, rather than complicating, the decision-making process.

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

 . 

To use Tsebelis’ ‘veto player’ approach, in a period when efficiency and effectiveness in government action is the number one priority, the multiplication of stakeholders could lead to inaction, because the more veto players you have, the less consensus you may obtain (Tsebelis, : , ). One might turn, therefore, to the Constitution and to the decision-making process it embraces. As already noted above, the majoritarian tradition of Greek constitutionalism and the prevailing ‘winner takes it all’ mentality have rarely favoured players other that the systemic parties. After the return to democracy (), that tendency was further reinforced in view of the traumatic experiences of the role of the monarchy in Greek politics up to  as well as the role of the army, which until  used to systematically interfere in domestic affairs. At the time the present Constitution of Greece was drafted, that is, the spring of , the prevailing spirit was, at last, after sixty years of political turmoil, that the Greek people should be left alone to choose the government they desire. It came as surprise, therefore, that the so-called ‘super-prerogatives’ (‘υπερεξουσίες’) allotted to the president of the republic by the  version of the Greek Constitution were perceived by most people as a ‘hidden para-Constitution’ which, under special circumstances, would open the way to illegitimate forces for cancelling the people’s will (Tsatsos, ). In sum, until recently the concept itself of contre pouvoirs or contrepoids institutionnels, and its American equivalent, that is, ‘checks and balances’, were unknown, if not intentionally and deliberately neglected in the Greek constitutional debate. However, things began to change in the second half of the s. At the time, the ruling party, PASOK, cancelled the constitutional powers of the president of the republic (the afore-mentioned prerogatives to dissolve the parliament) by way of an amendment of the  Constitution which it carried through in – with the assistance of the KKE. PASOK started giving ever clearer signs that it would not hesitate to overcome any obstacle in its aim to retain power. Its main targets were the judiciary, which it tried to control through the appointment of sympathizers in the top ranks of the justice system, and the state-owned television (ERT), which it kept under tight government control. It was only then that, for the first time in contemporary Greek history, the independence of the judiciary and the government’s accountability not only before the electorate, but also before the courts and independent agencies, started being openly debated in the public sphere (i.e. in the Greek press, legal circles, and academic world). Nevertheless, despite the relevant debate, little was effected in practice. Today, the reinforcement of the president’s powers through restituting some of the prerogatives taken away in  is a commonly made proposal by proponents of constitutional reform. Such reinforcement could be achieved by way of restituting the president’s powers to dissolve parliament (Article  of the Constitution) and to launch referendums (Article ), as well as by involving the president in the nomination of the chief justices of the two Supreme Courts of the country, which are the Council of State (StE, Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας) and the Court of Cassation (AP, Άρειος Πάγος) through amending Article  of the Constitution.

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     



In that way, the parliamentary form of government would be respected, while avoiding bicephalic power (president of the republic vs. prime minister) at the top of the executive branch which, as shown by the experience of most semi-presidential regimes, almost always leads to undesirable conflicts between heads of state and the prime ministers. Finally, most constitutional scholars agree that the president should continue to be elected by the Chamber of Deputies and not directly by the people (Contiades, ; Sotirelis, forthcoming). In a recent lecture, the incumbent president of the republic, a professor of public law himself, strongly supported indirect election (Pavlopoulos, ). Supporters of this view, add, however, that in case of absence of the qualified majority required by the Constitution for the election of a new president, the Chamber should not be automatically dissolved as happens today according to Article  of the Constitution. On that issue, SYRIZA has proposed that, if no candidate for the presidency of the republic obtains the qualified majority of  votes (out of a total of  in the Greek parliament, as provided for by Article  of the Constitution), six more rounds follow. A vote would be taken in parliament every month, for a period of six months; and then a vote by the people should decide the winner between the two leading candidates for the presidency. Widely criticized for being too complicated and unnecessarily long, this procedure, if adopted, would reinforce the divisive pattern of Greek politics, with no positive side-effects. The best solution, proposed by Manessis () would be to provide, as arranged by the Italian and the German Constitutions, for an ad hoc electoral college composed of MPs and an equal number of local government officials, who would vote for the winner. Guaranteeing judicial independence as well as the autonomy of independent authorities, such as, to cite three examples, the National Board of Radio and Television, the ombudsman, and the Competition Authority, is the second facet of a constitutional reform aiming to establish checks and balances. As already indicated, from among the methods suggested to achieve that end, the most appropriate appears to be the involvement of the president of the republic in the nomination procedure of the relevant chief justices. Most observers agree that in an over-politicized country like Greece, the Constitutional Court option for the resolution of constitutional conflicts would not be a useful idea (Manitakis,  and Rantos, ; opposite opinion by Venizelos, ). If such a new court were to be established, the risk would be immense: political parties would end up imposing their own chosen judges in the nomination process, if not in the functioning of the Constitutional Court itself, through all kinds of political pressures. Another issue which requires radical reform connects with the immunities provided by the Constitution for ministers and other cabinet members. To put it bluntly, the relevant rules (Article  of the Constitution in force) are outdated. In detail, the Constitution requires that a decision by the Chamber of Deputies is taken for the persecution of serving and former ministers for crimes committed in the exercise of their duties; moreover, unless initiated within a very short period of time after the crime was committed, the persecution is inadmissible. The general demand for equal

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

 . 

treatment of ministers with ordinary citizens imposes profound reforms of the above stipulations. Likewise, the immunity provided for by Article  of the Constitution for members of parliament (MPs) who are charged with having committed criminal offences, should be replaced by a different provision: the question of prosecuting or not prosecuting a MP should be decided each time by the Chamber, at the request of the MP himself/herself, and only on grounds related to his/her political action. Another area requiring profound reform is, of course, the public administration. This should be achieved by ensuring meritocracy and transparency, and the adoption of rules imposing a safe tax and investment environment, in the manner proposed by the ‘Manos’ committee of experts’ in  (Alivizatos et al., ). Lastly, the process for revising the Constitution (Article ), which is currently highly cumbersome, should itself be simplified, to facilitate the adjustment of the Constitution to a changing world.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. The most important features of Greek constitutionalism and the patterns of government analysed in this chapter are profoundly rooted in the mentality of the Greek people. Conducting the business of government through heated political debate, engaging in slogan-oriented debates rather than pursuing consensual confrontation, and above all holding elections at regular intervals, are deeply ingrained in cultural traditions and form an integral part of the modern Greek identity. In Greece, experience shows that political change is generally sought by winning elections and placing colleagues and friends in power. Such a conflictual pattern of Greek politics and government has survived all major crises in the twentieth-century history of the country. However, although majoritarian politics led to clashes of an unprecedented violence both in the interwar years and after World War II—the so-called National Schism (‘Εθνικός Διχασμός’) and the – Civil War respectively—it is clear from the preceding analysis that, save the effects of the two world wars in which Greece was directly involved, conflictual confrontation could not in itself bring about the fall of parliamentary government, neither in  nor in . This being said, acute and continuously heated conflictual confrontation among political parties and leaders created a fertile ground for spreading nationwide discord and for the reinforcement of oppositional passions to a point of no-return. After the return to democracy in , the same conflictual pattern was reestablished, albeit in a more ‘European’ way. While opponents were no longer dismissed from the civil service after every government change, the spoils system not only survived but was broadened. Consequently, party influence remained intact, modernization almost impossible, and the state apparatus outrageously unfit to face the challenges of the new era. Moreover, Greece’s accession to the European Union (the then European Community) in  produced a widespread feeling of unfounded

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     



political and economic comfort and security. The saying, ‘Whatever happens, Europe will assist us’, although not openly admitted, prevailed in many people’s mentality and injected a nonchalant spirit into the younger generations. It is early to say if the economic crisis which erupted in Greece in , with its devastating effects for the day-to-day life of the enormous majority of the Greek people, has put an end to that situation. In the public sphere, however, only small changes have occurred. Despite appearances, the conflictual pattern of Greek politics has survived. Although profoundly renewed after the advent of SYRIZA, the Greek political class remains attached to old clientelistic practices. It is unwilling to endorse radical reforms, which are necessary in order to cope with the challenges of efficient government, alongside free elections and the respect of the rule of law under the new economic conditions. The most important of such reforms would be limiting the catastrophic effect of conflictual politics, namely discontinuity in government action, through establishing new and strengthening existing checks and balances among the institutions of Greek democracy. The challenge, which sincere reformers are confronted with, is how to persuade the largest possible audience that constitutional reform itself can have practical effects going beyond regulating the behaviour of ruling elites; and that such reform would help improve the lives of Greek citizens.

R Alivizatos, N. C. (). ‘In Search of Legitimacy: A Retrospection of the Constitutional History of the Greek Monarchy’. In Spielmann, D., Tsirli, M., and Voyatzis, P. (eds.) The European Convention of Human Rights: A Living Instrument. Essays in Honor of Christos L. Rozakis. Brussels: Bruylant, –. Alivizatos, N. C., Vourloumis, P., Gerapetritis, G., Ktistakis, Y., Manos, S., and Spyropoulos, P. (). Ένα καινοτόμο Σύνταγμα για την Ελλάδα [Αn Innovative Constitution for Greece]. Athens: Metaichmio. Bagehot, W. (). The English Constitution. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins. Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L. M. (). ‘Mass Politics in Tough Times’. In Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L. M. (eds.) Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes, and Protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contiades, X. (). ‘Comments on Article ’. In Spyropoulos, P., Contiades, X., Anthopoulos C., and Gerapetritis, G. (eds.) Σύνταγμα. Κατ’άρθρο ερμηνεία [The Constitution. Interpretation by Article]. Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, –. Contiades, X. and Tassopoulos, I.A. (). ‘The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Greek Constitution’. In Contiades, X. (ed.) Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis. Farnham: Ashgate, –. Duverger, M. (). Les partis politiques, th ed. Paris: Armand Colin. Esmein, A. (). Eléments du droit constitutionel français et comparé. Paris: Librairie Recueil Sirey. Manessis, A. (). ‘Η νομικοπολιτική θέση του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας, κατά το κυβερνητικό σχέδιο συντάγματος’ [The Legal and Political Status of the President of the

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

 . 

Republic in the Government’s Draft Constitution]. In Manessis, A. (ed.) Συνταγματική θεωρία και πράξη [Constitutional Theory and Practice] Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Manitakis, A. (). ‘Η ίδρυση συνταγματικού δικαστηρίου στις συμπληγάδες συνταγματικής και κοινής δικαιοσύνης’ [The Creation of a Constitutional Court Between Constitutional and Usual Justice]. In Manitakis, A. and Fotiades, A. (eds.) Το Συνταγματικό δικαστήριο σε ένα σύστημα παρεμπίπτοντος ελέγχου της συνταγματικότητας των νόμων [The Constitutional Court in a System of Incidental Judicial Review of Legislation] Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Mantzoufas, P. (). Οικονομική κρίση και σύνταγμα [The Economic Crisis and the Constitution] Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing. Pavlopoulos, P. (). ‘Presidential v. Presided Republic’. Speech at the Cypriot Chamber of Deputies. Nicosia, October . Petropulos, J. (). Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, –. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rantos, A. (). ‘Η αναθεωρητική πρόταση δημιουργίας συνταγματικού δικαστηρίου στην Ελλάδα’ [The Constitutional Amendment Aiming at Establishing a Constitutional Court in Greece]. In Manitakis, A. and Fotiades, A. (eds.) Το Συνταγματικό Δικαστήριο σε ένα σύστημα παρεμπίπτοντος ελέγχου της συνταγματικότητας των νόμων [The Constitutional Court in a System of Incidental Judicial Review of Legislation]. Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Saripolos, N. N. (). Σύστημα συνταγματικού δικαίου [System of Constitutional Law], rd Edition. Athens: Raftanis. Soilentakis, N. (). Υπουργοί στο Ειδικό Δικαστήριο (–) [Ministers [Accused] Before the Special Court (–)]. Athens: Papazissis. Sotirelis, G., (forthcoming). ‘Αλλαγή παραδείγματος. Η πρόκληση μιας νέας συνταγματικής οργάνωσης σε εθνικό και ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο’ [Α Paradigm Change. The Challenge of a New Constitutional Organization οn National and European Levels]. In Volume in the Honor of D. Tsatsos and G. Papadimitriou. Athens: Eurasia. Tsatsos, D. (). editorial in the newspaper To Vima (May ). Tsebelis, G. (). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Venizelos, E. (). ‘Η ίδρυση συνταγματικού δικαστηρίου στο πλαίσιο του ελληνικού συστήματος ελέγχου της συνταγματικότητας των νόμων’ [The Creation of a Constitutional Court in the Context of the Greek System of Judicial Review of Legislation]. In Venizelos, E. and Chryssogonos, C. (eds.) Το πρόβλημα της συνταγματικής δικαιοσύνης στην Ελλάδα [The Problem of Constitutional Justice in Greece]. Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Waldron, J. (). ‘Constitutionalism—A Skeptical View’. In Christiano T. and Christman J. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

 

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I Greece, like in other jurisdictions with a strong positivist tradition, courts are not typically considered part of the political landscape. As many claim, their province is law, not politics. Yet Greek courts merit their place in a book on politics for two reasons. The first, and more obvious, is that courts are among the institutions that govern the polity’s affairs; they are part of its governance, in the broad sense of the term. The second reason is deeper and open to greater contestation. It relates to the question whether courts make their own political choices or simply apply the law. The latter approach has been influential in many civil-law countries with a strong positivist tradition, like Greece. According to this view, the judiciary is the bouche de la loi, a quasi-automatic, non-discretionary processor of general norms set by other institutions. In this paradigm, the courts’ operations are predominantly approached using vocabularies that are based on the binary code of legal/illegal—unlike political institutions, which operate on the binary code of government/opposition (Luhmann, , ). However, this picture of apolitical, mechanical courts is fictitious in Greece, like in other political systems. Greek courts are often left with choices regarding the interpretation of the law that invite engagement with political assessments—sometimes even fundamental political assessments. They are thus part of the political system also in the second sense mentioned above: they make political choices, choices that the binary code of legality cannot fully capture. Starting from this premise, this chapter introduces some basic characteristics of the Greek judiciary and delineates its role in Greek politics in three parts. The first part offers an overview of the building blocks of the Greek judiciary in comparative perspective. The focus here is on the judicial review of constitutionality, one of the major gates through which courts enter the world of politics. The second and main part is dedicated to the substance of the relationship between Greek politics and the judiciary. In addressing that issue, this part revisits the concept of the rule of law. The rule of law is at the same time

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

 

the most concise and the most archetypical expression of the dichotomy between the political and the legal system. It implies that the exercise of public authority is () subject to effective judicial review () by courts that are independent and () apply legal standards. The second part discusses these three elements in reverse order, examining three occasions when the Greek rule-of-law paradigm becomes porous. The first section covers situations where judges rule beyond clearly defined legal standards. This is the case when the judiciary engages in political assessments, generally captured in the concepts of judicial activism or the judicialization of politics. The second section investigates the opposite situation, where politics rule instead of the law. Here, the focus is on judicial (in) dependence, namely politics penetrating the realm of law, such as when political actors intervene in the exercise of judicial authority. The third section discusses occasions when the law does not rule. This covers the issue of judicial (in)effectiveness, introducing some elements of the political economy of the Greek judiciary and its problems with delivering justice in a timely manner. Finally, the third part of the chapter sketches directions for future research agendas.

. B E  C C

.................................................................................................................................. Greek courts are divided into three separate jurisdictions—administrative, civil, and criminal—depending on the subject-matter they adjudicate (Spyropoulos and Fortsakis, ). The control of public expenditure falls within the special scope of the Court of Audit (ES, Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο). Hierarchically, Greek courts are organized in three instances: the courts of first instance (lower courts), the courts of appeals (appellate courts) and the Supreme Courts, of which there are three. The Council of State (StE, Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας) presides over the hierarchy of administrative courts, the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court (AP, Άρειος Πάγος) is responsible for civil and criminal matters, and the Court of Audit has specific competences, mainly regarding fiscal issues and auditing public expenditures. A defining element of the Greek judicial system is the absence of a Constitutional Court dedicated to the review for constitutionality. Constitutional review is the single most powerful form of judicial review, as it allows courts to deny the application of parliamentary statutes. It is thus the basic instrument through which the judiciary engages with fundamental political issues. There are generally two possible systems of constitutionality review: systems of concentrated review and systems of diffuse review. In systems of concentrated constitutionality review, a central judicial body—a Constitutional Court or an equivalent institution—is tasked with reviewing whether exercises of public authority are compatible with the Constitution and has the power to declare legislation invalid. Because of its role, the composition of this institution often reflects political balances. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht is based on this model, which

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 



has also prevailed in Central and Eastern European countries. In systems of diffuse constitutionality review, on the contrary, all ordinary courts have the power to review the constitutionality of the law in the concrete cases brought before them. A diffuse system does not exclude the existence of one highest court at the apex of the judicial hierarchy, which, like the US Supreme Court, has the ultimate word. Rather, what matters is that there is no monopoly of constitutional interpretation (Stone Sweet, ). Unlike most European countries, Greece follows the US model of diffuse review. All Greek courts, regardless of their jurisdiction and their hierarchical rank, may pronounce themselves on the constitutionality of parliamentary statutes in the process of adjudicating the cases brought before them. Although ordinary courts do not have the power to invalidate an unconstitutional statute, they have the power and the obligation to disapply it in the concrete case they are adjudicating. In Greece, the development of the review for constitutionality followed an individual path, one markedly different from other European legal traditions—from which Greece borrowed most of its legal institutions in its nineteenth-century state-building phase (Ioannidis and Koutnatzis, ). Already in the second half of the nineteenth century, Greek courts started reviewing legislative acts for their compliance with the Constitution. This exceptional development was neither based on a political decision subsequently enshrined in some constitutional document, nor the outcome of a radical judgment by a supreme court, like in the US with the case Marbury v Madison (Kaidatzis, ). As Kaidatzis has explained, the courts themselves, in discussion with legal theorists and the public opinion, gradually and incrementally established the power of the judiciary to deny the application of unconstitutional statutes (Kaidatzis, ). The text of the Constitution first explicitly introduced the courts’ power to review the constitutionality of law in . Currently, Articles () and () of the Constitution provide for this competence. In the second half of the twentieth century, Greece’s integration in forms of European cooperation reinforced the power of Greek courts to review legislation. The accession of Greece in supranational (EU) and international (European Convention of Human Rights, ECHR) mechanisms of cooperation introduced two additional layers of quasi-constitutional rules, which claim precedence over parliamentary statutes. Although these mechanisms of judicial review function differently from constitutionality review stricto sensu, namely judicial review based on the Greek Constitution, the fundamental elements remain the same: courts may also use European rules to contest the decisions of political bodies, including of the parliament. Like constitutionality review in the narrow sense, this follows the principle of diffuse review. Unlike in the US, the Greek judiciary is not crowned by a powerful Supreme Court, which ultimately collects all controversial questions of compatibility with the Constitution. Greece, with its three Supreme Courts at the top of the respective jurisdictions, differs significantly from the US, the most famous system of diffuse constitutionality review. If two of the Greek courts render conflicting judgments on the constitutionality of a statute, the Special Highest Court (AED, Ανώτατο Ειδικό Δικαστήριο), a special

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judicial institution provided for in Article  of the Constitution, is called upon to ‘settle the controversy’. This court has the power to annul an unconstitutional statute with erga omnes effect, thus resembling a typical Constitutional Court of a system of concentrated review. In practice, however, the role of the SHC is rather limited. Due to its limited jurisdiction, the Special Highest Court, despite its title, is not the major judicial actor in Greek politics. In the absence of a Constitutional Court, the most significant forum of review for constitutionality and the most important judicial institution from a political perspective is the Council of State. Because the judicial control of public authority falls under the jurisdiction of administrative courts, most politically controversial cases take the form of applications for judicial review. The Council of State, the highest court of the administrative jurisdiction, has extensive original jurisdiction to review the legality of administrative acts at first and last instance, and it also has appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of lower administrative courts. This review includes controlling executive discretion, when the law allows such discretion, and incidentally controlling the constitutionality of the parliamentary statute that authorizes administrative action. These are the two most important paths that the Council of State uses to connect to— and often challenge—the political power exercised by the parliament and the executive. Moreover, the Council of State has the competence to give an opinion concerning the legality, prior to their adoption, of all executive regulatory decrees—another way to review the executive power’s basic choices. Two reforms further strengthened the position of the Council of State in the Greek legal and political landscape after . Thanks to the first reform, the so-called ‘pilot trial’, questions of ‘general interest bearing on a broader range of persons’ can be brought before the Council of State even if these issues would originally have been a matter for lower courts. The second reform, addressing the appeal system, turns the case-law of the Council of State into a standard of admissibility for applications for appeal, effectively rendering it akin to a source of law. In sum, considering both its traditional powers and the post- developments, the Council of State emerges as the single most important actor in the Greek judicial landscape for students of Greek politics. For lower courts, political actors, the media, scholars, and citizens, the Council of State occupies the central position in the Greek legal order when it comes to fundamental political issues.

. C  P: E   G R--L P

.................................................................................................................................. The Greek courts and politics cross ways at three junctures. First, there are instances where courts exercise judicial discretion over fundamental questions of public policy, such as the economy, national and religious identity, or the environment. In these cases, courts are often called to rule beyond clear legal standards and engage with

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political assessments (Section ..). Second, there are occasions when political institutions—mainly the executive—interfere with judicial organization and decisionmaking, challenging judicial independence (Section ..). Third, judicial ineffectiveness, namely the systemic problems of Greek courts in delivering timely justice, contributes to the general perception that in Greece, law often does not rule, thus further weakening the citizens’ trust in the state and the political system (Section ..). Combined, these three dimensions sketch the basic contours of the Greek rule-of-law paradigm.

.. When Judges Rule Beyond Legal Standards: Judicial Activism and Judicialization of Politics Greece is a civil-law jurisdiction: judicial reasoning focuses on the meaning of parliamentary statutes and executive regulations rather than on judicial precedents, as in systems of common law. Judicial authority is circumscribed by parliamentary and executive rules, which purports to comprehensively regulate social affairs. Thus, Greek courts never had the role of American and British judges in shaping the law of the land. Yet, Greek courts take part in the development of Greek law in several ways: by interpreting abstract principles, by fleshing out general clauses of private and public law, and by exercising their judicial discretion where positive law leaves lacunae. Like all acts of interpretation, the activity of Greek courts is never totally bound or textually predetermined. When the law reaches its limits, or when equally defensible interpretations of rules exist that lead to different decisions, judges are called upon to make their own policy assessments. Although present in all judicial activity, the most important field where the courts’ creative role assumes political significance is the review for constitutionality. Constitutionality review allows courts to check the will of the parliament against constitutional standards, which are often broadly drafted and allow the courts a creative margin. Ran Hirschl uses the concept of the judicialization of (in his terms ‘pure’ or ‘mega’) politics to distinguish between judicial activity that touches upon a society’s key political controversies and judicial activism in general, which also covers courts’ development of more mundane concepts of private and public law, such as contract and tort law (Hirschl, ; Hirschl, ). According to Hirschl, the ‘judicialisation of pure politics’ describes ‘the transfer to the courts of matters of an outright political nature and significance including core regime legitimacy and collective identity questions that define (and often divide) whole polities’ (Hirschl, ). The judicialization of core political controversies is a broader contemporary trend. In modern constitutional systems, most fundamental political issues eventually end up in courtrooms, where their contestation is governed by the laws, mores, and language of adjudication. This general trend is well documented in common law and civil law jurisdictions (Shapiro and Stone Sweet, ; Stone Sweet, ; Hirschl, ) as well as at the

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supranational (Weiler, ; Stone Sweet, ; Stone Sweet, ; Conant, ) and at the international level (von Bogdandy and Venzke, ). Greek courts have also been confronted with the conundrum (and sometimes criticism) of the judicialization of politics. Although, as explained above, all Greek courts may engage in this form of review, the most important cases, both from a theoretical and a practical perspective, come from the highest courts and especially the Council of State. The relevant literature has approached this issue more from the perspective of qualitative legal analysis and only to a lesser extent with quantitative methods. The pioneering analysis of Alivizatos, who also employs quantitative tools to rank western European courts along the activist–deferential axis, assigns the Greek judiciary a middle position in terms of judicial activism compared to the rest of western European courts—albeit presenting it as a leader among systems of diffuse constitutionality review (Alivizatos, ). However, most authors who engage with the judicialization of politics apply qualitative legal methodologies, analysing the caselaw to assess the scope and intensity of the judicial review of political choices. This is a field almost exclusively occupied by legal scholars, who approach judicial activism by analysing the way courts use certain legal concepts, such as public interest, standard of review, act of government, and proportionality—the most formidable concept of all adjudicators (Stone Sweet and Mathews, )—to engage with political assessments. Although not always explicitly employing the terms ‘judicial activism’ or ‘judicial politics’, these contributions ultimately study the terms of courts’ engagement with political issues. Some of these studies approach the relationship between courts and politics from a historical perspective, following the case law of the courts and especially of the Council of State and trying to define patterns of higher or lower judicial activism over time (Alivizatos, ; Sarmas, ; Koutnatzis, ; Kaidatzis, ). Although Greek courts awarded themselves the powers of constitutionality review early on, they hesitated to use them in an activist manner (Kaidatzis ). Until the s, Greek courts were generally reluctant to challenge the constitutionality of the decisions of political institutions. The establishment of the Council of State in  by Eleftherios Venizelos marked the beginning of an era in which the judiciary engaged much more systematically with constitutionality review. But in its early phases, the Council of State also avoided contesting basic choices and reforms of the political branches. Until the end of the twentieth century, the most systematic form of judicial review was the application of the constitutional principle of equality by civil courts and the Criminal Court (Alivizatos, : ). Between  and the early s, courts remained reluctant to engage with the choices of the executive and the parliament except to impose outer limits on the restriction of fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression and media freedom (StE /; /). The election of PASOK in the s marked a crucial point in the courts’ engagement with politics. For the first time, they were called upon to assess the constitutionality of the basic political choices of a democratically elected government, which came to power on a far-reaching

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political platform. The Council of State adopted a deferential stance to both the early interventionist period of PASOK at the beginning of the decade and the consolidation measures introduced after  (Alivizatos, ; Koutnatzis, ; Kaidatzis, ). The socialists’ major choices concerning public administration, economy, church property, universities, and the health system were upheld by the judiciary—which also followed a deferential approach when called to assess the proportionality of measures adopted by the other branches (Gerapetritis, ). Although the Council of State assumed a broadly deferential stance with regard to the liberalization era that started in  (Kaidatzis, ), the judiciary has not shied away from challenging the privatizations of core state tasks (StE /), the discrimination between groups (StE /), and the interference with its own judicial tasks (StE /). In this period, however, the protection of the environment began to receive growing attention, and after , it became the cause célèbre of Greek judicial activism. According to Sarmas, the period after  was generally characterized by the court’s greater willingness to engage with political choices and contest them (Sarmas, : –). Historical approaches necessarily try to generalize, departing from fields of policy that often obey their own legal and political rationalities. For this reason, some scholars approach judicial politics in relation to specific fields of public policy. Many focus on critical fields of the economy (Kaidatzis, ; Karavokyris, ) and the environment (Papaspyrou, ; Chryssogonos and Contiades, ; Dellis, ; Papakonstantinou, ). Few authors focus directly on identifying elements of a general theory of judicial activism (Efstratiou, ; Tassopoulos, ; Papaspyrou, ). Following this approach, certain fields that engage fundamental political assessments, such as economy, identity, and the environment, are presented below, to offer insights into the interplay between the judiciary and politics in Greece.

Economy during the Eurozone Crisis In , Greece entered its most defining post- phase (Featherstone, ). To avoid outright default and a possible exit from the eurozone, a series of agreements were concluded with European and international institutions, providing for economic assistance in exchange for extensive adjustment measures. Many of these measures, such as pension cuts and wage reductions, were challenged before the courts, which were called to assess their compatibility with the constitutional rules. As individual adjustment measures were adopted by successive Greek governments and parliaments as package deals following procedures that allowed for only limited political debate (Ioannidis, ), many affected interests saw the courts as the last available channel for expressing disagreement. Courts were approached by litigants not only as a means of seeking individual redress, but also as fora of collective political contestation. Judicial action and constitutionality arguments were embedded in political campaigns and formed a critical part of the strategies of interest groups and politicians opposing the EU/IMF assistance arrangements (Chryssogonos, ; Katrougalos, ; ABA, ; Katrougalos, ).

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Yet Greek courts, and especially the Council of State, proved extremely careful in contesting the central political assessments of the executive and legislative branches (Mantzoufas, ; Ziamou, ; Karavokyris, ). At the beginning of the crisis, the Council of State adopted a largely deferential stance towards the political branches. Starting from the milestone case /, the Court adopted a limited proportionality review and used the concepts of emergency and extraordinary circumstances to frame the notion of public interest, in the form of budgetary interest, as a ‘master justification’, which allowed the legislator and the government great leeway in interfering with individual rights and other constitutional limitations (see also StE –/; –/; /; SHC /) (Giannakopoulos, ; Lazaratos, ; Mantzoufas, ; Contiades and Fotiadou, ; Vlachogiannis, ). Later on, once the immediate danger of collapse had subsided, the Court showed greater willingness to check financial-adjustment measures and applied stricter judicial control to austerity measures that affected specific groups involved in what the Council of State identified as ‘core-of-the-state affairs’, such as the army and police officers (StE /), university professors (StE /), and the judiciary itself (Special Court competent for the salaries of judges /; see also StE / on the privatization of waterprovider services). By shifting its interpretation of the principle of proportionality, the Council of State ultimately found cuts to pensions and welfare benefits to be unconstitutional at a horizontal level, not only in relation to certain groups (StE –/ ). Even in this latter phase, however, the Court limited the budgetary repercussions of its judgments, creatively devising a temporal limitation, so that the effect of its judgments would apply only in the future. Notably, the Court did not assess the merits of the application for judicial review of the referendum of  on the third adjustment programme, based on the doctrine of act of government (StE /), which excludes the judicial review of certain acts of government with highly political character. In sum, during the crisis, the Court recognized the leading role of the political branches in determining the necessary measures to avoid default and to consolidate public finances. As the existential phases ended and the accumulated effects of austerity became more severe, the Court shifted to closer scrutiny (Contiades and Fotiadou, ). Yet even then, the Court reflected on the budgetary implications of its judgments, putting pragmatic limits on its involvement with fundamental economic decisions. In any case, the Court assumed a central place in the political contestation over the course the country should take during the eurozone crisis, it engaged with questions of ‘pure politics’ in Hirschl’s terms, and, as is also important, it was perceived to do so both in public discourse and inside the Court. Media often focused on the Court’s ‘crisis case-law,’ and forceful dissenting opinions became a common feature, evidencing a major divide within the Court that reflected the divide within society and politics (Vlachogiannis, ). This divide culminated in  in the first resignation of a president in the history of the Council of State based on his disagreement with the Court’s deferential stance towards internationally mandated social-security reforms.

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National and Religious Identity The Court has been a significant actor when it comes to issues of national and religious identity. In the milestone / case, the Council of State was called to assess a reform of the Nationality Act, initiated in  by the government as a response to Greece gradually becoming a country of immigration. The reform allowed aliens to receive Greek citizenship based on typical criteria (five-year legal stay of the alien’s parents in the country, six-year attendance of a Greek school). It also awarded aliens without Greek citizenship a limited right to vote and to stand as candidates in local elections. The Court found both reforms unconstitutional and judicially defined the identity of the Greek polity based on notions of continuity and national homogeneity. By interpreting a series of fundamental constitutional provisions, such as Article () and () (principle of popular sovereignty) and Article () (right to vote), the Council of State required ‘the existence of a genuine link between the alien and the Greek state and society’, which, as the Court claimed, is a polity based on a certain cultural background, relatively stable mores and traditions, and a common language. Adopting an intensive standard of review of legislative choices (Takis, ) and a much more activist stance compared to the economic-crisis measures (Mantzoufas, ), the Court ruled that the legislator cannot change the composition of the citizenry and the electoral body by offering citizenship and political rights to persons who do not meet substantial criteria substantiating a genuine link to Greek society. Cases / and / illustrate ways in which the Council of State becomes involved in the field of religious identity. In fact, case / literally pertains to identity issues: some Church-affiliated applicants judicially challenged the decision of the government not to include data on religious affiliation in the new identity documents. The issue had become fiercely politically contested in the early s, when the Church supported a policy that would allow for an option to declare religious faith in identity documents. The Court disagreed and ruled that neither the privileged position of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Constitution nor the freedom of religion would allow for such an option. In case /, the outcome was different. There the Court was called to scrutinize the decision of the government to reform the religious education curriculum for students between the ages of eight and fifteen years. According to this decision, which was once again adopted amid considerable opposition, school religious courses should be less oriented towards teaching the dogmas and beliefs of the Eastern Orthodox Church and instead aim to teach about religions in general. In a legally controversial reading of Article () of the Constitution, which requires that education shall strive for ‘the development of national and religious consciousness’, the Court annulled the ministerial decision on the basis that it did not sufficiently promote the development of students’ Christian orthodox consciousness. These judgments illustrate that the Court has been willing to adopt a more intrusive standard of review regarding questions that shape the self-understanding of the Greek polity, sometimes adopting a constitutional frame that resembles a communitarian paradigm of a closed, integral polity.

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Environmental Issues Environmental regulation is the field of public policy in which the judiciary has been the most actively involved. On the basis of a broadly drafted constitutional provision (Article ), the Court’s case law established the basis of the entire Greek spatial planning and environmental law (Menoudakos, ; Chryssogonos and Contiades, ; Siouti, ), and the Fifth Section of the Council of State, responsible for environmental issues, gradually became synonymous with judicial activism (Papakonstantinou, ). By accepting very liberal requirements for locus standi, the Court allowed interested parties to file applications for annulment even when only remotely affected by the attacked measure (StE /, /, / ). It also shaped basic principles of Greek environmental law, such as the principle of sustainable development, ruling that ‘not every form of development but only sustainable development’ is compatible with the Constitution (StE /, see also /, /). Scholars have mainly explained the Court’s activity concerning environmental issues with the failure of the political branches to develop and enforce a system of environmental protection. The process of binding national political institutions to European and international standards has also strengthened the position of the Council of State in this field. This stance has attracted political support but also criticism based on the economic costs of the jurisprudence and the substitution of the executive branch in technical and political choices (Papakonstantinou, ). Environmental activism became the focus of political debate again during the  revision of the Constitution (Contiades, ). This was the one of the few occasions when the Court’s case law triggered the possibility of constitutional amendment—the most radical means at the disposal of the political branches to curb judicial power and claim their authority. The  revision introduced a safety valve concerning the power of the Sections of the Supreme Courts—including the environmentally activist Fifth Section—to rule on the constitutionality of a statute. According to the new fifth paragraph of Article , when a section of the Council of State or a chamber of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court or of the Court of Audit is of the view that a statutory provision is contrary to the Constitution, it must refer the question to the respective plenum. In certain more recent judgments, the Court seems to have responded to these reactions, adopting a less intense standard of environmental review (StE /; /; /). Generally, the Council of State, the major Greek court of constitutional review, has treated challenges to the constitutionality of statutes with caution and deference, generally upholding the constitutionality of major political choices that come under its purview (Alivizatos, ; Kaidatzis, ). The fear of a gouvernement des juges, the major concern when designing the review for constitutionality in Europe and beyond, did not emerge as a threat to the Greek political system. As indicated both by historical and sector-specific studies, the Court has been rather pragmatic in adjudicating

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fundamental political issues, generally showing awareness of the limits in overriding basic political assessments. This approach should also be read in light of the Court’s nature and composition. The Council of State is not a constitutional court in the tradition of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht or the US Supreme Court, where judges, being elected by political institutions and nominated by political parties, also reflect political balances (Gerapetritis, ). The origins of the Greek Council of State as an administrative court and the overall bureaucratic-type structure of the Greek judiciary, which is composed of career judges, set implicit but clear limits to the scope of its political engagement.

.. When Politics Rule instead of Law: Judicial (In)Dependence The Greek judicial system resembles what is usually described as a bureaucratic-type judiciary, where judges enjoy strong external independence but weak internal autonomy. Strong formal institutional guarantees protect judges from outside political pressure by keeping judicial appointments, career development, and dismissal mainly in the hands of the judicial hierarchy. In turn, this arrangement results in less internal independence of the individual judge vis-à-vis the judicial hierarchy, especially when compared to common-law systems. Greek courts are formed as a separate branch of public authority, directly empowered by the Constitution to implement the law (Article ) and independent from the other two branches. According to Article () of the Constitution, Greek judges enjoy personal and functional independence. The latter requires that judges should be subject ‘only to the Constitution and the laws’, while selection and appointment procedures that seek to insulate the judiciary from the influence of politics guarantee the former. In Greece, like in other civil-law jurisdictions, the executive formally exercises influence over the judiciary only through the power to appoint certain high-ranking judges. According to Article () of the Constitution, the Cabinet selects the presidents and vice-presidents of the three Supreme Courts upon proposal of the Minister of Justice. The Cabinet also selects the public prosecutor of the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court. The aim of this arrangement is to instil elements of political accountability in the higher levels of the Greek Supreme Courts. Depending on the point of view, it can be read as a mechanism of political accountability to the elected executive or as an undue distortion of judicial independence. The executive has been criticized for exercising this power in ways that reflect political sympathies and have the dynamics to establish certain expectations for the future, as appointments to these posts may function both as rewards for a favourable stance in previous disputes and/or as a mechanism to ensure commitment in future cases. Despite occasionally strong critique and several proposals to amend the respective constitutional clause, this power

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of the executive remains generally intact. The constitutional revision of  introduced, however, a temporal limitation of these political appointments: presidents and vice-presidents may only serve a maximum of four years or until they reach the age limit of  years (whichever comes first). In , an effort was made to involve the parliament in judicial appointments for the first time by requiring the Conference of the Presidents, a bipartisan organ of the parliament, to give a non-binding opinion before the Cabinet’s decision. This suggestion faced both legal criticism and political opposition and in the first instance of its application, in , the Conference of the Presidents could not secure the majority needed to issue its opinion. After the Council of State declared that such a provision would not necessarily be in abstracto unconstitutional (CoS /), the procedure was initiated again in . The political branches are not involved in selecting ordinary judges. As is typical for civil-law systems with extensive judicial self-government, they are recruited at an early age, relatively soon after university graduation, following a periodic competitive national examination run by the Ministry of Justice. A body comprised of university professors and judges selects the successful candidates, who are subsequently trained in the National School of Judges. Due to their selection process, their early age of entry, and the socialization and hierarchical organization of the judiciary, Greek judges see themselves as public functionaries embedded in a judicial hierarchy. Their subsequent career development also follows this paradigm of independent bureaucracy. Newly recruited judges are placed at the bottom of the hierarchy, while senior judges monitor their career path, which is defined both by merit and seniority. According to Articles – of the Constitution, self-governing bodies of the judiciary determine the judges’ status, including their promotion and discipline. Judges are appointed for life, and dismissal is only possible on the grounds prescribed by the Constitution and after a judicial decision (Article ()). Both the institutional treatment and ethos of Greek judges contrasts with that of common-law judges, who are typically recruited in middle age from the senior ranks of the practising legal profession, so that their career advancement relies less upon internal controls and assessments (Guarnieri, : ; Georgakopoulos, ; Garoupa and Ginsburg, ). Due to these institutional characteristics, commonlaw judges usually transfer the experiences, individuality of opinion, and independence they have developed as senior practising lawyers to their judicial vocation. Judges in Greece tend to enjoy a high degree of independence vis-à-vis the political branches, but a lower degree of internal independence, that is, independence vis-à-vis the judicial hierarchy. With formal ways to influence judicial practice limited (for higher judges) or foreclosed (for lower ranks), political actors are left with two main channels to express preferences and exert influence in judicial decision-making. The first consists in retrospectively interfering with the law applied by the courts in pending cases. The second involves informal channels and often takes the form of suasion, public statements, and criticism directed towards specific judgments, certain judges, or even the judiciary as an institution.

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In Greece, retrospective laws are not prohibited in general, except for criminal laws and certain other categories explicitly set forth in the Constitution (Articles , , and  ()). Changing the law is also the basic constitutional prerogative of the legislature and as such does not amount to prohibited interference with judicial independence. Nevertheless, on certain occasions, courts have found that legislative interference with pending judicial proceedings and the exclusion of judicial review through the regulation of individual affairs by parliamentary statute do in fact violate constitutional principles as well as the ECHR. Dealing with an increasing number of such cases after the s, the Council of State has defined certain limits to the undue legislative interference with judicial functions (CoS /, /, /, /). Criticism as a form of influence, the second way of interfering with judicial functions, may challenge the independence of the judiciary when it comes from organs endowed with public authority. This kind of influence has been particularly prominent at times when the courts engage with highly political issues, such as those discussed earlier. Occasionally, however, this challenge takes on a more systematic and fundamental character, questioning the courts’ constitutional prerogative to review political decisions on the basis that they, unlike the other two branches, are not electorally legitimated. This challenge, which does not reflect the constitutional order of Greece as a rule-bound republic, where courts are awarded public authority together with the other branches, comes especially from political powers that are critical of the liberal constitutional paradigm of checks and balances. This fundamental critique has gained prominence over the last years when courts challenged several of the political initiatives of the -elected government in a series of judgments in which the executive and the judiciary confronted each other directly. Other forms of influence, such as behind-the-door suasion, are difficult to document, and the relevant field remains understudied.

.. When the Law Does Not Rule: Judicial Ineffectiveness The final qualification to the Greek paradigm of the rule of law relates to the Greek judiciary’s systemic problems in delivering timely justice. International indicators (World Bank, ) and decisions of international courts assessing the effectiveness of Greek judicial remedies reveal that access to justice in Greece is systemically more cumbersome than in other European countries. This is due to problems both with the length of proceedings and with the enforcement of final court judgments. The  Report of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe noted ‘failure or considerable delay in the enforcement of final domestic judgments and absence of effective remedies’ (Council of Europe, : ). This finding underlines a long series of judgments of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR), which establishes the excessive delays in judicial procedures in Greece as a recurrent concern, one that could even amount to denial of justice on certain occasions (Vassilios Athanasiou and others

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v Greece App. no / (ECtHR,  December ); Michelioudakis v Greece App no / (ECtHR,  April ); Glykantzi v Greece App. no / (ECtHR,  October )). Problems in implementing judicial decisions, often due to lack of administrative capacity and economic constraints, also weaken the judiciary’s effectiveness. The fact that these failings of the judicial system occur in an environment of mostly weak institutions and low-quality laws makes their overall impact on the rule of law even more significant (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, : –). The ineffectiveness of the Greek judiciary is a key parameter of the rule-of-law deficit in Greece (von Bogdandy and Ioannidis, ). Weak courts diminish trust in law and in the state in general in a way that also conditions politics. The basic function of law is to offer the members of a society a reliable foundation upon which they can organize their activities and plan their conduct (Luhmann, : –; Habermas,  (repr.):  et seq.; Raz, : ). In order to provide reliable information successfully, rules must be ‘socially shared’: that is, they must be ‘known to be generally applicable guides’ (Knight, : ). When institutional weakness or the lack of necessary resources results in an endemic inability to implement the law, the law fails to convey the information necessary to structure and support normative expectations. In such institutional environments, citizens turn to alternative mechanisms to generate trust and predictability, such as personal relations and networks. Low trust in the judiciary’s ability to uphold expectations thus makes access to politicians and clientelism more important. Despite efforts to address these deficiencies, including under the pressure of its international lenders (Featherstone, ; Ioannidis, ), the problem remains significant and is a key parameter of Greece as a low-trust economy and society. Judicial ineffectiveness is also one of the reasons that justifies treating Greece as a weak state within the EU framework (Ioannidis, ).

. R A   F

.................................................................................................................................. Judicial politics is a field of research that has been developed significantly over the last years. As some scholars have claimed, judicial politics is becoming a sub-field of comparative politics in its own right (Dyevre, ). Greek literature in the field has touched upon critical questions of judicial activism, but mainly from a qualitative perspective and using legal methodologies. In this analytical approach, historical qualitative analysis could further work to connect the rich crisis-related literature with previous periods to investigate patterns of continuity or disruption. Moreover, legal research is still characterized by a divide between studies on constitutionality review and the control of administrative discretion. Constitutional lawyers are most interested in the first category and administrative lawyers in the second. Nevertheless, both engage the same basic issue of the judiciary challenging political authority.

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In general, however, literature on Greek courts remains within the confines of legal discourse. There is no empirical study of the actual agents shaping judicial outcomes, namely judges, and little application of theories addressing judicial behaviour in causalpositive rather than legal-normative terms. The non-legal factors influencing the exercise of judicial discretion remain largely unexplored. Studies drawing on the insights of rational choice theory, delegation theory, game theory, and strategic accounts of decision-making, which have been the focus of much recent attention (for an overview see Dyevre, :  et seq.), could shed light, especially on the jurisprudence of the Council of State. Alivizatos’ older study (Alivizatos, ) shows the potential of undertaking such exercises, especially adopting comparative approaches within the growing field of comparative judicial politics. Kaidatzis, who embeds judicial-review case-law up to  in the broader legal discourse of the time, indicates interesting ways to consider the impact of the doctrinal activity of lawyers and law-professors in judicial practice (Kaidatzis, ). Regarding independence, documentation of the influence and impact of public and non-public interventions in the judiciary is lacking. Most accounts of judicial independence are case-specific and focus on the legal-constitutional standards of independence. Methodologies offered in the field of comparative judicial politics provide for tools to measure judicial independence that could be relevant for Greek courts (Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan, ). Finally, regarding judicial effectiveness, recent research has covered significant questions of its impact on the economy (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, , ). Further research in this field could reveal connections between judicial (in)effectiveness and political agendas.

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(nd chamber), / (th chamber) and / (st chamber) of the Council of State]. Journal of Administrative Law, : –. Guarnieri, C. (). ‘Justice and Politics: The Italian Case in a Comparative Perspective’. Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, (): –. Habermas, J. (). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Hirschl, R. (). Towards Juristocracy: the Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Hirschl, R. (). ‘The New Constitution and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide’. Fordham Law Review,  (): –. Hirschl, R. (). ‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts’. Annual Review of Political Science, : –. Ioannidis, M. (). ‘EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack” ’. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht,  (): –. Ioannidis, M. (). ‘Weak Members and the Enforcement of EU Law’. In Jakab, A. and Kochenov, D. (eds.) The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Ioannidis, M., and Koutnatzis, S. (). ‘Evolution and Gestalt of the Greek State’. In Cassese, S., Von Bogdandy, A., and Huber, P. (eds.) The Max Planck Handbooks in European Public Law Volume I: The Administrative State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Kaidatzis, A. (). ‘Δικαστικός έλεγχος των μέτρων οικονομικής πολιτικής. Νομολογιακές τάσεις και προσαρμογές στο μεταβαλλόμενο οικονομικο-πολιτικό περιβάλλον’ [Judicial Review of Economic Policy Measures. Jurispudential Trends and Adjustments in the Changing Economic-Political Landscape]. In Το δημόσιο δίκαιο σε εξέλιξη. Σύμμεικτα προς τιμήν του καθηγητού Πέτρου Ι. Παραρά [The Public Law in Development. Collection in Honour of Professor Petros. I. Pararas]. Athens/Komotini: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Kaidatzis, A. (). ‘Greece’s Third Way in Prof. Tushnet’s Distinction between StrongForm and Weak-Form Judicial Review, and What We May Learn From It’, Jus Politicum, , Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=/ (accessed  January ). Kaidatzis, A. (). Ο δικαστικός έλεγχος των νόμων στην Ελλάδα –. [The Judicial Control of Laws in Greece –]. Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing. Karavokyris, G. (). ‘The Role of Judges and Legislators in the Greek Financial Crisis: A Matter of Competence.’ In Papadopoulou, L., Pernice, I., and Weiler, J. H. H. (eds.) Legitimacy Issues of the European Union in the Face of Crisis. Dimitris Tsatsos in Memoriam. Baden Baden: Nomos, –. Katrougalos, G. (). ‘Memoranda sunt servanda? H συνταγματικότητα του ν. / και του μνημονίου για τα μέτρα εφαρμογής των συμφωνιών με ΔΝΤ, ΕΕ και ΕΚΤ’ [Memoranda sunt servanda? The Constitutionality of Law / and of the Memorandum for the Implementation Measures of the Agreements with the IMF, the EC and the ECB], Journal of Administrative Law, : –. Katrougalos, G. (). ‘The Greek Debt, under the Light of Constitutional and International Law’. The Committee for the Abolishment of Illegal Debt. Available at: http://www.cadtm. org/The-Greek-Debt-under-the-light-of (accessed  January ). Knight, J. (). Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koutnatzis, S. (). ‘Griechenland.’ In Von Bogdandy, A., Cruz Villalón, P., and Huber, P. M. (eds.) Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum. Band I: Grundlagen und Grundzüge staatlichen Verfassungsrechts. Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, –.

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Lazaratos, P. (). ‘Δημοσιονομικό συμφέρον και δίκαιο της ανάγκης’ [Budgetary Interest and Emergency Law] Theory and Practice of Administrative Law,  (–): –. Luhmann, N. (). Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, N. (). Die Politik der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, N. (). Law as a Social System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mantzoufas, P. (). Οικονομική κρίση και Σύνταγμα [Economic Crisis and the Constitution] Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing. Menoudakos, K. (). ‘Προστασία του περιβάλλοντος στο ελληνικό δημόσιο δίκαιο. Η συμβολή της νομολογία του ΣτΕ ’ [Environmental Protection in Greek Public Law. The Contribution of the Case-law of the Council of State]. Law and Nature,  (): –. Mitsopoulos, M., and Pelagidis, T. (). ‘Does Staffing Affect the Time to Dispose of Cases in Greek Courts?’ International Review of Law and Economics,  (): –. Mitsopoulos, M., and Pelagidis, T. (). ‘Greek Appeals Courts’ Quality Analysis and Performance’. European Journal of Law and Economics,  (): –. Mitsopoulos, M., and Pelagidis, T. (). Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Papakonstantinou, A. (). ‘Δικαστικός ακτιβισμός και Σύνταγμα. Το παράδειγμα της περιβαλλοντικής νομολογίας του ΣτΕ’ [Judicial Activism and Constitution. The Example of Environmental Case-law of the Council of State]. Environment and Law,  (): –. Papaspyrou, N. (). ‘A Farewell to Judicial Passivity: The Environmental Jurisprudence of the Greek Council of State’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies,  (): –. Papaspyrou, N. (). ‘Το ζήτημα της έντασης του δικαστικού ελέγχου συνταγματικότητας’ [The Question of Intensity of Constitutionality Review] In Τόμος τιμητικός του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας:  χρόνια [Honorary Volume for the th Anniversary of the Council of State]. Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, –. Raz, J. (). The Authority of Law. nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sarmas, I. (). Η συνταγματική και διοικητική νομολογία του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας: εξελικτική μελέτη των μεγάλων θεμάτων [The Constitutional and Administrative Case-law of the Council of State: Evolutionary Analysis of the Fundamental Issues]. Athens/Komotini: Sakkoulas Publishing. Shapiro, M., and Stone Sweet, A. (). On Law, Politics, and Judicialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Siouti, G. (). ‘Η προστασία της φύσης στη νομολογία του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας’ [The Protection of Nature in the Case Law of the Council of State]. In Τόμος τιμητικός του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας:  χρόνια [Honorary Volume for the th Anniversary of the Council of State]. Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Spyropoulos, P., and Fortsakis, T. (). Constitutional Law in Greece. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. Stone Sweet, A. (). ‘Judicialisation and the Construction of Governance’. Comparative Political Studies,  (): –. Stone Sweet, A. (). Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stone Sweet, A. (). The Judicial Construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stone Sweet, A, and Mathews, J. (). ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,  (): –. Takis, A. (). ‘Το “δικαίωμα” στην ιθαγένεια και η εξουσία του δημοκρατικού νομοθέτη στην πολιτογράφηση’ [The ‘Right’ to Citizenship and the Authority of the Legislator to

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Naturalisation]. Constitutionalism.gr website. Available at: www.constitutionalism.gr/ (accessed  January ). Tassopoulos, Y. (). ‘Ο ρόλος του δικαστή κατά τον έλεγχο της συνταγματικότητας των νόμων: αυτοπεριορισμός ή ακτιβισμός’ [The Role of the Judge in Constitutionality Review: Self-restraint or Activism?] In To Σύνταγμα: Επιστημονικά Συνέδρια. Tα εικοσάχρονα του Συντάγματος  [The Constitution: Academic Conferences. Twenty Years of the Constitution of ]. Athens/Komotini: Sakkoulas Publishing, –. Vlachogiannis, A. (). ‘From Submission to Reaction: The Greek Courts’ Stance on the Financial Crisis.’ In Szente, Z. and Gárdos-Orosz, F. (eds.) New Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication in Europe. London: Routledge, –. Von Bogdandy, A. and Ioannidis, M. (). ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’. Common Market Law Review,  (): –. Von Bogdandy, A. and Venzke, I. (). In Whose Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weiler, J. H. H. (). ‘The Transformation of Europe’. Yale Law Journal,  (): –. World Bank. (). ‘Doing Business: Enforcing Contracts’. Available at http://www. doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts?data%PointCode=DB_ ec_time/ (accessed  January ). Ziamou, T. (). ‘Controlling the Legislator’s Intent in the “Crisis Jurisprudence” of the Greek Council of State’. European Politeia (): –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

                  

......................................................................................................................

    

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I constitutional terms, the Greek system of government imitates that of a majority of European parliamentary systems: a prime minister and Cabinet are responsible to parliament, and a president as head of state performs a largely ceremonial role. Within that structure, however, the Greek system in recent decades has displayed exceptional and paradoxical traits. For much of the period, the formal position of the prime minister (PM) itself has been near-presidential (‘primus solus’); yet, it has also lacked a centralization of resources within government. At the same time, the position of the Cabinet in this structure has been weak, while individual ministries have enjoyed much operational independence. The PM might thus be thought to be ‘an emperor without clothes’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ), while government departments have acted as separate fiefdoms. Therefore, at its heart, the Greek ‘core executive’ (Dunleavy and Rhodes, ) prior to the  crisis, was often inimical to central direction and coordination. This undermined its capacity to lead and implement policy reform. This pattern endured for much of the post- period—across prime ministers, of different parties, with varying leadership styles, and enjoying different parliamentary majorities and factional strengths, and both pre- and post-entry to the European Union. Moreover, a Greek PM faces few formal checks and balances: parliament is unicameral; the political system is unitary and has been strongly centralized; and, party discipline in parliament has normally been high (though see Chapter  on the ability of courts to set aside laws that contradict provisions of the Constitution). Culturally, the weakness of the PM’s position has stood in apparent contradiction to an embedded culture that has long emphasized the role of the heroic leader. The reasons for this

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      



pattern enduring have much to do with the interplay of politics and culture: a minister’s countervailing electoral interests and the prevalence of clientelistic politics, undermining trust and creating divided networks. Starting in , the pattern was shaken by the debt crisis, provoking demands for changes in both personnel and process. In particular, Greece’s creditors came to recognize the weak control and coordination at the centre of government in Athens as a significant contributory factor to the problem of laggardly implementation of the reforms they had listed as part of their own loan conditionality. Such external leverage was the biggest shock to the established pattern since . Organizational changes were made, most notably the creation of a new General Secretariat for Government Coordination in  with some sixty-three designated posts and the proliferation of ministers without portfolio who assumed various coordinating roles under the PM, particularly after . Yet, it remains unclear whether the critical juncture of the debt crisis has actually disturbed a deeply rooted set of norms and culture to produce significant or lasting change. This chapter examines the evolution, since , of the Greek ‘core executive’. For the latter, we follow the now classic definition of Dunleavy and Rhodes, to refer to: ‘all those organisations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine’ (: ). As such, this is a sphere that incorporates the prime minister (PM), the offices supporting that post, the Cabinet and its committees, and ministers as individual actors within government. The argument developed here is that the Greek case has been a distinctive type of core executive: monocratic, ministerial, and segmented (Andeweg, ; Elgie, , ), with parallels to the Italian tradition of ‘direzione plurima dissociata’ (pluralistic and lacking centralized coordination) (Criscitiello, ). The chapter does not cover the president of the republic, as this post is not properly part of the Greek ‘core executive’. The president is elected by members of parliament (MPs) to serve a five-year term (which is renewable for one further term). The powers of the president under the  Constitution were initially extensive, but were greatly curtailed in a  revision. While the president appoints the PM, his/her political role is now very limited, approximating to that of the Irish president or the Dutch monarch. Instead, the chapter focuses primarily on the PM tenures of Constantinos Karamanlis (–); Andreas Papandreou (–; –); Constantinos Mitsotakis (–), Costas Simitis (–) and Costas Karamanlis (–). This allows us to compare the evolution of the institutional and human resources within the Greek core executive and assess the way in which prime ministerial leadership was exercised as a means of controlling and coordinating the heart of government. More recent premierships—those mostly affected by the onslaught of the economic crisis in — are not discussed in similar detail, although we do reflect on how external conditionality has affected the modus operandi of recent Greek governments. The chapter proceeds by outlining the challenges to empirical research on the Greek core executive; analysing the data on how the core executive has evolved since ; relating this

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

    

evolution to different leadership styles; and, assessing the impact of the recent debt crisis on how the core executive operates. The Conclusion assesses the overall patterns and their implications, while identifying key research questions for the future.

. E  L   G C E

.................................................................................................................................. As a means of operationalizing Dunleavy and Rhodes’ () definition of the core executive in the case of Greece, our empirical investigation focuses on four key dimensions. Firstly, under Prime Minister, we refer both to the constitutional powers bestowed on the post holder and to individual agency, particularly how different PMs ‘interpreted’ the job and, by extension, managed government business. Secondly, under Cabinet, we investigate the operation of the Ministerial Council (Υπουργικό Συμβούλιο) and its various committees,¹ seeking to ascertain how different PM management styles affected their nodality. Thirdly, under Cabinet bureaucracy, we examine the administrative resources deployed for the coordination of government business, focusing in particular on the work of the Secretariat of the Ministerial Council (Γραμματεία Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου) and its subsequent reincarnations.² Finally, under Ministers, we explore the potential for challenging the PM’s authority by his/ her ministerial colleagues, both by reference to the ‘constitutional’ position of ministers in the decision-making process within the Greek government and the longevity of ministerial tenures as an entrenched counterweight to the power of the PM within the Cabinet (for a fuller discussion, see Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). Beyond this four-dimensional template we adopt here, we recognize that the assessment of nodality and influence within the core executive faces inherent difficulties, some generic and some specific to the Greek context. For the purposes of our analysis we have used a range of quantitative data on the frequency of meetings of the Ministerial Council, the number of government reshuffles, the length of ministerial tenures, and staffing levels in core executive institutions. The collation of such figures, however, is severely compromised by the scarcity of archival material relating to the operation of the government and appointments (for an extensive discussion, see Featherstone and Papadimitriou, , see also Loverdos, ). ¹ The most significant of these was the ‘inner Cabinet’. It was known as the Government Committee (Κυβερνητική Επιτροπή) from  to  and from  onwards, but was renamed as the Government Council (Κυβερνητικό Συμβούλιο, KYSYM) between  and  ² The Secretariat of the Ministerial Council (GYP), previously under the aegis of the Ministry of the Presidency, was restructured and upgraded in  to be a separate service accountable to the PM and then it became the General Secretariat of the Ministerial Council (Γενική Γραμματεία του Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου, GGYP) in . In  it was renamed General Secretariat of the Government (Γενική Γραμματεία της Κυβέρνησης, GGK). Similarly, the body overseeing the final drafting of legislation went through several incarnations.

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      



Even where available, however, quantitative data alone do not always capture some of the finer dynamics behind the operation of the core executive. The premierships of Constantinos Mitsotakis and Costas Karamanlis, for example, reveal that the numerical strength of the PM office size does not always equate to greater influence. Neither can the effectiveness and quality of discussions in the Ministerial Council be inferred solely by the frequency of its meetings. A note of caution is also due with regards to ascertaining influence only by reference to individuals’ positions in official organograms or party-political rankings. Both the Greek and the international experience provide ample evidence that such inferences may be misleading. ‘Fixers’ come in different shapes and sizes depending on the instincts and the expediency of their political masters. Similarly, the circle of policy advice sought by individual PMs and its input into the policy process also varies. Prime-ministerial perceptions of leadership, delegation, and trust shape the way in which roles within the core executive are carved out—a process that does not always correspond neatly with official titles and institutional affiliation. In our analysis we seek to delve into these complex dynamics within the core executive through an extensive set of interviews with senior figures in the Greek government, including with all surviving prime ministers of the period –, in order to get an insight into their own ‘interpretation’ of the job. Recognizing that our interview material is not immune from selective memory and the institutional, partypolitical or personal biases, we have sought, where possible, to triangulate this privileged information with semi-autobiographical accounts by George Rallis () and Costas Simitis (), but also by senior ministers and core executive insiders of the Metapolitefsi period (indicatively, Arsenis, , Tsatsos, , Labrias, ; Rallis, , , Pangalos, , Varvitsiotis, , Kapsis, , Paleokrassas, ). In order to contextualize the personal accounts of the main protagonists, we will further build a retrospective ‘institutional map’ of the Greek core executive since . Here we extend our own earlier analysis (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). It is a challenging endeavour, sifting through the poor quality and the sheer volume of legislative output, features widely recognized as a major weakness of public policy in Greece. The operation of the core executive is not immune from this pathology (‘polynomy’, a plethora of laws), operating as it does under an impenetrable network of legalistic formalism, ridden with overlaps, contradictions, and confusion. Since the country’s transition to democracy in , there have been nine different laws whose prime focus has been to create and/or restructure institutions at the heart of government.³ In addition, the operation of the core executive has been affected by dozens of provisions scattered across seemingly unrelated (to the core executive) pieces of legislation. The multi-fragmentation of legal provision, combined with the absence of stable administrative structures servicing the Ministerial Council has created, in effect, a legal ³ ND /; ND /, ND /, Law /, Law /, Law /, Law /, Law / , Law /.

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

    

‘black hole’ at the epicentre of political power in Greece that even the most experienced political operators found hard to navigate (Simitis, : –). The identification of the human geography of the Greek core executive is severely hampered by an acute lack of transparency over appointments and the very high turnover of staff. The centre of the Greek government contains virtually no permanent civil servants in its ranks. All staff at the PM Office and the General Secretariat of the Government are political appointees, either seconded from other parts of the ‘wider’⁴ public sector on the request of the prime minister or drafted from the private sector on fixed-term contracts. The purging of such politically-contingent personnel at the end of the PM’s tenure is, of course, common practice across many Western democracies. The Greek case, however, is rather exceptional in that the PM’s office does not retain a permanent administrative backbone able to assist the incumbent post-holder in putting his/her team of advisers together.

. T H E   G C E

.................................................................................................................................. The origins of the contemporary Greek core executive lie in the choices made by Constantinos Karamanlis, when he returned from France to Greece to be PM in July  to lead the transition back to democracy. The circumstances of the collapse of the Colonels’ regime shaped his decisions in this regard. Karamanlis relied heavily on a small group of senior ministers for the running of government affairs and opted for a core executive architecture based on a lean PM’s Office, a constrained and shallow Cabinet system, and very limited institutionalized means of control and coordination over the rest of government. This was a blueprint of ‘heroic leadership’ that was to shape the post- years known as the Metapolitefsi period. Although a number of reform initiatives were undertaken by his successors as a means of improving the machinery of central government, the pattern of a detached centre, distrustful of the wider reaches of the administration, remained. In tandem, the control and coordination of the government from the centre would depend on a small, pro-active team intervening, inevitably, on an ad personam and selective basis. The alternative of an institutionalization of structures and committees was never properly established. Table . summarizes the evolution of the Greek core executive over the five premierships we examined. Our key findings can be summarized as follows:

⁴ This, for example, may include in addition the ministerial bureaucracies, those employed in the university sector, local authorities, and public utilities.

Table 9.1 Prime-ministerial power and the Greek core executive: A matrix of analysis Bureaucracy (General) Secretariat of the Ministerial Council/Government

Cabinet (Ministerial Council)

Prime Minister PM’s Office

Nodality

Size

Full inner Other Cabinet Cabinet4 Com/ ees

Ministers

Size Independence Influence Longevity6 Constitutional (Designated Powers Posts)5

Posts Designated Constitutional Activism Party Frequency Stability Powers (Agency) Strength Filled Posts2 Influence (Reshuffles/ (Meetings// year) year)3 Medium

High

Very High

10 22 (1976) (1976)

Medium High (0.55)

Low (5.9)

Low

High

Medium 16 (1975)

Low

Low

59%

High

Andreas Papandreou 21.10.81 to 02.07.89

High (post- 86)

Medium Very High

74 146 (1987) (1982)

High

Low (5.5)

Low

Low

Low

26 (1986)

Low

Low

43%

High

Low (1.68)

Constantinos Mitsotakis High 11.4.90 to 13.10.93

High

Medium 112 146 (1992)

Medium Low (1.41)

High (22.9)

High

High

Low

27 (1993)

Low

High

50%

High

Andreas Papandreou 13.10.93 to 22.1.96

High

Low

High

Medium Medium (0.88)

Low (4.4)

Low

Low

Low

27 (1994)

Low

Low

69%

High

Costas Simitis 22.1.96 to 10.3.04

High

High

Medium 85 146 (2000)

High

High (0.49)

High (21.4)

High

High

Medium 34 (2004)

Low

High

45%

High

Costas Karamanlis 10.03.04 to 06.10.09

High

Low

High

Low

High (0.35)

Low (5.0)

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

50%

High

1

n/a

146

88 161 (2005) (2005)

57 (2009)

Karamanlis’ national unity government (24.7.74 to 21.11.74) falls outside the scope of this analysis Excluding security and manual staff Refers to the replacement/appointment of at least 3 government ministers. All data available from the website of the General Secretariat of the Government (http://www.ggk.gov.gr/?page_id=776) 4 Refers to the Government Committee (Κυβερνητική Επιτροπή) or the Government Council (Κυβερνητικό Συμβούλιο), bringing together senior government ministers. 5 Does not include members of the Central Legislation-Drafting Committee (Κεντρική Νομοπαρασκευαστική Επιτροπή) or the Central Codification Committee (Κεντρική Επιτροπή Κωδικοποίησης). 6 Average tenure of most senior ministers as % of PM Tenure. Includes the vice president(s) of the Ministerial Council (where applicable) and the five most senior ministers according to government protocol (σειρά προβαδίσματος). The order of ministerial seniority has changed over the years. We have based our calculations on the order of ministerial seniority as it stood at the end of each PM tenure. For more details see website of the General Secretariat of the Government (http://www.ggk.gov.gr/ggk_old/goverments-47191.php.html).Source: Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2015: 192–3) 2 3

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Constantinos Karamanlis1 21.11.74 to 10.5.80

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

    

A. The ambivalent position of the PM’s Office The highly differential manner with which the PM’s Office has been operationalized during the Metapolitefsi period epitomizes the pathologies that shaped the governance of the Greek core executive. In different junctures the PM’s Office was conceived as a hub of expertise independent of the ministerial bureaucracies; a facilitator of the horizontal and vertical coordination of government business; a gate-keeping institution for the protection of the PM’s authority; or a combination of the three. In practice, however, the position of the PM’s office within the government machinery has never acquired a recognized identity, balancing awkwardly between its administrative and advisory functions. Its staffing shared something of the partisanship of recent compositions of the White House, while the pool of available talent was inevitably limited, with appointees often catapulted into positions of authority through clientelist networks and party-political connections. Neither could the PM Office style itself as the British Cabinet Office or the German Chancellery. With no permanent staff in its ranks and no established pattern of interaction with the wider administration, its position to monitor effectively the implementation of the government’s agenda was fatally undermined. Overall the size of the PM Office grew eight-fold (to  designated posts in ) during the timeframe of our investigation. Despite its numerical growth, its internal structure has remained rather stable. Constantinos Karamanlis had established five portfolios—diplomatic, legal. military, private, and the office of special advisers. Subsequently, the creation of the economic office in  added another important player within the core executive, particularly during the Papandreou (in the s) and Simitis premierships. The activism of the PM Office in handling press and communication matters has also grown steadily, reaching a peak of influence during the tenure of Costas Karamanlis (–). The establishment of the Office of Strategic Planning in  was a first attempt to introduce a hub of expertise across key policy priorities of the government, but its significant influence during the Simitis premiership has not been matched since. Overall, the influence of the PM Office has fluctuated widely: between high points under Andreas Papandreou (first period) and Simitis, and a low level under Costas Karamanlis. On paper, the involvement of the senior advisers of the PM’s Office within the Cabinet system—in particular, their ability to attend its meetings—remained constant but, in reality, the extent to which this was respected in practice has varied considerably between premiers. B. The weakness of the (General) Secretariat of the Government The relative obscurity of the administrative back-up behind the Cabinet system is another manifestation of Greece’s ‘solitary centre’. The Secretariat of the Ministerial Council, established in  with just sixteen staff, was a peripheral service tasked mainly with the secretarial support (e.g. transcription of minutes, archiving, etc.) of the Ministerial Council, but not of the ministerial committees that operated under it. The service was headed by a political appointee on a fixed-term contract and had no means

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      



of monitoring or evaluating policy implementation. Over the years the Secretariat grew in size (reaching  staff in ) and its remit was extended (renamed General Secretariat of the Government, GGK, in ). This included greater powers over the government’s legislative initiative, greater involvement in policy follow-up and the servicing of a greater number (but not all) of the ministerial committees. Yet, despite the extension of its formal competences, the GGK has remained very weak by international standards (Peters et al., ). Of all the General Secretaries of the Metapolitefsi, only Socratis Kosmidis (–) became a noticeable presence in the Greek core executive as a result of his highly activist style and the strong personal backing of his political master, Costas Simitis. Such a close working relationship between the PM and the head of the government’s administrative services has not been replicated before or since. Remarkably, one aspect that remained constant has been the fact that none of the nearly  posts assigned to the core executive (including those in the GGK) by  have been permanent career civil servants; a practice that continues unchanged in . The absence of continuity, in either resources or model, underscores the problem of establishing a regularized system of control and coordination from the centre across government. C. In search of coordination There has been much variation in how individual premiers have used or created posts to tackle the core tasks of controlling and coordinating the government. Greek prime ministers have pursued no fixed model, either at the ministerial or staffing levels. Constantinos Karamanlis (second term), Andreas Papandreou (second term), and Mitsotakis each appointed to the position of ‘Vice President of the Government’ (or Deputy PM). Although some of the appointees were certainly influential over government policy (particularly Constantinos Papakonstantinou and Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas) de facto their remits varied significantly and none had a specific set of ‘coordination duties’ (e.g. chairing a particular government committee). The same also holds true for those appointed to the post of deputy minister to the PM, or state minister or minister without portfolio, with the exceptions of Antonis Livanis (during Papandreou’s third tenure) and Theothodos Rousopoulos (under the premiership of Costas Karamanlis), whose involvement in the coordination of government policy was significant. The impact on government control and coordination by the directors of the PM’s Office also varied considerably. Livanis (under Andreas Papandreou) was by far the strongest director. Nikos Themelis (under Simitis) was never formally appointed to be director of the PM’s Office, but no-one could doubt his de facto supremacy. The two differed in their approaches: Livanis was the arch-manipulator, sensitive to factional tensions; Themelis was more the intellectual and ‘ideas-man’, contributing to policy direction. None of their counterparts under the other premiers matched the influence of these two men. Petros Molyviatis (under Constantinos Karamanlis) essentially played a gate-keeping role, managing access to and communications from the PM. His role was circumscribed by Karamanlis not wishing to see the PM’s Office as

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

    

being large or powerful. Each of these three benefitted from the recognition of their peers that they harboured no personal political ambition. Dora Bakoyanni (under Mitsotakis) was, by contrast, highly ‘political’ and she suffered from being junior and the daughter of the prime minister. Yannis Aggelou (under Costas Karamanlis) performed a role closer to that of Molyviatis. He was eclipsed by Rousopoulos, who was appointed to another post—that of minister of state, overseeing communications—a shift of dominance that signalled both that the nephew (Costas Karamanlis, in –) preferred the model of his uncle (Constantinos Karamanlis, in –) in assigning a limited role to the PM’s Office, but also that he accepted the modern need for PR. The variations across all the above cases offer no simple equation in terms of government effectiveness, however. Livanis, as the strongest of all directors of the PM’s Office, did not serve a premier who had established a well-functioning government administration. His role was often interpreted differently from these core needs. Molyviatis, playing a lesser role, could claim to have served in a government that had more coherence and consistency, with a stronger PM’s input. The lack of a simple correlation between a strong PM’s ‘chief of staff ’ and an effective government operation indicates the complexity of the environment and the task. This one element—that of a strong ‘chief of staff ’—cannot be seen in isolation from each of the other elements that oil the structures of the core executive. D. Managing the Cabinet system The significant variation with which the Cabinet system was operationalized during the Metapolitefsi period reflects the distinct leadership styles of the PMs under examination, but also highlights inherent problems of weak institutionalization at the heart of the Greek government. Overall the Ministerial Council (the ‘full’ Cabinet) has played a very limited role as a collective body under the majority of prime ministers. The number of its meetings per year was, on average, around five under Constantinos Karamanlis, Andreas Papandreou, and Costas Karamanlis. Such infrequency would, of course, seriously limit the extent to which it could act as a coordinating or decisionmaking body. Only under Mitsotakis and Simitis did the Ministerial Council meet on a regular basis, typically every fortnight. Until the early s the meetings of the Ministerial Council were poorly minuted and their agendas not always circulated in advance. Many sessions were limited to a ‘headmasterly’ address (often televised) by the PM, followed by legal formalities with ministers sitting round to sign collective government documents. The Cabinet’s rulebook (the Operational Code) was modernized during the Mitsotakis premiership, whereas under Simitis a number of formal competences of the Cabinet were decentralized in order to decongest its workload. Although the breadth and depth of Cabinet discussions during these two premierships improved markedly, follow-up procedures remained opaque, with Cabinet minutes available to ministers only ‘upon request’, rather than as a matter of course in the context of an organized system of vertical and horizontal coordination. In any event, the revitalization of the Ministerial Council during Simitis’ tenure was largely abandoned by his successor, Costas Karamanlis.

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      



By comparison, the ‘inner’ Cabinet (Government Committee/Council) assumed greater importance over the five premierships: in combination with, or substituting for, the Ministerial Council. The one exception was the two periods of Andreas Papandreou, who ignored both the Ministerial Council and the inner Cabinet as a collective forum on both occasions. More generally, the Cabinet system has not only been irregular in its operation, it has also been shallow in its extent. Ministerial committees (other than the Government Committee) have not really been developed as a stable part of government. The majority of them have met rarely. Only under Constantinos Karamanlis, and, more so under Simitis, were they given much importance or nodality within the governmental process. In terms of government stability and the longevity of senior ministers, the picture that emerges is a rather diverse one. Andreas Papandreou in the s and Constantinos Mitsotakis led the least stable governments of the Metapolitefsi, having reshuffled their Ministerial Council, on average, every seven and eight and a half months respectively. By contrast, Constantinos Karamanlis and Costas Simitis maintained a much more stable set-up, with a government reshuffle nearly every two years. Costas Karamanlis was the most adverse to governmental fluidity with an average of just one government reshuffle every thirty-four months. Ministers who remain in their posts have much greater scope to establish their political fiefdoms. Senior ministers under Andreas Papandreou were the most vulnerable in this respect (they survived only  per cent of the period of Andreas’ premiership); those of Constantinos Karamanlis the most secure ( per cent). At the same time, the higher the level of turnover of ministers, the greater the challenge of government coordination. A prime minister may remove the scope for rival power-bases, but he also threatens the knowledge and experience needed for ministers to run their operations. Against this background, ministers who survive in their posts have been accorded the space to act within distinct silos, relatively isolated and lacking effective, regular control or monitoring from the centre. Such space is the flip-side of the absence of a strong governmental centre. As such, it provides opportunities for separate zones of clientelism and corruption, let alone the problems of lower quality policy-making and implementation.

. L S  I

.................................................................................................................................. With the fluctuation in structures and resources across premierships, and the differences in reform initiatives and outcomes, it is evident that the individual prime minister matters to how the government is run. The personality types of Greece’s PMs have varied substantially. If we adopt the classic typology of James Barber (), then Constantinos Karamanlis, Mitsotakis, Simitis, and Andreas Papandreou (first tenure) can be termed ‘active’ prime ministers; Costas Karamanlis and Andreas

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

    

(second and third tenure) much less so. For the latter two cases, this correlates with their basic management approach: one of being relatively detached. Moreover, following Barber’s second dimension (positive-negative self-images), Andreas Papandreou often had a negative assessment of his own role, being selective and inconsistent in his application. Not surprisingly, the ‘active-positives’ (Constantinos Karamanlis, Mitsotakis, and Simitis, in particular) had a much more ‘hands-on’ approach to running the government: personally checking and prodding on action. Mitsotakis and Simitis were both inclusive of the Cabinet system, with regularized meetings of both the Ministerial Council and the ‘inner’ Cabinet. This feature goes beyond personality type to Heffernan’s () depiction of their political standing; specifically, their inclusiveness of the Ministerial Council was a defensive tactic in the face of contending party factions. Other prime ministers faced lesser threats—indeed, Constantinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou (at least until the end) were unassailable within their parties—and did not feel the same imperative to use the Cabinet system as a means of inclusivity. Certainly, the perceived success (or otherwise) of Mitsotakis and Simitis as premiers rested, in part, on their handling of the Ministerial Council. Using conventional criteria for differentiating leadership types (Kaarbo, ), a number of contrasts can be drawn. Leadership orientation—for example, a strong personal ‘mission’—did not always lead to a prioritization of control and coordination from the centre: it did so with Simitis, but not with Andreas Papandreou or Karamanlis (the senior). In terms of managing conflict, a PM, like Karamanlis (the younger), who saw his role as being one of an arbiter or consensus-builder, also discouraged his personal staff from much policy activism. Simitis had to be a consensus-builder, but he was also pro-active: the contrast was reconciled by his careful choreography of his advisers’ contacts with ministers. Leaders with long government experience— Karamanlis (senior), Mitsotakis, and Simitis—tended to be more interventionist than those who had not the same prior record. Distinctively, Mitsotakis used his knowledge to ‘meddle’ within government for political favours from colleagues. The search for wider expertise and information led Simitis to establish settled structures, while others settled only for preferred personal, ad hoc contacts (Andreas Papandreou above all). It is clear from these examples that there has been an inconsistent correlation between leadership types and performance as PM. Agency alone cannot fully explain how the problems of control and coordination within the Greek core executive were sustained. The explanatory frame has to be widened.

. T S’ N?

.................................................................................................................................. If the individual and collective constraints stymied reform in the good economic times, they were clearly tested even more profoundly by the onset of the Greek debt crisis in . It is, perhaps, the ultimate irony that a political system that had developed the

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      



constitutional myth of the prime minister being supreme, heading a government that faced relatively few formal ‘checks and balances’, should face such a huge loss of sovereignty as a result of needing to be ‘bailed-out’ by foreign creditors, both governments and private investors. Indeed, Greece’s creditors have honed-in on the inner workings of the core executive. Zahariadis (: –) has advanced the argument that the greater specificity of responsibility for undertaking certain reform actions sought by the Troika and others has actually been self-defeating because it has ‘increased effort compartmentalization and diffused responsibility’ with the effect that ‘policy-makers ended up trying to shift blame rather than dealing with the task at hand’. His critique is focused on what he sees as the isolation (and failure) of the ‘fall guy’—the minister charged with carrying out unpopular, Troika-inspired policies in the early crisis period—within the ‘lightning rod’ theory of blame avoidance by political leaders (Ellis, ). Greece’s external creditors and advisers recognized the weakness of reform agency within government and would later commend actions to address them and would note the gains therein (OECD, ; EU Second Adjustment Programme; Fourth Review). In reality, immediately prior to the onset of the ‘bail out’ conditionality, a domestic initiative for the reform of the core executive had appeared. George Papandreou on becoming prime minister in October  instigated a series of ambitious initiatives. These included: • an open competition, via an online platform (Opengov.gr), for the appointment of senior officials in public administration • the launch of the Diavgeia (transparency) programme in July  (Law /; revised by Law / and Law /), providing for the compulsory online publication of all decisions made by public authorities (including the prime minister, ministries, local and regional government, and authorities of the ‘wider’ public sector) before the latter could start producing legally binding results • plans to reform the PM’s Office, emanating from a committee of foreign experts, expressly to tackle the problems of ministerial fiefdoms and of control and coordination from the centre. Despite their ambition, however, the implementation of these reforms proved patchy. The response to the open competition for posts was overwhelming. In the first twentyfour hours of its operation, more than , applications were reportedly submitted to the platform (To Vima ..). There were long delays in appointments and many turned out to be the kind of party loyalist that might have been given jobs previously. Subsequently, the initiative lost its momentum and was later abandoned by Papandreou’s successors. The reach and ‘intrusion’ of Diavgeia into public policy-making was unprecedented not only by Greek but also by international standards. Its implementation proved more successful: some . million decisions were published online by July . The PM’s Office was radically restructured. In January , it was renamed General Secretariat of the Prime Minister (GGP, Γενική Γραμματεία του Πρωθυπουργού)

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

    

Table 9.2 The Greek core executive, 2009–2018 Legal Reference George Papandreou

PD 18/10 PA 293/10

Loukas Papademos

Alexis Tsipras

Head

General Secretariat of the Government PM’s Office

Sotiris Lytras George Athanasakis Reggina Vartzeli

Designated Posts 58 150

PD 2/11

General Secretariat of the PM (replacing the PM Office):

Unchanged

General Secretariat of the Government General Secretariat of the PM

Sotiris Lytras

58

n/a

87

Unchanged

General Secretariat of the Government

58

PA 179/12

General Secretariat of the PM

Law 4109/ 13

General Secretariat for the Coordination of the Government

Panagiotis Baltakos Fotis Kaimenakis Constantinos Bouras Dimitris Vartzopoulos

Unchanged

General Secretariat of the Government

PA 201/16

General Secretariat of the PM

unchanged

General Secretariat for the Coordination of the Government

PA 64/11 Antonis Samaras

Institution

Spyros Sagias Michalis Kalogirou Dimitris Tzanakopoulos Gianna Peppe Christoforos Vernardakis Dimitris Papagiannakos

150

88 63

58

86

63

Source: Authors’ own

and Reggina Vartzeli was appointed as its head (see Table .). The actual operationalization of these reforms proved confusing and ill coordinated, particularly in resolving certain overlapping responsibilities between the GGP and the General Secretariat of the Government (GGK, Γενική Γραμματεία της Κυβέρνησης) and in embedding the work of the GGP into a functional Cabinet system (To Vima ..). The roots of these dysfunctionalities appeared to lie both with Papandreou’s own diffused management style and the climate of perpetual crisis that the Greek government had to operate under following the ‘bailout’ deal with its international creditors in May . Indeed, the external intervention became increasingly obtrusive. The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ attached to the ‘bailout’ in  contained a set of conditions and targets that Athens had to meet in order to receive its successive instalments. Greece’s

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      



creditors established a ‘Troika’ of officials from the ECB, EU Commission, and the IMF to oversee her compliance with the terms of the loan. The Troika soon set up its own office in Athens and its officials visited individual ministries and public organizations on a very regular basis to scrutinize their operation. With an increasing international perception that Greece’s institutions were failing to deliver the necessary reforms, a second arm of external intervention was added. In September , Horst Reichenbach was appointed to head an EU Commission ‘Taskforce’ for Greece, with a remit to help the state administration to better exploit available EU funding to invest in programmes in Greece. Alongside the Taskforce, bilateral help was to be provided to the central government in Athens by officials from the French state administration. It was notable that the choice of partner was made from within the shared ‘Napoleonic’ tradition. The report produced by the OECD in  on the Greek central administration was part of a similar process of support. In short, government administration in Greece had never witnessed so much external advice and intervention. These interventions came with lists of prescribed reforms. The OECD Report of  had contained a shopping list of administrative actions that ought to be taken, as did the second [‘bail-out’] Memorandum of March  (IMF Memorandum,  March ). Following the collapse of the Papandreou government in November , the interim government of Loukas Papademos agreed that Greece would ‘accelerate efforts to improve structural reform management and monitoring’ and, to help that process, it would create ‘a directorate of planning, management, and monitoring of reforms’ (IMF Memorandum,  March : ). The short-lived government of Loukas Papademos ( November – May ) also introduced new legislation in order to improve the quality of regulatory governance and enhance the process of drafting legislation (Law /). Later, the Samaras government (June  – January ) created a new General Secretariat for the Coordination of the Government (GGSK, Γενική Γραμματεία Συντονισμού της Κυβέρνησης) in an apparent attempt to respond to the conditionalities imposed by Greece’s international creditors. The new entity comprised some sixty-three new staff positions and a secretary-general to be appointed for a fiveyear term—that is, beyond the constitutional term of any one government—again, in principle, a significant innovation. Thus, by  three General Secretariats (GGK, GGP, and GGSK), with over  designated posts, were directly subordinated under the prime minister (see Table .). Although bailout conditionalities introduced an unprecedented urgency for the delivery of targets, a workable delineation of responsibilities within the Greek core executive has remained elusive. Under Samaras (–), some of the government’s heaviest workload was ‘decentralized’ to senior ministers, Yiannis Stournaras and Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who led the Ministries of Finance and Administrative Reform respectively. Closer to Maximou, State Minister Dimitris Stamatis and the General Secretary of the Government Panagiotis Baltakos, also assumed key responsibilities for the coordination of government business. The first PM tenure of Alexis Tsipras (January–September ) had a paralysing effect on government business, caused by inter-ministerial

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

    

rifts and the overarching strategy of confrontation with Greece’s creditors. In Tsipras’ second tenure (September –present), the Vice President of the Government, Yiannis Dragasakis, assumed a central role in the day-to-day running of the government, chairing two of the key Cabinet committees on economic and social policy. The architecture of Tsipras’ core executive has also been exceptional in terms of the number of state ministers and/or deputy ministers to the PM, drafted to work within close proximity to Maximou with rather opaque ‘horizontal’ or ‘troubleshooting’ mandates. Of the five such appointments, Nikos Pappas (Tsipras’ arch ‘fixer’), Christophoros Vernardakis (responsible for the coordination of the government), and Dimitris Liakos (as one of the PM’s key links with the Troika) have been the ones with the greatest nodality. Beyond the different ministerial constellations of the last decade, however, the emergence of a professionalized administrative service at the heart of the Greek government has remained elusive. The widespread practice of parachuting partypolitical appointees in key core executive posts has prevailed over demands for more stable chains of command and greater institutional memory. More senior appointments at the GGK, such as Baltakos and Spyros Sagias (under PM Samaras), have been influential, but highly polarizing figures, with the former openly harbouring partypolitical ambitions (Kathimerini, .., To Vima, ..). Similarly, the tenures of those heading the GGSK have been cut short, in order for the post holder to pursue a political career (see Table .). Such practices clearly violated the spirit of Law / whose main preoccupation was the creation of more stable structures in the Greek core executive. The debt crisis broke taboos: it dragged Greece’s creditors into the ministries in Athens and forced its political elites into a long overdue process of self-reflection as to its system of governance. The ‘direct coercive policy transfer’ (Ongaro, ) mechanism of the Troika achieved headline-grabbing aggregate staffing reductions elsewhere in government (Featherstone, ), but sought more staff at its core.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. While change and continuity can be highlighted in the evolution of the Greek core executive, the constraints militating against transformative reforms also appear to have continuity and depth. These impediments are much more a matter of structural factors than of ‘agency’, that is, of political will and personality. We have advanced this argument in more depth previously (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). The areas of continuity that have been touched on are the following: the inability to establish a skilled, professional administration, with permanent staff in relevant posts

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      



to mitigate disruption. There remains a confusion between advisory and administrative functions. Even before the debt crisis, there was repeated experimentation of organizational mechanisms. Staff numbers increased. There was a greater emphasis on communications and media strategy. The General Secretariat of the Government was empowered. But the changes failed to be embedded and the PM’s circle remained a ‘solitary centre’. It is telling that the bail-out conditionality imposed on Greece honed in on the weaknesses of intra-government coordination and its deleterious effects on the capacity to promote reform in the economy and society. The bail-outs had involved an unprecedented volume of reform targets within very tight timeframes. The government machine struggled to deliver, whatever the level of political will. The conditionality reviews of the Troika were repeatedly delayed, and necessitated the frequent use of emergency ordinances. The experience highlighted the question of external leverage in promoting domestic change. With the ending of close external monitoring, what is left are indigenous pressures for reform. The OECD, in its  Report, concluded that a ‘big bang’ approach to administrative reform is ‘probably the only option’ for Greece (OECD, : ). Such an outcome is highly unlikely. As suggested here, internally, the system has been resilient in terms of many of its norms and behaviours. Future research agendas could usefully focus on the longer-term impacts of the bailout period for the internal workings of the core executive, delineating the degree of change. There is great need for case study research of the operational relations between individual ministries and the centre of government, as well as policy coordination across ministries. And, to fully address concerns of Greek exceptionalism, the focus on Athens needs to be brought into comparative analysis with empirical depth. The structural constraints on the inner workings of government in Athens will continue to be of importance to both practitioners and academics, as they assess processes of change. The institutional setting matters: traits such as the lack of trust and the prevalence of clientelistic politics create repertoires of responses by political figures; at the same time, they disrupt an already problematic administrative culture by which the machine operates (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ; Featherstone, ). They link the internal machine to wider society; indeed, they suggest a dependency upon it. As such, the scope or ease of change appears deeply challenging.

R Andeweg, R. (). Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, Cabinet Committees and Cabinet Ministers. In Weller, P., Bakvis, H., and Rhodes, R. A. W. (eds.)The Hollow Crow: Countervailing Trends in Core Executives. London: Macmillan, –. Arsenis, G. (). Πολιτική κατάθεση [Political Testimony]. Athens: Odysseas.

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    

Barber, J. D. (). The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Criscitiello, A. (). ‘Majority Summits: Decision-Making Inside the Cabinet and Out: Italy, –’. West European Politics,  (): –. Dunleavy, P., and Rhodes, R. A. (). ‘Core Executive Studies in Britain’. Public Administration,  (): –. Elgie, R. (). ‘Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Regimes’. Political Studies (): pp. –. Elgie, R. (). ‘Core Executive Studies: Two Decades On’. Public Administration,  (): –. Ellis, R. (). Presidential Lightning Rods: The Politics of Blame Avoidance. Kansas: University of Kansas Press. Featherstone, K. (). ‘External Conditionality and the Debt Crisis: the ‘Troika’ and Public Administration Reform in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). Prime Ministers in Greece: The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heffernan, R. (). ‘Prime Ministerial Predominance? Core Executive Politics in the UK’. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations,  (): –. IMF (). ‘Greece: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding’,  March. Kaarbo, J. (). ‘Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research’. Political Psychology,  (): –. Kapsis, Y. (). Κουβεντιάζοντας με τον Ανδρέα [Talking to Andreas]. Athens: Livanis. Labrias, T. (). Στη σκιά ενός μεγάλου [In the Shadow of a Great]. Athens: Morfotiki Estia. Loverdos, A. (). Κυβέρνηση, συλλογική λειτουργία και πολιτική ευθύνη [Government, Collective Operation and Political Responsibility]. Athens-Komotini: Sakkoula. OECD (). ‘Greece: Review of the central administration’. OECD Public Governance Reviews. Paris: OECD Publishing. Ongaro, E. (). ‘The Relationship between the New European Governance Emerging from the Fiscal Crisis and Administrative Reforms: Qualitatively Different, Quantitatively Different, or Nothing New? A Plea for a Research Agenda.’ Administrative Culture,  (): –. Paleokrassas, I. (). Μπροστά από την εποχή της: η κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας, – [Ahead of its Time: the Government of New Democracy, –]. Athens: Estia. Pangalos, T. (). Με τον Αντρέα στην Ευρώπη [In Europe with Andreas]. Athens: Patakis. Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., and King, D. S. (). ‘The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism’. Journal of Politics,  (): –. Rallis, G. (). Ώρες ευθύνης [Hours of Responsibility]. Athens: Evroekdotiki, reprinted by To Vima Vivliothiki: Athens []. Rallis, G. (). Πολιτικές εκμυστηρεύσεις, – [Political Confessions –]. Athens: Proskinio. Rallis, G. (). Με ήσυχη τη συνείδηση [With a Clean Conscience]. Athens: Potamos. Simitis, C. (). Πολιτική για μια δημιουργική Ελλάδα – [Policy for a Creative Greece –]. Athens: Polis.

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

Tsatsos, C. (). Ο άγνωστος Καραμανλής: μία προσωπογραφία [The Unknown Karamanlis: A Portrait]. Second edition. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon. Varvitsiotis, I. (). Όπως τα έζησα: – [As I Experienced Them: –]. Athens: Livanis. Zahariadis, N. (). ‘Leading Reform amidst Transboundary Crises: Lessons from Greece’, Public Administration  (): –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

           

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. G has a longstanding tradition of parliamentarism. In fact, Greece was among the pioneering states in certain salient features of parliamentarism. The Constitution of  acknowledged universal male suffrage (Article ), a presumption of competence in favour of the parliament and against the Crown (Article ), and the exclusive competence of the parliament to amend the Constitution (Article ). Further, as of , the principle that the government must enjoy the confidence of the parliament was recognised as a constitutional custom. Since the revolutionary era, between  and , prior to the formal international acknowledgment of the new state, politics in Greece were designed with the parliament playing a key role. Three elements seem to apply for most of Greek parliamentary history. First, systematically after , a Westminster-type of polity applies in Greece; only during the transitional period between King Otto and King George I (–), for the first and last time in Greek history, was the country ruled by a system, whereby the executive is fully absorbed by the parliament which exercises also governmental functions (système conventionnel, as of the French Convention National). The principle, entailing the executive’s dependence upon the parliament, was introduced in the form of a constitutional convention by Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis, who laid the essential foundations for the modernisation of the Greek state. Still, royal interventionist policy caused on two occasions (– and –) serious conflicts that resulted in a significant devaluation of the parliamentary prerogative to freely grant confidence to the government. Second, the parliamentary tradition in Greece is mostly of a unicameral system. Exceptionally, a second chamber, namely the Senate, was constitutionally established between  and , composed of twenty-seven members as a consultative body to the King, appointed by him, and between  and , composed of  members partly elected and partly designated according to a corporate model, with legislative powers, regarding mostly the revision of the Constitution, and joint powers to elect the president of the republic and dissolve the lower

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 



house. Finally, parliamentarism is based on party politics. Yet, although political parties existed as early as the revolutionary era as a parliamentary component, it was not before the beginning of the twentieth century that the political parties acquired a more structural organisation. Following the restitution of democracy, a referendum was held in December  on whether Greece should be a republic or a democratic kingdom. Almost  per cent voted in favour of the former. After the  elections and the referendum, a new Constitution was introduced in  that shapes the institutions of the Third Hellenic Republic. The  Constitution (‘C’) reinstated the parliamentary republic and, ever since, after three constitutional revisions (in , ,  and ), Greek parliamentary practice has been rather stable, resembling those of the Western European democracies. In the forthcoming analysis, the Greek parliament will be assessed within the constitutional architecture, with an emphasis upon the institutional relationship of the parliament towards other branches of governance and, in the second section, as a functioning body within political practice.

. T P   C A

.................................................................................................................................. The parliament constitutes a cornerstone in the constitutional architecture of the separation of powers (Article  C), a fundamental doctrine of the Greek polity that cannot be altered through any means, including constitutional amendment (Article  para  C). The theoretical foundation of the constitutional prevalence of the parliament lies in the fact that it is the only state branch that enjoys direct legitimacy from the electorate and is directly accountable to it, thus reflecting the key constitutional notion of popular sovereignty (Article  paras  and  C). In this respect, the parliament enjoys a series of crucial constitutional powers: it legislates, controls the government, elects state officials, and may press charges against the president of the republic, ministers, and MPs. Two features ought to be identified in the context of the constitutional status of the parliament. First, the wide privilege and immunities enjoyed both by the parliament, as a constitutional agency and individually by parliamentarians; and, secondly, the ways in which the parliament interconnects with other state branches, controls them or is controlled by them, and the level of its functional distinctiveness.

. P  I

.................................................................................................................................. The parliament is the only state agency that enjoys full autonomy and self-governance. This protective shell has developed as a counterbalance mechanism against coups targeting the parliament by the king, wishing to consolidate part of the exercise of state power, the military, or politicians wishing to establish a dictatorship.

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

 

Self-governance indicates that the House has full discretion to organise its services and appoint its servants and to draft and execute its own budget without any external intervention. In that respect, the parliament receives state grants that allow it to fully accomplish its expenses at its own request. Additionally, the parliament may also draw financial resources from EU funds or other financial programmes addressed to state bodies. Neither the Ministry of Finance nor the Court of Accounts, or any other independent authority entrusted with the state supervision, may interfere ex post or ex ante in any matter of an administrative or financial nature. Self-autonomy means that the House can organise its functioning through its own Standing Orders of Parliament (‘SO’). Apart from the drafting and voting of its own SO, the parliament also concludes without any external intervention the process of constitutional revision (Article  paras - C). It is noteworthy that, by contrast, the parliament, when exercising its ordinary legislative functions, does not operate autonomously; in principle, this competence is exercised jointly with the president of the republic. In addition to the above institutional guarantees, MPs also enjoy a high level of constitutional independence. They are bestowed unrestricted freedom of opinion and a right to vote according to their conscience (Article  para  C) and are not prosecuted or in any way interrogated for an opinion expressed or a vote cast by them in the discharge of their duties, unless for libel, and only after leave is granted by the parliament (Article  paras  and  C). MPs are not liable to testify on information given to them or supplied by them in the course of the discharge of their duties, or on the persons who entrusted the information to them, or to whom s/he supplied such information (Article  para  C). Most importantly, they are not prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise confined during the parliamentary term without prior leave granted by parliament. Likewise, a member of a dissolved parliament may not be prosecuted for political crimes during the period between the dissolution of parliament and the declaration of the election of the members of the new parliament. Leave to do so is granted in case the request for prosecution by the public prosecutor is not linked to the exercise of duties and the member’s political activities. The parliament must decide within three months of the date the request for prosecution by the public prosecutor was forwarded to the Speaker. The three-month limit is suspended during parliament’s recess. No leave is required when MPs are caught in the act of committing a felony (Article  C). Finally, MPs are entitled to receive compensation and expenses from the state, as determined by the parliament itself, and enjoy exemption from transportation, postal and telephone charges, the extent of which shall be determined by decision of the parliament in plenary session (Article  paras  and  C).

. S I  F D

.................................................................................................................................. The constitutional structure in Greece is based on the interpolarity of state branches, in an effort to combine separation of powers and an appropriate level of accountability through a system of checks and balances.

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 



.. Vis-à-Vis the Executive With respect to the executive, parliament must give its confidence to the new government within fifteen days from the date the prime minister is appointed; such confidence is tacitly deemed to exist throughout the governmental term in office, unless there is a vote of censure to the opposite effect. At any other time, the government may request a vote of confidence and parliament may on a motion of censure decide to withdraw its confidence from the government or from a member of the government (Article  C). The Standing Orders also provide for concrete parliamentary means to control the government, other than the motion of censure. These are: a) petitions, lodged by individuals or groups of citizens in writing to make complaints or requests, since no citizen may appear directly before the parliament to make an oral or written report; if such petition is endorsed by an MP, the competent minister ought to reply within twenty-five days (Article  C and Article  SO); b) questions, that is, written requests for explanations on matters of public importance as an ordinary form of interpellation; ministers must reply also in writing within twenty-five days in a day reserved for such questions (Articles –Β SO); c) topical questions, that is, written questions by MPs on issues of current significance; at least two questions are selected to be answered orally before the House by the prime minister or the competent minister (Articles –Α SO); d) applications to submit documents, that is, written MPs’ requests to supply documents related to issues of public importance, except for documents relating to diplomacy, military, or pertinent to national security; the competent minister ought to submit the requested documents within thirty days (Article  SO); e) post-questions, that is, follow-up requests when the minister’s response to a question or application to submit documents is deemed inadequate or if there are no responses whatsoever (Article – SO); f) current interpellations, that is, questions on critical current affairs (Article  SO); and, g) investigation committees, that is, committees set up from among MPs to inquire on an issue of public importance (Article  C). Further, parliament also appoints the chairpersons and the members of the administrative boards of the independent authorities prescribed by the Constitution, most importantly the National Council for Radio and Television, which is competent for the licensing and supervision of radio and television stations in Greece (Article  para  C). The decision is taken by a parliamentary committee, namely the Conference of Chairpersons, composed ex officio of the Speaker and the Vice-Speakers of the House, former Speakers who are members of the parliament, presidents of parliamentary committees, and presidents of the party parliamentary groups (Article A para  C and Article  SO). Finally, parliament has the power to take legal action against serving or former members of the Cabinet or undersecretaries for criminal offences committed during the discharge of their duties (Article  C).

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

 

By way of contrast, the government, insofar as it has received a vote of confidence, may cause, through a presidential decree, the dissolution of parliament with the purpose of renewing a popular mandate in view of dealing with a national issue of exceptional importance (Article  para  C). This has been, in fact the most common ground of dissolution of the parliament in post- political history, thus allowing the government to determine the most suitable time from a partisan standpoint to declare the elections.

.. Vis-à-Vis the President of the Republic Parliament holds a strong position towards the president of the republic concerning his/her election and dismissal. On the one hand, parliament elects the president through a series of votes. If there is no majority of two-thirds (/) of the overall number of MPs in favour of a nominee in the first and the second round of voting and there is no majority of three-fifths (/) of the overall number of MPs in the third round, the parliament elects the president with an absolute majority vote. If the majority required is not obtained, the parliament elects the president with a relative majority vote (Article  C). Moreover, although the president does not hold political responsibility for the exercise of his/her duties, the Constitution provides for a quasiimpeachment process (Article  C). Since the  constitutional revision, the president of the republic does not have extensive powers but remains, in a rather symbolic manner, the head of state. Prior to this revision, the president of the republic enjoyed substantial discretion to dissolve the parliament if there were indications of popular discontent to the parliament; today he/she may dissolve the parliament if two governments have resigned or have been voted down by parliament, and its composition fails to guarantee governmental stability (Article  para  C). Currently, the president of the republic is formally part of the legislative function, jointly with the parliament; his/her role is limited, ex post to the approval of bills by parliament, to their promulgation (i.e. control of the authenticity and constitutional review of the bill, both in terms of substance and of proceedings) and publication in the Official Gazette within one month of the vote. The president of the republic may indeed send back a bill stating reasons for this referral, and, in such case, the bill must necessarily be brought before the parliamentary plenum, not before a recess section, and the bill must be voted by an absolute majority of the total number of MPs (Article  C), instead of the regular requirement of a simple majority of the members present, which in no case may be less than one-fourth of the total number of the MPs (Article  C). It is noteworthy in this respect, that the  amendment abolished the competence of legislative ratification by the president of the republic, according to which he/she could refer the bill back to parliament if he/she disagreed with its contents on its merits. In that, there has been a significant change over time with a turn from a system with strong Crown under the Constitution of , later president under the Constitution of , to a system with a strong executive and parliament.

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 



.. Vis-à-Vis the Judiciary The Greek Constitution provides for a high level of organic and functional judicial independence in order to secure judicial impartiality and to safeguard the rule of law. Accordingly, the constitutional separation of powers between the political branches of government, including parliament, and the judiciary is rather clear-cut. Yet, parliament does have a say in the process of appointing judges of higher ranking, that is, presidents and vice-presidents of all three supreme courts (Council of State/Supreme Administrative Court, Supreme Civil and Criminal Court, and the Court of Auditors), the Supreme Court prosecutor, the general commissioner of the Court of Auditors and the general commissioner of administrative courts. Although the Constitution prescribes that it is substantially the competence of the Cabinet to appoint those judges (Article  para  C), ordinary legislation provides that the Conference of Chairpersons renders an opinion on the suitability of the candidates for each position to the competent minister of justice, who eventually makes a recommendation to the Cabinet (Article  of Law /). In spite of the fact that the parliamentary opinion does not bind the minister or the Cabinet, the Committee renders an official hearing of all candidates and makes a proper ranking; according to parliamentary tradition, such hearings do not go as far as to discern the political beliefs of the candidates or inquire about their views on specific controversial issues, as normally happens with the hearing of the US Senate when consenting to the appointment of federal Supreme Court judges. By way of contrast, all courts have an institutional obligation on their own initiative, as a collateral issue within any trial, to review the legislation produced by parliament (Articles  para  and  para  C). Yet, constitutional review does not go as far as to examine whether internal parliamentary proceedings prescribed by the Constitution or by the Standing Orders have been met. Pursuant to the constitutional clause that the courts shall be bound not to apply a statute whose ‘content’ is contrary to the Constitution (Article  para  C), as judicially interpreted, the courts abstain from constitutional review concerning parliamentary proceedings. This clearly goes contrary to most European adjudication systems, which review the internal processes of the respective parliaments to detect procedural unconstitutionality. Only minor exceptions apply in Greece in this respect: among the parliamentary proceedings, the courts merely examine whether a (e.g.) pension bill does not contain any irrelevant provisions and is accompanied by an opinion by the Court of Auditors (Article  para , Judgment of the Special Supreme Court /) and, as of , the courts examine whether the parliament has abided by a qualified majority constitutionally provided for a particular vote (Judgment of the Council of State /). This parliamentary immunity is conceptually founded on the principle of parliamentary autonomy and on the competence of the president of the republic to promulgate bills, thus certifying that process has been respected, which, however, has not occurred in practice under the  Constitution (Gerapetritis, ).

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.. Vis-à-Vis International Organisations The Greek legal system follows a traditional dualistic system in the relationship between domestic and international law. Therefore, parliament, in its legislative capacity, remains sovereign in terms of any imported source of law. Pursuant to the Constitution, international conventions become an integral part of domestic Greek law and prevail over any contrary provision of law, but not the Constitution itself, insofar as they are ratified by statute and enter into force according to their respective conditions (Article  para  C). Special majorities are required for treaties conveying competencies to agencies of international organisations, that is, a three-fifths (/) majority of the total number of MPs, or for treaties restricting national sovereignty, that is, an absolute majority of the total number of MPs (Article  paras  and  respectively C). The above applies without prejudice to the principle of the supremacy of EU law, which is to a large extent accepted, albeit not always explicitly, by the jurisprudence of domestic courts when called to reconcile cases of conflict between EU law and constitutional clauses. To that effect the Constitution provides an explicit foundation for the participation of Greece in the European integration process (interpretative clause under Article  C), and further provides that the sovereign right of the state to issue currency does not impede the participation of Greece in the process for European economic and monetary unification, in the wider context of European integration (interpretative clause under Article  C).

. P  P P

..................................................................................................................................

.. Majoritarian and Divisive Parliamentarism The basic feature of the Greek parliamentary system is majoritarianism. This has a double effect: an internal and an external effect. From an internal point of view, the fact that the majority in parliament politically coincides with the government through the vote of confidence essentially allows the latter to become the dominant actor in the political arena. Albeit a rather natural inclination of all Westminster-type parliaments, the problem becomes more acute in Greece. On the one hand, there has been the rule of single-party governments after the democratic transition of , with the exception of – and the post- period. On the other hand, the domestic parliamentary system relies heavily on a party system and, in turn, on the overriding figure of the prime minister, who typically serves simultaneously as leader of the parliamentary group of his/her party and as leader of the party altogether. These phenomena ultimately result in high-level party discipline being a stable feature of

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Greek politics, curtailing opposing voices from the inside of the dominant political party. However, this is exactly where the Greek institutional paradox lies: according to Featherstone and Papadimitriou, although prime ministers in Greece enjoy wide institutional and political powers, when compared to other western European constitutional orders, they have invariably been in the post- era ‘emperors without clothes’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, : ). This feebleness can be attributed mainly to the inadequate resources at the centre of government to exert proper control and coordination over the various ministries and the general government machine. Majoritarian parliamentarism results in the most powerful weapon of the parliament against the government, that is, the motion of censure, being essentially a blank bullet. In post- Greek politics, there have been eight motions of censure against the government overall (and two against individual ministers): June  against Andreas Papandreou’s government concerning foreign policy; March  against the same government concerning corruption; March  against Konstantinos Mitsotakis’ government concerning foreign policy; January  against Andreas Papandreou’s government concerning MPs’ incapacity on health grounds; February  against Konstantinos Karamanlis’ government concerning university education structures; March  against the same government concerning social security policy; November  against Antonis Samaras’ government concerning the shutting down of the public television company; and, June  against Alexis Tsipras’ government considering the Prespa agreement. Those motions produced no significant political effect; rather they operated to strengthen the political unity of the governmental majority in the House. This is hardly surprising, since no credible institutional threat exists, the government does not feel obliged to report to the parliament regularly, even on issues of great significance for the country, such as EU affairs and, especially, the outcome of the meetings of the European Council and other EU/euro area committees or foreign policy issues (Sotiropoulos, : ). In spite of the ambitious constitutional revision of  and the correlating amendments to the Standing Orders of the Parliament, basically through the constitutional upgrade of six standing parliamentary committees to elaborate on bills and to monitor governmental affairs (Foundethakis, ), parliamentary functions deteriorated even further. In light of this, the conceptual dominance of parliament has not been reflected in Greek political practice. In fact, there has been an overall reversal of the original constitutional theorem, insofar as the government has gradually taken the lead in the struggle for political prevalence and parliament seems to have deferred to it. From an external point of view, the governmental majority in parliament invariably imposes its will upon the minority parliamentary groups through structures and procedures set up by the Standing Orders, which are abundant in provisions safeguarding the prevailing rights of the majority. This misallocation of powers takes places in spite of the constitutional prescription that Standing Orders ought to regulate parliamentary functions in a free and democratic manner (Article  para  C), which entails that minority rights ought to be widely safeguarded (Gerapetritis, : –). Further, most of the oversight mechanisms of parliament towards the

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

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government, addressed par excellence to the opposition in parliament, are either ineffective or have been rendered politically inactive, such as in the case of investigation committees, which have been subject to a flagrant distortion of their constitutional aim: based on a contestable constitutional interpretation, instead of the parliament exercising control over the government on a contemporary basis, it is normally the governmental majority in parliament that exercises control over past governments which are currently in the opposition (Gerapetritis, : –). One might also identify elements of majoritarian parliamentarism in the proceedings of criminal prosecutions of Cabinet members. According to the Constitution, the competence of parliament to prosecute members of the Cabinet can be exercised through a majority decision. Before the Revision of the Constitution in , it was provided that the prosecution of the members of the Cabinet can be exercised in a strict timeframe, which is to say until the completion of the second regular session of the parliamentary term commencing after the offence was committed (Article  para  C). The existing limited deadline was introduced through a constitutional amendment in  with the purpose of preventing the abuse of the parliamentary power and the perpetuation of a toxic political environment. Instead, this competence was wielded as a constant prospective threat of opposition against the government and as an actual armoury of the majority in parliament against prior governments. The result was that if a parliamentary majority was re-elected in power, any criminal offences committed in the prior parliamentary period became effectively immune from prosecution, since under normal circumstances no government would have wished to press charges against its own members. By way of contrast, if elections were followed by a change in government, it was generally envisaged that somehow the prosecution process against prior governmental agents would be initiated. This constitutional falsification is further cultivated by the total absence of judicial intervention in the process of criminal inquiry that could operate as an impartial and non-political filter mechanism (Article  para  C). Not surprisingly, Greece has encountered cases where former prime ministers and influential political figures over its history have been subject to the parliamentary process of criminal investigation: Charilaos Trikoupis in  for misuse of sovereign loans, including a rather incredible allegation that the state bought shoe insoles for the military at the price of  cents instead of  cents per item, which was the lowest price required by law after a public auction; Eleftherios Venizelos for encouraging the th March  coup by ex-General Plastiras; and, Andreas Papandreou for his involvement in a bank-corruption scandal. Similarly, parliament has proceeded with criminal investigation of past members of the Cabinet even in cases where it was readily apparent that the constitutional deadline had elapsed, as happened, for example, in the recent inquiry against two former prime ministers and eight ministers and vice-ministers on  February  for corruption in the field of public expenditure in medicines for social welfare. A further element strengthens the deep roots of majoritarian parliamentarism in Greece: the party system is rather impermeable and, in all respects, facilitates strong political parties at the expense of smaller parties and new political entrants. This can be attributed to the electoral law generally employing a strong majority system. With the

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exception of the  Constitution, that was essentially never implemented, providing that the electoral law ought to be based on the principles of proportional representation (Article ), Greek constitutions allowed a wide margin of appreciation to the legislature in that respect. This has generally led to wide political manipulations that provoked a constitutional amendment in  to the effect that the electoral system is now determined by law which applies as of the elections immediately after the following ones, unless an explicit provision adopted by a majority of two-thirds (/) of the total number of MPs, provides its immediate application as of the elections immediately following (Article  para ). In fact, most elections in Greece have taken place on the basis of a qualified majority system and only on very few historical occasions has the electoral system in Greece been based on a proportional system (i.e. three elections in –; electoral law /, which set up a strong proportional version). Moreover, the state funding of political parties strongly correlates with the electoral share of each party. Further, a minimum applies for political parties and alliances to be eligible for state funding: they must in the last general parliamentary elections have had complete party lists in at least  per cent of the country’s constituencies and accrued at least . per cent of the total valid votes in the country (Law / as amended by Law /). The time allocated to political parties in the pre-electoral period is strictly regulated so that large parties have an advantage over their smaller counterparts, which in turn are prohibited from buying further broadcasting time (Law / as amended by Law /). In the above context, not surprisingly, very few political upsets have occurred in the course of recent Greek history with a bi-partisan political system being the predominant, most common pattern. This sealed political envelope has cultivated a rather divisive mentality on the part of key political actors. Political alliances were in the main not necessary because of the majoritarian electoral law. In this context, majoritarian parliamentarism has resulted in divisive parliamentarism where no deliberative spirit could effectively operate. This long-established pattern was challenged in the crisis elections of  and after (see Chapter ).

.. Clientelism and Nepotism Clientelism and nepotism constitute two major pathologies of Greek parliamentarism, which set a double hindrance on a rational operation of parliamentarism: personal will prevails over public policies and private interest becomes the basic concern in the decision-making processes as opposed to public interests. The roots of these phenomena can be traced in the structure of Ottoman sovereignty over Greece, whereby local nobles and landowners catered for the interests of the subjects of the empire. Obviously, this political reality is at odds with the constitutional stipulation that MPs represent the nation (Article  para  C). In this context, not surprisingly, the electoral system in Greece has traditionally adhered to a system of vote of preference for the candidates in each electoral district

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

 

and not a party list so that the electorate could be in a position to bargain their vote. This electoral scheme clearly facilitates personal relationships between the candidates and the electorate and results: (a) in a significant diminution of the level of the constitutionally guaranteed secrecy of the ballot (Article  para  C), since vote trade-off presupposes that the content of the ballot becomes known to the politician concerned or to the public; (b) in safe seats in parliament, since MPs developed a solid clientele that they could then pass on to their successors by simply retaining the level of clientele liaisons; and, (c) in generally closed political party structures, since political parties operated as insular organisations and were widely seen as synonymous with the figure of the party leaders. In fact, as Sotiropoulos points out, party leaders control party organs, which in turn control parliamentary groups, handpick candidates for parliament, often overruling local organisations’ preferences and threaten and enforce discipline upon those deviating from party lines (Sotiropoulos, ). Only as of  was a political party leader elected through a direct and open election by members of the party: specifically, Giorgos Papandreou as president of Panhellenic Socialistic Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), but then as the sole candidate. Ever since, only PASOK and the Centre-Right New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) have adopted open procedures for electing their presidents. It is noteworthy that, although the Constitution provides that Greek citizens possessing the right to vote may freely found and join political parties, the organisation and activity of which must serve the free functioning of democratic governance (Article  para ), the clause has not been interpreted by the constitutional literature as entailing intra-party democracy. This political landscape of clientelism and nepotism created a political arena in Greece where ideological contrasts and deliberative processes succumbed to a personalised political environment. The political parties have been dominated by a few influential families, which were in turn considered to have guaranteed seats in parliament and an ex officio right to represent their electoral district, thus creating a predictable political geography. According to field research operated by Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou, the Greek parliament seems to be dominated by ‘dynastic MPs’, a phenomenon, which slightly receded in the aftermath of the financial crisis, as of the  general elections (Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou, ).

. I P

.................................................................................................................................. Concurrently to the overall subordination of the parliament to the government, a serious downgrade as regards the legislative functions of the parliament has progressively taken place in the post- period, namely in the nature, quantity, quality, proceedings, and implementation of legislation. As regards the nature of legislation, this often suffers from motivations that go beyond rational necessity, to accommodate sectoral interests and pressures (Skouris, : –). As Spanou points out, the Greek state normally abstains from establishing

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a rational public policy ex ante, merely intervening through regulation ex post, without any genuine will to connect the regulated field with more global objectives (Spanou, : ). Under these circumstances, legislation in Greece is not founded upon a central strategy, lacks homogeneity, and is broadly scattered. As regards the scope of legislation, the overproduction of the Greek parliament is undeniable: in the forty-three-year period since , more than , statutes have been passed, amounting to an average of almost one statute every three days. Such polynomy inevitably causes overlaps and anachronisms, administrative delays, bureaucratic obstructions, lack of competitiveness, and corruption. By contrast, the major financial crisis that erupted in – produced a significant reduction in the actual number of primary laws, that is, those not involving ratification of treaties, incorporation of EU acquis, ratification of Acts of Legislative Content, ratification of concession agreements and approval of State Accounts, which fell altogether outside the drafting scope of the domestic legislature (Table .). Further, the government has progressively taken a much more active role in producing regulatory acts, thus essentially substituting itself for parliament. This is attained either through ordinary regulatory acts—presidential decrees and ministerial decisions—pursuant to parliamentary delegation (Article  para  C)—or through acts of legislative content introduced under extraordinary circumstances of an urgent and unforeseeable need without parliamentary delegation and subject to parliament ex post for ratification (Article  para  C). Yet, in effect, parliament often found itself in a position of being politically bound to uphold those acts of legislative content so as not to cause serious upsets ex post in governmental policy. Karkatsoulis has calculated the impressive number of five implemented presidential decrees per statute from  to  and sixty-nine implemented ministerial decisions per statute from  to —apart from ordinances from other layers of the administration (Karkatsoulis, ). In sectoral terms, Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos, merely in the field of taxation, counted thirty-seven statutes and three acts of legislative content in fifteen years, close to three tax laws per year (Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos, ). The authors shrewdly attribute this polynomy, on the one hand, to political party competition and political culture; that is, an arms race between governments to show a very active regulatory profile to their clientele, and, on the other hand, to the administrative culture and the perception of the state’s predisposition with regard to regulation (Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos, ). Further, on occasions, governmental intervention has gone as far as to regulate material that falls in the exclusive competence of the parliamentary Standing Orders (Gerapetritis, ). As regards the quality of legislation, Greece has not fared well: a huge number of laws, regulations, and ordinances overlap to a large extent, without significant codifications and without removal of provisions that have become outdated. Surprisingly for a modern state, there is not an official public record of the existing legislation as it stands over consecutive changes in law and it is the duty of anyone, public official or citizen, to identify what is applicable law in any given circumstances. In this context, bureaucracy and insecurity is raised which, in turn, results in huge delays in administrative and judicial performance and, eventually, in corruption. A post-crisis

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Table 10.1 Number of parliamentary statutes per category (2013–2017) Total number of parliamentary Year statutes 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

122 95 37 91 63

Ratifications of international treaties 60 32 6 41 21

Approval Acts of Ratification of Incorporation of state legislative concession Primary of EU law budgets content agreements laws 7 10 3 20 8

3 3 3 3 3

10 2 3 1 –

4 5 1 2 –

38 43 21 24 31

Table based on personal research and taken from the Official Gazette

phenomenon of poor legislation is the enactment of statutes of huge size (more than  pages long), of a single article or very limited number of articles, in order to avoid possible negative votes from individual MPs on parts of the statute over three stages of voting; that is in principle, per article and in total (for example, Laws / and /). In this context, Law / on regulatory governance, aiming at improving statutory drafting, and repealed by Law / has patently failed to exercise any significant influence in the domestic legal landscape. Interestingly, as early as , through the Prime Minister’s Decision Υ/.., a system of ‘Integrated Impact Assessment’ [Έκθεση Αξιολόγησης Συνεπειών Ρυθμίσεων] on the economy, the society, and the environment, became a mandatory requirement for any new bill, executive regulation, or local government ordinances. Yet, Hatzis and Nalpantidou rightly criticise such reports as having been of very poor quality and extremely simplistic (Hatzis and Nalpantidou, ). The reasons for poor legislative drafting are mainly the lack of legislative studies in Greece resulting in drafting being assigned to non-experts, and the lack of a high-profile central legislative bureau within the government and the parliament. As regards legislative proceedings, there has been a gradual devaluation of their quality. Given that there is no institutional requirement for a quorum, parliamentarians are scarcely present in the proceedings. In fact, more often than not, debates take place before an empty chamber. Only if there is an issue of roll-call vote requested by the opposition in order to achieve the required majority, are MPs gathered after receiving a relevant notice by the Speaker of the House. Further, it has become commonplace that bills are discussed, not through ordinary proceedings, which might take longer (albeit the procedure is time framed by the Standing Orders and no filibuster parliamentary tradition exists), but through curtailed proceedings of urgency (Articles  paras  and  C). In such cases, it is the government that names the bill urgent and the parliament that approves this denomination. The most common violation of parliamentary proceedings is that statutes contain a wide range of unrelated stipulations, in spite of the explicit constitutional clause prohibiting unrelated

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Table 10.2 Contents of primary laws on the basis of the number of ministers signing the statutes Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Number of primary laws 38 43 21 24 31

Competence of 1 Minister

Competence of 2-5 Ministers

1 1 – 1 –

9 5 4 1 –

Competence of 6 or more Ministers 28 37 17 22 31

Table based on personal research and taken from the Official Gazette

provisions or amendments to a Bill (Article  para  C; Gerapetritis, ). In fact, less than  per cent of the primary laws voted in – were signed by just one minister, an indicator of single content within the competence of one ministry pursuant to the Constitution ( out of a total of  statutes, Table .). As regards the implementation of legislation, the picture is blurred. In its  national Report on Better Regulation in Greece, the OECD identified a heavily legalistic approach whereby all changes are legislated but are not always appropriately implemented, enforced, or monitored (OECD, ). The structural deficiencies of the Greek public administration are relevant here. Apart from the above, however, there are many illustrations of statutes that remained inactive for long periods and, on occasions, were eventually abolished because the statute was drafted in an incomprehensive manner, or was practically impossible to be implemented without the enactment of a series of implementing regulatory administrative acts or there were strong reactions by those affected by the legislation and there was no strong political will to apply the legislation in an invariable way. Non-implementation of legislation has caused, more or less, serious damage to the public finances (Mantzoufas, ).

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Parliamentarism in Greece has been deteriorating, especially during the financial crisis. The degradation of legislation produces legal confusion and polynomy; subordination to government causes imbalances in the checks and balance system through high levels of party discipline and the extreme accumulation of power by the executive; the persistence of clientelism in the relationship between representatives and the electorate facilitates nepotism and a very limited level of accountability and meritocracy; lawmaking progressively deteriorates; and, the rise of extremist and populist parties in parliament aggravates the quality of proceedings.

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 

Beyond any doubt, a radical change in the parliamentary status and proceedings is needed. This entails a constitutional revision to elevate the general position of parliament vis-à-vis the executive, to make the criminal liability of MPs more rational, to allow significant minority rights for the opposition in parliament, to enable judicial review of the constitutionality of internal parliamentary proceedings, to prevent abuse of proceedings by the parliamentary majority at no cost, to secure the regular presence of MPs in the chamber during parliamentary processes, and to create an environment of genuine deliberativeness. There is much scope for research to inform public debate on such a revision: for example, to establish the extent of violations of parliamentary proceedings that are against the Constitution and the Standing Orders; or the number of judicial decisions that have struck down legislation as unconstitutional; or, bills introduced by the government to secure the support of specific governmental MPs. However, such amendments require a wide consensus of the prevailing political forces which, at the moment, does not seem possible. The broadly divisive political climate of post- Greece, in conjunction with the abrupt financial crisis has produced a toxic political environment that leaves little room for optimism to improve the functional role of parliament and the quality of its proceedings.

R Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). Prime Ministers in Greece: The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foundethakis, P. (). ‘The Hellenic Parliament: The New Rules of the Game’. The Journal of Legislative Studies  (): –. Gerapetritis, G. (). Σύνταγμα και Βουλή [Constitution and Parliament]. Athens: Nomiki Vivliothiki. Gerapetritis, G. (). ‘H οικονομική κρίση ως στοιχείο απορρύθμισης της ιεραρχίας των κανόνων δικαίου’ [‘Financial Crisis as an Element of Destruction of the Hierarchy of Norms]: Μελέτες επί του μνημονίου [Essays on the Greek Memorandum]. Athens: Athens Bar. Hatzis, A. and Nalpantidou, S. (). ‘From Nothing to Too Much: Regulatory Reform in Greece’ ENBR Working Paper No /. Available at: http://regulatoryreform. com/wp-content/uploads///Greece-From-Nothing-to-Too-Much-RIA-Hatzis-. pdf (accessed  October ). Karkatsoulis, P. (). ‘Η προϊούσα έκπτωση της νομοθετικής λειτουργίας στην Ελλάδα [‘The Progressive Deduction of the Legislative Function in Greece’]. In Kontiadis, X. and Anthopoulos, C. (eds) Κρίση του ελληνικού πολιτικού συστήματος; [Crisis of the Greek Political System?]. Athens: Papazisis, –. OECD. (). ‘Better Regulation in Europe: Greece ’ (OECD Publishing ) Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/better-regulation-in-europe-greece-_ -en#page (accessed  April ). Patrikios, S. and Chatzikonstantinou, M. (). ‘Dynastic Politics: Family Ties in the Greek Parliament –’. South European Society and Politics  (): –.

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

Skouris, V. (). The Crisis of the Legislative Function. Better Law with Fewer Laws. Athens: Sakkoulas Publishing. Sotiropoulos, D.A., (). ‘The Greek Parliament and the European Union After the Lisbon Treaty: A Missed Opportunity to Empower Parliament’. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O., and Smith, J. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Sotiropoulos, D.A. and Christopoulos, L. (). Πολυνομία και κακονομία στην ελλάδα. Ένα σχέδιο για καλύτερο και πιο αποτελεσματικό κράτος [Polynomy and Bad Legislation in Greece. A Plan for a Better and More Effective State]. Athens: Dianeosis. Spanou, C. (). ‘On the Regulatory Capacity of the Greek State’. International Journal of Administrative Sciences  (): .

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  ......................................................................................................................

 

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. G public administration is considered to belong to the wider Napoleonic tradition, together with its counterparts in Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Statism, bureaucratic centralization and legalism permeate its organization, operation, and its citizen–administration relations. Historical and sociopolitical legacies endowed it, however, with additional features that account for longstanding deficiencies. It is still seen as lagging behind in terms of modernization and Europeanization requirements. While historically the state was expected to be the main driver of such processes, partypoliticization, clientelism, and particularistic policies remained strong undercurrents emasculating modernization efforts. In the face of weak endogenous demand or pressure, external push has come to be seen as beneficial, if not necessary, in order to compensate for the weak reformist drive. The Greek administration became relatively recently a field of study from a social science perspective. Given the weight of legalism, it was seen as the domaine réservé of law and lawyers. Focusing on the political and social confrontations, which led to the formation of the modern Greek state, some macro-sociological and historical/culturalist analyses highlighted persistent weaknesses regarding administrative organization and operation. From an implicit or explicit west European perspective, the Greek exceptionalism is often attributed to the Ottoman legacy and post-Ottoman statebuilding dynamics (Argyriades, ; Diamandouros, ). Greek oddities are also related to the type of state–society relations and the overgrown state machinery common in countries of the capitalist semi-periphery (Mouzelis, ). The belated democratization and the experience of authoritarian regimes placed Greece in the southern European cluster of states which share a number of common features (Italy, Portugal, and Spain). In more recent times these countries were also confronted

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 



with similar modernization and Europeanization challenges (see Gunther, Diamandouros and Sotiropoulos, ; Sotiropoulos, ). A historical-institutionalist perspective mostly characterizes analyses of Greek public administration. The emphasis is on the historical legacies and path dependence. Potential critical junctures coincide with major moments of recent history: the post return to democracy, joining the EU () and the euro (), and more recently, the economic crisis. In discussing major aspects of the Greek administration this chapter is structured in three parts. First, it addresses the legacies of the sociopolitical context that define its distinctive features. Then, it summarizes modernization reforms undertaken during the recent decades. And last, it discusses the challenges of the crisis and the economic adjustment process since , marking the latest critical juncture.

. T : A ‘Q-W’ B

.................................................................................................................................. The Modern Greek state established in , was organized along the lines of the Napoleonic model (Peters, ; Spanou, a; Ongaro, ): a system of administrative law, a centralized administrative apparatus and a career civil service. These formal features interacted with pre-existing patterns of operation and sociopolitical realities on the ground (Mouzelis, ), producing a constant gap between formal and informal aspects of institutional operation. This legacy accompanies the politicaladministrative system to date, affecting social trust in formal state institutions.

. T D: L, E, I

.................................................................................................................................. If, for historical reasons, the central state was met by the distrust of the national periphery, the experience of political authoritarianism and the overgrown but inefficient state are key to the low legitimacy of public administration. More specifically, after the Second World War, Greece experienced a civil war (–) that resulted in deep social division. State expansion was accompanied by a combination of clientelism and political exclusionism. Merit considerations were sidelined, while ideological filters excluded people with left-wing ‘social convictions’ from access to public employment, among other state resources. The state apparatus became inflated and confined to a role of an instrument of reproduction of the party in government. Widespread public employment relied on low pay and low prestige. Rather than professional ambition,

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

 

employment in the civil service was motivated by ‘job security’ and upward social mobility for the lower social strata (Mouzelis, ; Tsoukalas, ). A series of expert reports in the s and s (Marangopoulos, ; Varvaressos, ; Langrod, ; Willson, ; for these four reports, see Makrydemetres and Michalopoulos, ) soon underlined the effects of these choices on the inadequacy of the administrative machinery to support economic development: misallocation of human resources, lack of qualifications, red tape and favouritism, organizational inadequacies, and excessive compartmentalization pervaded the administrative system. Subjected to constant political interventions into its organization and operation, throughout the post-war period, the administration did not manage to build the necessary organizational capacity and expertise to promote economic and social development and serve the citizens. The state developed a substitute legitimacy, absorbing a skilled workforce that otherwise found itself redundant due to the insufficient development of the private economy. The ‘employer state’ introduced a ‘social policy perspective’ that suffused personnel policies and disguised patronage practices. Adding to the low legitimacy and efficiency, wide areas of informal political discretion account for the low degree of administrative institutionalization and standardization. Centralization of decision-making and a context of maximum flexibility benefited governments and individual politicians, allowing them to adjust the rules of the game to immediate political–electoral objectives. They were thus in a position to distribute state resources between constituencies, regions, and municipalities, as well as to the benefit of their supporters. This worked at the expense of administrative predictability. Most visible results to date are the underdevelopment of staff and horizontal functions (e.g. planning difficulties, inadequate intra- and inter-ministerial coordination, etc.) and the fragmentation of legislation, as well as organizational fluidity. Monitoring, evaluation, and control mechanisms were until recently nearly absent. This not only affected administrative capacity but also nurtured corruption and waste, further adding to citizens’ mistrust of the state.

. P  S

.................................................................................................................................. During the second half of the s and the s, Greece experienced a successful process of democratic consolidation. Compliance with the democratic rules of the game and the abolition of political exclusivism that had dominated the post-war period were major achievements of the return to democracy. Increased public expenditure, especially since the s, reflected a belated attempt to establish a welfare state. However, past legacies survived in different forms undercutting institution building and administrative modernization and subordinating welfare functions to clientelistic and corporatist pressures.

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 



After , the two parties alternating in office relied on absolute majorities in parliament. The considerable strengthening of their apparatuses stimulated ‘bureaucratic clientelism’, a phenomenon whereby a party becomes a collective patron systematically infiltrating the state machine and allocating favours through it (Lyrintzis, ). During the s, the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), disposing of important organizational resources, subordinated the weak state bureaucracy (Sotiropoulos, ), to be later succeeded by New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) in the same game. Politics retained a ‘winner takes all’ character. While parties were drifting towards clientelistic practices and/or populism, the democratic learning process failed in consensus building. Political polarization was prolonged by politicization of the administration. Having challenged the monopoly of power held until then by the ND and its predecessor right-wing parties, PASOK in government (–) set out to represent its primary constituency, the ‘underprivileged’. It introduced a populist idea of ‘democratization’ (Sotiropoulos, ) which also served for gaining direct control over the administration. Populist democratization undermined the very organizing principles of the administration. To illustrate: ‘social criteria’ in personnel selection procedures took the upper hand on merit and qualifications (Sotiropoulos, ; Spanou , , ). This indirectly favoured the ‘under-privileged’ social strata at the expense of the ‘elites’. A democratic flattening of the organizational pyramid meant abolishing top civil service positions in order to dismiss their occupants suspected of political opposition. These were replaced by political appointees (special secretaries), strengthening the political grip on the administration. In parallel, the ‘employer-state’ continued through enhanced practices of hiring on short-term contracts—mostly on partisan criteria—with the implicit promise of later awarding them tenure. Discretionary appointments on short-term contracts bypassed official hiring procedures, while massive claims for tenure were satisfied during electoral periods. This neutralized any idea of HR planning in qualitative and quantitative terms. The resulting misallocation of resources became a constant issue, while a ‘labour-intensive’ administration sidelined the need for technological and operational modernization. At the same time, party competition became the defining element of political incumbency, feeding a striking lack of consensus, including on administrative reform. Against a clientelistic background, party polarization and a zero-sum game led to dramatizing political disputes as a means to attract and preserve their political clientele. Since parties drew from cross-class support, the material basis of such strategies was the possibility to gain control of, and take advantage from, state resources. This penetrated every policy field, with public administration becoming itself an arena of party competition and confrontation (Spanou, ). As a result, alternation in government tended to bring the reversal of previous policies. Even when promising rationalization, merit, and impartiality, far from advancing institutionalization and standardization, governing parties constantly manipulated

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

 

the civil service organization rules. It is interesting, however, to note convergence on methods that facilitate party concerns for political control of the administration. The introduction of the three-year term for appointment of managers (directors, directors general), for instance, has taken roots; it represents a form of rotation that weakens hierarchical authority but suits every governing party, while keeping alive the expectations for promotion among sympathizing civil servants. Party-politicization of the top civil service, interference into routine administrative matters, and patronage subjected public administration to a mix of formalism and defiance of formal rules and operational routines (Spanou, , , , a). Formalism became a symbol of transparency and impartiality, against the suspicion of favouritism, which most often returned through the back door of political discretion. In the name of increased transparency, official hiring procedures became centralized and inefficient, only to give way to uncontrolled hiring on short-term contracts (Spanou, ). Any attempt at differentiation by merit and performance criteria was stillborn, while political support was vital to access senior positions. This unavoidably impacted on work ethics. In such conditions, the emergence of a senior civil service that could play a role of an ‘administrative elite’ was impossible (Sotiropoulos, ). All the above points to an imbalance in favour of politics as the key factor explaining a wide range of administrative deficiencies. On this line of argument converge all academic analyses. However contrary to an appearance of mutual distrust, the relationship between politics and the administration gradually evolved into a form of symbiosis. Most reforms served (or were twisted to serve) large numbers of civil servants, who became a strong pressure group safeguarding their interests within the status quo and resisting change. Successive examples can be found, among others, in the fate of the National School of Public Administration (ESSD, Εθνική Σχολή Δημόσιας Διοίκησης) supposed to prepare an administrative elite, or in the neutralization of the performance appraisal system. Corporatism met direct or indirect partypoliticization through the links of civil service unions to the governing parties (Tsekos, a). Their presence in the service councils (υπηρεσιακά συμβούλια), for instance, provided the unions with significant influence and permitted ‘political deals’ with regard to promotion decisions. This symbiotic relationship points to a mutually beneficial exchange between politics and the civil service. Both take advantage of (and favour) the status quo, while ignoring efficiency and modernization requirements (Spanou, , a). This exchange formed the basis for corresponding ‘public service bargains’ (Hood and Lodge, ) that survived through the recent crisis. Under these circumstances, public administration has taken on the appearance of a quasi-Weberian bureaucracy (Spanou, , ), which can alternatively be termed a ‘non-Weberian’ bureaucracy (Tsekos, b). In other words, it did not manage to acquire fully fledged Weberian-type features. Public administration was wedged in a low level of institutionalization, legitimacy, and efficiency, unable to ensure continuity and institutional memory.

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 



. T R  F   M N

.................................................................................................................................. In response to the widespread dissatisfaction in society, administrative reform has become a perennial issue of the domestic political agenda. Since the s, the term ‘reform’ is indeed abundantly used in political rhetoric and in staging political action. Its content is defined at times as democratization, rationalization and Europeanization. Beyond the above discussed populist democratization, ‘rationalization’ became important at times of financial restraint (e.g. the early s) while ‘Europeanization’ later reflected the priority of full participation in the European integration process. Though these terms are supposed to explain the deeper rationale and direction of reform, their symbolic use tends to rather obscure real reform intentions and actions.

. T  N-W S?

.................................................................................................................................. In the era of ‘New Public Management’, Napoleonic tradition countries were seen as disposing ‘low reform capacity equaling resistance to managerialism’ (Ongaro, ). This was attributed to a set of values, structures, and relationships shared with other institutions in society (Peters, ), which filter influence from the external environment. However, such a perspective tends to ignore the domestic dynamics in individual countries within the same tradition. Administrative modernization became a priority in the s. Reforms undertaken under this moto need to be assessed on the basis of the above-mentioned legacies and the core need for predictable administrative institutions. Administrative modernization cannot be considered apart from the tradition of a Weberian-type administration, structuring the institution-building reforms. The fragility and discontinuity of universal norms, the centrifugal tendencies stemming from political clientelism, and the professional weakness of bureaucracy—that is, the ‘quasi-Weberian’ character of the Greek administration—point to priorities that the ‘managerial revolution’ was not suitable for in the Greek context. Notwithstanding formalism and legalism, administrative deficiencies are due less to an excess of standardization, uniformity, and central control and more to the underlying lack of the same. Injecting New Public Management principles without having ensured a Weberian-type institutional and operational environment would risk giving way to centrifugal forces that counter predictability (Spanou, , ). This is not to deny the value of decentralization, simplifications, and limitation of the heavy presence of the state in social and economic activities. In this sense, the notion of a neo-Weberian state advanced by Pollitt and Bouckaert (, rd ed. ) and Lynn () may be more appropriate to the discussion of administrative reform.

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

 

It points to ‘modernising the traditional state apparatus so that it becomes more professional, more efficient and more responsive to citizens’. ‘Businesslike methods have a subsidiary role in this’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, , rd ed. ). The combination of Weberian-type, institutional building reforms with ‘new’ elements coming from other perspectives such as NPM, seems indeed more advisable for the direction of reforms in the Greek administration. Looking at modernization efforts during these two decades (s–), institutional building was to varying degrees the essence of reforms—despite occasional references to the managerial ‘air du temps’ (Spanou, a, ; Spanou and Sotiropoulos, ). Reform activism and the corresponding modernization narrative focused on confronting longstanding issues such as clientelism, political and geographical centralization, and the absence of accountability and control mechanisms. These are conditions sine qua non for achieving performance modernization, and preparing the administration for the outwardlooking role of enabler of (public or private) activities. Very briefly, among significant reforms of the s, one would certainly include the new institutional architecture potentially rebalancing centre-periphery relations. It was meant to strengthen first- and second-tier local government through compulsory mergers (from almost , down to ,), transform prefectures to self-governed units, and re-organize deconcentrated regional administrations which acquired a critical role in managing EU funds. A second major reform trend is the creation of new (or the strengthening of existing) independent authorities, under the influence of domestic dynamics and European inspiration (see Ladi,  on the Ombudsman). They were meant to place certain policy fields and decisions outside the immediate control of politics and the government. Such an example was the Independent Authority for the Selection of Personnel [ASEP, Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Επιλογής Προσωπικού, ] conceived as a means to confront clientelism in public-sector recruitment; Similarly, independent authorities for the protection of citizens’ rights, consolidating the rule of law and guarantees to citizens, were created (Ombudsman [Συνήγορος του Πολίτη], Hellenic Data Protection Authority [ΑPDPX, Αρχή Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα], Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy [ADAE, Αρχή Διασφάλισης του Απορρήτου των Επικοινωνιών], Greek National Council for Radio and Television [ESR, Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Ραδιοτηλεόρασης]). These five received constitutional status and guarantees in . While timidly implementing European policies for market liberalization and privatization, a series of regulatory authorities (e.g. telecommunication, energy, etc.) came to life, as ‘watchdogs’ for competition and consumer protection. They were placed at arm’s length from ministries and were endowed with certain guarantees of independence. Third, in view of remedying administrative rigidity and inefficiency, some form of ‘agencification’ also emerged, without necessarily making reference to the New Public Management trend. Single-issue, decentralized, and specialized agencies, mostly in the form of ‘joint stock companies’ set out to upgrade operational capacity in new policy fields, bypassing traditional bureaucratic structures. A series of horizontal and sectoral

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 



inspection bodies were set up to remedy the longstanding absence of accountability and control mechanisms (Inspectors’ bodies for Public Administration, for Transport, Health, Environment, etc.). And last, a profusion of reforms repetitively changed civil service organization rules in the name of merit, transparency, and impartiality of selection procedures (Spanou, , a). These mainly institutional reforms have partly transformed the outlook of the Greek administration. However, they were not without drawbacks and compromises that weakened their potential. The effective reversal of traditional political and geographical centralization has been a slow and difficult process, among other things because it would reduce the extent of resources available to the party in government. Independent authorities took long to get accepted and integrated in the politicaladministrative operation, particularly those with regulatory powers that remained closer to the ministerial ambit (Spanou, b). A form of ‘two speed’ administration emerged, with on one hand the higher efficiency, better expertise, and greater responsiveness of arm’s length agencies and the persisting low-capacity, traditional bureaucratic structures. The prevailing legalistic approach in internal processes undermined the implementation of the legislated ‘management by objectives’ and limited the role of the new accountability and control mechanisms at the expense of efficiency considerations. More generally, reforms were often entrapped in traditional framings and revealed little innovation. Changes in civil service organization—often hardly implemented—illustrate the thesis that public policies do not just ‘solve’ problems but construct frameworks for the interpretation of the world (Muller, ). They were repetitive, symbolically overladen, and served confrontational politics, thus preventing consensus and leaving perennial problems unresolved (Edelman, ). Upgrading administrative operations mostly remained a secondary objective. Reform activism is therefore not necessarily an expression of commitment to improvement. Frequent changes keep the civil service in a state of limbo or lead to dysfunctional solutions. Rigid official hiring procedures, for instance, in the name of merit and transparency, legitimize their bypassing by more flexible appointments on ‘short-term’ contracts. While on the surface the reform agendas of the two parties that alternated in government until the crisis (PASOK and ND) tended to converge in the s, modernization and ‘radical reform’ took the form of political retaliation. Issues were symbolically overloaded and placed within an apparently zero-sum ideological debate serving competition for electoral resources. In this process, clientelistic and corporatist claims found their way to capture policy priorities. As a result, despite a rich reform agenda, the outcomes were limited. Critical dimensions for improved administrative performance were neglected (e.g. an orientation towards results and a rationalization of internal operation, monitoring, and evaluation procedures, etc.). Their low political visibility and the absence of a constituency to promote them and help overcome resistance are the main reasons for this neglect (Spanou, a, ; Spanou and Sotiropoulos, ).

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

 

. D  R: E   E C

.................................................................................................................................. The necessity, and above all the importance, of ‘administrative reform’ in political rhetoric and action raises the question: What drives reform activism in Greece? A first answer stems from the above: parties and their competition. However, this answer does not specify the content and direction of reforms. Problem definition and perceptions of reform challenges vary across time and parties. Back in , democratization was a home-grown agenda represented by PASOK and it took a populist turn. The problem was mainly defined as ‘lack of [administrative] democracy’ and took precedence over the requirements of the then new EC membership. In the s, ND pursued changing political priorities with a neoliberal colouring, under the influence of dire financial constraints, and advancing European integration. Modernization was seen as economic rationalization and as limiting the state’s presence in the economy. After that, EU membership requirements started to gain in importance. From the mid-s, modernization was redefined to incorporate ‘Europeanization’, in particular by the Simitis government. Convergence with other EU member states, as defined by the Maastricht criteria represented an external stimulus to reform. Soft Europeanization constraints were deemed capable of counterbalancing the low endogenous reform potential. As previously mentioned, important reforms were of European inspiration. However, in the face of strong historical legacies as explained earlier, the expected convergence with other EU member-states’ administrations (the ‘European administrative space’) remained limited and superficial (Spanou, , a; Tsekos, b). Furthermore, once the objective of joining EMU was achieved, Europeanization gradually lost its potential as a driver for reform. The ‘modernization’ narrative declined and business remained unfinished (see Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). The political–administrative system lacked consistency and coherence, exhibited weak steering capacity at the centre, and remained captured by corporatist and particularistic interests. These deeper governance issues resisted the soft Europeanization constraints.

. C  C: A R  T  C

.................................................................................................................................. The financial crisis focused attention on public-sector deficiencies. Along with drastic fiscal consolidation, a key element of the three Economic Adjustment Programmes

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 



(,  and ), the so-called ‘Memoranda’, was the urgent reform of public administration. A major objective was to tighten up the public financial management, building central capacity for policy coherence and coordination and strengthening institutional capability for policy formulation and implementation. Such an agenda cut across policy fields and challenged the status quo in the corresponding constituencies inside and outside the administration. What had not been achieved up to that time under the soft Europeanization constraints, had to be accelerated, deepened, and even forced under the pressure of urgency. Vital financial dependence on the international lenders as well as close and strict monitoring and review by the Troika representing lender institutions (EC, ECB, and the IMF) shaped a much more constraining reform environment. The increased stakes for reform were reflected in the new ‘crisis as opportunity for modernization’ narrative. A strong external push could be beneficial to the weak domestic reform drive. The experience of crisis in – revived the discussion regarding Greek exceptionalism, as Greece was the only country that needed three adjustment programmes. The political system and public administration remain in the spotlight.

. M A  S R

.................................................................................................................................. The administrative reform agenda inscribed in the Memoranda with the international lenders, constituted a mix of fiscally driven and diverse quick-win measures, institutional modernization carrying on from the pre-crisis initiatives, and policy performance modernization respectful of EU requirements (Spanou, ). At times it was difficult to distinguish between them, particularly because the priority to reduce public expenditure permeated practically all undertakings. The OECD report () undertook the ‘Functional Review of the central administration’ as required by the first memorandum (May ), in order to build the administrative reform agenda. The problems identified were hardly new. They referred to the role of the ‘centre of government’, the general organization of the central administration, human resources management, budgetary management, and policy development and implementation. The reform strategy was described as a ‘big bang’ approach, with an ambition to bring about a ‘paradigm change’. Administrative reform—among other structural reforms—was monitored and supported by a special technical assistance service set up by the EU Commission (the ‘Task Force for Greece’ – and, since , by the new Structural Reform Support Service). The French government became ‘domain leader’ (or ‘reform partner’) for central administration reform while the OECD concentrated on more specialized issues (e.g. regulatory reform, reduction of administrative burden).

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

 

Demarcating the area of administrative reform presents the inherent difficulty of defining what is covered by ‘the administration’. Requirements on administrative reform were extensive and grew further with every programme review. Besides, every sectoral policy (e.g. health care, pension reform, education, justice, taxation, etc.) included administrative components (in terms of structures, human resources, processes, and data) that may not appear under that title. In the limited space here, selective reference will be made to certain major issues that relate to deeper governance deficiencies and highlight reform dynamics: data, financial management, organizational restructuring, human resources, and inter-ministerial coordination (Spanou, ). Data management—from collection to collation and analysis, is directly linked to the deficits in evidence-based policy-making (Monastiriotis and Antoniades, ). Achievements appear uneven across sectors, with statistical data an important example, the accuracy and credibility of which had become a major issue in the relations between Greece and its EU partners. In order to avoid political intervention, the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT, Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή) was transformed into an independent authority. A census of public employees and public entities started in  in parallel to the creation of a Single Payment Authority (EAP, Ενιαία Αρχή Πληρωμής). Both were intended to provide quantitative as well as qualitative data necessary for HR and remuneration policies (e.g. the required new salary scale). In other sectors, ‘registries’ were introduced along with IT tools that could provide a better knowledge of the situation on the ground, and potentially the capacity to support informed policy development. Though in public finance there is significant improvement, evidence-based policy-making still leaves much to be desired. Public finance is a second area that stands out, linked to the need to contain and monitor expenditure. Radical changes were introduced in the financial management and reporting rules. They were meant to tame centrifugal financial practices in ministries and public corporations and increase the capacity of ministries to accept responsibility and accountability for their budgets, as well as the ability of the centre to have an accurate and timely picture of the state of public finances. A tight organizational network of General Directorates of Financial Services within ministries was created, which was coordinated and supervised by the General Accounting Office (GLK, Γενικό Λογιστήριο του Κράτους within the Ministry of Finance). This reform was a priority in all memoranda, closely monitored by the representatives of the lenders and supported by the technical assistance of the IMF. It seems one of the most advanced and sustainable reforms, despite the turnover of ministers and governments. Equally important has been the efficiency and integrity of the public revenue administration, given the gap between expenditure and revenue. Besides restructuring for improved efficiency, and a code of integrity for its staff, a critical requirement was distancing it from politics. In a first stage this led to granting it a semi-independent status under a non-political head appointed for a five-year term (secretary general). A second stage led to its transformation into an independent authority (Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή Δημοσίων Εσόδων, see Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, ).

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 



Two areas where a lot of energy was spent were organizational restructuring and human resources, though with mixed results. The reorganization of ministerial departments was intended to reduce and rationalize their inefficient and fragmented structures, clarify responsibilities and improve efficiency in resource management. Horizontal support functions (administrative and IT) were rationalized and at times integrated in the new DGs of Financial Services. New significantly consolidated organizational charts appeared in , though similar plans had been elaborated in  and . However, they were remodelled again (–), this time increasing the number of organizational units. Mergers and the abolition of public entities took place in various policy areas (e.g. the merger of pension funds and health funds, hospitals, schools, environmental agencies, etc.), while new agencies were created in connection with the implementation of the memoranda. The reform of human resources management was to deal with misallocation of personnel, its rapid ageing, extremely limited mobility, inefficient appraisal system, and politicization of appointments of managers. However, during the first four to five years, personnel policy was superseded by fiscally driven measures and downsizing priorities, challenging the principle of tenure. Various methods were used to fulfil the obligation to reduce the number of public employees by , until  and rationalize staff as a result of the above organizational restructuring (Spanou, a, b, ). Beyond downsizing, numerous changes were introduced with a view to depoliticization, increased mobility, and the higher efficiency of the appraisal system, and so on. The striking feature of this group of reforms is that they were either delayed or repetitively legislated though hardly implemented. Contrary to the widespread impression, delay does not necessarily indicate bureaucratic inertia. Rather, political discontinuity frequently interrupted corresponding initiatives before they were completed and implemented. The depoliticization of appointments of high-level managers was a prominent requirement of the third adjustment programme. A new selection system for directors and directors general, preserved the open competition in the entire administration but provided for a reduced term of service (three instead of five years). Furthermore, a new system introduced a four-year term for administrative and sectoral secretaries in ministries (replacing the general and special secretaries) which hitherto had been fully discretionary appointments. It also apparently constrained governmental discretion based on a registry of potential candidates. However, various loopholes in the selection process risked discrediting the new system. Party political controversies regarding the government’s scope to promote specific candidates might prove to undermine the sustainability of this reform. Last but not least, a major governance issue was (and is) weak inter-ministerial coordination, deficient supervision and control, and more generally the limited capacity of the core executive to set strategic priorities, to steer and ensure consistent policy implementation (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). It is striking that such an important issue has come down to the creation of two structures. First, at government level, a Governmental Council for Administrative Reform was created in order to

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

 

rubberstamp reforms and involve all ministers in the corresponding and often unpopular decisions. And second, a General Secretariat for Coordination was set up, which not only came with a delay and still underperforms, but also overlapped with the existing General Secretariat of the Government and the General Secretariat of the Prime Minister. From this selective account it is evident that the new pressing conditions resulted in higher reform activity. The reform track record appeared uneven, nevertheless, depending on the reform area. While, for instance, financial management received more attention and showed sustainability, audit and performance did not progress as much. The significant emphasis on personnel issues produced limited substantial effects and was undercut by downsizing concerns and their implications, which also permeated organizational restructuring. Regulatory quality, despite a new legislative framework did not improve, rather it worsened due to successive hasty legislative changes. The anticorruption framework was strengthened, and transparency was greatly increased with ‘Diavgeia’ (‘Clarity’), which required all executive decisions involving expenditure to be publicized on the internet.

. F, R  S E

.................................................................................................................................. The reform efforts can be distinguished by their intrinsic and contextual dimensions. The first included factors of domestic and external origin that shaped strategy and priorities. As already mentioned, administrative reforms often mingled with ad hoc measures and were hasty, lacking prioritization and preparation. The short-term horizon defined by the adjustment programmes and review process, did not allow either coherence or considerations of timing and sequence. The ‘big-bang’ approach, unnecessarily opened all reform chapters and led to dispersion of effort. Overriding fiscal rationales undermined reform potential and legitimacy within the administration and the society itself (Spanou, ; Featherstone, ; Ladi, ). The appropriateness and functional rationality of most of the ad hoc measures was questioned. The pressure to downsize led to wrong and/or spasmodic government actions, for example, the closing of the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT, Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία Τηλεόραση) in order to meet the target of dismissals. It also meant the loss of experienced personnel often at an early age (– years) and the understaffing of various public services at random. While uncertainty was looming over its prospects, the civil service was demoralized and weakened at a time when it was needed most. Changing civil service regulations yet again constantly disregarded the need for the administration to have a clear and stable operational framework. The civil service found itself in a ‘provisional’ state from  to , extending instead of contesting the symbiotic relation with politics (Spanou, a). Moreover, either

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 



intentionally or because of flawed design, provisional rules regarding promotions tended to sideline new more binding provisions, allowing ministerial discretion in appointments of managers. Thus, with the exception of specific policy areas, administrative capacity was not significantly improved. Contextual factors include the harsh fiscal consolidation implemented in parallel, the resistance met, and the absence of political consensus. It is significant, for example, that the ‘crisis as opportunity’ narrative was gradually sidelined. In such a context, reforms did not go unchallenged. Some reactions came from politicians and political appointees in the public sector wishing to preserve their margin of manoeuvre against tightened central control. For instance, certain public entities and corporations questioned their obligation to participate in the census and delayed the transmission of data regarding personnel and remuneration, thus postponing or avoiding compliance. Civil service unions reacted strongly twice ( and –) to the introduction of a new appraisal system, mainly under the argument that it would lead to dismissals and it lacked credibility. The absence of party consensus meant (a) the repetitive doing and undoing by every new minister or government and (b) weakened capacity of successive governments to drive reforms. Contrary to initial hopes, the external constraint dimension did not necessarily operate in a beneficial manner (Featherstone, ; Spanou, ). Generalized discontent was difficult to contain as shown by the collapse of the party system in the  and  elections. The only apparent exception is the government that came to power in , having successfully bet on social discontent and opposing all previous reform efforts. After its failure to deliver on the promise to renegotiate the loan agreement, it managed to survive by playing a two-level game: on the one hand championing domestic opposition to the Memoranda for which it solely blamed previous governments, while on the other—even unwillingly—fully complying with the new strict conditionality imposed by the third programme. This may explain the tolerance shown by the representatives of the lenders regarding the reversal of some emblematic measures and reforms (the rehiring of dismissed personnel, increase in organizational units, etc.), as long as selected priorities were met.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. The debt crisis was certainly a critical moment for the Greek administration. The political-administrative system was definitely disrupted (Pierson, ; Capoccia and Kelemen, ). Given the outside pressure and the high stakes of reform, it could be expected that the cost of stability would exceed the cost of change. Certainly, changes in rules and institutions take time to shape attitudes and actions. A fair assessment would therefore require more time. However, it cannot yet be asserted that the crisis has really been a critical juncture, marking a lasting change of course or a paradigm shift (Lampropoulou and Oikonomou, ; Ladi, , etc.).

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

 

It is nevertheless legitimate to raise certain questions regarding the long-term implications of this experience. The reforms initiated during the crisis years show a ‘neo-Weberian’ orientation. Did they alter the quasi-Weberian features of the administration? To what extent did new formal institutions and rules manage to tame and contain informal and centrifugal practices that bypass or contradict them? Current indications point to resilience and path dependence as reflected in the reproduction of longstanding patterns of political operation. External pressure induced reform activity but proved incapable of radically transforming the operation of the political-administrative system not only due to domestic blockages but also to the above-mentioned unfavourable wider context (Spanou, ). Party competition and reform reversibility have continued. Consistency appeared only in critical areas, where the Memoranda applied persistent pressure on governments. Depoliticization seems the weakest among reform achievements. Fluidity of civil service organization rules and low administrative efficiency are indications of limited and uneven change. Central strategic and coordination capacity do not seem to have improved. More importantly, the triple deficit in terms of legitimacy, efficiency, and standardization/institutionalization remained.

R Argyriades, D. (). ‘The Ecology of Greek Administration’. In Peristiany, J. (ed.). Acts of the Mediterranean Sociological Conference. Athens: Inesco—Social Science Center, –. Capoccia, G. and Kelemen, D. (). ‘The Study of Critical Junctures’. World Politics,  (): –. Diamandouros, N. P. (). Οι απαρχές της συγκρότησης σύγχρονου κράτους στην Ελλάδα – [The Origins of Modern State-building in Greece –]. Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece—MIET. Dimitrakopoulos, D. G. and Passas, A. G. (). The Depoliticisation of Greece’s Public Revenue Administration. Radical Change and the Limits of Conditionality. Cham: Springer. Edelman, M. (). Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Featherstone, K. (). ‘External Conditionality and the Debt Crisis: The “Troika” and Public Administration Reform in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). The Limits of Europeanization. Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). ‘The Emperor Has No Clothes! Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive’. Governance,  (): –. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, N. P., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) (). Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ladi, S. (). ‘Policy Change and Soft Europeanization: The Transfer of The Ombudsman Institution to Greece, Cyprus and Malta’. Public Administration,  (): –. Ladi, S. (). ‘Austerity Politics and Administrative Reform: The Eurozone Crisis and Its Impact upon Greek Public Administration’. Comparative European Politics,  (): –.

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 



Lampropoulou, M. and Oikonomou, G. (). ‘Theoretical Models of Public Administration and Patterns of State Reform in Greece’. International Review of Administrative Sciences,  (): –. Hood, C. and Lodge, M. (). The Politics of Public Service Bargains. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lynn, L. E. Jr. (). ‘What is a Neo-Weberian State? Reflections on a Concept and its Implications’. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy  (): –. Available at: http://www.nispa.org/files/publications/ebooks/nispacee-journal...pdf/ (accessed  January ). Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’? West European Politics,  (): –. Makrydemetres, A. and Michalopoulos, N. (). Εκθέσεις Εμπειρογνωμόνων για τη δημόσια διοίκηση, – [Expert Reports on Public Administration, –]. Athens: Papazissis. Monastiriotis, V. and Antoniades, A (). ‘Reform that! Greece’s Failing Reform Technology’. In Kalyvas, S., Pagoulatos, G. and Tsoukas, H. (eds.) From Stagnation to Forced Adjustment. Reforms in Greece –. London: Hurst and Company, –. Mouzelis, N. (). Modern Greece. Facets of Underdevelopment. London: Macmillan. Muller, P. (). ‘L’analyse cognitive des politiques publiques: vers une sociologie politique de l’action publique’. Revue Française de Science Politique  (): –. OECD (). Review of Central Administration. Paris: OECD. Ongaro, E. (). Public Management Reform and Modernization. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Peters, B. G. (). ‘The Napoleonic Tradition’. International Journal of Public Sector Management,  (): –. Pierson, P. (). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics. Jean Monnet Chair papers. Florence: EUI. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. [] . Public Management Reform, rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Populism and Bureaucracy. The Case of Greece under PASOK, –. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Southern European Public Bureaucracies in Comparative Perspective’. West European Politics,  (): –. Sotiropoulos D. A. (). ‘A Case of Amateurs and Professionals: The Role of the Greek senior Civil Service’. In Page, E. C. and Wright, V. (eds.) From the Active to the Enabling State: The Changing Role of Top Officials in European Nations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Spanou, C. (). ‘Les politiques de recrutement dans l’administration hellénique: Une modernisation impossible?’ Revue Française d’Administration Publique, : –. Spanou, C. (). ‘A la recherche du temps perdu. La modernisation de l’administration en Grèce’. Revue Française d’Administration Publique, : –. Spanou, C. (). ‘Penelope’s Suitors. Administrative Modernization and Party Competition in Greece’. West European Politics,  (): –. Spanou, C. (). ‘European Integration in Administrative Terms: A Framework for Analysis and the Greek Case’. European Journal of Public Policy,  (): –. Spanou, C. (). ‘(Re-)shaping the Politics–administration Nexus in Greece’. In Peters, G. and Pierre, J. (eds.) Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform. London: Routledge, –.

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

 

Spanou, C. (). ‘Αbandonner ou renforcer l’Etat wébérien?’ Revue Française d’Administration Publique –: –. Spanou, C. (a). ‘State Reform in Greece: Responding to Old and New Challenges’. International Journal of Public Sector Management  (): –. Spanou, C. (b). ‘Ανεξάρτητες αρχές: Κρίση, μετεξέλιξη ή αναβάθμιση του πολιτικού συστήματος;’ [‘Independent Authorities: Crisis, Transformation or Upgrading of the Political system?’]. In Kontiadis, X. and Anthopoulos, C. (eds.) Κρίση του ελληνικού πολιτικού συστήματος; [Crisis of the Greek Political System?] Athens: Papazissis, –. Spanou, C. (). ‘The Quandary of Administrative Reform. Institutional and Performance Modernization’. In Kalyvas, S. (eds.) From Stagnation to Forced Adjustment. Reforms in Greece –. London: Hurst and Company, –. Spanou, C. (a). ‘La haute fonction publique hellénique: La permanence du provisoire’. Revue Française d’Administration Publique, –: –. Spanou, C. (b). ‘Administrative Elites and the Crisis: What Lies Ahead for the Senior Civil Service in Greece?’. International Review of Administrative Sciences,  (): –. Spanou, C. (). ‘Administrative Reform and Policy Conditionality in Greece’. Administration and Public Employment Review—Revista de Administração e Emprego Público (Lisbon) : –. Spanou, C. (). ‘External Influence on Structural Reform: Did Policy Conditionality Strengthen Reform Capacity in Greece?’ Public Policy and Administration, : –. Spanou, C. (). (ed.) Reforms in Public Administration under the Crisis. Executive Summary. ELIAMEP, Athens: Papazissis. Available at: http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/ uploads///Reforms-In-Public-Administration_translation.pdf/ (accessed  February ). Spanou, C. and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘The Odyssey of Administrative Reforms in Greece, –: A Tale of Two Reform Paths’. Public Administration,  (): –. Tsekos, T. N. (a). ‘Structural, Functional and Cultural Aspects of the Greek Public Administration and their Effects on Public Employees’ Collective Action’. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal,  (): –. Tsekos, T. N. (b). ‘La convergence administrative européenne et l’administration publique grecque’. In Penser la science administrative dans la postmodernité, Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Jacques Chevallier. Paris: L.G.D.J, –. Tsoukalas, C. (). Κράτος, κοινωνία, εργασία στη μεταπολεμική Ελλάδα [State, Society and Labour in Post-War Greece]. Athens: Themelio.

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        ......................................................................................................................

            

......................................................................................................................

- 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I comparative local government literature, Greece is regarded as a member of a ‘southern European’ (Page and Goldsmith, ) or ‘Franco’ (Hesse and Sharpe, : ) group of countries. Indeed, Greek local government seems to meet relevant criteria such as patterns of intergovernmental relations (subordination of local politics), functions (minor importance for service provision), discretion (low autonomy/central regulation), representative primacy over administrative efficiency and individual, ad hoc access to upper level decision-makers. Also concerning horizontal power relations within local government, Greece is identified as a member of the ‘strong mayor’ (Mouritzen and Svara, ) or ‘political mayor’ (Heinelt and Hlepas, ) type which prevails in all countries of this southern European group. Finally, when the level of decentralization is correlated with welfare patterns (Sellers and Listöm ), then it turns out that a southern European welfare regime (characterized, among other things, by family networks and public spending focused on pensions) is combined with a residual role of local government in social services (Hlepas, ). Within this south European group, Greek local government stands out in terms of size, finance, and politics, even though it shares some common characteristics with Portugal, regarding the big size of municipalities and the extremely low percentage of municipal spending per GDP: , per cent during  in Greece (OECD, ). On the other hand, Portugal has kept a single-tier system, while Greece switched to a twotier system of local governance in . Nevertheless, according to a recent attempt of measuring local autonomy (Ladner et al., ), Portugal seems to be far less centralized than Greece. In the ‘Local Autonomy index’ (LAI) Greece had the third lowest

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

- 

score (after Ireland and the UK) among the EU- members with regard to local autonomy. The ability of the state to ‘exercise control and implement policy choices’ in a given territory reflects its ‘infrastructural power’ (Soifer, ), which certainly benefits from capacities provided by local government. In ‘Napoleonic’ systems, this infrastructural power mainly stems from the fully-fledged territorial organization of state hierarchy (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, : ) and the regulatory, supervisory, and financing competence of state authorities. In Greece, centralism has traditionally been perceived as necessary in order to sustain national unity in a country that had to cope with political instability, weak economic development, and regional divergence. Behind the scenes, Greece’s ‘paternalistic’ Jacobin state has been permeable to different kinds of party pressures, facilitating absorption and balancing of social conflicts, demands, and expectations (Hlepas and Getimis, : ). The Greek administrative system is basically marked by a formally dominant legalist tradition, but administrative practice is shaped by exceptionally strong politicization, clientelistic relations, and party patronage with regard to recruitment, promotion, and mobility of personnel. The Greek state administration is notorious for its instability, lack of cohesion, and ineffectiveness. Greece has one of the lowest scores in the international civil service effectiveness index (Blavatnik School of Government, ). In fact, Greece’s public administration focuses on serving partisan and patronage politics. Meanwhile responsiveness to citizens’ demands and policy priorities are usually achieved through ad hoc mobilization of clientelistic networks. In the course of the recent economic crisis, these settings proved their robustness even when they were challenged by the conditionality strategies of the Troika for structural reform and required adjustment (Featherstone, ). Before the crisis erupted, Greek reformers had implemented a long series of organizational rescalings, while they had neglected operational modernization and had avoided de-politicization of public administration. Official reform rhetoric frequently concealed real priorities, as it feigned focus on modernization and efficiency, whilst in reality promoting partisan and clientelistic arrangements, often hidden in detailed legislation. The rationale of reforms in local government and regional administration has followed the same pattern, up to the outbreak of the crisis. Paradoxically, parties are not officially allowed to compete in municipal elections, but this ban is largely circumvented, since Greek parties tend to announce their favourite candidates. Directly elected mayors/heads of regions yield considerable power that largely goes unchecked, and is often at the service of party politics and clientelistic networks. Meanwhile, after becoming new nodes of political networks, local and regional governments have awakened a spirit of distrust that has mobilized several stakeholders against devolution of power from the centre to the periphery. As a result, functional decentralization has been heavily constrained by the courts, through case law that has discouraged pertinent reform aspirations for the foreseeable future.

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    



Even though there is a broad consensus, among scholars, that Greece belongs to a distinctive, ‘south European’ type of local government system, it is clear that several particularities can be pointed out. Thus, the argument about Greek exceptionalism deserves deeper scrutiny. This chapter will demonstrate the extent to which the Greek system of local government and regional administration is similar or different from other systems elsewhere in Europe. The chapter will be based on findings of the academic literature on local government and will highlight the following features which have been suggested as possible distinguishing aspects in the comparative local government literature: constitutional status of local government, sub-national democracy, structure, and functions.

. T C S  L G

.................................................................................................................................. The constitutional guarantee of local self-government is generally seen as a basic precondition for strong local autonomy, especially when effective judicial protection is ensured (Hesse and Sharpe, ; Sellers and Lidström, ). In most European countries (UK is the most prominent exception), local self-government enjoys constitutional protection, while important amendments have strengthened local government in several countries, such as Italy (), France (), and Sweden (). In most countries, local government is considered to be a part of the state in a wider sense, while constitutional safeguards do not entail a guarantee for the existence of each and every single local government. Up to the beginning of the twentieth century Greek constitutions did not explicitly include the principle of local government. The republican constitutions of  and  were the first ones to include extensive regulations on local government, alongside other provisions for the parallel existence and operation of a so-called ‘system of deconcentration’ for territorial (‘peripheral’) state authorities. In all Greek constitutions that followed, the principle of local government was coupled with the principle of state deconcentration. The territorial organization of public administration should be twofold: on the one hand, the democratically elected local governments and, on the other hand, territorial state authorities supervising local governments and implementing state policies. The relationship between these two pillars of territorial public administration was characterized both by competition and cooperation (Hlepas, ). After the fall of the military dictatorship in , the new Constitution (voted in ) responded to democratization demands and considerably increased standards of human rights, fundamental freedoms, social justice, and environmental protection. However, the Constitution remained locked in centralizing patterns, avoiding granting legislative, taxation and planning autonomy to local self-government. At the same time, the Constitution seemed to encourage central state interventionism in the economy

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

- 

and society, and provide for corresponding restrictions in private property rights and economic freedom. Following a constitutional amendment in , the Constitution provides for two tiers of local government, while it stipulates that the allocation of competences for local affairs and delegated state tasks will be regulated by national law. The commensurability principle is introduced for new tasks transferred to local authorities, while the state is obliged to provide the necessary resources for mission accomplishment. Corresponding thereto, local authorities are subject to auditing controls by the Audit Office, parallel to state supervision and control of legality, which is exercised by the central state over local government acts and bodies. The  amendment also introduced the principle of transparency in financial management. Further on, local authorities became subject to several transparency rules and institutions, such as the ‘Observatory of Financial Autonomy’, launched in . In other European countries (e.g. in Germany), local government enjoys protection by a Constitutional Court. The Greek Constitution, however, establishes the jurisdiction of administrative courts, in which local authorities can challenge administrative acts, issued by state authorities, which infringe on their autonomy. However, according to the most recent evaluation by the Council of Europe (), the lack of any mechanism to directly challenge the constitutionality of legislative acts in the Greek system of judicial review results in a substantial gap in legal protection.

. S-N D

.................................................................................................................................. Free elections in all municipalities took place for the first time in , a decade before the establishment of a parliament (), while the direct election of mayors was provided for men, following the introduction of universal suffrage, in . The municipal elections of  February  were the first ones in which women were allowed to vote, that is, much earlier than the first time women were allowed to vote in parliamentary elections (in ). Just as it had happened in many other countries, local government was a testing field for political emancipation and the enlargement of voting rights (e.g. rights of aliens), for political and social innovation, for shifting alliances and conflicts among and within parties, and quite often at a personal level, among politicians. Even more than in other countries, in Greece local democracy reproduces the patterns of national-level democracy, under the given conditions of extreme centralization in parties, politics, and administration. Therefore, the model of a ‘Westminster’ pendulum democracy with unilateral majoritarian rule has also prevailed at the local level. The model has actually proved to be more resilient during the economic crisis, compared to the national level where it was substantially shaken. The primacy of politics and the subordination of public bureaucracy to political authority are stronger at the local level, where the tradition of professional administration is much weaker,

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    



while the smaller scale of governance facilitates the intrusion by political parties into bureaucratic structures. The most prominent figure of local democracy is certainly the mayor. The direct election of mayors is an enduring feature of Greek local government, which has also been transferred to the second tier, namely regional government. The figure of the strong mayor is an expression of traditional personalization of politics in Greece. It certainly reflects the strong position of the prime minister at the national level, which has also been an inherent characteristic of the Greek political system for nearly one and a half centuries. Legally speaking, national parties are not allowed to stand for local and regional elections and this is certainly a case of Greek exceptionalism. In fact, however, political parties ‘nominate’ candidate mayors and heads of regional authorities. Concerning regions and municipalities of important cities, political parties select their own candidates usually through decisions taken by their central bodies. With regard to smaller municipalities, the role of local MPs is enhanced. They select, behind the scenes, the candidates that will enjoy party support. The formal ban on party candidates facilitates the formation of catch-all lists (each one headed by a candidate mayor), while it blurs party accountability for the selection and performance of candidates. Similar to other countries, the turnout in local and regional elections is usually lower than turnout in national elections, but higher than turnout in European elections. Up to , the majoritarian electoral system had hardly changed since the mids. Electoral victory was achieved only by obtaining the absolute majority of all the valid ballot papers, even at a second round. In the municipal and regional councils, three-fifths of all seats (consisting of – seats in municipalities, – seats in regions) belonged to the mayor-affiliated list which obtained the majority of votes, and only two-fifths of all seats were allocated to the opposition lists. A similar system was introduced in Italy in , as a remedy against shortcomings of the proportional system and especially against non-transparent arrangements facilitated by the indirect election of mayors, which was practised in the past. However, many European countries today have adopted proportional systems, even for the direct election of mayors. The majoritarian electoral system, taken in conjunction with the fact that the mayor (or the head of region) could not be voted out by the council, nor could he/she be removed by a local referendum, has given rise to conditions for a ‘monocracy’ of the mayor/head of region. As a result, in Greece’s local and regional government, there has developed a quasi-presidential system, but without the usually associated checks and balances. Yet, compared to most of their European counterparts, the directly elected mayors and heads of regions in Greece have scarce resources and capacities at their disposal. Consequently, the performance of these elected leaders is often related to the extent of their informal access to a wide circle of powerful decision-makers at higher levels of governance (e.g. government ministers). Local and regional leaders are influential advocates of collective and personal interests, and this is also a factor underlining an emphasis on representation rather than participation which characterizes Greek local government.

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

- 

Local protest is the traditional form of local citizens’ mobilization, which is often stimulated by the mayors themselves in order to increase their bargaining power in cases of conflict with the state. Similar to other European countries, people tend to trust local and regional authorities more than they trust the national government or the national parliament (Fitzgerald and Wolak, ). During the crisis in Greece, local and regional leaders, supported by mainstream parties, managed to keep their posts and many of them were re-elected in  or/and in , that is, during times in which the popularity of mainstream parties had collapsed at the national level. This long-established system of elections and governance at local/regional level was reformed in  by law / (the so-called ‘Kleisthenis’ law). A proportional electoral system was introduced for electing municipal and regional councils, while provisions for the election of mayors and heads of region remained the same. Decisionmaking remained in the hands of councils, and mayors/heads of regions would have to obtain the support from multi-party or multi-list coalitions, in order to form governing majorities in their municipalities/regions. The new system was largely conceived to favour the governing SYRIZA party. The party’s lists were expected to obtain a considerable share of seats in municipal and regional councils in the municipal and regional government elections of May , while very few of SYRIZA’s candidates would stand a chance of being elected as mayors or heads of regions. In the near future, this new electoral system could prove to be short-lived. The system already faces fierce opposition from Greece’s associations of local and regional governments, that is, mayors and heads of regions who have raised concerns about governability of municipalities and regions. Any political fragmentation of municipal or regional councils expected to occur because of the new electoral law, would block decision-making and lead to paralysis. Meanwhile, opposition parties challenged SYRIZA in parliament, rejected this electoral reform, and promised to revert pertinent changes, just after the next parliamentary elections.

. T S  L  R P A

.................................................................................................................................. A first radical territorial reform was implemented in Greece as early as , right after the creation of a modern Greek state. Thousands of historical communities (Κοινότητες) were abolished and  municipalities (Δήμοι) were created, while the territorial state administration included ten prefectures (Νομαρχίες) and forty-two provinces (Επαρχίες). Reversing reform, a liberal government allowed the reestablishment of thousands of historical communities in . Prefectures, however, headed by a political appointee (‘Nomarch’, Νομάρχης), remained the elementary pillar of sub-national state administration until the late twentieth century. The political appointee was always handpicked by the governing party or government coalition.

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    



Until the early s, Greece had a fully-fledged structure of ‘peripheral’ (περιφερειακή, regional) administration, integrating most sectors at the level of the unitary prefecture. Following the model of Napoleonic centralism, public policies were decided and implemented from the top down. Formal hierarchies were, nevertheless, on various occasions bypassed by local elites and business interests, using centralization for their own benefit. The Greek case seemed to illustrate the rational choice institutionalist approach, since institutions were rather weak and actors particularly important. Soon after, in the mid-s, these vulnerable arrangements were overrun by machine politics (Mavrogordatos, ) and an unprecedented expansion of public administration and public spending that created new action arenas. Sub-national state administration entered a long-lasting process of uneven fragmentation, alongside different sectors that drastically increased complexity and clearly rearranged the lines of accountability for the benefit of line ministries, party branch organizations, and professional associations. This did not change when thirteen regions (Περιφέρειες) were launched in , since they were conceived as ‘programmatic’ units that should increase the efficiency of development policies in view of the then upcoming reform of the EU structural funds (). These state regions remained unimportant administrative units up to , when several tasks and services of the former state prefectures were integrated, transforming these regions into multi-purpose units of a de-concentrated state administration, in other words into ‘general’ regions. On the other hand, extreme fragmentation persisted in local government at the first tier, where no less than , rural municipalities existed. Several attempts to build up a comprehensive system of intermunicipal cooperation had failed, due to political polarization and weak social capital. In , Greek prefectures were transformed into a new, second tier of local government that offered new political career opportunities to party members. At the first tier, a comprehensive (with the exception of the metropolitan areas in Athens and Thessaloniki) territorial reform was decided and implemented in , reducing the total number of municipalities from , down to , units, in order to increase administrative efficiency and promote comprehensive party control. Organizational consolidation, however, was undermined by local politicians who pushed forward the internal fragmentation of municipal structures through the establishment of municipal enterprises, various entities, and new services, sometimes in order to circumvent legal and fiscal constraints. Moreover, this governmental growth through fragmentation created additional political posts as well as a considerable number of new public-sector jobs for contract workers, increasing the relative importance of local government for public employment. Finally, the most obvious outcome of these territorial reforms was the further politicization of sub-national administration that led to increased public spending and a retreat from legal to informal arrangements. Therefore, Greek territorial reforms during the s were not the equivalent of previous territorial reforms in Northern and Central Europe, where the corresponding consolidation of the first tier was mostly an instrument for the re-organization of social services, also aiming at increased efficiency through economies of scale. In North and

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

- 

Central European countries, eventual increases in political party influence and new political appointee posts were just a side effect of these reforms in some small municipalities, while bigger municipalities often tended to promote professionalism and bureaucratization instead of politicization. Furthermore, territorial reforms in these countries were combined with functional reforms and extensive devolution of power that did not take place in Greece at that time. Regional reform in Western Europe was a way of allocating responsibility for regional economic development to democratically elected regional bodies. Such bodies were expected to bring a new impetus to growth through regional mobilization that was expected to be more successful than the traditional state redistributive policies. By contrast, in Greece the second tier of local government has been located at the level of the prefectures, inheriting red tape responsibilities, while development policies have been implemented by state regions. Finally, metropolitan governance has remained a nearly exclusive state responsibility in Greece, while several EU countries had introduced different patterns including local and regional representatives. The evolution of sub-national (‘peripheral’) state administration once more provoked inherent fragmentation dynamics by the turn of the century: in the early s, new special regional districts were created by several ministries (‘Education Regions’, Εκπαιδευτικές Περιφέρειες; ‘Health Care Regional Authorities’, Υγειονομικές Περιφέρειες, etc.), thus bypassing the thirteen ‘general’ regions and increasing the complexity of sub-national state administration. These special districts reproduced sectoral and ministerial politics, which are typical for many unitary states (Hlepas and Getimis, ). In the Greek context this evolution turned these ministries into privileged ‘political fiefdoms’, since the responsible minister could choose his/her preferred appointees as heads of district and build up his/her personal patronage network all over the country. Trade unionists and representatives of professional associations and businesses of the corresponding sector were also supportive and demanded the creation of such special districts, because they expected their influence to increase within the environment of a single-purpose organization where other pressure groups would be excluded. An official argument for the establishment of such special districts was ‘efficiency through specialization’, while some incentives towards establishing such new branches of ministries at the regional level were offered by the requirements of EU policies. The outcome, however, was lack of synergies and frustration of political accountability (Hlepas and Getimis, : ). On the eve of the recent economic crisis, in , the ambitious ‘Kallikratis’ Project and law (/) was launched, affecting all levels of sub-national government. The reform combined territorial rescaling of the first tier to  municipalities and upscaling of the second tier from prefectures (which were abolished) to thirteen regions, with the strategic reallocation of responsibilities. Some municipalities (mainly former prefecture capitals) were obliged to cover a wider area of neighbouring municipalities for specific social, housing, and construction issues. The ‘Kallikratis’ law also provided for special status (additional responsibilities) of island and mountain municipalities and

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    



for three island regions, while it launched the notion of the ‘metropolitan region’ for Athens and Thessaloniki that will be further developed. Sub-national state administration moved up from the regional to a new supra-regional level and was restructured into seven territorial units (seven ‘Deconcentrated Administrations’, Αποκεντρωμένες Διοικήσεις), without incorporating the existing special districts. Initially, the heads of these deconcentrated state administrations, the secretaries general (Γενικοί Γραμματείς Αποκεντρωμένων Διοικήσεων), were political appointees. However, in  their posts were abolished and senior civil servants, the ‘coordinators’ (Συντονιστές), became the heads of these territorial units, which may ultimately represent a step towards depoliticization. This new, more consolidated sub-national territorial structure (see Table .) with fewer and stronger entities, combined with systematic reallocation of tasks and resources, was intended to bring about economies of scale and scope. Furthermore, it aimed to conform with the EU’s Lisbon Strategy and the White Paper on multi-level governance. The reform followed some basic principles of new public management, such as systematic control and overall supervision, accountability, and transparency. The ‘Kallikratis’ law also included measures of organizational rationalization, such as the abolition of numerous municipal corporations and other entities. A package of fiscal restrictions and controls that was included in ‘Kallikratis’ was further developed through a series of rigid norms and procedures (including real-time monitoring) at a later stage, following the bailout agreements signed between Greece and international lenders (Cohen and Hlepas, : ). Greece is characterized by strong geographical fragmentation (many islands, mountainous areas, an extremely long and fragmented seaside) as well as by extremely unequal division of population: the two major metropolitan centres of the country, Attica and Thessaloniki, comprise more than half of the total population. Therefore, it is no surprise that Greek regions are extremely unequal in terms of population size and number of municipalities included in each region. Disparities are also important concerning income and economic development. Just as in other European countries some years earlier, the establishment of elected regional bodies with important decision-making powers on development issues was anticipated to tackle economic disparities, through the mobilization of regional potential and capacity. Moreover, democratic governance at the regional level was expected to restore immediate accountability for policy priorities and outcomes. Further on, economic recession dating back to the start of the crisis (in ), caused an unprecedented GDP decline of no less than  per cent in seven years (–), and dramatically worsened intra-regional disparities. However, in terms of development, the performance of regions proved to be quite positive and better than the performance of state governments (Petrakos and Psycharis, ). Therefore, for the time being, the hopes of ‘Kallikratis’ reformers, who believed that a democratic regional self-government institution, directly accountable to the people, would perform better than the bureaucratic state administration were realized.

Deconcentrated State Administrations

Regions

Macedonia-Thrace

East Macedonia- Thrace Central Macedonia*

West. Macedonia— Epirus

Population

GDP per capita

EU Regional Funding Per capita

Municipalities ‘Demos’

611.067 1.871.952

11.300 12.500

831 515

22 38

West. Macedonia Epirus

301.522 353.820

15.000 11.500

1.096 921

12 19

Thessaly- Central Greece

Thessaly Central Greece

753.888 605.329

12.100 13.800

532 314

25 25

Peloponnese-West. Greece-Ionian Islands

Ionian Islands** West. Greece Peloponnese

212.984 740.506 638.942

15.100 11.900 13.200

1.065 663 423

7 19 26

Attica Aegean

Attica* North Aegean** South Aegean**

3.761.810 206.121 302.686

22.100 12.400 18.100

303 1.463 556

66 8 34

Crete SUMS: 7

Crete 13

601.131 10.964.020

13.900 16.200

723 492

24 325

* Metropolitan Regions (in Central Macedonia only the regional unit of Thesssaloniki) ** Island Regions Source: Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance (2015). The numbers for EU development funding managed by the regions refer to the programmatic period 2014–2020 (total sums per capita)

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Table 12.1 Deconcentrated state administrations, regions (population, GDP, EU regional funding per capita 2014–2020) and municipalities

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    



. A F

.................................................................................................................................. Traditionally, municipalities in Greece have been responsible for urban infrastructure and basic services, excluding the energy sector that had been nationalized, as well as water and sewage in the metropolitan areas of Athens, Thessaloniki, and Volos where state-owned enterprises were established. Waste management in the metropolitan area of Athens was the subject of inter-municipal cooperation, while special entities (‘FODSA’) were later on created for these tasks in the rest of the country. During the s, municipalities were declared to be responsible for local economic and social development, while the s marked the transfer of several licensing and control responsibilities for shops and small enterprises from the central government to municipalities. In a country where small- and medium- sized enterprises were dominant and no less than  per cent of the economically active population were selfemployed (Hlepas and Getimis, ), these were very important fields of competence. Later on, the municipal police was created and undertook, inter alia, important supervising responsibilities over local economic activities. In most cases, the corresponding permits, licences, and fines were issued by mayors and municipal councils (or council committees), not by professional administrators. In this way, local politicians visibly increased their influence over local economic life, sometimes politicizing or even personalizing relevant processes and decisions that used to be a bureaucratic routine. The same happened when the second tier, that is, elected prefectural administration, was launched in  since the prefectures were assigned most licensing and supervising competences for tertiary-sector businesses and professions. Citizens and businesses that were exposed to clientelistic and unfair practices of local government could hardly rely on state supervision, partly due to the politicization of the central public administration but also to the lack of skilled personnel in supervision services. Furthermore, resorting to Greek administrative courts was extremely timeconsuming, while court decisions were hard to enforce against local governments and other public entities. Local politicians emerged as crucial veto players for any investment or private business establishment in their territory. Even in cases where elected mayors and prefects did not have a formal competence (e.g. competence to approve large-scale private investments), they managed to arouse hostility and mobilize local reaction against unwanted investment projects and businesses, considerably affecting the business climate all over the country. Municipalities did not have strong incentives to attract private businesses, since they were primarily relying on state grants which made up more than  per cent of their revenue (‘flypaper effect’), while taxes on businesses were raised by the state. In fact, local authorities at the second tier almost exclusively relied on state grants. Since the mid-s, Greek governments have also tried to decentralize environmental protection and physical planning responsibilities, by transferring them to self-government

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

- 

authorities. Urban planning was especially considered to be a typical case of local government competence in many European countries. These decentralization efforts, however, were frustrated by the courts. The Council of State (StE, Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας, Greece’s highest administrative court), adopted a narrow interpretation of the term ‘state responsibility’ in the Constitution and rejected competences of selfgovernment authorities on major issues of environmental protection, physical planning, some welfare state services (such as public hospitals), major sport centres and human resource management in primary and secondary education. The Court of Audit (ES, Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο) took a further step: it required an explicit provision of law, covering specific policy areas or measures, for any territorial self-government (e.g. municipal) competence to spend public funds. Such a decentralization reform blockade by the courts is probably unique in Europe. The courts did not simply reject the devolution of some important responsibilities (as has happened in many countries). They rejected the devolution of nearly all of the important responsibilities that came into question. Effectively, courts denied the existence of planning and regulatory autonomy. Decentralization was blocked because of the prevalence of very traditional centralist views and the mobilization of influential trade unions (e.g. the teachers’ union) and other pressure groups. This blocking of decentralization reform was probably also due to the lack of trust stemming from the extremely poor record of local government in legal compliance, which was highlighted several times in pertinent reports of several institutions, such as the Ombudsman, the General Inspector of Public Administration and others. Nevertheless, other decentralization efforts, mostly triggered by EU funding, proved to be successful. Especially during the s, the impetus of convergence with European standards of social services marked a period of rising public expectations and increasing fiscal commitments in Mediterranean countries (Lyberaki and Tinios, ). But this aspect of Europeanization was mediated by obsolete political and social structures and tended to create dysfunctional outcomes that were frequently resolved by increasing public spending (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). Decentralization of social services mostly followed an incremental ‘muddling through’ pattern, often responding to EU policies offering incentives and windows of opportunity. Some kinds of social services, that were obviously neglected within the framework of the Greek welfare state (formal child and elderly care, social inclusion, etc.), could easily be decentralized because of their secondary status in Greek welfare state policy (Hlepas : ). The results of decentralization were visible to citizens, but did not change the nature and characteristics of territorial self-government in Greece. Local and regional government spending remained one of the lowest in Europe (. per cent of GDP in , compared to  per cent in Portugal,  per cent in France,  per cent in Italy,  per cent in Spain, and  per cent in Sweden: Dexia, : ). The largest share of sub-national expenditure in Greece was channelled to ‘general public services’ of municipal administrations (. per cent) and the second largest to ‘environmental protection’ (. per cent including waste management), while ‘economic affairs’

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    



were the third largest item (. per cent). Only . per cent was spent on social protection and . per cent on education (Dexia, : ). The aforementioned distribution of local and regional government expenses stands in contrast to the Scandinavian model of local and county/region government, where health and social care are, by far, the most important items of expenditure. Education also plays a minor role in Greek local government finance, since the municipalities only had the task of managing and maintaining school buildings up to  (when full responsibility for school infrastructure, including development of new schools, was given to the first tier). Public housing, which is a paramount task of local government in other countries, is a state responsibility in Greece, mostly exercised through special entities and public enterprises (nowadays barely active). After the ‘Kallikratis’ reform of , new municipalities were to offer a wide range of services closer to the citizen and to take over most prefectural competences. Decentralization of additional tasks to both tiers was planned to unfold in three successive ‘waves’ of competence transfer, but the last one (which included public health responsibilities) was cancelled in , due to the economic crisis. Resources from European Funds are expected to reach a total sum of more than five billion euros within the timeframe of the current programmatic period (–). Therefore, regional development can be characterized as the paramount task of the new Greek regions, just as it is the case for regions of several other European countries (France, Italy, Sweden, etc.), where ‘regionalization’ was introduced several years ago. Competencies of the seven Deconcentrated State Administrations focus on environmental and planning issues, which could not be transferred to municipalities because of the aforementioned decisions of Greek courts. The most important branches of subnational state administration (education, health, tax administration, cultural heritage) were not incorporated in these seven Deconcentrated Administrations and fragmentation of territorial state administration persisted. Soon after the ‘Kallikratis’ reform, the crisis and the bailout programmes triggered re-centralization tendencies, since the central state was the agent managing the crisis and was directly accountable to the financial markets, the Troika, and the EU institutions. Because of extreme time pressure, the national government was subject to conditionality and found it difficult to negotiate on two fronts: the supra-national and the sub-national arenas. Exclusive decision-making circumvented consultation of regional and local authorities, while the crisis also revitalized the old inertia and pathdependencies that were favouring re-centralization. Moreover, burden-shifting to local government seemed an attractive option to governments which were subjected to external pressures and political delegitimization at the home front. Municipal services (e.g. the municipal police) were abolished (then re-established in ), contract workers were fired, and state grants were drastically curtailed. Local government expenditure fell from . per cent of GDP in  to . per cent in  (while general government expenditure increased from . per cent to . per cent of GDP in the same period; Cohen and Hlepas, : ). The crisis exposed sub-national governments to bilateral financial pressures from cutbacks and increased needs for

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

- 

social assistance. However, eventually, municipalities and regions proved to be particularly flexible and responded to the crisis through adaptation, but have exhibited limited internal transformation and still remain vulnerable (Cohen and Hlepas, : ).

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Greek local government shares a set of characteristics which are common to all local government systems in Europe and most of them are enshrined in the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Among the different types or models of local government and regional administration, elaborated by comparative literature, it is clear that Greece comes closest to the south European and Napoleonic models with their duplication of territorial organization (local self-government and deconcentrated state administration). The local government systems of these models are characterized by restricted policy-making autonomy, limited resources, and the primacy of politics over professional bureaucracy. Greek local government has experienced successive waves of structural change, but its main characteristics of politics and administration have barely been touched and remain more or less the same. Unlike other European nations, radical territorial reforms in Greece during the s mainly followed a political and not a service rationale. Also, the decentralization reforms of this era were related to strategies of power shifting from professional public bureaucracy to the party-politicized institution of local government. For this reason, control and licensing tasks were those mostly transferred to local government, while the most important parts of social services remained a competency of the central state. This tendency diverged from what happened in other countries (e.g. in Scandinavia) where a decentralization of tasks was combined with territorial reform. In Greece politicization and power-acquisition strategies were also the main drivers for fragmentation tendencies in state de-concentrated administration through the establishment of various special districts. These tendencies remained largely untouched even when the large-scale and comprehensive ‘Kallikratis’ reform was implemented. The reform combined territorial with functional re-scaling and even introduced some elements of new public management and several efficiency-oriented measures to the Greek local government system. Several points of Greek exceptionalism can be noted. A Greek particularity has been the wide-ranging blocking of several decentralization attempts through decisions of administrative courts (especially of the Council of State). The result has been that decentralization reformers felt restrained, as became apparent in the case of the ‘Kallikratis’ reform. Another peculiarity is the legal ban on political parties from participating in municipal and regional elections, which is a long-lasting tradition. This tradition facilitates the formation of heterogeneous catch-all political alliances at

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    



the local and sometimes even at the regional level, while it also blurs national party accountability for the selection and support of candidates for local and regional government posts. Finally, even though the direct election of mayors is quite widespread in Europe, the amount of unilateral power concentrated in the hands of mayors and heads of region in Greece is rare, especially in view of the fact that institutional counterweights that could counterbalance this power barely exist. The recent introduction of a proportional system for the election of councils (nowadays controlled by mayoral/head of region party lists) was badly planned, since it was not combined with a reallocation of responsibilities among the different decision-making bodies. Taking into account the fragmentation of the party system and weak social capital, political deadlocks are expected in many municipalities and regions, right after the local/regional elections of . While the implications of centralization on the operation of public administration has been a topic of discussion for many years, the implications of political, party and electoral arrangements at local and regional level have not been sufficiently addressed, possibly because linkages among these different sectors and levels are not particularly visible. The relation between the judicial system and sub-national governance is another, barely investigated topic. Future research could usefully shed more light on these aspects.

R Blavatnik School of Government. (). ‘International Civil Service Effectiveness Index’ (InCiSE). University of Oxford. Available at: https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/about/partnerships/ international-civil-service-effectiveness-index/ (accessed  January ). Cohen, S. and Hlepas, N. K. (). ‘Financial Resilience of Greek Local Governments’. In Steccolini, I., Jones, M., and Saliterer, I. (eds.) Governmental Financial Resilience: International Perspectives on how Local Governments Face Austerity. Bingley, West Yorkshire: Emerald Publishing, –. Council of Europe. (). ‘Local and Regional Democracy in Greece’. Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/e#P_/ (accessed  January ). DEXIA. (). Sub-National Governments in the European Union: Organisation, Responsibilities and Finance. La Defense: Dexia. Featherstone, K. (). ‘External Conditionality and the Debt Crisis: The ‘Troika’ and Public Administration Reform in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). ‘Assessing Reform Capacity in Greece: Applying Political Economy Perspectives’. In Kalyvas, S., Pagoulatos, G., and Tsoukas, H. (eds.) The Challenge of Reform in Greece, –. New York, NY: C. Hurst & Co/ Columbia University Press, –. Fitzgerald, J. and Wolak, J. (). ‘The Roots of Trust in Local Government in Western Europe’. International Political Science Review,  (): –.

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

- 

Heinelt, H. and Hlepas, N. K. (). ‘Typologies of Local Government Systems’. In Back, H., Heinelt, H., and Magnier, A. (eds.) The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, –. Hesse, J. J. and Sharpe, L. J. (). ‘Local Government in International Perspective: Some Comparative Observations’. In Hesse, J. J. (ed). Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective. Analyses of Twenty Western Industrialized Countries. BadenBaden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, –. Hlepas, N. K. (). ‘Local Government Reform in Greece’. In Kersting, N. and Vetter, A. (eds.) Reforming Local Government in Europe: Closing the Gap between Democracy and Efficiency. Opladen: Leske and Budrich, –. Hlepas, N. K. (). ‘Is it the Twilight of Decentralization? Testing the Limits of Functional Reforms in the Era of Austerity’. International Review of Administrative Science, : –. Hlepas, N. K. and Getimis, P. (). ‘Greece: A Case of Fragmented Centralism and “Behind the Scenes” Localism’. In Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F., and Lidström, A., (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Kuhlmann, S. and Wollmann, H. (). Introduction to Comparative Public Administration: Administrative Systems and Reforms in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (). ‘Measuring Local Autonomy in  Countries (–)’. Regional and Federal Studies,  (): –. Lyberaki, A. and Tinios, P. (). ‘The Informal Welfare State and the Family: Invisible Actors in the Greek Drama’. Political Studies Review, : –. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). ‘From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece’. South European Society & Politics,  (): –. Mouritzen, P. E. and Svara, J. (). Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. OECD. (). ‘OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database’. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ tax/federalism/fiscal-decentralisation-database.htm#C_/ (accessed  January ). Page, E.C., and Goldsmith, M. (). ‘Centre and Locality: Functions, Access and Discretion’. In Page, E.C., and Goldsmith, M., (eds.) Central and Local Government Relations. A Comparative Analysis of West European Unitary States. London: Sage, –. Petrakos, G. and Psycharis, Y. (). ‘The Spatial Aspects of Economic Crisis in Greece’. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society,  (): –. Sellers, J. and Lidström, A. (). ‘Decentralization, Local Government and the Welfare State’. Governance,  (): –. Soifer, H. (). ‘State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement’. Studies in Comparative International Development,  (–): –.

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.................................................................................................................................. A voluminous literature still debates the causes and consequences of electoral systems but tends to agree that once formed, electoral systems seldom change (Renwick, ). Moreover, when change does take place, it typically comes as part of a more general response to a crisis in the party system or as a result of transnational diffusion of norms and best practices (Bol et al., ). Greece is an exception to both these stylized facts. A stable party system was long accompanied by frequent and often short-lived changes to the electoral law, with the intent of benefitting the existing government. By contrast, although the advent of the debt crisis quickly translated into a political turmoil that challenged deeply rooted partisan identities, transformed established voting habits, and reshaped the party system, the electoral system remained intact. This chapter sheds light on this seeming paradox by looking at the dynamic relationship between the electoral rules shaping party competition and the resulting party system that formed and evolved in Greece following the democratic transition of the mid-s. The first section traces all changes and transformations in the electoral system and examines their underlying causes and consequences. The next section uses comparative data to illustrate the role of the financial crisis in changing the party system. The last section concludes with some tentative suggestions about how demandand supply-side explanations of party system change have come together to explain party system change in Greece.

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. T S ( ) L   E S   T G R

.................................................................................................................................. Since the establishment of universal suffrage, Greece has used approximately fifteen electoral laws. Seven of these laws were applied since . Indeed, since the restoration of democratic rule in that year and until September , Greek voters had been asked to go to the polls and cast a vote for the national parliament seventeen times. These seventeen elections took place under seven different electoral systems.¹ The remainder of this section takes us through each of these seven electoral laws, starting from the inaugural election of .

.. Life : The  Election A few months after the end of the military junta in July , the nascent Third Greek Republic was celebrating its first general election, within a context of unprecedented euphoria. A formative election in many respects, the November  election provided little room for competition. The return of Constantine Karamanlis, a leading political figure before the authoritarian outturn, was accompanied by an electoral landslide for his newly formed political party, New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), which dominated the right of the ideological spectrum and won half of the national vote. The left-wing vote was trichotomized between the old Centre-Left, the Centre Union, a new left-wing party led by Andreas Papandreou, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), and the Communist Party, which secured almost  per cent of the national vote. The  election was as much about continuity as it was about rupture with the past. It was not only the leaders of the main political parties that signalled an unequivocal link with the politics of the pre-authoritarian period. Electoral institutions also drew on the pre- electoral context. The electoral system of , a ‘reinforced’ proportional representation (reinforced PR) system, consisted of a slightly modified version of the electoral rule employed in the  election. There were two main differences. First, instead of a two-tier open-list system, a third tier was added to provide an advantage to the first party as opposed to the second. Second, a closed-list nationwide ballot was added. In particular, the country was now divided into fifty-six districts of varying sizes, with district magnitude ranging from one to twenty-eight. For the second distribution, the country was divided into nine major electoral districts and the electoral quota was ¹ For a brief summary of the trajectory of Greek electoral laws (in Greek), see Aggeliki Karageorgou, TA NEA, “Οι επτά ζωές του εκλογικού νόμου στη Μεταπολίτευση” (The seven lives of the electoral law in the post-transition period), July ,  (last accessed on May , : https://www.tanea.gr//// politics/oi-epta-zwes-toy-eklogikoy-nomoy-sti-metapoliteysi/).

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reached by dividing the total number of votes cast for eligible parties in each major electoral district by the number of seats not yet distributed. These seats were then allocated by dividing the vote achieved by each eligible party by this quota. Any remaining seats were allocated in the third distribution. The quota for the third distribution was determined by aggregating the votes cast nationwide for parties eligible to participate in the second distribution and by dividing this figure by the number of seats not yet allocated (Clogg, ). If any remaining vote was still unallocated, it was given automatically to the party with the highest share of the popular vote. Overall, the MPs elected via an open-list ballot totalled . The remaining twelve MPs, known as ‘state deputies’, were elected via a separate closed list, allocated as a fourth tier according to the national vote share of parties—by dividing by twelve the total of votes cast nationwide for parties eligible to participate in the second distribution (Clogg, ). Two factors can explain the choice of reinforced PR. First, the electoral gridlock that preceded the military junta was still fresh in the memories of the political elites involved in the democratic transition. In this respect, deviations from proportionality seemed a price worth paying to ensure that the expected electoral landslide of Karamanlis would also translate into a strong, undisputed, single-party government (Pappas, ). Second, the  electoral rule was to a large extent the result of path dependence and institutional memory. Back in , the motivation for a system that favoured the first two parties at the expense of the third was to avoid having a strong pro-Communist Party—a goal not achieved as the pro-Communist Union of the Democratic Left (EDA, Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά) secured the second place in that election with an unprecedented  per cent. Similar fears did not seem to be at play in , but even so reinforced PR was the system most readily available to the political actors of the period (Dimitras, ). Although various changes were made since , all subsequent elections maintained this feature, namely a reinforced PR system, which did not reinforce proportionality but rather undermined it to reinforce the seat share of the first party.

.. Life : The  and  Elections The next two elections, in  and , completed the party-system consolidation process (see Chapter  in this volume). PASOK’s dynamic entry in  was followed by an equally impressive doubling of its vote in , at the expense of the old CentreLeft, which diminished in electoral support. Now the main opposition party, PASOK assumed the leading role on the Left and doing so was sufficient to yield a historical electoral landslide in the  election, gaining  per cent of the vote and  seats. Apart from allowing for the first change in government since , the  election was also the election that ended the party-system consolidation process. A new, twoparty system was born, characterized by an alteration in power between the two major Centre-Left and Centre-Right parties, while the Communist Party of Greece (the KKE) held for itself a relevant role in specific societal sectors, such as trade unions and

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professional associations (see Mavrogordatos, ; Zafeiropoulos and Marantzides, ; Pappas, ). Since then and up until the start of the sovereign debt crisis in , the party system in Greece experienced only minor and short-lived changes. This is also why for many analysts it is the  election that practically marks the beginning of the post-transition Greek party system (see e.g. Nikolakopoulos, ). The  and  elections took place under the same electoral system, which modified the  electoral system in one important way, namely the method used to allocate votes in the first distribution, from the Hare quota to the so-called ‘plus-one’ quota, also known as the Hagenbach–Bischoff method. As a result of this change, proposed and voted by the incumbent ND, more votes were now distributed at the first distribution, thus decreasing somewhat the premium of the first party. Yet, the threshold to enter into the second tier now became  per cent, the highest throughout the period of reinforced PR. This constraint would be relaxed as soon as PASOK ascended to power in late . Another, less consequential change was the decline of voting age from  to .

.. Life : The  Election The  electoral law, put forward by PASOK in , dropped the barrier for the second tier, hence bringing the system slightly closer to a pure PR system. Moreover, it changed the voting age from  to . Even more interesting was another innovation, namely, the replacement of the open-list system with a closed-list system. The rationale for this reform was to mitigate what was perceived as a long-term pathology of Greek politics, namely cultivating personal vote via clientelism and briberies. Indeed the  election was held under a closed-list system, initially celebrated by PASOK MPs as the beginning of the end of patronage. Yet, the reform ended up being short-lived: even PASOK MPs soon acknowledged that the new system did not prove resilient to favouritism, while at the same time it depreciated the status of the MPs. By , the closed-list experiment was dropped and the open-list system was back in place. In general, despite frequent modifications, the electoral system remained practically the same until . It reflected both how self-reinforcing early institutional choices generally were and, more specifically, an overall consensus in post- Greece over a system that would facilitate the formation of single-party majority governments insofar as the first party obtained at least  per cent of the total vote.

.. Life : The  and  Elections The implicit consensus in favour of a reinforced PR system changed in , when PASOK found itself forced to fight election amidst the revelation of serious corruption scandals. With the electoral prospects looking very gloomy, the incumbent party decided to change the electoral system once again, this time abandoning reinforced

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PR completely for a pure PR system, which effectively abolished any premium given to the first party. The resulting electoral system, designed and proposed by PASOK’s Minister of Interior Akis Tsochatzopoulos, worked as follows:  of the  members were elected in fifty-six constituencies, of which five were single-parliamentary seat districts while the remaining districts ranged between two and thirty-two seats. These  seats were allocated on two distributions. The first distribution used electoral quota for each district—calculated via the ‘plus one’ rule, that is, by dividing the number of valid votes cast by the number of seats plus one. The remaining seats were allocated on the second distribution when the country was divided into thirteen major constituencies (there had previously been nine) corresponding to Greece’s thirteen regional authorities. The quota used at this final stage was calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes left after the first distribution in one of the major constituencies by the number of unallocated seats remaining (this time, without the ‘plus one’). A corrective mechanism was introduced into the second distribution to ensure that small parties were allocated a guaranteed minimum of seats. Single parties or electoral coalitions which had fielded candidates in at least three-quarters of all constituencies and had managed to win at least  per cent of the total vote were granted at least three seats from the second distribution if they had not won any on the first distribution. Parties with  per cent of the total vote were entitled to one seat. In the five single-seat constituencies the first-past-the-post system applied, while votes cast in these constituencies were not taken into account on the second distribution. In constituencies comprising one to five seats, the number of candidates could be higher than the number of members of parliament (MPs) to be elected. This feature was meant to broaden the voters’ choice, as was the reinstatement of the open-list. Each such party list was printed on a separate ballot paper. Typically, the voter marked the name of a party candidate (up to three names in the two Athens constituencies and two in Thessaloniki-central), thus showing the MP (or MPs) whom he or she preferred to see elected. The remaining twelve ‘deputies of state’ were elected with simple PR in a single nationwide constituency (Featherstone, ). Overall, the system was less complex than its predecessor and more generous to small parties, providing three (out of ) seats to those having  per cent of the vote (Featherstone, ). Still, the presence of two tiers and the quotas within each tier meant that the allocation of seats within each constituency could be far from an accurate reflection of the vote distribution in that constituency. Featherstone () provides a telling example: in the district of Kastoria, electing two deputies, ND got the same number of seats (one) as PASOK even though the former had close to double the vote share of the latter ( per cent to  per cent). In a way the system, which had been engineered by PASOK before its fall from power in , fulfilled its purpose: for the ND party, achieving  per cent of the total vote in the June  elections was not enough to obtain a parliamentary majority. In a party system clearly polarized along the Left–Right dimension, the lack of other rightwing parties forced ND and its leader Constantine Mitsotakis to seek election partners

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on the left of the ideological spectrum. Eventually, after various concessions made by the ND, including that Mitsotakis would not assume the post of prime minister, the Coalition of the Left (Συνασπισμός, consisting of the KKE and the Eurocommunist KKE Interior), agreed to serve as a short-term government coalition partner. The future of this ND-Coalition of the Left government, however, was short lived. With its primary goal being to ensure an in-depth investigation of corruption attributed to the deposed PASOK government, the two-party coalition government, which was formed in the summer of , paved the way for fresh elections in the autumn of the same year. Indeed, new elections were held in November , with the same electoral system. The result was an even higher vote share for ND ( per cent), which still proved insufficient to provide it with more than  MPs. This time, instead of a coalition between the Left and the Right, a caretaker government was formed, combining all parliamentary parties under the leadership of a prominent banker, Xenophon Zolotas. New elections, held in , eventually provided  MPs to ND. Mitsotakis managed to form a single-party majority government by obtaining the support of a single MP elected on the ticket of a small Centre-Right party Democratic Renewal (DHANA, Δημοκρατική Ανανέωση), which had received just . per cent of the vote), and by gaining another seat after a decision of the Supreme Court that there had been a mistake in seat allocation across parties.

.. Life : The , , , and  Elections Soon after forming his government, Prime Minister Mitsotakis announced his intention to bring back the system of reinforced PR. However, the resulting electoral law, crafted and proposed by Minister of Interior Sotiris Kouvelas, was not simply a repetition of the  law. Instead, it was a law designed to yield single-party government even with less than  per cent difference in the vote share between the first two parties. The allocation of votes into seats followed three distributions. The first was the same as the one used in the previous electoral law, based on the electoral quota for each district, using the ‘plus one’ rule. The second now used the total of the valid votes of all thirteen major constituencies. To these, a third one was now added, which was divided into two stages, both favouring the party with most votes. One important innovation of the system was the introduction of an adjustment that ensured all parties would be represented by at least  per cent of their votes in the parliament. The correction mechanism was implemented starting from the smallest party, which was granted extra seats taken away from the party ranked just above it, if that was necessary for the former party to arrive at the  per cent of its vote share. This process continued up until the first party, that is, the winner of elections. Ironically, the first party to see the negative consequences of this electoral law was the party that had brought the law into being. After a domestic political crisis over the name of Greece’s neighbouring country, FYROM, the Mitsotakis government lost its

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parliamentary majority due to a new splinter, Political Spring (POLAN, Πολιτική Άνοιξη), a party led by Antonis Samaras, ND’s own former minister of foreign affairs. The parliament was dissolved and in the ensuing election of , POLAN ended up getting ten parliamentary seats, while it had obtained less than  per cent of the total vote. These votes were mainly granted to POLAN at the expense of the party which finished second, the formerly governing ND. A typical example of how the new system was particularly harmful to the second party was the case of Lesvos island. In that island’s electoral district, the Communist Party (KKE) won  per cent of the vote and secured one MP, while ND, which had obtained  per cent of the vote in Lesvos, won no seat. The same electoral system was applied in the following elections. It facilitated and even helped forge two-partyism, allowing for the formation of single-party majority governments even when the first party obtained less than  per cent of the vote. Indeed, this was the case with PASOK’s victory in the  elections. It was also the case when the two major parties were only one percentage point apart, as happened with PASOK’s victory over ND in the elections of . With their ups and downs, these two parties secured consistently around  per cent of the vote throughout all those elections. Eventually, this pattern would change radically, not due to an electoral reform, but rather due to the political turmoil provoked by the economic crisis of the s. Before we get into this period however, we need to review yet another change in the electoral system. The  electoral reform introduced a new feature in the electoral system that would remain intact in all subsequent elections, namely the imposition of a nationwide electoral threshold for parliamentary representation. A party or candidate could only gain access to parliament if they managed to receive at least  per cent of the national vote. The rationale for this law, which met the support of the major parties, was to ensure that independent candidates of the Muslim minority, concentrated geographically in the north-east of the country (Western Thrace), would not gain representation in the parliament. Similar to other cases, such as Turkey’s electoral threshold of  per cent, adopted by Ankara’s government to forbid the representation of Kurdish parties in parliament, the nationwide electoral threshold was used as a means to prevent minority political representation. As a result of the threshold, candidates representing the Muslim community would be obliged to seek election by joining party lists of parties that operated across the country. Doing so would limit their ability to politicize issues related to the rights and interests of the Muslim minority.

.. Life  (Plus One): The , , , and  Elections To prevent any further strategic changes in the electoral system by the incumbent, an amendment of the Constitution was initiated by the PASOK Government in . The amendment posited that if an electoral reform does not obtain the support of

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two-thirds of all MPs, then it can be voted on, but would not be implemented in the first election after the reform was passed. The reform of the electoral system would be effectuated in the following election, that is, in the second election whenever that happened to take place. As a result, a new electoral reform was not implemented immediately. Having been voted only by simple majority (not two-thirds’ majority), the electoral law which PASOK’s Minister of Interior, Kostas Skandalidis, had submitted to parliament in February , was applied, not in the elections of March, but in those of September . The new law differed in various aspects from the  one. First, it constituted an attempt to bring back a simple PR system. Indeed,  out of  seats were allocated via PR to all parties crossing the  per cent electoral threshold. The remaining forty seats were given as a bonus to the party which would come first in the elections. Notably, this bonus remained the same irrespective of the margin of victory or the vote share of the first party. The rationale behind the reform was that these forty seats would be sufficient to sustain single-party majority governments, while making the electoral system more proportional. Indeed, the system can yield more proportional representation of the parties crossing the electoral threshold. Yet, in contrast to the previous law that guaranteed a  per cent representation of all parliamentary parties, now the level of proportionality approaches  per cent, although the exact figure may vary, according to the total vote share of parties failing to cross the electoral threshold. Both laws were particularly disadvantageous for the second party. In the previous law, under-representation stemmed from the adjustment starting from the smallest party and going up to the next one. In the law of , the loss in seats was due to the fact that most of the bonus seats obtained by the first party were at the expense of the party that finished second. This increase in the under-representation of the second party could be consequential. The second party could not get  seats any more even if it had obtained  per cent of the total vote. This meant that the second party could not unilaterally provoke the dissolution of the parliament at the election of the president of the republic, who in Greece is elected by the parliament if he or she obtains  out of the total of  votes of MPs. (Otherwise, the parliament is dissolved and fresh elections are called to allow for the possibility of a new parliamentary majority to be formed in order to elect the president). Yet, in practice when that moment came, at the end of , the dissolution of the parliament was not avoided. At the time, SYRIZA, by then the main opposition party, rallied enough support among smaller parties to vote against the ND government’s candidate for president. Thus, the country was led into early elections which in January  brought SYRIZA to power. Meanwhile, after the elections of , a new electoral reform had taken place in  and was set in motion in the elections of May . This time, the change of the rules of the electoral game was far from radical. It was a change motivated by the result of the  election, in which ND won a slim majority of  seats (out of the total ), although it had won almost  per cent of the vote. ND’s achieving such a slim

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

majority caused a fear that the forty-seat bonus to the winner of elections might not be enough to ensure a single-party majority in parliament. Accordingly, the new electoral law increased the bonus by ten seats, now giving a bonus of fifty seats to the first party. The fifty-seat bonus is still applied at the time of writing (early ). How exactly these fifty seats are allocated is the result of a quite complicated procedure, contingent upon the vote share of small parties. What is probably more important is the deviations from proportionality that applying the fifty-seat bonus has led to in some constituencies. Quite ironically, the increase in the bonus from forty to fifty seats came to be implemented in the first election after the advent of the economic crisis (the election of May ). Until then, all electoral laws were designed to serve a system with two main parties, each of which was able to command close to or above  per cent of the total vote. In the May  election, the first party, ND, had less than  per cent of the vote. Accordingly, the allocation of the fifty-seat bonus became a very difficult task, often leading to severe deviations from the vote share of the parties within a given constituency. An example was seat allocation in the electoral district of Chania in Western Crete, which is represented by four seats in parliament. In three consecutive elections (June , January , and September ) the vote shares of the first two parties (at the district level), namely SYRIZA and ND, hardly changed from one election to the other: the left-wing party got approximately  per cent in all three elections, while the rightwing party got around  per cent in that district of Crete. Now, in  the winner (at the national level) was the right-wing party (thus receiving the -seat bonus), while in both  elections the winner was the left-wing party, which received the bonus. Yet in all three instances (and despite the fact that the parties’ vote share hardly changed in –), the allocation of seats varied dramatically: in  the rightwing party was allocated two bonus seats (– allocation in its favour); in January  the left-wing party was allocated one bonus seat (– allocation in its favour) while eight months later, in the elections of September , with almost identical vote shares, SYRIZA was allocated two bonus seats (– allocation).

. A N E?

.................................................................................................................................. In trying to understand the roots of party-system change, two sets of explanations are typically employed: demand- and supply-side explanations. The former type of explanations underlines the role of structural change and envisions a bottom-up process of change (e.g. Franklin, ). The latter highlights the role of institutional change, which according to this line of argument, operates as the vehicle of change in public opinion and voting behaviour (Amorim-Neto and Cox, ). Which of the two strands seems to explain better the party system change in the Greek case? The absence of significant electoral reform in Greece lends support to demand-side explanations. The question, however, is what caused such a shift in demand, given that there was

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

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absence of any significant institutional reform in the supply. The answer probably lies in the advent of the economic crisis. Until the eve of the crisis, electoral rules and the party system seemed to travel together: deviations from proportionality served to adjust for ups and downs in major parties’ vote shares, securing single-party majority governments in a party system that despite the presence of small parties throughout this period kept the key characteristics of two-partyism. After , this equilibrium vanished. The May  election yielded one of the highest volatility indexes ever seen in a European established democracy. Seven parties entered parliament, while three more marginally missed the  per cent threshold. ND came first but obtained less than  per cent of the vote—by far its lowest vote share in a national election. PASOK’s vote sank even more, to the point that this party (the winner of the immediately previous elections in the autumn of ) ended up in third place, having scored below SYRIZA’s unprecedented  per cent of the total vote. New parties emerged, scattered around the ideological spectrum, from the far Left to the far Right. The latter was now represented by the neo-fascist Golden Dawn, Europe’s most extreme parliamentary radical-Right party. The toxic combination of high levels of fragmentation and ideological polarization was driven by the debate over the austerity measures, accompanying the two bailout packages, which had been adopted in May  and February  by Greek governments. This novel situation in Greece raised concerns about the return of a party system that Western Europe had experienced bitterly during the Weimar Republic, but seemed to have left behind after the  Italian electoral reform: a system of polarized multi-partyism (Dinas and Rori, ). Eventually, fears of electoral gridlock and extreme polarization did not materialize into a threat to democratic stability. A long period of harsh austerity, leading to political turmoil, characterized by protests, riots, and eventually the emergence of the Indignados movement, had made it clear that the previous party system had come to an end (Aslanidis and Marantzides, ). The question, however, was what the new party system would look like—what would replace the dominance of the two established parties, PASOK and ND? The May  election provided a first answer to this question, offering a scattered but relatively clear picture of a new party landscape. The signal about the day-after was helpful in guiding voters after the May election. As a result, strategic considerations kicked in and the polarized multipartyism, which initially emerged in May , gradually evolved into a new moderate multi-partyism, with a major party on each side of the ideological spectrum surrounded by several smaller parties. Two major differences could be found. First, the major left-wing party, SYRIZA (a coalition of the Left, dominated by Synaspismos), was considerably more left-wing than its predecessor (the Centre-Left PASOK). Second, the range of political supply had increased considerably, from the communist Left to the neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Figure . tries to visualize these developments, while placing them into a comparative perspective. It plots the effective number of parties over time separately for Greece and for the other West European states plus the US. As we can see, although

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

ENP-Votes: Greece vs OECD 6

5

4

3

2

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year Rest OECD

Greece

 . The effective number of parties over time, Greece vs OECD. Note: The clear circles denote the EU countries plus the US, while the dark dots indicate the effective number of parties in Greece. Here, Greece is represented by the lower (dark) line, while the rest of the OECD countries are represented by the upper (light) line. Local linear regression curves (span=.) trace each of the two scatterplots. I employ the Laakso-Taagepera () ENP measure, using the vote share of parties for the estimation. (Source: Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al., ).

there was an overall increase in party-system fragmentation, the rate of this increase tended to be constant in the rest of the industrialized world. In Greece, on the other hand, the number of parties skyrocketed after the start of the debt crisis. This dramatic increase brought the country to the same level in terms of number of parties as countries with more inclusive electoral systems. Figure . presents a similar picture. It plots the combined vote share for the first two parties in each election, separately for Greece and for the other countries. Two interesting patterns become evident. First, similar to other newly democratized regimes, we see an initial increase in the vote share of the two leading parties in the

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

  Vote share of First Two Parties: Greece vs OECD 100

Cumulative Vote Share

80

60

40

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year Rest OECD

Greece

 . Cumulative vote share of the two first parties over time, Greece vs OECD. Note: The clear circles denote the EU countries plus the US, while the dark dots indicate the cumulative share of the first two parties in Greece. Here, Greece is represented by the upper (dark) line, while the rest of the OECD countries are represented by the lower (light). Local linear regression curves (span=.) trace each of the two scatterplots. (Source: The Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al., )).

first elections (in ) and along the process of party-system consolidation. By , party-system consolidation approaches an equilibrium that remains relatively stable until , when a rapid decline is observed. Once again, whereas the vote share of the major parties seems to also decline across the industrialized world, the rate seems to be much smoother compared to the abrupt fall observed in the case of Greece. In both figures, we see that the elections held in Greece in , provide a correction to the spikes found in . Both corrections, however, take us to a different equilibrium compared to what we used to see before the crisis, that is, one with more parties and one with less dominant major parties. Within this context, the fifty-seat bonus

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granted to the first party is not sufficient to enable the formation of single-party majority governments from  onwards. As a result, after the crisis the Greek party system comes closer to a typical PR system, with coalition governments which are shorter lived than before. Perhaps the best way to gauge the key role of austerity in transforming the party system is to look at the type of coalition governments formed after . Coalition theories begin from two premises. First, coalition partners tend to be ideologically close to each other. Congruence is typically measured along an overarching Left–Right scale. Second, the major coalition partner should choose a small coalition partner to retain a higher rate of ministerial positions (Rikker, ). A cursory look at the coalitions formed by SYRIZA after each of the  elections it came to win (in January and September ), challenges this premise. Tsipras could choose a much closer ideological party, with the same number of seats in parliament. Instead he opted for a populist right party, the Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες). His choice seems puzzling: the underlying assumption, when thinking about ideological congruence, would be to search for a coalition partner along the Left–Right dimension. However, in the Greek political context formed after the crisis, the EU-dimension, representing support or opposition to the austerity packages offered by the EU, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (collectively known as the Troika), was more salient than the Left–Right dimension. Even if involving less leapfrogging than the  coalitions, all governments formed after the May  election could be predicted better by congruence along the EU dimension than along the Left–Right dimension. It seems that in indebted countries, political dimensionality has evolved in the opposite direction than in the rest of the EU. According to Mair (), the euro-crisis brought the Left–Right distinction back into European politics. Formed around questions of international redistribution and austerity, the Left–Right distinction evolved as the key dimension to influence voting behaviour and eventually party competition (Bansak et al., ). In Greece, however, the Left–Right distinction seemed to lose its significance, as the EU dimension encapsulated the debate about austerity.

. C: T L A

.................................................................................................................................. The frequency of electoral reforms impedes researchers of electoral politics from characterizing the Greek electoral system as a single electoral law. That said, some generalizable characteristics can be detected. First, with the – exception, Greek elections took place under an electoral system that tried to marry PR with single-party majority governments. Sometimes the means to achieve such a marriage was a third tier in the distribution of the remaining votes, while other times it was a nationwide bonus of parliamentary seats given to the first party. In all occasions, the aim was

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fulfilled. Importantly, this was the case not only in the period of partisan polarization, up until , but also after the ideological convergence between the two major parties, ND and PASOK, took place in the mid-s. Similar with other countries, this convergence eroded partisan ties and partially replaced identity politics with a more cynical approach towards all parties (Nikolakopoulos, ). It was probably in that period that the electoral system had the greatest impact in sustaining a two-party system. Second, there seems to be a pendulum, driving the system towards a more proportional direction when the incumbent felt vulnerable, and in the opposite direction when the incumbent felt more powerful. Third, the changes in the electoral system did not significantly change the party system: throughout this period, the change in the number of parties in the parliament remained constant. Any dramatic change in the number of parties resulted not from electoral reform, but rather was the outcome of an exogenous event, namely the economic crisis. The crisis seems to have changed Greek politics in at least three ways. First, it has changed the form and intensity of clientelism. Patronage politics backlashed after it became obvious that there would be much less pork available in the future (Matakos and Xefteris, ). Second, the crisis exacerbated the process of de-alignment, eventually leading to a proliferation of new parties as well as the decline in the vote share of the major parties. It is difficult to think how in the future Greek elections could return to delivering single-party parliamentary majorities. PASOK has probably been the first victim of the crisis. In this respect, of course, Greece is not alone. Even if they disagree on the roots of this development, pundits, academics, and political commentators alike agree that social democracy is undergoing perhaps the most severe crisis since its birth in the early twentieth century. Even if PASOK ended up being the personification of this trajectory, pasokification as it became known, is far from a Greek idiosyncrasy. Politics, like nature, hates vacuum. PASOK’s electoral decline has already been compensated by the rise of SYRIZA, albeit with two important qualifications. First, while in government, SYRIZA, which is the main recipient of the pool of previous PASOK votes, seems to gradually and even somewhat reluctantly adopt the role of a new social democracy. It is a ‘social democracy’ located more to the left wing than the social democracy of the past. Meanwhile, SYRIZA has become more mature, both in its ideological profile and its organization than while it was in opposition. Second, we again find a proliferation of small parties on the left of the spectrum, similar to the type of asymmetric party system fragmentation that was experienced in Greece in the first formative period after the  transition to democracy. This build-up took place exactly in a period in which this space was losing the bulk of its typical inhabitants, moving either towards the pro-Europe Right or towards the radical Left. Taken together, these developments indicate that the increase in ideological distance between the two major parties, ND and SYRIZA, will be a more long-term phenomenon than was evident on the eve of the crisis. Third, the crisis has brought back into Greek politics cleavages that were seemingly pushed aside after the democratic transition. One important example is the case of the

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neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Neither exposure to austerity nor exposure to immigrants appears to be as good a determinant of electoral support of the party as the legacy of anti-communism. Anti-communist attitudes were a key component of Greek politics after the Civil War of the s. The electoral importance of such attitudes declined considerably after the end of the dictatorship (). Military regimes are often linked to the ideological right of the political spectrum and the Greek junta was not an exception. This link generated a favourable political context for the Left after the democratic transition. Within this context, anti-communist sentiments, originating in the Civil War, were viewed as an anachronism. Accordingly, the Greek Third Republic (– ) was in part forged around a consensus of ‘anti-Right’ bias (Dinas, ). The collapse of the party system after the economic crisis seems to have also put into question the Greek Republic’s fundamental ideological pillars. In so doing, the crisis seems to have resurfaced the memory of the anti-communist past, thus far hidden under the carpet of the democratic transition (Palaiologou and Dinas, ). This tendency is particularly evident in the vote share for the Golden Dawn in rural areas, marginally affected by the crisis, but clinging to rich local histories of civil war violence. In this respect, if the democratic transition helped to kill an existing electoral cleavage, the crisis helped in resurrecting it.

R Amorim-Neto, O. and Cox, G. W. (). ‘Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties’. American Journal of Political Science,  (): –. Armingeon, K., Wenger, V., Wiedemeier, F., Isler, C., Knöpfel, L., and Weisstanner, D. (). Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set—Government Composition –. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. Aslanidis, P. and Marantzides, N. (). ‘The Impact of the Greek Indignados on Greek Politics’. Southeastern Europe,  (): –. Bansak, K., Bechtel, M., Hainmueller, J., and Margalit, Y. (). The Ideological Basis of the Grexit Debate. Stanford University: Mimeo. Bol, D., Pilet, J. B., and Riera, P. (). ‘The International Diffusion of Electoral Systems: The Spread of Mechanisms Tempering Proportional Representation Across Europe’. European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Clogg, R. (). Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Dimitras, P. E. (). ‘Electoral Systems in Greece’. In Nagel, S. L. and Rukavishnikov, V. (eds.) Eastern European Development and Public Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Dinas, E. (). ‘Political Socialisation and Regime Change: How the Right Ceased to be Wrong in Post- Greece’. Political Studies,  (): –. Dinas, E. and Rori, L. (). ‘The  Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear and Loathing in the Polls’. West European Politics,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The ‘Party-State’ in Greece and the Fall of Papandreou’. West European Politics,  (): –.

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 

Franklin, M. N. (). ‘The Decline of Cleavage Politics’, In Franklin, M. N., Mackie, T., and Valen, N. (eds.) Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, –. Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (). ‘ “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe’. Comparative Political Studies,  (): –. Mair, P. (). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. London: Verso Books. Matakos, K. and Xefteris, D. (). ‘Citizens or Clients? Evidence on Opportunistic Voting from a Natural Experiment in Greece’. Political Science Research and Methods,  (): –. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). ‘The Greek Party System: A Case of “Limited but Polarised Pluralism”?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Nikolakopoulos, I. (). ‘Elections and Voters, –: Old Cleavages and New Issues’. West European Politics,  (): –. Pappas, T. (). Making Party Democracy in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Pappas, T. (). ‘Περί δικομματισμού και χρήσης της ιδεολογικής πόλωσης στη μελέτη του κομματικού συστήματος’ [On Two-Partism and the Use of Ideological Polarization in the Study of the Party System]. Greek Political Science Review, : –. Palaiologou, E. and Dinas, E. (). Interrupted Continuitites: The Brith, Death and Revival of Political Legacies, Unpublished Manuscript, University of Oxford. Renwick, A. (). The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rikker, W. H. (). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. Zafeiropoulos, K. and Marantzides, N. (). ‘Για το κομματικό σύστημα στη Μεταπολίτευση: Κριτικό σημείωμα’ [On the Party System in Metapolitefsi: A Critical Note]. Greek Political Science Review, : –.

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        ......................................................................................................................

   

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T present chapter seeks to delve into the historical evolution, the characteristics, and the dynamics of the contemporary Greek party system. The chapter is divided into three parts: firstly, the main issues and concepts are briefly analysed. Secondly, a concise account of the historical transformations of the Greek party system is offered. Finally, there will be an analysis of the current state of the Greek party system after the economic crisis. In each section, key aspects are covered, including the structure of the party system, its internal dynamics, its cleavages, its degree of institutionalization, and its exceptional features, as well as its major actors, the most important electoral contests, and possible future developments.

. M I  C

.................................................................................................................................. A discussion of a party system is, firstly, a discussion of the nationalization of politics, namely the degree to which the national political arena dominates sub-national arenas (Caramani, ; Jones and Mainwaring, ). Nationalization of politics involves the concept of the mass party, which is characterized by a nationwide organization and the ability to incite abstract and stable identification (Sartori, ), namely institutionalization. Any examination of a party system should also engage in an analysis of the original cleavages that gave birth to parties (Lipset and Rokkan, ) and are still echoed in contemporary party politics, shaping the party system’s dynamics and competition dimensions. Obviously, of particular interest is the question whether the Greek party system is indeed ‘new’ after the economic crisis. The main assumption is that there is a blend of continuity and change in the core characteristics of the Greek party system, in many respects.

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The primary determinants of the evolution and shape of the Greek party system are two major conflicts that happened during the course of the first half of the twentieth century and, obviously, the international economic crisis at the end of the decade of the s. For many decades, regardless of the specifics concerning different configurations or conflicts that will be analysed further on, the Greek party system has been characterized by three camps and two poles. While conforming to mainstream partysystem classifications, being a two-party system for three decades before the crisis and a polarized multi-party system after the crisis, it also has some exceptional features. These are the long-lasting element of clientelism and the distinct, culturally and historically specific content of the Left–Right dimension. With respect to the effects of the crisis, the Greek party system had similar responses to other crisis-hit South European countries, experiencing critical elections, near-total dismantling, increased polarization, strengthening of anti-systemic views and parties and decreased legitimacy. A summary of the development of the Greek party system in time can be found in Table ..

. T H C   G P S

..................................................................................................................................

.. The Pre-History, – The origins of the contemporary Greek party system can be traced back to the period when the first organizations remotely resembling mass parties appeared, roughly around the same time that a great division emerged, that is, the ‘national schism’ between republicans and royalists in . The division concerned whether Greece should participate or not in the First World War on the side of the ‘Entente’(Clogg, : –; Mavrogordatos, : –). The two major parties of that period were the People’s Party (Λαϊκόν Κόμμα) and the Liberal Party (Κόμμα Φιλελευθέρων). These parties were the more or less direct predecessors of parties which later dominated two of the three traditional political camps in Greece, the Right and the Centre respectively. In  the Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας) entered parliament for the first time. However, it was not until the second great division, the Civil War of – between nationalist bourgeois Western-backed forces and the mostly communist Left, that the KKE became the long-lasting hegemonic power in the third traditional Greek political camp, the Left. A party structure of three camps was then formed, ‘the single most stable element of the Greek political landscape’ for many decades (Mavrogordatos, ). Competition for power, however, was bi-polar, between the Right and the Centre, with the Left being excluded. Thus, the Greek party system inherited the persisting feature of polarized competition.

Table 14.1 The evolution of the Greek party system, 1946–2015 1946–1967

1974–1981

1981–2012

2012–2015

2015–

Party system format and dynamics

Predominant party

Limited but polarized pluralism/PolarizedAssymetricaltripartism

Two-party system/ Converging bipartisanism

Polarized multipartyism/ Triangular polarization/ Sequence of moderate multipartyism with a dominant party

Polarized multipartyism (signs of weak two-partyism after 2015)

Major features

Clientelism/ Sickly democracy

Clientelism

Bureaucratic clientelism/ Decrease in institutionalization/Deligitimation/ Dealignment/Fluidity Modernization/ Cartelization/ Ideological convergence (1996–2009)

Major divisions

Nationally minded- Right-Anti-Right Left/Right-AntiRight

Right-Anti-Right/ Left-Right/ Social LiberalismConservatism

Form of government

Mostly single-party Single-party

Single-party (10-month Coalition (from 2011) exception in 1989–1990)

Social Liberalism-Conservatism/Left-Right/Pro-Anti European

Source: author’s own elaboration drawing on several sources, chiefly Tsirbas, 2009a; Pappas, 2003; Mavrogordatos, 1984; Featherstone, 2005; Moschonas, 1994; Vernardakis, 2011; and Lyrintzis, 2005.

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Period

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After the victory of the Right in the Civil War, Greek politics entered a phase of ‘sickly’ democracy (Nikolakopoulos, ). Right-wing nationalism and anticommunism became the dominant ideology. KKE was illegal from ; left-wing civilians, activists, and politicians were regularly persecuted, exiled, and even executed; at least one election was severely rigged (Nikolakopoulos, ). Political parties were not the only agents of political power. The monarchy, the army, and the US government, were powerful and influential players in domestic politics, in a close relationship with the Right. Clientelism was another conspicuous and resilient trait of Greek party politics (Featherstone, ; Haralambis, ). After the Civil War, a new division occurred, comprising a conflict between the communists and their sympathizers on the one hand and the ‘nationally minded’ (εθνικόφρονες), who belonged to the anti-Soviet camp of the emerging Cold War, on the other hand. The ‘nationally minded’ were conservative, and their politics demonstrated continuity with the ruling class before the Second World War (Lyrintzis, ; Moschonas, ). The latter were the winners of the Civil War, while the former, although defeated, drew their popular appeal from the resistance against the Nazi occupation (Moschonas, ; Voulgaris, ). Despite the fact that this particular division was identifiable in classic Left–Right terms, it essentially blocked the conduct of politics in the redistributional sense in which this division functioned in other Western European countries (Moschonas, ). It was a battle of holistic world views on the very form of governance and not a battle of competing policy proposals and it, thus, constituted one of the exceptional aspects of the Greek party system. The division between the ‘nationally minded’ and the Left planted the seed of another cleavage, which would remain with Greek party politics for decades, that is, the Right vs. anti-Right cleavage (Moschonas, ). Basically, it was the product of three major features of the Greek party system combined: sickly democracy, extended clientelism, albeit limited to designated parts of the Greek society, and the ‘nationally minded’ vs. the left division. The segments of the population that were systematically excluded by the political system formed a common base of struggle against the ‘State of the Right-Wing’ (Moschonas,  :). The Centre was a major participant in this anti-Right alliance, especially after the  election of ‘violence and rigging’, when the Centre Union party (EK, Ένωσις Κέντρου) experienced the consequences of repression of the then ruling right-wing against its opponents. The Right vs. anti-Right division gradually became the deepest division in Greek politics (Moschonas, :) (Table .). In terms of its format, from  until  the party system was a ‘predominant party’ party system, using the Sartorian typology (Pappas, ) (Table .). The People’s Party, and its successors, ‘Hellenic Rally’ (Ελληνικός Συναγερμός) and National Radical Union (ERE, Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις), were the predominant Right parties, winning a total of six consecutive elections (, , , , , ). Their main antagonists for power during the same period belonged to the Centre camp: the Liberal Party, the National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK, Εθνική Προοδευτική Ένωσις Κέντρου) and the Centre Union [EK].

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Regarding the Left camp, the main actor was the Unified Democratic Left (EDA, Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά), serving mostly as the legal front of the outlawed KKE, but also incorporating most non-communist left-wing groups (Lyrintzis, ). In , only nine years after the Left’s defeat in the Civil War, the Centre and the Left united in an electoral coalition called ‘Democratic Union’ (Δημοκρατική Ένωση), a development that signalled the beginning of the end of political isolation for the Greek Left (Nikolakopoulos, : ). Furthermore, in , EDA came second and became the official opposition, shocking the nationally minded camp. In  and  the Centre Union won two consecutive elections, with a mandate to materialize a widespread social demand for social reforms and modernization (Haralambis, : ). However, the centrist parenthesis lasted only until , when the government of Georgios Papandreou was overthrown by the king. The overthrow put the monarchy at the centre of political developments, marking its transformation from a unifying factor of the nationally minded camp into a symbol of conflict (Nikolakopoulos, : ), identified with the Right camp. Tension and instability prevailed and escalated into the Colonels’ coup d’état in  and a subsequent seven-year dictatorship.

.. The History: After the Dictatorship, before the Crisis. – In , democracy was restored after the Colonels faced a war with Turkey which they had neither planned nor prepared for. Humiliated and eager to avoid war, the Colonels called back Konstantinos Karamanlis, the former prime minister (–) and leader of ERE, from his self-exile to form a new government. The Greek political system ceased to have ‘protectors’, either domestic or international, and its stabilization and efficacy were ‘dependent upon its own internal dialectics’ (Voulgaris, :). The process of democratization was swift and effective, while the Greek party system was quickly institutionalized (Mainwaring, ). KKE was legalized, and a democratic election was held in November . The monarchy was abolished through a popular referendum in December  and the Third Greek Republic started its own course.¹ Political parties almost unilaterally determined political developments, and Greece had a true party democracy for the first time (Spourdalakis and Papavlassopoulos, :). Karamanlis founded New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), which consisted of the vast majority of former ERE cadres. The party’s rather vague ideology was ‘radical liberalism’ (Lyrintzis, ). ND won the  election with . per cent (Table .). However, this particular election had the character of a plebiscite to confirm the process of democratic transition undertaken by the National Unity government, led ¹ The First Greek Republic was during – and the Second during –.

1974

1977

1981

1985

June 1989

Nov 1989

Apr 1990

1993

1996

2000

2004

2007

ND PASOK KKE EK-ND/EDIK United Left/SYNa Allianceb National Front KKE Interior POLANc SYNd DIKKIe LAOSf Other

54.4 13.6 – 20.4 9.5 – – – – – – – 2.5

41.8 25.3 9.4 12.0 – 2.7 6.3 – – – – – 2.5

35.9 48.1 10.9 – – – – 1.4 – – – – 3.7

40.8 45.8 9.9 – – – – 1.8 – – – – 1.7

44.3 39.1 – – 13.1 – – – – – – – 3.5

46.2 40.7 – – 11.0 – – – – – – – 2.1

46.9 38.6 – – 10.3 – – – – – – – 4.2

39.3 46.9 4.5 – – – – – 4.9 2.9 – – 1.5

38.1 41.5 5.6 – – – – – 2.9 5.1 4.4 – 2.4

42.7 43.8 5.5 – – – – – – 3.2 2.7 – 2.1

45.4 40.6 5.9 – – – – – – 3.3 1.8 2.2 0.8

41.8 38.1 8.2 – – – – – – 5.0 – 3.8 3.1

Total Turnout

100 79.5

100 77.8

100 78.6

100 79.1

100 84.5

100 80.7

100 79.2

100 79.2

100 76.3

100 75.0

100 76.5

100 74.2

a United Left (1974)=KKE/KKE Interior/EDA, SYN (1989-1990)=KKE/EAR (transformation of KKE Interior) b KKE Interior/EDA and smaller parties c Political Spring [Politiki Anoixi], a nationalist split from ND d Without KKE e Democratic Social Movement [Dimokratiko Kenoniko Kinima], a populist split from PASOK f Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos- Popular Orthodox Rally, a nationalist split from ND. Source: Hellenic Parliament

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Table 14.2 Elections in Greece, from the restoration of democracy until the outbreak of the economic crisis (%)

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

by Karamanlis (Nicolacopoulos, ). ‘Centre Union-New Forces’ (EK-ND, Ένωση Κέντρου—Νέες Δυνάμεις), a transformation of the pre- Centre Union came second. Nevertheless, EK-ND could not really differentiate itself from ND, either ideologically or in terms of important political choices (Pappas, ). On the other hand, the son of the pre-dictatorship leader of Centre Union, the charismatic Andreas Papandreou, chose not to join EK-ND, the successor of his late father’s party, but to found a new party, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), with no ties to the past. PASOK proclaimed socialism to be its political ideology, participated in the elections of , and obtained . per cent of the vote. The Left, including KKE, KKE interior,² and EDA contested the election under a loose coalition called ‘United Left’ (Ενωμένη Αριστερά) and obtained . per cent, the smallest vote share for the Left since the end of the Civil War (Nicolacopoulos, ) (Table .). The ensuing ‘normal’  election was an affirmation of dominance of one party within each political party family (Mavrogordatos, ). ND won (Table .) and quickly became the indisputable leader of the Right after assimilating ‘National Front’ [EP, Εθνική Παράταξις], a far right-wing party with ties to the dictatorship period (Nicolacopoulos, ). PASOK became the leading power in the Centre and CentreLeft, overtaking the Centrists who contested the election under a new name, Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK, Ένωση Δημοκρατικού Κέντρου). PASOK was different from EDIK at the party elite level, but not in terms of its electoral pool (Spourdalakis, ). Finally, KKE dominated the Left, against the reformist Left coalition called ‘Alliance’ (Table .). In the two latter cases, the most radical actors, namely PASOK and KKE, won over their more moderate competitors in the same party family (Mavrogordatos, ). Thus, the Greek party system, on its way to the seminal election of , had already acquired the structure it had before , with three camps and polarized dynamics (Mavrogordatos, ; Seferiades, ; Voulgaris, :; Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, ). PASOK had not only become the leader of the Centre but also the leader of the antiRight camp. It pursued an idiosyncratic catch-all strategy of ‘centrifugal centrism’, namely a strategy intending to occupy the centre of the political space and to surround the Left, by posing simultaneously as the radical Centre and the ‘left of the Left’ (Moschonas, ; Sotiropoulos, ). In terms of its ideological content, the antiRight camp was characterized by three antitheses: anti-US, anti-Dictatorship/State of the Right, and anti-monopoly/Capitalism (Nikolakopoulos, :). In , PASOK won, ND came second and KKE third (Table .). No other party entered parliament. It was the beginning of one of the most stable two-party systems in Europe, which endured for almost three decades. The party system’s central characteristic, facilitated by the electoral law, was the alternation of PASOK

² In February , KKE was split and ‘KKE Interior’ was created, having a reformist and Eurocommunist approach, compared to KKE’s more orthodox and loyal to the Soviets stance.

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and ND in single-party governments, aside from a ten-month exception in , thus conforming to the two-partyism category (Sartori, : ). Clientelism, which had emanated in the period before the Colonels’ dictatorship, became a major characteristic of Greek politics during the s. Both major Greek parties, PASOK and ND, devised clientelistic networks, making extensive use of their party mechanisms, to promote and expand their electoral clientele (Featherstone, ; Spanou, ; Haralambis, :; Lyrintzis, ). The political patronage phenomenon became so extended under PASOK that Lyrintzis () coined the term ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ in order to describe it, meaning that the state apparatus was gradually colonized by the party mechanisms. On the other hand, PASOK’s policies succeeded at incorporating into the political system social strata that had been long excluded or had been at the margins of the political process since the end of the Civil War (Mouzelis, ), while it put forward several reforms in the realm of civic rights and social protection. Nonetheless, PASOK’s socialism gradually degenerated to a ‘blend of populism, clientelism and radical rhetoric’(Lyrintzis, ). The next election, of June , was the peak of the Right/anti-Right division (Moschonas, : –; Nikolakopoulos, : ). After the election, which PASOK easily won (Table .), both ND and the Left realized that the contextualization of politics in historical terms was beneficial only to PASOK, enabling it to occupy the vital centre space of the political spectrum, while attracting voters from the Left (Nikolacopoulos, ). Hence, both the Right and the Left ceased inflaming the Right/anti-Right division. Towards the end of the s, the huge saliency of cases of corruption, in which PASOK government officials and even Papandreou himself were allegedly involved and the demand for ‘catharsis’—a cleansing of government and of the public bureaucracies—highlighted another sporadic aspect of Greek party politics, namely corruption (Featherstone, ). Catharsis was the main issue of the subsequent  election, which ND won (Table .), but due to an almost proportional representation (PR) electoral system could not form a single party government. The first coalition government of the Greek party system since  was then formed in the summer of  between ND and Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN, Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς και της Προόδου). The SYN party had been formed in early  between KKE and the reformist and Eurocommunist Greek Left (EAR, Ελληνική Αριστερά), which was an outgrowth of the KKE Interior party. This was a single-purpose government, formed to indict the accused of corruption scandals. However, the formation of this government coalition was a seminal point in Greek party politics, because it marked the symbolic end of the Civil War divisions and it meant that for the first time in four decades the Left was not perceived as a threat to the political system (Verney, ). It took two more elections (November  and April —Table .) for ND to finally form a government. By that time, ND had adopted a neoliberal platform (Lyrintzis, ). Nonetheless, neoliberal policies proved unpopular and in combination with a foreign affairs crisis, regarding the recognition of a neighbouring new state, the Former Yugoslavic Republic

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

of Macedonia, led to the fall of the ND government. In the  election, PASOK won (Table .) and Andreas Papandreou became prime minister again. He had already been acquitted for the scandals of the late s. In  Papandreou died and Kostas Simitis became the leader of PASOK. Simitis was a ‘modernizer’. PASOK, led by Simitis, won the  and  elections, under a modernizing platform, which had Greece’s positioning at the core of the EU through liberalizing reforms as its central premise (Featherstone, : ). As it will be argued further on, the victory of the modernizing faction of PASOK marked a significant change in Greek politics, both on the demand and on the supply side. ND won in  and  with Kostas Karamanlis, a nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis, as prime minister, also having modernizing and reformist aspects in the ND party’s platform (Featherstone, : ). Both endeavours, however, had limited results (especially the latter) and sooner or later succumbed to some of the long-lasting traits of the Greek party system (Table .), like clientelism. In , SYN, together with several small parties and political formations of the Left founded the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς), which was bound to be a protagonist of Greek party politics after the outbreak of the economic crisis of . Since the mid-s and during the greatest part of the s, ‘modernization’ became the dominant ideology of Greek office-seeking parties. Modernization was interpreted as an extrovert and innovative cultural trend, which was opposed to a widespread underdog culture, a division that is thought to have influenced Greek politics over time (Diamandouros, ). According to another view, modernization was a neoliberal programme, entailing the primacy of the market and the limitation of social welfare and social rights (Vernardakis, , pp. –). The modernization period coincided with a sharp decrease in the ideological clarity of major Greek parties (Lyrintzis, ; Tsirbas, a). This gradual convergence of major Greek political parties towards the centre of the political spectrum, which would serve as a ‘systemic core’ of the political system, had been predicted as the most likely development for the Greek party system (Katsoulis, : ). Similarly, the Greek party system of the period between the mid-s and the s has been characterized as ‘concentrated’ (Pappas, ) and as ‘converging bipartyism’ (Vernardakis, : ). These approaches imply the notion of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, ) and Downsian parties that converge towards the median voter in their quest for power (Downs, ). Furthermore, the Greek party system was gradually transformed into a system of cartel or ‘state oriented’ parties that steadily ceased to be representation mechanisms and became bureaucratic mechanisms, with PASOK being the exemplar case (Lyrintzis, ; Spourdalakis; Vernardakis, : ). The decade of the s was also the beginning of the era of high professionalization in Greek politics, with extensive usage of professional consultants in conducting electoral campaigns and decline of the role of intra-party processes and organization (Papathanassopoulos, ).

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The professionalization was followed by changes in parties’ decision-making processes. The most notable example is the election of the party’s president by an electorate comprising both party members and party ‘friends’. This electoral process was first initiated by PASOK’s leader George Papandreou, son of Andreas Papandreou and grandson of Georgios Papandreou, who succeeded Simitis at the helm of PASOK in . Papandreou aimed at using the electoral campaign and the new process of electing PASOK’s president as an instrument of both electoral success and party change (Rori, ). However, the change, which was subsequently adopted by ND as well, has had diminishing success ever since its introduction and practically failed to invigorate party organizations, as was initially assumed (Sotiropoulos, : ). The afore-mentioned ideological and programmatic convergence between PASOK and ND was accompanied by an increasing weakening of institutional consensus, especially from  onwards, when the ‘politics of politics’, like the constitutional reform of , was incorporated into everyday party competition (Kontiadis, : ). Moreover, a decrease in institutional trust became apparent, in the form of a decline in the steady commitment of all participants to follow certain rules and principles of institutional behaviour (Kontiadis, : ). An example is the initiation of a constitutional reform process by PM Karamanlis (the leader of ND, which had won the elections of ) during the traditionally polarized parliamentary discussion of the  state budget (Kontiadis, : ). This phenomenon was accompanied by a decrease in political trust on the part of the electorate (Verney, ). Therefore, starting in , the economic crisis occurred in a political atmosphere of waning institutional and political trust.

. T G P S D  E C: C  R   P

.................................................................................................................................. In , an early sign of a lurking weakening of two-partyism manifested itself. After Alexis Tsipras became SYRIZA’s leader, opinion polls showed that support for his party rose to unprecedented double-digit figures, owing to support mostly from disenchanted PASOK and ND voters (Tsirbas, b). Simultaneously, there were increasing signs of a decrease in party identification (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, a) and a further delegitimation of the political system (Verney, ). Meanwhile at the end of  the country saw its most extensive youth demonstrations and riots in decades, following the assassination of a -year old student (Alexandros Grigoropoulos) by a policeman. Moreover, the societal gaps that would become manifest in the so-called ‘earthquake elections of ’ (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, ), especially the age gap and the geographical gap in vote distribution, were already starting to

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  



Table 14.3 Crisis Elections in Greece (%) SYRIZA ND GD PASOK KKE The River ANEL Centrists’ Union DIMAR LAOS Other Total Turnout

2009

May 2012

June 2012

January 2015

September 2015

4.6 33.5 0.3 43.9 7.5 – – 0.3 – 5.6 4.3 100 71

16.8 18.9 7.0 13.2 8.5 – 10.6 0.6 6.1 2.9 15.4 100 65.1

26.9 29.7 6.9 12.3 4.5 – 7.5 0.3 6.3 1.6 4.0 100 62.5

36.3 27.8 6.3 4.7 5.5 6.1 4.8 1.8 0.5* 1.0 5.2 100 63.9

35.5 28.1 7.0 6.3** 5.6 4.1 3.7 3.4 ** – 6.3 100 56.2

* With Ecologists-Greens [Oikologoi-Prasinoi] ** With DIMAR (PASOK) Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior

form (Vernardakis, : ). Thus, the early election of  (following only two years after the election of ) can be characterized as the first crisis election. It was held well within the global economic crisis and it had a crisis-relevant agenda: Karamanlis invoked the global economic crisis and Greece’s poor economic condition when he called the election, while Papandreou, the leader of PASOK, contested the election with the slogan ‘there is money’. PASOK won by a landslide, ND came second, while KKE, LAOS (see Table .), and SYRIZA were the other parties that entered parliament (Table .). One could argue that the economic crisis and the  election in fact delayed the course of the collapse of the old party system. In a difficult time, the Greek electorate opted for the familiar, risk-averse recipe of two-partyism and single-party governments, and temporarily halted the course towards the unknown realm of multipartyism, which was, nevertheless, around the corner. Soon after the  election, Greece’s rapidly deteriorating public finances led to a loan agreement (and a Memorandum of Understanding—MoU—with the country’s lenders). The agreement was made by the PASOK government and European Central Bank, European Commission, and International Monetary Fund (the ‘Troika’), in May , in order for the country to avoid default. The only party that supported the MoU, except for PASOK, was LAOS. The MoU entailed harsh austerity measures, fiscal adjustments, and structural reforms. However, by the end of  a second MoU was necessary, which PASOK could not pass alone. Therefore, Papandreou stepped down as prime minister and a coalition government was formed, led by the technocrat Lucas Papademos, with the participation of PASOK, LAOS, and ND, which had shifted

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towards a pro-MoU stance. The second MoU was passed in February , albeit without LAOS’ votes. Another aspect of Greek exceptionalism is that while the crisis was internationally interpreted as a crisis of global capitalism, in Greece it signified the failure of the state to combine statism and clientelism when its international financing ended (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, :). Other explanations have also been proposed, suggesting that the crisis in Greece cannot be solely understood as a failure of internal politics, but also as a failure of the eurozone, which rather encouraged than prevented Greece’s extensive lending (Hyppolite, ; Koutsiaras and Manouzas, ). The period after the economic crisis saw the decrease in clientelism as a conspicuous feature of the Greek party system (Table .), due to both practical and institutional reasons and the increase of the discussion on the return of populism. However, ‘populism’ is mostly used in Greece as a way to express political criticism and not as an analytical category. Those who opposed the MoUs and austerity measures are usually identified as ‘populists’. In this respect, the analytical value of the term is rather poor, since literally all relevant Greek political parties (with the partial exception of PASOK) have been, at one point or another, anti-austerity, thus ‘populist’. The term, therefore, needs careful application if it is to have utility. The subsequent May  election brought about the collapse of bipartisanism. ND and PASOK barely got a little more than  per cent between them; what is more, PASOK was third and SYRIZA was second (Table .). In total, seven parties entered parliament: Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες), an anti-MoU, nationalist–populist split from ND; KKE; Democratic Left (DIMAR, Δημοκρατική Αριστερά), a pro-European reformist split from SYRIZA; Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή), a neo-Nazi, anti-semetic, anti-immigrant, anti-communist, and anti-MoU party. Since the ability of anti-system parties to gain seats (Mainwaring, ) is an indicator of low institutionalization, the rise of the GD is of particular importance, because it has been a constant undermining factor for the quality of Greek democracy (Dinas et al., ; Ellinas, ; Georgiadou, ). The May  election was a critical (Key, ) and a dealignment election (Campbell et al., ). It had full dismantling effects; it inaugurated a new political cycle and the formation of a new party landscape (Moschonas, ). The Greek party system moved from centripetal to centrifugal (Dinas & Rori, ). Once powerful parties lost more than two-thirds of their strength (PASOK), others quadrupled their influence (SYRIZA), new parties emerged as electorally relevant (ANEL, GD, DIMAR), and the Greek party system as a whole moved to multipartyism (Table .). Volatility sky-rocketed, the number of effective electoral parties rose considerably and vote nationalization, that is, the degree to which party support is geographically homogeneous across a country, dropped significantly (Figure .). No government was formed after the May  election and a new election was held in June , which took the form of a head-on-battle between ND and SYRIZA and of a debate on the European future of Greece (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, ). ND and SYRIZA increased their vote shares by roughly  per cent each and the same

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   Vote Share of the Two First Parties

Electoral Volatility

90

45

80

35

70

30

60

25

50

20

40

15

30

10

20

5

10 0

0 2009

2012a

1012b

2015a

2015b

2007–2009

Vote Nationalization Index 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.9 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.84



2009

2012a

1012b

2015a

2015b

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

2009–5/ 2012

5/2012–6/ 2012

6/2012–1/ 2015

1/2015–9/ 2015

Effective Number of Electoral Parties

2009

2012a

1012b

2015a

2015b

 . Party system institutionalization indicators, –. Calculations: Electoral Volatility (Pedersen, ); Vote Nationalization Index (Bochsler, ); Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Laakso and Taegepera, ). Source: Greek Minister of Interior, www.ekloges.ypes.gr.

parties as in the May  election entered parliament (Table .). After the election, a pro-European/pro-bailout coalition government was formed, between ND, PASOK, and DIMAR, with ND’s leader, Antonis Samaras, as prime minister. In sum, the structural configuration of the Greek party system after the twin elections of  was shaped into a triangular polarization marked by centrist pro-European forces (represented by PASOK and ND), anti-austerity forces on the Left, and xenophobic, anti-bailout forces on the Right (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, b) (Table .). Prior research has shown that in the years leading to the crisis, Greece conformed to the two-dimensionality of ideological space, which is common in Europe (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, ). This configuration consisted of a liberalism-conservatism viewpoint and an exceptional Left–Right dimension (Andreadis, Teperoglou, and Tsatsanis, ). The economic crisis and the MoUs substantially altered the content, by increasing the saliency of European issues, but not the structure of the ideological space (Tsatsanis, Freire, and Tsirbas, ). Moreover, after , coalition governments became the rule and all parliamentary parties were turned into potential government participants (Verney, ). At the end of , the second bailout agreement was expiring and the Greek economy was, once again, in urgent need of funding. The ND-PASOK government (DIMAR had left the coalition in ) initiated an early presidential election process. The constitutional requirement of an enhanced parliamentary majority of  out of  MPs in order to elect the president of the republic was not met because SYRIZA

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and other anti-MoU parties would not vote for any candidate. Thus, in December  the parliament was dissolved and a parliamentary election was held, after which the president could be elected with a simple majority ( out of  votes), according to the Constitution. The ensuing January  early election claims a special place in Greek political history. It was the first time a party of the Left (as opposed to Centre-Left) won, namely SYRIZA, with . per cent of the vote (Table .). ND was second, while GD solidified its place as the third strongest party. PASOK, on the other hand, was the seventh (and last) party to enter parliament. In total, PASOK had lost  per cent of its electoral strength since . DIMAR almost vanished at the polls (Table .). The harsh austerity measures and the consecutive loan agreements of  and  had ignited retrospective and economic voting (Artelaris and Tsirbas, ; Tsirbas, ), and eventually led to the punishment of those in government, as happened elsewhere, in the ‘electoral and government epidemic’ that followed the eruption of the economic crisis (Bosco and Verney, ). KKE, ANEL, and The River [To Potami] also entered parliament in . The latter was founded in February  by a famous TV journalist and mostly attracted former cadres and MPs of DIMAR. The River was pro-European, with a socially liberal and economically neo-liberal ideology. It served as DIMAR’s replacement, both in terms of vote share and positioning in the space between SYRIZA and ND (Tsirbas, ). Immediately after the election of January , a SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition government was formed, with Tsipras as prime minister. This seemingly grotesque coalition between a radical Left and a populist Right party was clearly based on their common anti-MoU platform and common views regarding ‘Europeanness’ (Tsirbas and Sotiropoulos, ), which provided much of the content of the Left–Right division in the Greek party system after the crisis (Tsatsanis, Freire, and Tsirbas, ). The new government-initiated negotiations with the country’s creditors. Negotiations reached a near-deadlock, with the creditors’ final offer involving a new round of harsh austerity in exchange for a loan. Tsipras then proclaimed a referendum, in order for the Greek people to decide on the proposal. The SYRIZA-ANEL government supported a ‘No’ vote, framing the th July  referendum as the apogee of democracy and as a means for the Greek side to acquire extra negotiating power. GD also supported ‘No’. On the other hand, ND, PASOK, and The River supported ‘Yes’, interpreting the referendum as a decision on the European future of Greece. KKE called for invalid ballots, deeming the referendum a false dilemma. It was the climax of polarization in Greek politics. The ‘No’ vote won with . per cent. If the response in the first crisis polls was risk-averse (), the response to the then considered most important confrontation for the future of the country was riskloving, implying a manifestation of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, ), where people in times of extreme threat opt for the lottery of the possibility of gaining (or losing) everything (Artelaris and Tsirbas, ). However, one week later the ‘No’ became ‘Yes’ and the Greek government signed an even harsher loan agreement.

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  



In September , a new election was held, because SYRIZA wanted to have a popular mandate in order to implement the third bail-out agreement. SYRIZA won the election and formed, again, a coalition government with ANEL (Table .). ND was second and for the first time in the Third Greek Republic eight parties entered parliament, including GD, PASOK, KKE, The River, and Centrists’ Union [Enossi Kentroon], an old fringe party with centrist ideas, strong anti-establishment and anti-corruption rhetoric, and a rather unconventional leader (Vassilis Leventis) (Table .). The post-MoU elections of  and  mark the failure of the Centre to satisfy some necessary conditions for sufficient party presence: differentiation, representation of specific social interests, and identification with particular social strata. This is probably the reason why centrist formations, like PASOK, DIMAR, and the River, or the subsequent formation of KINAL [Κίνημα Αλλαγής—Movement of Change], in which these three parties temporarily merged in , have not managed to gain political prominence. The Centre (and the Centre-Left) lost its voters to the Left and could not effectively differentiate itself from the Right, with which it allied in key policy choices. The Left, in turn, did best what the Centre used to do: employed anti-Right, left-wing rhetoric, while implementing reformist and pro-European policies. One could argue that the late s constituted the ‘revenge’ of the Left on the Centre for what had happened in the s, while PASOK, the main actor of the Centre, became the EK-ND/EDIK of the s. In this respect, the election result of September  was consistent with the recent pattern. The May  – July  events opened up a new political horizon, implying a division between ‘old and new’ (Moschonas, ) for the Greek party system, which maintained the format of polarized multipartyism. Employing another categorization (Siaroff, : ), the Greek party system after the economic crisis could also be classified as a sequence of moderate multiparty systems with one dominant party at the time (ND in the two elections of ; SYRIZA in the two elections of ). Additionally, after the May  election, the Greek party system demonstrated a hesitant realignment process, while signs of stabilization and a return to weak twopartyism continued to rise (Nikolakopoulos and Martin, ; Tsatsanis and Teperoglou, ; Tsirbas, ) (Figure .).

. C: T F   G P S  F R

.................................................................................................................................. After having discussed the Greek party system’s pre-history, history, and post-crisis present, one could assert that there is evidence for both continuity and rupture with the system’s past. Polarization of some sort continues as the operational logic of Greek party politics, as it has for decades, and there is little reason to believe that a change will

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occur. Regardless of the number of relevant parties, party competition has been and probably will be bipolar, even if a grand coalition between SYRIZA and ND was to be formed. Another aspect of continuity is the prolonged weakening of the roots that parties have in society (Mainwaring, ). Party identification is ever-weakening, legitimation of the political system is decreasing, the links of parties to interest groups wane (Sotiropoulos, ), the importance of party organization and intra-party processes is downgraded and parties become more personalized. This process has been accelerated by the economic crisis. Another sign of a return to a new normal is the fact that all relevant indicators from the June  election onwards, point towards a process of gradual stabilization of the Greek party system (Figure .) and a hesitant return of a weak bipartyism. Regarding aspects of change in the Greek party system, it is important to refer to its spatial configuration and its dimensions of conflict. There is, without doubt, continuity in terms of the resilience of the exceptional nature of the Left–Right division in Greek politics. However, it has already been asserted that EU politics and relevant issues gradually move towards the epicentre of Greek party politics. Moreover, the ‘old vs new’ rift has already played an important role in recent years, as a defining factor of the contemporary Greek party landscape. The electoral system is also a usual suspect of change. In July , the Greek parliament voted a PR electoral law to be in effect from the second election after the September  one. (In Greece any amendment to the electoral law is forbidden to be implemented in the first election after the amendment, in order to prevent short-term electoral manipulations). Classic political science would assume that the change of the electoral system towards PR might disturb the afore-mentioned weak stabilization process, making it more rational for more parties to contest the election and making government formation more difficult (Duverger, ), thus increasing instability and fluidity. Besides, we can assume that the disproportionality of the electoral system has prevented the Greek party system from turning into an extreme multipartyism after the crisis (Siaroff, : ). On the other hand, we also know that PR electoral systems can serve as safeguards of cohesion and cultivators of consensus, since significant numbers of voter movements are necessary in order for drastic changes to occur. Given the longitudinal polarized character of Greek party politics, further fragmentation is more possible under PR than further consensus, at least as a short-term outcome. There is also an alarming aspect of change in the Greek party system, namely a direct threat to democracy posed by the persistence of fascism. GD is the third most powerful political force in Greece. GD uses hate speech and violence, while it cultivates antipolitical and anti-democratic sentiments, continuously undermining the quality of democracy and parliamentary proceedings. Moreover, the Greek political system has so far failed in isolating GD. On the contrary, many of GD’s ideas, mainly on issues that are situated on the cultural dimension, are nested in mainstream political and media discourse and are adopted by both government and opposition parties. Some interesting questions for future research stem from the above analysis. Firstly, there is a need for continuous monitoring of the conflict dimensions of party

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competition and on possible new divisions that might give birth to new kinds of parties. Secondly, the changing aspects of the Greek party system are probably bound to lead to new criteria for coalition governments’ formation. It is possible that the existing theoretical tools are not sufficient to approach these developments anymore, so there might be a need for new ones. Moreover, the fact that political trust and positive party identifications are fading, highlights the need to address a rather overlooked strand of the relevant literature, namely negative party identification and antipathy towards politics in general as explanatory variables of electoral behaviour and, thus, partysystem change. In any case, it is evident that future developments of the Greek party system will continue to interact with developments in Southern Europe and even Europe in general. From the political science point of view, party politics in Greece will possibly pertain not only to party system classification theories, but also to core issues regarding the functioning of democracy.

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  .............................................................................................................

POLITICAL TRADITIONS .............................................................................................................

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 

. I: T E D   F R  G

.................................................................................................................................. T downfall in  of the seven-year military dictatorship in Greece paved the way for the creation of the Third Greek Republic, the most consolidated democratic regime in contemporary Greece thus far. During the passage to democracy (known in Greek as ‘Metapolitefsi’ [Μεταπολίτευση]), a new competitive party system emerged in the newly founded republic. The party system was initially classified as a tripartite system of ‘limited but polarised pluralism’ (Mavrogordatos, ), but soon thereafter—the turning point was the landslide victory of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) in the  legislative elections—it transformed itself into a typical two-party system (Pappas, ). Both variants of the party system proved not to provide optimum conditions for the consolidation of far right-wing and anti-system parties. Political forces which undermined the political regime—for example, the royalist supporters of the Greek junta—had limited prospects of establishing themselves in the political arena, since they challenged both pillars of the democratic regime: its republican and its anti-authoritarian form. The formation of single-majority-party governments and the regular alternation in power between the two dominant parties, the Centre-Right New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) and the Centre-Left PASOK, characterized—with a few exceptions when coalition governments came to power for a limited period of time (Pridham and Verney, )—the political scene in Greece during the period of democratic consolidation, Europeanization, and modernization. The short-lived far Right parties that emerged during the typical two-party phase of the Greek party system could be classified as either ephemeral or flash parties (Stanley, ); their common ground is attributed to the fact that they expressed pre-existing antagonisms and internal ideological variations of the right-wing party camp and cadres, while their presence inevitably undermined the electoral dynamic of the moderate Centre-Right party environment.

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The dominant position of ND in the entire right-wing spectrum made the rise of far Right parties difficult in the post-authoritarian period. During periods of transition and democratic consolidation, voters tend to avoid extreme choices (Taggart, ) and therefore it is expected that extremist forces lose ground and remain marginal (Gillespie, ). Greece’s fresh memories of the dictatorship, in conjunction with the tactics of incorporation adopted by the moderate Right vis-à-vis the far Right, were the main reasons why the far Right during this particular stage remained on the margins of the party system. From the mid-’s onwards, developments in the socio-cultural, political, and economic realm fostered the rise of the far Right in Greece. In the next section we focus on the conditions that determined the electoral success of the far Right parties, concentrating on relevant theoretical explanations. Thereafter, we examine both variants of the far Right party family, the populist radical Right and the extreme Right, since both sub-groups could be identified in the case of the Greek far Right during the late Metapolitefsi era (from  onwards) and after the outbreak of the crisis in . In particular, we focus on the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS, Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) and the People’s Association-Golden Dawn (Golden Dawn, Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος-Χρυσή Αυγή), in order to understand their political evolution, ideological appeal and voters’ electoral support. LAOS is classified among the European populist radical Right parties and Golden Dawn belongs to the extremist Right (Mudde, ; Minkenberg, ). Populist radical Right parties are challengers of the political establishment and question specific aspects of the status-quo, whereas extreme Right parties are anti-democratic and have linkages to historical fascism (Golder, ; Georgiadou et al., ). In what follows, we explain what makes each party typical of the major variants of the European far Right.

. T B G  G’ F R

..................................................................................................................................

.. Demand-Side Factors: Grievances Explanatory factors for the emergence of the far Right differ according to their ‘demand side’ or ‘supply side’ quality (Mudde, ). Demand-side factors originate in ‘grievances’ that occur when the discrepancy between voters’ expectations and outcomes is increasing (Klandermans, : ). However, the condition of being aggrieved does not transform people into far Right activists or voters ‘automatically’ (Golder, : ; Eatwell, : ). For this to happen, a more complex process is required in order to mobilize them to take part in elections and vote for those parties that launch economic, cultural, and political grievances onto the political stage (Rydgren, ; Klandermans, ). Supply-side components (Arzheimer and Carter, ), such as

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the so-called political opportunity factors (e.g. electoral rule, party competition, mass media) and factors related to the far Right parties themselves (leadership structure, organizational build-up, ideology) interact with the factors of demand. Focusing on the interaction between grievances, political opportunities, and parties’ preferences may provide an explanation for the success of the far Right in Greece during the phase of late Metapolitefsi. What factors explain the far Right parties’ electoral success in Greece during the time period we focus on? The fact that Golden Dawn, the extremist variant of Greece’s far Right party family and one of the most extreme parties in post-communist Europe, experienced a meteoric rise in the elections held amidst the financial crisis (Figure .), leads to the hypothesis that there may be a correlation between the crisis and the electoral preference for a far Right party of the extreme or the populist radical variant. Analysing the impact of the financial crisis on the Greek party system, scholars documented the extensive realignment of the voters that occurred due to the crisis. This realignment meant a rise of anti-system parties (Ellinas, ). Support for Golden Dawn (and SYRIZA as well) was positively affected by the economic crisis and the tight fiscal policies (Goulas et al., ). The electoral support for Golden Dawn among young voters who were hit by the crisis was greater than in any other age group (Sakellariou, ). The economic grievance argument seems to have a rather limited impact on far Right voting in Greece. This is because ‘there is no direct effect’ between deteriorating economic change related either to individual (‘egocentric’) economic conditions or to collective (‘sociotropic’) financial concerns and the voting for Golden Dawn (Lamprianou and Ellinas, : ). Other European far Right parties performed well without mobilizing voters as a result of economic crises or because

10 9 8 7 6

LAOS Golden Dawn

5 4 2 1 2015P (Jan.)

2015P (Sept.)

2014E

2012P (June)

2009P

2012P (May)

2009E

2007P

2004P

2004E

2000P

1996P

1999E

1994E

0

 . Electoral results of LAOS and Golden Dawn. Notes: European parliament elections are abbreviated to ‘E’ and legislative elections are abbreviated to ‘P’. Source: Ministry of Interior (www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/).

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of voters’ preferences for right-wing economic policies (Ivarsflaten, ). In the case of Greece, there is a lower probability to vote for Golden Dawn on account of voters’ socio-economic grievances, whereas this probability is higher with respect to political grievances (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, , –). In other words, people dissatisfied with the political system, who questioned the credibility of mainstream parties even before the outbreak of the financial crisis (Economides and Monastiriotis, ; Featherstone, ), were fuelled by anti-party sentiments and therefore, in the context of the crisis, they were more prone to make antisystemic electoral choices. The combination of political dissatisfaction with a right-wing ideological inclination boosted support for Golden Dawn (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, ; Lamprianou and Ellinas, ). Additionally, the anti-systemic vote was linked to a dramatic drop in political trust among Greek citizens. Compared to other crisisridden countries in Southern Europe, the strongest decline in political trust occurred in Greece (Georgiadou and Rori, ). Under the crisis, young Greeks, in particular, experienced worse life conditions than their parents and not only distrusted political institutions, but also felt abandoned by the mainstream parties, an experience which has contributed to the rise of populist and extremist political forces. Cultural grievances over immigration fuel support for Golden Dawn (Lamprianou and Ellinas, ), a furious anti-immigrant party that favours a closed-border policy and opposes all immigrants regardless of their legal position and rights (Dinas et al., ). The propensity to vote for Greece’s populist radical (LAOS) and extreme Right parties (Golden Dawn) increases through the combination of high levels of immigration and voters’ attitudes towards immigrants’ responsibility for crime and/or urban decay in areas where immigrants settle (Dinas and van Spanje, ). More recent evidence suggests that the direct exposure to sudden and massive inflows of refugees in Greek islands increases the residents’ hostility against refugees and economic migrants as well (Hangartner et al., ). On this basis, it can be hypothesized that the growth and persistence of anti-immigrant attitudes in regions with a high density of immigration will favour the electoral support of Golden Dawn. The propensity to vote for Golden Dawn increases in areas with high levels of immigration when immigrants are perceived as people who undermine the culture and/or harm the economy (Dinas et al., ).

.. Supply-Side Factors: Ideological— Communicational—Organizational Supply-side factors, among them ideological, communicational, and organizational, played an important role in the far Right’s upward electoral trajectory. Anna Fragoudaki () has placed emphasis on the sociopolitical context that prevailed

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on the eve of the financial crisis, since factors such as ‘immigration’, ‘globalization’ and the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ provided the breeding ground that caused the rise of the far Right. She has argued that the ideological context had a stronger effect on the evolution of Greece’s far Right (Fragoudaki, ) and that ultra-nationalist ideas had penetrated the political stage in Greece and had infiltrated the mainstream sociopolitical scene long before the electoral evolution of the far Right parties. The ‘politicization’ of the Greek church discourse (Stavrakakis, ), as well as the influential role of the so-called ‘neo-Orthodox’ current of intellectuals who adopted a polemical narrative against Western values and cultivated fears about the Greek nation being in ‘danger of decay’ (Stauning Willert, : –, ), served as ideological forerunners of the upcoming far right-wing mobilization (Fragoudaki, : –). The strong convergence between the ethno-populist narrative and the public discourse on socio-cultural threats made people more receptive to far right-wing electoral support. It has been argued that the media ‘can either block or facilitate the rise of the far Right’ (Ellinas, : ). The media in Greece provided generous visibility to far Right politicians, who have been recognized as either folklorist media personalities or anti-systemic figures (Fragoudaki, ; Ellinas, ). More specifically, the media played an important role in the rise of the populist radical Right LAOS; the party owned a local radio station (RadioCity) and a minor TV channel (TeleCity, renamed TeleAsty), while its leader, Giorgos Karatzaferis, had his own daily show on the party’s channel. LAOS diffused its positions through the party leader’s midday show, in which viewers were invited to air their comments live. This process gave the audience a feeling of direct communication between the party’s leadership and ordinary people (Ellinas, ; Tsiras, ). Furthermore, by inviting far Right cadres from the extreme Right and the neo-Nazi spectrum in his daily programme, Karatzaferis ‘whitewashed’ them and, thus, familiarized them with potential voters of his party, making them ‘electable’ by the voters of LAOS and, vice versa, opening LAOS to the supporters of right-wing extremism (Psarras, ). Instead of mediatization, the right-wing extremist Golden Dawn remained on the fringes of the mainstream media. Although its participation in TV programmes became more frequent after , its media visibility was restricted in comparison with the populist-radical LAOS. As a substitute for the limited media penetration and the lack of visibility on the national political stage, Golden Dawn used grassroots practices (e.g. food charity exclusively for Greeks) in order to directly diffuse political messages to potential supporters (Siapera and Veikou, ). The tactic of Golden Dawn for expanding its influence was twofold: first, to remain rigidly structured, with hermetic boundaries in terms of internal organization, strongly hierarchical on the basis of the so-called ‘leader principle’ (Führerprinzip), according to which the party leader requires the absolute obedience of all party cadres at all times (Georgiadou, ; Psarras, ); and, second, to create political bastions in order to impose itself locally by keeping outsiders away from its strongholds (Dinas et al., : , ).

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 

. T F R-W P S: P-R  E C

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.. The Populist-Radical Right ‘LAOS’ LAOS was founded in  at the peak of two interweaving contentious processes: the Church–State conflict over the inclusion or exclusion of religious affiliation on the new ID cards (Molokotos-Liederman, ); and the evolution of a (more) moderate party platform of the Centre-Right ND, which shifted towards the centre of the Left–Right dimension where the most volatile voters reside. In the early and mid-s, while ND was implementing a catch-all strategy, trying to widen its electoral base towards the ‘centre ground’ of the political stage, and the newly elected PASOK government was managing its ‘modernization project’ during the second term (–) of Prime Minister Costas Simitis (Lyrintzis, ), a new right-wing populist bloc emerged in the party arena. Giorgos Karatzaferis, a former MP of ND and founder of LAOS, embarked on his ‘mission’ to stop the ‘erosion’ of the Greek-Orthodox identity. The more moderate the ND party became, the more traditional right-wing voters, who felt disaffected by the conservatives and threatened by cultural changes (immigration), joined an electoral pool of prospective voters for Karatzeferis’s party, LAOS (Georgiadou et al., ). LAOS, which means ‘the people’ in Greek, can be categorized as a populist-radical Right party, as it embodies all three main characteristics of the European far Right party variant according to the typology of Mudde (); that is, nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. The solid link between LAOS and the Greek Orthodox Church ‘makes LAOS different’ according to Ellinas (: ) from mainstream populistradical Right parties. Yet, LAOS does not appear an exceptional case, since many populist radical Right parties underline their Christian heritage or even their ‘allegiance to religion’, and distance themselves from previous anticlerical stances (Mudde, : ; Pirro, : –). On the basis of the main party documents, LAOS’ trajectory can be divided into two distinct phases. During the first phase (–), LAOS adopted a pompous, chauvinistic rhetoric and expressed claims that carried irredentist overtones: ‘We say “Yes” to national claims . . . to the Union of Cyprus with Greece . . . ’, was stated in the party manifesto of  (LAOS, : , ) which was full of anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-European positions. The party declaration (LAOS, ) and the manifesto of  (LAOS, ) comprised many hard-line nativist and anti-immigrant stances. LAOS described itself as a ‘Hellenocentric’ party that promoted the rights of the Greek people, nation, and culture. In his opening speech, delivered in the first party conference (Athens, -..), the party leader argued that ‘Greece is for the Greeks but

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not for the illegal immigrants’, who were blamed for criminal behaviour and rising unemployment among the native population (LAOS, : , ). LAOS called for the deportation of all ‘illegal immigrants’ to their countries of origin (ibid: ), as well as for the replacement of the ‘corrupt’ political elite and the ‘nepotistic’ two-party system by a ‘Council of Excellents’ and a ‘Corporative Parliament’ (ibid: –), ideas dating from the authoritarian seven-year military regime in Greece and from Italian fascism. During its second phase (–), LAOS steered a more moderate course on the political stage. The reason for this change was based on Karatzaferis’s decision to transform his party from a far Right fringe group to an integral far Right part of the so-called ‘blue block of flats’, which was a metaphor for describing his vision of a larger right-wing pole in the party system that would embrace both ND and LAOS. This shift was marked by a new party manifesto (LAOS, ) that was prepared by the newly established Policy Planning Secretariat of LAOS—modelled after ND’s respective policy planning unit. The new party manifesto of LAOS toned down its anti-immigrant rhetoric by replacing the term ‘illegal immigrants’ with the term ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented economic immigrants’ and avoiding ascribing criminality exclusively to immigrants. Not only in terms of immigration, but also in the perception of ‘otherness’, LAOS restrained its original anti-Semitic, homophobic, and anti-minority views. Still, in his own TV show and internal party sessions, Karatzaferis used both rhetorical tactics, namely softening extreme party positions and calling things ‘by their real names’ (Psarras, : ). In its initial phase, LAOS was first and foremost an anti-immigrant party that relied on and induced cultural grievances and people’s concerns over immigration. In its second phase, LAOS emphasized anti-political grievances, addressing the ‘unprivileged’ and the ‘disadvantaged’ who ‘were abandoned’ by the political establishment. LAOS criticized the existing parliamentary democracy, censured the mainstream parties and the political elite and glorified referenda as being essential for ‘all crucial national and social issues’ (LAOS, : ). LAOS had been supported in the general elections of  by the so-called ‘cynical voters’, that is, those who felt that they were not represented by the mainstream parties and detached from ideologies (Georgiadou et al., ). This variety of electoral behaviour confirms the significance of cultural and political grievances in the sense that although anti-immigrant voters voted either for the Centre-Right ND or the far Right LAOS, political cynicism was the factor that distinguished the electorate of LAOS from the traditional conservative voters. Voters who did not recognize any differences among the established parties and believed that parties in government are all the same in terms of ideology and policy orientation were more likely to vote for LAOS than for any other mainstream party. LAOS was represented in the national parliament of  and , receiving . per cent and . per cent, and in the European parliament of  and , obtaining . per cent and . per cent of the votes, respectively (Figure .). In the May  elections, LAOS failed to reach the  per cent electoral threshold necessary to enter the Greek parliament, and since then it has had no parliamentary representation. Two reasons led to this electoral failure: first, its participation in the three-party coalition

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 

government (formed in November ) of the ex-vice president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Lucas Papademos, which eroded the party’s physiognomy as an anti-establishment protest party. The fact that the three governing parties of the Papademos Cabinet agreed to negotiate a second bailout package with the so-called Troika (EU, ECB, IMF) was enough to brand the coalition as a ‘pro-Memorandum’ government, that destabilized at its core the ‘Hellenocentric’, ‘anti-party’ profile of the party. Second, Golden Dawn attracted a number of LAOS’ voters first in the municipal elections of  in Athens (Dinas et al., : ), a trend that was intensified during the elections of May/June  (Koustenis, : ). After its failed attempt to rebrand itself and to appeal to the electorate of the CentreRight ND, LAOS returned to its initial populist radical Right positions. True to its reputation as a populist, nationalist, and xenophobic party (Ellinas, ), LAOS toughened its anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic, and anti-European agenda, asking the voters to ‘wake up’ and to ‘humiliate Europe’ (LAOS, ). While from the start, Karatzaferis rejected comparisons between LAOS and the French National Front (FN), ideological convergencies and analogies in party manifestos and rhetoric of both parties were apparent. They became more evident after the cadres of Hellenic Front (Eλληνικό Μέτωπο), a miniscule anti-immigrant party that cultivated close ties with the FN, jointed LAOS in . During its representation in the European parliament (–), LAOS entered the Eurosceptic political groups of Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) and Europe for Freedom and Democracy (EFD). The fact that Karatzaferis and LAOS MPs were expressing provocative anti-Semitic views attracted criticism even from within the EFD group, part of which considered LAOS as an extremist or neo-fascist party.

.. A Militia-Like Neo-Nazi Party: Golden Dawn The People’s Association-Golden Dawn (GD, Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμός-Χρυσή Αυγή) was a political entity formed around the editorial group of the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) magazine, an underground neo-Nazi periodical publication which propagandized National Socialism and promoted a Greeks-only racial nation-state. Vicious antiSemitism, denunciation of an alleged ‘Jewish-Marxist-capitalist’ conspiracy, glorification of white masculinity, labelling of any kind of ‘otherness’ as ‘racial enemies’ or ‘a-socials’ that degenerate the Greek people’s community and culture, were the core motifs of this pro-Nazi network (Psarras, ; Ellinas, ; Georgiadou, ). The saga among the periodical’s founders was that ‘politics is a very dirty thing’ and, therefore, they should distance themselves from the established political antagonisms by concentrating their efforts on how to overthrow the status quo (Golden Dawn, vol. , ). By overthrowing the latter, nationally and globally, Golden Dawn strived for the rebirth of white cultural supremacy (ibid.). Golden Dawn’s perceptions of the nation’s ‘decadence’ and ‘rebirth’ (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, : ) should

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be supplemented by the idea of the ‘demolition of the rotten status quo’ that is cardinal in Golden Dawn’s discourse from the very beginning: in order to put an end to national decadence, Golden Dawn supports the idea of the ‘abolition of the corrupt political system’ (Golden Dawn, ; Golden Dawn, a; Golden Dawn/Youth Front, n.d.). As a political organization, Golden Dawn is a twofold entity: firstly, it includes a system of beliefs, among which two principles—that is, the (neo-)Nazi doctrine of ‘race’ and the idea of awakening the historic memory of the ‘Greek blood’ for defending the Greek nation and state—were central (Golden Dawn, ; Golden Dawn/Youth Front, n.d.). Efforts after  to moderate its extreme ideological profile remained superficial and the party continued to support—masked or not—its core ideological credo: racial nationalism, leadership principle, a totalitarian people’s state, etc. (Ellinas, : –; Psarras, : –). Secondly, although Golden Dawn is formally a political party, it is structured as a paramilitary organization. It looks like a ‘militia’—a kind of marginal party model which typically describes the organizational structure of totalitarian parties (Duverger, ; Smith, : ). Such a type of paramilitary political formation, often attached to right-wing extremism, presents itself as a set of national entities that ‘safeguard’ societies from ‘social enemies’. They can be found in Central and Eastern European countries (e.g. the Hungarian Guard, the National Militia in Ukraine, the United Slovenia, etc.) (Backes and Moreau, ). Militia parties are strongly hierarchical and strictly disciplined and have a dual structure: a formal party apparatus and a ‘private army’ (Sartori, : ). In the case of Jobbik before , the Hungarian Guard was typically a structure that was independent from the party apparatus; however, both wings, the formal party (Jobbik) and the paramilitary organization (Hungarian Guard), have merged into one. For decades, Golden Dawn functioned as a typical militia, without distinguishing between formal party apparatus and paramilitary wing. This was due to the fact that its organizational structure was based on the so-called ‘secret statute’ (Psarras, : –); that is, the party’s constitution that steered the paramilitary inner structure of Golden Dawn. According to this document, its apparatus was based on ‘recruitment cells’ for new members ‘on probation’ and the ‘(real) cells’ that undertook street fights and other illegal activities and consisted of party members who had passed the probation procedures. All party members had to participate in training programmes which prepared them for taking part in street fights and other militant party activities (Golden Dawn, n.d.). Since August , Golden Dawn has a legal statute (Golden Dawn, b). However, its organizational pattern is to a large extent the same even under the new statute: the power of the party leader remains extensive (Article ), Golden Dawn supports the provision of welfare services ‘exclusively for Greek citizens’ (Article ), and the party continues to protect its members ‘in any kind of action undertaken’ within its ideological frames (article .) (Golden Dawn, b; Psarras, : ). The fact that since , Golden Dawn’s violent activities have been restricted is not a sign of party’s ‘de-extremization’. Golden Dawn continues to be a militia. However,

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since the beginning of the investigation of Golden Dawn’s criminal activity that was triggered after the murder of the musician Pavlos Fyssas and during the trial (started in April ) of the sixty-nine suspects, among whom Nikos Michaloliakos, Golden Dawn’s MPs, and dozens of party functionaries were accused (under Art.  § of the Greek Criminal Code) of ordering and directing a criminal organization, the militialike activities of Golden Dawn have been restricted. At the beginning of the s, Golden Dawn participated in mass protest actions against the recognition of FYROM under its constitutional name (Macedonia) and demonstrated solidarity with the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in former Yugoslavia. Gradually, Golden Dawn shifted its focus to domestic socio-cultural issues, central among which were immigration and ‘law and order’. Golden Dawn’s militant activities took place mostly in areas where militia-like ‘cells’ and/or typical party branches existed. A significant number of its organizational activities were violent events directed against specific targets, such as migrants, Roma, Jewish targets, and members of the LGBT community (Galariotis et al., ). Available data on violent activism shows that relevant events, in which Golden Dawn is reported as being involved, increased visibly after the party’s electoral breakthrough in the  municipal elections in Athens and around the parliamentary elections of May/June  (ibid.). In order to explain Golden Dawn’s electoral consolidation since the aforementioned elections of /, we use a demand-side perspective, focusing on the attitudes of voters. In research conducted in the aftermath of the September  parliamentary elections, we registered individual attitudes on a wide range of issues related to political behaviour (Thales Project, ). Golden Dawn has been supported by those voters who are significantly less interested in politics and less identified with political ideologies, since they were more inclined to express their refusal to self-placement on the Left–Right scale. What is more, Golden Dawn has been supported by voters who feel, on the one hand, that elected officials do not respond efficiently to people’s needs (external efficacy) and, on the other hand, are not competent enough to understand ‘the important political issues facing the country’ (internal efficacy). Golden Dawn’s voters express lack of positive expectations for Greece’s economic development, as well as good prospects for their personal economic situation. These provoke grievances and political alienation. Golden Dawn enjoys a significantly high vote share among respondents who equate parliamentary democracy with a ‘camouflaged authoritarian regime’, express the need for a strong leader, and the will to take justice into their own hands (Table .). Just after the May  elections which were inconclusive and prior to the elections of June , the Golden Dawn party called upon its voters to vote for ‘Golden Dawn again—to rid the country of the scum’ (Golden Dawn, c). This polemic fell on receptive ears among those voters who were disconnected from the parliamentary regime. Such voters, while feeling detached from ideologies and party identifications, remained engaged in politics and sought to be ‘punitive’ against the political establishment.

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Table 15.1 Voters’ attitudes towards far Right parties Golden Dawn voters

General electorate (total)

Participation in elections (referendum 2015)

91.7%

93.7%

Interest in politics (very + quite)

53.1%

68.2%

Left-Right self-placement (doesn’t make any difference)

28.6%

9%

Politicians put their own interests first (agree very + quite)

90%

70.1%

I feel that I understand the political issues facing the country (agree very + quite)

95.9%

88.3%

Expectations for the country’s economic condition (goes a little + a lot worse)

100%

59.2%

Expectations for the personal economic condition (goes a little + a lot worse)

85.7%

59.0%

Parliamentary democracy is a camouflaged authoritarian regime (agree very + quite)

75.5%

45.4%

Need for a strong leader not being controlled by the parliament or the elections (agree very + quite)

81.3%

56.8%

Take justice into own hands substituting the police (approve + acted in a similar way)

20.4%

5.5%

Ι voted for this party to punish those who governed (agree very + quite)

81.3%

37.6%

Source: Thales Project, 2015. The table has been computed by the author and the data have been weighted by previous vote in September 2015 legislative elections in Greece.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. In this chapter, we sought to outline the trajectory of the far Right’s identity, political performance, and electoral evolution. The Greek case corroborates the story of the European far Right: such parties in Greece, as well as in other European countries, occupy the terrain between radicalism/populism and extremism/violent activism. We focused on the course of the Greek far Right since the s and sketched roughly two phases: the first phase coincides with the ‘exit from lethargy’ in which Greece’s far Right was at the margins of the party system; the second phase corresponds to the rise and the strengthening of the most extremist variant (Golden Dawn) of the far Right that Greece has experienced since  and one of the most violent—militia-like— extreme Right parties which entered parliament in a European country during the late post-war era. The fact that this second phase of the Greek far Right coincides with the radicalization process that occurred on the Left of the party system, alongside the level of social mobilization (see the phenomenon of the ‘outraged’ citizens) might explain

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the persistence of party organizations that are giving a clear message ‘against the system’ and at the same time provoke or justify ‘anti-system’ activities among the population. This is a point—the internal dynamic of the party system and how radicalization of the party system and social mobilization feed into each other—that we have to focus on in order to explain the simultaneous rise of right-wing and leftwing radicalization. The populist radical Right LAOS, with which the far Right made its debut on the political stage in the beginning of the s, and the electoral upsurge of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn that followed in the s, constitute two different sub-groups of the far Right party family. The emergence of this party family was based on conditions that were predominant in Greek politics and society long before the evolution of the far Right. The acceptance of ultranationalist ideas, a sense of socio-cultural distinctiveness of the Greek nation, the spread of ambivalent attitudes towards the Western world in the Greek population after , functioned as fertilizers that provided opportunities for the rise of the far Right. As long as the political system remained solid, the ‘fertilizers’ did not help change the shape of the party system. This situation became dramatically different when, owing to Greece’s economic crisis, volatility and instability emerged. The dramatic political destabilization that occurred after the outbreak of Greece’s crisis gave rise to economic, socio-cultural, and political grievances, which in turn facilitated and sustained the rise of far Right parties. The coincidence of the crisis with the electoral rise of neo-Nazi Golden Dawn has led to an explosion of interest in the Greek case, in terms of mass media coverage and academic research. What remains intriguing in this case is the endurance of Greece’s far Right, as shown in the maintenance of its electoral influence and Golden Dawn’s preparedness for violent street fighting, despite a relative organizational decline of the local branches witnessed during the trial of Golden Dawn’s leaders. The existence of a militia-like mantle that surrounds Golden Dawn and a kind of ‘esprit de corps’ which characterized the party’s militants might explain the puzzle of the persistence of right-wing extremism in Greece.

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Pappas, T. S. (). ‘The Transformation of the Greek Party System Since ’. West European Politics  (): –. Pirro, A. L. P. (). The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance. London and New York: Routledge. Pridham, G. and Verney, S. (). ‘The Coalitions of – in Greece: Inter-Party Relations and Democratic Consolidation’. West European Politics,  (): –. Psarras, D. (). Το κρυφό χέρι του Καρατζαφέρη: Η τηλεοπτική αναγέννηση της ελληνικής Ακροδεξιάς [Karatzaferis’ Hidden Hand: The TV Renaissance of the Greek Far Right]. Athens: Alexandria. Psarras, D. (). Η Μαύρη Βίβλος της Χρυσής Αυγής [The Black Bible of Golden Dawn]. Athens: Polis. Psarras, D. (). The Rise of the Neo-Nazi Party “Golden Dawn” in Greece. Brussels-Athens: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Psarras, D. (). Golden Dawn on Trial. Brussels-Athens: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Rydgren, J. (). ‘The Sociology of the Radical Right’. The Annual Review of Sociology  (): –. Sakellariou, A. (). Golden Dawn and its Appeal to Greek Youth. Athens: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, –. Sartori, G. (). ‘Party Types, Organisation and Functions’. West European Politics,  (): –. Siapera, E. and Veikou, M. (). ‘The Digital Golden Dawn: Emergence of a NationalistRacist Digital Mainstream’. In Karatzogianni, D., Nguyen, F., and Serafinelli, E. (eds.) The Digital Transformation of the Public Sphere: Conflict, Migration, Crisis and Culture in Digital Networks. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Smith, A. G. (). A Comparative Introduction to Political Science. Contention and Cooperation. Lanhan, Boulder, New York & London: Rowman & Littlefield. Stanley, R. (). ‘Populism in Central and Eastern Europe’. In Rovira Kaltwasser, C., Taggart, P., Ochoa Espejo, P., and Ostiguy, P. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Stauning Willert, T. (). New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought: Untying the Bond Between Nation and Religion. Burlington: Ashgate. Stavrakakis, Y. (). ‘Politics and Religion: On the “Politicization” of Greek Church Discourse’. Journal of the Modern Greek Studies, : –. Taggart, P. (). ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’. West European Politics,  (): –. Thales Project. (). ‘Political and Social Radicalism in Greece’. rd round, – November. University of Macedonia. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/.// (accessed  January ). Tsiras, St. (). Έθνος και ΛΑ.Ο.Σ.: Νέα Άκρα Δεξιά και λαϊκισμός [Nation and LA.O.S.: New Far Right and Populism]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro. Vasilopoulou, S. and Halikiopoulou, D. (). The Golden Dawn’s ‘Nationalist Solution’: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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  ......................................................................................................................

              

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I what follows, a concise and comprehensive picture will be given of the creation, political personnel, organization, leadership, and ideology of the New Democracy party (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), ever since its creation in  until today. This attempt will start with a very brief presentation of its historical roots and early years, followed by an examination of ND’s aforementioned characteristics, both in government and in opposition, until , before attention is turned to most recent developments caused by the world economic crisis. As will be demonstrated, the latter did not only affect Greece’s economic stability, but also caused a political ‘earthquake’, ND’s response to which is instructive.

. T C   E Y   N D P

.................................................................................................................................. ND was created in the aftermath of the collapse of the Greek junta, when the latter’s leaders opted to return power to civilian political leaders. It was in these turbulent circumstances that, after negotiations between a small group of politicians, the then figurehead head of the state, President of the Republic Lieutenant-General Ghizikis and the army chiefs, politicians agreed to form a government under the joint leadership of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Georgios Mavros, the representatives of the two major pre- political parties—the National Radical Union (ERE, Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις), and the Centre Union (ΕΚ, Ένωσις Κέντρου) respectively. While the aforementioned political leaders were away to discuss the matter, another prominent ERE member and former foreign minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, returned to the conference room where President Ghizikis was still talking with the army chiefs and

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eventually managed to persuade him to arrange for Constantine Karamanlis’ return to head the national-unity government. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the reasons why things happened this way. Suffice it to mention that the same way in which Karamanlis was preferred by King Paul to form a government in  (after the death of Greek Rally leader, Alexandros Papagos) over his rivals, (who expected the party’s parliamentary group to vote for the new leader), he was once again chosen to lead the transition government in  (Alexakis, ). At some risk of oversimplification, it should nevertheless be accepted that most of the effort concerning both the restoration of democracy and the reconstruction of the conservative camp was undertaken and performed almost singlehandedly by Karamanlis. Overall, in a relatively very short period of time, he managed to set the foundations of a sound democratic regime, and to lead the country towards closing its distance to the European family, a trend that he had set in motion ever since the early s. He created a new political party and won a landslide (winning almost  per cent of the vote) in the  November  election. Three weeks later he organized an impeccable referendum on the issue of the monarchy (which returned an almost  per cent in favour of the republic) and, last but not least, had a new Constitution drafted in order to guide the country’s new political course. The ND party formed a single majority government after the  parliamentary elections and repeated its success, albeit with a smaller parliamentary majority, in the elections of . Last but not least, it should be stressed that as far as the question of punishment against the juntists and their collaborators is concerned, Karamanlis opted for a middle course: life-imprisonment for the -coup leaders, and more lenient penalties for their collaborators, both in the army and the wider civil bureaucracy. Along these lines, during its first seven years in office, ND tried to diminish such elements in public administration, and it met with partial success (Sotiropoulos, : ). All in all, most scholars agree that the transition process from dictatorship to democracy was more or less ‘a political miracle’ or a ‘masterpiece of political art’ (according to Raymond Aron, cited in Lambrias, : ). Still, notwithstanding Karamanlis’ personal charismatic skills, it should be also stressed that most factors considered influential in transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule (the special character and the duration of the authoritarian period, its internal dynamics and squabbles, the relative strength of its opponents, etc.) were also favourable (Voulgaris, : –). What is of interest, for our purpose here, is the way Karamanlis reconstructed the conservative camp. Although his old creation, ERE, had never been dissolved, he opted to form a new political party, which he aptly named New Democracy. In a proclamation on the foundation of the ND party ( September ), Karamanlis presented its political identity and gave an outline of its ideological orientation: it was meant to be ‘a broad and vital political front’, composed of not only experienced and sound, but also progressive and radical political forces, dedicated to serving the ‘true’ interests of the nation, which could not be categorized in terms of ‘ . . . the misleading labels of Right, Centre and Left’. It would strongly favour rapid economic development; nevertheless, it did not consider its commitment to economic freedom to be incompatible with an

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

 

expanded state sector (thus the party’s ideology was somewhat vaguely called ‘radical liberalism’, trying to strike a balance between economic freedom and social justice). But most importantly, nowhere in this proclamation (Alexakis, : –) has ND been called a ‘party’; instead, six times it is called ‘a political front’, once ‘a movement’, once a ‘concept’, and once ‘a system’. Furthermore, strong efforts were taken to disengage ND from anything reminiscent of the old ERE: it was a totally new political formation, not a continuation of its pre-dictatorial ancestor. Yet, Karamanlis reconstituted the conservative camp by gathering most of his colleagues and lieutenants of the pre-coup ERE, many of whom represented old political families, the so-called ‘tzakia’ (as evident in the elections of November ), together with a considerable number of newcomers mainly from the Right (most prominent among whom were Miltiadis Evert and Andreas Andrianopoulos, who would later become city-mayors of Athens and Piraeus respectively, whereas Evert was also ND leader from  until ). It was not until  that two of the most well-known politicians of the pre-coup Centre Union, Constantine Mitsotakis and Athanasios Kanellopoulos, joined ND. Given this mix, as Karamanlis himself much later acknowledged, many Greeks did not perceive much difference between ERE and ND at that time (Alexakis, : –). As regards ND’s governmental record during its first two consecutive terms in office (–), it should be pointed out that it greatly favoured the widening of the public sector, through nationalization of several private enterprises and/or buying off others, to such an extent as to be accused by some of its supporters of ‘socialmania’ (Bratakos, ). Moreover, traditional personalized clientelistic practices continued unabated, as they had before the dictatorship, especially as regards employment in the public sector (but also with respect to several other aspects of everyday life, such as the issuing of building licences or telephone connections, to mention but two things). In terms of its domestic policies it seemed as if the party had no definite long-term plan. No major steps were ever taken concerning reforms and the modernization of public administration (Sotiropoulos, : ), despite Greece’s imminent accession to the EU (at that time European Economic Community, EEC). The restoration of democracy, in the sense of a smooth transition from dictatorial rule and—even more so—Greece’s entry in the EEC are considered the most important achievements of ND during its early years, at least by its members and supporters (Alexakis, : ). The ex-premier (and one of Karamanlis’ closest associates since the times of ERE) George Rallis, was clear on the point: . . . the entry-agreement was exclusively Karamanlis’ own achievement. We, the rest, were just executives and assistants. (Rallis, : )

Last but not least, in view of his anticipated ascendancy to the presidency of the republic, Karamanlis also laid down ND’s organizational bases, by organizing a preliminary congress in  (this was meant to lay the foundations for the development of ND’s party organization), and the first congress of the party in Chalkidiki two years later. Even though ND did not really develop its organization to any considerable extent under Karamanlis’ leadership (Katsoudas, : ), it did however manage

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to survive its founder’s withdrawal, to elect his successor and, in due time, to build a mass-organization, incomparable to anything known previously for a conservative party in Greece (Loulis, a and b, Alexakis, : –; Bratakos, : –; Vernardakis : –; Dimitrokallis, : –, –).

. N D   F’ W: T L E

.................................................................................................................................. On  May , Karamanlis was elected by the parliament as president of the republic (obtaining  votes out of the total of  MPs), and three days later George Rallis succeeded him in the party leadership and premiership, winning a close victory in intra-party elections over his competitor, Evangelos Averoff. For reasons that had to do both with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) momentum to power as well as ND’s weaknesses, Rallis lost the  October  election and was in turn succeeded by Averoff straight afterwards. Apart from new efforts towards the development of a mass party organization, Averoff shifted ND more to the right, adopting ultra-conservative views and ideas, much reminiscent of those of the pre-coup ERE. Quite expectedly, ND lost the  June  European parliament election (Averoff himself headed ND’s ballot and had—unsuccessfully— urged PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou to do the same) and, in their aftermath, resigned. On  September , another intra-party election for the leadership took place, and it was now Mitsotakis, the ex-Centre Union politician, who prevailed over another, ex-ERE figure, Costis Stefanopoulos. Mitsotakis, like Rallis and Averoff before him, originated from a prominent tzakia family in Crete, in the region of Chania, being himself a grandson of the legendary Eleftherios Venizelos; his father, both his grandfathers, and his uncles had all been members of parliament. Mitsotakis exercised an important influence over a very large personal clientele in Chania; he had been elected to parliament continuously since  on the liberal ticket, and was one of the most prominent centrist politicians in the s and a founding member of the Centre Union in . A colleague, and at the same time major rival, of Andreas Papandreou in the – Centre Union governments, he joined and played a leading but obscure role in the group known as the apostates; that is, those who defected from the party. After the fall of the dictatorship, Karamanlis did not include him in ND’s electoral lists and he failed to enter parliament until  when he was elected on the ticket of his own short-lived party of neo-liberals. Mitsotakis joined ND in  and became minister of co-ordination (equivalent to today’s finance minister). Thereafter, he sought to succeed Karamanlis in ND’s leadership, which he finally achieved six years later (for Mitsotakis’ personal characteristics

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

 

and history see Dimitrakos, ; Diamandopoulos,  and ; Loule-Theodoraki, ; Vasilakis, ; Stefanakis ; and Papachelas,  and ). Despite his controversial record, Mitsotakis was elected to the party leadership mainly because he was considered the most capable of confronting and beating Andreas Papandreou (and PASOK), and bringing the party back to power. This proved to be an agonizing political project, as before leaving power PASOK had changed the electoral law, adopting a proportional representation system which reduced the chances of the front runner in elections forming a single majority government. ND under Mitsotakis won the elections of June and November  but was unable to form a government. ND finally gained a third consecutive victory in April , obtained  out of the total of  parliamentary seats and formed a single majority government with the help of an MP belonging to a small right-wing party. ND took office in times of a swiftly changing, post-Cold War world and seemed to have a specific government plan. Yet, both the ND party and government appeared unprepared to undertake that kind of responsibility (for quite the opposite views, see Palaiokrassas, ). The handling of the Balkan crisis (most importantly the issue of the name of a new neighbouring state which emerged out of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and became officially known as FYROM), caused the fall of the government in September . The Mitsotakis government fell because of the defection of some of its MPs who had in the meantime become followers of ND’s former minister of foreign affairs, Antonis Samaras. The latter, had been dismissed from his governmental office and later left ND to form his own, nationalist, right-wing party, Political Spring (POLAN, Πολιτική Άνοιξη). Apart from disputes over ND’s record in its – term in office, what is really important is Mitsotakis’ early effort to give ND a more liberal, centrist orientation, something that became evident in February , when he presented a new ideological declaration, entitled ‘A new proposal for freedom’ (Katsoudas, ). According to this new ideological manifesto, it was liberty that was now proclaimed as constituting the cornerstone of the party’s ideology, instead of some kind of balance between order, social justice, and individual freedom. This was an ideological shift for the party of ND from the period of Karamanlis when social justice had been stressed by the party’s founder. Regarding this new ideological declaration, a major role was played by a special electoral committee, headed by a prominent ND member, former minister of industry, Stefanos Manos, assisted by the Centre of Political Research and Information (KPEE, Κέντρο Πολιτικής Έρευνας και Ενημέρωσης), a think-tank that was formed as early as  by Karamanlis in his efforts to modernize his party (Alexakis, : –). During the June  elections, in which ND was led by Mitsotakis, liberalism had already become the watchword of ND, and the party’s name was always prefixed by phileleftheri (liberal). At the time, all party brochures laid great emphasis on ND’s liberal principles, and Mitsotakis’ liberal origins were stressed in electioneering. Last but not least, now the party had an economic programme consistently based on its ideological manifesto, and for the first time ND admitted certain ‘misdeeds’ in the past (for example, its extensive state intervention in the economy), and explained in detail

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the new policies it would implement if it were elected to resume office (Alexakis, : ). One should bear in mind that it was the neo-liberal Right which prevailed during the s both in the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher and in the US under Ronald Reagan. These developments were favourable for ND’s ideological re-orientation. Such views were widely accepted and supported by higher party members and executives: this ideological shift towards liberalism proved the event of the greatest consequence in the life of the party. The Manifesto was a properly structured theoretical text stressing more liberal than conservative principles, and as such was the first of its kind in Greece (Alexakis, : ). Nevertheless, this did not mean that all party members and MPs felt themselves committed to these new ideas. There was still much confusion, because neo-liberalism was given different meanings by different party officials, and at the same time, in reality, a considerable faction of ND officials and voters remained deeply conservative (if not totally against any decrease of the public sector, since this would limit their patronage potential). Last but not least, the party did not make serious efforts to disseminate these new ideological tenets down to its rank and file, so the latter remained uninformed, unenthusiastic, and indifferent (Alexakis, : –). Quite expectedly, when ND lost the  election and PASOK emerged victorious for a second time, this ideological re-orientation was considered as the prime cause for the party’s defeat. The first blow against ND’s unity came from its prominent member, Stefanopoulos, who opted to leave the party and create a new one, Democratic Renewal (DHANA, Δημοκρατική Ανανέωση), followed by another nine ND MPs. In February , during its second congress, ND reaffirmed its ideological ‘credo’ of radical liberalism, as had been sanctioned in its first congress, seven years earlier. Nevertheless, a clear reference to ND’s more liberal aspects was made this time, in an attempt to strike a balance between statist and liberal views. However, ND’s neo-liberal orientation was only temporarily stymied; while in opposition, the party laid greater importance on the further dissemination and clarification of its policies on social welfare, without abandoning its basic tenets for privatization, reduced state intervention, and full operation of a free market economy (Alexakis, : ). If, after the electoral defeat in , ND’s leadership could eventually reassure the party of its neo-liberal choice, it certainly failed to do so when it took office once again. ND came back to power in . As already mentioned, not only was ND’s governmental record poor during this second period, but the party also proved particularly vulnerable in the realm of ideas, failing to gain momentum even when the international context was quite favourable (Loulis, : ). But as regards its organizational development, ND scored much better; it now benefited from a huge grassroots organization (the party had , local organizations throughout the country and , members; Bratakos, : ) that played a decisive role as regards ND’s return to power. The party had done much better in various respects, ever since , when the candidates it supported for mayors in the three biggest cities of the country won their election, and it also managed to make its presence felt again in a great

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

 

number of social institutions, like trade-unions, farmers’ cooperatives, professional associations, etc. (Vernardakis, : ). Particularly as regards its performance during the – term in office, ND presented characteristics very similar to those of its main rival, PASOK: one can discern, first, that it acquired the characteristics of the so-called catch-all party and it became part of the political power cartel (Katz and Mair, ) and, second, that it was now the party organization that took over—mainly from the MPs but also from other notables—the task of distributing spoils and favours to the party’s followers, and of controlling public appointments. In other words, the more personalistic, clientelistic practices, so much characteristic of the conservative tradition, was now coupled with the so-called ‘party-directed patronage’ or ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis, ).

. T L O Y: A L C  ND’ R  M

.................................................................................................................................. As already mentioned, the ND government fell and the party lost the October  election to PASOK. Mitsotakis resigned and, on  November , Evert was elected as the fourth leader after Karamanlis (Evert had been an ND deputy since , had held various ministerial posts both in Karamanlis’ and in Mitsotakis’ governments, and had also been elected Mayor of Athens in –). One of his first priorities was to convene ND’s third congress (April ), to reaffirm ND’s faith in radical liberalism (its ideology as formed and defined by its founder, which was actually more statist than liberal), and put the blame on neo-liberalism (i.e. ND’s turn towards more liberal ideas after ), for the party’s poor performance in government and the eventual loss of power. Right after his election Evert declared that he had always been a faithful supporter of radical liberalism and a genuine political offspring of ND’s founder, and that ND’s – governmental record had been nothing more than an unacceptable deviation towards neo-liberalism. The balance achieved in the previous congress between the liberal reorientation of ND and its Karamanliist tradition was once again at stake. Indeed, during Evert’s rather weak and uninspired leadership, the party adopted a more empiricist, and in some cases also populist discourse, trying to return to its roots and to the traditional values of the old conservative camp (Seitanidis, : , Konstantinidis, : ). It is interesting that from this time onwards, one can clearly discern two ideological factions within the party ranks, the Karamanlisists (faithful to the party’s founder legacy of radical liberalism) and the neo-liberals who favoured ND’s ideological reorientation introduced by the  ideological manifesto (Sotiropoulos, : ). Moreover, from now on all intra-party leadership-elections were not merely fought over personal antagonisms, but they also reflected ideological ones (Vernardakis, : ).

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The longest period ND has ever found itself in the opposition started in  and lasted for eleven consecutive years, until . Andreas Papandreou, the PASOK leader, had stepped down as PM and party leader due to his ill-health, to be succeeded by Costas Simitis. The latter called snap elections for September , . New Democracy under Evert’s leadership, plagued by intra-party antagonisms (that no leader after its founder has ever avoided), ultimately lost again. Evert resigned, and in the subsequent fourth congress in March , Costas Karamanlis, nephew of ND’s founder, was elected to the party leadership (he was elected in the second round, prevailing over George Souflias, an ally of Mitsotakis and therefore considered to represent the liberal tendency within the party). As again became obvious, eleven years had not proved enough for ND to further modernize, revize its political programme and ideas and present an attractive and popular image. Instead, intra-party squabbles and antagonisms were unabated and all ND could do was again to wait for PASOK to lose power due to its own mistakes, as had happened in the past. Quite surprisingly and against all odds, ND won the  European parliament elections, but suffered a close defeat (by only  per cent of the vote) in the parliamentary elections of September . Supposedly due to this defeat (but also other reasons as well), one of its MPs, George Karatzaferis, left the party and created the nationalist/populist People’s Orthodox Rally (LAOS, Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός), which won parliamentary representation in the parliamentary elections of  and . Another MP and ex-mayor of Athens, Dimitris Avramopoulos, also abandoned ND to form the Movement of Free Citizens (KEP, Κίνημα Ελευθέρων Πολιτών), a very short-lived party. Before these developments, Karamanlis had—on various grounds—expelled several party officials, in order to strengthen his own position within ND (Bratakos, :  ff).

. ND’ R  O: E C,   C  E

.................................................................................................................................. The party won the  March  parliamentary elections and remained in power for two consecutive but not full terms (ND opted for early elections both in  and two years later). In the realm of ideas, Costas Karamanlis, in an effort to increase the party’s appeal to a broader social strata, had already declared—albeit in a rather vague manner—that ND was the party of the ‘middle space’ as he called it (meseos choros), something that had nothing to do ‘with any kind of extremism and arrogance’ (Bratakos, : ). With a similar ambiguity, as regards its governmental programme, the most ambitious promise was for the ‘re-foundation of the state’, a concept

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with imprecise meaning. ND’s five-year term in power (–) should be weighed against the share of responsibility it bore regarding Greece’s sovereign debt crisis in . ND’s term in power has been labelled a ‘fatal administration’, another lost chance (Voulgaris, : , ; for a different assessment, see Kottakis, ). Quite expectedly, in the October  parliamentary elections, ND lost to PASOK and Karamanlis stepped down from his party’s leadership. Antonis Samaras and Dora Bakoyianni, Mitsotakis’ daughter, contested the intra-party election to elect a new leader. For the first time, following the earlier example of intra-party elections in PASOK, not only members but also friends of the party were invited to cast their vote, and Samaras, the former foreign minister of Greece under the Mitsotakis government in –, was elected as the new party leader. Samaras had split off from the party causing its fall from power in , he had often supported nationalistic and ultra-conservative policies, and he did not hesitate to revert to populist methods whenever he felt it suited him (Loulis, : –). ND remained in opposition in –, formed a short-lived, pro-austerity coalition government with PASOK and LAOS in – while the economic crisis was evolving and experienced a dramatic decline in the subsequent May and June  parliamentary elections, in which mainly PASOK but also ND experienced an unprecedented decrease in their percentage and number of votes (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, ). Nevertheless, ND won by a relative majority the June  election, and it led a coalition government together with PASOK and a small party of the pro-European Left (DIMAR, which later left the coalition). Samaras, who while in opposition had been highly critical of Greece being placed under international and European surveillance, shrewdly switched to being a staunch supporter of the country’s pro-austerity course. ND’s (and of course also PASOK’s) responsibility for the country’s predicament is evident (since  and until the outbreak of the economic crisis in , that is a -year-span, the two parties had governed for a total of  years). In –, Samaras, serving as prime minister, supposedly tried to confront the consequences of the economic crisis, leading a party that never explained what had gone wrong and what should have been done differently to avoid the crisis. Rather expectedly, though, Samaras’ ND lost the January  and also the September  parliamentary elections to the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς). Later on, Samaras resigned from the party leadership, and in early  Kyriakos Mitsotakis, son of Mitsotakis, was elected the new leader of the party, surprisingly beating Vangelis Meimarakis, who was said to be backed by the ND Karamanlisist group. The ascent of Mitsotakis to the party’s leadership was a victory for ND’s liberal, pro-European ideological tendency. Bearer of a renowned name, a ‘tzakia’-family political tradition and being a former premier’s son, he was elected not only to bring ND back in office, but also to modernize and reform the party, a task that had largely eluded his predecessors.

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 



. C R

.................................................................................................................................. ND’s ideological identity—and its intra-party currents—at times appeared to be closer to Christian Democracy found elsewhere in Europe (where the emphasis is put on the role of the state, on social harmony, and on order), while at other times, the party moved towards a conservatism of the British and/or central European kind (where the market and the effectiveness of the private sector of the economy are considered most important). The variation has been strongly impacted, of course, by the personality of the party leader, the dynamics of the party system, and the party’s electoral prospects. Thus, during the – period, ND focused on the establishment of democracy, so its ideological preferences are not quite clear aside from its founder’s option for radical liberalism. Within the European parliament, the party’s MEPs joined the European People’s Party in . Under Averoff, the party projected a more ultra-right, conservative profile, however. Mitsotakis tried to re-orientate the party towards economic liberalism (thus moving towards the conservatism of the central European kind), only to move back again towards Christian Democracy. Under Evert, in the early s, ND adopted a more empiricist and populist identity, under Costas Karamanlis in the mid-s, the party projected a moderate image, in its effort to attract supporters and voters. Overall, to Konstantinidis, ND may be considered a Greek version of European Christian Democracy (Konstantinidis, ). Likewise, within its ranks three different factions may be discerned. The older and the most powerful group is that of the so-called ‘Karamanlisists’, who refer to the party founder as their symbol, and secondarily to radical liberalism, as their ideology. This tendency can be considered similar to ‘one-nation conservatism’, adhering to values like paternalism and pragmatism, but with an extra emphasis on its pro-European orientation (Heywood, ). This last element characterizes also the liberal tendency of the party, which stands for privatizations and the shrinking of the public sector, favouring the market economy instead of state intervention; this tendency gained momentum (but did not prevail) during Constantine Mitsotakis’ leadership. At times, some of ND’s party cadres projected a more neo-liberal image. Most prominent among them was Stefanos Manos, who in  formed his own short-lived party—the Liberals, Φιλελεύθεροι—and Andreas Andrianopoulos, head of another liberal tendency within ND since , the Liberal Forum (LF, Φιλελεύθερο Φόρουμ). The third, smaller group consists of MPs and party members who adopt a narrative with ultra-right, nationalistic and, quite often, populist overtones. Many had followed Samaras when he had left ND to form POLAN in the early s, while some others had sided with Karatzaferis’ LAOS in the s (the most prominent members of these groups returned and are today in ND, including Samaras who became ND leader and prime minister). Last, a fourth group followed Panos Kammenos, who left ND and founded his own party, Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες), right after ND adopted the austerity package included in the second Memorandum of

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Understanding signed between Greece and its creditors in early . Later on, in , Kammenos’ party formed a coalition government with SYRIZA, with some of its MPs becoming ministers. In , ND became the longest living political party in Greece (at  years). After all these years, after seven party leaders elected democratically within the party, after one preliminary (), two ad hoc (, ) and thirteen (, , , , , , , , , , , , ) regular party congresses, after eighteen years in office (fifteen alone and another three leading a coalition government), after twenty-two years in leading opposition, what is the ultimate picture of this party like? ND can be most proud of its early years, when it can be credited with a number of actions and policies which were to play a decisive role in the country’s future course. The smooth transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, the establishment of a truly democratic regime after  with all political parties able to contest on equal grounds (including the communists), the drafting and adoption of a genuinely democratic Constitution in , the disentanglement of the Conservatives, under Karamanlis’ guidance from the monarchy, as well as the accession of Greece into the European Union in , should be considered as some of the party’s most important achievements. All the above were achieved under the auspices but also personal involvement and the political statesmanship of ND’s founder, Constantine Karamanlis. After his withdrawal, though, the party has struggled to emulate anything like these achievements. Constantine Mitsotakis’, Costas Karamanlis’, and Antonis Samaras’ records were anything but successful. This is not to say that ND had not progressed at all since the days of its creation in . Important steps were taken towards the modernization of the party, concerning both leadership turnover, and also its organizational development. The main failure, however, was that the party never managed to dissociate itself from the state and the spoils system. ND never undertook the task to project a new, reformed conservatism, compatible with Greece’s changing social and economic reality of the post- period. Within the new context shaped by the post- economic crisis, the electorate’s desire to exit the policies of externally imposed austerity might be seen as something of a parallel to the post- transition. Yet, ND may struggle to emulate its role in its early years. If so, this is likely to stem not so much from its lack of a charismatic leadership, but from its deeper and enduring structural weaknesses: the poor quality of its political personnel; the predominance of party-notables—the so called ‘tzakia’, and the consequent personal antagonisms among them; a mass organization useful only for electioneering, not for discussing and shaping policies; and ideological vagueness leading to incapacity to set its own political agenda. In other words, whereas in  a charismatic political personality (Constantine Karamanlis) could carry the burdens of leadership, policy-formulation, and government direction alone, today such a mission is impossible, without the contribution of a modern, well-organized, reliable, and trustworthy political party organization, which to this day is something that ND, despite its indisputable progress and development, has not achieved.

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R Alexakis, E. G. (). ‘The Greek Right: Structure and Ideology of the New Democracy Party’. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. Alexakis, E. G. (). Conservatives and Ideology: The Case of the New Democracy Party in Greece, –, Athens: Center of Political Research. Bratakos, A. (). Η ιστορία της Νέας Δημοκρατίας [History of the New Democracy Party]. Athens: Livanis. Diamandopoulos, T. (). Κ. Μητσοτάκης: Πολιτική βιογραφία, τόμος β’ [K. Mitsotakis: A Political Biography, Volume B’]. Athens: Papazissis. Diamandopoulos, T. (). Το πορτρέτο ενός ηγέτη, [The Portrait of a Leader]. Athens: Patakis. Dimitrakos, D. (). Κ. Μητσοτάκης: Πολιτική βιογραφία, τόμος α’ [K. Mitsotakis: A Political Biography, Volume A’]. Athens: Papazissis. Dimitrokallis, I. (). Ο ηγέτης μετά τον ηγέτη [The Leader after the Leader]. Athens: Militos. Heywood, A. (). Πολιτικές ιδεολογίες [Political Ideologies]. Athens: Epikentro. International Symposium. (). ‘The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S’. May. Athens: Centre for Political Research and Information. Katsoudas, D. K. (). ‘The Conservative Movement and New Democracy: From Past to Present’. In Featherstone, K. and Katsoudas, D. K. (eds.) Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels, London: Croom Helm, –. Katsoudas, D. K. (). ‘Συντηρητισμός και/ή φιλελευθερισμός: η ιδεολογική εξέλιξη της Νέας Δημοκρατίας’ [Conservatism and/or Liberalism: Evolution of ND’s Ideology]. In The Friedrich Näumann Foundation (eds.) Φιλελευθερισμός στην Ελλάδα [Liberalism in Greece]. Athens: Estia, –. Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (). ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’. Party Politics,  (): –. Konstantinidis, Y. (). ‘Η Νέα Δημοκρατία ως η ελληνική εκδοχή της ευρωπαϊκής χριστιανοδημοκρατίας’ [New Democracy as the Greek Version of the European Christian Democracy]. In Konstantinidis, Y. Marantzidis, N. and Pappas, T.S. (eds.) Κόμματα και πολιτική στην Ελλάδα [Parties and Politics in Greece]. Athens: Kritiki, –. Kottakis, M. (). O Καραμανλής off the record [Karamanlis off the record]. Athens: Livanis. Lambrias, P. (). Στη σκιά ενός μεγάλου [In the Shadow of a Great Man]. Athens: Morphotiki Estia. Loule-Theodoraki, N. (). Κωνσταντίνος Μητσοτάκης [Constantine Mitsotakis]. Athens: Ellinika Grammata. Loulis, J. C. (a). ‘New Democracy: The New Face of Conservatism’. In Penniman, H. (ed.) Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of  and . Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, –. Loulis, J. C. (b.). ‘The Greek Conservative Movement in Transition: From Paternalism to Neo-liberalism’. In The New Liberalism: The Future of Non-Collectivist Institutions in Europe and the U.S., International Symposium. May. Athens: Centre for Political Research and Information, –. Loulis, J. (). Τα  χρόνια που άλλαξαν την Ελλάδα [The  Years Within Which Greece Has Changed]. Athens: Livanis.

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Loulis, J. (). Που οδηγείται η Ελλάδα. Η χρεωκοπία του κομματικού συστήματος [Where is Greece Going? The Collapse of the Party System]. Athens: Kastaniotis. Lyrintzis, C. . ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of “Bureaucratic Clientelism” ’? West European Politics,  (): –. Palaiokrassas, J. (). Μπροστά από την εποχή της. Η κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας, – [Ahead of Its Time. The – New Democracy Government]. Athens: Estia, Constantine Mitsotakis’ Foundation. Papachelas, A. (). Ο Κωνσταντίνος Μητσοτάκης με τα δικά του λόγια, τόμος α: – [Constantine Mitsotakis In His Own Words volume A: –]. Athens: Papadopoulos. Papachelas, A. (). Ο Κωνσταντίνος Μητσοτάκης με τα δικά του λόγια, τόμος β: – [Constantine Mitsotakis In His Own Words, volume B: –]. Athens: Papadopoulos. Rallis, G. (). Πολιτικές εκμυστηρεύσεις: – [Political Confessions –]. Athens: Proskinio. Seitanidis, D. (). Τα αίτια της χρόνιας κρίσης στην ελληνική κεντροδεξιά [Causes of the Persisting Crisis in the Greek Center Right]. Athens: Papazissis. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Κράτος και μεταρρύθμιση στη σύγχρονη Νότια Ευρώπη: Ελλάδα-Ισπανία-Ιταλία-Πορτογαλία [The State and Reform in Modern Southern Europe: Greece-Spain-Italy-Portugal]. Athens: Potamos. Stefanakis, G. K. (). Αποστασίας ανατομή [The Anatomy of Political Defection]. Academia Athinon. Vasilakis, M. (). Από τον ανένδοτο στη δικτατορία [From the Relentless Struggle to the Dictatorship]. Athens: Papazissis, Constantine Mitsotakis’ Foundation. Vernardakis, Ch. (). Πολιτικά κόμματα, εκλογές και κομματικό σύστημα [Political Parties, Elections and Party System]. Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publishing. Voulgaris, Y. (). Η μεταπολιτευτική Ελλάδα – [Greece during the – Years]. Athens: Polis. Voulgaris, Y. and Nikolakopoulos, E. (). : O διπλός εκλογικός σεισμός [: The Double Electoral Earthquake]. Athens: Themelio.

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. I: T H B

.................................................................................................................................. I the historical context of Greek politics the Centre is synonymous with liberalism. There was also discernible a continuity between the political party of Centre Union (EK, Ένωσις Κέντρου) and the Liberals (Clogg, ) although the EK, that was founded in , was a formation that transcended the boundaries of the Liberals. In the same Greek context, liberalism, which took the form of the Liberal Party (KF, Κόμμα Φιλελευθέρων) in , was not identified with a cleavage between the Church and the secular State or the landowners and the bourgeoisie. In the case of Greece, the Liberals were the agents of a policy of modernization that was supported by a coalition of disaffected petty bourgeois elements, officers, the educated middle class, and businessmen. Overall, the Liberals represented all those who wished to see a reformed state based on the rule of law and capable of achieving growth and completing the irredentist policy, the ‘Great Idea’, at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan competitors of Greece, mainly Bulgaria. This coalition and Eleftherios Venizelos’s pro-Entente policy collided in  with a neutralist, pro-German at the time, conservative bloc comprising the Crown, parts of the army and the bureaucracy and political elite that dominated Greek politics before the military intervention of . The division crystallized in a national schism that persisted till the imposition of a royalist dictatorship in August . Although marked by the particular Greek societal and political context, the Liberals were not isolated from European developments. As Michalis Psalidopoulos has pointed out, Venizelos’s liberalism was closely related with the ‘new liberalism’ (Psalidopoulos, ). It was a political and ideological current associated in particular with British liberalism of the early s, Leonard Hobhouse being its most important theorist. This current was marked by a tendency to utilize the state in order to redress economic and social problems of the industrial era. In the Greek historical context, Venizelos

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projected an advanced social legislation which sought to improve working conditions and mediate between capital and labour. Therefore, liberalism in Greece, although identified with private property and the entrepreneurial class, is not anti-state in its conception. It tended to identify with reforms like the redistribution of land, which benefited peasants who constituted the mass of Greek society, or the educational reforms of – and – favoured by the progressive educated middle class. It was a mentality of reform versus the conservative predisposition of the royalist and antiVenizelist bloc that marked the Liberals who were the precursors of the post-war Centre. After  the Centre was conceived as a broad political space defined by its republican identity towards conservatism and its attachment to a liberal social and political regime against the communist Left. Although the Liberals were not by any measure the sole representatives of the Centre, the formations emerging to the left of the party retained a distinctive Venizelist streak. This was indeed the case with important parties which appeared in post–war Greek politics, the National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK, Εθνική Προοδευτική Ένωσις Κέντρου) in  and the EK in . The former was a coalition and eventually a party that competed with the Liberal party led by Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleftherios who had founded and led the Liberal party after . There were strong elements that identified EPEK with Venizelism. It was its leader, General Plastiras, who was undisputedly identified with Venizelos and Venizelism. It was also Emmanuel Tsouderos, a distinguished banker and politician, the second in command, as it was a great number of candidates and elected deputies in the elections of March , who gave EPEK an unmistakably republican Venizelist flavour. Therefore EPEK, a party of basically Venizelist origins, was a part of the broader political space, termed the Centre, which formed unstable coalition governments from March  through to October . The EK was a constellation of forces which aimed to assemble the political currents and groups which were to be found in the broad political space between the communist Left, represented by the United Democratic Left (EDA, Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά), the parliamentary façade of the Communist Party of Greece, outlawed since the days of the Civil War in , and the conservatives. Although the new party, the EK, gathered, among others, isolated conservatives and left-wingers, the bulk of its parliamentarians were Centrists, Liberals and others. They cherished their Venizelist origins and democratic traditions, although they were not active republicans anymore. There was, though, a sort of residual historical mistrust between a great majority of them and the Crown. The regime question was dormant but had not been completely eclipsed. Moreover, there emerged important new aspects in Greek politics that rendered invalid the interchangeable use of liberalism and the Centre. These changes accounted for a differentiation between the Liberals and the Centre, as the latter evolved to something broader than the former. In the s the new cleavage between the communist Left and the non-communist political forces escalated into a civil war, a development that exerted heavy pressures on the heirs of Venizelism. The Liberals were in essence a bourgeois party which attracted the vote of smallholders, especially in Northern Greece, and parts of the educated middle classes and business.

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The emergence of a communist-led resistance during the Axis occupation deprived Venizelos of the sizable support of the refugees from Asia Minor and lower classes that had been attracted by the National Liberation Front. The armed clash during December  and the defeat of the communists at the hands of the British forces and the British-backed government units marked a shift to the Right. The Liberals countered this by asserting their attachment to the republic, in contrast to the ascendance of the royalist Right, and emphasizing their differentiation from the Right and its repressive tactics towards the defeated leftists. From the s onwards a part of the Centre, which was defined as the ‘left of the centre’, was persistently critical of the identification of Greek foreign policy with Washington and NATO which underwrote the post-Civil-War political order, and espoused a degree of national independence in the framework of the West. The Centre also asked for the relaxation of the repressive measures against the defeated communist Left and advocated an economic policy of redistribution against the orthodox monetary policy of low inflation and restrained wages implemented by the conservative governments and the Bank of Greece during the s. After  the EK party became the focal point of all those disaffected by the domestic and foreign policies of the conservative governments which were identified with the post-Civil-War political mentality and practices. The consecutive electoral victories of the EK in November  and February  led to a liberalization programme which, however, remained incomplete, as a result of the rift between the leader of EK and centrist prime minister, Georgios Papandreou, and the king over the control of the army. Although Georgios Papandreou remained a moderate factor who wished to see the EK return to power through elections with the consent of the Crown, Greek politics were heavily influenced by the emergence of a radical Centre-Left current within the EK, led by Andreas Papandreou, the son of Georgios. Andreas, an American-trained liberal economist, articulated a platform of change which was based on the mobilization of the ‘people’ against the ‘oligarchy’. The latter was considered a power bloc consisting of the Crown, the conservatives, the army, and the business class, whose domination was shored up by the United States. As the Greek economic and social structure was marked by the existence of extensive petty bourgeois groups and farmers and not by a compact mass of labour, Andreas’s populism outflanked EDA’s rather doctrinaire Marxist approach.

. T    D   C

.................................................................................................................................. The division within the ranks of the EK party between a liberal and a centre-left wing was accentuated after the military coup of , as Andreas Papandreou’s analysis and discourse were gradually marked by neo-Marxist overtones from Immanuel

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Wallerstein’s centre-periphery scheme (Lyrintzis, n. d.). Therefore, at the time of the fall of the junta and the establishment of the republic in , the EK broke up, with two formations emerging in competition. Although the formation founded by Andreas Papandreou invoked Marxist concepts as the base of its analysis, the newly found party of Socialists competed with the remaining EK to cover the wide space claimed by the Centre during the post-war period. From a historical perspective the continuity between the Centre Union-New Forces (EK-ND, Ένωση Κέντρου-Νέες Δυνάμεις) and the Union of Democratic Centre (EDIK, Ενωση Δημοκρατικού Κέντρου) with the pre-dictatorship EK is undeniable (Clogg, ). The post- political party of the Centre was a moderate, pro-European reformist current in contrast to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), founded by Andreas Papandreou on  September , which denounced the legacy of the EK in favour of a socialist, radical platform marked by a pronounced anti-Americanism. Setting the Centre of the s in a comparative European perspective, three cases emerge that claim a centre ground. The similarities between them though are not obvious. One such case is the British Liberals who were found in the Centre after the entrenchment of the Labour Party on the progressive pole in the British party system. The Liberals were rather middle class in marked contrast to Labour, and more tolerant on social issues and values in comparison to the conservatives. The same applied to the German Free Democrats, junior partners of the social democrats from  through . The reversion of the aforementioned Union of Democratic Centre (EDIK) to social democracy rendered it a somewhat distant but not estranged relative of the British and the German Liberals. Another candidate for comparison would be the Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy. They historically claimed a position in the centre of the party system between authoritarian conservatism to their right and social democracy, as the political representative of the proletariat to their left. However, the attachment of a confessional party to the Church was not a characteristic of the EDIK party. The Centre in Finland could be a case of a centrist formation, but it was in fact a transformed agrarian party. The most proximate case to the Greek one was the Union for the French Democracy (UDF) a centrist formation assembled in  by the president of the French Republic, Valery Giscard d’ Estaing, who relied on forces as distinct as possible from his Gaullist partners, the mainstream conservative current in French politics. The UDF gathered old Independent Republicans, similar to the Greek Liberals of the interwar and the immediate post-Civil-War periods, moderate social reformers who ascribed to social democrats, like those constituting the ‘New Forces’ allied with the EK party in  (EK-ND) in Greece, and a few Christian Democrats, a residue of the French version of Christian Democracy, the Republican People’s Movement (MRP) of the s and early s. It was this amalgamation of liberalism and social democratic reformism that probably marked the EK-ND and EDIK. The performance of the EK-ND party was lacklustre in the election of  (. per cent of the votes cast against . per cent for PASOK and . per cent for New

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Democracy) (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) and disastrous in  ( per cent of the votes cast against . per cent for PASOK and . per cent for ND). A common ground in the literature is the fact that Georgios Mavros’ performance as a leader of the EK-ND party and EDIK was poor, in a political and party system which was marked by the presence of the strong leader of ND (Constantine Karamanlis) and PASOK (Andreas Papandreou). Mavros was not a skilful orator in a time marked by mass mobilization and the presence of appealing and strong personalities like Karamanlis and Papandreou. Mavros’ inability to measure up to the challenge was apparent in the elections of  and . In contrast, Papandreou’s charisma permitted him not only to outpace Mavros in the course of the competition between the EDIK and PASOK but, moreover, to adjust PASOK’s radical platform to a moderate stance after  (Clogg, ; Mavrogordatos, ; Bakoyannis, ). There were nonetheless structural reasons more compelling than Mavros’ lacklustre leadership to account for the Centre’s decline in the s. After the Civil War the Centre emphasized civil liberties, democratization, and educational reform in domestic politics and a more balanced policy in international affairs. This was a quest for equality with the NATO allies and the US in particular. After the fall of the junta in , the revamped conservative party of ND had shared this centrist agenda to such an extent that political developments rendered the Centre identical to ND. Moreover, republicanism, after the referendum of  and the defeat of the monarchy, could not serve as an element of differentiation of the two parties (Mavrogordatos, ). The EK neither cooperated with nor opposed forcefully the ND government, led by Karamanlis in – (Mavrogordatos, ), but tried to explore a new ground in Greek politics. Right after the foundation of PASOK, the remaining EK parliamentary group of  elected Georgios Mavros as the new party leader on  September . A sense of vulnerability was apparent though, as the EK was in competition with Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK party. The need to present a renewed image was reflected in the merger of the party with a small group, the ‘New Forces’ (ND). This group gathered a remarkable figure like Ioannis Pesmazoglou, who was formerly deputy governor of the Bank of Greece and the Greek chief negotiator for the conclusion of the association agreement of  between Greece and the European Economic Community, and other well-known figures, distinguished by their opposition to the military rule. The EK-ND, which aspired to rally the entirety of the progressive forces between the traditional Right and the far Left, was basically a party of notables (Bakoyannis, ). Its members of parliament (MPs) did not emerge from a party bureaucracy but were persons influential in their local and regional contexts. Out of a total of sixty MPs elected in November , thirty-two were lawyers and eight doctors, reflecting the pervasive influence of the progressive, bourgeois, educated class in Greek politics (Bakoyannis, ). From an organizational point of view, the EDIK would fail markedly to evolve into a mass party. In December , with the national conference of the party in sight, the party’s membership did not exceed , (Bakoyannis, ).

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In February , four New Forces MPs defected from the party criticizing the ‘overbearing’ rule of the party leader and his inability to organize a mass democratic party. Still, an affirmation of the shift of Greek politics towards the Left was the adoption of social democracy as the ideological creed of the EK party which was renamed the Union of Democratic Centre (EDIK, Ένωση Δημοκρατικού Κέντρου) in April . The party adopted the social democratic creed of Bad Godesberg of , as it stated that it wished to be a mass but not a class party (Bakoyannis, ). Still, the Centre’s platform remained practically indistinguishable from that of ΝD on crucial fields of policy like the state intervention in the economy. Mavros tried in vain to retain a degree of autonomy towards the conservatives by invoking the republican tradition which, however, had not any political significance any more. Mavros was also unimaginative towards PASOK as he could not strike the right balance in treating Papandreou and the potential supporters of PASOK. This was reflected in the ambiguous terms with which PASOK was approached by the Centre: it was portrayed as the left wing that was detached from the republican mainstream, but ‘it is not yet clear whether it is Marxist’ (Bakoyannis, ). This was a poor proposition from a political communication perspective and ambiguous in a way convenient for PASOK. Papandreou had projected a radical, neo-Marxist rhetoric that was distinct from the liberal and pro-Western traditions of the Centre. The EDIK’s formulations, however, did not criticize Papandreou consistently on these grounds, so his party was afforded the benefit of the doubt. The impression that PASOK might not have been cut off from the Centre and the implication that this new party could evolve into a radical version of the Centre, would benefit Papandreou enormously in electoral terms in . Meanwhile, four broad currents were discernible within the EDIK party. One of the currents did not wish to see significant changes in the party and would not be averse to a coalition with Karamanlis’ ND party. A second sought to join PASOK, although that was not a realistic ambition. A third one, though not greatly differentiated from ND, was rhetorically vehement towards the conservative government. Finally, a fourth group was inclined to social democracy (Bakoyannis, ). On top of that, despite the shift to social democracy, the legacy of liberalism and Venizelism loomed in centrist politics. In April  Nikitas Venizelos, grandson of Eleftherios and MP running in the electoral district of Chania (Crete), posited a statement of re-foundation of the Liberal Party in the Areios Pagos, Greece’s Court of Appeal. His move was prompted by information that Constantinos Mitsotakis, an influential politician in Chania and a main participant in the defection of EK deputies in , was planning the re-foundation of the Liberal Party, with the aim of running in the elections anticipated for  or . Indeed, in  Mitsotakis ran as a leader of a party of ‘neo-Liberals’. The latter term should be interpreted in the Greek historical and political context. It referred to a revival of the Liberal Party of Eleftherios Venizelos and not to the neo-liberal ideology that gained ground in the Conservative Party of Britain from the mid-s onwards. The new party gained nationally . per cent of the votes cast and elected two deputies in the stronghold of Venizelism, Crete.

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Mitsotakis himself was elected in Chania, and Pavlos Vardinoyannis in Rethymnon (Clogg, ). In the electoral campaign of , Papandreou criticized the EDIK for practically supporting ND on major issues of foreign policy. He also assumed that the Centre would participate in a post-election coalition government with Karamanlis’ ND as the major partner. EDIK’s leadership argued in response that the party operated as constructive opposition. It alleged particularly that Papandreou’s opposition to the European Economic Community benefited the Superpowers, that PASOK’s extremism shifted voters towards ND, and that Andreas’s credibility should be judged against participation in the struggles of the nation (implying that Andreas Papandreou had been away from Greece since  and as a result of this his credibility was reduced). The central issue that differentiated EDIK from PASOK was accession to the European Communities. Still, the centrist leader, Georgios Mavros, remained silent on the issue of a possible cooperation with ND after the  election (Veremis, ). After its resounding defeat in the election of November , EDIK disintegrated. In May , a handful of centrist MPs, with Athanasios Kanellopoulos being the most prominent amongst them, joined the ND party. Kanellopoulos was appointed as finance minister along with Mitsotakis as minister of coordination. Another group consisted of Ioannis Pesmazoglou and three other MPs. They did not enter government, but founded in March  the Party of Democratic Socialism (KODISO, Κόμμα Δημοκρατικού Σοσιαλισμού). This new party represented the most consistent effort to recalibrate the traditional Centre and Centre-Left towards social democracy and establish a mass party organization, as New Democracy had merged conservatism and liberalism. In the late s it was not only that the centre of gravity of the Greek political system had moved leftwards (Veremis, ). It was also a symptom of increased communication and connection of Greek political currents with Western European ones, a process accelerated by the prospect of Greece’s accession to the European Communities. It was in this context that elements of the EDIK party concluded that an independent party was a necessity and proceeded to form the aforementioned KODISO. Their model was the Western European Social Democracy. The social democratic centrists believed in an open economy in contrast to PASOK which was inclined to a protected national market. An open Greek economy intertwined with the Common Market entailed an anti-inflationary policy, a competitive manufacturing industry and agriculture, and sound public administration. On the other hand, the social democratic centrists differed from the conservative ND in the sense that they perceived European Community membership as a challenge for the Greek society, economy, and public administration, rather than an accomplishment achieved once and for all. The KODISO wished to transform society incrementally within the context of the European Communities. Modernization was a central element in their thinking, and this could be achieved by extensive reforms based on the greatest possible consensus. Against ND, KODISO attempted to establish a distinct political position supporting the recognition of the communist-led National Liberation Front

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as a resistance organization of the s, thus aiming to contribute to national reconciliation between the Left and the Right. KODISO also advocated extensive reforms in education, health, and public administration. For the obvious reason of securing its political survival, it demanded a new electoral system of proportional representation (PR). The conservative government’s refusal to introduce a system of simple PR sealed the fate of the disintegrated EDIK, as PASOK remained the only viable alternative to conservative government (Calligas, ). As the party system tended already to crystallize, with PASOK as its central pole, the movement towards a Greek social democracy was received negatively by the electorate. Its failure was even more marked with regard to KODISO. The party’s appeal was not totally negligible as its performance in the national elections of October  demonstrated. However, in the European parliament elections, conducted in Greece simultaneously with the  national elections, KODISO secured . per cent of the votes. But despite the fact that eventually KODISO was crushed by polarization, as the European parliament polls of June  manifested, the essence of its agenda was similar to that of PASOK’s modernizers led by Costas Simitis (Simitis, ). Therefore, with the disparate centrist groups annihilated in the elections of , PASOK emerged as the ‘true reincarnation’ of the old Centre (Mavrogordatos, ). George Mavrogordatos established this view on two grounds: the vast majority of PASOK supporters and members, and Papandreou himself were previously identified with the EK. PASOK’s founding myth marked three ‘generations’ as the sources of its history: the resistance of the s, the ‘unrelenting struggles’ of the s, and the dictatorship. From a historical perspective, Mavrogordatos argued that PASOK embodied the resolution of a historical contradiction of Venizelism as a historic alliance of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeois and peasant elements (Mavrogordatos, ). It was in fact the recalibration of the relationship between liberal bourgeois and lower classes that permeated the Centre, a recalibration achieved on the basis of PASOK’s populist discourse and platform. The argument of continuity between the EK and PASOK is vindicated by the fact that the vote for PASOK in  overlapped with the vote for the EK party in –. As Kevin Featherstone argued, the process of PASOK supplanting the EK had unfolded gradually from  through  (Featherstone, ). The party system which became crystallized in , resembled the one of – and was similarly marked by three main currents, the Centre-Right, the Centre-Left, and the Left. There was thus evident an element of continuity in Greek politics to the extent that the centrist vote was transferred to PASOK, but this, as Featherstone emphasized, did not reflect an ideological identity between PASOK and EK. Andreas Papandreou had probably understood that the model of the old Centre in both structure and programme was not viable. In  Papandreou on purpose sought to make a clean break with the past (Mavrogordatos, : ). The perception of the Centre as a failed political formation was shared by others who were less populist inclined and more inspired by the ideological and theoretical elaborations of the German social democracy like Costas Simitis (who would become

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leader of PASOK in –). In Simitis’ view the EK was an assortment of local notables who were seeking to preserve their local power base of clientelistic networks. In the s the EK had failed to match the dynamics of mass mobilization against the throne. Its weak structures and shallow ideology were at the roots of its failure to withstand royalist pressure in . Displaying an understanding of the workings of Greek politics, Simitis felt that Andreas Papandreou’s personal pre-eminence and unrestrained control of PASOK was the prerequisite for the success of a party on the left of the Greek political spectrum (Simitis, ).

. T E  PASOK   C-L

.................................................................................................................................. Between  and  the Centre, organizationally and politically, did not exist. Political competition was an almost exclusive affair between the Centre-Right and the Centre-Left. It was a particular feature of the republic established in  that the founders of the main political formations, Karamanlis and Papandreou, wished, admittedly in vain, to disassociate their parties, New Democracy and PASOK respectively, from the Left-Right axis, by trying to emphasize the unique features of the parties which they had founded as new political movements. This strategy was implemented persistently by Karamanlis and subtly by Papandreou. Exceptionally, Karamanlis had made a reference to the Centre in  when attempting to expand the traditional boundaries of ND. It was an effort to overcome psychological and historical barriers in view of the presidential election of , when Karamanlis left the post of prime minister for that of president of the republic. Papandreou, for his part, while refraining from identifying his party with the Centre or the Left, campaigned in the legislative elections of  on a platform articulated in order to appeal to everyone opposed to the continuation of the ‘rule of the Right’. Assigning the label ‘the rule of the Right’ to ND was a strategy useful for PASOK. It polarized the electorate against ND, while PASOK portrayed its bid for power as the vindication of a long political struggle to terminate a rightist rule that had lasted fifty years. In this sense the Centre, although not explicitly invoked by PASOK’s leader, would be an integral part of a ‘progressive democratic camp’ that coalesced the nonrightist forces of the country. Despite Papandreou’s victory in the elections of June , PASOK’s second term in government (–) was confronted with mounting economic problems. The need for fiscal consolidation, organizational changes, and modernization of both the public and the private sectors were undeniable. From the mid-s onwards the two competing formations, PASOK and ND, would increasingly align to the Centre-Right and the Centre-Left. It was in the mid s that the two main parties’ policies converged, as it became evident from the

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policy of the last Papandreou government (October  – January ) and more conspicuously from the modernization project of theSimitis cabinets (January  – March ) (Lyrintzis, ). Research has also underscored the fact that this convergence was accompanied by increasing self-identification of PASOK’s voters with the Centre on the Left–Right axis. But this repositioning did not mean necessarily a revival of the Centre as a political current, but could frequently signify a rather moderate or even indifferent approach towards politics in a period of de-mobilization and de-politicization (Katsanidou, ). The Centre-Right did not acquire a concrete ideological content. It meant a moderate conservative and liberal attachment to parliamentary institutions. In the elections of , Costas Karamanlis (nephew of the elder Karamanlis and party leader of ND in –) would invoke the ‘middle space’. This was a rather vague concept on the basis of which Karamanlis attempted to reach out to citizens who were not particularly attached to any political party and were in search of pragmatic solutions to the economic and administrative problems of the country. From the Centre-Left’s vantage point, a current under the leadership of Simitis, identified with modernization and European integration, clearly emerged within the ranks of PASOK during the s. Simitis, who had won PASOK’s leadership in , attempted to weave the Centre-Left with a hegemonic project of modernization and social cohesion in the context of an alliance of PASOK with the European-oriented parts of the Coalition of the Left (Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς, SYN). However, this strategy did not bear fruit. Overall, in the s and the early s, a period in which the Centre-Right and the Centre-Left were converging to the centre of the political system, there was no real need for an autonomous party of the Centre. That became evident in the case of the ‘Movement of Free Citizens’ (Κίνημα Ελεύθερων Πολιτών), a short-lived party founded by the popular mayor of Athens, Dimitris Avramopoulos. He launched his party in March  and suspended it in June  as everyone understood that its chances of winning parliamentary representation were slim.

. A R   N C?

.................................................................................................................................. The return of the Centre in Greek politics was a side effect of the debt crisis of – and its management by the socialist government under Georgios Papandreou (October  – November ). As the socialist government almost imploded in the autumn of , high-ranking notables of the party concluded that the crisis signified the bankruptcy of a statist and clientelistic model associated with the socialist governments of the s which survived almost unscathed in the s and early s. The most significant exponents of PASOK’s shift to the Centre were Anna Diamantopoulou and Evangelos Venizelos. Diamantopoulou had matured politically within PASOK. Her shift to moderate and centrist policies was evident since the mid-s (when she had

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adhered to the modernization project of Costas Simitis) and sealed by her term as European Commissioner (–). In contrast, Venizelos, leader of PASOK between March  and June , had not acceded to PASOK before the late s. In that period, he had served as legal counsellor to Papandreou, who after stepping down from power in , was facing charges of corruption. Diamantopoulou and Venizelos influenced developments in the Centre in –. In that period, despite a shift of the electorate to the Left, manifested in SYRIZA’s (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) ascent to government, there remained a considerable pool of voters for parties of the Centre and the Centre Left (Stathopoulos, ). Already in January , that is, before PASOK’s demise and the rise of SYRIZA as the pre-eminent force on the Left and the Centre-Left, Diamantopoulou, minister of education in the governments of Georgios Papandreou and Loukas Papademos, had proposed the dissolution and re-foundation of the political formation that represented the ‘dynamic centre’ and the ‘responsible left’. PASOK, she argued, was fractured ideologically and politically. In May  she elaborated further on the issue arguing that the Centre was the prerequisite for the formation of a majority. Projecting as her overriding concern the safeguarding of Greece’s eurozone membership, she noted that the pro-European forces converged to the centre, with the latter becoming the point of reference for a reform (Diamantopoulou, a, b). In July , right after the second defeat of PASOK at the polls, Venizelos attempted to establish PASOK’s connection with the Venizelist and the centrist tradition that Andreas Papandreou had discontinued since the early s. Venizelos argued that the electoral defeats of May and June  signified the disintegration of a social coalition based on a specific conception of the state and economic development that was exhausted in  (Venizelos, a). Which were the key elements of this shift? The elaborations of the new centrism were based on an assumption that Greece needed to reorient its economic system towards private investment which would propel growth in the globalized economy. In this sense, the progressive camp needed to rediscover the reformist mentality of the old liberalism which, however, was not deprived of an interest in social cohesion. In September  Venizelos referred to a ‘greater democratic camp’ that superseded PASOK. He portrayed PASOK as a phase in the history of the democratic camp which could and should evolve to something different from the socialist party that PASOK was. His scheme took notice of the eventual reconciliation with Social Democracy but he also spotted a constant tension between ‘people’ and ‘modernization’ (Venizelos, b). The effort to recalibrate the concepts of the Centre and the Centre-Left brought back into the political debate the issue of the political space. What was the political space to be claimed by a new formation positioned on the Centre and the CentreLeft, since SYRIZA had succeeded in claiming a sizable part of the former PASOK electorate on the Left and the Centre-Left? On top of that, as globalization and participation in the eurozone constrained economic policy-making, the key problem

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was how to construct a new Centre and Centre-Left that would shift its focus from redistribution to investment and competitiveness and still be able to gain a mass following. These contradictions could not be easily resolved especially during a time of economic crisis and social dislocation. The Centre as a political and historical current not contradicting but contributing to the reconstitution of the Centre-Left appeared in the so called ‘Manifesto of the ’, who were fifty-eight distinguished intellectuals and citizens committed to the CentreLeft. Although their demarche failed at the time to ignite the process for a revamped Centre-Left, it is obvious in retrospect that it conceptually and ideologically contributed to the developments that led, four years later, to the launching of the KINAL party (Κίνημα Αλλαγής—Movement for Change). The ‘’ perceived the Centre-Left as the aggregate of ‘social democracy, the democratic left, the liberal centre, the political ecology’. Thus, the Centre was reinserted in the debate for the reconstitution of the wider Centre-Left. It was an operation that was a reminder of the effort for a unified Centre between  and , since the new political space would be ‘a convergence of all those collective entities and citizens that were not identified with the right or the neo-communist nationalist populist left’. It was an attempt to construct a ‘new democratic progressive camp’ (Kathimerini, ). The failure of the ‘’ to ignite a process of concentration of forces of the Centre-Left was followed by the emergence of political novelties unanticipated in Greek politics. In February  a new party, the ‘River’ (Ποτάμι) party, was founded by a popular journalist, Stavros Theodorakis. Although he refrained from claiming the representation of the Centre, his platform reflected a kind of a post-modern centrist discourse which, nonetheless, did not retain links with a centrist tradition. The new formation was reminiscent of the Liberals in the sense that it represented a current of educated progressive middle classes which were oriented towards the private sector and convinced that Greece had to reform the state in order to regain its competitiveness. The main point of Theodorakis’s platform was an anti-bureaucratic spirit. The Greek economy was burdened by taxation and social security contributions. The state structures should be subjected to evaluation, while institutional changes were imperative. In general, it was a pro-market but de-ideologized platform as Theodorakis claimed that social issues should not be approached in a doctrinal manner. The same notion marked his proposals for the appointment of ‘universally accepted’ technocrats as secretary generals of the ministries in order to break the hold of the parties over the bureaucracy. There was an ‘avant guarde’ streak in his claim that the leading group of the Potami possessed ‘brains and power’, the ‘power of reason and justice’ (Kathimerini, a). The new party made a promising start in the election for the European parliament of June  by obtaining . per cent of the votes cast. It displayed an ability to attract voters from many quarters, from SYRIZA, PASOK, and the Democratic Left (DIMAR, Δημοκρατική Αριστερά) which had split off from the Coalition of the Left in ). The electoral pool of the River party comprised former voters of the following parties: about  per cent were formerly SYRIZA voters,  per cent PASOK,  per cent DIMAR,

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and only  per cent ND. Therefore, the River was mainly a centrist and Centre-Left formation with regard to the origins of its voters. However, the party failed to expand or even solidify its position within these broad categories of the electorate. To the contrary, its shrunken electoral base of September  (. per cent of the votes cast) was socially more pronounced and its performance in bourgeois and upper-middleclass districts was well above its national average (Kathimerini, b). Similarly, around the same time, ‘Ciudadanos’ in Spain and ‘En Marche’ in France were formations strongly appealing to the middle classes. The latter were often, though not exclusively, embedded in the private sector of the economy. The income of such middle-class voters was normally above the median line, while their skills were presumably compatible with the globalized economy. Meanwhile, PASOK’s effort was focused on the reconstitution of the Centre-Left or the ‘democratic progressive camp’. A first manifestation of this was the formation of the coalition of the ‘Olive’ in , an imitation of the Italian ‘Ulivo’ of the s and the early s. The ‘Olive’ coalition participated in the European parliament elections of  and came third, behind SYRIZA and ND, obtaining  per cent of the vote. A second manifestation of the same effort was the equally short-lived coalition KINAL, already noted above. This was a political party which originated in the summer of  and was formally constituted in early . In the latter case PASOK secured the participation of party cadres left over from DIMAR, which had been obliterated at the polls in January , when SYRIZA rose to government. Needless to say, the need to coalesce disparate elements in the aforementioned coalitions was not an orderly process. The ‘Centre Left’ was a term that described vaguely a political space between the radical Left and the conservatives and a process as well. It was also realized by everyone concerned that this process unfolded while contradictory pressures were exerted upon the Centre-Left from both Right and Left. The founding document of the KINAL party refrained from locating the new formation on the Left–Right axis and refrained also from a choice between the Centre-Left and the Centre. It evaded the dilemma by the assumption that KINAL was the party of the ‘Democratic Progressive camp’. That seemed to be the scenario preferred, as the process of the formation of this new party of the Centre-Left gathered pace in – with the participation of the River party. The notion of the nonprivileged Greeks, that had marked PASOK’s discourse in the s and the s, was abandoned. Still, the social point of reference of the new party, its ‘backbone’, was equally vague: it was the ‘producers of wealth’, the Greeks of labour, the farmers and the ‘dynamic groups’ of ‘free-minded intellectuals’, new entrepreneurs, and ‘outwardoriented and inventive’ businessmen. The new priority of social democratic parties or parties originating from Social Democracy was reflected in the assertion that redistribution should be based on sustainable development (KINAL, ). Taking into account the structure of the party system, what is called a ‘downsized’ bipartism, the issue of the alliances of the new party remains open. It is clear that what matters most is the mechanics of the electoral system. As, according to the Greek electoral law, the single largest party is entitled to a bonus of fifty seats, it is apparent

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that the new party of the Centre-Left will see that it keeps a policy of equidistance between ND and SYRIZA and build its credibility as an autonomous third force in Greek politics. A tilt to the left or to the right could not be foreclosed, depending on the political circumstances in a rapidly changing situation. The contradictory pressures from its right and its left and the issue of control of the new formation’s structures became apparent in the KINAL party during the second half of  and the early months of . The River party left the new formation in July , realizing that the former PASOK essentially retained control of the new party. Moreover, the settlement of differences between Greece and North Macedonia was an issue that drove a wedge between the former PASOK on the one hand and the River and the DIMAR on the other and intensified differences within the River itself. Eventually, DIMAR also abandoned the ranks of KINAL in January .

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Overall, the Centre in Greece is a space in the making and still debated. Traditions of radicalism or profound reforms are not easily reconcilable with the rightward centrism of formations like the River, En Marche, and Ciudadanos. In this context, in Greece the new party of the ‘progressive democratic camp’ could be the reincarnation of centrist politics in a post-industrial, post-modern context, as a middle- and upper-middleclass, liberal centrism attempt to coexist with lower class radicalism within a broad Centre and Centre-Left party. The key difference in rebuilding a Centre and CentreLeft space in the twenty-first century—in comparison to the historical precedent of the s—is the socio-economic context of a globalized economy. The s were marked by growth and consequently the ability of governments to distribute. Moreover, in those times there prevailed an assumption that growth was infinite. Therefore, the Centre represented demands for fairness and redistribution, along with an imperative of modernization, either in the domestic or in the international contexts. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, as the thinking within the Centre and the Centre-Left has shifted from redistribution to investment and production, there remains a key issue unresolved: a progressive formation could not be uninterested in redistribution, since nowadays inequality dominates the political agenda. In this context, the main issue is what a new Centre would mean in terms of redistribution, so that it would be able to become a distinct social and political space.

R Bakoyannis, P. (). Ανατομία της ελληνικής πολιτικής [Anatomy of Greek Politics]. Athens: Papazisis.

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Calligas, C. (). ‘The Centre-Decline and Convergence’. In Featherstone, K. and Katsoudas, D. (eds.) Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels. Sydney and London: Croom Helm, –. Clogg, R. (). Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy. Durham NC: Duke University Press. Diamantopoulou, A. (a). ‘Με νέα ηγεσία το ΠΑΣΟΚ στις εκλογές’ [PASOK with a New Leadership in the Election]. Kathimerini,  January. Diamantopoulou, A. (b). ‘Ριζοσπαστική Σοσιαλδημοκρατία για την Ευρώπη και την Ελλάδα’ [A Radical Social Democracy for Europe and Greece]. Athens Voice,  May. Featherstone, Κ. (). ‘Elections and Voting Behaviour’. In Featherstone, K. and Katsoudas, D. (eds). Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels. Sydney and London: Croom Helm , –. Kathimerini (). ‘Πρόσκληση σε ιδρυτική συνέλευση για μια δημοκρατική προοδευτική παράταξη’ [Invitation to a Founding Conference for a Democratic Progressive Camp]. Kathimerini,  October. Kathimerini (a). ‘Το Ποτάμι, νέο κόμμα από το Σταύρο Θεοδωράκη’ [The River, New Party by Stavros Theodorakis]. Kathimerini,  February. Kathimerini (b). ‘. χαλαρές ψήφοι που δικεδικούν οι μεγάλοι’ [. Uncommitted Votes Pursued by the Big Parties]. Kathimerini.  June. Katsanidou, A. (). ‘Η τοποθέτηση των πολιτών στον άξονα δεξιάς-αριστεράς: Η σημασία του και το περιεχόμενό του’ [The Citizens’ Positioning on the Left-Right Axis: Its Importance and Content]. In Georgarakis, N. and Demertzis, N. (eds.) Το πολιτικό πορτραίτο της Ελλάδας. Κρίση και η αποδόμηση του πολιτικού [Greece’s Political Portrait. Crisis and Deconstruction of the Political]. Athens: Gutenberg/National Centre of Social Research, –. KINAL (). Διακήρυξη (Declaration),  March. Available at: https://kinimaallagis.gr/ diakiryksi/ (accessed  January ). Lyrintzis, C. (n. d.). ‘Ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου και η Αριστερά’ [Andreas Papandreou and the Left]. In Panayotopoulos, V. (ed.) Ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου και η εποχή του [Andreas Papandreou and his Era]. Athens: Hellinika Grammata, –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Το μεταβαλλόμενο πολιτικό σύστημα’ [The Changing Party System]. In Featherstone, K. (ed.) Πολιτική στην Ελλάδα. Η πρόκληση του εκσυγχρονισμού [Politics and Policy in Greece. The Challenge of Modernization]. Athens: Okto Publications, –. Mavrogordatos, G. (). ‘The Emerging Party System’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece in the s. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Psalidopoulos, M. (). ‘New Liberalism and Eleftherios Venizelos’s Economic Policy’. In Papadakis, N. (ed.) Eleftherios Venizelos and the Formulation of His Political Thought. Athens: Foundation of the Greek Parliament and Eleftherios Venizelos Research and Study Foundation, –. Simitis, C. (). Πολιτική για μια δημιουργική Ελλάδα – [Policy for a Creative Greece –]. Athens: Polis. Stathopoulos, P. (). Η ρευστοποίηση του κομματικού συστήματος [The Liquidation of the Party System]. In Voulgaris, Υ. and Nicolakopoulos, Ι. (eds.) Ο διπλός εκλογικός σεισμός [: The Twin Electoral Earthquake]. Athens: Themelio, –.

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Venizelos, E. (a,  July). ‘Evangelos Venizelos’ Speech at the National Conference for the Reconstitution of the Camp.’ (In Greek). Available at: https://www.evenizelos.gr/speeches/ politicalspeeches// (accessed  January ). Venizelos, E. (b,  September). ‘Evangelos Venizelos’ Speech on the th Anniversary of the Declaration of  September.’ (In Greek). Available at: https://www.evenizelos.gr/ speeches/politicalspeeches/ (accessed  January ). Veremis, T. (). ‘Η παρακμή του Κέντρου μετά το ’ [The Decline of the Centre after ]. Athens: Estia.

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T story of socialism in Greece is different from that of most European countries. Unlike most of Europe where socialist parties emerged during the late nineteenth century, in Greece it was only in  that the Socialist Labour Party of Greece was founded, which was soon transformed into the Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Κομουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας). The latter monopolized the Greek Left, became an illegal and persecuted force during and after the Civil War (–) and returned as a legitimate political entity after the fall of the military dictatorship in . That year was a turning point in Greek politics because it was the beginning of a new political regime known as the ‘metapolitefsi’ and at the same time marked the creation of a new socialist party outside the communist Left, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα). It can be argued, therefore, that Greece presents an exceptional case which has to do both with the timing of the creation of a viable socialist party and with the manner in which it was founded. The late arrival of a socialist party can be explained by the belated and limited industrialization of the country, but primarily by the political conflict between Left and Right which culminated with a civil war and the ensuing total dominance of the Right which lasted until the – dictatorship (Lyrintzis, ). PASOK’s fluctuating fortunes and its demise produced interesting questions and ongoing debates. In what follows, the analysis of the Greek socialists will start with a brief discussion of the manner in which PASOK was founded, its organizational and ideological features, its electoral base, and the new elements it brought into Greek politics. It continues with an analysis of the party’s performance in power during the s and the s. Next, follows a discussion of the period – when PASOK was in opposition and the management of the economic crisis during the period – when the party was again in power. Finally, the role of populism in Greek politics will be discussed in relation to the current problems PASOK is facing in an era of economic

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crisis. These problems are directly linked with the general discussion about the political identity and electoral prospects of social democracy in Europe.

. S  S

.................................................................................................................................. The political scene after the fall of the military dictatorship was fluid and offered opportunities for the emergence of new political forces. Indeed, new parties emerged to fill the political spectrum from the Right to the Left. Andreas Papandreou announced in September  the launch of PASOK as a new political force of the Left totally different from both the old parties of the Centre and Centre-Left pole of Greek politics in the s and more specifically the Centre Union party led by his father, George Papandreou. After , he refused to seek the leadership and to resuscitate the old Centre and proceeded with the totally new PASOK (Lyrintzis, ; Spourdalakis, ). The new party claimed to represent and unite forces from the old resistance against the axis occupation of Greece, forces that had an active role in the resistance against the military dictatorship, as well as forces that participated in the Centre-Left during the sixties. Being a charismatic leader, a superb orator and a leading figure in the resistance against the dictatorship, Papandreou was recognized and accepted as the undisputed leader of the new party (Lyrintzis, ). The new party advocated a ‘third road’ to socialism based on the themes of national independence (withdrawal from NATO and the EU), popular sovereignty, and social liberation, to be achieved through a radical programme including the socialization of the means of production, a welfare state, and massive institutional reforms. The party presented itself as the champion of the ‘underprivileged’, of the people, seeking to redress the injustices and inequalities that were accumulated after decades of rightwing dominance (Papadopoulos, ). As the  election approached, however, PASOK modified its position and presented a clearly moderate image, by abandoning the rhetoric for a third road to socialism and advancing the vague demand for ‘change’. Euroscepticism and hostility towards NATO were downgraded and the emphasis shifted to the necessary reforms in all areas of public life. The novel ideas were supported and complemented by another innovation, namely the development of a well-structured mass organization. In fact, this was the first time that a Greek party outside the communist Left successfully established an effective mass organization. Although internal democracy remained a problem as the leader was always able to impose its decisions and to bypass the party structures, the organization proved a strong asset and considerably helped the party during its ‘short march to power’ (Spourdalakis, : –). Moreover, it signalled an attempt to avoid the clientelistic practices that dominated Greek party politics in the past. Of course, clientelism continued to play a central role in Greek politics, albeit in a new form as will be discussed later in the chapter. The combination of radical rhetoric, novel

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ideas, strong charismatic leadership, and mass organization enabled PASOK to increase its share of the vote from . per cent in , to . per cent in the  election and finally to achieve a landslide victory in the  election with  per cent of the vote. PASOK’s electoral appeal was directed mainly to the lower and middle classes. The salaried strata in combination with PASOK’s appeal in the rural areas provided a stable electoral base for the party during the s and s (Nikolakopoulos, ). Private- and public-sector employees, as well as pensioners, were the main pillars of PASOK’s electorate; since the s PASOK performed as a typical catch-all party, a fact that became evident during the s when, under Simitis, the middle- and uppermiddle urban strata were attracted to the party (Nikolakopoulos, ; Sotiropoulos, ). In the  and  elections, PASOK drew mainly from the salaried middleand upper-middle strata; PASOK’s appeal to these strata collapsed in , as the party was held responsible for the economic crisis and its management. It has to be noted that the early s marked the ascendancy of socialist parties in Southern Europe; first the French Parti Socialiste (PS), under Mitterrand (Escalona and Vieira, : –) and later the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) rose to power and dominated the political scene throughout the decade. PASOK, however, lacked the political background and the cultural tradition of its European counterparts. These differences in combination with PASOK’s own attempts to distance itself from traditional social democracy caused important theoretical debates regarding the nature and political identity of the new party. It is interesting to note that PASOK was the first party in Greece outside the communist Left to attract a vivid and continuous academic research marked by the re-evaluation and reconsideration of old and new concepts. In the first place, the role and nature of clientelism in Greece was reexamined as it was evident that a significant transformation of clientelistic practices was taking place (Lyrintzis, ). Secondly, a new concept, unknown in Greek politics until the s, populism, acquired a central place in theoretical and political discussions (Mouzelis, ). It was a debate about the socialist or populist nature of the new party, which was to have significant implications in the political antagonisms that were to follow. The use and abuse of this term and the way it has changed during the decade of the s will be discussed and assessed later in this chapter.

. PASOK  P

.................................................................................................................................. Once in power, PASOK adopted a number of policies aimed at consolidating its image as a left-wing party of the people; it was a policy based on neo-Keynesian measures to stimulate demand, including substantial increases of pensions and salaries. Although similar policies were adopted by the French PS during its first years in office, the social and political context in France was very different; after the initial experiments,

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Mitterrand’s governments embarked on stabilizing economic policies and moderate reforms (Escalona and Vieira, : –). In Greece, state intervention in the economy was directed both at the state-owned enterprises and at private firms, particularly at those private companies which had accumulated huge debts, mainly owed to state-controlled banks which were to be reorganized under state control. It was a policy based on active state intervention in all areas of public interest, creating numerous networks and state-controlled organizations infiltrated by party mechanisms (Mavrogordatos, ; Sotiropoulos, ). What has been labelled as ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ describes this growing penetration of the state machinery by party structures, a process that led to PASOK’s description as a ‘party of the state’ (Lyrintzis  and ; Spourdalakis ; Eleftheriou and Tassis, ). State expansion necessitated increased public borrowing and this led to a significant increase of foreign debt; this was to be exploited by PASOK’s opponents when the sovereign debt crisis erupted to argue that the main cause of Greece’s default in  were PASOK’s and Andreas Papandreou’s policies during the s. In the short term, however, PASOK’s policies paid off and the party won a comfortable majority in the  election by . per cent of the total vote. However, soon after this election, the government had to adopt and impose austerity measures during the – period aimed at curbing inflation and controlling public debt (Moschonas, ). The last years of PASOK’s second term in office were marked by economic scandals and increased political polarization. Papandreou’s health problems and the involvement of PASOK’s leading members in corruption scandals brought an abrupt end to the party’s dominance in the s. The decade has been described as ‘the populist decade’ (Clogg, ) and the evaluation of PASOK’s performance and its legacy are still a difficult task (Lyrintzis, ; Moschonas, forthcoming). There can be little doubt that PASOK brought new elements into Greek politics. On the positive side, the development of a mass party which gradually acquired the characteristics of the ‘cartel’ party model was also adopted by its main rival, the New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) party, thus leading to a significant renewal of Greek party politics. This process was followed by the arrival of new political personnel to power and by the mobilization of large numbers of Greek citizens who entered politics for the first time, thus initiating a new phase of political participation (Lyrintzis, ). The long-term effect for Greek politics was the establishment of a two-party system with the two major parties alternating in power. Both PASOK and ND developed strong links with the state by infiltrating state agencies and exploiting state resources to consolidate their electoral clienteles. Despite the apparent stability of the system, this process gradually undermined the parties’ legitimacy and their ability to manage the economy, a fact that became evident in the post- economic crisis which led to a drastic transformation of the political scene. At the policy level, there is an ongoing controversy about PASOK’s performance and its implications (Sotiropoulos, : –). PASOK introduced significant and lasting reforms in education, the health service, and the trade unions (Lyrintzis ). Above all, it put an end to the old divide between Right and Left by recognizing the resistance

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movement and thus healing the scars of the Civil War. The PASOK government also implemented institutional reforms, which were overdue in areas of civil and penal law (dowry and divorce laws). In the area of foreign policy, PASOK totally abandoned its former anti-European and anti-NATO positions and took advantage of the EU funds allocated to Greece. Regarding the economy, the assessment is mixed. The PASOK governments were accused of overspending state funds by embarking on social policies with borrowed money. This is mostly true and forms the basis for the argument about the populist nature of the party. Yet, it could be argued that this provided for a significant redistribution of income in Greek society. Moschonas has aptly examined PASOK’s fiscal and institutional policies with particular emphasis on the party’s failure to tackle tax evasion and its role in the final fiscal disaster (Moschonas, forthcoming). His analysis forms the basis for his argument about PASOK as ‘inconsistent, superficial social democracy’. It is not surprising that these are still highly debatable issues, both in the political and the academic context. After a three-year period (–) when ND was in office, PASOK was returned to power in , after winning the election with . per cent of the vote. It was a vindication and a triumphant victory for Andreas Papandreou. However, he was seriously ill and in  he had to abdicate as prime minister (he died a few months later). The election of Costas Simitis as prime minister, and later as party leader, signalled a new phase in the party’s history. It was the beginning of what has been presented as ‘the modernization project’ (Lyrintzis, ). It was an organized attempt to distance PASOK from the populist rhetoric and practices of the past while aiming at major policy targets, such as the stabilization of the economy and the participation in the European Monetary Union. The  election and PASOK’s victory by . per cent of the vote marked the beginning of a new eight-year long term of the Socialists in power; it was a period of remarkable achievements, among which most notable was Greece’s success in meeting the required standards to join the eurozone. However, major goals of the ‘modernization project’ were not achieved. The Simitis governments failed to introduce viable reforms in major areas, such as health, education, the tax system, and above all the public administration (Moschonas, forthcoming). Despite the introduction of new structures like the Ombudsman, attempts to reform significant state sectors, such as the social security and pensions system, or the privatization of the state-owned and indebted national airline, failed under the pressure of organized interests and party interference (Lyrintzis, ). The complex state–party relationship may partly explain the relative failure of the modernization project: PASOK’s organization never fully embraced the ideas and practices of the modernizers. Instead, a significant block within PASOK remained attached to the old populist approach and thus undermined any initiative to implement drastic reforms (Eleftheriou and Tassis, ). Simitis’ vision of modernization never became dominant within PASOK, and the government had to face and tackle internal disputes and party grievances (Kazamias, ; Lyrintzis, ).

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The  electoral victory of PASOK with . per cent of the vote and a small margin over ND confirmed Simitis’ position in power. He undertook the task to make government competence a central political issue and to tackle the ‘everyday’ problems of the citizens. Yet the – period was marked by the gradual political decline of the modernization project which was reduced to minor reforms and technocratic management. It was apparent in  that PASOK was heading to an electoral defeat. The modernization project, though vaguely defined, was used to renew PASOK’s political discourse and to secure eight years in power. However, it never managed to become a hegemonic project for Greek society. It was gradually reduced to ‘Europeanization’ and the rationalization of the economy (Lyrintzis, , Pantazopoulos, ; Vernardakis ). While these themes did help the party to win two elections, it could not sustain the mobilization of PASOK’s electoral base. It is important to note that by the late s, PASOK was closer to mainstream social democracy than ever before, although this is still debatable as already noted. Participation and an active role in the Socialist International marked this change in PASOK’s profile. This meant that the party had to deal with all the problems which social democracy was facing during that period. Instead of the socialization of the means of production, the party slowly and reluctantly accepted the idea of privatizations and the need for austerity measures in order to stabilize and rationalize the economy. As was the case with other major European social democratic parties, most notably the Labour Party under Blair in the UK and the SPD under Schroeder in Germany, the adoption of liberal and often neo-liberal policies blurred their political identity and their differences from their right-wing or Centre-Right rivals (De Waele et al., : – and –). These developments in combination with PASOK’s inability to renew its political discourse and reactivate the modernization project may explain the party’s fall from power in , when it obtained . per cent of the vote and trailed behind the ND party which won the election with . per cent of the vote (Nikolakopoulos, ).

. F O   M   E C

.................................................................................................................................. The March  election and the return of ND to power mark the beginning of a new phase for PASOK. With a new leader—George Papandreou, son of Andreas Papandreou, who had assumed the party’s leadership shortly before the  election with the support of Simitis—the party was in search of new ideas and policies. Papandreou introduced the direct election of the party leader from an electorate consisting not only of party members but also of party friends, a practice that was to be adopted by the ND party. He also sought to implement new communication tactics by paying special emphasis on the role of social media and by renewing PASOK’s top political

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personnel. Sotiropoulos provides a comprehensive summary of PASOK’s ideological and organizational shifts during the – period (Sotiropoulos, : –). However, the party lost the  election, in which it obtained . per cent of the vote. Electoral defeat led to a mini internal crisis: Evangelos Venizelos, a leading and most prominent party member openly challenged the leadership of George Papandreou and provoked an electoral contest for the party leadership. Party members and party friends gave Papandreou an easy and foreseeable victory in the intra-party election. This was an interesting contest, because it confirmed PASOK’s already proven ability to surpass internal crises and to implement internal democratic procedures. On the other hand, it showed that the cult of personality and the dominant role of the Papandreou family within PASOK were still present and effective. PASOK spent five and a half years in opposition; however, it did not manage to present a new identity nor a new set of policies. By , it was evident that the Greek economy was in serious trouble, a fact openly acknowledged by the outgoing prime minister of ND, Costas Karamanlis, when he had to call for an early election in September . Although the PASOK leadership was aware of the imminent economic crisis, the party adhered to the old recipe of easy electoral promises. PASOK’s return to power in , when it won . per cent of the vote, was the outcome of the electorate’s frustration and dissatisfaction with the ND government and the related expectation that PASOK could perform better. It took several months for the new government to realize the extent of Greece’s economic problems. When it did, and in order to avoid bankruptcy, the answer was an agreement with the IMF, the EU, and the ECB (the so-called Troika) to secure the financing of the Greek economy for three years under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which dictated specific measures for the country’s fiscal policy and harsh measures concerning salaries and pensions. The MoU immediately became a major issue of political controversy and a new political cleavage in Greek politics (Lyrintzis, ). George Papandreou’s government did not fully grasp the consequences of its decision to accept and sign the MoU. It can be argued that it was a grave strategic error to confront the crisis by relying exclusively on its own parliamentary majority and thus taking full responsibility for the management of the crisis (Lyrintzis, ). Of course, at the time it was very difficult to anticipate the extent and the ferocity of the reaction and opposition to the Memorandum (Sotiropoulos, : –). However, the seriousness of the situation necessitated a different handling of the crisis; an alliance with other political forces could confer greater legitimacy to MoU-based austerity policies and above all minimize or share the political cost which PASOK bore in its entirety. It is possible to surmise that Papandreou’s government believed that PASOK could eventually emerge as the saviour of the country, but this soon proved wishful thinking. The PASOK government and Papandreou presented their policy as the outcome of a state of emergency, and on several occasions explicitly stated that they adopted measures they did not agree with. Their position was either the Memorandum or

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default. Moreover, the cynical acceptance that the measures were not just but they were inevitable and necessary, undermined the legitimacy of the Socialists in power and caused a major political and moral problem. This development led to a radical realignment of the traditional cleavages in Greek politics: the traditionally dominant old Left–Right cleavage has been substituted or complemented by a new one, to be for or against the Memorandum. Political forces for the MoU initially included the PASOK government and from  onwards a coalition government between ND and PASOK, while all other parties were against the Memorandum. The new cleavage, however, presented the following political antinomy or paradox: on the one hand, it created a new political front which could attract and mobilize large sections of the population; on the other hand, this new antiMemorandum camp included forces from both the Left and the extreme Right of the political spectrum, thus blurring political divisions and creating a confusing picture of the political system (Lyrintzis, ). Opposition to the Memorandum soon took unprecedented dimensions. Greek ‘indignados’ occupied the central square of Athens and mass demonstrations expressed a widespread resentment and reaction to the government’s harsh measures (Dalakoglou, ; see Chapter  in this volume). Indeed, throughout  and  the mobilizations escalated and PASOK was under extreme pressure from all opposition parties, the trade unions, and autonomous groups (Sotiropoulos, ; Katsambekis ). This situation caused significant tension within the government and the party. A considerable number of the governing party MPs refused to vote for the measures and eventually left PASOK. The government’s parliamentary majority was at risk and in November  George Papandreou’s decision to hold a referendum on the austerity measures (a decision which he immediately withdrew) caused a major political crisis and the PASOK government had to resign. A new coalition government under the technocrat Lucas Papadimos was formed with the support of both PASOK and ND MPs. This government continued with the implementation of the Memorandum and led the country to the May and June  elections. What has been described as the ‘electoral earthquake of ’ (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, ) marks not only the realignment of the Greek party system but also the collapse of PASOK’s electoral base. From almost  per cent of the vote in , PASOK’s share of the vote fell to . per cent in May  and to . per cent in June . At the same time, it marked the spectacular rise of the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αρισεράς) as the main opposition party, with . per cent of the vote in the June  election (Moschonas, ). The  elections confirmed that PASOK was associated with all the negative effects of the economic crisis and its management. It was not only the handling of the crisis that undermined PASOK but also the public image of the party during the – period. The party was torn by internal disagreements and the manner in which it supported the Memorandum and its implications was far from convincing. PASOK was involved in a paradoxical situation for a socialist party, namely, to have to accept and introduce austerity policies based on a neoliberal recipe. Repeatedly,

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PASOK’s parliamentary group had to vote for the measures prescribed in the Memorandum without fully knowing the details, and most importantly without being able to figure out the repercussions of austerity measures in Greek society. Moreover, it was not possible for the party to present any plan about the days and months to follow, nor to advance a vision for the day after the crisis. It is not surprising therefore, that many MPs and leading party members abandoned the party and most of them joined later the rising SYRIZA. George Papandreou had resigned before the  elections and PASOK had elected Evangelos Venizelos as new party leader; a competent and eloquent politician, Venizelos was closely associated with the Memorandum’s implementation, as he was a supporter of policy decisions taken during the first years of the crisis. PASOK was under pressure from both the Left and the Right and there was little to do to improve on the negative image of the party. The ND party was equally under pressure and suffered a significant decrease of its share of the vote. Nevertheless, ND was the party with the higher percentage (. per cent of the vote) in the June  election and formed a coalition government with PASOK (which obtained . per cent of the vote) and another minor party of the Centre Left. Venizelos and other PASOK members served as ministers in the governments under ND’s prime minister, Antonis Samaras, throughout the – period. The implementation of the Memorandum continued as did the worsening of the economic situation. The SYRIZA party exploited the anti-Memorandum cleavage and capitalized on the growing dissatisfaction of the electorate with the continuing austerity measures (Katsambekis, ). The SYRIZA electoral victory in  marked a total and viable change in the balance of power within the Greek Left and Centre-Left.

. T R  P

.................................................................................................................................. The economic crisis, the threat of default, and the decisions adopted initially by PASOK and later by both ND and PASOK not only caused important political changes, but also brought new elements into Greek politics related to old theoretical discussions. Clientelism, as already noted, has always been dominant in Greek politics, and PASOK exploited its own party machine and the state apparatus to enhance and consolidate its electoral basis. The allocation of favours and spoils, not only to individuals but also to specific target groups (businessmen, professionals, construction companies) was a common practice for both major parties, ND and PASOK, that dominated the post party system. The crisis, however, seriously undermined the parties’ ability to allocate favours; with the state virtually bankrupt and fiscal policy strictly dictated by Greece’s creditors, there was little room to maintain and activate effective clientelistic networks. Control of the state still allows favour to be given to particular social groups or individuals. Yet, the possibilities for the clientelistic system to reproduce itself were clearly restricted after .

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

 

As SYRIZA emerged as a serious contender for power, both PASOK and ND advanced a political discourse condemning clientelism and populism as the main causes of Greece’s problems. In fact, populism was presented as the major culprit for the country’s troubles, thus creating a new cleavage in Greek politics, that between the populists and the anti-populists. In this new divide, populism was presented not as an analytical concept, nor as a mode of political mobilization and participation. In this context, populism is associated with a political bidding to satisfy all kinds of popular demands; populism thus is used in a negative and pejorative manner, implying that the ‘people’ are misled by the populists. This approach denotes a special use of the term ‘people’: on the one hand, there is a good use of the people by the real democrats and a bad use of the term by the fake democrats, the demagogues. This was the common and rather descriptive use of the term, and it is in this way that populism acquired a central position in the political antagonisms during the era of crisis. A block of political forces joined the anti-populism front, branding their opponents as populist. Populism therefore is identified with irrationality, lies, and demagogy, whereas the anti-populists associate themselves with rationalism, realism, and responsible action. In a paradoxical and rather ironic turn, PASOK, which had in the past been accused of being populist, embraced the anti-populist discourse on the basis that the Memorandum was the responsible and rational policy option, whereas the antiMemorandum forces, most notably SYRIZA, were simply populists. According to this approach, adopted by both PASOK and ND, SYRIZA rose to power as a populist party, and once in government continued to follow the populist logic (Katsambekis, ). This is an important shift in the parties’ political discourse and it redefined the terms of political competition in Greek politics. Some further implications are worth noting. One interesting effect of the reemergence of populism is the conduct of political competition in moral terms. Indeed, political adversaries are described as liars, thieves, and irresponsible in an effort to delegitimize the opponent. This means that politics from a field of confrontation between ideas and policies, became a ground for the exchange of moral arguments. What is observed is not the moralization of politics, but rather the politicization of morality. As a result, the political debate is limited to the management of the system, and any discussion about policies, reforms, and political options is obscured by this moral discourse.

. C: G S D  S   I

.................................................................................................................................. There can be little doubt that PASOK’s emergence and performance during the last four decades marked the Greek political system and shaped the development of party politics. PASOK dominated the political scene during the s and s and

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 



its policies and political practices provoked conflicting political and theoretical interpretations. The assessment of the party’s performance in power still remains a controversial subject. It has been described as populist, especially the – period (Lyrintzis, ) and as superficial and incoherent social democracy (Moschonas, forthcoming) However, irrespective of the evaluation of PASOK’s performance, it must be noted that the party brought new elements into Greek politics and was associated with major policy decisions regarding Greece’s position in the EU. The management of the economic crisis became the battleground where PASOK’s political future was tested and the final outcome was electoral disaster. The  election and SYRIZA’s rise to power not only confirmed the realignment of the Greek party system but also showed that PASOK was cornered in an extremely difficult position. The problems were evident even before the  election. Internal disagreements were obvious, and in January  George Papandreou announced his departure from PASOK and the creation of a new party, Movement of Democratic Socialists (KIDISO, Κίνημα Δημοκρατών Σοσιαλιστών). His decision shattered PASOK and was perceived and presented as betrayal of the movement. The new party of Papandreou did not manage to achieve parliamentary representation in the January  election, but its presence certainly contributed to PASOK’s poor performance in this election (it obtained only . per cent of the vote). A few months after the January election, Venizelos resigned and Fofi Gennimata (daughter of the late George Genimatas, a prominent founding member of PASOK) was elected as the new party leader. It was a relatively easy victory for Genimata from the first round of the intra-party contest with two more well-known party members contending for the leadership. (It is estimated that , party members participated in the election). In August , PASOK formed an alliance with other minor parties of the Centre-Left under the banner of Democratic Alliance (DHSY, Δημοκρατική Συμπαράταξη). This alliance managed to obtain . per cent of the vote in the September  election which reconfirmed SYRIZA’s dominant position. Meanwhile, the Democratic Alliance entered into a long process of negotiation with the other parties of the Greek Centre and Centre-Left as well as with independent movements and personalities; the outcome of this process was the formation of a broad alliance in  under the banner ‘Movement for Change’ (KINAL, Κίνημα Αλλαγής). Fofi Gennimata was re-elected as leader of the new alliance in November ; nine candidates participated in this election and, as the first round proved inconclusive, only Gennimata and Androulakis, both PASOK members, participated in the final second round. This fact shows that, though seriously weakened, PASOK is the only political formation within KINAL that possesses an effective organizational base, and that it constitutes the backbone of this alliance. It is, however, a heterogeneous alliance, comprising not only PASOK and Papandreou’s KIDISO, but also minor parties and movements ranging from the Centre-Right to the Centre-Left, including the totally new party ‘Potami’, which was formed in 

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

 

and received  per cent of the vote in the  elections. Its objective was to cover the space between ND and SYRIZA, but this is a difficult task, given the fact that some leading members have a liberal ideological profile, while others lean on the social democratic image of society. These differences are reflected in the question of strategy: the new party will soon face the issue of future alliances, that is to cooperate with ND or SYRIZA after the election. Such problems are not exclusive to the Greek case; several European social democratic parties face similar questions. Some have decided to cooperate with the CentreRight as did the SPD in Germany. Other parties have opted for a left-wing turn, as with the British Labour Party under Corbyn. Others still face electoral decline—such as the French socialist party—as the French presidential election of  showed. Major questions and dilemmas trouble and divide social democracy. In an era where neoliberal ideas about the state, welfare politics, and privatizations are dominant in most countries, social democratic parties have to elaborate new ideas about the role and functions of the state and to advance convincing policies. Failure to do so will result in further electoral decline as their differences from their rivals—Christian democratic, popular, or conservative—gradually diminish. Moreover, in most cases social democratic parties face electoral competition from new parties which claim a position either to the centre or to the left of the political spectrum. This is evident in Greece where SYRIZA managed to achieve a spectacular rise to power in a very short period of time and to outflank PASOK as the new dominant force in the non-communist Left. This is an important topic for further research, related both to the future of European social democracy and to the final crystallization of SYRIZA’s political identity. In other words, the main question is whether SYRIZA will maintain and consolidate its position as the major force on the Greek Left and Centre-Left. Moreover, will this new dominant party adhere to mainstream social democracy or will it seek to participate in the movement for a new European Left? PASOK’s future depends on these developments; it can be argued that it will be very difficult to regain its past dominant position and that there is always the danger of further disintegration, following the path of the Italian socialist party. If SYRIZA is successful, this would lead to a party system with ND and SYRIZA as the main contenders for power. This scenario means that the new formation of Greek socialists (The Movement for Change, KINAL)—whose fragility was shown in July  when‘Potami’ left the alliance—would remain a relatively small party of the Centre and SYRIZA would occupy the position PASOK held during the s. All available evidence, including the polls, suggests that ND will come first in the  election and SYRIZA will be the dominant force in opposition. However, given that it is difficult to foresee whether ND will obtain a majority of the seats in parliament, KINAL may have a key role in deciding the coalition that could form a government. In any case, KINAL and PASOK will probably remain a minor force in the Greek party system for the foreseeable future.

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 



R De Waele, J. M., Escalona, F., and Vieira, M. (). (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan. Clogg, R. (). Greece –: The Populist Decade. London: Macmillan Press. Dalakoglou, D. (). ‘Beyond Spontaneity: Crisis, Violence and Collective Action in Athens’. City,  (): –. Eleftheriou, K. and Tassis, X. (). Η άνοδος και η πτώση ενός ηγεμονικού κόμματος [The Rise and Fall of a Hegemonic Party]. Athens: Savalas. Escalona, F. and Vieira, M. (). ‘France’. In De Waele, J. M., Escalona, F., and Vieira, M. (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, –. Katsambekis, G. (). ‘Radical Left Populism in Contemporary Greece: SYRIZA’s Trajectory from Minoritarian Opposition to Power.’ Constellations,  (): –. Kazamias, A, (). ‘Η άνοδος και η πτώση του κρατικού κομματισμού’ [The Rise and Fall of Party Statism]. In Pelagides, T. (eds.) Η εμπλοκή των μεταρρυθμίσεων στην Ελλάδα [The Logjam of Reforms in Greece]. Athens: Papazisis, –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Between Socialism and Populism: The Rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’. Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of “Bureaucratic Clientelism” ’?West European Politics,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘The Power of Populism: The Greek Case’. European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘PASOK in Power: From “Change” to Disenchantment’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece –. The Populist Decade. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘The Changing Party System: Stable Democracy, Contested Modernization’. West European Politics,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: Reassessing Causes and Effects’. Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southern Europe. London: London School of Economics. Mavrogordatos, G. (). ‘From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Mouzelis, N. (). ‘The Greek Election of ’. New Left Review, I: . Moschonas, G. (). ‘The Panhellenic Socialist Movement’. In Ladrech, R. and Marliere, P. (eds.) Social Democratic Parties in the European Union. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, –. Moschonas, G. (). ‘A New Left in Greece: PASOK’s fall and SYRIZA’s rise’. Dissent Magazine, Autumn. Moschonas, G. (forthcoming). ‘Superficial Social Democracy: PASOK, the State and the Shipwreck of the Greek economy’. In Lazar, M. and Fulla, M. (eds.) Socialism, Socialists and the State in Western Europe th-st centuries. London: Palgrave, Chapter . Nikolakopoulos, I. (). ‘Elections and Voters, –: Old Cleavages and New Issues’. In Featherstone, K. (ed.) Politics and Policy in Greece. London: Routledge, –. Pantazopoulos, A. (). Με τους πολίτες κατά του λαού. Το ΠΑΣΟΚ της νέας εποχής [With the Citizens against the People. The PASOK of the New Era]. Athens: Estia. Papadopoulos, I. (). Dynamique du discours politique et conquete du pouvoir. Le cas du PASOK –. Berne: Peter Lang.

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Sotiropoulos, D. (). Η κορυφή του πελατειακού κράτους [The Peak of the Patronage State]. Athens: Potamos. Sotiropoulos, D. (). ‘Greece’. In De Waele, J., Escalona, F., and Vieira, M. (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Sotiropoulos, D. (). ‘Triumph and Collapse: PASOK in the Wake of the Crisis in Greece, –’. In Bailey, D., de Waele, J., Escalona, F., and Vieira, M. (eds.) European Social Democracy during the Global Economic Crisis: Renovation or Resignation? Manchester: Manchester University Press, –. Spourdalakis, M. (). The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party. London and New York: Routledge. Spourdalakis, M. (). “Από το κίνημα διαμαρτυρίας στο Νέο ΠΑΣΟΚ” (From a Protest Movement to the New PASOK). In Spourdalakis, M. (ed.) ΠΑΣΟΚ. Κόμμα – κράτος – κοινωνία, (PASOK. Party – State – Society). Athens: Patakis, –. Voulgaris, Y. and Nikolakopoulos I. (). O διπλός εκλογικός σεισμός του  (The Double Electoral Earthquake of ). Athens, Themelio.

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        ......................................................................................................................

  

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T economic crisis, and particularly the effects of austerity politics initiated by the  Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between the Greek government of G. Papandreou (president of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement) (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) and the European institutions, had a destabilizing effect on Greece’s political system. Ever since that (first) memorandum, political and social developments in Greece have been occurring at a staggering pace; time is extremely condensed. In this period, from  to the present, Greek politics has undergone a fundamental change: old allegiances have broken down and a new, more fragile party system has emerged—one that is not yet fully consolidated (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, ). In this process of realignment, the Coalition of the Radical Left party (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) (formerly KKE-Es [Εσωτερικού] and then Synaspismos [Συνασπισμός]) rose from a mere . per cent in the  parliamentary elections, to . per cent in the May  elections, and then to  per cent in the January  elections, defeating—in less than three years—the then governing New Democracy party (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), and rose to government. This was an astonishing development in all respects (Spourdalakis, ). The party’s path to government has sparked severe criticism from various and different directions. Former party members, who in late  established the Popular Unity party (LAE, Λαϊκή Ενότητα), feel that SYRIZA has completely abandoned its former leftism in order to enjoy the benefits of incumbency, while former sympathizers are surprised by SYRIZA’s rapid transformation. Even European Left Party (PEL) allies such as Melenchon have asked the PEL to expel SYRIZA from its ranks in the European parliament because it promotes harsh austerity. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας), among others, says that SYRIZA was never leftist to begin with, while representatives of the old two-party system consider SYRIZA a populist party and a threat to democratic politics. Indeed, SYRIZA is

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

 

perhaps the best case study of the dilemma confronting—and the ambiguity surrounding—radical Left politics today. In this chapter, I consider both the turbulent history and the contemporary experience of the Greek radical Left, that is, SYRIZA, focusing particularly on its incumbent period (post-). In the course of my examination I will explore a range of relevant issues: the social and political developments in Greece and the EU; the structure of political opportunities (for the concept, see Kitschelt, ); the government– opposition dynamics inherent in most parties’ life-cycle at some point in time; and the agent itself, that is, SYRIZA, with its multiple internal contradictions. The analysis of SYRIZA highlights a number of strategic issues that all Left parties face once they become significant political actors, issues that unavoidably touch on their ideological identity and the type of party they embrace. In particular, the issue of governing still remains a normative question for all radical Left parties (RLPs). Investigation of these issues opens up wider research questions, such as how European integration, crises, and austerity politics, affect national political and party systems. These are issues that are pertinent not only to the Greek case but have implications for the entire radical Left party family.

. SYRIZA   E R L

.................................................................................................................................. An examination of SYRIZA will benefit from a comparative perspective; therefore, it is best, first, to situate SYRIZA within the European radical Left, which since  has been in the process of reinventing itself (Musto, : ). The new radical Left, of which SYRIZA is a prime representative, is diverse and draws on different traditions, including those of old leftist families like the communists and the social democrats, but also new ideologies like those of the Greens and various social movements (e.g. the Global Justice Movement) (Keith and March, : ). Despite differences in ideological orientation, organizational structure, policy objectives, election performance, and government experience, all RLPs have a common agenda that is gradually becoming clearer (Amini, : ): RLPs are those to the left of social democratic parties. And although their radicalism varies in kind and degree, it is based on an aspiration to fundamentally transform capitalism, while their leftism derives from a commitment to equality and internationalism. On the European level, RLPs have become less eurorejects and more eurosceptic (Amini, : ; March, : –). Keith and March (: –) propose a classification that delineates four classes of RLPs: conservative communists (e.g. the KKE); reform communists (e.g. the Cypriot AKEL); democratic socialists (e.g. SYRIZA and Die Linke); revolutionary/extreme left (e.g. Socialist Workers Party UK). The democratic socialists, the party category that includes SYRIZA, aim towards a position distinct from both communism and social

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  



democracy. They ground their ideology in neo-Marxism, left social democracy and local socialist traditions, although at the same time they are critical of the Soviet past. This sub-category disparages both capitalism and neoliberalism, and prioritizes ecological and gender rights as much as or even more than class struggle. They envision a democratic, socialist and emancipatory society, and take an increasingly pragmatic attitude to national governing and alliances. Electorally, they try to combine traditional working-class milieus with white-collar strata; they appeal to precarious workers, and they use populist rhetoric to attract those who oppose existing elites. Their international linkages are mostly found in the PEL, the Confederal Group of the European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), and the European Anti-Capitalist Left. Any analysis of SYRIZA—and governing RLPs in general—must examine the legacy of Eurocommunism and the experience of southern European socialist parties (Sassoon, ), as these resonate heavily with current RPL ideas and practices. One fundamental premise of Eurocommunism is that socialism should be achieved through elections; for this reason it has embraced liberal democratic institutions, gradually consenting to the European integration project, albeit in a different direction and context, and accepting government responsibility (Dunphy, : –). Most south European RLPs participating in coalition governments with the socialists in the s and early s were Eurocommunist, and many were criticized for the compromises that eventually led to their social democratization (Sodara, ). In the Greek context, PASOK offers an interesting case for comparison. In the context of the post-dictatorship radical environment, and thanks also to its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou, PASOK outflanked the KKE and other radical Left formations. PASOK’s socialism—a mixture of populist radicalism and Keynesian reformism—was sufficient to co-opt a large segment of the traditional Left’s social base (Spourdalakis, ). Although PASOK rose to power using anti-imperialistic and anti-European Community rhetoric, once in government it gradually abandoned these positions (Eleftheriou and Tassis, ). Moreover, and after the dissolution of the socialist bloc in  that curbed opposition from the Left, PASOK began to follow a course of identification with the state (Vernardakis, : ). The government became independent, not only from the party, but also from PASOK’s parliamentary group and party organization in an effort to safeguard government policies.

. T H

.................................................................................................................................. Historically, the Greek Left has been marked by introversion and fragmentation (Lyrintzis, : ). This characterization continues to apply today. Among the other Left parties, there are many with Marxist leanings as well as several with revolutionary and extremist Left tendencies (Kassimeris, ). In , Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia caused the KKE to split into two parties: the KKE and the KKE-Es. The KKE comprised those cadres and voters remaining loyal to Moscow many

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 

of whom remained in exile until the country’s democratization in , while the KKE-Es consisted mainly of party cadres operating illegally inside Greece under a Eurocommunist banner (Clogg, : ). When in  Greece transitioned to democracy, the KKE and the KKE-Es followed two different political trajectories, ‘orthodox’ and Eurocommunist, respectively (Kalyvas and Marantzides, ). Electorally, the KKE was consistently more successful than the KKK-Es. The KKE-Es adopted a pluralist model; thus, it included a number of differing ideological factions. This stimulated heated intra-party debates and continuous internal tensions, eventually resulting in splits and exits. In  the KKE-Es split terminally into two parties, the Eurocommunist Greek Left (EAR) and the KKE-Es Reformist Left. The larger of the two, EAR, dropped the most important communist symbols, the hammer and sickle, marking its de-communization (Verney, ). In the  elections EAR joined the Coalition of Left and Progress (i.e. Synaspismos), which was formed in cooperation with the KKE. This electoral coalition dissolved two years later when the KKE withdrew. Synaspismos was then transformed into a reformist Left party with the former EAR cadres dominating, and struggled to find its place in the Greek political system for more than two decades (Vernardakis, : –). Electorally, Synaspismos hovered between  and  per cent (Table .), and as such was unable to pose any real threat to either PASOK or the KKE. Until the official founding of SYRIZA in  there was a constant fight for the soul of the party between reformists and radical leftists, each group focusing on their own ideological perceptions of their role in society (Balafas, ). By the early s the reformists gradually lost ground to the radical leftists, with some of the former leaving the party. In , at the peak of PASOK’s modernizing project (which had started in  with C. Simitis replacing Andreas Papandreou at the helm of PASOK) and on the initiative of Synaspismos, several small leftist extra-parliamentary organizations, informal groups, and independent activists formed a network to consider cooperative possibilities—the Space for Dialogue for the Unity and the Common Action of the Left (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, : –). The group set up an organizational and political framework to unite various Left forces under the guidance of Synaspismos.

Table 19.1 Synaspismos (national elections)

electoral

results

1993–2009

Year

Votes

%

Seats

1993 1996 2000 2004 2007 2009

202,887 347,236 219,880 241,714 361,101 351,627

2.94 5.1 3.20 3.26 5.04 4.6

0 10 6 6 14 13

Source: Ministry of Interior, electoral results of parliamentary elections

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

Eventually, by , all participating organizations of the Left—sixteen in total—had agreed on a common electoral platform: the Coalition of the Radical Left, the Movements and Ecology (SYRIZA). This was a coalition whose ideological origins covered all varieties of Marxism (Katsourides, : –), and in which Synaspismos was but one among many constituents. Nevertheless, it was Synaspismos that furnished SYRIZA with most of its political personnel and programmatic goals (Spourdalakis, : ). The radical leftist profile of the party was consolidated with the election of A. Alavanos as president in  followed by A. Tsipras’s election to the presidency in . Following SYRIZA’s founding congress in , when the various organizations that had been operating under a confederated party model and the ‘tendencies’ (roughly equivalent to factions) of Synaspismos ceased to exist, the party again consolidated around two poles, leftist and centrist. This dual position highlighted, yet once again, the legacy of factionalism in the party.

. T R  G: T S  P O

.................................................................................................................................. Most scholars explain SYRIZA’s rise to government as due to the sweeping effects of the economic crisis and the EU measures imposed on Greece. While this explanation is not without reason, the reality is more complex, as there were various other factors that were key to the party’s success. Most important among these are the following: the electoral dynamics of the Greek party system (Mavris ) and its structural problems including populism, clientelism, and the systemic corruption of the old two-party system in Greece and particularly social democratic PASOK (Constantinidis and Tsakatika, ; Lyrintzis, ); the strategic choices of the Left (Spourdalakis, ; Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, ); and left-wing populism (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, ). These factors played an important role and must be taken into account, leading us to conclude, therefore, that SYRIZA’s rise to power must be attributed to a combination of factors related to the prevailing structure of political opportunities, that is, the degree to which the political system is vulnerable to change. Crucial to SYRIZA’s rise was the radicalization of middle-class voters, which led to their detachment from old allegiances (particularly PASOK) and their realignment with SYRIZA (Petras, a). This radicalization and subsequent realignment were a direct result of the economic crisis, as the government was forced into accepting European Union-imposed austerity programmes (as outlined in the  and  MoUs). These reduced the country’s parliament to a mere validating body that was forced to accept decisions made by others, and left the country and its people humiliated, indignant, and angry. Government policies were unable to prevent the impoverishment of the masses. Greek governments could not guarantee a stable social consensus, and often took refuge in coercion (Tsakiris and Aranitou, ).

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 

This situation fuelled social protest movements against austerity and neoliberalism, as well as against the practices of the old political system that were exposed by the crisis: corruption, clientelism, and nepotism, for example. As a result, a radical realignment of cleavages in Greek politics took place: the traditional Left–Right cleavage was replaced or complemented by a new division—for or against the MoU—with SYRIZA the main proponent of the ‘anti-Memorandum’ discourse. The economic crisis acted as the catalyst for the destruction of the social contract that had guaranteed and legitimated the political system. This was a veritable political earthquake, and one that accelerated the fall of the old two-party system. As a direct result, the structure of political opportunities was opened up. Crucially, the economic crisis served to discredit all old political forces, and particularly PASOK. Like many other European social democratic parties, PASOK was unable to take advantage of a situation that on the surface appeared favourable (Bruff, : ). Not only did it not oppose austerity and neoliberalism, but it embraced it. PASOK implemented the Troika-mandated austerity policy from  to , either as a one-party government (–) or in a coalition with ND and DIMAR (Democratic Left, Δημοκρατική Αριστερά) (–). This was the culmination of a course that had begun many years earlier. The party’s move to the political centre and its gradual convergence with neoliberalism freed space for the growth of SYRIZA. Consequently, SYRIZA became the principal challenger to mainstream social democratic PASOK, largely because it (SYRIZA) was no longer extreme: in fact, it had adopted the policies and values abandoned by the social democrats, such as public ownership and economic interventionism. Fiscal austerity and cuts in all areas of social welfare only served to perpetuate high unemployment, recession, and a violent overturn of labour relations. In this period SYRIZA embraced the protests and offered symbolic support and valuable resources to the Greek version of the Indignados (Spourdalakis, ). Although the Indignados did not give birth to SYRIZA, they nevertheless provided the party with a favourable context for its message. SYRIZA successfully proposed a programme (discussed in the next section) that resonated with what the majority of the people wanted. Most important in this radically changed environment, SYRIZA—as many other RLPs— endorsed governing as part of their strategy.

. A ‘S  H’: A M ..................................................................................................................................

Against this backdrop, SYRIZA increasingly appeared the only viable hope for an alternative way out of the crisis. Moreover, a significant part of the electorate was open to a new vision of social change. SYRIZA challenged both the predominance of neoliberalism and the democratic deficit in the European institutions (SYRIZA, ), offering a feeling of hope that spread among like-minded forces on the continent and beyond. However, and despite its harsh criticism of the Troika and the EU, the

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party supported a leftist Europeanism. In this way it avoided colliding with the deep sense of security that Greeks felt (and feel) by being members of the European Union. As a response to urgent popular demands, SYRIZA promised a threefold plan to resist austerity politics: elimination of the Memorandum; an end to the ‘bipartyism’ of the political system; preservation of Greece’s dignity (Katsourides, : ). Its political strategy was a combination of capitalizing on favourable electoral demand factors, a willingness to take on government responsibility, and political manipulation of issue dimensions (Tsakatika, ). SYRIZA’s programme and political practice in the  elections aimed to ‘empower the powerless’. In other words, it was a strong appeal to the losers of austerity policies imposed by the MoU, that is, the wage earners in both the public and private sectors and the unemployed (Vernardakis, ). Some called this type of appeal a form of left populism (Mouffe, ; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, ). SYRIZA’s political programme promised to reverse austerity and to balance budgets through ambitious public investment. The party proposed funding this through a combination of hardline negotiating for debt relief with Greece’s creditors, restructuring the broken tax system, and eliminating government corruption. In terms of organization, Spourdalakis (: ) argues that SYRIZA purposely adopted a party model that suited emerging social developments, describing it as a ‘mass connective party’ model; Gray (: ) described the model as a key strategic choice that built trust between social activists and the party. Instead of patronizing the various movements, as the KKE used to do (Eleftheriou, : ), SYRIZA connected with them in a way that enabled it to learn and benefit from their practices and ideas (Spourdalakis, : ). SYRIZA’s coalitional structure, internal pluralism, and openness provided an organizational locus that could easily include new groups, movements, activists, and voters, as well as adapt to rapid external changes (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, : ). Promoting itself as a feasible governing alternative to mainstream PASOK and ND, SYRIZA successfully brought all these different groups together, and offered cohesion by projecting Tsipras as the unifying element of the anti-Memorandum alliance (Eleftheriou, : ). Moreover, the party created a team of pro-SYRIZA technocrats to reassure the electorate who justifiably questioned the inexperienced party’s ability to govern. In the double (critical) elections of , SYRIZA became the main party of opposition (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, ), and in January  it became the first Left government of Greece, with . per cent of the vote and  parliamentary seats. ND received . per cent and PASOK polled a mere . per cent. SYRIZA had successfully capitalized on the people’s grievances and benefited from its strategy to align with the various social movements. At the same time, however, SYRIZA also pursued a slow but advancing de-radicalization clearly associated with its (realistic) government aspirations. To capitalize on the social protests, the party discourse became less class-oriented and took on more populist tones (e.g. the increasing use of the word ‘people’ in its rhetoric), aiming to appeal to larger audiences (Moschonas, ; Balabanidis, ).

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 

. T R L  O: C  L

.................................................................................................................................. It is not an easy task to evaluate SYRIZA’s government performance: marked by multiple contradictions and opposing dynamics, the party often seems unreliable because of its many ambivalent practices and positions. Some of these contradictions originate from factors inherent to the party (e.g. factionalism), and despite the leadership’s best efforts, factions (or tendencies) continue to permeate SYRIZA (Spourdalakis cited in Gray, : ). These oppositional forces—that is, between ‘fundis’ and ‘realos’—are responsible for intra-party tension, which was arguably more intense prior to the September  elections and the split. Those who align with Fundis favour a leftist narrative consistent with the party’s history, while Realos emphasize the management of the system until a more favourable balance of power emerges. There have also been inconsistencies due to external variables and conditionalities that restrict the party’s ability to govern effectively: one important example is the MoUs that were signed by previous governments in –. Some of SYRIZA’s political choices, such as its alliances policy, are also a relevant factor of ambiguity. Their coalition since the  elections with the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a rightwing, nationalist, and sometimes xenophobic party, is characteristic. Although SYRIZA joined forces with ANEL in January  to gain a majority of seats in parliament (SYRIZA commanded  seats and ANEL thirteen in an overall -seats parliament), the two parties’ only common ground seems to be their opposition to the Memorandum. Arguably though, SYRIZA’s greatest challenge was to combine its electoral success with the radical strategy that brought it to government—in other words, to honour its pre-electoral pledges. And yet, as soon as SYRIZA was elected, it abandoned any talk of fundamental changes: it accepted the legitimacy of the country’s foreign debt, which in the past it had questioned, and accepted the Memorandum despite its promise to cancel it. Second, and related to the above, SYRIZA declared its determination to remain in the EU and the eurozone, implying an inability to formulate an independent policy. Amidst speculation of a possible GREXIT, on  February  the government requested a six-month extension on its loan repayment; the creditors agreed to four months. While the party presented this as a much-needed time extension that would offer room for negotiation, some analysts saw this as a sign of either naivety or retreat (Seferiades, ), while others viewed it as a decision to remain in power at any cost (Mpogiopoulos, ). Whatever the case, under pressure from the Troika and other European governments, the party began to move away from its promises—in much the same way that PASOK had done earlier—and followed a linear course aimed at softening its more radical policies (Katsourides, : ). After months of fruitless negotiation and futile attempts to secure loans from other sources (e.g. China and Russia)—a tactic that in fact only lessened the country’s

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

bargaining power—creditors offered Greece a bailout plan, which the government rejected, instead calling for a referendum on the proposed bailout (July ). Amidst intense polarization the Greek electorate rejected the EU proposals, and by a large majority (. per cent). Armed with the popular ‘no’, Tsipras travelled to Brussels to negotiate a better deal, but returned having accepted a third and even harsher Memorandum, claiming he had no alternative because the Greeks were attached to the euro (Petras, b). The signing of a third Memorandum, submitted to the Greek parliament in August  by the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government, represented an ideological setback for SYRIZA and was harshly received. Some called this transformation a process ‘from the absurd to the tragic’ (Kouvelakis, ); others said that it was ‘a total reversal of the popular verdict through condensed and highly opaque procedures’ (Seferiades, ); Petras (c) called it an ‘electoral fraud’. Although from a broader European perspective the Greek referendum was a symbolic victory, ‘such victories are exactly that, symbolic, and tend to not last long’ (Mudde, : ). The party itself later acknowledged—in a unanimous statement of its  Congress—that the signing of the MoU was a compromise and a strategic retreat (SYRIZA, : ). Tsipras’s U-turn is a clear example of how the experience of office can fundamentally change the way leaders strategize: while Tsipras claimed that the bailout deal he had struck was the best offer, he had earlier described a similar scenario a plan to ‘humiliate’ Greece (Hough and Olsen, ). The signing of the Memorandum tested party unity once again. For example, the SYRIZA Youth demanded Tsipras’s resignation, and SYRIZA dissidents established a new party, LAE (Popular Unity). Party differences led Tsipras to announce that the popular mandate no longer held and he called for new elections in September  with the promise of a new, parallel programme (SYRIZA, ). Eventually, however, this programme was also abandoned. By calling for elections Tsipras hoped to reinforce his position within and beyond his own party; he wanted to consolidate his power before the repercussions of his policy shift were fully felt. And as the September  election illustrated, the twenty-five SYRIZA parliamentarians who had been elected in January  and split off to form their own political party (LAE) may have been faithful to an ideologically pure political agenda but they did not eventually win any representation in the parliament elected in September . Most Greeks were tired of fighting with the EU and were anxious to move forward; in the end they saw SYRIZA’s deal as a positive move. Thus, the party kept its popular appeal: SYRIZA won a second consecutive electoral victory in September  with a vote share of . per cent and  parliamentary seats— almost equal to the vote it had obtained in January of the same year. During its time in office, the party and the government have made numerous compromises with EU institutions, presenting them as honourable agreements and establishing much-needed reforms. The government has been negotiating according to a soft neo-liberalism, aiming to control austerity for the lower social strata without coming into conflict with established power structures and practices. This was justified initially under the pretext of dealing with the humanitarian crisis, and

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 

later rationalized as a means to prevent the ND’s return to office (Katsourides, : –). The government often tried to distance itself from its own decisions, even citing blackmail as a reason for their neoliberal policies (Douzinas, ). Party rhetoric resembled that of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) in the s: it was not the time for a total rupture; the government should aim to restore the country’s development prospects and the normality of the pre-crisis era. Party policy goals were now specified as ‘effective management’ and ‘socially sensitive austerity’ instead of ‘social overthrow’ (Seferiades, ). Some scholars see this as evidence that SYRIZA is a leftist populist party undergoing a transformation: the very same conditions of economic crisis that brought the party to power, as well as the economic institutions and the material constraints, have also tamed its populism and steadily socialized the party to the standard rules of the liberal democratic regime (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser, ). As it gradually yielded to the Troika demands, the government turned to a strategy of communications management and symbolic actions: for example, they renamed the Troika the ‘institutions’. To hide their compromises the party and the government have invoked polarization and strategies of agenda change, for example, enacting legislation to guarantee the right to choose sexual identity, and initiating parliamentary investigation into past political scandals (for which SYRIZA accuses politicians of the PASOK and ND parties). Many see polarization as a fundamental pillar in SYRIZA’s populist strategy, considering its actions as a tactic to stir public opinion against representatives of the old party system, pointing out their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Tsipras himself has spoken of ‘governing parties that operated with mafia terms in the past’, referring to PASOK and ND, and has claimed that ‘their reactions often recalled those of gangsters’ (Tsipras, ). This practice has led some commentators to suggest that SYRIZA presents two faces: one face shown abroad and another in Greece (Papachristos ). In a clever turn with words, Papachristos likened this to a reproduction of the old communist exterior/interior schism of the KKE. In fact, what we see with SYRIZA is that it seems to be (at least) two parties in one. More precisely, one party represents Greece in its dealings with the EU and foreign bodies, and an entirely different party addresses the internal/local audience. SYRIZA seems to oscillate between two opposing identities: an unconventional, anti-systemic identity of the radical Left that collides with its class enemies (in Greece); and a European, Centre-Left progressive political force that wishes to project a moderate profile (abroad). This approach is combined with a defensive strategy aimed directly at their leftist audience: it constantly reiterates that only the party and the government can prevent even worse policies. In reality, the party behaves ‘as if it is any other kind of government’ (Spourdalakis cited in Gray, : ). Moreover, it seems ill equipped for the task of governing; whether this is due to naivety or lack of preparation, the party has sorely misunderstood the task of administering the state, particularly within the context of the EU. Once in government, the party adhered to an EU policy that completely ignored the power balance among the twenty-eight EU member states and EU institutions.

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  



Confronted with the reality of the bailout and austerity, the party failed to present a plausible alternative plan. Once in office, and especially after its failed negotiations with Greece’s creditors in , SYRIZA’s top priority turned to remaining in office. This is reminiscent of the government–opposition dynamics inherent in most parties’ life-cycle at some point in time. It is clear that SYRIZA has abandoned all its campaign promises regarding the Memorandum as well as many of its other promises, leading some to suggest it resembles more and more a social democratic party (Symeonides, ). Party strategy and actions seem to confirm this. In the emerging party system, SYRIZA seems to be attempting to (re)construct political life along a new dichotomy: a split between progressives and conservatives in which SYRIZA takes the progressive role (a part played in the past by PASOK). In this direction, the party (SYRIZA, : –) and government officials (e.g. Skourletis, ) have reiterated their willingness to cooperate with PASOK and other centre-leftist political forces. The underlying rationale is the need to change the European context within which RLPs operate. Unable to change the systemic properties of their own national systems, SYRIZA—as well as all RLPs— believe that they can effect such a change first in a European context in cooperation with social democratic parties, and then transmit it to their national systems. To this end, Tsipras participates as an observer in the European Socialist Party, which favours the accession of SYRIZA to their ranks. Thus, SYRIZA seems clearly to be moving towards de-radicalization; this is evident in the party’s programmatic and policy changes. It is a move made easier by the sudden growth of the party and its incorporation of cadres and voters of different ideological origins. To be fair, the SYRIZA government has had minor successes: acting on its plan to alleviate poverty, it has spread the cost of economic adjustment to the wealthier strata via more progressive taxation and stepping up efforts to collect taxes and combat tax evasion. It has improved access to health care for the most vulnerable citizens, and implemented progressive legislation (such as same-sex marriage); it further aims to target structural funding for poorer regions and youth employment, and has initiated a process for the amendment of the Constitution (Avgi, ). Nevertheless, the real economy is recovering very slowly. Lacking infrastructure, experience in crisis management and significant resources, the government has struggled to cope with governing. Moreover, the party has not only sidelined important signifiers of leftism, but it is even embracing antithetical ideologies and programmes, for example, privatizations and NATO. In the winter of –, SYRIZA converged with the EU and NATO in resolving the dispute over the name of Macedonia; although the agreement resolves in a peaceful manner a long-lasting dispute, it was primarily done in a way favourable to Western interests. Voter discontent is growing and professional groups affected by structural reforms are organizing anti-SYRIZA street protests. The strategy that brought SYRIZA to power seems to be its weakness in government. Constantly confronted with its (past) radical leftist and anti-establishment rhetoric, SYRIZA has been forced to make painful compromises at home and abroad. SYRIZA represents a

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

 

clear example of how the moderating and centripetal dynamics of government participation negatively affect a party’s radical identity.

. T P  G

.................................................................................................................................. A good working relationship between the party and government is crucial: not only to the smooth running of the government, but also to the optimal electoral performance of the party and the preservation of party identity. This last point is particularly important for RLPs that wish to underline their distinctiveness (Katsourides : –). Vernardakis (), party member, academic, and government minister, warned that to prioritize government over party would be a strategic and historic mistake since it would undermine the party’s ability to maintain its distinct identity and communicate with and represent society. In practice though, many party actions/non-actions not only weakened party organization but also contributed to cartelization, for example, appointing party cadres to government positions, the inertia of party organs, etc. Thus, it reproduced post-democratic trends whereby the party in government sidelines other components of the party (Papadopoulou and Spourdalakis, ). Once in office, SYRIZA emphasized parliamentary strategy over social activism and shifted to a leader-based party with a more passive membership (Spourdalakis cited in Gray, : ). The party became dependent on the government instead of taking the initiative, running checks on the government, and pushing the leader to comply with the party constitution. At the same time, the party bureaucracy functioned as a shadow government, eventually weakening the party’s collective bodies (SYRIZA, : ). Just a few government officials, without consulting party organs, took all strategic decisions. Party functions and collective bodies were gradually replaced by experts and communication professionals, while the membership was reduced to being ‘cheerleaders’ of the leadership; there was no longer any strong ideological basis for party policies and strategies (Seferiades, ). In this way, there was no longer any mechanism for organizational and/or ideological processes that could lead to further development (Katsourides, ). The party’s stunted organizational development resulted in the greater importance of the central party and top leadership (Eleftheriou, : ). This is evident in Tsipras’s systematic promotion of himself—following his victory in the  elections—as a ‘responsible’ prime minister, who was not under party control, but who functioned as a ‘representative of the nation’ as a whole. Moreover, the fact that in  and  Tsipras was elected president by the party congress essentially means that he has been (and is) unchecked by any collective body since his legitimation derives directly from the highest party organ. A personalization/presidentialization of party politics is largely at work in this regard. All the above, taken together, indicate an alienation of the SYRIZA leadership from the party’s radical identity (Spourdalakis, ). Governmentalism has taken over the party.

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  



. C: P  S  D

.................................................................................................................................. In this chapter I have examined the Greek radical Left party SYRIZA, both historically and as it functions today, with a focus on its governing experience. SYRIZA rose to power by capitalizing on a favourable structure of political opportunities, which included, among others, the discredit of mainstream political parties and particularly PASOK, the failures of the old party system (corruption, nepotism, etc.), and above all, the social implications of the economic crisis. SYRIZA’s  victory highlighted how five years of fiscal orthodoxy in Europe, and particularly in Greece, had turned politics upside down. For the first time in European Union history, a ‘child’ of the European crisis, an explicitly anti-austerity party, took office. SYRIZA won office because it promised to put an end to Greece’s submission to the rule of the Troika. As such, their victory was presented as the biggest challenge to the era of ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA), and it signalled the re-emergence of the Left as a political force; many anticipated the launch of a radical alternative. However, it was clear from the outset that the SYRIZA government would have trouble defending its left-wing ideology against EU institutional and political ‘conservatism’. SYRIZA understood that opposing EU policies would test not only EU limits, but also its own limits as a left-wing party. Therefore, even before the  elections, SYRIZA began to soften its more radical positions. In , the party claimed the elections on a radical Left platform, emphasizing anti-establishment ideas and promising to renegotiate austerity at any cost. Yet as the party approached power it started to resemble a party in office, moderating its stance to attract broader electoral support. In government, SYRIZA illustrated the fraught tensions between office-seeking and policy-seeking approaches: the former prioritizing winning and maintaining power, and the latter favouring the party’s staying in power until changes in the balance of forces made possible a genuine alternative to austerity. SYRIZA’s incumbency revealed the inconsistencies between its pre-electoral promises and post-electoral performance. We must look at SYRIZA’s hold on power in a very specific context if we want to understand and explain the party’s multiple contradictions and policy changes. The party claimed and took power as a vehicle of anti-Memorandum protest and not as a radical Left party. This had a defining effect on the party’s programmatic and public discourse. Unable and/or unwilling to offer policy proposals consistent with its ideology and its radical past, SYRIZA actually did little more than most political parties ever do: business as usual, to such an extent that some scholars now describe the party as non-leftist Left (Petras, a). In so doing, it lost its moral advantage against the ‘old’ mainstream parties. Indeed, SYRIZA’s rise might have been too rapid: it seems that its electoral victories have gone beyond its capacities as a political party (Gray, : ). SYRIZA’s ‘moral crusade’ against capitalism ended when it accepted the Memorandum. The party’s entire electoral programme was sidelined either explicitly or

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

 

implicitly. Despite its vocal opposition to neo-liberalism, SYRIZA has practised a (soft) neo-liberal austerity policy since , which not only contradicts its ideological profile and pre-electoral pledges, but also refutes the party’s history and past political practice. As Spourdalakis (in Gray : ) noted, the Greek Left has been defeated above all at the ideological level and this occurred at a time when the Left was in government—a worse situation than if they were in opposition. SYRIZA lacks a holistic, well-rounded ideological and political programme, and seems trapped in populist practices and symbolic politics. There are very obvious similarities between SYRIZA post- elections and PASOK in –. The party’s radicalism subsided very quickly, just as PASOK toned down its socialist ideology during its time in government. SYRIZA benefited from its anti-austerity rhetoric much like PASOK benefited from its call in the s to exit NATO and the EEC. Mudde (: ) believes that SYRIZA will play roughly the same role in the Greek party system that PASOK had played for decades, that is, providing a populist left-wing alternative to the conservative ND. SYRIZA’s practices resemble those of most European RLPs that aspire to play a role in their national political systems: they join coalition governments to counter neoliberalism and steer the governmental centre of gravity to the Left. Today RLPs neither substantially oppose liberal democracy nor do they condone revolutionary methods. Rather, these parties concentrate on short-term, pragmatic goals, although they employ abstract ideological slogans (March, : ). Their main raison d’être is no longer (r)evolution for socialism, but the preservation and enhancement of the traditional social democratic welfare consensus, protection of worker rights, and redistribution of wealth (Bale and Dunphy, : ). Like many other RLPs, SYRIZA has exhausted itself in a defensive position in the effort to avoid even worse policies. Important questions remain and are controversial: for example, does SYRIZA’s path re-enforce the idea that ‘there is no alternative’ to neoliberalism? Can radical Left politics work within the EU? Will SYRIZA re-radicalize once it leaves government, thus confirming the government–opposition hypothesis? SYRIZA’s failure illustrates the fact that the European anti-capitalist Left still needs more resolute transnational campaigns and mobilizations. The radical Left party family has still a long way to go before becoming a genuine anti-systemic movement, as the social democrats were a century ago.

R Amini, B. (). ‘Situating the Radical Left in Contemporary Europe’. Socialism and Democracy,  (): –. Aslanidis P. and Kaltwasser, C. R. (). ‘Dealing With Populists in Government: the SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition in Greece’. Journal of Democratization,  (): –. Avgi (). ‘Δύο χρόνια κυβέρνηση της Αριστεράς: Καθημερινός αγώνας για διέξοδο από την κρίση’ [Two Years in Government for the Left].  January. Available at: (accessed  January ). http://www.avgi.gr/article///dyo-chronia-kybernese-tesaristeras-kathemerinos-agonas-gia-diexodo-apo-ten-krise/ (accessed  January ).

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

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March, L. (). ‘Problems and Perspectives of Contemporary European Radical Left Parties: Chasing a Lost World or Still a World to Win?’ International Critical Thought.  (): –. Mavris, Y. (). ‘Greece’s Austerity Election’. New Left Review, : –. Moschonas, G. (). ‘Syriza’s Tremendous Path to Power’. Available at: http://www. versobooks.com/blogs/-gerassimos-moschonas-syriza-s-tremendous-pathto-power/ (accessed  January ). Mouffe, C. (). ‘Η Ευρώπη χρειάζεται δημοκρατική επαναθεμελίωση’ [Europe Must be Rebuilt More Democratically]. Efimerida Sintakton,  March. Mpogiopoulos, N. (). ‘Έχουμε να χάσουμε μόνο τις αλυσίδες μας [We Can only Lose Our Chains]. Available at: http://www.enikos.gr/mpogiopoulos/,Exoyme_na_xasoyme_ mono_tis_alysides_ma.html/ (accessed  January ). Mudde, C. (). ΣΥΡΙΖΑ: Η διάψευση της λαϊκιστικής υπόσχεσης [SYRIZA: The Falsification of the Populist Promise]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro. Musto, M. (). ‘Recent History and Contemporary Challenges of the European Radical Left’. Marxism, : –. Papachristos, G. (). Ta Nea, – December. Papadopoulou, E. and Spourdalakis, M. (). ‘SYRIZA’s Two Months in Government: Difficulties and Challenges’. Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/syrizas-twomonths-in-government-difficulties-and-challenges// (accessed  January ). Petras, J. (a). ‘The Radical Reconfiguration of Southern European Politics: The Rise of the Non Leftist Left’. Blog post. Available at: http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=,  June (accessed  January ). Petras, J. (b). ‘Syriza: Plunder, Pillage and Prostration (How the ‘Hard Left’ Embraces the Policies of the Hard Right’). Blog post. Available at: http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=,  June (accessed  January ). Petras, J. (c). ‘Greek Elections: January and September –From Hope to Fear and Despair’. Blog post. Available at: http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=/ (accessed  January ). Sassoon, D. (ed) (). Looking Left. London: I. B. Tauris. Seferiades, S. (). ‘Transforming Victory to Defeat’. Blog post. Available at: http://www. huffingtonpost.gr/seraphim-seferiades/-__b_.html/ (accessed  January ). Seferiades, S. (). ‘Κόμματα και κινήματα χωρίς την πολιτική; Το μοντέλο του κόμματος καρτέλ υπό το φως της εμπειρίας ΣΥΡΙΖΑ’ [Parties and Movements without Politics? The Cartel Party Model in the Light of SYRIZA’s Experience]. In Serntedakis, N. and Tombazos, S. (eds.) Όψεις της ελληνικής κρίσης: συγκρουσιακός κύκλος διαμαρτυρίας και θεσμικές εκβάσεις [Aspects of the Greek Crisis. A Contentious Cycle of Protest and Institutional Outcomes]. Athens: Gutenberg, –. Skourletis, P. (). Interview in Ta Nea Newspaper, – February. Sodara, M. J. (). ‘Whatever Happened to Eurocommunism?’ Problems of Communism, : –. Spourdalakis, M. (). ‘Left Strategy in the Greek Cauldron: Explaining SYRIZA’s Success’. In L. Panitch, L., Albo, G. and Chibber, V. (eds.) Socialist Register : The Question of Strategy. London: Merlin Press, –. Spourdalakis, M. (). ‘The Miraculous Rise of the Phenomenon SYRIZA’. International Critical Thought,  (): –.

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

Spourdalakis, M. (). ‘Becoming SYRIZA Again’. Jacobin,  January. Available at: https:// www.jacobinmag.com///syriza-memorandum-troika-left-platform-tsipras-austeritygovernment/ (accessed  January ). Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G. (). ‘Left-Wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of Syriza’. Journal of Political Ideologies,  (): –. Symeonides, C. (). ‘Εξελίσσεται ο Τσίπρας σε σοσιαλδημοκράτη;’ [Is Tsipras Turning Into a Social Democrat?]. Deutsche Welle,  August. Available at: http://www.dw.com/el/ εξελίσσεται-ο-τσίπρας-σε-σοσιαλδημοκράτη/a-/ (accessed  January ). SYRIZA (). ‘Το Πρόγραμμα της Θεσσαλονίκης’ [The Thessaloniki Programme]. September . SYRIZA (). ‘ΣΥΡΙΖΑ: Σχέδιο κυβερνητικού προγράμματος’ [A Blueprint of the Government Programme]’. August . SYRIZA (). Θέσεις της Κ.Ε. του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ προς το ο Συνέδριο [Positions of SYRIZA’s Central Committee to the nd Congress]. Teperoglou, E. and Tsatsanis, E. (). ‘Dealignment, Delegitimation and the Implosion of the Two-Party System in Greece: The Earthquake Election of  May ’. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties,  (): –. Tsakatika, M. (). ‘SYRIZA’s Electoral Rise in Greece: Protest, Trust and the Art of Political Manipulation’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsakatika, M. and Eleftheriou, C. (). ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsakiris, A. and Aranitou, V. (). ‘Can’t Pay? Don’t Pay! Civil Disobedience Movements and Social Protest in Greece during the Memorandum Era’. Paper presented at the th Alternative Futures and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester, – April. Tsipras, A. (). Interview in Efimerida Sintakton Newspaper, – March. Vernardakis, C. (). Πολιτικά κόμματα, εκλογές και κομματικό σύστημα: Οι μετασχηματισμοί της αντιπροσώπευσης – [Political Parties, Elections and the Party System: The Transformations of Political Representation –]. Athens: Sakkoulas Publishing. Vernardakis, C. (). ‘Οι εκλογές της ης Ιουνίου και οι νέες τομές στο κομματικό σύστημα’ [The June th elections and the New Cleavages in the Greek Party System]. Avgi,  June. Vernardakis, C. (). ‘Το κόμμα, η κυβέρνηση και το κράτος. Το “αμαρτωλό” τρίγωνο και οι προκλήσεις του Νέου ΣΥΡΙΖΑ’ [The Party, the Government and the State: The ‘Sinful’ Triangle and Challenges for SYRIZA]. Available at: http://www.vernardakis.gr/article.php? id=/ accessed  January ). Verney, S. (). ‘ “Compromesso storico”: Reunion and Renewal on the Greek Left’. Journal of Communist Studies,  (): –. Voulgaris, Y. and Nikolakopoulos, E. (). ‘Εισαγωγή: Ο εκλογικός σεισμός του ’ [Introduction: The Electoral Earthquake of ]. In Voulgaris, Y. and Nikolakopoulos, E. (eds.) : Ο διπλός εκλογικός σεισμός [: The Twin Earthquake Elections] Athens: Themelio, –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

           

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T Greek Communist Party (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας) is one of the strongest orthodox communist parties in Europe today and it has left a turbulent and interesting trail.¹ As a result, relevant discussions of the Greek communists have been numerous across time. Several insights have been provided concerning the split of  (e.g. Balampanidis, ; Kornetis, ; Kapetayiannis, ); the party’s subsequent political strategy in relation to state power, alliances, and programmatic discourse (Eleftheriou ; Keith and Charalambous, ; Marantzides and Rori, ; Kalyvas and Marantzides, ; Bosco, ); the mark left by the Greek Civil War on its identity (e.g. Voulgaris, ; Mavrogordatos, ); internal tensions during its most troubling period of confronting the events of – (e.g. Smith, ; Pridham and Verney, ); and the process of ideological change it underwent in this same time frame and its aftermath, concerning among other things its stance towards the process of European Integration (e.g. Charalambous, ; Dunphy, ). Often, the central message that emanates from current literature suggests that the KKE’s most distinctive turn in the metapolitefsi period (post-) is to be found in , after which point its trajectory exhibits permanence due to the empowerment of hardliners. This chapter attempts to provide an understanding of the KKE’s physiognomy across time and in comparative perspective through an approach whereby ideological narratives, schemes of mobilization, and political tactics interact, as in fact has been the case with Marxist–Leninist thought tout court. This framework allows for an exposition of the inter-relationship between ideology, organization, and strategy in the case of Greek communism.

¹ The author would like to thank Costas Eleftheriou for discussions over previous drafts of this chapter and the editors of the present handbook for their insightful suggestions.

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Although we know a lot today about the Greek communists—many books and articles have been devoted to the KKE’s turbulent history (see Spourdalakis,: )—recent and updated analyses are extant. This may suggest an impression of straight-out continuity after , or in more critical terms, self-reproducing dogmatism. But that alone would be misleading in so far as the nuances and instances of ideological revision and organizational adaptation cannot be simply subsumed under and often may appear to qualify, a political actor’s long-term profiling. For the most part and in spite of certain notable exceptions (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, ; Eleftheriou, ; Bosco, ; Vernadakis and Mavris, ), there exist insufficient accounts of the party’s mobilization structures and internal dynamics in political science literature, or their relationship with what is projected as an inflexible attitude towards the question of socialism. The limitations of the corpus of writings on Greek communism further concern a lack of conceptual clarity and causal insight as regards the number one epithet ascribed to the party: ‘rigid’ or ‘dogmatic’. As the liberal academic consensus has it, in Greece there have existed two blocs representing two political cultures, namely the ‘modernizing’ and the ‘underdog’ (see Sotiropoulos, ; Mouzelis, ; Diamandouros, ). Perspectives which have often been openly hostile towards not only the KKE but more generally the Left as a political space, view it as a constituent part of the backwards-looking, pre-modern, conspiratorial camp, opposing openness to Western influences and cosmopolitanism. Extant accounts sometimes end up mostly critiquing and trying to deconstruct the party, rather than evaluating it in a comparative light with case examples from outside Greece. Some descriptions go as far as characterizing the KKE as an ‘ethno-populist’ entity (Marantzides, ; see also Featherstone, : ). Although variations of populist rhetorical schemas are aplenty throughout the party’s history, ‘ethno-populism’ is a misused term here, which significantly downplays the communists’ differences with the nationalist Right and outshines their quintessence of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ that enabled capitalist development. This is most evident in the KKE’s approach towards the Macedonian question, both in the s and in – when the issue became highly politicized. In an attempt to synthesize perspectives, revisit contested points, and close gaps in the study of contemporary Greek communism, the chapter’s reflections cut across three thematic sections. The next section concerns the party’s historical trajectory whereby ‘critical junctures’ and evolving opportunity structures are highlighted, giving particular emphasis to the period between  and today (the metapolitefsi), and illustrating the way pre- legacies impacted on subsequent developments. The third section investigates the KKE’s strategic behaviour within the context of the Greek party system, its relation with Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) and smaller extra-parliamentary radical parties on its Left, juxtaposing the party’s political strength with its mobilization capacity and focusing on the post-crisis (– ) period especially. The KKE’s response to the European Union (EU), the ‘euro’, and neo-liberalism, as well as its broader critique

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of capitalism and imperialism are discussed in the third section, which shows how they fit into the rest of the European radical Left. In the fourth section, internal tensions and compositional developments are outlined, mapping the organizational form of the party and the key moments and logic of reconfiguration in terms of structures and decisionmaking processes. The conclusion sums up and points to future research.

. T G C S  I H L

.................................................................................................................................. A number of legacies from the pre- period have influenced the later evolution of Greek communism. One of the main historical conflicts in Greek society, which still reverberates today, was the schism between the bourgeois parties and a communistdominated Left which erupted during the Second World War and culminated in the Civil War of –. The Unified Democratic Left (EDA, Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά) was established in , two years after the end of the Civil War, as a coalition of six leftist and socialist political groups and represented ‘exactly the same political space as that which had been covered by the parties which participated in, or cooperated closely with the National Liberation Front (EAM, Εθνικό Απελευθεροτικό Μέτωπο) until the end of ’ (Nikolakopoulos, : ). Substantively, EDA was the legal expression of the KKE, an illegal entity at the time and formally not represented in EDA’s six groups. On the Left itself, a ‘dualism’ with ideological, political, and organizational aspects emerged during the s with the simultaneous existence of two party-political nuclei—the KKE from abroad and EDA in Greece (Vernadakis and Mavris,). This led to the de-alignment of the social strata and groups that the communists had managed to represent and mobilize in the s, as well as to the split of , which was the outcome of a gradual path (partly shaped by outside developments in relation to the Soviet Union) towards full blown intra-party crisis (see also Balampanidis, ; Nikolakopoulos, ). The split of the KKE at the twelfth Broad Meeting of its Central Committee, in February  in Budapest, occurred within the context of the Colonels’ junta (–). The divisions between ‘pro-Soviet communists’ and ‘Eurocommunists’ (see also Kornetis, : –) would entail long-lasting implications for the future trajectory of Greek communism and the broader radical Left. Subsequently, two communist parties operated in Greece—known as KKE and KKEInterior (ΚΚΕ Εσωτερικού). These two forces (along with EDA) cooperated on the occasion of the first elections of the metapolitefsi. On the one hand, this signalled a turning point in Modern Greek political history, as all constituent parts of the radical Left wanted to re-enter the political system projecting a strong electoral standing. On the other hand, this was a stillborn alliance, undermined from the outset by each of its constituent parts.

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Altogether, these legacies can be seen as historical traumas which cost the communist movement blood, exile, and perennial persecution, and may have subsequently contributed to a culture of mysticism, or as critical junctures that shaped its organizational and political strategy-to-be vis-à-vis other political forces. Following the dictatorship, in the environment of ‘limited but polarized pluralism’ that followed, whereby three major parties shared between them  per cent of the vote and all the parliamentary seats (Mavrogordatos, : ), the KKE was a central political player. At one and the same time, the KKE has been concerned with penetrating social and political institutions and gaining social and political capital due to its long absence from political competition (Marantzides and Rori, ), and pursuing a stabilization function that was perceived as necessary for the consolidation of democracy. The party contested elections by participating in alliances among the broader radical Left (in , , and ) and in part through a conditional cooperation with the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), both at the central and municipal level. Table . presents the electoral trajectory of Greek communism since  and charts its electoral alliances or the absence thereof. It is evident that there is a tendency

Table 20.1 The performance of the KKE in Greek parliamentary elections, 1974–2015 Elections 1974 1977 1981 1985 1989 (June) 1989 (Nov.) 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012 (May) 2012 (June) 2015 (Feb.) 2015 (Sept.)

Percentage (seats) 9.5 (8) 9.4 (11) 10.9 (13) 9.9 (12) 13.1 (28) 11 (21) 10.3 (19) 4.5 (9) 5.6 (11) 5.5 (11) 5.9 (12) 8.2 (22) 7.5 (21) 8.5 (26) 4.5 (12) 5.5 (15) 5.6 (15)

Electoral alliances (autonomy during election) Part of the coalition ‘United Left’* Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign** Autonomous Campaign** Part of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’^ Part of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’^ Part of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’^ Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign^^ Autonomous campaign^^ Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign Autonomous campaign

* With KKE-Int. and Unified Democratic Left (EDA) ** Informal cooperation with the Agrarian Party of Greece. The latter’s leader was elected to parliament but the party itself was not consolidated and barely existed. ^ with Greek Left (EAR), EDA and others. ^^ Cooperation with the small ‘Communist Renewal’ group. Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior

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 

to run autonomously in parliamentary elections; although in particular in  and , the choice to do so was not entirely autonomous itself as PASOK rejected any prospect of cooperation with the KKE. The exceptions to this trend are  and the late s. In , the Greek political crisis of the time, essentially PASOK’s crisis, may have increased electoralist incentives among parts of the ‘renewers’ (ananeotikoi), who were driven towards accommodating ‘centrist’ voters. In conjunction with the unfolding of Soviet collapse and the historical defeat of the Left, the conjucture generated internal dynamics conducive to liberalization and the opening up of the party organization, establishing the Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos or SYN, Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς και της Προόδου) and undertaking ministerial duties. The occasion on which internal divisions unravelled was the thirteenth Congress of the party in February . In June of the same year, the majority inside the KKE, led by Aleka Papariga, withdrew from SYN. The latter kept the name and evolved into a unified party under the leadership of one of the polytechnic events protagonists, Maria Damanaki. A politics of no electoral alliances is primarily a feature of the s and after, although it was selectively endorsed in the first part of the s as well, amidst fluctuating antagonism with the KKE-Interior. From a rationalist perspective, the restoration of an electoral system of reinforced proportionality—after briefly using simple proportionality—effectively removed any sort of government participation dilemma from the KKE’s calculations. PASOK’s shift to the Centre and the experience of ‘modernization’ (eksixronismos) under Costas Simitis further eliminated any such thinking. For sub-national elections, the KKE has, since the onset of Greece’s economic crisis, become unwilling to make compromises to gain office; this line was effectively adopted in  (Eleftheriou, : ). Embarking on a strategy towards a narrower social and political front, without ‘openings’, clearly had an organizational dimension of tighter discipline and control. Before then, the party drew on selective cooperation with the Democratic Socialist Movement (DIKKI, Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα, a splinter from PASOK), at the elections of  and . It cooperated centrally with DIKKI, Communist Renewal (AKOA, Ανανεωτική Κομμουνιστική Οικολογική Αριστερά, a breakaway from the ecological Left party) and Democratic Regional Union (DPE, Δημοκρατική Περιφερειακή Ένωση), a splinter from PASOK) at the elections of . Cooperation with these forces was also sought and achieved at the prefectural elections of  and . Between the pre-crisis and crisis periods, one can discern a pattern of both relative change and continuity; change in ideological orientation, historical interpretation, teleological reflection and local politics, and continuity in terms of relations with the rest of the Greek Left, in particular SYRIZA. During the economic crisis, the KKE has sought to differentiate itself from SYRIZA on a number of policy areas, as well as in terms of overall ideological and political orientation. Yet, if the  elections at the beginning of the metapolitefsi had marked the complete dominance of the KKE (. per cent and  seats) relative to its primary rival, the KKE Interior, and had ended the dispute over the inheritance of the communist electoral tradition that had been going on since the  split, this balance of power within the Greek radical space was

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reversed after the crisis, with SYRIZA rising to success in  and thereafter, and the KKE facing electoral disaster (in June ). KKE’s electoral defeat three years after the onset of the Greek crisis was the worst during the metapolitefsi, but its partial reversal in the subsequent elections of February  (from . to .) may signal that the KKE’s core base, the social space where its bureaucracy is reproduced, has survived the crisis. Following the January  elections, when SYRIZA initially became the largest party but lacked a majority to form government, the KKE refused to engage in coalition negotiations, dismissing Alexis Tsipras’s appeal as manipulative. In the subsequent elections of September , when a number of politicians and activists left SYRIZA to form Popular Unity (LAE, Λαϊκή Ενότητα) under the leadership of Panayiotis Lafazanis (a former top KKE party cadre), the KKE also avoided any meaningful political dialogue with this new party and other potential allies from the extra-parliamentary Left, such as the Anti-Capitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow (ANTARSYA, Αντικαπιταλιστική Αριστερή Συνεργασία για την Ανατροπή). The simple fact is that the KKE currently has no concrete relations with any other part of the parliamentary or extra-parliamentary Left. The separation lines between the KKE and SYRIZA have remained profound throughout the post- financial crisis, especially as far as the KKE is concerned. On one level, this sectarianism may have prevented a more cohesive and thus more convincing anti-austerity front on the Greek radical Left, and possibly set a counterforce to SYRIZA’s ‘PASOKification’ (see Chapter ). It may also have given a freer hand to the revival of traditional (civil war) anti-communism in the context of social polarization during the crisis, which has targeted the SYRIZA Government but also affects the potential communist vote. At the  July  referendum on whether to accept or reject the Troika’s credit offer in exchange for austerity and institutional reforms, the KKE campaigned for a blank/invalid vote, rejecting both options on offer as a failure to address the problem at its root. This stance may have hurt the KKE itself as it could not claim to be the rightful vehicle of the disappointed parts of the ‘no’ vote. On another level, the KKE’s adamant demarcation from SYRIZA is an instance of bounded rationality, that is, rationalistic action within the confines of ideological doctrines and ingrained partisanship, aiming above all for the party to avoid past mistakes (as in –) and suffer organizational damage that, unlike electoral defeat, may not be easily fixed again.

. I O  P R

.................................................................................................................................. What distinguishes the Greek communists from other communist parties in Europe the most is its political capital.With a few exceptions, orthodox communism and especially its revolutionary adherents after the end of the Cold War have been relegated

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 

to marginal, often minuscule forces in European party systems.Yet, the KKE deviates from this trend in its electoral strength and the relative endurance of its insurrectionist profile. This is especially so when accounting for regional and European election results, where the KKE’s vote ranges approximately between  and  per cent. Perhaps exceptionalism lies also in the KKE’s assessment of the Soviet legacy and the causal factors that drove the dissolution of ‘actually existing socialism’. In the early s, the Greek communist leadership was dismissive of the Gorbachev era and charged the Soviet reformists with accusations of succumbing to imperialist pressure and intervention, and betraying socialism. Gradually, the KKE also rejected Nikita Krutschev’s earlier leadership of the Soviet Union—officially, in the context of the assessment of twentieth-century socialism—at its eighteenth congress in . The Greek Communist programmatic platform, essentially unchanged since the fifteenth party congress of May , argues for socialism as ‘both a long-term vision and a short-term demand,’ pursuing a ‘perfectionist’ form of Marxism-Leninism through consistent adherence to the communist thinking of before the popular fronts in the s and with a sustained defence of Stalinism (Keith and Charalambous, : , ). Premised in the conceptualization of workers as playing the primary and nonsubstitutable role in rising up to forge a socialist society, under the guidance of the Communist Party, the KKE views liberal democracy, free party competition and laissez faire economics as being totally undesirable for the working class and the popular masses. In Marxist terms, the KKE addresses the lower strata of society: both the industrial and service sector salariat and the lower (and impoverished) middle strata, including precarious labourers. The party’s manifestos for the past twenty years or so make explicit reference to small- and medium-scale farmers, intellectuals, employees in small-scale industry and services, artisans, pensioners, disabled people, women, and the young. The KKE’s nineteenth congress in  concluded that Greece is ‘ready’ for socialism. The party’s new statute no longer calls for the working class to fight for the shortterm goal of ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘democratic changes’, but for an ‘anti-monopoly, anti-capitalist struggle for workers’ power’.Within this context, by  the KKE had shifted towards a more class-confrontational interpretation of its own history, revising its earlier stances for substituting national independence for the class struggle; the promotion of patriotic rhetoric over class rhetoric; and substituting anti-imperialist struggle for anti-capitalist struggle which it argued was premised in a ‘faulty’ distinction between the patriotic and the unpatriotic capitalist class.A contradiction to be noted in the KKE’s overall discourse, is that as a strictly anti-capitalist (and not simply anti-neoliberal) organization, the party is simultaneously voicing concern over the corporate asset-stripping of the Greek capitalist state and rejecting its structures and processes that see the provision of public goods and welfare as inalienable rights to be defended through Keynesian politics. Geopolitical alliances such as NATO (North Atlantic Alliance) are seen as inherently aggressive and expansionist by the Greek communists, as the military machines behind the generation of private profit itself are highly correlated with war mongering

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(polemokapilia). A number of positions naturally arise out of these views: the rejection of the participation of Greece’s military forces in‘imperialist wars’; vociferous criticism of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the dismissal of the idea of a European army; and the call for theabolition of military foreign bases in Greece and other countries (Charalambous, : –). The KKE is the only radical Left party in an (EU) member-state which calls for an immediate exit from the EU. Yet, as of recently, EU exit is considered by the party to be a corollary of ‘popular power’, not its prerequisite; without popular power an EU exit is no longer considered as a possible scenario. A more pragmatic approach between the late s and early s, conditioned by both ideological heterogeneity inside the party and a strategy of office-seeking, gave way to a fully euro-rejectionist stance, which has continued unaltered until today. Precisely, the KKE’s selflegitimation against participation in a government of the ‘broader Left’ grows out of its differences with SYRIZA (and previously SYN) on the question of Greece’s relations with the EU, its future within the eurozone (which the party, unlike SYRIZA, does not distinguish from the EU) and subsequently the issue of bankruptcy and debt. Halikiopoulou et al. () argued that the determinants of the KKE’s Euroscepticism and anti-imperialism are ‘nationalist’, the product of a left-wing civic (cultural, economic, and territorial) defence of the ethnos. Although a civic type of nationalism is evident, this is less an ideology and more how the party frames anti-imperialism discursively, evoking the notion of a people that, in Leninist belief, has the inviolable right to be sovereign and to collectively oppose subjugation and foreign, self-serving intervention. In the Greek communist interpretation, ethnic communities are entitled to their self-determination, not because they are ethnically bound together, but because global capitalism, although conducive to the emergence of national consciousness and the nation-state, also entails oppression of nations or national minorities, as part of an unequal and combined development. The differentiation of the KKE from some (the more libertarian) sections of SYRIZA, as well as the anarchists and anarchosyndicalists (anti-eksousiastikos choros) are traceable back to Lenin’s battles with Rosa Luxemburg and the Polish and Dutch Social Democrats, among other Marxists in the early twentieth century, who criticized the right of self-determination as an exercise in reformism or nationalism (see Kryukov, ). The phenomenon of diminished sovereignty—especially in the eurozone context— means that the KKE is identifying it as a problem and obstacle towards social justice. Asserting democratic forms of territorial authority responds, not to their association with a nationalist interpretation of Greek independence whereby the Greeks as an ethnic community are superior to, different from, or prouder than, other peoples, but rather to an understanding of sovereignty as a natural prerequisite for progressive change, free of neo-imperialist domination by interlocking financial institutions and belligerent military power. Where the Greek communists do exhibit an ethnocentric interpretation concerns their policy on the Cyprus problem, which has gradually become openly hostile

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 

towards the (United Nations-backed) arrangement of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as the appropriate solution to the small island’s de facto division; a plan endorsed most forcefully by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Left. In concrete terms, the KKE supports a single-state solution, which will be established through popular, bottom-up mobilization, rather than intra-imperialist alliances and contradictions involving a key role by the EU and NATO. Politically, the Greek communist position on both the  Annan Plan and the current agreed framework as confederal and therefore a priori unacceptable, places the party squarely within the rejectionist forces represented in Cyprus by the traditional ‘centrist’ Greek Cypriot parties. These deny the Turkish Cypriot community both the right to autonomy and power-sharing, as well as communal agency, viewing the Turkish Cypriots as the extension of Turkish imperialism. Moreover, Greek communism is pervaded by a cultural conservatism, most evident in the KKE’s adamantly negative position on soft drugs and its recent intervention concerning the (SYRIZA) Government’s proposed legislation on same-sex marriage (the Co-habitation Agreement). The speech of KKE MP Giannis Gkiokas in parliament when debating the issue made three key claims: that homosexuality is a personal choice which is however rooted in chronic social problems arising out of capitalist development; that the Co-habitation Agreement will open the way to the possibility of child adoption by same-sex couples, which will damage children and the reproductive process; that the nuclear, heterosexual family constitutes a stable institution of reproduction and raising children that should not be undermined or allowed to be eroded (for a critique, see Ioakimides, ). In a historical study of cultural and sexual politics among Greek leftists since the s, Papadogiannis () points out a number of features of the ‘orthodox’ mind among communist youth, which drew upon Eastern European, Soviet-era sociology and legal theory during the rise of Stalinism when Soviet policy aimed at stabilizing and strengthening the family as a social unit. These features include the notion of a ‘healthy sexuality’ whereby stable heterosexual relations sealed by marriage are projected as a constitutive part of disciplined communist party activity; a communist ethics that stigmatizes soft recreational drugs and promotes ‘education’ and ‘work’ as the recipe in avoiding their always negative, American-inspired influence; and the refusal to acknowledge youth identity as something which is self-contained because this would cancel out the all-encompassing relevance of class conflict (see also Kornetis, : –). Finally, but importantly, in communist ethics there is an additional dimension in the form of a collective conviction which sometimes induces the party towards conservativism: that the communists should be more ethical than the bourgeoisie so as to avoid being arraigned for such reasons. For the KKE in particular, which went through long periods of illegality, this has been a central element of its culture. Conservatism has often been overemphasized by commentators, however. First, because the strict framework of communist ethics did not always produce strong commitments among party supporters towards a specific lifestyle or its acceptance— especially in the early s’context of osmosis within and around the KKE between

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the old-age traditional communists who experienced exile and illegality and the young generation attracted to the party’s youth organization. Second, conservatism stems partly from economism, because all conflicts are explained by material production and can be resolved through anti-capitalist struggle. Nevertheless, the KKE and the Communist Youth of Greece (KNE, Κομμουνιστική Νεολαία Ελλάδας) officially retain an ‘ethical’ communism that reproduces radical puritans. In this light, Luke March’s () widely used typological category of ‘conservative communist’ parties, at least in so far as the KKE is concerned, is accurate, not only in capturing a highly traditional Marxist-Leninism, the Stalinist legacy and nostalgia for the USSR, but also in reflecting these ideological traits’ corresponding to cultural views, habits, and imaginaries.

. O  M

.................................................................................................................................. Organizationally, the KKE although not a mass party strictly speaking, retains today several features of this model of party mobilization akin to the Cypriot Party of the Working People (AKEL, Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού) and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). It engages in extra-parliamentary mass mobilization of politically excluded social groups (such as, political refugees or the very lowest ranks of salaried employees); it is closely tied to mass ancillary organizations which function as counter-hegemonic agencies under its control; it enforces party cohesion and discipline; it is built upon an extensive and articulate membership organization of branches, cells, bureaus, and committees; it runs a party press and other controlled channels of communication which contribute to the cultivation of a collective identity; and its internal processes—of socialization, ideological education, training, and recruitment—constrain competitive intra-party elections and favour cooptation to the leadership line. Figure . presents graphically the operational levels of the KKE’s organizational structures which take the form of three concentric circles, with the party itself at the core guiding political mobilization. Rebuilding the party organization took communists most of the s, slowly increasing the membership of the KKE’s youth organization and strengthening its presence in street demonstrations; it can safely be assumed that the KKE’s membership base has since grown (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, : ). In this period of time, the communist youth (KNE) and its student branches emulated their pre- status—as a preparatory stage for entry into the party. As KNE was being re-consolidated, the KKE heavily invested in establishing centralized, closely controlled, ancillary organizations through which it mobilized from the top down (see Eleftheriou, ; Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, ). By , the All Workers Militant Front (PAME, Πανεργατικό Αγωνιστικό Μέτωπο) formed the main labour arm of the KKE, following a popular-frontist strategy (laiko-metopiki), which was formulated between  and  upon the

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  KKE KNE* PAME (et. al)**; Peace Movement***; Popular committees^; Cultural clubs^^

* Greek Communist Youth. ** All Workers Militant Front. *** At the national level there exists the Hellenic Committee for the International Recession and Peace (EEDYE). ^ Citizen initiatives at the local level for local issues (created during the crisis period). ^^ Limited in size and scope due to financial problems and de-mobilization. These clubs are tightly connected to resistance fighters' committees.

 . The Greek communist organizational model. Source: A schematic representation of the party’s organizational structures by the author.

basis of the anti-imperialist model of mobilization and which echoed the party’s mobilization during the Civil War and its clandestine past. Beyond PAME, other collateral organizations controlled by the KKE include: the Federation of Greek Women (OGE, Ομοσπονδία Γυναικών Ελλάδας); the Pan-Hellenic Militant Rally of Professionals, Artisans, Merchants (PASEBE, Πανελλαδική Αντιμονωπολιακή Συσπείρωση EBE); the All Peasants Militant Rally (PASY, Παναγροτική Αγωνιστική Συσπείρωση); and the Students’ Militant Front (MAS, Μέτωπο Αγώνα Σπουδαστών). Except for OGE, these bodies do not operate as autonomous organizations but function as autonomous actors sometimes within and sometimes outside of the official, interest representation unions and associations in which they participate. For instance, PAME is active in the trade union movement, PASEBE in the commerce and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) association, and PASY in agricultural associations and co-ops. Indicative of the strong control of these fronts by the party leadership is the fact that they are guided by a specific member of the KKE’s Political Bureau and by the respective office of the party’s central committee (Eleftheriou, ). Yet, centralized control by the party hierarchy should not be taken to mean the total lack of internal democratic practice. Although many commentaries and analyses have stressed the lack of democracy inside the KKE, it is a democratic party by liberal

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standards. On representation, participation, competition, responsiveness, and transparency, the Greek communists appear to be much more democratic than several other non-communist parties in Europe, as well as beyond. Indicatively, the party leader, the party platform, and parliamentary candidates are always chosen through voting by selected representatives; in most cases, voting takes the form of secret ballots. The party has systematically held competitive elections for the party institutions (convention, council, or central committee), which meet periodically and can take part in selecting the party’s representatives in (a potential) cabinet, approve whether the party should join a coalition, and conduct debates about policy matters. The KKE’s website is very rich and contains information on several issues, declarations, constitutional rules, and political activities. In parallel, there are strong features of centralization inside the KKE. The concentration of political control in the Political Bureau and absolute submission to the party hierarchy, make the party resemble a ‘monolith’. This may be the result of applying democratic centralism and informal processes and rituals which favour the cooptation of party cadres by the Political Bureau and the rise of highly orthodox leaders. There is no substantive horizontal debate within the party: removing the ban on factions is never even discussed, local level meetings and local leaders are monitored by the leadership and held accountable if they fail to maintain control, and a dominating approach towards KKE-controlled organizations in the labour, student, and other movements makes social alliances a top-down pursuit. This is in contrast with SYRIZA and other European ‘new Left’ forces, from the Podemos party in Spain to the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, where there has been more reciprocal influence between the party and outside groups, movements, or unions, and more generally, openness in linkage strategy. A process of further centralization occurred at the KKE’s congress in , as the party took steps to abolish its ‘prefectural’ (district) committees, one of the four levels between party cells and the party in central office, to increase the trial period of new members from six months to one year, to tighten the conditions for the re-admission of members who were expelled or left the party and to reintroduce powers allowing the party leadership to periodically review the party’s membership to ensure that members are suitable.These steps signalled an organizational hardening and went hand in hand with the ideological revisions since the early s. Currently, reflecting the theoretical (not simply conjuncture-based) opposition to an office-seeking strategy, the Greek communist organization primarily centres on solidarity initiatives, grassroots’ resistance, disruption, and more generally social contention, all under the organizational umbrella and political control of PAME. The nine months’ strike in a steel factory in Aspropirgos, which started in November , was the most symbolic action of the KKE during the crisis. An additional outcome of communist mobilization is support for marginalized groups, such as immigrants: PAME, for example, has a specific committee on immigrants, while KKE Peace Committees, trade unions, and Popular Committees organize the provision of subsistence and various other services to immigrant families and political refugees.

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 

The KKE’s electoral influence has oscillated over time between  and  per cent of the total vote, depending on the type of election. At the national level, the average communist vote decreased by approximately one-third over four decades, that is when the pre- elections are considered against the post- elections (Moschonas, ). There is clearly a discontinuity, especially given the ‘renewal left’s’ parallel electoral rise to prominence in the s, again a phenomenon which contrasts with the pre- period (Moschonas, ). In broad terms, the sociology of the communist vote has not really changed throughout time, although some of its parts have migrated to SYRIZA. Between the  transition to democracy and today, Greek communism continues to enter parliament on the same electoral base: an electoral alliance of the (mostly lower) middle classes and the popular and working classes. During the recent economic crisis, the party’s internal ‘direction’ shifted toward wage workers (Vernadakis, ), again in line with its recent ideological revisions. The KKE vote has diachronically had an intense class character but during the crisis—indicatively at the  elections—the Greek communists scored much lower than SYRIZA in terms of class voting (Vernadakis, ), suggesting the relevance of cross-class, anti-systemic sentiments among the party’s supporters, such as anger and disappointment (Moschonas, ). At the same time, the receding of left-wing influence in universities since the s and the party’s hostility towards the new social movements in Greece and elsewhere, is directly reflected in the limited communist appeal among the younger age groups (Mavris, ) and in the gradual ageing of the KKE’s social milieu. These sociological traits may, however, have been partly reversed in the face of the Greek youth’s (further) radicalization in the light of events since the riots of  (see Karakatsanis, ; Sotiris, ).

. C

.................................................................................................................................. The argument about the Greek communists in this chapter unfolds in four directions. First, the KKE’s ‘dogmatism’, in relation to ‘the other Left’, is a rational one, if seen within the context of the (almost) sacred significance given to the communist party organization as the only potential representative of the working class, itself perceived as the exclusive revolutionary subject. This point is especially evident in the light of the party’s adamant refusal to cooperate with SYRIZA. Second, this rationalistic behaviour, as underpinned by strong organizational consolidation and a sort of ‘fetishism’ in the party itself as a long-term, even eternal vehicle of the Greek working class, has ensured a reasonable level of electoral endurance at the national and European as well as local level, and dense organizational activity in terms of both protest mobilization and solidarity-building. Third, the party’s vision of socialism has remained rather conservative in orientation, defending Stalinism, adopting a sectarian perspective, often containing nationalist

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and patriarchal undertones or articulating anachronistic cultural and social narratives. Yet, the KKE’s trajectory does not only exhibit behavioural continuity and historical recurrence, it also shows several instances of ideological and organizational adaptation. Rather, continuity is primarily a feature of the post- period and a product of the final partition between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Greek Left, something that the crisis has not altered. Still, the KKE has become more ideologically orthodox and centralist through a gradual process, which started in  and was reinforced at its nineteenth congress in . Fourth, a long-lasting and firm leadership, combined with many operational features of the classic mass party, has led to the development of an internal party oligarchy frequently utilizing sanctions on cadres and members and invoking unity in action as the best option in an alleged state of class war. In view of the above, future research into contemporary Greek communism, may focus on the following themes: the varieties of ways in which party leaderships on the Left internationally conceive of anti-capitalist politics, situating the KKE carefully in this spectrum; how party leaderships adapt and change in order to respond to the socio-political opportunity structure, and defend the party’s ideological heritage; the post-crisis electoral geography and sociology of communist voters, members and nonmembers; and the modus operandi and social relevance of the party in the national and local levels of party organization, in central office and on the ground, that is the Greek communist Left’s primary arenas of operation. Due to the primacy accorded to extra-institutional activities, the KKE’s trajectory in relation to current social conditions, in the later stages of the crisis in Greece, can be fruitfully investigated through the notions of protest and resistance, anti-systemic at their core. In this light, contemporary Greek communism is a case rich with microlevel insights about the electoral appeal, political dynamics, and organizational structures of anti-austerity mobilization and radical collective action from outside the state.

R Balampanidis, I. (). Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical Left. London: Routledge. Bosco, A. (). ‘Four Actors in Search of a Role: The Southern European Communist Parties’. In Diamandouros, P. N. and Gunther, R. (eds.) Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, –. Charalambous, G. (). European Integration and the Communist Dilemma: Communist Party Responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy. Farnham: Ashgate. Diamandouros, P. N. (). ‘Politics and Culture in Greece, –: An Interpretation’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece, –: The Populist Decade. New York: St Martin’s Press, –. Dunphy, R. (). Contesting Capitalism: Left Parties and European Integration. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Eleftheriou, C. (). ‘Κομματική στρατηγική, οργανωτική αλλαγή και εκλογική κινητοπίηση: το ΚΚΕ στις αυτοδιοικητικές εκλογές του ’. [Party Strategy, Organisational

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 

Change and Electoral Mobilisation: The KKE in the Municipal Elections of ]. Greek Political Science Review, : –. Eleftheriou, C. (). ‘Η Στρατηγική του ΚΚΕ στην ύστερη Μεταπολίτευση: μεταξύ δύο μοντέλων κινητοποίησης’ [The Strategy of the KKE in the Metapolitefsi: Between Two Models of Mobilisation]. Unpublished PhD thesis, National Kapodistrian University of Athens. Featherstone, K. (). ‘Introduction: “Modernisation” and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics’. West European Politics,  (): –. Halikiopoulou, D., Vasilopoulou, S., and Nanou, K. (). ‘The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism’. European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Ioakimides, V. (). ‘Ο έρωτας στα χρόνια του Κουτσούμπα: μια κριτική ματιά στις θέσεις του ΚΚΕ για το σύμφωνο συμβίωσης’ [Love in the Age of Koutsoumbas: A Critical Glance at the Policies of the KKE towards Gay Marriage], Huffington Post. Blog Post.  December. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/vasilis-ioakimidis/-__b_.html/ (accessed  January ). Kalyvas, S. N. and Marantzides, N. (). ‘Greek Communism, –’. East European Politics and Societies(): –. Kapetayiannis, V. (). ‘The Making of Greek Eurocommunism’. The Political Quarterly,  (): –. Karakatsanis, L. (). ‘Radicalised Citizens vs. Radicalised Governments? Greece and Turkey in a Comparative Perspective from the December  Uprising to the  Gezi Park Protests’. Journal of Contemporary European Studies,  (): –. Keith, D. and Charalambous, G. (). ‘On the (Non) Distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism: The Portuguese and Greek Communist Parties Compared’. Communist and PostCommunist Studies, (): –. Kornetis, K. (). Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the ‘Long s’ in Greece. London and New York: Berghan. Kryukov, M. V. (). ‘Self-determination from Marx to Mao’. Ethnic and Radical Studies,  (): –. Marantzides, N. (). ‘The Communist Party of Greece after the Collapse of Communism (–): From International Proletarianism to Ethno-populism’. In Backes, U. and Moreau, P. (eds.) Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe. Dresden: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, –. Marantzides, N. and Rori, L. (). ‘Μεταβαλλόμενοι σόχοι, μεταβαλλόμενες συμμαχίες: το ΚΚΕ και ο κομματικός ανταγωνισμός στην Μεταπολίτευση’ [Changing Lyrics, Changing Alliances: The KKE and Party Competition in the Metapolitefsi]. Science and Society, : –. March, L. (). Radical Left Parties in Europe. Routledge, London. Mavris, G. (). ‘Κόκκινο και μαύρο: η ιδεολογική απήχηση του κομμουνισμού και το αναρχισμού σήμερα στην Ελλάδα’ [Red and Black: The Ideological Resonance of Communism and Anarchism in Greece Today]. Public Issue. Special Issue: Political Values and Ideologies in Contemporary Greece. Available at: http://www.publicissue.gr//redblack/ (accessed  January ). Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). ‘The Greek Party System: A Case of “Limited but Polarised pluralism” ’? West European Politics, (): –.

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

Mavrogordatos, G. T. (). ‘The s Between Past and Present’. In Iatrides, J.O. and Wrigley, L. (eds.) Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, –. Moschonas, G. (). ‘Το ΚΚΕ και ο χαοτικός ΣΥΡΙΖΑ’ [The KKE and the Chaotic SYRIZA]. To Vima Newspaper,  November. Mouzelis, N. (). ‘Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political Culture’. In Constas, D. and Stavrou, T. (eds.) Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, –. Nikolakopoulos, E. (). Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία: κόμματα και εκλογές, – [Sickly Democracy: Parties and Elections, –]. Athens: Patakis. Papadogiannis, N. (). Militant Around the Clock? Left-Wing Youth Politics, Leisure, and Sexuality in Post-Dictatorship Greece, –. London and New York: Berghan. Pridham, G. and Verney, S. (). ‘The Coalitions of – in Greece: Inter-Party Relations and Democratic Consolidation’. West European Politics,  ():–. Smith, O. (). ‘The Greek Communist Party in the post-Gorbachev era’. In Bell, D. S. (ed.) Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism. Oxford: Berg, –. Sotiris, P. (). ‘Rebels with a Cause: The December  Greek Youth Movement as the Condensation of Deeper Social and Political Contradictions’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,  (): –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Revisiting the Debate on National Identities in Contemporary Greece’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Spourdalakis, M. (). ‘The Study of Political Parties in Greece’. European Journal of Political Research, : –. Tsakatika, M. and Eleftheriou, C. (). ‘The Radical Left’s Turn Towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Vernadakis, C. (). ‘The Greek Left in the  Elections: The Return to the Class Vote’. Transform Europe. Available at: https://www.transform-network.net/el/publications/ periodiko/overview/article/journal-/the-greek-left-in-the--elections-the-returnto-the-class-vote/ (accessed  January ). Vernadakis, C. and Mavris, G. (). ‘Από την “Λαοκρατία” στην “Αλλαγή”: το ΚΚΕ και οι σχέσεις με το ΕΑΜικό κοινωνικό μπλοκ –’ [From Rule by the ‘People’ to ‘Change’: The KKE and its Relations with the EAM-ian Societal Bloc, –]. Theses, . Available at: http://www.theseis.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= &Itemid= (accessed  January ). Voulgaris, G. (). Η Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης -: Σταθερή δημοκρατία σημαδεμένη από την μεταπολεμική ιστορία [Greece of the Metapolitefsi –: Stable Democracy Marked by Post-War History]. Athens: Themelio.

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  .............................................................................................................

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTERESTS .............................................................................................................

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        ......................................................................................................................

 

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    

. I

.................................................................................................................................. S of political culture contend that democracy is as much a product of institutions, that is, the formal supply-side processes in place, as it is of the predispositions and orientations of the citizenry, that is, the informal or cultural demand-side processes at play. Such theories argue that democratic stability within a given country depends largely on its culture. Countries with high levels of a civic culture (Inglehart, ) are associated with democratic stability and economic affluence because their cultural orientations are in line with the values of liberal democratic institutions. On the contrary, instability and extremism are more likely in countries with low levels of a civic culture, where parochial and pre-modern orientations have crystallized and often prevail, causing tensions with the values and institutions of liberal democracy. The key point raised in the literature with regards to the Greek case is that because Western institutions were superimposed upon traditional loyalties and communal values during the creation of the modern Greek state, Greek political culture has been characterized by a tension between, on the one hand, modern institutions and the participant values these have instilled, and on the other hand, the traditional/ parochial values of the past which often prevail. This is understood in the literature as the ‘cultural dualism’ thesis (Diamandouros, ), which distinguishes between Greece’s ‘Westernizing’ and ‘underdog’ traditions. The ‘traditional’, ‘parochial’, or ‘underdog’ orientations of Greek political culture include the personalized character of social relations, irrational distributional forms of regulating social production, collective as opposed to individualistic moral standards, and a hierarchy of social bonds from family, to kin, to village, region, and ‘Genos’ (Tsoukalas, : ). In other words, Greece exhibits low levels of a civic culture. The prevalence of traditionalist/parochial orientations has led to a weak civil society, the persistence of ethnic

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

    

nationalism, political polarization, populism, clientelistic networks, and ‘partitocracy’ (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ), all features susceptible to instability and extremism, especially at times of crisis when the system is particularly vulnerable. This is especially true in light of the  eurozone crisis, which revealed the tensions inherent within Greek political culture, alluding to the question of whether the roots of the Greek crisis were domestic or part of developments undertaken at the European level (Triandafyllidou et al., ). This chapter examines Greece’s political culture post-. Specifically, it applies the broad literature on political culture to the Greek case, focusing on Greece’s cultural dualism. Drawing on Putnam (), we discuss Greek political culture with reference to four dimensions, including types of engagement, citizenship and political equality, solidarity and the politics of consensus, and finally social structures of co-operation. Our aim is to explain the ways in which the participant and parochial elements of Greek political culture in each dimension have interacted, with the latter prevailing and shaping Greek politics post-. While the system proved surprisingly resilient during the post-dictatorship era, and Greece’s membership of the European Union entailed a process of Europeanization, the  eurozone crisis exposed its inherent tensions and systemic weaknesses, revealing its propensity for instability, extremism, and illiberalism. At the same time, however, the fragmentation of the party system and the entry of a few new political personnel have also facilitated the possibility for some reforms in the areas of human rights, minority policies, Church–State relations and foreign policy. This suggests that political culture has also evolved, illustrating that, while as the literature argues, political cultures shape democratic institutions and to a great extent determine their stability, at the same time institutions also shape political cultures.

. G’ C D

.................................................................................................................................. Political culture refers to citizens’ orientations towards the political system and their attitudes towards its processes (Almond and Verba, ). The literature distinguishes between different types of political culture. In modern democratic societies, political culture is mixed, consisting of both modern and pre-modern elements. The greater the prevalence of modern characteristics, the more ‘civic’ the culture is, and as such the more likely it is to be associated with democratic stability and economic development (Inglehart, ; Putnam, ). Scholars tend to juxtapose Western to other societies in which pre-modern orientations prevail and clash sharply with modern institutions. This ‘cultural dualism’, which sees political culture as a dialectic and a balance between modern and pre-modern parochial or traditional orientations, can be applied to the Greek case. Greek political culture tends to be characterized by a tension between traditionalist and modern orientations (Tsoukalas, ; Diamandouros, ; Stavrakakis, ). On the one hand, Greece’s ‘Westernizing’ or ‘modernizing’ culture is secular and

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

influenced by the Enlightenment; on the other hand, its ‘underdog’ culture stresses tradition and is largely influenced by the country’s Ottoman and Byzantine pasts. Part of the reason for the tensions between different orientations within Greek political culture is its limited exposure to modernizing processes that took place in the West including the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and industrialization which promoted rationalization of thought, structural differentiation, and the emergence of liberal ideas and institutions (e.g. Pollis, ). This explains why there is an obvious contradiction between liberal democratic institutions and Greek mores and norms: the construction of the modern Greek state was accompanied by the introduction of Western institutions which were to an extent incompatible with local structures (Tsoukalas, ; Diamandouros, : ; Mouzelis, ; Stavrakakis, ). Greek political culture mixes the participant orientations associated with rational institutions and the parochial political orientations prevalent in Greece’s pre-modern political culture. Such types of political culture are prone to instability and authoritarianism because of their inherent contradictions and resulting weaknesses. In other words, they lack the horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, solidarity, trust, and tolerance, and strong civic associations that scholars expect will lead to democratic stability (Almond and Verba, ). Despite these apparent contradictions, however, the Greek political system proved particularly resilient post- (Pappas, ). What is paradoxical about the Greek case is not that the system collapsed as a result of the  eurozone crisis (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, ), but rather that despite its shallow foundations, the system survived for that long. The democratic system, consolidated after , was strong enough to see the country’s membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in  ahead of other southern European countries, including Spain and Portugal, and its accession into the eurozone in , as well as a period of economic boom which lasted between the mid-s and the start of the  eurozone crisis. This system was characterized by liberal and pluralist democratic institutions (Pappas, ) as well as a stable two-party system that produced strong majority governments. During this period, the Centre-Right party of New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) and the Centre-Left party of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) alternated in government, never gaining less than  per cent of the seats in parliament combined until . As a result, very few small parties gained parliamentary representation during that time—notably the Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας), which enjoyed parliamentary representation in most Greek parliaments of the post-dictatorship era after its legalization in  (The KKE had been outlawed in , during the Greek Civil War). While Greece’s membership of the European Union (EU) entailed a process of Europeanization (Featherstone, ), which accelerated some modernizing trends, for example, infrastructural development, the introduction of information technology, and some degree of privatization, these developments appear to have been cursory (Triandafyllidou et al., ). The eruption of the eurozone crisis in  challenged

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

    

the Greek system fundamentally, altering the dynamics of party competition and revealing the weaknesses inherent in Greece’s political culture. The strong majority governments of the post- era became substituted by coalition governments within a framework of an emerging division between those forces that supported and those that rejected external financial assistance in the form of a bailout, and intervention in the form of structural reforms. PASOK imploded, giving way to the rise of the previously marginalized Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) and anti-establishment parties, including Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή) and Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες). To what extent is this political instability, resulting from the crisis, linked to the inherent contradictions within Greek political culture? And how was the political system sustained prior to the crisis despite these contradictions? In this chapter, we proceed to address these questions by drawing on Putnam’s () dimensions of civic political culture.

. T  E

.................................................................................................................................. Societal engagement refers to public interest in politics and overall participation in public affairs and the political process. Civic forms of engagement require a high degree of participation, usually linked to institutional trust and political satisfaction (Putnam, : ). Countries in which civic forms of engagement are prevalent tend to exhibit high levels of public interest and a strong civil society. The Greek case constitutes a paradox in that despite high levels of public interest in politics (Charalambis and Demertzis, ), civil society tends to be weak and underdeveloped (Demertzis, ; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ). Greek citizens tend to have a positive attitude towards politics, despite some declining trends. This has much to do with the heritage of classical Greece and the Renaissance, which have instilled the belief that Greeks are the founders of democracy (Pollis, : ). Public interest in political affairs was high in the s, as indicated in Eurobarometer surveys (Charalambis and Demertzis, ). During that period, Greek citizens participated in political discussions, maintained close affiliation with particular political parties, attended political rallies, and participated in the electoral process. Party membership, however, has dropped dramatically since the early s. Turnout in elections has been historically high in Greece—partly a product of compulsory voting. From the end of the s until the mid-s turnout was consistently over  per cent. From  to  it ranged between  per cent and  per cent. The relaxing of electoral rules in recent years as well as the disenfranchisement of various social groups as a result of the crisis have meant that turnout has dropped somewhat in recent elections. During the September  elections, turnout dropped to  per cent. This figure, however, is well over the turnout in elections in many other European

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 



democracies. In sum, despite declining trends, there is generally a positive attitude towards politics in Greece. It is, therefore, paradoxical that civil society in Greece is weak at all levels: that is, in terms of structure, impact, and membership. There is a wider sentiment of distrust towards civil society organizations (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, ) and no formal procedure for consulting them. Civil society expanded after the fall of the military dictatorship (), partly because of the strengthening of democratic institutions and partly because of EU accession (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ). However, civil society organizations remain weak, lacking independence (Sotiropoulos, ; Featherstone, ). They do not have a strong role in service delivery and have little lobbying power (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, ), unless they are connected to a political party. This is what Mouzelis and Pagoulatos (: ) term ‘partitocracy’: that is, ‘the logic of political partisanship and party clientelism [which] permeated the whole of society and undermined the specific logic of all institutional subsystems.’ This has resulted in Greek civil society being overridden to a great extent by strong partisanship and the most powerful pressure groups being insider ones, strongly associated with political parties, such as labour organizations or trade unions.

. C  P (I)E

.................................................................................................................................. In modern societies, citizens are equal, bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity, whereas pre-modern societies are characterized by vertical relations, that is, a hierarchy of authority. In Greece, pre-modern vertical hierarchies have persisted, permeating It’s modern political culture. Partly to do with the absence of Enlightenment and limited industrialization, the concept of citizenship is shaped by an ethnic as opposed to civic form of nationalism, and the resilience of traditional–parochial orientations, such as religion. Unlike in most western European countries that underwent industrialization and developed a civic type of nationalism, the official ideology of nationalism in Greece is in line with the traditional nineteenth-century core nationalist doctrine. In other words, it is based on the idea of secession from a larger political unit in a designated ethnic homeland, seeking to set up a new political independent ethno-nation. The quest for autonomy is premised on two pillars: the Greek nation is unique with its individuality, history, and destiny, and thus should be allowed to rule itself, that is, the Kantian idea of the ethic of determination; and the Greek nation is superior to other nations, because its history and destiny are that of a higher civilization. Greek nationalism has stagnated on these pillars and continues to be premised on a culture of confrontation and defiance. By retaining its parochial orientations, Greece maintained an ethnic type of nationalism. This is characterized by an emphasis on a community of birth and native culture,

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

    

organic membership, and ascriptive criteria of inclusion in the nation, including blood, creed, and language. The defining features of Greek national identity are language and religion (Mavrogordatos, ), understood as identity markers which have existed throughout the longue durée. They provide ideological justification for exclusion from the Greek nation of everyone who does not share these characteristics on ethnic grounds, that is, those not born Greek Orthodox to Greek Orthodox parents and who are not native Greek speakers. As such Greek nationalism may best be characterized as ‘ethno-exclusionary’: based on ethnic identity criteria and excluding anyone who does not meet these criteria for membership of the Greek nation. Greek nationalism tends to emphasize superiority, valour, justified hatred, anomie (Psychogios, ), and the necessity of sacrifice (Fragoudaki, ). Unlike Protestantism, which contributed to the emergence of the civic culture (Inglehart, ), Orthodoxy contributed to the persistence of parochial orientations, entrenching the traditional ethic of Greece’s cultural heritage. These trends remain present in Greek society. For example, a Pew survey carried out in October  found that  per cent of Greeks think that their culture is superior to other cultures and  per cent view religion as a key component of their national identity (Pew Research Center, ). These figures are among the highest in the EU. The same applies at the institutional level. Greek nationalism accepts the supremacy of the Greek Orthodox Church, whose power is institutionalized though the Greek Constitution’s granting of special status to this church (Chrysoloras, ; Halikiopoulou, ). According to Article . of the Constitution of Greece (), the Orthodox Greek Church is the ‘prevailing religion’ of Greece. This is in line with Greek public opinion. According to the World Values Survey data (), . per cent trust the institution of the Church, a figure significantly higher than trust in civic institutions, such as elections (. per cent), the government (. per cent), the parliament (. per cent), and political parties (. per cent). The three institutions that enjoy greater trust than the Church are the university (. per cent), the army (. per cent), and the police (. per cent).

. S   P  C

.................................................................................................................................. Communities in which citizens are active participants are characterized by a degree of mutual trust and relationships of consensus. The higher the levels of civic culture, the greater the levels of tolerance and consensus are expected to be (Putnam, : –). Greek society is characterized by conflict lines, and a simultaneous absence of robust mechanisms that would be able to forge a consensus. The elements of Greek political culture that are able to forge a consensus are those that stem from the parochial orientations, for example religion and nationalism as described above. These cut across party lines and tend to be supported by the majority of the Greek population. For example,

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according to Public Issue research on patriotism (a), a large majority of Greek people have a strong sense of national pride ( per cent), are proud of the Greek flag ( per cent), proud of the national anthem ( per cent), and have a strong love for Greece ( per cent). In addition,  per cent feel a strong sense of anger towards those who blame Greece. The same research identifies an index of patriotism according to which  per cent of the respondents describe themselves as patriots. As expected, these percentages are particularly high among those who self-identify as right wing; however, they are also high among those who self-identify as left wing. On the other hand, participatory modern democratic politics in Greece has been largely governed by polarization. These conflict lines include Left versus Right, and populism versus liberal democracy (Kalyvas and Marantzides, ; Pappas, ; Vasilopoulou et al., ). Left–Right divisions are deeply embedded, partly a legacy of the Greek Civil War of the late s and partly the product of Greece’s electoral system, which has produced a two-party system and strong majority governments for decades, reinforcing the adversarial nature of Greek politics. This has served to consolidate a political culture of confrontation, which was reinforced by the military junta (–) and permeated the post-dictatorship era. Post-, Left and Right became associated with specific political parties. This became expressed through Greece’s strong partisanship, translating into inadequate mechanisms of cooperation for the efficient provision of public services and policy implementation. The second conflict line, that is, populism versus liberal democracy, is not a new feature of Greek politics, associated only with the political effects of the  eurozone crisis. For example, PASOK’s s expansionary economic policies were pursued and justified as being in the interests of the underprivileged (Lyrintzis, : ). In this framework, populism became associated with the ‘underdog’ culture, that is, the losers of modernization (Diamandouros, ; Stavrakakis, ). The people versus the elite distinction is at the core of Greece’s ‘cultural dualism’, as often the elites and their ‘collaborators’ are framed by political parties as hegemons. Populists appeal to the fact that they themselves belong to the ‘people’ or the ‘non-privileged’ (Lyrintzis, : ). Empirical studies focusing on this topic (Pappas, ; Vasilopoulou et al., ) have shown that the populist vision of Greek society is prevalent over the liberal democratic one.

. S S  C

.................................................................................................................................. Social structures of co-operation refer to the formal and informal ways in which members of a society interact. Civic structures of co-operation are associated with democratic stability (Putnam, ). In Greece, however, structures of co-operation tend to be dominated by personalized relationships, which have entailed the entrenchment and consolidation of a clientelistic system (Tsoukalas, ; Mitsopoulos and

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    

Pelagidis, ). This cuts across Left–Right lines and party identification, and is closely associated with the populist aspect of Greek political culture (Pappas, ). At the heart of Greek political culture is thus the structural issue of political clientelism, that is, a system based on corruption, cronyism, and patronage networks. Although changing in nature, scope, and intensity over the years, clientelism is historically embedded. It has been a constant and pervasive feature of the evolution of the Greek political system dating since the pre-industrial nineteenth-century Greek state. The post-dictatorial era became characterized by over-centralized mass clientelism, that is, political organization along the lines of mass parties, a move to mass politics, the penetration by party officers of the periphery of the country, and the concentration of power at the top levels (Lyrintzis, ; Mouzelis, ; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, ; Legg and Roberts, ). Local elites became powerless unless attached to the party leader (allowing the latter to assume unprecedented power). This created a window of opportunity to decompose the clientele, yet party leaders were unwilling to undermine these structures. For instance, despite being a new party, PASOK ‘not only relied heavily on old patronage networks, but also built new ones’ (Pappas, : -). Interestingly, PASOK did not attach itself to a specific social class, despite professing radical socialism in its founding manifesto; instead, it appealed to the under-privileged in an ‘allembracive’ way (Lyrintzis, : ; Featherstone, ). Due to these embedded clientelistic networks, ideological and/or class divisions have become linked to the capacity and willingness of the party to provide patronage (Pollis, ; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, ; Trantidis, a, b). In the absence of a fully functioning and structured civil society, winning elections and controlling the state provide the winners with the ability to distribute immediate benefits in the form of employment, favours and access; it allows the large scale but particularistic distribution of ‘spoils’.. Broad policy concerns, although present, are distinctly secondary. (Legg and Roberts, : )

Essentially, this two-way rent-seeking process characterizes the relationship between voters and parties, the latter using the state to provide ‘rents’. Pappas (: ) identifies two mechanisms through which this system was sustained: a ‘state bent on handing out political rents to practically every member of society; and a party system built to ensure the distribution of these rents in an orderly and democratic way.’ These mechanisms essentially have sustained the personalized relationships and populist politics that define the parochial orientations of Greek political culture.

. I O  G P C

.................................................................................................................................. Our analysis of the various dimensions of Greek political culture so far indicates that civic features tend to be underdeveloped. Instead the parochial features are

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predominant. These include vertical hierarchies of social relations, irrational distributional forms, and an emphasis on the organic whole. In other words, we argue here that each pillar of Greek political culture stands in antithesis to the key tenets of liberalism including ‘liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, sociability, the general interest, and limited and accountable power’ (Freeden, : ). Liberal democratic institutions are weak and the political culture is underpinned by an ‘organic worldview’ which supports the ‘whole group’ (Pollis, ) as opposed to the individual or social subunits. This results in support for illiberal forms of politics, which transcend ideology. These include populism and ethnic nationalism and an opposition to individualism and individual rights, as well as disapproval for institutional mechanisms of consensus both internally and externally. During the post- era we may observe a number of instances illustrating the illiberal orientations of Greek political culture. For example, the same rights and obligations that apply to Greek citizens do not extend to religious minorities, indicating the absence of the concept of inalienable rights for all in socially inclusive politics. In practice, the special status of the Greek Orthodox Church guarantees a set of privileges for the clergy, while at the same time discriminates against non-Orthodox minorities (Halikiopoulou, ). For example, there is no official place of worship for Muslims in Greece. While permission for the construction of a mosque in Athens was finally granted in , construction has not yet begun as of the time of writing. Similar types of discrimination have been noted in the past in relation to Jehovah’s Witnesses who have had to serve prison sentences on numerous occasions for failing to carry out military service. Finally, there is the issue of the cremation of the dead. While this was legalized in , it was done so with very tight provisions: only if the deceased had previously formally declared his/her wish to be cremated and had waived their right to a Greek Orthodox funeral. The state has not created the structures to allow cremation to take place on Greek ground. As of  there are no crematoria in Greece, and relatives must instead transport the dead abroad in order to be cremated. The Greek identity card crisis of May  is another example illustrating the embeddedness of illiberal orientations of Greek political culture, in fact merging Greek nationalism and religion. The Greek identity card crisis commenced in , following a reform initiative on behalf of the Greek government to eliminate the religion field from Greek identity cards. The Greek Christian Orthodox Church opposed the reform, organizing mass rallies in Athens and Thessaloniki. During the Athens rally, the then archibishop of Athens and all of Greece, Christodoulos, finished his speech by raising the Greek flag of independence and with his back to the Greek parliament proclaimed ‘let the laws sleep’ (Halikiopoulou, ). This example is important because it shows how a parochial institution and its leader showed obvious contempt for liberal democratic institutions and were applauded and supported by large numbers of the public. More recently, the events that unfolded outside the Hytirio theatre in Athens in  also reveal the extent to which intolerance in terms of religious pluralism, freedom of speech, and the acceptance of minority views, underpins Greek political culture.

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

    

Protesters objecting to the première of Terrence McNally’s play ‘Corpus Christi’ condemned the play’s moral agenda as ‘blasphemous’ because of its portraying Jesus Christ and the apostles as homosexuals. What is revealing about this case in terms of political culture is the joint protest of members of the Church and members of the public and the Golden Dawn Party. What was at stake was not whether the moral message of the play was blasphemous; it was the issue of the acceptance of the rights of others to hold beliefs that one may disagree with. The whole incident exposed the absence of respect for pluralist ideals and individual rights. The difficulty of introducing educational reforms may also be understood through the prism of Greece’s political culture. Education is the formal means through which nationalism is reproduced and disseminated, thus perpetuating political culture from generation to generation (Gellner, ). This is particularly true of highly centralized education systems where both the curriculum and the content of textbooks are determined by the state. Greek history textbooks draw heavily on the dividing line between ‘us’ and the ‘other’ (Koulouri, ; Fragoudaki and Dragona, ). Textbooks portray the Greek nation as an organic entity that has existed since time immemorial, bound on the basis of blood, kinship, religion, and descent, and which is constantly under threat by various hostile external forces. A series of reforms regarding the content of a primary school history textbook introduced in , soon became contested on nationalistic grounds from across the political spectrum. The textbook, which offered a revisionist version of Greek history, removing obvious ethnic nationalist references, was finally withdrawn (Halikiopoulou, ). Instances revealing the illiberal orientations of Greek political culture also include Greece’s uncompromising foreign policy and the popular explosion of nationalism that some foreign-policy initiatives have triggered, provoking confrontation with neighbouring countries. A good example is the ‘Macedonian’ question. The dissolution of Yugoslavia created the emergence of newly developed independent states. Greece at the time vetoed the ability of the state known as Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), to adopt the name ‘Macedonia’, blocking its NATO entry and EU accession. This was because ‘Macedonia’ is also the name of a region in northern Greece where the country’s second largest city, Thessaloniki, is situated. Justification for this veto was made on ethnic nationalist lines: that the adoption of such a name on behalf of the neighbouring country would result in its appropriation of the Greek language, history, and heritage, and could be an irredentist move on their behalf. This led to the collapse of the ND government which was led by Constantinos Mitsotakis (–), after then minister of foreign affairs, Antonis Samaras, who was unwilling to compromise on this question, resigned, split from ND, and created a new party. This move was widely supported by the public who opposed the adoption of the Macedonia name and fervently participated in mass demonstrations with slogans such as ‘Macedonia is Greek’, ‘Μολών Λαβέ’ (alluding to the story of Leonidas and the  Spartans resisting the Persians in the fifth century ), and ‘One cannot be a Macedonian without being Greek’. Protesters waved banners depicting pictures of Alexander the Great, a symbolic figure periodically used also by Greece’s northern neighbour. Similar nationalist

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reactions were revoked in  when a war almost erupted between Greece and Turkey over a rock in the Aegean Sea known as ‘Imia’. The difficulty in achieving consensus as well as the strong nationalist sentiment among the Greek public serve again to illustrate the illiberal elements in Greek political culture.

. G P C   C  C

.................................................................................................................................. Parochial–participant societies tend to be politically unstable (Almond and Verba, ) and are prone to authoritarianism and extremism. This means that they are particularly susceptible to crises, given that the latter challenge the foundations of political systems when those are weak. The effect of the  eurozone crisis on Greece was severe. A debate was generated on whether the roots of the Greek crisis might be found in the failures of global capitalism and European processes, or whether they might be found within the context of Greek historical, cultural, and institutional developments (Vasilopoulou et al., ; Triandafyllidou et al., ). This debate notwithstanding, the most important aspects of the Greek economic crisis are its political and ideological dimensions. Ultimately, the Greek economic crisis translated into an overall crisis of democratic representation. It exposed Greece’s severe issues of governability and the limited ability of the state to mediate the effects of economic malaise and deliver on its social contract obligations (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, ). The crisis served to further reveal the prevalence of the parochial orientations of Greek political culture by fuelling Greece’s ethnic nationalism and revealing how deeply embedded, but at the same time detrimental, clientelistic networks were in Greek society. The most straightforward effect of the political crisis was the high levels of electoral volatility, which resulted in the break-up of the party system and its transformation from bipolarity to multipolarity. The inability of a single party to gain a strong majority challenged the system and its majoritarian nature, by creating the need to forge consensus through coalition governments (as was the case with successive Greek governments since ). It has also elevated previously marginal extreme and anti-establishment parties to positions of strength. One good example is the Golden Dawn Party, which received support from over , Greek citizens during the May and June  elections, gaining twenty-one and eighteen parliamentary seats out of  respectively. The party sustained its electoral presence in subsequent national and European parliament elections. The Golden Dawn Party continued to enjoy considerable electoral influence, as in the elections of January  and September  it obtained . per cent and . per cent of the total vote respectively. The party continued to enjoy support even though key party members were undergoing trial for maintaining a criminal organization.

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

    

Golden Dawn is an extreme Right party, which publicly rejects procedural democracy. Its ideology is highly nationalistic, emphasizing the superiority of the Greek nation and the ethnic markers of Greek identity, including race, blood, and creed. Golden Dawn links nationalism with its anti-establishment and populist politics by portraying the Greek nation as pure and virtuous. The nation is conceived to be under threat by domineering foreign powers and collaborationist internal elites who serve foreign interests, including Germany, the EU, the United States, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The party pledges to ‘destroy’ the old ‘rotten system’, which it associates with stagnation and corruption. Greek political culture and the official ideology of Greek nationalism contain elements that are consistent with some of the values put forward by Golden Dawn. In other words, because of its traditionalist orientation and emphasis on defiance, resistance, and the ultimate value of national self-determination for the homogenous and organically defined Greek nation, Greek nationalism has provided a cultural opportunity for Golden Dawn. While Golden Dawn seized cultural opportunities related to Greek nationalism, SYRIZA seized cultural opportunities related to populism. SYRIZA, a formerly marginalized political party on the radical Left of the spectrum, marked its electoral breakthrough in , reaching second place. In January , the party further expanded its support, won the elections, and formed a coalition government with far-Right ANEL. While these two parties came from the opposite ends of the political spectrum, what united them was their anti-elite and anti-establishment narrative consistent with the populist elements of Greek political culture as discussed above. SYRIZA offered an alternative vision for Greece premised on national pride, defiance, and an antagonism against the status quo. The party linked the dichotomy between ‘us’, that is to say, the pure people, and ‘them’, that is, the corrupt elites, to a blame-shifting narrative that associated these corrupt elites with domestic politicians and their external collaborators (Vasilopoulou et al., ). Despite the fact that SYRIZA was elected to power in early  on a populist platform and brought radical politics to the fore, at the same time, certain of its policies aimed at protecting minority rights and reaching consensus. The legalization of samesex civil partnerships was approved in  with a strong majority in parliament. In  the SYRIZA-ANEL government forged a deal on the Macedonian question, the name issue of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which has perplexed relations between this country and Greece since . However, the deal has encountered significant opposition, both from other political parties and public opinion, entailing that the success of the deal stands on precarious grounds. For example, in a survey conducted in Greece in ,  per cent of respondents stood against the agreement between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the Prespes agreement) and  per cent of respondents believed that Greece should not accept the name ‘North Macedonia’ (Public Issue, b). In November , the government also made a first move towards the separation of Church and State by proposing some changes to the ways in which the Church is funded by the state. But the situation is fluid as of the time of writing. All in all, these developments suggest that while

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traditionalist orientations of Greek political culture are still persistent and influence institutions, such orientations are also fluid and are themselves influenced by longstanding democratic institutions.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. In this chapter, we have analysed Greek political culture with reference to the literature on the civic culture and the ‘cultural dualism’ thesis. Specifically, we focused on various dimensions of political culture offered by Putnam () and examined the ways in which participant and parochial orientations interact in each dimension. We understand this interaction as an inconsistency between on the one hand, modernizing trends and on the other hand, support for parochial forms of politics premised on a collective organic worldview and opposition to individualism. In terms of types of engagement, despite an overall interest in democracy, Greek civil society tends to be weak, having been overridden to a great extent by strong partisanship. In terms of citizenship and political equality, Greek society is characterized by the persistence of pre-modern vertical hierarchies. These parochial orientations have led to the emergence and maintenance of an ethnic type of nationalism defined by language and creed. In terms of solidarity and the politics of consensus, the latter is only present when it comes to the parochial elements of Greek political culture, such as nationalism and religion. When it comes to participatory democratic politics, however, Greek society is characterized by divisions both in terms of Left and Right and in terms of populism versus liberal democratic institutions. Finally, in terms of social structures of cooperation, Greek society has tended to be dominated by personalized relationships, leading to the entrenchment and consolidations of a clientelistic system that cuts across party lines. In sum, our analysis has indicated that the civic features of Greek political culture tend to be underdeveloped. In light of this analysis, we have also examined how this struggle between the participatory and parochial orientations of Greek political culture has shaped the dynamics of post-crisis Greek politics. This analysis is based on the modernization literature that expects political culture to have an effect on institutional performance. This raises the important question as to whether the Greek crisis has been country-specific, and whether Greece has been unable to provide effective crisis management partly as a result of its parochial political culture (Diamandouros, ). However, there is endogeneity in the relationship between political culture and institutions. While on the one hand, political culture indeed plays a role in the extent to which liberal democratic institutions can function, on the other hand the endurance of these institutions also shapes political culture which is not a static, but rather a dynamic process. This suggests that further research should place the Greek case in a comparative framework, examining cases with similar cultures but different political outcomes, or similar outcomes but different levels of civic culture.

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

    

R Almond, G. and Verba, S. (). The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Charalambis, D. and Demertzis, N. (). ‘Politics and Citizenship in Greece: Cultural and Structural Facets’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies,  (): –. Chrysoloras, N. (). ‘Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture’. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism,  (): –. Constitution of Greece (). [Σύνταγμα της Ελλάδας]. Available at: https://www. hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/fca--db--fdceac/SYNTAGMA_ .pdf/ (accessed  January ). Demertzis, N. (). ‘Greece’. In Eatwell, R. (ed.) European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? London: Routledge, –. Diamandouros, P. N. (). ‘Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece’. Working Paper . Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. Diamandouros, P. N. (). ‘Postscript: Cultural Dualism Revisited’. In Triandafyllidou, A. Gropas, R., and Kouki, H. (eds.) The Greek Crisis and European Modernity. Basingstoke: Palgrave, –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The “Party-State” in Greece and the Fall of Papandreou’. West European Politics,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘Introduction: Modernisation and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics’. West European Politics,  (): –. Fragoudaki, A. (). Ο εθνικισμός και η άνοδος της ακροδεξιάς [Nationalism and the Rise of the Far Right]. Athens: Aleaxandria. Fragoudaki, A. and Dragona, T. (eds.) (). Τι είναι η πατρίδα μας; Εθνοκεντρισμός στην εκπαίδευση [What is Our Fatherland? Ethnocentrism in Education]. Athens: Alexandria. Freeden, M. (). Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gellner, E. (). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Halikiopoulou, D. (). Patterns of Secularization: Church, State and Nation in Greece and the Republic of Ireland. Abingdon/New York: Ashgate. Halikiopoulou, D. and Vasilopoulou, S. (). ‘Breaching the Social Contract: Crises of Democratic Representation and Patterns of Extreme Right-Wing Party Support’. Government and Opposition,  (): –. Inglehart, R. (). ‘The Renaissance of Political Culture’. American Political Science Review  (): –. Kalyvas, S. and Marantzides, N. (). ‘Greek Communism, –’. East European Politics and Societies,  (): –. Koulouri, C. (ed.) (). Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education. Thessaloniki: Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe. Legg, K. R. and Roberts, J. M. (). Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘The Power of Populism: The Case of Greece’. European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘The Changing Party System: Stable Democracy, Contested Modernisation’. West European Politics  (): –.

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Mavrogordatos, T. (). ‘Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case’. In Madeley, J. and Enyedi, Z. (eds.) Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, –. Mitsopoulos, M. and Pelagidis, T. (). Understanding the Crisis in Greece: From Boom to Bust. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. Mouzelis, N. (). Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouzelis, N. (). Από την αλλαγή στον εκσυγχρονισμό [From Change to Modernization]. Athens: Themelio. Mouzelis, N. and Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Post-War Greece’. Athens: Athens University of Economics and Business. Available at: https://www. researchgate.net/publication/_Civil_Society_and_Citizenship_in_Post-War_ Greece/ (accessed  February ). Pappas, T. (). ‘Patrons against Partisans: The Politics of Patronage in Mass Ideological Parties’. Party Politics,  (): –. Pappas, T. (). ‘Why Greece Failed’. Journal of Democracy,  (): –. Pew Research Center. (). ‘Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues’. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Available at: http://www.pewforum.org////eastern-and-western-europeansdiffer-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/?fbclid= IwARX_WqLHtQOCbYysbTUhmN-UbzdKIMnwyDvaZdJZKsRmPkljJps/ (accessed  January ). Pollis, A. (). ‘The State, the Law and Human Rights in Modern Greece’. Human Rights Quarterly, : –. Psychogios, D. (). Η πολιτική βία στην ελληνική κοινωνία [Political Violence in Greek Society]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro. Public Issue (a). ‘Εμπειρική μέτρηση της έννοιας του πατριωτισμού σήμερα στην Ελλάδα’ [Empirical Measurement of the Concept of Patriotism in Greece Today]. Athens: Public Issue. Available at: https://www.publicissue.gr//patriotism-/ (accessed  January ). Public Issue (b). ‘Πολιτικό βαρόμετρο , Ιούλιος . Μακεδονικό – στάσεις απέναντι στη συμφωνία των Πρεσπών’ [Political Barometer , July . The Macedonian Question—Attitudes towards the Prespes Agreement]. Athens: Public Issue. Available at: https://www.publicissue.gr//varometro-jul-/ (accessed  January ). Putnam, R. (). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece’. Hellenic Observatory Working Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe . London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Sotiropoulos, D. A. and Karamagioli, E. (). ‘Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity’. Civicus Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool. Athens: Access to Democracy. Stavrakakis, Y. (). ‘Religious Populism and Political Culture: The Greek Case’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Trantidis, A. (a). Clientelism and Economic Policy: Greece and the Crisis. London and New York: Routledge. Trantidis, A. (b). ‘Clientelism and Economic Policy: Hybrid Characteristics of Collective Action in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy  (): –.

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Triandafyllidou, A., Gropasand, R. Kouki, H. (eds.) (). The Greek Crisis and European Modernity. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Tsoukalas, C. (). ‘ “Enlightened” Concepts in the “Dark”: Power and Freedom, Politics and Society’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies  (): –. Vasilopoulou, S. and Halikiopoulou, D. (). ‘In the Shadow of Grexit: The Greek Election of  June ’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D., and Exadaktylos, T. (). ‘Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. World Values Survey data (). ‘Μακεδονικό – στάσεις απέναντι στη συμφωνία των Πρεσπών’ ’ [Pan-Hellenic survey—Report on Results September ]. Available at: https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads///wvs_.pdf/ (accessed  January ).

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        ......................................................................................................................

          

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I their well-known introduction to Greek politics, Keith R. Legg and John M. Roberts (: ) wrote that ‘if a latter-day Tocqueville were to visit Greece, he would not conclude that [it] is a country of joiners’. Most researchers have argued that Greek civil society in the post- period was ‘poorly developed’ (Mavrogordatos, ; Tsoucalas, ; Mavrogordatos, ; Mouzelis, ; Polyzoidis, ). Featherstone (: ) summed up the key conclusions of the post- academic literature on Greek politics by stating that there is a consensus that ‘civil society, as conventionally understood, is weak: participation rates are low and organisations lack independence from the state and/or political parties’. In the apt words of an analyst: ‘every social scientist studying civil society in Greece ( . . . ) agrees that [it] is cachectic, atrophic or fragile’ (Hadjiyanni, : ). However, this is not entirely true. Some social scientists have questioned the ‘underdevelopment’ of Greek civil society. Sotiropoulos () has argued that researchers fail to take into account the important informal and non-institutionalized groups. Iordanoglou () has challenged the ‘conventional wisdom’ by including in Greek civil society interest groups of various kinds like professional associations and labour unions where, quite often, participation is not entirely voluntary, and by noting that some of these organizations were particularly strong and influential in post-junta Greece. And Rozakou (: –) completely rejected Greek civil society’s ‘weakness’ narratives, claiming that the whole debate is an externally imposed public discourse, reflecting a ‘civilizing mission’ of ‘modernization’ and ‘Europeanization’ that presents the relative lack of Western-style charities and volunteers as a problem that Greece should ‘address and resolve’. There is some truth in these arguments. Indeed, informal groups—especially at the local level—were and are quite active and effective in providing social services to people in need throughout Greece. In addition, informal Not-In-My-BackYard (NIMBY)

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

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movements have at times become very influential in their localities (such as mobilizations against waste-disposal sites). Especially since the beginning of the financial crisis in , several unregistered groups have arisen spontaneously, providing goods and services to people in need. One analyst that ‘discovered’ these civic initiatives while visiting crisis-hit Athens in  enthusiastically used Hannah Arendt’s poetic description of civil society initiatives as ‘oases in the desert’ (Guisan, : ). Moreover, some associations and ‘protective groups’ have been strong enough to affect policy-making. For example, associations of disabled people have been highly effective in raising public awareness and influencing law-makers. One example of such kind of activism that appeared almost immediately after the country’s return to democracy in , is the ‘Struggle of the Blind People’ vividly portrayed in the same-titled documentary. And to a large extent, it is true that the debate about civil society in Greece was ‘imported’ in the late s from the Anglo-Saxon world, with Greek academics quarrelling about the proper way of translating it into Greek (finally κοινωνία πολιτών became the accepted term). The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first part presents empirical evidence that details the weakness of Greek civil society and examines some factors that can explain it. The second part identifies the dynamics of Greek civil society organizations since the s with specific reference to the important role of the European Union. Next, the chapter focuses on the impact of the economic crisis on Greek NGOs and informal groups. Finally, the chapter presents some challenges that the Greek case poses to academic literature on civil society and identifies issues that need further research.

. C  C S’ W ..................................................................................................................................

Since the early s, a number of reliable empirical and quantitative studies have documented the low levels of social capital, civic engagement, and associational density in Greece. The  Civicus Survey noted widespread apathy, underlining that Greek civil society organizations are few and poorly organized and have little impact and limited influence (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, ). Data collected by the European Social Survey (ESS) have also shown very low levels of interpersonal trust. In the  and  ESS rounds, Greece ranked as one of the three countries with the lowest levels of social capital in Europe; only Poland and Portugal scored slightly lower (Jones, Proikaki and Roumeliotis, : –).The World Giving Index, which is based on more than half a million interviews about donations to charities and aid organizations, volunteering time, and offering to help strangers, consistently rated Greece at the very bottom. In the  Index, Greece ranked th among  countries with just thirteen points out of a maximum score of : only  per cent of the Greeks participating in the survey had contributed money to charity and only  per cent had donated money to philanthropic causes (Danopoulos, : ).

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 



But it is not only charities and NGOs. There is ample evidence that participation in trade unions, professional associations, and other protective groups is also comparatively low. In the Composite Active Citizenship Index, which measures sixty-one indicators ranging from voter turnout to trade union membership, Greece also scored much lower than other European countries (Hoskins, ). A  Eurobarometer Report noted that Greece is one of five European countries where a majority of respondents claimed that ‘European citizens do not need NGOs’ and  per cent argued that they do not trust associations (the third highest figure in the EU). In the same survey (Eurobarometer ), only  per cent of Greeks had ever signed a petition online or on paper (the second lowest in the EU after Cyprus— per cent), a clear indication of ‘a political culture emphasizing atomistic goals attained through individual recourse to people in positions of power’ (Pridham et al., : ). Several reasons have been put forward to explain Greek civil society weakness. For many analysts, the most important factor is the dominance of political parties. Throughout the post-junta period, trade unions, student associations, and even feminist organizations and peace movements were affiliated with a political party. Mouzelis and Pagoulatos () argued that Greek civil society became the victim of ‘partitocracy’, that is, parties ‘colonizing’ the associational sphere and leaving little space for autonomous civic engagement. The Civicus report also stated that political parties have ‘absorbed’ social demands and aspirations in a way that no civil society organization could match (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli, ). The party dominance argument is linked to the state dominance explanation that focuses on the ‘dirigistic’/interventionist nature of Greek capitalism. According to Legg and Roberts (), the dominant role of the state in the Greek economy has turned politics primarily into a struggle for office, fostering clientelism. Politicians have employed an emotional nationalistic rhetoric that avoided genuine issues, leading to the polarization of the political debate and diminishing the space for the development of an autonomous civil society. This view reflects Mouzelis’s () much-cited analysis that explains the weakness of Greek civil society as a symptom of the country’s imperfect modernization, the ‘early parliamentarism and late industrialization’ argument that led to a vertical rather than horizontal incorporation of the social spectrum into politics. These views present Greece as a rather unique case—clearly distinguishable from other countries of Western Europe. Nevertheless, there are important similarities with other south European countries. Some observers have noted that there exists a ‘Mediterranean pattern’ of civil society weakness that could be explained by ‘the restriction or even prohibition of the freedom of association during the authoritarian or dictatorial regimes that these countries went through’ (Archambault, : –). Indeed, it could be argued that the dictatorship ‘inhibited’ Greek society from being influenced by a number of important civil society movements emerging in Western Europe in the late s and early s (like the May  events and the founding of ‘global NGOs’ like Medecins Sans Frontières in France).

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

 

Thus, comparative research could offer persuasive explanations of Greek civil society’s underdevelopment. Some historians, following an argument made by Putnam (), focused on the long durée, arguing that the Industrial Revolution and the social changes that it brought spread into the eastern Mediterranean with much delay, more than  years later. Historians Koliopoulos and Veremis used Ernest Gellner’s ‘segmentary society’ to describe the clans and splinter groups that were a persistent characteristic of Greek society until much of the twentieth century (Koliopoulos and Veremis, : ). This ‘extreme familism’ was characterized by much ‘bonding’ but very little ‘bridging’ social capital (Putnam, ).

. T R  C S  S  EU A

.................................................................................................................................. Whatever the causes of weakness, Greek civil society has been changing since the late s. Many new NGOs have been formed, their activities have been strengthened and widened, and people have been devoting more time and money to social activism. Environmental NGOs have been among the most active, mobilizing citizens and making their impact felt on a number of issues. Although researchers have continued to question their ability to influence policy-making (Kousis, ; Pridham et al., ; Demertzis, ), in some cases and despite their small size, Greek environmental NGOs have managed to build alliances with their European counterparts and have proved effective in raising the issue of abuse of EU subsidies. One such case was the Achelöos River diversion project where a successful NGO campaign in the mid-s persuaded the European Commission to withhold funding. This NGO campaign has contributed to making successive Greek governments—though publicly continuing to be committed to the project—more sensitive to growing public resistance to environmentally destructive projects (Close, ). By the late s, a study by Panteion University found that , NGOs were operating throughout the country, of which  per cent were established in the s (Stasinopoulou, ). There are several reasons that explain this development. Apart from wider cultural shifts like the rise of post-materialism (Inglehart, ), an important factor has been that political parties have loosened their grip on the associational sphere, leaving more space for voluntary organizations. The availability of EU funds for civil society organizations has also played a very important role. The European Social Fund and Community Programmes such as LIFE and EQUAL have financed NGO projects with hundreds of millions of euros for projects implemented throughout the country. The LIFE programme was instrumental in raising environmental awareness and helped NGOs to develop their capacity and attract public

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

support. The EQUAL programme helped to tackle discrimination in the labour market and pushed Greek NGOs to develop transnational networks. Funding for povertyalleviation projects was also important in helping disadvantaged groups. EU funds were significant in strengthening the organizational capacity of Greek NGOs. Several NGOs with weak structures and little experience of how to manage funds and implement projects became more ‘professional’, learning how to set objectives, make needs assessment, manage their human resources, monitor and evaluate their activities. Voluntary organizations with limited project experience have developed their ability to plan, create, and maintain transnational networks. EU requirements to apply sound management and bureaucratic procedures aimed at promoting accountability, efficiency, and transparency. However, in several cases, the result has been to impose on civil society organizations a ‘business’ model that acted as a disincentive to citizen participation and engagement. Fake ‘voluntary’ organizations linked to profit-making consultancies and exploiting a loose and outdated legal/ regulatory framework multiplied. Some NGOs were simply created to win EU funds. Local authorities created ‘pseudo-NGOs’ in order to create job positions for the unemployed. Moreover, EU funds fuelled a ‘dependency culture’. NGOs became indifferent to other funding opportunities, neglecting their efforts to communicate their activities to the wider public and mobilize volunteers. Thus, external funding became a disincentive to maintain and strengthen the NGO grassroots bases. The ‘upward’ accountability of NGOs to the EU and responsible state agencies increased at the expense of their ‘downward’ accountability to their members and the broader society. This, in turn, compromised their autonomy and diminished their capacity to act as a check on state power. Many NGOs became reluctant to criticize the government and its policies and neglected advocacy, focusing simply on service provision. Civil society organizations, championed in theory as agents of associative democracy, were groomed to become service-providers or sub-contractors. In some respects, EU funding for NGOs hindered rather than fostered the formation of a more autonomous and democratic society that could act as a counterbalance to the arbitrariness of state institutions and the dominance of political parties (Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras, ). Within the older NGOs, the growing professionalisation meant a shift of power from volunteers to experts and professionals. The participation of citizens and the mobilization of society were put on the back burner and hiring skilled staff became a priority. Some big NGOs began to look more and more like consultancies, with fundraising departments, press and communication officers and a hierarchy that resembled wellorganized businesses rather than bottom-up initiatives. A proposal-writing and reporting-capacity in order to secure a constant flow of funds became a conditio sine qua non for a successful organization. Moreover, faced with short project timeframes, NGOs engaged in opportunistic behaviours and chased after everything that might provide funding. At the same time, Greek state authorities found it convenient to ‘delegate’ whole sectors of social provision to NGOs. Social care for people with disabilities, drug

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addicts, asylum-seekers, and the management of national parks gradually became the sole responsibility of EU-funded NGOs. The availability of EU funding also affected NGO priorities. This is the typical ‘goal succession’ problem: in order to increase their resources, NGOs shifted their emphasis ‘away from their original goals to adapt them to public donor priorities’ (Salgado, : ). Moreover, the lack of coordination among state agencies that managed EU funds led to extensive duplication and overlap. The change of governments and ministers and the resulting switching of priorities made matters worse. Funds were shifted from environmental projects to migration and from women empowerment to Romas without a clear strategic framework (Tzifakis et al., : ). Many NGOs focused on contacting politicians, regularly visiting government offices and trying to influence funding priorities and persuade officials about the need to ‘support civil society’ (Frangonikolopoulos, : ). All these developments generated public suspicion and mistrust for NGO work. A number of scandals linked to development assistance grants provided to NGOs by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late s led to negative publicity: the Greek media presented them as ‘lamogia’, the Greek equivalent of American ‘tricksters’. Generalized and negative reporting increased the suspicion of the public even towards NGOs that did good work (Frangonikolopoulos, : ). As NGOs competed fiercely to win contracts for all sorts of projects, they ended up accusing each other of being unreliable, useless, or even ‘dirty’—in fact confirming the negative reporting. Despite all these partly negative developments, there was a growth of genuine and spontaneous civic engagement. Natural disasters have indicated a rising citizen interest for issues beyond their immediate concerns and above their family connections. In September , when an earthquake hit Athens, hundreds of NGOs and informal groups immediately mobilized to help the victims (Sotiropoulos, : ). And in summer , after a forest fire destroyed a large part of Parnitha’s National Park, NGOs initiated a campaign that mobilized thousands of citizens: demonstrators asked the government to introduce tougher legislation and take more measures for environmental protection (Botetzagias, ). Some analysts saw in these developments a belated awakening of Greek civil society on environmental issues (Botetzagias and Karamichas, ). However, other researchers remained quite sceptical about the ability of these ‘bright moments’ to launch a systematic and permanent volunteer movement (Tsaliki, : ). They argued that these short-lived campaigns should be considered as ‘activist pyrotechnics’, acts of limited long-term significance that were facilitated and ‘sexed-up’ by new information and communication technologies such as emails, blogs, and internet-based networks like Facebook. A supporting and contextual milieu to promote and, above all, sustain citizen engagement was, in this view, still missing. Family and networks of relatives continued to be ‘the basic framework of mutual aid, solidarity and cooperation’ in the country (Frangonikolopoulos, : -). The  Olympic Games were considered by the optimists as a great boost for volunteerism. The Games attracted an impressive number of volunteers: it was

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reported that the Volunteering Committee of the Games received more than , applications of which  per cent were young people under  (Frangonikolopoulos, : ). However, it should be noted that this figure also includes many applications from abroad. Moreover, these were not exactly non-paid positions: there were a number of fringe benefits for volunteers, ranging from ‘compensations’ for group leaders to a twenty-day leave for army conscripts. Moreover, the mobilization was not entirely new: sport volunteering in Greece always attracted more people than other sectors. Finally, as Greece became a migrant-receiving country, several migrant organizations were founded. Migration grew sharply in the s and Greece experienced ‘the largest proportional increase in immigration in the EU between  and ’ (Clarke, : ). A  study by Harokopion University recorded  migrant organizations, representing migrants from more than forty countries as well as from ethnic groups, including Assyrians and Kurds. Using the year of registration as an indicator, an analyst calculated that the number of migrant organizations increased tenfold in the – period (Clarke, : –). Though organized along ethnic lines, migrant associations gradually formed ‘umbrella groups’ (like the Greek Forum for Migrants) that played an important role in promoting an integration agenda that included a reform of the Greek citizenship law.

. T E C

.................................................................................................................................. The prolongation and deepening of the  economic crisis tested the limits of the social welfare system. Poverty levels, unemployment rates, and homelessness increased sharply, increasing the strain on family support networks. The economic crisis affected the development of Greek civil society. The crisis hit NGOs hard, as public funding decreased or even ceased altogether. However, at the same time, the receding welfare state raised public awareness of social needs, encouraged civic engagement, and mobilized Greek civil society. New organizations were formed and older ones became more active in providing social services to both migrants and impoverished Greeks. Further, informal social networks and self-help groups emerged and became active in exchange and distribution of goods and services, healthcare, education, food and shelter provision, offering simultaneously a more critical view towards the state and seeking alternative view of social organisation. (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, : )

A variety of organizations providing social services have been formed since , ranging from cooperatives to support networks and for social groceries to solidarity bazaars (Polyzoidis, : ; Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, ; Vathakou, ). Among them were large-scale grassroots’ initiatives like the ‘potato movement’ that

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aimed to bypass intermediaries and deliver food staples at a lower price to poor Greeks and migrants. Some argued optimistically that an ‘alternative, parallel’ economy was in the making (Pantazidou, ). A  nation-wide survey by the University of the Peloponnese provided data that showed that the number of NGO employees and volunteers was steadily increasing throughout the crisis years (https://greekcivilsocietynetwork.wordpress. com/). The OECD reported in  that ‘. per cent of Greek students aged around  volunteered at least once in the  preceding months compared to the OECD average of . per cent’ (OECD, : ). Part of these positive developments reflected a change in the stance of a significant part of the Greek Left, which previously regarded NGOs with suspicion. By the mids, both SYRIZA and to a lesser extent the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) made a ‘turn towards civil society’. This largely reflected their effort to reach new constituencies. Especially since  SYRIZA has allied itself with a number of movements (including the ‘Won’t Pay’ and the ‘Indignant’ movement that occupied central squares in Athens and other Greek cities) and NIMBY protests (among others one against a waste-disposal plan in Keratea and another one against a gold-mining investment in Skouries) in order to present itself as a ‘vanguard’ of social and political forces (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, : –). SYRIZA activists also organized food kitchens and time banks and helped ameliorate the impact of the crisis on marginalized social groups throughout the country. At the end, SYRIZA’s approach ‘which emphasised pluralism and openness to social movements proved more adept in the fluid political environment of the - period’ (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, : ). However, it seems that many of these service-providing initiatives were part of an electoral strategy in the old-fashioned party politics. Thus, following the rise of power of SYRIZA, Greek civil society witnessed lower levels of collective mobilization (Simiti, : ). Another factor was the mobilization of the Greek Orthodox Church that controls a vast network of orphanages, nursing homes, boarding schools, and food kitchens. The Church announced an increase in its philanthropic spending from  million euros in  to  million in , claiming that its social programmes had more than . million beneficiaries. However, these figures are not entirely reliable due to the Church’s fragmented structure (a large number of dioceses with dissimilar reporting methods) (Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras, : ).

. P  S S ..................................................................................................................................

There is no doubt that a very significant part of the crisis-born non-profit activities was linked to left-wing political parties and migrant associations. However, as the Greek Orthodox Church remained ‘discursively distant’ from political debates related to the crisis, largely refusing to criticize local and foreign elites or castigate policies (Makris

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and Bekridakis, ), the secular and the religious ‘civil society camps’ remained almost totally isolated from each other. Interestingly, this split had a ‘discursive’ dimension. Left-wingers preferred the term ‘solidarity’ instead of the term ‘philanthropy’ that was used by the Church and private foundations like the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (Theodossopoulos, ). This was partly ideological. The Greek Left was always quite sceptical of the proclivity to de-politicize and individualize suffering. According to this view, ‘philanthropy’ addresses some of the immediate consequences of austerity but at the same time diverts attention from the root causes of poverty and inequalities. In contrast, ‘solidarity networks’ and informal citizen initiatives aim at bringing change. Various surveys cited many examples of citizen networks seeking alternative modes of economic conduct and doing advocacy for marginalized groups (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, ; Rakopoulos, ). However, in reality ‘philanthropic organizations’ and ‘solidarity networks’ largely provided the same goods and services and differed little in the scope and content of their activities. Indeed, there were some politicised initiatives that sought ‘alternative modes’, but they were few and short lived. The split between NGOs and informal solidarity networks was mostly artificial and discursive, largely reflecting also the long-term rejection of the word ‘philanthropy’ that brought memories of the Civil War and the charitable efforts of the ‘hated’ Queen Frederica with her philanthropic ‘Child Cities’ (Danforth and Van Boeschoten, ). In reality, this discursive conflict limited cooperation among organizations and led to uncoordinated efforts with much duplication. Unfortunately, the possibly more neutral word ‘charity’ has no Greek equivalent. The deterioration of socio-economic conditions in Greece negatively affected small donations from individuals, while the adoption of fiscal consolidation policies since  brought about a diminution of state financing to the sector. However, the crisis gave rise to new sources of funding with the emergence of private foundations as the leading donors for NGO activities. Private philanthropic foundations such as the Stavros Niarchos Foundation, the Alexander S. Onassis Foundation, the John S. Latsis Foundation, or the Bodossaki Foundation had been established long before the outbreak of the economic crisis, supporting cultural and arts-related events, and environmental initiatives, and providing scholarships to students. However, their priorities changed with the multiplication of appeals by NGOs that struggled to provide support to vulnerable groups hit by the crisis. In , the Stavros Niarchos Foundation announced a  million euros programme entitled ‘Initiative Against the Greek crisis’. Within the next couple of years, the Foundation allocated another  million euros to NGO projects and actions for the youth. Moreover, several new philanthropic foundations were established: among them, TIMA Charitable Foundation in  focusing on the elderly; Solidarity Now (initially funded by the Open Society Foundation) in  and Laskarides Foundation in , both with a more general focus; as well as Hellenic Hope and Hellenic Initiative in , two organizations created and funded by the Greek diaspora (Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras, : ).

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The emergence of private philanthropic foundations as the most important donors of Greek NGOs has had an impact on sectoral priorities: NGO activities on culture, international development assistance, and education received less funding than projects on health and social inclusion. It also reinforced the ‘rent-seeking’ mentality that had already characterized civil society’s ecosystem since the early s.Many Greek NGOs continued to look for funding at the ‘top’ rather than at the ‘grassroots’, depending on big private foundations instead of citizens (Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras, : –). However, the competitive procedures that most of the foundations demanded had, as did EU funding, a positive impact on NGOs: the efficiency and effectiveness of projects increased, as monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were strengthened. Another source of funding came from the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes of large Greek enterprises. Though many companies that saw their profits diminishing were unwilling to engage in CSR activities, the banking and the metallurgy sectors have shown a growing interest (Metaxas and Tsavdaridou, ). Moreover, some private media outlets like Skai TV and radio (the ‘Oloi Mazi Mporoume’ project) have played an important role in promoting volunteerism.

. P-C C S

.................................................................................................................................. The Greek economic crisis has had a ‘mixed’ impact on organized civil society, giving rise to informal solidarity groups and networks. In economic terms, NGOs came under increasing strain. But at the same time the crisis motivated NGOs to seek ways to increase their resilience. Greek civil society organizations adopted a variety of ‘adaptation’ strategies, such as restructuring to improve effectiveness, diversifying their funding sources, giving greater emphasis on transparency to meet donor expectations, and paying more attention to communication strategies in order to promote awareness of their causes (Tzifakis, Petropoulos and Huliaras, ). The crisis seems to have strengthened Greek civil society: the dependency on EU and state funds of previous years that had constrained NGO independence and autonomy may at last have started to wane. The plight of the Greek economy was devastating, but it also brought solidarity and collective action and raised public awareness of poverty and marginalization. The number of volunteers increased, new organizations were formed, and older ones became more active in providing social services to impoverished Greeks and migrants. Importantly, the new forms of activism and engagement that are on the rise are not linked to the state. There is—probably for the first time—a civil society that is discernibly autonomous from traditional political authority (political parties, government agencies, etc.). In terms of membership, organized civil society in Greece is largely virtual (Internet), ideological (mainly left-wing), secular, progressive— especially relating to human rights issues—and young (i.e. it consists mainly of students, unemployed, and professionals in their late s and s).

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Sotiropoulos has persuasively argued that in parallel to ‘considerate’ and ‘empowered’ modes of civil society, Greece also witnessed the rise of an ‘uncivil society’: a segment of citizens mobilizing against austerity policies who ‘resorted to racist and xenophobic as well as anti-parliamentary and destructive attitudes and activities’ (Sotiropoulos, : ). Radical groups emerging from both the right and left of the political spectrum pursued violent means of political intervention, incompatible with the rest of civil society and with democratic institutions. These groups, especially after , ‘were often left unfettered to roam the central streets of Athens and—depending on their political ideology—either to attack migrants and refugees or to destroy private and public property’ (Sotiropoulos, : ). Some analysts were also quite sceptical about the importance of the positive trends. Tellingly, Simiti () has argued that the increased density of civil society ‘may be a misleading indicator of its strength’ as the economic crisis multiplied social needs, corroding the equal representation of social groups, changing the nature and patterns of civic engagement and participation and in effect and in several ways undermining civil society’s range of activism and autonomy. For example, the rise of volunteering did not only reflect feelings of solidarity strengthened by the social crisis. As Clarke () notes, the phenomenon of crisis volunteering is more ambivalent than frequently acknowledged since it also mirrors economic and psychological survival strategies on the part of volunteers themselves. Further, it is doubtful if crisis-related patterns of volunteering observed in crisis-ridden Greece are relevant to longer-term trends (Clarke, : ). Thus, although the crisis has provided Greek civil society with a chance to develop, it is rather premature to foresee future developments. Social change is a gradual and nonlinear process. Eastern European civil society flourished in the early s, following the collapse of communism, but declined afterwards. A report by Transparency International Greece (: ) summed up this scepticism, concluding that organized civil society in Greece ‘has a long way ahead of it until it can serve as a contributing factor to social consciousness’. The development of civil society is closely linked to the performance of state institutions. Interpersonal trust is closely associated to trust to institutions. If the rule of law is weak (according to the  Rule of Law Index, Greece was in the nd place out of  EU and North American countries—and th out of  among high-income countries), cooperation among citizens becomes costly. Greek civil society cannot become strong while the Greek state is a ‘lame Leviathan’, unable to effectively collect taxes and offer reliable services. After all there is little evidence of a reverse causality: civil society is only a partial remedy for poor governance.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Research on Greek civil society is not restricted any more to ‘armchair’ studies. Several reports, papers, and books that are based on extensive empirical work and some

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nationwide quantitative research are now available. However, several aspects are still under-researched. Within the last two decades, the Greek NGO sector has undergone significant changes. Although the multiplication of initiatives and the increase of volunteers have been documented by several studies, there was not a significant rise in transnational networking. With few exceptions and until very recently, most Greek NGOs did not maintain systematic and long-term ties with foreign or international NGOs. Transnational cooperation was largely opportunistic and mainly within the framework of externally funded projects. More research is needed to understand this ‘introvert’ dimension of Greek civil society organizations. Further, the refugee crisis has created a new dynamic environment for the Greek NGO ecosystem and acted as a significant transformation driver (Chtouris and Miller, ). Available funding, mostly from European institutions, has increased while, as transnational NGOs and international organizations (like UNHCR) expanded their operations to Greece, close cooperation and partnerships with local NGOs multiplied. However, there is very little research on the impact of the refugee crisis on a traditionally weak sector. Refugee-crisis related developments raise important issues with regard to the autonomy of organized civil society in Greece, such as an increasing dependence on big donors and a widening cleavage between professionalized NGOs and grassroots movements. Moreover, other important issues related to Greek civil society need more research. There is a clear correlation between tax incentives and charitable giving. For example, the United States offers by far the most generous tax breaks and has the highest levels of giving as a proportion of the GDP (The Economist, ). However, research on the Greek tax system and in particular on how the very few, limited, constantly-changing and complicated exemptions provided to civil society organizations affect donations is almost non-existent. Another issue has to do with the Church. Bailer et al () found that an important predictor of a strong civil society is religious fragmentation. This may be related to the fact that in religiously heterogeneous societies, religious groups compete to attract followers (Baker et al., : ). Greece is religiously homogeneous to an extent rarely seen in the developed world. Also, the Greek Orthodox Church has a secured position as the ‘official religion’, acknowledged as such by the country’s Constitution, and in several respects is part of the state administrative apparatus. So, more research is needed on how the State–Church relationship has affected Greek civil society and, in particular, on how the ‘de-nationalization’ of religion could promote civic engagement. The Greek educational system does not encourage the participation of students in civil society activities. Though civic and citizenship education is offered in the lower secondary school as a compulsory subject, it has a ‘legalistic’ content focusing on the Constitution, the parliament, and other state institutions with an almost complete lack of extra-curricular activities (Huliaras, : –). More research is needed on how civic educational programmes in primary and secondary schools can promote volunteerism.

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In short, researchers should shift their attention from explanations of civil society weakness to more practical aspects, examining how public-policy reforms can increase civic engagement, promote volunteerism, enhance the autonomy of NGOs, strengthen Greek civil society and, at the very end, enrich democracy.

R Archambault, E. (). ‘The Third Sector in Europe: Does it Exhibit a Converging Movement?’. In Enjolras, B. and Sivesind, K. H. (eds.) Civil Society in Comparative Perspective. London: Emerald, –. Bailer, T. B., Bodenstein, T., and Heinrich, V. F. (). ‘Explaining the Strength of Civil Society: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Data’. International Political Science Review,  (): –. Botetzagias, I. (). ‘Green Politics in Greece at the Time of the Fiscal Crisis’. In Leonard, L. and Botetzagias, I. (eds.) Advances in Ecopolitics. London: Emerald, –. Botetzagias, I. and Karamichas, J. (). ‘Grassroots Mobilisations against Waste Disposal Sites in Greece’. Environmental Politics,  (): –. Chtouris, S. and Miller, D. S. (). ‘Refugee Flows and Volunteers in the Current Humanitarian Crisis in Greece’. Journal of Applied Security Research,  (): –. Clarke, J. (). ‘Transnational Actors in National Contexts: Migrant Organisations in Greece in Comparative Perspective’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,  (): –. Clarke, J. (). ‘Solidarity and Survival: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Volunteering during the Greek crisis’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. London: Routledge, –. Close, D. H. (). ‘Environmental NGOs in Greece: The Achelöos Campaign as a Case Study of Their Influence’. Environmental Politics,  (): –. Danforth, L. M., and Van Boeschoten, R. (). Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Danopoulos, C. P. (). ‘Participation, Competition, and the Quality of Democracy in Greece’. Mediterranean Quarterly,  (): –. Demertzis, N. (). ‘Greece: Greens at the Periphery’. In Richardson, D. and Rootes, C (eds.) The Green Challenge: The Development of Green Politics in Europe. London: Routledge, –. Eurobarometer. (). ‘Europeans’ Engagement in Participatory Democracy’. Flash Eurobarometer . Available at https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S_ (accessed  February ). Featherstone, K. (). ‘Introduction: “Modernisation”and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics’. West European Politics,  (): –. Frangonikolopoulos, C. A. (). ‘Politics, the Media and NGOs: The Greek Experience’. Perspectives on European Politics and Society,  (): –. Guisan, C. (). ‘EMU Political Leadership vs. Greek Civil Society: How Shall we Live Together?’ Mediterranean Politics,  (): –. Hadjiyanni, A. (). ‘On Social Cohesion in Greece’. The Tocqueville Review,  (): –.

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Hoskins, B. L. and Mascherini, M. S. (). ‘Measuring Active Citizenship through the Development of a Composite Indicator’. Social Indicators Research,  (): –. Huliaras, A. (). ‘Greek civil society: The Neglected Causes of Weakness’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. London: Routledge, –. Inglehart, R. (). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Iordanoglou, C. (). Kράτος και ομάδες συμφερόντων: Μια κριτική της παραδεδεγμένης σοφίας [State and Interest Groups: A Criticism of Accepted Wisdom]. Athens: Polis. Jones, N, Proikaki, M. and Roumeliotis, S. (). ‘Social capital levels in Greece in times of crisis’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. London: Routledge, –. Koliopoulos, J. C. and Veremis, T. (). Modern Greece: A History Since , London: Wiley-Blackwell. Kousis, M. (). ‘Environment and the State in the EU Periphery: The Case of Greece’. In Baker, S. and Milton, K. (eds.) Protecting the Periphery: Environmental Policy in the Peripheral Regions of the European Union, –. London: Frank Cass. Legg, K. R. and Roberts, J. M. (). Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Makris, G. and Bekridakis, D. (). ‘The Greek Orthodox Church and the Economic Crisis since ’. The International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church,  (): –. Mavrogordatos, G. (). Μεταξύ Πιτυοκάμπτη και Προκρούστη: Οι επαγγελματικές οργανώσεις στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα [Between Pityocamptis and Procrustes: The Professional Organisations in Modern Greece]. Athens: Odysseas. Mavrogordatos, G. (). ‘Civil Society Under Populism’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece –: The Populist Decade. London: St Martin’s Press, –. Metaxas, T. and Tsavdaridou, M. (). ‘CSR in Metallurgy Sector in Greece’. Resources Policy,  (): –. Mouzelis, N. (). Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Macmillan. Mouzelis, N. (). ‘Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society’. In Hall, J. A. (ed.) Civil Society: Theory, History. Cambridge: Polity Press, –. Mouzelis, N. and Pagoulatos, G. (). ‘Civil Society and Citizenship in Postwar Greece’. In Birtek, F. and Dragonas, T. (eds.) Citizenship and Nation State in Greece and Turkey. London: Routledge, –. OECD. (). How’s Life in Greece? Paris: OECD Better Life Initiative. Pantazidou, M. (). ‘Treading New Ground: A Changing Moment for Citizen Action in Greece’. Development in Practice,  (–): –. Polyzoidis, P. (). ‘Nonprofit Organizations and Human Services in Greece: The Residual Segment of a Weak Sector’. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations  (): –. Polyzoidis, P. (). ‘NGOs and Social Welfare in Greece: Comparative Insights and Crisis Repercussions’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. London: Routledge, –. Pridham, G, Verney, S. and Kostadakopoulos, D. (). ‘Environmental Policy in Greece: Evolution, Structures and Processes’. Environmental Politics, (): –.

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Putnam, R. D. (). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. D. (). Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and Schuster. Rakopoulos, T. (). ‘Resonance of Solidarity: Meanings of a Local Concept in AntiAusterity Greece’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies,  (): –. Rozakou, K. (). ‘Crafting the Volunteer: Voluntary Associations and the Reformation of Sociality’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies,  (): –. Salgado, R. S. (). ‘NGO Structural Adaptation to Funding Requirements and Prospects for Democracy: The Case of the European Union’. Global Society,  (): –. Simiti, M. (). ‘Civil Society and the Economy: Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis’. Journal of Civil Society,  (): –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Formal Weakness and Informal Strength: Civil Society in Contemporary Greece’. LSE: The Hellenic Observatory, Discussion Paper. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘The Need for Civil Society in Greece’. In Karl, F. (ed.) Ageing in the Crisis. Experiences from Greece, –. Berlin: LIT. Sotiropoulos, D. A., and Bourikos, D. (). ‘Economic Crisis, Social Solidarity and the Voluntary Sector in Greece’. Journal of Power, Politics and Governance,  (): –. Sotiropoulos, D. A., and Karamagioli, E. (). ‘Greek Civil Society: The Long Road to Maturity’. Civicus Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool Report for the Case of Greece. Stasinopoulou, O. (). Ελληνικές εθελοντικές οργανώσεις: μια πρώτη προσέγγιση μέσα από το ερευνητικό πρόγραμμα Volmed-Hellas [Greek Voluntary Organizations: A First Appraisal through the Research Project Volmed-Hellas]. Athens: Panteion University Press. The Economist (). ‘Charity and Taxation: Sweetened Charity’,  June. Theodossopoulos, D. (). ‘Philanthropy or Solidarity? Ethical Dilemmas about Humanitarianism in Crisis-Afflicted Greece’. Social Anthropology,  (): –. Transparency International Greece. (). ‘National Integrity System Assessment Greece’. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nisarticle/greece_/ (accessed  January ). Tsakatika, M, and Eleftheriou, C. (). ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsaliki, L. (). ‘Technologies of Political Mobilization and Civil Society in Greece: The Wildfires of Summer ’. Convergence,  (): –. Tsoucalas, C. (). Κοινωνική ανάπτυξη και κράτος [Social Development and the State]. Athens: Themelio. Tzifakis, N., Petropoulos, S. and Huliaras, A. (). ‘The Impact of Economic Crises on NGOs: The Case of Greece’. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations,  (): –. Vathakou, E. (). ‘Citizen Solidarity Initiatives in Greece during the Financial Crisis’. In Clarke, J., Huliaras, A., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece: Civil Society at the European Frontline. London: Routledge, –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

 

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. F the restoration of democracy in  to the recent financial crisis, Greece has experienced numerous episodes of collective action, ranging from peaceful demonstrations to violent protests. The cycles of protest have involved social movements as well as traditional political actors, including left-wing political parties and trade unions. In Greece, the political–institutional context is not conducive to the accommodation of demands made by social movements. Political features such as centralized state structures, an all-powerful executive, and the dominance, until recently, of majoritarianism and the two-party system have all limited the access of social movements to the policy-making process. Majoritarianism has also influenced the tendency of Greek political culture to privilege political ‘strategies geared to exclusion’ over more inclusive and ‘consensual alternatives’ (Bruneau, : ). Despite the generally limited political opportunities for social movements, access to the policy-making process has varied across social actors and policy domains. Moreover, major political realignments have led to the co-optation of demands made by social movements (e.g. following the election of the Socialist Party to government in ) and to opportunities for movements to mobilize successfully (e.g. the demise of the traditional two-party system during the financial crisis of the s). The political legacy of the Civil War (–) rendered the Left–Right cleavage the most salient cleavage in post-dictatorial Greece. During the early post-junta era, left-wing parties exerted a powerful influence over the social movement sector, undermining social movements’ autonomy. However, after the s, party-movement interactions underwent significant shifts in favour of greater movement autonomy. Left-wing parties have been the most influential allies of social movements. Differences can be traced in the stance of left-wing parties vis-à-vis movements, depending on the parties’ ideological identities (e.g. new–old, radical–mainstream Left) and their ruling or oppositional status. Ideological divisions within the Left have often increased the fragmentation

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and dispersion of collective mobilizations by the staging of separate protest events. Finally, the influence of the Left’s political culture on social movements is clearly visible in the latter’s interpretive frames and political claims. In regard to the repertoires of protest in Greek society, social movements have engaged in both conventional and confrontational activities, while violent encounters have also taken place. In general, the limited access of social movements to state institutions, coupled with a contentious political culture, have favoured the use of disruptive protest tactics. Even though protest is a normal and ubiquitous aspect of political life, Greece is not a representative case of a ‘social movement society’ (Meyer and Tarrow, :). Social movement activists have not retreated from the use of confrontational protest, nor has political conflict become more institutionalized. Furthermore, political mobilizations involve claims for the radical reconstitution of existing social and political institutions. Hence, social protest has not been pacified despite its high frequency in contemporary Greek society. From a comparative perspective, Greek social movements have some attributes in common with their southern European counterparts. Accordingly, in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, parties tried ‘to control and colonise the new social movements’ during the countries’ respective transitions to democracy’ (Kousis et al., : ). However, their ‘ability to do so decreased significantly in the s and s’ (Kousis et al., ibid.). As for collective mobilizations during the financial crisis, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain experienced a notable increase in the levels of protest (Altiparmakis and Lorenzini, ). Similarities have been more pronounced in the cases of Spain and Greece, which saw the significant expansion of protest (across social groups and sectors) and the intensification of conflict. Moreover, in both countries, collective mobilizations were followed by the electoral rise of left-wing ‘movement parties’ (e.g. SYRIZA and Podemos) (della Porta et al., ). Aside from Southern Europe, parallels can also be drawn between Greece and France with regard to the accessibility of political institutions, the actors involved in contentious politics, and the repertoires of protest. Thus, in both countries social movements have limited access to state institutions, which in turn increases their dependence on political parties for influence in policy-making. Apart from social movements, labour unions and left-wing parties are also actively involved in organizing protest. Lastly, political actors make frequent use of confrontational and disruptive protest tactics (Ancelovici, ). Moving beyond the European context, one can trace the presence of ‘social movement partyism’ (meaning the coalescence of oppositional parties with social movements and their employment of social movement-type strategies), both in the Greek alterglobalization and the anti-austerity movements as well as the anti-austerity protests in Latin America during the s and s (Kanellopoulos et al., ; Almeida, : ). On the other hand, the Greek case differs from the case of the Netherlands, where authorities apply integrative strategies toward social movements (Duyvendak et al., ; Kriesi et al., ). By such means social movement organizations are often subsidized or incorporated into advisory bodies. Accordingly, social movements in the Netherlands are more formalized and institutionalized than their counterparts in Greece.

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

 

This chapter analyzes the following Greek social movements: the student, feminist, ecological, alter-globalization movements, the anti-austerity protests, and the movement of the squares. (The labour movement is not included because it is covered in Chapter  of this volume). The social unrest of December  is also presented. The separate analysis of each individual movement aims to highlight intergroup variations within individual movements. The student movement is presented first. It possesses high symbolic value in Greek society due to the student uprising against the military junta in . Furthermore, it is highly representative of the pervasive influence that political parties exerted over the social movement sector during the post-junta era.

. T S M

.................................................................................................................................. The fall of the dictatorship in  set into motion a strong political current of collective action, with Greek society entering a prolonged period of politicization, radicalization and intense mobilization. In the post-junta era, universities became the ‘main locus of youth politicisation’ (Papadogiannis, : ). The first General Student Conference was held in . The most influential student unions were the ones linked to the Communist Party (KKE), the Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) and the Communist Party of the Interior (KKE-interior), a Eurocommunist party. The extra-parliamentary Left’s political appeal was also disproportionally strong among the student population. The student union affiliated to the Conservative Party New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), which was the ruling party in –, was a minor political force among students throughout the s. However, it has become a leading force in Greek universities since the late s. The student unions had very limited autonomy from political parties, which aimed to maximize their influence on the student body. Moreover, the Left–Right cleavage that prevailed in Greek society was also prominent in the student population (Karamanolakis, ). As for the ‘progressive’ (communist and socialist) student unions, their competition for the control of the National Student Association of Greece (EFEE, Εθνική Φοιτητική Ένωση Ελλάδας) was fierce. Thus, intense politicization, militancy, and competition held sway in the post-junta student movement (Papadogiannis, ). During the first years of the post-authoritarian era, students demonstrated against foreign interference, NATO, United States military bases in Greece, and the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. They campaigned for the punishment of the junta’s military and political officials and became actively involved in removing from universities any academics who had collaborated with the junta (Serdedakis, ). Finally, they challenged established academic hierarchies and demanded student representation in the administration of universities. In general, student unions subsumed their claims under the broader political objective of promoting radical social transformation.

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In , the parliament ratified new legislation (Law ) concerning tertiary education. The law did not satisfy the students’ demands for the democratization of education and it introduced stricter conditions for the successful completion of academic studies, while instituting the de-registration of students from university due to academic failure during their studies. The law generated fierce opposition from students who denounced the ‘intensification’ of studies as a means of disciplining the student population (Karamanolakis, ). Student unions affiliated with the parliamentary Left proposed adopting conventional forms of protest in order to postpone implementation of the law. By contrast the left-wing group ‘B Πανελλαδική’ (Second Panhellenic Conference, which emerged out of the youth organization of KKE-interior party) and a multiplicity of autonomous groups opted for the immediate occupation of university campuses. The new leading actors in the occupations radicalized the political agenda by introducing ‘a multiplicity of leftist, libertarian, autonomist, countercultural, and anarchist discourses’ in Greek universities (Kitis, : ). These discourses represented a decisive departure from the hegemonic political culture of the traditional communist Left in the universities. The massive spread of occupations across the country forced the ND government to repeal the law in . The students’ successful opposition to Law  prompted participants in the  annual march, taking place every  November in Athens, in commemoration of the student uprising against the junta to defy the government’s prohibition on continuing the march from the city centre to the US embassy. As a result, violent clashes between protesters and the police took place. The escalation of police violence led to the death of two protesters. In , the Pasok government introduced a new law on higher education that established the representation of students in university administration. There is unfortunately a lack of academic research into the post- movement, which is a striking and puzzling omission in contemporary Greek social movement studies. Besides the student movement there is also a highly active high-school student movement that has engaged in massive demonstrations and school occupations (e.g. –, –) (Sklavenitis, ). As in the case of the student movement, the high-school movement has been a central actor in Greek contentious politics, participating in broader protest events, but also succeeding in blocking educational reforms promoted by successive governments. Analysis of the feminist movement follows. It emerged in the wave of contention that followed the fall of the junta, while collective mobilizations persisted until the late s. As they did in the case of the student unions, political parties exercized significant influence on women’s organizations.

. T F M

.................................................................................................................................. In  women on the political Left founded the Movement of Democratic Women (KDG, Κίνηση Δημοκρατικών Γυναικών) (Cacoullos, ). It was a broad, non-partisan,

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

 

umbrella organization which, however, soon split into factions that represented different party affiliations. Consequently in  two new women’s organizations were set up: the Federation of Greek Women (OGE, Ομοσπονδία Γυναικών Ελλάδας), politically affiliated to KKE, and the Union of Greek Women (EGE, Ένωση Γυναικών Ελλάδας), ideologically and strategically linked to Pasok. The KDG subsequently allied itself with KKE-interior. Additionally, from the mid-s many new autonomous feminist groups were formed, reaching the number of fifty in the s (Dusia, ). In other words, by the early s there was a full spectrum of feminist organizations. The traditional Marxist position was mainly represented by the OGE, which framed feminist issues in class terms. The KDG embraced socialist feminism, perceiving women’s oppression to be a result of the complex interplay of patriarchy and capitalism. The EGE, which initially functioned as a general women’s organization, also forged a socialist–feminist identity. Autonomous feminist groups adopted diverse ideological premises ranging from radical feminism to socialist feminism. What they all shared, however, was a commitment to autonomy from men, political parties, and the state (Avdela, ). They represented therefore a decisive rupture with the previous tradition of feminist politics in Greece. Finally, a group of organizations campaigning for the full integration of women into society on the basis of legal equality with men represented a more liberal form of feminism in the Greek context. The party-affiliated women’s organizations adopted the organizational structure of the parties on which they relied. Their organizational model included ‘a constitution, centralised and hierarchical leadership, work in committees, an electoral system, and a spreading network of branches’ (Stamiris, : ). Autonomous feminists by contrast formed small non-hierarchical groups that promoted direct democracy and challenged the principle of representation. They also formed consciousness-raising groups that emphasized the collective analysis of women’s own life experiences. Autonomous feminists were the first to support the claim that ‘the personal is political’ (Repousi, ). They also were the first to introduce sexual politics to the feminist agenda (homosexuality, abortion, rape, etc.). Despite the leading part played by these groups in mass demonstrations during the late s and s, their social base remained narrower than that of the party-affiliated women’s organizations. Between  and  the Pasok government instituted a number of legal and institutional changes that modified women’s status in Greek society (e.g. Family Law Reform, amendment of the Penal Code, legalization of abortion, founding of the General Secretariat for Equality) (Pantelidou-Malouta, ). The reforms introduced by Pasok took the momentum away from the feminist movement (Varika, ). Following the decline of collective mobilizations in the second half of the s, many activists engaged in promoting feminist academic research in Greek Universities. Since the early s new feminist initiatives have emerged, especially in connection with the alter-globalization movement and the subsequent financial crisis. Moreover, issues of gender and sexuality have been addressed by a vibrant spectrum of LGBTQI+ groups (Apostolelli and Chalkia, ). Since the onset of the crisis a gender backlash has been recorded (e.g. curtailment of benefits for women) (Davaki, ).

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Furthermore since  violent attacks against members of the LGBTQI+ community have proliferated (Theofilopoulos, ). In conclusion, the majority of women’s organizations in the Greek feminist movement allied themselves with political parties, while double militancy became a prominent feature of the movement. These trends were not simply the outcome of political party influence over the social movement sector. They were also representative of the Left’s political culture at that time of subsuming feminist claims as ‘particular’ to the ‘general’ struggle of the Left for democratization and social transformation. The case of the feminist movement also reflects a particular reading of the ‘political’ that prevailed during the s. Left-wing political parties together with party-affiliated women’s organizations articulated radical visions of reconstituting society, focusing on the state as the only effective means of realizing these objectives. The autonomous feminists on the other hand actualized feminist principles in the present by means of small, nonhierarchical groups. Their frame however resonated to a limited extent with public opinion since traditional values were generally well entrenched in Greek society. The analysis of the ecological movement follows. It flourished in a different political context from the post-junta student and feminist movement. In contrast to the previous cases, the influence of political parties on the ecological movement has been marginal.

. T G S

.................................................................................................................................. From  to  at least eight significant grassroots’ mobilizations took place on the regional/local level, outside the Greek capital (Louloudis, ). All of them opposed large infrastructural and industrial projects close to inhabited areas. The campaigns openly criticized industrialization and acknowledged environmental degradation as a social problem. Accordingly, this period signifies the ‘nascence of modern environmentalism’ in Greek society (Karamichas and Botetzagias, : ). Grassroots’ mobilizations continued along the same lines throughout the s. Protesters deployed tactics including direct action such as occupying buildings and blocking motorways. During the s, however, a significant regrouping took place in the green spectrum. While organizations that endorsed the radical principles of political ecology (e.g. linking ecological theory to a critique of power relations) multiplied, environmentalism and its emphasis on environmental protection subsided. The proliferation of organizations, adopting the premises of political ecology, sparked a series of discussions on establishing a wide-ranging coordinating body. In , the Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organizations (Ομοσπονδία Οικολογικών και Εναλλακτικών Οργανώσεων) was founded (Karamichas and Botetzagias, ). It brought together more than  ecological, environmental, leftist, radical feminist, anti-war, single issue, and local groups, activists from the Eurocommunist Left, conscientious objectors, and proponents of other initiatives. When the

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

 

federation was founded the Greek party system was in the throes of a serious political crisis. The political opportunity structure was therefore favourable for the federation, which became a political party. It participated in the national elections of November  and April  securing one parliamentary seat in both elections. In , the federation gradually faded away as a result of internal conflicts. The demise of the federation was followed by the retreat of political ecology and the rise of environmentalism (Alexandopoulos et al., ). In the late s–early s environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) proliferated rapidly. During the s and early s the most prominent environmental campaigns were those that opposed the diversion of the River Acheloos in central Greece, the government’s plans to revise Constitutional Article  (which regulates the protection of the natural environment), and the hosting of the Olympic Games in Athens in  (Botetzagias, ). In , a new green party was founded under the name of Ecologist-Greens (OP, Οικολόγοι-Πράσινοι). The onset of the financial crisis in  and the subsequent austerity and privatization policies implemented by successive governments had a direct and negative impact on the environment (e.g. deregulation of environmental legislation, privatization of public assets, and extensive appropriation of natural resources). Protest against environmental degradation has involved grassroots’ mobilizations as well as professional ENGOs. Despite the local origins of many conflicts, some protests started with a clear political agenda while in other cases protesters gradually radicalized their claims. Consequently, not all of these conflicts qualify as NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) opposition. Finally, during the crisis degrowth initiatives proliferated across the country, leading to numerous synergies among localized schemes. Assessments of the green movement in Greece differ. N. Demertzis argues that in comparison with other West European countries Greece had a quasi-movement which has had limited influence on the general population and is sporadic in its nature (Demertzis, ). Conversely, M. Kousis, D. della Porta, and M. Jiménez assert that cross-national empirical research for  to  provides evidence that the frequency of environmental protest in Southern Europe is as high as in North European countries (Kousis et al., ). Thus, as far as the amount of protest is concerned, no dissimilarities can be traced. There are, however, noticeable differences in the features of the respective green movements. For instance, one distinctive attribute of environmental contention in Southern Europe is its localized character (Rootes, ). In Greece from  to  more than  per cent of environmental protests were local mobilizations focusing on local issues (Kousis, ). As for the relation of political parties to environmental activism, M. Kousis’ research shows that party participation in and support for environmental protest has been minor. Community-based groups have led the majority of protests in Greece (Kousis, ). Consequently, the case of the Greek ecological movement represents a significant shift in the grip of political parties on social movements. Next follows an analysis of the alter-globalization movement in Greece. It played a critical role in the consolidation of broader political networks in the context of grassroots’ activism. Some of these networks were later incorporated into party politics.

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 



. T A-G M

.................................................................................................................................. The emergence of the alter-globalization movement in the s signified the beginning of a new global cycle of protest. In Greece, a broad and heterogeneous spectrum of individuals, groups, and organizations (ranging from labour unions and the youth organizations of political parties to anarchists/anti-authoritarians) assembled under the banner of the alter-globalization movement. Greek activists had already participated in transnational networks of protest, such as the anti-war campaigns against the bombings in former Yugoslavia, the global networks of solidarity with the Zapatista insurrection in Chiapas, and the anti-austerity European marches (Serdedakis et al., ). In , Greek protesters joined the transnational rally against the summit of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Prague. In July , approximately , activists participated in the anti-G international rally in Genoa. Following the terrorist attacks of  September , the war in Afghanistan, and growing Islamophobia, protesters engaged in anti-war and anti-racism mobilizations. In – there were in total of  anti-globalization and anti-war protest events (Boudourides and Botetzagias, ). Protest peaked in the first half of  during Greece’s Presidency of the European Union (EU). During the EU Summit, protest culminated in a massive march and blockades in Thessaloniki and Chalkidiki. However, throughout – divisions within the Left were evident in collective mobilizations. While some organizations participated in the same protest events, competing protests on the same issue often took place at different locations. In , the Greek Social Forum (EKF, Ελληνικό Κοινωνικό Φόρουμ) was founded. It functioned as a political space operating on the principles of horizontality and diversity. Activists comprising the EKF belonged mainly to the political party of Synaspismos and organizations on the extra-parliamentary Left. However, ‘almost all leftist party formations participating in EKF were (later on) incorporated into the Coalition of the Radical Left’ (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς - a coalition of Synaspismos and organizations of the extra-parliamentary Left) (Serdedakis et al., : ). Political actors that abstained from the EKF such as the KKE, other organizations of the extra-parliamentary Left, and anarchists/anti-authoritarians, established their own political networks. In , Greek activists participated in the World Social Forum (WSF) and the European Social Forum (ESF). Anti-war and anti-racism mobilizations persisted. In , the fourth ESF took place in Athens. After , the Greek alter-globalization movement gradually declined. It is worth noting that, as in the alter-globalization movement in general, the Greek movement retained significant national and local roots. Thus, activists engaged in national and local protest events ranging from opposition to government policies (e.g. privatizations and pension reform) to defending immigrants’ rights and urban public space. In short, the Greek movement illustrated the presence of an ‘increasingly transnationally-accepted’ master frame

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

 

contesting neoliberal globalization (Ayres, :). Counter-summits and social forums emerged as the movement’s most distinctive action repertoires. Its identity was heterogeneous and fluid, encompassing a multiplicity of actors and ideologies. Finally, its influence can be traced later in the movement of the squares (aka the Greek Indignados) in . Next the civil unrest of December  is briefly presented. Besides marking a significant rupture in the politics of protest, the civil unrest revealed latent grievances that predated the onset of the financial crisis.

. T C U  D 

..................................................................................................................................

On  December , following the murder of a -year-old schoolboy by a police guard, violent clashes erupted between protesters and the police. For nearly three weeks, street fights transformed city centres into battlefields (Kotronaki and Seferiades, ). Urban riots usually differ from social movements by virtue of their discontinuous and alternating dynamic, their temporal and spatial limitations as challenges to social order, and the contested political identities of rioters (Simiti, ). However, the civil unrest of December  was not merely one more episode of large-scale rioting in Greek society. It was unprecedented in many respects. The spatial pattern of the protests was remarkable. Mobilizations ‘covered most of the national territory with rallies and riots sweeping rather evenly across Greece’ (Kalyvas, : ). Another distinctive element was the social heterogeneity of the actors involved (e.g. students, school children, the unemployed, leftists, anarchists/antiauthoritarians, first- and second-generation immigrants, and Roma youth). Thus, the initial riots were followed by massive protests and violent confrontations with diverse social actors transforming the scale and duration of the disruption. Another exceptional attribute was the simultaneous presence of diverse repertoires of action (Psimitis, a). Rioting took place alongside organized collective action such as sit-ins, rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and temporary and longer-term occupations of public and private buildings. In general, mobilizations that had begun more or less spontaneously gradually evolved into more fixed and longstanding organizational arrangements. Accordingly, during and following the December  unrest, neighbourhood assemblies, social centres and squats multiplied all over Greece (Dalakoglou, ). Participants in the civil unrest expressed their anger at the state, the political class, the official confederations of trade unions, the police, the mainstream media, and the financial elites. Moreover, they questioned the main ‘institutional “pillars” of society’ (Psimitis, a: ). Two events in the final stage of the mobilizations (shots fired at a police officer and a police riot bus) foreshadowed the resurgence of political terrorism in Greek society. To conclude, the large-scale social unrest of December  unveiled an acute legitimation crisis that had existed prior to the full manifestation of the financial crisis. The severe crisis further eroded the waning

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legitimacy of political institutions. In contrast to the December  unrest, political actors during the crisis did not articulate primarily anti-systemic claims, but an ideologically broad and diverse range of anti-establishment claims.

. A-A P   M   S (  G I)

.................................................................................................................................. Anti-austerity mobilizations marked the beginning of a new wave of protest in Greek society. In early  the Pasok government announced a series of austerity measures to curb the country’s mounting public debt and deficit. In April, the government requested a financial bailout from the EU and the IMF in order to avoid an official declaration of default. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was agreed between foreign lenders and the Greek government, involving structural adjustment and harsh austerity measures. The anti-austerity protests that had started in early  intensified following the bailout agreement. In ,  per cent of the adult population participated in anti-austerity demonstrations, while  per cent took part in strikes. It is worth noting that  per cent of the participants had not taken part in any demonstration or strike in the previous decade (Rüdig and Karyotis, ). Protests revealed other features too, such as the broad geographical diffusion of mobilizations, the participation of new trade unions and political formations, and the emergence of a new collective action frame denouncing ‘the corruption of politics’, as exemplified symbolically by the Greek parliament (Psimitis, b: ). After a tragic incident at the general strike and demonstration of  May  (the arson of a bank, leading to the death of three of its employees), the level of protest decreased. However, protest increased again towards the end of , while in  mobilizations escalated further. Thus, in  a mass movement known as the movement of the squares emerged as a major actor in the anti-austerity campaign. On  May , following calls-outs on social media for peaceful protests without party flags or banners, protests took place in central squares in over thirty-eight cities across Greece (‘Συνοπτικό Χρονικό’, ). Demonstrators occupied Syntagma Square in Athens (the central square in front of the Greek parliament) and White Tower Square in Thessaloniki. These initial occupations turned into long-term encampments. As in other Occupy protests across the globe, neo-liberalism and the power of global financial capital, economic inequalities, the crisis of democracy, and corruption were major causes of protest. At the first General Assembly in Syntagma Square, participants passed a resolution calling on citizens to fight for ‘Direct Democracy Now’ and the principles of ‘Equality–Justice–Dignity’. Protesters shared a critical stand on representation, a commitment to self-organization and the desire to safeguard autonomy from political parties (Oikonomakis and Roos, ).

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

 

Participants belonged to ‘the more educated, the more urbanised’, as well as those ‘worse hit by the economic cuts’ (Petropoulos, : ). As for the political profile of protesters, one of the distinctive elements of the Greek movement was the coexistence of conflicting political forces. Left-wing protesters played a prominent role. Protesters embracing right-wing populist frames also participated actively in collective mobilizations, while segments of the extreme right attempted to manipulate popular rage for their own advantage. The presence of conflicting political forces became more apparent in Syntagma Square where ideological divisions also took the form of a spatial divide between activists in the upper square and the ones in the lower square (Georgiadou et al., ; Kaika and Karaliotas, ; Simiti, ). Occasional demonstrators usually attended protests in both squares. In the upper part of Syntagma Square the dominant method of protest took the form of collective verbal abuse of parliament and political parties. For this bloc, what was at stake was not simply an issue of social injustice. It was primarily an issue of ‘national treason’ and the necessity of imposing punishment. Demonstrators protested holding Greek flags, while anti-political, populist, and strong nationalistic or xenophobic frames prevailed. An encampment dominated the lower square. Participants experimented with direct democracy. The main decision-making body was the open popular assembly. Working groups (operating on the principle of horizontality) were formed to support and sustain collective mobilizations. Protesters used social media to synchronize their actions with mobilizations across Greece as well as with transnational movements and events. Despite the fact that political parties were not welcome, activists from the left-wing party SYRIZA and the anti-capitalist left-wing Antarsya (‘Mutiny’) party played a prominent role. Some collectives from the anarchist/anti-authoritarian spectrum also became actively involved. The proclamation of general strikes by the trade union confederations increased the level of participation in collective mobilizations. However, some negative attitudes existed in the movement of the squares vis-à-vis the confederations, which were mainly associated with political parties (Sotiropoulos, ). The Communist Party abstained from the mobilizations in the squares and escalated its own protests ‘as a counterbalancing response’ (Petropoulos, : ). Collective mobilizations climaxed on  and  June  when activists attempted to surround the parliament to prevent deputies from ratifying a new package of austerity measures (the Medium-Term Economic Program). ‘What followed was two days of street blockades, barricades, attempts to invade the Parliament, counteroffensives by the police forces [and] fierce clashes’ (Vogiatzoglou, : ). The protesters’ failure to obstruct the ratification of the new measures coupled with extreme violence on the part of the police had a direct negative impact on subsequent mobilizations. Thus, in the following month mobilizations became smaller and less vociferous. In late July , the police dismantled the encampment in Syntagma Square. The end of the movement of the squares was followed by a significant shift in the protesters’ political strategy. Activists retreated from the central political stage and

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mobilized at the local level. Local neighbourhood assemblies, solidarity networks, and solidarity economy schemes proliferated rapidly (Arampatzi, ; Kavoulakos and Gritzas, ). In  participation in the movement of the squares and anti-austerity demonstrations was massive. Twenty-nine per cent of the adult population participated in the movement of the squares, and  per cent took part in anti-austerity demonstrations (Karyotis and Rüdig, ). As did other Occupy protests around the globe, the Greek movement of the squares appealed to the notion of citizenship to bring together disparate social forces (Gerbaudo, ). However, the coexistence of highly oppositional political forces in the Greek case was exceptional. Their coexistence reflected the waning of the Left–Right cleavage in Greek society and the emergence of a new cleavage between pro-Memorandum and anti-Memorandum political forces that cut across the Left–Right divide. Hence the movement mobilized conflicting political forces that were commonly positioned in the anti-Memorandum bloc. Finally, the Greek movement’s open and inclusive character should not be overestimated. Verbal and physical attacks on MPs were a recurrent theme (Georgiadou et al., ). Thus, the squares were sites of confrontation within a highly polarized society. The movement of the squares reinforced political changes that led to the restructuring of the existing party system. These changes were manifested in the subsequent national elections of May and June  when the two major parties (New Democracy and PASOK) were severely punished. SYRIZA’s electoral strength grew immensely (from . per cent of the popular vote in  to . per cent in June ) and it became the main opposition party. Thus, protest complemented electoral politics, leading to a synchronization of the cycle of protest and the electoral cycle (Goldstone, ). From March to December  a relative demobilization was recorded while labour unions acquired a more central role (Diani and Kousis, ). In addition, contention became more diffused, assuming numerous forms, such as refusal to pay new taxes and verbal denunciation of officials at national parades or celebrations (Vogiatzoglou, ). One example of large-scale defiance of official economic policies was the network ‘I Won’t Pay’ that ran a civil disobedience campaign against newly imposed taxes and fees (e.g. on highway tolls, electric bills, and property). In  contention increased again (Serdedakis and Koufidi, ). This time, however, collective mobilizations were driven by a different set of causes and claims (e.g. anti-fascist mobilizations, protest against the government’s decision to shut down the television and radio stations of the Greek public broadcaster (ERT, Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία Τηλεόραση). A survey conducted in February  recorded that  per cent of the adult population had participated in anti-austerity protests since June  (Karyotis and Rüdig, ). Overall, from May  to April , , protests occurred across the country according to the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection (Kousis, ). Even though collective mobilizations were generally peaceful, violence did break out on several occasions, as in the February  general strike which ended in riots (Vogiatzoglou, ).

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

 

In January , SYRIZA won the national elections and formed a coalition government with the far-Right party Independent Greeks. The government’s acceptance of a new Memorandum in July  led to conflicts as well as disillusionment in the antiMemorandum bloc. Opposition and extra-parliamentary parties of the Left, social movement organizations (e.g. anti-foreclosure collectivities), professional associations, and other actors continued to mobilize. It seems however that anti-austerity protests have failed to engage larger sections of the population and develop into sustained massive mobilizations since . On the other hand a different wave of activism emerged in Greek society in . Solidarity networks, formal organizations, and nonaffiliated individuals, all mobilized to provide active support to refugees and migrants, following their massive influx in –. To sum up, Greece was one of the countries hardest hit by the crisis. At the same time it witnessed one of the most massive anti-austerity movements. However, the decline of anti-austerity mobilizations also illustrates that beliefs about the feasibility of change and the efficacy of collective action may vary over time, affecting the level of contention. Accordingly, participation is an ongoing, processual phenomenon, where decisions to participate are frequently reassessed and renegotiated (Snow et al., ).

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Greece has a sustained political tradition of social movement activity. Claims for the radical reconstitution of society hold significant political appeal while political actors frequently rely on disruptive protest to advance their cause. In the post-junta era, the salience of the Left–Right cleavage undermined the development of an autonomous social movement sector. Thus, parties of the Left exerted a pervasive influence over both student unions and women’s organizations. The ecological movement by contrast did not follow this pattern. Left-wing parties were actively involved in the alterglobalization and anti-austerity movements. In both cases, however, movement–party interaction diverged from the pattern of party dependency that had prevailed in the social movement sector during the early post-junta period. The severe legitimation crisis facing political parties, coupled with a significant shift in the ideological and strategic premises of the Left (e.g. the growing appeal of a new global paradigm of radical activism stressing horizontality and direct democracy), has strengthened the autonomy of social movements. One indication of this is that the Greek movement of the squares originated independently of political parties and manifested a strong mobilizing capacity. Further long-term shifts in the social movement sector have been recorded, including the transnationalization of contention and the increased heterogeneity and fluidity of collective identities, as well as the proliferation of non-state-centric forms of political activism. Finally, collective mobilizations have brought to the fore novel political conflicts (e.g. antifascist mobilizations) and collective action repertoires (e.g. solidarity networks).

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 



Despite the leading and long-lasting presence of the Left in the social movement sector, conservative mobilizations have also taken place (e.g. rallies against any renaming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that would include the name Macedonia in  and , and collective mobilizations in favour of registering religious affiliation on Greek identity cards in –). These mobilizations were not addressed in the academic literature until recently. A further challenge for researchers is to study the varied social composition of social movements. So far, research has focused primarily on political agency, with in-depth analysis of participants in social movements as political subjects. This has relegated the question of protesters’ actual social identities to a secondary position. Finally, the most prominent theoretical framework in Greek literature on the subject is that of the political process and contentious politics, while extensive research has focused on protest event analysis (Seferiades, ). Lately, however, social movement research in Greece has expanded into different academic domains, multiplying the analytical perspectives (Kornetis and Kouki, ). Thus, social movement scholars could further the dialogue between the diverse academic subfields, bringing into contact the main body of the literature (which is based on the ‘classic agenda’ of collective action frames, mobilizing structures, and political opportunities) and the more recent contributions of historians, anthropologists, radical geographers, and social psychologists. In conclusion, Greek scholarship has been enriched by an exponential growth in social movement literature since the s. This reflects developments within the academic field, but also actual ruptures in social life (e.g. the social unrest of December , the severe financial crisis) and the resurgence of collective action.

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Theofilopoulos, T. (). ‘Η ρατσιστική βία στην Ελλάδα της κρίσης (–): δεδομένα, χαρακτηριστικά, ερμηνείες [Racist Violence in Crisis-Ridden Greece (–): Data, Characteristics, Interpretations]. In Koniordos, S. (ed.) Η ελληνική κοινωνία στο σταυροδρόμι της κρίσης: έξι χρόνια μετά [Greek Society at the Crossroads of the Crisis: Six Years On]. Athens: Hellenic Sociological Society, –. Varika, E. (). ‘Αντιμέτωπες με τον εκσυγχρονισμό των θεσμών: Ένας δύσκολος φεμινισμός’ [Confronting the Modernisation of Institutions: A Difficult Feminism]. In Leontidou, E. and Ammer, S. (eds.) Η Ελλάδα των γυναικών [Women’s Greece]. Athens: Gaia, –. Vogiatzoglou, M. (). ‘Turbulent Flow: Anti-Austerity Mobilisation in Greece’. In Della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Fernandes, T., O’Connor, F., Romanos, E., and Vogiatzoglou, M. (eds.) Late Neoliberalism and its Discontents in the Economic Crisis. Comparing Social Movements in the European Periphery. Cham: Springer, –.

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. S– relations in Greece have undergone a number of transformations since the return to democracy in , but up until —and the outset of the crisis—these were mostly of a path-dependent nature. Thereafter, however, a path shift appears to be under way, which has affected the organization and political leverage of labour interest groups. This chapter examines the unfolding of interest representation and intermediation, from  until  by focusing mostly on the organization of wage labour, farmers, and the liberal professions and their respective ties to political actors. The way interest group politics evolved during this period differentiates Greece in a number of respects from developments in Western Europe, as well as from other south European countries. Greece’s exceptionalism can in part be accounted for by its authoritarian and clientelist legacies, in combination with the deep political cleavages inherited from the Civil War. The absence of mass mobilizations during the transition to democracy in , left interest group organizations largely intact, along with corporatist structures of representation and intermediation. Networks of clientelism that had predominated in the pre-dictatorship period re-emerged after , but took on a more organized form, with political parties distributing benefits to interest groups in exchange for party allegiance. As a result, particularistic and politicized policymaking prevailed. The fragmentation of interests was reinforced by political divisions within union organizations and the presence of multiple interests in society, due to the large numbers of self-employed, which far exceeded any other European country. This led to multiple cleavages beyond the employer/employee divide, which in combination with intense political party polarization prevented concertation and compromise solutions between diverse interests. The model of interest representation and intermediation that emerged after  did not fit with either the pluralist nor the neo-corporatist models that prevailed in other

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Western European states in the s and s. This led to a debate over how best to describe state–society relations in Greece, which concerned whether state corporatism persisted, or if a distinct model had emerged that was labelled ‘disjointed corporatism’ (Mavrogordatos, ; Lavdas, ).

. A L: S C

.................................................................................................................................. Social science scholars paid little attention to interest groups during the period of democratic transition and consolidation. After the  transition to democracy was over, scholars began to turn their attention to labour unions as the latter assumed a more active role and strike activity increased. However, interest politics in a broad sense were not studied until the second half of the s. In the decade that followed researchers examined state–society relations within the context of the neo-corporatist literature that was prominent at the time. Scholars focused on labour unions and to a lesser extent on farmers’ associations that together represented the majority of the working population.

.. Labour Unions In the s, scholars studying relations between union organizations and the state concluded that they emulated the state corporatist model, which was typical of authoritarian regimes, rather than societal corporatism that characterized many Western democracies (Mavrogordatos, ). The above conclusion was based on the presence of centralized union organizations that were licensed and funded by the state and also on government interventions in the organization of unions and bargaining procedures. Labour unions organized under two peak labour confederations: The Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE, Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδας), created back in , represented all private-sector employees, including those employed in public enterprises. The Confederation of Greek Civil Servants (ADEDY, Ανώτατη Διοίκηση Ενώσεων Δημοσίων Υπαλλήλων) represented public-sector employees. Until  collective bargaining was authorized by the state and regulated by a law passed in  that granted to the minister of labour the right to exercise compulsory arbitration. While collective bargaining took place between the GSEE and its affiliated unions and the respective employer organizations, disputes were more likely to be resolved through arbitration rather than bargaining. While organizational unity was maintained, union factions, which were organized along political party lines, competed within union organizations, thus contributing to the hyper-politicization of labour conflicts. In addition, economic dependency of the labour confederations on state resources, and the presence of a very large number of

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 

small unions encouraged corruption and state intervention in both confederations. During the post- period the state intervened more than once to impose a leadership of its choice to head the GSEE. The rise of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) to power in  did not put an end to these practices, but instead intensified efforts to infiltrate and capture most interest organizations. Capture was achieved by exploiting existing corporatist and clientelist legacies, while at the same time adapting them to fit with competitive politics and mass party organization (Mavrogordatos, ; Koukias, ; Spourdalakis, ; Zambarloukou, ). Workers’ efforts at grassroots’ organization, outside the official union structure, only succeeded temporarily, a pattern which highlights difficulties in overcoming past legacies and organizational barriers. The most notable example was the so-called factory movement that was active from  to . Lack of coordination within the movement and hostility by official union organizations made it an easy target for employer reprisals and government crackdown, and its dynamic gradually declined. The organizations that survived formed a federation that came under the control of the union faction affiliated to PASOK, the Panhellenic Militant Labour Union Movement (PASKE, Πανελλήνια Αγωνιστική Συνδικαλιστική Κίνηση Εργαζομένων). Thereafter party politics dominated all union activity, while labour federations representing employees in state-owned enterprises, particularly public utilities and banks, affirmed their central role in the GSEE confederation (Ioannou, ; Zambarloukou, ). The trajectory followed by the factory movement underlines the weakness of privatesector unions in Greece, which is due to the small size of Greek business enterprises and low union density in the private sector (Kouzis, ). Despite similarities between the pre-dictatorship and the post- periods, there were also important differences. The infiltration of unions by political parties and the politicization of conflicts strengthened the bargaining position of unions and encouraged strike activity. The coming of PASOK to power in  did not result in major institutional changes, but encouraged policies of co-optation rather than exclusion. Patronage networks evolved from a personalized relationship between politicians and voters to a collective or bureaucratic form of clientelism that reinforced privileged ties between political parties and organized interests, particularly in the public-sector and public-utility enterprises (Lyrintzis, ). These linkages ensured party infiltration within unions and secured benefits to union leaders, who usually were also party members, in addition to state transfers that benefited the rank and file of the unions. The latter took various forms, such as generous social security benefits for public-sector employees. The presence of political party divisions within unions in combination with state interventions and a polarized political culture resulted in the hyper politicization of labour conflicts. Political parties supported demands coming from unions or other interest groups while in the opposition, but once in power the same parties more readily succumbed to those labour groups capable of causing major disruption or carrying considerable electoral weight, such as farmers’ associations or unions

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representing public-sector employees. Governments, thus, often found themselves hostage to organized interests that were part of the ruling party’s political clientele. Whereas prior to , governments could count on the party-led union faction aligned with the ruling party to contain their members’ demands, by the mid-s political party allegiance could not be guaranteed without concessions to interest groups (Sotiropoulos, ). Likewise, the system of collective bargaining that was inherited from the predictatorship period was designed to allow governments to impose their own incomes policy on unions. This only led to greater politicization and encouraged labour demands, particularly by public-sector unions. The drafting of new legislation in  that abolished compulsory arbitration signalled the desire of the then shortlived coalition government (which included all major political parties) to move towards a less politicized way of resolving disputes. Collective bargaining for setting wages remained highly centralized and took place between unions and employers’ representatives at the national and sectoral level. State interference in resolving disputes was replaced by a system of neutral arbitration, which encouraged bipartite negotiations. Unions accepted greater moderation in exchange for the strengthening of their institutional role, at a time when their bargaining position had been shrinking due to rising unemployment and budget deficits. The above led to a period of relative stability and a decline in union mobilizations and strikes (Zambarloukou, ).

.. Farmers’ Associations There is a long legacy of state involvement in farmers’ associations that continued after  and led to the characterization of farmers’ interest representation as state corporatist (Mavrogordatos, ; Koukias, ). Farmers were an important force in Greek society and constituted about a quarter of the working population in the s, which partly accounts for the eagerness of state-party actors to penetrate their associations. The Panhellenic Confederation of Farmers’ Cooperatives (PASEGES, Πανελλήνια Συνομοσπονδία Ενώσεων Γεωργικών Συνεταιρισμών) was the sole representative of the Greek co-operative movement and had the exclusive right to represent farmers’ interests, both at the national and international levels. PASEGES enjoyed financial support from the state, while it was responsible for distributing subsidized credit to the cooperatives provided by the state-owned Agricultural Bank of Greece (ABG). Following PASOK’s rise to power in , its supporters were encouraged to join cooperatives in order to gain control of PASEGES, which spurred political competition and turned cooperatives into a battleground for recruiting party supporters. As a result, ‘agricultural cooperatives shifted their focus from pursuing business goals to becoming efficient election machines’ (Iliopoulos and Valentinov, : ). It was not uncommon for cooperatives to receive state subsidies even when they had no commercial

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 

activity, as long as they lent their support to the ruling party. In return, cooperative leaders had access to various personal benefits. These practices continued into the s, despite the fact that generous loans from the ABG resulted in cooperatives incurring large debts. In the second half of the s, efforts to commercialize ABG moved forward very slowly due to the resistance posed, not only by PASEGES but also by local members of parliament (MPs) of the ruling party PASOK and the minister of agriculture, who often acted as farmers’ representatives within the government (Pagoulatos, ). Political party infiltration was not restricted to PASEGES, but was extended to other farmers’ interest organizations. After , PASOK infiltrated the General Confederation of Farmers’ Associations (GESASE, Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Αγροτικών Συλλόγων Ελλάδας) that was established in  and used it to further promote PASOK party clientelist networks (Koukias, ). Political antagonisms and the control of GESASE by PASOK, led New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) supporters to create the Confederation of Democratic Farmers Associations (SYDASE, Συνομοσπονδία Αγροτικών Συλλόγων Ελλάδας) (Mavrogordatos, ). While formally their role was to promote farmers’ interests, neither of these associations enjoyed the influence and power of PASEGES, which acted both as a coordinator of co-operatives and as a representative of farmers’ interests. Corporatist intermediation and political-party-dominated clientelist networks were sustainable as long as they were beneficial to both sides. In the s changes in agricultural trade agreements, EU subsidy policies, and the commercialization of AGB led to the reduction of cheap credit and subsidies for farmers, which in turn strained relations between them and the mainstream political parties that alternated to power. From the mid-s onwards we witness an increase in farmers’ mobilizations against government policies, which were usually initiated by local associations and involved the closure of major road arteries. In , regional associations affiliated with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας) formed a new federation, the Farmers Militant Alliance (PASY, Παναγροτική Αγωνιστική Συσπείρωση), that has since played a central role in farmers’ mobilizations. According to Mousidis () developments since  gave rise to a new generation of farmers who were less bound by political-party affiliations and were driven primarily by local economic grievances.

. B S C

.................................................................................................................................. Scholars writing in the s were less likely to adopt the term ‘state corporatism’ to describe interest group intermediation in the post- period and offered alternative definitions instead. Lavdas () introduced the term ‘disjointed corporatism’, to capture the presence of corporatist organizational features in conjunction with internally fragmented interest organizations and a polarized political system that is unable to

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broker social pacts. Pagoulatos (), on the other hand, introduced the term ‘parentela pluralism’ in an attempt to describe the presence of multiple interests and organizations in conjunction with patronage networks of political exchange. While Pagoulatos highlights the political divisions within organizations, Lavdas () stresses their comprehensive nature. Despite the difference in emphasis, both analysts seek to express the particularistic nature of policy-making during this period. The use of alternative definitions to describe state–society relations in part reflected the shift in the balance of power and the growing capacity of interest groups (particularly those representing labour) to influence party-politics outcomes and government policies after . Moreover, it also echoed broader changes in the way ‘corporatism’ was conceptualized. While the original usage of the term emphasized the legal characteristics of interest organizations and bargaining procedures, by the s the term was more frequently used to describe forms of policy-making (Schmitter, ). Greek governments after  were neither able to impose policies unilaterally, as in the ‘ideal’ state corporatist system, nor through consultation and pact building, as envisioned in the neo-corporatist model. Policy-making was much more fragmented and particularistic and impacted various sectors of society differently, depending on their linkages to the state and to political parties. The Greek state, while often seen as omnipresent, was in fact characterized by weak coordinating capacity, which in part stemmed from the fact that it had been colonized by political parties, whose priorities dictated policies. The weak capacity of the Greek state to introduce reforms has been well documented in the relevant literature (Sotiropoulos, ). Governments tended to grant privileges and make concessions to those groups with which networks of clientelism and close party linkages had been formed, as was the case with public-sector employees and the liberal professions. As a whole, state–interest-group relations varied depending on the organizational capacity of the groups’ respective associations, their dependency on state resources, and their ties to political parties. The liberal professions, most notably doctors, engineers, and lawyers enjoy a prominent role in Greek society that can be traced back to the first decades of the twentieth century when their respective professional associations were formed. While the liberal professions have not been studied in the context of interest-group politics in Greece, their role becomes apparent when we focus on their capacity to veto important policy reforms, which threatened their established occupational privileges. Their strong bargaining position can be seen as stemming from their proximity to political elites, which in turn is demonstrated by their over-representation in parliament and government cabinets throughout the post- period. Lawyers constitute the largest group of MPs and cabinet members, followed by doctors and engineers. This continues to hold true, but at a lesser extend, as other professional groups have been gaining ground, particularly since  (Kakepaki, ; Sotiropoulos, ). Their proximity to the political system and to policy makers secured for interest groups of liberal professions a number of privileges, many of which date back to the first half of the twentieth century. These range from higher social security benefits,

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

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administratively-determined minimum fees, set by the competent ministry, for services provided, administrative licences and other more specific arrangements for each profession. Subsequent efforts to introduce reforms, which might have adversely affected these groups, faced their fierce resistance and for the most part were not carried out. The second half of the s was a period of adjustment, as governments strove to meet the Maastricht and EMU criteria. In  the newly formed PASOK government under Prime Minister Costas Simitis, set out to introduce reforms by utilizing tripartite bodies of consultation. The most notable was the Economic and Social Committee (OKE, Οικονομική και Κοινωνική Επιτροπή), while other more ad hoc efforts at tripartite cooperation were also made. In  the minister of finance suggested that the council introduce measures towards the liberalization of certain professions, including lawyers, notaries, and pharmacists. This was opposed both by the professionals concerned and members of government. The minister of justice intervened on behalf of lawyers and the issue was put aside (Kathimerini newspaper, ..). Despite pressure from the EU to remove barriers to entry in professions and professional practice by newcomers, reforms were postponed for another decade. A similar fate awaited the attempt to reform the health-care system. The government’s proposals to streamline health-care benefits and make them more universally accessible, was opposed by powerful interests within the medical establishment. The first to react were IKA (Social Security Institute) doctors because the proposed changes did not guarantee their position in the public-health system. University doctors also objected to it, because the reform, if passed, would have curtailed their right to private practice. Doctors abstained from their duties for substantial periods throughout  and early  in opposition to the reforms. As a result, the PASOK government (in power in –) withdrew its reform proposals (Mossialos and Allin, ). After the mid-s Greek governments tried to advance their reform agenda through tripartite concertation and the signing of social pacts with unions and employers’ organizations. However, the outcome of this process shows that assertions claiming that Greece was entering a period of neo-corporatist intermediation were premature (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). In  the PASOK government invited union and employer representatives to participate in consultation on the themes of development, competitiveness, and employment. After seven months a ‘confidence pact’ was signed between the aforementioned representatives, which for the most part avoided issues of friction. The pact was to serve as a guideline for labour reforms, but the government passed legislation that introduced greater labour market flexibility, which was opposed by unions. In  unions and employers were again invited to discuss work arrangements, but an agreement could not be reached as the proposals were met with suspicion by both sides. The government again introduced new legislation unilaterally, that further enhanced flexibility in work time arrangements and regulations on overtime work and redundancies. The attempt to reform the social security system did not fare any better. As Featherstone et al. () point out, the social security system was itself ‘the product

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of embedded clientelism and disjointed corporatism’, as it delivered very unequal benefits to different sections of the labour force. In particular, it tended to favour the liberal professions and public-sector employees, to the detriment of the majority of private-sector employees. The proposed reforms would have streamlined the pension benefits without, however, radically changing the way the social security system was organized. Both the GSEE and ADEDY confederations rejected the proposals outright and a massive wave of strikes followed. A number of professional associations, for example those representing lawyers and journalists, also asked their members to abstain from work. After failing to reach a compromise, the PASOK government withdrew its proposal, and a new reform bill was introduced that impacted publicsector employees, but left intact the so-called noble funds of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals. This reform outcome highlights the capacity of the latter groups to act as veto players and prevent reforms threatening their interests. The new legislation gained the approval of the GSEE leadership, but was rejected by the union factions aligned with the opposition within the GSEE, and by ADEDY. The failure to establish tripartite policy-making reflects the lack of trust between political actors, the absence of a culture that promotes dialogue, and the presence of a conflictual political culture. The fragmentation within union organizations, both along political and sectoral lines has also been interpreted as a major obstacle (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ; Zambarloukou, ). In particular, the over-representation of public-sector employees within union organizations has been used to explain unions’ opposition to many of the proposed reforms (Matsaganis, ). Lastly, the role of professional associations in stalling the reform effort should not be overlooked. Successive failures to introduce reforms since the late s have drawn attention to the capacity of interest groups to veto policies that threaten entrenched privileges and interests. This concern has re-emerged following the crisis that brought Greece to the verge of sovereign default in . A growing literature argues that powerful interest groups, and particularly public-sector unions, act as rent-seeking groups that extract benefits from the public sector and are in a position to veto reforms that do not serve their interests (Iordanoglou, ; Mitsopoulos and Pelagides, ). Iordanoglou () has argued against the view that clientelism continues to be a determining force in Greek interest politics, given that patron–client relationships traditionally describe a personal relationship in which the client is weak and subservient to the patron. On the contrary, he argues, powerful interest groups, like publicsector unions, rather than being controlled by government and/or political parties, are in fact able to dominate political decision-making and to veto reforms considered harmful to their interests. While the balance of power has undoubtedly shifted in favour of interest groups after the return to democracy, it is perhaps an overstatement to claim that interest groups dictate policies. While public-sector unions have greater leverage than typical client groups, due to their electoral weight, they are not autonomous. As argued by Trantidis (: –), ‘the special position of unions as client groups generates party-union interdependencies and shared interests’, which limit the autonomy of both government

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 

and unions, as they both depend on ‘the electoral success of the patron party and its access to power’. This claim, however, does not apply to interest groups, like the liberal professions, which are more autonomous and less bound by party–union interdependencies, and thus resemble to a greater extent typical rent-seeking groups. The fragmentation and politicization of interest politics in combination with entrenched interests and clientelist practices has prevented a move away from ‘disjointed corporatism’ and towards neo-corporatist pact building. Moreover, the support provided to ‘insider’ labour groups by political parties and unions and the absence of forces prepared to defend the interests of ‘outsider’ groups and push for more equitable policies, has made it extremely difficult to introduce reforms. The near-default of Greece on its public debt in  has forced political actors to put the economy’s solvency above short-term political considerations. As a result, the policies adopted thereafter involved much harsher measures than the reforms that had been rejected a decade earlier.

. T E C: –

.................................................................................................................................. The eruption of the eurozone debt crisis brought Greece to the verge of bankruptcy, which was prevented by three successive bailout agreements signed in , , and . Each agreement was accompanied by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which involved economic adjustments and structural reforms that were unthinkable prior to the crisis. While it might be overstated to argue with Pagoulatos (: ) that ‘particularistic and populist policies of the past leave behind them not just the policies themselves but the status quo interests surrounding them’, it is undoubtedly true that state–society relations have been deeply affected by reforms passed during the economic crisis. While successive governments were forced to confront entrenched interests, or interest groups that were part of their political clientele, institutional inertia also proved very strong, and reforms were often stalled even when the relevant legislation was approved by parliament.

.. The Enacted Reform Measures The first MoU (May ) contained both fiscal measures, such as tax increases, reductions in the remuneration of public employees and pensioners, and structural reforms, such as liberalization of markets and professions, changes in the social security system, new labour legislation, and more. While all labour groups were affected, the timing and extent of the reform’s impact varied. Employees of both the private and public sector were among the first to be affected, but the impact was unequal. Publicsector employees suffered two major salary cutbacks following the first and second

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

MoU (February ), while efforts to streamline the many inequalities that existed within the public sector were first made in the second Memorandum. Despite the fact that the salaried employees of the public sector paid a high cost in terms of salary cuts, they were ‘protected’ in other ways. Efforts to reduce public-service employment through redundancies faced fierce opposition, both from unions and political parties and were never implemented, even though they had been part of the first and second MoU. Other reforms, that were opposed by public-sector unions, such as the privatization of public enterprises, also proved hard to enforce, and their implementation was delayed or postponed indefinitely. Private-sector employees suffered greater losses, not least because of the rise in unemployment. Structural reforms also disproportionately affected private-sector employees. New labour legislation eased employment protection and reduced redundancy compensations. In addition, decentralization of bargaining took place, as sectoral agreements became non-binding and enterprise agreements or agreements with ‘associations of persons’ could override them. The latter legal provision allowed very small enterprises with fewer than twenty-one employees, to sign agreements with their employees, a mechanism that—in the majority of cases—was used to reduce wages to the national minimum (Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, ). In , the government suspended the right of the GSEE and the peak employer associations to determine minimum wages through collective bargaining agreements, and unilaterally reduced the minimum wage. This move was opposed not only by unions but also by employers’ associations, and particularly by GSEVE that represented small enterprises, because of fears that this would curtail consumers’ spending capacity. The above developments essentially reversed all progress made since the s in bipartite collective bargaining. Unions as a whole lost much of their bargaining power, not only because of the legislative changes initiated, but also because of the rise in unemployment and the very small size of Greek enterprises that rendered decentralized bargaining meaningless. Another major reform initiated during the first MoU concerned the liberalization of markets and ‘closed-shop professions’. This affected both the prestigious liberal professions such as lawyers, notaries, engineers, and others, like taxi drivers, which displayed the characteristics of a closed shop. As on prior occasions, when similar reforms were attempted, opposition was fierce and accompanied by mobilizations and abstention from work. A law was nevertheless passed in  that did away with most restrictions on the practice of professions, such as, for instance, administratively fixed or minimum fees and licensing of professional activities. However, as many details were decided by ministerial decree during the implementation phase, the liberal professions and particularly lawyers, notaries, engineers, and accountants were able to avert the complete liberalization of their respective professions by utilizing their political linkages, particularly with the coalition government’s main partner, the ND party (Trantidis, ). Social security spending was regarded as a major factor contributing to Greece’s deficits, which explains why it was targeted for reform early on. As we have seen, past

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

 

efforts towards this direction faced severe opposition from organized interests and had been on the most part averted. This time around the reform process was successful despite opposition, but three successive waves of legislation in , , and , were required for the reform effort to be completed. It was only in  that all social security funds were consolidated, and rights and obligations were streamlined, even though older retirees continued to receive higher pensions. Later legislation on pensions, passed in  by the coalition government formed in  between the Coalition of the left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) and the Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες) aimed at minimizing pension cuts for basic incomes and shifting the weight to those labour groups that were considered the most privileged. The liberal professions, that were shielded during previous pension reform efforts, this time suffered heavy losses. This reflected the fact that the liberal professions were not considered to be part of SYRIZA’s electoral clientele, and thus could be more readily sacrificed. Nevertheless, in  the government took a step back and reduced social security contributions for the self-employed, in an effort to appease growing discontent.

.. The Impact of the Crisis on Interest Group Organization The passing of all the above measures provoked widespread mobilizations among unions and other interest organizations, depending on which group was targeted on each occasion. From  to  many large-scale protests were organised by GSEE and ADEDY, including strikes and mass rallies. A total of twenty-six general twentyfour-hour strikes were reported during the above period, while there were only nine for the years – (Papanikolopoulos et al., ; www.gsee.gr; www.adedy.gr). In addition, a number of strikes were organized at the sectoral or enterprise level. However, strikes and protests declined sharply after , in part due to widespread expectation that the rise of SYRIZA to power in  would result in the reversal of austerity. The fact that since  this expectation has not materialized and austerity has persisted, heightened the general disillusionment towards the political system and discouraged all forms of political mobilization. Moreover, it intensified the waning appeal of, and trust in unions, given their failure to ward off austerity, despite mass protests and strikes during the previous period. The decline in influence of unions is also confirmed by the further decrease in union density during the period under examination. Last, disillusionment with existing union organizations and mainstream political parties boosted the forces outside the official union movement. The Workers’ Militant Front (PAME, Πανεργατικό Αγωνιστικό Μέτωπο), which is the labour union organization affiliated to KKE that was created in , intensified its activity and held separate rallies throughout this period, thus confirming its

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

independent role and moving one step forward in the institutional division of unions along political/ideological lines (Papanikolopoulos et al., ; Sotiropoulos, , ). Mass protests were also organized in opposition to the MoUs of  and  that were attended by other segments of society, depending on the issues at stake. Such protests were not predominantly focused on ending austerity measures, but on preserving privileged arrangements for various interest groups, ranging from publicsector employees to various professionals. Indicative of this trend is that protests became larger when particularistic benefits were threatened, rather than when the focus was on general austerity measures whose impact was diffused across society (Sotiropoulos, ). Discontent among farmers also grew in the years following the crisis, which led to intensified protests and exacerbated the problems of representation within the sector. Farmers’ mobilizations had been mounting since  due to opposition to the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP), which had boosted the forces close to the KKE. In – the ND government (in power in –) responded to farmers’ mobilizations by handing out about half a million euros in the form of compensation, in an effort to appease farmers and avoid electoral losses. However, the compensations handed out by the ND government were deemed illegal by the EU in  and had to be returned. Dwindling of resources in combination with EU restrictions on the compensations and the subsidies governments could provide to farmers weakened the traditional close ties between farmers and the ND and PASOK parties that traditionally maintained the closest ties to farmers. After  PASY (affiliated with the Communist Party, KKE) was able to capitalize on rising discontent due to high fuel prices and increases in taxes and social security contributions. In  mass mobilizations were organized, with farmers blocking national highways for about a month. A ‘coordinating committee’ was formed to organize mobilizations of farmers which took place across the country and which has continued to play an active role since. The major force behind this initiative was PASY, which in certain geographic areas (e.g. in Thessaly) seemed to be the predominant force among farmers. While this is not the case in other areas, coordination of action between local associations was common (To Vima, .., and ..). While discontent among farmers encouraged the rise of new forces within their ranks, change in the representation of the sector was triggered primarily by corruption scandals that eventually led to the closure of PASEGES, GESASE, and SYDASE. Even though, news reports of mismanagement of public funds on the part of PASEGES and the agricultural associations had already surfaced during the decade prior to the economic crisis, close ties between their leadership and the governing parties had shielded the leaders of farmers’ association from persecution. The economic crisis and the implementation of austerity measures led to the demand for greater accountability for scarce public resources. This prompted the ND associate minister of agriculture to announce in September  that ‘it was time to put an end to the absurd funding of state-sponsored agricultural unions’ (Kathimerini, ..). At the same time, he called for an official investigation into all three farmers’ organizations

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

 

for the period –, during which they had received  million euros in funding from public sources. The findings of the investigation were published in  and revealed that widespread mishandling of funds took place. Mounting debts and lack of funding led to the closure of all the above organizations by . During the same year, the SYRIZA-led government introduced law / that encouraged cooperatives to organize on a more commercial/professional basis and put an end to all forms of state funding. Since  farmers’ representation appears to be much more pluralist than in the past, while patronage ties with political parties have weakened. The void created in the representation of cooperatives gave rise to two new organizations in . The Association of Farmers Cooperatives and Enterprises (SASOEE, Σύνδεσμος Αγροτικών Συνεταιριστικών Οργανώσεων και Επιχειρήσεων Ελλάδας) was formed under the leadership of a former New Democracy MP and minister of agriculture. Former PASEGES leaders tried to re-create PASEGES and formed what they called the newPASEGES. While the official cause for the rift was that SASSOE accepts for members not only cooperatives but also agribusiness interests, it is probable that political and personal motives played an equally important role. While it is too soon to tell how these organizations will evolve, the existing legal framework and their economic status precludes their gaining the same power and influence as PASEGES. On the other hand, with the exception of PASY, there are no farmers’ interest associations organized at the national level, which contributes towards the dismantling of previous corporatist arrangements. On the whole, the fact that austerity measures and reforms were carried out despite protests is an indication of the declining capacity of interest groups to veto policies. Moreover, it signals the ongoing weakening of ties between political parties and interest group organizations. While this has been taking place since the s the process has accelerated during recent years, as governments have been forced to take back many concessions made to particular labour groups. At the same time PASKE and the Democratic Independent Labour Movement, (DAKE, Δημοκρατική Ανεξάρτητη Κίνηση Εργαζομένων), which is affiliated to ND, have not hesitated to criticize policies put forward by their respective parties (Sotiropoulos, ). The severing of clientelist ties between political parties and interest groups has had a negative effect on the appeal of both sides. The failure of interest organizations to deliver benefits to their rank and file has contributed to a decrease in union density and disengagement from other interest associations. Political parties that had relied heavily on linkages to mass organizations also suffered losses. PASOK that had cultivated the closest ties to unions and farmers’ associations, was confined to fourth place in the  parliamentary election, despite having entered a coalition with other smaller centre-left-wing parties. On the other hand, PASKE remains the strongest faction within the GSEE, followed by DAKE, a fact which serves as a further indication of the autonomy labour unions have gained from political parties. SYRIZA, on the other hand, which has emerged as the major political party on the Left, lacks close ties to interest organizations. While it had managed during the first

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

years of the crisis to strengthen its position within public-sector unions, largely due to promises made to reverse austerity policies, this momentum was lost since it was voted into power and its influence has shrunk. In view of the above, it is unlikely that in the near future, relations between interest organizations and political parties will emulate those of the pre-crisis period.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Over the last three decades we have witnessed the unfolding of an academic debate on the nature of state–society relations in Greece. Despite differences in outlook and interpretation, these discussions provide us with valuable insights on how interest representation and intermediation have evolved in the post- period and the implications for policy-making. However, research on the organization and political leverage of different labour interest groups have been mostly focused on unions and to a lesser extent on farmers’ associations. Other groups, such as the liberal professions, have not received the academic attention they deserve, given their role in shaping policies and vetoing reforms that were considered harmful to their interests. The near default of Greece in  and the bailout agreements that followed acted as an outside force that put an end to normative practices and institutions which had evolved in a path-dependent manner for decades. Governments were forced to shed particularistic policy-making in favour of more universal policies. While the capacity of interest groups to shape legislation and stall reforms has declined since the outbreak of the crisis, this was a consequence of the fact that decisions were being carried out under the imminent threat of Greece’s default and insurmountable external constraints. It cannot therefore be assumed that government–interest group relations will continue on the same path after the end of the bailout agreements and the return to normalcy. Interest groups are likely to regain part of their influence after the bailout agreements are over, and practices associated with the pre-crisis period are likely to re-emerge. After all, even during the crisis, certain groups were better able to safeguard their basic interests than others. The above notwithstanding, it seems unlikely that there will be a full return to previous forms of interest representation and intermediation, not least because of the severing of ties between interest groups and political parties and the distancing of the rank and file from their respective organizations. On the contrary, developments after  point towards the emergence of more pluralist forms of representation, as demonstrated by the emergence of new organizations in sectors like agriculture. In addition, legislative changes that have facilitated less hierarchical and centralized forms of bargaining and collective agreements also reinforce the tendency away from corporatist intermediation. However, outcomes are still open and more research needs to be undertaken to understand the full impact that the economic crisis has had on the

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

 

internal dynamics of interest groups, their ties with the political system, and their capacity to mobilize and shape future public policies.

R Featherstone, K., Kazamias, G., and Papadimitriou, D. (). ‘The Limits of External Empowerment: EMU, Technocracy and Reform of the Greek Pension System’. Political Studies  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). The Limits of Europeanisation: Structural Reforms and Public Policy in Greece. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Iliopoulos, C. and Valentinov, V. (). ‘Opportunism in Agricultural Cooperatives in Greece’. Outlook on Agriculture,  (): –. Ioannou, C. (). ‘Η βιομηχανική εργατική τάξη και το συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα’ [The Industrial Working Class and the Union Movement]. In Moschonas, A. and Palaiologos, N. (eds.) Κοινωνικές τάξεις, αλλαγή και οικονομική ανάπτυξη στη Μεσόγειο [Social Classes, Change and Economic Development in the Mediterranean]. Athens: Mediterranean Research Institute, –. Ιordanoglou, C. (). Κράτος και ομάδες συμφερόντων: μια κριτική της παραδεδεγμένης σοφίας [State and Interest Organisations: A Critique of Common Wisdom]. Athens: Polis. Kakepaki, M. (). Η πολιτική αντιπροσώπευση στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα: Χαρακτηριστικά και φυσιογνωμία των μελών του ελληνικού κοινοβουλίου – [Political Representation in Contemporary Greece: Characteristics of Greek MPs –]. Athens: National Centre of Social Research. Koukiadaki, A. and Kokkinou, C. (). ‘Deconstructing the Greek System of Industrial Relations’. European Journal of Industrial Relations, :(). –. Koukias, K. D. (). Οργάνωση συμφερόντων στην Ελλάδα: ενσωμάτωση και πρόσβαση στο κράτος σε συγκριτική προοπτική [The Organization of Interests in Greece: Inclusion and Access to the State in Comparative Perspective]. Athens: Exantas. Kouzis, Y. (). Τα χαρακτηριστικά του ελληνικού συνδικαλιστικού κινήματος [The Characteristics of the Greek Union Movement]. Athens: Gutenberg. Lavdas, K. (). The Europeanisation of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crisis of Integration. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of Bureaucratic Clientelism?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Matsaganis, M. (). ‘Union Structures and Pension in Greece’. British Journal of Industrial Relations,  (): –. Mavrogordatos, T. (). Μεταξύ Πιτυοκάμπτη και Προκρούστη: Οι επαγγελματικές οργανώσεις στην σημερινή Ελλάδα [Between Pitiokamptis and Prokroustis: Professional Organisations in Contemporary Greece]. Athens: Odysseas. Mitsopoulos, M. and Pelagidis, T. (). ‘Vikings in Greece: “Kleptocratic” Interest Groups in a Closed, Rent-Seeking Economy’. Cato Journal,  (): –. Mossialos, I. and Allin, S. (). ‘Interest Groups and Health System Reform in Greece’. West European Politics,  (): –. Mousidis, A. (). ‘Συλλογικότητες του αγροτικού χώρου και αγροτικό κίνημα μετά το : από τη θεσμική έκρηξη στην παρακμή:’ [Collectives of the Agricultural Sector and the

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Peasant Movement after ]. In Mousidis, A. (ed.) To αγροτικό κίνημα στην Ελλάδα (The Peasant Movement in Greece]. Athens: Nisos, –. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s New Political Economy: State Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pagoulatos G. (). ‘The Political Economy of Forced Reform and the  Greek Economic Adjustment Programme’. In Kalyvas, S., Pagoulatos, G., and Tsoukas, H. (eds.) From Stagnation to Forced Adjustment. Reforms in Greece –. London: Hurst and Company, –. Papanikolopoulos D. et al (). Το απεργιακό φαινόμενο στην Ελλάδα. Καταγραφή των απεργιών κατά το – [Strikes in Greece. Strike Activity –]. Athens: ΙΝΕ-GSEE. Schmitter, P. C. (). ‘Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-corporatism May be Going’. In Lehmbruch, G. and Schmitter, P. C. (eds.) Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. London: Sage, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘The Paradox of Non-reform in a Reform-ripe Environment: Lessons from Post-authoritarian Greece’. In Kalyvas, S., Pagoulatos, G., and Tsoukas, H. (eds.) From Stagnation to Forced Adjustment. Reforms in Greece –. London: Hurst and Company, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Η ελληνική κοινωνία πολιτών και η οικονομική κρίση [The Greek Civil Society and the Economic Crisis]. Athens: Potamos. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Political Party–Interest Group Politics in Greece before and after the Onset of the Economic Crisis’. Mediterranean Politics,  (): –. Spourdalakis, M. (). The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party. London: Routledge. Trantidis, A. (). ‘Clientelism and Economic Policy: Hybrid Characteristics of Collective Action in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Trantidis, A. (). Clientelism and Economic Policy: Greece and the Crisis. London: Routledge. Zambarloukou, S. (). Κράτος και εργατικός συνδικαλισμός στην Ελλάδα, –: Μια συγκριτική προσέγγιση [State and Labour Movements in Greece, –: A Comparative Approach]. Athens: Sakkoulas Publishing. Zambarloukou, S. (). ‘Collective Bargaining and Social Pacts: Greece in Comparative Perspective’. European Journal of Industrial Relations,  (): –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

 

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T chapter concerns voting behaviour in Greece; it will cover several aspects of voting behaviour including cleavages, voter characteristics, psycho-sociological determinants and economic voting. Although the literature on Greek voting behaviour is not as extensive as in the US, or other European democracies, some conclusions can be reached. The chapter aspires to examine patterns, if possible, over time and across contexts. In other words, it uses a comparative lens to analyse voting behaviour in Greece in contrast to other—similar and dissimilar—democracies, before and during the post- debt crisis. The aim of the chapter is to summarize what we know about voting behaviour in Greece and identify a future research agenda for this particular field.

. S D

.................................................................................................................................. According to the seminal work by Lipset and Rokkan (), societal divisions at the expansion of suffrage determine the nature of party systems decades later. In Western Europe, the primary cleavage has been that of workers versus owners with left-leaning parties representing the former, and right-leaning parties the latter. These social structures and divisions form the bases of party competition. Because of the distinctive democratization process and the late industrialization of the Greek economy, traditional cleavages did not have a big influence on the Greek party system. To be sure, this is not to say that Greeks did not rely on their social class when casting their ballots, but the ties between parties and social classes were less apparent. Political divisions, however, did exist and they were strong. For example, in the first quarter of the twentieth century the main political division was between those who supported the king (Constantine) and those who supported the leader of the Liberal Party, Eleftherios Venizelos. The division was primarily a matter of outlook and it related

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 



to the choice of Great Power ally during WWI. Constantine was supporting neutrality, whereas Venizelos was in favour of entering the war with Entente. The consequences of the division between the two groups were evident throughout the interwar period. This period was characterized by political violence, assassination attempts, political instability, purges in the public sector, severe polarization, and military coups. The Greek Civil War that erupted after the end of WWII, split Greeks into two camps; the Nationalists and those who were not Nationalists (i.e. Communists and some of centre-left persuasion). After the  election, and the ‘Unrelenting Struggle’ that was launched by George Papandreou, the Nationalist/Communist division evolved to a Right versus anti-Right one (see Nikolakopoulos, ; Tsatsanis, ; Diamantopoulos, ). As in the pre-WWII period, the policy differences were visible yet not substantial, but political instability due to polarization had severe consequences for democracy. The sevenyear long military dictatorship that started in  attempted to revitalize the Nationalist versus Communist division. After  and the ‘Metapolitefsi’, the Right versus antiRight became again dominant. The Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) became the key player in that bloc and won most elections held during that period. After the death of PASOK’s founder and leader, Andreas Papandreou, PASOK moved towards the centre of the ideological spectrum. Modernisation became the new ‘pole’ in Greek politics. The content of this division was vague, but one could argue that, as in other periods of Greek political history (for example the end of the nineteenth century), its defining feature was the willingness or not to implement reforms. To be sure, the traditional Right–anti-Right division was still present, but much weaker. As of , however, the emergence of a new—and strong—division shook traditional cleavages in Greek society. The huge public debt and the inability of the Greek government to borrow from the international markets separated politicians and voters into two camps: those who supported the IMF/ECB/EU Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), outlining austerity policies, and those who did not. After the ‘earthquake’ of the  twin elections, the collapse of PASOK (from  per cent in  to  per cent in  and to  per cent in ), the ‘unnatural’ Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) and the Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες) alliance resulting in the coalition governments formed in , and the extremely divisive July  referendum, it became clear that the Greek party system had changed. To summarize, political divisions in Greece were not based on traditional—Western European—cleavages. Greece did not have a strong and large working class, and the religious divisions were absent. Still, the political divisions that have been described were strong, divisive, and long-lasting.

. C     C  V C

.................................................................................................................................. Other aspects of Greek voting behaviour have remained relatively stable. For example, there is a great deal of uniformity in the geographical distribution of the vote. To be

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sure, the left-wing tradition of the Island of Crete and the strong support for the Right in Central Macedonia or some parts of the Peloponnese are evident, but the shifts in votes from one election to the next are rather uniform (Featherstone and Katsoudas, ). There is also no discernible pattern when it comes to gender. Exit polls published in the elections after  suggest that men and women vote in similar ways. An important exception to this rule is Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή), and the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS, Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) before, which is primarily supported by men, a voting pattern that is also observed across Western Europe but the extreme-Right gender gap is currently fading. With respect to age, evidence from exit polls in the post-crisis elections suggest that support for SYRIZA (and ANEL in ) was higher for younger voters, but SYRIZA managed to perform well in older age groups as well. In , for example,  per cent of Greeks aged  or older voted for SYRIZA. The equivalent figure for the conservative New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) was  per cent. In the June  election,  per cent of + voters supported ND, whereas only  per cent voted SYRIZA. PASOK’s electoral base—post-crisis—appeared to be comprised of older voters. In the pre-crisis election of , in contrast, PASOK’s base was evenly distributed across age groups. In the same election, more than  per cent of + voters and  per cent of young (–) voters supported ND. More generally, there is no clear pattern when it comes to individual characteristics, and voters seem to shift from one election to the other in a uniform manner. In the absence of consistent measures of demographics and voting intentions that are publicly available, the exit polls are the only way to assess these patterns.

. S  P D  V

.................................................................................................................................. Although Butler and Stokes () emphasized the role of class for voting behaviour, the theoretical underpinning of allegiances was primarily psychological and it was based on studies from the US examining the concept of party identification (Campbell et al., ). The concept is widely used across the world and it is considered a measure of democratic stability (Dalton and Wattenberg, ). To be sure, the discussion on voters who ‘tend to think of themselves as being X or Z’ is more applicable to the political system of the US, but there is still merit in the concept of ‘party identification’. Many voters in Greece, and elsewhere, tend to have biased perceptions of the political world as they tend to glorify their party (their in-group) and think less of their opponents. In the absence of a Greek election study, comparative datasets can be analysed to understand the dynamics of party identification in Greece. Eurobarometer asked Greek

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%Party Identifiers

75

70

65

60 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Year

 . Proportion of Greek voters feeling close to a specific political party. Source: Eurobarometer.

respondents in the s: ‘Do you generally feel close to any political party?’ (see Schmitt et al., ). The results are plotted in Figure .. In , . per cent of the electorate declared they were supporters of a party and the figure increases to around  per cent in . Note here, that amongst those who felt closer to a political party, around half of them were supporting PASOK in , when seven years later, in , the distribution of support was more balanced: . per cent were PASOK partisans and . per cent were feeling closer to ND. In general, we can neither confirm nor refute the dealignment hypothesis for Greece (see Dalton and Wattenberg, ) as we do not have enough data points to measure long-term dynamics. It is also clear that respondents often conflate it with their current voting intentions and this is not what the Michigan team had in mind when putting forward the concept of party identification. How does Greece compare to other nations? Dalton and Wattenberg () use the same Eurobarometer data to provide some answers. Spanish and Portuguese data were collected after  and the figures for Greece—in terms of levels—are only comparable to Portugal. Portuguese partisanship ranges from . per cent to . per cent in  and , respectively. The same figures for Spain are . per cent and . per cent (the mean for the -year period is . per cent). When compared to established European democracies, Greece is—on average—not far away, but the trend in these countries is clearly downward. Still, the consequences of partisanship are clear (yet theoretically shallow); partisans are more likely to vote for their ‘own’ party. Two sets of studies show that in the s nine out of ten PASOK sympathizers actually voted for PASOK. Similar numbers are reported for all other competing parties (ND, the communist KKE and its offshoot KKE-Exterior). The interesting pattern is the following: only one out of ten PASOK

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voters report a high liking for ND in , whereas for ND the same number is close to  per cent (see Nikolakopoulos, ). In the same survey, four out of ten tend to have positive feelings towards KKE and around  per cent positive feelings about KKEes. By October ,  per cent of PASOK supporters also liked ND and the equivalent numbers for the Left (that was then organized in one party, Synaspismos) were around  per cent (see Nikolakopoulos, ). Of course, party identification is not independent of class membership and class voting. Social class is the key cleavage in the international literature and the main concern in recent years is whether, and by how much, class voting has declined (Evans and Tilley, ). The theoretical mechanism is straightforward and assumes that individuals are brought up in a specific social environment that reminds them of their preferences (see Butler and Stokes, ). One of the key issues with class membership is measurement. There are at least four ways to measure class voting and, unfortunately, for the purposes of this chapter, there is not enough data sources to examine class voting in great detail. But, some studies have attempted to measure class voting in Greece. For example, Katsoudas () shows that in  class membership (using the typical market-research distinction) was not relevant to PASOK’s support. PASOK drew equal support from all groups and the equivalent figures for ND were similar (Katsoudas, ). In  the same figures were different: PASOK compared to ND would appeal less to upper middle-class voters and more to unskilled working-class citizens. In the middle categories (skilled working, lower middle and middle class) the support was very similar for the two parties. Vernardakis () offers a comprehensive account of class voting in Greece from  to . According to Vernardakis, the two main parties, PASOK and ND, did not have a coherent class structure. Still, lower middle-class voters would support PASOK at a higher rate as ND would be supported by upper-middle-class voters. The Communist party (KKE) would exhibit a very similar pattern to PASOK, while Synaspismos (or SYRIZA later on) would also be supported by leftist, upper-middleclass voters. The overall conclusion for the Greek case is that of a weak class vote. The same Eurobarometer data, covering the period from  to , that was used for partisanship can be used to examine the degree of class voting. While not ideal in terms of measurement, analyses of subjective class voting (that is self-identification as working, middle, or upper class) shows only weak results. Although there is some pattern in the calculated log odds of class voting (only PASOK and ND were modelled), once educational attainment, age, and gender are accounted for, class does not predict voting in the surveys analysed. When looking at similar patterns using objective occupation indicators, the results do not reveal any systematic patterns. Nieuwbeerta and Ulltee () offer one of the few comparative studies of class voting. There, they confirm that class voting is in general decline due to dealignment or the melting of the frozen cleavages, but also show the amount of class voting in Greece was relatively low compared to most other countries. Lower even compared to Portugal and Spain. They also show that the dynamic trend from the s to the s, can be partly explained by increases in the proportion of manual workers. However,

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surprisingly, the coefficient they report is negative, meaning that in Greece the larger is the number of manual labourer, the smaller is class voting. This is not to say that class characteristics like income, location, or education did not matter for voters. For example, support for the Right was larger in affluent neighbourhoods, whereas it was lower in poorer areas of cities. But income should not be conflated with class, as income is age specific and social class is a function of the type of work and the type of contract (employer–employee relationship) an employee has. Across the advanced world, class voting is in decline and the few comparative studies show that the European north (the cases that made the ‘frozen’ social cleavages thesis plausible) exhibits significantly higher levels of class voting and Southern Europe the lowest. Given the data constraints and the fact that Portugal, Spain, and Greece became democracies in the mid-s, it is not possible to see whether there is a decline in class voting or whether levels of class voting would have been as high had there been no democratization process. The idea here is that the first elections after the transition to democracy in Southern Europe had a distinct character and the main aim of electors was democratic consolidation (see Nikolakopoulos, ; Freire, .) There is an obvious caveat here: in the UK, for example, national election studies run from , Germany since , and the US since . In Greece, there are only a few individuallevel election studies and the comparative studies like the EB dataset used above. It is not thus easy to reliably measure the theoretical concept in the context of Greece, let alone understand its long-term dynamics.

. E V

.................................................................................................................................. The list of studies examining class voting and party identification around the globe is very extensive. Equally prolific is the study of economic voting. The theory in its simplest form, suggests that governments are held into account in response to economic outcomes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, ). Improving economics bring about increases in government support, whereas economic downturns result in declines in governing party support. Economic voting thus rests on a simple rule on which voters reward a government for a good economy and punish it for a bad one. Economic voting studies have relied on two basic research designs. First, through measuring the subjective evaluations of performance or prospective and retrospective assessments of a citizen’s or the country’s financial situation. Secondly, by linking party support (vote intentions or actual vote shares) with objective economic conditions like the levels of unemployment, inflation, or/and growth. Figure ., for example, shows incumbent party support and its correlation with annual GDP growth rate from  until . Figure . suggests that for every additional percentage annual increase in GDP, incumbent parties gain around  per cent (this coefficient corresponds to the solid black line in the plot). When the crisis years are excluded this effect is reduced to around . per cent (see grey line in Figure .).

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 

50 1985

1993

40

%Incumbent

2000 1977 2007 1996 1989

2004

1981

2009 30

2015 20

2012 10 –10

–7

–4

–1 Growth

2

5

 . Economic voting in Greece, –. Source: Compiled by the author.

Before the Greek crisis, the established literature on voting behaviour would only consider Greece as a single observation in comparative datasets. For example, in a key comparative study in economic voting, Greece is considered a typical high-clarity case that exhibits modest levels of economic voting (see Duch and Stevenson, : ). In most surveys analysed in that volume, the effects of economic considerations on the vote are not big, but, overall, economic voting is evident. The authors noted, however, the following: when PASOK is in office the main recipient of the economic vote is the Left (KKE, KKE-exterior, NAR, and Synaspismos depending on the election year) and not ND as the theory would predict (: –). When ND is in office, the recipient of the punishment is PASOK. The authors do not seek to explain this, but the reported pattern is too interesting to be neglected. After , the bailouts and the uniqueness of the general handling of the crisis made Greece (along with Portugal, Ireland, and also Spain) prominent as case studies to understand several phenomena. Previously, with the exception of one or two studies, there was no literature on Greek voting behaviour and economic voting. The journal Electoral Studies published a special issue on economic voting in the European periphery, where Nezi () showed strong and asymmetric economic voting in the period after the economic crisis. Teperoglou and Tsatsanis () attributed the collapse of the party system as developed during the ‘Metapolitefsi’ to the

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unprecedented collapse of the national economy. The pattern was fairly similar across crisis-laden democracies. The introduction of the euro and, after , the conditionality of the IMF loans changed the way the Greek economy operates. Research on economic voting has examined how international political and economic institutions relate to the size of the economic vote. The association between globalization and domestic electoral politics is primarily related to the ability elected politicians have to propose and implement policies (Hellwig and Samuels, : ). The empirical prediction of this hypothesis is that the economic vote is lower because politicians can claim that they did not have the room to manoeuvre the economy and thus voters cannot assign responsibility for economic outcomes. This would lead to the expectation that economic voting in Greece should be lower after the bailout and thus political parties implementing austerity policies would be able to escape the blame. However, unemployment appeared to be irrelevant for voters before the bailout and became extremely salient around the period after the bailout agreement was ratified in parliament in May  (Kosmidis, ). Kosmidis’ () study on economic voting shows that before the crisis, economic voting (as measured by the impact of consumer confidence on support for the government) was not a significant predictor of government popularity. It became a lot more important after the national economic accounts started deteriorating. An experiment testing the microfoundations of the pattern further shows that economic voting was equally strong for those who considered that the Greek government is responsible for economic policy as well as for those who considered the international creditors as responsible (see Kosmidis, ). In short, the room to manoeuvre thesis cannot be confirmed in the Greek case. In general, there has been a significant shift in the way voters understand the role of international institutions in Greek politics. Metron Analysis, a polling company, used to ask their respondents, ‘For important issues, do you think that policy should be decided at the national or at the EU level?’ The distribution of these answers over time is interesting; before the crisis, more than half of the respondents would choose the EU as their answer. Even after the collapse of Lehmann brothers, the same number was high, and before the actual bailout it reached its highest ( per cent and  per cent in the two quarters before May ). From that point onward, the drop in the numbers preferring the EU (and the equivalent increase for the national government choice) was substantial (down to  per cent in the final quarter of ). Apart from showing a significant shift in the assignment of responsibility, it also shows a significant shift in public attitudes towards Europe and the EU. As already discussed, ideas like national sovereignty, anti-globalization, and ethnocentrism (see Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou, ) became the basic ingredients for the election outcomes after  and, of course, determined the outcome of the divisive July  referendum. This was a decisive moment of the Greek crisis. A strategy of confronting EU officials that lasted for almost seven months in  came to an abrupt end. Voters supported the SYRIZA/ANEL government and voted NO in the July referendum by a

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large margin. Paradoxically, days after the result, the Greek government agreed with the lenders and sided with the minority who voted YES in the July referendum. The government showed no consistency, but confronted their own voters and imposed severe capital controls. Yet, SYRIZA was eventually rewarded in the snap election of September . What can explain the public’s response to a textbook case of the failure of political manoeuvring? Using post-election surveys, Tsatsanis and Teperoglou () show that voters during the September  election rewarded SYRIZA not for the outcome, but for their effort to negotiate with the ECB and the EU. Since staying in the eurozone had been the preference of the majority of public opinion at the time, the third bailout, accompanied by an austerity package, that came after the July  referendum, was considered a necessary sacrifice to avoid the imminent exit from the eurozone and return to a national currency. As a matter of fact, the small portion of SYRIZA MPs who would oppose such a development left SYRIZA after the government’s U-turn and were not re-elected in September . Walter et al. () modelled voting behaviour in the referendum and found that only  per cent of those who thought Grexit would be the outcome voted NO in the referendum. Around  per cent of those who thought that the outcome in the case of a NO would be further negotiations actually reported that they voted NO in the Referendum. This is in line with the interpretation by Tsatsanis and Teperoglou (). A third study examined the influence of economic conditions on voting in the July referendum. Xezonakis and Hartman () examined the role of economic change at the regional level using satellite data to measure local change in economic conditions. They found that economic deprivation (and not ideology or socio-demographics), predicted higher levels of NO support at the regional level.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. This chapter sought to identify the key literature regarding voting behaviour in Greece, and, where appropriate, report findings that could help to paint a fuller picture of how voters choose their governments. Several aspects of voting behaviour were not covered. For example, there is no discussion about the rise of populism, the impact of leaders (see Dinas, ), turnout, the role of ideology, campaigning, or what some scholars denote as political culture. It is either because the literature was very limited or because other chapters in this volume cover the topic. Still, the topics covered here offer a good overview of voting behaviour in Greece. In terms of social cleavages, the dominant division in Greece for thirty or more years was that of Right versus anti-Right. This was an old cleavage characterized by the fact that PASOK was at the forefront of the anti-conservative, anti-Right bloc. However, since , in the context of Greece’s economic collapse, the implementation of austerity policies based on the Memorandum signed between Greece and its creditors

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and the coalition government formed between PASOK and ND (–), the radical Left SYRIZA led the anti-conservative bloc. The radical Right – radical Left coalition government that ruled after , was immune to the ‘Old Cleavage’ because it was based on the novel Memorandum/anti-Memorandum division in the Greek electorate. The new cleavage had probably emerged before the crisis broke out and eventually split Greeks into those who have a more cosmopolitan outlook and those with an ethnocentric worldview, but it found shelter for those voters after the economic crisis and the bailouts. It is difficult to name this division, let alone give it a specific policy content. The reality is that it is not unique to Greece and it is here to stay, even if it will form differently across different contexts. With respect to class voting, available data shows that class voting is not a strong determinant of voting behaviour in Greece. At least, when compared to other considerations, it does not capture how voters think when they vote. Party identification, on the other hand, seems to be an important aspect of voting in Greece. With the caveat of the inconsistency between measurement and concept, it seems that a good proportion of Greeks think of themselves as supporters of a particular party. Unfortunately, available analyses do not capture the period when PASOK and ND converged to the centre of the Left-Right continuum. Regarding the crisis period, without doubt, party identification collapsed and the new party system that emerged after  had nothing to do with the s or s (see Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, ), although it maintained much of the style of politics of that period. Economic voting, finally, seems to be an important aspect of voting behaviour in Greece. Past comparative studies, in conjunction with the more recent research on economic voting in Greece, reveal that Greek voters do consider the national economy when they cast their votes. Surely, some elections will be decided by other factors, but it turns out that strong economic voting grew even stronger after the crisis. Voting behaviour research is empirical, and it thus requires individual-level survey data to analyse how voters vote the way they do. Often, the hypotheses that we are interested in are dynamic. We are interested in how things have changed and why they have changed. This means that we also need consistent measures of the key concepts for our analyses. It should not come as a surprise that most theories of voting have been tested in the UK, the US, Germany, and some Scandinavian countries. These countries consistently run surveys that allow the interested researcher to analyse individual voters over time. Still, since most of the comparative datasets are available to measure occupation and class, further research is required to ascertain why Greek voters do not rely on their class membership when they vote. More importantly, are they aware of their social belonging and do they vote rationally, in a way that is consistent with their material incentives? What is the nature of party identification? Is it a running tally or a long-term disposition? How does it affect political attitudes and what kind of consequences does it bear for accountability and policy-making? Many of those questions require the appropriate data to answer them. Although there is a great deal of good quality polling taking place in Greece, polling firms only show the aggregate margins, they do not make their individual data publicly available

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

 

and they have different preferences regarding question wording and questionnaire design. Our analyses are thus limited to either macro models or individual-level models using data from the Eurobarometer, the European Social Survey, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Those interested in Greek voting behaviour should find ways to build the necessary infrastructure to understand Greek society. University teams should set up a Greek Election Study that would comprise multiple waves and ask questions in a consistent manner. This is key to understand change and continuity in Greek electoral politics. Finally, a synergy between private polling firms and academia would allow researchers to test many of the key empirical hypotheses that have been consistently tested elsewhere, but only sparsely in the Greek context. This synergy should also accommodate the analytical developments in voting behaviour; the experimental method has penetrated the subfield and many of the empirical puzzles and research questions can be evaluated using randomly assigned interventions.

R Butler, D. and Stokes, D. (). Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. New York: St. Martin’s. Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E. (). The American Voter. New York: Wiley. Dalton, R. J. and Wattenberg, M. P. (). Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diamantopoulos, A. ().  και μια δεκαετίες πολιτικών διαιρέσεων. Οι διαιρετικές τομές στην Ελλάδα: – [ and One Decades of Political Divisions. The Dividing Lines in Greece: –]. Athens: Epicentre. Dinas, E. (). ‘Big Expectations, Small Outcomes: The Impact of Leaders’ Personal Appeal in the  Greek Election’. Electoral Studies,  (): –. Duch, R. M. and Stevenson, R.T. (). The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evans, G. and Tilley, J. (). The New Politics of Class: The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Featherstone K. and Katsoudas, D. (). ‘Change and Continuity in Greek Voting’. Behaviour, European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Freire, A. (). ‘Cleavages, Values and the Vote in Portugal, –’. Portuguese Journal of Social Science,  (): –. Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K., and Vasilopoulou, S. (). ‘The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism’. European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Hellwig, T. and Samuels, D. (). ‘Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization’. Comparative Political Studies,  (): –. Katsoudas, D. (). ‘Ψήφος και ιδεολογία’ [Vote and Ideology]. in Lyrintzis, C. and Nikolakopoulos, I. (eds) Εκλογές και κόμματα στην δεκαετία του ’ [Elections and Parties in the s]. Athens: Themelio, –.

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 



Kosmidis, S. (). ‘Government Constraints and Accountability: Economic Voting in Greece before and during the IMF Intervention’. West European Politics,  (): –. Kosmidis, S. (). ‘International Constraints and Electoral Decisions: Does the Room to Maneuver Attenuate Economic Voting?’ American Journal of Political Science,  (): –. Lewis-Beck, M. S. and Stegmaier, M. (). ‘Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes’. Annual Review of Political Science,  (): –. Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press. Nezi, R. (). ‘Economic Voting under the Economic Crisis: Evidence from Greece’. Electoral Studies,  (): –. Nieuwbeerta, P. and Ultee, W. (). ‘Class Voting in Western Industrialized Countries, –: Systematizing and Testing Explanations’. European Journal of Political Research,  (): –. Nikolakopoulos, I. (). Η εκλογική επιρροή των πολιτικών δυνάμεων. Εκλογές και κόμματα στη δεκαετία του ’ [Electoral Influence of the Political Powers. Elections and Parties in the s]. Athens: Themelio. Nikolakopoulos, I. (). Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία. Κόμματα και εκλογές, – [Sickly Democracy: Parties and Elections, –]. Athens: Pataki. Schmitt, H., Scholz, E., Leim, I., and Moschner, M. (). ‘The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File –’ (ed. .). Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. Teperoglou, E. and Tsatsanis, E. (). ‘Dealignment, De-legitimation and the Implosion of the Two-Party System in Greece: The Earthquake Election of  May ’. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties,  (): –. Tsatsanis, E. (). ‘‘Παλαιές και νέες διαιρετικές τομες’ [Old and New Dividing Lines]. In Marantzides, N., Konstantinidis, G., and Pappas, T. (eds.) Κόμματα και πολιτική στην Ελλάδα: Οι σύγχρονες εξελίξεις [Parties and Politics in Greece: Contemporary Developments]. Athens: Kritiki, –. Tsatsanis, E. and Teperoglou, E. (). ‘Realignment under Stress: The July  Referendum and the September Parliamentary Election in Greece’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Vernardakis, C. (). Πολιτικά κόμματα, εκλογές και κομματικό σύστημα [Political Parties, Elections and the Party System: The Transformations of Political Representation –]. Athens: Sakkoulas Publishing. Walter, S., Jurado, I., Dinas, E. and Konstantinidis, N. (). ‘Non-Cooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the  Greek Bailout Referendum’. International Organizations,  (): –. Xezonakis G. and Hartman, F. (). ‘Economic Downturns and the Greek Referendum of : Evidence Using Night-Time Light Data’. Working Paper.

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  ......................................................................................................................

     

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I the age of digital disruption, it is commonly argued that there has been a process of convergence among media systems and practices, diminishing national and regional differences (McQuail, : –). At the same time, media and society continually interact and influence each other. In effect, political, social, and economic conditions, population and cultural traits, physical and geographical characteristics interact and usually influence the development of the media in specific countries, and give them their particular characteristics (Gallimore, : –). Although some other factors may also play a part, it seems that economic conditions and politics are the conditions that mainly influence the development and the structure of most media systems. In effect, the media in the southern European region represent what Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini () propose as the Mediterranean model and share a number of characteristics which distinguish them from the rest of media systems in Central, Western and Northern Europe. The Greek media system fits in well and presents similar features to the Mediterranean model (Papathanassopoulos, ). These are: low levels of newspaper circulation, a tradition of advocacy reporting, instrumentalization of privately owned media, tight governmental control of the public broadcaster, savage deregulation, and limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, ). The recent fiscal crisis in relation to the advent of the digital media has caused additional problems to Greece’s weak media system. With a few exceptions, however, the Greek media have managed to survive since the fiscal crisis has ultimately not weakened their close relationship with the political system. On the contrary, it seems that the Greek media landscape has entered a new era of ‘interplay’ between media owners and politicians.

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 



. L L  N C

.................................................................................................................................. The most obvious difference between the Greek media and the media of Western Europe is their low level of newspaper circulation and a corresponding importance of electronic media. Mass circulation newspapers have not developed in Greece, as they have in most countries of Southern Europe. In effect, as Hallin and Mancini (: ) note, ‘[A] true mass circulation press never fully emerged in any of the Mediterranean countries’. Regardless of the fact that in Greece the level of population literacy is high, newspaper readership is very low ( in , in ; WAN, ). It is not a coincidence that the only true Greek mass medium is the electronic media. On average the Greeks watch TV more than four hours on a daily basis (Nielsen, ). The importance of this for the potential formation of mass public opinion is, therefore, particularly great. Since the fall of the junta in , the Greek press has undergone a process of modernization. Since then, the introduction of new printing technologies in the s, the entry of private investors into the media sector, and strong competition from television have changed the media sector at large (Paraschos, ). As a result, print media has had to reposition itself: editorial content has become more objective, and close ties with political parties have been loosened. For the press this has partly arisen out of the need to attract a broader spectrum of readers, in order to increase circulation in times when the rate of economic and social development in Greece was again declining in the late s (Psychoyios, ). And it has partly reflected a drift away from the political party system itself and towards the major political orientations of the current Greek electorate (Komninou, ). The advent of several free newspapers in the first decade of the twenty-first century caused new problems for traditional newspapers, but most of them disappeared due to the financial crisis and the subsequent collapse of the advertising expenditure. Today, all media outlets are facing their most difficult period ever, but it is the print media (newspapers and magazines) which is suffering the most (Papathanassopoulos, ). Although press decline in terms of sales, readership, and advertising revenue is a worldwide phenomenon, the Greek press has entered a state of permanent crisis since the mid-s. Since then, fewer and fewer Greeks read a newspaper on a daily basis (Mpakounakis and Papathanassopoulos, ). Total sales of the national newspaper sector have decreased by about  per cent, in terms of readership, while the biggest losses are seen in daily editions (see also ADNA, ). However, in , there were around  local, regional, and national daily newspapers in Greece. In , the country had sixteen national daily newspapers (among them TA NEA, Kathimerini, Ethnos, Eleftheros Typos, Avgi), nine national daily sports newspapers (among them Sportday, Sportime, Fos ton Sport), four national business

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

 

newspapers (among them Naftemporiki), seventeen national Sunday papers (among them To Vima, Proto Thema, Kathimerini tis Kyriakis, Real News, Ethnos tis Kyriakis, Eleftheros Typos tis Kyriakis), and eleven national weekly papers (among them Parapolitika, Ependitis, Sto Karfi), most of which were based in Athens. As noted, the advent of free dailies and the Internet at the beginning of the new century, led newsprint demand to further decrease every year. On the other hand, the Greek press has tried to cope with these new conditions by re-designing their titles and/ or publishing new ones (Papathanassopoulos, ). To increase sales, most of the Athenian newspapers have adopted a policy of offering add-on services, such as books, free travels, apartments, and other consumer goods to readers through coupons for readers to collect. These marketing and sales efforts were effective in the short term, since selling editorial content without associated offers and products has become difficult (Papathanassopoulos, a). On the other hand, while the average circulation of newspapers in Greece is falling, the same cannot be said for the number of daily titles. Although a number of established newspapers have failed or ceased publication over the past ten years, new titles, and old ones under new ownership, have sprung up during the same time. Most recently, six new daily titles (Kontra News, Efimerida ton Sintakton, Epikairotita, Eleftheria, Phileleftheros), and two new Sunday papers (Documento, To Xoni) were brought to life in Athens. Sales, however, have remained significantly low. This is one of the main paradoxes of the Greek press: while the sales have fallen, the number of titles has either remained stable or even increased. An explanation of this pattern is that the media in general and the press in particular in Greece do not follow the rules of the market but the rules of politics, as we will explain in the next section.

. P P

.................................................................................................................................. As Hallin and Mancini point out, ‘the media in the Southern European countries are relatively strongly politicised, and political parallelism is relatively high’ (: ). In effect, Greece, as most of the southern European countries, has a tradition of advocacy journalism (Papathanassopoulos, ). Advocacy traditions have been modified both by diffusion of the Anglo-American model of journalism and by traditions of passive reporting that developed during periods of dictatorship. In general, the style of Greek journalism tends to give substantial emphasis to commentary. Newspapers tend to represent distinct political tendencies, and this is reflected in the differing political attitudes of their readerships: at times they play an activist role, mobilizing those readers to support political causes. Greece’s public broadcaster, the Hellenic Broadcasting Association (ERT, Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία Τηλεόραση), is regarded as an arm of the state, while journalists and private media owners often have political ties or alliances with it.

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 



In some instances, newspapers were published for a short period of time and for a particular purpose. After the latter was fulfilled, their publication ceased. It is not a coincidence that there has been a ‘wish’ on the part of journalists to become independent from political influences. But what actually constitutes ‘neutrality’ or ‘objectivity’— commonly seen as hallmarks of journalistic professionalism—is not too clear. For Greek journalists, the concept of an autonomous ‘fourth estate’ has been taken to mean that journalism as a profession serves the public and national interest. Critical views, creative questioning, respect for human values and the improvement of democracy, according to this view, should accompany news reporting. However, what exactly ‘neutrality’ or ‘objectivity’ or even ‘pluralism’ means has been open to various interpretations. For Greek journalists, ‘neutrality’ or ‘objectivity’ has been closely linked to freedom of expression and responsibility or accountability in news reporting, rather than separation of fact and value. To some extent, it has involved a question of moral integrity in the political stances one took rather than accurate and strictly factual reporting. So, while Greek journalism did assert a belief in neutrality or objectivity in the sense of a commitment to political pluralism and fair play, in daily practice political neutrality was abandoned according to the political position of the medium (Konstantinidou, : –). In effect, Greek newspaper journalists could not withstand political influences by the management of their newspaper or TV or radio channel either, since their views could not be independent from their paper’s political position or line, which was in turn subordinated to partisan forces.

. I  M

.................................................................................................................................. There is a strong tendency in most southern European countries for media to be controlled by private interests with political alliances and ambitions who seek to use their own media properties for political ends. In Italy, for example, old media companies, such as Mondadori, Rizzoli, and Rusconi, have been controlled by non-media businesses, such as Berlusconi (soccer, insurance, commercial television) and Fiat (automobile). In Greece, businessmen with interests in shipping, travel, construction, telecommunication, and oil industries have dominated media ownership since the s. Ultimately a long tradition of using media as a means of pressure on politicians continues. And it seems that private media owners use their media outlets to protect their interests in the other sectors of the economy, while there seems to be no efficient way to control such concentration of media ownership. As Leandros has commented: ‘The entry of industrialists, ship-owners and other business interests into the media scene was an important way for these interests to try to influence public opinion and to exert pressure in the political arena to the benefit of their business interests’ (Leandros, : ). The late former Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis once accused the ‘web of interests of media publishers’ of being the main reason why he lost power in . The

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

 

former Speaker of Parliament and MP of PASOK Apostolos Kaklamanis attacked the media many times, especially their owners, on the grounds that they were using their media enterprises to promote their interests in other business sectors. Similar statements have been made by other politicians. Even Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in his speech delivered in parliament on television licences in February  sketched out a clientelist relationship between businessmen ‘who are maintained and financed by banks, in order to support politically bankrupt parties and the two parties which have governed Greece for decades’ (To Vima, ). With the downturn of the Greek economy since , this potential benefit, however, turned out to become a structural flaw. This was due to the inability of the state either to pay off or reimburse the contractors for the public works on past contracts. This had a negative knock-on effect on the media and newspapers in particular, since entrepreneurs in public construction projects, who were also active in the media field, could not any more cross-subsidize their media outlets. They could not rely any more on revenues raised through public procurement contracts. In  a major television channel, Alter TV, went bankrupt and closed. In , Mega Channel, the country’s biggest private media concern and television market leader, was ‘in dire straits’ and eventually closed in that year. In effect, the Council of State on  October  rejected an appeal by Mega Channel against a decision by Greece’s media regulator (Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Ραδιοτηλεόρασης, ΕSR) to suspend the indebted channel’s operation. (The ESR is an independent authority foreseen by the Constitution—Article , paragraph ). Ironically, the initial main shareholders of Mega Channel (business entrepreneurs Lambrakis, Tegopoulos, Bobolas, Alafouzos, and Vardinoyannis) were the owners of the most influential Athenian newspapers. The same entrepreneurs also had interests in travel and culture (Lambrakis), construction (Bobolas), telecommunications (Tegopoulos, Lambrakis), and the shipping (Alafouzos, Vardinoyannis) and oil businesses (Vardinoyannis). The Tegopoulos group collapsed, while the Lambrakis group went bankrupt and was bought up by Alter Ego, a company owned by another ship-owner, Marinakis. Meanwhile the Bobolas family was forced to sell their media interests to Savvidis, a newcomer businessman in the field, and recent owner of Open TV station.

. G C  P B

.................................................................................................................................. All public broadcasting systems are to some degree subject to political influence and manipulation, while disputes over the independence of public broadcasting are common in the history of European media. Most countries in Western Europe, however, have succeeded in developing institutions which keep public broadcasting separate from the direct control of the political majority. The countries of Southern Europe, however, have not moved as far in this direction.

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 



In Greece, the management of news divisions of the public broadcaster (ERT) changes along with changes in government and even with reshuffling of the same government. Moreover, ERT’s news editorial judgements are expected to be in close agreement with, if not identical to, government announcements across a whole range of policies. Additionally, the regulatory body (the ESR) cannot fulfil its mission, since its members are chosen by political criteria, and the authority itself is understaffed and unable to impose media legislation. ERT’s history is often identified with the history of Greek broadcasting, but the emergence of private TV and radio stations has been disastrous for the public broadcaster. ERT has sharply declined in terms of audience ratings and advertising revenues. Nowadays, almost  per cent of ERT’s funds derive from the licence fee and  per cent from advertising. In effect, ERT’s three channels have witnessed a steady erosion of market share since private television channels were launched in late . By and large, ERT was too bureaucratic, in debt (with an accumulated debt of  million euros by ), its programming was uncompetitive, and its news output was lacking credibility. Following the EU recommendation for member-states to switch from analogue to digital broadcasting by  (Iosifidis, ), the government aimed to undertake the integration of the Greek television industry into digital terrestrial television (DTT) through the public broadcaster (Papathanassopoulos, b). As in many other European countries, ERT acted as a pioneer, introducing DTT exclusive television services in Greece. The digital channels were broadcast free-to-air and were funded exclusively through ERT’s budget, as they carried no advertisements. ERT’s digital terrestrial offerings were only available in Athens, Thessaloniki, and a handful of other major cities. In effect, a relevant law passed in  foresaw that  per cent of the taxes earmarked for ERT would go to the new public– private digital company, and allowed the ERT board to provide material resources for the new company. ERT’s union of employees, called POSPERT, conducted a series of work stoppages to protest the bill of law as a threat to ERT, bringing newscasts to a temporary standstill. In July , Digea, Digital Provider S.A., was officially named as the DTT network provider for the seven main Greek private television channels (Mega, ANT, Alpha, Alter, Star, Macedonia TV, and SKAI). Broadcasts by Digea began in the summer of  and gradually spread to many regions of the country until the full digitalization of the terrestrial frequencies (November ). In March , the then coalition government led by a technocrat prime minister (PM), Lucas Papademos, decided to close down ERT Digital, along with its three digital channels. In their frequencies, the government decided to relay BBC World, Deutsche Welle, Euronews (initially) and TV Europe. In practice, the development of DTT was left entirely to the private broadcasters (Papathanassopoulos, b). Its successor, a coalition government led by the New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) Party, was critical of ERT, since it considered that ERT’s trade union (POSPERT) was overwhelming in favour of the opposition, in particular the leftist Coalition of the Radical Left

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

 

(SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) Party, a fact that was reflected in the public broadcaster’s news output. On Tuesday,  June , ERT was closed down overnight. The radio stations of the Greek public broadcaster had already been silent for a few hours. A few hours earlier the ND-led coalition government had announced its decision to close down and to subsequently restructure ERT and set it ‘on the right track’. ERT’s closing down provoked an angry reaction among parties of the opposition and trade unions. The opposition, led by the SYRIZA Party—which subsequently came to power in early —claimed that the government had fired ERT’s , employees in order to prove to Greece’s international lenders (the so called ‘Troika’) that it was serious about cutting the country’s bloated public sector. Within a few months, ERT was replaced by a new public broadcaster, NERIT. As the closing down of ERT was a permanent bone of contention (see also Iosifidis and Katsirea, ), NERIT’s management intended the broadcaster to become independent, in line with Western counterparts. However, in reality the government degraded it as its own political mouthpiece. On  July , six months after SYRIZA formed a coalition government with the populist right-wing party Independent Greeks (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες), employees of Greece’s state television, ERT, hugged each other and cried, as the channel was re-opened. It aired its first broadcast two years after it had been shut down. The new PM, Alexis Tsipras, made its re-opening one of his priorities as part of efforts to roll back cuts demanded by the lenders, and called it ‘a great victory for democracy’. The SYRIZA–ANEL government re-employed all of the roughly , staff who had been made redundant in , including  journalists, at a cost of about  million euros a year. After two years of new ERT’s full operation, the public broadcaster’s audience ratings remain low (approximately  per cent of the television market share for the three ERT channels). Needless to say, the opposition parties accused all key radio and television appointees as being politically sympathetic to or affiliated with the SYRIZA government.

. S D   P   TV L

.................................................................................................................................. Across Europe, broadcasting has been in ferment, as governments of every political persuasion try to cope with the stress and upheavals caused by media deregulation. However, the deregulation of broadcasting in most southern European countries was associated with policies leading to an unregulated environment. The deregulation of Greek radio took place in , followed by the deregulation of television in late . As in most European countries, at the time the deregulation of Greek broadcasting was associated with partisan priorities, and eventually led by

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 



haphazard political considerations, rather than a coherent plan. Thus, deregulation in Greece resulted in an overcrowded broadcasting universe. In November , the first private TV channel, called Mega Channel and owned by the publishers of the five most important newspapers of the time, entered the Greek television landscape, and a month later a second channel by the name of Antenna TV followed. Since then, a plethora of national, regional, and local television channels have sprung up all over the country without, however, an official licence to broadcast. In effect, in Greece eight national private channels, and  local and regional channels gradually became operational, but no official TV licence has ever been granted to any of them. In , the then Socialist government of the Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) passed Law  regarding subscription television, to which it added a final article stating that ‘all TV stations that have applied for an official license to the regulatory authority are considered as legal till the licenses are awarded’. This article was continually renewed by passing further similar legislation for the following fifteen years. In October , the Greek parliament passed a law overhauling the country’s licensing system for private television, a reform which the governing SYRIZA Party saw as part of its quest to take on Greece’s business conglomerates and tycoons. The new legislation foresaw how licences would be issued, how long they would be valid for, and under what circumstances they could be revoked, among other conditions. The opposition parties criticized the SYRIZA–ANEL Coalition government, arguing that it gave too much power to the minister responsible for media to decide on the licence bids. But SYRIZA and ND (by then, the main opposition party) could not agree on the board members of the country’s regulatory body, the ESR. The SYRIZA–ANEL coalition was hoping to appoint a new ESR board, as the body was due to oversee the launch of a public tender for new private broadcasting licences. However, the ND and other opposition parties rejected the candidates put forward by the coalition government to staff the ESR. In order to make its decision more ‘scientific’, the government requested a study from the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence on the number of licences. The study concluded that Greece could issue up to four television licenses for private television channels broadcasting nationwide. The study pointed out that—since each multiplex can carry at most two HD channels—the total number of private channels broadcasting nationally in Greece could be up to four. Needless to say, the outcome of the study provoked a political outcry. The SYRIZA– ANEL Coalition government passed a law on regulating the aforementioned television licences on  June . Meanwhile, the government and the opposition parties accused each other of corruption, vested interests, and control over the media. After the auction, the four licences were awarded to SKAI TV, Antenna TV, and two newcomers, the businessmen and owners of two very popular Greek soccer teams, Vangelis Marinakis (owner of Olympiacos F.C.) and Ivan Savvidis (owner of PAOK F. C.) at the price of  million euros. Finally, Greece’s supreme administrative court, the Council of the State, ruled on  October  that the law through which the TV licensing tender and procedure had taken place by government initiative, was not in line with the constitutional provisions on licensing. The court’s rationale was that the

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

 

allocation of TV licences was the competence solely of the regulatory body, the ESR. The court concluded that there was no room to correct the law, and so it would be annulled in its entirety and the auctions should be annulled as well.

. L P

.................................................................................................................................. The instrumentalization of the news media by businessmen, parties, or the state implies that journalistic autonomy will be limited. Journalists will at times have to defer to their political masters. As Hallin and Mancini (: ) note, ‘[J]ournalism originated in the Southern European countries as an extension of the worlds of literature and politics’. Compared to other European countries, the political and literary roots of journalism were deeper, and connections between media and political actors persisted much longer. The limited development of media markets meant that newspapers were smaller and less likely to be self-sustaining. And state intervention, particularly in periods of dictatorship, interrupted the development of journalism as a profession. Thus, the level of professionalisation ‘remains lower in the Mediterranean countries, though it increased in important ways in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century’ (Hallin and Mancini, : ). However, the level of professionalization is not necessarily lower. For example, journalists in the European south are not less educated than elsewhere—in Greece, for example, famous writers and intellectuals have often been journalists. In Greece, as in Italy (Mancini, , ), the commercialization of the mass media system has taken place in the absence of a strong, truly independent code of ethics of journalists, a code capable of expressing the rules and the conditions of professional behaviour on its own terms. Greece suddenly leaped from a type of journalism closely related to political power and marked by a strong moral and educational input to commercial journalism. This rapid transformation has taken place in the absence of a solid tradition of professional training, and with no real intention of examining and elaborating a solid code of ethics accepted and applied by all journalists. Greek journalism offers numerous examples of how the lack of strong, consolidated, and consensually accepted principles of behaviour readily leads to sensationalism and dramatization in all almost aspects of social and political life. In sum, Greek journalism, once defined by ideological and ethical influences imposed by political power, is now limited by the influence, rules, and conditions imposed by media owners and by intense competition in the media market. The status of journalists and journalism has been lowered during the fiscal crisis. The crisis has become deeper in the era of the digital media, since on the one hand, traditional media and their journalists are regarded as less trustworthy, and on the other hand, more and more Greeks use the social and digital media for their information. In effect, according to a recent study by the Reuters Institute (), Greeks (and South Koreans) have the lowest levels of trust in news media globally ( per cent) and

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the greatest concerns about business and political influence over editorial content. More importantly, Greece appears as the only European country to trust social media more than traditional media outlets. In effect, Greek people tend to trust social media more ( per cent) compared to the traditional news outlets ( per cent). Facebook remains the most widely used platform for news ( per cent of respondents use it), while  per cent use YouTube for news content. Political involvement via commenting and sharing news is also at high levels in Greece, an indication of the polarized political environment and mistrust in journalistic content. Additionally, over half of the Greek respondents to the survey ( per cent) say they avoid the news of the mainstream media. This high percentage figure is probably a combined outcome of the financial crisis and its negative social and political aspects in relation to the low trust of Greeks towards traditional media, especially newspapers and television.

. T R   N M

.................................................................................................................................. Although developments in the media sector may not entirely respond to the needs of their industry, yet, the Greek media system has been surprisingly adaptable and flexible in the face of new developments. Looking at digital media, one sees that if the digital outlets of traditional news media, such as newspapers, are not the most visited, at least they are as frequently visited as one would expect. As noted, Greek people tend to prefer or even to trust pure digital news outlets more than those of traditional mainstream media. Although there has been a great number of digital news outlets— it is estimated that there are more than , websites and blogs in Greece—one can see the rise of four main digital-born groups that operate more than four different digital news brands (news sites). These are the following (Papathanassopoulos, ): • DPG (owned by Dimitris Giannakopoulos, basic shareholder of one of the most important pharmaceutical companies in Greece, Vianex, and owner of a very popular basketball team, Panathinaikos). Among the news sites DPG owns are Newsbomb.gr and CNN.gr. •  Media Group, mostly owned by Dimitris Maris. This company owns wellknown news sites such as News.gr and Huffingtonpost.gr. • Liquidmedia, owned by Rudolf Odoni. Among the sites it owns are Gazzetta.gr and Insider.gr. • Attica Media Group, owned by Theocharis Philippopoulos. Among the sites it owns is the financial newsiteCapital.gr. The Greek government certified  digital media companies in  with more than , news sites. According to the law, if a news site wants to obtain an advertisement from a public organization and receive compensation, it should be certified by the Ministry of Digital Policy and Communication.

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

 

Internet use in Greece developed rapidly in the s due to the attractive offers of telecommunications companies. According to a recent study by the Hellenic National Center for Social Research (EKKE, Εθνικό Κέντρο Κοινωνικών Ερευνών), nearly  per cent of Greeks aged  years and over are Internet users. The clear majority of Greek users (. per cent) consider the Internet as an important or very important source of information, while . per cent turn to the Internet for news consumption every day. As in other countries, search engines, social media, and websites are the main gateways Greeks use to access content. According to Alexa.com (), Google.gr comes first in the search engines in . Moreover, one out of three Greek Internet users have an account on social media sites. According to a ‘Public Issue’ (a polling company) opinion survey of October  (Public Issue ),  per cent of the Greek population over  years old (i.e. approximately ,, individuals) have an account on social media, which are trusted by  per cent of respondents of the survey. Regarding the younger generation of – years old,  per cent have an account on social media, most of them a Facebook account. Moreover, the Internet seems to have become the most important source of entertainment, especially for the younger generation (EKKE, ).

. C

.................................................................................................................................. As we have seen, the Greek media system shares a number of common characteristics with the media systems of other south European countries. In some cases, some of these features are more apparent in the case of Greece than in other south European countries. The heavy politicization of the media landscape is one of them. In effect, most Greek politicians claim that control over the media equals political power. The liberalization, commercialization and privatization of the media and the dominance of television in the Greek media landscape of news and entertainment have forced politicians and political parties to adopt the media logic. Greek politicians have come to realize that they are more vulnerable to media exposure than they were in the past. As noted, it may be not a coincidence that television licences have not been granted by Greek state authorities for the last thirty years. This policy of non-action may have a simple reason. Since the entry of private TV stations into the media field in the late s, successive governments have been playing an ‘on and off ’ game with private media owners who also have other interests in the Greek economy. In effect, governments seem to be implicitly telling media- owners ‘be nice to me, so that you get an official licence.’ It is not a coincidence that various governments passed relevant broadcasting laws which have not been implemented. Up to now, governments and politicians have threatened to introduce legislation (for example, the Presidential Decree no.  of , and the Law of Main Shareholder in ; see Karakostas and Tsevas, ), which would regulate either the television licences or media concentration. However, such legislation has been aborted or has been against EU law.

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 



In early , the government and the regulatory body (ESR) announced a new round of awarding national TV licences. This time the number of licences was increased from four to seven. Surprisingly, the number of contenders was not more than six. Eventually, five were the successful grantees. It seems obvious that the government, politicians, and business interests were in the process of reaching a new consensus in their ongoing negations. In this new round, especially in the aftermath of Greece’s severe fiscal crisis, each party tried to get a comfortable place in the new media and political environments. It is obvious that the government and its political allies want to have the upper hand in order either to put pressure on media owners and their vested interests in the Greek economy, or to form new alliances with other media owners and vested interests. In any case, the ‘traditional’ interplay between the two poles remains unchanged (Papathanassopoulos, ). At the same time, polls indicate that the Greek public appears to be increasingly cynical about both politicians and the media. With the advent of the new digital media, including Web TV and IPTV, which bypass the ‘traditional’ government licensing, and since newcomers, especially since telecommunications carriers and other interests have entered the market, future research should be focused on whether the traditional traits of the Greek media system are also present and strong in the digital era.

R ADNA [Athens Daily Newspapers Association]. (). ‘Circulation Data’. Available at: http://www.eihea.gr/ (accessed  January ). Alexa.com (). ‘Top Sites in Greece’. Available at: https://www.alexa.com/topsites/coun tries/GR (accessed  February ). ΕΚΚΕ [National Center for Social Research]. (). Το διαδίκτυο στην Ελλάδα  [The Internet in Greece ]. Available at: www.ekke.gr/ (accessed  February ). Gallimore, T. (). ‘Barriers to Media Development’. In Merril, J. C. (eds.) Global Journalism. White Plains: Longman Publishers, –. Hallin, D. C. and Mancini, P. (). Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hallin, D. C. and Papathanassopoulos, S. (). ‘Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective’. Media, Culture & Society,  (): –. Iosifidis, P. (). Public Television in the Digital Era: Technological Challenges and New Strategies for Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Iosifidis, P, and Katsirea, I. (). ‘Public Service Broadcasting in Greece in the Era of Austerity’. EUI Working Paper RSCAS/. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. Available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle///RSCAS__.pdf? sequence= (accessed  February ). Karakostas, I. and Tsevas, A. (). Το δίκαιο των ΜΜΕ [Media Law]. Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki.

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Komninou, M. (). ‘Ο ρόλος των ΜΜΕ στην Γ’ Ελληνική Δημοκρατία’ [The Role of the Media in the Third Hellenic Republic]. In Lyrintzis, C., Nikolakopoulos, I., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) Κοινωνία και πολιτική: Όψεις της Γ’ Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας – [Society and Politics: Facets of the Third Hellenic Democracy –]. Athens: Themelio, –. Konstantinidou, C. (). ‘Δημοσιογραφικές αρχές και αξίες: η δεοντολογα ενός επαγγέλματος’ [Journalistic Principles and Values: The Ethics of a Profession]. Theory and Society, : –. Leandros, N. (). ‘Media Concentration and Systemic Failures in Greece’. International Journal of Communication,  (): –. Mancini, P. (). ‘Old and New Contradictions in Italian Journalism’. Journal of Communication,  (): –. Mancini, P. (). ‘Between Trust and Suspicion: How Political Journalists Solve the Dilemma’. European Journal of Communication,  (): –. Mcquail, D. (). McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. London: Sage. Mpakounakis, N. and Papathanassopoulos, S. (). ‘Οι αθηναϊκές εφημερίδες μετά το ’ [The Athenian Press after ]. Επικοινωνία, [Communication]  (): –. Nielsen, A. (). TV Yearbook –. Available at: www.arianna.gr/yearbook/ (accessed  January ). Papathanassopoulos, S. (). ‘The Decline of Newspapers: The Case of the Greek Press’. Journalism Studies,  (): –. Papathanassopoulos, S. (). ΜΜΕ και πολιτική: η περίπτωση του ευρωπαϊκού Νότου [Media and Politics in the European South]. Athens: Kastaniotis. Papathanassopoulos, S. (a). ‘Greece: Press Subsidies in Turmoil’. In Murschetz, P. C. (ed.) State Aid for Newspapers, Media Business and Innovation: Theories, Cases, Actions. New York: Springer, –. Papathanassopoulos, S. (b). ‘The Transition to Digital Television in Greece: Now What?’ International Journal of Digital Television,  (): –. Papathanassopoulos, S. (). ‘Greece: A Continuous Interplay between Media and Politicians’. In Bajomi-Lázár, P. (ed.) Media in Third-Wave Democracies. Southern and Central/ Eastern Europe in a Comparative Perspective. Budapest: L’Harmattan, –. Papathanassopoulos, S. (). ‘Greece – the Media Landscape’. European Journalism Centre (EJC). Available at: https://medialandscapes.org/country/greece/ (accessed  January ). Paraschos, M. (). ‘The Greek Media Face the Twenty-first Century: Will the Adam Smith Complex Replace the Oedipus Complex?’ In Konstas, D. and Stavrou, T. G. (eds.) Greece Prepares for the Twenty-first Century. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, –. Psychoyios, D. K. (). Το αβέβαιο μέλλον του αθηναϊκού Τύπου [The Uncertain Future of the Athenian Press]. Athens: Diavlos. Public Issue (). ‘Social Media’, March. Available at: http://www.publicissue.gr// (accessed  January ). Reuters Institute (). ‘Digital News Report ’. Oxford. Available at: https://reutersinstitute. politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%News%Report%%web_.pdf/ (accessed  January ). To Vima (). ‘Major tension in Parliament over TV licensing amendment’.  February. Available at: http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=/ (accessed  January ). WAN (World Association οf Newspapers). (). World Trends Press. Paris: WAN.

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        ......................................................................................................................



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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. O  December , three unmasked gunmen stalked Richard Welch, the CIA’s station chief in Athens, shooting him down at point-blank range in front of his wife and driver. A previously unknown group calling itself The Revolutionary Organization ‘ November’ (N,  Νοέμβρη) claimed responsibility for the assassination. It was the first serious terrorist attack against the country’s still-fragile attempt to wipe away the legacy of the Colonels’ seven-year dictatorship and re-establish itself as an effectively functioning democracy. For the next twenty-seven years until the group’s demise in , Greece suffered one of the most lethal, protracted, and intransigent ideological campaigns of terrorism in Western Europe. N commandos carried out more than a hundred attacks and killed twenty-three people, ranging from foreign diplomats and Greek politicians to magistrates, newspaper publishers, industrialists, and shipowners, planting roadside bombs and firing rockets against foreign embassies and businesses. Astonishingly, in all that time not one N operative was killed or injured; neither in an operation nor as a result of actions by the Greek security and intelligence agencies. Nor did any undercover agent ever succeed in penetrating the group despite the astronomical rewards offered by the Greek and US authorities. The group—often referred to by the Greek media as the ‘phantom organization’ (οργάνωση φάντασμα) was named after the day in  when the military junta used tanks to crush a student–worker occupation of the Athens Polytechnic. Posing as the defender of Greek national independence against great-power interference, and the armed vanguard of the working class against a corrupt domestic elite, the N organization purposely cultivated an image of itself as a revolutionary group without ever in practice attempting to become a popular movement. Despite its longevity, the group failed to attract public support because its rationale had little connection with political and social realities. Greece, in the late s, was not on the verge of a

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revolution. Revolution, in fact, was the last thing in the minds of ordinary Greek people, for, seven years of military dictatorship (–) had a dramatic impact on national political values and attitudes. All Greek society wanted after  was political calm and long-term institutional stability. At the same time, however, the highly ideological Greek militant Left interpreted the dynamics of Metapolitefsi (as Greeks call the  transition to parliamentary democracy) very differently. Their dogmatic Marxist–Leninist definition of democracy drove them to the complete dismissal of Metapolitfesi as ‘junta by another name’, and the campaigns of revolutionary groups, such as the Red Brigades in neighbouring Italy and Baader-Meinhof in Germany, inspired them to believe that violent terrorist action could be the most effective way of reaching the masses and achieving revolutionary change in Greek society. It is worth mentioning that when N emerged, Western Europe was the most active terrorist scene in the world, with almost  per cent of all significant terrorist activity taking place inside its borders (Chalk, : –). Indicative of the climate of political extremism of the period was the fact that N’s debut attack, the assassination of the CIA’s station chief in Athens in December , took place only hours after the eleven OPEC ministers kidnapped by Carlos the Jackal in Vienna were released. What caused such a persistent and longstanding volume of terrorist violence? Could this high toll of deaths and violence have been prevented? Why did a tiny fringe movement like N, with no community support to draw strength and recruits from, become one of Europe’s most enduring and dangerous terrorist groups? What were the reasons lying behind the Greek state’s failure to defeat the N and other smaller militant groups, especially at a time when contemporary organizations, such Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe () in France, and Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) in Belgium, had all been crushed? Why did the collapse of Greece’s premier terrorist group (the N group) in —rather than weakening and demoralizing the country’s armed struggle movement—lead instead to the emergence of a new generation of urban guerrilla groups and the intensification of armed revolutionary violence? Essential to this chapter is the view that in contemporary democratic societies individuals seldom choose to commit political violence without discourse. Terrorists, to put it bluntly, are made, not born. They need, as Yale political scientist David Apter once observed, ‘to talk themselves into it’ (Apter, : ). Political choices are rooted in political beliefs and the belief in the utility and necessity of violence points to systemic collective grievances and ‘institutional weaknesses and blockages, injustices, or inequities, i.e. wrongs to be righted’ (Apter, : ). Politically motivated violent behaviour cannot be studied apart from its sociopolitical and ideological environment. Revolutionary terrorism in Greece resulted from a complex series of political conditions and longstanding cultural influences that drew politically active individuals towards the utopian world of revolutionary protest and violence. These conditions and influences provided the foundations upon which extreme Left terrorism took firm root in the mid-s and must be analysed in greater

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depth and be placed within the wider context of the evolution of the Greek political culture within the last forty years, especially the years following the Civil War and the collapse the Colonels’ dictatorial regime in .

. G P V  C

.................................................................................................................................. The Civil War (–) between communists and anti-communists, in which more than , Greeks lost their lives, not only generated a profound political division within a country already devastated by the ravages of the Second World War and the brutal German occupation, but it was also to cast, through its fanaticism and ferocity, a long shadow over the politics of the s and s. The deep political and social wounds inflicted upon the national psyche have not yet fully healed, even to this day. The institutional legacy of the Civil War survived, largely, until , through the systematic discrimination by the victors (the Right) against the vanquished (the Left). Discrimination against the vanquished was enforced through what became known as the ‘para-constitution’, a draconian set of emergency laws and political control techniques aimed at the political and economic exclusion of the Greek Left and the consolidation of the anti-communist state (Samatas, ). Discrimination and political and economic exclusion were imposed by a large police bureaucracy which kept files on every Greek citizen. The security files and the police-issued civic-mindedness certificates introduced a brand of totalitarianism which involved collective family responsibility and mass political surveillance through police informers who had reached over , by the early s. Until the fall of the Colonels’ dictatorship in , no Greek citizen was above suspicion, and everyone had to prove their innocence time and again. Greece’s repressive post-Civil War sociopolitical system came almost to a halt in . National and international events taking place that year fuelled a belief that a direct confrontation with the Colonels’ military regime was possible. The occupation of the Athens University Law School in February and Athens Polytechnic in November  provoked a major crisis to the apparatus by igniting an apparent revolution (Kouloglou and Floros, ). The Polytechnic uprising of  November , in particular, became the epicentre of student dissent and served as an effective focus of opposition to the military regime. The revolt not only challenged the regime but also catalysed popular mobilization in many sectors of Greek society. What began as a student protest against a draconian educational system escalated rapidly into a general political uprising against the military junta (Lygeros, ). In the end, the November  revolt failed to spark off a larger conflagration. Although the protest quickly became political, there was neither strong leadership nor coherent strategy to take organizational command of the movement. However, November  was clearly a

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critical moment, for it opened a period of radical utopianism and acute political debate on conceptions of class, social structure, and revolutionary strategy, giving the far Left an opportunity to present a fresh and autonomous agenda of activism. The Metapolitefsi and political modernization proved to be complex and difficult. The first years of the Metapolitefsi, were marked by a curious amalgam of continuity and change. The symbols, the rhetoric, and even the Constitution changed, but without any systematic purge of the bureaucracy and the police; key sections of the state apparatus continued in the hands of the old order. When it finally became apparent that the first post- government of Konstantinos Karamanlis was unable to deliver its promise of ‘irreversible change’, the credibility of the new republic was seriously weakened in the eyes of many ordinary Greeks, especially the students whose resistance to the military dictatorship had been instrumental in its destabilization. For those students on the extra-parliamentary Left who had believed that Metapolitefsi would bring about a broader democratic change, the sense of disappointment was even deeper. Their disillusionment was to become a major source of instability and radical discontent for the years to come. This was expressed in the form of protest movements, anti-establishment journalism, and ultimately political violence.

. T M T

.................................................................................................................................. Out of the numerous extreme Left terrorist signatures which appeared in the first years of Metapolitefsi, only two were to have a long-lasting impact: the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA, Επαναστατικός Λαϊκός Αγώνας) and the Revolutionary Organization  November (N). ELA may have been the first group to emerge but it was N which endured the longest, had the greatest influence on events, and spilled the most blood. Both ELA and N saw Metapolitefsi as nothing more than a democratic facade: a massive confidence trick on the Greek populace by a political elite seeking to consolidate its authority through the deliberate cultivation of fantasies of stability, transparency, and pluralistic democracy. Operationally, N bore more resemblance to other European urban guerrilla groups of the period, such as the German RAF and the Italian Red Brigades. Unlike them, however, N never attempted to expand its sphere of influence on the national territory, becoming a broad-based-umbrella group or movement, which to a large extent explains the organization’s impressive operational continuity and remarkable resistance to infiltration. Another equally striking operational difference between N and other European extreme Left groups was its tactical ambition. Most terrorist groups on the European scene followed a common operational trajectory: namely, a gradual transition from low-level bombings to more lethal attacks. The French AD, for example, waited for four years before it moved from a low-level bombing campaign to political assassinations. The Italian Red Brigades, a group that N held in high regard, went through seven years and two major operational phases before they started killing. N adopted a radically different approach: they started off by killing their targets.

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Both N and ELA believed in the violent overthrow of the capitalist state and in an ill-defined socialist Greek society. ELA argued in its  manifesto that meaningful revolutionary change required ideological direction from an armed vanguard of professional revolutionaries since ‘the conflagration that would eventually lead to the overthrow of the capitalist regime will be a long, hard and violent armed struggle’ (Για την Ανάπτυξη του Ελληνικού Λαϊκού και Επαναστατικού Κινήματος [For the development of the Greek Popular and Revolutionary Movement] ELA manifesto, dated June/July ). Organizationally, the group bore little resemblance to N. It was a bigger group with a hardcore membership of between twenty and thirty and a wide network of sympathizers. A less ‘closed’ urban guerrilla group, ELA was subdivided into departments and the departments into cells, each unit operating independently from the others to ensure security and prevent infiltration. Unlikely N, ELA also used an underground publication, namely Andipliroforissi (Counter-Information). Edited by one of ELA’s founding members, Christos Tsigaridas, the journal was used as a propaganda channel for the group to outline its politico-military agenda and communicate with its supporters, sympathizers and other like-minded groups of the Greek revolutionary movement. Tsigaridas (who exited ELA in ) was arrested in early  and was originally sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment for involvement in ELA attacks but was released in January  on grounds of ill health. The group carried out hundreds of non-lethal, low-level bombings aimed at symbolic material targets, ranging from US military and business facilities, to EU and UN offices and foreign embassies. ELA completely rejected the possibility of building socialism from within the existing system, arguing that there had been plenty of examples in the past which demonstrated the illusion of power-seizure through peaceful parliamentary transition. In the group’s mind, ‘the Greek civil war, Allende’s Chile, the fascist regime of Greece of  and November —all proved incontrovertibly that the only path to the establishment of a dictatorship of a proletariat was the path of popular and revolutionary violence’ (‘Για την Ανάπτυξη του Ελληνικού Λαϊκού και Επαναστατικού Κινήματος’, ELA Manifesto ). N’s conception of the political environment was one of protest, resistance, and aggressive violence. Constantly questioning the authenticity of the country’s conversion to liberal democracy, N attacked the entire political class as a hypocritical and demagogic clique pursuing its own interests at the expense of both the people and the nation. The group viewed itself as ‘a significant revolutionary force’ on the Greek political scene. In the words of the group’s operational leader, Dimitris Koufodinas, in his court testimony: ‘[T]he left which N belonged to was the left of Lenin and Che Guevara; to the left of the October, Spanish, Chinese and Cuban revolutions; to the left of the anticolonial revolutions in Algeria and Vietnam. The left of May’ and November’. The left of urban guerrilla warfare’ (Kassimeris, : ). The group’s modus operandi incorporated high-profile assassinations, kneecappings, armed raids, bombings, and rocket attacks. N saw the application of violence as the most effective way to crystallize public disaffection against the regime, and tried to embed itself in mainstream consciousness. The group in the early years used its attacks to gain public sympathy. From  to , N attacks were

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deliberately designed to identify the group with the concerns of the Greek masses, and to capitalize on public perceptions of US complicity in the emergence of the military junta in  and the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in . The group targeted symbolic enemies of the Greek populace, such as the US and members of the – police apparatus, to demonstrate its ethno-patriotic credentials and to highlight the fact that the first post-junta government of Konstantinos Karamanlis allowed crimes committed against the Greek people to go unpunished. After killing Richard Welch, the CIA’s station chief in Athens, N declared that this was the first time that the CIA paid a cost for supporting the military junta and for its involvement in the events in Cyprus. N hoped that its extreme tactics and revenge-motivated attacks would radicalize a militant minority in engaging in urban guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the N leadership in its eagerness to articulate the group’s ambition and strategy, chose to ignore the fact that there was little enthusiasm among the Greek people for revolution and root-and-branch critique of parliamentary democracy. Even if a revolutionary situation had arrived in post- Greece, the group lacked the organizational depth to exploit it. N’s refusal to recognize this and its persistent belief that ordinary Greek people would eventually be converted to the revolution through an escalation of terrorist violence alienated almost every level of Greek society. The failure to ignite serious activity deepened the group’s avant-gardism and led N to proceed in an elitist fashion. With no clear avenue of progress visible, and receiving media coverage on an extraordinary scale, the group gradually drifted into self-admiring exhibitionism, theatricalities, and purposeless violence. The group became an almost acceptable part of Greek national life, but it never laid siege to the establishment in the way both the RAF and Red Brigades did in Germany and Italy respectively in the late s. This is because N, despite the contemporary quality of its concerns, never had a discernible plan. Unlike the Red Brigades in Italy and the RAF in Germany which both took on ‘the capitalist state and its agents’, N hoped to create an insurrectionary mood which would empower people into revolutionary political action without promoting a generalized sense of chaos within Greek society. N’s violence was an audacious protest which aimed to discredit and humiliate the Greek katestimeno (κατεστημένο, establishment), but it never moved beyond terrorism to reach the stage of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

. T E   M T

.................................................................................................................................. Studies of Europe’s most enduring ideological terrorist groups show that organizations, despite their minority status, have always relied heavily for their strength and survival on the existence of a clear moral identity characterized by sacrifice, strong emotional

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bonds, and a quasi-religious devotion to an ideological cause. In N’s case, three of the terrorists were brothers, two were cousins, and one was godfather to the other’s children. Blood bonds—so important in Greek society—reinforced trust and silence. At the same time, however, the fact that its members were so few and so close to each other also meant that, once its structure cracked, the group would collapse like a ‘house of cards’ to use the phrase of veteran US State Department terrorism analyst, Dennis Pluchinsky, who specialized in European Marxist revolutionary terrorist groups. In the early s, Pluchinsky had prophetically written that ‘the Achilles heel’ for N maybe the absence of any known supporter or sympathizer base. Unlike other European groups N, he argued, never had to demonstrate an ability to reorganize after police arrests. His conclusion was: ‘[T]he group may be susceptible to police “knockout punch”—like  in France and CCC in Belgium. A small, possibly single cell, selfsufficient group like N could become demoralized and unravelled with the arrests of one or two of its members’(Alexander and Pluchinsky, : ). Which is exactly what happened on  June  with the premature detonation of the bomb which a N militant, Savvas Xiros, was carrying in the port of Piraeus. Soon after the incident, Xiros gave, from his hospital bed and apparently fearing for his life, the prosecutor in charge of the anti-terrorism investigation critical information which provoked a chain reaction of arrests that dismantled the group in less than a month. In December , after a nine-month trial held in the maximum-security prison of Korydallos (in the vicinity of Piraeus), a three-member tribunal convicted fifteen members of the group, while another four were acquitted due to the lack of sufficient evidence. The court upheld the state prosecutor’s recommendation for twenty-one life terms and also a twenty-five-year sentence for N’s chief ideologue, Alexandros Giotopoulos; the group’s operational leader, Dimitris Koufodinas, received thirteen life sentences and twenty-five years in jail. Why did dismantling such a small organization take the Greek state so long? One important reason for the Greek state’s failure to rise to the terrorist challenge was the inability of the political elites to agree on a common definition of what constituted political violence. The absence of a consensus on the nature of terrorism polarized the political environment and negatively impacted on the mechanisms responsible for dealing with national security problems. At the same time, N’s campaign exposed several deficiencies within the country’s political system and state structure: irresolute administrations, unreliable intelligence services, inadequate police forces, and a cumbersome judicial system. N might have been more easily contained had the governing elites and the security authorities acted decisively. Their underestimation of the seriousness of the threat, slow and indecisive responses and, above all, their outright failure to grasp the nature and dynamics of terrorism all contributed to the growth and consolidation of serious revolutionary violence in post- Greece. The end of the Metapolitefsi terrorism, when it finally came, did not diminish the attractiveness of persistent terrorist violence as a tactical and strategic tool. Although from an ideological standpoint both ELA and N campaigns were a failure,

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revolutionary political behaviour remained deeply embedded in the Greek armed struggle movement. Which explains why the collapse of N was not the end of the story for Greek terrorism. The summer  N mass arrests led at the time a considerable number of senior officials at the Greek Ministry of Public Order to entertain the theory that N’s dismantling was equivalent to the final blow against terrorism in Greece, insisting that any remaining splinter groups posed no real security threat. The European counter-terrorism experience has repeatedly shown otherwise: namely, that when a major terrorist organization is broken, after a period of time a new generation of ideologically like-minded terrorists emerges. Post-N Greece proved not to be the European exception. The new generation of Greek militants may have lacked the operational ambition, capabilities, and scope of the group they aspired to emulate, but that did not render them any less dangerous.

. T P-N G

.................................................................................................................................. Even before the N trial in  had even come to an end, a new group calling itself Revolutionary Struggle (RS, Επαναστατικός Αγώνας) picked up the baton of violence. RS was joined in  by a second anarchist-oriented guerrilla group, the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF, Συνωμοσία των Πυρήνων της Φωτιάς), and they went on to become the most active of Greece’s new generation of urban guerrilla groups. A mixture of nostalgia for the Metapolitefsi revolutionary politics and admiration for the old generation of militants, meant that these new groups, diverse in structure and character, quickly displayed an ability to reproduce essential ideological characteristics of the post- adversarial militant tradition on the Greek political scene. They sought to impose revolutionary ideals on the national political discussion and provoke an atmosphere of near-insurrection. RS, like N, recognized that a well-defined strategy and detailed justification of its actions would serve as an indicator of political effectiveness and ideological cohesion. The group, like N before them, offered an analysis of a society that required violence in order to be changed. Undertaking certain modes of action to affect its host political environment was deemed necessary if Greece was to be liberated from a political system that RS believed placed parliamentary structures over popular interests. The group, in fact, saw its violence as a historically necessary and inevitable consequence of longstanding domestic sociopolitical conditions. RS writings, a mixture of ultra-leftist political analysis, international relations commentary and polemical hyperbole, very similar in style to past N communiqués, explored a number of themes from which the group drew inspiration and motivation for its campaign: ‘the Greek political establishment’, ‘the trial of N’, ‘capitalist exploitation’, ‘globalization’, ‘/’, ‘the US-led war on terror’, ‘the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’, ‘the Arab–Israeli conflict’ and the ‘US hegemonic plans in the Balkans’, to name a few.

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RS’s central ambition was to stand alongside N in the Greek pantheon of great revolutionary forces. Believing that N’s revolutionary experiment could only be surpassed by a new revolutionary experiment, RS’s overriding objective was to ‘shape a genuine revolutionary current, equal to the requirements of the age’.¹ In that sense, RS embraced N’s view of terrorist violence as a legitimate and logical form of expression for those humiliated and ridiculed by the ruthless capitalist mechanisms of power. The group presented themselves and their violence in terms of political dissent, moral conviction, and armed insurrection. Narrating its discourse through lengthy attack communiqués which have long become an established Greek media ritual, RS elaborated the presentation of political events and expanded the dimensions of their violent context in an attempt to exaggerate the anomalies of the existing system, deny its legitimacy, and propose alternative models. The group believed that it was a priority to create an insurrectionary mood which would awaken consciences and radicalize people. Utterly convinced that the ‘age offered unique opportunities for anyone wishing to fight’, RS sought to take the role of vanguard of the movement and convince like-minded militant groups making up the panorama of the Greek extraparliamentary Left that conditions for an overthrow of the system by revolutionary armed struggle were never better. As such, the group’s modus operandi incorporated high-profile assassination attempts, armed raids, car bombings, and rocket attacks, in order to promote a generalized sense of terror. RS’s campaign ended in April  when its core members were captured (Kassimeris, ), but another anarchist-oriented guerrilla group, the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire quickly became the most active of Greece’s new generation of terrorists. The CCF gained global notoriety in November  when it forced the Greek government to take the unprecedented step of suspending international airmail for forty-eight hours to halt a wave of CCF mail bombs. The mail bombs were sent to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as to a number of foreign embassies in Greece and across Europe, causing an international security scare. The CCF, like all organizations that resort to terrorism, claimed that its cause justified extremism. Narrating its discourse through attack communiqués, announcements, and interventions, the CCF tried to elaborate the presentation of sociopolitical events, dramatize the anomalies of the country’s existing constitutional representative structures and refute their legitimacy. Although national public life was the most significant target of CCF extremism, their constant references to liberal capitalism, the International Monetary Fund, financial scandals, crises of governability, and political corruption revealed its deep hostility toward national institutions, international interdependence, and transnational policies.

¹ RS attack communiqué, dated  March .

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 

The CCF’s campaign of violence was centrally driven by a rejection of the values of the society in which it lived. The absolutist nature of the CCF’s rejection recapitulated key elements of Sergei Nechaev’s nihilism (Dartnell, : ) and helped to shape the group’s overall worldview. As its campaign grew more violent, CCF repeatedly endorsed the claim that armed struggle was the only activity that could actually transform conditions. At the same time, the group aspired to become the vanguard and ideological shaper of the various organizations of Greek anarchist–revolutionary movements. The CCF believed that this movement was prevaricating over the question of what level of violence was appropriate at the given historical juncture. Organizationally, the CCF’s membership profile and concept of politics suggested a new generation of militants dissimilar in many respects from the older, highlyorganized and mission-oriented metropolitan guerrillas of N. Born into middleclass, relatively well-off families, educated in private schools and young in age, the personal histories of CCF militants illustrated the complexity, degree, and unique ways in which individuals come to be involved in political terrorism. The CCF also illustrated that the younger and greater the group membership in a terrorist organization, the higher the likelihood for mistakes of a logistical and operational nature. Frequent violations of basic conspiratorial rules and procedures by CCF militants, such as using mobile phones, keeping incriminating materials where they lived, and being conspicuously involved in protests, cost the group dearly in terms of arrests. Nevertheless, the arrests and heavy sentences handed down to fifteen key militants between  and  failed to destroy the CCF. Following the succession model first introduced by the German RAF in the s, the CCF, unlike both N and their contemporary RS, constructed an effective support and sympathizer network from which successor groups emerged. Like their predecessors, the post-N generation of Greek terrorist groups did not use violence in the Clausewitzean sense of warlike pressure, namely that ‘if our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand’ (Clausewitz, : ). The new groups both intoned the claims and revisited the motives, martyrdoms, and sacrifices of their predecessors. Both the RS and the CCF presented themselves and their violence in terms of commitment, solidarity, and continuity. The groups embraced the belief that ‘violence was not merely an instrumental technique for damaging opponents but also the symbolic basis of the community of activists’ (Moss, : ). At the same time, their determination to link themselves to a broader level of social conflict was demonstrated in the selection of their targets. Both RS and CCF struck at targets with symbolic value (Greek parliament, Athens Stock Exchange, Bank of Greece, Korydallos Prison) which they believed if damaged would humiliate the Greek political establishment, stimulate popular protest, and create revolutionary impetus. Fixated on the memory of N, both groups (RS in particular) saw themselves and their violence as a natural historical extension of N’s revolutionary grand narrative. By rejecting the very nature of Greek democracy, these post-Metapolitefsi radical organizations escalated their demands symbolically, with the elaboration of

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distinctive frames of revolutionary rhetoric, and operationally, with the promotion of systematic violence.

. W D G T P?

.................................................................................................................................. A fundamental factor in determining the durability and persistence of terrorist political violence lies in the degree of commitment and the beliefs of those involved. One of the main reasons why the ELA and N campaigns endured so long, apart from the Greek state’s ineptitude incorrectly diagnosing the problem early on, was because of the genuine political commitment of the militants involved. Carlos Marighela, the Brazilian Marxist revolutionary and author of the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, argued that it was ‘moral superiority’ which sustained most armed guerrilla movements, and the Greek terrorist experience confirms this belief (Parker, :). N’s chief of operations, Dimitris Koufodinas, depicted the Greek armed revolutionary as somebody ‘whose life choices are actually made against his personal interests’ (Court proceedings ). A revolutionary, Koufodinas maintained, ‘if he is true to himself and to his ideas has the obligation to go all the way’. (Court proceedings ). The polar opposite of Abimael Guzman, the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso Maoist (Shining Path) leader who, after his dramatic arrest in , wrote letters from his prison cell to fellow Sendero militants, urging them to lay down their arms, Koufodinas remained committed to violence as the only method of achieving social and political change. As long as groups like N ‘intervened’ and ‘resisted’, Koufodinas told the chief judge of the Korydallos court during the group’s trial, it did not matter if military victory was never achieved. For Koufodinas, who since his imprisonment went on to become an icon of the Greek armed struggle movement, what was, and indeed remained, important was the act of ‘resistance’. Echoing this revolutionary practice of utopian politics, Koufodinas’s counterpart in ELA and the group’s theoretician, Christos Tsigaridas, took the confident view that in Greece there would ‘never be a shortage of armed revolutionary groups’. The plethora of militant organizational acronyms that appeared on the scene after the end of his own organization back in the mid-s demonstrated that his optimism regarding the depth of Greece’s revolutionary community was far from groundless (Court testimony,). To men like Tsigaridas and Koufodinas, it was axiomatic that a revolutionary militant led from the front and always took political responsibility for his actions irrespective of the cost, a view shared by key personalities of the new generation of Greek revolutionaries, such as Nikos Maziotis and Paola Roupa, the imprisoned leaders of Revolutionary Struggle (RS). It is a measure of Maziotis’s and Roupa’s absolute commitment to the cause that neither the decapitation of RS, nor the birth

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 

of their own son made them reassess their life and choices. From prison Maziotis painted a telling picture of the contemporary Greek revolutionary militant when he insisted that becoming a father did not cancel out the fact that he was also a member of an armed revolutionary organization. ‘As a matter of fact’, he said, ‘all our struggles take place so that we can hand over to our children a better world, while making certain that we never place ourselves in the difficult position of having to admit to them, when they grow up, that we did nothing to resist the unfairness of the existing system’ (To Vima, ..). Greece is an interesting laboratory, not only for studying terrorism but also for counter-terrorism. To counter terrorism effectively, governments need to fully understand the terrorists’ strategy in political and operational terms. One other essential reason why groups such as N were able to survive for so long, was the failure of successive Greek governments to make a proper diagnosis of the problem. Put another way, the cardinal rule of counter-terrorism, ‘know your enemy’, was repeatedly violated. Terrorism is a political and social phenomenon that must be understood within a specific context. When a terrorist campaign begins, there is a reason for every bombing and each shooting. In Greece, there was a failure to recognize and understand N’s vision, capabilities, and objectives. It has always been easier for governments to dismiss terrorists as irrational wild-eyed fanatics or homicidal maniacs than to attempt to understand the roots of their seemingly irrational actions. In his seminal book Inside Terrorism, veteran terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman admits that after studying terrorists and terrorism for more than two decades, he is still struck by how disturbingly ‘normal’ most terrorists seem when you meet them. When you actually sit down, Hoffman writes, and ‘talk to these militants and persuade them to discuss their violent actions, many are not the wildeyed fanatics or crazed killers you would expect, but highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals for whom terrorism is an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and then only after a considerable reflection and debate’ (Hoffman, : ). Koufodinas’s performance in court confirmed Hoffman’s argument. In nine months of court proceedings inside the polarized atmosphere of Korydallos maximum security prison, Koufodinas never raised his voice above the pitch of natural conversation and his every gesture and every word was controlled and measured. Discerning the logic behind the terrorists’ violence does not, of course, rationalize their motives nor does, it in any way lessen the barbarity of their acts. Yet trying to see things from the terrorist’s point of view can be an extremely effective tool in the effort to dismantle their networks and deter further attacks. Every society has its own political inventory of norms, images, and symbols that are formed over long periods of time. In the case of Greece, distinct politico-ideological traditions and memories invoking the radicalism of the mid-s remain still alive in a way that is difficult to imagine in other European countries with comparably developed confrontational political cultures. In Greek political culture, militant opposition and direct action continue to function as first-choice weapons of confrontation and dissent by groups and individuals aggravated by what they perceive as an unfair

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and unresponsive political system. N and ELA were the first political organizations to present themselves in terms of political rebellion, moral conviction, and armed resistance. Their successor groups, drawing upon the languages of political revolution and radical utopianism attempted without success to duplicate the Metapolitefsi terrorist campaigns aimed at paralysing Greek public life and discrediting the political establishment. A history of failure, however, is not automatically a history of insignificance. The extraordinary durability of the Metapolitesi terrorism campaigns, followed by the dynamic emergence of a new generation of militant groups, clearly illustrates how constant ‘visibility of terrorism enhances its contagiousness’ (Crenshaw, :). Greece has been fortunate enough not to have suffered anything comparable to Italy’s Red Brigades anni di piombo (the years of lead) and no Greek terrorist organization ever held the nation to ransom through terror. Greece and its national institutions have proven resilient and able to withstand strong levels of terrorist activity, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the corroding effects that persistent campaigns of violence can have on political attitudes and behaviour (Merolla and Zechmeister, ). If the Greek terrorist experience has a lesson to offer, that is that in the long run all terrorist campaigns eventually end. But the longer each one is allowed to last, the more innocent people die and the more damage is caused. Another equally important lesson is that neither lethargy nor hysteria are effective ways of solving issues of national security. Balanced determination grounded in facts and sound judgements about the nature of the challenge is more useful than opting for quick-fix solutions. The literature, despite the difficulties in observing conspiratorial militant organizations on a first-hand basis, is rich in both comparative and single-case studies of terrorist campaigns, but there has been relatively little research on individual exit and disengagement from terrorist organizations. With regards to the Greek case, analysis of key primary source material and interviews with former group members provided rich insights into their personalities and some of the factors and motivations pushing individuals into giving up terrorist violence (Kassimeris, ). Given the value of such findings for state and counter-terrorism efforts, understanding individual exit from a terrorist organization should be viewed by future students of the phenomenon as having the same urgency as analysing the reasons why people join such organizations.

R Alexander, Y. and Pluchinsky, D. (). Europe’s Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communists Organizations. London: Frank Cass. Apter, D. (). The Legitimization of Violence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chalk, P. (). West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Clausewitz, C. (). On War. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

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 

Court Proceedings. (). Korydallos Prison Chambers. Athens, July . Court Testimony. (). Christos Tsigaridas. Athens, October . Crenshaw, M. (). Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania: Penn State Press. Dartnell, M. (). Action Directe : Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, –. London: Frank Cass. English, R. (). Does Terrorism Work? A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hoffman, B. (). Inside Terrorism. London: Victor Gollancz. Kassimeris, G. (). ‘Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists: The Revolutionary Struggle’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,  (): –. Kassimeris, G. (). Inside Greek Terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press. Kouloglou, S. and Floros, Y. (). ‘Η Κατάληψη της Νομικής—Προάγγελος του Πολυτεχνείου’ [The Occupation of the Athens Law School—Prelude to the Polytechnic]. Anti, : –. Lygeros, S. (). Φοιτητικό κίνημα και ταξική πάλη στην Ελλάδα [The Student Movement and Class Struggle in Greece]. Athens: Ekdotiki Omada Ergassia. Merolla, J. and Zechmeister, E. (). Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Attacks Affect the Public. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Moss, D. (). ‘Politics, Violence, Writing: The Rituals of Armed Struggle in Italy’. In Apter, D. (ed.) The Legitmization of Violence. London: Macmillan, –. Parker, T., (). ‘Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain Terrorist Movements They Oppose’. Terrorism and Political Violence,  (): –. Samatas, M. (). ‘Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the US Truman-McCarthy Era’. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora,  (–), –.

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  .............................................................................................................

POLICY-MAKING .............................................................................................................

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        ......................................................................................................................

     -      

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T unexpected depth and width of the eurozone crisis with its multiple effects upon politics, society, and the economy at both the European and Greek levels meant that an increased interest in strengthening policy reform and implementation existed. The role of stakeholders, external actors, and experts in policy-making in Greece, although it has followed some familiar patterns for Greece post-, was also altered by the crisis, not always for the best. Stakeholders such as trade unions often felt marginalized since the time pressure was high, and negotiations with the lenders often excluded them. The European Commission (EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were more pervasive than ever before in the post- Greek political history. Finally, experts were needed to assist in the negotiations with the lenders and to provide credible data, but also to help with the implementation of the ‘conditionality’ measures attached to the ‘Economic Adjustment Programmes’ (the ‘bail-outs’). They often held important political posts representing the whole spectrum of the political system. This increased demand has signified changes in the experts’ landscape. Policy-making in Greece pre-crisis was characterized by ‘muddling through’ where the participation of policy actors did not follow a predictable sequence of actions. Some longstanding features such as the politicization of the policy process, a focus on procedure and legislation rather than results and implementation, and a distrust in evaluation continued to prevail during the crisis. Political affiliation and trust relationships remained central for the participation of policy actors in the policy process. In brief, the  financial crisis and the three Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece put some strain on these long-lasting policy-making features but did not eradicate them. The conditionality attached to the programmes altered the policy agenda, pushed forward some long-awaited reforms and emphasized the importance of targets and evaluation but at the same time put strain on the public administration’s

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ability to implement the reforms because of personnel and budget cuts. It is claimed in this chapter that no radical change in processes of government policy-making can be observed. The chapter is organized in four sections. The first section analyses the key features of policy-making in pre-crisis Greece by identifying its main characteristics and the role of different policy actors. The second section is devoted to the way policy-making has evolved during the crisis by analysing the role of conditionality in the policy process. The final section presents the changing landscape of expertise in Greece after the crisis. Some general conclusions and possible avenues for further research are offered at the end of the chapter.

. P-C G P-M

.................................................................................................................................. Greece, like other European countries, is characterized by a policy-making style which is closer to the incremental and garbage-can models rather than rational policy-making (Ladi, ). This means that policy-making and the participation of different actors, such as stakeholders, experts, and other external actors does not follow a predictable sequence of actions. Nevertheless, some important differences exist regarding the politicization of the policy-making processes. Greece has been classified as a country belonging to the semi-periphery of less developed countries together with Balkan and Latin American countries (Mouzelis, ). It has often been compared with other southern European countries because of their simultaneous transition to democracy (Gunther, Diamandouros, and Sotiropoulos, ). This comparison holds well since Greece, Spain, and Portugal entered the European Community almost at the same time (Featherstone and Kazamias, ). They also more recently experienced the eurozone and immigration crises in a similar way. The Greek public administration has often been classified as part of the Napoleonic model together with France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy (Ongaro, ). It has thus been argued that the Greek state has followed a very different path to western European countries and has more similarities to the development of the state in South and East Europe (Sotiropoulos, ). Its dominant policy-making style has followed a similar path. This style, pre-crisis, was rich in the production of new regulations and poor in their implementation (OECD, ). Many attempts have been made to explain this lack of reform. Public administration capacity has been the usual suspect (Spanou, ; Sotiropoulos, ). Public administration in Greece, despite numerous attempts to modernize it, remained weak, inefficient, and to a large extent dependent on political parties (Sotiropoulos, ). The dominance of the party in government meant that continuity in governance was more often the exception than the rule, since political advisors were often more central in the decision-making processes than were senior

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 -



administrators (Spanou, ). Public administration had traditionally been hierarchical and centralized as far as its institutions and control mechanisms were concerned. Patronage, which often led to corruption and was linked to the dominance of the party in office, was claimed to be the most important reason for the failure of Greek public administration (Sotiropoulos, ). It undermined the technical and personnel capacity of public administration by violating the values of meritocracy in the selection and development of personnel, and weakened the experts’ input for policy reform (Ladi, ). It was often the case that responsibilities in public administration were allocated following criteria linked to one’s affiliation with the party in power rather than capability, expertise, and knowledge. Trantidis () has shown that clientelism in economic policies from  to  created a bias that prevented Greece from implementing penetrating reforms. Legalism and formalism which characterized the function of the public sector were not followed by profound controls and strict sanctions of law-breakers. Quite the opposite: respect for formal rule was fragmented, and informal practices frequently opposed and formal rules ignored (Spanou, ). The large number of often conflicting regulations was also linked to the client–patron relations and was habitually an expression of attempts to deviate from the general rule in order to offer benefits to specific social groups (Sotiropoulos, ). For example, the salaries and benefits of public-sector employees traditionally differed from unit to unit, not because of their different tasks, responsibilities, or performance, but because of their different access to power, which was reflected in exemptions in the regulations arranging public-sector wages. The result was complex regulations, lesser productivity, and low morale as feelings of injustice and uselessness often prevailed (Anastasatou, Nitsi, and Katsikas, ). Conflicting regulations also added to complexity and lack of predictability which meant that policy-makers were obliged to dig into piles of legislation to clarify matters, even though such laws were often obsolete, as they could later be used against the reform in court. Greece’s accession to the European Union (EU) in  and later to the European Monetary Union (EMU) in  created some hope for more rational policy-making due to processes of Europeanization (Ioakeimides, ). However, Greece’s political culture obstructed such a major shift in the policy-making style, and policy practices and institutions remained ‘locked-in’ to established morals. Undoubtedly, the introduction of the acqui communautaire affected many different policies in Greece similar to the rest of the member-states. The Europeanization literature points to a tendency towards policy convergence, but cases of inertia seem to be similarly common (Ladi, ). Inertia can be defined as the persistence of the status quo or a lack of change or implementation, and was quite common in policy reform in pre-crisis Greece. For example, inertia was observed in the pension system reform (Featherstone, ), public administration reform (Ladi, ), environmental policy (Ladi, a), and regional policy (Andreou, ). Telling examples of lack of implementation are the legislation regarding illegal buildings in coastal areas or in forests, and the still incomplete Hellenic Cadastre (land register). Numerous bills regarding illegal

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buildings and constructions were voted on in the Greek parliament but demolitions are still limited and only take place after natural disasters such as the wild fires of the  summer in south-eastern Attica. Policy-making in pre-crisis Greece included a number of internal (or formal) and external (or informal) actors. The legalism and formalism that characterized public policy in Greece meant that internal actors always played a more central role than external actors that had to struggle for inclusion in the policy process. As far as internal actors are concerned, the government was traditionally considered to be the single most important actor in policy-making. Indeed, the OECD report () sees leadership and oversight capacities of the centre of government as a prerequisite for effective policy-making. Featherstone and Papadimitriou () in their study of prime ministers in Greece observe a pattern of a ‘segmented government’ with a ‘solitary centre’ which was translated into a lack of effective control and coordination from both the prime minister and the Cabinet. They conclude that the centre of government in Greece was much weaker than anticipated and it was the individual ministers and the political party that held the power. Similarly, parliament had not been much stronger in policy-making since the party in government normally held a strong majority which meant that most bills were adopted almost unchanged. Even the role of select committees was rather limited since they mainly focused on exploring possible cases of corruption of former ministers and rarely contributed to the evaluation or redesign of policies. Public administration was also dominated by political parties. However, some islets of administrative innovation and production of policy proposals could be found, such as the introduction of Citizen’s Service Centers (KEP, Κέντρα Εξυπηρέτησης Πολιτών) in  that had its roots within the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration, and Decentralization. Finally, the courts and especially the Council of State managed to play an active role in checking legislation for constitutionality and interpreting legislation, especially in relation to environmental policy (Ladi and Dalakou, ). As a consequence, external actors in pre-crisis Greece played a diverse role in policymaking, attempting to propose but more often opposing policies. The single most important external actor in policy-making were political parties. Greece could be best characterized as a party democracy where interest groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), experts, and the media had all been highly connected to strong political parties (e.g. Pappas, ). Interest groups representing powerful sections of the population (e.g. public-sector workers, businesses, etc.) were tightly linked to political parties and were always effective in obstructing policies which could hurt their interests (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, ). On the other hand, NGOs were traditionally weaker, since they did not represent organized interests, and, historically, political parties were much stronger and managed to absorb most independent initiatives (Ladi, ). As a result, policy-making in Greece had been characterized by a lack of more independent voices coming from less-politicized actors representing less powerful segments of the population. Policy-making processes were a direct consequence of the glitches in public administration and in the centre of government as well as of the dominant role of

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

political parties. In summary, the key characteristic of the policy process pre-crisis was a bias towards regulation and lack of implementation (OECD, ). Social problems were thought to be solved by the preparation of laws followed by administrative-legal documents such as presidential degrees, ministerial decisions, and administrative circulars (Christofilopoulou, ). Policy-making was often perceived as the simple voting of legislation as if there was no need for follow-up, implementation, and evaluation of results (Ladi, ). Even worse, the quality of the regulations was often quite poor and did not take into account expert opinion, since it habitually reflected party interests. This type of policy-making is common in many political systems and is far from any rational or evidence-informed policy-making model.

. G P-M   C

.................................................................................................................................. The international financial crisis of  has been described as a critical juncture for Greece (Featherstone, ; Ladi, ). The full impact of the crisis became apparent at the end of  when financial ratings agencies downgraded their credit rating for Greece and the government could not serve its debt. As a result, financial assistance was sought from the IMF and the EU to avoid default. This intensified the Europeanization processes. For example, at the policy level, the presence of European constraints, either in the form of formal loan agreements as in the case of Greece or informally as in the case of Italy, led to the emergence of ‘fast-forward’ Europeanization in the fields of employment and welfare policies (Ladi and Graziano, : ). The most prominent policy tool during the crisis years was ‘conditionality’. Spanou () describes it as a ‘mega’ policy instrument. Conditionality was an essential part of the loan agreements of the struggling member states. It was broad in scope and usually had two key goals: macro-economic stabilization and structural adjustment. In the case of Greece, the conditionality of the second and even more the third Economic Adjustment Programme (based on the Memoranda of Understanding of  and  respectively) was so detailed that it has been described as micro-management of domestic policy agendas (Ioannidis, ). Conditionality was connected to detailed surveillance mechanisms which meant that introducing legislation was not enough and achieving specific targets in a given timetable was necessary. The funds that were originally assigned for a member state were divided into loan tranches, which were released gradually and only after the country had fulfilled a number of prescribed measures. In the case of Greece, a positive evaluation by the Troika or the so-called Institutions (the Troika plus the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that came after detailed scrutiny was thus a necessary precondition to unlock additional funds. Ioannidis (: ) claims that conditionality proved to be an extremely powerful instrument since it was used to press for reforms in economic policy, health care and pension systems, education and research, and even national defence.

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To better organize the evaluation of the impact of the crisis and of conditionality in policy-making in Greece we look at the different policy stages separately, starting from agenda-setting and continuing with policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. It is fair to say that conditionality played a decisive role in agenda-setting since it operated as a parallel agenda-setting process (Spanou, : ). This was definitely the case in Greece during the crisis period when reforms, such as that of the pensions system, which was characterized by inactivity for many years, became a priority. Pension changes up to  had been largely cosmetic (Tinios, ). It was only after  that change took place and under the Troika’s/institutions’ pressure that pension reform combined structural changes with a cost-cutting exercise. Interestingly, even reforms that were not promoted by any political party, such as the labour policy reform, entered the agenda and change was major. By contrast, important issues, such as youth unemployment that were high in the political discourse did not enter the policy agenda because of the complexity of the problem and of the low impact of youth upon the agenda (Ladi, ). It can be claimed that the role of political parties in agenda-setting was more limited during the crisis. Policy formulation was also strongly affected by conditionality in at least two ways. The first characteristic was time pressure. In the case of Greece, this was particularly evident for the first Economic Adjustment Programme () where the conditionality of the programme had to be agreed within a week under extreme pressure from the markets and without any precedence of a similar programme for a eurozone memberstate. The Papandreou government announced the discovery of the faulty statistical data in October  which triggered the downgrading of the economy by the global markets. The first programme was announced only a few months later in May . Similarly, the second and the third programmes were also decided under a lot of pressure, in light of discussions of a possible Grexit or of the default of the Greek economy. The second characteristic which stems from time pressure is the limited participation of stakeholders and of the public administration in the process of policy formulation. Although attempts were made to consult stakeholders such as the social partners (GSEE, GSEVEE, SEV, ESEE, SETE) the margin of manoeuvre the Greek governments had was limited and not enough time was available to negotiate with or even efficiently communicate to the stakeholders the exact situation. Social partners were invited to meetings with the Troika/institutions, but their impact was rather limited. The first reason was that it took them some time to develop the necessary technical capacity for the negotiations. The second reason was that time pressure often made these meetings more top down than bottom up. This meant that the institutions were presenting the necessary reforms (e.g. labour reforms, minimum wage) and time-lines and the social partners were only reacting to them without much impact. Additionally, the relationship was quite antagonistic and there was no climate of trust between the social partners and the institutions. The only exception was SEV which was much closer to the institutions and promoted specific reforms regarding the flexibilization of the labour market.

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The efforts for policy formulation were concentrated in the executive and the offices of the ministers. Public administration officials were only marginally involved. In the first years of the crisis and until , public administration officials played a peripheral role and were often informed about the necessary reforms at the same time as the general public. ADEDY (the public sector confederation of trade unions) did not agree to meet with the Troika/institutions and the relationship was quite antagonistic. As expected, this meant that the implementation of the Memoranda was difficult since public administration officials often felt alienated and under threat. This changed during the third Memorandum since SYRIZA, lacking access to external expertise and advisors, turned to the administration for assistance. Parliament is another institution that was weakened in relation to the executive because of conditionality (Spanou, ). The time pressure for implementation of the reforms imposed by the international lenders led to ‘emergency’ procedures and tight deadlines for parliamentary discussions. The details of the proposed conditionality were not thoroughly discussed and MPs of all parties found themselves under immense pressure to vote for the loan agreements which meant that the contribution of parliament to policy-making during the crisis was even more limited than before. Fast-track legislative procedures are not new in policy-making in Greece and following Auel and Hoeing’s () findings, it can be argued that the crisis only exacerbated a pathology already present pre-crisis. The implementation phase did not prove to be easier than the other stages. The fact that policies were often designed under time pressure without meaningful negotiations with the social partners, public administration, or the opposition, meant that implementation faced the same problems as before the crisis and some additional ones. Firstly, regulations were poorly drafted and the relevant documents such as the loan agreements were often roughly translated at the last minute, leaving many points open to interpretation. Implementation time was never enough since it was always linked to the evaluation procedures for the release of loan tranches. This was particularly the case for the structural reforms. Economic reforms and reforms with cost-cutting characteristics were easier to implement in contrast to structural reforms that needed longer to show their results (Ladi, , Spanou, ). Secondly, reforms could not easily be implemented under conditions of austerity and especially en masse. Reform fatigue was already evident in the Greek case during the implementation of the First Economic Adjustment Programme. Finally, another interesting point is that the evaluation of concrete numerical and other goals became an integral part of the policy process because of the surveillance system attached to conditionality. Government officials and public administration personnel had to get accustomed with this rather novel procedure for the Greek system. It is expected that some policy learning has taken place, at least for the units and personnel directly involved with the evaluation. Despite the difficulties, many reforms were implemented during the crisis period and it remains to be seen how sustainable they will be. The conditionality attached to the three Memoranda pointed towards radical reforms in a variety of policy sectors

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such as the labour market, public administration, pension system, opening-up of professions, and so on, but not all of them were implemented with the same success. Four different types of developments can be observed: ) Successful reforms because of their importance for macro-economic targets: reforms in which the primary aim was to reduce public-sector costs in order to achieve the macro-economic standards were the most successful. This was, for example, the case with the reduction of the cost of the public sector that was quickly achieved by using a variety of tools, such as reducing the public-sector personnel, cutting wages by  per cent and applying a unified remuneration system (Ladi and Katsikas, ). ) Successful reforms because of their incremental character: an example of this type of reform is the ‘Cl@rity’ programme via which all public entities’ decisions should be published online in order to be implemented (http://diavgeia.gov.gr/ en). This is a reform that, although it was part of the conditionality of the First Economic Adjustment Programme (EC, ), was also one of the key promises made in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) Election Programme (). It can be best described as an incremental reform for which the government had the ownership and no strong opposition existed. ) Reforms that have been already reversed: a telling example is that of a controversial reform which took place as an indirect measure stemming out of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme (EC, ). This was the infamous closure of the National Broadcasting Television Station (ERT, Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία Τηλεόραση). It took place in  as part of a series of closures of public-sector organizations that had either fulfilled their role or were judged to be nonessential. It led to reactions and protests from the opposition and to the withdrawal of the Democratic Left party from the governing coalition. In , the new government of SYRIZA and ANEL re-opened ERT, which had by then become a symbol of resistance against the Memoranda. ) Reforms that were never implemented: for example, in the area of public-sector employment, personnel evaluation, and the linkage of wages to productivity and tasks was part of the first Economic Adjustment Programme (EC, ). This is a reform which, if implemented would have been rather radical for Greek public administration standards and has not yet been fully implemented because of the strong resistance from ADEDY. The varied policy results of conditionality mean that although it is indeed a powerful policy instrument it does not necessarily lead to change. Conditionality increases the exogenous pressure for change and adds to the pressures of Europeanization and globalization, but this does not denote a power to alter the policy-making practices of a country.

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 -

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In summary, it can be claimed that the Greek policy-making style did not radically change because of the crisis, although some new procedures were introduced. The continuous evaluation rounds from the lenders and their recommendations that asked for much more than the passing of legislation, is not without importance. Nonetheless, the policy style in Greece remains legalistic and the capacity of public administration has been reduced because of austerity. Since the eruption of the eurozone crisis in , the relationship between policy advice and reform processes in Greece—and also elsewhere in Europe—has become quite paradoxical. Governments are facing an increasing need for expertise because of the complexity of policy problems, but also reduced resources given the prevailing austerity dogma. We now turn our attention to this changing landscape of expertise.

. T C R  E

.................................................................................................................................. The aim of this section is to map the changing experts’ landscape by discussing both the role of policy advisory organizations and the role of individual experts in policymaking processes. The role of experts pre-crisis was limited similar to other policy actors due to two key reasons. The first was the significance of trust which derived from personal and observable contact and not from impersonal processes following standard checks based upon skills. The second was the dominance of clientelism and patronage and the dominance of political parties in the bureaucratic mechanism. Both of these characteristics meant that the selection of advisers at the centre of government was not based upon merit criteria that valued the expertise or excellence of the candidates in a particular field. More often the selection was based upon personal trust and party affiliation and the advisers played the role of a partisan ‘fixer’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, : ). The role of experts in policy-making increased during the crisis because of the technical nature of negotiations and conditionality. Five types of organizations can be detected pre- and during the crisis but their significance often varies between the two periods (also see Ladi, , b).

.. University Departments University departments inside, and lately outside the country, have traditionally been a source of expertise for governments. Individual academics often work as formal or informal consultants close to ministers and prime ministers or in other similar posts. Not surprisingly, party affiliation and/or personal connections which ensure trust are necessary for entering such a post (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). During the crisis the specialization that gained importance was economics when traditionally it

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had been law that was the most prominent. Quite a few academics were given ministerial posts during the crisis. Some examples are Loukas Papademos, Yianis Varoufakis, and Eucleides Tsakalotos. A direct relationship between academia and political power before and during the crisis can clearly be observed. During the crisis this relationship was even more pronounced since very prominent positions were trusted to economists and not to political personnel, perhaps because of the complexity of the issues and of the very fixed macro-economic targets to be achieved.

.. Government-funded Research Institutes The first research institutes that emerged in Greece were funded by the government. For example, the Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE, Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών) was established in  (https://www. kepe.gr/). KEPE continued being active in the years of the crisis producing studies for some of the key issues such as the impact of debt restructuring or evaluations of the structural reforms. In the s, more organizations were founded, such as the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM, Ελληνικό Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκών Μελετών). These organizations were non-profit and they functioned under the supervision of ministries. Nevertheless, the research that they produced was not policy-oriented per se and their contribution was mainly academic. During the crisis years and as a result of budget cuts, organizations such as EKEM were closed down. Ideological and party affiliation has always influenced staffing decisions in government-funded research institutes, especially in relation to the selection of the president and board members. During the crisis years, funding cuts were substantial and only the biggest and most relevant organizations to the crisis managed to survive.

.. In-House Research Structures Another hub for policy experts is in-house research structures in public institutions which enjoy increased prestige and visibility. Two are the most prominent organizations of this type. The first one is the Council of Economic Experts (SOE, Συμβούλιο Οικονομικών Εμπειρογνωμόνων) which started functioning in its current form in  and is an advisory body of the Ministry of Finance. Its significance has increased during periods when the economy is high on the agenda and it has certainly increased during the crisis. The second organization is the State Budget Office in the Parliament (PBO, Γραφείο Προϋπολογισμού του Κράτους στη Βουλή) which was created in  as an internal unit of the parliament. Its creation was part of the structural reforms introduced with the First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (EC, : ). Its role is to monitor the State Budget’s implementation and to produce reports regarding the fiscal targets which are set in the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Frameworks (http://www.

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pbo.gr/en-gb/). The tight links between politics and expertise are evident in in-house research structures, and a reverse doors phenomenon can be observed, especially in the case of SOE since a lot of its presidents have also served as ministers and vice versa. This trend has not changed during the crisis years.

.. Policy Research Institutes and Think Tanks In the s a small number of non-profit research organizations following the think tanks model, seeking to advise and influence the government, appeared. The Hellenic Foundation for European and International Affairs (ELIAMEP, Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Ευρωπαϊκής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής) which was created in  belongs to this category. The emphasis has traditionally been placed on issues related to foreign affairs. Most of these institutes attract governmental as well as private funding. During the crisis years, funding opportunities, especially governmental, for such type of institutes reduced, and some of them had to decrease their volume of activities. ELIAMEP, in , received funding from the Stavros Niarchos Foundation and created the Crisis Observatory aiming to ‘become a central hub for information, research and dialogue for both the Greek and European crises’ (http://crisisobs.gr/en/the-observatory/). In , Dianeosis, a new dynamic think tank emerged, aiming to provide policy proposals leading to economic growth while protecting social cohesion. It is the first policy research institute focusing on public policy and not foreign-policy issues. It has secured full funding for its first three years of existence from the prominent Greek businessman Dimitris Daskalopoulos (https://www.dianeosis.org/en/). Although the crisis put strain on some policy research institutes, it also gave a push to new initiatives focusing more on economic- and domestic-policy issues.

.. Research Institutes Affiliated to Political Actors In the s a new wave of research institutes emerged when political parties and social partners inaugurated in-house research structures. For example, in  PASOK created the Institute of Strategic and Developmental Studies (ISTAME, Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών και Αναπτυξιακών Μελετών), aiming at providing a forum for political discussion and research. Research institutes affiliated to political parties continued their activity during the crisis. They have mainly contributed to the provision of a forum for discussion rather than a research platform. Quite to the contrary, research institutes, affiliated to social partners such as the Labour Institute (INE, Ινστιτούτο Εργασίας), the Institute of Small Enterprises (IME, Ινστιτούτο Μικρών Επιχειρήσεων), and the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE, Ίδρυμα Οικονομικών και Βιομηχανικών Ερευνών) had to upgrade their research activities in order to be able to participate in the negotiations with the lenders and to promote their members’

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demands using concrete research data. This was a demanding exercise since their funding remained limited. The awareness by political actors of the importance of research as an initiator of policy reform or at least as a justification for unpopular political decisions remains a key feature of the Greek political system. It is evident that the crisis has put strain upon organizations, both in the public and in the non-governmental sector, but at the same time it has prompted them to reconfigure their agenda towards economic and publicpolicy issues. The social partners were forced to strengthen their research capacity in order to better present their position and when possible negotiate with the government and the lenders. Finally, a new in-house research structure, the afore-mentioned PBO, was initiated by the Economic Adjustment Programmes and quickly gained visibility. The characteristic that remains unchanged is the strong relationship between politics and expertise as well as the importance of personal trust by the politicians towards experts who occupy high-level positions in research organizations close to the state.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. The key finding of this chapter is that although the eurozone crisis has triggered important changes in government policy-making and the need for expertise has certainly increased, the outcome of these changes is still modest. It cannot be claimed that the impact of the crisis has been so dramatic as to change longstanding political legacies and traditions. Nevertheless, it has certainly shaken the political and administrative system. It brought to the surface a dissatisfaction with old practices such as clientelism, and led to a significant reshuffling of the political system. Policy practices had to be reconsidered, especially in light of the loan agreements and the tight surveillance mechanisms attached to them. Government policy-making in Greece was characterized by a conflict between legalism and the need for efficiency and concrete outcomes. Stakeholders such as social partners and the public administration participated in a limited way in policy formulation, which meant that implementation became more difficult since they were often taken by surprise by the reforms. Even parliament had limited input in the proposed legislation since emergency procedures were often used. Experts were often called to assist in the governmental attempts for reform in various policy sectors, but whether their voices were heard or not depended on the political game. Technocracy found itself in conflict with clientelism since the first focused on knowledge and best practices, while the second on social and political interests. The crisis was seen as a critical juncture, and expectations were high for radical reform of some of the pathologies of the Greek state, similar to when Greece entered the European Communities. In reality, the key features of policy-making did not change. What changed was that conditionality affected the policy-making processes by bringing to the agenda issues for action and by putting time pressure on policy

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formulation and thus further limiting the participation of stakeholders. However, this pressure meant that important reforms such as the pension and labour market reforms were implemented, although reform fatigue was an early symptom of the crisis. Additionally, it cannot be neglected that evaluation became an integral part of the policy process. The necessity to negotiate loan agreements and the need to implement and evaluate the reforms which were part of the conditionality attached to the agreements meant that technocratic experts gained ground. None of these observations is unique to Greece or to the impact of this particular crisis. More comparative research between different policy fields and across countries is needed in order to better understand government policy-making during crises as well as the trends and challenges ahead. Some important changes can be observed in the policy experts’ landscape in Greece during the crisis. First of all, austerity has meant that research structures, both in the public and in the non-governmental sector, have been hit hard. Some research organizations had to close down, while others had to reconsider their priorities as well as the focus and spectrum of their activities. At the same time, the increased need for technocratic expertise and the requirements of conditionality signified the emergence of new in-house research structures such as the PBO and of think tanks such as Dianeosis. The agenda of policy expertise also changed, giving more emphasis to economic and public-policy issues rather than foreign policy and European affairs that had traditionally been the target of policy experts. Having said that, the essence of the relationship between experts and politics remains unchanged. Political affiliation and trust continue to play a significant role in the appointment of experts in high-level positions and the revolving-doors phenomenon between academic and ministerial roles, if anything, has been strengthened. Crises are opportunities, but institutional and political practices seem to persist even in difficult times.

R Anastasatou, M., Nitsi, E. I., and Katsikas, D. C. (). ‘Η μεταρρύθμιση του ενιαίου μισθολογίου στο Δημόσιο’ [The Reform of the Common Wage-Grid for the Public Sector]. In Katsikas, D. (ed.) Διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις στην Ελλάδα κατά τη διάρκεια της κρίσης, – [Structural Reforms in Greece during the Crisis (–)]. Athens: Bank of Greece, –. Andreou, G. (). ‘EU Cohesion Policy in Greece: Patterns of Governance and Europeanization’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Auel, K. and Hoeing, O. (). ‘Parliaments in the Euro-Crisis: Can the Losers of Integration Still Fight Back?’ Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Christofilopoulou, P. (). ‘Professionalism and Public Policy Making in Greece: The Influence of Engineers in the Local Government Reforms’. Public Administration,  (): –. Crisis Observatory. Available at: http://crisisobs.gr/en/the-observatory (accessed  January ).

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Dianeosis. Available at: https://www.dianeosis.org/en/ (accessed  January ). Diavgeia. Available at: http://diavgeia.gov.gr/en/ (accessed  January ). European Commission (EC) (). ‘The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece’. Occasional Papers , May. European Commission (EC) (). ‘The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece’. Occasional Papers , March. Featherstone, K. (). ‘Greece and EMU: Between External Empowerment and Domestic Vulnerability’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and the EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (eds.) (). Europeanization and the Southern Periphery. London: Frank Cass. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). Prime Ministers in Greece. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, N., and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (eds.) (). Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ioakeimides, P. (). Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και ελληνικό κράτος: Επιπτώσεις από τη συμμετοχή στην ενοποιητική διαδικασία [European Union and the Greek State: Implications from Participating in the Integration Process]. Athens: Themelio. Ioannidis, M. (). ‘EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack” ’ Heidelberg Journal of International Law, : –. KEPE. Available at: https://www.kepe.gr/ (accessed  January ). Ladi, S. (). ‘Policy Learning and the Role of Expertise in the Reform Process in Greece’. West European Politics,  (): –. Ladi, S. (a). ‘Εξευρωπαϊσμός και αλλαγές δημοσίων πολιτικών: Η περίπτωση της ελληνικής περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής’ [Europeanization and Public Policy Change: The Case of Greek Environmental Policy]. Greek Political Science Review, : –. Ladi, S. (b). ‘The Role of Experts in Greek Foreign Policy’. Hellenic Studies/Etudes Helleniques,  (): –. Ladi, S. (). ‘Policy Change and Soft Europeanization: The Transfer of the Ombudsman Institution to Greece, Cyprus and Malta’. Public Administration,  (): –. Ladi, S. (). ‘Evidence-Based Policy Making in Greece’. In Sklias, P. and Tzifakis, N. (eds.) Greece’s Horizons: Reflecting on the Country’s Assets and Capabilities. Heidelberg: Springer, –. Ladi, S. (). ‘Austerity Politics and Administrative Reform: The Eurozone Crisis and its Impact upon Greek Public Administration’. Comparative European Politics,  (): –. Ladi, S. (). ‘Discursive Institutionalism, Problem Definition and the Consequences of Crisis for Agenda-Setting’. In Zahariadis, N. (ed.) Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, –. Ladi, S. and Graziano, P. (). ‘Fast-Forward Europeanization: Welfare State Reform in Light of the Eurozone Crisis’. In Coman, R., Kostera, T., and Tomini, L. (eds.) Europeanization and EU Integration: From Incremental to Structural Change? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Ladi, S. and Dalakou, V. (). Ανάλυση δημόσιας πολιτικής [Public Policy Analysis]. Athens: Papazisis. Ladi S. and Katsikas, D. (). ‘Είναι αλήθεια ότι ο δημόσιος τομέας στην Ελλάδα είναι υπερβολικά μεγάλος;’ [Is it True that the Public Sector in Greece is Unduly Large?] In

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Katsikas, Filinis, D. K., and Anastasatou, M. (eds.) Κατανοώντας την ελληνική κρίση [Understanding the Greek Crisis]. Athens: Papazisis, –. Mouzelis, N. (). Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Palgrave Macmillan. OECD. (). Greece: Review of the Central Administration. OECD Public Governance Reviews. Paris: OECD Publishing. Ongaro, E. (). Public Management Reform and Modernization. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Pappas, T. (). Making Party Democracy in Greece. Hampshire and London: Palgrave Macmillan. Parliamentary Budget Office. Available at: http://www.pbo.gr/en-gb/ (accessed  January ). PASOK (). ‘PASOK Election Programme’. Athens. Pelagidis, T. and Mitsopoulos, M. (). Ανάλυση της ελληνικής οικονομίας. Η προσοδοθηρία και οι μεταρρυθμίσεις [Greek Economy Analysis. Rent-Seeking and Reforms]. Athens: Papazissis. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Κράτος και μεταρρύθμιση στη σύγχρονη Νότια Ευρώπη [State and Reform in Contemporary South Europe]. Athens: Potamos. Spanou, C. (). ‘On the Regulatory Capacity of the Greek State: A Tentative Approach Based on a Case-Study’. International Review of Administrative Sciences,  (): –. Spanou, C. (). ‘State Reform in Greece: Responding to Old and New Challenges’. International Journal of Public Sector Management,  (): –. Spanou, C. (). ‘Policy Conditionality, Structural Adjustment and the Domestic Policy System’. EUI Working Papers, RSCAS /. Tinios, P. (). ‘Pension Reform in Greece: “Reform by Instalments” – A Blocked Process’. West European Politics,  (): –. Trantidis, A. (). Clientelism and Economic Policy: Greece and the Crisis. London: Routledge.

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  ......................................................................................................................

           

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. O the past sixty years, the Greek economy has been through several growth phases. An initial phase of rapid growth in the s was followed by a relatively slow adjustment and restructuring process, amid strong macroeconomic imbalances, structural weaknesses, and alternating upturns and downturns. At the global level, that period saw major shifts in production and economic paradigms and the emergence of new players with a strong technological base and new competitive advantages. Within this environment, the dynamic evolution of Greece is reflected in its GDP per capita, which rose from USD  in  (current USD) to USD , in  and USD , in , before declining to USD , in  (  per cent from ) (ΚΝΟΕΜΑ, ). This chapter will focus on Greece’s development process and the role of public policies, mainly since democracy was restored (), with a brief discussion of the period from  to . The aim is to investigate the key interactions between state policies and economic development, identify the factors hampering or driving development during this long period, and provide a deeper insight into the links and causalities between the short- and long-term dimensions of policy-making and into the nexus between economic development and the underlying social and political dynamics. During these long years, the Greek economy evolved from being mainly agricultural to semi-industrial and, since the s, to being services dominated. In , agriculture accounted for  per cent of GDP, while the secondary sector and services contributed  per cent and  per cent to GDP, respectively. By , services had come to represent about  per cent of GDP, compared with . per cent for agriculture and . per cent for the secondary sector. In the first two post-war decades,

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    



industrialization advanced with leaps and bounds. The share of manufacturing in GDP peaked at . per cent in , exceeding that of agriculture (. per cent). However, from the mid-s onwards, three changes took place that brought industrialization to a halt: (a) the dismantling of protectionism, causing a downward adjustment of manufacturing value added; (b) the closure of many manufacturing firms; and (c) the fact that new technologies required new skills and knowledge, raising barriers to entry for countries and firms lacking the appropriate knowledge base. De-industrialization, a common trend internationally since the mid-s, left Greece with a weaker industrial base among the southern European countries. In the mid-s, manufacturing accounted for . per cent of GDP in Greece, compared with about . per cent in Spain and Portugal. In , manufacturing declined further in all three countries (. per cent, . per cent, and . per cent of GDP in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, respectively). Overall, Greece’s economic performance until its accession to the then European Community (EC) () was the outcome of a policy mix combining strong elements of the typical import substitution strategy of many developing countries at the time, a partial integration into the world market, and strong state interventionism based on rigid fiscal, credit, wage, and labour market policies. Until the  crisis, Greek policy mainly focused on development issues. After  and through to the end of the s, policy was geared towards political and social objectives rather than economic development per se. The neglect of economic rationality coupled with political considerations and ignorance led to growing macroeconomic imbalances, which would bring the macro-economy to the top of the policy agenda in the next period (–). However, at the time, support from European Union (EU) structural funds enabled a combination of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies with expansive public investment. From , some small steps towards privatization, deregulation, and the creation of favourable market conditions completed the array of policy choices. After  and the changeover to the euro, efforts relaxed significantly and the policy stance was rather complacent, leading to mounting macroeconomic imbalances. Against this background, macro-economic rebalancing became once again the top priority during the crisis years (–), while development policy was largely subordinated to consolidation policies.

. L-T D  G’ P-W E D

.................................................................................................................................. Several cross-cutting features shaped Greece’s development process throughout the post-war period: contradictory and inconsistent development policies, weak structural competitiveness, lack of reforms, incomplete adjustment policies, absence of innovation

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and technology policies, corrupt practices, tax evasion, informal economy, weak institutions, and high inequalities (Featherstone, ). Five such specific issues will be discussed in greater detail.

.. The Ambivalent Role of the State The state has historically played a very important part in Greece’s development process, sometimes positive and sometimes negative. The scope of government as measured by public expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from  per cent in  to . per cent to , declining only slightly during the crisis years (. per cent in ). Development policies exhibited some persistent structural characteristics, such as: State incentives and preferential arrangements for various activities or individual businesses were very strong, as was a widespread protectionism coupled with extensive direct and indirect state subsidies. On the other hand, despite strong state intervention throughout the long period under review, the conduct of development policy suffered from serious weaknesses (Sotiropoulos, ; Pagoulatos, ), leading to very heterogeneous outcomes over time. Development policy acted essentially in a defensive manner, failing to foster competitive businesses in new areas of productive activity or enable the country to keep pace with the changes taking place internationally.

Policy was geared to supporting established balances and interests, paying lesser or no attention to growth-enhancing actions. Moreover, state interventionism was associated with corrupt bureaucratic practices related to a close-knit nexus of favouritism and mutual benefit between the business class and the political system. As a result, structural weaknesses were exacerbated over time, becoming increasingly more harmful and more difficult to deal with. Weak policy consistency, absence of even mediumterm development goals, and unwillingness to address major societal challenges are some of the features that significantly differentiated the state in Greece from the ‘developmental state’ characterizing the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) in the s and s. The state and state-controlled enterprises had an overwhelming presence in several sectors of the economy. The financial results of public enterprises were increasingly deficitary, putting a burden on public debt and acting as a drag on productivity and growth dynamics in the country (Pagoulatos, ; Vavouras, ). Very often, economic and development policy was influenced by electoral cycles (–, , –, –) (Thomadakis, ). In all these cases, increased expenditure, tax and income concessions, excessive hiring in the public sector, and other measures exerted severe destabilizing effects on the macro-economy. Each time, after the elections, restrictive policies had to be imposed. Such stop-and-go policies impacted negatively on the medium- and long-term growth performance, undermining confidence and stability. In the run-up to the  elections, a new cycle was under way, threatening to generate an economic and political upheaval in the following years.

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    



Pre-electoral handouts and public-sector hirings, targeted concessions, indirect wage increases in the public sector, and new state liabilities are some of the tools being deployed. However, an accurate evaluation of the extent and impact of this new electoral cycle will become possible at a later stage. Development after  was strongly supported by European Structural Funds. Between  and , net inflows from the EU totalled EUR  billion, corresponding to about . per cent of annual GDP on average and varying from . per cent in – to . per cent in – (Oikonomou and Kazantzis, ). About half of these amounts was used to support agricultural income, while the other half was allocated to fixed investment, regional development, education and training, and soft and social policies. On the other hand, public investment as a percentage of GDP showed a continuous decrease (from . per cent in  to . per cent in  and . per cent in ). The relationship between economic development and employment was consistently problematic. Development policies favoured particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the growth of which was associated mainly with low-skilled, hence low-paid, employment and the black economy. The state constantly absorbed an increasing part of new labour supply, with higher pay than in the private sector, and was seen as the main employer for jobseekers (Giannitsis and Zografakis, ). This situation has started to change slightly since about the mid-s, as a result of the pressure on many firms to become more efficient and competitive.

.. The Persistent External Deficits and the Weak Technological, Innovation, and Knowledge Capabilities External deficits were a chronic and significant structural weakness of the Greek economy. The current account deficit amounted to . per cent to . per cent of GDP (–), gradually rising to . per cent in –, before falling to . per cent as a result of the income and investment contraction in the years of the crisis. Persistent external deficits were associated with low export intensity and increasing import penetration, reflecting the weak investment, and productive and technological capabilities of the economy. Exports of goods and services accounted for . per cent of GDP in , compared with . per cent in Portugal, and . per cent in the eurozone. In fact, fixed capital formation was for long concentrated in residential investment ( per cent of the total), which has only a weak and indirect impact on outward-looking development. Hence, the paradox that Greece’s high investment rate was associated with a weak industrial base and constantly rising external deficits. Industrialization in Greece did not go full cycle to maturity, while the country’s innovation performance was among the weakest in the EU. In the first post-war decades, technology transfer from abroad, foreign direct investment, capital equipment

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imports, or licensing agreements enabled many businesses to develop and grow in the short and medium term. In the long run, however, failure to generate endogenous innovation processes evolved into a serious structural handicap, with dampening effects on development, weighing down on structural competitiveness, valued added, wages, and employment, and exacerbating inequality. In the s, efforts were made to stimulate R&D and innovation, with not much success, however. Even the growing weight of services in the economy was not accompanied by a momentum of knowledge- and technology-intensive processes. The technological lagging behind of Greece is reflected in the very low or negative rate of change in total factor productivity for any period after  (Table .), as well as in the very weak specialization and the low level of competitiveness regarding products classified as ‘medium to high technology’ and ‘high technology’. These two groups together accounted for  per cent of total Greek exports before the crisis (), compared with  per cent for Portugal and  per cent for Spain. This figure deteriorated slightly in the crisis years (. per cent in ). However, a number of young start-ups succeeded in growing in the crisis years, adding some optimism to Greece’s growth outlook.

Table 29.1 Average annual growth rates or average values per period, in percentages (1961–2017) 1961–73 GDP growth Total fixed capital investment/GDP*

1974–81

7.5

3.0

1.5

3.5

2.0

3.0

24.3

27.1

23.9

22.7

23.3

13.1

81.0

84.8

86.4

90.7

63.8 17.2

66.8 18.0

65.8 20.6

69.0 21.7

Total consumption expenditure/GDP* - Private - General Government* Gross national saving/ GDP*

1982–93 1994–2003 2004–09 2010–17

26.0

28.3

22.3

17.8

11.5

8.6

Total factor productivity Consumer prices* Unemployment*

5.1 3.4 Very low

0.6 (1974-85) 18.3 2.5

0.0 18.0 7.7

1.7 5.3 10.5

0.4 3.0 9.1

1.0 0.8 22.4

Fiscal deficit/GDP*

Very low

3.4

11.1

4.8

8.6

6.4

19.3

33.6

64.0

109.2

119.1

166.4

4.3

4.6

4.9

5.7

11.8

3.9

Debt/GDP* Current account balance/ GDP*

* Average values per period. Missing data are due to the lack of statistical comparability. Sources: Eurostat, OECD (Economic Outlook), and Bank of Greece, Η ελληνική οικονομία [The Greek Economy], 1966 and 1984.

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    



.. Macro-Economic Imbalances and Economic Development The – crisis marked a turning point for economic development in Greece. Two key factors came into play, which would shape economic trends for years to come: (a) an increased exposure of the economy to international competition as a result of global dismantling of tariffs and other trade barriers, followed by deregulation processes, both of which caused serious disruptions to the production system: investment sluggishness, import penetration, closure of businesses, dwindling profits, and rising unemployment; and (b) a prevailing perception that the failure to achieve satisfactory growth rates could be counteracted by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, increased credit to businesses, a loose incomes policy, and higher social spending. The result was deficits, over-indebtedness, and dependency. Thus, in particular from  onwards, inflation, fiscal deficits, public debt, and unemployment were gradually added to the existing structural weaknesses (see Table .). In general, after , the Greek economy entered a phase of increasing consumption as a percentage of GDP and a declining saving-to-GDP ratio. The saving ratio fell from . per cent of GDP in – to . per cent in – and was associated with a dramatic fall in investment and rising fiscal deficits and foreign debt. This combination proved to be disastrous for both growth and macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic imbalances grew to become a constant preoccupation for policymakers and a severe constraint on growth. Against this background, macro-economic imbalances and low to negative growth rates went hand in hand and were mutually compounding. Coupled with the structural weaknesses of the production system, they kept the economy in stagnation. Inflation, as a combined result of wage and profit pressures, weak competitiveness, and fiscal deficits pushed up government expenditure and interest rates. Rising fiscal deficits, in turn, created an overall climate of uncertainty, with adverse repercussions on the balance of payments, investment, output, and growth. In an effort to control these imbalances, consolidation programmes were introduced in , , and –, but were short-lived. From the early s to the end of the decade, however, macro-economic stabilization became a central goal. The policy mix implemented to this end involved a restrictive fiscal and monetary stance and in particular a hard drachma policy. Stabilization policies at times did deliver some restoration of balance. In particular, after  and until the end of , the Greek economy managed to overcome most of its key macro-economic weaknesses (see Table .), satisfying the Maastricht criteria (in ) and posting its second strongest post-war growth cycle (–). However, this back and forth from stabilization to destabilization and uncertainty during nearly two decades held back Greece’s economic development in two crucial ways: first, it maintained a volatile macro-economic environment, which, often coupled with an investment-unfriendly political landscape, could not create appropriate pro-

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 

development framework conditions. Second, it contributed to a sustained economic policy focus on short- and medium-term macroeconomic challenges rather than on long-term structural and development problems.

.. The Increasing Weight of Public Debt From a relatively limited role until the mid-s, government borrowing grew increasingly in size and importance. It took the form of domestic borrowing in – and foreign borrowing thereafter. At that time, fiscal deficits began to expand rapidly, rising as a percentage of GDP from . per cent in – to . per cent in –. Interest payments as a percentage of GDP also rose from . per cent in  to . per cent in . The government debt-to-GDP ratio soared from  per cent in  to . per cent of GDP in  (European Commission, Statistical Annex, ), remaining broadly stable between  and . The dire fiscal situation came to a head in , when the deficit ratio peaked at . per cent and the debt ratio at . per cent. In fact, although Greece made substantial progress in converging with the EU- in terms of per capita GDP, its growth was increasingly linked to invisible debt accumulation processes. For the private sector too, strong credit expansion proved to be an important lever of growth. Expansionary monetary policy in the euro area in the years – facilitated strong credit expansion, leading to annual average increases of . per cent in business loans and of  per cent in consumer and housing credit. This resulted in a mountain of non-performing loans (about EUR  billion or  per cent of total bank loans outstanding in ) after , which, coupled with a severe banking liquidity squeeze, further deepened the recession.

.. The Pension System Deficits and Their Impact on Growth The destabilizing effect of the pension system on Greece’s development during the s was decisive. The pension deficits financed by the state budget increased from . per cent of GDP in  to . per cent in  and to about  per cent in the years after . In absolute figures, the cumulative level of these deficits came to EUR  billion for –, accounting for  per cent of the total increase in public debt during that period (Giannitsis, ). In addition, the number of pensioners increased by about  thousand between  and , bringing the employee-to-pensioners ratio to .: by . Almost every key economic variable, such as fiscal deficits, indirect wage cost, investment, consumption, growth, unemployment, social protection expenditure, wages, and

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    



disposable income, were adversely affected. Such an extensive burden will continue to affect the future of the economy for as long as its structural causes remain unaddressed, high unemployment persists, and the pension system fails to offer fair, sustainable, and credible protection to the insured.

. T S S  G’ P-W E D

.................................................................................................................................. In the context of the foregoing analysis, six major economic cycles can be identified during the post-war period: – – – –

Greece’s ‘easy development’ phase (–); Development after the first post-war crisis (–); Socialist governance and world market integration (–); From structural imbalances to a new growth cycle and to euro area participation (–); – The build-up to the crisis (–); and – The crisis of / and its aftermath. Underlying this classification is a mix of economic and political criteria, notably the growth performance and the development policies pursued in response to the different priorities, challenges, and constraints. Within this long time frame, the Greek economy experienced two main growth cycles (– and –),¹ a severe recession (–) and the great crisis after –. Over the whole period – ( years), Greece experienced forty-nine years of positive growth and fourteen years of negative growth or stagnation, while over the period –, the average growth rate of GDP was . per cent vs. . per cent for the EU-.

.. Greece’s ‘Easy Development’ Phase (–) After a world war and a civil war (–), Greece returned to economic and political normality by the mid-s. Economic policy focused on four main goals: to improve significantly the living standards; to integrate the economy into the European Economic Community; to attract significant foreign investment that could boost ¹ The period – was also one of robust growth, with GDP growing annually by . per cent on average. However, these years were characterized also by stagnant investment, de-industrialization trends, and the emergence of several of the subsequent structural weaknesses. Hence, it is questionable whether this period could be considered as a growth cycle.

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

 

industrialization, export orientation, and structural change; and to expand public infrastructures (electrification, telecommunications, water supply, and transport) throughout the country. In the first post-war years till , infrastructure investment, foreign exchange and imports, fiscal expenditure, and a fledgling business sector were supported by the Marshall Plan funds. Basically, however, the country’s development in that first postwar phase was largely driven by residential investment and construction, migrants’ remittances, international shipping, and public utilities (electricity, telecommunications, etc.) controlled by public enterprises. After , strong fiscal and other incentives, favourable terms on loans to industry, state guarantees, public infrastructure projects, and the creation of specialized development organizations provided an impetus to industrialization. Concurrently, a strong tariff and non-tariff system protected a very broad range of branches and firms, allowing for high prices and profit margins, but also low productivity and inefficiencies, and favouring inward instead of outward orientation. In , a military coup overthrew the democratic government, imposing a dictatorship until . The reversal of political conditions was reflected also in many aspects of economic policy. However, in terms of performance and overall economic stance, no major rupture can be discerned in comparison with the preceding years. The new regime benefited from the underlying momentum of the past, but its attempt to secure continuing high growth rates through enhanced residential investment, privileged concessions, loans to potential investors, and a state-controlled wage policy, caused the build-up of serious weaknesses, the effects of which would become visible after the  oil shock. Overall, the period – can be described as a cycle of ‘easy’ economic growth. The Greek economy recorded a spectacular average growth rate of . per cent and succeeded in attracting the highest inflow of foreign industrial investment ever seen in its entire post-war period, including a number of huge foreign investments (aluminium, petrochemicals, refineries, shipyards, chemicals, plastics, and electro-technical material). FDI in manufacturing represented almost  per cent of total manufacturing investment in – and played a significant role in transforming manufacturing, and the economy at large for that matter (Giannitsis, , ; Kostis ). It also led to significant sectoral shifts in manufacturing, enhancing the share of chemical industry and metallurgy at the expense of traditional industries (food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, and clothes). The balance of payments increasingly constituted a constraint, and the growth performance relied on a broad set of state subsidies and artificially cheap bank lending. Although total exports as a percentage of GDP remained broadly unchanged between  and  (at . per cent and . per cent, respectively), industrial exports accounted for  per cent of total exports in , up from . per cent in  (Bank of Greece, ). The transition from an agricultural to a semi-industrial economy was associated with two main problems: (a) a significant deterioration of the internal terms of trade between industrial and agricultural products, leading to (b) mass internal migration

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

from rural to urban areas, migration to other countries, and an over-concentration of manufacturing in the greater Athens area.

.. Development After the First Post-War Crisis (–) Around , four important changes took place, marking a turning point for Greece: the first major post-war crisis (/); the collapse of the dictatorial regime in ; the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in , creating strong pressure for spending on military equipment; and a legacy of complex structural problems that called for the urgent attention of governments. At the time, the global economy was experiencing a recession, changing production structures and national specializations, and seeing the emergence of new players. In Greece, total factor productivity, external deficits, debt, and inflation—all showed adverse trends. The economy was gradually caught in a cycle of stagnation and de-industrialization, the effects of which would become more pronounced in the following years (Giannitsis, , ). Meanwhile, due to earlier internal and foreign migration flows, the situation in the countryside was getting worse and worse, giving rise to serious problems of regional inequality and unbalanced development (Glytsos, ). In , a set of regional development incentives for border regions was introduced (Law /), along with measures and incentives to support the agricultural sector, which were further strengthened in the following years. The impact of the  crisis, coupled with the abandonment of fixed exchange rates () and the increasing cost of capital at the end of the s, revealed the significant structural weaknesses of Greece’s industrial and competitive base. As early as , the first cases of ailing enterprises (or ‘problematic firms’, as they were more commonly known) marked the start of Greece’s inexorable de-industrialization process. The phenomenon of ailing firms was broadly based across sectors, including shipyards and textile, paper, steel, and fertilizer industries. Their failure would imply the closure of leading firms, mass job losses, collapse of suppliers, mostly SMEs, significant social and political upheaval, and even destabilization of the banking system, given that the biggest commercial bank (the National Bank of Greece) was also the main lender to these firms (Sakellaropoulos, ). The state ran to the rescue, by introducing credit measures and by setting up special entities aimed at promoting development and investment, such as the Hellenic Industrial and Mining Company (ELEVME, Ελληνική Εταιρία Βιομηχανικών και Μεταλλευτικών Επιχειρήσεων). Equally, negative interest rates continued to favour industrial firms until the deregulation of the banking sector in the second half of the s. A number of firms in the sectors of banking, industry, and services were nationalized and, more generally, there was an increase in the share of the state in the economy, which would grow further in the next phase.

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

 

.. Socialist Governance and World Market Integration (–) The period – can be divided into two sub-periods, – and –. The election of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) to power was a milestone in Greece’s post-war politics. Socialist governance started in late  and completed its first cycle by mid-. The conservative New Democracy party (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) governed from  until PASOK’s comeback in . From a political and economic point of view, the two sub-periods were marked by very different policy choices. Besides the profound political and economic changes, which had already started by the end of the s, that period was marked by three major events: the extensive integration of the Greek economy into the world market via its accession to the EC in ; the shift of the West to monetarism and to restrictive fiscal and monetary policies following the failure of Keynesian policies to combat ‘stagflation’ in advanced countries; and the worldwide diffusion of a new technological paradigm, associated with a catch-up process by many emerging countries and fundamental changes in world economic balances. In , the newly elected government of PASOK was faced with adverse macroeconomic conditions and significant structural weaknesses (recessionary trends, inflationary pressures, stagnant investment, and increasing balance of payments deficits). Besides the international conjuncture, domestic political factors aggravated the economic landscape. The development question was now more complex and difficult. Previous discretionary measures and preferential treatment had to be abolished and replaced by more horizontal policies. Important multinational firms (petrochemicals, shipyards, Goodyear, Pirelli, and Esso Pappas) closed down their local industrial plants or were taken over by domestic firms or the state, or abandoned manufacturing production and shifted to import activities (Giannitsis, ). In the early s, a defensive approach was followed regarding the most vulnerable, declining, and even inefficient sectors and firms, with the aim of shoring up the traditional industrial basis of the country. Also, an attempt was undertaken to foster new activities within the broader spectrum of emerging industries (biotechnology, industrial engineering, and information technologies). Most of these attempts failed to deliver a satisfactory result. Accession to the EC exerted adverse effects on manufacturing and the trade balance. Import penetration increased substantially, and many medium-sized and bigger manufacturing firms, especially the larger firms in various sectors, which formed the core of the Greek industrial system, could not survive (Giannitsis, , ). Certain branches, such as textiles, apparel, leather, steel industry, and shipyards, shrank. The agricultural sector also weakened significantly. As a result, ailing firms became one of the biggest problems of that time. The deeper origin of the problem was more political and less economic. A weak institutional framework and non-transparent relationships

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    



between businesses, the political system, and banking actors allowed many important firms to grow for years through heavy loans and minimal adjustment to competitive threats. Debt increased to a multiple of their equity, with loan proceeds often being siphoned off to the business owners’ private accounts within or outside the country. The viability of these firms crucially depended on restructuring efforts, new equity capital, the capability to reduce production costs and have competitive prices, and the willingness to accept lower than oligopolistic profits (Katsos, ). The large majority, if not all, of these firms were unwilling or unable to do any of the above. In , the Organization for the Reconstruction of Enterprises (OAE, Οργανισμός Ανασυγκρότησης Επιχειρήσεων) was established, for the purpose of rescuing and restructuring ailing firms, preventing closures of significant businesses and job losses, restoring their competitive position, and enhancing the public sector by socializing these enterprises. Under the pressure of their owners and labour unions, OAE acquired forty-three firms with , employees and about USD . billion in liabilities (Xanthakis, ; Sakellaropoulos, ). After a decade and a half, it became obvious that the project had failed. The rescue measures (loans, capitalization, and subsidies) had attained about USD . billion (exchange rate of ). Eventually OAE closed down () and the majority of these firms did not survive, while only ten firms could return to private ownership. Looking back, the case of the ailing firms was another link in a long chain of state interventionism, which started off with the ambition to transform and revive significant sectoral activities and foster growth, but ended up with shifting to society the huge cost of a nexus of inefficient or even corrupt political and business interconnections. Besides its trade effects and their impact on the manufacturing sector, accession to the EU was also accompanied by significant income transfers to the agricultural sector (about  per cent of total agricultural income), boosting mainly consumption. From a longer-term perspective, however, the inflow of agricultural subsidies and structural funds was indeed associated with a moderate shift to new crops and regional infrastructure projects. The period from the early s onwards but especially after , apart from the above-mentioned structural changes, saw substantial changes in the relationship between the state and the economy, which, without overturning traditionally strong forms of government intervention, nevertheless introduced a number of innovative elements. The most notable examples were the privatization of enterprises (e.g. shipyards and cement industries), the deregulation of public-sector departments (telecommunications, airports, gas, large infrastructure projects, and banking system, etc.), and the efforts to rationalize the management and pricing policy of public enterprises and organizations, etc. (Kazakos, , Papoulias, ). Throughout that period, under the pressure of competition, more resilient and competitive production models were increasingly established at individual firm level. In particular after , a slow but significant transformation of the production and competitive structures of the economy was under way. There was also a trend towards the acquisition of medium-sized enterprises, mainly industrial but also in other sectors,

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

 

by multinationals (Giannitsis, ). The impact of these changes became more pronounced after the early s. In effect, there was a dual movement into and out of the economy: older structures and entities that were unable to adapt to new conditions were wiped out of the picture, and their place was taken by new businesses and set-ups conducive to the transformation of the economy, thereby providing stronger growth prospects. This was a cumbersome and slow process with partial success.

.. From Structural Imbalances to a New Growth Cycle and to Euro Area Participation (–) In the period –, the central policy objective was to address the chronic weaknesses and imbalances of the economy and policy that had built up in the preceding years, ensure a return to positive and satisfactory growth rates and achieve Greece’s entry into Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It was perceived that a failure of the country to consolidate its economy and join EMU would have had multiple negative impacts, both economic and political. In particular, it would have reinforced a spiral of malaise and social upheaval, have increased the vulnerability of the economy to speculative attacks, and have kept the country outside a new pole of power. Back then, of course, the problems that later revealed the flaws of the EMU architecture had not yet become visible, nor had domestic resistance to macroeconomic discipline taken hold. Even if problems had been visible, this would not necessarily have meant a different political choice. In that period, for the first time since , growth reached historic highs. Furthermore, EU structural funds financed the implementation of large infrastructure investments, such as the Athens underground train (the ‘metro’), the new Athens international airport, national highways, the Rio-Antirio bridge, the Acropolis Museum, and infrastructure works for the Athens  Olympic Games, and so on. Moreover, the privatization of a number of banks and non-banking enterprises was promoted, while the decline of the previously high interest rates after Greece’s entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism in , and a set of improvements in the efficiency of public administration facilitated adjustment and growth. The achievement of sustained positive growth rates, for the first time in many years, greatly helped the return to relatively stable macroeconomic balances, and vice versa. However, the very low interest rates in the euro area after , as well as the deficits of the national pension system, gradually tipped Greece onto a path of fiscal and macro-economic destabilization, which would later take on explosive proportions.

.. The Build-Up to the Crisis (–) After Greece joined the euro area in , in particular after the successful hosting of the Olympic Games in , policy choices were marked by optimism and a

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    



relaxation of the macro-economic stance. The average growth rate of the period was  per cent. Growth was expected to arise as the natural outcome of low capital cost and increased lending to the business sector and to households for consumer and housing purposes. The big investment projects of the previous period were completed without being replaced by new ones. While a range of other macroeconomic aggregates (growth, savings, and total factor productivity) deteriorated significantly (Table .), most importantly the typical twin deficits (fiscal and external) as well as external debt exploded, triggering the collapse of the Greek economy in .

.. The Crisis of / and its Aftermath The crisis caused a major breakdown in Greece’s economic development and marked the most fundamental rupture in its economic history over the last hundred years. Table . displays the dramatic deterioration of many crucial economic indicators in the crisis years. During these years, all key drivers of growth weakened significantly: investment and capital stock, skilled labour, and the knowledge base (Barkas and Pisu, ). Between  and , industrial production fell by about  per cent, while employment fell by . per cent between  and its crisis-period peak in . The liquidity squeeze became a serious constraint on the growth of the real economy. Overall, Greece’s production base was heavily impaired, even though some new and competitive small and medium-sized start-ups emerged. GDP per capita, from . per cent of the corresponding average figure for the EU-, plummeted to . per cent in . However, since  macroeconomic aggregates seem to have stabilized, showing signs of fragile improvement. Most analyses of the crisis, or even of smaller past crises, focus on macro-issues, public deficits and debt, asset bubbles, and/or financial factors. Accordingly, they tend to interpret the Greek crisis, or the euro area crisis, as an outcome of macroeconomic mismanagement, inappropriate monetary policy, inadequate banking regulation, absence of fiscal and/or financial discipline, etc. However, in addition to domestic and European macroeconomic and institutional mismanagement, a broad set of weaknesses regarding governance capabilities, institutions, and development and technology policies are instrumental in understanding how the crisis erupted. They also explain why the crisis, besides its macroeconomic nature, was also the outcome of a long-term accumulation of structural weaknesses, broader long- and short-term policy choices, and social and political attitudes and behaviours. In fact, the causality between macroeconomic management and negative growth is not unidirectional. Obviously, the collapse of the macroeconomic framework led to the collapse of development. However, the macroeconomic imbalances themselves had been the combined result of failed economic governance, of structurally determined weaknesses of the economy, and of politically induced irrational expectations that could not be met but by excessive lending, leading unavoidably to debt overhang and

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

 

bankruptcy, which could only be averted by the intervention of European institutions and the IMF. From a development perspective, the crisis revealed four important lessons: • It showed the consequences of policy choices which disregarded the close interaction between the macroeconomic crisis management and structural weaknesses. It also showed how the accumulation of such weaknesses had escalated into deeply entrenched situations, the overcoming of which required extensive and highly painful interventions at a later stage. • It proved how wrong the expectation was that the elimination of fiscal deficits, the correction of macroeconomic imbalances, coupled with wage cuts, income reductions, and labour market liberalization, would by themselves improve significantly the conditions for growth and would boost confidence, investment initiatives, and competitiveness. However, it should be noted that the reduction of wage costs along with the pressure on many firms to expand out of the shrinking domestic market led, after the shock of the first years, to remarkable total export increases ( per cent) between  and , while exports of goods of high technological intensity increased by  per cent. • Because of the adverse impact which the recession had on demand and businesses, efforts were made to attract foreign direct investment in the expectation that capital inflows would increase investment and enhance the technological and productive base as well as the outward orientation of the economy. In fact, some important foreign investment projects were approved (privatization of airports, redeployment of the area of the former Athens airport, Cosco, Hellas Gold), but only a part of them was really implemented by the end of . Some foreign direct investment was also undertaken in real estate, hotels, banking, and other services. Even in such cases, it is necessary to distinguish the simple change of ownership, which from a macroeconomic viewpoint does not constitute real investment. Regarding the flows of foreign financial placements in the Athens Stock Exchange, pre-crisis inflows were EUR . billion (–), followed by an outflow of EUR  billion (–), and again an inflow of about EUR  billion in –. • The crisis showed that development cannot be achieved without structural policies and that policy failures in structural reform have a heavy social and political cost. In particular, the crucial factors that inhibited growth before and after the onset of the crisis in  were the lack of political will to address inefficiencies across the public sector (Giannitsis, ; Sotiropoulos, ), the exploding pension deficits, problems relating to tax evasion, and the dominant role of the informal economy, malfunctioning institutions, the deficits of public enterprises, and low productivity. It could be said that all of them could be traced back in the social and political history of Greece over many decades.

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    



. C

.................................................................................................................................. The crisis, by definition, had a strong destructive impact on Greece’s productive fabric and development process. However, within this specific context, social and political factors, besides economic ones, affected equally significantly investment and development. Perhaps the most damaging fallout of the crisis was the extensive fragmentation of society, the degradation of collective values, and the destruction of the middle class (Giannitsis and Zografakis, ), which destabilized fundamental economic and social balances. A central question concerns the key drivers of development. From an economic perspective, development and growth are typically seen as a function of factors such as labour, investment, technological and innovation capacity, the education system, or demographic trends. However, from a broader perspective, and with specific regard to the Greek case, further factors should be added: society’s and investors’ distrust in politics; the elimination of high unpredictability and quasi-corrupted bureaucratic procedures; a highly unstable tax system; disdain of institutions; crime and violence in the public sphere; an ineffective judicial system; and incapability to design a credible growth policy. All these factors exerted an important adverse impact on Greece’s economic development throughout the crisis, and still do so. These factors aggravated—beyond any rational consideration—the social burden of the crisis. Although, after ten years of crisis, economic indicators have stabilized and even showed some improvement in –, the central development question is how to create a competitive, stable, and self-sustained economy, and how to address its systemic structural weaknesses. As mentioned, throughout the period since , government and opposition parties systematically resisted any consolidation measure, rationalization proposals or reforms aimed at remedying fundamental deficiencies. In fact, growth and development suffered a heavy blow, not only because of the eruption of the crisis and the pre-crisis policy failures, but also because of the lack of policies to manage more efficiently the new realities and limit the extent and the social cost of the crisis.

R Bank of Greece. (). Η ελληνική οικονομία [The Greek Economy]. Athens: Bank of Greece. Barkas, P. and Pisu. M. (). ‘Boosting Investment in Greece’ (OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. ). Paris: OECD Publishing. European Commission. (various years) Statistical Annex of European Economy. Brussels: European Commission. Featherstone, K. (). ‘Introduction: “Modernisation” and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics’. West European Politics,  (): –.

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

 

Giannitsis, T. (). Η ελληνική βιομηχανία. Ανάπτυξη και κρίση [The Greek Industry: Development and Crisis]. Athens: Gutenberg. Giannitsis, T. (). Η ένταξη στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα και επιπτώσεις στη βιομηχανία και στο εξωτερικό εμπόριο [Accession to the E.C. and the Impact on Industry and External Trade]. Athens: Foundation of Mediterranean Studies. Giannitsis, T. (). ‘Transformation and Problems of Greek Industry: The Experience During the Period –’. In Vryonis, S. (ed.), Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK –. New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, –. Giannitsis, T. (). ‘World Market Integration: Trade Effects and Implications for Industrial and Technological Change in Greece’. In Psomiades, H. J. and Thomadakis, S. (eds.) Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order. New York: Pella Publishing, –. Giannitsis, T. (). Διεθνείς κεφαλαιακές ροές [International Capital Inflows]. In Kalafatis, T. and Prontzas, E. (eds.) Οικονομική ιστορία του ελληνικού κράτους, οικονομικές λειτουργίες και επιδόσεις [Economic History of the Greek State, v., Economic Functions and Performance]. Athens: Cultural Foundation of Piraeus Group, –. Giannitsis, T. (). H Ελλάδα στην κρίση [Greece in the Crisis]. Athens: Polis. Giannitsis, T. (). Το ασφαλιστικό και η κρίση [The Pension Question and the Crisis]. Athens: Polis. Giannitsis, T. and Zografakis, S. (). Crisis Management in Greece. The Shaping of New Economic and Social Balances. IMK-Hans Böckler Stiftung, Studies Nr.. Düsseldorf: Hans Böckler Stiftung. Glytsos, N. P. (). Περιφερειακές ανισότητες στην Ελλάδα: Δημογραφικά και οικονομικά χαρακτηριστικά [Regional Inequalities in Greece: Demographic and Economic Characteristics]. Athens: KEPE. Katsos, G. H. (). Προβληματικές επιχειρήσεις στην Ελλάδα: Αίτια, πρόβλεψη, πρόληψη και εξυγίανση [The Ailing Firms in Greece: Causes, Predictions, Prevention and Reorganisation]. Athens: KEPE. Kazakos, P. (). Ανάμεσα σε κράτος και αγορά. Οικονομία και οικονομική πολιτική στη μεταπολεμική Ελλάδα – [Between the State and the Market. Economy and Economic Policy in Post-War Greece –]. Athens: Patakis. KNOEMA (). ‘World Data Atlas-Greece’. Available at: https://knoema.com/atlas/ Greece/ (accessed  January ). Kostis, K. (). Κράτος και επιχειρήσεις στην Ελλάδα. Η ιστορία του ‘Αλουμινίον της Ελλάδος’ [The State and Enterprises in Greece. The Case of ‘Aluminium of Greece’]. Athens: Polis. Oikonomou, G. and Kazantzis, K. (). ‘Ο προϋπολογισμός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και οι χρηματικές ροές Ελλάδας-Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης’ [The E.U. Budget and Financial Flows between Greece and the EU]. In Maravegias, N. and Sakellaropoulos, T. (eds.) Ελλάδα και ευρωπαϊκή ενοποίηση: Η ιστορία μιας πολυκύμαντης σχέσης – [Greece and European Unification: The History of a Turbulent Relationship –]. Athens: Dionikos, –. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s New Political Economy. State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Papoulias, D. B. (). Χρυσάφι είναι το δημόσιο [Public Sector is Gold]. Αthens: Hestia. Sakellaropoulos, T. (). Προβληματικές επιχειρήσεις. Κράτος και κοινωνικά συμφέροντα τη δεκαετία του ’ [The Ailing Firms, the State and Social Interests in the s]. Athens: Kritiki.

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    



Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-authoritarian Greece’. In Thomadakis, S. and Psomiades, H. J. (eds.) Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order. New York: Pella, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘South European Governments and Public Bureaucracies in the Context of Economic Crisis’. Journal of European Social Security,  (): –. Thomadakis, S. B. (). Κράτος και ανάπτυξη στην Ελλάδα. Ένα εξελικτικό δίδυμο [The State and Development in Greece. An Evolutionary Twin]. Athens: Alexandria. Xanthakis, M. D. (). Η κρίση της ελληνικής μεταποίησης και η παρέμβαση του Κράτους [The Crisis of Greek Manufacturing and State’s Intervention]. Athens: Papazissis. Vavouras, I. (). ‘Το μέγεθος του δημόσιου τομέα’ [The Size of the Public Sector]. In Tatsos, N. (ed.) Τα δημόσια οικονομικά στην Ελλάδα [Public Economics in Greece]. Athens: Smpilias-To Oikonomiko, –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

             

......................................................................................................................

 .    

. I

.................................................................................................................................. S the course of Greek public finances and its politics in a broader historical context facilitates the understanding of relevant developments and the ways these diverged from Greece’s European counterparts. The post-war period witnessed rapid economic expansion both in Greece and in most European countries. In the latter, this was accompanied by a substantial growth of the public sector and a rapid expansion of the welfare state. In Greece, however, political developments hindered a parallel process. The country emerged from World War II only to plunge directly into a civil war, followed by a series of mostly unstable governments, whose actions were delineated by and themselves reinforced a deeply divisive social structure, royal family interventions, and external involvement. In the absence of wide democratic participation and any sense of overall social solidarity, the fruits of the post-war economic boom were neither equally distributed, nor did they fund the establishment of an inclusive welfare state (see, for example, Koliopoulos and Veremis, ). The newly founded democracy after the collapse of the junta in  had to deal with long-accumulated, repressed demands for redistribution of power and wealth, expansion of social controls, and the creation of a more equitable society backed by a stronger welfare state. The growth of the public sector and of public expenditure in the postjunta era and especially after the election of the socialist party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) in the early 0s have to be understood precisely in this context. However, the growth of public expenditure was not the consequence of the development of an industrial economy since it occurred against the backdrop of a rather unfavourable domestic and international macroeconomic environment of sluggish growth. At the same time, it was completely out of pace with international trends in public outlays; in the aftermath of the two oil-shocks, most advanced economies,

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     



notwithstanding Greece’s European counterparts, sought ways to rationalize public expenditure, putting in place institutions that would promote fiscal prudence and restore international competitiveness. Fiscal developments in Greece and many other European countries were put on a seemingly similar path in the s in view of the common aspiration to participate in the euro area. The admittedly arbitrary, but quite precise, Maastricht convergence criteria meant that public deficits in Greece, as in other prospective euro area members, had to be brought under control, and so they did. The European Union’s (EU) common fiscal framework does not seem to have worked equally successfully once entrance in the euro area was secured, but again the ineffective application of EU fiscal rules was not unique to the Greek case. At the same time, the domestic fiscal governance framework remained weak. The unravelling of the  global financial crisis, brought to light in an abrupt manner the unsustainability of domestic policies, as well as certain flaws in the architecture of the EU, rendering Greece a complete outlier in terms of its fiscal derailment. The reasons behind fiscal developments were certainly unsustainable fiscal policies, but the question that arises is why successive governments could not or did not impose fiscal discipline. In this sense, the Greek case is quite distinctive, not only in terms of its different historical and fiscal trajectory, but also with respect to the fact that despite high public deficits and escalating public debt, no rules, mechanisms, or other legal frameworks were put in place that could assure fiscal prudence. In this chapter we will attempt to outline the basic legal framework for fiscal policy in Greece, with respect to, for example, the legislature’s role in budget approval, the inyear parliamentary oversight of budget execution, problems of audit and control, transparency of fiscal documents, institutional accountability, and alignment of budgets with medium-term government fiscal targets. We will further examine how these have been transformed within the EU fiscal framework and, more recently, as a result of the impact of external intervention. Since sound fiscal management is necessary, not only to prevent unsustainable fiscal deficits, but also for the more efficient allocation of resources and to enhance democratic control, further developments on this front hinge directly on the outcome of recent debates at the EU level regarding the legitimacy and enhancement of democratic control of its institutions.

. T P-C F G F

.................................................................................................................................. The basic instrument of a democratic government to influence economic outcomes is the public budget. However, the budget is not only an expression of economic commitments, but mainly an expression of political priorities. Thus, any analysis of expenditure and/or tax policies has to take into account the political rules and procedures that shape the fiscal policy of a country, or in other words, its fiscal

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

 .    

budgeting framework. Understanding crucial aspects of this framework would help reconcile the seeming inconsistency of Greece not being able to effectively control its public debt, while at the same time enjoying the fastest growth rates in the eurozone in the years immediately before the  crisis. The importance and principles of good budgetary governance have been a subject of interest and enquiry of both national and international organizations (for a recent update see, for example, OECD, ). For reasons already signalled, Greece until recently conducted fiscal policy with no clear predetermined limits. The first time in its recent history that it adopted some rules for fiscal policy was the elaborate system of budget surveillance and fiscal rules of the  Maastricht Treaty and the  Stability and Growth Pact. This system indeed acted as a catalyst in reducing deficits to ensure participation in the euro area. At an institutional level, however, it changed hardly anything in the domestic fiscal governance framework. This comes at little surprise, since recent research on the determinants of adherence to the fiscal framework of the EU on part of its member states, provides evidence that ‘despite common supranational rules and monitoring, domestic institutions (budget transparency), politics (elections), and economic cycles (recessions) explain much of the variation in (fiscal) outcomes’ (Alt et al., ), reinforcing the argument that the source of fiscal discipline is primarily at the domestic level. In the case of Greece, despite the fact that the effort to comply with the Maastricht criteria for entrance in the euro area triggered, beyond doubt, a substantial reduction in fiscal deficits, the statistical recording adopted at the time regarding certain budget items later came under question (for details, see Featherstone, ). The concerns reflected both weaknesses in the Greek statistical reporting system and the fact that the ‘European System of National and Regional Accounts’ had not as yet evolved to impose unified recording rules along the whole spectrum of government accounts. Thus, the recording method of certain items was left to the discretion of national governments. More precisely, in , the newly elected government proceeded to an internal audit of public finance statistics, raising the  deficit figure to . per cent of GDP. The main driver was the unilateral change in the recording rules of military equipment expenditure from an ‘accruals’ to a ‘cash’ basis (Eurostat, ). It is worth noting that in  Eurostat decided that such equipment should be recorded on an accruals basis in all member states (Eurostat, ). Nevertheless, in the meantime, many analysts had already questioned whether Greece had qualified to join the eurozone, as its deficit in  (the key reference year) had exceeded the  per cent of GDP Maastricht criterion. In any case, the excess over  per cent was a few decimal points, and a similar pattern was common in other countries (see European Commission, : ). Focusing on the Greek institutional framework, the basic provisions of the Greek constitutions have always been very general and were a poor guide both for tax and public expenditure policies. Focusing on issues of legislative control, the parliament has a powerful constitutional role since according to the Constitution (Article ), it votes to approve the budget of central government revenue and expenditure for the following

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     



year, and in fact, it is broken down by ministry. Thereafter, however, the parliament had no mechanism available for following up on the budget execution and for monitoring developments on public expenditures and revenues. To be more specific, every November the parliament was presented with the draft budget documents and the Introductory Report of the State Budget for the following year that presented the basic macroeconomic assumptions, on which the budget forecasts were based. Parliament was asked to approve the budget on a block basis, and it could not reallocate expenditures between line items, or change tax revenues. The time available to the legislature to scrutinize the government’s budget proposal was less than a month, which is considered excessively short by international standards. An OECD () study referring to  ranks Greece last (along with Australia and Chile) in terms of the length of legislative debate on the budget. Furthermore, information on the finances of other parts of the general government (for example, local government, hospitals, and social security funds) appeared only in a fragmentary manner and were largely missing. The next time the parliament was presented with information on the execution of the budget was in October or November of the following year, already too late to address any deviations. Finally, parliament was asked to approve the final outcome of the budget in November following the end of the budget year. The large gaps in the flow of information and the fact that the data approved by the parliament were at the central government level and thus quite disjoint from those monitored within the European fiscal framework (which refer to general government and also include local authorities, social security funds, and hospitals), rendered the important institutional role of the Greek parliament ineffective. The lack of effective legislative control over the budget is also manifested in a study by Wehner (), who constructs a composite index of legislative budget institutions, aimed at assessing the budgetary power of national legislatures. The index is based on the institutional arrangements that give the legislature power to scrutinize and influence budget policy and to ensure its implementation. Greece, not-surprisingly, ranks twenty-sixth among the twenty-seven OECD countries covered in the study, which suggests that legislator control was a constitutional artefact, rather than a key safeguard of democratic governance. Have fiscal deficits shown the impact of electoral cycles? There are only a few older studies available that indicate that this was indeed the case. Thomadakis () presents evidence of a strong electoral-fiscal cycle, which involved systematic fiscal expansions shortly before election periods. He also estimates that over the – period, each of the seven electoral contests increased the public deficit by . per cent of GDP on average, which implies that pre-election populism alone translated into cumulative deficits of about  per cent of GDP. Tsakalotos () also notes that the fiscal deficit increased in all election years (, , , and ), suggesting the existence of political cycles. In a more recent relevant study, Alt et al. () further present evidence at the EU level that fiscal gimmickry (proxied by the statistical term ‘stock-flow adjustment’) displays an electoral cycle, which is aggravated at low levels of fiscal transparency. In this setting, the authors identify Greece not as a special case, but

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

 .    

rather as an extreme case of a general and comprehensible pattern characterizing most EU member states. Turning to the issue of poor budget management in Greece, many of its aspects had already been identified and analysed in several studies before the outbreak of the recent crisis, see, for example, Rapanos (), Hawkesworth et al. (), Vraniali () and Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (). According to these studies, the budgeting framework in Greece had several weaknesses which led to serious problems of audit and control and a lack of accountability. Here we briefly mention the most important. Transparency of fiscal data was largely absent, owing mainly to the drafting of two separate budgets (the ordinary and the investment budget) with overlapping expenditure categories, the existence of significant off-budget operations, and the lack of coherent reporting of the finances of general government bodies not included under central government. Reporting coherent fiscal data in a timely manner was hardly possible, given the organizational weaknesses of the public sector accounting and information systems. The General Accounting Office, which was entrusted with monitoring the execution of the budget, had no coherent information system that would enable it to have an overview of total public revenues and expenditures at any point in time. Local information systems managed by, for example, local fiscal audit offices or different bodies of the central or general government were not online with the General Accounting Office, and the accounting systems of such entities were either absent or not standardized. Moreover, the internal audit dealt mainly with the legality of expenditures and mostly ex post, and only for a small percentage of the central government expenditures. The Audit Office in Greece has the status of a court, and deals mostly with the legality of public expenditures. The annual report of this Audit Office is submitted to parliament with very long delays, and it draws only minimal attention from parliamentarians. Another weakness relates to the lack of a medium-term perspective of budget priorities at the domestic level. The Greek government, along with all other EU member states, was indeed compiling three-year rolling Stability and Growth Programmes in accordance to the premises of the EU fiscal governance framework. However, the strategic orientation of these programmes was rather disconnected from the domestic budget process, which as a whole tended to focus only on the current fiscal year. The budget preparation process was also out of line with the recent international best practice of top-down budgeting. The budgeting system followed a bottom-up approach, whereby requests were being made by spending ministries without clear indications of spending ceilings or financial restraints. This, in combination with the lack of a medium-term framework, removed any incentive to prioritize expenditures instead of asking for additional funds, thus often leading to strong pressure on the expenditure side. The Ministry of Finance intervened at all stages of the budget process at a very detailed level, eliminating any sense of ownership of the line ministries’ budgets and weakening their accountability in the management of public funds.

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     



Focusing on the assessment of public expenditure, its control and accountability framework was characterized by excessive and overlapping ex ante controls, and ex post multiple expenditure controls inclined mainly towards compliance with the legality of procedures (Vraniali, ). There was no focus on policy objectives, which would address the quality of expenditure, review programme results, and address value-for-money issues. Meaningful assessment of public expenditure would have been possible, for example, in a programme budgeting framework, which, despite having been proposed for Greece by Hawkesworth et al. (), never actually materialized. Furthermore, input budgeting in the framework of an extremely detailed budget structure, consisting of the impressive number of , line items where each line represented grouped items of expenditure within part of the public administration, made the budget an inflexible and rather incomprehensible document, and resulted in thousands of budget adjustments per year. This was related also to the approach of most line ministries that attempted to exhaust all expenditure allocated to them, so that in the following year’s budget they could ask for increased expenditures. If there were any savings this might entail cuts in their subsequent forthcoming budget. As Featherstone (: ) points out, this management system lacked ‘the capacity to track and assess the efficacy of such spending’. The lack of effective control over the quality of public expenditure is manifested in a number of international studies. OECD (), for example, comparing tools for government control over the aggregate level and prioritization of expenditure across OECD counties, identifies a complete lack of spending reviews in Greece over the – period. Several studies assessing overall public-sector efficiency (Afonso and Kazemi, ), and public-spending efficiency in education (Sutherland et al., ), rank Greece among the middle or low performers of OECD or EU countries. It is commonly argued that the Greek deficit problem stemmed mainly from the revenue side of the budget, namely that expanded public expenditure was not accompanied by tax reforms necessary to accommodate its funding in a sustainable manner (for example, Tsakalotos, ). This raises issues not only of tax policy, but also of tax administration and the efficiency of tax collection procedures. Over the fifteen-year period preceding the crisis, both the level and the structure of tax revenues resembled those of a developing rather than a developed county, with the tax-to-GDP ratio falling short of what one would expect for the country’s level of economic development, and with consumption taxes being the most important source of tax revenue, contrary to what theory and international experience might predict. More importantly, low tax revenue went hand-in-hand with rather high tax rates and a narrow tax base, suggesting that the real problem was not the design of the tax system itself, but rather its administration and enforcement. Although no precise measure of tax evasion is available for Greece, its indications are numerous, as reported in several studies (for example, Artavanis et al. , Mylonas et al., ; European Commission, ). A question that naturally arises is why successive governments did not succeed in enhancing the efficiency of tax administration and in containing tax evasion, despite their often explicitly declared intentions. Tax reforms were usually confined to changes

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

 .    

mainly in tax rates, rather than simplification of the tax structure and effective enforcement. Although this topic deserves much closer attention, one could raise the more general point that commitment to a simple tax system and its credible implementation crucially depends on continuity in governance, which could not be guaranteed (Spanou, ). According to more recent evidence (OECD, : ), for example, the staff turnover in advisors to ministries and senior civil servants following a change of government was much more frequent in Greece than in most of its EU counterparts. International literature on the determinants of tax compliance has more recently shifted attention to factors beyond the quality of formal institutions (like the tax administration). Moral or normative considerations, like personal and social norms and the level of trust between the state and the citizens have been found to also shape tax compliance behaviour (see, for example, Alm et al., ). Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (a) examine the failures of both formal and informal institutions in a thorough analysis of the Greek tax system, pointing out in detail its particular features that made it not only inefficient in yielding tax revenue, but also a source of social injustice and a symptom of the lack of trust in the state–citizen relationship. A final related issue that has attracted a lot of attention is the sources of ‘deviations from fiscal plans’. The effective implementation of the EU’s rules-based fiscal framework hinged crucially, among other things, on the credibility of the medium-term fiscal plans presented in national Stability and Growth Programmes. However, fiscal outcomes often deviated from such plans, with Greece being an outlier since the size of such errors, during the decade preceding the crisis, was usually much higher than the EU average. Most relevant studies (surveyed in Cimadomo, ) point to strategic use by national governments of optimistic economic growth assumptions as the main determinant of fiscal forecast errors at the EU level. Weaker than expected growth serves as a good argument for fiscal outcomes turning out worse than planned. In a study covering thirty-three OECD countries, Frankel () regresses the budget balance oneyear-ahead forecast error against the real GDP growth one-year-ahead forecast error and concludes that the latter is highly significant in determining the former. Hardouvelis et al. () and Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (b) show that Greece does not fit this pattern. They analyse economic growth and fiscal forecasts of Greek governments and come to the conclusion that GDP forecasts were systematically rather pessimistic. At the same time, annual deficit targets set in the Stability and Growth Programmes were systematically being missed by a large margin. Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (b) adopting Frankel’s () analytical framework, find that indeed data from the Greek Stability and Growth Programmes indicate no significant impact of the GDP forecast error on the budget forecast error. What is even more surprising is that macro and fiscal forecasts of international organizations (namely the European Commission, the IMF, and the OECD) displayed exactly the same pattern. Despite the fact that the economy was growing in line with forecasts, budgeted revenues did not find their way into the public purse, while primary expenditure was not kept under planned control, and this feature was systematically not being picked up by the forecasting models of these organizations.

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     



What political features of governments have been found to be linked with higher deviations from fiscal plans? According to several studies (for example, Pina and Venes, ), ‘size-fragmentation’ and ‘time-fragmentation’ played a significant role. In the first case, coalition governments are expected to be more prone to ‘common pool’ problems, while in the second case, frequent changes in government shorten the expected tenure of governments and effectively raise the rate at which the latter discount the future. The ideological gap between successive governments is another factor with a potentially significant effect on forecasting errors. Deviations from fiscal plans in Greece cannot be explained according to this analytical framework, however, since the country’s performance in these terms has been rather outstanding; according to all international political indices employed, Greece in the post- period had very strong governments (all single-party majorities), among the lowest number of government changes, and even when the government changed, its ideological gap with its predecessor was exceedingly low (Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, b). The main conclusion to be drawn from this section is that the weak domestic fiscal governance framework is a key driving factor of the Greek fiscal derailment. Greek fiscal governance was characterized by the limited capacity of the legislative arm to essentially control the implementation of the public budget, by lack of transparency in government finances, weak medium-term planning, ineffective audit and evaluation of public expenditure, and inadequate mechanisms of tax enforcement. Joining the EU made the system more rules-based, but no paradigm shift can be observed in domestic fiscal governance (Ladi, ). At the same time, serious questions are raised regarding systematic inconsistencies in the forecasts of international organizations which rendered their monitoring role partly ineffective. In this sense, external monitoring did not sufficiently counterbalance problems of audit and control at the domestic level.

. F G   M E

.................................................................................................................................. The – global financial crisis coupled with escalating public deficit figures, reaching . per cent of GDP in , led to a growing distrust of capital markets and the inability of Greece to finance its public debt. The bailout programme agreed with the country’s EU partners and the IMF () in May  imposed heavy conditionality for rapid, front-loaded fiscal adjustment and structural reforms, covering economic, fiscal, financial, and labour-market policies. As Featherstone () notes ‘the “tutelage” of the bail-out conditions established a domestic reform momentum of a magnitude rarely seen before’. On the public finance institutional front, reforms focused on the areas of public financial management and tax administration guiding the way to a more modern system. In the former area, reforms aimed to address most problems identified in the

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

 .    

foregoing sections: fragmentation of functions, high degree of centralization of budgeting, lack of multiannual planning framework, poor oversight of general government entities outside the central government, multiplication of controls, detailed input orientation, low accountability, and lack of adequate mechanisms for the imposition of upper limits to expenditure. Two broad amendments of the Greek Organic Budget Law in  (Law /) and  (Law /) introduced many reforms in the budgeting framework, with the double aim of enforcing budgeting principles that were at an international level believed to enhance discipline and transparency in public finances and of fully aligning the national law with the requirements of the EU economic surveillance mechanism incorporated in the Fiscal Compact. The horizon of the budgeting framework was increased to four years through the establishment of a Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, which sets the targets for the fiscal balance and the level of debt of the general government, and for spending ceilings for the state and balanced targets for the budgets of local governments, social security funds, and other general government entities. To ensure implementation of fiscal plans, the fiscal monitoring and oversight role of the Ministry of Finance has been expanded to more effectively include all entities of general government, that is, supervised legal entities, hospitals, social security funds, local government, and public corporations classified within general government. All these entities are required to set monthly and quarterly targets for budget execution, and produce reports regularly, while corrective mechanisms are implemented to ensure targets are achieved. On the basis of monthly budget implementation programmes and quarterly data on budget execution, the General Accounting Office of the Ministry of Finance publishes quarterly reports which include data on budget targets and execution. Furthermore, the approach to formulating the budget has moved to a top-down rationale. Expenditure ceilings are imposed at the state level, while balanced budget rules are imposed for all other general government entities. Accountability and budget ownership are strengthened by making each state entity responsible for breaking down the ceilings by budget code and modifying its budget within the initial limits. The new laws also seek to address operational obstacles that impede effective fiscal monitoring. Among the most important is the simultaneous existence of different accounting systems applied by different general government entities, such as those mentioned above, which complicates financial and fiscal reporting and restricts the transparency of the reports. Thus, meaningful implementation of the new concise reporting framework and budget surveillance rests on the adoption on behalf of all general government entities of consistent double-entry accounting methodology, namely a single chart of accounts as explained in Miliakou et al. (). The new chart of accounts was to be based on international accounting principles and standards and its gradual application was planned to start from the  State Budget. Regarding the assessment of the quality of public expenditure, little progress has been made, perhaps not surprisingly, since this would be conditional on building up

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     



sufficient institutional infrastructure, for example consistent accounting standards. Nevertheless, significant initial steps are being made, including the creation of a registry of public-sector employees and the establishment of a single payment authority for public-sector wages which facilitates the monitoring of public remuneration expenditure. Furthermore, line ministries have been given responsibility for handling their financial issues through the establishment of General Directorates of Financial Services, which are responsible for the management and execution of the ministry’s budget and provide to the General Accounting Office all required fiscal data regarding the monitoring of spending ceilings and the management of the entity’s resources. Such institutional reforms primarily aim at decentralizing budgeting procedures and addressing the ownership issues identified in the previous section. The first effort to evaluate public expenditure was presented by the Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE, Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών) (Monogios et al., ) in the form of a General Government Spending Review. Its admitted aim was primarily to identify areas where cuts could be made to reduce overall government expenditure, and is thus quite far from a proper evaluation of public expenditure efficiency and the elimination of ‘government waste’. In the spirit of adopting best practices in fiscal governance, the economic adjustment programmes imposed on Greece included the establishment of an independent fiscal council to be entrusted with the analysis and assessment of fiscal policy. A Parliamentary Budget Office was indeed established in , with the aim of reinforcing the capacity of the legislature to monitor the executive branch, while in November , an additional Fiscal Council was established after pressure from the country’s creditors. This Hellenic Fiscal Council was entrusted with the role of providing an independent opinion on the budget proposal and execution, and monitoring compliance with EU fiscal rules. By December , the Council had already produced three bi-annual reports. Turning to the revenue side of the public budget, all three Economic Adjustment Programmes (of , , and ) included conditions aiming at enhancing the government’s revenue-raising capacity. Thus, all MoUs included commitments on part of the Greek government to increase tax compliance, enhance the efficiency of tax and customs collection mechanisms, fight tax fraud, and improve audits. Specific antievasion institutional measures were envisaged only in the second and third programmes. These included, for example, unification of taxpayers’ identification numbers, introduction of an IT system to interconnect all tax offices, electronic access to bank account registers for the tax administration, promotion and facilitation of electronic payments, and creation of audit units dedicated to large taxpayers and high-wealth individuals. One of the major institutional reforms on the tax collection front has been the establishment as of  January  of a fully independent revenue agency, the Independent Authority for Public Revenue (AADE, Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή Δημοσίων Εσόδων), which is in charge of the implementation of the legal framework relating to the determination and collection of taxes and duties. The setting out of tax policy itself remains with the Minister of Finance, who does not have hierarchical

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

 .    

control over the authority. The latter is controlled by parliament, while its independence rests on its management board, composed of independent members nominated for a five-year period. The broad-ranging reforms of the fiscal governance framework complemented heavy fiscal austerity policies and were meant to align this framework with what is perceived as international best practices. In this light, Greece’s performance with respect to several international fiscal governance indicators indeed improved. This is evident, for example, in successive editions of the OECD’s publication Government at a Glance, where progress is documented in human resource management in the public sector, the use of performance budgeting, regulatory governance indices, or the use of spending reviews. The European Commission assessing its own programme for Greece reports that: significant progress has been made in improving the operational management of public finances. This includes a wide range of measures . . . to modernise budgetary planning, execution and control, and rationalise public spending’ (EC, ).

However, serious questions remain and important challenges remain.

. C A

.................................................................................................................................. With an eye to the future, two major challenges lie ahead. The first one is purely of a domestic character. Will Greece manage to successfully and meaningfully implement the ambitious reform agenda identified in this chapter? Will it manage to simplify its budget and impose meaningful audit mechanisms for public expenditure? Will it enhance its capacity in curbing tax evasion? Will it manage to build up the credibility of a truly non-partisan independent fiscal council that will act as a lens of transparency for public policy? Will it succeed in strengthening legislative control over the budget? These are important research questions on aspects of the politics of public finances that are crucial to be addressed in the years to come. Some points of criticism have already been raised. It has been justifiably argued, for example, that an important part of the reforms in public administration were only costcutting in order to quickly comply with the international loans economic targets (Ladi, ). In many cases what has been promoted as rationalization of public expenditure has seriously compromised the provision of public services, instead of reducing ‘government waste’. Regarding tax collection mechanisms, the criticism has been put forward that, despite the fact that the adopted measures were in the right direction, ‘performance indicators of the programmes for tax administration show fragile and partial improvement in terms of the number of tax inspections and collection rates in the specialised audit centres’ (European Court of Auditors, ). Furthermore, several initiatives, for example combating fuel smuggling, still remain at an action plan level.

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     



The Parliamentary Budget Office (Γραφείο Προϋπολογισμού του Κράτους στη Βουλή) established in  is bi-partisan (since its members are appointed on the basis of party affiliation) instead of non-partisan (not affiliated to any party), and this partly undermines its supposedly impartial role and authority (Anderson, ). Moreover, the Hellenic Fiscal Council (Ελληνικό Δημοσιονομικό Συμβούλιο) that was established in  does not yet work as a fully fledged fiscal council, at least judging by the number and length of its reports so far. In other cases, the reform process is still under way and perhaps it is too soon to draw firm conclusions. The implementation of a comprehensive accounting system for the entire general government, the introduction of performance budgeting, and the drafting of comprehensive spending reviews are a few examples. Assessing the effectiveness of ongoing reforms would also constitute active areas of future research. The second challenge is a much more subtle one that also touches the European sphere. ‘International best practices’ in fiscal governance are not simply about controlling public deficits in elaborate technocratic ways, but more significantly about enhancing transparency in the conduct of fiscal policy and disseminating information to all, rather than to a closed circle of technocrats. Their ultimate purpose thus is, or at least should be, strengthening the exercise of democratic control over the executive, and the latter’s obligation for accountability, which is a fundamental principle of democracy. The core contradiction of the present state of politics of the public finances is that, under current circumstances, democratic control appears to be absent, since the executive appears much more accountable to the external creditors than to the national legislature. Through these lenses, the natural question emerges about what the chances are that reform proposals, whatever their economic virtues, will be meaningfully adopted if they are promoted by foreign imposition and not by a democratic political process? Furthermore, although the questions of sustainability and transparency of fiscal policy have still to be dealt with by Greek political and economic institutions, these questions are less than ever confined to national borders. The limits of fiscal policy are and will be very clearly delineated by the mandate to respect the European fiscal governance framework. At the same time this framework is under attack on grounds of lack of flexibility, legitimacy, and democratic control of its institutions. As Offe () notes, ‘[I]t is precisely those EU institutions which have the greatest impact on daily life of people which are so far the farthest remote from democratic accountability.’ In the Greek case, a clear manifestation of such lack of accountability is the special report of the European Court of Auditors which evaluates the European Commission’s involvement in the Greek financial crisis, but declares it was unable to do so in the case of the second European institution also involved, that is, the European Central Bank. As the European Court of Auditors () explains, ‘[T]he ECB questioned the Court’s mandate in this respect; did not provide sufficient amount of evidence and thus we were unable to report on the role of the ECB in the Greek programmes’. This is clearly part of the broader contemporary issue of legitimacy of political decisions, where there is ‘a growing tension between a sharpened democratic norm of

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

 .    

giving citizens a greater say in the formulation of governmental policies on the one hand, and a growing administrative practice of making important political decisions without a clear mandate from the voters, on the other’ (Koole, ). The widening gap between what Mair () called ‘representative’ and ‘responsible’ government means that political power has gradually shifted to non-majoritarian institutions where decision-making belongs to the category of ‘responsible’ politics. This comes at odds with the growing demand for democratic legitimacy which is embraced across the board of European peoples, based partly on the belief that adopted policies have excluded large parts of society from the benefits of growth and have led to increasing inequality. These developments have had profoundly worrying effects on the economic and political front in various countries, including Greece, where fiscal adjustment has been made possible only at the cost of severe social hardship. The outcome of ongoing discussions at the European level on strengthening democratic control of its institutions and decision-making procedures is highly uncertain, but it will greatly impact on fiscal politics in Europe at large and Greece in particular.

R Afonso, A. and Kazemi, M. (). ‘Assessing Public Spending Efficiency in  OECD Countries’. In Bökemeier, B. and Greiner, A. (eds.) Inequality and Finance in Macrodynamics. Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance. Basel: Springer International Publishing, –. Alm, J., Kirchler, E., Muehlbacher, S., Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., Kogler, C., and Pollai, M. (). ‘Rethinking the Research Paradigms for Analysing Tax Compliance Behaviour’. CESifo Forum,  (): –. Alt, J. E., Lassen, D. D., and Wehner, J.(). ‘It Isn’t Just About Greece: Domestic Politics, Transparency and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe’. British Journal of Political Science,  (): –. Anderson, B. (). ‘The Changing Role of Parliament in the Budget Process’. OECD Journal on Budgeting, : –. Artavanis, N., Morse, A. and Tsoutsoura, M. (). ‘Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank Credit: Evidence from Greece’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,  (): –. Cimadomo, J. (). ‘Real-time Data and Fiscal Policy Analysis: A Survey of the Literature’. European Central Bank Working Paper . European Commission (). General Government Data, Autumn. Directorate General ECFIN, Economic and Financial Affairs. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission (). ‘The ESM Stability Support Programme: Greece, First & Second Reviews.’ European Economy Institutional Paper . Brussels: European Commission. European Commission (). ‘Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU- member States’. Brussels: European Commission. European Court of Auditors (). ‘The Commission’s Intervention in the Greek Financial Crisis. Special Report No ’. Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors.

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     



Eurostat (). ‘Progress Report by Eurostat on the revision of the Greek government deficit and debt figures.’  November. Luxembourg: Eurostat. Eurostat (). ‘New Decision of Eurostat on Deficit and Debt: Recording of Military Equipment Expenditure’. Eurostat News Release /,  March. Luxembourg: Eurostat. Featherstone, K. (). Greece and EMU: A Suitable Accommodation? In Dyson, K. (ed.) The Euro at Ten. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Frankel, J. A. (). ‘A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile’. NBER Working Paper ,. Hardouvelis, G., Sabaniotis, T., and Davradakis, E. (). ‘The State Budget and Deviations in its Implementation’. Economy and Markets, Eurobank Research, : –. Hawkesworth, I., Bergvall, D., Emery, R., and Wehner, J. (). ‘Budgeting in Greece’. OECD Journal of Budgeting,  (): –. International Monetary Fund (). ‘Greece: Staff Report on Request for Stand-by Arrangement’. Country Report No. /. Washington DC: IMF. Kaplanoglou, G. and Rapanos, V. T. (). ‘The Greek Fiscal Crisis and the Role of Fiscal Governance’. Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe . London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Kaplanoglou, G. and Rapanos, V. T. (a). ‘Tax and Trust: The Fiscal Crisis in Greece’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Kaplanoglou, G. and Rapanos, V. T. (b). ‘Fiscal Deficits and the Role of Fiscal Governance: The Case of Greece’. Economic Analysis and Policy,  (): –. Koliopoulos, J. S. and Veremis, T. M. (). Modern Greece: A History Since . UK: John Wiley & Sons. Koole, R. (). ‘Greece, European Democracy and the Legitimacy of Politics’. Social Europe,  April. Available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/greece-europe-legitimacypolitics. Ladi, S. (). ‘The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics: A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece?’ Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe . London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Mair, P. (). ‘Representative versus Responsible Government’. MPIfG Working Paper / . Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. Miliakou, S., Pappa, A., Tetorou, K., and Tserkezis, E. (). Greece: Recent Developments in Public Financial Management. Athens: Ministry of Finance, General Accounting Office, General Secretariat for Fiscal Policy. Monogios, Y., Nitsi, E. I., Anastassakou, J. N., Cholezas, I., Kanellopoulos, N. C., Karagiannis, R., Konstantakopoulou, I., Lychnaras, V., and Tsekeris, Th. (). ‘General Government Spending Review, –: An Analysis Framework for Future Spending Reviews in Greece’. Athens: Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE). Mylonas, P., Magginas, N., and Pateli, E. (). What are the Margins for Increasing PIT Revenue in the Greek Economy? Monthly Macroeconomic Outlook. Athens: Strategy and Economic Research Division, National Bank of Greece. OECD (). Government at a Glance . Paris: OECD Publishing. OECD (). Recommendation of the Council on Budgetary Governance. Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, Paris: OECD Publishing. OECD (). Government at a Glance . Paris: OECD Publishing.

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 .    

Offe, C. (). ‘Europe Entrapped. Does the EU Have the Political Capacity to Overcome its Current Crisis?’ European Law Journal,  (): –. Pina, A. and Venes, N. (). ‘The Political Economy of EDP Fiscal Forecasts: An Empirical Assessment’. European Journal of Political Economy, : –. Rapanos, V. T. (). Σύνταξη και εκτέλεση του κρατικού προϋπολογισμού: Ευρωπαϊκή εμπειρία και η ελληνική πραγματικότητα [Government Budget Procedures: Weaknesses of the Present System and Proposals for Reform]. Athens: Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research. Spanou, C. (). ‘European Integration in Administrative Terms: A Framework for Analysis and the Greek Case’. Journal of European Public Policy  (): –. Sutherland, S., Price, R., Journard, I., and Nicq, C. (). ‘Performance Indicators for Public Spending Efficiency in Primary and Secondary Education’. Economics Department’. Working Paper . Paris: OECD Publishing. Thomadakis, S. (). The Greek Economy: Performance, Expectations and Paradoxes’. In Allison, G. and Nicolaidis, K. (eds.) The Greek Paradox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, –. Tsakalotos, E. (). ‘The Political Economy of Social Democratic Policies: The PASOK Experiment in Greece’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,  (): –. Vraniali, E. (). ‘Rethinking Public Financial Management and Budgeting in Greece: Time to Reboot?’ Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, . London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Wehner, J. (). ‘Assessing the Power of the Purse’. In Stapenhurst, R., Pelizzo, R., Olson, M., and von Trapp, L. (eds.) Legislative Oversight and Budgeting. Washington, DC: World Bank, –.

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        ......................................................................................................................

                  

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T and again, pensions have played a pivotal role in the Greek political economy. They can explain why Greece entered the crisis, why it took so long to exit, and why economic prospects are still undermined. Pensions dysfunctions dominated in the past, continue in the present, and will do so in the future. This chapter will concentrate on the ‘big picture’ to explain why pensions in Greece led to failure and what this means for both the economy and society. How did pensions fail? Meaningful reform stalled between  and . In , the head of the General Confederation of Unions justified delay, as pensions were guaranteed, arguing that ‘Social insurance will collapse after the State Budget and the economy’ (quoted in Paleologos, : ). He was right. The cost of that guarantee, state borrowing to finance pension grants given between  and , accounted for  per cent of the increase in national debt; it was chiefly to blame for the eventual fiscal collapse, a virtual bankruptcy (Giannitsis, : –). In the course of the bankruptcy, pension entitlements– past, present, and future—were subjected to deep ‘haircuts’. Pensions failed in macro terms, as they brought about bankruptcy; they also failed in micro terms, for reneging on individual longevity contracts. Why, then, did pensions fail? Two common explanations can be dismissed as facile. One such is that disaster was due to the absence of reform. Yet, political economy after  is punctuated by reforms, each ‘tackling the problem decisively’ and certainly succeeding in disrupting political life. Another explanation points to idiosyncrasies of the Greek pension system. Yet its building blocks are not unique. The riddle is how familiar pension structures proved, in Greece, disastrous. This chapter starts by tackling those paradoxes. The Greek system managed to combine innocuous components in a toxic fashion. A mixing of narratives favoured fragmentation, and hence, ‘second best politics’—levering pensions to solve short-term clientelistic problems. The next section speculates on the structural implications of

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

 

these drivers for societal actors and for political economy. These explain pre-crisis reforms—‘Talk without Action’. The insertion in the bailout of an activist but silent player, the Troika (the agent of the IMF, EU Commission and the European Central Bank), was enough to reverse this into ‘Action without Talk’. The final section examines whether the outcome of this gestation, the pension system in place in , can overcome the curse of path dependence. The final section speculates on looming issues.

. ‘M  M’— T L  P

.................................................................................................................................. Pension challenges proceed glacially, unfolding over decades, but periodically erupting to shake up expectations. Table . shows how the pension problem compounded demographic developments after  and led to the face-off in . It also casts doubt on the ‘no reform’ claim. This may have been true for the s, until the – stabilization, which addressed mounting deficits by consolidating existing pensions and a new system for labour entrants after . Those attempts set the template for what pension reform meant for current politics: major confrontations lasting weeks, in which political and economic life was suspended. The near certainty of face-offs discouraged discussions between reform episodes, giving rise to the syncopated rhythm of ‘reform by instalments’ (Tinios, ). Such disruptions featured in the aborted ‘Giannitsis reform’ of , the much milder ‘Reppas reform’ of , and even during the cosmetic ‘Pallis reform’ of ; reactions were seemingly unrelated to the content of proposals. The ‘Talk without action’ of the pre-crisis decade did not constrain expenditure, which rose beyond what could be justified by demography, reaching almost  per cent of GDP in . After that, governments of all hues, acting at all times under protest, delivered a new pension system in a confused process spanning three bailouts (the ‘Action without Talk’). The dozen (or so) pension cuts could not prevent the rise of expenditure, which peaked at almost  per cent in  (Panageas and Tinios, ). We see from the timeline in Table . that pension reform did occur at regular intervals. We cannot blame its absence, but its fecklessness. This, in its turn, is one more effect of the logic of Greek pensions—of a dysfunctional pension system. Pensions act as bridges over difficult technical terrain. Designing pension systems means endowing them with safeguards to overcome predictable temptations. Countries with similar systems delivered. Greece did not. The Greek pension system is composed of providers catering to different groups of the population; these sub-systems were introduced at different times to serve different primary aims and were financed in different ways. Pensions can reward employment, can act as savings, or be awarded as social policy. These three modes of understanding follow different organizing ‘logics’ (Börsch-Supan and Tinios, ). First, in the civil service, pensions were a prolongation of employment. The logic entails pension rights ‘earned’ by service and not by contributions. The employers’ side

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     



Table 31.1 Periodization of the pension challenge and of pension reforms 1970–2020 People 65 + as % of total*

Pensions as % of GDP*

Decade

Description

Pension Reforms

-1970

Prehistory

IKA refounded (1951) and spreads gradually. First deficit 1958

1980s

Problem insulated but spreading

Deficits become endemic. Simitis stabilization programme 1985–7 fails to include pension structural reform. Government grants to pension providers

13.1

6.2

1990s

Half a reform at the start; preparation for other half

ND Reform. Souflias (1990), Sioufas (1992). ‘New’ system for post-1992 labour market entrants. Last contribution increase. Spraos Committee suggests that system will collapse by 2007 without reform. Ignored

13.7

10.7

2000s

Ineffective repeated reforms

Attempt by Giannitsis (2001) withdrawn after protests. Reppas Law (2002) milder. ‘Quasi-Reform’ 2008 (Palli-Petralia)

16.5

10.9

2010s

Reform under protest

Three Bailouts. Four reform bills under five governments and 12+ pension cuts

18.9

14.8

21.3 (2016)

17.7 (2016)

2020s

Reform at last?

New unified system. Is it fit for purpose?

21.4**

13.4**

* Value at beginning of decade ** projections for 2020 from EPC 2018 Source: data Eurostat and Tinios 2010 (before 1990)

of the bargain was to finance claims and to underwrite shortfalls. Pensions were paid by the Ministry of Finance, together with salaries—irrespective of actuarial factors, thus encouraging dispersion in entitlements. These arrangements were copied by public enterprises and banks: employees enjoyed civil-service type entitlements, while employers shifted the cost to consumers. Second, private sector pensions resulted from social insurance, following a logic of life cycle saving, stressing reciprocity, as rewards for earlier sacrifice. Though financed by a ‘pay-as-you-go’ (PAYG) system, the link between entitlements and contributions

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

 

was emphasized with frequent references to a ‘social insurance contract’. To legitimize contributions as more than a payroll tax, language was borrowed from prefunded pensions: ‘Pensions as our own money’. The Institution for Social Insurance, known by its acronym IKA (Ίδρυμα Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων), was founded in  for employees, and its coverage spread gradually, eventually covering settlements larger than , inhabitants. IKA pensions were calculated to replace final salaries; in technical terms it was a defined benefit, final salary system. The providers for the self-employed and small business owners also applied social insurance, but with differences. First, in the system of ‘insurance classes’, only the lowest was obligatory: department stores or kiosks paid the same. Second, as there was no employer, the consumer was targeted. A proportion of all sales taxes subsidized selfemployed pensions. After the introduction of VAT in , this was converted into a grant. Clearly, the idea of a state role to finance pensions was present early on. Third, the rural sector was covered by social pensions, serving a logic of need. Low flat-rate pensions, financed from the central budget, were granted to all at age . From the early s, old people with no other pension and who met a means test could receive that pension. How did the three systems treat women? In the civil service, differentially easy access, for example, pensions after fifteen years’ work with no age conditions, translated into low pensions. In social insurance, women lost out through incomplete or interrupted careers. Many women had to make do with derived rights, namely supplements to spouse’s pension or a survivor’s pension. Low retirement ages for women were understood as belated rewards for greater burdens, not as affirmations of their subordinate role. The side effects of systematically wide pension and coverage gender gaps (Betti et al., ) were simply ignored. Table . gives an idea of the key characteristics of providers following different logics, focussing on their relative size, cost, generosity, and retirement behaviour for the two genders. The coincidence of pensions following different logics in the same country is not unique. Each subsystem can be motivated by a different original purpose, yet the system can still function effectively. The members of the Holy Trinity are distinct, yet there is but one God. However, coexistence needs demarcation and synergy rules— a grammar for communication, especially where systems come into contact. In Greece, the dominant logic was supposed to be social insurance. IKA was designed as the ‘pole of attraction’; all other providers were to have been gradually absorbed to lead to a unitary system (Tinios, a). The organizing principle was reciprocity, which lay behind the ‘insurance mentality’: larger entitlements should reflect greater effort, with any departures clearly justified. It was not to be. Whereas the insurance mentality was ritually defended, it was frequently eclipsed by selective use of narratives from other paradigms. Governments appealed to either employment remuneration or need (social policy) to buy influence. So, rather than the system consolidating towards a social insurance pole, it moved in the opposite direction, as privileged groups cashed their influence to gain entitlements.

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     



Table 31.2 Key indicators for primary providers following different ‘logics’, 2008 Primary providers

A. Insurance** B. Employment** C. Social

Population (In millions)

Expenditure (in % of GDP)

Per cent already retired in age group*

Actives

Pensioners

Pensions

Grants***

M 55–59

F 50–54

2.84 0.50 0.72

1.34 0.45 0.85

5.2 3.7 2.2

2.6 2.0 2.4

27.5 37.6 3.1

24.0 29.8 6.5

* as a per cent of people in the labour force plus pensioners; Social includes self-employed ** Insurance (A) includes IKA, seamen, professions; Employment (B) Civil service, public enterprises; Social (C) Farmers + indigent uninsured *** Grants include cost of civil pensions minus own contributions Source: Tinios 2010: 258, 357

In this way, fragmentation quickly became the hallmark of Greek pensions. ‘Vertical’ fragmentation, affecting all types of pensions, involved the disaffiliation of occupations from the general system. ‘Horizontal’ fragmentation, by kind of benefit, involved adding new layers of pension protection (Panageas and Tinios, ). The next section examines what form these privileges could take. The force behind pension dysfunctions was the mixing of pension narratives, using a logic for one paradigm to argue for changes in another. This entrenched pension misunderstandings and misperceptions as organic pillars of clientelistic politics. This often enabled sidestepping, rather than solving, issues. The ‘second best politics’ that emerged solved immediate problems by creating others, which would ‘only’ need to be faced in the future. In the meantime, unless an external restraint operated, the pension problem would quietly snowball. With hindsight, we know that this process was only stopped after the bailout. It is instructive to consider how the external context influenced the evolution of these second-best politics. In the early part of the period, external conditions insulated pension politics, allowing the pursuit of internal contradictions. In immature systems, current finances are healthier than future ones; so long as no projections were made, current surpluses could be spent (Börsch-Supan and Tinios, ). Greece’s demography was marked by a late and spread-out baby boom, which postponed pressures to the s. Rural–urban migration up to the s also helped: migrants contributed immediately but entitlements matured much later. The economy was characterized by dualism: public/private; small/large business; insiders/outsiders (Burtless, ). These translated into differences in entitlements and finance. If privileges were not emulated by larger groups, they posed no financing problems; hiding within larger aggregates also helped. So, it became imperative that social policy did not pose fiscal competition to pensions.

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

 

Thus, external conditions encouraged a dual social protection system, where formal solidarity was dominated by the state, while implicitly assigning the role of social backstop to the family. In such a two-speed system, pension adequacy and poverty prevention were likely victims (Lyberaki and Tinios, ). The dual system was initially strengthened by the main preoccupation of the s—inflation. In the early years, the absence of indexation meant that pensions lagged behind revenue, and further clouded the structural origins of financial issues. This gradually changed, as protecting low-income pensioners entered the discussion. The stage was set for a fateful decision, the rapid rise of minimum pensions between  and . Pension minima expressed as multiples of the minimum wage were raised from under ten in  to twenty-one days’ minimum pay in ; minimum wages were also dramatically raised, notably in . Expenditures rose, leading to a large cash shortfall. An IKA balance in  turned into a deficit of  per cent of GDP in , peaking at . per cent by , over half of total revenue for that provider. Pension politics entered the fiscal ‘radar screen’ in the mid-s, never to leave since. However, the s pushed back the eventual showdown: immigration added a million workers to the labour force, while eurozone entry facilitated cheap borrowing. While the external environment was changing, the system’s internal logic could only operate if there were enabling factors, or, equivalently, if warning bells were neutralized. Foremost among such factors are finances. For pensions to be used as political levers, the budget constraint must be sidestepped. A group will value a ‘privilege’, only if it can send the bill elsewhere. Mixing narratives provided an easy answer: a fragmenting system generates immediate revenue but leads to extra expenditure only in the future; in a sense the system remains in a state of actuarial immaturity. It can spend cash surpluses, unbothered by looming future deficits. Burdens could be shifted within generations through cross-subsidies. Tied taxes, known as ‘social contributions’, were assigned to specific pension providers. Oligopolists underwriting deficits burdened consumers. Shifting between generations was on a grander scale. As ‘democratization’ spread in the s, privileges were extended to wider groups. The possibility of securing benefits at the expense of distant others is present in all pension systems, especially those financed by PAYG. Open scrutiny and regular actuarial reviews is how pension governance can prevent that. Though Greek law required the use of such studies, it was ignored. Even current information on operating accounts was only published patchily. Long before the  ‘Greek statistics’ episode, concerning Greece’s compliance with the fiscal rules of the eurozone, the imprecision, insufficiency, or nonexistence of social insurance data ensured alarm bells were silenced. Rationality could also help prevent economic side effects. Payroll taxes, for instance, hurt competitiveness by cascading into the prices of exports. Similarly, a fragmented system discourages labour mobility. However, these and other issues were ‘solved’ through selective (non)application of regulations. This could be tacit (as for SMEs) or open (formal exemptions). So long as labour was moving towards more

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     



generous pension providers, that is, towards the public sector, there was no problem for individuals. Another possible counterweight that could have favoured clarity, that is, pressure from private pensions, was totally absent. Private pensions were the matter of a few thousands of life policies, while the insurance industry, fragmented and dominated by public firms, was passive (Tinios, ). Recapitulating, the key to pension dysfunctions was the use of instruments for inappropriate purposes, contravening the ‘users’ manual’. Their persistence would give rise to two reactions, dealt with in the two following sections. (a) structural features resulting from the contradictions (b) pension reforms attempting to temper the contradictions.

. S I  P D

.................................................................................................................................. The Greek pension system is often seen as a ‘museum of idiosyncrasies’. Many of these can be explained as coping mechanisms, creating areas for give and take in clientelistic transactions. This section examines the implications for individuals, collective actors and social policy.

.. Pensions and Sectional Politics Social insurance sits easily with corporatism. The dual nature of the labour market— where relatively small groups of insiders enjoyed high employment protection, denied to a larger number of ‘outsiders’, was the driving force behind differentiation (Lyberaki et al., ). Social insurance applies general rules; clientelism abhors them. This contradiction was met by fragmenting the interpretation of the laws. The result was a confusing agglomeration of legal texts and administrative instruments, requiring expert assistance to navigate. Privileges could be secured within larger pension providers. Special treatment could be sought in contributions, but also in retirement ages, replacement rates, or other dimensions. Once a privilege was awarded, ‘equalization upwards’ spread it wider. One prize was to be classed as having a ‘heavy and unhygienic occupation’, justifying earlier retirement. This was originally granted to miners, on the grounds of lower life expectancy, but was expanded to cover  per cent of all pension awards. Hairdressers are an example; church cantors suffered mental anguish due to exposure to funerals. In time, the rule became the exception: in IKA only  per cent of pension applicants used the ‘rule’ on retirement age, while  per cent exploited one of many favourable ‘exceptions’ (Tinios, ).

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 

Special treatment could also take place between organizations. Some banks and public enterprises disaffiliated, mimicking civil service entitlements. Differentiation could also result by inventing layers of provision. Employees after  became entitled to ‘auxiliary pensions’ (also translated as ‘supplementary’). These were indistinguishable in economic terms from primary pensions: mandatory, PAYG, final salary provided by state bodies. The difference lay in that greater fragmentation meant more opportunities for preferential treatment (Panageas and Tinios, ). In these ingenuous ways, current sectional privileges were transformed to future liabilities. These went from beneficiaries to pension providers, and thence to the general tax payer through government grants. The buck did not stop there; the bill, through government borrowing, was sent to the next generation. In a table set for three, the two generations present at the table ordered, safe in the knowledge that the bill would be sent to those yet to arrive.

.. Pension Governance, Trade Unions and Individuals The system was difficult to navigate. It was important to have access to a facilitator, an insider to smooth the way. That was the essence of the clientelistic system—roles for insiders whose connections could deliver results. This influence was employed by elected officials to weave webs of patronage. A privileged role was reserved for trade unions. Through their membership on boards and committees (e.g. for disability pensions), unions could exert influence at the individual level. Fragmentation multiplied points of contact and amplified the influence of even small unions. Unions saw the preservation of the system as key to their power. In social insurance, it is not uncommon for them to act as system guardians. However, in Greece this was interpreted as preserving and expanding rights for immediate members only. Unions implicitly saw themselves as bargaining with the state, showing a preference for subsidies from the general public. Their contention was that pension entitlements should always be increased. What had to be found was additional revenue; if that was not forthcoming from employers, it had better come from the state. Unions, therefore, eagerly took on the mantle of protector of rights. As the only associations of any size were in the public sector and utilities, their advocacy was not tempered by actuarial considerations. It was also less divisive to focus on the state, while improving current entitlements would secure popularity. Unions used the misunderstandings in ambivalent narratives skilfully to assume the role of vox populi in discussions. Indeed, studies of how public opinion was formed showed that the message was getting across (O’Donnell and Tinios, ). Trade unionists spearheaded the opposition to the  proposals. The withdrawal of these proposals was a major success, the vindication of the hard line leading to the rejuvenation of their influence (Giannitsis, ). Unionists were intensely aware of how their power was tied to pensions, and acted to make pensions the ‘sacred cow’ of Greek

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     



structural reform. The Unions’ Labour Institute was active in promoting research on pensions, and built a privileged position with the mass media; its pre-eminence was used more to project union views, rather than to shape them (e.g. Rombolis, ). Where did that leave social policy? If pensions were primarily clientelistic instruments, then social policy would take the back seat. If privileged groups were successful, we would be more likely to follow the Evangelist Matthew, and see rewards bestowed on those who hath, rather than on those who hath not. We saw, however, that inflation from the mid-s raised awareness of social issues. In the absence of quantification, ‘social issues’ became associated with certain parameters, which, absent more meaningful measures, served as badges for ‘social conscience’. When the focus turned to low pensions in the late s, the minimum pension of IKA acquired totemic significance. Raising the minimum was the quickest way to help low-income pensioners—a crucial ‘social conscience’ test. This was popular, but totally undermined reciprocity in the pension system. The rapid rise of the minimum pension after  ‘censored’ pension amounts lower than that, leading to two-thirds of all IKA pensioners collecting the minimum pension. Thus, IKA was financed as social insurance, whereas it gave out for the majority a social pension. Whether contributors had worked for fifteen or for twenty-three years, they received the same amount. Moreover, the sooner they left work, the better: the money would be the same. The structural reasons behind low pensions—short careers—were exacerbated. That such a pension system would promote inequality was always suspected. That supposition was conclusively borne out from the mid-s with the publication of EUwide poverty data. Despite the high share of pensions in GDP, pensioners and the old were at much greater risk of poverty than all others. Far from pensions correcting labour market inequality at older ages, they made it worse (Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, ).

. ‘W  A’— P-C P R

.................................................................................................................................. From the start, Greek pensions were a work in progress. As the system spread, it was to curtail early generosity (known as ‘grandfathering’) by tightening eligibility. However, rather than consolidating, the system moved in the opposite direction. The first current deficit was experienced in , when an official report warned of ‘the extreme urgency of pension reform’ (quoted in Tinios, ), but was then ignored. As reform was postponed, danger signs multiplied. It was significant that, after a point, warnings came increasingly from outside the system. Fragmentation indirectly limited internal financing: one provider’s surplus could not cover the deficit of another. So, top-ups were sought from the state, even as some providers were still accumulating property. As internally generated finance was exhausted by the s, growing deficits were initially financed by loans from state-owned banks on commercial terms. These

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

 

loans were rolled over and rapidly snowballed. The decision during the stabilization programme of  to replace them with government grants, ushered in the Ministry of Economy, perhaps unwittingly, as the key pension politics player arguing for reform. The Ministry of Economy exercised that role in a light-handed fashion: the  adjustment programme excluded pensions from retrenchment. In exchange, a raft of ‘structural’ measures should have been proposed. They were never delivered, and their formulation was passed on to the next government’s stabilization programme in . Though the – reforms were the most potent change since the s, they introduced themselves as only half of a reform, emergency measures to pave the way for a systemic restructuring to come later. They set a template for reforms to follow. It was composed of five components: (a) legacy cost was reduced by compressing existing pensions; real pensions fell by  per cent, through incomplete indexation; (b) privileges were curtailed, but incumbents were protected; (c) a new system of entitlements was to apply for entrants after ; (d) contributions were not increased: there were only selected rises for small providers facing pressing needs; and, (e) organizational consolidation was largely absent. The story of reforms since  is essentially the tale of repeated attempts to provide the missing structural half. While structural problems were pulling system performance downwards and the necessary grants were pushing its cost upwards, there was, at least in the technocracy and the upper echelons of the government, a sense of unfinished business—even while at lower levels life continued as usual (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). So, it is not true that there was no pension reform. There was a ‘shadow’, ongoing pension reform, drawing from a stock of unchanging ideas. What was at issue was the implementation speed: the direction and general shape of the reform were not doubted (Tinios, ). The Ministry of Finance thought contribution rates were too high, so the shadow reform would have centred on entitlement consolidation. In consequence, as fixing structures was always ‘round the corner’, some bridging finance was (regrettably) necessary. This had the implication that, as deficits grew, all extra finance required came from direct grants. This was the mechanism through which the structural pension problem stoked the looming public finance crisis (Panageas and Tinios, ). Pension reform discussions were thus trapped in path dependence—the inability to break out of existing modes of thinking. The syncopated nature of discussions where reform was always ‘forced’ meant that there was never time for reflection. The independent ‘Spraos Committee’ tried to break out of this impasse, offering in  ‘a contribution to the public debate’. It introduced larger issues on ageing and argued for systemic change, including pre-funding. Confronted with the size of the public reaction, opinion leaders in political parties and social partners underwent a kind of vertigo, denouncing the Committee for daring to open issues best not discussed (Featherstone et al., ). The take-home message from that episode was that pension reform should be administered only in homeopathic (‘parametric’) doses. Leaving work for later, these modest reforms would address as much of the problem as was politically feasible.

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     



This lesson was reinforced in the next serious attempt at reform by Minister Tassos Giannitsis in . The driver was an actuarial evaluation compiled by the UK Government Actuary’s Department. Their projections, when submitted to the EU Ageing Working Group (AWG), showed pensions expenditure doubling by  to . per cent of GDP, the worst deterioration in the EU, where the equivalent figure was . per cent (EPC, ). Notwithstanding this, the reform used quantification as a backdrop, to argue its proposals were mild in comparison to what was appropriate. Even that proved futile. Pressured by a wave of strikes and the threat of parliamentary mutiny, the government withdrew and resubmitted a far milder set in the  ‘Reppas reform’. The rest of the s saw subsidies growing, financed up to  by external borrowing at low eurozone rates. Many thought this confirmed that talk about the urgency of change could be contained, their view consistent with the wisdom of ‘reform by instalments’. Thus, Greece was the only country not to compile pensions projections for the  AWG exercise; in preparing a reform in , projections were commissioned but never used. Few were surprised when the  (‘Pallis’) reform concentrated on cosmetic organizational changes—consolidating the ‘name on the door’ of pension providers but leaving everything else untouched. Convinced its overall strategy was sound, the government reacted to the onset of the financial crisis in / in traditional fashion by raising military and civil service pensions, which therefore played a role in the explosion of deficits in . The fact that through the Open Method of Coordination the operation and prospects of Greek pensions were by then familiar territory to the EU ensured that pensions would be prominent on the creditors’ bailout agenda (Tinios, b). Thus, the scene shifted from ‘Words without Action’ to ‘Action without Words’.

. ‘A W W’ B-E P R

.................................................................................................................................. The bailout meant a change in the rules. The Troika, a villain everyone happily blamed, forced the pace by introducing a ‘hard’ budget constraint for pension expenditure. The twin characteristics of the period, urgency and blame avoidance, meant that reform took shape in confused steps between  and  (Table .). Pensions in July  inaugurated the bailout reforms. There followed at least four other major pension laws, spread over three bailouts and voted on amid mutual recriminations by five governments formed by permutations of five political parties. More than a dozen nominal cuts to pensions, all presented as short-term fiscal fixes, formed the key ingredient. Ironically, the government elected to overturn the reforms was instead the one to complete them by applying them retroactively to all generations, old and new. Fittingly, pensions are providing the bailout afterword: backtracking on reform details started by postponing cuts to  and went on to contributions of the self employed and survivors pensions.

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

 

Table 31.3 Bailout era pension changes Bailout

Date

Action

July 2010 First bailout May 2010–May 2012 2011

Pension law 3863/10 is first bailout law. New system for all work supplied after 2011; increase in pension ages to 65; incumbents protected Implementation laws, including Disability, Heavy and Hazardous Occupations. Early retirement builds up. Pension cuts

Second Bailout May 2012 – February 2015

Supreme Court decides pension cuts before 2012 constitutional Further rises of retirement ages to 67. Major cuts in pensions. Law governing auxiliary pensions introduces ‘zero deficit clause’ Zero deficit clause leads to 5.2 per cent cuts to auxiliary pensions ND/PASOK government neglects to issue first ‘new pensions’

2012 2012

2014 Dec 2014 Gap: ‘Negotiations’ February–July 2015

Jan 2015

Third Bailout

July 2015

August 2015 – August 2018

May 2016

Mar 2015

May 2017 Dec 2018 May 2019

Anti-austerity government committed to overturn pension changes, make up for cuts. Implementation halts Supreme Court decides pension cuts after 2012 unconstitutional Retirement ages rise with immediate effect; health contributions rise ‘New System’ enforced on all new pension applications. All pensions to be recalibrated; excess to be abolished gradually Excess to be abolished in Jan 2019. Indexation suspended until 2022 Gradual abolition after 2022 replaces immediate 2019 cut Supreme court rules recalibration is constitutional Feb 2020 Some bailout changes rescinded

The situation in hindsight is simpler than the tortuous process that created it (Panageas and Tinios, ; Stergiou, ). The new pension arrangements consisted of two ingredients: a new state-run system and a recalibration of the level of pensions to reduce them below their levels in . The new system had four structural features: a. A new two-tier defined benefit system to apply to all—even retroactively to existing pensioners. All with a record of fifteen years’ contribution would be entitled to a national pension of €–. To this would be added an accrual rate proportional to career. A forty-year career leads to around  per cent earnings replacement for low earners, which is high by EU standards. Top earners would be hurt by a low pension ceiling. b. All categories of income would be treated as if they were earned by employees. The same combined percentage-contribution would be levied on the selfemployed, who had hitherto been subject to a system of insurance classes.

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     



c. Retirement ages applicable to everyone not able to retire by May  were raised to  years and  years for long service. This meant step increases of up to seventeen years, mainly for women. d. All separate primary pension providers, including the civil service and military, were consolidated from  into a single provider, with the exception of auxiliary pensions. Most pension reforms introduce new arrangements gradually with long periods of forewarning; their cash impact is felt only in the long term. This was not an option for Greece. There was an immediate cash shortage to address, while state bankruptcy meant that there was no guarantor. Pension changes had to deliver cash savings quickly, which could happen only if existing pensions were affected. This practical consideration inevitably generated arguments concerning how to spread the cost between generations. The country proved to be a quarter less affluent than was believed; the new reality confronted everyone equally. However, while private-sector remuneration adjusted ‘automatically’, pensions which reflected precrisis incomes could only be changed by administrative act. Intergenerational equity could thus provide strong arguments for pension adjustment. However, such a reassessment would have needed to revisit repeated past assurances that ‘pensions were safe for the long term’. Unfortunately, no party was brave enough for that measure of self-criticism. As a result, pension cuts were justified instead as capitulations to demands from the Troika and were imposed according to only one criterion, namely the size of the pension. Cuts were repeatedly made, with higher pensions losing over  per cent of their value. Lower pensions, by contrast, were mainly affected by the abolition of holiday bonuses, which meant a  per cent annual reduction. The selective incidence of cuts meant pensioner poverty was more than halved over the crisis. It also meant that long contributions were penalized and a history of contribution evasion rewarded (Panageas and Tinios, ). A vicious cycle was repeated in the first two bailouts. The Troika demanded fiscal results, while the government attempted to protect those close to retirement, thus increasing the pay-offs to retiring early. Waves of early retirements, combined with drops in revenue, led to ‘unexpected’ cash shortfalls. These shortfalls were addressed in two ways: first by cutting pensions, as the largest expenditure item under direct control and, second, by new laws extending the application of the new system. While the usual practice is to legislate for new entrants only, the  law applied new rules to all work supplied after . In , new rules were fully applied to all new pension applications; existing pensions, including survivors’, were also to be recalibrated according to new rules by  and any excess gradually abolished. In this way, the new rules now apply to all system participants, young and old. As could have been expected, cutting pensions met with judicial obstacles. The top administrative court decided that the cuts of December  were warranted constitutionally on the grounds of fiscal exigency. In , however, the court reversed itself,

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

 

judging that post- cuts were insufficiently justified, hence unconstitutional. The idea of recalibrating the old pensions of the  law was introduced to comply with the court decision, but still avoided reversing the pre- cuts, even if the government voting it was elected to do the opposite. This aspect of the  law was deemed constitutional in , after a long deliberation. However, courts are to decide in  on the exact date when the original constitutional deficiency was corrected, and hence on the financial restitution that pensioners must receive; the fiscal implications of this, seemingly arcane, decision range from a minimum of . per cent of GDP to more than  per cent. It is noteworthy that recalibration is to take entitlements approximately where they would have been had the original warnings been heeded in a timely fashion. It negates a generation’s worth of political assurances that entitlements were ‘safe’. Seen in the context of ageing, Greece ‘telescoped’ in the space of a few years social insurance adjustments which usually span a generation or more. Despite its confused introduction, the situation after  looks like a unitary system. Whilst changing many parameters, it retains key features, projecting existing logic. For example, it attempts to solve immediate cash shortfalls by devising new sources of revenue, delaying changes in structures where possible. Despite being imposed from outside, it refutes accusations of a ‘neoliberal agenda’ by retaining paternalism and distrust of private involvement in pensions. Hence it is easier to interpret the new system as a response to backward-looking criticisms, rather than as part of a forward- facing agenda (Panageas and Tinios, ). By comparison with European peers, the new system is: • Generous: pension replacement is at the top end of the EU. • Expensive: non-wage costs are high, especially for flexible work. • Rigid: little differentiation is allowed. Some groups are forced to over-insure to shore up the current pensions of salaried workers. • Statist: little room is left for non-state pensions. High replacement rates crowd out demand, while high contributions crowd out supply. The Greek people are asked to trust a newly legislated system which already looks like an anachronism: a monolithic state-run PAYG system transported from the s (Panageas and Tinios, ). Trust must overcome the heavy legacy of promises repeatedly broken, whilst generating much blame and little understanding.

. L A–A  C

.................................................................................................................................. Greece is exiting its bitter bailout with its original problem largely intact: the mountain of debt is no lower. The period to  will be marked by the necessity to subtract, each

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     



year, a sizeable portion of production to service national debt. The production process will have to pay for this, together with an extra portion to pay for pensions. Pension politics over the next decades is sure to be dominated by these competing claims (Nektarios et al., ). Demography takes a turn for the worse after  and does not improve until after . The bailout pension reform tried to meet this challenge by abruptly recalibrating existing pensions downwards, increasing contributions, and reducing future entitlements. Pension projections published in  embody optimistic expectations that the job is done (AWG, ). But is it? Greece over the crisis chose institutional continuity over systemic change. This raises some fundamental issues. The first concerns the collateral damage of a large state pension system on growth. Non-wage costs act as a disincentive for the return of the ‘brain-drain’ young people who emigrated after , while growth is impeded by a dearth of saving. The new pension system will be a factor behind anaemic growth. The second consideration has to do with the political durability of the changes. All sides agreed to blame pension cuts on the Troika. As demography increases the electoral weight of pensioners, pressures to reverse the recalibration of pensions will grow; examples of backtracking were evident already by . The third issue has to do with new social risks, borne of longevity, but also the changing ‘future of work’. s’ style paternalism is ill equipped to deal with such issues. Governments over the decades repeatedly boasted that they had conclusively solved the pension problem. If our analysis is correct, the latest version is no less wishful. The agenda remains full (Panageas and Tinios, ; Nektarios et al., ), thus prompting issues for future research. Would systemic change shake things up? Would multiple pension-system pillars, in particular, do the trick? How can intergenerational justice be served best? How can the pension system encourage new forms of work and the return of the large and still growing new diaspora? Could pensions encourage success, or are they doomed to promote failure? In attempting to preserve continuity, Greek society may have managed only to preserve the pension problem.

R Betti, G., Bettio, F., Georgiadis, T., and Tinios, P. (). Unequal Ageing in Europe: Women’s Independence and Pensions. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Börsch-Supan, A. and Tinios, P. (). The Greek Pensions System: Strategic Framework for Reform. Athens and Washington DC: Bank of Greece and Brookings Institution. Burtless, G. (). ‘The Greek Labour Market’. In Bryant, R. C., Garganas, N., and Tavlas, G. S. (eds.) Greece’s Economic Performance and Prospects. Athens and Washington DC: Bank of Greece and Brookings Institution, –. Economic Policy Committee (ΕPC) (). ‘ The Impact of Ageing Populations on Public Finances: Overview of Analysis Carried Out at EU Level and Proposals for a Future Work Programme’. Available at: https://europa.eu/epc/sites/default/files/docs/pages/pensionmaster_ en.pdf (accessed  February )

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

 

Economic Policy Committee (ΕPC) (). ‘The  Ageing Report Economic & Budgetary Projections for the  EU Member States (–)’. European Economy, Institutional Paper , Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economyfinance/ip_en.pdf/ (accessed  January ) Featherstone, K., Kazamias, G. and Papadimitriou, D. (). ‘The Limits of External Empowerment: EMU, Technocracy and the Reform of the Greek Pension System’. Political Studies  (): –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). The Limits of Europeanization. Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Giannitsis, T. (). Το ασφαλιστικό και η κρίση [The Pension System and Crisis] Athens: Polis. Lyberaki A. and Tinios, P. (). ‘The Informal Welfare State and the Family: Invisible Actors in the Greek Drama’. Political Studies Review, : –. Lyberaki, A., Meghir, C., and Nicolitsas, D. (). ‘Labor Market Regulation and Reform in Greece’. In Meghir, C., Pissarides, C. A., Vayanos, D., and Vettas, N. (eds.) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, –. Mitrakos, T. and Tsakloglou, P. (). ‘Inequality, Poverty and Material Well-Being: From  to the Current Crisis’. In Social Policy and Social Cohesion in Greece under Conditions of Economic Crisis. Athens: Bank of Greece, –. Nektarios, M., Tinios, P., and Symeonidis, G. (). Συντάξεις για νέους: ένα αναπτυξιακό σύστημα κοινωνικής ασφάλισης [Pensions for the Young: A Social Insurance System Focused on Growth]. Athens: Papazissis. O’Donnel, O. and Tinios, P. (). ‘The Politics of Pension Reform: Lessons from Public Attitudes in Greece’. Political Studies, : –. Paleologos, Y. (). The th Labour of Hercules. Inside the Greek Crisis. London: Portobello Books. Panageas, S. and Tinios, P. (). ‘Pensions: Arresting a Race to the Bottom’. In Meghir, C., Pissarides, C. A., Vayanos, D., and Vettas, N. (). (eds.) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, –. Rombolis, S. (). Οικονομική κρίση και κοινωνικό κράτος [Economic crisis and the welfare state]. Athens: Epikentro. Stergiou, A. (). Δίκαιο κοινωνικής ασφάλισης [Social Insurance Law]. Athens: Sakkoulas. Tinios, P. (). ‘Pension Reform in Greece: “Reform by Instalments” – A Blocked Process?’. West European Politics, : –. Tinios, P. (). [The Pension Problelm: A Method to Decipher]. Athens: Kritiki. Tinios, P. (a). The Pensions Merry-Go-Round: End of a Cycle?’ In Kalyvas, S., Pagoulatos, G., and Tsoukas, H. (eds.) From Stagnation to Forced Adjustment: Reforms in Greece –. London: Hurst and Company, –. Tinios, P. (b). ‘Pensions and the Lisbon Strategy’. In Papadimitriou, D. and Copeland, P. (eds.) The EU’s Lisbon Strategy: Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Tinios, P. (). ‘Off-the-Shelf Reforms and their Blind Spots: Pensions in Postmemorandum Greece’. In Karyotis, G and Gerodimos, R. (eds.) The Politics of Extreme Austerity: Greece in the Eurozone Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –.

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        ......................................................................................................................

          

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I the comparative literature, the Greek health-care system is considered a ‘sui generis case’ or even an ‘anomaly’ (Toth, : , ). Various streams of typological studies find it difficult to fit it into either the broadly used three-fold typology (Bismarckian social health insurance, Beveridgean tax-financed national health systems, and private health insurance), or the more detailed, deductive typologies relying on a range of ideal-type combinations of major actors (state, corporatist organizations, and market participants) in health-care funding, delivery, and regulation (Böhm et al., ). In this chapter, we examine major aspects of health politics and policy in Greece since the restoration of democracy in the mid-s. We highlight continuity and change by drawing upon a combination of analytical frameworks. The concepts of ‘path dependency’ (Wilsford, ) and ‘institutional layering’ (Thelen, ) are useful for conceptualizing how the national health system, introduced in , was accommodated within the pre-existing institutional setting. Equally important for identifying obstacles to or triggers of policy reform is Kingdon’s framework () of ‘windows of opportunity’ for change. We start with an account of the socio-economic and political factors that heavily marked the evolution of the Greek system as an ‘outlier’ regarding major health-care components. Then we briefly trace its origins and move on to examine the reform dynamics at key turning points. We also provide an overview of trends in funding, provision, and regulation. Our analysis shows that the current crisis has catalysed solutions beyond the system’s traditional path. This renders health care in Greece less distinctive and sets in place reforms oriented to more or less convergent policy measures in Europe (e.g. a declining state involvement, the increasing role of internal/external markets, the control of consumption volumes, etc.). Yet, worrying deterioration in access poses stark challenges ahead. In the conclusion, we stress the

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need for further research on the complex questions of equity, comprehensiveness, and fiscal sustainability.

. W  D   G H-C S?

.................................................................................................................................. The evolution of health care in Greece followed a similar path to those of other south European (SE) countries (Spain, Portugal, and Italy). In all four countries, compulsory health insurance was introduced in the early twentieth century along occupational lines, following the Bismarckian model. The similarities also extend to the timing of a significant paradigm shift in health care, from a Bismarckian to a National Health Service system. The transition took place between the late s and the mid-s in these four countries, and in three of them (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) the collapse of authoritarian regimes provided a critical juncture for the reform. Democratization and the rise to power for the first time, in the early s, of a party of the Centre-Left, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), created an exceptional political and institutional milieu that opened the way for this transition, in tandem with rising social spending (from  per cent of GDP in  to  per cent in ; Petmesidou : ). But soon the expansionary trend stalled as the economy faced serious fiscal constraints in the second half of the s, which were intensified when Greece embarked on the project to join the European Monetary Union after . Strained economic conditions seriously limited the resources for meeting the significant set-up costs of a universalist health system. Transformation remained incomplete, private health expenditure kept growing, and health care was stuck halfway between a highly fragmented Social Health Insurance (SHI) and a National Health Service (NHS) model. Following Thelen’s approach (), the  reform can be conceptualized as a policy-change process where a new ‘layer’ (universalist health care) is added onto an existing stable institutional framework (a splintered SHI system). Thelen underlines the potential of such a process, if taking place for a prolonged period, to ‘significantly alter the overall trajectory of an institution’s development’ (: ). Yet, in this case, the new institutional ‘layer’ hardly functioned as a trigger of wholesale reform in the medium to long term. Instead it produced a ‘disjointed’ pattern with a low degree of institutional coherence and with persistent path-dependent features. Some distinctive traits of sociopolitical integration and policy-making are crucial for explaining the incomplete path shift. A statist–clientelistic mode of sociopolitical organization has for a long time cultivated a highly conflictual political milieu. Extensive fragmentation of interests and a plethora of sociopolitical ‘veto’ points have played a major role in maintaining deep polarization and particularism in social protection. These conditions easily blocked consensus on long-term policy commitments

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   



(Petmesidou, : –). When PASOK rose to power in , its stance strongly reflected controversial dynamics. Drawing upon pent-up pressures for ‘change’ (Αλλαγή, PASOK’s dominant campaign slogan), it put forward an ambitious plan for establishing universal entitlement to health care and a fair distribution of health resources. However, at the same time, it amply strengthened a mode of sociopolitical integration through clientelistic exchanges underpinned by a populist rhetoric. These conditions hindered a modernization path towards rational–bureaucratic structures and universalist social citizenship values. They also highly contributed to the rapid increase of public debt (from  per cent of GDP in the early s to  per cent in the mid-s) and of the social funds’ deficits (Petmesidou, : , ). Significant deficiencies of public administration and planning are also among the main factors blocking reform. In particular, when the transition to a social democratic health-care system was initiated, historical precedents in social planning practice and machinery were rather weak. Close to thirty years after the establishment of the National Health System (ESY, Εθνικό Σύστημα Υγείας), the policy still faced serious deadlocks. Reform momentum subsided in the decade of the s. In the early s, an attempt by the then PASOK government to press through with reforms that would consolidate a universalist system and rationalize organizational structures and modes of coordination among the major actors (state, sickness funds, and private-market participants) blatantly failed. It took a major economic and financial crisis that engulfed the country and strong outside pressure by the international lenders (the European Commission [EC], the International Monetary Fund [IMF], and the European Central Bank [ECB]), under the three bailout packages Greece signed with them in –, for some major provisions of the ‘path shift’ introduced in  to be progressively materialized, though under harsh austerity conditions that greatly weakened public provision. It must be noted that, over the last few decades, health politics and policies across Europe manifested some convergent trends. Since the late s, when the golden age of welfare state expansion ended, state-led NHS and corporatist SHI systems came under strong pressure to contain costs and find efficient ways to operate with limited resources. This was the more so as demographic ageing and progress in medical technology tended to increase demand on scarce resources. Under the dominant neo-liberal mantra, individualization of risk, introduction of market competition, and the progressive retreat of the state largely influenced reforms. Furthermore, cross-national policy learning and policy diffusion, mostly in the context of the European Union (EU)’s soft law mechanisms (e.g. the guidelines and indicators of the Open Method of Coordination, benchmarking, and sharing of best practices) contributed to the integration of non-system specific and/or innovative elements in both of the above two main models of health care (Schmid et al., : ). In the following sections we briefly discuss health-care reform at key turning points since the restoration of democracy. We focus on some major questions. How far has change been driven by endogenous and/or exogenous pressures? Has it constituted a

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breakthrough or a stalled change? How is problem pressure mediated by major component factors of policy-making (such as organized interests and associated ‘veto’ points, ability/willingness of political agents to act, etc.) and how do these affect reform?

. H B

.................................................................................................................................. The historical origins of social insurance lie in the late nineteenth–early twentieth century when the first ‘mutual funds’ covering various categories of public employees were created (army officers, civil servants, employees of the National Bank of Greece, and others). This laid the ground for the development of a polymorphous coverage along the lines of Bismarckian social insurance, where different occupational groups are covered by distinct programmes varying considerably in funding and provisions. In the early s, the first law on compulsory health insurance was introduced with the establishment of the Social Insurance Fund (IKA, Ίδρυμα Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων) covering private-sector workers. Due to political instability, the law came into force in the late s. Yet a large part of the population in the rural areas (about  per cent) remained uninsured until  when the Social Security Fund for Farmers (OGA, Οργανισμός Αγροτικών Ασφαλίσεων) was created, providing pensions and basic medical care. The sociopolitical climate of the first decades after World War II and the Civil War that followed (–) hardly favoured the expansion of social citizenship rights. The rift between the political Left and Right remained deeply embedded in political culture, and clientelistic practices under the control of right-wing political forces prevailed. Rural to urban migration increased the ranks of the middle class mostly through the expansion of public employment and activities spanning across the private/public sector and the formal/informal economy divides. It is in the decades of the s and s that unequal distribution of privileges among social insurance funds were consolidated, leading to a more comprehensive coverage of a few groups of white-collar workers (mainly of the broader public sector). During the seven-year military dictatorship (–) and the subsequent rightwing administration of New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) in the second half of the s, the glaring deficiencies of health care indicated ‘a system in continuous crisis’ (Tountas et al., : ). In , an attempt by the health minister, Spyros Doxiades, of the ND government to introduce reforms met with the strong opposition of the medical profession and party cadres. Unpropitious external conditions, like the second oil shock in late s, further contributed to the abandonment of the reform plan (Mossialos and Allin, : ). By the early s there were about  social insurance funds, and eighty of these provided medical care. Two-thirds of the population were covered by the two major organizations, IKA and OGA. Yet per capita expenditure in OGA was almost half that of IKA, while in the ‘privileged’ funds of employees in public banks and other public

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   



companies it ranged between two to four times that of IKA (Tountas et al., : ). Between  and  health expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from . to ., roughly about half of it being private (out-of-pocket) spending (unless otherwise stated, all statistics are taken from the OECD webpages at http://stats.oecd.org/). From the s onwards, health politics and policy are punctuated by three major reform efforts: (a) the enactment of a national health system, a few years after the restoration of democracy; (b) an attempt to resume reform momentum towards system rationalization and integration at the turn of the century; and (c) crisis-driven reform under the stipulations of Greece’s bailout programmes.

. T I S   N H S   F R   T   C

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.. Process and Dynamics of Reform PASOK’s landslide victory in  created a propitious environment for expanding social welfare. The enactment of Law  of  constituted a landmark in health reform. It responded to constrained pressures around unmet needs in the previous decades. Its major provisions included the creation of uniform funding and administration by merging health insurance organizations into a single unit; entitlement linked to citizenship; the increase in public health spending and the gradual absorption of the private by the public sector; the development of primary care through a network of rural and urban health centres (κέντρα υγείας); the introduction of a referral system based on family doctors; de-concentration of decision-making with the establishment of regional health councils; full-time exclusive employment for ESY physicians; and, a more balanced distribution of health professionals and infrastructure in the country. However, a number of these provisions required further legal specifications in order to be materialized. Strong opposition by key stakeholders (private-practice physicians, as well as the social insurance funds and trade unions of employees in the broader public sector enjoying better coverage under the fragmented system) seriously impeded any further legislative and organizational activity required for the implementation of key provisions of Law . Soon, the reform changed course. Major aims, such as the vertical integration of primary and secondary care, the unification of health insurance funds, the standardization of the basket of services for the entire population, and the de-concentration of the system were abandoned. The reform turned out to be heavily oriented towards secondary care. Public hospital infrastructure was expanded, while the construction of new private hospitals/clinics was banned. The provision of full and

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exclusive employment in public hospitals was put in force and new recruitments were made. Undoubtedly, for a policy breakthrough to take place there needs to be an alignment favourable to change between three components: actors, institutions, and ideas (problem recognition by actors, willingness/ability to act, and availability of policy ideas; Kingdon, ). In Greece, such an alignment was almost absent at the time when this major legislation was passed through parliament and in subsequent years. Pathdependent institutional factors hindered the government’s willingness/ability to pursue the breakthrough initiated by the above legislation. PASOK consolidated its dominant position in the Greek political system by effectively rebuilding/expanding clientelist relations. Demands on the state for welfare provisions were expressed in terms of differential access to clientelist networks and the accrual of privileges to those groups who could avail themselves of them. In this way, even a minimum consensus among social actors about how to articulate redistributive issues along the lines of universalist citizenship values and criteria would have been difficult. Hence the inconsistencies in the reform process: it purported to be radical change towards universal coverage, but many key provisions remained in the sphere of political rhetoric with strong populist overtones, in blatant dissonance with the social-democratic model of citizenship. A watered-down version of the  legislation implemented universal access only to hospital care—outpatient and inpatient, though regarding the latter, differences in coverage among sickness funds persisted. This was a politically expedient solution, as it did not significantly change the status quo in health insurance. Moreover, divergent interests within the medical profession, as a result of a rapidly increasing number of junior physicians who faced difficulties in the medical job market, created a favourable environment for this turn. Junior doctors supported the expansion of public hospitals as an employment opportunity. This allowed the government to extend its clientelistic inroads into the medical profession, notably in the Panhellenic Federation of Employees in Public Hospitals (POEDHN) and the Associations of Hospital Doctors (e.g. the EINAP association for hospitals in Athens and Pireaus). The reform momentum subsided during PASOK’s second term in office. Minimal economic growth throughout the s (followed by the early s’ global economic decline), an increasing central government deficit and public debt, and an alarming social insurance deficit abruptly slowed down expansionary trends. An urgent need for budget restraint emerged. This put a brake on financing hospital expansion, let alone the provision of funding for making a radical reform as envisaged by the  law. During the s, health reform was not high on the policy agenda. The ND government that ruled the country for a small interlude (–) overturned some of the above legal provisions. The ban placed on the growth of private hospitals, with a view to incorporating the existing ones into the public system, was lifted. Meanwhile, investment in the private health sector had already been channelled to diagnostic centres and expensive medical technology; however, without any standards and control mechanisms addressing need and quantity (Liaropoulos and Kaitelidou, ). New legislation allowed public hospital doctors to combine part-time employment with

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   



private practice, and health insurance funds to contract with private clinics and diagnostic centres. It additionally introduced co-payments for drugs and tax deductions for private insurance premiums, and increased per diem hospital reimbursement rates by sickness funds. PASOK regained power in  and remained in office until . An expertscommittee (chaired by the late Professor Brian Abel-Smith) that was appointed in  to report on the predicaments of health care made significant proposals for an overhaul, along the lines of system unification and rationalization of funding and organization. However, it was not until the turn of the century that health reform issues seriously occupied the political agenda. The ‘modernization project’, particularly under the second Simitis government of PASOK (–) and the pressure from the convergence criteria for joining the eurozone played a significant role in reviving reform momentum. In July , a new ambitious proposal for an overhaul of health insurance and ESY, to be achieved within a six-year period, was announced by the then PASOK minister of health, Alecos Papadopoulos. It expressed a renewed interest in tackling fragmentation, rationalizing and de-centralizing policy, and regulating relations between key health actors. However, once again a diluted version of the proposed plan made its way to parliament, while the health minister was forced to resign under pressure from the trade unions of physicians and medical associations. The development of an integrated system of primary health care was swept off the agenda. Also, the amalgamation of health insurance funds into a single financing agent, and the introduction of control mechanisms in the system, were not taken forward into a legislative programme. The two laws that were enacted concerned the establishment of a health auditors’ body and the administrative de-concentration of ESY through the creation of seventeen regional health authorities (PESYs, Περιφερειακά Συστήματα Υγείας) responsible for the supervision of hospital administration and health-service delivery. The latter merged into seven authorities in  and were renamed as Health Care Regional Authorities (YPE, Υγειονομικές Περιφέρειες). Legislation also provided for hospital managers to replace the politically appointed hospital boards. Yet, the persistence of splintered financing seriously limited the role of the newly created PESYs, as they lacked any powers with regard either to the operational costs of, and capital investment in, public health units or to the payment of providers. These were the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the sickness funds, respectively. Tellingly, the filling of new managerial and administrative posts continued down the well-trodden path of party-political appointments. The same holds for the presidents of the sickness funds’ managing boards, even though formally these are self-governed, self-managed (non-profit) organizations. The return of ND to power in  led to a prolific legislative output that singled out various administrative components of delivery, again leaving untouched major issues of funding fragmentation, inequalities in entitlement and coverage, high out-of-pocket spending, and system inefficiency. The main obstacles to building a truly national health system have persistently been a serious lack of support by major social actors, conflicting interests within the medical community, discretionary privileges to

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 

particular social insurance funds, and complex ties between the public and private sector fostering corruption and a waste of resources. Until the  crisis broke out, the path-dependent elements of the system were not directly impacted by the novel institutional ‘layer’ of universal access, and health reform remained stuck halfway in transition.

.. Funding, Regulation, and Provision Splintered health resources, the absence of rational allocation processes, inadequate management and accounting methods, and a lack of monitoring mechanisms contributed to a rapidly growing health budget. From  to , total health expenditure as a proportion of GDP grew steadily from . to  per cent. Particularly between  and , average annual growth in total health expenditure per capita (measured in constant Purchasing Power Parities [PPPs], Table .) was about double the growth registered in the EU-. But, average yearly per capita private spending increased faster than public spending, in sharp contrast with the respective rates for EU- and the other three south European (SE) countries. Thus, when the crisis broke out, public expenditure amounted to just about  per cent of total health spending (compared to over  per cent in EU- and the three SE countries shown in Figure .). Private (mostly out-of-pocket) payments (including informal payments) covered close to one-third of funding, but voluntary private health insurance was negligible. A little over a quarter of total health expenditure was financed by taxation (with indirect taxes accounting for a large part of it) and about  per cent by social insurance contributions. Extensive reliance on out-of-pocket payments and indirect taxation renders the system highly regressive. The rise of pharmaceutical spending per capita was strikingly high: at an annual rate of . per cent on average (in real terms) during the s (Table .). In , per capita total spending on medical goods (mostly pharmaceuticals, in constant PPPs) was well above the EU- average. It covered close to a third of total health spending (about one and a half times higher than the corresponding EU- rate). More than two-thirds of pharmaceutical consumption was funded publicly. Inefficient control mechanisms for drugs pricing, and absent protocols and monitoring of physicians’ prescription behaviour coupled with pressures from drug industry lobbies, account for this rapid increase that made Greece an outlier in pharmaceutical spending. Until the late s, health information systems were very slowly introduced. Medical record keeping and reporting methods on resources and care outcomes were poor, while quality assessment techniques were absent (Davaki and Mossialos, : –). Budgetary predictions for government and social insurance organizations’ spending were based on historical precedents and political decisions (Economou et al., : ). No ceilings were applied, either for health funds or hospital expenditure. Public hospital funding derives from two sources: doctors’ salaries and capital investment are provided by the Ministry of Health through general taxation, but

Table 32.1 Health expenditure 2008

2014

2016

Per capita expenditure in constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base yeara Greece

SEb

EU-15

Greece

SEb

EU-15

Greece

SEb

EU-15

1712 1222

2088 752

2907 825

1093 760

1915 780

3078 897

1232 771

1988 812

3149 891

Expenditure on medical goods (mostly pharmaceuticals) Total 838c 625 Public 650c 347 Private 188c 278

685cd 435cd 250cd

543 292 251

554 286 268

625 372 253

625 367 258

589 302 287

642 391 251

Health expenditure Public Private

2000–2008

2008–2014

2014–2016

Average annual per capita growth (constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base yeara) percentage points SEb

EU-15

6.6 5.8 7.7

2.7 3.1 1.8

3.7 4.0 2.7

2000–2009

Greece

SEb

7.2 7.2 7.6

0.9 1.4 0.6

EU-15

Greece

SEb

EU-15

1.1 1.0 1.4

3.4 6.2 0.7

2.0 2.5 2.2

0.8 1.7 0.3

2009–2016

Average annual per capita growth (constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base yeara) percentage points

Pharmaceutical expenditure

Greece

SEb

Greece

11.1

1.3

4.1

SEb 0.7

Note: (a) constant prices (2010), constant PPPs (2010), in US dollars; (b) SE=Italy, Spain and Portugal; (c) data refer to 2009; (d) EU-13 (data on Ireland and the UK missing) Source: OECD Health Data and own elaboration, http://stats.oecd.org/, accessed 15 October 2018

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Total health expenditure Public health expenditure Private health expenditure

Greece

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

 

100 90 80 70

Other

60

Out-of-pocket payments

50

Voluntary Health insurance

40

Social Insurance Funds Government

30 20 10 0

Greece, 2009

Greece, 2016

SE, 2016

EU-15, 2016

 . Expenditure on health by type of financing. Note: SE= Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Source: Eurostat http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/health/health-care/ data/database, accessed  October .

services offered are paid by the sickness funds. Until , a per person, per diem payment system was used. In practice, expenditure persistently exceeded the budgeted amounts, and deficits by both health funds and hospitals were transferred to the state budget to be covered retrospectively by state subsidies. These conditions hardly provided any incentives to use resources efficiently. Moreover, the market power of health funds vis-à-vis contracted providers (diagnostic centres and private clinics) was negligible given the high fragmentation of health insurance. Per capita spending by the largest sickness funds clearly reveals the inequities in coverage: in , health expenditure (including health-care services and benefits) per head of the insured in the health fund for the self-employed (excluding the liberal professions) amounted to €; the corresponding rates for IKA, OGA, and some of the ‘noble funds’ for public utility employees, like those in telecommunications and electricity, were €, €, €, and € respectively (Petmesidou and Guillén, : ). In the early to mid-s, private clinics and diagnostic centres exhibited rapid increases in their economic indices, reflecting the predominance of a mixed system of service delivery. Primary (and ambulatory) care was largely provided by privately practising physicians, who were mostly specialists, and by private diagnostic laboratories. Hospital outpatient departments and rural/semi-urban health centres were among the main public providers. Also, IKA ran about one hundred primary health centres and some polyclinics for its insured population. Physicians in IKA health centres were salaried staff, but they could pursue private practice as well. Other sickness funds schemes contracted physicians (on a fee-for-service basis) for primary health consultation. The ratio of practising physicians per , population steadily increased (in  it stood at . compared to . in EU-), but the corresponding ratio for nurses remained less than half the EU- average. Furthermore, over  per cent of

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   



medical doctors are specialists. There are very few general practitioners and the persistent overuse of expensive specialist services is accounted for by the lack of a gate-keeping mechanism; namely, a referral system based on family doctors. In a nutshell, three decades after the introduction of ESY, health-care policy was stuck in system incoherence. Despite the establishment of PESYs, centralization in decision-making persisted, though under conditions of defective planning mechanisms and irrational costing practices. Combined with an oversupply of specialist physicians and absence of monitoring processes, this resulted in soaring expenditure within the formal and informal economy, while citizens’ dissatisfaction regarding the quality and affordability of services reached high levels (Petmesidou et al., : –).

. T C   W M  H-C R

..................................................................................................................................

.. Process and Dynamics of Reform Arguably, the crisis catalysed significant policy changes. Under the bailout programme a (more or less forced) alignment between the three spheres mentioned above— institutions, actors, and ideas—occurred. This created a window of opportunity that made long-overdue reforms possible. But these were accompanied by drastic cuts in public spending and a diminishing public provision. First, the protracted economic and financial crisis limited significantly the resources for clientelistic exchanges, seriously curtailed the legitimacy of political parties and trade unions, and brought the party system to a state of flux. Secondly, the bailout package imposed an upward shift in decision-making for major reforms to the international lenders (and mainly to the crisis-management apparatus of the EU). The bailout conditionalities made imperative the government’s intervention in the field of health care. Under the close monitoring of the international lenders, the role of the executive (and, most importantly, of the Ministry of Finance) was strengthened, while trade unions, associations, and other ‘veto’ groups, which previously had impeded reform, were sidelined. Third, a portfolio of policy measures and regulatory instruments (among others, e-prescribing, diagnosis protocols, closed-budgets of health units, etc.), widely used in other European countries as a convergent trend, provided a pool of ideas and measures. The EC and the IMF (as well as other international organizations like the World Health Organization, acting in an advisory manner) supplied the ideas, guidelines, and even the concrete design of the reforms. Hence a coupling of the three major streams in policy formation, according to Kingdon, has occurred: a shift in the institutional balance under the sovereign debt crisis forced the recognition of functional deficits, made it imperative for political actors to embrace reform, and set the reform agenda.

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

 

Undoubtedly, fiscal retrenchment and cost-effectiveness are paramount goals of the successive health-care reform laws that have been passed since . But, at this juncture, crucial issues of system rationalization took central stage too. Of significant importance are the merging of health funds into a unitary organization, the National Health Services Organization (EOPYY, Εθνικός Οργανισμός Παροχής Υπηρεσιών Υγείας, legislated in ) acting as a main purchaser, the standardization of the health benefits basket across occupational groups, and the implementation of monitoring and regulative mechanisms. However, the issue of primary and secondary care integration is still pending and out-of-pocket spending remains comparatively high. There are also persisting spatial inequalities in access, due to the high concentration of health personnel, medical facilities, and equipment in the larger urban centres. The hiring freeze in the public sector, imposed under the bailout package, contributed to a  per cent decrease of the medical personnel in public hospitals and created serious staff shortages in a number of clinics. Acute hospital bed capacity is also low ( per , population compared to , EU- average), and often falls even lower due to shortage of required health personnel. Demographic parameters, together with the fast pace of medical technology advancement, are expected to progressively intensify pressure on public spending. Life expectancy at birth has increased over the last decades (. years in ; EU average . years), but the number of healthy life years after the age of  has been declining. Addressing ill health among elderly people is a major challenge ahead for health and long-term care services, given that the share of the population aged over  years at . per cent in  is estimated to reach  per cent in . This is a daunting problem on account of the persistently meagre public spending on long-term care (. per cent of GDP in ) and the continued budget constraints in the foreseeable future under the strictures of fiscal sustainability.

.. Funding, Regulation, and Provision Between  and , we observe a significant change in the composition of healthcare financing with the sharp drop of the health funds’ share and the increase of ‘outof-pocket’ payments. Voluntary health insurance remained limited, but a slight increase in premiums is recorded (Figure .). In the same period, total health spending (in current prices) dropped from €. billion to €. billion and public spending almost halved (from €. to €. billion). In , public health expenditure stood at  per cent of GDP (EU- average . per cent), which itself has contracted by about a fourth since the eruption of the crisis. Compared to the other three SE countries that have also implemented austerity programmes, Greece exhibited a sharper decline of per capita public and private spending (in real terms) during the first years of the crisis (Table .).

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   



Notably, despite falling household incomes, per capita private spending has resumed an upward trend since . This has been largely accounted for by a significant shift of the cost to patients (e.g. the increase of co-payments for pharmaceuticals and the introduction of new ones for clinical tests, the charging of fees per visit to the afternoon shift of outpatients, only partly covered by EOPYY, a leaner basket of publicly provided services, etc.) and an inelastic demand for some categories of health services. In , out-of-pocket payments accounted for . per cent of monthly household expenditure (up from . per cent in ). A little over a third of it covered pharmaceuticals, about a third hospital care, and the rest mostly dental and primary care (ELSTAT webpage, http://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SFA/). In terms of governance, system centralization remains high. Regional health authorities, as well as EOPYY, have limited powers as they mostly execute decisions taken by the Health Ministry. New information systems and hospital reforms aim to improve health-system management. There has been some success with policies to rationalize the costing of hospital services, reduce expenditure for supplies, assure a smooth and efficient payment system, and increase accountability. The measures introduced embraced a double-entry accounting system and a more transparent process for the procurement of medical supplies and devices; diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) as an instrument regulating the relation of providers and financing bodies (mainly EOPYY); the all-day functioning of hospitals and the extension of working hours of outpatient offices; and the adoption of performance indicators (though quality assurance strategies are lacking). Moreover, budget ceilings were set for EOPYY in tandem with a clawback/rebate mechanism. This requires pharmacies, pharmaceutical companies, private diagnostic centres, and clinics (if expenditure exceeds the pre-agreed budget), to repay the excess to EOPYY. Other important regulatory measures concern thresholds to physicians’ activities, such as limits to the number of referrals for diagnostic/laboratory tests, ceilings on the monthly amount of prescribed drugs, compulsory prescribing by active substance, and mandatory electronic monitoring of these activities. Plans to redraw the map of hospitals, cut down/rearrange the number of clinics and functional beds and reallocate staff in order to contain cost, and rationalize structure and administration were only limitedly implemented. The merging of hospitals, mainly located at close proximity, stumbled over disagreements among major stakeholders driven by local/regional clientelistic politics. Reforms had a slightly positive impact on overall hospital efficiency (Kaitelidou et al., ). But major challenges remain with regard to the deployment and management of resources, the coordination with primary care, the response to need, and the quality of services. Also, a large space is left to the private sector, as about half of the  hospitals belong to the ‘for-profit’ private sector, and privately operated diagnostic centres remain a dominant characteristic in ambulatory care. Two reform attempts, in  and , focused on primary care integration. The  legislation postulated the transfer of all public primary care centres (mostly the ex-IKA urban primary care units, transferred to EOPYY in , and the  rural surgeries under ESY) to a newly established organization, the National Primary Care

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

 

Network (PEDY, Πρωτοβάθμιο Εθνικό Δίκτυο Υγείας) under the administration of the Health Regions. The law also provided for public primary care units, together with contracted physicians and diagnostic centres, to establish a network under PEDY. The aim was to facilitate the registration of the population with a family doctor and improve primary care. Yet the law left many crucial policy implementation issues unanswered. Markedly, only half of the medical staff of the ex-EOPYY health centres remained in the PEDY units, as doctors were asked to choose whether to become fulltime employed in PEDY and close down their private practice, or else quit the system. The change of government in  slowed down implementation. A year later, new legislation added a further layer of primary services, the so-called Local Health Units (TOMYs, Τοπικές Μονάδες Υγείας). These are planned to operate as gate-keepers to the system and strengthen primary prevention and health promotion activities, while PEDY units will function as a second-tier ambulatory care. First-contact local units will comprise GPs, pathologists, paediatricians, and nursing staff. Once more an attempt is being made to develop public primary care and counteract overreliance on specialist and in-patient care. However, TOMYs’ operation appears to be on shaky ground. Budgetary provision is for a limited time-span with funding largely from EU sources, and adequate infrastructure is not available in all localities for which local primary care units have been designed. Most importantly, as with other programmes introduced with EU funding (e.g. the Home Help programme), there is the danger of discontinuity in their operation when EU funding stops. Insecure fixed-term contracts and low levels of salaries account for the reluctance of doctors to respond to the repeated calls by the Ministry of Health for filling the large number of vacant positions in TOMYs. Overall, reforms in progress embrace steps towards system consolidation and efficiency. However, diminishing public service coverage, public health sector downsizing, and a shift of the cost to the patients predominate. The reforms are couched in a language that presents the need for deep cuts and receding public provision as unavoidable for keeping the publicly operating system alive and improving universal access. But a shift towards a universalism of basic provisions is evident. Eurostat data (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database) indicate that in / – self-reported unmet needs for medical examination (for reasons such as ‘too expensive, too far to travel or waiting list’) increased rapidly among low and middle-income groups. Also various studies clearly document the ‘catastrophic’/ ‘impoverishing’ effect of high ‘out-of-pocket’ payments on households during the crisis (Petmesidou et al., : –; Chantzaras and Yfantopoulos, ). Receding public provision has prompted a higher presence of NGOs (such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde) in health care, as well as a range of civil-society initiatives including the citizen-run ‘solidarity clinics’ and other ad hoc activities (e.g. the voluntary collection and the free distribution of pharmaceuticals and other medical goods). Although prior to the crisis the services of NGOs were sought almost entirely by immigrants and refugees, since  a rapidly increasing number of native Greeks are turning to them also (Petmesidou et al., : –). Significant

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   



differences in the aims and values underlying these initiatives reflect a notable divide: between voluntary providers considering themselves as temporary agents (e.g. ‘solidarity clinics’ that strongly support comprehensive public coverage) and those that seek a complementary role to public services. Crucial parameters of the interface with the voluntary sector do not get sufficient attention policy-wise, and evidently thirdsector organizations can hardly substitute for the retreat of public coverage. Moreover, in the last few years, voluntary providers are under strain too due to the intensification of refugee (and immigrant) flows from the Middle East and Africa.

. C R  A  F R

.................................................................................................................................. For a long-time, the Greek health-care system has been a mixed and splintered system with high disparities. In the early s, path-breaking legislation added a new element of universalist health care to an unequal health insurance structure. However, strong ‘veto’ points, enshrined in the build-up of social insurance and the clientelistic mode of sociopolitical integration, hindered reform. Hence, the new institutional ‘layer’ hardly functioned as a driver of comprehensive change and a ‘disjointed’ pattern—combining limited implementation of universal access, fragmented health insurance, and rising outof-pocket health costs—persisted. With the outbreak of the  sovereign debt crisis, a confluence of factors, such as the increasing influence of, and fiscal surveillance by, supranational actors, the strengthening of the national executive branch vis-à-vis other traditional ‘veto’ players, as well as a raft of convergent policy measures in the EU, enforced reforms towards a more unified structure. Yet, at the same time, the reforms increasingly co-opted universal public health care into private operators. This brought to the fore the complex issues of equity, comprehensiveness, and fiscal sustainability as the health-care system is confronted by an ageing population, rising costs of medical technology, strained resources, and significant inequalities in access to services. In the extensive literature on the evolution and profile of the Greek health-care system (and its predicaments), health inequalities, social group health differences, and health needs assessment at the national, regional, and local levels are under-researched topics. Theoretically informed analyses of the empirical evidence on these issues would be very valuable in examining, for instance, whether the ‘incomplete’ reform, which established ESY, had any impact whatsoever on health outcomes and equity issues in the following decades. Also, critical analysis of the ways in which current policies and priorities contribute to disadvantage—in terms of access and treatment—would be illuminating. Such studies could generate important evidence for an informed policy debate on the pressing challenges and trade-offs facing health care—mainly, how to ensure appropriate comprehensive care under tight budgetary constraints and the advancement of an increasingly privatized model unduly restricting access.

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

 

R Böhm, K., Schmid, A., Götze, R., Landwehr, C., and Rothgang, H. (). ‘Classifying OECD Healthcare Systems: A Deductive Approach’. Working Paper No. . Bremen University. Available at: http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/pages/pubAp.php?SPRACHE=en/ (accessed  January ). Chantzaras, A. and Yfantopoulos, J. (). ‘Financial Protection of Households Against Health Shocks in Greece During the Economic Crisis’. Social Science and Medicine, : –. Davaki, D. and Mossialos, E. (). ‘Financing and Delivering Health Care’. In Petmesidou, M. and Mossialos, E. (eds.) Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate, –. Economou, C., Kaitelidou, D., Karanikolos, M. and Maresso, A. (). ‘Greece. Health System Review’. Health Systems in Transition,  (): –. WHO/Europe. Available at: http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/partners/observatory/publications/health-systemreviews-hits/full-list-of-country-hits/greece-hit-/ (accessed  January ). Kaitelidou, D., Katharaki, M., Kalogeropoulou, M., Economou, C., Siskou, O., Souliotis, K., Tsavalias, K., and Liaropoulos, L. (). ‘The Impact of Economic Crisis on the Hospital Sector and the Efficiency of Greek Public Hospitals’. European Journal of Business and Social Sciences,  (): –. Kingdon, J. W. (). Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy. New York: Harper Collins. Liaropoulos, L. and Kaitelidou, D. (). ‘Health Technology Assessment in Greece’. International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care,  (): –. Mossialos, E. and Allin, S. (). ‘Interest Groups and Health System Reform in Greece’. West European Politics,  (): –. Petmesidou, M. (). ‘Social Protection in Greece: A Brief Glimpse of a Welfare State’. Social Policy and Administration,  (): –. Petmesidou, M. and Guillén, A. (). ‘Southern-Style National Health Services? Recent Reforms and Trends in Spain and Greece’. Social Policy and Administration,  (): –. Petmesidou, M., Pavolini, E. and Guillén, A. (). ‘South European Healthcare Systems Under Harsh Austerity: A Progress-Regression Mix?’ South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Petmesidou, M., Papanastasiou, S., Pempetzoglou, M., Papatheodorou, C., and Polyzoidis, P. (). Υγεία και μακροχρόνια φροντίδα [Health and Long-term Care]. Athens: Observatory on Economic and Social Developments, Institute of Labour. Schmid, A., Cacace, M., Götze, R., and Rothgang, H. (). ‘Explaining Health Care System Change: Problem Pressure and the Emergence of “Hybrid” Health Care Systems’. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,  (): –. Thelen, K. (). How Institutions Evolve. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Toth, F. (). ‘Is there a Southern European Healthcare Model?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Tountas, Y., Stefannson, H. and Frissiras, S. (). ‘Health Reform in Greece: Planning and Implementation of a National Health System’. International Journal of Health Planning and Management,  (): –. Wilsford, D. (). ‘Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way’. Journal of Public Policy,  (): –.

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        ......................................................................................................................

     

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T chapter deals with the question of how policies against poverty and social exclusion have evolved since the mid-s, focusing on the most recent period. In particular, it deals with the question of how the welfare state responded to, and was transformed by, the social emergency of the s. Its structure is as follows. The first section discusses the state of Greek welfare before the crisis broke out. The second section considers the social implications of the Great Recession, focusing on the effects of job losses, falling earnings, and higher taxes, on family incomes. The third section provides an account of policy responses under austerity, and the fourth reviews the evidence on rising poverty and social exclusion, and on the distributional impact of taxbenefit policies. The chapter concludes that the system of social protection emerging from the recession and the austerity differs significantly from the one that preceded it: it is leaner, less robust in core policy areas such as pensions and health, but also probably more effective in protecting against extreme poverty than at any time in history.

. P D  –

.................................................................................................................................. Greece’s return to democracy took place as the world economy reeled under the impact of the first oil crisis (), marking the end of the long period of rising prosperity known as ‘les trente glorieuses’. In Greece, the average rate of growth slowed from . per cent in – to . per cent in – (Iordanoglou, ). The military regime of – had been curiously active in the field of social assistance. In a bid to project a paternalistic image, a scheme for the protection of

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

 

large families was introduced in  providing cash benefits for third and additional children. Moreover, a general framework was established for the provision of social assistance to the needy, the handicapped and victims of natural disasters, while a new disability scheme (for the ‘deaf-mute’) was also put in place. The restoration of democracy and the extension of civil rights to all citizens ushered in a period of welfare state expansion, in response to the high expectations nurtured by large sections of the population after decades of politically motivated discrimination. At first, under the New Democracy governments of –, expansion was modest: social spending as a share of GDP rose to . per cent, from . per cent in – (Sotiropoulos, , citing national sources). Greece’s accession to the European Community in , widely considered to be a guarantee of political stability, appeared to legitimize aspirations for levels of income and social protection comparable to those enjoyed by other Europeans. Following the victory of PASOK (the Socialists) in the  general election, welfare state building took off in , driven by a  per cent rise to the statutory minimum wage, lifting social insurance minimum pensions and other social benefits indexed to it, followed by a  per cent rise in non-contributory farmers’ pensions, eligibility for which was extended to women. (The combined effect of the latter was that elderly couples living in rural areas saw their pensions increase by a factor of four, albeit from a low base.) Universal coverage was further promoted with the introduction in  of the ‘pension for the uninsured elderly’, targeted to those aged over  with insufficient contributions and inadequate incomes. In pension policy, expansion often degenerated to excess: contributory conditions became lax (in the civil service, a mother could now retire on a full pension after fifteen years of service); as manual work declined, the share of those in ‘hard and arduous occupations’, conferring the right to early retirement, continued to rise; the share of invalidity pensions in all new pensions reached  per cent in . On a different register, the creation of a ‘National Health System’ in  was a decisive, if incomplete, step towards establishing universal coverage in health. Social assistance remained low key and fragmented, with new disability benefits introduced to cover additional categories of claimants. In social care, a nationwide network of open care centres was created, aiming to reduce old people’s isolation and dependence (Petmesidou, ; Guillén and Matsaganis, ; Matsaganis, a). In view of all this, welfare expenditure took off, averaging . per cent of GDP in – (Sotiropoulos, ). The poverty rate declined from . to . per cent (Tsakloglou and Mitrakos, ). The brief interregnum of New Democracy rule (–) was chiefly marked by a serious attempt at pension reform. During the same period, the minimum age required for eligibility to the social pension was lowered from  to , new higher benefits targeted to families with three or more children were introduced, and the duration of unemployment benefit was extended from six to twelve months. Social spending fell slightly to . per cent of GDP in – (Sotiropoulos, ). Meanwhile, the economy stagnated: the average rate of growth in – was . per cent (Iordanoglou, ).

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     



PASOK was returned to power in , and again in  with a ‘modernizing’ leadership under Prime Minister Simitis, re-elected in . Pension reform was high on the agenda, but was effectively abandoned in the face of stiff opposition from unions and most of public opinion, including from within PASOK’s own ranks (Featherstone, ; Matsaganis, ). Otherwise, the concept of selectivity was conceived as the way to reconcile social cohesion with fiscal rectitude in the run up to the single European currency. The new orthodoxy yielded some early results: an income-tested pension supplement introduced in  enabled the government to escape an earlier pledge to restore the link of minimum pensions to the minimum wage. But the strategy soon ran out of steam, for lack of obvious targets in a social protection system dominated by contributory benefits. As for the option of a guaranteed minimum income scheme, the logical counterpart to the strategy, it was briefly considered but rejected (Matsaganis, b). Meanwhile, separate schemes for various types of disability proliferated, and the number of recipients increased by a factor of . since the mid-s. As the economy grew fast, social expenditure grew even faster, averaging . per cent of GDP in – (Sotiropoulos, ). Under the New Democracy governments of –, pension reform was shelved, benefits for large families were raised, social spending continued to grow, and fiscal deficits ballooned. When the eurozone crisis broke out, the Greek welfare state was no longer underresourced. In the s, with the economy growing by an average annual rate of  per cent and unemployment falling as low as  per cent, social spending per inhabitant increased by  per cent in real terms (Eurostat data). Yet, its traditional traits—a wasteful health service, an unsustainable pension system, a ‘rudimentary social assistance regime’ (Gough, : )—were left intact. As a result, on the eve of the crisis, the Greek system of social protection fitted perfectly the characterization of the southern European model of welfare as a combination of ‘unparalleled peaks of generosity reserved for the protected core of the labour market’ on the one hand, and ‘vast gaps of protection’ on the other (Ferrera, : , ). Peaks of generosity were evident in the pension rights of public-sector employees (in the civil service and, especially, the public utilities), liberal professions (judges and lawyers, doctors and pharmacists, engineers and architects), and other groups. Elsewhere in the system, the heavy reliance on contributory social insurance de facto disenfranchized non-standard workers and their families, while the absence of a generalized social safety net for those in poverty deprived them of income support in times of hardship. The risks of that arrangement were fully exposed by the crisis of the s, when hundreds of thousands of workers, on losing their jobs, also lost access to social benefits for themselves and their dependants (Matsaganis, ). Coverage gaps abounded. Contributory unemployment insurance seemed reasonable in terms of benefit level (around  per cent of the minimum wage), but its duration was short (maximum  months), and its coverage less than complete. As a result of stringent eligibility conditions and low rates of take-up, the number of recipients of non-contributory unemployment assistance was extremely low. Child

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

 

benefits were adequate for large families, as were family allowances for workers in the ‘protected categories’ (civil service, banks, and public utilities); by contrast, most families with one or two children received little or no support, even when in poverty. Public assistance with housing costs was limited. Social rented accommodation was practically unknown, while a means-tested rent subsidy was only available on a contributory basis, that is, beyond the reach of most families in poverty. Disability benefits were extremely fragmented even by Greek standards, with no fewer than ten different categories with twenty-two sub-categories, often concealing absurd cases of differential treatment in yet another manifestation of clientelism and patronage. Shortterm benefits in instances of sickness or maternity ranged from quite generous (for labour market insiders) to non-existent (for non-standard workers). Last but not least, Greece remained the only EU country where a broad social assistance scheme acting as a social safety net of last resort was unavailable even on a local or regional basis (Matsaganis, ).

. T D  S P  

.................................................................................................................................. In –, gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by . per cent in real terms. This was far greater than the downturn in other European economies affected by the eurozone crisis. Taking into account the timid recovery of , the new dip into recession in , and the sluggish growth of –, relative living standards in Greece had plummeted to . per cent of the western European average in , from . per cent in  (Eurostat online database—the source of all figures in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated). As the economic outlook darkened, labour market conditions deteriorated rapidly. Between q and q (i.e. from peak to trough), the number of workers in employment fell by . million, or . per cent. The employment rate declined from . per cent in  to . per cent in , undoing in five years the progress of many decades (the proportion of population of working age in employment had been . per cent in , and . per cent in ). Unemployment rose precipitously (from . per cent in  to . per cent in , having peaked at . per cent in November ). Given the length of the recession, the majority of jobless workers were out of work for over a year: the longterm unemployment rate went from . per cent in  to . per cent in . As new entrants to the labour market faced bleak prospects, many youths chose to prolong full-time education. In view of that, the proportion of those aged – who were not in employment, education, or training increased less than might have been expected: from . per cent in  to . per cent in .

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     



Until the onset of the crisis, labour market institutions and norms in Greece, whether formal or informal, protected ‘male breadwinners’, often at the expense of their wives and their (grown-up) children. No doubt this pattern stifled mobility, consigned too many women to housewifery, and prevented too many young adults from leaving the parental home before an unusually late age. However, it had one advantage: by protecting the jobs of ‘primary earners’, it severed the link between unemployment and poverty. Indeed, there seemed to be little overlap between the unemployed and the poor: the former comprised mostly wives of employed men and youths sharing the parental home, while the latter mainly concerned the elderly and others living in rural areas. This was to change dramatically under the impact of the crisis. In , the unemployment rate for men aged – had been a mere . per cent; six years later, it had reached . per cent. Often, joblessness (or low work intensity, with one adult unemployed and another in a part-time job) was the fate of entire households. Families with children were not spared: the proportion of population aged – that lived in households with dependent children, and had low or very low work intensity, grew from . per cent in  to . per cent in . For those still in employment, real earnings fell as a result both of the recession (i.e. lower demand for labour) and of ‘internal devaluation’ (i.e. policy-driven compression of wages via labour market deregulation). The relevant policy changes included reductions in the strictness of employment protection legislation, restrictions in the scope and reach of collective bargaining, and a drastic cut in the minimum wage. The resulting wage depression was massive. Bank of Greece estimates suggest that average gross earnings of all employees in  had fallen by . per cent relative to their pre-crisis peak (in ), and stood at . per cent below their  level. Newly hired and young workers were worst affected. Administrative data from IKA (the social insurance agency for private-sector employees) indicate that in – the median earnings of newly hired workers and of those aged below  declined by over  per cent in real terms, while those of workers who kept their job with the same employer fell by less than  per cent (Dimakakos and Skiadas, ). Labour Force Survey data show that the share of workers in private firms who earned less than € per month rose from . per cent in  to . per cent in  (INE, : –). Most likely, wages fell by even more in the ‘informal sector’ (typically in construction, agriculture, tourism, and other services), where employers are often subject to no legal or other constraints, except those implicit in the free play of unregulated market forces. Because of the rising tax pressure under austerity, net incomes collapsed. The combined effect of job losses, lower earnings (and other market incomes), and higher taxes was a fall in household disposable incomes by an average of . per cent in real terms in –. As all this suggests, the Great Recession, far greater than anywhere else, raised the demand for social protection in Greece to unprecedented levels.

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

 

. T S  S P  A

.................................................................................................................................. In principle, a well-designed system of ‘automatic stabilisers’¹ should be able to mitigate the effects of a recession. Indeed, ‘Long lines of the unemployed caused by economic crises are the core business of the welfare state’ (Castles, : ). Not the Greek welfare state, as it turned out: in spite of rising social spending pre-crisis, its configuration rendered it particularly unfit for the challenge. When the crisis did arrive, the policy response initially merely involved a string of ‘special support schemes’, targeting existing benefit recipients, to whom a few hundred euros were paid as a lump sum. As the recession deepened, there was little to prevent the hundreds of thousands of families suffering losses in terms of jobs and/or earnings from falling into poverty. The social protection system generally failed to support the living standards of vulnerable groups. With the May  bailout package and its successors, social policy—like most public policy—was placed under strict international supervision (Featherstone, ). In the context of austerity, the welfare state became subject to fiscal consolidation, just like any other policy area. The extent of waste and inefficiency in the use of resources, incapacity to meet social objectives, poor administration, outright fraud in some cases, overlaps or duplication between schemes, as well as coverage gaps, suggested that the scope for strengthening social protection while cutting social expenditure was considerable, although political and technical constraints limited what might realistically be achieved. As it turned out, welfare state ‘recalibration’ (Pierson, ; Ferrera and Hemerijck, ), that is the strategy of expanding coverage for new social risks (e.g. child care) while ‘retrenching’ spending on old social risks (e.g. retirement benefits), under conditions of ‘permanent austerity’, was not pursued at all until . In the meantime, as the recession fuelled the demand for social protection more than ever before, austerity reduced its supply. In absolute terms (per inhabitant, at constant prices), expenditure on social benefits peaked in , that is, the last year pre-crisis. Thereafter, with the economy in free fall, social spending declined. By , the size of the Greek welfare state (proxied by social expenditure per capita in real terms) had shrunk by over  per cent relative to what it had been in . In relative terms, as a share of GDP, expenditure on social protection continued to grow from . per cent in  to . per cent in , coming close to the EU- average (. per cent). In –, as the cuts in social protection under

¹ Income taxes and social benefits can be thought of as ‘automatic stabilizers’ because in a recession the former go down and the latter go up, thereby softening the impact of earnings losses on family incomes.

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     



fiscal consolidation took effect, social spending fell faster than GDP (to . per cent in ). Expenditure on social benefits seemed to have picked up somewhat thereafter. The effects of the austerity on the welfare state were asymmetric. In –, pension benefits were cut in nominal terms. Reductions varied with benefit level, and sometimes with pensioner age, and were introduced at different points in time. Their cumulative effect was considerable, ranging from  to  per cent in real terms. Nonetheless, total expenditure on pensions, driven by rising recipient numbers, continued its upward trend, temporary setbacks notwithstanding, reaching . per cent of GDP in  (up from . per cent in ), according to Greek government estimates. Predictably, the growth in pensions spending crowded out other components of Greek welfare, to a still greater extent than had always been the case. Structural reform attempted to rein in pension spending, raise the age of retirement, and unify entitlements across categories, while at the same time improving protection against poverty in old age. The pension system brought in by the  reform can be described as ‘Scandinavian’ in structure, at modest benefit levels (Matsaganis and Leventi, ): it provided for a tax-funded quasi-universal first tier, and a contribution-related second tier. The new system was due to come into force in January . As it turned out, the general election of that month disrupted its introduction. The incoming government repealed the  reform, hinting at its intention to reverse the cuts as well. That never happened. Its own reform, brought to parliament in , further reduced accrual rates, especially for those with a long work history. Moreover, in one sense it did turn the clock back: by reinstating the sharp division between those with an adequate contributory record (of at least  years) and those without, it left retirees with an erratic work history less protected than under the  reform. The persons concerned may only be eligible for a means-tested national pension at € per month, with up to fourteen years of contributions counting for nothing. The diminished capacity of the welfare state to respond to the increased need for social protection can be seen most clearly in the area of income support for the unemployed. In –, unemployment protection became subject to a flurry of legislative or administrative changes. On the negative side, the benefit rate of contributory unemployment insurance was cut (from € to € per month), and the duration of repeat spells of receipt over a period of four years was limited (to  days in all). On the positive side, unemployment insurance was extended to formerly self-employed workers (on strict terms), and access to means-tested unemployment assistance was broadened (though the benefit rate was left unchanged). On balance, the result of these changes was reduced coverage. As unemployment soared, and spells out of work grew longer, the proportion of jobless workers drawing unemployment benefits declined. Between  and , as the number of jobless workers doubled, the number of unemployment benefit recipients fell by about one-third, as a result of which the coverage rate decreased from . per cent to . per cent of all jobless workers (Matsaganis, ). It is hard to reconcile this with the claim of Blanchard et al. (: ) that, under IMF advice, unemployment benefit coverage in Greece ‘expanded’.

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

 

This is not to say that policy initiatives to strengthen the social safety net were completely absent under the pro-austerity government coalition that ruled the country from June  to January . The consolidation of child benefits was probably the most significant. Until recently, income support was generous for only two types of families: those with three or more children, and those of employees of public utilities, banks, and the civil service. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of children received little or no benefit, even if they were poor. In , contributory family allowances, benefits for large families, and tax relief for families with children were replaced by a ‘unified’ (i.e. non-categorical) child benefit, payable on an income-tested basis. The introduction of a unified child benefit brought public assistance within the reach of hundreds of thousands of poor families that had been ineligible for income support under the previous system. The benefit level varied by family income and number of children: for example, a couple with two children and annual income below €, received € per month. The anti-austerity coalition that won the January  general election had amassed considerable political capital when in opposition by loudly denouncing the country’s ‘humanitarian crisis’ (its preferred term for the social situation in Greece). Once in government, its much-awaited social programme proved something of an anti-climax. Legislation on ‘immediate measures to fight the humanitarian crisis’ boiled down to three rather modest means-tested schemes: an electricity allowance for poor families, some of which had had their homes disconnected because of unpaid bills; a rent benefit, paid directly to landlords on behalf of their tenants; and a food subsidy in the form of a pre-paid debit card, accepted at supermarkets and other groceries. Total spending on these three schemes was far lower than the previous government’s discretionary measures, rightly criticized as inadequate. In –, a nationwide guaranteed minimum income scheme was introduced. This was certainly a major policy development, and a long overdue addition to the country’s social protection system. The groundwork was laid by the previous government, which had overseen a Guaranteed Social Income pilot in thirteen municipalities for six months from November  (Lalioti, ). The government was initially hostile, but the austerity programme signed in August  explicitly stipulated that financial aid to Greece was conditional on the introduction of a nationwide minimum income scheme, renamed ‘Social Solidarity Income’. Pressure from the European Commission and the IMF, technical assistance by the World Bank, and the active support of administrative staff in central and local government more than compensated for the distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of ministers. As a result, implementation proceeded quite smoothly. After a brief ‘phase I’ from July , in thirty municipalities accounting for  per cent of the country’s total population, Social Solidarity Income was launched nationwide in February . The number of beneficiaries was expected gradually to reach . per cent of population, at an estimated cost of . per cent of GDP. In , unified child benefit became more generous, and more narrowly targeted: the amount of support was raised to € per month for a family of four, but the

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     



income threshold at which benefit was phased out was lowered. Also in , legislation for the introduction of a means-tested housing benefit was approved by parliament, but the plan was postponed as resources had to be diverted to pay for the nonimplementation of previously agreed cuts to pension benefits. In the area of social services, school meals were provided to a larger number of children, and a childcare voucher was made available for families meeting the income test (annual income below €, for families with up to two children), while the ‘Home Help’ programme (first introduced in the late s, and partly discontinued under austerity) was fully restored.

. P  S E

.................................................................................................................................. The implications of the crisis, mediated by policy changes under austerity, profoundly affected the distribution of incomes, whether in cash or in kind, including access to publicly funded services. The available evidence shows that while some attempts were made to limit the impact of austerity on vulnerable groups, by designing spending cuts and tax increases more equitably, that objective was not always pursued consistently, and it proved elusive anyway. What frustrated efforts was that austerity had pernicious effects on demand, depressing economic activity, causing business closures and job losses. These second-order effects increased poverty and social exclusion, and more than offset the first-order impact of austerity measures, even when that was progressive (Matsaganis and Leventi, , : –; Perez and Matsaganis, : ). More generally, changes in poverty rates depend on how one defines poverty in the first place. Here we present four different poverty indicators. The first indicator is the standard (relative) poverty rate. It shows the share of population with a household disposable income below  per cent of the median. By construction, that threshold will go up as median incomes rise, and down as median incomes fall: in Greece, for a family of two adults and two children aged below , it was € per month in  (down from €, in ). This is consistent with the concept of ‘relative poverty’, and may not matter much when income growth is slow either way. The second indicator is similar to the first, except that the threshold is set at  per cent of median incomes. This threshold, for the same family of four, was € per month in  (€ in ). Clearly, the lower the poverty threshold, the lower the share of population below it. The third indicator is the ‘anchored’ poverty rate. It is computed by reference to a threshold fixed at  per cent of the  median, adjusted for inflation: for a family of four, that threshold was €, per month in  (from €, in ). This indicator measures the share of population unable to purchase the goods and services that were just affordable to those with income exactly equal to the poverty threshold just before the outbreak of the Greek crisis. The intuition is that at times of rapid change in living standards, individuals may compare their material circumstances not

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

  50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

2009

2010

2011

relative (at 60% of meian)

2012

2013

2014

relative (at 40% of median)

2015 anchored

2016 extreme

 . Poverty rates (–). Note: Poverty thresholds defined as follows. Top line:  per cent of median income in , adjusted for inflation. Second line:  per cent of median income in current year. Third line:  per cent of median income in current year. Fourth line: cost of a basket of basic necessities. Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC survey data (except for extreme poverty: Matsaganis et al., ).

only with those of ‘the average person’ in the society in which they live, but also with their own situation at a previous point in time. The fourth indicator is the extreme poverty rate. It counts the population share of households whose income is too low to purchase the cheapest basket of basic necessities without incurring debt. Clearly, estimating the cost of such a basket of goods and services inevitably involves a considerable amount of discretion. In an earlier study (Matsaganis et al., ), the cost of basic necessities was allowed to vary by household type, geographical area, and tenure status. For a couple with two children aged  and , living in Athens, in a mortgage-free owner-occupied home, the extreme poverty threshold in  was € per month (up from € in ). The share of population with a disposable income below each of the four poverty thresholds discussed above is shown in Figure .. The standard (relative) poverty rate went up by three percentage points in –, falling again by two percentage points in later years. The share of population with incomes below a lower threshold of  per cent of median increased by . percentage points, and stayed high after the worst of the crisis had passed. The ‘anchored’ poverty rate rose vertiginously to . per cent in . As for the extreme poverty rate, it peaked at . per cent in , then fell somewhat. In , it had been no more than . per cent. Interestingly, the composition of the population in poverty changed rapidly during the crisis. While pensioners suffered significant income losses (and were adversely affected by funding cuts in health care), the unemployed and their families lost even more income, and were offered less protection. As a result, the poverty rate of the elderly (and that of other categories traditionally seen as poor, e.g. farmers) fell, while child poverty (and that of residents in urban centres) rose significantly (Matsaganis et al., ; Andriopoulou et al., ).

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     



The case of the elderly merits attention. In terms of relative (monetary) poverty, the elderly have paradoxically done rather well in recent years, as their incomes (chiefly pensions) have been cut less than wages and other earnings, while those on low incomes were protected, albeit to a limited extent (in the sense that pension cuts have been progressive, with higher pensions being reduced by a higher proportion). Moreover, pensions continued to be paid every month, which was not the case with wages in the event of job loss. In view of the above, poverty rates have fallen for the over , while those of children and other age groups have risen. Nevertheless, we know that the elderly are particularly vulnerable to changes in the funding and delivery of health care, as they face higher medical needs than younger groups. In Greece, the proportion of those aged  and over who reported unmet need for health care because they could not afford it went up in recent years, especially among older groups, and at lower incomes. In the general population, the relevant share increased threefold during the crisis, from . per cent in  to . per cent in  (relative to . per cent in the EU- as a whole). The combination of falling household incomes, low benefit coverage, rising prices (albeit at a low inflation rate), and significantly increased user charges in health care and other public services, has brought extensive financial hardship, reaching higher levels than is implied by the rise in income poverty alone. As a result, economic strain has become more pervasive, with . per cent of households making ends meet ‘with great difficulty’ in  (compared to . per cent in the EU- as a whole). Severe material deprivation also increased, steeply and steadily, to . per cent in  (relative to the EU- average of . per cent). Finally, the share of population at risk of poverty or social exclusion rose to . per cent in  (relative to . per cent in the EU- as a whole).

. C

.................................................................................................................................. In spite of rising expenditure since the early s, Greek welfare was particularly unfit for the challenge posed by the economic crisis in the s. In retrospect, given its depth and duration, including mass joblessness, the crisis would have probably been a severe test to any welfare state, even the most advanced. Yet the performance of the country’s system of social protection was particularly disappointing. As a result, and as the preceding analysis illustrates, the social costs of the crisis for vulnerable groups in the country have been unnecessarily high. Under austerity, social spending was reduced significantly, just as the need for social protection reached unprecedented heights. As in other peripheral countries, successive Greek governments had to cope with the social impact of the crisis while at the same time striving to bring fiscal deficits under control. However, harsh austerity under the terms of bailout programmes made budget constraints tighter than elsewhere. Moreover, political developments further limited the scope for improving income support to

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

 

vulnerable groups: as distributional struggles became bitter, scarce resources were often allocated on the basis of the strength of veto power rather than according to the need for social protection. The social policies urged by the EU–ECB–IMF ‘Troika’ and pursued by national governments of all political hues did not come anywhere near to being an adequate response to the social emergency, and failed to compensate for the adverse effects of the recession (Sotiropoulos, ). Under pressure from external actors, excesses in spending on pensions and health care were curbed, probably going all the way to the other extreme of failing to provide adequate incomes in old age and to guarantee access to essential treatments. Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to view the welfare state emerging from the crisis as simply a shrunken version of the one existing before. Most importantly, an unacknowledged policy shift seems to have taken place, away from income replacement and towards poverty relief. In particular, the social safety net was bolstered, with the introduction of a non-categorical means-tested child benefit from April  and the nationwide launch of a minimum income programme from February , representing key moments in the modernization of social protection. In contrast, notwithstanding the massive rise in joblessness, income support to the unemployed generally deteriorated, as the number of those claiming unemployment benefits declined. Recent policy changes have clearly transformed Greek welfare. The system of social protection emerging from the recession and the austerity differs significantly from the one that preceded it. It is leaner, less robust in core policy areas such as pensions and health (Petmesidou and Guillen, ), but also probably more effective in protecting against extreme poverty than at any time in history. Nevertheless, as the economy recovers, dealing with the legacy of the crisis will not be a matter for the welfare state alone: it will crucially hinge on job creation and wage growth, of which there was little sight at the time of writing.

R Andriopoulou, E., Karakitsios, A. and Tsakloglou, P. (). ‘Inequality and Poverty in Greece: Changes in Times of Crisis’. In Katsikas, D., Sotiropoulos, D. A., and Zafiropoulou, M. (eds.) Socioeconomic Fragmentation and Exclusion in Greece under the Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Blanchard, O. J., Jaumotte, F., and Loungani, P. (). ‘Labor Market Policies and IMF Advice in Advanced Economies during the Great Recession’. IZA Journal of Labor Policy,  (): –. Castles, F. G. (). ‘Black Swans and Elephants on the Move: The Impact of Emergencies on the Welfare State’. Journal of European Social Policy,  (): –. Dimakakos, A. and Skiadas, C. (). Μελέτη οικονομικών στοιχείων απασχόλησης ενεργών ασφαλισμένων ΙΚΑ-ΕΤΑΜ, – [Analysis of Employment and Earnings Data of Active Contributors to IKA-ETAM, –]. Athens: IKA. Featherstone, K. (). ‘ “Soft” Coordination Meets “Hard” Politics: The European Union and Pension Reform in Greece.’ Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –.

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

Featherstone, K. (). ‘Conditionality, Democracy and Institutional Weakness: The Eurocrisis Trilemma’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Ferrera, M. (). ‘The “Southern Model” of Welfare in Social Europe’. Journal of European Social Policy  (): –. Ferrera, M. and Hemerijck, A. (). ‘Recalibrating Europe’s Welfare Regimes’. In Zeitlin, J. and Trubek, D. M. (eds.) Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Gough, I. (). ‘Social Assistance in Southern Europe’. Southern European Society and Politics,  (): –. Guillén, A. M. and Matsaganis, M. (). ‘Investigating the “Social Dumping” Hypothesis: Welfare Policies in Spain and Greece in the s and s’. Journal of European Social Policy,  (): –. INE. (). Η ελληνική οικονομία και η απασχόληση: ετήσια έκθεση [The Greek Economy and Employment: Annual Report]. Athens: Labour Institute. Iordanoglou, C. H. (). Η ελληνική οικονομία στη ‘Μακρά Διάρκεια’: – [The Greek Economy in the longue durée: –]. Athens: Polis. Lalioti, V. (). ‘The Curious Case of the Guaranteed Minimum Income: Highlighting Greek “Exceptionalism” in a Southern European Context’. Journal of European Social Policy  (): –. Matsaganis, M. (a). ‘Fighting with Hands Tied Behind the Back: Anti-poverty Policy Without a Minimum Income’. In Ferrera, M. (ed.) Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe: Fighting Poverty and Social Exclusion in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. London: Routledge, –. Matsaganis, M. (b). ‘The Limits of Selectivity as a Recipe for Welfare Reform: The Case of Greece’. Journal of Social Policy,  (): –. Matsaganis, M. (). ‘Union Structures and Pension Outcomes in Greece’. British Journal of Industrial Relations,  (): –. Matsaganis, M. (). ‘The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece’. Journal of European Social Policy,  (): –. Matsaganis M. (). The Greek Crisis: Social Impact and Policy Responses. Berlin: FriedrichEbert-Stiftung. Matsaganis M. (). ‘Incomes and the Welfare State in Southern Europe during the Crisis’. Presented at the th International Conference of Europeanists’. Chicago: Council of European Studies. Matsaganis, M. and Leventi, C. (). ‘Pathways to a Universal Basic Pension in Greece’. Basic Income Studies,  (): –. Matsaganis, M. and Leventi, C. (). ‘The Distributional Impact of Austerity and the Recession in Southern Europe’. South European Society and Politics  (): –. Matsaganis, M., Leventi, C., Kanavitsa, E., and Flevotomou, M. (). Η ακραία φτώχεια στην Ελλάδα [Extreme Poverty in Greece]. Athens: Dianeosis. Matsaganis, M. and Leventi, C. (). ‘Distributive Effects of the Crisis in the European Periphery’. In Cantillon, B., Goedemé, T., and Hills, J. (eds.) Decent Incomes for All: Improving Policies in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Perez, S. A. and Matsaganis, M. (). ‘The Political Economy of Austerity in Southern Europe’. New Political Economy,  (): –. Petmesidou, M. (). ‘Social Protection in Greece: A Brief Glimpse of a Welfare State’. Social Policy and Administration,  (). –.

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 

Petmesidou, M. and Guillen, A. (). ‘Can the Welfare State as we Know it Survive? A View from the Crisis-Ridden Southern European Periphery’. Southern European Society and Politics,  (): –. Pierson P. (). ‘Coping with Permanent Austerity Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies’. In Pierson, P. (ed.) The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘The EU’s Impact on the Greek Welfare State: Europeanization on Paper?’ Journal of European Social Policy,  (): –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Too Little, too Late: The Mismatch Between Social Policy and Social Crisis’. In Katsikas, D., Sotiropoulos, D. A., and Zafiropoulou, M. (eds.) Socioeconomic Fragmentation and Exclusion in Greece under the Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Tsakloglou, P. and Mitrakos, T. (). ‘Inequality and Poverty in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century’. In Mossialos, E. and Petmesidou, M. (eds.) Social Policy Developments in Greece. Aldershot: Ashgate, –.

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        ......................................................................................................................



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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. E as a policy area is controversial in contemporary Greece. As such, policy-making becomes highly contentious, often fragmented in terms of its goals, orientation, and stakeholders, and frequently appropriated for political gains. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the theoretical debates and discourses influencing Greek education and explore some of the recent developments in the reform of primary/secondary education (such as mandatory years of schooling, modern pedagogy, university entry exams system), which also set the foundations for the debate around the most recent version of reforms in higher education. The chapter begins with a preliminary examination of the dominant debates in education and focuses on issues of policy implementation to discuss the role of the school as an institution; education reform as a political tool; the idea of excellence in education and evaluation; the democratization of education; and the politics of higher education. It then continues to explore the most recent round of university reforms, starting with Law , which was passed in . The chapter then turns its focus on the advent in  of the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) government, which discarded the aforementioned Law and brought about fresh reforms in all tiers of education and a new approach to higher education. Finally, it examines the period of the financial crisis to discuss funding, political coupling of university reforms with the bailout agreement, extremism from the Left and the Right, and the question of neo-liberalization of higher education. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research agendas and sets out some challenges for research.

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

 

. B O  G’ E S

.................................................................................................................................. From a comparative perspective and in relation to other European Union (EU) or OECD countries, Greece has been quite late in modernizing its education policy. It has frequently emulated or copied best practices elsewhere without ever managing to adjust its education programme to the realities of a global society. Against the Education and Training benchmarks of  as reported by the European Union (European Commission, a), Greece has underperformed in all basic skills and with high margins, including prospects of employability after graduation. In comparative terms Greece has always invested less in terms of public spending in education. Between  and , spending on education increased from . to  per cent of GDP compared to a double average for other member states. Although spending between  and  doubled for Greece (starting at . per cent in  to . per cent in ), it is still lower than the EU average of  per cent. These differences were even more profound during the financial crisis: since , teachers’ salaries have decreased to among the lowest within OECD countries (OECD, a) and recruitment of new teachers has been frozen, thus negatively impacting on the average age of teaching staff (OECD, b). Moreover, university entry has been affected, creating barriers to education for those from lower economic backgrounds who cannot afford private tutoring for the entry exams. This state of play is not a contemporary phenomenon however, but it is rather a result of a long historical journey that begins with the consolidation of Greek national identity in the early twentieth century and has followed closely the political developments of modern Greece until the present day. Given the gradual growth of the Greek state since its independence (), and the inclusion of various linguistic and ethnic minorities, the prime objective of education has been the development of national identity (Frangoudaki, , , Frangoudaki and Dragona, ) and the main vehicle towards that aim was the teaching of the Greek language. Educators and policymakers were torn between the adoption of a formal version of modern Greek (Georgiadis, ) and the colloquial language (δημοτική ‘demotiki’) as the formal language of the state. Frequently, the use of the ‘demotiki’ was deemed a sign of inclination towards antinational and communist ideas (Stamelos, ). This debate dominated education discourses until , when ‘demotiki’ was adopted as the formal language of the state, yet it had damaged significantly the purpose of education as a tool for professional development and employability. This latency led to the development of a rather inward-looking educational discourse, both politically and in terms of policy-making (Georgiadis, ; Stamelos et al., ). Since  Greek education policy has entered a transitional period followed by a period of continuous reforms that have generally set out the axes of development of the policy itself, both in terms of concepts and discourses, and in terms of implementation. The two main grassroots’ political demands were democratization and social justice in

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

terms of social equality and access to education. With the advent of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) in power in , the socialist/social democratic ideal influenced the socio-economic framework in which Greek education policy began an era of modernization. Despite Greece’s accession to the European Economic Community (ΕΕC, in ), this was an education policy paradoxically still inward-looking in terms of nurturing a new domestic political paradigm. The tension between an inward-looking policy and one that responded to the European and international outlook on education frequently sits at the root of all debates in Greek education at all levels. From the development of new curricula, the nurturing of future generations, and the university entry exams system, to the politicization of higher education and the competitiveness of Greek students and university academic staff compared to their European and international counterparts, the policy area of ‘education’ exemplifies a number of cleavages pertinent to modern Greek society post-. Certainly, secularism versus religion, favouritism and clientelism, excellence and meritocracy, the division between Left and Right, education as a public or private good, and implementation of reform and political trust are only some of the cleavages that feature highly on the political agenda on education policy.

. C  D  G E P

.................................................................................................................................. Authority and organization are central concepts in education policy; in other words education policy can be defined as the distribution of resources, authority, and decisionmaking power on issues of education (Luke and Hogan, ; Rizvi and Lingard, ). Across these lines, one of the most influential Greek education theorists, Alexis Dimaras, in his seminal work The Reform that Never Happened (in Greek, ) analysed in two volumes the foundation of modern Greek education, associating education policy with parallel processes of social, political, and economic developments alongside related ideological discourses. The purpose of his work was to assess Greek education’s problems and challenges in order to reform it. But for Dimaras, reform was not about the legal substitution of one method with another, the development of infrastructure or the change of the school curriculum; instead he argued that education reform is about ‘changing of orientation, the dominance of a new spirit’ (Dimaras, ). He, therefore, referred to changes in the dominant discourse and philosophy of education policy, focusing on two dimensions: (a) Decentralization of education, in terms of delegating decision-making to stakeholders; and, (b) Professionalization of education to allow pedagogical freedom within the Greek schooling system.

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

 

Nonetheless, neither of the two dimensions materialized. Education policymakers did not always align with education research in Greece. One of the main concerns of policymakers was the diffusion of national identity and the integration of future generations to reproduce particular paradigms that also applied to the demands of a national labour market. This kind of perspective ensured the demarcation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ to maximize homogeneity in identity (Zambeta, ) and to allow the smooth operation of economic production and social life. Whereas these kinds of models became obsolete in Western Europe (Faas, ), in Greece they persisted. Education research in Greece started informing policy-making relatively late. Benchmarking and standards primarily cascaded in a top-down fashion from EU frameworks or the OECD toolkit and the World Bank, that connected education with employability and skills (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, ) or investment in education with possible returns to the economy (Psacharopoulos, ). Participation in EU structures was particularly important as it was connected to the transfer of funds to EU member states. Although education policy belongs to the soft forms of policy coordination in the EU, for instance processes like Bologna and programmes like Erasmus and Socrates, research funding created pressures for alignment or convergence of national models to the wider European model of education. The main debate here has to do with policy transfer, policy diffusion, and policy isomorphism (for extensive accounts, see Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, ), especially when it comes to knowledge transfer from abroad. Even so, one of the greatest corporatist pathologies of Greece, namely clientelism and state capture by trade unions (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis, ), interfered not only in the implementation of education policy, but also in policy design, frequently posing a populist rhetoric and a denunciatory discourse, which was often not evidence based. Education as a policy area became a political subsystem on its own merit that was not necessarily part of a single government agent or programme. This type of complexity did not allow reforms to be generally successful or to be fully implemented, for example in higher education (Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, ). Frequently, in the case of Greece, policy change in education was not necessarily a product of internal fermentation, but rather an effort to transfer external structures and emulate external practices, or as part of a wider effort to link the Greek economy to global demand for skills. In turn, this tendency in policy-making frequently led to badly copying a full policy agenda or emulating ideas, rather than becoming the inspiration behind a reform, especially in the context of education reforms in Greece, not only in the recent years but also in the past (e.g. the reform of secondary education in ).

. T S   I

.................................................................................................................................. The organization of the education system and schools at large is deeply embedded in structures of past cleavages which had shaped Greek society from the origins of the

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

modern Greek state. Traditionally, the role of the school emanated from the role central government assigned to it. In other words, the central government designed and delivered education, while the state was to provide education as a public good. At the same time, the Greek Orthodox Church was interwoven within the provision of education, as religion was seen as part of the construction of the modern Greek identity. In fact, religious studies have always been and still are compulsory in the primary and secondary school curriculum from the first grade to graduation. The embeddedness of the Church in education has historically made it an important stakeholder, frequently reacting to reform efforts. The development of the school as an institution cannot be taken out of the social and political context from which it has sprung. Following the restoration of democracy in , the party of New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) which was in power in – proceeded with the first major reform in the Greek school system and with the development of the school curriculum, which took place in , including changes in primary and secondary education (Stamelos et al., ). In this context, mandatory education expanded from the six years of primary education to include the first three years of secondary education (thus nine years in total). At the same time, colloquial Greek (‘demotiki’) was adopted as the official language of instruction. The implementation of the reform took place in the s, and assumed an ideological justification: with the advent of PASOK in  in power and social democratic ideas in public policy-making, this reform was seen as a means to democratize education, and to maintain as many pupils as possible within the public education system. At the same time, aptitude examinations were minimized to the point of becoming symbolic in secondary education. Within a decade, this measure resulted in the doubling of the flow of pupils from primary to secondary education. In terms of developing new curricula, the secularization agenda of PASOK (in power in –) tried to decouple religion from schools. Given the strong Greek Orthodox Christian tradition even in modern times, this created a point of friction with the Church, and still remains a point of contention today (Erasmus, ). In fact, recent changes to religious education in schools, meant to disentangle it from the Greek Orthodox tradition, have been deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (Kathimerini, ). Part of the problem is that religious issues still fall under the remit of the Ministry of Education (which was formally known as Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs—a unique denomination for a ministry in a developed country). To that extent, education policy and subsequently the education system, is highly centralized, with national and compulsory curricula emanating from the Greek Ministry of Education. In fact, the Ministry dictates the content for all education levels and assigns textbooks (Ifanti, ). To the present day, and covered by the Constitution (Art. ), the state is the provider of education and maintains central control of the curriculum and other education issues. Despite several attempts to recognize the input of regional and local decision-makers in shaping education policy, especially in the first two tiers of education, with regional administrative units (Law /), the result

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

 

was adverse. Centralization was strengthened and regional administrative units became extended bureaucratic arms of the ministry. Therefore, instead of embedding stakeholders’ interests at the local level, these interests are excluded from decision-making (Saiti, ). Finally, it is important to discuss the role of the school in diffusing identity and values. The cultural and political tradition of Greece is not only tied with the presence of the Church as already discussed, but also with ancient Greek civilization and its humanistic values. Despite the fact that in the s there was heavy modernization of the school curriculum, there is still an emphasis on the classical values (Ifanti, ). That means that despite the educational turn towards economic development and the globalization of education policy, conservative and elitist paradigms are still reproduced through the school. One additional challenge has been the rise of extreme rightwing politics in Greece as a result of the Greek financial crisis. The electoral success of extreme right-wing party, Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή), in the elections of  and  brought back the debate about nationalism within the school curriculum and how such values can be infused through pedagogical means. Recent research conducted in the Department of Education in the University of Western Macedonia amongst its own students (future teachers) found that among supporters of the GD party, entering the education system was perceived as an opportunity to form education programmes and teaching material relating to the values of the party, with the view to reform Greek youth and impart traditional Greek values to the education system (Kalerante, ).

. R: A G A   P T?

.................................................................................................................................. Reform capacity is one of the greatest pathologies in Greece. The problem is not contemporary or stemming only out of the recent financial crisis post-. The inability of the Greek public sector to design and implement structural or administrative reforms has been largely noted in the literature (Featherstone, ). Spanou and Sotiropoulos () present an extensive account of administrative reforms since the early s, making specific references to the concepts of clientelism and favouritism as constraining the capacity and the will of political actors to implement reforms. The Greek state also has a weak system capability to reform which, in turn, means that policy objectives often are not clear, and the institutional set-up does not facilitate the clarity of competencies among implementation agents (see Zahariadis, ). Education policy and education system reform could not be an exception to the above pathology. In fact, many of the reforms in education have either been incomplete or abandoned altogether, frequently succumbing to pressures from various interest groups and public opinion.

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

A number of legislative acts since the s have attempted to modernize all levels of education, although the majority of them are concerned with access to higher education. One of the prime examples was Law /, quite radical in spirit and resembling some of the contemporary debates in higher education in Britain on the co-production of education with students. Andreas Papandreou, prime minister and leader of PASOK at the time, himself described the law concerning the structure and the functioning of the Greek university system as ‘the most radical there is, compared to any law in any other country’, as university students would be able to work alongside university academics to decide the course of higher education (Grant, ). The law was criticized for deteriorating standards and politicizing the university, an issue that will be explored in a separate section. The first PASOK government (–) abolished entry exams for upper secondary education, further increasing access. It also created a model of a comprehensive upper secondary school that would be able to distribute students according to vocational aspirations (Georgiadis, ). At the same time, Law / established a threeyear long post-secondary tier of vocational education training through Technological Education Institutes (TEI, Τεχνολογικά Εκπαιδευτικά Ιδρύματα). New curricula and textbooks were introduced and decision-making was opened up to devolved committees. Ideologically, changes followed the spirit of social justice in terms of equal access to education, but at the same time led to the rapid growth of student numbers progressing to higher education, without the necessary investment in school infrastructure. A second major reform began in – following the electoral victory of ND (). The reform emphasized conservative principles that included more stringent disciplinary restrictions/penalties in schools and mandatory church attendance. The proposals led to extensive school occupations, culminating in countrywide uprising by pupils. The protests led to the murder of Nikos Temponeras, a schoolteacher in one of the occupied schools, by members of ONNED (the youth branch of ND party) in January . Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, minister of education of the ND government at the time, was forced to resign and the reform was abandoned. Nevertheless, protests did not subside and during one riot, a department store was set alight, leading to the death of four civilians. The new minister of ND, Georgios Souflias attempted a second, ‘lighter’ reform in  which, as expected from a popular centre-right party, was dominated by a neoliberal spirit. In fact, this was the first time that the concept of privatization in higher education entered the education discourse in Greece. Reform ideas also included students’ responsibility to progress from one level of education to the next, and the distributive functions of the schools, namely the use of examinations to restrict access to upper secondary and higher education (Andreou, ). The return of PASOK to government in  was not followed by a return to the previous status quo but rather, given the party’s alignment with more contemporary social democratic ideals of the time, prepared the grounds for a new reform in . It is important to understand at this stage that changes in the EU itself, such as the launching of new programmes of mobility and exchange, vocational training, and

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

 

structural and cohesion funds, influenced the spirit of the  reform, focusing on expanding the knowledge base and providing flexibility in education. Law / retained university entry exams, established lifelong training programmes for teachers and appraisals of their performance, and also introduced meritocratic recruitment of teaching staff across all levels of education. The reform was implemented with delay and again under extreme resistance from opposition parties and both teachers and student unions. Later, and until , many of the reform measures were revoked or amended. At this stage, it is worth mentioning the high number of stakeholders and interest groups/associations that were safeguarding established regimes. Teachers’ associations (widely known with their acronyms OLME, representing secondary education teachers, and DOE, representing primary school teachers) colluded frequently with the political factions of university students. Such factions were organized by youth organizations of political parties, thereby amplifying the deep embeddedness of clientelism in the Greek education system. Since , many governments have attempted reforms at all levels of education but without a complete overhaul of the education system itself. Largely, this was an effect of stark opposition embedded within interest groups, such as the afore-mentioned unions and factions. Opposition has mainly been directed against the privatization of higher education and the modernization of the university system in accordance with EU guidelines (e.g. the Bologna Process). Time and time again, successive ministers of education have been forced to resign or have been dismissed by prime ministers in cabinet reshuffles. An interesting case was the reform attempted by Minister Marietta Giannakou of ND in : her proposals were touching upon the revision of the secondary school curriculum as well as the autonomy and internationalization of higher education institutions in line with the Bologna Process. She was also forced out after an outcry of the afore-mentioned interest groups of all kinds. Another major reform was attempted by the PASOK Minister of Education Anna Diamantopoulou (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis, ) in , through Law /, which was also subsequently amended and partly implemented. Beyond the higher education reform (outlined later in a separate section), the law included significant changes in the digitization of primary and secondary education and the creation of an all-day schooling system with vocational-based training, including the full devolution of decision-making to the regional/local education authorities. With the advent of Syriza in office in , some minor reforms took place in terms of primary and secondary education focusing on school timetables, exams, and textbooks. The changes pertaining to the teaching of religious education were particularly controversial and, as discussed earlier, deemed unconstitutional by Greece’s highest administrative court in . Thus, although there have been some huge efforts to reform and modernize the education system since the restoration of democracy in , those have been only partly successful. The political will to reform has repeatedly fallen victim of political cost and this is not out of the ordinary for a number of reform attempts in public policy in Greece.

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



. E  D  E

.................................................................................................................................. Access to education, not least as a universal human right, is a paramount obligation of the state. Nonetheless, neglecting the quality of education may be to the detriment of that access. In fact, access to education is guaranteed under the Greek Constitution and is considered a public good for achieving prosperity of the individual and society. As part of the ‘welfare state’, access to public and free education is part of the ideological grounding of all Greek political parties, albeit with different worldviews. Public education has the mission to provide social cohesion, homogeneity in terms of values, and a national identity (Giannakopoulos, ). Coupled with a perception in Greece that without higher education, career progression is impossible, the elimination of social inequalities and barriers to education has become a mantra for successive Greek governments. After the restoration of democracy (), democratization of education was a social demand that was aligned with the European orientation of Greece, and there was an overall consensus about widening participation from all social strata. Some of the early reforms increased the years of mandatory schooling in line with other western democracies. However, plenty of issues emerged with regard to hiring of teaching staff, the staff–student ratio and ideological frictions regarding private education. This latter cleavage is in line with the ideological battle in Greece between the Left and the Right, between social democracy and neoliberal practices, in other words the debate between equality of outcome versus equality of opportunity. However, certain concepts were distorted in political rhetoric. For example, in , PASOK already declared that the school exam system should be replaced by methods of constant quality assurance and evaluation of knowledge. Later, from  onwards, and in line with international benchmarking, improving the quality of education became a key feature in education policy. In recent times, we encounter a similar political rhetoric in Syriza’s stance towards private education and more specifically, in terms of decoupling secondary education from university entry exams. According to Syriza, the emancipatory nature of education contributes to active citizenship in line with a humanistic understanding of education (Syriza, ). Therefore, the most recent reforms introduced by Syriza Ministers of Education, Aristides Baltas and Kostas Gavroglou, were aimed at the reduction of private tutoring for pupils in the earlier grades of secondary education, and the eventual transformation of the final grade of high school into a foundation year for higher education entry. Focusing on the period post-, there were multiple efforts to create a system of evaluating not only education output but also the performance of teaching staff. These attempts have fallen short of expectation (Stamelos et al., ). In terms of quality assurance and evaluation, successive PASOK and ND governments passed legislation to regulate the evaluation of the education system across all tiers. Between  and

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

 

, two laws, two presidential decrees, one ministerial decision, and thirteen circulars on primary education were issued emphasizing alignment with the European benchmarks, but failing to be coherent in terms of concepts and discourses surrounding the evaluation system (Stamelos et al., ).

. T P  H E

.................................................................................................................................. Many of the pathologies of the Greek education system and the shortcomings of Greek education policy can be located in the provision of higher education. This section examines some of these issues around three main dimensions: (a) the politicization of the university; (b) the marketization and provision of private education; and (c) the denunciation of reforms in higher education. The main inference in this case is that the point of departure to solve some of those issues would be the disentanglement of a political cost mentality and the formation of a unified education strategy and vision, an idea that has been long floating in the literature (Lambropoulos and Psacharopoulos, : ). As already mentioned, one of the earliest reforms post- brought in a vision for higher education that would position the student as a co-producer of education (Grant, ). Such visions stem from the development of a strong student movement, which had contributed a lot to the resistance against the Colonels’ regime (–) and also nurtured many of Greece’s post-dictatorship political leaders, including future prime ministers and ministers. The impact of student activism in bringing forward political change has been widely documented in the international literature (see Staggenborg, ), and universities have held a reputation for fostering critical thinking and progressive ideas. Greece was no exception, as one of the first demands post- was the restoration of academic freedom and the overall democratization of education. To that extent, the perception of the university as an ‘asylum’ where government is not to intervene became a central axis in most higher education reforms. At the same time, political life within the university was organized around student factions closely affiliated with the major political parties in Greece. Therefore, there was a direct association of university politics to national politics (for an extensive reference, see Kornetis, ). University demands became, in turn, embedded within party politics in terms of participation, creation, and expansion of university departments (Pesmazoglu, ), university entry exams, length of studies, and infrastructure. Frequent student strikes and occupations, intimidation of academic staff, and violent rioting reduced the idea of the university as an ‘asylum’ to a space protecting antisystemic elements in Greek society. University campuses were often associated with violent frictions between anarchists and the police (Karamichas, ). Therefore, any education reform could hardly ignore the students as stakeholders. The other area of contention has to do with the establishment of non-state (private) higher education institutions. In Greece, according to the Constitution (Art. ), higher

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

education is exclusively provided by the state, while the employees of higher education institutions, including academics, researchers, and administrators, are considered civil servants. At the same time, higher education is free (with no tuition fees at all for undergraduate studies), while universities are funded primarily through the state budget. It can be argued that there is a state monopoly in the provision of higher education. The sector itself is engaged in rent-seeking, which has been linked to the deterioration of the quality of education (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, ) and the absence of quality assurance mechanisms (Stamelos et al., ). To that extent, some of the reforms of the early s made some reference to the provision of higher education by non-profit, non-public institutions, opening a window to private education which, however, was met with strong resistance. In fact, private higher education establishments are operating in Greece as colleges and are not of equal standing to public higher education institutions. Degrees awarded by such non-stateowned colleges are not officially recognized as university degrees. Many of the colleges operate under franchising licences and provide degrees formally awarded by mostly British or American universities. Psacharopoulos () has provided an interesting economic analysis of the social cost of this constitutional prohibition of non-state higher education in terms of its impact on the national economy. The cost is measured, not only in terms of the provision of education in Greece, but also in terms of brain-drain effects in the economy from the outflow of Greek students to universities abroad. Nonetheless, despite resistance to the provision of higher education by private agents, the idea of marketization of higher education has emerged. This emerging idea in Greece’s education system is coupled with international practices of creating autonomously financed universities, which are still subsidized by the public purse but are effectively operating on their own and generating their own income. Therefore, the discussion focuses more on the reduction of the public character of the university rather than on privatization per se (Georgiadis, ). Today, for example, the Hellenic Open University and the Hellenic International University operate under such principles of self-financing, alongside postgraduate taught programmes in the rest of state universities for which students incur tuition fees. Finally, higher education reform has provoked much opposition at every turn. The most recent attempt for an overhaul was Law / (the ‘Diamantopoulou law’ mentioned previously), which was passed in  with a majority of more than  MPs out of  in one of the largest ever majorities in the Greek parliament. Nonetheless, its implementation was not as smooth: the law was linked to the increasing pressures for structural reform by the bailout agreement, that is, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Greece’s international lenders in , despite not being part of it. Implementation also failed because of the lack of a wider supporting coalition by stakeholders affected by the reform. The law aimed at decoupling university administration from direct political influence, widening the autonomy of universities from the Ministry of Education in decision-making, and creating mechanisms for quality assurance in order to align Greece to the European benchmarks.

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

 

The so-called ‘Diamantopoulou law’ envisaged the establishment of university councils (equivalent to boards of trustees). It allowed flexibility in terms of organizing programmes of study and focus of curriculum. It set out guidelines for linking state universities to public and private sources of funding for research. The law elevated the role of an oversight body, the Hellenic Quality Assurance Agency, to a mechanism of evaluation of the quality of academic programmes. However, university employees’ unions, some academic staff, the university factions of political parties, and student unions reacted fiercely (Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, ). In this case, within six months from ratification, the law had already been amended and, following two more amendments, eight supplementary laws, and one ministerial decision, elements of the reform were either reversed, abandoned, or partly implemented. New pressures for reform emerged after the  update of the MoU that the government of Syriza signed with the EU, contrary to its prior opposition to university reform. Thus, there was a deliverable on education reform in Greece (European Commission, b), but further legislation, not always converging with EU reform guidelines, was passed while Syriza was in government.

. C R

.................................................................................................................................. The purpose of this chapter was to explain how the state of education and education policy in Greece is entangled within historical and political debates in the country. As an area of policy-making and as a sector in general, education highlights some deep cleavages and wider problems that affect both the Greek society and economy. Marred by constant ideological struggles, in Greece the school as an institution has been reduced to a basic service provider with overstretched staff, outdated infrastructure, and an overall lack of vision in a global context. Although a number of reforms have been passed, the majority of them have fallen short of expectations, mostly because of their appropriation as political tools to promote or constrain particular interests. One of the main problematic areas remains higher education, where consecutive reforms have failed to modernize university governance and outlook, crystallizing issues of politicization and clientelism. In fact, this is demonstrated in the lack of coherent mechanisms of quality assurance, but also through general barriers to education access, as shown in this chapter. The challenges for future researchers in this area is to dig deeper in the discourses around Greek education policy and the education system at large to further understand (a) the linkages between education and the future outlook of Greek society; (b) the involvement of education experts and stakeholders in decision-making processes; (c) the alignment of the graduates of Greek schools of all tiers with the skills and knowledge challenges of the future. Most importantly, however, future research should focus at the micro-level in terms of the challenges presented by issues of unequal access to education and the—continued to this day—cultivation of value-sets that do not

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promote equality and diversity—an issue that is perhaps reflected in the development of Greek society at large.

R Andreou, A. (). ‘Η ‘ύλη’ των εκπαιδευτικών μεταρρυθμίσεων και αλλαγών στην πρωτοβάθμια και δευτεροβάθμια εκπαίδευση: –’. [The Content of Education Reforms and Changes in Primary and Secondary Education: –]. Themes of History of Education,  (): –. Dimaras, A. (). Η μεταρρύθμιση που δεν έγινε [The Reform That Never Happened]. Athens: Estia. Erasmus (). ‘Greece’s Ruling Leftists Soften their Secularism: In Greece, a Step Backwards from Secularism’, The Economist,  October. Available at: https://www.economist.com/ blogs/erasmus///religious-education-greece/ (accessed  April ). European Commission. (a). ‘Education and Training Monitor  Greece’. Available at: https://eclass.uowm.gr/modules/document/file.php/NURED/monitor-el_en.pdf/ (accessed  February ). European Commission. (b). ‘Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding ..’ Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ecfin_smou_en. pdf/ (accessed  February ). Exadaktylos, T. and Zahariadis, N. (). ‘Quid Pro Quo: Political Trust and Policy Implementation in Greece during the Age of Austerity’. Politics & Policy,  (): –. Faas, D. (). ‘The Nation, Europe, and Migration: A Comparison of Geography, History, and Citizenship Education Curricula in Greece, Germany, and England’. Journal of Curriculum Studies,  (): –. Featherstone, K. (). ‘External Conditionality and the Debt Crisis: The “Troika” and Public Administration Reform in Greece’. Journal of European Public Policy,  (): –. Frangoudaki, A. (). Γλώσσα και ιδεολογία [Language and Ideology]. Athens: Odysseas. Frangoudaki, A. (). Η γλώσσα και το έθνος, – [Language and the Nation, –]. Athens: Alexandria. Frangoudaki, A. and T. Dragona. (). Τι είναι η πατρίδα μας; Εθνοκεντρισμός στην Εκπαίδευση [What Is Our Country? Ethnocentrism in Education]. Athens: Alexandria. Georgiadis, N. M. (). ‘Trends in State Education Policy in Greece:  to the  Reform’. Education Policy Analysis Archives,  (): –. Georgiadis, N. M. (). ‘Greek University: The Road to Marketisation’. Research in Comparative and International Education,  (): –. Giannakopoulos, D. (). ‘Η γένεση του ευρωπαϊκού κράτους πρόνοιας και η ανάδειξη της παιδείας ως δημόσιου αγαθού’ [The Birth of the European Welfare State and the Emergence of Education as a Public Good]. Mentoras, : –. Grant, G. H. (). ‘University Reform in Greece:  and After’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies,  (): –. Ifanti, A. (). ‘Policy and Curriculum Development in Greece. The Case of Secondary School Curriculum’. Pedagogy, Culture & Society,  (): –. Kalerante, E. (). ‘The Youngsters’ Participation in Extreme Right Political Parties in Greece: The Case of Students—Supporters of ‘Chrisi Avgi’. American Journal of Educational Research  (): –.

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Karamichas, J. (). ‘The December  Riots in Greece: Profile’. Social Movement Studies,  (): –. Kathimerini (). ‘Court Deems Changes to School Religion Classes Unconstitutional’, Kathimerini,  March. Available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com//article/ ekathimerini/news/court-deems-changes-to-school-religion-classes-unconstitutional/ (accessed  February ). Kornetis, K. (). Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the ‘Long s’ in Greece. Oxford: Berghahn Books. Lambropoulos, H. S. and Psacharopoulos, G. (). ‘Κοινωνικοοικονομικές διαστάσεις της τριτοβάθμιας εκπαίδευσης: Τάσεις, προβλήματα και δυνατές λύσεις [Socioeconomic Dimensions of Tertiary Education: Trends, Problems and Possible Solutions]. Greek Review of Social Research, : –. Luke, A. and Hogan, D. J. (). ‘Redesigning what Counts as Evidence in Educational Policy: The Singapore Model’. In Ozga, J., Seddon, T., and Popkewitz, T. (eds.) Education Research and Policy: Steering the Knowledge-based Economy. London: Routledge, –. OECD. (a). ‘Greece—Country Note—Education at a Glance : OECD Indicators’. Available at: http://gpseducation.oecd.org/Content/EAGCountryNotes/GRC.pdf/ (accessed  February ). OECD (b). ‘Education Policy in Greece: A Preliminary Assessment’. Available at: http:// www.oecd.org/education/educationpolicyingreeceapreliminaryassessment.htm/ (accessed  February ). Pelagidis, T. and Mitsopoulos, M. (). ‘State Monopoly in Higher Education as a Rent Seeking Industry in Greece’. Journal of Educational Planning and Administration,  (): –. Pesmazoglu, S. (). ‘Government, Ideology and the University Curriculum in Greece’. European Journal of Education,  (): –. Psacharopoulos, G. (). ‘The Social Cost of an Outdated Law: Article  of the Greek Constitution’. European Journal of Law and Economics,  (): –. Psacharopoulos, G. (). (ed.) Economics of Education: Research and Studies. New York: Pergamon Press. Psacharopoulos, G. and Woodhall, M. (). Education for Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rizvi, F. and Lingard, B. (). Globalising Education Policy. London: Routledge. Saiti, A. (). ‘The Development and Reform of School Administration in Greece: A Primary School Perspective’, Educational Management Administration & Leadership,  (): –. Spanou, C. and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘The Odyssey of Administrative Reforms in Greece, –: A Tale of Two Reform Paths’. Public Administration  (): –. Staggenborg, S. (). Social Movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stamelos, G. (). ‘Le poids de l’histoire dans la construction du “nous” et de “l’autre”: analyse du cas grec’. Penser l’Éducation, : –. Stamelos, G., Vasilopoulos, A. and Bartzakli, M. (). ‘Understanding the Difficulties of Implementation of a Teachers’ Evaluation System in Greek Primary Education: From National Past to European Influences’, European Educational Research Journal,  (): –. Stamelos, G., Vasilopoulos, A., and Kavasakalis, A. (). Εισαγωγή στις εκπαιδευτικές πολιτικές [Introduction to Education Policies]. Athens: Syndesmos Ellinikon Akadimaikon Vivliothikon.

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Stamoulas, A. (). ‘Greece before the Bologna Process: Confronting or Embracing Quality Assurance in Higher Education?’ Higher Education Policy,  (): –. SYRIZA (). ‘Syriza’s Programme for the Reconstruction of the Education System’ (in Greek). Available at: https://www.syriza.gr/theseis/pros_diavoulefsi_paideia.pdf./ (accessed  February ). Zahariadis, N. (). ‘Leading Reform amidst Transboundary Crises: Lessons from Greece’, Public Administration,  (): –. Zahariadis, N. and Exadaktylos, T. (). ‘Policies that Succeed and Programs that Fail: Ambiguity, Conflict, and Crisis in Greek Higher Education’, Policy Studies Journal,  (): –. Zambeta, E. (). ‘Religion and National Identity in Greek Education’, Intercultural Education,  (): –.

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  ......................................................................................................................

          

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. G has been typically an emigration country for much of its modern history. Greece was an emigration country throughout the post-World War II period and it was only in the late s and early s that this trend was reversed. The net migration rate (those arriving minus those leaving) became positive in the s as former emigrants started returning to the country. However, there was little, if any, foreign immigration until the implosion of the communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe in . Greek immigration policy developed in reaction to the significant geopolitical and demographic changes that followed  and without a long-term vision. Immigration was seen as a temporary phenomenon and both New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) and the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) governments in the s and s failed to develop a proactive policy. The first comprehensive migration law was voted in  (Law /), and another law was passed in  (Law /), but both were also marked by a view of immigration as a necessary evil and as a short-lived phenomenon. Integration into the labour market, schools, and society happened largely de facto, strengthening a dual labour market structure where natives took the stable, more prestigious and well-paid jobs, while immigrants worked in the so-called ‘ D’ jobs (dirty, dangerous, and demanding) in agriculture, construction, care work, cleaning, and catering (Baldwin Edwards, ; Labrianidis and Lyberaki, ). While in the late s Greece was on a path of normalization of migration and of tacit conversion of Greek society into a de facto culturally and religiously diverse country (epitomized in the first citizenship reform in ), the onset of the acute economic and political crisis of  and the refugee emergency of  interrupted this normalization path. Despite the integration of relevant migration legislation into a single bill, the Migration Code, voted in , Greece is still lacking a proactive migration management approach.

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The economic crisis of  and the following years have strongly affected settled migrants and their families. The main challenge for them has been the precarity of their legal status. Those who had not managed to obtain a long-term ( years or more) permit (for which one can apply after having spent  years of uninterrupted legal residence in the country) lost their legal status, as they became unemployed and hence unable to renew their stay permits. Often whole families were dependent on the stay permit of the father (the wife and mother being employed informally) and faced deregularization even when their children were born in Greece or had come to Greece at a very young age. After the start of the economic crisis in Greece many families returned, particularly to Albania, or lived transnationally, for instance with one parent circulating between the two countries and the other parent living with the children in Albania or in Greece (depending on what they cοuld afford). While legislation was passed in  to address the issue of de-legalization because of unemployment or underemployment, this has been an important challenge for many migrant families since . Other migrant populations, like for instance Georgians, have stayed, as many of the women migrants were employed as live-in carers, while many Pakistanis have left the country because of protracted unemployment. The last decade has also seen a sharp rise in racial violence and xenophobic/racist discourse against migrants alongside the rise of the far-right-wing party Golden Dawn (GD, Χρυσή Αυγή) (Triandafyllidou, ). In addition to these more long-term migration issues, Greece has been affected by the massive transit of over a million people, mostly asylum-seekers, during  and the early months of , which was part of the EU wide ‘refugee emergency’. While the large flows through the Aegean islands decreased significantly after the issuing of the EU-Turkey statement in March , arrivals to the Aegean islands continued at a steady pace in – and with a notable increase in the spring and summer of  also through the Greek Turkish land border. Important challenges remain with regard to the processing, return, relocation, or integration of the asylum-seekers currently present in the country. This chapter seeks to offer an overview of the migration policies and challenges that Greece faces in the twenty-first century and on how these have evolved in the s and s. The chapter starts with a short presentation of the migrant population in Greece, its composition and its access to the labour market, so as to give a sense of the socio-economic and demographic importance of immigration in Greek society today. It then looks at the evolution of immigration and asylum policies in relation also to the politics behind such evolutions, notably the positions of the two main parties, ND and PASOK and more recently the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς). The chapter also explores the role of external pressures from fellow European Union (EU) member states and EU institutions, and the overall role of exogenous factors, such as the dramatic increase of asylum-seeking flows since . The chapter concludes with some critical observations concerning the present and future of immigrants and their descendants in Greek society.

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

 

. M P  G

.................................................................................................................................. The  national census data registered , third-country nationals (TCNs) and , EU citizens (non-Greek) living in Greece accounting, respectively, for . per cent and . per cent of the total resident population—hence a total of . per cent of the resident population in the country. The largest immigrant communities were Albanians (approximately half of all immigrants present in Greece), Bulgarians, Romanians, Pakistanis, Georgians, Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles. In , there were just over half a million third-country nationals living in Greece and, according to the Labour Force Survey, just over , EU citizens (see Table .). Since the mid-s the migrant population of Greece has been decreasing, both because a few tens of thousands have been naturalized (see Table ., later in chapter) and because many third-country nationals have returned to their countries of origin. The main immigrant communities in  are the same as those registered at the  census. Concerning the purpose of third-country nationals’ stay in Greece (see Figure .),  per cent of men held permits of the ‘other category’, which includes permits of ten-year or indefinite duration as well as permits for humanitarian or exceptional reasons, followed by permits for family reunification ( per cent) and residence permits for employment purposes ( per cent). The majority of women hold family reunification permits ( per cent) followed by ‘other’ category permits ( per cent) and employment permits ( per cent). Student permits are considerably lower in number. During the s there has been a clear shift in the number of permits from permits of employment (for men) and of family reunification (for women) to those of ten-year or indefinite duration, which suggests that the migrant population in Greece has stabilized and is mostly long-term settled in the country. This shift also attests to the fact that migrants have faced similar unemployment and underemployment challenges as native workers in the last few years. Looking at the employment patterns of third-country nationals up to , Greece presented a typical southern European pattern: relatively high levels of unemployment Table 35.1 Stock of foreign population in Greece, 2018 Size of immigrant stock Total Third countries’ nationals population Total EU28 countries’ citizens (non-Greeks) Total immigrant stock Total population in Greece

540,260* 76,600** 616,860 10,738,868***

% of total resident population 5.03 0.71 5.74 100.00

Sources: *Ministry of Migration Policy, database of permits for TCNs/ **Eurostat LFS Database, 2018 (Q2)/ ***Eurostat database on population change, 2018.

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

180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

Employment

Other

Family MEN

Studies

WOMEN

 . Stay permits by gender and purpose. Source: Graph compiled by the author on the basis of database on residence permits on August , Ministry of Migration Policy.

among nationals coexisted with low unemployment rates among foreign workers. The pattern had a relatively simple explanation, rather common among South European countries: the Greek labour market was characterized by high segmentation with special employment niches occupied by migrant workers. The native population’s living standards had increased in recent decades and there was widespread participation in tertiary education. Thus, young Greeks preferred to wait for employment which conformed to their skills, while being financially supported by their families, rather than take up a low-prestige, low-skilled, and low-paying job. However, the situation started changing in early  as a result of the overall economic crisis in the country. Labour Force Survey data for the period – showed a spectacular rise in unemployment for both immigrant men and women (mainly TCNs). Immigrant men jumped from nearly full employment to unemployment levels of  per cent (EU citizens) and  per cent (TCNs) in , reaching  per cent (EU citizens) and an alarming  per cent (TCNs) in the last trimester of . The year  marked a further important change in the distribution of migrant workers among the three sectors of production (primary, secondary, and tertiary). Employment in the secondary sector (typically the largest in the s and s) fell sharply from a half to a third of all migrant employment. Migrant occupation rose significantly in the primary sector (from . per cent in  to . per cent in ) and in the tertiary sector (from  per cent in  to . per cent in ). It is highly likely that these changes reflect the crisis in the construction sector and the necessity for many migrants to declare themselves as employed in the agricultural sector or indeed to turn to employment in that sector, in order to renew their permits. The turn of migrant employment towards the tertiary sector was confirmed in the period – when migrants were mainly occupied in the tertiary sector, with a large representation of Albanians in all three sectors for both years (Triandafyllidou and

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

 

Gemi, ). While unemployment rates for Greece’s general population showed a steady decrease after , the same trend was followed only by male third-country nationals, while female third-country nationals and non-Greek EU citizens showed higher unemployment rates. This probably also testifies to the gradual transition of both the EU and non-EU migrant population into sectors where they compete with natives.

. G M P D

.................................................................................................................................. Greek migration policy development can be divided into an early period which covers the early s until  and a later period from  to today.

.. The Early Period: Migrants as Labour Force The early period of Greek migration policy and politics was characterized by an instrumental view of migrants as a cheap and plentiful labour force. There was largely consensus between the major political forces that migration should be tolerated, or indeed accepted, for as long as migrants were seen as beneficial to the national economy; if they were not, they should return to their country of origin. There was little concern as to whether and how they should integrate socially and culturally beyond the labour market. It was seen as natural that the whole integration work should be done by migrants and their families alone: Greeks did not have any integration work to do (Figgou and Condor, ; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, ; Gropas and Triandafyllidou, ). Greek immigration policy in the s was mainly guided by regional and foreign policy concerns (political instability in the Balkans) alongside a lack of experience in immigration management. However, as the situation stabilized in the Balkans and political elites realized that migration was there to stay, the factors and concerns driving Greek migration policy (and political elites’ interests for that matter) changed. The role of migrants as a cheap and plentiful labour force catering to important niches of the Greek labour market (agriculture, small family firms, construction, cleaning, and generally low-pay, low-prestige jobs) came to be appreciated by employers and elites (Triandafyllidou, ). Thus, the first comprehensive immigration law, which was voted in , reflected this instrumental view of migration. Mavrodi () notes that law  of  was influenced by European policies, mostly through increased awareness of what was happening in other countries. She argues, however, that effectively the impact of EU migration legislation was rather limited. The law voted in  concentrated on a short-sighted regulation of migration through restrictive legal migration channels and a large regularization programme. The

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

short duration of stay permits was maintained on purpose, with a view to keeping migrants insecure and hence more flexible for employers (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, ). During the s, a pro-immigrant shift occurred in the positions of PASOK and other left-wing parties as well as trade unions and other civil society actors, even though this had not translated into a majority policy shift (Triandafyllidou, ). The ND party, which was in government between  and , continued implementing a restrictive migration policy in line with the rationale that prevailed in the early s. European policies, like for instance the EU long-term resident status directive, had been transposed, but their implementation on the ground was particularly restrictive. For instance, it was required that all migrants who would like to apply for this status should follow a special state-funded Greek language course that had effectively very few places available across the country. Migration had not been, however, an important issue in the Greek policy agenda until the late s, not least because the two main parties, ND and PASOK, were largely in agreement on an instrumental view of migrants as a temporary labour force who should be ready to depart when no longer needed. Beginning in  and as irregular migration and asylum-seeking pressures at the Greek-Turkish sea and land borders started rising, while the Greek labour market’s capacity to absorb low-skilled migrant workers was contracting, priority was given to border controls. In these early years the preferred route was to cross the short straits between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands in the Aegean. The situation was further complicated by the lack of a functioning asylum system in Greece and the impossibility to return people back to their countries of origin, either because these were unsafe (as for instance, Afghanistan) or because there were no readmission agreements or cooperation between, for instance, Bangladesh and Greece. These two factors, the inability to manage irregular migration and process asylum claims effectively, while the economic situation in Greece was deteriorating, provoked a tense situation. Irregular migrants and asylum-seekers continued to cross the Greek-Turkish borders, were shortly arrested, held for a period of time and then released with an expulsion decision. They moved on and concentrated in the large cities, particularly Athens. However, there was little hope either of finding a job and making a living, or having their asylum case processed and move on, or indeed being regularized (as happened in the previous  years in Greece and other southern European countries) and integrate somehow. This situation caused a political crisis in Greece which the ND government sought to address by intensifying internal and external migration controls with dubious results (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, ). Looking at Greek migration control policies, Geddes and Lazarou () argue that Greek policymakers presented the country as a key player in guarding Europe from migration-related threats. They sought to change traditional national frames regarding migration and promote frames that focused on EU migration-related goals, such as partnership with the countries of origin referring to the  Tampere principles and

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

 

the agenda on ‘Migration and Development’ introduced by the European Commission in . It was mainly in year  that migration and asylum started entering the Greek political arena as issues on which parties competed. The then far-right wing Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS, Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) had rather unsuccessfully tried to put migration on the election campaign agenda (in the September  election in particular). The ΝD government (–) tried to use migration and issues of public order to attract the attention of the electorate and keep it away from the impending economic crisis. It is in this migration policy context and with the worst economic crisis in the country’s recent history looming that PASOK came to power in  and introduced two very important changes in migration legislation: it reformed the citizenship law and it overhauled the asylum and irregular migration management system. These were two much needed and long overdue policy developments which came, however, in a period when the country was plummeting into economic hardship. This is why we consider  as a turning point for Greek immigration and immigrant integration policy: it signalled the start of an acute economic and political crisis in the country and of important reforms in Greek migration and asylum policy, while irregular migration and asylum pressures at the country’s borders with Turkey continued rising.

.. The Later Period: Migration between Security and Humanitarian Concerns Since , Greek migration policy and politics have been characterized by important tensions and developments. Migration became an issue that could shift an election, while the long-term settled migrants were largely forgotten, considered assimilated even if still suffering from discrimination and largely excluded from citizenship. The focus has shifted to increasing migration pressures at Greece’s borders with Turkey and to the related increasing pressures by fellow EU member states and EU institutions that Greece overhauls its non- functioning asylum system. FRONTEX (: ) noted that irregular migration between Turkey and Greece along the eastern Mediterranean route was undoubtedly the main challenge at the EU level. The PASOK government that came to power in October  introduced Presidential Decree / in an effort to process the backlog of asylum applications that had formed during the previous years and which exceeded , applications at the end of . In addition, Law /, passed by the Greek Parliament in January , introduced two separate agencies, the Asylum Agency and the Agency for First Reception. It thus set new standards concerning the first reception of irregular migrants, the distinction between irregular migrants and asylum-seekers, the processing of asylum applications, and the waiting period for the judgment of these applications. Most importantly, the law took the asylum committees away from the authority

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

of the Greek police (which had basically taken over the whole asylum system since ). Law / transposed the EU directive on common standards for returning illegally staying aliens and promised to significantly improve Greece’s record on both asylum and irregular migration management. Although voted in , the asylum reform was implemented only in summer —implementation was very slow, not least because of the continuing social and economic crisis that Greece was going through. The reform of the irregular migration and asylum management legislation was largely the result of Greece’s obligation to transpose the EU directive on common standards for returning illegally staying aliens as well as an effort to respond to harsh criticisms (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, ) concerning its failed asylum system. Greece had been under the spotlight because of its continuing inability to provide effective protection to asylum-seekers arriving at its shores and having to be handled on Greek territory in line with the Dublin II regulation. Already on  January , the European Commission had started infringement proceedings against Greece because of its failure to implement the Dublin II regulation, bringing the country in front of the European Court of Justice. On  January , the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Greece’s broken asylum system and appalling detention conditions meant that Belgium’s transfer of an Afghan asylum-seeker to Greece in  under the Dublin II Regulation had breached the prohibition on ill-treatment and denied him an effective remedy (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, ). These pressures to reform the country’s asylum policies were seen by MPs of different Greek parties as contrary to national interests (Triandafyllidou, ). While until , migration and asylum-seeking pressures were predominantly felt on the short straits between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands in the Aegean, in the period – migration routes shifted to the Greek-Turkish land border in the north-east corner of Greece, across the Evros River. Flows shifted again in  back to the islands, and pressure kept mounting as the situation in Syria was deteriorating. Flows were growing in  mainly from Syria, but none predicted the massive increase of . During that year over , asylum-seekers and other migrants crossed from Turkey to Greece and headed further north, taking the so-called Balkan route to Austria, Germany, Sweden, and other northern and western European countries. The flows were a result of the prolonged Syrian conflict and the bleak situation in Iraq, but as the flows grew and the ‘Balkan path’ was opened, Afghan asylum-seekers seized the ‘opportunity’ as migrant smugglers’ fees for the crossing had significantly decreased. Indeed, the flows continued in early  when another , people continued crossing via Greece, seeking refuge in northern Europe and particularly Germany, until the issuing of the EU–Turkey statement in March  that put a stop to the transit flows. In April , the Greek government led by SYRIZA hastily adopted a new law (L. /) implementing a partial reform of the asylum application processing. This law introduced an exceptional regime applicable at border areas, implementing a fast-track procedure and the notion of ‘admissibility’ of an asylum application. In other

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

 

words, if an asylum-seeker comes from a safe third country, their asylum application is considered inadmissible. In this case the application should not be examined in Greece but rather the person should be returned to the safe third country, notably Turkey. This last development has provoked criticisms from a myriad of NGOs both in Greece and abroad and from many scholars who have pointed to the fact that Turkey is not a safe country and that several provisions of the exceptional border regime do not provide for the necessary procedural safeguards (AIRE ECRE, ; Amnesty International, a, b, and c). Conditions on the islands continued to deteriorate, given the further arrivals adding to the thousands who were ‘trapped’ there. The Reception and Identification Centres on the Aegean islands in Greece (‘hotspots’) were severely overcrowded in . The NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF Statement, //) urged the authorities to immediately transfer people from Lesvos to mainland Greece and to scale up the provision of health care on the island, also warning about the dramatically worsening conditions there. The hotspot in Samos was also overcrowded threefold in early July, hosting almost , asylum seekers, with official capacity only at  (FRA, : ). In September , the ministries of education and migration policy jointly presented a plan for the education of refugee children and their integration into the Greek education system. This plan aims at facilitating access to education for all minors living in accommodation structures in Greece. More specifically, it provides for pre-schoolers to be educated through schemes organized in the refugee camps (as parents might feel uncomfortable sending them away to pre-schools), while children of primary and secondary school age will be integrated into local schools. On  July , the minister of migration policy announced that the ministry was working on a comprehensive integration plan focusing on education and employment, after systematic assessment of refugees’ skills and qualifications and consultation with all stakeholders in the field of employment. However, efforts with regard to areas fundamental for the integration of the refugee or migrant community, such as education/training and employment/apprenticeships, are sporadic and mostly originating with civil society (NGOs and international organizations) (Petrakou, ). In terms of procedures, the decision by the director of the asylum service on the duration of the validity of the cards of applicants (Decision no. /--) for international protection for a six-month period was also adopted in . With regard to subsidized and other assisted accommodation schemes for asylum seekers, there were an estimated , migrants and refugees in different accommodation facilities on the Greek mainland and islands in August . An estimated  per cent of people registered as residing in official reception facilities in Greece at the end of August  were registered in the facilities on the islands, while the remaining  per cent were registered in different types of accommodation facilities and shelters on the mainland (Triandafyllidou and Gemi, ). In conclusion, during the s, policy reforms were largely shaped by external pressures, on one hand to improve the asylum system in the early s and, on the other hand, more recently to lessen the safeguards and standards of the system, so as to

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

provide for a quick fix to returning prospective asylum-seekers to Turkey as a ‘safe third country’. The SYRIZA-led government of the – period was certainly between a rock and a hard place, as it has traditionally been a pro-immigrant and pro-diversity political force (Triandafyllidou and Kouki, ) but has had to align itself with pressures from other EU member states to stop the flows, even though the electorate was broadly supportive of refugees and rather critical of the EU.

. G C R

.................................................................................................................................. This section turns the focus to the conception of the Greek ‘nation’ and the position of migrants within it. Greek nationality has been based predominantly on the jus sanguinis principle and the naturalization procedure was long, costly, and with a very uncertain outcome, even for applicants who satisfied the requirements. Greek law provides for several modes of citizenship acquisition. Thus, besides naturalization, the law provides for acquisition of citizenship by declaration due to birth and/or residence as a minor and citizenship ascertainment (‘διαπίστωση ή καθορισμός ιθαγένειας’), based on the ethnic origin of the person. A simplified and fast procedure of naturalization is provided for persons of Greek ethnic origin, albeit the jus sanguinis logic has been applied differently for different groups of co-ethnics. Thus, Pontic Greeks coming from the former Soviet Republics benefitted from citizenship ascertainment and at least about , people acquired Greek citizenship through that procedure. By contrast, co-ethnics from Albania, the so called Voreioipirotes, were faced with a tacit ban on citizenship acquisition till  (Christopoulos, : ). The policy changed in November  after a recommendation by ministers of interior, public administration and decentralization, and of foreign affairs, to promote the procedures for granting Greek citizenship to co-ethnics from southern Albania. The policy started being implemented from January  onwards. Naturalization of both ethnic Greek and non-co-ethnic migrants stood at between , and , cases each year in the period between  and . The situation changed rather radically after  through the lifting of the informal ban on the naturalization of co-ethnic Greeks of Albania residing in Greece, who were roughly  hundred thousand at that time (Baltsiotis, : –, –). Naturalizations of Greek Albanian co-ethnics rose exponentially to over , people per year and actually to approximately , people in the period –. When PASOK came to power in October , it quickly proceeded to change the citizenship law, in keeping with its electoral promises, to facilitate naturalization for non-Greek-origin immigrants. In March , the Greek parliament adopted law / on citizenship and naturalization. The new law lowered the requirement for naturalization from ten to seven years of legal residence in Greece. Concerning the second generation of immigrants, the new law provided for children born of foreign parents in Greece to become Greek citizens through a simple declaration of their

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

 

parents, provided that both parents had been living in Greece legally for at least five years. Children who were born abroad of foreign parents, but who had completed at least six years of schooling in Greece and lived in Greece, could also naturalize with a simple declaration by their parents. Law / also introduced full local political rights for foreign residents who had lived legally in Greece for five years. The reform of citizenship law in Greece was the culmination of a slow process of ‘soft’ changes in the PASOK political elites’ views on migrant integration, which prepared the ground for this legislation. Internal developments took place within PASOK between  and  (the period during which it was in the opposition), which signalled a clear pro-migrant integration policy of the party (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, ). In , PASOK created three positions within its central committee, which were to be devolved exclusively to migrant party members. In the  PASOK Convention, the party made a firm commitment to extend citizenship to the second generation of migrants, facilitate citizenship acquisition for first-generation immigrants, and also introduce local voting rights for migrant residents when it would come to power (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, ). During the s and until the mid-s, two competing views of national identity could be identified in the Greek political spectrum: one that saw the nation as a community of descent supported by ND and smaller right-wing and far right-wing parties. The other view considered the nation as a civic community supported by PASOK, SYRIZA, and other smaller left-wing forces. The terms of the debate, however, changed and so did Greek policy in this domain with the elections of May and June  when the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn received  per cent of the national vote with a clear anti-immigrant agenda and as the crisis became ever more acute, leading many natives to unemployment and poverty. When the ND party came to power (in a three-party coalition government) in July , the new minister of the interior hurried to introduce a bill amending again the citizenship law, substantially returning to the previous situation when first-generation immigrants had to wait for ten years before applying for naturalization. On  November , the Council of State (StE, Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας) found the / law unconstitutional. The reasoning of the StE judges was that voting rights of whichever type are for citizens, even if the Constitution does not specify this as regards local elections. In addition, it maintained that the law’s new provisions for naturalization of first- or second-generation immigrants were against the Constitution because they disregarded the fact that naturalization can only happen if there is a ‘real bond’ between the foreigner and the Greek nation. Such a ‘real bond’ cannot be ascertained, they argued, by formal legal requirements such as the length of residency or the fact of having been born in Greece or the fact of having studied at a Greek school for six years. A minority among the State Council judges contested these arguments and supported a jus soli definition of the Greek nation. The annulment of the citizenship law reform of  was greeted with enthusiasm by both the ND and other small far right-wing party supporters, while it was heavily criticized by the left-wing DIMAR and PASOK (coalition partners of New Democracy

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Table 35.2 Citizenship acquisition (2011–17) 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Naturalizations of co-ethnics 12,616 13,495 22,574 15,791 8,563 7,460 3,689 Naturalizations of other nationalities 930 1,149 1,866 2,019 1,487 3,624 3,483 Birth or study in Greece 3,103 5,543 529 0 305 19,032 24,785 Other provisions 946 928 1,917 2,029 1,529 1,183 979 Under-age children of naturalized 1,627 622 3,337 1,990 2,294 1,515 782 adults (parents) Total 19,222 21,737 30,223 21,829 14,178 32,814 33,718 Source: Ministry of Migration Policy statistics on nationality, 2017

in the – government) as well as the then main left-wing opposition party SYRIZA. The issue came back to discussion after the rise of SYRIZA to government in early . Indeed, that was a priority for the new government which, despite strong opposition by its junior government coalition partner ANEL (a small right-wing nationalistic party), passed a new citizenship law (/) in . It thus made acquisition of citizenship possible with a simple declaration/application for children born in Greece and enrolled at Greek elementary schools. Naturalization has also become simple for youth that have completed most of their education in Greece (whether primary— years required, secondary— years required or university— where also a secondary education certificate is required). People who fulfil the requirements were also allowed to apply under these preferential provisions even if in the meantime they had become adults (a period of three years was given to all those who had qualified retroactively). Following this reform,  marked an important increase in the number of citizenship acquisitions (see Table .), mainly due to naturalizations through birth or study by non-co-ethnics, while the acquisition of citizenship in the ‘other provisions’ category decreased. With regard to their previous nationality, the vast majority (approx.  per cent) of new citizens were Albanians. Interestingly enough, based on a poll that took place in December , the majority of Greeks, . per cent, believe that children of legal migrants born in Greece should receive Greek citizenship at birth, yet, the percentage that had responded positively to the same question in  was even higher (.) (Dianeosis, ).

. M I  R  G

.................................................................................................................................. Greece had not developed a clear migrant integration policy in the s and s. There was a strong ethno-cultural conception of the nation based on jus sanguinis,

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

 

migrants were expected to assimilate and there was little space for accommodating cultural or religious diversity whether in policy or in practice. Claims raised by Muslim migrants for the building of a formal mosque in Athens have been met with resistance by the Greek Orthodox Church and reluctance by the state and successive governments (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, ). The predominant view of integration, as expressed also in Greece’s education policy, is one of gradual full assimilation (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, ). A nationalist intolerance has been rising in the s, where migrants, and particularly Muslims, are represented as a threat to the natives’ material well-being and to the survival of Greek culture and the Christian Orthodox religion (Triandafyllidou and Kouki, ). While integration may have happened on the ground through private initiatives between families, these have largely been predicated on the idea that migrants are ‘guests’. ‘We’ are doing ‘them’ a ‘courtesy’ by accepting ‘them’ in ‘our’ country and ‘our’ society, and ‘they’ should be grateful for that. A language of rights with regard to migration and migrant integration is still to become the dominant idiom in speaking about migration and migrant integration, despite the different initiatives and policy reforms enacted in  and in  as discussed earlier in the chapter. It is clear that as the second generation of migrants come of age, Greece will have to confront itself with its multicultural composition and the different faiths within its resident population. Recent studies highlight the efforts and nuances of belonging among adolescents and young people (Katartzi, ). The exclusive character of the dominant national identity discourse is actually reflected in public-opinion surveys throughout the last ten years. Surveys conducted in  and then annually between  and  (January of each year) by the opinion poll company Public Issue, sponsored by the large Greek daily Kathimerini (Public Issue, ), present an ambivalent assessment of migration by lay people (see Table .). A public opinion survey conducted in  by the Pew Research Centre found that anti-immigrant sentiment in Greece was the highest among seven EU countries ( per cent, as stated in Minority Rights Group International, ). In February , in its report on Greece, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) noted that the public and political discourse is widely permeated by hate speech against migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, who often become targets of racist violence. It also highlighted that Greece continues to fall short of measures to deal with and fight racism, which is on the rise in all expressions of social and political life (ECRI, ). According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Greece is ranked in the lowest category as regards existing state mechanisms for recording and publishing data on hate crimes (FRA-Fundamental Rights Agency, ). The decade of the s has seen some positive institutional and legislative developments for fighting racist violence. These have included the introduction of new special police units to tackle racist violence in late  and the appointment of public prosecutors responsible for the prosecution of acts of racist violence in October . In addition, a new anti-racism law adopted by the Greek Parliament was enacted in

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Table 35.3 Public opinion on immigration in Greece (2006–2010) 2006

2008

2009

2010

54

40

32

30

Migration harms the Greek economy

34

47

52

59

Migrants do jobs that Greeks do not want to do—agree

88

48

46

Migrants increase unemployment

56

39

45

9

8

Local voting rights for immigrants—agree

38

46

Disagree

55

49

Migration makes a positive contribution to the Greek economy

Migrants do jobs that Greeks do not want to do, but also increase unemployment

Sources: Table compiled by the author on the basis of data given in Xenios Dias (2006) and Public Issue (2010). The two surveys were conducted by different companies and with different questionnaires. This table presents those questions that were common in the two surveys.

September , and a trial against the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) party leadership started in April  (a trial concerning the assassination of a radical left-wing singer which is still ongoing in January ). Despite these developments though, the road towards a sociopolitical climate that is more respectful of fundamental rights of migrants and that condemns racial violence and hate speech, while also recognizing naturalized citizens as fully Greek, is long and tortuous.

. C R

.................................................................................................................................. While Greece seems to be entering a path of normalization and integration of its longterm settled migrant population, the challenges it faces on the asylum-seeking front have all but receded. Immigration and asylum-seeking flows via the Greek-Turkish sea and land borders increased in , leading to significant pressures on the islands and in the mainland and the re-opening of emergency accommodation in hotels and camps that had been used in the  emergency but were since abandoned. In ,  per cent of the settled immigrant population (predominantly from Albania) held long-term permits. Interestingly such permits along with family reunification permits formed the vast majority of all stay permits for third-country nationals residing in Greece. In addition, the naturalization provisions that came into effect in  led to increasing numbers of citizenship acquisitions, mostly by children born in Greece or who came to the country at a young age and attended Greek schools (, naturalizations in  of which about two-thirds were for children of the second or . generation).

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These developments suggest that Greece is faced with a bifurcated migration reality. On one hand, there is a long-term settled population that has changed the ethnic demographic composition of the citizenry and of the resident population and which has increasingly been socio-economically integrated. On the other hand, there is a recently arrived population of mostly asylum seekers that remain in precarious living conditions, even if efforts are made to stabilize and integrate it. A related challenge is the situation on the islands where tens of thousands of people are stuck, without good prospects of either going forward or going back, in inhumane living conditions. It appears that the situation on the islands will not improve significantly in the months or even years to come because of the dire conditions there and the limited hope for transfers to the mainland or other countries. These conditions act as deterrence factors to those who seek international protection outside the Middle East. However, even if managing the flows is a legitimate policy objective both at the national (Greek) and the EU level, it is neither legitimate nor acceptable to keep people in inhumane conditions, lacking access to basic facilities, for months on end. This is of course a moral and political dilemma for both Greece and the entire EU in the late s.

R AIRE, ECRE. (). ‘With Greece. Recommendations for Refugee Protection’. Report on Greece. June. Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/ with_greece.pdf/ (accessed  February ). Amnesty International. (a). ‘Trapped in Greece: Refugees Stranded in Dire Conditions as Europe Drags its Heels’. Report on Greece, July. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/ latest/news///trapped-in-greece--stranded-in-dire-conditions/ (accessed  February ). Amnesty International. (b). ‘Greece: Our Hope is Broken. European Paralysis Leaves Thousands of Refugees Stranded in Greece’. Report on Greece, September. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur///en/ (accessed  February ). Amnesty International. (c). ‘Greece: Reported Illegal Returns of Syrian Refugees to Turkey Dangerous’. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news///turkeyillegal-mass-returns-of-syrian-refugees-expose-fatal-flaws-in-eu-turkey-deal/ (accessed  February ). Baldwin Edwards, M. (). ‘Albanian Emigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbiosis and Social Ambiguity’. Southeast Europe Review, : –. Baltsiotis, L. (). ‘Developments in Albania’s Greek Minority’. Ελληνική μειονότητα της Αλβανίας: Εκπαίδευση και δημογραφική κινητικότητα στην Αλβανία και την Ελλάδα. Latsis Foundation Research Programmes, –. Available at: http://www.latsis-foundation.org/ files/Meletes/report.pdf (in Greek) Christopoulos, D. (). Ποιος είναι έλληνας πολίτης [Who is a Greek Citizen?] Athens: Ianos. Dianeosis (). ‘Τι πιστεύουν οι Έλληνες’ [Report: What Greeks Think]. Available at http:// www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads///ti_pistevoun_oi_ellines_final_version.pdf/ (accessed  February ).

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ECRI. (). ‘Report on Greece’, Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/cfe. html/ (accessed  February ). Figgou, L. and Condor, S. (). ‘Irrational Categorization, Natural Intolerance and Reasonable Discrimination: Lay Representations of Prejudice and Racism’. British Journal of Social Psychology, : –. FRA-Fundamental Rights Ageny. (). ‘Fundamental Rights: Challenges and Achievements in ’. Available at: https://fra.europe.eu/sites/default/files/annual-report-_en.pdf FRA—Fundamental Rights Agency. (). ‘Periodic Data Collection on the Migration Situation in the European Union’. November. Available at: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publi cation//migration-overviews-november-/(accessed  February ). FRONTEX. (). ‘Annual Risk Analysis’. Available at https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/ Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_.pdf/ (accessed  February ). Geddes, A. and Lazarou, E. (). ‘Europeanization of Migration Policy and Narratives of Migration Management: The Case of Greece’. Rennes: ECRC Workshop Paper, – April. Gropas, R. and Triandafyllidou, A. (). ‘Greek Education Policy and the Challenge of Migration: An “Intercultural” View of Assimilation’. Race, Ethnicity and Education,  (): –. Gropas, R. and Triandafyllidou, A. (). ‘Migrants and Political Life in Greece: Between Political Patronage and the Search for Inclusion’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Katartzi, E. (). ‘Unpacking Young Migrants’ Collective Identities: the Case of EthnoNational Identifications and Belonging’. Children and Society, : –, Labrianidis, L. and Lyberaki, A. (). Αλβανοί μετανάστες στη Θεσσαλονίκη [Albanian Immigrants in Thessaloniki] Thessaloniki: Paratiritis. Mavrodi, G. (). ‘Ulysses Turning European: The Different Faces of “Europeanization” of Greek Immigration Policy’. In Faist, T. and Ette, A. (eds.) The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Minority Rights Group International. (). ‘State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples  – Greece’. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/afa.html/ (accessed  February ). Petrakou, E. (). ‘Greece’. In Federico, V. and Cerrina Feroni, G. (eds.) Migration Governance. Collection of Country Reports: Legal and Policy Framework, –. Available at: https://www.academia.edu//Migration_Governance_Collection_of_ Country_Reports_Legal_and_Policy_Framework/ (accessed  February ). Public Issue. (). ‘Οι Έλληνες απέναντι στη μετανάστευση: Στάσεις απέναντι στη μετανάστευση και το νέο νομοθετικό πλαίσιο’ [Greeks Facing Immigration: Attitudes Towards Immigration and the New Legal Framework]. Available at: https://www.publicissue.gr/ /immigration-/ (accessed  February ). Triandafyllidou, A. (). ‘Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the st Century: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?’ European Journal of Migration and Law,  (): –. Triandafyllidou, A. (). ‘Greek Migration Policy in the s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis’. Journal of European Integration,  (): –. Triandafyllidou, A. (). ‘Reform, Counter-Reform and the Politics of Citizenship: Local Voting Rights for Third-Country Nationals in Greece’. International Migration & Integration,  (): –. Available at https://doi.org/./s---.

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Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. (). ‘Constructing Difference: The Mosque Debates in Greece’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,  (): –. Triandafyllidou, A. and Maroukis, T. (). (eds.) Η μετανάστευση στην Ελλάδα του ου αιώνα [Migration in st Century Greece]. Athens: Kritiki. Triandafyllidou, A. and Dimitriadi, A. (). ‘Η διαχείριση του ασύλου στην Ευρώπη: η αναθεώρηση του Δουβλίνου ΙΙ και η περίπτωση της Ελλάδας’ [The Management of Asylum in Europe. The Reform of Dublin II and the Case of Greece]. Public Law Applications  (): –. Triandafyllidou, A. and Dimitriadi, A. (). ‘Migration Management at the Outposts of the European Union’. Griffith Law Review,  (): –. Triandafyllidou, A. and Kouki, H. (). ‘Muslim Immigrants and the Greek Nation: The Emergence of Nationalist Intolerance’. Ethnicities,  (): –, Triandafyllidou, A., Gemi, E. and Maroufof, M. (). ‘Migration in Greece: Recent Developments in ’. Report prepared for the OECD International Migration Experts’ Network. October. Available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/mtnstelrcdoecd/ (accessed  February ). Triandafyllidou, A. and Gemi, E. (). ‘Migration in Greece: Recent Developments in ’. Report prepared for the OECD International Migration Experts’ Network, November. Available at: https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/mtnstelrcdoecd/ (accessed  February ). VPRC. (). Στάσεις και αντιλήψεις της ελληνικής κοινωνίας απέναντι στους μετανάστες [Attitudes and Opinions in Greek Society about Immigrants]. Available at: http:// eustathopoulos.gr/sections/Social%Economy%_%Social%Issues/Stances%towards %immigrants_GR.pdf/ (accessed  February ).

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  .............................................................................................................

EXTERNAL RELATIONS .............................................................................................................

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        ......................................................................................................................

                 

......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. G post-Cold War strategic culture can be described as generally status quo oriented, perceiving change as a threat rather than as an opportunity, and as being mostly inward looking (with notable exceptions such as the – period). Although a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO, Greece is geographically situated in a conflict-prone region where the use of force in inter-state relations may still be considered as an option for certain governments. Greece is faced with what she considers as a major security threat from her Eastern neighbour (Turkey) and risks resulting from Balkan and Mediterranean instability. The chapter begins with a very concise review of Greece’s defence and security policies from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War. The analysis then focuses on the post-Cold War era, and especially the transformation of Greece’s security environment after  (as a result of the Arab revolts, but also the Ukraine conflict, Balkan instability, and the multidimensional European crisis) and the emergence of new risks and threats in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, security challenges and priorities and Greece’s security prospects in this fluid regional and international environment are presented and assessed. The key argument is that the Turkey factor remains dominant in Greece’s threat assessment and the driving force behind most foreign and defence policy initiatives. Greek security strategy is also examined in a comparative context, with European countries of similar size. A discussion of Greece’s contemporary geostrategic value is followed by Greece’s participation and possible role in the context of the EU and NATO. Additional issues examined include the defence and security decision-making mechanism and the main institutions and actors involved, and the evolution and (in) flexibility of defence expenditures. The chapter also assesses the state of the art regarding research and analysis in the field of Greek security policy.

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

 

. T E  G’ N S P

.................................................................................................................................. Historically, the main strategic dilemma for Greek decision-makers was whether to ally themselves with the sea-power dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean or the land power dominant on the Balkan Peninsula. In most cases, mindful of their responsibility for the defence of two thousand Greek islands, stretching from the Eastern Aegean to the Adriatic Sea, Greek decision-makers have chosen to ally themselves with the seapower. (Stearns, : ) During the late s and early s, the difference between conservatives and liberals (the communists had been outlawed as a result of the Greek Civil War) on security issues and NATO was one of emphasis. Both groupings basically believed that Greece’s main security threat emanated from its northern borders and that communism (external and domestic) threatened mutually cherished values. NATO was viewed, therefore, as indispensable for the defence of the country and the United States was treated as Greece’s natural ally and guarantor. Greek governments, given the dependence on the US, yielded on most issues in the field of national defence. Since the years of the Civil War (-) Greek security arrangements were closely identified with American foreign policy. The Greek armed forces were exclusively equipped with American arms and the hundreds of officers who received graduate military training in the US welcomed the continuity of their host country’s influence on the Greek armed forces (Veremis, : ). As a result, the US and NATO took for granted Greece’s commitment, thus downgrading its strategic significance. With the relaxation of international tension in the late s, perceptions of a domestic communist threat, supported by Greece’s communist neighbours (except former Yugoslavia) diminished considerably, while a confrontation between Greece and Turkey became more likely (especially after the  and  Cyprus crises). Greek security planning could no longer rely on the dogma of the internal danger and NATO defence prescriptions. Even as early as the late-s, NATO’s south-eastern flank experienced periodic cycles of great tension. This was caused by the emergence of the Cyprus problem in the s (with the Greek–Turkish crises of the s and the Greek junta-sponsored coup of , which offered Turkey a much sought-after pretext for the invasion and occupation of the island, which continues to the present day) and the Greek–Turkish frictions in the Aegean region from the s onwards, caused by Turkey’s pressure for the revision of the Aegean status-quo. Such tensions led to the re-orientation of the Greek defence doctrine, with the official declaration of the ‘threat from the East’ as the main security concern for Greece (Couloumbis et al., : –). The restoration of democratic rule in  was, indeed, a major turning point in Greek security policy. This new period of Greek political history, lasting from  to the present, has been characterized by the diversification of Greece’s external relationships, including a relative weakening of its ties with the US in favour of closer economic

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   



and political integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern Europe. The re-orientation of Greece’s security doctrine (following the necessary redeployment of forces from the north to the Greek–Turkish border in Thrace and the islands of the Aegean), in the aftermath of the  crisis (a process that began, however, in the mid/late-s), led to an instinctive de-emphasis towards developments related to the Warsaw Pact.

. T T  G’ S E   L T   E T-F C

.................................................................................................................................. Being located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa), Greece is an integral part of the Balkans (where it is the oldest member of the EU and NATO) and is also in proximity to the Black Sea and the energy-significant regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Aegean Sea is an important shipping route, connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, a major transit route for the transportation of energy products and for Russian maritime access to the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Greece’s position in the Mediterranean enhances its strategic importance, as this region has been either a familiar route of trade and culture, or a fault line between hostile states and civilizations. Europe’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods have changed considerably during the past few years, and the key words describing the regional security environment are fluidity, instability, and unpredictability. In the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the impact of the Arab revolts has added to other global and regional trends and drivers such as the emergence of non-Western powers and the shifting global balance of power, demographic changes, technological developments, globalization, and climate change. In Europe’s east, rather surprisingly, we find ourselves closer to a twentiethcentury-style Cold War between the West and Russia than to a strategic relationship better suited to addressing the challenges of the twenty-first century, as the unfolding crisis in Ukraine has indeed been Europe’s most serious post-Cold War security challenge since the Yugoslav civil war. Furthermore, there is a general failure of governance as the Eastern Mediterranean and its adjoining regions remain an extremely turbulent and unstable neighbourhood and the security environment continues to be ‘Hobbesian’. The list of frequently interacting problems is very long indeed: civil conflicts and sectarian tensions and the emergence of fragile, unstable, dysfunctional, or even failed states; jihadist terrorism; extreme inequality in the distribution of income; the ambitious agendas of regional powers (including Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia); the lack of a regional

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

 

security architecture; and a deep, structural European crisis also affecting the EU’s global and regional influence and policies. All the aforementioned factors combined to cause an almost perfect storm in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and may lead to a more fragmented and increasingly polarized region. Due to the complexity of these issues and the strong interaction between many of them, there are no easy, quick, or one-dimensional solutions to the region’s problems.

. S C  P

.................................................................................................................................. Greece’s Balkan interests have always been, for reasons of geographical proximity and historical connections, more vital than any of the other EU members. Currently Athens, along with its EU and NATO partners, is concerned about ‘soft’ security risks such as organized crime, radicalization, and domestic instability in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, and FYROM, as well as the prospect of Albanian irredentism in the region. Regarding the Mediterranean, there is increasing concern about non-state/asymmetrical threats such as international [jihadist] terrorism, transnational organized crime, and irregular migration from the Middle East, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. For reasons of geography (but also relative economic affluence), Greece will continue to be strongly affected by those trends. Security, demographic, political and socio-economic developments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East are putting an increasing strain on southern European states (which are frontline states whether the Mediterranean is considered a fault-line, a bridge, or a barrier). Turkey has been the main concern of Greek security policy and the driving force behind most of its foreign and security policy initiatives. According to a former US ambassador to Greece, ‘[I]t would be only a slight exaggeration to say that Greek foreign policy for  years has taken no major initiative that was not, directly or indirectly, intended to create a more favorable balance of power with Turkey’ (Stearns, : ) The perception of a potential military threat from Turkey has been widely shared by public opinion and reflected in expert debates as well as Greek security planning for—at least—the last four decades. Indeed, despite differences in style, both parties that have been in power for most of the post- period (PASOK and New Democracy) have shown remarkable continuity in handling core foreign-policy questions. There has also been relative continuity during the SYRIZA period (–). The  Cyprus crisis can be regarded as the major turning point in post-World War II Greek security considerations: the Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus was for Greece a highly traumatic experience, but also a basis for ‘new thinking’ in terms of security (Valinakis, : ). Greek security planners remain concerned about Turkey’s revisionist aims towards Greece expressed

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   



through official statements, diplomatic initiatives, and military actions (including the order of battle of its armed forces). Geography and its small population in comparison to that of Turkey further increase Greek insecurity. As one analyst points out: Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines in Greek mass media, have been intensifying Greek fears. For instance, the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel stated in  that ‘ . . . half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so . . . . We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked’. (Valinakis, : )

Turkish official references to a ‘growing Turkey’ and to the twenty-first century as the ‘era of Turkism’ and more direct challenges (e.g. ‘the group of islands that are situated within  km of the Turkish coast . . . should belong to Turkey’) have caused considerable concern in Greece (Valinakis, : ). Furthermore, the rejection of Greece’s periodic proposals for a bilateral non-use-of force pact, reinforced arlarmist perceptions of Turkish intentions to use military force (Platias, : ). In addition to longstanding disagreements regarding the Aegean continental shelf, territorial waters, and the airspace, Turkey presented for the first time in  ( and  years respectively after the signing of the Lausanne and Paris Treaties) the concept of the so-called ‘Grey zones’ in order to challenge Greek sovereignty over an unspecified number of small islands (some of them inhabited) and islets. This has been perceived in Greece as a major escalation by the Turkish side. Greek policymakers see Turkey as backing its ‘non-friendly’ intentions with significant military capabilities. Since , Turkey has launched an impressive modernization programme of its armed forces, which forced Greece to follow suit to the extent of its economic capabilities. The prospect of a negative change in the relative balance of military power (as a result of the acquisition by Turkey of advanced weapon systems such as F- (or another fifth-generation fighter aircraft) fighter planes and S- airdefence systems, the growth of the Turkish defence industry, and bigger defence budgets) is a source of serious concern for Greece, which would like to avoid an arms race at almost all cost. To deter the perceived Turkish threat, Greece, for many years, relied mainly on international law and agreements (Greece is a member of almost all relevant international organizations and has signed practically all multilateral arms control agreements), as well as the mediating role of the US, NATO, and the UN. As this policy proved rather ineffective, Greece began to place more emphasis on internal balancing (through the strengthening of its armed forces) and less on membership in NATO and the bilateral relationship with the US (mainly as a result of Turkey’s membership of the former and ‘privileged’ relationship with the latter). According to the theory of states’ alignment policies, that is, ‘balance of threat theory’, states, especially the small and rather weak, have two ideal choices to make when they are confronted with external threats: either to balance against the threat (by ‘borrowing’ security from great powers or alliances, which inevitably leads to a certain loss of autonomy) in order to deter it

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

 

from attacking or to defeat it if it does, or to bandwagon with the threat in order either to appease it or to profit by getting the spoils of its victory (Tsakonas, : –). In the last three decades or so, Greece placed increased importance on its ‘European card’ (membership of the European Community/Union and the Western European Union/WEU). Today, Greece relies on a mixture of diplomatic manoeuvring, the strengthening of its armed forces, and its membership of the European Union in order to balance Turkish military superiority and revisionism.

. S/A S T

.................................................................................................................................. Although the emphasis of Greece’s security has for many years been on defence (because of the perceived Turkish threat), there is under way a gradual evolution of the concept of security to include not only traditional, ‘hard’ security threats, but also ‘soft’ security challenges. It is becoming widely accepted among security planners and decision makers that security is no longer just a military concern, it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security, and that interagency cooperation is more necessary than ever. Indeed, asymmetric security threats or the use of hybrid methods is quickly becoming an issue of greater concern for Greece’s security sector. For example, imported jihadist terrorism is a threat for Europe in general, but several European countries, including Greece, may also expect to be affected by religious radicalization trends in the medium to long term, because of their own resident Muslim immigrant communities (Dokos and Tsakonas, : –). Disaster (natural or man-made) management has been a challenge for Greece, as demonstrated by the Peloponnese and Parnitha mountain fires in the summer of , the destructive floods in Mandra Attikis in –, and the deadly fires in Mati Attikis in , among many others. Those failures can be attributed to weaknesses of the crisis-management mechanism, such as a relative lack of the necessary security culture and ineffective coordination between first responders and other agencies involved, and the lack of risk awareness, planning, and training at the local and regional level, as well as among the general public. There is general agreement that those weaknesses need to be addressed as quickly and efficiently as possible, as climate change is expected to contribute to an increase in the frequency and intensity of such incidents.

. G D D

.................................................................................................................................. Greece’s armed forces will, for the foreseeable future, have one primary and one secondary mission. The primary will be to deter external threats and challenges to Greece’s territorial integrity and vital interests. Areas of concern include the Aegean,

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   



Greece’s land borders with Turkey and also Cyprus (for which Greece is implementing a policy of extended deterrence, mainly through the deployment in Cyprus of a Greek Military Force (ELDYK, Ελληνική Δύναμη Κύπρου) which is designed to act as a ‘tripwire’). It should be mentioned, however, that the Greece–Cyprus Joint Defence Doctrine, initially conceived and partially implemented in the mid-s, has been inactive for several years. A secondary mission will be to participate in EU and NATO’s multinational forces and in international stabilization and peace-support operations, under the UN, EU, or NATO auspices. Another mission, clearly of lower priority, will be to provide assistance, when necessary, to Greek security services in their effort to deal with asymmetric ‘threats’. More recent energy developments regarding the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece may become a potential player in cooperation with Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt may have an impact on Greek defence planning. The prospect of the construction of the East Mediterranean pipeline might lead Greece to increase its naval presence in this region. Based on the fundamental strategic principle that intentions may change very quickly but [military] capabilities remain, Greece feels it should be prepared to maintain a relative military balance with Turkey. Therefore, to deter the Turkish threat, at least until Turkish attitudes and policies towards Greece change in a fundamental way, Greece’s emphasis has been on the strengthening of its armed forces through the adoption of a modern strategic and operational doctrine with emphasis on combined/ joint operations, improved personnel training, and the acquisition of modern weapon systems, including smart weapons and force multipliers. These measures focus on shifting the country’s arms procurement policy from quantity to quality to an even greater degree than before (Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, : ). According to the Constitution, every Greek citizen capable of bearing arms has the obligation to serve in the Hellenic Armed Forces upon reaching his twentieth year of age. Deferments are granted for completion of studies. Women are not subject to conscription. There is the possibility of ‘alternative’ service for conscientious objectors. There is a general acceptance of the conscription system (although young people consider it ‘lost time’), but the reduced length ( months), the lengthy deferments, and demographic trends lead to increasing calls for a general restructuring of the system. It should also be mentioned that the Greek armed forces have an important social role and contribution in civil protection (especially forest fires, floods, and major accidents), search and rescue, emergency medical evacuation, and provision of health care in isolated regions. This social role strengthens the special bond between a largely-conscript force and the general population. At the same time, the conscription factor heavily reinforces the reticence to deploy the Greek military in scenarios which do not directly threaten national security and sovereignty. The low tolerance of potential casualties means that Greek governments need to justify carefully all deployments on international missions (Economides, ). Despite this ‘low-tolerance for casualties’ mentality, in the last two decades, Greece had evolved into an active participant of United Nations’ peacekeeping operations. However, as a result of the economic crisis, Greek participation in international peacekeeping and other operations has been trimmed down.

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

 

. T D  S D M M

.................................................................................................................................. According to the Greek Constitution, the president of the republic is the supreme commander of the armed forces, but his powers have a largely symbolic character. Decisions related to defence and security matters are taken by the prime minister and the government. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA, Κυβερνητικό Συμβούλιο Εξωτερικών και Άμυνας), which usually convenes on an ad hoc basis, appoints the chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff and the chiefs of staff, and makes important decisions on procurement. KYSEA also has the ultimate responsibility for preparing the threat assessment and national security policy. The final decision for awarding a major contract to a specific company is made by KYSEA on the basis of the recommendations of technical committees that evaluate the offers of various bidders. The priorities of the government are mainly the cost and military capabilities of the weapon systems under consideration. The accountability and transparency in the procurement process are also taken into consideration (as demonstrated by public tenders, evaluation committees composed of uniformed and –occasionally—civilian experts, oral briefings, and written reports to the parliament, etc.). Accountability and transparency used to weigh less than the economic/operational criteria, but this is gradually changing as new rules and regulations (to an extent imposed by the EU) have been adopted. Despite some progress achieved over the past few years, however, parliamentary oversight remains rather weak. Civil–military relations are an important issue, if only for historical reasons nowadays. The military had repeatedly intervened in Greek political life during this century, on three occasions establishing a dictatorship (in , , and ). After the restoration of democracy and the trial and incarceration of the leaders of the  coup d’état, officers have consistently refrained from intervening in political life. After the restoration of democratic rule in  and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed Forces, civil control over the military has never been in question. The role of the military has been scrupulously limited to defence matters and all significant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the government.

. D E

.................................................................................................................................. Greece has been allocated a considerably high share of its national income to defence (consistently being one of the few NATO countries to spend over  per cent on defence). The Greek defence burden—that is, defence spending as a percentage of GDP—is substantially higher than the EU average. As seen in Figure ., over the past decade the Greek defence burden was on average roughly double that of the

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   



7,0 6,0 5,0

6,2 5,7

4,0

Greece EU

3,8

3,0 3,0

3,0

2,9

2,0

2,0 1,6

1,0 0,0

1970–79

1980–89

1990–99

2000–10

 . Defence spending as a percentage of GDP. Source: SIPRI.

corresponding EU average. This has been the situation over the past four decades due to the acute external security problems faced by Greece compared to her EU partners (Dokos and Kollias, ). Nevertheless, even if the efforts of internally balancing the Turkish threat were crowned with total success and Greece managed to attain its short-term goal of achieving a balance of power with Turkey, the medium/long-term goal for Greece would still be to ‘escape’ from the existing interminable arms race in a way that would not deviate it from its strategic objective of economic development and full integration into the European Union. Thus, Greece has faced the difficult ‘guns or butter dilemma’. The dilemma came down to Greece’s ability to match the need for immediate and considerable defence expenditures with its medium- or long-term objective to fulfil the commitments imposed by the terms of the eurozone’s stability and growth pact. There was, in other words, a quest for the achievement of both deterrence and economic development which did not end well for the country (Dokos and Kollias, ). This is not to say, however, that the high defence expenditures were the main cause of the Greek economic crisis. As a result of the economic crisis, defence expenditures have been reduced cumulatively by over  per cent in the period –. In this context, the decision has been taken to significantly reduce defence expenditures and, with this in mind, Greece’s participation in international peacekeeping and other operations (ISAF/Afghanistan, KFOR/Kosovo, Active Endeavour, and Operation Ocean Shield) have been trimmed down.

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

 

. G S P   C C

.................................................................................................................................. When compared to other EU and NATO members, Greek security concerns in many respects present a unique case that is reflected in the level of resources—both human and material—the country yearly allocates to defence. As already explained, the Greek defence effort that the various indices reflect, cannot be explained only in terms of the broader western security priorities as they have evolved during the bipolar era as well as in the post-bipolar period. Greece perceives a physical threat from Turkey and as long as the core of their differences remains unresolved (mainly the Aegean, but also Cyprus), Greece will continue to invest resources in its defence capability. In principle, it would be interesting to attempt to identify similarities and differences and to assess the impact of Europeanization on Greece security policy. Looking, however, at the defence and security policies of other European countries of similar size in terms of population and economy, it would be extremely difficult to find another country combining Greece’s physical location in an unstable region (frontline state) and a territorial threat perception from a neighbouring country. Portugal and Belgium have been located in more benign neighbourhoods and were able to profit from the end of the Cold War and the relaxation of concerns about a Soviet threat to Europe. Neither has been a frontline state in the context of external threats and challenges to European security and both have been more than happy to continue to rely on NATO for their external security. The size of their armed forces has been , and , and their defence expenditure . per cent and . per cent of their GDP respectively. By comparison, Greece has ,-strong armed forces and spends . per cent of its GDP on defence. Countries in eastern and south-eastern Europe, like Bulgaria and Hungary, downsized substantially their armed forces once they joined NATO and the EU, as they were neither frontline states, nor faced with any direct threat to their security. The size of their armed forces has been , and , and their defence expenditure at . per cent and . per cent of their GDP respectively.

. G’ C G V   R   C   EU  NATO

.................................................................................................................................. Greece’s geostrategic value is mainly the result of its role in five important geographic and thematic areas: (a) as a key player and increasingly as a security provider for stability in the Western Balkans, especially in the context of EU integration; (b) its role as ‘first line of defence’ (for Europe) regarding immigration, as the management of

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   



migration and refugee flows from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa remains an issue with important external and internal dimensions for several EU countries; (c) as a complementary energy hub, initially in the context of the Southern Gas Corridor and eventually as a gateway for the transportation of the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons to the European market, thus contributing to the further diversification of Europe‘s energy suppliers; (d) its relations with non-western powers such as Russia and China which are demonstrating a strong interest in Greece’s energy and transport infrastructure sectors (especially in the latter’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative). In the latter case, Greece could become an economic gateway for China in south-eastern and central Europe. Should Greece’s relations with those two important powers develop in a balanced way, it would allow it to promote its economic and geopolitical interests and in the case of Russia to become a complementary ‘bridge’ between the West and Moscow, contributing quietly to the normalization of relations and the development of a functional strategic partnership between Europe and Russia; and (e) its geostrategic location vis-à-vis the Eastern Mediterranean conundrum (Dervis, : –). In addition to its rather critical geographic location and the offered facilities (especially Souda Bay on the island of Crete, arguably the most important—and dependable—NATO/US military facility in the Eastern Mediterranean), Greece has an evolving strategic partnership with Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus (with Jordan being invited to participate) and a privileged relationship –of various degrees—with the Arab world, Iran and, as already mentioned, Russia and China. In the Eastern Mediterranean context, Greece’s recent re-positioning closer to two important US allies, Israel and Egypt, has further enhanced its geopolitical importance in a region where there is in fact no other country that is both a reliable partner for Washington and Tel-Aviv and an acceptable interlocutor to Muslim countries. Playing an active role in that turbulent region would be a difficult task, indeed, for a country with limited resources but the alternative is strategic irrelevance in the wider region.

. T E  T D

.................................................................................................................................. The European and transatlantic dimensions of Greek foreign and security policy is of increasing importance (Dokos ). As Greece’s strategic choice is to become as deeply integrated into the European security architecture as possible (opinion polls over the past several years show a steady and strong support for this strategic choice), and as Greece’s security interests are served by a preventive conflict resolution approach and the early containment of sources of instability, it might wish to contribute to such efforts. In such a case, a partial restructuring of its armed forces in such a way as to increase interoperability and participation with EU and NATO multinational forces might be necessary (Lesser et al., : –).

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

 

However, current fiscal constraints and national defence priorities, as well as Greece’s strategic culture have relegated this into a secondary priority objective. The long-term challenge for Greece will continue to be the reconciliation of its international responsibilities with deeply entrenched national security interests and convictions. At the same time, it will be essential for Athens to maintain good working relations with the United States, the pre-eminent strategic actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even after the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the role of the EU in Greece’s security planning was subordinate to NATO. However, Greece was not a blocking state in the EU but rather a minor but active participant in CSDP crisis management operations. There have been over the years some adaptation and convergence with the EU, although it has been limited in scope and ambition (Economides, ). It remains to be seen if this trend of convergence will continue and possibly accelerate as the EU tries to strengthen its defence capabilities and may therefore become more attractive in Greek eyes as a security provider. Greece has over the years cultivated bilateral defence ties with a number of countries. Its partners have traditionally been the US, France, the UK, and Germany. These countries, with the addition of Russia (for reasons related to the NATO ‘Cascade’ programme, as well as the Cyprus problem), have also been Greece’s main suppliers of military equipment and it seems that this will continue to be the case. The US and France will most likely be the main sources of military equipment for the next several years, although Greece may decide to become more deeply involved in various European consortia for the joint production of weapon systems. This may ensure the survival of at least part of Greece’s defence industries (although their economic and technological significance has been rather limited). During the last few years there has also been increasing military cooperation with Israel and Egypt, in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean sub-regional security complex, as well with Bulgaria and Romania in the context of the EU Battlegroups (Moustakis and Sheehan, : ).

. S   A R R  A   F  G S P

.................................................................................................................................. The existing literature on Greek defence policy is rather extensive, with a strong focus on the Turkish threat and the policy mix necessary to deter the perceived Turkish aggression, although there is limited reference (Dokos, ) to the impact of the Revolution on Military Affairs/RMA on Greek defence policy (The RMA refers to the evolution of weapons technology, information technology, military organization, and military doctrine). A sober and realistic threat assessment is always a challenge for analysts and scholars. Civil–military relations have also been satisfactorily covered, at

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   



least in its historical dimension as this is no longer an issue for Greece. But there are several other topics in Greece’s priority research agenda that need to be studied at greater depth. One such example would be the conceptual evolution from ‘defence’ to ‘security’. It would also be extremely useful to discuss the relationship between foreign and defence policy in the context of Greek grand strategy, as well as the role of public opinion and of civilian experts and the think- tank community in security policymaking. Finally, additional research and analysis of the evolution of Greek strategic thinking on incentives and constraints for Greece’s greater involvement in international operations, whether under the aegis of the EU or NATO or under the UN flag, would make an important contribution to both the scholarly research and the public debate on this significant issue.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. In terms of the future foreign and security policy agenda, relations with Turkey will probably remain at the top. Athens has no wish to border a ‘lone wolf ’ Turkey. It is in Greece’s interest that Turkey remains anchored in Western institutions and engaged in a political, economic, and social modernization process. But obviously this is far from guaranteed. Eventual NATO and EU enlargement in the Western Balkans will make a considerable contribution towards the transformation of the region into a more stable, democratic, and economically developed one, removing that factor from Greece’s security equation. Unfortunately, it is expected that the Mediterranean and the Middle East will remain regions of considerable uncertainty and Greek security planning will have to take this into account. Greek security policymakers will function for the foreseeable future under the Damocles sword of the country’s economic limitations, which is imposing a number of serious constraints and limitations. As key organizations such as the EU and NATO are evolving in an effort to adapt to new global, regional, and domestic trends, Greece needs to find its own niche in the distribution of regional roles and influence and convince its partners and allies of its own added value in managing common security challenges. A difficult task, indeed, for a country with limited resources, but the alternative is strategic marginalization and inability to protect its vital national interests. There is an emerging consensus among experts, and to some degree among policymakers as well, that Greece needs to become more active inside the EU and NATO, try to enlarge its footprint in the energy map, enhance regional partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean, and regain its role and influence in south-eastern Europe. The best option—as it could have a multiplier effect- would be Greece’s active participation in the shaping of the new EU and transatlantic regional policies, without, however, ignoring the need for national initiatives and the further multilateralization of Greece’s foreign policy within the general Euro-Atlantic framework.

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 

By necessity, the key concept for Greek foreign and security policy in the foreseeable future will be the smart use of its resources in foreign and defence policy. Economies of scale, cooperative schemes, full exploitation of high-efficiency organizational models and operational doctrines, as well as the use of new technologies might be part of the answer to Greece’s problems in the defence sector. To this end, Greece might decide to explore possible benefits from the EU’s concept of ‘Pooling and Sharing’, NATO’s concept of ‘Smart Defence’ and of bilateral opportunities for training, defence, and security sector reform, crisis management and disaster management systems, and strategic planning mechanisms. Regular Strategic and Defence Reviews, a standard procedure in all NATO countries, to provide early warning and identification of changes in the security environment would also be of critical importance for designing an effective security policy. In view of the difficulties of coordination between ministries and agencies, the lack of a coordinating mechanism on national security issues (especially as a wider definition of the term ‘national security’ is being gradually adopted) becomes even more pronounced. In this context, the creation of a National Security Council would be strongly recommended and has been a topic of discussion among experts for several years, without however any practical results (Dokos and Tsakonas, ). Overall, the main challenge for Greek security policy will remain the management of a complex security equation. Its multiple variables include an unstable neighbourhood, a perceived territorial threat from a neighbouring country, the continuous quest for a sufficient deterrent capability without undermining the country’s fragile economy, efficiently dealing with soft security threats of an increasing intensity (and in this context ‘border protection’ will become a higher priority for both Greece and the EU), and successfully balancing between its national, European, and transatlantic ‘obligations’, as well as political and economic relations with great powers. Certainly, a tall order for the country’s security establishment, which would be greatly facilitated, as already suggested, by the strengthening of the country’s institutional capacity in the areas of strategic planning and crisis management.

R Couloumbis, T., Kariotis, T. and Bellou, F. (eds.) (). Greece in the th Century. London: Frank Cass. Dervis, Κ. (). Greek Myths and Reality. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Dokos, T. (). Η επανάσταση στις στρατιωτικές υποθέσεις: Οι συνέπειες για την ελληνική ασφάλεια [The Revolution in Military Affairs: Consequences for Greek Security]. Athens: Institute for Defence Analyses. Dokos, T. (). Λευκή Βίβλος για την εξωτερική πολιτική, την άμυνα, και την πολιτική ασφάλειας [White Paper on Foreign, Defence and Security Policy]. Athens: Sideris Publishers. Dokos, T. and Kollias, C. (). ‘Greece’s Defence Spending in Times of Crises.’ ELIAMEP Thesis no. /, March . Athens: ELIAMEP.

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

Dokos, T. and Tsakonas, P. (). Ελληνική στρατηγική εθνικής άμυνας [Greek National Security Strategy]. Papazissis Publishers: Athens. Economides, S. (). ‘Greece’. In Biehl, H., Giegerich, B., and Jonas, A. (eds.) Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent. London: Springer Scientific Publishers, –. Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. (). White Paper, Athens,  Available at: (https://ia.us.archive.org//items/WhitePaper/White_Paper.pdf) Lesser, I., Larrabee, S., Zanini, M., and Vlachos, K. (). Greece’s New Geopolitics. Santa Monica: National Security Research Division, RAND. Moustakis, F. and Sheehan, M. (). ‘Greek Security Policy After the Cold War’. Contemporary Security Policy,  (): –. Platias, A. (). ‘Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence’. In Constas, D. (ed.) The Greek Turkish Conflict in the s. London: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Stearns, M. (). ‘Greek Foreign Policy in the s: Old Signposts, New Roads’. In Constas, D. and Stavrou, N. (eds.) Greece Prepares for the st Century. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, –. Tsakonas, P. (). The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Valinakis, Y. (). Greece’s Security in the Post-Cold War Era, SWP-S. Veremis, T. (). Greek Security: Issues and Politics. Adelphi Paper No. , IISS, London.

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  ......................................................................................................................

     strategic vision, diplomatic finesse and poor domestic delivery ......................................................................................................................

 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. G’ relationship with the European Union (EU), and its previous incarnations the European Community (EC) and earlier the European Economic Community (EEC), goes a long way back. Barring the six founding members, Greece has been associated with the European project longer than any other European country. It has been, though, a troubled relationship, never short of crises. Arguably, only the UK’s relationship with the EU has been more turbulent over the years—and this relationship has now ended with divorce. Greece is still a member, and Greeks still have euros in their pockets, to the surprise of many people who speculated about different forms of ‘Grexit’ during the big crisis of the euro and the refugee crisis. But the time spent on Greece in European councils and inside the Brussels officialdom has been totally disproportionate to the relative size of the country: much though the proud natives enjoy being at the centre of international attention, it has been mostly for the wrong reasons. In the pages that follow, we shall attempt to analyse and explain Greece’s anything but boring relationship with European integration by looking at the bigger picture and the main turning points over a period of sixty years or so. We shall concentrate more on the years of full EU membership and the recent period of Greece’s euro membership, which has proved to be the most explosive. In doing so, we shall attempt to explain the big contradiction between, on the one hand, the strategic vision that has characterized Greece’s European policy over the long term, coupled with significant successes of Greek diplomacy, and on the other, repeated failures to conform with common rules, which in turn led to crises. Is it the case of a clever student who often fails to do her homework? Too simple to be true for a country full of contradictions will be the answer that follows.

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    



. E H

.................................................................................................................................. Greece asked for the opening of negotiations with the EEC in  only one year after the Treaty of Rome had come into effect, and it ended up with a very comprehensive and highly ambitious association agreement signed in  with the six founding members. Thus, Greece became the first associate member of the EEC. That was far from obvious. Greece was still a poor, mostly agrarian society with weak democratic institutions essentially controlled by those who had won a long and bloody civil war following the ruthless occupation of the country by the Nazis and their allies; a civil war that had also acted as a catalyst for US direct involvement in Europe’s Cold War. On the Greek side, opting for the ambitious integration project of the EEC was a strategic decision. It was very much the decision of one man, namely Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, who dominated the Greek political scene in two different periods separated by an interval of political exile in Paris. It was inextricably linked with the perceived need to anchor Greece in the West and a more united Europe; it was also seen as an instrument of modernization and a way of securing allies for Greece in her troubled neighbourhood (Botsiou, ; Tsoukalis, ). However, the choice for European integration was also a big gamble given the distance that separated Greece from the founding members of the EEC in terms of both productive capacity and the quality of institutions. The Six welcomed the choice made by Greece, a country with long historical ties with the UK, at a time when the EEC and EFTA (European Free Trade Area) were still competing projects. But they had legitimate concerns about the capacity of Greece to adjust to the requirements of an association agreement. Such concerns were ultimately trumped by geopolitical considerations and the special treatment often accorded to Greece because of her historical heritage. Strategic location and a huge imprint on European history and civilization have been all along powerful trump cards in the hands of politicians of modern Greece, at least those able to use them wisely. Karamanlis could also count on strong US support for Greece’s participation in the European project: it was part of the effort to secure a safe place for Greece on the Western side of the Cold War divide. A few years later, the implementation of the association agreement was violently interrupted by the coup d’état in Greece in . The military dictatorship lasted until  and the agreement was ‘frozen’ during those seven years; it was limited to its ‘current administration’, in the words of the EEC Commission (Yannopoulos, ; Coufoudakis, ). The Greek colonels pretended that business continued as usual, while the Commission did not have the courage (or the political support) to proceed with a unilateral abrogation of the agreement. Economic interests had to be reconciled with political sensitivities on the European side, while (relative) isolation from Europe served as a strong weapon in the hands of the democratic opposition in Greece and their allies abroad. Democracy and the European project are closely intertwined and the first difficult test case was Greece. The results of that early test, however, left something to be desired: it was a typical European compromise.

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

 

The restoration of democracy in Greece in , following another coup in Cyprus engineered by the Greek colonels, and Turkey’s subsequent invasion of the island, had an immediate impact on relations between Greece and the EC. Shortly after his return from exile and in his capacity as head of the new government of national unity, Karamanlis declared the intention to apply for full membership. He had previously withdrawn Greek forces from the integrated military structure of NATO because of the inability of the latter to prevent Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus. The EC was therefore presented at least in public as a kind of substitute for NATO and Karamanlis sought to replace the old Pax Americana in his part of the world with a new Pax Europaea (Karamouzi, ; Tsoukalis, ). Even though this was intended more for domestic consumption, the initial reception he got in European capitals was mixed at best. France under the presidency of Giscard d’ Estaing was strongly supportive. In fact, France has acted all along as Greece’s godfather and protector in European institutions. Other EC countries were, however, much less enthusiastic. The Federal Republic of Germany and the UK, the latter having joined the EC in  together with Denmark and Ireland, were not at all keen on treating European integration as an alternative to NATO. They also did not want to take sides between Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, all existing members, France excepted, were not ready to entertain the prospect of membership anytime soon for a country with a fragile democracy and weak economy. The official Greek application was submitted by the government of New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) led by Karamanlis in June , and matters became even more complicated when the new democratic governments in Portugal and Spain made clear their intention to follow the Greek example. Sure, applications for membership from the new democracies in Southern Europe were the best form of flattery and a strong proof of success of the European project. But member countries were not ready for another big enlargement. Therefore, considerations of high politics and the desire to help consolidate democracy in the southern periphery had to be reconciled with domestic economic interests (mostly agricultural interests), concerns about the suitability of the new candidates, and the likely effect of further enlargement on the functioning of Community institutions. The strategy finally adopted was to welcome the three applications, while hastening slowly with the negotiations. What followed was a truly remarkable political success for Greece. Faced with a lukewarm reception at best from most member countries and a negative opinion from the Commission (Commission of the EC, ), which proposed instead a preaccession period of indefinite duration, Karamanlis engaged in intense personal diplomacy touring European capitals. The ideals of European unity and democracy were once again carefully mixed with references to history and high politics—and, surprise, surprise, it worked! When it came to the crunch, nobody wanted to be seen standing against Greece’s membership. Germany’s gradual shift to a favourable stance also made a big difference: Schmidt joined Giscard in yet another manifestation of FrancoGerman leadership in Europe.

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    



The Commission’s proposal was unanimously rejected by the Council of Ministers and membership negotiations began. Greece then succeeded in separating her application from those of Spain and Portugal. Greece was small enough not to create much of a problem for existing members and she had been in the waiting room for long, so went the argument of Greek negotiators. It worked, and Greece became a member on  January . The two Iberian countries followed five years later and with less favourable terms of entry. Greece’s accession negotiations offer a fascinating case study (Karamouzi, ) of how the single-minded determination of a political leader, backed by a small team of able negotiators and with the support of a Greek elite with access to centres of power and international media, succeeded in placating different interests inside the EC and, most importantly, in overcoming resistance from those (they were indeed many) who thought that Greece was not ready for membership. Karamanlis made skilful use of the diplomatic cards in his hands, while turning internal weakness and the threat of instability in Greece and the wider region into a strong negotiating weapon.

. (M)A  M

.................................................................................................................................. Greece was divided when she joined the EC. But this was hardly surprising for a country where politics is almost invariably of a gladiatorial nature and consensus an unknown term in the domestic political vocabulary. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα), the main opposition party during the accession negotiations, had a charismatic populist leader, Andreas Papandreou, who offered an explosive mix of radical Left ideology and nationalism. He was opposed to EC membership, or so he used to say in public until he was elected to power a few months after Greece’s accession to the EC. Does this mean that those who voted PASOK to power in  were against EC membership? Not really. Europe was not the main issue in those elections. But has it ever been in elections in other countries? Hardly so would be the answer. In this respect, Greece is not very different. Two further explanations are, however, specific to Greece. In the peaks and troughs of Greece’s troubled relationship with the EC/EU, there has always been a pro-European majority, even when Greeks had a negative opinion of European policies—and they often did. For many Greeks, being part of the European construction is an existential choice because of history and geography, and this has not changed much during the last few decades. The second explanation is less straightforward. Many people voted for PASOK in  precisely because they did not believe that, once in power, Papandreou would try to pull the country out. Anti-EC slogans were part of a left-wing, anti-imperialist stance. They were not necessarily meant to be taken literally. For a country that in ancient times had turned rhetoric into high art, this might not be totally surprising.

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

 

With PASOK in power, the early years of Greece’s membership of the EC were indeed difficult, and Greece was often treated like a black sheep by her European partners. Starting with a weak economic base, Greece experienced rapidly worsening current account deficits and de-industrialization following the liberalization of trade in an economy that had previously enjoyed high levels of protection mainly through nontariff barriers. The Greek experience was therefore different from that of Spain and Portugal after they joined. It certainly did not help that the socialist government of Greece nationalized instead of reforming. Nor did it help that the government adopted a partial reading of Keynesian economics by running large budget deficits, trying to deal with unemployment by creating more jobs in the state sector, and spending ever increasing amounts on social policies with borrowed money. Domestic demand grew rapidly, while external competitiveness worsened in an increasingly open economy. During the s and early s, real growth in Greece was lower than the EC average, thus reversing a long trend of convergence in terms of living standards, although with more redistribution in a highly unequal society. Annual inflation was close to  per cent, while public debt as a percentage of GDP climbed from  per cent in  to  per cent in  and  per cent in . Economic policy was conducted as if there were no tomorrow and Greece a closed economy. In other words, those in power in Athens deliberately or otherwise ignored the constraints of EC membership (Panagiotarea, ; Tsoukalis, ). When the economy reached a dead end, they were forced to introduce stabilization programmes with extra EC financial aid and devaluation of the currency; and back again. At the same time, Greece called for a substantial increase in the transfer of funds through the EC budget. She was instrumental in the creation of the so-called ‘Integrated Mediterranean Programmes’ (Papageorgiou and Verney, ) destined for the less developed regions of southern Europe and an early precursor of the newly named and much better endowed ‘Structural Funds’. PASOK had able negotiators arguing in favour of more redistribution at the European level, but alas the country lacked the administrative capacity to make an efficient use of those European funds. Greece ended up as a major beneficiary of European structural aid (and agricultural subsidies) with net inflows reaching – per cent of GDP per annum. However, considerable waste— and corruption—at home seriously undermined their arguments for more European solidarity. This was one among several of Greek contradictions. Foreign policy was at the time one of the least developed areas of European cooperation/integration—and still is. During the early years of membership, PASOK governments became notorious for vetoing joint European initiatives, or more generously just adding dissenting footnotes, on a variety of issues that extended much beyond Greece’s immediate neighbourhood. They included the dispatch of a peacekeeping force in the Sinai, the suppression of the democratic opposition in Poland under General Jaruzelski, and the shooting down of a South Korean passenger plane in Soviet airspace (Valinakis, ). Those in power in Athens often felt the need to differentiate themselves from their European partners, especially when the US connection was strong on specific issues. Anti-Americanism in Greece was in turn related to a

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    



widespread popular perception of US support for the military dictatorship (not completely unfounded) and the passive US attitude, if not connivance some people suspected, in the tragic developments on the island of Cyprus in . Greece was the only EC country at the time facing a direct external threat against which neither her partners in the EC nor in their capacity as members of the Atlantic alliance offered real support. On the wide range of Greek–Turkish disputes, which sometimes risked getting out of control, as well as on the Cyprus problem, most European countries and the US generally tried to keep an equal distance. Naturally, Greeks were not happy with the neutral stance of their partners. Greece had been on the frontier of the Cold War divide. When communist regimes collapsed one after the other like a pyramid of cards in the Balkans and further afield in , the prospect of establishing friendly relations and mutually beneficial economic ties with her immediate neighbours was very enticing. But the collapse of the old order also came with fears of instability, failed states, and a resurgence of nationalism and irredentism, those very ills that communist regimes had contained if not suppressed. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia confirmed these fears in the worst possible way. For Greece, war was close to home, while the creation of independent republics out of former Yugoslavia brought the old Macedonian question (Pettifer, ) back to the fore. For many Greeks, the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by the small, newly independent republic on their northern border was treated as an attempt to hijack part of their own history, and with irredentist claims to boot addressed against them. Memories of many Slav Macedonians fighting on the side of the communists in the Greek Civil War and calling for the creation of an independent wider Macedonia to encompass the Greek region were not easily forgotten, especially in the north of Greece. Nationalists and demagogues on both sides of the border between Greece and the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, the provisional name under which the new republic was admitted to the UN and other international organizations pending an agreement with Greece, have reinforced each other for years. The best chance of a workable compromise was lost in the early s, and Greece bore a large part of the responsibility for this failure. It was one more reason for her European partners to treat Greece as an outlier. True, much of the domestic debate in Greece and the strong emotions expressed in relation to the ‘republic without name’ sounded pre-modern to the ears of many Europeans. But is it not always easier to feel and think modern, when at a safe distance from major trouble spots? Insecurity often breeds irrationality.

. L  E

.................................................................................................................................. Adjustment to the requirements of EC membership proved to be a long and painful experience for Greece, and so was the much-trumpeted process of ‘Europeanization’. The next important turning point came with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The negotiations leading to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in  were for the

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

 

Greeks a repetition in a way of earlier negotiations with their European counterparts (Featherstone et al., ). The prime minister, Constantine Mitsotakis, leader of ND, knew full well that EMU would be the most ambitious integration project ever and he wanted Greece to be in mainly for political reasons. Some people also saw benefits in having a much stronger external constraint (vincolo externo, as the Italians call it with a similar experience in their own country) on domestic macroeconomic policy through participation in EMU (Tsoukalis, ; Dyson and Featherstone, ). They knew full well the destabilizing effects of electoral cycles on economic policy, which had become very pronounced in Greece during the s and early s. Understandably, such views could not easily be expressed in public. One of the important dividing lines today in Europe is between countries where people trust European institutions more than national ones (mostly in the South and the East) and countries where the opposite happens. Greek negotiators knew that the country’s track record was poor and that current macroeconomic figures allowed little optimism for Greece being able to fulfil the criteria for admission to EMU anytime soon; in short, their credibility was low. They played up the political dimension as much as they could, they called for flexible transitional periods and admission criteria, and asked for financial assistance to facilitate convergence. What followed the signing of the Maastricht Treaty was untypical for Greece (Pagoulatos, ; Panagiotarea, ). The treaty was ratified by the Greek parliament with a very large majority. It was a rare example of consensus between the two main parties, New Democracy and PASOK. A few years later, a new economic stabilization programme under Prime Minister Simitis delivered the unexpected. Budgetary consolidation was pursued with uncharacteristic consistency. It created positive expectations in the markets and led in turn to a big drop in long-term interest rates, hence to a substantial reduction in the cost of servicing the large accumulated debt. For once, a Greek government succeeded in creating a virtuous circle for the economy that finally enabled Greece to meet the convergence criteria while achieving high rates of growth. Greece was unanimously and without reservations admitted as the twelfth member of the euro with effect from  January . Only a few years earlier, Greek macroeconomic data had still appeared in little inserts on Eurostat graphs, because they were way out from the corresponding data for other EU countries. Europeanization was catching up with Greece at long last, or so it appeared. Under Prime Minister Simitis (–), Greece gradually became a ‘normal’ member of the EU, thus abandoning its old wayward behaviour. Modernization and Europe were closely linked together, and the latter was expected to provide the powerful external catalyst. It had happened several times before in the history of modern Greece. Gaining on credibility, Greece also played a more constructive and influential role in EU affairs. The next major turning point was in foreign policy. Instead of being the first to block any kind of positive European gesture towards Turkey and repeatedly denouncing Turkey’s intransigence on bilateral disputes and the Cyprus problem, the Simitis government took the bold decision to Europeanize relations with her eastern

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    



neighbour (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, ; Ioakimidis, ). At the Helsinki European Council in December , Greece endorsed Turkey’s candidate status for EU membership while securing the support of her European partners for a peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes and recourse ultimately to the International Court of Justice as a pre-condition for accession. Greece also succeeded in getting her partners to agree that a political settlement of the Cyprus problem should not be considered as precondition for accession of the still divided island of Cyprus. The intention was not to allow the unrecognized ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (and indirectly Turkey) to hold the accession process of the Republic of Cyprus as hostage. In a remarkable and indeed highly successful diplomatic volte-face, Greece became an ardent supporter of Turkey’s European vocation. In the process, her European partners acquired a more direct experience of Turkey as an interlocutor, while also being forced to reveal their own apprehensions regarding Turkey as a future member of the EU. Greece no longer provided a convenient fig leaf. But it was surely not easy inside Greece: domestic public opinion was not ready and therefore required delicate handling. The Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy delivered some goods. It certainly did not solve bilateral problems with Turkey, but Greece was no longer on her own. The most important success was no doubt the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus in the big bang enlargement of . Greece played a crucial role as flagbearer of further enlargement, building coalitions while reserving the right of veto as an instrument of last resort. The treaty of accession for the ten new members was signed in Athens in  during Greece’s presidency of the council. But things began to change once again. Elections in  brought New Democracy back to power and the new government chose to be a passive observer in the final phase of the UN-mediated negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus. In the referendums subsequently held on the Annan plan, named after the secretary general of the UN, Turkish Cypriots voted ‘yes’ and Greek Cypriots ‘no’. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU a few days later, leaving Turkish Cypriots out and many Europeans with the (justified or not) feeling of having been cheated. Things had not gone according to plan.

. W W W   E?

.................................................................................................................................. In the beginning of the new millennium, Greece was doing remarkably well. She was growing fast, already a member of the hard core of European integration, and handling foreign policy issues in her troubled neighbourhood with remarkable self-confidence. In , Greece was host for the Olympic Games, the smallest country to have done so for decades. She was finally opening up to the world and getting richer, as Spain had already done earlier on in her own more successful version of Europeanization.

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

 

Or, so it seemed. The picture got shadier however, if one looked closer. The productive base of the economy remained weak, consisting mostly of small, familyrun firms catering for the domestic market and only a few internationally competitive ones. The economy was heavily regulated and hostage to organized interests. Domestic consumption continued to be the main contributing factor for growth and was fed by sizeable budget deficits that re-appeared once Greece had secured her place inside the eurozone. Membership of the latter was interpreted by Greek governments as a way of obtaining privileged access to low-cost borrowing through the collective credibility of the euro instead of an urgent need to reform and invest to become competitive. Greece was living beyond her means and this became more pronounced with membership of the euro. Inflation climbed up, and so did wages, budget deficits grew and external competitiveness suffered, leading in turn to growing external deficits, while the ticking bomb of the pension system was getting day by day closer to explosion time. The surveillance system of the eurozone under the Growth and Stability Pact adopted back in  clearly did not function. As for domestic control mechanisms, they had always been weak. Clientele politics, a strong tradition of populism and a divisive political culture, coupled with a strong presence of economic oligarchs and an enrichissez-vous culture ever more prevalent in society, fed into each other. Inside the euro, successive Greek governments pretended their public finances were in order and reforms were under way, while their European partners conveniently pretended to believe them—they were not blameless either. International markets were only too pleased to provide the necessary finance at a profit. Nobody wanted to spoil a good party. The Greek bubble was fed by the state borrowing mostly abroad, unlike the Irish and Spanish bubbles that were created by private banks. They were all part of the biggest international financial bubble since . When this bubble burst, first in the US and then Europe, it turned into an existential crisis for the euro and European integration in general, thus exposing the vulnerability of European structures, more specifically the euro structure (Tsoukalis, ; Pisani-Ferry, ; Mody, ). Greece became the catalyst for the transformation of the international crisis into a European crisis, because she had at the time the worst combination of three deficits, namely a huge budget deficit (and the biggest accumulated public debt), an equally huge current account deficit, and a credibility deficit because people discovered that Greek politicians and statisticians had been economical with the truth, hence the newly coined term ‘Greek statistics’. It had all become much worse by –, when the tidal waves of the international crisis reached Greece, and the government tried to buy its way out of it through more borrowing. Admittedly, the problem was not just the government of New Democracy at the time. With few notable exceptions, the whole political system and society at large were in a state of denial when the crisis hit—and they remained so for some time until they ran out of easy options. Should Greece have joined the euro in the first place? And can different countries such as Greece and Germany co-exist in a currency union operating essentially under rules pronounced with a rolling r like in German? This is a question that should have been asked when the euro was created and when membership was extended to

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    



countries that had not been part of the de facto Deutschemark zones that had operated in earlier phases of European monetary integration. It was too late to ask this question at the peak of the crisis as people began to realize that the cost of disintegration would be prohibitive in both economic and political terms. There was no way back.

. I  S  Q

.................................................................................................................................. In the early months of , Greece lost access to international markets and appealed to her European partners for help, precisely the kind of help that the authors of the Maastricht Treaty had tried to prohibit through the ‘no-bailout’ clause as a protection, they had thought, against ‘moral hazard’. The only realistic alternative at the time was for Greece to unilaterally declare default and leave the euro. Wisely, this option was rejected by all sides after some thought about the likely implications. However, the policy adopted proved to be extremely problematic. Greece went through three successive bailout programmes, with the last one ending in August , and with large amounts of financial assistance that remain today a world record. During these eight years, she received European and international attention that bore no relation at all to the size of the country—and caught the headlines too often and mostly for negative reasons. ‘Grexit’ was avoided more than once, and only just (Papakonstantinou, ; Varoufakis, ; Katsikas, Filinis and Anastasatou, ). Meanwhile, the Greek economy was reformed while also imploding: the size of loss of GDP, as well as the dramatic increase in unemployment, had not been experienced by any country in the developed world since the Great Depression. Not unexpectedly, the implosion of the economy led to the implosion of the old political order, highly imperfect though it was. In comparison to other countries also forced to go through adjustment programmes during the crisis, namely Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and in part Spain, Greece’s purgatory lasted way longer and was much more painful. The Greek crisis offers a case study in precisely what should not be done in such circumstances. It all started with an insolvent country that everybody chose to treat as illiquid because of fears that an early restructuring of the Greek debt could destabilize the international financial system: Greece as another Lehman Brothers. She was a country with large internal and external imbalances that had been financed for years by bankers and fund managers who should have known better, with limited policy instruments at her disposal as a member of the monetary union, weak institutions, and a political class in internecine struggle while the house was on fire; and a bankrupt country to which international rescuers (EU creditors and the IMF) imposed unrealistic programmes of fiscal adjustment and a very wide range of reforms, often down to the minute detail and with the kind of treatment that used to be reserved for colonies. Of course, Greece needed to change—and she did change to a considerable extent—but there is only so much change that can be imposed from outside in a short space of time, with little prioritization and with the domestic economy in downward spiral.

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

 

In the elections of January , Greeks in despair voted to power a party of the radical Left (SYRIZA, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) which proceeded to form a coalition government with a small party of the nationalist Right (ANEL, Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες): an unorthodox marriage of anti-systemic parties in Orthodox Greece. They had vowed to liberate Greece from the ‘old corrupt system’ and from the shackles of adjustment programmes imposed by the creditors. They came to power from the outer bounds of the Greek political system, with virtually no experience of government and little understanding of the world outside. They were the precursors of things to come in other European countries with the rise of anti-systemic parties and populism across the continent. They challenged Greece’s creditors, won a referendum in Greece that endorsed their uncompromising policy, and then quickly backed down when they finally realized the narrow limits of their bargaining power faced with the threat of a forced exit from the euro. The creditors led by Germany played tough and decided to teach the Greeks a lesson, also sending a warning to other potential challengers of the status quo on the embattled periphery of Europe. And Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, made use of the nuclear weapon by cutting the flow of liquidity to Greek banks. This confrontation cost the Greek economy dearly: capital controls were introduced, Greek banks had to be recapitalized once again, and Greece’s slow economic recovery was stopped in its tracks, hence the economy missed out on the boom years enjoyed by the rest of Europe, in turn fed, at least partly, through the policy of quantitative easing of the ECB. Adding insult to injury, the Greek government was forced to acquiesce to more direct control by foreign creditors over domestic public assets and banks: so much for sovereignty in a bankrupt country—or whatever had been left of it as member of the EU. After surrender, the radical government in Greece began to follow dutifully the strictures imposed by her creditors. The exit from the third programme was celebrated as a clear break in August , although Greece will continue under close monitoring by her European partners for many years to come. The SYRIZA-led government tried to make the best of yet another compromise agreement that provided some, but arguably not enough, breathing space, while creditors wanted to make sure that present and future Greek governments will not be allowed to return to their old bad habits. They offered favourable terms for the servicing and repayment of debt, although the fiscal straightjacket for Greece would remain tight and meant to be worn for long. Greece’s creditors promised to re-evaluate debt sustainability in : Europe plans long!

. A C  M C

.................................................................................................................................. The story of Greece and European integration is marked by big successes and terrible failures. The credit for successes goes mostly to a relatively small number of individuals

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    



who took bold initiatives and negotiated skilfully with their European counterparts. They delivered the first association agreement signed by the EEC, an early membership of the EU and later the euro, they secured a place for Greek Cypriots in the  enlargement, and generally had an influence in European affairs more than the relative size of the country might justify. They made clever use of Greece’s geopolitics, often succeeding in turning internal weakness into diplomatic strength, and reminded other Europeans, perhaps too often, of Pericles, Plato, and Aristotle. The failures (and they have been many) can be attributed to the weakness of the domestic economy and institutions, a long tradition of populism, and a troubled neighbourhood that breeds insecurity. The arrival of mass parties and the intensification of the struggle for income shares has increased further the tendency of the domestic political system to produce deficits and resist change. Similarly, public opinion has imposed severe constraints on politicians who might be bold enough to seek compromises on sensitive foreign policy issues. A mismatch between ambition and capacity to deliver, or perhaps more precisely a mismatch between considerations of high politics and the capacity of the domestic economy and institutions to comply with rules designed by and for more developed countries? Greece is a country of many contradictions: an extremely heavy historical baggage and a mixed record as modern state; a highly successful cosmopolitan elite, an inward-looking culture and a Balkan state; very rich people and large inequalities. These contradictions have manifested themselves repeatedly in Greece’s interaction with European institutions and partner countries. During the recent crisis, the rest of Europe became more aware of the reality of the Balkan state and began to behave accordingly. It was a humiliating shock for many Greeks. Greece’s most important bilateral relations in the EU have been with France and Germany: a close alliance with the former and a relationship with many ups and downs with the latter (more downs during the recent crisis). On EU matters, Greece has had relatively little in common with her former protector power, namely the UK, even less so on Greek–Turkish disputes and the Cyprus problem. Several people have speculated or wished for a strong alliance of Southern countries inside the EU, although this has rarely worked in practice. The lines of communication South to South have not been much used. On the other hand, Greeks learned early enough from experience that the Community method served better the interests of small and medium-sized countries than intergovernmentalism. The contrast became even starker during the euro crisis when the strong set the rules and the weak had little choice but to obey. Many Greeks have strongly and repeatedly complained about the treatment they have received from the rest of Europe. But even when dissatisfaction with European policies hit rock bottom, as it did during the long economic crisis, there was still a majority who did not question membership of the EU and the euro. This is arguably the most important factor that prevented ‘Grexit’ by constraining the actions of an otherwise Euro-agnostic government in Athens at the time. When it comes to the crunch, most Greeks know where their fundamental interests lie. Whether this existential relationship can survive another big crisis or a prolonged crawling of the Greek

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

 

economy under the strictures of euro membership remains, however, an open question. Hopefully, Greek membership of the EU will be spared such a test in the future. We need to acquire a deeper understanding of Greek public attitudes towards Europe and EU membership, especially among the younger generations. Greece has already experienced twice during her membership the rise to power of radical parties with a very critical stance on the EU, one with PASOK in  and the second with SYRIZA in . The reasons for the rise of such parties are discussed elsewhere. When in power, both turned into ardent supporters of European integration, although always searching for a different kind of Europe. Nowadays, similar phenomena are taking place in other European countries. Greece is no longer the odd man out. Are there lessons to be learned? One thing we now know for sure from experience (and not only from Greece) is that the so-called process of Europeanization is slow, and with ups and downs. Are we witnessing the end of an era in Europe, and perhaps the developed world more generally? We need to understand and analyse what went wrong with the European project in the more recent phase of deepening and widening in the age of global capitalism and technological revolution, and what, if anything, can be done to save it. The future of the European project will be decided in member countries, not by the Brussels officialdom. Surely, some countries are more equal than others and further integration, if any, is likely to be even more differentiated than in the past. Greece wants to be as close as possible to the core, but she has repeatedly failed to meet the standards. Her participation in the European project is therefore intimately tied with internal developments. Greece is a gridlocked country in a difficult neighbourhood, with a dysfunctional state, arguably more Kafkaesque than Balkan. She needs a game changer that can only come from inside, not imposed from outside: we should have learned this by now. Only after she has begun to deliver real change at home could she credibly negotiate for a new garment to replace the straightjacket she has been forced to wear for several years, and eventually join forces with those who want to change Europe. This is the good scenario, although admittedly difficult to realize. The alternative of being left behind in a looser EU where those countries willing and able move forward, or the even worse scenario of a disintegrating Europe may be too unpleasant to contemplate. Greece needs a strong Europe more than most of her fellow members of the EU.

R Botsiou, K. E. (). ‘The Origins of Greece’s European Policy’. In Arvanitopoulos, C. and Botsiou, K. E. (eds.) The Constantinos Karamanlis Institute of Democracy Yearbook . London/Heidelberg: Springer, –. Commission of the European Communities (). ‘Opinion on the Greek Application for Membership’. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement /. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

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    



Coufoudakis, V. (). ‘The European Economic Community and the “Freezing” of the Greek Association, –’. Journal of Common Market Studies,  (): –. Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (). The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Featherstone, K., Kazamias, G., and Papadimitriou, D. (). ‘Greece and the Negotiation of Economic and Monetary Union: Preferences, Strategies, and Institutions’. Journal of Modern Greek Studies,  (): –. Ioakimidis, P. (). ‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy’. In Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E. (eds.) Contemporary Greece and Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, –. Karamouzi, E. (). Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, –: The Second Enlargement. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Katsikas, D., Filinis, K., and Anastasatou, M. (). Κατανοώντας την ελληνική κρίση [Understanding the Greek Crisis]. Athens: Papazissis/Crisis Observatory ELIAMEP. Mody, A. (). EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pagoulatos, G. (). Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU. Basingstoke: Palgrave/St. Antony’s. Panagiotarea, E. (). Greece in the Euro: Economic Delinquency or Systemic Failure? Colchester: ECPR. Papageorgiou, F. and Verney, S. (). ‘Regional Planning and the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in Greece’. Regional Politics and Policy,  (): –. Papakonstantinou, G. (). Game Over. Athens: Papadopoulos. Pettifer, J. (ed.) (). The New Macedonian Question. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pisani-Ferry, J. (). The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tsardanidis, C. and Stavridis, S. (). ‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal’. Journal of European Integration,  (): –. Tsoukalis, L. (). The European Community and Its Mediterranean Enlargement. London: George Allen & Unwin. Tsoukalis, L. (). ‘Εισαγωγή: ευρωπαϊκή προσαρμογή και εθνικές ιδιαιτερότητες’ [Introduction: European Adjustment and National Particularities]. In Tsoukalis, L. (ed.) Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα: Η πρόκληση της προσαρμογής [Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adjustment]. Athens: Papazissis/EKEM, –. Tsoukalis, L. (). The New European Economy Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tsoukalis, L. (). In Defence of Europe: Can the European Project Be Saved? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Valinakis, Y. (). ‘Πολιτική Συνεργασία: Τα πρώτα δέκα χρόνια [Greece in European Political Cooperation: The First Ten Years]. In Tsoukalis, L. (ed.) Η Ελλάδα στην Ευρω παϊκή Κοινότητα: Η πρόκληση της προσαρμογής [Greece in the European Community: The Challenge of Adjustment]. Athens: Papazissis/EKEM, –. Varoufakis, Y. (). And the Weak Suffer What They Must? London: Random House. Yannopoulos, G. (). Greece and the European Communities: The First Decade of a Troubled Association. London: Sage.

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  ......................................................................................................................

     

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. L many states, Greece is essentially a status quo country in terms of its international relations, privileging stability over change: it seeks security in a structured and regulated international order. Periodic bouts of exceptionalism and rogueness pander to popular domestic trends providing occasional challenges to Greece’s ‘western’ orientation and international identity. This orientation is both pragmatic in terms of the realization that Greece’s national interests are best served and protected by membership of the ‘West’, as it is emotional and ideational in the context of the heritage of Ancient Greece and its cultural and political influence on defining the ‘West’. This chapter deals with three main aspects of Greek foreign policy since  with a special focus on the period since the end of the Cold War. First, is the transition from US tutelage to membership of the European Community/European Union in terms of foreign and security policy: the basis for all debate on issues of Greek external relations since . Second, are the changing international and regional contexts through which Greek foreign policy is viewed and which are highly deterministic: ‘the Cold War system’; ‘post-Cold War change’; Greece and Turkey; Greece and Cyprus; Greece and the Balkans. Greek foreign policy has always been ‘context heavy’ in this regard, and most analyses of foreign and security policy are dominated by the primacy of deterministic understandings of the external environment. Third, are the domestic factors influencing foreign policy formulation and implementation, ranging from the impact of leadership and personalities, to the role of political parties and ideologies, and through to decision-making structures and the influence of the media and public opinion. It is argued that this domestic environment, so crucial in understanding why nation-states act the way they do in foreign policy, remains relatively untouched in any systematic way in the literature on Greek foreign policy.

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     



These three aspects form a broad framework through which we can explain the formulation and implementation of Greek foreign policy across time and a variety of different international, regional, and domestic settings. It also affords us a reasoned articulation of the symbiotic relationship between theory and practice which is often missing from general work on foreign policy (and Greece is no exception): scholarship on Greek foreign policy is heavily skewed in favour of practice, with scant attempt to conceptualize and thus encourage and enable comparative work (Tsakonas, ).

. S S; S  R: B  US   EU

.................................................................................................................................. In traditional foreign policy analysis, states are portrayed as rational, unitary actors who define goals and seek the instruments to achieve them. They are driven on by objective national interests determined by the need to ensure national security—the survival of the state. While the national interest is notionally objective, it is increasingly informed by the interaction between the domestic environment and an international milieu, an interaction which becomes ever more formative. Even more formative in terms of national foreign policy is the international system in which the state is located. In this context, the nature of state ‘actorness’ changes (see for example, Clarke and White, ; Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, ; Hudson, ; Hudson, ; Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, ). States retain their sovereignty and right to autonomy of action but are usually constrained by the nature of the international system. Greece is no exception. Throughout the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first, Greece has sought security in a periodically changing international system. Its actorness has been bound both by the nature of the system and by geographic/geopolitical specificities: Greece is a ‘small state’ in foreign policy terms and has sought security through alliances, co-operation, and integration. History has shown that forays into the unilateral use of force to achieve national objectives have had disastrous consequences: the ‘Megali Idea’ was shattered by the military campaign in Asia Minor in the early s. As a result, since the end of the Second World War, Greece has pursued its national interests through interdependent means, accepting that its relative power limits its autonomy as an actor: these means have centred around the relationships with the US and the European Community/Union (EC/EU). Indeed, the main narrative in terms of Greek foreign policy since  has been the extent to which Greece has passed from US to European ‘protection’ in terms of its foreign policy and security interests. Arguably, Greek foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by the search for a ‘security provider’ (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, ). From the end of the Second World War until the metapolitefsi, there is no doubt that the US was this security provider. The Truman Doctrine, early membership of NATO, the supply of military capabilities, all stemming

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

 

from the US, provide evidence of a deep—if asymmetrical relationship—in which there was a foreign policy and security dependence on the US. This was just as true in ‘global’ terms, that is in the divided, bipolar international system of the Cold War in which Greece was a ‘frontline’ state, as it was in regional terms and the relationship with neighbouring rivals, especially Turkey. In the academic literature this was best captured early on primarily through the work of Theodore Couloumbis, who brought forward the first significant analyses of the Greek–US relationship, both in the Cold War context and in its more regional iteration (Couloumbis and Iatrides ; Couloumbis, ). Of course, the literature on US–Greek relations in the Cold War context is not limited to the field of foreign and security policy or the Greek search for a ‘security provider’, it also falls under the theme of the great importance to the role, influence, interference, and intervention of Great Powers in Greek domestic politics since the creation of the modern Greek state (Couloumbis, Petropoulos, and Psomiades, ). For our purposes, in the context of foreign policy, the US (through the vehicle of NATO) was the ‘security provider’, actively guaranteeing Greece’s interests in the Cold War context and maintaining balances across the Aegean with Turkey. Paradoxically, the major impact of the – junta on the search for a security provider was the questioning of the US commitment to Greece, especially in relation to Turkey, after the division of Cyprus (Rizas, ). Thus, under the leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis, who played the biggest role in shaping Greece in the immediate metapolitefsi era, a concerted effort was made to move away from the American orbit and pull closer to the European one. Karamanlis is rightly seen as the architect of Greece’s integration into the European project. It was his vision, diplomacy, and at times sheer willpower which pulled Greece into the EC, even when it seemed that it was nowhere near prepared for accession (Svolopoulos, Botsiou, and Hatzivassiliou, ). The received wisdom is that this accession process was primarily built on the desire to see the consolidation of Greek democracy post-junta especially in the East–West context (Karamouzi, ). Foremost in the mind of Greek policymakers and especially Karamanlis, was the necessity to acquire a new ‘security provider’ which could better guarantee Greek interests especially in the Aegean context (Economides, ): it is striking that the EC is not only seen as a set of political institutions and a common market, but as a security provider; a defender of borders (Valinakis, ). This turn to Europe did not eliminate NATO and the US from the foreign policy agenda but rather marked the beginning of a longer and more difficult process, probably best captured by the debates surrounding the Europeanization of national foreign policy (Wong and Hill, ). What is at stake here is the extent to which Greece has become ‘Europeanized’/Europeanist’ in its foreign policy outlook and the exact nature of security provided by membership of the EU (Kavakas, ). Initially, the EU provided no hard security guarantees but this has been modified by the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses within the Lisbon Treaty. Nonetheless, Greece’s membership of the EU and participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

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     



(CFSP), and more recently in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has provided a different forum for the provision of security in a different manner than in the previous relationship with the US or the ongoing membership of NATO (Wivel, ). The EU’s provision of security stems from membership of an exclusive institution which although dominated in its foreign policy capacity by a trinity of ‘Big Powers’, Germany, France, and the UK, allowed for participation and the equal voicing of interests: an intergovernmental process of equal say in decision-making far removed from the asymmetrical relationship endured with the US. At times, and especially during the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) governments of the s, this process of decision-making afforded the Greek government the right to act as a spoiler by blocking certain decisions and actions. Seen as Europe’s awkward partner, Papandreou was keen to assert Greek independence and autonomy of action, and to some extent his vision of anti-westernism, by refusing to condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland (), hampering the UK’s attempts to forge a common position with respect to the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands (), and adopting a non-condemnatory stand on the Soviet downing of Korean airliner KAL  (). But gradually, and particularly from the mid-s onwards, Greek foreign policymaking was shaped by the idea that belonging to the EU was a commitment which entailed responsibilities but was also empowering. Greece did not need to assert its autonomy of action and sovereign independence by being a rogue element and a disrupter. By acting consensually and pursuing Greek interests within the CFSP context it became increasingly obvious that the EU provided a multiplier effect on Greek power. In a sense, and especially in regional foreign policy terms and in a postCold War world where ‘soft security’ was becoming more relevant, being an active and positive player in such a powerful political and economic institution, whose normative international influence was growing exponentially as the international system in Europe and beyond took shape in the s, afforded Greece greater leverage in securing its national interests. This is best captured by the literature on Europeanization of Greek foreign policy (Ioakimidis, ; Ioakimidis, ; Economides, ; Tsardanidis and Stavridis, ). In general, the Europeanization of foreign policy contends that states are Europeanized as a result of membership of the EU which has specific impacts on them. Over time, it is argued, member state interests converge as states adopt and adapt to ‘European foreign policy’. This process of convergence is accounted for in rationalist terms through a process of repetitive bargaining in the CFSP, for example, or as the result of a broader process of socialization in constructivist terms (or potentially both). Alternatively, it is argued that member states Europeanize their foreign policy by projecting their interests onto the European level to the extent that their interests become European interests. Lastly, and more abstractly, national foreign policies become Europeanized on an ideational basis, that is, as a sense of ‘European-ness’ evolves on a normative basis and a ‘European identity’ emerges over time, so member state foreign policies become more European on this level.

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 

How is this relevant to Greek foreign policy? Since accession in , Europe and the EU, have become the primary loci for Greek foreign policy. If security has been the principal goal of Greek foreign policy, it is best served through membership of the EU. Belonging to this exclusive ‘club’ has led to democratic consolidation and economic growth (despite the effects of the crisis since ), and to protection and empowerment in international terms. The economic strength, and normative and diplomatic clout of the EU, serve the interests of Greece abroad very well. Arguably European foreign policy has become Greek foreign policy (Economides, a). Greece has adapted to mainstream EU positions on issues ranging from nuclear nonproliferation to positions on the Israeli–Palestinian dispute and more. And this process of convergence and adaptation—Europeanization—was best evidenced by the changing positions of Greek foreign policy both in substance and style in the immediate post-Andreas Papandreou period. The anti-EU, anti-western rhetoric was replaced by a more considered foreign policy under the Costas Simitis government which adopted a more mainstream European approach as a better way of serving Greek interests. The best example of this is the deliberations over the EU and NATO response to the Kosovo crisis in –. Here, the Simitis government upheld more traditional Pasok (and nationalist) positions of autonomy of action and challenging subservience to ‘western interests’ by not participating in NATO action in Kosovo, whilst simultaneously not hindering NATO action either institutionally or geographically: a pragmatic middle road which allowed for a rhetorical challenge to EU and NATO policy, popular to some domestic audiences while guaranteeing Greece’s western credentials politically and institutionally by not blocking western actions. The most noteworthy and perhaps controversial policy change undertaken by Greek decision makers in the context of EU membership and European foreign policy was the  decision to promote Turkish candidacy and accession to the EU. Since Greece joined the EC in  it was seen as the one veto player blocking Turkey’s path to membership. In the autumn of , a rapprochement occurred between the two countries after what became known as ‘earthquake or disaster diplomacy’ led by the respective foreign ministers of the two states which ensued after a pair of powerful earthquakes shook both countries and led to mutual rescue/assistance missions (KerLindsay, ). George Papandreou, the Greek Foreign Minister, was the prime mover of this policy change, this volte-face, by which Greece lifted its veto on Turkish membership but insisted that EU accession talks and ultimately membership would be conditional on resolving all outstanding bilateral disputes with Greece and the adoption of practices of good neighbourliness. This position was then adopted by the EU. In this instance, Greece’s membership of the EU afforded it the power of institutional belonging, and the normative ballast this brought with it, and the ability to leverage membership of the EU in a bilateral relationship and indeed lift the bilateral relationship into the multilateral sphere: as the EU had adopted the Greek line, it now was equally responsible in ensuring that Turkish progress towards membership fulfilled conditions beneficial to Greece and the normalization of relations with Turkey in a peaceful manner.

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     



This was seen as a radical EU policy change, achieved by a ‘small’ European power. It, of course, matched the interests and approach of the EU but nevertheless defined a new agenda of Turkish–EU relations within which the bilateral relationship across the Aegean was now subsumed. In the context of the theme of ‘security provision’ as the central goal of Greek foreign policy since the Second World War, and the swing from US to European sponsorship of national interests, this is the par excellence example. In the academic literature it has also been considered in the light of the Europeanization debates. Some argued that this change in the Greek position and the ensuing change in EU policy towards Turkey was a clear example of a form of Europeanization in which Greece ‘uploaded’ or ‘projected’ its interests onto the European stage and its policy was adopted as ‘European policy’ (Economides, ). Others disagreed, arguing that projection did not constitute Europeanization (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, ). What matters most here is that it is incontrovertible that EU membership had a substantial impact on how Greece behaved in foreign policy terms towards its most significant issue in foreign policy, the relationship with neighbouring Turkey. Equally, it is a manifestation of the extent to which Greece has shifted the point of emphasis in its relationship with Turkey from the US/NATO pole to that of the EU. The former still remains the paramount relationship in terms of hard security, military and defence matters: it is commonly asserted that war between Greece and Turkey was narrowly averted through US and NATO diplomatic intervention. This was certainly true in the naval stand-off in the Aegean in  (the result of disputes over oil exploration drilling rights) and near-war in  (where Turkey challenged Greek sovereignty of the Imia islands). But in broader foreign policy terms, and in the achievement of long-term policy goals with respect to Turkey, there can be little doubt that the lead is now taken by the European context. ‘Soft power’ Europe, for better or for worse, is the primary context and conduit for Greek foreign policy: arguably the swing from US to European tutelage in foreign policy terms is complete and unlikely to be changed in the near future. The provision of security in terms of the protection and promotion of vital national interests, the very stuff of foreign policy, is now primarily located in membership of the EU and Greece has become increasingly Europeanist in its outlook. The transatlantic element is still important in hard security terms and NATO is the key military institution in Greece’s national security and defence doctrine (Economides, b) but the age of US hegemony is superseded by the relationship with Europe whose ‘soft power’ is the key determinant of Greece’s broader foreign and security policy concerns.

. T D   I M

.................................................................................................................................. Greek foreign policy is conditioned if not determined by two specific aspects of the international milieu or environment. The first is the structure of particular

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

 

international orders such as Cold War and post-Cold War international systems. The second is a series of constant regional and bilateral issues which dominate the foreign policy agenda and which everything revolves around in foreign policy terms: Greece’s relations with Turkey, the Cyprus ‘problem’, and the relationship with various Western Balkan states and especially the ‘Macedonian issue’. This section will look at these two assertions in turn. It is argued that Greek foreign policy has been determined by the international order of the time. Not a novel argument perhaps, but one which sheds much light on the direction taken by Greek foreign policy in the post-junta era. In this sense, and with very few exceptions, this structural determinism has made Greece a reactive state in foreign policy terms and also provided useful mitigation, not only for inaction and the negation of agency, but also for ascribing negative outcomes to the influence of powerful external actors. How can we best characterize the two dominant international orders since  and describe their effects on Greek foreign policy? Firstly, the Cold War international system was one of rigid bipolarity, especially in the European theatre. While periodically wars were waged elsewhere, in Asia and Africa in the context of the Cold War, in divided Europe the state system was static and in a stalemate. This was a heavily structured and structuring system for Greece. It allowed for a degree of certainty and identity much needed after the turbulent years of the Second World War, the Occupation, and the ensuing Civil War. Belonging to the western world provided real security guarantees in terms of NATO membership from , defined the foreign policy orientation of successive governments, and limited the leeway for autonomous foreign policy: almost everything was determined by the Cold War system. There were exceptions to this but with only marginal consequences. In the mid to late-s, the Karamanlis government did attempt an opening to the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc but with minimal consequences to Greece’s Western orientation and always within the margins of manoeuvrability afforded to individual ‘western’ states by the US-underpinned ‘western world’. Similarly, the Pasok governments of Andrea Papandreou did at times pursue policies at odds with European partners and quite openly anti-American, especially in relation to US base rights in Greece, the assumption of pro-Palestinian positions, or calls for denuclearization of the Balkan peninsula. But here too, the consequences were limited in international terms and directed towards a domestic audience in the context of the pursuit of a ‘third way’. When there was real crisis, for example with Turkey in the Aegean in , reliance on the US in defusing the situation provided a clearer picture of the role of and location of Greece in the Cold War international system. In short, the Cold War international system provided a clear and sure framework within which Greek foreign policy would be formulated and implemented. Potential regional and bilateral flashpoints were minimized if not eliminated by the structure of the Cold War European order and the necessities for Western solidarity and security in the light of the perceived Soviet threat. Relations with Turkey were mediated by the need to maintain cohesion within the NATO alliance: war between two Western allies

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

was not permissible. Relations with Greece’s northern neighbours was also reflected through the prism of the Cold War in which Greece was a ‘frontline state’ against the Eastern bloc leading to the maintenance of a constancy of direction in relations with Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia (Hatzivassiliou, ). In this sense, the international milieu—the external environment—was the main source of Greek foreign policy and a determining source as such. The collapse of communism shattered Greece’s Cold War certainties and threw up enormous systemic and geopolitical challenges to Greek foreign policy (Lesser, Larrabee, Zanini and Vlachos, ; Veremis, ). From  onwards, Greece’s external environment has been a—if not the—determining feature and source of foreign policy. What changed with the collapse of the Eastern bloc to provide such challenges to Greece’s external relations? Essentially, Greece’s raison d’etre as a Western power was undermined and the role afforded to it in the divided Europe and the confrontation with ‘international communism’ was eliminated. Greece had to carve out a new role in a fluctuating international system full of threats and insecurities. Why was Greece now any longer important in the NATO context? What could Greece offer its European partners in terms of European foreign policy? What defined Greece’s ‘westerness’ in the absence of a general external threat to the West? These were the inherent challenges of the post period, and Greece’s reactions to change, in the early s, seriously impaired its ‘westerness’ in the eyes of allies and partners, and confirmed the assertion that its foreign policy was fundamentally reactive in nature and externally driven. The stand-out example here is the emergence of the ‘Macedonian issue’ and Greece’s handling of its bilateral relationship with its neighbouring state in the context of the EU. This is an issue which still figures highly on the Greek foreign policy agenda (as we shall see in the next section). At this point, suffice it to say that the handling of the issue in the early s, with the refusal to recognize the name of the new state—claiming ancient heritage and cultural appropriation—was extremely harmful to Greece’s image and standing among its partners. The damage caused by the position taken by the Greek governments of the early s took years to repair, both in regional terms and in relation to Greece’s broader foreign policy and international image. Its western credentials were in tatters; its standing as a European partner plummeted, and the benefits of belonging to an exclusive organization which was a guarantor of vital national interests was increasingly questioned. The result of the break-up of Yugoslavia, in the context of a fluctuating international post-Cold War system, the ‘Macedonian issue’ came to define Greece’s new role abroad and re-emphasized the ideas of the determinism of the external environment (whilst also linking it to domestic sources of foreign policy). Greece’s policy-making elite was unprepared for the threat emanating from a collapsing Yugoslavia: Greek identity, so long shored up by belonging to the Western world as defined by the Cold War, could not cope with the national challenge thrown up by ‘the ‘Macedonian issue’. Indeed, much of Greece’s foreign policy in the late s was aimed at restoring a degree of normality, if not Europeaness, in its international relations (Tsoukalis, ). Greece, reactive in international affairs, had been exposed to a situation generated by

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 

the collapse of an existing international order and the emergence of a new one, within which it had to define and adopt a new role. The international milieu continued to be the determining context and source of foreign policy albeit in a radically different international context which had crushed all preceding foreign policy. The determinism of the international environment is also relevant to understanding Greek foreign policy in a non-systemic way. In other words, Greek foreign policy is externally determined, not only by the nature of any given international order but by the dual challenge provided by Turkey and Cyprus. These two countries, and the triangulated relationship Greece has with them, overshadow all elements of Greek foreign policy. It is not by coincidence that they are referred to in Greece as the Ethnika Themata (National Issues): the challenge they provide is viewed in Greece not as an issue of external relations but almost existentially, of defending Hellenism (not unlike the Macedonian situation but much more longstanding, threatening, and essential). Greece’s relationships with EU partners, NATO allies, and other significant European and non-European actors, for example Russia and China as members of the P, and of the UN Security Council are explicitly determined by positions on Turkey and Cyprus. We have seen how Turkey figured and still figures in Greece’s position within the EU and its view on NATO’s regional role, and as an intermediary in the transAegean relationship. Cyprus has figured equally highly in Greece’s EU policies: it is said that Greece threatened to block the EU’s ‘big-bang enlargement’ towards Central and Eastern Europe in  if Cyprus was not included, even though EU conditionality on the resolution of the Cyprus dispute had not been met (Ker-Lindsay, ). Equally, Greece is one of the five EU member states yet to recognize the independence of Kosovo, a position determined by the effects that recognition of a secessionary state would have on the delicate balance on the divided island of Cyprus. This points to the determining effect that these externally driven issues have on the shape and content of Greek foreign policy: it is yet another facet of the significance of the international environment as the primary source of policy. As has been argued, the external environment is a primary determining feature in foreign policy formulation, both in a systemic and bilateral (if not regional) sense. But as we shall see in the next section, there are aspects of the domestic environment which also need to be considered in analysing the main sources and substance of Greek foreign policy.

. T D E: T P  S  S  P F

.................................................................................................................................. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a foreign policy agenda dominated by Ethnika Themata will be heavily determined by national sentiment. In other words, the domestic source of

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

Greek foreign policy is dominated by an implicit and explicit nationalism as expressed through public opinion and overt public demonstrations. Foreign policy analysis identifies multiple domestic sources of foreign policy in liberal democracies, including public opinion, the role of the media, political parties, ideology, personality and leadership, and policy-making systems and practices (including parliament, government, ministries and the civil service) (Alden and Aran, ; Hill, ). It is argued here, that in the Greek case, the formal, organizational, public and institutionalized structures of foreign policy-making are subservient to more transient and capricious forces dependent on outbursts of nationalism and exceptionalism, often derived from and driven on by party political interests (at times couched in pseudo-ideology). And, foreign policy decision-making is normally very ‘personality driven’ and more often than not concentrated within the narrow environment of the prime minister’s office (see Chapter ). Essentially, foreign policy is formulated and implemented primarily through an ad hoc system of relationships between the prime minister, his advisors, other Cabinet members including the foreign minister and party-political appointees. The formal structures of government, including parliamentary scrutiny and increasingly the diplomatic corps and foreign policy bureaucracy, are marginalized actors in the foreign policy process. As a result, there is a paucity of academic literature concentrating on Greek foreign policy formulation and the shaping role played by the domestic environment. Most studies of Greek foreign policy are issue specific, concentrating mainly on relations with Turkey, Cyprus, and the Western Balkans (including the Macedonian issue). Within these studies one may get a glimpse of decision-making and policy formulation but this is not usually the central element of the study (and more often than not the external environment is emphasized). There are of course some exceptions to this in which the role of specific actors and practices are the focus and where these domestic sources of foreign policy figure highly (see Stefanidis, ;Tsakonas, ; Triantaphyllou, Ifantis, and Kotellis, ). Unsurprisingly, nationalism and identity has been an important focus of studies on the domestic environment of foreign policy either explicitly (Economides, ) or implicitly in other broader studies (Michas, ). Of course, the issue of the role of nationalism in Greece’s foreign policy is a dominant theme. And it is a distorting theme in that immediately the debate is captured not by what is rational, feasible, and achievable, but on the capricious nature of public sentiment driven on by particular short-term political interest. Public opinion strongly matters and should not be ignored but it is mediated by a form of political leadership which bypasses normal channels of policy formulation and decision-making, pandering to the emotional vicissitudes of public sentiment. Consequently, domestic origins of foreign policy are more often than not derived from the nature of the concentration of power in the office of the prime minister or the individuals who have held that position in the metapolitefsi and have more often than not been in sole charge of shaping and executing foreign policy. The influence of the office of prime minister has been exhaustively analysed in one specific book which sets the benchmark for this kind of study (Featherstone and

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 

Papadimitriou, ), where the concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister and the ‘core executive’ is laid out clearly and extensively. While this study is not overtly concerned with the foreign dimension, its implicit relevance and implications are obvious. For better or worse, individual and individual leadership matters more than anything else in this highly centralized political system in which power is centred on the PM. Irrespective of the holder of the PM office, the evidence suggests that foreign policy is usually conducted through this office as another manifestation of the centralization of power and authority. A quick run through the major premierships post- provides clear evidence of this. Konstantinos Karamanlis was the undisputed leader of the foreign policy process throughout his tenure. Not for nothing was he often referred to by his supporters as the ethnarchis (ethnarc or ‘national leader’) rather than simply the prime minister or leader. This was the result not only of the central role he played in the restoration of democracy in Greece post-junta but also the defining role he played in restoring Greece’s role and reputation internationally and leading it to membership of the European Community (and the implications this had in foreign policy terms). His foreign ministers were noteworthy political and public figures in their own right (Rallis, Bitsios) but were essentially subservient to his leadership and decisions, especially in the European context. Andreas Papandreou, was another overwhelmingly dominant leader who shaped his governments’ foreign policy options and ruled the external relations agenda through his office. His brand of foreign policy nominally deferred to the ideological exigencies of his party and was highly populist in its approach (Loulis, ). It veered between an attachment to a ‘third way’ verging on non-alignment, including a virulent and vocal anti-Americanism/westernism often threatening withdrawal from NATO and the EC, and a more pragmatic orientation in which Pasok’s bark was worse than its bite. Papandreou withdrew Greece neither from the EC nor NATO; the emotive US base rights issue became a protracted process with a partial outcome which fell short of total US withdrawal; and Greece increasingly became more muted in more outlandish foreign policy initiatives relating to the Group of Six or the PLO. Papandreou’s understanding of the politics of power, and defence of the national interests, muted the more ideologically driven electoral and public pledges, especially so in his second term as PM. In turn, he appointed foreign ministers who were of standing in his party (Charalambopoulos, Papoulias) but little clout in international terms or interest in defining policy. In the Simitis governments of – there was a slight shift in emphasis and roles in terms of policy-formulation and implementation. While ultimate power and authority was still concentrated in the PM’s office, Simitis was more willing to delegate responsibility to his foreign ministers, Theodore Pangalos and, more importantly, George Papandreou. It was under the stewardship of the latter that the rapprochement with Turkey took place and Greece started openly supporting Turkish membership of the EU. This was an initiative sponsored by Simitis but clearly the work of Papandreou through his personal diplomacy with his Turkish counterpart and international

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     



connections and profile. Indeed, Papandreou was also a central actor in the attempts to reach a resolution to the Cyprus dispute through the Annan Process and was a strong supporter of the Annan Plan. Under Simitis, foreign policy, just like much of the domestic reform process was geared towards conforming to a more European standard and method of governing. Whether this was successful or not is another matter. Under the Karamanlis premiership of –, foreign policy did not figure highly on the core executive’s agenda even though, as with previous PMs, power was highly centralized in Maximou, the PM’s official residence. Karamanlis’ choice as his first foreign minister, Petros Molyviatis, an erstwhile career diplomat and close confidant of the Karamanlis family, indicated the desire for a safe pair of hands rather than an activist minister. His successor, Dora Bakogianni, a high-profile, high-ranking member of New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) took a more active line but was restricted by her prime minister’s reticence to engage with foreign policy. This prime ministerial reticence continued into the premiership of Alexis Tsipras: it is widely held that he has no intrinsic interest in or knowledge of foreign policy, and sees it almost exclusively as an instrument of domestic electoral politics. As such he delegated authority to his foreign minister, Nikos Kotzias, who paradoxically centralized power in foreign policy in his immediate office and personally appointed staff, replicating the core executive model which had dominated Greek governments in the metapolitefsi. Kotzias was given a lot of leeway by the prime minister in pursuit of resolutions to the Ethnika Themata, signing a treaty with Skopje resolving the ‘Macedonian name’ issue (for which, of course, the prime minister claimed credit), supporting UN-sponsored Cyprus peace talks, discussing with Albania over outstanding bilateral issues, and engaging diplomatically with Turkey. What this brief engagement with a selection of the longest lasting metapolitefsi governments and their foreign policy-making has attempted to show is that there is no real process of foreign policy-making beyond the personal, centred primarily in the prime minister’s office and exceptionally in the office and person of the foreign minister. Parliament plays a negligible role in foreign policy: debates do occur in the chamber and are dominated by party politics and not the merits of the case in hand. Parliamentary scrutiny through committee is virtually non-existent. The KYSEA (the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence), a high-ranking Cabinet committee, supposedly the chief decision-making body for foreign affairs, has never met regularly and acts on the whim of the prime minister. The diplomatic corps has been increasingly marginalized, while the world of think tanks suffers from severe financial constraints. All this acts as a reinforcement of the central premise here that rational, structured, policy-making processes in the field of foreign policy are not apt in the case of Greece. The main issues in foreign policy are defined as national issues and for any success to be had in dealing with these issues, erstwhile governments have to mobilize public support based on national sentiment (with some exceptions). Thus, the domestic environment in terms of foreign policy is conditioned, not by democratic practices and checks, but by the need to pander to the street or by manipulating public and

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

 

national sentiments in an attempt to fulfil a domestic political agenda. As a result, Greek foreign policy has often been typified by a dependence on resolving issues of identity through foreign policy.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Since the metapolitefsi, Greek foreign policy has been characterized by a series of swings between stability and change, the US and Europe, the pursuit of interests and questions of identity, and the predominance of the international environment and the domestic milieu. Greek foreign policy since  is best viewed as a progressive shift from US to EU sponsorship and alignment with Europe. What has come with this is a gradual and increasing Europeanization of Greek foreign policy: a convergence with the European mainstream. Where once Greek exceptionalism was seen as the norm, as a distinguishing feature distancing Greece from a European consensus, it has now gradually been replaced by a sense of adaptation and belonging. Perhaps the agreement creating the ‘Republic of North Macedonia’, and how it has been welcomed internationally, is good evidence of this emerging normalization of Greek foreign policy. Alongside the Greek– Turkish rapprochement of , this shows autonomy and proactiveness, but within defined normative and material concerns shared with Greece’s European partners. Arguably, Greece has carved out a new role for itself within a specific geopolitical sphere which protects it from the large-scale shifts and turbulence of an ever-changing and more challenging international order. But the structure of that international order still remains the dominant feature in setting Greece’s foreign policy agenda. The role of the domestic environment to foreign policy-making is more volatile. Public sentiment is often stirred up and expresses itself quite openly on the street, compelling prime ministers to take control of foreign policy as national leaders; a process exacerbated by the heavily centralized policy-making powers of the core executive at the expense of other government and state institutions. As a result, there is no real or functioning foreign policy decision-making process beyond the office of the PM (or at times the foreign minister). Not surprisingly, this has often led to the conflation of foreign policy and the domestic electoral agenda, where significant issues of foreign policy are raised as a way of dividing political opponents rather than achieving progress on thorny issues in international relations. This has been seen as a source of Greek exceptionalism and divergence from the European mainstream. Perhaps this too is not an exclusively Greek phenomenon, certainly not in times when Europe and European-ness is questioned by various factors, including the treatment of refugees and illegal migrants, triggering populist, nationalist, and xenophobic instincts across Europe as a whole. This chapter has attempted to highlight the role of the external environment—the international system in its structural form—on the formulation and implementation of

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     

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Greek foreign policy, as well as to tease out some of the implications of a domestic environment in which foreign policy serves various purposes and which has a highly centralized—and this politicized—decision-making process. The interface between the two is less than clear and is worthy of further examination. We need to encourage and pursue more systematic, and evidence-based research and analysis, bringing together these two faces of the Greek foreign policy world so as to be able to better define who sets the foreign policy agenda, under what conditions and for which reasons.

R Alden, C. and Aran, A. (). Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches. London: Routledge. Clarke, M. and White, B. (eds.) (). Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Couloumbis, T. (). The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle. New York: Praeger. Couloumbis, T., Petropoulos, J., and Psomiades, H. (). Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective. New York: Pella Publishers. Couloumbis, T. and Iatrides, J. (). Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review. New York: Pella Publishers. Economides, S. (). Nationalism and Foreign Policy: Greece and the ‘Macedonian’ Question. London: Brassey’s/Centre for Defence Studies. Economides, S. (). ‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy’. West European Politics,  (): –. Economides, S. (a). ‘The Relevance of “Europe” to Greek Foreign Policy’. In Featherstone, K. (ed.) Europe in Modern Greek History. London: Hurst and Company, –. Economides, S. (b). ‘Greece’. In Giegerich, B., Biehl, H., and Jonas, A. (eds.) Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent. Wiesbaden: Springer, –. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). Prime Ministers in Greece: The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hatzivassiliou, E. (). Greece and the Cold War: Front Line State, –. Abingdon: Routledge. Hermann, C., Kegley, C., and Rosenau, J. (). New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. London: Allen & Unwin. Hill, C. (). The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hudson, V. M. (). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Latham: Rowman & Littlefield. Hudson, V. M. (). Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Latham: Rowman & Littlefield. Ioakimidis, P. C. (). ‘The Europeanisation of Greece’s Foreign Policy: Problems and Progress’. In Mitsos, A. and Mossialos, E. (eds.) Contemporary Greece and Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate, –. Ioakimidis P.C. (). ‘The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment’ In Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (eds.) Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, London: Frank Cass, –.

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

 

Karamouzi, E. (). Greece, the EEC and the Cold War –: The Second Enlargement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kavakas, D. (). ‘Greece’. In Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds.) The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press, –. Ker-Lindsay, J. (). ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of Disaster Diplomacy?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs,  (): –. Ker-Lindsay, J. (). EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus. London: Palgrave Macmillan Lesser, I., Larrabee, S., Zanini, M., and Vlachos, K. (). Greece’s New Geopolitics. Santa Monica: Rand. Loulis, J. (). ‘Papandreou’s Foreign Policy’. Foreign Affairs, December . Michas, T. (). Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milošević’s Serbia. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Rizas, S. (). Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, η Δικτατορία των Συνταγματάρχων και το Κυπριακό Ζήτημα – [The United States, the Colonels Dictatorship and the Cyprus Question, –]. Athens: Patakis. Smith, S., Hadfield, A., and Dunne, T. (eds.) (). Foreign Policy: Theory, Actors, Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stefanidis, I. (). ‘Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy’. Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper No. . London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Svolopoulos, K., Botsiou, E. and Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds.) (). Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής στον εικοστό αιώνα, τόμος  [Constantine Karamanlis in the Twentieth Century, volume ]. Athens: Anagramma. Triantaphyllou, D., Ifantis, K. and Kotelis, A. (). ‘National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy: An Exploratory Study of Greek Elites’ Perceptions towards Turkey’. GreeSE Paper No , Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Tsakonas, P. (). Σύγχρονη ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική: μια συνολική προσέγγιση [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach]. Athens: Sideri S. Tsakonas, P. (). ‘Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,  (): –. Tsakonas, P. and Tournikiotis, A. (). ‘Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The “Expectations-Reality Gap” ’. Security Dialogue,  (), – Tsardanidis, C. and Stavridis, S. (). ‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal’, Journal of European Integration,  (), – Tsoukalis, L. (). ‘Greece: Like Any Other European Country?’ The National Interest, : –. Valinakis, Y. (). ‘Security Policy’. In Kazakos, P. and Ioakimidis, P. C. (eds.), Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, –. London: Pinter. Veremis, T. (). Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική: Διλήμματα μιας νέας εποχής [Greek Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Era]. Athens: Sideri S. Wivel, A. (). ‘The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,  (), – Wong, R. and Hill, C, (eds.) (). National and European Foreign Policy: Towards Europeanization. Abingdon: Routledge.

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        ......................................................................................................................

– 

......................................................................................................................

 . 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. T has been one of the main preoccupations of Greek foreign policy for obvious reasons. Besides Turkey being Greece’s largest neighbour, Greek and Turkish national identity have to a significant degree been defined against each other, as the Balkans and Anatolia painfully shifted from the empire to the nation-state era (Özkırımlı and Sofos, ). Following a decade of military confrontation, the  January  Population Exchange Convention and the Treaty of Lausanne of  July  became the cornerstones of the bilateral relationship between Greece and Turkey. They were followed by an unexpected rapprochement that delivered the Venizelos–Ataturk accords of  and the  Treaty of Friendship (Ladas, ). The end of the Second World War and the outbreak of the Cold War found both states in the same camp. The Soviet Union and its client states were identified as the key security threat for both. Both states fought on the same side in the – Korean War and simultaneously entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Greece and Turkey’s  NATO membership was meant to consolidate the Western orientation of both countries and facilitate a security partnership between them. Nevertheless, the rise of the Cyprus issue would abruptly end the rapprochement and bring to the surface several latent bilateral disputes, especially with reference to minorities and borders. The – September  pogrom against the Greek minority of Istanbul linked to the outbreak of the Greek Cypriot armed struggle for union with Greece became a watershed (Alexandris, ). The independence of the Republic of Cyprus in  did not smooth relations, as already in December , a constitutional crisis led to the de facto end of the bicommunal character of the state and intercommunal violence. Greek–Turkish relations came to the brink of war in  and in  due to Cyprus. The July  events

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

 . 

with the Greek-instigated military coup and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus brought Greek–Turkish relations to the lowest point since . While an all-out war was avoided, Turkey rose to the position of Greece’s top security threat. Greek strategic planning was reconfigured: security forces were no more focusing on preventing a Soviet bloc assault across the Iron Curtain that divided Europe and went along the northern borders of Greece. Instead they built up Greece’s defence capacity against Turkey along the Evros and the Aegean islands. Meanwhile, old disputes were rekindled, and new ones emerged. A race to the bottom became a key feature of the respective minority rights policies. Retaliatory measures against Turkey’s Greek minority and Greece’s Muslim minority became another painful feature of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, a set of new disputes emerged in the Aegean. The parties disagreed on the delineation of their territorial waters, continental shelf, and flight information zone (FIR) and the demilitarization of certain Aegean islands (Heraclides, ). The signature of the International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLoS) in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on  December  could not provide a blueprint for a solution, as Turkey refused to become a signatory. Greece urged Turkey to comply with international law, while Turkey argued that the Aegean Sea was a sui generis case where UNCLoS general provisions would not apply. Recurrent aircraft dog fights over the Aegean would become a dangerous and costly reminder of the absence of a solution. The lack of any progress in the Cyprus issue continued to frame the bilateral relationship between Greece and Turkey. Bilateral relations appeared trapped in a ‘cold war’ that offered limited possibilities for dialogue both at the diplomatic and the civil society level. Self-righteous complacency characterized the attitude of both states towards each other. Greece’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in  and Turkey’s declared ambition to join the organization eventually raised the EEC to an important parameter of the bilateral relationship. This chapter examines the development of Greek–Turkish relations under the influence of the European Union (EU) and the limits of the rapprochement between the two countries. The EU has been the catalyst for the pacification of the relations of several European states whose competition had led them to recurrent conflict. The  lifting of the Greek veto on the improvement of EU–Turkey relations triggered an improvement in bilateral relations which has remained unprecedented since the s. Academic literature on Greek–Turkish relations has also followed political vicissitudes. Pre-rapprochment works on the topic included Couloumbis (), Bahcheli () and Constas (). At the onset of the rapprochement process the relevant literature flourished. Apart from the works already cited, one could note Keridis and Triantafyllou (), Aydin and Ifantis (), Çarkoğlu and Rubin (), Veremis (), and Anastasakis et al. (). In the Greek-language academic literature, one could resort to Syrigos (), while in the Turkish-language one could refer to Oran (a; b; (). Bilateral relations underwent a paradigmatic shift which allowed for zero-sum game-based approaches to be challenged. Economic and civil-society ties grew stronger; minority problems were mitigated while longstanding bilateral diplomatic disputes remained unresolved and far from international adjudication. Turkey’s

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– 



faltering EU membership ambitions weakened a crucial catalyst of Greek–Turkish rapprochement, yet there was no relapse to the pre- problematic relations. Turkey’s possible drifting away from Western institutions, were it to gain significance, would pose a fresh strategic challenge for the Greek government. Despite the severe economic and social crises that hit Greece and Turkey in the last decade, Greek–Turkish relations have not been derailed. In both countries, bilateral disputes and the Cyprus issue have declined in importance compared to other foreign policy issues. This allowed both sides to focus on urgent questions, but removed a strong incentive to take risks for conflict resolution. The costs of postponing a bitter compromise appear low, and this provides a strong incentive to political leaders to refrain from necessary political initiatives. This poses substantial risks for the future and sets a limit to the development of even closer economic and social relations. The inability to resolve outstanding problems through unpleasant but necessary compromise can be juxtaposed with the chronic inability of Greek governments to reach unpopular but necessary solutions in a number of crucial domestic political issues. Institution-building and leadership are sine qua non for the overcoming of the seemingly intractable Greek–Turkish disputes.

. T EU   N F: T R  H

.................................................................................................................................. Greece’s membership of the European Economic Community (EC, later the European Union, EU) in  became a watershed for Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. The unanimity rule in issues pertaining to EEC foreign relations and enlargement meant that Greece acquired leverage upon the future of EEC–Turkey relations. When following the – military regime, Turkey acquired an interest in EC membership and filed a membership application in , Greece made its consent on the improvement of EC–Turkey relations conditional upon positive developments in the Cyprus issue and its bilateral disputes with Turkey. Vetoing any steps towards improving EEC–Turkey relations in the absence of any progress became a key point of Greek policy towards Turkey. Short-lived efforts to overcome the stalemate as in Davos in  failed to deliver any tangible results. The crisis of  when Turkey declared that the Turkish exploratory vessel Sismik would conduct hydrocarbon research in disputed regions of the Aegean pointed at how dangerous the situation remained for regional peace and stability. The crisis in bilateral relations had a negative spillover regarding the treatment of minorities. The application of negative reciprocity in minority affairs turned the Greek minority in Turkey and the Muslim minority of Greece into hostages of bilateral relations (Grigoriadis, ; Kurban and Tsitselikis, ). This reflected a dominant view that minority members did not enjoy their rights as fully-fledged citizens of the

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

 . 

state but in the context of the treaties signed by both Greece and Turkey and the extent to which they remained applicable or valid. Turkey’s weight in Greece’s security calculations was reinforced with the end of the Cold War, which removed the last vestiges of a Soviet threat from Greece’s northern borders. While both states competed for regional influence in south-eastern Europe and the Black Sea, Greek–Turkish relations went through two severe crises in the s. The Imia/Kardak crisis of January  and the Ocalan crisis of February  highlighted the risks that the absence of any dialogue and inertia harboured. Both sides eventually realized that the prolongation of the status quo was not a safe option, and urgent diplomatic action was needed. The first steps taken by foreign ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem in early  at the outset of the Kosovo war gained traction following two calamities that befell the two countries. The August  earthquake near Istanbul and the September  earthquake near Athens caused major damages and thousands of deaths. The two earthquakes painfully reminded both Greeks and Turks of their geographic proximity and common human security threats. They offered a rare opportunity for the manifestation of mutual solidarity. The delivery of humanitarian aid across the Aegean had a catalytic effect on public opinion, and the two foreign ministers captured the historic opportunity (Tsakonas, ). What was coined as ‘earthquake diplomacy’ culminated in the December  Helsinki European Council decision. Greece lifted its veto against the EU candidacy of Turkey, while at the same time securing a path for the resolution of bilateral disputes through international adjudication and the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey would become a candidate for EU membership, while the resolution of the Cyprus issue while desirable would not be a precondition for the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus. Regarding the bilateral disputes, both sides were invited to conduct bilateral negotiations. If these failed to produce a result by the end of , the issues would have to be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

. T H W: R G–T R

.................................................................................................................................. The Helsinki decision proved a watershed for Greek–Turkish relations (Onis, ; Tsakonas, ). For the first time Greece considered Turkey’s socialization into the European political values and norms as an essential strategic objective. Greek policy towards Turkey had shifted from conditional sanctions to conditional rewards (Couloumbis, ; Couloumbis and Kentikelenis, ). The Greek–Turkish frontier was no longer envisioned as the border of the European Union and the European continent itself but as an area of communication and trade. Greece became a stakeholder in Turkey’s democratization process. Turkey’s Europeanization process was hoped to influence government offices and the government to endorse European

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– 



political values (Evin, ). EU-initiated political reform in Turkey offered a crucial instrument for the improvement of bilateral relations, breaking the stalemate in the Cyprus conflict and bilateral disputes, and contributing to their resolution upon the basis of international law. It was agreed that the emergence of a prosperous, democratic Turkey would serve Greek national interests, as this would facilitate the resolution of the Cyprus question and the bilateral disputes, and boost trade and civil-society relations. In other words, Greece would not have to deal with an angry and aggressive neighbour any more but with a partner of growing significance (Grigoriadis, a; Ker-Lindsay, ). Tapping on the potential of growing bilateral trade, tourism, and energy partnerships offered mutual gains and underlined the unrealized peace dividend. It was hoped that confidence-building measures would prepare the ground for the resolution of diplomatic disputes. As the UN-facilitated bilateral negotiations came to a high point with the Annan Plan, several rounds of high-level bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey raised hopes about a breakthrough. The  Helsinki decision had set  as a crucial year. In , the political conditions for the resolution of Greek–Turkish disputes were optimal. Greece enjoyed an unprecedented prosperity and political stability, while the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government made serious efforts to achieve the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and challenged many of the stereotypes of Turkish foreign policy. Its opposition to the secularist military-bureaucratic allowed the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to take positions against longstanding Turkish official views of the Cyprus conflict and the Aegean dispute. Civil-society actors also benefited from the favourable political environment. Greek–Turkish NGO cooperation was legitimized and supported by the European Union and Turkey’s EU membership process (Rumelili, , ).

. A D O M  

.................................................................................................................................. On the other hand, the ability of civil society to catalyse a change had its own limits. At the heyday of Turkey’s reform process and EU optimism and the Greek–Turkish rapprochement, the sides appeared not prepared to capture the historic opportunity and take the courageous step of conflict resolution. While the Simitis government had worked hard to create the conditions for a success in the Cyprus peace negotiations, the Karamanlis government proved unwilling to put in the same effort and was indulgent with the non-compromising attitude of the Cypriot president, Tassos Papadopoulos, who had succeeded Glafcos Clerides in early  (Grigoriadis, ). On  April , the most comprehensive effort to resolve the Cyprus question failed, when the Greek Cypriots rejected in a referendum the comprehensive plan prepared by the

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

 . 

United Nations. This meant that Cyprus would become a member of the European Union without a prior solution of the conflict. While the failure of Annan Plan referendums did not prevent the entry of Cyprus into the European Union on  May , the Cyprus problem remained an obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and continued poisoning Greek–Turkish relations, as well as Turkey’s EU accession process (Evin, ). While the Cyprus question was far from being the most important obstacle to the conclusion of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, it complicated the relationship even further. In December , at the Brussels European Council, when the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations would be decided, the Karamanlis government opted not to enforce the terms of the  Helsinki European Council decision on the referral of the bilateral disputes with Turkey to the International Court of Justice as a condition for the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. This meant that Turkey would start its EU accession negotiations without a prior referral. The Greek government twice appeared unprepared to make historic decisions and missed the opportunity to change the course of Greek–Turkish relations. The significance of this negligence could be better evaluated when the permissive conditions that made a breakthrough deal in Cyprus and adjudication of the Aegean disputes possible expired. The deterioration of EU–Turkey relations, the declining prospects of Turkey’s EU accession, the slowdown and eventual backslide of the reform process all removed strong incentives for courageous steps in resolving the bilateral disputes and the Cyprus question. EU–Turkey relations have persistently soured ever since and this meant that the transformative power of the EU over Turkey has become constantly weaker. The EU could no more play the crucial role in promoting Greek–Turkish relations and conflict resolution (Öniş and Yılmaz, ).

. T A   R

.................................................................................................................................. While the opportunity to resolve the Cyprus question and the Aegean disputes was missed, it should be stressed, however, that the rapprochement maintained its momentum and delivered spectacular results in low politics issues.

.. Economic Relations Bilateral economic relations enjoyed an unprecedented boom. Τrade rose from . million USD in  to . million USD in , while Greece ranked third with . billion USD in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey between  and  (Tsarouhas, ). The decision of the National Bank of Greece

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– 



(NBG) to acquire the Turkish Finansbank in  raised controversy in both countries. Nevertheless, it proved one of the smartest investments in the history of Greek banking. Through its profit and the premium acquired by its sale to QNB in December , Finansbank investment bolstered the NBG balance sheet at a time the Greek banking system came to the brink of collapse under the ramifications of the Greek economic crisis. Tourism was another key growth area. The number of Turkish tourists to Greece rose to , in , comprising one of the most dynamic groups in Greek tourism. Greece was the second most visited country by Turkish tourists in . About , Greeks visited Turkey in the same year. The number of Turkish tourists to Greece soared, despite the failure of EU–Turkey negotiations to reach an agreement on the abolition of visas for Turkish tourists visiting EU member states. In fact, the Greek government requested and secured a special visa regime for those Turkish tourists wishing to visit Greece’s eastern Aegean islands.

.. Energy Energy emerged as another key cooperation area. While in the s energy strategic planning of both countries used to take the bilateral conflict as a given and suggested projects bypassing each other, the rapprochement highlighted that Greek–Turkish energy cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Energy rose in significance in bilateral relations. On the one hand, it pointed at the potential of improved relations. Energy was an important new area of cooperation, which could serve as an instrument for peace or an amplifier of existing conflict. The EU interest in gaining access to Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas provided both Greece and Turkey with such an opportunity. This was meant to diversify the natural gas supply in the European energy market in particular when EU–Russian relations and access to non-Russian natural gas was considered a security priority for the EU. The construction of a pipeline bringing Azerbaijani natural gas from Turkey to Greece with the aim not only to supply the Greek natural gas market but further supply the Italian and Balkan energy markets was such an example. Aiming to reduce the dependency of the European natural gas market on Russian natural gas imports, the project was ample proof that Greece and Turkey—whose conflict has been one of the biggest security liabilities within NATO—could emerge as energy security assets for the EU through their cooperation. Two projects aimed to realize the potential of Greek–Turkish cooperation in natural gas transport. The first was the Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI) project. It aimed to construct a pipeline connecting Turkey and Italy via Greece (Grigoriadis, b). The second was the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) project seeking to construct a pipeline from Turkey to Italy via Greece and Albania. The connection of the Greek and Turkish natural gas networks was achieved already in  and allowed the export of Azerbaijani natural gas to Greece. Nevertheless, the

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

 . 

construction of the pipeline connecting Greece to Italy met with complications, both because of the Greek economic crisis and because of the existence of two competing projects. On the Turkish side of the border, the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) project aimed to improve the infrastructure capacity of Turkey and transport natural gas across Turkey to the Greek–Turkish border so it could be further exported to the European market. Meanwhile, the construction of an interconnecting line to Bulgaria and the discussion about constructing an interconnecting pipeline from Albania across the Western Balkans further raised the significance of this project. Such projects would forge long-needed interdependence links and raised the interest of the EU Commission (Winrow, ).

.. Minority Rights Significant improvements were noted in the field of minority rights. In some cases, the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) proved crucial. Its decisions identified violations of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by Greece and Turkey and paved the way for the rectification of violations. Turkey’s EU reform process also helped in that direction. Some confiscated immovable assets including churches and other community buildings were restored to Greek minority foundations. On the other hand, negative reciprocity in human rights declined, but did not disappear. On the contrary, addressing fundamental human rights questions was often linked to the situation on the other side of the border. Criticisms against the violation of the rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey were often responded to with countercriticisms on the treatment of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace (Grigoriadis, ). The demographic decline of Turkey’s Greek minority was presented as proof of its sufferings, while the relative demographic resilience of Greece’s Muslim minority was presented as evidence that things were not as bad as Ankara claimed. Similarly, the election of the Ecumenical Patriarch by the Holy Synod was given as an example of how the Greek minority was allowed to elect its own religious leaders while this was not possible for the minority in Western Thrace. On the other hand, there were still considerable shortcomings. The reopening of the Religious Seminary on the island of Heybeliada (Halki) was repeatedly promised but never materialized. Occasionally, the issue was connected to the resolution of the mufti question in Western Thrace. The appointment of the muftis by the Greek state met with the opposition of a sizeable part of the minority, which claimed its right to elect its own mufti. The Greek government responded that muftis were not elected but appointed in Turkey itself and that muftis in Greece also had judicial duties, in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, which made their election impossible. Turkey also raised the question of the construction of a mosque in Athens as an example of Greek intolerance towards Muslims, although this issue rather referred to Greece’s Muslim immigrants than the Muslim minority of Western Thrace.

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– 



. T E   C   A U

..................................................................................................................................

.. Greece’s Strategic Puzzle The outbreak of the Greek crisis in  inevitably shifted public attention from foreign policy issues, including relations with Turkey. Greece’s diplomatic capital declined, as the country had to face an economic and social crisis of momentous proportions. Greek foreign policy was recalibrated to manage the new circumstances. Ambitions were curbed, and emphasis was put on bailout and memorandum negotiations rather than Greece’s relations with its neighbours. The relative decline in significance of the Greek–Turkish disputes also meant that both sides could afford to reduce their ranking in the priority list of foreign policy making. Meanwhile Turkey’s ambitions in playing a pivotal role in the transformation of the Middle East following the  Arab uprisings meant that less attention would be paid to Greek–Turkish relations and Turkey’s EU membership perspective. While some feared that Greece’s relative weakness and fragility could be an opportune moment for Turkey to score diplomatic and political points against Greece, bilateral relations remained rather calm. This could have potentially contributed to a more dispassionate approach contributing to the resolution of the bilateral relations. Greece had become one of the least troublesome neighbours for Turkey. Nevertheless, this was complicated by rising populism and polarization in the domestic politics of both Greece and Turkey. As both countries entered a crisis of different dimensions but severe in its effect, the rise of anti-Western and anti-EU sentiment in both countries started undermining the bilateral relations. Greece also had to face a strategic dilemma and critical questions regarding her future strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Given that the EU was the framework within which Greece chose to develop its relations with Turkey, the weakening of Greece’s position within the EU and the relegation of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations to a formality, spelt risks for their bilateral relations. Since EU membership appeared not to be a realistic objective in the foreseeable future, Greece remained in search of an alternative strategic framework for its relationship with Turkey. Turkey’s mixed signals about the future of its Western strategic orientation did not only become a source of concern in NATO. The fading of Turkey’s EU membership prospects and the shift of Turkey’s foreign policy away from the West towards seeking an independent role weakened the influence on Turkey which Greece had considered as essential to promote the socialization of Turkey to European values, as well as its vision of bilateral partnership. Developing an alternative strategy aiming to decouple Greek–Turkish relations from the EU emerged as a big challenge, especially given the widening gap between the GDP and the military capabilities of the two states. The economic gap between Greece and Turkey widened, as the Turkish GDP soared in the years between, while the Greek

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

 . 

GDP slumped following the economic crisis. While in  Greece’s GDP was . per cent of Turkey’s, this figure slumped to . per cent in  (World Bank, ). In addition, because of the declared intention of the US to reduce its involvement in Europe and the Middle East, Greece’s participation in the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was an obvious option. Yet, Greece’s ability or willingness to remain in the core group of European integration became challenged during the economic crisis. On the other hand, it remained unclear whether the European institutions would grow fast enough to meet Greece’s security needs against Turkey. The temptation to instrumentalize foreign policy for domestic political objectives has been particularly strong, as it has historically proven to pay off well on both sides of the Aegean. Under these circumstances, reigniting the bilateral disputes and raising tension to levels not seen for several years underlined how fragile the achievements of the rapprochement were without a resolution of the diplomatic disputes.

.. Balancing Turkey in the Region Beyond the EU, seeking ways to balance Turkey through regional partnerships appeared as an alternative. The development of an axis with Cyprus and Israel and Egypt was discussed, while similar high expectations were put on developing Greece’s strategic relations with Russia. Nevertheless, it was clear that convincing countries like Russia or Israel to forego their strategic relationship with Turkey in favour of Greece would not be an easy task. Opportunities appeared when Turkey’s relations with Israel suffered a major setback following the Mavi Marmara incident and when Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft operating in Syria in November , but these proved more apparent than real. Both Israel and Russia sought to repair their relations with Turkey, even though previous levels of cooperation were not met. The case of Egypt was different, given the refusal of the Turkish government to recognize the government of General Abdelfattah al-Sissi who had toppled the elected Muslim Brotherhood government under Mohammad Morsi. The links between the AKP and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood remained too strong for the resumption of diplomatic relations following the military coup and Egyptian–Turkish relations fell to a minimum. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, the Egyptian government did not go as far as to antagonize Turkey on the key issue of the delineation of maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek–Egyptian relations fell short of acquiring strategic dimensions. It would be difficult for Greece, particularly in its current economic and diplomatic state, to find a credible and strong regional strategic partner vis-à-vis Turkey other than the EU. Hence, attempting to placate Turkey through the course of EU–Turkey negotiations on issues other than EU membership, such as the refugee crisis and the update of the customs union agreement or the potential signature of a privileged partnership agreement appeared as the most prudent tactic. On the other hand, it

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– 



was clear that removing the normative element and underscoring the transactional side of EU–Turkey relations substantially limited the ability of EU institutions—and indirectly Greece—to influence domestic political developments or even the definition of Turkish national interest. EU influence on Turkey remained commensurate with the degree of integration offered.

.. Energy Cooperation and its Limits The prospects for Greek–Turkish energy cooperation acquired wider dimensions when sizeable natural gas reserves were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean. The discovery of natural gas in the Cypriot, Israeli, and Egyptian Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean introduced the region as a prospective natural gas supplier of the European energy market. The most cost-effective way to transport the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to Europe would be via pipeline to Turkey and Greece. This could further reinforce the role of the two countries as energy security assets for the European Union (Grigoriadis, ). Nevertheless, the absence of a breakthrough in the Cyprus peace negotiations was blocking such projects. While it was hoped that energy discoveries could provide an additional incentive to pursue conflict resolution and energy cooperation, they instead rekindled Greek–Turkish confrontation over maritime zones in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey challenged the right of the Republic of Cyprus to conduct natural gas exploration drillings, citing the rights of Turkish Cypriots and its own views on the delineation of the maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. This inevitably dragged Greece into the confrontation, as there is no delineation between the EEZs of Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts to achieve a common understanding between Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and Israel on issues of natural gas maritime exploration and monetization became reminiscent of efforts to isolate or bypass Turkey in the s. The political and economic dividend of Greek–Turkish energy cooperation appeared too weak to influence the terms of competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, as sovereignty questions were also involved. The monetization of the reserves remained dependent upon global energy prices and the diplomatic relations between the regional actors. It remained up to the leaders to present energy as a catalyst for peace in the region or as yet another issue which would foment further confrontation.

.. Civil Society Civil-society encounters continued in the crisis years. Tourism was not the only instrument of promoting better understanding bottom–up. The same objective was

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

 . 

served by the entertainment industry. Turkish TV series, already very popular across the globe, found an unexpected market in Greece. Against social stereotypes, the Greek audience could relate with the normative and cultural underpinnings of the Turkish TV series and discovered unexpected commonalities between their respective societies. Meanwhile, though the Greek crisis had a toll on the volume of trade and FDI, it also had some unexpected positive effects. Greece’s decision to introduce a ‘golden visa’ programme, thereby introducing the possibility of acquiring a residence permit in Greece following a real estate investment of at least , euros allowed thousands of Turkish citizens to become legal residents in Greece. Turkey’s growing domestic social rifts interestingly became one of the reasons boosting tourism and relations on the civil-society level. Turkey’s secularist middle class, which would normally view with suspicion and nationalist bias Turkey’s Greek minority and Greece, made a U-turn in its approach. Following the AKP political hegemony and the polarization of Turkish society between the conservative majority and the secularist minority, Turkish secularists could come closer to the country’s non-Muslim minorities. As they felt themselves becoming a minority within their own country they could develop empathy for their nonMuslim co-citizens. Increased relations between the secularist municipalities of the Izmir province with the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a further example. Considering that transformation, Greece’s image was also transformed. Many secularist Turks started feeling more comfortable in Greece than in a Turkey increasingly defined by Sunni Islam under the hegemony of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

.. Mental Barriers to Compromise While increased contact helped mutual understanding, this did not affect public opinion on bilateral issues and the Cyprus question. The Greek public appeared unwilling to endorse efforts to overcome the existing stalemate. This was not a surprise given that exceptionalism, self-victimization, and propensity to conspiracy theories featured strongly in public opinion perceptions. Moreover, framing the diplomatic disputes as ‘national issues’, securitizing almost every aspect of the bilateral relationship, sentimentalized the debate and limited the scope for manoeuvre of any government wishing to negotiate a solution. This was no surprise given the way history was taught in schools (Millas, ) or the quality and diversity of information circulating in both countries through print and electronic media. In fact, compromise was not seen as a virtue but rather as a vice or a sell-off of ‘national rights’. This mentality helped consolidate the status quo, which meant that opportunities to resolve the disputes would be forfeited. The adamant position of the parties would be protected at the discourse level without making any effort to address the losses that both sides incurred because of deliberate procrastination and the missed opportunities for cooperation.

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– 



.. The Effect of Domestic Politics and Cyprus This resonated with the increasing influence of domestic politics on Greek and Turkish foreign policy. As political parties were engaging in efforts to outbid each other in nationalism, any attempts to promote moderate views in the bilateral disputes were feared to backfire electorally. Belligerent statements became more common, and Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria caused ire within Greek public opinion. The non-permissive international and domestic political environment on both sides of the Aegean meant that it would be even more difficult to expect from political leaders the sense of responsibility necessary to embark on a conflict resolution process. The virtuous constellation of political leadership and the international environment existing in  appeared nowhere on the horizon. Turkey’s democratic backsliding and the declaration of a ‘state of emergency’ following the abortive coup of  July  further complicated the relationship and raised additional concerns. The flight of Turkish citizens to Greece, which the Turkish government accused of being members of the Gülen movement and coup conspirators, added new problems to the agenda. The case of the eight military officers who fled Turkey for Greece on the night of  July  on board a military helicopter and accused by the Turkish government of being implicated in the abortive military coup was only the tip of the iceberg. As the extension of the ‘state of emergency’ in Turkey meant that the rule of law and fundamental human rights and freedoms remained suspended, it was impossible for Greek judicial authorities to approve the extradition of Turkish fugitives. The arrest of two Greek military personnel by the Turkish armed forces in March  and their detention until August  added further tension to the bilateral relations. Moreover, one should not underestimate the enduring ability of the Cyprus question to affect Greek–Turkish relations. The Cyprus question may no more be a priority for public opinion in Greece or Turkey. Yet a crisis in Cyprus could still endanger the rapprochement and all steps made towards the promotion of peace and stability. While optimism had risen since the election of Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akıncı, the failure of the latest round of the peace negotiations in July  increased the risk of a crisis. A possible collapse of the UN-facilitated peace process in Cyprus is likely to trigger a series of negative developments. As alternative plans for the future of Cyprus would be discussed, the possible annexation of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ to Turkey would have disastrous consequences, not only to Greek–Turkish relations, but to EU–Turkey relations as a whole.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. The reasons for the failure of conflict resolution in Greek–Turkish disputes and the Cyprus problem are reminiscent of the reasons that contributed to the Greek economic and social crisis. Postponing hard but necessary decisions indefinitely to the future may

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

 . 

have been endorsed by public opinion and served the fortunes of specific political parties or leaders in the short term, but it burdened domestic and foreign policy making. At some point, politics was understood as an ad infinitum management of problems without the intention of solving them. The leadership shown in  was missed in . Lack of leadership meant following public opinion attitudes and not shaping them through reasoned argument. While the instrumentalization of foreign policy to rally domestic support turned into an increasingly common and rather damaging practice in both Greece and Turkey, nationalism remained a handy tool in the toolkit of leaders. There has been no tool more effective in generating nationalist mobilization in Greece than Greek–Turkish relations. Since opportunities to resolve the disputes were missed, damage control was the only option when escalation occurred. Most importantly, it did not allow for the cost of inertia to be clear and the benefits of reform to be accrued. The official visit of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Greece in December  emerged as an unexpected opportunity to reverse this stagnation. The first official visit of a Turkish head of state in more than sixty years provided an occasion to recast bilateral relations. Erdoğan himself, who was embattled on several foreign policy fronts, appeared willing to improve Turkey’s international profile through a successful visit. Nevertheless, his message of win-win solutions and stronger cooperation were overshadowed by his reference on the need to update the Treaty of Lausanne. This monopolized the interest of the Greek media and the official reception of President Erdoğan by the Greek President Prokopios Pavlopoulos ended up in an unexpected, and rather unprecedented, public exchange of arguments. Soon after the departure of Erdoğan, Turkey reiterated its claims over Aegean islands and rocks reigniting deeper problems. The crisis was sparked by an exchange of salvos between the leader of the main opposition party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who saw the opportunity to score some points by pointing at the alleged indulgence of the AKP government against defending Turkish territorial integrity in the Aegean. These statements elicited a response from the Greek minister of defence, Panos Kammenos, and eventually prompted an official response by the Turkish government which brought all sides to confrontation positions. The  February  Imia/Kardak crisis highlighted that issues that both sides have opted to bypass and not resolve will remain thorns that could inflame tensions if domestic politics provide incentives in that direction. Greece’s gradual recovery to political and economic normalcy and Turkey’s democratic backsliding are likely to create conditions where bilateral disputes will become exposed to the risk of an accident. Missing the conflict resolution opportunities in the past has turned damage control into an essential task. Leadership and responsibility will be again essential when the next opportunity arises. The institutional prerequisites for the cultivation of these virtues are indeed a topic worth academic inquiry in the field of Greek foreign policy and beyond.

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

R Alexandris, A. (). The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations –. Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies. Anastasakis, O., Nicolaides, K., and Oktem, K. (eds) (). In the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Aydin, M. and Ifantis, K. (). Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean. Abingdon, Oxon & New York: Routledge. Bahcheli, T. (). Greek-Turkish Relations since . Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Çarkoğlu, A. and Rubin, B. (). Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. Constas, D. (). Greek-Turkish Conflict in the s: Domestic and External Influences. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Couloumbis, T. A. (). The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle. New York: Praeger Publishers. Couloumbis, T. (). ‘Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy Since ’. In Coufoudakis, V., Psomiades, H. J., and Gerolymatos, A. (eds.) Greece and The New Balkans. Challenges and Opportunities. New York: Pella, –. Couloumbis, T. A. and Kentikelenis, A. E. (). ‘Greek–Turkish Relations and the Kantian Democratic Peace Theory’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,  (): –. Evin, A. O. (). ‘Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An Assessment of the PostEarthquake Rapprochement’. Turkish Studies,  (): –. Evin, A. O. (). ‘The Future of Greek-Turkish Relations’. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, (): –. Grigoriadis, I. N. (a). ‘Greek and Greek Cypriot Views of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: On the Endurance of a Spectacular Paradigmatic Shift’. In Müftüler-Bac, M. and Stivachtis, Y. A. (eds) Turkey and the European Union: Dilemmas, Constraints and Opportunities. Latham: Lexington Books, –. Grigoriadis, I. N. (b). Natural Gas Corridors in Southeastern Europe and European Energy Security. Athens: ELIAMEP. Grigoriadis, I. N. (). ‘Europe Overshadowed: Reciprocity as a Race to the Bottom in Religious Freedom’. In Anastasakis, O., Nicolaidis, K. and Oktem, K. (eds.) Under the Long Shadows of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post-Nationalism. Leiden: Brill, –. Grigoriadis, I. N. (). ‘The Unripe Fruits of Rapprochement: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era’. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis,  (): –. Grigoriadis, I. N. (). ‘Energy Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conflict or Cooperation?’ Middle East Policy,  (): –. Heraclides, A. (). The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ker-Lindsay, J. (). ‘The Policies of Greece and Cyprus Towards Turkey’s EU Accession’. Turkish Studies,  (): –. Keridis, D. and Triantafyllou, D. (). Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization. Washington DC: Potomac Books Inc. Kurban, D. and Tsitselikis, K. (). Bir Mütekabiliyet Hikâyesi: Yunanistan ve Türkiye’de Azınlık Vakıfları [A Tale of Reciprocity: Minority Foundations in Greece and Turkey]. İstanbul: TESEV.

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 . 

Ladas, S. P. (). The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. New York: The Macmillan Company. Millas, H. (). ‘History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey’. History Workshop : –. Onis, Z. (). ‘Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective’. Mediterranean Politics,  (): –. Öniş, Z. and Yılmaz, Ş. (). ‘Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?’ Political Science Quarterly,  (): –. Oran, B. (a). Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: Cilt I (–). İstanbul: İletişim. Oran, B. (b). Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: Cilt II (–). İstanbul: İletişim. Oran, B. (). Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: Cilt III (–). İstanbul: İletişim. Özkırımlı, U. and Sofos, S. A. (). Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey. London: Hurst and Company. Rumelili, B. (). ‘Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek–Turkish Cooperation’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Rumelili, B. (). ‘Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek–Turkish Relations’. Journal of Common Market Studies, (): –. Syrigos, A. (). Ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις [Greek-Turkish Relations]. Athens: Patakis. Tsakonas, P. (). The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek–Turkish Relations: Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Tsarouhas, D. (). ‘The Political Economy of Greek-Turkish Relations’. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,  (): –. Veremis, T. M. (). Greeks and Turks in War and Peace. Athens: Athens News Publications. Winrow, G. M. (). ‘The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Transit State and Energy Hub’. Insight Turkey,  (): –. World Bank (). World Bank National Accounts Data: Greece vs. Turkey. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=GR-TR/ (accessed  February ).

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  .............................................................................................................

LEADERS .............................................................................................................

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        ......................................................................................................................

 

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. C Karamanlis had an unusually long presence in Greek politics. A major (and, at times, dominant) figure from the early s until the mid-s, and the longest-serving prime minister of Greece, he was pivotal in the attainment of economic development during the s and s, the founding of an established democracy in –, and Greece’s accession to the European Communities in . Karamanlis was the major political figure during ‘the metamorphosis of Greece since World War II’ (McNeill, ), namely, the transition of the country from underdevelopment to becoming a full member of the ‘West’. The momentous transformation of Greek fortunes during the post-war era contrasts sharply with the failures and the successive tragedies of the previous period: defeat by Turkey in  and the expulsion of the Greek populations from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace; the social horrors of the refugee camps; bankruptcy in  during the Great Depression; successive military coups in –; and the Ioannis Metaxas dictatorship in . The s was a hellish period: war with Italy in ; German invasion in ; triple (German, Italian, and Bulgarian) occupation in –; famine in –; hyperinflation in –; and a civil war until , the first war by proxy of the Cold War era, that accumulated enormous additional losses, human and material, at a time when the other European countries had started their reconstruction. The years – saw a radical reversal of the country’s fortunes. Aided by the US through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in –, Greece after  was among the most rapidly developing countries of the globe; in  it joined NATO; in  it became the first country to sign a Treaty of Association with the European Economic Community (EEC); and despite the humiliating experience of a military dictatorship in –, it managed to perform an impressive transition to democracy

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

 

in –, and to sign the treaty of Accession to the European Communities (EC) in , becoming a full member in . Karamanlis led the government in – and again in –; thus, he held power for fourteen out of the thirty years of this era. He also served as president of the republic in – and in –. In this chapter, it will be argued that his role generally resembles that of Western European conservative/ Christian Democratic leaders, such as Konrad Adenauer or Alcide de Gasperi, who assumed a leading role in the revival of their countries and their participation in European integration after the Second World War. New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία), the political party that Karamanlis founded in , joined the Christian Democratic group in  (later, the European People’s Party). Often in public discourse, another parallel is drawn, depicting Karamanlis as ‘the Greek de Gaulle’. Karamanlis’ dramatic return to Greece in , after an eleven-year self-imposed exile in Paris, and his success in founding a new democracy was, for many, strongly reminiscent of de Gaulle’s triumphant return in . Karamanlis’ decision in  to withdraw the Greek armed forces from the NATO military command, just as de Gaulle had done in , tended to amplify this impression. However, these analogies are largely superficial. It is accurate that, in view of the strong inertia of the Greek political system, Karamanlis and his associates saw de Gaulle’s decisive initiatives of  as a possible model for the restructuring of Greek institutions. Yet, Karamanlis regarded Atlanticism and Europeanism as complementary, not antagonistic strategies, and was embarrassed by the Gaullist ‘mutiny’ and its possible effects on NATO (Hatzivassiliou, : –). Moreover, Karamanlis was strongly critical of de Gaulle’s ambivalence towards European unification, and subsequently criticized him for missing the opportunity to ‘unite’ Europe in the s (Rioux, , : –; Svolopoulos, , : –). Last but not least, Karamanlis led a small European country, not a major power. In view of such important differences, the space for analogies is rather limited. In any event, it is important to keep in mind Greece’s relative position compared to the more developed countries of Western or Northern Europe, as well as its particular circumstances arising from the legacies of under-development and of the successive political cleavages of the twentieth century (the post- National Rift between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, and the civil wars of the s). Throughout these years, Greece, together with other countries of Southern Europe, was desperately struggling to escape from the entrapments of under-development. Thus, comparisons, analogies, or generalizations must be attempted with some modesty.

. A L P C

.................................................................................................................................. Karamanlis, born a subject of the Ottoman Empire in , was not a member of the Greek elite; he remained an outsider—a ‘provincial’ from Greek Macedonia—who rose to the top. The son of a Greek fighter of the Macedonian Struggle (the vicious guerrilla

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

war between Greeks and Bulgarians in Ottoman Macedonia in –), he inherited his father’s connections with the People’s Party (the anti-Venizelists), and was elected to parliament in  as an MP for Serres. In , the Metaxas dictatorship put a sudden stop to his political career. During the – occupation he remained in Athens, and became a member of the Socialist Union, the circle of the prominent intellectual Constantine Tsatsos who eventually emerged as his mentor (Tsatsos, : ; Hatzivassiliou, : –). This was a period which shaped him ideologically. After the war, Karamanlis’ abilities were recognized by his peers in the People’s Party. Following surgery in the US to deal with the problem of his otosclerosis that threatened to leave him deaf, he achieved prominence as minister of social welfare during the last phase of the Civil War in –, when he successfully implemented a large programme for the return of refugees to their homes in the zone of military operations. He visibly ascended during his term as minister of public works in – in the government of the Greek Rally, under Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos. At that time, his efficiency and his association with large-scale public works that modernized the country established him as one of Papagos’ lieutenants (Woodhouse, ). Although close to the intra-party group of the vice-prime minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos (whose niece, Amalia, he had married in ), Karamanlis grew in stature within the party in  when Papagos fell ill and his two vice-premiers, Kanellopoulos and Stephanos Stephanopoulos, engaged in a barren conflict for the succession, effectively destroying each other. When Papagos died in early October, King Paul surprised the political system by appointing Karamanlis as prime minister. Despite subsequent allegations that the Americans had played a role in his selection, research has shown that this was not the case: it was the king who became convinced that the two other pretenders could not keep the government together, and sought a strong personality to deal with the exceptionally difficult circumstances of that time, and one who was prominent as a symbol of Greece’s new era of development (Hatzivassiliou, ). Once he rose to the top, Karamanlis assumed the initiative with imaginative decisions involving new large works of infrastructure, new labour legislation, the provision of medical care for farmers, and the relaxation of repressive measures against the communists. He ceased the executions of convicted communists since the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. He also proclaimed new elections and founded a new political party, the National Radical Union (ERE, Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις), which many members of the centrist Liberals joined: Constantine Tsatsos, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Dimitris Makris, Grigoris Kassimatis, and others. ERE’s victory in the February  elections (aided also by the majority electoral system) stabilized in power these younger people who would remain prominent until the early s. Karamanlis also won the elections of  and , although in the latter case the Centre opposition denounced the elections as the result of ‘fraud and violence’ (Nikolakopoulos, ; Hatzivassiliou, ; Alivizatos, ). Karamanlis did not initiate Greece’s post-war economic development. This had taken place in , thanks to the daring structural reforms and the devaluation of

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 

the currency by the minister of economic coordination of the Greek Rally government, Spyros Markezinis. Still, the devaluation had caused high inflation and problems in the balance of payments; these difficulties were overcome, and development was expanded in a sustainable manner, under Karamanlis in –. In –, the government continued the works of infrastructure, mostly in land reclamation, road building, and energy projects. The ‘leap’ of industrialization took place in –, also aided by the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan, the only one to be fully implemented in Greek economic history, that provided for the development of agriculture, industry, and services, mostly tourism (Drakatos, ; Kazakos, ). This economic success allowed Greece to become the first country to seek Association with the EEC, an agreement signed by Vice-Premier Kanellopoulos in July . The Karamanlis government made a conscious option in favour of the EEC rather than the inter-governmental European Free Trade Area (EFTA): Athens preferred the supranational structure, feeling that this was a long-term option for the country’s economy, society, and the political system. Moreover, EFTA did not cover agriculture, an important interest for Greece, while the EEC did. Last but not least, the Association agreement provided for Greece’s full membership in the future (Verney, ; Kazakos, ; Pelt, ). In foreign policy, Karamanlis needed to deal both with the tensions of the Cold War and of the Cyprus dispute in –. Although Cyprus tended to amplify antiwesternism in large parts of the Greek public, Karamanlis persisted in his policy to integrate into the West, visibly resisting neutralist pressures and thus gaining the respect of the other Western statesmen. In , the Zurich–London agreements with Britain and Turkey provided for Cypriot independence (Hatzivassiliou, ; Holland, ; Nicolet, ). Yet, in  Karamanlis faced his greatest political defeat. He tried to revise the conservative Constitution of , to provide for the setting up of a modern interventionist state, and to remove the ‘extraordinary measures’ of the Civil War period that were still in force. However, this would entail a strengthening of the executive, and sparked strong reactions by the Palace and the opposition. In May , the murder of the left-wing MP Grigoris Lambrakis made the government more vulnerable. In June , King Paul took advantage of this situation in order to block the constitutional revision: he refused to accept Karamanlis’ advice to cancel his state visit to Britain and thus forced him to resign. In the autumn  elections, which resulted in a hung parliament, Karamanlis suffered an unexpected narrow defeat at the hands of the Centre Union (EK, Ένωσις Κέντρου) under George Papandreou. When the king showed his preference for Papandreou, Karamanlis left for self-exile in Paris where he would remain until . His years in Paris were a difficult period of inactivity. He remained largely silent, refusing to get involved in the painful crisis which brought a collapse of the Greek political scene in –. Then, during the years of the military dictatorship, he made some well-considered public interventions against the junta, contributing to the effort of ERE leaders to prevent the dictators from gaining inroads to Greek conservative opinion, and thus from acquiring a popular base. Soon, especially after , the ‘Karamanlis solution’ emerged as a point of reference for many democratic politicians,

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

including former political adversaries. However, Karamanlis remained sceptical towards such ideas. Both in , when his former enemies (including the Palace and sections of the Centre) had asked him to return and form a government, and during the junta, he made clear that he had left Greece because his main precondition could not be fulfilled; namely, the revision of the Constitution. He believed that without this, no viable solution was possible. This opportunity came in summer . The junta’s attempt forcibly to overthrow President Makarios in Cyprus opened the road for a Turkish invasion of the island. Then, the junta collapsed and Karamanlis was invited to assume power and restore Greek democracy. He was sworn in office in the early hours of  July. It was a hugely difficult endeavour. While the junta had fallen, it had not been ejected from power by another power centre that could control things. Pro-junta officers kept controlling the army and especially the units in the Athens area, and the danger always existed of a new coup, or an assassination of Karamanlis; in fact, several assassination attempts were averted by the Ministries of Defence and of Public Order under Averoff and General (rtd.) Solon Ghikas respectively. Moreover, there was also a danger of a war with Turkey either in Cyprus or in the Eastern Aegean, where the Greek islands were unfortified, while a second Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in mid-August, resulted in the occupation of more than one third of the island. Despite these enormous problems, the transition to democracy was swift, bloodless, and effective. Karamanlis initially led a national unity government, and after the elections of  November  (the swift holding of which was pivotal in the success of the transition) he formed a government of his new party, the ND. Mostly, Karamanlis and his team set out to solve not only the problems created by the – junta, but the whole range of problems which the two Greek cleavages of the twentieth century had created—both the post- National Rift (Venizelists against anti-Venizelists) and the Civil War of the s. Thus, Karamanlis legalized the Communist Party (KKE) which had remained illegal since , while in early December  a referendum—the only fair one in Greek history— definitively solved the issue of the monarchy (a major issue in the National Rift), resulting in a  per cent vote in favour of a republic (Hatzivassiliou, : –; Alivizatos, : –). In June , a new Constitution was adopted, written largely by Tsatsos, and based on the  proposal for constitutional revision. The new charter modernized the state, strengthened the executive, provided for the effective protection of human rights, recognized social rights, and included the protection of the environment (Alivizatos, : –). On the very day after the coming to force of the new Constitution, Greece applied for full accession to the European Communities. This was going to become the next big endeavour: accession to the Community was seen as the other side of the coin of the transition to democracy, a step that would stabilize the young republic. Mostly, it would signal the full integration of Greece into the West. The Treaty of Accession was signed in Athens on  May  (Karamouzi, ). On foreign policy, Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the NATO military command in protest at the allies’ inactivity during the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus of August . This decision has been severely criticized for allowing Turkey to

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 

monopolize the alliance’s military institutions for several years (Iatrides, ). Karamanlis also made an impressive opening to Western Europe, and his relationship with the French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, played a pivotal role in the effort to join the EC. Indeed, Karamanlis at that point aimed for a quick Greek accession, and managed to convince the leaders of the EC countries to move on with the negotiations with Athens, which had already progressed, without linking them with the similar ones for the accession of Spain and Portugal that were just starting. Moreover, the Karamanlis governments adjusted Greek policies to the climate of international détente. He became the first Greek prime minister to pay an official visit to Sofia in  (signalling also the reconciliation of the two former enemies in the south of the Balkans), and then, in , to Moscow and to Beijing. In , following a Greek proposal, multilateral Balkan cooperation on economic and scientific issues was established with the first conference taking place in Athens (Karamouzi, ; Kourkouvelas, ). In May , when the term of the president of the republic, Constantine Tsatsos, was coming to an end, Karamanlis had accomplished his main aims, namely, the establishment of a novel democratic system and accession to the EC. Moreover, he realized that it would probably be difficult to secure a third term in power, while the ascent of Andreas Papandreou and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) might require his presence in the presidency of the republic, as a bulwark to Papandreou’s radical proclamations. He was now elected as president of the republic, and was replaced in the premiership by George Rallis, one of his closest associates. As president, Karamanlis dealt with Andreas Papandreou’s first government in –. The coexistence of these two strong personalities, former opponents in the political scene, was an unusual phenomenon in Greek political history, but the experience contributed to the stabilization of Greek democracy. Although endowed with significant powers by the Constitution, Karamanlis opted to refrain from intervening in the process of government. He made clear to Papandreou that his priority was to prevent the detachment of Greece from the West, given the anti- American, anti-NATO, anti-Western, and anti-European discourse of the early PASOK (Svolopoulos, , : ). For his part, Andreas Papandreou not only realized this priority of the president, but also skilfully used the potential political ‘threat’ that Karamanlis represented in order to convince his party to moderate its stance on these issues. The crucial developments took place in summer . First, the Papandreou government accepted a ‘memorandum’ with the EC, allowing for a partial renegotiation of the terms of entry, but also clearly entailing its acceptance; and, in mid-July, a Greek–US agreement for the retention of US bases on Greek soil was concluded (Mitsotakis, ). These marked the emergence of a bipartisan consensus on Greece’s international position. Tellingly, and quite uniquely for a person so reluctant to reveal his sentiments, Karamanlis’ personal note of  July , commenting on the Greek–US agreement, started with the sentence: ‘Today a burden has been removed from my soul’ (Svolopoulos, , : ). Karamanlis was now recognized as one of the ‘wise men’ of European integration. He became the first

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

head of state to be officially invited to address the European Parliament on  September . On that occasion, he made a strong appeal for the stepping up of the unification process (see the speech in Svolopoulos, , : –). But politics can play strange tricks in any political system—more so, perhaps, in Greece of the s, where populism had been dominant. In March , despite his repeated assurances that he intended to propose a second presidential term for Karamanlis, Papandreou abruptly changed his mind and put forward the name of Judge Christos Sartzetakis, as well as a proposal for a revision of the Constitution depriving the president of most of his powers. Karamanlis immediately resigned his post, but (despite the expectations of many observers) did not re-enter politics to seek ‘revenge’. Karamanlis had finally formed an established democracy, based on sound institutions, and would not put this accomplishment at stake by provoking another national rift. He withdrew to his brother Achileas’ house in the Athenian suburb of Politeia, once more upsetting with his long silences a political system so accustomed to big talk. He again became president of the republic in , when the ND narrowly won a new election, to be later succeeded by Constantine Stephanopoulos, one of his lieutenants of the post- period.

. P S B

.................................................................................................................................. Karamanlis was an exceptionally successful political leader, winning five general elections (, , , , ), and losing only one (), with a share of the vote ranging from . per cent () to . (). He led the dominant political force of that era; moreover, he constantly faced a compartmentalized opposition consisting of smaller parties, sometimes more at odds with themselves rather than with him. Yet, he did not create this political force: he inherited it. The first, though in many respects incomplete version of the contemporary Greek centre-right was Papagos’ Greek Rally, which included a large group of former Liberals. In , the Rally received more than  per cent of the vote, thus changing the electoral pattern of whole regions of the country (Nikolacopoulos, : –). Yet, the Rally was a loose confederation of various (often strongly antagonistic) factions united by its imposing leader, while ERE and ND, the two parties that Karamanlis founded, although also riven by factionalism (a usual characteristic of the Christian Democratic ‘family’) were much more compact and unified. ERE survived Karamanlis’ resignation in , while ND has changed leaders several times since its foundation in , remaining the major political formation of the Greek Right. Karamanlis reorganized the Greek Right on a new footing, and as a wide popular movement under a strongly reformist and modernizing leadership. ERE and New Democracy marked the effort of one part of the Greek political system, the Right, to adjust to the prevailing trends of Western Europe, with the other pillar, the Socialists, going through their own soul-searching in the post-junta period (Hatzivassiliou, ).

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

 

Moreover, Karamanlis enjoyed huge popularity, and retained the unyielding loyalty of his electoral base until the very end; even until the evening of spring , when his supporters respected his wish for a private funeral, but massed on the streets where his coffin would pass and in the entrance of the Karamanlis Foundation to greet him for the last time; and no one attempted to cross the narrow Karaiskaki Street and enter the Foundation, where his private funeral would be held, because he had asked for this. The strength of the personal loyalty that his supporters showed was impressive until the end. But electoral results or the strength of sentiments are not the whole story. During the period when Karamanlis was active, and beyond the electoral appeal of his own party, he managed to acquire a wider measure of legitimization for his policies. In –, Karamanlis appealed to a whole generation who had gone through the hell of –, had faced successive disasters, and were now convinced that they had to build in order to survive. Never before in Greek history was the social climate so permissive for reform as in those decades. This was why Karamanlis’ peculiar personal style, his heavy Greek-Macedonian accent, even his reputation as a workaholic and his persistence in keeping people away from him (a result of his social insecurity rather than of arrogance), was accepted by the Greek people of his time.

. S  L  I

.................................................................................................................................. The myth of Karamanlis refers to a lone wolf, autocratic and unyielding to popular pressure. The image of Karamanlis returning to Athens on the night of  to  July  to save his country from chaos, with huge crowds massing to Hellenikon Airport to welcome him, contributes to this assessment. And the myth was also amplified by Karamanlis’ own phrase, used as an epitaph on his grave, that he had dried up his soul in order to serve his country. Perhaps, some of these features are not just myths. His role in the – transition to democracy was widely recognized by the international press and the international community (Keridis, ). Yet, it is important, in a scholarly interpretation, to go beyond the myth. Karamanlis preferred to work with small groups (he rarely called full Cabinet meetings), rather than with the big organization of a Cabinet Office. A recent study of prime ministers in contemporary Greece, characterizing him as ‘primus solus’, notes that his style of government was strictly ‘hierarchical’ (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, : –). At the same time, he relied heavily on Cabinet Committees and ad hoc committees with the participation of prominent experts, and was ready to delegate following the making of a decision; this was a permanent characteristic of his methodology from the early s to the late s (Christidis, ; Pappas, ). In fact, the phenomenon described in Greek political history as ‘Karamanlis’ does not really refer to one person only, but to an inner circle of his governments acting

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

under his coordination. Karamanlis relied heavily on Constantine Tsatsos, Professor of the Philosophy of Law, his mentor, in major issues such as constitutional problems, Europe and cultural policy. Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, another prominent intellectual, played a major role in European policy, as did Panayis Papaligouras, a minister who was pivotal in Greece’s decision to opt for the supranational EEC in the s. Evangelos Averof in foreign and defence policy, and George Rallis and Constantine Papaconstantinou on the home front were major associates, while Professor Xenophon Zolotas, the Governor of the Bank of Greece in –, was pivotal in economic affairs. Three members of this team became prime ministers (Rallis in , Zolotas in  and Mitsotakis in ), and two, presidents of the republic (Tsatsos in  and Stephanopoulos in ). However, assessing the relationship between the team and the leader is a demanding and complicated affair. The team was crucial, but the truth is that without its leader, it was not able to function equally efficiently. Witness, for example, the fact that in – the same group of leaders, under Kanellopoulos, proved much more timid and even conservative compared to the years –, when the ERE governments managed to surprise with their groundbreaking initiatives. The leader was the catalyst that made the team work efficiently. Arguably, the team was even more important in terms of ideology. Although Karamanlis was a profound pragmatist, it is wrong to assume that he disregarded ideas. The notion that the only Greek party that had an ‘ideology’ was the Communist Left, while the Right or the Centre did not, seems to confuse the concept of ideology with that of dogmatism. In terms of ideology—and always strongly reliant on Tsatsos, who wrote the drafts of the founding declarations of ERE and ND (Hatzivassiliou, : , )—Karamanlis projected a Greek version (inevitably influenced by the social and economic conditions of the country) of the social market and of the post-war fusion of the conservative and liberal agendas that can be traced in western European Christian Democracy (Psalidopoulos, ). His team consisted of people coming both from the pre-war anti-Venizelists (Karamanlis himself) and Venizelists (for example, Tsatsos and Averoff), who had converged in the s and mostly in the s in their denunciation of the ‘old parties’, in their desire to modernize the country by adjusting to Western trends, and in their priority to re-establish institutions in a country where these had been torn apart both during the National Rift and the Civil War (Hatzivassiliou, ). The crux of the ideology of ERE and ND in Karamanlis’ days was state intervention in a free economy. This was the dominant model of governance in the West since the days of the New Deal and the Marshall Plan, but it was becoming even more important in a small country, where accumulation of capital was always weak and the state needed to make important investments in infrastructure, or even in sections where private enterprise was reluctant to move. Karamanlis and his parties represented mainly the drive for modernization, which would allow for the Europeanization of the country and thus its exit from the vicious circle of underdevelopment and institutional disasters. The endeavour was far from easy, since age-old patterns had to be overcome. Still, economic

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 

development reshaped the Greek economy and society, and provided the basis for the establishment of an inclusive democracy and entry into European institutions. Although Karamanlis (and Papaligouras) are often criticized for their ‘statism’ or ‘social-mania’ (a term coined in the s to describe the whole political system, not ND specifically), this is an exaggeration. The Karamanlis government nationalized some companies in the s (the Andreadis group and Olympic Airways) because they demanded preferential treatment (Psalidopoulos, : ). Throughout the Western world, until the late s and early s, the dominant model of governance, which Karamanlis followed, was the interventionist state. During this period, Greece moved as the other Western countries did. It was only later, in the s, when all Western countries, even those with Socialist governments, reduced their states and Greece quadrupled the size of its own, that a painful deviation of the country from the West occurred in terms of economic strategies and practice; this deviation arguably was at the root of the Greek crisis of the s.

. P    (  ) .................................................................................................................................. Karamanlis is widely regarded as the major personality of the contemporary Greek Right, but his position within its various parties evolved significantly through time. His universal acceptance as a leader is a phenomenon of the later period, mostly after his return in . In the early s, he gained ground in intra-party politics thanks to his devotion to his work, his few words (an unusual, even exotic element in a Greek politician), and his ability to convince his peers about his credibility. However, after his ascent to the premiership, there was a period when his leadership was disputed: it was difficult for the Greek elite to accept a ‘peasant’. In , the American Embassy commented that ‘his inability to speak French and poor family background are responsible for the snobbish accusations of Athens “society”’ (Hatzivassiliou, : ). Thus, in autumn , three ERE MPs left the party; in the summer of  the Vice-Prime Minister, Andreas Apostolides, resigned; and a complicated crisis in early  led fifteen MPs to withdraw their confidence from the government and bring it down. It was then that his response, indicative of his political methodology, crushed the revolt and imposed him as an undisputed leader: although he could remain in power by attracting the support of another party, he led the country into new elections which he won, whereas his critics—Rallis among them—were not elected (Nikolacopoulos, : –; Rizas, : –). Having showed his ability to ‘punish’ the rebels, his position in the party became much more secure, although there is evidence that even during his  conflict with the Palace some of ERE’s leaders were prepared to side with the latter (Christidis, ). After , when he emerged as a kind of Messiah, it was very difficult for an ND leader to question him. Generally, Karamanlis relied much on his personal popular appeal, and spent little time directing his party. Tsatsos commented that as a party leader/organizer he was rather ‘mediocre’ (Tsatsos, :

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–). The ND acquired a full organization as a mass party only under Averoff ’s leadership in –.

. L

.................................................................................................................................. The evolution of the historiography on Karamanlis mirrors the gradual maturing of the Greek academic debates during the past forty years; a process, however, that has been disrupted (or in some respects even reversed) as a result of the current Greek crisis. Initially, bibliography was strongly critical of Karamanlis, identifying him as the main representative of a Right that was inherently undemocratic, subservient to the predatory Americans, selling the nation out (especially Cyprus) to any conceivable reactionary actor including the Turks, and pursuing something described as the cult of free economy (Tsoucalas, ; Katris, ). This was the time when many Greek authors, both on the Left and the far Right (for example, Papageorgiou ), were eager to read the American and the British documents in order to find incriminating evidence in the dirty laundry of the West. But these efforts led nowhere, and archival research disclaimed those allegations that were based more on the ideological convictions (or prejudices) of those authors, rather on their research abilities. On the other hand, some early biographies of Karamanlis tried to offset this picture, but they were written too close to the events, were not based on archival evidence, and could only present working hypotheses focusing on the man rather than on the deeper forces and trends in the country and in the international system (Genevoix, ; Massip, ; Woodhouse, ). A much more balanced and functional bibliography about Cold War Greece has emerged after the s that tries to understand priorities and processes, as well as the man’s contribution and limits. Still, it remains to be seen whether this promising trend will continue after the current crisis, and the signals are not fully reassuring. But the exceptional element in Karamanlis’ legacy, at least for Greek standards, lies elsewhere. Advised by Tsatsos and Professor Constantine Svolopoulos, Karamanlis set up his Foundation in . In  the Foundation presented a twelve-volume publication of documents from his personal archive, which is also available to researchers. This gave a significant boost to research on post-war Greece, if only because it made available, for the first time, a huge volume of material. At the same time, the decision to make this material available is also interesting in assessing Karamanlis’ personality. It refers to an ability, admittedly encouraged by Tsatsos, to comprehend the notion of historicity. Moreover, Karamanlis, the former ‘peasant’, was tormented by social insecurities until the end, and perhaps it was for this reason that he developed the ability to dispute his own myth (Tzermias, : ). He thus was prepared to exchange the myth with the facilitation of academic research, which offers interpretations which are less heroic, but more stable in the long term, a notion with which he felt more safe. It was, admittedly, an unusual feature in a Greek politician.

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 

A common hypothesis about Karamanlis suggests that there were ‘two’ versions of the man—one before the junta, leading the repressive ‘state of the Right’, and another after the junta, placing emphasis on democratization. The concepts are often plainly wrong. For example most of the decrees establishing this ‘state of the Right’ (including the one prohibiting the Communist Party) had been signed by a prime minister and ministers of the centrist Liberals; the executions of convicted communists (which Karamanlis ceased in ) had taken place under governments led by the Centre; and it was a Centre-Left government under Nikolaos Plastiras that retained these anticommunist measures in force even after the Civil War, enacting the new Constitution in . But the notion of ‘two’ (different) versions of Karamanlis is anyway flawed. Research has established that his aims remained stable throughout his political career: rationalization of state action, economic development and modernization, democracy and stability, and integration in the West. For example, accession to the EEC was set as the prime aim since ; it was merely achieved in . The  Constitution emerges in its basic principles in the  proposal for the constitutional revision (and in the proclamations of Tsatsos’ Socialist Union since ). Of course, these had to be implemented in a different climate in the early post-war and in the post-junta period. But if his aims and political methodology remained stable throughout these years, it is difficult to point to a radical transformation of the person (Hatzivassiliou, ; Svolopoulos, ). On the other hand, Karamanlis’ role as the irreplaceable leader is an indication of the relative underdevelopment of the Greek political system. This is a general phenomenon in Greek history. Both Karamanlis and Eleftherios Venizelos before him attempted to create a state able to function on procedures, not through the ‘magical’ touch of a mythical leader. But, despite their impressive accomplishments, both Venizelos and Karamanlis failed in that pivotal effort: they remained the positive exceptions in a political system which so easily gives in to parochialism and to populism. In his annual review for , the British Ambassador, Sir Brooks Richards, noted that, for this reason exactly, Karamanlis remained ‘a structural anomaly’ in the Greek political scene (Hatzivassiliou, : ). Yet, after the full accession to the European Communities/Union, achieved mostly thanks to Karamanlis’ leadership, things have radically changed. The social conditions of Greece have grown beyond the need for sudden, short bursts of exceptional effectiveness, which were the eras of Venizelos and of Karamanlis. Perhaps leaders like them were enough for a country trying to enter the developed world, but a more comprehensive effort is now necessary. These are, effectively, the limits of Karamanlis’ model as a leader. And yet, when all is said, it is important to note that the bitter years of the recent crisis have revealed another legacy of Karamanlis. His strong stance against populism and mostly his insistence on the accession to Europe have left him as a point of reference for Greece’s pro-European forces, and have created an ideological/political backbone for his political party. This may be one of the reasons why the Greek Right, although severely wounded, has held its ground even during the recent crisis.

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R Alivizatos N. (). ‘Ο Κ. Γ. Καραμανλής και η Αριστερά την κρίσιμη οκταετία, –’ [K. G. Karamanlis and the Left during the Crucial Eight-Year Period, –]. In Svolopoulos, C., Botsiou, K. E., and Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds.). Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής στον εικοστό αιώνα, τόμ  [Constantine Karamanlis in the twentieth century, vol. ]. Athens: Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, –. Alivizatos, N. (). Το Σύνταγμα και οι εχθροί του στη νεοελληνική ιστορία, – [The Constitution and its Enemies in Modern Greek History, –]. Athens: Polis. Christidis, C. (). ‘Το πρώτο δείγμα γραφής: η θητεία του Κ. Καραμανλή στο Υπουργείο Κοινωνικής Προνοίας, –’ [First Signals: Karamanlis’ Term in the Ministry of Social Welfare, –]. In Svolopoulos, C., Botsiou, K. E., and Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds.). Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής στον εικοστό αιώνα, τόμ  [Constantine Karamanlis in the twentieth century, vol. ]. Athens: Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, –. Christidis, C. (). Ανένδοτος Αγώνας: η Ένωση Κέντρου ενώπιον της ρήξης, – [The Relentless Struggle: the Centre Union Facing the Rupture, –]. Thessaloniki: Epikentro. Drakatos, C. (). Ο μεγάλος κύκλος της ελληνικής οικονομίας (–) [The Big Cycle of the Greek Economy (–)]. Athens: Papazisis. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). Prime Ministers in Greece: The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Genevoix, M. (). The Greece of Karamanlis. St Louis: Doric Publications. Hatzivassiliou, E. (). Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, –. Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs. Hatzivassiliou, E. (). Η άνοδος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή στην εξουσία, – [The Rise of Karamanlis to Power, –]. Athens: Patakis. Hatzivassiliou, E. (). Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, –. London: Routledge. Hatzivassiliou, E. (). Ελληνικός φιλελευθερισμός: το ριζοσπαστικό ρεύμα, – [Greek Liberalism: The Radical Trend, –]. Athens: Patakis. Holland, R. (). Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, –, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Iatrides, J. O. (). ‘Challenging the Limitations of the Atlantic Community: Konstantine Karamanlis and NATO’. In Svolopoulos, C., Botsiou, K. E., and Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds.) Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής στον εικοστό αιώνα, τόμ  [Constantine Karamanlis in the twentieth century, vol. ]. Athens: Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, –. Karamouzi, E. (). ‘Managing the “Helsinki Spirit” in the Balkans: The Greek Initiative for Balkan Co-operation, –’. Diplomacy and Statecraft,  (): –. Karamouzi, E. (). Greece, the EEC and the Cold War –: the Second Enlargement. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Katris, J. A. (). Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power. St. Louis: New Critics Press. Kazakos, P. (). Ανάμεσα σε κράτος και αγορά: οικονομία και οικονομική πολιτική στη μεταπολεμική Ελλάδα, - [Between the State and the Market: Economy and Economic Policy in Postwar Greece, –]. Athens: Patakis. Keridis, D. (). Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής και ο ξένος Τύπος [Constantine Karamanlis and the Foreign Press]. Athens: Patakis. Kourkouvelas, L. (). ‘Détente as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, –’. The International History Review,  (): –.

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 

Massip, R. (). Caramanlis: un grec hors de commun. Paris: Stock. McNeill, W. H. (). The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mitsotakis, K. (). Οι συμπληγάδες της εξωτερικής πολιτικής: εσωτερικές και διεθνείς πιέσεις στις ελληνοαμερικανικές διαπραγματεύσεις για τις βάσεις, – [The Symplegades of Foreign Policy: Internal and External Pressures in the Greek-US Negotiations about the Bases, –]. Athens: Patakis. Nikolacopoulos, E. (). Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία: κόμματα και εκλογές, – [The Sickly Democracy: Parties and Elections, –]. Athens: Patakis. Nicolet, C. (). United States Policy towards Cyprus, –: Removing the Greek— Turkish Bone of Contention. Manheim: Bibliopolis. Papageorgiou, S. (). Καραμανλής και Κυπριακόν [Karamanlis and the Cyprus Question]. Athens: Nea Thesis. Pappas, T. (). ‘‘Κυβερνητικά επιτελεία στη δεκαετία του ’ και η τέχνη της διακυβέρνησης’ [Government Staff in the Decade of the s and the Art of Government]. In Svolopoulos, C., Botsiou, K. E., and Hatzivassiliou, E. (eds.) Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής στον εικοστό αιώνα, τόμ  [Constantine Karamanlis in the twentieth century, vol. ]. Athens: Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, : –. Pelt, M. (). Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, –. Copenhagen: Museum Tuscullanum Press. Psalidopoulos, M. (). Πολιτική οικονομία και έλληνες διανοούμενοι: μελέτες για την ιστορία της οικονομικής σκέψης στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα [Political Economy and Greek Intellectuals: Studies on the History of Economic Thought in Contemporary Greece]. Athens: Metamesonykties Ekdoseis. Psalidopoulos, M. (). ‘Ο οικονομικός φιλελευθερισμός στην Ελλάδα’ [Economic Liberalism in Greece]. Fileleftheri Emphasi, : –. Rioux, J. P. (ed.) (). De Gaulle en son siècle, Vol. : dans la mémoire des hommes et des peuples. Paris: Fondation Charles de Gaulle. Rizas, S. (). Η ελληνική πολιτική μετά τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο: κοινοβουλευτισμός και δικτατορία [Greek Politics after the Civil War: Parliamentarism and Dictatorship]. Athens: Kastaniotis. Svolopoulos, C. (ed.) (). Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής: Αρχείο, γεγονότα και κείμενα [Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Events, and Texts]. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon. Svolopoulos, C. (). Καραμανλής, –: μια πολιτική βιογραφία [Karamanlis, –: A Political Biography]. Athens: Ikaros. Tsatsos, C. (). Ο άγνωστος Καραμανλής: μια προσωπογραφία [The Unknown Karamanlis: A Portrait]. Athens: Ekdotike Athenon. Tsoucalas, C. (). The Greek Tragedy. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Tzermias, P. (). Ο ‘ριζοσπαστικός φιλελευθερισμός’ του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Karamanlis’ ‘Radical Liberalism’]. Athens: Sideris. Verney, S. (). ‘Greece and the European Community’. In Featherstone, K. and Katsoudas, D. K. (eds.) Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels. London: Croom Helm, –. Woodhouse, C. (). Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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. I

.................................................................................................................................. A Papandreou (–) was the son of a Greek prime minister (Georgios) who railed against the defeat of his father’s government to later create the first mass socialist party (‘Movement’) in post-war Greece, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) on  September . He successfully led it to power, and he himself became prime minister (PM) in . This chapter focuses primarily on his ideas and discourse, as these constituted a major new insertion into Greek politics, with reverberations felt in the present period. First, a brief overview of his career can provide a useful background for the themes to be developed. Andreas Papandreou rose to prominence as a distinguished economist at several US universities in the s, such as Harvard and Berkeley. His career overseas meant that he had been absent from Greece during the Second World War and the subsequent Civil War. Returning to Greece for family visits in the late s, the then Centre-Right prime minister, Constantine Karamanlis, was prevailed upon by Andreas’s father to offer him a position to keep him in Greece. Thus, Andreas became the first head of KEPE (Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών), an economic research centre studying the country’s economic growth conditions. When his father became PM in , Andreas took up the position of minister to the prime minister and alternate minister of co-ordination. Tension soon appeared between Andreas and his father in the direction of the government and the need, as Andreas saw it, for greater radicalism.

. E

.................................................................................................................................. The  political crisis, the clash between the government and the king, as well as the departure of a group of MPs from the government majority resulting in the

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government’s downfall, enabled Andreas Papandreou to lead a radical popular movement within the emergent Left-Centre. Forced into exile at the start of the Colonels’ junta, he returned in  to lead PASOK as an alternative to his late father’s party, the Centre Union (Ένωσις Kέντρου). The rise of PASOK was impressive (see Chapter  in this volume). Andreas Papandreou served three terms as PM (–; –; –). Throughout, he dominated the party he had created: its appeal, its nature, and its shifts of policy were his above all. Thanks to his charismatic style and direct rapport with the ‘people’, Andreas Papandreou managed to give voice to what he called the desires of the defeated of the Civil War generation (–) (who were asphyxiating in the ‘police state of the Right’) for restoring ‘real’ democracy in Greece, as well as the aspirations to upward social mobility of the popular and emergent petty bourgeois social strata. The first interpretative approaches of the ‘PASOK phenomenon’, even as early as the s, trace the peculiar character of the Movement founded by Andreas Papandreou to the features of a specific type of Greek social and political ‘underdevelopment’: a type of political development that was quite removed from the European social democratic paradigm (Mouzelis, , ; Elephantis, ; Mavrogordatos, ; Diamandouros, ; Lyrintzis, ; Charalambis, ). Indeed, PASOK’s foundation, rapid rise to power, and subsequent domination of the Greek political scene cannot be understood out of the context of the difficult postwar years: although this period saw significant economic growth in Greece, a considerable segment of the country’s population—the defeated of the Civil War, which had brought into conflict the party of the communists and that of the ‘nationalists’ (ethnikόfrones), the latter comprising the right-wing and centrist parties—found itself, or felt itself to be, outside the political system and the state. PASOK drew upon an unusual subversion of this sociopolitical and ideological cleavage, particularly as this changed during the crucial decade of the s, when a large part of the population was radicalized toward the Left, overcoming the wounds of the Civil War. Being the leader of the left-wing of the Centre Union, the centrist party founded by his father, Georgios, in  (Meynaud, ), Andreas Papandreou managed (thanks to his ‘demagogical’ rhetoric, as his political opponents saw it) to shape and lead a social and political movement that questioned the political system’s post-Civil War structure and claimed its own peculiar form of modernization, based on denouncing the ‘establishment’ and demanding the conquest of the country’s ‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘national independence’. Translating the will to secure an autonomous Greek foreign policy and put an ‘end’ to American interference in Greek internal affairs, Papandreou’s electoral slogan, ‘Greece [belongs] to the Greeks’, epitomized, both during and beyond that crucial period in the s, the strict correlation of national and popular sovereignty (the essential conditions of ‘real modernization’), which was clearly employed as the ideological basis of PASOK’s founding Manifesto in September . The Colonels’ military dictatorship (–), largely seen as ‘US-imposed’, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of , which occasioned the

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restoration of parliamentary democracy in Greece, greatly reinforced Papandreou’s rhetoric, henceforth obsessively focused on the national independence demand (Pantazopoulos, ; Pantazopoulos, ). It is thus evident that, in genealogical terms, PASOK did not originate in the working-class movement, as was the case with other European socialist and social democratic parties. It was a component part, not of the traditional Greek Left, but of a Centre radicalized toward the Left (Elephantis, ), clearly bearing the mark of its charismatic founder. Indeed, Andreas Papandreou lent PASOK a quality of the ‘new Left’, or at least a North American version of it, imbued with the anti-imperialist ‘theories’ of ‘unequal exchange’ and the class struggle between the ‘metropolises’ and ‘peripheries’ of ‘contemporary monopoly capitalism’—a theoretical model heavily drawing inspiration from the intellectuals rallied around the American leftist Monthly Review, such as Harry Magdoff and Paul Sweezy (Papandreou, a). Furthermore, his political and ideological views were quite close to those of John Kenneth Galbraith, in terms of the elitist technocratic structure of contemporary monopoly capitalism; Bertrand de Jouvenel, from whom he mainly drew a ‘pessimist’ analysis of state power, seen here as dependent on the ‘establishment’; and Herbert Marcuse, from whom he borrowed a humanist, radical critique of the ‘machine’ and consumerism as threats to democracy and ‘human liberty’ (Papandreou, ). This politico-ideological proposition largely reinforced the permanent resistanceoriented features of the Greek political culture, and politicized its crucial ‘Eastern’, antiWestern, dimension. This time, however, it was not the defeated communists that were called upon to lead the national liberation struggle, but the radicalized post-Civil War generations. Andreas Papandreou provided them with a renewed resistance-oriented narrative, largely reiterating (at least according to himself) in a new setting the fundamental patriotic message of the National Liberation Front (EAM; Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο), the main pro-communist resistance organization activated in Greece against the Nazi occupation forces (–). This was a message of national independence (Voulgaris, ; Pantazopoulos, ). In this respect, the s, during which the post-Civil War electoral dominance of the Right was effectively destabilized, proved to be a real turning point for all subsequent political developments. Supported by the contribution and interventions of the monarchy, the so-called ‘apostasy’ of several MPs of the governing party (Centre Union) led to the resignation of Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and the eventual downfall of his government in July . This gave Andreas Papandreou the chance to lead a mass sociopolitical mobilization and shape its politicoideological framework. For Αndreas, the ‘apostates’ were the long arm of the ‘establishment’, the ‘fascist Right’, and the ‘dark foreign powers’ scheming with a view to perpetuating Greece’s dependence. Against such a conspiracy backdrop, and through a subversion of the post-Civil War political cleavage (between communists and anticommunist ‘nationalists’), the future founder of PASOK claimed the very name of ‘nationalist’ on behalf of the emergent radical anti-right-wing party (Papandreou, ; Pantazopoulos, ). Demanding ‘the repatriation of our terminology’

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(‘nationalists’) and, to this end, going as far as supporting his arguments for an essential ‘national regeneration’ by invoking the nationalist and simultaneously socialist writer Ion Dragoumis (who, influenced by the ideas of Maurice Barrès, was one of the patriarchs of Greek nationalism that attempted to annex Macedonia to Greece in the early twentieth century), Andreas Papandreou’s rhetoric identified the ‘people’ (i.e. the ‘popular movement’ that opposes both the Right and its ‘foreign protectors’, the US) as ‘nationalists’, and the post-Civil War right-wing establishment as ‘traitors’ (Papandreou, ). Employing a plain, emotionally charged discourse that was understandable to all, Andreas Papandreou gave his own interpretation of contemporary developments and explained what was for him the principal cause of the Greek misfortune. Thus, he clearly defined the ‘enemy of the people’ (namely, the ‘establishment’ and the ‘foreign powers’) and put forward his own transcendental solution to the Greek problem. To his potential audience, Papandreou was an ‘apostate’ of his own sociopolitical class, a ‘defector’ and, therefore, an ‘insider’ that could reveal the ‘truth’: the nexus of established power, the intrigues and plots of foreign and domestic elites aiming to keep ‘an entire people’ in constant dependence and servitude. Papandreou’s political emergence and accession to leadership, which came about during a transitional sociopolitical period (given that Greece had to shift from economic underdevelopment to the way of growth, with all the psychosocial and political dimensions this entailed: expectations of upward social mobility, democratization, etc.), was thus inextricably linked, firstly, to the myth Papandreou had carefully constructed for himself; secondly, to the political myth that explained the causes of disaffection of very large population strata and their sociopolitical exclusion from both politics and the post-Civil War state; and, last but not least, to his ‘redemptive’ and ‘salutary’ proposition. Although Papandreou’s public discourse reiterated numerous core phrases of the Greek resistance-oriented left-wing culture (Elephantis, ; Veremis, ), the fact that he was not coming from a ‘stigmatized’ Left of communist origins enabled him to improve on them, render them relevant and effective, and, therefore, integrate them into a reliable prospect of achieving political power.

. T ‘E’   ‘P’

.................................................................................................................................. For Andreas Papandreou, the gravest problem of all was none other than the ‘Establishment’ itself (Papandreou, ). He actually politicized and introduced this term into public debate, particularly stressing it in his own rhetorical explanation of the July  events that led to the resignation/downfall of the Centre Union government. The enemy, a nexus of economic and political power (‘the ruling class

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of Athens’, the financial ‘oligarchy’, in close collaboration with the governing elites, the top authorities of the state, the Crown being the first amongst them), was what Papandreou emphatically described as a ‘parallel power’ network: a ‘secret’, ‘dark’ power that dictated the direction of all developments by means of ‘backstage’, ‘secret’ moves to the detriment of the ‘people’, who were thus victimized by a plot against their interests. Coming ‘from above’, this plot essentially turned against the nation itself (here understood even in terms of ‘race’ and/or community of character, given that its cultural determination, through an appeal to ‘tradition’, is not absent) (Papandreou, ; Papandreou, b).

.. ‘Scheming’ Significantly, in a speech given at an event held by the progressive ‘Papanastasiou Society’, where Andreas Papandreou explained the meaning of ‘apostasy’ (of the ‘coup’), the terms ‘the Establishment’, ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’, as well as the derivatives of these last two, were repeated again and again: the first one, twenty-nine times; the other two, twenty-four and seventeen times, respectively (Papandreou, ). Besides, in several of the speeches he delivered within the context of the so-called second unrelenting struggle (the ‘progress toward the people’), Andreas Papandreou revealed all the current ‘schemes’ and ‘networks’, and indicated the enemy that was hatching the evil plan (‘the subjugation of our erstwhile powerful race’) and undermining ‘popular sovereignty’. The political elites denounced are thus stigmatized and demonized. Characteristic examples include such formulations as ‘[the leadership of the National Radical Union (ERE, Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις)] is the parliamentary guise of fascism’, ‘the party of the Right, with its slavish attitude toward foreign powers’, and even the description of those who questioned the choices of the Centre Union leadership as ‘a fifth column’ and as ‘agents of the Right’. These were all invariably combined with celebrating the ‘oft betrayed’ people’s virtues, their political maturity (‘the average Greek citizen has fully grasped the deeper meaning of the crisis thanks to his amazing political maturity’), their radical liberation from the shackles of the post-Civil War state, and their successful elevation to the status of an autonomous subject of (their own) history. Constantly activated, the ‘people’ thus become the source of the unique truth that must inform the efforts of the elites wishing to offer an alternative prospect to Greece: [ . . . ] the atmosphere of the ancient Greek cities has been regenerated. A new kind of rapport has been established between the political leadership and the people. For these are no longer mere political meetings. They are, indeed, instances of a mutually enlightening mystical ritual, out of which the party line emerges [ . . . ] (Papandreou, : ).

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.. Appropriation of ‘Progressive Nationalism’ If such an ‘evil-denouncing’ rhetoric systematizes and politicizes conspiracy populism so fully, intensely, and officially in the public sphere by essentially identifying ‘power’ with ‘conspiracy’ (the very essence of power being perpetual conspiracy), Andreas Papandreou’s proposition about exiting from the contemporary political and civil crisis formed an integral part of his appropriation of nationalism, or ‘progressive nationalism’. If the ultimate aim pursued is ‘national regeneration’, a Greece ‘governed by Greeks’, a ‘Greece that belongs to the Greeks’ after having destroyed the realm of ‘dark powers’, the radical appeal to the national idea in activist/activating terms effectively acquires ideological and political characteristics. The ‘nation’ thus becomes the dogmatic framework providing intellectual feedback to the political contest; moreover, a specific understanding of the ‘national interest’ must be prioritized against any other and redetermine ‘the order of the day’, the criteria of a new political legitimation. Exalting Greekness or Romiosini (an alternative term for Greekness, connoting nationalism), Papandreou put forward the new vision of ‘national independence’ (against all sorts of ‘guardians’ and ‘protectors’), which was meant to act as the dividing line for a new political cleavage, a new ‘Great Idea’ (or Megáli Idéa, as was the name given to the goal of ‘liberating’ the Asia Minor Greek population, which ended in the  tragedy), thus subverting the post-Civil War cleavage between nationalists and communists. This time, nationalism is not concerned with an issue of irredentism, as in the interwar period, but turns to the country’s interior itself. Papandreou himself described this new dividing line, which must prevail in the political contest, in the following words: ‘A party is national if it supports [the new “Great Idea”]; antinational if it’s against it. Only thus can we repatriate our terminology and put an end to the ridiculous misappropriation of the term “nationalist” by the “nation-mongers”.’ Not hesitating to resort to Ion Dragoumis’s ideas, Andreas exalted the ‘strength’ that Greeks must have—or at least those Greeks ‘who do not see their Greekness as a burden or misfortune’ (Papandreou, ). Although the aim declared, by Andreas Papandreou himself, was the country’s ‘modernization’, he saw in it a product of a ‘democratic decision’ and political voluntarism, based on the termination of national ‘dependence’ and the unconditional celebration of the virtues of ‘the people and the nation’. While Papandreou apparently wished to see Greece become a Western country like all the others—thus accepting, for example, in the early s, Greece’s connection to the then EEC as a positive challenge, and clearly supporting the democratic modernization of political parties, the termination of clientelism, and the modernization of education (Papandreou, )—he mortgaged this prospect by supporting the conspiracy national-popular myth he himself constructed. The emergence of a homogenized, nationalistically constituted anti-right-wing social subject, the ‘people’, is the successful ideological venture that effectively connected the social and the national questions, and reset the post-Civil War social and political

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balances of power in the interest of a nationalist and populist Left-Centre. Only temporarily did the Colonels’ military coup of  April  interrupt this process; the restoration of democracy in July  (occasioned by the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus) further reinforced the national-popular features of this mass anti-rightwing social and political movement. The military dictatorship period saw Papandreou leading a resistance organization, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK, Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα), which sought to ‘violently overthrow’ the military regime and, in ideological terms, described itself as a ‘national liberation movement’. PAK actively engaged in anti-dictatorial propaganda amongst the Greek diaspora, notably in Western Europe and Canada (Papandreou, a; Drainas, ).

. T S  M  PASOK’ N L C

.................................................................................................................................. Self-styled as a ‘Movement’, rather than a political party, in its founding Manifesto ( September ), which bears Andreas Papandreou’s personal mark, PASOK focused on claiming the country’s national independence from ‘American imperialism’—a necessary condition for reinstating ‘popular sovereignty’, which, in turn, was thought to be an essential condition for achieving ‘social liberation’, namely establishing socialism. However, this type of socialism, according to the leader of PASOK, was not to follow foreign models, as it was a specifically Greek variety of socialism. The ‘root of the evil’, Greece’s chronic misfortune, socio-economic underdevelopment and cultural atrophy were attributed to its dependence on imperialist centres, notably the US, and their close alliance with their domestic ‘representatives’, particularly the rightwing parties. The termination of Greek underdevelopment, the country’s social, economic, and political modernization (following the ending of clientelism in economy and politics, and the democratization of political parties), as well as the establishment of a neutral state free from party-political and ideological influences, could not therefore materialize unless the umbilical cord between the Greek ‘establishment’ (i.e. the right-wing parties, at least one part of the Centre, the monarchy, the armed forces, and the near entirety of the country’s economic and intellectual elites) and its foreign ‘protectors’ was effectively severed (Papandreou, a). If Andreas Papandreou’s Greek brand of socialism (obsessively focused on ‘national independence’, which he saw as the way to remove all social inequalities) lent the newly established PASOK a strong national liberation dimension, it also made it adopt a ‘tough’ attitude vis-à-vis Turkey’s foreign policy—which sought to renegotiate the two countries’ Aegean borders—and oriented it toward demanding Greece’s withdrawal from NΑΤΟ, removing all American military bases, and forming other international

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 

alliances with political movements and Third-World countries, prominent amongst which were Yasser Arafat’s PLO, Muammar Gadaffi’s Libya, Syrian and Iraqi Baath political regimes, and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Besides, Andreas Papandreou’s ethnocentric, Third-World orientation made him see Europe, the then EEC, as a mere outpost of the US and, therefore, as a factor that undermined Greek ‘popular sovereignty’, since ‘decisions will be made by the Brussels directorate’. Opposing the prospect of Greece’s EEC membership (as the PASOK slogan of the time went: ‘EEC and NATO [are] the same syndicate’), PASOK denounced and condemned European social democracy as the ‘Trojan horse’ of imperialism, and even refused to become a member of the Socialist International. According to Papandreou, social democracy, particularly the German SPD, had ‘betrayed’ socialism by serving American interests (Papandreou, a; Papandreou, b; Pantazopoulos, ). Oriented, as noted, toward the Third World, national liberation, and resistance, this socialist politico-ideological identity is particularized (in the field of social alliances) in what Papandreou called the strategy of ‘national popular unity’: the equitable classbased alliance of the ‘non-privileged’ Greeks, accounting for the solid, vast majority of the population, as against the ‘privileged’ lean minority, a social group consisting of the ‘parasitic’, ‘comprador’, ‘non-national’ part of the bourgeoisie, whose socio-economic interests directly conflict with the interests of the vast majority of the ‘Greek people’. Thus, the dichotomization of the social field in Papandreou’s rhetoric meets the dichotomization of the political field, constructing a clear sociopolitical ‘friend’/‘foe’ division, a discursive conflict between the people, on the one hand, and the domestic economic, political, and intellectual elites, on the other. As explained earlier, these elites were represented as being in the service of foreign powers, imperialism, and (American) multinational companies that doomed the present and future of Greece to perennial social, economic, and cultural underdevelopment. Consequently, adopting an independent economic policy presupposed liberating Greece from the shackles of ‘dependence’ and organizing economic and social activity within the context of a ‘selfreliant’ and ‘autocentric development’, capable of primarily responding to the productive needs of the country, which must escape the ‘peripheral’ status ascribed to it by the international division of labour through ‘unequal exchange’ relations (Papandreou, a). In cultural terms, this nationally determined economic orientation was accompanied by an unyielding defence of the Greek popular cultural heritage, which was represented as threatened by the ‘by-products’ of the ‘American way of life’ dominating the West and tainting with its ‘consumerism’ the traditional popular values, the pure popular culture (Papandreou, ). As far as political alliances are concerned, Andreas Papandreou consistently rejected any kind of cooperation with the two parties of the Greek communist Left, namely the orthodox pro-Soviet Communist Party of Greece (or KKE) and the Eurocommunist KKE Interior, as he wished to keep the character of his own Movement uncontaminated by intra-communist party disputes. PASOK was to be regarded as a brand-new

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

political formation, free from all past burdens (especially those associated with the traumatic experience of the Civil War), and, through a remythologized past, as a ‘genuine’ representative of a resistance-oriented history of the Greek people. PASOK ‘represented’ the country’s ‘democratic’ and ‘progressive’ forces. As a ‘Movement’, it had to keep its distance from all inessential disputes and inherited party-political identities, leave past divisions behind, and aim for a new ‘national popular unity’, ‘in the service of the people and the country’. In organizational terms, PASOK was to be structured ‘from below’, through ‘selforganization’: the anti-imperialist, ‘patriotic’ and socially liberating call of the September  Manifesto broke with all the traditional political inclusions and aimed at creating a ‘new political movement’ by organizing what PASOK, in later party documents, would call a ‘radicalism of the masses’. Yet, despite the Movement’s ‘constitution from below’, the charismatic leader’s presence always remained dominant: intraparty procedures rarely followed the democratic rule; occasionally, party members were expelled according to the leader’s personal wishes; PASOK held its very first party conference in , ten years after its foundation, electing the party leader by acclamation, as it also did in all subsequent conferences (Lyrintzis, ; Spourdalakis, ; Charalambis, ; Pappas, ). Thus, with a sweeping percentage of . per cent (Nikolakopoulos, ) and the slogans of ‘Change, here and now’ and ‘The people want [change]; PASOK can [bring it]’, Andreas Papandreou signed his own ‘contract with the people’ and led his party to the landslide victory of  October .

. T E  G P: C  R

.................................................................................................................................. Lending PASOK’s electoral victory anti-right-wing content and the ‘redemptive’ dimension of the people who had been tortured and excluded from the power centres of post-Civil War Greece, Andreas Papandreou followed a popular government policy as regards the ‘social issue’. Extensive ‘social redistribution’ was accompanied by a series of welfare-related and liberal, modernizing, institutional interventions: wider democratization of education through the extension of compulsory education from six to nine years; modernization of university structures and employment relations, based on institutionalized participatory practices; establishment of a national health system; reform of the family code; institutionalization of gender equality in employment; protection of maternity and single mothers; independent pension coverage for female farmers; establishment of civil marriage on a par with religious marriage; and extension of local government responsibilities. Yet this important democratic ‘widening’ was not accompanied by the necessary rules and procedures that could ensure a democratic and meritocratic restructuring of the state. As a result, that structural feature of Greek public life, clientelism, was yet again perpetuated (Sotiropoulos, ). Moreover,

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Papandreou proceeded to a number of symbolical moves in the name of ‘national reconciliation’, such as recognizing the communist-inspired EAM resistance against Nazi Germany as a part of the Greek people’s unified national resistance, and, also, allowing all the (communist) political refugees of the Civil War to return to Greece. By contrast, Papandreou distanced himself from all his grand politico-ideological proclamations regarding the so-called ‘foreign policy issues’. More specifically, he abandoned all his pledges about withdrawing from NATO, removing all the American and NATO military bases in Greece, and holding a referendum about whether Greece should exit or remain in the EEC. Clashing with the complexities of reality (Pantazopoulos, ; Voulgaris, ; Veremis, ), Papandreou was obliged to adopt a new ‘dialectical’ approach between, on the one hand, the ideological wishes of his Movement and of all those who had believed in them, and, on the other hand, the inexistent possibilities of ever fulfilling them. This was a matter of managing the relationship between the ‘feasible’ and the ‘desirable’, between ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ (Pantazopoulos, ). The socialist government was devoted to the promotion of a ‘feasible’ programme, namely one permitted by the existing ‘balance of power’ (both within and across borders), whilst the Movement could express the ‘desirable’, the ultimate ‘strategic’ aims, and back the government in the area of trade union struggles, thus gradually turning the trade union movement into a conveyor belt of government policy. This suggested, precisely, that PASOK as a government party always had to present its ‘realism’, its transformation into a ‘mainstream political party’, in a guise of both ‘patriotic’ and anti-right-wing rhetoric radicalism. In this way, PASOK mortgaged the modernizing dynamics of the Greek socialist experiment—the Greek ‘third way’ to socialism, for Papandreou’s governments, especially that of –, proved that economic modernization was an important parameter of their policy; Papandreou’s rhetoric itself was focused on the achievements of technology and suggested that Greece should by all means pursue technological modernization and break with all dated ideological doctrines. ‘Today’, Papandreou stated in  before an audience of farmers, ‘the battle [of national independence] is not fought with guns; it is fought with the weapons of technology, knowledge, and high quality’ (Pantazopoulos, ). Nevertheless, this modern aspect of PASOK’s policies, now viewing economic independence as a pillar of national independence, was essentially entrapped in PASOK’s ‘popular’ profile, which was inextricably linked to statism. Delivering these policies conflicted with the interests of the ‘non-privileged’ (whose guardian was the PASOK leader himself): namely, the people’s own ‘vested’ interests. Moreover, the demonization of the Right (which produced one of the Movement’s main slogans: ‘Right means a sell-out Greece’), the invariably conspiracy-oriented nationalist rhetoric (despite the effective compromises and regressions; despite the failure of the great anti-imperialist promises), as well as the celebration of the ‘people’, always remained constants. A further proof of this turn in the public political discourse and debate, occasionally taking on an illiberal dimension, was Papandreou’s anti-institutional attitude in . Indeed, following his political opponents’ accusation that he was politically and even criminally involved in a major

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political–economic scandal (the infamous ‘Bank of Crete’ scandal), he exclaimed at a campaign meeting: ‘There exist no institutions, only the people exists’, suggesting that even criminal acts could be ‘pardoned’ if only the ‘people’ ensured PASOK’s electoral victory. If it is difficult to doubt the significance of the democratic breakthrough Papandreou inspired in the Greek political scene by including all those citizens previously excluded from the Greek political system and the state, and, thus, fulfilling their upward mobility expectations, it is no less difficult to downplay the fact that this process was carried out ‘vertically’, at the expense of an autonomous and emancipated civil society (Featherstone, ; Lyrintzis, ). The right-wing MP-focused clientelism was replaced by new relations of ‘patronage’, this time interconnected with PASOK’s party organization (Lyrintzis, ). Being organizationally integrated into PASOK effectively became a passport for appointment/admission into the state bureaucracy. Both the state orientation of the party and the party orientation of the state were not questioned at all. By contrast, both processes were actually re-legitimated within the context of a nominally progressive rhetoric. It was these ideologized practices that determined PASOK’s electoral victories over these years: . per cent in the  European Parliament election; . per cent in the  general election; and . per cent in the  general election. Having been acquitted by the Supreme Special Court of the ‘corruption’ charge levelled against him during the Bank of Crete scandal, Andreas Papandreou effectively returned to power from  to . However, in , because of serious health problems, he was succeeded as leader of PASOK by Kostas Simitis, a convinced Europeanist and political modernizer.

. PASOK: B S D  P?

.................................................................................................................................. Despite the fact that all the commentators who have attempted to interpret the ‘PASOK phenomenon’ are agreed on the populist dimensions of the policies adopted by the party during its terms in office and, at any rate, its opposition period (–), only a few have ascribed to it an unambiguous populist character. Several commentators have suggested that PASOK’s governmental policies can be identified, so to speak, in a ‘Greek-coloured’ social democracy reflecting the peculiar development of the Greek social formation (Verney, ). Such an interpretation mainly focuses on Papandreou’s (up to a point) successful efforts to organize a ‘welfare state’. The same interpretation is further supported by the relations developed by PASOK and Papandreou, even as early as the s, with southern European socialist parties, notably François Mitterrand’s French Socialist Party and Felipe González’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), both of which Papandreou regarded as being very close to PASOK’s own

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views. However, this approach underestimates some important aspects of PASOK’s inexistent relation with the history of the working-class movement in Greece (and this movement’s anaemic presence, as a result of the country’s meagre industrialization), its hostility toward the European social democratic parties, its alliances with Third-World national liberation movements, and its increasingly claimed ‘national liberation’ character, as opposed to the French and Spanish socialists’ Europeanist orientation (Pappas, ). If the social democratic model is not exhausted in a government programme (e.g. measures establishing a welfare state) and is generally identified as a form of participatory government and consultation based on a powerful working-class movement and a democratically organized political party (Bergounioux and Manin, ), PASOK cannot be classified with any precision into this political party family. PASOK’s leader-centred character, its sheer identification with the leader, its social references to the ‘non-privileged’, to the one and undivided people, its vertical integrations of the masses into politics, its constant appeals to the ‘nation’, its rhetorical demonization of the political ‘opponent’ and the ‘foreign power’ (‘imperialism’), its statism, not to mention the charismatic leader’s omnipotence—all this seems to place Andreas Papandreou’s movement into a category of ‘national-populism’, according to Pierre-André Taguieff ’s relevant categorization (Taguieff, ). Indeed, nationalpopulism emerges as the insurmountable horizon of both Papandreou’s political discourse and PASOK’s actual political practices. Totally dependent on Papandreou, PASOK as a political organization operated as a conveyor belt moving the charismatic leader’s discourse to society and its institutions. If populism is defined as a polemical ‘political style’ which can lend form to various symbolical materials and which can also be identified in numerous ideological contexts (where it adopts the respective political colour), populist discourse is constituted as a set of rhetorical ventures of the charismatic leader, who refers to the people as ‘demos’ or ‘ethnicity’, praises their ‘natural’ virtues, rejects all political mediations, and constructs an enemy to be fought against, an enemy purported to be constantly ‘plotting’ against popular interests. When the ‘enemy’ is defined as the group of domestic (governmental, economic, intellectual, etc.) ruling elites, the populist protest discourse takes on social-populist characteristics. If the ‘enemy’ is defined as the ‘foreigner’ or ‘foreign power’ (imperialism, financial capital, immigrants) and the domestic ruling elites, the ‘establishment’, are regarded as serving these very same ‘foreigners’, then the polemical, denunciatory discourse takes on national-populist characteristics. Rhetorically speaking, the case of PASOK, both as an opposition party (–) and as a government one (–), can indeed be identified in this national-populist categorization. The fact that during PASOK’s term this rhetoric did not in fact materialize, at least as far as its grand ‘anti-imperialist’ promises are concerned (significantly, Papandreou never actually challenged Greece remaining in the camp of ‘the West’: neither did he end the country’s alliance with the US, nor did Greece exit from the EEC), does not mean that it did not also shape the outlines of an essentially inauthentic, counterfeit modernization: an imitative reproduction of ‘Western models’, unaccompanied

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however by the development of the necessary domestic social, economic, and cultural foundations. Besides, the obsessive employment of a nationalist discourse, combined with corresponding governmental practices, was unequivocally evidenced by the trade embargo imposed on FYROM in  by Greece under Papandreou, because this new state, which had emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, was using the word ‘Macedonia’ in its name (Veremis, ). This is yet another proof that the Andreas Papandreou of the – period remained ideologically and politically committed, or even ‘captive’, to his own nationalist references from the previous decades, which mutilated the institutional dynamics of his governments’ modernizing interventions.

. C

.................................................................................................................................. Founding the first mass socialist party in post-war Greece, charismatic Andreas Papandreou created a national-populist movement of Third-World inspiration, PASOK. Especially over its first period, as an opposition party, PASOK claimed a ‘national liberation’ character for itself. Its terms in office allowed for a ‘mass entry of the masses’ into politics and the state, thus renewing the networks of political clientelism. Its rhetoric and some of its practices, exalting ‘the people and the nation’ and reproducing a number of permanent characteristics of the Greek resistance-oriented culture, prevented this democratic and ‘socialist’ experiment from modernizing the country’s social and political life. The modernizing measures taken by the PASOK governments, especially over the – period, conflicted with and were eventually rejected by its leader’s national-populist ‘ideology’ and governmental practices. If these measures changed Greek society on several fronts, they did not manage, however, to change its orientation, nor did they ‘westernize’ the country in terms of its political culture and a democratic and liberal function of the state and its institutions.

R Bergounioux, A. and Manin, B. (). Le régime social-démocrate. Paris: PUF. Charalambis, D. (). Πελατειακές σχέσεις και λαϊκισμός: Η εξωθεσμική συναίνεση στο ελληνικό πολιτικό σύστημα [Clientelism and Populism. The Extra-Institutional Consensus in the Greek Political System]. Athens: Exantas. Diamandouros, P. N. (). Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece. Madrid: Centro Juan March de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales. Drainas, S. (). ‘What PAK Was and What it Sought’ [‘Τι ήταν και τι ήθελε το ΠΑΚ’]. In Panagiotopoulos, V. (ed.) Ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου και η εποχή του [Andreas Papandreou and his Time]. Athens: To Vima, –.

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Elephantis, A. (). ‘PASOK and the Elections of : The Rise of the Poulist Movement’. In Penniman, H. R. (ed.) Greece at the Polls. The National Elections of  and . Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, –. Elephantis, A. (). Στον αστερισμό του λαϊκισμού [Under the Constellation of Populism]. Athens: Gonis. Featherstone, K. (). ‘Ο “εκσυγχρονισμός” και οι διαρθρωτικοί περιορισμοί της ελληνικής πολιτικής [“Modernization” and the Structural Limitations of Greek Politics]. In Featherstone, K. (ed.) Πολιτική στην Ελλάδα [Politics in Greece]. Athens: Okto, –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of “Bureaucratic Clientelism”?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘PASOK in Power: From “Change” to Disenchantment’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece, –: The Populist Decade. New York: St. Martin’s Press, –. Lyrintzis, C. (). ‘Το μεταβαλλόμενο κομματικό σύστημα: σταθερή δημοκρατία, αμφισβητούμενος “εκσυγχρονισμός” ’ [‘The Changing Party system: Stable Democracy, Debatable Modernization”]. In Featherstone, K. (ed.) Πολιτική στην Ελλάδα [Politics in Greece]. Athens: Okto, –. Mavrogordatos, G. (). ‘Civil Society under Populism’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece, –. The Populist Decade, New York: St. Martin’s Press, –. Meynaud, J. (). Les forces politiques en Grèce. Lausanne: Etudes de Sciences Politiques. Mouzelis, N. (). Modern Greece. Facets of Underdevelopment. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouzelis, N. (). Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and the Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Nikolakopoulos, E. (). ‘Εκλογές και ψηφοφόροι, –: Παλιές ρήξεις και νέα ζητήματα’ [‘Elections and Voters, –: Old Ruptures and New Issues’]. In Featherstone, K. (ed.) Πολιτική στην Ελλάδα [Politics in Greece]. Athens: Okto, –. Pantazopoulos, A. (). Για το λαό και το έθνος. Η στιγμή Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου, – [For the People and the Nation. The Moment of Andreas Papandreou, –]. Athens: Polis. Pantazopoulos, A. (). ‘Le national-populisme grec, –’. Les Temps Modernes –: –. Pantazopoulos, A. (). Λαϊκισμός και εκσυγχρονισμός, –. Απορίες και κίνδυνοι μιας μαχητικής συμβίωσης [Populism and Modernization, –]. Athens: Estia. Papandreou, A. G. (). Η ελευθερία του ανθρώπου [Human Liberty]. Athens: Karanassis. Papandreou, A. G. (a). Πατερναλιστικός καπιταλισμός [Paternalistic Capitalism]. Athens: Karanassis. Papandreou, A. G. (b). Η δημοκρατία στο απόσπασμα [Democracy in Front of the Firing Squad]. Athens: Karanassis. Papandreou, A. G. (). Δημοκρατία και εθνική ανεξαρτησία [Democracy and National Independence]. Athens: Fexis. Papandreou, A. G. (a). Από το ΠΑΚ στο ΠΑΣΟΚ. Εθνική ανεξαρτησία. Λαϊκή κυριαρχία. Λόγοι, άρθρα, συνεντεύξεις, δηλώσεις [From PAK to PASOK. National Independence. Popular Sovereignty. Speeches, Articles, Interviews, Statements]. Athens: Ladias. Papandreou, A. G. (b). Η Ελλάδα στους Έλληνες [Greece to the Greeks] Athens: Karanassis. Papandreou, A. G. (). Έτσι θα γίνει η Μεγάλη Αλλαγή’. Συνεντεύξεις-ντοκουμέντα από το αρχείο των Νέων – [‘Thus Shall the Great Change Come About’: Historic Interviews from the Ta Nea Newspaper Archive –]. Athens: Ta Nea.

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

Pappas, T. (). Το χαρισματικό κόμμα. ΠΑΣΟΚ, Παπανδρέου, εξουσία [The Charismatic Party: PASOK, Papandreou, Power]. Athens: Patakis. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Populism and Bureaucracy. The Case of Greece under PASOK, –. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame. Spourdalakis, Μ. (). ΠΑΣΟΚ: Κόμμα – κράτος – κοινωνία [PASOK: Party—State— Society]. Athens: Exantas. Taguieff, P. A. (). L’illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l’âge démocratique. Paris: Flammarion. Veremis, T. (). Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου. Μεγάλες προσδοκίες [Andreas Papandreou: Great Expectations]. Athens: Patakis. Verney, S. (). ‘From the “Special Relationship” to Europeanism: PASOK and the European Community, –’. In Clogg, R. (ed.) Greece, –. The Populist Decade. New York: St. Martin’s Press, –. Voulgaris, G. (). Η Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης –. Σταθερή δημοκρατία σημαδεμένη από τη μεταπολεμική ιστορία [Post-Dictatorship Greece –. A Stable Democracy Marked by Post-War History]. Athens: Themelio.

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  ......................................................................................................................

 

......................................................................................................................

.  

. I

.................................................................................................................................. C Simitis was elected prime minister of Greece, on  January , following a closely contested vote, taken on that date by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s (PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) parliamentary group, in which he prevailed on a second ballot with . per cent of the votes cast. Five months later, on  June , days after Andreas Papandreou, the party’s founder and uncontested leader, had passed away, PASOK’s Fourth Congress elected him leader of the party, in what was, yet again, a close race, in which he obtained . per cent of the votes, once more on a second ballot, and after two of the initial four contenders, who had been placed third and fourth in the first ballot, had been eliminated. In both cases, the protagonists were Simitis and Akis Tsohatzopoulos. The latter, Papandreou’s long-time loyal lieutenant, senior minister in all PASOK governments from  to , and secretary-general of the party from  to , had emerged as the dominant force in the party’s powerful central apparatus (Spourdalakis, , Moschonas,  and , Eleftheriou and Tassis, , Sotiropoulos,  and ). As a result, Tsohatzopoulos was viewed by most observers, within the party and without, as Papandreou’s likely heir-apparent. Seen in this context, Simitis’s eventual and admittedly slim victory in both contests was clearly not a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, it can arguably be described as in many ways improbable.

. T I T  C  L

.................................................................................................................................. In what follows, I shall seek to analyse Simitis’s management and, especially, leadership style. I will initially place my analysis within the macro-context defined by the political

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

evolution of Greek political culture and of the two competing cultural traditions that have largely shaped it across time. Within this broader context, I shall then seek to identify (a) the distinguishing features of Simitis’s approach to politics; (b) the ways in which such an approach converged or diverged from the party’s mainstream across time; (c) the particular elements that best characterized his leadership style; (d) the strengths and weaknesses deriving from such an approach; and, finally, (e) tentative conclusions concerning his legacies to a political system, which he served for eight consecutive years (–), in what, to date, constitutes the longest uninterrupted tenure ever by a Greek prime minister. Of necessity, such a focus implies that the ensuing analysis will not engage in a detailed examination, let alone enumeration, of Simitis’s many and compelling policy achievements, except as these can serve as illustrative examples explaining or highlighting aspects of his management or leadership style. The Simitis–Tsohatzopoulos confrontation serves, therefore, as an apposite setting, providing both structure and context to the analysis that follows. Seen in ideal–typical terms, the two men represented qualitatively different and, in many ways, sharply divergent conceptualizations anchored in two overarching cultural traditions. As I have argued elsewhere, these two traditions have decisively shaped the course of Greek history and politics from the moment of liberation from Ottoman rule in the early nineteenth century to the present (Diamandouros,  and ). The older of these traditions, which I have called ‘underdog,’ reflects the Balkan– Ottoman heritage and is profoundly influenced by the Orthodox Church. It is a culture marked by introversion, an étatiste orientation, a preference for paternalistic arrangements, an adherence to pre-capitalist norms, parochial attachments, low social capital and the pervasive lack of trust accompanying it, preoccupation with formal arrangements promotive of rigidities impeding change, a latent authoritarian temperament, an inclination to privilege clientelistic arrangements, a weak tradition of the rule of law and, a conceptualization of democracy based on the zero sum logic associated with majoritarianism. It is, moreover, a tradition that has become entrenched among the less competitive sectors of Greek society and has diachronically commanded the adherence of a clear majority of Greeks. The younger of the twin cultural traditions draws its origins from the Enlightenment. Secular and extroverted in temperament and orientation, this tradition, which I have called ‘reformist’, has tended to identify with institutions associated with the West. Over time, it has been associated with a distinct preference for reform. Favourable to the market mechanism, it has been less parochial than its rival. Its powerful links with liberalism have fostered in this tradition a preference for liberal democracy, an expansive conceptualization of civil society, and a strong emphasis on human rights. In striking confirmation of their potency and durability, these two rival cultural traditions have historically transversally cut across all levels of Greek society and have become a salient feature of Greek social and political reality, giving rise to an enduring cultural dualism (Diamandouros, ).

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

.  

. S’ L S

.................................................................................................................................. From the preceding account, it is abundantly clear that, seen in ideal–typical terms, Simitis’s approach to politics and, hence, his management and leadership style inscribe themselves firmly within the universe of the reformist tradition, in which he has played a major role over a period of more than thirty years. Conversely, Akis Tsohatzopoulos, his rival in the battle to succeed Andreas Papandreou, is, again in ideal–typical terms, to be regarded as a distinguished exemplar of Greece’s underdog culture, which he served systematically throughout his political career, through to his downfall, following his implication in corruption scandals, his conviction by a court of appeal in , and his subsequent incarceration (from which he was released for health reasons in July ). Simitis is a prolific author. Since leaving office in , he has published eight books, virtually all of them lengthy, and has intervened in public debates through the press and other public fora. Meticulously written, these books and public utterances provide an account of his trajectory from his early years to the present. In studying this trajectory, the careful and discerning observer gradually becomes aware of a series of structural juxtapositions and resulting contrapuntal paradoxes, which, in many ways, defined Simitis’s career from the very start, in the process profoundly shaping what was eventually to emerge as his distinct style of management, but, above all, leadership, and decisively affecting the manner, in which he related to, and interacted with, his peers and, more broadly, his social and political environment. Seen through these juxtapositions and paradoxes, Simitis emerges as a private, retiring, and cerebral individual, more at ease with small audiences, more amenable to dialogue, rational argument, and exchange of views, than emotional language and fiery interaction with large crowds, a man committed to public life and to his own moral obligations as a citizen. Thus equipped, Simitis managed, throughout his career, to combine direct involvement in the central political stage with a distinct intellectual and emotional, as well as reflective, distance from the noxious dynamics of interpersonal clashes and outright conflicts, which constitute a defining feature of Greek politics.

. I L  D: A D B E  A

.................................................................................................................................. This delicate balance between committed actor and astute, as well as reflective observer, endowed him with a distinct aura of differentness, which set him apart from his peers across the political spectrum, including those in his own party. In turn, this quality of

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 



differentness makes it legitimate to think of Simitis as an insider who consciously opted for a degree of marginality. This self-determined marginality helped him maintain intellectual, moral, and political autonomy vis-à-vis an institutional setting, including that of his own party, with which he frequently found himself at odds. Put otherwise, this was a man, whose value system allowed him to combine intense loyalty to both a political cause (social democracy) and a political party (PASOK), to which he remained steadfastly committed, with clear knowledge that, even in the best of circumstances, he would remain a minority within the latter, and an outsider to the underdog culture, which a clear majority within it identified with. This quality, moreover, made it possible for him to accept the leadership and primacy of Andreas Papandreou, within party and government, loyally to serve him, frankly and clearly to declare his dissenting views when necessary, but never openly to break with him, despite the major differences in both their approach to politics and style, which set the two apart and which were emphatically captured by Papandreou’s celebrated comment that ‘Simitis is good, but he is not PASOK’ (Papandreou, ). This same quality is graphically recorded in an autobiographical statement, made in the context of general reflections relating to the political situation in Greece in the early to mid-s: ‘I belonged to the minority. My choice was conscious and expressed my views.’ (Simitis , ). It was a quality which would serve him well in his rise to the top, but which would also stand at the root of many a disappointment and of painful reversal. Simitis’s ‘differentness’, with respect to both PASOK and the rest of the Greek political class stemmed, furthermore, from the fact that, unlike the overwhelming majority of his peers as popularly elected prime ministers, he did not originate from either an established or a powerful political family, which had formed part of a potent tradition of hereditary politics spanning most of the twentieth century and lasting into the beginning of the twenty-first (Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou, ). His rise to power, rather, was the result of a gradual and faithful ‘ascendance through the ranks’, following dutiful service within the political party he, together with others, helped found. A third dimension of differentness characterizing Simitis’s style of leadership, which distinguished him from the mainstream of the Greek political class, was his distinct rejection in both his public and private life of the culturally dominant ‘heroic’ style of politics, an entrenched feature of the underdog culture. This was a style, in which both Andreas Papandreou and also Akis Tsohatzopoulos excelled. Some of its salient features include the use of grandiloquent language, laden with emotional content and patriotic overtones, and prone to populist utterances, as well as a certain degree of theatricality. In condensed form, these features were highlighted by the clear predilection of both Papandreou and Tsochatzopoulos for the rebetiko music and the zeibekiko dance, distinctly identified with the urban popular strata in Greek society and exalting the primacy of the male in social organization. Theirs was, in other words, an agonistic style of leadership that was mostly devoid of the unheroic and pragmatic policy concerns expressive of the legal–rational logic of reform, that constituted so dominant a dimension in Simitis’ thinking and practice.

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

.  

A further feature of differentness, which, over time, emerged as a salient feature of Simitis’s leadership style, was his methodicalness. Simitis was widely known for the meticulous and systematic manner, driven by the logic of rationality and of reform, in which he sought to organize the tasks confronting him. This character trait famously manifested itself in his ‘little notepad’, in which he studiously took notes during meetings with colleagues, and which he subsequently used to check on whether proper follow-up action had been taken by those involved, and whether the legal rationality as well as efficacy of a given operation or initiative had been secured. It was a practice which earned Simitis the pejorative designation of ‘an accountant’, attributed to him by political rivals adhering to the logic of the underdog culture and inclined to privilege grandiloquent and often vague declaratory language over pragmatic, result-driven approaches, so strongly associated with the reformist culture. It was, finally, a practice which further strengthened the distinctly and consciously non-charismatic nature of his leadership style—a style that poignantly expressed his distinct preference for rational and technocratic approaches to the solution of policy dilemmas.

. A C P

.................................................................................................................................. To the extent that Simitis is to be understood as an insider who, nevertheless, was regarded as an outsider, his career trajectory bears a notable resemblance to that of Romano Prodi. Like Simitis, the former Italian prime minister was a university professor, known for his managerial skills, technocratic style, avoidance of flamboyance, grandiloquence, and hyperbole, as well as for his non-charismatic nature, and commitment to the pragmatic and reformist politics of the moderate left. Much as Simitis, Prodi, who also served as minister of industry, was consistently opposed by the professional politicians in his own party, who sought to undermine his authority and to defend the more clientelistic modus operandi of the Italian political class. The attempt to combine the capacity and the drive to move forward, while also coping with an adverse environment internal to the party, thus became a further distinguishing characteristic of the leadership style exhibited by both men. A further point of similarity between them was their strong commitment to the European project—a commitment reflected in their oft-repeated utterances stressing the economic and political benefits their respective countries derived from active participation in such a project. As president of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, in , Simitis utilized those aspects of his management and leadership style privileging methodical, systematic, and, quite often, informal consultations, capable of gradually generating a dynamic leading to convergence over contentious issues, and of eliciting agreements expressive of positive sum logics in several policy areas (Donovan and Gilbert, : –).

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 



. N-B

.................................................................................................................................. A final dimension of Simitis’s differentness derives from his impressive networking capacity. This entailed the twofold task of (a) building networks consisting of individuals sharing converging policy orientations regarding reform and the need for change in Greek politics and society, and (b) striving to ensure that their selection was based on rational, meritocratic criteria capable of imparting a sense of cohesion, efficacy, and purpose to the network into which they were being recruited. This organizational skill and capacity, which was to prove a critical asset for Simitis throughout his career, stemmed from principle and from conviction concerning ‘best practice’. As such, network-building was arguably most conspicuously evident in his appointments of advisors to assist him in dealing with various policy areas central to his political and intellectual agendas. Many, but certainly not all of these, came from the academic world, where Simitis, whose father and brother were also academics, had solid and deep roots. The earliest informal example of such a network on record is arguably the creation in London, during the time of Simitis’s postgraduate studies at the London School of Economics, of a ‘conversational circle’ in the early s, which, following his return to Greece in , was formalized into ‘The Alexandros Papanastasiou Society for Political Research’. This association served as an institutional forum for brainstorming and for exchanges of views geared to generating policy-related ideas and publications capable of sensitizing the wider public with the need for substantive reform. The advent of the Colonels’ authoritarian regime (–) effectively terminated the society’s activities. The network of individuals underpinning it, however, proved both durable and resilient. Parts of it re-emerged as an active component of the clandestine resistance organization, Democratic Defence, whose reformist agenda was to play a significant role in the loose coalition of forces opposed to the authoritarian regime. After the  transition to democracy, it once again featured as part of the political bloc seeking a clean break with the past and the adoption of a decisively reformist orientation for the incipient democratic regime.

. T P-A P (–)

.................................................................................................................................. This pattern of network building was systematically reproduced, once Simitis entered the government and was to assume major significance, following his rise to the premiership. In , Simitis established the ‘Debating Association for the Modernization of Greek Society’, (Όμιλος Προβληματισμού για τον Εκσυγχρονισμό της Κοινωνίας), known by its acronym as ‘OPEK’. Chaired for the most by politically

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

.  

active academics close to Simitis, it was to prove a significant pool of human resources and of ideas for reformist political projects that was to remain at his disposal, both in and out of office. While heading the Ministry of Agriculture, between  and , and, especially, the critical Ministry of National Economy between  and , during which he undertook a thorough and successful economic stabilization programme, Simitis made use of the same networking strategy in seeking to reach out to his constituents in both urban and rural Greece, and to build solid networks of supporters through which to promote his policies and ideas of reform. These networks were subsequently to stand him in good stead during the time he sought the party’s leadership and eventually the premiership. They constituted the backbone of organizational and political support emanating from the party’s ‘middle ranks’ and successfully served as a powerful counterweight to the party’s central apparatus, headed, above all, by Tsohatzopoulos. In addition, they also functioned as effective and powerful multipliers with respect to wider strata in society and served as a solid foundation for the broad popular support which Simitis gradually and systematically built over time. At the pinnacle of all these and other networks stood a small cluster of individuals. These were Simitis’s closest collaborators, for the most part professionals and technocrats of great experience, who served two functions: on the domestic front, they coordinated activities in government policy, as well as relations with the mass party, parliament, and the European Union. On the international front, they occupied important posts in European and international organizations. As such, they served as convincing examples of Simitis’s leadership style and as tangible evidence of his determination and capacity to promote reformist agendas in regional and international fora, and to signal Greece’s commitment to contribute to policy initiatives and projects capable of promoting further EU integration. Simitis’s network of appointees in international fora included (a) Professor Vassilios Skouris, as Greek judge (–) in, and eventually president (–) of, the European Court of Justice; (b) Professor Christos Rozakis, as Greek judge and first vice president of the European Court of Human Rights (–); (c) Professor Lucas Papademos, as vice president of the European Central Bank (–)—who in – became prime minister of Greece; and (d) Dr Ioannis Sarmas, as Greek judge in the European Court of Auditors (–). Simitis also actively supported the candidacy of Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros for the post of European ombudsman, in which the latter served from  until . With respect to the domestic front, the late Nikos Themelis, an especially talented and quietly charismatic personality, stood first and foremost. He was arguably Simitis’ closest confidant and ‘man of ideas’, who served as his de facto chief of staff, with special responsibility for ‘thinking strategically’, for coordinating foreign relations, and for heading special, and quite often secret, missions to other member states of the EU, in the process earning Simitis, respect and approbation among peers, especially in the EU and NATO.

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 



While Simitis served as prime minister, Socratis Kosmidis, a lawyer as well as a longtime close collaborator, utterly loyal to Simitis and, much like Themelis, with no political ambitions of his own, emerged as a pivotal actor in efforts to ensure the effective and efficient operation of the government and to promote reform in a wide range of policy areas. From his position as head of the greatly expanded General Secretariat of the Government, Kosmidis oversaw the production of legislation and closely monitored the activities of MPs during parliamentary debates, with an eye to ensuring the ‘rationality’ of legislation and the efficiency of the government’s output (Kosmidis, ).

. A S’ L S

.................................................................................................................................. In many ways, this small network of individuals expressed the essence of Simitis’s management and leadership style. Its distinguishing features were the systematic quest for merit, for dialogue, collaboration, and for exchange of views. Its ultimate purpose was to build alliances capable of creating the requisite political and cultural environment, in which projects promoting reform and modernization could gain wider acceptance and legitimacy. It was, by extension, a leadership style geared to generating moral or social capital, which, in dexterous and imaginative combination with his organizational skills and resources, was to serve Simitis well over time. At the domestic level, four achievements can serve as salient, illustrative examples of the effective and successful use of such capital: first, the two critical votes in January and June , cited at the outset of this chapter, through which Simitis triumphantly emerged initially as prime minister and subsequently as leader of PASOK. In both cases, Simitis’s victory in the confrontations leading up to the actual votes was organizationally rooted in meticulous, methodical, and long-term planning made possible by the existence of solid networks of supporters, built over time, and operating within the middle and lower ranks of both the parliamentary but also the mass party. Politically, it constituted a potent manifestation of the organizational capacity but also moral authority, which Simitis had been able gradually to accumulate over time, but, especially, during Andreas Papandreou’s painful waning years, when an atmosphere of cronyism, nepotism, and moral turpitude had become the dominant reality pervading the party, and, by extension, Greek politics; second, the economic stabilization programme of –, which successfully brought the Greek economy back from the brink, to which the politically expedient, but economically spendthrift policies of the previous four years had led it; and, lastly, the ensemble of economic rationalization policies adopted between  and , which, on the one hand, generated annual rates of growth ranging from a low of . in  to a high of . in  (with an average of . for the nine year period), and, on the other,

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

.  

produced the economic and political conditions necessary for the country to seek entry in the European Economic and Monetary Union (International Monetary Fund, ). At the international, and especially the European, level, Simitis’s moral capital is best captured by two crowning achievements of his premiership: (a) the initiative, which led to the December  decision of the European Council in Helsinki effectively to cast the vexed Cyprus problem within a European context, to extricate it from its Balkan entanglement, and thus to pave the way for Cyprus’s entry in the European Union in , without prior resolution of the country’s lingering internal division dating back to ; and, most of all, (b) Greece’s admission into the eurozone in January , which helped anchor the country within a financially and politically more stable, European political, as well as institutional, environment, enabling it to distance itself from the more noxious aspects of its Balkan legacy. Two additional, large-scale projects contributed to Simitis’s further accumulation of political and moral capital that commensurately enhanced his authority and stature, whether domestically or internationally: first, the organization of the  Athens Olympic Games, which earned Greece widespread approbation and accolades at the international level; and, second, a large-scale programme of major public works linked to the Olympic Games and mostly, but not exclusively, focused on the greater Athens area. Illustrative examples of such projects, which had a direct and immediate, positive impact on the daily lives of millions of citizens, are the Athens Metro, and the highspeed highway (Αττική Οδός) surrounding the Athens metropolitan agglomeration, which vastly improved vehicle traffic in the highly congested region and greatly facilitated access to Southern Greece. The admittedly high cost of these mega projects generated debate, criticism, and, indeed, controversy. Though at no time touching Simitis personally, these developments somewhat inevitably cast a shadow over those major policy achievements, and, given the intensely conflictual temperament of the Greek political culture, did not allow Simitis fully and unreservedly to draw the full political and, indeed, moral capital issuing from them. Taken together, however, these undertakings, arguably Simitis’s signature projects during his eight years in power, serve as testimonies of the long-term benefits yielded by a leadership style which systematically pursued positive sum policies geared to maximizing Greece’s capacity to be part of the inner circle of European Union decision-making structures and mechanisms.

. T D  S’ L S

.................................................................................................................................. This having been said, what, if anything, can arguably be said to constitute weak points of the management and leadership style adopted and utilized by Simitis over time? Two

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

such dimensions, one objective and one subjective, readily come to mind. The first stems directly and somewhat inevitably from Simitis’s status as a minority within PASOK—a status, which objectively constituted a permanent and inescapable constraint, a ‘confining condition’ in Otto Kirchheimer’s celebrated formulation (Kirchheimer, ), limiting his options and freedom of movement. A case in point was the manner in which Simitis related to his colleagues within the Cabinet, where, in an implicit acknowledgment of the constraints limiting his freedom of movement, he consciously opted to act as primus inter pares (and not, as had Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou, as primus solus). Somewhat ironically and certainly unintentionally, what I choose to call a subjective downside of Simitis’s leadership style stems from one of his major strengths: to wit, his intense sense of loyalty towards his colleagues, collaborators, and, by extension the party. To be sure, the obvious and unquestionable upside of such sense of loyalty was the creation of lasting bonds, firm relationships, and powerful commitments capable of withstanding the stresses and strains of everyday developments across time, and of serving as a firm foundation for promoting new reform initiatives. As experience and practice was to demonstrate, however, a perverse outcome, and, indeed a salient cost, of such an approach manifested itself in Simitis’s disinclination and reluctance to sever a relationship until late in the game, when the perceived political damage brought upon the government by allowing a colleague to continue in office clearly and compellingly exceeded and outweighed the benefits derived from unwavering commitment to loyalty, continuity, and stability. To be sure, such action was easier to take, and was most certainly taken, in the case of less powerful, but, nevertheless, influential figures in his entourage, such as Theodoros Tsoucatos and Tassos Mandelis. When allegations of illicit or illegal activities linking them to the Siemens’ scandals surfaced, the political cost of their dismissal was containable and tolerable. The situation proved to be vastly more complicated, however, when it came to such party heavyweights as Tsohatzopoulos, questions about whose increasingly lavish lifestyle were becoming rife during the years (–), in which he held the powerful, politically insulated, and hence virtually invulnerable, Ministry of National Defence. Of equal complexity and intractability was the case of Yannos Papandoniou, the powerful, competent, ambitious, and overconfident senior minister, who was the entrenched occupant of the pivotal post of minister of national economy for nearly six years (–). Papandoniou’s exuberantly optimistic but ultimately misguided, if not downright negligent, utterances concerning the state and prospects of the Greek economy, made at the height of the speculative fever that had seized the Greek stock exchange in , led large numbers of citizens, woefully lacking in experience with the vicissitudes, unpredictability, and dangers associated with the operation of financial markets, to engage in what quite often were high-risk investments. These vulnerable and poorly informed segments of the population proceeded to invest their meagre or, at best, modest savings in the market, only to see them effectively wiped out by the ensuing bursting of the bubble, with painful and often dire consequences. Precisely

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.  

because the speculative fever linked to the stock market had penetrated deeply in society and had enveloped large layers of the population, the fallout from the eventual market downturn and resulting correction generated widespread discontent, and, indeed, anger against the government. Somewhat inevitably, this development affected Simitis politically and, however fairly or unfairly, has adversely coloured memories of this event among significant segments of citizens. A final, poignant and, ultimately, traumatic example of the downsides of Simitis’s otherwise mostly effective, and quite often compelling, leadership style concerns the serious embarrassment which the abortive pension reform of  caused the government. Launched very shortly after Simitis had secured a narrow victory of just over  per cent of the popular vote in the parliamentary elections of April , this initiative constituted yet another attempt to reform Greece’s deeply and chronically problematic pension system. With the benefit of hindsight gained by the harsh realities generated by ten years of deep economic crisis in the country, most knowledgeable and nonpartisan observers agree that the proposal brought forward by the government constituted a well-thought out, thoroughly researched attempt at reforming the ailing pension system. The reform proposal addressed many of the pathologies long plaguing the system—pathologies, which, for the most, reflected the perennial tendency of the Greek political class, irrespective of party, to privilege short-term fixes over long-term solutions based on expert advice, with an eye to eschewing the inevitable and painful political cost associated with structural reform. The task of producing a credible long-term legislative proposal to that effect was entrusted to the newly appointed minister of labour and social security, Professor Tassos Giannitsis, a German-trained academic economist with long prior service in key advisory posts in earlier PASOK administrations, including that of chief economic advisor to the prime minister. A quiet and retiring individual with a compelling personality, Giannitsis closely conformed to, and exemplified, the efficient, technocratic, but intensely human management and leadership style associated with Simitis. Over the years, he had forged a close personal relationship of respect and trust with Simitis. His influence, moreover, greatly transcended the narrow boundaries of his formal post and effectively enabled him to emerge as an always discreet but highly influential actor in shaping government policy, and to serve as an integral part of the inner circle of the policy network surrounding Simitis (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, : ; Giannitsis, ). Following thorough and lengthy preparation, the draft reform proposal was presented to a joint meeting of PASOK’s all-powerful Executive Bureau, and to the influential Government Committee, including senior ministers. The proposal was debated, and the final text that was made public by the prime minister was endorsed by all those present, only to be undermined in the hours and days immediately following by means of informal leaks and public statements, emanating both from (a) colleagues entertaining second thoughts concerning the anticipated political cost of an initiative, which, was bound to affect expectations regarding retirement income among very many voters; and (b) organized labour led by PASOK

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militants, which approached the whole issue of social security reform from an utterly rigid zero-sum perspective, oblivious to the system’s long-term unsustainability and to the need for structural reform. Given the intense and widespread opposition it encountered within both the party and society at large, the proposal was withdrawn within a week (Giannitsis, : –; Simitis, : –). The Giannitsis reform should be conceptualized as a rare and extreme cautionary tale, forcefully casting in relief and powerfully highlighting the effective limits, indeed structural constraints, operating upon Simitis’ modus operandi and leadership style. Put otherwise, the underdog coalition, which manifestly enjoyed the support of a clear majority within both PASOK and Greek society, was able to marshal its formidable resources in moments when it perceived its vital interests and those of its core constituencies to be threatened. In the face of widespread, well organized, and intense reaction, the reformist coalition, whose interests and aspirations Simitis’s leadership style emblematically exemplified, had to recognize both the constraints operating upon it, as well as its own isolation, and to withdraw the proposal in retreat. In his memoirs covering the period of his premiership, Simitis implicitly acknowledges this reality, admitting that ‘ . . . the proposal’s long-term horizons with respect to problems relating to the economy and social security sidetracked us [emphasis added] and we did not accord due attention to parameters of direct importance for workers and, hence, the labour unions’ (Simitis, : ).

. A S’ L

.................................................................................................................................. Setting aside the difficulties inevitably confronting any attempt to assess and evaluate the legacy of a living political leader, let alone a prime minister, three initial parameters deserve attention as factors impeding attempts to arrive at a detached and dispassionate synchronic account of Simitis’s legacy: (a) the divisions generated by the financial crisis, and, especially, by the coming to power, in , of the radical left government led by SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς), have served as a profoundly distorting lens, which has produced a levelling interpretative framework of the postauthoritarian decades, in which earlier achievements are systematically minimized or simply ignored; (b) such a conceptual framework for interpreting the past, laden as it is with polemical imagery and replete with potent populist language and symbols, adversely affects attempts at a detached and dispassionate assessment of Simitis’s years in office; and (c) following Simitis’s retirement from office in , and the catastrophic decline in PASOK’s electoral fortunes, which saw its share of the vote go from . per cent in  to . per cent in June , his successors have kept an impressive and disquieting distance from a former leader who led them to victory in two consecutive elections (, ). In the long run, however, Simitis’s legacy is to be judged on his major achievements or reversals.

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.  

Undoubtedly, Simitis’s major legacy was securing Greece’s entry into the eurozone. In so doing, it provided the country with a stable anchoring in European and international structures, capable of shielding it from the country’s sectarian, domestic politics, but also from those of its traditionally unstable and volatile Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean neighbourhood. This assessment acquires even greater political and historical salience, when conceptualized as a historical complement to Constantine Karamanlis’s declaration, made in the mid-s, that Greece ‘belongs to the West’. As such, it lends it an aura of political continuity, stressing the benefits to be derived by Greece from adopting an extroverted orientation. It is, finally, a legacy, which, from  onwards, has been confirmed and legitimated in practice by the SYRIZA government’s actions and policies while in office. Turning to the domestic front, Simitis’s second major legacy is the introduction into the Greek body politic of an alternative approach to politics, one that traced its intellectual as well as political roots in the reformist traditions of European social democracy and in the centripetal logic it emblematically expresses. This tradition, to which Simitis had been exposed from the formative years of his youth, whether through his family’s experiences during the turbulent years of foreign occupation and civil war, which brought it into conflict with both the far Left and the far Right or through his studies in what was then Western Germany and, subsequently, in the United Kingdom, profoundly shaped his approach to politics and served as a guiding principle, which decisively influenced his intellectual orientation, as well as his management and leadership style. This alternative style of politics, with its emphasis on consensus, compromise, moderation, and inclusion manifestly did not have enough time to take root in Greece. Rather, in the years following Simitis’s departure from office, such a more benign and dignified conceptualization of politics fell victim to the centrifugal, zero-sum, and deeply contentious, indeed sectarian, logic of traditional Greek politics, that is strikingly reminiscent of Max Scheler’s brilliant analysis of the non-rational element of politics, contained in his seminal work, Ressentiment (Scheler, ). Preoccupation with institution-building constitutes a third Simitis legacy. Throughout his eight years in office (–), he promoted initiatives designed to establish institutions capable of empowering citizens and of improving the quality of services which the state renders to them. Examples of such initiatives were the establishment of (a) citizens’ assistance helpdesks, known as KEPs (Κέντρα Εξυπηρέτησης Πολιτών), designed to expedite the processing of citizens’ dealings with the public sector; (b) the Civil Service Selection Board (Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Επιλογής Προσωπικού) to ensure transparency and objectivity in recruitments to the public sector; and (c) the office of the Greek ombudsman (Συνήγορος του Πολίτη), which served as an effective institutional counterweight to executive power, in the process perceptibly contributing to the strengthening of the perennially weak rule of law in the country, and aligning the Greek legal order with European Union practice.

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

A fourth legacy left behind by Simitis is intimately linked to his personality. It can best be captured by the twin concept of civility and the search for fairness—a concept, in other words, exuding respect for one’s interlocutor, whether colleague or rival, which historically exists in short supply in Greece’s sectarian political culture. Seen from the perspective of the longue durée, what I wish to call Simitis’s final legacy is paradoxical. It is a legacy stemming from incomplete and interrupted reform, which has, nevertheless, succeeded in leaving behind the seeds for potential future initiatives. Crafted within an otherwise inimical party-institutional environment, in which Simitis’s minority status constituted an ever-present confining condition for reform initiatives, this legacy offers tangible, if not convincing, evidence of Simitis’s tenacity and perseverance in the face of adversity. It is a legacy which underscores the importance of human agency in politics and which highlights Simitis’s capacity improbably to overcome the odds against him. It is also this capacity to achieve the improbable that justifies his designation as an ‘improbable prime minister’ (Simitis, : –). Finally, an unintended by-product and hidden cost of this legacy of incomplete and interrupted reform was that the tendency to assign primacy to broader goals relating to the macro-level inevitably reduced the time Simitis could effectively devote to the dayto-day handling of internal party affairs, and, seen cumulatively, had a non-negligible adverse impact on the conduct of government. Taken together, these legacies seem to have derived inspiration from the logic informing Weber’s celebrated essay, Politics as a Vocation, and from his famous distinction between the ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and the ethic of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). It is the difficult combination of the two, Weber pointed out, that produces the individual capable of pursuing politics as a vocation. Evidence at present available to the discerning observer suggests that this is the difficult combination undergirding Simitis’s understanding of politics and informing his leadership style (Weber, ). It is still too early for a definitive assessment of Simitis’s legacy to be arrived at. While the jury is still out, however, the evidence at hand to date, suggests tentatively, that, when Minerva’s owl, famously invoked by Hegel in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, eventually arrives at dusk, the verdict of history will, overall, be more positive than negative. (Hegel, : ). If borne out, such an eventual verdict, based on the benefit for detached and dispassionate analysis generated by temporal distance, would suggest interesting parallels with the treatment which the passage of time has accorded to the legacies left behind by such predecessors as Charilaos Trikoupis, arguably the dominant Greek statesman of the second half of the nineteenth century, Eleftherios Venizelos, the towering personality of the Greek political scene during the first half of the twentieth century, and, more recently, Constantine Karamanlis. The reform initiatives and achievements associated with all three quite often generated heated acrimony, controversy, and conflict during their lifetimes but, over time, gained wider acceptance, recognition, and approval. Such an eventuality will,

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

.  

moreover, also arguably confirm Simitis’s stature as a leader steadfastly committed to the pursuit of a major and qualitative paradigm shift in Greek politics, based on the positive sum logic of consensus and compromise that contributes to less sectarian and conflictual politics, ensures a higher quality democracy in Greece and strengthens its anchoring within the enduring institutional context of liberal democracy and the rule of law in the European Union.

R Diamandouros, P. N. (). ‘Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Postauthoritarian Greece’. Working paper . Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales. Diamandouros, P. N. (). Πολιτισμικός δυϊσμός και πολιτική αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης [Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Postauthoritarian Greece]. Athens: Alexandria. Donovan, M. and Gilbert, M. (). ‘Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi’. In Jones, E. and Pasquino, G. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, –. Eleftheriou, K. and Tassis, C. (). ΠΑΣΟΚ: Άνοδος και πτώση ενός ηγεμονικού κόμματος [Pasok: The Rise and Fall of a Hegemonic Party]. Athens: Savvalas. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (). Prime Ministers in Greece: The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Giannitsis, T. (). Το ασφαλιστικό (ως ορφανό πολιτικής και μια διέξοδος) [The Pension System (as a Policy Orphan and a Way Out)]. Athens: Polis. Hegel, G. F. W. (). Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, vol. , Theorie Werkausgabe [Principles of the Philosophy of Law]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. International Monetary Fund. (). World Economic Outlook Database. Kirchheimer, O. (). ‘Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs’. American Political Science Review  (): –. Kosmidis, S. (). Εκσυγχρονισμός και μεταρρυθμίσεις [Modernization and Reforms]. Athens: Kastaniotis. Moschonas, G. (). ‘The Panhellenic Socialist Movement’. In Ladrech, R. and Marlière, P. (eds.) Social Democratic Parties in the European Union. London: Macmillan, –. Moschonas, G. (). ‘The Path of Modernisation: PASOK and European Integration’. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,  ():–. Patrikios, S. and Chatzikonstantinou, M. (). ‘Dynastic Politics: Family Ties in the Greek Parliament, –’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Papandreou, A. (). Cited in To Vima Newspaper,  July. Simitis, K. (). Πολιτική για μια δημιουργική Ελλάδα, – [Policy for a Creative Greece, –)]. Athens: Polis. Simitis, K. (). Δρόμοι ζωής [Life Trajectories]. Athens: Polis. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Greece’. In de Waele, J-M., Escalona, F., and Viera, M. (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). ‘Triumph and Collapse: Pasok in the Wake of the Crisis in Greece (–)’. In Bailey, D. J., de Waele, J. M., Escalona, F., and Viera, M. (eds.) Εuropean

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Social Democracy during the Global Economic Crisis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, –. Scheler, M. (). Ressentiment. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press. Spourdalakis, M. (ed.) (). ΠΑΣΟΚ: Κόμμα, κράτος, κοινωνία [PASOK: Party, State, Society]. Athens: Patakis. Weber, M. (). Politics as a Vocation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  ......................................................................................................................

 

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 

. I

.................................................................................................................................. I the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the leadership of European radical Left parties (ERLPs) has undergone a profound transformation. The emergence of leaders such as Die Linke’s Oscar Lafontaine (Germany), the Socialist Party’s Jan Marijnissen (Netherlands) France Insourmise, Insoumise’s Jean-Luc Mélenchon (France), Podemos’ Pablo (Spain), and indeed, SYRIZA’s Alexis Tsipras in some of the more electorally successful ERLPs, has revealed a new brand of left leadership that breaks with the experience of pre- communist, Eurocommunist, left-socialist and revolutionary parties. Instances of ‘personality cult’ and the centralization of party power are nothing new in the history of the radical Left (Kriegel, ; Tucker, ). What is decisively different about post- left leadership of the kind described here, is its agenda, characterized by a shift to left social democratic policy priorities (Bailey, ), its maverick and left-populist style (March, ) and the increased strategic weight it attributes to office-seeking in contrast to the traditional focus that leaders of radical Left parties placed on policy and ideology (Olsen et al., ). The case of Alexis Tsipras’s leadership is typical from this point of view. At the same time, his case is exceptional among the ranks of this new left leadership, if we take into account the fact that he is one of only three leaders from the post- ERLP family who have had the opportunity to take the helm not only of their party but also of their country (the others being the former Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin (Tudoroiu, ) and the former Cypriot president, Dimitris Christofias (Katsourides, ) and become prime minister (PM). The Tsipras case thus offers a unique opportunity to explore the characteristics of this new type of radical left leadership, while in opposition as well as while in government, with the aim of analysing its evolution and exploring its potential effects on Greek and more broadly, European, politics. The first section will clarify the concept of political leadership that will be used in this case study and set out a framework for analysis of the emergence and evolution of

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Tsipras’ leadership. The following sections will examine, respectively, the ideological and political traditions from which Alexis Tsipras draws his co-ordinates, his leadership style, policy project, and legacy.

. N, I C  P L

.................................................................................................................................. The study of political leadership has long been divided among several approaches that are predominantly biographical (Edinger, ), psychological (Greenstein, ) and organizational (Helms, ). Whereas the first two focus on the person and personality traits of the leader, the latter places much greater importance upon the complex institutional and social environment within which leaders operate and treats leadership as a resource and/or focal point for effectiveness, accountability, and collective identity at the national and international political domains (Foley, ). Without questioning the importance of the contribution of leaders’ personal qualities to explaining political outcomes and at times not hesitating to make reference to such qualities, this case study will approach political leadership primarily from the perspective of organizational theory, that is emphasizing the embeddedness of political leaders within their organizational milieu performing specific, albeit malleable, roles and the structural constraints they face when trying to push through their political agenda. More specifically, we start from the core precept that institutions shape and constrain political actors (March and Olsen, ). From this perspective, understanding political leadership involves, on the one hand, examining the norms, experiences, and events that shape their core values and ideas providing direction to their actions following a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and, on the other hand, analysing the impact of a leader’s ideas and actions on the political and institutional context in the face of persistent institutional constraints. How do leaders exercise their roles and assert their own agendas within given institutional constraints? In line with the long-term trends of the ‘presidentialization’ (Poguntke and Webb, ) and personalization (Langer, ) of politics, it can be argued that leaders are increasingly better able to exert their agency by developing a direct relationship with supporters and voters, often overshadowing and disempowering their parties and cabinets in the process (Costa Lobo, ). In addition to (and reinforcing) these broader contemporary trends affecting liberal democratic government, the Greek case is also characterized by a personalistic political culture which allows the leader an enhanced degree of personal discretion in the exercise of power. This more traditional type of personalism has long compensated for historical state weakness (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, : ). Furthermore, it would seem that different institutional constraints posed by role requirements, such as leading an opposition party or leading a national government,

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affect the ways in which leaders exercise agency. Literature on government–opposition dynamics for instance has pointed out the tendency for anti-establishment political parties and their leaders to go mainstream, that is, turn towards more moderate policies and tone down Eurosceptic rhetoric, once the possibility of government becomes real (Abedi and Lundberg, ; Sitter, ). It will be examined in what follows whether Tsipras’ trajectory from leader of a minor opposition party towards the prime ministership has led to significant changes to his leadership style, both in terms of personalization/presidentialization and in terms of moving towards the mainstream.

. E   N S M

.................................................................................................................................. Alexis Tsipras’ early political engagement began with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας) in the late s when he was still a highschool student. At the time, the orthodox Marxist and pro-Soviet KKE, while still dominated by the generation of the Resistance and the Greek Civil War (–), was undergoing a period of soul searching. Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika’ and the coming of age of a new generation of cadres who had been active in the Athens Technical University (‘Polytechnic’) uprising and the anti-junta struggle in the s had led to a flowering of new ideas and a reconsideration of the party’s strategy at the national and European level. In terms of domestic politics, this period saw the formation of an electoral coalition between the Communist Party and its smaller rival in the left milieu, the Eurocommunist Greek Left (formerly Communist Party of the Interior—Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας Εσωτερικού). The latter had originated in a split from the Communist Party that had taken place in , in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Prague (Kapetanyannis, ). The Greek Left (EAR, Ελληνική Αριστερά) had recently discarded the communist label and adopted feminist and environmentalist imperatives alongside its position in favour of Greece’s European Community (EC) membership and its commitment to the ‘democratic road to socialism’. The ‘Coalition of the Left’ (SYN, Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς) participated in two short-lived coalition governments in the early s with the Centre-Right party New Democracy (ND, Νέα Δημοκρατία) in the first case and ND and PASOK in the second case (Pridham and Verney, ). Participation in the Coalition of the Left catalysed a split in the Communist Party in  which saw many of its more ‘critical communist’ (Moschonas, ) prominent cadres remain in the Coalition, while those who remained in the Communist Party retreated into their ideological roots and maintained a traumatic view of coalition agreements with the other parties of the Greek Left (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, ). Synaspismos itself was transformed into a party in . Alexis Tsipras, at the time still a KKE member, was one of those activists who chose to remain in the Coalition and join the new party, abandoning the Communist Party.

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While Synaspismos was a pluralistic party whose members were recognized as coming from different traditions of the Left (communist, Eurocommunist, left socialist, ecologist), it was Eurocommunist ideas that were dominant within its ranks. Three main factions were active in Synaspismos for the best part of the s and early s. The Left Current comprised mostly but not exclusively former KKE members, the more radical fringe of the former Eurocommunists, trade unionists, and the party youth (that had mostly been recruited after the  split and hence had no political ‘origins’ other than Synaspismos itself). The Presidential ‘faction’ was a support network for the most successful leader of the party over this period, Nicos Costantopoulos (–). The Renewal Wing, mostly though again not exclusively, comprised cadres whose origins lay in the Eurocommunist former KKE interior. What divided the factions were ideological differences (economic policy and the position towards the European Union, EU) and strategy (being a party of protest or being a party that could be seen as a reliable government partner for PASOK). The Left Current was ‘soft Eurosceptic’, radical and oriented towards activism and protest, while the Renewal Wing was staunchly pro-European, reformist, and open to ‘programmatic’ agreement with PASOK. The presidential faction held an important moderating role among the two main ‘camps’ and often brokered compromise and policy positions that reflected a synthesis of opinion. Much like most of the youth wing of SYN, Tsipras was throughout this period closer to the Left Current. However, in the pluralistic context of Synaspismos, where policy was decided by consensus among the factions, Tsipras was exposed to Eurocommunist ideas and imperatives in their post- evolution that included embracing electoral politics, advocating a democratic socialist political and economic agenda, and adopting a critical but supportive position on the EU. A successful operator in party politics, Tsipras was appointed as the first SYN Youth Secretary (–), later joining the party and being elected a member of SYN’s Central Committee and the Political Secretariat, in charge of education and youth, with wide party support. He rose rapidly within the party hierarchy, becoming SYN’s leadcandidate for the  mayoral elections in Athens. Tsipras was selected for that post by the new party leader, Alekos Alavanos (–), a stalwart of the Left Current, who was aiming to give his party a more radical profile and appeal to young voters. Tsipras’ electoral campaign was very successful, projected a fresh and youthful profile that attracted an unprecedented . per cent of the Athenian vote (Makraki and Apospori, ), a major success for a new candidate representing a small party of the Left in a conservative stronghold. Two years later, Alavanos stepped down from SYN’s leadership in order to lead the new wider coalition that SYN had forged with other smaller organizations and groups of the Greek radical Left in , a coalition named SYRIZA, nominating Tsipras to replace him as SYN’s leader In SYN’s th Congress, Tsipras won  per cent of the delegates’ votes and became the leader of SYN. Alavanos’s unsuccessful attempt to shift the centre of power from SYN under Tsipras’ leadership to SYRIZA soon led to his resignation and to Tsipras assuming the leadership of both SYRIZA and SYN in , at the age of .

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Tsipras’ rapid ascendance to the highest of ranks in the Greek Left might have one think that he is a ‘test tube’ politician whose only point of reference and main experience had been internal party politics. This was not the case. From his early years, Tsipras stood out initially as a leader of the student movement and later as a frontline activist and organizer in the Global Justice (or ‘alterglobal’) Movement (GJM) of the early twenty-first century. As the first leader of SYN Youth, Tsipras had played a significant role in shaping its political direction. In particular, under his guidance, SYN Youth was established as an organization attuned to gender equality, secularism, human rights, pacifist, and anti-authoritarian priorities. Tsipras himself and SYN Youth were also engaged in what were at the time non-conventional repertoires of action, such as those practised in the GJM. Beyond its protest-oriented and transnational character, a further key aspect of the GJM that left a marked imprint on SYN Youth, and later SYRIZA, was its pluralistic, less ideological, and more pragmatic approach towards co-operation and alliances within the broad milieu of the radical Left and the social movements (Della Porta, ). In brief, Alexis Tsipras’ formative ideological and political influences came from the time-honoured traditions of the Greek communist and Eurocommunist Left. Equally, if not more so, however, Tsipras was a child of the major political events and the social movements of his own time, in which he was an active participant.

. L 

.................................................................................................................................. Alexis Tsipras became a strictu sensu political leader the moment he assumed the presidency of SYN in , at a time when SYN was a small but established party of the minor opposition with stable parliamentary representation, rarely receiving more than – per cent of the vote. Soon afterwards he led the SYRIZA coalition into the  elections and was elected to parliament for the first time. After the turbulent events of –, and the game-changing double elections of  discussed elsewhere in this volume, Tsipras became the leader of the opposition; while after the January and September  elections he was appointed prime minister of Greece. It will be argued in this section that Tsipras’ leadership style was transformed over time, gradually since the  elections, and decisively since Tsipras became the PM of Greece for the second time, in September . The change was from inclusive to personalistic/presidentialist and from maverick to mainstream leadership.

.. Inclusive to Personalistic/Presidentialist Leadership Throughout its twenty-year lifespan (–) and until its merger into SYRIZA, SYN was not a leader-centred party. The views of the leader were important, but the

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operation of the party’s collective decision-making bodies allowed cadres and members a significant say in party policy and strategy. Intra-party factions were the most powerful actors in the context of setting the agenda and deciding party strategy and policy. SYN’s leaders were expected to show a significant capacity to synthesize the views of the factions. This would sometimes lead to immobilism, but overall it had the effect of constraining personalism at the leadership level. It was in this context that Tsipras was called upon to lead his party. Prima facie, Tsipras was a highly appropriate candidate for the leadership of such a party. He is said to be a good listener (Markaki and Apospori, ), open to input from a broad range of sources and advice and a fast learner (Interview , ). He is reported as being skilled at synthesizing views (Interview ), a team mobilizer, and an alliance builder: SYRIZA nearly collapsed just before the  elections when Alekos Alavanos resigned from its leadership and ‘it was Tsipras who stepped in and held it together’ (Interview ). Some of these qualities seem to have suited Tsipras well when he again assumed the PM role after the September  elections, helping him to run his Cabinet and maintain his unorthodox coalition with the right-wing nationalist ANEL party (Interview ). Yet being inclusive, open to input, and able to reconcile internal differences was a feature of his leadership style that gave way to a more personalistic and presidentialist leadership style over time. The ‘personalization of politics’ is a term that refers to the shifting focus from the party to the person of the candidate. Mediatization of politics and institutional factors (i.e. presidential vs parliamentary systems) seem to play a significant role in encouraging it (Aarts et al., ). It can be shown that Tsipras’ leadership evolved in the direction of both personalization (in relation to his party) and presidentialization (visà-vis his government). The campaign for the May  national elections was run on the premise that Tsipras himself was an asset for the SYRIZA coalition. It was party strategy but also the importance of the office of the PM in the Greek political system which encouraged a personalistic campaign focused on the leader (Interview ), especially since in the May  elections it was SYRIZA’s declared aim to claim government responsibility (Tsakatika, ) and hence present a lead candidate who would make a suitable PM. This was reinforced in the  campaign for the post of European Commission President which Tsipras ran on behalf of the Party of the European Left (Schmitt et al., ). The extent of the international coverage of the Greek case and the personal focus on Tsipras as a radical Left opposition leader who would challenge austerity in Europe largely contributed to elevating Tsipras to a highly visible and central position within Greek politics. The personalization of SYRIZA’s campaigns peaked in the  elections of both January, and more so, September, where the electorate was called upon to ‘Vote for the PM’ with Tsipras being the main focus of the campaign, completely displacing the party. The shift to a more personalized leadership style was complemented by ‘presidentialism’ in the exercise of government once Tsipras assumed office. In the light of the principle that a left-wing Cabinet should operate in a collective (rather than a

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centralized) way, Tsipras convened his Cabinet regularly. He appointed large cabinets which included the highest number of alternate ministers in contemporary Greek political history (i.e. ministers that participate in Cabinet meetings rather than junior ministers who do not), (see ggk.gov.gr) aiming to have ‘all hands on deck’ and shared responsibility among coalition partners and among his party’s factions. That said, Tsipras’ term in government has not escaped the pattern that reflects Greece’s ‘prime ministerial’ political system, which is conducive to ‘presidentialization’ and the PM operating as primus solus (Koutsoukis, : ). The Greek ‘core executive’ involves autonomous ministries and weak inter-ministerial co-ordination (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, ). The PM has absolute power over Cabinet appointments, but a weak administrative apparatus available to him for the purpose of controlling, overseeing, and co-ordinating the workings of his government (Sotiropoulos, ). In terms of improving government co-ordination and efficiency, Tsipras initially attempted, in conjunction with the government deputy PM Yiannis Dragasakis, to articulate problem-solving at three levels: when an issue emerged, the first attempt to resolve it took place within the ministry, should this fail given wider implications that extend beyond the ministry, a second attempt took place cross-ministry, and only then would the issue be raised at Cabinet level with the involvement of the PM (Interview ). These efforts were not been very successful, ultimately, due to the chronic structural weakness of inter-ministerial co-operation (interview ). To compensate, Tsipras chose to strengthen his own hand by appointing initially two and, after a first reshuffle of his Cabinet, three ministers of state who worked under his guidance and a junior minister without portfolio attached to the PM (see primeminister.gr). He built his own team around the PM’s Office and established a new branch of the PM’s Office in Thessaloniki in November .

.. From Maverick to Mainstream Leadership Tsipras did not project charisma in the Weberian sense of being considered as possessing ‘supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities’ (Weber, : ); he was not a party intellectual, but a persistent and successful mobilizer; he did not come with excellent credentials from his studies, professional activities, or leadership experience in other fields outside of politics. He was often scorned by his opponents and hostile media for his lack of general knowledge and poor foreign language skills. Tsipras was not the heir of a political dynasty; nor did he project himself as a working-class hero. In contrast to all the political leaders of postauthoritarian Greece who would fit in one or other of these descriptions, his was a profile of a likeable ‘everyman’ with whom ordinary people could identify. While representing a party with roots in the history of the Greek Eurocommunist left and a traditionally sober, moderate discourse, Tsipras’ achievement of electoral success and government power coincided with a shift to a maverick, anti-establishment, left

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populist discourse (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, ), particularly between  and September  (Tsakatika, ). The electoral decline of the main parties of government, especially PASOK, left a considerable section of voters in search of a new political ‘home’. SYRIZA’s assumption was that they would be willing to vote for it, provided its discourse was broad enough to include them. Partially by making reference to the legacy of the Greek Communist Left and partially by ‘appropriating’ the radical beginnings of PASOK (Tsipras, ), Tsipras ‘performed’ (Moffit and Tormey, ) left populism and in the process managed to displace PASOK on behalf of his party. His references to ‘our people’ on the one hand and the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ Troika that condemned the Greek people to impoverishment and indignity on the other hand became a staple of his public speeches (Tsipras, ). This discourse was very effective in gaining him personal appeal and favour with a significant part of the working-class and lower-middle-class groups that traditionally supported PASOK. Tsipras’ maverick leadership style nonetheless steadily shifted towards a more mainstream approach since he became leader of the opposition in  and substantially after his second electoral victory in September . Moderating his discourse was one aspect of this shift. A characteristic example was the shift from ‘scrap(ping) the Memorandum with one law containing a single article’ (Tsipras ), to ‘replacing the MoU with a national plan for productive reconstruction’ (Dragasakis, ). This shift took place between May and June , when the prospect of government office was in sight, as the May  elections were inconclusive and were repeated a month later. Aiming for a peer-to-peer relationship with his European Council colleagues as a PM that can be relied on to keep agreements, rather than acting as an outsider aiming to disrupt business as usual in Brussels, has been Tsipras’ preferred approach since the summer of . In domestic politics, his discourse has since increasingly approximated that of a mainstream politician of the Centre-Left, going about the business of government. To summarize, over the past ten years Tsipras’ leadership style has shifted from inclusive to personalistic and from maverick to mainstream. These changes have mirrored the shift of his party from a minor party representing a small segment of the professional middle class to a major party that represents broad social segments of middle- and working-class strata that shifted their allegiance to SYRIZA in the context of the political realignment that followed the economic crisis. It has also mirrored the evolution of Tsipras’ career from leader of a small opposition party to PM of Greece.

. P S

.................................................................................................................................. Tsipras’ first steps in politics were aimed at the political representation and mobilization of a younger generation of Greeks without previous party-political identification that the party system had alienated. According to Tsipras’ narrative, his cohort’s economic prospects were bleaker than those of its members’ parents. They found

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themselves in precarious jobs, in a two-tier labour market and dependent on family support to the detriment of their independence. Furthermore, the values and preferences of this generation were not represented or legitimately expressed in public life. For instance, issues such as same-sex marriage, separation of Church and State, deeper democracy and transparency in governance, a more open approach to immigration, and a reconsideration of foreign-policy priorities were not on the agenda of the twoparty system that dominated Greek politics in the post-authoritarian period. Young people consequently felt unwilling and unable to participate in politics because they saw established political parties and trade unions as representatives of the interests of an economic, cultural, media, and political elite. This was the project Tsipras pursued in his student activist days, during his  mayoral campaign, and even in his early days as SYRIZA’s leader. In , when the economic crisis in Greece forced the radical reconsideration of the Greek ‘social contract’, Tsipras found himself leading a radical Left party with parliamentary representation and an active presence in the emerging anti-austerity social movements including the Indignants of Syntagma Square (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, ; and Chapter  here). Adopting the broader perspective of the coalition he was heading, he directly addressed the injustice and inequalities that had become exacerbated by the severe austerity measures and were affecting extended social strata in Greek society. He began to attack the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ attached to the bailout agreement, the invasive presence of the lenders’ representatives (the ‘Troika’ of the ECB, European Commission, and IMF) in Greek politics and institutions and the Greek political parties that had lent their support to both. In parliament, he called for an end to the Memorandum and the abolition of a large part of the country’s debt. As the prospect of government became more realistic in the aftermath of the  elections, SYRIZA, led by Tsipras and his inner circle, abandoned the programme of radical economic and social transformation it had set out in  (SYN ) in favour of a strategy that had been followed by Sweden’s social democrats and US New Deal Democrats in the s (Moschonas, ). The Thessaloniki Programme, that is, the measures that Tsipras personally promised to implement if elected in the  January elections was designed to address a crisis. It involved immediate support measures for the alleviation of extreme poverty, scaling back austerity measures, rebuilding the welfare state, addressing unemployment, putting forward a new plan for the country’s ‘reconstruction’, and reforming the state in a democratic direction. The longer-term aim would be to eventually rebuild the country’s economy on a just and productive basis with the support of a ‘new social and political coalition’ while remaining in the European Union and the eurozone (SYRIZA, ). Signing the Third Memorandum of Understanding in the summer of  after seven agonizing months of negotiation with the lenders (Tsatsanis and Teperoglou, ) was a defeat of Tsipras’ objectives as these had been articulated in the Thessaloniki Programme, particularly in what concerned the scaling back of austerity measures. As a consequence, mustering sufficient resources to fund the welfare state and promote public investment in order to stimulate job creation proved to be a difficult

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task. Nonetheless, Tsipras won the September  elections, a fact that forced a major compromise with regard to his declared policy project. He had to turn from the politics of opposition to the business of governing, and salvage as much as he could from the policy project he had put forward in the Thessaloniki Programme. Upon his re-election Tsipras promised a ‘parallel programme’ to alleviate the effects of austerity. Once in government, he indeed prioritized addressing social exclusion. Some examples include introducing a Social Solidarity Income scheme covering about , people subject to extreme poverty; universal access to health care for all residents and denizens of Greece; free school meals for deprived areas; and free use of public transport for the unemployed. On two occasions (December  and November ), where the budget surplus was higher than expected in the context of the terms of the Third MoU, he symbolically ordered a social dividend of the surplus to be distributed to low-earning pensioners, the unemployed, and the young. Nonetheless, during the best part of his second term in office he was unable to resort to demand-side economic policies to any significant extent. In line with the Third Memorandum he had signed up to in August , his was a programme of continued wage restraint, austerity budgets, continued benefit and pension cuts, high taxation, and limited public investment. Consequently, the under-performance of the economy, flight of skilled labour, and slow economic growth continued. Αt the same time Tsipras prioritized and pushed through issues involving social and political rights that he considered essential, such as the regulation of same-sex partnership and fostering, gender recognition, and citizenship law. On the other hand, while he took the lead in defending a humane and open approach to the public’s reception of the refugee crisis in Greece, the practical implementation of his government’s asylum policy has been controversial. Despite the obstacles set out by his government coalition partner, the nationalist right ANEL party, Tsipras boldly pushed forward the separation of Church and State and a new bilateral Treaty between Greece and FYROM, whose main purpose would be to settle the question of FYROM’s name in return for Greece lifting its veto on its EU and NATO membership. Finally, Tsipras set the fight against corruption, modernizing public administration, constitutional reform, and media regulation as priorities for his second term in office with only moderate success. Tsipras primarily wants to be known as the leader that ‘took Greece out of the Memorandum’, that is, out of the grasp of economic guardianship and set it on an autonomous course of development and national reconstruction along socially progressive and democratic lines as an equal partner in the EU. He also wants to be known as a peacemaker, a ‘safe pair of hands’ in a troubled and unstable geopolitical region. In September  Tsipras found himself overpowered in his negotiation with the lenders and in the uncomfortable position of being under obligation to implement a Third MoU that went against his programme and vision for the country’s politics and economy. He also found himself in need of again forming a government coalition with ANEL, a political party that shares none of his values and priorities over social rights and core foreign policy issues. These formidable constraints have not allowed

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Tsipras to pursue his long-term policy project or political and economic ‘vision’ for the country to the extent that he would have liked. Nonetheless, he did demonstrate that where constraints could be overcome or bypassed, his policy commitment to the socially progressive and egalitarian agenda he put forward in the ‘Thessaloniki programme’ on the basis of which he was elected, was deep and consistent.

. L

.................................................................................................................................. Pronouncing on Tsipras’ legacy in terms of his policy project for Greece is a tall order. In terms of the impact of his leadership on the Greek political system, without a doubt his contribution to party system change, that is, the end of the two-party system that characterized post-authoritarian Greece and the displacement of PASOK, cannot be overstated. In relation to the quality of democracy in Greece, Tsipras’ leadership invites a discussion about the populist discourse that he espoused to win power, on one hand, and his ascendancy as a PM of the radical Left, on the other hand; while the former can be argued to build on and perpetuate a negative trait of Greek democracy that partly draws its inspiration from the legacy of the early days of PASOK (Pappas, : ), the latter can be argued to strengthen Greek democracy by breaking a historical barrier of exclusion that had not allowed the Left to lead a national government. Finally, the effect Tsipras’ leadership has had beyond Greek politics can be approached through his role as an international figurehead of the movement against austerity. Between June  and July , Tsipras became known to the world as the radical Left firebrand representing a small, indebted country labouring under a heavy regime of conditionality that ‘stood up’ to European and international neoliberal policies (van Esch, : –). However, the policy shift Tsipras performed by agreeing to the adoption and implementation of a Third Memorandum of Understanding in July  may well turn out to constitute a major setback for the ideas he advocated as a representative of the European radical left. His time in government confirms the European radical Left’s social democratic turn, the continued emphasis of significant sections of it on office-seeking, and the fact that personalization and a shift towards a more conventional leadership style affect the radical Left as much as other party families that start from the margins and enter the mainstream.

R Aarts, K., Blais, A., and Schmitt, H. (). (eds.) Political Leaders and Democratic Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Abedi, A. and Lundberg, T. C. (). ‘Doomed to Failure? UKIP and the Organisational Challenges Facing Right-Wing Populist Anti-Political Establishment Parties’. Parliamentary Affairs,  (): –.

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

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

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Sitter, N. (). ‘The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?’ West European Politics,  (): –. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (). Η κορυφή του πελατειακού κράτους [The Peak of the Clientelist State]. Athens: Potamos. Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G. (). ‘Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery: the Case of SYRIZA’. Journal of Political Ideologies, (): –. SYN (). ‘Για την Αριστερά του ου αιώνα’ [For the Left of the st Century]. Available at: http://www.syn.gr (accessed  February ). SYRIZA (). ‘The Thessaloniki Programme’, Available at: http://www.syriza.gr/article/id/ /SYRIZA–ThE-ThESSALoNIkI-PRoGRAMME.html#/ (accessed  February ). Tsakatika, M. (). ‘SYRIZA’S Electoral Rise in Greece: Protest, Trust and the Art of Political Manipulation’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsakatika, M. and Eleftheriou, C. (). ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths’. South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsatsanis, E. and Teperoglou, E. (). ‘Realignment under Stress: The July  Referendum and the September Parliamentary Election in Greece’, South European Society and Politics,  (): –. Tsipras, A. (). Ήταν ο Ανδρέας ψεύτης; [Was Andreas (Papandreou) a liar?] Documento,  September. Tsipras, A. (). Speech in Omonoia Square, Eve of the  European Elections,  May, Available at: www.syriza.gr/ (accessed  February ). Tsipras, A. (). Speech in the Greek Parliament, Minutes of Plenary Session ΞΘ,  November. Available at: http://www.vouli.gr/ (accessed  February ). Tudoroiu, T. (). ‘Communism for the Twenty-First Century: The Moldovan Experiment’. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,  (): –. Tucker, R. C. (). ‘The Rise of Stalin’s Personality Cult’. The American Historical Review,  (): –. Van Esch, F. A. W. J. (). ‘The Paradoxes of Legitimate EU Leadership. An Analysis of the Multi-level Leadership of Angela Merkel and Alexis Tsipras during the Euro Crisis’. Journal of European Integration,  (): –. Weber, M. (). Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Interviews Interview : SYRIZA communications strategist, Athens,  May . Interview : SYRIZA minister, senior policy adviser, Athens,  December . Interview : SYRIZA Minister A, Athens, , May . Interview : SYRIZA Minister B, Athens,  July .

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I  N

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Note: Tables are indicated by an italic ‘t’ following the page number.

A

ABA  Abedi, A.  Afonso, A. ,  Aggelou, Y.  Akıncı, M.  Alavanos, A. ,  Alden, C.  Alexa.com  Alexakis, E. G , , , ,  Alexander, Y.  Alexandropoulos, S. et al.  Alexandris, A.  Alivizatos, N. , , , , , , , ,  Allin, S.  Allison, G.  Alm, J. et al.  Almeida, P.  Almond, G. ,  Alogoskoufis, G.  Alt, J. E. et al. ,  Altiparmakis, A.  Amable, B. ,  Amin, S.  Amini, B.  Amorim-Neto, O.  Anastasakis, O. et al.  Anastasatou, M. et al.  Anastasiades, N.  Ancelovici, M.  Andeweg, R.  Andreopoulos, C.  Andreou, A.  Andreou, G. ,  Andrianopoulos, A.  Andriopoulou, E. et al.  Apostolelli, A. 

Apter, D.  Arampatzi, A.  Aran, A.  Aranitou, V.  Archambault, E.  Arendt, H.  Argyriades, D.  Arkolakis, C. et al.  Aron, R.  Artavanis, N. et al.  Artelaris, P.  Arzheimer, K.  Aslanidis, P. ,  Auel, K.  Avdela, E.  Averof, E.  Averoff-Tositsas, E. , ,  Avgi  Avramopoulos, D. ,  Aydin, M.  Ayers, J. 

B

Backes, U.  Bagehot, W.  Bahcheli, T.  Bailey, D.  Bakoyanni, D. ,  Bakoyannis, P. ,  Balafas, G.  Balampanidis, I. , ,  Bale, T.  Baltakos, P.  Bansak, K. et al.  Barber, J.  Barkas, P.  Bartes, L. M.  Bass, G. , 

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

  

Beaton, R.  Bekridakis, D.  Bergounioux, A.  Bermeo, N.  Blanchard, O. J. et al.  Börzel, T.  Böhm, K. et al.  Bol, D. et al.  Börsch-Supan, A. ,  Bosco, A. ,  Botetzagias, I. , ,  Botsiu, K. E.  Bouckaert, G. – Boudourides, M.  Bourikos, D. ,  Bratakos, A. , , ,  Bruff, I.  Bruneau, T.  Burtless, G.  Butler, D.  Byatt, D. vi

C

Cacoullos, A.  Calligas, C.  Campbell, A. ,  Capelos, T.  Capoccia, G.  Caramani, D.  Çarkoğlu, A.  Carter, E.  Castles, F. G.  Cem, I.  Chalari, A. et al.  Chalk, P.  Chalkia, A.  Charalambis, D. , ,  Charalambous, G. , ,  Chatzikonstantinou, M. ,  Chrisostomos II, Archbishop ,  Christidis, C. ,  Christodoulakis, N.  Christodoulos, Archbishop ,  Christofilopoulou, P.  Christopoulos, L.  Chrysoloras, N. ,  Chryssogonos, K. , 

Chtouris, S.  Churchill, W. ,  Cimadomo, J.  Clarke, J. ,  Clarke, J. et al.  Clausewitz, C.  Clogg, R. , , , , , , ,  Close, D. H.  Cohen, R.  Cohen, S. , ,  Conant, L.  Constantine, King , ,  Constas, D.  Contiades, X. , , , ,  Costa Lobo, M.  Costantinides, G.  Cottakis, M.l vi Coufoudakis, V.  Couloumbis, T. , , ,  Cox, G. W.  Crenshaw, M.  Criscitiello, A. 

D

Dakin, D. ,  Dalakoglou, D.  Dalakou, V.  Dalton, R. J. ,  Damanaki, M.  Damaskinos, Archbishop  Danforth, L. M.  Danopoulos, C. P.  Dartnell, M.  Daskalopoulos, D.  Davaki, K. , ,  Deegan-Krause, K.  de Gaulle, C.  Della Porta, D. , ,  Dellepiane-Avellaneda, S. et al.  Dellis, G.  Demertzis, N. , ,  Dertilis, G. , ,  De Waele, J. M. et al.  DEXIA  Diamandouros, P. N. , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , 

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   Diamantopoulou, A. , ,  Dianeosis , ,  Diani, M. ,  Dimakakos, A.  Dimakopoulou, C. ,  Dimaras, A.  Dimitrakopoulos, D. , , ,  Dimitras, P. E.  Dimitrokallis, I.  Dinas, E. , , , , , ,  Divani, L. , ,  Dokos, T. ,  Donovan, M.  Douzinas, C.  Downs, A.  Dragasakis, Y. , ,  Draghi, M.  Dragona, T. ,  Dragoumis, I.  Drainas, S.  Drakatos, C.  Duch, R. M.  Dunleavy, P. , ,  Dunphy, R. , ,  Dusia, G.  Duverger, M. , ,  Duyvendak, J. W. et al.  Dyevre, A. ,  Dyson, K. , , , , 

E

Eatwell, R.  Eckstein, H.  Economides, S. , , , , , , , ,  The Economist  Economou, C. et al.  ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance)  Edelman, M.  Edinger, L. J.  Efstratiou, P-M.  Eisenstadt, S. N.  EKKE  Elefhteriou, C. , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Eleftheriou, K. 



Elephantis, A. , ,  Elgie, R.  Ellinas, A. A. , , , , , ,  Ellis, R.  Enyedi, S.  Erasmus  Erdoğan, R. T. , ,  Escalona, F. ,  Esmein, A.  Eurobarometer , , –,  European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)  Eurostat , , ,  Evans, G.  Evert, M. ,  Evin, A. O. ,  Exadaktylos, T. , , , 

F

Faas, D.  Falkner, G. et al.  Featherstone, K. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Ferejohn, J.  Ferrera, M. , , ,  Fitzgerald, J.  Floros, Y.  Flyvbjerg, B.  Foley, M.  Fortsakis, T.  Fotiadou, A.  Fragiadis, A.  Frangonikolopoulos, C. A. ,  Frangoudaki, A. –, , ,  Frankel, J. A.  Franklin, M. N.  Frary, L. ,  Frazee, C. A.  Freeden, M.  Freire, A. 

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

  

Friedrich, W.  FYROM , , , , , , , 

Guisan, C.  Gunther, R. et al. , 

G

H

Galariotis, I. et al.  Galbraith, J. K.  Gallimore, T.  Garoupa, N.  Gazi, E.  Gellner, E. ,  Genevoix, M.  Genimata, F.  Georgakopoulos, N. L.  Georgiadis, N. M. , ,  Georgiadou, V. , , , , , , , ,  Gerapetritis, G. , , –, ,  Gerbaudo, P.  Getimis, P. , ,  Ghizikis, P.  Giannakopoulos, C.  Giannakopoulos, D. ,  Giannakou, M.  Giannitsis, T. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , – Gilbert, M.  Gillespie, R.  Gingerich, D. W.  Ginsburg, T.  Gkiokas, G.  Glytsos, N. P.  Golder, M.  Goldsmith, M.  Goldstone, J.  Gough, I.  Goulas, E. et al.  Grant, G. H. ,  Gray, P. C. , , , , ,  Graziano, P. ,  Grechyna, D.  Greenstein, F. I.  Grigoriadis, I. N. , , , ,  Grigoropoulos, A. ,  Gritzas, G.  Guarnieri, C.  Guillén, A. , , 

Habermas, J.  Hadjiyanni, A.  Halikiopoulou, D. , , , , , , , , ,  Hall, P. , , , ,  Hallin, D. C. , , ,  Hamman, K. et al.  Hangartner, D. et al.  Haralambis, D. , ,  Hardouvelis, G. et al.  Harokopion University  Hartman, F.  Hartz, L.  Hatzis, A.  Hatzivassiliou, E. , , , , , , , , , ,  Hawkesworth, I. et al. ,  Heffernan, R.  Hegel, G.  Heinelt, H.  Hellenic Observatory (LSE) vi Hellwig, T.  Helms, L.  Hemerijck, A.  Heraclides, A.  Herzfeld, M.  Hesse, J. J. ,  Heywood, A.  Hill, C. ,  Hippolite, P.-A.  Hirschl, R.  Hirschman, A. O. , ,  Hirschon, R.  Hlepas, N. K. , , , , , , , ,  Hobhouse, L.  Hoeing, O.  Hoffman, B.  Hogan, D. J.  Holland, R.  Hoskins, B. L.  Hough, D.  Huliaras, A. 

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  

I

Iatrides, J. O.  Ieronimos I, Archbishop  Ieronimos II, Archbishop  Ifanti, A. ,  Ifantis, K.  Inglehart, R. , ,  Ioakimides, P. C. , , , , ,  Ioakimides, V.  Ioannidis, M. , , ,  Iordanoglou, C. , , , , , ,  Iosifidis, P.  Irvasflaten, E. 

J

Jones, M. P. 

K

Kaarbo, J.  Kahneman, D.  Kaidatzis, A. , , , ,  Kaika, M.  Kaitelidou, D. ,  Kaklamanis, A.  Kalerante, E.  Kaltwasser, C. R.  Kalyvas, A.  Kalyvas, S. N. , , , , , ,  Kammenos, P. –,  Kanellopoulos, A. ,  Kanellopoulos, K. et al.  Kanellopoulos, P. ,  Kapetayiannis, V.  Kaplanoglou, G. , ,  Kapodistrias, I. ,  Karakatsanis, L.  Karakostas, I.  Karaliotas, L.  Karamagioli, E. ,  Karamanlis, Constantine , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , ,  Karamanlis, Costas , , , t, , , , , , , ,  Karamanolakis, V.  Karamichas, J. , , 



Karamouzi, E. , , , , , , , ,  Karatzaferis, G. , , , ,  Karavokyris, G. ,  Kariotis, G.  Karkatsoulis, P.  Karyotis, G. ,  Kassimeris, G. , , ,  Kathimerini , , , ,  Katris, J. A.  Katrougalos, G. ,  Katsambekis, G. , , , , ,  Katsanidou, A.  Katsikas, D. ,  Katsos, G. H.  Katsoudas, D. , , ,  Katsoulis, E.  Katsourides, Y. , , ,  Katz, R. S.  Katzenstein, P. J.  Kavakas, D.  Kavoulakos, K.  Kazakos, P. , , , , , ,  Kazamias, G. A. ,  Kazantzis, K.  Kazemi, M.  Keith, D. , ,  Kelemen, D.  Kentikelenis, A. E.  Keridis, D. ,  Ker-Lindsay, J. , ,  Key, V.  Kingdon, J. W.  Kirchheimer, O. ,  Kitis, D.  Kitromilides, P. , , , ,  Kitschelt, H.  Kılıçdaroğlu, K.  Klandermans, B.  Knight, J.  KNOEMA  Kokkinou, C.  Kollias, T. ,  Koliopoulos, J. S. , , , , , ,  Komninou, M.  Konidaris, I. M.  Konstantinidou, C. 

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

  

Kontogiannopoulos, V.  Kontogiorgi, E. , ,  Koole, R.  Korais, A. –,  Kornelakis, A. ,  Kornetis, K. , , , ,  Kosmidis, S. , ,  Kostantinidis, Y. ,  Kostis, K. ,  Kotronaki, L.  Kottakis, M.  Kotzias, N.  Koufidi, M.  Koufodinas, D. , – Kouki, H. , ,  Koukiadaki, A.  Kouloglou, S.  Koulouri, C.  Kourkouvelas, L.  Kousis, M. , , , ,  Koustenis, P.  Koutalakis, C.  Koutnatzis, S. , ,  Koutsiaras, N.  Koutsogiorgas, A.  Kouvelakis, S.  Kouvelas, S.  Koziris, F.  Kriegel, A.  Kriesi, H. P. et al.  Krutschev, N.  Kuhlmann, S.  Kurban, D. 

L

Labour Force Survey , ,  Ladas, S. P.  Ladi, S. , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Ladner, A.  Ladner, A. et al.  Ladrech, R.  Lafazanis, P.  Lalioti, V.  Lambrakis, G.  Lambropoulos, H. S.  Lamprianou, I. , 

Lampropoulou, M.  Langer, A. I.  Lavdas, K. A. , , , , , , , ,  Lazaratos, P.  Lazaridis, G.  Leandros, N.  Legg, K. R. , ,  Leontidou, L.  Lesser, I. et al.  Leventi, C. ,  Leventis, V.  Lewis-Beck, M. S.  Liargovas, P.  Liakos, D.  Liaropoulos, L.  Lidstrōm, A. ,  Lijphart, A.  Lingard, B.  Lipset, S. M. , , ,  Livanis, A. ,  Llewellyn Smith, M. ,  Locke, J.  Lorenzini, J.  Loulis, J. , , ,  Louloudis, L.  Loverdos, A.  Luhmann, N. ,  Luke, A.  Lundberg, T. C.  Lyberaki, A. , , , ,  Lygeros, S.  Lynn, L. E. Jr.  Lyrintzis, C. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

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Mainwaring, S. , ,  Mair, P. , ,  Makris, G. – Makridimitris, A. ,  Mancini, P. , , ,  Manessis, A.  Manin, B.  Manitakis, A.  Manos, S. , 

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   Manouzas, Z.  Mantzoufas, P. , , ,  Marantzides, N. , , , , , , ,  Maravall, J-M.  March, J. G.  March, L. , , ,  Marcuse, H.  Marighela, C.  Marinakis, V.  Maris, D.  Martin, I.  Massip, R.  Matakos, K.  Mathews, J.  Matsaganis, M. , , , , , , , , , ,  Mavris, Y. ,  Mavrogordatos, G. T. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Mavros, G. ,  Maziotis, N. ,  Mazower, M. , , ,  McNeil, W. H. , , , , ,  Mcquail, D.  Megelidou, S.  Meghir, C. et al. , , , , ,  Meimarakis, V.  Menoudakos, K.  Merkel, A.  Merolla, J.  Metallinos, G. D.  Metaxas, I.  Metaxas, T.  Metron Analysis  Meyer, D.  Meynaud, J.  Michaloliakos, N.  Michalopoulos, N.  Michas, T.  Migdal, J. S.  Miliakou, S. et al.  Mill, J. S.  Millas, H.  Miller, D. S.  Minkenberg, M. 



Mitrakos, T. ,  Mitsopoulos, M. , , , , , , , ,  Mitsotakis, C. , , t, , , , , –, , –, , , , , , , ,  Mitsotakis, K. , ,  Mody, A.  Mplavoukos, S.  Molina, O.  Molokotos-Liederman, L.  Molyviatis, P. , ,  Monastiriotis, V. , , ,  Monogios, Y. et al.  Moreau, P.  Moschonas, G. , , , , , , , , ,  Moss, D.  Mossialos, E. , ,  Mouffe, C.  Mouritzen, P. E.  Mouzelis, N. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Mpakounakis, N.  Mudde, C. , , ,  Muller, P.  Musto, M. 

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Nalpantidou, S.  Nektarios, M.  New York Times  Nezi, R.  Nicolaidis, K.  Nicolet, C.  Nielsen, A.  Nieuwbeerta, P.  Nikolakopoulos, E. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

O

Odoni, R.  O’Donnel, O.  OECD , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

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

  

Offe, C.  Oikonomakis, L.  Oikonomos, C.  Oikonomou, G. ,  Olsen, J. , ,  Ongaro, E. , , ,  Öniş, Z. ,  Oran, B.  Özkırımlı, U. 

P

Page, E.  Pagoulatos, G. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Paleologos, Y.  Panageas, S. , , , , , ,  Panagiotarea, E. ,  Pangalos, T.  Pantazidou, M.  Pantazopoulos, A. , , ,  Panteion University  Pantelidou-Malouta, M.  Papaconstantinou, G.  Papademos, L. , , t, , , , ,  Papaderos, A.  Papadimitriou, D. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Papadogiannis, N. ,  Papadopoulos, A.  Papadopoulos, C.  Papadopoulos, F.  Papadopoulos, I.  Papadopoulou, E.  Papageorgiou, F. ,  Papageorgiou, I.  Papagos, A.  Papakostantinou, A. ,  Papakostantinou, G.  Papakostas, A.  Papaligouras, P. ,  Papandoniou, Y.  Papandreou, G. , , ,  Papandreou, A. , , , , t, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

Papandreou, G. A. , t, , , –, , , , , ,  Papaspyrou, N.  Papathanassopoulos, S. , , , , , ,  Papavlassopoulos, E.  Papoulias, D. B.  Pappas, N.  Pappas, T. , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Paraschos, M.  Paraskevopoulos, C. ,  Parker, T.  Passas, A. ,  Patkos, V.  Patrikios, S. ,  Pavlopoulos, P.  Pelagidis, T. , , , , , , , , ,  Pelt, M.  Perez, S. A.  Pesmazoglou, I. ,  Pesmazoglu, S.  Peters, B. G. , ,  Petmesidou, M. , , , , , , ,  Petrakos, G.  Petras, J.  Petropoulos, N.  Petropulos, J. ,  Pettifer, J.  Pharmakidis, T.  Philippopoulos, T.  Pierson, P. ,  Pina, A.  Pirro, A. L. P.  Pisani-Ferry, J.  Pisu, M.  Plastiras, N.  Platias, A.  Pluchinsky, D.  Poguntke, T.  Pollis, A. , , ,  Pollitt, C. – Polyzoidis, P.  POSPERT  Pridham, G. , , , ,  Psacharopoulos, G. , , 

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   Psalidopoulos, M. , ,  Psarras, D. , , ,  Psimitis, M. ,  Psycharis, Y.  Psychoyios, D. K.  ‘Public Issue’  Putnam, R. , , , , , 

R

Radaelli, C. M. ,  Rakopoulos, T.  Rallis, G. , , ,  Rantos, A.  Rapanos, V. T. , ,  Raz, J.  Regan, A.  Reichenbach, H.  Reinhart, C. M. , – Renwick, A.  Repousi, M.  Reuters Institute  Rhodes, M.  Rhodes, R. A. , ,  Rikker, W. H.  Rioux, J. P.  Rizas, S. ,  Rizvi, F.  Roberts, J. M. ,  Rodogno, D.  Rokkan, S. ,  Rombolis, S.  Roniger, L.  Roos, J.  Rootes, C.  Rori, L. , , , , ,  Rothstein, B. ,  Roupa, P.  Rousopoulos, T.  Rozakou, K.  Rubin, B.  Rüdig, W. , ,  Rumelili, B.  Rydgren, J. 

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Saiti, A.  Sakellaropoulos, T.  Salgado, R. S. 



Samaras, A. , t, , , , , , , ,  Samatas, M.  Samuels, D.  Saripolos, N. N.  Sarmas, I. ,  Sartori, G. , ,  Savvidis, I.  Scheler, M.  Schmidt, V. A.  Schmitt, H. et al.  Schmitter, P. C. ,  Seferiades, S. , , , , , ,  Seitanidis, D.  Sellers, J. ,  Seraphim, Archbishop  Serdedakis, N. , ,  Shapiro, M.  Sharpe, L. J. ,  Siani-Davies, P. ,  Siapera, E.  Siaroff, A. ,  Simiti, M. , , , , ,  Simitis, C. , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Siouti, G.  Sitter, N.  Skandalidis, K.  Skiadas, C.  Sklavenitis, D.  Skopetea, E.  Skouris, V.  Smith, A. G.  Smith, O.  Sodara, M. J.  Sofos, S. A.  Soifer, H.  Soilentakis, N.  Soskice, D. , ,  Sotirelis, G.  Sotiris, P.  Sotiropoulos, D. A. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Sotiropoulos, G.  Souflias, G. , 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



  

Spanou, C. , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Spencer, T. J. B.  Spourdalakis, M. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Spyropoulos, P.  Staggenborg, S.  Stamatis, D.  Stamelos, G. , ,  Stamiris, E.  Stamoulas, A. ,  Stasinopoulou, O.  Stanley, R.  Stathopoulos, M.  Stathopoulos, P.  Stauning Willert, T.  Stavrakakis, Y. , , , , ,  Stavridis, S. , ,  Stearns, M. ,  Stefanopoulos, S.  Stegmaier, M.  Stergiou, A.  Sternberg, C.  Stevenson, R. T.  Stokes, D.  Stone Sweet, A. , ,  Stournaras, Y.  Svara, J.  Svolopoulos, C. , , , , ,  Sykes, N.  Symeonides, C.  Syrogos, A. 

T

Taggart, P.  Taguieff, P.-A.  Takis, A.  Tarrow, S.  Tassis, C. , ,  Tassopoulos, Y. ,  Temponeras, N.  Teorell, J. ,  Teperoglou, E. , , , , , ,  Thelen, K. ,  Themelis, N. , 

Theodorakis, S.  Theodossopoulos, D.  Theofilopoulos, T.  Thomadakis, S. , ,  Tilley, J.  Tinios, P. , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Toay, T.  Toth, F.  Tountas, Y. et al. ,  Tournikiotis, A.  To Vima ,  Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP)  Transparency International  Trantidis, A. , , ,  Trebesch, C. , – Triandafyllidou, A. , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Triantafyllou, D.  Trikoupis, C. , , ,  Troianos, S. , , ,  Tsakalotos, E. , , ,  Tsakatika, M. , , , , , , , , , ,  Tsakiris, A.  Tsakloglou, P. ,  Tsakonas, P. ,  Tsalicoglou, I. S.  Tsardanidis, C. , ,  Tsarouhas, D.  Tsatsanis, E. , , , , , , ,  Tsatsos, C. , , , ,  Tsatsos, D.  Tsavdaridou, M.  Tsebelis, G.  Tsekos, T. N. ,  Tsevas, A.  Tsigaridas, C. ,  Tsipras, A. , , t, –, , , , , –, , ,  Tsiras, St.  Tsirbas, Y. , , ,  Tsironis, T.  Tsitselikis, K.  Tsohatzopoulos, A. , , , ,  Tsoucalas, C.  Tsouderos, E. 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

   Tsoukalas, C. , , , , , , , ,  Tsoukalis, L. , , , , , ,  Tucker, R. C.  Tudoroiu, T.  Tversky, A.  Tzermias, P.  Tzifakis, N. , , , ,  Tziovas, D. 

U

Ultee, W. 

V

Valinakis, Y. –, ,  Van Boeschoten, R.  van Esch, F. A. W. J.  van Spanje, J.  Varika, E.  Varoufakis, Y. ,  Vartzeli, R.  Vasilopoulou, S. , , , , , , ,  Vathakou, E.  Vavouras, I.  Veikou, M.  Venes, N.  Venieris, D.  Venizelos, E. , , , , , , , –, –, , , , ,  Venizelos, N.  Venizelos, S.  Venzke, I.  Verba, S. ,  Veremis, T. , , , , , , , , , , ,  Vergopoulos, K.  Vernardakis, C. , , , , , , , , , , ,  Verney, S. , , , , , , , , , ,  Vieira, M. ,  Vink, M.  Vlachogiannis, A.  Vogiatzoglou, M. ,  von Bogdandy, A.  von Maurer, G. L. 



Voskeritsian, H.  Voulgaris, Y. , , , , , , , , , , ,  Vraniali, E. , 

W

Waldron, J.  Wallerstein, I. – Walter, S. et al.  WAN (World Association of Newspapers)  Wattenberg, M. P.  Webb, P.  Weber, M. ,  Wehner, J.  Weiler, J. H. H.  Welch, R.  Wilsford, D.  Winrow, G. M.  Wolak, J.  Wollmann, H.  Wong, R.  Woodhall, M.  Woodhouse, C. ,  World Bank , , ,  World Economic Forum 

X

Xefteris, D.  Xezonakis, G.  Xiros, S. 

Y

Yannopoulos, G.  Yataganas, X.  Yılmaz, Ş. 

Z

Zafeiropoulos, K.  Zahariadis, N. , , , , ,  Zambarloukou, S. , ,  Zambeta, E.  Zartaloudis, S. , , ,  Zechmeister, E.  Ziamou, T.  Zografakis, S. , ,  Zolotas, X. , 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

S I

..............................................

Note: Tables and figures are indicated by an italic ‘t’ and ‘f ’, respectively, following the page number.

A

ABG (Agricultural Bank of Greece) , ,  ADAE (Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy)  ADEDY (Supreme Directorate of Unions of Civil Servants) –, , , , , , ,  Ageing Working Group (AWG)  AKEL (Cypriot Party of the Working People) ,  All Workers Militant Front (PAME) –,  ANEL (Independent Greeks) , , , , , t, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  coalition with SYRIZA ,  Annan Plan , , , ,  ANTARSYA (Anti-Capitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow) ,  APDP (Hellenic Data Protection Authority)  ASEP (Independent Authority for the Selection of Personnel) ,  Athens , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , – civic engagement  media circulation ,  mosque , ,  municipal elections ,  Olympic Games , , , , ,  protests , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  austerity , , , , , , –, , –, , , , , , ,  anti-, by interest groups 

anti-, citizen protests , , , , , , , , –,  anti-, politics , , , –, , , t, – judicial control  and the party system  and radical Left parties (RLPs) –, , , , ,  and reform implementation ,  and social protection –, – authoritarian regime , , , , , t, , , , 

B

bailouts , , , , , , –, , , , , ,  conditionality , , –, , ,  dependency on foreign powers –, – and Europeanization –, ,  impact on voting behaviour  and privatization  and reform implementation –, –, ,  Balkan Wars (–) , , ,  Bank of Crete scandal  Bank of Greece , , , , , , –, 

C

cabinet government –, , t appointment of judges ,  ‘cabinet bureaucracy’  management of – member prosecution ,  PM’s position within  CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) ,  ‘Catastrophe’ of  – CCF (Conspiracy of Cells of Fire) , –

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  centre centre-left –, , , , –, , , , , , ,  disintegration of – and liberalism –, ,  and the middle class , ,  modernization – revival and re-foundation – and social democracy , , , , , ,  Charter of the Church of Greece ,  ‘Child Cities’  Church-State relations – archiepiscopal questions – autocephaly – ID cards issue –, ,  impact on civil society  nationalization – populism – religious freedom – citizenship civic education ,  and political equality –,  reforms , , , –,  and social movements  civil society , , , , , , ,  and civic education  civic engagement –, – impact of Greek-Turkish relations – impact of the crisis – NGOs and EU funding –,  and party affiliation ,  philanthropy and solidarity – and religion ,  and taxation  weakness of , , , , , , , , , –, – Civil War , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  clientelism , –, , , , , , , ,  in the health-care system ,  impact on policy-making ,  within interest groups –, , , , , , , 



and parliamentarism – within party systems , , , , , , , ,  and political culture – in public administration , , , ,  and staffing in the core executive  Cold War , , , , , –, , ,  Colonels’ junta , , , , , , , , , –, , ,  conservatives achievements and failures  clientelism ,  and the crisis – liberalism –,  opposition years – restoration of democracy – see also ND Constitution , – on Church-State relations , –, ,  on citizenship ,  on education – on environmental issues ,  on local government –,  on media  parliamentary powers –,  powers of the executive –, t,  revisions –, , , , –, ,  constitutionalism –, – checks and balances , , , , , , , ,  parliamentary government – reforms –, , ,  core executive –, – and the Cabinet system – and the debt crisis – definition ,  historical evolution – leadership – PM’s Office  policy coordination – reforms , – staff  weakness of the GGK –

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



 

corporatism , , ,  disjointed , , , – and interest groups –, – and public administration  and social insurance  Crete , , , ,  Crisis Observatory  CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) ,  CSF (‘Community Support Frameworks’)  CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility)  Cyprus question , , –, , , , , , , –, , , , –, , , , –

D DAKE (Independent Democratic Movement of Workers) ,  defence and security , , – asymmetric threats ,  Balkans ,  comparative context  Cyprus problem , ,  decision-making  defence doctrine – Eastern Mediterranean  expenditures – research on – role within EU and NATO , –, ,  Turkish threat –, , , – DEH (Public Power Corporation) ,  development policy –,  crisis management , , – ‘easy’ phase – and EU funds ,  and European integration , – external deficits  macro-economic imbalances – over-indebtedness  socialist governance  state role – weak technology, innovation and knowledge – DHANA (Democratic Renewal) ,  Diavgeia programme , 

dictatorship , , , , , , , , , , –,  abolition of parliamentary government  and church-state relations – impact on civil society ,  impact on the media  DIKKI (Democratic Socialist Movement) t,  DIMAR (Democratic Left) t, , , , , , , , , , 

E

EAM (National Liberation Front) , ,  EAR (Greek Left) , ,  Economic Adjustment Programme , , , , , , , , , , ,  economic crisis , , , , , , , –, vi and administrative reform – and civil society – and the core executive , – and crisis politics  and development –, , – and the electoral system –, –, – and health-care – impact on local governments – impact on the parties , , –, –, –, – and interest groups – and judicial action – and the media  and policy-making –, – and political culture , – and the rise of the far Right  and state-market relations , –,  and state-society relations ,  and voting behaviour – and welfare –, – see also bailouts Economist Intelligence Unit  ECtHR (European Court of Human Rights) –, 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  Ecumenical Patriarchate –, , , ,  EDA (Union of the Democratic Left) , , t, , , ,  EDIK (Union of Democratic Centre) t, , , – education , – centralization of – civic  democratization of  funds , ,  and illiberal political culture  modernization tensions  and national identity , , ,  policy implementation –, , , , ,  politicization of  privatization of , ,  provision and marketization  reform , , –, , – of refugees  student movements – university , , , , , – EFEE (National Student Association of Greece)  EGE (Union of Greek Women)  EK (Centre Union) , , , ,  continuity with PASOK – divisions and decline – rise of – EKF (Greek Social Forum)  EK-ND (Centre Union-New Forces) t, , , – electoral system, elections , – abstaining from   and  elections –  and  elections – bonus , , – clientelism –, ,  and constitutional reforms –  election –  election  - elections – electoral threshold , , ,  and fiscal policy – impact of the crisis –, –, –



local and regional – and majoritarian parliamentarism – open-list , , ,  parliamentary ,  and political culture  reform , –, ,  reinforced proportional representation –, , ,  see also voting behaviour ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and and Foreign Policy)  ELSTAT (Hellenic Statistical Authority) ,  employment and clientelism  and economic development  of migrants – and social protection –,  and state corporatism – EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) , , , , , –, , , – crisis – environmentalism ,  judiciary action , ,  party participation  and policy-making ,  and social movements – ENYEK (Special Legal Service for the European Communities at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  EOPYY (National Health Services Organization) , ,  EPEK (National Progressive Centre Union) ,  EQUAL programme – ERE (National Radical Union) , , , , , , , , , , , ,  ERT (Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation) , , , , –,  ESR (Greek National Council for Radio and Television) , , , –,  ESY (National Health System) , , , , , ,  EUI (European University Institute) 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



 

Eurocommunism , , , , , , , –,  see also KKE-interior European Commission , , , , , , , , , ,  European Court of Justice (ECJ) ,  Europeanization , , , –,  administrative , ,  and bailout programmes ,  and cultural dualism – and decentralization efforts  definition  and foreign policy –, – images of Europe – and immigration policies , , –,  impact of the crisis ,  integration pressures – obligation to EU laws  PASOK government on , –, , – and policy-making ,  and political culture – and state-market relations , – uneven adaptation , , – European Union (EU) , , , , ,  accession negotiations –, – admission to EMU – fiscal framework ,  funding NGOs –, ,  and the Greek crisis – and Grexit , , ,  and immigration policies  influence on domestic politics  integration, and economic development – law conventions, vs. Greek law  membership issues –, –, – pressures from  and voting behaviour – eurozone crisis , –, , –, , , , , , ,  economic situation – impact on political culture –, , 

F

farmers’ associations ,  and party affiliation – reaction to the crisis and EU policies – far Right – demand-side factors – electorate t extreme , , , , , –,  populist radical , , , –,  supply-side factors – see also GD; LAOS feminist movement – fiscal policy – budgetary governance – challenges – data transparency  deficit , –, , , ,  democratic control , ,  during elections – EU framework ,  implementation issues – institutional level –, , ,  monitoring –, , , – public expenditure , , – reforms – rules –, –, , , ,  and taxation – FN (French National Front)  foreign direct investment (FDI)  in manufacturing  in Turkey  foreign policy –, – and the centralization of leadership – and Europeanization , –, – impact of the domestic environment – and international orders – Karamanlis’ , – Macedonian issue  and nationalism  providers of security – support of Turkey’s EU candidacy , – Turkey and Cyprus question  US relationships – France , , , , , , , –, , , ,  centre, as compared to the Greek  social movements 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  support of EU membership  terrorism 

G

Golden Dawn , , , , – anti-immigrant views , ,  economic grievances – electorate , t,  media visibility  militia-like activities – and nationalism within education  origins and ideology , , – Germany , , , , , , , , ,  constitutional court model –, ,  on European integration , , , ,  party system comparisons , , ,  terrorism , , , ,  GESASE (General Confederation of Farmers’ Associations) ,  Great Depression , , ,  ‘Great Idea’ , , ,  GSEE (General Confederation of Workers of Greece) , , , , , , , , , , , , , 

H HCAP (Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations)  health care –,  expenditure , t, f, , – funds , , , , –, ,  historical background – inequalities , , , ,  insurance , , –, , ,  national , ,  out-of-pocket , , , t, , , ,  path shift – primary care , , , , – providers –, – reforms –, –, – Hellenic Front  Hellenic Hope 



Hellenic Initiative  ‘Hellenic Rally’  Hellenic Republic Assets Development Fund 

I

ID cards question –, ,  IKA (Social Insurance Fund) , t, , , , , –, ,  immigration , –, –, –, –,  accommodation scheme  asylum policies – census  citizenship reform – and civic engagement  and employment , – and Europeanization , , –,  far Right attitudes , –,  integration and racism – irregular , , –,  KKE on  permits , f refugee education  Indignados , , , , , , –,  interest groups , –, –,  and clientelism –, , , , , , ,  and educational reforms  farmers’ associations – impact of the crisis – labour unions – liberal professions , , , , ,  opposition within ,  reforms – and state corporatism –, –, – International Monetary Fund (IMF) , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Ireland , , , , , , ,  Italy , , t, , , , , ,  electoral system comparison  energy cooperation –

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



 

Italy (cont.) media instrumentalization ,  party system comparison ,  terrorism , , ,  ITGI (Interconnector Turkey–Greece– Italy)  ‘I Won’t Pay’ movement , , 

J

judicial system , –,  blocking decentralization  and constitutional review , – Courts – and the economic crisis – environmental issues  future research suggestions – ineffectiveness –, ,  judicialization of politics – and the local government  national and religious identity issues – and the parliament  and pensions – and policy-making  political independence –,  recruitment and appointment of judges  rule-of-law paradigm –

K

‘Kallikratis’ Project and law –, ,  Karamanlis C. , , –, –, , , , ,  Karamanlis, K. , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , ,  creation of ND , – economic development  and European integration , –, , – first appointment as PM  foreign policy , , , – ideology – leadership style , – legacies – parallel with de Gaulle  Paris years – popular support – position within the parties –

as president of the republic ,  resignation and last years  revision of the Constitution  KDG (Movement of Democratic Women) – KEP (Citizen’s Service Centres) ,  KEPE (Centre of Planning and Economic Research) , ,  KEP (Movement of Free Citizens) ,  KINAL (Movement for Change) , –, ,  KKE (Communist Party of Greece) , , , , , , , t, , , , , –, –, , ,  affiliation with social movements ,  class voting  conservatism and ethical communism – demarcation from SYRIZA  electoral influence  electoral strategies – fragmentation – historical legacies – ideology – and interest groups , – organization and mobilization – origins and rise of , ,  Tsipras as a member – voter identification in  KKE-interior (Communist Party of the Interior) , t, , t, , ,  link to social movements , ,  KNE (Communist Youth of Greece) , f KODISO (Party of Democratic Socialism) – KPEE (Centre of Political Research and Information)  KYSEA (Government Council on National Defence Defence) , 

L

LAE (Popular Unity) , , ,  LAOS (People’s Orthodox Rally) , t, –, , f, , , ,  immigration issues , –, ,  media visibility  moderate phase 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  origins  parliamentary representation – voter characteristics  Laskarides Foundation  Lausanne Convention  leadership  Cabinet management , , , – impact on foreign policy –,  institutional constraints – local and regional ,  organizational theory  parliament censure of  personalistic / presidentialist , – liberalism –,  and the centre –, ,  and the conservatives –,  illiberal political culture – Liberal Party , , , ,  LIFE programme  Lisbon Programme  local and regional government –, – administrative functions – catch-all alliances , – and centralism , ,  comparison to Portugal  constitutional status – and the crisis – electorate – mayors , , –, ,  structure of public administration – territorial reforms –, , ,  ‘Local Autonomy Index’ (LAI) – Local Health Units (TOMYs) 

M

Maastricht Treaty , , –,  Macedonia name dispute , –, , , , , , ,  Marshall Plan , , , , ,  media , , , , , ,  deregulation and licenses –, – digital, rise of – government control – impact on the far Right rise  instrumentalization – and limited professionalization – low circulation of newsprint –



on NGOs work  political influences – promotion of volunteerism  social, use of protesters ,  and terrorist propaganda  ‘Megali Idea’ , ,  Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) , , –, –, , , –, ,  and policy-making – and the radical left –, , , – reforms – and the socialists – and social mobilization – ‘Metapolitefsi’ , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , v Metaxas period , ,  migration see immigration modernization , , , –, , ,  administrative –, ,  and bailouts – booms and setbacks – of the Cabinet  ‘early-late’ –, – of education –, –,  Karamanlis’ , , ,  limited, cultural dualism – of media  Orthodox Church on –,  Papandreou’s , – political , , , , , , , , , , , , –, –, ,  Simitis’ – of social protection ,  see also Europeanization

N nationalism, national identity Church interventions –, , ,  and education , , ,  ID card debate –, ,  immigration issues ,  influence on foreign policy  Macedonia name dispute , –, , , , , , , 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



 

nationalism, national identity (cont.) political culture –, – progressive – NATO , , , , , , , ,  defence and security strategies , , , –, , , , ,  withdrawal , , , , ,  ND (New Democracy) , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , ,  achievements and failures  and the centrist agenda – crisis and post-crisis elections , , –, –, , ,  education reforms , – and Europeanization , , ,  and farmers’ mobilization ,  health-care reforms , – influence on media –,  interventionism  liberalism – migration policy , ,  opposition years – pension reform t, t, ,  pre-crisis elections , , , , , , , t, –, – and protest movements –, ,  rise and ideology , , –, ,  voter age and attitude , –,  neo-Weberian state –,  Netherlands  NGOs , , , ,  and environmentalism ,  funds –, –,  health-care provision  impact of the crisis – and policy-making  NIMBY (‘Not in My Back Yard’) –, , 

O OAE (Organization for the Reconstruction of Enterprises)  OGA (Social Security Fund for Farmers) , 

OGE (Organization of Greek Women) ,  OKE (Economic and Social Committee)  Olympic Airways , ,  Olympic Games , , –, , , ,  Ombudsman , , , ,  OOSO (Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organizations)  OP (Ecologist Greens)  Orthodox Church –,  identity and nationalism , –, , , ,  link with LAOS  philanthropy – provision of education ,  and the ‘underdog’ tradition  see also Church-State relations OTE (National Telecommunications Organization) , 

P

PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement)  Papandreou, A. , , , , t, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  cabinet management  and clientelism , , , ,  criminal investigation on  on the education system  emergence – the ‘Establishment’ – foreign policy , , , –,  ideology vs. reality – national-populism – PASOK Manifesto – ‘progressive nationalism’ – see also PASOK parliament, parliamentarism –, – accountability , ,  clientelism and nepotism – consensual  control on fiscal policy – deficiencies – divisive  imbalanced legislation – and international law 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  key elements – majoritarian –, – and policy-making ,  polynomy ,  privileges and immunities –,  relations with the executive – relations with the judiciary  relations with the President of the Republic  party system , –, , – administrative politicization – and civil society ,  and clientelism , , , ,  collapse –, , –,  modernization , , , , , , , , , , , , –, –, ,  origins and evolution – polarized multipartyism , t, , , ,  and policy-making – post-dictatorship and pre-crisis – two-partyism , , , –, , t, –, , , , , ,  volatility , f see also electoral system PASEGES (Panhellenic Confederation of Farmers’ Cooperatives) –, ,  PASKE ,  PASKE (Panhellenic Militant Labour Union Movement) , , , , ,  PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) , , , , , –, , , , , , – and anti-austerity protests –, ,  citizenship reform – clientelism and corruption , , , , , , , ,  comparison with the radical Left  continuity with EK – and the crisis , –, , , – and democratization – and economic development  and economic voting  education reforms , , –,  electorate , , –, 



and Europeanization / modernization , –, , –, –,  and health-care reform , , , ,  influence on media  and interest groups –, ,  and the judiciary – leader persecution  links to social movements ,  and the Memorandum of Understanding , – opposition years – origins, rise of, and ideology –, , , –, – pension reform  populism , , , – and reform implementation  shift to the centre , –,  PASY (All Peasants Militant Rally) , , ,  Patriarchate of Constantinople , – patronage see clientelism PEL (European Left Party) ,  pensions , , , , , , , –, ,  ageing , t, , , , t, ,  cuts , , , ,  deficits – dual system  external context – fragmentation  gender issues  periodization , t poverty and social exclusion – preserving continuity – public and private sector – reforms , , , , –, –, ,  sectional privileges – social insurance , –, , , , ,  trade unions – People’s Party , ,  POEDHN (Panhellenic Federation of Employees of – Public Hospitals) 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



 

POLAN (Political Spring) , t, ,  policy-making , , , , –, – and conditionality – conflicting regulations  evidence-based  experts –,  implementation – inertia  influence of civil society on ,  influence of interest groups on , ,  internal and external actors  pre-crisis – in public administration – see also development policy; education; fiscal policy; health care; immigration; pensions political culture , , , , ,  citizenship and political inequality – and clientelism – and cultural dualism –,  and ethnic nationalism –, , –,  and the eurozone crisis – as illiberal – personalistic  and social engagement – and social movements –, – solidarity, consensus and populism – underdog vs. reformist , , , , ,  populism , , , , , , , , ,  ethno-populism  and the ID card debate  ‘national’ – ND , , ,  radical Left , –, , , , , , , , –,  radical Right –, , – socialists , , , , , –, , , – Portugal , , , , , , , ,  economic growth , ,  local government ,  voting behaviour ,  Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) 

poverty , , , ,  alleviation , , ,  austerity effects – income support –, – indicators, and social exclusion – and the pension system , ,  pre-crisis policy – rise of unemployment – social benefits –, – president of the republic , , , , , , , ,  election , ,  and the parliament , ,  prime minister , t, , ,  ambivalent position of  cabinet management – checks and balances ,  government control and coordination –,  influence on foreign policy – leadership style – parliamentary investigations on  reform management – role , , , , , t,  see also core executive privatization , ,  and the crisis – and Europeanization , , , , , ,  of higher education , ,  judiciary tasks on ,  protests and strikes , , ,  anti-austerity , –, , , , , , , –,   Church-State relations , –,  confrontational  on education ,  on education reform  by interest-groups , , , , ,  KKE  nationalist  on pension reform , t,  and political culture  and political violence –, , ,  see also social movements

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  public administration , , , –, –, , , , , , , ,  and clientelism , , , ,  deficiencies , , –,  Europeanization , ,  legacies  modernization –,  neo-Weberian orientation –,  policy-making –, –,  politicization –, ,  reforms , , –, , , ,  territorial organization , –, , 

R

racism , , – radical Left parties (RLPs) , , , , , , , –, –, ,  and austerity –, , , , ,  Eurocommunism – on the European level – fragmentation – inconsistencies and limitations – programme and organization – relationship with the government  rise of , – and social democratization , , , ,  see also KKE; SYN; SYRIZA; Tsipras reforms administrative –,  citizenship , – constitutional –,  and the core executive , – education , , –, , – electoral , –, ,  fiscal policy – health-care –, –, – implementation , – and interest groups – and liberalism  pension , , , , –, –, ,  territorial –, , , 



refugees , , , , ,  anti-immigrant attitudes ,  ‘emergency’ ,  post- mass population displacement –, , , ,  regional administration , , ,  in education – in health care  structure – see also local and regional government religion see Orthodox Church River party (‘Potami’) , , , – ideology – Russia ,  and autocephaly  defence ties with ,  and relations with Turkey , 

S SASOEE (Association of Farmers Cooperatives and Enterprises)  Scandinavia ,  sexuality discrimination, and political culture – feminist movements on – same-sex marriage legislation , , , ,  Simitis, C. , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  achievements , , – authorship  comparison to Prodi  comparison to Tsohatzopoulos – differentness – downsides , – ‘Europeanization’ and ‘modernization’ , , –, , , –, , , , ,  foreign policy – institution building  legacy – ‘minority’ status , ,  networking capacity – pension reform t, , – perception of the Centre – underdog vs. reformist culture , , , , 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi



 

Single European Act  socialism see PASOK social movements , , , , – alter-globalization – as a confrontational protest  cross-country comparisons  environmental – feminist – Indignados , , , , , , –,   riots – student – Social Progress Index  social security –, –, , , , ,  SOE (Council of Economic Experts)  SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) , , ,  Solidarity Now  Spain economic growth ,  voting behaviour ,  Standing Orders of Parliament (SO) , , , , , ,  State Budget Office in the Parliament (PBO) , ,  state-market relations –, , – democratization – developmentalism –,  Europeanization , – eurozone crisis , –,  Greek exceptionalism – nationalization – privatization  varieties of capitalism –,  state-society relations , , – alienation –,  civic engagement –,  clientelism , , –, – disjointed corporatism , – loyalty –,  social mobilizations – Stavros Niarchos Foundation ,  strikes see protests and strikes ‘Struggle of the Blind People’  student movement – Sweden , , 

SYDASE (Confederation of Democratic Farmers Associations) ,  SYN (Coalition of the Left and Progress) , , , , , – Synod of the Church of Greece , , – SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) , , , , , , , , , –, –, –, ,  coalitions  and constitutional reforms ,  contradictions and limitations – education reforms , ,  electorate , , – emergence –, , –, –, , –, , , , –, – and Eurocommunism  ideology – and immigration / citizenship , – and interest group politics , – KKE’s demarcation from  and local governance  and media deregulation ,  and populism , , , ,  programme and organization – and social movements , , , ,  see also Tsipras

T

taxation , , , , , , , ,  and charity  and the crisis , ,  and health policy ,  and pensions ,  reform and compliance –, – and social safety net , , , ,  and transition to democracy  taxi owners’ protests  technological progress and economic development , –, ,  and Europeanization ,  media, and civic engagement  medical , ,  Papandreou on  print media 

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/9/2020, SPi

  terrorism  CCF , – context – ELA –,  end of – extreme , , ,  jihadist threat , ,  N –, –, ,  persistence – RS – violence –,  Thessaloniki Programme –,  TIMA Charitable Foundation  trade unions –, , , , , , , , , , , ,  and collective mobilization , ,  and health policy , ,  KKE’s affiliations ,  and local administration ,  and pension governance – and public broadcasting – and state corporatism , –, – truck owners’ protests  ‘Truman Doctrine’ , , , ,  Tsipras, A. , , t, –, , , , , –, , ,  anti-austerity politics – ascendance – and Eurocommunism – left populism , – legacy  personalism and presidentialization – on public broadcasting ,  Turkish relations , , , , –, – and civil society – conflict resolution , –, , – crisis , , , –,  and the Cyprus question –, , , , , –,  EU membership , –, – influence of domestic politics 



minority issues , , , ,  rapprochment , , , –,  and regional partnerships – strategic challenges –

U

UDF (Union for the French Democracy)  United Kingdom , , , , , ,  support of autocephaly  voting behaviour  United States , , , , , , , , , , ,  comparison to – election studies , ,  influence on foreign policy –, –, ,  judiciary model  role in defence and security policy , , , 

V

‘varieties of capitalism’ –, ,  voting behaviour  age and geographical distribution – class voting –,  economic voting –,  party identification – research on – social and political divisions –, –

W

War of Independence , , , , ,  welfare state , , , , ,  benefits , ,  cuts in , ,  and decentralization ,  fragmentation , , , – and social protection –, –, – WSF (World Social Forum) 