The Oxford Companion to Philosophy [2 ed.] 0199264791, 9780199264797

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The Oxford Companion to

Philosophy

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The Oxford Companion to

Philosophy Second Edition

Edited by Ted Honderich

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan South Korea Poland Portugal Singapore Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Oxford University Press 1995, 2005 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First edition 1995 New edition 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The Oxford companion to philosophy / edited by Ted Honderich. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Philosophy—Encyclopedias. I. Honderich, Ted. B51.094 1995 100—dc20 94–36914 ISBN 0–19–926479–1 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Typeset in Dante by Jayvee, Trivandrum, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn, Norfolk

To Bee, Ingrid, John, Kiaran, and Rina, with love

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Preface The brave, large aim of this book has been to bring philosophy together between two covers better than ever before. That is not a job for one man, or one woman, or a few, or a team, although it is tried often enough. So 249 of us joined forces joined forces ten years ago for the first edition. We have now been reinforced by forty-two more contributors for this second edition. To the 1,932 entries in the first edition, about 300 more have been added. Also, many of the entries in the first edition have been considerably lengthened and revised. Many others have been updated. The list of contemporary philosophers in the first edition has been adjusted in order to reflect what McTaggart denied, that time is real. The philosophy brought together includes, first of all, the work of the great philosophers. As that term is commonly used, there are perhaps twenty of them. By anyone’s reckoning, this pantheon of philosophy includes Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, the blessed Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. These, together with others who stand a bit less solidly in the pantheon, are the subjects of long essays in this book. Philosophy as this book conceives it, secondly, includes all of its history in the English language, a history mainly of British and American thinkers. In this history there are many figures not so monumental as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Among them, if they are not admitted to the pantheon, are John Stuart Mill, Charles Sanders Peirce, Bertrand Russell, and, if an Austrian can be counted in this particular history, and should be, Ludwig Wittgenstein. They also include Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Reid, William James, and F. H. Bradley. Thirdly, if the book cannot include all of the histories of philosophy in languages other than English, it does attend to them. It attends to more than the great leaders of the philosophies in these languages. Thus Descartes is joined by such of his countrymen and countrywomen as Simone de Beauvoir, Henri Bergson, and Auguste Comte. Kant and Hegel are joined by J. G. Fichte, Jürgen Habermas, Karl Jaspers, and others. There are also general entries on each of the national philosophies, from Australian to Croatian to Japanese to Russian. A fourth part of the book, not an insignificant one, consists in about 150 entries on contemporary philosophers, the largest groups being American and British. It would have been an omission to leave out contemporaries, and faint-hearted. Philosophy thrives. Its past must not be allowed to exclude its present. It is true, too, that one of these contemporaries may one day stand in the pantheon.

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What has now been said of four subject-matters within philosophy as the book conceives it can be said differently. These subject-matters can be regarded less in terms of individual thinkers and more in terms of ideas, arguments, theories, doctrines, world-views, schools, movements, and traditions. This contributes to another characterization of the book, more complete and at least as enlightening, perhaps more enlightening. In particular, it brings out more of the great extent to which the book is about contemporary philosophy rather than the subject’s history. There are perhaps a dozen established parts of philosophy: epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical logic, logic, the philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and so on. In the case of each of these, the book contains a long essay on its history and another on its problems as they now are, by contributors not at all new to them. In the case of each of these established parts of philosophy, more light is shed by very many additional entries—for a start, by the aforementioned entries on the great philosophers, on their lesser companions in English-language history and other-language histories, and on contemporaries now carrying on the struggle. In the case of each of the established parts of philosophy, there are also very many subordinate entries not about individual philosophers. They are quite as important and perhaps take up more of the book. They range from shorter essays down to definitions. To glance at subordinate entries just in the philosophy of mind, the two long essays go with such shorter entries as actions, animalism in personal identity, anomalous monism, body, Brentano, bundle theory of the self, cognitive architecture, cognitive science, and determinism, double-mindedness, dualism, and duck-rabbit. That is but a very small start on the philosophy of mind. I have now said something of the philosophy which it is the aim of the 2,230 entries of this book to bring into clear view. But whose clear view? The book is for all those who want authoritative enlightenment, judgement by good judges. Thus it is directed partly to general readers for whom philosophy has a fascination greater than, or at least as great as, any other part of our intellectual and cultural existence, and who want accounts of it that they can trust. The book is also directed to those who study and practise the subject, and are scrupulous about their guides. If it did not also have the second aim, it could not have the first. No accounts of a subject can be authoritative for the general reader if they do not also attract and aim to survive the scrutiny of its experts. If that is one description of the two classes of intended readers of this book, there is another quite as important. There are different ways of reading. The general readers and the experts can be taken together and then divided into two other classes of readers. The first class has in it readers who are on the job, the second those who are not. Not even your most conscientious postgraduate, or your academic of truly careerist inclination, or your zealous autodidact, is always attending to duty. Reading is not always work. Fortunately, it is more often not work. It is not done to get answers to pre-existing questions, to pass exams or write essays, to get promoted to full Professor. It is not done out of a stern determination to become informed, to pursue truth. To read is often to browse, dally, and meander. It is to satisfy curiosity, or a curiosity owed just to a page that falls open. It is to be intrigued by the sight of affirming the consequent,

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agglomeration, American philosophy today, arthritis in the thigh, Baudrillard, beatitude’s kiss, closure, feminist philosophy of science, quantum logic, slime, slingshot arguments, tarot, tarwater, Thrasymachus, vague objects, or the new Wittgenstein. A Companion, then, in what there is excuse to call the correct sense of that sometimes abused word, is not only a book for diligent readers, to be studied and perhaps laboured over. It is not only a complete reference book. It is more amiable than that. It diverts. It suits a Sunday morning. Hence, not all that is in it was chosen by the high principle of nose to the grindstone. There are entries in it, as already noticed, that are owed to their intrinsic interest rather than their proven place in a sterner editor’s list of headwords. Only three things remain to be said in this Preface, the first of them about the nature of philosophy and hence of the book. Isaiah Berlin, one of the contributors, once characterized philosophy not only as lacking answers to many questions but also as lacking an agreed method for the finding of answers. (He may have had in mind a contrast with science, perhaps a contrast not dear, albeit for different reasons, to a fellow contributor or two, say Paul Feyerabend or W. V. Quine.) Certainly it is true that philosophy, no doubt because of the peculiar difficulty of its questions, is at least as much given to disagreement and dispute as any other kind of inquiry. In fact it may be more given to disagreement and dispute than any other inquiry. It has the hardest questions. As a result, this book cannot be wholly consistent. Even with fewer than 291 contributors, if they were as committed to their views as philosophers usually are, and no doubt should be, there would be disagreement. There would be disagreement if the book was limited to the thirty-four Oxford philosophers in it, or, say, the various Californians. As it is, there are entries, occasionally cheek by jowl, that fight among themselves, or at any rate jostle. As an editor, I have not tried too hard to subdue or get between my colleagues, but only succumbed to a thought or two about unlikely philosophical propositions. (Nor have I bullied my colleagues about what sort of thing to put into the bibliographies at the ends of their entries, or ruthlessly excluded an entry whose subject is also treated, somewhat differently, somewhere else.) To do so would have produced more decorum but less truth about philosophy. It would also have touched what I hope is another recommendation of the book: it has not only different views but different voices in it. That brings to mind a second matter, that of the 150 contemporary philosophers on whom there are entries in the book. The aim was to give to the reader, mainly the general reader, a sense of the philosophical enterprise as it is now being carried forward. (Philosophy, as already remarked, is not a dead or dying subject, but one whose vigour—I am tempted to say its youth—is as great as ever it has been. It is only the sciences and the superstitions that come and go.) Another editor, quite as sane, would have looked around at his cohorts, contemplated a reputation or two, no doubt mused on the fact of philosophical fashion, and chosen somewhat differently. For the first edition, a list of contemporaries was initially drawn up mainly by me. The list was subsequently the subject of a kindly suggestion or two from possible contributors to the book who laid eye on it, and perhaps a letter or two of hurt pride or disbelief. Notice was taken of these pleas, in a certain way. The initial list of contemporaries was submitted to a jury of a dozen distinguished

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philosophers from all parts and inclinations of the subject. They agreed about the large and indisputable core of the list, but not much more. They did not much agree about their proposed additions to the rest of the list, or their proposed deletions from it. No proposed inclusion or deletion got more than two votes from the twelve good philosophers and true. Any contemporary who did get two votes was added in. No deletions were made. For this second edition, opinions were taken from thirty philosophers, of all or anyway various persuasions, as to how to make the contemporaries in the book representative of the new millennium well under way. The results of this poll contained some biffs to my loyalties and sensibilities. But, being a true as against merely a hierarchic democrat, I acted on the advice. Should you be certain, reader, that this little anointing is a very serious matter, remember David Hume, Saint David, the greatest of British philosophers. He did not get elected to professorships at Edinburgh and Glasgow, which accolades went instead to Mr Cleghorn and Mr Clow. Finally, my gratitude, of which there is a lot. I am grateful to many people, first the 291 contributors. They did not do too much satisficing. Contributors to the first edition put up with a change of mind about entry lengths. Many of them put up with a lot more, including a lot of letters about revising their work or making new starts. Some were stalwarts who did a goodly number of entries very well. They rush to mind, and produce glows of gratitude there. Some were philosophical about the sad fact that their prize entry, say the Frankfurt School or the indeterminacy of translation, did not get into the book because the editor had blundered and earlier assigned it to someone else. Some contributors and others were decent or anyway silent when their proposed entries, say marital act and Ayn Rand, did not penetrate my fortress of philosophical principle. My special thanks to Peter Momtchiloff, doyen of the world’s philosophy editors, the Philosophy Editor of Oxford University Press. This book is almost as much his doing as mine, despite my sole responsibility for errors, infelicities, and one or two judgements with which he is not in absolute agreement. I am also grateful to the following fourteen philosophers who read all or parts of the first manuscript and issued proposals for its improvement: Christopher Kirwan, David Hamlyn, and Jonathan Lowe, above all, and also Simon Blackburn, Alexander Broadie, Jonathan Cohen, Ross Harrison, Ronald Hepburn, Michael Inwood, Nicola Lacey, David Miller, Richard Norman, Anthony O’Hear, and Richard Swinburne. My thanks as well to the jury of distinguished philosophers who cast an eye over the initial list of their contemporaries, and then to the thirty advisers in this matter for the second edition. Thanks too to all of these: Ingrid Coggin Honderich; Jane O’Grady; Alan Lacey, who did the Chronological Table of Philosophy and the Maps of Philosophy; John Allen of the library at University College London; Helen Betteridge, Vivien Crew, and Ann Wooldridge for some secretarial assistance; Tim Barton, Laurien Berkeley, Angela Blackburn, and Frances Morphy of Oxford University Press, all of whom were fortitudinous, and almost always right. t.h.

Contents list of portraits list of contributors on using the book

The Companion: Alphabetical Entries appendices Logical Symbols Maps of Philosophy A Chronological Table of Philosophy sources of illustrations index and list of entries

xii xiii xix 1 971 973 991 1003 1005

List of Portraits ancient philosophy Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Socrates, Democritus Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Plotinus

754 35

late ancient and early medieval philosophy Augustine, Boethius, Abelard, Anselm

344

medieval philosophy Avicenna, Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon, Aquinas

580

founders of modern philosophy Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume

784 243

philosophy in britain Francis Bacon, Reid, Sidgwick, Bradley Bentham, Mill, Wollstonecraft, Burke Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Collingwood Ryle, Ayer, Strawson, Popper

249 937 121 676

french philosophy Rousseau, Comte, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty Sartre, de Beauvoir, Foucault, Althusser

320 278

continental european philosophy Hegel, Marx, Lukacs, Croce Fichte, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche Husserl, Frege, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger

366 334 171

philosophy in america Edwards, Peirce, James, Santayana Dewey, Carnap, Quine, Goodman Davidson, Putnam, Searle, Nagel Rawls, MacIntyre, Kripke, Dennett

749 25 609 628

eastern philosophy Confucius, Nishida, Tagore, Radhakrishnan

429

philosophy at the end of the twentieth century Kuhn, Lewis, Rorty, Williams

483

Contributors Almost all the contributors are or were members of the departments, faculties or sub-faculties of philosophy at the mentioned universities.

A.C.A. E.B.A. H.E.A. M.A. M.M.A. S.R.A. W.E.A. A.B. A.Bel. A.Bre. A.Bro. D.B. D.Bak. D.Ber. G.B. G.H.B. H.A.B.

Dr Alison Ainley University College, Dublin Prof. Edwin B. Allaire University of Texas, Austin Prof. Henry E. Allison Boston University Dr Milosˇ Arsenijevic´ University of Heidelberg Prof. Marilyn McCord Adams University of Oxford Dr Sophie Allen University of Oxford Prof. William E. Abraham University of California, Santa Cruz Prof. Akeel Bilgrami Columbia University Mr Andrew Belsey University of Wales, Cardiff Prof. Andrew Brennan University of Western Australia Prof. Alexander Broadie University of Glasgow Mr David Bostock University of Oxford Prof. David Bakhurst Queen’s University, Ontario Prof. David Berman Trinity College, Dublin Prof. George Bozonis University of Athens Prof. Graham Bird University of Manchester Prof. Hugo Adam Bedau Tufts University

H.I.B. I.B. J.B.B. J.Ber. J.Bish. J.Bro. J.W.B. K.B. K.Ber. L.W.B. M.B. N.B. R.L.B. R.P.B. S.B. S.W.B. T.L.B. T.R.B.

Prof. Harold I. Brown Northern Illinois University Sir Isaiah Berlin University of Oxford Prof. James Bogen Pitzer College Prof. Jose Bermudez Washington University, St Louis Dr John Bishop University of Auckland Prof. Justin Broackes Brown University See Alvin Goldman Prof. Kent Bach San Francisco State University See Pauza Prof. Lewis W. Beck University of Rochester Prof. Myles Brand Indiana University Prof. Ned Block New York University Prof. Robert Bernasconi Memphis State University Prof. Richard Bellamy University of Reading Prof. Sissela Bok Harvard University Prof. Simon Blackburn University of Cambridge Prof. Tom L. Beauchamp Georgetown University Prof. Thomas Baldwin University of York

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W.B. A.C. A.Car. B.J.C.

C.A.J.C. C.C.

D.C. D.E.C. F.C. F.Chr. J.C. J.Cot. L.J.C. M.C. M.J.C. N.C.

N.S.C. Q.C. R.Clif. R.Cri. S.C. S.R.L.C.

Prof. Dr Wilhelm Baumgartner University of Würzburg Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti University of Delhi Prof. Alisa Carse Georgetown University Prof. Jack Copeland University of Canterbury, New Zealand Prof. C. A. J. Coady University of Melbourne Prof. Charles Crittenden California State University, Northridge Dr David Charles University of Oxford Prof. David E. Cooper University of Durhan Prof. Frank Cioffi University of Essex Prof. Ferrell Christensen University of Alberta Prof. James Cargile University of Virginia Prof. John Cottingham University of Reading Mr L. Jonathan Cohen University of Oxford Mr Michael Cohen University of Wales, Swansea Prof. Max Cresswell Victoria University, Wellington Prof. Nancy Cartwright London School of Economics and Political Science Associate contributors T.Chi. Timothy Childers R.F.H. Robin Findlay Hendry T.U. Thomas E. Uebel Prof. Norman S. Care Oberlin College Prof. Quassim Cassam University College London Prof. Robert Clifton University of Western Ontario Dr Roger Crisp University of Oxford Prof. Steven Coutinho Towson University Prof. Stephen Clark University of Liverpool

T.C. T.Car. T.Chi. W.C. D.D. F.D. J.D. M.D. N.C.D. N.J.H.D. R.D. R.De G. R.S.D. W.A.D. D.E. J.D.G.E. P.E. E.J.F. J.M.F. N.F. O.F. P.K.F.

P.R.F. A.C.G. A.Gew.

Prof. Tim Crane University College London Prof. Terrell Carver University of Bristol See Cartwright Mr William Charlton University of Edinburgh Prof. Donald Davidson University of California, Berkeley Prof. Fred Dretske Stanford University Prof. Jonathan Dancy University of Reading Sir Michael Dummett University of Oxford Mr N. C. Denyer University of Cambridge Prof. Nicholas Dent University of Birmingham Prof. Ronald Dworkin University College London Prof. Richard T. De George University of Kansas Prof. R. S. Downie University of Glasgow Prof. Wayne A. Davis Georgetown University Prof. Dorothy Edgington University of Oxford Prof. J. D. G. Evans Queen’s University, Belfast Prof. Paul Edwards Brooklyn College Dr Elizabeth Frazer University of Oxford Prof. John Finnis University of Oxford Prof. Nicholas G. Fotion Emory University Prof. Owen Flanagan Duke University Prof. Paul K. Feyerabend University of California, Berkeley Prof. Philippa Foot University of Oxford Dr Anthony Grayling Birkbeck College, London Prof. Alan Gewirth University of Chicago

Contributors

A.Gom. A.Gup. A.H.G. A.I.G.

B.G. D.G. G.G. J.C.A.G. J.C.B.G. J.G.

J.Gar. J.O.G. J.P.G. L.E.G. L.P.G. M.D.G. M.G. P.G. P.Good. P.G.-S. P.L.G. R.G. R.M.G.

Dr Antoni Gomila University of Salamanca Prof. Anil Gupta Indiana University Prof. Alan Goldman University of Miami Prof. Alvin Goldman Rutgers University Associate contributor J.W.B. Prof. John Bender Prof. Bernard Gert Dartmouth College Prof. Don Gustafson University of Cincinnati Prof. Gary Gutting University of Notre Dame Prof. J. C. A. Gaskin Trinity College, Dublin Mr J. C. B. Gosling University of Oxford Prof. Jorge J. E. Gracia State University of New York, Buffalo Associate contributors M. G. Michael German E. M. Elizabeth Millan Dr James Garvey Royal Institute of Philosophy Prof. James O. Grunebaum Buffalo State College Prof. James P. Griffin University of Oxford Prof. Lenn E. Goodman Vanderbilt University Prof. Lloyd P. Gerson St Michael’s College, Toronto Dr Marcus Giaquinto University College London See Gracia Prof. Paul Gilbert University of Hull Prof. Peter Goodrich Birkbeck College, London Prof. Peter Godfrey-Smith Australian National University Mr Patrick Gardiner University of Oxford Prof. Reinhardt Grossmann Indiana University Prof. Richard M. Gale University of Pittsburgh

R.P.G.

Prof. Robert P. George Princeton University S.A.G. Prof. S. A. Grave University of Western Australia S.G. Dr Stefan Gosepath Hochschule der Künste, Berlin S.Gard. Prof. Sebastian Gardner University College, London S.Gau. Prof. Stephen Gaukroger University of Sydney A.H. Prof. Alastair Hannay University of Oslo B.H. Prof. Brad Hooker University of Reading C.H. Prof. Colin Howson London School of Economics and Political Science C.J.H. Prof. C. J. Hookway University of Sheffield D.W.H. Prof. D. W. Hamlyn Birkbeck College, London D.W.Has. Prof. D. W. Haslett University of Delaware E.L.H. Mr E. L. Hussey University of Oxford G.P.H. Mr Geoffrey Hawthorn University of Cambridge I.C.H. Ingrid Coggin Honderich Royal Institute of Philosophy J.Hal. Prof. John Haldane University of St Andrews J.Heil Prof. John Heil Washington University, St Louis J.Horn. Prof. Jennifer Hornsby Birkbeck College, London K.H. Prof. Karen Hanson Indiana University K.J.J.H. Prof. Jaakko Hintikka Boston University P.H. Prof. Paul Humphreys University of Virginia P.H.H. Prof. Peter H. Hare State University of New York, Buffalo P.M.S.H. Dr Peter Hacker University of Oxford R.B.H. Prof. R. Baine Harris Old Dominion University R.F.H. See Cartwright R.H. Dr Ross Harrison University of Cambridge

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R.Har. R.J.H. R.W.H. V.H. W.A.H. M.J.I. C.J. E.R.J. M.D.J. O.R.J. P.F.J. S.J. S.P.J. A.J.P.K. C.A.K. C.H.K. H.-H.K. J.A.K. J.J.K. J.K. J.Kek. L.K. M.K. P.K. R.K.

Prof. Russell Hardin New York University Mr R. J. Hawkins University of Oxford Prof. R. W. Hepburn University of Edinburgh Mr Vincent Hope University of Edinburgh Prof. Wilfrid Hodges Queen Mary and Westfield College, London Mr M. J. Inwood University of Oxford Prof. C. Janaway University of Southampton Dr Roger Jones Berea College, Kentucky Prof. Mark D. Jordan University of Notre Dame Mr O. R. Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth Prof. Paul F. Johnson St Norbert College Stuart Jeffries The Guardian Dr Simon James University of Durham Sir Anthony Kenny University of Oxford Mr Christopher Kirwan University of Oxford Prof. C. H. Koch University of Copenhagen Prof. Hans-Herbert Kögler University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign Dr Jill Kraye Warburg Institute, London Prof. Joel J. Kupperman University of Connecticut Prof. Jaegwon Kim Brown University Prof. John Kekes State University of New York, Albany Prof. Leszek Kolakowski University of Oxford Dr Martha Klein University of Oxford Prof. Peter King University of Toronto Prof. Robert Kirk University of Nottingham

S.T.K. W.K. A.J.L. A.R.L. B.L. E.J.L. H.L. J.L. J.Lac. J.Lev. K.-S.L. M.L. N.L. N.M.L. O.L. R.Le P. W.G.L. A.M. A.MacI. A.R.M. B.M. C.McK. D.M. D.McL. D.McN.

Prof. Steven T. Kuhn Georgetown University Prof. Will Kymlicka Queen’s University, Ontario Mr Ardon Lyon City University, London Dr Alan Lacey King’s College London Prof. Brian Leiter University of Texas, Austin Prof. E. J. Lowe University of Durham Dr Hallvard Lillehammer University of Cambridge Dr James Logue University of Oxford Prof. John Lachs Vanderbilt University Prof. Jerrold Levinson University of Maryland, College Park Prof. Kwang-Sae Lee Kent State University Prof. Margaret Little Georgetown University Prof. Noa Latham University of Calgary Prof. Nicola Lacey London School of Economics Prof. Oliver Leaman University of Kentucky Prof. Robin Le Poidevin University of Leeds Prof. William G. Lycan University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Prof. Adam Morton University of Alberta Prof. Alasdair MacIntyre University of Notre Dame Prof. Alfred R. Mele Florida State University Dr Benjamin Morison University of Oxford Prof. Catherine McKeen SUNY Brockport Dr Derek Matravers Open University Prof. David McLellan University of Kent, Canterbury Dr Mike McNamee University of Wales, Swansea

Contributors

E.J.M.

Dr Elinor Mason University of Edinburgh E.M. See Gracia F.MacB. Dr Fraser MacBride Birkbeck College, London G.B.M. Prof. Gareth B. Matthews University of Massachusetts, Amherst G.F.M. Prof. Gregory Mellema Calvin College G.I.M. Prof. George I. Mavrodes University of Michigan, Ann Arbor G.W.McC. Prof. Gregory McCulloch University of Nottingham J.J.M. Prof. Jack Macintosh University of Calgary J.M. Prof. Joseph Margolis Temple University J.McM. Prof. Jeff McMahan Rutgers University K.M. Dr Kevin Magill University of Wolverhampton M.G.F.M. Prof. Michael Martin University College London N.M. Prof. Nenad Misˇcˇevicˇ Central European University P.J.M. Dr Penelope Mackie University of Nottingham P.N.M. Mr Peter Momtchiloff Oxford University Press R.B.M. Prof. Ruth Barcan Marcus Yale University R.D.M. Prof. Ronald D. Milo University of Arizona S.M. Prof. Susan Mendus University of York S.McC. Prof. Storrs McCall McGill University S.M.-G. Dr Saladin Meckled-Garcia University College London C.N. Prof. Christopher Norris University of Wales, Cardiff H.W.N. Prof. Harold Noonan University of Nottingham J.N. Prof. Jan Narveson University of Waterloo P.J.P.N. Dr Paul Noordhof University of Nottingham

R.J.N. S.N. T.N. A.D.O. A.O’H. J.O’G. D.P. D.Pri. G.P. G.R.P. I.S.P. L.P.

M.J.P. M.P.

M.Pot. O.P. P.P. S.P. T.P. A.Q. P.L.Q. W.V.Q. B.B.R.

Prof. Richard Norman University of Kent, Canterbury Dr Svante Nordin University of Lund Prof. Thomas Nagel New York University Dr Alexander D. Oliver University of Cambridge Prof. Anthony O’Hear University of Buckingham Ms Jane O’Grady Fine Arts College, London Prof. David Papineau King’s College London Dr D. H. Pritchard University of Stirling Prof. Graham Priest University of Melbourne Prof. Graham Parkes University of Hawaii, Manoa Prof. Ingmar Persson University of Lund Dr Letizia Panizza Royal Holloway College, London Prof. M. J. Petry Erasmus University Dr Miroslav Pauza Institute of Philosophy, Prague Associate contributors K.Ber. Prof. Karel Berka V.S. Dr Vera Soudilova Prof. Matjazˇ Potrcˇ University of Ljubljana Dr Oliver Pooley University of Oxford Prof. Philip Pettit Princeton University Mr Stephen Priest University of Oxford Dr Thomas Pink King’s College London The Rt. Hon. Lord Quinton University of Oxford Prof. Philip L. Quinn University of Notre Dame Prof. W. V. Quine Harvard University Mr Bede Rundle University of Oxford

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Contributors

M.R. N.R. P.R. S.D.R. S.L.R. B.C.S. D.H.S. E.S. E.T.S. J.E.R.S. J.M.S. J.P.S. J.R.S. J.S. K.-l. S. L.F.S. L.S. M.S. P.F.S. P.S. R.A.K.S. R.A.S. R.C.Sle. R.C.Sol. R.G.S.

Prof. Michael Ruse Florida State University Prof. Nicholas Rescher University of Pittsburgh Prof. Peter Railton University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Dr Sarah Richmond University College London Dr Stephen Read University of St Andrews Dr Barry C. Smith Birkbeck College, London Prof. David H. Sanford Duke University Prof. Ernest Sosa Brown University Prof. Edward Sankowski University of Oklahoma Mr Roger Squires University of St Andrews Prof. John Skorupski University of St Andrews Prof. James P. Sterba University of Notre Dame Prof. John Searle University of California, Berkeley Dr Jeremy Stangroom The Philosophers’ Magazine Prof. Kwong-loi Shun University of California, Berkeley Mr Leslie F. Stevenson University of St Andrews Prof. Lawrence Sklar University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Prof. Michael Slote University of Miami Professor Paul Snowdon University College London Prof. Peter Singer Princeton University Dr Rowland Stout University College, Dublin Prof. Robert Sharpe University of Wales, Lampeter Prof. R. C. Sleigh, Jr. University of Massachusetts, Amherst Prof. Robert C. Solomon University of Texas, Austin Prof. R. G. Swinburne University of Oxford

R.M.S.

Prof. Mark Sainsbury University of Texas, Austin R.S. Prof. Richard Schacht University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign R.W.S. Prof. R. W. Sharples University College London S.S. Prof. Stewart Shapiro Ohio State University T.S. Prof. Timothy Schroeder University of Manitoba T.L.S.S. Prof. T. L. S. Sprigge University of Edinburgh V.S. See Pauza V.Such. Dr Victor Suchar Bath Royal Literary and Scientific Institute B.T. Prof. Bergeth Tregenza California State University, Northridge C.C.W.T. Prof. C. C. W. Taylor University of Oxford G.M.T. Prof. G. M. Tamas Hungarian Academy of Sciences I.T. Prof. Ivo Tretera Charles University, Prague L.S.T. Prof. Larry S. Temkin Rutgers University R.E.T. Prof. Robert Tully St Michael’s College, Toronto R.P.L.T. Dr Roger Teichmann University of Oxford T.U. See Cartwright R.V. Mr. Ruediger Vaas University of Giessen A.D.W. Mr Andrew Williams University of Reading A.W.W. Prof. Allen Wood Stanford University Cath.W. Prof. Catherine Wilson University of British Columbia C.J.F.W. Prof. C. J. F. Williams University of Bristol C.W. Mr Colwyn Williamson University of Wales, Swansea D.N.W. Prof. Douglas Walton University of Winnipeg G.J.W. Sir Geoffrey Warnock University of Oxford I.P.W. Prof. John White Institute of Education, London Prof. Jan Wolen´ski J.Wol. Jagiellonian University, Cracow

Contributors

J.Woo. K.W. K.Wuch. M.W. M.Walz. M.Warn.

Prof. John Woods University of British Columbia Prof. Kwasi Wiredu University of South Florida Prof. Dr Kurt Wuchterl University of Stuttgart Prof. Michael Wreen Marquette University Prof. Michael Walzer Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton Baroness Warnock University of Cambridge

P.W. R.C.W. R.S.W. S.W. T.W. H.Z.

Ms Patricia Walsh King’s College London Prof. Roy C. Weatherford University of South Florida Prof. Roger Woolhouse University of York Dr Sybil Wolfram University of Oxford Prof. Timothy Williamson University of Oxford Prof. Hossein Ziai University of California, Los Angeles

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On Using the Book In one way there is little need for an entry in this book to contain crossreferences to other entries. This is so since the reader can safely assume that almost every philosophical term which is used for an idea or doctrine or whatever also has an entry to itself. The same is true of almost every philosopher who is mentioned. That is not all. Entries can be counted on for very many subjects which fall under such common terms as ‘beauty’, ‘causation’, ‘democracy’, ‘guilt’, ‘knowledge’, ‘mind’, and ‘time’—all such subjects which get philosophical attention. Still, it seems a good idea to provide occasional reminders of the general possibility of having more lights shed on something by turning elsewhere. And there is often a good reason for prompting or directing a reader to look elsewhere, a reason of which a reader may be unaware. So occasionally a term in an entry is preceded by an asterisk, indicating that it is the heading or the first word of the heading of another entry. For the same reason an asterisked term or terms may appear on a line at the end of an entry. In some cases the latter references are to related or opposed ideas or the like. In order not to have the book littered with asterisks, they have very rarely been put on the names of philosophers. But it is always a good idea to turn to the entries on the mentioned philosophers. The cross-references are more intended for the browsing reader than the reader at work. For the reader at work, there is an Index and List of Entries at the back of the book. The Index and List of Entries usually gives references to more related entries than are given by cross-references in and at the end of an entry. It is also possible to look up all the entries on, say, aesthetics or American philosophy or applied ethics. The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori and a posteriori. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on Logical Symbols as well as the appendices A Chronological Table of Philosophy and Maps of Philosophy.

A abandonment. A rhetorical term used by existentialist

philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre to describe the absence of any sources of ethical authority external to oneself. It suggests that one might have expected to find such an authority, either in religion or from an understanding of the natural world, and that the discovery that there is none leads one to feel ‘abandoned’. For existentialists such as Sartre, however, this sense of abandonment is only a prelude to the recognition that ethical values can be grounded from within a reflective understanding of the conditions under which individuals can attain *authenticity in their lives. Thus the conception of abandonment is essentially an existentialist dramatization of Kant’s rejection of heteronomous conceptions of value in favour of the *autonomy of the good will. t.r.b. *existentialism; despair. J.-P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. P. Mairet (London, 1948).

abduction. Abductive reasoning accepts a conclusion on the grounds that it explains the available evidence. The term was introduced by Charles Peirce to describe an inference pattern sometimes called ‘hypothesis’ or ‘*inference to the best explanation’. He used the example of arriving at a Turkish seaport and observing a man on horseback surrounded by horsemen holding a canopy over his head. He inferred that this was the governor of the province since he could think of no other figure who would be so greatly honoured. In his later work, Peirce used the word more widely: the logic of abduction examines all of the norms which guide us in formulating new hypotheses and deciding which of them to take seriously. It addresses a wide range of issues concerning the ‘logic of discovery’ and the economics of research. c.j.h. *induction. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, vii (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 89–164.

Abelard, Peter (1079–1142). Most widely known for his

love affair with Héloïse, about which we learn a good deal from his letters to her as well as from his Historia Calamitatum. He was also one of the great controversialists of his era. After studying under Roscelin (c.1095) and William of Champeaux (c.1100), he established himself as a master in

his own right, and one to whom students flocked throughout his career. In the dispute about the nature of *universals he was in the nominalist camp, holding that universals are utterances (voces) or mental terms, not things in the real world. The universality of a universal derives from the fact that it is predicable of many things. Nevertheless, unless a number of things are in the same state, the one universal term cannot be predicated of them. Hence although universals are not themselves real things, it is a common feature of real things that justifies the predication of a universal of them. In his Dialectica Abelard takes up, among numerous other topics, the question, widely discussed in the Middle Ages, of the relation between human freedom and divine providence. If God, who is omniscient, knows that we are going to perform a given act, is it not necessary that we perform it, and in that case how can the act be free? Abelard’s answer is that we do indeed act freely and that it is not merely our acts but our free acts that come under divine providence. God’s foreknowing them carries no implication that we are not free to avoid performing them. a.bro. *Heloïse complex; properties; qualities. Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen, 1970). J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 2002).

ableism. Prejudice against people with disabilities, which can take many forms. It can take the form of a prejudice against using sign language with those who are deaf even when only a small percentage of them can master the alternatives of lipreading and speaking. It also shows itself as a prejudice against the use of Braille with the blind or visually impaired even when this makes them less efficient readers than they might be. In general, it is a prejudice against performing activities in ways that are better for disabled people. j.p.s. *disability and morality. Anita Silvers, ‘People with Disabilities’, in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Oxford, 2003).

abortion. Human beings develop gradually inside women’s bodies. The death of a newly fertilized human egg does not seem the same as the death of a person. Yet

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abortion

there is no obvious line that divides the gradually developing foetus from the adult. Hence abortion poses a difficult ethical issue. Those who defend women’s rights to abortion often refer to themselves as ‘pro-choice’ rather than as ‘proabortion’. In this way they seek to bypass the issue of the moral status of the foetus, and instead make the right to abortion a question of individual liberty. But it cannot simply be assumed that a woman’s right to have an abortion is a question of individual liberty, for it must first be established that the aborted foetus is not a being worthy of protection. If the foetus is worthy of protection, then laws against abortion do not create ‘victimless crimes’ as laws against homosexual relations between consenting adults do. So the question of the moral status of the foetus cannot be avoided. The central argument against abortion may be put like this: It is wrong to kill an innocent human being. A human foetus is an innocent human being. Therefore it is wrong to kill a human foetus. Defenders of abortion usually deny the second premiss of this argument. The dispute about abortion then becomes a dispute about whether a foetus is a human being, or, in other words, when a human life begins. Opponents of abortion challenge others to point to any stage in the gradual process of human development that marks a morally significant dividing-line. Unless there is such a line, they say, we must either upgrade the status of the earliest embryo to that of the child, or downgrade the status of the child to that of the foetus; and no one advocates the latter course. The most commonly suggested dividing-lines between the fertilized egg and the child are birth and viability. Both are open to objection. A prematurely born infant may well be less developed in these respects than a foetus nearing the end of its normal term, and it seems peculiar to hold that we may not kill the premature infant, but may kill the more developed foetus. The point of viability varies according to the state of medical technology, and, again, it is odd to hold that a foetus has a right to life if the pregnant woman lives in London, but not if she lives in New Guinea. Those who wish to deny the foetus a right to life may be on stronger ground if they challenge the first, rather than the second, premiss of the argument set out above. To describe a being as ‘human’ is to use a term that straddles two distinct notions: membership of the species Homo sapiens, and being a person, in the sense of a rational or self-conscious being. If ‘human’ is taken as equivalent to ‘person’, the second premiss of the argument, which asserts that the foetus is a human being, is clearly false; for one cannot plausibly argue that a foetus is either rational or self-conscious. If, on the other hand, ‘human’ is taken to mean no more than ‘member of the species Homo sapiens’, then it needs to be shown why mere membership of a given biological species should be a sufficient basis for a

right to life. Rather, the defender of abortion may wish to argue, we should look at the foetus for what it is—the actual characteristics it possesses—and value its life accordingly. p.s. *applied ethics; double effect. D. Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge, 2002). Rosalind Hursthouse, Beginning Lives (Oxford, 1987). Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, in Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford, 1986). Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford, 1983).

Absolute, the. That which has an unconditioned exist-

ence, not conditioned by, relative to, or dependent upon anything else. Usually deemed to be the whole of things, conceived as unitary, as spiritual, as self-knowing (at least in part via the human mind), and as rationally intelligible, as finite things, considered individually, are not. The expression was introduced into philosophy by Schelling and Hegel. In the English speaking world it became the key concept of such absolute idealists as Josiah Royce and F. H. Bradley. t.l.s.s. *idealism, philosophical. J. N. Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute (London, 1970). T. L. S. Sprigge, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh, 1983).

absolutism, moral. The view that certain kinds of actions

are always wrong or are always obligatory, whatever the consequences. Typical candidates for such absolute principles would be that it is always wrong deliberately to kill an innocent human being, or that one ought always to tell the truth or to keep one’s promises. Absolutism is to be contrasted with *consequentialism, the view that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined solely by the extent to which they lead to good or bad consequences. A consequentialist could maintain, for example, that *killing is normally wrong because it creates a great deal of grief and suffering and deprives the person who is killed of the future happiness which he/she would have experienced, but that since, in some cases, a refusal to kill may lead to even more suffering and loss of happiness, it may sometimes be right even to kill the innocent. Moral absolutism is linked to, but not synonymous with, a *deontological position in ethics. The latter is the view that certain kinds of actions are intrinsically right or wrong—right or wrong simply because they are that kind of action—independently of the consequences to which they may lead. Killing the innocent, for instance, may be thought to be wrong just because it is the killing of the innocent, quite apart from the suffering and loss of happiness to which it will normally lead. A deontological position obviously contrasts with a consequentialist one, and may appear to be the same as absolutism, but in fact the two are distinct. One may hold that killing the innocent is intrinsically wrong, but also accept that in certain extreme circumstances the intrinsic wrongness of killing the innocent may itself be overriden by the appalling consequences

academic freedom

which will occur if one refuses to kill. Absolutism builds on a deontological position but adds a stronger claim— not only is the action intrinsically wrong, but its wrongness can never be overridden by any consideration of consequences. The absolutist position corresponds to common traditional views of morality, particularly of a religious kind— what might be called the ‘Ten Commandments’ idea of morality. Nevertheless, when detached from appeals to religious authority absolutism may appear to be vulnerable to rational criticism. Is it not perverse to maintain that a certain kind of action is simply ruled out, even when the refusal to perform it will lead to even worse consequences? Why insist on never killing the innocent, for instance, if in certain circumstances a refusal to do so will mean that more innocent people will die? To be plausible, absolutism needs to be supplemented with some further distinction between different ways in which consequences may come about, such as the distinction between *acts and omissions, or the doctrine of *double effect. The absolutist who refuses to condone the killing of the innocent, even though more innocent people will die as a result of not doing so, can then say that though the loss of innocent lives is a terrible thing; nevertheless, letting innocent people die, or bringing about innocent deaths as an unintended side-effect, is not ruled out by an absolute prohibition in the same way as is the intentional killing of the innocent. Whether this is a sufficient defence of absolutism remains a matter for debate. r.j.n. *ideals, moral; lying. G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, in Collected Philosophical Papers, iii (Oxford, 1981). Jonathan Bennett, ‘Whatever the Consequences’, in Analysis (1966). Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge, 1979).

abstract entities. The dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete is supposed to effect a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ontological classification. The dichotomy is, however, too naïve to be of theoretical use. There are many different ways, themselves vague, to mark the distinction: abstract entities are not perceptible, cannot be pointed to, have no causes or effects, have no spatio-temporal location, are necessarily existent. Nor is there agreement about whether there are any abstract entities, and, if so, which sorts of entity are abstract. Abstract entities, conceived as having no causal powers, are thought problematic for epistemological reasons: how can we refer to or know anything about entities with which we have no causal commerce? Hence the existence of nominalists, who try to do without abstract entities. a.d.o. *universals; nominalism; proposition. B. Hale, Abstract Objects (Oxford, 1987).

abstract ideas: see ideas.

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abstraction. A putative psychological process for the

acquisition of a *concept x either by attending to the features common to all and only xs or by disregarding just the spatio-temporal locations of xs. The existence of abstraction is endorsed by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (esp. ii. xi. 9 and 10 and iii. iii. 6ff.) but rejected by Berkeley in The Principles of Human Knowledge (esp. paras. 6ff. and paras. 98, 119, and 125). For Locke the capacity to abstract distinguishes human beings from animals. It enables them to think in abstract ideas and hence use language. Berkeley argues that the concept of an abstract *idea is incoherent because it entails both the inclusion and the exclusion of one and the same property. This in turn is because any such putative idea would have to be general enough to subsume all xs yet precise enough to subsume only xs. For example, the abstract idea of triangle ‘is neither oblique nor rectangular, equilateral nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once’ (The Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, para. 13). s.p. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689). Stephen Priest, The British Empiricists (London, 1990).

abstract particulars: see properties, individual. absurd, the. A term used by existentialists to describe that

which one might have thought to be amenable to reason but which turns out to be beyond the limits of rationality. For example, in Sartre’s philosophy the ‘original choice’ of one’s fundamental project is said to be ‘absurd’, since, although choices are normally made for reasons, this choice lies beyond reason because all reasons for choice are supposed to be grounded in one’s fundamental project. Arguably, this case in fact shows that Sartre is mistaken in supposing that reasons for choice are themselves grounded in a choice; and one can argue that other cases which are supposed to involve experience of the ‘absurd’ are in fact a *reductio ad absurdum of the assumptions which produce this conclusion. The ‘absurd’ does not in fact play an essential role within existentialist philosophy; but it is an important aspect of the broader cultural context of existentialism, for example in the ‘theatre of the absurd’, as exemplified by the plays of Samuel Beckett. t.r.b. *abandonment; existentialism. A. Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (London, 1955). J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. H. Barnes (London, 1958), 479.

academic freedom. An integral aspect of open societies, academic freedom is the right of teachers in universities and other sectors of education to teach and research as their subject and conscience demands. This right, though, may not be unproblematically applicable, even in free societies. Should academic freedom be extended to those perceived by others as using it to interfere with the rights

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academic freedom

of others, or to pursue morally objectionable research? Like other *freedoms, in practice academic freedom is constrained by often tacit conventions regarding its limits. One should never underestimate the ingenuity of academics themselves in justifying denials of academic freedom to their colleagues. a.o’h. *persecution of philosophers; teaching and indoctrinating. C. Russell, Academic Freedom (London, 1993).

Academy, the. The educational institution founded by Plato, probably around 387 bc, so-called because of its location at a site sacred to the hero Academus. It is fanciful to call the Academy a ‘university’ or ‘college’. The best idea we have of the subjects studied there comes from Plato’s dialogues themselves and Aristotle’s testimony. When Plato died, the leadership of the Academy passed to his nephew Speusippus. About 275 the so-called Middle Academy came to be dominated by *Sceptics under the leadership of Arcesilaus. This dominance continued through the middle of the second century when Carneades founded the New Academy. In 87/6 Antiochus of Ascalon broke away from the sceptical tradition of Platonic interpretation to try to recover what he regarded as a more authentic form of Platonism. Since the physical structures of the original Academy had been destroyed with the fall of Athens in 88, Antiochus’ Academic leadership was more notional than real. Though the Academy was revived in the later fourth century ad, it was destroyed finally by Justinian in 529. l.p.g. *philosophy, history of centres and departments of. J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy 347–274 BC (Oxford, 2003). —— The Middle Platonists 80 BC to AD 220 (Ithaca, NY, 1977).

access, privileged: see privileged access. accident. The term ‘accident’ in philosophy has two main uses, both stemming from Aristotle. In the first an accident is a quality which is not essential to the kind of thing (or in later philosophers, to the individual) in question. ‘Being musical’ is accidental to Socrates, ‘being rational’ and ‘being an animal’ are not. Which *qualities, if any, are essential or non-accidental is a controversial matter in contemporary philosophy. In the second main use, the term ‘accident’ is a way of allowing chance and causality to coexist: digging for truffles I turn up some treasure. The digging was not an accident, and since the treasure was there all along, my finding it if I dug there was determined; none the less, my finding of it was accidental, since my digging was a digging for truffles, not for treasure. Typically, events which are accidental under one description are determined under another. In non-philosophical contexts the term often connotes harmful accidents. j.j.m. *properties, general. J. L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses’, in Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1961).

Irving Copi, ‘Essence and Accident’, in Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds (Ithaca, NY, 1977).

Achilles paradox. A paradox of motion, due to Zeno of Elea. In a race, Achilles can never catch the tortoise, if the tortoise is given a head start. For while Achilles closes the initial gap between them, the tortoise will have created a new gap, and while Achilles is closing that one, the tortoise will have created another. However fast Achilles runs, all that the tortoise has to do, in order not to be beaten, is make some progress in the time it takes Achilles to close the previous gap. Standard responses include claiming that the argument misconceives the implicit ideas of infinite series and their limits; alternatively, that space is not adequately described in purely mathematical terms. Zeno’s own response is not documented. One hypothesis is that he took the conclusion at face value, as part of a general scepticism concerning matter, space, and motion. r.m.s. *infinity. Mark Sainsbury, Paradoxes (New York, 1988), ch. 1.

acquaintance and description. A distinction between two kinds of knowledge, crucial to Russell’s philosophy, and analogous to that between connaître and savoir. We are not acquainted with Sir Walter Scott, so we know him only by description, for example as the author of Waverley. By contrast, we can know one of our experiences ‘by acquaintance’, that is, without the intermediary of any definite description. More generally, to know a thing by description is to know that there is something uniquely thus and so; to know a thing by acquaintance is for it to come before the mind without the intermediary of any description. Knowledge by description involves knowledge of truths, whereas knowledge by acquaintance does not: it is knowledge of things. For Russell, acquaintance is basic on two counts: all understanding rests upon acquaintance (with what the word or concept stands for); and all knowledge of truths depends upon acquaintance with those things which the truths concern. r.m.s. *descriptions, theory of. B. Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vi (London, 1992); first pub. in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1911). —— The Problems of Philosophy (London, 1912), ch. 5.

action. An action is sometimes defined as someone’s doing something intentionally. The phenomenon of human action owes its importance both to questions about *agents’ metaphysical status, and to ethical and legal questions about human *freedom and *responsibility. Recently many philosophers have thought that an account of action (the phenomenon) should proceed via an account of actions (events). When an action is defined as someone’s doing something intentionally, actions are

active and passive intellects

taken to be a species of event, and events are taken to be particulars which can be described in different ways. On this account, Jane’s moving of her fingers against the keyboard, where it results in sounds of piano playing, is Jane’s playing of the piano. Thus Jane does two things—move her fingers and play the piano—although there is only one action here. Typically someone who does something does several ‘linked’ things, each one being done by or in doing some other. (*Basic action.) According to the definition, for there to be an action a person only has to have done intentionally one (at least) of the things she did. So Jane’s waking up the neighbours could be an action, even though she didn’t intentionally wake them: it would be, if it were also her playing of the piano, and she did play the piano intentionally. When this definition is combined with the thought that it is by moving her body that a person does anything, the claim that actions are bodily movements is made: every action is an event of a person’s moving (the whole or a part of ) her body. The definition is not uncontroversial. Some philosophers (such as Goldman) deny that a person’s doing one thing can be the same as her doing another; they believe that events should be ‘finely individuated’, not ‘coarsely’, so that only some actions, not all of them, are bodily movements. Other philosophers deny that actions are events at all: either they think that there are no such things as particular events, or they allow that there are events but say that actions are not among them. Even a proponent of the definition will acknowledge that it does not cover all of the ground where attributions of responsible agency can be made. (1) A person may be said to have done something when she keeps perfectly still—when, apparently, no event occurs. In such cases, it seems intuitively right that to say there is an instance of action only if the person intentionally kept still. Thus it may still be thought that ‘doing something intentionally’ marks out action: the original definition can be seen to be basically right, but it has to be conceded that there is not always an event when there is an instance of action, and that no fully general link can be made between action and bodily movement. (2) A person may be answerable for doing something that she didn’t intentionally do: for instance, when she starts a fire by idly throwing away her lighted cigarette. To cover cases like this, more resources than the word ‘intentionally’ are needed. But further elucidation of ‘intentionally’ may uncover a range of concepts which can in turn illuminate a broad conception of responsible agency. A person’s doing of something intentionally, it may be argued, always results from that person’s believing something and her desiring something, which jointly constitute her having a reason to do the thing. The definition of actions, then, may be part of a view according to which a certain sort of causal history distinguishes actions from other events. Such a view fell from philosophical favour in the 1950s and 1960s, but has by now been largely restored to credibility. The view has many variants. In a traditional

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empiricist version, each action is caused by a *volition. In some quarters, the traditional version has been supplanted by the thesis that each action is itself an event of someone’s *trying to do something: the suggestion is that a person’s having a reason to do something leads her to attempt to do it, and then, when her attempt actually has the effects she wants, as usually it does, it is her doing the thing intentionally. Giving someone’s reasons is a matter of saying why she did what she did, so that the idea of a distinctive kind of explanation—action explanation—enters the picture when an action is seen to result from someone’s having a reason. (*Reasons and causes.) Also introduced is the idea of a distinctive kind of thinking from which action issues— *practical reason, or deliberation, an account of which requires understanding of (at least) *belief, desire, valuing, *intention, and choice. j.horn. *choosing and deciding; mental causation. D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980). A. I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton, NJ, 1970). J. Hornsby, Actions (London, 1980). A. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of Action (Oxford, 1997).

action, basic: see basic action. action at a distance. That one event could have direct causal influence on another spatially separated from it without causation being propagated continuously from point to point has often been met with scepticism. In the nineteenth century field theories ‘filled in’ the causation between particles with spatially continuous fields. But field theories have their own problems, especially with the interaction of the source particle of the field with its own generated field. These have led to contemporary action at a distance theories of interaction. In order to conform to the observed facts and to relativity, these must posit a time delay between cause and spatially distant effect. In order to account for the behaviour of the source, both retarded and advanced effects must be posited. While the denial of action at a distance is built into quantum field theory and into many accounts of causation (Hume, Reichenbach, Salmon), the famous space-like correlations of *quantum mechanics are a difficulty for those who deny action at a distance. l.s. *causality. P. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry (Berkeley, Calif., 1974), sect. 5.8. J. Earman, A Primer of Determinism (Dordrecht, 1986), ch. 4, sects. 7, 8.

active and passive intellects. Two powers relating to conceptual thought associated with Aristotelian philosophy. In De anima Aristotle distinguishes between the *mind as a capacity for conceptual thinking (the passive intellect), and another power (the active intellect) which forms concepts and activates the latent capacity for thought. The interpretation of these notions has been a

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active and passive intellects

matter of controversy since antiquity and remains unresolved today. Some medieval Arabic commentators regarded the active intellect as a single immaterial principle to which all thinkers are related; other medievals held this to be so in respect of both intellects. Aquinas argued instead that the two intellects are simply powers of the mind of each thinker. Conceived in this way the distinction corresponds to that recurrent in cognitive psychology between concept-forming and concept-employing capacities. It also bears upon the debate between nativism and abstractionism in relation to the source of *ideas. j.hal. *acts, mental. Z. Kuksewicz, ‘The Potential and the Agent Intellect’, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982).

acts and omissions. The moral distinction between acts and omissions amounts to the claim that there is a morally significant difference between a particular action and a corresponding failure to act, even though they have the same outcomes. Thus, it is said that there is a moral difference between, for example, lying and not telling the truth, hindering and failing to help, and between *killing and letting die, even though, in each case, the consequences of the action and the omission may be the same. There is undoubtedly some obscurity about the distinction. Understanding it is complicated by the somewhat untidy concept of an omission. Roughly speaking, an omission of mine may be said to occur when I fail to do something which I might reasonably have been expected to do. Such an omission may or may not be a matter of moral censure, depending on what duties I have and what expectations they give rise to. However, since the fact that something is an omission settles no moral questions, it is mistaken to interpret the acts–omissions distinction as straightforwardly differentiating between what we are obliged not to do and what we are allowed to do. Hence it is not the claim that killing, for instance, is morally forbidden while letting die is morally permissible. Nor does it seem helpful to see the distinction as hanging on a difference in intention, for, clearly, both a case of killing and a case of letting die would have to be intentional, as opposed to accidental, to raise serious moral questions. The point of the distinction seems rather to be to assert that there are prima-facie differences in gravity in the moral logic of the two areas, i.e. that cases of positive commission require reasons that are morally weightier than, and perhaps different in kind from, those that would justify an omission. Thus not killing and not lying, for example, are held to be morally more basic than saving lives and telling the truth, even though the latter are also a matter of moral duty. As a cornerstone of *deontological ethics, the acts– omissions distinction is vulnerable to the usual criticisms by *consequentialism and its proponents. But some of these criticisms are misguided: utilitarian dismissals of the distinction are often based on the idea that it amounts to,

for instance, a denial of the duty to save life. Yet one does not have to refute the distinction to establish the moral duty to save lives. If we can be held just as responsible for the things we fail to do as for the things we do, we need not deny what the distinction asserts—that there is a difference between the moral ground we should be able to take for granted and the moral ground we have to struggle continuously to gain. p.w. *absolutism, moral. E. D’Arcy, Human Acts (Oxford, 1963).

acts, linguistic: see linguistic acts. acts, mental. (1) Mental actions; or, less commonly, (2) *mental events in general. Mental events that are not mental actions include suddenly remembering where one left one’s keys and noticing that it is raining. Paradigmatic mental actions include adding numbers in one’s head, deliberating, and (one some views) choosing and trying. The precise difference between mental events that are actions and those that are not is a vexed question (sometimes examined under the rubric ‘activity versus passivity’). Whether there is a single concept of action that includes both mental actions and actions essentially involving peripheral bodily movement is controversial. The promising idea that actions are analysable as events with ‘the right sort’ of psychological–causal history may provide the key to both questions, provided that the right sort of history does not itself essentially include actions. a.r.m. *active and passive intellects; mental states; volitions. B. O’Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (Cambridge, 1980).

Adams, Marilyn McCord (1943– ). American philosopher (at Michigan, UCLA, Yale, and Oxford) who has written particularly on medieval philosophy and in philosophy of religion. She is the author, inter alia, of numerous papers on various topics, and of a monumental two-volume study of William of Ockham (1987). She has written on the problems of *evil. For example, in ‘Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God’, considering ‘evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of ) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could . . . be a great good to one on the whole’, she argues that ‘the how of God’s victory’ can be rendered intelligible for Christians ‘by integrating participation in horrendous evils into a person’s relationship with God’. Her work often offers solutions for believers using terms internal to Christian tradition. Arguably, it also clarifies religious views for non-believers. Spouse of R. Adams. e.t.s. *Anselm. Marilyn McCord Adams, ‘Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God’, in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (eds.), The Problem of Evil (Oxford, 1990).

Adorno, Theodor

Adams, Robert M. (1937– ). American philosopher (at Michigan, UCLA, Yale, and Oxford) who has done work in philosophy of religion, ethics, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. His book The Virtue of Faith incorporates diverse aspects of his views in philosophy of religion, with references. Another example of his writing is the paper ‘Involuntary Sins’ (Philosophical Review (1985))