The Ottoman Empire and the Bosnian Uprising 9780755607730, 9781780761114

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To my lovely children, Gu¨lru, Yahya and Katre, and to my husband, I˙brahim

INTRODUCTION

During my Masters degree study on the abolition of the janissary corps and its repercussions in 1826, I placed special emphasis on the provincial responses to the abolition. At the same time I realized that, among the Ottoman provinces, Bosnia showed the strongest reaction in that its cities and districts were not pacified for a long time. Even a short perusal of archival documents showed that the period of rebellion followed a fluctuating line, with short periods of suppression, followed by recurring reactions. In addition, these reactions were not limited only to ‘the professional janissaries’, but almost all members of the various strata of society took an active part in the rebellion. When I broadened my research, I realized that the Bosnians were not only against the abolition of the janissary corps, but were also uncomfortable about the changes brought about by the centralization and reform policies of the state in general. In terms of local issues, centralization and reform meant a new army for the Bosnians as well as a new land system, a new administration, a change in the status of non-Muslims to the disadvantage of Muslim Bosnians and the establishment of a more interventionist state than before. The reaction of the Bosnians against the centralization policies took the form of outbreaks of rebellion against the Ottoman centre. This reactionary position of Bosnia drove me to study the topic further. Therefore, this study seeks to analyse the reactions of the Bosnians to the centralization and reform policies of the Porte between 1826

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

and 1836. It is important to note that the period under consideration witnessed many rebellions in Bosnia, large and small, some of which affected only very limited areas and could be suppressed through small-scale interventions. Two of these rebellions, however – the one that took place after the abolition of the janissary corps and the rebellion of Hu¨seyin Kapudan – affected the whole region and could only be suppressed through large-scale interventions. In both of these rebellions, although the leaders had changed, the general participation and demands of the rebels as well as the reasons for the rebellion followed a very similar pattern, indicating, in essence, a certain continuity which can be formulated as ‘reactions against the centralization policies of the empire’. For this reason, I prefer to evaluate the process as two stages of a period of rebellion rather than calling them two separate rebellions. Within this context, the study first examines the Bosnian rebellion against the abolition of the janissary corps in 1826 and then focuses on the subsequent rebellion of 1831 against the new orders of the Porte, the nizaˆmaˆt, including the changes in land tenure and in the military system, the changes in uniform as well as the changes in the status of some districts of Bosnia. The main aim of this study is, therefore, to discuss the underlying factors that led the local people to rebel against the central authority, as well as the reasons for the tumultuous situation of the region and the social, political and economic effects on the lives of its inhabitants. It also tries to show how these reactions by local people were interpreted by the Ottoman statesmen, including the Sultan, and what kind of counter-measures were taken by the central authorities. In that sense, my examination of the rebellion tries not only to describe the dynamics of a regional, organized, popular resistance, but also to demonstrate the perception of the state towards the rebellion and show its methods of suppression. However, this does not mean that the study seeks to analyse all the social, political and economic dynamics of Bosnia during the period under discussion. Rather, it attempts to present the all-embracing reasons that led the Bosnians to rebel against the central authorities. Thus, the basic aim of this study is to focus on ten years in Bosnia, between 1826 and 1836, in order to show how

INTRODUCTION

3

underlying factors paved the way for popular rebellions. In this respect, in spite of the suggestion that clear-cut distinctions of the period would have led the people of the region to rebel, it is believed that historical continuities provided the background for the rebellion. It is mainly for this reason that the study has been extended until 1836, four years after the rebellion of Hu¨seyin Kapudan had been suppressed, in order to show that the problems did not end even with the suppression of rebellion. On the contrary, it was only the first phase in the establishment of the new order in which the changes followed a very tortuous path, and occasionally even a regressive one. In this context, in order to understand the reasons behind the reactions of the Bosnians, this study mainly seeks answers to the following questions: why did the Bosnian people become so reactive during the centralization and reform programme of Mahmud II? What were the real causes of their grievances? Did the rebellion include a national agenda? What form did the rebellion take? Who were the rebels? What were the social classes, professions, religious beliefs, etc., of the rebels? What kind of stimuli motivated the rebels? Did the rebellion arise because of a shared consciousness? Where did the rebellion occur? What were the aims of the rebels? Who were the leaders of the rebellion? What was the policy of Ottoman statesmen towards the Bosnian rebellion? In what ways did the central authorities suppress the rebellion? Were the rebels punished? What kind of punishments took place? What were the effects of the rebellion on the lives of the Bosnians? In this respect, this study seeks to provide a profile of a ‘regional– provincial rebellion’ and, related to this, the perception and response of the Ottoman centre in terms of coping with a provincial rebellion. As the questions above indicate, this study is built mainly on a twodimensional approach. First, concentrating on the rebels within an inductive approach, it tries to define the rebels from all points of view; including their demands, aims and grievances. In that sense, the study looks at the popular resistance from the ‘rebel’ point of view. Since defining the rebels is closely associated with having an intimate knowledge of the historical background of that province,

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there is a special stress on Bosnia’s geography, people and population, social life, administration, military organization and land tenure system, as well as its economy. Second, by focusing on the policies of the state in terms of coping with the rebellion, the study seeks to analyse the internal dynamics of the state administration by looking at it from within. It tries to find reliable answers to the questions: ‘How did Ottoman statesmen cope with internal conflicts within Bosnia during the period under discussion?’ and ‘What kind of counter-measures and policies did they initiate?’ Studies of archival materials show that, in dealing with the rebellion, apart from suppressive movements against the rebels, the Ottoman centre put into practice a series of different counter-measures and policies. The change of valis in Bosnia when crises were at their peak, the dispatch of selected officials with special missions to the region or the utilization of promotions and rewards to win the support of indigenous notables in particular, were among the most prominent policies that the state put into practice. Detailed research on those measures and policies not only makes clear the multiplicity of motivations and interests represented in the resolution of these internal conflicts, but also exemplifies the methods of provincial administration used by the state, its expectations of its subjects, and hence its perception about itself. Moreover, the variety of materials consulted for the study brings out new questions and findings both about the region and about the Ottoman centre beyond the information already widely known, and contributes to the literature on it. This study maintains that the rebellions in Bosnia can only be understood within the Ottoman context and by considering both the regional and imperial dynamics of the period. This approach reveals the fact that even though some characteristics of Bosnia seem to be different from those at the centre of the empire, this is mainly related to the flexibility of the Ottoman system and the regional solutionseeking characteristics of the empire up until the time when the centralization process brought about a conscious divergence from that traditional system.

INTRODUCTION

5

Theories and debates on rebellion, the dichotomy of decentralization –centralization, and borderlands As Mark Weitz points out, ‘mutiny is as old as soldiering’. The accounts of ancient historians, for example the Annals of Tacitus, show us that records of mutiny and rebellion go back as far as Roman times, to the first century CE , while the reasons, such as long service terms or excessive campaigning, are ageless.1 As in the case of the Roman Empire, rebellions and revolts in the Ottoman Empire were very frequent occurrences, seen throughout its long history of more than 600 years in every quarter, from its capital to its far-flung provinces. The most famous of those rebellions were the Edirne Vakası of 1703 that helped to bring Ahmed III to the throne, the 1730 Revolt of Patrona Halil that overthrew Ahmed III, and the Celali Rebellions of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries that derived from the discontents of the reaya and discharged soldiers of reaya origin.2 In that sense, the reasons behind the rebellions and revolts in the Ottoman Empire were not inconsistent with the reasons behind rebellions in other societies. In terms of state response, while some mutinies and rebellions were almost tolerated – by accepting them as part of the dialogue between the centre and periphery or as part of the negotiations between the state and other traditional sources of authority – others developed into great struggles. As Trim points out, in manner reminiscent of the early years of the modern Ottoman Empire where the huvvaˆn (traitors) were severely repressed, the Dutch Republic firmly crushed those troops who mutinied in frontier garrisons. In other cases, the Dutch authorities did not hesitate to negotiate settlements with those who might be compared to what the Ottomans termed es
kıyaˆ; ‘that is rebels, brigands, or disorderly persons whom the state was prepared to buy off’.3 Thus, in cases which were not directly accepted as threats to the order of the state, mutinies and rebellions could become a part of the negotiating and bargaining process. It is not surprising to find that there are stereotypical incitements for all mutinies and rebellions. Indefinite postponement of pay, poor

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food, corrupt or brutal commanders, excessively long service in wars far from home, or tension between high-ranking officers and lowerranking ones are the most widespread causes. However, underneath those incitements, in the Ottoman Empire, as in other societies, there were more profound factors that led the society to rebel: inflation and currency debasement, a particular threat by the state to janissary payrolls, artificial shortages created by corrupt officials, wars long drawn-out by the agendas of palace factions or claims that the Sultan violated the laws of justice.4 As Tilly states, it was a phenomenon of the later eighteenth century that people in different parts of the world, in Western Europe and North America for instance, began to create ‘social movements’. They were social movements in the sense that they were inclusive organizations comprising various interest groups.5 Within this framework, Tilly argues that until the middle of the nineteenth century, such collective actions were rather primitive, and mainly defensive or reactionary. In Europe, the reactions were most frequently seen in the form of rebellion against taxes or rioting as well as movements against conscription and land occupation.6 It is seen that such kinds of grievances echoed throughout most societies and enabled historians to make comparisons between the Ottoman rebellions and those of other societies. As Brummett points out, however, the catalogue of Ottoman rebellions includes a phenomenon that, while not unique to the Ottoman Empire, constitutes a hallmark of Ottoman rebellion. This is the chronic phenomenon that, after the establishment of a regional power base, a provincial governor or grandee rebelled against the Sultan not in order to move outside the shelter of the empire, but to gain an autonomous sphere of operation beyond the intervention of the central authorities.7 As we shall see in later chapters, leaders such as Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a and Hu¨seyin Kapudan, as well as other provincial leaders of the era, such as Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a, I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a or I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, were typical examples of this kind. Recent studies on other parts of the world, such as the one done by Meisel, show us that the Ottoman Empire was not alone in witnessing the

INTRODUCTION

7

establishment of such a provincial power base that aimed to enlarge its area of operation contrary to the interests of the central authority. For example, the regional military strongmen or caudillos of Argentina became successful in forming the nuclei of provincial military forces during the war period between 1810 and 1860. It is important to note that these caudillos from the Co´rdoba province of Argentina were local men jealous of preserving their autonomy in the face of the central authority.8 As Hathaway points out, what distinguishes these former grandees from their equivalents in other parts of the world is their place in the administrative hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire. All these people were government officials, and many of them were a part of the imperial household network. In that sense, establishing a power base in a province was directly related to building a strong household that could not only compete with the households of other provincial grandees but could also rival that of the Sultan.9 However, the reaction of the Ottoman centre changed in accordance with the extent of the rebellion by the provincial grandee. If the rebellious actions of a provincial leader were restricted to stirring up disorder by levying oppressive taxes or by tormenting the peasantry, it was highly probable that the losses to the state could be balanced through new coercive measures. It was accepted as a threat to the state, however, when a provincial grandee gathered a sizeable army and started to ‘conquer’ the land for himself. It is important to note that, during the suppression of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement in May 1832, the cleansing of rebels from some lands was reported as the ‘conquest’ of those lands by the state.10 As Hathaway puts it, ‘when the state imposed a fundamental institutional change, however, as in the case of Selim III’s Nizam-ı Cedid, the opposition of a rebellious grandee such as Pasvanog˘lu could no longer be countenanced, even rhetorically’.11 As we shall see later, the examples of Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a and Hu¨seyin Kapudan as rebellious grandees are very fruitful in exemplifying the situation. The fermans attached to them reflect a highly formulaic kind of proclamation, couched in a harsh rhetoric that suggests that their movements were regarded as serious rebellions.

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With regard to the Ottoman mutinies and rebellions, there are important questions that draw the attention of the specialists, such as ‘What constituted a mutiny and what constituted a rebellion?’ and ‘Were all rebellions mutinies?’ These questions provoke the critical historiographical debate within the Ottoman context. One of the specialists, Hathaway, in depicting the ambiguity of the term ‘mutiny’, says that some mutinies coincide with or contribute to fullscale rebellions against the current political authorities. According to her, mutiny is one of the most terrifying forms of rebellion since ‘it erupts within the very military institutions that are supposed to ensure a society’s order and security.’12 Thus, though indirectly, there is a special stress in those sayings suggesting that mutiny is a subtitle of rebellion and a more specific term for it. It is impossible to make clear distinctions between them in the field of Ottoman history as the boundaries separating military, social, and political history are fuzzier than in other related fields.13 Aksan also stresses the difficulties of making distinctions between mutiny, rebellion, and revolution within the Ottoman context, because of the fact that ambiguous vocabulary was employed by the Ottoman sources to define them. It is seen that numerous Ottoman Turkish words, such as isyaˆn (rebellion, riot, mutiny); es
kıyaˆ-es
kıyaˆlık (bandits-banditry, also rebels-rebellion); fitne (rebellion, sedition, disorder) or fesaˆd (sedition, disorder) were used in these sources. As Aksan points out, it is possible to argue that there are some nuances among them, but in most cases the terms were used interchangeably. For the central government, isyaˆn was the most serious form of revolt, necessitating a severe response.14 In our example of rebellion, we shall see in the following chapters how a great variety of words were used for the definition of ‘rebellion’ and ‘rebel’, including harsh labels such as bagy (oppression, rebellion, sin) or huruˆc-ı alessultan (withdrawal of allegiance from the Sultan). One of the earliest and most important studies of these Ottoman rebellions, which stresses their complexities as well as the internal and external causes behind them, is the dissertation of Halil I˙nalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (‘Tanzimat and the Bulgarian Issue’).15 In this work I˙nalcık clearly represents the Serbian, Russian and British

INTRODUCTION

9

influences in the Vidin Rebellions of 1849 and 1850. For the interior factors he points out that, in a similar manner to that of beylik-ayanlık regimes seen in Bosnia, the ‘gospodar rule’ in the Bulgarian lands was the essential cause for the Vidin Rebellions. To I˙nalcık, the changes in the agricultural-social conditions throughout the empire, in opposition to the interests of the rural population, constituted the most important motive behind the rebellions that took place after the Tanzimat. What is striking in terms of the topic of this book is that, according to I˙nalcık, after the rebellion of Bosnian beys, the central authorities became aware that fierce pressures on the rebels were creating the conditions for further rebellions. For this reason, the central authorities preferred to handle the Vidin Rebellion not by applying extreme pressure but through ‘idare-i maslahat’ (makeshift measures).16 In the past few decades, thanks to the studies that analyse the Ottoman rebellions in the larger Ottoman context and try to underline the complexities of rebellions, it has become possible to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the rebellions in the Ottoman Empire. In this sense the work of Khaled Fahmy, namely All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt, deserves special mention. In this work, diverging from the traditional view that accepts Mehmed Ali Pas
a as the founder of modern Egypt, Fahmy presents a new interpretation by locating him in the Ottoman context as an ambitious, if not problematic, Ottoman reformer. Using archival materials, Fahmy clearly shows how Mehmed Ali struggled for the modernization of Egypt, not as a means of obtaining independence from the Ottoman Empire, but to enlarge his influence and to become a hereditary ruler over the province.17 In this context, though it does not focus on a specific rebellion, Dina Rizk Khoury’s work State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540– 1834 should be mentioned as an inspiring study. Khoury’s work is important because it not only offers a new interpretation for the relations between the central Ottoman Empire and the provincial society of Mosul, but it also redefines the complex layers of that provincial society. In this work Khoury argues successfully that, contrary to the accepted view, the relations between

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

the central authority and the provincial society were strengthened rather than weakened throughout the period.18 The second focus of this book is the decentralization/centralization dichotomy. The rebellion described here occurred just before the Westernizing reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, known as the Tanzimat. In the preparatory period of Tanzimat, a series of important changes implemented to create a modern centralized government gradually weakened one of the most important characteristics of the Ottoman Empire; that is, its heavy dependence on local elites to collect taxes and to exercise control over the local population. The changing structure of city life in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in accordance with the shift in political power from the Sultans to the political elites and from the Ottoman centre to the provinces, had resulted in the rise of local notables in the cities. As Quataert points out, thanks to that decentralization process, the establishment of a notable family’s authority over an area was not seen as a rebellion against the central authority. Rather, it was a product of a complex mutual need between the provincial elites and the Ottoman centre; while the former was in need of central recognition for its legitimacy, the latter depended on the support of the provincial elites for collecting taxes, conscripting troops, and dealing with local needs and aspirations.19 This does not mean that the Ottoman Sultans had not attempted to centralize provincial administration between the late sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Barkey points out that, by the seventeenth century, the aims of the Ottoman Empire and France were similar in the sense that both struggled for ‘consolidation of peripheral territory, centralization of power, and incorporation of both external and internal opponents into the polity’.20 However, as Faroqhi stresses, although some attempts were made, as a direct consequence of the great distances involved they had a limited impact, especially in the farther provinces.21 During the period that Faroqhi calls the ‘transformation’ or ‘crisis and adaptation’ period, discrediting the conception of ‘decline’,22 while European powers strengthened their bureaucracy by separating it from society, Ottoman bureaucracy, on the contrary, lost some of its basic characteristics, for example its

INTRODUCTION

11

separateness from society, and some of its ethical codes because of the widespread use of personal agents and elite alliances. Another important change took place in institutions such as the janissaries, the provincial cavalry, the governors, the judges and, more importantly, the system of state ownership of land, namely miri. During the eighteenth century the janissaries participated in small trades, became almost an unpaid militia, and, in turn, obtained some judicial and tax immunities while the second most important pillar of the Ottoman army, the timarli cavalry, practically disappeared just at the beginning of the eighteenth century when its income and numbers declined dramatically. The death of the timar system was balanced by the rise of local powers. The relative decline in the incomes of provincial governors made it impossible for them to support their large retinues and this gave rise to a number of illegal levies which were imposed to help them retain their position.23 Thus, it is essential to analyse the position of local notables, especially ayan, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to understand the socio-political transformation of the Ottoman Empire. Historiographically, the position of ayan has been the subject of a controversial debate since the 1950s. In 1953, Traian Stoianovich argued that the rise of the notables, along with the concomitant deterioration of peasant status, was closely related to the agricultural exports to Western Europe. Thus, the emerging European world economy helped strengthen the notables’ position.24 In contrast, according to Avdo Suc´eska, who was the first scholar to focus on the ayan system in particular, examining the socio-political aspects as well as institutional ones revealed a strong linkage between the emergence of the ayan system and the high taxation that was put into effect in the last decade of the seventeenth century by the Grand Vizier, Ko¨pru¨lu¨ Mustafa Pas
a.25 To Suc´eska, as a consequence of ‘deterioration’ in the administrative and social orders in the provinces, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, state affairs began to be run by the new emerging groups, known as ayan. Suc´eska maintains that in exchange for supplying some services that were formerly provided by the central authorities, such as

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

protecting local inhabitants from attacks by brigands (es
kıyaˆ), the ayan were given important rights and privileges.26 Following Suc´eska, a similar perspective has been offered by Vera Mutafc´ieva. Mutafc´ieva repeats the date given by Suc´eska for the emergence of the ayan system and adds that the factors that paved the way for this system were mainly the collapse of the timar system and the impediments in the rule of central authority. To Mutafc´ieva, the formal establishment of the ayan system was directly related to the deficiencies of the Ottoman army. Mutafc´ieva maintains that its military incapability led the Ottoman Empire to rely on considerable help from the local troops; an important development that directly strengthened the position of ayan.27 Mustafa Cezar contributes to the available literature on the ayan system with his stress on the emergence of the levend troops. According to Cezar, the levends functioned as a kind of militia of the ayan groups. Though not so widespread, these groups already existed as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but they reached their prominent position in the eighteenth century. To him, especially after the timar system had degenerated, these groups substituted the position of timarlis.28 Another important contributor to the ayan issue, Yu¨cel O¨zkaya, approaches the arguments of Suc´eska, Mutafc´ieva and Cezar very critically, arguing that the establishment of the ayan system occurred in the last decades of the seventeenth century. According to him, during the eighteenth century the valis preferred local ayan for the mu¨tesellimlik post, which in the end increased their wealth and power. ¨ zkaya also maintains that there were close ties between the rise in O the influence of ayan and the deterioration of the timar system.29 According to Sadat, the transformation of ayan also related to the changes in the land system. However, he shares similar ideas with Stoianovich, arguing that this transformation was part of a local response to a more general European development; that is to say, ‘the extension of world commerce, which particularly, after the mideighteenth century, became an increasingly significant economic factor within the Ottoman lands’.30 From the 1970s this tendency to connect the rise of the ayan directly to the emerging European world

INTRODUCTION

13

economy changed substantially. For example, Veinstein shows that, thanks to their political origin which enabled them to penetrate the state apparatus by supplying taxes and services demanded by increasing needs, notables could make a lot of money by interfering between peasants and the market.31 I˙nalcık also points out that the increasing demands of the state created an environment where even the control of taxpayers in villages formed a significant source of many a notable’s power.32 I˙nalcık finds the roots of ayan problems in the seventeenth century, saying that the central authority undertook a number of measures to prevent the abuses of the rising authority of provincial governors but these measures unintentionally prepared the ground for the rise of the ayan. At the turn of the sixteenth century, the provincial governors began to establish sekban-sarıca or levend troops, which were Anatolian mercenaries, as part of their retinues and, in order to feed them, insisted on imposing illegal taxes. To I˙nalcık, the struggle between the central government and the provincial governors became the most important development of the period.33 Following the decay in the timar system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many sancaks in the provinces were given as arpalık to high officials in Istanbul or to commanders of fortresses in the frontier regions. Since they had their own offices, they preferred to appoint a deputy, a mu¨tesellim, in their stead. Thus, the widespread use of the arpalık system, the consequent development of appointing mu¨tesellims as governors of sancaks, and finally the appointment of mu¨tesellims from among the local ayan were the chain of factors which brought about the rise of local ayan. It also gave way to fierce rivalry among the ayan since the post of mu¨tesellim became the principal means of acquiring provincial power and wealth.34 Mustafa Akdag˘, who concentrates on the ayan system, reveals a different picture in arguing that the ayan system resembled a feudal system in which the local notables became the governors, manipulating the law for their own benefit and turning Ottoman justice into ‘Ottoman oppression’. Although his views are shared to some degree by some other historians, such as I˙nacık and McGowan, his manner of explanation draws a very dark picture in which he

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

represents the state as a toy in the hands of local authorities, with the decentralization process starting at the beginning of the seventeenth century and being closely related to the ‘decay’.35 Those kinds of interpretations which take the whole period as unchanged and explain all developments from a mono-causal perspective are very suspect from the historiographic point of view because of their subjectivity. Contradicting Akdag˘’s arguments, Halil Berktay clearly depicts the role of the state in the changes in the land system. To him, the state was always blaming local elites and ‘privatizing’ tax-farmers for over-stepping the limits of the average tax rate and treating the peasantry selfishly. But it was the central state which initiated the iltizam and malikane system from above, and it is not true that the state did not know what it was doing when it shifted from timars to iltizam or when it granted for life the tax-farming system known as malikane. It was not a spontaneous response to market forces but rather a conscious transformation carried out by the government itself. Hence, Berktay says that any automatic identification of changes in tax-farming with decentralization would be a mistake because, as time went on, the state’s need for income increased as it developed from a relatively uncomplicated organism, a ‘light state’ in his words, to a process of ‘state-deepening’. All these cost more money, so that to find mu¨ltezims, malikanecis, es
raf and ayan solely responsible looks rather like an act of Freudian guilt transfer which aims to take the guilt from the shoulders of the central government by creating a new scapegoat.36 With regard to the evaluation of the ayan system, I˙slamog˘lu and Keyder in their joint work stress that, by the early eighteenth century, certain tax-farmers of local origin had transformed themselves into ayan. Before that time, they worked as merchants, moneychangers or provincial ulema and became mediators of taxfarms whose real purchasers were Istanbul merchants or high officials. They were usually the local representatives of governors, so that they easily combined their accumulated wealth with political authority and became ayan. I˙slamog˘lu and Keyder add that during the eighteenth century the more important ayan who created trouble

INTRODUCTION

15

were those who were appointed by the government as provincial officials. The change in the tax-farming system allowed those groups to purchase tax-farms for the entire area under their authority and to establish a client group of locally powerful sub-contracting taxfarmers. Thus tax-farming became not only a device of the economy but a mechanism of political authority as well. The change in the taxfarming system also accelerated the
iftlik c system, which aimed to produce commercial crops for the market. The
iftlik c system caused a serious deterioration in the status of peasants who, after payment of o¨
u s ¨ r, lost half of their produce as dues taken by the
iftlik c holders. I˙slamog˘lu and Keyder see the rise of the
iftlik c system as a most disruptive development in terms of the political system. They argue that the
iftlik c system paved the way for the commercialization of production and a change in the status of the peasantry, both of which are necessary components of peripheralization. Thus, they saw this change as an important step in the integration of the Ottoman system into a capitalist world economy.37 Moreover, Bruce McGowan closely associates the rise of ayan with the change in the land tenure system. To him, while the deterioration in the land tenure system gave rise to life-term tax-farm leases known as malikane and decreased state control over the lands, the deterioration in military status altered the military/non-military dichotomy on which Ottoman society was constructed. The rise in corruption increased the power of two classes: tax gatherers and ayan. While the malikane system strengthened the power of bankers who financed the tax-farming system, the war of 1768– 74 in particular created a new group from the ranks of local notables misleadingly known as ayan. Since they were the product of a war situation where quasi-feudal networks and power by force prevailed, they were more like warlords.38 Likewise, according to Mehmed Genc
, the changes in the land tenure system were directly related to the changes in the world economic system. He says that the Ottoman timar system had been the original and successful base for the continuity of a great state over a long period when communication opportunities were very restricted and fiscal-bureaucratic organizations and their methods were inadequate. As the empire’s borders expanded and the usage of

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

cash money accelerated due to changes in the world economic system however, it became impossible to collect taxes directly and individually, so that the central authority developed the iltizam system in which the amount of tax revenues to be collected and sent to the treasury every year was fixed by auction.39 According to Barkey, decentralization only occurs when a dealer or army recruiter places himself permanently in a certain region, becomes an inhabitant of it and uses his connections to acquire regional benefits and autonomy from the state. This was the eighteenth-century phenomenon in which a group of notables from different classes – janissaries, ayan or even judges, who were no longer rotated – became permanent members of society.40 Faroqhi shares with Barkey similar ideas about the rising power of local notables, arguing that these ayan became more prominent from the late seventeenth century onwards. Faroqhi gives the period between 1775 and 1825 as a special time in which the central administration probably did not consider the empire as separated into a stable set of regions, but rather as a mass of domains controlled by different local power-holders. Since these power-holders obtained their position through appointment by the central government, they frequently controlled the execution of power.41 Hence Faroqhi argues that the institutionalization of the ayan in the eighteenth century was an attempt at centralization in which the state used negotiation and bargaining with provincial power-holders to reach local people.42 Thus, she claims, though not directly, that the rise of the ayan in the eighteenth century was a conscious preference and policy of the state. Coming to the third prominent theory related to my topic, the borderland theory is not only important in understanding the growing influence of local people or the increasing interventions of international powers throughout the frontier regions up until the centralization policies of the nineteenth century, but it also contains important responses to the theory that the Bosnian province enjoyed a special status in the Ottoman Empire and was a kind of ‘state within a state’.43 I focus on the timar system and its different applications in Bosnia, such as ocaklik timari, the kapudan system or yerlikulu janissaries, in Chapter 1. It is important to emphasize that,

INTRODUCTION

17

although those systems were applied particularly in Bosnia,44 this does not mean that this was mainly because of the special status of Bosnia in the Ottoman Empire; rather it was directly related to Ottoman pragmatism and flexibility.45 As Ga´bor A´goston points out, In the frontier regions of Hungary and eastern Anatolia, the pragmatism of the Ottomans permitted just enough flexibility to ensure the rule of the Sultan, as well as the indispensable conditions of his rule, that is, the peace of his subjects and the normal working of the economy. If this was possible with the assistance of local institutions and in accordance with local legal customs, then the Ottoman government usually retained these elements and made no attempts to form the conquered territories in its own image. This flexible administrative practice, born of a necessity that was political, military and economic, may be observed to the full in the frontier zones of the empire, which the Ottoman government always treated differently from the core territories.46 Thus, it is clear that the central government enjoyed only limited authority in areas such as Bosnia and some parts of Anatolia where the old, privately-owned estates were kept by leaving them in the hands of the native population, as well as in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, where, as Karpat claims, a hybrid system of miri-mulk was formed.47 Based on this information, it is not surprising to see that, when the central authorities attempted to extend their control during the nineteenth century into the areas that were not traditionally subject to direct rule, they met with strong reactions.48 The situation also indicates a dilemma in itself: during the implementation of new reforms, especially in the borderlands, the state had to secure the frontier zone in order to prevent attack from outside. Clearly, this could only be done with the cooperation of the local population, but since the local population were against the reform programme, reforming the population was only possible by struggling with them as well.

18

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Thus, during that period the central authorities struggled not only to implement the reform programme, but also to secure the borderlands. Maurus Reinkowski clearly depicts how, during the Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman authorities were confronted with a Gordian knot in the Ottoman – Montenegrin borderlands of Northern Albania. According to Reinkowski, in order to cope with the tasks of both securing the borderlands and implementing the reforms: ‘the Ottoman polity seems to have resorted to its traditional policy of bargaining, cooptation, limited military pressure and playing the various tribes off against each other.’ Thus, the need to struggle against Montenegro in the borderlands kept the authorities from executing some measures of Tanzimat which had produced alienation from Ottoman rule of the people in other parts of Albania and the empire as a whole.49 As we shall see in later chapters, the example of Bosnia is very productive in representing that dilemma of the state in which the authorities were torn between implementing the reforms on the one hand and securing the Serbian and Montenegrin borders of Bosnia on the other. It is important to note that, here, I only refer to the prominent theories and approaches that shed light on the complexity of the historical processes. However, rather than following any one of these approaches as a historical guideline, I contribute to a kind of historical writing in that an explanation of the happenings in Bosnia during the period is presented in the form of a discussion of their complexities. Thus, my aim is to piece together the whole mosaic in order to analyse the components; that is, the different theories and approaches which were put into practice in accordance with different issues and different questions. Methodologically, I analyse a limited region, Bosnia, over a specifically restricted period, and on an issue where there are plenty of question marks. In my study, narrative and micro-historical approaches are given preference. Thus historians such as Carlo Ginzburg,50 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie,51 Natalie Zemon Davis52 and George Duby53 constitute my main source of inspiration from both the methodological and history-writing perspectives. My style is shaped by the example of new history which, as Burke says, ‘is more

INTRODUCTION

19

concerned with the analysis of structures’.54 Unlike traditional narrative history, this style can benefit from many kinds of source materials within a wide range including not only official archival documents and chronicles but also alternative sources, such as the court registers, or sicils. In particular, comparative analyses of different sources enrich this study, which, in this way, is differentiated from other works in this field. Thus, this study is original and distinguishable from other works in regard to the following characteristics: the analysis of the issue is based not only on a state-centred perspective, but also on the rebels’ perspective. The reasons for rebellion are researched in detail, going back into early periods of Bosnian history to give a full background to the events. Moreover, the aims and practices of the central authority in Bosnia are compared with government policies in other issues and regions during the same period. Developments in Bosnia are discussed with special reference to inter-relationships between the groups and classes of the region such as kapudans, ayan, janissaries, and ordinary people. Instead of only giving a chronological account of events, questions that represent the complexities of these events with the relations between their past and future developments are examined in detail. The study also aims at penetrating and reconstructing the inner worlds of the people of the region, some of whom, such as Hu¨seyin Kapudan, became important figures in the rebellion.

A survey of the literature on nineteenth-century Ottoman Bosnia Although there is a rich cultural heritage in Ottoman Bosnia, based on its well documented history of more than 400 years, on the international scene historical scholarship has dedicated very little attention to Bosnia in the Ottoman period. In that sense, apart from a few important publications,55 the Ottoman period of Bosnian history has been neglected. Clearly, as Noel Malcolm points out, there are very fruitful studies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, centred mainly on the Oriental Institute, the Historical Institute and the University of

20

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Sarajevo; but the works produced there are mainly in Bosniak and unfortunately do not attract the attention of international scholars because of language restrictions.56 Apart from language restrictions, there were also some ideological obstacles that heavily affected the historiographical approaches to the history of Ottoman Bosnia during the Yugoslav era. As Malcolm clearly shows, Yugoslav historiography concerning the Ottoman period passed through two distinct phases. While in the romanticnationalist phase Ottoman dominance during that period was accepted as ‘the Ottoman Yoke’, in the Communist phase it was interpreted as a feudal oppressor. It is unavoidable that in this type of history-writing, mythical-stereotypical views give direction to the studies.57 Thus, it is not surprising to see that following the outbreak of war in 1992, some academic researchers went beyond the arguments of the Communist period in displaying the Ottoman period as inherently primitive, morally defective, or even subhuman.58 Concerning the works dealing with the period, there are eyewitness and travel accounts written by Western Europeans. It is seen that Bosnia in particular attracted the attention of Western European travellers, mostly from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, when Western European interest in Bosnia started to grow. Thus, spies of emperors, civil servants of embassies, or people with a strong interest in geography or natural phenomena came to Bosnia and described the region. What is striking in most of those works is that, as Bozˇidar Jezernik asserts, parallel to their vision of the Balkans, they contain negative images about Bosnia, representing the region as backward and undeveloped. According to those works, civilization in Bosnia could only be realized through the direct rule of a European power.59 For instance, according to a French consul in Travnik ‘the Bosnians were amongst the most brutal people of the Ottoman Empire’. Also, to a French traveller, the ‘Bosnian Turks’ were very ignorant people, and even the ‘Macedonian, the Greek and the Istanbul Turks’ describe them as ‘ignorant and brutal’.60 In a work by Chaumette des Fosse´s, who was appointed as the consul of

INTRODUCTION

21

France in 1807 and stayed in Travnik for two years, the Bosnians were frequently called ‘barbarians’ and ‘cruel’.61 Other important sources of information about nineteenth-century Bosnia are the chronicles of Ottoman officials. The most famous and important of these is the Vak‘a-i Hayretnu¨ma of Belgradıˆ Ras
id.62 In this chronicle Ras
id talks mainly about Serbian events, concentrating on the governorships of Milosˇ Obrenovic´, Mihail Obrenovic´ and Alexander Karadjordjevic´ (the son of Karadjordje) and gives important information about their relations with Bosnia. Although the work seems rather disorganized thematically, going backwards and forwards, the information provided harmonizes in most cases with that in the archives. The second work I would like to mention is the Ahval-i Bosna by Mehmed Emin Isevic´. This work summarizes the regional conditions at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century in Ottoman Bosnia with special reference to the state officials. It is divided into nine chapters: on kadıs, on muftis, on muderrises, on pas
as, on liva alaybegs, on cizyedars, on mutevellis, on kapudans, and on janissaries, respectively. In each part of his work Isevic´ directs severe criticisms towards these groups, arguing that Bosnia was in great chaos in that period and it was those groups which were mainly responsible for the chaotic atmosphere.63 Another important work is the chronicle of Mustafa Sˇevki Basˇeskija, who narrates events in Bosnia between 1746 and 1804.64 In this chronicle, Basˇeskija not only narrates the political issues but also gives useful information about the daily life of Bosnians together with his personal comments. Last, but not least, the chronicle of Salih Sıdkı Hadzˇihuseinovic´ Muvekkit deserves mention. The chronicle of Muvekkit, Tarih-i Bosna, existed in two manuscript copies, one in the Oriental Institute of Sarajevo and the other in the Gazi Hu¨srev Bey Library of Sarajevo. Unfortunately the one in the Oriental Institute was destroyed in 17 May 1992 because of an attack during the war.65 Thanks to the existence of the other manuscript, the work was later published in an edition edited by Enveri Kadic´.66 While the first volume of the chronicle gives information about Bosnia from prehistoric times to

22

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

1791, the second deals almost entirely with events in the nineteenth century, up to 1878. In terms of Bosnia’s status within the Ottoman Empire there are two main theories; one which argues that Bosnia enjoyed a special status within the Ottoman Empire, and one which rejects the theory of the special status of Bosnia. According to the first theory, Bosnia was a sui generis in the Ottoman Empire, and the differences between Bosnia and other provinces mainly derived from the different applications of the timar system.67 While this theory is favoured by some scholars like Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Ahmet Cevat Eren, or Mustafa Imamovic´, other specialists like Colin Heywood, Nenad Moacˇanin and Srec´ko Dzˇaja reject the argument. Alicˇic´ relates the special position of Bosnia to the national character of Bosniaks, arguing that there was a historical continuance of a kind of near-independent Bosnia from the Middle Ages until modern times.68 According to Eren, the special character of Bosnia was linked with its autonomous character,69 while Imamovic´ places special stress on its ‘territorial unity’, arguing that Bosnia remained firmly centred in a single geographic region throughout its history.70 According to Heywood, however, ‘what was unique about Bosnia was that, as an Ottoman ancien-re´gime society, it survived when all – or almost all – around it fell’.71 To Moacˇanin, this kind of argument arises mainly because of political concerns and gives rise to the creation of myths.72 Dzˇaja has similar ideas to Moacˇanin, saying that this kind of sui generis form of history-writing is a reaction of Bosnian historiography to the centrifugal tendencies of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats and poses the risk of marginalizing the Serbian and Croatian elements throughout the history of the region.73 It is evident that some of the available Bosnian literature views the events in nineteenth-century Ottoman Bosnia mainly from a nationalist perspective and represents Hu¨seyin Kapudan as a nationalist leader. The works of Ahmed S. Alicˇic´ fit this category well. In his work Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine (‘Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia from 1831 to 1832’), Alicˇic´ focuses on the de facto governorship period of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and calls the rebellion the strongest of all independence movements in the

INTRODUCTION

23

Ottoman Empire up to that time.74 This work persists in showing the rebellion as a nationalist, secessionist awakening. Within this framework, Kapudan is inevitably represented as a national leader. However, in later chapters, close examination of the documents shows us that although there were some national awakenings in other parts of the Balkans, the rebellion in Bosnia in that period did not show a national character as Alicˇic´ implies and was not an independence movement against the Ottoman Empire. It was rather a period during which local instruments rather than ethnic ones became predominant. In that sense the period can be interpreted as a pre-nationalist or proto-nationalist period. Alicˇic´ continues these arguments in another book, namely Ured--enje Bosanskog Ejaleta od 1789 do 1878. Godine (‘Administrative Organization of the Eyalet of Bosnia from 1789 to 1878’), claiming that the rebellion was in reality ‘a movement towards autonomy or independence in Bosnia’.75 According to him, there was a great gulf between the Sultan and the Bosnian inhabitants as the Sultan’s and his officials’ policies were contrary to the demands of the Bosnians, who wanted self-administration.76 Thus he establishes the Sultan at the heart of all events and represents him as carrying on a blood feud with the Bosnians. He depicts Mahmud II as being in continuous conflict with the Bosnians and argues that ‘Mahmud’s demands on Bosnia were unreasonable’.77 Another important scholar of Bosniak origin who carried out important studies on the kapudan and esnaf system in Bosnia in that period is Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´. In his books Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini (‘Kapudans in Bosnia and Herzegovina’)78 and Esnafi i Obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini 1463– 1878 (‘Tradesmen and Craftsmen in Bosnia Herzegovina Between 1463 and 1878’),79 Kresˇevljakovic´ focuses on the kapudan and esnaf systems in Bosnia and tries to show the changes which took place in those systems as time went on. Kresˇevljakovic´ is more cautious than Alicˇic´ when interpreting events, and hence avoids representing the rebellion in Bosnia as a nationalist movement. He uses many Serbian and Bosniak manuscripts and chronicles, but what his studies lack are references to Ottoman archival documents.

24

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Like Kresˇevljakovic´, Hamdija Kapicˇic´ also deserves mention when talking about the studies on nineteenth-century Ottoman Bosnia. In his work Ali Pas
a Rızvanbegovic i Njegovo Doba (‘Ali Pas
a Rıdvanbegovic and his Epoch’)80 Kapicˇic´ focuses on the life of I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Rıdvanbegovic who, as will be seen later, gave active support to the Porte during the suppression of the rebellion under consideration. Like Kresˇevljakovic´, Kapicˇic´ uses very useful Serbian and Bosniak documents, but he, too, is not able to use Ottoman documents. Since all the sources of both Kresˇevljakovic´ and Kapicˇic´ depend heavily on citation or oral narratives, they necessitate a critical approach, based on comparisons with different kinds of sources that are lacking in those studies. Also, by focusing mainly on limited sources and not comparing the events in Bosnia with those in other regions of the Ottoman Empire, let alone in other parts of the world, both Kresˇevljakovic´ and Kapicˇic´ convey in their works the idea that Bosnia is unique. They argue that Ottoman Bosnia had a very privileged status when compared with the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As Abou-El-Haj states clearly, the ‘differentness’ paradigm not only prevents us from establishing a dialogue with neighbouring historical disciplines,81 but also leads to mythologization in historical writing. As Nenad Moacˇanin rightfully warns, after the 1980s Bosnian historiography mainly attempts ‘“scientifically” to demonstrate the validity of the old myth that its political nearindependence and national self-identification extends back uninterruptedly from the present day to the Middle Ages’.82 For this kind of sui generis form of history-writing concerning nineteenth-century Ottoman Bosnia, the study of Ahmet Cevat Eren, namely Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek (‘Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Rule of Mahmud II’), deserves special mention. Using archival materials as well as the chronicles of the period, the book provides valuable insights into the period. However in this work Eren frequently reiterates the special position of Bosnia within the Ottoman cadre.83 He mentions the rebellion under consideration as a movement towards autonomy in Bosnia, arguing that ‘Bosnia was in reality in request of autonomy like Serbia, and the sole aim of Hu¨seyin Kapudan was to establish an independent

INTRODUCTION

25

government in Bosnia’.84 It should, however, be mentioned that Eren’s attempt to show the rebellion as a movement towards autonomy and independence does not include such a stress on a national agenda as that of Alicˇic´. When considering the existing literature on nineteenth-century Ottoman Bosnia, it is important to mention some valuable works that are not only devoted to the nineteenth century but are also very useful in understanding the internal dynamics of the region in that period. The first book, Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, edited by Markus Koller and Kemal H. Karpat, is a publication by the Center of Turkish Studies and was compiled after a conference held in Sarajevo in 2001 by the Bosnian Institute in London.85 The book contains valuable information and comments about the cultural, social, political, and demographic history of Ottoman Bosnia. The second book is Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed by Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr.86 In this collaborative study, Donia and Fine, two of the few established American specialists on Bosnia, have drawn upon their personal observations and experiences as well as their historical research into the area. The other book that I want to mention is a conference book compiled by the Committee for Islamic Studies at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University and edited by Mark Pinson under the title The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia.87 This book also aims at examining the internal developments of the Muslim community in BosniaHerzegovina from the Middle Ages to the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992. Last but not least, I should mention Aydın Babuna’s extensive study Bir Ulusun Dog˘us
u Gec
mis
ten Gu¨nu¨mu¨ze Bos
naklar.88 In this work, Babuna mainly focuses on the developments after the annexation of Bosnia by the Austria-Hungarian Empire but gives a short history of the Bosniaks as well.

Notes on archival sources This study relies mainly on various Ottoman archival sources. A wide body of relevant Ottoman archival materials in the Prime Ministerial

26

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Archives of Istanbul is used, among which the Hatt-ı Hu¨mayun collection is the essential source for an understanding of events during the period of rebellion in Bosnia between 1826 and 1836. The Hatt-ı Hu¨mayun collection (BOA HAT) was formed by gathering together documents that were kept in the Aˆmedi Kalem. The collection includes documents starting from the reign of Mahmud I and ending with the reign of Mahmud II, a period of 112 years; but most of the documents belong to the Selim III and Mahmud II periods. Exceptionally, there are a few documents related to the periods before the reign of Mahmud I and after the period of Mahmud II, respectively.89 The Hatt-ı Hu¨mayun collection contains a large volume of documents including imperial orders or commands of the Sultan, correspondence between the governors and the central authority, memoranda of couriers, officials or spies who were sent to Bosnia on special missions, petitions of local inhabitants and their letters of acceptance or complaint. With relation to my topic, a survey of those records shows us not only the perception of Ottoman authorities about the political, social, economic and diplomatic issues in Bosnia in the period under consideration, but also the understanding of the region’s people and their manner of expressing their feelings on the events. This classification consists of 32 volumes and includes 94,678 documents, of which I used nearly 700 related to my study. The other category of Ottoman Prime Ministerial archival documents used in this study is Muallim Cevdet Tasnifi. This category consists of 34 volumes in which 216,572 documents are housed, ranging in date from 1553 to 1904.90 This collection also supplied me with important information. Related documents from other categories such as Sadaret Mektuˆbıˆ Kalemi Evrakı (A. MKT. MHM.), Sadaret Nezaˆret ve Devaˆir Evrakı (A. MKT. NZD.), Sadaret Meclis-i Vaˆlaˆ Evrakı (A. MKT. MVL.), Sadaˆret Aˆmedıˆ Kalemi Evrakı (A. AMD.), I˙radeler Dahiliye, I˙radeler Hariciye, Haritalar Tasnifi, and a few documents from the Archives of Topkapı Sarayı are also included. With these documents, I had the opportunity of obtaining direct information not only on the local dynamics of the Ottoman Bosnia but also on their relations with the Ottoman centre as well as the

INTRODUCTION

27

impositions and impediments placed by the central authorities on the local inhabitants. Apart from those state documents, I used the court records (S
er‘iye Sicilleri) of Sarajevo and Travnik. Before the war of 1992, the archives in Bosnia included a wide range of Ottoman documents, but unfortunately the war damaged a great number of those documents, including tens of thousands of Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Hebrew and Bosnian manuscripts.91 Thanks to the efforts of discerning scholars who started the Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project (BMIP) under the leadership of Andra´s Riedlmayer, they succeeded in making copies of a number of important manuscript materials accumulated in the Oriental Institute before the war.92 Fortunately, the documents in the Gazi Hu¨srev Bey Library survived the war. I used the microfilms of the sicils kept in the Gazi Hu¨srev Bey Library which have been traced by ISAM, I˙slam Aras
tırmaları Merkezi in Istanbul. The records of Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65 (1241– 1242/1826– 1827), vol. 66 (1242– 1244/1827– 1829), vol. 67 (1244– 1245/1829– 1830), vol. 68 (1245– 1246/1830– 1831), vol. 69 (1246 – 1247/1831 – 1832), vol. 70 (1247/1832), vol. 71 (1248/1833), vol. 72 (1248 – 1249/1833 – 1834), vol. 73 (1249/1834), and the records of Travnik Sicilleri vol. 30 (1248– 1249/1833– 1834) are examined in detail. Since at times of popular discontent court records are of special importance to build up the profile of a local community, reading between the lines in those documents enriched my awareness about regional issues and enabled me to gain inside knowledge of local dynamics.

Notes on chapters Chapter 1 provides a general overview of the historical background of Bosnia with special reference to its geography, people and demography, social life, administration, military organization and land tenure system, and economy. In other words, it is an attempt to show how underlying local factors in Bosnia prepared the ground for rebellion. In this respect, though clear-cut distinctions specific to the period that led the region’s people to rebel are looked for, it is

28

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

believed that historical continuities provided the background for the rebellion. Chapter 2 examines the first stage of the rebellion period, between 1826 and 1831. It first deals with the attempts of the central authorities to introduce centralization policies in Bosnia. Following this, it tries to show how the Bosnian people took a leading part politically in regional events. In that sense, for Bosnia, the acceptance of rebellion as a form of regional policy-making and the existence of a culture of resistance in terms of introducing regional demands to the central authorities are examined in detail. It then analyses the reactions after the abolition of the janissary corps in Bosnia and the repercussions following this throughout the region. It summarizes events following the arrival of the new vali, Abdurrahim Pas
a, and his efforts to suppress the rebellion and to establish a new order. It then pays special attention to a new uprising, the Visoko, an event that brought an end to the governorship of Abdurrahim Pas
a. Later, it focuses on the governorship of the new vali, Ali Namık Pas
a, during which the old claims of the Bosnians surged up again. The next issue in this chapter is the question of the ‘six districts’ of Bosnia which, according to the Treaty of Edirne, were ceded to the Serbians. The chapter ends with an analysis of the march of the rebels against the vali, mainly due to the news of the cession of those districts and the flight of Ali Namık Pas
a. Chapter 3 deals with the second stage of the rebellion period, between 1831 and 1836. It first attempts to analyse the de facto governorship of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. It then tries to show how the Porte opposed Kapudan’s governorship and how it tried to eliminate him by appointing a new vali, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, to Bosnia and by ordering a major assault on the rebels. It also deals with the issue of recognizing and rewarding the supporters of the state after the suppression of the rebels had been achieved. It focuses on the events after the suppression of Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s movement to show that the problems did not finish with the suppression of the rebellion. Instead, it was only the first phase in the establishment of the new order, a process that was far from smooth and often turbulent. In order to show this, it focuses on the problems during the

INTRODUCTION

29

governorship of the new vali, Davud Pas
a, and reactions to his attempts to establish the new order, nizaˆmaˆt, in Bosnia. It then deals with the reasons for the dismissal of Davud Pas
a and the appointment of a new vali, Vecihi Pas
a. The final focus of this chapter is the attempt of Vecihi Pas
a to establish the new order in the region. Chapter 4 attempts to define the rebellion and the rebels in detail. It first tries to analyse the conceptual framework of the rebellion. It inquires into the questions of how the documents addressed rebels and rebellion, what kind of information the choice of language conveys about the state and the rebels, and why and how these choices were made. The subsequent focus of this chapter is on the rebels. It tries to define who the rebels were, paying special attention to an analysis of the rebels’ origins, social classes, professions and religious beliefs. It concentrates on the objectives and demands respectively of those rebels, by examining the aims of rebels and their ways of legitimizing their demands. Finally, it illustrates the policies of the Ottoman state in struggling with the rebels. It deals with the question of whether mutinous behaviour was punished or unpunished, and if punished what kind of punishments were applied. Chapter 5 tries to analyse the common characteristics of the rebel leaders, based on the examples of Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a and Hu¨seyin Kapudan, the two leading figures in the period of Bosnian rebellion under consideration. It first questions what the central authorities called the leaders of the rebellion. Then, by tracing back the biographical details of these leaders, it aims to reflect the surrounding conditions in the Balkans that eased the path of these leaders in their rise to power as provincial governors. In that sense, it analyses in detail claims made as to the wealth of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, in order to show how he accumulated huge wealth in a short period of time, and the reasons for this increase in wealth. It concentrates on the fate of Hu¨seyin Kapudan after the suppression of his movement, with special reference to his escape to Austria, his capitulation, and the circumstances concerning his wealth and his relatives after he was sent to Istanbul.

CHAPTER 1 BOSNIA: GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY

The land Vilaˆyet-i Bosna bir memleket-i vasıˆ‘ ekseri cibaˆl-i raˆsiyaˆttur; tag˘ları refıˆ‘ ve kılaˆ‘ı menıˆ‘, maaˆdin-i fidda vu¨ zehebi mu¨stemil bir memlekettu¨r. Aˆb u¨ havaˆsı letaˆfetinden menba‘-ı mahaˆbıˆb cins-i ins olmıstur ki her geh ki tesbıˆh-i mehaˆbıˆb olunmalu olsa mu¨sebbehu¨n bih anı iderler; ‘Bosna mahbuˆbına benzer’ dirler. Mesel-i saˆyirdu¨r. Mahbuˆb og˘lanlar ve mahbuˆbe caˆriyeleri kaˆmet-i baˆlaˆ ve suˆret-i zıˆbaˆ ve talat-ı beyzaˆ, meylaˆ, sehlaˆ sıfatları ile aˆlemde gu¨nes gibi meshuˆrlardur.1 Bosnia, vast in extent and mountainous in character, has often been described in this way, with a heavy emphasis on the country’s natural wealth and its geostrategic position. Very mountainous, Bosnia stretches from the dense forest and rich high plateau pastures of north-central Bosnia to the dry and barren landscape of western Herzegovina, and is divided by rivers, most of which are nonnavigable. As Braudel states in his great work, The Mediterranean, ‘The traveler crossing from the bare stones of Herzegovina to the wooded slopes of Bosnia enters a different world, as Jean Brunhes has noted’.2 It is mainly because of this characteristic of Bosnia that the

BOSNIA

31

nineteenth-century Austrian geologist Ami Boue´, who made three trips to the Balkan lands, called Bosnia the ‘Switzerland of Turkey’.3 Geographically, the Bosnian lands were a long way from the centre of Ottoman authority. The city of Saray in the Bosnia eyalet was almost twice as far from Istanbul as it was from Vienna, then the capital of the Habsburg Empire. Belgrade, then the Serbian capital, was four times closer than Istanbul; and the northern borders of Bosnia then were closer to Berlin than they were to Istanbul. Due to the territory’s mountainous character, even small groups of defenders would be able to cope with large armies.4 Thus while the mountains encouraged localism and division into small units, at the same time they acted as places of exile or refuge for defeated groups. The term ‘Balkan’ derived through Turkish from two Persian words meaning ‘high house’ or ‘mountain’; it corresponds to an area of four or five different mountain systems, namely the Pindus and Dinaric Alps in the west, the Rhodope Mountains in the centre and southeast, and the CarpathoTransylvanian and Balkan Alps in the northeast.5 The hazardous nature of the mountains led local people to warn visitors that ‘it is very dangerous to pass through the Balkans at night’, as in the case of Mustafa, the courier of the mutasarrıf of C¸irmen who wanted to return there by night.6 Matija Mazˇuranic´ (1817– 81), the youngest brother of two leaders of the Illyrian national movement in Croatia, gives detailed information about his journey to Bosnia, his life in Sarajevo and the return journey to Croatia between 1839 and 1840 after travelling there on a secret political mission on behalf of the Illyrian national movement.7 He describes the dangerous position of the roads as follows: I left Zvornik in the afternoon at around eight o’clock Turkish time, but when I got to the outskirts two kavazi came up to me and asked me for the teskera (passport). I showed it to them, but – unable to read the teskera and seeing that I was German – they became worried that I might be a spy, so they searched me all over to see what I was carrying. They found two maps on me and said: ‘What is this then? Are you not a spy?’ This gave

32

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

me something of a fright. Waiting for me to say something, they grabbed one each with their fingers and pretended that they were about to tear them up: ‘Talk, for otherwise we shall start tearing now.’ ‘Please don’t, Turks, please don’t, they’re my icons, I pray for them.’ ‘Ahaa! Peke, peke!’ they said, wrapped them up neatly and handed them back to me. They then told me to make haste, because the inn was far away and the land full of hajduks, and there was also a forest ahead of me. I gathered my things and hurried across the field, but did not manage to reach the forest before night caught up with me. I crossed the forest in darkness and arrived at a mehana to spend the night. They were surprised: whence was I coming so late? ‘From Zvornik’, I said. ‘But how come you managed to cross the forest without any trouble at all, when no one has done so before during day or night?’ they asked. ‘You were indeed very lucky.’8 It is important to note that among more than 1,000 documents that I studied, the term ‘Balkan’ appeared in very few.9 This is directly related to the fact that the term ‘Balkans’ gained currency only after the mid-nineteenth century following its use by the German geographer, Johann August Zeune, of the word Balkanhalbinsel (Balkan Peninsula) in 1808, and the publication by Major George Thomas Keppel of a book entitled Narrative of a Journey across the Balcan in 1831.10 According to one document, ‘although great efforts were made to catch fugitives among Saray bandits, they could not be seized since they were walking and riding in the Balkans’.11 These statements reveal much about the difficult terrain of the Balkans. This rugged character was seen as an obstacle to the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia as well. According to the memoirs of Konstantin Mihailovic´: And Mahmud Pasa said to I˙shak Pasa: ‘What must we do? What kind of response must we give the Bosnian king?’ I˙shak Pasa said: None other than this: Let us grant him a truce for fifteen years, and immediately, without delay we will march after them. And otherwise we would not be able to conquer

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33

Bosnia, for it is a mountainous land, and besides he will have the Hungarian king for help, and the Croats, and other rulers, and he will have taken measures so that then we will be able to do nothing against him.12 Apart from mountains, rivers also became natural barriers especially in winter. Once, due to the overflowing of the Mat River, the courier who was bringing new orders from the Sultan to Bosnia had to wait on the other side of the river for seven days from 27 May 1832 for the waters to recede, and reported this time loss to the Porte.13 Extreme winters with excessive cold and snow hindered comings and goings even to nearer places like I˙skodra.14 This was also the main obstacle in the reciprocal transmission of news and information picked up by people who became a part of the communication networks either as official functionaries or merchants. Besides geographic obstacles, the considerable distance of the province from the Ottoman centre hampered communications via this network. According to the couriers’ notes, the two-way journey between Bosnia and Istanbul took 20– 40 days and the time gap was directly related to seasonal differences as well as the courier’s length of stay in Bosnia, according to his mission and his speed. According to one document, at least 22 days were needed in order to receive news from the Porte.15 On the other hand, in a courier’s note, it was said that since Bosnia was very distant from Istanbul, going and coming back would take at least 40 days.16 High speeds could substantially reduce this time span. According to another courier, for example, the oneway journey from Istanbul to Bosnia took nine days.17 Remoteness from the Ottoman centre as part of its northwest borderland was also a very decisive factor in the history of Bosnia. The border between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires was very flexible and shifted easily, mainly because of the difficulties of each empire in holding and garrisoning the region18 and due to the demographic mobility which was supported by these empires because of the sparsely populated character of the region.19 This is even true for the sixteenth century, a period which was characterized by a high level of centralization.20 Mustafa Aˆli, for example, who had been a

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military commander in the serhad of Bosnia during the second half of the sixteenth century, complained that the Sultan’s orders could not be carried out along the remote Bosnian borders.21 There had always been demographic movement from Dalmatia to Bosnia and from Bosnia to the Habsburg lands, mainly on the part of Christian groups. Commerce, wars and propaganda catalysed this human traffic and created a more fluid borderland in which neither empire could succeed in maintaining stable conditions.22 Moreover, while remoteness from the Ottoman centre strengthened the particularity and regionalism in which state intervention became more complicated, Bosnia’s position as a frontier land compelled the Porte to enforce its policies directly in that province. The documents reflect the situation well: ‘Bosnia, being the farther frontier of Islam is enclosed by enemies on all four sides.’23 ‘Being the frontier and the key to the countries of Islam, this eyalet attracts the evil eyes of rivals. In that sense, it necessitates being well protected and guarded from traces of obstruction and wretchedness.’24 ‘However, this eyalet was actually a place for reciprocating the attacks of enemies and an efficient barrier on the imperial frontier. That is why there is absolutely no royal toleration of any mutiny and rebellion there.’25 In another document it was said that: Since the imperial conquest, Bosnia has been the amulet and the final frontier of the empire; so loyalty and generosity have been its characteristics. The inhabitants of Bosnia are expected to greatly appreciate the benefactions of the state and show obedience and loyalty. In that case, they will keep their famous courage and valor and will retain their devotion in their services to the state.26 Within these statements we see how the state, after starting to lose land by the end of the seventeenth century, was forced to adopt a defensive strategy27 that brought changes in its perceptions of the borderlands. The concentration in the control of land led the state to expand its authority over the borderlands and resulted in the

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pressures of centralization. While these frontier regions were seen to be continuously expanding in previous centuries before the first land losses began and were thought of as becoming more integrated with every expansion,28 from then on they were to be accepted as expendable in the face of any attack. The reaction of the state was also directly related to the changing status of the frontiers where, previously, the state had been hemmed in by the enemy or challenged to go beyond, and then witnessed porous and overlapping boundaries. Darling, concentrating on the Mediterranean borderlands, underlines the differences between frontier and borderland, saying that ‘unlike a frontier, the edge of society looking outward from the centre, the borderland looks backward over its shoulder at the metropole, because the borderland is the meeting place of two societies, not the edge of one’.29 This description fits Bosnia well as a place that in previous centuries had usually been accepted as a frontier between Christian and Muslim civilizations, where relations between the two had been restricted mainly to war, especially small-scale fighting, which had become a way of life. It was later regarded as a place where interactions became more complex through trade or education and international intervention became more prevalent. As Karpat points out, for their own strategic, economic and commercial reasons, Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy encouraged the discontented people of the borderlands to seek autonomy by providing them with armed protection or directly occupying the land.30 Within this process, the threats came not only from ‘outside enemies’; any internal uprising that would weaken the relations of the borderlands with the Ottoman centre was perceived as ‘the enemy’ of the state as well.

The people After the mid-tenth century, the term ‘Bosnia’ was primarily used to refer to a geographical area. Later on, the name ‘Bosnian’ was used to define the people that inhabited this area and it was at the end of the twelfth century that the word Bosnia was used to refer to a state.31 After the conquest, the Ottomans called the population ‘Bosnaklar’

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(Bosniaks), ‘Bosnalılar’ (Bosnians), ‘Bosnavıˆ’ (Bosnian), ‘taife-i Bosnakiyan’ or ‘Bosnak taifesi’ (the Bosniaks), ‘Bosna takımı’ (Bosnian lot), ‘Bosnak milleti’ (Bosniak community), ‘Bosnalı’ or ‘Bosnak kavmi’ (Bosniak people),32 while their language was named ‘Bosnakca’ (Bosnian language).33 Hadzˇijahic´ asserts that during the Ottoman period, prominent figures who came from Bosnia and Herzegovina were called Bosniak while people from Herzegovina were rarely called ‘Herseklu¨’ (Herzegovinians).34 It is important to note that, in official Ottoman censuses, all inhabitants of the region whatever their different social classes or religions – distinguished by names such as Marko Jovan or Ahmed – were registered only as ‘Bosnians’ with reference to their common use of the Bosnian language.35 During the period of nation formation, both Muslim Bosnian historians and non-Muslim Yugoslavian ones made recourse to these definitions of Bosnians in order to introduce contrary arguments. While the first group, such as Muhammed Hadzˇijahic´ or Safvetbeg Basˇagic´, aimed to show how Bosnak, Bosnalu or Bosnavi each had an ethnic connotation, the proponents of the second approach, such as Alexandre Popovic or Vancˇo Bosˇkov, argued that the terms referred only to regional origin. While the first group argued that the specific Bosnian alphabet bosancˇica, which came into use in the sixteenth century, the existence of the Bosnian Aljamiado literature (works that were written in the Bosnian language but in Arabic script) and the influence of sevdalinka songs on Ottoman poetry36 were clear evidence of that rich ethnic background, the second disagreed, arguing that the literature produced by the Bosnians during the Ottoman period was a part of Ottoman literature, but not Bosnian.37 The Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in 1463 brought important changes in population and religion, with a gradual increase in conversions to Islam. The ethnic origins of the Bosniak people have been a most controversial subject, especially during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. According to some nationalistic claims, the Bosniak Muslims came to the region after the conquest of Bosnia, so they were labelled as outsiders.38 However, based on Ottoman cadastral registers and defters, Fine has shown academically that the origin of the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians is the same as all came from a

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single Slavic group, the Slaveni.39 According to Hadzˇijahic´, the origins of noble families that appeared after the conquest of Bosnia had roots in the previous local noble families, and this suggests that the Ottoman authorities preferred to protect the regional dynamics.40 Moreover, Eren argues that, after the conquest of Bosnia, the rights and privileges of the Bosniak aristocracy remained the same without any changes, which eased Ottoman dominance in the region.41 Handzˇic´, on the other hand, extrapolates Hadzˇijahic´’s hypothesis to the whole population, arguing that the structure of population during the Ottoman administration was basically similar to that of previous periods before the conquest. Although, according to him, some migrations took place along with the expansion of Islam, this did not cause big changes in the structure of the population which socially, legally, economically and confessionally was still divided into the following basic categories: feudal lords and peasants (reaya), kasaba inhabitants and village inhabitants, farmers and shepherds, who were generally Wallachians. The reaya also included several privileged strata, such as martoloses, voynuks, derbendcis and akincis.42 Historiographically, more controversial than this is the religious background of Bosniaks and the Islamization process in Bosnia.43 Since the second half of the nineteenth century a linkage between the Bosnian Patarin Church, medieval Balkan Bogomilism and the Catharism of Western and Southern Europe has been suggested. There was a belief that the Bosnian Church had been dualist in its doctrines and had served ‘as a connecting link between the Bogomils and the Cathars’.44 Ivo Andric´ in his doctoral dissertation in 1924, for example, argued that the Patarin movement had left deep marks upon the geography and the people.45 The Bogomil debates were revived in 1949 by Alexandar Solovjev, who argues that conversion to Islam became voluntary and the main motivation was the affinity between Bogomilism and Islam.46 Based on forms and ornaments of medieval Bosnian tombstones or stec´ci that were engraved between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, Solovjev says that they must be related to the Bosnian Church. Believing that the Bosnian Church must be Bogomil, Solovjev reaches the conclusion that the Ottoman

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conquest of Bosnia was supported by the Bogomils, who had suffered greatly from Roman Catholic oppression and therefore turned to the Muslim side.47 On the other hand, since the mid-twentieth century historians have raised doubts about the Bogomil character of these stec´ci. Criticizing the issue from an archeological perspective, Maja Miletic asserts that the ornaments can hardly be interpreted in terms of NeoManichean symbolism. According to her, instead, the Bosnian Church was a monastic institution which came under the influence of the Gnostic tradition.48 A more categorical challenge to the Bogomil claims comes from Marian Wenzel, who asserts that ‘since stec´ci began to be erected just after the arrival of the Bogomils in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ceased to be erected with the arrival of the Ottomans, they must have been erected by the horse breeding inhabitants of the region, known as Vlachs’.49 Milan Loos also shares similar ideas, arguing that while the Bosnian church of the medieval era was dualist in character, stec´ci had nothing to do with that church.50 The most important contributions on the issue come from Fine, who argues that to establish a relationship between some motifs of stec´ci and dualist beliefs is an inconsistent interpretation. Moreover, most stec´ci were erected beyond the border of Bosnia and they were set up by everyone who was rich enough to afford them.51 According to Fine, due to the mountainous terrain and poor communication network, Bosnia’s Catholicism became primitive. The Bosniaks severed their ties with international Catholicism and established their independent church, known as the Bosnian Church, in schism with Rome. Unlike the Bogomils or Western neo-Manichees, the Bosnian Church accepted an omnipotent God, the Trinity, church buildings, the cross, the cult of saints, religious art, and at least part of the Old Testament; items that were rejected by the dualist Bogomils. Thus Bosnia, having three faiths, namely, Catholic, Orthodox and the Bosnian Church, all of which were weak because of the rivalry among them, had not developed a strong religious organization. That fact helped the Islamization process, which in the first stages came

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from migrations and conversions to Islam, which, as the religion of the conquering state attracted the attention of the local population. Most Bosnians later became Muslim, but probably perpetuated their previous customs and lived as they always had done. Religious changes were not only realized through conversions from Christianity to Islam; the Orthodox Church also gained large numbers of converts from the members of the Bosnian Church as well as from Catholics, and this was especially due to the fact that the Orthodox Church was the Christian group favoured by the Ottomans. Thus, religious change was a large-scale and multi-directional phenomenon and the term ‘acceptance’ for conversions is more appropriate, since religious changes occurred voluntarily and at a gradual rate.52 Nedim Filipovic´ shares similar ideas with Fine about the fluidity of conversion, which, according to him, was especially related to the imposition of Islam by the conquerors. Pressures to convert, and poor living conditions, especially for peasants who were charged with burdensome labour duties for their Christian lords, motivated the region’s people to become Muslims. Thus, according to Filipovic´, it was a combination of pressure and tolerance that created the tendency toward Islamization.53 According to another contributor, Nenad Filipovic´, the process of Islamization in Bosnia started even before 1463 and became significant after the first ten years of the conquest, a period when Islamization was seen among the members of all social categories.54 To Handzˇic´, another important contributor to the Islamization process, conversion from Catholicism to Islam, was the consequence of two processes: the relocation of Vlachs by the Ottoman central authorities to strategically significant areas on communication routes so as to put pressure on sedentary Catholics, and the expansion of urbanism by the transformation that turned medieval settlements into important Muslim kasabas. This transformation led to the abandonment of the churches there by the Franciscans and these kasabas became the centres of Muslim cultural life. Diverging from Nedim Filipovic´ in his views on the role of state pressure in Islamization, Handzˇic´ asserts that the Islamization process was carried on voluntarily and gradually.55 In Bosnian towns there were

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two main groups: native Christians and newcomer Muslims, of which the first included prisoners of war, many of whom accepted Islam in order to improve their position, and the second included administrative and military officials who came from the eastern parts of the empire.56 Stressing the pioneering role of dervishes in the formation of settlements and the spread of Islam in Bosnia, Handzˇic´ argues that the construction of vakıfs and the establishment of dervish zaviyes in Bosnia were very common, even right at the start of the Islamization process.57 Mainly because of this, as Bejtic´ clearly shows, the myth and cult of evliya, the Muslim saints, was very widespread during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Even now its effects are noticeable, with some of their tombs still extant and open to visitors.58 The expansion of Islam in Herzegovina followed the path seen in other regions of Bosnia, but with some peculiarities. The region was settled mainly by two groups: farmers, and cattle breeders who were Vlachs. While more than 80 per cent of plowmen accepted Islam, only 35 per cent of Vlachs were Islamized.59 Like Handzˇic´, basing his information on Ottoman defters, Hadzˇijahic´ underlines the key role of urbanization, saying that the Islamization process had four stages: starting in the urban centres, it proceeded to the immediate hinterland and afterwards moved to the more accessible rural areas, and finally to the mountainous places. He draws special attention to the role of the devsirme system and acemi og˘lans in Islamization, saying that after being educated in Istanbul these acemi og˘lans obtained high ranks in the administration and even became grand viziers. Their influence in their homelands eased the Islamization process.60 Thanks to an anonymous work, namely Kavaˆnıˆn-i Yeniceriyaˆn, dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century, we know that after the conquest of Bosnia the conqueror, Fatih, was very pleased with the voluntary acceptance of Islam in Bosnia and, based on the demands of their parents, gave permission for Bosniak children to be part of the devsirme.61 Thus, contrary to the usual practices of the devsirme system that were based on collecting the children of nonMuslims in conquered areas every three, five or more years,62 in Bosnia Muslim children became a part of the devsirme system.

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On the other hand, Antonina Zhelyazkova underlines the importance of economic factors in the Islamization of the original inhabitants and, referring in particular to the disturbances and anarchy that had occurred during the pre-Ottoman period, says that the situation facilitated first the success of the conquest and later the Islamization of the Bosnian peasants. The Catholic Church allowed the sale of heretics into slavery, and medieval Bosnia became a source of slaves for the West. In order to protect themselves from this trade, the Bosnian peasants affiliated themselves with the Ottomans and their religious ideology. According to Zhelyazkova, neither the number of converts in Sarajevo nor the influx of Bosnian Muslims from nearby places suffices to explain the rapid growth of Islamization. During that period the towns flourished and took on the characteristics of Islamic centres, mainly through their specific type of architecture, production and trade, infrastructure and the organization of social life in general. Thus the cultural influence of the Ottomans became the key factor in the Islamization process.63 According to another contributor, Alexander Lopasic, the inducement of Ottomans to encourage Islamization among Christians was directly related to the position of Bosnia as an important frontier province of the Ottoman state. The region was developed as a ‘military frontier’ facing the Austrian military frontier, intended to be a Muslim cordon sanitaire and a reservoir of Muslim fighters. Lopasic also asserts that forced conversion was never applied in the region, and Islamization was a gradual process.64 Along with the Islamization process, the question of demographic changes attracts special attention. Comparing different regions through information based on tahrir defters (written surveys of a province), Kiel comes to the conclusion that, while Europe was witnessing rapid population growth during the years 1460 – 70 after more than a century of stagnation and decline, the Balkan lands and Bosnia followed the same path with an important increase in population as well as rapid Islamization. After 1526, a period during which the Hungarian kingdom fell into the hands of the Ottomans, the Islamization process gained momentum so that the ratio of Muslims rose to 46 per cent of the population and reached 68 per cent

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in 1540.65 Studies by Barkan show that at the beginning of the sixteenth century, while the majority of the population in cities and towns were Muslims, the surrounding rural areas were mainly populated by Christians.66 I˙nalcık asserts that in 1469, soon after the conquest of Bosnia, of 467 timar holders just 111 were Christians.67 According to Barkan and I˙nalcık, the gradual increase in the Muslim population after the conquest was directly related to large-scale Turkish colonization from Anatolia based on a forced settlement policy by the state in which people from Anatolia were placed within the newly conquered regions of the Balkans.68 Contrary to these arguments, Zhelyazkova claims that the migration of Turkish nomads and semi-nomads into the newly conquered lands was a consequence of a very complex political and social situation in Anatolia, and was largely spontaneous, not state controlled. In addition, the colonization policy was not extensive enough to change the ethnic base of the region as a whole.69 Coming to the total population figures for Bosnia, studies show that the Muslim population had grown vigorously while the number of Christians had fallen slightly. In reaching total numbers after the conquest, however, the problem of how many people a household might contain is a very controversial subject, and tahrir defters give only the number of households.70 According to the 1489 tahrir, Bosnia had 30,856 households of which 3,951 were Muslim and 26,905 were Christian. Thus, in 1489 the Christian population comprised 87 per cent of the whole, with the Muslim population at just 13 per cent. Coming to the tahrir of 1530, among 23,717 total households, 12,943 were Christian and 10,774 were Muslim. Thus, when we make an estimation based on household numbers, we see that the number of Christian households was still slightly higher at 53 per cent, while the proportion of Muslims was 47 per cent. In the tahrir of 1604, the Muslims had 45,941 households while the Christians had 18,891. Thus we can say that the Muslim population was 70 per cent of the whole, while the Christian population was 30 per cent.71 Unfortunately, due to the neglect of land surveys (tahrir) at the end of the sixteenth century there are no detailed figures for households in this period. Interestingly, in the middle of the seventeenth century

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Evliya C¸elebi listed Saraybosna as being a very large city containing 400 districts, of which ten belonged to Serbians, Bulgarians and Vlachs, and two belonged to Jewish communities, while Greek, Armenian and French people had no specific districts since they were only there on a temporary basis. There were 17,000 houses, 1,080 shops, 177 mosques and mescids (77 of which were open for Friday prayer), 187 schools, 47 dervish lodges, more than 110 fountains, 300 sebilhanes (buildings where water is distributed free), 700 water wells, 176 mills, five public baths, three kervansarays, 23 khans, eight bachelor lodgings and seven bridges over the Miljacka river.72 However, in comparison with other sources these numbers seem very high. For all the Bosnian lands during the seventeenth century there were Catholic visitation reports including population data. These official church reports to Rome by the Catholic bishops of Bosnia provide estimates of the number of individuals rather than of households. According to Masarecci, in Bosnia in 1624 there were 900,000 Muslims and 300,000 Catholics, while the number of Orthodox was about 150,000 (his estimate did not include Herzegovina, and the numbers seem very high). Two years later, Georgiceo gives the number of Catholics as 250,000 and adds that the Orthodox were more populous than the Catholics, whereas the number of Muslims was less than the number of all Christians combined. In 1655, Marijan Maravic´ says that the majority of the population was Muslim, while the Catholics numbered around 73,000; he gives no figure for the Orthodox. In 1809, the French consul mentions that there were 600,000 Muslims, 120,000 Catholics and 500,000 Orthodox in Bosnia.73 According to one register recorded by Mula Muhammed Mestvica in 1841, in the city centre of Saray there were 3,415 households in 100 districts.74 Moreover, McCarthy, basing his ideas on the data of 1870, makes a comment which infers that for 1800 the Muslim population of Bosnia would have been approximately 800,000.75 It is important to note that the first modern Ottoman census was carried out between 1828/1829 and 1831 in both Europe and Anatolia, but the war with Russia in 1828 – 9 prevented its generalization.76 On the orders of the Sultan, this registration was

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carried out throughout the Empire especially in order to compile records for military conscription. In that census only 490,000 Muslim males were listed in the whole of the Ottoman Europe, approximately one-half of the real number. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, no Ottoman province yielded reliable population data that could be used to estimate the numbers of the population, and for most provinces the situation did not change until the 1877– 8 Russo – Ottoman War. For Bosnia, no precise data exist before 1870.77 A document dated 9 January 1833 says that if a population census was held in Bosnia, Bosniaks would be uneasy and would spread conflicting rumours about its purpose to all regions. For this reason, it would be more appropriate to postpone the census for a while.78 It is clear that speculation would circulate as to the possibility of new taxes or new military conscription, which were the main reasons behind the population census for the Porte. As Khoury points out for Mosul, a region like Bosnia distant from the Ottoman centre, the elite at the centre had recourse to many different ways of raising and financing armies, since major wars forced them to implement large-scale mobilization of human and economic resources.79 In the case of Bosnia, while any population census meant new recruitment and income for the state, it also raised the possibility that new burdens might be imposed on the local population. The personal notes of Mahmud II concerning the census well reflect its aims: With the help of census registers, it came into the open that there are definitely a great number of people capable of fighting and suitable to be soldiers in many of the well protected domains of the empire. When Bosnia and some other parts of the empire are included in that registration as they will be later, it will be very clear how many soldiers could be recruited and how much power they could accrue. I hope that the total number and size of these troops will be more than we wish.80

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Registration was not to the population census, but was also carried out through land surveys, which was a clear indication of the economic intentions of such registration.81

Social life It is not surprising to note that during the rebellion the cities took a leading role, with rural areas dominated by such cities. The main city of the province was Saray.82 Its powerful position was not based on its status as capital; on the contrary, the capital moved from Saray to Travnik, from a bigger and more developed city to a lesser, for the reason that the local population in Saray resented the state’s more direct administration.83 Saray’s inhabitants had had the reputation of being mischievous plotters for generations, and it was argued that this was a good reason for moving the capital away from the city.84 The religious diversity and tolerance of the early Ottoman centuries changed with the gradual transformation of religious differences into enduring distinctions among the ethno-religious communities.85 The transition from more heterogeneous and fluid identities to more homogeneous and stable ones gradually produced different worldviews among Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Jews, respectively. As a document well reflects, the eyalet of Bosnia, being full of different groups (ecnaˆs-ı muhtelife), became a centre for seditious acts and, by infection from Saray, every group started to degenerate.86 As this system of diversity evolved, nodal points of social and daily life began to determine the direction of movements. The formal divans (councils of the vizier) and informal mesverets (councils) of the notables, tribal networks, bazaars and panayırs (fairs), main roads and streets, coffeehouses, religious establishments such as vakıfs and mosques, became a part of the decision-making, discussion and publicizing process through which people became accustomed to dealing with alternative corporations of society, apart from the formal councils of the Ottoman centre. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the notables of Bosnia consisted of a huge group, divided into three main categories. The first group included those whose power and wealth was urban-based,

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namely money lenders, regional and inter-regional merchants or owners of commercial buildings such as khans or shops. Notables whose prosperity was mainly dependent on the rural economy, such as sipahis or kapudans, made up the second group. The third one was sustained by both urban and rural economies; this group, in addition to being a part of the urban economy, had ciftliks or cattle in the countryside.87 The key indicator of the political power exerted by these groups was their position as arbiters in solving regional problems. In reality, because of their key position and prestige in their own society, the ayans had become the most convenient agent for the distribution and collection of taxes, the supply of provisions and the recruitment of troops. As a result of this key position, the ayanlık had become a (semi-)official post in the provincial administration. The population in each kaza elected their ayan as the representative of the local inhabitants.88 As members of the two important assemblies of the eyalet, the notables of Bosnia played a formal and crucial role in the decisionmaking process of the region. The first assembly, known as the council of ayan, was called together in Travnik under the leadership of the vali of Bosnia. The council first came to existence on the initiative of Hekimog˘lu Ali Pasa, the vali of Bosnia who governed the eyalet between 1735 and 1740.89 Together with the vali, as well as the ayan and kapudans of the region, senior officers and high-ranking janissaries and sipahis were also members of this council. It was a regular council that convened yearly on the third day of the Ramadan feast in order to discuss regional questions, but the vali had the authority to convene extraordinary sessions if necessary. The influence of the notables was clear in that decisions were sometimes made contrary to the wishes of the central authorities. In 1737, for example, during the war with the Habsburg Empire, the assembly resisted the Porte’s decision to withdraw and insisted that the Bosniaks should continue to fight the Austrians on the Bosnian frontier.90 In contrast, the second assembly, the city council or divan-ı eyalet-i Bosna, which was organized following the prototype of Grand Vizier’s council divan-ı hu¨mayun, functioned as a kind of local assembly. Here

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regional issues were dealt with, outcomes were formally reported to the Porte and the responses of the Porte were promulgated. The council’s members included some indigenous notables as well as senior officials of the central authorities, such as the vali and other high-ranking state functionaries.91 In these assemblies, which were held every Sunday92 in Travnik,93 various complaints and demands of the region’s people were reported to the Porte, and decrees concerning commands and prohibitions were announced to the notables of the region. In general, orders sent from the Porte were the first to be read and announced at the divan and these were then dispatched to other districts of the eyalet in order to be publicized in their courts.94 Petitions of local inhabitants were also copied and answers were sent to the offices concerned.95 A few examples may make the mechanism of divan clearer: according to a prescript that was sent to the divan of Bosnia, for example, during long campaigns the region provided numerous soldiers, provisions and other equipment and was burdened with heavy expenses. The state, being aware of this situation, would help the region’s people by cancelling their debts; for example, a debt of 145,068 gurus 50 para that had been left unpaid during the rule of Celal Pasa and Sunullah Pasa, the previous valis of Bosnia, was pardoned by the state.96 In another document the central authorities criticize profiteers, stating that ‘although there is a prohibition against selling sheep to darulharb (the countries outside the dominion of Islam), some are breaking this ban and people are deprived of sufficient meat because of this. From now on, if any sheep is sold to darulharb, those liable will be punished. It is the duty of the divan . . . to announce this to profiteers and flock owners.’97 Another issue concerned the post of mu¨tesellimlik. It is understood that, because of his seditious acts after the abolition of the janissary army, the Porte was planning to dismiss Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey from his mu¨tesellimlik, but there were some doubts as to what the response of the local people would be. The Porte sought the approval of the participants of the divan of Bosnia before announcing this move. Only after the divan members agreed did the Porte dismiss Emin Bey from his post. It appears that this agreement was not

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willingly given because a short while later the members of the divan applied to the Porte requesting Emin Bey’s reappointment. This incident is a good example of the influence of local elites in the divan vis-a´-vis that of other appointed high-ranking members in particular and the power of the divan in general: the Porte, which could not withstand these demands, reappointed Emin Bey to his post.98 Problem solving was not only restricted to the divans of the eyalet, however. Various forms of mesverets (councils) were convened, from narrow and informal circles of a few people to more extended and formal ones including delegates from every district. As a lively and widespread mechanism, mesverets became a part of the communication network and decision-making process.99 The sources of the period indicate that mesverets were very often used as institutions to discuss specific or general matters and, in some cases, being accessible not only to notables but also to members of the middle class, they were commonly used as forums. According to Abdurrahim Pasa, the vali of Bosnia, following his appointment as vali, he asked the notables of Bosnia whether it would be possible to recruit the soldiers required for his retinue by turns, as otherwise it would create a huge financial burden on the budget of a single eyalet. On hearing this proposal, those notables present started to talk in Bosniak among themselves and when the vali asked what they were talking about, they replied that not everybody was present and there were others whose opinions must be sought by convening a mesveret. A day later, when they were gathered in the court of Saray, the vali sent a spy to the mesveret to find out what was happening. The spy reported to the vali that they were making plans that could incite the population to seditious acts.100 Apart from courts,101 castles,102 barracks,103 market places,104 mosques,105 coffeehouses,106 public squares107 and residences108 were used for mesverets, which, by enabling a strong communication and discussion network, became very crucial places in popularizing movements. The process of convening the mesveret changed depending on the gravity of the situation. While smaller ones could be held secretly, bigger ones necessitated proper organization in which letters of invitation were sent to all areas calling for one or two representatives from each district to attend the council. During the

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two biggest mesverets, the first of which was held in Saray after the abolition of the janissary army in September 1826, and the second under the leadership of Hu¨seyin Kapudan in February 1831 in Tuzla, decisions were made that would determine the direction of the movement. At each of these meetings there was widespread attendance and extensive discussions were held.109 Interestingly, the Bosnian tribes in rural areas operated in much the same fashion as the ayan of the urban regions in the sense that each functioned largely as an interest group which, under the leadership of a grandee, would make contracts with others or argue about the benefits it would receive during the mobilization of the movement. Stressing the role of tribal culture in the violent practices of the Balkan societies, as well as in the formation of Balkan nationalist states, Tomasic argues: ‘that tribal social organization generated bands (cetes) of looters and warriors, [so] that within it carrying a weapon became synonymous with manliness, and “heroism” – that is, outbidding in plunder and crime – became the dominant social value.’110 A few examples make the situation clearer. According to one document, dated from 1829, the Albanian tribes (kabile) in the Kolasin, Dıranes and Lericka districts of Bosnia had been disobedient to the appointed valis for more than 30 years and had seized by force some lands and villages in the Taslıca and Pirebol districts. Their armed forces in these districts numbered about 4,000– 5,000, indicating that that they were extensively scattered and had captured the whole area. The difficult terrain, as well as the warlike character of these people, prevented any intervention. While these people were the source of great trouble during the uprising period, reconciliation rather than confrontation was later adopted as the method of approach. While their tribal chieftain (serkabile) Hamid Bey was appointed as mu¨tesellim, 78 influential people among the Albanian tribes were designated as rural sergeants (kır bo¨lu¨kbasısı) who were to refuse passage to those who did not have official certificates permitting them to pass through the area. It then became their mission to punish members of their tribes who were riding between districts without permission.111

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While alliances between these tribes were hindering the state from penetrating their areas, agreements with one or other of them were bringing new allies, too. After the central authorities came to an agreement with the tribes of Kolasin, for example, it was expected that another tribe, the Kirmantu, would leave the Saray rebels and take the side of the state as it was closely allied to the Kolasin. For the Porte this change in the allegiance of the Kirmantus would mean that more than 2,000 armed people (Kirmantular iki bin tu¨fengi mu¨tecaˆviz bir kabile idu¨g˘u¨nden) would give up the struggle with the state and might even start to support it.112 Breaking up alliances and even creating enmity between the tribes that were in conflict with the state was a policy of the Ottoman central authorities; officials were even charged with special secret or public duties for those missions.113 For instance, the Mu¨tesellim of Gosine, Gu¨l Ag˘a, was given the task of eliminating support for the Saray rebels from the Mıˆcan tribe (Mıˆcan Kabilesi) from Kolasin. Osman Pasa of Yenipazar and the ayan of Pirebol were also called in as mediators in order to break off relations between the two sides.114 Moreover, shopping districts, bazaars and fairs were used for communication and popularizing the rebellion. Sunday was the day for buying and selling in Saray,115 and brought together people from urban and rural areas of the region. Once every two or three days shopping districts and bazaars, if there were any, were closed and people would congregate especially in big mosques in order to talk about the rebellion.116 Fairs became crucial places for the exchange of information not only for the people of the region but for the state as well. The lieutenant (Kapı Kethu¨dası) Mehmed Bey, for example, who had been ordered to go to the vali of Bosnia on special duty, could not go to Saray because of the unrest and had to remain in Piristine for a long time. By chance he met some merchants from Bosnia at Uzunca Ova Panayırı in Piristine. He asked them about the situation in Bosnia, and they replied that the notables of Saray had gathered and decided that they would accept the order for the abolition of the janissaries, but were demanding that the position of kapudans should not be changed. He reported this information to Istanbul.117

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Certainly, roads and other routes had become significant chains in this communication process. Bosnia, being very near to the classical route known as the Via Egnatia, also called the Sol Kol (Left Arm) of the Ottoman road network,118 had traditionally played a very special role not only in terms of commerce and transportation but also in communication. This is why, apart from other reasons such as security problems or measures to arrest fugitive soldiers and rebels,119 various orders were issued prohibiting the movement of people from one region of the Empire to another without official passport certificates (mu¨ruˆr tezkeresi). The main purpose of this was to prevent unfavourable news or rumours travelling from one part of the empire to another. Orders were given that every person on the road should be searched and anyone who did not have a passport certificate should be forced to return.120 People who absolutely had to travel outside of their district in order to perform important services could obtain one of these certificates by applying to their district court. However, in the course of time, abuses of the practice necessitated new preventative measures. The orders strongly criticized judges who sold these certificates for money, namely 10, 15 or even 50 gurus, and stressed that their acts would be severely punished.121 With these strict controls by the state, the roads and routes became, to borrow Stoianovich’s expression, ‘antiroutes’ which restricted access to channels of circulation.122 It was clear evidence of this ‘antiroute’ function of the routes that during more violent and intensified periods of the rebellion, mountain passes, major roads and other routes were barricaded in order to prevent rebel sorties.123 Another route that turned to an antiroute in Bosnia during periods of the rebellion was the pilgrimage route. In 1827, by order of the Porte, pilgrims from Saray were prevented from going on their pilgirmage and forced to return home. While the state acknowledged the harshness of this order, it argued that if this precaution was not taken, news of the rebellion could spread to Rumelia and Anatolia and trouble could break out there.124 There is no doubt that coffeehouses and taverns (meykedes) became favoured meeting places, as conversations in these places could not easily be monitored by state officials, mainly due to their local and

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even class-specific nature.125 For the janissaries, coffeehouses and taverns were more than ordinary gathering places due to their historical role of being places for exchanging ideas and rumours. In addition, every regiment of janissaries had their own coffeehouse where their insignias were displayed.126 For the Bektashis, drinking wine became a part of their social life and certain Bektashis even produced their own wine, believing that their spiritual status freed them from religious law and its prohibitions.127 Although it is a controversial subject as to how and in which context the janissary – Bektashi connection was established, it is clear that there was a strong mutual relationship. Mainly for this reason, after the abolition of the janissary troops, the next step to be taken was the prohibition of the Bektashi order.128 However, there is no evidence to indicate that, in a similar way to the janissary organization, the Bektashi order had established a powerful social base in Bosnia. Eric Cornell argues that mainly because of the existence of the janissaries, Bosnia must have had a strong Bektashi order, but there is no evidence to infer any such relationship. According to him, in 1908, long after its prohibition, the Bektashi order gained permission to continue its traditions in the Ottoman Empire, but those in Bosnia were not granted that opportunity.129 It must be stressed that these assertions are based on the assumption that if the janissary organization was strong in a given place, there should also be a powerful Bektashi tradition there based on their relationship. Although these comments might be valid for Istanbul or for parts of the empire such as Albania where the Bektashi tradition was very strong, they should not be generalized. The dervish orders came very early to Bosnia and played an essential role in the Islamization process as well as in the development of Muslim towns. The first tekke (dervish lodge) in Saray, the Tekke of I˙sakbey, belonged to the Mevlevi order and was built before 1463,130 while the second one was built by I˙skenderpasa of the Naqshibendi order in 1500. Later, others followed them and this system penetrated even the remote parts of the country. These tekkes were not only centres of local fellowship and piety, but also part

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of a huge international network. Probably due to the existence of a strong Naqshibendi cult, the Bektashi order never became very popular in Bosnia. There were some tekkes belonging to the Bektashis, but they were mainly supported by visiting Albanians and Turks.131 It is not surprising to see that in Bosnia, a place where the presence of janissaries had become a major factor in the formation of social life,132 coffeehouses and meykedes, places made famous by their janissary clientele, were accepted by the Porte as risky places where political issues were discussed, news of rebellion was exchanged and public opinion was shaped.133 It is important to note that in Saray it was not only the coffeehouses of the janissaries but also of the notables that were frequented by members of the rebel movement.134 Because of the role of coffeehouses, after the abolition of the janissary army more than 60 coffeehouses in Saray, some of which were known as meeting places for the rebels, were razed to the ground, while others were turned into greengrocers, esnaf shops or lodgings.135 The vali was accused of not being diligent in turning coffeehouses into shops or lodgings, and warned that this process should be put in motion made without further delay.136 Moreover, the policy of demolishing or transforming coffeehouses was not restricted to the period during which the janissaries were abolished. During the second stage of rebellion, in June 1832, it was decided that some coffeehouses in Saray, such as the coffeehouse of Zob Hasan, should be razed on the grounds that it had become a place for seditious acts.137 It was argued that taverns were open day and night in Saray and people were becoming very drunk and enjoying many other forbidden things.138 It is important to note that Bosnians in general were very famous both for being ‘god-fearing’ as well as for being less strict in their attitude towards drinking raki.139

Administration After its conquest in 1463, Bosnia was organized as an Ottoman sancak and Minnetog˘lu Mehmed Bey was appointed as the first sancakbey.140 By order of Mehmed II, Saray was constructed as the

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main city and the centre of this sancak. When Hersek was captured in 1483 it became a part of the Bosnian sancak, but the conquest of the whole of Bosnia took until the 1580s. Yayce and Banja Luka were seized in 1528, Pojega and Dubica in 1537, Krupe in 1565, Nevesil in 1570 and Bihke in 1580.141 After this last conquest, the administrative unit was turned into a beylerbeyilik (governor-general) with its eight sancaks, namely Liva-i Bosna, Klis, Hersek, Izvornik, Pojega, Zacesne/C¸ernik/Pakrac, Kirka and Bihke/Bihac.142 During the eighteenth century, the administrative units were decreased to seven respectively; Bosnia, the centre of the eyalet, together with six sancaks: Hersek, Izvornik, Kirka/Lika, Klis, Zacesne/C¸ernik/Pakrac and Bihke/Bihac.143 It is understood that the number continued to decrease during the following century. For example, in 1829 the administrative units were reduced to four: the eyalets of Bosna, Klis, Hersek and Izvornik, respectively.144 We learn from sicils and hatt-ı hu¨mayuns that, during the period under consideration, the years between 1826 and 1836, the number of administrative units was first decreased to three, then increased to four with the addition of Izvornik in 1829; a short time later they were again reduced to three, with the subtraction of Izvornik. After the suppression of the rebellion in May 1832, they were again increased to four with the addition of Izvornik. However, a short while later, the districts were again reduced to three with the subtraction of Hersek. The letter of appointment of Mustafa Pasa, for example, written in May 1826 and registered in the Saray sicil, mentions that he was put in charge of three units: namely the eyalet of Bosnia together with the sancaks of Hersek and Klis.145 During the rule of Abdurrahim Pasa, the division remained unchanged.146 However, during the governorship of Ali Namık Pasa, the administrative units were first increased to four with the addition of the sancak of Izvornik,147 and later on in his governorship reduced to three when Izvornik was separated.148 The divisions did not change further until the suppression of the rebellion, but after that, through the application of Mahmud Hamdi Pasa, the vali of Bosnia, in May 1832, Izvornik was again added to the eyalet as the fourth sancak.149 Later that same year Hersek was separated from Bosnia as a

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special mutasarrıflık under the governorship of I˙stolceli Ali Pasa due to his strong support of the Porte,150 and Bosnia’s administrative units were again reduced in number to three. In the letter of appointment of Davut Pasa, for example, he was made responsible for three administrative units, namely the eyalet of Bosnia and the sancaks of Izvornik and Klis.151 The centre of first the sancak and then the eyalet also changed continuously; until 1550 it was Saray, but from then it was transferred to Travnik.152 In 1583, when it was decided to turn Bosnia into an eyalet, its capital was moved to Banja Luka and remained there until 1640. At this time, when the balance of power in Europe was shifting and Habsburg pressure accelerating, the vizier moved his seat back to Saray and from then on the capital alternated between Travnik and Saray. In 1698 the capital was moved to Travnik, a smaller town than Saray, and most Yugoslav scholars interpret this as the consequence of the conflict between the vizier and the local notables. Since this transfer of the capital followed a disastrous Austrian raid in 1697 in which much of Saray was burned down, it is possible that the need for a new residence necessitated the change.153 Here we see that conflicts between the Ottoman central authorities and the local population went back to the 1720s, a period when the Bosnian population was required to support Christian peasants through a newly introduced system of provincial taxation known as taksit. The new tax caused a rebellion which persisted for a long time, from 1747 to 1758, and worsened when the janissaries of Saray became involved.154 During this period Bosnia was in a condition of anarchy in which kapudans fought janissaries, who in turn fought other janissaries. The peasants attacked the representatives of the central authority, burned down their homes and destroyed their possessions.155 At the beginning, the main reason for this transfer of the capital may have been war damage, but later tensions between the vizier and the local population of Saray possibly forced the vali to stay in Travnik. Saray had been the most important city of the Bosnia eyalet for religious institutions, commerce and crafts.156 The local guild

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organizations, of which the predominant figures were local notables, were established and remained there until 1850, when they were abolished in order to break their supremacy over the local population. The key position of Saray was voiced many times in documents where the Porte argued that the city was source of sedition in the eyalet.157 Saray’s position at the geographical centre of the eyalet encouraged rebel groups to assume that, if the state was to retaliate, it would have to start with other districts because of the geographical position of Saray, and when Saray’s turn came, the severity of the attack would decrease.158 It was argued that Saray had been the centre of conspiracy for the whole eyalet for more than 50 years,159 and this would come to an end only by transferring the eyalet centre there from Travnik.160 One reason for Saray’s prominent position in the unrest was the preference of the valis to remain in Travnik. Following arguments that political division in Saray encouraged those who were gossiping and poisoning other regions, it was decided to transfer the vali to Saray, accompanied by a significant military force. It was argued that, despite Bosnia’s breadth and size, in former times valis had ruled Bosnia with huge managerial and martial proficiency; however, rebel groups had been in charge of the situation for some time and, although there was no other settlement in Rumelia161 which was as prosperous a commercial centre as Saray, the valis could not stay there for very long.162 ‘It was not even possible to collect mu¨tesellimlik revenues in Bosnia and because of this shortfall in income, the valis of Bosnia could not recruit enough soldiers.’163 Pointing out that it was neither proper to frighten people suddenly by charging those revenues to them nor to load them onto the shoulders of the Ottoman central authorities, this document argued that a solution must be found in some middle ground. The proposal was, first, to recover the expenses of the previous two or three months from the people of the region, who were obliged to pay their debts; second, to supply the need for soldiers on the frontier region by calling them up for periodical employment, thus decreasing expenses; third, to meet the expenses of the vali’s soldiers and services from his official revenues; and, fourth, only if, when all of this had been done, there was still a budget deficit, to demand that this be made up by the Porte.164

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The problem remained unsolved for a long time, since the transfer was still on the agenda during 1832, six years after the previous proposals had been mentioned. It was once more argued that, since the sedition originated in Saray, the transfer would end the rebellious situation in the city. It was also claimed that Saray was a location more proper for this function: ‘Therefore, from now on, Saray, as it will be the centre of Bosnia, necessitates a “governor’s porte” ( pasa kapısı) in a suitable place and barracks which will be constructed in the castle for about 1,000 soldiers.’165 The Second Halife of Mu¨hendishane-i Hu¨mayun, Halil Efendi was instructed to inspect the conditions and estimate the cost and it was decided that expenses for this should be demanded from the districts of the eyalet with amendments and settlements like those which had been carried out in other regions of the empire.166 However, this does not mean that during the whole rebellion period all viziers administered the eyalet from Travnik. The idea of transferring the centre from Travnik to Saray had come from the state, and the state’s wishes were not always implemented in full. For example, Abdurrahim Pasa, who ruled the eyalet between 1826 and 1828, had been successful in transferring his residence to Saray and remained there during his administration period. After he was discharged from office, however, later valis were forced by the local people of Saray to live in Travnik and ruled Bosnia from there until the governorship of Mahmud Hamdi Pasa. It is important to note that after Hu¨seyin Kapudan declared himself the vali of Bosnia, he stayed a few days in Saray and then went on to Travnik, where he restored the residence of the vali and ruled the eyalet from Travnik.167 It is probable that, in order to obtain approval for his governorship from the Porte, he refrained from making big changes that would perturb the Porte, even if such changes were on the agenda of the state. After the destruction of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement, Mahmud Hamdi Pasa sucessfully constructed a governor’s porte and barracks in Saray and transferred the eyalet centre there in June 1832. The new residence of the Pasa represented the changing conditions in Bosnia; there was a belief that until the janissary troops had been totally abolished the valis of

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Bosnia could stay in Saray for only three days at most. Saray kept its new position until 1836 and then the centre was again moved to Travnik.168 Although, according to the Tanzimat reforms, Saray was accepted as the centre of the eyalet, it is understood that the de facto position of capital was held by Travnik until the 1850s.169 It is not wrong to say that the lack of success in transferring the centre had become a sign of the strength of the Saray elite, who thus prevented the vizier from reestablishing his residence in Saray. The administrative unit, pasa kapısı or divan of the vali of Bosnia, was actually a miniature of the Grand Vizier’s court in its structure and organization. The administrative structure also imitated the divan councils of the Grand Vizier and the kapı halkı, members of his household, were divided into four parts: selamlık (men’s part), harem (women’s part), hazine (treasury), and kiler (store-room).170 At the head of each of these departments, there was a high courtier; the odabası or head of selamlık, who was at the same time the head of all the servants in the beylerbeyi’s private quarters. There was a silahdar (beylerbeyi’s personal courtier who took care of his arms) and, under his leadership, a tu¨fekcibası (armourer) and a cephaneci (responsible for ammunition), a bascukadar (the chief cukadar) and a cukadar (responsible for his master’s wardrobe) and, under his command, a yedekcibası (responsible for the master’s riding horses) and a rikaˆbdar (responsible for the master’s boots), an etekci (responsible for carrying his master’s robe on the occasion of his arrival at the divan), a kavasbası (responsible for guarding his master), a tulbend gulaˆmı or tulbend ag˘a (responsible for his master’s turbans), an anahtar ag˘a (the key keeper) and his assistant, peskir ag˘a (chief servant in charge of the table napkins), an ibrikdar or ibrik gulamı (official whose duty was to superintend his master’s ablutions), a mahramacıbası (responsible for the towels), a muezzin (an official who calls to prayer), a berberbası (the head of the barbers), a tırnakcı (who performed manicures and pedicures), a bascavus (who guarded the master when he was going to the mosque) and, under his command, several cavuss, a sır katibi (private secretary of the master) and a mu¨hu¨rdar (responsible for the master’s seal).171

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The head of the Treasury, hazine, the second most important part of the divan, was the haznedarag˘a or haznedarbası who was in charge of the hazinedars. A terzibası (the head of the court-tailors), ku¨rkcu¨bası (head of furriers), gu¨gu¨mbası (who made copper dishes), kuyumcu (the court goldsmith), nakkas (the court decorator) and kılıccı (who made swords) were also under the command of the haznedarag˘a. An imam (priest), hocaag˘a (teacher of the master’s children), hekimbası (chief physician), macunag˘a (responsible for the court’s medicine), and cu¨ndibası (skilful in using arms) also belonged to the hazine department.172 The head of the kiler department was the kilercibası (the chief butler), and under his supervision there were a kiler kethudası (responsible for the food, drinks and utensils of his master), a peskirbası (responsible for bread; it must be noted that he was a different person from the peskirag˘a of the has oda), an ascıbası (head of ascıs; responsible for the cooking at court), a sarabdar (responsible for drinks), a kahvecibası (person who made coffee), a tu¨tu¨ncu¨bası (courtier in charge of tobacco and pipes), a sofracıbası (responsible for the table of the master; head of the sofracıs) and a matbah emini (responsible for the governor’s kitchen).173 There were also several other officials attached either directly to the governor or to his court; the kapıcılar kethudası (the main commander of the master’s court), miralem (responsible for distributing flags), sancakdarag˘a (flag carrier), reis efendi (secretary general), and tezkereci (the announcer of the vali’s decrees) are mentioned in this group. The vali was naturally the head of the divan of Bosnia and in his absence his kahya substituted for him. The defterdar, divan efendi, kadı, defter kahyası, timar defterdarı, defter emini, tezkereci and ruznameci also attended divan meetings, together with selected local notables.174 The Bosnia eyalet was divided into four main parts or arms by the local people: Cadde Kolu or Orta Kol, the Sava or Bosavine Kolu, Hersek Kolu and Serhad Kolu, respectively. This categorization was also used by the Ottoman central office and its functionaries in the region.175 Of these regions, in general Cadde Kolu held the leadership during the rebellion.176 It is not surprising to see that districts that supported the rebellion were all located near Saray.177

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According to Hasan Efendi, scribe of the treasury of Mustafa Pasa, the eyalet had 48 districts, three of which were very small ones in the centre of Montenegro.178 The scribe of the treasury of Mustafa Pasa, Hasan Efendi does not mention the names of these districts; however, the Mutasarrıf of Izvornik, Zu¨lfikar Pasa, when classifying those districts according to their position as being for or against the rebellion, counts in particular all those arms (kol) and the districts they belonged to and quotes their number as 52 in total.179 The list can be seen in Table 1.1.

Military organization and the land tenure system After the conquest of Bosnia, the central authorities introduced the timar system in which the predominant form of land ownership was Table 1.1

The Bosnian districts according to the four arms (Do¨rt Kol).

Cadde Kolu/ Orta Kol

Hersek Kolu

Sava/Bosavine Kolu

Saray Travnik C¸elebipazarı Foca C¸anice Taslıca Pirebol Kolasin

Visoko Fonice Akhisar Revmine Ihlevne Libosko Mostar Blagay

Gradacanice I˙zıˆce Maglay Tesne Derbend Tuzla-i Baˆlaˆ Tuzla-i Zıˆr Blene

Taˆra Praˆce I˙stareflak Yenipazar

C¸ernice Pocitel I˙stolce Levebin together with Terebin Belgradcık Pirezor Terkuˆh Anagoste

Izvornik Serebrenice Visegrad Kladine Doboy

Serhad Kolu Yayce Go¨lhisar Kluˆc Gılamoc Nevesin Bihke Kamengrad Bakıyye-i Kostanıˆyyice Gozarce Banaluka Hestaˆ

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the arazi-i miri, as in other provinces of the Balkans. While previous notables were accepted and conjoined into this system, they were not left untouched, as their position as hereditary land owners was turned into that of timars and zeamets in which the full ownership of the land was in the hands of the state.180 Not only the noble class, but also the Vlach chiefs became part of this system.181 The crisis in the Ottoman timar system as well as its handicaps in implementing this system over large areas led the government to take new measures, one of which was to turn the timars and zeamets of Bosnia into hereditary fiefs with the aim of improving the poor security of this border region. The new institution, ocaklık timars, was established in accordance with these considerations in Bosnia at the beginning of the seventeenth century and continued until the end of the timar system in the region.182 A ferman dated from 1644 well reflects the situation: the zaˆims and timar holders of Bosnia wrote a letter to the Porte, claiming that: Bosnia was a borderland to neighboring Christians and had fought for the honor of the empire for a long time, regardless of sacrifices. Just a short time before, for example, during the Budin defense, Bosnian sipahis had showed great courage and sacrificed their lives. A large number of zaˆims and timars lost their lives in this battle. According to the imperial edicts of Ahmed I, Osman II and Murad IV, the timars of those people who lost their lives in the battle were assigned to their sons, brothers or, in the absence of these, the relatives in his ocak. But now, contrary to these orders, vacant zeamets and timars were being given, not to former owners’ sons or brothers, but to people from outside. From now on, in the case of the death of a zaˆim or a timar holder, let the vacant zeamet or timar be assigned to his relatives, not to a stranger.183 The losses in battles on the Balkan frontier were very heavy and the campaigns demanded numerous recruits, a situation which forced the state to make concessions in favour of the region’s population.

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According to Avdo Suc´eska, for instance, over 20,000 Bosniak Muslims perished on the battlefield between 1711 and 1739 and, in the second half of the eighteenth century, another five-year period of war in this region took about 20,000 lives.184 At least by the eighteenth century, the concept of ocaklık timar broadened its scope by widening its hereditary position not only in the case of death in war but for ordinary deaths, and became de facto family properties.185 Because of this hereditary position, the land was divided into small parts through the increase in heirs over the course of time, but, thanks to the system of ocaklık, in which the land always stayed in the hands of the family, the division created big estates under a family framework rather than breaking up the land into small pieces.186 The system created family enterprises and became one of the most important reasons for ayan power in the region. Despite these changes, ocaklık timars retained their position of being in a relationship/contract between a certain body of militia and the source of its funding. During the eighteenth century, it continued to claim an annual salary for the local troops taken from the revenues of tax farming, levies and head taxes. Also, being the agents who regulated this system, Bosnian governors obtained control of the militia through fiscal means as opposed to coercive threats. Through direct regulation of militia funding, the Ottoman state was able to keep control. The revenues assigned by the central government and collected by agents from military units gave Bosnians a shared set of interests with the Ottoman central government.187 In Bosnia, big changes came about throughout the nineteenth century by the extension of large cifliks and the application of the malikane system in which landed property was given as an entire property without any limitations or obligations. In this kind of tax farming, the lessee had to pay the fixed amount called muaccel on receiving a malikane, and had to pay the amount called mueccel as an annual lease each year.188 The malikane-type taxes were not only limited to land, however; their reach was enlarged by adding the cizyes189 taken from gypsies, as well as bridge taxes and customs revenue. Sometimes, because of the magnitude of the amount, the owner of a malikane could be more

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than one person.190 Since the malikane tax farms were lifetime grants, in the long run the government lost control over them. Changes in fiscal policy seriously diminished the effectiveness of Bosnian troops and led to a separation of the interests of Bosnian society from that of the Ottoman state as a whole.191 The old Slavic nobility who had large estates, ciftliks (farms) and malikane-type taxes, as well as high government and military positions, formed the dominant class in Bosnia. The members of this group, numbering a few hundred, were known as beys. Below them, there was a lower nobility called ag˘as, which included smaller landholders, sipahis and janissaries. These groups held two types of estates: ag˘alık and beylik. While in the beylik land was accepted as the property of the noble, in the ag˘alık the peasants retained some rights of usufruct. While the majority of Orthodox Serbian peasants, known as kmets – a word which is usually translated as ‘serfs,’ and refers to non-landowning peasants – were sharecroppers, most Muslim peasants were freeholders of smallholdings. In the long run, that is to say from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, a long process of social polarization took place. While at first the landholders could be either Christians or Muslims, and the peasants who worked their estates were also of both religions, by the nineteenth century all major landholders were Muslims and the vast majority of the nonlandowning peasants, kmets, were Christians.192 Under these circumstances, the indigenous groups of Bosnian notables, mainly sancakbeys, alaybeys, mu¨tesellims, voyvodas, subashis, kapudans and other ayan, those who held the highest military or civilian offices, increased their power in the region. They began to operate independently from the central government, exercising authority in their own right rather than on behalf of the state. The belief that after 1826 the new system would bring changes in both land tenure and the military system that would be unfavourable to them, brought together a huge group of people from different classes in the interests of maintaining their rights. There was a fear that not only would the professional janissaries be abolished, but the kapudans and yerlikulu janissaries as well. In addition, changes in the land system brought the possibility that the ocaklık, ciftlik and malikane

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lands would be reorganized. In addition to the native aristocracy, military elements had been very influential in Bosnia. In the eighteenth century, for example, sipahis held 144 zeamets and 3,617 timars. Like the cavalry in Bosnia, the janissaries of the region had increasing influence, depending heavily on the changing conditions especially after the Treaty of Karlowitz. They became the leading power during the wars of 1711 – 18 and 1736 – 9, both of which involved Austria, Venice and Russia, and the war of 1727 against Persia. As mentioned previously, many Bosnians perished in these wars; for instance, of 5,200 men sent to Persia, only 500 returned.193 In reality, the janissary soldiers had become an important military power after the conquest of the region but with the establishment of the yerlikulu janissaries and the increase in their numbers, the military structure began to coalesce with other parts of society. In the beginning, that is the period starting with the conquest of Bosnia and continuing until the end of the sixteenth century, these yerlikulu janissaries were charged with guarding the cities and lived in isolation from other parts of society. However, as time went on, and there was a concurrent rise in Habsburg pressure in the region, their power increased and their numbers rose. Under the title of yerlikulu janissaries, local people were recruited as seasonal soldiers, being paid only when they participated in battle. When not fighting they carried on their normal commercial or agrarian activities.194 The most important benefit of this kind of recruitment for the local people was undoubtedly their exemption from paying taxes. This process was different from the one at the Ottoman centre. While the janissaries of the centre mostly integrated into the local economy by engaging in trade or pursuing commercial activities, a process referred to as the ‘commercialization of the janissaries’195 or the ‘esnafization of the janissaries,’196 the participants in the commercial life of Bosnia, such as craftsmen, merchants or peasants, usually entered the military scene. Thus they became a crucial power among the janissaries, who were recruited in times of war, were paid during the inter-war periods, and returned to their daily life at the end of conflict. Thanks to this process, which created a kind of

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militia, both sides obtained certain profits: while the state was relieved of paying regular salaries for all recruits and benefited from being able to call on a large army in case of need, the local people used the title of yerlikulu janissary in order to protect their commercial activities as well as to obtain tax immunities. Thus, during the abolition of the janissaries, the position of these yerlikulu soldiers became a significant problem. It is understood that both the central authorities and local people tried to argue that the yerlikulus were not the same as the professional janissaries. While the Porte was trying to calm down these disappointed groups and to break up possible coalitions between the janissaries of Saray and Travnik and the yerlikulus of the rural areas, the yerlikulus were hoping to keep their position unchanged. A letter from a kapudan of Hersek to Mustafa Pasa, the vali of Bosnia, reflects these complexities well. He states that there were no janissaries in his castle after its conquest, all the soldiers being yerlikulu. During the governorship of Selim Pasa (1822–5), although some yerlikulus claimed that they were indeed janissaries, according to the aforementioned kapudan, he had rejected them and therefore no longer had janissary soldiers in his castle. It is important to note that the letter was a response to the vali’s request to the kapudans to give up all janissary items as well as their claims.197 The central authorities, however, especially at the beginning of the abolition, stressed that, for them, the janissaries and yerlikulus were not the same, and provided the yerlikulus rejected the janissaries their salaries would be paid as before and they would be employed as guards.198 This policy of creating discord between yerlikulus and professional janissaries was successful in hindering any cooperation between the two in the long term. Coming to 1829, although the Porte did not think that this group could be easily put in order or could become more useful, the idea that it would be more chaotic to proceed to new regulations was accepted overall and it was decided not to make any new arrangements for yerlikulus. The decision was probably made out of fear of the yerlikulus’ reaction, but also in consideration of their low salaries and high numbers. Being a very numerous group,199 the yerlikulus became a crucial military power along the borderland and,

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since most of their costs were covered by local funds, replacing them with regular salaried soldiers would be more costly.200 In reality, the yerlikulu system included a huge group of people with sub-branches such as mustahfız soldiers or artillery as well as their kapudans,201 financed by the timars of the region, and the state believed that abolishing all these branches at the same time would be more of a threat to order than if they continued to exist. Mainly for this reason, the first step was restricted to the professional janissaries. Among the military class, an important additional group, the kapudans of Bosnia (kapudans of kıla-ı hakaniye, in other words), who at the same time were the chiefs of those yerlikulus and had similar functions to their Christian equivalents in remote districts of Greece,202 had always played a crucial role in local life. Bosnia, being a border province with both the Habsburg Empire and with Venetian Dalmatia, needed to be handled with particular care. The kapudan system was established under these considerations, first in 1558 in Gradisˇka with its first kapudan, Cafer Bey. After the conquest of Krupe the second kapudan was established there in 1565, and was followed by Gabela in 1591, Bihke (Bihac´) in 1592 and Klis in 1596. During the seventeenth century the number of kapudans reached 29, of which Pojega had two, Bosna-Saray seven, Bihke four, Kirka seven, Klis four and Hersek four. The increase in their number continued and during the reign of Mahmud II reached 39, as listed in Table 1.2.203 The kapudans were given hereditary fiefs and, because of this, they are sometimes compared to the feudal lords of Europe,204 but there are underlying differences which should not be ignored. The position of kapudanlık was created by the Ottoman centre itself and although there was a tendency to select kapudans from among the noble families of the region, this was not always the case. They were responsible for guarding around 70 castles and forts.205 As time went on, the power of the kapudans was strengthened in relation to their number. They started to behave as absolute rulers of their region, to the extent that if someone escaped from one kapudanlık to take shelter in another one, they were accepted like a refugee from a foreign country.206 A popular poem addressing the kapudans reflects their power well:

The Sancak of Klis

Prkosi Petrovac (Petrovac) Kluˆc to Sana (Kljucˇ to Sana) Kupres Glamoc (Glamocˇ) Ihlevne (Hlivno)

Bihke (Bihac´) Nevesil (Novi) Ustrosca (Trzˇac´) Krupe Priyedor (Prijedor) Kamengrad (Stari Maden) Dubicka (Dubica) Gradiska (Gradisˇka) Gozarce (Kozarac) Banyaluka (Banja Luka) Cisr-i Sana (Tomina) Gobaska (Kobasˇ) Yayce (Jajce) Derbend (Derventa) Maglay (Maglaj) Doboy (Doboj) Tesne (Tesˇanj) Yenipazar (Novi Bazar)

The list of Kapudanlıks.

The Eyalet of Bosnia

Table 1.2 Sedd-i Cedid (Duvno) Libuska (Ljubusˇka) Mostar Pocitel (Pocˇitelj) Istolce (Stolac) Kluˆc on Gacka (Kljucˇ on Gacˇko) Tirebin (Trebinje) Globucka (Klobuk) Niksik (Niksˇic) Hutovo Kolasin (Kolasˇin) Cisr-i Taˆra

The Sancak of Hersek Izvornik (Zvornik) Tuzla Gradacac (Gradacˇac)

The Sancak of Izvornik

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O! Feared, are you afraid of God? A little bit from God, never from the Sultan, And from the Vizier, as much as my horse.207 It is not surprising that after the destruction of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement the next step was directed towards all kapudans. In 1834/5 the administrative duties of kapudanlık were given to the mu¨tesellimlik. However, in general, new mu¨tesellims were again selected from among previous kapudans who, with this appointment, lost their hereditary position as well as much of their authority.208 Due to strong opposition, however, the removal of the timar system was achieved through a gradual process starting in 1834 and lasting until 1851. The order to turn timar soldiers into artillerymen was sent to Bosnia, along with all the other regions of the empire, but because matters there required greater delicacy, it was postponed until a more convenient time.209 When the regular army was established through the Tanzimat reforms, the sipahi group lost its former role. In other provinces of the empire the new regulations ensured that the timar system was officially superseded, but the change could not be carried out in Bosnia because of rebellions. Apart from a small number of sipahi groups who became attached to the gendarmerie, others kept their position until 1851. During the governorship of O¨mer Pasa Latas, who cracked down hard on the rebel groups, the central authority strengthened its power in the region and introduced a new land system.210 In contrast to other parts of the empire, however, the timar revenues in Bosnia managed to survive – albeit in a different form. The decree for the new system was first announced by Hayreddin Pasa in 1840, and continued to apply until the end of Ottoman rule. According to this system, while on the one hand the sipahis gave up the right of collecting timar revenues, on the other hand they and their heirs obtained an equivalent sum, payable twice a year, from the state coffers.211 Thus, an optimum solution for both parties was found: while the state was undermining the domination of timar owners over landed property and gaining advantages through

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reorganizing the sipahi soldiers, the local class of timarniks was not deprived of timar revenues which had always been an important component of their wealth.

Economy: conditions, activities and prohibitions It is evident that Saray, the most developed and most populous city of the Bosnia eyalet, was at the same time the centre of commercial activities.212 Despite all the economic problems of the empire, such as lack of capital, low education and high taxation, which were seen throughout the ‘long’ nineteenth century,213 Saray’s economic importance was considerable, with trading links reaching along the frontiers with the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, throughout Dalmatia and in Trieste. This was a result of the commercial revival during the eighteenth century as a consequence of trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. As Karpat states, trade with Austria and Western European countries expanded rapidly throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.214 In this sense the Treaty of Karlowitz became a turning point, not only in terms of establishing boundaries between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, but also in developing trade between them. Thereafter the borderland witnessed a constant increase in trade, especially in the export of raw materials and foodstuffs to the Habsburg Empire.215 Under these circumstances, the merchants of Saray took part in the great trading fairs of Leipzig and Vienna as well as in local ones. While they mainly exported agricultural products such as hides, furs and fruit, their main import was textiles.216 Thus, it is not surprising to see that the influence of the merchants and craftsmen of Bosnia increased rapidly, in parallel with their numbers. The research of Rasid Hajdarevic´ reflects the situation well. Hajdarevic´ makes a transcript of five esnaf defters from Saray from 1726 to 1823: respectively, I-1726, II-1750, III-1777, IV-1797, and V-1823.217 The number of esnafs registered in these documents clearly shows how numbers reached their peak in the last of those defters. In the first defter the number of registered esnafs was 525; in the following, that is the defter of 1750, the number fell to 481; while

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in the third the number reached 866. In the fourth defter the number did not change dramatically and showed a slight decrease, to 849. However, in the defter of 1823, the number rose to 1,160, which marks an important increase.218 Archival sources also support the argument that the influence of esnafs increased during the period under consideration. Ali Namık Pasa, the Vali of Bosnia, says that the notables and officials of Saray lost their power to the esnaf class, which became dominant in affairs of state but, since the leading figures of those esnafs were conspicuous for their seditious acts, they were bound to be repulsed.219 Again, in another document, the vali condemns the merchants and craftsmen of Saray, saying that for ten to 15 years these classes had dominated the notables and started to determine the affairs of the region. The influence of the esnaf kethu¨das especially was so strong that, according to two other documents, whatever they wanted tended to happen.220 Trade appears to have been the most widespread occupation of the Saray inhabitants, most of whom were either producing goods for export or exporting them.221 Mainly for this reason, the valis of the two stages of the rebellion period in 1826 and 1831, Abdurrahim Pasa and Ali Namık Pasa, respectively, proposed to prevent Saray merchants from crossing into Rumelia, hoping that if their trading was stopped their support for the rebellion could be broken.222 It is understood that in the second instance, the vali did not give a detailed explanation as to why he wanted to suppress the Saray merchants and the Porte replied that it was not proper to prevent trade in order to stop a few merchants from supporting a rebellion.223 However, after the vali informed the Porte in detail about the strong relationship the merchants and craftsmen had established with the rebel side, the Porte sent a decree to the vali ordering the prohibition.224 It is understood that both valis were aiming to kill two birds with one stone. According to this policy, while on the one hand merchants and craftsmen who were afraid of losing their businesses due to this prohibition would, in the long run, cut their support to the rebels,225 on the other hand, in the short term, it would prevent the spread of gossip and information about the rebellion to other regions

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of the empire.226 It is evident that this policy did not work, since people who were prohibited from carrying out trade managed to circumvent the ban by sending representatives with the title ‘kiracı’ (tenant) to substitute for them, as in the case of Piristine Panayir where merchants were represented by their tenants.227 When neither trade nor long-distance communication could be impeded, the authorities tried a total prohibition of trade over a set period of time.228 Despite strong prohibitions concerning provisions and the livestock market, strenuous efforts were made to evade the ban. For example, in 1825 the vali of Bosnia warned that a plentiful supply of food must be maintained in order to prevent food shortages in the region. It was observed that some merchants and dealers were buying a large quantities of provisions and livestock to sell to darulharb (the countries outside the dominion of Islam), so causing shortages in the territory. In order to stop this, it was once more declared that all sales of those products from Bosnia to the darulharb were legally forbidden.229 Similar arguments were repeated in 1828230 and at the end of 1830, when the merchants were warned that ‘it was prohibited to sell even one single sheep to the darulharb’. The scope of the punishment was enlarged so as to include responsible livestock owners as well as speculators.231 Concerning economic issues, another major concern was the control of the economic activities of merchants and craftsmen, whose numbers had increased rapidly. The well-established Saray merchants were troubled by this increase and applied to the Porte, complaining that foreign merchants who came from the provinces or other countries or who had formerly worked as furriers were penetrating their lines of business and selling supplies that they brought from Istanbul or Rumelia. Arguing that those activities were dragging them into utter poverty, they demanded stricter state control. In reply, the central authorities sent a decree to be announced at the Divan-ı Bosna stipulating that each merchant class should trade only supplies that were particular to its group. Also, provincial merchants who brought goods to Saray should market them only by way of esnaf kethudas, not by way of individual retail.232 This was because, in

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accordance with local custom, supplying goods was in the hands of small merchants and craftsmen whose activities were tightly regulated by the guild system.233 The earliest information about the development of crafts in Bosnia comes from 1489, when Bosnia already recognized 20 different crafts, including blacksmiths, sword-smiths, saddlers, boot-makers, tailors, cotton-carders, bakers, butchers and helva sellers. All major crafts had their trade guild organizations and smaller crafts belonged to a larger trade guild related to one of these, such as the sandal makers, who became part of the trade guild of saddlers.234 It is clear that forcing merchants to sell their goods by way of esnaf kethudas, the top officials of the guilds, was an effort to draw trades into the guild system so that control would become easier for the Porte. Again, in another document, it was stressed that in former times every merchant class engaged only in the trade of those goods appropriate to it. However, because the many merchants who were buying and selling basic commodities such as shoes, or essential goods such as butter, honey or cheese, eased the lives of ordinary people, it was decided not to interfere with them even if their numbers increased dramatically. It was, however, decreed that trade in other commodities should be carried out only by existing merchants and nobody should encroach upon another merchant’s sphere. Moreover, some merchants, such as furriers and silk weavers – taken as being the most mobile groups – who were dealing in goods outside their sphere of trade, should be summoned to the council and be given a warning.235 Another important issue that affected the economic life of Bosnia was the depreciation of the currency against other currencies and gold, which led to attempts by dealers to profit from and exploit the rebellious situation. For instance, applying to the Porte in 1827, the vali, Abdurrahim Pasa, reported a general price rise and an increase in various currencies in circulation, such as the riyal and other foreign coinage. He stressed the necessity of regulating the value of the domestic currency according to the fiyat-ı miri. In reply the Porte decreed that a mubayaacı (agent for the wholesale purchase of grain and especially of obsolete coins for the mint) should be sent to

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Saraybosna from Darbhane-i Aˆmire (the Imperial Mint).236 Again, in another decree of the period, the vali reported to the Porte that the rebels of Travnik were meddling with the price of certain items. He complained that although he was paying enough to buy supplies for all of his personnel, including administrative, military and service units as well as his family members, the rebels were continuously raising their prices in order to thwart him.237 It is understood that rising prices were a consequence of merchant– rebel collaboration against the Porte. It is clear that a situation in which the merchants and craftsmen formed a huge group actively supporting rebellion in the cities would facilitate a boost in prices. The increase in prices was not limited only to the vali’s purchases, however. There was a general increase in which the price of a kıyye (about 1,300 grams) of rye, for example, increased to 18 or 20 paras and inflation rose daily.238 An official, Arif Bey, who was sent to Bosnia on a special mission together with Ahmed Efendi, applied to the Porte demanding further payment and saying that all supplies in Bosnia were very expensive.239 Before he went to Bosnia, he was paid the total sum of 15,000 gurus but, due to his remoteness from the Ottoman centre and the high price of supplies, he was embarrassed by lack of money. He also complained that, although the mission’s expenses should be paid by local inhabitants, the Bosniaks, who, because of the rebellion had become suspicious about their mission, did not give them anything so that they were forced to spend money from their own pocket. His request for another 15,000 gurus for himself and 3,000 gurus for his companion was immediately approved and the money sent by special order of Mahmud II.240 Besides the speculative organized movement of the merchant– rebel coalition, the political conditions may have caused general price inflation in the region, and this was also supported by the depreciation of the currency. However, more detailed archival work is needed to clarify the subject of inflation in Bosnia during the period under consideration.

CHAPTER 2 THE FIRST STAGE OF THE REBELLION PERIOD, 1826—1831

The centralization process in Bosnia The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed many changes in the Ottoman Empire in terms of reconstructing political and administrative structures in a centralized manner and, related to this, the creation of a new bureaucracy. The most visible outcome of these efforts was a more influential centralized state in every aspect of life. The janissaries were destroyed, the guilds were weakened and, after the campaigns of Mahmud II between 1820 and the 1830s in the Balkan, Anatolian and Arab lands, the power of local notables was swept away. The expanding bureaucracy and military based on Western technology became crucial in controlling, weakening or destroying domestic rivals. The establishment of the Translation Bureau; the modernization of the military through the introduction of Western techniques, along with clothing regulations to create a uniformity of dress in 1829; and the creation of the Foreign Ministry in 1834 to set up a new diplomatic apparatus, were also all part of that modernization process.1 Mahmud II’s vigorous efforts towards reform frequently made it clear that ‘in his view, all his subjects, of whatever creed, were equal’.2

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Mahmud II first started his reform programme with the destruction of the janissary corps in 1826. As Shaw points out, it was the first time that reform had been guaranteed by destroying this old institution, and the opposition had been broken down by silencing possible elements of resistance. Mahmud’s next aim was to achieve increased centralization; he began the process by dividing the functions of the central government into departments and institutions.3 Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the central government sternly suppressed the monopoly of ayan over the western Anatolian economy and society in order to centralize and standardize revenue collection. The centralization was supported by dismantling the traditional system of land tenure in 1831.4 In that centralization process, Bosnia became one of the main battlegrounds for conflicts between central forces and local ayan and between centralization and local autonomy. A more modernized and centralized government meant the reduction of the influence of local elites and created a paradoxical situation, since one of the essential characteristics of the Ottoman Empire was its dependency on the local elites in terms of collecting taxes and exercising control over the population. Conscious divergence from the traditional system of the state brought about a huge reaction among local inhabitants, who, from then on, turned into defenders of the ancien re´gime. For the local inhabitants of Bosnia, especially for the local notables, the centralized system meant the restriction of their rights. According to Karpat, through this reaction to the centralization process Bosnia provided one of the best examples of emerging local nationalism, ‘which did not take on ethnic characteristics primarily because the ethnic identity of the Bosnian Muslims was rooted in history, culture and territory rather than in a presumed ethnicity or language, as it was among other Balkan groups, Muslims and non-Muslims alike’.5 It is clear that the most pervasive and dynamic ideological force in nineteenth-century Europe was nationalism,6 but in the case of Bosnia, the rebellion of the Bosnians cannot be said to display the essential factors of ethnic nationalist movements. It was, rather, a regional solution seeking to change the policies of the central authorities and, as we shall see later, these regional worries united

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two ethnic groups, the Bosnians and the Albanians, under the same movement. On the other hand, the demands of rebels to choose their valis, to resist those who were appointed by the central authority or to plan a movement against the Ottoman centre under the leadership of a local power, can all be interpreted under the title of a pre-nationalist or proto-nationalist period in which local instruments rather than the ethnic ones became dominant. The rebellion was intended to preserve the privileges of the Bosnian notables in opposition to the aims of centralization. For the Bosnians centralization meant a new army, a new land system, a new administration, a change in status for non-Muslims in which the Ottoman Sultan was much more interested in maintaining his authority over his subjects, regardless of their faith, and in a more interventionist state in terms of local issues. With the new army, there was the possibility that the position of kapudans and yerlikulu janissaries of Bosnia would change, while the new land system would break the power and influence of local notables. With the new administration, Saray, the main city of Bosnia, would become the administrative centre, a significant change which would crush the autonomous character of Saray. Another source of unease among the Bosnians was the rights given to the Serbs; for instance, some districts were handed over to the Serbs to the disadvantage of the Bosnians. All these changes seem to have profoundly debilitated the traditional, semi-independent socio-administrative order of Bosnia.

Bosnia’s culture of rebellion During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bosnia witnessed various forms of armed resistance against Ottoman rule. As Avdo Suc´eska points out, the uprisings of the eighteenth century mirrored the dissatisfaction of the Muslim peasantry about the changes in their social conditions; that is to say, they were uprisings of a rural nature. However, in the nineteenth century, the uprisings turned into a movement of the Muslim elites, in other words, uprisings of an urban nature against the central and later egalitarian policies of the Ottoman bureaucracy.7 To quote Hobsbawm, these eighteenth-

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century rural uprisings can be classified as social banditry, which Hobsbawm describes as ‘a universal and unchanging phenomenon, [which] is little more than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty’. It becomes epidemic when a peasant society finds no alternative strategy to defend itself.8 In that sense, the failure of the siege of Vienna became a turning point after which, because of severe attacks by Habsburgs and Venetians, Bosnia witnessed influxes of refugees which had a huge effect on the size and nature of the Bosnian population. As mentioned before, the psychological blow of land losses after the Treaty of Karlowitz gave rise to an obsessive aim for long-term recovery of Ottoman rule amid conditions that had become disordered with the new influx of refugees, increased taxation and revolts in Hersek in 1727, 1728, 1729 and 1732.9 The wars of 1714 – 8 and 1736 – 9 against Austria, Venice and Russia naturally imposed heavy burdens on the Bosnian people. Although there were almost no invasions in the following five decades, the region had to contend with difficulties arising from new taxes as well as power struggles among the Muslim military classes, mainly janissaries and kapudans. The rebellion against the new taxes, known as the taksit, during the 1740s was so unmanageable that the vali of Bosnia, Hekimog˘lu Ali Pas
a, was forced to leave the country. When he came back six months later, he met with even stronger rebellions and withdrew again. The rebellion in Mostar in 1748 extended to other tax revolts in different parts of Bosnia during the following years. In order to stop unrest, in 1752 a new governor, Mehmed Pas
a Kukovica, was appointed to calm the situation.10 He was chosen because, as a Bosnian, he was well known by the region’s people as well as personally known to the Sultan.11 He succeeded in pacifying the province in 1756, but was soon removed from his post after complaints about his administration. The following years witnessed urban resistance among high-ranking Muslims in Mostar who were trying to defend their tax privileges, and where the rebellion was only suppressed by a large army of the vali.12 Based on the chronicle of Mustafa Sˇevki Basˇeskija, who wrote about events in the Bosnian province between 1746 and 1804,

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Vladislav Skaric´ maintains that during this period the Muslim Bosnians lost their confidence in the Sultan. As a result, the local notables became more powerful in the eyes of local people, since they accepted those local leaders as guarantors against the abuses of central authority. It is very clear from the sayings of Basˇeskija, who did not hesitate to criticize the Sultan directly, that the Bosnian Muslims no longer believed in the ability of the Sultan to defend the frontier and to secure the Bosnian province.13 The rebellions have led some Yugoslav historians depict Bosnia as being in anarchy throughout the eighteenth century, and represent the Bosnian militia as a tool employed by the local elite to keep their position and power.14 Recent studies, such as those of Hickok, have however shown that, rather than an adversarial relationship existing between the provincial society and the centre, mutual agreements were constructed between the governor and militia and between the centre and periphery during the eighteenth century.15 This does not mean that proclamations about popular unrest, disruptions or rebellions in Bosnia were only ad hoc and deliberately created fantasies; rather, their explanation lies beyond the one-dimensional claims of class warfare, emergent nationalism, religious strife, or even Ottoman decline. These events were in fact complex and rooted in the multiplicity of interconnected layers that made up Bosnian society. Just a glance at a few examples of the numerous documents about previous uprisings and revolts in Bosnia demonstrates the complexity of reasons as well as the multiplicity of layers: in 1712, for instance, it is understood that a political vacuum arose in Bosnia because of the absence of the vali and the mutasarrıfs of sancaks who left the eyalet in order to participate in the campaigns. Exploiting the situation, a certain Mihail provoked the Christian subjects of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia to rebel and gathered together a huge group of people who occupied some castles and fortresses. They were stopped by military intervention.16 In 1788, a group of Christians rebelled in the Belgrade region and, breaking into open revolt, they went to villages in Izvornik and started to incite unrest among the people. They were stopped after a short struggle and were pardoned after apologizing humbly.17 The exiled janissaries of Belgrade, for

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example, joined the dag˘lı bandit ranks in Berkofc
a in 1797 and began to mutiny. More troops had to be recruited to put down this rebellion.18 In 1820 a widespread rebellion in the region near the borderland was vigorously suppressed by the vali, Celal Pas
a, and the leaders were either executed or put into prison.19 The success of Celal Pas
a in subduing the rebels was remembered with great admiration by the central authorities; even Mahmud II said that ‘being a harsh community, the Bosniaks did not allow their valis to govern for a long period of time; only Celal Pas
a became successful in creating order there, but later the Bosniaks again violated this’.20 The frequency of rebellions in Bosnia, for whatever reason – a new tax, military recruitment because of a new campaign, a protest against the abolition of tax privileges, or resistance to the newly recognized privileges of non-Muslims – reveals a more profound facet of Bosnia; that is to say, the acceptance of rebellion as a form of regional policy-making and the existence of a culture of resistance in terms of introducing regional demands to the central authorities. In other words, it represents the strength of Bosnian society in political participation in regional events. The situation was closely related to the formation of powerful local classes and groups; merchants, ayan, kapudans or tribes for example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, and the construction of proliferating networks among these groups. In that sense, the rebellion provided a nexus for these groups in coming together in regional solidarity, especially for a period and geography in which international intervention created more crystallized societies, and internal conditions unified people against difficulties. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that the rebellions in Bosnia demonstrate not only its share of discontent in the empire in general, but also in the modus operandi of local politics in particular. The period under consideration, that is to say between 1826 and 1836, witnessed many rebellions in Bosnia, large and small, some of which affected only very limited areas and were suppressed through small-scale interventions. Two of these rebellions, however – the one that took place after the abolition of the janissary corps and the rebellion of Hu¨seyin Kapudan – spread all over the region and could only be suppressed through large-scale intervention. In both,

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although the leading figures had changed, the reasons for the rebellion and the demands of the rebels had followed the same pattern, indicating in essence a certain continuity. For this reason, I prefer to evaluate the process as following two stages of a rebellion period rather than calling them two separate rebellions, independent from each other. In the following pages I will concentrate on the first stage of the rebellion period, that is the rebellion after the abolition of the janissary corps and the years between 1826 and 1831.

The abolition of the janissaries in Bosnia A few days after the abolition of the janissary corps in Istanbul on 15 June 1826, the ferman abolishing the Bosnian janissaries was prepared and sent to Bosnia.21 During this period the governor of Bosnia was Mustafa Pas
a, who had been appointed to the post on 12 May 1826 during his governorship of Damascus and moved to Bosnia on 26 May.22 His appointment to this post was a consequence of the serious rebellions and revolts witnessed during the rule of Selim Sırrı Pas
a, the previous vali of Bosnia. The loss of his ascendancy in favour of local elites prepared the ground for Selim Sırrı Pas
a’s dismissal.23 It is understood that Vali Mustafa Pas
a was very famous for his brutal methods of suppression24 and might have been selected for this post because of this reputation. One of the first activities of Mustafa Pas
a after arriving in Travnik was to build a new prison which included some 300 chain sets for the prisoners.25 The seizure of ocaklık cizyes of Osman Pas
a, who was the Mu¨tesellim of Yenipazar, by order of Mustafa Pas
a26 – and according to some documents even his dismissal from his mu¨tesellimlik post27 – made the vali an object of abhorrence in the eyes of the region’s people. It was claimed that the vali was demanding payment of the kudumiye tax (a landing fee), which had been abolished by kaˆnuˆnnaˆme-i vezaˆret during the reign of Selim III, wherever he travelled in Bosnia.28 These arbitrary practices of Mustafa Pas
a horrified the Bosniaks and aroused heavy criticism,29 with people commenting that ‘while Mustafa Pas
a had been known as “Hacı” [pilgrim] for more than 22 years, would he concede the meaning of that title included robbing the Bosniaks?’30

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It is seen that Kapıcıbas
ı Mehmed Ag˘a was appointed mu¨bas
ir to proclaim the ferman of abolition to Bosnia. In this ferman, the central authorities demanded that the vali collect all possessions of the janissary corps and store them in the arsenals of the imperial castles in the region, while the janissary insignias (c
aprasts) would be gathered by the aforementioned mu¨bas
ir for dispatch to Istanbul.31 A certain Selim Ag˘a was charged with the registration of the corps’ treasury in Bosnia as well.32 Moreover, the previous mirahur, Ali Bey, was sent to Bosnia entrusted with two duties: the secret duty of dissolving the Bektashi Tekkes of the region, and the public duty of inspecting the imperial forests of Bosnia. However, when he left for Bosnia he was warned that, because of the probability of a reaction, he should postpone his secret duty for a while. However, since later reports sent from Bosnia show that the Bosnians were not in favour of Bektashiism, this secret duty was later publicized in the region. Messages from the region suggested that this duty be made public, on the grounds that the people of the region were not particularly concerned about the issue and that rumors about it would be more dangerous than if the truth were announced.33 It is seen that all initiatives, from the appointment of a vali famous for his brutal policies, to the designation of secret personnel, pursued a wise course, suggesting that the central authorities were well aware of possible reactions. Another issue was to convince local inhabitants of the wisdom of the abolition of the janissary corps. At this point, two influential people, Esham Mukataacısı Mehmed Arif Bey from the bureaucracy and Pirlepeli Ahmed Efendi from the ulema class, were selected and sent to Bosnia to help persuade people of the advisability of the abolition of the janissaries and to report developments to the central authorities.34 At first, Ahmed Efendi was also charged with the destruction of Bektashi Tekkes in Rumelia, but later this order was cancelled because of the situation in Bosnia and a new person was attached to the staff of the aforementioned Ali Bey to deal with the Bektashi Tekkes.35 Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi first went to Sofia together36 and then passed to Piris
tine, where they stayed for a long time because, on account of the rebellion, they could not travel on to

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Saray or Travnik.37 It is understood that the presence of Arif Bey with special duties greatly embarrassed Mustafa Pas
a, who was worried that Arif Bey might send unfavourable reports to the central authorities.38 He may have been afraid that if Arif Bey revealed the Bosnians’ negative opinions about him he might be dismissed. In the event, Arif Bey registered strong criticism of the rule of Mustafa Pas
a,39 reporting that the vali had lost all his power and deserved to be dismissed. He warned that Mustafa Pas
a would blame him in order to deflect blame from himself.40 He proposed that if relations with some important notables of the region were restored and if a new vali came through Cadde Kolu together with 3,000 armed men, the problems afflicting the region would easily be solved.41 It is understood that the shift from localized reaction to a regional rebellion started shortly after the declaration of the abolition of the janissaries. As early as September 1826, after one or two representatives from every district had been summoned to Saray for a council, discussion started about what the people’s response should be.42 News of the turmoil spread very quickly over the region. For example, as early as August 1826, when the term of the Kadı of Belgrade, C¸ukacızade Mustafa Efendi, expired, he applied to the Muhafız of Belgrade, Abdurrahim Pas
a, for permission to extend his stay in Belgrade because of the unrest in his home region of Bosnia.43 The aforementioned Kapıcıbas
ı Mehmed Ag˘a first went to Travnik, where he was met by Mustafa Pas
a. After the ferman regarding the abolition of the janissaries had been publicized, the inhabitants of Travnik said that they would not react to it until a decision had been reached in Saray and they would abide by that. However, in the meantime Mustafa Pas
a began to make some changes in the uniform of the commanders-in-chief and removed some janissary insignias. Waiting for the answer from Saray, the inhabitants of Travnik did not respond to these changes.44 About ten days after the announcement of the abolition of the janissaries in Travnik, a new ferman, demanding the acceptance of the abolition of the janissaries as well as the cooperation of the city, was prepared by order of Mustafa Pas
a and sent to Saray with a group of people including Mustafa Pas
a’s son, Mehmed Ag˘a, and Mustafa Pas
a’s brother-in-law, Battal Ag˘a.45

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After the ferman had been read in Saray, local inhabitants protested against the order, shut their shops and even attacked functionaries, who were in so much danger that they had to be led secretly out of the city during the night.46 Kapıcıbas
ı Mehmed Ag˘a, for instance, who was being sought for execution, sheltered in the Serb region and then moved on to Yenipazar, where he met with Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi.47 When one courier, who was charged with the transmission of the ferman to Sol Kol and the Albanian districts, went to Saray eight days later and demanded to know the decision of the region, the leaders of the rebellion said that they would not give their approval and in any event the ferman had not been accepted anywhere. When the courier showed them acceptance letters from 39 districts, they did not respond and sent him on to Travnik.48 News from Saray showed that the preparations for rebellion had started just after the declaration of the ferman and that the notables of Saray had been on the rebels’ side. In order to get the notables of Saray on his side Mustafa Pas
a summoned them to Travnik, but they did not respond. Mustafa Pas
a told the central authorities that this was because they feared the rebels,49 but later events would show that, far from fearing the rebels, they actually supported them. Travnik also continued to stall. When the notables of the city were summoned to the court and asked for their response to the ferman, they said nothing. Ten days later the courier re-applied to the court, summoned all the notables and demanded to hear their decision. Senior members of the military attacked the court, turning everyone out, and sent news to the local artillerymen that they would all be killed if they resisted.50 In reality, the support of artillerymen had been ensured by the efforts of Mahmud II during the period leading up to the abolition of the janissaries. With this support, the suppression of the janissaries in Istanbul and elsewhere became easier.51 The courier stayed a few days in the residence of Mustafa Pas
a, and on his return to the capital demanded the personal notes of Pas
a, who gave him nothing, saying that if he was caught with those notes, the rebels might not only seize them but also kill him.52 Sending communications for long distances was a major problem during the

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rebellion. Mustafa Pas
a had to send documents to Istanbul via Abdurrahim Pas
a, the Muhafız of Belgrade, since direct routes to Istanbul were controlled by rebels.53 Couriers quite often did not enter the region but stayed in neighbouring places where they attempted to find out what was going on in the area controlled by the rebels. This information was sometimes incorrect or incomplete, however. For example, the courier Arif Bey who stayed in U¨sku¨b said he talked to a traveler from Bosnia who told him that, although the Bosnians reacted badly to the ferman at first, now there were no uprisings and the situation was quite tranquil and secure.54 By crosschecking with other documents we see that Bosnia was in fact extremely troubled at the time, so this information was quite false.55 In Saray, preparations for the second big mes
veret were continuing; letters of invitation were sent to every district. The mes
veret, including delegates from almost every district, was held on 2 October 1826 in Saray.56 The participants made the important decisions not to accept the new army, not to join in military drills and not to give up their janissary claims. The act, or mahzar, recording these decisions was prepared and sent to Travnik.57 After delegates from Travnik returned to the city, similar reactions to those seen in Saray were repeated in Travnik. The rebels shut the market place, gathered notables to the big mosque of the city in order to share the decisions that were taken in Saray, and moved to the court in order to get the kadı’s signature for the prepared mahzar. However, they failed to get the signature because the kadı escaped from the court on hearing the news. According to the reports of Mustafa Pas
a, a group of 40–50 men were patrolling the city during the daytime in order to incite people, and during the night their numbers rose to between 100 and 400. He said that main aim was to spread the rebellion into Rumelia and even as far as Istanbul.58 Rumours were circulating that the rebels had sent their agents to Vidin, Edirne, Sofia, Filibe and Salonika to spread the rebellion.59 The rebels also talked with the merchants of Rumelia and demanded that they circulate news of the rebellion in their districts. The rebels threatened them with retribution if they did not do this.60 About a month later, in November 1826, the mutinies started to intensify. Arif Bey now believed that it would not be possible to stop

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the rebellion without the use of force.61 The rebels summoned Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi to Saray. Arif Bey insisted that if they went, the rebels would force them to declare that the state would preserve the janissary corps in Bosnia. Mustafa Pas
a advised Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi not to come to Saray or Travnik, adding that ‘he was unwittingly caught [in Travnik], as he came there with a small retinue’.62 Rebels piled up stones at the entrance to main roads as well as the residences of important officials such as kapıcıbas
ı and the vizier in Travnik and shot at the gate of the harem so as to intimidate the vali, saying that they would kill the vali in case of any attack against them.63 They also threatened to kill any of the local inhabitants who entered the court or any of the court servants who went to the bazaar and stayed there too long. They did not even allow the vali to supply his court with needs such as food or firewood.64 The vali was besieged in his court65 and was not allowed to go out even on Friday for public prayer.66 He planned to flee to Yayc
e Castle, but was unable to do so67 as rebels patrolled round his court day and night.68 According to the courier Sadık, who visited Travnik at this time, the vali lost all his credibility and influence after the blockade. He added sarcastically that he was seen as so weak that ‘if the rebels kill his son, he will even say “Thank heaven!”’69 In the meantime the rebels repaired the castle of Saray and filled it with hard tack and provisions in preparation for attack.70 They also repaired their guns and bought horses.71 In bazaars and market places, when two people talked to each other they were watched carefully in case they were spies from the other side. According to a courier’s note, everybody was suspicious of everyone else.72 Rebels who wanted to abandon the fight were severely punished. For instance, when a former janissary, Delalog˘lu Salih Ag˘a, said that he would give up his janissary title since the state could not be withstood, the rebels beat him violently and put him into the jail of Saray castle.73 The nakib of Saray, S
erifzade Mustafa Nuri Efendi, was stoned and killed by the rebels because he initially supported the rebellion but then changed his mind.74 It is important to note that, until his death, S
erifzade was frequently mentioned as being among the leading figures of the rebellion,75 but after his death he was

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commemorated as a martyr and different stories were ‘created’ to dramatize his ‘honor of martyrdom’.76 Events were escalating and the authorities tried to prevent things getting worse by winning over some indigenous notables: the Kapudan of Izvornik, Mahmud Pas
a was granted the title of mirmiran and appointed to the post of Zu¨lfikar Pas
a, the Mutasarrıf of Izvornik; the Mutasarrıf of I˙
skodra, Mustafa Pas
a, who was supporting the rebellion, was reconciled to the government, and about 15 people who had been exiled to Tirana, Filibe and Tatarpazarı in previous rebellions were pardoned and allowed to return to their homelands.77

Repercussions throughout the region According to Hasan Efendi, the scribe of the treasury of Bosnia who as a local person knew Bosnia very well, of the 48 districts of Bosnia only 20 submitted in obedience to the authorities during the rule of Mustafa Pas
a, while the others went along with the decisions of Saray.78 In terms of winning the support of the districts, at first there was considerable competition between the rebel centre of Saray and the administrative centre of Travnik, but later Saray gained the upper hand. While in Travnik, the vali had copies of the decree of abolition of the janissaries prepared and sent them to every district by way of mu¨bas
ir. For their part, the rebel leaders had their letters of invitation or bulletins of their mes
verets prepared in Saray and also sent out to the districts.79 Heavy pressure from the other side, especially from the central authorities, could lead districts to change sides, at least on paper. It is not surprising to note that sometimes there was confusion as to whether certain districts were for or against the rebellion. In Yenipazar, for example, the Mu¨tesellim Osman Pas
a had a rebel bulletin read out in the coffeehouses and said that as he was always supported by Saray, he would be on the side of Saray. He also complained about the Vizier Mustafa Pas
a and proposed that the Saray rebels demand his dismissal.80 When the courier Mustafa went to Yenipazar a short while later and asked Osman Pas
a what his loyalties were, Osman Pas
a said that he was obedient to the Sultan.81 On the other hand, Arif Bey

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first asserted that Osman Pas
a was a strong adherent of the rebellion82 but later reported that, after he and Ahmed Efendi went to Yenipazar together, Pas
a was persuaded to join them.83 It is understood that during Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi’s stay in Yenipazar, rebel pressure continued as new rebel agents arrived in Izvornik and Yenipazar to win the inhabitants over to the rebel cause. When the region up to and including Vis
egrad was secured through the considerable efforts of Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi, the leader of the janissaries, Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, went first to C¸elebipazarı and then to Vis
egrad together with his 700 men and regained the region’s support.84 During the same period, Tas
lıca, Pirebol, C¸anic
e and Gorajde districts, were reported to be supporting the janissaries.85 In many districts, however, people had split into two groups, for or against the central authority, and were at loggerheads. In Tas
lıca, for instance, when supporters of the rebellion attacked the pro-authority side and tortured Abdurrezzak Bey, his wife shot at them with a gun, shouting ‘we will not be rebels’. Arif Bey reports that the brave stand of Abdurrezzak Bey’s wife prevented others from joining the ranks of rebels.86 There is little information in the documents about what kind of treatment was shown to the rebel side by others, but it would probably be safe to assume that similar events took place on the rebel side as well. Meanwhile the Bosavine and Serhad region, especially Derbend and Banaluka, were summoned to the side of the rebels.87 About a month later the notables of Pirebol prepared a decree accepting the abolition of the janissaries and sent it to the capital,88 but this does not mean that events had quietened down in Pirebol. As the Mutasarrıf of U¨sku¨b, Yas
ar Pas
a pointed out, although most of the districts sent statements approving the abolition of the janissaries, they were not to be trusted as they demonstrated great hostility to the authorities.89 The statement of a courier of Mustafa Pas
a, who was on an errand to Yenipazar, well reflects the atmosphere during this period: When I was on the way to Yenipazar by way of Saray, rebels captured me, interrogated with great torment and then

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imprisoned me in the menzilhane of Saray. I was not alone in being subject to that kind of behavior: a friend of mine experienced very similar things in Pirebol. After I was released, I went to C¸anic
e where I met with similar bad treatment. I am in Travnik now, pale as a ghost and trembling to the marrow of my bones with fear.90 In the Sava/Bosavine Kolu region, the inhabitants of Serebrenice were also supporting the rebels of Saray. Because of this its mu¨tesellim, Hasan Pas
azade Ru¨stem Bey, was dismissed from his post and replaced by another local notable, Memis
Ag˘a, who pledged his allegiance to the central authorities. After Abdurrahim Pas
a travelled to Izvornik, the inhabitants of Serebrenice presented him with a petition expressing their repentance91 and requesting the reappointment of Ru¨stem Bey to his post.92 Ru¨stem Bey duly pledged his allegiance to the vali, who then reappointed Ru¨stem Bey to his previous post, but he dismissed the Naib of Serebrenice because of his relations with the Saray rebels. Thanks to his reappointment, Ru¨stem Bey gave important military support to Abdurrahim Pas
a and halted the transport of provisions to Saray.93 The rebels of Kolas
in gave considerable support to Saray,94 and groups of rebels scattered to other districts like Tas
lıca in order to draw others into their net.95 In Izvornik, when the mu¨bas
ir came to the city, the gate of the castle was closed and he was denied entry. However tensions subsided in the course of time and the notables of Izvornik eventually presented their obedience to the Mutasarrıf of Izvornik, Zu¨lfikar Pas
a.96 According to the reports of its mutasarrıf, while the centre of Izvornik was safe from rebel attacks, some of its districts such as Blene, Tuzla and Gradacac, were under the control of the rebels.97 It is important to note that, while on the one hand the mutasarrıf was sending letters to the head office declaring his obedience, he was in a close relationship with the rebels on the other hand. This connection brought about his dismissal and the kapudan of Izvornik, Mahmud Pas
a, was appointed to the post.98 The inhabitants of Foc
a also had close links with Saray, partly because the notables of Saray had huge estates in Foc
a. It was argued that, even if

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the inhabitants of Foc
a were against the rebellion, they would not admit this to the Saray rebels out of fear.99 It is understood that the ulema of Foc
a had close ties with rebels and the key role in this relationship was played by Mufti I˙brahim Efendi. When its Haˆkim Hatibzade Mehmed Efendi left his post because of the rebellion, the rebels demanded that the mufti be appointed to this post.100 When the sancak of Klis sent the mahzar to Travnik, one of the city’s districts, Ihlevne, declared its support of Saray. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, the abolition of the janissaries was declared in Hersek without any great problem, and districts of Hersek such as Libos
ka, Mostar and Nevesin presented their letter of approval to the vali of Bosnia.101 Later on, problems spread to Mostar as well.102 In Belgrade, a short while after the abolition of the janissary corps, the training of a new corps was started on the initiative of Abdurrahim Pas
a. Training also began in districts of Bosnia, namely Sokol and O¨zice, where most of the inhabitants were Bosniaks and the influence of Saray was clearly felt. Abdurrahim Pas
a informed the Sultan with pride that, along with Sokol and O¨zice, the Semendire, Cisr-i Mora and Bo¨g˘u¨rdelen districts of Belgrade, which were known as kıla-i hamse (five castles), were participating in the training program.103 The second in command of Austria’s army came to Belgrade from Varadin with a huge retinue to observe the training programme, which won praise from Mahmud II.104 This retinue of Austrians included 12 or 13 generals, about 100 kapudans and zaˆbits, many notables and women who travelled first to the Zemun district of Austria and then crossed the border into the Ottoman Empire, where they were welcomed with an official ceremony. Abdurrahim Pas
a reported that when the commander-inchief saw the firearm instruction programmes of the cavalry and the infantry, he admitted that it would take at least four years for his soldiers to perfect this kind of training and asked how these soldiers gained such expertise so quickly. ‘Have the soldiers been as successful in other parts of the empire?’ he asked. ‘And why did the Muslims show such an interest in the training program?’ Abdurrahim Pas
a replied that ‘since it was the command of the Sultan, all Muslims

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eagerly set to work on this training’. Abdurrahim Pas
a gave Erzurum as an example and said that the people there were training both day and night. He added that the number of soldiers who attended the programme all over the empire had reached 400,000. According to Abdurrahim Pas
a, the Austrians were astonished at his answers.105 It is seen that Abdurrahim Pas
a became an important agent and mediator in a period when, because of the rebellion, getting news from and sending messages to the centre was very difficult. This is because Belgrade was very near to Bosnia. Abdurrahim Pas
a knew the region very well and, more importantly, he had agents who could travel to Bosnia using alternative routes or who, as native Bosnians, were not seen as suspicious characters by the rebels.106 This factor was crucial, especially considering that even the special agents of the state, Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi, could not go near Travnik or Saray.

The arrival of Abdurrahim Pas
a According to the reports of Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi, the only way of ensuring the compliance of the inhabitants of Saray and Travnik was through suppression. It is understood that the Porte paid special attention to the issue of Bosnia because of the alarming news reported Arif Bey and Ahmed Efendi.107 It was decided to close roads between the two districts to prevent the rebels travelling to and fro. Humbaracı Mesud Ag˘a was charged with this duty and at first the authorities considered appointing him as the vali of Bosnia in order to make this easier. He was given letters setting free 15 people, as mentioned above, but warned that they were being pardoned because it was planned to use them against the rebels. They would not be allowed to return to their homelands in case they supported the rebellion. It is understood that there were two main factions ( fırka) in Saray, namely the Vratnik and the Liburic, which, because of their rivalry, occasionally fought against each other.108 The 15 people pardoned were notables of the Vratnik faction and had some influence over public opinion, which might affect people’s attitude toward the rebellion.109 Thus, it appears that through these pardons the central

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authorities were planning to win the support of the Vratnik faction as well as to leave Liburic isolated on the rebel side.110 Subsequently, the appointment of Mesud Ag˘a as the vali of Bosnia was debated in detail at the Porte and it was decided that he had not had enough experience to fill the post since he had not performed this duty before. The Porte deemed that the vali of Bosnia should be a dominant leader who, if necessary, could fight as well as pacify with gentleness. It was decided that Abdurrahim Pas
a was the most suitable person for the job.111 It seems that the decision was strongly influenced by Abdurrahim Pas
a’s performance during his muhafızlık period in Belgrade, when he became very active not only in the abolition of the janissaries but also in the implementation of the new training programme, as mentioned before. Even Mahmud II honoured him with great respect, saying that during his Belgrade Muhafızlık, Abdurrahim Pas
a had showed what a wise and cunning vizier (ne guˆne aˆkil ve mu¨dıˆr vezir) he was.112 The dismissal of Mustafa Pas
a from this post was said to be because of his harsh policies, which encouraged people to rebel.113 In the meantime, it was decided to appoint Mesud Ag˘a as the Muhafız of Belgrade.114 When he arrived there, however, he reported to the Porte that while this position required a huge daire, 1,500 soldiers at least, only 40 or 50 staff remained as Abdurrahim Pas
a had taken most of his subordinates with him. He added that, if he recruited soldiers from nearby regions, soldiers coming in groups could cause disturbances on the Serbian side. In consideration of this, the central authorities decided to appoint the Muhafız of Nig˘bolu Hu¨seyin Pas
a to Belgrade and the previous vali of Bosnia, Mustafa Pas
a, as the muhafız of Nig˘bolu.115 Hence Mesud Ag˘a’s term as muhafız was very short, and he returned to Istanbul a few months after the suppression of the rebellion.116 The decree for the appointment of Abdurrahim Pas
a was prepared in December 1826 and sent to him.117 Due to the unrest, Abdurrahim Pas
a was not able to go to Travnik and Saray, moving instead to Izvornik, on 11 January 1827.118 At this point there came a crucial turning point: Mahmud Pas
a was won over to the side of the state. As an indigenous notable of Izvornik, Mahmud Pas
a easily

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gained the support of the region’s people before the arrival of Abdurrahim Pas
a.119 While he was en route to Izvornik, Mahmud Pas
a sent him letters saying that the rebels of Saray were raising a group of 400 people from Yane, Blene, Tuzla-i Baˆlaˆ and Serebrenice districts to start a mutiny in Izvornik. He advised the vali to send a large cavalry force ahead to stop the intended uprising.120 The words of Mahmud Pas
a indicate that he was very concerned about the possibility of violence once the vali arrived in Izvornik. Meanwhile, Abdurrahim Pas
a claimed that the rebels were in contact with the Serbian Supreme Knez, Milosˇ, and he demanded Mahmud Pas
a’s help to stop Milosˇ. When Abdurrahim Pas
a arrived in Bo¨g˘u¨rdelen, he was met by Avram, the brother of Milosˇ, who told him that a few thousand people from Saray had come to the Izvornik, Blene and Yane regions where they were starting to stir up trouble. Moreover, Avram claimed that they had all now gathered on the other side of the Drin River with their guns and artillerymen. On hearing this, Abdurrahim Pas
a sent a holder of a large military fief, zaˆim of Belgrade, Su¨leyman Bey and a cavalry ag˘a of Bo¨g˘u¨rdelen, I˙brahim Ag˘a to Serebrenice, Lozinc
e, Blene, Yane and Tuzla districts in order to calm the inhabitants.121 It was said that in Saray a group of 120 people were recruited with a monthly pay of 30 gurus
in order to stop Abdurrahim Pas
a near Izvornik, and this cost was paid by the kadıs and merchants of the city.122 When news arrived from Izvornik that a group of a few hundred rebels were close to the city, Abdurrahim Pas
a quickly sent a troop of 900 infantry to Izvornik and moved there himself as well. He reached the city on 18 January 1827, two days after the arrival of his troops.123 The day after his arrival, he seized the castle of Izvornik.124 Then he prepared letters of invitation to a mes
veret and sent them to every district, demanding two or three delegates to be sent from each district. He warned that while the districts which answered the summons would gain his good opinion, others would be punished.125 It is seen that the gravity of the circumstances forced the state to intervene in the rebellion even during the winter, a period when the recruitment of soldiers and the preparation for fighting would become more complicated. The statements of the Mutasarrıf of

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I˙
skodra, Mustafa Pas
a, for example, describe the troubles he had in transporting troops: he was willing to do so, but the roads were snowbound in the winter conditions. He warned that soldiers might perish on the road from extreme cold.126 The central authorities advised Abdurrahim Pas
a to go to Bosnia with a huge retinue in order to crush the rebellion. Abdurrahim Pas
a reported back that he had gone to Izvornik with 1,300 local soldiers, as well as his ic
daire. He also left 673 soldiers in Belgrade until the arrival of the new muhafız, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, and when he arrived these soldiers would then rejoin his ranks. Nevertheless, he needed at least 3,000 more soldiers, and to recruit them he would need more money as well.127 He proposed to the Porte that if some important people of the region were recruited as bas
bug˘s and regular salaried soldiers were attached to them, it could create a separation between the rebels and those recruited soldiers.128 He added that, in order to avoid upsetting the people further, he was making no material demands from them and was supplying all the needs of his daires, enderun and bıˆrun in cash.129 It is understood that the vali had borrowed 100,000 gurus
from Milosˇ, and he reported this to the Porte.130 His demand for money was personally answered by Mahmud II, who first ordered 1,000 kese akc
e to be sent to him and then his debt to Milosˇ to be met by credits from the 1824– 5 and 1825– 6 revenues of Belgrade, which had not yet been taken by him.131

The suppression of the rebellion It is understood that the change of vali at the region’s request and the policies and unbending attitude of the new one were raising doubts on the rebel side. The closure of roads and other routes had caused prices to rise and there was widespread disquiet among the local population. According to a courier’s note, rebels were no longer as determined as before and they had started quarrelling with each other.132 The vali’s call for those rebels willing to obey the central authority to come to Izvornik, and for those unwilling to do so to stay in Saray, was perceived as a challenge by the region’s people.133 Upon the summons of the vali to every district demanding their

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obedience,134 letters of submission for the abolition of the janissaries were prepared and sent to the Porte as well. For instance, seven districts of Cadde Kolu, namely Istereflak, Pirebol, Yenipazar, Kolas
in, Tas
lıca, C¸anic
e, and Foc
a with Vis
egrad, presented their letters of submission together.135 It was also reported that most districts of Serhad Kolu and all districts of Bosavine Kolu submitted their obedience to the central authorities.136 Moreover, districts from Hersek Kolu complied with the orders and people loyal to the Porte began to expel rebels from the region.137 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a managed to get to Izvornik with 100 armed men via Saray, although rebels had warned him that he would not be allowed to go any further than Saray.138 This does not mean that the rebellion was supressed easily; on the contrary, in districts such as Tas
lıca, Pirebol or Vis
egrad rebel strongholds were only overcome by night-time advances by groups of armed men accompanied by indigenous notables. While these groups advanced, messages were sent to the loyal notables of the district demanding their support. Thus, unable in general to resist either interior or exterior attacks, the rebels were escaping to the outskirts of Saray.139 Rumours were deliberately spread that a huge army of crack soldiers from Rumelia and Albania was being rushed to the Saray region. According to these rumours, Yas
ar Pas
a of U¨sku¨p was also approaching Yenipazar, together with 3,000 hand-picked Albanian soldiers. Apart from these discouraging rumours, the rebels were depressed by the news that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had deserted them and joined the vali’s ranks.140 It is important to note that although Hu¨seyin Kapudan supported the rebellion in the first stages, he was not among the most eminent rebel leaders. This indicates that he must have been a very popular and important figure who was able to win support easily from the people. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the liberation of 15 people from the Vratnik, a move that seems at first glance to be a kind of concession, was actually a strong political instrument employed by the vali. When these 15 pardoned people reached Izvornik, their leader, Genc
Mustafa Ag˘a, had an interview with the vali, received his orders and left for Saray. Before doing so he sent

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letters to his faction ordering that they should construct a camp in opposition to the Liburic. Thus, the relationship with Genc
Ag˘a provided important support to the vali in the heart of Saray. When Genc
Ag˘a and his friends reached Saray, they stirred up more friction between the two factions and circulated the news that about 1,000 cavalry as well as a great number of infantry were nearing Saray. They then went into the castle and seized all the belongings of the janissaries from the inhabitants of Saray, who were very frightened by the latest news.141 They had good reason, for more than 4,000 soldiers from different districts had been dispatched to Saray. It is important to note that, after Abdurrahim Pas
a dispatched these soldiers to Saray, he waited for a while in Izvornik both for reasons of caution and also in the hope of attracting more soldiers. Meanwhile, the mutasarrıf of U¨sku¨b, Yas
ar Pas
a, led his soldiers to Izvornik to join Abdurrahim Pas
a’s ranks. About 1,000 soldiers from the Serhad region as well as the remaining soldiers from Belgrade also set out for Izvornik. According to Abdurrahim Pas
a, the purpose of gathering such a huge army was not to battle with the region’s people, but rather to show the strength of the state and demonstrate that victory had been achieved.142 Apart from these policies of permeation, another method of restoring order was the state policy of providing rewards, not only to bring the indigenous notables to the vali’s side but also to encourage the region’s people to support the state. The policy was described as ‘encouragement and motivation’ (tergıˆb ve tes
vıˆk) by Abdurrahim Pas
a,143 who prepared promotion lists (defters) for rewards and sent these to the central authorities.144 Among those promoted were those who had taken a stand on the side of state and especially those who were previous yerlikulus of the province. Among these, while some were recruited as tabye ag˘ası (the agha of a bastion), kethuda or sancakdar on appropriate salaries, others were enlisted as yerlikulu soldiers on salaries of 15 akc
e a day. As a part of this strategy, the kapudans were also guaranteed that there would be no change in their previous positions.145 With this policy, the state was aiming to show that yerlikulus of the region were not its target.

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It is interesting to see that Abdurrahim Pas
a formulated those policies in a ‘three articled programme’ (u¨
c
ıkkın s i‘mali); first, giving advice and admonition as well as rewards and promotions; second, using exiled notables to win over their factions and third, if necessary, suppressing the rebels on the battleground with a huge army. He also added that if he had no option but to fight there would also be looting and pillaging, which was seen as an accepted part of military campaigns during the period. Hence, he demanded permission from the central authorities to implement the combination of strategies outlined above. In reply, the Porte said only that ‘he was a capable vizier in his methods and regulations; if God wished, he would only succeed’ – a statement that implies an indirect acceptance.146 On the Saray side, Abdurrahim Pas
a’s measures as well as the oncoming army had frightened not only passive supporters of the rebellion – that is, almost all the inhabitants of the district – but also active supporters and even leaders of the movement, such as Salih I˙zzetıˆ, Osman Nuri or Hacı Salih Ag˘a. Calls to give up the rebellion were spread among all the population who had participated in the gathering up of the insignias of janissaries and placed them in the castle’s arsenal.147 Abdurrahim Pas
a entered Saray on 25 March 1827,148 and thanks to its submission, it was reported to the Porte that the city had been subjugated without anyone being hurt (kimsenin burnu kanamadan).149 It is possible that the rebels knew how strictly the janissaries had been dealt with in the Imperial capital. The rebels might have realized that if they continued to resist, it could be their turn next. A few days after he had entered Saray, Abdurrahim Pas
a called the divan as usual and declared the abolition of the janissaries.150 By order of the vali, all barracks of the janissaries were demolished.151 Abdurrahim Pas
a reported to the central authorities that he was the one who struck the first blow in destroying the barracks.152

The struggle for the new order After the suppression of the movement as such, Abdurrahim Pas
a asked Hamid, the kadı of Travnik, to send the leading figures of the

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rebellion to him. When his request remained unanswered, the vali ordered that a group of 40 or 50 armed men, under the command of a bo¨lu¨kbas
ı should arrest these leading rebels.153 He also dismissed the naib from his post, appointing as a substitute Pirlepeli Ahmed Efendi, who, as mentioned before, had come to Bosnia with special duties.154 The next step was to invite the local notables of every district to their district court in order to sign the decree of abolition of the janissaries.155 Together, all kapudans and yerli ag˘as prepared letters of submission and sent them to the Porte.156 Abdurrahim Pas
a decided that the time was now right to suppress the rebels of Travnik; he charged Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi with this duty and gave him 5,000 armed men to do so.157 Troops were also sent to other districts active in supporting the rebellion, namely Foc
a, Vis
egrad and Tas
lıca.158 On hearing the news that soldiers were on their way to Travnik, the inhabitants of Travnik assembled in As
ag˘ı C¸ars
ı and Yukarı C¸ars
ı to talk about what to do. In the final sitting of their mes
veret two different views were expressed: while some were in favour of allowing the soldiers into the city, others opposed this. In the end, Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi and his soldiers succeeded in entering the city, where they were put up in the khans, coffeehouses and in the court without any trouble. Later, the leading figures of the rebellion were arrested and punished.159 After Abdurrahim Pas
a had established order in Saray, he called a series of mes
veret where he asked the opinions of local notables about the reasons for the rebellion. According to the local notables, the main reason was the fact that the valis preferred to stay in Travnik. They argued that, due to a political vacuum in the main city of the eyalet, the people who were intent on plotting mischief found a receptive environment. They proposed that the vali stay in Saray in order to stop this incitement.160 When Mesud Ag˘a returned to the capital, he also warned that keeping order in Bosnia would only be possible if the vali remained in Saray with at least 5,000 soldiers under his command.161 The state decided that the vali should stay in Saray with a huge army,162 and preparations were started for the construction of government offices ( pas
a kapısı) in Saray.163 An

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assistant architect (mimar halifesi) was appointed by the order of the chief architect, Mahmud, in Istanbul and sent to Bosnia to estimate costs and conditions and to draw up a plan.164 However, when the vali demanded that the notables supply at least a part of the expenses for the construction of the office and for the recruitment of the new soldiers from local revenues, new debates started again. According to the Porte, the construction of a powerful administrative office (mu¨kemmel daire) meant the recruitment of a huge army, which would require new registrations of soldiers in the region. According to the gossip circulating among the local notables, the Porte was planning to recruit 12,000 soldiers from the region and to meet their expenses from the local taxes.165 The communications of the vali reflect the balancing act he was faced with: applying the orders of the central authorities on the one hand and respecting local circumstances on the other.166 Due to the sensitivity of the situation, the vali preferred to treat the Bosnians very leniently so that they did not feel threatened.167 The training programme had just been started, but it was on a voluntary basis with encouragement from the authorities.168 The recruitment of new soldiers for the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre army was postponed until later, because of possible opposition by Bosnians not only towards their recruitment, but also towards the raising of revenues for the new army, which were to be met locally due to economic difficulties in the capital. The vali reported to the authorities that the Bosnians had not been used to giving anything to the state until now, and any requisition would create a disturbance.169 It is evident that the primary object of the vali was to establish order in the eyalet. Castles were repaired and provisions were supplied to the region where, because of the siege, people had been deprived of food stocks.170 One important reason for the repair of these fortifications was the outbreak of the Russo –Ottoman war,171 after the disaster of Navarino where the Ottoman fleet had been sunk by Britain, France and Russia, in October 1827.172 However, domestic strife had not totally ceased. The vali reported to the central authorities that some notables of the region, especially Pekli Hasan Ag˘a and Murad Kapudan, were secretly inciting rebellion among the

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people, and plundering Austrian lands,173 and the Austrian authorities presented their complaints to the Porte.174 It is understood that, because of the above-mentioned state of affairs (ahvaˆl-i haˆzıra), the central authority did not want any turmoil on its borderlands.175 The vali was ordered to prevent any fighting in the region and to treat the leading plotters wisely (usuˆl-i haˆkimaˆne) by appearing to promote them but in fact punishing them by transferring them elsewhere on being promoted. The central authorities also stressed that because of the present circumstances it had become more important to keep control of the Bosnian soldiers since they would be dispatched to fight against Russia.176 Because of the rebellions in Peloponnesus, the inhabitants of Bosnia were ordered to be vigilant and prepare themselves for any possible war.177 In reply, the notables of the region sent their letters of submission to the order, saying that they had 2,600 soldiers standing ready.178 The authorities stepped up their activity after Russia sent a consul to the vladika of Montenegro and demanded military support of the region.179 During the nineteenth century the Great Powers began to extend political and financial support to national groups that were struggling for freedom from Ottoman rule.180 To guard against the possibility of any Russian intervention in Montenegro, it was decided to recruit a huge army in Bosnia.181 In fact, raids between the border regions of Bosnia and Montenegro had been a way of life for centuries, so that pillaging and banditry supplemented the meager existence of the semi-nomadic people in the mountains.182 The opinion of the state about Montenegro and the Montenegrins was as follows: Those Montenegrins as a small community, were in reality distinguishing themselves from others by their rebellious character. However, when they showed hostility, the inhabitants of neighboring places responded and repelled them. Also because of the location of Montenegro, bounded by Bosnia, I˙
skodra and the Venetian Bay and very arduous to access, it was accepted as not worthy of seizure by the state.183

100 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Since the Montenegrins were always quarrelling with the inhabitants of Podgoric
e and I˙
sbozi districts,184 the state felt a need to keep a close eye on the situation in the region. Kapıcılar Kethu¨dası Musa Ag˘a was sent from Istanbul to Bosnia to advise people to unify against the enemy, persuade them of the need to prepare soldiers for the war against Russia and organize the recruitment of soldiers.185 When he arrived in Bosnia, he duly publicized the decree of the central authorities and demanded soldiers from the eyalet.186 Musa Ag˘a reported that the Bosnians agreed to give 20,000 soldiers for the war and signed letters of acceptance to this effect.187 He also reported that the vali had summoned all local notables to Saray to discuss the issue.188

A new turmoil: The Visoko event Despite ostensible acceptance of the order, the recruitment of soldiers had initiated a new conflict in the region. On 21 June 1828, a group of 600 people from Visoko came to Saray, where, their numbers swollen by local people, they attacked the court of Abdurrahim Pas
a.189 The question why this rebellion started on the initiative of the Visoko inhabitants was answered by Musa Ag˘a. He reported to the central authorities that the rebel group was actually made up of the soldiers recruited in Visoko, who were intercepted by some notables on the way to Saray and persuaded to rebel. According to Musa Ag˘a, the real reason for the disturbance was the vali’s unwanted presence in Saray. Musa Ag˘a added that he had tried to talk to the rebels, but they had replied with gunfire in which he and some of his attendants had been injured. They all escaped to the mountains, where they hid.190 According to the reports of kadı and mu¨tesellim of Tas
lıca, the conflict was sparked by the issue of dress.191 Unfortunately they give no detailed information about the matter. It is likely, however, that during the latest recruitment phase, arguments raised during the abolition of the janissaries about the modernization of dress for the new Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre army192 were revived and the new uniforms for the soldiers caused a reaction.

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The battle between the Visoko-Saray inhabitants and the vali’s soldiers continued from afternoon until night, and people from both parties perished. It was stopped through the efforts of reconcilers (muslihuˆn), and the area was quiet the next day, but the battle started again the day after and continued throughout the day.193 During the fight, the Saray inhabitants were divided into three sections: the supporters of Visoko, supporters of the vali and the neutrals, who included merchants and craftsmen who just wanted to get on with their work.194 The muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, reported that when news of the turmoil reached his region about 1,500 Bosniak soldiers under his command who were looking for an excuse to desert departed for Bosnia.195 Abdurrahim Pas
a was forced to leave Saray on 29 June 1828 and moved to Travnik. It is important to note that the Bosnians were not alone in resisting the recruitment of soldiers from their region. According to Hu¨seyin Pas
a, Milosˇ thought that the recruitment of the Bosniak soldiers and their despatch to the Serbian border was not a move against Russia, but against the Serbians. According to Hu¨seyin Pas
a, for that reason Milosˇ said that he would not permit the troops to go to Vidin via Serbian territory. They might only go there by the way of the Danube River, which could be reached via Yenipazar and the Sava River. Milosˇ added that there had been enmity between the Bosniaks and the Serbians for a long time, and the Serbians felt threatened by the movement of the Bosniak soldiers.196 Milosˇ and the Serbians were frightened that the Bosniak soldiers might turn against them, but the central authorities were also frightened that with the intervention of Russia, the Serbians might turn against the empire. In reality, Russian intervention in the Serbian lands was not new. For instance, during the Russo – Ottoman War of 1806 – 12, Russia saw the Belgrade Pas
alık as an advantageous military outpost in the region and regarded the Serbian army as a functional auxiliary force for the advancement of Russian policy. The Russians established a kind of patron– client relationship with the Serbians.197 As a sign of this patron–client relationship, in the Treaty of Bucharest in May 1812 that terminated the Russo – Ottoman War, the Russian side had secured the Porte’s promise of

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complete amnesty for the Serbian rebels and recognition of the Belgrade Pas
alık as an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire.198 Hu¨seyin Pas
a reported that a Russian committee visited Milosˇ and Milosˇ reported that visit to him but with some distortions. He also added that, although Milosˇ and the Serbians were seemingly obedient to the state, they were also continuing to report and annotate everything for the Russian side.199 The reports of the muhafız of Nis
, Osman Pas
a, support those claims. According to Osman Pas
a, it was obvious that the state was not safe from Milosˇ and the Serbian side, even though Milosˇ declared that he would not separate from the state and would obey it, and claimed that he would not allow the passage of Russian soldiers through Serbian lands.200

The arrival of a new vali: The Ali Namık Pas
a period It is seen that a new discussion was started at the Porte when the local inhabitants expelled the vali from Saray and forced him to stay in Travnik. When Musa Ag˘a suggested that the vali be replaced the idea was not welcomed at first because the vali was thought to be a wise and thoughtful person.201 Musa Ag˘a was not the only one who thought the vali’s position was untenable. According to the muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, the expulsion of the vali by the local inhabitants had demeaned the power and prestige of the state. He proposed that the vali be changed and the eyalet be administered through a kaymakam, who would substitute for the vali. According to him, this would not only reduce the tension in the region but would also send out a signal that the inhabitants of the eyalet were again liable for punishment.202 The central authorities debated his proposal in detail and decided not to act, arguing that Bosnia was an enormous province and was surrounded on four sides by Austrian, Serbian and Montenegrin unbelievers (kefere).203 In addition, the mutasarrıf of I˙
skodra, Mustafa Pas
a, had reported that the inhabitants of Bosnia were being victimized by Abdurrahim Pas
a.204 Abdurrahim Pas
a for his part told the Porte that he had been sent to the region in order to suppress the rebellion and he had succeeded

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in his mission. He was adamant that there was no need for him to step down.205 In the final stage of these discussions about the change of vali, it was decided to send the present vali to Edirne, where he would wait for a new appointment.206 Thus, his position was represented as a kind of temporary one; waiting for a new appointment, rather than a dismissal. It was also decided to send the soldiers under his command to Edirne in order to join the army of the Grand Vizier.207 Many names were put forward for the valilik post and the matter was debated in detail. The previous vali of Haleb, and the muhafız of Istanbul at the time, Mehmet Vahid Pas
a, was appointed based on the argument of Abdurrahim Pas
a that it would be advisable to appoint the vali from among the viziers who were not well known by the Bosnians.208 Abdurrahim Pas
a left the eyalet under the administration of the defterdar of the Bosnian Treasury, Mag˘alkoc
Mehmed Bey, as kaymakam.209 Nevertheless, the death of Vahid Pas
a a short while later meant a new vali had to be found. Once again, detailed discussions ensued and many names were put forward.210 Finally, at the end of August 1828 it was decided to appoint the previous muhafız of I˙nebahtı, Ali Namık Pas
a, who was living in Filibe at the time.211 As was traditional, Ali Namık Pas
a went first to Yenipazar, where he was met by the notables of Bosnia and reported that situation to the central authorities as a sign of his acceptance.212 He then went on to Saray, where he stayed for three days. Ali Namık Pas
a warned the local inhabitants that if they showed any reaction to his entry into Saray he would stay there for good; otherwise, he would go to Travnik a few days later. He reported that when he entered the city, he saw that, contrary to the decree, people were wearing old kavuks instead of imame. He scolded them and ordered them to wear imame. Ali Namık Pas
a said that the local inhabitants discarded their kavuks for the next few days and wore imames,213 but once the vali left the city, they reverted to their kavuks.214 Unlike his predecessor, Ali Namık Pas
a preferred to reside in Travnik where he did not meet with any disapproval.215 It is understood that this was also preferred by the central authorities in

104 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

the interests of maintaining calm. Mahmud II acknowledged that it was necessary to establish order in Bosnia, but now was not a very convenient time.216 The first action of Ali Namık Pas
a was to exchange the kadı of Saraybosna Bekir Efendi for the kadı of Filibe Takiyu¨ddin Efendi, on the grounds that Bekir Efendi had participated in seditious acts.217 It is most probable that, as Ali Namık Pas
a was to remain in Travnik, he wished to appoint a close associate of his to this important position in Saray in order to obtain reliable information about the city. When the Russian war broke out the recruitment of soldiers continued, but because of the rebellion it was naturally postponed in Bosnia. Since it was very late for the organization of professional soldiers, Ali Namık Pas
a promised to gather about 1,000– 1,500 voluntary soldiers with the help of the notables of the region.218 However, the dispatch of Bosnian soldiers alarmed the Serbians when rumours circulated that the vali had recruited those soldiers for the ¨ zice, Bo¨g˘u¨rdelen and Semendire castles. guarding of the Belgrade, O The Supreme Knez Milosˇ asked Ali Namık Pas
a about these rumours, and he replied that the recruitment was for the Russian war and some soldiers had been sent to Vidin because of the Russian attack there. The vali added that, from now on, the soldiers would go to Vidin via Yenipazar and Nis
.219 Due to the war, the Serbian border required careful handling. The Bosnian commanders were warned to be vigilant and not to provoke any action unless there was aggression on the Serbian side.220 Vali Ali Namık Pas
a managed to send about 5,000 soldiers to Vidin in total.221 As the war with Russia became more heated, recruitment of soldiers from the region became more critical. The Russian troops had cut the passes in the Danube region and had prevented the distribution of provisions.222 It was decided to send the mutasarrıf of I˙
skodra, Mustafa Pas
a, with his troops to Rahova, and the mu¨tesellim of Sofia, Said Pas
a, together with all his soldiers to Vidin. The soldiers of Bosnia would also come to Vidin.223 Because of fierce fighting in Edirne, Ali Namık Pas
a, together with his soldiers, was diverted to Edirne on 12 October 1829. While they were on the way to Edirne from Ko¨stendil, however, the war with Russia was

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ended and the Treaty of Edirne was signed.224 Ali Namık Pas
a therefore returned to Bosnia with his soldiers, in case their arrival in Edirne caused any disturbances among the region’s population.225 During the valilik of Ali Namık Pas
a, local unrest continued and worsened when Ali Namık Pas
a tried to give the kapudanlık of Izvornik to Mehmed Ali Bey, the son of Fedayizade Ali Pas
a from Izvornik. The previous kapudan of Izvornik was Mahmud Pas
a and, when he became the mutasarrıf of Izvornik, he was expected to leave his kapudanlık post to one of his relatives, since he had no son. However, during the rule of the previous vali, due to the pregnancy of Mahmud Pas
a’s wife, it was decided to wait. When the newborn was a girl, Ali Namık Pas
a decided to take back this kapudanlık post from Mahmud Pas
a, but Mahmud Pas
a did not agree to give it to his relative, Mehmed Ali Bey. This was because there was hostility between Fedayizade Ali Pas
a, the father of Mehmed Ali Bey, and Mahmud Pas
a, a close friend of the kapudan of Gradacac, Hu¨seyin Kapudan.226 It is understood that the conflict intensified, so Ali Namık Pas
a dismissed Mahmud Pas
a from his mutasarrıflık post,227 and applied to the central authorities to give the post to Fedayizade Ali Pas
a.228 The rumours that the vali intended to commit acts of bribery together with Fedayizade Ali Pas
a started to circulate in the region and reached the Porte. Ali Namık Pas
a defended himself, saying that he absolutely did not desire any benefits from the city and would not do so in the future.229 Even the Serbian Knez Milosˇ intervened in the dispute by writing a letter to Hu¨seyin Kapudan saying that he should not interfere in the dispute between the vali and Mahmud Pas
a.230 The hostility between two local notables, Izvornikli Fedayizade Ali Pas
a and Mahmud Pas
a, later turned into a battle so serious that the Serbians started to mass troops on their Izvornik border in case the conflict worsened to the extent that it spilled over the frontier.231 Later, through the efforts of mediators between Fedayizade Ali Pas
a and Mahmud Pas
a, the fighting was brought to an end.232 Fedayizade Ali Pas
a later became a strong supporter of Hu¨seyin Kapudan; however, it seems that this event was to be a turning point in hostilities between the vali and the notables of the region.

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According to a report by Ali Namık Pas
a, on 1 June 1830 the Bosnians started to talk among themselves thus: ‘The aim of the state was to restore the order. If this is not possible, the state will give our cities to the Austrians and Serbians. Let us finish those hostilities and enmities among ourselves, and establish unanimity so that we may prepare for war with the enemy.’233 The idea of giving lands to the Austrians and Serbians was related to the local affairs of the period. The alteration of the course and direction of the Rastok River on the Austrian border by the Bosnians had caused a serious dispute with the Austrians. Tomasic´, the Commander of Dalmatia, complained to the Porte in May 1830 that the Bosnians in the region had set a barrier across the Rastok River and opened up a new watercourse. Thus, the lands on the border had become waterlogged and all crops on the Austrian side had perished.234 Due to strong pressure from the Austrian side, the Ottoman authorities decided to send an engineer to the region to investigate the claims.235 The disputes with the Austrians became more problematic when the Commander of Zemun complained to the muhafız of Belgrade at the end of May 1830. He declared that about 400– 500 people from I˙storic
e-i Atik in the Serhad region of Bosnia had crossed to the Austrian side, killed some Austrian men and captured women and girls as slaves. They had also pillaged the goods and property of the villagers. He reported that the Austrians were preparing three battalions of cavalry and eight of infantry to send to the Serhad region. Ali Namık Pas
a reported this to the Porte and added that these attacks had not been carried out by the Bosnians, since he had heard nothing about them. According to him, they were the work of Austrian bandits.236 However, after an inquiry, he learned that these attacks had been carried out by Pekli Hasan Ag˘a and Murad Kapudan from the Serhad region.237 Due to strong pressure from the Austrian side, he set up a committee and sent people to the region to assess the damage. The vali reported that he had responded realistically to the heavy demands of the Austrians, a statement that shows that he had been confronted with intense pressure from the Austrian side.238 He summoned all the notables

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from the Serhad region and warned them that they should obey the treaties between the states.239

The question of the ‘Six Districts’ (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte) As explained below, Serbian issues had become the most important reason for the resurgence of the rebellion and the revival of old claims, which were articulated during the abolition of the janissary corps in Bosnia. According to the Treaty of Edirne, the Ottoman authorities agreed to cede some territory to the Serbian side. The territory was to include the six districts from Vidin, Alacahisar and Bosnia, which Serbia claimed, but did not administer.240 Through this treaty, Serbia had also obtained the protection of Russia, though still acknowledging the supreme authority of the Porte. With the four successive hatt-ı
erifs, s Serbia was defined as an autonomous state which paid tribute to the Porte, under the rule of a Prince who, then, had dynastic rights.241 The scribe of Tobhane, Kes

saf Efendi was appointed to inspect the borders of the six districts and was sent to the region in January 1830.242 It is understood that the Porte did not publicize the arrangement and let the matter rest for a period because about one year later, in January 1831, Ali Namık Pas
a sent a letter to the mutasarrıf of Izvornik, Osman Pas
a, saying that he had received no decree about the position of these six districts.243 When the news started to circulate around the region, it was represented as a demand of Milosˇ, who with the aid of the ‘three states’ (du¨vel-i selaˆse) was aiming to capture those districts.244 It is probable that the Porte preferred a kind of wait-and-see policy and expected the position of those six districts to change as time went on. However, approximately one year after Kes

saf Efendi’s inspection, because of Russian pressure, a new official, Lebib Efendi from haˆcegaˆn-ı divan-ı hu¨mayun, was sent to the region to inspect the districts together with a Russian committee.245 His mission was to examine whether these six districts had been attached to Vidin, Alacahisar and Bosnia since the old days, or whether they had originally been Serbian districts and had been tied to those sancaks later.246 The explanation of the Porte that Lebib

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Efendi’s mission was restricted to inspection only and it was not necessary to give those districts to the Serbians immediately,247 seems to have been an attempt at appeasement. When news of the new arrangement started to spread in the region, it caused great shock among the local inhabitants, who claimed that the lands concerned had belonged to the Bosnians and Albanians since their conquest.248 Many letters were sent to the Porte underlining that if these lands were given to the Serbians it would cause great anger among the local inhabitants, and demanding that the idea be abandoned.249 Rumours were circulating in the region that the number of districts given to the Serbians would not be restricted to those six, but would be increased to 14 by adding new districts from Rumelia, Albania and Bosnia.250 Moreover, the inhabitants of the region thought that even if the Porte decided not to change the position of these six districts after the inspection, the Serbian side would not follow the decrees of the state, but would plot mischief.251 The Bosnians also argued that, if these districts were given to Serbia, their access to Rumelia would be cut off and they would be surrounded as the Serbian lands would unite with the Montenegrin lands.252 Milos, in contrast, was increasing pressure on the Izvornik and Yenipazar regions in order to take the Badre, Rakodine and Morava districts.253 When Milosˇ turned the screw even tighter and started to seize the goods, commodities and crops of the inhabitants, the Bosnian population began to ally with the I˙
skodra region.254 Even the mutasarrıf of I˙
skodra, Mustafa Pas
a, who was very troubled because of his dismissal from the control of Elbasan and Ohri sancaks which had become a part of the direct rule of the Grand Vizier after August 1829,255 sent a troop through Tirana and held secret councils with the Gheg chieftains as preparation for a possible reaction.256 According to some claims, the dismissal of Mustafa Pas
a from his posts was related to his refusal to agree to the Porte’s appointment, in which Mustafa Pas
a was entrusted with putting Bosnia in order and with the recruitment of the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers from Bosnia.257 The vali declared that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had started to recruit soldiers in preparation for a quarrel and had sent money to Pekli

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Hasan and Murad Kapudan for this recruitment. Moreover, I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a was making similar preparations in his region and was in close communication with Bosnia.258 According to a report of Ali Namık Pas
a on 4 February 1831, the notables of Bosavine Kolu gathered in Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s house and decided to fight back against the attempts of the Serbians to capture these six districts.259 They prepared a letter of invitation and sent it to all the notables of the region, calling them to a mes
veret in Tuzla-i Zıˆr in order to talk about the wishes of the districts in question.260 According to Ali Namık Pas
a, they were in touch with the Albanians as well. The vali warned that, if they united with the Albanians, it would not be possible to stop the Bosnians.261 Information coming from the region said that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had succeeded in gathering a huge group in Tuzla-i Zıˆr, where most of the notables of the region either came personally or sent responsible men so as to constitute a general alliance (ittifak-ı umum). Only the Hersek notables neither went there nor sent their men.262 The vali’s struggle to stop the rebellion was continuing. He sent buyuruldus to the notables of all districts calling them to obey the decrees of the Porte.263 He reported that some inhabitants of the Serhad region had shown their obedience, but they could turn to the other side again,264 which indicates that almost all inhabitants of Bosnia were united in favour of the rebellion. During the mes
veret, the movement gained the support of the other three arms, apart from the Bosavine,265 and, thanks to that alliance, approximately 2,000– 3,000 soldiers gathered in Tuzla-i Zıˆr.266 The most important decision of the mes
veret was to march on to Travnik.267 The vali reported that, without any invitation, the notables of Bosavine region applied to him and said that they would come to Travnik in March 1831.268 It was argued that the aim of the group was to attack the vizier and his advocates.269 He had the alternatives of escaping or withdrawing to the castle of Travnik but, in spite of this, he waited for them in his court where he was almost surrounded.270 According to the muhafız of Vidin, I˙brahim Pas
a, the group was planning to take off the vali’s fez and to wear the kavuk instead. After that, they would take the vali with them and when

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they arrived in Yenipazar, they would separate into two arms. While ¨ sku¨b in order to unite with I˙
skodralı one arm would move to U Mustafa Pas
a, the other would cross to Vidin and go on to Edirne.271

The rebels’ march and the flight of the vali On 28 March 1831, the rebels in Tuzla moved through Travnik. The mirmirans, mu¨tesellims and kapudans of Bosnia left their districts with soldiers to join the rebels and all of them came together near Travnik. They were met by an army of approximately 3,000 soldiers under the command of the sons of Su¨leyman Pas
a, known as the Su¨leyman Pas
azades.272 In this battle, the rebels succeeded in smashing the army of the Su¨leyman Pas
azades and entered Travnik with ease. There they attacked and plundered the residences of the Su¨leyman Pas
azades. The state officials who were on the vali’s side were either dismissed or exiled to other regions and were replaced by supporters of the rebellion.273 Most of the vali’s supporters escaped from Travnik, where the vali remained under siege. He was ostensibly in a position of consent and was dressed in the forbidden clothes.274 The rebels sent letters to all the notables of the region under the signature of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, calling on them to send soldiers to Yenipazar.275 According to a report dated 8 June 1831, they were able to gather a large army in Yenipazar consisting of more than 8,000 soldiers who would be sent to the Kosova region.276 As time went on the numbers increased and the rebels reported that their infantry soldiers in Yenipazar numbered 70,100. Milosˇ found out, however that the rebels had no infantry and their cavalry numbered just 12,000.277 After Ali Namık Pas
a had stayed in Travnik for 20 days, the rebels sent him to Busovac, a district of Saray where his position of housearrest continued for the following 24 days. Just 200– 300 of his supporters accompanied him.278 During the Muslim Festival of Sacrifice in June 1831, he left his belongings as well as his wife in Busovac and escaped, together with his men, through the Hersek region. He first stayed in I˙stolc
e and then passed into the lands in the Austrian borders.279 As the Hersek region of Bosnia had taken the

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Porte’s side, the rebels from Saray and Mostar attacked the region, and were met in Poc
itel and Nevesin where they were rebuffed.280 It is highly probable that because of these attacks Ali Namık Pas
a preferred to pass through Austrian territory. It was also seen as more fitting for the vali to go to Belgrade by way of Austria rather than to remain surrounded and to pass through Vidin by river.281 Unfortunately for him he could not reach Belgrade, and remained in Austrian territory. According to a report of Prince Metternich, sent to the Porte, Ali Namık Pas
a took refuge on the Dalmatian border of Austria together with his 250 attendants. He was planning to return to I˙stolc
e by way of Dalmatia. The Dalmatian commander treated him with respect and gave him 1,000 riyal.282 It is understood that on 10 June 1831, Ali Namık Pas
a went to the Zadre district of Austria near the Dalmatian coast, together with his attendants,283 and there awaited the arrival of some ships of the Imperial navy (donanma-yı hu¨mayun).284 During this period, the correspondence of the Porte with the Bosnian side continued and it is understood that the return via sea was delayed since a promise had been made that the rebels would not stir up any trouble if Ali Namık Pas
a went to Vidin via Bosnia.285 However, a short time later this agreement also failed, as the Porte claimed the rebels’ promises were not to be trusted.286 Later, with the help of I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, Ali Namık Pas
a first went to Belgrade via the Austrian border and then travelled on to Vidin via the Serbian region.287 Due to the flight of Ali Namık Pas
a, the post of valilik was vacant in Bosnia. At the end of June 1831 it was decided to give this position to the muhafız of Vidin, I˙brahim Pas
a,288 and orders were given that, so as not to be embarrassed by lack of money, I˙brahim Pas
a should be supported by the Porte. I˙brahim Pas
a went to Piris
tine with about 1,000 soldiers.289 The rebels also marched towards Piris
tine but did not remain there and instead passed through I˙pek in order to join up with the soldiers of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a.290 It was reported that the rebels in Bosnia first presented their letters of submission after the appointment of I˙brahim Pas
a to the valilik but soon changed their minds, demanding the appointment of the muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, as vali.

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This demand was also very short-lived, since they then reapplied for the appointment of Hu¨seyin Kapudan to the post of valilik.291 The argument that the rebels did not accept the proposal of Hu¨seyin Kapudan as vali and retreated, accusing him of being responsible for the events,292 seems unreliable since, as we shall see later, the Bosnian rebels succeeded in rebuffing the army of the Grand Vizier, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a. At the same time, Milosˇ was continuing to communicate with the Porte and presented his submission to the state, agreeing that if it was allowed, he would fight against the Bosnians under the flag of the Ottoman Empire.293 The state was happy to accept Milosˇ’s help.294 However, his offer to send troops against the Bosnian rebels was politely rejected, on the grounds that it would damage the confidence of the Bosnians in the state.295 It is probable that, behind that politeness, there was doubt as to Milosˇ’s intentions since, for example, the Grand Vizier reported that in order to support I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a, Milosˇ had sent 500 kese akc
es which were confiscated in Nis
and were allocated to be spent for the expenses of the army in the region.296 It is important to note that, of Milosˇ’s offers of money, soldiers and provisions to help the Porte, only the offer of provisions was accepted and it was decided to accept this on account of the taxes of Serbia.297 Due to the worsening situation in both Albania and Bosnia, the Grand Vizier, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a – who had been serving in the Balkan lands for a long time, first as the commander of the Vidin fortress on the Danube region, then as the governor general of Rumelia, and, after 28 January 1829, as the Grand Vizier,298 – was charged with suppressing the rebellion.299 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a’s army managed to defeat I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a, who became besieged in I˙
skodra.300 The delay by the central authorities in sending artillery and mortars to Dırac
to support Res
id Mehmed Pas
a’s troops led to the siege continuing for a long time.301 When the rebels of Bosnia reached I˙pek and joined the I˙
skodralı soldiers under the command of Arslan Pas
a, they attacked I˙pek, Piris
tine and Vulc
etrin, where they succeeded in repulsing the army.302 According to rumours, their next march would be on

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113

¨ sku¨b, and Res
id Mehmed Pas
a did not want to fight them in U ¨ sku¨b U as the Imperial army was not very powerful there. For this reason, ¨ sku¨b he planned to cross to Piris
tine via the Kac
anik after going to U mountain pass and to join up with other armed forces. However, the Bosnian-Albanian rebels cut the Kac
anik pass and attacked the army of the Grand Vizier, which, according to the records, included more than 20,000 soldiers. The rebels were able to rebuff them.303 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a was forced to return to U¨sku¨b where he impaled three captured rebels,304 probably in revenge for his defeat as well as a show of strength. The Grand Vizier believed that the Bosnian issue should be postponed until a more suitable time since the Imperial army was under strong pressure from all sides. Though suppressed, the I˙
skodralı issue had not been totally solved; and there had been a rebellion by Silahdar I˙lyas Bey (Silahdar-ı Poda, Silahs
or-ı Poda)305 in the Tosk region of Albania,306 where the Ergiri, Tepedelen and Permet regions had also started to mutiny.307 Res
id Pas
a believed that the rebellion in Bosnia stemmed from the incitement of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a. According to him, after Mustafa Pas
a was totally suppressed, the Bosnian rebellion would calm down spontaneously and without necessitating the use of any arms. After ¨ sku¨b he retreated to Piris
tine where he deliberated on the issues of U the region.308 It is understood that Res
id Mehmed Pas
a was obliged to accept the demands of the Bosnians to dress in their old clothes, a concession that was strongly criticized by the Sultan. Res
id Mehmed Pas
a defended himself, saying that by making this concession he aimed to calm the Bosnian issue so that he could suppress the mutinies in Albania more decisively.309 The Bosnian rebels then began to return to their homelands.310 Hu¨seyin Kapudan went to Yenipazar and waited to see if his request to be appointed as the vali of Bosnia would be granted.311 It is important to note that the Bosnians were not pursued on their return, based on the decision that it would be more advisable to march on Bosnia after the total suppression of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a and after the establishment of order in the Gheg region.312

CHAPTER 3 THE SECOND STAGE OF THE REBELLION PERIOD, 1831—1836

The de facto vali: Hu¨seyin Kapudan As mentioned in the previous chapter, the muhafız of Vidin, I˙brahim Pas
a, was appointed to the valilik of Bosnia at the end of June 1831. ¨ sku¨b for Yenipazar on 2 When I˙brahim Pas
a was preparing to leave U September 1831, news reached him that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had applied to the central authorities to be awarded the valilik and was awaiting their decision.1 In his application to the Porte, Hu¨seyin Kapudan argued that all the inhabitants of Bosnia, including notables, high officials, chieftains, as well as old and young people, demanded his vizierate. He said that although he resisted and tried to dissuade them, they would not back down. For this reason, he felt it necessary to ask for the post. He added that he was completely obedient to the state, and if he was accepted for the valilik, he would strive with heart and soul to do his best in the post.2 Hence, the people of Saray refused to allow the kaymakam who was sent by I˙brahim Pas
a to substitute for him until he came, saying that they would not accept any vali apart from Hu¨seyin Kapudan.3 Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his men had gone to Yenipazar to apply to the Porte for the valilik. Leaving 300 soldiers to guard the castle there, he moved on to Saray where he was planning to hold a mes
veret to be attended by all the notables of the region.4

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The mes
veret was attended by huge numbers of delegates, including mirmirans, serbevvabs, mu¨derrises and others from the ulema, mu¨tesellims, ayan, kapudans sergerdes, beys, and zadegans, other local notables, traders and merchants and ordinary inhabitants of the region.5 Based on the decision of that mes
veret, the local inhabitants appointed Hu¨seyin Kapudan as vizier on 24 September 1831 and celebrated the appointment with a gun salute.6 When a state official came to them to remind them of the state’s orders, the people of the region replied: ‘We have appointed our vizier and we are requesting the state to confer his horsetails. However, if they are not sent, we will able to gather 200,000 armed men and we will fight until all of us perish, but we will not accept any other vizier apart from Hu¨seyin Kapudan.’7 According to Kapıcıbas
ı Hu¨seyin Ag˘a, who was sent to Bosnia with the special mission of explaining the orders of the Porte and convincing people to accept them, all the people of Bosnia, young and old, entered into a solemn agreement (ahd-i mıˆsaˆk), swearing on the Qur’an and appointing Hu¨seyin Kapudan as their vali and vizier.8 Moreover, Hu¨seyin Ag˘a added, the only way of terminating this rebellion was to get the central authority to accept this valilik. If it did not do so, the Bosniaks would move through Rumelia with a huge army and, if his valilik was affirmed, it was apparent that Hu¨seyin Kapudan would march on the enemy, wherever the central authorities might dispatch him.9 Meanwhile, the notables of every district signed the letters of appeal and sent these to the central authorities, requesting the acceptance of Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s valilik.10 The similarity between these letters indicates that the text may have been prepared during the Saray mes
veret. A short time after these events, in the letters sent from Bosnia to the Porte, the title of Hu¨seyin Kapudan was raised to Kapudan Hu¨seyin Pas
a as a sign of his position as vizierate.11 He was also mentioned as ‘Devletluˆ Hu¨seyin Pas
a, Vali-i Bosna, or Vali-i eyaleti Bosna’ many times in the sicils.12 The aforementioned Kapıcıbas
ı Hu¨seyin Ag˘a also called Hu¨seyin Kapudan ‘the Vali of Bosnia, Kapudan Devletluˆ Hu¨seyin Pas
a’ in his letters to the central authorities.13 More important than this is that, in a buyuruldu of the Grand Vizier, he was mentioned as ‘eyalet-i Bosna valisi vezir-i

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mu¨kerrem saadetlu¨, refetlu¨ Hu¨seyin Pas
a’ and it was said that he (Hu¨seyin Kapudan) begged pardon for his part in the events and requested the vizierate post, saying that he was desirous to serve the state. Then the text continues with expressions of how he would perform this duty, which implies that he expected his request to be granted.14 At the same time, false rumours that the central authorities had given the valilik to Hu¨seyin Kapudan with three horsetails marking the vizierate position of Bosnia, and relinquished the practice of the new order in Bosnia, started to spread all over the region.15 Due to his opposition to Hu¨seyin Kapudan, I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a was dismissed from his mu¨tesellimlik in Hersek by Hu¨seyin Kapudan, and his substitute was one of Hu¨seyin Kapudan advocates, Osman Bey, in accordance with the claim that Ali Ag˘a was plotting mischief in the Hersek region.16 When Ali Ag˘a opposed this, Osman Bey attacked him with his soldiers and besieged the castle of I˙stolc
e.17 In November 1831, the Grand Vizier’s forces succeeded in suppressing the rebellion of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a, who was then sent to Istanbul by sea together with his family.18 On receiving the news of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a’s repulsion, Mahmud II personally congratulated Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, who greeted him with the words: ‘Aferin (bravo)! Helal olsun. My bread and salt are yours!’19 Thereafter, special emphasis was placed on the fortification of Albanian castles, as well as acquiring the support of the Gheg Pas
as to suppress the Bosnian rebellion.20 The Grand Vizier reported that he was unable to rely on these Gheg Pas
as any longer, and the problems in the Gheg region would not be solved unless all the Gheg Pas
as were punished, but, because of the strong need for soldiers, he was unwilling to use any of them as escorts.21 It is understood that the Ottoman centre could not decide what to do about the Bosnian issue so decided to do nothing for a while. This stance was criticized by the Grand Vizier, who said that time was being wasted in awaiting replies to urgent questions from the Porte.22 It seems that the silence was not only because the Porte was waiting for the most suitable time to move, but was also influenced by the rebellion of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a, who was attacking Syria.23 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a personally

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117

remonstrated saying that, while the Albanian issue had come to an end, mutiny had broken out in Egypt – a development that prevented the punishment of the Albanian Pas
as.24 When Mehmed Ali marched to Sayda at the end of 1831, the Porte demanded that Res
id Mehmed Pas
a recruit soldiers from Albania to resolve the situation. The Grand Vizier replied that, if he sent for soldiers from Albania, this would give away his plans to act against the rebels of Bosnia and Ghegs. He said that because of turmoil in the region, it would not be proper to send soldiers from Albania to Anatolia and Arabia; instead he would send Deliorman and Kırcaali soldiers there.25 When news reached the Grand Vizier that a group of Bosnian rebels had gone to the regions of Mitrovic
e and Baneska, he decided to intervene first and sent a troop there on 9 December 1831. At first, the battle favoured the Grand Vizier’s troops, but later the situation changed in favour of the rebel side, with the support of Albanians from Vulc
etrin and other places. The troops of the Grand Vizier were forced to withdraw and return to Vulc
etrin. After this experience it was realized that in order to stop the Bosnian rebels, the support of the Albanians was needed.26

A new vali, a new campaign: The valilik of Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a It is understood that the Porte was very uneasy about the fact that I˙brahim Pas
a was unable to go to Bosnia. The Porte believed that I˙brahim Pas
a had shown irresponsibility in meddling in events.27 Sultan Mahmud wrote personally to the Grand Vizier complaining that I˙brahim Pas
a had lost his ascendancy in the eyes of local people and the supporters of Hu¨seyin Kapudan had started to behave how they liked.28 According to the Sultan, it was clear that I˙brahim Pas
a was no longer serving his purpose.29 Thus, the change of vali again came into question. The Grand Vizier, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, proposed I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a for the valilik post due to his strong support for the central authorities. Res
id Mehmed Pas
a believed that the valilik of Ali Ag˘a might be able to break down the support of some local people for Hu¨seyin Kapudan, but the kapudans who were then

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supporting Ali Ag˘a might turn against him because of jealousy.30 Many other names were proposed at the divan council of the Grand Vizier, including the vali of Silistre, Mehmed Pas
a, the muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, the mutasarrıf of Ko¨stendil, Elbasanlı Salih Pas
a, and the mutasarrıf of Tırhala, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a. The previous vali, Ali Namık Pas
a, also applied for the valilik, arguing that he would be able to resolve the quarrels.31 In the end, it was decided at the beginning of 1832 to appoint Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a to this post.32 The arguments made during the appointment of the vali of Bosnia give important clues to the preferences of the central authorities in terms of the valilik appointment. It was said that Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a was capable of commanding soldiers and well aware of the characteristics of the Ghegs and Tosks.33 He was described as very useful in battle (kavgaca is
e yarar) and esteemed for his courageous personality (s
ecaat-i zaˆtiye). However, after the suppression of the movement it would be desirable to remove him from office, since his style would not inspire confidence or appreciation among the local people.34 During this period Ali Namık Pas
a was appointed as the mutasarrıf of the I˙
skodra, Ohri and Elbasan sancaks, because he was widely thought to be a very moderate and chaste person (muˆtedil ve mu¨tenezzıˆh), and the post required these qualities.35 The letter of appreciation sent to Hamdi Pas
a on his appointment to this post on 13 February 1832 shows that he was expected to cleanse the eyalet of the rebels and to restore order,36 which would be done by dispatching a huge army there under his command.37 In a report, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a advised that any army sent to Bosnia should go there from Piris
tine and use the Kac
anik mountain pass. Since the Gheg Pas
as would be in position on the other side of mountain, there was a danger that they might attack the army or hinder the transportation of provisions. In order to prevent this, several of the leading Gheg Pas
as, namely Hıfzı Pas
a, Prizrenli Mahmud Pas
a, I˙vraniyeli Hu¨seyin Pas
a and Yas
ar Pas
a, should be summoned to Istanbul and given strong warnings.38 In reply, the Sultan said that:

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If assurance was not received from those Gheg Pas
as, they would not serve the state. Hence those Gheg Pas
as would not wish the Bosnian issue to come to an end and they would not desist from provocation and sedition since they thought that if this issue was ended, they would be the next in line. It would be proper to call two of them, namely Hıfzı Pas
a and Mahmud Pas
a to Istanbul, to inspire them with confidence.39 When news arrived that a group of more than 4,000 Bosnian and Albanian rebels were attacking the castle of Vulc
etrin, a troop was sent there on 27 February 1832 under the command of the mutasarrıf ¨ sku¨b, Yas
ar Pas
a. After securing Vulc
etrin, the next priority of of U the rebels was to capture Gilan and to cut the passes of Piris
tine, to prevent the army advancing into Bosnian lands. However, during the battle in Vulc
etrin in March 1832 the rebels were repulsed.40 This battle became a turning point in terms of both the morale and the military capability of the central forces in suppressing the rebels, since they not only regained the initiative but also removed the barrier that was preventing their march into Bosnia. For the state forces, the next step was taken in April 1832 in Mitrovic
e and Baneska, where, a few months earlier, the rebels had succeeded in making them withdraw. New measures were also put in place. According to correspondence with Austria, which promised to help with the suppression of the rebellion, soldiers were dispatched from I˙
skodra and Dırac
to the Hersek region by sea and troops were landed in Austrian territory.41 Naval vessels were sent near to Bosnia via the Sava river.42 The central authorities also decided to send 3,000 kese akc
e to the Grand Vizier for expenses during the Bosnian campaign.43 At the end of April 1832, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a was able to go to Yenipazar with approximately 25,000 soldiers under his command. From there he sent buyuruldus to every district, reassuring the inhabitants as well as threatening them.44 Political instruments were also applied to get the leading figures of the rebellion to cease their opposition.45 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a said that, since the Albanian tribes of Laˆp, Gulaˆk and S
aˆle could not be trusted, his

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¨ sku¨b and Vulc
etrin plains in order to army would bivouac on the U strengthen Hamdi Pas
a’s army. He advised Hamdi Pas
a that he should not move further until provisions could be stored in Yenipazar to support the army for one or two months. It was also decided to supply provisions from the Nis
and Alacahisar regions as well as from Serbian ones through the agency of Milosˇ.46 The Serb knezes who had gone to Istanbul in order to discuss their concerns were increasing pressure on the Porte to hand over control of the six contested districts mentioned previously. Milosˇ was also reporting regularly to the Porte on the Bosnian issue. According to Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, he was a habitually deceitful indifel who was on the lookout for any opportunity (begaˆyet mekkaˆr-ı vesıˆlekaˆr bir kaˆfir), but at the same time rather timid and apprehensive ( fakat evhaˆmı gaˆlib oldug˘undan). Thus, ‘when he observed the victory of the state over the Bosnian bandits, he would be subject to fear and fright’. For this reason, according to the Grand Vizier, it would be advisable to delay the question of the six districts until the Bosnian issue was resolved.47 The advance of the central forces continued when Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a dispatched about 6,000 Tosk soldiers under the command of Ku¨rd Yusuf Ag˘a to the Senic
e district. Here, about 3,000 rebels were deployed under the leadership of Hacı Muˆyuˆ, known as Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a or Muyag˘a Zlatarevic´.48 In reality Hacı Muˆyuˆ was a close associate of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, who, after declaring his valilik, appointed him the mu¨tesellim of Yenipazar.49 When Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a entered Yenipazar with his troops, Hacı Muˆyuˆ left the city and escaped to Senic
e together with the rebels under his command. In the battle near Senic
e, the rebels were dispersed and Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a’s forces captured the city.50 The battles of Pirebol, Hisarcık and Vis
egrad again ended in victory for Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a’s forces.51 During the same period, there was also a great effort to crush the rebels of the Montenegrin region. It was reported that more than 300 rebels from Montenegro were put to the sword, while their villages were set on fire.52 It is understood that the centre was aiming to cleanse the whole area of rebels, including those of Albania and Montenegro as well as Bosnia.

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On 4 May 1832, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a reported that the Tosk soldiers were fighting with their heart and soul, but because of the size of Bosnia and the strong alliance between Bosniaks and Ghegs, more soldiers needed to be recruited. He therefore informed the Porte that he had started to recruit about 2,000–3,000 soldiers from among the Tosks.53 While the inhabitants of Foc
a and Mostar districts had been mobilizing, along with those from Saray, since the beginning of the rebellion, the marches of the central army through their region had daunted them and they had now presented their submission to the state. The march of the army continued and the rebels were suppressed in Pirace and Alacahan by an army of about 8,000 Tosk and Gheg soldiers under the command of Hamdi Pas
a.54 It was reported that from Baneska and Yenipazar to Alacahan, all the regions had been ‘conquered’ and cleansed of rebels.55 However, beyond Pirace and Alacahan, in C¸elebipazarı, there was a large group of rebels under the command of Fedayizade Ali Pas
a. Hu¨seyin Kapudan had left the Saray district with the rebels and had approached very close to C¸elebipazarı in order to stop the army of Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a. On 29 May 1832, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a reported that the next battle would be very important. For this reason, he sent news to the region that the army should not attack the rebels until additional troops had arrived there. He himself was also on the move to C¸elebipazarı together with his soldiers.56 It is understood that the armies of the two sides were very close to each other as there was only a distance of half an hour between them.57 The final battle took place in Saray on 4 June 1832.58 The first move came from the rebels’ side, since the aim of Hu¨seyin Kapudan was to attack the army of the state first and take the initiative. The rebels’ army attacked from five or six sides with its cavalry and infantry forces. It was reported that the battle continued for seven hours with cannon and gunfire.59 Kresˇevljakovic´ cites that eight horses died under Hu¨seyin Kapudan. The troops of Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a suffered considerable losses. When Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a decided to stop fighting, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a and I˙smail Ag˘a Cˇengic´ brought their soldiers and gave important support.60 In the end, the rebels were defeated. Many rebels perished during the battle. About

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100 – 200 rebels were captured, and some others escaped.61 Meanwhile, the kethuda of I˙
skodralı, Mustafa Pas
a, Dervis
Bey was on the move with 3,000– 4,000 rebels to join Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s forces. When they arrived in Yenipazar, however, they learned that Hu¨seyin Kapudan and some of his followers had escaped to Austria. According to the document he suggested deserting, but the rebels under his command prevented him from doing so.62 The seizure of the Saray district was greeted with great pleasure by the Porte, where prayers were offered that the Egyptian issue would be solved with similar success. Albanian support for the suppression was also welcomed and heavily publicized, with the state recording the support in the columns of Takvim-i Vekaˆyi and thanking the Albanians via the newspaper. Hence, letters of thanks and encouragement were prepared and sent to the Pas
as of Albania, as well as the vali of Bosnia.63 The Sultan believed that, since many soldiers had been dispatched to Bosnia and Albanian military support was ensured, the time was right to suppress the inhabitants of Saray for once and for all, so that they could not rebel again.64

Recognition activities: promotions and rewards After the suppression of the rebellion, one of the most important issues was the recognition and rewarding of the supporters of the state, as well as celebrating their new appointments. By the personal order of Mahmud II that great supporter of the state, I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, was gratified to receive the nis
aˆn-ı iftihaˆr, the imperial order of special merit which was given by the Ottoman court.65 This honour was only bestowed in return for great services.66 Many people received rewards for their efforts during the suppression period. For example, a notable from the Sancak of Delvine, namely Ahmed Ag˘a, was rewarded with the title of kapıcıbas
ılık while a scribe of the Vali of Bosnia, namely Besim Efendi, was gratified to receive the title of divan-ı hu¨mayun haˆcelig˘i (the title given to the department chief of the imperial chancery of State).67 The lists, defters, including the names of the Pas
as and other notables who deserved rewards and promotions due to their support

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for the state, were prepared by the vali and sent to the Sultan.68 It is seen that the state was well aware of the role played by the Gheg Pas
as during the suppression of the rebellion. It was Mahmud II’s personal opinion that the state should reward those Gheg Pas
as and reassure them of the policies concerning it. Therefore, he asked the Grand Vizier about how they could be rewarded in the future and which services they would benefit from, saying that the Grand Vizier was well enough informed about them, since he had lived with them for such a long time.69 At this point, the Grand Vizier summoned all the Gheg Pas
as to a secret meeting where he reassured them about the acts of the central authorities. He said: What has happened until now is over. You have received the mercy of the state and have been given letters of assurance so there is no room for doubts. However, I called you to this council to firmly reassure you and to remind you that it is like drinking water for the state to blast all of you totally, but it is not the aim of the Sultan to extinguish you, but rather to leave you in your proper places. I think that, from now on, you will be faithful to the state.70 According to the report of the Grand Vizier, the most powerful of these Gheg Pas
as were Kalkandelenli Hıfzı Pas
a, his brother Abdurrahman Pas
a, and Prizrenli Mahmud Pas
a, whose loyalties were assured by the efforts of the Grand Vizier.71 A list of the Gheg Pas
as who were loyal to the central authorities and who had helped I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a was prepared and sent to the Porte, including the names of Prizrenli Mahmud Pas
a, Yas
ar Pas
a, Hıfzı Pas
a, his brother Abdurrahman Pas
a, I˙vraniyeli Hu¨seyin Pas
a, Likofc
alı I˙smail Pas
a, Yakovalı Seyfeddin Pas
a, the Mu¨tesellim of I˙pek, Arslan Pas
a and the Mu¨tesellim of Debre, Hakkı Pas
a.72 Detailed discussions were held about the sort of awards and promotions to be given to those Gheg Pas
as. For instance, when the names of some Gheg Pas
as were put forward to receive the nis
aˆn-ı iftihaˆr,73 it was said that there were about eight to ten Gheg Pas
as who had given considerable help in terminating the I˙
skodra and

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Bosnia uprisings, and so it was not appropriate to bestow the nis
aˆn-ı iftihaˆr on only some of them. Bestowing the nis
aˆn-ı iftihaˆr on all of them could create new disputes since there were other Pas
as such as the mutasarrıf of Ko¨stendil, Salih Pas
a, Debreli Hakkı Pas
a, S
ehlaˆ I˙brahim Pas
a, Abdurrezzak Pas
a and Cafer Pas
a as well as some Tosk notables who had greatly helped in suppressing the rebellion. It was said that since the nis
aˆn-ı iftihaˆr was a very special award, it was not possible to give it to all of those people. The divan’s decision was that it was more proper to give it only to I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, while the others would be rewarded with robes of honour (hilat), bounties (atiyye), the uniform of the new army (bisaˆt-i nizaˆmiye), as well as horses and capes embroidered with gold or silver thread (harvaˆnıˆ-harmaˆnıˆ).74 For the period under consideration there are numerous documents testifying that rewards and promotions were used to gain the support of indigenous notables, and this was especially so after the suppression of the rebellion. It is clear that the awards and promotions had two main goals: first to remunerate the state supporters for their services and give the message to the society as well as to individuals that the state appreciated the value of their support; second, these promotions and awards were aimed at winning the approval and support of those who had failed to support the state during the rebellion. For instance, in October 1826, during the first stage of the rebellion period, the central authority sent one or two letters of haˆcelik, two or three letters of kapıcıbas
ılık and a few letters of silahs
orluk to the region with the aim of attracting indigenous notables who were undecided about where their allegiance lay, as well as rewarding the obedient ones. These letters did not include any names, as the lines for names were blank and it was the duty of the vali and the official, Arif Bey, to select the most proper names for these appointments.75 Again in March 1827, when Abdurahim Pas
a summoned all the notables from Saray to talk about the rebellion, he gave the ulema furs as gift, while other notables were rewarded with capote robes.76 In September 1830, the vali of the period, Ali Namık Pas
a, informed the state that a notable from the region, namely Su¨leyman Pas
azade Mehmed Cemal Bey, had been

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125

able to gather approximately 4,000 soldiers in order to stop the mutiny, so he deserved the title of kapıcıbas
ılık.77 The rewards were not restricted to the Muslims of Bosnia, however. A certain non-Muslim, Yuvan, from Mostar was given immunity from his cizye taxes in return for his strong support of I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a during the suppression of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. What is interesting is that the immunity from taxes to Yuvan was awarded about six years after the suppression of Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement.78 It is seen that different types of tax immunities were offered as a kind of reward; for instance, during the rule of Abdurrahim Pas
a in October 1826, in return for the support of the mutasarrıf of U¨sku¨b, Yas
ar Pas
a to the vali, he was given immunity from the provisions tithes of the Neveberde and Vulc
etrin districts under his rule.79 In July 1827, due to the success of Abdurrahim Pas
a, he was rewarded with a jeweled dagger,80 while the mutasarrıf of I˙
skodra was awarded a jewelled box in March 1827.81 After the suppression of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, in May 1833, the emperor of the Habsburg Empire presented a jewelled box to the Grand Vizier in appreciation for the new regulations in Bosnia. In return, the Grand Vizier gave a shawl to the envoy as a gift.82 It is understood that rewarding couriers and spies was also a tradition of the period. For instance, in May 1827, the courier who brought the severed heads of rebel janissaries to Istanbul was rewarded with the gift of a robe of honour as well as other bounty.83 Again, according to another document dating from April 1827, Mahmud II personally ordered the courier who brought severed heads of janissaries from Bosnia to Istanbul to be rewarded according to the practice of previous times.84 The bounties were to change according to the rank of the couriers; for instance, in March 1827, while a certain tatar ag˘ası from Bosnia was given a sable-skin coat and 3,500 gurus
, the couriers under his command were granted capotes and 1,000 gurus
per person.85 It is important to note that the rewards for couriers were not restricted only to those who were entrusted with special burdens, such as the carrying of severed heads, but was a more general practice. For instance, in May 1832, the courier of the vali of

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Bosnia who brought news to Istanbul was rewarded with a gift of robes of honour and bounties, and there is a record implying that this was the general procedure.86

The aftermath of the suppression On 29 May 1832, when the Grand Vizier reported that the Bosnian issue was almost resolved, the Porte decided to recognize the Grand Vizier’s contribution towards victory with a public declaration praising his efforts.87 According to the central authorities, it would be desirable for the Grand Vizier to stay in Bosnia for a period, but the march of Mehmed Ali through Anatolia necessitated his return to the Porte as soon as possible.88 The vali, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, was also publicly thanked for his support.89 After the suppression of the rebellion, the process of reforming the eyalet was started without delay. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first chapter, the first step was to transfer the administrative centre from Travnik to Saray. It was realized that, as the rebellion originated in the Saray district, if the centre was transferred to Saray further rebellions would be easier to put down.90 Another problem was providing the salaries and rations for the soldiers who would be recruited in Bosnia. In effect, it was decided that about 1,500 soldiers would be mustered for the household of the vali and 2,500 Tosk soldiers for the protection of the eyalet. The Porte informed the vali that, because of financial difficulties, it would not be possible for the state to pay the charges of these soldiers and asked how much of these could be met by the districts of Bosnia. Vali Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a replied that it would not be proper to demand anything from Bosnia, at least not until other issues of the state had been resolved, in case the Bosniaks plotted mischief again, and he insisted that the expenses of 2,500 Tosk soldiers be paid by the central office.91 The state’s actions in sending secretaries to the region to undertake the census and dispatching engineers for the demolition of some palankas (palisaded forts) were also questioned by the vali.92 The central authorities argued that in Bosnia there were many palankas, some of which were situated in the Serbian lands and others were

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built very close to each other and needed demolishing.93 It is likely that the authorities also hoped to reduce the number of yerlikulu soldiers by demolishing some palankas. However, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a said it would be impossible to persuade the Bosnians that these moves were necessary, and it would be wise to postpone them to a later period.94 The vali’s advice was very reasonable in a period when Mehmed Ali’s forces were marching through Anatolia.95 It is clear that the situation demanded great flexibility and caution. Mahmud II accepted the advice of the vali, said that in such troubled times it was appropriate for the vali to show caution in his actions.96 The separation of Hersek from Bosnia as a self-governing mutasarrıflık and the appointment of I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, who had obtained the title ‘Pas
a’ and was known as I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Rıdvanbegovic´, mutasarrıf, annoyed Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a greatly. He warned that it would create great suffering and danger because Hersek had intermingled with other districts of Bosnia since ancient times, and because some of its districts had even formed part of the Cadde Kolu of Bosnia, so their separation from Bosnia would cause a great disturbance among the local population.97 It is understood that, by this separation, the Porte was aiming to kill two birds with one stone: first, to carry out the new order in Hersek and to create a model that other parts of Bosnia would follow later; second, to use I˙stolc
eli Ali for the organization of the soldiers that would be dispatched to Anatolia to fight against Mehmed Ali’s forces. Bosniak soldiers were ordered to be dispatched to Anatolia through the agency of the mutasarrıf of Hersek, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a.98 By December 1832, about 19,000 Albanian and Bosniak soldiers had passed through the Straits.99 Hamdi Pas
a had two objections to this move. First he believed that it would not be possible to carry out the intended reforms in the districts of Hersek and that trouble would arise there and spread to other parts of Bosnia. Second, according to Hamdi Pas
a, as an indigenous notable, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a would endeavour to protect some people in order to make a name for himself among the local population and win their hearts, developments that would increase his personal influence at the

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expense of the central authorities.100 We can add a third presumption: it is possible that the vali might feel affronted if an alternative person replaced him in at least some parts of the region previously under his rule. Despite this, the central authority continued to ask for advice about Bosnia from other leaders in the region. For instance, when asked about the appointment of I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, the mutasarrıf of ¨ sku¨b, Yas
ar Pas
a said that this appointment was preferable to the U employment of about 20,000 soldiers there.101 He also added that the districts of Neveberde, Vulc
etrin and Piris
tine under his rule were very near to Bosnia and this situation required a strong alliance between him and both Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a.102 He told the central authorities that turmoil had again broken out in Bosnia103 and, because of this, it would be very unwise if Mahmud Pas
a of Izvornik, Mahmud Bey of Tuzla and Hamza Bey of Tes
ne, who were detained in Istanbul, were released and allowed to return to Bosnia. When an advocate of Mahmud Bey of Tuzla came to Tuzla and brought news from him, gossip started to circulate in Tuzla and places nearby, and people began to plot mischief again.104 In addition to this, soldiers returning from Anatolia after the war with Mehmed Ali had been plotting in the districts of Bosnia on their way back.105 Yas
ar Pas
a also reported some grievances of the local people deriving from the attitude of Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a. For instance, according to Yas
ar Pas
a, while some supporters of Hu¨seyin Kapudan had repented and begged for pardon, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a preferred to punish them. He believed that some of Hamdi Pas
a’s mu¨tesellims were offensive to the local inhabitants as well. When I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a was appointed as mutasarrıf, disgruntled inhabitants took heart from this and started to argue with their mu¨tesellims. Rumours that Hu¨seyin Kapudan was being summoned to Istanbul since the Porte was about to appoint him as the vali of Bosnia106 also encouraged the local inhabitants to stir up disorder. According to Yas
ar Pas
a, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a’s method of administration was disliked by the people.107 Yas
ar Pas
a was not alone in believing this. According to I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, although Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a was a very useful

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129

vizier, his attitude and temperament were not suitable for Bosnia. He believed Hamdi Pas
a should be replaced with another vali who would be more suitable and would get on well with others. Importantly, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a explained that he did not insist on keeping the post of vali, and if a capable vali from outside was appointed and he cooperated by working under the rule of that vali it would be more beneficial for Bosnia.108 When Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a reported that Milosˇ was increasing his pressure on the Istereflak and Yenipazar regions and was aiming to unite at least a part of those regions with the Serbian supremacy by expelling the Muslim inhabitants, the Porte was naturally alarmed. According to Hamdi Pas
a, Milosˇ’s actions might lead to problems with the collection of cizye taxes in the Istereflak and Yenipazar regions. He also believed that Milosˇ was planning to drive out the Muslim inhabitants of the Lozinc
e and Kodine districts of Izvornik and was inciting people in the Senic
e district to rebel.109 The Porte’s opinions on the issue can be traced in the documents that advised that, since there was some disorder in the Serbian districts because of the six districts issue, Bosnia should be watched carefully.110 It seems that Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a’s preference for using Albanian soldiers to protect the eyalet was not approved by the Porte, which argued that the local inhabitants were depressed and fearful, among other reasons because the Albanians were ethnically different from them (hilaˆf-ı cinsiyet). ‘In addition, since unfortunately there was such a blood feud between Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a and the Bosnians, he would not do anything there without soldiers. According to public opinion, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a could not get on with I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a. For these reasons, it was advisable to dismiss Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a from the valilik and appoint another person there.’111 In reality, as mentioned previously, right from the start of Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a’s valilik the Porte intended to replace him after the suppression of the rebellion, in the belief that he was not suitable in a post that required such delicate handling. It is possible that the opinions of the region’s people consolidated the Porte’s decision to replace the vali.

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The valilik of Davud Pas
a The Grand Vizier Res
id Mehmed Pas
a strongly supported the replacement of the vali, saying to the Sultan that introducing the new order in Bosnia necessitated the change. Res
id Mehmed Pas
a thought that the changes should be made in Bosnia as soon as possible because of the possibility of new uprisings. ‘Since the new order would be realized gradually rather than all at once, it was the most suitable time to take action.’ Thus, the Grand Vizier proposed the vali of Baghdad, Davud Pas
a for this post, saying ‘he was a very shrewd person’.112 But, according to Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, the candidate lacked relevant experience: the viziers who were used to serving in Arabia could not do well in the Rum region (iklim-i Ruˆm), whereas the viziers who were familiar with Rumelia were not very useful in Arabia. To make up for this possible disadvantage, he added more names of suitable vali candidates, including Su¨vari-i Hassa Mirlivas Hafız Pas
a, Mesud Ag˘a and O¨mer Lu¨tfi Efendi.113 In reply, Mahmud II said that of these names Davud Pas
a was the most suitable person from both a scholarly point of view and in other respects (gerek ilmen ve gerek cihet-i saˆir ile).114 Thus in May 1833 Davud Pas
a was appointed as the new vali of Bosnia.115 It appears, however, that Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a did not wish to leave his post. For this reason, the Porte initially agreed that the change would be kept secret until Davud Pas
a arrived at Yenipazar. However, according to the Porte’s records, this decision was not taken because of any possible reaction of the local inhabitants, but because of the probability that the employees of Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a would provoke an incident and would start to collect money from the region. The decision to keep the appointment secret was in the event not approved by the state out of fear that, unless extraordinary precautions were taken, news of the change would reach the region before the new vali arrived and this would cause more trouble. Thus, the Porte demanded help from I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a to remove the previous vali from the eyalet without any trouble.116

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The change was announced to Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a and it was decided that he should leave Bosnia and pass through Rumelia after the kaymakam of Davud Pas
a had arrived in Saray. However, Davud Pas
a chose the muhafız of Nig˘bolu, Sadık Pas
a as his kaymakam.117 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a waited in Saraybosna for 70 days after the declaration since the new kaymakam arrived in Saraybosna very late, on 31 August 1833. Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a left the city three days after the handover, along with his men.118 Later, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a was appointed as the mutasarrıf of Yanya, Delvine and Avlonya sancaks.119 As mentioned before, Serbian claims to the six contested districts of Bosnia had been parried by the state, which declared to the Serbian side that the matter would be resolved after the suppression of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan rebellion. Thus it is not surprising that Serbian pressure resumed after the rebellion had been crushed, and increased during the rule of Davud Pas
a. Based on the previously drawn up map, officials who would determine the new border were appointed by the vali of Vidin, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, and Milosˇ, and the six districts were annexed by Serbia. When Milosˇ appointed new officers to these districts, the Bosnians opposed the move and attacked some Serbian villages, setting fire to houses, killing people and enslaving others.120 During this period, Milosˇ was recruiting soldiers among the Serbs. When he heard about this incident, he dispatched those troops to the borderland. He informed the Porte that he would not deploy these soldiers further, but if the Bosnians attacked again he would retaliate.121 In answer, the Porte told Milosˇ that the Bosnians would be warned not to oppose the decision, and if they did not agree the problem would be settled by the central authorities. Moreover, the Porte ordered an investigation of the problem. According to opinion at the Porte, if the problem arose from the opposition of the Bosnians to the newly drawn map, the state should deal with this, but if the Serbians were extending their claims to further places not on the map, this time the Serbians should be given a very serious warning.122 In a document written to Milosˇ, probably by the Grand Vizier, it was said:

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This kind of behavior by the Bosnians is contrary to the consent of the state; they are doing this of their own accord. Hence, it is not proper for you to answer them and go against the state. But we will not allow the Bosnians to come, destroy the Serbians and enslave them. You will not use your arms and will not battle with them, because the situation has been reported to the valis of Bosnia [he meant both Davud Pas
a and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a]. They would behave according to the will of the state, would make those Bosnians unable to grasp the situation understand it clearly, and resolve this situation.123 Hence, Kapıcılar Kethu¨dası I˙brahim Ag˘a was entrusted with the investigation of the issue. According to the reports of I˙brahim Ag˘a, in disregard of the map, the Serbians were trying to capture the region extending from the border to Debrebin.124 A quarrel also broke out between the Serbians and the inhabitants of Vis
egrad, when one of the officials of Milosˇ, who was responsible for the replanning of the border, came to Vis
egrad. According to I˙brahim Ag˘a, the Serbian side was responsible for this quarrel. It is understood that during the quarrel both sides damaged some houses and property. By mediation of the Porte, it was decided to repair the damaged buildings jointly. Hence, Milosˇ agreed to withdraw his soldiers from the region.125 There were also quarrels in Derbend, where some nonMuslims attacked Muslim villages under the incitement of a priest who came there from Banaluka with a group of people.126 The central authorities believed that both Milosˇ and the Austrian side stirred up that event.127 However, because of the abundance of Muslims in the region, the fighting ended in favour of the Muslim side. There was a reminder from the Porte, saying that it was possible for the Muslim side to rout all of the non-Muslims, but the state did not approve of such actions, since it was the duty of the state to reconcile the two parties in order to prevent further suffering among non-Muslims. By order of the Porte, the non-Muslims were told that the quarrel between the Serbians and Bosnians had been settled by the initiatives of the Ottoman centre.128

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From these proclamations it is apparent that the state preferred to stand in a median position where it could conduct events at the same distance from the two parties. The following explanations make this clearer: Since the non-Muslim subjects attacked the Muslims, they got what they deserved, but if the Bosnians were not regarded indulgently, they would extirpate all non-Muslims without differentiating between the guilty and the innocent and this was not acceptable. On the other hand, if the state approached the Bosnians with suspicion, it would not be proper. Thereafter, the state should pay more attention to inspiring confidence among the non-Muslim subjects.129 However, at this point an important question comes to mind: what did Milosˇ think about the issue? According to the muhafız of Belgrade, Vecihi Pas
a, these events made Milosˇ so uneasy that he even fell ill. Milosˇ summoned all his kapudans, knezes and his family members, including his wife and children, to an assembly near Belgrade. He also invited Vecihi Pas
a to talk about the issue. During the interview with Vecihi Pas
a, Milosˇ argued that he was not in any way responsible for events, but the Bosnians were, since the quarrels originated from the Bosnian side. Vecihi Pas
a told him that the quarrel had originated from a misconception and it was now over. The central authorities expected him to make great efforts to prevent such incidents from now on. Vecihi Pas
a reported that the situation required a middle course to be found in which all of Milosˇ’s demands should not be granted, but that he should not be offended. The reins should be drawn somewhere and he should be reminded that the issue of ‘liberty’ (serbestiyet) was one for the non-Muslims in general (genel harb reaayası) but, as he was the Supreme Knez of Serbia, he should serve the Ottoman Empire and should show loyalty to the state.130

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The application of the Nizaˆmaˆt In September 1834 the Porte appointed Bas
tezkereci Akif Efendi to be responsible for the application of the new orders in Bosnia and put Alayemini Kaˆmil Bey under his command.131 According to Akif Efendi, his task was to investigate and report on how the ‘good regulations’ (nizaˆmaˆt-ı hasene) could be applied in Bosnia.132 As Akif Efendi travelled to Bosnia he was first welcomed by Milosˇ, who affirmed his loyalty to the state and said that, as a slave of the state, he was ready to pay humble respect to it. Milosˇ informed him that he was uneasy on two points. First, whereas before the goings and comings from Bosnia to Istanbul were made via Belgrade and there had been a huge number of people passing through Austrian lands, later as a precaution and as part of the new Bosnian order such transits were not allowed. This was causing great difficulties in the region. In reply, Akif Efendi said that this was a temporary state of affairs and would change with the new order in Bosnia. The second of Milosˇ’s demands concerned the Nis
customs. He said that, whereas previously the control of those customs had belonged to him, responsibility had now been given to the muhafız of Nis
. Akif Efendi replied that the state had full control over those customs, so it could make any changes it wanted. He pointed out to Milosˇ that: ‘All his possessions were granted by the state, so he should sacrifice not only his possessions but also his life for the sake of the state.’133 Akif Efendi’s remarks to Milosˇ make it clear that there was considerable stress on Milosˇ’s position as a subject of the state. Akif Efendi frequently reminded Milosˇ that he should do everything the state demanded without question because he was the subject of the state.134 The duties of Akif Efendi and Kaˆmil Bey were kept under cover, but when they got to Saraybosna the local inhabitants heard about their arrival and reacted with unease. It was not difficult for them to guess why these officials had come to Bosnia; according to the rumours, they had been charged with applying the new order, carrying out the census and collecting money. As a precaution, Akif Efendi and Davud Pas
a decided to call a council. All the notables of

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the region were summoned to the vali’s court (Pas
a Kapısı), where they were told that the officials had come to Saraybosna in order to end the disputes between the Bosnians and Austrians, and the ferman about this issue had been publicized.135 In reality, the disputes arose from the alteration in the bed and direction of the Rastok River, which had first come into question in July 1829.136 It is understood that the problem had remained unsolved until that time, November 1834.137 Akif Efendi consulted some notables of Saray and reported that certain actions had been carried out in Hersek against the will of the state and the notables accused I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a of responding in a lukewarm manner. According to them, the vali of Bosnia was trying to abolish the old traditions and replacing them with new ones, whereas in Hersek these old traditions were still in use. ‘For instance the kapudans and yerlikulus were continuing to take their salaries as before. As for the people of Saray, since they saw the power and majesty of the state, most of them had become obedient and submissive to it. However, sedition was not absent from Hersek in those days.’138 According to the notables, whereas before Saray’s inhabitants had always carried their guns with them, now they had even given up their weapons. They believed the implementation of the nizaˆmaˆt required a significant number of soldiers, about 6,000– 7,000, to be recruited under the command of the vali of Bosnia.139 Akif Efendi reported that since he had come to Bosnia very recently, he had not had the chance to investigate the accuracy of those claims, but it was clear that if the vali was supported by a great number of soldiers the implementation of the new order would be much easier.140 Akif Efendi added that, although it was very appropriate to administer Bosnia and Hersek under two separate viziers, they were one eyalet and any problem in one part would set off reactions in the other part.141 It is understood that the main focus of the nizaˆmaˆt was the establishment of the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre in the region. This was only possible through the recruitment of a great number of soldiers in Bosnia, where their expenses would be met by eyalet revenues.142 When Akif Efendi asked Nakibu¨les
raf Fazıl Bey and Tımar Defterdarı

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Mustafa Bey what they thought about the issue, they told him that the topic of meeting soldiers’ expenses from eyalet revenues should not be discussed with Ali Pas
a until the Hersek region had somehow been put to rights, and it should not be put into practice in Saraybosna until Ali Pas
a had proved he could be relied on. For those reasons, Akif Efendi decided to go to Hersek on the pretext of investigating the Austrian dispute, and to look into the situation without delay. He told the Porte he was thinking of postponing the nizaˆmaˆt if Ali Pas
a would not accept it, since without his support all the notables would resist its implementation.143 In his reply to the Porte, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a did not express any reservations about the issue, but he said that he had been informed of the secret duty of Akif Efendi and would endeavour to carry it out.144 There may have been two reasons for this response. It is possible that Ali Pas
a was concealing his unease in order not to infuriate the state. The second possibility is that, although he was ready to apply the nizaˆm, the notables of Bosnia were disinclined to obey the state in this case, because they were uncomfortable about Ali Pas
a’s growing influence in the region. The first probability seems more likely, since, as will become evident later, the attitude of Ali Pas
a toward the Porte started to change after he obtained the mutasarrıflık post and this change brought growing disquiet about his policies. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that this period indicated the breaking point between Ali Pas
a’s interests and those of the Porte, and the first step of the conflict would later bring about the dismissal of Ali Pas
a and his suspicious death.145 Akif Efendi decided to gather a large council in Travnik by summoning all the notables of the region and to reveal the main reason for his journey. Unfortunately, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a was very ill at the time and it was understood that it would take a few months for him to recover completely. For this reason, Akif Efendi changed the gathering place and sent formal invitations summoning all the notables to Mostar.146 The notables must have taken the invitation seriously because, apart from the notables of Serhad, the mu¨tesellim of Blene, Ali Pas
a and the mu¨tesellim of Tuzla Mahmud Bey, all took their seats.147 Mahmud Bey informed the state that he could not

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come because of his illness and sent Hasan Ag˘a as his representative.148 The main topic of the council was the organization of the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers and, after both Davud Pas
a and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a had affixed their seals to the order, all those present signed it.149 The announcement was sent to the courts of every district, where the order was publicized.150 Akif Efendi reported to the Porte that, since the Serhad inhabitants were very ‘savage’ (vahs
i) people, it would be advisable not to react too strongly to their action in refusing the invitation. After a series of councils in Mostar, Akif Efendi returned to Saray together with Davud Pas
a.151 According to Akif Efendi, the inhabitants of Bosnia were generally satisfied with the implementation of the new order and he expected that many soldiers would register with the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre for a short period. He believed that Vali Davud Pas
a’s share in that success was very great and he merited a reward.152 Akif Efendi also informed the state that he had been able to gather 3,200 kese akc
e for the organization of the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre.153 It is understood that some of this money came from the cizye revenues of Bosnia districts and of Yenipazar.154 The new order necessitated changes in the position of the mustahfız soldiers, who were to be reassigned as artillery corps. The timars would also be transferred to the revenues used as salary for the artillery corps. Akif Efendi warned that any changes in the position of mustahfız soldiers could cause new conflict in the region and he demanded that they be postponed until a more suitable time.155 In January 1835, he also requested permission to return to Istanbul, saying that Bosnian affairs had been put in order.156

The change of the vali: The dismissal of Davud Pas
a and the appointment of Vecihi Pas
a After Bas
tezkereci Akif Efendi returned to the central office, he made a statement to the Sultan that the application of nizaˆmaˆt in Bosnia would only be possible through the appointment of a very shrewd, eloquent and diligent vali (orada bulunacak vali diraˆyet-i kaˆmile ashaˆbından olarak kendu¨ cerbeze ve is
gu¨zarlıg˘ı iktizasınca) and that, although Davud Pas
a was a devoted, wise and virtuous vizier, he was

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extremely ingenuous and ignorant in the management of affairs.157 Akif Efendi’s assistant Kaˆmil Bey supported him, saying that Davud Pas
a did not carry out many duties beyond sitting in his office and taking his share of the taxes.158 Akif Efendi argued that, while on the one hand the vali of Bosnia should get on well with the notables of the region and be persuasive in gradually implementing the new order, the nizaˆmaˆt, on the other hand he should not make the Bosnians suspicious and should be capable of collecting the taxes, vaˆridaˆt-ı eyalet.159 According to Akif Efendi, ‘although Davud Pas
a was a very clever man, since he did not take the trouble to do anything it was understood that he could not perform these services well and it would be more proper to appoint the muhafız of Belgrade, Vecihi Pas
a, who was endowed with the necessary qualities and knew Bosnia well’.160 He added that, since the dismissal of Davud Pas
a did not derive from any failure on his part, he should not be offended by it: It was important to move him from Bosnia without upsetting him, since, in this manner, members of his household, the Bag˘dadlis would not be disturbed. It was possible that, if they were to be angered, the news would reach even as far as Bag˘dad and would cause trouble there. Because of the possibility of this, the situation was reported in a letter to Bag˘dad and the Vali of Bag˘dad, Ali Pas
a, was informed.161 This shows that, in a period when communications were very restricted and oral messages widespread, news that spread orally or as rumours from one eyalet to another could be very dangerous in terms of stirring up sedition. According to Akif Efendi, the Bosnians had undertaken the organization of Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre, had made haste in the execution of nizaˆm and had joined in the Mostar assembly. When he went to Izvornik, he summoned those who had not joined the assembly, namely Fedayizade Ali Pas
a and Tuzlalı Mahmud Bey, and persuaded them to demonstrate their loyalty.162 Thus, in these statements, Akif Efendi was stressing that an important step had been taken.

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Thereafter, he believed, success would only be possible through the endeavours of the vali and the notables. Akif Efendi underlined the fact that the vali’s attitude and preferences would be very important from then on. According to him, the nakibu¨les
raf of Saraybosna, Fazıl Bey, and the mu¨tesellim of Banaluka, Hıfzı Efendi, were very influential among the region’s people and were ready to support the Porte’s orders. Thus, the new vali should promote them and use them in the application of the nizaˆmaˆt. According to him, the new vali, should be wary of the mu¨tesellim of Gradac
anic
e, Ahmed Bey, since he was a very suspicious and rancorous person. The new vali should also move both Bleneli Ali Pas
a and Mahmud Bey from the eyalet using some plausible excuse, since their strife was overcoming their loyalty.163 Both Bas
tezkereci Akif Efendi and his assistant, Kaˆmil Bey, thought that I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a might be a suitable vali of Bosnia, since he was very eager to apply the new order and was among the most loyal notables of the region. However, there would also be some problems in the event of his being appointed to the valilik: like other people of the region, he was accustomed to ‘the Bosniak temperament’ (Bos
naklık mizacı) and his valilik would also be objected to in terms of circumstances in the eyalet. According to Akif Efendi and Kaˆmil Bey, it would be safer to appoint the muhafız of Belgrade, Vecihi Pas
a, to the valilik of Bosnia since he was very famous for his goodwill and powers of comprehension, as well as being well aware of the problems of Bosnia because of its geographical closeness.164 We clearly see from these statements that, when Akif Efendi and his assistant Kaˆmil Bey were sent to Bosnia, they were entrusted with two tasks: to order the implementation of nizaˆmaˆt in Bosnia and to report the problems and make proposals when they returned to Istanbul. The proposals of Akif Efendi and Kaˆmil Bey were obviously taken seriously, as in April 1835 Davud Pas
a was dismissed and the muhafız of Belgrade Vecihi Pas
a was appointed to the valilik of Bosnia.165 Sirozlu Yusuf Pas
a was appointed as the muhafız of Belgrade.166 Akif Efendi was even asked by the Porte how much money should be paid to Davud Pas
a as salary after his dismissal.167

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The nakibu¨les
raf of Saraybosna Fazıl Bey, whom Akif Efendi praised highly, was summoned to Istanbul and was promoted and given the title of mevleviyet.168 Later, in April 1836, Davud Pas
a was appointed to be the vali of Trablusgarb and, in order to prevent any dissatisfaction, he was offered a bounty of 100,000 gurus
.169

The Serbian question and problems on the Austrian frontier The period had witnessed significant problems not only on the boundaries of Bosnia, but in nearer places where the conflicts impinged upon Bosnia as well. The first problem derived from the Serbian lands, where in April 1835 a rebellion undermined the efforts to achieve order in the region. The main reason for this rebellion was opposition to the rule of Milosˇ, who was behaving like an allpowerful ruler. By the 1830s he had alienated scores of notables, merchants, officials and others. The rebel group included many who had once been associates of Milosˇ and rose to power with him.170 It is understood that Milosˇ reported this rebellion as being related to his visit to Istanbul and he said that the main objection of the rebels was his attachment to the Ottoman Empire.171 However, according to a document of a beylikc
i (head of the government chancery office), the rebellion arose because of enmity between Milosˇ and his men. This beylikc
i was en route to London and he stopped over in Serbian territory. He talked to some Serb knezes and kapudans who told him that Milosˇ’s actions had caused that rebellion, and his account of the rebellion was misleading because it was difficult for Milosˇ to admit that the main trigger was his hostility to his former comrades.172 According to the beylikc
i, there were so many rebels that the Porte would be ill advised to mount an attack on them. Hence the rebels pushed Milosˇ to accept their demands and the rebellion came to an end.173 More important than this were the problems faced by the Muslim inhabitants of the lands relinquished to the Serbians in 1835. It was reported that, especially in Sokol, the Muslims were expelled and their houses were set on fire. Through intervention from the Porte, it was decided to rebuild these houses on the initiative of the Serbian

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side and to give back the property that belonged to the Muslims. Apart from Sokol, in other lands yielded up to the Serbians, Muslims were also pushed to leave. These pressures on the Muslims aroused protest throughout the Ottoman Empire. According to the Porte, it was clear that the Serbians were not moved by the desires and orders of the state but if the state gave them an inch they would take a mile. In order to stop this, the Serbians should be given a serious warning.174 In the opinion of the state, although the main cause of those attacks on the Muslims was the bad attitude of the Serbs towards the Muslims, as well as the fractious temperament of the Serbs, their leader, Milosˇ, should also be considered responsible as he had ignored their actions. However, Milosˇ had recently written secretly to his deputy in Istanbul to apologize for the expulsion of the Muslims, and his apology had been accepted.175 Before these events took place, it had been decided to give the nis
aˆn-ı iftihaˆr (the imperial order of special merit) to Milosˇ at the suggestion of the muhafız of Vidin. The document mentioning this was silent about why he should be honoured with that nis
aˆn, but it is predictable that, since the nis
aˆn issue first came into question during his Istanbul visit,176 it was related to his affirmation of great loyalty to the Sultan. Because of those events, the Porte decided to postpone the bestowal of the nis
aˆn on Milosˇ, saying that first the destroyed houses of Muslims should be rebuilt, and other problems connected with the issue should be solved through his initiative. More importantly, the Porte underlined the fact that giving a nis
aˆn to Milosˇ did not mean that the state was giving preference to the Serbs over the Muslims, or that through its postponement the state was denying Milosˇ’s influence and power. Rather, it was a sign that ‘the Serbians were not like other nonMuslims since, by means of treaties, they had acquired privileges (imtiyaˆzaˆt) and freedom (serbestiyet). For these reasons, it was not possible to bridle them, but rather they should be treated in a wise manner (u¨sluˆb-ı hakimaˆne) and with suitable forbearance (etvaˆr-ı mu¨layimaˆne), in order to advise them how to act in the proper way (hu¨sn-i muaˆ
seret).’177

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Another important issue of the period was the continuing Bosnian bandit attacks on Austrian lands.178 As mentioned before, the Bosnians from the Serhad region had a long tradition of raiding and plundering Austrian territory. In spite of strong efforts on the Austrian side, these attacks accelerated and caused increasing trouble. The ongoing attacks led Metternich to write personally to the Porte and criticize the attitude of the Ottoman state on the issue, saying that although the troubles had been discussed many times and warnings given, there had been no definite outcome. The Bosnians were incessantly crossing the border to steal animals and carry out raids. According to Metternich, ‘while all these had been reported to Istanbul, there had been no movement to recover those possessions, nor for any pardons or indemnities. Some officials had been sent to investigate the problem, but this had not brought about any result.’ Metternich warned that if the Bosnians dared to continue the attacks the Austrian side would respond fiercely. He added that the inhabitants of the region would then be armed and would react to any attack.179 Metternich’s threats were soon put into practice. In April and May 1835, the Porte received a report that an Austrian commander, General Gospic´, had attacked the castle of Cisr-i Kebir with a huge army of 13,000 soldiers as well as many cannon, shells and other weapons, and bombarded the castle for six hours.180 When the Porte asked about the reason for the attack, it was told that Bosnians were continually mounting attacks along the Austrian frontier. In their first attack, these Bosnians took some animals before returning to the Bosnian side. Some other Bosnians again crossed to the Austrian side and fired their rifles at the Austrian inhabitants. In a third attack, some other thieves and rogues (hırsız ve yaramaz) trespassed across the border and killed two moneychangers. These attacks impelled the Austrians to take revenge.181 It was argued that the attacks were carried out by ‘irresponsible people’ who aimed to inhibit the application of the new order in Bosnia. But the Austrians demonstrated that they had run out of patience. According to the document, ‘since all those [attacks] originated from the oppression of some irresponsible Bosniaks, it would be wrong to say or write

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anything about the Austrian side. On the other hand, those murderers and irresponsible people should be punished.’182 These statements clearly show us that, even if the state could implement the new order in the central places of Bosnia, its application in distant places, and particularly the borderlands, was very difficult. In spite of all efforts towards the centralization of Bosnia, there were still some places that were very far from being under the direct control of the state. Since all state inquiries about the issue asserted that the Bosnian rebels were responsible for these events, the Porte told the Austrian authorities that the incidents would not cause any change in the policies between the two states. In addition, the Ottoman state would henceforth try harder to prevent Bosnian attacks on Austrian territory, and its expectations of the Austrian side were the same.183 Based on these statements from the Ottoman side, it appears that the Porte believed that the counter-attack by the Austrians had taught the Bosnians not to do the same thing again. For this reason, it did not turn into a diplomatic crisis, but there was a warning from the Ottoman side that if the attacks of the Austrians continued, the Ottoman Empire would be aggrieved.184 Hence, the Porte perceived this not as an attack on the Ottoman state, but rather as a lesson to the Bosnian rebels.

The administration of Vecihi Pas
a Vecihi Pas
a preferred to administer Bosnia with a large retinue as well as a huge army, but he assured the Porte that the retinue and soldiers would not place further burdens on the local inhabitants.185 In the case of previous valis of Bosnia, the Porte also believed that the vali should be supported by a huge retinue. Due to the complaints and disquiet of the region’s people about his huge household, which included approximately 1,500 soldiers, Vecihi Pas
a was warned by the Porte not to give offence when he arrived in Saray.186 Vecihi Pas
a guaranteed that he would levy mu¨bas
iriye taxes (the taxes that were imposed to pay the salaries of officials in the vali’s household) no greater than the ones ordered187 and added that his household would

144 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

not cause any harm but that the region’s people would also benefit from it.188 After Vecihi Pas
a came to Bosnia, his first act was to attract the notables of the region to his side. He gave special emphasis to softening the harshness of mu¨tesellims and other people of the Serhad region. Vecihi Pas
a reported to the Porte that his efforts had proved successful in that the mu¨tesellims had sent three notables to express their gratitude.189 Moreover, in an attempt to pacify the Serhad region and to ensure the obedience of its inhabitants, the mu¨tesellim of Gradac
anic
e, Ahmed Bey, was summoned to Istanbul. There had been some quarrels between Ahmed Bey and the people of Serhad, who had demanded his dismissal. The cause of these quarrels is unknown, but Vecihi Pas
a believed that Ahmed Bey deserved his dismissal. According to him, however, the suggestion that he was dismissed because of the insistence of the Serhad inhabitants might be taken by the local inhabitants as a sign of weakness. He proposed to announce that Ahmed Bey had been summoned to Istanbul to discuss some issues that required him to spend a few months there. For this reason, he should be replaced by a new official. His proposal was accepted and was put into practice.190 The Serhad notables undertook initially to recruit 350 Mansuˆre soldiers and it was agreed that later the yerlikulu soldiers of the region would be absorbed gradually into the Mansuˆre army.191 In order to increase the support of notables for the new order, some people were selected to be endowed with imperial monograms while others were given high rank.192 For example, in February 1836, through the initiative of Vecihi Pas
a, Tuzlalı Mahmud Bey was honoured with the title of mirmiranlık, while the Mu¨tesellim of Blene, Fedayizade Ali Pas
a, the Mu¨tesellim of Izvornik, Mahmud Pas
a, and the Mu¨tesellim of Yenipazar, Eyu¨b Pas
a, were awarded a nis
an.193 It is important to note that those names were among the most influential notables of the region. Even so, from among them, Fedayizade Ali Pas
a, Tuzlalı Mahmud Bey and Izvornikli Mahmud Pas
a became active supporters of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and, as we shall see in the next chapter, were punished with exile. Thus, it would not be wrong to say that Vecihi Pas
a not only promoted

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his supporters but also targeted those who had the potential to stir up sedition. The next concern of Vecihi Pas
a was the recruitment of Mansuˆre soldiers. Related to this issue, in December 1835 all notables and mu¨tesellims were summoned to the vali’s court, where the aims of the new order were explained in detail. After several councils of notables, it was decided to recruit two battalions of soldiers in Bosnia.194 It is understood that the registration of these two battalions continued until 1838. From two records of March 1838, we learn that the registration of the two cavalry battalions had just been finished, together with one infantry battalion, while the registration of the second infantry battalion was in progress.195 Vecihi Pas
a applied to the central authorities for military instructors and equipment. In reply, the central authorities sent swords and fezes from Istanbul and arranged for other equipment, such as rifles and snare drums, to be bought from Austria. It was also decided to send models of cartridge belts and military clothes from Istanbul, so these might be manufactured in Bosnia.196 The 1,000 fezes requested by Vecihi Pas
a were later sent from Istanbul, while some models of haversacks, canteens, cartridge belts and rifles were sent from Austria. Vecihi Pas
a reported to the central office that, as he found the rifles a bit heavy and their price rather high, he would rather they be supplied from Austria.197 It is understood that along with this equipment the Habsburg emperor sent Vecihi Pas
a a ring, but the Porte ordered Vecihi Pas
a to give it back,198 probably because it could be perceived as a kind of bribe. It is believed that, Vecihi Pas
a requested 20 instructors for the instruction of the Mansuˆre soldiers, but the Porte replied that the nature of Bosniaks was well known and it was very difficult to find 20 very intelligent instructors who could accommodate themselves to the Bosniak temperament. For this reason they proposed to send only three or four very capable instructors. Meanwhile, Vecihi Pas
a’s request was investigated by the Bas
tezkereci Akif Efendi, who said that it was not necessary to find ‘exceptionally mature’ (diraˆyet-i kaˆmile) instructors, but it would be enough to choose ones who were acquainted with the training programme, had a modest personality

146 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

and would approach the Bosniaks with tolerance. Thus, according to Akif Efendi, it would be more proper to send 15 to 20 instructors of this kind there.199 It is understood that the Akif Efendi’s proposal was put into practice. With regard to the salaries of these soldiers, the Porte ordered them to be paid not by the Mansuˆre Treasury but out of the revenues of the eyalet, saying that these soldiers would be part of the eyalet troops.200 It is possible that through this measure the centre was trying to reduce the expenses of the new army.

CHAPTER 4 REBELS

Defining the rebellion Bunlar cemıˆ‘ zamaˆnda ve her bir husuˆsda ¸su‘uˆrlarında fahr u¨ mu¨baˆhaˆt edecek ve cu¨mle ehl-i I˙slaˆma tafazzul ve ru¨chaˆn go¨sterecek etvaˆrı kendu¨lere sermaˆye-i rif‘at add u¨ zan eylemis¸ mu¨demmag˘ taˆife olduklarından bu baˆbda dahi zuhuˆr eden haˆl ve hareketleri saˆir memaˆlik-i I˙slaˆmiyeden imtiyaˆz fikriyle bazı iltimaˆs ve metaˆliblerini tervıˆc ve tahsıˆl daˆ‘iyesine du¨¸secekleri ve bu keyfiyet yenicerilik iddiaˆsında olmalarının dahi matluˆb ve marzıˆleri olmak ¸simdiye kadar anların bu hareketine mu¨maˆnaat eylemediklerinden hatıra gelir manadır. Bu mu¨naˆsebetle edebsizleri so¨ylettirerek sonunda bir takım ¸suruˆt ve metaˆlib ıˆraˆdıyla irzaˆya mu¨tevassıt olacakları bu Bos¸nak taifesinin mu¨cerreb olan usuˆl ve mes¸vaˆrlarından baıˆd deg˘ildir ve ibtidaˆ-yı emirde metaˆlibleri oldug˘unu dahi izhaˆr etmeyerek her ne so¨yledirler ise ayakda olan so¨z anlamaz takımına so¨ylederek so¨z ayag˘a du¨¸smu¨¸s meaˆlini is¸raˆb ve kendi tahrıˆk ve ilkaˆlarını setr suˆretiyle biz dahi bunlara so¨z anlatmakda aˆciz kalmıs¸ız diyecekleri mestuˆr olmadıg˘ından bunlarla muhaˆverede cokluk mu¨maˆ¸saˆt ve mu¨laˆyemet bir alay ¸serıˆrin ¸sirinlenmesini muceb ve pek de tahkıˆr ayarında u¨zerlerine varılmak taannu¨d ve hus¸uˆnetlerini mu¨stecvib olacag˘ından. . .1 This exemplary text representing the complexity of events as well as betraying a certain set of prejudices is by Abdurrahim Pas¸a, who was

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the muhafız of Belgrade when this document was written and who, a short while later, became the vali of Bosnia. Even this short quotation from Abdurrahim Pas¸a foreshadows the larger conflicts of Bosnia that would upset not only the region’s order but also put the state to a great deal of trouble. However, the gravity of the conflicts and the multiplicity of troubles require deeper analysis of who and what the rebels were. Before this can be done, it is necessary to analyse the conceptual framework of the rebellion. In what terms did the documents refer to the rebels and the rebellion; what kind of information does the use of language convey about both parties, suppressor and suppressed; and why and on what grounds were these choices made? The second focus is on the rebels: who were they and what were their social classes, professions, religions, etc.? The next concern is the objectives and demands of those rebels: what were the aims of rebels and how did they justify their demands? And finally, it is necessary to examine the policy of the Ottoman state: was such mutinous behaviour punished or unpunished? What kind of punishments took place? Were the rebels formally suppressed or did the rebellion just fizzle out?

Conceptualization of the rebellion and the rebels Some of the first and most relevant questions about the rebellion concern the conceptual analysis of the terms used to describe it in various documents. In general, in Ottoman sources an ambiguous vocabulary was employed to describe mutinies, ranging from a single limited event to a more complex outbreak, in which any Imperial decree was ignored by any group of people.2 As Aksan points out, focusing on vocabulary makes it possible to grasp some nuances about the legitimacy of rebellion, as in the case of fitne, which, for many Muslims, indicated the legitimate right to overthrow an unjust government. The terms are, however, for the most part interchangeable, and one may be substituted for another.3 In a close analysis of numerous related documents I came across usages of various terms such as fitne (‘sedition’, ‘disorder’, ‘rebellion’),

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fesaˆd (‘sedition’, ‘disorder’), isyaˆn (‘rebellion’, ‘insurrection’, ‘riot’, ‘revolt’), ihtilaˆl (‘revolution’, ‘rebellion’, ‘riot’), ¸sekaˆvet (‘brigandage’), huruˆc-ı alessultan (‘withdrawal of allegiance from the Sultan’), bagy (‘oppression’, ‘rebellion’, ‘sin’), tug˘yaˆn (‘insubordination’, ‘rebellion’), gaˆile (‘trouble’, ‘period of disturbance’), ihaˆnet (‘betraying’, ‘treachery’) and hıyaˆnet (‘treachery’, ‘ingratitude’, ‘perfidy’). Fesaˆd is the most common term used as a single form of definition and is sometimes used in its variant forms of plural or genitive.4 Fitne,5 isyaˆn,6 ihtilaˆl,7 ¸sekaˆvet,8 huruˆc-ı alessultan,9 gaˆile,10 ihaˆnet,11 hıyaˆnet,12 bagy,13 and tug˘yaˆn14 are also used in the singular form in the documents. The choice of similar words in a subsequent word count, connected by one or more conjunctions, significantly strengthens the meaning and creates a certain rhetorical effect. The most common use of this type is the form fitne ve fesaˆd.15 Fitne ve mefsedet,16 fesaˆdaˆt ve ifsaˆdaˆt,17 bagy ve isyaˆn,18 fitne ve ihtilaˆl,19 fesaˆd ve fitne,20 fesaˆd ve ¸sekaˆvet,21 ihtilaˆl ve fesaˆd,22 fesaˆd ve mel‘anet,23 mel‘anet ve fesaˆd,24 fesaˆd ve ihtilaˆl,25 fesaˆd ve habaˆset,26 inaˆd ve fesaˆd,27 hada‘a ve fesaˆd,28 fesaˆd ve karıs¸ıklık,29fesaˆdat ve isyaˆn,30 fesaˆdat ve ifsaˆdat31, fesaˆd ve ihaˆnet32, ¸serr u¨ fesaˆd,33 ihtilaˆl ve s¸iraˆze-i nizaˆmdan huruˆc,34 tes¸niyet ve ihtilaˆl,35 ¸suˆris¸ ve ihtilaˆl,36 fazaˆhat ve ¸sekaˆvet,37 mel‘anet ve ¸sekaˆvet,38 ¸sekaˆvet ve temerru¨d,39 ¸sekaˆvet ve mefsedet,40 ¸sekaˆvet ve isyaˆn,41 isyaˆn ve s¸ekaˆvet,42 isyaˆn ve isaˆet,43 isaˆet ve isyaˆn,44 tug˘yan ve isyaˆn,45 isyaˆn ve tug˘yan,46 tug˘yan ve ¸sekaˆvet,47 isyan ve huruˆc,48 bagy ve tug˘yaˆn,49 bagy ve isyaˆn,50 bagy ve ¸sekaˆvet,51 tug˘yaˆn ve s¸ekaˆvet,52 tug˘yaˆn ve nahvet,53 galebe ve tug˘yaˆn,54 ihanet ve hıyaˆnet,55 hıyaˆnet ve mel‘anet,56 suˆ-i kasd ve ihaˆnet,57 hakaˆret ve ihaˆnet,58 bagy ve tug˘yaˆn ve huruˆc-ı alessultan.59 The ambiguity of the vocabulary and the interchangeability of its use mark the fact that a wide range of vocabulary was used to define that rebellion. Even if detailed comments based on the terms cannot be made, since one expression could easily be substituted for another, the variety and plurality of the terms used in this context confirm that the language is thus enriched not only because a huge group of people were incorporated into the rebellion, but also that a large group of people from various strata commented about it. The term ‘Ahkaˆm al-bughaˆ’ expresses the view of a juristic Islamic discourse on the rebellion.60 According to Islamic

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jurisprudence, in general, any kind of stable authority is preferred to rebellion and sedition in order to preserve the unity of umma.61 The legitimacy of this argument is predicated by the following two verses from the Qur’an: ‘Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter’ (2/217) and ‘Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and giving to kith and kin, and He forbids all indecent deeds, and evil and rebellion’ (16/90).62 The hadith tradition that inspires the duty of obedience to a Muslim ruler is also seen as a determining source for this field.63 It is seen that in Ottoman parlance, while fitne, fesaˆd and ¸sekaˆvet seem to be more generic terms, gaˆile, isyaˆn, ihtilaˆl, bagy, tug˘yaˆn, huruˆc-ı alessultan, ihaˆnet and hıyaˆnet appear as more specific ones. Using more specific terms, the fermans labelled the case as being worse than a mere ‘rebellion,’ calling it sometimes an act organized against the authority of the Sultan and a revolution. Not surprisingly, the terminology and parlance became harsher as relations between the capital and Bosnia worsened and the rebellion turned into an organized movement against the central authority. Coming to the rebels, the vocabulary used for describing them is also very prolific. The most common term is es¸kıyaˆ (‘brigand’) with its variant forms.64 Mu¨ fsid (‘mischief-maker’, ‘corrupter’, ‘seditious’),65 aˆsi (‘rebellious’, ‘rebel’),66 haˆin (‘treacherous’, ‘traitor’),67 habıˆs (‘wicked’, ‘vicious’),68 bagy-bugaˆt (‘rebellious’, ‘rebel’),69 eraˆzil (‘vile’, ‘disgraced’),70 edebsiz (‘ill-mannered’, ‘rude’),71 huˆne (‘murder’),72 has¸erat (‘vermin’, ‘rabble’),73 gu¨ruˆh-ı mekruˆha-i mu¨lgaˆ (‘undesirable and proscribed gangs’),74 mefsedet-pıˆ¸se (‘evildoer’, ‘villain’),75 sebu¨kmag˘z (‘stupid’, ‘silly’),76 ¸sekaˆvet-pıˆ¸se (‘brigand’, ‘wretch’),77 cehele (‘ignorant’),78 yaramaz (‘useless’, ‘naughty’),79 fitnecuˆ (‘troublemaker’),80 la‘ıˆn or mel‘uˆn (‘accursed’ or ‘damned’),81 hazele (‘rogues’, ‘villains’),82 esaˆfil (‘mob’, ‘rabble’)83 and su¨fehaˆ (‘dissolute’),84 are terms frequently used to refer to the rebels. It is reasonable to think that a pejorative vocabulary reflecting unequivocal condemnation was consciously implemented and rebels were promptly denounced as being both stupid and traitors to the state and the Sultan at the same time. These formulaic expressions have two distinct characteristics in their very

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origin. First, using pejorative words to depict the rebels as ignorant, naughty, stupid, vicious or vile people gave the authorities a symbolic power through such language: the people rebel because they are from an inferior class of society, they have no ability to control their actions and they may be manipulated because of their marginal status in society. Second, labelling them as rebels, bandits, troublemakers, or even traitors to the authority, also elevates them to a new level of rebelliousness in which ‘uninformed gangs of bandits’ turn into ‘conscious traitors’ to the whole of Dar’ul-Islam. The state authority should thus be motivated to take lawful action against them in order to stop this malign movement. More important than this is that in describing the Bosniaks the central authorities did not hesitate to use the stereotypes most frequently used in archival documents to define rebels. Here they were frequently spoken of in general ethnonyms such as Bosna has¸eraˆtı (‘Bosnian vermin’),85 taˆife-i Bos¸nakiyaˆn (‘the Bosniaks’),86 Bosna es¸kıyaˆ sı (‘Bosnian brigands’),87 Bos¸nak milleti (‘Bosniak community’),88 Bos¸nak taˆifesi (‘the Bosniaks’),89 Bosnalu (‘Bosnian’),90 Bos¸nak gu¨ruˆhu (‘Bosniak gangs’),91 Bosna takımı (‘Bosnian class’)92 Bos¸naklar (‘Bosniaks’),93 bıˆ-idraˆk Bos¸nak gu¨ruˆhu (‘dull-witted gangs of Bosniaks’),94 and ahmak-ı Bos¸nak (‘foolish Bosniaks’).95 It is known that throughout the Balkans the most widespread ethnonyms used in official documents were the variants Bosna, Bosnalı, Bos¸nak or (al)Bosnavi.96 This raises several important questions: How was such a widespread use of ethnonyms used to describe a specific group of rebellious people who were described in epithets such as naughty, ignorant or even as vermin? What was the underlying motive in representing the Bosniaks as such? Snjezˇana Buzov, who concentrates on Ottoman perceptions of Bosnia, reflected in the works of Tursun Bey, Mustafa Aˆli, Evliya C¸elebi and Cevdet Pas¸a, depicts how a panegyrical rhetoric was employed to describe the various features of the Bosniaks’ character; primarily their ability, loyalty to the Sultan and openness to culture.97 These works cover a period ranging from the late fifteenth to the nineteenth century.98 It is seen that the panegyric turns into rhetoric of severe criticism during the period of rebellion, at least in

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official documents. A close analysis of related documents shows that these biased expressions were not limited only to ethnonyms but also employ a general critical tone. Here are a number of examples of these expressions: ‘Since the characters of the majority of Bosniaks are variegated, it is not proper to rely upon their sayings.’99 ‘Those [Bosniaks], because of their nefarious character, do not keep their word and are not to be trusted.’100 ‘The Bosniak community, because of their foolishness, are simple-minded creatures.’101 ‘The leaders of the Bosnian vermin who were murderers and damned people wrote letters and sent them to all districts of the region.’102 ‘Most of the Bosniaks are seditious and, for a period of time, they call on disorder in order to obtain their aims.’103 ‘It is apparent from their behavior and understanding that the Bosniaks, because of their being corrupt [. . .] will provoke and seduce each other.’104 ‘According to their well-known temperament and predilection for sedition [. . .] and because of their harsh character it is not proper to make contact with the Bosniaks in these times.’105 ‘The Bosniaks are a fickle group (mu¨televvin bir kavim).’106 ‘It is apparent that among ehl-i I˙slaˆm, the Bosniaks, being privileged above others, always urged freedom (Bos¸nak taˆifesi ehl-i I˙slaˆm arasında cu¨mleden imtiyaˆzen daima serbestlik iddiaˆsında oldukları zaˆhir).’107 ‘As is known by all, the Bosniaks, because of their harsh character and ingratitude for so much favour and mercy from the Sultan, are a kind of foolish and brutal people (bir takım akılsız ve behaˆyim makuˆlesi adamlar).’108 ‘Those [Bosniaks] were like a plane tree growing on the peak of a mountain and, as if they were unable to be sociable with other people apart from themselves, were a brutish and bestial group (bir takım vahs¸i ve behaˆyim makuˆlesi adamlar). Because of that, it will be very difficult to explain imperial orders to them unless the state uses force.’109 ‘Because of the fickle character of the Bosniaks it is not proper to trust their contracts and verbal engagements as their previous commercial activities show that they repeatedly give contracts and oaths and then change their mind.’110 ‘As time went on, false rumors and news spread among a group of dim-witted Bosniaks whose temperament is dissimilar to that of a human being (mizaˆcları insan mizaˆcına benzemez bir takım bıˆ-idraˆk Bos¸nak

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gu¨ruˆhu).’111 ‘It was seen that the expression “stupid Bosniak” (ahmak Bos¸nak) was true.’112 ‘The Bosniaks are known for their acts of plotting and devilry (Bos¸naklar mekr u¨ ¸seyaˆtıˆnetle ma‘ruˆf olduklarından).’113 ‘Those Bosniaks as an abject group do not appreciate any mercy or favour (Bos¸nak taˆifesi bir kavm-i leıˆm olarak merhamet ve inaˆyetin kadrini bilmediklerinden).’114 ‘Most of the Bosnian people are characterized by improvization and harshness and by always harming each other; they become obstinate and arouse rebellion and sedition (eyaˆlet-i Bosnanın ekser ahaˆlisi bedaˆhet ve hus¸uˆnet ile mevsuˆf ve daima birbirlerini ızraˆr ederek icraˆ-yı tamarrud ve tekniyet ve ıˆkaˆd-ı fitne ve mefsedet ile me’luˆf olub).’115 ‘The Bosniaks are not Muslims one can advise (Bos¸naklar nush bilir Mu¨slu¨manlardan olmadıg˘ından).’116 ‘The Bosniaks are not persevering or stable in any situation or promise (Bos¸nak taˆifesinin bir halde ve bir makaˆlde sebaˆt ve kararları olmadıg˘ı misillu¨).’117 ‘The Bosniak people, because of their foolishness and stupidity are a simple-minded group (Bos¸nak milletinin derkar olan beleh ve hamaˆkatleri icabıyla bir alay saˆdedilaˆn).’118 ‘The Bosniaks, in terms of their natural temperament, are harsh people and apt to gossip (Bos¸naklar tab’an has¸ˆın ve kıyl u kaˆle meyyaˆl olduklarından).’119 ‘The Bosniaks do not exhibit firmness of mind in any situation and they are not expected to render service for the sake of the religion and the state. Their treachery is apparent and it is clear that they are more abominable than unbelievers.’120 The list of such examples can be extended; however, these tendentious proclamations that show a negative approach to not only the rebels but the whole population of the Bosnia eyalet clearly depict that, at least according to the perception of the state, this rebellion was not restricted to a single group of people, so that it was not considered to be a ‘group rebellion’ but rather was directly related to a region, and connected with the ethnonym of being ‘Bosniak’. As Hathaway points out, regionalism and ethnic diversity were not simply extraneous details but rather key contributing factors of mutiny and rebellion in that period.121 Rebellion was a land-based phenomenon in which the primary enactors were the military – administrative classes who were looking for solutions to the conflicting interests of the centre and the periphery.

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During such a problematic period, language was also purposefully used to create a negative attitude towards the accused people. One is struck by the difference between the negative expressions used to describe these people during the internecine years and the praise heaped on them after the suppression of rebellion. The documents, for example, say that: ‘disruption and revolution in Bosnia which became active for a certain period of time were entirely got rid of with the help of God [. . .] and the people of that region, heretofore famous for their bravery, skillfulness, loyalty and integrity, rendered many worthy services and from now on, will be receptive to my imperial orders.’122 ‘Since earlier times, the Bosniak people had been renowned for their loyalty and integrity and had always done good service to the state on the battlefield and showed loyalty and servitude. Unfortunately some years ago some traitors ventured to provoke sedition and uprisings for their own selfish desires and disrupted order in Bosnia, but, thanks to God, they were fined as a punishment and from now it is hoped that those Bosniaks will show loyalty and perseverance as before.’123 ‘The Bosniak people rendered good service with heart and soul in previous campaigns for Islam and they were given the title of “gazi” (one who fights on behalf of Islam) for being obedient, zealous and brave soldiers. It is hoped that they will show similar service and zeal in this campaign as well.’124 ‘The Bosnians were famous for their “gazilik” title and showed good service in previous campaigns for the sake of Islam and for the sake of the state. In those campaigns, they promised to send 20,000 soldiers as a first recruitment and a further 40,000 more as a second [. . .] a situation which shows that their efforts and bravery cannot be compared with those of others.’125

Rebels’ identities: Who were they? Just after the abolition of the janissaries, the population of Bosnia was separated into two groups: those who were obedient to the state and those who were rebellious against it; but as time went on the second group became more numerous and turned into a regional movement, taking part in what the central authorities called an eyalet

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rebellion.126 Rebel leaders either obtained direct support from Bosnian local notables, the ulema,127 esnaf,128 and merchant classes129 or silenced them through fear; so that a ‘unanimous and concerted attitude’ (yekdil ve yekcihet) was created among the rebel leaders, the notables of the region and the ordinary people.130 This unanimity and concordance reveal much about the power of the local social network to which this region’s people belonged. First, ‘being a Bosniak’ was the consequence of a multi-dimensional group identity that caused people to return to that nucleus in a critical situation. Second, it was part of the Bosniak identity to provide legitimacy for each other. If this uprising had been restricted to a small group, the state would more readily have considered it a criminal act and punishment would have been very formal. Third, it created a kind of regional solidarity in which people’s personal, familial and social relationships were firmly connected one to the other. The saying ‘whenever a Bosniak fights with another Bosniak, they are later reconciled’ (Bos¸nak Bos¸nakla her ne kadar cekis¸se yine araların bulurlar)131 is a reflection of the perception of the region’s people that they were all in the same boat. Thus, ‘Bosniak’ became an umbrella term for both parties, Bosnia and the Porte; the first one accepted it as a commonalty, while the latter used it as a tool to differentiate the Bosnians from other groups of the larger Ottoman world during this period. The general characteristic of the rebellion, which represented various social strata even among its leading figures, can easily be seen by just glancing at the names of the rebels given in the documents. The number and variety of the names that were inscribed as chiefs (ru¨esaˆ or sergerde) of rebels is an indication of this. It is important to note that, while the documents give detailed information about the chiefs and leaders in referring to them by name, information about ordinary people was limited to giving their group identities, such as merchants, or esnafs, or to giving their numbers: for example ‘the Bosnian vermin were seven or eight thousand in the Yenipazar and Senice districts’.132 This is probably due to the large number of local people who participated in the rebellion. During the two flare-up periods of the rebellion; that is between the years 1826 – 7 and 1831– 2, the most important figures came

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from among the askeri class and were mainly janissaries, kapudans and the ulema. While in the first stage of the rebellion period the exjanissaries took vanguard positions, in the second stage – especially after the suppression of important figures among the janissaries – it was the kapudan group which became the leading power. Two kinds of leaders arose during the rebellion. The first, which I prefer to call ‘head or chief of rebels’ rather than ‘leader,’ is more general and includes important figures from different groups. For the second, the leader turns into the ‘leader of the leaders’. While in the first stage the local Ag˘a of the janissaries, Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, undertook that leadership position, this role was taken by Hu¨seyin Kapudan in the second one. Because of the importance of this kind of leadership, I place special emphasis on Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a and Hu¨seyin Kapudan in the following chapter, but it is important to note that both leaders shared the same objective: being appointed as viziers of Bosnia.133 A simple classification can be made according to the titles and professions of the chief rebels as shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The assortment and variety of names listed in the tables does much to reveal the fact that it was a regional rebellion in which people from different professional backgrounds took active roles. Reading between the lines, it is possible to trace their networks, close ties with each other and their lines of communication; for example who was close friends with who, who helped who, and who encouraged who to be a ‘supporter’ of the rebellion. According to a courier who was an intermediary between the central authorities and Arif Bey, who was charged by the state with special duties and sent to Bosnia, Arif Bey sent a letter to the nakib of Saray. The nakib summoned the mu¨tesellim and said that he had received a letter from the state and proposed to publicize it at court. The mu¨tesellim of Saray answered: ‘We do not go to court since our assembly is in the Beyler Mosque.’ They then went to that mosque, where the naib of Tas¸lıca, Vehbi, Saraylı Elhac Abdullah, the mu¨tesellim of Mostar Osman Bey, the Ag˘a of the janissaries Ruscuklu Ali, Pinyo I˙brahim Alemdar, Tahmiscizade Mustafa Ag˘a and Bakırcızade Turnacı Mustafa were also present. The letter was read out. It warned them ‘as the region’s people, [to] obey your rulers, remove your headgear and deliver up

REBELS Table 4.1

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The leading figures of the rebellion in the first stage.

Social Status/Group

Name

Location

The Aga of janissaries

Ruscuklu Ali

Janissary, Ag˘a

Bakırcızade or Bakırcı I˙brahim Zu¨lfikar Osman Tahmiscizade or Tahmisci Hacı Mustafa Su¨leyman

Origin: Ruscuk, Location: Saray Saray

Mutasarrıf, Pas¸a Mutasarrıf, Pas¸a Janissary, Ag˘a Janissary, Ag˘a, brother of Tahmiscizade Hacı Mustafa Janissary, Alemdar Janissary, Turnacı, Ag˘a Janissary, Ag˘a Janissary Janissary, Ag˘a Janissary, Ag˘a Janissary, Bayraktar Janissary, Ag˘a Defterdar, Bey Defter Kethu¨dası, Bey (Son of Su¨leyman Bey) Mufti, Efendi Bey Mu¨tesellim, Bey Ulema, Naib Ulema, Hacı Ulema, Mufti Ulema, Efendi Ulema, Hacı Ulema, Kadı, Efendi Es¸raf, Efendi

Pinyo I˙brahim Su¨rmelizade Feyzullah (in some documents Feyzi) Uzunbas¸og˘lu Ahmed Doluca Salih

Izvornik Yenipazar Saray Saray Saray Saray

Menzilciog˘lu Nuri Hamid Pekli Hasan Su¨leyman Ahmed Bey

Saray Saray Origin: Drin, Location: Saray Saray Saray Serhad Travnik Travnik

Muidzade Mehmed S¸akir Ahmed Cennetizade Osman Vehbi Abdullah Hamid Ataullah Fettahog˘lu Golucu Mustafa Sabri Nazif

Travnik Gradacac Saray Tas¸lıca Saray Travnik Saray Saray Saray Saray (Continued)

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Table 4.1

(Continued)

Social Status/Group

Name

Location

Ulema, Kadı, Efendi Ulema, Kadı, Efendi Ulema

Salih I˙zzetıˆ Osman Nuri Ali

Ulema Kapudan, Kapudan, Kapudan, Kapudan, Kapudan,

Abacı Abdullah Hu¨seyin Mehmed Mehmed I˙brahim Mustafa

Saray Saray Origin: Mostar, Location: Saray Saray Gradacac Bihke Krupe Ihlevne Yayce

Bey Bey Bey Bey Bey

the janissary insignias; otherwise I do not come into Saray.’ The ulema asked for the reactions of those present and they replied that they would not abandon their janissary corps. They prepared a document confirming their opposition, and the ulema also affixed their seal to the document.135 The documents reveal that the defterdar of Bosnia became a key figure in winning the hearts of the notables to support the rebellion. The defterdar of Bosnia, Su¨leyman Bey, his son, defter Kethu¨dası Ahmed Bey, and the Mufti together kidnapped some notables of the region including a certain Su¨leyman Pas¸azade I˙brahim Bey and his brother, Hacı Kerim Pas¸azade, who was the muhafız of Ada-yı Kebir, tımar defterdarı and cavus¸lar kethudası, claiming that they were in favour of the vali. The document claims that if relations between the defterdar and the mass of the population were severed, Travnik would immediately take the vali’s side and this would also damage the alliance of the Saray inhabitants with the rebels. Unfortunately, this relationship was so strong that, according to the document, ‘nothing but the sword’136 would break it. The power of Defterdar Su¨leyman can be more clearly understood from another document which mentions that before arriving in the region the valis of Bosnia would send a kaymakamlık order granting

REBELS Table 4.2

159

The leading figures of the rebellion for the second stage.134

Social Status/Group

Name

Location

Mirmiran, Pas¸a Silahs¸or, Pas¸a Mirmiran, Pas¸a Kethu¨da, Pas¸a Defterdar of Tımar, Bey Mu¨tesellim, Bey Previous Defter Kethu¨dası, Bey Mu¨tesellim, Bey

Mahmud Fedayizade Ali Zu¨lfikar I˙bs¸ir Mustafa Osman Belıˆk Ahmed

Izvornik Izvornik Izvornik, Foca Belgrade Saray Mostar Saray

Cennetıˆzade Mehmed Emin Ahmed Memis¸ Ahmed

Saray

Bey Mu¨tesellim, Ag˘a Dizdar of Saraybosna Castle, Ag˘a Ag˘a Ag˘a, son of Pekli Hasan Ag˘a Ag˘a Ag˘a Hancı Kırcali, among vu¨cuˆh Hancı, among vu¨cuˆh Bo¨lu¨kbas¸ı The Defter Kethu¨dası of Ahali-i Divan, Bey Kapudan Kapudan, Bey Kapudan, Bey Kapudan, Bey Kapudan, Bey Esnaf

Gradacac Senice Saray

Pekli Hasan Hu¨seyin Yaldızcıog˘lu I˙zlatar Mustafa, Hacı Muˆyuˆ Bakırcı Ahmed Timurci Hacı Acemog˘lu Kel Mustafa Hacı Mustafa Hamid Caˆfik Mustafa Zibovic Ahmed

Serhad Serhad Saray Saray Saray Saray Saray Saray Saray Saray Saray Saray

Hu¨seyin Mahmud Murad Mahmud Emin Mahmud Cancanog˘lu Mustafa

Gradacac Derbend I˙storice Maglay Tuzla Saray (Continued)

160 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Table 4.2

(Continued)

Social Status/Group

Name

Location

Esnaf, Kahya of Tailor Esnaf, Etmekcibas¸ı Ulema, Mu¨derris, Efendi Previous Nakib of Saray, Ulema, Kadı, Efendi

Seyyid Hacı Ali I˙lyasizade Emin S¸erifzade (He must be the son of S¸erifzade Mustafa Nuri) Mehmed Hasib

Saray Saray Saray Belgrade

Ma‘denıˆ (Madenci) Hafız I˙sazade Su¨leyman

Saray Saray

Kadı, scribe of the court, Efendi Kadı, Efendi Kadı, Efendi

certain rights to Defterdar Su¨leyman. The document implies that this practice had been going on for some time, and that if it was stopped Su¨leyman might incite the people to insurrection.138 There are many similar examples in which a specific pattern emerges: an important figure claims power in a given region and becomes a local power. He establishes close ties with other local powers and, if he has the capacity, he may create a faction or a household on his own initiative. Abou-el-Haj, when focusing on the 1703 rebellion, points out how factionalism became a key factor in the rebellion. He says that a single faction attempting at carrying out a rebellion alone would not receive social approval, but rather such a rebellion had to be the product of a coalition of many factions originating from the various bodies that constituted Ottoman society.139 As shown in Abou-el-Haj’s study of Vizier-Pas¸a households, which found that nearly half of the key posts in the central and provincial administration of the state were given to men who belonged to at least one such household (kapılar),140 we see in Bosnia at that time traces of a local household structure which was called daire halkı. For example, the mufti of Travnik, Hamid, had a daire halkı where, according to one courier, because of Hamid’s provocative acts of rebellion, half of the household started quarrelling with the other half. Those daire

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halkı were not his relatives, because when Hamid’s brother in-law, nephew and kethuda wanted to leave because they opposed the rebellion, he told them: ‘if my daire halkı wish to leave, I can say no words to them, but you are my relatives and it is not proper to behave like that.’141 There are many similar examples. I˙stolceli Ali Pas¸a who was the mutasarrıf of Hersek142 and Mahmud Pas¸a who was the mutasarrıf of Izvornik143 had daire halkı, as did all the valis. The size of the retinue varied according to the vali. While some valis preferred a large entourage, like Abdurrahim Pas¸a whose daire included about 4,000 people,144 some had smaller ones, like Davud Pas¸a who was criticized for having such a small household.145 In reality, the establishment of such large daires by the valis was mainly related to the decline of the timar system, which led to the weakening of the sipahi army. This resulted in the establishment of local military troops by the valis. These troops participated in campaigns under the command of the valis, and after the campaigns they were used as their private armies. Thus, the local Muslim population was incorporated into the provincial military system.146 The daires of the valis were divided into two sections, biruˆn and enderuˆn,147 following the example of the Sultan’s household,148 and attendants were sometimes called daire ashabı instead of daire halkı.149 Each household was a unit of social organization in which disparate elements were brought together under the patronage of a grandee.150 Certainly, such a household structure strengthened the political power and influence of the grandee who was in charge of it. During a period when the central authority was fragmented, it was this household structure which filled the political, social and economic power vacuums. As Brummett points out, in the Ottoman state rebellion was a chronic phenomenon in which provincial governor(s) or grandee(s) propped up their regional power base by rebelling against the Sultan, not in order to move out of the shelter of the empire but to advance their positions and augment their wealth and power.151 Thus creating a local power and protecting it culminated

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in a series of complaints and negotiations. It necessitated cooperation with others who shared mutual grievances. As described above, cooperation between the Saray notables, chiefs of rebels and the defterdar of Bosnia152 brought about the enrollment of new followers from the mu¨tesellim, voyvoda, kapudan and ayan ranks. Their numbers increased with the assistance of Hu¨seyin Bey, who was the kapudan of Gıradacanice, the mu¨tesellims of Foca, Blene, Serebrenice, Mostar and Tas¸lıca and the inhabitants of these cities, the notables of C¸elebipazarı and Tuzla-i Bala and their inhabitants, and the kapudans of Ihlevne and Yayce.153 It is important to note that whether or not the indigenous notables from the various regions of Bosnia were for or against the rebellion was the determining factor in the allegiance of the region’s people. Attachment to a local notable led the people to take up a position in his favour. Thus, a kind of tripartite cooperation based on these complex layers of relationships led to a union between the rebel chiefs, the notables of Bosnia and the region’s people. There were of course many reasons for this tripartite cooperation; the perception of ‘being in the same boat’ and regionalism were mentioned previously. The third and possibly most important factor was an economic one. The people thought that changes in the military system would bring changes in economic conditions as well. The central authorities blamed the chiefs of the rebels from the Saray and Travnik districts for encouraging people to think this way and for bombarding them with papers in which they claimed that people’s lives would change dramatically if they accepted the abolition of the janissaries. The Porte dismissed these rumours as downright lies. Although the Porte guaranteed that no harm would result from the measure and no other obligations would be imposed,154 people did not seem to be convinced. A wide spectrum of economic relationships between chiefs of rebels and local notables led them to resist abrupt changes that would not only disturb the old order but would also bring radical changes in their economic situation as well. This is why the central government accused the rebel chiefs of becoming protectors of the notables and in this way making a profit from the towns and villages under the rule of those notables.155

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The leading figures of the first stage of the rebellion In the first stage of the rebellion, the rebel chiefs Bakırcızade I˙brahim Ag˘a, Tahmiscizade Mustafa Ag˘a, Pinyo I˙brahim Alemdar and Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, who had previously belonged to the janissary corps, became the most influential leaders.156 These four men could be defined as the ‘kernel’ or ‘first circle’ of leaders in the first period as their names were the most often mentioned. They were all from the Saray district of Bosnia and very famous locally. In one report, ¨ sku¨p, called Bakırcızade and Yas¸ar Pas¸a, the mutassarıf of U Tahmiscizade ‘avaricious for property’ (mal azgını) and reported a speech of Pinyo I˙brahim Alemdar, who boasted that if he set off from Bosnia to Istanbul with 300 or 400 cavalry or even dervishes, the number would have increased to 25,000 by the time he arrived. According to Yas¸ar Pas¸a, Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a was also causing alarm and confusion.157 While in some documents the names of those four people are given as rebel chiefs without any other names being mentioned, in others different names are added to them. A closer analysis of the documents reveals that there was also a definite ‘second circle,’ a more extensive cadre that included six more people apart from the four mentioned previously; namely, Defterdar Su¨leyman Bey, Turnacı Feyzullah, Tahmiscizade Su¨leyman, Saraylı Hacı Abdullah (Hacı Abdi in some documents), Tas¸lıcalı Vehbi, and Cennetizade Osman Bey, who was the mu¨tesellim of Saray during the first stage of the rebellion period. Their importance can be seen not only from the frequency with which their names appear in conjunction with each other, but also from the fact that their punishment was execution.158 It is understood that the naib of Tas¸lıca, Vehbi, and Saraylı Hacı Abdullah were very close to each other. The two were mentioned as ‘bandit chiefs’ and were accused of seducing the ulema.159 Due to his close relation with the ulema class there is a strong possibility that Saraylı Hacı Abdullah was also from the ulema class, like Vehbi. The mufti of Bosnia, Muidzade Mehmed S¸akir Efendi, and from among the kadıs Saraylı Salih I˙zzetıˆ and Osman Nuri were together called chiefs of the rebels.160 Mufti Mehmed S¸akir, in particular, became an

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eminent figure in organizing resistance against the changes. A document stresses that all the ulema of Istanbul covered their heads with imame instead of kavuk in accordance with the new order and the ulema from other cities also complied; but in Bosnia Mufti Mehmed S¸akir claimed that there was no order calling for the imame and persuaded others of the ulema to keep on wearing kavuk, so that all of them continued to use kavuk instead of imame. His act was interpreted as opposition to the ‘Islamic rulers’, ulu’l-emr, and he was dismissed from his post.161 From the ulema class the mufti of Foca, I˙brahim, Mostarlı Ali and Abacı Abdullah, who were also accused of giving fetva to rebels, were sentenced to death.162 In this first stage of the rebellion, other names were also added to the ranks of the chiefs in the documents: Defter Kethu¨dası Ahmed Bey, who was the son of Su¨leyman, the defterdar of Bosnia, was among them. According to the vali of Bosnia, Abdurrahim Pas¸a, due to his actions Ahmed deserved the death penalty but, since his father had already been executed, it would be more expedient to send him into exile for a long period.163 The mufti of Travnik, Hamid, was also very well known for organizing meetings among the rebels. He used the meeting house in Travnik for smaller assemblies while the bigger ones were held in the C¸ars¸ı mosque.164 It is understood that a certain Dervis¸ Bey was also one of the prominent janissaries and his name was mentioned together with those of Pinyo I˙brahim and Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, the Ag˘a of the janissaries.165 Likewise, others such as Uzunbas¸og˘lu Ahmed Alemdar, Drinli Salih, Doluca and Menzilciog˘lu Nuri Ag˘a were called the chiefs of the rebels together with Tahmiscizade, Bakırcızade, Pinyo I˙brahim and Mu¨tesellim Osman.166 The names of Miralem Mehmed and S¸ahidanog˘lu Ahmed were mentioned together with that of Bakırcızade Turnacı Mustafa, and the three were also condemned to death.167 Gıradacaclı Ahmed Bey and Pekli Hasan Ag˘a, who became more popular in the second stage of the rebellion, were also referred to as chiefs of the rebels during the first period.168 The kapudans became mutinous in the first stage of the rebellion and their leading position was strengthened during the second. Hu¨seyin Kapudan, who was the most important figure of the second

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stage, was active and branded as head of the rebels in the first stage as well.169 Alongside him, the kapudan of Bihke, Murad Kapudan, the kapudan of Krupe, Mehmed Kapudan, the kapudan of Ihlevne, Mehmed Kapudan, the kapudan of Yayce, Mustafa Kapudan and I˙brahim Kapudan were mentioned as being among the chiefs of rebels during the first stage.170 Among the Pas¸as, the mutasarrıf of Izvornik, Zu¨lfikar Pas¸a, also supported the rebels, and for this reason he was dismissed from office and forced to return to his home town of Foca.171 Some documents, however, claim that he was loyal to the state and opposed the rebellion.172 It is important to note that he was not alone in falling between the opposing sides; the mu¨tesellim of Yenipazar, Osman Pas¸a, was also accused of inciting people to mutiny in support of the janissaries on the one hand173 and gratefully acknowledged as a servant of the state on the other.174

The attitude of the Bosnian ulema towards the rebellion It is evident that during the rebellion the most crucial support for the rebels came from the ranks of the ulema, the scholarly class. Paradoxically, during the abolition of the janissaries and subsequent reformation period in Istanbul, it was the ulema class who supported the central authorities and behaved like intermediaries between the people and the authorities.175 The crucial support of high-ranking members of the ulema enabled the central authorities not only to legitimize the changes but also to win the hearts of lower-ranking members of the ulema as well as those of ordinary people.176 This position led the ulema class to behave as oral mediators in a period when published media were very restricted.177 Introducing such a reform programme was possible only with the help of the ulema, and this support was planned over a long period. The state used Islam to legitimize its policies in order to suppress rebellious groups. Fermans calling on Muslims to perform their daily prayers publicly in mosques, small mosques or konaks were dispatched all over the empire.178 Moreover, the state decreed that

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the abolition of the janissaries was to be carried out with the general concurrence (icma-ı u¨mmet) of the people and any city which did not show submission to that decision could not perform the Friday prayer or the prayers for the two religious festivals, Bairams.179 The state threatened that any ulema who disobeyed this order would be dismissed.180 In the face of these threats, the local ulema class of Bosnia preferred to stay silent at first, but in a meeting attended by notables, ulema and important rebel figures, they offered support for the rebel side. Undoubtedly, the support of the ulema in Istanbul eased the programme of the state there, but the lack of it in Bosnia worsened the position of the state. It is probable that because of the critical position of the ulema, the state preferred to portray the ulema’s support of the rebellion in Bosnia as reluctant,181 although there is strong evidence that they voluntarily supported the rebellion. Many people from the ulema class were cited as being among the chiefs of the rebellion and punished because of this. Hence, while the central authorities argued that if the Bosniaks did not obey the order for abolition, their prayers on Fridays and Bairams would not be lawful according to jurisprudence, the Bosniaks replied that they would not give up their janissarial claims; they in their turn had their ulema and their fetvas (fatwas).182 As Bosnia was so remote from the Ottoman centre that it had developed its own internal dynamics in which the local ulema class took an active role during the rebellion. The participation of the local ulema in the rebellion was a direct consequence of their increasing power after the eighteenth century, connected with the rise of the ayan system. I˙slamog˘lu and Keyder in their joint work stress that the provincial ulema, together with merchants and moneychangers, became intermediaries in the system of tax-farming, the real purchasers of which were Istanbul merchants or high officials. Since those mediators were the local representatives of governors, they easily combined their accumulated wealth with political authority and became ayans. The change in the tax-farming system allowed those groups, including ulema, to purchase the right to collect taxes for the entire area under their authority and to establish a client

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group of locally powerful subcontracting tax-farmers. Thus taxfarming served not only as an economic device but also became a mechanism of political authority.183 As I˙nalcık points out, the emergence of an ayan was a very complex phenomenon which was related not only to the wealth based on the agricultural production of the owner’s estates but more on ‘financial operations such as usurer, tax-farmer and controller of trade between European merchants and Ottoman producers’.184 Hence the growing abuses in ulema ranks, especially after the seventeenth century, had reduced the prestige of the ulema in the provinces as well as at the Ottoman centre. The extraordinary financial needs of both elite and state contributed to the peculiar vulnerability of the ulema and paved the way for the virtual sale of important ilmiye posts.185 In his important work Ahval-i Bosna, Mehmed Emin Isevic´ depicts the difficult conditions in Bosnia in the early nineteenth century, albeit with some exaggeration. Isevic´ asserts that abuses in the jurisprudence system in Bosnia led to enormous corruption. Important posts such as kadı, naib or mu¨derris were generally seized by uneducated and inefficient people who bought those posts for cash. For example, in the Saray district of Bosnia two people, namely Cabizade Ali Efendi and Cavalry Mehmed Bey, had seized the iltizam of 48 kadılık and sold them to people related to them who paid more money. Thus ulema posts were turned into a kind of commercial instrument in which, according to Isevic´, a kadılık with an income of 30 gurus¸ could be sold for 300 gurus¸, while one of 300 gurus¸ income could be sold for 500.186 Those changes were very apparent in Bosnia, where the ulema class became a link in the ayan chain. It would not be wrong to use the term ‘ayanization of the ulema’ to describe this process. Thanks to this ayanization process, the power of the ulema proliferated, and although members of this group were appointed as provincial officials by the government they became agents exemplifying local interests. As mentioned previously, some leading members of the ulema were even accused of inciting the people to mutiny and being chiefs of the rebellion. Their cooperation with the janissaries induced the central authories to classify them in general as ‘assistants of the bandits’187

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and they were accused of being toys in the hands of the bandits who were using the ulema to do their bidding.188 My contention is that the participation of the ulema class in the rebels’ ranks was also embedded in or, indeed, partly the product of, a drive to defend the ancien re´gime. Heywood argues that Ottoman Bosnia had kept its main characteristics unchanged from the Ottoman conquest down to the end of the eighteenth century, and this was the survival of Bosnia as an Ottoman ancien re´gime society. This was directly related to the role of Bosnia as a frontier region, sharing its northern and western borders with Austria. The general crisis of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries also diminished the wealth of Bosnia, but ‘what had not changed, however, was the general involvement of men of Bosnian origin in the affairs of the empire’.189 This loyalty of the Bosnian ulema or people in general to the ancien re´gime was a direct consequence of the fear of losing what they had. They thought that the changes might not only be related to the military system but also spill over into other aspects of life. Changes in their landholdings, properties, hereditary earnings, or ways of dress, as in the case of the imame-kavuk dilemma described above, would sweep away what they had obtained over a long period of time. If there was any stereotyped pense´e of the Bosniaks in that period, it was that defence psychology, a kind of ‘conservatism’ towards change.190 This defence psychology was closely related to the geographical situation of Bosnia, a place bordered on three sides by the ‘enemy’, as one document says; that is to say, by ‘Nemcelu (Austrian), Sırblu (Serbian) and Karadag˘lı (Montenegrin) bandits’.191 While it was ‘a sacred duty’ of the state to defend this encircled and widespread eyalet,192 it is probable that accomplishing this sacred duty meant extra burdens and important changes for the region’s people as well.

The leading figures of the second stage of the rebellion As so many leaders of the first stage of the rebellion had either been executed or exiled, in the second stage most of the leading rebels were different from the first. As with the first period of rebellion,

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there are four names that can be classified as the kernel unit, the first circle of chiefs. Hu¨seyin Kapudan, who became the leader of the second period, had three close associates, namely Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a, Mehmed Kapudan, who was the kapudan of Krupe, and Yaldızcıog˘lu I˙zlatar Mustafa Ag˘a, known as Hacı Muˆyuˆ. The fact that their names are repeated very frequently in the documents193 and that they fled together to Austria after the suppression of the movement demonstrate the importance of these four men. Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a was the chief guard of the kapudan of Izvornik, Mahmud Bey, and after the abolition of the janissary army he became a silahs¸or. Because of the dismissal of Zu¨lfikar Pas¸a from his post as mutasarrıf of Izvornik due to his support for the janissaries in the first period of rebellion, the previous kapudan, Mahmud Pas¸a, took over his post and became mirmiran.194 It is probable that both Fedayizade and Mahmud obtained the title of ‘Pas¸a’ along with these appointments because previously the documents used the title of Bey instead of Pas¸a for them.195 It is understood that both were powerful indigenous notables with large households.196 The mirmiran of Izvornik, Mahmud Pas¸a, Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a, Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi and the kapudan of Tuzla, Mahmud Bey – who escaped to Austria together with Hu¨seyin Kapudan – had been summoned to dersaadet a few years before the Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement by order of the Grand Vizier, Res¸id Mehmed Pas¸a, as important figures of the region.197 It is seen that after the destruction of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement, Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a was pardoned in 1835 and returned to Bosnia. However, a year later, in September 1836, he rebelled against the vali of Bosnia, Vecihi Pas¸a. The rebellion was suppressed and he was exiled for life to Trabzon.198 It is important to note that during the first stage of the rebellion, while these four indigenous notables supported the rebels at first, only Mehmed Kapudan maintained his support as time went on; the others either preferred to be silent or appeared to support the state. Even Hu¨seyin Kapudan supported the rebellion at first but was later persuaded by the central authorities to leave the rebel ranks.199 This prompts the question of why they gave up their support for the rebellion. The answer lies mainly in their new appointments

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and promotions awarded by the state. As discussed previously, promotions and rewards became a way for the state to gain the support of the indigenous notables. According to a report by a courier called Mehmed, in the first stage of the rebellion the appointments of Mahmud Pas¸a and Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a were made on account of their promises of loyalty, but they were not loyal in reality and were concealing their intentions in order to keep their positions.200 These four vanguard characters are discussed in Chapter 5, but it is important to note that Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a had three brothers with whom he jointly held cizye properties.201 Fedayizade also had a flock of 40 –50 sheep.202 Not only were they collectors of the cizye taxes which were taken from the non-Muslims, but they also owned the iltizam for them.203 It is known that as the empire’s borders enlarged and the use of money accelerated due to changes in the world economic system, it became impossible to collect taxes directly and individually, so the central authority developed the iltizam system in which the amount of tax revenue to be collected and sent to the treasury every year was fixed by auction.204 As Khoury points out, this process gave the central authorities the opportunity to absorb the resources of the empire’s wealthier subjects, who then became the financiers of the state’s war efforts.205 As mentioned before, Mehmed Kapudan, accused of being one of the chiefs of the rebellion in the first period, had been banished to Sofia, but after a short period he was pardoned and returned to Bosnia where he later obtained his position. Before his flight to Austria he was the kapudan of Krupe. He was the son of Mirmiran Osman Pas¸a, mu¨tesellim of Yenipazar206 and, during the period of the abolition of the janissary army, Osman Pas¸a pleaded with the dersaadet to appoint his son as a hassa haseki. However this request was not granted since he had been accused of supporting the rebels. After his father’s death, during the inter-rebellion years, he applied to the central authority for permission to take over his father’s office. It is important to note that his appeal was named as one of the rebels’ requests in a document listing them in order.207 He was criticized for having secret relations with the Albanian leaders who were accused of inciting the Bosniaks to rebel.208 He had huge wealth as well as deadly enemies who, after

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his flight to Austria with Hu¨seyin Kapudan, plundered his possessions and demolished his house.209 The third man, Yaldızcıog˘lu I˙zlatar or Zlatar Mustafa Ag˘a from the Hoca Kemaleddin quarter of Saraybosna, was the closest associate of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and the second-in-command of the rebellion; in some documents the rebellion was even named after him and Hu¨seyin Kapudan.210 The fact that, of all the rebels, only these two men’s wives were summoned to Istanbul by the decree of the state, while they themselves escaped to Austria, may be seen as further evidence supporting this argument.211 Likewise, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a was one of the very few whose possessions were confiscated by the state treasury. They were then sold by auction and the income was conveyed to the treasury of Asaˆkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye. The total income raised was 17,044 gurus¸, 38 para, an amount which shows that he was a very rich person.212 After Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a escaped to Austria, he petitioned the Sultan for mercy and requested that his belongings be returned to him. He said that if it was not possible for his property to be handed back, at least the possessions of his wife and his son should be given back.213 He also petitioned to return to his homeland, saying that he, together with his wife and children, were suffering from extreme poverty.214 There is no information about the fate of the property of his wife and son, but their misery suggests that it was not returned to them. He and his family were not allowed to return to their homeland because of his actions. Instead, after Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa and his family were sent to Istanbul, it was decided to exile them to Trabzon in order to remove Yaldızcıog˘lu from the centre of things. It was also decided that the vali of Trabzon, Osman Pas¸a, should give him 300 gurus¸ per month for the living expenses of his family.215 Prominent figures from the Pas¸a ranks of the region also became active participants in the rebellion and were mentioned as its chiefs. Among them Zu¨lfikar Pas¸a of Foca (a previous mutasarrıf of Izvornik), who had been an active supporter of the rebels during the first stage of the period, continued his support in the second stage as well. When Mahmud Hamdi Pas¸a’s army marched victoriously against the

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rebels, the inhabitants of Foca deserted the rebels under the leadership of Zu¨lfikar Pas¸a, affirming their loyalty to the state and requesting the appointment of Zu¨lfikar Pas¸a as the mu¨tesellim of Foca.216 Their request was granted, in return for their support of the army of Mahmud Hamdi Pas¸a.217 Thus, we see that bargaining continued right up until the suppression of the rebellion, and turned into an instrument that led to the regaining of lost positions or the obtaining of new ones by the rebels of higher rank, as well as gaining new support for the state. Zu¨lfikar Pas¸a was not the only pas¸a to take the rebels’ side. For instance the muhafız of Belgrade, I˙bs¸ir Pas¸a, was originally from the Saray district and, together with the nakib of Saray, S¸erifzade, he tried to revive the rebellion that had calmed down in 1832.218 Also, as mentioned before, the mirmiran of Izvornik, Mahmud Pas¸a, was warned many times by the state that he must shun the rebels and carry out the orders of the government. While he affirmed his obedience on the one hand, on the other he remained an associate of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, according to state documents.219 It is understood that important people of the region who were in direct communication with the central authorities were warned personally and their response in general was a kind of evasion. It is likely that they did not want to resist the state personally or were not even aiming to debilitate it; their reaction was rather based on the idea of enlarging their interests if that was possible and, if not, at least of keeping their acquisitions unchanged. Their preceding acts had not been aimed at fighting against the state but rather to gain a strong hand in negotiating with it. As in the first stage of the period, it is also possible to deduce a second circle of rebel chiefs for the second stage, based on information in relevant documents. Apart from Mahmud Pas¸a of Izvornik, kapudan of Tuzla, Mahmud Kapudan, mu¨tesellim of Senice, Memis¸ Ag˘a and the mu¨tesellim of Saray, Cennetizade Emin Bey, seem to have been very influential in getting people to participate in the movement. While Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Mahmud Pas¸a, Mahmud Kapudan and Memis¸ Ag˘a were very active in organizing meetings,220 Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey worked on gaining support from the

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ulema class. He was dismissed from his office for sedition, but appeals by the notables to reinstate him influenced the Porte to give him back his position.221 Abdullah Ag˘a, who had likewise been dismissed from his post, also returned to his position as I˙slam zabitlig˘i after the Porte was petitioned.222 This ability to force the state to change its decisions demonstrates the power of sanction that local notables could have over the central authorities when they cooperated with each other. It is understood that Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey was killed in battle and a list of his belongings was prepared by Mu¨tesellim Musa Ag˘a, who presented it to the central authorities. These belongings and money were then confiscated by Musa Ag˘a.223 It is important to note that rebel chiefs from different districts, who were also from distinct classes, with differing professions or titles, came together in meetings where they made important decisions about the aims of their movement. For example, Mahmud Pas¸a of Izvornik, Fedayizade Ali Pas¸a, mu¨tesellim of Mostar, Osman Bey, the kapudan of Derbend, Mahmud Bey, the kapudan of I˙storice, Murad Bey, Pekli Hasan Ag˘a and his son Hu¨seyin, the kapudan of Tuzla-i Zıˆr, Murad Bey, the previous mu¨tesellim of Serebrenice, Memis¸ Ag˘a, the kapudan of Gradacac, Hu¨seyin Kapudan, the kapudan of Maglay, Mahmud Emin Bey, mu¨tesellim of Saray, Cennetizade Emin Bey, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa, Caˆfik Mustafa, the defter kethu¨dası of Ahali-i Divan, Ahmed Bey, timar defterdarı Mustafa Bey, and the previous defter kethu¨dası Belik Ahmed Bey held a meeting and decided to send a group under the leadership of the mu¨tesellim of Serebrenice, Memis¸ Ag˘a, to destroy the houses of Su¨leymanzade I˙brahim Bey, a kapıcıbas¸ı at the Sultan’s court, and his sons because of their opposition to the rebellion and direct support of the state. A group of about 300 people plundered the properties of Su¨leymanzade I˙brahim and his sons.224 Similarly, important meetings were held under the leadership of Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey, Babizade Mustafa Bey, Yaldızcıog˘lu I˙zlatar Mustafa, Kırcali Hacı Mustafa, Hancı Hamid, Cancanog˘lu Mustafa, Terzi Kahyası Seyyid, Etmekcibas¸ı Hacı Ali, the scribe of court, Mehmed Hasib Efendi, Madenıˆ Hafız Efendi, I˙sazade Su¨leyman Efendi, Dizdar of Saray Castle Ahmed Ag˘a, Bo¨lu¨kbas¸ı Zibovic, Bakırcı Ahmed, Timurcı

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Hacı, Acemog˘lu and Hancı Kel Mustafa.225 A glance at these names and titles makes it very clear that the movement attracted widespread participation from all different groups; namely the ayan, military, esnaf (guilds), ulema and merchants. One important question concerns the behaviour of non-Muslim subjects of the region during the period of rebellion. Did they support the rebellion, take a stand against it or prefer to be neutral? It is true that the non-Muslim subjects did not pay as much attention to the rebellion as the Muslims of the region. The names of nonMuslims were, however, counted among the rebels, such as Zibovic, who was mentioned previously, Kıyyeci Lazo, Kalaycı Todori and Etmekci Sepro. This indicates that the non-Muslims were not totally indifferent to the rebellion.226 The documents indicate that nonMuslims who joined the rebel ranks were not restricted to those mentioned; ‘in reality, gangs of bandits seduced a great number of non-Muslims who resorted to arms against the soldiers of the Sultan.’227 After the suppression of the rebellion, the central authorities levelled similar accusations against other parts of the population in the region; they were usually pardoned rather than punished. The explanation for their participation was also very familiar: ‘Those gangs of bandits pestered non-Muslims into supporting the rebellion as well; non-Muslims were in reality powerless and because of this, were deserving of pardon.’228 A document dating from 1832 stresses that most of the rebel chiefs died of an epidemic disease and only Memis¸ Ag˘a and Mu¨derris I˙lyasizade Emin Efendi remained alive as spokesmen of the rebels.229 It is understood that this claim was rather exaggerated; however, other documents support the existence of such an epidemic and clearly show that daily life was heavily disrupted because of the epidemic in the region. The disease was said to be ‘unknown and unheard of,’ not encountered in any other Muslim lands (ehl-i I˙slam toprag˘ında vuku‘ı olmayan ve adı is¸idilmeyen bir aslıˆ hastalık zuhuˆr).230 When identifying this disease, the first probability that comes to mind is the plague; but although plague was widespread in Bosnia between 1813 and 1818, none was recorded during 1832, according to studies on the disease.231 Also, people must have been very

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familiar with the plague in 1832, as only a short time earlier a major epidemic had killed many people of the region. According to Panzac, during the Ottoman period in general, people knew all about the plague and its characteristics.232 The epidemic may have concerned a disease that was more difficult to recognize, such as typhus, typhoid or paratyphoid, which were active in different regions of the empire such as Egypt, Baghdad, Syria and Sayda, during the period.233

Objectives and demands of the rebels The reasons for the rebellion have been touched on above, but the size and scope of the action makes further analysis imperative, including a consideration of the targets of the movement and the objectives and demands of the rebels. As mentioned before, in the first stage of the rebellion, the apparent reason behind it was the abolition of the janissary army. Here I use ‘apparent’ deliberately, since I think that more profound and complex underlying factors contributed to that phenomenon and, based on this background, various subjects that constituted the region’s dynamics should be discussed. The main arguments given by the rebels for both stages were that the changes in the military system, in the manner of dress and in other areas of life, were in reality contrary to kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm; applying those changes was a violation of the kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm.234 An important question, however, is what they meant by using the expression kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm – ‘ancient law’. Their statements reflect a stress on the ‘old constitution’. The interest in constitutionality was in fact a product of traumatic periods;235 in other words, it was not new, and suggested a yearning for an idealized past and a ‘Golden Age’ in opposition to significant change. It was a desire to keep their society in the stable order that had taken generations to build, and to prevent the trend towards change. The main keynote of that traditionalistic perspective is the idea of kadıˆm; as described in one Kaˆnuˆnnaˆme, kadıˆm had existed from time immemorial.236 This stress on kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm by the rebels in both stages clearly expresses their idealization of the past in the face of ‘wretched

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alterations’. Also by stressing the kaˆnuˆn, the rebels were seeking grounds on which to legitimize their movement. It was a reminder to the state that their arguments were not new or invented and that they were not vagabonds. In the first stage, the stress was on the violation of kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm by the abolition of the janissary army,237 while in the second this was amplified to include all stipulations and laws that would have been applied, including the changes in uniform, which were declared contrary to the law of the state, the canonical law of the prophet Muhammed and the Hanefi doctrine.238 In this sense, just as the state argued that the changes were religious necessities, the rebels appealed to Islamic terminology to support the legitimacy of their claim. For instance, in one of the decrees of Divan-ı Bosna during the governorship of Hu¨seyin Kapudan in 1832, it was claimed that the epidemic was divine intervention because Muslims did not pay enough attention to performing their daily prayers diligently and publicly and children were not sent to the mekteb in order to learn the Qur’an and Islamic knowledge. First the imams and muezzins and then all the Muslims had to go to the mosques and mescids and perform their daily prayers publicly so as to ward off the evil. The decree added that those who would not go to the mosque on the pretext of having work to do must be scolded and beaten with sticks. Also children should be presented to the teachers in order to be taught the Qur’an; mektebs should be constructed in districts where there was no school and teachers should be appointed there. Subsequently, according to the document, spies should be sent to the region to inform the authorities about people who did not attend the mosques and this should be carefully followed up.239 The rebels regarded the abolition of the janissaries as bid‘at, an apocryphal and uncanonical situation, arguing that the acceptance of this would bring about many further bid‘ats.240 They pleaded with the Sultan to remove all atrocities, oppressions, and bad innovations and asked for better treatment.241 According to the Ottoman jurisprudence system, bid‘at included unjust innovations and things that were contrary to ¸seriat (canonical law), o¨rf (common law), emr-i padis¸ahi (orders of the Sultan), kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm (ancient law) and defter

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(official registration).242 In judicial matters concerning the empire’s subjects, application was to be made to the Kaˆnuˆn-ı Osmanıˆ, the precepts of law, including the principal text and articles of law,243 and things that were accepted as being contrary to the Kanun-i Osmanıˆ were called bid‘at.244 Thus law and religion were called on, with the rebels indirectly arguing that implementing the proposed changes would be a violation of law as well as of religion. In line with this strategy, the rebels decided to obtain mahzar (decree) and ilaˆm (written judgement) from districts which were opposed to the abolition, and presented these to the Porte.245 In fact this was a ‘request’ made to the Sultan by people who accepted him as an absolute ruler, as well as a ‘demonstration’ of the region’s preference not to accept what was dictated to them. By pleading with the Porte, the rebels were showing that they were the servants of the Sultan, but, by defying the Porte’s policies, they were declaring that they expected to decide about their future for themselves. Thus, they were putting themselves in state of limbo in which they were poised between being absolute servants or free people. A further motive of the rebels was the suspicion that if they accepted the first demands then new demands would follow. By resisting the current proposals they hoped to forestall further ones. The people’s fear of change led them to interrogate the people in other areas that accepted abolition. When they questioned a certain I˙brahim, who was a courier of Abdurrahim Pas¸a, the muhafız of Belgrade, about the instruction of new troops in Belgrade, he replied that, ‘those rumors circulated among you are quite unfounded. No harm would be done to anybody’s income. The aim of the instruction is limited to the cleaning of weapons, learning the art of war and preparing the guns.’ Then the rebel chiefs replied that they would submit to those proposals, but there could be other proposals after they had accepted the first ones.246 These statements clearly represent the idea that the new order would mean far more than the mere abolition of the janissaries; it could even threaten the income of the region’s people. The central authorities promised that there would be no further proposals; more

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honours would be bestowed upon the other corps than in ancient times (‘kadıˆm’), and the abolition would be restricted to the professional janissaries.247 As mentioned in previous chapters, the military organization of Bosnia was very complex and included the ranks of kapudans and yerlikulus as well as the ocaklık timaris. It is likely that people were alarmed by the prospect that abolition might be extended to other parts of the military system. According to a French traveller in 1803, the majority of men in Bosnia, approximately 78,000, bore the title of ‘janissary’, but he learned that only 16,000 of them were professional soldiers who participated in fighting and received quarterly salaries. The rest were not paid regularly, but they were using this title to benefit from judicial and tax immunities conferred by it.248 This was closely related to the geographic situation of Bosnia, because its position as a frontier region conveyed a special status. As people of the frontier region, the Muslim peasants were obliged to participate regularly in battles and in return they gained tax immunities. As mentioned before, this situation continued until 1720, when the Bosnian population was required to support Christian peasants through a newly introduced system of provincial taxation known as taksit. The new tax was not accepted by the Muslim peasants, who rebelled against it. That rebellion lasted for a long time, from 1747 to 1758, and worsened with the participation of the janissaries of Saray. Later, in the face of such a hostile reaction, the authorities were obliged to respect the wishes of the population and conceded that all Bosnian Muslims were indeed members of the military class.249 In return they became a part of the Ottoman armies as irregular troops mustered on a seasonal basis by the local elite and tribal leaders. In fact, this situation was not unique to Bosnia, or even to the Ottoman Empire; militias and mercenary armies were widely used in Europe.250 This situation gave the population of Bosnia judicial and tax immunities and became one of the reasons for a strong reaction against the abolition, because they interpreted the abolition of the janissary army as an end to their privileges. It seems that the term ‘janissary’ gained a more general meaning that included more groups

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and more people than actual janissaries, and, at least in the practical daily use or in the minds of people, became an umbrella term including yerlikulus, kapudans and other military groups aside from actual janissaries. It is therefore not surprising that rumours started that the salaries of yerli soldiers would be stopped and timars of the cavalry would be seized by the central treasury.251 According to the central authorities, such gossip originated from the consuls of foreign powers, with the French and British consuls in particular stirring up sedition. To counter the unrest Mahmud II personally ordered the continued payment of these salaries,252 probably to give a strong message to the region’s people that the abolition did not include those groups. It is likely that these guarantees persuaded the Bosnians to stop supporting the rebellion and eventually broke the power of the rebels. Accordingly, in the first stage of the rebellion, the support of indigenous people for the movement accelerated for a time and then declined. The initial increase in support was also a reflection of the persuasive power of the rebels. The later fall in support clearly shows that the central authorities were successful in persuading people that there would be no changes apart from the abolition of the professional janissaries. In the second stage of the rebellion, however, the movement continued to gain power and in the end it was suppressed only with military force. Thus in the first stage of the rebellion, the suppression was restricted to the punishment of certain janissaries, but this was only a postponement in order to calm down the situation. Later, with the acceleration of the centralization process, new arrangements were brought into force including a new military system and further taxation. The effect of this programme on the Bosnian population intensified when six districts were handed over to the Serbians.253 The Bosnians reacted strongly to these developments and reiterated their previous claims. As mentioned before, the expression kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm again came into question; the old claims were repeated and the new clothing regulations were rejected.254 According to I˙stolceli Ali Pas¸a, the mutasarrıf of Hersek, who was an important notable of the region and must have been well aware of the complex

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dynamics involved, the problem behind the reality lay in the fact that the Bosnian people had become accustomed to their yerli zabits (indigenous officers) and rejected the foreign officers who were sent to them by the vali. Also, according to I˙stolceli Ali Pas¸a ‘the Bosnians had been in the habit of performing labor services such as plowing and hoeing for their previous zabits. Now, it was a source of resentment for those Bosnians not only to carry out these services for their new officers but even to have to give [so much as] an egg to them.’255 It is known that performing labour tasks in exchange for taxes was a general practice among the Balkan peasants, for example in the Danubian Principalities and in Bulgarian and Bosnian lands.256 The documents reflect that the abolition of the sipahis, postponed in the first stage of the rebellion, was put into action during the second phase when the question of the disposal of their lands arose. The appointment of new officers not only threatened those who benefitted under the old system; the cavalry, kapudans, and other local military units in general, but also the ordinary peasants who had established mutual relationships with their previous local officers over a long period of time. The new system would introduce new redemption costs for peasants and they did not want to pay them.257 A petition by the rebels to the central authorities came during the second stage of the rebellion period, on 29 June 1831. It shows that, apart from the new uniforms, the Bosnians were apprehensive about new recruitment orders, new tax demands by the state, and changes in the rights of non-Muslims to the disadvantage of Muslim Bosnians. The list of their complaints was as follows: For the sake of reform and order (inkılab ve nizaˆm), we are forced to wear new uniforms which are contrary to our religion and doctrine (din ve mezheb). Our children are taken compulsorily in order to recruit them as soldiers. The lands of Islam are subjected to insults because of these practices. Hence, the non-believers (kaˆfirler) are emboldened through that kind of treatment. The non-Muslims (reaya) even started to usurp our

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land, and a lot of districts and castles were lost to us in favour of them. People who do not want to give their properties and children, and who do not want to use these uniforms are targeted and are attacked by soldiers with arms and weapons.258 As a part of their demand to return to the kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm, the rebels recapitulated their request for the revival of the janissary army and the relinquishment of new dress regulations in the second stage of the rebellion.259 In response to these demands, the central authorities warned that it was totally forbidden to say anything about the abolition of the corps wherever it took place and declared that, even if criticism was only implicit rather than openly voiced.260 Regarding the new uniforms and dress regulations, the authorities reminded the people that this only applied to the military class and there were no decrees for anyone else.261 Nevertheless, a reminder came that the Sultan was personally wearing these ‘pleasant new clothes’ and all ministers, officials high and low, as well as the ulema were generally doing the same. Since it was a duty for all Muslims to obey the Sultan, protesting about these regulations to the state was highly inappropriate.262 Those requests were called ‘impudent demands’ (bıˆ-edebaˆne istidaˆlar) and were said to exemplify the increasing rudeness of the Bosniaks.263 However, the chiefs of the rebellion continued to oppose the new dress regulations and paraded themselves in the streets wearing the old form of clothing; namely kavuks, janissary headgear and old official dresses.264 In previous chapters we saw how rebellions became a way for the Bosnians to find solutions through complaints and negotiations. It is understood that rebellion became a chronic symptom, continuing over a period of time before coming to an end, and then an event would spark it off again. It is important to note that this pattern continued for a long time and Bosnia’s history was marked by rebellions until the region’s occupation by Austria-Hungary. Even Mahmud II complained that ‘The ways of the Bosnians are not possible to handle. Their disobedience is not a new case, but very old. For a long period of time because of their opposition their valis have not been able to govern properly.’265

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In view of this, a crucial question is whether this rebellion was a planned movement or an instant reaction to new developments. Indications are that even if it demonstrated some spontaneity in the beginning, later on it turned into a planned movement, continued in spurts over a period of time. The rebels declared that they would not give up their janissarian claims and organized people for battle, ordering that all people above the age of seven should resort to arms.266 They argued that even if the state killed all of those older than seven, they would not give up. Hancı I˙brahim Alemdar’s sayings clearly depict their determination. He raised his forefinger, and said: ‘O! Efendis, here are religion and life,’ and then raising his next finger, ‘Here are the janissaries and bes¸e; I can give up the former but will not relinquish the janissary and bes¸e claims.’267 Meetings, both secret and public, were also an indicator of a planned programme. While the chiefs and rebel leaders ordered secret meetings to discuss the future of their movement, their decisions were publicly announced at more general meetings, especially ones held in mosques. The chiefs of the rebellion stockpiled a large amount of wheat268 and dry goods269 in the castle at Saray to be ready for an operation and transformed the Saray district into a military stronghold, a place that became a forerunner of others.270 Efforts were also made to change the minds of people in the districts who were about to offer their acceptance to the Porte or had already done so. The rebel chiefs sometimes succeeded in re-enlisting those who had sent their submission to the state.271 This meant that while the state was trying to win the submission of one district, it could lose another previously submissive one. The Saray-based organization of the movement provided an important opportunity for the rebels; thanks to its strategic situation in the heart of the region, Saray was a convenient centre from which to reach other districts. The resistance became particularly fierce during the second stage, a period when, a document claims, sedition would destroy much more than in the previous phase. It predicted that the trouble would spread to nearby eyalets as the whole population, being desperate, would sacrifice their comfort in order to reach their aims; everyone, children as well as

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adults, would abandon their sleep and their homes, and even give their lives for the cause.272 We have seen how living a frontier region created a defence psychology in the minds of the inhabitants of the region. The thought that they were ‘surrounded by enemies on all sides’273 placed heavy burdens on both the Ottoman central authorities and the province. A document stating that, being encircled in all directions by enemies of their religion, Bosnia should be carefully watched and its inhabitants should be protected more than other places, well reflects the special position Bosnia had for the state.274 Another document elaborates on the feelings of the region’s people: We do not absolutely differentiate ourselves from other people of the empire and are certainly not disobedient to the Sultan; were not, and never will be. But, we are surrounded by enemies on all four sides and in campaigns with the Serbians which have been continuing for more than ten or fifteen years, we have given more than ten thousand martyrs. We have faithfully and perseveringly spent our properties and bodies in this way. We were afflicted with destitution through the loss of all our properties until we re-conquered the Castle of Belgrade. If any enemy of our religion attacks from anywhere, there will be difficulties in defending and responding to the attack. For this reason, we want to maintain the janissary and other ancient corps and old regulations as in the ancient times, and request the annulment of all oppressions and bid‘ats. We therefore apologize for expressing our sincere feelings to the Sultan.275 Certainly, almost unceasing military conflict with the Serbians between 1804 and 1813 placed heavy burdens on places nearest to Serb territory, especially Bosnia as the nearest eyalet to Belgrade, where the majority of the population were Muslims. At first the Serbs carried out a successful revolution, but in 1813 the Ottoman armies took back Belgrade, from where they had been expelled in 1806,276 and reasserted their rule there. Having suffered a great deal from those conflicts, the Bosnians were reluctant to join in the new

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campaigns.277 It is understandable that, being surrounded by ‘enemies’, their main weapon was their military power base and they did not want to lose it because of the abolition of the janissaries and other cavalry corps. Presumably, there was always the possibility of further conflict over Belgrade and to combat this a reasonable level of military force must be maintained. Unfortunately, the abolition of the strongest military power could create a military vacuum in which the Bosnian lands could easily become the target for Serbian expansion. At this point, however, the rebels seem to have made another important demand: the appointment of a native vali, namely Hu¨seyin Kapudan. Almost every district of Bosnia applied to the central authority with this demand,278 arguing that since previous valis were not well acquainted with Bosnia, they had been unable to solve significant problems which could easily have been dealt with by a native vali. For that reason, they needed a local vali who would be ‘acquainted with the affairs of the eyalet, benevolent to the religion and the state, Devlet-i aliyye, a well wisher of the country and devout and skillful’.279 These demands were seen by many scholars as a way of seeking autonomy for Bosnia. Some argued that their programme strongly resembled that proposed by the Christians in other parts of the empire,280 while some evaluated it within the nationalist discourse arguing that Hu¨seyin Kapudan was the first national leader of Bosnia.281 Instead, I argue that like other rebellious figures of his time, namely Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas¸a, Mehmed Ali of Egypt or Mustafa Pas¸a of Albania,282 Hu¨seyin Kapudan was a product of the larger Ottoman world. As we will see below, the world view and demands of Ruscuklu Ali or the more powerful figure, Hu¨seyin Kapudan, were not outside the framework of the Ottoman Empire; in fact, their stress on kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm and reasoning in their reaction to change sometimes painted a vividly Ottomanist picture. They certainly placed themselves within the borders of the empire as their horizons were imperial and they were trying to find legitimacy inside it. They were problematic leaders, like other rebellious contemporaries such as Tepedelenli Ali and Pasvanog˘lu Osman, but they were not national

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leaders; the expectation of region’s people was not to leave the empire but, on the contrary, to be supported and strengthened within it. As Moacˇanin points out, there was no demand to cease paying taxes to the Porte, nor was there any call to introduce Bosnian as the official language. Their basic demand was the preservation of the status quo rather than forming an autonomous unit.283 In this respect, we see that, in terms of an ethnic national agenda, the basic elements were lacking. As Sadat points out, these late eighteenth and early nineteenth century developments should be analysed basically in terms of inter-Ottoman power negotiations, not the growth of nationalistic ideologies.284

Methods of subjugating the rebels As maintaining stability was the main function of the state, sedition and the collapse of order in Bosnia compelled it to intervene. The aim was not only to punish the guilty but also to strengthen its control over the territory. The state preferred to respond by executing or banishing leading rebels rather than trying to negotiate with them. Despite this, negotiation was not totally ignored; people who were attached to a leading person were sometimes grouped as ehl-i ırz (honest) and were treated leniently in the hope that they would abandon their master and stop fighting against the state.285 This was because, while the rebellion by the leading figures was completely unacceptable to the state, whose master goal was the centralization of administration both at the centre and in the provinces, the passive support of ordinary people was recognized as very fragile. The state believed that if the leading figures were punished severely their organization would be destroyed; so punishment was not carried out on a large scale and was not extended to the ordinary people who often supported rebellion without becoming very radical about it. Accordingly, I classify the rebel side into three groups: leading figures, active supporters of those leading figures, and passive supporters of the rebellion. While punishments were almost totally confined to the first class, the outcome for active supporters varied according to their position, their level of support or the extent of

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their wealth. For instance, if the rebel was a member of a household and became a supporter because of that affiliation, the central authorities sometimes tried to sever that affiliation rather than punish him and, if it was decided to punish him like his master, he was exiled to a different place.286 We see how almost the whole population was in favour of rebellion during both stages of the rebellion; the state preferred not to struggle directly with these widespread passive supporters by using force against them, but rather to gain their repentance through political pressure. One example of this strategy was that, after the suppression of the rebellion on the battleground, the Porte declared that whoever had any connection with the rebel side but afterwards repented would be pardoned. They added that everything was now over and all people of the eyalet must abstain from such acts and take great pains to obey the orders of the Sultan from now on.287 Thus, those who were plotting mischief were defined as ‘deserving punishment and chastisement’ (mu¨stahakk-ı te’dıˆb ve terbiye) because, according to the state, if the brigands were repulsed and removed, the cleansing of Bosnia from ‘the filthy bodies of rebels’ would be possible (Saraybosnayı ve anlara tebe‘ıyyet etmis¸ olan kazaları huˆne-i es¸kıyaˆnın cırkaˆb-ı vu¨cuˆd-ı nikbet-nu¨muˆdlarından tasfiye ve tathıˆr).288 However, an important question facing the state was whether it was better to send troops against the rebels or to leave the solution to the local authority, that is the vali, so as to prevent disaffection among the local people who were not directly supporting rebels but might suffer under the hands of troops from outside. The central authorities decided that it was possible to send troops, but based on previous experience, if the state did so the Bosniaks, ‘being brutal peasants who were made up of gangs of the foolish and mindless,’ would assist the rebels. Also, sending troops would cause shortages and famine and would lead to distress among a large part of the population.289 These statements demonstrate that the central authorities, who thought of the state’s orders as unquestionable, could not explain the reaction of people in any other way than as a collective mental disorder. These kinds of comments, repeated very frequently, reveal

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much about the viewpoint of the central authorities. First, it includes the idea that the state, being an absolute authority, is not only ascendant in terms of its physical power, but at the same time is always more rational than its subjects, and hence it is the ultimate competent authority. Indirectly there was an emphasis on the ontological superiority of the Sultan over his subjects, who, all being slaves of the Sultan, were expected to show an unquestioned devotion. Second, it indicates that the objectives and demands of the rebels simply seemed absurd to the state. Third, it was a reminder that the state should act in a tutelary capacity for these ‘foolish and mindless’ groups and would decide on behalf of and for them. Likewise, the punishment of rebels was, in fact, effective on two counts: while the state, on the one hand, was aiming to frighten the rebels and to show that there must be a response to this crime as drawing a line between the rebellious and the submissive; on the other hand, it intended to restore the absolute sovereignty of the state; to draw a further line between the ‘miserable’ bodies of the culprit and the supreme body of the state. As Foucault points out, one should see public punishments as an equation in which one side would display rituals of power, the other would be the rituals whereby the sovereign would portray his body in its magnificent glory in front of his subjects.290 As we shall see later, the decisions of the state were acted on and while, on the one hand, the exchange of the existing valis for new ones when confronting problems became a part of political practice, on the other hand punishment of leading figures continued until the central authorities were convinced that there would be no solution unless a military operation was carried out. At first, the state authorities tried two ways of restoring order. One was to punish leading figures in order to break the power of movement; the other was to increase the administrative power base by appointing more influential valis and other officials. Punishment was carried out in four ways according to the decision and judgment of ehl-i ırz (virtuous); some were executed, some were exiled, others were reprimanded and others fined. Those who fled because they were afraid of being punished were pursued by officials.291

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Sometimes two kinds of punishment could take place together. For example, while exile was sometimes practiced as an independent punishment, sometimes – according to the severity of the crime – it might be combined with other punishments. The situation of Kıyyeci Lazo, Kalaycı Todori and Etmekci Sepro was a good example of this. In June 1833 the Patriarch of Istanbul requested their liberation from the punishment of hard labour with exile to Istanbul, arguing that those really responsible were the bandits who forced them to participate in the rebellion. In answer to this, the authorities decided to release them.292 It was also decided to release other Bosniak prisoners sentenced to hard labour as a sign of the benevolence of the state, and it is important to note that this decision was given in 1833, a year after the suppression of the rebellion.293 However, requests did not always result in favourable answers. The plea by Davud Pas¸a, the vali of Bosnia, for amnesty for Yaldızcıog˘lu Hacı Mustafa, known as Hacı Muˆyuˆ, who was sentenced to hard labour as well as exile, was refused in the strongest terms. The state argued that if the vali had full details of how abominable he was, he would not request that he be freed from his sentence let alone that his exile be annulled.294 This rejection was on account of Hacı Muˆyuˆ’s close relationship with and strong support of Hu¨seyin Kapudan who, during his interregnum between June 1831 and June 1832, appointed him as mu¨tesellim of Yenipazar.295 Lists (defters), containing information about the names, professions, and misdemeanors of the rebels who were caught, were prepared for every district and sent to the central authorities. If the punishment was execution, a statement about this was added. It was recorded whether the guilty person was to be banished and whether he was to receive further punishment that would be carried out after he arrived in his place of exile.296 It is seen that fines could be very high and in June 1827 they amounted to the weighty sum of 185,648 gurus¸, of which the vali said that he took 168,000 gurus¸ for his revenues and for the country’s expenses.297 It is important to note that in April 1827, Vali Abdurrahim Pas¸a organized a divan to which he summoned all the notables to demand from them the names of those who were responsible for the sedition

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and asked their views about what kinds of punishments were to be caried out. In reply, the notables prepared three different defters including the names and the punishments incurred respectively; one concerned those to be executed, one those to be sent into exile, and the last one those to be chastised. The vali then told them: ‘I know you well from heretofore: Here you say such and such about someone like that and later you say that indeed he was not guilty and he had been punished for nothing.’ He then asked for their promissory notes concerning those defters; they promised to give these but it is understood from texts that they did not in fact do so.298 The vali’s efforts to win the notables to his side clearly reflect the power of the indigenous people as well as the isolated position of the vali if he was deprived of their support. At the end of the first stage of the rebellion period, the most important figures among the rebels from all districts were either executed or sent into exile. The punishments started in Saray, and Travnik followed after the kadı of Banaluka, Abdullah Hıfzı Efendi, was appointed as bas¸bug˘ (commander) to 1,000– 2,000 Serhad soldiers and was dispatched to capture the rebels. The leaders and chiefs of the rebels, namely the Ag˘a of janissaries, Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, Bakırcızade I˙brahim, Tahmiscizade Mustafa, Turnacı Feyzullah, Tahmiscizade Su¨leyman, Hacı Abdi and Pinyo I˙brahim were executed together and their severed heads were taken by the courier Yusuf Ag˘a to Istanbul, where they were exhibited like other severed heads of rebel janissaries so as to be a warning to others.299 Some people who supported them were put into the dungeon of Saray.300 The execution of these seven leading figures was carried out by order of Abdurrahim Pas¸a, the vali of Bosnia, who, in a report to the Sultan, said that ‘those Bosniaks have very thick skulls. If we had been satisfied to condemn them to exile and we had seen this as a sufficient punishment for those who dared to commit so much treachery, it would not have been a lesson to their associates; so in order to show what the state and religion are and how long-lasting is the Imperial wrath, we punished them with death.’ In response to this the Sultan said ‘Aferin (bravo)! Helal olsun. My bread and salt are yours! They were all bandit chiefs.’301 Obviously, these statements indicate that

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the Sultan was closely acquainted with the affairs of Bosnia and that he supported severe measures there. Another group of executions included 14 people from Saray, four from Travnik, six from Vis¸egrad and two from Foca. A total of 26 severed heads were sent to I˙stanbul by the master of the couriers (odabas¸ı) of Vali Abdurrahim Pas¸a. Meanwhile the rebels of Foca, who were under the protection of the mufti of Foca, were arrested and jailed in Foca, from where the mufti was exiled while the rest were transferred to the prison of Saray. According to one document, of other important figures among the rebels, Miralem Mehmed was exiled to Nis¸; S¸ahinpas¸azade Ahmed, who held a zeamet in Berce district, was banished to S¸ehirko¨yu¨; and the son of Bakırcızade I˙brahim, Turnacı Mustafa, was exiled to Vidin. Among the ulema class, the mufti of Travnik, Hamid, Mostarlı Ali and Abacı Abdullah were exiled as well, though Hamid died on the journey.302 One of the most important figures of the rebellion, the naib of Tas¸lıca, Vehbi, who was called ‘the most wicked member of the rebellion’ by Mahmud II,303 was seized in his district and brought to Saray in order to be exiled. In another decree, Mahmud II stated that exile was not an appropriate punishment for him and, instead, ordered him to be executed.304 Lists concerning execution and exile clearly show that rebels arrested from the same district were generally exiled together; for instance, seven rebels from Yayce district, including its mufti, Ahmed, and its kapudan, Mustafa, were exiled to Nis¸,305 while another group of five was banished to Konya. From Travnik five rebels were exiled to Nig˘bolu, while a further five were sent to another place. From Mostar 11 were banished to Yergo¨g˘u¨, while another 11 were exiled to Ruscuk. From Nevesin, four were exiled to Rahova. This defter includes information about 56 rebels, of whom eight were executed – four from Mostar and another four from Travnik; while 48 were exiled to the above-mentioned places.306 According to another defter 20 people were exiled to the castle of Ada-yı Kebir, while another 15 were banished to the castle of Fethu¨lislam. Ten people from Saraybosna who were exiled to Demirhisar were accompanied by a mu¨bas¸ir of the new corps, Ahmed

REBELS

191

Ag˘a, who had 45 cavalry in his suite.307 Another five were exiled to Ormanpazarı and a group of five people were charged to accompany them.308 From Tes¸ne district, six were exiled to S¸umnu while another six were exiled to Hezergrad.309 Pursuit of fugitives was taken seriously but, as they had dispersed all over the Balkans, it was difficult to track them down. Some fugitives were charged with catching others and dispatched to various Balkan regions to round up their former comrades. For example, 17 fugitives were sent to Nig˘bolu, Vidin, Silistre, Ruscuk, Nis¸ and Belgrade for this reason.310 Also, of the fugitives, 21 from Travnik and 12 from Travnik villages, two from Nevesin, seven from Saray, one from Doboy, two from Senice, two from Visoko and another two from Berce were exiled; unfortunately there is no information about their places of exile. Apart from these, ten from Saray, 15 from Travnik and six from its villages, two from C¸elebipazarı, one from Serebrenice, one from Visoko and another one from Foca, two from Doboy, and two from Yayce were executed and their severed heads sent to I˙stanbul.311 According to the document in question, the defter kethu¨dası Ahmed Bey, who was the son of the defterdar of Bosnia, Su¨leyman Bey, deserved the death penalty because of his actions, but since his father had been one of those executed it was considered more suitable to send him to exile for a long time.312 Leading figures of the rebellion among the kapudans could not escape banishment. The kapudan of Bihke, Mehmed, and the kapudan of Krupe, another Mehmed, were exiled to Sofia; the kapudan of Ihlevne, I˙brahim, was banished to Yenipazar and, as mentioned before, the kapudan of Yayce, Mustafa, was sent away to Nis¸. The preference of the Porte in the case of rebel kapudans was to have them executed; however, on that issue, the central authorities asked the opinion of Abdurrahim Pas¸a, the vali of Bosnia. He replied that they deserved the death penalty for their actions but their executions might cause new unrest because they were very influential in their regions. It would therefore be more expedient to send them into exile. Since Yenipazar was very near to Saray, the centre of rebellion, the central authorities ordered that I˙brahim Kapudan should be removed from Yenipazar and transferred to a

192

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

more distant place.313 It is understood that their exile was not to last long; thanks to the insistent requests of the region’s people for their amnesty, they were set free and returned to their homelands after a short period.314 This example, however, clearly shows how the internal dynamics of the region could impinge upon the judgements of the central authorities, even if such judgements were based on established laws. According to one document, a short time after the abolition of the janissary army, approximately 400 people were either executed, sent into exile, reprimanded or fined.315 However, the total number of those punished was much higher; after that date, namely 18 June 1827, punishments continued until at least 12 July 1828, a date on which 35 people were exiled,316 but documents reflect that punishments followed a falling trend through the end of 1827. In any event, compared with the punishments after the abolition of the janissaries in Istanbul, where the number of those executed was reported as about 6,000 and of those exiled as more than 20,000,317 the number of punishments in Bosnia was very low. This is striking when we consider the scale and duration of the Bosnian unrest. The reason for this was because the circumstances called for the ringleaders to be severely dealt with but without alarming passive supporters. The wording of a document well reflects the situation: ‘The Bosniaks having been ‘haˆkim-i manevıˆ’ (morally superior) for a long time, were not used to being considered as convicts and, in order not to be deprived of that haˆkim-i manevıˆ situation, most of them were struggling to maintain it.’318 We know that up until the abolition of the janissary army, Bosnia was the main province that helped the continuation of the devs¸irme system by supplying new soldiers for the army. Many Bosnians had attained high positions through the devs¸irme system and had become active in the affairs of the empire.319 As a general practice, after their retirement the janissaries would return to their homelands. Thus influential janissaries who had been born in Bosnia, such as Ahmed C¸elebi in the sixteenth century, or Dervis¸ Ag˘a in the seventeenth, spent the rest of their lives there, where they had also the opportunity to marry and have children. As Cornell pointed out,

REBELS

193

those janissaries in general had played a role in the Islamization process of the province as well. According to an Albanian traveller in the seventeenth century, one of the reasons for the quick acceptance of Islam in the region was the influence of the janissaries who, thanks to the devs¸irme system, could obtain for their relatives the chance to occupy high positions.320 More significant was the priority given to local people in obtaining zeamets and timars, which was legalized in 1516 by a kaˆnuˆnnaˆme of the Sultan. According to the kaˆnuˆnnaˆme ‘vacant zeamets and timars could be given to the people of the vilayet who had been deprived of their property, equal to those zeamets or timars, and not to people deprived of property from other sancaks.’321 This was directly related to the new Ottoman conquests on the European border and became more conspicuous when it was turned into a hereditary structure with the establishment of ocaklık timarıs, as mentioned previously. This special position opened the path towards the development of a Bosnian aristocracy, of which many leading figures were of Bosnian origin. Their reaction to the changes denoted the worries of a group of people who had become prominent and faced the prospect of losing their privileges. In the second stage of the rebellion, however, the seriousness of the situation compelled the state to take more radical measures and the preference shifted from executing only the leaders, as in the case of the first stage, to crushing the rebels on the battleground. Unfortunately, there is no information about how many people died during the two campaigns organized respectively by Grand Vizier Res¸id Mehmed Pas¸a, who was repulsed and withdrew, and Mahmud Hamdi Pas¸a, the vali of Bosnia, together with I˙stolceli Ali Pas¸a, the mutasarrıf of Hersek, who succeeded in suppressing the rebellion. We see that, although many people died in battle, very few were sentenced to exile or hard labour. There are only a few documents that give information about the captured rebels. From one document we learn that a group of 68 rebels were sentenced to hard labor at the Tersane-i Amire shipyard.322 Another document reveals that some other rebels were exiled to Salonika but before long they returned to Bosnia. It is understood that the mutasarrıf of Salonika turned a blind eye to their departure.

194 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

He was criticized by the vali of Bosnia, Hamdi Pas¸a, who suggested to the Porte that the mutasarrıf should be reprimanded as those rebels who returned to Bosnia had begun to create mischief again.323 According to another document dated 14 March 1833, 33 rebels of Bosniak or Albanian origin were exiled to Preveze. The Muhafız of Preveze, Yakub Pas¸a, asked for them to be set free because they were suffering from great poverty, but his request was denied.324 A fourth document recommends the liberation of captured Bosniak rebels, arguing that they had only participated in battle because of the coercive activities of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. This document, dated June 1833, almost a year after the suppression of the movement, reveals that the decision to set people free was not restricted to a group of people, but included all Bosniak rebels sentenced to hard labour, apart from Hacı Muˆyuˆ.325 After the suppression of the rebellion, orders were sent to all Bosnian districts and neighbouring ones declaring that rebels who manifested repentance for their former crimes and obeyed the authorities would be honourably pardoned and receive mercy. It appears that almost all the leading rebels who escaped to Austria with Hu¨seyin Kapudan returned to Bosnia and initiated proceedings asking to be pardoned. For some of them, such as Izvornikli Mahmud Pas¸a, the kapudan of Tuzla, Mahmud Bey, Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi, the mu¨tesellim of Saray, Emin Bey and Hasanpas¸azade Ru¨stem Bey, who had been very active during the rebellion, a decision was made to exile them elsewhere, as they could be a threat to the established order if they stayed in Bosnia.326 What is important is that, in exchange for their request for amnesty, the state preferred to keep the leading rebels outside the Bosnian boundaries rather than arresting them. This indicates that the state believed they would still pose a threat to stability in Bosnia, even if they were incarcerated there.

CHAPTER 5 LEADERSHIP

Who were the leaders of the rebellion? As mentioned in Chapter 4, there were two levels of leadership among the rebel forces. The first group included those who are generally described by the terms sergerde (‘head of bandits’),1 reıˆs and ru¨esaˆ with various usages such as ru¨esaˆ-yı es
kıyaˆ (‘chief of bandits’),2 ru¨esaˆ-yı fesaˆd (‘chief of sedition’),3 ru¨esaˆ-yı bugaˆt (‘chief of rebels’),4 reıˆsu¨’l-es
kıyaˆ (‘chief of bandits’),5 mu¨fsidbas
ı (‘head of the seditious’),6 and, though not so common,
ira s ˆ rebas
(‘head of the wicked’),7 pis
rev-i 8 es
kıyaˆ (‘pioneer of bandits’), and pis
vaˆ (‘leader’).9 The second kind of leader was labelled haˆin-i dıˆn u¨ devlet (‘traitor to the religion and the state’). This term was used to describe only two people, namely Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a and Hu¨seyin Kapudan, during the years of rebellion. It well reflects the special position of those leaders as well as showing the distinctive meaning of the phrase itself. The precise meaning of the term becomes clearer when we consider the other figures it was applied to. In analysing the documents, the term ‘haˆin-i dıˆn u¨ devlet’ is used to describe legendary figures such as Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a,10 Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a,11 and I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a Bus
hati,12 along with Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a13 and Hu¨seyin Kapudan.14 Labelling them not merely
akı s ˆ, ‘rebel,’ but traitor to the entire state and Dar’ul-I˙slam clearly shows how their position as malefactors was extrapolated to include not only the Ottoman territories but also

196

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

all the lands of Islam. This label makes it abundantly clear that these men were denounced as pestilential by the state. If these men can be said to have anything in common, it is their path of rising to power as provincial governors (except for Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a), as well as their mutinous character. This important characteristic impels me to give a little information about these men in order to deduce whether there are any other common features. Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a’s rebellion became a turning point in Ottoman history in that it represents the fact that when ayan established firm control over the community politically, as well as economically, it gave them the power to resist the central authority. Pasvanog˘lu had attained such control over the pas
alık of Belgrade and filled Vidin, the centre of his ayanlık, with dissatisfied people and turbulent janissary contingents who opposed Sultan Selim’s reforms. Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a’s rise to power well reflects the situation of the Belgrade pas
alık during the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first decade of the nineteenth century. Born in 1758 as a son of the powerful ayan O¨mer, the bayrakdar (standard bearer) of Vidin who was later accused of inciting rebellion and then executed, he followed the path of his father in organizing bands of brigands. His numerous associates and broad network led to the strengthening of his power as well as his ability to resist the central authorities.15 This is why on the one hand the state ordered his capture and execution, while on the other hand it accepted his and his associates’ petitions for pardon. He was not the only powerful ayan of the region but what distinguished him from others was, as Zens remarks, the strategic land that he held.16 As Vidin was a borderland, it was easy to penetrate into both Habsburg and Ottoman territory from there. Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a was well aware of conditions in the borderland, as well as popular needs. He reacted violently against the reforms of the central authority and devoted himself to the continuance of the old order, a policy that appealed to the masses. He switched backwards and forwards between legal and illegal activities so that, in the end, the central authorities called on Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a to bring him under control.17

LEADERSHIP

197

Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, together with many powerful ayan, succeeded in driving Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a away to his fortress at Vidin. However, the war with France forced Selim III to make peace again with Pasvanog˘lu, whose prestige increased with the failure of massive campaigns against him. He remained in the position of being poised alternately between legality and illegality until his death in 1807.18 Concerning my topic, what is most striking is the determination of Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, who, like Pasvanog˘lu, spent part of his life as a bandit and followed a similar career path by see-sawing between legality and illegality until 1799, when he became the governor of Rumelia, the highest Balkan post. The continuous efforts of Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a to enlarge his lands and increase his revenues, his practice of building up a broad network of clients who were obliged to him for jobs and other favours – in combination with the establishment of close relations with the local Christian notables, his offers of protection to remote villages in exchange for their support, and his use of force in order to show his supremacy – were all the methods he used for the enlargement of his dominions.19 At the peak of his power, in 1812, Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a was the de facto governor of a huge area, with a population of 1.5 million, including great portions of present-day Greece and Albania.20 Although he was used to help eliminate Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, he himself later came under fire because he had amassed so much power that he established himself as an independent authority at Janina and began conducting independent relations with foreign powers. When he was dismissed from his post, he began to support Greek independence, and it was because of this that he was finally captured and executed in 1822.21 It is astonishing to see that in the same way that Pasvanog˘lu’s revolt against the central authority prepared the groundwork for the Serbian uprising, so Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a’s rebellion paved the way for the Greek revolution of 1820.22 Meanwhile another important figure was taking the stage – Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a, who in 1824 was appointed to deal with the Greek uprising. It is interesting that, like Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, this Albanian chieftain was promoted to a high position in the Ottoman service.23 As Rood points out, he, more than anyone, would

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

have understood the internal as well as international significance of Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a’s achievements and his sad end.24 Ironically, due to the military weakness of the empire, the Sultan needed his help in order to suppress the rebellion. Mehmed Ali’s career path cannot be addressed in this short space but what is most interesting is that, like other figures mentioned above, he was a product of the world around him, not of the palace school. He shares a similar career path with other famous names previously mentioned, as his family background, education and social network were similar and well enough placed with regard to trade, shipping and military life. We saw in previous chapters that a local notable, namely I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Rıdvanbegovic´, was used to crush the Hu¨seyin Kapudan rebellion. It is clear that the support of I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a became the critical turning point for the suppression of that rebellion, since it was only after he gave his support that revenge was taken for the failure of the Grand Vizier Res
id Mehmed Pas
a’s massive campaign against Hu¨seyin Kapudan, when the second march against the rebels ended in success. In that sense, the Porte again followed its previous method in suppressing rebellion in the Balkan lands; that is to say, by using one local notable to eliminate another. Thus it is not surprising that, after the suppression of the rebellion, Hersek was separated from Bosnia as a self-governing mutasarrıflık and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a was granted the title of mutasarrıf25 in return for his support. Through this appointment, which was at the same time the sign of a new vicious circle, a local notable once again obtained administrative power over his homeland. However, as time went on, sympathy towards I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a started to dwindle when, following previous examples, he consolidated and expanded his domain over the territory, contrary to the state policy of centralization and reform. Having carried out detailed research on I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, Kapicˇic´ believes that Ali Pas
a administered the Hersek region to strengthen his own power and increase his wealth. This soured his relations with the Porte. Kapicˇic´ mentions that, after he came to power in Hersek, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a amassed huge wealth, some of which was earned through unethical methods. His great wealth helped his businesses in the capital as he

LEADERSHIP

199

was paying 1,000,000 piasters in taxes. However, in the course of time the antagonism of other notables, as well as the uneasiness of the central authorities in the face of his increasing wealth and power, brought matters to a head and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a was no longer able to maintain close links with the Porte. In order to prevent any local reaction against his policies, he did not hesitate to eliminate his most powerful rivals, the two mu¨tesellims, namely I˙smail Ag˘a Cˇengic´ and Hasan Bey Resulbegovic´. In 1841 he was invited to Istanbul, probably to talk about his growing divergence from the central authority as well as to be informed of state anxiety about his management of the region.26 According to Austrian documents, Ali Pas
a answered that invitation thus: ‘Istanbul may see my head, but will never see it together with my living body.’27 It is possible that these sayings are only rumours or fables, but their creation and propagation is enough to indicate that there were serious differences between I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a and the central authorities. Although complaints were made by the local inhabitants about Ali Pas
a’s illegal practices as early as March 1845,28 as well as by the Austrian side because of intrusions on the Hersek frontiers, for example in February 1847,29 the Porte waited for a more convenient time to eliminate him. However, the rebellion which had been going on in Hersek since the 1850s was put down during the governorship ¨ mer Lu¨tfi Pas
a,30 who reported in November 1850 that I˙stolc
eli of O Ali Pas
a had been responsible for the rebellion.31 It is interesting that I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a shared a very similar end with Hu¨seyin Kapudan: he was brought to Istanbul along with his family in December 1850,32 and a few months later in April 1851 it was reported that he had been killed accidentally by a bullet fired by a guard.33 After the suppression of I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, the position of mutasarrıflık of Hersek was discontinued and Hersek was annexed to Bosnia.34 Now we can move to another provincial leader, I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a Bus
hati, who was a member of the Bus
hati family in I˙
skodra and, like other figures who alternated between cooperating with and defying the centre, he chose a similar path. I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a was very prominent on account of his strong relations with and direct help to Hu¨seyin Kapudan. The ancestors of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a,

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the Bus
hatlıs, came to power in the region of I˙
skodra in 1756 and, apart from a few short breaks, ruled the region until 1831. During the leadership of the most famous member of the family, Kara Mahmud Pas
a (who ruled between 1775 and 1796), the Porte twice attempted to remove him, but he successfully repulsed their efforts and kept his vizierate.35 After Kara Mahmud Pas
a perished in a battle during his last campaign against the Montenegrin tribes, his brother I˙brahim Pas
a was appointed to his post. In contrast to his brother, I˙brahim Pas
a administered the region in cooperation with the Porte until his death in 1810. After a power struggle, I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a obtained the post in 1811 and succeeded in imposing his control over a large area and cooperating with the mountain tribes. Although he, too, displayed ebbs and flows in his attitudes, the central authorities were more concerned about Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, and preferred to use I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a against Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a rather than move against him.36 However, after the destruction of Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a the cooperation between the central authorities and I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a again came to an end. As mentioned before, because he directly helped Hu¨seyin Kapudan, the Grand Vizier’s forces suppressed I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a in November 1831, after which he was sent to Istanbul by sea together with his family.37

The leader of the first stage of the rebellion: Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a Ali Ag˘a, whose name indicates that he was from Ruscuk (Ruse), originally became an eminent figure among the janissaries in Ruscuk, Vidin and I˙stanbul and was involved in seditious acts there.38 Unfortunately little is known about the process by which he rose to become the Ag˘a of the janissaries of Bosnia, the highest position among the janissaries in the eyalet. However, by tracing backwards, it is possible to deduce some interesting facts about this. Ruscuk was a sancak of the Silistre eyalet until 1864, when Silistre, Vidin and Nis
conjoined under the name of Tuna Vilayeti (Vilayet of Danube) of which Ruscuk then became its eastern part.39 The vilayet was located on the shore of the Danube river.40 When in May 1807 the

LEADERSHIP

201

janissaries, ulema and students organized a rebellion against Selim III and forced him to relinquish power, his adherents gathered around Alemdar Mustafa Pas
a, who was an important notable of Ruscuk supported by a large group known as the Ruscuk Friends.41 Alemdar Mustafa Pas
a was not the only prominent figure to come from Ruscuk, however. The famous Tirsinikli I˙smail Ag˘a from Ruscuk had gained the reputation of being the most cunning and courageous ayan in Rumelia.42 Vidin, in contrast, was well known because of Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a’s struggle, which is described briefly above. It is interesting to note that, like those of Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a and Hu¨seyin Kapudan, the conservative views of Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a brought him the support of many janissaries, the ulema, and important officials, not only in his own region but also in Istanbul.43 This does not mean that Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a had a formal relationship with these people as being either for or against him. Rather, it was the case that Ruscuk – like Vidin and other relatively small cities in the Balkans including I˙
skodra under Mahmud Pas
a Bus
hati or Janina under Ali Pas
a – became a nexus for proliferating networks of ayan which possibly eased the emergence of the socalled ‘Ali Ag˘a’ and others like him. In that sense, Ruscuk and Vidin were not unique places where the ayan and their associates found a suitable environment for establishing their power and preserving it; in fact, especially in the provinces, it was a common characteristic of the eighteenth century and devolved to become a characteristic of the beginning of the nineteenth, the period called by scholars ‘the age of the ayan’.44 It is not wrong to say that the dynamics in the provinces during the first quarter of the nineteenth century were closer to the past century than the dynamics of the areas closer to the centre during the same period since, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, we see that the decentralization process had created a more chaotic atmosphere in peripheral regions than in central ones. This chaotic atmosphere was not restricted only to the Balkan lands; for example, Bruce Masters says of Aleppo that the city was extremely unsettled during this period because of the tribal groups which were menacing the caravan trade. The political struggles

202 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

between the janissaries and the es
raf made it impossible for the central government to control the region directly. Although Mahmud II struggled to crush the power of local ayan and attempted to destroy the power of janissaries in all the provinces, the janissaries of Aleppo strongly resisted the imperial writs. Hence, to break the power of the janissaries in Aleppo, Mahmud II appointed C¸apanog˘lu Celaleddin Pas
a, who came from an important Anatolian ayan family, as governor of Aleppo in 1813. Celaleddin Pas
a executed the leading janissaries but even this extreme measure was successful only for a short time. In 1819, during the administration of Hurs
id Pas
a, the city fell into the hands of the rebels. Mahmud II did not condone this rebellion, so he sent troops to suppress the rebels. Masters says that, throughout the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Mahmud II was aware of the problems which were threatening his power in northern Syria. However, when another important threat to the authority of the Sultan arose from Greece, the concern of the central government turned to that more dangerous threat, thus leaving Aleppo to decline as well.45 According to the documents, the main duty of Ruscuklu Ali was to collect taxes in Bosnia, to take over the administration, and thus become its governor.46 The claim was, however, that he was inciting people to rebel, using the argument that the janissary army would remain until the time of the Mahdi, who would appear during the period of the last judgment as a sign of it,47 and that if Ali Ag˘a was not stopped, the inhabitants of Saray would make him their leader in their struggle for freedom.48 Ali Ag˘a’s acts and writings support these claims. In a letter to the serdar of I˙stolc
e, Serdar Ag˘a, Ali Ag˘a said that, since the order of the central authority was against the kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm, the people of Saray were in favour of keeping the old order. This period of the year was the routine time for sending serdarlık letters to the districts that had the post of serdarlık, so he sent a letter to the serdar of I˙stolc
e saying he hoped that he would keep his post and would strive to maintain and defend his district.49 In another letter sent to the defterdar of Bosnia, Ali Ag˘a demanded 320 gurus
from him as a part of his salary, arguing that as the order for the abolition of the janissaries sent to Bosnia by the Porte did not

LEADERSHIP

203

include his name, his duty was to continue in his post. He added that the people of Bosnia, both young and old, did not want him to leave. Presenting a copy of Ali Ag˘a’s letter to the central authorities, the defterdar asked despairingly how things would end up. He said things would probably end badly since all the people of the country had come together, asked forgiveness of each other and pledged that ‘we are going to get this done, even though we may die in the process’. The defterdar added that, due to these pressures, the old system was to continue as before.50 Though the movement of Ali Ag˘a was based in Saray, it was not restricted to the Saray region but spread to other areas. This spread was achieved mainly by sending a group of several hundred mounted rebels out to the districts together with their leaders, Ali Ag˘a and other rebel chiefs. For example, Ali Ag˘a went with 700 rebels to C¸elebipazarı and then Vis
egrad, where the order of the Porte had already been put into practice, but was then postponed in the aftermath of the rebellion. A group of 400 rebels took up arms and joined Ali Ag˘a’s men.51 It is understood that this kind of action became a way of finding new supporters, as the huge mass of armed rebels coaxed those who were possibly undecided and perplexed by the goings-on. One of the claims made about Ali Ag˘a was that he was getting help from the Venetians, who were sending missionaries and letters to organize a movement against the central authority.52 It is probable that these Venetians were merchants who the Bosnians were trading with. According to rumour, Ali Ag˘a declared: The Venetians are my allies. News came to me from them that the abolition has not been accepted in many places in Anatolia and Rumelia. Even in Edirne, where people previously conceded to the abolition, they then reneged and returned to the old order. Give me soldiers and I will go there and put things in order.53 Unfortunately there are no other sources to shed light on the relations of Ali Ag˘a with the Venetians; however, it is known that there was a great deal of cross-border travel and commerce between Bosnia and

204 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

the Dalmatian coasts. This trade moved in both directions and it was one of the tasks of the central authority to ensure the safety of both foreign traders in Ottoman lands and Ottoman traders in Venetian lands.54 According to Ali Ag˘a, preventing the abolition of the janissaries in Bosnia was a matter of life or death for him and he was risking his life in opposing this move.55 Ali Ag˘a was put to death on the orders of Abdurrahim Pas
a, the new vali of Bosnia, who did not hesitate to use severe measures to suppress the rebels. As mentioned previously, Ali Ag˘a’s severed head was sent to Istanbul, along with the heads of six other rebel chiefs executed with him.56

The leader of the second stage of the rebellion: Hu¨seyin Kapudan Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s rise to power is the key to understanding fully the dynamics of Bosnia in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century. Hu¨seyin Kapudan was probably born in 1802 in Gradacac, a small and picturesque city in the western part of the Bosavine region. In fact, Gradacac or Grad was well known from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards when the ancestors of Hu¨seyin Kapudan became the holders of its kapudanlık.57 The first famous kapudan of the family was Ko¨se Ahmed, who took up this post at the beginning of the eighteenth century. After Ko¨se Ahmed, Mehmed I, Mehmed II, Osman, Murad and Hu¨seyin from that family held the kapudanlık position, where they accumulated wealth and consolidated and expanded their territories from Gradacac to Gradac
anic
e, Modrica, S
amac and Brcko. The father of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Osman, had four sons, namely Murad, Hu¨seyin, Osman Pas
a and Hacı Bekirbey. After the vali of Bosnia, Ali Celaleddin Pas
a, killed Murad Kapudan in 1821, Hu¨seyin Kapudan took the position and became the kapudan of Gradacac at an early age.58 Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s education was shaped by his mother, a very devout Georgian Muslim who had him educated by ulema in the classic religious way. Kapicˇic´ narrates a story to show his mother’s influence on the decisions of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. As mentioned above,

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on 31 August 1828 the previous muhafız of I˙nebahtı, Ali Namık Pas
a, was appointed as the vali of Bosnia.59 When Ali Namık Pas
a went to Yenipazar, he was met by all the local notables, apart from Hu¨seyin Kapudan. On his mother’s advice, Hu¨seyin Kapudan deliberately delayed his welcome. Meanwhile, his mother prepared a coffer filled with jewels and sent it to the new vizier, in the name of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. Although Hu¨seyin Kapudan went to the meeting later than the other notables, he was welcomed with great ostentation by the vizier, a greeting which not only brought him a greater reputation but also increased his power in the eyes of local inhabitants.60 Unfortunately, it is not possible to check the authenticity of the story, but the fact that it spread orally as a folktale in the region speaks volumes about his mother’s influence on Hu¨seyin Kapudan, as well as showing what sort of reputation he had. Kapicˇic´ adds that as the final act of this welcoming ceremony, all the notables were offered coffee and tobacco pipes. When they started to smoke their pipes, Hu¨seyin Kapudan secretly told one of his followers, S
erifzade Fazıl Efendi, to break I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a’s pipe as if by accident. When S
erifzade pressed the pipe and broke it, Ali Pas
a got very angry and told S
erifzade that he had not broken the pipe, but had had somebody break it for him. I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a added: ‘I swear that the pieces of this pipe will not unite anymore.’61 According to Kapicˇic´ this story was significant because, by this metaphorical use of ‘pieces’, Ali Pas
a was referring to Bosnia and Hersek where the antagonism between two parties was increasing. The main reason behind this antagonism was the more powerful political and economic situation of Bosnia. According to Kapicˇic´, when the reforms began to be applied in the eyalet, the Bosnian part would lose much more than the Hersek part, since Bosnia was bigger and more powerful.62 There was an indirect suggestion that the more powerful situation of the Bosnian part was mainly related to its more prosperous position and the reform programme of the Porte would impose heavy burdens on the local inhabitants. We can take this comment a step further and add that the Bosnian part of the eyalet showed more resistance to the centralized policies of the state since, being the more prosperous, more developed part, its inhabitants,

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especially its powerful and wealthy ayan, may have felt that they had more to lose. It is understood that, as he grew up in such tumultuous circumstances, Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s youth was spent listening to stories about Karadjordje,63 the Serbian leader who succeeded in obtaining the central leadership in the first Serbian uprising of 1804 which was, at first, a spontaneous response of the Serbians to janissary atrocities.64 Hu¨seyin Kapudan was married young and his son, Mehmed, was born in 1822 when Hu¨seyin was 20 years old. He held the kapudanlık for 11 years between 1821 and 1832, during which he developed strong relationships with not only the Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia but also the non-Muslims, especially the Catholics, and was able to build a huge monastery housing 1,500 persons in Tolisa without permission from the Sultan. Hence, the first Catholic primary school was opened in Tolisa in 1823 through the agency of the priest Ilija Starcˇevic´, who had a close relationship with Hu¨seyin Kapudan. It is likely that the growing grievances between the Muslim Bosnians and the Serbians after the leadership of Karadjordje caused the establishment of closer relationships between the Muslim Bosnians and the Catholics of the region. Moreover, Hu¨seyniye, one of the biggest and prettiest mosques of Bosnia, and a clock tower near the mosque were built on Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s initiative in 1826, and a huge vakif was attached to the mosque. His father, Osman, had also restored a historical mosque in Modrica. In the village known as C¸ardak, Hu¨seyin Kapudan also had a large fosse dug, about 100 meters wide and a few meters deep, and constructed an artificial island where he built a mansion and a bower. He had a farmstead in this village where he used to go hunting. According to local documents, he passed the happiest days of his life on this island but he set fire to it after the suppression of the rebellion, before he escaped to Austria in 1832.65

Claims on the wealth of Hu¨seyin Kapudan It is understood that, like the other leading figures of the era mentioned above, Hu¨seyin Kapudan thrived and become increas-

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ingly prosperous as time went on. According to Saffetbeg Basˇagic´, Hu¨seyin Kapudan had gained his wealth mainly by counterfeiting money. He claims that an Austrian escaped from his homeland and took refuge with Hu¨seyin Kapudan. He had a machine for making counterfeit coins with him. While the Austrian minted the coins, Hu¨seyin Kapudan put the money into circulation and exchanged it for gold. After this illegal activity had brought Hu¨seyin Kapudan great riches, he killed the Austrian.66 Jelenic´ supports these claims by Basˇagic´ and adds that a letter sent by Starcˇevic´, a priest very close to Hu¨seyin Kapudan, to King Ferdinand of the Habsburg Empire seven years after Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s death in 1840 upholds the claims. According to the letter, when everybody heard of the counterfeiting machine, an Austrian who had information about the forgeries and a knez who hid the machine in his house accused Starcˇevic´ of revealing the secret. During their quarrel, Starcˇevic´ killed them and was arrested for murder. He was brought to Saray and put in prison in order to await his execution. Later, on the initiative of Knez Reviczki, he was reprieved from execution and released 18 days later.67 Kresˇevljakovic´ counters these arguments, claiming that ‘the story was created long after the death of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. The oldest people who told the story of Hu¨seyin Kapudan orally did not mention anything about the counterfeiting machine, and it was possible that Starcˇevic´ fabricated those stories.’68 Unfortunately it is impossible to check these claims, but even if we accept that the stories were fabricated, they give an indication of the fabulous wealth that Hu¨seyin Kapudan was said to have accumulated. On 26 September 1831, Kapıcıbas
ı Hu¨seyin Ag˘a, who had been sent to Bosnia with a special mission to explain the orders of the Porte, reported that after Hu¨seyin Kapudan claimed his valilik in Bosnia he spent a lot of money – several times more than previous valis of Bosnia – on the affairs of the eyalet, which had drawn the attention of Hu¨seyin Ag˘a. When he interrogated an ehl-i vukuˆf, a local expert, on this, he said: ‘our vizier is not afraid of expenses, since he has prosperous partners.’ When Hu¨seyin Ag˘a asked who they

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were, this person replied that they were Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a and Milosˇ, and added that he had certain information that these two people were supporting Hu¨seyin Kapudan with money. It seemed to him that there might be others, but he had no names apart from the two men already mentioned. Hu¨seyin Ag˘a added that these claims seemed reliable to him, since it was not possible to meet expenses from the revenues of a district alone.69 There were other documents testifying to the financial support of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a to Bosnian and Albanian rebels. For example, in a letter sent on 25 May 1831 by I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a to Silahdar I˙lyas Bey and other notables of the Tosks, I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a said that in order to proceed further he was waiting for the promised financial support of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a as well as the assistance of Bosnian soldiers with him. He added that the honour of the Albanians could be maintained only by alliance with those Albanian chieftains.70 It is understood from two other documents dated August 1831, that I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a sent his uncle, Ohrili Celaleddin Bey, and his treasury scribe, Mustafa Bey, to Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a in order to get the promised money. After Celaleddin Bey and Mustafa Bey had collected the money, they sailed to Fitor harbour on a Greek ship and delivered the money to the Bosnian and Albanian rebels.71 It is understood that Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a’s connection with Albanian notables was not restricted to I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a. According to another document dated 19 May 1833, Ragıb, the son of Silahdar I˙lyas, went to Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a and after taking some akc
es from him, then returned to Salonika where he started to recruit soldiers for the rebellion from among the Albanians.72 According to the central authorities, the aim of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a in giving this financial support was to divert the state troops in Bosnia and the Gheg region, so he was seducing the Albanians in order to prevent them taking action against him. The Porte also confirmed that Mehmed Ali was buying off the Albanian rebels.73 The second claim: Milosˇ’s support of the Bosnian and Albanian rebels, is a more complicated issue that necessitates deeper analysis. It is understood that during this period a complex communication

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network was created between Milosˇ and I˙
skodralı Ali Pas
a, between Milosˇ and Hu¨seyin Kapudan, and between Milosˇ and the Porte. As mentioned earlier, the report of the Grand Vizier for 16 June 1831 states that Milosˇ had sent 500 kese akc
es to I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a for the support of his movement. The money was later confiscated by the Grand Vizier, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, who allocated it to be spent on the expenses of the army in the region and reported on the relationship between Milosˇ and I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a and the Porte.74 It is interesting to see that during the same period Milosˇ was in full communication with the Porte, with which he shared all his information on Bosnian and Albanian issues.75 It is probable that after that relationship between Milosˇ and I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a became public, the Porte refused Milosˇ’s offers to help the Porte with money and soldiers.76 There is an important claim by Mihailo Gavrilovic´, who prepared a detailed biography of Milosˇ, that – after Hu¨seyin Kapudan repelled the first attack of Res
id Mehmed Pas
a on Kosova plain in September 1831 – Milosˇ sent Hu¨seyin Kapudan a present of 50,000 gurus
and promised to send him further help. According to Gavrilovic´, Milosˇ later changed his mind and in November 1831 wrote a letter to Fedayizade Ali Pas
a, a strong supporter of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, saying that he had given the 50,000 gurus
to Hu¨seyin Kapudan as taxes for Jadra and Radjevine, since Hu¨seyin Kapudan was the vizier of Bosnia. Gavrilovic´ argues that Milosˇ had known that the Grand Vizier recognized Hu¨seyin Kapudan as the vizier of Bosnia,77 and used this information to disguise his support in the form of taxes. Hu¨seyin Kapudan insisted that the money was not given as taxes but as a present and added that Milosˇ had promised to send more. He also claimed that Milosˇ aimed to take over the Jadra and Radjevine districts by claiming that he even paid their taxes.78 In January 1832, Milosˇ replied to Hu¨seyin Kapudan saying that he had information that Res
id Mehmed Pas
a had named him as the vali of Bosnia, and because of this, he had sent the taxes of these districts to him. He added, ‘It will never be possible not only for you, but also for all Bosnians to change the situation of those districts that were bounded by God with rivers and mountains. These districts have been under

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the control of Serbia since ancient times and the Sultan is also of the opinion that they should be rejoined to Serbia.’79 Unfortunately, there are no documents that substantiate such a relationship between Hu¨seyin Kapudan and Milosˇ. On the contrary, the documents mentioned in the previous chapters indicate that Hu¨seyin Kapudan was very uncomfortable because of Milosˇ’s claims to some Bosnian lands.

Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s escape to Austria As described in Chapter 3, during the battle on 4 June 1832 the rebels were repulsed by Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a’s and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a’s troops. That night Hu¨seyin Kapudan escaped from Saray and first went to Gradacac, where he took some important portable goods from his home. However, since Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a had sent Albanian soldiers after him, he could not stay very long in Gradacac. With the help of the priest Ilija Starcˇevic´, he communicated with Austria and appealed for refuge. The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the group of rebels permission to take refuge in Austria in exchange for their promise that they would not join in any future rebellion.80 On 15 June 1832, Hu¨seyin Kapudan, together with a group of about 140 people, crossed the Sava River and went to S
aˆmaˆc. The group’s next stop was at Zˇupanj in Austria, where they were met by Austrian officials who interrogated them and sent them on to Osijek. The group included Hu¨seyin Kapudan, his wife and his son, 50 rebels who were very close to Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 22 women, 26 children, and 40 servants.81 Later, under the control of the Commander of Varadin, the group was sent to Brut, where Hu¨seyin Kapudan was given residence. Towards the end of June 1832 a group of about 80 of these rebels returned to Bosnia, expecting that Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a would pardon them.82 As mentioned before, although they presented their submission, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a chose to punish them.83 It is seen that, although the rebellion was suppressed, the central authorities continued to pursue the fugitive group. Mahmud II even personally ordered Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a to capture Hu¨seyin

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Kapudan as soon as possible, because he believed that the Bosnian issue would only be resolved once Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his supporters had been caught.84 It is understood that at first the Porte officials did not know where the fugitives had escaped to; the only information about Hu¨seyin Kapudan was that, before he escaped, he got someone to fetch some belongings which he used or had kept in his valilik in Travnik.85 Later, on 21 June 1832, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a and Milosˇ reported to the Porte that there were rumours that the group had escaped into Austrian lands. The official Hacı Hasan Efendi, who was in Austria at the time, reported that correspondence was taking place between Hu¨seyin Kapudan and the Governor of Dalmatia. Letters were then sent to the Governor of Dalmatia demanding that the fugitives should not be allowed into Austria, and if they had already fled there they should be repatriated to the Ottoman Empire. Again it was heavily stressed that, if these people were not caught, they would continue to conspire in Bosnia. The central authorities also said that Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his advocates had embezzled money from the cizye and miri revenues and confiscated the belongings of some people loyal to the state, and they were anxious to recover this plunder.86 Mahmud II also ordered the authorities in Istanbul to remind the Austrian officials that, since the Austrian side occasionally suffered from the banditry of the Bosnian rebels, creating order in the region would be very beneficial to the Austrians as well. In his opinion, unless the rebels were handed over, not only the Ottomans but also Austrians would suffer. He ordered the Porte to explain these problems in detail to the envoy of the Habsburg Empire in Istanbul.87 After these warnings by the Sultan, the envoy of the Habsburg Empire was informed of the risks posed by the refugees and letters relating to the issue were also sent to Prince Metternich, via the charge d’affaires in Vienna.88 A long and detailed correspondence then took place between the Ottoman and Austrian sides. Prince Metternich wrote that the ‘bandits’ had taken refuge in Austria well before the arrival of the letters from Istanbul informing of their offenses. According to him, after great efforts on the part of the Austrians, these refugees

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

presented their apologies and asked to be pardoned.89 In a letter sent to the emperor of Austria by the refugees, after thanking him for giving them refuge, the rebels said that they were well aware that, because of the Bosnian rebellion, in the eyes of the Sultan they were guilty. They had taken refuge to avoid being branded as rebels. However, they needed to be forgiven by the Sultan and to avoid being deprived of their possessions. They added that both the vali of Bosnia and the Serbian Knez had repeatedly given promises that, if they returned, they would not be punished. But they wanted the emperor to mediate with the Sultan to request their pardon and permission to regain their possessions.90 Through the agency of the Habsburg emperor, letters of amnesty were prepared and sent to Istanbul via the muhafız of Belgrade.91 Metternich, via the envoy of Austria, also asked the central authorities to approve the pardon for those refugees since they had pledged their obedience.92 In the end, the Porte gave guarantees to the Austrian side via the envoy in Istanbul that if the fugitives were handed over, they would be pardoned and their possessions restored to them.93 The decrees were prepared and sent to Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a, Fedayizade Ali Pas
a and Mehmed Kapudan, calling them to Istanbul and guaranteeing them that if they agreed to come their possessions would not be taken from them.94 On the initiative of the Austrian side, a decree of assurance was also sent to Hu¨seyin Kapudan from Istanbul. It ordered that the group would first go to Belgrade where they would be asked which city in Anatolia they would prefer to be exiled to. Later, depending on their decisions, the fugitives would be sent to their places of exile.95 Belgradıˆ Ras
id attributes Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s agreement to return to the Ottoman lands to his devout character, saying that as a very religious person he did not want to live in non-Muslim lands.96 It is understood that before going to Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his associates were first brought to Zemun where an official of the muhafız of Belgrade talked to Hu¨seyin Kapudan about their choice of exile. Hu¨seyin Kapudan complained that the Anatolian districts were very far away and requested permission to stay in Belgrade. Moreover, he added that his wife was in Osijek in Austria and asked that she be

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allowed to return to Bosnia. The state replied that it could not accept such demands, and it would be more proper for him to accept what the state ordered.97 Moreover, when the Governor of Zemun asked the muhafız of Belgrade to see that Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s demands were met, he received the same answer. It was also said that, since Hu¨seyin Kapudan had been pardoned, there was no need for any doubts, and in appreciation of this, Hu¨seyin Kapudan should obey whatever the Porte decided for him. More importantly, there was a reminder that, when any rebellion of such kind broke out in Austrian lands and ended with a battle, it was the general practice for the persons responsible to be exiled to distant places (kaˆide-i mu¨lkiye).98 After three days of discussion, the group accepted the demands of the Porte. A day later, Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Fedayizade Ali Pas
a, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa and Mehmed Kapudan of Krupe went to Belgrade together with their 69 supporters. Here again, Hu¨seyin Kapudan requested permission from its muhafız to stay in Belgrade.99 His request was reported to the central authorities by the muhafız of Belgrade, together with Hu¨seyin Pas
a’s possible reasons for those requests: ‘Belgrade has borders with Austria and by staying in Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Kapudan may continue to correspond with the Austrian side. Moreover, in any possibility of bad treatment, he may again easily escape to Austria, by crossing over the Sava River.’ Thus, according to Hu¨seyin Pas
a, it would be very unwise to allow Hu¨seyin Kapudan to stay in Belgrade, since the region was very close not only to Bosnia, but also to Austrian and Serbian lands.100 We see that the state took notice of these objections and, in spite of protests by Hu¨seyin Kapudan, he was summoned to Istanbul.101 It is understood that the group went to Belgrade at the beginning of October and stayed there more than two months. During their stay, Hu¨seyin Kapudan became very ill and they had to postpone the journey to Istanbul until he recovered. He was treated by Milosˇ’s physician, Dr Bartol Kunibert, who visited him frequently during his stay in Belgrade.102 When Hu¨seyin Kapudan recovered, in spite of the winter conditions and poor state of the the roads, the central authorities ordered four of them, namely Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Fedayizade Ali Pas
a,

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Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa and Mehmed Kapudan of Krupe, to travel to Istanbul immediately. Before their journey began, the muhafız of Belgrade handed over 17,850 gurus
to Hu¨seyin Kapudan, the money that had been ceded to the muhafız by the Commander of Zemun as belonging to Hu¨seyin Kapudan.103 On 26 December 1832, the group departed from Belgrade, and the muhafız of Belgrade reported to the Porte that, because of bad weather conditions, their arrival in Istanbul could be delayed as long as the beginning of February.104 It is interesting to see that Mahmud II personally ordered that Hu¨seyin Kapudan and the other three men should be closely escorted to prevent them fleeing. He also ordered that the muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, and the muhafız of Vidin, I˙zzet Pas
a, should be told how important it was not to allow the men to flee and to do all they could to prevent this happening.105 It was also decided that after the group reached Istanbul they would live in the residence of Mu¨teveffa Ahmet Efendi, where I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a had stayed the previous year.106 On 25 February 1833 the group arrived in Istanbul and stayed in a house in Su¨leymaniye, where a host was attached to look after them.107 It is not known whether this house was the aforementioned Mu¨teveffa Ahmet Efendi’s residence or not, but since the document says that they lived in the residence previously decided on, it is very likely that the group stayed in that same Ahmed Efendi’s house. It is important to note that after Hu¨seyin Kapudan arrived in Istanbul and was placed under house arrest, he continued to communicate secretly with Bosnia. On 11 May 1833, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a reported to the Porte that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had sent one of his couriers and his treasurer to Bosnia. After they arrived in Bosnia they began to circulate false rumours, causing the people of the region to plot mischief. Hamdi Pas
a warned that in order to prevent any such intrigues, people associated with Hu¨seyin Kapudan should not be allowed to travel from Istanbul to Bosnia.108 This warning by Hamdi Pas
a also gives us clues about the conditions under which Hu¨seyin Kapudan was imprisoned. He was kept under surveillance, with very restricted opportunities to communicate with others.

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In another report of Hamdi Pas
a he argues that, since Hu¨seyin Kapudan was characteristically a very seditious person, he would try to plot mischief wherever he was. The vali claimed that when Hu¨seyin Kapudan crossed from Austria to Belgrade he tried to incite the Serhad region to rebel as well. After arriving in Istanbul he first sent his courier and later his treasurer to Bosnia in order to spread rumours about the issue of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a. The vali believed that Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s attempts at interference had been prevented, but it was likely that he would try to plot mischief again. To prevent this the vali proposed exiling Hu¨seyin Kapudan to Anatolia.109 It is understood that these claims about Hu¨seyin Kapudan greatly angered the central authorities. Not very long after Hamdi Pas
a made the claims, Hu¨seyin Kapudan died in Istanbul. According to one eyewitness of his death, a female servant who talked about his death with Bekir Bey Gradacaczade, the oldest person of the Gradacaczade family, ‘Hu¨seyin Kapudan went out shopping in order to make preparations for the Feast of the Birth of the Prophet. In the evening, when he was performing the ablution, he became ill and he started to vomit. A short while later, he died.’110 After his death, suggestions were made that he had been poisoned. According to another suggestion there was a cholera epidemic at that time, and it was possible that he had become infected.111 After his death, which probably occurred on 17 August 1834, he was buried in Eyu¨b Cemetery.112

Those left behind: Wives, children, relatives As mentioned previously, there were women and children in the group that deserted with Hu¨seyin Kapudan. When Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his advocates went to Belgrade expecting to receive an amnesty, they left their children and wives in Osijek. The group left behind included 12 children and 19 wives; including the wives of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa.113 It is understood that after Hu¨seyin Kapudan went to Belgrade, his wife fell ill. The Porte wanted the wives and children to be sent to Belgrade as well. When

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the Porte demanded their dispatch, the Habsburgs reported that Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s wife was too ill to travel. Despite this, the Porte kept asking the Commander of Varadin to send the Bosnians to Belgrade. After repeated requests, the Austrians agreed to send the wives and children there.114 However, the Governor of Srem, Baron Radostevic, suggested sending the children together with their two wet-nurses to Bosnia by way of S
amac port. The central authorities agreed, because travelling overland in wintry conditions could be deadly for the children. The 19 wives set out for Belgrade on 7 December 1832 and a day later the children set out for Bosnia. However, because of the bad weather, the wives’ group could not cross the Sava River and were delayed for a few days in Zemun.115 After they had reached Belgrade, the Porte decided to summon the wife of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa to Istanbul together with their husbands,116 but because of the illness of Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s wife they were kept waiting in Belgrade until she recovered.117 During her convalescence, Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s wife applied to the muhafız of Belgrade saying that, as an innocent person, she requested permission to return to her homeland, Gradac
anic
e.118 She said that the income of their family properties in Gradac
anic
e was about 15,000 – 20,000 gurus
, and requested that this income be assigned to her.119 After the muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, reported her application to the Porte on 11 February 1833, he suggested that, if the central authorities wanted her to be sent to Istanbul, they should order Hu¨seyin Kapudan to prepare a letter calling his wife to his side. It is understood that the wives of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa stayed in Belgrade for a few months and were then sent to Istanbul with their children. Due to the winter weather their children had previously been sent to Bosnia. It likely that, when their mothers were summoned to Istanbul, the children were sent to Belgrade to join them before they set off on the journey. We know that the children were also sent to Istanbul mainly from the letters of appeal written by Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s wife to the central authorities. After the death of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, his wife wrote to the Porte

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saying that she and her two little children were in a poor situation in Istanbul, having no relatives with them, and requested permission to return to Bosnia.120 Apart from the wife of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, his servant Mustafa also applied to the Porte for permission to return to Bosnia with Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s wife and children.121 When the Porte asked the opinions of high officials of Bosnian origin in Istanbul, especially the Miralay of Bosnia, Mustafa Bey, on the issue, Mustafa Bey and other officials reported that there was no risk involved in sending the family and the servant of Hu¨seyin Kapudan to their homeland. Based on these opinions, the central authorities agreed to their return to Bosnia.122 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the wife and children of Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a were also summoned to Istanbul but were all exiled to Trabzon.123 With regard to the other relatives of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, it is understood that his brother Osman Pas
a, the previous mutasarrıf of Izvornik, went to Belgrade after the suppression of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan rebellion. There are many documents saying that during the period of turmoil following the suppression he went to Belgrade and applied to the Porte for permission to return to Bosnia.124 It is probable that after Hu¨seyin Kapudan escaped to Austria, the state found it too risky to let Osman Pas
a stay in Bosnia and sent him to Belgrade. We do not know how long Osman Pas
a stayed in Belgrade, but a report from the vali of Bosnia, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, on 7 January 1833 states that the central authorities believed that Osman Pas
a had spent enough time in Belgrade and could therefore return to Bosnia. It is important to note that the vali opposed the idea and warned the central authorities that, if Osman Pas
a returned to Bosnia, it was possible that some ‘simple-minded’ people would plot mischief again.125 A few months later, in March 1834, Osman Pas
a died.126 In 1847 another brother of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Hacı Bekir Bey, also died.127 It is interesting to see that the life of Hu¨seyin Kapudan became the subject of a novel and a drama. The novel, The Dragon of Bosnia (Zmaj od Bosne) was written in 1879 by Josip Eugen Tomic´, and was translated into German by Olga Filipovic´ in 1910. The drama ‘The Fraternal Obstinacy’ (Bratski Inat) was written by Krsto Pavelic´ in 1911.128

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Those left behind: Wealth, properties, estates Shortly after Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his supporters escaped to Austria, the central authorities moved swiftly to confiscate the goods of both Hu¨seyin Kapudan and Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa. It is understood that the order of the general council of Bosnia (divan-ı Bosna) for confiscating the goods of Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa was realized on 28 July 1832 and that for Hu¨seyin Kapudan on 12 August 1832. While the confiscation of Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa’s goods included his belongings in his house and his shop, the confiscation of Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s goods included those which he had left at the governor’s court of Travnik. By this order, all goods that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had used during his governorship were collected and brought to Saraybosna to be sold at auction.129 At this auction, the goods of Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa were sold for 17,044 gurus
, 38 para. After the expenses for dellaˆliye (fee given to the crier), hammaˆliye (porterage), and kaˆtibe (secretarial fee) of 275 gurus
had been deducted, the total income of 16,769 gurus
38 para was assigned to the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre treasury.130 Likewise, by auction, the goods of Hu¨seyin Kapudan were sold for 60,070 gurus
27 para. After the dellaˆliye of 598 gurus
, hammaˆliye of 36 gurus
and the secretarial fee of 125 gurus
had been deducted, the total income of 59,311 gurus
, 27 para was assigned to the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre treasury.131 The Porte also entrusted Lebib Efendi who, as mentioned before, was in Bosnia during the period on a special mission, with the task of registering the properties and real estate of the fugitives. The vali of Bosnia, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, was also warned that, although there had been no suggestion by the Austrian side that the amnesty of the fugitives be extended to include their property, they might demand this as time went on. It was said that if this happened the answer should not be hastily given; rather, the matter should be allowed to drag on.132 What the central authorities meant by all this would be understood a short while later. When the Habsburg emperor applied to the Porte demanding amnesty for the refugees, another of his requests concerned their property. It is possible that, as all the household goods of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa were

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sold at auction shortly after they fled to Austria, the refugees had been anxious about the possibility that all their belongings, including their real estate, their animals as well as the crops in their fields, might also be confiscated. Only after the emperor obtained a promise that there would be no more confiscation did these refugees agree to go to Belgrade.133 It was decided that the property of the fugitives would be managed by intermediaries to be appointed by the owners themselves.134 Based on this decision, Hu¨seyin Kapudan appointed a certain Osman Efendi as manager of his real estate.135 After the fugitive group’s return to Ottoman lands had been implemented, the central authorities reneged on their promises. The vali of Bosnia, Hamdi Pas
a reported to the Porte that the yearly income of all Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s properties amounted to about 100,000 gurus
and, according to him, this was because Hu¨seyin Kapudan had embezzled a large amount of public money and property.136 Moreover, the muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pas
a, reported that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had plundered the savings of Ali Namık Pas
a, the previous vali of Bosnia.137 Based on this information, it was initially decided that of his income, 20,000 gurus
would be given to Hu¨seyin Kapudan for his belongings and for his living expenses, while the rest would be seized by the state to compensate for the money he had stolen.138 However, this idea was later abandoned on the basis that most of the property of Hu¨seyin Kapudan had been gained by bribery.139 It was decided that after Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s (modest) daily expenses in Istanbul had been met, all other income would be assigned to the state treasury.140 Thus, according to the decree of the Porte sent to the mu¨tesellim of Gradacac, Ahmed Bey, on 16 April 1833, it was decided that the state treasury should seize all interests, real estate, timars, zeamets and other properties of Hu¨seyin Kapudan in Gradacac and in other regions. It was decided to send a surveyor to the region to do this, but in order to prevent any delay the mu¨tesellim of Garadacac, Ahmed Efendi, was asked to do the job until the official arrived.141 As mentioned before, a similar duty of controlling and registering the estates of Hu¨seyin Kapudan was also given to Lebib Efendi. My contention is that Ahmed Bey would personally manage the

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operation while Lebib Efendi, along with his other duties, would monitor whether the process was being carried out systematically. Moreover, Lebib Efendi had been in Bosnia on temporary missions, and the central authorities needed not only to make an inventory of the wealth and possessions of Hu¨seyin Kapudan but also to administer them on behalf of the state. For this reason, we see that later, on 21 March 1848, responsibility for the administration and control of Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s estates was handed over completely to the vali of Bosnia, who would prepare their accounts yearly and send them to the capital.142 It was also stated that there was no need for the services of Osman Efendi, who had previously been appointed manager by Hu¨seyin Kapudan. A new order was issued, summoning Osman Efendi to Istanbul. It added that, in order to make an inventory of all the possessions of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Osman Efendi should bring all the registers in his possession to Istanbul.143 Through those registers, the aim was to obtain a detailed inventory of all the properties of Hu¨seyin Kapudan in order to confiscate them and transfer their revenues to the state treasury. It is seen that detailed documents had been prepared including all income and revenue from Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s
iftliks c and other estates. Thus, the amount of wheat, barley, corn and fodder produced on Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s
ifliks c was registered in detail, and after expenses were deducted the remaining sum was paid over to the vali of Bosnia.144 It is seen that the issue of the administration of ˆ t was on the agenda even in 1865, a time Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s
iftlika c when it was decided by order of Meclis-i Vu¨kela to hand over those ˆ t in Izvornik to the tenants. Those
iftlika ˆt confiscated
iftlika c c 145 Studies by Alicˇic´ indicate that the included 1,151
iftlik-hanes. c total number of
iftliks c of Hu¨seyin Kapudan in the whole region, including Izvornik, was 1,277, which shows that Hu¨seyin Kapudan had amassed truly enormous wealth.146 It is understood that the tenants reacted badly to the administration of mu¨ltezims because of the usurpation of their rights and, in the end, the state decided to give up these lands to the tenants.147 As stated in Chapter 3, another person whose properties were confiscated was Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey. Cennetizade

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Mehmed Emin Bey was the mu¨tesellim of Saray and was very influential, especially among the ulema. During the final battle, in Saray on 4 June 1832,148 he was killed and a list of his properties was prepared by mu¨tesellim Musa Ag˘a who presented it to the central authorities, prior to confiscation.149 Unfortunately it is not known whether the property of other leading figures of the rebellion, apart from Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a and Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey, were confiscated or not. There is silence in the documents concerning decisions taken with regard to the property of other leading figures, whereas detailed information is given about those confiscated, giving us the impression that, as they were the leading figures in the rebellion, only Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a’s and Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey’s properties were confiscated.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This study analyses the reasons why the people of Bosnia rebelled against the centralization and reform policies of the Ottoman Empire during the period between 1826 and 1836, the ways in which the rebels legitimized their action and struggled to gain acceptance for their demands, and how those reactions were interpreted by the Ottoman statesmen. The study has mainly concentrated on the theme within a tripartite theoretical framework, by examining it according to the cases of rebellion in that period, the centralization policies of the state and the borderland situation of the region. As this rebellion against the Ottoman centre was a provincial one, the study has sought to analyse the dynamics of the region as well as of the Ottoman centre which led the people to rebel. Since the rebellion was an attempt to keep the ancien re´gime unchanged in the face of the centralization process of the empire, the study inquires into the factors that turned Bosnia into one of the main battlegrounds for the conflict between centralization and local autonomy. Hence, since the rebellion has direct relationships with the borderland situation of Bosnia – where people were used to living according to their own customs and traditions, and were accustomed to a degree of selfgovernment – the study concentrates on Bosnia in terms of changing conditions in its borderland position. The study argues that the rebellions in Bosnia should be analysed within the Ottoman context, by considering both the regional and

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the imperial dynamics of the period. Through a closer examination of the years between 1826 and 1836, this study demonstrates that although some implementations in Bosnia seem to have been different from those at the centre of the empire, this is directly related to Ottoman pragmatism and flexibility as well as the regional solution-seeking mechanism of the empire. In this sense, the centralization and reform policies brought about a conscious divergence from that traditional system. The research on the rebellious years in Bosnia between 1826 and 1836 has also provided an opportunity to examine certain questions about the general characteristics of rebellions in the nineteenthcentury Ottoman Empire, a period when rebellions and revolts not only predominated in the Ottoman Balkans, but also were a turning point in Ottoman history in the sense that thousands of local inhabitants who were adversely affected by the reforms united to defy the authority of the central government. Thus, Ottoman Bosnia presents a noteworthy case in studying reactions against the centralization policies of the empire. This study also provided an opportunity to analyse the rebellion as a regional policy-making process. In that sense, the study shows that this rebellion is not limited only to struggles with the central authority or fighting for control over the region. Rather, it tested the limits of the state in terms of legitimacy and regionalism. This study focuses on a limited region, Bosnia, over a specifically restricted period, and on an issue where plenty of questions are obvious. Thus, contrary to traditional narrative history, this focus enabled me to use a wide range of materials as sources, as well as to undertake analysis of new questions. In that sense, this study has attempted to contribute to the literature in several ways. First of all, it narrates the events in Bosnia concentrating not only on the state perspective but also on the rebel perspective, by analysing their aims, demands and grievances in detail. Second, rather than regarding the rebellion as a single, clear-cut event over a limited period, it argues that the rebellion after the abolition of the janissary corps and the rebellion of Hu¨seyin Kapudan followed very similar patterns, indicating in essence a certain continuity, which can be formulated as

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‘reactions against the centralization and reform policies of the empire’. For this reason, instead of calling them two separate rebellions, independent of each other, the two rebellions have been evaluated as parts of a process. Third, instead of giving a merely chronological path of events, questions that represent the complexities of these events with their relations to past and future developments have been examined in detail, using a wide variety of sources. Moreover, the study argues that the conditions that paved the way for the rebellion should be researched by going back to earlier periods in the region, at least as far as the beginning of Ottoman rule. The geographical characteristics of Bosnia, specifically its remoteness from the centre of the empire, mountainous nature and position as a borderland, indicate the long-term causes of events, what Braudel refers to as ‘structures’.1 In that sense, while remoteness from the centre and the mountainous nature of the land strengthened localism, paradoxically, Bosnia’s staus as a borderland with the Christian world compelled the state to intervene directly in the region. Whereas before the frontiers had been firmly fixed, borders became more porous and overlapping, especially after the Treaty of Karlowitz. In such a world, interactions between two civilizations – Christianity and Islam – became more complicated with the emergence of new networks, such as trade and education, and international intervention became more prevalent. It is seen that, in contrast to the core territories of the empire, the state planned by conquest to establish flexible administrative practices in Bosnia, in terms of local institutions and local customs. Thus it is not surprising to see that, after the conquest, the inhabitants of Bosnia were called Bosnians with reference to their common use of the Bosnian language. The central authorities accepted the Bosnians as a group with particular characteristics, and did not try to change established local usage. Also, the origins of the noble families that came to prominence after the conquest of Bosnia had their roots in previous local noble families and this suggests that the Ottoman authorities chose to protect the regional dynamics. However, thanks to the gradual Islamization process, the rapid

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growth in urbanization and rise in population, and the application of the devs
irme system to Bosnian Muslim children, the cultural influence of the Ottomans was felt in every aspect of life. Thus, I have argued that, while on the one hand the Ottoman Empire kept the components of local elements stable in Bosnia, on the other hand it successfully established the traditional Ottoman culture. When talking about conditions that paved the way for the rebellion, the dynamics of social life in Bosnia should also be scrutinized in detail. It is seen that the rebellion was a city-centred movement as the initiator was Saray, the main city of the province.2 Thanks to the preference of the Ottoman system for establishing a flexible administration in Bosnia, as in other remote eyalets of the empire, local groups in Bosnia such as ayan, kapudans, merchants and ulema were strengthened and a strong regional network was established between them. Interestingly, Bosnian tribes in rural areas operated in much the same fashion as the ayan of the urban regions in the sense that each functioned largely as an interest group which, under the leadership of a grandee, made contracts with others and joined actively in the mobilization of the movement. Thus, all social meeting places of the province, such as the formal divans and informal mes
verets of the notables, tribal meetings, bazaars and fairs, main roads and streets, coffeehouses, religious establishments such as vakıfs and mosques, all became a part of the decision-making, discussion and publicizing process of the rebellion through which, in contrast to the formal councils of the Ottoman centre, people were to enjoy dealing with alternative corporations within the society. It is seen that one attempt of the central authorities to break the power of the movement was to transfer the centre of the eyalet from Travnik to Saray, the most important city in terms of religious institutions, commerce and crafts. It has been argued that the vanguard position of Saray was linked to the valis’ preference to remain in Travnik.3 However, every initiative of that transfer came to naught because of pressure from the local inhabitants. It is not wrong to say that the lack of success in attempts at transferring the centre had become a sign of the strength of the Saray elite, who thus prevented the vizier from re-establishing his residence in Saray.

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This study illustrates that the land tenure system and the military organization in Bosnia deserve special attention when it comes to determining the reasons for this rebellion. It is seen that after the conquest, while, on the one hand, the notables of Bosnia were conjoined into the timar system and kept their positions as notables, on the other hand, they were not left untouched since their hereditarily owned lands were turned into timars and zeamets in which the full ownership of the land was in the hands of the state. However, the change in the position of timars and zeamets to ocaklik timars, the hereditary fiefs, at the beginning of the seventeenth century because of the crisis in the Ottoman timar system and its handicaps in implementing the system over large areas, facilitated the creation of a powerful military class in the region.4 Later, the adaptation of new systems,
ifliks c and malikanes, throughout the nineteenth century increased the rights of local notables over their lands, since the lands were given to them as entire properties without any limitations or obligations.5 Thus, the indigenous Bosnian notables increased their power in the region and began to operate independently from the central government, exercising authority in their own right rather than in the name of the state. The belief that the new system would not only abolish the professional janissaries but would also bring great changes in the military class with other changes in the military establishment – such as abolishing the kapudans and yerlikulu janissaries, as well changing the land system by reorganizing the ocaklık,
iftlik c and malikane lands – brought together a huge group of people from different classes and united them in a struggle to maintain their rights. One of the most obvious reasons for the rebellion was the abolition of the janissary corps. Archival documents show that the people’s reaction to the abolition was not restricted to the first stage of the rebellion period, but the discontent was again repeated in the second one aiming to revive the janissary corps.6 This is directly related to the strong position of the janissaries in the region as well as the extrapolation of the title through the ‘yerlikulu janissaries.’ Under this title, local people were recruited as seasonal soldiers, paid only when they participated in battle, and then returned to their

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commercial or agrarian activities in peacetime. This process was different from that at the Ottoman centre in the sense that, while the janissaries of the centre mostly integrated into the local economy by engaging in trade or pursuing commercial activities, the participants in the commercial life of Bosnia usually entered the military scene. Thanks to this process, which created a kind of militia, both sides obtained certain advantages. While the state was relieved of paying regular salaries for all recruits and benefited from being able to raise a more numerous army in case of need, the local people used the title of janissary in order to protect their commercial activities as well as to obtain tax immunities. In the first stage of the rebellion period, the grievances of those people who had the title of kapudan – the chief of the yerlikulus – and of yerlikulu had become more apparent. In the end, in order to break their support for the rebellion, the state was left with no choice but to create a separation between yerlikulus and professional janissaries and restrict the abolition to the second group only.7 It is clear that this kind of solution did not meet the aims of the central authorities, but the state had to retreat in order to prevent wider unrest breaking out. This study has also paid special attention to the analysis of economic activities in the region following the idea that the existence of influential merchants and craftsmen in Bosnia was strongly related to the powerful economic activities there. During the period under consideration, despite all the economic problems of the empire – such as lack of capital, low education and high taxation – Saraycentred economic activities were considerable, especially along the frontiers. This meant the power of merchants and craftsmen in Bosnia increased rapidly, and so did their numbers. The archival documents show that these merchants and craftsmen were made very apprehensive by the centralization and reform policies of the empire, since it was clear that the new orders would bring about strong control and some prohibitions to their activities.8 Mainly for this reason, these powerful merchants and craftsmen took an active part in the rebellion. They struggled actively against all measures and policies of the central authorities to break their support for the rebellion.

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Close examination of archival documents reveals that, during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Bosnia witnessed various forms of uprisings and rebellions against the Ottoman centre. While the uprisings of the eighteenth century arose mainly from the unpleasant conditions of the Muslim peasantry – that is to say, they were uprisings of a rural nature – in the nineteenth century these turned into movements of the Muslim notables, in other words, uprisings of an urban nature against the central and later egalitarian policies of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The frequency of rebellions in Bosnia, for whatever reason – a new tax, military recruitment because of a new campaign, a protest against the abolition of tax privileges, or resistance to the newly recognized privileges of nonMuslims – reveals a more profound facet of Bosnia. This is the acceptance of rebellion as a way of regional policy-making and the existence of a culture of resistance in terms of introducing regional demands to the central authorities. In other words, it represents the prominence of Bosnian society in political participation in regional events. The situation was closely related to the formation of the powerful local groups – merchants, ayans, kapudans or the tribes previously mentioned – and the construction of proliferating networks among these. In that sense, the rebellion provided a nexus for those groups in combining them together in a regional solidarity, especially for a period and geography in which international intervention created more crystallized societies, and internal conditions unified people against difficulties. In July 1826, during the abolition of the janissary corps in Bosnia, in order to prevent any reaction, the state put into practice the methods of both coercion and persuasion at the same time. The appointment of Mustafa Pas
a, who was famous for his brutal methods of suppression, as the vali of Bosnia just a few months before the abolition,9 and the despatch of a delegation of selected ulema from Istanbul to Bosnia in order to convince people to accept the decree of abolition after it had been declared there,10 indicate that the Porte had taken into account the possibility of a strong reaction in Bosnia. In reality, it was not difficult for the Porte to foresee such a reaction in Bosnia based on former experiences. It is not surprising to see that,

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based largely on the pioneer status of Saray in terms of local issues, the protests started just after the decree of abolition was announced in Saray and the inhabitans of Travnik followed Saray in organizing a rebellion.11 However, the decision to rebel and the follow-up programme, which were the outcome of two huge mes
verets in Saray which attracted great attendance, show that the rebel side also followed a very conscious and planned programme. At first, there was great contention between the rebel centre of Saray and the administrative centre of Travnik, but later Saray gained the upper hand. While in Travnik, the vali sent the decree of abolition of the janissaries to every district, the rebel leaders prepared their letters of invitation or bulletins of their mes
verets and also dispatched them to the districts. It is seen that, due to the gravity of the circumstances, the state put into practice many political instruments to suppress the rebellion. Roads were blocked to prevent the rebels from coming and going; the vali was replaced with a more active and manipulative one; spies and special officials were despatched to the region; local notables were rewarded with new titles and guilty notables were pardoned in exchange for their support. Rumours were deliberately circulated that a huge army was being rushed to the Saray region, and the state kept up its military efforts even during the winter, a period when the recruitment of soldiers and preparations for fighting became very difficult. All these things indicate that the rebellion was a highly organized and dangerous regional, popular resistance. They also demonstrate the perception of the state towards the rebellion and its methods of suppression. This study asserts that, although suppression of the rebellion was somehow carried out during the first stage, the application of the new orders was postponed to a later period because of critical conditions in the province. The military training programme was started, but only voluntarily and with considerable state encouragement. The recruitment of new soldiers for the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre army was postponed until later, because of the possible reactions of Bosnians not only to the recruitment, but also due to the fact that revenues for the new army would have to be met locally, due to economic

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difficulties in the capital.12 Thus, it is not wrong to claim that although there was a seeming success for the Ottoman centre at first, in reality this was very restricted since the yerlikulu janissaries and kapudans had been assured that they would keep their titles. In that sense, although the central authorities managed to suppress the rebellion by using force, the second step of applying the new order in Bosnia was realized only by means of a very gruelling process. Rebellion continued to simmer, and it was suppressed only after many setbacks on the part of the central authorities. The possibility that unrest would spill over to the rest of the Balkans, the Russian war, and revolts in Peloponnese all played key roles in this situation. A short while later, the recruitment of new soldiers from Bosnia because of the Russo – Ottoman war of 1828 showed that reconciliation was not easy in Bosnia. The region again reverted to rebellion as the Bosnians wanted neither to provide soldiers, nor to accept the new uniform.13 Milosˇ strengthened his relations with Russia out of fear that Bosnian soldiers might attack Serbian lands. The Porte was very uneasy about this Russian – Serbian rapprochement.14 The state was well aware that any intervention in the region’s dynamics would cause reactions against it so once again it looked for the solution within itself and through concessions: the vali was changed and old janissary claims were revitalized again.15 Concessions on the part of the Ottoman central authorities are clear evidence that an interpretation of Bosnian events cannot address only the regional dynamics, but that inter-regional and international developments should also be taken into consideration. The effects of interregional and international dynamics on Bosnian issues becomes more apparent when one sees that, during the land problems with the Austrians and the Serbians, the Porte was forced to make concessions contrary to the interests of Bosnians. In particular, the ceding of six Bosnian and Albanian districts to the Serbians in accordance with the Edirne Treaty united the Albanians and Bosnians in protest.16 In that sense, the aim of the Bosnians was rather to insist on their dues, together with the Albanians, against the Serbians than to engage in conflict with the state. At this point, the Bosnians gradually came to share the idea that the Sultan was much more

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interested in maintaining his authority over his subjects, regardless of their faith, than, as Halife-i Muslimıˆn, defending Muslim territories and protecting Muslim rights. Thus, while the rebellion brought about the gradual alienation of the local inhabitants from the state, the Porte began to look upon the Bosnians as obstacles to its power and progress. The first signs of this divergence led the Bosnians to organize their own self-defense. The de facto governorship of Hu¨seyin Kapudan started in September 1831, when local inhabitants, old and young, applied to the Porte with petitions and demanded that he be the vizier.17 The demands of the local people that Hu¨seyin Kapudan become governor were directly related to their shared idea that the valis sent by the centre did not protect their rights properly, and only a native vali could maintain and uphold the rights of the Bosnians. The centralization process of the Porte and increasing pressure from the Serbians were two matters in which the people felt these rights were not being upheld. It is clear that, for them, this demand had become a matter of life and death. Special officials who were sent to Bosnia to report on conditions, and even the Grand Vizier, believed the only way of terminating this rebellion was for the central authorities to accept Hu¨seyin Kapudan’s valilik.18 Based the demands of the people, some scholars like Alicˇic´ or Eren argue that the rebellion included a nationalist agenda.19 However, it evident that, while requesting the post, Hu¨seyin Kapudan frequently repeated how obedient he was to the state, saying that if he was granted the valilik, he would work heart and soul for the good of the state. Through an analysis of the requests and pleas of the local people, this study has come to the conclusion that the movement of Hu¨seyin Kapudan was not a secessionist one, aiming to separate Bosnia from the Ottoman Empire. Rather, these demands intended to preserve the historical rights offered by the Ottoman Empire. The demands of rebels to decide on their valis, to resist those appointed by the central authority or to plan a movement against the Ottoman centre under the leadership of a local power, can all be interpreted under the title of a pre-nationalist

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or proto-nationalist period in which local instruments rather than ethnic ones became determinant. The Bosnians probably believed that if they did not accept the appointed vali, the Porte would finally approve the valilik of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. This kind of reasoning was used during previous rebellions in the province. The rebellious history of Bosnia contained various examples in which the state preferred to step back rather than leave the province in tumult. As Brummet points out, the punishment for such rebellions was death in theory, but in practice the process of rebellion often began with a series of complaints and threats but concluded with negotiation and compromise rather than punishment.20 Based on previous examples, the Bosnians probably believed that the rebellion would end with negotiations and the state would postpone the application of new reforms. In that sense, the most insistent and firm attitude in favour of the change came from Mahmud II, who followed events in Bosnia closely and did not hesitate to intervene in every problem. Bosnian – Albanian cooperation in organizing the rebellion, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a’s attack on Syria and, consequently, the postponement of the march on the rebels’ side, as well as Mehmed Ali’s financial assistance to the rebels, Milosˇ’s relations with both the Bosnians and the central authorities and the Porte’s correspondence with Austria in order to get help for the suppression of the rebellion are all clear evidence that the rebellion should not be analysed without taking into consideration all inter-regional and international participants and their relations with each other. Promotions and rewards given by the Porte after the suppression of the rebellion show that the Porte also paid special attention to winning the hearts of all those who gave strong support to the suppression. In that sense, as a reward, the separation of Hersek from Bosnia as a self-governing mutasarrıflık and the appointment of I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a there21 not only represented the idea that the state might appoint an indigenous notable as governor of his own region if it wished, but also showed that theoretically it was not impossible to appoint Hu¨seyin Kapudan to the post of governorship, since he was a local notable.

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One of the main reasons why the state persisted so hard in trying to suppress the rebellion was to show that the Ottoman Empire had the capacity to control its rebellious subjects. The importance of this is well understood if we consider that the empire had been undergoing hard times in terms of inside and outside pressures. Apart from Bosnia, there had been rebellions in other parts of the empire, and the period had witnessed increasing international intervention. It is possible that, if the state had not succeeded in assuring even the obedience of its Muslim subjects, there might have been concern as to how it could make the non-Muslim subjects, for example the Serbians, do what it ordered. Therefore, the insistence of Mahmud II on the centralization of Bosnia showed that Bosnia had become one of the main battlegrounds in representing the symbolic power of the Sultan not only to his subjects but also to his enemies. It is, however, possible that because of the remoteness of Bosnia from the centre, the centralization and modernization policies of the state were not well understood and the region’s people did not have any real information about how important those policies were for the Porte. It is clear that the central authorities had difficulty in explaining its changing policies, especially in the remote provinces, since the decentralization process of previous centuries had created a more chaotic atmosphere in the peripheral regions than in the centre. It is important to note that not only the Ottoman Empire but also the European Empires were confronted with similar crises during this period as such crises were characteristics of the early modern state.22 This study shows that, as with the abolition of the janissaries, the suppression of the Hu¨seyin Kapudan movement did not end the problems but was only the first step in the tortuous process of establishing the new orders, the nizaˆmaˆt. Again, during the establishment of the new orders, including the recruitment for Asaˆkir-i Mansure, the abolition of the timar system, the reorganization of the mustahfız soldiers, and the collection of new taxes, the local inhabitants showed great resistance. Therefore after a few abortive attempts, the state was again obliged to postpone these reforms until the 1850s.

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This study has paid special attention to analysing the vocabulary used in related documents in order to tease out the state’s perception in terms of the rebels and the rebellion. It is seen that although an ambiguous and interchangeable vocabulary was used to describe the rebels and the rebellion, it is enough to assert that the language was enriched not only because a huge group of people were incorporated into the rebellion, but also because a large group of people from various strata commented on it. It is important to note that the state did not hesitate to use the stereotypes most frequently used to describe Bosniaks to define the rebels, in which all the people of the region were accused of being rebels and bandits, such as: ‘It was seen that the expression “stupid Bosniak” (ahmak Bos
nak) was true.’23 ‘The Bosniaks are known for their acts of plotting and devilry (Bos
naklar mekr u¨
eya s ˆ tıˆnetle ma‘ruˆf olduklarından).’24 ‘Those Bosniaks as an abject group do not appreciate any mercy or favour (Bos
nak taˆifesi bir kavm-i leıˆm olarak merhamet ve inaˆyetin kadrini bilmediklerinden).’25 The use of such labels by the central authorities to describe the whole population of the Bosnia eyalet showed that this rebellion was not limited to a group of people, and was not accepted as a particular ‘group rebellion’ but rather it was directly related to a whole region, and constituted an ethnonym of being ‘Bosniak’. It is also seen that a pejorative vocabulary was used consciously in describing the rebels who, on the one hand, were merely called stupid or naughty but, on the other hand, were denounced as traitors to the state. In employing these preferences, the state aimed to kill two birds with one stone. First, by describing the rebels in those pejorative terms, the state intentionally put forward the idea that these people had rebelled because they were not able to control their behavior and, hence, were marginal. Second, labelling the rebels as bandits, troublemakers, or even traitors to the state elevated them to a new level of rebelliousness in which ‘uninformed gangs of bandits’ thus turned into ‘conscious traitors’ to the entire Dar’ul-Islam. Analyses of the documents allows one to assert that a ‘unanimous and concerted attitude’ (yekdil ve yekcihet) was present among the region’s people, which included the notables of the region, the ulema, merchants, and craftsmen, as well as ordinary people.26 Thus the

CONCLUSION

235

term ‘Bosniak’ turned into an umbrella term used by the state as well as by the rebels; while the state used it to indicate a commonalty among all of the region’s people without differentiating among them, the rebels used it to create a kind of regional solidarity and to separate themselves from other groups of the larger Ottoman world. It is important to note that while documents giving detailed information about the leaders of the rebellion call them by their names, information about ordinary people is limited to their group identity or to giving their numbers. This is mainly related to the huge number of local people participating in the rebellion. It is also clear that the non-Muslim subjects did not pay as much attention to the rebellion as the Muslims of the region. However, even if infrequently, the names of non-Muslims who were counted among the rebels reveal to us that the non-Muslims were not totally indifferent to the rebellion.27 The assortment and variation in the names of those who were called the rebel leaders also reveal that it was a regional rebellion in which people from different social groups took an active part. It is seen that during the rebellion period, the most crucial support for the rebels came from the ulema ranks. Paradoxically, during the abolition of the janissaries and the following reformation period in Istanbul, it was the ulema class who gave active support to the Sultan.28 Undoubtedly, while the support of the ulema eased the programme of the state in Istanbul, the lack of such support in Bosnia worsened the position of the state. It is clear that the participation of the local ulema in the rebellion was a direct consequence of their increasing power after the eighteenth century, an increase which was related to the ayan system. Thanks to this ayan system, although the ulema were appointed as provincial officials by the government, they became agents exemplifying local interests. Thus, it would not be wrong to use the term the ‘ayanization of ulema’ to describe this evaluation in Bosnia. The study argues that the participation of the ulema class in the rebel ranks was embedded in, or indeed partly a product of, a drive to defend the ancien re´gime as well. This loyalty of the Bosnian ulema and people in general to the ancien re´gime was a direct consequence of the fear of losing what they had. They thought that the changes which would come with the new order might not

236

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

simply be related to the military system but might also sweep away what they had obtained over a long period of time. If there was any stereotyped ‘pense´e’ of the Bosniaks in that period, it was that defence psychology; in other words, a kind of ‘conservatism’ toward change. This defence psychology was closely related to the geographical situation of Bosnia, a place which was surrounded on three sides by the ‘enemy’, as archival documents assert.29 Coming to the objectives and demands of the rebels, the main argument of the rebels in both stages was that the changes to be brought about by the new order were in reality contrary to kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm, the ancient law.30 This stress placed by the rebels on kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm in both stages clearly shows their idealization of the past in the face of ‘wretched alterations’. By stressing the kaˆnuˆn, the rebels also sought grounds for legitimizing their movement. It was a reminder to the state that their arguments were not new or invented and that they were not vagabonds. As in the first stage, stress was placed on the violation of kaˆnuˆn-ı kadıˆm by the abolition of the janissary army, while in the second one this was amplified to include all the stipulations and laws that had recently been applied, including the changes in uniform, which were declared to be contrary to the law, the canonical law of the prophet Muhammed and the Hanefi doctrine. In this way, similar to the state arguments that labelled the changes as religious necessities, the rebels appealed to Islamic terminology in order to claim that their actions were just. The rebels also regarded the abolition as bid‘at, an apocryphal and uncanonical situation, arguing that the acceptance of this would bring about many bid‘ats.31 Thus, apart from the law, religion was also called on in cases where the rebels indirectly argued that applying those changes was a violation of the law as well as of religion. In connection with that strategy, the rebels decided to obtain mahzar (decree) and ilaˆm (written judgment) from districts which were opposed to the new orders and presented these to the Porte.32 In fact, this was expressed as a ‘request’ to the Sultan by the people who accepted him as an absolute ruler, as well as a ‘demonstration’ that they would not accept what was dictated to them. By pleading with the Porte, the rebels showed that they were

CONCLUSION

237

the servants of the Sultan but, by defying the Porte’s policies at the same time, they proved that they had expectations of being allowed to decide their own future. When it comes to to the methods used to subjugate the rebels, it is clear that the aim of the central authorities was not only to punish the guilty, but also to use punishment as a show of strength to consolidate its control over the territory. The state preferred the symptomatic responses of executing or banishing the leading rebels rather than trying to negotiate with them. Despite this, negotiation was not totally ignored in the case of people who were able to change sides easily; for instance, people who were attached to a leading figure in the rebellion were sometimes treated kindly, or selected notables were rewarded with new titles in order to win their support.33 This was because the circumstances called for the ringleaders to be severely dealt with but without alarming their passive supporters. According to state policies, if the leading figures were punished severely, organization would break down; so punishments were not implemented on a large scale and did not extend to ordinary people who supported the rebellion without becoming very radical about it. In that sense, I classify the rebel side into three groups: leading figures, active supporters of those leading figures, and passive supporters of the rebellion. While punishments were almost totally confined to the first class, the outcome for active supporters varied according to their position and their level of support or wealth. In that sense, by punishing the rebels, the state aimed to show that there must be a consequence for this crime and to draw a clear line between the rebels and the submissive, while it intended to show the absolute sovereignty of the state in order to assert the distinction between the ‘miserable’ bodies of the culprits and the supreme body of the state. Moreover, the study argues that the leadership position during the rebellion was a very decisive factor in terms of motivating the region’s people into action, and of consolidating them under the shelter of a regional power base. Here, I do not mean that all the responsibility for the rebellion lay on the shoulders of the leader, but rather I argue that the strong leadership of the period, seen throughout the Balkans,

238 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

was directly related to the conditions there, was created by the region’s people, and hence was a product of the world around it. It is seen that leaders, such as Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, Hu¨seyin Kapudan or I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a in our case, or Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, or Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a in the case of the Balkans during the same era, shared similar career paths and enjoyed similar family backgrounds, education and social networks, and so on. In that sense, a relatively small city in the Balkans – such as I˙
skodra, Vidin, Janina or Ruscuk, in the case of Ruscuklu Ali Pas
a, or Gradacac, in the case of Hu¨seyin Kapudan – could become a nexus for a proliferating network of ayan which possibly eased the emergence of those leaders. It is very interesting to see that those leading figures lived in very tumultuous circumstances in which their lives were spent alternately cooperating with or defying the Ottoman central authorities. In that sense, the nexus of their relationships reveals much about the world to which they belonged. First, they predominated over a large area, in terms not only of managerial but also of martial control. This is why the central authorities were unable to suppress them without the support of a local power, and why they constantly applied to one another for help. However, the situation created a vicious circle in which the suppression of one of them meant the rise to power of another. Metaphorically speaking, one gave birth to the other while it itself was dying. In the case of Hu¨seyin Kapudan, for instance, another important notable of the region, I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, was used to eliminate him.34 In that sense, rather than negotiating with the rebellious notable, the state preferred to use the shared antagonism between two notables, which was a characteristic of the period. Second, cooperation between two or more of the leaders was as frequent as antagonism between them. Cooperation between Hu¨seyin Kapudan and I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a, or the financial support of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pas
a to both of them, are clear evidence of such situations.35 Moreover, having internal knowledge of their region, these leaders had the opportunity to unite the people there and to mobilize them. Being active participants in their region’s problems gave them the

CONCLUSION

239

opportunity to use their initiative and win popularity among the local people. As a third reason, it is probable that civic turmoil in the Balkans in that period gave life to a regional consciousness, something that was highly significant in that it gave rise to the creation of a ‘leader’ under whose wings the population might congregate.

APPENDICES

A. The petition of Hu¨seyin Kapudan to the Porte for the valilik post Hatt-ı Hu¨mayun 440/22154 D Devletluˆ, inaˆyetluˆ, ebhetluˆ, merhametluˆ, veliyyu¨’n-ni‘m, amıˆmu¨’l-vu¨cuˆd ve’l-ekrem efendim, sultaˆnım hazretleri Atebe-i ulyaˆ-yı hazret-i veliyyu¨’n-ni‘maˆne-i rahıˆmaˆnelerine arz-ı haˆl-i daraˆat-meaˆl-i kullarıdır ki, Bundan akdemce karındas
ımız Osman Pas
a kulları hizmet-i hazret-i veliyyu¨’n-ni‘maˆnelerinde bulunarak mazhar-ı nevaˆzis
ve naˆil-i lutf u ihsaˆn ve hayaˆt-bahs
aˆ-yı kerem-aˆsaˆr-ı veliyyu¨’n-ni‘maˆnelerinin edaˆ-yı
su¨kr ve sitaˆyis
kaˆrıˆleriyle vu¨ruˆd-ı naˆmiye ve bu abd-i ahkar kullarına ifaˆde eyledikde bu kulları dahi hizmet-i devletlerinde bulunmak ve izhaˆr-ı sadaˆkat etmek ve ol vechle ni‘met-i bahiru¨l- mu¨temennıˆleriyle mu¨tena‘im ve
serefyaˆb olmam arzusunda olub o¨teden beru deruˆn-ı saˆdıka-i
caˆkeraˆnemizden
sekk ve
su¨bheden aˆrıˆ olan meraˆsim-i sadaˆkat ve levaˆzıme-i sıdk u ubudiyet izharıyla cerıˆde-i bendegaˆn kullarına daˆhil ve zıˆr himaˆye-i felek-i
sukuˆhlarında mu¨stazıll olarak hidemaˆt-ı devletlerinde bulunmamızı ez dil u¨ caˆn is
tiyaˆk ve arzuˆ-yı berkemaˆl ile mevlaˆ-yı mu¨teaˆlden mu¨sted‘aˆ-yı kulları olmus
ise dahi hilaˆf-ı u¨mıˆd-i kulları ve adem-i istihkaˆkiyet-i
caˆkeri olarak bu defa vu¨cuˆh-ı eyaˆlet-i Bosna ve erkaˆn ve ru¨esaˆ ve sag˘ıˆr ve kebıˆr sekene-i vilaˆyet kullarının zenbvaˆr-maˆnend-i ser-aˆcizaˆne-i abıˆdaˆnem tecemmu¨‘ ve hablu¨’lmu¨teayyin ile bu kullarına tes
ebbu¨s ederek ru¨tbe-i vaˆlaˆ-yı vezaˆret ile

APPENDICES

241

eyaˆlet-i Bosna uhde-i kullarına liecli’t-tevcıˆh ibraˆm ve ilhaˆh olunduysa da bu kulları bervechle rızaˆ-daˆde olmayub ibram-ı bıˆmeaˆllerini her ne kadar indifaˆına dikkat-i kulları derkaˆr ise de bir du¨rlu¨ ibraˆm ve ilhaˆhlarından hilaˆs olmayarak
caˆr naˆ
caˆr ol vechle ibraˆm-ı ehaˆlilerine bi’z-zaruˆr rızaˆdaˆde olub ve cenaˆb-ı hazret-i veliyyu¨’n-ni‘met-i aˆlem efendimiz hazretlerinin kemaˆl-i
sefkat ve asaˆr-ı merhamet- seniyyelerine ma‘zuˆren ve elfaˆf-ı deryaˆnevaˆl-i hazret-i veliyyu¨’n-ni‘mıˆlerine mu¨steniden taraflarından bir kıta mahzarı tertıˆb ve temhıˆren hakpaˆy-i meraˆhim-bahs
aˆ-yı hazret-i vaˆridaˆnelerine takdıˆme cesaˆret olundug˘undan eltaˆf-ı bıˆgaˆye-i hazret-i veliyyu¨’nni‘maˆnelerinden mutazarri‘dir ki ez-kazaˆ-i deruˆn-ı eyaˆletde vukuˆ-ı yaˆkıne olan harekaˆt-ı naˆ-becaˆ ve uygunsuzlug˘un men u¨ def‘ ve kaˆffe-i mevaˆdaˆt-ı laˆzımesi ber-tıbk-ı iraˆde-i seniyye-i
saˆhaˆne vech-i suhuˆletiyle ru’yet ve tems
iyetine medaˆr olmak mu¨laˆhazaya binaˆen ve deruˆn-ı kullarıda olan sadaˆkat-ı kaviyye ve aˆsaˆr-ı hakıˆkat-i (one word illegible) ibraˆz ve her vechle ug˘uˆr deyu devlet-i aliyyede bezl-i caˆn ve fedaˆ-yı maˆl edeceg˘imizi ve saˆye-i meraˆhim-i
sahaˆne-i zıllullaˆhıˆde ehaˆli kullarının keyfiyet-i istirhaˆmları nezdi keraˆmet vefd-i hazret-i veliyyu¨’n-ni‘mide makbuˆl ve mesmuˆ‘ ve ol vechle bu abd-i kullarını cerıˆde-i
cıraˆg˘aˆn-ı bendegaˆn kullarına idhaˆl buyurulmak u¨mıˆdiyle ez-gayri hod li-tastıˆr-i arz-ı haˆl-i kullarıya ceraˆid ve mahzar ehaˆli-i kullarıyla maan hakpaˆy-i devletlerine cesaˆret kılındı. Eltaˆf-ı hazret-i hadıˆdıˆlerinden mutazarrı‘dır ki evvel u¨ aˆhire duaˆtaˆn-ı kabuˆl-i aˆciz-i abd-i der- (one word illegible) -leriyle tevcihaˆt-ı hayriyet-aˆyaˆt-ı bende-i pervaˆneleri mazhariyet ile kaˆm buyurulmak baˆbında ve her haˆl ve beher emirde emr u¨ fermaˆn hazret-i men lehu’l-emrindir. Hu¨seyin Bey Kulları

September 1826 October 1826 December 1826 December 1826 March 1827 June 1827 October 1827 May 1828 June 1828 29 June 1828 August 1828 June 1829

The abolition of the janissaries in Istanbul. The ferman abolishing the janissary corps was sent to Bosnia. One or two persons from every district were summoned to Saray, for the mes
veret. At the mes
veret the people decided to rebel. The rebellion started to spread all over the region. The second big mes
veret of the rebellion side. The participants made the important decisions of not accepting the new army, not joining in the drills and not giving up their janissary claims. Esham Mukataacısı Mehmed Arif Bey and Pirlepeli Ahmed Efendi were sent to Bosnia with special duties to convince people on the subject of the abolition of the janissaries and to report developments to the central authorities. Vali Mustafa Pas
a was dismissed and the previous muhafız of Belgrade, Abdurrahim Pas
a, was appointed as the vali of Bosnia. Abdurrahim Pas
a entered Saray and the city was subjugated without anyone being hurt. The state ordered the vali to stay in Saray. The Ottoman fleet was sunk by Britain, France and Russia. The Bosnians agreed to give 20,000 soldiers for the war with Russia. The recruited soldiers from Visoko rebelled because of new uniforms. Abdurrahim Pas
a was forced to leave Saray and moved to Travnik. Abdurrahim Pas
a was dismissed and the previous muhafız of I˙nebahtı, Ali Namık Pas
a was appointed as the vali of Bosnia. Ali Namık Pas
a preferred to reside in Travnik. Ali Namık Pas
a managed to send approximately 5,000 soldiers to Vidin for the war with Russia.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

15 June 1826 17 –26 June 1826 September 1826

242

B. Chronology of events in Bosnia 1826 –36.

December 1829 January 1830 January 1831 January 1831

2 September 1831 September 1831 24 September 1831 November 1831 February 1832

243

March 1832 End of April 1832 4 June 1832

APPENDICES

End of January 1831 28 March 1831 June 1831 May 1831 End of June 1831 August 1831

The Treaty of Edirne was signed. Ottoman authorities agreed to cede six districts from Vidin, Alacahisar and Bosnia to the Serbian side. The scribe of Tobhane, Kes

saf Efendi, was appointed to inspect the borders of the six districts. Because of Russian pressure, a new official, LebibEfendi, was sent to the region to inspect the districts together with a Russian committee. The notables of Bosnia gathered at the residence of Hu¨seyin Kapudan and decided to unite against the efforts of the Serbians to capture the six districts. In the mes
veret in Tuzla-i Zir, the group decided to march on to Travnik. The rebels captured the vali and sent him to Busovac, where he was put under house arrest. Ali Namık Pas
a escaped through the Hersek region. The Grand Vizier Res
id Mehmed Pas
a was charged with suppressing the rebellion. The muhafız of Vidin, I˙brahim Pas
a, was appointed as the vali of Bosnia. The rebels were able to rebuff the army of the Grand Vizier, Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, in the Kac
anik pass near U¨sku¨b. Hu¨seyin Kapudan applied to the central authorities for the valilik. A huge mes
veret was gathered in Saray including all notables of the region. The local inhabitants appointed Hu¨seyin Kapudan as vizier of Bosnia. The Grand Vizier’s forces succeeded in suppressing the rebellion of I˙
skodralı Mustafa Pas
a. Since I˙brahim Pas
a was not able to go to Bosnia, the Porte dismissed him and appointed the mutasarrıf of Tırhala, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a to the valilik post. The rebels were repulsed at a battle in Vulc
etrin. Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a was able to go to Yenipazar. With the help of I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a, Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a succeeded in defeating the rebels.

October 1832 26 December 1832 25 February 1833 May 1833 March 1834 August 1834 17 August 1834 September 1834 April 1835 April 1835 February 1836

Hu¨seyin Kapudan, together with a group of about 140 people, escaped to Austria. The administrative centre was again transferred from Travnik to Saray. Because of his support, I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a was rewarded with the nis
an-ı iftihar and Hersek was separated from Bosnia and was given to him as a self-governing mutasarrıflık. Hu¨seyin Kapudan and his associates went to Belgrade. Hu¨seyin Kapudan, Fedayizade Ali Pas
a, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a and Mehmed Kapudan of Krupe departed from Belgrade on the order of the Porte and went to Istanbul. The group arrived in Istanbul and were placed under house arrest. Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a was dismissed from the valilik of Bosnia and the vali of Baghdad, Davud Pas
a, was appointed. The six districts were annexed by Serbia. Hu¨seyin Kapudan died in Istanbul. The most probable reason was that he was poisoned. Hu¨seyin Kapudan was buried in Eyu¨p Cemetery. The Porte appointed Bas
tezkereci Akif Efendi to be responsible for the application of the new orders in Bosnia. The organization of the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers and the application of the new order was started by Davud Pas
a and I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a. Davud Pas
a was dismissed from the valilik post and the muhafız of Belgrade, Vecihi Pas
a, was appointed. In order to increase the support of local notables, some Bosnian notables were endowed with imperial monograms.

244 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

15 June 1832 July 1832 July 1832

APPENDICES

245

C. The list of valis of Bosnia 1826 –1836 Mustafa Pas
a (S
evval 1241/ May 1826-Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/December 1826). Abdurrahim Pas
a (Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/December 1826-Safer 1244/ August 1828). Ali Namık Pas
a (Safer 1244/August 1828-Muharrem 1247/June 1831). I˙brahim Pas
a (Muharrem 1247/June 1831-Ramazan 1247/February 1832). The de facto governorship of Hu¨seyin Kapudan (Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/September 1831-Muharrem 1248/June 1832). Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a (Ramazan 1247/February 1832-Zilhicce 1248/May 1833). Davud Pas
a (Zilhicce 1248/May 1833-Zilhicce 1250/April 1835). Vecihi Pas
a (Zilhicce 1250/April 1835).

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded

1 1

24 400 10 10 35 51 65 65 27 4 35 20 26.5 150 350 173 560 175 14 452 101

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


19

10

5 11

10 15

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Mu¨sta‘mel mai bez
salvar Sim
caprazlı kırmızı
cuka boylu dolama 1 Billur bardak Ko¨hne alaca kısa entari Penbe renk
cuka kısa dolama Al
cuka kısa dolama Mu¨sta‘mel
sitari kısa entari maa yelek Vis
nevi
cuka
salvar I˙pek kenarlı
camas
ır Tahta sandık Bog˘
calık 1 aded Defa bog˘
calık Kırmızı basma zenne yelek Selimiye boylu entari Telli zenne entari S
al u¨zeri kazak entari Sim kılabudan harclı boylu
cuka dolama Yes
il
cuka boylu dolama Kısa ko¨hne ku¨rk Sim do¨g˘meli kırmızı
cuka boylu dolama Kırmızı fermene Yelek

246

D. Confiscated properties of Hu¨seyin Kapudan1.

2

1 aded 1 1 1 aded

1 aded 2 1 aded 1 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


5

247

17 30 54.5 100 15.5 67 23 115 18 26.5 50 32 25.5 135 100 90 15 31 35 401 221 690

APPENDICES

Beyaz takye Beyaz alaca ko¨hne kısa entari Kırmızı
sal abdestlik 1 Kılabudan harclı mu¨sta‘mel alaca entari ve yelek Sim kopc
alı kırmızı katife tozluk Ko¨hne abanıˆ ahmediye Mu¨sta‘mel abanıˆ ahmediye Ko¨hne mai bez
salvar ve du¨lbend parc
ası Benefs
e renk
cuka abdestlik Timur habzalı sandık Sarı cu¨zi kısa entari S
itari alaca kısa entari Mai canfez fermene S
itari alaca kısa entari Kırmızı
cuka kolsuz cebe Kırmızı
cuka kılabudanlı fermene Mai
cukaya kaplı kısa ku¨rk Basma zenne yelek Defa bog˘
calık Defa bog˘
calık Siyah katife sim harc
lı zenne cebe Telli zenne entari ¨ stu¨faye kaplı semmur zenne ku¨rk U

1 aded

1 aded 1 aded 1 1

3 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

1 aded

33 40 26 20 25 7 43 22 55 66 132 750 111 20 120 4 76 700 110 25 817.5 12 74

248

Mai atlas kısa entari Selimiye kısa entari Nemc
ekarıˆ basma
sal Damgahane zenne entari Mesturaˆt Pes
tamal S
itari kısa entari maa yelek Ko¨hne abanıˆ ahmediye Kırmızı kısa
cuka dolama Kılabudan harclı kısa entari ve yelek Sim kopc
alu tozluk Sim
capakun raht maa sine bend Abani Ahmediyye Kılabudan kenarlı beyaz sarık Mu¨sta‘mel sırma is
leme lebeb Yes
il bez parc
a Kılabudan harclı kırmızı yelek Ense gu¨mu¨
s raht maa sine-bend Kırmızı
cuka abdestlik Mor cu¨zi kısa entari Defa enselikli sim raht maa sine-bend S
itari alaca yelek Ko¨hne yelek

1 aded

4 aded 1 aded 1 aded

2 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


5 5

10 15 249

26 253 66 211 44 35 20.5 24 151 292.5 711 500 115 107 260 125 171.5 6 40 40 108 36.5

APPENDICES

Maa mai bez
salvar Beysilah Cu¨z
cuka u¨zeri pullu gas
iye Kırmızı kadife kısa dolama Mu¨sta‘mel sim gaˆ
siye C¸uka kısa zenne ku¨rk Nemc
e basması bog˘
ca Defa bog˘
calık Defa bog˘
calık Al kazak zenne entari Al
cuka ince pullu gas
iye Orta divan gas
iye Deryakaˆri telli zenne boylu ku¨rk Mor
cuka boylu dolama Mor
cuka kısa ku¨rk Kırmızı kadife is
lenmis
kılabudan fermene Mor ve kırmızı cu¨zi
salvar Mu¨sta‘mel kılabudanlı gas
iye Astar parc
ası Defa mesturaˆt Kırmızı camedaˆn yelek maa tozluk Suˆd mai
cuka abdestlik Kılabudan harclı kadife yelek

1 aded

49 375.5 687 26 75 271 10 150 35 85 60 25 35 49 81 586.5 91 51 42 275 115 27.5 45

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


31 15 10 28 2 17 10 3 32 10

250 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Kılabudan harclı kısa entari ve yelek Bosna elması
cuka ku¨rk Mu¨sta‘mel bol yenli semmur ku¨rk Sarı I˙ngiliz
sal Abani Semmur kablı mu¨sta‘mel kısa
cepkan ku¨rk Beyaz Ahmediye Mu¨sta‘mel kırmızı
cuka boylu dolama Yes
il
cuka abdestlik Ko¨hne kırmızı ku¨rk Defa yes
il
cuka abdestlik Darc
ıni cu¨zi kısa entari S
itari ko¨hne kısa entari Atlas libade Sim kopc
alu kırmızı
cuka sıkma Mor kadife kılabudanlı dolama Mu¨sta‘mel mor kadife fermene Mu¨sta‘mel kırmızı kadife fermene Mu¨sta‘mel yes
il kadife fermene Mu¨sta‘mel zerdava ku¨rk Kadife entari maa yelek Atlas salta marka C¸uka kısa ku¨rk

2 1 aded 1 aded 1

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded

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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


2

11

15

2 3

251

3 24.5 357.5 24 23 97 190 111 17.5 83 184 185 75 450 155 45 70 23 59 61 190 29 147

APPENDICES

Sırc
a bardak Defa bog˘
calık Cu¨z
cuka sırma
semseli kaput Defa bog˘
calık Timur habzalı sandık Cu¨z
cuka sim paftalı kaput Kırmızı kadife kılabudan is
leme fermene Cu¨z
cuka mu¨sta‘mel sıkma Mai
cuka salta marka Vis
nevi
cuka sag˘ir dolama Kırmızı kadife fermene Telli zenne entari Cu¨z is
leme boylu entari Sim kılabudanlı boylu
cuka dolama Sim kılabudanlı yes
il kadife kısa entari Kırmızı
cuka fermene Selimiyye kısa entari Beyaz alaca kısa entari Kırmızı
cuka ku¨
cu¨k kaput Kırmızı
cuka cebe Yes
il
cuka boylu dolama S
am alaca kısa entari Sim kopc
alı kırmızı
cahs
ır

3 aded aded aded aded aded

5 aded 5 aded 9 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 15 aded 6 aded 5 aded 2 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus


37.5 35 15 7 175.5 19 40 7.5 100 45 20 15 20 18 150 122.5 40 700

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


30

30

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

2 1 1 6 1 1

47 30 105

252

Alaca yelek Timur habzalı sandık Zenne
salvar Yag˘lık Mu¨sta‘mel hamam go¨nlek Mu¨sta‘mel beyaz havlu I˙
sleme havlu Banbuk pes
tamal Kadife Selanikkaˆri gaˆ
siye Bog˘
ca Defa bog˘
ca Astar ve alaca parc
aları I˙pek parc
aları I˙pek kenarlı bez parc
a Go¨nlek C¸ars
eb Bir go¨nlek bezi Kılabudan is
leme zenne go¨nlek Selanikkaˆri sag˘ir yasdık yu¨zu¨ Selanikkaˆri
silte Kabaralı beysilah ve fis
enklik As
ag˘ı ayyar sim iftar sahan C¸orba tası, kapaklarıyla

1 aded 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

aded aded aded aded aded aded aded aded

2 2 1 5 2

aded aded aded aded aded

gurus
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gurus
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gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


25

16

3

253

2 aded

110 111 35.5 557 20 22.5 10 11 41 20 40 1 81 627 14.5 20 44 715 72 21 670 10 115

APPENDICES

Sim kaplı u¨zengi Mor
cuka abdestlik Defa bog˘
ca Orta kıta sim
samdan Defa go¨nlek Beyaz hassa parc
a Defa go¨nlek Defa go¨nlek Zenne go¨nlek Bog˘
ca
cars
eb Uc
kur ve omuz makreme ve is
leme bu¨ru¨ncu¨k Yag˘lık 1 aded Sim kus
ak Sim tabla Kubbe bez tob Defa bog˘
ca I˙
sleme
serbet makreme Sim leg˘en maa ibrik I˙
sleme zenne go¨nlek Sim mercanlı zarf Kırmızı
cuka orta divan gaˆ
siye Yes
il tahta sandık I˙pekli zenne
camas
ır

1 aded 6 aded

1 1 aded 1 aded 3

8 aded 86 aded 2 aded 2 aded

10 20 80 160 215 25 511 311 60 161.5 45 1.5 79.5 37 57 37 85 25 125 25.5 2,000 97 315

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
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gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


1 akc
e

25 10 30

21

254 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Defa go¨nlek Omuz makreme Bez parc
aları Sag˘ir yedek gaˆ
siye Defa yedek gaˆ
siye Darc
ıni
cuka kısa entari Mu¨sta‘mel mai
cuka semmur ku¨rk Kadıfe is
leme seccade Selanikkaˆri seccade Kırmızı ve mor kadife parc
aları Beyaz hassa is
leme entarilik Mu¨sta‘mel lahur duhan kisesi Selimiye entarilik parc
ası Ferma pes
parc
ası S
al is
leme entarilik Damgahane entarilik Selimiye entarilik Bir mikdar kılabudan-ı
serbet Mu¨sta‘mel kaput
caprazı Tel is
leme duhan kise Mor kadife fermene maa yelek ve etrafında hayret-i nısfıyye Sim sag˘ir kahve ibrik Sim sag˘ir gu¨labdan

2 aded 3 aded

2 aded 1 aded 7 aded

aded aded aded aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


57.5

gurus


6 15

8 10 10 5

255

2 3 1 1

29 75 65 5 3 70 47.5 18 30 249 20 8 1 80 75 30 35 49 27 51 20

APPENDICES

Maa buhurdan Sim tek buhurdanlık Sim macun hokkası At kus
ag˘ı Ko¨hne seped sandık I˙
sleme ko¨hne
cuka gaˆ
siye Sim tu¨kru¨k hokkası Timur habzalı sandık Kelam-ı kadim heybesi Sim divid takımı 1 Ko¨hne
camas
ır ve bez parc
aları I˙
c don maa yelek Ko¨hne seped sandık hurdasıyla Nafe ku¨rk tulum Sim kaput
semse Ko¨hne damgahane boylu entari Bindallı ko¨hne boylu entari Cild kafa ve serd ve pac
a ku¨rk parc
aları Kısa entari Sim sag˘ir tabak Boyama mendil Kebez Sim terlik tepesi

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 1

aded aded aded aded aded aded aded aded

1 3 aded

9.5 40 17.5 15.5 16 45.5 68 10

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


51 81 261 8 5 16 27 1,710 71 25 92 14 9

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus


5

10

5 30

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

3 aded 1 aded 1 aded

256

Yasdık bezi I˙pekli
cars
eb C¸ars
eb Ko¨hne ipekli
cars
eb maa sofra bog˘
ca I˙
c donu Harcıˆ Selimiye tob Siyah kadife fermene Ko¨hne don Go¨nlek Yelek Ve patos
tas
ı ko¨
seleri diz bag˘ı Sim enfiye kutusu Ufak zenne Ceneviz saati Basma ve boyama parc
a Defa cars
eb Beyaz iplik C¸ekme haˆkir parc
ası Sim ve eyvan raht maa sine-bend ve res
me Kırmızı
cuka kısa ko¨hne ku¨rk Sim sag˘ir fis
enklik Sim hırdavatı Kırmızı
cuka ko¨hne gaˆ
siye Ko¨hne don

1 aded 2

3 1 3 1 1

aded aded aded aded aded

8 1 1 1 1

aded aded aded aded aded

1 aded

gurus


65 42 188 10 43 1 27 155 195 137.5 275.5 85 25 3 351 19.5 40 115 271 15 4

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
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31

5 5 10 30

257

2 aded 3 aded 1 aded

8

APPENDICES

Kahve deg˘irmeni Mikras Bindallu boylu entari Defa bindallu boylu entari Nafe tulum maa pervaz pog˘azlık Kırmızı kadıfe
cavus

salvar Defa kırmızı kadıfe
cavus

salvar Na‘lin S
erbet makreme Sim palaska Defa sim palaska Sim En‘aˆm kisesi Kılabudan top Ortası mine sim tebelik C¸ars
eb Tahta sandık Etrafı sim kaplı sag˘ir
cekmece I˙pekli
cars
eb Haˆkir tob El cu¨zi is
leme kısa zenne ku¨rk Defa gu¨mu¨
s sag˘ir
samdan Go¨nlek Defa
cars
eb

15

gurus


1 aded

10 211 88.5 131 2.5 185 210 61 66 5 1,122 17 55 63 45 18 10 8 207 295.5 51

gurus
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1 1 1 aded 1 aded

3 aded 1 1 aded 1

15

5

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

2

258

Zenne don Yasdık kabı Defa cars
eb Mai
cuka kablı nafe abdestlik Kırmızı
cuka kaput Mai
cuka
salvar Tahta sandık Etrafı tombak pis
tahta saati Defa etrafı tombak pis
tahta saat Seri tombak nargile maa
sis
e Tuc

samdan Kabaralı kuburluk Kırmızı
cuka kabaralı gaˆ
siye Ko¨hne kısa entari Mor damgahane boylu entari Defa ku¨rk parc
aları Defa bindallı boylu entari Kırmızı kadife
salvar Nakıs
lı yemek makreme Yasdık bezi maa yag˘lık Ayyari Mısır altunu sag˘ir kus
ak Ayyari I˙slambul altunu dig˘er kus
ak Cars
aflık bez tob

1 aded 1 aded 3 aded

5 aded 1 2 2 aded 1

9 1 aded 5

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
gurus


20 18 2.5 21 8 5 60 151 66 91 34 165 60 77

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
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gurus


5

25 10 15

32

259

1 aded

30 8 15 511 12 40 56 12.5

APPENDICES

Defa cars
eb Defa cars
eb Defa havlu Mu¨sta‘mel zenne telli entari Defa timur habzalı sandık Telli ko¨hne zenne entari Kırmızı kutnıˆ zenne entari Ko¨hne don Bog˘
ca Defa go¨nlek Defa go¨nlek Defa tahta sandık Basma sofra bog˘
ca maa pes
kir Melez
cars
eb Hurdavat Ko¨hne telli entari Vis
nevi
cuka boyalı dolama Kılabudanlı siyah kadife fermene Sim sag˘ir zarf Pirinc
u¨zengi Ayyarı aˆ
sa sim tabak I˙bris
im bas
lık maa sine-bend Sim
cavus
kus
ag˘ı

2 aded 1 aded 12 1

Klaplı do¨g˘me sahan Tas kapag˘ıyla Fincan Zarf hurdavat der kutu Melez bir parc
a Harcıˆ Selimiye entari Kısa telli entari Defa telli boylu entari I˙
c donu C¸ubuklu lahur
sal Trablus kus
ak Bog˘
ca I˙pekli
cars
eb maa yasdık bezi ko¨hne havlu maa sofra bog˘
ca ve pes
kir Mesturaˆt

197.5 77

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


12 1 6 aded 7

111

gurus


16

gurus


1 aded

31 51 70 166.5 5 400 83 70 20 35

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


2 aded 1 aded 5 aded

3.5

260 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Gu¨g˘u¨n Timur u¨zengi Bakır yaldızlı sahan Tas kapag˘ıyla Defa yaldızlı leg˘en maa ibrik

2 aded

1 1 1 1

1 aded

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gurus


5 30 10 10 10

5 261

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded

14.5 13 49 70 86 401 18 38 6 20 32.5 2.5 403 219 114 154 0.5 5.5 35 91 25 69 51.5

APPENDICES

I˙
c donu Kırmızı
cuka zenne entari C¸ubuklu I˙ngiliz
sal Mor kadife zenne kısa ku¨rk Uc
ları telli yes
il sarık Defa
cubuklu lahur
sal Sag˘ir yorgan Kutnıˆ sofra bog˘
ca maa pes
kir Defa cars
eb Do¨rt taraklı
cars
eb Timur habzalı sandık Defa tahta sandık Kırmızı
cuka boylu dolama Defa
cubuklu lahur
sal Nemc
ekaˆri beyaz
cars
eb Vis
nevi
cuka
salvar Ko¨hne kayıs
sine-bend Defa kuburluk Telle eg˘er gaˆ
siyesi Lo¨k kabaralı sag˘rılık Defa melez bez parc
a Dallı I˙ngiliz
sal Dallı Nemc
e
sal

Defa yaldızlı sahan Tas hamam tas kapag˘ıyla Mu¨sta‘mel cu¨z lahur
sal C¸ubuklu Mısır kus
ak C¸ubuklu u¨c kenarlı Mısır kus
ak Nemc
ekaˆri kırmızı
sal Ko¨hne kadıfe mintan Fincan tablası Makreme maa yag˘lık Defa haˆkir tob Defa
cars
eb Defa ipekli cars
eb I˙pekli zenne
camas
ır

20 aded

6 1 1

1 1 aded

417 80 51 145 55 11.5

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


214

gurus


450 100 134 53 12 5 3.5 48 17 28 40

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


2 3

262 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Defa
cubuklu Lahur
sal Selimiyye boylu entari Defa Selimiyye boylu entari Telli boylu entari Cild-kafadane Defa tahta sandık

1 3 aded 1 4 aded 2 2 aded 4 aded 3 aded

1 aded 2 aded 1 aded

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gurus


3

10

10

263

40 50 30 23 13.5 135 14 7.5 2,445 2 8 12 57 1,706 250 99 7 4 199 15 101 26.5 50

APPENDICES

Defa zenne go¨nlek Defa go¨nlek maa ic
donu Defa go¨nlek Defa go¨nlek maa ve yag˘lık Yemeni Telli ko¨hne zenne entari Defa go¨nlek Makreme kılabudan Defa sim divan raht maa sine-bend ve res
me Defa
cars
eb Pencere perdesi Bu¨yu¨k bog˘
ca Mor kadıfe fermene Defa sim divan raht ve sıˆne-bend ve res
me Kırmızı kadıfe kılabudanlı boylu dolama Barutıˆ
cuka
salvar Defa timur u¨zengi Bakır sag˘ir
sorba tası I˙
ci kırmızı atlas
cuka binis
Sag˘ir ko¨hne entari I˙
ci atlas mai
cuka binis
Sarı sag˘ir
cuka cebe I˙
ci atlas penbe
cuka sag˘ir abdestlik

6 1 3 2 1

aded aded aded aded aded

5 aded 2 aded 1 aded 1

20 20 51.5 25 13 16.5

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


11 63 15 3 5 27.5 6 1,853 121 110 5 13.5 39 13 110 23

gurus
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gurus
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gurus


5 30 35

1 akc
e 35

10 5

264 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Mesturaˆt Uc
kur maa
serbet makreme Nakıs
lı yag˘lık Kehriba imame Uc
kur Yag˘lık Cevre Defa cars
eb Siyah kadife sag˘ir fermene Defa pencere perde Telli ko¨hne zenne papuc
Sag˘ir go¨nlek Defa
cubuk imame Defa
cars
eb Defa sim divan raht maa sine-bend ve res
me Al
cuka abdestlik Kostaki
cuka abdestlik Ko¨hne mus
amma‘ fanus Tuc
samdan Kadife sag˘ir fermene Mai
cuka sag˘ir dolama I˙
ci atlas yes
il
cuka binis
Kırmızı
cuka sag˘ir binis


2 1 4 1 1 3 1 1

aded aded aded aded aded aded aded

4 aded 3 aded 1 aded 4 aded 2 5 aded

16 15 17

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


30 52.5 358 7 91 110 12 10 43

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


7 11 60.5 4 19

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus


5 5 30 2 1

10 10 12 30

265

1

2.5 18.5 33

APPENDICES

Defa tahta sandık Defa
serbet makreme Defa kehriba imame Yag˘lık C¸evre Du¨rbu¨n Yag˘lık C¸evre Keten bezi tob Defa bez parc
aları Al
cukaya kablı semmur abdestlik Defa yag˘lık Mai
cuka mu¨sta‘mel abdestlik Al
cuka abdestlik Ko¨hne beledi yasdık kabı Defa yag˘lık Zenne don Go¨nlek Demur u¨zengi Ko¨hne gaytab dig˘er mas
k ve yasemin
cubuk Sim kopc
alı kırmızı
cuka sag˘ir potur Yes
il hassa parc
a Sarı
cuka libade

2 aded 1 aded 3 aded 3 aded 3 aded 10

3 2 aded 1 aded 4 aded

41 28 16 5

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


32 74 9 241 15 30 2,103 20 5 8 92 46 14 51 32 15 35 15.5

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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gurus
gurus


12 35 5

6

21

266 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Defa
serbet Defa kehriba imame Defa
cevre maa yag˘lık Kebez Havlu Mu¨sta‘mel yemek makreme 13 aded Telli hurda der bog˘
ca Defa
cars
eb Sim zarf I˙pek der bog˘
ca Tahta sandık hurdasıyla Sim kabaralı divan gaˆ
siye Kırmızı libade ve alaca parc
ası Defa timur u¨zengi Kutnıˆ sag˘ir entari Mu¨sta‘mel ic
i atlas kırmızı
cuka binis
Yu¨zu¨ telli sag˘ir yorgan Sag˘ir alaca yelek Erguvani sag˘ir abdestlik Mai
cuka libade Defa yag˘lık Ayı postu Defa yag˘lık

2 aded 1 1 3 aded

2 aded

1 aded 1 1 aded

gurus


35.5 4 15 14 10 11 5 15 91 80 81 5 105 10 9 900 160 15 81 300 600

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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10

267

8

APPENDICES

Uc
kur Yag˘lık Defa haˆkir tob Ko¨hne havlu ve hurdavat Bog˘
ca Sofra bog˘
ca ve yes
il bez parc
ası Defa yes
il tahta sandık Pac
a ku¨rk parc
ası ve hurda Ko¨hne bez parc
aları Mu¨sta‘mel zenne terlik Al
cuka abdestlik I˙
ci atlas al
cuka abdestlik Sarı
cuka abdestlik Kırmızı
cuka parc
a Suˆd mai
cuka abdestlik Ku¨
cu¨k entari Harcıˆ kılıc
Sim evsat raht C¸uka boylu dolama C¸uka fermene Mu¨sta‘mel
cuka cebe ku¨rk Mu¨sta‘mel cild-kafa ku¨rk Sim ufak raht maa sine-bend

2 aded 4 1 2 7 1 1

3

aded aded aded aded

80 23 27 160 5 156 90 66 18 6 13 24 5 27.5 5 3 70 16 25.5 10 151 1,400 80

gurus
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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
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10

268 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Kısa ku¨rk Defa mus
amma‘ fanus Tuc

samdan maa tas ve sandık I˙
ci atlas penbe
cuka binis
Defa bog˘
ca Benefs
e renk
cuka sag˘ir
salvar I˙
ci atlas al
cuka sag˘ir binis
Defa
serbet makreme Defa kehriba imame Defa bog˘
ca Ko¨hne havlu ve bog˘
ca Terlik maa babuc
ve boyama yag˘lık Defa ic
donu I˙pek go¨nlek Defa go¨nlek Basma bog˘
ca Al tuman cahs
ır maa mest Defa sofra bog˘
ca ve pes
kir Minderlik bez tob Defa tahta sandık Mu¨sta‘mel cu¨zi vas
ak ku¨rk Sim divan raht ve sine-bend Darc
ıni
cuka abdestlik

8 aded

2 aded 4 aded

26.5 7 2 2.5 75 3 479 150 100

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


APPENDICES

Mai
cuka ko¨hne yasdık kabı Ko¨hne bez parc
ası Bez
silte Tahta sandık Sarı
cuka abdestlik Tahta sandık Kırmızı
cuka zardava ku¨rk I˙pekli bas
lık ve sine-bend Harcıˆ kehriba imame

269

E. Confiscated properties of Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a2.

1 1 3 aded 1 aded 1 aded 11 12 aded 2 12 aded 4 aded 3 aded 1 aded 3 aded

77.5 70.5 30 150 30 70 47 43 26.5 51 150 15 39 23

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gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


550

gurus


221 13 14 45

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

2 aded 2 aded 1 aded 5 aded 2 11 aded 2 aded

270

Bakır gu¨g˘u¨m Kuzu lenger kapag˘ıyla Yapag˘ıyla minder Defa yapag˘ıyla minder Kumas
alaca
silte Ko¨hne yasdık Kebir maa sag˘ir minder Ko¨hne kec
e maa kilim parc
aları Tahtıvan ko¨hne kırmızı
cuka maa mak‘ad C¸alar saat Defa yapag˘ıyla minder Basma yorgan Defa basma yorgan Siyah
cuka mak‘ad Mu¨sta‘mel katife yasdık C¸ic
ekli
silte Defa mu¨sta‘mel katife yasdık Marsivan Sag˘ir yasdık Kilim mak‘ad maa kilim parc
ası Bakır hamam leg˘en Bakır pide tepsi

1 1 1 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10

210 150 157 30 50.5 45 42.5 26.5 26.5 50 50 26

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10

271

32 aded 4 1 1 1 aded 1 1 1 aded 1 aded 3 aded 3 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 1 aded 1 aded

22.5 40 7 19 10

APPENDICES

Bakır leg˘en maa ibrik Bakır orta tepsi Sag˘ir bakrac Defa bakrac Pirinc
taka tuka maa demir iskemle Sahan kapag˘ı Kase Hamam leg˘en Susak Haˆvan S
amdan Bakır
co¨mlek Bakır kazan Defa bakır kazan Bakır ibrik Defa ibrik Kebir tencere Kuzu tencere Pak leg˘en Defa basma yorgan Defa yapag˘ıyla minder Defa yapag˘ıyla minder Defa kalic
e seccade

5 aded 1 aded 1 aded 2 aded 1 aded 4 aded 1 aded 2 aded 4 aded 4 aded 3 2 aded

10.5 10 19 20 25.5 64 77 35 18 120 54 49 42 27.5 42.5 50.5 46.5 37 36 35 51 21 30

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

1 aded 1 aded 1 1 2 aded 1 aded 7 aded 1 aded

272

Ko¨hne sag˘ir yorgan Kırmızı ko¨hne ihram maa
cerge Ko¨hne yorgan maa kalic
e
silte Defa pak leg˘en Sag˘ir leg˘en Defa meydan tepsi Kapaklı sahan Bakır mangal Kebir kantar Defa kapaklı sahan maa tencere ve pultabe Bakır-ı Harrani Defa Harrani Burunlu gu¨g˘u¨m Defa hamam leg˘en Kebir bakır lenger Kebir tencere kapag˘ıyla Defa tencere kapag˘ıyla Defa lenger Defa lenger Defa basma yorgan Marsavan do¨
sek Ko¨hne
cit yorgan Defa ko¨hne yorgan

1 aded 1 aded 2 aded 4 aded 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 2 aded 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


30

15

273

2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 6 aded 1 aded 2 aded 2 aded 2 aded

65 31.5 50 41 56 81 110 161 50 60 50 32.5 24 15 35 46 50 50 43.5 200 44.5 51 16

APPENDICES

S
ehirko¨y kilim Kebir pak leg˘en Defa pide tepsi Derin tepsi Defa kebir tencere Defa kapaklı sahan 4 aded, kase 1, tepsi 1 Defa kazan Kebir kazan Defa pak leg˘en Kara maa kalaylı gu¨g˘u¨m Defa bakır-ı Harrani Defa kebir tencere kapag˘ıyla Pultabe maa sag˘ir derin tepsi Pilav tencere Pultabe maa tencere Defa tencere Defa minder Defa minder Defa sahan Defa meydan tepsi C¸arhlı bakrac
Defa kapaklı tencere Topraklı tabe

1 1 1 1

aded aded aded aded aded aded aded

aded aded aded aded

20.5

gurus


5 7.5 4.5 3 2 4 12 18 7 4.5 4 6.5 6 10 1.5 14 30 101 60 50 19.5

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


1

38 5 1 5 1

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

274

Defa kantar Sepaye Tabla Kavaˆl tu¨feng Kılıc
Defa kılıc
Defa kılıc
Defa kılıc
Yasdık bezi maa bez parc
a C¸uka boylu maa kısa ku¨rdıˆ Yes
il sac
ak maa bez parc
ası Sırc
alar der zenbil Hırdavat der kutu Seped sandık hurdasıyla Kısa
cuka ku¨rdıˆ Tahta sandık hurdasıyla Defa tahta sandık hurdasıyla Pis
tahta devaˆt S
is
e maa tabaklar ve kutular Sim paftalı kılıc
Defa sim paftalı kılıc
Sofra bog˘
ca Yes
il
serbet makreme

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 7 aded der kutu 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 1

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


5

5 7 5 5

275

12 30 1,200 28 1,130 640 12 50 40 43.5 50 30 15 13.5 4 1.5 2 4 12 48 8 11 222

APPENDICES

Fes o¨rtu¨ Defa
serbet makreme Kadife entari Pes
kir Sim raht maa sine-bend ve sag˘rılık I˙ncu¨ pafta kolanıyla Zu¨mru¨d yu¨zu¨k Zu¨mru¨d ku¨pe maa askı Altun corse Melez bezi parc
a C¸uka ferace Beyaz zenne entari maa yelek Bez parc
a Bosnakaˆri tu¨fenk Sag˘ir kılıc
Defa kılıc
Defa kılıc
Yes
il kalpak Yemeni maa kısa ku¨rdıˆ Ayineli sag˘ir pis
tahta Defa sag˘ir pis
tahta C¸uka parc
aları maa sac
ak Sim kabza ve paftalı kılıc


1 aded 1 aded

2 2 aded 1 aded 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 1 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


1 30

10

10 15 6 1 30

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

1 aded

57 124 21 25 23 170 87 101 13 60 10 10 10 5 1.5 3.5 33.5 7 12 5.5 33 2 70

276

Defa sofra bohc
a Cedid abanıˆ Hamam go¨nlek yakası Telli bog˘
ca Mai fes bog˘
cası Kılabudanlı gas
iye Altun kakma kehriba imame Defa kehriba imame Sade bez parc
a Kapak maa kakma kehriba imame Kırmızı
cuka kısa ku¨rk kabı Kırmızı fermene Sag˘ir beyaz entari Ko¨hne bog˘
ca maa yemeni Sag˘ir yelek Filinta Defa Bosnakaˆri tu¨fenk Defa kılıc
Ko¨hne kısa entari Don maa bez parc
a Defa kalic
e seccade Defa kılıc
Yes
il sandık

2 aded 1 aded 2 aded 8 aded 9 aded der kutu 1 1 1 aded 1 aded

1 aded 5 aded 14 aded maa du¨g˘me 40 aded 2 aded 2, maa havlu

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10 5

1

1 31 2

277

1 aded 1 aded

6 12 8 1 4 25 16.5 220 13 30 15 62 33 119 81 142 50 33.5 16 26 4 1 2

APPENDICES

Sag˘ir yasdık maa ko¨hne entari ve bog˘
ca Yes
il sac
ak parc
a Bez parc
aları Sag˘ir sandık Defa sandık Sag˘ir tabak Fincan Sim kabza ve paftalı kılıc
Mai eg˘er
silte Mu¨nakkas

serbet makreme Sim is
leme pec
e Sim do¨g˘meli kabudanlık Delaˆilu¨’l-hayrat Sim setme maa incu¨ bas
lı
cic
eg˘i ve saat kesesi Sim enfiye kutusu Sim kakma maa kehriba imame Sim kopc
a Kafes bez parc
a Sag˘ir entari maa bog˘
ca Havlu makreme Filinta Defa kılıc
Kebir bıc
ak

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 2, maa kısa ku¨rk 1 aded 2 aded 3 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10 5

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

1 aded 2, maa susak

23.5 6 2 6.5 3 20 9 7 8 321 13 150 3 105 107.5 171 20 9 120 7.5 37 19 40

278

Nemc
e alaca zenne entari Nemc
e alaca kısa entari Dimi maa bez parc
ası Hurdavat ve sag˘ir sandık Ag˘ac
su¨bha Tencere Du¨rbu¨n maa
cini hokka Kara takım kılıc
Defa kılıc
Sim
sis
Telli bog˘
ca Sim kapaklı palaska Yes
il sandık Mercan tesbih Kehriba imame Defa kehriba imame Saat bag˘ı Nafe tesbih Yes
il
cuka nafe ku¨rk Defa basma yorgan Telli sag˘ir yorgan Zeytunıˆ
cuka
salvar Penbe der bog˘
ca

1 aded 3 aded, maa mai
cuka 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 2 aded, maa sade 3 1 1 1 aded 2 aded 1 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


28.5 61 165

gurus
gurus
gurus


40 8 20 33.5 70 35 31

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10

39

gurus


39

5

279

2 aded 9 aded 1

26.5 169 56 13 180 181 27 23

APPENDICES

Defa kalic
e seccade Al
cuka mak‘ad Zeyli Hamam leg˘en Vis
nevi
cuka semmur ku¨rdıˆ Kılabudanlı semmur kısa ku¨rdıˆ Sarı alacalı kus
ak Mu¨nakkas
makreme Havlu Kebez Yas
mak Sarı sag˘ir zenne entari Telli sarı zenne entari Cars
eb Yasdık bezi Gedik maa babuc ve terlik ve hurda Alaca kısa entari Beyaz zenne entari Kırmızı
cuka binis
Kahvaˆi
cuka
salvar Yorgan cars
ebi Ko¨hne makreme C¸ars
eb

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 2 aded 1 5 aded 3 aded 1 aded

2 aded 1 2

18 17 41 47 42 44.5 284 38

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


20 20 100 10 2 8 20 30 17 15 3

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


14

gurus


10 30

30 10 10 2 10 10 10

280 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Bir makar penbe maa sag˘ir bog˘
ca Kısa entari Penbe renk
cuka ku¨rdıˆ Kilim Kalic
e seccade Bez parc
a Kılabudanlı zenne entari Zenne
saˆli sag˘ir entari Havlu Yasdık bezi Kebez maa yas
mak ve do¨
seme Beyaz alaca zenne entari Bog˘
ca Fes o¨rtu¨ maa bez parc
ası Bog˘
ca Zenne alaca yelek Pes
kir Futa maa pes
tamal Al
cuka bes
ik o¨rtu¨ Ko¨hne bir dimi Yemeni Makreme Bog˘
ca

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 2 aded

1 aded

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10

30

30

39 281

1 aded

53.5 120 20 40 40 41.5 111 90 20 4 32 40 67 567 123 20 5 22 27 12 29 20 66

APPENDICES

Kırmızı
cuka
cahs
ır Lahori
cuka ku¨rdıˆ Defa kalic
e seccade Defa seccade Defa seccade Defa zeylıˆ Telli yorgan Vis
nevi
cuka
salvar I˙
sleme havlu Sag˘ir zenne basma dimi Sade bez parca Kırmızı
cuka potur
cahs
ır Kılabudanlı sag˘ir zenne entari Kılabudanlı boylu semmur ku¨rdıˆ Beyaz
sali entari Pes
kir maa zenne go¨nlek Alaca kısa entari Su pes
kir Beyaz kısa entari Mai
cuka cebe Tu¨tu¨n kise ve bog˘ca Kırmızı telli kus
ak Vis
nevi
cuka parc
a

1 aded 1 1 aded 1 aded

2 3 aded 1 aded 5 aded 1 aded 4 aded 1 aded 3 aded

25 30.5

gurus
gurus


25 9 24 24 13 51 50 65 36 171 21 20.5 16 48 14.5 60 18 12 2.5 6

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


10

30 39 5

10 1

282 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Mai
cuka boylu ku¨rdıˆ Defa kilim Go¨nlek Yag˘lık Yemeni Telli sag˘ir yorgan Kırmızı kadife sag˘ir fermene Fes o¨rtu¨ maa bog˘
ca ve bez parc
ası Sarı basma zenne yelek Lahur
sali entari Beyaz zenne entari Zenne go¨nlek Yes
il
cuka ferace Su pes
kir Kırmızı
cuka
salvar Sag˘ir bog˘
ca Mor
cuka cebe Su¨bha maa akik tas
Servi sandık Kebir vezne Tabanca Kırmızı yu¨n S
erbet parc
ası

1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded

8 aded 2 aded

3 maa hurdavat

63 4 6 5 5 12

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


16 5 30 15 39 11 15 15 5 35

22 30 5 20

283

23 aded 10 aded

20 5 5 3 5 19 16 5 9.5 6 4 19 12 25 16 2

APPENDICES

Kehriba imame Beraber terazu Bakır ibrik Timur mangal Demur leg˘en maa eg˘erler C¸it
silte Hamam kiseler maa
cic
ekli Mes
in maa kag˘ıd Ko¨hne
sal C¸uka kenarı maa hırdavat Kalemler maa mismar ve hurda Tahta sandık maa hurda Kaplan post Mu¨hu¨r yu¨zu¨k Yaldızlı go¨bek Birgivi risalesi Kutu maa hurdavat Lu¨leler maa imameler der sandık Sag˘ir kutu Sag˘ir vezne maa tas Bir mikdar lif I˙mame etekleri dizi Sir ve zeynıˆ pes
tamal

2 aded 5 aded 2 aded 1 aded 1 2 aded 1 aded 1 aded 1 aded 4 aded 2 aded 1 aded 5 aded

29 12 7 20 8 20

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


39 5

10 8 10 10 10 14 17 5 40.5 71 60 50

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


5 16 39 15 10 39 10

15 7

gurus
gurus


1

5 5

284 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

Bir mikdar klabdan-ı
serbet Penbe kabiha maa penbe Tahta sandık Beyaz kebe Hurdavat Vezne Tas Tabanca Makreme Cehreler maa mackalar Bez libade Kırmızı
cuka mak‘ad C¸ekmece Kılabudanlı yelek maa
cubuk Defa vezne Bir mikdar darc
ın Defa kapaklı sahan Hurda elmaslı
cic
ek maa tas
lı
cic
ek Mercan tesbih Sim palaska Bog˘
ca Makreme Atik akc
e

150 33 2 1 1 aded

187.5 49.5 90 30 30

gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus
gurus


APPENDICES

Demir kıyye Ufak ekser kıyye Boylu tu¨fenk Kısa tu¨fenk Yes
il sandık

285

Mai
cuka kaplı ic
i kedi ve yaka zag˘rası semmur kısa ku¨rk Kırmızı Lahur taklidi
sal Kırmızı kutni alaca kısa entari Mu¨stamel mai binis
Filiz renkli mu¨sta‘mel
cuka
salvar Yes
il
cuka boylu dolama Yes
il
cukaya kaplu nafe kontos
ku¨rk Yes
il
cukaya kaplı zerdaˆva ko¨hne pac
a boylu ku¨rk Erguvanıˆ
cuka takye Tu¨rkıˆ tarih cild Nakıs
lı yag˘lık Defa yag˘lık Nakıs
lı ku¨rre Nakıs
lı uc
kur Bez don Cedid iplikli go¨nlek Ku¨
cu¨k bog˘
ca Gurus
Tam I˙stanbul altunu Nısfıˆ Rub-ı I˙slaˆmbul Tam Mısır altunu

286 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

F. Confiscated properties of Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey3. 1 aded 1 1 1 1

aded aded aded aded

1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

aded aded maa S
uruˆt-ı Salve aded aded aded aded aded aded aded

25 aded 4 aded 2 aded

550 279

gurus
gurus


25 aded 19 aded 1 aded 20 aded 1 aded 1 aded 15,5 aded 3 aded

168 47.5

gurus
gurus


72.5

gurus


254

gurus


APPENDICES

Fındık rub‘u Barbut-ı Mısır Adlıˆ Adlıˆ rub‘u Kulb-ı adlıˆ Kulb-ı yaldız Riyal Budin gurus
rub‘u

287

NOTES

Introduction 1. Mark A. Weitz, ‘Desertion as Mutiny: Upcountry Georgians in the Army of Tennessee,’ in Jane Hathaway (ed.), Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective (Westport, Connecticut; London: Praeger Publishers, 2001), p. 3. 2. Jane Hathaway, ‘Introduction,’ in Jane Hathaway (ed.), Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 2002), p. 1. 3. David J.B. Trim, ‘Ideology, Greed, and Social Discontent in Early Modern Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands, 1568– 1609,’ in Hathaway, Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention, p. 53. 4. Jane Hathaway, ‘Introduction,’ in Hathaway, Mutiny and Rebellion, p. 4. 5. Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768– 2004 (Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), p. 3. 6. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century 1830–1930 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 50–5, 250–5. 7. Palmira Brummett, ‘Classifying Ottoman Mutiny: The Act and Vision of the Rebellion,’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 22(1) (1988), p. 106. 8. Seth Meisel, ‘The Politics of Seduction: Mutiny and Desertion in Early Nineteenth Century Co´rdoba, Argentina,’ in Hathaway, Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention, pp. 133– 4. 9. Jane Hathaway, ‘Introduction,’ in Hathaway, Mutiny and Rebellion, p. 5.

NOTES TO PAGES 7 –10

289

10. BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832. 11. Jane Hathaway, ‘Introduction,’ in Hathaway, Mutiny and Rebellion, p. 5. 12. Jane Hathaway, ‘Introduction,’ in Hathaway, Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention, p. xi. 13. Ibid., p. xii. 14. Virginia H. Aksan, ‘Manning A Black Sea Garrison in the Eighteenth Century: Ochakov and Concepts of Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Context,’ in Hathaway, Mutiny and Rebellion, p. 64. 15. Halil I˙nalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943). 16. Ibid., pp. 109– 11. 17. Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 18. Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540– 1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 19. Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700– 1922 (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 48. 20. Karen Barkey, ‘Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire,’ American Sociological Review, 56(6) (1991), p. 703. 21. Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520– 1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 301– 2. 22. The ‘periodization of the Ottoman Empire’ is one of the key issues on which a rich debate exists. Studies constituting a scholarly discussion framework question the classical approach to the practice that classifies more than six centuries of Ottoman history into three clear-cut distinct periods: first a nomadic tribe succeeded by a centralized empire followed by a decentralizing, declining, and yet reforming state. Bernard Lewis not only stereotyped this approach in his article in 1962, but also put forward the parameters of ‘the decline literature’. For more information, see Bernard Lewis, ‘Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline,’ Islamic Studies, 1 (1962), pp. 71 – 87. On the other hand, that idea is strongly criticized by some Ottoman scholars such as Suraiya Faroqhi. See ‘Crisis and Change,’ in Halil I˙nalcık and Donald Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300– 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 413– 4, 468– 70; Leslie P. Pierce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 153– 85; Douglas A. Howard, ‘Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of “Decline” of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,’ Journal of Asian History, 22 (1988), pp. 52 – 77; Jane Hathaway, ‘Problems of Periodization in Ottoman History: The Fifteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries,’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 20(2) (1996), pp. 25 – 31.

290

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

NOTES TO PAGES 10 –14 Cemal Kafadar calls the situation ‘the myth of the myth of the golden age’ and argues that the myth of the golden age is a suitable plan for modern scholarship which sees ‘Ottoman historical consciousness as static, uninnovative, tradition-bound and more important, a unitary, monochrome universe made up of a single cloth’. For more information see Cemal Kafadar, ‘The Myth of the Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Su¨leymanic Era,’ in Halil I˙nalcık and Cemal Kafadar (eds) Su¨leyman the Second and His Time (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993), p. 3. Bruce McGowan, ‘The Age of the Ayans, 1699– 1812,’ in Halil I˙nalcık and Donald Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300– 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 659– 60. Traian Stoianovich, ‘Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600– 1800,’ The Journal of Economic History, 13 (1953), pp. 398– 411. Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Vilayetski Ajani (Prilog I˙zucˇavanju Organizacije Tuske Vlasti u Nasˇim Zemljama),’ Godisˇnijak Drusˇtva Istoricˇara Bosne i Hercegovine, 13 (1962), pp. 188– 198. See also Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Promjene u Sistemu Izvanrednog Oporezivanju u Turskog u XVII Vijeku i Pojava Nameta Tekaˆlif-i Saˆkka,’ Prilozi Za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 10 –11 (1960 –1), pp. 75 – 112. Avdo Suc´eska, Ajani Prilog Izucˇavanju Lokalne Vlasti u Nasˇim Zemljama Za Vrijeme Turaka (Sarajevo: Naucˇno Drusˇtvo sr Bosne i Hercegovine, 1965), pp. 197– 200, ff. Vera E´.P. Mutafc´ieva, ‘L’Institution de l’Ayanlık pendant les Dernie`res De´cennies du XVIIIe Siecle,’ E´tudes Balkaniques, 2 – 3 (1965), pp. 246–7. Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler (Istanbul: Istanbul Gu¨zel Sanatlar Akademisi Yayınları, 1965), pp. 317– 23. Yu¨cel O¨zkaya, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Aˆyaˆnlık (Ankara: A. U¨. Dil ve TarihCog˘rafya Faku¨ltesi Yayınları, 1977), pp. 16 – 18, 305– 9. Deena R. Sadat, ‘Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century,’ The Journal of Modern History, 44(3) (1972), pp. 347–8. Gilles Veinstein, ‘Aˆyaˆn de la Region d’Izmir et le Commerce du Levant (Deuxie`me Moitie´ du XVIII. Sie`cle),’ Revue de l’Occident Musulman et de la Mediterrane´e, 20 (1975), pp. 131– 46. Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600– 1700,’ Archivum Ottomanicum, 6 (1980), pp. 283– 337. Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration,’ in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds), Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illionis University Press, 1977), pp. 27 – 8. Ibid., pp. 30 – 4. Mustafa Akdag˘, ‘Osmanlı Tarihinde Ayanlık Du¨zeni Devri 1730– 1839,’ Tarih Arastırmaları Dergisi, viii – xii (1975), pp. 51 – 61. Halil Berktay, ‘Three Empires and the Societies they Governed: Iran, India and the Ottoman Empire,’ in Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi (eds), New

NOTES TO PAGES 14 –17

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47. 48.

291

Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 250– 4. Huri I˙slamog˘lu and C¸ag˘lar Keyder, ‘Agenda for Ottoman History,’ in I˙slamog˘lu-I˙nan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 53 – 62. Bruce McGowan, ‘The Age of the Ayans, 1699– 1812,’ in I˙nalcık and Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 659– 63. Mehmed Genc, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Devlet ve Ekonomi (I˙stanbul: O¨tu¨ken Yayınları, 2000), pp. 99 –104. Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 229– 42. Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century,’ in Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (eds) The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography (Leiden, Boston, Cologne: Brill, 2002), pp. 366– 8. Ibid., p. 380. I discuss this theory in detail later in the chapter. With the term ‘especially’ I do not mean that these systems were only applied in Bosnia, but rather that, although there were some restricted applications in other parts of the empire, it was the province of Bosnia that became particularly famous through these applications. Halil I˙nalcık mentions Ottoman pragmatism and flexibility in Ottoman methods of conquest in the fifteenth century. For more information see Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest,’ Studia Islamica, 2 (1954), pp. 104– 29. However recent studies, such as that of Ga´bor A´goston, show us that this preference of the state was not restricted to the fifteenth century. It was rather a general characteristic of the empire until the centralization policies of the nineteenth century began. Ga´bor A´goston, ‘A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers,’ in Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens (eds), Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), p. 27. Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Comments on Contributions and the Borderlands,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, pp. 9 – 10. For example, concentrating on the case of Transjordan, Eugene Rogan shows how the state restructured itself during the last decades of the empire. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Transjordan was a frontier region of the Ottoman province of Syria. However, international challenges to the empire during the period led the Ottoman authorities to extend their rule over the region due to its strategic location, linking Syria to Palestine and Arabia. For more information see Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850– 1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Isa Blumi’s study on Yemen and Northern Albania shows us that during the

292

49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58.

NOTES TO PAGES 17 –20 centralizing mission of the late nineteenth century, ‘the Ottoman state attempted to impose a system of regulation that required a more extensive bureaucracy than it could provide’. Blumi calls this a failure of state and says that, ‘as a consequence, the ambitions of Istanbul’s bureaucratic elite gave rise to a complex parallel economy, which specifically sought to avoid state-building measures. Ultimately the state’s lack of manpower and the sophistication of local populations endangered even the ability of imperial reformers to maintain any meaningful presence in the distant territories.’ Isa Blumi, ‘Thwarting the Ottoman Empire: Smuggling through the Empire’s New Frontiers in Yemen and Albania, 1878– 1910,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, p. 273. Maurus Reinkowski, ‘Double Struggle, No Income: Ottoman Borderlands in Northern Albania,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, pp. 252– 3. Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms; The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller, trans. Anne Tdeschi and John Tedeschi (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Carnival: A People’s Uprising at Romans 1579– 1580, trans. Mary Feeney (London: Scholar, 1980); The Beggar and the Professor: A Sixteenth-Century Family Saga, trans. Arthur Golhammer (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Natalie Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983); Women on the Margins: Three Seventeenth-Century Lives (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997). George Duby, The Legend of Bouvines: War, Religion, and Culture in the Middle Ages, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (California, California: University of California Press, 1990). Peter Burke, ‘Overture: the New History,’ in Peter Burke (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Oxford & Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 4. I should mention some of them: Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims’ Denial of a Nation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996); Adem Handzic, Population of Bosnia in the Ottoman Period: A Historical Overview (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1994); Michael R. Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia (Leiden, New York and Cologne: Brill, 1997); Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia from the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi Books, 2007); Ivan Lovrenovic´, Bosnia: A Cultural History (London: Saqi Books, 2001); Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York, New York: New York University Press, 1999); Yuzo Nagata, Materials on the Bosnian Notables (Tokyo: Hakuei Printing, 1979); I˙smet Binark, Bosna-Hersek ile I˙lgili Arsiv Belgeleri: 1516–1919 (Ankara: Basbakanlık Osmanlı Arsiv Daire Baskanlıg˘ı, 1992). Noel Malcolm, ‘Preface,’ in Markus Koller and Kemal H. Karpat (eds), Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. vii. Ibid., pp. vii – viii. For more information about these claims see Norman Cigar, ‘Serbia’s Orientalists and Islam: Making Genocide Intellectually Respectable,’ Islamic

NOTES TO PAGES 20 –21

59. 60.

61. 62.

63.

293

Quarterly: Review of Islamic Culture, 38(3) (1994), pp. 147– 70, quoted in Noel Malcolm, ‘Preface,’ in Koller and Karpat, Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. viii. Bozˇidar Jezernik, Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers (London: Saqi Books, 2004), pp. 40 – 1. Midhat Sˇamic´, Francuski Putnici u Bosni na Pragu XIX Stoljec´a i nijhovi Utisci o Njoj (Sarajevo: Veselin Maslesˇa, 1966), pp. 265– 6. This work of Midhat Sˇamic´ is very important in representing the interests of French travellers in Bosnia at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. We learn from this work that, in the eyes of local people as well as in the eyes of central authorities, travellers and consuls were seen as unreliable and as spies who were collecting information for possible occupiers. For instance, at the end of the eighteenth century when a French consul, Felix, was appointed to Bosnia, he waited in vain for his ferman from the Sultan, who did not sign it, in spite of all efforts of the consul in Istanbul. Ibid., p. 182. Jean Baptiste-Ame´de´e Chaumette des Fosse´s, Voyage en Bosnie dans les Anne´es 1807 et 1808 (Paris: F.-Didot, 1816). The chronicle consists of two volumes. While the first volume was published in 1291/1874; the second volume is only the manuscript copy in the I˙stanbul Millet Ku¨tu¨phanesi Ali Emiri Tarih Kitapları, no. 603. While the first volume focuses on the period between 1217– 65/1802– 48/9 the second volume is about the period between 1265– 77/1848/9– 61. In this study, I use the first volume of this chronicle; Belgradıˆ Rasid. Vak‘a-i Hayretnu¨ma (Istanbul, 1291). Mehmed Emin Isevic´ was born in the second half of the eighteenth century as a member of an ulema family, most of whom were primarily kadıs. He lived in a period when problems in Bosnia, especially with the Ottoman centre, were gradually growing. Due to his critical approach to state policies in Bosnia, he was arrested and banished from Bosnia, but he managed to return and started to struggle with abuses there. Soon he enjoyed a great deal of support from local people, and was deemed dangerous for the Porte and again it was decided to exile him. He was banished in 1809 to the island of Limnos, where he wrote this Ahval-i Bosna and submitted it directly to the Sultan as a kind of petition for his pardon. In this work, he attacked kadıs and muftis most bitterly, accusing those classes of thinking only of bribery and of abandoning justice completely. According to him the muderrises were also behaving carelessly while about their basic task; that is, educating pupils and the people generally. The liva alaybeys were also obtaining their posts not by ability but bribery, according to him. His next severe criticism was directed towards the collectors of cizye. He argued that cizyedars were collecting cizyes arbitrarily from children and old men and, because of this, the dissatisfied reaya were fleeing from Bosnia. He accused the mutevellis of misusing vakıf properties, the kapudans of forgetting their primary duty of defence and of wallowing in luxury, and the janissaries for pushing ¨ niversitesi Bosnia into chaos. Mehmed Emin Isevic´. Ahval-i Bosna. I˙stanbul U Ku¨tu¨phanesi, Anonim Yazma no. 6647. For more information about Mehmed

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64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

NOTES TO PAGES 21 – 24

Emin Isevic´ and his work, see Ahmed Alicˇic´, ‘Manuskript Ahval-i Bosna Od Muhameda Emina Isevic´a (Pocˇ. XIX V.) Uvod, Prevod s Turskog i Napomene,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 32 – 33 (1982– 3). Mula Mustafa Basˇeskija, Ljetopis (1746 –1804), prijevod s Turskog, uvod i komentar, Mehmed Mujezinovic´ (Sarajevo: Sarajevo-Publishing, 1997). Hatice Oruc, ‘Tarih-i Bosna,’ Tarih Arastırmaları Dergisi, 32 (2002), p. 215. Salih Sıdkı Hadzˇihuseinovic´ Muvekkit, Povijest Bosne, II Volumes, prevodioci, Abdullah Polimac, Lamija Hadzˇiosmanovic´, Fehim Nametak, Salih Trako (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999). Muvekkit was born in 1825 in Sarajevo; his family moved there from a small city of Bosnia called C¸aynice. He took medrese education and later was interested in astronomy. In 1859 he started to work in the first clock room, Muvakkithane of Sarajevo, as timekeeper or muvakkit; hence his nickname. His work included the preparation of the calendars which featured time-tables for prayers. Mainly for this reason, he is very careful about giving detailed information about time when mentioning events in his chronicle. For more information about his biography see Hatice Oruc, ‘Tarih-i Bosna,’ pp. 215– 23. See for example Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Specificˇnosti Drzˇavno-Pravnog Polozˇaja Bosne pod Turcima (Skiza),’ Godisˇnjak Pravnog Fakulteta u Sarajevu, 9 (1961), pp. 269– 72; 10 (1962), pp. 317– 61; 12 (1964), pp. 100–14. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine (Sarajevo: Orijentalni Institut u Sarajevu, 1996), p. 415 ff. Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek (Istanbul: Nurgo¨k Matbaası, 1965), p. 72 ff. Mustafa Imamovic´, Historija Bosˇnjaka (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1997), p. 25 ff. Colin Heywood, ‘Bosnia Under Ottoman Rule, 1463– 1800,’ in Mark Pinson (ed.), The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 40. Nenad Moacˇanin, ‘Defterology and Mythology Ottoman Bosnia up to the Tanzıˆmaˆt,’ in Kemal and Karpat, Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. 189. Srec´ko Dzˇaja, ‘Bosanska Povijesna Stvarnost i njezini Mitolosˇki Odrazi,’ Bosna Franciscana, 17 (2002), p. 153 –5. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine, p. 415. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Ured¯enje Bosanskog Ejaleta od 1789 do 1878. Godine (Sarajevo: Orijentalni Institut u Sarajevu, 1983), p. 19. Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 179. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2. Izdanje, 1980). Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Esnafi i Obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini 1463– 1878 (Sarajevo: Veselin Maslesˇa, 1991). Hamdija Kapicˇic´, Ali Pasa Rızvanbegovic i Njegovo Doba (Sarajevo: Akademija Nauak I Umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 2001).

NOTES TO PAGES 24 –30

295

81. Rifa’at ‘Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 2. 82. Moacˇanin cites the studies of Ahmed Alicˇic´ for the mythologization of Bosnia. Nenad Moacˇanin, ‘Defterology and Mythology Ottoman Bosnia up to the Tanzıˆmaˆt,’ in Koller and Karpat, Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. 189. 83. Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek (Istanbul: Nurgo¨k Matbaası, 1965) p. 72 ff. 84. Ibid., p. 115. 85. Koller and Karpat, Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril. 86. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York, New York: Colombia University Press, 1994). 87. Pinson, The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 88. Aydın Babuna, Bir Ulusun Dog˘usu Gecmisten Gu¨nu¨mu¨ze Bosnaklar (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000). 89. Basbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi Rehberi, prepared by Hacı Osman Yıldırım, Nazım Yılmaz, Yusuf I˙hsan Genc (Istanbul: T.C. Basbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel Mu¨du¨rlu¨g˘u¨, 2000), pp. 443– 4. 90. Ibid., p. 441. 91. Stephen Schwartz, ‘Beyond “Ancient Hatreds”’: What Really Happened to Yugoslavia,’ Policy Review, 97 (1999), p. 41. For a survey about the status of Ottoman documents in the archives of Sarajevo after the war, see Arifa Ramovic´ and Markus Koller, ‘Ottoman Archival Documents in Sarajevo. A Post-War Survey of the Archives,’ Turcica, 33 (2001), pp. 321–32. 92. For more information about BMIP see Andra´s Riedlmayer, ‘The Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project,’ in Koller and Karpat, Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, pp. 27 – 33.

Chapter 1

Bosnia: Geography and Society

1. Tursun Bey, Taˆrıˆh-i Ebu¨’l-Feth (ed. A. Mertol Tulum) (I˙stanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1977), p. 111 b, in original metin, and p. 122, in the transcription. ‘The land of Bosnia is a spacious region, chiefly consisting of great mountains. With its high mountains and impregnable fortresses, it is a region that has silver and gold mines. Thanks to the purity of its water and air, it became the source of attractive people, so that if one were to search for a metaphor for someone’s attractiveness it could be said that she [sic.] “resembles a Bosnian Beauty”.’ This is a widespread saying. The features of these handsome young men and graceful young women, that they are ‘tall, with rosy cheeks, a fair complexion and slender, supple figure, and blue eyes, are well-known and plain to see.’ The English version of the text is taken from Snjezˇana Buzov, ‘Ottoman Perceptions of Bosnia as Reflected in the Works of Ottoman

296

2.

3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

NOTES TO PAGES 30 –32 Authors Who Visited or Lived in Bosnia,’ in Markus Koller and Kemal H. Karpat (eds), Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 84. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol. I, translated from the French by Siaˆn Reynolds (New York, Cambridge, Philadelphia, San Francisco, London, Mexico City, Sa˜o Paulo, Singapore, Sydney: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), p. 239. Ami Boue´, La Turquie d’Europe, ou Observations sur La Ge´ographie, La Ge´ologie, L’histoire Naturelle, La Statisque, Les Moeurs, Les Coutumes, L’arhe´ologie, L’agriculture, L’industrie, Le Commerce, Les Gouvernements Divers, Le Clerge´, L’histoire de L’e´tat Politique de cet Empire, 4 vols (Paris: Arthus Bertrand E´diteur, 1840), pp. 5– 6. Justin McCarthy, ‘Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878,’ in Mark Pinson (ed.), The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1994), p. 71. Traian Stoianovich, Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 1. BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826. Matija Mazˇuranic´, A Glance into Ottoman Bosnia or A Short Journey into That Land by A Native in 1839– 40, trans. Branka Magasˇ (London: Saqi, 2007), pp. 7 – 16. Ibid., pp. 73 – 4. BOA HAT 426/21862 S, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/15 October 1826, BOA HAT 433/21971, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/4 September 1833, BOA HAT 438/22102, 01 Rebiyu¨levvel 1245/31 August 1829, BOA HAT 514/25194, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827, BOA HAT 1029/42851, 09 Safer 1245/10 August 1829. For more information about the Balkans see Carl L. Brown, Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); John V.A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1987); Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804– 1999 (New York, New York: Viking, 2000); Edgar Ho¨sch, The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day (London: Faber, 1972); Dennis P. Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, New York: Palgrave, 2002); Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Volume I; History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and politics since the Eighteenth Century (Hamden: Conri Archon Books, 1974); Kemal H. Karpat, Balkanlar’da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusculuk (Ankara: I˙mge Kitabevi, 2004); Machiel Kiel, Studies on the Ottoman

NOTES TO PAGES 32 –34

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

297

Architecture of the Balkans (Aldershot, Hampshire: Gower Pub. Co., 1990); William B. King, The Balkans, Frontier of Two Worlds (New York, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1947); John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550 – 1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982); Mark Mazower, The Balkans, A Short History (New York, New York: The Modern Library, 2001); Michael R. Palairet, The Balkan Economies, c. 1800– 1914: Evolution Without Development (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History of the Balkans, 1804– 1945 (London; New York, New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1999); Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, with A New Introduction by Traian Stoianavich (New York, New York: New York University Press, 2000); Traian Stoianovich, Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Traian Stoianovich, A Study in Balkan Civilization (New York, New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1967); Peter Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354 – 1804 (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1977); Marie Todorova. Imagining the Balkans (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); K.E. Fleming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography,’ The American Historical Review, 105 (4) (2000), pp. 1218–33. Traian Stoianovich, Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe, p. 1. BOA HAT 514/25194, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827. Konstantin Mihailovic´, Memoirs of A Janissary, trans. Benjamin Stolz, historical commentary and notes by Svat Soucek (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1975), p. 137. BOA HAT 536/26355, 29 Zilhicce1247/30 May 1832. BOA HAT 426/21849, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. BOA HAT 426/21861, 26 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/26 Deccember 1826. BOA HAT 1311/51042 C, 15 Receb 1250/17 November 1834. BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, pp. 145– 8. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine, p. 143. For the Ottoman centralization process of this period and its limits see I. Metin Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550 –1650 (New York, New York, 1983). Cornell H. Fleischer, Buraucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Aˆli (1541 –1600) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 66. The memoirs of Temesvarlı Osman Ag˘a, an indigenous janissary from the last decades of the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century well reflects this fluid position of the military frontier and the frequent raids organized on both sides. For more information see Esat Nermi Erendor, Temesvarlı Osman Ag˘a’nın Anıları (Istanbul: Aksoy Yayıncılık, 1998). BOA HAT 443/22221 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831.

298

NOTES TO PAGES 34 –35

24. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65, p. 21, 11 Saban 1241/21 March 1826. The document says that: ‘Eyaˆlet-i mezkuˆre nazargaˆh-ı ag˘yar bir serhadd-i sedıˆd ve memaˆlik-i I˙slaˆmiyeye mahfaza ve kilıˆd mesaˆbesinde oldug˘u nu¨muˆdaˆr olarak bilvu¨cuˆh ‘aˆriza-i aˆsaˆr-ı perıˆsaˆnlıkdan vikaˆye ve muhaˆfazasına dikkat laˆzımeden oldug˘una binaˆen. . .’ 25. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 19, Evaˆsıt-ı Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10-19 December 1826. The document says that: ‘Bosna eyaˆleti mukaˆbele-i a‘daˆda vaˆki‘ serhaˆdaˆt-ı haˆkaˆniyemin sedd-i sedıˆd ve kıft-ı mu¨tenahhıˆ mesaˆbesinde olmak mu¨laˆbesesiyle ol taraflarda bir guˆne ihtilaˆl ve fesaˆd tekevvu¨nu¨ne kat‘an rızaˆ-yı saˆhaˆnem olmadıg˘ı. . .’ 26. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 16, 07 Ramazan 1247/09 February 1832. The document says that: ‘Bosna eyaˆleti dahi feth-i haˆkaˆnıˆden beru devlet-i aliyyenin nazarkerdesi ve ale’d-devam intihaˆ-yı serhadd-i Sultaˆniyeden bulundug˘una mebnıˆ sadaˆkat ve atiyye-i saˆhaˆne ile berverde oldug˘undan gayri her haˆlde terfiye-i haˆllerine riaˆyet ve haˆklarında ibraˆz-ı re’fet-i seniyye-i hazret-i taˆcdaˆrıˆ ile zill-i secere-i himaˆye-i hemaˆvaˆye-i cihaˆndaˆrıˆde mustazill ve ol vechle ahaˆlıˆ-i merkuˆme dahi niaˆm-ı celıˆlenin kadrini bilerek meraˆsim-i inkıyaˆd ve sadaˆkat icraˆsıyla naˆm-ı secaat ve dilaˆverlik istihaˆrını iktisaˆb ile mu¨ftehıˆ ve devlet-i aliyye-i ebedi’d-devaˆmın hidemaˆtında izhaˆr-ı inkıyaˆd ve bendegıˆde bezl-i vu¨cuˆd edegeldikleri bedıˆdaˆr ise de. . .’ 27. Aydın Babuna, ‘Nationalism and the Bosnian Muslims,’ East European Quarterly, 33(2) (1999), p. 199. 28. The frontier theory was popularized by Frederick Jackson Turner in his study The Frontier in American History (New York, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920). For more information about the frontier strategy of Ottoman Empire see Colin Heywood, ‘The Frontier in Ottoman History: Old Ideas and New Myths,’ in Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (eds), Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700– 1700 (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 228– 50; Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest,’ Studia Islamica, 2 (1954), pp. 104– 29; Feridun Emecen, ‘Beylikten Sancag˘a: Batı Anadolu’da I˙lk Osmanlı Sancaklarının Kurulusuna Dair Mu¨lahazalar,’ Belleten, 60(227) (1996), pp. 81– 91; Ga´bor A´goston, ‘A Flexible Empire: Authority and its Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers,’ in Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens (eds), Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), pp. 15 – 32. For the transformation of Ottoman borderland strategy see Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850– 1921; Maurus Reinkowski, ‘Double Struggle, No Income: Ottoman Borderlands in Northern Albania,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, pp. 239– 53; Sevket Pamuk, ‘The Ottoman Monetary System and Frontier Territories in Europe, 1500– 1700,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, pp. 175– 82; Isa Blumi, ‘Thwarting the Ottoman Empire: Smuggling through the Empire’s New Frontiers in Yemen and Albania, 1878 –1910,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, pp. 255– 74.

NOTES TO PAGES 35 –36

299

29. Linda Darling, ‘Mediterranean Borderlands: Early English Merchants in the Levant,’ in Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay O¨zel (eds) The Ottoman Empire: Myths, Realities and ‘Black Holes’ (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2006), p. 174. 30. Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Comments on Contributions and the Borderlands,’ in Karpat and Zens, Ottoman Borderlands, p. 12. 31. Adem Handzic, Population of Bosnia in the Ottoman Period: A Historical Overview (Istanbul: IRCICA, 1994), p. 4. 32. For these uses see for example Bosnaklar; BOA HAT 715/34142, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/12 October 1831, BOA HAT 1117/44858 B, 14 Sevval 1247/17 March 1832, BOA HAT 1266/49030 B, 25 Sevval 1246/08 April 1831, Bosnalılar; BOA Cevdet Askeriye 313/12935, 29 Zilkade 1203/21 August 1789, BOA Cevdet Hariciye 31/1541, 16 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1216/24 October 1801, BOA HAT 1380/54442, 29 Zilhicce 1203/20 September 1789, Bosnavıˆ; BOA Cevdet Maliye 52/2426, 29 Zilhicce 1108/19 July 1697, BOA Cevdet Evkaf 280/14298, 09 Receb 1117/27 October 1705, Bosnak taifesi; BOA Cevdet Askeriye 1220/54745, 25 Receb 1200/24 May 1786, Bosna takımı; BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 M, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/26 January 1827, Bosnak milleti; BOA HAT 334/19179, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/17 November 1832, BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833, Bosnalı or Bosnak kavmi; BOA HAT 405/21174 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826. 33. For example, BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/08 September 1826. 34. Muhamed Hadzˇijahic´, Od Tradicije do Identeta: Geneza Nacionalnog Pitanja Bosanskih Muslimana (Zagreb: Islamska Zajednica Zagreb, 1990), p. 18. 35. Adem Handzˇic´, ‘Konfesionalni Sastav Stanovnisˇtva u Bosni i Hercegovini u Prvim Stoljec´ima Osmanske Vladavine,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 42 – 43 (1992 – 3), p. 119. 36. For more information about the sevdalinka songs see Heather Laurel Peters, Song of Sevdalinka: Cultural Anthem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation (Canada: York University, 2007). 37. For the arguments of the first group see for example Muhammed Hadzˇijahic´, ‘Muslimanska Knjizˇevna Tradicija,’ in Bosansko-Hercegovacˇka Knjizˇevna Hrestomatija Starija Knjizˇevnost (Sarajevo: Zavod za Izdavanje Udzˇbenika, 1974), pp. 221– 32; Safvetbeg Basˇagic´, Bosˇnjaci i Hercegovci u Islamskoj Knizˇevnosti (Sarajevo: Vlastita Naklada, 1912); for contrary arguments see for example Vancˇo Bosˇkov, ‘Neka Razmisˇljanja o Knjizˇevnosti na Turskom Jeziku u Bosni i Hercegovini,’ in Knjizˇevnost Bosne i Hercegovine u Svjetlu Dosadasˇnjih Istrazˇivanja (Sarajevo, 1977), pp. 53 – 64; Alexandre Popovic, ‘Repre´sentation du Passe´ et Transmission de L’identite´chez les Musulmans des Balkans Mythes et Re´alite´s,’ in Les Balkans a` L’e´poque Ottomane, ed. Daniel Panzac, Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Me´diterrane´e, 66(4) (1992), pp. 139– 44. For more information about these debates see Nenad Filipovic´, ‘Literary Heritage of

300

38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45. 46.

47.

NOTES TO PAGES 36 –38 Bosnian Muslims Written in Oriental Languages in the Light of European Oriental Studies,’ Prilozi za Orientalnu Filologiju, 50 (2000), pp. 343– 52; Fikret Adanır, ‘The Formation of a Muslim Nation,’ in Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi (eds) The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography (Leiden, Boston, Cologne: Brill, 2002), pp. 300– 1. For more information about these claims see Roy Mottahedeh, ‘Foreword,’ in Mark Pinson (ed.), The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 1994. John V.A. Fine, ‘The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society,’ in Pinson, The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, p. 19. Muhammed Hadzˇijahic´, Porijeklo Bosanskih Muslimana (Sarajevo, 1990), pp. 19 – 36. Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 22. Adem Handzˇic´, ‘O Drusˇtvenoj Strukturi Stanovnisˇtva u Bosni Pocˇetkom XVII Stoljec´a,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 32 – 33 (1982 –3), pp. 129– 46. Jusuf Mulic´ also shares similar ideas. For his work see Jusuf Mulic´, ‘Drusˇtveni i Ekonomski Polozˇaj Vlaha i Arbanasa u Bosni pod Osmanskom Vlasˇc´u,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 51 (2003), pp. 145– 6. For historiographical debates on the Islamization process of Bosnia see Markus Koller, ‘Introduction: An Approach to Bosnian History,’ in Markus Koller and Kemal H. Karpat (eds), Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), pp. 4 – 8, Fikret Adanır, ‘The Formation of a Muslim Nation,’ in Adanır and Faroqhi, The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, pp. 286– 7. Franjo Racˇki, ‘Bogomili i Patareni,’ Rad Jugoslovenske Akademije Znanosti I Umjetnosti 7 (1869), pp. 126– 79, quoted by Fikret Adanır, ‘The Formation of a Muslim Nation,’ in Adanır and Faroqhi, The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, p. 285. Ivo Andric´, The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule (Durham, North Carolina and London: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 9. For more information about Bogomilism see Dimitur Simeonov Angelov, Les Balkans au Moyen Age: La Bulgarie des Bogomils aux Turcs (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978); Dimitri Obolensky, The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan NeoManichaeism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948); Parakevopoulou Vassiliki, Some Aspects of the Phenomenon of Heresy in the Byzantine Empire and in the West, during the 11th Century (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1976). Alexandar Solovjev, ‘Nestanak Bogumilstva i Islamizacija Bosne,’ Godisˇnjak Drusˇtva Istorcara Bosna i Hercegovine, 1 (1949), pp. 42 – 79; Alexandar Solovjev, Vjersko Ucˇenje Bosanske Crkve (Zagreb, 1948); Alexandar Solovjev, ‘La Doctrine de l’E´glise de Bosnie,’ Bulletin de l’Acade´mie Royale de Belgique, Class de Letters, 34 (1948), pp. 481– 534.

NOTES TO PAGES 38 –39

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48. Maja Miletic, I ‘Krstjani’di Bosnia alla Luce di Loro Monumenti di Pietra (Rome, 1957), quoted in Fikret Adanır, ‘The Formation of a Muslim Nation,’ in Adanır and Faroqhi, The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, p. 287. 49. Marian Wenzel, ‘Bosnian and Herzegovinian Tombstones: Who Made Them and Why?,’ Su¨dost-Forschungen, XXI (1962); Marian Wenzel, ‘Bosnian History and Austro-Hungarian Policy: Some Medieval Belts, the Bogomil Romance and the King Tvrtko Graves,’ Peristil Zbornik Radova za Povijest Umjetnosti, 30 (1987), pp. 29 – 54; Marian Wenzel, Ornamental Motifs on Tombstones form Medieval Bosnia and Surrounding Regions (Sarajevo: Veselin Maslesˇa, 1965); Marian Wenzel, ‘Four Decorated Steles: The Influence of Islam on Bosnian Funerary Monuments,’ Journal of Islamic Studies, 5 (1994), pp. 221– 41. 50. Milan Loos, Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages (Prague: Akademia, 1974), p. 309. 51. John V.A. Fine, Jr., The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and its Place in State and Society from the 13th to the 15th Centuries (New York, New York and London: 1975), pp. 89 – 90. 52. John V.A. Fine, Jr., ‘The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society,’ in The Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina, pp. 1 – 21; John V.A. Fine, Jr., ‘Religious Change and Bosnia’s Distinct Situation under the Ottomans,’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, pp. 35 – 45; Adem Handzˇic´, ‘Konfesionalni Sastav Stanovnisˇtva u Bosni i Hercegovini u Prvim Stoljec´ima Osmanske Vladavine,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 42 – 43 (1992 –3), pp. 119– 53; Florian Bieber, ‘Muslim Identity in the Balkans before the Establishment of Nation States,’ Nationalities Papers, 28(1) (2000), pp. 19 – 21. As Bieber points out, the term ‘voluntary’ does not imply that the population converted to Islam purely for their own advantage, but rather the situation frequently asserts that ‘the population had only little reason to remain Christian, in the light of economic, social and spiritual hardship’ Ibid., p. 28. 53. Nedim Filipovic´, ‘A Contribution to the Problem of Islamization in the Balkan under Ottoman Rule,’ in Ottoman Rule in the Middle Europe and Balkan in the 16th and 17th Centuries (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, 1978), pp. 305– 58; Nedim Filipovic´, ‘Osvrt na Polozˇaj Bosanskog Seljasˇtva u Prvoj Deceniji Uspostavljanja Osmanske Vlasti u Bosni,’ Radovi Filozofskog Fakulteta u Sarajevu, 3 (1965), pp. 63 – 75; Nedim Filipovic´, ‘Napomene o Islamizaciji u Bosni i Hercegovini u XV Vijeku,’ Godisˇnjak Akademije Nauka i Uumjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine 7 Centar na Balkanolosˇka Ispitivanja 5 (Sarajevo, 1970), pp. 141– 67. 54. Nenad Filipovic´, ‘Islamizacija Bosne u Prva Dva Desetljec´a Osmanske Vlasti,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 41 (1991), pp. 53 – 65. 55. Adem Handzˇic´. Tuzla i Njena Okolina u XVI. Vijeku (Sarajevo: Monografija Svjetlost, 1975), pp. 143– 62; Adem Handzˇic´, Population of Bosnia in the Ottoman Period, pp. 18 – 32; Adem Handzˇic´, ‘O Sˇirenju Islama u Bosni s Posebnim Osvrtom na Srednju Bosnu,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 41 (1991), pp. 37 – 52.

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56. Adem Handzˇic´, ‘O Gradskom Stanovnisˇtvu u Bosni u XVI Stoljec´u,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 28 – 29 (1978 – 9), pp. 247– 56. 57. Adem Handzˇic´. ‘O Specificˇnostima Nekih Osmanskih Popisa u Vezi I˙nstitucije Vakufa u Bosni u XVI i XVII Stoljec´u.’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 40 (1990), pp. 237– 42; ‘O Ulozi Dervisˇa u Formiranju Gradskih Naselja u Bosni u XV Stoljec´u.’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 31 (1982), pp. 169– 78. 58. Alija Bejtic´, ‘Jedno Vid¯enje Sarajeviskih Evlija i Njihovih Grobova kao Kultnih Mjesta,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 31 (1982), pp. 111– 23. 59. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, ‘Sˇirenje Islama u Hercegovini,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 41 (1991), pp. 67 – 73. 60. Muhammed Hadzˇijahic´, Porijeklo Bosanskih Muslimana (Sarajevo: Bosna Muslimanska Biblioteka, 1990), pp. 72 – 4; Muhammed Hadzˇijahic´, Islam i Muslimani u Bosni i Hecegovini (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1991), pp. 99 – 103. For more information about the devsirme system see I˙smail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teskilaˆtından Kapıkulu Ocakları, vol. I, pp. 13 – 30; Y. Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800– 1909 (New York, New York: Palgrave, 1996), pp. 1 – 11. 61. The original text states that ‘. . . yukarıda og˘lan cem’ıˆ icu¨n virilen emr-i serıˆfin kaˆfir evlaˆdından gayrısın cem‘ eylemeg˘i nehy eylemisken Bosna diyaˆrında cem‘ olunan og˘lanların cu¨mlesin Mu¨slu¨man og˘lu Mu¨slu¨man iken ve cem‘ olunmamak [sic. olunmak?] kaˆnuˆn deg˘il iken andan maadaˆ anların ekserini saraˆy-ı aˆmire ve haˆs bag˘ceye virdu¨klerine ve taˆife-i mezbuˆrun bu denlu¨ i‘tibarına sebeb oldur kim ol zamaˆnda faˆtih-i Kostantıniyye Sultaˆn Mehmed Haˆn Hazretleri Bosna diyaˆrı u¨zerine asker-i zafer-eserleri ile teveccu¨h buyurduklarında ol diyaˆrda umuˆmen re‘aˆyaˆ ve beraˆyaˆ paˆdisaˆh-ı aˆlempenaˆh hazretlerinin kuvvet-i kudretin [sic. kuvvet u¨ kudretin] bildiklerinde karsu gelu¨b rikaˆb-ı hu¨maˆyuˆnlarına yu¨zlerin su¨rdu¨ler ve bir ug˘urdan ıˆmaˆna gelicek padisaˆh-ı aˆlempenaˆh hazretleri ˆımaˆna geldiklerin go¨ricek bildi kim bunlar kim taˆife deg˘ildir seref-i esaˆreme [sic. I˙slaˆma] mu¨serref olduklarına binaen benden ne muraˆd edersiz ve taleb-i eyilu¨k [sic. taleb eyleyu¨n] didikde diyaˆrlarından og˘lan cem‘ olunmasun muraˆd ittiklerinde bu iltimaˆsların kabul idu¨b bunlardan og˘lan cem‘ olunmasını kaˆnuˆn eylediler bunları gerek su¨nnetli olsun ve gerek olmasun cem‘ idu¨b bunların yoklanması kaˆnuˆn deg˘ildir meg˘er bu taifede olmayub icine daˆhil olmasun deyu hıttıˆtaˆ [sic. hattıˆtaˆ] yoklayalar fi’l-vaˆki bu taˆifenin su¨risi geldikde muhkem yoklanmak lazımdır taˆ kim icine etraˆk taˆifesinden akce-i kutı [sic. akce kuvveti] ile kimesne [sic. girmesin] ve Bosna diyarına varan corvacı ve cu¨mle devsirmeye varanlardan mu¨stakıˆm gerekdir zıˆraˆ bu taˆife Mu¨slu¨man olmakla aralarına haˆricden adam daˆhil olmak aˆsaˆndır ve bu taˆifeden bu ana deg˘in cem‘ olunanın eg˘er saraˆyda ve eg˘er bostaˆnda eg˘er saˆir yerde ekseri eyu¨ olub aˆli mansublarına daˆhil olub aˆkil daˆnaˆ olmuslardır ol cihetden bunları saraˆy-ı aˆmireye ve bostaˆna verib Tu¨rk u¨zerine virmezler. . .’ Quoted in Philippe Gelez. Petit Guide Pour Servir A L’etude de L’Islamisation en Bosnie et en Herzegovine (Istanbul: Les E´ditions ISIS, 2005), pp. 162–3.

NOTES TO PAGES 40 – 43

303

62. I˙smail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teskilaˆtından Kapıkulu Ocakları, vol. I, p. 14. 63. Antonina Zhelyazkova, ‘The Penetration and Adaptation of Islam in Bosnia from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century,’ Journal of Islamic Studies, 5(2) (1994), pp. 191– 2. 64. Alexander Lopasic, ‘Islamization of the Balkans with Special Reference to Bosnia,’ Journal of Islamic Studies, 5(2) (1994), p. 165. 65. Machiel Kiel, ‘Ottoman Sources for the Demographic History and the Process of Islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in the 15th – 17th Centuries: Old Sources – New Methodology,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, pp. 104– 5. ¨ mer Lu¨tfi Barkan. ‘Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Bir I˙skan ve Kolonizasyon 66. O Metodu Olarak Su¨rgu¨nler.’ I˙stanbul U¨niversitesi I˙ktisat Faku¨ltesi Mecmuası, 11 (1949– 50), pp. 524– 69; 13 (1951 –2), pp. 56 – 78; 15 (1953 –4), pp. 209– 37. 67. Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Ottoman Methods of Conquest,’ Studia Islamica, II (1954), pp. 103– 130. ¨ mer Lu¨tfi Barkan, ‘Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Bir I˙skan ve Kolonizasyon 68. O Metodu Olarak Su¨rgu¨nler,’ I˙stanbul U¨niversitesi I˙ktisat Faku¨ltesi Mecmuası, pp. 209– 237; Halil I˙nalcık, ‘The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City,’ Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 23 – 24 (1969– 70), pp. 231– 49. 69. Antonina Zhelyazkova, ‘Islamization in the Balkans as an Historigraphical Problem: The Southeast-European Perspective,’ in Adanır and Faroqhi, The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, pp. 232– 3. 70. It is seen that historians used different quotients for different regions and periods. O¨.L. Barkan proposed the number of five for a household population and this proposal was accepted and applied by H.W. Lowry, H. Gerber, Stefanos Yerasimos, N. Go¨yu¨nc, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Feridun Emecen, ¨ zdeg˘er and I˙smet Mirog˘lu. There are, however, other historians who Hu¨seyin O found the number of five unrealistic and used eight, while some others thought it too high and used 3.5 for the quotient. Apart from these, there are also others who used four, five, six or seven as the quotient for different regions. Because of different quotient uses, I preferred to estimate population ratios based on household numbers. For more information about the household quotient see Coskun C¸akır, ‘Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bir Hesaplama U¨nitesi/ Birimi Olarak Hane/Aile,’ in Ekonomik Hesaplamalarda Bir Birim Olarak Aile (Ankara: Basbakanlık Aile Arastırmaları Kurumu Yayınları, 1998), pp. 303– 36. 71. Mehmet Emin Yardımcı, 15. ve 16. Yu¨zyılda Bir Osmanlı Livası Bosna (I˙stanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), pp. 40 – 2. 72. Evliya C¸elebi. Seyahatname, vol. 5 (I˙stanbul: I˙kdam Matbaası, 1315), pp. 429– 33.

304

NOTES TO PAGES 43 – 46

73. John V.A. Fine, ‘The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society,’ in The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, p. 18, and John V.A. Fine, ‘Religious Change and Bosnia’s Distinct Situation under the Ottomans,’ in, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, p. 43. 74. Yuzo Nagata, Materials on the Bosnian Notables (Tokyo: Hakuei Printing, 1979), pp. 2– 6. 75. Justin McCarthy, ‘Muslims in Ottoman Europe: Population from 1800 to 1912,’ in Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2002), p. 139. 76. Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830– 1914 (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 18. 77. Justin McCarthy, ‘Muslims in Ottoman Europe: Population from 1800 to 1912,’ in Population History of the Middle East and the Balkans, p. 136. According to McCarthy, in 1870 and 1879 the population of the Ottoman Bosnia province was as follows: for 1870 the population of Muslims was 694,000, of Orthodox 534,000, and of Catholics 208,000. In 1879 the Muslim population had declined to 449,000, while the Orthodox population had also declined to 496,000, and the Catholic population had risen slightly to 209,000. Justin McCarthy, ‘Archival Sources Concerning Serb Rebellions in Bosnia 1875– 76,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. 144. For more information about the first Ottoman census see for example Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘u’nda I˙lk Nu¨fus Sayımı 1831 (Ankara: T.C. Basvekalet I˙statistik Umum Mu¨du¨rlu¨g˘u¨, 1943). 78. BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833. 79. Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire Mosul, 1540– 1834, p. 44. 80. BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. 81. BOA HAT 440/22170, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 82. For detailed information about Saray (Sarajevo in today’s usage) see for example I˙lhan Sahin, ‘The Story of the Emergence of A Balkan City: Sarayova,’ in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans Sofia, April 21 – 23, 2000 (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2002), pp. 113–19. 83. This transition is discussed in detail later in the chapter. 84. BOA HAT 430/21898, 27 Zilhicce 1243/10 July 1828, BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. 85. Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, pp. 79 – 80. 86. BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. 87. Yuzo Nagata, Materials on the Bosnian Notables, pp. 8 – 9. 88. Gergana Georgieva, ‘Administrative Sutructure and Government of Rumelia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Functions and Activities of the Vali of Rumelia,’ in Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (eds), Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760 – 1850: Conflict,

NOTES TO PAGES 46 – 47

89. 90. 91.

92. 93.

94. 95. 96.

305

Transformation, Adaptation (Rethymno: University of Crete, Department of History and Archaeology, 2007), pp. 7 – 8. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2. Izdanje, 1980), p. 60; Enes Pelidija, Banjalucˇki Boj iz 1737 Uzroci i Posljedice (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2003), p. 533. Ibid. Enes Pelidija gives a detailed chronology and factography of these events in his book. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 426/21862 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. It is clear that ahaˆlıˆ-i dıˆvaˆn were not including all notables but some part of them since a document uses the term ‘ahaˆlıˆ-i dıˆvaˆn and other notables’ (ahaˆlıˆ-i dıˆvaˆn ve saˆir vu¨cuˆh-ı eyaˆlet) together, but there is no answer to the question that, according to which criteria the selection of its members was made. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. Although the document gives no direct information about the place of dıˆvaˆn, in the documents, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 34, 15 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1246/01 December 1830, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 44, 03 Safer 1246/24 July 1830, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 55, 11 Zilkade 1246/23 April 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 89, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/29 November 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 2, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 3, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 31, 23 Safer 1248/22 June 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 11, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1248/06 October 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 38, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 70, Gurre-i Muharrem 1249/21-30 May 1833, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 80, 13 Safer 1249/2 July 1833, the term ‘divan-ı eyalet-i Bosna’ is enumerated together with the cities Klis, Izvornik, Hersek and Saray. This is a strong indication that it was to be held in the capital of the eyalet, Travnik. BOA HAT 426/21862 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 437/22082 E, 27 Rebiyu¨lahir 1245/26 October 1829. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 83, 27 Zilkade 1245/20 May 1830. Yu¨k was a monetary term used to define firstly a total sum of 100,000 akce, one gurus being equal to 120 akces. In other words, one yu¨k was equal to 833 gurus until the end of eighteenth century. For yu¨k see, Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri So¨zlu¨g˘u¨, vol. III (Ankara: Milli Eg˘itim Bakanlıg˘ı Yayınları, 1971), p. 639, and for gurus see Pakalın, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri So¨zlu¨g˘u¨, vol. II, p. 248. All of these parities were changed in the nineteenth century, especially during the reign of Mahmud II when a great devaluation of currency took place. For more information see Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800– 1914 (Chicago, Illinois and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 521. According to Belen,

306

97. 98. 99.

100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110.

111. 112. 113. 114. 115.

NOTES TO PAGES 47 –50 while in previous times one yu¨k meant one camel-load of akce and was equivalent to 100,000 akce, it later became 100,000 gurus (Quoted in Pakalın, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri So¨zlu¨g˘u¨, vol. II, p. 248). It is understood that those numbers mentioned before belong to that period of change since the expression of ‘one yu¨k 45 thousand 68.5 gurus’ implicitly denotes that one yu¨k was a greater measure than 45,000. Thus the total sum was 145,068 gurus, 50 para. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 87, 09 Zilhicce 1245/01 June 1830. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 34, 15 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1246/01 December 1830, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 44, 03 Safer 1246/24 July 1830, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 57, 04 Rebiyu¨lahir 1246/22 September 1830. For detailed information about the decision-making process in the Ottoman Empire, see for example Caesar E. Farah (ed.), Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire (Kirksville, Missouri: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993). BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. BOA HAT 436/22062 A, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 437/22076 B, 12 Muharrem 1242/16 August 1826, BOA HAT 437/22077 E, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. BOA HAT 424/21811 D, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/07 November 1826. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. For the Saray mesveret see for example BOA HAT 424/21811 D, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/07 November 1826, BOA HAT 425/21813 G, 28 Rebiyu¨ levvel 1242/30 October 1826, BOA HAT 425/21834, 13 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/13 December 1826. For the Tuzla mesveret see for example BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. Dinko Tomasic, ‘Plemenska Kultura i Njeni Danasnji Ostaci,’ Mjesecnic, 62 (1936), reprinted in ‘Socilogija Dinka Tomasica,’ Drustvena Istrazivanja, II (6) (1992), quoted in Xavier Bouragel, ‘Yugoslav Wars: The “Revenge of the Countryside” between Sociological Reality and Nationalist Myth,’ East European Quarterly, XXXIII (2) (1999), pp. 157–75, here, pp. 158– 9. BOA HAT 423/21778, 03 Saban 1244/8 February 1829. BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. BOA HAT 426/21850, 20 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/19 January 1827. BOA HAT 423/21804 E, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827.

NOTES TO PAGES 50 –52

307

116. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 437/22076 B, 12 Muharrem 1242/16 August 1826. 117. BOA HAT 290/17367, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 118. Some districts such as Yenipazar and Tirebin were part of this route. For more information see Gilles Veinstein, ‘Avlonya (Vlore¨), Une E´tape de la Voie Egnatia dans la Seconde Moitie´ du XVIe Sie`cle?,’ in Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), The Via Egnatia under Ottoman Rule 1380– 1699 (Crete: Crete University Press, 1996), p. 220. 119. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 14, 28 Muharrem 1248/27 June 1832; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 72, p. 11, 19 Rebiyu¨lahir 1248/15 September 1832; Travnik Sicilleri, vol. 30, p. 12, 17 Muharrem 1248/16 June 1832. 120. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 66, p. 25; Evaˆsıt-ı Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10-19 January 1827; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 66, p. 144; Evaˆhir-i Cemaziyu¨levvel 1243/1019 December 1827; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 66, p. 199; Evaˆhir-i Sevval 1243/6-15 May 1828; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 66, p. 200; Evaˆhir-i Cemaziyu¨levvel 1243/10-19 December 1827; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 67, p. 15; 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1244/19 October 1828; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 68, p. 102; Evaˆil-i Sevval 1247/4-13 March 1832. 121. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 66, p. 24; Evaˆil-i Saban 1242/28 February – 9 March 1827. 122. Traian Stoianovich, ‘A Route Type: The Via Egnatia under Ottoman Rule,’ in Zachariadou, The Via Egnatia under Ottoman Rule, p. 208. 123. BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 426/21848 G, 24 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/23 January 1827. 124. BOA HAT 426/21848 K, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. 125. Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire (London and New York, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), pp. 215–7. 126. For more information about the importance of coffeehouses in the lives of janissaries see for example Cengiz Kırlı, The Struggle over Space: Coffeehouses in Ottoman Istanbul, 1780– 1845, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation (Binghamton, New York: State University of New York, 2000). 127. Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan, p. 216. 128. For more information about this relationship and the prohibition of the Bektashi order see: Ethem Ruhi Fıg˘lalı, Tu¨rkiye’de Alevilik Bektasilik (Ankara: Selcuk Yayınları, 1990); Suraiya Faroqhi, Anadolu’da Bektasilik (Istanbul: Simurg, 2003); John K. Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes (London: Luzac, 1994); Howard A. Reed, The Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June 1826, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Princeton, New Jersey, 1951); Fatma Sel Turhan, The Abolition of the Janissary Army and Its Reflections, Unpublished M. A.Thesis (Istanbul: Bog˘azici University, 2001); Albert Doja, ‘A Political History of Bektashism from Ottoman Anatolia to Contemporary Turkey,’ Journal of Church and State, 48 (2) (2006), pp. 423– 50; Belkıs Temren, Bektasilig˘in Eg˘itsel ve Ku¨ltu¨rel Boyutu (Ankara: T.C. Ku¨ltu¨r Bakanlıg˘ı Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995).

308

NOTES TO PAGES 52 –54

¨ zdalga, 129. Eric Cornell, ‘Bosna Bektasilig˘i U¨zerine,’ in T. Olsson, E. O C. Raudvere (eds) Alevi Kimlig˘i (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), pp. 14 – 15. 130. Dzˇemal C´ehajic´, ‘Neke Karakteristike Ucˇenja G˘ala¯duddin Rumija i Nastanak Dervisˇkog Reda Mevlevija, Mevlevije u Bosni i Hercegovini,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, Simpozij o Arapsko-Islamskoj Kulturi, XXIV (1976), p. 100. 131. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 104. 132. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine, pp. 155– 6. 133. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826, BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827. 134. BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. 135. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. 136. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 20, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 137. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 3, 9 Muharrem 1248/8 June 1832. 138. BOA HAT 415/21503, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 139. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 105. 140. I˙smail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. II (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), pp. 82 –83. 141. Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 17. 142. Ayn Ali, Kavaˆnıˆn-i Aˆli Osman der Hu¨laˆsa-i Mezaˆmıˆn-i Defter-i Dıˆvaˆn (Istanbul, 1280), pp. 16 – 17; Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Bosna,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju (37) (1987), p. 434. 143. Orhan Kılıc, 18. Yu¨zyılın I˙lk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin I˙dari Taksimatı Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı (Elazıg˘: Ceren Matbaacılık, 1997), pp. 47, 95. 144. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´. Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini, pp. 15 – 16. 145. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65, p. 41, 13 Sevval 1241/21 May 1826. It is important to note that, unlike some studies which mention the eyalet centre as a sancak, numerous original documents mentioned in the following notes make a distinction by referring to the eyalet of Bosnia separately from the sancaks. 146. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65, p. 51, 25 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/24 January 1827, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 19, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826. 147. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 7, 11 Safer 1245/12 August 1829. 148. For example in Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 34 Ali Namık Pasa was mentioned as responsible for three units, namely the eyalet of Bosnia, Klis and Hersek. The date of the document is 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1246/28 November 1830. 149. BOA HAT 423/21795, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832.

NOTES TO PAGES 55 –58

309

150. BOA HAT 439/22127 A, 21 Ramazan 1248/11 February 1833, BOA HAT 439/22127 D, 21 Ramazan 148/11 February 1833, Ahmed S. Alicˇicˇ. Uredinje Bosanskog Ejaleta od 1789 do 1878, p. 20. 151. Travnik Sicilleri, vol. 30, p. 60, 5 Safer 1249/24 June 1833. 152. Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 18. 153. Robert Donia and John V.A. Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina A Tradition Betrayed, pp. 52 – 9. 154. Bruce McGowan, ‘The Age of the Ayans, 1699–1812,’ in I˙nalcık and Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, pp. 664– 5; Avdo Suc´eska, ‘The position of the Bosnian Moslems in the Ottoman State,’ International Journal of Turkish Studies, I(2) (1980), pp. 6–13. 155. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 90. 156. For more information about the importance of Saray during the Ottoman Empire see Behija Zlatar, ‘Sˇirenje Islama i Islamska Kultura u Sarajevu i Okolini.’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 41 (1991), pp. 252– 67. See also Behija Zlatar, Zlatno doba Sarajeva (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1996). In this work Zlatar relates Sarajevo’s growth to the gradual Islamization of the city and its nearby villages. 157. See for example Saraybosna Sicilleri vol 71, p. 45, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/16 August 1832, BOA HAT 423/21763, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21764, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 158. BOA HAT 426/21858, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 159. BOA HAT 425/21833 E, 13 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/13 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21858, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 160. BOA HAT 424/21811 Y, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 161. Rumelia was the name given by the Ottomans to their Balkan lands, which they sometimes referred to as Rumeli-i sahane, or ‘glorious Rumelia.’ 162. BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 163. BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 164. BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 165. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 45, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/16 August 1832, BOA HAT 423/21763, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21764, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 439/22131, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 166. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 45, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/16 August 1832, BOA HAT 439/22131, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 167. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV Prilozi za Politicˇku Istoriju Bosne I Hercegovine u XVIII i XIX Stoljec´u (Sarajevo: Veselin Maslesˇa, 1991), p. 36. 168. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 44. 169. Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 18. 170. Hazım Sˇabanovic´, ‘Bosanski Divan, Organizacija i Ured¯enje Centralne Zemaljske Uprave u Bosni pod Turskom Vlasˇc´u do Kraja XVII Stoljec´a,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, XVIII – XIX (1973), pp. 20 – 1.

310 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179.

180.

NOTES TO PAGES 58 – 61 Ibid., pp. 22 – 5. Ibid., pp. 25 – 7. Ibid., pp. 27 – 9. Ibid., pp. 30 – 45. BOA HAT 426/21848 H, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. BOA HAT 426/21862 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 442/22219 K, 10 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10 December 1826. BOA HAT 426/21862 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. Zu¨lfikar Pasa mentiones only a few of these districts as supporters of the rebellion, namely Saraybosna, Travnik, Gradacanice, C¸elebipazarı, Foca, C¸anice, Taslıca, Pirebol, Kolasin and Taˆra. It is important to note that names of kazas were sometimes changed slightly or totally while they were sometimes divided or combined. However, the difference between the numbers of Hasan Efendi and Zu¨lfikar Pasa lies apart from those reasons, since the two documents are from the same year. The number given by Hasan Efendi is likely to be more correct because of his ex officio position. It is possible that Zu¨lfikar Pasa may mention some subdivisions of districts as separate kazas, or part of a kaza as a separate unit. There is the trace of this in the example of Tuzla, which was mentioned as Tuzla-i Baˆlaˆ and Tuzla-i Zıˆr. Examples of historical changes can be seen in 1870 in the administrative divisions of Bosnia where seven sancaks respectively held these districts: Nefs-i Saray: Visoka (Visoko), Konice (Konjic), C¸aynice (Cˇaynicˇe), Visegrad (Visˇegrad), C¸elebipazarı (Rogatica), Kaladina (Kladanj). Izvornik: Tuzla, Blene, Izvornik (Zvornik), Serebrenice (Srebrenice), Berca (Brcˇka), Maglay (Maglaj), Gradacac (Gradacˇac). Travnik: Travnik, Yayce (Jajce), Akhisar (Prozor), Glamoc (Glamocˇ), Ihlevne (Livno). Bihke: Bihke (Bihac´), Nevesil (Novi), Ustrosca (Trzˇac´). Yenipazar: Senice (Sjenica),Yenipazar (Novi Bazar), Taslıca (Pljevlja), Yenivaros (Nova Varosˇ), Akova (Bjelo Polje), Mitrovice (Mitrovica), Pirepol (Prijepolje), Tırgoviste (Tirgovisˇte), Kolasin (Kolasˇin), Vasevik. Banaluka: Banaluka (Banja Luka), Gradiska (Gradisˇka), Tesne (Tesˇanj), Derbend (Derventa). Hersek (Herzogovina): Mostar, Tirebin (Trebinje), Libuska (Ljubusˇka), Istolce (Stolac), Foynice (Fojnice), Gacka (Gacˇko), Nevesin (Nevesinje), Foca (Focˇa), Niksik (Niksˇic), Bileke (Bileca). The list is taken from Justin McCarthy, ‘Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878,’ in The Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, p. 57. There is fierce debate about the position of the Bosnian aristocrats and their power under Ottoman rule. Basˇagic´, Truhelka and Novakovic´, for example,

NOTES TO PAGES 61 – 63

181.

182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188.

189. 190.

311

argue that the privately owned landed estates of the Bosniak nobility continued under the new rule without any fundamental change. On the other hand, Nedim Filipovic´ successfully criticizes the validity of these arguments and asserts that there was a fundamental change in land tenure, which changed from private ownership to state ownership, with the establishment of the category of the miri land. For more information about this debate see Nedim Filipovic´, ‘Ocaklık Timars in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 36 (1986), pp. 149– 56; Ciro Truhelka, ‘Bosna’da Arazi Meselesinin Tarihi Esasları,’ Tu¨rk Hukuk ve I˙ktisat Tarihi Mecmuası, vol. I (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1931), pp. 43 – 69; Safvetbeg Basˇagic´, Kratka Uputa u Prosˇlost Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo: Vlastita Naklada, 1900). For more information about the application of the timar system in Bosnia and its problems see Nedim Filipovic´, ‘Bosna-Hersek’te Tımar Sisteminin I˙nkisafında Bazı Hususiyetler,’ I˙ktisat Faku¨ltesi Mecmuası, 15 (1954), pp. 154– 88; Nedim Filipovic´, ‘Ocaklık Timars in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 36 (1986), pp. 149–80. Nenad Moacˇanin, Town and Country on the Middle Danube 1526– 1690 (Leiden and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill, 2006), p. 131. Nedim Filipovic´, ‘Ocaklık Timars in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, pp. 169– 72. Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Bune Seljaka Muslimana u Bosni u XVII i XVIII Stoljec´u,’ in Oslobodilacˇki Pokreti Jugoslovenskih Naroda od XVI Veka do Pocˇetka Prvog Svetskog Rata, vol. I (Belgrade: The Institute of History, 1976), pp. 74 – 5. Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia, p. 46. For the hereditary position of ocaklık timars see also BOA HAT 326/18991 C, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1251/04 October 1835. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine, pp. 44–5. Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in the Eighteenth Century Bosnia, pp. 41 – 2. Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Ma¯lika¯na Lifelong lease of Governmental Estates in the Ottoman State,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 36 (1986), p. 230. For the development of the malikane system and its effects on provinces see Mehmed Genc, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Devlet ve Ekonomi, pp. 99 – 104; Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire: 1700– 1922 (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 49 – 50; Fikret Adanır, ‘Tradition and Rural Change in Southestern Europe During Ottoman Rule,’ in Daniel Chirot (ed.), The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley, California and London: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 131– 76; Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Crisis and Change,’ in Halil I˙nalcık and Donald Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 –1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 565– 73. The cizye was a per capita tax levied on non-Muslim citizens. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Kapetanije u Bosni I Hercegovini, p. 56.

312

NOTES TO PAGES 63 –66

191. Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia, pp. 111– 2. 192. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, pp. 93 – 4; Justin McCarthy, ‘Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878,’ in The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, pp. 62 – 6; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 89. 193. Enes Pelidija, Banjalucˇki Boj iz 1737 Uzroci i Posljedice, p. 529; Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Bosnian Moslems in the Ottoman State,’ International Journal of Turkish Studies, I(II) (1980), pp. 9 – 10. 194. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne, p. 155– 6. 195. Cemal Kafadar, Yeniceri– Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict, Unpublished MA Thesis. McGill University, 1981, pp. 83 – 5; see also Kafadar, ‘On the Purity and Corruption of Janissaries,’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, 15 (1991), pp. 273– 80. 196. I˙smail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teskilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları, vol. II, pp. 477– 8. 197. BOA HAT 426/21862 A, 15 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/17 October 1826. 198. BOA HAT 429/21881, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, BOA HAT 436/22062 K, 17 Receb 1242/14 February 1827. 199. The state documents give changing numbers for yerlikulus in the region ranging from ‘more than ten thousand’ (see BOA HAT 422/21754, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833) to ‘seventy thousand’ (see BOA HAT 1311/51040 Y, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835). The difference between those numbers can be related to the locally salaried status of yerlikulus as well as to the open status of local men entering the service when needed. 200. BOA HAT 422/21754, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 201. BOA HAT 422/21754, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 437/22078, 03 Zilhicce 1245/26 May 1830. 202. It is important to note that the kapudan system was established by the Ottoman Empire within some parts of the Balkan lands: Bosnia, Serbia, Greece and Albania. In Greece this duty was given to the Christian armed forces in order to control remote districts of the region and to combat klepths, with the division of armatoliks or kapitanates. These armatole bands were responsible for jurisdiction over a group of villages and for maintaining law and order as well as for collection of taxes. While the leaders were known as kapitanios, their followers were called pallika´ria. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 76. I came across some documents such as BOA HAT 907/39751, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835, which give information about the kapudans of Serbia. A document from Archives of Topkapı Sarayı, namely E. 5024, talks about the Christian kapudans. The existence of this system in Greece, Albania and Serbia with slight differences from that in Bosnia questions those claims which argue that the kapudan system was special to Bosnia. For those claims see, Alexander Lopasic. ‘Islamization of the Balkans with Special Reference to Bosnia,’

NOTES TO PAGES 66 –71

203. 204. 205. 206. 207.

208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228.

313

pp. 163– 16; Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 24. For more information about the position of armatoles in Greece see Pınar Senısık, The Transformation of Ottoman Crete: Cretans, Revolts and Diplomatic Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1895– 1898, p. 37. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Kapetanije u Bosni I Hercegovini, pp. 15 – 17. For example, Avdo Suc´ eska, ‘Osmanlı I˙ mparatorlug˘ unda Bosna,’ pp. 434 – 5. BOA HAT 1311/51040 Y, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´. Izabrana Djela IV, p. 26. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´. Izabrana Djela IV, p. 25. The original version is: Oj Bojcˇic´u, bojisˇ li se Boga? Boga malo, a cara nimalo, A vezira ko dorata moga. Ahmed S. Alicˇicˇ, Uredinje Bosanskog Ejaleta od 1789 do 1878, pp. 19 – 20. BOA HAT 1311/51040 Y, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. Ahmed S. Alicˇicˇ, Uredinje Bosanskog Ejaleta od 1789 do 1878, p. 20. Hatidzˇa Cˇar-Drnda, ‘Remnants of the Tıˆmaˆr System in the Bosnian Vilaˆyet in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century,’ pp. 171– 4. See for example BOA HAT 423/21758, 04 Ramazan 1242/01 April 1827, BOA HAT 440/22160, 06 Saban 1246/20 January 1831. I borrowed ththise term from Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700– 1922, p. 54. Kemal H. Karpat, ‘The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789– 1908,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3(3) (1972), p. 246. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans vol. I, p. 179. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, p. 97. Rasid Hajdarevic´, Defteri Sarajevskog Saracˇkog Esnafa 1726– 1823 (Sarajevo: Istorijski Arhiv Sarajevo, 1998), p. 23. Ibid., pp. 27 – 157. BOA HAT 440/22173, 22 Ramazan 1246/06 March 1831. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, pp. 83 – 84, Evaˆhir-i Receb 1248/13-22 December 1832. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 73, p. 115, undated. BOA HAT 426/21861 A, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 440/22173, 22 Ramazan 1246/06 March 1831, BOA HAT 633/31243, 06 Saban 1246/20 January 1831. BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. BOA HAT 426/21861 A, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826. BOA HAT 440/22160, 06 Saban 1246/20 January 1831. BOA HAT 426/21861 A, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21862 P, 17 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/19 October 1826. BOA HAT 426/21861 A, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826.

314

NOTES TO PAGES 71 –77

229. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65, p. 8, Gurre-i Muharrem 1241/16-25 August 1825. 230. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 67, p. 18, 10 Rebiyu¨lahir 1244/20 October 1828. 231. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 87, 09 Zilhicce 1245/01 June 1830. 232. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 49, 07 Sevval 1248/27 February 1833. 233. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 179. 234. Ines Asˇcˇeric´-Todd, ‘The Noble Traders: The Islamic Tradition of “Spiritual Chivalry” (Futuwwa) in Bosnian Trade-Guilds (16th –19th Centuries),’ The Muslim World, 97(2) (2007), pp. 159– 73, here 162. For more information about the Bosnian guild organization see Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Esnafi i Obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini 1463– 1878 (Sarajevo: Veselin Maslesˇa, 1991). 235. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 49, 07 Sevval 1248/27 February 1833. 236. BOA HAT 423/21758, 04 Ramazan 1242/01 April 1827. 237. BOA HAT 442/22219 K, 10 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10 December 1826. 238. BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/02 February 1827. 239. BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826. 240. BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826.

Chapter 2 1. Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire: 1700– 1922 (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 62, 80, 146. 2. Roderic H. Davison, ‘Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian –Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century,’ The American Historical Review, 59(4) (1954), p. 846. 3. Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 36 –40. 4. Daniel Goffman, ‘Izmir: From Village to Colonial Port City,’ in E. Eldem, D. Goffman, B. Masters (eds) The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, I˙zmir, and I˙stanbul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 125–6. 5. Kemal H. Karpat, ‘The Migration of the Bosnian Muslims to the Ottoman State, 1878– 1914: An Account Based on Turkish Sources,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 127. 6. L.L. Farrar, Jr., ‘Realpolitik Versus Nationapolitik: Rethinking Nationalism During the Eastern Crisis, 1875– 1878,’ East European Quarterly, XXX(1) (1996), p. 27. 7. Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Bune Seljaka Muslimana u Bosni u XVII i XVIII Stoljec´u,’ in Oslobodilacˇki Pokreti Jugoslovenskih Naroda od XVI Veka do Pocˇetka Prvog Svetskog Rata, vol. I, pp. 69 – 100. 8. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, New York The Norton Library, 1959), p. 5. 9. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York, New York University Press, 1999), pp. 85 –6.

NOTES TO PAGES 77 –80

315

10. Ibid., pp. 86 – 7. 11. Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia, p. 135. 12. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, pp. 86 –7. 13. The work of Vladislav Skaric´ is quoted by Markus Koller, ‘Introduction,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, pp. 16 – 17. The work of Mula Mustafa Sˇevki Basˇeskija is Ljetopis (1746 – 1804) (Sarajevo: Sarajevo-Publishing, 1997), and the work of Vladislav Skaric´ is Mula-Mustafa Sˇevki Basˇeskija Sarajevski Hronicˇar 18. Vijeka (Sarajevo, 1927). 14. For example, Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 90. 15. Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia. 16. BOA Cevdet Hariciye 34/1697, 29 Safer 1124/07 April 1712. 17. BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 23/1102, 10 Receb 1202/16 April 1788. 18. BOA Cevdet Zabtiye 32/1565, 29 Ramazan 1211/28 March 1797. 19. BOA HAT 1125/45005, 25 Muharrem 1236/02 November 1820. 20. BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826. Celal Pasa could stay a year in this charge since he was appointed as the ‘Vali and Serasker of Rumelia,’ a more important post that was vacated by the death of Hursid Pasa. For more information about the governance of Celal Pasa in Bosnia see Cevdet Pasa, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. XII (I˙stanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1309/1891), pp. 66 – 7; BOA HAT 424/21809, 07 Zilkade 1238/16 July 1823, BOA HAT 424/21809 A, 18 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1238/31 January 1823, BOA HAT 424/21809 C, 16 Muharrem 1238/03 October 1822, BOA HAT 440/22165, 23 Muharrem 1238/10 October 1822. 21. According to the Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 65, pp. 71 – 2, the ferman of abolition which was sent to Bosnia was written in the middle ten days of Zilkade 1241, in other words between 17 and 26 June 1826, and shows that just after the abolition of the janissary corps, a ferman was sent by the central government to Bosnia as well since the abolition of janissaries was declared on 15 June 1826 ¨ ss-i Zafer (I˙stanbul, 1243), p. 104; Ahmed in Istanbul. Mehmed Esad, U Cevdet Pasa, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. XII, p. 168. According to the same document, it reached Bosnia and was recorded in the sicil during the first ten days of Zilhicce 1241; that is to say between 7 and 16 July 1241. Those records refute Eren’s arguments which claim that the ferman abolishing the janissaries was sent to Bosnia and other provinces two months after the abolition in Istanbul and was declared in Bosnia in September 1826. Eren, Mahmud II Zamanında Bosna Hersek, p. 74. 22. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 65, p. 41, 13 Sevval 1241/21 May 1826, BOA HAT 476/23348, 29 Zilhicce 1241/04 August 1826, BOA HAT 639/31478, 29 Zilkade 1241/05 July 1826. 23. BOA HAT 904/39704 A, 09 Saban 1241/19 March 1826. 24. Ahmed Lutfi Efendi, Tarih-i Lutfi, vol. I (I˙stanbul, 1292), p. 183. 25. BOA HAT 338/19346, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826.

316 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48. 49. 50.

NOTES TO PAGES 80 –83 BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. XII, p. 267, Lutfi. Tarih-i Lutfi, vol. I, p. 183. Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. XII, p. 363. BOA HAT 338/19357, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826. BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 Z, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/26 January 1827. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 65, p. 53, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/10 November 1826. BOA HAT 290/17370, 01 Safer 1242/04 September 1826, BOA HAT 290/17370 A, 19 Zilhicce 1241/25 July 1826. BOA HAT 291/17406, 29 Zilhicce 1241/04 August 1826. BOA HAT 424/21811 G, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 S, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21862 S, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/15 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21862 U, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 429/21881, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. BOA HAT 430/21894, 27 Muharrem 1242/31 August 1826. BOA HAT 426/21862 U, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 426/21862 V, 17 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/19 October 1826. BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827, BOA HAT 426/21862 V, 17 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/19 October 1826. BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826. BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826. It is important to note that among the four arms, mentioned in the previous chapter, Cadde Kolu (Cadde Arm) was the region where rebellion was most widespread; see for example BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. BOA HAT 338/19357, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826, BOA HAT 1056/43477 A, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826. BOA HAT 430/21894 A, 27 Muharrem 1242/31 August 1826. BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/08 September 1826. BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826, BOA HAT 423/21802, 13 Safer 1242/16 September 1826, BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/08 September 1826, BOA HAT 442/22219 D, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/08 September 1826, BOA HAT 1056/43477, 01 Safer 1242/04 September 1826, BOA HAT 1056/43477 B, 02 Safer 1242/05 September 1826, BOA HAT 1056/43477 D, 12 Safer 1242/15 September 1826. BOA HAT 442/22219 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 442/22219 L, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/08 September 1826. BOA HAT 423/21802, 13 Safer 1242/16 September 1826. BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/8 September 1826.

NOTES TO PAGES 83 –86

317

51. Fatma Sel Turhan, The Abolition of the Janissary Army and its Reflections, pp. 101, 104, 118. 52. BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/8 September 1826. 53. BOA HAT 423/21802 A, 13 Safer 1242/16 September 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881 B, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. 54. BOA HAT 430/21894 C, 01 Safer 1242/04 September 1826. 55. For example, BOA HAT 430/21894, 27 Muharrem 1242/31 August 1826, BOA HAT 430/21894 B, 05 Safer 1242/08 September 1826. 56. BOA HAT 425/21815 B, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 57. BOA HAT 425/21813 G, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/30 October 1826, BOA HAT 425/21829, 08 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/10 October 1826. 58. BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826. 59. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827. 60. BOA HAT 429/21880 R, 09 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/08 January 1827. 61. BOA HAT 424/21811 B, 25 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/26 November 1826. 62. BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. 63. BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA HAT 442/22219, 12 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/13 November 1826. 64. BOA HAT 442/22219 K, 10 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10 December 1826. 65. BOA HAT 423/21802 C, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 442/22219 B, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 442/22219 D, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 66. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827. 67. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. 68. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827, BOA HAT 425/21833 F, 15 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/15 December 1826. 69. BOA HAT 442/22219 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1826, BOA Cevdet Askeriye 301/12488, 29 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/30 November 1826, BOA Cevdet Askeriye 754/31783, 29 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/30 November 1826. 70. BOA HAT 442/22219 K, 10 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10 December 1826, BOA HAT 425/21833, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1826. 71. BOA HAT 425/21833 H, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826, BOA HAT 425/21833 J, 21 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/21 December 1826. 72. BOA HAT 425/21833 F, 15 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/15 December 1826. 73. BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826. 74. BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826. 75. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/02 February 1827. 76. According to Yasar Pasa, the Mutasarrıf of U¨sku¨b, Serifzade was among the rebels and escaped to his ciftlik village since he did not want to communicate with the central authorities. BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. It is understood that later he returned to Saray and broke with the rebels, who then turned against him. I came across three different stories about his death. According to the first one, when he was summoned by an

318

77. 78. 79. 80.

NOTES TO PAGE 86 agent of the state who talked with him, rebels saw them and attacked him, arguing that he was inclined toward the state. BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826. According to the second one, which was mentioned by Abdurrahim Pasa, who was appointed as the vali of Bosnia a short while after Serifzade’s death, the rebels of Saray prepared a mahzar which rejected the abolition of the janissaries and asked Serifzade to seal it as well, but he did not want to seal it and escaped towards the castle. The rebels followed him and stoned him to death. It is important to note that, after Abdurrahim Pasa cited these events, he said that his aim in doing so was to ask whether it was appropriate to punish those Saraylis with the punishment of homicide or not. BOA HAT 429/21880 F, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827. It is important to note that during the eighteenth century in Bosnia, the homicide was transformed into another kind of crime, namely brigandage. By this reinterpretation, whereby murderers were turned into brigands, the governor shifted the matter from the kadı’s sphere into his own clearly defined authority. Thus, it was possible for him not only to place the murderer under his authority, but also to change the punishment, because brigandage was a more serious crime than homicide in Islamic jurisprudence. It is probable that, by this question, Abdurrahim Pasa was planning to appropriate for himself the role of plaintiff, investigator, judge and executioner. For more information about the issue see Michael Hickok, ‘Homicide Investigations in Ottoman Bosnia: The Tension Between Legality and Stability,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, pp. 205– 24. According to the third account cited by Belgadıˆ Rasid, when the rebels demanded the seal of Serifzade he resisted them, saying that their way was not correct either canonically or rationally. He then pounded his seal in the mortar, broke it into pieces and gave it to the rebels. This angered them so much that they stoned him to death. Belgradıˆ Rasid, Vak‘a-i Hayretnu¨ma, p. 68. When we compare these three stories we see how a person previously associated with rebels was turned into a hero and a martyr. This case is a good example of ex post facto history writing in which events are confined to a simplistic form of storytelling, resisting the complexity of the reality. As Giovanni Levi has pointed out: ‘The true problem for historians is to succeed in expressing the complexity of reality, even if this involves using descriptive techniques and forms of reasoning which are more intrinsically selfquestioning and less assertive than any used before.’ Giovanni Levi, ‘On Microhistory,’ in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, p. 110. BOA HAT 423/21802 C, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21850, 20 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/19 January 1827. BOA HAT 442/22219 K, 10 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10 December 1826. BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826. BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826.

NOTES TO PAGES 86 – 90

319

81. BOA HAT 426/21862 G, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826. I mentioned previously that, when the couriers could not enter the region because of the rebellion, they passed on what news they could about conditions there. While sometimes these accounts were unreliable, in this case the courier reported that he talked personally with Osman Pasa. 82. BOA HAT 426/21862 V, 17 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/19 October 1826. 83. BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. 84. BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826. 85. BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21862 G, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826, BOA HAT 429/21880 N, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 426/21862 S, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/15 October 1826. 86. BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. 87. BOA HAT 425/21833 E, 13 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/13 December 1826. 88. BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826. 89. BOA HAT 424/21811 O, 09 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/09 December 1826. 90. BOA HAT 425/21833 F, 15 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/15 December 1826. 91. BOA HAT 436/22062 O, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827. 92. BOA HAT 436/22062 N, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827. 93. BOA HAT 436/22062 J, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. 94. BOA HAT 422/21747, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 425/21833 H, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826, BOA HAT 425/21834 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 95. BOA HAT 425/21834 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 N, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826. 96. BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826. 97. BOA HAT 425/21834, 13 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/13 December 1826. 98. BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 429/21880 K, 25 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/24 January 1827. 99. BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 S, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 T, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 100. BOA HAT 429/21880 N, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 101. BOA HAT 426/21862, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/26 October 1826. 102. BOA HAT 425/21833 I˙, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 425/21833 J, 21 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/21 December 1826, BOA HAT 438/22101, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826. 103. BOA HAT 301/17922, 21 Safer 1242/24 September 1826. 104. BOA HAT 301/17922 E, 21 Safer 1242/ 24 September 1826. 105. BOA HAT 301/17922 E, 21 Safer 1242/ 24 September 1826.

320

NOTES TO PAGES 90 – 93

106. BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826, BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 423/21802 C, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826. 107. BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 108. BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827. 109. BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 110. BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827. 111. BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 19, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826. 112. BOA HAT 438/22110, undated. 113. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 19, Evaˆsıt-ı Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10-19 December 1826. 114. BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827, BOA HAT 438/22111, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 115. BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827, BOA HAT 1139/45308, 30 Receb 1242/27 February 1827. Eren claims that after his deposition, Mustafa Pasa was exiled to Nig˘de, but we see that this was not the case. Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 84. Apart from this document there are others which assert that he was appointed as the Muhafız of Nig˘bolu on 29 December 1826, but a short while later, on 26 February 1827, he was dismissed again and sent to Kırkkilise. For more information see: BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 179/8916, 29 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/29 December 1826, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 179/8917, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827, BOA Cevdet Askeriye 512/21356, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827, BOA Cevdet Askeriye 755/31819, 29 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/29 December 1826. 116. BOA HAT 704/33846, 05 Sevval 1242/02 May 1827, BOA HAT 704/33846 A, 01 Zilkade 1242/27 May 1827. 117. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65, p. 67, 07 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/06 January 1827, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 19, Evaˆsıt-ı Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10-19 December 1826, BOA HAT 429/21880 I˙, 18 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/17 January 1827, BOA HAT 21887 B, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 98/4889, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826. 118. BOA HAT 429/21880 F, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827. 119. BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827. 120. BOA HAT 429/21880 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 G, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 121. BOA HAT 429/21880 Z, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/26 January 1827, BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. 122. BOA HAT 429/21880 Z, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/26 January 1827. 123. BOA HAT 429/21880 F, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827, BOA HAT 426/21848 M, 29 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/28 January 1827. 124. BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/02 February 1827. 125. BOA HAT 429/21880 F, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827. 126. BOA HAT 466/22832 C, 25 Saban 1242/24 March 1827.

NOTES TO PAGES 93 – 97

321

127. BOA HAT 429/21880 U, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 U¨, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827. 128. BOA HAT 429/21880 U¨, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827. 129. BOA HAT 429/21880 U¨, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827. 130. BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827. 131. BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827, BOA HAT 430/21893, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827. 132. BOA HAT 429/21880 Z, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/26 January 1827. 133. BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/02 February 1827. 134. BOA HAT 426/21848 H, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. 135. BOA HAT 425/21833 I˙, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. 136. BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/02 February 1827. 137. BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827. 138. BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/02 February 1827. 139. BOA HAT 426/21848 H, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 426/21848 P, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827, BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827, BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. 140. BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827. 141. BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827. It is important to note that according to the written documents (ilaˆm), cauldrons (kazgan) and ladles (kepce) of the janissaries were put into the arsenals of the castles and their insignias were seized by Abdurrahim Pasa in order to be sent to Istanbul. For more information see BOA HAT 438/22097, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 142. BOA HAT 426/21855, 29 Receb 1242/26 February 1827. 143. BOA HAT 426/21847, 17 Receb 1242/14 February 1827. 144. BOA HAT 423/21804, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/25 October 1826. 145. BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. 146. BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. 147. BOA HAT 436/22062 A, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827, BOA HAT 436/22062 E, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827, BOA HAT 1058/43518, 17 Receb 1242/14 February 1827. 148. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 149. BOA HAT 436/22062 A, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827. 150. BOA HAT 424 21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. 151. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 152. BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. 153. BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827. 154. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 423/21787, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 155. See for example BOA HAT 422/21747, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 156. BOA HAT 436/22062 K, 17 Receb 1242/14 February 1827.

322

NOTES TO PAGES 97 –99

157. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827. It is seen that there were conflicting numbers of the soldiers under the command of Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi. According to another document, namely BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, the number of soldiers under his command was reported as 2,000 – 3,000, while according to BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827, Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi went to Travnik together with 6,000 soldiers. It is most probable that Banalukalı Hıfzı Efendi departed from Saray together with 2,000 – 3,000 soldiers and the number reached 5,000 – 6,000 with the participation from different districts’ soldiers, while he was on the way to Travnik. 158. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 159. BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. 160. BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 161. BOA HAT 438/22110, undated. 162. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. 163. BOA HAT 426/21860, 27 Sevval 1242/24 May 1827. 164. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 111, 20 Rebiyu¨levvel 1243/11 October 1827. 165. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. 166. This situation of the vali can be seen in BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. 167. The vali’s worries about any reaction can be clearly seen in BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827. 168. BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827, BOA HAT 440/22162, 23 Sevval 1242/20 May 1827. 169. BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827. 170. BOA HAT 424/21808, 11 Rebiyu¨levvel 1243/02 October 1827, BOA HAT 1026/42766 D, 03 Saban 1243/19 February 1828. 171. See for example BOA HAT 955/40967 C, 05 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/26 October 1827, BOA HAT 1089/44275 C¸, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 172. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 227. 173. BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 174. See for example BOA HAT 1089/44275, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827, BOA HAT 1089/44275 A, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1243/20 October 1827, BOA HAT 1089/44275 B, 15 Rebiyu¨levvel 1243/06 October 1827, BOA HAT 1089/44275 C, 17 Rebiyu¨levvel 1243/08 October 1827, BOA HAT 1206/47281, 04 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/25 October 1827. 175. In the BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827, the situation was reflected as such: ‘simdilik ehl-i I˙slaˆm beyninde muˆceb-i semaˆtet bir keyfiyetin vukuˆ‘ bulması bir vechle tecvıˆz olunmuyor. . .’. 176. BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 177. BOA HAT 1069/43767, 30 Receb 1243/16 February 1828. 178. BOA HAT 1026/42766 C, 05 Saban 1243/21 February 1828. 179. BOA HAT 1134/45182 G, 29 Saban 1243/16 March 1828. It is seen that during the period under consideration, Russia showed a great interest in

NOTES TO PAGES 99 –101

180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185.

186. 187. 188. 189.

190. 191. 192. 193.

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Montenegro. The Russian subsidy was so apparent in the region that it constituted one of the few financial sources of its bishopric in Cetinje. During this period, the country’s status in relation to the Ottoman Empire was not very clear. While the Montenegrin leaders argued that they were independent, the Ottoman Empire insisted that the region was an integral part of its territory. For the first part of the nineteenth century, it was estimated that there was a population of about 120,000 people divided into 36 tribes and living in 240 villages in Montenegro. Its capital Cetinje contained the monastery. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, pp. 246– 9. For more information about Montenegro during this period see: Natasha Margulis. Njegosˇ’s Montenegro, the Great Powers, and Modernization in the Balkans: 1830– 1851, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation (University of Cincinnati, 2004), Florian Bieber. Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, 2003), Thomas Fleming. Montenegro: The Divided Land (Rockford, Illinois: Chronicles Press, 2002). Anastasia Karakasidou, ‘The Burden of the Balkans,’ Anthropological Quarterly, 75(3) (2002), p. 577. BOA HAT 1056/43462, 13 Zilkade 1243/27 May 1828. Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), pp. 39 – 46. BOA HAT 422/21742, undated. See for example BOA HAT 442/22207, 14 Zilhicce 1247/15 May 1832. BOA HAT 1025/42743, 19 Sevval 1243/04 May 1828, BOA HAT 1025/42743 C, 19 Sevval 1243/04 May 1828, BOA HAT 1025/42743 D, 15 Sevval 1243/30 April 1828, BOA HAT 1059/43544, 15 Saban 1243/02 March 1828. BOA HAT 1025/42743 D, 15 Sevval 1243/30 April 1828. BOA HAT 1025/42743, 19 Sevval 1243/04 May 1828, BOA HAT 1025/42743 E, 19 Sevval 1243/04 May 1828, BOA HAT 1025/42743 J, 29 Zilhicce 1243/12 July 1828. BOA HAT 1025/42743 F, 19 Sevval 1243/04 May 1828. The reports came from the Muhafız of Belgrade, Hu¨seyin Pasa and the Muhafız of Nis, Osman Pasa, who cited the event in very similar terms. For the citation of Hu¨seyin Pasa, see BOA HAT 423/21782, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828, and of Osman Pasa see, BOA HAT 423/21785, 25 Zilhicce 1243/08 July 1828. According to Musa Ag˘a, the group included 800– 1,000 people. BOA HAT 423/21898, 27 Zilhicce 1243/10 July 1828. BOA HAT 423/21898, 27 Zilhicce 1243/10 July 1828. BOA HAT 429/21886 H, 11 Zilhicce 1243/24 June 1828. Those arguments are studied in detail in Chapter 4. BOA HAT 423/21782, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828, BOA HAT 423/21785, 25 Zilhicce 1243/08 July 1828, BOA HAT 429/21886 C, 29

324

194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211.

212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220.

NOTES TO PAGES 101 –104 Zilhicce 1243/12 July 1828, BOA HAT 429/21886 H, 11 Zilhicce 1243/24 June 1828. BOA HAT 423/21782, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828, BOA HAT 423/21785, 25 Zilhicce 1243/08 July 1828. BOA HAT 423/21782, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828, BOA HAT 1034/42900, 01 Muharrem 1244/14 July 1828. BOA HAT 440/22152, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828. Lawrence P. Meriage, ‘The First Serbian Uprising (1804 –1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question,’ Slavic Review, 373 (1978), p. 428. Ibid., p. 437. BOA HAT 440/22152, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828. BOA HAT 429/21886 G, 20 Zilhicce 1243/03 July 1828. BOA HAT 430/21898, 27 Zilhicce 1243/10 July 1828. BOA HAT 441/22191, 04 Muharrem 1244/17 July 1828. BOA HAT 422/21740, 29 Zilhicce 1244/02 July 1829. BOA HAT 1036/42946 B, 19 Muharrem 1244/01 August 1828. BOA HAT 1036/42946, 26 Muharrem 1244/08 August 1828. BOA HAT 422/21740, undated, [1828]. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 67, p. 7, 13 Safer 1244/25 August 1828, BOA HAT 1038/42997, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/29 September 1828. BOA HAT 422/21740, undated [1828]. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 67, p. 7, 13 Safer 1244/25 August 1828, BOA HAT 1060/43567, 01 Rebiyu¨lahir 1244/11 October 1828. See for example BOA HAT 474/23217, 29 Zilhicce 1244/02 July 1829. BOA HAT 438/22096, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/19 September 1828, BOA HAT 1029/42840, 19 Safer 1244/31 August 1828, BOA HAT 1032/42879, 20 Safer 1244/01 September 1828, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 67, p. 9, 19 Safer 1244/31 August 1828. BOA HAT 438/22096, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/19 September 1828. BOA HAT 437/22087 E, 21 Receb 1245/16 January 1830. See for example Sarabosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 92, Gurre-i Muharrem 1246/22 June –1 July 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830. BOA HAT 438/22096 A, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/19 September 1828, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 67, p. 21, 24 Rebiyu¨lahir 1244/03 November 1828. BOA HAT 438/22096, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/19 September 1828. BOA HAT 437/22086, 03 Receb 1244/09 January 1829, BOA HAT 437/22086 C, 03 Receb 1244/09 January 1829, BOA HAT 437/22086 D, 03 Receb 1244/09 January 1829. BOA HAT 1029/42836, 09 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1244/17 November 1828, BOA HAT 1029/42836 A, 09 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1244/17 November 1828, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 54, 11 Zilkade 1246/23 April 1831. BOA HAT 437/22086 B, 03 Receb 1244/09 January 1829. BOA HAT 1072/43890, 29 Zilhicce 1244/02 July 1829.

NOTES TO PAGES 104 –107

325

221. BOA HAT 441/22177, 07 Safer 1245/08 August 1829, BOA HAT 1017/42560, 09 Zilhicce 1244/12 June 1829, BOA HAT 1075/43941, 17 Zilhicce 1244/20 June 1829, BOA HAT 1075/43941 A, 17 Zilhicce 1244/20 June 1829. 222. BOA HAT 1029/42827, 20 Zilhicce 1244/23 June 1829. 223. BOA HAT 1075/43941 B, 29 Zilhicce 1244/02 July 1829. For the preparations of Mustafa Pasa see also BOA HAT 1075/43939, 29 Zilhicce 1244/02 July 1829. 224. BOA HAT 437/22085, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. 225. BOA HAT 437/22085, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. 226. BOA HAT 437/22082 E, 27 Rebiyu¨lahir 1245/26 October 1829. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´ makes a statement about the degree of affinity between Mahmud Pasa and Fedayizade Ali Pasa and says that they were brothers. Hamdija Kresˇevljkovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 31. 227. See for example BOA HAT 437/22082 C, 29 Zilhicce 1245/21 June 1830, BOA HAT 437/22085, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. 228. BOA HAT 437/22085 B, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. 229. BOA HAT 437/22085 B, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. 230. BOA HAT 1125/44989 H, 15 Muharrem 1246/06 July 1830. 231. BOA HAT 1125/ 44989, 15 Muharrem 1246/06 July 1830, BOA HAT 1125/44989 B, 03 Muharrem 1246/24 June 1830, BOA HAT 1125/44989 D, 05 Muharrem 1246/26 June 1830, BOA HAT 1125/44989 E, 05 Muharrem 1246/26 June 1830. 232. BOA HAT 1125/44989, 15 Muharrem 1246/06 July 1830. 233. BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830. 234. BOA HAT 437/22074 B, 11 Zilkade 1245/04 May 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074 E, 15 Saban 1245/09 February 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074 G, 03 Zilkade 1245/26 April 1830, BOA HAT 437/22087 B, 09 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1245/06 November 1829. 235. BOA HAT 437/22074 B, 11 Zilkade 1245/04 May 1830. 236. BOA HAT 437/22078, 03 Zilhicce 1245/26 May 1830. 237. BOA HAT 437/22079, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830, BOA HAT 437/22079 A, 01 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/18 October 1830, BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830. 238. BOA HAT 437/22079, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830, BOA HAT 437/22079 A, 01 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/18 October 1830. 239. BOA HAT 437/22078, 03 Zilhicce 1245/26 May 1830. 240. BOA HAT 442/22200, 02 Ramazan 1246/14 February 1831. 241. Cˇedomir Antic´, ‘The Formative Years of the Principality of Serbia (1804– 56): Ottoman Influences,’ in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760– 1850 Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation, p. 245. 242. BOA Cevdet Askeriye, 1191/53204, 21 Receb 1245/16 January 1830, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 187/9310, 14 Saban 1245/08 February 1830. 243. BOA HAT 438/22091 C, 13 Saban 1246/27 January 1831.

326

NOTES TO PAGES 107 –108

244. BOA HAT 438/22091 C, 13 Saban 1246/27 January 1831. 245. BOA HAT 1127/45030 B, 17 Saban 1246/31 January 1831, BOA HAT 1128/45034, 03 Receb 1246/18 December 1830, BOA HAT 1308/51008, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831, BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831. 246. BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831. 247. BOA HAT 406/21183, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 406/21183 A, 23 Ramazan 1246/07 March 1831. 248. BOA HAT 1109/44685, 03 Zilkade 1245/26 April 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 E, 23 Sevval 1245/17 April 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 H, 04 Sevval 1245/29 March 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 I˙, 09 Sevval 1245/03 April 1830, BOA HAT 44685 V, 17 Sevval 1245/11 April 1830, BOA HAT 45032 A, 29 Zilhicce 1245/21 June 1830. 249. See for example BOA HAT 1109/44685 B, 15 Sevval 1245/09 April 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 C¸, 09 Sevval 1245/03 April 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 E, 23 Sevval 1245/17 April 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 H, 04 Sevval 1245/29 March 1830, BOA HAT 1109/44685 I˙, 09 Sevval 1245/03 April 1830. 250. BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 442/22200, 02 Ramazan 1246/14 February 1831. 251. See for example BOA HAT 1308/51008, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831. 252. BOA HAT 442/22200, 02 Ramazan 1246/14 February 1831. 253. BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831. 254. BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831, BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831. 255. For the dismissal of I˙skodralı Mustafa Pasa from the administration of Ohri and Elbasan and the appointment of Resid Mehmed Pasa there, see: BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 137/6817, 18 Zilhicce 1246/30 May 1831, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 159/7942, 29 Zilkade 1246/11 May 1831, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 230/11462, 07 Zilhicce 1246/19 May 1831, BOA HAT 406/ 21186 A, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831, BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 412/21412 A, 09 Saban 1246/23 January 1831, BOA HAT 412/21412 B, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831, BOA HAT 414/21471, 14 Ramazan 1246/26 February 1831, BOA HAT 414/21472, 14 Ramazan 1246/26 February 1831, BOA HAT 415/21491, 14 Ramazan 1246/26 February 1831, BOA HAT 430/21915, 04 Sevval 1246/18 March 1831, BOA HAT 432/21948, 25 Receb 1246/09 January 1831, BOA HAT 442/22200 B, 03 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831, BOA HAT 540/26662, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831, Topkapı Sarayı Arsivi, E. 1589, 1831. 256. BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/05 March 1831, BOA HAT 438/22091 B, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831, BOA HAT 442/22200, 02 Ramazan 1246/14 February 1831. It is important to note that the Albanians constituted two main groups: the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs were living in the northern mountainous areas. They had their self-governing tribal

NOTES TO PAGES 108 –110

257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279.

327

organization in which the basic unit was the clan called a fis, which was administered by the oldest male of the group. The Tosks mostly lived in the southern part of the Albanian lands and had no tribal system. For more information about the Ghegs and Tosks, see for example Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878– 1912 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831. BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831. See also BOA HAT 1127/45030, 17 Saban 1246/31 January 1831. A copy of this letter can be seen in BOA HAT 438/22095 G, 29 Saban 1246/12 February 1831. BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831. BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831, BOA HAT 438/22091 C, 13 Saban 1246/27 January 1831, BOA HAT 1308/51008 E, 11 Ramazan 1246/23 February 1831. BOA HAT 406/21183 B, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831, BOA HAT 441/22178 A, 23 Ramazan 1246/07 March 1831. BOA HAT 441/22178, 22 Ramazan 1246/06 March 1831, BOA HAT 441/22178 A, 23 Ramazan 1246/07 March 1831. BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831. BOA HAT 438/22091 C, 13 Saban 1246/27 January 1831, BOA HAT 438/22091 D, 17 Saban 1246/31 January 1831. BOA HAT 443/22222, 25 Muharrem 1247/06 July 1831, BOA HAT 443/22222 A, 20 Zilhicce 1247/21 May 1832. BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831. BOA HAT 1308/51008 E, 11 Ramazan 1246/23 February 1831. BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831. BOA HAT 1308/51008 C¸, 07 Zilkade 1246/19 April 1831. BOA HAT 443/22222, 25 Muharrem 1247/06 July 1831, BOA HAT 443/22222 A, 20 Zilhicce 1247/21 May 1832. BOA HAT 443/22222, 25 Muharrem 1247/06 July 1831, BOA HAT 443/22222 A, 20 Zilhicce 1247/21 May 1832. BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831. A copy of these letters can be seen in BOA HAT 431/21919 D, 19 Zilhicce 1246/31 May 1831. BOA HAT 413/21919 C, 27 Zilhicce 1246/08 June 1831. BOA HAT 436/22063, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 436/22063 G, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. BOA HAT 438/22095 D, 21 Zilhicce 1246/02 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831. BOA HAT 419/21667, 23 Zilhicce 1246/04 June 1831, BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095 A, 09

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280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287.

288.

289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299.

300. 301. 302.

NOTES TO PAGES 110 –112 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095 D, 21 Zilhicce 1246/02 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831. BOA HAT 441/22183 A, 19 Safer 1247/30 July 1831. BOA HAT 423/21773, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831. BOA HAT 431/21919 B, 21 Zilhicce 1246/02 June 1831. BOA HAT 431/21919 A, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831. BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 H, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/03 November 1831. BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. BOA HAT 440/22154 B, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831. BOA HAT 437/22077, 22 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/31 August 1831, BOA HAT 437/22077 A, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/28 August 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095 C, 29 Zilhice 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 438/22109, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 443/22221 H, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/03 November 1831. BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 440/22147, 11 Muharrem 1247/22 June 1831. For the same issue see also, BOA HAT 432/21963, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/22 August 1831, BOA HAT 441/22183, 14 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/22 September 1831. BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831, BOA HAT 442/22218, 27 Muharrem 1247/03 July 1831. BOA HAT 440/22154 A, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831. BOA HAT 440/22154 A, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831. BOA HAT 441/22180 B, 19 Muharrem 1247/30 June 1831. BOA HAT 441/22180, 27 Muharrem 1247/08 July 1831, BOA HAT 441/22180 B, 19 Muharrem 1247/30 June 1831. BOA HAT 441/22180 B, 19 Muharrem 1247/30 June 1831. For the same issue see also, BOA HAT 418/21621, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. BOA HAT 431/21924, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. BOA HAT 1117/44858, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. Hakan Erdem, ‘“Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”: Ottomans, Albanians, and Turks in the Greek War of Independence,’ in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760– 1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation, pp. 227, 237. BOA HAT 433/21989, 19 Zilhicce 1246/31 May 1831, BOA HAT 440/22148, 24 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/02 October 1831. For more information about Resid Mehmed Pasa see Erdem, ‘ “Perfidious Albanians” and “Zealous Governors”,’ p. 237. BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, BOA HAT 442/22218, 27 Muharrem 1247/08 July 1831. Topkapı Sarayı Arsivi, E. 5780, undated. BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, BOA HAT 442/22218, 27 Muharrem 1247/08 July 1831.

NOTES TO PAGES 113 –114

329

303. BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 73, 03 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/12 August 1831. 304. BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. 305. It is important to note that Silahdar I˙lyas Bey was mentioned frequently as Silahdar-ı Poda (for example, BOA HAT 405/21174 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21790, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 439/22125, 22 Sevval 1248/14 March 1833, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831, BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831); and occasionally as Silahsor-ı Poda (for example BOA HAT 423/21777, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832). 306. It is understood that Silahdar I˙lyas Bey became successful in escaping to Morea together with his companions, namely I˙vraniyeli Sahin Bey and Abdullah Bey, and started to plot mischief in this region together with some notables. BOA HAT 421/21717 C, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. For more information about the rebellion of the Silahdar I˙lyas Bey see, BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 405/21174 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 408/21252 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21764, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21777, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21790, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 431/21919, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 432/21956, 20 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/27 September 1831, BOA HAT 432/21959, 24 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/02 October 1831, BOA HAT 435/22035, 29 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/07 October 1831, BOA HAT 435/22038, 24 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/02 October 1831, BOA HAT 439/22125, 22 Sevval 1248/14 March 1833, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831, BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. 307. BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. 308. BOA HAT 440/22148, 24 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/02 October 1831, BOA HAT 440/22148 A, 15 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/23 September 1831. 309. BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. 310. BOA HAT 659/32166 A, 03 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/11 September 1831. 311. BOA HAT 440/22154 C, 24 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/02 September 1831. 312. BOA HAT 405/21174 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 21180 C, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/06 September 1831.

Chapter 3 1. BOA HAT 442/22205, 01 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/09 September 1831. 2. BOA HAT 440/22154 D, undated. 3. BOA HAT 437/22077 D, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, BOA HAT 440/22148 C, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. 4. BOA HAT 442/22205, 01 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/09 September 1831.

330

NOTES TO PAGES 115 –116

5. BOA HAT 437/22077 D, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, BOA HAT 440/22148 C, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. 6. BOA HAT 440/22148 B, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. 7. BOA HAT 440/22148 B, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. 8. BOA HAT 435/22039 A, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831, BOA HAT 435/22039 B, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831, BOA HAT 437/22077 C, 09 Ramazan 1247/11 February 1832. 9. BOA HAT 435/22039 A, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831, BOA HAT 435/22039 B, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831. 10. For the letters of Glamoc and C¸elebipazarı, see: BOA HAT 443/22221 I˙, 21 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/29 September 1831, Blene and Lozince; BOA HAT 443/22221 J, 28 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/06 October 1831, Ihlevne and Anoguste; BOA HAT 443/22221 K, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, Yayce and Nevesil; BOA HAT 443/22221 L, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/25 September 1831, Memliha-i Bala and Nevesin; BOA HAT 443/22221 M, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, Kladine and Liboska; BOA HAT 443/22221 N, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, Bozanski Brad and Do¨mene; BOA HAT 443/22221 O, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, Visoko and ¨ , 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, Doboy; BOA HAT 443/22221 O C¸aynice and Krupe; BOA HAT 443/22221 P, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/12 October 1831, Kamengrad and Fonice; BOA HAT 443/22221 R, 19 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/27 September 1831, Kamengrad and Glamoc; BOA HAT 443/22221 S, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, Taslıca and Tesne; BOA HAT 443/22221 T, 19 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/27 September 1831, Kolasin and Izvornik; BOA HAT 443/22221 U, 02 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/09 October 1831, Kolasin and Visegrad; BOA HAT 443/22221 U¨, 19 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/27 September 1831, Maglay and Derbend; BOA HAT 443/22221 V, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/25 September 1831, Istereflak and Blagay; BOA HAT 443/22221 Y, 23 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/01 October 1831, Go¨lhisar; BOA HAT 443/22221 Z, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/21 September 1831. 11. For example, BOA HAT 435/22039 A, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831, BOA HAT 437/22077 C, 09 Ramazan 1247/11 February 1832, BOA HAT 443/22221 F, 07 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/14 October 1831. 12. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 83, 07 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/14 October 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 89, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/29 November 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 16, 17 Zilkade 1247/18 April 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 25, 13 Sevval 1247/16 March 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 34, 17 Sevval 1247/20 March 1832. 13. BOA HAT 435/22039 B, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831. 14. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 16, 07 Ramazan 1247/09 February 1832. 15. BOA HAT 443/22221 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 F, 07 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/14 October 1831. 16. BOA HAT 443/22221 F, 07 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/14 October 1831. 17. BOA HAT 443/22221 H, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/03 November 1831.

NOTES TO PAGES 116 –120

331

18. BOA HAT 443/22221 A, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831. 19. Topkapı Sarayı Arsivi, E. 4236, Gurre-i Muharrem 1247/12-21 June 1831. 20. BOA HAT 441/22189, 16 Receb 1247/21 December 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 A, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831. 21. BOA HAT 441/22190, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831. 22. BOA HAT 439/22129, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831, BOA HAT 441/22190, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831. 23. For the rebellion of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasa see Judith Mendelsohn Rood, ‘Mehmed Ali as Mutinous Khedive: The Roots of Rebellion,’ in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 115–28. 24. BOA HAT 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832. 25. BOA HAT 351/19831, 25 Receb 1247/30 December 1831. 26. BOA HAT 439/22138, 11 Receb 1247/16 December 1831. 27. BOA HAT 437/22073, 03 Sevval 1247/06 March 1832. 28. BOA HAT 438/22109, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 29. BOA HAT 423/21775, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 30. BOA HAT 438/22109, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 31. BOA HAT 853/38206 A, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 32. BOA HAT 423/21775, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 33. BOA HAT 439/22144, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 34. BOA HAT 423/21775, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 35. BOA HAT 423/21775, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 36. BOA HAT 716/34202, 11 Ramazan 1247/13 February 1832, BOA HAT 716/34202 A, 11 Ramazan 1247/13 February 1832. 37. BOA HAT 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832. 38. BOA HAT 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832, BOA HAT 734/34838, undated [1832]. 39. BOA HAT 734/34838, undated [1832]. 40. BOA HAT 437/22073, 03 Sevval 1247/06 March 1832. 41. BOA HAT 422/21742, undated [1832], BOA HAT 442/22211, 22 Zilkade 1247/23 April 1832. 42. BOA HAT 442/22211, 22 Zilkade 1247/23 April 1832. 43. BOA HAT 422/21743, 29 Zilhice 1247/30 May 1832. 44. BOA HAT 439/22132, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832, BOA HAT 443/22224, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832. 45. BOA HAT 440/22170, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 46. BOA HAT 443/22224, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832. 47. BOA HAT 439/22135, 14 Zilhicce 1247/15 May 1832. 48. BOA HAT 443/22224, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832. 49. BOA HAT 427/21865, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 50. BOA HAT 443/22224, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832. For the entry of Mahmud Hamdi Pasa to Yenipazar, see also BOA HAT 439/22132, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832.

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NOTES TO PAGES 120 –126

51. BOA HAT 442/22217, 28 Zilhicce 1247/29 May 1832, BOA HAT 909/39784, 05 Muharrem 1248/04 June 1832. 52. BOA HAT 909/39784, 05 Muharrem 1248/04 June 1832. 53. BOA HAT 443/22224, 03 Zilhicce 1247/04 May 1832. 54. BOA HAT 442/22217, 28 Zilhicce 1247/29 May 1832. 55. BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832. 56. BOA HAT 442/22217, 28 Zilhicce 1247/29 May 1832. 57. BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832. 58. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´. Izabrana Djela IV, p. 43. 59. BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832. 60. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´. Izabrana Djela IV, p. 43. 61. BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832. 62. BOA HAT 430/21891 D, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 63. BOA HAT 422/21745, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 64. BOA HAT 422/21745, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 65. BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21757, undated, BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 66. BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 67. BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 68. BOA HAT 422/21749, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. For the preparation of promotion and rewarding defters for the first stage of rebellion, see BOA HAT 423/21804, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/25 October 1826. 69. BOA HAT 423/21764, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 70. BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 71. BOA HAT 433/21972, 25 Safer 1248/24 July 1832. 72. Topkapı Sarayı Arsivi, E. 5024/2, undated. 73. BOA HAT 423/21757, undated, BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 74. BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 75. BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826. 76. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 77. BOA HAT 442/22209, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1246/01 September 1830. 78. BOA HAT 438/22122 B, 23 Ramazan 1254/10 December 1838. 79. BOA HAT 423/21804, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/25 October 1826. 80. BOA HAT 437/22088, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 81. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 82. BOA HAT 1201/47144, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 83. BOA HAT 441/22174, 23 Sevval 1242/20 May 1827. 84. BOA HAT 429/21889, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. 85. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827. 86. BOA HAT 422/21755, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. The same practice was seen in BOA HAT 423/21761, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832 as well. 87. BOA HAT 423/21768, undated, BOA HAT 423/21791, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832.

NOTES TO PAGES 126 –131 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118.

333

BOA HAT 423/21768, undated. BOA HAT 423/21795, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. BOA HAT 439/22131, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. BOA HAT 334/19179, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/17 November 1832. BOA HAT 334/19179 A, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/17 November 1832, BOA HAT 334/19179 B, 21 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/15 November 1832, BOA HAT 351/19838, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 423/21783, undated. BOA HAT 423/21783, undated. BOA HAT 334/19179 A, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/17 November 1832, BOA HAT 334/19179 B, 21 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/15 November 1832. For the issue see Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, pp. 278– 9; Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt, pp. 66 – 7. BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833. BOA HAT 439/22127 D, 21 Ramazan 1248/11 February 1833. BOA HAT 358/20031 B, 19 Receb 1248/12 December 1832. BOA HAT 371/20377, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 371/20377 A, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 371/20377 B, 21 Receb 1248/14 December 1832. BOA HAT 439/22127 D, 21 Ramazan 1248/11 February 1833. BOA HAT 428/21871, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 428/21871 B, 19 Sevval 1248/11 March 1833. BOA HAT 428/21871 A, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. BOA HAT 421/21715 E, 05 Zilhicce 1248/25 April 1833, BOA HAT 428/21871 D, 19 Sevval 1248/11 March 1833. BOA HAT 428/21871 D, 19 Sevval 1248/11 March 1833. BOA HAT 421/21717 C, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. I discuss the will of Hu¨seyin Kapudan in detail in Chapter 5. BOA HAT 421/21715 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. BOA HAT 421/21718, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. BOA HAT 441/22176 I˙, 11 Muharrem 1249/31 May 1833. BOA HAT 438/22114, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 441/22176 I˙, 11 Muharrem 1249/31 May 1833. BOA HAT 438/22114, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. BOA HAT 481/23557, undated [1833]. BOA HAT 481/23557, undated [1833]. BOA HAT 481/23557, undated [1833]. BOA HAT 479/23430, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, Travnik Sicilleri, vol. 30, p. 60, 05 Safer 1249/24 June 1833. BOA HAT 479/23430, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. BOA HAT 433/21971, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/04 September 1833, BOA HAT 478/23401, undated. BOA HAT 433/21971, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/04 September 1833, BOA HAT 433/21971 A, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/04 September 1833, BOA HAT

334

119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.

127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136.

137.

NOTES TO PAGES 131 –135 433/21971 B, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/03 September 1833, BOA HAT 433/21971 C, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/03 September 1833. BOA HAT 422/21727, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834, BOA HAT 422/21727 B, 07 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1249/22 October 1833, BOA HAT 696/33582, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834, BOA HAT 428/21878 B, 03 Zilkade 1249/14 March 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 B, 03 Zilkade 1249/14 March 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 B, 03 Zilkade 1249/14 March 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 C, 03 Zilkade 1249/14 March 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 E, 21 Zilkade 1249/01 April 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 F, 01 Zilhicce 1249/11 April 1834, BOA HAT 428/21878 M, 11 Zilkade 1249/22 March 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 F, 01 Zilhicce 1249/11 April 1834, BOA HAT 428/21878 G, 07 Zilhicce 1249/17 April 1834, BOA HAT 428/21878 N, 17 Zilkade 1249/28 March 1834, BOA HAT 684/33239 A, 18 Zilhicce 1249/28 April 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 I˙, 17 Zilkade 1249/28 March 1834, BOA HAT 428/21878 J, 20 Sevval 1249/02 March 1249. BOA HAT 428/21878 G, 07 Zilhicce 1249/17 April 1834. BOA HAT 428/21878 G, 07 Zilhicce 1249/17 April 1834. BOA HAT 1291/50124 A, 15 Muharrem 1250/24 May 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 A, 19 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/23 September 1834, BOA HAT 1312/51043 C¸, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834, BOA HAT 1312/51043 H, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 G, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 G, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 C¸, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 437/22074 F, 12 Muharrem 1245/14 July 1829. For the issue see, BOA HAT 437/22074 B, 11 Zilkade 1245/04 May 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074 C, 19 Sevval 1245/13 April 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074 D, 05 Rebiyu¨levvel 1245/04 September 1829, BOA HAT 437/22074 E, 15 Saban 1245/09 February 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074 G, 03 Zilkade 1245/26 April 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074 H, 29 Zilhicce 1245/21 June 1830, BOA HAT 437/22087 B, 09 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1245/06 November 1829. I mentioned that dispute in the previous chapter in detail. Bastezkereci Akif Efendi says that, in order to solve that water problem, he went to Liboska and crossed to the Rastok Plain together with some notables of the region for an on-the spot inspection. BOA HAT 1311/51042, 15 Receb 1250/17 November 1834, BOA HAT 1311/51042 E, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1250/31 October 1834. Akif Efendi reported to the Porte that he had been successful in solving the problem but did not give detailed information about how he did so. BOA HAT 1312/51044 A, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835.

NOTES TO PAGES 135 –139 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146.

147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163.

335

BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 I˙, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 I˙, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. See also, Travnik Sicilleri, vol. 30, p. 121, Evaˆhir-i Saban 1250/22-31 December 1834. BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. BOA HAT 1311/51040 J, 29 Saban 1250/31 December 1834, BOA HAT 1311/51042 G, 25 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1250/29 October 1834. I focus on the will of I˙stolceli Ali Pasa in Chapter 5. BOA HAT 427/21870, 13 Zilhicce 1250/12 April 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51042 A, 17 Ramazan 1250/17 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51042 C¸, 10 Receb 1250/12 November 1834. Tabib Nuri Efendi was sent from Istanbul to examine Ali Pasa’s illness. BOA HAT 1311/51042 C, 15 Receb 1250/17 November 1834, BOA HAT 1311/51042 C¸, 10 Receb 1250/12 November 1834, BOA HAT 1311/51042 E, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1250/31 October 1834, BOA HAT 1311/51042 F, 03 Receb 1250/05 November 1834. BOA HAT 1311/51040 T, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. BOA HAT 1311/51040 L, 15 Saban 1250/17 December 1834. BOA HAT 427/21870, 13 Zilhicce 1250/12 April 1835. The signed document can be seen in BOA HAT 1311/51040 V, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 1311/51040 U, 19 Ramazan 1250/19 January 1835. BOA HAT 1311 51040 G, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 T, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. BOA HAT 330/19085, 11 Zilhicce 1250/10 April 1835. BOA HAT 1311/51040 G, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. BOA HAT 526/25844, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 1311/51040 B, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 C¸, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 D, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 E, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 F, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 Y, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, Travnik Sicilleri, vol. 30, p. 75, 21 Receb 1249/04 December 1833. BOA HAT 1311/51040, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1311/51040 F, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. BOA HAT 439/22123 A, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 427/21866, undated. BOA HAT 439/22123 A, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 439/22123 A, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 439/22123 A, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 439/22123 B, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. BOA HAT 439/22123 B, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835.

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164. BOA HAT 427/21866, undated. 165. BOA HAT 471/23069, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835, BOA HAT 682/33202 A, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1251/15 July 1835, BOA HAT 1123/44939, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1251/02 August 1835, BOA HAT 1420/58051, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1251/04 August 1835, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 151/7512, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1251/25 July 1835, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 175/8737, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1251/25 July 1835. 166. BOA HAT 471/23069, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835, BOA HAT 682/33202 B, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1251/15 July 1835, BOA HAT 1420/58051, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1251/04 August 1835, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 151/7512, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1251/25 July 1835, BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 176/8759, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1251/25 July 1835. 167. BOA HAT 439/22123, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 168. BOA HAT 465/22782, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835, BOA HAT 465/22782 A, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 169. BOA HAT 476/23329, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. 170. Alex N. Dragnich, ‘Leadership and Politics: Nineteenth Century Serbia,’ The Journal of Politics, 37(2) (May 1975): pp. 347– 9; Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, p. 241. 171. For detailed information of Milosˇ to Istanbul see BOA HAT 1118/44889, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835, BOA HAT 1118/44892, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. 172. BOA HAT 907/39751, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 173. BOA HAT 907/39751, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 174. BOA HAT 674/32982, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 175. BOA HAT 674/32982, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 176. BOA HAT 1118/44877, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836, BOA HAT 1118/44892, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. 177. BOA HAT 674/32982, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 178. See for example Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, pp. 49 – 50, Gurre-i Receb 1246/16 December 1830. 179. BOA HAT 1312/51044, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835. 180. BOA HAT 1202/47201, 29 Zilhicce 1250/28 April 1835, BOA HAT 1204/47272 A, 25 Muharrem 1251/23 May 1835. For more information about the event, see also: BOA HAT 1204/47272, 01 Safer 1251/29 May 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 A, 17 Safer 1251/14 June 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 B, 19 Muharrem 1251/17 May 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 C, 09 Safer 1251/06 June 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 C¸, 13 Safer 1251/10 June 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 D, 05 Safer 1251/02 June 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 E, 11 Safer 1251/08 June 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 F, 11 Safer 1251/08 June 1835. 181. BOA HAT 1206/47288 E, 11 Safer 1251/08 June 1835, BOA HAT 1206/47288 F, 11 Safer 1251/08 June 1835. 182. BOA HAT 1206/47288 G, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836.

NOTES TO PAGES 143 –147 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200.

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BOA HAT 1199/47057, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. BOA HAT 1199/47057, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. BOA HAT 428/21873 B, 03 Receb 1251/25 October 1835. BOA HAT 331/19114 D, 05 Receb 1251/27 October 1835, BOA HAT 428/21873 D, 05 Receb 1251/27 October 1835. BOA HAT 428/21873 B, 03 Receb 1251/25 October 1835. BOA HAT 331/19114 D, 05 Receb 1251/27 October 1835, BOA HAT 428/21873 C, 02 Zilhicce 1251/20 March 1836. BOA HAT 586/28828 H, 07 Zilhicce 1251/25 March 1836. BOA HAT 439/22124, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1251/27 August 1835, BOA HAT 439/22124 A, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1251/27 August 1835. BOA HAT 332/19121 G, 21 Ramazan 1251/10 January 1836. It is important to note that the yerlikulu soldiers were defined as the remnants of the abolished janissaries in the mentioned document. BOA HAT 477/23367, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. BOA HAT 477/23367 A, 17 Sevval 1251/05 February 1836. BOA HAT 330/19079 E, 11 Ramazan 1251/31 December 1835, BOA HAT 332/19121, 28 Ramazan 1251/17 January 1836. BOA HAT 328/19027, 29 Zilhicce 1253/26 March 1838, BOA HAT 328/19036, 29 Zilhicce 1253/26 March 1838. BOA HAT 331/19114, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. The list of Vecihi Pasa’s demands for the Mansuˆre soldiers can be seen in BOA HAT 331/19114 B, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. BOA HAT 477/23367 A, 17 Sevval 1251/05 February 1836. BOA HAT 477/23367 A, 17 Sevval 1251/05 February 1836. BOA HAT 331/19114 A, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. BOA HAT 331/19114 C, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836.

Chapter 4 1. BOA HAT 438/22106 A, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. The English version is ‘The people of Bosnia have always prided themselves on and boasted of being superior to all other Muslims in every subject. Being a stupid group, they are of the understanding that those attitudes will show their sublime ability. Hence, in this manner, their behavior reflects the idea that they will claim some privileges and demands based on the idea that they have superiority over other Islamic countries. It is my contention that those ideas constitute the basis for their morbid Janissarian claims. They will finally try to satisfy their demands by using insolent people as guides. As experience has proved this way is not far from the origins and attitudes of the Bosniaks. At first, they will avoid presenting their demands and will draw out the rabble; thus, they will argue that important affairs have got into the hands of the rabble. Concealing their true demands, they will say that they could not dissuade the rabble. Concession and gentleness during any dialog with them

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NOTES TO PAGES 147 –149

will cause them to be spoiled by indulgence; on the other hand, to treat them contemptuously will lead to obstinacy and coarseness.’ 2. For a conceptual framework of mutinies see Palmira Brummett, ‘Classifying Ottoman Mutiny: The Act and Vision of Rebellion,’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, pp. 91 – 107. 3. Virginia H. Aksan, ‘Manning A Black Sea Garrison in the Eighteenth Century: Ochakov and Concepts of Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Context,’ in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, p. 64. 4. The single form of the term can be seen in BOA HAT 334/19179, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/17 November 1832, BOA HAT 405/21172 A, 28 Safer 1247/08 August 1831, BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 429/21882, 29 Zilhicce 1243/12 July 1828, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826, BOA HAT 1312/51043 B, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. It is important to note that these documents are only few selected ones I studied that included these terms. Because of the huge numbers it is not possible to mention all of them. For the forms of plural or genitive see for example: Fesaˆdaˆt; BOA HAT 429/21880 G, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 423/21802, 13 Safer 1242/16 September 1826, fesaˆdlar; BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 8, Rebiyu¨levvel 1246/August – September 1830, fesaˆd-ı azıˆm; BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, saˆ‘ıˆ fesaˆd; BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, sermaˆye-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 443/22221 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831, Bosna fesaˆdı; BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, Saray’ın fesaˆdı; BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826, Saray ve Travnik fesaˆdı; BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, icraˆ-yı fesaˆd; BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831, mazanne-i fesaˆd, BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, istikaˆl-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 443/22221 C, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831, ilkaˆ-yı fesaˆd; BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, madde-i fesaˆd; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 8, Rebiyu¨levvel 1246/August-September 1830, baˆ‘is-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 429/21882, 29 Zilhicce 1243/12 July 1828, serrıste-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, erbaˆb-ı fesaˆd; BOA HAT 427/21867, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834, envaˆ‘-ı fesaˆd; BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, pıˆsvaˆ-yı fesaˆd; BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, saˆ‘ıˆ bi’l-fesaˆd; BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, fesaˆd-ı mezkuˆre; BOA HAT 423/21785, 25 Zilhicce 1243/08 July 1828, naˆire-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 423/21785, 25 Zilhicce 1243/08 July 1828, bu¨nyaˆn-ı fesaˆd; BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, pisvaˆ-yı ehl-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, ru¨esaˆ-yı

NOTES TO PAGE 149

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

339

fesaˆd; BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, menba‘-ı fesaˆd; Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71 p. 3, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832, tuhm-efsaˆn-ı mazanne-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 429/21880 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, sevaˆd-ı cemiyet-i fesaˆd-ı berhemzede; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71 p. 3, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832, fesaˆd-ı fitne; BOA HAT 443/22221 C, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831, eskıyaˆnın fesaˆdları; BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. The use of the term fitne in a single form can be seen in BOA HAT 428/21878 N, 17 Zilkade 1249/28 March 1834, BOA HAT 429/21880 F, 22 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/21 January 1827, BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831. Iˆkaˆd-ı fitneye su¨luˆk; BOA HAT 429/21881 E, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, intıfaˆ-ı fitne; BOA HAT 429/21881 E, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, ıˆkaˆd-ı fitneye cu¨ret; BOA HAT 421/21715 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, mevkıd-ı fitne-i fesaˆd; BOA HAT 425/21815, 10 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/12 October 1826. The single form of the term can be seen in BOA HAT 421/21715 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 425/21815 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 440/22154 A, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 31, 23 Safer 1248/22 June 1832. The term can be seen in BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826, BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 27, 20 Safer 1248/19 June 1832. Def-i dag˘dag˘a-i ihtilaˆl; BOA HAT 437/22077 D, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, Bosna ihtilaˆli; BOA HAT 437/22083 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833, ihtilaˆl-i mu¨tevaˆtire; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 58, 09 Zilkade 1246/18 April 1831. The term can be seen in BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/2 February 1827, BOA HAT 437/22077, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 3, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832. The plural and genitive form of the term can be seen in Bosnalının sekaˆvetleri; BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826. Erbaˆb-ı sekaˆvet; BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830, keyfiyet-i sekaˆvet; BOA HAT 442/22219 D, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, sekaˆvet pise; BOA HAT 514/25194, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827. The term can be seen in BOA HAT 423/21760, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831. Emr-i padisahiden huruˆc; BOA HAT 425/21834 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, padisahımız efendimiz hazretleri u¨zerine huruˆc; BOA HAT 438/22095 E, 09 Zilhicce 1246/21 May 1831. For the use of Bosna gaˆilesi see: BOA HAT 351/19838, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, Saray gaˆilesi; BOA HAT 424/21811 H, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12

340

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

NOTES TO PAGE 149 November 1826, I˙skodra ve Bosna gaˆileleri; BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832, Bosna ve C¸amlık ve Karadag˘ gaˆileleri; BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, Bosnak gaˆilesi; BOA HAT 440/22154 A, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831, gaˆile-i kerıˆhe; Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 3, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832. The term ihaˆnet can be seen in BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830, BOA HAT 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832. The term hıyaˆnet can be seen in BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827, BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826. For the use of azıˆmet-i baˆgıyaˆne see, BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831. The term tug˘yaˆn can be seen in BOA HAT 338/19351, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826, zamaˆn-ı tug˘yaˆn; BOA HAT 428/21876 B, 26 Zilkade 1248/16 April 1833. See for example BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826, BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 1327/52492, 29 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1252/11 October 1836. Suˆret-i fitne ve fesaˆd; BOA HAT 437/22072, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, menba-i fitne ve fesaˆd; BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826, baˆdıˆ-i fitne ve fesaˆd; BOA HAT 440/22173, 22 Ramazan 1246/06 March 1831, naˆire-i fitne ve fesaˆd; Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 66, p. 56, Evaˆhir-i Zilhicce 1242/15-24 July 1827, aˆtes-i fitne ve fesaˆd; BOA HAT 443/22221 C, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831, baˆb-ı fitne ve fesaˆd; Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 56, Evaˆhir-i Zilhicce 1242/15-24 July 1827, fitn u¨ fesaˆd; BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. See for example BOA HAT 421/21715 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. See for example BOA HAT 429/21880 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10 January 1827. See for example BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, zırva-i bagy ve isyaˆn; BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, izhaˆr-ı bagy ve isyaˆn; BOA HAT 439/22138, 11 Receb 1247/16 December 1831. See for example BOA HAT 427/21867 D, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834. For the use of ilkaˆ-yı fesad ve ıˆkaˆd-ı fitne, see BOA HAT 442/22219 H, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. See for example Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 65, pp. 71 – 72, Evaˆsıt-ı Zilkade 1241/16-25 June 1826. See for example BOA HAT 442/22219 I˙, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/18 November 1826, kesb-i ihtilaˆl ve fesaˆd-ı azıˆme; BOA HAT 437/22077 D, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. Mel‘anet means ‘abominable deed’. For the use of fesaˆd ve mel‘anet see Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 59, Evaˆil-i Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/29 July-7:

NOTES TO PAGE 149

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

341

August 1832, BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831, BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 436/22063, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. See for example BOA HAT 421/21717 C, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. See for example BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. Habaˆset means ‘villainy’, ‘infamy’, ‘baseness’. For the use of fesaˆd ve habaˆset see BOA HAT 423/21783, undated, BOA HAT 442/22200, 02 Ramazan 1246/14 February 1831. I˙naˆd means ‘obstinate’. For the use of inaˆd ve fesaˆd see BOA HAT 425/21846, 30 Zilkade 1242/25 June 1827. Hada‘a means ‘deceiver’. For the use of hada‘a ve fesaˆd see BOA HAT 427/21867 D, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834. Karısıklık means ‘tumult’, ‘troubles’. For the use of fesaˆd ve karısıklık see BOA HAT 428/21878 J, 20 Sevval 1249/02 March 1249. See for example BOA HAT 429/21880 G, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. See for example BOA HAT 429/21880 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10 January 1827. See for example BOA HAT 426/21861, 26 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/26 Deccember 1826. Serr means ‘bad’ or ‘wicked’. For the use of serr u¨ fesaˆd see BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831, aˆlet-i serr ve fesaˆd; BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828. Siraˆze-i nizaˆmdan huruˆc means ‘to lose the balance of order’. For the use of ihtilaˆl ve siraˆze-i nizaˆmdan huruˆc see BOA HAT 425/21834, 13 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/13 December 1826. Tesniyet is commonly accepted as an erroneous form of the term tesniaˆt, which means ‘vituperation’. For the use of tesniyet ve ihtilaˆl see BOA HAT 440/22148 C, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831. Suˆris means ‘confusion’, ‘tumult’, ‘sedition’. For the use of suˆris ve ihtilaˆl see Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 45, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/16 August 1832, muceb-i suˆres ve ihtilaˆl; BOA HAT 423/21800, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. Fazaˆhat means ‘shameful act’. For the use of fazaˆhat ve sekaˆvet see BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. See for example BOA HAT 294/17478, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/11 December 1826. Temerru¨d means ‘obstinacy’, ‘perverseness’. For the use of sekaˆvet ve temerru¨d see BOA HAT 425/21846, 30 Zilkade 1242/25 June 1827. See for example BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. See for example BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826, BOA HAT 338/19348, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. See for example BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 38, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832.

342

NOTES TO PAGE 149

43. I˙saˆet means ‘offense’, ‘crime’, ‘sin’. For the use of isyaˆn ve isaˆet see BOA HAT 405/21172 A, 28 Safer 1247/08 August 1831. 44. See for example Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 16, 23 Muharrem 1248/22 June 1832. 45. For the use of siddet-i tug˘yaˆn ve isyaˆn see BOA HAT 423/21757, undated. 46. See for example Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 51, 03 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/31 July 1832, Bosna’nın isyaˆn ve tug˘yaˆnı; BOA HAT 437/22076 B, 12 Muharrem 1242/16 August 1826, Travnik Sicilleri vol. 30, p. 3, 03 Muharrem 1248/02 June 1832. 47. See for example BOA HAT 423/21760, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 48. See for example BOA HAT 429/21880 G, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 49. See for example Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 53, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1248/07 September 1832, BOA HAT 441/22183 A, 19 Safer 1247/30 July 1831. 50. See for example BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, saˆhika-i bagy ve isyaˆn; BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827, izhaˆr-ı bagy ve isyaˆn; BOA HAT 439/22138, 11 Receb 1247/16 December 1831. 51. See for example BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. 52. See for example BOA HAT 423/21760, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 53. Nahvet means ‘haughtiness’, ‘conceit’. For the use of tug˘yaˆn ve nahvet see BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826. 54. Galebe means ‘predominance’, ‘prevalence’. For the use of galebe ve tug˘yaˆn see BOA HAT 436/22062 E, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827. 55. See for example BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. 56. See for example BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. 57. Suˆ-i kasd means ‘criminal attempt’, ‘plot’. For the use of suˆ-i kasd ve ihaˆnet see BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826. 58. Hakaˆret means ‘insult’, ‘contempt’. For the use of hakaˆret ve ihaˆnet see BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826. 59. See for example BOA HAT 338/19351, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826. 60. Khaled M. Abou el-Fadl, The Islamic Law of Rebellion: The Rise and Development of the Juristic Discources on Insurrection, Insuregency and Brigandage, Unpublished Ph D. Dissertation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1999), p. 7. Abou el-Fadl successfully represents the way paradoxical positions were taken by different scholars, who point out the complex origin and context of ahkaˆm al-bughaˆ. He argues that, according to Muslim jurists, there are three types of combat other than fighting unbelievers: fighting apostates, fighting brigands and fighting rebels. He uses the word muharebe for classifying brigandage and, based on related documents from the the tenth and eleventh centuries, argues that apostasy and brigandage are very serious crimes and are to be punished harshly. According to him, while a brigand may be killed, tortured,

NOTES TO PAGES 149 –150

61. 62. 63.

64.

343

imprisoned or banished, a bagy may not, since insurrection and rebellion are not crimes and are to be treated leniently. However, in our case it is understood that the meaning of those words has no such clear-cut distinction. It may be due to the transformation of terms along with the course of history and different applications of them in Ottoman jurisprudence. I have no note of muharebe used as a synonym of brigandage, for example. For detailed discussions about Ahkam al-Bugha see also Khaled Abou El-Fadl, ‘Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam,’ in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Traditions, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990); Joel L. Kraemer, ‘Apostates, Rebels and Brigands,’ Israel Oriental Studies, x (1980): pp. 35–73; Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 77–80. About the ideas of jurists on the theme see Henry Siegman, ‘The State and the Individual in Sunni Islam,’ The Muslim World, 54 (1964), pp. 14 – 26. The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (New York, New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1946). It is important to note that Seyhulislam Yasincizade Abdulvahhap Efendi, who was from the palace circles politically, wrote a booklet in 1831 entitled ‘Hulasaˆt el-Buhraˆn fi Itaat el-Sultan’ (The essence of the proof concerning the duty of obedience to the Sultan) in which he collected and interpreted 25 hadiths which endeavour to support the Sultan’s power. For the details see Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826 –1876) (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001). For the use of eskıyaˆ see for example: BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826, BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831, BOA HAT 422/21749, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 423/21803 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. Mu¨cemmi‘-i eskıyaˆ; BOA HAT 422/21745, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, eskıyaˆ-yı menhuˆse; BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, eskıyaˆ sergerdeleri; BOA HAT 422/21747, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827; sergerde-i eskıyaˆ; BOA HAT 423/21773, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831, Bosna eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, Saray eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, Saraybosna eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21758, 04 Ramazan 1242/01 April 1827, Saray ve Travnik eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, Travnik ve Saray eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, Travnik eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, Foca eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, Visegrad eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, Bosnak eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21782, 21 Zilhicce

344

65.

66. 67.

68.

NOTES TO PAGE 150 1243/04 July 1828, Ocag˘-ı mu¨lgaˆ eskıyaˆsı; BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828. Sakıˆ, sakıˆler; BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827, BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, BOA HAT 426/21861, 26 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/26 Deccember 1826, BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827, BOA HAT 441/22183 A, 19 Safer 1247/30 July 1831, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826. Erbaˆb-ı sekaˆvet; BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826, BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830. For the use of the term see for example: BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 426/21861, 26 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/26 Deccember 1826, BOA HAT 429/21880 B, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827, BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830, BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831, BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833, BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831, BOA HAT 442/22219 M, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. Other forms of fesaˆde are mefsedet-engiz; BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, erbaˆb-ı fesaˆde; BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. See for example: BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21861, 26 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/26 Deccember 1826. See for example: BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 422/21755, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, BOA HAT 433/21972, 25 Safer 1248/24 July 1832, BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830, BOA HAT 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832, BOA HAT 440/22149, 03 Safer 1248/02 July 1832, BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826, BOA HAT 488/23960 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 31, 23 Safer 1248/22 June 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 38, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832. See for example: BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT

NOTES TO PAGE 150

69. 70.

71. 72.

73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

345

426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/2 February 1827, BOA HAT 427/21865, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 429/21889, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827, BOA HAT 436/22063, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 440/22149, 03 Safer 1248/02 July 1832, BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830, BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. See for example BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. See for example: BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881 B, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826, BOA HAT 443/22222 A, 20 Zilhicce 1247/21 May 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 51, 03 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/31 July 1832. See for example: BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 438/22106 A, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, BOA BOA HAT 1327/52492, 29 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1252/11 October 1836. See for example: BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 433/21972, 25 Safer 1248/24 July 1832, BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831, BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830. See for example: BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831, BOA HAT 421/21717 C, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832, BOA HAT 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832, BOA HAT 439/22138 A, 11 Receb 1247/16 December 1831, BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830. BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 429/21889, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. BOA HAT 441/22183 A, 19 Safer 1247/30 July 1831, BOA HAT 442/22219 M, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 443/22221 B, Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831. BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827, BOA HAT 514/25194, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827. BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. BOA HAT 429/21880 R, 09 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/08 January 1827, BOA HAT 436/22062 E, 15 Receb 1242/12 February 1827, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 63, 23 Zilhicce 1246/04 June 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 64, 23 Zilhicce 1246/04 June 1831. BOA HAT 427/21867, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834.

346

NOTES TO PAGES 150 –151

81. BOA HAT 423/21773, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831, BOA HAT 423/21795, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71 p. 2, 07 Muharrem 1248/06 June 1832. 82. BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/2 February 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 R, 09 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/08 January 1827, BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 H, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/03 November 1831, BOA HAT 633/31243, 06 Saban 1246/20 January 1831. 83. BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881 B, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 44, 03 Safer 1246/24 July 1830. 84. BOA HAT 424/21811 G, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881 B, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, BOA HAT 438/22106 A, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. 85. BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831, BOA HAT 439/22135, 14 Zilhicce 1247/15 May 1832, BOA HAT 439/22138 D, 02 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/09 October 1831. 86. BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 87. BOA HAT 739/35042 O, 05 Zilkade 1242/31 May 1827, BOA HAT 909/39784, 05 Muharrem 1248/04 June 1832. 88. BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/9 January 1833, BOA HAT 438/22119 F, 21 Rebiyu¨lahir 1250/27 August 1834. 89. BOA HAT 338/19346, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 405/21180 C, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/06 September 1831, BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827, BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA BOA HAT 438/22106 A, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. 90. BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 421/21717 C, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 423/21760, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/2 February 1827, BOA HAT 428/21871, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 436/22063, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831, BOA HAT 438/22096, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/19 September 1828, BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826, BOA HAT 440/22154 A, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831, BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831, BOA HAT 442/22209, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1246/01 September 1830.

NOTES TO PAGES 151 –153

347

91. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 1311/51042 C, 15 Receb 1250/17 November 1834. 92. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827, BOA HAT 429/21880 M, 27 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/26 January 1827. 93. BOA HAT 429/21881 E, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827, BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/9 January 1833, BOA HAT 438/22110, undated, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831, BOA HAT 1311/51040 Y, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835, BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. 94. BOA HAT 1311/51042 C, 15 Receb 1250/17 November 1834. 95. BOA HAT 425/21834, 13 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/13 December 1826. 96. Olga Zirojevic´, ‘On the Distinctive Feature of the Bosniaks,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. 167. 97. Snjezˇana Buzov, ‘Ottoman Perceptions of Bosnia as Reflected in the Works of Ottoman Authors Who Visited or Lived in Bosnia,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, pp. 83 – 91. 98. Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebu¨’l-Feth, A Martol Tulum (ed.) (I˙stanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1977), Mustafa Aˆli. Ku¨nh’u¨l-Ahbar, 5 vol (Istanbul, 1861– 1869 CE/1277-85 AH), Evliya C¸elebi, Seyahatname (I˙stanbul: I˙kdam Matbaası, 1315); Ahmed Cevdet Pasa, Tezaˆkir, prepared by Cavid Baysun (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986). 99. BOA HAT 441/22178 A, 23 Ramazan 1246/07 March 1831. 100. BOA HAT 440/22154 B, 30 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/08 September 1831. 101. BOA HAT 438/22119 F, 21 Rebiyu¨lahir 1250/27 August 1834. 102. BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831. 103. BOA HAT 735/34884, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827. 104. BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827. 105. BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827. 106. BOA HAT 426/21862 P, 17 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/19 October 1826. 107. BOA HAT 426/21862 A, 15 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/17 October 1826. 108. BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. 109. BOA HAT 1312/51043 I˙, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. 110. BOA HAT 1311/51040 G, 25 Ramazan 1250/25 January 1835. 111. BOA HAT 1311/51042 C, 15 Receb 1250/17 November 1834. 112. BOA HAT 429/21880 R, 09 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/08 January 1827. 113. BOA HAT 423/21770, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 114. BOA HAT 405/21174 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 405/21180 C, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/06 September 1831. 115. BOA HAT 421/21715 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 116. BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. 117. BOA HAT 438/22106 A, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826.

348 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

129.

130. 131. 132. 133.

134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139.

NOTES TO PAGES 153 –160 BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/9 January 1833. BOA Cevdet Dahiliye 55/2717, 23 Zilhicce 1248/13 May 1833. BOA HAT 423/21782, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828. See Jane Hathaway, ‘Introduction,’ in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, p. 10, and Palmira Brummett, ‘Classifying Ottoman Mutiny: The Act and Vision of the Rebellion,’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, p. 106. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 45, 19 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/16 August 1832. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 59, Evaˆil-i Rebiu¨levvel 1248/29 July – 07 August 1832. The decree was repeated with few differences in Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 11, 19 Rebiyu¨lahir 1248/15 September 1832. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 7, 11 Safer 1245/12 August 1829. Topkapı Sarayı Arsivi, E. 1589, 1246/1830 – 1831. BOA HAT 338/19348, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. There are many documents that testify to the support of local notables and ulema; i. e. BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826, BOA HAT 338/19348, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 425/21833, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1826. According to the document, the esnaf group did not support the rebels at first but the rebels threatened that they would be killed unless the ensaf gave them support and the esnaf reluctantly joined the rebel ranks. BOA HAT 425/21833 H, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826. The document claims that the merchant class was not in favour of the rebel group but because of their ‘simple-minded character’, they did not dare to take action against it. BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826. BOA HAT 437/22085 B, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831. That desire of Ruscuklu Ali can be seen in BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827. It is understood that his name was wrongly written as Ruscuklu Veli in that document. For a similar objective of Hu¨seyin Kapudan see for example BOA HAT 442/22205, 01 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/09 September 1831. It is important to note that there were also other people who were called chiefs of the rebellion in the documents. Here only the most prominent ones are mentioned. BOA HAT 426/21859, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 426/21851 B, 29 Zilhicce 1242/27 July 1827. BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827. Rıfaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics (Istanbul: Nederlands Historich-Archaelogisch Instituut the Istanbul, 1984), pp. 10 – 11. Rıfaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, ‘The Ottoman Vezir and Pasa Households, 1683– 1703: A Preliminary Report.’ Journal of American Oriental Society, 94(4) (1974), pp. 438– 47.

NOTES TO PAGES 160 –163 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

146. 147. 148. 149.

150. 151.

152. 153. 154. 155.

156.

349

BOA HAT 425/21833 F, 15 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/15 December 1826. BOA HAT 427/21870, 13 Zilhicce 1250/12 April 1835. BOA HAT 437/22085, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829. BOA HAT 438/22109, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. BOA HAT 331/19114, 29 Zilhicce 1251/16 April 1836. Gergana Georgieva, ‘Administrative Structure and Government of Rumelia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Functions and Activities of the Vali of Rumelia,’ in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760– 1850, p. 4. An example of this kind of use can be seen in BOA HAT 441/22183 A, 19 Safer 1247/30 July 1831, where it was called ‘dairemiz bıˆruˆn ve enderuˆn halkı’. Rıfaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, ‘The Ottoman Vezir and Pasa Households, 1683– 1703: A Preliminary Report,’ Journal of American Oriental Society, pp. 438– 47. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 86, Evaˆhir-i Zilhicce 1242/15-24 July 1827. For the household structure and its place in Ottoman history see I. Metin Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550– 1650 (New York, New York: Colombia University Press, 1983); Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdag˘lıs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jane Hathaway, ‘The Household of Hasan Ag˘a Bilifya: An Assessment of Elite Politics in Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Egypt,’ Turcica, 27 (1995), pp. 135– 51; Jane Hathaway. ‘Marriage Alliances among the Military Households of Ottoman Egypt,’ Annales Islamologiques (29) (1995), pp. 133– 49; Jane Hathaway, ‘The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27(1) (1995), pp. 39– 52; Rıfaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, ‘The Ottoman Vezir and Pasa Households, 1683– 1703: A Preliminary Report,’ Journal of American Oriental Society, pp. 438– 47. Palmira Brummett, ‘Classifying Ottoman Mutiny: The Act and Vision of the Rebellion,’ Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, p. 106. Detailed information about this cooperation can be found in BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨ levvel 1242/29 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21862 K, 07 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/09 October 1826, and BOA HAT 430/21892, 12 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/11 January 1827. BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826. BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826. Their names were repeated in various documents; for example BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827, BOA HAT 425/21833 J, 21 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/21 December 1826. BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826.

350

NOTES TO PAGES 163 –165

157. For example, BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21811 Y, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/10 January 1827. 158. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. 159. BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 160. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 68, p. 92, Gurre-i Muharrem 1246/22 June – 01 July 1830, BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830. 161. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 162. BOA HAT 441/22174, 23 Sevval 1242/20 May 1827. 163. BOA HAT 425/21833 F, 15 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/15 December 1826. 164. BOA HAT 429/21881 B, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. 165. BOA HAT 429/21880 R, 09 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/08 January 1827. 166. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. 167. BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 168. BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. 169. BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828, BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 170. BOA HAT 425/21815, 10 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/12 October 1826, BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826. 171. For example, BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827, BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 172. BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826. 173. BOA HAT 423/21770/29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 174. Lutfi uses the term ‘tavassut’ (mediation) for this kind of intermadiation; Ahmed Lutfi Efendi, Tarih-i Lutfi, vol. III (Istanbul, 1292), p. 142. 175. It is important to note that during the abolition of the janissaries three eminent persons from among the high-ranking ulema gave support to the central authority through their works. The most famous of these was Mehmed Esad Efendi, the official historian, who wrote a book in which he claimed that the suppression of the janissaries was an absolute necessity because of their corruption (Mehmed Esad Efendi, U¨ss-i Zafer (Istanbul, 1828)). The second one was Kececizade Molla I˙zzet, who was the kadı of Istanbul and a famous poet. He wrote a Layiha in which he explained his ideas about war, peace and reforms. This Layiha may be seen in I˙hsan Sungu, ‘Mahmud II’nin I˙zzet Molla ve Asakir-i Mansure Hakkında bir Hattı,’ Tarih Vesikaları, I (1941), pp. 162– 83. The third one was Yasincizade Abdulvahhab Efendi, who has been mentioned previously. For the ulema– state consolidation in that period see also Butrus Abu Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001); Butrus Abu Manneh, ‘The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century,’ Die Welt des Islam, 22 (1982); Uriel Heyd, ‘The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,’ Studies in Islamic History and Civilization (Scripta Hierosolymitana), IX (1961), pp. 63 – 97;

NOTES TO PAGES 165 –167

176.

177. 178. 179. 180. 181.

182. 183. 184.

351

Avigdor Levy, ‘The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II,’ Asian and African Studies, 7 (special number) (1971); Howard A. Reed, ‘The Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June, 1826’, Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation (Princeton, 1951); Fatma Sel Turhan, ‘The Abolition of the Janissary Army and its Reflections’, Unpublished M.A. Thesis (Istanbul: Bog˘azici University, 2001). It is important to note that the first volume of Takvıˆm-i Vekaˆyi, the official newspaper of the Ottoman Empire, was published in November 1831 with the support of ulema and viziers. In the first editorial of Takvıˆm-i Vekaˆyi, the reason for publishing that newspaper was stated as the necessity of explaining recent developments to the subjects because some misunderstandings had arisen that was causing hostility towards the changes. Lutfi, Tarih-i Lutfi, vol. III, pp. 158– 9. One example of these fermans can be seen in Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 66, p. 86, Evaˆhir-i Zilhicce 1242/15-24 July 1827. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. BOA HAT 429/21881 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. See for example BOA HAT 426/21859, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, and BOA HAT 426/21862 O, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. Thanks to the dissertation of Selma Zecevic, we have the opportunity to understand the development of the institution of muftiship, the production and reproduction of fatwa-texts, and the nature of legal interpretation in Ottoman Bosnia from the mid-sixteenth century to the end of Ottoman dominance in 1878. The dissertation is exemplary in representing the historical, political and cultural factors which led to the rise and development of the muftiship institution in Ottoman Bosnia, and in examining the manner in which the muftis from Ottoman Bosnia interpreted locally originated questions in the light of universal authoritative doctrinal texts. For more information see Selma Zecevic, ‘On the Margin of Text, on the Margin of Empire: Geography, Identity and Fatwa-Text in Ottoman Bosnia,’ Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation (Columbia University, 2007). Huri I˙slamog˘lu and C¸ag˘lar Keyder, ‘Agenda for Ottoman History,’ in I˙slamog˘lu-I˙nan (ed.) The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1987, pp. 53 – 62. Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Ayan de la Re´gion d’Izmir et Commerce du Levant (Deuxie`me Moitie´ du XVIII. Sie`cle),’ E´tudes Balkaniques, 12(3) (1976), pp. 71 – 83. For more information about the degeneration of the ulema see Madeline Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600 – 1800) (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), pp. 96 – 106; Roderic

352

185. 186. 187. 188. 189.

190. 191. 192. 193. 194.

195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200.

201. 202.

NOTES TO PAGES 167 –170 Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774– 1923: The Impact of the West, pp. 17 – 19. Mehmed Emin Isevic´, Ahval-i Bosna, p. 3. BOA HAT 425/21833 J, 21 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/21 December 1826. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. Colin Heywood, ‘Bosnia under Ottoman Rule, 1463– 1800,’ in The Muslims of Bosnia Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, pp. 36 – 40. Fikret Karcic relates this conservatism to the borderland situation of Bosnia and argues that in a situation of permanent frontier warfare, conservatism is almost a natural state of mind. For more details of his arguments see Fikret Karcic, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999). BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. For example, BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832, BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. BOA HAT 423/21770, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, BOA HAT 436/22062 I˙, 17 Receb 1242/14 February 1827. For example, BOA HAT 423/21770, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811 H, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826, BOA HAT 425/21815, 10 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/12 October 1826. BOA HAT 438/22119 F, 21 Rebiyu¨lahir 1250/27 August 1834. BOA HAT 438/22119 F, 21 Rebiyu¨lahir 1250/27 August 1834. BOA HAT 1327/51795 C, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1252/09 September 1836, BOA HAT 1327/52492, 29 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1252/11 October 1836, BOA HAT 1343/52513 B, 29 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1252/11 October 1836. BOA HAT 294/17478, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/11 December 1826. BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826. For cizye tax and its evaluation see: Shibli Nomani, Jizya Capitation Tax (Patna: Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, 1914); Hamid Hadzibegic´, ‘Djizja ili Harac-Le Cizya ou Harac,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 3 – 4 (1952 –3), pp. 55– 135; vol. 5 (1954 – 5), pp. 43 –102; Hamid Hadzibegic´, Glavarina u Osmanskoj Drzavni, Posebna Izdanja, 4 (Sarajevo: Orientalni Institut u Sarajevu, 1966); Hamid Hadzibegic´, ‘Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Cizye,’ in 25th International Congress of Orientalists, Moscow, 1960, Proceedings, 2, 5 vols (Moscow: Izdatelistvo Vostoynoi Literaturia, 1962– 3), pp. 429– 30; Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising & Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560– 1660 (Leiden, New York, Cologne: E.J. Brill, 1996). BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832.

NOTES TO PAGES 170 –173

353

203. For the changes in tax system and their effects on provincial life, see: Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire Mosul, 1540– 1834, pp. 75 – 110; Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century,’ in The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography, pp. 366– 9; Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600– 1700,’ in Archivum Ottomanicum, pp. 283– 337; Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration,’ in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, pp. 27 – 8. 204. Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540– 1834, p. 45. 205. BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 437/22088, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 206. BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 207. BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831. 208. BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 209. For example, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 31, 23 Safer 1248/22 July 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 38, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833. 210. BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832. 211. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, pp. 38 –41, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832. The list of Yaldızcıog˘lu I˙zlatar Mustafa Ag˘a’s confiscated possessions can be seen in the appendix part. 212. BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 213. BOA HAT 438/22118, undated. 214. BOA HAT 438/22118, undated, BOA HAT 438/22118 A, undated, BOA HAT 438/22118 B, undated. 215. BOA HAT 437/22072, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 216. BOA HAT 442/22217, 28 Zilhicce 1247/29 May 1832. 217. BOA HAT 437/22072, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. This Serifzade must be the son of Serifzade Mustafa Pasa who was killed during the first stage of the rebellion period. 218. For example, BOA HAT 437/22085 B, 06 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1245/03 December 1829, BOA HAT 438/22095 E, 09 Zilhicce 1246/21 May 1831. 219. BOA HAT 443/22222, 25 Muharrem 1247/06 July 1831, BOA HAT 443/22222 A, 20 Zilhicce 1247/21 May 1832, BOA HAT 1308/51008 E, 11 Ramazan 1246/23 February 1831. 220. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 68, p. 16, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1245/10 September 1829, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 34, 15 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1246/01 December 1830, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 57, 04 Rebiyu¨lahir 1246/22 September 1830. 221. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 57, Gurre-i Zilkade 1246/13-22 April 1831. 222. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 41, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832. The list of Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey’s possessions can be seen in the appendix.

354

NOTES TO PAGES 173 –177

223. BOA HAT 438/22095 E, 09 Zilhicce 1246/21 May 1831. Detailed information about I˙brahim Bey and his sons, who were also called Su¨leymanzadegan, can be found in BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831, BOA HAT 441/22183 B, 19 Safer 1247/30 July 1831 and BOA HAT 442/22209, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1246/01 September 1830. 224. BOA HAT 443/22222, 25 Muharrem 1247/06 July 1831, BOA HAT 443/22222 A, 20 Zilhicce 1247/21 May 1832. 225. BOA HAT 437/22083 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. 226. BOA HAT 437/22083 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. 227. BOA HAT 437/22083 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. 228. BOA HAT 437/22072, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 229. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 69, p. 89, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/29 November 1831. 230. Daniel Panzac, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Veba (1700– 1850) (I˙stanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), pp. 84 – 7. 231. Ibid., p. 16. 232. Ibid., pp. 19 – 20. 233. See for example BOA HAT 338/19348, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21760, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 425/21829, 08 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/10 October 1826. 234. Cornell Fleischer clearly shows how the interest in constitutionality increased during the traumatic late sixteenth century, a period when the central authority was in need of adjustments to altered circumstances. Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Aˆli (1541– 1600), p. 200. 235. See Mehmet Genc, Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Devlet ve Ekonomi, p. 63. 236. For example, BOA HAT 1056/43477 I, 01 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/02 November 1826. 237. BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 238. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 69, p. 89, 23 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/29 November 1831. 239. BOA HAT 425/21815 B, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 240. BOA HAT 426/21851 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 241. Halil I˙nalcık, Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet (I˙stanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2000), pp. 80 –81. 242. Halil I˙nalcık says that the main lines of Kaˆnuˆn-ı Osmanıˆ were laid down by the end of the fourteenth century. For details see Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Osmanlı Hukukuna Giris,’ Ankara U¨niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Faku¨ltesi Dergisi, 13(2) (1958), pp. 107– 9. 243. Halil I˙nalcık, Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet, pp. 80 – 1. 244. For example, BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826, BOA HAT 425/21813 G, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/30 October 1826, BOA

NOTES TO PAGES 177 –181

245. 246. 247. 248. 249.

250. 251. 252.

253. 254.

255. 256. 257. 258.

259. 260. 261.

355

HAT 425/21813 I˙, 15 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/17 October 1826, BOA HAT 425/21829, 08 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/10 October 1826, BOA HAT 425/21833 H, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826, BOA HAT 426/21851 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 429/21881 B, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. Eric Cornell, ‘Bosna Bektasilig˘i U¨zerine,’ in Alevi Kimlig˘i, pp. 15 – 16. Bruce McGowan, ‘The Age of the Ayans, 1699– 1812,’ in Halil I˙nalcık and Donald Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300– 1914, pp. 664– 5. For the changes in military system see: Halil I˙nalcık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600 – 1700,’ in Archivum Ottomanicum, pp. 283 – 337; Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, pp. 141 – 188; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 45 – 81; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990– 1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 16 – 66. BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. BOA HAT 437/22076, 21 Muharrem 1242/25 August 1826. For example, BOA HAT 406/21183, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 431/21917, 19 Ramazan 1246/03 March 1831, BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831, BOA HAT 438/22091 C, 13 Saban 1246/27 January 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22114, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 633/31243, 06 Saban 1246/20 January 1831, BOA HAT 1309/51017 H, 05 Sevval 1246/19 March 1831. BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831. BOA HAT 421/21718, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. In the document Ali Pasa says that ‘Ahaˆlıˆ-i merkuˆme fıˆ’l-asl yerlu¨den olan zaˆbitlerine meselaˆ ciftini su¨rmek ve bag˘ını capalamak misillu¨ bedenen hizmete alısub simdiki zaˆbitlerine halen hizmet etmek deg˘il bir yumurta vermek gu¨clerine gelmesi cihetleri olub. . .’. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, pp. 267, 339, 351. Ibid., p. 340. BOA HAT 415/21495, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831. BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831. BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831. BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831. BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831.

356 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277.

278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290.

NOTES TO PAGES 181 –187 BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831. BOA HAT 437/22074, 09 Zilkade 1245/02 May 1830. BOA HAT 438/22106, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/11 October 1826. BOA HAT 442/22219 K, 10 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/10 December 1826. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827. BOA HAT 425/21833 J, 21 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/21 December 1826. BOA HAT 425/21833 H, 22 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/22 December 1826. BOA HAT 442/22219 M, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. See for example BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. BOA HAT 443/22221 C, 17 Receb 1247/22 December 1831. BOA HAT 438/22095 G, 29 Saban 1246/12 February 1831. BOA HAT 405/21172 A, 28 Safer 1247/08 August 1831. BOA HAT 426/21851 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. Alex N. Dragnich, ‘Leadership and Politics: Nineteenth Century Serbia,’ The Journal of Politics, p. 347. BOA HAT 415/21495 B, 22 Muharrem 1247/03 July 1831. For example, BOA HAT 443/22221 B, Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 D, 08 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/15 October 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 E, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 F, 07 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/14 October 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 G, 30 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/06 November 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 H, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/03 November 1831, BOA HAT 443/22221 I˙, 21 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/29 September 1831. For example, BOA HAT 443/22221, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 443/22221 G, 07 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/14 October 1831. For example, Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I. p. 349. For example, Ahmed S. Alicˇicˇ. Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832 Godine. These provincial leaders are discussed in detail in the next chapter. Nenad Moacˇanin, ‘Defterology and Mythology Ottoman Bosnia up to the Tanzıˆmaˆt,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, pp. 196–7. Deena R. Sadat, ‘Ayaˆn and Ag˘a: The Transformation of the Bektashi Corps in the Eighteenth Century,’ The Muslim World (Hartford) (1973), pp. 206– 19. See for example BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828. BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 51, 03 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/31 July 1832. BOA HAT 438/22110, undated. BOA HAT 441/22184, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1246/28 October 1830. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 48. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 423/21803 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03

NOTES TO PAGES 187 –192

291. 292. 293. 294.

295.

296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305.

306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317.

357

Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. BOA HAT 437/22083 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833, BOA HAT 441/22176 F, 13 Muharrem 1249/02 June 1833. BOA HAT 441/22176 F, 13 Muharrem 1249/02 June 1833. BOA HAT 438/22120, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834. BOA HAT 438/22120, 29 Zilhicce 1249/09 May 1834, BOA HAT 439/22138, 11 Receb 1247/16 December 1831, BOA HAT 439/22138 D, 02 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/09 October 1831, BOA HAT 439/22138 E, 02 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1247/09 October 1831. For example, BOA HAT 423/21804 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 430/21893 B, 29 Zilhicce 1243/12 July 1828, BOA HAT 438/22101, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. For the changes in the parity of yu¨k in terms of gurus see previous explanations in the book. BOA HAT 424/21810 A, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827, BOA HAT 429/21888 A, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827. BOA HAT 423/21762, 13 Saban 1242/12 March 1827. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826. BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827. BOA HAT 739/35042 O, 05 Zilkade 1242/31 May 1827, BOA HAT 423/21804 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 423/21804 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. General information about those people was repeated in BOA HAT 438/22101, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, and information about those who were exiled to Yergo¨g˘u¨ was iterated in BOA HAT 739/35042 D, 29 Zilkade 1242/24 June 1827. BOA HAT 739/35042 B, 07 Zilkade 1242/02 June 1827. BOA HAT 739/35042 J,13 Sevval 1242/10 May 1827. BOA HAT 514/25194, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827. BOA HAT 514/25194, 07 Safer 1243/30 August 1827. BOA HAT 441/22174, 23 Sevval 1242/20 May 1827. BOA HAT 441/22174, 23 Sevval 1242/20 May 1827. Their names were given in BOA HAT 441/22174 A, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828. BOA HAT 955/40967, 05 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/26 October 1827. BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827. BOA HAT 430/21893 B, 29 Zilhicce 1243/12 July 1828. Fatma Sel Turhan, The Abolition of the Janissary Army and its Reflections, p. 224. BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828.

358

NOTES TO PAGES 192 –195

¨ zerine,’ in Alevi Kimlig˘i, pp. 14 – 16; Colin 318. Eric Cornell, ‘Bosna Bektasilig˘i U Heywood, ‘The Bosnia under Ottoman Rule, 1463– 1800,’ in The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, p. 40. 319. Eric Cornell, ‘Bosna Bektasilig˘i U¨zerine,’ in Alevi Kimlig˘i, pp. 15 – 16. 320. Hatidzˇa Cˇar-Drnda, ‘Remnants of the Tıˆmaˆr System in the Bosnian Vilaˆyet in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. 171; also quoted in Hazim Sˇabanovic´. Kanun-nama Bosanskog Sandzˇaka iz 1516 Godine, Kanuni i Kanun-name za Bosanski, Hercegovacˇki, Zvornicˇki, Klisˇki, Crnogorski i Skadarski Sandzˇak (Sarajevo, 1957), p. 26. 321. BOA HAT 422/21753, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 322. BOA HAT 439/22127 C, 21 Ramazan 1248/11 February 1833, BOA HAT 441/22182, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833. 323. BOA HAT 439/22125, 22 Sevval 1248/14 March 1833, BOA HAT 439/22125 F, 22 Sevval 1248/14 March 1833. 324. BOA HAT 441/22176 F, 13 Muharrem 1249/02 June 1833. 325. BOA HAT 433/21972, 25 Safer 1248/24 July 1832. .

Chapter 5

1. For the term sergerde and its different usages see for example: BOA HAT 338/19344, 03 Safer 1242/06 September 1826, BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 423/21767, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 423/21773, 29 Zilhicce 1246/10 June 1831, BOA HAT 423/21804 C, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 425/21815 B, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 428/21871, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833, BOA HAT 428/21874, undated, BOA HAT 429/21880, 03 Receb 1242/31 January 1827, BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831, BOA HAT 440/22170, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 1026/42766, 07 Saban 1243/23 February 1828, BOA HAT 1327/52492, 29 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1252/11 October 1836. 2. For the term ru¨esaˆ-yı eskıyaˆ see for example: BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 425/21833 J, 21 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/21 December 1826, BOA HAT 429/21889, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827, BOA HAT 433/21972, 25 Safer 1248/24 July 1832, BOA HAT 440/22149, 03 Safer 1248/02 July 1832, BOA HAT 441/22185, 22 Muharrem 1248/21 June 1832. 3. For the term ru¨esaˆ-yı fesaˆd see for example: BOA HAT 424/21810, 03 Ramazan 1242/31 March 1827, BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827.

NOTES TO PAGES 195 –197

359

4. For the term ru¨esaˆ-yı bugaˆt see for example BOA HAT 426/21848, 05 Receb 1242/2 February 1827. 5. For the term reıˆsu¨’l-eskıyaˆ see for example BOA HAT 438/22095 E, 09 Zilhicce 1246/21 May 1831. Other forms of the term reıˆs are: reıˆsu¨’l-eskıyaˆ ve’lmu¨fsidıˆn; BOA HAT 438/22095 F, 17 Zilhicce 1246/29 May 1831; eskıyaˆ ru¨esaˆsı, BOA HAT 429/21889, 13 Ramazan 1242/10 April 1827, BOA HAT 438/22095 E, 09 Zilhicce 1246/21 May 1831. 6. For the term mu¨fsidbası see for example: BOA HAT 338/19350, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826, BOA HAT 424/21811, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/12 November 1826. 7. For the term siraˆrebas see for example BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 8. For the term pisrev-i eskıyaˆ see for example BOA HAT 429/21885, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1243/01 November 1827. 9. For the term pisva-yı ehl-i fesaˆd see for example BOA HAT 423/21801, 27 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/27 December 1826, and pisvaˆ-yı mefsedet; BOA HAT t-ı Hu¨mayun 439/22130, 22 Sevval 1247/25 March 1832. 10. For example, BOA HAT 222/12427, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1213/12 November 1798. 11. For example, BOA HAT 363/20138, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1248/13 September 1832, BOA HAT 488/23960 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. 12. For example, BOA HAT 415/21495 A, 18 Muharrem 1247/29 June 1831, BOA HAT 438/22095, 09 Muharrem 1247/20 June 1831, Topkapı Sarayı Arsivi, E. 5780, undated. 13. For example, BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. 14. For example, BOA HAT 437/22081 D, 13 Muharrem 1248/12 June 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 31, 23 Safer 1248/22 June 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 38, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832. 15. Robert Zens,‘Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade, 1791– ¨ zkaya, 1807,’ in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 89 – 92; Yu¨cel O Osmanlı I˙mparatorlug˘unda Dag˘lı I˙syanları (1791 – 1808) (Ankara: Ankara ¨ niversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cog˘rafya Faku¨ltesi Yayınları, 1983), pp. 32 – 5. U 16. Zens, ‘Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade,’ p. 93. 17. Ibid., p. 97. 18. For more information about Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pasa see: Zens, ‘Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade,’ pp. 89 – 104; Rossitsa Gradeva, ‘Secession and Revolution in the Ottoman Empire at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Osman Pazvantog˘lu and Rhigas Velestinlis,’ in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760 –1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation, pp. 73 – 94. 19. Dimitris Dimitropoulos, ‘Aspects of the Working of the Fiscal Machinery in the Areas Ruled by Ali Pasa,’ in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760– 1850, pp. 62 – 3.

360

NOTES TO PAGES 197 –200

20. Dennis N. Skiotis, ‘From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepedelen, 1750– 1784,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2(3) (1971), p. 220. 21. For detailed information about Tepedelenli Ali Pasa see K.E. Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasa’s Greece (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999); Dennis N. Skiotis, ‘From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepedelen, 1750– 1784,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2(3) (1971), pp. 219– 44. 22. Zens, ‘Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade,’ p. 89. 23. For detailed information about Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasa see: Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasa’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of the Modern Egypt; Khaled Fahmy, ‘Mutiny in Mehmed Ali’s New Nizamıˆ Army, April – May 1824,’ in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 129– 38; Sinasi Altundag˘, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasa I˙syanı, Mısır Meselesi (1831– 1841) (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Judith Mendelsohn Rood, ‘Mehmed Ali as Mutinous Khedive: The Roots of Rebellion,’ in Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 115– 28. 24. Rood, ‘Mehmed Ali as Mutinous Khedive,’ p. 122. 25. BOA HAT 439/22127 D, 21 Ramazan 148/11 February 1833. 26. Hamdija Kapicˇic´. Ali Pasa Rızvanbegovic i Njegovo Doba, pp. 107– 8. 27. Ibid., p. 109. 28. BOA A. MKT. MHM. 753/5, 13 Rebiyu¨levvel 1261/22 March 1845. 29. BOA I˙. HR. 39/1812, 22 Safer 1263/09 February 1847. 30. Justin McCarthy, ‘Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878,’ in The Muslims of BosniaHercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, p. 76. 31. BOA I˙. DH. 223/13272, 04 Muharrem 1267/09 November 1850. 32. BOA A. AMD. 27/96, 24 Safer 1267/29 December 1850, BOA I˙. DH. 230/13799, 06 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1267/09 March 1851, BOA A. AMD. 30/21, Cemaziyu¨levvel 1267/09 March 1851. 33. For more information about his death see: BOA I˙. DH. 232/13968, 19 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1267/21 April 1851, BOA A. MKT. NZD. 34/19, 12 Receb 1267/13 May 1851, BOA A. MKT. NZD. 48/60, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1268/20 January 1852, BOA A. MKT. MHM. 37/51, 16 Zilhicce 1267/12 October 1851, BOA A. MKT. MVL. 49/95, 19 Rebiyu¨lahir 1268/21 February 1851, BOA A. MKT. MVL. 50/21, 27 Rebiyu¨lahir 1268/19 February 1852, BOA A. MKT. MVL. 58/73/-25, 18 Muharrem 1269/01 November 1852. 34. Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Ured¯enje Bosanskog Ejaleta od 1789. do 1878. Godine, p. 20. 35. Rossitsa Gradeva, ‘Secession and Revolution in the Ottoman Empire at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Osman Pazvantog˘lu and Rhigas Velestinlis,’ in Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760 –1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation, p. 79. 36. For detailed information about I˙skodralı Mustafa Pasa see Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. I, pp. 361– 2.

NOTES TO PAGES 200 –204

361

37. BOA HAT 443/22221 A, 11 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1247/17 November 1831. 38. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827. 39. Slavka Draganova, Tuna Vilayeti’nin Ko¨y Nu¨fusu (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006), p. 43. 40. According to Kemal Karpat, the sancak of Ruscuk had 833 villages and while its Muslim population was 138,692, the non-Muslim population was 95,834 in 1868. Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population (1830– 1914): Demographic and Social Characteristics, p. 25. 41. For more information about Alemdar Mustafa Pasa see for example I˙smail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Meshur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli I˙smail, Yılıkog˘lu Su¨leyman Ag˘alar ve Alemdar Mustafa Pasa (I˙stanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942); Kalost Arapyan, Ruscuk Ayanı Mustafa Pasa’nın Hayatı ve Kahramanlıkları, translated from Armenian by Esat Uras (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943). 42. I˙smail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı, Meshur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli I˙smail, Yılıkog˘lu Su¨leyman Ag˘alar ve Alemdar Mustafa Pasa, p. 8. 43. Robert Zens, ‘Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade,’ p. 93. 44. Bruce McGowan, ‘The Age of the Ayans 1699– 1812,’ in Halil I˙nalcık and Donald Quataert (eds) An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300– 1914. 45. Bruce Masters, ‘Aleppo: The Ottoman Empire’s Caravan City,’ in The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul, pp. 62 – 5. 46. BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826, BOA HAT 442/22219 E, 03 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/03 December 1826. 47. For Islamic views on belief in the Mahdi see for example: Hayrettin Gu¨mu¨sel, Beklenen Mehdi Hakkında I˙slam Alimlerinin Go¨ru¨sleri (I˙stanbul: Ko¨pru¨ Yayınları, 2002); Jan Olaf Blichfeldt, Early Mahdism: Politics and Religion in the Formative Period of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985). 48. BOA HAT 424/21811 C, 13 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/12 January 1827. The document says that: ‘. . .Tedbıˆr olunmaz ise bu Saraylu Ruscuklu Aliyi kendu¨lere bas ederek istedikleri gibi bir serbestiyet tahsıˆline calısırlar.’ 49. BOA HAT 1056/43477 I˙, 01 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/02 November 1826. 50. BOA HAT 1056/43477 H, 15 Zilhicce 1241/21 July 1826. 51. BOA HAT 424/21811 A, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826. 52. BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826. 53. BOA HAT 424/21811 E, 13 Rebiyu¨lahir 1242/14 November 1826. The document says that: ‘. . .Merkuˆm Aliye Venediklu¨ tarafından kag˘ıd ve adam gelib gittig˘i isitilmis olub merkuˆm Ali dahi Venedik tarafı benim dostumdur bana haber geldi. Anadoluda ve Rumelide cok yerde kabul olunmayub hatta Edirne mukaddem kabul etmis iken tekraˆr nu¨kuˆl ile ocag˘ı ibkaˆ eylemisler. Bana isterseniz biraz asker verin, gideyim bakın nasıl nizam veririm diyerek envaˆ-ı fesaˆda cu¨ret ederek. . .’ 54. Michael Hickok, ‘Homicide Investigations in Ottoman Bosnia: The Tension between Legality and Stability,’ in Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, p. 220.

362

NOTES TO PAGES 204 –209

55. BOA HAT 424/21811 N, 29 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/31 October 1826. 56. BOA HAT 423/21759, 16 Saban 1242/15 March 1827. 57. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, pp. 29 – 30. It is understood that the second name of Hu¨seyin Kapudan is Bahtiyar, since in some documents he was referred to as Hu¨seyin Bahtiyar Bey. See for example: BOA HAT 294/17478, 11 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/11 December 1826, BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826, BOA HAT 942/40659, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/16 January 1827. 58. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, pp. 29 –30. 59. BOA HAT 438/22096, 09 Rebiyu¨levvel 1244/19 September 1828, BOA HAT 1029/42840, 19 Safer 1244/31 August 1828, BOA HAT 1032/42879, 20 Safer 1244/01 September 1828, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 67, p. 9, 19 Safer 1244/31 August 1828. 60. Hamdija Kapicˇic´, Ali Pasa Rızvanbegovic i Njegovo Doba, p. 50. 61. Ibid., pp. 50 – 1. 62. Ibid., p. 50. 63. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 30. 64. Lawrence P. Meriage, ‘The First Sebian Uprising (1804 – 1813) and the Nineteenth Century Origins of the Eastern Question,’ in Slavic Review, p. 422; Tim Judah, ‘The Serbs: The Sweet and Rotten Smell of History,’ Daedalus, 126 (3) (1997), p. 28. 65. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 30. 66. Saffetbeg Basˇagic´, Kratka Uputa u Prosˇlost Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 143, quoted in Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 31. 67. Julijan Jelenic´, Kultura i Bosanski Franjevci, vol. II (Sarajevo, 1912– 1915), p. 133, quoted in Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 32. 68. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 32. 69. BOA HAT 435/22039 A, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831. 70. BOA HAT 431/21919 H, 13 Zilhicce 1246/25 May 1831. 71. BOA HAT 416/21529, 08 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/17 August 1831. 72. BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 73. BOA HAT 347/19732, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 74. BOA HAT 431/21924, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. 75. See for example BOA HAT 436/22063, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 436/22063 G, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831, BOA HAT 436/22063 H, 05 Muharrem 1247/16 June 1831. 76. This refusal of help of Milosˇ by the central authorities can be seen in BOA HAT 1117/44858, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 1117/44858 A, 24 Zilhicce 1247/25 May 1832. 77. As mentioned Chapter 2, this information comes to us in Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 16, 17 Zilkade 1247/18 April 1832. 78. Mihailo Gavrilovic´, Milosˇ Obrenovic´, vol. III (Belgrade: Davidovic´, 1908, 1909, 1912), pp. 358, 363, quoted in Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 39.

NOTES TO PAGES 210 –213

363

79. Ibid., pp. 362 – 3, quoted in Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 39. 80. Belgradıˆ Rasid, Vak‘a-i Hayretnu¨ma, p. 87. 81. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 45. Kresˇevljkovic´ gives a list of important persons in this group as such: Fedayizade Ali Pasa, Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa Ag˘a, known as Muyag˘a Zlatarevic´ or Hacı Muˆyuˆ, Mahmud Bey of Gradacevic, Mustafa Bey of Tuzla, Emin Bey of Maglay, Mahmud Bey of Derbend, Sinan Bey of Doboy, Mehmed Bey of Krupe and Tu¨fekci Salih Ag˘a. Some of goods possessed by the group were 3,000 golden dukas, two sacks of silver money, two gilded daggers, four silver horse pistols, two jewelled swords, two gold cartridge belts, four gold watches, one silver watch, one gold tobacco box, two silver candlesticks, four suits embroidered with gilded thread, 38 double silver pistols, 38 gilded rifles, four daggers embroidered with jewels, two lances and two flags. 82. BOA HAT 440/22149, 03 Safer 1248/02 July 1832. 83. BOA HAT 421/21715 D, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 84. BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 422/21755, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 85. BOA HAT 441/22185, 22 Muharrem 1248/21 June 1832. 86. BOA HAT 441/22185, 22 Muharrem 1248/21 June 1832. 87. BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 88. BOA HAT 423/21764, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 89. BOA HAT 442/22213, undated. 90. BOA HAT 442/22213, undated. 91. BOA HAT 428/21874 A, 10 Rebiyu¨lahir 1248/06 September 1832. A copy of the translation of these letters can be seen in BOA HAT 442/22215, undated. 92. BOA HAT 428/21874, undated, BOA HAT 428/21874 A, 10 Rebiyu¨lahir 1248/06 September 1832. 93. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 94. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 37, 23 Safer 1248/22 July 1832. 95. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 96. Belgradıˆ Rasid, Vak‘a-i Hayretnu¨ma, p. 87. 97. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 98. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 99. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 37, 23 Safer 1248/22 July 1832. 100. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 101. BOA HAT 422/21749, 29 Zilhicce 1248/19 May 1833. 102. Bartol Kunibert, Srpski Ustanak i Priva Vladavina Milosˇa Obrenovic´a (Belgrade, 1901), p. 312, quoted in Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 47. It is important to note that Dr Kunibert described some physiognomic and habitual characteristics of Hu¨seyin Kapudan. According to him, ‘Hu¨seyin Kapudan was about thirty years old at that time. He was of medium height and had a mild and gloomy appearance. His smile was also very gloomy and

364

103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130.

NOTES TO PAGES 213 –218 attractive. He had big eyes and thick eyebrows.’ The doctor was astonished to see such bravery in that body. ‘He was very devout person, at the same time. He never gave up performing his prayers, namaz, five times a day. He never used alcohol either.’ BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832, BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832. BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832. The order sent to the muhafız of Vidin about the dispatch of these four men can be seen in BOA HAT 658/32140, 01 Ramazan 1248/22 January 1833. BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832. BOA HAT 439/22128, 05 Sevval 1248/25 February 1833. BOA HAT 441/22176 A, 11 Muharrem 1249/31 May 1833. BOA HAT 433/21971 C, 17 Rebiyu¨lahir 1249/03 September 1833. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 48. Ibid. Kalender Narodna Uzdacina (1353 – 1354/1935). Sarejevo, A. 73. In this calendar, there was the inscription of his grave: ‘Eyalet-i Bosna’da Izvornik Sancag˘ı’nda Gradacanice kazasına bag˘lı Gradacac Kalesi’nden Gradacaczadelerden Osman Kapudanzade merhum esseyyid Hu¨seyin Bey’in ruhu icin elfatiha.’ Quoted in Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek, p. 146. BOA HAT 441/22175 B, 14 Receb 1248/07 December 1832. BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832. BOA HAT 441/22175 B, 14 Receb 1248/07 December 1832. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 37, 23 Safer 1248/22 July 1832. BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832. BOA HAT 428/21875 A, 21 Ramazan 1248/11 February 1833. BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. BOA HAT 1426/58368, undated, BOA HAT 1426/58370, undated. BOA HAT 756/35776, undated, BOA HAT 1426/58369, undated. BOA HAT 756/35776, undated, BOA HAT 1426/58370, undated. BOA HAT 438/22118, undated, BOA HAT 438/22118 A, undated, BOA HAT 438/22118 B, undated. BOA HAT 441/22182 D, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833, BOA HAT 488/23960 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833, BOA HAT 495/24281 C, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. BOA HAT 441/22182 D, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 73, p. 6 – 7, Evaˆil-i Zilkade 1249/12-21 March 1834. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 48. Ibid. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, p. 38, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 45, 15 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/12 August 1832. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, pp. 38 – 41, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832.

NOTES TO PAGES 218 –226

365

131. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, pp. 45 – 50, 15 Rebiyu¨levvel 1248/12 August 1832. 132. BOA HAT 423/21783, undated. 133. BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832. 134. BOA HAT 428/21875, undated, BOA HAT 441/22175, 03 Saban 1248/26 December 1832, BOA HAT 495/24281, 03 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1248/28 October 1832, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 72, p. 38, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833. 135. BOA HAT 428/21876 B, 26 Zilkade 1248/16 April 1833. 136. BOA HAT 428/21875, undated, BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/09 January 1833. 137. BOA HAT 441/22182 C, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. 138. BOA HAT 428/21875, undated, BOA HAT 437/22083, 17 Saban 1248/9 January 1833. 139. BOA HAT 428/21876 B, 26 Zilkade 1248/16 April 1833. 140. BOA Cevdet Maliye 233/9770, 14 Zilkade 1249/25 March 1834, BOA HAT 428/21876, undated, BOA HAT 428/21876 A, undated. 141. BOA HAT 428/21876 B, 26 Zilkade 1248/16 April 1833, BOA HAT 428/21876 C, undated. 142. BOA Cevdet Maliye 233/9770, 14 Zilkade 1249/25 March 1834. 143. BOA HAT 428/21876 B, 26 Zilkade 1248/16 April 1833. 144. BOA Cevdet Maliye 233/9770, 14 Zilkade 1249/25 March 1834. 145. Ahmed Cevdet Pasa, Tezaˆkir, pp. 61 – 2. 146. Ahmed Alicˇic´, ‘Cˇifluci Husein Kapetana Gradasˇcˇevic´a,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, xiv –xv (1964– 1965), pp. 320– 8. 147. Ibid., p. 328; Ahmed Cevdet Pasa, Tezaˆkir, pp. 61 – 2. 148. Hamdija Kresˇevljakovic´, Izabrana Djela IV, p. 43. 149. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 41, 29 Safer 1248/28 July 1832. The list of Cennetizade Mehmed Emin Bey’s possessions can be seen in the appendix part.

Chapter 6 1. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol II, p. 520 ff. 2. See for example: BOA HAT 430/21898, 27 Zilhicce 1243/10 July 1828, BOA HAT 1312/51043 E, 17 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1250/21 September 1834. 3. See for example: BOA HAT 423/21803, 23 Zilkade 1242/18 June 1827, BOA HAT 429/21888, 21 Ramazan 1242/18 April 1827. 4. Nenad Moacˇanin, Town and Country on the Middle Danube 1526– 1690 (Leiden and Boston, Massachusetts: Brill, 2006), p. 131. 5. Avdo Suc´eska, ‘Ma¯lika¯na Lifelong Lease of Governmental Estates in the Ottoman State,’ Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju, 36 (1986), p. 230. 6. See for example: BOA HAT 405/21172, 23 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/01 September 1831, BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT

366

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

NOTES TO PAGES 226 –235 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831, BOA HAT 441/22192, 07 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/15 September 1831. BOA HAT 429/21881, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826, BOA HAT 436/22062 K, 17 Receb 1242/14 February 1827. See for example: BOA HAT 440/22173, 22 Ramazan 1246/06 March 1831 and BOA HAT 440/22160, 06 Saban 1246/20 January 1831. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 65, p. 41, 13 Sevval 1241/21 May 1826, BOA HAT 476/23348, 29 Zilhicce 1241/04 August 1826, BOA HAT 639/31478, 29 Zilkade 1241/05 July 1826. See for example: BOA HAT 424/21811 G, 05 Cemaziyu¨levvel 1242/05 December 1826, BOA HAT 429/21881, 29 Safer 1242/02 October 1826. BOA HAT 338/19357, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826, BOA HAT 1056/43477 A, 30 Muharrem 1242/03 September 1826. See for example: BOA HAT 430/21895, 19 Muharrem 1243/12 August 1827, BOA HAT 440/22162, 23 Sevval 1242/20 May 1827. See for example: BOA HAT 429/21886 H, 11 Zilhicce 1243/24 June 1828. BOA HAT 440/22152, 21 Zilhicce 1243/04 July 1828. See for example: BOA HAT 442/22201, 11 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/19 September 1831. BOA HAT 437/22080, 25 Ramazan 1246/09 March 1831, BOA HAT 438/22091, 21 Saban 1246/04 February 1831. See for example: BOA HAT 437/22077 D, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, BOA HAT 440/22148 C, 09 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/17 September 1831, BOA HAT 440/22154 D, undated. For example, BOA HAT 435/22039 B, 18 Rebiyu¨lahir 1247/26 September 1831, Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 70, p. 16, 17 Zilkade 1247/18 April 1832. See for example Ahmed S. Alicˇic´, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831 do 1832 Godine (Sarajevo: Orijentalni Institut u Sarajevu, 1996), p. 415; Ahmet Cevat Eren, Mahmud II. Zamanında Bosna-Hersek (I˙stanbul: Nurgo¨k Matbaası, 1965), pp. 72, 115. Palmira Brummett, ‘Classifying Ottoman Munity: The Act and Vision of the Rebellion,’ in Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, pp. 91 – 107. BOA HAT 439/22127 A, 21 Ramazan 1248/11 February 1833, BOA HAT 439/22127 D, 21 Ramazan 148/11 February 1833. Rifa’at A. Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, pp. 1 – 6. BOA HAT 429/21880 R, 09 Cemaziyu¨lahir 1242/08 January 1827. BOA HAT 423/21770, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. BOA HAT 405/21174 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 405/21180 C, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/06 September 1831. BOA HAT 426/21851, 27 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/29 October 1826. See for example: BOA HAT 437/22083 A, 15 Saban 1248/07 January 1833. See for example Fatma Sel Turhan, The Abolition of the Janissary Army and Its Reflections, pp. 65, 69, ff.

NOTES TO PAGES 236 –286

367

29. For example, BOA HAT 436/22062, 16 Receb 1242/13 February 1827. 30. See for example: BOA HAT 338/19348, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827, BOA HAT 405/21172 B, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832. 31. For example, BOA HAT 425/21815 B, 29 Zilhicce 1242/24 July 1827. 32. For example, BOA HAT 425/21813, 16 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/18 October 1826, BOA HAT 425/21813 G, 28 Rebiyu¨levvel 1242/30 October 1826. 33. See for example: BOA HAT 423/21781, 11 Saban 1243/27 February 1828. 34. See for example: BOA HAT 422/21746, 29 Zilhicce 1247/30 May 1832, BOA HAT 423/21757, undated, BOA HAT 439/22133, 14 Safer 1248/13 July 1832. 35. See for example: BOA HAT 406/21191, 07 Sevval 1246/21 March 1831, BOA HAT 431/21919 H, 13 Zilhicce 1246/25 May 1831, BOA HAT 416/21529, 08 Rebiyu¨levvel 1247/17 August 1831.

Appendices 1. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, pp. 45 – 50. At auction the confiscated properties of Hu¨seyin Kapudan were sold for 60,070 gurus 27 para. After the dellaˆliye of 598 gurus, hammaˆliye of 36 gurus and the secretarial fee of 125 gurus had been deducted, the total income of 59,311 gurus, 27 para was assigned to the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre treasury. 2. Saraybosna Sicilleri, vol. 71, pp. 38 –41. At auction the confiscated properties of Yaldızcıog˘lu Mustafa were sold for 17,044 gurus, 38 para. After the expenses for dellaˆliye (fee given to the crier), hammaˆliye (porterage), and kaˆtibe (secretarial fee) of 275 gurus had been deducted, the total income of 16,769 gurus 38 para was assigned to the Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre treasury. 3. Saraybosna Sicilleri vol. 71, p. 41.

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INDEX

Abaci Abdullah, 164, 190 Abdurrahim Pas
a administration, 54 arrival, 90 – 3 attacks, 100 Belgrade, 89 – 90 currency, 72 –3 daire halki, 161 Defter Kethu¨dasi Ahmed Bey, 164 divan-i eyalet-i Bosna (city council), 188– 9 executions, 189– 90 Izvornik, 88 kapudans, 191 mediation, 90 policies, 96 Porte, 102– 3 prejudices, 147– 8 restrictions of movement, 70 rewards, 124, 125 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 204 Saray (Bosnia), 57, 97 soldiers, 95 Travnik, 101 vali of Bosnia, 48 abolition janissaries, 2, 28, 53, 57 – 8, 65, 80 –6 kudumiye tax (landing fee), 80

sipahis, 180 timar system, 233 yerlikulu janissaries, 226 Abou-El-Haj, R.A., 24, 160 abuses, 78, 167 active supporters, 185– 6, 237, 238– 9 administration acemi og˘lans, 40 ayanlik, 46 Bosnia, 53 – 60 centralization, 10 changes, 74 deterioration, 11 eyalet, 135 flexibility, 224 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 128 Mehmed Pas
a Kukovica, 77 properties, 220 Saray (Bosnia), 45, 126 state, 4 Vecihi Pas
a, 143–6 aftermath, 126– 9 Ahmed Ag˘a, 122, 191 Ahmed Bey, 139, 144, 191 Ahmed Efendi, 73, 83, 87, 90, 219–20 Ahval-i Bosna, 21, 167 aims, 223, 237 Akif Efendi, 134– 5, 136– 7, 138– 9, 145–6

386 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Aksan, V.H., 8, 148 Albania Bosnia, 109 Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pas
a, 208 rebellions, 232 rebels, 117, 120 rumours, 108 soldiers, 94, 129 suppression, 122 Ali Namik Pas
a administration, 54 escape, 110– 11 esnaf (guilds), 70 house arrest, 110 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 219 mutasarrif, 118 mutiny, 116– 17 restrictions of movement, 70 rewards, 124– 5 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 109 vali of Bosnia, 102– 7 Yenipazar, 205 Ali Pas
a Rizvanbegovic i Njegovo Doba (Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic and his Epoch), 24 Alicˇic´, A.S., 220, 231 Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od, 1831 do, 1832 Godine (Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia from, 1831 to, 1832), 22 Uredenje Bosanskog Ejaleta od, 1789 do, 1878. Godine (Administrative Organization of the Eyalet of Bosnia, 1789 to, 1878), 23 All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt, 9 ambiguity, 8, 149 analysis aims, 223 archival sources, 152, 163, 195 economic activities, 227 Milosˇ, 208– 9 rebellions, 175, 222

vocabulary, 234 anarchy, 41, 55, 78 Anatolia, 17, 42, 51, 127, 212 Anatolian mercenaries, 13 ancien re´gime, 222, 235– 6 Annals, 5 application, 134– 7 appointment, 118, 130, 228 archival sources accommodation, 214 analysis, 152, 195 Bosnia, 25 – 7, 168 captured rebels, 193– 4 children, 216 confiscation, 221 frontier zone, 183 fugitives, 191 group identity, 235 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 208 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 199 janissaries, 226 language, 148, 154 merchants, 227 non-Muslims, 174 Osman Pas
a, 217 Ottoman sources, 148 properties, 220 punishments, 190, 192 rebel leaders, 163 rebellions, 228 rebels, 155 rebels’ power, 158 research, 223 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 202, 203 second stage of the rebellion, 172 stereotypes, 151 ulema (scholarly class), 164 vocabulary, 234 Arif Bey, 124, 156, 158 aristocracy, 37, 193 army Bosnia, 99, 192 daire halki, 161 irregular troops, 178

INDEX Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 118 Ottoman empire, 12 private armies, 161 provisions, 120 regular army, 68 Vecihi Pas
a, 143 winter troop movements, 92 – 3 Yenipazar, 110 Arslan Pas
a, 112, 123 Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers confiscated goods, 218 council of ayan, 137 establishment, 135 organization, 138 recruitment, 108, 144, 145, 229, 233 salaries, 146 attacks Abdurrahim Pas
a, 100 bandits, 142– 3 borderlands, 131 Mostar, 111 Muslims, 141 rebels, 180– 1 Saray (Bosnia), 121 Su¨leyman I˙brahim, 173 attitudes Bosnian people, 234 central authorities, 186–7 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 136 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 128 rebellions, 90 – 1 Serbians, 141 ulema (scholarly class), 165– 8 vali of Bosnia, 93, 139 Austria Ali Namik Pas
a, 110 Bosnia, 106, 140– 3 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 122, 210– 15 kapudans, 89 Porte, 232 rebellions, 99 authority borderlands, 34 – 5 Bosnian notables, 63

387

central government, 17, 223 Islamic jurisprudence, 150 local elites, 226 mu¨tesellims, 68 Porte, 107 state, 187 Sultan, 76, 231 autonomy Belgrade, 102 Bosnia, 22, 35, 184, 222 central authorities, 7 centralization, 75 decentralization, 16 Hersek, 198, 232 rebellions, 23, 24 Serbia, 107 awards, 124, 144 ayan(s) Bosnia, 225 corruption, 15 decentralization, 14 emergence, 167 local elites, 11– 13 networks, 238 ocaklik timari, 62 politics, 228 power, 16, 63, 196, 235 prestige, 46 provincial power, 14 – 15 rebel leaders, 174 rebellions, 79 rebels, 162 resistance, 206 rise, 15 Tirsinikli I˙smail Ag˘a, 201 ulema (scholarly class), 166, 167 Babuna, A. Bir Ulusin Dog˘us
u Gec
mis
ten Gu¨nu¨mu¨ze Bos
naklar, 25 Bakircizade I˙brahim Ag˘a, 163, 164, 189 Balkans, 31, 32, 151, 237– 8, 239 Banalukali Hifzi Efendi, 97, 169, 194

388 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING bandits, 142–3, 167– 8, 174 Banja Luka, 54, 55, 87, 132, 189 Barkey, K., 10, 16 Basˇagic´, S., 36, 207 Basˇeskija, M.S., 21, 77 –8 battles borderlands, 61 deaths, 193 frontier zone, 178 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 118 Pirebol, 120 Saray (Bosnia), 121 soldiers, 226–7 Visoko event, 101 Vulc
etrin, 119 bazaars, 45, 50, 225 Bekir Efendi, 104 Belgrade Abdurrahim Pas
a, 89 Ali Namik Pas
a, 111 autonomy, 102 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 212 Hu¨seyin Pas
a, 93 Mesud Ag˘a, 91 Milosˇ, 133 Ottoman empire, 31 rebellions, 78 recaptured, 183 refugees, 219 Sirozlu Yusuf Pas
a, 139 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 196 wives, 215– 16 Bey, Arif, 73, 84, 90 Bey, Mehmed Arif, 81 – 2, 83, 85, 86 – 7 bid`at, 176– 7, 183, 236 Bihke/Bihac
, 54, 66 Bir Ulusin Dog˘us
u Gec
mis
ten Gu¨nu¨mu¨ze Bos
naklar, 25 borderlands attacks, 131 Bosnia, 168, 222, 224 control, 143 economic activities, 227

flexibility, 33 – 4 frontier zone, 35 perceptions, 34 –5 reforms, 17 security, 61, 99 Serbia, 104 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 107 theories, 16 trade, 69 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 196 yerlikulu janissaries, 65 – 6 Bosavine Kolu, 59, 88, 109 Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 25 Bosniaks, 155, 181, 234– 5 Bosnian Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project (BMIP), 27 Church, 37 districts, 60t1.1 history, 19 – 20 language, 36 Patarin Church, 37 people, 35 – 6, 183– 4, 186, 230– 1, 234, 236 province, 16 tribes, 49 troops, 63 Braudel, F., 224 Mediterranean, The, 30 Brummett, P., 6, 161, 232 bureaucracy, 10 – 11, 16, 74, 76, 295n48 Cadde Kolu (Orta Kol), 59, 82, 127 casualties, 62, 64, 121 categorization, 60t1.1 Catholics, 41, 43, 45, 206 causes, 5 – 6, 9 C¸elebipazari, 87, 121, 203 Cennetizade Emin Bey (mu¨tesellim of Saray), 47 – 8, 172– 3, 220– 1, 286–7 census, 43 – 5, 126, 134

INDEX Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 25 central authorities abuses, 78 administration, 225 aims, 237 Ali Namik Pas
a, 103– 4 autonomy, 7 ayan, 13 Bosnian people, 186– 7 changes, 177– 8 concessions, 230 confiscation, 218 control, 17 – 18 eyalet rebellion, 154– 5 frontier zone, 183 fugitives, 219 Grand Vizier, 119 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 115 –16, 212 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 127– 8 Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pas
a, 208 palankars (palisaded forts), 126– 7 power, 68, 86, 173 rebellions, 87, 150 rebels, 99, 162, 180 reforms, 18 relatives, 216– 17 resistance, 196, 228 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 202 sedition, 179 stereotypes, 234 support, 179 suppression, 230 ulema (scholarly class), 165, 166, 167 unrest, 132– 3 vali of Bosnia, 118 central government, 17, 62, 75, 202, 223 centralization acceleration, 179 ayan, 16 borderlands, 35 Bosnia, 1 – 2, 74 –6, 233 control, 143

389

dichotomy, 10 increased, 75 merchants, 227 mobility, 33 – 4 Ottoman empire, 5 –19, 294n48, 295n48 policies, 28 reactions, 223– 4 rebellions, 222 resistance, 205– 6 rights, 231 state, 185 changes fear, 177 land system, 12, 14, 63 – 4 law, 177 military system, 175, 179 Ottoman empire, 74 tax farming, 15 vali of Bosnia, 187 characteristics, 223, 224 Chaumette des Fosse´s, J. B.-A.., 20 – 1 children, 180, 182– 3, 215– 17 Christianity, 35, 39, 224 Christians, 34, 40, 42, 78, 178 chronology, 242– 4
iftliks, c 15, 46, 62, 220, 226 cizyes, 62, 80, 170, 211, 314n189 coffee houses, 45, 52 – 3, 225 commerce, 12, 55 – 6 communications climate, 33 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 214 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 48 networks, 208–9 rebellions, 50, 83 – 4 rebels, 156 rumours, 138 transport network, 51 complaints, 180– 1, 199 confiscation of properties, 218– 19, 221, 246– 69, 270– 85, 286– 7 conflicts, 55, 75, 100– 2, 148, 222 continuity of rebellions, 223– 4, 230

390 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING control Aleppo, 201– 2 borderlands, 34 – 5, 143 Bosnia, 74, 222 central authorities, 17– 18, 237 economic activities, 71 merchants, 72 militias, 62 movement, 51 Ottoman empire, 10 rebel leaders, 238 state, 185 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 196 cooperation, 161– 2, 173, 232, 238 Cornell, E., 52, 192– 3 correspondence, 156, 158, 214 corruption, 6, 15, 167 costs, 66, 137 council of ayan, 46, 136 couriers, 33, 84, 125– 6 crafts, 55 – 6, 72 craftsmen, 69, 70, 71, 72, 227, 234 culture, 76 – 80, 225, 228 Dalmatia, 111, 203– 4, 211 Davud Pas
a administration, 55 council of ayan, 137 daire halki, 161 dismissed, 137– 40 governorship, 29 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 134– 5 vali of Bosnia, 130– 3 vali of Trablusgarb, 140 Yaldiziciog˘lu Haci Mustafa Ag˘a, 188 death, 174, 199, 215, 217, 221 decentralization, 5 –19, 201 decision making, 46, 48 – 9, 109, 173, 225 decrees, 71 – 2, 97 defence, 31, 236 defter (list), 69 – 70, 122–3, 188, 189 defterdar, 158, 202–3

demands, 2, 175– 85, 187, 236 dervish lodge (tekke), 52 – 3, 81 descriptions, 195– 6, 234 devs
irme system, 40, 192, 225 discussions, 149– 50 disputes, 106, 135 divan-i eyalet-i Bosna (city council) Abdurrahim Pas
a, 188–9 abolition of janissaries, 96 confiscation, 218 decision making, 225 decrees, 71 – 2 local assembly, 46 – 8 rewards, 124 vali of Bosnia, 58, 118 dominance, 37, 45, 76 Donia, R.J. Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 25 Dragon of Bosnia, The (Zmaj od Bosne), 217 duties, 66, 68 economic activities, 71, 227 economics, 41, 162 economy, 11, 15, 69 – 73 Edirne, 103, 104– 5, 110 Edirne Vakasi (1703), 5 education, 35, 204, 238 effectiveness, 63, 187 Egypt, 9, 17, 117 Emin Bey, 194 Eren, A.C., 22, 37, 231 Mahmud II. Zamaninda Bosna-Hersek (Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Rule of Mahmud II), 24 escape Ali Namik Pas
a, 110– 11 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 210– 15 Mehmed Kapudan (kapudan of Krupe), 170– 1 rebels, 121– 2, 187 Silahdar I˙lyas Bey, 332n306 Yaldiziciog˘lu Mustaf Ag˘a, 171 esnaf (guilds), 23, 69 – 70, 155, 174

INDEX Esnafi i Obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini, 14631878 (Tradesmen and Craftsmen in Bosnia Herzegovina Between, 1463 and, 1878), 23 establishment Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre, 135 kapudans, 66 levend troops, 13 regular army, 68 Translation Bureau, 74 zaviyes, 40 estates, 218– 21 ethnicity, 36– 7, 42, 153, 231– 2 ethnonyms, 151, 152– 3, 234 events, 242– 4 execution fugitives, 191 punishments, 187 rebel leaders, 163, 189 rebels, 164, 185 Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, 197 exile Defter Kethu¨dasi Ahmed Bey, 164 Fedayizide Ali Pas
a, 169 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 212 –13 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 116 punishments, 187, 190– 1 rebels, 185, 190, 194 Yaldiziciog˘lu Mustaf Ag˘a, 171 expansion, 15 – 16, 35, 37 exports, 69, 70 eyalet administration, 135, 225 Bosnia, 34, 45, 54 categorization, 59 kapudanliks, 67t1.2 order, 98 political vacuum, 97 punishments, 102 rebellions, 154– 5, 234 rebels, 118 reforms, 126 Saray (Bosnia), 56, 69 soldiers, 100

391

Fahmy, K. All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt, 9 fairs, 45, 50, 225 farmers, 37, 40 Faroqhi, S., 10, 16 Fazil Bey, 135– 6, 139, 140 Fedayizide Ali Pas
a Akif Efendi, 138 awards, 144 Belgrade, 213– 14 C¸elebipazari, 121 Izvornik, 105 Milosˇ, 209 rewards, 170 second stage of the rebellion, 169 fermans Akif Efendi, 135 janissaries’ abolition, 80, 81, 82 – 3 rebellions, 7 state, 165– 6 timar system, 61 feudalism, 13 –14, 37 Filipovic´, O. Dragon of Bosnia, The (Zmaj od Bosne), 217 Fine, J.V.A. Jr, 36 – 7, 38 Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 25 first stage of the rebellion, 163– 5, 200–4 fitne (rebellion, sedition, disorder), 8, 148 flexibility, 4, 17, 33 – 4, 223, 224 flight, 110– 13 Foc
a, 88 – 9, 97, 121, 165, 190 Fraternal Obstinacy, The (Bratski Inat), 217 frequency of rebellions, 5, 79, 228 frontier theory, 301n28 frontier zone Austria, 140– 3 borderlands, 35

392 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Bosnia, 41, 168 defence, 78 porous, 224 Porte, 34 psychology, 183 security, 17 – 18 status, 178 troops, 105 fugitives, 191, 210– 11, 218– 19 funding, 62, 66, 93 geography Bosnia, 4, 22, 30, 224, 298n1, 299n1 defence psychology, 236 international powers, 228 Saray (Bosnia), 56 Ghegs Albania, 329n256, 330n256 Bosnia, 121 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 118 Mustafa Pas
a, 108 role, 123 Sultan, 118– 19 suppression, 113, 116 Ginzburg, C., 18 government buildings, 97 – 8 government officials, 7, 97 –8 governorship Celal Pas
a, 79 Davud Pas
a, 29 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 22, 28, 231 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 232 Mehmed Pas
a Kukovica, 77 ¨ mer Pas
a Latas, 68 O Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 202 staff, 58 – 9 Gradacac (Grad), 204, 210, 219 Grand Vizier army, 103 Bosnia, 113 central authorities, 119 direct rule, 108 divan councils, 46, 58 gifts, 125

Islamization, 40 Porte, 126 reports, 123 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 112, 117, 130 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 120 suppression, 116 group identity, 155, 235 guilds, 72, 74 Habsburg Empire, 34, 55, 69, 212 Haci Muˆyuˆ see Yaldiziciog˘lu I˙slatar Mustafa Ag˘a Hadzˇijahic´, M., 36, 37, 40 Hajdarevic´, R., 69 – 70 Hakki Pas
a, 123– 4 Hamid (mufti of Travnik), 164, 190 Handzˇic´, A., 37, 39, 40 Hasan Ag˘a, 136– 7 Hasan Efendi (scribe), 60, 86 Hathaway, J., 7, 8, 153 Hatt-i Hu¨mayun collection (BOA HAT), 26, 54 Hekimog˘lu Ali Pas
a, 46, 77 Hersek Akif Efendi, 135 Ali Namik Pas
a, 110 attacks, 111 Bosnia, 199, 205 Bosnian sancak, 54 eyalet, 54 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 116 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 193, 198 kapudans, 66 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 109 rebellions, 77, 199 sancaks, 54 separated from Bosnia, 127, 232 separation, 54– 5 soldiers, 119 Hersek Kolu, 59 Herzegovina, 30, 40, 78, 288, 290 Heywood, C., 22, 168 Hifzi Pas
a, 119, 123

INDEX history, 33, 232 Hobsbawm. E.J., 76 – 7 house arrest, 110, 214 households, 42, 160– 1 Humbaraci Mesud Ag˘a, 90 – 1 huruˆc-i alessultan (withdrawal of allegiance from the Sultan), 8 Hu¨seyin Kapudan aims, 24 – 5 appointment, 184 C¸elebipazari, 121 central authorities, 188 changed sides, 94
iftliks, c 220 confiscation, 218 descriptions, 195 destruction, 68 escape, 210– 15 exile, 212– 13 Fedayizide Ali Pas
a, 105 governorship, 22 – 3, 28, 231 importance, 19 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 122 Istanbul, 214 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 199 leadership, 156, 238 Mahmud Pas
a, 172 Mehmed Kapudan (kapudan of Krupe), 171 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 49, 114– 15 Milosˇ, 105 Muslims, 176 Osman Efendi, 219 petitions, 240– 1 properties confiscated, 246– 69 rebel leaders, 164– 5 rebellions, 2, 3, 6, 29, 110 rebels, 194 recruitment of soldiers, 108–9 representation, 22 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 198 second stage of the rebellion, 169, 204– 6

393

support for the rebellion, 169 supporters, 117, 128, 144 suppression, 7, 125 Travnik, 57 vali of Bosnia, 112, 114– 17 wealth, 206– 10 wives, 215 Yaldiziciog˘lu I˙slatar Mustafa Ag˘a, 120 Yenipazar, 113 Hu¨seyin Pas
a Belgrade, 91, 93 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 213, 214, 219 Milosˇ, 102 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 131 vali of Bosnia, 102, 111 Visoko event, 101 I˙brahim Ag˘a, 92, 132 I˙brahim Kapudan, 165, 191 I˙brahim Pas
a, 109– 10, 111, 114, 117, 200 idare-i maslahat (makeshift measures), 9 identities, 154–62 iltizam system, 14, 16, 170 importance, 35, 41, 55 – 6, 69, 163, 169 I˙nalcik, Halil, 13, 42, 167 Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Tanzimat and the Bulgarian Issue), 8 – 9 incitements to rebellion, 5 – 6 incomes, 11, 177–8 independence, 22 –3, 326n179 indigenous notables, 63, 124 indigenous peoples, 179, 182, 189, 226 influence Cennetizade Emin Bey (mu¨tesellim of Saray), 221 esnafs, 70 Fazil Bey, 139 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 127– 8, 136, 198– 9 janissaries, 192 kapudans, 191–2 lack of, 85 military elements, 64

394 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Milosˇ, 141 notables, 46, 144, 162 reduced, 75 regions, 192 state, 74 influences, 9, 16, 40, 41 information sources, 21, 50 international powers, 16, 224, 228, 230, 233 interpretations, 9, 222 interventions, 1, 16, 35, 224, 228, 233 I˙pek, 111, 112 Isevic´, M.E. Ahval-i Bosna, 21, 167 I˙
skodra Ali Namik Pas
a, 118 climate, 33 Kara Mahmud Pas
a (r., 1775-1796), 200 rebellions, 6 recruitment of soldiers, 109 Serbia, 108 soldiers, 119 status, 113 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a descriptions, 195 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 122 I˙
skodra, 199– 200 Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pas
a, 208 Milosˇ, 112, 209 rebellions, 113, 116 Islam Bosnia, 34, 36, 37, 38 – 9 Christianity, 224 expansion, 37 frontier zone, 35 government, 176 imposed, 39 state, 165– 6 terminology, 236 Islamic conversion, 37 – 8, 39 – 40 Islamic discourse, 149– 50 Islamic jurisprudence, 149– 50 Islamization, 40 – 2, 52, 193, 224– 5

I˙slamog˘lu, H., 14 – 15 I˙smail Ag˘a Cˇengic´, 121, 199 Istanbul Ahmed Bey, 144 Ghegs, 119 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 213 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 200 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 199 punishments, 192 rebellions, 84 ulema (scholarly class), 166, 235 wives, 216 Yaldiziciog˘lu Mustaf Ag˘a, 171 I˙stolc
e, 110, 111, 116 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a Ali Namik Pas
a, 111 dismissed, 116 Hersek, 89 Izvornik, 94 Porte, 123 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 117– 18 rewards, 122, 124 support, 125 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic council of ayan, 137 daire halki, 161 Hersek, 54 – 5, 127, 135, 232 leadership, 238 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 121, 128– 9 military changes, 179– 80 Nizaˆmaˆt, 136 Porte, 24 rebellions, 6 rebels, 210 S
erifzade Fazil Efendi, 205 status, 198– 9 suppression, 193 vali of Bosnia, 139 Izvornik Abdurrahim Pas
a, 88, 91, 95 Akif Efendi, 138 eyalet, 54 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 94 Mehmed Ali Bey, 105

INDEX mutiny, 92 rebellions, 78, 87 sancaks, 54 janissaries abolition, 2, 28, 53, 57 – 8, 80 –6 Belgrade, 78 – 9 Bosnia, 183, 340n1 Bosnian notables, 63 changes, 178– 9 coffee houses, 52, 53 council of ayan, 46 destroyed, 74, 75 economic activities, 227 Genc
Mustafa Ag˘a, 95 Hersek, 89 influence, 192– 3 kaˆnuˆn-i kadıˆm (ancient law), 176, 236 Ottoman empire, 1 power, 64, 202 power struggles, 77 protection, 204 punishments, 179 rebellions, 55, 175, 226 rebels, 156, 164 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 163, 200 trade, 11 ulema (scholarly class), 167, 353n175 vali of Bosnia, 80 yerlikulu janissaries, 65 jurisprudence, 167, 176– 7 Kadic´, E. Tarih-i Bosna, 21 – 2 Kaˆmil Bey, 134, 138, 139 kaˆnuˆn-i kadıˆm (ancient law), 175– 6, 179, 181, 202, 236 Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Kapudans in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 23 Kapicibas
i Hu¨seyin Ag˘a, 115, 207– 8 Kapicˇic´, H., 198– 9, 204, 205 Ali Pas
a Rizvanbegovic i Njegovo Doba (Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic and his Epoch), 24

395

kapudanliks, 66, 67t1.2 kapudans abolition, 226 Austria, 89 Bosnia, 16, 23, 225, 315n202, 316n202 exile, 191 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 117– 18 janissaries, 55, 179 Ko¨se Ahmed, 204 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 88 military class, 66 mutiny, 164 politics, 228 Porte, 191 position, 76 power, 63, 68 power struggles, 77 rebellions, 79, 227 rebels, 156, 162 rewards, 95 rural wealth, 46 salaries, 135 status, 230 Karpat, K.H., 17, 35, 69, 75 Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, 25 kasabas, 37, 39 Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pas
a descriptions, 195 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 208, 215 leadership, 238 position, 197– 8 rebellions, 6, 116 Syria, 232 Keppel, Major G.T. (1799-1891) Narrative of a Journey across the Balcan, 32 Keyder, C¸., 14 –15, 166 Khoury, D.R., 44, 170 State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834, 9–10 Klis, 54, 66 Koller, M. Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, 25

396 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Kresˇevljakovic´, H., 121, 207 Esnafi i Obrti u Bosni i Hercegovini, 1463-1878 (Tradesmen and Craftsmen in Bosnia Herzegovina Between, 1463 and, 1878), 23 Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Kapudans in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 23 Krupe, 54, 66 labels, 196, 234 land ownership, 60, 63 land system, 12, 14, 68, 76 land tenure, 2, 15, 60 – 9, 75, 226 language, 20, 148, 151, 154, 234 Lazo, Kiyyeci, 174, 188 leadership Balkans, 237– 8 first stage of the rebellion, 163– 5 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 23 rebellions, 156, 195 –200 rebels, 157t4.1, 158t4.1, 159t4.2, 160t4.2 leading figures, 163–5, 168– 75, 237 Lebib Efendi, 107– 8, 218, 219– 20 legitimacy central authorities, 165 group identity, 155 provincial elites, 10 rebellions, 148 rebels, 176, 184, 222, 236 state, 165– 6, 223 levend troops, 12, 13 Liburic faction, 90 – 1, 95 literature, 19 – 25, 36 local elites cooperation, 161– 2 governorship, 232 influence, 47 – 8, 75 Ottoman empire, 10 power, 11, 78 Saray (Bosnia), 225 social networks, 225

taxation, 14 troops, 161 loyalty, 34, 139, 168 Mahmud Bey Akif Efendi, 138 awards, 144 council of ayan, 136–7 exile, 194 Fedayizide Ali Pas
a, 169 imprisoned, 128 threats, 139 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a daire halki, 161 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 211, 219 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 127 mutasarrif, 88 palankars (palisaded forts), 127 properties, 218 rebellions, 91 – 2 rebels, 210 removal from office, 130– 1 reports, 214– 15 Saray (Bosnia), 57 second stage of the rebellion, 171–2 soldiers, 121 support, 126 suppression, 193– 4 vali of Bosnia, 54, 117– 22, 128– 9 Mahmud II (r., 1808-1839) Abdurrahim Pas
a, 91, 93 ayan, 202 Bosnia, 23, 104, 181, 232 Celal Pas
a, 79 census, 44 centralization, 3, 233 Ghegs, 123 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 210– 11, 214 I˙brahim Pas
a, 117 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 122 janissaries’ abolition, 83 kapudans, 66 new corps, 89 price rises, 73

INDEX reforms, 74– 5 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 116 rewards, 125 salaries, 179 Vehbi (naib of Tas
lica), 190 Mahmud II. Zamaninda Bosna-Hersek (Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Rule of Mahmud II), 24 Mahmud Pas
a awards, 144 dismissed, 105 exile, 194 imprisoned, 128 Istanbul, 119 rebel leaders, 169 rewards, 170 second stage of the rebellion, 172 malikane system (tax-farming), 14, 15, 62 – 3, 226 McGowan, B., 13, 15 mediation, 90, 165 Mediterranean, The, 30 meeting places, 52 – 3, 182 meetings, 173, 182 Mehmed Ag˘a, 81, 82, 83 Mehmed Ali Bey, 105 Mehmed Ali Pas
a, 9, 127, 184, 232 Mehmed Kapudan (kapudan of Krupe), 165, 169, 170– 1, 191, 213– 14 Memis
Ag˘a (mu¨tesellim of Senic
e), 88, 172, 174 merchants attitudes, 234 Bosnia, 225 control, 71, 72 guilds, 72 influence, 69, 227 politics, 228 rebel leaders, 174 rebellions, 79 rebels, 155 tax farmers, 14 vali of Bosnia, 70 wealth, 45 – 6

Mesud Ag˘a, 91, 97 mes
verets (councils of the notables) Akif Efendi, 134– 5 decision making, 45, 225 Izvornik, 92 problem solving, 48 –9 rebellions, 229 Saray (Bosnia), 84, 97, 114– 15 Travnik, 97 Tuzla-i Zıˆr, 109 Metternich, Prince (Austria), 111, 142–3, 211– 12 migrations, 37, 39 Mihailovic´, K., 32 – 3 military changes, 162, 176, 180– 1 class, 226 conscription, 44, 174, 179– 80 control, 74 elements, 64 equipment, 145 force, 56 frontier, 41 organization, 60– 9, 178 power, 64 – 6 status, 15, 184 system, 2, 175, 179, 226, 236 militias, 12, 62, 78, 178, 229 Milosˇ Akif Efendi, 134 Ali Namik Pas
a, 104 borderlands, 209– 10 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 208– 9, 211 Kunibert, Dr Bartol, 213 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 129 Muslims, 141 opposition, 140 Porte, 112, 232 provisions, 120 rebellions, 92 rebels, 110 rumours, 105 Russia, 102, 230

397

398 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 107, 108, 131– 2 soldiers, 101 unrest, 133 Miralem Mehmed, 164, 190 miri, 11, 211 Mitrovic
e, 119 Moacˇanin, N., 22, 24, 185 modernization, 9, 74, 233 Montenegro districts of eyalet, 60 Ottoman empire, 18 rebellions, 78 rebels, 120 Russia, 99, 325n179, 326n179 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 108 mosques, 45, 50, 206, 225 Mostar, 77, 89, 121, 136 mountains, 30, 31 movement, 51, 70 Muallim Cevdet Tasnifi, 26 Mu¨derris I˙lyasizade Emin Efendi, 174 Mufti, 89, 158, 164 Murad Kapudan (kapudan of Bihke), 98 – 9, 106, 109, 165, 204 Musa Ag˘a, 100, 102, 173, 221 Muslims Bosnia, 40, 340n1 Bosnians, 1, 25, 42, 78 children, 40, 225 elites, 76 epidemic, 176 military conscription, 44 peasants (reaya), 63, 228 population counts, 43 power struggles, 77 Serbia, 140–1 under threat, 129 world views, 45 Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, The, 25 Mustafa Bey, 135– 6, 208, 217

Mustafa Kapudan (kapudan of Yayc
e), 165, 191 Mustafa Pas
a administration, 54 appointment, 228 Bey, Mehmed Arif, 82 dismissed, 91 governorship, 80 Hasan Efendi (scribe), 60, 86 I˙brahim Pas
a, 111 notables, 83 Ottoman empire, 184 rebellions, 109, 113 recruitment of soldiers, 109 reports, 84 troops, 108 war with Russia, 104 winter troop movements, 92 –3 mutasarrif, 88, 118 mu¨tesellimlik, 12, 47 – 8, 68 mu¨tesellims decentralization, 14 Osman Pas
a, 80 power, 63 provincial governors, 13 rebels, 162 Saray (Bosnia), 163 Serebrenice, 88 Yenipazar, 86, 120 mutiny Albania, 113, 116– 17 archival sources, 148 defined, 8 increased, 84 – 5 Izvornik, 92 negotiations, 5 not tolerated, 34 rebellions, 5, 8 Muvekkit, S.S.H. Tarih-i Bosna, 21 –2 myths, 22, 40 nakib, 156, 158 Narrative of a Journey across the Balcan, 32

INDEX nationalism, 23, 75, 231– 2 negotiations, 5, 185, 232, 237 networks, 45, 79, 224, 225, 228, 238 Neveberde, 125, 128 new order, 96 – 100 nizaˆmaˆt, 2, 134– 7, 233 non-Muslims, 174, 180– 1, 206, 235 notables Ali Namik Pas
a, 103 arazi-i miri, 61 attitudes, 234 decision making, 46 esnaf (guilds), 70 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 114 influence, 162 Izvornik, 88 kidnapped, 158 Milosˇ, 140 origins, 224 power, 173 power loss, 74 punishments, 189 rebellions, 83, 86, 94, 97 rebels, 155 rewards, 229, 237 rights, 226 Serhad (Bosnia), 106– 7 timar, 226 vali of Bosnia, 105– 6, 134– 5 Vecihi Pas
a, 144 wealth and power, 45 – 6 objectives, 175– 85, 187, 236 ocaklik timari, 16, 61, 62, 193, 226 opinions, 97, 129 opponents, 10, 75 oppression, 13, 77 order, 97, 98 Orthodox Christians, 45, 63 Orthodox Church, 39, 43 Osijek, 210, 215 Osman (kapudan of Gradacac), 204, 206 Osman Nuri, 163, 164 Osman Pas
a

399

Belgrade, 217 Mehmed Kapudan (kapudan of Krupe), 170 mu¨tesellim, 80 rebellions, 165 Russia, 102 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 107 Yaldiziciog˘lu Mustaf Ag˘a, 171 Yenipazar, 86 – 7 Ottoman Bosnia: A History in Peril, 25 palankars (palisaded forts), 126– 7 panayirs (fairs), 45, 50 participation, 2, 79, 228, 235 passive supporters, 185– 6, 237 peasants (reaya), 15, 37, 55 Pekli Hasan Ag˘a, 98 – 9, 106, 108– 9, 164 people, 35 – 45 perceptions, 34, 153, 155, 229, 234 periodization, 292n22, 293n22 Pinson, M. Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, The, 25 Pinyo I˙brahim Alemdar, 163, 164, 189 Pirebol, 87, 120 Piris
tine Panayir attacks, 112 I˙brahim Pas
a, 111 rebellions, 81 rebels, 119 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 113 trade, 71 Yas
ar Pas
a (U¨sku¨p), 128 Pirlepeli Ahmed Efendi, 81 – 2, 85, 97 planning, 182, 229 Pojega, 54, 66 Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od, 1831 do, 1832 Godine (Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia from, 1831 to, 1832), 22

400 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING policies Abdurrahim Pas
a, 95 – 6 Bosnia, 34 centralization, 28, 223 changes, 63 coffee houses, 53 forced settlement policy, 42 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 136 modernization, 233 Mustafa Pas
a, 91 Ottoman empire, 4 rebellions, 75 – 6, 228 reforms, 18 restrictions of movement, 70 – 1 tribal culture, 50 policy making, 79, 228 political authority, 14, 15, 79, 167, 186 elites, 10 power, 10, 46 structures, 74 vacuum, 97 politics, 79, 119 population Bosnia, 4, 36, 154 counts, 43 increased, 41, 42 refugees, 77 structure, 37 Porte Abdurrahim Pas
a, 93, 96 Akif Efendi, 134, 137 Albania, 208 Ali Namik Pas
a, 111 Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers, 146 authority, 107 Bosnia, 33, 90, 116, 228– 9 budgets, 56 census data, 44 centralization, 1 – 2 changes, 177 coffee houses, 53 control, 72, 143 correspondence, 112

currency, 72 – 3 Davud Pas
a, 130 Derbend, 132–3 divan-i eyalet-i Bosna (city council), 47 – 8 frontier zone, 34 fugitives, 211 Grand Vizier, 126 Hersek, 127 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 28, 57, 114, 213, 214 I˙brahim Pas
a, 111, 117 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 123 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 24, 55, 136, 199 janissaries, 65 kapudans, 191 Kara Mahmud Pas
a (r., 1775-1796), 200 Lebib Efendi, 107–8, 218 Metternich, Prince (Austria), 142– 3 Milosˇ, 120, 129, 131– 2, 209, 230, 232 policies, 233 power, 231 rebellions, 109 rebels, 162, 236– 7 rumours, 105 Saray (Bosnia), 56, 71 – 2, 102, 122 Serbia, 140– 1 soldiers, 98 suppression, 198 timar system, 61 Tosks, 121 trade, 70 tribal culture, 50 vali of Bosnia, 240– 1 wives, 215–16 position, 56, 65, 76, 195– 6, 225, 226 postponement of reforms, 232, 233 power ayan, 12, 16, 62, 201– 2 central authorities, 68 esnaf (guilds), 70

INDEX households, 161 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 204, 205 indigenous notables, 63 indigenous peoples, 189 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 199 kapudans, 66 language, 154 local elites, 78 merchants, 45 – 6, 227 military class, 226 Milosˇ, 141 notables, 226 punishments, 187 rebel leaders, 196, 238 rebels, 156, 179 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 200 social networks, 155 struggles, 77 Su¨leyman Bey, 158, 160 Sultan, 7, 233 Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, 197 ulema (scholarly class), 166, 167, 235– 6 vocabulary, 151 pragmatism, 17, 223 preparations, 83, 85 prestige, 102, 167, 197 privileges, 11 – 12, 76, 193 promotions, 122– 6, 170, 232 properties, 218–21, 246–69, 270– 85, 286– 7 protection, 11 – 12, 34, 107, 197, 231, 235– 6 protests, 77, 83, 141, 229 provincial elites, 10 governors, 11, 13 power, 6 – 7, 13, 14 – 15, 222 rule, 9 society, 9 punishments Abdurrahim Pas
a, 189 aims, 237 archival sources, 192

401 Bosnia, 102 exile, 190– 1 hard labour, 188 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 128 rebellions, 232 rebels, 185, 187 suppression, 179 trade restrictions, 71 types, 187– 8 Yaldiziciog˘lu I˙slatar Mustafa Ag˘a, 194

Rastok River, 106, 135 rebel leaders archival sources, 163 death, 174 decision making, 173 indigenous peoples, 182 local knowledge, 238– 9 popularity, 239 punishments, 185 social class, 173 rebellions Abdurrahim Pas
a, 93 Albania, 113 Ali Namik Pas
a, 105 analysis, 222 archival sources, 228 Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers, 145 autonomy, 24 Bosnia, 1, 2, 27 – 8, 51, 76 –80, 232 Bosnian notables, 76 Cadde Kolu (Orta Kol), 59 characteristics, 223 Christian peasants, 55 communications, 50, 83 – 4 complexity, 78 conceptualization, 148–54 continuity, 230 culture, 76 – 80 currency depreciation, 72 – 3 decision making, 225 defined, 8, 147– 8 ethnicity, 153

402 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING factionalism, 160– 1 frequency, 79, 228 Hersek, 77, 199 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 115 independence, 22 – 3 Islamic discourse, 149– 50 janissaries’ abolition, 82 leadership, 156, 195– 200 leading figures, 157t4.1, 158t4.1, 159t4.2, 160t4.2, 163– 5 legitimacy, 148 merchants, 227 Montenegro, 99 mutiny, 8 nationalism, 75 – 6, 231 negotiations, 5 not tolerated, 34 opinions, 97 Ottoman empire, 6, 222– 3, 233 participation, 235 patterns, 181 perceptions, 2, 234 planning, 182 preparations, 83 reasons, 3 regionalism, 235 regions, 234 repercussions, 86– 90 research, 224 rumours, 128 Saray (Bosnia), 56 Serbia, 140 Serbian issues, 107 Serhad (Bosnia), 215 support, 70 suppression, 90, 93 – 6, 116 taksit, 77 theories, 5 – 19 Travnik, 229 ulema (scholarly class), 165– 8 vali of Bosnia, 109 Yenipazar, 87 rebels archival sources, 193– 4

attacks, 111, 119 C¸elebipazari, 121 central authorities, 99 conceptualization, 148–54 defeated, 121– 2 defter (list), 188 descriptions, 234 determination, 93 exile, 194 group identity, 235 Hu¨seyin Pas
a, 111 I˙brahim Pas
a, 111 identities, 154– 62 infighting, 93 kaˆnuˆn-i kadıˆm (ancient law), 175– 6 leadership, 157t4.1, 158t4.1, 159t4.2, 160t4.2 legitimacy, 222, 236 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 118, 210 mercy, 194 non-Muslims, 174 objectives, 175– 85 payment, 92 petitions, 180 planning, 229 politics, 119 Porte, 236– 7 power, 179, 231 punishments, 185, 186 return to Bosnia, 210 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 203 second stage of the rebellion, 168– 75 Senic
e, 120 subjugation, 185–94, 237 summons, 93 –4 terminology, 176, 235 Travnik, 97, 110 ulema (scholarly class), 166 vocabulary, 150–1 recognition, 122– 6 recruitment Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers, 108, 135, 144, 229, 233

INDEX Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 121 resistance, 101 soldiers, 56, 64 –5, 93, 98, 100, 226– 7 war with Russia, 104, 230 reforms borderlands, 17 Bosnia, 1 – 2, 205 eyalet, 126 military system, 236 Ottoman empire, 9, 223 postponement, 232, 233 rebellions, 222 Tanzimat, 10 ulema (scholarly class), 165, 236 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 196 refuge, 31, 111, 210 refugees, 77, 211– 12, 218 regionalism, 153, 162, 223, 224, 235 regions, 192, 222, 234 regulation, 72, 74 Reinkowski, M., 18 relatives, 215– 17 religion Bosnia, 36, 37, 38 – 9 diversity, 45 households, 42 networks, 224 population, 42 rebels, 177, 236 Saray (Bosnia), 55 Saraybosna, 43 remoteness, 33 –4, 166, 224, 233 reorganization, 75, 226 repercussions, 86 – 90 reports Ali Namik Pas
a, 109 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 207 –8 I˙brahim Ag˘a, 132 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 214– 15 Milosˇ, 209 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 118 Yas
ar Pas
a (U¨sku¨p), 163 representation, 22, 151

403

reputation, 45, 80 research, 25 – 7, 223, 224 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a battles, 121 Grand Vizier, 112, 117, 130 I˙stolc
eli Ali Ag˘a, 117– 18 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 198 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 119– 20 Mahmud II (r., 1808-1839), 116 Milosˇ, 120, 209 mutiny, 116– 17 rebels, 112 reports, 118 second stage of the rebellion, 169 suppression, 193 Tosks, 121 U¨sku¨b, 113 resistance ayan, 196 Bosnia, 76, 205– 6 culture, 79, 228 Muidzade Mehmed S
akir Efendi, 163– 4 rebellions, 229 recruitment of soldiers, 101 strength, 182 taxation, 233 urban resistance, 77 restrictions, 51, 71, 75 revenues, 68, 197, 229– 30 Revolt of Patrona Hill (1730), 5 rewards Ghegs, 123 Milosˇ, 141 notables, 170, 229, 237 Porte, 232 suppression, 122– 6 rhetoric, 151– 2 rights, 11 – 12, 76, 226, 231 rise of ayan, 12 – 13, 15 rivers, 33, 106, 135 roads, 51, 90, 93, 229 role Bosnia, 168

404 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING coffee houses, 52 Ghegs, 123 kapudans, 66 notables, 46 sipahis, 68 transport network, 51 urbanization, 40 Via Egnatia, 51 Rumelia Bosnia, 115 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 131 rebellions, 51, 84 restrictions of movement, 70 rumours, 108 soldiers, 94 Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a, 197 Tirsinikli I˙smail Ag˘a, 201 vali of Bosnia, 56 rumours bribery, 105 changes, 177 communications, 138 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 116, 205, 211, 214 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 199 rebels, 162 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 203 salaries, 179 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 108 state, 229 Tuzla-i Zıˆr, 128 rural areas, 45, 46, 49, 76 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a C¸elebipazari, 87 death, 204 descriptions, 195 duties, 202 executed, 189 first stage of the rebellion, 200– 4 janissaries, 164 leadership, 156, 163, 238 Ottoman empire, 184 rebellions, 6, 7, 29 Russia

Bosnia, 35 Montenegro, 325n179, 326n179 Ottoman empire, 101– 2 Treaty of Edirne (1829), 107 wars, 98, 230 Ru¨stem Bey, Hasan Pas
azade, 88, 194 Sadat, D.R., 12, 185 salaries, 64 – 5, 126, 135, 146, 179, 226–7 Salih Pas
a, 124 sancaks, 13, 53, 54, 67t1.2 Saray (Bosnia) Abdurrahim Pas
a, 96 administration, 45, 225 administrative centre, 58, 76, 126 Akif Efendi, 135, 137 Ali Namik Pas
a, 103, 110 battles, 101, 121 Bey, Mehmed Arif, 82 capital city, 55 Cennetizade Emin Bey (mu¨tesellim of Saray), 221 central authorities, 162 coffee houses, 53 commerce, 69 communications, 50 dervish lodge (tekke), 53 economic activities, 227 executions, 190 Foc
a, 88 – 9 Genc
Mustafa Ag˘a, 95 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 114, 210 importance, 55 – 6 janissaries’ abolition, 82 – 3 kapudans, 66 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 131 merchants, 71 – 2 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 49, 84 Mustafa Pas
a, 86 order, 97 Ottoman empire, 31 pilgrims, 51

INDEX position, 225 punishments, 189 rebel leaders, 163 rebel stronghold, 182 rebellions, 59, 87 – 8, 92, 158, 225 rebels, 92, 94, 121, 156 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 202, 203 sancaks, 53 – 4 seizure, 122 status, 229 support, 88 Takiyu¨ddin Efendi, 104 taksit, 178 trade, 70 vali of Bosnia, 56 – 7, 97 Vecihi Pas
a, 143 Visoko, 100 Saraybosna, 43, 134, 218 Sarayli Haci Abdullah (Haci Abdi), 163, 189 Sava (Bosavine Kolu), 59, 88 second stage of the rebellion, 168– 75, 204– 6 security, 17 – 18, 61, 78, 99 sedition Bekir Efendi, 104 Bosnia, 45, 154 Bosnian people, 152 Cennetizade Emin Bey (mu¨tesellim of Saray), 173 central authorities, 179 coffee houses, 53 esnaf (guilds), 70 Ghegs, 119 Hersek, 135 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 215 Islamic jurisprudence, 150 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 48 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 200 Saray (Bosnia), 56 – 7 second stage of the rebellion, 182 state, 185 Vecihi Pas
a, 144– 5 Selim III (r., 1789-1807), 7, 80, 197

405

Senic
e, 120, 129 Sepro, Etmekc
i, 174, 188 Serbia borderlands, 104, 209– 10 Bosnia, 28, 106 conflicts, 183– 4 protection, 107 rebellions, 107 rights, 231 Russia, 101– 2 Serbian peasants (kmets), 63 Serbian question, 140– 3 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 132, 179 Yenipazar, 129 Serbs, 76, 101 Serhad (Bosnia), 106– 7, 109, 142, 144, 215 S
erifzade, Mustafa Nuri Efendi, 85 – 6, 320n76, 321n76 siege, 110, 112, 116 Silahdar I˙lyas Bey, 113, 332n305, 332n306 sipahis, 46, 64, 68, 161, 180 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 107– 10, 120, 131, 179, 230 social banditry, 76 – 7 class, 63, 173, 235 life, 45– 53, 225 movements, 6 networks, 155, 156, 198, 201, 238 polarization, 63 strata, 37, 155 Sokol, 89, 140– 1 soldiers Abdurrahim Pas
a, 48, 103 advance, 120 Albania, 117, 129 Anatolia, 127 Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers, 108, 145 borderlands, 61 Bosnia, 154, 192 children, 180 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 118

406 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING Nizaˆmaˆt, 135 rebellions, 94 rebels, 110 recruitment, 56, 100, 121, 226– 7 salaries, 126 Saray (Bosnia), 95 Tuzla-i Zıˆr, 109 uniforms, 100 Visoko, 100 war with Russia, 99, 104 yerlikulu janissaries, 64 – 5 Starcˇevic´, 207, 210 state administration, 4 ayan, 11 Bosnia, 35 centralization, 74 coercion, 228 control, 15, 68 – 9 decision making, 173 flexibility, 224 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 213 janissaries, 227 land ownership, 61 land system, 14 legitimacy, 223 Montenegro, 99 perceptions, 2 policies, 16 pressure, 39 properties, 219 punishments, 187 rebellions, 232 rebels, 194 responses to rebellions, 5 rewards, 170 show of strength, 95 stability, 185 stereotypes, 234 strategy, 34 suppression, 229, 233 terminology, 235 tribal culture, 50 ulema (scholarly class), 166, 235

State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834, 9 – 10 status Bosnia, 22, 24, 183, 224 Bosnian people, 177 Bosnian province, 16 districts, 2 frontier zone, 35, 178 Muslim Bosnians, 1 peasants, 15 rebels, 151 Saray (Bosnia), 229 Six Districts (Nevaˆhi-i Sitte), 107– 10, 131 stereotypes, 151, 168, 234, 236 Stoianovich, T., 11, 12, 51 structure, 10, 37, 58 subjugation, 185– 94, 237 Suc´eska, A., 11 – 12, 62, 76 Su¨leyman Bey, 158, 160, 163 Su¨leyman I˙brahim, 173 Su¨leyman Pas
azade Mehmed Cemal Bey, 124– 5 Sultan authority, 76 Bosnia, 23, 34 Bosnian people, 183– 4, 230– 1 executions, 189– 90 flexibility, 17 Ghegs, 118–19 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 211 Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pas
a, 198 Mehmed Pas
a Kukovica, 77 Muslim Bosnians, 78 Ottoman census, 43 – 4 Ottoman empire, 7 political power, 10 power, 233 rebels, 236– 7 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 113, 130 Saray (Bosnia), 122 superiority, 187 ulema (scholarly class), 235 uniforms, 181

INDEX support Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 117 Kavalali Mehmed Ali Pas
a, 208 Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 201 rebellions, 179, 227 rebels, 155, 165 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 203 vali of Bosnia, 95, 189 suppression aftermath, 126– 9 Albania, 122 Bosnia, 1 central authorities, 230 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 7 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 116 Islam, 165– 6 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 199 methods, 2 Mustafa Pas
a, 80, 228 Porte, 198 punishments, 179 rebellions, 2, 79 – 80, 90, 93 – 6 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 112 rewards, 122– 6 state, 229, 233 Travnik, 97 survey, 19 – 25 Syria, 17, 116, 232 Tacitus Annals, 5 Tahmiscizade Mustafa Ag˘a, 163, 189 Tahmiscizade Su¨leyman, 163, 164, 189 tahrir defters (written surveys of a province), 41, 42 taksit, 55, 77, 178 Tanzimat, 10, 58, 68 Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Tanzimat and the Bulgarian Issue), 8 –9 Tarih-i Bosna, 21 – 2 Tas
lica, 87, 88, 97 taverns (meykedes), 52 – 3 tax farming, 14, 15, 166– 7 taxation

407

ayan, 13 Davud Pas
a, 138 exemption, 64– 5 illegal, 13 iltizam system, 170 increased, 77 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 199 janissaries, 178, 227 labour, 180 malikane system (tax-farming), 62 –3 Milosˇ, 209 new taxes, 179 Ottoman empire, 10 provincial governors, 11 resistance, 233 as rewards, 125 Ruscuklu Ali Ag˘a, 202 Saray (Bosnia), 57 soldiers, 98 taksit, 55 tax collection, 46 tax gatherers, 15 ulema (scholarly class), 166–7 Vecihi Pas
a, 143–4 Yenipazar, 129 Tepedelenli Ali Pas
a dismissed, 197 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 200 leadership, 238 power, 197 rebellions, 6 rebels, 184 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 196– 7 terminology ambiguity, 8 archival sources, 149 Balkans, 32 Bosniaks, 155 Bosnian people, 35 – 6 Islam, 176 Ottoman empire, 150 rebel leaders, 195 rebels, 150– 1, 236

408 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING theories, 5 – 19, 22 threats, 35, 139, 142–3, 166, 194 timar application, 22 Bosnia, 16, 193 collapse, 12 daire halki, 161 decline, 13 land ownership, 60 – 1 notables, 226 religion, 42 revenues, 68 – 9 rumours, 179 success, 15 yerlikulu janissaries, 66 timar system, 61, 68, 226, 233 timeline, 242– 4 Todori, Kalayci, 174, 188 Tomic´, J.E. Dragon of Bosnia, The (Zmaj od Bosne), 217 Tosks Albania, 329n256, 330n256 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 118 Res
id Mehmed Pas
a, 121 rewards, 124 soldiers, 120, 126 trade Bosnia, 35, 203– 4 janissaries, 11 networks, 224 Ottoman empire, 41 prohibition, 71 Saray (Bosnia), 55 – 6, 69, 70 transport network, 51 training, 89 – 90, 98, 145– 6, 229 transformation, 10 – 11, 14 transport network, 51, 88, 90 Travnik administration, 225 administrative centre, 56, 58 Akif Efendi, 136 Ali Namik Pas
a, 103– 4 Bey, Mehmed Arif, 82

capital city, 45, 55 central authorities, 162 council of ayan, 46 divan-i eyalet-i Bosna (city council), 47 executions, 190 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 84 Mustafa Pas
a, 80 Pirlepeli Ahmed Efendi, 97 protests, 229 punishments, 189 rebellions, 83, 158 rebels, 110 soldiers, 109 vali of Bosnia, 86 Treaty of Edirne (1829), 28, 104– 5, 107, 230 Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), 64, 69, 77, 224 tribal culture, 49, 79, 225, 228 troops, 97, 105, 108, 112, 161, 186 Turnaci Feyzullah, 163, 189 Tuzla-i Zıˆr, 49, 109, 128 ulema (scholarly class) abuses, 167 attitudes, 165– 8, 234 Bosnia, 225, 228 Cennetizade Emin Bey (mu¨tesellim of Saray), 173, 221 correspondence, 158 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 204 janissaries, 353n175 loyalty, 168 Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 201 punishments, 190 rebel leaders, 163, 174 rebellions, 168 rebels, 155, 156 resistance, 164 support, 235– 6 tax farmers, 14, 166– 7 threats, 166 uniforms, 181

INDEX uniforms, 100, 179, 180– 1, 230, 236 urbanization, 39, 40, 225, 228 Uredenje Bosanskog Ejaleta od, 1789 do, 1878. Godine (Administrative Organization of the Eyalet of Bosnia, 1789 to, 1878), 23 ¨ sku¨b, 110, 113, 114, 120, 125 U Uzunbas
og˘lu Ahmed Alemdar, 164 Vak`a-i Hayretnu¨ma, 21 vakifs, 40, 45, 225 vali of Bosnia Abdurrahim Pas
a, 88, 91 abolition of janissaries, 229 Ali Namik Pas
a, 102– 7 ayan, 12 changes, 4, 93, 137–40, 187, 230 coffee houses, 53 council of ayan, 46 Davud Pas
a, 130–3 defter (list), 122– 3 divan-i eyalet-i Bosna (city council), 118 esnaf (guilds), 70 flight, 110– 13 government officials, 181 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 108 –9, 113, 114– 17, 184, 209, 240– 1 I˙brahim Pas
a, 114 janissaries, 80 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 117– 22, 126, 193 mes
verets (councils of the notables), 134– 5 notables, 105– 6 pillaging, 106 post holders, 1826-1836, 245 properties, 220 protection, 231 rebellions, 79, 109 replaced, 229 Saray (Bosnia), 57 – 8, 97 Selim Sirri Pas
a, 80 under siege, 85

409

soldiers, 100 Su¨leyman Bey, 158, 160 support, 95, 189 Travnik, 55, 56 – 7 vacant post, 111 Vecihi Pas
a, 29, 133, 137–40, 143–6 Vidin Ali Namik Pas
a, 111 ceded to Serbia, 107 rebellions, 8 – 9 soldiers, 104, 110 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 196, 201 Vidinli Pasvanog˘lu Osman Pas
a, 6, 7, 195, 196– 7, 201, 238 Vis
egrad, 87, 97, 120, 132, 190, 203 Visoko event, 100– 2 Vlachs, 39, 40, 61 vocabulary, 148– 9, 151, 234 volunteers, 104 voyvodas, 63, 162 Vratnik faction, 90 – 1, 94 Vulc
etrin, 112, 117, 119, 120, 125, 128 wars, 64, 77, 98, 101, 230 wealth active supporters, 237 ayan, 12 Bosnia, 30, 168 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 29, 204, 206– 10, 220, 246– 69 I˙stolc
eli Ali Pas
a Ridvanbegovic, 198– 9 Mehmed Kapudan (kapudan of Krupe), 170–1 mu¨tesellims, 13 political authority, 14 relatives, 218– 21 Yaldiziciog˘lu I˙slatar Mustafa Ag˘a, 270– 85 wives, 215– 17 Yaldiziciog˘lu I˙slatar Mustafa Ag˘a Belgrade, 213– 14

410

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BOSNIAN UPRISING

confiscation, 218 exile, 171 properties confiscated, 270– 85 punishments, 188, 194 rebels, 120 second stage of the rebellion, 169 wives, 215 Yas
ar Pas
a (U¨sku¨p) Bakircizade I˙brahim Ag˘a, 163 central authorities, 128 Izvornik, 95 janissaries’ abolition, 87 rewards, 123, 125 suppression, 94 troops, 119 Yenipazar Ali Namik Pas
a, 103, 205 army, 110 Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers, 137 Davud Pas
a, 130 Haci Muˆyuˆ, 120 Hu¨seyin Kapudan, 113, 114 I˙brahim Kapudan, 191– 2 I˙brahim Pas
a, 114 I˙
skodrali Mustafa Pas
a, 122 Mahmud Hamdi Pas
a, 119 Mehmed Ag˘a, 83

Milosˇ, 129 Osman Pas
a, 80 rebellions, 86 rebels, 110 soldiers, 101 suppression, 94 yerlikulu janissaries abolition, 226 Asaˆkir-i Mansuˆre soldiers, 144 Bosnia, 16 establishment, 64 – 5 janissaries, 179 position, 65 – 6, 76 rebellions, 227 reduced numbers, 127 rewards, 95 salaries, 135 status, 230 Yusuf Ag˘a, 120, 189 zeamats, 61, 193, 226 Zemun, 212, 216 Zhelyazkova, A., 41, 42 Zibovic
, 173, 174 Zlatar Mustafa Ag˘a see Yaldiziciog˘lu I˙slatar Mustafa Ag˘a Zu¨lfikar Pas
a, 60, 88, 165, 171– 2