The Origins of International Counterterrorism : Switzerland at the Forefront of Crisis Negotiations, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Intelligence Cooperation (1969-1977) [1 ed.] 9789004356696, 9789004276642

Citation preview

The Origins of International Counterterrorism

New Perspectives on the Cold War Series Editors Jussi M. Hanhimäki (Graduate Institute Geneva) Marco Wyss (Lancaster University)

VOLUME 2

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/npcw

The Origins of International Counterterrorism Switzerland at the Forefront of Crisis Negotiations, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Intelligence Cooperation (1969–1977) By Aviva Guttmann

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: The picture was taken in Jordan in September 1970, during the later phase of the ­negotiations for the “Skyjack Sunday” hijacking. The picture shows Palestinian guerrillas, who patrol the streets of Amman in a heavily armed jeep during the civil war that broke out between the Jordanian army and various Palestinian forces. The Palestinians later called the events during the Jordanian civil war “Black September,” and the Palestinian terrorist splinter group “Black September Organisation” took this name with reference to the events in 1970. With attacks like Skyjack Sunday, the Palestinian armed struggle directed its violence against civilians of countries outside of the Middle East. Governments of Switzerland and other countries reacted to this gradually internationalising terrorist threat, which is the topic of the book. (Photo by Central Press/Getty Images, Editorial no. 3172075, Collection: Hulton Archive) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Guttmann, Aviva, author. Title: The origins of international counterterrorism : Switzerland at the forefront of crisis negotiations, multilateral diplomacy, and intelligence cooperation (1969–1977) / Aviva Guttmann. Description: Leiden, The Netherlands ; Boston : Brill, [2018] | Series: New perspectives on the Cold War, ISSN 2452-2260 ; Volume 2 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017041355 | ISBN 9789004276642 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Security, International–Switzerland–History–20th century. | Switzerland–Foreign relations. | Intelligence service–Switzerland–History–20th century. | Terrorism–Switzerland–Prevention–History–20th century. | Terrorism–Prevention–International cooperation. Classification: LCC JZ5595 .G88 2017 | DDC 363.325/160949409047–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017041355

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2452-2260 ISBN 978-90-04-27664-2 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-35669-6 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 From Bystander to Shaper of European Counterterrorism ­Cooperation 1 Method and Sources 6 Defining “Terrorism” 13 International Terrorism and the Global Cold War 16 State Security and the Culture of the Cold War in Switzerland 20

Part 1 Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship: Switzerland’s Response to Palestinian and Brazilian Terrorism 1 Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday 27 Meticulously Prepared Crisis Mismanagement 36 Swiss Policymakers’ Role during the Crisis ­Management 43 Summary of Swiss Reactions to Palestinian Terrorism 54 2 Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970–71) 57 After Zarqa, Now Rio 61 First Round in the “War of the Nerves”—Unmaking of Swiss Policy 66 Second Round in the “War of the Nerves”—Limited Options 71 The Protracted Last Phase of the Crisis 74 Controlling the Kidnapping’s Media Coverage 78 The Swiss Authorities’ Threat Evaluation after the “Bucher Crisis” 87 Summary of Swiss Reactions to Brazilian Terrorism 91 Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management 95

vi 

contents

Part 2 At the Forefront through the Backdoor: Switzerland’s Counterterrorism Diplomacy

The Working Group on Terrorism and its Context 103 The WGT: The Start of Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking 107

3 Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO: “An Elegant Way of ­Doing Nothing” 111 Preparations for Rome: Constructive ­Obstruction 114 The Limit of Enhancing Aviation ­Security Laws 117 4 Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN: A Fastidiously Balanced Position 121 Drafting of the Swiss Position at the UN 128 The Swiss Position at the UN 129 UN Counterterrorism Efforts Deadlocked 132 5 Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts “Making” Foreign Policy 135 The “Non-Beginning” of the ­Convention 138 The ECCP Accelerates the Process 141 New Terrorist Attacks, Renewed Counterterrorism Efforts 144 The Police against the Rest: Inner Swiss Negotiations 147 Revision, Fast-Track, and Finalisation of the ECST 150 France against the Rest: The CoE Negotiations 155 French Decision-Making: Worrying About the Third World 157 Reinsertion of the Political Offence Clause 161 ECST: Success or Dead Letter? 167 The WGT: An Overview 170 Conclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Multilateral Fora 173

Part 3 In Defiance of Neutrality: Switzerland’s Secret Counterterrorism Cooperation The Club de Berne 183

contents

vii

6 A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: Intelligence-Sharing within the Club de Berne (1971–1972) 193 Suspect Profiling: The Conspicuous Traveller 194 Political Activists as Terrorist Suspects 197 Tracing Terrorist Organisations 200 Terrorist Innovations in Weaponry and Tactics 207 Perpetrated Terrorist Attacks and the Lessons Learnt 210 Threat Assessments and Concrete Warnings 219 Summary of One Year of Kilowatt ­Cooperation 224 Conclusions of Part 3: A Glimpse into the Club de Berne in the 1980s 228 Conclusions 230 Crisis Management Shaping Swiss Counterterrorism Policy 230 Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in the 1970s 236 Swiss Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation 239 Research Avenues and Reflections 241 How and Why Countries Cooperated 242 No Democratic Oversight 244 Politics of the Latest Outrage 246 Swiss Neutrality and Relations with the Third World 247 Further Research in Terrorism Studies 248 Summary and Outlook 248 Bibliography 251 Appendixes 271 Appendix 1: PFLP Propaganda Material 271 Appendix 2: UN Resolution 3034, 18.12.1972 272 Appendix 3: European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27.01.1977 274 Index 281

Acknowledgements I would like to thank several people and institutions, who helped me enormously throughout the process of writing this book. First and foremost, I would like to express gratitude to Professors Brigitte Studer and Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl for their valuable feedback, helpful comments, and continuous support and encouragement. I also owe gratitude to Dr Javier Argomaniz, who provided me with a warm welcome in Saint Andrews at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV). This research stay was possible through the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), which generously awarded me a mobility grant and allowed me to have an enriching and academically stimulating experience in Scotland. I would also like to thank the Centre for Global Studies (CGS) at the University of Berne for granting me the Walter Benjamin scholarship and for allowing me to benefit from a dynamic and interdisciplinary research centre. I would also like to thank my current academic home, the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Bologna, for providing the ideal context to further my research in a lively and diverse research environment. Discussions with such brilliant scholars as Professor Raffaella Del Sarto were worth their weight in gold and helped me connect my research to current issues in international security cooperation. This fellowship was also made possible through a SNSF mobility grant, for which I am immensely grateful. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and my dear colleagues in the Police Programme. Coordinating projects on police reform, intelligence oversight, and security cooperation has given me practical policy experience, which has undoubtedly sharpened my analysis. Similarly, my stay in Nigeria with the Swiss Embassy gave me relevant insights into today’s foreign policy making. For these opportunities, I am grateful. Furthermore, of immeasurable importance for this monograph were the archivists at the Swiss Federal Archives. I am thankful for their friendly and professional help during my many stays in Berne. I am also very much indebted to my friend Lisa for her excellent, detailed-oriented, and thorough proofreading job. I am also very grateful for the anonymous peer reviewers’ expert and insightful comments that helped me improve the manuscript. Furthermore, Meredith McGroarty did a great job copy-editing parts of the manuscript. I would also

x Acknowledgements like to thank Professor Jussi Hanhimäki and Dr Marco Wyss, the editors of New Perspectives on the Cold War for including me in the series. A heartfelt thank you to the Brill team for organising the publication process so smoothly and efficiently, in particular Jason Prevost and Gerda Danielsson Coe. On a personal level, I have no words to express my gratitude to my parents. My mother read every single word of the manuscript and helped me refine my arguments. My dad also supported me all along the way with advice, knowledge, and affection. I would like to thank my good friends from Basel, Geneva, Paris, London, Abuja, Berne, St Andrews, New York, Bologna, and all around the world. Your encouragement has kept me on my path and you have made the years of researching enjoyable and fun. Last but not least I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my husband Nat, who makes me laugh every day and makes me happy. I could not have written this book without his love. Aviva Guttmann Bologna, 9 June 2017

Abbreviations AFP Agence France Press ALN Aliança Libertadora Nacional [National Liberation Alliance] BAR Bundesarchiv BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz BOAC British Overseas Airways Corporation BSO Black September Organisation BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheids Dienst CIA Central Intelligence Agency CoE Council of Europe CoM Committee of Ministers CoMD Committee of Ministers’ Deputies CSCE Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe CSSPP Comité Suisse de Soutien au Peuple Palestinien DDS Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland DST Direction de la surveillance du territoire EC European Community ECCP European Committee for Crime Problems ECST European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism EEC European Economic Community ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna EU European Union FDD Federal Defence Department FDJP Federal Department of Justice and Police FOCA Federal Office of Civil Aviation FPD Federal Political Department FRG Federal Republic of Germany GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters GDR German Democratic Republic GSG9 Border Protection Group 9 of the German Federal Police ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross, INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization IR International Relations IRA Irish Republican Army JRA Japanese Red Army KGB Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti [Committee for State Security] MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

xii 

abbreviations

MI5 Military Intelligence, Section 5 [UK domestic counter- intelligence] MI6 or SIS Military Intelligence, Section 6 [UK foreign counter- intelligence] or British Secret Intelligence Service NSA National Security Agency OAS Organisation of American States OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PET Politiets Efterretningstjeneste PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation RAF Red Army Faction RG Renseignements Généraux SGCI Secrétariat général du comité interministériel SISDE Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Democratice SISMI Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Militare SREL Service de Renseignement de l’Etat SSR Société suisse de radiodiffusion et télévision TREVI International Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence TWA Trans World Airlines UAR United Arab Republic UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization US United States VPR Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria [Popular Revolutionary Vanguard] WGT Working Group on Terrorism WHO World Health Organization

Introduction In 1969 and 1970 the Swiss government experienced some chaotic and challenging moments when four international terrorist attacks struck the Confederation during that short period. Previously, Switzerland had been spared from involvement in international conflicts. These events forced the Swiss government to address the issue of international terrorism. It needed to react on two levels: in the international diplomatic arena and in terms of national security and intelligence cooperation. These terrorist attacks and the subsequent counterterrorist efforts are the topic of this monograph. I analyse Switzerland’s response to international terrorism between 1969 and 1977 with a focus on the Swiss government’s immediate reactions to specific attacks as well as the development of a longer-term counterterrorism strategy and policy. With an actor-centred political history approach, I use previously unknown archival records in order to shed light on different levels of Swiss counterterrorism cooperation. The overall aim is to better understand the underlying motives and interests of the Swiss counterterrorism engagement against the backdrop of Cold War power dynamics. The book covers the evolution of Swiss counterterrorism policies from the first post-war terrorist incident on Swiss soil in 1969 up to 1977, the year 1977 marks the end point of the monograph because that is when the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) was signed by Switzerland at the Council of Europe (CoE). The ECST represented an important shift in the pan-European approach to terrorism as it was the first regional counterterrorism convention. It thus showed a united Western Europe in the fight against international terrorism. From Bystander to Shaper of European Counterterrorism Cooperation The terrorist attacks of 1969 and 1970 primarily challenged Switzerland’s sense of security. In order to reassert Switzerland’s position and be part of international efforts to counter and prevent terrorism, Swiss policymakers engaged in various multilateral fora for counterterrorism cooperation. With their active engagement in international organisations, Swiss decision makers also strengthened the country’s intelligence-sharing network with Western Cold War powers. I investigate how, as Swiss policymakers became more sensitive to a perceived threat of transnational terrorism, they positioned Switzerland at the forefront of secret intelligence exchanges on terrorism.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_002

2

Introduction

The overall argument of this book is that the Swiss government’s policy went from unconcerned passivity in the late 1960s to a well-informed counterterrorism diplomacy and a highly active and dynamic intelligence-sharing network. This development towards an increasingly consistent and coherent counterterrorism policy is analysed in terms of the Swiss foreign policy of neutrality and within the Global Cold War context. More precisely, I argue that at the diplomatic level, counterterrorism efforts were strictly kept within the boundaries of traditional Swiss policy lines: Berne actively took part in international efforts to contain the threat, yet shied away from condemning terrorism too vocally. In doing so, the Swiss government managed to place Switzerland at the heart of international counterterrorist cooperation while aiming to keep its efforts unnoticed by the “Third World”1 in order not to raise the ire of terrorist supporting countries or of terrorists themselves. This book shows that in the framework of the three multilateral fora that dealt with terrorism at the time—the United Nations (UN), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), and the CoE—the Swiss government led a balanced and careful foreign policy in matters of international cooperation to contain terrorism. In contrast, in the framework of a secret counterterrorism intelligencesharing network called Club de Berne—co-initiated in 1969 by Switzerland and named after its capital—the question of neutrality needs to be discussed. The Club de Berne was an informal forum of nine Western intelligence services established in 1969 in order to discuss issues of common concern. Linked to the Club de Berne was a secret counterterrorism alerting system called Kilowatt. This intelligence cooperation framework was operational since 1971 and included also countries outside of the Club de Berne such as Israel and the United States (US).2 1 The term “Third World” was used at the time by both Southern anticolonial movements and Western elites as a way to describe former colonial or semicolonial states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The concept “Third World” was first used in the 1950s and gained importance after the first meeting of the Non-Aligned-Movement in Bandung in 1955. Its meaning was twofold, on the one hand, based on its original French term tiers état—the “third estate”—it described the formerly oppressed people on a global scale, who were shaking off the colonial yoke and who were gaining worldwide political influence. On the other hand, it insinuated a “Third Way” in the Cold War bipolar system, refusing political, economic, or ideological allegiance to either of the two Great Powers. In this monograph, I use the term in accordance with its meaning during the Cold War and base my interpretation on Odd Arne Westad’s definition, cf. Odd Arne Westad. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 2. 2 See the third part of the book for a detailed account of its origins and actions.

Introduction

3

According to international neutrality law, as defined in the 1907 Hague Conventions, a neutral state must accept a certain number of constraints with regard to the belligerents. Most importantly, a neutral country must treat all belligerents equally, refuse the provision of troops or operational bases, and deny transit access through its territory.3 The equal treatment of all parties of the conflict is called the principle of universality and is a core element in the politics of neutrality. Switzerland was further bound by its self-inflicted adherence to “permanent neutrality.”4 This means that neutrality policy must also be applied during peacetime in order not to jeopardise the practicability of neutrality policy in wartime.5 The problem regarding the Club de Berne, as will be shown in this monograph, stems from the fact that through this network, Switzerland chose to cooperate solely with Western Cold War powers, namely the United States and Western European states, and supported only one side in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict by granting Israel strong support in its fight against Palestinian resistance. Two aspects are of major concern in this respect. First, in the context of the Global Cold War, terrorism was used as a means of indirect warfare. Some terrorist groups enjoyed the secret support of the Soviet Union and of recently decolonised states, which used terrorists as proxies to further their own goals.6 For instance, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had close links to the Soviet Union’s secret service, which provided the group’s leaders with weapons and facilitated the perpetration of terrorist attacks.7 Hence, by 3 Alois Riklin, “Neutralität. Verfestigung der Neutralität,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 09.11.2010, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/ D16572.php. 4 Alois Riklin, “Die Neutralität der Schweiz,” in: Alois Riklin, Hans Haug, and Raymond Probst (eds.). Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Berne: Haupt, 1992, p. 194. Cf. also Dietrich Schindler, “Die Schweiz und das Völkerrecht,” in: Riklin, Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, p. 104. 5 For a discussion of permanent neutrality as opposed to general conceptions of neutrality, see also Jürg Martin Gabriel. Sackgasse Neutralität. Zurich: ETH Hochschulverlag AG, 1997, pp. 18–27. 6 For a systematic analysis of support given by states to terrorist organisations, see Daniel Byman. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. His fifth chapter traces the support network of Middle Eastener terrorist groups during and after the Cold War, pp. 117–153. 7 The Palestinian-Soviet cooperation was later confirmed by the so-called “Mitrokhin archives,” where the relations between the KGB and PFLP leadership was outlined in details. See Christopher Maurice Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. New York: Basic Books, 2005. In particular chapter 13 recounts the KGB relations with PFLP leaders.

4

Introduction

exclusively providing Israel and the West with relevant information about terrorism, the Swiss government secretly provided a strategic advantage to one side of the Global Cold War and to one side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arguably, this is a breach of the principle of universality. Second, Swiss participation in the Club de Berne is problematic when considering that this close cooperation with the West meant not only a onesided approach but also the de facto integration of Switzerland into the Western Cold War security framework. This, in turn, negatively affected the credibility of Swiss neutrality. In order to maintain its credibility, a neutral state is not supposed to undertake any action in peacetime which could undermine its conduct in wartime.8 This means that a neutral state has to be entirely independent from any influence so that it can convincingly argue that in case of an attack or an outbreak of war, it will not take any side. However, through this secret “counterterrorism alliance” the Swiss government made itself dependent of these states and the security they provided. Thus, through its participation in the Club de Berne, the Swiss government was entangled with the Western powers, which made it difficult for it to uphold its position of neutrality in the case of a war. With these considerations in mind, I argue that this full integration into the security exchange system of Western Europe, America, and Israel, meant that the Swiss government gave up its independence and undermined the country’s credibility as a permanent neutral state. This security cooperation was of course born out of necessity, since the Swiss government realised it could not fight terrorism on its own. Hence, from the above it becomes clear that the need to protect the country from further terrorist attacks led the Swiss government to seek international security cooperation. The decision being inevitable, it chose what Swiss policymakers perceived as Switzerland’s best long-term security interest: close cooperation with the Western bloc and with Israel. Furthermore, one has to take into consideration two core aspects of neutrality policy. First, neutrality is generally conceived as a means to serve the country’s national interest and not as a goal in itself.9 Second, the idea of “neutrality” 8 Harto Hakovirta. East-West Conflict and European Neutrality. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 26–30. For an analysis of the relation between neutrality and credibility, see also Lisa Bender. Neutralität als Mittel der Sicherheitsgewährleistung. Über die Herausforderung, Andere von der eigenen Friedfertigkeit zu überzeugen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014, pp. 123. 9 In the Swiss Constitution, for instance, the policy of neutrality is only marginally mentioned. The foreign political duties are specified in art. 85, no. 6 and in art. 102, no. 9

Introduction

5

is a profoundly state-based international concept and is illsuited in a confrontation with non-state political actors. Taking these two aspects also into account, the overall argumentation is that since the Swiss authorities found it most beneficial to cooperate with the Western bloc and since the Club de Berne framework guaranteed absolute secrecy even about the existence of this network, the Swiss government kept a “neutral” face on the official diplomatic level and disregarded considerations of neutrality on the secret level. This book is, however, not only a story of Swiss policymaking, it is also an account of the formation of an international counterterrorism cooperation framework. In this respect, in view of the Club de Berne as an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism involving secret information, one can ask about a country’s incentives to share such information with others. Given the highly secret nature of intelligence, the often precarious and sensitive situation of informants who need protection, and the delicacy of the gathered information, it would in fact seem rather unlikely that countries would cooperate on this issue. Traditional statist practice has been to protect intelligence, not share it.10 Guaranteeing the security of its citizens is a core governmental area and a sign of its ultimate sovereignty. In this context, intelligence is the quintessential national product.11 However, this state tendency to hide and monopolise intelligence is confronted by the need to cooperate in matters of terrorism in order to effectively counter the threat. Simply put, one country cannot fight transnationally operating organised groups by itself and is thus forced to give up parts of its authority over security, and in doing so, give up parts of its sovereignty.12 Hence, out of necessity, countries are willing to participate in intelligence cooperation in order to counter terrorism. Besides the necessity argument, one can also think of other reasons for counterterrorism collaboration. One incentive for cooperation consists of a mutually beneficial arrangement. An example of such cooperation was the US-UK partnership. Historian Richard Aldrich classified the US-UK intelligence-sharing



under “Assertion of Switzerland’s Independence and Neutrality” [German orig. “Behauptung der Unabhängigkeit und Neutralität der Schweiz”]. 10 Derek S. Reveron, “Beyond the State? The impact of transnational terrorist threats on security cooperation,” in: Ersel Aydinli (ed.). Emerging Transnational (in)Security Governance: A Statist-Transnationalist Approach. London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 23–43, p. 25. 11 Ibid. 12 For a theoretical explanation of this contradiction in state behaviour (the state requirement to keep the monopoly of force faced with the need to give up part of its autonomy in light of security cooperation) see the introduction in Jörg Friedrichs. Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Police Cooperation. London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 1–18.

6

Introduction

relationship as “realism, not romanticism,” which operated in terms of “terrain for technology.”13 In the 1970s, the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States was technologically more advanced in code-breaking than their British counterpart but it needed outposts where they could place their listening stations. The United States used British stations in the areas of former British colonies and provided the British with access to US technology. In the case of the Club de Berne, as will be shown, the necessity and partnership arguments are both relevant. A major incentive for the participating countries was the fact that some countries, such as Israel, had more familiariry with Palestinian terrorist groups. Having agents with the required language skills and the capacity to infiltrate terrorist networks, Israel proved to be an important and invaluable partner in the fight against terrorism. For Israel, in return, it was important to ensure the cooperation with the European governments in order to monitor and counter the Palestinian terrorist activities and destroy their supporting network in Europe. In this vein, the book will show that in the 1970s the necessity for cooperation created a cross-country inter-dependency in which the different governments had no alternative but to trust one another and share a great deal of sensitive information on a relatively large scale. Method and Sources Historiographically, this book is innovative on three levels. First, it is the first study to examine how Swiss foreign policy positioned the country within the international struggle against terrorism. Second, it is also the first study to address the question of Swiss neutrality in relation to international terrorism. Third, it breaks new ground by examining the Club de Berne and thus offers important insights about Switzerland’s integration into the Western security system during the Cold War. Hence, this monograph contributes to a yet fully unknown aspect in the history of Swiss, Western European, and transatlantic security cooperation. Literature on the Swiss government’s reactions to terrorism and its involvement in international efforts to contain the threat is largely absent. There are two reasons worth mentioning that can explain this gap in the literature. The first one relates to the availability and accessibility of this period’s primary source documents. Archival records for the 1970s have only recently been

13

Richard J. Aldrich. GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency. London: HarperPress, 2010, p. 7.

Introduction

7

declassified and are therefore still in the process of being integrated into Swiss historiography.14 The second reason can be connected to the fact that the historiography of Swiss foreign policy often focused on areas which can be characterised as general Swiss foreign policy lines, of which the foreign political aspects of terrorism have not been included.15 Since the 1990s, research about Switzerland’s foreign policy and its role during the Cold War has gradually attracted greater interest from all disciplines and culminated today in a dynamic and varied research field, with topics not only looking at foreign policy but also at how the international context shaped Swiss society.16 With the panoply of historical approaches, the richness

14

15

16



The project Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS) is worth mentioning in this respect. The DDS publishes selected primary source documents from the Swiss Foreign Office, which are accessible online and in printed source compilations. For the topic of this book, the DDS volume 01.01.1971–31.12.1972 is most relevant. See Sacha Zala (senior researcher), Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland, vol. 25, 1.1.1970–31.12.1972, Bern, 2013. DDS’s online database is called Dodis, online accessible: http://www.dodis.ch. For Dodis’ source collection with documents pertaining to “terrorism,” see: dodis.ch/T1101. Summarising the post-1945 period up until the mid-1990s, Swiss historiography has mainly centred on international trade and finance, neutrality and security policy (security from an intra-state war), European integration, specific bilateral and multilateral relations, and development assistance. This is observable in Georg Kreis’ overview of the state of research up until 1992, cf. Georg Kreis, “Geschichte der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik 1948–1991,” in: Riklin, Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, p. 28. See also Sacha Zala, “Publications sur les relations internationales de la Suisse parues depuis la fin de la Guerre froide,” Relations Internationales, no. 113, Spring 2003, pp. 115–133. This monograph builds on existing literature in this field, in particular publications that cover Switzerland’s security policy, neutrality policy, and Swiss efforts in multilateral fora. For a recent publication about Swiss and other countries’ neutral stand in the Cold War, see Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (eds.). Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2016. For a summary of the main function of Swiss neutrality and its role during the Cold War, see Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexandre H. Trechsel. The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 23. For historical works that specifically challenge this view of a specific function of neutrality accoss time periods, see Andre Holenstein. Mitten in Europa Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer Geschichte. Baden: hier + jetzt, 2014; and Jakob Tanner. Europaische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert/Geschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert. Munich: Beck, 2015.  For a publication on Swiss foreign relations during the Cold War from various perspectives, see the edited volume by Sandra Bott, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Sacha Zala (eds.). Die internationale Schweiz in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges, Basel: Schwabe, 2010.

8

Introduction

of available source material, and mounting academic interest, this is certainly a highly promising field. With this book, I hope to contribute to the further development of this area. Until recently, Swiss security policy during the Cold War has widely been presented as a policy of “autonomous national defence.”17 While it is known that the country’s capitalist economy and its elites’ anti-communist ideological orientation placed it in the Western bloc, its security policy is said to have been a “complete solo effort” on a “strict autarchy course.”18 Only relatively recently has this view been challenged by historians.19 With the analysis of Switzerland’s management of terrorist crises and its involvement in the Club de Berne security umbrella, this monograph further aligns with those that challenge the conception of the country as having been “independent” or “neutral” during the Cold War.

17

18

19

There are publications about Swiss involvement in international organisations, many focus on the Swiss government’s contribution to the Helsinki Process 1975, see for instance Philip Rosin. Die Schweiz im KSZE-Prozess 1972–1983: Einfluss durch Neutralitat. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014. Publications about the relationship between Switzerland and the UN centre on the question of why for such a long time neutrality was seen as incompatible with the UN system, see for instance Thomas Brückner, “Das Verhältnis der Schweiz zur UNO. Gedanken zu einer Beziehungsgeschichte,” Traverse, vol. 21, 2014, pp. 124–13. For Switzerland’s contribution at the CoE, see Bernhard Altermatt and Gilbert Casasus (eds.). 50 Jahre Engagement der Schweiz im Europarat 1963–2013: die Schweiz als Akteur oder Zaungast der europaischen Integration? Zurich: Ruegger, 2013. Based on an understanding of ‘security’ in purely military terms, a reference study concludes that Switzerland was not cooperating with anyone, but rather isolated itself during the Cold War. In their view, only in the 1990s did the government begin to shift its orientation towards international cooperation, Kurt Spillmann, Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser, Marcel Gerber. Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945. Zwischen Autonomie und Kooperation, Zurich: Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2001. Karl W. Haltiner, “Vom schmerzlichen Verlieren alter Feindbilder—Bedrohungs- und Risikoanalysen in der Schweiz,” in: Thomas Jager and Ralph Thiele. Transformation der Sicherheitspolitik Deutschland, Ö sterreich, Schweiz im Vergleich. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2011, p. 44. Marco Wyss, for instance, argues that the Swiss government undermined the country’s neutrality because it only purchased weapons from the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, which created a dependency on these countries. Therefore, the Swiss government could not remain detached from a possible future conflict and thus undermined its status as a permanently neutral state. Wyss’ reasoning connects to this article’s argument about Switzerland’s participation in the Club de Berne. Due to its intense cooperation with Western powers in matters of terrorism, it too made itself dependent on the security they provided. Marco Wyss. Arms Transfers, Neutrality and Britain’s Role in the Cold War: Anglo-Swiss Relations 1945–1958, History of Warfare, vol. 79, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013.

Introduction

9

Current historiography further assumes that Israel scarcely relied on counterterrorism cooperation to address the Palestinian threat and ‘throughout its history, has followed a determined and often draconian policy of self-help.’20 However, through the sources regarding the Club de Berne, this book shows that this assumption needs to be revised as Israel, on the contrary, very much relied on its European partners and upon their help in tracing terrorist networks and suspects. In the field of intelligence studies, the practice of cooperation among intelligence agencies still remains an extremely sensitive and opaque area of international relations and governance. On the one hand, agencies want to cultivate relationships with their counterparts in like-minded countries and, on the other hand, close cooperation also creates a degree of dependency which can increase vulnerability and thus require high levels of secrecy. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are hardly any works on the history of intelligence cooperation using archival records.21 This research gap is in stark contrast to the generally agreed-upon importance of intelligence in the realm of international relations. In this vein, in terms of relevance of this research, this book represents the very first study to present a historical account of the Club de Berne, which until today remained almost as secret as the intelligence files themselves.22 Furthermore, these findings also allow for broader theoretical reflection on counterterrorism cooperation.

20 21

22

Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London: Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2006, p. 168. A few historical case studies exist dealing with specific bilateral intelligence cooperation during moments of crisis, such as the interesting case of Franco-German cooperation during the Algerian war, Mathilde von Bülow, “Franco-German Intelligence Cooperation and the Internationalization of Algeria’s War of Independence (1954–62),” Intelligence and National Security, 2013, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 397–419. Another interesting case using recently declassified sources is cooperation among some Western countries—the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada—during the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, Don Munton and Miriam Matejova, “Spies without Borders? Western Intelligence Liaison, the Tehran Hostage Affair and Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” Intelligence and National Security, 2012, vol. 27, no.5, pp. 739–760. For current regional counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms with a particular focus on European Union security ties see Javier Argomaniz, Oldrich Bures, and Christian Kaunert (eds.), EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment, London: Routledge, 2016. One of the few researchers who mention the Club de Berne is historian Neville Wylie, cf. Neville Wylie, “‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland, neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison,” Intelligence and National Security, 2006. vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 782–808, p. 794.

10

Introduction

Within historical scholarship, this study is situated in International History.23 Accordingly, based on multi-archival research I use an actor-centred political history approach in order to analyse the underlying interests of Swiss counterterrorism efforts against the backdrop of the Cold War and the international security system. By using recently declassified documents, I recount the yet untold history of Swiss foreign security policy in the 1970s in order to uncover its continuities, ruptures, and peculiarities and to provide a better understanding of its structural elements. Since the secondary literature on the topic of this book is almost entirely absent or outdated, I rely heavily on archival material. The types of sources that I use can be categorised as government administrative documents, which were produced by mid-level officials. Except for the first two chapters where I consult the Swiss Federal Council’s crisis meeting minutes, the source material mostly consists of diplomatic cables, internal foreign policy papers, memoranda, Swiss and other countries’ threat estimation reports, and the meeting minutes of the so-called “Working Group on Terrorism,” the internal Swiss Foreign Service organ that was tasked by the Federal Council to advise and shape Swiss foreign policy regarding terrorism. These meeting minutes and internal discussion-papers were found in the Swiss Foreign and Interior Ministries in the Federal Archives of Switzerland [Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, BAR] in Berne. Besides the BAR, whenever possible archives outside of Switzerland have also been considered. This includes the online accessible CoE Archive in Strasbourg and the ICAO Archive in Montreal. For the decision-making in the context of the ECST negotiations, the French foreign policy archives in La Courneuve (near Paris) were of particular interest. For the account of the Swiss confrontation with Palestinian terrorism, the US National Security Archive and the British National Archives were also consulted. These institutional records allow for the retracing of different aspects of Swiss policymaking and, by the same token, present and explain the security concerns that were behind these international efforts. By doing so, it addresses important policy aspects, that allow to draw conclusions for today’s considerations. Namely, it elucidates the policy dilemmas that the Swiss government faced thirty to forty years ago and what it meant for a modern, rich, democratic, and “neutral” state to handle this challenge. For instance, in 1971 the

23

For a definition of international history as a subject and a practical research guide, see Marc Trachtenberg. The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Introduction

11

Swiss government chose not to be neutral when faced with terrorism. One can therefore ask whether neutrality still makes sense in a world of a “Global War on Terror.” Switzerland encountered international terrorism in 1969 with the first attack on Swiss soil. Similarly constructed threats have remained topical in policymaking circles to this day and counterterrorism remains an important component of Swiss security policy.24 This raises the questions of if and how counterterrorism was or can be done without infringing the democratic rights of its citizens. By looking at Swiss counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the past, the book’s findings help to respond to these questions. Furthermore, the monograph goes beyond the Swiss dimension as it reconstructs the establishment of the country’s cooperation with European and other states. This helps to understand counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms. On the one hand, the concerns were clearly embedded in Cold War rhetoric but, on the other hand, they were very similar to the terrorist challenges that states face today. This research thus contributes to identifying today’s difficulties for international counterterrorism cooperation and can provide insights in counterterrorism studies more generally. This book is therefore not only useful for Cold War historians, Europeanists, and scholars in terrorism or counterterrorism studies, but it should also interest policymakers and other observers closely following current events. In assessing Swiss counterterrorism measures in the early 1970s, three main themes are of importance. First, how the Swiss government was forced to become involved in international terrorism due to attacks on Swiss soil or citizens. Second, the subsequent engagement of Switzerland in international counterterrorism diplomatic efforts. Third, the country’s active engagement in a secret intelligence exchange mechanism. These are the book’s three main parts. The first part analyses Switzerland’s first encounter with international terrorism, specifically when Switzerland faced Palestinian terrorism (1969–70) and Latin American terrorism (1970–1971). The first terrorist attack on Swiss soil was committed by the PFLP in February 1969. The book’s opening chapter recounts the details of this attack and looks at the Swiss government’s diplomatic efforts to handle this challenge to its security. Based on recently 24

For instance, in its security policy report of November 2015, the Federal Council specifically identified Islamic terrorism as a threat for Switzerland’s security, Swiss Federal Council, Bericht des Bundesrates über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz, draft as of 26.10. 2015, the report was published on 11.11.2015, accessible online: http://www.news .admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/41701.pdf

12

Introduction

declassified primary sources from the BAR, the US National Security Archive, and the British National Archives, this chapter then reconstructs Swiss crisis management during the world’s largest hijacking on “Skyjack Sunday,”25 in September 1970. It examines why the Swiss government took a leading role in the concerted international efforts of five countries to negotiate a resolution and to what extent this meant an alignment with the Western side of the Global Cold War. After these events, Swiss government officials were confronted with Latin American terrorists who tried to put pressure on the Brazilian government. This will be covered in chapter II. Of particular interest is that when Ambassador Giovanni Enrico Bucher was abducted by Brazilian rebels in 1970–71, Swiss officials tried to keep these affairs and negotiations entirely secret. The chapter investigates why Swiss government officials complied with the demands of the Brazilian authorities and, at times, even exercised media censorship in Switzerland. This chapter is also based on primary sources from the BAR. The account of these terrorist attacks by two different terrorist groups will allow a comparison of the administration’s crisis management. As will become apparent, a characteristic of both cases was the Swiss government’s readiness to comply with terrorist demands due to a perceived helplessness and powerlessness. After these confrontations with international terrorism at home and abroad, Swiss policymakers thus realised the country’s vulnerability to international terrorism. In order to avoid the risk of falling prey to further attacks, the Swiss government decided to embark on an active engagement in international counterterrorism efforts. Each of the following main parts treat a different level of this counterterrorism policy, starting with the official level of multilateral efforts to combat terrorism in international organisations (part II) and the secret level of international intelligence exchanges (part III). The second part focuses on the official Swiss positions regarding terrorism in the three most important international counterterrorism fora: ICAO, the UN, and the CoE; each treated in chapters III-v. It will be shown that the UN negotiations for a counterterrorism convention could not proceed due to resistance from Third World countries, which refused to agree on a definition of “terrorism.” Once it became clear that the UN approach had failed, the CoE took up the matter and began to prepare a solely European convention to contain terrorism. This process led to the formulation of the ECST, which opened for 25

For referencing this incident as “Skyjack Sunday” in the literaure, cf. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (eds.). Encyclopedia of World Terrorism. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1997, p. 689.

Introduction

13

signature in 1977. It will become clear that the European approach was more successful because without the Third World as a power bloc, it could avoid the debate about whether perpetrators were “ordinary criminals” or “freedom fighters.” Yet, precisely the image of Europe in the eyes of the Third World almost prevented one member, France, from agreeing to the convention’s adoption. This almost meant the failure of the ECTS. The role and contribution of the Swiss government is analysed from a policy formation perspective in which the transformation of Swiss foreign policy is highlighted in particular. The third part focuses on the Club de Berne, the above-mentioned intelligence gathering and sharing network among nine Western European countries to which the United States, Israel, Canada, and Australia were also linked. The third part of the book highlights the importance of this network for the Swiss government and its involvement in it. It takes a closer look at the first year of this counterterrorism cooperation, from October 1971 to December 1972, which will be covered in chapter VI. The chapter examines why the various governments managed to establish trust in one another in a very short amount of time. It will further raise questions about Swiss security services’ complete integration in this security framework. This third part is almost exclusively based on highly sensitive primary source documents to which I have received personal access. Defining “Terrorism” “Terrorism” comes from the two Latin expressions terrere, which means “to make tremble” and deterrere, which means “to scare off or deter from.” In line with terrorism as a tactic of political violence, one can thus describe the essence of terrorism as aiming to break an adversary’s will by inflicting fear. In the literature, two forms of this tactic are distinguished, one that is exercised by states, which is commonly referred to as terror, and one that is effected by non-state actors, which is called terrorism.26 Terror or terrorism is commonly understood as the earliest form of psychological warfare because it targets a wider audience than the immediate victims.27 This tactic was succinctly 26

27

Charles Townshend. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 5. See also the article by Charles Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory, 2004, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 5–13. Paul Wilkinson, “Liberal State Responses to Terrorism and Their Limits,” in: Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller (eds.). Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge. Portland OR: Hart, 2008, pp. 71–92, p. 72.

14

Introduction

described by the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun-Tzu: “kill one, frighten ten thousand.”28 An important characteristic of terrorism as psychological warfare is that its violence is indiscriminate, symbolic, and often directed against civilians in order to inflict widespread fear among a society. This aspect of terrorism was described by the theoretician and political thinker Raymond Aron as follows: An action of violence is labelled “terrorist” when its psychological effects are out of all proportion to its purely physical result. […] The lack of discrimination helps to spread fear, for if no one in particular is a target, no one can be safe.29 Yet, the term “terrorism,” as International Relations scholar Adam Roberts says, is “confusing, dangerous and indispensable,” similar to other abstract political terms. It is confusing, he believes, because it means something very different to different people and because the term’s meaning has changed a lot over the course of time. Roberts considers the term as dangerous because it can be misused as an instrument of propaganda and a means of diverting attention from the causes of political violence. However, Roberts argues that despite the difficulties with it, the term is indispensable because there is a phenomenon commonly referred to as “terrorism” that exists and poses a threat to many societies.30 These problems inherent in the term “terrorism” might explain why it has been so very difficult, if not impossible, to find a common definition of terrorism.31 Political as well as academic attempts have failed on the issue of definition.32 Academics agree that until present day there exists no agreement on how to define terrorism.33 Some authors, such as Bruce Hoffman and David Rapoport, believe that the reason for this difficulty lies in the fact that the meaning of 28 29 30 31 32 33

Sun-Tzu, “The Art of Warfare,” in: Sun-Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The Book of War. New York: Modern Library, 2000. Raymond Aron. Peace and War; A Theory of International Relations. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966, p. 170. Adam Roberts, “Countering Terrorism: A Historical Perspective,” in: Bianchi and Keller, Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge, pp. 3–42, p. 5. Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 33; and Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction, p. 3. Harvey W. Kushner, “Introduction,” in: Harvey W. Kushner. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2003. p. XXIII. Alex P. Schmid, “Definition of Terrorism,” in: Alex P. Schmid (ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 39–157.

Introduction

15

“terrorism” has changed frequently over the last few centuries.34 Furthermore, the difficulty with defining terrorism is that it is “labelling.”35 In other words, “terrorist” is a designation that has hardly ever been adopted by choice by an individual or a group, it is rather applied by one group in order to delegitimise the other.36 In short, trying to define the term to the satisfaction of everyone is an unrealisable task. Given that it has thus far been impossible to find a conclusive definition of terrorism, in this monograph I deliberately leave the term in its original context. Furthermore, because this book’s focus is not on terrorism itself, but rather on the state response to what it defined as terrorism, I use the term in accordance with what the policymakers at the time meant by it. In the framework of the Club de Berne, a terrorism threat assessment was produced which provided an overview of the “international terrorist scene” in 1978. In the introduction, “politically motivated terrorism” was defined to determine a common understanding of the threat among the different countries. Since it was a product of the Club de Berne and since this report was later shared internally in Switzerland among high-ranking police officers, the definition in the report can be considered as representative of the way policymakers thought about terrorism at the time.37 The report defined terrorism as an “act of violence with the purpose of furthering a political goal”38 and classified the following acts as terrorism: of people, murder or injury generally through a bullet or • “Kidnapping a bomb (including bombs with delay charges such as that used in letter bombs); Destruction of high-priority targets such as government buildings, diplomatic representations, police stations, public institutions, vehicles, ships, and airplanes;

•

34 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 3 and David Rapoport, “Terrorism,” in: Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics. London: Routledge, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 1061–1082. 35 Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction, p. 3 36 Ibid. 37 Letter from Amstein, “An die Herren Polizeikommandanten der deutschen Schweiz. Vertaulich,” Berne, 11.12.1978, in: CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978–1989. Amstein sent the report to selected heads of police in Switzerland. 38 Club de Berne threat assessment report, “Bericht über die Bedrohung der neun Länder des Klubs von Bern durch den politisch motivierten Terrorismus. Vertraulich,” [no place mentioned], September 1978, p. 1, in: CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978–1989.

16

Introduction

of airplanes and ships, as well as hostage taking in order to • Hijacking exchange imprisoned terrorists or in order to extort a ransom; robbery in order to obtain weapons, money, and supply goods; • Violent Sabotage of civil/public institutions (such as defence structures, • power plants, fuel storage, water reservoir, telecommunication infrastructure).”39

The report acknowledged that there might be specificities among various terrorist groups, but it identified the goal of terrorism as follows: raise national or international awareness for a group’s existence or • “To cause through the use of violence; frighten the public in order to force them to support the terrorists’ • Tocause; or discredit the state authorities which are opposed to • Totheundermine terrorists’ cause; repressive counter-measures, • ToTo trigger annihilate the terrorists’ enemies.” • 40

The above quotes have shown how the term “terrorism” was understood within the context of the 1970s from the perspective of the Swiss and the other Club de Berne governments. In this monograph, I use this term accordingly. International Terrorism and the Global Cold War According to Bruce Hoffman, a leading scholar in terrorism research, the first international terrorist attack happened on 22 July 1968. That day, three PFLP members hijacked an El Al plane en route from London to Tel Aviv Lod Airport and flew it to Algiers. This was in fact the first and only successful hijacking of an El Al plane.41 The non-Israeli passengers were released the following day, keeping seven crew members and five Israeli male passengers as hostage for five weeks. After 39 days of negotiation, the Israeli government consented to free 16 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 David B. Green, “This Day in Jewish History. The First and Only El Al Hijacking. The 39-day ordeal heralded the rise of political terror in the air,” Haaretz, 23.07.2013, online accessible: http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/this-day-in-jewish-history/ .premium-1.537402

Introduction

17

In Hoffman’s view, three core aspects distinguish this event from previous attacks, qualifying it as the beginning of modern international terrorism. First, as opposed to previous hijackings, such as the ones in Cuba for instance, this plane was not simply diverted to change the course of the flight but the hijacking represented a political statement. The plane was hijacked in order to free fellow PFLP group members from Israeli prisons. Second, this plane was specifically chosen as a target because the Israeli airline company represented a national symbol of the Israeli state. Third, because the Israeli government could not ignore nor reject the terrorists’ demands, it was forced into negotiations with them and provided their organisation, the PFLP, a certain degree of recognition.42 This initial attack marked the beginning of a large scale internationalisation of terrorist attacks, with the particular characteristic of involving innocent citizens from countries that were foreign to the conflict. This massive increase and the implication of regular passengers proved to be an effective means for terrorists to attract attention to their cause. In this respect, two technological developments can be identified as catalysts for the internationalisation of terrorism. First, air travel became faster due to the introduction of jetliners for commercial use. The air tourism industry was thus growing and the number of passengers increased steadily. Furthermore, airlines openly published the flight schedules, which not only was convenient for the passengers but it also allowed terrorists to better plan their attacks.43 Second, thanks to the satellite transmission of television pictures, media broadcasting became a widespread phenomenon. It was now possible for terrorists to reach out to a large audience, which followed events immediately as they happened on the other side of the world.44 Besides the technological developments, a number of other factors contributed to the rise of international terrorism in the 1970s. For left-wing terrorism, one can identify two main historic reasons that fostered this kind of terrorist violence. First, the successes in Africa and Asia of former colonies in achieving independence from their former rulers infused a general sense of optimism and a feeling that “anything” was possible.45 Vietnam and Algeria were seen as “models” for anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic struggles.46 In this Cold War setting, the Soviet Union and China further promoted the idea of Marxism as a means to fight imperialism and the social injustices experienced by the 42 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 64. 43 Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank. What Is Terrorism? New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2006, p. 60. 44 Ibid. 45 Randall David Law. Terrorism: A History. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, pp. 254. 46 Ibid.

18

Introduction

recently decolonised countries. Second, during that time a number of theoreticians turned to a Marxist interpretation of international economic politics and these ideas were taught at universities in the United States and Europe.47 This led to another element that characterises terrorism in the 1970s: the armed struggle became part of the Global Cold War. This dimension of international terrorism became most apparent when in the early 1970s the number and brutality of terrorist attacks drastically increased all over the world, especially involving Western targets.48 Terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF), Irish Republican Army (IRA), or the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) specifically selected Western countries and attacked them as symbols of the capitalist system that they were trying to fight. These groups saw themselves as spearheading a global anti-imperial and anti-capitalist struggle. The Cold War dynamic becomes even more visible when one considers who supported the terrorists, namely Communist and recently decolonised countries. Since the emergence of international terrorism, the Soviet Union and Arab states obstructed the establishment of international counterterrorism measures and secretly facilitated terrorism.49 For instance, the PLO, the PFLP, or other Palestinian organisations received support, often financially, from nearly every Arab country.50 Furthermore, the Palestinians managed to establish training camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya. Not only did the Palestinians go there for training, but so did the RAF and the Red Brigades, as well as separatist groups such as the Provisional IRA and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, or Basque Homeland and Freedom) militants.51 These financial and administrative gestures of support enhanced terrorist activities around the world and helped to further their network. 47

James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz. Terrorism: Origins and Evolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 99. 48 For a historical account of how the United States increasingly became a target by international terrorism, see Mark Ensalaco. Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11. Philadelphia, Pa: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008., pp. 134 ff. 49 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p. 161. 50 David E. Long. The Anatomy of Terrorism. New York: Free Press, 1990, p. 109 and Lutz and Lutz, Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, p. 115. 51 Noemi Gal-Or, “Countering Terrorism in Israel,” in: David A. Charters (ed.). The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 137–172, p. 141; Harvey W. Kushner. Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat. Springfield, Ill: Charles C. Thomas, 1998, p. 14; and Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” in: Gerard Chaliand, Arnaud Blin, Edward D. Schneider, Kathryn Pulver, and Jesse Browner. The History of Terrorism: from Antiquity to al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007, pp. 221–255., p. 244.

Introduction

19

The Soviet Union kept close ties with Palestinian resistance, in particular with the PFLP.52 Other Middle Eastern terrorist groups also received outside help, most notably Hezbollah from Iran.53 Libya was known to have backed the IRA.54 Furthermore, North Korea was host to terrorist training camps or gave assistance to the Palestinians in the form of military advisors.55 In Latin America, leftist groups received help from Cuba whenever possible.56 The leftist groups in Europe received help from Communist countries, most frequently in the form of safe heavens.57 Even though the amount of control that these states could exert over the terrorists was limited, the Soviet Union or other terrorist supporting states saw it as an attempt to promote civil unrest in Western democracies and as a way to weaken them.58 Furthermore, during that time US security policy was heavily shaped by the Cold War. US policymakers believed that the Soviet Union was behind most terrorist movements and designed their response to terrorism based on the perception of it as a global Cold War revolutionary danger.59 In this sense, even if from today’s perspective it is not possible to conclusively know the degree of state support that terrorist groups received, it is apparent that policymakers in the West and East interpreted terrorism in a geostrategic bipolar Cold War “zero-sum” contest.60 This global context is crucial in order to understand the 52 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, see chapter 13. 53 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 194. 54 Jack Holland. Hope against History: The Course of Conflict in Northern Ireland. New York: Henry Holt, 1999, p. 141. 55 Jae Taik Kim, “North Korean Terrorism: Trends, Characteristics, and Deterrence,” Terrorism, 1988, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 309–322, p. 315; and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 184. 56 Lutz and Lutz, Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, p. 115. 57 Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany’s Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972–1991),” in: Yonah Alexander and Dennis A. Pluchinsky. European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow. Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1992, pp. 3–92, p. 81; and Marco Rimanelli, “Italian Terrorism and Society, 1940s–1980s: Roots, Ideologies, Evolution, and International Connections,” Terrorism: An International Journal, 1989, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 249–96, p. 280. 58 Lutz and Lutz, Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, p. 115. 59 Martin A. Miller. The Foundations of Modern Terrorism. State, Society and the Dynamics of Political Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 221 and Law, Terrorism: A History, p. 276. 60 For publications about the United States and its reactions to international terrorism, see Timothy J. Naftali. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. New York: Basic Books, 2005; David C. Martin and John Walcott. Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War against Terrorism. New York: Harper & Row, 1988; and Jeffrey D. Simon. The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

20

Introduction

options for the Swiss government. Obviously, the Swiss administration chose the Western side, and unmistakably placed itself in the “camp” that actively combatted terrorism. State Security and the Culture of the Cold War in Switzerland In order to explain the Swiss government’s preference for cooperation with the Cold War Western bloc, one also has to inquire about the ideological predisposition of Swiss policymakers. There are several studies that have researched the government elites’ general way of thinking, highlighting that the wider Cold War context heavily shaped the world view of Swiss elites and government officials.61 Cultural historians have further noted a deep-seated anticommunism in Switzerland ever since the ideology’s appearance in the 19th century.62 This anticommunist mindset resurged during the Cold War and shaped how the Swiss authorities handled not just Palestinian terrorism but also other terrorist challenges. In particular, with the increase of terrorist attacks in Europe, especially with the RAF campaigns in Germany in 1972, Swiss high government officials also worried about domestic left-wing terrorism.63 They feared that activists from neighbouring countries would infiltrate the leftists’ scene, using it as hideout 61

62

63

Kurt Imhof, “Wiedergeburt der geistigen Landesverteidigung: Kalter Krieg in der Schweiz,” in: Kurt Imhof, Heinz Kleger, and Gaetano Romano (eds.). Konkordanz und kalter Krieg: Analyse von Medienereignissen in der Schweiz der Zwischen- und Nachkriegzeit. Zurich: Seismo, 1996, pp. 173–248; Beat Leuthardt. Festung Europa: Asyl, Drogen, “organisierte Kriminalitat”: die “Innere Sicherheit” der 80er und 90er Jahre und ihre Feindbilder: ein Handbuch. Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 1994; and Jurg Martin Gabriel and Jon A. Fanzun. Swiss Foreign Policy: An Overview. Zurich: ETH Zurich—Forschungsstelle fur Internationale Beziehungen, 2003, p. 9. The edited volume of Michel Caillat researched the history of anticommunism in Switzerland and shows the ideology’s persistence throughout the 20th century, Michel Caillat (ed.). Histoire(s) de l’anticommunisme en suisse / Geschichte(n) des Antikommunismus in der Schweiz. Zurich: Chronos, 2009. See also Brigitte Studer, “Antikommunismus,” Historiches Lexikon der Schweiz, Version of 23.03.2009, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs -dss.ch/textes/d/D27836.php . See also Luc van Dongen. “De la place de la Suisse dans la ‘guerre froide secrete’ des Etats-Unis, 1943–1975.” Traverse, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, pp. 55–72. Carole Villiger. Une Suisse pas si paisible: la violence comme moyen de revendication politique, 1950–2000, Ph.D. Dissertation, Lausanne: University of Lausanne, 2014. For the 1960s and the influence of international student movements on Swiss society, see Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Nuno Pereira (eds.). 1968–1978: ein bewegtes Jahrzehnt in der Schweiz / une decennie mouvementee en Suisse. Zurich: Chronos, 2009.

Introduction

21

or developing a home-grown violent leftist cell in Switzerland.64 A word that was used very frequently by high government officials, militaries, police, and parliamentarians to describe this threat was “subversion,” often suspected to have been covertly planned with the help of the Soviet Union.65 This fear of a communist revolutionary danger evolved into a general suspicion towards leftist circles, which were placed under tight surveillance. The reach and the scope of this surveillance system were revealed in 1989, in the course of a special parliamentary investigation. The report brought to light how the federal police and the cantonal “political police” had closely monitored the left-wing population in Switzerland.66 For each person that the police had considered to be a potential security threat, the police had issued a “secret personal file.” In 1989, the number of the files amounted to 900,000, which gave the scandal the name “File Scandal” [Fichenaffäre]. Not only was the amount of files shocking, so was their content: they showed how people with left-wing political opinions were treated as security threats. For instance, an ensuing study of those files showed that of the 900,000 files, 86 per cent covered leftist activists in Switzerland. The authors of the study link this focus on the leftist scene to the government’s fear of communist subversion.67 This was, however, not only a police mindset; several studies highlight that this “culture of the Cold War” dominated the political discourse of large parts of the political and economic establishment.68 64

65 66

67 68

Georg Kreis, Jean-Daniel Delley, Otmar Wigger, and Otto Konstantin Kaufmann (eds.). Staatsschutz in der Schweiz: die Entwicklung von 1935–1990: eine multidisziplinare Untersuchung im Auftrage des schweizerischen Bundesrates. Berne: Haupt, 1993 (Kreis 1993), p. 390 and Igor Perrig, Geistige Landesverteidigung im kalten Krieg. Der schweizerische Aufklärungsdienst (SAD) und Heer und Haus 1945–1963, published Ph.D. thesis from the University of Friburg, Brig, 1993, pp. 150 ff. Kreis 1993, p. 389. Parliamentary investigation report. Moritz Leuenberger (president of the Commission) and Meier Josi (vice-president), Vorkommnisse im EJPD. Bericht der Parlamentarischen Untersuchungskommission (PUK), 24 Bundesblatt, 142. Jahrgang, Bd. 1, 22nd of November 1989. Kreis, p. 41. For a study about the anticommunist networks in and across the borders of Switzerland, see Luc van Dongen, Stephanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith. Transnational AntiCommunism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks, 2014. For an analysis of an anticommunist network in Switzerland and its actions against leftist activists, see Aviva Guttmann. “Ernst Cinceras nichtstaatlicher Staatsschutz im Zeichen von Anti­subversion, Gesamtverteidigung und Kaltem Krieg,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, vol. 63, no. 1, 2013. For a summary of general anticommunist mindset in Switzerland, see also journalist Jürg Frischknecht. Die Unheimlichen Patrioten: politische Reaktion in der Schweiz: ein aktuelles Handbuch. Zurich: Limmat-Verlag, 1979.

22

Introduction

This backdrop of a deep-seated anticommunist mindset among Swiss political and economic elites, a powerful state security apparatus coupled with fears of “spill-over effects” of European violent left-wing extremism, are important factors that shaped the Swiss government’s reaction to terrorist attacks and its choices for cooperation to counter the threat.

Part 1 Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship: Switzerland’s Response to Palestinian and Brazilian Terrorism

∵

Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship

25

In 1969–1971, the first terrorist attacks that directly involved Switzerland were perpetrated by Palestinian violent groups, which since 1967 employed international terrorism as a tactic to direct the world’s attention to their cause.1 Even though after 1967, all parties in the Palestinian resistance unanimously agreed to take up arms, the 1970s were marked by severe inner-Palestinian disputes about leadership and about the best tactics to use.2 The PLO, whose function was to group the different Palestinian factions under one political and administrative body, did not manage to unite all of the Palestinian resistance.3 Two major forces dominated the Palestinian political scene in the early 1970s. On one side was Fatah, founded in 1954 by Yassir Arafat, with the goal of acquiring an independent position for the Palestinians.4 On the other side was the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), founded by George Habash in Jordan in 1953, with the pronounced aim of linking the Palestinian cause to the pan-Arabic struggle.5 While Fatah grew larger, the ANM declined and gave rise to its successor movement, the PFLP, headed by George Habash. These different approaches—transforming local Palestinian authority into a distinct parastatal entity or, in contrast, integrating the Palestinian cause within the wider Arab nationalist movement—created the inner-Palestinian fault-line that divided the movement throughout the 1970s.6 This dualism

1 George Habash, the founder and leader of the PFLP, called it “publicity terrorism,” see George Habash quoted in David Hirst. The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, p. 304. For the “internationalisation” of their fight as a new Palestinian strategy, cf. Bassam Abu Sharif and Uzi Mahnaimi. Tried by Fire: The Searing True Story of Two Men at the Heart of the Struggle between the Arabs and the Jews. London: Little, Brown, 1995, p. 110. See also Yazid Sayigh, who analysed the Palestinians’ violent struggle in one of the most complete and authoritative historical studies on the subject. He argues that the Palestinian armed struggle constituted an integral part of state-formation and contributed to the formation of a distinct Palestinian nationalism and identity, Yazid Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 2 Paul Thomas Chamberlin. The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 70. 3 Law, Terrorism: A History, p. 218. 4 Alain Gresh. The PLO: The Struggle Within, London: Zed Books, 1985, p. 12. 5 Chamberlin, Global Offensive, p. 11. 6 Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 22. For an assessment of the influence of the Palestinian resistance on Arab unity and vice-versa and how this affected Palestinian relations with Arab states, see Roger Owen. State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. London: Routledge, 2000, p. 68−69.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_003

26

Part 1

was personified by each of the two main leaders, Arafat on the one side and Habash on the other.7 Throughout the 1970s, numerous groups split further from Fatah and the PFLP either over ideological differences or disputes about the most appropriate political line, namely whether a more pragmatic or a radical stance should be adopted. Such splinter groups included, for instance, the Black September Organisation (BSO), which became Fatah’s violent branch.8 The BSO’s most spectacular attack was the Munich Olympic Massacre of 5 September 1972.9 the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) which broke away from the PFLP and was led by Nayef Hawatmeh or the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), a more radical sub-group of the PFLP, which operated under Ahmed Jibril. There also existed the pro-Syrian group al-Saika and the proIraqi Palestinian Arab Front, and Abu Nidal’s group, which opposed the pragmatic conciliatory approach of the PLO of negotiating with Israel and which worked in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.10 The most important aspect in this respect is to understand that the Palestinians were divided into various groups and that they were competing with one another. Often the “measure” of their legitimacy was how successful their terrorist strikes were in order to show how effective they were in the fight against Israel.11 For the Swiss government, the first confrontations with Palestinian and Brazilian terrorism were defining. Namely, the experiences with these first encounters influenced how the Swiss government framed its subsequent counterterrorism diplomacy and concluded an inter-state intelligence-sharing mechanism. In the first part of this monograph I look at the reactions and policies of the Swiss government to these confrontations with non-state actors, provide a detailed account of the crises management, and, lastly, compare the ways in which the Swiss authorities handled the attacks. 7 Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 22. For a personal account of Habash’s activism in the Palestinian armed struggle, see Georges Habache and Georges Malbrunot. Les revolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, Paris: Fayard, 2008 8 Ibid. 9 See chapter V for a short account of the Munich Olympia Massacre. 10 For an inside account of Abu Nidal’s terrorist group and its operations, see Patrick Seale. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire. London: Arrow, 1993. 11 Sayigh, Armed Struggl, pp. 195−196 and pp. 206−207.

Chapter 1

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday1 At the Zurich Kloten Airport on 18 February 1969 at 5.32 PM, an El Al airplane from Amsterdam to Tel Aviv was ready for departure after an interim stop at Zurich, when four Palestinians approached the plane on the runway in a rental car and began shooting at it from the outside.2 Six passengers were hit by the gunfire 1 For a contextualisation of those events within the Global Cold War see also my article: Aviva Guttmann, “Une coalition antiterroriste sous l’égide d’un pays neutre: la réponse suisse face au terrorisme palestinien, 1969–1970,” in: Relations internationales, 2015, vol. 3, no. 163, 2015, pp. 95−110. Furthermore, in January 2016, there was a fierce controversy in Switzerland about a book published by NZZ journalist Marcel Gyr about the Swiss government’s relations with Palestinian terror groups in the early 1970s. Marcel Gyr. Schweizer Terrorjahre: Das Geheime Abkommen mit der PLO, Zurich: NZZ Libro, 2016. Gyr claimed, without any documentary proof nor demonstration of knowledge of the historical context, that Federal Councillor Graber, at the time Foreign Minister of Switzerland, concluded a “secret deal” with the PLO. This highly problematic book triggered the creation of an intergovernmental fact-finding group, which concluded that the claims of this book were false and that a deal as described by Gyr never happened. See the intergovernmental group’s report, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe «1970». Schlussbericht, 3.05.2016, online accessible: https://www .eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/dienstleistungenundpublikationen/publikationen/alle -publikationen.html/content/publikationen/de/eda/Geschichte/interdepartementale -arbeitsgruppe-1970. Before the group published its results, there was also an academic response to Gyr’s theses, which were completely dismantled: Sacha Zala, Thomas Bürgisser, Yves Steiner: “Die Debatte zu einem ‘geheimen Abkommen’ zwischen Bundesrat Graber und der PLO. Eine Zwischenbilanz”, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, vol. 66, no. 1, 2016, pp. 80–103, accessible online:http://www.dodis.ch/res/doc/SZG_1_2016_Zwischenbilanz.pdf The article also gives an overview of the debate. 2 The following description is based on the official internal police rapport, issued the day after the attack, Bezirksanwaltschaft Bühlach Dr. Rehbach and Polizeikommando Zürich Dr. Grob: “anschlag auf ein kursflugzeug der el al auf dem flughafen kloten am 18.2.1969”, Zurich, 19.02.1969, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Attentat auf ein El Al Flugzeug im Flughafen Kloten am 18.2.1969 und Entführung eines Swissair-Flugzeuges durch arabische Terroristen am 6.9.1970 nach Jordanien, 1969–1970 [hereafter title will be referred to as Kloten and Zarqa Dossier] box number 46.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_004

28

Chapter 1

and two of them, the pilot and co-pilot, were seriously injured. The fire brigades and the Zurich police arrived quickly and prevented the terrorists from boarding the plane. While the police were disarming them, the official El Al armed security guard jumped out of the emergency exit and shot one of the Palestinians on the tarmac. In a police report several days later, it was specified that the El Al security guard killed the Palestinian terrorist after the police had already disarmed him.3 A few days later, the Israeli co-pilot died from his injuries.4 This attack was part of the above-mentioned new Palestinian resistance strategy that evolved in the late 1960s with the aim of “internationalising” their struggle against Israel.5 The PFLP claimed responsibility for the attack and in their declaration they formally apologised for “having violated Swiss neutrality.”6 Indeed, this violation of Swiss neutrality and sovereignty was what disturbed the Swiss government the most. In the Federal Council’s press communiqué it heavily condemned the attack and expressed its disappointment in the Palestinians. Especially in view of Switzerland’s previous humanitarian efforts in support of the Palestinian refugees, the Swiss government was “indignant that our neutral land has been used as a world stage for a warlike confrontation.”7 On the diplomatic level, the biggest difficulty for Swiss policymakers lay in the fact that the PFLP was a non-state actor.8 The question was: Which state could be held accountable for the terrorist acts of the Palestinians? Their best way of answering this question was to narrow the issue down to logistics and to consider which state enabled, tolerated, or even helped these terrorists to 3 Inspektor Rümeli and Federal Police Officer Schoch: “Antwort auf Cable Nr. 9093 vom 21.2.1969 der Bundespolizei”, Zurich, 22.02.1969, p. 4, in: C­ H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 46. (hereafter Police Report 22 February 1969). 4 The DDS database Dodis has publishes a collection with documents pertaining to the Kloten Airport attack, see: “Kloten attack 1969,” dodis.ch/T1390. 5 Habache and Malbrunot, Les revolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, 2008, p. 106. 6 Claim of Responsibility Leaflet of the PFLP, found in the jacket of Amina Dabor, one of the four attackers at Zurich’s Kloten Airport, in: CH-BAR#E4363A#1986/166_5*, Dokumentation über Bürgerkrieg in Jordanien im Herbst 1970 sowie über PFLP, 1969–71. See annex 1 for PFLP propaganda material. 7 Press Communiqué by the Federal Council: “Verurteilung des Anschlages auf ein Kursflugzeug der El Al in Kloten durch den Bundesrat”, 20.02.1970, in: C­H-BAR#E2001 E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 46. 8 The Committee for Foreign Affairs discussed that question in a meeting a week after the attack. The Committee reflected on the possible foreign political options for Switzerland, see Nationalrätliche Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten: “Protokoll der ausserordentlichen, dem Flugzeugattentat gewidmeten Sitzung”, Berne, 24.02.1969, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 46. (hereafter Foreign Affairs Meeting 24 February 1969).

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

29

develop an unconventional war capacity. The Swiss Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs advised the Swiss foreign ministry, the Federal Political Department (FPD),9 to approach the Arab states that stood in direct and traceable contact to the Kloten terrorists.10 In the police interrogation, the terrorists said that they participated in training camps in Jordan, the claim of responsibility for the attack came from a communication in Lebanon, and the terrorists reached Switzerland through a flight from Syria.11 Accordingly, with reference to the interviews, the Swiss authorities presented protest notes to these three states. The Swiss policymakers accused the countries of “indirect responsibility,” urged them to condemn the incidents, and requested that they do everything in their power to prevent further international terrorist attacks.12 The Swiss government complained to the Israeli government that Swiss territorial sovereignty had been violated by the actions of the Israeli security guard; and it demanded that such incidents not be repeated.13 Jordan and Syria responded by refusing to accept Berne’s notes and all three states denied having any connection with the PFLP. Lebanon complained that Switzerland’s approach “threatened to damage diplomatic relations, which had always been intact.”14 Jordan acknowledged that there might have been training camps on its territory, however, it pointed out that such camps were “everywhere, especially in Syria” and that these guerrilla actions lay beyond the control of Jordan.15 Israel denied any responsibility for the homicide of the security guard, who, according to the Israeli government, was acting beyond his authority. Israel agreed to leave it to the Swiss justice system to determine whether or not the guard had killed in self-defence.16 9

The department in charge of foreign affairs changed its name in 1979 and today it is called Federal Department for Foreign Affairs. 10 Ibid, p. 22. 11 Police Report 22 February 1969. See also the reports of the police interviews with the terrorists, Federal Police Officer Schoch and Federal Police Officer J. Rümmeli: interrogation reports of Amena Dahbor, Ibrahim Yousef, Mohamed Abu El Heiga, Dielsdorf, 27.02.1969, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 46. 12 A circular letter from the Headquarters in Berne to several Swiss Embassies informing them about Switzerland’s protest notes vis-à-vis Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. The notes and the government replies were attached to the letter, in: CH-BAR#E2200#London#1990/80#303.30*, Movement revolutionaire, actes de terrorisme, généralités, 1970– 72 (hereafter Protest Note February 1969). 13 Protest Note February 1969. 14 Ibid, reply of Lebanon. 15 Ibid, Jordan’s reply. 16 Ibid.

30

Chapter 1

The Swiss government’s behaviour reveals how difficult it was for it to handle this terrorist attack. One could say that Swiss authorities were “experimenting,” not least as they realised that the foreign political options were limited. Berne had to deal with a particular form of foreign aggression on its soil, for which no other state could really be held accountable. Confronting states with the issue only risked worsening bilateral relations. The situation deteriorated a few weeks later when, in March 1969, the Zurich cantonal court decided to release the Israeli security agent on bail in exchange for the formal promise from Israeli authorities that the agent would return to Switzerland for the end of the trial.17 Arab newspapers in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia heavily criticised Switzerland for this court decision, especially because the dead Palestinian was seen as a martyr.18 Swiss neutrality and Swiss-Arab friendship was called into question despite the fact that neither the foreign ministry nor the Swiss government had anything to do with this legal decision.19 These negative media reports about Switzerland had an impact in Egypt, for example, where a large number of Palestinians resided in Cairo who increasingly perceived Switzerland as pro-Zionist, and according to this logic, as a hostile country.20 This view radicalised when, in April 1969, the Swiss justice decided to keep the three Palestinians under detention, despite Algeria’s offer to pay bail and to formally guarantee the return of the Palestinians to Switzerland for the trial; as Israel did for its agent.21 Since the Swiss judges feared the terrorists’ escaping, they preferred to keep the Palestinians in detention in Switzerland.22 17

Inspector Rümmeli, Office of the Attorney General Rapport, “Haft-Entlassung des israelischen Sicherheitsbeamten Morderchai Rachamim,” Berne, 24.03.1969, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 46 and the Judgement of the Court on Mordechai Rachamim sent from the Headquarters to several Swiss ­Embassies abroad, in: CH-BAR#E2200#London#1990/80#303.30*: Movement ­revolutionaire, actes de terrorisme, généralités, 1970–72. 18 Press Digest Reports of the Swiss Embassy in Morocco as of 25.03.1969 and Egypt as of 10.04.1969, Egypt also informed about Saudi Arabian newspapers, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 47. 19 Ibid. 20 Report of the Swiss ambassador in Egypt, ibid. 21 A note of the Zurich Criminal Court to the Federal Councilor Spühler, signed by Dr. Fehr, President of the Trial Commission Zurich High Court: “Notitz. Klotener Attentat: rechtliche und politische Situation”, 28.04.1969, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 47. 22 Ibid., Dr. Fehr explains the court`s reasoning for the decision of keeping the terrorists under detention.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

31

This decision outraged Algeria’s public opinion and President Boumedienne publicly reproached the Swiss justice system for a “pro-Zionist bias.”23 The Syrian government sent a protest note to Switzerland.24 Furthermore, everywhere in the Arab world an anti-Swiss press campaign followed suit. When a PFLP spokesman proclaimed that for them, the concept of neutrality had “lost its meaning,” Switzerland became a clear target for further terrorist attacks.25 The Swiss authorities, however, did not really know how to protect against such an attack.26 High officials thought that Swiss embassies, staff in Arab countries, as well as the national airline Swissair were most at risk. But soon the realisation dawned that even on Swiss soil terrorism loomed large.27 In response, Berne ordered the increased protection of Swiss embassies and consulates in Arab states.28 Visa regulations were tightened and residence permits for Arab nationals in Switzerland restricted, and Swiss hotels were urged to work more closely together with the police with regard to their Arab guests.29 With view to protecting civil aviation, the Swissair directory board was tasked with suggesting measures that could be taken to prevent air piracy attacks.30

23

24

25

26

27 28 29

30

Another note to the Federal Councilor Spühler by the FPD head of Middle East Division Michael Gelzer: “Notitz für Herrn Bundesrat Spühler, Klotener Attentat”, 29.04.1969, in CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 47. In this note, Gelzer refers to a report of the Swiss Embassy in Egypt. Report from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN: “Note à la Division des affaires politiques. Démarche syrienne au sujet des partisans FLN (sic) détenus à Zurich”, Geneva, 29.04.1969, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 47. Quoted through a report from the Swiss Embassy in Iraq to Berne, 24.04.1969, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 47.The Austrian ­Embassy in Iraq forwarded this declaration of a PFLP spokesman to the Swiss Embassy in Iraq. Minutes of a meeting of high foreing office and civil aviation representatives, “Klotener Attentat und mögliche Auswirkungen für die schweizerischen A ­ ussenvertretungen, SWISSAIR-Agenturen ect. in gewissen arabischen Staaten”, Berne, 21.04.1969, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 47, p. 2 (hereafter Foreign Office Meeting April 1969). Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 4. A report to Federal Councillor von Moos of February 1970 about the visa restrictions and control of Arabs in Switzerland since April 1969: “Bericht betreffend Massnahmen gegenüber Angehörigen arabischer Staaten im Zusammenhang mit Terroranschlägen und mit dem Flugzeugunglück in Würenlingen”, Berne, 28.02.1970, in: CH-BAR#E101 0B#1986/151_58#200*, Luftverkehr (inkl. Fluganfall b. Würenlingen, Flugzeugentführung nach Jordanien, Ausbildung lybischer Piloten durch Heliswiss), 1970–1973. Foreign Office Meeting 1969, p. 4.

32

Chapter 1

Despite these measures, Palestinian terrorists attacked again in February 1970. A Swissair flight from Zurich to Tel Aviv crashed in Würenlingen, Switzerland, after a bomb exploded in the luggage compartment.31 All 47 passengers and crew members died. According to police investigations, a parcel-bomb had been sent from Munich to Tel Aviv by the PFLP-GC. Originally intended for an El Al flight it had been loaded onto the Swissair machine because El Al did not operate on the day of the attack.32 With the crash in Würenlingen, Swiss policymakers could be certain that the terrorist threat had increased.33 But from where and how would the Palestinians attack? In July, the PFLP struck in another European country, Greece, and here, for the first time they achieved the liberation of their fellow PFLP members. On 2 July 1970, the PFLP seized an El Al air plane that was waiting for departure at the Athens Airport and threatened to kill all of the passengers and crew, if seven Palestinian prisoners were not released from Greek prisons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), offered to act as a mediator and led the negotiations with the PFLP. Greece agreed to free the requested detainees in exchange for the hostages.34 This incident was taken by the Swiss authorities as a point of reference. They now believed that the PFLP would use a similar attack in order to achieve the liberation of the three Palestinians held in Zurich’s prisons. From late July 1970 onwards, Swiss high government officials prepared themselves for a response if an attack akin to Athens were to occur. 31 The DDS database Dodis has publishes a collection with documents pertaining to the Würenlingen attack, see: “Würenlingen attack 1970,” dodis.ch/T1389. 32 Alex Meyer. Internationale Luftfahrtabkommen, Bank VI: Luftpiraterie—Begriff, Tatbestande, Bekampfung. Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1972, p. 72 f. It was after this incident that Switzerland and Austria called an ICAO meeting in order to launch the drafting of a convention to suppress air sabotage. This initiative resulted in the Montreal Convention, which opened for signature in 1971. 33 Pierre Graber. Memoires et reflexions. Lausanne: Editions 24 heures, 1992, p. 162. See also a circular letter within the FJPD: “Kreisschreiben Nr. 18/70 an die schweizerischen Vertretungen im Ausland und an die Polizeidirektion der Kantone, Behandlung der Staatsangehörigen arabischer Länder”, Berne, 22.07.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 34 David Phillips. Skyjack: The Story of Air Piracy. London: Harrap, 1973, p. 137 and cf. a report by the head of the Federal Police, Dr. Amstein to the General Secretary of the FDJP, Dr. Riesen, “Erpressungsversuch eines palästinensischen Kommandos in Athen”, Berne, 10.08.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, 1970. The report was based on newspaper articles, Embassy cables and talks with ICRC staff member André Rochat.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

33

The highest decision-making organ that was in charge of planning counterterrorist measures was the Federal Council, the Bundesrat. Foreign relations are administrated by the FPD, in Berne, which handles everyday foreign political affairs. The Federal Council is in charge of taking important decisions, however, it primarily relies on reports from the FPD and follows its advice.35 Accordingly, in July 1970 it was the Federal Council that organised the preparation for the event of a hostage taking in coordination with representatives of the FPD. In their meeting of 28 July 1970, the first question that came up was: who would be in charge of taking the decision about whether or not the three Palestinians should be liberated?36 Very soon it became apparent that because of the federalist distribution of jurisdictional power in Switzerland, the decision had to be taken by an institution from Zurich, because it was under their cantonal authority that the Palestinians had been judged and detained. After several week-long evaluations and internal legal discussions, personal conflicts, and disagreements, it was decided that the Cantonal President of the Zurich Government, Mr Meier, had sole decision-making competence.37 Upon his request, in a meeting in late August it was further determined that after the attack, Meier would take the decision but the Federal Council would then have to approve it.38 With this procedure, the responsibility was shared and the Federal Council had veto power. 35 36

37

38

Aviva R. Schnur. Agieren oder Reagieren?: aussenpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung. Chur, Zurich: Ruegger, 2000, pp. 75 ff. Minutes of a meeting concerning a potential attack, “Vertraulich, Memorandum über die Sitzung vom 28. Juli 1970, betreffend Massnahmen und Kompetenzausscheidungen bei eventuellen “Erperssungsversuchen” zur Befreihung arabischer Strafgefangener in Zürich”, Berne, 29.07.1970, in: BAR: E2001E#1980/83#231, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970, p. 2 (hereafter Meeting July 1970). For the legal discussion underlying this decision, cf. ibid and a letter that explained the legal situation: Attorney General Walder, “An die Herren Regierungsräte Moosdorf und A. Bachmann betr. Haltung und Massnahmen der Behörden für den Fall eines nötigen Vorgehens einer Terroristengruppe im Zusammenhang mit den im Kanton Zürich inhaftierten drei Palästinensern”, Berne, 29.07.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. (also in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, 1970. The fact that both Federal Councillors had kept this document in their personal files indicates how important the issue was at the time). Minutes of a high government meeting in preparation for an attack, “Streng vertraulich, Aussprache vom 28. August 1970 um 14.15 Uhr im Bundeshaus betreffend palästinensische Drohungen”, Berne, 31.08.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, 1970, p. 4 (hereafter Meeting August 1970).

34

Chapter 1

In a secret government meeting on 12 August 1970, Zurich cantonal authorities affirmed that they realised the highly political nature of the issue and in case human lives were in danger, Zurich would give the order to concede to the terrorists’ demands.39 The minutes of this meeting were sent to the Federal Council, which confirmed in a secret reply that it would agree to this procedure.40 This means that the Swiss authorities had predetermined the outcome of the negotiations with the terrorists long before the actual hostage taking took place and negotiations began. The police also issued a detailed emergency plan in case of a terrorist attack: It pre-wrote letters that would only need to be telexed to the relevant places; code words were agreed upon; and, for example, the exact wording was agreed for the text a police officer should read to the airport fire fighters.41 Moreover, as of early August, an Arabic speaker was stationed at every airport for eventual translations.42 With regard to these efforts, it is interesting to see that Switzerland had lost hope that it could effectively prevent an attack. In a Federal Council meeting, for instance, the question was discussed whether Switzerland should launch further diplomatic approaches towards Arab states.43 The head of the FPD, Federal Councillor Pierre Graber, however, pointed out that he did not believe that any pressure on Arab states would have the slightest impact.44 Officials agreed that airport security needed to be increased, but because there was not enough Swissair personnel or police agents to check the passengers’ luggage, this option was abandoned.45 In the end, the only actual “counterterrorism 39

Minutes of a secret meeting of the Federal General Secretary Dr. Riesen and Federal General Attorney Dr. H. Walder that was sent to the Federal Councillor von Moos entitled, “Vertraulich, Massnahmen gegen Erpressung durch Gewaltakte”, Berne, 12.08.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, 1970. 40 The Federal Councillor von Moos’s reply to this, “Notitz an Herrn Generalsekretär Dr. A. Riesen und an Herrn Dr. H. Walder”, Berne, 13.08.1970, in: ­C H-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, 1970. 41 A secret letter to all heads of police units in Switzerland, “Dienstanweisung Nr. 34 im Falle einer Flugzeugentführung durch arabische Untergrundorganisationen, Geheim,” 05.08.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969– 1970 (hereafter Police Action Plan Nr. 34). 42 Meeting July 1970. 43 Meeting August 1970, p. 1. 44 Ibid. 45 Minutes of a meeting concerning a potential attack, “Vertraulich, Memorandum über die Sitzung vom 28. Juli 1970, betreffend Massnahmen und Kompetenzausscheidungen bei eventuellen “Erperssungsversuchen” zur Befreihung arabischer Strafgefangener in Zürich,” Berne, 29.07.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970 (Meeting July 1970), p. 3.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

35

policy” that emerged was the drafting of the aforementioned detailed action plan in case of an attack similar to Athens. That Swiss policymakers exclusively expected an attack akin to Athens became especially apparent in the way a request by the Swissair directory board was handled. After they were asked to think of possible counterterrorist measures, in late August 1970, the Swissair CEO, Dr. W. Berchthold, requested that two armed security guards accompany Swissair flights, especially en route to the United States or Israel.46 In the Federal Council meeting of 28 August 1970, this request was discussed. But since the policymakers took Athens as their point of reference, where the terrorists came from the runway and seized the plane, they argued that “in the plane, the security agents were useless” and there would be too many agents needed in relation to the expected degree of protection that they could bring.47 In hindsight, it is true that the government officials could not know that the terrorists were in fact going to attack from within the plane and that these measures could have maybe prevented the hijacking. Until then, only El Al and one TWA flight had been affected by hijackings and it was not yet an issue of international concern.48 Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that in all its meticulous preparation for an Athens-like ground attack, it lost view of the actual threat. In the end, Switzerland was well prepared, but not for the attack that was really going to happen a few months later. In sum, it is evident that as of February 1969, for high government officials, terrorism was an issue that was difficult to handle internationally as well as domestically. On the one hand, Palestinian terrorists used Swiss soil for their fight against Israel and drew Switzerland into the conflict.49 The Arab states made it clear that the Swiss government could not hold them accountable without risking the deterioration of bilateral relations. The Swiss government then had to focus on how it could protect the country. In this, however, it was faced with the unpredictability and ubiquitousness of the terrorist threat, which stood in contrast to the limited amount of police and state security resources. Swiss policymakers limited their measures to preparing for a terrorist incident with a narrow focus on what had happened in Athens in July. However, as shown, these measures can only be described as “preparation” and not “prevention” 46 Letter of Dr. W. Berchthold to the Federal Council, Berne, 24.08.1970, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 47 Meeting August 1970, p. 5 [emphasis in the original text]. 48 Phillips, Skyjack: The Story of Air Piracy, p. 134. 49 For this intention behind the Palestinian’s international terrorism, cf. Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 110.

36

Chapter 1

of the attack. Swiss government officials only focused on ad hoc policymaking responses but did not proactively create a strategy. Meticulously Prepared Crisis Mismanagement50 On 6 September 1970, at 12:15 PM, the Zurich Airport control tower received the following radio message: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine informs you that its (sic) Rafik Assaf commando unit is now in complete control of the DC-8 plane belonging to SWISSAIR, flight-number 100 from Zurich to New York.51 A few hours later, the Swiss authorities were notified that the plane had landed safely at Dawson’s Field, an old military airfield in the Jordanian desert close to the city of Zarqa.52 Around the same time, the United States was informed that 50

Several memoires were written by people who witnessed this crisis. For retrospectives of high government officials, see Graber. Memoires et reflexions, particularly pp. 161−171; Edward Heath. The Course of My Life: My Autobiography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998; Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski. Mit Leidenschaft und Augenmass: in Mogadischu und anderswo: politische Memoiren. Munich: Bertelsmann, 1989; Jacques Freymond. “D’Athènes à Zarka dans la perspective du CICR,” in: Edouard Brunner (ed). Einblick in die schweizerische Aussenpolitik. Zum 65. Geburtstag von Staatssekretär Raymond Probst, Zurich, 1984, pp. 133−152; For eye witness accounts of hostages, see Walter Jost. Rufzeichen: Haifa. Ein Passagier erlebt die Entfuhrung der Swissair DC-8 “Nidwalden” und als Geisel den Krieg der Fedayin. Zurich: Schweizer Verlagshaus, 1972; and David Raab. Terror in Black September: The First Eyewitness Account of the Infamous 1970 Hijackings. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 51 Radio-Schweiz AG, Flugsicherungsdienst Zürich, “Auszug aus der Tonbandaufnahme vom 6. September 1970,” Zurich, 10.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 53. 52 Minutes of Federal Council meeting, “Flugzeugentführung DC-8 Swissair. Sitzung des Bundesrates vom 6. September 1970/21.30 Uhr,” Berne, 06.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. The minutes of the Federal Council crisis meetings were found in the personal documents of Federal Councillor von Moos. In the course of the “Gyr controversy,” the database Dodis of the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS) published those meeting minutes based on the regular collection of Federal Council meeting minutes, CH-BAR#E1003#1994/26#13*, see: “Minutes of negotiation of the Federal Council in the Zarqa crisis,” dodis.ch/C1392. Dodis has also published another source collection about this hijacking, see: “Highjackings to Zarqa,” dodis.ch/T1391.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

37

a TWA flight from Tel Aviv to New York via Athens and Frankfurt had been hijacked shortly after takeoff from Frankfurt and was brought to the same place.53 Soon after, London reported an aborted hijack attempt on an El Al aircraft.54 Right above London, two Palestinian terrorists had tried to take control of the plane. But two of the plane’s armed security guards overpowered them. The plane made an emergency landing at London Heathrow; the female hijacker, Lela Khaled, was taken into custody.55 Her male accomplice had been killed by the armed security guards during the struggle in the air.56 On the same day, two other PFLP members had tried to board the same El Al flight as Lela Khaled but El Al security identified them as being on their blacklist and refused to grant them access.57 In a last minute decision, the two terrorists bought new tickets for a Pan Am flight from Amsterdam to New York and they then proceeded to hijack this Pan Am flight.58 The plane however was a Boeing 747, which was too big to land at Dawson’s Field, and thus it was brought to Cairo where they blew up the machine after the passengers were evacuated.59 That evening, the ICRC delegation from Beirut reached Dawson’s Field. The PFLP allowed the head of the ICRC delegation, André Rochat, access to the plane to determine whether the passengers had enough to eat and drink.60 53

A memorandum of Dave Clark, “Aircraft Hijackings, 6 September, 1970”, in: US National Security Archive, archive file no. 00079, 1970/09/06. This and the following US National Security Archive documents were accessible online under http://nsarchive.chadwyck .com/home.do 54 Ibid. cf. also the Federal Council meeting, 06.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/ 136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 55 Cabinet Paper CM(70), Copy No. 23, “13th Conclusion of the 9 September 1970”, in: British National Archives, CAB/128/47, accessible online: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ cabinetpapers/ 56 Ibid. 57 The Israeli Foreign Office informed the US authorities that El Al turned them away during the boarding of the plane, cf. ibid. Khaled was not recognised because she made a face surgery so that her face looked too different for the Israeli authorities to recognise her, cf. Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 104. 58 For the information that it was a last minute decision, cf. Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 105. For an account of what happened when, cf. memorandum of Dave Clark, “Aircraft Hijackings, Infromation as of 1430,” 06.09.1970, in: US National Security Archive, archive file no. 00080, 1970/09/06. 59 Cable of the Swiss Embassy in Beirut to Berne, 07.09.1970, 06.20 AM., in: C­ H-BAR#E2001 E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 53. 60 The National Military Command Centre, Memorandum for the record, “Aircraft Hijackings,” 06.09.1970, 2300 EDT, in: US National Security Archives, archive file no. 00078, 1970/09/06.

38

Chapter 1

Overnight, the PFLP issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the Swiss government that was transmitted through the ICRC delegation in Beirut to Geneva. On 7 September, at 4.25 AM, Rochat called the head of the Middle Eastern Section of the FPD, Michael Gelzer.61 Rochat explained that the PFLP had so far only directed concrete requests towards Switzerland to “release the three Palestinian prisoners that were captured in February 1969 in Zurich Kloten. In exchange, the Swissair plane and all passengers and the crews could go home.”62 Because the FPLP had so far only made demands of Switzerland, Gelzer understood from this that if Switzerland liberated the three Palestinians, all of the passengers of both planes would be allowed to return. This did not correspond to the actual PFLP demands (which were to only release the Swissair passengers in exchange for the PFLP prisoners in Zurich), but since Gelzer understood it that way, he transmitted his understanding of the terms of the ultimatum to the Federal Council, which discussed it in its meeting in the early morning.63 Immediately, Zurich cantonal offices were contacted and, as discussed weeks before, Zurich agreed to the release of the prisoners because the lives of the passengers were in danger.64 In no time, the Federal Chancery drafted a press communiqué in German and French, which was ready to be sent to the media by 2 PM.65 At that point, however, Agence France Press, AFP, published an updated version of the PFLP ultimatum with new conditions. According to AFP, the PFLP wanted to deal with each country separately with respect to the nationality of the passengers. Thus, they would release the Swiss citizens in exchange for the 61 62

For further information about Michael Gelzer, see also dodis.ch/P2735. A memorandum by Gelzer, “Pikett-Dienst vom 7 September 1970 (02.00–07.00 Uhr) im Zusammenhang mit der Entführung des Swissairflugzeuges nach Jordanien”, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 53, (hereafter Gelzer ­Report 7 AM) [emphasis in the original text]. 63 Gelzer’s note to the Federal Councillor Graber, “Notitz an Bundesrat Graber. Ultimatum der Palestinenser betreffend die in Jordanien gelandeten zwei Flugzeuge (Swissair und TWA),” Berne, 07.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E 2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. (hereafter Gelzer Report to Graber). For the Federal Council discussion of Gelzer’s version of the ultimatum, cf. the minutes of the Federal Council, 07.09.1970, 8.00 AM, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. p. 1. 64 A report of Ambassador Jürg Iselin in London, “Notiz betreffend gestrige Flugzeugentführungen,” London, 07.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 65 Minutes of the meeting of the Federal Council, 07.09.1970, 8.00 AM, in: ­C H-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

39

prisoners in Switzerland, the German hostages for the Palestinian prisoners in Germany, British nationals for Lela Khaled, and Israeli and Israeli-US dual citizens for a yet undefined amount of prisoners in Israel. The hostages of other nationalities would be freed unconditionally.66 Despite knowledge of this AFP news, the Federal Council decided to publish the communiqué that stated its “agreement to the PFLP conditions of releasing the three Palestinian prisoners in exchange for both of the hijacked planes (Swissair and TWA machines) with all the passengers.”67 However, because of the quasi-simultaneousness of the AFP publication with the updated PFLP requests and the response of the Swiss government, domestically and internationally it was understood that Switzerland agreed to this new PFLP proposition to deal with the situation country-wise, meaning that terrorists in Zurich would be exchanged only for the Swiss citizens.68 Soon afterwards, the ICRC and the US embassy in Amman confirmed that the AFP had published the accurate PFLP demands.69 In the Swiss national press over the next few days, this quick compliance with the terrorist demand was presented as a hasty surrender of a weak government.70 With the PFLP’s 72 hours ultimatum, the Swiss government would 66 67

68

69

70

Agence France Presse, 07.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. For the decision to publish the communiqué despite knowledge of the AFP news cf. minutes of Federal Council meeting, 07.09.1970, 08.00 AM. (the meeting was interrupted at 9 AM, continued at 11 until the communiqué and was taken up again at 6 PM after the press conference), in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. The communiqué was attached to the minutes. An internal report that criticised the publication of the communiqué, FPD, “Einsatz des Politischen Departements in Krisenzeiten. Erfahrungen anlässlich der Flugzeugentführungen vom 6. September 1970,” in: CH-BAR#E2024B#2001/146#1225*, Entführung von Flugzeugen: Zerka September 1970, 1970–1971, p. 4. Henry A. Kissinger, “Memorandum for the President. Status of Mid-East Hijackings, Secret Information”, 07.09.1970, in: US National Security Archives, Archive file no. 00083, 1970/09/07, (hereafter Memorandum 00083), p. 2. The US Ambassador Wine then informed the FPD head of Middle East Section Gelzer, cf. Gezer report to Graber. Christoph Schmid, Herausforderung Zerka. Die Entführung einer Swissair-Maschine durch palästinensische Extremisten im September 1970 und dessen Bewältigung in der Schweiz, unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit], Berne: University of Berne, 2006, p. 86 ff. The press coverage in Switzerland during the crisis has also been analysed in other studies, see also Christian Lalive d`Epinay and Gilbert Rist, “La crise de Zerka selon les titres de la presse romande,” in: Kongress der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fur Soziologie. Beitrage zur soziologischen Analyse der Schweiz / Contribution a l’analyse sociologique de la Suisse, Geneva: Societe suisse de sociologie, 1974, pp. 271−281; and Caroline Arbellay, La crise

40

Chapter 1

have had two more full days to take a position. By being so quick, journalists and parliamentarians later criticised the Swiss decision to have been inconsiderate, hasty, and amateurish.71 Given their “pre-preparedness,” the authorities could act swiftly. The Swiss government however reacted quickly at a moment when it would have been wise to reflect more on what signals it sent out with the communiqué. The Council could have waited with the publication of its position until it knew which of the PFLP demands were the accurate ones, and only then, it could have decided. This also would have been the better option because on the international level, the other concerned governments, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel, interpreted the Federal Council’s communiqué as an agreement to the new PFLP demands.72 Therefore, they believed that Switzerland only wanted to free its own citizens.73 The problem, however, was that right from the start, the Israeli government made it clear that it refused to make concessions to the terrorists while there was a great number of hostages with US-Israeli dual nationality.74 The PFLP announced that the dual citizens would be treated as Israeli citizens, which meant that their lives depended on Israel’s decision.75 The United States was thus in an especially difficult situation. With the communiqué of the Federal Government, US decision-makers now believed that the three European countries would negotiate bilaterally with the PFLP.76 With Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom freeing only their own citizens, American General Alexander Haig, who at the time was Deputy Assistant de Zerqa (1970): regards croisés de la presse suisse et du Département politique fédéral, unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit], University of Fribourg 2008; Monika Keller, Vom Terrorismus zum legitimen Widerstand des «palästinensischen Volkes»? Die Einschätzung und Darstellung der Palästinenser in den Schweizer Medien zwischen 1964 und 1974, unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit], University of Fribourg 2006. 71 Ibid. 72 Memorandum 00083 and General Haig, “Memorandum for the president, Subject: Middle East Hijacking Status Report, September 7, 1970, 0330 EST”, in: US National Security Archives, Archive file no. 00086, 1970/09/07 (hereafter Memorandum 00086). 73 David Carlton. The West’s Road to 9/11: Resisting, Appeasing, and Encouraging Terrorism Since 1970. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 20. 74 Departement of State Operation Center, NEA Working Group, “Situation Report as of 1800 Hours EST,” 07.09.1970, in: US National Security Archives, Archive file no. 00085, 1970/09/07. The Israeli ambassador also called Gelzer to indicate Israel’s no-negotiation line, cf. Gelzer report to Graber. 75 For US dual citizens treated like Israelis, cf. Memorandum 00083, p. 2. 76 Memorandum 00086.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

41

to the President for National Security Affairs, concluded in a secret memorandum to President Nixon, that the United States “could be placed in the untenable position of being isolated with Israel in negotiating the release of Israeli and dual-citizenship personnel”.77 In this intricate situation, the United States immediately called for a coordination of positions vis-à-vis the PFLP and aimed to convince the European states to only free their Palestinian prisoners in exchange for all the hostages that were in the hands of the PFLP.78 With the bad timing of the Swiss communiqué, the US observers thought that Swiss decision-makers wanted to negotiate bilaterally with the PFLP and thus believed that it would be a difficult task to convince Swiss policymakers to coordinate further actions.79 To its great surprise, the Swiss government not only agreed to concerted actions, but it also demanded to “take the lead” and to host the coordination meeting.80 Accordingly, after the first meeting in Washington, the four governments convened in Berne, while Israel initially did not attend the sessions.81 The contradictory policies of the Swiss government can be explained through several considerations. It is possible that the Swiss government indeed believed that if it freed its prisoners, all the hostages would be liberated. In the source material there is an indication of when the misinterpretation of the PFLP request happened. In the first PFLP ultimatum, transmitted by the ICRC delegate Rochat to Gelzer on 7 September, at 4.25 AM, the PFLP actually said that for the prisoners in Switzerland, all the passengers of the Swissair plane could go home.82 It is striking that Gelzer wrote a memorandum at 7 AM in which he highlighted that all passengers could go home.83 In the sentence, however, this “all” clearly refers to the entirety of the Swissair plane, no mention of the second 77 Ibid. 78 Memorandum 00083, p. 3. 79 Memorandum 00086 and Memorandum 00085, p. 1. 80 E. O. Martin, Brigadier General USAF, “Memorandum for the Record. Aircraft Hijackings”, September 1970, 2215EDT, in: US National Security Archives: Archive file no. 00087, 1970/09/07. For the cable from Berne instructing the Swiss Embassy in Washington to coordinate and demand to host the meetings, cf. cable from Berne to Washington, cable number 529, Berne, 07.09.1970, 10.45 PM, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 53. 81 Minutes of the first Berne coordination meeting, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54. 82 Memorandum 00083, p. 2. 83 Gelzer Report 7 AM.

42

Chapter 1

one.84 In his report to Federal Councillor Graber, he however changed it in such a way that “all” meant both planes.85 It is not clear whether Gelzer changed the report on purpose or whether it was a mistake that occurred in the hastiness of the moment. The latter seems more probable since in the crisis management that was prepared by the government in advance, all actions were planned to take place quickly. Furthermore, the fact that Switzerland was the only country that had addressed by the PFLP at that point may have confused Gelzer as well. With Gelzer’s misunderstanding, the Council meeting proceeded on the basis of the second report, which is also visible through the minutes of the meeting and the text of the communiqué.86 However, it remains unclear why the Council decided to publish the communiqué even though it knew that the AFP had just released the PFLP’s second demands to go with a country by country negotiation line.87 An internal FPD investigative report was published several months later. It evaluated the crisis management of the government and concluded that this mistake was simply because the high officials were unable to identify what information was relevant or not.88 In the wealth of information they could not recognise the importance of this AFP news. Accordingly, one could conclude that the Swiss government’s initial signal of dealing separately with the Palestinians was more because of incompetence, hastiness, and mistakes rather than maliciousness. Furthermore, it is plausible that after the United States proposed coordinating the actions, Swiss policymakers considered this to be a more opportune way to handle the crisis. In view of Switzerland’s neutrality, however, it is quite surprising that it chose to coordinate its actions. One could argue that coordination represented a lack of respect for neutrality politics because, in doing so, Switzerland affiliated with the Western Bloc, or what the terrorists called the “proZionist” camp. One can think of three main reasons that can explain this decision to cooperate. First, by coordinating their positions, the five involved countries 84 Ibid. 85 Gelzer Report to Graber. 86 Minutes of the Federal Council meeting, 07.09.1970, to which the communiqué was attached, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 87 The Federal Council knew about the AFP news and decided to publish the communiqué nevertheless, cf. ibid. 88 FPD, “Einsatz des Politischen Departements in Krisenzeiten. Erfahrungen anlässlich der Flugzeugentführungen vom 6. September 1970”, in: CH-BAR#E2024B#2001/146#1225*, Entführung von Flugzeugen: Zerka September 1970, 1970–1971, pp. 5 ff.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

43

could strengthen their position vis-à-vis the PFLP. Second, through a “common front,” the Swiss government was less exposed in the direct negotiations with the Palestinians; a perception of the situation which was later expressed by Graber and which will be outlined further below. Third, it is conceivable that the Swiss government was preparing the grounds for after the immediate crisis situation with a view towards extending counterterrorism cooperation over the longterm. In this vein, the risk of being affiliated with the Western bloc outweighed the long-term interest of establishing counterterrorist cooperation for which it needed the support of the United States and European countries.89 In sum, at first there was probably an atmosphere of hastiness and panic that the Swiss policymakers tried to counter through a swift reaction and a clear position. Because Swiss authorities were so well prepared and had decided well in advance to liberate the prisoners, it could act fast. The extremely rapid decision-making, however, backfired because domestically it was seen as unconditional surrender and internationally it, accidentally or consciously, led to a unilateral approach. Later, the Swiss government realised that it was not in its long-term interests to act alone and thus it reversed course and took the lead in the multilateral approach. Swiss Policymakers’ Role during the Crisis Management The first meeting in Berne took place on the evening of 7 September 1970. At the same time, at the meeting in Washington it was decided that thereafter it would be Berne where the governments would meet to align their positions.90 In these coordination meetings, the countries were represented by the highest diplomatic officials that were present in Switzerland. With Ambassador von Keller, Germany had even sent a special commissioner to the meetings. The chargé d’affaires for the United Kingdom was Mr West and the United States was represented by Mr Vine. Israel did not join the first meetings. In Switzerland’s leading role, Federal Councillor Graber headed the first session, which he started by providing a detailed justification for Switzerland’s policy change.91 He argued that Swiss authorities had believed that they would 89 90

Long-term Swiss counterterrorism politics will be evaluated in the next chapters. Cable from the Swiss Embassy in Washington to Berne, cable no. 647, 07.09.1970, 06.40 PM (US time), in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54. 91 Minutes of coordination meeting, 07.09.1970, with Swiss, British, US and German chargé d’affaires. Israel only joined the meetings after the 9 September, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54.

44

Chapter 1

free all 280 hostages through the liberation of the Palestinians in Swiss prisons. With the new PFLP conditions, however, all five governments were involved and therefore concerted action was needed. He further informed them that the ICRC had in principle agreed to a mandate to negotiate with the PFLP on behalf of the concerned governments.92 In the next meeting, on 8 September, the exact terms of the mandate were fixed. The United States, Switzerland, Germany, and the United Kingdom awarded the ICRC the mandate to negotiate with the PFLP so that all the hostages, including the Israeli and US citizens, could be freed in exchange for the three Palestinian prisoners in Zurich, the three prisoners in Munich, and Lela Khaled in London.93 Israel did not give the mandate to the ICRC and could thus remain in its official no-negotiation line. The four governments agreed that Israel’s stay-out policy was not sustainable but highlighted that “for the moment” this would be the course of conduct.94 This reference to the temporariness of the agreement was constantly repeated in the coordination meetings as well as in the bilateral meetings with Israel.95 With the deadline of the first ultimatum approaching, Germany especially was worried. Bonn declared that it would only remain in the coalition if it saw that the ICRC delegation, headed by André Rochat, was achieving real progress.96 The option to negotiate bilaterally with the PFLP was maintained, not least because militarily the situation in Jordan was very tense. The Jordanian government threatened to attack the Palestinians to regain control over its territory. With the chance of an outbreak of violence in Jordan, the ICRC negotiations risked failing.97 At the same time, by constantly threatening to 92 Ibid. 93 Coordination meeting, 08.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54. The word “negotiation” was explicitly avoided because the Palestinians apparently hated the term. 94 Coordination meetings of 7, 8, and 9 September 1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54. 95 Ibid. and a bilateral information meeting of Switzerland and Israel, 8 September, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54. 96 The report of the meeting between German Ambassador Schlegelberger with the FPD head of Middle Eastern Section Gelzer where Germany justified the maintenance of the single-handed option, “Notitz für Herrn Graber. Flugzeugentführungen durch Palestinenser,” Berne, 09.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 97 A cable from the US embassy in Amman, 09.09.1970, which reported about the latest developments and PFLP requests in Amman. It was transferred to Swiss authorities at 11.00 PM (Swiss time), in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

45

eventually abandon the multilateral approach, the group increased pressure on Israel in order to make it revisit its no-negotiation line and to convince it to also offer the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. With Israel’s contribution to the deal with the PFLP, the ICRC delegation would have had more leverage in the negotiations with the terrorists. Yet, at first the ICRC mandate envisaged the release of all the hostages in exchange for the Palestinians only in European prisons, which was called the “package deal.”98 After the first meeting in Berne, the Swiss policy line remained consistent. The Swiss government was keen on the “package deal,” and in bilateral consultations with the UK and Germany it urged unity among the states. With Israel, Graber also tried to pressure it to agree to the release of some prisoners.99 Vis-àvis the PFLP, Switzerland communicated strictly through the ICRC delegation and, unlike Germany, it had not sent an intermediary that could have been deployed in case the negotiations failed.100 It was not only the four governments that exerted pressure on Israel, the whole PFLP negotiation strategy also seemed to have worked towards such an isolation. Analysing the various PFLP ultimatums towards the Europeans, the Palestinians had always addressed clear requests while their approach towards the Israelis varied. At first, the PFLP requested the liberation of an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners from Israel. They then demanded 1,200 prisoners—a seemingly absurdly large number. On 10 September, they communicated vague terms to Israel, saying that it would have to release prisoners without specifying the amount.101 Because Israel had already declared that 98

Coordination meeting, 09.09.1970. It was especially hoped that the United States could exert pressure on Israel in this matter, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 99 Minutes of the first coordination meetings and the bilateral meeting with Israel, 08.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 54. Cf. also the minutes of Federal Council meeting, 10.09.1970, 10 AM and 4 PM, in: ­C H-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 100 When Swiss decision-makers heard for instance of the presence of German intermediary Wischnewski in Amman, the Federal Council briefly discussed the option of sending an intermediary too but dismisses the idea, cf. Minutes of the Federal Council meeting, 12.09.1970, 5 PM, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 101 For the first requests, cf. Memorandum 00085, for the second demand of 1200 prisoners, cf. the cable of the US embassy in Amman, 09.09.1970 that reported about the latest developments and PFLP requests in Amman. It was transferred to Swiss authorities at 11.00 PM (Swiss time). For vague requests vis-à-vis Israel, cf. minutes of the coordination

46

Chapter 1

it followed a no-negotiation line months in advance, the PFLP could assume that Israel would remain firm on this stance.102 The Europeans, however, especially after Switzerland had already signalled its willingness to deal with the PFLP separately, did not seem as categorical. It is possible that with specific demands to the European countries and unclear requests towards Israel, the PFLP wanted to protract the negotiations so that, sooner or later, one of the Europeans would break from the common position and deal with the PFLP individually. Once the unity was broken, Israel would have to look for its citizens on its own, which would have increased Palestinian leverage over Israel. On the evening of 9 September, a new element was added by the PFLP to the ongoing story. In their ultimatum of 7 September, the Palestinians made demands on the British government, but they did not yet have British hostages since there were no British nationals on either the TWA or Swissair planes.103 The PFLP thus hijacked a BOAC flight from Bombay to Beirut and also brought it to Dawson’s Field.104 In return, the Europeans spared no effort to increase the pressure on the PFLP. Besides trying to get Israel to make concessions to have more bargaining chips with the terrorists, diplomatic measures were launched as well. In the UN Security Council, the United States and the United Kingdom called for an emergency session for 9 September.105 After initial objections from the Soviets and Arabs, the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the hijackings and requesting the liberation of all of the passengers.106 Furthermore, seeking to increase the pressure on the Arab states, the FPD assembled the Arab diplomats in Berne and requested their help.107 The next action of the PFLP, on 12 September, represented another test for the coalition. At that time the ICRC negotiations seemed to have reached a meeting, 10.09.1970, and ICRC message to Berne, 09.09.1970, “Texte dicté par M. Martin CICR,” the last two documents in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 102 Philips, Skyjack: The Story of Air Piracy, p. 142. 103 For the PFLP decision to hijack another plane, cf. Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 115. 104 A cable from the ICRC in Amman to Berne, 09.09.1970, 9.00 PM., with title “nouveau developpements de l`action humanitaire du cicr,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 105 A cable by the Swiss embassy in New York to Berne, 09.09.1970, cable no. 201, at 9.10 PM. The cable reported about the UN debates on the issue. 106 Resolution number 286 of the UN Security Council, 09.09.1970. 107 A cable of the FPD in Berne to the Swiss embassy in Paris informing about Switzerland’s diplomatic démarches towards Arab countries, 09.09.1970, cable no 254, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

47

deadlock.108 The Jordanian army had already attacked Palestinians in parts of the country, and heavy disputes emerged between the PFLP and the more moderate PLO, headed by Yassir Arafat.109 The PLO sought contact with the vice-president of the ICRC, Mr Jacques Freymond, who went to Jordan to support the rest of the delegation.110 In Zarqa, the PFLP took action as rumours circulated of an Israeli-US military intervention to liberate the hostages.111 During the talks between Arafat and Freymond, the PFLP evacuated all of the passengers from the planes in Dawson Field, invited journalists to film, and in front of their live cameras they blew up the three aircraft.112 In his memoir, Abu Bassam explains that blowing up the planes was done principally in reaction to a possible US and Israeli intervention.113 Habbash further highlights that the timing was set to irritate Arafat and to show that it was the PFLP that was in charge of the hostage negotiations.114 News reached Berne that after this action, all of the hostages were released with the exception of six Germans, six Swiss, six British, and 30 US-Israeli dual citizens, who were hidden in Palestinian refugee camps around Jordan.115 The ICRC no longer knew with whom to negotiate, with the PLO or with the PFLP, and demonstratively departed from Jordan.116 Because the hostages were now 108 Cable from the CICR in Amman to Gelzer in Berne, 11.09.1970, 10.45 PM, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 109 For reports of the ongoing conflict between the PFLP and the Jordanian army, cf. a report by the French embassy in Amman that was transmitted to Berne, 10.09.1970, 00.16 AM. For disagreements between the PFLP and the PLO, cf. another report of the French embassy to Berne, 12.09.1970, both documents in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 110 ICRC report, “Tel. de M. Martin du CICR,” Berne, 12.09.1970, 4.15 AM., in: ­C H-BAR#E2001 E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 111 For the fear of a military intervention cf. CICR cable that request certitude that no military intervention is planned, 11.09.1970, “nouveau message delegation amman no 26 de rochat,” arrived in Berne at 2.00 MP. Cf. also the report of the French embassy in Amman to Berne, 12.09.1970, both documents in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. For the claim that the blow up of the planes was a consequence of the rumours about the military intervention, cf. Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 111. 112 Cable of the US embassy in Amman to Berne, 12.09.1970, 12.00 PM., in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. The report stressed how Arafat himself was caught by surprise by the PFLP action. 113 Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 117. 114 Habbash and Malbrunot, Les revolutionnaires, p. 105. 115 Memorandum of FPD staff member Mr Blankard, Berne, 12.09.1970, in: ­C H-BAR# E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 116 A cable from Freymond to Berne via Beirut, 12.09.1970, 4 PM., in: C­H-BAR# E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55.

48

Chapter 1

out of the line of fire, the Jordanian army launched a full-scale assault on the Palestinians. With the hostages’ location unknown, no clear Palestinian interlocutor, and the outbreak of violence, the coalition’s unity was at its lowest point.117 In Berne during the subsequent coordination meeting, Swiss and US diplomats insisted that the common approach had to be upheld, independently of Israeli intransigence.118 The other states agreed and the ICRC was sent back with a new delegate instructed to resume the negotiation mandate.119 Apart from that, however, a general feeling of distrust and bad faith prevailed among the diplomats.120 From embassy to embassy, the rumour spread that representatives of the three European states had independently sought direct contact with the PFLP or with the Palestinian Red Crescent to seal a separate deal. Germany especially raised suspicion because its unofficial representative, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, had been placed in Jordan since the beginning of the crisis.121 When Switzerland called the German ambassador to Switzerland for clarification, Ambassador Schlegelberger replied that Wischnewski had undertaken “actual negotiations” and that the exchange of the German hostages for the Palestinian prisoners in Munich was imminent.122 A report from the French embassy in Amman confirmed this and added that the United Kingdom too, contrary to their line in Berne, had started to individually negotiate with the PFLP through their embassy in Amman.123 117 Graber, Memoires et reflexions, p. 165 He perceived that moment as complete deadlock. 118 Minutes of the coordination meeting, 12.09.1970, 10 PM to 00.25 AM, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. With regard to the archiving of the coordination meeting minutes, the first meetings are in the Kloten and Zarqa Dossier but the ones after 11 September can be found in the personal documents of Ambassador Micheli. 119 Press Communiqué no 1078 of the ICRC, 14.09.1970, “Le CICR poursuit son action en Jordanie,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 120 Minutes of a Swiss-US private conversation in which US officials expressed their distrust vis-à-vis the Germans and the British governments, in: ibid. 121 Wischnewski later confirmed that he was charged by German Chancellor Willy Brandt to remain in close contact with the PFLP, Wischnewski. Mit Leidenschaft und Augenmass, p. 128. 122 A note from Gelzer to Federal Councillor Graber, “Telephon mit Herrn Schlegelberger von der BRD-Botschaft, 13 September 1970, 12.15 Uhr,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. A cable from the Swiss Consulate in Köln to Berne also mentioned the separate deal, cf. cable number 81, 15.09.1970, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 123 A report of the French embassy transmitted to Berne, 18.09.1970, “Reçu de l`Ambassade de France. Ammane, le 16 septembre 1970,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. In a US-Swiss bilateral meeting, the US Ambassador

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

49

Around the same time, the Swiss representative to Jordan, Ambassador Dubois, had further added to this general climate of uncertainty and distrust. Because Switzerland’s ambassador to Jordan was based in Beirut, Switzerland had no embassy building in Jordan. Dubois was, thus, allowed to use the British embassy in Amman to transfer his communication to the home office.124 His telex of 13 September, transmitted via the British embassy in Berne, urged the Swiss government to deal separately with the PFLP.125 He argued that Germany and Great Britain did the same and that it was the only way to save the hostages.126 In the Federal Council meeting, policymakers were worried about the civil war in Amman but agreed that Switzerland would never be the first country to break the unity.127 Accordingly, the Council replied to Dubois and requested that he stay away from the PFLP leaders.128 In retrospect, it is difficult to estimate whether the solo runs need to be seen in the context of diplomatic hypocrisy, realpolitik, backup solutions, or whether it was only meant as a threat to increase the pressure on Israel to force it to finally agree to release the prisoners that could serve as bargaining chips in the ICRC negotiations. Irrespective of the actual intentions behind the singlehanded approaches, it did not fail to result in the desired effect with regard to Israel.129 On 13 September, Israel had secretly communicated to the coalition that it agreed to release two detained Algerian security agents as part of its contribution to the “package deal.”130 Sisco mentioned too that he suspected the two other countries adopted a single-handed approach, cf. cable from Washington to Berne, cable no. 660, 14.09.1970, in: CH-BAR# E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 124 The Swiss embassy to Jordan was based in Beirut and had no facilities in Jordan. 125 The message of Ambassador Dubois transmitted through the British embassy in Berne to Ambassador Micheli on 13 September 1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 126 Ibid. 127 Minutes of the Federal Council Meeting, 14.09.1970, late in the night at 1.15 AM, in: ­C H-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 128 Cable from Berne to Beirut, 14.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 129 That Israel knew about the single-handed approaches can be inferred through the Israeli Ambassador’s remark at a coordination meeting. Ambassador Levavi asked about Wischnewski and signalled to Germany its awareness of the issue, cf. minutes of the coordination meeting, 14.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 130 A cable of the Swiss embassy in Berne to the Swiss embassy in Alger, 14.09.1970, in: CH-BAR# E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. Switzerland had offered good offices to Israel and transmitted the information about the release of the Algerians to Algeria.

50

Chapter 1

Despite Israel’s move, the relations between the five concerned governments remained tense, especially since news from Jordan revealed that the ICRC negotiations were stagnating because of the outbreak of the Jordanian civil war.131 In the coordination meetings after violent combat had started, Germany and the United Kingdom consistently threatened to abandon the coalition if Israel did not release Palestinians too, while Federal Councillor Graber and Swiss Ambassador Pierre Micheli,132 Secretary General of the FPD, who were heading the meetings tried to reconcile the positions.133 For instance, in the meeting of 16 September 1970 at 12:05 AM, Switzerland was worried that the unity would break because a few minutes previously, Germany gave Israel until noon the following day to cooperate with the coalition.134 In that same meeting, British representative Midgley expressed his country’s discontent with Israel and with the coalition in general. Swiss Ambassador Micheli insisted that unity was the best way to counter the terrorists and requested that German Ambassador von Keller ask his government to reconsider the ultimatum.135 In the morning, Switzerland talked separately with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel trying to calm the waves.136 From the moment the coordination meetings were placed in Berne, Swiss officials did all they could to keep the coalition together. This was mainly because they were convinced that the common approach was the best way to manage this crisis. Swiss policymakers believed that it was good to show strength vis-à-vis the PFLP, while they realised that this was only possible through the framework of the coalition.137 But the coalition was not only a means to implement what Swiss policymakers believed to be the best counterterrorism strategy. The Federal Council considered the common approach more in line with Swiss neutrality. As the head of the FPD Federal Councillor 131 The war was later called “Black September” by the Palestinians, Sharif and Mahnaimi, Tried by Fire, p. 113. 132 For further information about Pierre Micheli, see also dodis.ch/P86. 133 Minutes of the meetings that took place between 12 and 25 September 1970, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 134 Minutes of coordination meetings, 16.09.1970, 00.05–01.30 AM, in: CH-BAR#E2001 E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 135 Ibid. 136 Minutes of these bilateral talks, 16.09.1970, in: ibid. 137 For the idea that counterterrorism must be implemented with strength, cf. F­ederal Council Meeting, 16.09.1970, at which point the Council discussed the c­ oordination meeting of the night before when Germany had set the ultimatum to Israel, in: ­C H-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

51

Graber had explained in a secret Council meeting, he was worried that without the coalition, Switzerland would find itself alone in the midst of the Arab-Israeli conflict.138 This meant that for the Swiss government, the coalition represented a way to “hide away” behind the common front. This, however, contradicts the fact that Swiss officials actually took the lead in the negotiations. In their fear of endangering the country’s neutral position when faced with the Arab-Israeli war on their own, Swiss officials engaged in the maintenance of the coalition and this, as mentioned before, put Switzerland at the forefront of the negotiations with the Palestinians and placed it in the Western Cold War power bloc. By the same token, in their role of keeping unity, Swiss officials could serve as mediators and this was a role that fitted them well. Swiss foreign policy has a long tradition of so-called “good offices,” where it took up mandates to function as a mediator in the resolution of conflicts.139 One could argue that finally, in the last phase of the crisis, Swiss officials, on the one hand, infringed the traditional foreign political line of neutrality and, on the other hand, maintained a long foreign political tradition of mediating between conflicting positions among the coalition partners. The whole situation changed when on 25 September, the Jordanian army progressed to the point where it encircled a Palestinian refugee camp in which some of the hostages were hidden.140 The Palestinians, as they explained later, could no longer ensure the security of the hostages and thus decided to liberate them.141 They left them in the camp so that the Jordanian army could find them later.142 It turned out that the 16 liberated hostages were all the European hostages that were held in groups among the camp.143 A few hours later, 138 Minutes of the extraordinary Federal Council meeting, 14.09.1970, 8 AM, in: ibid. 139 For this aspect of Swiss foreign policy tradition during the Cold War, see for instance Thomas Fischer. Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise: 1979–1981: eine Studie zur Politik der Guten Dienste im Kalten Krieg. Zurich: ETH Zurich—Forschungsstelle fur Sicherheitspolitik, 2004. 140 Report about the liberation of the hostages, “Note pour le Chef du Département. Libération des otages, confidentiel”, 30.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55 (hereafter Hostage Liberation Report). 141 Ibid, p. 2 and also cf. a cable of the Swiss embassy in Cairo, 27.09.1970, 3.00 PM, which explained the Palestinian presentation of how the liberation of the hostages happened, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier. Cf. also Habbash and Malbrunot, Les revolutionnaires, p. 106. 142 Ibid., cable of the Swiss embassy in Cairo, 27.09.1970, 3.00 PM, in: ibid. 143 Cable sent by M. Clavien arriving in Berne by 25.09.1970, 12.25 PM, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier.

52

Chapter 1

another 32 hostages were brought to the ICRC in Amman by the PFLP and only six US-Israeli hostages remained in the hands of the PFLP.144 For Switzerland and the other two European states the question came up as to whether the remaining six US hostages should be exchanged for their seven Palestinian prisoners. In the coordination meeting of 26 September, it was agreed that the negotiations through the ICRC would be continued. Later that day, the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser offered to act as an intermediary between the Western governments and the PFLP since he had already successfully mediated between the Palestinians and the Jordanian government in the establishment of a ceasefire.145 The United States and Israel, however, were against the exchange of prisoners because they believed that since the previous hostages were released unconditionally, there was a high chance that this could also be achieved for the last remaining ones.146 The United Kingdom was inclined to do the exchange despite the disapproval of the United States and Israel and offered the Royal Air Force to take charge of the prisoner transport.147 With these givens, the Federal Council had to decide whether it wanted to keep or to free the Palestinian prisoners in Zurich. There were several elements considered in the four days of the decisionmaking process that took place in the form of various meetings of the Federal Council with the Zurich authorities, Swissair representatives, and FPD officials between 26 and 29 September. The aspect that was raised most often in the final Federal Council meeting was the fear of further terrorist attacks against Switzerland.148 The FPD and Swissair reported PFLP terrorist warnings in case the Kloten attackers were not freed immediately.149 144 Hostage Liberation Report. 145 Minutes of the Coordination meeting, 26.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. The British ambassador informed his Swiss counterpart about Nasser, “Notiz. Vertraulich. Flugzeugentführungen,” Berne, 26.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 146 The US ambassador informed Gelser, “Vertraulich, Notiz. Flugzeugentführungen,” Berne, 27.09.1970, in: ibid. For the Israeli views, cf. cable from the Swiss embassy in Tel Aviv, 28.09.1970, 5 PM, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. 147 Minutes of a meeting with the British, German and Swiss diplomats in Berne, “Flugzeugentführungen. Besprechung”, 27.09.1970, 4.30 PM in Berne, in: CHBAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. 148 Minutes of the Federal Council meeting, 29.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/ 136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 149 The Federal Council based its information on a cable of Ambassador Dubois from Beirut to Berne, cable no. 287, 26.09.1970, 08.30 PM, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*,

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

53

The Zurich cantonal officials argued that it would make a juridical difference whether the hostages were liberated by the PFLP or by the Jordanian army because if it was the army, the Swiss government’s release of the prisoners was no longer part of the ICRC deal with the PFLP.150 Zurich officials argued that if the PFLP deliberately chose to free the hostages, it would mean that they had kept their part of the ICRC deal and Switzerland would then have to fulfil its part. If the army forcefully liberated the hostages, then Switzerland would have no obligation to free the prisoners.151 The FPD, however, argued that it was in the Swiss state’s interest to free the Palestinian prisoners because, on the one hand, it could avoid further terrorist attacks that would again aim to free the prisoners in Zurich and, on the other hand, the Swiss government could justify the release by referring to the maintenance of the coalition.152 The Swiss officials could argue that the prisoners in Switzerland should be exchanged against the six remaining US hostages in Jordan.153 The Federal Council decided to follow the FPD’s suggestion and consented to the release of the three Palestinians. A week later, after the last six US hostages were freed, the three Kloten attackers were picked up by the Royal Air Force on its way to Cairo, with Lela Khaled and the three Palestinian prisoners from Munich.154 The Swiss government had overcome its first terrorist crisis with the hostages back safely and the terrorists at large. This first encounter with Palestinian terrorism, however, showed Swiss policymakers the country’s vulnerability to the terrorist threat. After this first shock, Switzerland engaged more actively in international fora to suppress terrorism and aimed to increase international counterterrorist collaboration. Accordingly, in the last coordination meeting after the crisis, Switzerland suggested several measures to the other states with a view to improving international security, such as the exchange of Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 55. The Swissair representatives reported that the airline got bomb threats through anonymous phone calls, cf. “Protokoll der Vorsprechung einer Swissair-Delegation bei den Herren Bundesräten Graber und Bovin,” 25.09.1970 and 28.09.1070, in: ibid. 150 Minutes of a Federal Council meeting with Zurich cantonal authorities, 28.09.1970, 8.30 AM, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 154 Federal Council communiqué, 01.10.1970, which informed that the prisoners had left Switzerland, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier, box 56.

54

Chapter 1

information about the terrorist threats.155 What the Swiss authorities took away from this experience of a terrorist attack and how and why it actively engaged in counterterrorism prevention in the following years will be the subject of the next chapters. Summary of Swiss Reactions to Palestinian Terrorism When in February 1969, four Palestinian terrorists attacked an El Al plane, the Swiss government was confronted with a new form of aggression that was perpetrated by non-state actors who could strike at any time and place. Swiss policymakers did not know how to handle this new threat and their first reaction to terrorism can best be described as “experimental.” As they looked for state sponsors, they held the Arab states accountable for the Palestinian’s actions. But this led to a deadlock. The Swiss government also understood that there were limited possibilities to protect Switzerland from further terrorist attacks and thus, instead of proactively developing a counterterrorist prevention strategy, such as for instance deploying security guards in Swissair flights, Swiss authorities only prepared ad hoc response measures. In an excessively meticulous way, the Swiss authorities planned to respond to a terrorist crisis in such a way as to ensure fast and swift management—which meant the immediate release of the three Palestinian terrorists in exchange for the hostages. When in September 1970 the actual hostage crisis hit Switzerland in the form of the Palestinian plane hijackings, Swiss policymakers indeed reacted extremely quickly. Berne immediately agreed to release its Palestinian prisoners, but this action did not bring the expected result. Domestically, the prompt answer to the PFLP ultimatum was interpreted as surrender and internationally, the Swiss government appeared selfish because its communiqué followed the publication of new PFLP demands which made it seem to only care for its own citizens. Swiss policymakers soon realised that the “solo run” was a mistake and immediately took the exact opposite position. They then not only agreed to coordinate actions but also to take the lead in the coordinated negotiations with the PFLP. Analysing the responses of the Swiss government to Palestinian terrorism, one can thus conclude that the Swiss policy was originally an insecure and experimental trial and error approach, which soon developed into fear-inspired realpolitik, careful mediation, and a leading role within the coordination 155 Minutes of the coordination meeting, 01.10.1970, in: CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970.

Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism

55

group. In this context, one can ask whether Palestinian terrorism and the Swiss government’s response undermined the country’s status of neutrality. In view of the options at the disposal of the Swiss government during Skyjack Sunday, both available policy options risked undermining the credibility of the country’s neutrality. By acting on its own, the Swiss government would have been involved in the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict as it would have given a certain degree of recognition and legitimacy to the PFLP. It would further have risked alienating Israel, which since July 1970 had employed a strict no-negotiation line. However, by acting in the coalition, the Swiss government would have admitted a pro-Israeli position and would have positioned itself within the Cold War Western bloc. As has been shown, concerted action seemed more acceptable to Swiss policymakers. For them, the fact that they acted in a concerted way meant that they could maintain a strong counterterrorism voice, without having to engage in the political discourse that surrounded the terrorist act. In fact, Swiss policymakers believed that remaining in the coalition corresponded more closely to Swiss neutrality, because it could stay out of the Arab-Israeli conflict as far as possible by hiding behind a common approach. The desire to avoid direct involvement in the conflict thus gave the Swiss diplomats a strong incentive to insist on maintaining unity. Unlike the other European states, the Swiss government refused to enter into separate negotiations with the PFLP. Furthermore, Swiss diplomats served as intermediaries between the members of the coalition, which corresponded to a well-­established foreign policy tradition and allowed the Swiss negotiators to work credibly to maintain the unity. Ultimately, the desire to avoid any confrontation with the terrorists played a central role; this interest prevailed over the risk of being affiliated with the group of Western powers. Similarly, the desire to stay out of the Arab-Israeli conflict further contributed to the government’s decision to release the Palestinian prisoners, even though they were charged and prosecuted for murder (among other crimes). This decision was even more problematic because once the hostages were brought back onto Swiss soil, the Swiss government could have claimed that it had no obligation to release the prisoners. It could either say that it was the Jordanian army that had liberated the hostages and thus there was no deal between Switzerland and the PFLP, or it could have argued that it refused to fulfil a promise that it made under pressure.156 Swiss policymakers, however, 156 Israel suggested to refuse the release of prisoners because the promise to do so was given under pressure, cf. cable from the Swiss embassy in Tel Aviv, 28.09.1970, 5 PM, in: CHBAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Kloten and Zarqa Dossier.

56

Chapter 1

decided to free the Palestinian prisoners and, in doing so, they wanted to prevent short-term terrorist attacks that would have again aimed at the liberation of the Palestinian prisoners.157 In this vein, safeguarding security interests were sacrificed for the principles of the rule of law. In sum, the Swiss government tried to reconcile the contradictions between terrorism and neutrality through a policy that attempted to avoid international antagonisms while countering terrorism at the same time. Yet, with this crisis management strategy the Swiss government made the first step towards integrating into the Western security framework, undermined the most basic principles of the rule of law, and buckled under the pressure of international terrorism.

157 Minutes of the Federal Council meeting, 29.09.1970, in: CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/ 136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, “Persönlich,” 1970.

Chapter 2

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970–71) The year 1970 marked a rather turbulent episode in the history of Swiss foreign policy. Soon after Skyjack Sunday, the next crisis was not long in coming. This time, the Swiss Foreign Service was struck by the revolutionary Brazilian urban guerrilla VPR. The VPR kidnapped the Swiss ambassador to Brazil, Giovanni Enrico Bucher1 on 7 December 1970.2 For his release, the kidnappers directed all of their demands towards the Brazilian government. The VPR requested the release and safe transport into exile of 70 prisoners from Brazilian prisons, an immediate stop of police checks, and the broadcast of a VPR message on national TV.3 The Swiss government did not have much leverage due to Switzerland’s small size, but it was an important trade partner and the Brazilian government had a strong interest in keeping good relations with Switzerland.4 According to statistics at the time, Switzerland was one of the biggest foreign investors in Brazil and 1 For more information about Ambassador Giovanni Enrico Bucher, see also dodis.ch/P10060. For published archival sources on Bucher’s kidnapping, see Dodis’ database for the following documents: http://dodis.ch/35990 http://dodis.ch/35991 http://dodis.ch/35840 http:// dodis.ch/35992 http://dodis.ch/36408 http://dodis.ch/35993 http://dodis.ch/35997 http:// dodis.ch/35994 http://dodis.ch/35996 http://dodis.ch/35998 http://dodis.ch/35999 http:// dodis.ch/36001 http://dodis.ch/36003 http://dodis.ch/36000 http://dodis.ch/35841 http:// dodis.ch/36004. 2 Cable from the Swiss embassy in Rio to the crisis task force members in Berne [hereafter cable from Rio to Berne], 7.12.1970, no. 101, 00.00 PM [the time refers always to the local time from where the cable was sent] in: CH-BAR#E2500#1990/6#2585*, Bucher, Enrico, Entführung 7.12.1970, Dossiers I-VIII, 1970–71, [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier”, Main Dossier I]. 3 Memorandum of the Swiss embassy in Brazil, “Embassy Activities—a brief chronological description”, 7–11.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Annex to Main Dossier I. 4 For an evaluation of Swiss economic relations with Latin American countries during that time, including its trade with Brazil, see Ursina Bentele and Sacha Zala, “Neutrality as a Business Strategy: Switzerland and Latin America in the Cold War,” in: Bott, Sandra; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (eds.). Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 178−195. Bucher’s abduction is also discussed, pp. 189−190.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_005

58

Chapter 2

an important trade partner.5 Swiss industrial companies were mostly present in the following sectors: the food industry (Nestlé, Hero), the chemical industry (Ciba-Geigy,), pharmaceuticals (Sandoz, Hoffmann-La Roche), the construction industry (Cementia), and the mechanical engineering industry (Sulzer).6 In return, highlighting the strong commercial ties between the countries, Brazil was the biggest provider of green coffee to Switzerland in the years 1970–1973.7 Because the acceptance of the VPR’s demands depended entirely on the Brazilian government’s decision, Swiss officials soon realised that their hands were tied. Fearing what they called Brazilian “sensitivity,” Swiss policymakers tried to avoid any action that could possibly upset the Brazilian government.8 As will be shown, they not only accepted the government’s monopoly over negotiations with the VPR, they also decided to abide by its demand to limit criticism of their politics in the media. Accordingly, to minimise misinterpretation of Swiss press releases, the Swiss embassy in Brazil stopped publishing any news whatsoever. Furthermore, the administration in Berne undertook several attempts to influence TV, radio, and press reports in the Swiss media. The principal aim of this chapter is to show the perceived powerlessness of the Swiss policymakers and their resulting readiness to undermine the freedom of the press in Switzerland. This is particularly interesting when considering the complex relationship between terrorism and the media.9 A majority of 5 Kommission für Entwicklungsfragen der Universität Zürich. “Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Schweiz-Brasilien,” Zentrum Schweiz—Peripherie Brasilien, eine Dokumentation zu den schweizerischen-brasilianischen Beziehungen, 1975, in: Dokumentensammlung Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum der Universität Basel (WWZ), p. 50. 6 Kommission für Entwicklungsfragen der Universität Zürich, “Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Schweiz-Brasilien,” p. 88. See also Gérard Perroulaz and Serge Ghinet. Comment mieux cooperer avec le Bresil? Aide des ONG et relations economiques de la Suisse. Geneva: Institut universitaire d’etudes du developpement, 1995. 7 Historical Statistics of Switzerland, Chapter L, “L.42a. Einfuhrwerte einzelner Produkte nach den wichtigsten Ursprungsländern (in Millionen Franken): Mittel der Jahre 1970–1973,” online accessible: www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/nls_rev/sylkgenerator.php?datei=L.42aLaenderWaren1970_73L.slk&filename=L.42aLaenderWaren1970_73L.slk&chapter=l/ 8 The original French word used in the sources was “susceptibilté.” The term was constantly used to describe the possible negative reaction of the Brazilian government to a measure undertaken by the Swiss government. The first time the term was used in the correspondence was in a cable from Rio to Berne, 18.12.1970, 06.30 PM, no. 139, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 9 On this topic, the literature embodies a wide range of different positions, see Christian F. Buck’s work for a summary of specifically the literature on media and hostage taking. Christian F. Buck. Medien und Geiselnahmen: Fallstudien zum inszenierten Terror. Wiesbaden: Verl. fur Sozialwiss, 2007.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

59

researchers consider the media to be an encouraging factor for the terrorists.10 The media provides terrorists with a socio-political communication platform that gives them the publicity they seek and need.11 This view is well summarised by Walter Laqueur’s often cited phrase: “The media are the terrorist’s best friend.”12 The reverse, however, is also valid, as Marta Crenshaw shows in her works on mass media and terrorism. She points out that the media constantly searches for spectacular stories and they find in terrorism a field that can attract readers or spectators.13 Consequently, several authors call the relationship between the media and terrorism a “symbiosis.”14 By applying these ideas to the management of Bucher’s abduction, I argue in this chapter that Swiss official attempts to control the media helped to deprive the VPR of media attention, which is crucial for the success of a terrorist attack. By the same token, Switzerland aligned entirely with the Brazilian government, at the time a military dictatorship, and tried to prevent any account that criticised this regime. In this vein, the Swiss government agreed to be an accomplice of a dictatorship. The reasons for the Brazilian government’s strong demands concerning media censorship were connected to the recent developments in Brazil.15 In the late 1960s, the regime began to lay greater emphasis on its public appearance. 10

11 12 13 14

15

D. L. Paletz and J. Boiney, “‘Researchers’ Perspectives,” in: David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid. Terrorism and the Media: How Researchers, Terrorists, Government, Press, Public, Victims view and use the Media. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage, 1992. For a more recent summary of the debate about the relation between terrorism and media see also: Brigitte Nacos. Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p. 11. A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke. Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications, 1991, p. 8. Walter Laqueur, “The Futility of Terrorism,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1976, pp. 99−105, p. 104. Marta Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 1981, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 379−399, p. 386. M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Spring 1981, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 1−51, p. 14. and Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter. Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public. Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1990. For an overview of the Brazilian government’s repressive and bloody military dictatorship, see Leslie Bethell (ed.). The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX, Brazil since 1930s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 and Thomas E. Skidmore. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. For older works on the urban guerrilla in Brazil and their repression see also, Wilfred A. Bacchus. Mission in Mufti: Brazil’s Military Regimes, 1964–1985. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990; Maria Helena Moreira Alves. State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Austin: University of Texas

60

Chapter 2

It installed the “Fifth Institutional Act” in 1968, which consisted of strict media censorship.16 Several print media were subject to prior censorship, meaning that their copy had to be cleared by an army censor.17 Furthermore, the kidnapping of a diplomat aimed to expose the weakness of the government. With media control, the government tried to counteract this aspect. This explains why the Brazilian government was so sensitive to media broadcasts in Brazil as well as in Switzerland. With the hardening of the regime and the publication of the “Fifth Institutional Act,” many in the left opposition radicalised and became more firmly committed to the armed revolutionary struggle.18 Among other leftist groups which split from the Brazilian Communist Party, the VPR became active in 1969 in Sao Paulo under the leadership of Carlos Lamarca.19 The VPR and its allied group ALN constituted the biggest subversive groups in Brazil. Their tactics had been kidnappings of diplomats as well as suicide bombings of military buildings.20 The VPR was active between 1969 and 1971, when its leader Lamarca died in September 1971.21 Until present day, Bucher’s abduction has not been researched, neither in Brazilian nor Swiss historical scholarship. This chapter is thus the first historical account of these events and is mainly based on primary sources. Historians who mention Bucher’s abduction refer to the incident as the last time the Brazilian government succumbed to revolutionaries’ demands.22 After

Press, 1985. For the leftist movement in Brazil leading up to the violent struggle, see also Colin Snider, “A More Systemic Fight for Reform. University Reform, Student Movements, Society, and the State in Brazil, 1957–1968,” in: Samantha Christiansen and Zachary A. Scarlett (eds.). The Third World in the Global 1960s. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013, pp. 101−115. 16 Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change, p. 157. 17 Ibid. 18 Leslie Bethell and Celso Castro, “Politics in Brazil under Military Rule 1964–1985,” in: Bethell Cambridge History of Latin America, pp. 165−230, p. 188. 19 James Kohl and John Litt. Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1974, p. 46. 20 For a contemporary interpretation of the urban guerrilla tactics, with an appendix of Carlos Marighella’s minimanual for urban guerrilla warfare, see also Robert Moss and Carlos Marighella. Urban Guerrilla Warfare; With an Appendix: Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 21 Peter Calvert, “Brazil: Military Dictatorship, 1946–85,” in: James Ciment (ed.). World ­Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011, pp. 177−179, p. 178. 22 Calvert, “Brazil: Military Dictatorship,” in: Ciment, World Terrorism, p. 178.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

61

Bucher’s release, the Brazilian police increased the use of violence (namely death squads) and soon dismantled the VPR, which brought urban terrorism and all internal opposition in Brazil to an end.23 The chapter’s focus is on Swiss policymaking and primarily looks at the implications for Swiss security ­concerns. To best understand Swiss reactions, decisions, and policies, this chapter is divided into three sections. First, the focus is on the initial phase of the crisis and elucidates the bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Switzerland in view of countering the VPR. I place particular emphasis on the power dynamics between the VPR, the Brazilian authorities, and the Swiss government. I analyse their tactics and aims through a chronological examination of the negotiation period and show that Switzerland’s policy actions were highly limited and entirely dependent on Brazil. Second, because of this dependency, Swiss policymakers complied with the Brazilian demands of trying to control the media in Switzerland and abroad, which I analyse in the subsequent section. Third, in the last section I focus on the Swiss government’s evaluation of the terrorist threat and look at what measures were designed in reaction to Bucher’s abduction.

After Zarqa, Now Rio

Ambassador Bucher was born 1913 in Milan as a Swiss expatriate from Kerns (in the Obwalden canton). After his studies in law in Zurich and Paris, he joined the Swiss Foreign Service in 1943. His assignments before Rio had been in New Delhi, Paris, Berne, Baghdad, and Lagos and Bucher had already been posted in Rio for four years when the abduction happened.24 Bucher was in his car in Rio on the way to work when on 7 December 1970 the kidnappers attacked his vehicle. His bodyguard tried to protect him and was critically wounded by a bullet in the back. Bucher recalled how the whole kidnapping lasted no more than 15 to 30 seconds and he barely realised what was happening to him: he was getting out of the car, searching for his cigarettes, felt the bullets close to 23 Bethell, Cambridge History of Latin America, p. 193. 24 Update on the latest developments, “Wer ist Botschafter Bucher?”, 07.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. After his release from the VPR, Bucher went back to Rio for a few months and was later posted to Japan, cf. “Nomination de M. Giovanni Bucher comme Ambassadeur à Tokio et de M. Emil Stadelhofer comme Ambassadeur à Brasilia” classified as secret, Berne, 22.03.1971, in: CH-BAR#E7001C#1982/118#295*, Entführung Botschafter Bucher, 1971.

62

Chapter 2

his head, and in the next moment he was already being driven away in the VPR’s Volkswagen.25 Bucher’s chauffeur escaped with no more than a fright and reached the ­embassy unhurt. An hour after the driver got back, Berne was informed.26 Later the same day, the first message from the kidnappers was transmitted to the ­embassy. Berne created a crisis task force as it had for Skyjack ­Sunday. Meanwhile, the media bombarded the embassy with requests and ­Brazilian President Medici promised that all “necessary measures will be taken to save ­Ambassador ­Bucher.”27 Thus began a month-long crisis, where Swiss ­government o­ fficials were sometimes stretched to their limits. The FPD published the following press release the day of the abduction: With consternation has the Federal Political Department received the message about the kidnapping of the Swiss ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Giovanni Bucher. It is outrageous that, once again, violent acts have been perpetrated against innocents, in violation of human rights.28 The message was released after the crisis task force assembled under the presidency of Michael Gelzer. In order to best handle this new counterterrorist challenge, the crisis task force was organized along a similar structure as during Skyjack Sunday. The directing personnel also remained the same as during the previous crisis, namely Michael Gelzer and Ambassador Pierre Micheli.29 Besides the members of the diplomatic corps, the task force consisted of jurists and administrative assistants and was deployed in Berne as well as in Rio. The next day, Micheli, who a few months earlier presided over the Skyjack Sunday cooperation meetings, briefed the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the National Council and the Council of States about the kidnapping. The commission recommended sending a high-ranking diplomat to Rio, to ensure

25 Report written by Ambassador Bucher addressed to Federal Councillor Graber: “Mon elèvement du 7 décembre 1970 au 16 janvier 1971,” classified as secret, p. 2, in: ­C H-BAR#E2024B#2001/146#131*, Bucher Giovanni E., 1970–71. 26 Cable from the Swiss embassy in Rio to the crisis task force members in Berne, 7.12.1970, no. 101, 00.00 PM, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 27 Memorandum of the Swiss embassy in Brazil: “Embassy Activities—a brief chronological description,” 7–11.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Annex to Main Dossier I. 28 FPD, Press release, 7.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 29 Minutes of a news briefing of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Council and the Council of States, session of 17.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier II.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

63

smooth intergovernmental cooperation and crisis management.30 Accordingly, the Swiss ambassador to Luxembourg, Max Feller, was appointed “interim head of mission” to Brazil. He had previously served in Brazil as an embassy policy adviser from 1954 to 1964. Because Swiss policymakers were afraid that the Brazilian authorities could interpret Feller’s temporary posting to Brazil as a lack of trust, the Swiss authorities carefully introduced Feller to Brazil and emphasised his function as “chargé d’affaire a.i.” [ad interim] and not as a “special envoy.” This communicated to the Brazilian authorities that Feller was sent to Brazil as the temporary head of the embassy in the absence of the current holder of the position, Ambassador Bucher. The understanding of Feller’s role as “special envoy” would have risked giving the impression that Switzerland was trying to undermine the Brazilian government’s authority in dealing directly with the terrorists. A personal letter to President Medici was sent by the President of the Federal Council, Councillor Hans-Peter Tschudi, to formally introduce Feller as the temporary Swiss ambassador to Brazil and to express the Swiss government’s gratitude for the efforts that Brazil had agreed to take to free Bucher from the hands of the VPR. This fear of a possible misinterpretation by the Brazilian government was a constant pattern in the diplomatic communications throughout the whole crisis. Another pattern had been that the Brazilian government took all decisions and then retroactively informed the Swiss government. Typically, in the bilateral correspondences the Brazilian government updated Feller about the latest developments, explained the Brazilian counterterrorist strategy, or made specific requests for Swiss policy. For example, in Feller’s first meeting with his official Brazilian contact Mr Parente de Mello, Feller was informed about the Brazilian general strategy and presented with the most likely scenario for the liberation of the hostage.31 According to the Brazilian government, the liberation would be achieved in five phases.32 The first phase extended from the actual kidnapping to the assurance of the Brazilian government to do everything in their power to liberate Bucher alive. In phase two, negotiations would begin over the conditions for 30 31

32

Ibid., p. 3 Minister Parente de Mello was appointed the coordination manager of the operations to liberate Bucher. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland had previously issued an entry banner against de Mello, which it cancelled for the occasion. Cf. cable from Rio to Berne, 11.12.1970, no. 142, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, 11.12.1970, no. 114, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

64

Chapter 2

Bucher’s liberation between the VPR and the Brazilian government. In phase three, the Brazilian government and the VPR would implement the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, phase three would be completed once the prisoners released in exchange for Bucher reached exile. Phase four covered the waiting period between the fulfilment of the conditions and Bucher’s release. The final fifth phase followed Bucher’s liberation, in which it was expected that Bucher would cooperate with the Brazilian police and conform his media statements to the Brazilian government’s directions. This scenario, presented by the Brazilian government’s spokesperson, was based on the assumption that the Brazilian government would agree to negotiate with the kidnappers. In Feller’s first talks with Brazilian Foreign Minister Barbosa, Feller understood that this willingness to negotiate was not shared among all government agencies.33 Barbosa explained that many representatives of the military thought that the Brazilian government should cease to be susceptible to blackmail. According to them, the only way to counter terrorism and to prevent future kidnappings was to adopt a strong unalterable line with no concessions and no negotiations. The embassy staff members in Rio explained to Feller that the reasoning of the military was based on the assumption that if the Brazilian government released prisoners, the VPR would be encouraged to continue kidnapping diplomats with ever higher demands.34 These concerns stemmed from the so-called “urban guerrilla tactics,” a manual for armed struggle in Latin America developed by Carlos Marighella, the co-founder of ALN, the VPR’s ally.35 According to this manual, the demands should increase with further kidnappings.36 The Brazilian counterterrorism units killed Marighella in 1969, while it seemed that the subversive groups continued to follow his tactics. For the first two kidnapping cases, the VPR demands were not too high. In September 1969, they kidnapped US Ambassador Burke Elbick and demanded 15 prisoners. In March 1970, they kidnapped Japanese consul-general Nobuo Okuchi and the government agreed to free four prisoners.37 However for the West German 33

Cable from Rio to Berne, no. 120, 13.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I (hereafter Feller’s cable no. 120, 13.12.1970). 34 Political contextualisation by Michel Pache, 9.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 35 Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. St Petersburg, FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2008, [orig. name Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano, first published in Brazil, June 1969]. 36 Ibid. 37 Calvert 2011, p. 179 and political contextualisation report by Michel Pache, 9.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

65

Ambassador Ehrenfried von Holleben in June 1970, the VPR wanted 40 prisoners and for Bucher the number jumped to 70 prisoners. According to Feller, this was the reason why the military opted for a nonegotiation line and constantly threatened to try liberating Bucher by force. The possible loss of Bucher’s life was considered a “sacrifice” that would have to be made in order to prevent violent acts of this kind in the future.38 The Foreign Minister explained to Feller that these hardliners were quite powerful and that the Brazilian government’s decision to enter negotiations was on a knife’s edge.39 This piece of information about the internal policy disagreement was the core determinant of Swiss policy in this crisis. Swiss decision-makers believed that the “slightest faux-pas [from Switzerland] could have catastrophic consequences,” since it would strengthen voices in favour of a forceful intervention.40 Consequently, the Swiss government saw its task while facilitating the negotiations between the Brazilian government and the VPR as “to prevent rash actions on both sides.”41 However, this de facto meant that Swiss decision-makers would strictly obey instructions from the Brazilian government.42 The latter then had free reign to handle the crisis as they saw fit according to their best interests. The main goal of the Brazilian government was to scale down the rather high conditions for the liberation of Bucher. As mentioned above, the VPR wanted the release of 70 prisoners, the immediate stop of police deployment, a broadcast of a video message, and, in addition to these originally expressed demands, the VPR also requested free train transportation for poor migrant workers in the outskirts of Rio.43 An important element, however, was left out by the VPR: as opposed to the two previous kidnapping cases, the group did not set any ultimatum. The absence of a deadline allowed the Brazilian government to stall its reaction to the VPR messages and, in doing so, to show “strong nerves” in the power game. Furthermore, within minutes after the kidnapping, 38 39 40 41

42 43

Feller’s cable no. 120, 13.12.1970, p. 3. Ibid, p. 2. “Note pour le chef du Département, Suite à notre rapport sur l’enlèvement de M. Bucher,” 14.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Max Feller, “Vertraulich,” “Betrifft: Entführung von Botschafter Bucher,” 05.02.1971, p. 5 and p. 12, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III (hereafter Feller Internal Report). To what extent the Swiss authorities implemented the Brazilian authorities’ demands will be outlined further below in the second part of this chapter. Cable from Rio to Berne, 8.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

66

Chapter 2

around 20,000 policemen and soldiers were deployed and all exits out of Rio were blocked immediately.44 Summarising the first 11 days of the crisis, one could say that the Brazilian authorities gained the upper hand in the negotiations through these two elements: “delaying tactics” and the enormous police deployment in and around Rio. The first communiqué of the Brazilian government already announced a tougher policy line compared to previous kidnapping cases. Brazil condemned the VPR action as a “human rights violation” and warned the kidnappers that Brazil would not accept any demand that would undermine the “dignity of the Brazilian people and of its government.”45 Furthermore, it took 11 days just to confirm the authenticity of the VPR messages and to begin actual negotiations. This represented a long time to spend on formalities when one considers that in previous cases the government had concluded the affair within three days. In what follows, I reconstruct these negotiations and explain the policies behind them. First Round in the “War of the Nerves”—Unmaking of Swiss Policy In the immediate aftermath of the kidnapping, contradictory information ­circulated in the media about the name of the group who perpetrated it.46 On 8 December, the police and the Swiss embassy received anonymous calls that indicated the location where messages with ransom demands had been deposited.47 None of these messages could be identified with certainty to have been issued by the kidnappers.48 To establish clarity, in an official communiqué on 9 December the Brazilian Justice Ministry requested that the claim

44

45 46

47

48

Cable from Rio to Berne, no. 102, 7.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I; and also cable from the next day, cable from Rio to Berne, no. 104, 8.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. The police was able to react quickly because it was part of a carefully prepared deployment plan in case of another kidnapping. Feller’s cable no. 120, 13.12.1970, p. 2. For a collection of all the 122 AFP messages that were published concerning Bucher’s kidnapping, cf. CH-BAR#E1010B#1986/151#81*, Entführung schweiz. Botschafter in Brasilien, 1970–71. The embassy received 7 calls in the first two days, cf. “Aktivitäten der Botschaft,” BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. About the police, cf. cable from Rio to Berne, 8.12.1970, no 104, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, 8.12.1970, no 106, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

67

of responsibility as well as the list of the 70 prisoners was accompanied by a hand-written letter from Bucher in which he described his health conditions.49 The VPR reacted swiftly and later the same day it submitted a hand-written letter from Bucher to the police, which was later verified as authentic.50 The VPR also renewed its previously stated demands and, as requested, let Bucher sign the document.51 This information was given to Feller on 12 December, but he had to maintain “absolute secrecy” about the fact that these documents were deemed to be authentic.52 Officially, the Brazilian government did not mention these received messages, but a few days later it addressed a radio and TV message to the VPR: on 14 December the Justice Ministry requested that the VPR provide a list with names of the 70 prisoners and that this document should be dated and signed by Bucher.53 It argued that it needed to be certain about the authenticity of the document before negotiations could start.54 This seemingly insignificant move was in fact a quite important manoeuvre by the Brazilian government. The Foreign Minister of Brazil, Mr Barbosa, explained to Feller from the beginning that every single decision was geared towards influencing public opinion.55 In view of this, the Brazilian government’s omission of previous VPR messages could give the impression to the public that the VPR still failed to provide the necessary documents. It could thus blame the VPR for delaying the negotiations and increasing the pressure on the VPR by winning time.56 With regard to the actual negotiations, the Brazilian government only focused on receiving the 70 prisoners’ names. In doing so, it centred the point of contention onto one aspect of one of the four demands, 49

Communiqué from the Justice Minister Alphredo Buzaid, published in Rio, 9.12.1970 at 00.30 PM, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 50 Memorandum by Embassy staff member Wipfli, 9.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 51 Cable from Rio to Berne, 13.12.1970, no 121, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 52 Ibid. 53 Cable from Rio to Berne, 14.12.1970, no. 125, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I and cable from Rio to Berne, 15.12.1970, no 127. 54 Cable from Rio to Berne, 14.12.1970, no124, quoting from the Brazilian government message, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 55 Cable from Rio to Berne summarising a secret talk with Barbosa, Feller’s cable no. 120, 13.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 56 The Brazilian government applied that argument also vis-à-vis the Swiss government. When Swiss officials requested that the speed of the negotiations should increase, Brazil blamed the VPR for blocking the negotiations process. Cf. cable from Rio to Berne, 18.12.1970, no. 139, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

68

Chapter 2

to receive the names before it formally agreed to release the prisoners. This increased the chances that the VPR would eventually drop the other demands. In view of influencing public opinion, the Brazilian government had a particular interest in eliminating the possibility of the VPR broadcasting the message to the Brazilian media.57 Thus, by insisting on the 70 prisoners’ names, Brazil could blame the slow process on account of the VPR and limit the ransom demands to the release of prisoners. The VPR was indeed reticent in answering the Brazilian communiqué. After two days of silence, the VPR replied on 16 December that it would send the list with 70 names under the precondition that the government would first promise that the prisoners would be liberated.58 With the government’s determination not to retreat from its position, the two parties had reached a deadlock even before negotiations really began. In this back and forth, the Swiss authorities stayed surprisingly silent and passive. The crisis task force’s main activity was to gather all kinds of information relating to Bucher’s kidnapping and to then subsequently ask Feller for verification.59 Especially because the Swiss embassy in Rio refused to reply to any media enquiries (as will be discussed later), the news agencies published all sorts of information, for which Berne asked Feller for clarification. Two breaking news stories particularly worried the Swiss authorities: the announcement that Bucher had had a heart attack as well as the rumour that the police had found the VPR’s hideout where Bucher was being held.60 Feller calmed worries about the deterioration of Bucher’s health, but confirmed that the Brazilian authorities drastically increased the police presence in Rio, where house after house was surrounded and searched for Bucher.61 57

According to Peter Calvert, Brazil had managed to hide its use of force against the internal opposition through a media censorship. The Brazilian government was thus strongly interested in controlling its media portrayal. Cf. Calvert “Brazil: Military Dictatorship,” in: Ciment, World Terrorism, p. 178. 58 Communiqué AFP, Rio de Janeiro, 16.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 59 Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force 14.-17.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology,” Annex to the Main Dossier I. 60 For the heart attack, cf. cable from Berne to Rio, 16.12.1970, no 152, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For the police increase and detection of VPR hideout cf. daily activity of the Swiss Embassy in Rio, 15.12.1970. At 07.00 PM representatives from AFP called to announce that the police encircled the VPR’s hideout, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For the inquiry from Berne to Rio, cf. cable from Berne to Rio, 16.12.1970, no. 151, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 61 Cable from Rio to Berne, 17.12.1970, no 132, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

69

However, the Foreign Minister assured Feller that the presence of the police was solely to increase pressure on the VPR. He also asserted that if Bucher’s location was traced, the police would not intervene forcefully, in order not to endanger Bucher’s life.62 In essence, the situation resembled a poker game, where the trump card was that Bucher’s death would be in nobody’s interest. Swiss decision-makers were displeased that the ambassador’s life was being wagered and Feller delivered a letter to the Brazilian president to protest against what seemed an inappropriate dilatory policy. Feller gave the letter secretly, in order not to give the impression to the public that Switzerland was putting pressure on Brazil. This discretion was explicitly requested by the Brazilian authorities to preserve a positive image towards the wider public. The Swiss authorities accepted this wish in the context of what Feller again called “managing Brazilian sensitivity.”63 A feeling of relief was shared among the Swiss authorities when on 18 December the VPR conceded and submitted the list with the names of the 70 prisoners, signed by Bucher.64 This respite did not last long though, since the next day, the Brazilian government rejected the list for, again, formal shortcomings.65 It complained that the list had only been signed by Bucher, but the date was written by typewriter. Accordingly, it demanded another version of the list, with Bucher’s signature as well as the hand-written date. To Feller, this seemed to be another unnecessary step in Brazil’s irresponsible brinkmanship policy and he asked for secret talks with the Brazilian Foreign Minister to express his concerns.66 To everyone’s surprise, exactly four and a half hours after the communiqué requesting the hand-written dated list was transmitted, the VPR sent the list again in accordance with the new requirements via an intermediary messenger.67 With this resubmission, the so-called “second phase” supposedly came to an end. During these first two weeks of the crisis, the Brazilian government

62 63 64 65 66 67

Cable from Rio to Berne, 17.12.1970, no. 134 and second part of cable no.132, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, 18.12.1970, no. 139, the direct quote was “ménager la succeptibilité du gouvernement brésilien,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, 18.12.1970, no. 141, “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, 19.12.1970, no. 145, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Ibid. and reply from Berne, cable from Berne to Rio, 19.12.1970, no. 164 “flash,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, 21.12.1970, no 149, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

70

Chapter 2

managed to gain the dominant position in the power relations. The VPR had finally dropped all other previously stated demands and showed strong interest in speeding up the negotiation process. Thus, the Brazilian government regained confidence that with patience and tenacity it could liberate Bucher alive with an acceptable price.68 The previously requested secret talk between Feller and Foreign Minister Barbosa happened nevertheless, despite the fact that the main discussion point, the impasse in agreeing to the terms of the negotiations, had been surmounted. In this conversation, Barbosa convinced Feller that for the upcoming proceedings, Switzerland’s best policy option was the maintenance of a low profile in order to help the Brazilian government appear to be in a position of strength vis-à-vis the VPR.69 The purpose of this show of strength, Barbosa explained, was to appease the military and police forces, who pressed for a hard line and who would only accept “to negotiate but not to capitulate” to terrorists. For Switzerland, this meant refraining from showing “signs of impatience” in public and giving the Brazilian authorities full power over the crisis management.70 Even though it is possible that Barbosa invented this internal division to ensure that the Swiss would stay quiet, Feller seemed to have believed every word of it. Surprisingly, he not only fully accepted the Brazilian non-interference request but also suggested that Berne help Rio not to appear as weak or “lose face” vis-à-vis public opinion.71 Gelzer agreed to this policy advice and followed Feller’s belief that any other course would have “counter-productive” effects.72 Thus, one could say that after the first two weeks the Brazilian government was not only better positioned in relation to the VPR, it also neutralised the risk of any undesired Swiss interference. It could then continue its “hard line” of taking a long time with each step in crisis management. It slowly began to study the list of the 70 prisoners and to secretly contact the countries that might agree to receive them. The kidnappers stated Algeria, Mexico, or Chile as possible exile countries, which the Brazilian government approached in this respect. As 68 69

Feller Internal Report, p. 5, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Rio to Berne, top secret, 20.12.1970, no. 146, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 For Gelzer’s statement, cable from Berne to Rio, 20.12.1970, no. 165, in: BAR, Bucher ­Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For Feller’s reply to cable 165 and assessment of the situation, cable from Rio to Berne, 20.12.1970, no. 147, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

71

Brazilian-Algerian relations were rather tense, Brazil favoured Mexico or Chile, who both confirmed their willingness to grant asylum to the prisoners.73

Second Round in the “War of the Nerves”—Limited Options

Right after overcoming the first deadlock, the Brazilian government and the VPR were heading for yet another collision. During internal discussions, representatives of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Interior could not agree on the release of all 70 prisoners. The security forces had accepted the liberation of 57 inmates but refused to set free 13 prisoners, who were either accused of murder or of kidnapping or who were sentenced to long-term imprisonment.74 The Ministry of Interior published the corresponding communiqué around the same time as the information was given to Feller.75 In contrast, the VPR categorically insisted on its position and threatened that either the 13 detainees be liberated or Bucher would be executed.76 After 16 days of ambiguous negotiations and insecurity, deadlocks, police and military presence in Rio, and the readiness to follow the instructions of the Brazilian authorities, the Swiss decision-makers had had enough. Feller and Gelzer, in Rio and Berne respectively, began to think of options on how to speed up the process. They thought of ways of how to coax the Brazilian ­government to agree to release the controversial 13 prisoners. Influential personalities in Brazil could play an important role in this matter by exerting pressure on the government. For instance, Feller had a contact in the Brazilian army, who offered him inside information as well as direct access to high military circles.77 In Feller’s own words, he “discretely mobilised” him as well as others to lobby for a change in the government’s position as well as to receive further useful information.78 73

The decision to favour Chile was taken in January, cable from Rio to Berne, 9.1.1971, no. 14, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 74 Cable from Rio to Berne, 22.12.1970, no. 150, “urgent,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 75 Ibid. 76 Cable from Rio to Berne, 23.12.1970, no. 152, “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 77 Cable from Rio to Berne, 13.12.1970, no. 121, “urgent,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 78 Cable from Rio to Berne, 30.12.1970, no. 180, “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. The cable explains the results of Feller’s “discrete mobilisation,” (hereafter cable no. 180).

72

Chapter 2

Another option that Feller and Gelzer discussed was the intervention of leading Swiss industrialists in Brazil.79 However, Gelzer was advised against this course. On the one hand, the Swiss industrialists were themselves dependent on the goodwill of the Brazilian government and could thus exert only limited pressure. On the other hand, Bucher already had the reputation of being “only the ambassador of Swiss economic interests” in Brazil and Swiss industrialists’ intervention would reinforce this viewpoint.80 In return, an important Brazilian industrialist and friend of Bucher was instead recommended to exercise his influence in the higher echelons of the government.81 Feller however did not use his help and that option was fully dropped. Around the same time, the diplomatic corps, initiated by the papal nuncio [nonce apostolique], released a press communiqué expressing sympathy with Bucher.82 Feller took the opportunity to ask the diplomatic body to write a letter to the government, showing their solidarity with Bucher and demanding a speedy resolution of the crisis in respect of human rights. A day later, the letter was addressed to the Brazilian President and transmitted by the nuncio in the name of all diplomats in Brazil.83 Since the clergy was further considered a powerful force in Brazil, Feller persuaded the Cardinal in Rio to include a note for Bucher in his Christmas Prayers.84 On Christmas Day, the Cardinal indeed appealed to the Brazilian nation to remind them of Bucher’s precarious situation.85 In addition to exerting pressure through public channels, Gelzer suggested specifically asking third countries to intervene in favour of Switzerland.86 Feller consulted a few ambassadors from European countries, who offered to issue a common démarche to the Brazilian Foreign Minister.87 This, however, bore the risk that the Minister would then be considered under the influence of the 79

Cable from Berne to Rio, 23.12.1970, no. 173, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. In the same cable, Gelzer suggested other options (hereafter cable no. 173). 80 Note to Gelzer, 23.12.1970, by Mr Simonin, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 81 Ibid. 82 Cable from Rio to Berne, 24.12.1970, no. 156, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 83 Cable from Rio to Berne, 24.12.1970, no. 159, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 84 Cable no. 180, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 85 Ibid. 86 Cable no. 173, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 87 Cable from Rio to Berne, 24.12.1970, no. 160, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

73

European powers, which would weaken his position within internal Brazilian government decision-making.88 Therefore the option was envisaged to have only one country advocating in Switzerland’s favour. Gelzer coordinated with the Swiss embassy in Paris to inquire about the possibility of receiving French help in this respect.89 After a positive reply, Gelzer still decided to hold this option as a backup plan. He was strongly advised by the Federal Republic of Germany to strictly avoid the involvement of third parties, based on its experiences with the abduction of its Ambassador von Holleben.90 Besides the tightening of measures through external actors, Swiss policymakers also increased pressure at the bilateral level. Gelzer and Feller drafted a letter that went beyond the habitual diplomatic language of simply expressing “concerns” or the wish for the “respect of human rights.”91 Feller submitted a letter that particularly pointed out that the Brazilian authorities had broken their word to the VPR. Feller argued that the government misled the VPR by making them believe that the submission of the list of names would suffice. Furthermore, Feller reminded the Brazilian authorities of their responsibility to ensure the life of diplomats and criticised the considerably different treatment of Bucher in comparison to the two previous kidnapping cases.92 Overall, despite having disposed of a number of considerably effective measures, the Swiss authorities finally decided to only employ relatively light measures, which would not seriously inconvenience the Brazilian government. As mentioned above, Feller believed that putting external pressure on the Brazilian government bore the risk of strengthening the voices in the government that wanted to end all negotiations with terrorists.93 Anxious about these effects backfiring, Swiss officials attached the utmost 88 Ibid. 89 Cable from Paris to Berne, 24.12.1970, no. 455, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 90 Cable from Berne to Paris, 24.12.1970, no. 391, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For German dissuasion attempts, cable from Cologne to Berne, 8.12.1970, no. 118, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 91 Cable from Berne to Rio (with Gelzer’s suggestions for the letter), 22.12.1970, no. 168, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 92 Cable from Rio to Berne, 23.12.1970, no. 153, “flash,” “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 93 Cf. a cable in which Feller summarises his meeting with the army contact, cable from Rio to Berne, 30.12.1970, no. 180, “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cf. also the above quoted Internal Report Feller where he explained in retrospect what his policy motivations had been.

74

Chapter 2

importance to the Brazilian government’s public appearance.94 It agreed to help preserve the image of a government that withstood any sort of pressure, from the VPR as well as from outside actors.95 This explains why the Swiss government was especially cautious in showing any strong public sign of discontent with the Brazilian government. Consequently, all measures were done either in absolute secrecy—the letter, for instance, was explicitly kept secret from the press—or phrased in sufficiently broad language—the diplomats’ note only expressed general concerns—in order not to irritate the constantly mentioned Brazilian “sensitivity.” In short, the problem stemmed from the fact that Swiss officials saw their policy as highly dependent on the Brazilian government but could not accept that it constantly put Bucher’s life at risk. The Protracted Last Phase of the Crisis It seems that Feller had good reasons to be cautious since even the considerably harmless measures triggered an immediate response from the Brazilian government. The Brazilian President’s reply to the letter emphasised that the Brazilian government and nobody else could act as judge on the appropriateness of the measures to save Bucher. It further stressed that its determination to help Switzerland was based on its “spontaneous” choice, i.e. a decision independent of external pressure.96 A further symbolic gesture to emphasise Brazil’s exclusive decision-making power was made in relation to press communiqués. Berne had previously complained that it received the text of communiqués at almost the same time as the media.97 After the Swiss tried to increase pressure, the intervals became even shorter and this left absolutely no

94 95

96

97

Cable from Rio to Berne, 29.12.1970, no. 177, “politique,” “urgent,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Ibid, original quote in the cable: “Schlage vor, […] nach Aussen (brasilianische öffentliche Meinung) Anschein zu verhindern, dass Regierung zugemutet werde unter Druck nachzugeben”. Cable from Rio to Berne, 24.12.1970, no. 158, “urgent,” quoting the letter from Brazilian president in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. See also cable from Rio to Berne, 25.12.1970, no. 161. The second cable included an interpretation of the embassy’s legal consultant regarding the exact diplomatic wording of the president’s letter, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. Cable from Berne to Rio, 23.12.1970, no. 172, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

75

possibility for Switzerland to comment on the text.98 With these pronounced reactions, Feller refrained from pursuing further ways of coercing the Brazilian authorities. He felt that he had exerted “just the optimal amount of pressure” and took comfort in Barbosa’s promise that the government planned to resume discussions.99 The final and most effective leverage arose right at the moment when Feller had given up further coercive efforts and accepted leaving Bucher’s destiny in the hands of the Brazilian government. On the morning of 25 December 1970, the Swiss embassy in Rio received a call from a spokesperson of the VPR, asking for a personal meeting with Feller.100 Feller called Minister Janner in Berne to discuss the option of offering himself as a “mediator” between the Brazilian government and the VPR.101 In the following cables, they referred to this option under the code word “last resort.”102 In the afternoon, Feller met with Barbosa, whom he immediately told about the VPR’s attempt at contact and offered to act as a mediator. Barbosa’s reaction was swift and determined: he categorically refused this possibility for security reasons and because it was solely up to the Brazilian government to negotiate with the VPR.103 He assured Feller, however, that the government was currently focusing all internal debates on Bucher’s case and that soon an acceptable solution would be found.104 Barbosa’s prediction was correct and already the next day, 26 December 1970, the Interior Ministry issued a communiqué, which Feller received one hour before the publication “for information and not for consultation.”105 The 98

Cable from Rio to Berne, 25.12.1970, no. 163, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. As well as another cable with further complaints about this subject from Berne to Rio, 27.12.1970, no. 179, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I 99 Cable from Rio to Berne. 25.12.1970, no. 162, “urgent,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. About the internal governmental discussions, cf. cable from Rio to Berne, 24.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 100 “Note pour la séance du Conseil fédéral du 30 décembre 1970,” which consists of a summary of main events per day, Berne, 30.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. See also cable from Rio to Berne, 25.12.1970, no. 164, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 101 Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force of 25.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology”, Annex to the Main Dossier I. 102 Cable from Rio to Berne, 25.12.1970, no. 164, “flash,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Cable from Rio to Berne, 26.12.1970, no. 166, “politique,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

76

Chapter 2

Brazilian government’s new proposed solution still consisted of the refusal of the 13 prisoners while it further offered to replace them with other inmates. Consequently, the government suggested to the VPR that it submit another list with 13 prisoners. Feller considered this proposition a compromise, since the government had agreed to the total amount of 70 prisoners but it also ensured that it had a say in deciding which prisoners would be released.106 In another attempt to reach Feller, the VPR again called the Swiss embassy in Rio.107 With the Interior Ministry’s latest communiqué however, Feller no longer had any incentive to continue contact with the VPR since he would not want to use it as bargaining chip against the Brazilian government. On the contrary, Feller thought that it could seriously upset the Brazilian authorities, especially since the designated Brazilian crisis coordinator, Mr Parente de Melo, previously called the Swiss mediating proposition an “interference in internal Brazilian affairs.”108 He thus explained to the VPR that he could not continue the talks with them and, when they called a last time on 29 December, Feller took the opportunity to advise them to accept the government’s offer.109 While having been on tenterhooks for another two days, on 31 December the embassy finally received an answer from the VPR with suggestions for a possible replacement of the 13 contested prisoners.110 This document represented the VPR’s acceptance of the compromise and if the Brazilian government approved these 13 people, this could seal the agreement for the liberation of Bucher.111 Feller was quite optimistic about the possible closure of these protracted negotiations after the holidays.112 To Switzerland’s irritation, however, the negotiations continued into the next year. This time though, the proceedings sped up considerably: the government first rejected 9 of the 13 prisoners on 4 January,113 on 5 January the VPR 106 Cable, 26.12.1970, no. 167, “politique,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 107 Daily summary of the Embassy events of 27.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. See also cable from Rio to Berne, 27.12.1970, no. 169, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 108 Cable from Rio to Berne, 28.12.1970, no. 176, “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 109 Cable from Rio to Berne, 29.12.1970, no. 177, “politique,” “urgent,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 110 Cable from Rio to Berne, 31.12.1970, no. 181, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 111 Cable from Rio to Berne, 31.12.1970, no. 184, “flash,” “top secret,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 112 Ibid. 113 Cable from Rio to Berne, 4.1.1971, no. 4, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

77

offered 9 new names,114 of these the Brazilian government rejected the last 4,115 until on 8 January both parties finally agreed to the 70 prisoners that were to be liberated in exchange for Bucher.116 This deal was sealed exactly one month and one day after Bucher had been kidnapped. It then took another week for the prisoners to be assembled in Rio and brought safely to Chile.117 After the prisoners landed in Chile, Bucher was finally released on 16 January 1971 in Rio.118 The Federal Council expressed its “great satisfaction”119 about the news of Bucher’s liberation and organised the proceedings in accordance to the previously agreed terms. Bucher talked with the Brazilian police to help catch his kidnappers and at the press conference he lauded the Brazilian government and thanked it for its efforts. He returned home to rest, but promised to come back to resume his posting in Brazil.120 This last point was important for the Brazilian government, since it showed Switzerland’s trust in it and Switzerland had to agree to this if the bilateral relations were not going to suffer from the incident. It is safe to conclude from this account of Swiss crisis management that Switzerland was at Brazil’s mercy from the beginning to the end. Swiss policymakers’ hands were tied and they were doomed to be mere spectators of their colleague’s fate. With anxiety and prudence they observed the internal Brazilian power struggle, which was fought between the VPR and the Brazilian authorities but also between internal governmental forces that each opted for different policies. Swiss decision-makers were especially fearful of this internal governmental division between a camp that was driven by foreign political aspects and an opposing group that prioritised internal security concerns. The latter group, comprising the military and the police, attributed no importance 114 Cable from Rio to Berne, 5.1.1971, no. 6, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 115 Cable from Rio to Berne, 6.1.1971, no. 7, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 116 Cable from Rio to Berne, 8.1.1971, no. 12, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 117 Cable from Rio to Berne, 14.12.1971, no. 23, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 118 Cable from Rio to Berne, 16.1.1971, no. 28, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 119 Press communiqué FPD, 16.01.1971, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 120 For Switzerland’s agreement to the Brazilian suggestion for the proceedings after Bucher’s release, cf. cable from Berne to Rio, 8.1.1971, no. 5, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

78

Chapter 2

to Bucher’s life, which according to them could be sacrificed in order to show a hard line against terrorism. In hindsight it is not sure whether the Brazilian government was indeed internally divided or whether Barbosa made exaggerated claims in order to ­influence Swiss policymaking. Independently of the accuracy of this (dis-)information, it did have a determining effect on the Swiss decision-makers. As this section has shown, fearing the predominance of the no-negotiations line, the Swiss authorities did everything to please the Brazilian government. In view of the important Swiss economic interests in Brazil, they not only dropped all of the options to exert serious pressure on the Brazilian government, but also complied with every single one of its demands. It patiently stood aside and did not interfere in the negotiations and it further helped to portray a positive image of the Brazilian government, in line with its requests. This last aspect was one of the most important for Brazil, which directed every policy step in view of the wider Brazilian public—extinguishing any sort of critique of its behaviour. Interestingly, Swiss authorities not only accepted this policy but also adopted it in Switzerland. As the next section will show, the Swiss authorities undertook serious efforts to influence public opinion, eliminating all voices that were critical of the Brazilian government.

Controlling the Kidnapping’s Media Coverage

Early on in the crisis, Swiss decision-makers understood the tremendous importance of the media and public opinion for the Brazilian authorities. This was not limited to Brazilian media, but also to news, opinions, and statements in the press, on TV, or in radio broadcasts in Switzerland.121 Brazilian government officials specifically demanded on numerous occasions that Switzerland “do everything it can […] to ensure that negative statements in Switzerland against the Brazilian government stop entirely.”122 The Brazilian authorities argued that negative statements in the Swiss media would strengthen the Brazilian political hard-liners that wanted to end all negotiations with the VPR.123 These warnings had their desired effect on Swiss decision-makers, who took this issue very seriously and who subsequently did everything conceivable to influence 121 Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force of 13.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology,” Annex to the Main Dossier I. 122 Cable from Rio to Berne, 13.12.1970, no. 120, p. 3, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 123 Ibid.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

79

the Swiss media coverage of the events. The Swiss authorities started by thinking about who could constitute a possible target of the Swiss media. The Swiss officials especially worried that Bucher’s immediate family would be contacted in view of extracting information from them about the ongoing negotiations. Fearing that Bucher’s relatives could blurt out sensitive information, the Swiss authorities tried to convince Bucher’s siblings (as he had no wife or children) to refrain from giving any statements to the press.124 Bucher’s sister had already given a few answers to the press and asked for advice on how to proceed. The crisis task force members instructed her to officially deny all of her previous statements.125 As a next step, the crisis task force aimed to get an overview of possible interested journalists, who could plan to report about the kidnapping. They saw journalists as a potential nuisance factor that had to be watched carefully. When, for instance, Mauro Santayana, a foreign correspondent in Bonn for the Journal do Brazil asked for an interview with Federal Councillor Graber, his request was treated with utmost suspicion. Since Santayana was based in Bonn, Berne requested the Swiss embassy in Cologne to do a background check on him.126 It was reported that Santayana generally managed to “hide well his leftist tendencies in the Brazilian press” but that he had direct contacts with the VPR.127 After Feller “respectfully but categorically” urged him not to grant the interview, Gelzer judged that it was too “dangerous” to accord the interview before Bucher’s liberation.128 The crisis task force was further alerted about other potentially critical journalists.129 A special warning was given to 124 For recommendations to Buchers’ sister, cf. memorandum, Berne, 9.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For recommendations about Bucher’s brother, cf. Memorandum “Telephonanruf des Bruders von Botschafter Bucher, 10. Dez. 1970, 14.00 Uhr,” Berne, 10.12.1970, in: ibid. For the Swiss authorities’ decision to recommend media restraint for Bucher’s family, cf. memorandum [anonymous], 9.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 125 Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force, summarised by Gelzer, 9.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology”, Annex to the Main Dossier I. 126 Cable from Berne to Cologne, 11.12.1970, no. 199, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 127 Note to Peter Erni, 9.12.1970, in: ibid. As well as the reply from Cologne, cable from Cologne to Berne, 11.12.1970, no. 120, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 128 Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force of 12.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology”, Annex to the Main Dossier I. For Feller’s urge not to give the interview, cable from Rio to Berne, 11.12.1970, no. 117, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 129 Cable from Rio to Berne, 9.12.1970, no. 136, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

80

Chapter 2

the Swiss embassy in Rio about Bucher’s cousin, who worked as a journalist for the Ringier publishing company and who intended to travel to Brazil to report about the affair.130 This cautious and controlled public relations policy could be considered as an adequate measure in view of the rather exceptional circumstance in which journalists posed potential threats to Swiss diplomatic efforts or to the Brazilian negotiation process. The precautionary measures, however, reached a new level when members of the crisis task force directly intervened at relevant Swiss publishing houses. At first, the SSR [Société suisse de radiodiffusion et télévision, the main Swiss broadcasting corporation] informed the crisis task force about J.P. Goretta’s journey to Brazil to investigate the kidnapping. The task force in Berne communicated this to Feller and asked him to help Goretta and his team with their documentary.131 Feller, however, had just formally assured the Brazilian government that he would stop any media coverage whenever possible and thus refused to support Goretta’s journalistic activities; in particular he denied help by refusing to send his films and audio recordings to Switzerland.132 But he did not leave it there and asked Gelzer’s team to also block the broadcast of any material that Goretta had already managed to send to the SSR.133 Since Feller argued that testing Brazilian “sensitivity” could lead to Bucher’s death, the task force agreed to comply with his suggestion.134 Micheli personally called the deputy head of the SSR, Mr Carl, requesting that Swiss radio and TV refrain from publishing any commentary that could be considered “dangerous” in the given circumstances. Micheli specified that this measure was not meant to “muzzle” the press but to avoid the risk of the Brazilian government feeling that it was losing face vis-à-vis the VPR.135 SSR’s reply, however, seemed very much like a declaration of intent to “muzzle” the

130 Memorandum [anonymous], Berne, 8.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For the warning of the embassy in Rio about the cousin, cf. cable from Berne to Rio, 8.12.1970, no. 128, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 131 Cable from Berne to Rio, 9.12.1970, no. 136, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 132 Cable from Rio to Berne, 12.12.1970, no. 119, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 133 Ibid. 134 Cable from Berne to Rio, 12.12.1970, no. 146, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 135 Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis talk force of 12.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology”, Annex to the Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

81

media in the affair about Bucher: Carl made sure that a TV programme already scheduled for the following Sunday as well as other planned broadcasts were cancelled. He further designated one of his chief editors to ensure compliance with Micheli’s request until the end of the crisis and he also transmitted the request to the German-speaking Swiss TV, which had not yet sent a team to Brazil.136 After this phone conversation, the crisis task force and the chief editors continued their close cooperation. The chief editors practised what the boss of the international-information sector of the French-Swiss radio called “selfcensorship,” without of course mentioning the explicit request of the Swiss authorities.137 For the Brazilians though, this media self-censorship was not enough. After further talks with his Brazilian counterparts, Feller understood that the Brazilian government’s request even included positive reporting on the Brazilian opposition. Feller was thus worried when he heard that the journalist Claude Mossé from Swiss French-speaking radio had been in Latin America independently of Bucher’s kidnapping and intended to interview Chilean President Allende as well as a Brazilian anti-government activist named Dom Helder Camara.138 Feller feared the “catastrophic consequences that such a broadcast could have for the efforts to save Bucher” and began to act on his own. He personally contacted the journalist to dissuade him of his enterprise.139 The crisis task force approved Feller’s efforts, but stressed that it was unlikely that he would succeed. Instead he might do better to ask for a more balanced report.140 Feller failed to persuade Mossé, whose broadcast appeared over the radio on 12 December. As the Brazilian embassy in Berne closely monitored the Swiss media, it indeed noticed this radio programme and reported back to Rio about it. Shortly afterwards, the Brazilian authorities confronted Feller with Mossé’s and other reports in the Swiss media, which it considered hostile towards the Brazilian government.141 It seemed their intervention left quite an effect 136 Ibid, 12.15h. 137 Account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force of 14.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology”, Annex to the Main Dossier I. 138 Cable from Rio to Berne, 14.12.1970, no. 126, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 139 Ibid. 140 Cable from Berne to Rio, 15.12.1970, no. 150, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 141 Cable from Rio to Berne, 17.12.1970, no. 130, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

82

Chapter 2

on Feller, who sincerely worried that further negative media remarks could have detrimental consequences for Bucher. This happened during the above described long and insecure waiting period, in which everything depended on Brazil’s decision to actually start negotiations. Feller was thus afraid that any “faux-pas” could undermine the whole process. Consequently, Feller reported the complaints to Berne, in order to increase the crisis task force’s willingness to control the media more firmly.142 For the first time, the task force members became somewhat sceptical of Feller’s increasingly extreme propositions and simply suggested that he might want to mention to the Brazilian government the principle of freedom of the press, which is guaranteed by the Swiss constitution.143 To underscore the importance of this point for Feller’s negotiations with the Brazilian government (and maybe also to remind him about it), the task force in Berne stressed that by law the government was not allowed to intervene in the reporting and that in no way should media statements weaken the Brazilian government’s willingness to save Bucher.144 Feller however did not even consider this suggestion and simply dismissed it by explaining that such an argument about freedom of press would not matter much to the Brazilian authorities.145 He was, however, pleased to notice a more conciliatory attitude in the Swiss press— probably, as he thought, due to collaboration with the publishing houses. Feller e­ stimated that these sympathetic reports would have “appeasing effects on the ­Brazilians.”146 Overall, one could see that Feller’s policies primarily aimed at pleasing the Brazilian government so that it would agree to the terms of the VPR. For him, there was no limit, even if democratic principles had to be undermined. In line with accommodating the Brazilian government in every conceivable way, Feller thought of a further option on how to meet Brazilian wishes. This move concerned the embassy’s own newsfeed, which had previously attracted the negative attention of the Brazilian authorities. For instance, when the embassy received the first proof of life from Bucher, it published the document right 142 Ibid. 143 Cable from Berne to Rio, 17.12.1970, no. 158, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 144 Ibid. See also daily account of the decision and actions of the crisis task force of 17.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology”, Annex to the Main Dossier I. 145 Cable from Rio to Berne, 18.12.1970, no. 138, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 146 Ibid.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

83

away. Since, as we have seen in the first section, the Brazilian government used the omission of information to influence public opinion, the Brazilian government did not appreciate such spontaneous moves by the Swiss embassy. As the risk persisted that the embassy would publish a piece of information before the Brazilian government wanted it to be publicly known, Feller decided to impose a total media embargo.147 In anticipation of what could possibly cause Brazilian resentment, no information was given out to any journalists anymore, whether they were Brazilian or Swiss.148 In doing so, Feller was reinforcing the Brazilian position. Swiss journalists were outraged about the embassy’s “scandalous conduct” and presented their complaints to National Councillor Erich Weisskopf (1920–1984)149 from the Free Democratic Party [one of the predecessor parties of today’s “FDP.The Liberals”], who passed on their cause to Federal Councillor Graber.150 The Swiss authorities sided with Feller’s policy but asked him to submit a justification for this measure to Swiss journalists.151 In Feller’s declaration, he blamed the journalists for “misinterpreting” the embassy’s comments, “which could unduly influence the situation.” Thus, the Swiss embassy had been “compelled to impose a complete information blackout.”152 With the exception of two trustworthy Swiss journalists whom Feller granted an interview on New Year’s Eve, he applied the information blackout consistently until the release of Bucher.153 Feller also asked Berne on numerous occasions to withhold any possible information from the media.154 It seems that this paranoia of “respecting the Brazilian sensitivity” and their wish for an 147 Cable from Rio to Berne, 13.12.1970, no. 123, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 148 Ibid. 149 Diego Hättenschwiler, “Weisskopf, Erich,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 08/08/2012, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6750.php?topdf=1. 150 Letter to Erlich Weisskopf from various Swiss publishing houses, such as Ringer editor house, Tagesanzeiger, Schweizer Illustrierte, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 151 Cable from Berne to Rio, 16.12.1970, no. 156, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 152 Cable from Rio to Berne, 18.12.1970, no. 138, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. See also cable from Rio to Berne, 17.12.1970, no. 131, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 153 Cable from Rio to Berne, 31.12.1970, no. 183, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 154 For the first formal request to keep all information secret, cable from Rio to Berne, 12.12.1970, no. 118, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

84

Chapter 2

uncritical presentation of the Brazilian government dominated most of Feller’s and the crisis task force’s policy considerations.155 This concern to control the media portrayal of the affair reached such dimensions that they applied this authoritarian logic everywhere. An interesting example for this rigid media policy is reflected in the Swiss authorities’ reaction to a TV report on German television. On 27 December 1970, the first German TV channel broadcasted a report about Bucher in the show Weltspiegel.156 The National Councillor Peter Dürrenmatt (1904–1989),157 from the Liberal Party, called the crisis task force members’ attention to the issue that Bucher had been presented as a “gigolo” with an “excessive sense for night-life” and as a “playboy-Ambassador, who looked more after women than after his work”.158 Dürrenmatt worried that presenting Bucher as an unserious party animal could undermine the legitimacy of efforts for his liberation. Gelzer agreed with Dürrenmatt that this represented a “maximum of German tactlessness” and demanded that the case be reported to the German authorities.159 The next day, the Swiss embassy in Cologne was requested to raise a complaint to the German Foreign Ministry in order to inform it about the dangerous impact such TV shows could have for Bucher. The embassy requested that the German authorities inform the TV channel about the disapproval of wide sections of the Swiss German-speaking population for the show.160 In response to the verbal note, the German Foreign Ministry expressed its regrets for the incident and promised to inform the relevant people in charge of the TV show.161 155 Feller wrote a long letter to Berne in which he kept insisting how important the Swiss media were for the Brazilian authorities and how it was crucial to try to keep the Swiss media look favourable towards the Brazilian government, “Lettre pour M. Ambassadeur Janner. Confidencielle,” 16.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 156 Memorandum, 28.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 157 Paul Fink, “Dürrenmatt, Peter,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 18/03/2010, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6272.php 158 Memorandum, “Entführung,” by Gelzer, 28.12.1970, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 159 Cable from Berne to Cologne, 29.12.1970, no. 126, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 160 Cable from Berne to Cologne (with the formal request to act), 30.12.1970, no. 213, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. For the conformation that the verbal note was sent, cable from Cologne to Berne, 4.01.1971, no. 1, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 161 Cable from Cologne to Berne, 6.01.1971, no. 5, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

85

Given the fact that Germany, a democracy, could not be held accountable for shows on its TV and considering that German TV could not be influenced by the Swiss government, it is not clear why the Swiss authorities made this complaint. It shows though the extent to which the Swiss authorities left no stone unturned in its almost obsessive execution of the Brazilian’s request to control the media—in Switzerland or in Germany. Interestingly, some Brazilian newspapers had also presented Bucher as a “playboy,” which Feller however did not consider a bad thing. According to him, in Brazil the appellation “playboy” did not have the same negative connotation as in German-speaking countries. Feller was, however, worried about another trait used to describe Bucher’s character. The Brazilian press made fun of Bucher’s “gourmet and luxury” habits, which risked giving the impression that Bucher was a snobby expatriate, who might not be worth all of these efforts. In order to correct Bucher’s image, Feller encouraged the Swiss expatriate community to publish a pamphlet highlighting Bucher’s positive actions, such as the inauguration of a Swiss school or a visit to the favelas.162 The incessant efforts to influence public opinion to best suit Brazilian and Swiss interests only stopped once circumstances changed. After the VPR agreed to exchange the 13 rejected prisoners for other prisoners, planning began for the management of Bucher’s media presence after his release.163 The Brazilian authorities were particularly worried that right after Bucher’s liberation, he would be so emotionally charged that he would make critical remarks about the Brazilian government. The Brazilian government thus suggested keeping Bucher away from the media right after his release and to schedule an official press conference a few days later.164 Swiss officials in Berne agreed with this procedure and consequently denied journalists’ requests to interview Bucher, arguing that they had to protect his privacy.165 As mentioned above, Bucher was released on 16 January 1971. The press conference in Brazil was scheduled for the next day.166 Before receiving the journalists, Feller cross-checked his statements with the Brazilian government.167 162 Feller, “Lettre pour M. Ambassadeur Janner. Confidencielle,” 16.12.1970, p. 4, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 163 Cable from Rio to Berne, 6.1.1971, no. 8, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier II. 164 Cable from Rio to Berne, 7.1.1971, no. 9, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier II. 165 Memorandum, “Concerne: entretien téléphonique avec l`Ambassadeut Bucher,” 13.1.1971, by P.S. Erni, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III. 166 Cable from Rio to Berne, 16.1.1971, no. 30, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III. 167 Ibid.

86

Chapter 2

On this occasion, Feller was reminded that Bucher had to be extremely careful not to criticise the Brazilian government’s hard negotiation line, which it intended to pursue in the future.168 Except for an ambiguous statement by Federal Councillor Graber right after Bucher’s release, in which he insinuated that he did not appreciate the current Brazilian government, Brazil was pleased with the general positive media echo.169 In Feller’s and Bucher’s last visit to the Foreign Ministry, Feller formally apologised for the “misunderstanding” that Graber’s statement caused and assured his Brazilian counterparts of Switzerland’s high appreciation and deep thankfulness for the Brazilian efforts.170 This last visit concluded the long and exacting efforts related to the liberation of Swiss Ambassador Enrico Giovanni Bucher. A few weeks later, in an article by Hans U. Büschi, in the National-Zeitung [a leftist Basle newspaper], Feller was criticised for the 41 days of complete media embargo.171 Since these criticisms were quite strong, the Federal Council asked Feller to prepare a few answers. Feller countered the criticism by arguing that journalists were sufficiently informed about the reasons for this information blackout and he explained that this discretion contributed considerably to the pleasant ending of the crisis.172 Internally, he explained to his colleagues that the complete information blockade was necessary to establish the secret diplomacy with the Brazilian authorities.173 In this respect, Feller later wrote an internal report about his main conclusions in which he emphasised that Switzerland’s main task had been to prove that it had full confidence in Brazilian capabilities to manage the crisis. Feller explained that he was too afraid that the embassy could publish a statement that could be misunderstood as questioning the Brazilian authorities. Thus he decided to refrain entirely from providing any information.174

168 Ibid. 169 Memorandum, 18.01.1971, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III. See also Gelzer, “Aktennotiz Entführung Bucher,” 18.1.1971, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III. 170 Memorandum, “Visite à Brasilia des ambassadeurs Bucher et Feller,” 22.01.1971, Berne, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 171 Hans U. Büschi, “Brasilien ist für “Bern” tabu,” National-Zeitung, 09.02.1971, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 172 FPD communiqué, “Richtigstellung. Tätigkeiten von Botschafter Max Feller,” 12.02.1971, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 173 Cable from Rio to Berne, 31.12.1970, no. 182, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I. 174 Feller internal report, p. 5 and p. 12.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

87

As was shown in this section, with the dependency on the Brazilian authorities, Swiss officials were mere spectators of their own fate. This feeling of powerlessness seemed to be discharged onto the Swiss media, where the crisis task force could exert all its power. That this act of faith came at the expense of freedom of speech was simply justified as an “adequate” measure; arguably a rather meagre justification for a democracy.

The Swiss Authorities’ Threat Evaluation after the “Bucher Crisis”

In view of the threat evaluation, the Swiss press addressed several major concerns which were similar to the ones of the Swiss authorities.175 An important question related to Switzerland’s vulnerability to terrorism. In this respect, several journalists reckoned that Switzerland’s neutrality policy and smallness could no longer guarantee Switzerland’s security, nor was it any longer possible to stay away from the world’s violent conflicts.176 In a similar vein, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Council and the Council of States concluded that for Switzerland the terrorist threat was likely to increase over the course of the next few years and that further measures had to be taken.177 In view of evaluating the threat posed to Switzerland, the authorities reflected on possible reasons why the VPR had specifically targeted a Swiss diplomat. In this respect, Bucher was able to provide the Federal Council with a firsthand account. During his captivity, he managed to gain the confidence of the terrorists and thus extracted relevant information from them. In his report to the Federal Council, Bucher mentioned five main reasons why the VPR specifically selected him. Bucher wrote in the first person from the VPR’s perspective: 1. You as a person have caught our attention for the first time through an article in “Le Monde” about the von der Weid affair.178 We understood from this that you were in favour of torture. 175 Embassy Press Digest, “Enlèvement de l’Ambassadeur Bucher,” in: E220.48#1988/169#14, Relations politiques Suisse-Brésil, enlèvement Ambassadeur Bucher, 1970–71. For the concerns shared by the Swiss authorities, see Commission des Affaires Etrangères du Conseil National et du Conseil des Etats, “Procès—verbal de la séance du 17 décembre 1970 à Berne, consacrée à l`enlèvement de l`Ambassadeur G.E. Bucher, Rio,” in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier I [hereafter meeting commission foreign affairs, 17.12.1970]. 176 Ibid. (press digest) 177 Meeting commission foreign affairs, 17.12.1970. 178 Jean Marc von der Weid was a Swiss citizen, who studied in Sao Paulo. He was a prominent figure at the time in the Brazilian student opposition and was imprisoned in Brazil in 1969. He was liberated with the other 69 prisoners in exchange for Bucher.

88

Chapter 2

2. Subsequently the campaign was launched by the Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Thus we became aware of the great importance of Swiss investments in Brazil, which made you an interesting target to kidnap. 3. We were deeply offended by the declaration of Mr Eric Haegler, an ICRC delegate who, on his return from Europe, announced to the ­Brazilian newspaper, Galeao, present in Switzerland, that torture was unknown in Brazil.179 4. During a visit to the Journal do Comércio, Mr Roch [the First Secretary of the Swiss Embassy] had once again stressed the importance of Swiss investments in Brazil. It was after the publication of this article that the final decision was taken to abduct you. 5. The expulsion of Apolonio de Carvalho and Ladislav Dobrow further increased our discontent with your country, which only confirmed our decision to kidnap you, which had already been taken.180 From this account, one could see that Bucher was mostly selected for his important exchange value for the Brazilian government. In another report, Bucher further highlighted the connection between economic interests and being the target of an abduction: The United States was the largest investor in Brazil, thus their ambassador was kidnapped first. The next kidnapping was the ambassador from West Germany, the second biggest investor in Brazil. The third was the Japanese consul-general and then Bucher, both the third biggest investors in Brazil at the time.181 Bucher further stated another important aspect of why kidnappings of diplomats posed a serious threat to Swiss interests. He explained how during the kidnapping he tried to pass his briefcase to his driver. A member of the VPR saw this however and took it with them. After they inspected it for weapons, 179 The quotation marks were put by Bucher because Haegler was not an ICRC delegate. Instead he was an ICRC spokesperson. Furthermore, the ICRC did not represent the official Swiss opinion, while the VPN did not make that distinction. 180 Report written by Ambassador Bucher addressed to Federal Councillor ­ Graber, “Mon elèvement du 7 décembre 1970 au 16 janvier 1971,” secret, p. 2, in: C­ H-BAR# E2024B#2001/146#131*, Bucher Giovanni E., 1970–71 [hereafter Bucher’s report after his kidnapping]. 181 Letter written by Ambassador Bucher to Dr. Carol Edler Baumann, Director of the Institute for World Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, “personal and confidential,” 02.07.1971, in: CH-BAR#E2200.114A#2003/126#110*, Elèvement de l’Ambassadeur Bucher 07.12.1970–16.01.1971, 1970–71.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

89

they gave it back to Bucher. He was worried since the day before he had drafted a political report with sensitive information about the upcoming elections in Brazil. He estimated that Swiss-Brazilian relations could take a serious setback if this had fallen into the government’s hands and it was dangerous for him since his political estimations could also attract the anger of the VPR. In the first 48 hours of his detention, he thus ate the report, bit by bit, in what he called a “diet of paper and printers-ink.”182 Another conclusion from Bucher’s account related to the VPR’s tactics after the decision had been taken to kidnap him. Bucher explained that the VPR undertook three previous unsuccessful kidnapping attempts before finally capturing him on 7 December. The reason for escaping the first attempts was related to Bucher’s regular change of commuting path. The terrorists were simply waiting for him at the wrong places. Since Bucher always had to be at the office between 08.30h and 08.45h and since the ambassador’s residence was rather close to the embassy, his variation options were limited. Thus, Bucher concluded that with continuous tries it was inevitable that the VPR eventually got him. Feller agreed with Bucher’s assessment and in his evaluation after the crisis he stressed that it would have been impossible to prevent Bucher’s kidnapping and that it was also impossible to prevent further abductions. He pointed out that the terrorists generally planned their strike months in advance, they were heavily armed, and they could decide on the intervention place and time, which Feller called the “surprise effect” in favour of the kidnappers.183 Since Switzerland was mostly selected for its importance to the host ­country—in the Brazilian case for its strong economic interests—Swiss ambassadors around the world were potentially susceptible to further abductions. Since becoming a target was unavoidable and it would be difficult to prevent another kidnapping, several measures had to be taken in Berne as well as on the ground in high-risk areas. In order to secure an adequate and quick reaction to further terrorist challenges, Feller recommended establishing a “permanent experienced crisis task force” in Berne, which could be deployed as soon as a crisis of this kind emerged again.184 He thought that the task force should consist of a few permanent high 182 Bucher’s report after his kidnapping. Not surprisingly, after his “appétit for papers” he got diarrhoea. 183 Feller internal report, p. 19. 184 “Anlage zum Bericht Sondermission Brasilien vom 5. Februar 1971. Erfahrungen während der Krisensituation bei der Entführung des Botschafters Bucher,” annex to Feller internal report, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III.

90

Chapter 2

government officials and, in the case of an event, it should be complemented with regional experts.185 This suggestion was seized by Gelzer, who convened a meeting to discuss the modalities of deploying and optimising such an on-callservice.186 All participants at the meeting, namely the staff of the crisis task force for Bucher’s abduction, agreed that such a service was indispensable in order to surmount a crisis of that calibre. Therefore, for future cases the Swiss authorities had to ensure the fast mobilisation of diplomatic as well as technical staff, while it was decided that it should only be arranged in very serious crises, while the exact criteria for what would determine the seriousness of a crisis were not specified.187 In view of giving a brief overview of the Swiss decision-makers’ threat perception, the following terms were used most frequently to describe the kidnappers or potential future perpetrators of a terrorist act: most of the time the abductors were called “terrorists,” or “kidnappers.”188 Often they were referred to as “revolutionaries,” “subversive Groups,” or “violent activists.” Sometimes officials spoke of “extremists,” “rebels,” or with the adjective “fanatical rebels.”189 Sometimes they were confused with the other main Brazilian terrorist organisation, the ALN, which had not kidnapped Bucher. The terrorist phenomenon was essentially associated with political unrest especially in the Third World. The authorities thus detected a need to increase the security on the ground specifically in countries with political unrest. The security officer of the FPD was tasked with informing the head of missions around the world about the new dangers that lurked for diplomatic personnel in these areas. He sent all Swiss embassies a list with recommendations on how to increase the embassies’ and the residences’ security.190 The new safety regulations mainly suggested a complete “isolation” of the embassy and its staff. Bucher’s abduction 185 Ibid. 186 Memorandum, “Notiz für Herrn Botschafter A. Janner und Herrn Minister M. Gelzer über die Aussprache der für den Pikettdienst während der “Bucher-Krise” aufgebotenen Beamten vom 25. Januar 1971,” Berne, 10.03.1971, in: CH-BAR#E2024B#2001/146#131*, Bucher Giovanni E., 1970–71. 187 Ibid. 188 “Terrorist” was used most frequently by Gelzer and his team, cf. Daily account of the decisions and actions of the crisis task force, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, “Chronology,” Annex to the Main Dossier I. 189 Revolutionaries or subversives were more Feller’s words, while he also frequently used “terrorist,” cf. Feller internal report as well as his cables. Bucher was more specific and called them “the VPR.” 190 FPD Safety Officer, “An die Missions- und Postenchefs,” Berne, 14.09.1971, in: BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier, Main Dossier III.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

91

prompted reflections on further safety precautions, but the recommendations were not limited to the specificities of his case. For the embassies and ambassadors’ residences, the security officer’s suggestions included: a fortification of the buildings through walls, installation of grids against explosives at the windows, installing an alarm system, keeping a dog, deploying constant police surveillance, limiting the reception hall to only one separate room, only accepting prearranged visitors and granting them entrance only after a strict control of their personal belongings.191 With regard to the behaviour of diplomatic staff members, the security officer recommended: to always change the commute path and only use main highways, never use public transportation, always move with (armed) security guards, always lock the car doors, avoid going out in general and especially at night, check the personal data of people to meet, wear a bullet-proof vest and if necessary and if competent carry one’s own weapon.192 Because every host country had its specificities, Berne suggested that each embassy decide for itself which measures it considered most adequate.193 It emphasised though the need for increased watchfulness and utmost carefulness and suggested that the security recommendations serve as guidance.194 In sum, one could say that after this second terrorist crisis, Swiss officials were fully aware of the terrorist danger. There was an increased interest in engaging with the roots of terrorism in order to develop effective long-term strategies, an identified need to enhance security capacities on site, and putting state officials on higher alert in Berne and abroad. Overall, Swiss security policymakers began to seek counterterrorist options on the operational, technical, as well as political level.

Summary of Swiss Reactions to Brazilian Terrorism

When Bucher was kidnapped on 7 December 1970, Switzerland was struck by an act of terrorism for the fourth time within a few months. Unlike Skyjack 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid.

92

Chapter 2

Sunday, this time a Swiss citizen was the only hostage and the fulfilment of the terrorists’ conditions did not rely on the Swiss government. Swiss officials had to deal with the challenge through the Brazilian government, which created a strong dependency. This inequality led to a situation in which the Brazilian authorities could almost dictate Swiss policies, especially with regard to public relations management. This Brazilian emphasis on public opinion essentially turned Swiss crisis management into “media management.” For Feller, one could almost say that the biggest “enemy” was not the VPR but Swiss journalists. At times, Feller was even more inclined to talk to the terrorists than to journalists, since the latter he considered dangerous and hostile players in this terrorist power game. In his distrust of the media, he left no effort untried to influence, control, change, or prevent reporting of the kidnapping. Reflecting on the above-mentioned relationship between terrorism and the media, on the one hand, without necessarily realising it, Swiss officials helped to suppress the terrorists’ possibility of getting their message passed on to the wider public. As some terrorism researchers consider media attention one of the core aspects of terrorist action, the prevention of the VPR’s means of expression can thus be considered an appropriate counterterrorist measure.195 On the other hand, this crisis both illustrated the deficiencies of independent Swiss media in that they collaborated with the government, and the ability of the Swiss government to obstruct the free flow of information and to control the nature of official information. The elimination of all possibilities to express sympathy with the Brazilian opposition was seen as a necessary effort to help liberate Bucher. In retrospect, this however meant that the Swiss government was helping to delegitimise the VPR, a group that could have also been considered a resistance force against the tough Brazilian regime. In other words, aiming at raising awareness against the cruelties of its government, the VPR was deprived of a voice even in “neutral” Switzerland. In such a way, with this second terrorist incident Switzerland was again dragged into a political conflict, in which it took a position. Similar to the management of Skyjack Sunday, for realpolitik considerations the Swiss authorities threw out fundamental Swiss principles such as neutrality and, in this case, also freedom of speech. This terrorist incident, which placed the Swiss government at the Brazilian government’s mercy, has highlighted a rather dark side of

195 See, for instance, Alex Peter Schmid and Janny de Graaf. Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, London: Sage, 1982.

Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism

93

Swiss foreign policy. Faced with helplessness and impotence to influence the course of events, Switzerland was downgraded to executing the instructions of the Brazilian government, namely to stay away from the negotiation process and to silence the Swiss media. However, a question remains regarding the extent to which Switzerland was indeed as helpless. Since Switzerland was the fourth biggest investor in Brazil, it is not clear why Swiss officials did not exert more pressure on the Brazilian government. One could assume that Brazil could not afford the death of the ambassador of a rather important foreign investor. It is therefore surprising that Swiss government officials did not consider using precisely this “sensitivity” of the Brazilian government against itself. Since the Brazilian government had such a strong interest in its public portrayal, why for instance did Feller not threaten to pass undesired information to the media or express Switzerland’s complaints publicly? In this respect, the sources show that Feller and the other crisis task force members were too afraid of the possible negative effect this could have on the Brazilian government. The risk of losing the ambassador’s life was deemed too high for them to consider using Switzerland’s economic power. For Swiss government officials at the time, these measures were considered adequate in view of the exceptional circumstances. Feller later judged that it was the right decision to place all trust in the Brazilian government and not to challenge its authority.196 He also acknowledged the lack of alternatives and the difficulty that came with the dependency on Brazil’s goodwill. Feller recalled that the insecurity about Bucher’s fate was constant due to the internal Brazilian differences between the military hard-liners, who wanted to intervene forcefully, and the compromising pragmatists, who were pushing for negotiations. Since Feller fully believed the Foreign Minister’s claim that an uncritical reporting in Switzerland was necessary for the pragmatists to win over the hardliners, Feller concluded that the intervention among the Swiss media was correct.197 This measure further underpinned Switzerland’s willingness to cooperate with the Brazilian authorities. Overall, Feller admired the Brazilian government’s “tactical manoeuvring” and he predicted (correctly) that the VPR would soon be wiped out by the military and the police.198 Another question arises, however, as to whether the Brazilian government was indeed internally divided or whether this information was used tactically in order to neutralise any Swiss opposition to Brazil’s negotiation policy. Swiss 196 Feller internal report, p. 1. 197 Ibid, p. 13. 198 Ibid.

94

Chapter 2

decision-makers, however, were not at all sceptical about the Brazilian government and, as described above, they took the need for uncritical media reporting very seriously. The question of complicity with a dictatorial regime, the validity of Brazilian internal power-plays, conformity with neutrality, or violation of freedom of speech simply were not taken into consideration during the decision-making process. In this vein one could conclude that the VPR made Switzerland a pawn in the hands of Brazil, which once more underscored Switzerland’s vulnerability and helplessness when faced with non-state actors. With the omnipresence of the terrorist danger, Swiss decision-makers realised that a change of thinking was required. Besides the establishment of a permanent crisis task force and the increase of the safety regulations at various embassies, Swiss government officials also needed to reflect on ways to combat terrorism more permanently and, for that matter, they had to envisage possible collaborations with other countries.

Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management Comparing the handling of the crises during the two major terrorist attacks, Skyjack Sunday and the abduction of Ambassador Bucher, several considerations are noteworthy. The biggest and most obvious difference between the two was the international setting of the two crises. The PFLP addressed demands to five countries, which could act in a coalition and thus improve their negotiation strength vis-à-vis the terrorists. During Bucher’s kidnapping, Switzerland was isolated with Brazil. The framework influenced the means and possibilities of the Swiss government and essentially determined its degree of control over the course of events. In the negotiations with the Palestinians, the Swiss position was partially dependent on the position of the other countries. However, this was a “voluntary” decision and, hypothetically, at every instance during the crisis the Swiss government could decide to liberate the Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages. If it wanted, it could thus have put an end to the crisis for the Swiss citizens. In the Brazilian case, however, the terrorists made demands of the Brazilian government and confined the Swiss authorities to mere bystanders. In this constellation, the Swiss government could only indirectly influence the outcome of the negotiations. The second aspect relates to media management. During the VPR abduction the Swiss government was much more susceptible to the requests of the Brazilian government, especially in view of its demands regarding the management of media. While in 1970, the Palestinians were in near full control of the picture presented to the media—e.g. the meticulously chosen moment of the explosion of the airplanes in front of an audience of live journalists—in the VPR case, the Brazilian government gained the upper hand in the “war of images.” Interestingly, the Swiss government supported the Brazilian authorities in this respect, with quite drastic and unusually undemocratic means of media censorship in and outside of Switzerland. Similarly with regard to the democratic rule of law, in the case of the Palestinian attacks, the Swiss government decided to liberate the PFLP members despite the fact that they were on trial for murder. Third, an important difference concerns the amount of decision-makers involved in the decision-making process and the administration of the crises. At the beginning of the Palestinian negotiations, the Federal Councillor and a whole range of other staff members determined Swiss policy. This left much room for misunderstandings or for the accidental omission of information from one briefing to another. For example, having gotten incomplete information from Gelzer,

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_006

96

Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management

the Federal Council decided to publish the agreements with the terrorist demands, which then sent confusing signals to the other concerned countries. However, once the crisis was only managed by Gelzer and Micheli, the Swiss government regained control and led much more consistent crisis management. It seems that the Swiss government learned from its mistakes and as soon as the kidnapping of Ambassador Bucher was known, Max Feller was immediately sent to Rio. He then bundled all crisis management efforts under his strict authority. Having only one man in charge minimised the risks of misunderstandings or mistakes and led to meticulously, at times a bit excessively, controlled crisis communication. Apart from the differences, one striking commonality of the Swiss government’s policy was its nearly unquestioned readiness to comply with the demands addressed to it. In less than 24 hours, the government was ready to accept the PFLP’s propositions and, finally, decided to free the Palestinians even though there was a high likelihood that the last hostages would be liberated by the Jordanian army. Similarly, during Bucher’s kidnapping, the government complied with nearly every demand from the Brazilian government—even if this was problematic for freedom of speech or the fact that it meant providing support to a dictatorship. In both cases, in order to save the lives of the hostages, the Swiss government did not hesitate once in taking drastic, undemocratic, and illicit exceptional measures. In order to avoid having to face such a situation ever again, it is not surprising that the Swiss government placed considerable efforts in preventing further attacks. Shortly after the crises, the Swiss government took a number of ad hoc measures. After Skyjack Sunday tighter visa regulations for Arabs and close surveillance of Arab people in Switzerland were introduced. After Bucher and Skyjack Sunday a so-called “Sonderstab Geiselnahme,” a permanent crisis task force within the FPD, was established. This task force regularly attended training sessions on how to manage crises situations.1 Besides these measures, the Swiss administration developed a more focussed way of evaluating terrorism, the apprehension of its danger, the international law dimension, and the best means to counter it from a policing perspective. Accordingly, the Swiss government led diplomacy with the intention of removing Switzerland from the list of terrorist targets and signalling its readiness to engage in counterterrorism cooperation. On the policing level, it founded an inter-agency secret intelligence network in order to monitor possible terrorist suspects and their movements around Europe. Both of these policies, the diplomatic and the secret, will be analysed in what follows. 1 For further information about this crisis task force and about seminars organised for FPD staff member to learn about how to best manage abductions, see archive materials in CH-BAR# E4001E#1992/116#46*, SOGE; Allgemeines, Alarmübungen, Sonderstabsübung Geiselnahme, 1972–1982 or CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#369*, Geiselnahme: Diverse Fälle, 1972–1982.

Part 2 At the Forefront through the Backdoor: Switzerland’s Counterterrorism Diplomacy

∵

At the Forefront through the Backdoor

99

After the Skyjack Sunday attacks and the kidnapping of Ambassador Giovanny Enrico Bucher, terrorist attacks increased drastically all over the world, especially those involving Western targets. In the early 1970s, more diplomats were kidnapped, more airplanes were hijacked, and more politicians were murdered by transnational terrorist groups.1 For the United States and Western European countries, counterterrorism became a priority. In this context, Switzerland took an active part in the development of a multilateral counterterrorism cooperation process. The Swiss government was active in the three international organisations that dealt with counterterrorism at the time, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the United Nations (UN), and the Council of Europe (CoE). From the perspective of Swiss policymakers, after Skyjack Sunday and ­Bucher’s abduction, three major diplomatic issues were at stake. First, the country risked being identified as a target by terrorists again. The Third World, which became a new force in the international arena, was generally rather sympathetic towards international terrorist actions because these countries themselves had often obtained their independence through means of terrorism. Since Third World countries often supported terrorism, the Swiss government had reason to believe that they could influence the terrorists’ choice of target. Hence, during the debate about terrorism in the framework of international organisations, the Swiss government showed restraint in condemning terrorism. A too vocal condemnation could have meant that Switzerland also condemned liberation struggles or any kind of non-conventional warfare and risked arousing the anger of Third World countries. Accordingly, in order not to upset terrorist-supporting countries, the Swiss government officially called for a moderate and differentiated approach to terrorism. Second, having been affected by international terrorism, the Swiss government had a strong interest in the international community’s establishment of measures to contain it. Through international legal provisions that outlawed terrorist acts, members of terrorist groups could be punished and combatted in a way similar to the fight against transnational organised crime. This would have provided the international community with important mechanisms to counter the terrorist threat. With effective international counterterrorism laws, governments would have the necessary legal framework to effectively destroy terrorist groups. With increased involvement of and specific attacks against civilians, the concerned governments had strong interests in regularising and 1 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in: Audrey Kurth Cronin, and James M. Ludes. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46–73, p. 58.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_007

100

Part 2

harmonising the international struggle against terrorist activists. In this vein, whenever possible, Swiss policymakers contributed to the process of negotiating and adopting international conventions for the suppression of terrorism. Third, and linked to the second concern, after the terrorist attacks, the Swiss government urgently needed to ensure that counterterrorism cooperation was being established not only at the level of international law, but also on an operational policing level. This could only be achieved through “like-minded” countries that also shared a real interest in preventing terrorism. Hence, in its official statements and diplomatic positions, the Swiss government signalled its interest in counterterrorism exchanges and cooperation beyond official diplomatic channels. Based on these three foreign political stakes, two main traits resulted from the Swiss government’s foreign political stance. On the one hand, the Swiss government aimed to be at the forefront of international counterterrorist efforts in order to secure the rapprochement of countries also affected by terrorism, while on the other hand, it tried to keep these efforts unnoticed by Third World countries in order to limit the risks of being selected as yet another terrorist target. Over the course of the 1970s, one can summarise international counterterrorism efforts as a dynamic that started with a piecemeal approach—the prohibition of specific terrorist acts in relation to civil aviation—followed by efforts to reach a comprehensive global response to terrorism, and finally concluded with a geographically restrained European regional accord. This international process is also reflected in the narrative of this second part of the monograph, where chapters III–V each focus on Swiss counterterrorism policymaking efforts in one institution at a time. As international terrorism began with the hijackings of airplanes, it is not surprising that the ICAO was among the first international agencies to outlaw terrorist acts.2 The ICAO is a UN specialised agency that was founded in ­December 1944 upon the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).3 Its function was to advance international standards, which member states took into consideration when they developed their national civil aviation laws. When in the 1970s several deadly sabotage acts were perpetrated on ­European and American airlines, security concerns increased and the ICAO 2 David MacKenzie. ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization. ­Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010, p. 261. 3 The Chicago Convention can be found online: http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/chicago1944a .pdf

At the Forefront through the Backdoor

101

was host to a number of conventions to supress aviation terrorism.4 The ICAO’s advantage was its focus on particular aspects of terrorism. Outlawing specific terrorist acts, such as acts of airline sabotage, could initially be done in a less polemical and politicised surrounding.5 These efforts are known as a “­single-crime oriented approach” or “piecemeal approach” to regulating international terrorism, which is analysed in chapter III.6 When hostage-taking episodes increased in number and in brutality in the early 1970s, the demand grew not only to suppress specific kinds of terrorist acts, but to draft a comprehensive convention to suppress terrorism. Especially after the Palestinian attacks on the Olympic village in Munich in September 1972, voices calling for a global response to terrorism grew louder. This prompted UN institutions to look for solutions on a global scale.7 In September 1972, the planning for a counterterrorist convention began in the UN General Assembly.8

4 Heiko Schäffer. Der Schutz des zivilen Luftverkehrs vor Terrorismus: der Beitrag der International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007. See also Yonah Alexander and Eugene Sochor. Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990. 5 Gilbert Guillaume, “Terrorism and International Law,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 3, 2004, pp. 537–548, p. 538. 6 For reflections on how to better implement the aviation security laws viewed from a practitioner’s perspective, see Rodney Wallis. How Safe Are Our Skies? Assessing the Airlines’ Response to Terrorism. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003; and Jin-Tai Choi, Aviation Terrorism: Historical Survey, Perspectives, and Responses. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. See also the special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence of 1998, in particular Bruce H ­ offman, “Aviation Security and Terrorism: An Analysis of the Potential Threat to Air Cargo Integrators,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 10, 1998, pp. 54–61. Paul ­Wilkinson and Brian M. Jenkins, “Introduction,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 10, 1998, pp. 2–8. See also Noemi Gal-Or. International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985, specifically ppp. 83 ff. 7 Peter Chalk. West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 123 ff. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment,” Harvard International Law Journal, Winter 2002, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 83–103, pp. 93 ff. 8 For an achives-based account of the UN counterterrorism debates from the perspective of the German Ministry of Foreign affairs, see Bernhard Blumenau’s book. He covers over seven years of German policy at the UN and has a closer look especially at the negotiations from 1975 to 1979 about the “International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.” Cf. Bernhard Blumenau, The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

102

Part 2

However, the problem in this global institution was that the member states could not agree on a universal definition of terrorism.9 The main reason for this discordance was that the Western Bloc had different interests than the recently decolonised Third World countries.10 As a consequence, the forces within the UN were too antagonistic and resulted in a deadlock between the two opposing sides.11 In chapter IV, I analyse how the Swiss government positioned itself within this debate. In particular, I explain how Swiss policymakers aimed to not upset any of the opposing parties. With the increasingly apparent impossibility of reaching a global agreement on how to define and counter the terrorist threat, in Europe the desire to find a regionally concerted solution to international terrorism strengthened. The CoE was seen as the most adequate multilateral European venue, as there already existed a number of CoE conventions that regulated criminal matters.12 With its particular focus on European extradition regulations, the council’s approach to the suppression of terrorism was different from previous attempts.13 The idea underlying this approach was that certain crimes could be considered to be so odious in their methods or consequences, in relation to their motives, that they could no longer be justified as a “political offence” for which extradition could be refused. In case extradition was still going to be refused, it further applied the legal concept aut dedere, aut judicare, [either extradite or prosecute].14 Grounded in the ideas of Hugo Grotius dating back to the 17th century, 9 10

11

12

13

14

Schmid, “Definition of Terrorism,” in: Schmid, Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 50. Jörg Friedrichs, “Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle Behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 2006, vol. 19, pp. 66–91, p. 70. Reuven Young, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,” in: Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 2006, vol. 29, p. 37. The decision to delegate the issue of counterterrorism to the CoE was suggested by France, cf. Heribert Golsong. La convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme: Provocation ou instrument de paix?, Strasbourg: Ici Europe, May 1977, p. 5. Otto Lagodny, “The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism?” The University of Colorado Law Review, vol 60, 1989, pp. 583–600. M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.). Introduction to International Criminal Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, in particular “Section 2. The Maxim Aut Dedere Aut Judicare,” p. 487 ff. For an extensive legal evaluation of the application of the concept aut dedere, aut judicare in customary international law practice, see also, Claire Mitchell, Sources of the “aut dedere aut judicare” obligation, in: Aut Dedere, aut Judicare: The Extradite or

At the Forefront through the Backdoor

103

this formula had been a long-rooted practice for establishing jurisdiction in continental Europe.15 In line with this concept, the draft convention aimed to force states that received extradition requests related to terrorist acts to always either extradite or submit the case to their own authorities for prosecution. Thus the goal was to eradicate safe havens for terrorists in Europe. This was the legal avenue that the CoE member states pursued, which culminated in what was later known as the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST).16 In 1963, Switzerland joined the CoE and was therefore provided with a useful political platform in which it could share its views with neighbouring countries. The Swiss government’s contribution to the drafting of the ECST showed steady and constant engagement. The Swiss authorities gave high priority to the successful completion of the ECST. Over the course of five years, from 1972 to 1977, Swiss representatives actively contributed expertise, political will, and legal know-how. In chapter V, I recount the development of this CoE initiative: its conceptualisation, the negotiations, and its meaning in legal as well as ­political terms. In order to explain the decision-making framework in which the Swiss ­government was operating in matters of counterterrorism multilateral diplomacy, the departmental FPD policymaking context in the early 1970s is ­outlined next.

The Working Group on Terrorism and its Context

Early in the morning of 5 September 1972, a group of Palestinian members of the terrorist organisation “Black September”17 entered the Olympic site in

15

16

17

Prosecute Clause in International Law [online]. Genève: Graduate Institute Publications, 2009 (generated 18 February 2015). Available on the Internet: http://books.openedition .org/iheid/301 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Chapter XXI “On the Communication of Punishment,” Sections III and IV, translated by A. C. Campbell, Project Gutenberg EBook no. 46564, 11 August, 2014, accessible online: https://www.gutenberg.org/ files/46564/46564-h/46564-h.htm#Page_256 Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Strasbourg, 27 January 1977, accessible online: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/ html/090.htm See annex 3 for the final version of the convention. Black September was a Palestinian splinter terrorist group. It refers to the civil war in September 1970 in Jordan after the Skyjack Sunday events.

104

Part 2

Munich and broke into the Israeli male team’s camp.18 The terrorists killed two Israeli athletes on the spot and took nine others as hostages. The attackers demanded the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages. After a day, the terrorists changed their strategy and demanded to be flown to Egypt, together with the hostages, in order to undertake the hostage exchange there.19 Egypt refused to receive them, but since the German authorities had hoped to be able to free the hostages while transporting them, they agreed to bring them to the nearby airport, Fürstenfeldbruck.20 The rescue operation at the airport, however, failed miserably, with all of the Israeli hostages being executed by the terrorists. One German police officer was killed in the course of the shooting, four terrorists were killed, and three were taken into custody.21 The terrorist attacks in Munich in 1972 marked the point of escalation of the rising terrorist threat and topped all previous attacks in brutality and ­relentlessness.22 Due to the large media presence covering the Olympic Games, the massacre was broadcast to millions of spectators around the world. This shocked the international community and inspired widespread concerns over international terrorism. The UN, where most of the world’s countries were member states, became active in order to find a multilateral response to the growing terrorist threat. However, the UN’s attempt at drafting a global convention to supress terrorism was overshadowed by changing Cold War power dynamics in line with the process of decolonisation. During the 1960s, a number of former colonies gained independence, and their attribution of full UN membership was an 18

For a detailed and interesting account in German about the Olympia attacks and the German authorities’ reaction, see also Matthias Dahlke. Demokratischer Staat und ­ transnationaler Terrorismus Drei Wege zur Unnachgiebigkeit in Westeuropa 1972–1975. Munchen: De Gruyter, 2011, pp. 57–128. 19 Kay Schiller and Christopher Young. The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010, pp. 194–207. 20 Eva Oberloskamp, “Das Olympia-Attentat 1972. Politische Lernprozesse im Umgang mit dem transnationalen Terrorismus,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, July 2012, vol. 60, no. 3, p. 321–352, p. 324. She recounts the sequences during the attack and later analyses the attack’s impact on the German government’s long term domestic security policy. 21 Paul Thomas Chamberlin. The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 142. Chamberlin’s account is particularly interesting because he gives the Palestinian perspective and contextualises the Munich attack in the inner-Palestinian turmoil that lasted throughout the 1970. 22 Hoffmann, Inside Terrorism, 2006, p. 3.

At the Forefront through the Backdoor

105

important symbol of their nationhood.23 In 1968, the membership grew to 119 countries, which was more than double the original membership of 51 countries.24 With similar interests and bearing a grudge against their former rulers, these newly independent countries became a strong international political force. In the 1970s, the “Third World bloc”25—a wide coalition of communist and non-aligned states from Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East— constituted a majority at the UN and could thus largely influence the organisation’s agenda according to their interests.26 The UN discussion on counterterrorist measures was representative of the tensions between the Western bloc and much of the Third World bloc.27 The discontent began with trying to find a common definition of “terrorism.”28 The Third World countries, some of whose leaderships emanated from violent liberation movements, were afraid that such a convention would condemn national liberation struggles. To counter this initiative they insisted, among other things, that “state terrorism” was the most harmful form of terrorism and should also be included in the definition.29 As will be shown later, two diametrically opposed positions had formed. On the one side, the Western countries aimed to delegitimise the use of terrorism, and on the other side, Third World states were trying to legitimise it.30 With this tense atmosphere and the possibility of even more heated debates, the head of the Swiss Observer Office to the UN, Ambassador Bernard Turrettini (1911–2007),31 brought the issue to the attention of his colleagues in the FPD.32 Switzerland had an “observer status” but was often invited to issue statements or to support an initiative. The Swiss representative requested that 23

Jussi M. Hanhimäki. The United Nations. A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 21. 24 Ibid. 25 For an explanation of the term “Third World,” refer to footnote 1 of this monograph. I use it in accordance to the meaning during the Cold War and base my understanding on Odd Arne Westad’s definition, cf. Westad, Global Cold War, p. 2. 26 Hanhimäki, United Nations, p. 22. 27 Townshend, Terrorism, p. 28. 28 Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss. Terrorism and the UN Before and After September 11. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 179. 29 Friedrichs, “Defining the International Public Enemy,” p. 70. 30 Peter Romaniuk. Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation. London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 32–63. 31 For more information on Bernard Turrettini, see also dodis.ch/P2656. 32 Letter from Bernard Turrettini, Swiss ambassador to the UN, to Prof. Dr. Rudolf Bindschedler, Legal Advisor of the FPD, 28.09.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#736*,

106

Part 2

his government internally clear its position in order to give him appropriate policy instructions. Furthermore, he foresaw the possibility of non-member states being able to participate in the debates in a newly created UN Ad Hoc Committee on the issue of terrorism. Since the discussions were highly politicised, Turrettini thought that the Swiss position needed to be well thought out and carefully elaborated. In his opinion, the best way to draft a balanced position was by tackling terrorism from an international law perspective. Hence, he suggested that the FPD’s legal advisers attend to the matter.33 The head of the FPD Political Affairs Division and the FPD Secretary General, Ernst Thalmann (1914–1993),34 took this request seriously and tasked Jean-Pierre Ritter (1931–2000),35 at the time the head of the FPD International Law Division, with establishing a cross-division counterterrorism policyadvising organ.36 This led to the so-called “Working Group on Terrorism” [Groupe de travail sur le terrorisme, hereafter referred to as WGT]. The role of this group was to become “experts” on all questions related to terrorism.37 The WGT’s main activities centred on drafting official Swiss statements and instructing Swiss delegations accredited to multilateral organisations on how to contribute to the counterterrorism discussions. The WGT comprised JeanPierre Ritter, who presided over the group, and five members from various divisions within the FPD. The five members were François-Charles Pictet (1929*), who at the time served as deputy chairman of the Division of International Organisations38; Dino Sciolli (1931*), who retained his regular function as deputy chairman of the Protocol Service39; Karl Fritschi (1928–2004), who was a staff Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, Dossiers I–III, 1971–75, [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism”], Dossier I. 33 “Notiz für Herrn Botschafter Diez. Bekämpfung des Terrorismus,” Berne, 27.09.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 34 For more information on Ernst Thalmann, see also dodis.ch/P997, or the article about him in the Historical Lexicon of Switzerland, Marc Perrenoud, “Ernst Thalmann,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 02.04.2012, online accessible: http://www .hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D14899.php. In 1971, Thalmann replaced Pierre Micheli as head of FPD Political Affairs Division and FPD Secretary General. Micheli was in this function from 1961–1970 and he played an important role during Sunday Skyjack. 35 For more information on Jean-Pierre Ritter, see also dodis.ch/P17429. 36 Note to Ambassador Thalmann from Ritter, 13.12.1972, in which Ritter informs about the creation of the WGT on Thalmann’s instigation, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 37 Ibid. 38 For more information on François-Charles Pictet, see also dodis.ch/P17262. 39 For more information on Dino Sciolli see also dodis.ch/P15376.

At the Forefront through the Backdoor

107

member in the Political Affairs Section East40; Alfred Reinhard Hohl (1930– 2004), who worked in the Political Affairs Section West41 and Gaudenz von Salis (1936*), who joined the WGT from the Political Secretariat.42 WGT meetings could be called by any of the members. The group convened on a regular basis depending on the need for a Swiss foreign political action or statement. In the next section, the WGT’s first meeting and its working methods will be outlined. The WGT: The Start of Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking The WGT met for the first time on 16 October 1972. Its constituting assembly defined the scope of its work, concluded an agreement on the procedures, and began its analysis of global counterterrorism means and mechanisms and the implications for Swiss policymakers. The discussions in this first meeting were important because they laid the basis for the future of Swiss counterterrorism policy. The members distinguished the three approaches of the international community to contain terrorism: protection of civil aviation; • the protection of diplomats; • the terrorism as a general problem. •

43

In this sense, the WGT differentiated between countering specific terrorist acts and measures against terrorism as a whole. The group first applied its attention to the protection of diplomats, which at the time was part of an ongoing discussion at the UN. The discussions took place at the UN General Assembly’s 6th Commission and were based on a US initiative to draft a specific convention on the protection of diplomats.44 Not being a member state, Switzerland was not invited to participate in these discussions. As the WGT noted,

40 41 42 43

44

For more information on Karl Fritschi, see also dodis.ch/P16389. For more information on Alfred Reinhard Hohl, see also dodis.ch/P16080. For more information on Gaudenz von Salis, see also dodis.ch/P16413. “Procès-verbal de la séance constitutive de notre groupe, le 16 octobre 1972,” the meeting minutes were circulated among the WGT members by internal mail on 06.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. [hereafter Minutes of First WGT Meeting] At a later stage, this chapter will go back to the developments preceding the discussion at the 6th Commission.

108

Part 2

Switzerland was thus excluded from a process that was of high priority for its foreign policy.45 Yet, there existed two policy options through which Switzerland could nevertheless get involved in the debates. First, even as a non-UN member, Switzerland was allowed to formally request active participation in dealing with specific issues, such as the drafting of a possible convention protecting diplomats. Since the Swiss authorities had directly been affected by terrorism in the form of the kidnapping of diplomats—namely, the abduction of Ambassador Bucher—the WGT found it pertinent for Switzerland to contribute to the 6th Commission’s work. Access was not, however, easy to obtain, and the repeated use of this right risked triggering negative reactions. Asking for extraordinary involvement in UN working groups was therefore a sensitive issue and had to be carefully considered. Furthermore, with the enormous divide among the UN members on the matter of terrorism, the WGT estimated that the chances of the successful drafting of a convention to protect diplomats were low. With these concerns, the WGT decided that it was not worth it for Switzerland to use its UN special-request credit in this particular case.46 Second, at the UN, there was also another way for Switzerland to participate. UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 3034 (which will be explained in detail below) formally invited all countries to submit their general observations and considerations on terrorism. The head of the WGT, Jean-Pierre Ritter, expressed concerns regarding this option. He thought that Switzerland would underscore its status as a “second-class” country by replying in writing to negotiations to which it had not been invited. None of the other WGT members, however, shared that opinion. The majority believed that any opportunity in which Swiss representatives were offered to express their views had to be seized. Ritter, however, still pressed his point and countered that “terrorism” as a subject matter was still very new to Swiss authorities. He estimated that it would take months until a formally agreed-upon Swiss statement could be submitted to the UN. Nevertheless, after intense back-and-forth discussions, the WGT decided to push forward internal efforts to write an official Swiss statement on counterterrorism. This could be used for the public, in international organisations, or for internal policy briefings for Swiss government officials.47

45 46 47

Minutes of First WGT Meeting, p. 2. Cf. Minutes of First WGT Meeting, p. 2. For instance, part of the text of this WGT meeting minutes were copied and used for internal briefings, cf. “Note sur le terrorisme”, Berne, 04.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

At the Forefront through the Backdoor

109

After evaluating the policy towards the UN, the group turned to the issue of protecting civil aviation. The agency which had thus far been most active in this respect was the ICAO, of which Switzerland was a full member. The ICAO had already passed several conventions to suppress aviation terrorism and, during that time, discussions were held in view of enhancing the implementation of these existing conventions. Shortly before the WGT meeting, the United States had introduced such a proposal in the ICAO. The United States suggested introducing a “convention on concerted measures” against any state that did not abide by the standards of the conventions to suppress hijackings and other attacks against international civil aviation. American reasoning was that despite the adoption and ratification of three conventions regulating aviation terrorism, there were still no mechanisms that could enforce these conventions. States remained unpunished when they supported or harboured hijackers. In this vein, the United States suggested an ICAO convention by which the signatory states would inflict sanctions on states that violated one of the three conventions on air piracy. The ICAO member states were invited to discuss this proposal in January 1973, and the WGT was in charge of preparing and coordinating the Swiss position. The difficulty regarding the US proposal, as the WGT noted, was that it went against the general practice of international law. The international legal system had always been based on bilateral or multilateral agreements by which each state voluntarily subjected itself to the adherence of certain norms. Usually, only at the point of ratification of a convention did it become legally binding for a country. How to handle the American initiative again triggered a controversial debate at the WGT. Ritter wanted to refuse the US proposal outright, while the other WGT members disagreed on the practical diplomatic implications of curtly refusing the American proposal. Therefore, the group commissioned Ritter to also consult with the FPD legal division and the FOCA. After their input, the WGT was going to reconvene in order to determine the instructions for the Swiss delegation to the ICAO. This was the start of a long-winded interdepartmental coordination process, which will be discussed below. As will be shown, policy design, such as the Swiss position at the ICAO or the UN, later became a core responsibility of the WGT. Even though the WGT was formally only assigned to give advice, by becoming the main in-house experts on counterterrorism, it de facto considerably shaped and determined Swiss counterterrorism policy. Over the course of the next few months, the WGT became the reference point for anything that related to terrorism and it thus drafted statements, gave policy guidance, ensured inter-departmental

110

Part 2

coordination, and its head, Ritter, participated as an expert in international counterterrorism negotiations. In sum, one could see that there was a strong governmental need for the establishment of the WGT, namely, for an agency that could give policy guidance. Interestingly, the main parameter under which the WGT approached the issue of terrorism was under international law. Even though they were operating within the FPD, the WGT members still shied away from the political aspects of terrorism. On the one hand, this reflected the educational background of the WGT members, as most of them had a university degree in law. On the other hand, the issue of terrorism was still very new to them, and the political aspect took longer to fully apprehend. The group’s hesitation regarding political questions is apparent, for instance, with regard to the drafting of a general Swiss official statement about terrorism. The group needed more time and could only agree on the intention to draft such a statement. When the issues were narrowed down to specific questions related to terrorism (such as specific conventions dealing with kidnapping or hijacking), the WGT was much more pronounced and outspoken and found its analytical framework in international law. This will further become apparent in the next chapter about Switzerland’s involvement at the ICAO.

Chapter 3

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO: “An Elegant Way of Doing Nothing” In 1972, the ICAO had already existed for 18 years. Since the ICAO was in charge of ensuring the safety of international aviation, and since international terrorism often targeted planes and passengers, by the early 1970s several ICAO conventions against air piracy had already been adopted and entered into force. The first convention that criminalised violent acts against air traffic was the socalled Tokyo Convention, which outlawed any offence that happened on board an aircraft.1 The convention opened for signature in Tokyo in September 1963. The second convention regulated the illicit capture of airplanes, and it was concluded in The Hague in December 1970.2 Switzerland had already signed and ratified both of these conventions.3 One of the conventions of the early 1970s was even co-initiated by ­Switzerland after a Palestinian terrorist placed a parcel bomb on a Swissair flight in February 1970.4 The Swissair plane crashed soon after the bomb exploded over Würenlingen, killing all 47 passengers and the crew. A week later, on an Austrian Airlines flight, another terrorist bomb attack happened, where the plane caught fire but the pilot managed an emergency landing in Frankfurt.5 In reaction to the bombings, Berne and Vienna called for an extraordinary session of the ICAO Council.6 This was welcomed by other European 1 For legal explanation of the Tokyo convention, see also Ruwantissa Abeyratne. Aviation Security Law. Berlin: Springer, 2010, p. 217. 2 For a legal explanation of the Hague convention, see also ibid, p. 230. 3 Note for Minister Thévanaz, “Lutte contre le terrorisme,” Berne, 16.10.1972, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 4 Report of the Zurich Cantonal Police, “Flugzeugabsturz (Swissair Coronado HB-ICD) am Samstag, den 21. Februar 1970 bei Würenlingen,” Berne, 01.12.1970, in: CH-BAR #E2001E#1982/58#180*, Absturz eines Coronado-Flugzeugs der Swissair bei Würenlingen am 21.2.1970, 1971–1972. Interestingly, this case has yet left a number of unanswered questions regarding the prosecution of Sufian Radi Kaddoumi, the main terrorist subject. See this book’s chapter I for a short description of the Würenlingen terror attack. 5 MacKenzie, ICAO: A History, p. 245 ff. 6 For the Swiss-Austrian involvement in the drafting of this convention, see the archive file CH-BAR#E4260C#1993/10#14*, Akten der diplomatischen Konferenz in Den Haag, Dezember 1970: ICAO/OAIC-Uebereinkommen betr. die Luftpiraterie. (Luftstrafrecht), Vol. 1, 1970–1971.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_008

112

Chapter 3

governments and led to the agreement on the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (i.e. airplane sabotage), which opened for signature on 23 September 1971.7 In December 1972, at the time of the WGT’s second meeting, the ratification process of this convention was still ongoing because part of the penal code had to be amended to apply the convention. From the above, one can see that Swiss policymakers drew from an active engagement at the ICAO when the WGT convened to discuss Switzerland’s reaction to the above-mentioned US proposal, which was on the agenda of the next ICAO conference in ­Montreal in January 1973. The United States suggested drafting a treaty that would enforce sanctions against countries that did not abide by the Tokyo, Hague, or Montreal conventions. When the WGT convened in December 1972, Ritter had already pre-written draft policy instructions and explained the procedure that was to be followed. A long and complicated coordination process was awaiting this text, as the Swiss ICAO position had to be cleared among several federal offices. In order to illustrate the drafting process behind the Swiss counterterrorism position at the ICAO, and in order to explain the working methods of the WGT, the various steps are outlined here as follows. First, Ritter’s draft had to pass the scrutiny of the WGT, and then it needed to be revised by Werner Guldimann (1916– 2003),8 the director of the FOCA.9 After this, the FPD’s law division had to check the document, followed by the FPD’s Division for International Organisations. After consultations with all of these agencies, Ambassador Thalmann, head of the FPD Political Affairs Division and FPD secretary general, had to comment on the statement and give it back to Ritter, who then had to submit it again to his colleagues in the WGT. At last, the final version of the Swiss ICAO position had to be given to the heads of two federal departments, namely, the FPD and the Department of Transport, Communications, and Energy.10

7 8 9 10

For legal explanation of the Montreal convention, see also Abeyratne, Aviation Security Law, p. 237 ff. For more information on Werner Guldimann, see also dodis.ch/P43133. Invitation to the second WGT meeting, “Aux membres du groupe de travail sur le terrorisme,” Berne, 6.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Letter from Ritter to Guldimann, Berne, 13.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. and “Note à Monsieur l’Ambassadeut Thalmann,” Berne, 13.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. The Department changed name in1979 and 1998 and today it is known as the “Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC).”

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO

113

This marathon interdepartmental drafting process of the official Swiss position at the ICAO shows that several offices had an interest in the matter, be it political, legal, or technical. Given that this was only an internal document on policy instructions, and not even an official public statement, the effort was quite considerable. With all of these actors influencing Swiss policy, the final instructions were very nuanced, but they would also have to be categorized as contradictory and cautious.11 The instructions called for a certain degree of hypocrisy, as the Swiss ambassador was told to give the impression that Switzerland stood strongly in favour of concerted measures, while ensuring that these measures were not too strong. Under no circumstances could the delegation single out a specific Third World country.12 Concretely, on the US convention proposal, the Swiss delegation was instructed to be as vague as possible while secretly working against the US proposal.13 Four main reasons guided the WGT’s decision-making on the dismissal of this proposal. First, it rejected the proposal by arguing that such a convention was a breach of fundamental international law principles. Generally, restrictions could only voluntarily be imposed upon a country by itself, and not by external actors. Namely, if a country chose not to ratify a convention, it could not be punished in the event that it perpetrated an act forbidden by the convention. Second, the WGT questioned the practicability of international law enforcement without the consent of the country in question. If, for instance, a country was accused of violating the Hague Convention but refused to cooperate, it would be nearly impossible to conduct an investigation. The WGT thus considered the US-suggested convention to be unenforceable. Third, the WGT believed that such a system of imposed sanctions risked undermining the existing mechanisms of intergovernmental conflict resolution.14 Lastly, and most interestingly, the WGT also emphasised that international law was not necessarily the right means to contain terrorism. In the WGT’s opinion, countries that sided with, tolerated, or helped terrorists could not be convinced to change their policies through a different international legal system. In this sense, “the work achieved through discreet diplomacy seems to promise better results than a multilateral initiative.”15 This quote from Ritter 11

“Instructions à la Délégation Suisse au Comité juridique de l’OACI, du 9 au 30 janvier 1973, à Montéal,” Berne, 4.12.1972, discussion of the text by the WGT in their second meeting in December 1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid, p. 5. 15 Ibid.

114

Chapter 3

points to the hypothesis that the official Swiss counterterrorism policy in multilateral fora was also a means of keeping up appearances with a view to enable secret diplomacy. In sum, one can say that the policy instructions for the Swiss delegation to the ICAO represented a diplomatic balancing act. The delegation had to feign interest in concrete measures but opt for the status quo. In view of preparing for the ICAO conference, Switzerland was informed about a French proposal. The French ambassador explained to the Swiss that the French concurred with Switzerland’s position and that they had found a way to circumvent the problem. Instead of punishing non-­contracting third parties, the French suggested amending the Chicago Convention, the founding ICAO convention of 1944 to which all ICAO members were signatories. The French idea was to amend this constitutional ICAO convention in order to give a more obligatory character to the above-mentioned Hague ­Convention.16 Ritter was rather suspicious about this proposal, as he anticipated its impracticability due to procedural constraints. He believed that the French delegation was going to present a proposal which “seemed” like a valid option in view of finding an agreement on a counterterrorism convention, but which in fact could not work due to technical imperatives. He concluded that the French had “thus found an elegant way of doing nothing.”17 The notable sarcasm in this sentence cannot hide the fact that he acually agreed with this diplomatic approach. The WGT, too, gave similar instructions to the Swiss delegation, which had to find an elegant way of contributing to but also obstructing this law-making process. How the delegation managed to perform these potentially conflicting tasks will be outlined in the next section.

Preparations for Rome: Constructive Obstruction

At the meeting of the Legal Committee of the ICAO, which took place in Montreal from 9–30 January 1973, the US proposal to apply sanctions to states that supported or harboured air piracy was discussed. Convincing European states and other partners to agree upon a convention on sanctions against air piracy

16 17

French proposition, annex to a note of Ritter to Guldimann, 13.12.1972, in: CH-BAR# E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Note of Ritter to Guldimann, 13.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO

115

had already been one of many US initiatives since 1969.18 The US proposal envisaged sanctions in the form of the suspension of air services to and from any state that had infringed on one of the three aviation security conventions.19 The ICAO discussion in January 1973 on concerted measures evoked questions about fundamental legal principles. The atmosphere was highly politicised, and a vote on the subject finally ruled out any future possibility of establishing a legal instrument that would inflict sanctions on states that were not party to this same instrument.20 Yet, the discussions were inconclusive and left room for an amendment of the Chicago Convention, which could contain provisions for sanctions to be taken against states that were signatory to this new instrument.21 Nevertheless, this outcome revealed the low level of support that the United States could mobilise for its proposal, even after several years of trying. The Swiss delegation, too, in accordance with the WGT instructions, stood against the US initiative.22 The diplomatic argumentation on how the delegation internally justified the Swiss position is worth highlighting. The reasoning was that Switzerland had itself been hit by terrorism against civil aviation, with which it could argue that it shared an interest in strong anti-terrorist measures. Therefore, it could not be suspected of complicity or indulgence with terrorists or terroristsupporting countries. This previous experience, the delegation believed, would thus provide Switzerland with a “moral credit.” Because Switzerland could only be interested in the establishment of international counterterrorism measures, it was by default on the Western side, and the delegation believed this made it safe to vote against the United States.23

18

Kevin Chamberlain, “Collective Suspension of Air Services with States which Harbour Hijackers,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, July 1983, vol. 32, no. 03, pp. ­616–632, p. 618. 19 MacKenzie, ICAO: A History, p. 260. 20 Gerald F. FitzGerald, “Recent Proposals for Concerted Action against States in Respect of Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 1974, vol. 40, pp. 161–224, p. 182. 21 Ibid, p. 183. 22 The Swiss delegation’s implementation of the WGT’s ICAO policy instructions was discussed at the 3rd meeting of the WGT on the 13 February 1973. The ICAO conference report of the Swiss delegation was annexed to the invitation, “Aux membres du groupe de travail sur le terrorisme,” Berne, 8.2.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 23 “Rapport de la délégation suisse au Comité juridique de l’OACI, Montréal, 9–30 janvier 1973,” Berne, 12.02.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

116

Chapter 3

The delegation reported its relief that its position had not evoked negative reactions from the United States and that it was welcomed by Third World countries. Yet, having worked against the US proposal, the Swiss delegation sought to compensate for it and agreed to develop a proposal in partnership with the United Kingdom on amending the Chicago Convention with the provision of sanctions. In the words of the delegation: By joining the British project, we constructively and positively counterbalance our critical attitude towards the US draft proposal.24 The ICAO Legal Committee decided to resume this debate at an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the ICAO combined with a simultaneous diplomatic conference in Rome from 28 August to 21 September 1973. S­ witzerland and the United Kingdom thus planned to offer an amendment to the Chicago Convention with a view to tightening measures currently foreseen against countries that did not adhere to international aviation norms. The Swiss-British proposal was to be presented along with a similar French draft amendment, one from the Scandinavian countries, and one from the USSR. Interestingly, it seems that the Swiss delegation did not have high hopes for the success of this Swiss-British initiative and had already planned to support the French proposals in the event of failure. Despite this pessimism, the Swiss and British delegations met regularly to draft a proposal. Finally, instead of competing with them, France joined the group in order to submit a common approach.25 The bulk of their work, however, was not about the details of the proposed text of the law itself, but about the strategy conceived to pass it. The three delegations, with Switzerland represented by Ritter, discussed every aspect of how to lobby for their proposal, including which delegation was to speak about what aspects of it to whom.26

24 25 26

Ibid., p. 4. Information letter from Ritter to Guldimann, “Préparatifs de la Conférence de Rome,” Berne, 10 May 1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Ritter’s report on the preparations of the ICAO conference, “Note sur la séance de conceration entre les délégations suisse, britanique et française le 18 mai 1973, à Paris,” written in Berne, 22.05.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO



117

The Limit of Enhancing Aviation Security Laws

The Swiss delegation put a lot of effort into this trilateral proposal for an amendment in order to create a viable option. But the diplomatic conference and assembly in Rome turned into a complete failure, and none of the seven submitted proposals found the necessary majority acceptance. There were two main reasons for the failure. The first relates to procedural difficulties. Since it was the Chicago Convention of 1944, the founding ICAO convention, that was to be altered, a rare two-thirds majority was required to pass the amendment. Second, similar to the debates at the UN (discussed in the next chapter), the politicised confrontational course between Western and Third World countries had finally also reached the ICAO.27 The discord among the different countries had become too considerable, and the willingness to formulate a compromise was too low. Yet, the Swiss-British proposal fared comparatively well, especially because parts of it were redrafted so that it included provisions to cover acts of unlawful interference committed by states. This insertion corresponded to the Third World’s discourse for outlawing state terrorism. Nevertheless, after a few further minor changes, this proposal and every other proposal was rejected. This marked the end of efforts at the ICAO to mount concerted actions (such as sanctions) against states that supported aviation terrorism.28 The only possible area of agreement was in regards to a resolution initiated by Egypt. A week before the meeting in Rome, on 10 August 1973, Israel diverted and seized a Lebanese airplane over its territory.29 This was presented as an “illicit act against international civil air transport,” and the Egyptian draft resolution “strongly condemned Israel for violating Lebanon’s sovereignty” and “solemnly warned Israel that if it continued committing such acts, the Assembly would take further measures against Israel to protect international civil aviation.”30 All

27 MacKenzie, ICAO: A History, p. 270. 28 Next efforts in this respect were undertaken in 1978 in the “Group of 7” (G7), which in 1978 consisted of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, United States and Canada. The G7 issued the “Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism,” which determined that the G7 governments would cease all air traffic to states that refused to extradite or punish a hijacker or refused to return a hijacked airplane. For further information on the Bonn Declaration, see also Chamberlain, “Collective Suspension of Air Services,” pp. 626–628. 29 FitzGerald, “Recent Proposals for Concerted Action,” p. 186. 30 “Assemblée de l’OACI—31 août 1973,” annex to the copie verte “Terrorisme aerien,” Berne, 4.9.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

118

Chapter 3

participating delegations, with the exception of Israel and three abstentions (by accident, as they were not in the room) voted in favour of this resolution, which became known as Resolution A20-1.31 Switzerland also voted yes. Given the unanimity regarding the condemnation of Israel, one can deduce that the Swiss delegation adopted a low and mainstream profile. Instead of ostensibly abstaining or opposing the resolution, Swiss officials preferred to align with the dominant majority. However, this attitude risked alienating Israel, an important partner in counterterrorism cooperation. In order to reply to possible Israeli complaints about Switzerland’s pro-Arab tendency during this conference, the FPD sent a memorandum to all its delegations, which they could use to explain the recent Swiss policy at the ICAO. Switzerland’s stance was justified by five main arguments. First, it was emphasised that Switzerland had actively contributed to the existing conventions suppressing aviation terrorism because it, too, had been affected by terrorism. Second, it worked against proposals to sanction terrorism-supporting countries (as suggested by the United States) because many Arab countries opposed it. A convention that lacked the support of a big group of states, the FPD explained, would lose its applicability. The FPD acknowledged that “this realistic attitude had not always been understood by the Israeli delegations.”32 Third, in order to apply an “objective” approach and an attitude that represented the interests of the majority of states, international legislation should not only outlaw terrorism undertaken by non-state actors but also by states. For Switzerland in particular: Switzerland cannot refuse to condemn state terrorism after having taken a clear stand against individual terrorism. Fourth, the United States had planned to submit an alternative wording of the Egyptian resolution, one that would not have specifically condemned Israel. The Swiss delegation would have voted for this US-amended option, had it not been withdrawn. Lastly, the FPD Division for International Organisations had received the appeal from the Israeli Minister of Transport requesting Switzerland’s opposition to any anti-Israeli measures after the policy instructions had already been sent to the delegation in Rome.33

31 Ibid. 32 Copie verte, “Terrorisme aérien,” Berne, 4.9.1973, p. 1, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 33 Ibid, p. 3 and 4.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO

119

Analysing this justification from the FPD, it seems that—besides some ad hoc excuses—the Swiss government was treating the concept of international law as if it were an objective and interest-free international framework. Its argumentation left out the politicised nature of the debates surrounding terrorism. As will be shown later, the argument to introduce state terrorism legislation was used by some non-aligned countries to obstruct the establishment of effective counterterrorism measures. International law was not and had never been “objective,” and it is interesting to see that the Swiss government was presenting it in this way. It is conceivable that this was a way for the Swiss government to distance itself from the politicised nature of the debates about terrorism. Not addressing it as a clash of interests could thus simply have been a form of “ideological refuge” particularly appealing for a neutral country. Domestically, because of the considerable Swiss involvement at the ICAO conference in Rome, a parliamentary commission gained interest in the matter. The Swiss MP Olivier Reverdin,34 representative for the Canton of Geneva in the Council of States and member of the Liberal Party, demanded that the Federal Council formally comment on the ICAO conference in Parliament. The Federal Council received a reply prepared by Ritter and chose to present his text to the Parliament.35 Even though the Rome conference was widely considered a total diplomatic failure, Ritter presented it as a success. He argued that the complete rejection of all proposals did not bear any serious consequences in reference to international counterterrorism laws. All of the proposals were only meant to tighten existing laws, which would have been an additional benefit, but the international community could well live without these supplementary measures.36 The Federal Council’s reply concluded by reiterating that the real solution to terrorism was what was already happening, namely, “enhanced international cooperation,” and not necessarily the supplementation of already existing legal means.

34

35 36

Reverdin was member of the National Council for the Liberals from 1955–1971 and then representative for Geneva canton in the Council of States from 1971–1979. For further information about Olivier Reverdin, see also Jean de Senarclens, “Olivier Reverdin,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 19.08.2010, online accessible: http:// www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6547.php “Note au Chef de Département,” transmitted by Yves Moret from the FPD International Public Law Directorate, Berne, 13.05.1974. “Réponse à la question 9 posée par la Commission de gestion du Conseil des Etats (M. Reverdin),” Berne, 13.05.1974, p. 2, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, ­Dossier I.

120

Chapter 3

Internationally, a similar realisation was dawning that the limits of enhancing international civil aviation legislation had been reached. After the ICAO conference in Rome, no further attempts were made to regulate air traffic until the 1990s. The three conventions that existed at the time—Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal—already covered a wide spectrum of air piracy. After Rome, it had become apparent that tightening measures to enforce these conventions could not be agreed upon.37 What was left were hopes to not only outlaw specific terrorist acts, but to at some point achieve a global counterterrorism convention. Accordingly, international attention focused on the UN. While the Swiss approach of pretending to take international law at face value worked in the ICAO negotiations when dealing with specific acts of aviation terrorism, the next chapter about the UN’s quest for a global response will show that the Swiss government revised this approach. Even for countries with a supposed “moral credit” of having previously been affected by terrorism, the Swiss authorities saw the need to adjust to the increasing polemic. Accordingly, they engaged with the political dynamics of the debates about terrorism but with absolutely equal consideration of Western and Third World interests, which will be outlined in the next chapter. 37 MacKenzie, ICAO: A History, p. 272.

Chapter 4

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN: A Fastidiously Balanced Position “The United Nations cannot remain a silent spectator,” said Kurt Waldheim, general secretary of the UN, on 8 September 1972, in preparation for the 27th UN General Assembly.1 He requested that the following additional item be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly: “Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardise fundamental freedoms.” He anticipated that there would be difficulties getting this proposal accepted but, according to him, it was “better to try finding a solution than doing nothing.”2 In hindsight, one can say that the term “difficulties” used by Kurt ­Waldheim turned out to be an understatement for the debates that followed after his suggestion. Even this basic question of whether or not the UN should discuss terrorism issues met strong opposition. This resistance was led by African and Arab countries. Their position to in principle refuse to treat the subject in the framework of the UN received support from Muslim-Asian countries and Eastern countries. Together, they formed a coalition against Kurt Waldheim’s proposal, which was supported by the United States and Western European countries.3 When the General Assembly effectively took place on 20 September 1972, the Swiss observer reported that the atmosphere was “extremely tense” as the African-Arab coalition actively fought against the inclusion of counterterrorism on the agenda.4 Based on the UN meeting minutes and according to the Swiss Observer Office’s impressions, one can trace the development of the 1 Letter to the FPD International Organisations’ Division, by Jimmy Martin, Deputy of the Permanent Observer Bureau of Switzerland to the United Nations, “27ème Assemblée générale. Nouvelle question Terrorisme,” New York, 15.09.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 2 Ibid, p. 2. 3 Cable from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to Berne, “terrorisme,” 22.09.1972, no. 174, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 4 Cable from the Swiss Observer to the UN in New York to Berne, “Mon 174 sur terrorisme,” 25.09.1972, no 178, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. (hereafter “Swiss UN observer report, cable no. 178”)

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_009

122

Chapter 4

discussions into two irreconcilable discursive strains, where actors played with words, used each other’s arguments against one another, and employed all possible political leverage in order to win this UN counterterrorism war of words. In what follows, the climate during the initial phase of the UN counterterrorism debates will be outlined in order to better understand the context in which the Swiss government was operating.5 The arguments representing Western interests, namely the need to take concerted counterterrorism measures within the UN framework, was first outlined by Kurt Waldheim himself in the explanatory memorandum accompanying his request to add terrorism to the agenda. He laid the greatest emphasis on the indiscriminate nature of terrorist violence, which could affect anyone at any time, thus creating a “climate of fear.”6 He called terrorist attacks “tragic events [using] devastating blind violence [that created an] alarming situation.”7 The main argument centred on the fact that terrorism specifically targeted “innocent civilians.” This can be placed in the context of the general international standard to distinguish between combatants and unarmed civilians. This principle was disregarded when civilians were the deliberate object of violence. Despite Waldheim’s insistence that he had no specific acts in mind, but that terrorism was a threat to the world community as a whole, many Arab countries were bothered by its proximity, time-wise, to the Munich attacks. Thus, efforts to act against terrorism were seen as directed against the Palestinian cause. Arab countries therefore regrouped to fight this possible agenda item.8 The African representatives also preferred avoiding debates about terrorism. Their main argument was that a condemnation of terrorism could lead to a delegitimisation of anti-colonial liberation movements. In their view, efforts to counter terrorism served as a Western pretext to undermine the (African) people’s right to self-determination.9 5 Regarding the timeline of this main part as a whole, this chapter is slightly going back in time to when the UN began to deal with the question of terrorism. 6 United Nations official document, General Assembly, 08.09.1972, A/8791, “Request for the Inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session,” explanatory memorandum, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 7 Ibid. 8 Letter from Swiss Observer Office, 15.09.1972, p. 2, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 9 Cf. cable 174 and Letter to the Legal Section of the FPD from Jimmy Martin, Deputy ­Permanent Observer Bureau of Switzerland to the United Nations, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” New York, 19.12.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN

123

The countries opposing Waldheim’s proposition tried to minimise the problem of terrorism and to present it as a problem entirely created and inflated by the West.10 The Cuban delegate, for instance, emphasised that other, more important issues deserved the UN’s attention, such as economic underdevelopment or unresolved political issues in the Middle East.11 It was precisely these problems, his argument continued, that were the underlying reason for terrorism. Terrorism was thus seen as a reaction to former colonial rule, and it was the industrialised states that were to be held accountable for terrorism.12 Countering this view, Waldheim reiterated the importance of having the UN address violence against innocent civilians as an: “international issue […] whose scope because of modern technology has added a formidable new dimension.”13 He argued that by addressing the issue of terrorism, the UN would fulfil its mandate to further the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the protection of civilians. In order to assuage African objections, he stressed that countering terrorism would not affect the people of present and former colonies’ self-determination liberation struggles. The controversy over whether or not to include terrorism on the agenda further persisted and intensified. The longer and more intricate the situation became, the more it developed into a prestige issue.14 If the proposal was withdrawn, the bureau of the General Secretary, the United States, and Western European countries would have risked losing face.15 This was finally averted by a compromise where the title of the agenda item was amended and by the inclusion of the task of looking into the “underlying causes of terrorism” in the UN’s future work. Accordingly, on 27 September 1972, the issue was delegated to the UN 6th Commission, which was in charge of legal questions, under the following amended title: .

Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence 10 Ibid. p. 3. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 United Nations official document, “Statement Made by the Secretary-General at the 199th Meeting of the General Committee,” 20.09.1972, A8791, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 14 Swiss UN observer report, cable no. 178. 15 Letter from the Swiss Observer Office, 29.09.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

124

Chapter 4

which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair, and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes16 [In italics are the changes added from the original agenda title.] The difficulty in reaching a compromise over the sole question of the agenda item’s heading foreshadowed the subsequent discussions. In the 6th Commission, the gulf between the positions widened. The matter had turned into an extremely politicised question, behind which several Third World countries managed to form a consolidated front.17 Yet, this growing difference did not discourage the US representatives to the UN to submit a “Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorist Acts.”18 The draft convention suggested first defining the punishable acts that fell under this antiterrorism convention and then determining the procedures countries would undertake if such an act were committed on a country’s territory or by its citizens.19 After the US proposal, the Third World states intending to obstruct the adoption of concrete counterterrorism measures introduced another discursive weapon; namely, they demanded that the focus be on state terrorism instead of terrorism committed by civilians. The Yemeni representative published documentation about Israel and its terrorist past and present.20 The report aimed to present Israel as a “terrorist state” by highlighting the non-state violence used by Zionist groups, such as the Irgun or Stern, when they fought the British

16

United Nations official document, General Assembly, Twenty-seventh session, Sixth Committee, Agenda item 92, 27.11.1972, A7C.6/L.880, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 17 Swiss UN observer report, cable no. 178. For the politicisation of the UN counterterrorism debate, see also Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism, p. 40. 18 Letter from the Swiss Observer Office for the FPD International Relations Division, “Internationaler Terrorismus: amerikanischer Konventionsentwurf,” 28.09.1972, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. See also the document itself, ­United Nations official document, General Assembly, “United States of America: draft resolution,” 25.09.1972, A7C.6/L.850, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 19 For further details about the US draft convention and its scope, cf. Ben Saul, “Attempts to define terrorism in international law,” Netherlands International Law Review, 2005, vol. 52, no. 01, pp. 57–83, pp. 68 ff. 20 Letter from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” 30.11.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN

125

colonial authorities in the 1940s (before the creation of the State of Israel).21 The report continued by listing acts of sabotage supposedly done by Israel’s secret services during the 1956, 1967, and 1972 wars, arguing that these, too, were forms of terrorism.22 Israel retaliated a few days later with a report entitled “Accomplices of Terror,” which held Arab countries accountable for Palestinian terrorism, reproaching them for having helped with the foundation of terrorist groups, and giving these groups territorial bases, financial support, arms, intelligence, hideouts, and operational facilities.23 It essentially argued that if the Arab countries wanted to, they could make terrorism stop immediately.24 Finally, the Yemeni authorities replied and submitted a letter from Yassir Arafat, the leader of the PLO at the time, reiterating that his people were “victims of organised and systematic terrorism.”25 This juxtaposition of Palestinian non-state violence with Israeli efforts during the wars with Arab countries reintroduced the core issue of the definition of terrorism. This line of argumentation was also carried forward by other Arab countries.26 Under the initiative of Algeria, a draft resolution was submitted suggesting the inclusion of a condemnation of “repressive and terrorist acts of colonial, racist, and foreign regimes and to reaffirm the legitimacy 21

22

23

24 25

26

For a historical overview of violent Jewish activism, including the years before the founding of the state of Israel, see Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg, “Jewish Self Defense and Terrorist Groups Prior to the Establishment of the State of Israel: Roots and Traditions,” Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions, 2003, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 91–118; and Bruce Hoffman. Anonymous soldiers: the struggle for Israel, 1917–1947. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. United Nations official document, General Assembly, “Lettre datée du 13 novembre 1972 adressée au Secrétaire général par le représentant permanent de la République ­arabe du Yémen auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unis,” 15.11.1972, A7C.6/L.869, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. United Nations official document, General Assembly, “Lettre datée du 20 novembre 1972 adressée au Secrétaire général par le représentant permanent d’Israel auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unis,” 15.11.1972, A7C.6/L.872, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Ibid, p. 42. United Nations official document, General Assembly, “Lettre datée du 22 novembre 1972 adressée au Secrétaire général par le représentant permanent de la République arabe du Yémen auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unis,” 22.11.1972, A7C.6/L.876, in: BAR: E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. For an overview of the different submitted draft resolutions, cf. Letter from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” 30.11.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

126

Chapter 4

of the struggle against forms of alien domination [explicitly meaning Israel, South Africa, or Portugal].”27 Instead of condemning terrorism, this draft resolution justified terrorism if it was used against an “oppressive regime.”28 Meanwhile, the US draft resolution and its call for immediate measures to supress terrorism were discounted.29 In support of the United States, A ­ ustralia submitted a draft resolution that was in line with the US position and demanded that a mandate be given to the UN International Law Commission to immediately elaborate a counterterrorism convention, which was to be discussed at a diplomatic conference in November 1973.30 In contrast, the Algerian draft resolution foresaw the establishment of an ad hoc committee solely responsible for the evaluation of the underlying causes of terrorism and what could be done to counter them.31 Since the underlying causes of terrorism were presented as Western postcolonial policies, this was again an affront directed towards Western countries, and as mentioned above, it aimed to delay the introduction of effective counterterrorism measures.32 Finally, the Third World countries managed to form a majority for the adoption of Algeria’s revised draft resolution. On 18 December 1972, GA Resolution 3034 (XXVII), “On Measures to Prevent International Terrorism,” was accepted, with references to state terrorism, the right to self-determination, and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for the study of terrorism’s underlying causes included.33 27

28

29

30 31 32

33

United Nations official document, General Assembly, “Afghanistan, Algeria, Guyana, India, Kenya, Yugoslavia, Zambia: Draft Resolution,” 27.09.1972, A/C.6/L.880 (thereafter “Third World Draft Convention”), in: BAR: E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. The question whether people living under oppression have a right to use violence, even against civilians, dominated the UN debates for decades to come, cf. Edward Newman. A Crisis of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security. London: Routledge, 2007, p. 119. For the US proposal’s disregard, cf. cable from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to Berne, “internationaler terrorismus,” 14.11.1972, no. 269, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. United Nations official document, General Assembly, “Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Italy, Japan and New Zealand: draft resolution,” 27.09.1972, A/C.6/L.879. Third World Draft Convention, in: BAR: E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Letter from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” 19.12.1972, (hereafter “Swiss Mission Summary”) in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. United Nations official document, General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), “Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN

127

In sum, three main arguments turned Waldheim’s initial proposal and the US proposal upside down. First, future UN work was going to focus on the underlying causes of terrorism, which served to obstruct the establishment of concrete counterterrorism measures. Second, the inclusion of state terrorism reopened the question of the definition of terrorism, and this, again, hindered the adoption of counterterrorist measures. Third, by asserting the right of people to defend their self-determination, a justification for terrorism was given in case the fight was for a just cause, such as anti-colonial struggle. Having been entirely diverted from its original purpose, the resolution did not adopt measures against terrorism, but provided justifications for it.34 This represented a crushing defeat for the United States and its Western supporters, and it meant that if Third World countries formed a common bloc, they could easily outvote the industrialised countries.35 The Soviet bloc claimed that it was at first favourable to the US initiative, but in the end it voted for the Third World resolution.36 In talks with the Swiss diplomats, the representative of the USSR explained that they unsuccessfully tried to mediate a compromise that was deadlocked due to the intransigence of both sides.37 The main conclusions that the Swiss Mission to the UN drew was that with the failure to agree on a resolution that would have initiated preparations for concrete counterterrorism measures, it was now up to each country to install measures that it deemed necessary in the fight against international terrorism. The Mission further noted that this Afro-Asian “show of force” would result in Western countries dismissing the UN as a relevant institution to address international problems. Diplomats at the Swiss Mission to the UN predicted that solutions for issues of importance to the United States or Western European countries would be sought outside of the UN context.38



of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.” (hereafter “UN Resolution 3034”) The text is accessible online: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/27/ares3034%28xxvii%29.pdf. See annex 2. 34 For a similar interpretation of UN resolution 3034, cf. Abraham D. Sofaer, “Terrorism and the Law,” Foreign Affairs, summer 1986, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 901–922, p. 904. 35 The Swiss Ambassador calls it “Niederlage,” cf. Swiss Mission Summary, p. 6, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 36 United Nations official document, General Assembly, “Report of the Sixth Commission. Votes,” 16.12.1972, A/8969, p. 16, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, ­Dossier  I. 37 Swiss Mission Summary, p. 5, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 38 Ibid. p. 7.

128

Chapter 4

Drafting of the Swiss Position at the UN After UN Resolution 3034 was adopted, in 1973 the counterterrorism debates at the UN centred on defining the mandate for the Ad Hoc Commission to look into underlying causes of terrorism, which was foreseen in Resolution 3034. Furthermore, under clause no. 7 of the resolution, each country (independently of whether or not it was a UN member state) was requested to “consider the subject-matter urgently and submit observations to the Secretary-General by 10 April 1973, including concrete proposals for finding an effective solution to the problem.”39 It was decided that the Ad Hoc Commission should then write a final report based on the contributions. The goal was that the different contributions would provide the grounds for the Ad Hoc Commission to formulate concrete recommendations for the next General Assembly.40 Within the Swiss government, all relevant agencies in the Swiss administration were informed about the developments at the UN on issues relating to counterterrorism. Besides the FPD’s Division for International Organisations, the Federal Police and the WGT were notified in particular.41 Before making the decision about whether or not Switzerland should submit its observations on terrorism, the FPD used its diplomatic channels to inquire about the intentions of other countries. Berne was particularly interested in knowing the position of the 19 countries that were members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and that either abstained (Spain, France, Greece, Norway, and Sweden) or voted against (­Turkey, Belgium, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Canada, Italy, Japan, Austria, the United States, and New Z ­ ealand) Resolution 3034.42 These countries were confronted with two alternatives: either abstain from the terrorism debates in order to show disagreement with the Third World countries’ hijacking of the issue, or join the debate in the hope of being able to 39 UN Resolution 3034. 40 Ibid. 41 Cable from the Swiss Observer Mission to the UN in New York to Berne, “fuer rechtsabteilung und abteilung fuer internationale organisationen,” 12.12.1972, 11.30 AM, no 338, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. For the information for the Federal Police, cf. letter from Alfred Reinhard Hohl, Deputy head of the FPD for Political Affairs Division, to the Swiss Observer Mission in New York, 08.12.1972, in: ibid. 42 Letter from Bodmer from the FPD International Organisations Division to the Swiss Ambassadors in all OECD countries, 20.02.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2003A-1988/15#1430, Terrorisme, Dossiers I–II, 1973–75, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN

129

steer the course of the 6th Commission’s work. With the exception of Belgium, all contacted countries chose the latter, some even expressing the hope of being able to counteract the Third World initiative by means of heavily criticising the weaknesses of Resolution 3034.43 Overall, the logic had been that it was better to try to influence the course of action instead of voluntarily taking the role of bystander. The Swiss government also decided to take this opportunity to express its views on terrorism. The FPD International Organisations Department instructed the WGT to draft the official Swiss statement and transmitted the countries’ replies to Ritter.44 The WGT had to decide how best to approach the topic, taking into account Switzerland’s interests and the positions of the other countries. Switzerland, however, was not a member of the UN, and its degree of influence was thus very limited. Yet, its voice would still be heard in a multilateral arena, and this could affect its position of being a target country for a terrorist attack and of being appreciated as a relevant partner in counterterrorism cooperation. The Swiss Position at the UN The word which best describes the Swiss statement at the UN is “balanced.” The text incorporated many different viewpoints, while the overarching basis of its argumentation was legal considerations. Again, as during the ICAO debates, the WGT chose international law as the basis for its argumentation under the assumption that it could provide the necessary distance with the otherwise very controversial subject matter.45 Also, as mentioned earlier, it corresponded to the expertise of the WGT’s members. Analysing Switzerland’s statement as a whole, the text would at first seem anodyne and featureless, while with a closer look at the different paragraphs, the nuances of the Swiss position become discernible. The Swiss statement 43

44

45

The replies of all the countries are in the same file: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. The Netherlands and Greece were the most optimistic ones in their estimation of being able to counteract the Third World bloc. Ritter was personally informed about the developments, cf. Letter from Staehelin to Ritter, “Internationaler Terrorismus,” 15.01.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Letter from B. Turrettini from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, 5.6.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, ­Dossier  I.

130

Chapter 4

was marked by a strong bipolarity and was geared towards both of the opposing sides at the UN, each approached in view of a different goal. One can see from the text that the Swiss government wanted to straightforwardly position itself in the West in view of furthering international measures, but it wanted to do so without upsetting the Third World countries. Thus, the structure of the text was such that every paragraph exactly counterweighed the following one, each supporting either a Third World or a Western line of argument. The first paragraph read: Switzerland condemns, without compromise, the use of terrorism in all circumstances but it is aware of the fact that terrorism has emerged in some cases from serious political situations for which no remedies have yet been found.46 Even though it seemingly started with a strong condemnation of terrorism, it then relativised this “condemnation” by taking into consideration the political reasons for terrorism, which made resorting to violence more understandable. The second subset thus weakened the condemnation’s impact and alluded to the underlying causes of terrorism. The next sentence, however, nuanced the attenuation again by saying that even if these acts were understandable, the perpetrators were not excluded from legal prosecution: However, it goes without saying that the historical explanation of certain situations will not legally exculpate the perpetrators of criminal behaviour.47 After these two sentences, the text reconciled the Western and Third World positions by arguing that both distinct approaches were needed. In classic diplomatic language, it estimated that not only was the study of terrorism’s underlying causes important (as Third World countries argued), but so was the establishment of terrorism prevention measures (as was the policy of the United States).48 The Swiss statement continued by specifying that the two 46

Final version of Swiss counterterrorism statement: FPD, “copie verte,” Berne, 29.05.1973, distributed to Amb. Thalmann, Amb. Bindschedler and all the WGT members, “Réponse à l’enquête des Nations Unies sur le terrorisme,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN

131

approaches were operating on different levels: one on the historical socioeconomic political level, and the other situated in international criminal law. However, it emphasised that it was dangerous to let the study of underlying causes delay the adoption of concrete measures: It would be dangerous to wait until the study of its causes is completed before adopting practical measures.49 The above sentence was in line with Western demands because it supported the Western push for strong and immediate counterterrorist international action. The next sentence, in turn, swung back to the Third World side: Illicit acts of violence committed by states themselves are in direct violation of international law.50 Even though it was supposedly a statement about international law, calling state terrorism a violation of international law was evidently aligned with the Third World initiative to blur the lines of a definition of terrorism. Furthermore, this passage did not miss its intended audience, as it was later quoted by Egypt in another speech.51 Before the concluding remark, the text switched again in favour of the Western side. It explained that as long as states refused to abide by a convention and international norms, terrorism was bound to continue: Such crimes will persist for as long as the Community of States will not have agreed to subject them, by the conclusion of conventions, to international jurisdiction and standards.52 This again underlined the need for international measures, which was what the Western countries had been advocating. The final sentence furthered this 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Letter from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, “Internationaler Terrorismus Ad Hoc-Komitee,” 10.08.1973, in: ­ ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 52 Final version of Swiss counterterrorism statement, FPD, “copie verte,” Berne, 29.05.1973, distributed to Amb. Thalmann, Amb. Bindschedler and all the WGT members, “Réponse à l’enquête des Nations Unies sur le terrorisme,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

132

Chapter 4

position and emphasised the need to establish a juridical mutual-assistance framework that was as effective and as large as possible and it affirmed Switzerland’s readiness to engage in the establishment of such a framework.53 While one could see that the Swiss statement at the UN was, overall, very balanced by taking into account all possible positions and even attempting to reconcile them, the pro-Western ending of the text pointed at what was most at stake for Switzerland: the country wanted to ensure its participation in bilateral and multilateral mutual counterterrorism assistance frameworks and to be seen as a relevant partner in this endeavour. This was also in relation to developments at the CoE, where member states were solidifying efforts towards a European framework of mutual judicial assistance.54 Besides the supposedly neutral line of argumentation, based solely on legal aspects or generally well-accepted considerations, the text also included a hint to Western countries that Switzerland was ready to foster intergovernmental cooperation. Support for this interpretation of the Swiss statement can be found in the WGT’s second meeting. There, it was highlighted that selected counterterrorism exchange networks were the most important means to increase ­Switzerland’s security. In this sense, the diplomatic efforts at the UN can be seen as enabling other counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms. Furthermore, the last sentence of the UN statement specifically used a rather vague formulation for where this “mutual judicial assistance” could be. Thus, it implicitly insinuated that this cooperation would not have to be bound to the UN. Since Switzerland was not a member of the UN, it was in its interest to have counterterrorism efforts shift towards an international forum in which it could participate more actively. Overall, one can conclude that the Swiss statement was excessively diplomatically correct, paying lip service to all stakeholders but subtly aimed at opening the door for bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation that was not limited to the UN framework. UN Counterterrorism Efforts Deadlocked Finding a regional, European solution instead of a global response to terrorism was indeed a likely scenario. Over the course of the UN debates, and especially after the adoption of Resolution 3034, Western countries increasingly

53 Ibid. 54 The counterterrorism efforts and debates at the CoE will be treated in the next chapter.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN

133

perceived the UN as incapable of dealing with terrorism issues in the way these countries had envisaged it.55 After some Third World countries had “hijacked” the initial debate on terrorism, the power play continued in the Ad Hoc Committee. On the basis of the various responses of the countries (including the Swiss contribution), the committee was tasked with formulating concrete recommendations for the next GA. However, in its four-week-long session in July and August 1973, it took a full week just to set the daily agenda and determine the discussions’ president, vice president, and rapporteur.56 The 35 committee members did not agree on even the most fundamental subjects. Opinions differed on a number of areas, such as the procedural question of whether or not one should first agree upon a definition of terrorism before elaborating measures.57 However, the unfeasibility of any agreement became most apparent when some members pushed for a recommendation stating that state terrorism was the “most harmful and deadly form of terrorism.”58 This obviously stood in contrast to the US and UK demand to focus on terrorism committed by individuals. The question of “studying the underlying causes” before countering terrorism was again up for debate, claiming that “the pursuit of certain States of policies of colonialism, racism, occupation of foreign lands and exploitation” were the reasons for international terrorism. Finally, this led to Algeria’s motion to recommend to the GA that for the struggle of self-determination, any means—including terrorism—were to be allowed. No Western country could possibly agree to this, and so it was not surprising that in the end, the Ad Hoc Committee did not manage to formulate any recommendations for the next GA.59 It thus failed to fulfil its mandate due to the irreconcilability of the members’ positions. Reporting on the Ad Hoc Committee’s work, the deputy head of the Swiss mission to the UN, Jimmy Martin (1920–2008),60 nevertheless identified the

55 Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism, p. 41. 56 Letter from Jimmy Martin from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, “Internationaler Terrorismus Ad Hoc-Kommitee,” 27.07.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 57 UN General Assembly, Official Document of the 28th Session, supplement no. 28 (A/9028), “Report of the Special Committee on International Terrorism,” in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I, p. 6. 58 Ibid, p. 12. 59 Ibid, “VI Déclaration finale,” p. 21. 60 For more information about Jimmy Martin, see also dodis.ch/P1558 and Marc Perrenoud, “Jimmy Martin,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 03.12.2013, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D30736.php

134

Chapter 4

Western countries as the “winner” in this debate. According to him, there was a noticeable break in the unity of the Third World countries, which allowed the “Western group [of countries] to prevent the adoption of extreme Third World propositions.”61 In this sense, one can see that it got to a point where blocking the Third World coalition was already considered a “success.” In sum, the above has shown that the year-long discussions around international terrorism were going around in circles. The positions remained intransigently divided, and from Martin’s judgement it becomes apparent that the only real policy for Western countries was limited to what could be called “damage containment.” With these givens, and once it became clear that a comprehensive global international accord to supress terrorism was improbable, there were two main policies that Western states pursued in accordance with their experiences at the UN. On the one hand, a so-called piecemeal approach was possible, hereby focussing on initiatives to prohibit specific offences, such as kidnaping diplomats or hijacking planes. This approach was similar to the one applied in the three ICAO conventions, which dealt with certain acts of terrorism without employing this politically loaded term.62 On the other hand, due to the deadlocked situation at the UN, regional fora among “like-minded countries” became more appealing. The Organization of American States (OAS), the G7, and the CoE began to seek new solutions for the growing terrorist ­problem.63 From the Swiss government’s perspective, the shift towards a European multilateral framework was a positive development, since Switzerland was a member of the CoE and could thus participate more actively in designing international cooperation. Switzerland’s strong engagement at the CoE will be the focus of the next chapter. 61

Letter from Jimmy Martin from the Swiss Observer Office to the UN in New York to the FPD Legal Division in Berne, “Internationaler Terrorismus Ad Hoc-Kommitee,” 10.08.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 62 Some contemporaries, such as Max Finger, until 1971 US ambassador to the UN, found the piecemeal approach better suited to deal with international terrorism, cf. Seymour Maxwell Finger, “International Terrorism and the United Nations,” in: Yonah Alexander. International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives. New York: Praeger, 1976, pp. 323–37, p. 335. However, only after 1989 did this approach lead to concrete measures, such as conventions on hostage taking, terrorist bombings, the protection of diplomatic staff and terrorism financing. cf. Peter J. van Krieken. Terrorism and the international legal order: with special reference to the UN, the EU and cross-border aspects. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002, p. 3. For a good account of the UN legal counterterrorist instruments after 1989, see in particular Krieken’s forth chapter, pp. 112–235. 63 Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism, p. 43.

Chapter 5

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts “Making” Foreign Policy In the present state of things, the forces within the United Nations are too antagonistic to formulate a unanimously accepted common policy in this area [fight against terrorism]. […] Given the lack of results so far in this global organization, does the Committee [of Ministers] not think that we should start by a joint action of the Western European countries?1 Thus spoke Erik Bernhard Blumenfeld on the occasion of the Committee of Ministers’ (CoM) meeting on 22 November 1972. At the time, he was the head of the Commission for Political Questions of the CoE’s Consultative Assembly.2 He referred to the ongoing discussions at the UN, right before Resolution 3034 was about to be adopted. He addressed the question of concerted European actions against terrorism because in the previous month, the CoE’s Consultative Assembly adopted Recommendation 684 on International Terrorism, which called for a “joint European front to combat terrorism” under the political guidance of the CoM.3 Having placed the issue permanently on its agenda, it was now up to the CoM to decide how to push counterterrorism efforts further. The CoM, however, had not yet activated any mechanism of the CoE to enhance counterterrorism cooperation, because most members still favoured a global answer to the question of terrorism, hoping that the UN could elaborate the adequate means.4 The Swiss government also favoured an international 1 Document produced by the CoE, “Comité des Ministres. Terrorisme international. Recommandation 684. Exposé du President de la Commission des questions politiques de l’Assemblée consultative. CM(72)198,” Strasbourg, 27.11.1972, transmitted on 27.11.1972 by the Swiss Permanent Mission to the CoE, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 2 For Blumenfeld’s profile, cf. http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/MP-Details-EN .asp?MemberID=1148 3 CoE official document, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 684 on International Terrorism, adopted by the Assembly on 23.10.1972 (16th Sitting), online accessible: http:// www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/PA_Recommendation_684_1972_EN.pdf 4 Working document from the CoE, “Terrorisme international. Note du Secrétariat Général préparée par la Direction Politique. CM(72)187 révisé,” Strasbourg, 7.12.1972, transmitted to the FPD International Organisations Division on 11.12.1972 by the Swiss Permanent Mission to the CoE, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_010

136

Chapter 5

legal instrument to which the maximum number of states could adhere.5 However, when in December 1972 the UN eventually adopted Resolution 3034, the European statesmen fully understood the deadlock at the UN and finally agreed to direct the CoE’s efforts toward fostering counterterrorism cooperation. In its next meeting in January 1973, the CoM decided to form an ad hoc committee that would concentrate on issues related to international terrorism.6 In Switzerland, the mood had also changed, and support for a European counterterrorism approach grew. The adoption of Resolution 3034 infused widespread pessimism in Switzerland over the UN’s chances of drafting an effective international counterterrorism cooperation instrument. This was pointed out by Swiss MP Henri Schmitt,7 representative of the Canton of Geneva in the National Council, in his parliamentary request to the Federal Councillor one day after the adoption of Resolution 3034: The recent resolution at the United Nations has provided the proof that a global solution is not realisable. […] Does the Federal Council not consider it now to be the right moment to concert efforts on the European level in order to establish the basis for an effective international collaboration, which would go beyond existing treaties?8 This request showed that members of parliament supported active Swiss participation at the CoE. Federal Councillor Pierre Graber replied through a text prepared by the WGT, in which he fully seconded these considerations.9 The 5 Internal memorandum, “I. Question no 3 [about the Swiss engagement in ICAO, the UN and the CoE], II. Réponse,” Berne, 30.04.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 6 Summary of the 217th CoMD meeting held from 9–19.01.1973 sent from the Swiss Permanent Mission to the CoE to the FPD’s Legal Division, “Conseil de l’Europe Terrorisme International,” Strasbourg, 29.01.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 7 Henri Schmitt was in the National Council from 1963–75 for the Canton of Geneva, further information can be found in the HLS article about him, cf. Bernard Lescaze, “Henri Schmitt” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 02.10.2014, online accessible: http:// www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6666.php 8 Official document from the Swiss National Council [Nationalrat], Interpellation “Kleine Anfrage” Schmitt-Genève “Prévention du Terrorisme,” 299.(11527), 19.12.1972. 9 Agenda of the third meeting of the WGT as described on the invitation sent by Ritter for the meeting held on the 13.02.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

137

executive confirmed its agreement with Schmitt’s interpretation of current events and assured Switzerland’s strong commitment and active participation in the CoE’s or any other international endeavours in matters of counterterrorism. In the words of Graber: I would like to assure that Switzerland is determined to take an active part in the international struggle against terrorism both, on the European and the global level.10 With this, the Swiss government indeed oriented its attention towards the European counterterrorism arena. With regard to the CoE structure, it is important to note that the CoE consisted of different political and operational levels. The principal organ of the CoE was the Committee of Ministers (CoM). The other core CoE body was the Parliamentary Assembly. Yet, since the CoE was an intergovernmental organisation where the states were the main actors, the parliamentary component was secondary. Thus, the CoM—the representative body of all the member states—had core decision-making powers.11 The CoM operated on two different political levels: the Foreign Ministers themselves, who constituted the members of the CoM, and the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies (CoMD), who were on the level of ambassadors. The latter ran the daily business and smoothed out the decision-making. The CoM met twice a year, in mid-May and in mid-November, in Strasbourg. The CoMD was also a political organ, but it operated separately from the CoM with the view of ensuring the long-term functionality of the CoE and the sustainability of CoM decisions. The Ministers’ Deputies were generally identical to the permanent representatives, meaning the diplomatic staff in the Missions accredited to the CoE. The CoMD met frequently, approximately twice per month. The CoM and the CoMD were further supported by advisory expert committees which developed contents, prepared decisions, and guided the implementation of adopted measures. The CoM and the CoMD were allowed to create committees on any subject that they deemed important. The members of the committee were selected by the respective governments. There were two types of committees: permanent ones called “steering committees,” which were 10

11

Swiss Federal Council, “Beschluss, Réponse verbal (11527) Interpellation Schmitt-Genève du 19 décembre 1972 concernant prévention du terrorisme,” revised final approved draft of 19.03.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. Klaus Brummer. Der Europarat: eine Einfuhrung. Wiesbaden: VS, Verl. fur Sozialwiss, 2008, p. 33.

138

Chapter 5

accountable to the CoM, and ad hoc committees, in charge of narrowly defined topics and accountable to the respective steering committee.12 The committees were further supported by the CoE Secretariat. Besides the above, the CoE also regularly organised the Conferences of Specialised Ministers. The Conference of Ministers of Interior was central because it provided the political backing of ongoing convention drafting processes. The “Non-Beginning” of the Convention Despite the CoM’s agreement in January 1973 in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc committee focussing on international terrorism, controversy arose over several aspects of the nature of this committee.13 The largest disagreement concerned the mandate and the staffing of the committee. Opinions diverged first on whether the committee should apply a political lens or only limit itself to legal issues, second on whether experts or ministerial delegates should constitute the committee, and third on whether non-CoE member countries should be allowed to participate.14 The Swiss delegation suggested having the committee treat the same issues as at the UN, while other countries, such as Denmark, saw a risk that the CoE could give the impression of forming a “‘European front’ of old and prosperous nations against newer and poorer nations,”15 which could aggravate the current rift at the UN. With a majority fearing the potentially negative consequences of a large mandate, the CoMD decided to limit the ad hoc committee’s mandate to strictly legal questions and to staff it with experts, and these only from CoE member countries. Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Officials that was instructed to look “into the legal aspects of the problem raised by international terrorism” was created.16 Ritter, the head of the FPD’s WGT (now recently promoted 12

13

14 15 16

For further reading on the CoE functioing, see also Michaela Wittinger. Der Europarat: die Entwicklung seines Rechts und der “europaischen Verfassungswerte”. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005; and Jörg Polakiewicz. Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publications, 1999. Summary of the 217th CoMD meeting held from 9–19.01.1973 sent from the Swiss Permanent Mission to the CoE to the FPD’s Legal Division, “Conseil de l’Europe Terrorisme International,” Strasbourg, 29.01.1973. The Austrian position for instance went quite far, suggesting that the committee should mainly focus on political issues related to terrorism, ibid. Ibid. p. 29. Letter from Heribert Golsong, CoE Director of Juridical Affairs, in view of the ad hoc committee meeting of 8 and 9 March 1972, Strasbourg, 01.02.1972, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

139

to head of Section of the FPD’s Direction for International Public Law), was selected to join the committee as an expert in counterterrorism matters.17 The committee set itself a gruelling agenda that was compiled of suggestions from the member states. It met on 8–9 March 1973.18 The discussions during these sessions were difficult due to the abundance of opinions expressed. Proposals ranged from the idea of strengthening INTERPOL in order to enhance police cooperation, to the insistence of collectively condemning terrorism while also prioritizing the study of its underlying causes. One attendee even suggested that the CoE attempt to contact terrorists in order to dissuade them from violent actions. Others favoured a fragmented approach, like at the ICAO, in banning specific acts and accelerating the adherence of states to these existing conventions. Others believed this piecemeal path to be largely insufficient and affirmed the urgent need for a comprehensive counterterrorism convention. Some participants demanded the eradication of safe havens for any political offenders. Many still held out hope that the UN could manage to adopt a viable global c­ ounterterrorism ­convention and preferred that the CoE wait temporarily. Others h ­ eavily opposed this ­ ­ optimism by expressing strong scepticism about the UN’s ­chances of ­success.19 However, there was one element that was unanimously accepted by the participants, and this concerned the kind of legal approach that a possible effective counterterrorism convention should adopt. The principle that should guide such concerted legal action was determined to be: “aut dedere aut judicare.” The idea behind this legal concept is that any violent offender of a kind of action as determined by the convention has to be either extradited or put on trial in the country where the perpetrator was being held in custody.20 There already existed a European Convention on Extradition, which had been adopted 17 Letter from Ambassador Dumont to Heribert Golsong, Berne, 12.02.1972, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 18 Working document from the CoE, “Comité ad hoc de hauts fonctionnaires chargé de procéder à un échange de vues sur les aspects juridique des problèmes posés par le terrorisme international,” prepared by the Secretariat of the Direction for Juridical Affairs in view of the sessions of 8th and 9th March 1973, Strasbourg, 20.02.1973, transmitted on 27.02.1973 by the Swiss Permanent Mission to the CoE, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 19 Working document from the CoE, “Comité ad hoc de hauts fonctionnaires chargé de procéder à un échange de vues sur les aspects juridique des problèmes posés par le terrorisme international,” Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee’s Meeting of 8th and 9th March 1973, transmitted on 29.03.1973 by the Swiss Permanent Mission to the CoE, in: ­C H-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 20 Further below, this chapter will return to this concept in more details.

140

Chapter 5

in 1957.21 Yet, under this convention and its protocols, extradition could be refused under the claim that the offence was a “political offence.”22 A possible European Convention on Terrorism would attempt to find ways to ban this political offence exemption clause when it came to terrorist acts.23 Because this approach was seen to run the risk of conflicting with some principles of domestic law, the Belgian government drafted a questionnaire to be completed by each member state. The questionnaire was about aspects of terrorism in domestic extradition laws—namely, it asked whether a definition of “political offences” existed, and it demanded clarification regarding the countries’ regulations on extraterritorial jurisdiction and penalties for acts of terrorism.24 Information about this from each country was meant to help identify the aspects of national law that would need to be changed if such a convention were to be negotiated. Nevertheless, after unwieldy discussions, the ad hoc committee concluded that a convention on a global scale, instead of a regional one, was preferable. Therefore, despite the clear political guidelines from the CoM and despite some participants’ prediction of a counterterrorism cooperation deadlock at the UN, the committee concluded in its final declaration that it was premature for the CoE to envisage a counterterrorism convention. The UN was presented as a more appropriate framework in this respect. Accordingly, it asked the CoM to again decide whether this ad hoc committee should really continue to exist in the current setting. It nevertheless recommended that each CoE member state answer the Belgian questionnaire. On the basis of the questionnaire, the CoM could then assess whether the drafting of a European counterterrorism convention was feasible. 21

22

23

24

For further reading on the 1957 convention and on extradition laws in Europe more generally, see also Mark Mackarel and Susan Nash, “Extradition and the European Union,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1997, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 948–957, more specifically p. 949–953; and Paul O’Higgins, “European Convention on Extradition,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1960, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 491–494. Art. 3 (1) of the European Convention on Extradition reads: “Extradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the requested Party as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence.” Cf., http:// conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm For a detailed history of the political offence exception clause, see also Geoff Gilbert. Responding to International Crime. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, in particular chapter 5 “The Political Offence Exemption,” pp. 193–304. Annex to the ad hoc committee meeting of 8th and 9th March 1973, “Projet de questionnaire (suggéré par la délégation belge),” in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

141

Besides the somewhat unusual situation of a newly created committee requesting to have its mandate lifted during its first meeting, the discussions within the committee showed that the counterterrorism efforts at the European level were challenging as well. The ministers, their delegates, and the ad hoc committee’s senior officials could not dissociate their work from events at the UN. It seems that, among other things, the amount of optimism or pessimism for the UN’s ability to reach an agreement determined its policy decisions. In sum, despite shared values and a common understanding regarding a wide array of matters, on the issue of terrorism not even the (supposedly apolitical) senior officials or experts managed (or were willing) to reconcile their differences. The ECCP Accelerates the Process The ad hoc committee’s decision indeed temporarily slowed down the CoE’s counterterrorism process. In its subsequent meeting, the CoMD decided to dissolve the ad hoc committee but requested that each country complete the Belgian questionnaire. Instead of the ad hoc committee, a regular CoE committee, the European Committee for Crime Problems (ECCP), was charged with analysing the answers.25 The ECCP finally made the crucial decision to limit the issue of terrorism to strictly legal matters and involved Subcommittee XXXI on the Application of the European Convention on Extradition in the drafting process.26 Subcommittee XXXI was set up in 1971 by the ECCP to examine the practical application of the European Convention on Extradition.27 It was chaired by the representative from Austria and among the experts on this subcommittee was Hans-Peter Wyssmann from Switzerland.28 Wyssmann was based in Berne as head of the Section of the Police Division of the FDJP. 25

26 27

28

Letter from Heribert Golsong, CoE Director of Juridical Affairs, informing about the CoMD of 14th to 22nd March 1973, Strasbourg, 31.03.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. CoE CoMD working document, “Observations sur l’ordre du jour. Terrorisme International,” Strasbourg, 21.12.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. CoE Publications, Extradition: European Standards. Explanatory Notes on the Council of Europe convention and protocols and minimum standards protecting persons subject to transnational criminal proceedings, Strasbourg, 2006, p. 81. FPD, Division for International Organisations, “Organes et comités du Conseil de l’Europe dans les divers domaines de la coopération intergouvernementale auxquels la Suisse est représentée,” Berne, 15.05.1973, p. 9, in: CH-BAR#E2003A#1988/15#276, Comités d’experts et délègues suisses, 1973–75.

142

Chapter 5

Since Subcommittee XXXI was in charge of all matters pertaining to ­ uropean extradition laws, it was certainly the most competent committee E to conceive a convention in line with the chosen approach to “extradite or prosecute.” In contrast to the rather slow and tedious developments previously, the ECCP and its Subcommittee XXXI managed to show results in a surprisingly short amount of time. As soon as the ECCP secretariat received the answers to the Belgian questionnaire from the countries in May 1973, it drafted a consolidated summary of the various legal aspects of terrorism in August 1973.29 In September 1973, Subcommittee XXXI met to discuss possible options for a European extradition convention for perpetrators of terrorist attacks.30 In these meetings, Subcommittee XXXI identified the following core challenges and possible solutions with regard to terrorism and extradition laws: should the need to define terrorism be dealt with? • How How • limited?could the possibility of using the political offence clause be • What if a country did not grant extradition? With regard to the first issue, the committee concluded that instead of attempting to define terrorism—an undertaking that had failed on numerous previous occasions—it instead suggested listing certain specific offences which very often were considered terrorism. This would, for instance, include infractions against aircraft or diplomats, or the taking of hostages. In view of the second question, it suggested taking into consideration the seriousness of the offence. One could argue that in many cases a violent act was so serious either in its nature or in its effects, in relation to its motives, that it could no longer be considered political and should fall under the category of ordinary

29 CoE ECCP, “Réponses au questionnaire relatif aux aspects juridiques des problèmes posés par le terrorisme international,” Strasbourg, 21.08.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. For the answer provided by Switzerland, cf. Letter from Jean-Pierre Ritter to Heribert Golsong, “réponse au questionnaire,” Berne, 04.05.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 30 CoE ECCP, XXXI, “Extradition of the authors of terrorist acts,” Strasbourg, 11.09.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01#2000/392#248*, Bd. 1–2; Europarat: Etude application de la Convention europ. d’extradition (sous-comité XXXI) = Anwendung des europ. Auslieferungs­ übereinkommens; Dokumentation/Dokumente, 1967–1973 [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “CH-BAR#E4260D-01, Subcommittee XXXI”].

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

143

offences. Should a country refuse to extradite, then it should be bound to hand the criminal over to its own authorities for prosecution.31 With these straightforward solutions to complex matters, by October 1973 Subcommittee XXXI had already outlined the major traits of a European counterterrorism convention based on extradition laws.32 On these grounds, a first draft resolution on the guiding principles for a European convention to suppress terrorism and its explanatory note were prepared in November 1973.33 Consequently, the ECCP met in November and decided to give the draft resolution to the CoE member states for their comments before the CoM discussed it in its next meeting in January 1974.34 Switzerland also received the opportunity to comment on the text.35 The Swiss government did not request any changes to the resolution, and the WGT and the person in charge at the Federal Office of the Attorney General affirmed their confidence that the Swiss Parliament would readily agree to ratify such an instrument.36 Swiss decision-makers stressed that they highly welcomed any possible European mechanism to effectively fight terrorism.37 31 Ibid. 32 CoE ECCP, XXXI, “Application of the European Convention on Extradition,” Strasbourg, 10.10.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, Subcommittee XXXI. 33 CoE, ECCP, XXXI, “Application of the European Convention on Extradition. Resolution,” CM (73) 260, Strasbourg, 08.11.1973, and “Draft Explanatory Note,” CM (73) 261, 12.11.1973, both in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, Subcommittee XXXI. 34 CoE, ECCP, XXXI, “Summary Report. Third meeting. Strasbourg, 5–9 November 1973,” Strasbourg, 14.11.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, Subcommittee XXXI. 35 For the internal consulting process, cf. Letter from Franz E. Muheim from the FPD Division for International Organisation to the Political Directorate and the International Public Law Division (Jean-Pierre Ritter) of the FPD and to the Federal Office of the Attorney General [Ministère Public de la Confédération/Bundesanwaltschaft] of the FDJP, “Conseil de l’Europe—Projet de Résolution sur le terrorisme international,” Berne, 04.01.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 36 Letter from Ritter to the members of the WGT, “Aux membres du groupe de travail sur le terrorisme,” Berne, 07.01.1974, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. For the Federal Office of the Attorney General’s reply, cf. the letter from the head of Legal Department of the Office of the Attorney General to the FPD Direction for Public International Law, “DRINGEND,” Berne, 02.05.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01#2000/392#264*, Bd.1–3: Europarat. Internationaler Terrorismus. Korrespondenz. Terrorismusbekämpfung, 1973–76 [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence”]. 37 A memorandum prepared by Jean-Pierre Ritter, “Travaux du Conseil de l’Europe sur le terrorisme international,” Berne, 22.01.1974, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I.

144

Chapter 5

The ECCP preliminary proposition for a draft convention led to the CoM’s adoption of Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism on 24 January 1974.38 The resolution was in line with the aut dedere aut judicare approach. Yet, despite this solid basis for continuation, the drafting process of the convention again came to a halt for over a year. Only when the terrorist threat reached another climax in Europe did the governments reapply their attention to European counterterrorism matters.39 In April 1975, for instance, the Red Army Faction attacked the West German embassy in Stockholm.40 The explosives placed by the terrorists detonated prematurely, blowing up part of the embassy, killing one terrorist, and wounding the others. This happened in front of live cameras, after the police had begun the raid and finally secured the building. New Terrorist Attacks, Renewed Counterterrorism Efforts The attack in Stockholm and other increasingly spectacular attacks prompted the Ministers of Justice of the CoE member states to act. They called a meeting in Obernai (Alsace, France) on 22 May 1975, where they formally recognised the need for coordinated and forceful actions.41 Consequently, in the next CoMD meeting, the ministers’ delegates approved the creation of another ad hoc expert working group under the auspices of the ECCP. This subcommittee of the ECCP was to consist of two experts per country and was mandated again, like the first ad hoc committee in 1973, to “examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence.”42 38

39 40

41

42

CoE, CoM, “Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism,” Adopted on 24th of January 1974 in its 53rd session, accessible online: https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet ?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=589966&SecMode=1 &DocId=648192&Usage=2 Barry M. Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008, p. 44. For a source based account from the terrorist and the Swedish government’s perspective, see also Michael März. Die Machtprobe 1975: Wie RAF und Bewegung 2. Juni den Staat erpressten. Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 2007. CoE, CoM, “Compte-rendu des activités du Conseil de l’Europe dans le domaine du terrorisme international,” CM(76)106, Strasbourg, 27.06.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. CoE, 246th meeting of the CoMD, 9–18.06.1975, decisions, CM/Dél/Concl.(75)246 Point XXXVI(d), in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01#2000/392#217*, Bd.1–3: Europarat. Les problèmes que soulèvent certaines nouvelles d’actes (sic) de violence concertés. Comité formés;— Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme, 1973–77, [hereafter this archive

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

145

This subcommittee of the ECCP, an expert working group, was indeed established and convened a first meeting in October 1975.43 Two Swiss experts participated at this meeting. One representative, Pierre-Henri Bolle, came from the Federal Department of Justice, and another, research associate Olivier Gautschi, came from the Federal Office of the Attorney General. It was decided to leave the police department out for the moment, since the focus was primarily on legal aspects.44 Based on Bolle’s account, the expert working group proceeded on the basis of the Subcommittee XXXI’s suggestions. He deemed the group’s discussions to be highly productive and explained that the experts managed to agree on a number of issues quickly—including the speedy drafting of a European convention aimed at the elimination of the political offence exemption clause.45 The intention behind this was to effectively eliminate any legal vacuum in Europe that could allow terrorists to escape punishment. Without further ado, the committee designated a drafting group of eight committee members, in which Gautschi from Switzerland was included.46 By October 1975, this drafting committee had elaborated the first version of the convention, offering different alternatives for the convention’s main Article 3, which was aimed at limiting the political offence exemption clause.47 For the second drafting committee meeting in December 1975, Gautschi was

record will be referred to as “CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence.” The full name of the committee’s mandate to which this archive file is referring to is: Les problèmes que soulèvent certaines formes nouvelles d’actes de violence concertés]. 43 CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Memorandum on possible topics for discussion,” Strasbourg, 29.09.1975, DPC/CEPC/(75)3, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 44 Note to O. Müller from the Federal Police Department, “Tél avec M. Moret (DPF) du 4.9.1975,” Berne, 5.9.1975, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 45 “Rapport sur la réunion du Comité ad hoc chargé d’examiner les problèmes que soulèvent certaines formes d’actes de violence concertés,” by Pierre-Henri Bolle, Berne, 09.01.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1, (hereafter referred to as “Bolle report, October 1975”). 46 CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Summary Report of first meeting (Strasbourg 6–8 October 1975),” Strasbourg, 10.10.1975, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 47 CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Preliminary Draft Convention,” Strasbourg, 20.10.1975, in: ­C H-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I.

146

Chapter 5

instructed to push for an effective solution to the convention, one that would bring change to current practice.48 This corresponded to the FPD and the Federal Office of Justice’s intention to have Switzerland appear as an active shaper of increased counterterrorism cooperation in Europe.49 In December, before the meeting, Gautschi fell ill and was replaced by J. Schouwey from the Federal Office of Police. The police, however, had a different interpretation of what should represent Switzerland’s interests in this respect.50 Accordingly, Schouwey was instructed to advocate for the maintenance of the status quo.51 From his report and from the CoE meeting minutes, it becomes clear that the Swiss suggestion was one of many contradictory voices. Article 3 of the future convention was especially heavily discussed because banning the political offence exemption clause was seen by some as being contrary to traditional international asylum law.52 In the end, instead of deciding for one option, the drafting committee added new alternative formulations and produced another draft convention, with each article comprising various alternatives.53 While this draft convention was presented to the subcommittee of the ECCP for its consideration in its next plenary session in February 1976, Gautschi’s replacement by Schouwey prompted an inner Swiss policymaking dispute between the police on the one side and the Federal Office of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General, and the FPD on the other side. The head of the FDJP, 48 49

Bolle report, October 1975, p. 9. Summary of Jean-Pierre Ritter, “Note. Travaux du Conseil de l’Europe sur le terrorisme international,” Berne, 22.01.1974, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier II. 50 Letter from Curt Alfred Markees to Prof. Dr. H. Schulz, Berne, 28.11.1975, in this letter he asked his academic friend for advice while explaining the police’s policy choice, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 51 J. Schouwey, “Note concernant la séance du groupe de rédaction tenue à Bruxelles les 4 et 5 décembre 1975,” Berne, 16.12.1975, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 52 Ibid, and CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Summary Report of the Drafting Group meeting, Brussels 4–5 December 1975,” Strasbourg, 22.12.1975, document code DPC/CEPC/AV(75)11, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 53 CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Preliminary Draft Convention. Prepared by the Drafting Group at its meeting in Brussels on 4 and 5 December 1975,” Strasbourg, 8.12.1975, document code DPC/CEPC/AV(75)10, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

147

Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler, was pressured by each of these agencies trying to persuade him of their interpretation of Switzerland’s best policy at the CoE. This bureaucratic dispute will be summarised in the next section. The Police against the Rest: Inner Swiss Negotiations The Federal Office of Justice argued its position through three main points.54 In his note to Kurt Furgler, Bolle first reminded the Federal Councillor that it had long been the practice of Switzerland to insist on extensive and strong international counterterrorism cooperation. Bolle specifically reminded Furgler that he, as Councillor, had called for firm European counterterrorism action at the extraordinary ministerial meeting in Obernai in 1975. Second, Bolle emphasised the tense international climate in matters pertaining to terrorism and said that the CoE and the draft convention offered the only and most effective means to counter the threat. Bolle explained that by adhering to this convention Switzerland agreed not to consider certain acts (that generally corresponded to the ones perpetrated by terrorists) as political offences. Even though this represented a new legal obligation for Switzerland, Bolle stressed the importance of such a convention to effectively fight transnational political terrorism. Third, Bolle mentioned the possibility of expressing reservations at the time of signature. This so-called “safeguard clause” would include a provision for ensuring Switzerland’s sovereignty, security, and other interests. It could be invoked in case a requesting government, signatory to the convention, had failing democratic structures such that an extradition would be deemed inappropriate. By adopting a firm stand and insisting on an effective European counterterrorism convention, the Swiss government would demonstrate its willingness to engage in the international fight against terrorism. This, he summed up, was in Switzerland’s best foreign policy interest. He also pointed out that the Federal Office of the Attorney General was in full agreement with the Federal Office of Justice in this regard.55 Furthermore, Bolle’s superior, Joseph Voyame, director of the Federal Office of Justice, concurred with Bolle in another letter to the 54

“Note à Monsieur le Conseiller fédéral Kurt Furgler relative au Comité chargé d’examiner les problèmes que soulèvent certaines formes d’actes de violence concertés, Conseil de l’Europe, CEPC” by Pierre-Henri Bolle, Berne, 23.01.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1. 55 Ibid.

148

Chapter 5

councillor.56 He noted that in light of the tough political international climate (e.g. tedious negotiations at the UN) the European counterterrorism initiative represented the only chance to adopt a forceful instrument among mutually trusting countries that had been most affected by terrorism.57 In return, the Federal Office of Police had a diametrically opposed view of what constituted Switzerland’s interest. Bühler, the director of the Federal Office of Police, wrote a letter to Voyame and sent a copy of it to Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler. In this formal communication, he listed all of the conceivable negative aspects of the draft European convention to suppress terrorism, arguing that it be rewritten or, even better, completely abandoned.58 He began by emphasising the competency of his office in this matter and, in an unusually harsh tone, regretted the fact that his office was not invited to participate in the initial work of the ECCP.59 He stressed that as soon as they had been informed in January 1976, they had expressed their serious concerns with such a convention. The major reason that he gave for his office’s scepticism was that the staff considered the convention to be in conflict with human rights and with fundamental freedoms; it would violate conventional international and national legal practice; and he reckoned that the draft convention showed inherent inconsistencies and shortcomings. Overall, he concluded that the convention in its present form was “unacceptable” and the drafting process should, for the benefit of Switzerland and the international legal order, be stopped as soon as possible.60 As one can see from these intra-Swiss disputes, the question of what is in a country’s interest is highly debatable. Interestingly, the Federal Office for Justice was arguing from a foreign policy perspective. It considered how 56

Letter from Joseph Voyame, “Note à M. le Conseiller fédéral Furgler,” Berne, 29.03.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1. 57 Ibid. 58 “Avant-projet de convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme, du 10 février 1976 (DPC/CEPC/AV (76) 2 Rév.)” by Bühler, Berne, 12.03.1976, (herefafter referred to as “Bühler report on the ECST”) in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1. 59 It is correct that the first time the police was involved was in December 1975 on the occasion of Olivier Gautschi’s absence on account of illness. Previous to this, the matter had only been dealt with by the FPD, the Federal Office of the Attorney General and the Federal Office of Justice. Cf. Letter from Joseph Voyame “Conseil de l’Europe / Comité chargé d’examiner les problèmes que soulèvent certaines formes d’actes de violence concertés,” Berne, 14.01.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier I. 60 Bühler report on the ECST, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

149

Switzerland would be seen in the international arena and concluded that appearing to be a firm advocate of strong measures in the fight against terrorism was most beneficial for Switzerland’s foreign policy goals. The Federal Office of Police, on the other hand, was instead arguing from an international law angle. Disregarding how Switzerland would appear politically, the police inquired about the technical benefit of such a convention and concluded that assistance in criminal matters functioned well and that such a convention would only complicate current practice. Hence, from its viewpoint, this convention would do more harm than good. It is possible that precisely because the police had already established excellent secret counterterrorism exchange networks, which will be explained further in the third part of this monograph, it found this convention to be useless at best, and perhaps disruptive at worst. It obviously favoured the status quo, whereas the Federal Office for Justice and the Federal Office of the Attorney General opted for a strong, binding, and effective European counterterrorism convention, one that would also send signals beyond Europe. In the course of the decision-making, the FPD also stated its appreciation of the need for a European counterterrorism convention and Switzerland’s interests in this regard. As summarised in an internal note by Yves Moret, the head of the FPD Political Division I in charge of CoE matters, a global phenomenon would technically require a global response, which, under the circumstances, was not realistic at the UN.61 Therefore, as he noted, even if the CoE convention could be seen as a “stopgap,” two major aspects made this European endeavour important. First, if the CoE countries ratified such a convention, it would make a significant portion of the planet inhospitable for terrorists. Second, this convention could prefigure as a model for regulations that were to be agreed upon on a universal scale. Another aspect that Moret mentioned in his internal policy note indicates the importance that the FPD gave to this CoE convention and Switzerland’s involvement in it. At the time, discussions were taking place within the European Community (EC), of which Switzerland was not a member, about the possibility of alternatively confirming a separate counterterrorism agreement that comprised only the nine member states. Moret stressed that it was important for the FPD that Switzerland not be excluded from a process that the FPD considered as a high priority. Unlike the Federal Office of Police, the FPD 61

Internal memorandum of Yves Moret, “Note de dossier,” Berne, 16.02.1976, in: CHBAR#E2003A#1990/3#270*, Convention europ. sur la répression du terrosisme (sic) C.E., Dossiers I-III, 1976–78, [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “CHBAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST”], Dossier I.

150

Chapter 5

saw a distinct international need for the CoE counterterrorism convention and clearly advised Switzerland to engage in the negotiation process. On 26 March 1976, after the differences within the FDJP had persisted for over three months, the highest representatives of the FDJP came together in a summit meeting with the head of Department, Federal Councillor Furgler, in order to settle the dispute.62 Finally, Furgler ruled in favour of pursuing Switzerland’s active participation in the CoE drafting process, estimating that it was valuable for Switzerland to sign and ratify such a convention and that the convention’s substantive law was compatible with current legal provisions. Overall, what has become apparent from the above is that the intra-Swiss policymaking debate was controversial. Its consequence was that it temporarily obstructed Switzerland’s engagement in the further development of the convention. For the Swiss delegation in Strasbourg, for instance, this Swiss interdivisional quarrel caused the diplomats on the ground to put possible Swiss interventions on hold.63 Nevertheless, this policymaking blockade did not prevent Bolle from continuing his work as an expert in the ECCP, which in early February 1976 had begun its work of revising and clarifying pending legal questions. Revision, Fast-Track, and Finalisation of the ECST The above-mentioned first version of the convention, as elaborated by the drafting group in which Gautschi and his replacement Schouwey participated, was ready in December 1975 for examination by the ECCP subcommittee, the Committee to Examine the Problems Raised by Certain New Forms of Concerted Acts of Violence. In its meeting in February 1976, which Bolle attended, the ECCP subcommittee decided on the various alternatives, which the drafting group had left open for the ECCP experts to determine. From the committee’s summary report it becomes evident that the discussions were tedious, detail-oriented, and held in an opinionated, polarised 62

63

The results of the meeting were summarised by Yves Moret in a policy briefing to Federal Councillor Graber, cf. internal memorandum of Yves Moret “Note au Chef du Département. Conseil de l’Europe Projet de convention sur le terrorisme,” Berne, 26.03.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier I. Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE, “Instructions, 225e réunion du Comité des Délégueés,” March 1976, in: CH-BAR#E2210.6B#1993/29#429*, Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme, 1976–80, [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST”].

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

151

way.64 Nevertheless, the expert group managed to reach an agreement on nearly all of the open issues and effectively finalised the draft version that was to be sent to the member states for feedback. The most crucial decisions about the convention regarded the exact means of how the guiding principle aut dedere aut judicare was to be applied and the definition of the infractions that were to be covered by the convention (meaning what kinds of terrorist acts would lead to extradition or prosecution). Interestingly, unanimously (with 4 abstentions) the experts voted in favour of using the word “terrorism” in the title. Based on its decisions, the subcommittee issued a revised draft convention, dated 10 February 1976.65 The ECCP main body then sent the draft version to the heads of delegations that were part of the ECCP, asking for comments from their respective governments to be sent before its next meeting on 16 March 1976.66 In late February 1976, at the 254th meeting of the CoMD, the issue of terrorism and the forthcoming convention were discussed. In view of the “urgency of the matter,”67 as they put it, the delegates suggested that they proceed in an accelerated way. Instead of waiting for the ECCP plenary session in May 1976 to formally adopt the convention, the CoMD proposed skipping this step and directly discussing it at the political level in the next meeting of the CoMD. As a consequence, a tight, but in their view reasonable, schedule was established. They planned that by 16 March 1976, the ECCP office would consolidate the final draft based on the comments from the member states. In April, on the occasion of the 255th meeting of the CoMD, the delegates could discuss the member states’ suggested amendments. In May, the final text of the

64 CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Summary Report of the second reunion, 2–6 February 1976,” Strasbourg, 12.02.1976, document code DPC/CEPC/AV(76)4, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. 65 CoE, ECCP, Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence, “Avant-projet de Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme. Adopté par le Comité lors de sa réunion tenue à Strasbourg du 2 au 6 février 1976,” (only French version in this archive record) Strasbourg, 10.02.1976, document code DPC/CEPC/AV(76)2 Rév., in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. 66 Letter from Erik Harremoes, Deputy Director of Juridical Affairs, to the head of Delegations of the CEEP, Strasbourg, 12.02.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. 67 Extract from the conclusion of the 254th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, “confidenciel,” document number CM/Dél/Concl(76)254, Point XXVIII(h), in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1.

152

Chapter 5

convention was to be agreed upon in order to present the convention for signature at the 10th Conference of European Justice Ministers 4–5 June 1976.68 The Swiss authorities were sceptical about the June deadline, especially since the decision to open the convention for signature required unanimity, and it was likely that some countries would demand considerable amendments. The FPD Division for International Organisations nevertheless instructed the Swiss delegation in Strasbourg to consent to the accelerated procedure.69 Over the course of the next few months, this dense action plan was implemented and, accordingly, the level of discussion jumped directly to the political spectrum. The Ministers’ Deputies debated the two remaining pending issues in relation to the convention in parallel. First, a heated controversy arose over the accession clause (allowing non-CoE members to sign the convention), and second, the delegates revised the convention based on the countries’ few requests for amendments.70 Over many meetings that took place over several weeks, the question of the accession clause could not be settled.71 Some countries, such as France, Sweden, Greece, and Denmark, hoped that the convention would act as a precursor to a global international counterterrorism convention. They favoured opening accession to the convention so that at some point it could develop into a global convention to supress terrorism. Others, such as the Swiss authorities, saw the very purpose and strength of the convention precisely in the fact that it was a European convention. In their view, it should remain a convention among countries that had similar democratic state structures. The assumption was that only a shared democratic culture would allow countries to reach the level of mutual trust needed for such a convention to be effective.72 After postponing the decision from meeting to meeting, finally, during the sessions 68

69 70

71

72

Letter from Heribert Golsong, Director of the CoE’s Juridical Affairs, informing about the accelerated procedure, Strasbourg, 25.02.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier I. Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE, “Instructions, 256e réunion du Comité des Délégueés,” April 1976, in: CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST. Extract from the conclusion of the 255th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, “confidenciel,” document number CM/Dél/Concl(76)255, Point XXVIII(h) in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. Extract from the conclusion of the 256th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, “confidenciel,” document number CM/Dél/Concl(76)256, Point XXVIII(h) in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. For the Swiss position, cf. Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE, “Instructions, 258e réunion du Comité des Délégueés,” May 1976, in: CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

153

from 17 to 26 May, it was decided that the convention would be limited to the CoE member states.73 The determining factor was that if the convention was opened, the text would have to be changed again, and the delegates did not want to delay the process. Meanwhile, relatively few countries had made requests to amend the convention. Since only the United Kingdom and Ireland submitted change suggestions, these requests did not take considerable time to discuss. The UK addition in Article 9 was approved, as it consisted of legal precisions on how the convention was to be interpreted, which were acceptable to all.74 Ireland’s request was linked to its special court system, and it was decided that Ireland should adopt the convention with reservations in this respect, without having to change the convention text for all of the other 18 member states.75 Finally, with all pending issues cleared, all political and legal questions settled, and all procedural aspects agreed upon, the draft text was finalised and the ECCP office produced a consolidated definitive version integrating all of the amendments and decisions.76 The final version was sent to the countries by 24 May 1976, and the plan was to have all of the CoE Ministers’ Deputies formally agree to the opening of the convention for signature at their 259th meeting, held 16–25 June 1976.77 Once it was opened for signature, the only remaining issue was setting a date for the ceremonial signing of the convention by the countries’ ministers. From 3 to 4 June 1976, the 10th Conference of European Justice Ministers took place in Brussels. According to the plan based on the accelerated procedure, this would have been the date and place where the convention was to be formally signed by the ministers. The nearly finalised draft convention was nevertheless at the centre of their discussions, and the ministers adopted a 73

74 75

76

77

Extract from the conclusion of the 258th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, “confidenciel,” document number CM/Dél/Concl(76)256, Point XXVIII(h) in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier I. CoE, Obsevations of the day, 258th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 12.05.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. Addendum to the conclusion of the 258th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, “restricted,” document number CM/(76)256, 12.05.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. Annex to the Intermediate Report in relation to the European Convention to Supress Terrorism of the XXV Plenary Session of the CEEP, document number DPC/CEPC(76)10, Strasbourg, 24.05.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. Letter from Heribert Golsong, Director of the CoE’s Juridical Affairs, informing about the final version of the convention, Strasbourg, 24.05.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II.

154

Chapter 5

resolution on the repression of terrorism.78 All the ministers who spoke, including those from Switzerland, Germany, France, Belgium, and others, expressed their support for the convention and hoped for its rapid adoption and opening for signature. In their view, the convention represented a valuable instrument in the fight against new and destructive forms of terrorism by ensuring that no terrorist would find refuge within the borders of CoE member states.79 With this strong political support and prioritisation and with all pending issues cleared, the agreement to open the convention for signature seemed to be merely a formality.80 Berne informed its delegation that the convention was acceptable to Switzerland, instructed it to adopt the convention at the 259th CoMD Meeting, and began planning the date for when Federal Councillor Furgler could travel to Strasbourg to sign it.81 At the 259th CoMD Meeting, Ireland finally proclaimed its agreement with the text, but to the great surprise of all participants, the French delegation formally rejected the convention and requested that it be sent back to the expert group for revision.82 The French delegate not only voted against the adoption of the text, but also announced that his country would oppose the convention’s opening for signature.83 This was more than simply announcing France’s non-participation in the convention. Due to the requirements for the adoption of a CoE convention, it meant that France effectively vetoed the opening for signature of the ECST and deadlocked the entire ECST adoption process. The

78

79

80

81 82

83

CoE, Comité mixte “Rappel de textes adoptés et de prises de position officielles du Conseil de l’Europe en matière de terrorisme,” document number AS/CM(76)4, 11.06.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. CoE, Obsevations of the day, for the 259th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, point XVIII, “restricted,” 15.06.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. Cable sent to the FPD International Organisations Division, “Entwurf einer Konvention gegen den Terrorismus,” 04.06.1976, cable no. 053, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE, “Instructions, 259e réunion du Comité des Délégueés,” June 1976, in: CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST. Transcript of the French intervention at the 259th Ministers’ Deputy Meeting, text was sent for the attention of Pierre Bolle, “Intervention du Délégué de la France au cours de la 259e réunion des Délégués des Ministres, Strasbourg, 16 au 25 juin 1976,” sent to Bolle on the 30.06.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. CoE, “Conclusions de la 259e réunion des Délégués des Ministres (Strasbourg, 16–24 juin 1976),” CM/Dél/Concl(76)259, “Confidentiel,” p. 60, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

155

French motives for this sudden policy change will be explained in the next section. France against the Rest: The CoE Negotiations The French delegate justified this decision by explaining its government’s “serious technical problems”84 with the convention. He mentioned Article 1 and Ireland’s suggestions for changes and emphasised that his government could not accept this current form of the finalised text of the convention. Discontent about this abrupt halt in the ECST course of action instigated by France, the other delegates reminded their French colleague that only a few weeks earlier, at the 10th Conference of European Justice Ministers in Brussels, the French Minister of Justice, Jean Lecanuet, had approved the definitive ECST text and shown France’s strong support for the rapid enactment of the ECST. Defending his country’s policy switch, the delegate explained that the situation had changed in the meantime, since Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, upon whom such decisions depended, now rejected the ECST in its current form.85 Given the importance of the successful conclusion of a CoE counterterrorism convention to the Swiss government, the International Organisations Division of the FPD in Berne immediately instructed the Swiss Embassy in Paris to enquire about the possible reasons for this French policy.86 Besides the already mentioned “serious technical problems,” high-ranking French officials at the Quai d’Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) said that for “political reasons” France preferred to first conclude a counterterrorism convention among the nine EC countries, which other European states then could also adopt.87 The French officials did not specify what political reasons prompted

84 Ibid. 85 Letter from the Swiss Mission to the CoE signed by Ambassador Alfred Wacker, “Bekämpung des internationalen Terrorismus,” Strasbourg, 16.07.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier III. 86 Letter from Anton Robert Hegner, Deputy Director of the FPD Political Division 1, to the Swiss embassy in Paris, “Conseil de l’Europe—Projet de Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” Berne, 06.07.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. 87 Letter from the Swiss embassy in Paris to the Political Division I, “Confidentielle. Conseil de l’Europe—Projet de Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” Paris, 20.07.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II.

156

Chapter 5

their preference for the EC over the CoE; however, the Swiss authorities secretly received confirmation from the Dutch government that France had indeed proposed that an EC counterterrorism convention begin to be drafted at the latest EC summit meeting in Brussels, on 13 July 1976.88 This was further confirmed by the Swiss Embassy in Cologne.89 Swiss officials could not follow this French reasoning, since for them, the CoE convention represented a valuable instrument in the fight against terrorism. It was essential that the greatest number of states participate in order to make it effective. Since the convention was already finalised and 17 of 18 CoE member states were in complete agreement, why would one want to start all over again in a setting with fewer states? Other European governments shared this feeling of incomprehension and tried to get France to reverse its policy. The Dutch government, for instance, communicated to Swiss officials its intent to oppose the French initiative at the EC and highlighted that it was unacceptable to allow all this effort at the CoE be in vain.90 Swiss policymakers further speculated about possible reasons for France’s move. They suspected that the Basque problem and the fact that Turkey was a CoE member state influenced the French government’s decision.91 The policymaking reasons could only be political, since from the perspective of the other CoE members, the “technical problems” seemed staggeringly far-fetched, as was pointed out in a letter from the CoE General Secretary to the President of the CoM.92 This letter addressed every single objection that the French delegation had voiced during the 159th CoMD meeting and explained why the French criticisms were either obsolete, misplaced, inaccurate, insignificant, or pointless. 88

89

90 91

92

Cable from the Swiss embassy in The Hague to Berne, “Abkommen zur bekämpfung des terrorismus. besprechung mit rutten, generaldirektor politik mae (x),” cable no. 49, 28.07.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II (hereafter “Cable no. 49 of the Swiss embassy in The Hague”). Letter from the Swiss embassy in Cologne to the FPD Office for Integration, “Déclaration communautaire sur la lutte contre le terrorisme,” Cologne, 23.07.1976, in: CHBAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. Cable no. 49 of the Swiss embassy in The Hague. Letter from Yves Moret, FPD Political Division I, to the Director of the Federal Police, “Conseil de l’Europe—Projet de Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” Berne, 11.08.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1. CoE, Annex to the CoM “Questions diverses,” “Texte de la lettre adressée le 23 juillet 1973 au Président des Délégués des Ministres par le Secrétaire Général,” Letter no. 1740, “restricted,” in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

157

This letter concluded by putting increased diplomatic pressure on France with a reminder that a country could choose not to adhere to the convention, without having to oppose its opening for signature. This was the most puzzling aspect for all governments. What could France possibly gain through the prevention of the adoption of the ECST? Essentially, everyone was wondering why France actively blocked the conclusion of the convention instead of simply abstaining from it. Overall, one could say that the European governments could neither understand nor accept France’s policy move.93 As mentioned before, emphasis was put on speed, and decisions were made specifically in order not to delay the process. For the ministers, the conclusion of the ECST would have been an achievement, a breakthrough, and now France “stole” that moment from them for reasons that were incomprehensible to the 17 other CoE member states.94 Because the French reasons for blocking the ECST posed such a mystery to the other countries, the documents from the Swiss archives are not sufficient to explain the negotiations behind the ECST. For this, I consulted the French archives directly, namely, French cabinet papers (Direction Europe) and documents from the French Mission to the CoE in Strasbourg. The French reasons for obstructing the ECST have thus far not been researched, and therefore the following section fills an important gap in the literature. French Decision-Making: Worrying About the Third World As in Switzerland, different French ministries had conflicting interests in the ECST debate. At first, the Justice Ministry alone represented French interests during the CoE counterterrorism efforts. In May 1976, the French inter-ministerial coordination unit, the Secrétariat général du comité interministériel (SGCI), realised the far-reaching political dimension of a possible European convention to suppress terrorism, and called for a meeting of the three governmental

93

Note of Bolle to Federal Councillor Furgler, “Note sur l’état des travaux et démarches relatif au projet de Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme et postérieurs à la 10e Conférence des Ministres de la Justice,” Berne, 17.08.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. 94 Friedrichs. Fighting terrorism and drugs, p. 87–99. Friedrichs devotes a few pages to the ECST background politics by specifically focusing on the Italian, French, German and British positions.

158

Chapter 5

stakeholders—the Justice Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Interior Ministry.95 The purpose of the meeting was to determine an official French governmental position, which meant a concerted response from the different administrative bodies on the CoE terrorism convention. From the policy statements in preparation for this meeting and from the meeting notes it becomes clear that the MFA and the Interior Ministry expressed their disagreement with France’s existing policy as determined by the Justice Ministry. Their criticism related to both political and legal questions. Politically, the main concern was about the possible reaction of Third World countries to the ECST. The MFA worried that because the ECST represented a repressive instrument in the fight against terrorism, Third World states could see this European initiative as a “one-sided stance directed against the actions of liberation movements or against those who fight ‘foreign occupation.’”96 Instead of “looking into the causes of terrorism,” as was the counterterrorism approach at the UN, the CoE convention aimed to effectively eliminate terrorism from Europe and therefore risked irritating Third World countries. Another argument against the ECST, as put forward by the MFA, was that European counterterrorism cooperation could cause highly sensitive political problems. French policymakers foresaw serious difficulties if there was an ECST case involving Ireland, Cyprus, or a Turkish-Armenian dispute.97 From the French government’s perspective, in the event that Spain or Israel98 one day became CoE members, they could adopt the ECST, and this, too, could create difficult situations. The French policy papers do not specify why this could lead to serious difficulties for the French government, but one could imagine that a CoE member state might request the extradition or prosecution of a 95

96

97 98

“Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre. A l’attention de M. Georges Roux. a/s projet de convention européenne sur le terrorisme,” Paris, 10.05.1976, in: Archives diplomatiques de la France—Centre de La Courneuve [ADF], 1929 INVA, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Direction Europe, Série 38–23, Communautés européennes, Terrorisme, 1971-Juin 1976 [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as CoE ECST 1971-June76]. “Projet de convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme,” annex to a Note for the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the document was prepared by the MFA ­Direction des Affaires juridiques, Paris, 10.06.1976, [hereafter, this document will be ­refered to as “Policy Briefing Note”] in: ADF, 1929 INVA, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Direction Europe, Série 42–98, Conseil de l’Europe et la convention européenne sur la ­répression du terrorisme. (10 Novembre 1976), Juillet 1976–1980 [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as CoE ECST July 1976–80]. Policy Briefing Note, p. 2, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. Israel was, for instance, part of the European Convention on Extradition.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

159

violent activist whose struggle could be seen as legitimate by the French government. Through the adoption of the ECST, France would have been legally bound to act against any offender who operated by using terrorism as a tactic, irrespective of their motivations and independently of the French government’s interpretation. Many French government officials wanted to keep the greatest possible freedom of action in the country’s dealing with Basque, Arab, Irish, or other armed activists in its territory. Legally, the Interior Ministry claimed (without going into detail) that the convention had not managed to “elaborate satisfactory common rules” in view of the widespread differences among the member states. In their view, the development of the CoE convention had been “premature.” It included a number of legal mishaps, and it should never have been drafted.99 Similarly to the Swiss policy disputes described above, this indicates a rift between government institutions. In this case, the Justice Ministry, which was actively involved in the drafting committees, opposed the MFA and the Interior Ministry, which would have tried to hinder the ECST drafting if they had been consulted earlier. Based on the mostly political concerns as put forward by the MFA, French decision-makers held an inter-ministerial meeting in the Office of the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, on 22 June 1976—a week before the CoMD where the convention was to be opened for signature—and concluded that the CoE was an inappropriate framework in which to adopt a counterterrorism convention.100 Instead, the French government resolutely preferred a convention in the framework of the EC, at the time composed of nine countries and often referred to as the Nine.101 Accordingly, it was planned that in the next meeting of the Interior Ministers of the Nine, the French representative would launch the initiative for an EC counterterrorism convention.102 The EC was given preference because, on a political level, actions against terrorism within the EC framework would be integrated within a broader context of European cooperation against crime. It would therefore “appear less 99 Ibid, p. 4. 100 Summary of the decisions taken during the French inter-ministerial meeting of 22.06.1976, “Note. a/s. Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme,” June 1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 101 At the time the EC constituted of the founding members Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy and West Germany, and after the first enlargement in 1973, also Ireland, United Kingdom and Denmark. 102 Note to the Minister of Justice, “Note. Pour le Cabinet du Ministre. a/s. Terrorisme,” 11.05.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST 1971-June76.

160

Chapter 5

like a Western impulse against certain movements in the world.”103 In other words, it might not attract the attention of the Third World and would not send any provocative signals. Legally, the argument for the EC setting was that with fewer signatory countries, the French government believed it would be easier to find an appropriate common denominator. This obviously disregarded the fact that all remaining 17 CoE member states had already found this “common denominator” in the final version of the convention. Aware of the fact that the convention enjoyed widespread political support, the attendees of the 22 June 1976 meeting in the Prime Minister’s office considered it unwise to oppose the convention per se, and decided to state that the ECST presented “serious technical shortcomings” and that it was not acceptable in its current (finalised and agreed-upon) form. One should note that French policymakers did truly believe in the qualitative shortcomings of the convention from a legal point of view. It was, however, political considerations that determined the high government officials’ choice to instruct the French delegation to block the adoption of the convention in its current form.104 In analysing French decision-making, it is striking that, to a large extent, the ECST was assessed in relation to a possible risk of negative repercussions on France’s relations with Third World countries. French concerns about the country’s image in the Third World were probably in relation to their presence in Africa and to their close relations with many Arab countries. The Third World thus represented a heavy political and economic weight for the French government, which also influenced its European policy.105 Furthermore, another reason for France’s blockade of the ECST might relate to its unofficial “sanctuary” policy toward terrorists in the 1970s. In the form of a tacit agreement, as long as there were no attacks on French soil, terrorists

103 Policy Briefing note, p. 8, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 104 Summary of the decisions taken during the French inter-ministerial meeting of 22.06.1976, “Note. a/s. Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme,” undated, June 1976, p. 3, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 105 See also Maurice Vaïsse. La puissance ou l’influence ?: la France dans le monde depuis 1958. Paris: Fayard, 2009. For a study on French development cooperation and interest in its former colonies, see also Veronique Dimier. The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. See also the study of France’s role in Africa at this time, Nathaniel Kinsey Powell, France’s African Wars, 1974–1981, Ph.D. Dissertation, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2013.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

161

knew that they could operate freely within France without having to fear the French authorities.106 A direct reference to this policy as a motive for obstructing the ECST conclusion was not found in the researched source material, but it can help explain France’s reluctance to establish counterterrorist measures, specifically ones that aimed at the elimination of safe havens. Reinsertion of the Political Offence Clause After the veto, and with its newly gained interest in impeding the ECST, the French government spent a lot of resources persuading its European partners to abandon the ECST in order to conclude a counterterrorism convention in the EC.107 As mentioned earlier, however, as soon as the French veto was known, the remaining CoE member states distanced themselves from France and expressed their disapproval of France’s last-minute surprise. The German Foreign Ministry made an official demarche a few weeks later, warning France that if its veto was not lifted, this would likely create a “climate of tension” among the Nine and other CoE member states.108 In its “non-paper,”109 the Germans highlighted that, in their view, the French government had no reason to obstruct the adoption of the ECST and “presumed that France was soon going to authorise the opening of signature.”110 The Dutch government likewise communicated its surprise and did not see any reason why a convention at the CoE

106 Michael M. Harrison, “France and International Terrorism: Problems and Response,” in: Charters, Deadly Sin of Terrorism, pp. 103–35, p. 107; and Jeremy Shapiro and Benedicte Suzan, “The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism,” Survival, 2003, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 67–98, p. 69. 107 Retrospective summary of the core traits of the French policy regarding the ECST, MAE, Direction des Affaires Juridiques, “Note. a.s convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme,” Paris, 08.12.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 108 Sous-Direction d’Europe Occidentale, “Note. a.s/ Convention sur le terrorisme. Démarche du Chargé d’affaires d’Allemagne,” [place not mentioned], 21.07.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 109 A “non-paper” is an unofficial policy statement often used in bilateral diplomatic relations in order to explain a country’s internal policy position. As opposed to a memorandum, the non-paper does not represent the official policy line of a government. 110 Untitled non-paper from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the German views on the CoE future counterterrorism procedure, Paris, 20.07.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80.

162

Chapter 5

and a convention among the Nine had to be mutually exclusive.111 Instead, it invited France to join the CoE convention and promised its support for a complementary EC counterterrorism convention.112 In August, the French MFA analysed the political situation and concurred with an earlier statement from German Foreign Minister Genscher to the French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues on 6 July 1976: the French veto had “psychologically very harmful effects,” and France’s move was met with very strong opposition.113 Realising France’s isolation due to the lack of any support for its policy and feeling the mounting pressure from CoE member states, the French mission to Strasbourg requested that Paris urgently find a way to unblock the situation.114 The experts in the MFA Legal Division continued to look for possible amendments that would “limit the impact” of the ECST in order to make it politically acceptable to France.115 In view of an extraordinary meeting scheduled for 14 September 1976 called by Luxembourg, and with the sole discussion topic of “finding a consensus on the question on the opening of signature” of the ECST, the French government knew it had to come up with a solution fast.116 Shortly before the meeting it hence instructed its delegation to offer one important amendment: to delete paragraph 4 of Article 13, which said that “No reservation shall be permitted.”117 This paragraph forbade the addition of reservations to the list 111 Sous-Direction d’Europe Occidentale, “Note. a.s/ Convention sur le terrorisme. Démarche du Chargé d’affaires des Pays-Bas,” [place not mentioned], 27.07.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 112 Ibid., p. 2. 113 Sous-Direction d’Europe Occidentale, “Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre. A l’attention du M. Ulrich,” [place not mentioned], 11.08.1976, p. 2, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 114 MAE, French Mission to the CoE, Cable sent from Strasbourg to Paris, “A/S. Projet de convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” cable no. 075, 06.10.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 115 Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre, à l’attention de M. Georges Roux. a/s projet de convention européenne sur le terrorisme,” Paris, 10.05.1976 [Already since May 1976 the experts from the MAE Legal Division looked into ways of amending the convention in view of lessening its impact], in: ADF, CoE ECST 1971-June76. 116 Letter from the Ministry of Justice, Direction des affaires criminelles et des grâces to the MAE Division Europe, “Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme (Conseil de l’Europe),” Paris, 02.09.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 117 Cable sent to the French Mission to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, “Immediat. Projet de convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme,” cable no. 67/68, reply to cable 75, 14.09.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

163

of offences in Article 1 of the convention. The deletion of paragraph 4 of Article 13 would have allowed, for instance, making the reservation that in cases of political offence—even if listed in Article 1—extradition could be refused. This effectively opened the possibility of reinstating the political offence exemption clause.118 From the above, one can see that once the French government understood the inevitability of the ECST’s adoption due to the other countries’ strong political wills, it instead aimed to water down the convention and limit its importance. Furthermore, France maintained its intransigence in this respect and insisted on the deletion of the paragraph, or else France would uphold its veto indefinitely.119 With this move, the French government speculated that the CoE member states’ firm desire to adopt a European counterterrorism convention and, in doing so, sending at least a strong symbolic signal, would make them willing to accept a watered-down convention, rather than risk having no European convention at all. Indeed, after France made this proposal at the 160th CoMD meeting, which took place from 20 to 29 September 1976, the other representatives stressed the high importance of the ECST for their respective governments.120 Many delegations declared their profound disappointment about France’s veto but were thankful that the debate had now been reopened. However, several governments were sceptical about the deletion of paragraph 4 of Article 13 because, as stated by the CoE Director General of Legal Affairs, with this change “the Convention would be emptied of its substance.”121 The countries nevertheless agreed to reconsider this question at the 161st CoMD in October 1976. For the Swiss authorities as well, this French amendment proposition was viewed with great disdain and disapproval. The Swiss representative agreed with his colleagues from the other CoE member states that if the ECST were 118 David Freestone, “International cooperation against terrorism and the development of international law principles of jurisdiction,” in: Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory (eds.). Terrorism and International law. London: Routledge, 2003, 43–67, p. 55. 119 Letter from the MAE Direction of Juridical Affairs for the Political Direction, “260eme réunion des délégués des ministres du Conseil de l’Europe—Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme (questions diverses d),” Paris, 15.09.1976, in: ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80. 120 CoE, Extract from the conclusions of the 160th CoMD, “Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” Point XXXVI(d), Strasbourg, 20–29.09.1976, CM/Dél/Concl (76)260, p. 128, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. 121 Ibid. p. 130.

164

Chapter 5

to be amended according to the French suggestion, the ECST would lose all of its meaning.122 This was very disappointing to Swiss officials in Berne, who perceived Switzerland as an “active shaper of the convention.”123 In view of this active engagement during the drafting process and the expected change the ECST could have brought, the Swiss government saw it as in the country’s interest that the CoE issue the ECST without the French amendment in its finalised version of June 1976.124 Accordingly, in phone conversations between Joseph Voyame, director of the Federal Office of Justice, and Heribert Golsong, CoE director of Juridical Affairs, both men agreed that “we must not give in to France.”125 The Swiss government decided to refuse the French amendment proposal and to instead demand an expert revision of the convention by the ECCP.126 Since France had originally claimed “technical problems” as the reason for the veto and requested that the convention be sent back to the ECCP, Berne strategized that an expert revision would allow France to lift its veto while saving face.127 Berne thus hoped to have found a way out of the quagmire. During the 261st CoMD in mid-October 1976, the ECST, the French amendment, and another newly submitted amendment proposal from the Irish government were discussed. To the Swiss representative’s “surprise

122 Aktenübermittlungsnotiz, “Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme. Misc (76)47,” Strasbourg, 01.10.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. 123 Letter from Bolle to the FPD Political Division I, “Conseil de l’Europe—Dixième Conférence des Ministres européens de la justice,” Berne, 18.08.1976, Bolle emphasised the importance of the ECST for the Swiss government and was worried that due to the French veto the convention risked to never be concluded, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier II. 124 Letter from Fançois Clerc to E. Harremoes, head of the CoE Division for Criminal Problems, explaining Switzerland’s views regarding the ECST, St. Blaise, 22.08.1976, in: ­C H-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence, Dossier 1. 125 Joseph Voyame, “Entretien téléphonique avec M. GOLSONG (Conseil de l’Europe),” [place not mentioned], 30.09.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, ­Correspondence, Dossier 1. 126 Letter from Yves Moret from the Federal Office for Police to Bolle from the Federal O ­ ffice of Justice, “Conseil de l’Europe—Convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” Berne, 05.10.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. 127 Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE, “Instructions, 261e réunion du Comité des Délégueés,” October 1976, in: CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST (hereafter “October Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE”).

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

165

and displeasure,”128 an indicative vote showed that a majority of states were ready to accept the French amendment. Eleven countries voted in favour of the French amendment, Switzerland and Belgium voted against it, and five countries abstained. For the Irish proposal, no majority could be found.129 This meant that in two weeks’ time, 11 countries had turned against their original commitments, and Switzerland found itself isolated with Belgium.130 Until the definitive vote on the ECST, scheduled for 10 November 1976, the Swiss government was thus faced with three alternatives: the French amendment and live with what Swiss officials con• Accept sidered a distortion of the original convention into a pointless and

toothless new legal text; Lobby other countries to vote against the French amendment; or In the event that no majority could be found against the French amendment, Switzerland could veto the convention and request it be sent back to the ECCP.

• •

In order to determine the likelihood of gaining a sufficient number of states to oppose the French veto, Joseph Voyame, director of the Federal Office of Justice, attended a meeting with Germany’s representative to the CoE, P.G. Pötz, who was at the time head of the ECCP. In the meeting were also representatives from Belgium and Austria, as well as Heribert Golsong, who initiated this coordination meeting. Voyame understood from the discussions that it was nearly impossible to find a sufficient number of countries that would vote against the French amendment in order to enforce an expert revision.131 This meant that the ECST would pass with the French amendment, unless the Swiss government vetoed it. In order to decide on Swiss policy, all governmental stakeholders who were involved in the ECST drafting process came together. In this interdepartmental meeting on 3 November 1976, representatives from the FPD, Federal Office 128 Cable from the Swiss Mission to the CoE to the FPD Political Division and International Law Division, [untitled], Strasbourg, 19.10.1976, cable no. 17, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier III. 129 Ibid. 130 Letter from Yves Moret, Federal Office for Police, to Ambassador Hegner at the Swiss embassy in Strasbourg, “Conseil de l’Europe—Visite aux Pays-Bas,” [place not mentioned] 28.10.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier III (hereafter “Letter from Yves Moret October 1976”). 131 Joseph Voyame, “Note à M. le Conseiller fédéral Furler. Conseil de l’Europe Projet de convention européenne sur la répression du terrorisme,” [place not mentioned] 27.10.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II.

166

Chapter 5

for the Police, Federal Office for Justice, and Federal Office of the Attorney General were present. Several of the following considerations influenced Swiss ­decision-making.132 On the one hand, the Swiss policymakers were most worried about public opinion and believed the reasons for vetoing the ECST could not be explained to the wider public. Furthermore, sending the convention back to the ECCP expert committee could invite other states to seize the occasion to also add amendments. This, in turn, could result in the total deadlock of the convention, because if there were too many changes, then agreement might never be reached. The failure to adopt any counterterrorism convention, however, represented a serious “political defeat” for the CoE, and this risk was simply considered too high.133 Finally, Bolle, who a few years earlier had been an active member of the ECST drafting committee, pointedly said with a touch of sarcasm: “either we veto the convention and have nothing or we join the French blunted convention and have almost nothing.”134 Accordingly, almost nothing was chosen over nothing, and the Swiss delegation was instructed to vote no, but to bite the bullet and not veto the opening of the convention for signature.135 Finally, on 10 November 1976, the French amendment received 11 votes in favour, five abstentions, and two votes against, from Switzerland and Belgium. In the final vote on the convention, the ECST was definitively adopted, with 17 member states voting yes, and Ireland abstaining.136 The convention would come into force once three countries had ratified it.137 Looking at the development and negotiations of the ECST as a whole, it would seem at first glance that states were more likely to agree to counterterrorism 132 “Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme. Ouverture à la signature. Position de la Suisse. Procès-verbal de la séance de travail du 3.11.1977,” present were for the FPD Moret, Krafft and Grünigen, for the Federal Office for the Police Markees and Schouwey, for the Federal Office of the Attorney General Gautschi and von Weid and for the Federal Office for Justice Voyame, Bolle and Beck, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier III (hereafter “Meeting minutes of the interdepartmental meeting November 1977”). 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE, “Instructions, 262e réunion du Comité des Délégueés,” Novembre 1976, in: CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST. 136 Cable from the Swiss Mission to the CoE in Strasbourg sent to Federal Councillors Graber and Furgler, to the FPD Political and Legal Affairs Divisions, to the Federal Department of Police, the Federal Department of Justice and the Federal Office of the Attorney General, Strasbourg, 10.11.1976, cable no. 19, in: CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Committee New Forms of Violence, Dossier II. 137 The convention entered into force on 4 August 1978.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

167

cooperation after the most spectacular terrorist attacks happened.138 Yet, analysing the main actors behind the drafting process of the ECST one has to see more nuance in this hypothesis. The ECST was more than a “policy of the latest outrage,”139 it was a steady and constant process. In this vein one could say that the successful conclusion of the convention was mostly owed to the persistence of the operational staff of the CoE and its member states. The political support was certainly essential, and the political backing was probably prompted by the need to show that the governments were “doing something.” Yet, the heart of this convention was carried through by the experts and the operational staff who were the major driving force behind the ECST. ECST: Success or Dead Letter? Before the adoption of the ECST, all stakeholders in Switzerland expressed their disappointment in the French-amended, watered-down convention. Swiss officials believed that with the French amendment the convention had “the effect of a sword cutting through water,”140 or that it was entirely “emptied of its substance”141 and bound to remain “dead letter”142 without any legal “use, meaning or interest.”143 However, the FDJP prepared a note of authorisation for Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler suggesting that he sign the convention in January 1977. The procedure was such that Federal Councillor Furgler had to present this note to his fellow Federal Councillors in order to get their permission to sign the convention on behalf of Switzerland. The note highlighted the importance of the convention for Switzerland and for Europe, legally as well as politically.144 The FDJP acknowledged that, in theory, a criminal problem of global scope deserved a global response. However, due to the UN’s powerlessness to condemn terrorism, the ECST represented the only instrument to counter terrorist 138 This hypothesis has for instance been proposed by Paul Wilkinson, cf. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy. 139 Ibid. 140 Letter from Yves Moret October 1976. 141 October Instructions for the Swiss Mission to the CoE. This phrase, “vidée de sa substance” was used over and over in many policy documents. 142 Meeting minutes of the interdepartmental meeting November 1977. 143 Ibid., this was the general consensus among the Swiss stakeholders. 144 Au Conseil fédéral, “Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme; signature,” Berne, 29.12.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier III.

168

Chapter 5

acts, which undermined Europe’s security and democratic foundations. It was exactly this common democratic basis that provided the CoE member states with sufficient mutual trust to establish a powerful multilateral mechanism. Given European-wide confidence that human rights and fundamental freedoms must be respected, invoking political asylum had become obsolete and allowed for the conclusion of a more restrained extradition regulation.145 When the convention was opened for signature, most CoE member states proclaimed that they did not intend to make use of the French amendment to make reservations on Article 1. If most countries voluntarily decided to disregard the French amendment, then the Swiss authorities also believed in the ECST’s legal benefit. Furthermore, the changes to be made to Swiss domestic laws were few and manageable.146 The FDJP thus concluded that it was imperative for Switzerland to sign the convention in order to engage in a more effective fight against international terrorism, which was in Switzerland’s as well as in Europe’s clear interest.147 Two major political reasons explaining why the ECST was important can be discerned from previous policy briefings for the Federal Councillor. First, the ECST showed the world that with enough political will, an important number of states were able to stand united in the fight against terrorism. Having found a regional solution, it was hoped that the ECST would radiate positively on developments at the UN. In this respect, the ECST was expected to serve as a model for what was hoped would one day become a global convention for the suppression of terrorism.148 Second, the collaborative counterterrorist efforts of all of the CoE states, covering most of Europe’s territory, were seen as a strong signal to terrorists and terrorist-supporting states. The ECST sent the straightforward message that terrorists were no longer tolerated in Europe. It was hoped that the criminalisation

145 Ibid. p. 1 and 3. 146 For a legal analysis of the ECST with regard to the Swiss domestic laws, see also Ilse Lacoste. Die Europäische Terrorismus Konvention. Eine Untersuchung des Europäischen Übereinkommens zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus vom 27. Januar 1977 im Vergleich mit ähnlichen internationalen Abkommen und unter der Berücksichtigung des schweizerischen Rechts. Zurich: Schulthess, 1986 and Georg Daetwyler. Der Terrorismus und das Internationale Strafrecht (unter Berücksichtigung des neuen europäischen Übereinkommens zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus von 1977). Zurich: unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit] of the University of Zurich, 1981. 147 Ibid. p. 6. 148 Internal memorandum of Yves Moret, “Note de dossier,” Berne, 16.02.1976, in: CH-BAR# E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier I.

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

169

of terrorism could serve as a deterrent.149 The main political symbol was that Europe stood united against terrorism—precisely the message that France was afraid could have had negative repercussions in the Third World. The importance of the ECST from an international law perspective can be summarised based on contemporary and current legal interpretations. It seems that the convention’s significance stemmed from the fact that it tackled two major problems in international law pertaining to the issue of terrorism. First, it attempted to abolish the refusal of extradition for political reasons—a longlasting contagion on the European continent for several centuries. Second, the ECST defined the crime of terrorism by listing the offences for which a terrorist perpetrator could be punished—indeed, until the present day no consensus has been found on a comprehensive generic definition of terrorism in international law.150 The political offence exemption has a centuries-long history in Europe. It was meant as a way for states to remain neutral with regards to the internal affairs of another country.151 However, it allowed terrorists to remain unpunished when they escaped from one country to another. The ECST explicitly declared in Article 1 that, for the purposes of extradition, a number of offences commonly associated with terrorism were not to be regarded as political offences. With the possibility of reservations inserted by France, this became possible again.152 Yet, the convention addressed important loopholes in the extradition legislation and considerably advanced European counterterrorism extradition legal framework.153 Regarding the legal definition, Article 1 of the ECST specifically spelled out what kind of offences were not considered as “political offences.” These were: (a) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970;

149 Handwitten note on top of the document: “Texte ayant servie d’instruction à notre délégation pour la 58e session du Comité des ministres (6.5.),” [unknown author and place], 30.04.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier I. 150 Cástor Miguel Díaz-Barrado, “The Definition of Terrorism and International Law,” in: Pablo Antonio Fernandez Sanchez. International Legal Dimension of Terrorism. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 27–42, p. 30. 151 See also Gilbert, Responding to International Crime. 152 Antonio Cassese, “The International Community’s “legal” Response to Terrorism,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, July 1989, vol. 38, pp. 589–608, p. 596. 153 For an in depth analysis of the ECST’s legal impact on the political offence exemption clause, cf. Lagodny, “European Convention,” pp. 583 ff.

170

Chapter 5

(b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Montreal on 23 September 1971; (c) a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity, or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; (d) an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or serious unlawful detention; (e) an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm, or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons; (f) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence. By listing the offences, it essentially offered a way of dealing with one of the biggest problems pertaining to international terrorism: it defined the crime.154 Even though this was only a regionally agreed definition, the ECST was at the time the first convention to comprehensively condemn the different categories of terrorist acts.155 Overall, one can conclude that a convention without the French amendment would have been much more effective, but the ECST was nevertheless a sign of considerable political and legal progress in Europe in the concerted fight against terrorism. The WGT: An Overview With the growing global interest in international terrorism and the contradictory and sensitive implications of counterterrorism policy in the early 1970s, the FPD urgently needed to develop a concerted official counterterrorism policy line. It essentially required reference documents that could be applied in different diplomatic settings. By setting general foreign policy principles, the WGT thus not only formulated Swiss official communiqués but ­effectively determined how Switzerland addressed issues relating to terrorism and ­counterterrorism. 154 Kerry Ann Gurovitsch, “Legal Obstacles to Combatting International State-Sponsored Terrorism,” Houston Journal of International Law, autumn 1987, vol. 10, pp. 159–180, p. 176. 155 The regional convention of the Organisation of American States of 1971 was limited to the protection of diplomats, cf. http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-49.html

Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE

171

Since its inception, another important function of the WGT had been the organisation of intradepartmental and interdepartmental coordination. Because terrorism threatened a variety of civil-military targets—ranging from airplanes to diplomats to travellers—and because the international community addressed terrorism in a number of ways—technical, political, and legal—a number of different departments that usually did not interact were forced to work together. The WGT thus consulted with different departments across the administrative spectrum. This process was often very time-consuming, but it seems to have been a more efficient way, since the WGT thus avoided duplication and overlap in its efforts. However, by 1974, the WGT had lost a great deal of competencies to the respective agencies within the Swiss government. During the CoE negotiations, for instance, the WGT was no longer involved in the decision-making process. The experts from the relevant administrations were sent to the committees, where they could influence the process at their discretion. Coordination was only required when internal disagreements surfaced between the governmental stakeholders. This, however, was again solved without the help of the WGT in a meeting directly chaired by Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler. A similar development can be noted when, in January 1976, Swiss officials received a formal demand from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting to know the Swiss position regarding a German counterterrorism initiative at the UN. In February 1976, Yves Moret, the head of Political Division I of the FPD, was asked to summarise Switzerland’s policy at the ICAO, the UN, and the CoE over the previous few years.156 In order to define the Swiss position, an interdepartmental policymaking meeting was held in March 1976.157 In this meeting there were representatives from the FPD, the Police Department, the Justice Department, the Federal Office of the Attorney General, and the FOCA. The Swiss government replied to the German request based on the meeting report and Moret’s summary. Only two years later, however, in October 1978, the Swiss ambassador to Denmark, Rudolf Hartmann158 (1916–2002), emphasised how important international counterterrorism had been in the past and how, in his opinion, it 156 Summary of Swiss counterterrorism policy from 1971 to 1976 by Yves Moret, “Note à la Division politique I,” [Place not mentioned], 06.02.1976, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier III. 157 Meeting minutes, “Réponse à la note de l’Ambassade de la RFA du 16.1.1976 demandant une prise de position au sujet d’une démarche allemande à l’ONU sur la lutte contre le terrorisme. Procès-verbal de la séance de travail du 23.3.1976,” Berne, 26.03.1976, in: CHBAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST, Dossier I. 158 For more information about Ambassador Rudolf Hartmann, see also dodis.ch/P2732.

172

Chapter 5

would be a pressing issue for decades to come.159 In comparison to his host country, Denmark, he noted the low level of attention that the FPD attributed to this issue and criticised the resulting foreign policy incoherence. Similarly to the request made in 1972 by the head of the Swiss Observer Office to the UN, Ambassador Bernard Turrettini, the Swiss ambassador to Denmark again called for a specialised group within the FPD on the foreign policy aspects of terrorism. His conception of this working group in 1978 reads like a description of the competencies that the WGT actually held in 1972. Like a recurring foreign policy loop, the need for a WGT was emerging anew. However, when Ambassador Hartmann made this request, the circumstances within the Swiss government were much different compared to the early 1970s. Instead of the FPD, it was the FDJP which had taken over a great deal of the competencies in the fight against terrorism; not least due to its involvement in the CoE negotiations and its secret counterterrorism networks. In Swiss counterterrorism engagement, one can therefore note a shift in policymaking power from the FPD to the FDJP. One can conclude from the above that the WGT originally held an influential policy-shaping function and thus laid the foundation for Switzerland’s counterterrorism engagement. However, it increasingly became obsolete with the growing expertise contained within the respective departments, these departments’ capacity to independently convene ad hoc policy coordination meetings, and the FDJP’s appropriation of most aspects of the international fight against terrorism. 159 Letter from the Swiss ambassador to Denmark, Rudolf Hartmann, to Ambassador A. Hegner, General Secretary of the FPD Political Division I, “Terrorismus—internationale Bemühungen zu seiner Bekämpfung,” Copenhagen, 10.10.1978, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier III.

Conclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Multilateral Fora These few examples of our policy in international organizations shows to you the great importance that we attach to this issue [terrorism] and to the search for means to counter it.1 This quote from a 1973 policy briefing for Federal Councillor Graber by JeanPierre Ritter, the head of the working group on terrorism and at the time the FPD’s foremost expert in international counterterrorism matters, shows the importance that the Swiss government attributed to issues relating to international terrorism. This part of the book has traced Switzerland’s involvement in diplomatic efforts to harmonise and coordinate the international response to terrorism in the early to mid-1970s. The most important feature of Swiss diplomacy was the wish to be perceived as an active partner in the fight against terrorism. Its goal was to be seen as a trustworthy, reliable, and steady ally in the negotiations that aimed at elaborating counterterrorism laws at the specific and general, the global and regional levels. Yet, Swiss speechwriters carefully avoided engaging with the polemic that encircled the political aspects of terrorism. In the diplomatic arena, words about terrorism mattered deeply and called for nuanced and conscientiously elaborated statements. The decision-makers took this task very seriously and refined the Swiss official position time and again. They polished the statements in order to produce linguistic “masterpieces” of diplomatic ambiguity and generality, targeted at two very different audiences at the same time. It was geared towards the Western anti-terrorist bloc on the one side, and the Third World with its Eastern bloc supporters on the other. With the shock of the terrorist attacks in 1969, 1970, and 1971 still weighing heavily, Swiss policymakers were anxious not to upset any non-state t­ errorist actor or any state sponsor of terrorism from Third World countries.2 This was especially important at the ICAO and the UN, where, in the 1970s, Third World 1 Memorandum for Federal Councillor Graber, written by Jean-Pierre Ritter, “Note au Chef du Département. Exposé sur le terrorisme,” Berne, 24.08.1973, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, Counterterrorism, Dossier I. 2 Regarding the Soviet Union’s support to Middle Eastern terrorists, cf. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_011

174

Conclusions of Part 2

countries collectively had a strong voice. Having often emerged from violent anticolonial struggles, the newly independent countries attempted to block any initiative that would delegitimise the use of unconventional warfare, such as terrorism. The strategy of some Third World countries was to lay the blame for terrorism not on the terrorists themselves, but on Western policies that were being resisted by so-called terrorists. Hence, many of these states insisted on studying the “underlying causes” of terrorism as a means to, on the one hand, avoid the establishment of effective international mechanisms to contain certain forms of unconventional warfare, and on the other hand, present the West as being guilty of its own terrorist “boomerang.” As was shown in chapter IV, the Swiss government took great care to include references that mirrored Third World rhetoric. Towards the Western bloc, the Swiss government had equally high stakes, and it could not risk upsetting any Western European state or the United States. Since civilians in these countries were the main victims of terrorism, their governments had a real interest in containing the terrorist threat. Switzerland was dependent on intelligence cooperation with Western European states, as will be shown in the next chapter, and needed to prove itself a strong and trustworthy collaborator. In its official (as well as confidential) positions, the Swiss government subtly signalled its readiness to contribute to the enhancement of international counterterrorism security frameworks. Essentially, the Swiss government wanted to be at the forefront of the formation of counterterrorism measures. At the same time, Swiss policymakers wanted to meticulously avoid being noticed or standing out. For this discreet but firm counterterrorism approach, the CoE structure, with its many political and operational levels, was a particularly well-suited organisation. In this regional intergovernmental platform, the Swiss government could show its steadfast support for the construction of counterterrorism cooperation instruments. Swiss authorities actively shaped the process by providing expertise during the drafting of the convention text. Yet, this involvement at the operational level was only visible to other CoE member states. On the political level, the Swiss government could rally behind the CoE as a common European front against terrorism. By and large, the Swiss government led a very careful counterterrorist diplomacy, not least because it established an interdepartmental WGT which considered various foreign policy options in lengthy discussions. The WGT familiarised itself with the issue of terrorism in view of its legal, political, international, and social dimensions. Over the years, the WGT’s role changed depending on the needs and relationships of and between different government

Conclusions of Part 2

175

departments. However, it lost its importance when the FPD focussed on other issues. Another reason for this can be linked to the fact that the FDJP gradually became the competent entity dealing with the issue of terrorism. This department was active in the CoE on the political and legal levels and also contained terrorism at the policing and technical levels. Hence, it covered most policymaking aspects of international terrorism and superseded the FPD in this role. Lastly, one can raise the question of neutrality. It is striking that the issue of neutrality hardly ever came up in internal policymaking discussions. Yet, one can still evaluate Swiss policy and ask to what extent Switzerland’s official counterterrorism policy was in line with the principle of neutrality and universality. In view of the polarised nature of international debates about terrorism, one can conclude that this policy of discreet but firm counterterrorism diplomacy corresponded particularly well with Switzerland’s politics of neutrality. It maintained good terms with all stakeholders and ensured intact relations with Third World states, but also paved the way for closer counterterrorism cooperation with Western states. In this respect, one could even view this neutrality policy as a cover. Switzerland’s active yet discreet counterterrorism policy might have been applied in order to facilitate unhindered counterterrorism intelligence cooperation. Official counterterrorism cooperation thus ensured secret counterterrorism cooperation. This secret operational level will be the focus of the next chapter, where it will be shown that in this area, Switzerland’s behaviour was much less “neutral.”

Part 3 In Defiance of Neutrality: Switzerland’s Secret Counterterrorism Cooperation

∵

In Defiance of Neutrality

179

In a survey conducted by Alex P. Schmid, a senior scholar in terrorism studies, on how to best counter terrorism, academics and practitioners unanimously replied that the best means to counter the threat was through intelligence and intelligence cooperation.1 Asked about both positive and negative lessons from their country’s experience with terrorism, the experts replied that governments should: “Build international cooperation/coalitions/regimes/norms for counter-terrorism. […] Intelligence, above all, is what it takes to defeat terrorism.”2 Thus, we see the importance of counterterrorism cooperation viewed by practitioners and researchers in the field of counterterrorism. As will be shown in this part of the book, intelligence cooperation was already a means to counter terrorism in the 1970s. In what follows, I analyse Swiss secret counterterrorism cooperation efforts in the early 1970s by looking at the intelligence exchanges within the framework of the Club de Berne.3 The Club de Berne was an informal forum of Western security agencies that was established in 1969 in order to discuss issues of common concern.4 Linked to the forum was a threat warning system against Palestinian terrorist attacks, which used the code word Kilowatt and which became operational in autumn 1971. The Club de Berne and its intelligence-­ sharing alert system Kilowatt are at the centre of this part of the book. During the Cold War, intelligence played a major role, ranging from mutual spying between the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries, covert actions, economic and technological espionage, and sabotage.5 However, the states within each Cold War power bloc cooperated on a number of matters. 1 Alex P. Schmid (ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. New York: ­Routledge, 2011, p. 29 and p. 32. 2 Ibid., p. 32. 3 For a similar discussion of the Club de Berne as a Euro-Israeli intelligence-sharing framework and questions related to Swiss neutrality, see also my article, Aviva Guttmann, “Secret Wires Across the Mediterranean: the Club de Berne, Euro-Israeli Counterterrorism, and Swiss ‘Neutrality’,” International History Review, (forthcoming). 4 Wylie, “Importance of being honest,” p. 794. 5 Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence in the Cold War,” in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 417–437. For Soviet espionage in the United States in the early Cold War based on documents from the legal cases, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr. Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics. Cambridge: C ­ ambridge University Press, 2006.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_012

180

Part 3

Intelligence ties were particularly close between the United States and the United Kingdom.6 With regard to terrorism, as mentioned in the introduction, the international system was divided into states that shared a real interest in suppressing terrorism and others that considered it in their national interest to support terrorism.7 For instance, the Soviet Union entertained close ties with the leaders of the PFLP and supplied them with arms. This was later confirmed by the Mitrokhin archives, where the relationship between the KGB and the PFLP leadership was outlined in detail.8 In this vein, terrorism was not a simple transnational criminological issue, but an element in the indirect warfare between the Cold War great powers. In this constellation, combating terrorism thus meant taking a side in the Global Cold War. After the terrorist attacks, the Swiss government’s choice was straightforward: it decided to cooperate with Western European states and their allies in the suppression of terrorism. With regard to the Swiss involvement in international actions against terrorism, one has to raise questions about the country’s ostensible status of neutrality. As mentioned in the introduction, according to international law as set out in the 1907 Hague Convention, a neutral state must treat all belligerents equally.9 This is an essential element in the politics of neutrality known as the principle of universality. Given the fact that counterterrorism intelligence consisted of sensitive strategic security information, which the Swiss government only shared with one side of the Cold War bloc and one side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I argue that the Swiss government’s behaviour constituted a breach of this principle. Furthermore, by integrating itself entirely in the transnational security framework in the West, the government made Switzerland’s national security dependent on the Club de Berne countries. Yet, if it wanted to uphold its credibility, as a neutral state it needed to remain independent, particularly in 6 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. In Spies We Trust. The Story of Western Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. For a more recent analysis of intelligence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom since 9/11, see also Adam D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11. London: Routledge, 2010. 7 Ersel Aydinly sees this as major impediment for counterterrorism cooperation, Ersel Aydinli (ed.). Emerging Transnational (in)Security Governance: A Statist-Transnationalist Approach. London: Routledge, 2010, p. 14. 8 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way. In particular chapter 13 recounts the KGB relations with PFLP leaders. 9 Riklin, Alois, “Neutralität. Verfestigung der Neutralität,” in: Historisches Lexikon der ­Schweiz (HLS), version of 09.11.2010, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D16572 .php

In Defiance of Neutrality

181

matters of international security. This secret “counterterrorism alliance” limited Switzerland’s choices and undermined the credibility of its permanent neutral status. Conversely, given the fact that this cooperation was entirely secret, one can raise the question as to whether the same level of neutrality or impartiality applies compared to other foreign and security policy requirements. The Club de Berne and its warning system were only known to a handful of people in the entire Swiss administration, and the Club de Berne was therefore likely to remain secret to the Swiss as well as to other countries’ populations. There was no parliamentary oversight either, and the Club de Berne has remained unknown to the general public even until today. Yet, even the best-kept secrets could not hide the fact that the Swiss government made itself dependent on the Western counterterrorism security framework and that it became indirectly involved in the Global Cold War. This part will thus show that the Swiss government took a clear (albeit hidden) political stand against the Soviet bloc by entertaining intelligence cooperation solely with Western Cold War states and their partners and that it effectively helped Israel to suppress Palestinian resistance. It is worth noting, however, that the actors involved, such as the police agents and political stakeholders, did not see counterterrorism as conflicting in any way with neutrality. Throughout the intelligence-sharing process, the political implications of counterterrorism cooperation were left unspoken. Cooperation was kept on a completely operational, tactical, and criminological level. It is possible that it was precisely this depoliticisation that made the cooperation so effective. If the agents of cooperation, such as police officials, had addressed questions regarding the legitimacy of terrorism, maybe they would have been tempted to withhold information from other agencies. As will be shown, however, this cooperation went extremely smoothly, and a large amount of highly sensitive material was shared in a sincere and open way. Through the lens of Swiss involvement in the Club de Berne and its Kilowatt exchange system, it is possible to gain significant insights into the means and mechanisms of counterterrorism cooperation in the early 1970s. Based on this, further insights can be gained regarding states’ incentives to work together on intelligence matters. Due to the sensitivity of intelligence material, states might be expected not to work together. A number of important factors can be identified that contribute to a state’s reluctance to cooperate on counterterrorism issues. First, intelligence is gathered in order to guarantee the security of its citizens, and this touches upon the very core of statehood. Matters of such importance to the heart of a country’s sovereignty are generally considered

182

Part 3

to be too sensitive to be shared with partners, and even more so with a whole group of states. Second, each intelligence agency has an obligation to protect its intelligence sources. By sharing information with other countries, the spies and informants are more vulnerable to disclosure. Given the nature of the information that they provide, disclosure can be paid for with their lives. Third, cooperation and sharing of intelligence can create dependencies. It is in each country’s interest to minimise reliance on others when it comes to securing the safety of its inhabitants. Another reason for why countries might avoid intelligence cooperation was identified by Paul Wilkinson, who believes that an agency’s reluctance to share intelligence lies in the intelligence services’ mentality of competitiveness. Giving out information to another country’s agency can disadvantage them over their national rival agency. This means that intra-­governmental competition sometimes hinders intergovernmental exchanges.10 These statist tendencies to monopolise intelligence information are contrasted with the transnational nature of the terrorist threat. It is much easier for terrorists to operate when countries are not cooperating, as it allows them to hide in one country, even though their terrorist intentions might be known in another country. Lack of intergovernmental counterterrorist cooperation effectively meant the provision of safe havens for terrorists each time they crossed borders. Furthermore, terrorist networks stretched over countries and continents and could only be destroyed if each individual agency contributed with its bit of information. With these givens, I argue that the necessity to cooperate forced the governments affected by terrorism to abandon parts of their autonomy in order to achieve overall greater security for their citizens. Furthermore, the Kilowatt exchange system established an ongoing pattern of cooperation, which led to a continuous increase and intensification of multilateral counterterrorism security ties. This third part first provides background knowledge of how the Club de Berne emerged and how important it was for the Swiss government. Second, chapter VI analyses in detail the first year of the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing system. Because most cables in the Club de Berne counterterrorism system were sent to all partners simultaneously, the Swiss authorities and any other member state were included in nearly all communications. This allows us ­today to draw conclusions on cooperation mechanisms within the Kilowatt network more broadly. 10 Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy, p. 175.

In Defiance of Neutrality

183

The Club de Berne The Club de Berne, sometimes also called the Berner Klub or Berner Club, was an association of the heads of security and intelligence agencies of nine ­Western European countries. Only one source in the archives refers to the founding date, which is said to be 1969.11 The countries were (in alphabetical order) ­Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.12 The goal of the Club de Berne was to ensure an effective exchange of information and knowledge about terrorism and espionage. The heads of each of these countries’ security agencies met twice a year for a threat assessment and to set priorities in their operational work. Switzerland was represented at these meetings by Dr. André Amstein, at the time the head of the Federal Police. Occasionally, specialised officers of the member countries also participated in workshops or training courses on relevant themes. The members of the Club de Berne deemed this personal contact among the leadership and the operational staff to be extremely valuable and helpful in fostering international counterterrorism cooperation.13 The most important part of this network was the establishment of a common encrypted telex system. In order to prevent terrorist attacks, the countries alerted one another about imminent threats, and shared new insights into terrorist strategies and the tracing of terrorist movements. Furthermore, they distributed general threat assessments or lessons learned after a successful attack. In addition to the Club de Berne members, nine further countries were also included in the encrypted telex system. From 1971 onward, Israel and the United States were included, and gradually over the course of the decade Canada, Australia, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Spain (after Franco’s death) joined, too.14 This warning system was installed to prepare and protect against

11

Note from the Federal Police [author not mentioned], “Der Berner Klub,” and added next to the title in Handwriting “gegründet 1969,” [place not mentioned], 24.05.1989, in: CHBAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978–1989. 12 Note [author not mentioned],“Vertraulich. Notiz über den Berner Klub,” Berne, 06.04.1978, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. 13 Policy briefing note from Rudolf Gerber, at the time Attorney General [Bundesanwalt], for Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler in view of an upcoming ministerial meeting, Berne, 04.02.1980, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#345*, Terrorismus: Verschiedenes, 1972–1982. 14 Note from the Federal Police [author not mentioned], “Der Berner Klub,” and added next to the title in Handwriting “gegründet 1969,” [place not mentioned], 24.05.1989.

184

Part 3

Palestinian terrorism. Information regarding their terrorist activities was given under the code name Kilowatt. More concretely, the different security agencies of the nine original countries were as follows: for West Germany, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV); for Belgium, the Sureté d’Etat; for France, the Renseignements Généraux (RG) and the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST); for the United Kingdom, the Security Service (MI5); for Italy, the Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Militare (SISMI) and the Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Democratice (SISDE); for Luxembourg, the Service de Renseignement de l’Etat (SREL); for the Netherlands, the Binnenlandse Veiligheids Dienst (BVD); for Denmark, the Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET); and for Switzerland, the Bundespolizei.15 In order to facilitate further research on the Club de Berne, the code names and the Club de Berne cable channels under which the countries operated are also listed here as follows: used the code name “jusbrb” and operated under channel V; • Belgium France was • channel II; either “d.s.t.” using channel XI or “r.g.” sending cables under used the name “pet” and had channel XXIII; • Denmark Italy was known “sinfor” or “scrlc” and used channel XXVII; • Luxembourg wasasknown as “sereta” under channel VIII; • The Netherlands was calledto the“syth”group and channel IV; • Switzerland was referred to as “bupo” orhadas “tell” and sent cables under • line X; United Kingdom had the codename “snuffbox” and operated un• The der line I; Germany was referred to as “bkln” or “arminius” and operated • West under channel XVI. 16

15

16

Note from the Federal Police, [author not mentioned], “Geheim. Berner Klub. Partnerdienste,” [Date and Place not mentioned, likely to have been written in 1989], in: CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978– 1989. Circular note for the Commanders and Inspectors in the Swiss Federal Police, “Berner-Club: Subversion/Terrorismus/Spionage,” 10.06.1980, CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978–1989.

In Defiance of Neutrality

185

For the non—Club de Berne members that were, however, included in the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing system, one can deduce some of the operating code names and channels from the sent and received cables as follows: was using either “speedis” or “orbis” and was operating under • Israel channel XVII. United States was under the name “fbi.” • The Austria cables through channel III. • Spain wassentknown as “cesid.” • Sweden was included under the name “p.o.t.” • Norway and Ireland were in the cables on a regular basis, but • since the source body doesincluded not include cables sent by them, one cannot know which operating codes and names they used.

Absolute Secrecy For the Swiss government, the importance of the Club de Berne cannot be overemphasised. On numerous occasions throughout the 1970s, Amstein personally briefed Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler about the Club de Berne. In these policy memoranda, Amstein called the Club de Berne “very effective and efficient.”17 As an example he reported that after the Munich attacks a surge in terrorist conspiratorial activities took place, but he emphasised his conviction that a great number of planned attacks had been prevented through Kilowatt intelligence-sharing.18 Similarly, Attorney General Hans Walder19 also explained that through the counterterrorism exchange mechanism, several terrorist plots had been thwarted after the Munich attacks.20 From the sources it becomes apparent that these three men—Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler, the head of the Federal Police Dr. André Amstein, and Attorney General Hans Walder—and the operational staff directly involved in

17 18

19

20

Letter from Dr. Amstein to the General Secretary of the FDJP, Berne, 07.10.1981, in: CHBAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. Letter by Dr. Amstein to Federal Councillor Furgler, “Notiz an Herrn Bundesrat Dr. Furgler,” Berne, 03.04.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. For further details about Hans Walder, see Therese Steffen Gerber, “Walder, Hans,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 20.08.2013, accessible online: http://www .hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D31892.php Letter from Hans Walder to the FPD Division for International Organisations, Berne, 26.07.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982.

186

Part 3

the Kilowatt exchanges were among the only people in the Swiss administration in the know about the Club de Berne. This absolute secrecy was illustrated, for example, in the 1973 CoE discussions on the question of strengthening intergovernmental counterterrorism cooperation in Europe. Staff members in the FPD did not know about the current counterterrorism structures in place. Accordingly, the head of the FPD Direction for International Organisations suggested a few possibilities to increase police cooperation in the fight against and prevention of terrorism.21 He specifically wanted to open diplomatic channels with European countries in order to look into the option of installing counterterrorism exchange mechanisms. In his reply, Walder curtly dismissed all of these recommendations.22 His reply letter stated that for the last two years the Western European countries had already been working together very closely in matters of counterterrorism. He explained that the heads of the national security agencies came together twice a year and discussed any need for further action. It is interesting to see, however, that Kilowatt was not mentioned in particular, but Walder added that should the head of intelligence services deem the current situation to be unsatisfactory, they would initiate the necessary procedures. Furthermore, since coordination among the European states was “seamless and excellent,” Walder concluded that any additional effort was simply “superfluous.”23 In return, it seems that the head of the FPD Direction for International Organisations, who received Walder’s reply, was highly sceptical about its content, as one can infer from handwritten notes on the letter. In red ink somebody added “a bold statement!” next to the claim that cooperation was seamless, and criticised the use of the word ‘superfluous’ for further measures with the handwritten note: “how presumptuous!”24 Obviously, the author of these handwritten notes was doubtful of the content of Walder’s letter because for the most part the FPD was simply kept in the dark about the Club de Berne and the details of Kilowatt cooperation. In the sources, it is not documented as to whether the FPD was left out on purpose, but it is certain that the Federal 21

Letter from H. T. [name anonymised, he was a high ranking Swiss diplomat] to the Office of the Attorney General, “Europarat: Empfehlung 703 der Beratenden Versammlung betreffend den internationalen Terrorismus,” Berne, 22.06.1973, in: BAR, 4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. 22 Letter from Hans Walder to the FPD Division for International Organisations, Berne, 26.07.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

In Defiance of Neutrality

187

Police, the Attorney General, and Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler operated on a “need-to-know” basis in this regard. This extreme confidentiality might not only be linked to general precautionary measures in matters of intelligence cooperation; it might also relate to the Swiss government’s public relations. The fewer people who knew about it, the lesser the likelihood that it would be disclosed. A disclosure of this security framework with Israel and its partners might have been difficult to explain to the Swiss public or to friendly Arab countries. In order to uphold Switzerland’s image as a neutral state, keeping the Club de Berne and its Kilowatt cable system as secret as possible was certainly a wise decision. Swiss Secret Counterterrorism Engagement beyond the Club de Berne On some occasions, Switzerland’s neutrality proved useful for other countries in the sector of secret counterterrorism cooperation. For instance, Amstein was often asked to represent the interests of the United States, Israel, and A ­ ustria at meetings of head of security agencies.25 The three countries were part of the Kilowatt exchange system but were not formal members of the Club de Berne. Amstein believed that he was selected for this task due to S­ witzerland’s ­neutrality.26 Furthermore, in other incidents, Switzerland even served as the facilitator for counterterrorism exchange initiatives. This was the case in 1977 when the Swiss embassy to Iraq organised a meeting between the ambassadors from West Germany and East Germany.27 The context of the meeting is not apparent in the sources, and it is therefore not entirely clear how it happened that the representatives of these two countries talked about terrorism. The year 1977 represented the peak of RAF violence, known as the “German Autumn.” East Germany was suspected of helping RAF terrorists, most notably by providing them with safe havens. Nonetheless, according to the Swiss ambassador in Iraq, the East German government began to worry about terrorist attacks, too. East Berlin apparently gave direct instructions to its ambassador to work more closely together with West 25

Note by Dr. Amstein to Federal Councillor Furgler, “An Herrn Bundesrat Dr. K. Furgler,” Berne, 05.04.1973, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. 26 Ibid. 27 Letter from the Swiss ambassador in Bagdad, B. F. I. [name anonymised], to the FPD Political Division II, “DDR: Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus (Gesprächsnotiz). Vertraulich,” Bagdad, 01.11.1977, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1988/16#967*, Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, 1976.1978.

188

Part 3

Germany on matters pertaining to terrorism. In this meeting, the East German ambassador explained that his country was concerned about terrorism in Western Europe because its consequences could quickly lead to highly undesirable political repercussions for the East-West relationship. As a result, the embassies of East and West Germany agreed to mutually keep one another updated about suspicious developments and to install a common warning ­system.28 This kind of intermediation was, however, not frequent, as it required a great deal of trust among the concerned countries. In matters of counterterrorism, West Germany was by far the closest partner for Switzerland. Study visits were organised on a regular basis, and very sensitive information was exchanged. For example, in 1974 a German delegation met Swiss cantonal officers, and a year later Swiss officers went to see the working methods of the gsg9, the special counterterrorism operation force.29 In 1975, the president of the German Bundeskriminalamt, Dr. Horst Herold, agreed to a number of measures which indicated the closeness of the counterterrorism ties between the two countries. Herold approved the Swiss request to be part of the German alert system for terrorism sympathisers, which held records of all persons who had had contact with terrorists.30 He also agreed to put Switzerland on an alert system for bomb attacks. Lastly, Herold promised to send the German internal terrorist threat estimation reports to the Swiss police. This willingness to have such intense cooperation among police agencies was very rare, and Gelzer highly appreciated German readiness.31 Relations on the diplomatic and ministerial levels were excellent, too, and the counterterrorism bilateral collaboration was repeatedly praised as “very pleasant” and “admirably efficient.”32 28 Ibid. 29 Letter from U. I. [name anonymised], Vice President of the German Bundeskriminalamt, “Lieber Herr Bundesanwalt, lieber Herr Gerber!” Wiesbaden, 18.11.1974, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. See also Rudolf Gerber’s note to the Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler about the visit to the GSG9, Rudolf Gerber, Attorney General, “Notiz für Herrn Bundesrat K. Furgler. GSG9,” Berne, 29.11.1974, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. 30 Report from Rudolf Gerber, Attorney General, “Kurzbericht zuhanden des Herrn Departementsvorstehers über meinen Besuch beim Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden vom 28. – 30. April 1975,” Berne, 02.05.1975, in: BAR E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. 31 Ibid, p. 2. 32 Letter from Michael Gelzer, at the time Swiss ambassador in Bonn (where he stayed from 1975 to 1981) to Federal Councillor Kurt Furgler, [no reference head], Cologne,

In Defiance of Neutrality

189

Mutual trust, however, was not easily gained with other countries. The Swiss government was highly selective in the creation of new counterterrorism cooperation links with interested states. In 1981, for instance, there was a request from the Turkish government to install a direct bilateral counterterrorism exchange channel.33 After due internal consideration, the Swiss government concluded that as Turkey was not a democratic state, and thus, having to be very careful with this request, it declined to establish bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with Turkey.34 Accordingly, it replied that ­Switzerland was pleased with the current counterterrorism exchange framework through which the countries were operating, which was the general worldwide criminal exchange organisation, INTERPOL. The Swiss authorities formally rejected the possibility of installing any direct counterterrorism link, but as a consolation they invited Turkish police agents to come for a visit to Switzerland to discuss general issues of terrorism.35 When India had made the same request a few years earlier (in June 1978), the Swiss government, in contrast, looked very favourably upon a possible direct bilateral counterterrorism channel. The internal decision-making note said that counterterrorism cooperation was possible because India was a constitutional democracy where “the term ‘counterterrorism’ really means this

33

34

35

20.05.1975, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. Gerzer had already been mentioned above in chapters I-V. From 1966 to 1973 he was the head of the FPD Political Affairs Division West, for further information about him, see dodis.ch/P2735. For appraisals about the good German-Swiss relations in security matters see also another letter from Gelzer to Federal Councillor, Cologne, 31.10.1975, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. In another letter from Siegfried Buback, at the time the Attorney General of Germany, the security ties among Germany and Switzerland were also highlighted in particular, cf. Letter from Siegfried Buback, [no reference head], Karlsruhe, 22.01.1976, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982. In this letter, Siegfried Buback was warning Rudolf Gerber about the increased threat of terrorist attacks and a year later, in April 1977, Buback became the first assassination victim of the RAF. Letter from K. C. [name anonymised], FPD Political Division I, to the Secretary General of the FDJP, “Turquie / Terrorisme. Confidenciel,” Berne, 16.03.1981, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#345*, Terrorismus: Verschiedenes, 1972–1982. FDJP Administrative form issued by Rudolf Gerber, “Terrorismus in der Türkei,” 24.03.1981, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#345*, Terrorismus: Verschiedenes, 1972– 1982. Cable from Berne to the Swiss embassy in Ankara, “vertraulich/confidentiel,” cable number 40, 03.04.1984, in: CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#345*, Terrorismus: Verschiedenes, 1972–1982.

190

Part 3

and nothing else.”36 Furthermore, India was a transit area for terrorists from Europe to Japan, and closer cooperation with India was thus seen to be in the interest of Western Europe too.37 From these requests, one can see that not only was a genuine governmental will to counter terrorism deemed necessary for cooperation, but also that adherence to democratic values was a core criterion. In this vein, one can conclude that cooperation was limited to countries with a similar understanding and legal handling of terrorism. The closer a country corresponded to a democratic governing structure, coupled with a strong strategic interest, the greater was readiness for counterterrorism cooperation. Conclusions on the Importance of the Club de Berne In sum, one can see that the Club de Berne was a strong counterterrorism medium, one that the Swiss government perceived as efficient and effective. The personal contacts among the security agencies’ leadership and operational staff were seen as highly beneficial because issues could be addressed directly among the national counterparts. Furthermore, the fact that the Club de Berne was endorsed by the heads of internal security in each country ensured its smooth implementation on the operational level. If problems had surfaced, these intelligence policymakers could have directly intervened and steered the cooperation process in another direction. From the above, another very important element of the Club de Berne has crystallised: its absolute secrecy. The documents in the archival records about this network are written exclusively by very high-level decision-makers at the time, either the head of the Federal Police, the Attorney General, or the head of the department of the FDJP, Kurt Furgler, personally. It appears that besides the operational staff among Swiss intelligence, these three figures were among the very few to be fully aware of the Club de Berne network. This was probably linked to the nature of the work itself, but for Switzerland in particular it is possible that in order to uphold credible neutrality—at least in appearance—the Club de Berne could only be known to a handful of people. Finally, a major factor that enabled cooperation was trust and a common understanding of terrorism. It is obvious that governments could not work 36

37

Letter from B. U. [name anonymised], FPD Political Division, to the General Secretary of the FDJP, “Indische Anfrage wegen Terrorismusbekämpfung in der Schweiz,” Berne, 12.06.1978, in: CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1988/16#967*, Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, 1976.1978. Whether the Swiss government followed up on this request and established direct cooperation with India is not documented in the sources.

In Defiance of Neutrality

191

with countries that supported terrorists, such as certain Middle Eastern states or the Soviet Union, but it seems that a country’s democratic governmental structures and constitution were decisive factors, too. Hence, counterterrorism cooperation was only possible among so-called “like-minded countries,” where enough trust reigned for an unquestioned, sincere, and open sharing of information. This mutual conviction of the need to eradicate terrorism provided the ideological basis for cooperation. It might even have been the reason for the Club de Berne’s efficiency, as will be examined in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: IntelligenceSharing within the Club de Berne (1971–1972) The first cable in the intelligence-sharing network, sent by Switzerland on 4 October 1971, confirmed that the Israeli proposition at the last Club de Berne heads of intelligence service meeting in June 1971 was unanimously accepted by all parties.1 Israel had suggested establishing a secret cable warning system under the Club de Berne framework, using the channel called Kilowatt. The cable in early October 1971 reported that from that moment onwards Kilowatt was indeed operational.2 A week later, the first threat warning was shared among the group.3 In what follows, the first year of this counterterrorism cooperation is analysed in detail. In order to facilitate understanding of this network, six categories are distinguished in order to help explain this counterterrorism cooperation mechanism. Each category represents a key method of counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the early 1970s. The division is as follows: profiling; • Suspect Identification terrorist supporters and political activists; • Tracing terroristof movements based on information gathered by infor• mants or spies; Detection of new terrorist strategies, including monitoring the techno• logical advancement of their weaponry;

1 Kilowatt cable no 0001, sent from Switzerland, “multilateraler austausch von informationen ueber arabische terroristen / verteiler-system und hinweis auf herkunft der meldungen,” 04.10.1971, in: CH-BAR#E4320-07C#1994/349#812*, Ausgang KILOWATT, 1971–1977 [hereafter this archive record will be refered to as “Outgoing Kilowatt”]. [The cables usually had no capital letters. Hereafter, when the cable subject is given in the footnote, it will be written only in lowercase the way it was written in the cables. If a cable is quoted in the running text, letters are capitalised when appropriate in order to facilitate the reading.] 2 Ibid. 3 For the cables received by Switzerland during this period, see CH-BAR#E432007C#1994/349#806*, Eingang KILOWATT, 1971–1972, [hereafter this archive record will be referred to as “Incoming Kilowatt”]. For the cables sent by Switzerland, see the cables ranging from October 71–72, BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_013

194

Chapter 6

on prevented, executed, or failed terrorist attacks based on • Reporting interrogations of arrested terrorists; • Warnings about planned attacks and likely scenarios. Each of these categories forms one section of this chapter.4 Suspect Profiling: The Conspicuous Traveller During this and subsequent periods, one of the most frequent type of cables consisted of details about one or many potential terrorists. These suspects were thought to either undertake violent actions or to be accomplices to conspiratorial terrorist plans. The cables contained the person’s name, passport number, place of birth, physical appearance, and intended itinerary. Sometimes the sender explained why this person had gained the attention of the intelligence services. Almost all of these types of cables ended with a request for further information on the subject in case he or she was known to the services of the other Kilowatt members.5 From these cables, it is thus possible to reconstruct the most “typical” traits of the suspects, the reasons why they were noticed by the services, what kinds of activities the agencies believed the terrorists were preparing, and how the agencies aimed to keep track of them. Of the 300 cables sent between October 1971 and December 1972 that had the names of suspects, almost every single person that was suspected of undertaking a terrorist attack was said to have come from a Middle Eastern country. Most frequently, the suspects’ passports had been issued in Jordan or Lebanon, while Iran, Egypt (referred to as the United Arab Republic, UAR), and Tunisia were common, too. Two suspects were Latin American: one from Brazil and one from Colombia. One suspect came from Nigeria. The average age of a terrorist suspect was believed to be between 21 and 35 years, and their skin colour was described as dark. This breakdown of suspects by geographic origins therefore essentially means that the terrorist at the time was believed 4 For an analysis of the Kilowatt network as precursor to current European internal security cooperation frameworks, see also my article: Aviva Guttmann, “Combatting Terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971–1972),” Intelligence and National Security (forthcoming). 5 A service asking whether a given suspect was known to the other intelligence services was very frequent. See for instance Kilowatt cable no. 1037, sent from Germany, “a. c. k. [name anonymised] geb. 1.7.42 in hillan, iraker, wohnh.: berlin 31, joachim-friedrich-str. 42,” 30.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972;

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

195

to be Arab. Even after the Lod Airport incident, where Japanese terrorists shot dead 25 passengers waiting for their luggage, the focus remained on nationals from Middle Eastern countries. For a potential suspect there were generally two ways that he or she could gain the attention of an intelligence agency. It was either through a lengthy process where the information came directly from undercover spies (covered below in the next subsection), or through the help of ordinary citizens collaborating with the intelligence services. Particularly important informants were travel agents, airport personnel, and hotel staff; these people alerted the police when a person matched the general physical traits of a Middle Easterner and if he or she showed a particular behaviour. Conspicuous behaviour often related to a person’s travel itinerary.6 This is not surprising given the fact that at the time, the danger of hijackings was most acute. In what follows, two illustrative examples of how people could become suspects based on their travel route and appearance are given, it should be noted that the source material encompasses many more of these cases. One case concerns three Iranians flying the route Stockholm-HamburgAmsterdam-Madrid-Rome-Athens-Tel Aviv- Tehran in May 1972. All of them were “of dark complexion, 25–30 years old, elegantly dressed and carry identical small ‘samsonite’ suitcases.” Because of this itinerary and their similar traits, the three were “likely to be subjects of acts of sabotage and/or hijackings.”7 Later it was discovered that their passports were authentic and that the travellers were, in fact, Jews. Notwithstanding, the Israelis still called for caution and justified their suspicions as follows: Nevertheless as all three chose an unusual flt. route, refused to produce their passports, their being in possession of identical attache (sic) cases, and because of their [same] age, we still consider them as suspects, and therefore recommend that flt. permission should only be granted to them after passing thorough check, normally carried out only in respect of suspects.8 6 Twice, for instance, did Switzerland receive and send cables mainly containing passengers’ flight details, cf. Kilowatt cable no. 5023, sent from the United Kingdom, “k. [name of suspect not mentioned for privacy rights],” 15.11.1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 0027, sent from Switzerland to all Kilowatt countries, “sprengstoffbriefe,” [the cable contained the flight route of four Arab people suspect of sending letter bombs], 22.09.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 7 Kilowatt cable no. 6502, sent from Israel, “movement of suspects,” 27.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 8 Kilowatt cable no. 6505, sent from Israel, “movement of suspects,” 02.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

196

Chapter 6

The Swiss police indeed informed the airport authorities of Kloten and Cointrin and asked them to look out for these passengers.9 In another case, a person’s physical appearance, refusal to show his passport to an El Al travel agent, and the impression that someone else had chosen his travel route caught the attention of an El Al staff member at the airport in Paris. This led the Israeli security service to warn the other countries about this passenger: Subject is swarthy and speaks German. He refused to present his passport. All details he was interested in were written in bad French on a slip of paper he had with him.10 From the above quote one can see that a person could raise enough suspicion to be reported to the police if he seemed to have followed a prewritten plan because he was reading possible “instructions” from a piece of paper. Determining a person’s terrorist potential based on these observations also reveals an aspect of the general mood at the time. It is apparent that travel personnel were extremely well-attuned to the terrorist threat. The police, too, took these indications seriously enough to share it with other agencies. Details about conspicuous travellers as potential terrorists were received either through airline companies handing out flight itineraries to the security services11 or hotel managers communicating their guests’ stated travel intentions, call registry (which phone numbers they dialled during their stay at the hotel), and car licence plates.12 If the passport details were known, they were 9 10 11

12

Ibid., the information that Kloten and Cointrin were alerted was handwritten on the cables in red ink by a police agent abbreviated as “Bü”. Kilowatt cable no. 6019, sent from Israel, “n.a. [name anonymised]” 02.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 8000, sent from Luxembourg, “passage d’un suspect a luxembourg,” 27.09.1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 1004, sent from Germany, “reisen terrorverdächtiger personen,” 31.05.1972, both in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. For a cable with flight details sent from Switzerland, Kilowatt cable no. 0031, sent from Switzerland to all Kilowatt countries, plus Sweden, “mouvement d’elements arabes suspects,” 03.10.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. Kilowatt cable no. 7035, sent from Italy, “watt 0032 du 3.10.1972,” [about terrorists having stayed at a hotel in Venice], 10.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. See also a cable sent by Switzerland as a reply to Germany and the US about a suspect, “betrifft ihre telex-meldung nr. 133, watt 6048 vom 11.9.1972,” [informing that an Arab suspect, who was known to the intelligence services in Germany and in the United States, stayed in Hotel Bergues in Geneva], 03.10.1972; and see also Kilowatt cable no. 0036, from Switzerland to Germany, “betrifft info. watt 6060,” [informing that an Arab suspect known to the

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

197

given to the respective embassies whenever possible in order to have them verified.13 Embassies from Arab countries also cooperated when they knew that passports were stolen, in order to counter the possible misuse of the stolen passports by terrorists.14 From the above, two aspects of counterterrorism cooperation are worth highlighting. In order to identify suspects on the spot through a terrorist’s eye-catching behaviour, security services were able to count on travel agencies or hotel owners to notify them about their observations. This means that the tourism industry was strongly interlinked with policing and terrorism prevention. Second, through the large number of cables that shared information about externally spotted suspects, one can detect a practice of disseminating information solely based on airport staff members’ first impressions. It is conceivable that due to the urgency and imminence of the possible threat—e.g. suspects taking the plane on the very same day—the agencies sent out information without taking the time to test it for accuracy. The hastiness often left no room for doubt about the validity of the claim, since any anomaly combined with the general traits of a suspect could be a looming terrorist danger. Political Activists as Terrorist Suspects Another means to prevent terrorism consisted of carefully tracing the members of terrorist organisations. Security agencies thus kept records of the organisations’ membership and circle of sympathisers. These people were considered suspicious due to their political affiliation. A cable, for instance, noted that in Italy someone was a “philo-communist Arab” and thus deserved closer observation.15 Another person was known to the Israeli intelligence services as “Arab communist extremist in Montreal.”16 13

14

15 16

German police stayed in Hotel Beaujolais in Geneva], 01.11.1971, both in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. Kilowatt cable no. 1004, sent from Germany, “reisen terrorverdaechtiger personen,” [Iranian passports were verified by the Iranian General Consulate in Hamburg], 31.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Lebanese embassy in The Hague informing about stolen diplomatic passports, Kilowatt cable no. 9021, sent from the Netherlands, “diplomatic passports,” 02.08.1972. Cable about a French stolen passport, Kilowatt cable no. 4004, sent from France, “usage possible d’un passeport français par le f.p.l.p.,” 15.06.1972, both in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 5004, sent from Italy, “y. i. [name anonymised] ne a bethlem 20.7.1924,” 01.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6067, sent from Israel, “m. z. [name anonymised],” 23.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

198

Chapter 6

Pro-Palestinian conferences in Europe were monitored with great care, and detailed accounts were sent about them. For instance, in January 1972 a conference of the Comité Suisse de Soutien au Peuple Palestinien (CSSPP) took place in Geneva. The Swiss government sent a three-page-long Kilowatt report about the conference, which was attended by a mix of leftists and representatives of the Arab diplomatic corps in Geneva.17 The Swiss police particularly highlighted the determination of some orators at the conference and their conviction about the triumph of the Palestinian “revolution.”18 They gave the names of the most powerful speakers. If conferences were known to be happening in advance and if an agency could get hold of the participants list, it was sent to the partner agencies asking if any of the attendees were recognised terrorist suspects.19 In reply to such a request, for instance, the Belgian security service said that a suspect had previously been noticed at conferences in Geneva, Paris, and Brussels as a “fervent supporter of the Palestinian cause.”20 However, the Belgians added that although this person’s entourage believed that he was intellectually capable of writing incendiary newspaper articles or heatedly voicing his positions in meetings, the Belgian security agency estimated that he was hesitant to “take it to the street” to perpetrate actions.21 The information sent to the partner agencies about monitored terrorist sympathisers generally provided their family background, previous addresses, jobs, contact with state authorities, and circle of friends.22 On one occasion, ironically, a cable sent from Germany mentioned that the suspect had indicated to his former boss that the reason for his departure from Germany was that he felt “watched” by the German state.23

17

Kilowatt cable no. 009, sent from Switzerland to all Kilowatt countries, “Conférence organisée par le Comité Suisse de Soutien au Peuple Palestinien (CSSPP), le 26 janvier 1972, à Genève, salle communale de Plainpalais, sour le title ‘OU EN EST LA REVOLUTION PESTINIENNE?’” 15.02.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 18 Ibid. 19 Kilowatt cable no. 7002, sent from Italy, “rome, 19–29 september 1972—conference of interparliamentary union,” 16.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 20 Kilowatt cable no. 2025, sent from Belgium, “la note WATT/0009 du 15 fevrier 1972,” 06.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 21 Ibid. 22 Kilowatt cable no. 6062, sent from Israel, “r.h. [name anonymised] ref. kilowatt 9026,” 30.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 23 Kilowatt cable no. 1040, sent from Germany, “Z.M.A.G. [name anonymised] unser fs kilowatt nr. 1023,” 19.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

199

Information about members of terrorist groups could, however, also be limited to their names. It was not uncommon for countries to send out long list of names requesting that they be placed on a “watch list”24 or “terrorist album”25 and, if available, asking for further information about these people. It is noteworthy that the Swiss officers readily accepted the information and generally gave the internal instructions to include the suspects in the police database. For example, a cable from Germany about possible hijackers in Europe had the following handwritten note from an officer with the abbreviation “Bü” [probably for E. Bühlmann, deputy head of the Federal Police at the time]: “For the immediate inclusion in the database [German orig. “zum sofortigen Fichieren”].”26 On other occasions, the annotation next to the suspect’s name was written: “personal file ✓” to mean, again, that a file had been created about the individual suspect.27 A general trait noticeable in all of the cables was that the judgement made by one agency was not questioned by another. If one agency claimed that certain people were dangerous because of their political beliefs, then they were considered as such. For instance, Germany gave a list of 55 names of suspects presumed to be activists of Fatah who had either been deported from Germany or whose entry had been refused.28 Swiss officials made a new file for each of the referenced names.29 Also on the basis of this cable, the Swiss police issued entry barriers.30 In comparison to how the agencies countered the above-mentioned “conspicuous suspects,” for the terrorist sympathisers as well as low- and mid-level members of terrorist organisations, the security services were more interested in the activists’ names. While their travel routes and physical appearance were 24 25

26 27 28

29 30

Kilowatt cable no. 1010, sent from Germany, “überwachungsliste terroristen,” 25.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. For the term “terrorist album,” cf. for instance Kilowatt cable no. 0021, sent from Switzerland to Germany, “mordanschlag auf das olympische dorf in muenchen am 5.9.72,” 12.09.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. Kilowatt cable no. 1003, sent from Germany, “geplante anschläge auf den zivilen luftverkehr,” 29.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6005, sent from Israel, “f.m.o. [name anonymised] further to our watt 6001 and 6004,” 03.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 1042, sent from Germany, “ausslaenderrechtliche masznahmen (sic) gegen funtionäre und aktivisten radikaler palaestinensicher gruppen,” 24.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Ibid., with red ink on top to the right was written “Original weitergeleitet z. Fichieren.” Kilowatt cable no. 0024, sent from Switzerland to Germany, “watt nr. 1023 v. 14.9.72,” 21.09.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77.

200

Chapter 6

needed to protect against imminent danger, due to the sheer number of political activists, one had to make lists with names and only in selected cases add further information on the life and background of the activists. Tracing Terrorist Organisations Higher-placed members in the Fatah and the PFLP were put under a “very tight surveillance.”31 Similarly to the general suspect, the movement of terrorist organisations’ leadership was monitored. Agencies informed one another about operatives’ upcoming or current travels and meetings of Fatah,32 the PFLP,33 the PFLP-GC,34 and the Black September Organisation (BSO).35 These were the main organisations put under surveillance in order to anticipate their general or immediate plans and tactics, as well as their organisational setup, mode of operation, and structure. The information about the organisations’ leadership was often very precise and indicated concrete and detailed operational terrorist plots. The reason for this more detailed knowledge lies in the type of informants that the agencies relied upon. In nearly every cable in this category, at the beginning of a cable

31 32

33

34

35

Kilowatt cable no. 4011, sent from France, “activité suspecte de a.a.a [name anonymised],” 27.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. For cables informing about a Fatah meeting in November 1971 in Algiers, Kilowatt cable no. 4000, sent from France, “réunion des représentants d’el fatah,” 17.09.1971. For a meeting in December 1972 in Beirut, Kilowatt cable no. 9036, sent from the Netherlands, “Fatah representatives in Europe,” 19.12.1972; and the subsequent cable informing about the date change of the meeting to January 1973, Kilowatt cable no. 9037, sent from the Netherlands, “Fatah representatives in Europe,” 19.12.1972; and a cable with the attendees of this meeting, Kilowatt cable no. 5031, sent from the United Kingdom, “Fatah representatives in Europe,” 22.12.1972. See also another cable saying that the meeting will be in Cairo instead of Beirut, Kilowatt cable no. 5035, sent from the United Kingdom, “PLO/ Fatah meeting,” 22.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. For a cable about a PFLP meeting, cf. Kilowatt cable no. 0039, sent from Switzerland to all Kilowatt members, “Représentants en Europe de l’organisation el fatah,” 11.01.1973, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. For cables about PFLP-GC meetings, Kilowatt cable no. 6004, sent from Israel, “f. m. o. [name anonymised],” 22.11.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 6005, sent from Israel, “f. m. o. [name anonymised],” 03.12.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. For cables about Black September meetings, Kilowatt [cable no. missing], sent from Germany, “fahndung nach terroristen,” 15.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

201

it said: “source: reliable has access to terrorist circles.”36 Or “source: extremely delicate.”37 The cover addresses of the organisations were debunked and letters to and from the known terrorist post boxes were intercepted. For instance, in December 1972 Israel provided details about Habash’s cover address in Lebanon and another one which the PFLP used to communicate with its activists in Europe. The cable specifically asked that any correspondence sent from one of the Kilowatt member countries to these addresses be indicated to the Israeli authorities.38 Information about the “top terrorists” and Palestinian leaders was particularly valuable, such as evidence about the whereabouts of George Habash, Lela Khaled, Ahmed Jibril, Yassir Arafat, Faruk Kaddumi, and Abu Iyad. Habash and Khaled were the leaders of the PFLP, Jibril was the head of the PFLP—GC, a more radical splinter group of the PFLP. Arafat was a central figure in the Fatah and the PLO, and Iyad was his deputy.39 Kaddumi was the leader of the BSO. For the well-known members of the PFLP, such as Khaled, the agencies could still count on external civil society helpers. For instance, a “casual source” reported to the Israeli police about having seen a woman resembling Lela Khaled in Zagreb in early September 1972.40 Her cover name and her car’s German licence plate and type (Mercedes) were also indicated. A few days later, a Pan American travel agent believed to have recognised her in Frankfurtam-Main.41 Yet, most cables were based on information from inside agents. For instance, Israel received a hint that Habash was going to meet in Paris with four PFLP members arriving from London on 29 October 1971. Two of these PFLP members were believed to be the released terrorists that had perpetrated 36 37 38

39

40 41

Kilowatt cable no. 6068, sent from Israel, “n. h. al-m. [name anonymised],” 01.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 9037, sent from the Netherleands, “fatah-representatives in europe,” 21.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6006, sent from Israel, “pflp (habash) cover address in lebanon,” 07.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. For a cable with an intercepted PLO circular letter, cf Kilowatt cable no. 7000, sent from Israel, “Organisation pour la libération de la paléstine—plo,” 06.10.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Abu Iyad wrote a memoire about his engagement in the armed struggle, see Abu Iyad and Eric Rouleau. My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle. New York: Times Books, 1981. Kilowatt cable no. 6509, sent from Israel, “arab terrorism—layla khaled,” 04.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 1015, sent from Germany, “gefaehrdung des zivilen luftverkehr,” 07.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

202

Chapter 6

the attacks at Kloten Airport in 1969 (Amina Dhabor and Ibrahim Toufik).42 The United Kingdom reported Abu Iyad’s likely stay in Europe and asked if a security service could send a picture of him.43 Besides regular meetings among terrorists, concrete operations were traced and attempts were made to prevent them. For instance, Germany expected a couple of terrorists to arrive from Baghdad on 7 July 1972 for an arms deal.44 Because it was difficult to send weapons by air, the terrorists were going to collect weapons from German fellow travellers in exchange for large amounts of cash that they got from their latest Lufthansa hijack ransom payment.45 A few weeks after the German state security received this information, it intercepted a letter saying that the German terrorist sympathisers realised that the police were investigating them and they therefore called off the arms deal.46 From the various cables reporting about the terrorist groups it becomes apparent that the agencies possessed a lot of information about the groups’ organisational structures and about the different operatives’ areas of responsibility. The PFLP was believed to have been strongly hierarchically organised, with every action depending on Habash personally “giving orders.”47 It was assumed that he directed operations by himself, closely controlling and supervising each operative.48 This was different from the description of Jibril’s organisational structure. Numerous cables warned that a Jibril operative would be tasked with an attack and that he or she was free to determine the assault’s implementation, timing, 42 43 44 45

46 47

48

Kilowatt cable no. 6003, sent from Israel, “pflp activists leave london,” 29.10.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 5004, sent from the United Kingdom, “arab terrorist activities,” 01.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 1008, sent from Germany, [no title] “nur für den dienstgebrauch,” 07.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. It is likely that the cable refers to the Lufthansa Boeing 747 hijacking of 22 February 1972 on its way from Delhi to Athens. The terrorists brought the machine to Aden and received 5 million Deutsche Mark (DM) as ransom. Kilowatt cable no. 1011, sent from Germany, “sabotageakte palaestinensischer terroristen,” 31.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6029, sent from Israel, “pflp/new operation with japanese,” 29.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 1036, sent from Germany, “arabische terroristen,” 29.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6003, sent from Israel, “pflp activists leave london,” 29.10.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

203

and location. For instance, Israel reported that a member of the Jibril organisation was on a “very secret and dangerous mission in Europe.”49 After his first stop in London, the terrorist was entrusted with deciding how to pursue the terrorist attack: [He] was to decide whether to continue on to the United States or to one of the countries in Europe (France, Germany, Italy or Switzerland). Ahmad Jibril also empowered him to decide whether to continue with the organisation or not.50 The Fatah was believed to have been well organised in terms of divisions and sub-divisions, each division acting individually within its competencies. One cable, for instance, explained that a Fatah intelligence division led by Jihad al-Rasad “contains a department for ‘special operations.’ This department is in charge of terrorist operations outside Israel.”51 With regard to the BSO, the German intelligence service sent a Kilowatt cable with a very detailed account of the BSO’s means of operation.52 According to this cable, the BSO was separated into two divisions: an intelligence unit and an operational sabotage unit. The leader of the intelligence unit was Ali Hassan Salameh (1940–1979), and the “headquarters” of both divisions were known to be in Sabra (Gaza); the cable also included the landlines of the headquarters. The BSO intelligence unit was responsible for the detection of people and institutions in Europe who collaborated with Israel. The leader of the BSO, Kaddumi, then analysed the data and selected the most suitable and interesting target for the attack. After having selected the target, he planned the attack and charged the BSO sabotage operations unit with its implementation. This unit subsequently assembled a team, trained each member in rented apartments in Lebanon, and provided the members with Kuwaiti and Yemeni passports. Meanwhile, hotel reservations carrying the passports’ cover names were made in the respective countries where the operation was to take place. The perpetrators of the attacks generally did not know each other in advance and were flown individually into the operations site. There, not more 49

Kilowatt cable no. 6036, sent from Israel, “pflp-gc/senior personality sent abroad on mission,” 12.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 50 Ibid. 51 Kilowatt cable no. 6076, sent from Israel, “m. a. al-h. t. [name anonymised],” 28.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 52 Kilowatt cable no. 1032, sent from Germany, [no title] 25.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

204

Chapter 6

than three hours before the operation, they each received their instructions. This “need-to-know” practice was seen as a security precaution and made it very difficult for the police to intervene. During each operation there was also a supervising officer whose task was to guide the operations and report back to the BSO leadership in Beirut.53 In comparison, this description of the BSO also corresponds to a journalists’ interpretation at the time, John Kent Cooley, who was working for the newspaper Christian Science Monitor. According to him, the BSO indeed operated without any central leadership with each cell structure functioning on a need-to-know basis. “This operational philosophy protected the operatives by ensuring that the apprehension or surveillance of one cell would not affect the others.”54 Cooley had written his book over a year after the cable from Germany was sent, and it is unlikely that the German state security had gotten this information from him. Hence, the informant for the German service seems to have described the BSO methods quite accurately and was likely based on inside knowledge. The security services were not only aware of the organisation and planning of the attacks, a special focus was placed on the terrorist organisations’ recruitment process. Israel sent a cable providing details about how three Palestinians (one Fatah and two PFLP), which it called a “terrorist delegation,” went on an awareness raising and recruitment tour through Scandinavia.55 The terrorists met with local Palestinian activists in Stockholm on 2 December 1971 and tried to gain their support as follows: they appealed to them to step up their efforts on behalf of the Palestinian cause and the struggle against Zionism. D.N [name anonymised] talked about the need for assistance in sabotage operations and mentioned that the terrorist organisations had European volunteers at their disposal. In this connection he noted the existence of ties with German, French, Belgian and Dutch youths.56

53 Ibid. 54 John Kent Cooley. Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs. London: Frank Cass, 1973. 55 Kilowatt cable no. 6008, sent from Israel, “terrorist delegation in europe,” 09.12.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 56 Kilowatt cable no. 6007, sent from Israel, “terrorist delegation in europe,” 07.12.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

205

Over the next few months, the Security Agencies closely monitored the Palestinian acquisition and mobilisation of European followers. When new recruits were ascertained, their names were immediately shared among the Kilowatt network.57 A more challenging aspect of intelligence gathering was not learning about how each individual group operated, but rather what their relationships to one another were. The BSO in particular seemed to have initially posed a puzzle to the security services. Gradually, however, it became clear that the BSO was the violent branch of Fatah, which secretly supported the BSO with activists and infrastructure. For instance, a cable from Israel concluded that “most Black September members are estimated to belong to Fatah intelligence”58 and that they were linked by a “liaison officer/ombudsman.”59 Similarly, a cable from Germany reported that 11 Fatah activists had been delegated to the BSO and were now, after being trained in sabotage operations, available to the BSO for special-forces operations.60 A high-ranking terrorist was believed to have been working for Fatah and BSO at the same time.61 Interestingly, here, again, it seems that the security services got it right. Benny Morris, a historian of the Arab-Israeli conflict, describes the relations between Fatah and the BSO in a way similar to how the security services understood it. Morris explains that the BSO was created out of a dispute between moderates and extremists.62 Fatah provided logistical and intelligence support but politically kept its distance from the BSO’s violent activism.63 Furthermore, another interesting aspect of the cables of this category is noteworthy from a discourse analysis perspective. It is surprising to see that 57

Kilowatt cable no. 1033, sent from Germany, “organisation ‘schwarzer september.’ neue mitglieder von operationsgruppen,” 26.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 58 Kilowatt cable no. 6076, sent from Israel, “m. a. al-h. t. [name anonymised],” 28.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 59 Kilowatt cable no. 1023, sent from Germany, “jordanischen staatsangehörigen m.a. e. [name anonymised], geb. 10.06.1943 in beit-nabala, angestellter der deutschen schlafwagengesellschaft, koeln,” 14.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 60 Kilowatt cable no. 1033, sent from Germany, “organisation ‘schwarzer september.’ neue mitglieder von operationsgruppen,” 26.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 61 Kilowatt cable no. 6068, sent from Israel, “n. h. al-m. [name anonymised],” 01.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 62 Benny Morris. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999. New York: Knopf, 1999, p. 379. 63 Ibid.

206

Chapter 6

in order to describe the terrorist responsibilities within an organisation, similar words were used as for governmental or military positions and divisions. For instance, in the PFLP, someone was referred to as “senior commander in the pflp.”64 The BSO possessed “operations officers”65 who were “in charge of terrorist attacks in this organisation”66 as if it were a regular “task” given to them. In the PFLP-GC organisation, a high-ranking operative was “Jibril’s chief aid and in charge of preparations and send-off of terrorists who are to carry out attacks abroad.”67 For Fatah, someone was described as “second in command to Yassir Arafat”68 or, in the same cable, “chief of intelligence and planner of Black September operations.”69 Regarding Fatah, it said that a “subject is a senior activist in Fatah intelligence. In mid-November he was put in charge of psychological warfare and sabotage operations for Fatah in Europe.”70 A leading Fatah member was connected to the “commanders of the terrorist organisation in Lebanon.”71 On another occasion, a link between Fatah and the BSO was referred to as a “liaison officer between BSO and Fatah”;72 one might use a similar word to describe embassy personnel. On the one hand, it is sensible to use familiar terms for comparable fields of responsibilities. These terms provided precision and ensured that the partner

64

Kilowatt cable no. 6003, sent from Israel, “pflp activists leave london,” 29.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 65 Kilowatt cable no. 6066, sent from Israel, “black september plans for an attack in europe,” 03.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 66 Kilowatt cable no. 6004, sent from Israel, “f. m. o. [name anonymised],” 22.11.1971, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 67 Kilowatt cable no. 6051, sent from Germany, “movements of pflp-g.c. leaders,” 18.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 68 Kilowatt cable no. 5005, sent from the United Kingdom, “arab terrorist activities,” 06.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 69 Ibid. 70 Kilowatt cable no. 6068, sent from Israel, “n. h. al-m. [name anonymised],” 01.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; and for a similar formulation, Kilowatt cable no. 1043, sent from Germany, “g. i. e.-d. m. [name anonymised], student, geb. 21.10.1940 in bssnadadorf/kreis lattakia/syrien, syrischer staatsangehoeriger, bis zum 12.2.1970 wohnhaft in Bonn, bonner talweg 145,” 27.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 71 Kilowatt cable no. 6076, sent from Israel, “m. a. al-h. t. [name anonymised],” 28.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 72 Kilowatt cable no. 1023, sent from Germany, “jordanischen staatsangehörigen m.a. e. [name anonymised], geb. 10.06.1943 in beit-nabala, angestellter der deutschen schlafwagengesellschaft, koeln,” 14.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

207

agencies would understand exactly what was meant in the cable. On the other hand, this might hint at an overestimation of the organisational capacities of the terrorist cells. It is possible that by using the same categories as the military or government sector, the officers in the security agencies might have subconsciously inflated the importance of the terrorists—or at least bought into the terrorist propaganda, which generally preferred to present the terrorists as bigger than they actually were. Furthermore, by using words such as “Commander,” “Chief of Intelligence,” and “warfare,” the police attributed aspects of a military entity to them. This corresponded precisely to the way the terrorists wanted to be presented, who saw themselves as “soldiers” in a national liberation war. These words were certainly unusual to describe “regular criminals.” One could say that by describing them in more military terms, the police were—even if just among the security services—acknowledging the terrorists’ political legitimacy. Overall, the agencies had a great deal of first-hand information about the terrorist groups. From today’s perspective it is, however, difficult to know whether the intelligence agencies were correct in their estimation of the terrorist groups’ operational structure. From the records, it is apparent that the groups were either infiltrated or had inside informants providing the agencies with highly detailed and precise information. Terrorist Innovations in Weaponry and Tactics An important type of information that the agencies were seeking concerned the terrorists’ next strategic targets and their tactical advances to commit such attacks. Furthermore, the security agencies shared information about terrorists’ innovation in the efficiency and deadliness of their offensives. As will be shown below, letter bombs were the most frequent type of terrorist attack in 1972. Because letter bombs were particularly efficient for terrorists—very low costs in material and risks, and a considerable amount of possible damage and publicity—the Israeli security service expected that the threat of letter bombs was likely to intensify.73 With regard to weaponry and the technological innovation of explosive letters, booby-trapped letters were sent from Malaysia to Germany, Italy, Austria, and South Africa with explosives that were mixed with Curare, a poison used

73

Kilowatt cable no. 6054, sent from Israel, “departure for europe of terrorists to carry out acts of sabotage,” 04.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

208

Chapter 6

by indigenous people in Central and South America as arrow poison.74 In contact with humans it attacked the neuromuscular junction, and a high dose could lead to paralysis or death. In Switzerland, the FDJP scientific service researched the effects of the poison in relation to the letter bomb. It concluded that adding the poison to a letter bomb could not inflict harm because the poison would burn in the course of the explosion, without having any effect. The only risk it bore was for the person defusing the bomb, as he or she could have skin contact with the poison during the bomb disposal.75 Another way that terrorists enhanced the effectiveness of letter bombs was by flattening the detonator and by shortening the “striker pin retaining lever.” This allowed the use of thinner envelopes and increased the sensitivity during letter opening.76 Israel warned of this new technique as the letters thus became more difficult to detect and disarm.77 Other innovations in terrorist techniques centred on making the weapons undetectable to airport controls. An inside “reliable source with access to terrorist circles, sub-source: PFLP member” disclosed to the Israeli security service that the PFLP had their weapons manufactured in Europe.78 This gun maker was said to possess expertise in equipping the arms with “countermeasures to neutralise electronic detection devices” at European airports.79 How exactly this European armament manufacturer achieved this technological upgrade was, however, not explained further. For sabotage attacks, the Dutch security service discovered that two Lebanese terrorists had bought over 50 taximeters. These meters were suitable as mechanisms for bombs and could be hidden in plain sight, as a regular taximeter, in a car.80 Similar car bomb attacks were perpetrated by the IRA and the 74

Kilowatt cable no. 9024, sent from the Netherlands, “letter bombs,” 11.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Similarly, in October 1972 a letter was sent to the Israeli embassy in Bonn containing the poison Zyaniol, which leads to death if it is eaten, Kilowatt cable no. 1041, sent from Germany, “giftbrief an die israelische botschaft in bonnbad godesberg,” 19.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 75 Kilowatt cable no. 0034, sent from Switzerland to all Kilowatt members, “bomben-briefe,” 16.10.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 76 Kilowatt cable no. 6055, sent from Israel, “letter bombs,” 05.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 77 Ibid. 78 Kilowatt cable no. 6015, sent from Israel, “pflp—methods to avoid security-checks at airports,” 05.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 79 Ibid. 80 Kilowatt cable no. 9019, sent from the Netherlands, “old taximeters,” 28.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

209

RAF in Germany, and it was believed that the Palestinians could now use this technique as well.81 Another new device that was believed to be in the terrorists’ hands was a rather peculiar one. France reported that Fatah had developed a “suitcase rocket launcher to fire 3,5 rockets at aircraft on the ground. The estimated operational range of this weapon is about 200 meters. It is aimed instinctively and actuated by pressure on the carrying handle”82 The suitcase parameters were 65 × 40 × 18 cm and the colour was generally black. It could also be used to shoot at crowds near airline counters and passenger buses. Even though the cable estimated that aircraft attacks using this method were “rather probable,” nothing could be found in the secondary literature about such a device. It is unlikely that this piece of information was accurate, and it seems, once again, that a threat—even one as unrealistic as a rocket-firing piece of luggage—was reported to one’s counterparts for the sake of comprehensiveness and in order to report nearly every single possibility. A more realistic scenario was Israel’s fear that model planes (like toys) could be misused as carriers of explosives in order to attack aircrafts or crowds.83 This warning is interesting when considering current recreational use of civilian drones or when linking it to more recent terrorist events where everyday household appliances or cars had been transformed into deadly weapons (for example, in the Boston Marathon bombings of 15 April 2013 or the Nice attack of 14 July 2016). The misuse of everyday tools as deadly weapons has been a recurring trait in terrorist tactics and represented a particular nightmare for the police due to the difficulty in detecting such devices as possible terrorist tools. On a tactical level, a few successful terrorist strikes were reported. Lebanese terrorists received a parcel in late September 1972 with uniforms and badges of the British and German police, the Swiss army, and European airlines.84 The United Kingdom confirmed that it was indeed easy to get police uniforms from surplus stock or from theatrical agencies, and that momentarily there was nothing it could do to prevent this.85 France also reported the theft of an Air 81 Ibid. 82 Kilowatt cable no. 6042, sent from France, “fatah—suitcase rocket launcher,” 31.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 83 Kilowatt cable no. 6030, sent from Israel, “pflp/model planes as flying bombs,” 29.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 84 Kilowatt cable no. 6059, sent from Israel, “terrorists/army, police and airline uniforms for terrorist operations,” 16.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 85 Kilowatt cable no. 5013, sent from the United Kingdom, “bogus use of uniforms by arab terrorists,” 17.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

210

Chapter 6

France uniform and security manual from an air hostess’ home.86 The manual was particularly sensitive, as it included maps of Air France routes and a detailed description of all security measures taken on board the aircraft. In order to be able to enter Germany without a visa, Israel reported that two terrorists had acquired Turkish and Iranian passports in Istanbul.87 Lastly, again on a tactical level, in 1972 security services noticed two geographical expansions by terrorist networks. A Palestinian terrorist cell, which was highly specialised in airline sabotage, was detected in Yugoslavia.88 The Turkish government informed German officials that Fatah was collaborating with Turkish socialist exiles in Germany. The exchange was believed to be such that Turkish activists in Germany would receive training in Fatah camps in exchange for unlimited organisational support for planned Palestinian terrorist attacks in Europe.89 Overall, even though some of the reported terrorist weapons believed to be in the terrorists’ hands were rather unlikely to have existed (such as the James Bond-esque rocket-shooting suitcase), one can derive from the above that terrorists kept improving and innovating their techniques. The police tried to keep up with the terrorists by thinking from their perspective and by considering the technological advancements which could be used by the police as well as by the terrorists. As will be shown in the next section, the race was far from being won. Perpetrated Terrorist Attacks and the Lessons Learnt Despite extensive knowledge, efforts, and well-functioning intelligencesharing mechanisms, several terrorist attacks were perpetrated in 1972. Most notorious was the Olympic attack on 6 September 1972. However, less

86

87 88 89

Kilowatt cable no. 4010, sent from France, “utilisation d’uniformes de compagnies aeriennes de la police et de l’armee en vue d’operations terroristes,” 25.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6053, sent from Israel, “terrorists/dispatch of terrorists to europe,” 02.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 9033, sent from the Netherlands, “palestine terrorists in yugoslavia,” 20.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 1046, sent from Germany, “zusammenarbeit tuerkischer extremisten mit palestinensischen terrororganisationen,” 02.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

211

well-known today is that the most serious and constant threat at the time was posed by explosive letters. Even though many booby-trapped letters were intercepted and neutralised before they exploded, the terrorists were constantly sending such letters—keeping the main targets on perpetual alert, namely the Israeli embassies, Jewish institutions in Europe, and regular citizens in Israel. The terrorists knew that several of their letters were being stopped, and therefore varied the places from which they were sent within Europe (Vienna, Belgrade, and Amsterdam)90 and worldwide, mainly Asia (India, Malaysia, and Singapore).91 Most frequently, the bombs in the letters were prevented from exploding because the addressee noticed an anomaly. For instance, an elderly Jewish woman in Düsseldorf received a particularly thick letter from an unknown originator that bore a Malaysian stamp. She immediately called the old people’s home’s manager, who in turn called the police.92 Israeli embassies and Jewish institutions in Europe knew that they were targeted and maintained a high level of vigilance. Other letters were discovered because they exploded in the post office. This happened with a dispatch from India, where one letter detonated in Bombay in the post office without causing any harm.93 Since the terrorists sent out a batch of similar types of letters each time, the information from one letter could successfully allow the others to be located. This was the case, for instance, after the British police detected the circulation of explosive letters bearing a seemingly Jewish sounding name living in Malaysia as the sender. After this warning, a letter to a Jewish Institute in London evoked immediate suspicion because the consignor corresponded to the above description: “Abraham Jacobson, 113 Orchard Road, Malaysia.”94 The letter could thus be intercepted without exploding.

90

91 92 93 94

Kilowatt cable no. 6018, sent from Israel, “hijacking of sabena airliner,” 12.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 6509, sent from Israel, “letter bombs,” 25.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 5028, sent from the United Kingdom, [no title], “confidential,” 13.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 6056, sent from Israel (reporting about the event in Düsseldorf), “letter bombs,” 09.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 5018, sent from the United Kingdom, “letter bombs,” 09.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. Kilowatt cable no. 5017, sent from the United Kingdom, [no title], 03.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

212

Chapter 6

This was therefore the general way of countering the threat: as soon as one letter was discovered, a detailed description of the letter, its contents, and the detonation mechanism of the explosives was sent to the Kilowatt members.95 With this information, the mail and custom services, together with the security services, were able to detect the letters. Another such example occurred in Switzerland when the Israeli mission to the UN in Geneva found two letter bombs before they were opened.96 The Geneva police dismantled the bomb and gave a very detailed account of the letters. The Swiss security service sent the report with pictures and drawings of the bomb mechanism to the Kilowatt members.97 After this, a total of 17 corresponding letter bombs were found in London (4), Geneva (4), Montreal (2), Brussels (2), the Paris UNESCO office (2), and New York City (3).98 Despite these precautions and effective methods, one person died from a letter bomb explosion in 1972. The agricultural attaché at the Israeli embassy in London opened a letter and detonated the explosives; he died on the way to the hospital.99 With regards to this kind of threat, a striking qualitative difference is noticeable concerning the terrorists’ targets. Not only were Israeli citizens at risk, but also Jewish institutes, rabbis, or ordinary people who were targeted specifically for being Jewish. For instance, the above-mentioned letters from India were sent to the Jewish community in Geneva and to Israelis living in Geneva.100 In London, seven letters were found that were directed to Jewish institutes with 95

This was the case in several incidences, cf. Kilowatt cable no. 6509, sent from Israel, “letter bombs,” 25.09.1972; Kilowatt cable no. 7029, sent from Italy, “rome—lettre piegee,” 07.10.1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 1038, sent from Germany, “sprengstoffbrief-eingegangen beim juedischen altersheim in duesseldorf,” 09.10.1972; Kilowatt cable no. 1050, sent from Germany, “versendung von sprengstoffbriefen und briefen von sprengstoffverdaechtigem inhalt,” 08.11.1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 5020, sent from the United Kingdom, “letter bombs,” 10.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; Also Kilowatt cable no. 0023, sent from Switzerland, “envoi de lettres piegees a la mission d’israel a geneve,” 20.09.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 96 Ibid. (cable no. 0023) 97 Kilowatt cable no. 0026, sent from Switzerland, “zustellung von sprengstoffbriefen an die israelische mission in genf,” 21.09.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 98 Kilowatt cable no. 6509, sent from Israel, “letter bombs”, 25.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 99 Kilowatt cable no. 5007, sent from the United Kingdom, [no title], 19.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 100 Kilowatt cable no. 0037, sent from Switzerland, “envoi de lettres piegees par voie postale, depuis les indes,” 10.11.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

213

addressees such as the “Jewish Folk Society,” or the “Jewish Youth Society” and to an important rabbi in London.101 One letter from India was also sent to the United States, for the “American-Jewish Committee.”102 This clearly demonstrated an expansion of terrorist targets and went beyond the realm of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In order to hinder the detection of their letters, the terrorists sent a particularly high volume of letters towards the end of the year. In doing so, they took advantage of the high volume of Christmas gift sending, when it was not unusual for people to send bigger parcels or envelopes.103 On one occasion, a bomb was attached to a new year’s calendar. Besides the letter bombs, five terrorist attacks were recorded within the Kilowatt network: hijacking of a Sabena flight from Brussels to Tel Aviv, 8 May 1972; • The The conducted by three Japanese men at Lod Tel Aviv Air• port,massacre 30 May 1972; Pipeline Attack in Trieste, 5 August 1972; • The The massacre in Munich Olympic Village, 6 September 1972; • The hijacking • October 1972.of a Lufthansa flight on its way from Beirut to Ankara, 29 The general procedure after an attack was that the agency would send out a detailed report about how the terrorist attack happened and what conclusions one could derive from it in order to protect other countries from experiencing such attacks in the future.104 Such was the case with the Sabena hijacking. On 8 May 1972, Sabena Flight No. 571 was flying from Brussels to Tel Aviv via Vienna. Shortly after departure from Vienna, two male and two female

101 Kilowatt cable no. 5019, sent from the United Kingdom, [no title], 10.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 5021, sent from the United Kingdom, “letter bombs,” 13.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 102 Kilowatt cable no. 5020, sent from the United Kingdom, “letter bombs,” 10.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 103 Kilowatt cable no. 6011, sent from Israel, “explosive letters,” 05.01.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 104 For instance, Switzerland immediately asked the Belgian security service about their estimation for why the terrorists were successful and, based on this, what Switzerland could do to improve airport security. Cf. Kilowatt cable no. 0011, sent from Switzerland, “detournement d’un avion de la sabena bruxelles—vienne—tel aviv du 8 mai 1972,” 09.05.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77.

214

Chapter 6

members of the BSO took over the plane and brought it to Lod Airport (Israel). The hijackers demanded the release of 317 prisoners in Israel. Via wireless, Israeli representatives and the hijackers negotiated for 23 hours until, on 9 May, IDF forces burst onto the plane, overcame the hijackers, and released the passengers. In the IDF action, the two male hijackers were killed, while one of the women was severely wounded, and the other was taken into custody. A few passengers were slightly wounded by the IDF during the raid. The cable about this incident gave a detailed account of the events, laid out the terrorists’ background and criminal files, and explained the preparations for the attack, such as their training and acquisition of weapons and false Israeli passports.105 Most of the information was based on what the arrested female terrorist said during her interrogation. The cable pointed out specifically that before boarding, the terrorists were only “frisked and the girdle was not detected. The powder compact was only superficially examined.”106 Yet, the explosives were in the belt and the pistol was hidden in the powder compact, a female cosmetics item. In order to improve travel agents’ ability to detect suspicious terrorist behaviour, another cable was sent describing in detail the questions asked by the terrorists during the purchase of their flight tickets.107 For instance, the terrorists asked about the duration of the stopover in Vienna and whether passengers would be requested to leave the plane during the layover. The second major terrorist attack of that year happened at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv. On 30 May 1972, three Japanese terrorists arrived by plane in Tel Aviv, went through passport control, and retrieved their luggage.108 They opened their baggage, took out two Czech vz. 58 assault rifles, two magazines, and hand grenades, and opened fire on the crowd in the passenger hall and threw the grenades. Twenty-five people were killed and many were heavily wounded.109 The terrorists claimed to belong to the “Japanese Red Army,” affiliated with the PFLP.

105 Kilowatt cable no. 6018, sent from Israel, “hijacking of sabena airliner,” 12.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 106 Ibid. 107 Kilowatt cable no. 2007, sent from Belgium, “secret-urgent. detournement d’un avion sabena de la ligne bruxelles-tel aviv,” 16.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 108 Kilowatt cable no. 7004, sent from Italy, “aeroport de tel aviv—30.05.1972—massacre effectue par trois ressortissants japonais,” 07.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971– 1972. 109 Kilowatt cable no. 6503, sent from Israel, “pflp—japanese terrorists who reached tlv airport with airfrance flight 132 on 30.05.1972,” 31.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

215

As with the Sabena hijacking report, the cables recounted the events and gave organisational details about the preparation of the attack. Italy (where the plane had departed from) and Israel sent the most extensive reports. The terrorists were recruited by a PFLP representative based in Tokyo and received their arms in Rome from the PFLP contact man there.110 These rifles were chosen for their lightness in order not to raise suspicion when the suitcases were being weighed.111 The Israeli government, not having expected Japanese terrorists and trying to understand their linkage with the Palestinians, was most interested in tracing the perpetrators’ previous movements.112 Upon a request to all hotels in Switzerland, the Swiss security services found that none of the three terrorists had stayed in Switzerland.113 There was, however, a fourth member of the group who had trained in Lebanon in sniping, as opposed to the others who had been practicing automatic arms in order to commit the mass slaughter.114 The sniper, who due to his training was likely to be deployed by the PFLP as an assassin, had stayed in Zurich and Berne on 4–6 June 1972 (shortly after the Lod massacre).115 He sent a postcard to Japan in which he stated his intention to remain in Europe until January 1973.116 The Swiss government initiated a manhunt for the sniper, who was described by the Israelis as looking “typically Japanese,”117 but the Swiss authorities did not know whether he had already left the country. Noteworthy in the report sent from Italy is a reference to Air France, which the terrorists flew on to Tel Aviv. The Italians referenced a decision that had been taken by a Committee for Airport Security that stated that the responsibility for checking passengers’ luggage was with each airline—and not with 110 ibid. 111 Kilowatt cable no. 6504, sent from Israel, “terrorist outrage at tlv. lod airport—weapons,” 01.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 112 Kilowatt cable no. 6021, sent from Israel, “the terrorist outrage at lod airport. further to our previous report on the subject,” 03.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 113 Kilowatt cable no. 0019, sent from Switzerland, “anschlag japanischer terroristen im flughafen tel—aviv (lod) vom 30. mai 1972,” 10.08.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 114 Kilowatt cable no. 6022, sent from Israel, “terrorist outrage at lod airport,” 06.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 115 Ibid. 116 Kilowatt cable no. 0015, sent from Switzerland, “m. o. [name anonymised. Japanese sounding name] ne le 20 octobre 1950 au japon, etudiant, passeport no. 275 834, domicile a kyoto-city,” 09.06.1972, in: BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt, 1971–77. 117 Kilowatt cable no. 6022, sent from Israel, “terrorist outrage at lod airport,” 06.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

216

Chapter 6

airport security.118 Hence, in this cable Italy tried to distance itself from any responsibility and subtly passed the blame onto the French airline company. No cables were sent by the French security services about this terrorist attack. The third, and comparatively minor, terrorist act was a sabotage attack against four oil tanks in Trieste on 4 August 1972.119 The BSO claimed responsibility for the attack via a communiqué from the Wafa [Palestine News Agency] in Beirut.120 The BSO statement also claimed responsibility for sabotaging an Israeli cargo boat, which caught fire in the Ionian Sea near the Yugoslav coast.121 Investigations, however, led to a dead end, and only one possible suspect was identified by the German police. This terrorist suspect, who was already known to the German security services, was put under closer surveillance because “according to his wife” he was in Trieste on said date.122 However, despite intensive investigations no clear perpetrator could be identified.123 On 6 September 1972, the Olympic Massacre was perpetrated by the BSO. Given the widespread awareness of the details of the attack, the security services did not issue a report about its execution and implications, but focused on information about the preparation of the attack. With the help of a “vulnerable source,” the Dutch security service disclosed that the Munich Massacre was prepared by Arab circles in Paris and Lyon.124 Germany added through a “friendly service with contact to terrorist circles and high terrorist leaders in Beirut” that the BSO commanders had in fact been Fatah members temporarily deployed by the BSO for the attack and that they were indeed trying to escape from Europe.125 Later, Germany reported that the Iraqi embassy in Paris 118 Kilowatt cable no. 7004, sent from Italy, “aeroport de tel aviv—30.05.1972—massacre effectue par trois ressortissants japonais,” 07.06.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971– 1972. 119 Kilowatt cable no. 7006, sent from Italy, “attacks against pipeline trieste-vienna. 4 august 1972,” 04.08.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 120 Kilowatt cable no. 7007, sent from Italy, “attacks against pipeline trieste-vienna-ingolstadt 4 august 1972,” 07.08.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 121 Kilowatt cable no. 7009, sent from Italy, “attacks against pipeline trieste-ingolstadt-vienna. 4.8.1972,” 09.08.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 122 Kilowatt cable no. 1012, sent from Germany, “irakischen staatsangehörigen n. a. a. a. b. [name anonymised], geb. 7.3.1938 in bagdad, wohnhaft: iserlohn, in der langen heeke 27,” 24.08.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 123 Kilowatt cable no. 7012, sent from Italy, “fiumicino airport—attempt to el-al aircraft, 168-1972,” 21.08.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 124 Kilowatt cable no. 9022, sent from the Netherlands, “attack in muenchen, 5-9-72,” 06.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 125 Kilowatt cable no. 1024, sent from Germany, “ermittlungsverfahren zur aufklaerung des attentats von muenchen,” 13.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

217

provided help to one of the Munich perpetrators so that he could escape prosecution by flying from Paris to Baghdad on 9 September 1972.126 Furthermore, through consultation with the hotel in Munich where the terrorists had stayed for two weeks until the night of the assault, all telephone numbers that were dialled and received were tracked.127 These phone lines and some of their personal notes led to Tripoli, Tunis, and Beirut.128 Based on these traces of their network, a list of suspects involved in the Munich attack was established. It was advised that these individuals be denied entry into any of the Kilowatt member countries.129 The last major terrorist event happened on 29 October 1972, when a Lufthansa plane was hijacked en route from Beirut to Ankara. The air pirates first brought the plane to Nicosia (Cyprus) and then to Zagreb (Yugoslavia). The terrorists had dynamite on board and threatened to blow up the plane and its passengers if the three surviving perpetrators of the Munich Olympic Massacre were not released from prison in Germany.130 Within hours after the hijacking, the German government agreed to free the three BSO prisoners in exchange for the hostages. The prisoners were brought to Zagreb and handed over to the hijackers, who flew further to Tripoli (Libya), where the hostages were released. As with the cables after the previous attacks, Germany and the other states shared information about the preparation of the attack. For instance, a “friendly service” told Germany that the kidnappers got their visas from the Turkish consulate in Beirut, that the details of the hijacking plan were elaborated by a BSO leader, and that the weapons were brought on board by an airport staff member at Beirut Airport.131 Apparently, this BSO recruit placed the explosives directly on the plane.132 126 Kilowatt cable no. 1031, sent from Germany, “anschlag auf olympisches dorf in muenchen,” 26.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 127 Kilowatt cable no. 1020, sent from Germany, “terroranschlag auf olympisches dorf in muenchen,” 11.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 128 Kilowatt cable no. 1022, sent from Germany, “anschlag im olympischen dorf,” 13.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; and Kilowatt cable no. 1028, sent from Germany, “terroranschlag im olympischen dorf am 5.9.1972,” 18.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 129 Kilowatt cable no. 7006, sent from Italy, “arabes suspects en rapport au massacre de munich (baviere),” 02.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 130 Kilowatt cable no. 1044, sent from Germany, “entfuehrung eines dlh-flugzeuges am 29.10.1972,” 30.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 131 Kilowatt cable no. 1055, sent from Germany, “entfuehrung einer dlh maschine am 29.10.1972,” 16.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 132 Ibid.

218

Chapter 6

Yet, the most important cable was sent a week later. Germany recounted the events based on an inside BSO informant and laid particular emphasis on the instructions that the BSO leadership had given to the hijackers.133 According to this source, there were two main orders. First, the terrorists were to refuse any exchange of hostages; namely, they were to decline any offer of switching hostages. As a result, any person who entered the plane to negotiate or to offer himself or herself as a replacement would also have been taken hostage. Second, if the German government had not conceded to the terrorists’ demands, the hijackers had strict orders to blow up the plane. The BSO informant confirmed to the German security services that he personally knew the hijackers and that based on his impression, they would have executed this order had the German government not agreed to the release of the prisoners. The cable ended with the information from the insider that the BSO was planning to abduct an Israeli ambassador. The German government did not, however, know where the terrorists would perpetrate this attack against a diplomat. From this cable, one can see that, similarly to Italy’s cable about the Sabena hijacking, Germany was not just updating the others on the latest intelligence about this attack, but rather providing justification for why the German government had agreed to concede to the terrorists’ demands. The German government’s decision had been very controversial and was heavily criticised in Israel.134 In this vein, the German government was presenting the information as “intelligence” about the hijackers, but it clearly used this Kilowatt channel to explain its reasons for the release. It essentially pointed out that due to the risks involved, Germany had no other choice than to free the Palestinian prisoners. Furthermore, it might not have been a coincidence that the cable ended with the warning about another threat. This addition hinted to the Kilowatt partners that Germany was a valuable member, one with access to terrorist circles and one willing to share this information to save the other countries from further attacks. The Kilowatt network was certainly too important to Germany for it to alienate the other members. It is likely that this cable was intended to calm its partners. 133 Kilowatt cable no. 1058, sent from Germany, “entfuehrung einer maschine der lufthansa nach tripolis,” 08.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 134 Amnon Rubinstein, “Bonn’s disgrace,” in: Haarez, 30 October 1972, quoted through Yael Greenfeter, “Israel in shock as Munich killers freed,” Haaretz, 04.11.2010, accessible online: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/israel-in-shock-as-munich-killers -freed-1.322811.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

219

From these five attacks it becomes apparent that terrorists could exploit security weaknesses and override protection mechanisms if they acted unexpectedly. For the Lod attack, weapons were transported undetected in the luggage despite a growing appreciation and widespread awareness about hijackings and aircraft sabotage. Another exploited security loophole during the Lod attack was related to terrorist profiling. As described above, security agencies were looking out for Arab or Middle Eastern terrorists, and they were taken by complete surprise when Japanese terrorists appeared. As countermeasures, the governments could not do much else than to fill security gaps, increase airline staff awareness, locate the perpetrators, and identify their supporters in order to destroy their means of operation and their networks. With a view to assembling as many individually collected pieces of information as possible about the terrorist threat as a whole, cooperation was indispensable. The justifications in the follow-up cables are to be seen in this context of mutual dependencies. Namely, the security officers felt the need to justify their policies in order to ensure that counterterrorism cooperation was not impeded by political differences about crisis management or due to security mistakes that happened at the airport. Threat Assessments and Concrete Warnings With regard to the various threat warnings, the countries most frequently warned one another about hijackings (over 30 cables) and sabotage acts (8 warning cables). Besides threats to air travel, the security services identified the hostage taking of Israeli diplomatic staff and sabotage against Jewish institutions in Europe as being of high risk.135 But not only were Israeli diplomats the object of possible terrorist assaults, Israel received further intelligence that the children of staff members working at Israeli embassies were also in danger.136 According to a source with access to terrorist circles, the terrorists had already begun collecting operational information on the children’s movements, their schools, and their routines.137 Other expected targets were sabotage attacks on 135 Kilowatt cable no. 6050, sent from Israel, “black september plans to carry out attacks. from a source whose reliability in those matters is untested,” 15.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 136 Kilowatt cable no. 6058, sent from Israel, “terrorists—plans to kidnap children of israeli diplomats. source reliable with access to terrorist circles,” 12.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 137 Ibid.

220

Chapter 6

ships that carried arms to Israel, or more generally against air and sea transportation to and from Israel.138 Bomb threats against Israeli embassies in Europe or the United States as well as NATO installations were believed to be high.139 Letter bombs were also expected to increase in the coming months and years.140 The content of the warnings about planned attacks were either extremely vague or contained very concrete warnings with dates, perpetrators’ names, locations, and targets. A general cable, for instance, about air transport sabotage read as follows: “a booby-trapped gift package is to be sent through an innocuous European tourist (a woman) to a fictitious address.”141 Another cable from 30 October 1972 consisted of these three pieces of information: 1. Black September is planning a spectacular operation involving explosives and murder. The operation is to take place in Europe, apparently in London or Paris. 2. The operation is to be carried out either in November or December, more likely in November. 3. The perpetrators will be equipped with false Iraqi passports.142 Yet another cable from Germany “disclosed” that the BSO had just decided to hijack an El Al or a Lufthansa plane from Frankfurt or Cologne within the next few weeks.143 One probably did not need to be a security agent to know that the BSO was at least trying to attack El Al or Lufthansa, but to be on the safe side Germany preferred to issue a warning about this. Formulations that predicted “spectacular attacks” or a “spectacular sabotage operation” were used very frequently, without going into details regarding the attack itself.144 138 Kilowatt cable no. 6061, sent from Israel, “pflp/policy on attacks abroad,” 09.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 139 Kilowatt cable no. 6054, sent from Israel, “depature (sic) for europe of terrorists to carry out acts of sabotage,” 04.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 140 Kilowatt cable no. 6510, sent from Israel, “forecast of possible arab terrorist activities,” 18.12.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 141 Kilowatt cable no. 6013, sent from Israel, “sabotage of el al aircraft,” 19.01.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 142 Kilowatt cable no. 6064, sent from Israel, “black september plans operations in europe,” 30.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 143 Kilowatt cable no. 1034, sent from Germany, “beabsichtigte flugzeugentfuehrung durch die organisation ‘schwarzer september’,” 29.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 144 For a cable using this kind of hyperbolic language, see for instance, Kilowatt cable no. 6044, sent from Israel, “aircraft hijacking plan,” 07.08.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972; Or a cable for a warning about Palestinian plans to hijack five airplanes

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

221

Conversely, warnings could be remarkably detailed, alerting others about a specific plot and explaining how, by whom, when, and where an attack was going to be executed. An example of a precise warning was the lengthy description of a planned Fatah “three-man suicide squad” at Copenhagen Airport supposedly scheduled for 10 July 1972.145 The Israeli security service gave the names, nationalities, passports, physical appearance, and ages of the three designated perpetrators. The three suicide assassins were scheduled to meet in Rome on 8 July 1972 in order to receive weapons, money, and documentation from Fatah’s local representative, who was believed to have been working at the Libyan embassy in Rome. The weapons were to be brought to Rome from London with the help of an Air France pilot who collaborated with Fatah in exchange for money and hashish. They planned to open fire in the plane in the direction of the flight deck and the rear of the plane. However, in accordance with the habitual Fatah working methods of giving its operatives instructions at the very last minute, the Israeli security service was cautious and noted that in Rome plans could change. They specified that the terrorists might not continue to Copenhagen and requested that Israel be informed should one of these names appear in a Kilowatt country. Because there was no follow-up cable, one cannot know whether this attack did not happen because the agencies were able to prevent it, because the terrorists simply changed their plans, or because the information was wrong. However, in 1972 there are two noteworthy warning cables about an attack that did indeed take place shortly after the alert. Namely, the German government sent two alerts about the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane in order to free the terrorists of the Munich Olympic Attack. The first cable was sent by Germany on 15 September 1972, six weeks prior to the actual event. It reported BSO plans to free the incarcerated Palestinians through the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane aimed at bringing them to an Arab country.146 The second cable, sent on 10 October 1972, detailed that the attack was planned for the morning of 30 October 1972 (the actual date of the attack was, in fact, 29 October) and that the jailed terrorists were to be brought to Libya. The cable even listed the names of the perpetrators assigned to the job

simultaneously, Kilowatt cable no. 1002, sent from Germany, “weitere geplante anschlaege auf den zivilen luftverkehr,” 19.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 145 Kilowatt cable no. 6033, sent from Israel, “planned attack on el al plane at copenhagen,” 07.07.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 146 Kilowatt cable no. 1026, sent from Germany, “gefaehrdung des zivilen luftverkehrs,” 15.09.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

222

Chapter 6

by the BSO.147 The actual attack was perpetrated by different people, but the terrorists were indeed brought to Libya. The German government had received these indications from a BSO member after having paid him $5,000. He explained that the reason for the betrayal of his group was that he could only identify with the BSO’s actions as long as they only concerned Israeli targets. Now that other states were also being targeted, he considered defecting. He asked for $50,000 in order to begin a new life for him and his friend in exchange for further information. However, the details of the Lufthansa hijacking were only vaguely outlined and the German government was thus not sure whether they should follow up on this informant.148 One could speculate that had the German government continued to work with him, the hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 615 on 29 October 1972 might have been prevented. This hypothesis is of a particularly explosive nature because Germany was heavily castigated for its conduct, and some critical voices even claimed that the German government had staged or tolerated the attack.149 It was believed that Germany was eager to free the three jailed Munich attackers in order to avoid a trial against them. On the one hand, prosecuting the terrorists risked alienating Arab states and endangering German trade interests in the Arab world. On the other hand, a trial would have re-evaluated the events during the Munich attacks and the German government could not be certain that the Israeli hostages were really killed by the terrorists and not—in the tumult of the moment—accidentally shot by German policemen.150 Furthermore, the German government hoped that with the terrorists liberated, it could avoid being a terrorist target.151 With these considerations in mind, one can assume that the German government had an interest in having the Munich attackers set free.

147 Kilowatt cable no. 1039, sent from Germany, “geheim / amtlich geheimhalten / information ueber planung terroristischer aktionen durch palaestinenser,” 09.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 148 Ibid. 149 Dahlke, Demokratischer Staat und transnationaler Terrorismus, pp. 70–74 and Jason Burke, “Bonn ‘faked’ hijack to free killers,” The Observer, 26.03.2000, accessible online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/26/jasonburke.theobserver1 150 Majid Satta, “Deutsche Geschichte(n) Folgen eines Anschlags: Mit einer Flugzeugentführung preßten palästinensische Terroristen im Oktober 1972 die drei überlebenden Olympia-Attentäter frei. Die Bundesrepublik hatte nun einige Sorgen weniger,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.11.2006, accessible online: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ die-gegenwart-1/deutsche-geschichte-n-folgen-eines-anschlags-1381601.html 151 Ibid.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

223

When the two cables are placed in the broader context of the Kilowatt exchanges, however, the hypothesis that the German government voluntarily allowed the Lufthansa attack to happen has to be revised. As mentioned before, there was constantly a very high number of warnings about terrorist attacks sent from agency to agency. Sometimes the agencies received valuable and useful information, which indeed could have contributed to the prevention of attacks. Sometimes the agency paid for information that turned out to be worthless or incorrect. In this vein, it is likely that the German government suffered from an “information overload” rather than deliberately let the attack occur. Furthermore, if the German government had planned to knowingly let the attack happen, why would it warn its Kilowatt partners about it? The fact that the German government had an interest in getting rid of the terrorists and that it did not follow up on one of many clues does not prove that it voluntarily refrained from intervening. Hence, Germany was probably not taken by complete surprise, but it is not safe to conclude that Germany bore responsibility for the attack.152 Furthermore, except for following up on this intelligence source, there was little that Germany could have done to prevent this attack. Even the implementation of airport security provisions in Germany could not have averted the hijacking as the terrorists embarked in Beirut (Lebanon), where Germany had less control over security measures. Yet, before drawing a general conclusion about the total ineffectiveness of the security agencies in preventing attacks, one has to consider that few attacks could have indeed been thwarted. In the Kilowatt cables, there were two known cases where the terrorists were stopped at airport security checks. In the Netherlands, on 23 October 1972, a man was arrested at Schiphol Airport (Amsterdam) by the Dutch police. The man, who had an Algerian diplomatic passport and was living in Rio de Janeiro, was found carrying hand grenades, blocks with high explosives, detonators, letter bombs, a list of addresses for Jewish institutions, pistols and ammunition, and a list of worldwide Fatah and PLO members in his luggage.153 Among his belongings there was also a diary with a “to do” list of items to be prepared before an attack.154

152 It would be interesting for further research to examine this particular attack and the role of the German government. 153 Kilowatt cable no. 9026, sent from the Netherlands, “r. h. [name anonymised], born 2.7.39 in mazara (west bank, ramallah district),” 24.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 154 Kilowatt cable no. 9028, sent from the Netherlands, “r. h. [name anonymised],” 26.10.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

224

Chapter 6

From this list and the police interrogation, the Dutch police inferred that the man was planning to free two Palestinians from jail in Paraguay.155 After the interrogations, all Kilowatt members and the destination countries of the Brazilian Airline Varig were alerted in order to inform them that the airline was a high-risk target for Arab terrorists.156 Similarly, in May 1972, the Italian police arrested a woman with two pistols under her clothes who was planning a terrorist attack.157 Furthermore, a few letter bombs were intercepted and an arms arsenal was found in Pelouse (France) by the French police in February 1972. From the few successfully prevented attacks one can see that in 1972 the way imminent attacks were stopped was through ad hoc measures such as luggage controls at airports. This was the most straightforward prevention mechanism: find out the names of potential terrorists and search them thoroughly at the airport. Furthermore, it is possible that since the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing had only started in late 1971, it did not yet have a full understanding of the terrorists’ network. Instead of destroying their organisation, for the time being they were reliant on airport controls. Summary of One Year of Kilowatt Cooperation Looking at the Kilowatt cooperation framework altogether, it is safe to conclude that a considerable amount of sensitive information, which previously was only given to a handful of people within an administration, was now given to counterparts in other countries. How can this development in such a short amount of time be explained? Two aspects can be identified in this respect. First, the agencies’ willingness to engage in this cooperation came from the realisation that one country alone could not counter terrorism. The terrorists acted transnationally and were able to use loopholes in state controls by planning and perpetrating attacks across state borders. One country simply did not have the necessary means and jurisdiction to trace the terrorists, detect their plans, and prevent them. This created a mutual dependency and a clear need for counterterrorism cooperation. 155 Kilowatt cable no. 9030, sent from the Netherlands, “r. h. [name anonymised],” 03.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 156 Kilowatt cable no. 5016, sent from the United Kingdom, “arab terrorist threat to brazilian air lines,” 01.11.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972. 157 Kilowatt cable no. 7003, sent from Italy, “arrestation de la ressortissante etrangere e. a. k. j. [name anonymised]—née a kob ellas en 1951, pour possession d’armes,” 30.05.1972, in: BAR, Incoming Kilowatt, 1971–1972.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

225

Second, aware that cooperation was imperative, the agencies were confident that the information was handled with the necessary care and secrecy. If a receiving agency had exposed a source or leaked information to third parties, this would certainly have meant the end of this counterterrorism cooperation. From this we can infer that the agencies speculated that the common interest in cooperating was more important to each than the risk of the potential exposure of their secret intelligence. In other words, the agencies preferred to take a potential risk of a breach of trust because trusting was in everyone’s interest. Despite the intense and large-scale counterterrorist exchanges in the framework of Kilowatt, one can see that the terrorists were generally one step ahead of the security services. The state authorities knew the names of many terrorist suspects, the groups’ operating methods, weapons, and support network, and yet terrorists moved too unpredictably or undetectably. They managed to infiltrate ground airport staff, send explosive letters in thinner and more indistinguishable envelopes, recruit a growing number of violent activists (even from Japan), and gain new weapons with improved technology. In return, general awareness rose among travel agencies and the general public. While terrorists mobilised new members, security agencies recruited new informants, infiltrated terrorist networks, and increased their understanding of the terrorists’ operating methods in order to anticipate the attacks—even if, however, they often remained unable to prevent them. Massive lists of the names of terrorist suspects were collected, out of fear that they might strike anywhere at any time. With the perceived ubiquity of the terrorist danger, the general approach of a given security agency was that any person accused by another agency of planning an attack was considered to be a terrorist suspect. Accordingly, the way the security services handled suspects can be described with a derivation from the Latin legal principle: “innocent until proven guilty,” the suspects were instead “guilty until proven innocent.” In this sense, the information given from one agency to the others was generally accepted at face value. In the case of Switzerland, this adoption of information from a partner service seems to be a general trait in the way Swiss police officials treated given information. This can be explained by several factors. First, there was often no possibility for them to verify the information provided. In this framework of mutual dependency, the agencies had to rely on one another. Second, showing mistrust between one agency and another would have created a negative atmosphere, which would have been detrimental to effective cooperation. Third, the adoption of information also corresponds to the general practice at the time. Security agencies have a tendency to gather as many pieces of information as possible and to decide later whether the information was useful

226

Chapter 6

or relevant or whether it could be placed in connection with other leads.158 In essence, information was worth its weight in gold and was generally not challenged. Reflecting more broadly on the role of the Club de Berne, one can see that its function also served deeper political purposes. One can argue that precisely because one country alone did not have the necessary means to counter the threat, it not only had to work together with others but, in doing so, each country extended its powers. Receiving vast amounts of information about the movement of (suspect) people, and their friends, network, and actions in and around Europe increased the amount of control over the countries’ borders and territory. With a clear terrorist profile, the countries could also establish more specific and precise control mechanisms at airports and border posts. Overall, one can say that the agencies gave up parts of their autonomy only to regain even greater amounts of information, power, and control. Furthermore, one can detect another function of the Club de Berne, which can be described as a tightening of multilateral security relations. With the almost daily exchange of cables and the supply of sensitive information, it seems as if each partner wanted to prove its value within this secret forum. By showing their capacities to find relevant information about terrorist networks, the members thus might have tried to make themselves appear indispensable to the group. It is conceivable that this intensive intelligence exchange strengthened ties among the security agencies. In addition, the secret multilateral fight against Palestinian terrorism is especially interesting when considering the global context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the 1948 war, Israel and the Arab states were in a state of war and the Arab countries provided tacit (and not so tacit) support for the Palestinians. In the framework of the Club de Berne, the European countries worked closely together with Israel in particular to help it combat this terrorist threat. Obviously, these countries had an interest in avoiding terrorism on their own soil and in protecting their citizens who were sometimes targeted for being 158 This practice of security services to collect as much information as possible was noticed in two parliamentary investigative reports in Switzerland published in 1989 and 1991, Moritz Leuenberger, (president of the Commission) and Josi Meier (vice-­president), ­Vorkommnisse im EJPD. Bericht der Parlamentarischen ­Untersuchungskommission (PUK), 24 Bundesblatt, 142. Jahrgang, Bd. 1, 22.11.1989, p. 827 and in another report that ­examined the operational methods of the Zurich cantonal police, specifically the practice of the so-called “political police,” Zurich (city). Staatsschutz der Stadt Zurich: Bericht der Untersuchungskommission an den Gemeinderat von Zurich, Zurich: Untersuchungskommission Politische Polizei des Gemeinderates von Zurich, 1991, p. 154.

A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance

227

Jewish (without necessarily having Israeli nationality). Yet, one can also see this cooperation as tacit support for Israel’s indirect warfare with the Palestinians, who were backed by the Arab states and the Soviet Union. In this sense one can see the Club de Berne as a platform for countries to secretly cooperate and support Israel, while keeping relations with the Soviet Union, the Arab states, or Third World countries intact, as it was unlikely that any of them would ever know about it. In sum, the reasons for cooperation were born out of necessity but soon developed into an extension of state power. Cooperation in the Club de Berne also provided a platform to support Israel in undercover Cold War indirect warfare. Because of the Club’s secrecy, this could be done without negatively affecting relations with Arab states or their Soviet backers. Overall, the Club de Berne intensified Europe’s struggle against terrorism and formed a secret Western Cold War link, which was meant to be kept secret from Arab states and from the Soviets, and also meant to go behind the backs of the citizens in Europe who were being watched as well.

Conclusions of Part 3: A Glimpse into the Club de Berne in the 1980s At the end of 1972, the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing network was only in its initial phase, and one can infer from the available source material that the member states found this cooperation important and useful. Even if c­ ertain differences about the handling of terrorist attacks may have emerged, the overall atmosphere of trust and sincere sharing of information was not affected by this. In 1972, terrorists were far from ending their activities, and the security services continued to be on alert for years to come. From the internal Swiss policy briefings we know that the Club de Berne and the Kilowatt warning system continued well into the 1980s. For instance, a memorandum written in 1989 explains the Club de Berne and the Kilowatt framework, which means it most likely existed until the end of the Cold War.1 Furthermore, this policy note reveals that a second cable alert system was installed for different kinds of terrorism. This second network was installed in 1974 to protect, as the anonymous author of the note put it, against “any non-Arab terrorism.”2 From the few sources about the Club de Berne in the 1980s to which I had access, we know that the forum’s regular meetings continued as well. For instance, in 1984, the French intelligence service invited its Club de Berne counterparts to a course in Bordeaux on Islamic religious fundamentalism and its dangers after the Iranian revolution.3 Since late 1975 talks had been undertaken on the European level with a view to intensifying counterterrorism cooperation.4 This new framework was called TREVI; the acronym stands for “International Terrorism, Radicalism,

1 Note from the Federal Police [author not mentioned], “Der Berner Klub,” [place not mentioned], 24.05.1989, in: CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978–1989. 2 Ibid. 3 Cable sent from French Intelligence Services [Renseignements Généraux (RG)], “secret / routine / preparation du 11eme cours europeen du ‘club de berne’ a bordeaux, du 5 au 15 septembre 1984,” 30.03.1984, in: CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / (5)39/5, 1978–1989. 4 Internal note [author not mentioned], “Kurzorientierung über die Organisation ‘Trevi’,” 06.04.1978, in: E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ausland, 1972–1982.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_014

Conclusions of Part 3

229

Extremism and Violence,” and the founding meeting of the TREVI group took place in Rome near the Trevi Fountain in December 1975. TREVI was part of the European Integration process and later developed into the so-called Third Pillar of the European Community on Justice and Home Affairs, which in 1992 became its own component with the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union. The sources about the TREVI developments reveal one important aspect about Switzerland: the Swiss government had already been so engaged in counterterrorism exchange mechanisms that naturally Switzerland was also involved in the TREVI network.5 This was not self-evident, since it was not a member of the European Community. In terms of strategically positioning Switzerland in the international struggle against terrorism, the Swiss secret counterterrorism policy seems to have attained its goals. By the late 1970s, Switzerland was perceived by its neighbours as an important security partner, one that automatically should be part of the new European security framework. 5 Ibid.

Conclusions Looking at Swiss counterterrorism policy in the 1970s, in this monograph I have presented four main arguments. First, the Swiss government’s counterterrorism policymaking developed from the initial amateurish crisis responses of 1969 and 1970 to an active and more competent engagement over the course of the 1970s. Second, with regard to neutrality policy, the Swiss government upheld a “neutral” façade in multilateral counterterrorism fora, while violating considerations of neutrality in the course of its involvement in the Club de Berne framework. In this sense, the Swiss government had the benefits of neutrality on the official level and the benefits of an intense counterterrorism security cooperation on the secret level. Third, in Europe and among the ­Western Cold War powers, counterterrorism cooperation mechanisms were already in place as of 1971. The security exchanges were frequent, effective, and trustful. At the time, from the perspective of the police, it was the most adequate response to the mounting international terrorist threat. Fourth, Swiss counterterrorism efforts have a mixed record, particularly with regard to democratic principles. On the diplomatic level, the Swiss government had a balanced and coherent approach. However, during its crisis management it was compliant and submissive to terrorist pressure, disregarded the rule of law by freeing prisoners who were charged with murder, and stifled the country’s press freedoms by censoring voices which were critical of the Brazilian government. On the secret policing level, the security service acted without parliamentary oversight, monitoring supposed terrorist suspects without authorisation and readily giving their information to partner agencies. Crisis Management Shaping Swiss Counterterrorism Policy Analysing the four initial terrorist attacks that hit Switzerland between 1969 and 1970, one can see that each brought another realisation about the means and possibilities of the Swiss government to counter the threat. The reactions to the first attacks and their crisis management thus shaped subsequent counterterrorism policy on the diplomatic, operational, and intelligence levels. The first attack at Kloten Airport in February 1969 revealed a central difficulty for the Swiss government about how to handle international terrorism. It became clear that no country could be held accountable for international terrorist acts. Faced with Palestinian violence on its soil, which meant an antagonistic confrontation in the framework of an unresolved Middle Eastern

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356696_015

Conclusions

231

conflict, the Swiss government was at first insecure over how to react. Who could be held responsible for the attack of the PFLP, and what did it mean for Switzerland’s neutrality given the fact that its territory had been used for a belligerent act of aggression? The Swiss government came to the conclusion that providing indirect support for terrorism meant a certain degree of co-­ responsibility. Hence, it addressed the issue with the Arab states with which a direct connection to the Kloten attack could be established. These states were Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, who all replied harshly, denying any responsibility, and threatening a deterioration of bilateral relations. Besides the resulting understanding that terrorism had to be dealt with as a matter by itself, these responses from the Arab states were the first element that contributed to the Swiss government’s realisation that counterterrorism protection was likely to be more effective through cooperation with countries affected by terrorism than through an attempt at persuading terrorist-­ supporting countries to change their policies. This eventually pushed Swiss policymakers closer to Israel and later made them more willing to cooperate with Western Cold War powers. Having reached a deadlock in its diplomatic efforts to address the issue of terrorism with the Arab states, the Swiss government needed to rely on its own means in order to protect itself from further attacks. Yet, this was a nearly impossible task, as the sabotage of a Swissair airplane on 21 February 1970 over Würenlingen showed. The PFLP sent a parcel bomb from Munich to Tel Aviv, which later was reloaded onto a Swissair flight from Zurich to Tel Aviv and exploded in the air. All 47 passengers and staff members were killed by this act of terrorism. After this terrorist event, the Swiss government, along with Austria, introduced an initiative at the ICAO for an international regulation for the suppression of air sabotage. This later became the Montreal Convention, which opened for signature in 1971. Würenlingen thus triggered a strong Swiss interest in tough international regulations to suppress air piracy and led to the country’s later active involvement in the ICAO’s counterterrorism law-making efforts. Without adequate international means to contain the threat, the Würenlingen incident thus showed to the Swiss authorities that because terrorism was an unpredictable, ubiquitous, and constant danger, there was as yet no effective means of protection. The Swiss government thus gave up hopes of preventing an attack in the upcoming months and undertook the necessary preparations in order to react swiftly in case of another terrorist strike. On 2 July 1970, the PFLP attacked an El Al plane in Athens, and this event served as a reference point for the Swiss government. Expecting the terrorists to attack soon, the

232

Conclusions

Swiss authorities took all necessary precautions. Yet, the Swiss administration had only limited resources at its disposal. In particular, it could not ensure the availability of enough police personnel for baggage control. Also, contrary to El Al’s practice, the Swiss authorities saw no need for an armed security guard inside of the plane. Since the Swiss government expected an attack similar to Athens where the PFLP stormed the runway to get onto the El Al airplane, the Swiss government was reluctant to invest in such measures. In retrospect, this could possibly have been the best means to prevent a hijacking. Accordingly, on 6 September 1970, the PFLP managed to capture Swissair flight 100 from Zurich to New York, without much difficulty. During what later became known as Skyjack Sunday, a total of five planes were attacked, four of them successfully hijacked, and three of them were brought to Jordan. With this action, the PFLP forced five governments into negotiations: Switzerland, the UK, Germany, the United States, and Israel. Skyjack Sunday provided a major counterterrorism insight for the Swiss government, which was essential for its future take on terrorism. It began to understand that cooperation with other concerned countries in matters of counterterrorism was possible and preferable, even when different approaches to terrorism had to be overcome. After initial hesitations, the Swiss government not only agreed to align its policy, it further offered to take the lead in the coordination process and to host the consultation meetings. Three main reasons can explain the Swiss motivations for cooperating in this framework. First, by concerting their efforts, the five governments increased their bargaining power and could thus hold a stronger position vis-à-vis the PFLP. Second, through their cooperation the five countries formed a “common front” against the Palestinians, and the Swiss government was thus less exposed during the direct negotiations with the PFLP. Third, after the deadlock was reached with the Arab states on the diplomatic level, the Swiss government understood that viable counterterrorism cooperation could only come from countries also affected by terrorism, and therefore it was wise to seek a rapprochement with them. It is probably no coincidence that the Kilowatt intelligence cooperation was initiated a few months after Skyjack Sunday, which then included Israel and the United States in a direct counterterrorism intelligence exchange mechanism. With these ultimate motives, during the protracted negotiations with the PFLP, which lasted over several weeks, the Swiss diplomats attempted to maintain the unity of the affected countries. This task was not always easy, as the situation in Jordan became increasingly tense and Germany and the United Kingdom threatened to abandon the coalition. Finally, the crisis came to an abrupt and successful end when most of the hostages were freed by the

Conclusions

233

Jordanian army, which had attacked the Palestinians in order to evict them from their territory. After this, only six US-Israeli dual citizens remained in the hands of the terrorists. Thus arose the question for the three European governments of whether or not to free the Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the US-Israeli hostages, even though their own citizens had already been freed. Interestingly, after due deliberations and consultations with the European governments, the Federal Council chose to free the Palestinian terrorists held in Zurich. The internal meeting minutes explicitly stated that this decision was connected to the hope of being spared from terrorist attacks in the future. The reasoning was that with the Palestinian prisoners gone, there was no need for fellow PFLP group members to attack again in order to free them. This decision to free the Palestinians, despite the Swiss citizens already having reached safety, shows another trait of the government’s crisis management, which was also apparent in the next crisis: Swiss decision-makers capitulated to the terrorist demands with the hope that they could thus stay out of the underlying conflict that had driven the terrorists to violent action. This aim of keeping their distance from terrorism during a confrontation can be compared to the Swiss government’s later foreign policy of engaging in international counterterrorism efforts while meticulously avoiding any positioning in the polemic surrounding the debates about terrorism or its legitimacy. Similarly, during the fourth terrorist crisis, the abduction of Ambassador Giovanny Enrico Bucher in Rio di Janeiro on 7 December 1970, the Swiss government also attempted to dissociate itself from Brazil’s internal struggle. This was possible, to a certain degree, because the terrorists’ demands were solely directed at the Brazilian government. This meant that the conditions for Bucher’s release depended entirely on the Brazilian regime. The Swiss policymakers thus chose an acquiescent and accommodating policy towards the Brazilian government, which corresponded to a meticulous respect for what they called the Brazilian government’s “sensitivity.” The Swiss policy of accepting and submitting to Brazilian appeals demonstrates the anxiety and the perceived helplessness of the Swiss government during this terrorist crisis. It showed Swiss decision-makers that a terrorist attack could reduce them to foreign policy inertia, dependency upon another country’s goodwill, and compulsion to enforce tough and unpleasant ­anti-democratic measures at home. These circumstances thus gave a strong incentive to the Swiss government to undertake any measure, diplomatic as well as operational, in order to be spared any such ordeals in the future. The extent to which the Swiss government became a pawn in the hands of the Brazilian authorities is best shown through the Swiss decision-makers’

234

Conclusions

media management regarding the Brazilian government’s portrayal. One of the strongest Brazilian demands concerned gradually stricter media censorship, which the head crisis manager, Ambassador Max Feller, readily organised. He maintained close contact with major Swiss publishing houses, imposed the cancellation of potentially critical shows about Brazil, and hindered a leftist journalist from travelling to Brazil. Since it was difficult to influence what journalists were going to write, after a while he decided to have no news published whatsoever about Bucher’s case. Not even the Swiss embassy in Rio was allowed to provide information. Thus, a complete communication barrier about the kidnapping was installed. Feller did not only comply with every single request from the Brazilian policymakers, he even anticipated what they might want the Swiss government to do. This policy is most surprising from today’s perspective because the Swiss government was not at all in a position of weakness vis-à-vis its Brazilian counterparts. Switzerland was an important trade partner and the fourth biggest investor in Brazil. In its relative position of strength, the Swiss government had a number of options available to enhance pressure on Brazil, which it chose not to use. Feller thus gave the Brazilian authorities complete free range in their handling of the crisis. It only took a threat from the Brazilians that they might not be willing to liberate the prisoners and Feller knuckled under immediately. One can summarise Feller’s clear-cut policy line as follows: accept everything from the Brazilian state, refuse available means of pressure, and apply a tough line about freedom of speech at home. What this crisis had shown to Swiss policymakers quite plainly was the country’s continuous vulnerability to terrorism. The threat was ubiquitous, but it was particularly serious in zones of political unrest and unstable state structures. As a direct consequence of the kidnapping, Swiss embassies in high-risk areas increased their safety regulations. For instance, diplomats’ driving routes to work were altered on a regular basis. Furthermore, in order to prepare for the next crisis, a permanent crisis task force was created. In terms of comparing the management of the two major terrorist crises, the most important difference between Skyjack Sunday and the abduction of ­Ambassador Bucher was the degree of the Swiss government’s direct involvement in the crisis. In the case of the Palestinian hijackings, the terrorists’ conditions were dependent on the Swiss government, while in Bucher’s case they were contingent on the Brazilian authorities. This made the Swiss policy entirely dependent on the Brazilian regime’s decisions. In the case of Skyjack Sunday, while Swiss actions also depended on those of other countries, the Swiss administration remained free to choose to agree to the separate deal with the PFLP at any time. Its alignment with the other concerned countries

Conclusions

235

was thus a voluntary policy choice with a view toward avoiding direct involvement in the conflict and toward a future security rapprochement with these states. In contrast, not having been addressed by the VPR’s demands strongly limited the Swiss government’s manoeuvring power in the negotiations. Another difference concerned the crises’ day-to-day management. In the Palestinian case, policymakers were more numerous and decisions were taken at much higher political echelons. We know, for example, through Ludwig von Moos that the Federal Council deliberated on the matter on a nearly daily basis. The number of staff members involved in the crisis management was also higher during Skyjack Sunday, which made the decision-makers more prone to mistakes, misunderstandings, and decisions based on misleading information. In contrast, when all operations were bundled under Feller’s authority, the risk of miscalculations or mistakes made due to internal transmission errors was considerably reduced. Apart from the differences, one striking commonality of the Swiss government’s policy was its nearly unquestioned readiness to accept all demands addressed to it. In both cases, during Ambassador Bucher’s kidnapping and during Skyjack Sunday, the Swiss authorities complied with every single request that was directed to them as long as it promised to save the lives of Swiss citizens or if it promised to spare Switzerland from future attacks. Faced with demands from the Brazilian government, measures included drastic infringements on the freedom of speech in Switzerland. Faced with Palestinian hijackings, the government cooperated during the Skyjack Sunday negotiations and liberated the incarcerated terrorists, even though the Swiss hostages had already been released. By and large, during its initial encounters with international terrorism, the Swiss government showed experimental, and at times chaotic, crisis management. In its attempt to “get rid” of the problem as soon as possible, it disregarded the rule of law by liberating criminally tried terrorist prisoners and infringed the freedom of speech in its excessive pro-Brazilian media management. After a few ad hoc measures in reaction to the crises, Swiss decision-makers came to the realisation that besides technical measures, more carefully thought-out and developed strategy and policy were needed. Bucher’s kidnapping showed the authorities that the plague of terrorism was not going to end anytime soon, and that on the diplomatic level, policymakers needed to try to erase Switzerland from the list of terrorist targets. The confrontation with Palestinian terrorism revealed to the Swiss authorities that counterterrorism cooperation was needed. It further demonstrated that such cooperation could only be effective if it was undertaken by countries also affected by terrorism. These perceptions shaped the Swiss counterterrorism

236

Conclusions

policy of the 1970s: the Swiss government tried to avoid being seen as a terrorist target and indicated its willingness to start cooperation with like-minded states. Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in the 1970s In the years following the attacks, three major diplomatic issues were at stake from the perspective of Swiss policymakers. First, the country risked being identified again as another target by terrorists. Second, having been affected by international terrorism, the Swiss government had a strong interest in the international community’s establishment of measures to contain terrorism. Third, after the terrorist attacks the Swiss government urgently needed to ensure counterterrorism cooperation not only on the level of international law, but also on an operational policing level. This could only be achieved with “like-minded” countries who also shared a real interest in preventing terrorism. Swiss diplomacy was thus geared toward two different kinds of “audiences.” On the one hand, it was aimed towards the countries also affected by international terrorism, to which the Swiss government signalled its eagerness to engage in counterterrorism efforts and communicated its desire to be involved in joint counterterrorism mechanisms. On the other hand, it refrained from vehemently condemning terrorism, so as not to expose the country too openly in the fight against terrorism and in order not to irritate Third World countries, whose perceptions of the nature of terrorism differed significantly from those of their Western counterparts. In avoiding opposing Third World discourse, the Swiss government thus hoped to not be selected as a target of terrorism again. In its overall counterterrorism law-making engagement, the Swiss government tried to avoid publicity while shaping events through the provision of expertise, carefully chosen positions, and what it perceived as useful international policy propositions. Swiss decision-makers led a policy that corresponded to Swiss neutrality because it secured Swiss interests while keeping the country away from the polemic, disputes, and conflicts that surrounded terrorism in the 1970s. The reasons for this carefully considered counterterrorism foreign policy were connected to the way policy was designed, in particular because it involved inter-departmental coordination and collaboration. The FPD brought together all relevant agencies and departments in order to determine various foreign policy options and in order to form a coherent official position on

Conclusions

237

terrorism. Thus, the WGT was created, which included representatives from various institutions. Based on the expertise of this decision-making organ, the Swiss government actively participated in all three international organisations that dealt with counterterrorism in the 1970s. In the 1970s, three main international organisations dealt with the issue of terrorism: the ICAO, the UN, and, later, the CoE. In each of these three fora, one policymaking aspect of the Swiss administration stands out the most. For the Swiss policy at the ICAO, it became clear that the members of the WGT interpreted issues relating to international terrorism from a purely legal perspective. This led to a hesitant policy in favour of the status quo. In the UN, the drafting of the Swiss statement for the UN discussions had to be approved by several policy divisions in different departments. The outcome was the adoption of a fastidiously balanced position and a strict avoidance of any engagement with the polemic linked to the term “terrorism.” In the CoE, the most remarkable aspect of Swiss decision-making was the dominant role of legal and police experts in this process. This resulted in the Swiss government’s long and steady support of various CoE committees contributing to the establishment of the first regional counterterrorism convention. Since terrorism primarily affected international civil aviation in the early 1970s, it is not surprising that the ICAO was among the first agencies to devote efforts to adopting international coercive measures to fight air piracy. In 1971, the ICAO already had a set of conventions outlawing international terrorism. Nevertheless, aviation terrorism persisted because terrorists received support from or were tolerated in certain countries. The states affected by terrorism, most prominently the United States, thus sought ways to enforce the existing conventions. Their proposition was to punish those states that did not adhere to the aviation security conventions, i.e. to sanction the terrorism-supporting countries. Corresponding to the educational background of the WGT, Swiss policymakers addressed matters of multilateral counterterrorism primarily from a legal perspective. Despite, in principle, agreeing to the installation of tough counterterrorism measures, the Swiss policymakers opposed the idea of sanctioning non-compliant countries for reasons pertaining to international law considerations. Thus, in order not to upset the United States, the Swiss delegation was instructed to suggest impracticable and unrealistic measures in line with the task of “finding an elegant way of doing nothing.” This policy was not only applied by Swiss representatives but also by other European states. With these stances as givens, the Rome Conference in September 1973, where these measures should have been adopted, turned into a complete disaster. This was one of the last attempts for such an effort; it would be several years before the

238

Conclusions

United States again pushed for such conventions that attempted to enhance the enforceability of counterterrorism conventions. At the UN, the setting was different and the debates at the time reflected the global power changes and shifts of centres of gravity. A new force emerged: the newly decolonised countries, who recently obtained their independence precisely through violent conflicts often using tactics akin to terrorism. These circumstances led the Third World to organise a total block of counterterrorism initiatives at the UN by stalling the debates on definitional questions of what could be considered as “terrorism.” Thus, two blocs formed, namely the United States and Western Europe versus the Third World and the Soviet Union. When Switzerland was asked to contribute to the discussions, it issued an extremely balanced and nuanced statement. The Swiss government straightforwardly positioned the country within the Cold War Western bloc by advocating the furthering of international measures, but it did so with great care so as not to upset the Third World countries. While the statement was diplomatically overly correct, it affirmed Switzerland’s interest in active participation in bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism frameworks. Hence, the main goal of Swiss positioning at the UN can be summarised as subtly enabling bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation beyond the framework of the UN, while trying not to have the Third World notice it. With the realisation of a near complete deadlock at the UN, collective efforts to address issues of terrorism continued on the regional level in the context of the CoE. This represented a setting where the Swiss government felt more at ease. First, the constellation of like-minded states meant that the debates were led in a less polemical way. Second, the engagement of an individual government was less visible because the CoE operated through a number of committees and councils by which the policies of one country were less conspicuous. Once again, in the framework of the CoE, the Swiss government could “hide” behind a common front, in this case European countries eradicating safe havens for terrorists. The Swiss contribution in this endeavour and for the successful conclusion of the ECST was steady and active. This process has shown the strong influence of experts over foreign policymaking. The FPD relied heavily in particular on legal and policing experts, who guided and shaped counterterrorism diplomacy. Swiss experts sat in a number of specialised CoE groups, which were drafting and negotiating the text of the convention. In a long and dreary process, members of the operational staff, diplomats, and legal as well as police advisers joined forces until the final draft was about to be signed. In a last-minute intervention, France suddenly and unexpectedly opposed the ECST signature and prevented the convention’s adoption if it was not watered down.

Conclusions

239

The importance that the Swiss government attributed to an effective ECST became apparent through internal discussions in which it was considered that Switzerland itself would veto the convention if a weaker version were to be adopted. Finally, foreign political considerations that this position could harm Switzerland’s image won over concerns that the ECST would end up as a paper tiger without counterterrorist teeth. In the end, in November 1977 the ECST’s adoption—despite its legal shortcomings—nevertheless sent a strong symbolic message of a united Europe against terrorism. Furthermore, even if in the final version of the convention countries were allowed to refuse extradition by referring to the political exception clause, local authorities were still obliged to put the captured terrorist on trial. This was seen as a considerable step forward in the international struggle against terrorism, especially considering the deadlocked situation at the UN. Additionally, legally it did have relevance as it managed to, for the first time, define terrorism through the acts that were henceforth to be considered as illegal under this terrorism convention. An interesting aspect of policymaking in multilateral fora is worth highlighting further, which concerns the institutional differences influencing the Swiss foreign political positions. It became clear that in order to lead a coherent foreign policy on such complex issues as terrorism—which span legal, security, and diplomatic considerations, and even touched East-West North-South ­power relations—a coordination unit was essential. This is best illustrated in the case of the CoE ECST drafting, where an internal Swiss ­policymaking conflict erupted between the Departments of Justice, Police, and Foreign Affairs. The discordance within the Swiss administration happened when the WGT was consulted less and lost its role as coordinator or as provider of in-house expertise. Interestingly, in 1978 the need for a WGT the way it was established in 1972 was again requested by the Swiss ambassador to Denmark. This implies that with the changing nature of terrorism, particularly its international and transnational dynamic, the Swiss government needed to adjust, re-evaluate, and carefully monitor its policy on a regular basis. Swiss Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation The need for constant adjustment and swift reactions not only applied on a diplomatic level, but it was also a prerequisite for the policing of terrorism. After the first terrorist confrontations and the Swiss government’s cooperation in the framework of Skyjack Sunday, one of the consequences was the

240

Conclusions

installation of the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing framework among the Club de Berne members and its partners. With the initiation of Kilowatt, an intense counterterrorism effort commenced, which effectively linked Switzerland to the Western alliance. Right from the start, the different governments fully invested substantial efforts in this exchange instrument. After only a few weeks, correspondence occurred on a daily basis, and it included general threat assessments, concrete bomb warnings, insights into terrorist operational methods, information on terrorists’ weapons techniques, and details about terrorist suspects. The Swiss government was entirely involved and not only readily accepted the incoming information, but also contributed with intelligence gained in Switzerland. Swiss participation raises several questions, however, with regard to the country’s permanent neutrality and its credibility. Two major concerns are worth highlighting in this respect. First, one has to recall that the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing system was established specifically in order to counter Palestinian terrorism. This meant that the countries participating in the Club de Berne and its partners helped Israel in its fight against its Arab neighbours. In return, the Palestinians were supported by Arab states and by the Eastern bloc. The Club de Berne was thus a form of counterbalance in the provision of assistance to Israel and the ­Western Cold War countries affected by terrorism. Switzerland’s collaboration within the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing network thus represented a one-sided pro-­Israeli approach and a clear preference for the West in the Global Cold War setting. It thus failed to treat all Cold War conflicting parties equally and provided support for only one party in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In doing so, Switzerland violated the principle of universality, a fundamental element of neutrality p ­ olicy. Second, the Club de Berne and its secret intelligence exchange represented a full integration of Switzerland into the Western counterterrorism security framework. The Swiss government made the country dependent on the information of its partner security services. Independence, however, is at the heart of Switzerland’s neutrality policy as it relates to maintaining its sovereignty. By opening up its security services for cooperation, the Swiss government gave up parts of its autonomy and undermined the freedom its neutrality policy is supposed to guarantee. On the other hand, one could argue that this also applied in reverse. With its participation, Swiss authorities could also threaten to withhold information, and this is the core of the paradox: the Swiss government gave up part of its independence by agreeing to share and receive sensitive information relating to state security, and at the same time this increased its power. The better the information it provided, the more indispensable the country was for its partners.

Conclusions

241

Because each member made itself dependent on the others, the power loss and power gain were shared in a form of a systemic equilibrium. In this sense, participation in the Club de Berne did undermine Swiss neutrality, but the benefits of the cooperation outweighed the costs. This was further underscored by numerous policy briefings of the head of the Federal Police, André Amstein, who praised the excellent counterterrorism cooperation conditions and continuously emphasised the importance and benefits of this framework for Switzerland. According to Amstein’s estimation, several attacks had been prevented through this warning system. The conviction to have found the best means possible in the fight against terrorism simply made any concerns regarding neutrality entirely irrelevant. Yet, with a closer look at the actual cooperation, one can conclude that its effectiveness was mixed. The police ran a tight race with the terrorists, and it was not always clear who had the upper hand. For instance, the agencies determined the typical profile of a terrorist suspect and, in return, they were taken by surprise when Japanese perpetrators committed an attack at Lod A ­ irport. Or, the police intercepted letter bombs because these letters were usually thicker, and in reaction, the terrorists employed thinner and less detectable bombs, or used the Christmas season as camouflage in order to avoid detection. Yet another of many examples was the expansion of security controls at airports in Europe, while terrorists either boarded their planes outside of ­Europe or directly infiltrated and collaborated with airport personnel. However, given the circumstances and the terrorists’ refined ways to trick, sabotage, circumvent, and outmanoeuvre the authorities, the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing framework was the best possible way to react to the transnational threat. It represented a pertinent use of resources available to them at the time because through the cables the information could be passed on immediately and to all agencies at once. Since the terrorists aimed at abusing cross-country security loopholes, intensifying inter-agency cooperation was an adequate response. Research Avenues and Reflections Besides the history of the Swiss government’s policymaking, the evidence presented in this monograph allows one to draw conclusions on a number of broader topics, which open up new theoretical research avenues.

242

Conclusions

How and Why Countries Cooperated One such theoretical debate relates to questions of how states cooperate in the fight against terrorism. Generally, very little is known in the field of International Relations (IR) about intelligence cooperation, and this is simply because there is a near complete lack of data. Based on the detailed analysis of one year of counterterrorism intelligence cooperation, I was able to gain relevant insights into the working methods of security services and the information they shared among each other. The analysis of the intelligence-sharing source material has shown that all available resources were deployed in order to counter terrorist threats. Furthermore, cooperation among the security agencies was extremely smooth, and a large amount of data was exchanged in the course of a very short time span. What was remarkable was the rapid rate at which trust was built among the various agencies willing to share highly sensitive intelligence. Often, this intelligence was only accessible to a small, privileged policy circle. In terms of a cooperation mechanism, it became apparent that the most important tool to counter the threat was information about terrorists, their intentions, and their armaments. In order to obtain this information, various intelligence agencies cooperated with civil society, shared files about terrorist suspects, spied on terrorist networks, and analysed this information to the best of their knowledge. Another theoretical research field that this monograph has touched upon relates to the inherent Kilowatt intelligence-sharing dynamic and the question of why countries cooperated in matters of secret counterterrorism intelligence. Given the potentially compromising nature of the information gathered by spies, informants, and other highly sensitive sources, it is surprising to have seen a nearly daily exchange of information in this intelligence-sharing framework. Various reasons can explain the countries’ motivations, which are strongly connected to the structural incentives of the intelligence-sharing system itself. Similar to the above-mentioned Swiss motives for participating in the Club de Berne, one can extrapolate this reasoning for other countries more generally. On the one hand, there was a clear terrorist threat, which was mounting and which had an increasingly transnational component. This obviously demanded an inter-governmental response, and the best way forward was to share information about terrorist networks, their means of operation, their profile, and their expected intentions. Yet, besides sheer necessity, a look at the cooperation mechanism itself can explain further reasons for the maintenance of this intelligence-sharing framework. Four main aspects relate to this.

Conclusions

243

First, each country took a risk in giving out information it had acquired secretly (and often through ways that lay at the fringes of international legality). Each agency trusted the others, and its trust was rewarded by also receiving information from its partners. After a while, this created a “critical mass” of sensitive information by which the stakes had become too high to be exposed. The group thus collected sufficient sensitive material to potentially compromise one another so that they formed a mutual dependency in which it was in everybody’s interest to trust and to not abuse the other’s trust. Furthermore, abusing an agency’s trust by leaking information would have meant the end of the cooperation (at least for that country). Thus, by maintaining smooth and effective cooperation, no country had an incentive to risk exclusion from or termination of the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing system. Second, by sharing information about terrorism based on a country’s assessment, it accorded to the others a degree of control over how to use this information. In doing so, it gave away its interpretative power, which traditionally had only been in the hands of the individual agency. Yet, because all countries did this, in return each received greater collective powers. Since one country did not have the power to deal with terrorism on its own, combining efforts thus multiplied the degree of control that they collectively could exert over the terrorists. By each giving up part of its control, all expanded their powers and, in fact, increased their control. Third, another reason for the sustainability of this cooperation relates to a form of group persuasion in which the various members mutually reinforced the belief in the common threat. This applies especially to Israel, which was by far the most active member of the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing group. On the one hand, this is explicable by its familiarity with terrorist networks, by which it naturally could acquire more information than its European or ­American counterparts. On the other hand, Israel also had a strong interest in keeping the Europeans committed to the counterterrorist struggle. By sending out nearly weekly warnings, the Israeli intelligence service contributed to the impression that the terrorist danger was constant and omnipresent. Israel’s profuse activism could thus be seen as a way to convince the European states that cooperation was needed. In return, the diligent reply by the Europeans to the Israeli requests shows that Israel’s partners indeed believed in the threat and were taking its warnings very seriously. This consideration thus leads to the underlying reason for the sustainability of the counterterrorism exchange: after a while counterterrorist cooperation became so normal, it became unthinkable to renounce it. Thus, in a perpetual, mutually reinforcing counterterrorism cycle, the Kilowatt exchange system itself created a belief that cooperation was indispensable and that it needed to continue.

244

Conclusions

This aspect of a common belief further relates to a fourth reason for cooperation. Through daily communications in order to fight terrorism, this regular exchange also helped intensify security ties among the intelligence-sharing agencies. In a secret dimension of international relations, this created what one can call a multilateral “special” relationship between Western Europe, the United States, and Israel. Given the secrecy under which the exchange took place, it allowed its members to effectively help Israel in its fight against ­Palestinian terrorism without the knowledge of other countries which might have disapproved of such security connections. No Democratic Oversight The absolute secrecy of the Club de Berne further points to a fundamental problem from the point of view of civil liberties, namely a complete lack of democratic control. Evaluating Switzerland’s involvement in the Club de Berne in view of the above operational methods, it seems safe to conclude that it acted like any other member of the club. Swiss police officials contributed with information whenever they could and integrated the material they received into their own police records. The handwritten notes in red ink, such as “Kärtchen ✓,” are testimony to this unquestioned acceptance of information. In order to feed information back to the other Kilowatt countries, the Swiss government deployed all sorts of available resources. The cables sent by the Swiss security agency with phone numbers that suspects dialled during their stays in Switzerland indicate, for instance, cooperation between the Swiss authorities and the hotel industry. From the point of view of democratic rights, this collaboration can be seen as problematic since a person has the right to privacy. One could argue that a free citizen should be allowed to dial any number when he or she stays in ­Switzerland without having this information retrieved by the police or, even more questionably, being given to foreign intelligence services. This last practice points to a far more problematic aspect of the Club de Berne: the complete lack of parliamentary oversight. The concealment from the wider public can, of course, be explained by a number of raison d’état considerations, while they still remain highly problematic. First, the most obvious reason for secrecy lies in the nature of the matter itself. Intelligence services traditionally avoid transparency with the argument that the core essence of their work is that it must operate in secrecy. Their purpose is to provide authorities with a mechanism that precisely goes beyond traditional and transparent policy measures.

Conclusions

245

Yet, one could counter that the Swiss administration could have at least mentioned the existence of the Club de Berne without having to disclose the content of the files or its working methods. This, in turn, could have conflicted with the interest of the Club de Berne partners. Since the Israeli security service played such an important part in the Kilowatt intelligence-sharing framework, it is likely that the governments involved—Switzerland included—preferred to conceal this secret collaboration in view of foreign political considerations. Namely, it is conceivable that Arab states would have interpreted this counterterrorism cooperation with Israel as a form of support for Israel in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. This could have had a negative impact on the Kilowatt partner countries’ relations with Arab states. For the Swiss government as well, these considerations applied particularly in view of its goal to uphold an image of “neutrality.” In this vein, know­ ledge about the secret cooperation against Palestinian violent groups could have endangered Switzerland’s credibility as a neutral country in the eyes of Arab or other countries. Hence, the second main reason for concealment can be described as realpolitik in the sense that the Swiss government wanted to protect itself against Palestinian terrorism and needed to cooperate with Israel, but also had to ensure Swiss interests in Arab and other Third World states. The price was democratic oversight. Even today, very little is known among the wider public about the Club de Berne, its cable threat warning systems, and certainly not the scope of its counterterrorism cooperation. In fact, the Swiss government today is still very discreet when it comes to information about the Club de Berne. The only direct mention of the Club de Berne today on the FDJP website is about a meeting on 21 April 2004 of the Club de Berne in Switzerland. The site explains that: The Heads of EU Member States’ security and intelligence services, plus Norway and Switzerland, meet on a regular basis to discuss intelligence and security matters. This group is known as the Club of Berne.1 One can infer from this quote that the Club de Berne still existed in 2004. Yet the FDJP does, however, leave out any explanation of what the Club de Berne was or is, who runs and finances it, and how it is organised. For instance, one does not even know whether there exists a secretariat or a coordination unit

1 Swiss Federal Police (fedpol), 28.04.2004, Press release, accessible online: http://www.ejpd .admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/aktuell/news/2004/ref_2004-04-28.html

246

Conclusions

of any sort. The FDJP’s webpage certainly excludes any mention of the long history of this network and its intelligence cooperation dating back to 1971. In other countries, the Club de Berne is kept equally obscure. In Germany, for example, the intelligence records are never given to the archives. Either the intelligence documents are kept strictly within the BND or they are destroyed. This degree of secrecy is also applied in other Club de Berne countries; only Switzerland has so far given access to these files. Thus, with the availability of these sources a thorough debate about Switzerland’s counterterrorism history is opportune, for which this monograph has provided a starting point. Politics of the Latest Outrage Another area to which the second part of this book relates touches upon a question within the discipline of political science. According to Paul ­Wilkinson and other authors in IR, counterterrorism cooperation in multilateral fora generally follows a “politics of the latest outrage.”2 This hypothesis suggests that governments remain passive and do not devote time and effort to the establishment of counterterrorism mechanisms until a terrorist attack occurs. Only after a terrorist event takes place and the public demands that “something” be done, do governments finally embark on concerted efforts to contain the threat. Analysing the long and tedious process of the ECST, this hypothesis can in part be confirmed. The development of the ECST was steady and constant, but it faded and nearly came to a complete halt for several months until, in 1975, further spectacular attacks pushed the governments into action. The subsequent summit meeting in May 1975 in Obernai (Alsace, France) was such an example, where the CoE interior ministers promised that “something” would be done, at least on the European level. Similarly, it was the day after the ­Munich Olympic massacre that Kurt Waldheim placed the topic of terrorism on the UN agenda. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the ECST was only following the “politics of the latest outrage” has to be given nuance. While indeed the 1975 OPEC and other attacks injected new dynamism into the ECST drafting process, the ECST cannot be dismissed as a mere reaction to immediate terrorist events. As

2 Paul Wilkinson. The Lessons of Lockerbie: A Special Report on Aviation Security to Mark the First Anniversary of the Air Disaster. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1989, p. 7.

Conclusions

247

shown in this monograph, the work behind the scenes comprised painstaking and detail-oriented drafting and negotiating behind closed doors, and this took place over the course of several years, independently of the ministerial level. This means that the existence of political will did not necessarily entail the adoption of effective instruments. Taking into consideration the insights from the ECST negotiations, one can conclude that the ministers provided necessary, but not sufficient, political support for the convention. In this sense, the ECST process was relaunched by terrorist events after it came to a near halt, but the process itself was deeper and more substantial than just the governments showing that “something” was being done. Swiss Neutrality and Relations with the Third World Switzerland’s experiences with violent non-state actors further raise the question of the place of neutrality in the country’s relations with the Third World.3 In their claim of responsibility, the PFLP apologised for having violated Swiss neutrality. This shows that they were clearly aware of the country’s foreign political status and were hesitating before infringing upon it. Why did they justify violating Swiss neutrality, instead of mentioning the more obvious infraction, the violation of its sovereignty? Historically, Swiss neutrality was designed to keep the country aloof from great power conflicts, not to regulate Switzerland’s relations with Third World countries per se. Nevertheless, the PFLP’s claim of responsibility and the ­Palestinian reproach of a pro-Israeli bias in the treatment of the Israeli security officer indicate that Swiss actions could be understood as “unneutral,” at least in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, in the case of Bucher’s abduction, Swiss interests were chosen explicitly because of activities of Swiss commercial enterprises and banks. Hence, it was its blatant pro-capitalist orientation that made it a target of Third World socialist movements. One can therefore ask whether Switzerland could be neutral in the Third World? Conversely, it was precisely its neutral position that was considered by Swiss decision-makers as the basis for Switzerland to legitimately entertain business relations with all parties. In accordance with the principle of universality, its independence from any alliance allowed it to trade with every country (in wartime or in peacetime). Countering this argument again, one

3 I would like to thank the annonymous reviewer who raised this point. The thoughts in this paragraph were triggered by the reviewer’s comments.

248

Conclusions

can counter that neutrality is only applicable for as long as the international community accepts and respects it. What if recently decolonised countries or non-state actors challenge this status? What are the political and legal implications of a contestation of “neutrality” by armed political movements? As shown in this monograph, confrontation with violent non-state actors indeed forced the Swiss government to pick a side. One can therefore ask to what extent this might be a general problem: is “neutrality”—a profoundly state-based concept—incompatible with non-state political actors, and would another terror attack ultimately lead to Switzerland’s abandonment of its neutrality policy? One cannot know the answer to those questions, but they are important also in view of today’s global security challenges and policy debates. Further Research in Terrorism Studies To a limited extent, this book points at further research about the terrorists themselves. Even though this work focused on the intelligence services, these accounts further hint at a number of hypotheses about various terrorist groups, too. It is, for instance, likely that certain terrorist groups indeed established a local support network in Europe. It is also probable that they constantly aimed at improving their methods to avoid detection, infiltrated airport staff, or stole uniforms from airlines. It is also likely that the BSO was extremely well organised and operated on a “need-to-know” basis, issuing instructions to its agents shortly before an imminent attack. For further research it would be interesting if one could compare the security agencies’ portrayal of terrorist groups with their own autobiographical memoires or journalistic studies of that time. A juxtaposition of the two “histories”—the history of terrorist organisations and the history of anti­ terrorism counterintelligence—promises to be fruitful in order to better ­understand the accuracy of the intelligence services’ threat perceptions and assessments. Summary and Outlook Taking into consideration this period as a whole, one can see that each terrorist event brought with it a new realisation, which shaped subsequent Swiss counterterrorism policy. The Kloten attacks revealed that no country could be held accountable for terrorist actions. This meant that in the immediate aftermath

Conclusions

249

the Swiss authorities needed to protect the country from further attacks using its own resources. This was not possible due to the ubiquity of the threat, as shown by Würenlingen, Skyjack Sunday, and Bucher’s abduction. Skyjack Sunday forced not only the Swiss government into negotiations but four other governments as well, and brought the realisation that other countries were also affected. Decision-makers thus understood that terrorism became a global threat requiring a global response. With the experiences during these four major terrorist attacks, the Swiss government gained a better understanding of the terrorist threat and of the means to counter it. On the diplomatic level, Swiss delegations actively engaged in international counterterrorism efforts by contributing to the establishment of international legal and technical means to suppress terrorism. During this process, the Swiss government tried to stay aloof from the Global Cold War rhetorical crossfire. Berne developed carefully conceived foreign policy positions and provided steady support in all three international organisations that dealt with terrorism in the 1970s. The Swiss Federal Police co-founded the Club de Berne, and thus built an interwoven counterterrorism intelligence cooperation network. After a while, each member of the Club and its partners became indispensable for the others. Thus, in a climate of mutual interdependency and trust developed an effective Western counterterrorism alliance against international terrorism. Through this network, the Swiss security service gained access to better means of protection from terrorism, intensified its ties with its partners, and, in also becoming a source of intelligence knowledge, it acquired a certain degree of relative power over its partners and terrorist groups. In this monograph I have shown that on the foreign policy level, Swiss counterterrorism cooperation was strictly confined to the realm of neutrality policy, while on the secret security level, it violated permanent neutrality policy because its counterterrorist involvement represented a one-sided approach to the Middle East conflict and an important degree of integration into the ­Western bloc. This active counterterrorism engagement further meant that security was placed above everything; above the rule of law and freedom of speech in crisis situations, and above liberal freedoms and parliamentary oversight in ­longer-term policing practices. Swiss institutions were not only part of the international counterterrorism game, they were in the middle of it. This makes Switzerland particularly well suited to think of its response as the counterterrorism policy of any other ­European country. Especially since neutrality policy was entirely disregarded in its secret combat against terrorism, the Swiss case can be seen as an example

250

Conclusions

of a small European state that struggled with a new type of violence. In line with like-minded Western European countries and its partners, it spanned a gradually increasing, interwoven, European, intercontinental, and global counterterrorism security web. This opens a panoply of research avenues, ranging from the reasons for countries to cooperate in matters of counterterrorism and democratic oversight of the security sector, to an assessment of terrorists’ accounts in contrast to intelligence reports. Overall, this research embarked for completely uncharted territory. It thus contributed to closing an important gap in the literature while at the same time opening up further research on crisis management, policymaking, and counterterrorism cooperation, its mechanisms, reasons, power plays, and interdependencies. Thus, through the Swiss case I also recounted the history of European and global counterterrorism policymaking and cooperation. Hopefully I caught the reader’s interest and was able to light a spark that might kindle further research in this field.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Unpublished Primary Sources Part I Archival records for chapter I Federal Archives of Switzerland in Berne [Bundesarchiv Bern, BAR]: Attentat auf ein El Al Flugzeug im • CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#228*, Flughafen Kloten am 18.2.1969 und Entführung eines Swissair-Flugzeuges

• • • • • •

durch arabische Terroristen am 6.9.1970 nach Jordanien, [in the chapter this title was referred to as “Kloten and Zarqa Dossier”], 1969–1970, boxes 46 to 54. CH-BAR#E4363A#1986/166_5*, Dokumentation über Bürgerkrieg in Jordanien im Herbst 1970 sowie über PFLP, 1969–71. CH-BAR#E2200#London#1990/80#303.30, Movement revolutionaire, actes de terrorisme, généralités, 1970–72. CH-BAR#E1010B#1986/151_58#200*, Luftverkehr (inkl. Fluganfall b. Würenlingen, Flugzeugentführung nach Jordanien, Ausbildung ­lybischer Piloten durch Heliswiss), 1970–1973. CH-BAR#E2001E#1980/83#231*, Handakten Micheli und Graber, 1969–1970. CH-BAR#E4001D#1976/136#701*, Flugzeugentführung, Handakten BR von Moos, 1970. CH-BAR#E2024B#2001/146#1225*, Entführung von Flugzeugen: ­Zerka September 1970, 1970–1971.

US National Security Archive: file no. 00079, 1970/09/06. • Archive file no. 00080, 1970/09/06 • Archive Archive no. 00078, 1970/09/06 • Archive file file 00083, 1970/09/07 • Archive file no. 00086, 1970/09/07 • Archive file no. no. 1970/09/07 • Archive file no. 00085, 00087, 1970/09/07 •

252

Bibliography

The documents are accessible online through the Digital National Security ­Archive: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do. British National Archives:

• Cabinet Paper CM(70), Copy No. 23, CAB/128/47 Archival records for chapter II Federal Archives of Switzerland [Bundesarchiv Bern, BAR]: CH-BAR#E2500#1990/6#2585*, Bucher, Enrico, Entführung 7.12.1970, • Dossiers I–VIII, 1970–71, [in the chapter this title was referred to as “BAR, Bucher Abduction Dossier”]. CH-BAR#E7001C#1982/118#295*, Entführung Botschafter Bucher, 1971. CH-BAR#E2024B#2001/146#131*, Bucher Giovanni E., 1970–71. CH-BAR#E1010B#1986/151#81*, Entführung schweiz. Botschafter in Brasilien, 1970–71. CH-BAR#E220.48#1988/169#14*, Relations politiques Suisse-Brésil, enlèvement Ambassadeur Bucher, 1970–71. CH-BAR#E2200.114A#2003/126#110*, Elèvement de l’Ambassadeur Bucher 07.12.1970–16.01.1971, 1970–71. CH-BAR#E4001E#1992/116#46*, SOGE; Allgemeines, Alarmübungen, Sonderstabsübung Geiselnahme, 1972–1982. CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#369*, Geiselnahme: Diverse Fälle, 1972–1982.

• • • • • • •

Part II Archival records for the Groupe de Traveil pour le Terrorisme and overall counterterrorism policymaking covered in chapters III–V: CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1987/78#736*, Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, • Dossiers I–III, 1971–75. [In the chapter this title was referred to as “CH-BAR#E2001E-01, FPD, ­Counterterrorism”] Archival records for chapter III and IV: Absturz eines Coronado-Flugzeugs • CH-BAR#E2001E#1982/58#180*, der Swissair bei Würenlingen am 21.2.1970, 1971–1972. Akten der diplomatischen Konferenz • inCH-BAR#E4260C#1993/10#14*, Den Haag, Dezember 1970: ICAO/OAIC-Uebereinkommen betr. die Luftpiraterie. (Luftstrafrecht), Vol. 1, 1970–1971.

Bibliography

253

Archival records for chapter V: CH-BAR#E4260D-01#2000/392#248*, Bd. 1–2; Europarat: Etude ap• plication de la Convention europ. d’extradition (sous-comité XXXI) =

•

•

•

•

Anwendung des europ. Auslieferungsübereinkommens; Dokumentation/ Dokumente, 1967–1973. [In the chapter this title was referred to as “CH-BAR#E4260D-01, ­Subcommittee XXXI”]. CH-BAR#E4260D-01#2000/392#264*, Bd.1–3: Europarat. Internationaler Terrorismus. Korrespondenz. Terrorismusbekämpfung, 1973–76. [In the chapter this title was referred to as “CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE, Counterterrorism, Correspondence”]. CH-BAR#E4260D-01#2000/392#217*, Bd.1–3: Europarat. Les problèmes que soulèvent certaines nouvelles d’actes (sic) de violence concertés. Comité formés;—Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme, 1973–77. [In the chapter this title was referred to as “CH-BAR#E4260D-01, FDJP, CoE Committee New Forms of Violence”]. CH-BAR#E2003A#1990/3#270*, Convention europ. sur la répression du terrosisme (sic) C.E., Dossiers I–III, 1976–78. [In the chapter this title was referred to as “CH-BAR#E2003A, FPD Div. Int. Org., CoE ECST”]. CH-BAR#E2210.6B#1993/29#429*, Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme, 1976–80. [In the chapter this title was referred to as “CH-BAR#E2210.6B, Swiss Mission in Strasbourg, CoE ECST”].

French Diplomatic Archives in La Courneuve [Archives diplomatiques de la France, ADF] 1929 INVA, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Direction Europe, • ADF, Série 38–23, Communautés européennes, Terrorisme, 1971-Juin 1976 [In the chapter this title was referred to as “ADF, CoE ECST 1971– June76”]. ADF, 1929 INVA, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Direction Europe, Série 42–98, Conseil de l’Europe et la convention européenne sur la ­répression du terrorisme. (10 Novembre 1976), Juillet 1976–1980 [In the chapter this title was referred to as “ADF, CoE ECST July 1976–80”].

•

254

Bibliography

Part III Archival records for the Club de Berne general background and intelligence cooperation beyond the Club de Berne: Terrorismus / BERNER KLUB / • CH-BAR#E4320C#1994/77#479*, (5)39/5, 1978–1989. CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#348*, Terrorismus: Zusammenarbeit mit • dem Ausland, 1972–1982. Terrorismus: Verschiedenes, 1972– • CH-BAR#E4001E#1985/152#345*, 1982. CH-BAR#E2001E-01#1988/16#967*, Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, • 1976.1978. Archival records for the secret counterterrorism intelligence-sharing network Kilowatt as covered in chapter VI: Ausgang KILOWATT, 1971–1977. • CH-BAR#E4320-07C#1994/349#812*, [In the chapter this title was referred to as “BAR, Outgoing Kilowatt”] CH-BAR#E4320-07C#1994/349#806*, Eingang KILOWATT, 1971–1972, • [In the chapter this title was referred to as “BAR, Incoming Kilowatt”]

Published Primary Sources

Marighella, Carlos, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. St Petersburg, FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2008, [orig. name Minimanual do Guerrilheiro Urbano, first published in Brazil, June 1969]. Moss, Robert, and Carlos Marighella. Urban Guerrilla Warfare; With an Appendix: Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. Zala, Sacha (senior researcher). Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland, vol. 25, 1.1.1970– 31.12.1972, Berne, 2013. The following DDS database Dodis source compilations relate to the topic of this monograph:

• • • • •



“Terrorism,” dodis.ch/T1101; “Kloten attack 1969,” dodis.ch/T1390; “Würenlingen attack 1970,” dodis.ch/T1389; “Minutes of negotiation of the Federal Council in the Zarqa crisis,” dodis.ch/ C1392; “Highjackings to Zarqa,” dodis.ch/T1391.

Bibliography

255

Memoires

Freymond, Jacques. “D’Athènes à Zarka dans la perspective du CICR,” in: Edouard Brunner (ed). Einblick in die schweizerische Aussenpolitik. Zum 65. Geburtstag von Staatssekretär Raymond Probst, Zurich, 1984, pp. 133–152. Graber, Pierre. Memoires et reflexions. Lausanne: Editions 24 heures, 1992. Habache, Georges and Georges Malbrunot. Les revolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, Paris: Fayard, 2008. Heath, Edward. The Course of My Life: My Autobiography. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998. Iyad, Abu and Eric Rouleau. My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle. New York: Times Books, 1981. Jost Walter. Rufzeichen: Haifa. Ein Passagier erlebt die Entfuhrung der Swissair DC-8 “Nidwalden” und als Geisel den Krieg der Fedayin. Zurich: Schweizer Verlagshaus, 1972; Raab, David. Terror in Black September: The First Eyewitness Account of the Infamous 1970 Hijackings. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 Sharif, Bassam Abu and Uzi Mahnaimi. Tried by Fire: The Searing True Story of Two Men at the Heart of the Struggle between the Arabs and the Jews. London: Little, Brown, 1995. Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen. Mit Leidenschaft und Augenmass: in Mogadischu und ­anderswo: politische Memoiren. Munich: Bertelsmann, 1989.Secondary Literature

Books

Abeyratne, Ruwantissa. Aviation Security Law. Berlin: Springer, 2010. Alali, A. Odasuo and Kenoye Kelvin Eke. Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of ­Diffusion. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications, 1991. Aldrich, Richard J. GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency. London: HarperPress, 2010. Alexander, Yonah and Richard Latter. Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public. Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1990. Alexander, Yonah, and Eugene Sochor. Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990. Altermatt, Bernhard and Gilbert Casasus (eds.). 50 Jahre Engagement der Schweiz im Europarat 1963–2013: die Schweiz als Akteur oder Zaungast der europaischen Integration? / 50 ans d’engagement suisse au sein du Conseil de l’Europe 1963–2013: la suisse, actrice ou spectatrice de l’integration europeenne? Zurich: Ruegger, 2013. Altermatt, Claude. La politique etrangere de la Suisse pendant la guerre froide. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, 2nd edition, 2003. Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985.

256

Bibliography

Andrew, Christopher Maurice. The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. London: Allen Lane, 2009. Andrew, Christopher Maurice and Vasili Mitrokhin. The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. New York: Basic Books, 2005. Argomaniz, Javier; Oldrich Bures, and Christian Kaunert (eds.), EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment, London: Routledge, 2016. Argomaniz, Javier. The EU and counter-terrorism: politics, polity and policies after 9/11. London: Routledge, 2010. Aron, Raymond. Peace and War; A Theory of International Relations. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966. Aydinli, Ersel (ed.). Emerging Transnational (in)Security Governance: A StatistTransnationalist Approach. London: Routledge, 2010. Bacchus, Wilfred A. Mission in Mufti: Brazil’s Military Regimes, 1964–1985. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. Bassiouni, M. Cherif (ed.). Introduction to International Criminal Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013. Bender, Lisa. Neutralität als Mittel der Sicherheitsgewährleistung. Über die Herausforderung, Andere von der eigenen Friedfertigkeit zu überzeugen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014. Bethell, Leslie (ed.). The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX, Brazil since 1930s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Blumenau, Bernhard, The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Bonjour, Edgar. Histoire de la neutralité suisse: quatre siècles de politique extérieure fédérale. Neuchâtel: La Baconniere, 1970. Bott, Sandra; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (eds.). Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2016. Bott, Sandra, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Sacha Zala (eds.). Die internationale Schweiz in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges / Relations internationales de la Suisse durant la guerre froide. Basel: Schwabe, 2010. Boulden, Jane, and Thomas G. Weiss. Terrorism and the UN Before and After September 11. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. Breitenmoser, Christoph. Strategie ohne Aussenpolitik: zur Entwicklung der schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg. Berne: Peter Lang, 2002. Brown, David. The European Union, Counter Terrorism and Police Co-Operation 1992– 2007: Unsteady Foundations? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010. Brummer, Klaus. Der Europarat: eine Einfuhrung. Wiesbaden: VS, Verl. fur Sozialwiss, 2008.

Bibliography

257

Buck, Christian F. Medien und Geiselnahmen: Fallstudien zum inszenierten Terror. Wiesbaden: Verl. fur Sozialwiss, 2007. Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Byman, Daniel. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Caillat, Michel (ed.). Histoire(s) de l’anticommunisme en suisse / Geschichte(n) des Antikommunismus in der Schweiz. Zurich: Chronos, 2009. Carlton, David. The West’s Road to 9/11: Resisting, Appeasing, and Encouraging Terrorism Since 1970. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Chaliand, Gerard; Arnaud Blin, Edward D. Schneider, Kathryn Pulver, and Jesse Browner. The History of Terrorism: from Antiquity to al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. Chalk, Peter. West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Chamberlin, Paul Thomas. The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Choi, Jin-Tai. Aviation Terrorism: Historical Survey, Perspectives, and Responses. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Comras, Victor D. Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2011. Cooley, John Kent. Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs. London: Frank Cass, 1973. Dahlke, Matthias. Demokratischer Staat und transnationaler Terrorismus Drei Wege zur Unnachgiebigkeit in Westeuropa 1972–1975. Munich: De Gruyter, 2011. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja and Daniel S. Hamilton. Transatlantic Homeland Security: Protecting Society in the Age of Catastrophic Terrorism. London: Routledge, 2006. Davies, Philip H. J. and Kristian C. Gustafson. Intelligence Elsewhere. Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013. Deflem, Mathieu. Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Dimier, Veronique. The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy: Recycling Empire, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Dongen, Luc, Stephanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith. Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks, 2014. Ensalaco, Mark. Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11. Philadelphia, Pa: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

258

Bibliography

Fischer, Thomas. Die Grenzen der Neutralitat: schweizerisches KSZE-Engagement und gescheiterte UNO-Beitrittspolitik im Kalten Krieg 1969–1986. Zurich: Chronos, 2004. Fischer, Thomas. Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise: 1979–1981: eine Studie zur Politik der Guten Dienste im Kalten Krieg. Zurich: ETH Zurich—Forschungsstelle fur Sicherheitspolitik, 2004. Friedrichs, Jorg. Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Police Cooperation. London: Routledge, 2008. Frischknecht, Jürg. Die Unheimlichen Patrioten: politische Reaktion in der Schweiz: ein aktuelles Handbuch. Zurich: Limmat-Verlag, 1979 Gabriel, Jurg Martin. Sackgasse Neutralitat. Zurich: ETH Hochschulverlag AG, 1997. Gabriel, Jurg Martin and Jon A. Fanzun. Swiss Foreign Policy: An Overview. Zurich: ETH Zurich—Forschungsstelle fur Internationale Beziehungen, 2003. Gal-Or, Noemi. International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985. Gilbert, Geoff. Responding to International Crime. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006. Ginkel, Bibi Van. The Practice of the United Nations in Combating Terrorism from 1946 to 2008: Questions of Legality and Legitimacy. Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010. Golsong, Heribert. La convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme: Provocation ou instrument de paix?, Strasbourg: Ici Europe, May 1977. Götschel, Laurent, Magdalena Bernath, and Daniel Schwarz. Swiss Foreign Policy Foundations and Possibilities. London: Routledge, 2005. Gresh, Alain. The PLO: The Struggle Within, London: Zed Books, 1985. Grotius, Hugo, The Rights of War and Peace, Chapter XXI “On the Communication of Punishment,” Sections III and IV, translated by A. C. Campbell, Project Gutenberg EBook no. 46564, 11 August, 2014, accessible online: https://www.gutenberg.org/ files/46564/46564-h/46564-h.htm#Page_256. Gyr, Marcel. Schweizer Terrorjahre: Das Geheime Abkommen mit der PLO, Zurich: NZZ Libro, 2016. Hakovirta, Harto. East-West Conflict and European Neutrality. Oxford (England): Clarendon Press, 1988. Hanhimaki, Jussi M., and Bernhard Blumenau. An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013. Hanhimäki, Jussi M. The United Nations. A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Haynes, John Earl and Harvey Klehr. Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Hirst, David. The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Bibliography

259

Hoffman, Bruce. Anonymous soldiers: the struggle for Israel, 1917–1947. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. Holenstein, Andre. Mitten in Europa Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweizer ­Geschichte. Baden: hier + jetzt, 2014. Holland, Jack. Hope against History: The Course of Conflict in Northern Ireland. New York: Henry Holt, 1999. Irving, Sarah. Leila Khaled Icon of Palestinian Liberation. London: Pluto Press, 2012. Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. In Spies We Trust. The Story of Western Intelligence. Oxford: ­Oxford University Press, 2013. Jost, Hans Ulrich, Matthieu Leimgruber, and Isaline Marcel (eds.). Europa und die Schweiz 1945–1950: Europarat, Supranationalitat und schweizerische Unabhangigkeit. Lausanne: Editions Payot, 1999. Kaunert, Christian and Sarah Leonard. European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence: Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: A History. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. Klöti Ulrich, Christian Hirschi, Uwe Serdült and Thomas Widmer, Verkannte Aussenpolitik. Entscheidungsprozesse in der Schweiz, Zurich: Ruegger, 2005. Kohl, James and John Litt. Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1974. Kraushaar, Wolfgang (ed.). Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006. Kreis, Georg, Jean-Daniel Delley, Otmar Wigger, and Otto Konstantin Kaufmann (eds.). Staatsschutz in der Schweiz: die Entwicklung von 1935–1990: eine multidisziplinare ­Untersuchung im Auftrage des schweizerischen Bundesrates. Berne: Haupt, 1993. Krieken, Peter J. van. Terrorism and the international legal order: with special reference to the UN, the EU and cross-border aspects. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002. Kriesi, Hanspeter and Alexandre H. Trechsel. The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Kushner, Harvey W. Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat. Springfield, Ill: Charles C. Thomas, 1998. Lacoste, Ilse. Die Europäische Terrorismus Konvention. Eine Untersuchung des Europäischen Übereinkommens zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus vom 27. Januar 1977 im Vergleich mit ähnlichen internationalen Abkommen und unter der Berücksichtigung des schweizerischen Rechts. Zurich: Schulthess, 1986. Laqueur, Walter. A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001. Law, Randall David. Terrorism: A History. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

260

Bibliography

Leuthardt, Beat. Festung Europa: Asyl, Drogen, “organisierte Kriminalitat”: die “Innere Sicherheit” der 80er und 90er Jahre und ihre Feindbilder: ein Handbuch. Zurich: ­Rotpunktverlag, 1994. Linke, Manfred. Schweizerische Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit. Chur: Ruegger, 1995. Long, David E. The Anatomy of Terrorism. New York: Free Press, 1990. Lutz, James M. and Brenda J. Lutz. Terrorism: Origins and Evolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. MacKenzie, David. ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization. ­Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. Mantovani, Mauro. Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg (1947–1963): zwischen angelsachsischem Containment und Neutralitats-Doktrin. Contribution in the framework of the NPF42. Zurich: Orell Fussli, 1999. Martin, David C. and John Walcott. Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War against Terrorism. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. März, Michael. Die Machtprobe 1975: Wie RAF und Bewegung 2. Juni den Staat erpressten. Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 2007. Meyer, Alex. Internationale Luftfahrtabkommen, Bank VI: Luftpiraterie—Begriff, ­Tatbestande, Bekampfung. Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1972. Miller, Martin A. The Foundations of Modern Terrorism. State, Society and the Dynamics of Political Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999. New York: Knopf, 1999. Nacos, Brigitte. Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Naftali, Timothy J. Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. New York: Basic Books, 2005. Newman, Edward. A Crisis of Global Institutions?Multilateralism and International Security. London: Routledge, 2007. O’Kane, Rosemary H. T. Terrorism. Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007. Owen, Roger. State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. ­London: Routledge, 2000. Phillips, David. Skyjack: The Story of Air Piracy. London: Harrap, 1973. Polakiewicz, Jorg. Treaty-Making in the Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Council of ­Europe Publications, 1999. Rees, G. Wyn. Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006. Riegler, Thomas and Oliver Rathkolb. Im Fadenkreuz: Ö sterreich und der Nahostterrorismus 1973 bis 1985. Gottingen: V & R Unipress, Vienna Univ. Press, 2011.

Bibliography

261

Romaniuk, Peter. Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation. London: Routledge, 2010. Rosin, Philip. Die Schweiz im KSZE-Prozess 1972–1983: Einfluss durch Neutralitat. ­Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014. Rubin, Barry M. and Judith Colp Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008. Sayigh, Yazid. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Schaffer, Heiko. Der Schutz des zivilen Luftverkehrs vor Terrorismus: der Beitrag der ­International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007. Schaufelbuehl, Janick Marina, and Nuno Pereira (eds.). 1968–1978: ein bewegtes Jahrzehnt in der Schweiz / une decennie mouvementee en Suisse. Zurich: Chronos, 2009. Schmid, Alex Peter and Janny de Graaf. Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, London: Sage, 1982. Schnur, Aviva R. Agieren oder Reagieren?: aussenpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bundesrat und Bundesverwaltung. Chur, Zurich: Ruegger, 2000. Seale, Patrick. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire. London: Arrow, 1993. Simon, Jeffrey D. The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Skidmore, Thomas E. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Spillmann, Kurt, Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser, Marcel Gerber. Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik seit 1945. Zwischen Autonomie und Kooperation, Zurich, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 2001. Svendsen, Adam D. M. Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations After 9/11. London: Routledge, 2010. Tanner, Jakob. Europaische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert/Geschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert. Munich: Beck, 2015. Townshend, Charles. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Trachtenberg, Marc. The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Vaïsse, Maurice. La puissance ou l’influence?: la France dans le monde depuis 1958. Paris: Fayard, 2009. Wallis, Rodney. How Safe Are Our Skies? Assessing the Airlines’ Response to Terrorism. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003. Weinberg, Leonard and William Lee Eubank. What Is Terrorism? New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2006.

262

Bibliography

Wilkinson, Paul. The Lessons of Lockerbie: A Special Report on Aviation Security to Mark the First Anniversary of the Air Disaster. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1989. Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London: Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2006. Wittinger, Michaela. Der Europarat: die Entwicklung seines Rechts und der “europaischen Verfassungswerte”. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005. Wyss, Marco. Arms Transfers, Neutrality and Britain’s Role in the Cold War: Anglo-Swiss Relations 1945–1958, History of Warfare, Vol. 79, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013.



Book Chapters

Andrew, Christopher, “Intelligence in the Cold War,” in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge ­University Press, 2010, pp. 417–437. Bentele, Ursina and Sacha Zala, “Neutrality as a Business Strategy: Switzerland and Latin America in the Cold War,” in: Bott, Sandra; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (eds.). Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 178–195. Bethell, Leslie and Celso Castro, “Politics in Brazil under Military Rule 1964–1985,” in: Leslie Bethell (ed.). The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume IX, Brazil since 1930s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 165–230. Chaliand, Gérard and Arnaud Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” in: Gerard Chaliand, Arnaud Blin, Edward D. Schneider, Kathryn Pulver, and Jesse Browner. The History of Terrorism: from Antiquity to al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007, pp. 221–255. Díaz-Barrado, Cástor Miguel, “The Definition of Terrorism and International Law,” in: Pablo Antonio Fernandez Sanchez. International Legal Dimension of Terrorism. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 27–42, p. 30. Epinay, Christian Lalive de and Gilbert Rist, “La crise de Zerka selon les titres de la presse romande,” in: Kongress der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fur Soziologie. Beitrage zur soziologischen Analyse der Schweiz / Contribution a l’analyse sociologique de la Suisse, Geneva: Societe suisse de sociologie, 1974, pp. 271–281. Finger, Seymour Maxwell, “International Terrorism and the United Nations,” in: Yonah Alexander. International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives. New York: Praeger, 1976, pp. 323–37. Freestone, David, “International cooperation against terrorism and the development of international law principles of jurisdiction,” in: Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory (eds.). Terrorism and International law. London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 43–67.

Bibliography

263

Gal-Or, Noemi, “Countering Terrorism in Israel,” in: David A. Charters (ed.). The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 137–172. Haltiner, Karl W., “ Vom schmerzlichen Verlieren alter Feindbilder—Bedrohungs- und Risikoanalysen in der Schweiz,” in: Thomas Jager and Ralph Thiele. Transformation der Sicherheitspolitik Deutschland, Ö sterreich, Schweiz im Vergleich. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2011. Harrison, Michael M., “France and International Terrorism: Problems and Response,” in: David A. Charters (ed.). The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 103–35. Imhof, Kurt., “Wiedergeburt der geistigen Landesverteidigung: Kalter Krieg in der Schweiz,” in: Kurt Imhof, Heinz Kleger, and Gaetano Romano (eds.). Konkordanz und kalter Krieg: Analyse von Medienereignissen in der Schweiz der Zwischen- und Nachkriegzeit. Zurich: Seismo, 1996, pp. 173–248. Paletz, D. L. and J. Boiney, “‘Researchers’ Perspectives,” in: David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid. Terrorism and the Media: How Researchers, Terrorists, Government, Press, Public, Victims view and use the Media. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage, 1992. Peterson, M.J., “Using the General Assembly,” in: Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss. Terrorism and the UN Before and After September 11. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 178–81. Pluchinsky, Dennis A., “An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany’s Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972–1991),” in: Yonah Alexander and Dennis A. Pluchinsky. European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow. Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1992, pp. 3–92. Rapoport, David C., “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in: Audrey Kurth Cronin, and James M. Ludes. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46–73. Reveron, Derek S., “Beyond the State? The impact of transnational terrorist threats on security cooperation,” in: Ersel Aydinli. Emerging Transnational (in)Security Governance: A Statist-Transnationalist Approach. London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 23–43. Riklin, Alois, “Die Neutralität der Schweiz,” in: Alois Riklin, Hans Haug, and Raymond Probst (eds.). Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Berne: Haupt, 1992. Roberts, Adam, “Countering Terrorism: A Historical Perspective,” in: Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller (eds.). Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge. Portland OR: Hart, 2008, pp. 3–42. Schindler, Dietrich, “Die Schweiz und das Völkerrecht,” in: Alois Riklin, Hans Haug, and Raymond Probst (eds.). Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Berne: Haupt, 1992.

264

Bibliography

Schmid, Alex P., “Definition of Terrorism,” in: Alex P. Schmid (ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 39–157. Snider, Colin, “A More Systemic Fight for Reform. University Reform, Student Movements, Society, and the State in Brazil, 1957–1968,” in: Samantha Christiansen and Zachary A. Scarlett (eds.). The Third World in the Global 1960s. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013, pp. 101–115. Sun-Tzu, “The Art of Warfare,” in: Sun-Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The Book of War. New York: Modern Library, 2000. Wilkinson, Paul, “Liberal State Responses to Terrorism and Their Limits,” in: Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller (eds.). Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge. Portland OR: Hart, 2008, pp. 71–92.



Journal Articles

Bassiouni, M. Cherif., “Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, spring 1981, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 1–51. Bassiouni, M. Cherif., “Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment,” Harvard International Law Journal, winter 2002, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 83–103. Brückner, Thomas, “Das Verhältnis der Schweiz zur UNO. Gedanken zu einer Beziehungsgeschichte,” Traverse, 2014, vol. 21, pp. 124–13. Blumenau, Bernhard, “Taming the Beast: West Germany, the Political Offence ­Exception and the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2015, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 310–30. Brückner, Thomas, “Das Verhältnis der Schweiz zur UNO. Gedanken zu einer Beziehungsgeschichte,” Traverse, vol. 21, 2014, pp. 124–13. Bülow, Mathilde von, “Franco-German Intelligence Cooperation and the Internationalization of Algeria’s War of Independence (1954–62),” Intelligence and National ­Security, 2013, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 397–419. Cassese, Antonio, “The International Community’s “legal” Response to Terrorism,” ­International and Comparative Law Quarterly, July 1989, vol. 38, pp. 589–608. Chamberlain, Kevin, “Collective Suspension of Air Services with States which Harbour Hijackers,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, July 1983, vol. 32, no. 03, pp 616–632. Crenshaw, Marta, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 1981, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 379–399. Dongen, Luc van. “De la place de la Suisse dans la ‘guerre froide secrete’ des Etats-Unis, 1943–1975.” Traverse, vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, pp. 55–72. Fägersten, Björn, “Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation—The Case of Europol,” Intelligence and National Security, 2010, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 500–520.

Bibliography

265

FitzGerald, Gerald F., “Recent Proposals for Concerted Action against States in Respect of Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 1974, vol. 40, pp. 161–224. Fluri-Dasein, Eric, “Die Schweiz und Schweden vor den Herausforderungen des Kalten Krieges 1945–1970: Neutralitätspolitik, militärische Kooperation, Osthandel und Korea-Mission,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, 2004, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 123– 124. Friedrichs, Jörg, “Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle Behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 2006, vol. 19, pp. 66–91. Guillaume, Gilbert, “Terrorism and International Law,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 3, 2004, pp. 537–548. Gunter, Michael M., “Switzerland and the United Nations,” International Organization, vol. winter 1976, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 129–152. Gurovitsch, Kerry Ann, “Legal Obstacles to Combatting International State-­Sponsored Terrorism,” Houston Journal of International Law, autumn 1987, vol. 10, pp. 159–180. Guttmann, Aviva “Secret Wires Across the Mediterranean: the Club de Berne, Euro-Israeli Counterterrorism, and Swiss ‘Neutrality’,” International History Review. (forthcoming). Guttmann, Aviva “Combatting Terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli Counterterrorism Intelligence Cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971–1972),” Intelligence and National Security (forthcoming). Guttmann, Aviva. “Une coalition antiterroriste sous l’égide d’un pays neutre: la réponse suisse face au terrorisme palestinien, 1969–1970,” in: Relations internationales, 2015, vol. 3, no. 163, 2015, pp. 95–110. Guttmann, Aviva. “Ernst Cinceras nichtstaatlicher Staatsschutz im Zeichen von Antisubversion, Gesamtverteidigung und Kaltem Krieg,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, vol.63, no. 1, 2013. Hoffman, Bruce, “Aviation Security and Terrorism: An Analysis of the Potential Threat to Air Cargo Integrators,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 10, 1998, pp. 54–61. Kim, Jae Taik, “North Korean Terrorism: Trends, Characteristics, and Deterrence,” ­Terrorism, 1988, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 309–322. Lagodny, Otto, “The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism?” The University of Colorado Law Review, 1989, vol. 60, pp. 583–600. Mackarel, Mark and Susan Nash, “Extradition and the European Union,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1997, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 948–957. Munton, Don and Miriam Matejova, “Spies without Borders? Western Intelligence Liaison, the Tehran Hostage Affair and Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” Intelligence and National Security, 2012, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 739–760.

266

Bibliography

Oberloskamp, Eva, “Das Olympia-Attentat 1972. Politische Lernprozesse im Umgang mit dem transnationalen Terrorismus,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, July 2012, vol. 60, no. 3, p. 321–352. O’Higgins, Paul, “European Convention on Extradition,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1960, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 491–494. Perliger, Arie and Leonard Weinberg, “Jewish Self Defense and Terrorist Groups Prior to the Establishment of the State of Israel: Roots and Traditions,” Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions, 2003, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 91–118. Rimanelli, Marco, “Italian Terrorism and Society, 1940s-1980s: Roots, Ideologies, Evolution, and International Connections,” Terrorism: An International Journal, 1989, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 249–96. Saul, Ben, “Attempts to define terrorism in international law,” Netherlands International Law Review, 2005, vol. 52, no. 01, pp. 57–83. Shapiro Jeremy and Benedicte Suzan, “The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism,” Survival, 2003, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 67–98. Sofaer, Abraham D., “Terrorism and the Law,” Foreign Affairs, summer 1986, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 901–922. Tilly, Charles, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory, 2004, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 5–13. Wilkinson Paul and Brian M. Jenkins, “Introduction,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 10, 1998, pp. 2–8. Wylie, Neville, “‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland, neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison,” Intelligence and National Security, 2006. vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 782–808. Wyss, Marco. “Neutrality in the early Cold War: Swiss arms imports and neutrality,” Cold War History, 2012, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 25–49. Young, Reuven, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,” in: Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 2006, vol. 29.



Masters Theses and Dissertations

Arbellay, Caroline. La crise de Zerqa (1970): regards croisés de la presse suisse et du Département politique fédéral, unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit], University of Fribourg 2008. Daetwyler, Georg. Der Terrorismus und das Internationale Strafrecht (unter Berücksichtigung des neuen europäischen Übereinkommens zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus von 1977). Zurich: Diploma Thesis [Lizenzarbeit] of the University of Zurich, 1981. Keller, Monika. Vom Terrorismus zum legitimen Widerstand des «palästinensischen Volkes»? Die Einschätzung und Darstellung der Palästinenser in den Schweizer Medien

Bibliography

267

zwischen 1964 und 1974, unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit], University of Fribourg 2006. Perrig, Igor. Geistige Landesverteidigung im kalten Krieg. Der schweizerische Aufklärungsdienst (SAD) und Heer und Haus 1945–1963, published Ph.D. thesis from the University of Friburg, Brig, 1993. Perroulaz, Gerard, and Serge Ghinet. Comment mieux cooperer avec le Bresil? Aide des ONG et relations economiques de la Suisse. Geneva: Itinéraires Notes et travaux, no 44, Institut universitaire d’etudes du developpement, 1995. Powell, Nathaniel Kinsey, France’s African Wars, 1974–1981, Ph.D. Dissertation, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013. Schmid, Christoph, Herausforderung Zerka. Die Entführung einer Swissair-Maschine durch palästinensische Extremisten im September 1970 und dessen Bewältigung in der Schweiz, unpublished diploma thesis [Lizenzarbeit], Berne: University of Berne, 2006. Villiger, Carole, Une Suisse pas si paisible: la violence comme moyen de revendication politique, 1950–2000, Ph.D. Dissertation, Lausanne: University of Lausanne, 2014.



Official Publications

Council of Europe. Extradition: European Standards: Explanatory Notes on the ­Council of Europe Convention and Protocols and Minimum Standards Protecting Persons Subject to Transnational Criminal Proceedings. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub, 2006. Leuenberger, Moritz (president of the Commission) and Josi Meier (vice-president), Vorkommnisse im EJPD. Bericht der Parlamentarischen Untersuchungskommission (PUK), 24 Bundesblatt, 142. Jahrgang, Bd. 1, 22.11.1989. Swiss Federal Council, Bericht des Bundesrates über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz, draft as of 26.10. 2015, the report was published on 11.11.2015, accessible online: http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/41701.pdf Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe «1970». Schlussbericht, 3.05.2016, accessible online: https://www.eda.admin.ch/ eda/de/home/dienstleistungenundpublikationen/publikationen/alle-publikationen .html/content/publikationen/de/eda/Geschichte/interdepartementale -arbeitsgruppe-1970 Swiss Federal Police (fedpol), 28.04.2004, Press release, accessible online: http://www .ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/aktuell/news/2004/ref_2004-04-28.html Zurich (city). Staatsschutz der Stadt Zurich: Bericht der Untersuchungskommission an den Gemeinderat von Zurich, Zurich: Untersuchungskommission Politische Polizei des Gemeinderates von Zurich, 1991.

268

Bibliography



Encyclopedia Articles



Newspaper Articles

Calvert, Peter, “Brazil: Military Dictatorship, 1946–85,” in: James Ciment (ed.). World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011, pp. 177–179. Crenshaw, Martha and John Pimlott (eds.). Encyclopedia of World Terrorism. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1997. Fink, Paul, “Dürrenmatt, Peter,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 18/03/2010, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6272.php Hättenschwiler, Diego, “Weisskopf, Erich,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 08/08/2012, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6750 .php?topdf=1. Kushner, Harvey W., “Introduction,” in: Harvey W. Kushner. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2003, pp. xxiii–xxvii. Lescaze, Bernard, “Henri Schmitt” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 02.10.2014, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6666.php Perrenoud, Marc, “Ernst Thalmann,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 02.04.2012, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D14899.php Perrenoud, Marc, “Jimmy Martin,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 03.12.2013, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D30736.php Rapoport, David, “Terrorism,” in: Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics. London: Routledge, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 1061–1082. Riklin, Alois, “Neutralität. Verfestigung der Neutralität,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 09.11.2010, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/ textes/d/D16572.php Senarclens, Jean de, “Olivier Reverdin,” in:: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz (HLS), version of 19.08.2010, online accessible: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D6547.php Steffen Gerber, Therese, “Walder, Hans,” in: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 20.08.2013, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D31892.php Studer, Brigitte, “Antikommunismus,” Historiches Lexikon der Schweiz, version of 23.03.2009, accessible online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D27836.php.

Burke, Jason, “Bonn ‘faked’ hijack to free killers,” The Observer, 26.03.2000, accessible online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/26/jasonburke.theobserver1. Büschi, Hans U., “Brasilien ist für “Bern” tabu,” National-Zeitung, 09.02.1971. Green, David B., “This Day in Jewish History. The First and Only El Al Hijacking. The 39-day ordeal heralded the rise of political terror in the air,” Haaretz, 23.07.2013, online accessible: http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/this-day-in-jewish-history/. premium-1.537402.

Bibliography

269

Gyr, Marcel, “Arabischer Terror in der Schweiz (1/4). Ein dunkler Verdacht,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), 27.12.2014. Online accessible: http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/ arabischer-terror-in-der-schweiz-1-1.18445672. Laqueur, Walter “The Futility of Terrorism,” Harper’s Magazine, March 1976, pp. 99–105. Rubinstein, Amnon, “Bonn’s disgrace,” in: Haarez, 30 October 1972, quoted through Yael Greenfeter, “Israel in shock as Munich killers freed,” Haaretz, 04.09.2010. Satta, Majid “Deutsche Geschichte(n) Folgen eines Anschlags: Mit einer Flugzeugentführung preßten palästinensische Terroristen im Oktober 1972 die drei überlebenden Olympia-Attentäter frei. Die Bundesrepublik hatte nun einige Sorgen weniger,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.11.2006, accessible online: http:// www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/die-gegenwart-1/deutsche-geschichte-n-folgen-eines -anschlags-1381601.html.

Others

Historical Statistics of Switzerland, Chapter L, “L.42a. Einfuhrwerte einzelner Produkte nach den wichtigsten Ursprungsländern (in Millionen Franken): Mittel der Jahre 1970– 1973,” online accessible: www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/nls_rev/sylkgenerator.php?datei =L.42aLaenderWaren1970_73L.slk&filename=L.42aLaenderWaren1970_73L .slk&chapter=l/. Kommission für Entwicklungsfragen der Universität Zürich. “Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Schweiz-Brasilien,” Zentrum Schweiz—Peripherie Brasilien, eine Dokumentation zu den schweizerischen-brasilianischen Beziehungen, 1975, in: Dokumentensammlung Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum der Universität Basel (WWZ). Mitchell, Claire, Sources of the “aut dedere aut judicare” obligation, in: Aut Dedere, aut Judicare: The Extradite or Prosecute Clause in International Law [online]. Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, 2009. Accessible online: http://books.openedition .org/iheid/301.



Referenced Internet Sites Conventions and Resolutions (in chronological order)

ICAO, Chicago Convention, 7 December 1944: http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/ chicago1944a.pdf. CoE, European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957: http://conventions.coe .int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/024.htm. Organisation of American States, Convention to Prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance, February 1971: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-49.html. CoE, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 684 on International Terrorism, 23 October 1972: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/PA_Recommendation _684_1972_EN.pdf.

270

Bibliography

UN, Resolution 3034, 18 December 1972: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/27/ ares3034%28xxvii%29.pdf CoE, CoM, Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism, 24 January 1974: https://wcd .coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet& InstranetImage=589966&SecMode=1&DocId=648192&Usage=2. CoE, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27 January 1977: http:// conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/090.htm.



Research initiatives

Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland: http://dodis.ch. Mentioned staff members of the FPD:

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •



Bucher, Giovanni Enrico, dodis.ch/P10060. Fritschi, Karl, dodis.ch/P16389. Gelzer, Michael, dodis.ch/P2735. Guldimann, Werner, dodis.ch/P43133. Hartmann, Rudolf, dodis.ch/P2732. Hohl, Alfred Reinhard, dodis.ch/P16080. Martin, Jimmy, dodis.ch/P1558. Micheli, Pierre, dodis.ch/P86. Pictet, François-Charles, dodis.ch/P17262. Ritter, Jean-Pierre, dodis.ch/P17429. Salis, Gaudenz von, dodis.ch/P16413. Sciolli, Dino, dodis.ch/P15376. Thalmann, Ernst, dodis.ch/P997. Turrettini, Bernard, dodis.ch/P2656.

Appendixes Appendix 1: PFLP Propaganda Material Imitation of Swissair ticket with claim of responsibility and explanation for attacking Switzerland:

272

Appendixes

Stamp with text in Arabic: “in memory of Zurich” (in reference to the PFLP attack at Zurich Kloten Airport in 1969). It is likely that the people in the forefront refer to George Habash and Lelah Khaled:

Documents found in: CH-BAR, E4363A#1986/166#6*, Dokumentation über Bürgerkrieg in Jordanien im Herbst 1970 sowie über PFLP, 1969–1971.

Appendix 2: UN Resolution 3034, 18.12.1972 3034 (XXVII). Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying

Appendixes

273

causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes

The General Assembly

Deeply perturbed over acts of international terrorism which are occurring with increasing frequency and which take a toll of innocent human lives, Recognizing the importance of international cooperation in devising measures effectively to prevent their occurrence and of studying their underlying causes with a view to finding just and peaceful solutions as quickly as possible, Recalling the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1 Expresses deep concern over increasing acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms; 2 Urges States to devote their immediate attention to finding just and peaceful solutions to the underlying causes which give rise to such acts of violence; 3 Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist régimes and other forms of alien domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations; 4 Condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms; 5 Invites States to become parties to the existing international conventions which relate to various aspects of the problem of international terrorism; 6 Invites States to take all appropriate measures at the national level with a view to the speedy and final elimination of the problem, bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 3 above; 7 Invites States to consider the subject-matter urgently and submit observations to the Secretary-General by 10 April 1973, including concrete proposals for finding an effective solution to the problem; 8 Requests the Secretary-General to transmit an analytical study of the observations of States submitted under paragraph 7 above to the ad hoc committee to be established under paragraph 9; 9 Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism consisting of thirty-five members to be appointed by the President of the General

274

Appendixes Assembly bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation; 10 Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to consider the observations of States under paragraph 7 above and submit its report with recommendations for possible co-operation for the speedy elimination of the problem, bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 3, to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session; 11 Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Ad Hoc Committee with the necessary facilities and services; 12 Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of its twentyeighth session.

At its 2114th plenary meeting, 18 December 1972

Appendix 3: European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27.01.1977 Strasbourg, 27.01.1977 The member States of the Council of Europe, signatory hereto, Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members; Aware of the growing concern caused by the increase in acts of terrorism; Wishing to take effective measures to ensure that the perpetrators of such acts do not escape prosecution and punishment; Convinced that extradition is a particularly effective measure for achieving this result, Have agreed as follows;

Article 1 For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of the following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political ­motives: a an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970;

Appendixes

275

b an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971; c a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; d an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention; e an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons; f an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.

Article 2 1 For the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, a Contracting State may decide not to regard as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives a serious offence involving an act of violence, other than one covered by Article 1, against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a person. 2 The same shall apply to a serious offence involving an act against property, other than one covered by Article 1, if the act created a collective danger for persons. 3 The same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.

Article 3 The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable between Contracting States, including the European Convention on Extradition, are modified as between Contracting States to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention.

Article 4 For the purpose of this Convention and to the extent that any offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 is not listed as an extraditable offence in any extradition convention or

276

Appendixes

treaty existing between Contracting States, it shall be deemed to be included as such therein.

Article 5 Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for an offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.

Article 6 1 Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over an offence mentioned in Article 1 in the case where the suspected offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him after receiving a request for extradition from a Contracting State whose jurisdiction is based on a rule of jurisdiction existing equally in the law of the requested State. 2 This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

Article 7 A Contracting State in whose territory a person suspected to have committed an offence mentioned in Article 1 is found and which has received a request for extradition under the conditions mentioned in Article 6, paragraph 1, shall, if it does not extradite that person, submit the case, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.

Article 8 1 Contracting States shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters in connection with proceedings brought in

Appendixes

277

respect of the offences mentioned in Article 1 or 2. The law of the requested State concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters shall apply in all cases. Nevertheless this assistance may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives. 2 Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to afford mutual assistance if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for mutual assistance in respect of an offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. 3 The provisions of all treaties and arrangements concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters applicable between Contracting States, including the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, are modified as between Contracting States to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention.

Article 9 1 The European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe shall be kept informed regarding the application of this Convention. 2 It shall do whatever is needful to facilitate a friendly settlement of any difficulty which may arise out of its execution.

Article 10 1 Any dispute between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, which has not been settled in the framework of Article 9, paragraph 2, shall, at the request of any Party to the dispute, be referred to arbitration. Each Party shall nominate an arbitrator and the two arbitrators shall nominate a referee. If any Party has not nominated its arbitrator within the three months following the request for arbitration, he shall be nominated at the request of the other Party by the President of the European Court of Human Rights. If the latter should be a national of one of the Parties to the dispute, this duty shall be carried out by the Vice-President of the Court or if the Vice-President is a national of one of the Parties to the dispute, by the most senior judge of the Court not being a national of one of the

278

Appendixes Parties to the dispute. The same procedure shall be observed if the arbitrators cannot agree on the choice of referee. 2 The arbitration tribunal shall lay down its own procedure. Its decisions shall be taken by majority vote. Its award shall be final.

Article 11 1 This Convention shall be open to signature by the member States of the Council of Europe. It shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 2 The Convention shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance or ­approval. 3 In respect of a signatory State ratifying, accepting or approving subsequently, the Convention shall come into force three months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

Article 12 1 Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, specify the territory or territories to which this Convention shall apply. 2 Any State may, when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval or at any later date, by declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend this Convention to any other territory or territories specified in the declaration and for whose international relations it is responsible or on whose behalf it is authorised to give undertakings. 3 Any declaration made in pursuance of the preceding paragraph may, in respect of any territory mentioned in such declaration, be withdrawn by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Such withdrawal shall take effect immediately or at such later date as may be specified in the notification.

Appendixes

279

Article 13 1 Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, declare that it reserves the right to refuse extradition in respect of any offence mentioned in Article 1 which it considers to be a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives, provided that it undertakes to take into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offence, any particularly serious aspects of the offence, including: a that it created a collective danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons; or b that it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it; or c that cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of the offence. 2 Any State may wholly or partly withdraw a reservation it has made in accordance with the foregoing paragraph by means of a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe which shall become effective as from the date of its receipt. 3 A State which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may not claim the application of Article 1 by any other State; it may, however, if its reservation is partial or conditional, claim the application of that article in so far as it has itself accepted it.

Article 14 Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by means of a written notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Any such denunciation shall take effect immediately or at such later date as may be specified in the notification.

Article 15 This Convention ceases to have effect in respect of any Contracting State which withdraws from or ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe.

280

Appendixes

Article 16 The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the Council of: a any signature; b any deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval; c any date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with Article 11 thereof; d any declaration or notification received in pursuance of the provisions of Article 12; e any reservation made in pursuance of the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 1; f the withdrawal of any reservation effected in pursuance of the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 2; g any notification received in pursuance of Article 14 and the date on which denunciation takes effect; h any cessation of the effects of the Convention pursuant to Article 15. In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this Convention. Done at Strasbourg, this 27th day of January 1977, in English and in French, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory States.

Index Agence France Press, AFP 38, 39, 42 Air France 210, 215, 221 Algeria 17, 30–31, 49, 70–71, 125–126, 133, 223 Aliança Libertadora Nacional [National ­Liberation Alliance], ALN 60, 64, 90 Allende, Salvador 81 Amstein, André 15n, 32n, 183, 185, 187, 241 Anticommunism 20 Arab-Israeli conflict 3–4, 35, 51, 55, 180, 205, 213, 226, 240, 245, 247 Arafat, Yassir 25–26, 47, 125, 201, 206 Athens 32, 35, 231–232; see also Terrorist   Attacks  Australia 13, 126, 183 Austria 31n, 32n, 138n, 141, 165, 183, 185, 187, 207, 231 Austrian Airlines 111 Baghdad 61, 202, 217 Barbosa, Mario Gibson 64, 67, 70, 75, 78 Basque 18, 156, 159 Beirut 37–38, 46, 49, 200n, 204, 213, 216–217, 223 Belgium 129, 140–142, 154, 165, 166, 183, 184, 198 Berne 10, 33, 41, 43, 45–50, 58, 61–62, 71, 75, 80–82, 85, 89, 91, 111, 141, 155, 164, 215; for the intelligence network see Club de Berne  Binnenlandse Veiligheids Dienst, BVD see   Club de Berne  Black September Organisation see   Palestinian Armed Groups  Blumenfeld, Erik Bernhard 135 Bolle, Pierre-Henri 145, 147, 150, 166 Border Protection Group 9 of the German Federal Police, GSG9 188 Brazil 12, 26, 57–96, 194, 230, 233–235 British Overseas Airways Corporation, BOAC 46 Brussels 153, 155–156, 198, 212–213 Buback, Siegfried 189n

Bucher, Giovanni Enrico 12, 57, 61–91, 99, 108, 233–235, 247, 249; see also terrorist attacks  Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz see Club de Berne  Büschi, Hans 86 Cairo 30, 37, 53, 200n Canada 13, 183 Chile 70–71, 77, 81 China 17 Chirac, Jacques 155, 159 Club de Berne 2–6, 8–9, 13, 15–16, 179–187, 190–191, 193, 226–228, 230, 240–242, 244–246, 249 Intelligence agencies that frequently used the Kilowatt network:  Binnenlandse Veiligheids Dienst, BVD (Netherlands) 184, 208, 216, 224 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV (West Germany) 184, 198, 199,   202–205, 216, 218, 220–223 Bundespolizei, (Switzerland) 193, 195–200, 208, 212–213, 215 Direction de la surveillance du territoire, DST (France) 184, 197, 200, 209, 210,   224 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI (United States) 184, 196n Military Intelligence, Section 5, MI5 (United Kingdom) 184, 195, 200, 202,   206, 209, 211–213, 224 Mossad (Israel) 184, 195, 197–214, 219–221 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET (Denmark) 184 Renseignements Généraux, RG (France) 184, 228 Service de Renseignement de l’Etat, SREL (Luxembourg) 184, 196 Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Democratice, SISDE (Italy) 184, 197,   212n, 214n, 215, 216, 217n, 218, 224

282  Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Militare, SISMI (Italy) 184 Shin Bet (Israel) 184, 195–196, 215, 219–220 Sureté d’Etat, (Belgium) 184, 198, 214, 198, 213 Cointrin Airport Geneva 196 Cold War 1–8, 10–12, 17–21, 51, 55, 104, 179–81, 227–8, 230–231, 238, 240, 249 Cologne 79, 84, 156, 220 Colombia 194 Comité Suisse de Soutien au Peuple Palestinien, CSSPP 198 Cooley, John Kent 204 Council of Europe 1–2, 12, 99, 102–103, 132, 134–141, 143–144, 146–147, 149–150, 153–168, 171–172, 174–175, 186, 237–239, 246 Ad hoc Committee to examine the problems raised by certain new forms of concerted acts of violence 144–146,   150–151 Ad hoc Committee to look into the legal aspects of the problem raised by international terrorism 136, 138–141 Commission for Political Questions of the CoE’s Consultative Assembly 135 Committee of Ministers, CoM 135–140, 143–144, 156 Committee of Ministers’ Deputies, CoMD 137–138, 141, 151, 154, 156,   159, 163–164 Conference of Ministers of Justice 138, 152–153, 155 European Committee for Crime Problems, ECCP 141–146, 148, 150–151, 153,   164–166 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, ECST 1, 10, 12, 103, 150,   154–155, 157–170, 238–239,   246–247 European Convention on Extradition 139, 141 Legal approach to international terrorism: aut dedere, aut judicare 102, 139, 144,   151 Recommendation 684 on International Terrorism 135

index Resolution (74) 3 on International Terrorism 144 Subcommittee XXXI on the Application of the European Convention on ­Extradition 141–143, 145 Cuba 17, 19, 123 Cyprus 158, 217 Dawson’s Field 36–37, 46–47 Denmark 138, 152, 171–172, 183–184, 239 Dhabor, Amina 202 Direction de la surveillance du territoire, DST see Club de Berne  Dürrenmatt, Peter 84 East Germany 187–188 ECST see Council of Europe  Egypt 30, 52, 104, 117–118, 131, 194 Elbick, Burke 64 European Community, EC 149, 155–156, 159–162, 229 European Union, EU 229, 245 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA 18 Fatah see Palestinian Armed Groups  Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI see Club de Berne Federal Republic of Germany, FRG see West Germany Feller, Max 63–76, 79–86, 89, 90n, 92–93, 96, 234–235 France 13, 73, 102n, 114, 116, 152, 154–166, 168–169, 183, 209, 216, 224, 228, 238 Interior Ministry 158–159 Justice Ministry 157–159 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA 158, 159, 162 Policymaking at the CoE 155–161 Secrétariat général du comité ­interministériel, SGCI 175 Frankfurt 37, 111, 201, 220 Freymond, Jacques 47 Fritschi, Karl 106 Furgler, Kurt 147–148, 150, 154, 167, 171, 185, 187, 190 Fürstenfeldbruck Airport 104. For Munich   Olympic Massacre see Terrorism

index Gautschi, Olivier 145–146, 148n, 150, 166n Gelzer, Michael 38, 39n, 40n, 41–42, 62, 70–73, 79–80, 84, 90, 95–96, 188 Geneva 38, 119, 136, 197n, 198, 212 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 162 German Democratic Republic, GDR see East Germany  Golsong, Heribert 164–165 Goretta, J.P. 80 Graber, Pierre 27n, 34, 42–43, 45, 50–51, 79, 83, 86, 136–137, 173 Great Britain see United Kingdom  Greece 32, 129n, 152 Grotius, Hugo 102 Group of 7, G7 117n, 134 Guldimann, Werner 112 Habash, George 25, 25n, 26, 201, 202, 272 Haegler, Eric 88 Hartmann, Rudolf 171–172 Hawatmeh, Nayef 26 Herold, Horst 188 Hezbolla 19 Hohl, Alfred Reinhard 107 Holleben, Ehrenfried von 65, 73 Intelligence Cooperation see Club de   Berne  International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO 2, 10, 12, 32n, 99–101,   109–120, 129, 134, 139, 171, 173, 231, 237 British-French-Swiss proposition 114, 116–117 Convention on International Civil A ­ viation (Chicago Convention) 100, 114–117 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention) 32n, 112, 120,   231 Convention on Offences and Certain ­Other Acts Committed on Board ­Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) 111–112, 120 Convention for the Suppression of ­Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague ­Convention) 111–114, 120, 169 Legal Committee Meeting in Montreal, 9–30 January 1973 112, 114–116

283 Rome Conference, 28 August to 21 ­September 1973 116–120, 237 US proposition for a convention on ­concerted measures 109, 112–117 Resolution A20–1 118  International Committee of the Red Cross 32, 37–39, 41, 44–50,   52–53, 88 International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL 139, 189 International Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence, TREVI 228–229 Iran 19, 194–195, 197n, 210, 228 Iraq 26, 31n, 187, 216, 220 Ireland 153–155, 158, 166, 183, 185 Irish Republican Army, IRA 18–19, 208 Israel 2–4, 6, 9, 13, 16–17, 26, 28–30, 35, 37n, 39–41, 43–52, 55, 104, 117–118, 124–126, 158, 181, 183, 187, 193, 195–198, 201, 203–205, 207–212, 214–216, 218–222, 226–227, 231–233, 240, 243–245, 247 Italy 183, 184 Iyad, Abu (Salah Mesbah Khalaf) 201, 202 Japanese Red Army, JRA 195, 213, 214, 215 Jibril, Ahmed 26, 201–203, 206 Jordan 18, 25, 29, 36, 44, 47–53, 55, 96, 103n, 194, 231–233 Kaddumi, Faruk 201, 203 Khaled, Lela 37, 39, 44, 53, 201 Kilowatt 2, 179, 181–182, 184–187, 193–228, 232, 240–245; see also Club de Berne  Kloten Airport 27, 29, 38, 52–53, 196, 202, 230–231, 248, for Kloten Airport Attack see Terrorism  Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti [Committee for State Security], KGB 3n, 180 Lebanon 18, 29, 117, 194, 201, 203, 206, 215, 223, 231 Lecanuet, Jean 155 Libya 18–19, 26, 217, 221–222

284  Lod Tel Aviv Airport 16, 214; for Lod Airport massacre see terrorism  London 16, 37, 44, 201, 203, 211–213, 220–221 Lufthansa 202, 220–222; for hijacking of Lufthansa flight on 29 October 1972 see Terrorism Luxembourg 63, 162, 183–184, 196 Martin, Jimmy 133–134 Medici, Emílio Garrastazu 62–63 Mello, Parente de 63 Mexico 70–71 Micheli, Pierre 50, 62, 80–81, 96, 106n Middle East 19, 105, 123, 191, 194–195, 230, 249 Military Intelligence, Section 5, MI5 see Club de Berne  Moos, Ludwig von 235 Moret, Yves 149, 166n, 171 Morocco 30 Mossad see Club de Berne  Mossé, Claude 81 Munich 44, 48, 53, 231; for Munich Olympic Attack see Terrorism Nasser, Gamal Abdel 52 National Security Agency, NSA 6 Netherlands 156, 161, 183, 184, 223 Neutrality 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7n, 8, 11, 28, 30, 31, 42, 50, 51, 55, 56, 87, 92, 94, 175, 180, 181, 187, 190, 230, 231, 236, 240, 241, 245, 247, 248, 249 Neutrality law 3, 180 Permanent neutrality 3, 4, 8n, 181, 240, 249 Nidal, Abu 26 Nigeria 194 Nine see European Community  North Korea 19 Obernai 144, 147, 246 Okuchi, Nobuo 64 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD 128

index Palestinian Armed Groups 3, 6, 9–11, 16, 18–20, 25–28, 30, 32–33, 35, 37–39, 41, 44–48, 50–56, 95–96, 101, 103–104, 111, 122, 125, 179, 181, 184, 198, 201, 204– 205, 209–210, 215, 218, 221, 224, 226– 227, 230, 232–235, 240, 244–245, 247 al-Saika 26 Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) 25 Black September Organisation (BSO) 26,   103, 200–201, 203–206, 214, 216–218,   220–222, 248 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 26 Fatah 25–26, 199–201, 203–206, 209–210, 216, 221, 223 Palestine Liberation Organisation, PLO 18, 25–26, 27n, 47, 125, 201, 223 Palestinian Arab Front 26 PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) 26, 32, 200–201, 206 Popular Front for the Liberation of ­Palestine (PFLP) 3, 11, 16–19, 25–26, 28–29,   31–32, 37–50, 52–55, 95–96, 180, 200–202, 204, 206, 208, 214–215, 231–234, 247 Pan American 37, 201 Paris 10, 61, 73, 155, 162, 196, 198, 201, 212, 216–217, 220 PFLP see Palestinian Armed Groups  Pictet, François-Charles 106 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste, PET see Club de Berne  Red Army Faction (RAF) 18, 20, 144, 187, 189n, 209 Red Brigades 18 Renseignements Généraux, RG see Club de Berne  Reverdin, Olivier 119 Ritter, Jean-Pierre 106, 108–110, 112–114, 116, 119, 129, 138, 173 Rochat, Andé 32n, 37–38, 41, 44, 47n  Sabra (Gaza) 203 Salameh, Ali Hassan 203 Salis, Gaudenz von 107 Santayana, Mauro 79

index Sauvagnargues, Jean 162 Schmitt, Henri 136–137 Schouwey, J. 146, 150, 166n  Sciolli, Dino 106 Service de Renseignement de l’Etat, SREL see Club de Berne  Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Democratice, SISDE see Club de Berne  Servizio Informationi e Sicurezza Militare, SISMI see Club de Berne  Shin Bet see Club de Berne  Société suisse de radiodiffusion et télévision, SSR 80 Soviet Union 3, 17–19, 21, 116, 127, 173n, 179–180, 191, 227, 238 Spain 158, 183, 185 Stockholm 144, 204 Strasbourg 10, 137, 150, 152, 154, 157, 162 Sureté d’Etat see Club de Berne  Sweden 152, 183, 185, 196n. Swissair 31–32, 34–36, 38–39, 41, 46, 52, 53n, 54, 111, 231–232 Switzerland 1–4, 6–8, 10–12, 15, 20–21, 25, 27n, 28–35, 38–46, 48–55, 57–61, 63, 65, 69–70, 72–78, 80, 85–89, 91–96, 99, 103, 105, 107–116, 118, 128–130, 132, 134, 136–137, 141, 143, 145–150, 154, 157, 164–168, 170–175, 180–181, 183–184, 187–190, 193, 203, 208, 212, 213n, 215, 225, 229–232, 234–235, 238–241, 244–249 Council of States 62, 87, 119 Federal Archives, BAR 10, 12 Federal Council 10, 11n, 28, 33–35, 38–40, 42, 45n, 49–50, 52–53, 63, 77, 86–87, 95–96, 119, 136, 233, 235 Federal Department of Justice and Police, FDJP 141, 146, 150, 167–168, 172, 175,   190, 208, 245–246 Federal Department of Transport, ­Communications, and Energy 112 Federal Office of Civil Aviation, FOCA 109, 112, 171 Federal Office of the Attorney General 63n, 143, 145–147, 148n, 149,   166, 171, 187, 190 Federal Office for Justice 148–149, 166 Federal Office of Police 146, 148–149,   see also Club de Berne 

285 Federal Political Department, FPD 29, 33–34, 38, 42, 46, 50, 52–53, 62, 90, 96, 103, 105–106, 109–110, 112, 118–119, 128–129, 138–139, 146, 149, 152, 155, 165, 170–173, 175, 186, 236, 238 National Council 62, 83–84, 87, 136 Parliamentary Committee (also called Commission) for Foreign Affairs 28n,   29, 62, 87 Syria 18, 26, 29, 31, 231 Tel Aviv 16, 27, 32, 37, 195, 213–215, 231 Terrorism 1–7, 10–20, 25–27, 31, 35, 53–59, 61, 78, 87, 91–92, 94, 96, 99–111, 113, 115, 117–143, 147, 149, 151–152, 154, 156, 158–159, 167–175, 179–184, 186–191, 197, 224, 226–246, 249 Attacks:  Ambassador Bucher Kidnapping (7 ­December 1970) 57–96 Athens Airport Attack (2 July 1970)  32, 35, 231 Lod Tel Aviv Airport massacre (30 May 1972) 195, 213–215, 219, 241 Lufthansa Hijacking (29 October 1972) 213, 217, 222–223 Munich Olympic Massacre (5 September 1972) 26, 101,   103–104, 122, 185, 210,   213, 216–217, 221–222, 246 Pipeline Attack in Trieste (5 August 1972) 213, 216 Sabena Hijacking (8 May 1972) 213, 215, 218 Skyjack Sunday 12, 27, 55, 62, 92, 95–96, 99, 103n, 232, 234–235, 239, 249 Crisis management during Skyjack ­Sunday 43–56 West German Embassy siege in ­Stockholm, (24 April 1975) 144 Würenlingen attack (21 February 1970) 32, 111, 231, 249 Zurich Kloten Airport Attack (18 February 1969) 27–28 Counterterrorism 1–2, 4–5, 9–13, 18, 26, 34, 43, 50, 54, 64, 96, 99–100, 103, 106–107, 109–110, 112,

286  Counterterrorism (cont.) 114–115, 118–122, 124, 126–129, 132, 135–137, 139–141, 143–144, 146–150, 153, 155–159, 161–163, 166, 169–175, 179–183, 185–191, 193, 197, 219, 224–225, 228–233, 235–243, 245–246, 248–250 Definition 12, 13–16, 102, 105, 125, 127, 131, 133, 140, 151, 169–170, 238 International Terrorism 1, 6, 11–12, 16–18, 25, 56, 99–102, 104, 111, 123, 126–127, 133–136, 138, 144, 168, 170, 173, 175, 230, 235–237, 249 State Terrorism 105, 117–119, 124, 126–127, 131, 133 Terrorism-supporting countries 118, 237 Thalmann, Ernst 106, 112 Third World 2, 12–13, 90, 99–100, 102, 105, 113, 116–117, 120, 124, 126–131, 133–134, 157–158, 160, 169, 173– 175, 227, 236, 238, 245, 247 Toufik, Ibrahim 202 Trans World Airlines, TWA 35, 37, 39, 46 Tripoli 217, 218n Tschudi, Hans-Peter 63 Tunisia and Tunis 194, 217 Turkey 156, 158, 189, 210, 217 Turrettini, Bernard 105–106, 172 United Arab Republic, UAR 194, see also Egypt  United Kingdom UK 5, 40, 43–46, 48–50, 52, 116, 133, 153, 180, 183–184, 202, 209, 232 United Nations 2, 12, 46, 99–102, 104–109, 117, 120–124, 126–130, 132–136, 138–141, 148–149, 158, 167–168, 171–173, 237–239, 246  6th Commission in charge of legal ­affairs 107–108, 123–124, 126, 129 Ad Hoc Committee for the study of terrorism’s underlying causes (sometimes also called “Ad Hoc Commission”) 106, 126,   128, 133  Educational, Scientific and Cultural ­Organization, UNESCO 112 General Assembly (GA) Resolution 3034 On Measures to Prevent International

index Terrorism 108, 126, 128–129, 132,   135–136 Swiss counterterrorism diplomacy at the UN 128–132 United States 2–3, 5–6, 13, 18–19, 35–36, 39–44, 45n, 46–48, 52–53, 64, 88, 99, 107, 109, 112–116, 118, 121, 123–124, 126–127, 130, 133, 174, 179–180, 183, 185, 187, 213, 220, 232–233, 237–238, 244 Universality principle see neutrality  Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria, VPR 57–71, 73–80, 82, 85, 87–89,   90n, 92–95, 235 Varig Airlines 224 Vienna 111, 211, 213–214, 216n Voyame, Joseph 147–148, 164–165, 166n Walder, Hans 185–186 Waldheim, Kurt 121–123, 127, 246 Weid, Jean Marc von der 87 Weisskopf, Erich 83 West Germany 20, 39, 40, 43–45, 48–50, 64, 73, 84, 85, 88, 104, 144, 154, 161, 162, 165, 171, 183, 184, 187–189n, 202–205, 209, 210, 217, 218, 221–223, 232, 246 GSG9 188 Bundeskriminalamt 188 Western Europe 1, 3–4, 6, 13, 99, 121, 123, 127, 135, 174, 180, 183, 186, 188, 190, 238, 244, 250 Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen 45n, 48, 49n Working Group on Terrorism, WGT 10, 103, 106–110, 112–115, 128–129, 132, 136, 138, 143, 170–174, 236–237, 239 Würenlingen see Terrorism  Wyssmann, Hans-Peter 141 Yemen 124–125, 203 Yugoslavia 210, 217 Zagreb 201, 217 Zarqa 36 Zurich 30, 32–34, 36, 38–39, 44, 52, 53, 61, 215, 231–233; for Zurich Kloten Attack see Terrorism