Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping: International Cooperation at Work 9781626376632

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Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

Evolving Patterns of PEACEKEEPING International Cooperation at Work

Hikaru Yamashita

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2017 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2017 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: 978-1-62637-662-5 (hc. : alk. paper) British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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Contents

vii ix

List of Tables Acknowledgments

1

What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation?

2

Contexts and Actors

13

3

Understanding Peacekeeping Cooperation

45

4

Operational Collaboration: Sudan and Congo

69

5

Joint Decisionmaking: Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Congo

115

6

Capacity-Building Assistance and African Peacekeeping

149

7

Global Security Governance and International Cooperation

189

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Bibliography Index About the Book

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197 203 223 235

Tables

2.1

Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations by Situation, 1990–2016

19

Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations by Year, 1990–2016

21

Peacekeeping Cooperation Norms Articulated by the UN, the AU, and the EU

57

4.1

Operational Collaboration, 1990–2016

70

4.2

UN Peacekeeping Deployments, 1990–2016

73

4.3

Multinational Forces and UN Peacekeeping: Uniformed Personnel

75

2.2 3.1

5.1

Joint Decisionmaking, 1990–2016

116

6.1

French RECAMP Training Cycles

168

vii

Acknowledgments

The idea of a study on peacekeeping cooperation was conceived

in a process of trial and error that spanned nearly a decade. I took up a research position at the National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo in 2003, the year that, as I highlight in Chapter 2, proved to be a turning point in the globalization of peacekeeping. Through researching and teaching peacekeeping at NIDS, I realized that some fundamental changes were taking place. I spent eight months between the summer of 2008 and the spring of 2009 thinking about this question at Columbia’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, but it took a few more years to come up with what is now the third chapter of this book. The three empirical chapters that follow Chapter 3 were completed more or less concurrently with the process of theory development. I was not at all sure what I would end up with, and I am certainly indebted to many people for getting this far. At NIDS, which is a research institute within the Japanese Ministry of Defense, I have immensely benefited from research projects, workshops, and educational engagements, as well as from informal conversations and daily chats with officers, officials, and researchers. In particular, NIDS has researchers covering a whole range of area and security studies, and talking and working with them on a daily basis has always been inspirational. I would like to thank the Japan-US Educational Commission/ Fulbright Japan for granting a visiting scholarship, and the Saltzman Institute for accepting me as a visiting scholar. I am especially grateful to Richard K. Betts, director, and Kimberly Martin, my host professor, for kind hospitality and advice during the visit. My thanks also go to ix

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Acknowledgments

experts I have come to know along the way for sharing experiences and insights on various occasions, including Patrick Cammaert, Eunsook Chung, Michael Doyle, Ekkehard Griep, Birger Heldt, Wolfgang Jilke, Randhir Kumar Mehta, Yukie Osa, Nicholas Sambanis, Hideaki Shinoda, Paul D. Williams, and Tetsuya Yamada. This work would not have taken the form it did without the support of Lynne Rienner Publishers. I was fortunate to work with Caroline Wintersgill, who helped me with enthusiasm and sharp interest in this project from early on. She and Lynne Rienner were instrumental in reorganizing my argumentation in an early draft and remained very supportive throughout the production process. Finally, my greatest debt is to my wife, Atsuko, and our child, Mei. This book’s final pages were written during our daughter’s busy but delightful first months. I am cautious yet hopeful that she will live her life in a more peaceful future.

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

1 What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation? This book is an inquiry into the evolution of global peacekeeping

cooperation. It asks what motivations drive such cooperation, what concrete forms it has taken, and what it means for the international community, especially its collective management of global instabilities and security challenges (i.e., global security governance). Peacekeeping, of course, has been global from its inception, and has always been about international cooperation. Peacekeeping as we know it owes its origin and development mostly to the United Nations, an international organization whose membership covers most of the globe.1 Indeed, since its first deployment as the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the wake of the first Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, UN peacekeeping operations have been multinational and authorized by one of the UN’s two principal organs: either the Security Council or, in a few early cases, the General Assembly. Global peacekeeping cooperation refers to a more specific development taking place in recent years: the emergence of new peacekeeping organizers and initiatives that create an increasingly active and dense web of cooperative relationships among contributing states and international and regional organizations. This development is premised on the phenomenon of institutional proliferation: several regional organizations and global policy frameworks started taking their own peacekeeping roles. Historically, peacekeeping has been the responsibility of the United Nations;2 and yet the UN’s long-held monopoly on peacekeeping has now been replaced by a global proliferation of peacekeeping actors. Examples abound. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a peacekeeping mission in 1990, to Liberia, 1

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followed by missions to Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Ivory Coast, while the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed its peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan and Georgia in 1993 and 1994, respectively. The European Union and the African Union (AU) organized their first peacekeeping missions in 2003. The EU deployed police and military peacekeeping missions to Bosnia, FYR Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the same year, followed by a number of military, police, rule of law, and other missions in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. In 2003 the AU organized its first mission in Burundi, followed by missions to Darfur (Sudan), the Comoros, and Somalia. Moreover, subsequent African subregional efforts toward the creation of a regionwide African Standby Force (ASF) are gradually being organized around the division of labor envisaged in the ASF framework. It was also in 2003 that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose peacekeeping engagements had been limited to new states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the multinational forces in Afghanistan. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has also expressed interest in and made institutionalized efforts for deploying its peacekeeping missions. But it was not only regional organizations that began serious engagement with peacekeeping. Individual states and coalitions of states conducted military missions that served in part as de facto peacekeeping missions. It is also notable that many such missions worked alongside peacekeeping missions organized by the UN or by regional organizations. Furthermore, several diplomatic initiatives have emerged that aim to facilitate policy consultations among peacekeeping contributors, generate wider consensus on key operational and doctrinal challenges, and encourage efforts by individual states. Most notable in this regard is the Group of Eight (G8), which began global peacekeeping capacity building in 2000, launching a capacity-building clearinghouse that held together midlevel to senior officials from donor and recipient states and organizations; it also enabled several G8 members to launch their own capacity-building programs. On policy and doctrinal debates the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum), funded by several governments, has also served as a dialogue platform since 2006. The emergence of new peacekeeping actors within a relatively short span of time is striking. Moreover, through these activities they interact with each other on multiple levels. For instance, the UN has worked with the AU to authorize and command their hybrid mission in Darfur

What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation?

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and the mission thus created, the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), has also been supported by NATO’s airlifts of African peacekeepers. In the DRC, two EU missions played crucial stabilizing roles for the larger but less militarily capable UN missions. The UN, the EU, and active individual states such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have launched programs to build the peacekeeping capacity of developing nations, especially in Africa. These activities inform and are informed by the G8 and other consultative frameworks. Collectively, these efforts have greatly intensified international cooperation in the field of peacekeeping. How do we make sense of all this? There are three questions that may be useful in examining global peacekeeping cooperation. One concerns motivations. Why are peacekeeping states and organizations engaged in such cooperative endeavors? What explains this emerging phenomenon? To understand the drivers for increased peacekeeping cooperation one needs to examine the roles of peacekeeping and peacekeeping actors within the context of broader changes taking place in today’s security environment. A second question relates to forms of cooperation: How have peacekeeping actors cooperated in practice? I argue that there are three primary patterns of peacekeeping cooperation: joint decisionmaking, operational collaboration, and capacity building. Joint decisionmaking takes place between the appropriate organs of the mission organizers. It usually involves the sharing of command and mission management responsibilities and of funding arrangements. Along with these considerations joint decisionmaking also aims to bolster the legitimacy of the proposed mission internationally and vis-à-vis the host government, whose acceptance and cooperation constitute an essential element of successful peacekeeping. Operational collaboration consists of mission-to-mission collaboration on the ground in a given conflict setting. Arrangements for such collaboration are therefore generally ad hoc and situation specific, and yet some organizations, most notably the AU and the UN, have developed more formal cooperative arrangements. Capacity-building assistance is different from the former two in that it aims to assist the development of peacekeeping capability by newer peacekeeping actors over a longer term. Because of the gap between the enormous demands on peacekeeping on the continent and the still limited capacity of regional organizations, Africa has been the center of the effort. A third analytical theme revolves around the implications of evolving peacekeeping cooperation for the international community as a whole. There are two dimensions to such implications: global security

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governance and international cooperation. With regard to the former, global peacekeeping cooperation may be seen as an emerging layer of global security governance. In what ways does this development contribute to our collective management of contemporary conflicts and related security threats and risks? The record of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool is decidedly mixed. While there are several prominent studies that point out the existence of successful peacekeeping missions,3 analysts tend to draw attention to the fact that peacekeeping is prone to dilemmas, failures, and unintended consequences.4 A fairer starting point may be to state that peacekeeping is constantly changing in response to these experiences, and, in that context, the development of global peacekeeping cooperation may be seen as a renewed effort to help overcome these difficulties. It is therefore relevant to ask whether increased interstate/interorganizational cooperation in peacekeeping represents an overall improvement in global security governance. The second dimension is related to the first but has a theoretical rather than institutional or policy focus as it considers global peacekeeping cooperation a new manifestation of international cooperation. What do the practices of cooperation in peacekeeping tell us about the nature of international cooperation in general?

What Is Peacekeeping? Before embarking on answering the three questions outlined above, I want to make clear what is meant by peacekeeping in this book. This is in fact more complex than it seems because the proliferation of peacekeeping actors has steadily widened and diversified the scope of peacekeeping. In the 1990s UN peacekeeping missions were deployed with a growing number of tasks, including security sector reform, mine action, human rights promotion, protection of civilians, and so on. Diversification led to active debates within UN circles concerning the proper classification of the types of peacekeeping (traditional versus modern peacekeeping, and the notion of generations of peacekeeping)5 and whether the trend toward a greater scope of peacekeeping activities constituted a justifiable or sustainable path for the UN.6 While these debates have not entirely subsided, subsequent efforts by the UN Secretariat to rearticulate the concept of UN peacekeeping give us a reasonably good sense of what the UN means by peacekeeping.7 The global proliferation of peacekeeping actors gives the diversification of their activities an entirely new dimension. For example,

What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation?

5

NATO’s ISAF operation was often described as bordering on counterinsurgency, which, in turn, was increasingly indistinguishable from counterterrorism.8 More broadly, NATO has developed its own conception of peacekeeping, which forms part of the alliance’s crisis response operation. The EU, for its part, has introduced new classes of peacekeeping operations in line with a broader vision of its role in regional and international security, which it calls comprehensive crisis management. The AU views peacekeeping “as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it,” and stresses that its peace support operation (PSO) is accordingly more robust and less risk averse than the UN operation.9 As a result, the seemingly simple question of what peacekeeping is has become increasingly ambiguous. Relatedly, an important trend is the proliferation of terms similar to peacekeeping—stabilization, PSO, operation other than war, state building, and nation building, to name but a few—that have been used mainly by non-UN bodies. Even the UN has used “stabilization” for its peacekeeping missions in Haiti, the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali. These terms are intended by some peacekeepers to make their actions separate from peacekeeping, but in some other contexts the terms are used almost interchangeably. What all this suggests for our purposes is the need for a broad baseline concept of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping cooperation as defined at the outset includes all these peacekeeping endeavors by the UN as well as non-UN bodies; the term peacekeeping needs to be framed for this inquiry in such a way that it captures this diversity without undermining the essence of evolving practice. Clearly we need such a definition to consistently select data on operations. One way to formulate a proper definition is to examine what peacekeeping is not. This question may be approached from two directions. On one side peacekeeping is not war fighting; they differ in that peacekeeping, however stretched in its meaning, is still directed toward the overall objective of international management and resolution of conflicts, while war fighting has the primal goal of defeating the enemy. This distinction, however, still raises the question of differences between peacekeeping on the one hand and peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention on the other: NATO’s operation in Kosovo (1999), the US operations in Somalia (1992–1993), and the French operation during the Rwandan genocide (1994) are well-known cases that have already been extensively debated. Moreover, there are deployments by multinational and national forces whose activities appear to make them at least partly qualify as peacekeeping missions. Examples include the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements

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(MISAB, 1997–1998, CAR), the Italian-led Operation Alba (1997, Albania), Britain’s Operation Palliser (2000, Sierra Leone), the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET, 1999–2000), the International Stabilization Force (Operation Astute, 2006–) in Timor-Leste, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI, 2003–), France’s Operation Licorne (2002–, Ivory Coast), and the US-led multinational forces in Haiti (1994–1995 and 2004). All these operations have served as international management of the conflict in one way or another (or at least their proponents have so claimed). The UN Security Council authorization to use “all necessary means” under Chapter VII has long ceased to be a criterion that distinguishes enforcement and peacekeeping, as many UN peacekeeping missions are now robust peacekeeping missions with such authorization.10 What we need, then, is a more discernible benchmark that reflects the nature of force employed in these operations. Even in cases where peacekeeping forces are resorting to the active use of force, it is not meant to be punitive toward enemies but to stabilize the situation by restoring general law and order, deterring and controlling the spoilers of the peace process, and/or creating conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The use of force by peacekeeping missions, even in a more robust mode, takes place at the tactical rather than the strategic level, and is generally more restrained than conventional military enforcement.11 Put differently, whereas the logic of collective security as envisaged in the UN Charter hinges on the identification and defeat of states and other actors seen as a threat to the international community, peacekeeping hinges on the assessment and improvement of the overall situation on the ground so that peace can be kept and built in a sustainable manner. The logic of (eventual) inclusion rather than exclusion prevails in peacekeeping, for which reason its effectiveness and ultimate success depends not on force but on political negotiation.12 Peacekeeping thus aims at nonpunitive (if not necessarily noncoercive) international conflict management. NATO’s Kosovo intervention, the allied operation in the Gulf War, and more recently the AU-led multinational operation against the Lord’s Resistance Army, the notorious rebel group in Uganda, are most properly described as military enforcement, while the shifting US and nebulous French strategic objectives give dubious credentials to their respective operations in Somalia and Rwanda. Many of the aforementioned multinational and national missions can, in contrast, be seen as peacekeeping in this broadest sense.

What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation?

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At the other end of the scale, there are a variety of small missions. They may conduct political mediation, monitor human rights or elections, or offer training or advice depending on the nature of their mandate. But these missions are characterized by the absence of military and police units within their organizational structures. There are numerous examples, including the UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH, 1993–2000), Commonwealth police mission to the Solomon Islands (1999–2000), EU and Commonwealth observer missions to Zimbabwe (2002), and missions organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Since 2003 the EU has deployed small missions for a diverse range of tasks (good offices/mediation; monitoring and provision of training; advice and assistance in the fields of border control, rule of law, and security sector reform) in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In Aceh, Indonesia, the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) jointly organized a monitoring mission between September 2005 and December 2006.13 The AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), dispatched a total of eight observer missions to Rwanda (1991–1993), Burundi (1993–1996), the Comoros (1997–1998, 2001– 2002), the DRC (1999–2000), and Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000–2008).14 Ad hoc multinational formations were also created, such as monitoring missions in Papua New Guinea (1997–2003), Sri Lanka (2002–2008), and Mindanao in the Philippines (2004–).15 The UN evolved its repertoire of field missions in the form of expanded political missions and peacebuilding missions; some such missions, such as the one in Nepal (2007–2011), have military observers. An increasingly diversified and sophisticated use of small missions with a tendency for larger field presence is an important development that may blur the definition of peacekeeping. 16 But these smaller missions are not generally seen as peacekeeping missions. Indeed, the important point about the current trend is that non-UN organizations have come to organize operations beyond these smaller missions. The fact that they have started to deploy missions with more teeth is a significant development that deserves examination. I hope this brief discussion provides a basic working definition of peacekeeping to guide readers through the chapters that follow. Peacekeeping is a conflict management tool that takes the form of a field mission organized by agents of international society, equipped with security (military and/or police) components that may resort to nonpunitive, tac-

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tical uses of violence. The selection of missions and operations for this study will be based on this definition.

Plan for the Book The following chapters seek to address the motivations behind, forms of, and implications for evolving global peacekeeping cooperation. Chapter 2 introduces the contextual factors behind the evolution of global peacekeeping cooperation. Identifying the context requires an examination of changes both in peacekeeping as well as in the broader strategic and political environment and structure of the post–Cold War period. Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework for analyzing peacekeeping cooperation. This is a challenging task not only because of the embryonic nature of the phenomenon to which the framework is supposed to apply, but also because developing such a framework demands serious engagement with the rich tradition of cooperation theory. The chapter comprises a review of three prominent theories of international cooperation (instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism) and discusses how each of these theories may contribute to the investigation of peacekeeping cooperation. Drawing from all three theories, I conceptualize global peacekeeping cooperation as a multilateral security cooperation regime. Characterizing peacekeeping cooperation as an emerging regime has the heuristic benefits of identifying its components (patterns, rules, procedures, principles, and norms) as well as analyzing its potential effects on global security governance. The subsequent three chapters look in detail at each of the three patterns of the peacekeeping cooperation regime: operational collaboration, joint decisionmaking, and capacity building. Chapters 4 (operational collaboration) and 5 (joint decisionmaking) start with an overview of trends, followed by an analysis of cases—the Darfur region of Sudan and the DRC in Chapter 4, and Macedonia, Afghanistan, and the DRC in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 focuses on capacity-building assistance for African peacekeeping because the level of attention and activity devoted to Africa in this context sets it apart from the other regions. I consider four major capacity-building initiatives by the Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), the UN, the EU, and the G8. Analytically, these concrete examples will be studied from two perspectives. One relates to motivation. Motivation can arise out of normative commitment to the regime and its principles as well as from

What Is Global Peacekeeping Cooperation?

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calculation of interests: In what ways does a pattern of peacekeeping cooperation help meet the interests and constitute the identity of the peacekeeping actors? The second perspective considers the security governance implications: What effects does such a pattern of cooperation have on global efforts to deal with instabilities and security challenges? As will be explained in Chapter 3, there are two types of effect. Regulative effects influence the calculation of actors’ interests and control their behaviors in certain ways; constitutive effects shape or alter their identities, which in turn are expressed in their definitions of interest as well as their behaviors. These effects may collectively bolster global security governance, but cooperation is not without various complications and limitations. Along with the positive effects of the given pattern, the three chapters will identify what is hindering the evolution of peacekeeping cooperation. The concluding chapter will summarize the key findings of the book, discuss the prospects of the peacekeeping cooperation regime and its implications for global security governance, and suggest how the analytical framework of this book might apply to other areas of international cooperation. The peacekeeping cooperation regime is—and may remain in the foreseeable future—largely informal and not as strong as more established regimes such as international trade. However, as the nature of conflicts and broader security threats to the international community continues to change and demands a flexible response, it may be that informal regimes hold greater promise.

Notes 1. It should be noted, however, that there are cases of peacekeeping missions that date back even to a pre-UN era: the interwar years, for instance, saw cases of what Norrie MacQueen called “plebiscite peacekeeping,” mostly on the borders of Germany such as in the Saar region and Upper Silesia. These cases meet the baseline definition of peacekeeping articulated here. Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (London: Routledge, 2006), chap. 2. 2. The Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, for instance, defines peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (emphasis added). This qualification to “a United Nations presence” disappears in the Brahimi report’s definition published eight years later. UN General Assembly/Security Council, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992,

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para. 20; and Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, Annex, para. 12. 3. James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); and James Dobbins et al., Europe’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). 4. See, e.g., Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001); Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007). 5. See, e.g., Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, “Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor,” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Thakur and Schnabel, 3–25; UN, “History of Peacekeeping,” www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history .shtml (accessed December 13, 2016). 6. Shashi Tharoor, “Should UN Peacekeeping Go ‘Back to Basics’?,” Survival 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 52–64. 7. For the current UN definition of peacekeeping and related concepts, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, January 2008, 17–19. 8. Ian Johnstone, “Normative Evolution at the UN: Impact on Operational Activities,” in Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy, ed. Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 206. See also Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone, “New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the ‘War on Terror,’” Coping with Crises working paper, International Peace Academy, New York, March 2007, 10. 9. AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, AU doc. PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), January 9, 2012, paras. 71, 100 (vii), 109. See also Chapter 4. 10. For discussions on robust peacekeeping, see Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force,” Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York, December 2009; Patrice Sartre, “Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust: Protecting the Mission, Persuading the Actors,” International Peace Institute, New York, July 2011; Thierry Tardy, “A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 152–167. 11. DPKO/DFS, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 19. 12. Sartre, “Making UN Peacekeeping More Robust,” 10. 13. For a good review of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, see Paul Kirwan, “From European to Global Security Actor: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in

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Indonesia,” in European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė, 128–142 (New York: Routledge, 2008). 14. This includes Neutral Military Observer Group I and II (Rwanda); OAU Mission in Burundi; OAU Mission in Comoros I, II, and III; Joint Monitoring Commission (DRC); and (O)AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea. With regard to the Burundi mission, the OAU initially planned to deploy a mission with a wider political mandate (Protection and Observation Mission for the Reestablishment of Confidence in Burundi). But this plan met domestic opposition and instead of the full deployment of its military component (180 officers), it was reconfigured into a small observer mission. Cedric de Coning, “Peace Operations in Africa: The Next Decade,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Working Paper 721, Oslo, June 2007, 12n41; David Francis and Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “The AU and the Search for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi and Comoros,” Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 2011, 14; AU Commission, “Peace and Security Department at a Glance,” n.d., www.peaceau.org /uploads/au-booklet.pdf (accessed December 13, 2016). 15. The Truce and Peace Monitoring Group was composed of unarmed monitors and support personnel from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was made up of civilian monitors from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The International Monitoring Team– Mindanao has consisted of personnel from countries including Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, as well as several members of the EU. 16. For instance, in the UN system the division between peacekeeping on the one hand and political and peacebuilding missions on the other was relatively clear with the former managed by the DPKO/DFS and the latter the Department of Political Affairs, but this line has since become blurred as some of the recent political/peacebuilding missions such as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UN Integrated Office in Burundi, and UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone are managed by the DPKO.

2 Contexts and Actors

In this chapter I introduce important contexts that have led

peacekeeping actors to expand cooperation in recent years. These factors include the changed nature of security and threats in the post–Cold War period, a redefinition of the role of international and regional organizations, and the UN’s peacekeeping reform processes. In what follows I will discuss each factor in turn.

New Threats and Security Roles Predominance of Intrastate Conflict

The structural context is the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of global strategic competition between East and West in 1989 had two important implications for the evolution of peacekeeping: the increasing prominence of internal and regional conflicts and a redefinition of the security roles of regional and international organizations. As is frequently pointed out, the post–Cold War period witnessed the predominance of intrastate conflicts, though some became internationalized due to the military involvement of external powers. While interstate conflicts were in a steady decline throughout the 1990s and 2000s compared to the preceding two decades, the number of intrastate conflicts rose to a peak in the early 1990s. Although on a downward trend since the 1990s, they remained the dominant form of contemporary conflict through the mid- to late 2000s. According to Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program, 39 of the 40 active conflicts in 2014 were fought within states.1 13

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Moreover, the way these conflicts are perceived has undergone significant change. The end of the Cold War removed their strategic meaning for the great powers. In a discussion of UN policy changes on civilian protection, Hugo Slim sums up this shift as follows: In the bipolar international politics before the 1990s, Cold War policy on both sides had tended to deny both the intent and the extent of civilian casualties in its proxy wars. A myth was sustained that held that civilian suffering was accidental and inevitable, or that civilians were not really civilians at all. . . . This perception changed as the major powers became spectators rather than primary protagonists in the civil wars of the 1990s. With no immediate interests of their own in the so-called “new wars” that followed the end of the Cold War, major UN powers had no need to sustain the myth that repressed the fact of civilian violations. Their need for denial fell away, and as they watched the new wars, they saw civilian deaths in a different light. What they saw others doing to civilians appalled them in a way that had not happened when they had backed governments and rebel groups implementing similar policies of civilian atrocity in the preceding decades. As a result, international policy was able to rediscover the civilian in war, and take his or her side more forcefully.2

The heightened sensitivity to civilian suffering led to a tendency to perceive the gravity of conflicts not in terms of battle-related deaths alone but the extent to which they imposed suffering of various forms onto the civilian populations. This civilian perspective naturally not only emphasizes the mitigation of civilian suffering but also calls for comprehensive solutions to ongoing conflicts. It is only by addressing the root causes of such conflicts that a degree of stability and order can be achieved for the population as a whole and that problems of civilian insecurity can be ameliorated on a sustainable basis. New concepts and approaches that were emergent or became prominent in this period— humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, human security, peacebuilding, protection of civilians, to mention a few—all reflected this international interest. One consequence of all these changes was that peacekeeping was constantly asked to deal with intrastate and regional conflicts as a major operational vehicle for the civilian-focused and multidimensional responses of the international community. Though peacekeeping has always been flexible and, as in the UN Operation in the Democratic Republis of the Congo and UN Security Force (West New Guinea) in the 1960s, did engage in multidimensional tasks in the past,3 the predominant experience of peacekeeping in the Cold War period was that of managing

Contexts and Actors

15

and resolving interstate conflicts, especially in the Middle East. Politically, Cold War peacekeeping represented a neutral effort in the shadow of the East-West confrontation to create necessary security conditions for the settlement of disputes between states. In the post–Cold War period, in contrast, the focus of peacekeeping is on intrastate conflicts where it represents the will of the international community to assist societies in the painful process of transition from war to sustainable peace. Redefined Security Roles of International Organizations

As the end of the Cold War period thus created new expectations for peacekeeping, it also drove the UN as well as regional organizations to redefine their identities and roles in a changed security environment. These organizations invariably expanded their roles in international security; peacekeeping was often newly included in, or given a renewed weight among, their repertoire of operational activities. The then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, famously declared in his 1992 Agenda for Peace that the opportunity to “achieve the great objectives of the Charter . . . must not be squandered”; the UN, once crippled by Cold War politics, could now emerge “as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace.”4 He argued that a four-pronged system of conflict management (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding) would offer “a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter.”5 He welcomed the broadening of UN peacekeeping tasks, recommended the strengthening of the UN capacity to implement these tasks, and called on member states to support this initiative politically and by helping the organization meet the increased resource requirements. Though this UN activism very soon led to frustrations in Bosnia and Somalia, resulting in a period of dashed enthusiasm for the UN’s role in international security in the late 1990s, peacekeeping became established as one of the most salient means available to the UN in its conflict management efforts. For regional organizations, it was the combination of changed threat perceptions and the need for a new organizational identity that prompted them to embark on conflict management efforts. They engaged in these efforts because of “the realization that the majority of threats and security problems are primarily regional rather than local, national, or global.”6 Because many conflicts were civil wars and often involved neighboring states and nonstate armed groups, they represented a clear threat to the wider region, yet lacked clear-cut systemic implications for

16

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

major powers. Moreover, these regional organizations had been founded and developed against the backdrop of the Cold War, which meant that the end of the Cold War would require a significant review of their roles if they wanted to stay relevant and operative. As a result, several regional organizations came to include conflict management as part of their new security identity. As early as July 1990, for instance, the OAU, in a landmark declaration, pointed out the changing East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation, the socio-economic and political changes in Eastern Europe, the steady move towards the political and monetary union of Western Europe, the increasing global tendency towards regional integration and the establishment of trading and economic blocks, as well as the advances in science and technology. These, we found, constitute major factors which should guide Africa’s collective thinking about the challenges and options before her in the 1990s and beyond in view of the real threat of marginalisation of our continent.7

The declaration went on to emphasize the nexus between development and democratic governance on the one hand and lasting peace and stability on the other, and argued, We therefore renew our determination to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts on our continent. The resolution of conflicts will be conducive to the creation of peace and stability in the Continent and will also have the effect of reducing expenditures on defence and security, thus releasing additional resources for socio-economic development. . . . It is only through the creation of stable conditions that Africa can fully harness its human and material resources and direct them to development.8

In 1992, the then OAU secretary-general, Salim Ahmed Salim, proposed measures to strengthen the organization’s security roles. His proposals aimed to establish a comprehensive system of conflict resolution and management, including regionwide peacekeeping capacity. The idea of an inter-African force goes back to the earliest days of the organization in the 1960s; Salim resuscitated it in the prevailing contexts of regional conflict and atrocities against civilians. Although Salim’s proposal was significantly watered down in the ensuing negotiations, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, introduced at the 1993 Cairo summit, would form the foundation of the AU’s security architecture a decade later.9

Contexts and Actors

17

For the EU, conflict management (“crisis management” in its nomenclature) also became a key objective of its new security profile, but for different reasons. As the Cold War ended, European states were not faced with existential threats to their security.10 What they faced instead was a series of conflicts in the periphery and neighboring regions that did not pose such threats but had potentially negative, destabilizing implications for the historic region of Europe. Moreover, the end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes to the strategic landscape of Europe. On the one hand, the region ceased to be the front line of the East-West confrontation, opening up the possibility of accelerating integration both of long-term members and of former Eastern bloc states. A larger, more integrated Europe could play a more prominent role in international affairs. On the other hand, Western Europe’s security had long depended on the United States through NATO, and the disappearance of existential threats in the region naturally put the continued commitment of the United States in constant doubt. As this doubt became reality in the former Yugoslavia, European states tried to develop an option that would allow them to operate on their own in responding to crises. In the well-known joint declaration of December 1998 at Saint Malo, France and Britain declared that the union “needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage” and that, to that end, it “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”11 Politically, this declaration was a landmark in the sense of getting Britain on board for the Europe-led defense project, thus significantly closing the long-standing policy gap between the Atlanticist and Europeanist (Gaullist) camps within Europe. Operationally, it meant the need to establish institutional structures and various capacities such as situation analysis, intelligence, and strategic planning, and to streamline the EU’s relationship with existing organizations, most importantly the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO. NATO’s search for a new security identity was related not so much to new ambitions in the new world order as to the need for clarity in its organizational identity. When the strategic environment on which NATO was founded disappeared, its member states were soon faced with conflicts in the Balkans and the Gulf and the prospects for instability in former Soviet countries, including Russia. The focus of debate moved away from the traditional in-area defense of NATO territory under Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty to a more contentious question of its out-of-area operational role; as the latter revolved around

18

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

the challenge of managing and containing political crises, often with military dimensions, it was essentially a question of determining NATO’s posture toward crisis management in general and peacekeeping (peace support operation, crisis response operation) in particular. The alliance’s initial and somewhat hesitant reaction came in the form of a new Strategic Concept adopted in November 1991. While this document ultimately avoided a clear answer to the out-of-area question,12 it adopted a broad, comprehensive approach to security and suggested that using “a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field” on the basis of a “coherent approach,” could bring crises under control at an early stage.13 Events in southeastern Europe quickly overtook policy debate. Though creating frustrations on the European side (thus driving them toward European security and defense capability), these experiences gradually transformed NATO into an organization capable of deploying military missions to stabilize and keep the peace of those countries of strategic interest to the alliance members (not the least the United States). The 1999 Strategic Concept renewed its commitment and readiness, for the stability and security of the (now loosely defined) EuroAtlantic area, “to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.”14 This concept also made a point about the out-of-area question by arguing that NATO’s operations would have the twin aims of keeping risks to Euro-Atlantic stability at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage and of supporting the activities of other international organizations within a broad approach to security.15 Despite the slight differences in emphasis and focus, these responses were remarkably consistent across organizations. They all represented efforts to respond to changed patterns of conflict in a new geopolitical environment in which they also had to redefine their roles and identities for the future. This combination of security interests and identity needs led these organizations to identify regional and international conflict management as a promising way ahead for the future. And operationally, this meant increasing readiness to deploy peacekeeping missions.

Expansion in Peacekeeping Actors It was against this broad backdrop that we saw the more immediate context for the emergence of global peacekeeping cooperation: entry by several non-UN multilateral organizations into the business of peacekeeping. To get a bird’s eye view of the phenomenon, Table 2.1 is a situation-by-

Contexts and Actors

19

situation summary of non-UN operations, based on the chronological order in which these missions were launched. Table 2.2 provides a summary of missions and organizations on a year-by-year basis. These tables suggest two things. First, there is a regional concentration of new peacekeeping actors. Regional peacekeeping is active in Europe (NATO, EU, CIS) and Africa (AU, ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community [SADC], Central African Economic and Monetary Community [CEMAC], Economic Community of Central African States

Table 2.1 Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations by Situation, 1990–2016 Situation

Operations

Liberia

ECOWAS (ECOMOG, 1990–1999; ECOMIL, 2003)

Moldova

CIS (JCC, 1992–)

Bosnia

NATO (Deny Flight, 1993–1995a; IFOR, 1995–1996; SFOR, 1996–2004); EU (EUPM, 2003–2012; EUFOR Althea, 2004–)

Tajikistan

CIS (CPF, 1993–2000)

Georgia (Abkhazia) CIS (PKF, 1994–2008) Haiti

Uphold Democracy (1994–1995); Secure Tomorrow (2004)

Croatia

NATO (Deny Flight, 1994–1995; IFOR, 1995–1996; SFOR, 1996–1998)

CAR

MISAB (1997–1998); CEN-SAD PF (2001–2002); CEMAC (FOMUC, 2002–2008); ECCAS (MICOPAX, 2008–2013); AU (MISCA, 2013–2014); Operation Sangaris (2013–); EU (EUFOR RCA, 2014–2015)

Albania

Alba (1997)

Sierra Leone

ECOWAS (ECOMOG, 1997–2000); Palliser (2000)

Lesotho

SADC (Boleas, 1998–1999)

Guinea-Bissau

ECOWAS (ECOMOG, 1998–1999; ECOMIB, 2012–); MISSANG (2011–2012)

Kosovo

NATO (KFOR, 1999–); EU (EULEX, 2008–)

Timor-Leste

INTERFET (1999–2000); Astute (2006–2012)

Macedonia

NATO (Essential Harvest, 2001; Amber Fox, 2001–2002; Allied Harmony, 2002–2003); EU (Concordia, 2003–2004; Proxima, 2004–2005)

Ivory Coast

Licorne (2002–); ECOWAS (ECOMICI, 2002–2004)

Burundi

AU (AMIB, 2003–2004) (continues)

20

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

Table 2.1 continued Situation

Operations

DRC

EU (Artemis, 2003; EUFOR RD Congo, 2006)

Solomon Islands

RAMSI (2003–)

Afghanistan

NATO (ISAF, 2003–2014; Resolute Support, 2015–); EU (EUPOL Afghanistan, 2007–2016)

Darfur/Sudan

AU (AMIS, 2004–2007; UNAMID, 2007–)

Somalia

AU (AMISOM, 2007–); IGAD (IGASOM, 2005–2007b,c)

Comoros

AU (MAES, 2007–2008)

Chad/CAR

EU (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 2007–2009)

Libya

EU (EUFOR LIBYA, 2011b,d)

Mali

ECOWAS (AFISMA, 2012–2013)

Sources: Data from AU, EU, NATO, UN, and University of Montreal Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations websites, www.peaceau.org/en/, https://eeas.europa.eu/, www.nato.int /cps/en/natohq/68147.htm#crisis, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/, www.operationspaix.net/. Notes: See list of Acronyms and Abbreviations on page 197. a. NATO’s Operation Deny Flight was primarily designed to enforce a no-fly zone, but is here included in recognition of the fact that its airpower provided close air support for UNPROFOR peacekeepers. The operation was initially confined to Bosnia, but following Serbian attacks on the border towns, most notably Bihac, the Security Council expanded its area of operations to include Croatia (Resolution 958, November 19, 1994). b. Denotes operations that were formally authorized but not actually deployed. c. The IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), though originally proposed in March 2005 by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and authorized by the Security Council in December 2006, was never actually deployed and was eventually absorbed into the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). d. Under the plan approved by the EU Council in April 2011, EU Force (EUFOR) Libya would provide military support to humanitarian assistance upon request from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In practice, the operation did not take place as OCHA did not make a request.

[ECCAS], Community of Sahel-Saharan States [CEN-SAD]). Outside these two regions, peacekeeping needs are largely met, apart from the UN, by ad hoc multinational initiatives. In Africa, ECOWAS was far ahead of the other subregional bodies that initiated (or planned, as IGAD did) relatively small-scale deployments. After the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 and the subsequent announcement to create the ASF, which would serve as a continent-wide division-of-labor framework for subregional organizations, the AU was expected to become the chief organizer for African peacekeeping. In Europe, the EU and NATO deployed missions initially to parts of Europe that were in

21 Table 2.2 Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations by Year, 1990–2016

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Regional Organizations

Operations

ECOWAS

ECOMOG Liberia

CIS CIS (NATO) CIS NATO NATO ECOWAS SADC, ECOWAS NATO

JCC CPF (Deny Flight) PKF, Uphold Democracy IFOR SFOR MISAB, Alba, ECOMOG Sierra Leone Boleas, ECOMOG Guinea-Bissau KFOR, INTERFET Palliser CEN-SAD PF, Essential Harvest, Amber Fox FOMUC, Allied Harmony, Licorne, ECOMICI ECOMIL, EUPM, Concordia, AMIB, RAMSI, ISAF, Artemis Secure Tomorrow, EUFOR Althea, Proxima, AMIS IGASOMa EUFOR RD Congo, Astute EUPOL Afghanistan, UNAMID, AMISOM, MAES, EUFOR Tchad/RCA MICOPAX, EULEX

2004

CEN-SAD, NATO CEMAC, NATO, ECOWAS EU, AU, ECOWAS, NATO EU, AU

2005 2006 2007

IGAD EU EU, AU

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

ECCAS, EU

2003

Others

EU ECOWAS AU EU NATO

MNF

MNF MNF UK France MNF MNF

MNF

Angola France

EUFOR LIBYA,a MISSANG ECOMIB, AFISMA MISCA, Sangaris EUFOR RCA Resolute Support

Sources: Data from AU, EU, NATO, UN, and University of Montreal Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations websites, www.peaceau.org/en/, https://eeas.europa.eu/, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq /68147.htm#crisis, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/, www.operationspaix.net/. Notes: See list of Acronyms and Abbreviations on page 197. a. Denotes operations that were formally authorized but not actually deployed.

22

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

political transition, and then to out-of-area societies in conflict such as Afghanistan, the DRC, and Chad/CAR. The CIS’s activities were limited to former Soviet countries, and after the termination of its peacekeeping force (PKF) following the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, there were no new efforts by the CIS or others to conduct peacekeeping in this part of the world.16 In Asia, no regional organization includes peacekeeping as part of its portfolio, although the three Australia-led multinational forces (INTERFET, Operation Astute, and RAMSI) stand out as examples of regional initiatives. Similarly, violent political transitions in Haiti produced two US-led multinational interventions, though they did not serve as opportunities for regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community to take on peacekeeping roles.17 Second, the evolution of regional peacekeeping in the post–Cold War era can be divided into three periods: (1) 1990 to 1995, when ECOWAS and the CIS deployed peacekeeping missions for the first time and NATO conducted operations in the Balkans in support of UN peacekeeping; (2) 1995 to 1999, in which NATO and SADC joined the list of peacekeeping actors through missions to the Balkans and Africa, and three multinational forces (MISAB, Operation Alba, and INTERFET) were organized; and (3) early 2000s to the present. For the purposes of this book, I shall elaborate on the third period, which constitutes the current context of globalized peacekeeping. Though developments in the current period build on earlier ones, the current period is qualitatively different from the earlier periods in three important ways: (1) entry of the AU and the EU as major peacekeeping actors, (2) institutional approach, and (3) parallel expansion of UN peacekeeping. Let me explain each in turn below. Entry of the AU and the EU

First, this period has seen the entry of two major regional organizations, the AU and the EU, into the business of peacekeeping. The AU was officially launched at the inaugural AU summit in Durban in July 2002. Though its predecessor, the OAU, did have a history of peacekeeping— it deployed two Pan-African Peacekeeping Forces in Chad from January to March 1980 and from November 1981 to June 198218—the organization remained reluctant to develop its peacekeeping capability, typically sending a small number (somewhere between 10 and 60) of military and liaison officers and observers. The OAU’s reluctance in this regard was rooted in deference to the principle of noninterference by the member

Contexts and Actors

23

states, most of which were newly independent societies and naturally guarded against outside interference. The creation of the AU was intended specifically to address this lack of peace and security function on the continental level. The AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission, AMIB in Burundi, as early as April 2003, followed by missions to Sudan and Somalia. The organization also initiated efforts to create a continent-wide system of peacekeeping responses by linking subregional peacekeeping actors in Africa (see a later section in this chapter). The EU deployed its first peacekeeping missions also in 2003, first a police mission to Bosnia and then two short military missions to Macedonia and the DRC. Apart from a police mission in Afghanistan and an eventually aborted mission in Libya, the EU’s operations have been concentrated in the Balkans and Africa. They are also characterized by relatively short duration (especially military operations) and a focus on the civilian dimensions of conflict management. With regard to the latter, the EU has invented many new types of small civilian missions with specific focuses, such as aviation security (South Sudan), maritime security (Horn of Africa), rule of law (Georgia, Kosovo, Iraq), border management (Gaza Strip), countering terrorism and organized crime (Niger), and security sector reform (Guinea-Bissau). Through deploying these missions, the EU intends to project itself as a civilian conflict manager, though there appear to be different views concerning the extent to which this projection of civilian power should be accompanied and backed up by military power.19 As such, the nature of EU peacekeeping reflects a wider debate on the EU’s role in global conflict management in general. Since 2003, the AU (with its associated subregional organizations) and the EU have actively contributed to the peacekeeping regime and left distinctive marks on its contour. In the same year, NATO took over the command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. These three frameworks represent the majority of non-UN peacekeeping endeavors in recent years. Institutional Approach

The AU, the EU, and NATO are making bigger impacts on peacekeeping cooperation not just because of the number of their operations but also in terms of the way they have engaged in peacekeeping. Indeed, one marked difference of the current period concerns the manner in which non-UN peacekeeping actors institutionalize peacekeeping as part of the officially declared menu of their operational activities.

24

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

Before these three actors, some regional and subregional organizations in Africa had expanded the remit of their activities to include peacekeeping. ECOWAS, already an active peacekeeper since the early 1990s, created in 1999 a conflict management structure centered on the Mediation and Security Council. The ECOWAS (Ceasefire) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established as one of the official organs to support the implementation of council decisions by conducting peacekeeping and other diverse types of field operation.20 But the ECOWAS efforts rather represented an exception based on its unique experience of having to organize multiple missions in response to a succession of crises in the subregion. By the late 1990s these experiences had demonstrated to its members a clear need to come up with proper decisionmaking rules, management procedures, and support structures.21 Apart from ECOWAS, however, there was little institutional development. When IGAD was created to replace the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1996, it was agreed that the new organization would work toward conflict prevention and management and that its members “shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress.”22 This offered a potential opening for IGAD to engage in peacekeeping. But IGAD’s peacekeeping so far consists only of a botched attempt to deploy a mission to Somalia. Similarly, the SADC’s 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation provided its Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation with the ability to authorize a broad range of activities in matters of regional peace and security, and yet this has resulted in no new peacekeeping missions.23 Rather, these provisions in IGAD and SADC (not to mention ECOWAS) provided an institutional foundation to make them subregional arms of the continental peacekeeping system managed by the AU.24 All in all, therefore, regional peacekeeping missions in the 1990s tended to take place in an institutional vacuum. But this picture began to change with the AU and the EU. The AU addressed African peacekeeping capacity as a key component of the comprehensive security apparatus of the new organization. The AU Constitutive Act, which was adopted by the OAU Assembly on July 11, 2000, and entered into force on May 26, 2001, stated the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent among the goals of the organization.25 At the inaugural AU summit in July 2002, African leaders stressed the need for a Common African Defence and Security Policy and decided to set up a Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC has extensive decisionmaking powers including those to “authorize

Contexts and Actors

25

the mounting and deployment of peace support missions” and to recommend and approve the modalities of an AU intervention into a member state.26 To implement these provisions, the PSC Protocol approved at that summit provided for the establishment of the ASF, which will consist of “standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin . . . ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”27 In practice, the ASF operates through five subregional frameworks, each of which is mandated to organize a standby capability of military, police, and civilian components: ECOWAS (west), Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG, now Eastern Africa Standby Force [EASF]), SADC (south), ECCAS (central, known as Multinational Force of Central Africa [FOMAC]) and North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).28 Initially, a regional brigade was to consist of military units of around 3,000–4,000 troops plus civilians, and the subregional frameworks were expected to complete their operationalization by 2010. While the AU made steady headway by adopting, for instance, a common doctrine, training policy, logistics concept, command and control plan, as well as the standard operating procedures by 2008,29 the time lines and the plan had to be revised on several occasions due to lingering financial difficulties, new conflicts, and a recognized need for expanded police and civilian capabilities. Each subregion was responsible for a multidimensional force of around 6,000 personnel.30 Progress in the implementation of the ASF plan varies across subregions. ECOWAS and SADC are more advanced toward the ASF benchmarks than the others, especially NARC, which has seen little headway.31 The AU explains that the ASF achieved initial operational capability in 2010.32 In practice, the ASF so far has been activated only once, through the dispatch in late 2011 of 14 staff officers from the EASF to the AMISOM mission in Somalia.33 Moreover, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), a less ambitious plan to provide a rapid reaction capability, was floated in 2013 as a possible replacement for the ASF (see Chapter 6). Despite these setbacks, the AU’s efforts through these initiatives have two important implications for African and global peacekeeping. For one, the ASF effectively brings the African subregional organizations into an AU-led continental system of peacekeeping. In this system, they are expected to implement the decisions of the AU; or, as seems to take place more often in reality, these subregional bodies demand such decisions to legitimize their operations and mobilize broader support from the AU and beyond. Either way, the ASF and its background rules and procedures put not just the AU but

26

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

also these subregional organizations on a firmer institutional footing. Moreover, the ASF serves as a globally accepted framework for African peacekeeping capacity building. In Africa, the ASF provides an agreed time frame and a set of benchmarks for the required capabilities. Globally, the framework clarifies shortfalls in regional capabilities and thus serves as a platform for international assistance. I will take up the latter aspect in Chapter 6 on capacity building. The EU followed a similar path. Its peacekeeping framework emerged out of the wider process of creating a new European organization throughout the 1990s in which the development of security functions was one of its distinctive features. The EU was created by the Treaty of Maastricht (signed on February 7, 1992, entered into force in November 1993). Though the treaty included a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the three pillars of the new organization, it was the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force in May 1999), which amended and expanded the Treaty of Maastricht, that concretized the security aspects of the CFSP. These aspects are now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).34 This treaty did so by incorporating the WEU’s repertoire of field actions into the EU, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management (Petersberg tasks).35 Peacekeeping thus officially became part of the EU’s activities. Following the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks, the EU launched a series of initiatives to establish the necessary capabilities and support structures. With regard to military capabilities, the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 determined that by 2003, the EU would have the capabilities to perform the Petersberg tasks through the establishment of a 60,000-strong European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that could be deployed within 60 days and sustain operations for at least one year. The ERRF constituted the core of the Helsinki Headline Goal.36 Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003,37 the EU updated these objectives in 2004 (Headline Goal 2010). Central to this headline goal was the creation of combined arms, battalion-sized forces of 1,500 personnel (EU Battlegroups [EUBG]). They would start implementation of their mission 10 days after the EU Council’s decision to launch the operation and would be sustainable for 30 days (extendable to 120 days). The EUBG reached its full operational capability in 2007 with two brigades on standby. On the civilian side of crisis management, the Feira European Council (June 2000) defined four priority areas (police, rule of law, civil

Contexts and Actors

27

administration, and civil protection) and set out the target of making available up to 5,000 police officers for international missions by 2003.38 It was also decided that out of this total there should be 1,000 officers (later increased to 1,400) deployable within 30 days.39 Building on these efforts, the EU Council adopted in 2004 a Civilian Headline Goal 2008. This headline goal added two tasks (monitoring missions and support to EU special representatives) to the role of EU civilian missions. It also applied the EUBG time frame to civilian missions by declaring that the EU must be able to make the decision to launch such a mission within five days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the EU Council, and that specific civilian capabilities should be deployable within 30 days of the Council decision to launch the mission.40 In November 2007, the EU Council agreed on the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, which did not introduce new numerical targets but identified priority areas to better manage the EU’s civilian capabilities.41 The adoption of the military and civilian headline goals introduced an elaborate process of identifying capability shortfalls and developing plans to fill these gaps on both the military and civilian fronts by 2010. In December 2008, the EU Council declared an integrated level of ambition for future EU civilian and military capability development, and two years later reaffirmed that it will apply to years beyond 2010. This level of ambition consists of the following elements: • Two major stabilization and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10,000 troops for at least two years; • Two rapid response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups; • An emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each member state regarding its nationals and making use of the consular lead state concept; • A maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; • A civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; • Around a dozen CSDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including rapid response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3,000 experts), which could last several years.42

28

Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

Many of these elements, including stabilization and reconstruction, rapid response, as well as some scenarios of humanitarian assistance and civilian missions, fall under the category of peacekeeping. Along with the development of operational capabilities, the EU created several support structures for EU operations. The structures concern political decisionmaking (Political and Security Committee and Military Committee), policy development and planning (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate), and operational planning and management (Military Staff and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability).43 These structures were gradually developed on a parallel track to the capability development, although the process was by no means straightforward.44 All these structures now form part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by a high representative.45 Despite this impressive array of structures and capabilities, the EU’s peacekeeping missions, especially those with strong military components, are so far mostly dependent on the ad hoc contributions of individual member states. EUBG formations have not yet been used for CSDP military missions. A more ad hoc approach relying on the offers of member states or the existence of a framework nation (like France in the EU’s Operation Artemis; see Chapter 4) has been the norm for the force generation of these missions. Nevertheless, the EU’s capacity development and institution building have had a great impact on its member states (e.g., force structure) in such a way that they can contribute their assets and personnel to EU missions. These EU institutions, such as the Military Committee, often serve as driving forces for European security integration by pushing for more active operational roles by the EU.46 One should also note that it took place against the backdrop of cooperation between the EU and NATO. The origin of EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management was the effort from the early 1990s to make the WEU the platform for European action that would be at the same time complementary to NATO. In Berlin in 1996 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) officially declared the completion of the groundwork for a system in which NATO’s assets can be used for the WEU’s autonomous actions.47 As the EU developed its security and defense profile by incorporating the WEU’s functions, the two organizations declared a strategic partnership in crisis management in December 2002. The details for using NATO assets in EU-led operations were finalized on March 17, 2003 (Berlin Plus agreement).48 The two cases of mission handover from NATO to the EU—from Operation Allied Harmony to Operation Concordia in Macedonia (see Chapter 5), and from the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia—both took place using this procedure.49 The Berlin Plus arrange-

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29

ments are unique in their unidirectional nature: they allow the EU to access NATO’s long-established military assets, thereby giving the EU a range of critical elements necessary for the successful conduct of contemporary peacekeeping. In sum, the EU developed its peacekeeping capability through the internal process of institution/capacity building as well as the external one of establishing the rules and procedures for cooperation with NATO. Similar institutional approaches can also be observed in the other organizations during the same period. Throughout the 1990s NATO played important supporting roles for the resolution of the Bosnian conflict and assumed extensive peacekeeping tasks in postwar Bosnia and Kosovo. As mentioned earlier, the 1999 Strategic Concept made clear that the Alliance would stand ready to contribute to conflict prevention and management in the Euro-Atlantic zone. This includes potential deployment of what it calls crisis response operations (CRO)—a broad range of operations that do not fall under Article 5 (collective defense) of the Washington Treaty; peacekeeping is one option in this category.50 On the capability front, NATO embarked on initiatives to transform its military readiness to meet the requirements for comprehensive crisis management. In addition to the Berlin Plus arrangements mentioned already, at the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO announced the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a joint and combined force consisting of a command and control element, the Immediate Response Force (13,000 troops serving on 12-month rotations), and a Response Forces Pool that supplements the NRF. NATO declared full operational capability for the NRF in November 2006.51 Like the EUBG, however, the NRF has actually been used for rather limited purposes short of peacekeeping.52 After the initial successes in the Balkans, the Berlin Plus cooperation with the EU has also stalled, due to differences in the memberships (especially the denial of full EU membership to Turkey) and in the priority attached to the two organizations by the member states. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the heavy burden placed by the ISAF operation on NATO members made it difficult to envisage the use of the NATO framework for concurrent contributions to peacekeeping. NATO’s contribution in this field during the ISAF era was limited to activities such as the airlifting of AMIS peacekeepers to Darfur and the training provision in Iraq. It therefore remains to be seen how NATO will be able or willing to respond to such needs after ISAF, but the overall record of its institutional developments over the course of the past two decades suggests that it is unlikely that NATO will discard its newly acquired identity as a comprehensive crisis management actor.

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As far as peacekeeping is concerned, the CSTO is at a much more embryonic stage of development. But the way it has concretized its interest in peacekeeping is typical of the institutional approach. The CSTO peacekeeping force is intended either as an autonomous operation or as part of a UN peacekeeping operation.53 In 2004, the organization adopted a “concept of formation and functioning of the mechanism of peacekeeping.”54 The concept was later developed into three regulations that were adopted by the CSTO Collective Security Council on October 6, 2007, and entered into force on January 15, 2009.55 They provide for the formulation of the collective peacekeeping forces, the post of the head of the mission, and the preparatory task force.56 Set up by the council, the task force is responsible for all aspects of mission preparation for a new mission at the startup phase, and then constitutes the core of the mission once it becomes operational. While these procedures have not yet been tested on the ground, the CSTO has taken steps to further develop its peacekeeping mechanism. On September 28, 2012, the CSTO secretariat and the UN DPKO signed a memorandum in which they agreed on promoting operational-level cooperation in peacekeeping matters including joint training and exchange of information.57 On October 8, 2012, CSTO member states conducted in Kazakhstan a two-week peacekeeping exercise named Undefeatable Brotherhood 2012, the first of their peacekeeping exercises.58 Though at a much less developed stage, the League of Arab States (LAS) has also expressed interest in peacekeeping through the establishment in 2006 of an Arab Peace and Security Council, a standing body that is expected to organize an Arab peacekeeping force when necessary.59 These organizations are vastly different in many aspects, including the level of institutional capacity, operational preparedness of the member states, political dynamics and constraints on peacekeeping deployments, and availability of financial and human resources. Nevertheless, they have taken an essentially institutional approach to peacekeeping by developing a new set of rules and decisionmaking processes as well as systems of operational capabilities and management structures. These arrangements are made in view of lessons and requirements from past deployments, or (in the case of the CSTO) even in the absence of such experiences. From our perspective, an important point to make here is that this approach is presumed on a long-term commitment to peacekeeping: by declaring the inclusion of peacekeeping in their official roles, they constitute themselves as peacekeeping actors. Actors taking this approach are thus clearer in this commitment than those who are engaged only on an ad hoc basis.

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Parallel Expansion of UN Peacekeeping

A third characteristic in the current stage of the evolution of the peacekeeping regime is that all these developments are taking place concurrently with a historic surge in UN peacekeeping. A comparison with the second period of the evolution of regional peacekeeping (between 1995 and 1999) will help underline this point. In the latter half of the 1990s, NATO initiated three large peacekeeping deployments (Implementation Force [IFOR], SFOR, and Kosovo Force [KFOR]) in Bosnia and Kosovo, and a succession of new multinational forces were deployed to Albania (Operation Alba) and Timor-Leste (INTERFET). African subregional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC) also engaged in peacekeeping deployments. In contrast, the UN reduced peacekeeping deployments in this period. Between February 1995 and June 1996, seven UN missions—the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)—were officially closed, followed by nine mission closures from May 1997 to February 1999.60 Though some 14 new missions were established between 1995 and early 1999, they were much smaller in scale and less ambitious in mandate. This was in fact reflected in a dramatic dip in the number of deployed peacekeepers from a high of 78,444 in July 1993 to 12,084 in June 1999.61 At the policy level, in January 1995, Boutros-Ghali famously criticized the blurring of the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement as seen in Bosnia and Somalia: “Peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence),” he argued, “should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other.”62 The Supplement to an Agenda for Peace also highlighted the prominence of intrastate conflicts that posed unique challenges to peacekeepers and the limited availability of troops and logistic capabilities for UN operations. While the Supplement did not specifically call for returning to traditional peacekeeping, it strongly cautioned against stretching the mandate and capacity of UN peacekeeping. At the same time, in this report Boutros-Ghali elaborated on the proposal he made in the 1992 Agenda for Peace concerning cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements. He laid out five forms of such cooperation, three of which were related to peacekeeping (operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations), and expressed willingness on the

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part of the UN to help build the capacity of regional organizations for peacekeeping.63 While in the same report the Secretary-General emphasized the primacy of the UN as a principle of conflict management,64 there was an emerging sense that regional peacekeeping could be used as a promising alternative to UN peacekeeping.65 The further expansion of non-UN peacekeeping in the following period would have made the trend away from the UN a decisive one. But the latter half of the year 1999 saw the establishment of four new missions that would bring UN peacekeeping to a new level in size and complexity: the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, established in June), UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, October), and UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC, November). The number of uniformed personnel more than doubled by February 2000 (26,710), and followed an overall upward trajectory afterward, reaching over 100,000 personnel for the first time between February and June 2010.66 Though figures are not available, this is in addition to an incremental expansion of civilian mission components and a resultant increase in civilian experts. This dramatic turnaround coincided with the UN’s reform process, which introduced a more proactive and multidimensional concept of peacekeeping. Another point of note here is that this reform process would gradually include consideration of better working arrangements with regional peacekeeping actors (see below). In any event, the overall picture is very different: instead of regional and global (UN) actors providing somewhat competing frameworks for peacekeeping, they are both actively expanding their operations in quantitative and qualitative terms. In sum, the expansion of peacekeeping actors thus involves not just the entry of prominent regional organizations such as the EU and the AU into peacekeeping, but also changes in the institutional setup of these organizations as well as their relations with the UN in conflict management. We can see these developments as a remarkably consistent response to changed patterns of conflict in today’s world and the new geopolitical environment in which they must redefine their roles and identities.

UN Peacekeeping Reform Along with the expansion of non-UN peacekeeping, another important contextual factor conducive to the emergence of global peacekeeping cooperation relates to UN peacekeeping policy. The UN’s attitude toward regional and other peacekeeping efforts has undergone a few

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changes. In particular, the current period has given the global organization a unique set of challenges that were partly of its own making. On the one hand, there is a resurgent activism on the part of the UN that has led, as we saw, to the historic surge in UN peacekeeping deployments in the past decade. This activism is underlined by the gradual realization of the limitations of non-UN peacekeeping frameworks, such as the lack of financial, administrative, and logistical capabilities and regional political dynamics that might make agreement on setting up new missions difficult in some situations.67 On the other hand, however, there is a widely shared sense that the UN cannot realistically be expected to take on the increasing demand for peacekeeping missions on its own. Highlighted by the recent surge that revealed (yet again) the gap between the mandates of UN missions and the resources available to achieve them, this awareness has made the issue of peacekeeping cooperation an increasingly important element of the UN’s reform process. Initially, the issue of peacekeeping partnership did not receive great attention. Though, as we saw, the 1992 Agenda for Peace flagged,68 and the 1995 Supplement highlighted, the potential for peacekeeping cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, the Brahimi panel was largely silent on the topic. Almost entirely focused on reforming its own operational and decisionmaking weaknesses, the report offered little by way of the roles regional and other actors could play in peacekeeping. The report argued: The Charter clearly encourages cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to resolve conflict and establish and maintain peace and security. The United Nations is actively and successfully engaged in many such cooperation programmes in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking, elections and electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and humanitarian work and other peace-building activities in various parts of the world. Where peacekeeping operations are concerned, however, caution seems appropriate, because military resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere. Providing training, equipment, logistical support and other resources to regional and subregional organizations could enable peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping operation or to set up regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council resolution.69

Instead of advancing the debate on peacekeeping cooperation, the Brahimi report urged caution against the proliferation of non-UN

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peacekeeping, hinting only at the possibility of building the capacity of national and regional peacekeepers who will serve UN-commanded or -authorized peacekeeping missions. This caution, which perhaps reflected the broader political environment at that time (the panel conducted its work between March and August 2000, not long after NATO’s military intervention into Kosovo in the previous year), was nevertheless quickly replaced by the need to initiate substantive engagement with regional peacekeeping actors. Thus when the then undersecretary-general of the DPKO, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, launched a Peace Operations 2010 reform process in November 2005, he astutely included the establishment of effective partnerships among the five priorities. The range of partnerships conceived were both internal (various UN headquarters departments and UN agencies) and external (regional organizations and international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank group). The goal of such broad partnerships was “to establish predictable, effective, and transparent frameworks . . . to optimize our collective engagement with post-conflict peace operations.”70 With regard to regional peacekeepers, the interoffice memorandum stated that the priority would be to establish predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations in peace operations, including common peacekeeping standards; joint training and exercises; and modalities for cooperation and transition in peace operations. The African Union is a key external partner for us. We are committed to helping build African peacekeeping capacities over the next 10 years and, together with other external partners, supporting the AU in its peacekeeping activities.71

While capacity-building assistance to the AU thus received a high priority, development of practical frameworks and procedures with EU and NATO operations was also put forward. In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed, and the General Assembly approved, the creation of “a partnership capacity that would lead the development of strategic peacekeeping partnerships.”72 The Partnerships Team, under the Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division, was formally established in November that year as one of the DPKO/DFS shared capacities.73 The New Horizon agenda announced by the DPKO/DFS in July 2009 carried on in this direction. Aptly titled “A New Partnership Agenda,” the nonpaper expanded further on the theme of peacekeeping cooperation by arguing that the success of UN peacekeeping depends on renewing and strengthening the global partnership of peacekeeping actors and institutions, including, in addition to those already men-

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tioned, contributing member states and host countries.74 It pointed out that building such partnership would require a three-pronged strategy focusing on the strategic management, mission implementation, and future capacity of UN peacekeeping. To achieve a unity of purpose in planning and management, the agenda stressed the importance of a “wider political strategy” that should inform a right combination of available conflict management resources in which UN missions and non-UN field instruments constitute alternative or collaborative options. On the implementation of mandated tasks, it acknowledged that UN peacekeeping was not well equipped to handle the social and economic dimensions of peacebuilding and called for establishing “predictable divisions of labour” between UN peacekeeping and development assistance actors within and outside the UN system.75 With regard to building the global base capacity for multidimensional peacekeeping, it pointed out that UN peacekeeping missions were regularly operating alongside or following regional missions, demanding case-by-case creative operational collaboration. While the case-specific nature of such arrangements was to some extent inevitable, the transaction costs and potential redundancy associated with these responses should be minimized. “Options must be pursued,” the agenda argued, mostly with the UN-AU partnership in mind, “to improve resource-sharing and reimbursements, enhance information-sharing and the pooling of such scarce resources as strategic lift and specialist civilian and police expertise.” It also announced the intention to work with national and international partners to build the capacity of potential peacekeeping contributors.76 The UN’s growing interest in dialogue with regional organizations was not limited to peacekeeping. The Secretary-General hosted seven high-level meetings with heads of regional organizations between 1994 and 2006.77 Starting in 2003, the Security Council has also invited representatives of regional organizations to discuss issues of globalregional security cooperation on a semiregular basis. Between 2003 and 2016 such meetings took place on 19 occasions, including those devoted to cooperation with the EU (May 2010, February 2013, February 2014, March 2015, and June 2016); the AU and African subregional organizations (November 2004, March 2007, April 2008, January 2012, December 2014, and May and November 2016); and the CIS, CSTO, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (October 2016).78 Clearly, the issue of global-regional security cooperation, enshrined but under-elaborated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has received renewed attention at the UN.

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In sum, the UN has developed its peacekeeping partnership agenda in response to the rising demand for and the growing complexity of contemporary peacekeeping. Acknowledging that UN peacekeeping is only one of the options for the international community as a whole (“wider political strategy”), the UN has now turned to broader actors and institutions outside the UN system for a long-term solution. This new sense of pragmatism was expressed in July 2003 when Secretary-General Kofi Annan told representatives of regional organizations, the international community’s vision of global security should be one that draws on the resources and legitimacy of a network of effective and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanisms—regional and global—that are flexible and responsive to our rapidly changing and integrating world. The experiences of the past few years suggest that this new multilayered security architecture is already beginning to emerge. The challenge today is to move beyond purely ad hoc arrangements and put in place a system capable of generating a rapid and flexible response to crises in Africa and elsewhere.79

He also described the initiatives by the AU and the EU in 2003 as “positive developments towards the creation of strategic partnerships to meet the peacekeeping challenges of today, which for the United Nations are overwhelmingly in Africa. The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation can now be envisaged as part of a series of efforts that take advantage of the comparative strengths of different organizations.”80 The search is on for ways to strengthen the global network of peacekeeping capacities and improve its effectiveness. Annan’s successor, Ban Ki-moon, shared this recognition, arguing that there is a new paradigm of “partnership peacekeeping”: Rather than one organization exiting and handing off its mandates/ responsibilities to another, the respective roles of the organizations continuously evolve to meet new requirements and complement the changing roles being played by the others. This is a paradigm shift that is not the result of happenstance, but reflects the invaluable contribution that each organization can make. . . . It also reflects the clear recognition that no single organization can effectively address increasingly complex, multifaceted peace and security challenges on its own, whether at the subregional, regional or global level. Responding to those challenges has increasingly been and must be a joint endeavour. At the same time, it is important that the endeavour truly be the full sum of all its parts, namely, that each organization play a mutually supportive role with the others to advance the common goal of peace.81

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While it is in the interest of the UN now to support global peacekeeping cooperation, this poses the challenge of identifying the role of the UN within the thus constructed regime. In his first report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Secretary-General Ban argued that the UN “must become the leading global actor in planning and implementing integrated peacekeeping operations and in working with partners in that effort.”82 Like Boutros-Ghali more than 10 years ago, Ban was proposing the same principle of UN primacy but in a very different context from that which led to the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. With the parallel expansion of UN and non-UN peacekeeping a growing reality, UN leadership is now expected to pursue the potentially difficult role of leading the construction of a mutually reinforcing network of peacekeeping cooperation while respecting the autonomy and ownership of regional actors and supporting their peacekeeping capacity building. As the new high-level panel on UN peace operations argued, “In a future of greater global and regional partnership, the UN should embrace a dual role as one partner responding politically and operationally alongside others, as well as an enabler and facilitator of others to play their increasingly prominent roles.”83

Conclusion I have so far examined the various contextual factors that have promoted cooperation among established and newly emerging peacekeeping actors. In the post–Cold War period peacekeeping has become a multidimensional conflict management endeavor requiring deeper engagement into the societies that went through regional and civil wars. It has also become an important avenue through which many international and regional organizations seek to reposition their place in the new strategic environment. The resultant expansion of peacekeeping actors throughout the past two decades has led to the creation of conditions ripe for cooperation. As this chapter demonstrates, the level of attention to and the number of various initiatives and arrangements in this field suggest the emergence of a new phenomenon with regard to the international management of conflicts. But how do we make sense of all this? Here, we need a theoretical framework that will make intelligible the motivations, forms, and implications of peacekeeping cooperation. It is to this task that I shall turn in the next chapter.

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Notes 1. On the other hand, they note that 13 of the 39 intrastate conflicts were internationalized due to the contribution by one or more states to one or both parties to the conflicts. Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 4 (July 2015): 537. 2. Hugo Slim, “Protecting Civilians: Putting the Individual at the Humanitarian Centre,” in The Humanitarian Decade: Challenges for Humanitarian Assistance in the Last Decade and into the Future, vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 2004), 155. 3. In this context one should not therefore overemphasize the discontinuity between the Cold War and post–Cold War years. Interview with a former senior UN official, New Delhi, September 24, 2013. 4. Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111), paras. 3, 15. 5. Ibid., para. 22. 6. Rodrigo Tavares, Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations (London: Routledge, 2010), 3. 7. OAU, Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, OAU doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXVI), July 11, 1990, para. 2. 8. Ibid., para. 11. 9. Klaas von Walraven, “Heritage and Transformation: From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,” in Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, ed. Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 49–52. For an excellent summary of this process, see Benedikt Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa: A Reappraisal (Boulder, CO: FirstForum Press, 2009), chap. 5. 10. For an informed analysis of the development of the EU’s security and defense policy, see, for instance, Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), chaps. 1–2. 11. Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint Malo, December 3–4, 1998, paras. 1–2. 12. Henning-A. Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991– 1999: Policies and Doctrines (Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass, 2005), 61. 13. NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” November 7–8, 1991, para. 32. 14. NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” April 24, 1999, para. 10; see also para. 31. 15. Ibid., para. 48. 16. For instance, in 2010 the CSTO reportedly declined a request from Kyrgyzstan’s then interim government to deploy a peacekeeping force to control rising ethnic clashes between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz (they had made similar unsuccessful appeals to Russia). Eventually the OSCE concurred to deploy a small mission of unarmed police officers to train local police. Andrew E. Kramer, “Kyrgyzstan Asks European Security Body for Police Teams,” New York Times, June 24, 2010; Sylvia Westall, “OSCE to Send Police Force to Kyrgyzstan,” Reuters AlertNet, July 22, 2010.

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17. The OAS organized two small missions: MICIVIH (1993–2000, jointly with the UN) and the Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti (2002–2007). OAS, “Peace Missions Map,” https://www.oas.org/sap/peace fund/VirtualLibrary/Maps.html#1 (accessed November 16, 2016). 18. Terry M. Mays, Africa’s First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981–1982 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 19. Xymena Kurowska, “The Role of ESDP Operations,” in European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė (New York: Routledge, 2008), 30. 20. ECOMOG was defined as “a structure composed of several stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment.” Apart from peacekeeping, the types of the ECOMOG mission included observation and monitoring, humanitarian intervention, enforcement of sanctions, preventive deployment, peacebuilding, policing, and “any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council.” Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, December 10, 1999, arts. 21–22. 21. Karin Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 199. 22. Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, March 21, 1996, art. 18A, quoted in Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, 114. 23. The only deployment by the SADC, Operation Boleas, took place between 1998 and 1999 and there are debates about the operation’s credentials as a SADC operation. See Chapter 5. 24. The SADC Protocol in this regard states that the organ would aim to “develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations” (art. 2[k]). 25. The Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, art. 3(f). 26. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol), July 9, 2002, art. 7.1(c), (e), (f). 27. PSC Protocol, art. 13.1. 28. For a comprehensive introduction and review of the ASF, see Jakkie Cilliers and Johann Pottgieter, “The African Standby Force,” in Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, edited by Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, 111–141 (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010). 29. Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa, 162–163. 30. Mavis Otinkorang, “Ghana: African Standby Force Operational by 2015,” AllAfrica, December 12, 2011; Hussein Solomon, “Critical Reflections of the African Standby Force: The Case of Its SADC Contingent,” Southern African Peace and Security Studies 1, no. 2 (2012): 21–22. 31. Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, 132–134; Fred Oluoch, “Deadline for African Standby Force Now 2015,” East African, January 26, 2013.

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32. AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security, PSC/PR/2(CCCVII), para. 32. 33. AU Peace and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, AU doc. PSC/PR/2(CCXCIII), September 13, 2011, para. 36; European Commission, African Peace Facility Annual Report 2011 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012), 19. For progress in the EASF, see Colin Robinson, “The East African Standby Force: History and Prospects,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 1 (February 2014): 20–36. 34. Initially the security and defense aspects of the CFSP were called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). They were renamed the CSDP as the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s earlier constitutive treaties, went into force on December 1, 2009. 35. Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam Treaty), art. 17(2). These tasks originally formed part of the Petersberg Declaration (June 1992) where the WEU declared its own role in acknowledging the establishment of the EU. As a result, by introducing the Petersberg tasks, most of the WEU operations other than common defense operations were transferred to the EU. 36. Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council, December 10–11, 1999, Annex IV. 37. The ESS effectively expanded the scope of the Petersberg tasks by adding joint disarmament operations, security sector reform, and support for third countries in combating terrorism. European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels, December 12, 2003), 12; see also Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty), art. 43(1). 38. See Presidency Conclusions: Santa Maria da Feira European Council, June 19–20, 2000, appendixes 3 and 4. 39. Requirements for intervention capabilities in the other areas were later agreed on. In the area of civil protection, the commitments include two or three assessment and/or coordination teams deployable within three to seven hours, rapidly deployable intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons, and a roster of experts including a pool of judges (300) and civilian administration advisers. Declaration of EU Chief of Police Following the Meeting on Police Aspects in the ESDP-Framework, October 25, 2004; Council of the EU, Ministerial Declaration Adopted by the Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference on November 19, 2002; Council of the EU, Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference: Ministerial Declaration, November 22, 2004; Caroline R. Earle, “European Capacities for Peace Operations: Taking Stock” (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 6–8. 40. Council of the EU, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, EU doc. 15863/04, December 7, 2004, para. 5. Preceding this Headline Goal, the Police Action Plan (June 2001) and the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP (June 2004) had been adopted at the EU Council. 41. The areas include planning, mobilization, training, mission support, synergies with other CSDP instruments, developing national deployment strategies, and introduction of a feedback system from the missions. Council of the EU, Civilian Headline Goal 2010, EU doc. 14823/07, November 19, 2007.

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42. Council of the EU, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, December 11, 2008; Council of the EU, EU Civilian and Military Capability Development Beyond 2010, EU doc. 17127/10, December 7, 2010, para. 4. 43. The establishment of the Peace and Security Committee, Military Committee, and Military Staff was decided at the Cologne European Council (June 1999). The Nice European Council (December 2000) included them among the standing bodies of the EU. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability was established in August 2007 following the council’s endorsement of the Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management that defined its roles. The idea of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate was endorsed at the Brussels European Council (December 2008). Presidency Conclusions, June 3–4, 1999, December 7–9, 2000, and December 11–12, 2008; EEAS, “The Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC),” April 2011, www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/110412_factsheet _-_cpcc_-_version_4_en.pdf (accessed November 17, 2016). 44. For instance, at early stages there were debates within EU countries regarding whether the EU should possess its own military command and control capability. The proponents for such capability included France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, which had proposed the creation of an independent EU military command at their summit meeting held on April 29, 2003. Countries like Great Britain, however, feared that this could undermine NATO’s capability. 45. The decision to create the high representative post was made by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999. The creation of the EEAS was provided for in the Lisbon Treaty and the service was officially launched in 2010. Council of the EU, Council Decision Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service, EU doc. 2010/427/EU, July 26, 2010. 46. Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “The Military Dimension of European Security: An Epistemic Community Approach,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42, no. 1 (September 2013): 45–64. 47. The background for this development was the conflict in the Balkans where both the WEU and NATO played operational roles. The WEU deployed naval task forces to enforce the UN-authorized embargoes against the former Yugoslavia in 1992 (Operation Sharp Fence). In June 1993, this operation was merged with a separate NATO operation (Operation Maritime Guard) to become part of a WEU-NATO combined operation (Operation Sharp Guard) that continued until June 1996. NATO, “NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard,” www.nato.int/ifor/general/shrp-grd.htm (accessed November 17, 2016). 48. For a detailed commentary on the agreement (whose text is classified), see Martin Reichard, The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), chap. 8. 49. EEAS, “About CSDP—The Berlin Plus Agreement,” http://eeas.europa.eu /csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm (accessed November 16, 2016); Gabriele Cascone, “ESDP Operations and NATO: Co-operation, Rivalry or MuddlingThrough?” in Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, European Security and Defence Policy, 143–158. 50. NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” paras. 31, 47–49; NATO, “Crisis Management,” www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm? (accessed November 16, 2016).

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51. NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration,” November 21, 2002, para. 4a; NATO, “The NATO Response Force—At the Centre of NATO Transformation,” October 2013, www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018 _131022-MediaBackgrounder_NRF_en.pdf (accessed November 17, 2016). For more recent developments see Chapter 5. 52. NRF contingents have been used for protecting the 2004 Olympics in Athens, supporting the 2004 presidential elections in Afghanistan, airlifting relief supplies to the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (September– October 2005), and providing disaster relief to earthquake-hit Pakistan (October 2005–February 2006); “NATO Response Force.” 53. Nikolai Bordyuzha, “The Collective Security Treaty Organization: A Brief Overview,” in OSCE Yearbook 2010, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishers, 2011), 343; see also SCOR, 7796th Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.7796, October 28, 2016, 5. 54. Statement by the Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty N. Bordyuzha, the 16th Meeting of OSCE Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, December 4–5, 2008, www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index_bzznengl.htm (accessed November 17, 2016). 55. Bordyuzha, “Collective Security Treaty Organization,” 343. 56. Regulations for the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Regulations for Task Forces for the Preparation of Peacekeeping Operations of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Regulations for the Head of the Peacekeeping Mission of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, UN doc. A/63/749-S/2009/126, March 5, 2009, Annexes I–III. 57. “UN, CSTO Agrees to Expand Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations,” Itar-Tass News, September 29, 2012. 58. The exercise mobilized a total of around 950 troops from Kazakhstan (which provided 535 troops), Russia (160), Kyrgyzstan (50), Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan. “CSTO Holds First-Ever Peacekeeping Exercises,” Eurasianet, October 8, 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Kazakhstan, “CSTO Peacekeepers Gather in Kazakhstan,” www.kazembassythailand.org/news /csto-peacekeepers-gather-kazakhstan (accessed November 17, 2016). 59. Tavares, Regional Security, 109–110. 60. These include the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL); UNAVEM III; UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP); UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES); UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH); UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA); UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA); UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH); and UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG). 61. UN DPKO, “Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United Nations Operations,” www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors /documents/Yearly_Summary.pdf (accessed November 17, 2016); UN DPKO, “Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991–Present,” www .un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/chart.pdf (accessed November 17, 2016). 62. UN General Assembly/Security Council, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth

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Anniversary of the United Nations, UN doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, January 25, 1995, para. 36. 63. Ibid., paras. 86–87. 64. Ibid., para. 88. 65. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 2 (2002): 71. 66. The number reached the mark again in September 2014 and as of this writing has remained above that level. UN DPKO, “Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United Nations Operations,” www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Yearly.pdf (accessed November 17, 2016). 67. Ibid. 68. Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111), paras. 60–65. 69. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305S/2000/809), Annex, para. 54 (emphasis added); see also para. 105. 70. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Peace Operations 2010, Interoffice Memorandum, November 30, 2005, 6. 71. Ibid., 4. 72. UN General Assembly, Comprehensive Report on Strengthening the Capacity of the United Nations to Manage and Sustain Peace Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/61/858, April 13, 2007, para. 80. 73. UN General Assembly, Strengthening the Capacity of the United Nations to Manage and Sustain Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, UN doc. A/65/624, December 13, 2010, paras. 63–68. 74. UN DPKO/DFS, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, July 2009). 75. Ibid., 9, 23. 76. Ibid., 34. 77. Tavares, Regional Security, 6. 78. In addition to those mentioned, they took place in April 2003, July 2004, October 2005, September 2006, January 2010, and July 2014. These are exclusive of more thematic debates, such as consultations on UN support to AU peacekeeping (March and October 2009, October 2010), the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean (May 2015), and cooperation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in countering extremist ideology (November 2016). Apart from them, the Security Council under the Indonesian presidency organized an open debate on the topic in November 2007, this time, however, without inviting regional organizations. 79. UN General Assembly, Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity: Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/591, November 30, 2004, para. 11 (emphasis added). 80. UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/58/694, January 26, 2004, para. 84. 81. UN Security Council, Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2015/229, April 1, 2015, para. 57.

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82. UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN doc. A/61/668, February 13, 2007, para. 39. 83. UN General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People, UN doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, June 17, 2015, para. 56.

3 Understanding Peacekeeping Cooperation

In this chapter I set out an analytical framework for investigating

peacekeeping cooperation by examining theories of cooperation. This is based on the somewhat obvious but important point that peacekeeping cooperation, and indeed peacekeeping itself, is a form of cooperation in the international arena. As cooperation is one of the central themes of international politics and security studies, it is possible to draw and apply insights from theories of international cooperation to the more specific field of peacekeeping. After a review of three major strands of thought on international cooperation, I examine how they can apply to global peacekeeping cooperation and argue that we can characterize this emerging practice of cooperation as a type of regime. In the remainder of the chapter I articulate this regime in terms of its patterns, rules, procedures, norms, and principles as well as its implications for global security governance.

Theories of International Cooperation The question of why actors, in their social and political relations, decide to cooperate with each other is a question as old as the study of politics in general, and as such well precedes the modern discipline of international relations.1 For instance, Thomas Hobbes, in his famous portrayal of the state of nature, argued that self-preservation (“foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby”) provides the key motivation driving humans to agree on the establishment of a state.2 The thus established states are concerned exclusively with their own security: while this may or may not contribute to the development of 45

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cooperative relations among them, in Hobbes’s world such relations do not have any ideational basis and can sustain only as long as they meet the security interests of the states concerned. Machiavelli may also be included in this camp in his generally pessimistic view on human nature and the political community, which is likewise fundamentally indifferent toward the issue of cooperation. Many other thinkers, however, tried to see potential for cooperation at the social level in their accounts of human nature and political community. Thinkers such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Locke, and Rousseau highlighted the role of rationality and innate sociability in the original state of nature, which Locke, for instance, described as “a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance, and preservation.”3 Though this state of nature is by definition still fragile and necessarily degenerates into civil society that tends to be dominated by competing interests in self-preservation and dominance,4 these thinkers’ trust in human rationality and sociability provided a theoretical foundation—expressed by Grotius, for example, as pacta sunt servanda—on which they (except perhaps Rousseau) could envisage cooperation among nations on the basis of international treaties. Kant developed the theme further in his portrayal of how peaceful relations might emerge among nations. He attributed the process to the human capacity to learn from experiences and regulate relations accordingly, aided by the spread of moral reasoning among citizens (in turn facilitated by improvement in their overall education and intelligence) and the expansion of economic interdependence that produces societal effects in favor of peace (spirit of trade or commerce).5 This last element, the recognition of economic relations as a springboard for cooperation, received closer attention by Montesquieu and Adam Smith, who saw in the creation of the market a great potential for fostering the sharedness of interests and sentiments among people (Smith is also known as a theorist of sympathy and compassion). These earlier philosophical works have inspired modern and late modern international theorists who have produced several theoretical approaches geared toward the question of cooperation in today’s international relations. There are three broad ways of thinking about international cooperation that will be of relevance for the purposes of this book: instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. There are differences among the theorists, even within the same camp, but also important overlaps among the three approaches. Indeed, one can surmise that these three exist in perhaps any move toward cooperation. Nevertheless, they can be seen as distinct in highlighting different motivations for and

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consequences of international cooperation. I review them here and attempt to identify their heuristic value for the present inquiry. The instrumentalist approach to cooperation highlights the utility of such choice for actors: actors choose cooperation when it is in their interest to do so. This argument essentially revolves around actors’ rational calculation of costs and benefits in social interaction, from which cooperating with others may be appealing because it reasonably promises to provide benefits at lower costs. Cooperation usually entails some cost to the actors involved;6 and yet when the potential benefits are projected by the actors to outweigh such cost they can decide on a cooperative scheme or agreement. With regard to the question of the actors’ choice for cooperation versus confrontation, a significant body of work has been developed that draws on insights from game theory. Here, however, the question of cooperation in international relations is mainly explained with reference to the difficulties of achieving it under the conditions of anarchy and limited communications; cooperation in this setting becomes a “problem precisely because state interests are independently given, often in conflict with one another, and pursued within an environment of anarchy.”7 The prisoner’s dilemma (and, to a lesser degree, the chicken game) was thus deemed most appropriate and applied to many issues, especially the analysis of international crises and military strategies. Frequent interaction among the members over a long period of time (shadow of the future) and the use of specific strategies of interaction (tit for tat or reciprocity) even by a small cluster of actors are identified as conducive to the emergence of cooperative patterns of behavior.8 Constructivist theories of international cooperation highlight the social environment in which interaction takes place as well as the role of shared identities and interests that facilitate cooperation. Whereas instrumentalist approaches more or less take an actor’s identity and interests as given, constructivism argues that an actor shapes her identity and interests through interaction with others. 9 It follows that the quality of interaction matters in generating what sort of identity she comes to possess. Another important insight from constructivism is the nexus between the sharedness of identities (and perceived interests) and the cooperative relationships that emerge as a result: cooperation becomes possible in ways that reflect the sharedness of the self among the members of a social group. From this perspective, a purely instrumental form of cooperation would be nothing more than ad hoc and opportunistic, and therefore unsustainable; if cooperation exists in forms that are more sustainable and longer term, as often does in international relations, it requires “a corresponding shared sense of being”

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that shapes the actor’s sense of self and structures the nature of its relationship with others.10 In short, cooperation does not simply arise out of any interaction: only the kind of interaction with certain characteristics or conditions facilitates international cooperation by shaping shared identities. Bruce Cronin argues that the formation of such transnational identity requires both material and intersubjective conditions. Materially, there are three necessary conditions: a shared objective characteristic (shared ethnicity, similar level of development, etc.), a shared exclusive relationship to the other actors, and a high level of positive (i.e., mutually rewarding) interdependence among the members. While these provide minimum conditions, Cronin argues, they need to be combined with the intersubjective condition of common experiences to generate transnational identity: the longer and the more intensely the actors act together as a group, the more likely they are to come to share common identity.11 Interaction taking place under these conditions leads to the formation of transnational identities among the actors concerned; and these identities produce an effect of facilitating transnational cooperation because actors sharing common identity are more likely to value and commit themselves to their association.12 Institutional approaches generally highlight the role of institutions through which interaction takes place and analyze how they could play important catalytic, facilitative, or formative roles for cooperative behavior. Institutionalism in actuality includes a wide range of conceptions and underlying assumptions,13 but they can be encapsulated into two strands, which define the role of institutions in instrumental and constructivist senses, respectively. One strand argues that institutions provide a solution to the problem of cooperation identified by instrumentalism. As mentioned, the instrumental approach, because of its basic assumption, tends to highlight the difficulties of achieving cooperation under anarchy. This strand of institutionalism shares the self-interested nature of the primary actors (states) but suggests alternative paths to cooperation by introducing into their description of international life such elements of sociality as the creation of institutions. Institutions contribute to cooperative patterns of behavior by generating (1) expectations of continuous interaction, which helps lengthen the shadow of the future; (2) opportunities for reciprocity and expectations for a rough long-term equivalence of benefits among the members (diffuse reciprocity); (3) a flow of information that leads to improved transparency about the motives and purposes of actions; (4) mechanisms, procedures, and rules to resolve conflicts of

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interests when they arise; and (5) as a result of the combined effects of all these, prospects of reduced transaction costs involved in negotiating and maintaining cooperative arrangements.14 One basic question about institutionalism is what counts as institutions. Ruggie categorizes institutions into three levels: international orders, regimes, and formal international organizations.15 The most prominent body of work in this strand is related to regimes, whose most quoted definition in political contexts is supplied by Krasner: sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.16 In the instrumental-institutionalist perspective, states interpret the value of regimes in terms of maximizing the effects of their behavior; accordingly, regimes are “effective and persist only as long as states find it in their interest to maintain them.”17 Such interests involve two sets of scenarios: states may become aware that regimes are useful in fostering international cooperation, or a dominant state may find in regimes an effective means of maintaining its hegemony (hegemonic stability).18 For the present inquiry, the former aspect is of greater relevance here. Several factors, mostly along the lines suggested earlier, have been pointed out with regard to the potential roles of regimes in international cooperation. Regimes can foster international cooperation by (1) reducing the costs of verifying members’ compliance with the agreed rules, thus making it easier to punish noncompliant behaviors; (2) creating iterative patterns of behavior and thereby reducing information costs; (3) clarifying existent norms and procedures and facilitating the development of new ones; (4) serving as a hub of information exchange to reduce uncertainty about motivations and promote mutual understanding; (5) controlling patterns of transaction costs in a way that rewards cooperation and punishes defection; and (6) making it easier to establish a reputation as a compliant member.19 While instrumentalist approaches to regimes explain institutions as instruments that bring certain utility to state actors that favor cooperation, they remain silent on how states find international cooperation desirable in the first place. The other strand of institutionalism draws from the basic constructivist assumptions about the ontology of actors and highlights how institutions have deeper roots in the social aspects of states. From this perspective, institutions emerge as expressions of transnational, and therefore cooperative, identities. That is, shared identities provide the members with a web of certain roles, obligations, and privileges into which they are expected to socialize,20 and institutions help such socialization process by generating, articulating, maintaining, and developing the norms of a group. Oye points out two ways this takes place: “First,

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norms generated by regimes may be internalized by states, and thereby alter payoff structure. Second, information generated by regimes may alter states’ understanding of their interests.”21 In this understanding, therefore, regimes and individual actors that are their members are part and parcel of each other’s social existence. When actors transform their interests and identities through interaction under certain conditions that are articulated by Cronin, the institutional memories of such process and the resultant agreements are embodied in the form of regimes. Regimes can be either thin (based on states’ calculation of interests) or thick (as embodiments of shared ideas and identities). An important point to note at this juncture is that, while highlighting different aspects of international cooperation, these theories are largely complementary. Instrumentalism and constructivism offer explanations of motivations based on interests and identities that can coexist in actors’ moves toward cooperation.22 While in some cases a conflict of interests can hinder the development of cooperation based on shared identities, in others these identities transform the members’ interests toward a community of interests and thereby toward cooperation. With its focus on the process of international cooperation, institutionalism is combinable with the two motivational theories. A regime can exist by virtue of its interest-enhancing role for states, as a representation of shared identities, or as an institution that incorporates both elements.

Applying Theories What do these theories tell us about global peacekeeping cooperation? In applying these theories to peacekeeping cooperation, I take an eclectic approach based on the acknowledgment that the three theories elaborated above each generate potentially useful insights. Each can be used in a mutually complementary manner, while applying one theory to the exclusion of the others likely leads to limited understanding of peacekeeping cooperation. On the one hand, theory should be tailored to the question at hand. On the other hand, the question should not predetermine theoretical preferences: it should be approached with awareness of theoretical perspectives that are available independently from, and applicable to, broader research questions. This awareness of theoretical independence tends to be lacking in the existing literature on peacekeeping cooperation. The literature is typically focused on specific institutions (UN-AU, EU-UN, etc.) and, as a result, consists mostly of a review of mission-specific collaborative experiences and intra-institutional dynam-

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ics that led them to such collaboration.23 A few of these existing works do raise useful generic points on the nature of the cooperation, but these points are made without clear awareness of the availability of diverse theoretical perspectives. For instance, Haugevik derives two groups of motives from her review of peacekeeping cooperation—materialist (organizational survival, neutralizing competition, resource dependence) and ideational (legitimization, shared values, organizational learning)— without further examining their theoretical and policy implications.24 Theoretical eclecticism allows us to generate an analysis of peacekeeping cooperation that is better grounded in terms of the relationship between theory and practice, and is richer in insight. As suggested earlier, in this book I purport to advance knowledge on these two fronts. Theoretically, this book represents a practice of analytical eclecticism: the challenge and the potential benefit are in the promise of generating a theory of global peacekeeping cooperation grounded in a combination of different cooperation theories. As well, such theory will allow us to examine the actual practices of cooperation on a consistent analytical plane and thereby consider their overall implications for global security governance. In the rest of this chapter I aim to address the former, on the basis of which Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will contain the latter analysis. With regard to theoretical implications, analytical eclecticism leads us to articulate peacekeeping cooperation as a newly developing cooperative regime for the management of security threats and conflicts around the world. Peacekeeping cooperation is a regime in that it involves a set of patterns, principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that help converge the actors’ expectations. This articulation is institutionalist insofar as it uses regime as a main frame, and yet allows both instrumental and constructivist explanations as they offer accounts that explain the motives and implications of the formation of such a regime. In fact, these two theories constitute a continuum from purely instrumental to purely ideational that characterizes the nature of a regime: actors are motivated by calculations of self-interest, commitment to the regime’s norms and principles, or some combination of the two.25 Attempts to explain peacekeeping cooperation from each of the three theories alone, however, are likely to have limited power. Instrumentalism has limited applicability to peacekeeping cooperation because of its narrow definition of the actors’ social conditions. Central for instrumentalism is the question of what one might call firstorder cooperation—how states can initiate cooperation in the first place under what they identify as the fundamental condition of structural anarchy. In contrast, global peacekeeping cooperation is an example of

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second-order cooperation (i.e., attempts to advance cooperation among actors that are already committed to the joint action to some extent). Peacekeeping by definition is a multilateral cooperative exercise: a peacekeeping mission needs multiple contributors and authorization or endorsement from at least one international organization. In order for peacekeeping to stand as an international practice, therefore, concerned states and organizations have to be already predisposed toward international cooperation. Therefore, peacekeeping cooperation takes place under conditions that are closer to generalized trust (“general optimism about the trustworthiness of others”).26 This point effectively precludes the predominant scenarios of instrumentalism such as the prisoner’s dilemma from consideration as main frames of analysis. In other words, a central question here is, what brings states and organizations, already committed in one way or another to the cooperative venture of peacekeeping, to extend and deepen their mutual cooperation? Instrumentalism, however, brings at least two insights that are useful for this book. One concerns explanations of behavior based on calculations of interest. Peacekeeping cooperation aims to generate some gains for the actors involved, and its evolution can be seen as a process of negotiations where they each try to maximize their interests at a fraction of the cost. Generalized trust is never total in international life, and can easily coexist with strategic behavior to maximize one’s own interests. 27 Cooperation may also be characterized to some extent by institutional and interstate rivalries. There is in this sense an element of competition even in this area of international action. The other insight from instrumentalism is related to the conditions conducive to the development of cooperation. In a recent review of Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation, Stanger points out the significance of the shadow of the past that constitutes a context for social interaction among the population: instead of the shadow of the future as highlighted by Axelrod, “the seeds of cooperation must be present in the initial inclinations of agents at the outset.”28 For our purposes, this in turn underlines the importance of contextual factors that make it rational for multiple actors to cooperate in peacekeeping: what generates in states and institutions the interest in and the need for multilateral cooperation in peacekeeping? The question of context can be posed by instrumentalism as well as constructivism. Whereas instrumentalism leads us to identify background factors conducive to the actor’s calculation of interests in favor of peacekeeping cooperation, the constructivist version defines context in terms of actors’ identities—cooperation emerges by dint of their

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cooperative identities (initial inclinations). This reasoning, however, incurs the problem of circularity because of the obvious tautology of the argument that actors cooperate because they are cooperative in nature. But in the specific context of peacekeeping cooperation, the problem of circularity is lessened by pointing out that peacekeeping cooperation is in fact an example of second-order cooperation. Since global peacekeeping cooperation emerges through efforts among actors already active in peacekeeping, one can indeed assume to some extent the cooperative inclinations of the engaged actors. The question therefore is not so much why peacekeeping actors cooperate as why these actors have embarked on a range of measures to step up mutual cooperation in recent years. And if instrumentalism suggests answers based on mutual or competing interests, constructivism suggests interpretation of the cooperation as a deepening of the transnational security community. In Chapter 2, we already saw important contextual factors at play. The heightened threat of intrastate conflicts that calls for comprehensive intervention and the need for expanded roles of international and regional organizations in the post–Cold War environment have driven many of these actors to embark on and include peacekeeping among their portfolios. The resultant existence of multiple peacekeeping actors, coupled with the awareness of their own limitations and constraints against the globally rising demand for peacekeeping, have made it rational for them to cooperate so that they can better respond to conflicts and develop their own peacekeeping capability. Moreover, such cooperation suits and promotes their newly acquired identity as peacekeeper. While this goes some way toward explaining why peacekeeping actors cooperate, motivations can vary depending on the actual manner in which cooperation is taking place. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I therefore analyze the more specific motivations behind each of the cooperative patterns (operational collaboration, joint decisionmaking, and capacity building). Another problem with constructivism is the assumption of exclusivity. As noted, Cronin identifies a shared exclusive relationship to the other actors as a necessary condition for the formation of transnational identities. In contrast, peacekeeping cooperation has been evolving among a diverse range of actors that interact in a fairly nonexclusive manner. The difference here may be attributed to the scope or nature of the issues. Whereas Cronin analyzes mostly cases of comprehensive transnational cooperation on the strategic level (Holy Alliance, Concert of Europe, Germanic and Italian regions) where the existence of the Other constitutes a crucial reference point for the construction of a national or regional identity, peacekeeping cooperation is cooperation in one issue area of global security

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governance. Moreover, Cronin’s examples of transnational cooperation are regional and national communities, while peacekeeping cooperation is global. In peacekeeping cooperation, therefore, the availability of selfother distinctions does not play a major role in its development. But characterizing peacekeeping cooperation as nonexclusive issuespecific cooperation does not make it inevitable to reject constructivism. To the extent that national, regional, and international actors now share the common experiences of peacekeeping and work toward more effective management of conflicts around the world, global peacekeeping cooperation facilitates the formation of the sense of a transnational cooperative identity that will be the foundation of global security governance. Though this identity lacks Cronin’s material conditions, especially exclusivity, and as such does not constitute a strong case of transnational identity, it does represent an important intersubjective aspect of the cooperation that has implications for global security governance. The discussion so far has characterized peacekeeping cooperation as a type of second-order cooperation that constitutes one major area of today’s global security governance. It is nonexclusive in scope and motivated by both actors’ interests and perceived security identities. But while these accounts help consider the substantive motivations behind peacekeeping cooperation, instrumentalism and constructivism are not geared toward explaining the actual forms and processes of the cooperation. Institutionalism, especially the concept of regime, is most helpful in this regard.

Peacekeeping Cooperation as a Regime It is possible, and indeed heuristically beneficial, to articulate global peacekeeping cooperation as an issue-specific, multilateral regime of second-order cooperation. As we saw earlier, a regime consists of a set of patterns, rules, procedures, norms, and principles in a specific policy area. Applying this description to peacekeeping cooperation—or understanding peacekeeping cooperation as if such a regime exists—can be a useful intellectual process to grasp this emerging practice on a clearer analytical setting. Then, what does this regime consist of? In this section I sketch the peacekeeping cooperation regime in terms of its key components. Patterns

Any regime involves identifiable patterns of behavior by the actors concerned. In peacekeeping cooperation, these observed patterns take the

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specific forms of joint decisionmaking, operational collaboration, and capacity building. These three patterns take place at headquarters (joint decisionmaking), mission (operational collaboration), and logistic and managerial levels (capacity building). While addressing different assistance needs, they are nevertheless linked to one another, covering together a broad spectrum of areas for potential cooperation. Operational collaboration takes place in the field, yet it is usually based on the political decisions of the partnering bodies. Joint decisionmaking includes such coordinated authorizations, but also includes cases that do not involve operational collaboration. It is a form of political or strategic cooperation. Capacity building, in contrast, addresses shortfalls in the logistic requirements (equipment, management, and personnel) of contemporary peacekeeping. Capacity building is sometimes based on decisions at higher levels, and in some cases capacity-building projects are conducted as part of operational collaborations. I will discuss more of each pattern in the concluding part of this chapter. Rules and Procedures

These patterns of cooperation involve certain rules and decisionmaking procedures, although they are still diffuse and undeveloped. Prominent peacekeeping actors, most notably the UN, the EU, and the AU, all base their operations on formal decisionmaking processes, which are also invoked for their cooperative endeavors. In Mali in 2012, for instance, the ECOWAS decision to launch a peacekeeping force was endorsed by the AU and then the UN Security Council. A similarly hierarchical sequence of authorizations exists with EU and NATO operations, for instance in Bosnia. Operational collaboration similarly requires going through the necessary procedures by the collaborating organizations; and such collaborative experiences in some cases, such as between the EU and the UN, generate joint efforts to create working rules and procedures for future endeavors. Capacity-building programs are also based on agreements that need to be approved and implemented by the partner organizations. In more substantive terms, capacity building requires an improvement not just in the field capacities of the deployable personnel but also in management capacities at the headquarters level. One can thus expect a gradual transmission and sharing of rules and decisionmaking procedures concerning peacekeeping management. Admittedly, these procedures and related rules are not specific to peacekeeping cooperation. Forming part of the preexisting decisionmaking and management structures of international and regional organizations, they are spread among the various

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organs of the peacekeeping actors. Globally, therefore, there are thus no tangible, centralized rules and procedures that govern global peacekeeping cooperation: one cannot find an equivalent of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for global peacekeeping in this field.29 Nevertheless, as the cases of joint decisionmaking show most clearly, there are self-conscious efforts by major peacekeeping actors to make use of their procedures and rules in a coordinated manner. Norms and Principles

At the most general level, global peacekeeping cooperation includes acceptance of certain norms and principles around which expectations converge among the actors. Promoting cooperation in peacekeeping is based on two fundamental beliefs or principles: one, that peacekeeping provides a legitimate and effective conflict management tool, and two, that cooperation in peacekeeping enhances the effectiveness of peacekeeping and global security governance. Peacekeeping is international society’s attempt to collectively manage conflicts; consists of a set of tasks formally authorized by the organizations that claim responsibility for regional or global security governance; and involves the deployment of substantive field presences often with military means to achieve the mandated tasks. In peacekeeping, the actors are expected to act as agents of the international community and to work with all the major stakeholders to help resolve the conflict. Doing peacekeeping thus makes actors susceptible to a type of behavior that is distinct from other securityrelated actions such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, humanitarian intervention, or war. As discussed above, peacekeeping makes the engaged actors disposed to cooperation; belief in the value of cooperation is in that sense ingrained in the belief in peacekeeping. The global peacekeeping cooperation regime is what Ruggie has called a multilateral regime that is based on the “appropriate generalized principles” of conduct.30 Such principles serve to support a set of more specific norms in peacekeeping cooperation. Generally, norms play a foundational role in a regime because they make up its general obligations and rights and thereby guide actors’ behavior.31 Like the rules and procedures, these norms are still embryonic in peacekeeping cooperation, and yet one can discern what they might look like from various reports and declarations that the three key players in peacekeeping cooperation (the UN, the EU, and the AU) have generated over the past decade (Table 3.1). Three such norms stand out: UN primacy, regional ownership and leadership, and comparative advantage and complementarity.

57 Table 3.1 Peacekeeping Cooperation Norms Articulated by the UN, the AU, and the EU UN and regional organizations (Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN doc. A50/60S/1995/1, January 25, 1995, para. 88)

Agreed mechanisms for consultation Primacy of the United Nations Division of labor to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry Consistency by members of regional organizations who are also UN member states in dealing with a common problem of interest to both organizations

AU-UN (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, AU doc. PSC/PR/2(CCCVII), January 9, 2012, paras. 92–97)

Primacy of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security Support for African ownership and priority setting in the spirit of mutual respect Principle of subsidiarity consisting of consultative decisionmaking, division of labor, and burden sharing to foster political coherence Mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage, based on the greater political legitimacy and greater flexibility of regional organizations Division of labor underpinned by complementarity Need to engage in dialogue to establish a mutually agreed division of labor to foster coherence and limit competition

AU-EU (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, EU doc. 16344/07, December 9, 2007, para. 6)

Unity of Africa Interdependence between Africa and Europe Ownership and joint responsibility Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and the right to development Enhancement of the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies, and instruments

EU-UN (Actions to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping, EU doc. 17497/11, November 24, 2011, 3–4)

Added value and mutual (comparative) advantage, leading to a complementarity of efforts and elimination of duplication and competition Political control and strategic direction Unity of the chain of command National ownership of decision to allocate resources Lessons learned from previous experiences Consistency with UN reform Increasing EU member states’ direct contributions Coordinated support and capacity building to regional and subregional organizations and southern partners

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The first norm is UN primacy or centrality. As the 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace stated, “The primacy of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter, must be respected.”32 The Charter (Chapter V, Article 24) confers on the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, a responsibility that has led to many peacekeeping operations under its authority. This norm has been frequently reiterated by the UN;33 and regional organizations, on their part, regularly affirm this norm and remind the UN of this responsibility.34 Another important norm is regional ownership and leadership—the idea that regional actors should play a leading role in resolving conflicts in their own region. This is also based on the Charter, which allows the role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security insofar as such regional action is consistent with UN primacy in general and the authority of the Security Council in particular (Chapter VIII). In the peacekeeping context, this general norm has been articulated with reference to a series of new elements specific to the field. They include the idea that regional actors have a better knowledge of the dynamics of the conflict as well as a unique leverage and interest in engaging with the warring parties,35 the awareness on the part of regional actors that they should be able to provide solutions to their regional problems and be recognized as credible security providers on their own, and the recognition of growing peacekeeping needs that cannot be met by the UN system alone. This norm thus calls for more active peacekeeping initiatives by regional organizations and their members. An idea closely linked to this is the concern for autonomy—that regional actors should retain as much control over their activities as possible. The norm of regional ownership is one incarnation of this general idea that appears when the conflict takes place within the region of the actor concerned; where that actor is engaging in conflicts outside its regional boundaries, it may still insist on keeping autonomy in its decisions and actions. The AU and the EU in the context of African conflicts provide good examples of this norm. A third norm that comes from these two is complementarity and comparative advantage. Since peacekeeping cooperation is based on a balance between the potentially contradictory norms of UN primacy and regional ownership, and since peacekeeping actors each have different strengths and limitations, the call is made for a division of labor that hopefully produces an effective synergy of the efforts. As the secretary-general argued, While United Nations peacekeeping partnerships with regional organizations have always come as a result of particular circumstances on the ground, to the extent possible the division of labour and burden

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sharing between the United Nations and regional organizations should be based on the principle of complementarity and added value. Partnerships should produce real operational benefits on the ground and not result in inefficient duplication.36

Together, these norms make up a web of interaction that is based on shared expectations. It is possible, therefore, to articulate the regime of global peacekeeping cooperation to some extent. But one may ask whether depicting peacekeeping cooperation as a regime in this way is justified, pointing out the still rather weak salience of the regime’s procedures, rules, norms, and principles. Two points may be made in response. First, the weak salience of the regime does not mean its absence. The salience of a regime is predominantly measured by the degree to which it is formalized (i.e., whether it possesses formal rules and procedures in the form of multilateral treaties and agreements). As we saw, peacekeeping cooperation remains largely informal, led by informal principles and norms, whereas rules and procedures are only diffusely present. However, this does not have to lead us to conclude that peacekeeping cooperation constitutes a case of “nonregime” for which “only the utter absence of a regime,” including not just the absence of formal treaties but also the absence of shared ideas, would qualify.37 More broadly, there is a tendency in regime analysis to focus on regimes that are centrally organized around explicit rules (e.g., GATT) while neglecting other potentially numerous cases that are less organized. Studying predominantly informal and diffusely organized regimes such as global peacekeeping cooperation will thus have the potential to enhance understanding about the world increasingly characterized by dense and complex international interactions. Second and as indicated earlier, it is not so much a question of measuring the regime’s salience per se but a consistent perspective offered by regime analysis that will be useful to us. Using regime analysis heuristically to make sense of global peacekeeping cooperation—that is, understanding the phenomenon as if it has formed a regime—enables us to conceive the totality of its constituent units as such. In fact, this may apply with greater force to weaker regimes such as peacekeeping cooperation, because they are more difficult to discern and grasp their workings than salient regimes such as international trade negotiations. Such perspective offered by regime analysis helps us examine the regime effects on the behavior of actors.38 Specifically in the context of this inquiry, I want to consider how the development of this regime produces effects conducive to global security governance.

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Implications for Global Security Governance Global security governance is a broad concept whose definition is constantly up for debate, especially as the meaning of security becomes increasingly diversified. The notion is used here simply as a generic term for actions and efforts by state and nonstate actors to govern relations and manage issues and situations that pose security threats to the entire international community.39 It refers to the totality of such efforts in response to today’s security challenges. How does the emergence of a global peacekeeping cooperation regime impact on global security governance? There are two ways this can take place, owing to the two effects generated by a regime: regulative and constitutive effects. The distinction between the regulative (or regulatory) and constitutive effects of norms and rules has been made in constructivist literature.40 In the context of this book, I argue that a peacekeeping cooperation regime can bolster global security governance by influencing the calculation of actors’ interests and controlling their behaviors in certain ways (regulative effects), and by shaping or altering their identities, which in turn are expressed in definitions of interest and behaviors (constitutive effects). As many commentators point out, these two effects are closely related and in practice generated through an actor’s ability to (re)define its own identity, interests, and the social world.41 Analytically, however, one can separate them as two avenues by which to evaluate the impact of global peacekeeping cooperation on global security governance. Regulative effects of a regime are the effects suggested in the instrumental-institutionalist perspective. Applied to peacekeeping cooperation, the development of such a regime can produce the effects of (1) strengthening the sharing of information and knowledge through routinized or institutionalized contacts (shared information); (2) creating and clarifying norms, rules, and procedures concerning the emergent iterative patterns of cooperation (clarified framework); (3) constraining actors’ choices in such a way that makes it difficult to disrupt or reject schemes of cooperation and assistance (increased sense of obligation); and (4) empowering weaker actors to demand assistance from more powerful actors (diffuse influence).42 These effects can improve global capacity to deploy peacekeeping missions and thereby to manage conflicts around the world more effectively by filling capability gaps through pooling or sharing resources, promoting better coordination at policy and operational levels, and reducing redundancy by means of a predictable division of labor. The regime can also be useful in making

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peacekeeping missions more legitimate in the eyes of the local populations and internationally because it enables a mission to be authorized or endorsed by multiple actors. As legitimacy (or lack of it) in peacekeeping has a potentially strong influence down to the operational level, it has implications for the effectiveness of the endeavor as well.43 By delivering these utilities and values, the regime thus serves the overall strategic interest of the peacekeeping actors in containing and managing intrastate and regional conflicts. The constitutive effects of peacekeeping cooperation relate to how becoming a member of the regime changes an actor’s perception of its identity and expected role in global peacekeeping. More specifically, the development of a peacekeeping cooperation regime strengthens the actor’s identity in a specific manner by cooperating with similarly constituted actors. That is, engagement in peacekeeping constructs actors as peacekeeping actors, with the expected roles and obligations associated with the idea of peacekeeping. As was pointed out earlier with regard to the second-order nature of peacekeeping cooperation, peacekeeping actors are predisposed toward international cooperation. Such cooperative disposition involves an actor’s recognition that ensuring and advancing its own security interests is dependent on progress in the ability of the international community to manage security issues and conflicts (i.e., a sense of collective security interest). If peacekeeping is “a clear institutional expression of international society’s principle of limiting violence and providing for the peaceful resolution of disputes,”44 then becoming a peacekeeper means a general (as opposed to case-by-case) commitment to this collective effort. Advances in cooperation among the peacekeeping actors have the potential to build on such predisposition, further reinforce their identity as cooperative security actors, and generate mutual recognition of the actors as peacekeeping actors that share certain expectations about the roles they should play in security governance. Strengthened peacekeeping cooperation thus represents an improvement in terms of our intersubjective sense concerning the importance of global security governance and its linkage to individual actors’ interests. Pointing out these two potential effects does not mean that peacekeeping cooperation will somehow progress automatically toward a better security governance system—far from it. Rather, development of such a regime is likely to be a painstakingly slow, complex, and political process. Several complications can be identified that are attributed mainly to two sources. One is inequality in resources, status, and leverage among the peacekeeping actors. As mentioned in Chapter 2, peacekeeping actors are not at all equal in these aspects, and peacekeeping

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cooperation can empower the disadvantaged institutions by giving them some right to demand proper assistance. This situation creates a new dynamic of negotiation between the conflict-prone and resource-poor regions, especially Africa on the one hand, and regional and global actors that are capable of generating peacekeeping resources and obligated under the regime to assist such regions on the other. Such dynamics can be observed most clearly in peacekeeping capacity building, as well as the other forms of cooperation. The other source of complications is concern for autonomy and ownership.45 As we saw earlier, the current globalization of peacekeeping is partly based on the need by the international and regional organizations to redefine their roles and identities in international security affairs, and as such is driven by their desire to position themselves as cooperative conflict managers. Thus they have the motivations for both promoting global cooperation and safeguarding autonomy and ownership. They seek to secure a degree of autonomy and leadership in their peacekeeping activities because peacekeeping engagement is an important way of showing their role in and contribution to international security. This is so especially for actors that have taken the institutional approach: as peacekeeping is already ingrained into and based on their procedures, rules, and principles, it is important to ensure that they are properly reflected on and respected in the actual operations. Cooperation, after all, is not integration: cooperation and autonomy in this context do not necessarily conflict with each other and may indeed be intertwined. However, at some point these two qualities will need to be negotiated independently by each actor as well as among these actors globally.

Conclusion Our analytical framework has conceptualized global peacekeeping cooperation as a multilateral security regime that has the potential to develop global security governance by generating regulative and constitutive effects. This regime consists of observed patterns, rules, procedures, norms, and principles as outlined above. In analyzing the regime further, the chapters that follow are structured around the three patterns of peacekeeping cooperation because they represent the most observable components of the cooperation regime and it is generally through these patterns that the rules, principles, norms, and procedures are mobilized and negotiated by the regime’s actors. These patterns will be examined with a view to identifying the motivations driving the specific type of coopera-

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tion as well as measuring the effects on global security governance. The discussion so far has also suggested that there may be some complicating factors working against the realization of these effects. Chapter 4 will focus on operational collaboration. Since any form of operational collaboration is designed to meet the peacekeeping requirements of a given situation by establishing some form of division of labor, the main interest is in gaining access to resources that are in short supply for a peacekeeping actor. This may be because the actor cannot secure such resources in a sustainable manner, or because it simply does not possess them. The availability of needed resources through cooperation can contribute to more effective implementation of the mandated activities and therefore the strategic objectives of the mission. Insofar as the practical awareness of shortage as well as the strategic calculations that tend to be situation bound drive cooperation, however, the possibility of operational collaboration leading to a deeper sense of cooperative security identity is rather slim. The same applies to the regulative effects of operational collaboration. Operational collaboration does promise to produce regulative effects by promoting the sharing of information and encouraging mutual understanding that may lead to an agreed framework of interorganizational cooperation. Such collaboration can also empower resource-stricken mission organizers to demand assistance. But to produce such effects, operational collaboration will have to be repeated sufficiently so that the peacekeeping actors can become mutually aware of their capabilities and limitations. As we shall see in Chapter 4, major peacekeeping frameworks do engage in operational collaboration with enough frequency to produce constitutive and regulative effects, and yet such cases of collaboration are highly divergent across regions. Moreover, they tend to result in an unequal division of labor that places the major operational onus back onto the UN. Joint decisionmaking in most cases takes place between the UN and non-UN peacekeeping organizers. As Chapter 5 shows, this practice in fact appears to have been widespread as most non-UN missions are now deploying with some form of Security Council decision while those without any attention from the Council are increasingly becoming a rarity. The reason for this predominant arrangement is partly based on the provisions of the UN Charter concerning the relationship between the UN and regional arrangements, but other motivations are also important. One is political legitimacy: joint decisionmaking works as a sort of legitimacy multiplier for a non-UN mission, especially when the situation on the ground is such that it needs to operate with the real possibility of using force. The other motivation, related to

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Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

operational collaboration and capacity building, is the possibility that a Security Council resolution can provide a legal framework through which the UN can render logistical, financial, or other forms of support to non-UN missions. Recognition of such missions by the Council also serves to bolster their organizers’ identity as peacekeeping actors. Therefore, the practice of joint decisionmaking can produce a clearer framework of peacekeeping cooperation between the UN and regional organizations and create an avenue through which non-UN actors can demand assistance and recognition from the global forum of the UN. Authorizing and legitimizing non-UN missions at the UN can also likely reinforce the principle of UN primacy in global peacekeeping. In addition to the obvious problem of dependence on the UN, however, it will be suggested that such a UN-centered normative framework does not necessarily lead to a convergence of views on the nature of peacekeeping among the mission organizers. As pointed out in Chapter 1 and will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, indications are that peacekeeping has become increasingly a contested concept: the UN’s decisionmaking hierarchy does not entitle the global organization to impose its version of peacekeeping on the other actors. Capacity building, the focus of Chapter 6, is in many respects an extension of operational collaboration. The two patterns basically share the motivations of meeting operational needs and thereby making the operations more effective. The main difference lies in the time-space setting in which they take place. Operational collaboration takes place when there is an awareness of shortfalls in peacekeeping capacity that the partner institutions can fill through cooperation on the ground. Whereas operational collaboration is necessarily bound to the context of the situation, capacity building is a longer-term proposition that is relatively free from such time-space constraints. As such, capacity building has more potential for generating regulative and constitutive effects. Capacity building is a form of cooperation in which the assisting actor directly addresses the logistical and managerial shortfalls of the recipient actor. As such, the extent to which the peacekeeping actors have engaged in capacity-building projects may provide an important measure of the evolution of global peacekeeping cooperation as a whole. Another point of note is that capacity building is a type of assistance that flows from actors with already developed resources and skills to those who plan to develop such resources in the future. Since the capability to properly equip, manage, and man the missions is ultimately founded on the overall institutional strength of the mission organizer, the region that is less developed in such capability but faced

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with a series of conflicts and political crises attracts the most attention. Africa has become the focus of peacekeeping capacity building, but greater need of assistance does not mean weaker political wherewithal. The norm of regional ownership, coupled with the potential regulatory effect of diffuse influence, may actually empower African actors to actively seek further assistance from donors. While capacity building can be seen basically as a plus for the long-term progress of peacekeeping cooperation and global security governance, this is not without its limitations and difficulties. One such limitation that will be covered in Chapter 6 is related to the predominance of national programs: unlike the other two patterns of cooperation, capacity building is more open to national as well as multilateral initiatives, and major donors continue to conduct their programs to pursue their own agendas and interests. This will affect coordination among the donor programs as well as the areas of assistance these programs tend to highlight.

Notes 1. This overview benefited from Alexis Keller, “Debating Cooperation in Europe from Grotius to Adam Smith,” in International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism, ed. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, 15–39 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 117. 3. John Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government,” in Political Writings, ed. David Wootton (London: Penguin Books, 1993), chap. 3, para. 19. 4. For a classic argument on this, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men,” in The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 111–222. 5. Immanuel Kant, “To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), especially its first supplement. 6. I William Zartman, “Conflict Management as Cooperation,” in Zartman and Touval, International Cooperation, 161. 7. James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,” in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 58. 8. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Joshua S. Goldstein, “Chicken Dilemmas: Crossing the Road to Cooperation,” in Zartman and Touval, International Cooperation, 135–160. For an informed critique on the long shadow of the future, see Allison Stanger,

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“The Shadow of the Past over Conflict and Cooperation,” in Zartman and Touval, International Cooperation, 111–134. 9. In more general terms, constructivists thus highlight the intersubjective or perceptive nature of identity and interest formation. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 228; Joseph S. Nye Jr, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th ed. (New York: Longman, 2007), 8. 10. Bruce Cronin, Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 7. 11. Ibid., 31–33. 12. Ibid., 35. 13. See, e.g., Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism,” 73–77. 14. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 47; John Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 11. 15. Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 13–14. 16. Principles are defined as beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude; norms as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations; rules as specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; decisionmaking procedures as prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. 17. Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” in Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, 52. 18. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 19. Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies,” in Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, 17, 20; Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,” 250. 20. Cronin, Community Under Anarchy, 34–36. 21. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” 11. 22. Cronin, Community Under Anarchy, 131–132. 23. See, e.g., Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). Though still limited to specific organizations (UN-NATO) or situations (CAR), recent works by Harsch and Welz utilize theoretical frameworks in their analyses. See Michael F. Harsch, The Power of Dependence: NATO-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) and Martin Welz, “Multi-Actor Peace Operations and Inter-Organizational Relations: Insights from the Central African Republic,” International Peacekeeping 23, no. 4 (August 2016): 568–591. 24. Kristin M. Haugevik, “New Partners, New Possibilities: The Evolution of Inter-Organizational Security Cooperation in International Peace Operations,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Series on Security in Practice 6, Oslo, Norway, 2007. 25. Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 89–90.

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26. Generalized trust is distinguished from strategic trust, the type of trust that actors have in response to the self-interested moves by specific others to reciprocate cooperation. Strategic trust is the predominant assumption in rationalist accounts of cooperation. Brian C. Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 248. 27. Ibid., 249. 28. Stanger, “Shadow of the Past,” 125. 29. See, e.g., Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 273–314. 30. Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” 13. 31. Finlayson and Zacher, “GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers,” 276. 32. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60-S/1995/1), para. 88. 33. See, e.g., UN General Assembly/Security Council, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities, UN doc. A/61/204-S/2006/590, July 28, 2006, paras. 16, 38, 88, 100. 34. See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security (PSC/PR/2(CCCVII)), para. 92; Council of the EU, Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, June 7, 2007, para. 1 35. See, e.g., UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UN doc. S/2008/186, April 7, 2008, para. 9. 36. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations–African Union Cooperation in Peace and Security, UN doc. S/2011/805, December 29, 2011, para. 46. 37. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Detlef F. Sprinz, Gerald M. DiGiusto, and Alexander Kelle, “International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 9, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 235. They define a nonregime as a “transnational policy issue area characterized by the absence of multilateral institutions for ordering actors’ interactions” (ibid., 234). 38. Charles Lipson, “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change,” in Krasner, International Regimes, 233. 39. For arguments on the notion, see Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, “Collective Conflict Management: A New Formula for Global Peace and Security Cooperation?,” International Affairs 87, no. 1 (January 2011): 39–58; Emilian Kavalski, “The Complexity of Global Security Governance: An Analytical Overview,” Global Society 22, no. 4 (October 2008): 423–443. 40. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–917; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). However, the significance of this distinction varies among constructivists. See Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivisms in International Relations: Wendt,

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Onuf, and Kratochwil,” in Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, 54–75 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001). 41. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, 19; Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual,” in International Relations in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 68. 42. The term “diffusion of influence” is taken from Finlayson and Zacher, “GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers,” 310. 43. For the legitimization of peacekeeping missions and the roles therein of international organizations, see Linnéa Gelot, Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security: The African Union–United Nations Partnership in Darfur (New York: Routledge, 2012) and Katharina P. Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 44. Bruce Cronin, Institutions for the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208; see also 12–13. 45. Thierry Tardy, “Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges,” Global Governance 20, no. 1 (January–March 2014): 108.

4 Operational Collaboration: Sudan and Congo

In this and the following two chapters I analyze three patterns of peacekeeping cooperation in turn. The present chapter considers the most conspicuous form of cooperation: operational collaboration. Operational collaboration refers to cooperation on the field level between missions of different organizations. There are accumulating examples of such collaboration. I first identify patterns of collaboration and then look at several cases to consider motivations and governance implications in greater detail. Let me start with an overview. Table 4.1 is a list of examples of operational collaboration. Using the same list of cases as Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, Table 4.1 adds information where operational collaboration between the missions has taken place. As such it includes noncases. For reference I also included small (nonpeacekeeping) missions that worked in cooperation with peacekeeping missions organized by other organizations. The list includes a total of 50 non-UN missions (excluding EUFOR Libya and IGASOM in Somalia, and including the hybrid mission of UNAMID). One thing that stands out from this table is the relative frequency with which these operations work with UN missions. In Moldova, Albania, Lesotho, Macedonia,1 the Solomon Islands, and the Comoros there was no history of a UN field presence working with non-UN missions. In the CAR between the termination of the UN Mission in the CAR (MINURCA) and the subsequent deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan, and Somalia (after the withdrawal of UNOSOM), the UN stopped short of deploying peacekeeping missions and instead opted for peacebuilding or political missions. And 69

70 Table 4.1 Operational Collaboration, 1990–2016 Location of Situation

Form

Operations

Liberia

COD FOD

ECOMOG, UNOMIL-UNOLa ECOMIL → UNMIL

Moldova

None

Bosnia

COD COD FOD FOD

Tajikistan

COD

Georgia (Abkhazia)

COD

Haiti

FOD FOD

Croatia

COD COD

CAR

FOD FOD FOD FOD FOD COD None

JCC

NATO Deny Flight, UNPROFOR NATO IFOR-SFOR, UNMIBH UNMIBH → EUPM SFOR → EUFOR Althea CPF, UNMOT

Uphold Democracy → UNMIH Secure Tomorrow → MINUSTAH PKF, UNOMIG

NATO Deny Flight, UNPROFOR-UNCRO NATO IFOR-SFOR, UNTAESb

MISAB → MINURCA CEN-SAD PF → CEMAC FOMUC CEMAC FOMUC → ECCAS MICOPAX ECCAS MICOPAX → AU MISCA MISCA → MINUSCA MISCA-MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, Operation Sangaris FOMUC-MICOPAX-MISCAa BONUCA-BINUCAa

Albania

None

Alba

Sierra Leone

COD FOD COD

UNOMSIL, ECOMOG ECOMOG → UNAMSIL Palliser, UNAMSIL

Lesotho

None

SADC Boleas

Guinea-Bissau

None FOD

Kosovo

COD FOD

ECOMOG, UNOGBISa,d MISSANG → ECOMIB

Timor-Leste

FOD COD

Macedonia

None FOD None

Ivory Coast

None FOD COD

UNMIK, NATO KFOR UNMIK → EULEX

INTERFET → UNTAET Astute, UNMIT

NATO Essential Harvest, Amber Fox NATO Allied Harmony → EU Concordia EU Proxima

ECOMICI, UN MINUCIa ECOMICI → UNOCI (ECOMICIUN MINUCIa) Licorne, ECOMICI-UNOCI

(continues)

71 Table 4.1 continued Location of Situation

Form

Operations

Burundi

FOD

DRC

COD

AMIB → ONUB

Solomon Islands

None

RAMSI

Afghanistan

COD

NATO ISAF-Resolute Support, EUPOL Afghanistan

Darfur/Sudan

COD JOP

AMIS, UNAMISa-UNMIS UNAMID

Somalia

None None

AMISOM, UNPOSa-UNSOMa IGASOMc

Comoros

None

MAES

Chad/CAR

COD FOD

MINURCAT, EUFOR Tchad/RCA EUFOR Tchad/RCA → MINURCAT (expanded)

Libyad

None

EUFOR LIBYAc

Mali

FOD

MONUC, EU Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo

ECOWAS AFISMA → MINUSMA

Sources: Data from AU, EU, NATO, UN, and University of Montreal Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations websites, www.peaceau.org/en/, https://eeas.europa.eu/, www.nato .int/cps/en/natohq/68147.htm#crisis, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/, www.operationspaix.net/. Notes: COD = co-deployment; JOP = joint operation; FOD = follow-on deployment. a. Denotes a nonpeacekeeping mission. b. Resolution 1037 provided for the potential provision of close air support and withdrawal capability for UNTAES. This in practice meant the use of IFOR (and its successor, SFOR) in support of the UN mission. c. Denotes operations that were formally authorized but not actually deployed. d. Following the ouster of President João Bernardo Vieira in a bloodless coup on May 7, 1999, ECOWAS decided to withdraw ECOMOG from Guinea-Bissau later in that month. Originally expected to work with ECOMOG in its peacebuilding mandate (Resolution 1233, April 6, 1999), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) instead became a political mission whose main objective was to help restore conditions for peace.

in Bosnia (from SFOR to EUFOR Althea), Guinea-Bissau (from the Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau [MISSANG] to the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau [ECOMIB]), Macedonia (from NATO’s Allied Harmony to EU’s Concordia), and the CAR (between CEN-SAD, CEMAC ECCAS, and AU missions), handover of operational responsibilities took place among non-UN missions without any UN field presence. Arguably, however, these cases are in the minority. Of the 50 missions, only 10 (the CIS Joint Control Commission [JCC], Alba, Boleas, ECOMIG Guinea-Bissau, Essential Harvest, Amber Fox,

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Proxima, RAMSI, AMISOM, and the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros [MAES]) are stand-alone non-UN missions, while some form of operational collaboration with UN or other non-UN missions took place in the remaining 40 cases. With regard to the latter, the UN has provided the bulk of operational partners for nonUN missions, with its 24 missions working with 29 non-UN missions so far (the case of UNAMID is included in both figures). To put this into perspective, the DPKO has organized a total of 51 peacekeeping operations between 1990 and 2016, of which 24 are operational partners with non-UN operations (see Table 4.2). This means that the 27 UN missions are stand-alone operations, a marked contrast with the ratio of stand-alone non-UN operations (10 out of 50 missions). This suggests a trend: regional peacekeeping missions tend to be deployed with higher expectations for operational collaboration with the UN, which often ends up taking over from these regional missions. The same trend can be seen more clearly by looking at cases of operational collaboration, which takes place in one of the following patterns: co-deployment (COD), follow-on deployment (FOD), and joint operation (JOP). The most common pattern is co-deployment. A consistent pattern has emerged in which the UN mission maintains a civilian side of the tasks while the non-UN mission provides military presence. This was the typical experience with ECOWAS (e.g., ECOMOG was in charge of supervising the military aspects of the July 25, 1993, peace agreement in Liberia, while UNOMIL monitored the peace process); NATO (close air support under Operation Deny Flight for UNPROFOR, UNCRO, UNTAES,2 and ground operations in Kosovo and postconflict Bosnia); and CIS (which deployed peacekeeping forces while the UN’s field presence was limited to observer missions). In some situations, non-UN missions provided over-the-horizon military surge capacity, as happened in Liberia where ECOMIL was deployed between August and September 2003, and in the DRC where the EU deployed a military peacekeeping mission in response to the clashes between local armed elements in the Ituri region (Operation Artemis, June–August 2003). However, this pattern does not apply to AU deployments in Somalia and the Darfur region of Sudan. In Somalia, the AU operates with its own mission, AMISOM, which receives support from donors and the UN but not in the form of a division of labor with codeploying UN or other regional missions. In Darfur, by contrast, the deployment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) came from the outset as part of the UN’s support package to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and eventually this supportive collaboration culminated in the so far only case of joint peacekeeping deployment, UNAMID.

73 Table 4.2 UN Peacekeeping Deployments, 1990–2016 Location of Situation

Operations

Iraq-Kuwait

UNIKOM

Western Sahara

MINURSO

Angola

UNAVEM II & III, MONUA

El Salvador

ONUSAL

Cambodia

UNAMIC, UNTAC

Bosnia

UNPROFOR,a UNMIBHa

Somalia

UNOSOM I & II

Mozambique

ONUMOZ

Rwanda

UNOMUR, UNAMIR

Georgia (Abkhazia)

UNOMIGa

Liberia

UNOMIL,a UNMILa

Haiti

UNMIH,a UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MIPONUH, MINUSTAHa

Libya (Aouzou Strip)

UNASOG

Tajikistan

UNMOTa

Croatia

UNPROFOR-UNCRO,a UNMOP, UNTAES,a UNCPSG

Macedonia

UNPREDEP

Guatemala

MINUGUA

CAR

MINURCA,a MINUSCAa

Sierra Leone

UNOMSIL,a UNAMSILa

Kosovo

UNMIKa

Timor-Leste

UNTAET,a UNMISET, UNMITa

DRC

MONUC,a MONUSCO

Ethiopia-Eritrea

UNMEE

Ivory Coast

UNOCIa

Burundi

ONUBa

Darfur/Sudan

UNMIS,a UNAMIDa

Chad/CAR

MINURCATa

Abyei (Sudan–South Sudan)

UNISFA

South Sudan

UNMISS

Syria

UNSMIS

Mali

MINUSMAa

Sources: Data from UN website, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/. Note: a. Denotes UN missions collaborating with non-UN missions.

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In follow-on deployments, three different sequential patterns can be identified. One such pattern is that of a non-UN operation’s replacing a UN mission. This happened in Bosnia where the International Police Task Force (IPTF), as part of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), was replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003;3 and Kosovo, where the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) replaced the law enforcement (including executive policing) functions of UNMIK in the post-Status period. 4 Another rarer pattern concerns follow-on deployment from one non-UN mission to another, as happened in Macedonia (see Chapter 5) and in the CAR. Generally speaking, these two patterns are characterized by a tendency for a follow-on regional mission to be smaller in scale and more civilian in nature than the preceding mission, suggesting that they have taken place in stabilizing contexts allowing a gradual drawdown of international involvement. An interesting exception to this pattern is the CAR, which saw a series of transitions among the missions of African subregional organizations (CEN-SAD, CEMAC, and ECCAS) until a new round of violence following a coup d’état in early 2013 forced the AU to take over. These transitions involved progressively larger and more complex mission transitions. However, the AU-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) was eventually turned over to the UN’s even larger MINUSCA operation, thus constituting part of a more common pattern of follow-on deployment. As indicated in the MISCA-MINUSCA transition, one striking feature of follow-on deployment from a non-UN operation to a UN mission is the latter’s larger size and more comprehensive mandate. In Ivory Coast, for instance, the ECOWAS Mission in Ivory Coast (ECOMICI) and the UN Mission in Ivory Coast (MINUCI, political mission) were replaced by a much larger and multidimensional UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI), because ECOMICI was beset by the lack of institutional, logistical, and financial capacity to sustain the operation from the start. In Burundi, the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) contingents were rehatted and integrated into the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) for similar reasons. 5 In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL was established in response to the Nigerian decision to pull its troops from the country, which constituted the bulk of ECOMOG peacekeepers. In Chad/CAR, the UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) was significantly expanded from the initial strength of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers by adding 5,200 military personnel in order to take over from the EUFOR (3,700 troops).6 UNOCI, ONUB, UNAMSIL, and MINURCAT are all large-

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scale missions with comprehensive mandates.7 The same applies to a handover from multinational forces to UN missions (Table 4.3). In Haiti, CAR, and Timor-Leste, these multinational stabilization forces served as entry forces into still fragile situations and required major deployments. Nevertheless, the follow-on UN missions are often required to maintain a large uniformed presence on top of many civilian experts in charge of a broader range of peacebuilding areas. What does all this tell us about the present state of global peacekeeping cooperation? The prevalence of UN-centered patterns of operational collaboration suggests that such collaboration strongly depends on the UN’s capability to organize comprehensive peacekeeping missions. Missions by regional bodies and multinational forces are limited in timescale, resources, and/or mandate. For these actors, therefore, their key motivation is that operational collaboration allows them to deploy their missions with the expectation of eventual handover to the UN, which can complement them with a broader range of capabilities, especially those related to civilian peacebuilding. For the UN, operational collaboration offers an opportunity to access regional or (multi)national military capacity that can be used for UN purposes (if not under UN command). That sort of capacity is effective especially at early postconflict stages where the situ-

Table 4.3 Multinational Forces and UN Peacekeeping: Uniformed Personnel Location of Situation

Multinational Force

UNPK

Haiti

21,000 military (Uphold Democracy) 3,700 military (Secure Tomorrow)

6,065 military, 847 police (max. deployed, UNMIH, June 1995) 8,915 military, 3,637 police (max. deployed, MINUSTAH, October 2011)

CAR

Approx. 800 military (MISAB)

1,350 military, 24 police (max. authorized, MINURCA, March 1998)

Timor-Leste

Approx. 11,000 military (INTERFET)

8,561 military, 1,213 police (max. deployed, UNTAET, May 2000)

Sources: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2006 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 42; data from UN DPKO and Australian Department of Defence websites, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/, www.defence.gov.au/.

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ation could relapse into conflict without strong international backing and pressure. However, this benefit needs to be weighed against the burden on the UN system, which is likely to be the eventual destination of the international community’s peacekeeping engagement. Another related observation is the highly limited pattern of operational collaboration among nonUN peacekeeping missions. The pattern so far has been either between NATO and the EU (Bosnia, Macedonia, and Afghanistan8) or African organizations (CAR). Mission-to-mission collaboration has taken place predominantly between regional/multinational missions and the UN, or within the same region (between the EU and NATO, or among African regional organizations). In other words, there have been few instances of cross-regional operational collaboration, though two cases might appear to fit this description. One is the deployment of EUFOR RCA to support the AUled mission in the CAR. Between April and September 2014, there was a brief period when MISCA (December 2013–September 2014) and EUFOR RCA (April 2014–March 2015) operated alongside each other in the same country. However, by the time of EU troops’ deployment in late April 2014, the Security Council had already decided to transition MISCA to MINUSCA (Resolution 2149, April 10, 2014). In this operational context, therefore, EUFOR’s activities were from the start intended in support of the MISCA-MINUSCA transition and the posttransition MINUSCA rather than the soon-to-be-integrated MISCA. Moreover, EUFOR RCA was a small mission (750 troops) whose deployment was confined to two districts in Bangui and the national airport; and the mission took over these areas from France’s Sangaris operation, not MISCA. Overall, there is thus a very limited sense in which the EU and AU operations engaged in substantive collaboration in the CAR.9 This leaves the collaboration between ECOMICI and Operation Licorne between 2002 and 2004 the only clearly discernible case of cross-regional operational collaboration. But the cross-regional nature of the effort is somewhat diminished by the fact that Licorne was in practice a French intervention based on the bilateral agreement between Ivory Coast and France. The dearth of region-to-region operational collaborations, coupled with the general dependency on UN peacekeeping, suggests the existence of a loose hub-and-spoke system when it comes to operational collaboration. Such a system appears to be supported by the prevalent norm of UN centrality, but is this arrangement effective? What sort of regulative and constitutive effects has it produced? There is, moreover, a related question of whether we should see this current state of

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affairs as more or less unchanged or as part of a transition process toward a more dynamic and less stratified arrangement. In the rest of this chapter, I will consider these questions by examining several cases. Rather than providing comprehensive coverage of each situation, I will focus on the specific debates and contexts leading to the collaborative arrangements in question, in order to identify their implications for our analysis.

Darfur, Sudan: 2004– The global response to the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan is an important case in many ways. Darfur is the only joint operation to date, and one of the first operations for the newly created AU. Operational collaboration between the UN and the AU took place in a unique process of evolution from co-deployment to joint operation. The other two forms of peacekeeping cooperation were also present: the need for joint operation originated from the need to build the capacity of AMIS, and the UN decisions to support African efforts entailed significant cooperation at the decisionmaking level of the two organizations. The UN-AU cooperation in Darfur therefore represents an important milestone in the evolution of peacekeeping cooperation between the two organizations, and yet it also suggests a number of challenges as well. The conflict in the western Sudanese part of Darfur (comprising North, West, and South Darfur states) started in February 2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A, led by Minni Minnawi) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM, Khalil Ibrahim) began an insurgency against the central government. While these groups split into smaller factions and were joined by new groups in an increasingly complex jockeying for power within the rebel front, the government reacted with a scorched earth policy that involved killings, rapes, and the burning of villages. The Sudanese military as well as armed affiliates called Janjaweed were mobilized to implement this policy, though Khartoum constantly denied its linkage to the militia. Within two years from the start of the war, there were an estimated 2.5 million affected people, including more than 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a region of roughly 6.8 million.10 In terms of the death toll, a UN estimate in 2007 identified the number of civilian deaths caused by the fighting or due to its impact on access to health care, shelter, food, and other life essentials as at least 200,000.11

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The international response to the conflict featured peacekeeping from an early stage with the AU decision in April 2004 to launch a small mission (AMIS I, with 60–80 military observers plus a protection element of 310 soldiers)12 to monitor the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (April 8, 2004). Since then the international peacekeeping presence in Darfur has evolved in a rather complex process. I explain this process by dividing it into three major stages, followed by an examination of the consequences of this collaboration. The stages are 1. AMIS I and II and UNAMIS: April 2004 through March 2005 2. AMIS II and III and UNMIS: March 2005 through July 2007 3. UNAMID: from July 2007 The first period consists of the gradual expansion of the AU mission from a small observer force to a more ambitious (but grossly underresourced) stabilization force. In October 2004, the AU PSC decided to expand AMIS into a force of 2,341 military personnel including 450 military observers, up to 815 civilian police, and appropriate civilians (AMIS II). The mandate was strengthened with the additional tasks of assistance in the process of confidence building and contribution to a secure environment for humanitarian activities. Crucially, the expanded mandate was interpreted to authorize the protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel as well as the restoration of law and order through active patrolling, public confidence-building measures, and local police reform.13 On the UN side, Resolution 1547 (June 11, 2004) set up a UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) in preparation for a new peacekeeping operation that would support the implementation of an expected north-south agreement (signed in January 2005). As a political mission that served as a planning team for UNMIS, UNAMIS did not have operational presence and its main focus was on the northsouth conflict, although a later resolution gave to the mission a new task of “contingency planning for the Darfur region.”14 This included planning assistance to AMIS and preparations to support the implementation of a future agreement in Darfur.15 UNAMIS subsequently established four liaison offices in the Darfur region.16 The second period was marked by the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping presence in the Sudan through UNMIS. Several options for operational collaboration were actively discussed in this period. The UNMIS mandate did not include any specific Darfur-related tasks, but Resolution 1590 (March 24, 2005) did request close and continuous liaising and coordination with AMIS at all levels “with a view

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towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur.”17 The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to report on how to make such reinforcement possible.18 Based on consultations with the AU and joint assessment missions (involving the UN, the AU, the EU, and the United States), Annan proposed in May a three-phase timetable: (1) support for AMIS II to reach full operational capability by May 2005, (2) expansion of AMIS into a force of 5,887 military and 1,560 police from June to August, and (3) transition to a multidimensional operation of more than 12,000 military and police personnel in the following periods.19 The envisioned expansion in the second phase was based on the AU PSC decision in late April 2005 to strengthen the mission by the end of September (AMIS III).20 In proposing phase three, for which necessary decisions would have to be made by September, the Secretary-General suggested a possible follow-on operation by the UN. In terms of the first two phases, however, the Secretary-General proposed to maintain the existing system whereby individual donors provide support through appropriate coordination. With its daunting mandate in relation to the north-south peace process, UNMIS had a limited role in support of AMIS: it did not provide direct logistical support and was largely limited to providing assistance with regard to the training of AU peacekeepers.21 While neither UNAMIS nor UNMIS was able to provide substantial operational support for AMIS, this period saw one innovation that would have broader implications for AU-UN relations in peacekeeping: the creation of a UN support office at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. The UN Assistance Cell was established in October 2004 with military, finance, logistics, and police experts from the DPKO to provide “specific planning and management support” for AMIS.22 Earlier, the UN had dispatched a team of experts led by the DPKO’s military adviser, Major General Patrick Cammaert, to support the transition from AMIS I to II.23 Upon request from the AU Commission, Annan decided to create an assistance cell at the timing of the AMIS II setup to provide technical assistance to the mission on “a more sustainable basis.” It also had a more general purpose of enhancing peacekeeping cooperation between the two organizations.24 With regard to the latter rationale, it is worth mentioning that the creation of the cell was seen as part of the broader issue of the UN’s capacitybuilding assistance to African peacekeeping (see Chapter 6). By the end of 2004, the UN and the AU identified the latter’s major shortfalls in peacekeeping capacity, one of which was the lack of institutional capacity for the planning and management of peacekeeping operations. To address

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this, Annan proposed in November “a small core planning and advisory capacity” to support the AU’s mission planning and startup processes.25 The assistance cell, set up in October 2004, was initially expected to serve in such capacity; as will be seen in Chapter 6, the establishment of this small unit was the start of expanding DPKO support to the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The process of planning cooperation for AMIS thus encouraged the construction of a more institutional UN-AU capacity-building cooperation in peacekeeping. As already noted, Annan’s May 2005 timetable already hinted at a possible UN takeover of the African mission. The AU PSC supported in principle the transition of AMIS to a UN operation in its March 2006 decision.26 Resolution 1663 (March 24, 2006) welcomed this AU decision and requested the secretary-general to report on options for such operation.27 The transition issue was given added urgency by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, 2006. Signed by the Sudanese government and the SLM/A–Minni Minnawi faction (the SLM/A’s breakaway factions and the JEM did not join the agreement), the DPA asked AMIS to verify the implementation of its security arrangements.28 AMIS was, however, widely seen as incapable of meeting the challenges of the broadened operational tasks demanded by the DPA amid the increasingly fragile security situation. Following the DPA’s signing, the AU acknowledged an urgent need to review the AMIS mandate and take concrete steps toward the AU-UN transition.29 The Secretary-General’s proposal at this point was to expand UNMIS to Darfur rather than create a new mission. Given the enormity of DPA implementation alongside the north-south peace process, he proposed a unique arrangement whereby a smaller mission leadership structure led by a senior deputy special representative of the Secretary-General would be tucked into the overall UNMIS management. In terms of mission strength, the expansion would require an additional 11 to 16 infantry battalions aided by mobility assets and reserve forces (15,300–18,600 troops), up to 3,300 police officers, and 16 formed police units (FPUs).30 The Security Council approved Annan’s proposal including the addition of up to of 17,300 troops recommended by the Secretariat, expanded the UNMIS mandate to support the DPA implementation, and decided that the UN takeover should take place by the end of 2006; but that decision came with an invitation to the Sudanese government to grant consent to this expansion.31 While expanding the existing mission had the apparent advantage of bypassing a separate Status of Forces Agreement with the government, Khartoum’s consent remained crucial to make the transition politically acceptable and operationally possible. The government, how-

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ever, remained strong in rejecting the resolution and threatened a military response if the expansion proceeded as planned.32 Faced also with antiUN mass demonstrations and protests (with government connivance and encouragement), this situation forced the UN leadership to seek alternative arrangements in the remaining months of 2006. The arrangements, agreed in principle at the UN-AU-Sudan highlevel meeting in mid-November, consisted of a three-phase support package. The initial light support package of logistical and material assistance, 105 military staff, 33 police advisers, and 48 civilian experts had been agreed with the AU and the government and initiated deployment in October, although the actual deployment was slowed by Khartoum’s administrative delaying tactics.33 The second heavy support package was finalized with the government in late January 2007 and included UN provision of 2,250 military personnel, 721 civilian police (three FPUs and individual advisers), and a total of 1,136 civilian staff and experts.34 These packages would eventually constitute part of the hybrid operation. Negotiations for the joint operation took place alongside the implementation of phase one and the finalization of phase two. The process was influenced by two interrelated issues: the African character of the operation, and the question of financing. Khartoum insisted the mission be predominantly African: the joint special envoy should be an African “acceptable to the Government of Sudan”; the force commander should be appointed by the AU alone; and only the AU should be responsible for the mission’s command and control.35 The AU PSC largely approved the Sudanese position by confirming an AU-appointed African force commander and indicating that the UN would provide only command and control structures and systems to the mission. The communiqué of November 30, 2006, stated the AU’s decisions: (1) the Special Representative shall be jointly appointed by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union and the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, after appropriate consultations as per the practice, (2) the Force Commander, who should be an African, shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the Commission in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, (3) the Mission shall benefit from United Nations backstopping and command and control structures and systems, (4) the size of the force shall be determined by the African Union and the United Nations, taking into account all relevant factors and the situation on the ground, as well as the requirements for it to effectively discharge its mandate.36

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The same communiqué also appealed to the UN to provide financial and logistics support for AMIS,37 reiterating the conclusions of the tripartite meeting where Annan had agreed to direct UN funding for the peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Overall, this AU/Sudanese position was a hard sell for the UN because it effectively meant that the UN and its member states should provide all funding and logistic capabilities while relinquishing the power to direct the mission through command and control authority. The Secretary-General had consistently warned about this to his African counterparts in the negotiations.38 Though the Security Council endorsed the conclusions in principle relatively quickly,39 meting out the precise terms of reference required additional effort. Several more rounds of negotiations took place in the first half of 2007. The Sudanese government confirmed its agreement with the hybrid operation on June 17, and the AU PSC formally authorized its deployment five days later.40 The UN Security Council approved the concept of operations jointly developed by the AU and UN teams in Resolution 1769 (July 31, 2007). The mission is one of the largest missions to date: up to 19,555 military (including 18 infantry battalions, three infantry reserve companies, 240 military observers, and 120 liaison officers deployed for three sectors), up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 FPUs (140 personnel each), and an appropriate number of civilian experts. It was given a multidimensional mandate with a greater emphasis on the protection of civilians and a Chapter VII use-of-force authorization for humanitarian protection and mandate implementation.41 In line with the tripartite agreement, the mission would be headed by a joint special representative who would report to the UN SecretaryGeneral and the AU commissioner for peace and security. An African force commander would be appointed by the AU, but only after consultations with the UN secretary-general, who would bring the expected appointment to the attention of the Security Council and reply to the AU that the Council “noted” the AU decision. The force commander would report to the joint special representative—an arrangement that would appear to ensure joint AU-UN management of the mission.42 However, since the relationship between a civilian special representative and a military force commander in peacekeeping is not exactly the same as command and control in the conventional military sense, there remained significant ambiguities as to the location of strategic-level command authority, especially for the UN, which was not appointing the force commander. As planned, the mission officially took over from AMIS by the end of 2007, but two well-documented problems continued to hinder its

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activities: capability shortfalls and Sudanese obstructions. UNAMID suffered from UN member states’ unwillingness to contribute required capabilities, as a result of which the mission was not able to establish its presence, especially in the crucial startup phase. It had only half of the authorized strength with 9,941 military (9,367 troops, 353 staff, 161 military observers, and 60 liaison officers), 2,541 police (2,111 individual police and 3 FPUs), and 2,962 civilian personnel (770 international, 1,933 national, and 259 UN volunteers) one year after the start of the operation. The mission still lacked critical enablers such as a multirole logistics unit, a medium transport unit, a heavy transport unit, an aerial reconnaissance unit, light tactical helicopters, and 18 medium-utility helicopters.43 As had happened against AMIS and UNMIS, UNAMID activities were also hindered by the government’s obstructions: arbitrary stoppages, denials of access, unilateral impositions of government rules, delayed or denied visa permissions, and other administrative interferences were all intended to constrain its freedom of movement. There were other factors that constrained the mission: high insecurity (including direct attacks on UNAMID troops and premises), a poor state of critical infrastructure in the region, the stalled peace process, and increasing tension between the Sudanese government and the international community as a result of the International Criminal Court decision in July 2008 to indict President al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. These problems all prevented effective operation of the mission. Overall, therefore, this first hybrid operation was not an outright success, and the UN acknowledged limited progress against the mission’s own benchmarks.44 From our perspective, the question is to what extent the limitations of UNAMID were attributable to its hybrid nature (i.e., the fact that it was established as a result of extensive operational collaboration between the UN and the AU). Did the hybridity of the operation contribute to the mission’s effectiveness, or did it present a new set of complications? On the positive side, hybridity brought in new personnel and equipment, secured a stable source of finance, and strengthened international legitimacy for the mission and the mission organizers. Despite early setbacks, UNAMID became one of the biggest peacekeeping missions, with a size roughly three times as large as AMIS, which had peak strength of over 7,000 uniformed personnel. UNAMID had a total of 23,466 uniformed personnel (17,466 troops, 3,275 individual police, 16 FPUs, and 591 staff and experts) in May 2012.45 Moreover, becoming a United Nations mission meant ensured

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access to the UN peacekeeping budget. The mission was projected to cost around $2.6 billion per year in full deployment; 46 the actual expenditure for UNAMID in its first year cost about $1.06 billion, or 17.6 percent of the total expenditure of all UN peacekeeping missions in the same period. 47 Access to UN financing was in the interest not only of the AU but also AMIS’s bilateral and regional donors, which were thereby able to withdraw their direct financial support.48 Finally, the fact that the two major peacekeeping actors jointly authorized UNAMID worked to strengthen the legitimacy status of the mission and the two organizations involved. The mission had a strong basis of international legitimacy through the formal authorizations of prominent global and regional organizations. 49 For the AU and its member states, UNAMID “symbolizes the UN’s clearest validation of the AU’s peace and security role.”50 For the UN, the operation served to maintain its global responsibility by staying engaged operationally (and thereby deflecting the potential criticism of disengagement from the continent) while respecting the principle of African ownership. In the Darfur context, the principle of African solutions to African problems was closely aligned to the issue of Sudanese consent, as the AU lead for peacekeeping in Darfur was one of Khartoum’s persistent demands. As such, this principle served the multiple purposes of ensuring the AU’s interest in maintaining its leadership in the region’s peace process, allaying Sudanese fears of outside intervention and promoting unity among Security Council members, some of which were wary of forcible intervention and made their support for the operation contingent on Sudanese consent.51 But these benefits of the hybrid arrangement were countered by significant complications. The transition from AMIS to UNAMID led to a slow but significant increase in its personnel, many of whom, however, lacked sufficient equipment or training. In late 2008, for example, Secretary-General Ban noted the existence of “some slippage” in the troop/police contributors’ preparations that “could result in delays in deployment.”52 In mid-June 2012, when UNAMID was at its peak strength, Ban continued to bemoan deficiencies in the operational and self-sufficient capabilities of military and police contingents, noting only 25 out of 54 UNAMID units were meeting the requirements of UN-standard contingent-owned equipment.53 While hybridity opened the door to non-African contributions, many of them in reality required UN provision of logistic capabilities in order for them to sustain themselves and start operating as part of the mission. Given the limited stocks of materials and equipment within the UN system, this meant

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the Secretariat would need to solicit these requirements from other member states. The hybrid arrangement thus produced a new burden for the UN. While, as already suggested, the reluctance by states to contribute to the mission was partly due to concerns about its ambiguous command and control,54 this aspect of the hybrid operation also affected the management of the mission. Despite the apparent AU lead in command and control matters, the AU and the UN agreed that the UN would be responsible for daily operational command and control of the mission. While this clarified the problem of the location of command authority to some extent, there remained the fundamental question of how to ensure proper strategic guidance through the decisionmaking and management bodies of the two organizations. As the Secretary-General noted four years after the start of the operation: While under this arrangement day-to-day operational questions have been addressed, it can be challenging for the mission, given that the joint special representative reports to two organizations with different legislative bodies. In the case of the Sudan, the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council have not always had the same position with respect to the situation, which has resulted in the fact that the Secretariat and the Commission can provide, at times, two sets of strategic guidance as to implementation of the mission’s mandate. While every effort is made at the Secretariat and Commission level to harmonize guidance, it cannot be guaranteed that the United Nations and African Union will have the same position with regard to a particular crisis situation. This should be taken into account when planning joint endeavours in future.55

Clearly, the issue of command and control was a symptom of the broader problem of different strategic objectives and institutional cultures. These differentials, coupled with administrative inertia that arises from multiple reporting lines, were brought into sharper relief through hybridization.56 A third complication arose from the principle of African ownership underlying the idea of the hybrid mission. In the tripartite negotiations, the Sudanese government demanded the “predominantly African character” of the new mission and the AU and the UN essentially agreed with this position under the idea of African solutions to African problems. The principle thus represented a compromise that made the operation politically acceptable to the parties (especially Khartoum). However, the process produced a new complication by making the management of the relationship between the mission organizers and the host government

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more difficult. It did so by making the deployment and operation of the mission conditional on its being African. As the list of mission personnel would have to be agreed on by the two bodies before being submitted to the Sudanese government for approval,57 the predominantly African condition opened a new avenue for Khartoum to intervene in the makeup of the hybrid mission. The process of obtaining government clearance delayed the mission’s force generation.58 The African nature of the mission thus created a sort of negative path dependency that haunted the mission from the start. Finally, though UNAMID enjoyed a high level of international legitimacy that strengthened the cooperative security identities of the UN and especially the AU, this did not automatically translate into a higher level of local legitimacy and mission acceptance. Gelot suggests UNAMID was no better than AMIS in terms of local legitimacy primarily because of its ineffective performance. “In general,” she wrote, “local Darfuris mistrust UNAMID’s ability to protect them, since they cannot even protect themselves.”59 Insofar as the expectation for the protection of civilians (which was the key aspect of the mission) was heightened with the supposedly more robust and better equipped hybrid arrangement, slow and insufficient implementation on the ground in reality might have created a disappointing gap in the local perception, which in turn had a negative impact on the international legitimacy of the mission and its organizers. In a January 2012 report on the AU-UN partnership on peace and security, the AU commission chairman argued that the challenges to UNAMID were largely due to the political environment it found itself in and “cannot be attributed to the hybrid nature of the mission.”60 Investigation here suggests a rather different picture: the potential benefits of the hybrid mission were undermined by the complications associated with its hybridity. The AU’s optimism is not totally unfounded, however, if one takes a longer-term perspective. There are two such effects that UNAMID helped generate for a deeper institutional cooperation between the AU and the UN in peacekeeping. One is cooperation in mission planning and management. As will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 6, the UN’s support to AMIS in the form of the assistance cell would evolve into more permanent and larger institutional support by the UN. The assistance cell was developed into a permanent Peace Support Team, which was later merged with other offices to become an integrated UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in July 2010.61 The decision to set up such a standing support capacity, headed by an assistant secretary-general, reflected the recognition that the two

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organizations would likely need to stay engaged jointly in dealing with African conflicts for the foreseeable future. There is, in other words, an element of the shadow of the future here. The establishment of the UNOAU was followed, in September 2010, by the inaugural meeting of the UN-AU joint task force on peace and security.62 Another long-term effect that was generated by the UNAMID experiment is related to UN funding and in-kind logistic assistance to AU missions. From this perspective, the key difference from AMIS was that the UN was able to directly fund and support what was essentially an AU mission, using its regular peacekeeping budget. One AU report pointed out that UNAMID could be seen as an innovative breakthrough: Importantly, UNAMID stands as testimony of the importance of the AU-UN partnership. The AU is convinced that hybrid peace operations and other innovative approaches to peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building are the way of the future as the strength of such joint ventures draws from the universal character of the UN and the advantages embedded in regionalism. Even on the more challenging issue of the funding of AU-led peace support operations, progress has been made, though more slowly than Africa expects. The support package rendered to AMIS, before its transformation into a hybrid operation, and now to AMISOM is indicative of a more innovative approach to peacekeeping and the challenges associated to it.63

The AU had been demanding regularized access to the UN’s peacekeeping budget for its missions, arguing that this was the best way to ensure their sustainability and predictability.64 In the January 2007 decision, the AU Assembly officially requested that the UN Security Council examine the possibility of funding AU missions through the UN’s assessed contributions. The decision also called for the application of the same formula to the ongoing AMIS operation.65 However, in a repeat of the UNAMID negotiations, the UN Security Council was cautious to open the door of UN funding to AU missions in a regularized manner. After much procrastination, the Security Council agreed to set up a joint UN-AU panel headed by Romano Prodi, which was tasked with presenting options for UN funding assistance.66 The Prodi Report, submitted to the Council in late December 2008, proposed the creation of two mechanisms: (1) a multidonor trust fund, which, in addition to seeking new contributors, would also serve to consolidate the various existing schemes, and (2) use of the UN peacekeeping budget on a caseby-case basis for a maximum of six months, during which the supported AU mission would transition to UN management. The report described

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these two not as alternatives but as complementary channels that would operate in different contexts: the second option could be suitable for ongoing African missions and the first, based on voluntary funding, for longer-term capacity building. Under the second option, emphasis was also placed on in-kind assistance rather than direct transfer of funds to the AU.67 The issue of direct UN funding to AU missions, which was the main point of contention between the AU and the UN, was thus watered down by the introduction of strict conditions. The UN-AU negotiations on UN funding assistance for AU missions took place concurrently with those related to UNAMID. The experiences of support packages to AMIS, along with a similar assistance program for AMISOM, revealed several limitations inherent in this scheme. Since a support package was based on finding and matching inkind contributions with force requirements, the process took time, causing delays especially at the time of mission startup when such assistance could make the biggest impact. Moreover, there was no guarantee that the required resources would be made available, as the case of AMIS’s heavy support package (several of whose critical components were not delivered) demonstrated.68 Beyond these points, there is reason to argue that the financial and logistic dependence of the AU on the UN system, if institutionalized, would create a culture of dependency that might undermine not just the sustainability of UN peacekeeping but also the development of African peacekeeping in the long term. From this perspective, the Prodi Report’s recommendations are sensible in emphasizing long-term capacity building while addressing the current operational limitations in a way that minimizes the concerns of the UN membership and the possible side effects of direct assistance. The Prodi Panel’s formula did leave some gaps in African peacekeeping capacity unanswered for instance—what if the AU determines not to transition a UNsupported mission to UN management after six months? One should also note that as of this writing, the UN has not drawn any definitive conclusion on this issue.69 Nevertheless, the UN-AU operation collaboration in Darfur left experiences and lessons that helped articulate the terms of UN assistance for the AU in this area. As we saw, it was a rather unique combination of factors, including Khartoum’s political demands, AU ambitions, and deficiencies in African peacekeeping capacity, that made UNAMID a unique experiment at deeper operational collaboration. Though it may be rather unlikely that hybrid operations represent the way of the future as the AU hopes, UNAMID reveals a number of potential effects and complications that are likely to be repeated in other cases of operational collaboration.

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Democratic Republic of Congo: 2003, 2006, and 2008 Another case of operational collaboration that has left an important mark on the peacekeeping regime is in the DRC. The volatile situation in the eastern part of the country (mostly South Kivu and North Kivu provinces) led to two short military interventions by the EU in support of long-standing and yet struggling UN missions. These experiences, coupled with diplomatic wrangling concerning another proposed EU deployment in 2008, not only suggest what to expect from the EU as an emerging peacekeeping actor but also leave several challenges with regard to EU-UN operational collaboration. Eastern Congo has been the center of gravity in the conflict in the DRC since 1996. The conflict was triggered by violent campaigns, supported by the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko, against Tutsis living in the Kivus (Banyamulenge). The Tutsis, supported by Rwanda, Angola, and Uganda, started armed rebellion against Kinshasa in late 1996. Linking up with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire/Congo led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the rebellion quickly turned into a regional war that eventually ousted Mobutu from power in May 1997. Kabila, who became president and was threatened by the increasing influence of Rwanda and Uganda, refused to continue working with his eastern neighbors and did little to prevent the Hutu mistreatment of the Tutsis in the east. This led to an even greater regional conflict that, starting in August 1998, pitted Rwanda, Uganda, and their supported rebel groups against the government supported by Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Libya, and Sudan. The July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement marked a formal end to the conflict, and MONUC was established by Resolution 1258 (August 6, 1999) to help implement the agreement by assisting the work of the Joint Military Commission. The mission was initially very small with only 90 military liaison officers and had a limited mandate, but the country’s continuing instability forced the UN to make the mission one of the biggest peacekeeping missions in UN history. The Security Council expanded the mission’s strength several times: to 5,537 troops and military observers (February 2000); 10,800 troops and military observers (July 2003); 16,700 including 341 civilian police (October 2004); 17,030 troops, 760 military observers, 391 police trainers, and 750 FPU personnel (May 2007); and 19,815 troops, 760 military observers, 391 police, and 1,050 FPU personnel (December 2008).70 In addition, the mission was reinforced on a temporary basis with troops, FPUs, and police several times, including through the redeployment of

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peacekeepers from Burundi.71 The latest innovation of note is the establishment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the existing troop ceiling (19,815).72 In short, throughout this second peacekeeping engagement (the UN had deployed ONUC between 1960 and 1964), the UN has not so far been able to reduce the mission once. Although, with the transition from MONUC to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in May 2010, the Security Council indicated its willingness to gradually reduce the mission,73 this has not materialized as of this writing. The reason why it has not been able to do so is the lingering presence of many armed political groups and local militias in the region. They have diverse origins and connections, with some related to the previous conflicts in the region (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda [FDLR]), others aligned to regional powers (Rally for Congolese Democracy [RCD], Movement for the Liberation of the Congo [MLC], National Congress for the Defence of the People [CNDP], March 23 Movement [M23]), and still others based on local communities (Mai-Mai groups). Moreover, these groups have loose organization, allegiance, and membership, leading them to produce or split into many splinter groups over the years. They have also shifted alliances among themselves. It is not the intention of this study to give a detailed account of how this complex conflict has unfolded.74 But the active presence of these armed groups, which have continually threatened to destabilize the area, provided the contexts for operational collaboration between the UN and the EU. It took place with the EU deployment of Operation Artemis (June–September 2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (April– November 2006). The two missions were small but sharp interventions in response to the actual or feared outbreak of violence, and they were deployed in support of the more multidimensional and yet militarily struggling UN mission. In this section I look at how these two missions were deployed, and examine what effects and complications these experiences have left for the two organizations. The first EU military deployment to the Congo took place against the background of a comprehensive peace agreement. The 1999 ceasefire agreement did not prevent the proliferation of armed groups, which controlled different patches of the Congolese territory. Nevertheless, the process of a countrywide dialogue in the wake of the assassination of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila in January 2001 led to the signing of a Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC in Sun City, South Africa, in December 2002.75 The government as well as the major rebel forces, including the RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-Liberation

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Movement, RCD-National, and the Mai-Mai signed the agreement, while separate agreements with Rwanda (July 2002) and Uganda (September 2002) provided for the withdrawal of these forces from the country.76 However, these processes of withdrawal and transition created an opening that led to growing instability over the control of the resource-rich Ituri (eastern border region within the Oriental province). Massacres and fighting from early 2003 over the area’s central town of Bunia involved several armed factions with shifting alliances, including the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC, primarily from the Hema tribe, led by Thomas Lubanga and supported by Rwanda), the National Integrationist Front (Lendu, led by Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui), and the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FPRI, Ngiti, led by Germain Katanga). The early May withdrawal of Uganda’s 7,000 troops in accordance with the South Africa–mediated agreement between Rwanda and Uganda (April 9, 2003) in fact aggravated the security situation as Lendu attacks on Hemas accelerated. The UPC, once sidelined by the Ugandan forces, now responded by retaking the town on May 12, from which time the tide turned against the Lendu. In the period between May 6 and May 16, up to 500 civilians were killed and most of Bunia’s population (approximately 150,000) fled the city.77 From April 23, the MONUC compound had been reinforced by a Uruguayan guard contingent of around 700 troops (including logistic and engineering elements), but their tasks were limited to guarding the Bunia airfield and providing protection to UN premises and personnel.78 While MONUC’s sector 2 headquarters compound and the Bunia airport thus became magnets for thousands of fleeing civilians, the Uruguayan battalion “completely abdicated its responsibilities to protect civilians.”79 The problem, however, was not limited to the performance of deployed peacekeepers on the ground. As Annan reported in late May, the contingent would “clearly be well below the minimum required to assume full security tasks in the town, and its deployment can only be temporary, as it comes at the expense of sacrificing the fundamental principle of maintaining a Mission reserve battalion for contingencies.”80 It was projected that a brigade-size force of 3,800 would be needed at minimum to stabilize Bunia and the broader Ituri province,81 and yet generating such force would take several months, at least. In this situation, Secretary-General Annan in mid-May appealed to member states to provide a multinational force led by a UN member state and authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The force would be deployed as a “temporary bridging arrangement” until the arrival of MONUC reinforcements.82 Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003)

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authorized an Interim Emergency Response Force “in close coordination with MONUC,” to stabilize security conditions, improve the humanitarian situation, ensure the protection of the airport and IDPs, and protect civilians in Bunia.83 The resolution emphasized the “strictly temporary” nature of the force and directed the Secretariat to deploy a follow-on military formation as part of MONUC by the end of August.84 On June 5, the EU responded to the call by creating a military mission until September 1. The mission would be led by France in accordance with the EU’s framework nation concept but directed by the EU’s political and military organs. Operation Artemis was officially launched a week later with the adoption of its operational plan.85 The process that led to the formation of Operation Artemis can be explained through a combination of three main factors: the ERRF proposal, the evolution of the French-British cooperation in security and defense since the late 1990s, and EU-UN relations in the wake of the Iraq War.86 The idea of a short intervention force came at a time when the EU was implementing its own vision of a rapid deployment force. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ERRF proposal was agreed in 1999, following which the EU worked on aligning its members’ military capabilities while identifying areas where improvements and additions might be needed. On May 19, 2003, when Javier Solana, EU high representative for the CFSP, was asked by the EU Political and Security Committee to study the feasibility of a military operation in the DRC,87 the General Affairs and External Relations Council of the EU confirmed that “the EU had operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls.”88 The latter caveat indicated that this operational capability was still in the process of development. In fact, following the adoption of the ESS in December that year, the EU would replace the ERRF with the more deployable battlegroup platform. And central to this shift from the ERRF to the EUBG was the operational experience gained through Artemis. While the EU’s very first military mission in Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia) already took place a few months earlier in March 2003, it was a much smaller mission with around 350 personnel. Moreover, it was effectively a continuation of the preceding NATO deployment through the Berlin Plus agreements. Whereas Concordia thus presented an opportunity for the EU to operationalize EU-NATO cooperation in peacekeeping (see Chapter 5), Artemis was the EU’s first substantive engagement with military peacekeeping on its own.89 In that sense, the deteriorating situation in the DRC’s east and the demand for a sharp military intervention in the region came at an opportune moment for

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the EU to put its still developing military capability into practice. In broader terms, the situation presented the EU with an opportunity to demonstrate its global security role. As Duke pointed out, “Artemis was as much about shaping the EU’s global role as it was about strengthening the relatively new ESDP.”90 A second factor, which also was a major driving force behind the emergence of the EU as a security actor, was the evolution of FrenchBritish cooperation in security and defense since the 1998 Saint Malo Declaration. Since the declaration, the two European powers took steps to deepen policy coordination and operational cooperation on two fronts: security and defense policy integration in the EU, and coordinated engagement in international crises, especially in Africa. As Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace point out, “The French and British initiatives for the development of European cooperation in security and defence progressed hand in hand with initiatives to strengthen cooperation on security issues in Africa. The two were finally linked in Operation Artemis.”91 In practice, Operation Artemis was a predominantly French initiative that included the French provision of 1,785 personnel (out of the required 2,200), a force commander, as well as operational headquarters, although countries such as Britain and Sweden also provided troops (with the latter contributing special forces).92 French president Jacques Chirac had told the Secretary-General the French plan to deploy its troops to Bunia as early as May 10–11, since which time France was instrumental in drafting UN resolutions and formulating the EU response while pressing ahead in operational planning as the framework nation (in which France officially declared its interest on May 28).93 Nevertheless, to develop this into a European Union military operation would not have been possible without support or at least approval of the majority of EU members, including the most influential ones. This was ensured through the participation of units and personnel from 16 other nations, including 13 EU members and 3 non-European states (Brazil, Canada, and South Africa).94 A third factor that had a more direct bearing on EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping was the fledging authority of the UN in the wake of the Iraq War. The diplomatic row at the Security Council in the runup to the war not only revealed cleavage among the Europeans but also damaged the authority of the UN. Annan’s appeal for a rapid response force was an opportunity for Britain and France (both permanent members of the Council) as well as the other European states such as Germany to show unified support for the global organization. 95 As described in Chapter 2, there was also a rising interest in

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security cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, with the first Security Council meeting with regional organizations taking place on April 11, 2003. 96 In short, the operation was based on the motivations of the EU and its key states to operationalize their vision of conflict management as well as to place this action within a broader context of EU-UN cooperation in security affairs. The mission, which completed its withdrawal on September 7, was credited with swift improvement of the security conditions in Bunia by weakening the local militias, securing the airport, and delivering relief aid, although the mission left many lessons mostly related to shortfalls in logistic capabilities and the need for better interoperability among contributing troops. Moreover, the mission attracted some criticisms because of its short time span and limited area of operation. It has also been argued that the successful utilization of the framework nation concept resulted in an expensive proliferation of national operations headquarters in major European countries to the detriment of European integration.97 From our perspective, however, the mission stands out as an important milestone marking the start of operational collaboration between the EU and the UN.98 Indeed, Artemis set a precedent that helped clarify the terms of EU operational support to UN peacekeeping in several important ways. First, the operation concretized the idea that the UN is a priority framework for the EU in its peacekeeping engagement. The ESS, whose draft had been discussed since June 2003 before its eventual adoption in December, emphasized the UN’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and argued, “Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.”99 Coupled with the French-British initiatives in the previous years, the deliberations and stated commitments along this line created an expectation in the UN leadership that the EU would respond to UN requests for operational contribution.100 Artemis demonstrated the EU’s serious commitment to peacekeeping, and it did so in a way that imbued this actor with a strong emphasis on the norm of UN primacy. In the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management agreed on September 24, 2003, the UN Secretary-General and the presidency of the Council of the EU declared that the two organizations were “united by the premise that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Within this framework, the European Union reasserts its commitment to contribute to the

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objectives of the United Nations in crisis management.”101 Gaining a clear authorization from the UN Security Council would be one of the defining characteristics of EU operations in the following periods. With regard to the EU’s relationship with NATO, this definition of the EU’s role as a peacekeeper in support of the UN served the EU well by creating a space where it could play a more distinctive and autonomous role in international security governance. On an operational level, Artemis provided the EU with a model of rapid deployment in support of the UN. It was a model where the EU would dispatch upon request from the UN a relatively small but robust mission with a fixed time frame to create space for a follow-on UN presence. As noted, the operation took place at a time when the EU was trying to update its ERRF plan. In a French-British summit in February 2003, British prime minister Tony Blair and French president Jacques Chirac had already described the development of rapid reaction capacity as a “European priority.”102 Then, in another summit meeting in late November, the two leaders stated the intention to build on “the success of Operation Artemis” and proposed “a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to respond to UN requests in short-term crisis-management situations.”103 As in the case of Operation Artemis, this French-British proposal gained German endorsement and found its way into EU deliberations in February 2004.104 The Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 (endorsed by the European Council in June 2004) similarly celebrated the operation and envisaged that the development of the Battlegroup concept “will strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests.”105 On the UN side, Resolution 1493 (July 28, 2003) authorized doubling the number of MONUC’s military personnel to 10,800, including the addition of a brigade-size contingent along the line of Annan’s proposal in May. By the time of the official handover from Operation Artemis to MONUC on September 1, the MONUC Ituri Brigade had half of its scheduled strength (2,400 out of 4,800) take up positions in Bunia, and the remaining half (two battalions) were in place by mid-November.106 The EU operation, then, did serve at least some bridging purposes as envisaged by the Secretary-General. A related, institutional aspect of these developments was that the operation triggered broader discussions between EU and UN officials concerning the nature of EU-UN operational collaboration. Though the two missions were generally successful in coordinating their activities, there was a recognized lack of communication between the operational headquarters of Artemis and MONUC in the predeployment phase.107

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Reflecting this, the UN-EU Joint Declaration mentioned earlier identified four areas (planning, training, communication, and best practice) in which the two organizations should examine ways to achieve greater coordination and compatibility in operational management, including through a joint consultative mechanism (steering committee).108 With regard to cooperation at the planning stage, the ensuing EU-UN discussions109 revolved around the question of how the EU’s rapid response capability as demonstrated by Artemis could be used for UN missions.110 The UN Secretariat suggested two such modalities: the bridging model and the standby model. The former built directly on the experiences of Operation Artemis. The standby model envisaged by the Secretariat expected EU troops to provide an over-the-horizon force to deal with contingencies such as a rapid deterioration of the operational environment of UN troops. The EU, however, was not in favor of developing the standby model further as it found this scenario too risky and complicated. This left the bridging model the only model, but in discussions, the UN side maintained that smooth mission handover would require rehatting EU troops and/or mission enablers to the follow-on UN mission—a position that many EU members found unacceptable. Despite the limited scale of the collaboration, however, Operation Artemis provided the EU and the UN with a crucial foundation for future cooperation as it led to efforts on both sides to turn the experience into a more enduring system of operational collaboration. The deployment three years later of EUFOR RD Congo, another similarly short-term EU mission deployed in support of the same UN mission,111 did represent a continuation of this collaboration, but its achievements were decidedly more mixed. The circumstances that led to the creation of this mission were different from those in 2003 in several ways. First, whereas Operation Artemis was an EU response to a series of rapidly developing situations in the eastern provinces that were difficult to predict, the EUFOR mission was related to the organization of the planned national and local elections by the end of June 2006. Given the history and reality of continued political violence in the country, the UN Secretariat was concerned about the possibility of flare-ups of violence that neither MONUC nor the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) would be able to contain. This situation, coupled with the perceived success of EU-UN collaboration in 2003, made the idea of an EU force reserve “that could enhance the quick reaction capabilities of MONUC during or immediately after the electoral period” a natural one for UN planners.112 This idea was proposed as early as November 2005 in the aforementioned steering committee, following which Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the then

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undersecretary-general of the DPKO, made a formal request to Britain (then holding the presidency of the EU) in late December. In that letter, where he cited the Artemis precedent and the EU’s continued engagement in the region, Guéhenno framed his request for an EU reserve force within the broader context of “strengthening collaboration between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of international peace and security.”113 In other words, there was an awareness and intention (at least on the UN’s part) to institutionalize an emerging process of operational collaboration between the two organizations. Second, while the process of legitimizing and generating troops for Operation Artemis was in many ways a European and especially a French-British initiative, the idea of sending an EU force this time originated from the UN without prior offers or promises of commitment from Europeans. This explains why it took much longer for the EU to accept the UN proposal and assemble necessary troops. The initial EU response was relayed to the Secretariat three months later, but since it still hinged on the adoption of a Security Council resolution legitimizing its presence in the DRC, the EU’s final decision to dispatch the EUFOR came on April 27, 2006, following the adoption of Resolution 1671 two days earlier. The actual launching of the mission was further delayed, with the EU Council decision only on June 12.114 The operation continued for four months between July 30 and November 30, 2006. A third difference between the EUFOR and Artemis efforts concerns different forms of operational collaboration. Though the two operations both deployed alongside the UN forces already on the ground, they played different supporting roles for MONUC, with Operation Artemis functioning as a bridging force and the EUFOR playing an over-the-horizon role in helping MONUC deal with contingencies. It is interesting to recall that the latter model in fact represented one of the two possible uses of EU rapid response capacity to support UN missions as proposed by the UN Secretariat in June 2004; and this option did not receive a favorable response from the EU side back then. The fact that the EU nevertheless decided to deploy such a force indicates the shared sense of evolving cooperation between the two as well as an associated sense of obligation toward the UN. The force was in fact roughly the same size as its predecessor (2,200 troops) and more multinational (21 states, including non-EU states such as Turkey and Switzerland). The EU decision, however, was also premised on the EU’s effort to limit the scope of its contribution. EUFOR support to MONUC would include limited extraction capacity, assistance in securing the Kinshasa airport, and support to MONUC as needed in stabilizing a sit-

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uation. It would “not have the capacity to conduct major evacuation operations of nationals” and should not be expected to replace MONUC or FARDC tasks “in particular with regard to ensuring the general security of the election process”; apart from around 400 troops concentrated in Kinshasa, the remainder of the force would stay on alert outside the country, and the deployment period would be limited to four months.115 Resolution 1671 acknowledged these conditions, including the posting of the majority of the EU troops outside the country. In fact, the EU had already finalized the EUFOR’s operational plan: it was only after the EU had finished formulating its own plan that it was presented to the UN during the drafting process of Resolution 1671.116 The lengthy process of force generation as well as the strict limitations on the mandate reflected a changed political environment within the EU. As in 2003, France, along with Belgium, lobbied actively for an EU operation but refused to take on the role of a framework nation. Instead France called for another major European power, Germany, to play that role, and yet Germans were reluctant to contribute troops due to question marks about its value and because of the uncomfortable position of being pressured to lead an EU mission it had not lobbied for. Britain was also reluctant because of its increasingly extensive engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.117 In an effort to bring Germany on board, France then proposed the use of an EUBG. France and Germany had agreed to provide a combined force for the battlegroup throughout 2006 with alternating leading roles, and Germany was a leading troop contributor to the formation. In a repeat of the force generation process for another eventually botched intervention in 2008 (see below), Germany resisted the French move, forcing the EU to organize the mission on the basis of ad hoc contributions from within and outside the EU. Eventually, Germany and France agreed to each provide roughly one-third of the force, in which process Germany also insisted on the nonextension of the mandate beyond the four-month limit and restricting its units solely to Kinshasa. In contrast to the political context leading to Operation Artemis, therefore, EUFOR RDC was an operation against the background of a waning European interest in African conflicts and a fracturing of the unity among key European countries. This political context, in turn, helps explain the lack of substantive UN-EU coordination in the planning stage. As mentioned, the EU completed the mission planning largely on its own, and the Joint Action 2006/319 was clear in insisting that the EU would keep political and strategic control over the force. Though this demand for autonomy could be seen, as some commentators noted, as a sign of growing con-

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fidence as a peacekeeping actor, the foregoing analysis suggests that the opposite might be closer to reality in this case. The force generation process revealed that European states were able to agree on the force only through intense negotiations among themselves. If the planning process had also been open to the UN DPKO, this would have created significant complications in the negotiations that could have delayed agreement on the mission to the point where its deployment might have lost any relevance. Once the European force started operation, cooperation with MONUSCO was also constrained by the absence of joint planning, the lack of agreement in the exchange of secure information, complex chains of command within the EU structure, and the EU’s determination to retain the political control of its force. Thanks in part to pragmatic initiatives by mission leaders to improve coordination in information exchange and external communications, the EUFOR was nevertheless able to deter potential attacks and contain violent clashes during the electoral period. On three occasions EUFOR units engaged in a coordinated manner with MONUC troops to separate warring parties and guard key infrastructures and stakeholders in Kinshasa.118 While the operation thus represented an alternative use of EU troops in support of UN peacekeeping, the way it was organized and managed did not indicate a willingness, especially on the part of Europeans, to deepen this operational collaboration at the institutional level. This hesitation can in fact be seen again in 2008 when the idea of another EU force deployment emerged, this time in response to the offensive by Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP. Rejecting the peace agreement they and several other Kivu-based rebel groups signed on January 23, 2008, the CNDP rebels started fighting government troops in late August. In Ituri, other rebels, including the FPRI and Popular Front for Justice in the Congo, also started attacks on FARDC positions in late September.119 The tension escalated with the threat of war between the DRC and Rwanda as the latter was suspected of assisting the CNDP as well as covertly deploying its own troops, and Kinshasa was increasingly vocal in its criticisms of Kigali.120 By late October the CNDP advanced toward the North Kivu capital of Goma, and MONUC’s perceived inaction attracted local and international criticism (in reality MONUC did use some force against the rebels including through its combat helicopters). 121 With only around 850 MONUC peacekeepers deployed in Goma (and the rest of 16,000 troops spread throughout the country), it was estimated that two more battalions would be needed to stabilize the situation.122 While the UN Security Council subsequently

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approved the French-drafted resolution authorizing a temporary increase of up to 2,785 military and 300 police personnel (Resolution 1843, November 20, 2008), it was expected that such reinforcement would be hard to come by soon unless there was some bridging presence. France, holding the EU presidency, then floated the idea of a tactical group or “military guard which on a rotating basis can offer between 400 and 1,500 men whom we could deploy in the name of Europe within eight to 10 days,” according to French foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.123 The idea of the military guard alluded to the use of one of two battlegroups on standby, one led by Germany and France and the other led by Britain. The proposal raised expectations from UN officials, including Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (who publicly made calls for the EU to provide a bridging force), and led to an offer from Belgium to send up to 500 troops provided that they would not take a lead and that they would be joined by three or four other nations.124 The use of the battlegroups was reportedly one of the military options Solana presented to European leaders on December 11.125 However, Germany and Britain were opposed to the deployment, and even within the French government there were concerns about French military action against the Rwanda-backed rebels.126 Moreover, French president Nicolas Sarkozy did not support European intervention, instead calling for the full deployment of MONUC, which had not reached its force level even before the adoption of Resolution 1843.127 Eventually, talk of a European bridging force dissipated amid the rapid succession of events in January 2009—an internal split within the senior ranks of the CNDP, the start of the DRC-Rwanda joint operation codenamed Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) to topple the FDLR, and Rwanda’s arrest of Nkunda.128 On March 23, 2009, the government and the CNDP signed a peace agreement that provided for the transformation of the rebels into a political party and the integration of its soldiers into the FARDC. The issue of possible EU deployment to the DRC in 2008 emerged at the same time that the EU was conducting a major military mission in Chad and the CAR. EUFOR Tchad/RCA served in a bridging format for the incoming UN mission (MINURCAT) between January 2008 and March 2009 with up to 3,700 troops. It suffered from problems similar to those besetting the DRC missions: difficulties in coordinated planning, absence of real information sharing, and lack of mutual understanding concerning the procedures and constraints of the respective organizations.129 EU-UN consultation in the following periods produced some efforts toward more sophisticated and institutionalized cooperation, such as the 2011 setup of a UN Liaison Office for Peace

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and Security in Brussels.130 But progress has been slow, and there appears to be no clear momentum for the process. One should also note that instability in the eastern DRC did not end with the 2009 agreement. Three years later, former CNDP members of the FARDC deserted the military, claiming the lack of implementation of the March 23 agreements, and resumed insurgency in North Kivu. The March 23 (M23) Movement’s military advance throughout the year 2012 followed a similar pattern to that in 2008—the government and M23 agreed on a preliminary review of the 2009 agreement on February 6, 2013, and yet this agreement was undermined by the internal split within the ranks of the movement in the following month. This time there was neither a UN call for EU deployment nor an EU proposal for potential contribution. It was an African military initiative (Force Intervention Brigade) that was eventually deployed as part of MONUSCO in 2013 (see Chapter 5). These sequels suggest a continuing fracturing of the European commitment to peacekeeping and engagement in Africa. 1 3 1 What overall effects and complications can be identified from EUUN cooperation in the Democratic Republis of Congo? On the positive side, these collaborations have created an opening for the EU to register its role as a global peacekeeping actor, and they have set a pattern of operational collaboration based on complementarity and UN primacy that benefits both the EU and the UN. The EU can provide short, geographically limited but highly capable military interventions that create credible deterrence benefiting the collaborating UN mission; and the UN provides a legitimizing framework and a comprehensive mission that serves as an exit strategy for the EU mission. Related to this interest is the strong European emphasis on the UN as a primary authorizing framework. These experiences in the DRC constituted the EU as a peacekeeper that was oriented toward the UN.132 However, the evolution of EU peacekeeping in the DRC presents several complications. There was a persistent problem of coordination with UN missions that does not appear to have improved. Progress has been elusive also in the development of the EU-UN operational collaboration framework. The June 2012 document titled Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping, developed by the EEAS on the basis of an earlier proposal endorsed by the EU Political and Security Committee in November 2011, shows how little has in actuality developed on this front from the initial stage of consultation in 2004.133

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One reason for this stalled progress is the EU’s sense of autonomy that comes from at least two sources. On the one hand, the EU appears to be increasingly confident of its achievements as a peacekeeping/conflict management actor, based on the deployment of some 30 military and civilian missions of varying size and composition. This, according to an observer, has led the EU to rethink its relationship with the UN in terms of both the UN’s role as legitimising body and the terms of participation in peacekeeping operations. . . . Ultimately, the EU-UN relationship seems to be determined more by the EU’s agenda and willingness to act than by the UN’s needs. The overlap between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to give defines the limits of their cooperation.134

The tendency to dictate its terms of operational collaboration with the UN was clear especially in the 2006 deployment of EUFOR RD Congo. On the other hand, however, the claim for autonomy in the establishment and management of missions can be a sign of internal vulnerability, because in cases where the mission enjoys only fragile political consensus among EU members, allowing external voices to influence mission management can undermine that political unity. In fact, the pattern we saw in the DRC—French initiative (joined by a few smaller contributors) versus growing reluctance on the part of the other major contributors—seems to be repeated in the other EU military deployments, most recently in the CAR.135 The sources for such tension are both short-term and long-term, including the impact of the Afghan campaign on NATO members, multiple debt and financial crises in Europe since 2009, gradual detachment and fatigue of Europeans toward engagement in Africa, and the impacts of conflicts and instabilities in Europe’s neighboring regions of the Middle East and North Africa. Driven in part by internal vulnerability, this growing sense of autonomy does not help reinforce global peacekeeping cooperation. More to the point, as suggested above, the claim for autonomy goes against the EU’s proclaimed norm of UN primacy. Another complication arises in a way that appears to contradict the point just made in the preceding paragraph: EU dependency on the UN. This dependency is in a different sense from the AU case, and arises from the limited and basically niche nature of its contribution. Because EU operations, in the Congo but also elsewhere, are limited in time and space and play a relatively small part in the overall peacekeeping posture in a given situation,136 their promised effectiveness is predicated on the other peacekeeping partners playing expected roles in a timely man-

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ner.137 Therefore, although the EU seeks autonomy for its operations for the reasons suggested above, autonomy is possible only within the limits defined by the scope of these operations. Furthermore, this tendency in turn confirms the burden on the UN system: the transitory and confined nature of EU peacekeeping eventually brings the mid- and longterm burden of peacekeeping back onto the UN, perhaps with heightened expectations for follow-on presence.

Effects on Global Security Governance So far I have examined the two situations of Darfur and the DRC to consider how these collaborations produced effects conducive to global security governance on the operational level. They also revealed several complications, some of which were even exacerbated through these practices. On the positive side, first, as expected in Chapter 3, operational collaboration enabled partnering peacekeeping actors to provide their respective resources toward the overall mission requirements. Though this point tends to be underestimated by the range of problems associated with such collaboration, it would have been extremely difficult if not impossible for the international community to maintain its peacekeeping presence in such a wide range of situations through the UN alone. Second and contrary to my prediction in Chapter 3, these cases show that operational collaborations did encourage the peacekeeping actors toward a more institutionalized form of cooperation. In the case of the AU, the UN’s assistance cell to support the AMIS mission inspired more institutionalized support of the AU by the UN, especially in the AU’s mission management capacity. The UNAMID force generation process also increased the AU’s expectations for use of the UN peacekeeping budget for its missions. The EU-UN collaborations in the Democratic Republic of Congo led to efforts to improve interinstitutional communication, including through the steering committee. Even in the less successful case of EUFOR RDC, the difficulties encountered in the planning process led to the development of guidelines for joint planning in June 2008.138 A third positive effect of operational collaboration is that the principle of UN primacy is broadly recognized and endorsed by the regional partners. Both the AU and the EU explicitly referred to the preeminent status and responsibility of the UN in matters of international peace and security, on which basis they constituted their relationship with the global organization. While the broadly confirmed principle thus served to structure the peacekeeping regime around the

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UN as a hub, this situation has also created diffuse influence for the AU and the EU, which were dependent, albeit differently, on the UN for their activities. A fourth potentially positive effect of this aspect of the peacekeeping regime is increased international legitimacy, which the regional partners gained by working with the UN mission. For the AU (or other subregional organizations in Africa) and the EU, co deployment or joint operation with the UN represented global recognition of their missions as well as their institutional profile as global security governance actors. When they deploy in their own regions (as the AU has regularly done, and the EU did in the Balkans), operational collaboration with the UN may also help strengthen their leverage with the host government as well as the governments of neighboring countries. These potentially positive effects are, however, undermined by several complications. All of the cases examined in this chapter reveal persistent coordination problems that undermined the effectiveness of the missions in various ways. Some such problems are due to ambiguities in decisionmaking procedures and command and control systems, or lack of prior experience and know-how in interorganizational coordination. Poor coordination, however, can also be deeply political insofar as it represents an actor’s unwillingness to cede its autonomy in favor of effective coordination with its partners. Though the idea (or ideal) of autonomous operation has regional variations and backgrounds, it is uniformly rooted in the desire to maintain political control of its missions and thereby leave its footprint as a security governance actor. But as we saw in this chapter, concern for autonomy is more complex than it appears. It can be created by both confidence and insecurity; operates at institutional (procedural) as well as political levels; and affects interinstitutional coordination through various routes including caveats for deployment or points of vulnerability that may be exploited by the host government (e.g., the Sudanese government in Darfur). Moreover, the cases indicate that operational collaboration tends to deepen regional dependency on the UN. This takes either an overt (AU) or covert (EU) form. In the former, the regional partner demands financial and logistical support from the global organization for its missions and/or expects their eventual handover to the UN. The EU’s operational dependency is not as obvious, and yet the limited scale and scope of its missions are premised on the existence of a larger deployment that is usually provided by the UN. A related point that emerges from this is that whereas the AU’s current dependence on the UN can be understood as part of a long-term process of building Africa’s own peacekeeping capabilities, the EU’s dependency is more a reflection of the Union’s

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selective posture toward peacekeeping contribution. To point this out brings us back to the question of autonomy: for the AU, the idea of autonomy is translated into the eventual development of self-sufficient peacekeeping capacity; for the EU, it means the determination to protect and make visible its operational contribution. A third complication is diminishing interest and fatigue. Though the cases here show the process whereby repeated operational collaboration leads to efforts toward more institutionalized and systematic cooperation, it does not mean that this process would sustain itself over a long period. This is most clearly observed in the EU. The EU’s initial spurt of interest in peacekeeping created high-level political momentum in favor of military deployment in the DRC and institutionalized cooperation with the UN, but such momentum waned rather quickly by 2006 and was replaced by gradual withdrawal from military engagement in Africa. With regard to UN-EU cooperation, the steering committee did not hold meetings in 2010 and 2011.139 Though the EU came back as a military peacekeeper in the CAR in 2013, this was an isolated case against the general trend of sending small advisory and capacity-building missions. As we saw, some of the reasons, such as the financial crises, are exogenous and affect many other EU policies and practices. But the trend also appears to reflect the lack of political convergence that resulted from increased membership and the crumbling of unity among key European states that used to drive the CSDP process. Whether this trend will continue remains to be seen. From our perspective, an important point is that even if repeated operational collaborations take place, as happened between the EU and the UN in the DRC, they do not necessarily lead to the continuous strengthening of institutionalized cooperation. A final point I should make concerns the relationship between international and local legitimacy. Operational collaboration between the UN and regional partners generally works to bolster the regional acceptance of the former and the international legitimacy of the latter. However, as was argued in the case of Darfur, greater international legitimacy of the operational collaboration does not translate into local acceptance of the mission in place. This is especially the case where the country already has a history of peacekeeping missions that were locally perceived as unsuccessful or ineffective. In that situation, no amount of international authorization is likely to dramatically improve weak local acceptance and fatigue from yet another peacekeeping presence. This last point raises fundamental questions about the utility of joint decisionmaking. Joint decisionmaking is often part of operational

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collaboration, but I have not yet fully explored the motivations for and effects of this form of peacekeeping cooperation. To this I will turn in the next chapter.

Notes 1. In Macedonia, the UN deployed a conflict prevention mission, UNPREDEP, between 1995 and 1999, but that period did not overlap or intersect with those of the European missions. 2. UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1037 (January 15, 1996, para. 14) provided authorization for NATO to deliver close air support in the initial phase of UNTAES. 3. The EUPM represents a borderline case from our definition of peacekeeping. The EUPM was much smaller than its UN predecessor and, unlike the IPTF, did not have executive powers in law enforcement. It was more a police reform mission than a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. I have nevertheless included it because of its importance as the first EU field mission and because the EUPM and the military Althea mission, which started operation one year later in 2004, constituted the EU’s security governance of postconflict Bosnia. 4. Council of the EU, Joint Action, EU doc. 2006/304/CFSP, April 10, 2006 and 2008/124/CFSP, February 4, 2008. 5. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, UN doc. S/2004/210, March 16, 2004, paras. 61–62. 6. SCR 1834, September 24, 2008, para. 4. 7. Maximum deployment for each mission is as follows: 17,368 military, 87 UN police, 322 international civilians, 552 local civilians for UNAMSIL (March 31, 2002); 5,400 military, 168 military observers, 97 police, 316 international civilians, 383 local civilians for ONUB (September 30, 2005); 3,531 military, 24 military observers, 259 police, 422 international civilians, 524 local civilians for MINURCAT (February 28, 2010); 9,361 military, 190 military observers, 1,611 police, 417 international civilians, 766 local civilians for UNOCI (February 28, 2013). Data from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations. 8. As in the case of the EUPM, the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan and NATO’s Resolute Support are both training and advisory missions but included here because of their important operational linkage to ISAF in the context of continuing EU-NATO operational collaboration in the country. 9. Thierry Tardy, “EUFOR RCA: Tough Start, Smooth End,” European Union Institute for Security Studies Issue Alert 17, March 2015; EEAS, “EUFOR RCA Takes Control of Security at Bangui Airport,” press release, EU doc. 140430/02, April 30, 2014. 10. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, UN doc. S/2005/57, January 31, 2005, para. 26; World Health Organization, “Darfur: One Year On,” www.who.int/hac/crises/sdn/sitreps/darfur_report_2004_final.pdf (accessed November 22, 2016), 4. 11. UN General Assembly, Report of the High-Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision S4/101, UN doc. A/HRC/4/80, March 7, 2007, para. 38.

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12. AU PSC, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, AU doc. PSC/PR/2.(XVII), October 20, 2004, paras. 17–19. 13. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 17th meeting, AU doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII), October 20, 2004, paras. 4, 6. 14. SCR 1556, July 30, 2004, para.15. 15. Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/2005/57), para. 9. 16. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) and Paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), UN doc. S/2004/787, October 4, 2004, para. 50. 17. SCR 1590, March 24, 2005, para. 2 18. Ibid., para. 5. 19. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan, UN doc. S/2005/285, May 3, 2005, paras. 5–9. 20. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 28th meeting, AU doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(XXVIII), April 28, 2005, para. 9. The authorized number here was slightly larger (6,117 military personnel) than envisaged in the UN plan. 21. Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (S/2005/285), paras. 12–15. 22. UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/60/640, December 29, 2005, para. 30. 23. The team was dispatched August 4–17, 2004, and worked with the AU Commission. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraphs 6 and 13 to 16 of Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), UN doc. S/2004/703, August 30, 2004, paras. 54–58. 24. Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/2004/787), para. 50. 25. Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (A/59/591), para. 30. 26. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 46th meeting, AU doc. PSC/MIN/Comm.(XLVI), March 10, 2006, para. 2; see also Communiqué, 45th meeting, AU doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(XLV), January 12, 2006, para. 5. 27. Ibid., preambular para. 7 and para. 4. 28. See the Darfur Peace Agreement, May 5, 2006, especially chap. 3, www .un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf (accessed November 22, 2016). 29. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 51st meeting, AU doc. PSC/MIN/Comm/1.(LI), May 15, 2006, para. 15. 30. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, UN doc. S/2006/591, July 28, 2006, paras. 84–92. 31. SCR 1706, August 31, 2006, para. 1. 32. For the Sudanese positions (both government and nongovernment) in the period leading up to the adoption of the resolution, see Report of the SecretaryGeneral on Darfur (S/2006/591), para. 20. 33. UN Security Council, Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, UN doc. S/2006/1041, December 28, 2006, paras. 40–42. 34. UN Security Council, Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, UN doc. S/2007/104, February 23, 2007, paras. 35–37. 35. Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur (S/2006/1041), paras. 56–58.

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36. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 66th Meeting, AU doc. PSC/AHG/Comm.(LXVI), November 30, 2006, para. 2. 37. Ibid., para. 4. 38. Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur (S/2006/1041), para. 49; Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur (S/2007/104), para. 53. 39. Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/PRST/2006/55, December 19, 2006. 40. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 79th Meeting, AU doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXIX), June 22, 2007, para. 6. 41. For the mandate and tasks, see UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN doc. S/2007/307/Rev.1, June 5, 2007, paras. 54–55. 42. UN Department of Public Information, “UNAMID Deployment: Background Fact Sheet (September 2007),” www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/UNAMID _Deployment.pdf (accessed November 22, 2016). 43. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN doc. S/2008/781, December 12, 2008, paras. 2, 55. 44. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN doc. S/2014/26, January 15, 2014, paras. 69–73. 45. DPKO, “UN Missions Summary of Military and Police,” May 31, 2012, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/militarypolice.zip (accessed November 22, 2016). 46. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Addendum, S/2007/307/Rev.1/Add.1, July 5, 2007, para. 2. 47. The period covers July 2007 to June 2008. UN General Assembly, Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, UN doc. A/63/696, January 30, 2009, Table 2. 48. Gelot, Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security, 123. 49. For similar views see, e.g., Haugevik, “New Partners,” 14. 50. Gelot, Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security, 125. 51. SCOR, 5727th Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.5727, July 31, 2007; “UK, France Soften UN Text on New Darfur Force” (corrected update), Reuters, July 25, 2007; Security Council Report, August 2007 Monthly Forecast, July 30, 2007, 3–5; David Mickler, “UNAMID: A Hybrid Solution to a Human Security Problem in Darfur?,” Conflict, Security and Development 13, no. 5 (November 2013): 499. 52. Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2008/781), para. 13. 53. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN doc. S/2012/548, July 16, 2012, para. 60. The situation has remained largely unchanged and even deteriorated in some areas in the following periods. See, e.g., Report of the

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Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2014/26), para. 64. 54. In explaining the mission’s concept of operations, for instance, Ban Kimoon noted that UN troop and police contributing countries were making “further clarity and agreement” on the UN role in command and control a condition for their contributions. Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2007/ 307/Rev.1), para. 63. 55. Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations–African Union Cooperation in Peace and Security (S/2011/805), para. 40. 56. Tardy, “Hybrid Peace Operations,” 112. 57. Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2007/307/Rev.1), para. 113. 58. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN doc. S/2007/596, October 8, 2007, para. 18. 59. Gelot, Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security, 130. 60. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security (PSC/PR/2(CCCVII), para. 63. 61. Ibid., para. 48. 62. Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/PRST/ 2010/21, October 22, 2010. The task force is organized at the level of the UN undersecretaries-general and the AU commissioner for peace and security. 63. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security (PSC/PR/2(CCCVII), para. 105. 64. Ibid., para. 102. 65. AU Assembly, Decision on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.145(VIII), January 29–30, 2007, paras. 7, 20. 66. SCR 1809, April 16, 2008, para. 16. 67. UN General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the African Union– United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, UN doc. A/63/666-S/2008/813, December 31, 2008. 68. UN General Assembly/Security Council, Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations, UN doc. A/64/359 -S/2009/470, September 18, 2009, para. 36. 69. UN General Assembly/Security Council, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/70/357-S/2015/682, September 2, 2015, para. 48; Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/70/579, November 30, 2015, para. 122; SCR 2320, November 18, 2016. 70. SCRs 1291 (February 24, 2000), 1493 (July 28, 2003), 1565 (October 1, 2004), 1756 (May 15, 2007), 1856 (December 22, 2008).

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71. SCRs 1621 (September 6, 2005), 1635 (October 28, 2005), 1711 (September 29, 2006), 1736 (December 22, 2006), 1843 (November 20, 2008). Resolution 1711 authorized the deployment of up to one infantry battalion, one military hospital, and 50 military observers from ONUB (para. 3). 72. SCR 2098, March 28, 2013, para. 9 and SCR 2147, March 28, 2014, para. 1. 73. SCR 1925, May 28, 2010, para. 3 and SCR 2211, March 26, 2015, para. 3. 74. See, e.g., Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). 75. The Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, inclusive of this and other related agreements, was eventually signed on April 2, 2003. 76. Emeric Rogier, “The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview,” in Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ed. Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto, 25–42 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, December 2003). 77. DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit and Military Division, “Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force,” October 2004, 18. 78. UN Security Council, Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN doc. S/2003/566, May 27, 2003, para. 14. The DRC government also deployed elements of the national police (700 in total), but they were poorly equipped and quickly disintegrated in the face of the local clashes; ibid., para. 16. 79. Kees Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Faster and More United? The Debate About Europe’s Crisis Response Capacity, ed. Andrea Ricci and Eero Kytömaa (Brussels: European Communities, 2006), 151. 80. Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2003/566), para. 49. 81. Ibid., para. 51. 82. Ibid., para. 98 and UN Security Council, Letter Dated 15 May 2003 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2003/574, May 28, 2003. 83. SCR 1484, May 30, 2003, para. 1. 84. Ibid., para. 2. 85. Council of the EU, Joint Action, EU doc. 2003/423/CFSP, June 5, 2003 and 2003/432/CFSP, June 12, 2003. 86. Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?,” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 512. 87. Ibid. 88. GAERC (external relations), 2509th meeting, May 19–20, 2003, EU doc. 9379/03 (Presse 138), para. 8. 89. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 232–233.

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90. Simon Duke, “Consensus Building in ESDP: The Lessons of Operation Artemis,” International Politics 46, no. 4 (2009): 407. 91. Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis,” 509. 92. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 233. 93. Homan, “Operation Artemis,” 151–152; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis,” 512. 94. Ryan C. Hendrickson, Jonathan R. Strand, and Kyle L. Raney, “Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy,” Canadian Military Journal 8, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 39. 95. Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis,” 513. 96. SCOR, 4739th Meeting, UN doc. S/PV.4739 and Corr.1, April 11, 2003. 97. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, “Our Work Here Is Done: European Union Peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review 20, no. 2 (June 2011): 20. 98. Homan, “Operation Artemis,” 154; Marta Martinelli, “Implementing the ESDP in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, European Security and Defence Policy, 118. 99. EU, European Security Strategy, 9. 100. Duke, “Consensus Building in ESDP,” 401–403. 101. Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management, September 24, 2003, para. 1. 102. Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence, Le Touquet, February 4, 2003, para. 3(c). 103. Joint Communiqué Issued at the British-French Summit, London, November 24, 2003. 104. European Parliament, The EU Battlegroups (note), EU doc. DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006_145, September 12, 2006, 4. 105. Headline Goal 2010 (Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 and Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004), para. 10. 106. UN Security Council, Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN doc. S/2003/1098, November 17, 2003, para. 7. 107. DPKO, “Operation Artemis,” 11, 14. 108. Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation, para. 3. 109. EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, ESDP Presidency Report, EU doc. 10547/04, June 15, 2004, Annex II. The civilian version of this document was also adopted later in the same year. See EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management, ESDP Presidency Report, EU doc. 16062/04, December 13, 2004, Annex IV. 110. EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (10547/04), Annex II. This document also suggested two broad options for potential European contributions to EU missions. One such model is provision of national military capabilities facilitated by EU clearinghouse functions. This applies especially to scenarios where EU member states contribute critical mission enablers such as communication capabilities. Another category of EU contribution is through the organization of EU missions in support of UN missions. This can take the form of a stand-alone mission or a modular approach in which

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an EU mission is responsible for a specific component within a UN mission. See also Actions to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping, EU doc. 17497/11, November 24, 2011, and EEAS, Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping, EU doc. 11216/12, June 14, 2012. 111. Analysis in this and the following paragraphs related to EUFOR RD Congo has benefited especially from Claudia Major, “EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006,” European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper 72, Paris, September 2008. 112. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 27 December 2005 from the UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN doc. S/2006/219, April 13, 2006, Annex I. 113. Ibid. 114. Council of the EU, Joint Action, EU doc. 2006/319/CFSP, April 27, 2006 and Decision 2006/412/CFSP, June 12, 2006. 115. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 28 March 2006 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2006/219, April 13, 2006, Annex II. 116. Major, “EU-UN Cooperation,” 27. 117. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 238. 118. Major, “EU-UN Cooperation,” 33–35. 119. “DRC: Army Sends Reinforcements After Militia Attacks,” IRIN, October 3, 2008; “DR Congo: Government Forces, Rebels Clash in Ituri,” IRIN, October 8, 2008. 120. “U.N. Urges Congo-Rwanda Talks to Avert War,” Reuters, October 10, 2008. From early November there were also increasingly widespread reports of Angolan and Zimbabwean soldiers fighting alongside FARDC, raising fears for another regionwide conflict on the scale of the 1998 war. See, e.g., “DR Congo: Foreign Troops Backing Congolese Army Against Rebel,” Deutsche Presse Agentur, November 13, 2008. 121. “U.N. Force Commander in DR Congo Resigns,” Reuters, October 27, 2007; “Many Flee as Congo Rebels Approach Eastern City,” New York Times, October 30, 2008; “Congo Conflict Shows Flaws in UN Force,” Independent, October 31, 2008. 122. “British Troops May Protect Aid in Congo,” Independent, November 3, 2008; “Thousands Flee DR Congo Clashes, Goma Ceasefire Holds,” Reuters, November 5, 2008. 123. “Congo Rebels Declare Ceasefire, Gunfire Goes On,” Reuters, October 29, 2008. 124. “Europe Hesitant, Divided over Force for East DR Congo,” Reuters, December 1, 2008; “No Prospects of EU Force in Congo,” Reuters, December 2, 2008; “Belgium Expects EU to Send Troops to DR Congo,” Reuters, December 10, 2008. 125. “UK Blocking European Congo Force,” The Guardian, December 12, 2008. 126. “European, U.S. Envoys Visit E. Congolese City,” Washington Post, November 1, 2008; “Rebels Tighten Hold in E. Congo,” Washington Post, November 1, 2008.

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127. “Congo Sees EU Sending Equipment, Not Full Force,” Reuters, December 23, 2008. According to the mission source, as of mid-December 2008 MONUC had 17,421 peacekeepers deployed, of whom 6,139 (8 out of 17 battalions) were stationed in North Kivu, 3,513 in South Kivu, and another 3,769 in Ituri. “Over 90% of MONUC Force Deployed in Eastern DRC,” MONUC/Reliefweb, December 15, 2008. 128. “DR Congo: Hundreds of Rebels Surrender, Four Killed,” AllAfrica, January 27, 2009; “Hunt Begins in Congo for Rwandan Militia Leaders,” Washington Post, January 20, 2009; “Rwanda’s Arrest of Congolese Rebel Leader Marks a Key Shift,” Washington Post, January 23, 2009. 129. Alexandra Novosseloff, “Options for Improving UN-EU Cooperation in the Field of Peacekeeping,” in The EU, the UN, and Collective Security, ed. Joachim Krause and Natalino Ronzitti (New York: Routledge, 2012), 158–160. 130. The Liaison Office represents the DPKO, DFS, and Department of Political Affairs in their dealings with the EU, NATO, and other international organizations in Brussels. See “UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security— DPKO/DPA/DFS Liaison Office (UNLOPS),” www.unbrussels.org/un-liaison -office-for-peace-and-security-dpkodpadfs-liaison-office-unlops/ (accessed November 22, 2016). 131. Malte Brosig, “EU Peacekeeping in Africa: From Functional Niches to Interlocking Security,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 1 (February 2014): 84; see also Eva Gross, “Missions,” in CSDP Between Internal Constraints and External Challenges, Issue Report 17, ed. Eva Gross and Anand Menon, (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2013), 40, 43. 132. Brosig, “EU Peacekeeping in Africa,” 78–79. 133. Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping (17497/11). See also Tobias Pietz, “The European Union and UN Peacekeeping: Half-Time for the EU’s Action Plan,” Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) Policy Briefing, Berlin, October 2013; Thierry Tardy, “Partnering in Crisis Management: Ten Years of UN-EU Cooperation,” European Union Institute for Security Studies Issue Brief, Paris, September 2013. 134. Major, “EU-UN Cooperation,” 13. 135. See, e.g., “The EU’s Central African Republic Mission,” IISS Strategic Comments 20, Comment 13 (April 2014). 136. This is aggravated by the reluctance of Europeans to rehat EU peacekeepers into UN ones. The only exception so far is the EUFOR Tchad/RCA, roughly half of whose personnel (2,000) stayed on under the follow-on UN mission. DPKO, “Operation Artemis,” 14; EU, “EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA),” updated March 2009, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Final _FACTSHEET_EUFOR_TCHAD-RCA-version9_EN.pdf (accessed August 15, 2014). 137. Brosig, “EU Peacekeeping in Africa,” 78–79. 138. UN DPKO/DFS, “Guidelines for Joint UN-EU Planning Applicable to Existing UN Field Missions,” June 13, 2008, author’s copy obtained in February 2009. 139. Novosseloff, “Options for Improving UN-EU Cooperation,” 159.

5 Joint Decisionmaking: Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Congo Joint decisionmaking is closely related to the requirements for operational collaboration. As we saw in Chapter 4, operational collaboration usually takes place through some form of formal decisionmaking process by mission organizers. But joint decisionmaking is much more prevalent than in just the cases of operational collaboration. I start here by examining how regional and global peacekeeping actors have cooperated by means of their decisionmaking powers. Table 5.1 adds to Table 2.1 information regarding UN Security Council decisions on nonUN missions. This list shows how the Security Council has been using its resolutions to engage politically with regional, multinational, and national operations. Joint decisionmaking takes the specific form of the UN’s political support to the organizers of these missions. As we saw in Chapter 4, there are very few clearly identifiable cases of region-toregion operational collaboration. The tendency may be more prominent in joint decisionmaking, because it is premised and depends for its effectiveness on disparities of power between the UN and the rest. The UN is bestowed with broad responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VIII of the Charter, empowered to utilize regional instruments for such purposes (Article 53). Using its resolutions as the main vehicle, the Security Council is thus in a unique position to bestow global legitimacy on regional and other peacekeeping initiatives. In practice, UN provision of political support to regional peacekeeping takes two specific forms: authorization and endorsement in Security Council resolutions. Security Council authorization means 115

116 Table 5.1 Joint Decisionmaking, 1990–2016 Location of Situation

Operation

UN Decision

Liberia

ECOMOG

SCE (SCRs 788, 813, 856, 866, 911, 950, 972, 985, 1001, 1014, 1020, 1041, 1059, 1071, 1083, 1100, 1116) SCA (SCR 1497) None SCA (SCRs 816, 836)

Moldova Bosnia (during conflict) Tajikistan

ECOMIL CIS NATO Deny Flight CPF

Georgia (Abkhazia)

PKF

Haiti

Uphold Democracy Secure Tomorrow NATO Deny Flight, IFOR, SFOR NATO IFOR, SFOR EUPM

Croatia Bosnia (postconflict)

EUFOR Althea

CAR

MISAB CEN-SAD PF CEMAC FOMUC

Albania Sierra Leone

Lesotho Guinea-Bissau

ECCAS MICOPAX MISCA Sangaris EUFOR RCA Alba ECOMOG Palliser SADC Boleas ECOMOG MISSANG ECOMIB

SCE (SCRs 968, 999, 1032, 1061, 1089, 1128, 1138, 1167, 1206, 1240) SCE (SCRs 934, 937, 971, 993, 1036, 1065, 1096, 1124, 1150, 1187, 1225, 1255, 1287, 1311, 1339, 1364, 1393, 1427, 1462, 1494, 1524, 1554, 1582, 1615, 1666, 1716, 1752, 1781, 1808) SCA (SCR 940) SCA (SCRs 1529, 1542) SCA (SCRs 908, 958, 981, 1037) SCA (SCRs 1031, 1088, 1174, 1247, 1305, 1357, 1423, 1491, 1551) SCE (SCRs 1491, 1551, 1575, 1639, 1722, 1785, 1845, 1895, 1948, 2019) SCA (SCRs 1575, 1639, 1722, 1785, 1845, 1895, 1948, 2019, 2074, 2123, 2183, 2247, 2315) SCA (SCRs 1125, 1136, 1152, 1155, 1159) None SCE (Presidential statements 2002/28, 2004/39, 2005/35, 2006/47) SCE (SCRs 2031, 2088) SCA (SCR 2127) SCA (SCRs 2127, 2149, 2217, 2301) SCA (SCRs 2134, 2181) SCA (SCRs 1101, 1114) SCE (SCRs 1132, 1162, 1171, 1181, 1231, 1245, 1260, 1270, 1289) None None SCE (SCRs 1216, 1233) SCE (SCR 2030) SCE (SCRs 1949, 2030, 2092, 2103, 2157, 2186, 2203, 2267) (continues)

Table 5.1 continued Location of Situation Kosovo Timor-Leste

Macedonia

Ivory Coast

Burundi DRC Solomon Islands Afghanistan

Darfur/Sudan

Somalia

Comoros Chad/CAR Libyaa Mali

Operation

UN Decision

NATO KFOR EULEX INTERFET Astute

SCA (SCR 1244) SCA (SCR 1264) SCE (SCRs 1690, 1704, 1745, 1802, 1867, 1912, 1969, 2037) SCE (SCRs 1345, 1371)

NATO Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, Allied Harmony EU Concordia, Proxima Licorne SCA (SCRs 1464, 1498, 1527, 1528, 1584, 1594, 1600, 1603, 1609, 1652, 1726, 1739, 1763, 1765, 1795, 1826, 1865, 1880, 1911, 1924, 1933, 1962, 2000, 2062, 2112, 2162, 2226, 2284) ECOMICI SCA (SCRs 1464, 1498, 1527, 1528) AMIB SCE (SCR 1545) EU Artemis SCA (SCR 1484) EUFOR RD Congo SCA (SCR 1671) RAMSI None NATO ISAF SCA (SCRs 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1890, 1943, 2011, 2069, 2120) NATO Resolute SCE (SCRs 2189, 2210, 2274) Support EUPOL Afghanistan SCE (SCRs 1746, 1776, 1806, 1833, 1868, 1890, 1917, 1943, 1974, 2011, 2041, 2069, 2096, 2120, 2145, 2210, 2274) AMIS SCE (SCRs 1556, 1564, 1574, 1590, 1591, 1663, 1679, 1706, 1714, 1755) UNAMID SCA (SCRs 1769, 1828, 1881, 1935, 2003, 2063, 2113, 2173, 2228, 2296) AMISOM SCA (SCRs 1744, 1772, 1801, 1831, 1863, 1872, 1910, 1964, 2010, 2036, 2072, 2073, 2093, 2124, 2182, 2232, 2289, 2297) IGASOMa SCA (SCR 1725)a MAES None EUFOR Tchad/RCA SCA (SCRs 1778, 1834) EUFOR LIBYAa SCE (SCRs 1970, 1973)a ECOWAS AFISMA SCA (SCR 2085)

Sources: Data from AU, EU, NATO, UN, and University of Montreal Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations websites, www.peaceau.org/en/, https://eeas.europa.eu/, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq /68147.htm#crisis, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/, www.operationspaix.net/. Notes: In cases where various forms and document types of decision are used for one mission, only the more formal and weightier form (authorization [SCA] rather than endorsement [SCE]) and document type (resolution rather than presidential statement) are listed. a. Denotes operations that were formally authorized but not actually deployed.

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explicit authorization of the establishment of a non-UN mission, and in some cases includes its periodic extension as in UN missions. Endorsement comes in the form of expressions welcoming or at least acknowledging the regional mission; or resolutions are worded in general terms in such a way that interested regional organizations can make use of these provisions as a legitimacy basis for their operations. Endorsement thus allows greater variety. Typically, the Security Council endorses missions by mentioning their roles in the preambles and/or main paragraphs of its resolutions, but that is not the only pattern. For instance, endorsement for the ECOMOG Sierra Leone was implied when the Council authorized ECOWAS to use its mission for ensuring implementation of travel bans and oil and arms embargoes against the military junta.1 Endorsement for the CEMAC Multinational Force in the CAR (FOMUC) came not through a resolution but in presidential statements.2 In terms of timing, the Council’s expressed support for the AMIB in Burundi was initially made through presidential statements and then, only at the final stage of the mission, Resolution 1545 (May 21, 2004) welcomed the efforts of the mission, the troop contributors, and other countries that were assisting the mission’s deployment.3 In contrast, the Security Council was ready to endorse MISCA when it was being set up in October 2013, and then formally authorized the mission right before the actual deployment took place.4 Why has there been such variety in UN support, and what roles do these Council decisions play for non-UN missions? There are several potential reasons that explain differentiated UN responses. One is whether the nature of the situation requires a use of force authorization under Chapter VII. In many EU and NATO operations (NATO air operations in the Balkans, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR; EU’s Althea, Artemis, RD Congo, Tchad/RCA), Chapter VII authorization to use all necessary means to implement their mandates was deemed necessary. Another is the extent to which other political and legal bases are available for the operation. These bases include explicit provision in a ceasefire or peace agreement; invitation for intervention by the government (e.g., NATO operations in Macedonia); or decisionmaking by the mission organizer. If a non-UN mission is well grounded in these decisions, endorsement might be deemed enough by its host organization and key contributors. A third concerns the timing of Security Council engagement. In order for the Council to authorize an operation, that decision must precede its actual establishment, in principle. But several regional operations, especially in West Africa, were already in place, sometimes for years, before the situation was taken up by the Council.

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Fourth, there appear to be differences among non-UN bodies in the level of eagerness to seek Security Council authorization or endorsement. For instance, the EU has been the most consistent seeker of such authorization every time it organized a military mission. For the EU, it has been assumed in the crisis management field “that any EU-led military operation that would imply a chapter VII mandate would have to be legally endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution.”5 Apart from periodic extensions in the authorization for ISAF, NATO by comparison has not sought Council authorization for a mission once it was established. A final and related factor conducive to the different manners in which regional missions have been treated by the Security Council is that, especially up to the late 1990s, there has been a tendency for the Council to respond to the demands of European organizations with specifically worded resolutions, while with regard to African missions Council responses have been somewhat sloppy (as in Sierra Leone) and sometimes absent (as in Lesotho and the Comoros). This tendency, however, is gradually disappearing as African missions have been increasingly closely connected to, and dependent on, the Council’s decisionmaking. Good example are the two ECOWAS operations in Liberia. For ECOMOG Liberia (1990–1999), the earlier operation, the Council in its first resolution on Liberia commended ECOWAS for its efforts toward peace and exempted ECOMOG from the arms embargo imposed by the same resolution;6 in many subsequent resolutions the Council acknowledged its activities and expected it to cooperate with the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).7 But these endorsements stopped short of authorizing its mandate. In contrast, when ECOWAS returned to the country in 2003 with a robust peacekeeping force, the Council quickly authorized its mandate under Chapter VII.8 But despite all these fluctuations, what is clear is that the Security Council did authorize or endorse most of the non-UN missions. Security Council decisionmaking takes place on the initiative of either its members or the Secretary-General, and through them all member states who are also members of non-UN organizations. The fact that most of the non-UN missions have been endorsed or authorized by the Council suggests that non-UN bodies and their members have actually found it both necessary and valuable to gain such decisions. Moreover, formal authorization has become increasingly the preferred option for joint decisionmaking. Many recent non-UN missions have received formal authorization from the Security Council: EU (EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR RCA), AU (AMISOM, UNAMID, AU MISCA), ECOWAS (African-led International Support Mission to Mali [AFISMA]), and coalition (Operations

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Licorne and Sangaris) missions are prime examples. This trend indicates a gradual strengthening of formal strategic cooperation between major peacekeeping actors. As for the perceived need to obtain Security Council decisions, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter conditions “regional arrangements and agencies” and their activities in the field of international peace and security in three ways: (1) they should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN; (2) no enforcement action should be taken by them unless authorized by the Security Council; and (3) the Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation by them for the maintenance of international peace and security. Taken literally, these provisions indicate the need for nonUN peacekeeping to be at least endorsed by the Council, ideally before its actual deployment. Why do these actors seek Security Council authorization or endorsement? What are the expected benefits of Council decisions? The discussion so far indicates there are at least two benefits. One obvious benefit is international legal and political authority derived from the Council’s power to determine a situation a threat to international peace and security and grant a use of force authorization under Chapter VII. Even though these missions are usually established by non-UN organizations themselves within the context of internationally brokered agreements, linking Security Council decisionmaking to these missions raises the level of their international legitimacy, especially when the mission’s mandates require robust action on the ground. As we saw in the previous chapter, the problem with international legitimacy is that it does not necessarily lead to the strengthened acceptability (local legitimacy) of the non-UN mission. Instead of improving its local perception, association with the UN may even damage the mission’s image when the UN has a record of failed peacekeeping endeavors in the past. Despite this complication, the UN’s power to recognize the regional activities under its authority generally constitutes a key consideration for the regional planners who seek an additional source of legitimacy to justify active military engagement. At the national level, the availability of UN authority also matters for governments to achieve domestic consensus and decide on their level of contributions. Moreover, and as argued with regard to operational collaboration, UN authorization for non-UN missions implies the UN’s recognition of the mission organizers as peacekeeping actors, thereby reinforcing their institutional identity as security governance actors. The UN Charter thus gives the UN unique powers to provide legal grounds for non-UN peacekeeping missions and to facilitate the formation of their identity as peacekeeping actors.

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Another benefit is related to the prospects for financial and logistic resources through the UN. This has indeed been a consistent theme in African peacekeeping and can be seen in the region’s first operation in the 1990s, ECOMOG Liberia. Resolution 866 (September 22, 1993) welcomed the creation of a Trust Fund for ECOMOG and called on “Member States to support the peace process in Liberia by contributing to the Trust Fund.”9 This trust fund was set up in late August 1993 by the Secretary-General, who had received a request for financial assistance from ECOWAS.10 The trust fund formula would be repeated in other situations, such as ECOMOG Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau,11 and later in more general terms (UN trust fund for African peacekeeping, created in 1996). Other than setting up such a fund, appeals to wider member states to provide financial and logistic support have been regularly made in resolutions related to African missions.12 The Security Council has also authorized existing UN missions to extend logistical support to UN-authorized African missions.13 As we saw in Chapter 4, these developments would culminate in the UNAMID experiment and proposals for UN regularized funding and in-kind assistance. Linking the mission’s mandate to Security Council decisionmaking thus opens a useful avenue for the host organization to request assistance from outside sources, mostly through the UN. Along the line of this logic lies the availability of UN operations. Indeed, joint decisionmaking appears to be a necessary if insufficient condition for global-regional operational collaboration. On the one hand, most of the non-UN missions that were not supported by the Council did not get any UN missions to work with. These include the CIS JCC, CEN-SAD Peacekeeping Force, Operation Boleas, RAMSI, and AU MAES; the only exception in this regard was Operation Palliser (Sierra Leone), which provided military support to the struggling UNAMSIL despite the lack of relevant resolution. On the other hand, however, getting support from the Security Council has not necessarily guaranteed operational collaboration. NATO and EU missions in Macedonia and Afghanistan, Operation Alba, ECCAS Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX), ECOMOG and MISSANG in Guinea-Bissau, and AMISOM did receive Security Council decisions but were not relieved by, or operated alongside, UN missions due to varying circumstances. Of course, and as indicated earlier in this paragraph, there is a wider range of assistance options short of operational collaboration. In any event, an important point here is that Security Council decisionmaking in support of non-UN missions creates a political context for mobilizing financial, logistical, and/or operational support to these missions.

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The joint decisionmaking form of peacekeeping cooperation is centered on the power of the UN Security Council to authorize or endorse non-UN missions. Security Council decisions meet the interests and identity needs of non-UN actors by providing additional legal grounds, creating an avenue for external assistance, and signaling a global recognition of their role as peacekeeping actors. We can see how joint decisionmaking is effective in helping meet these interests and needs. Just as we saw on the operational level, we expect cooperation at this strategic level to produce positive effects on global security governance, but there may also be several complications in this type of cooperation. In the discussion below, I will take up several cases of joint decisionmaking for non-UN operations. Since, as pointed out earlier, Security Council resolutions are often regarded as the legal basis for operational collaboration, in order to measure the effects of joint decisionmaking clearly one needs to look at cases where non-UN operations are authorized or endorsed by the UN while the UN does not deploy its own missions. However, one deviation from this selection criterion that will be examined in this chapter is the case of the MONUSCO FIB. There, the UN and African partners worked together to incorporate what was originally a regional peacekeeping force onto the formal UN peacekeeping structure.

Macedonia: 2001–2003 The EU operation in Macedonia between March and December 2003 was a small but landmark operation. It was the first EU military mission deployed by the EU. In practice, the deployment took the form of transition from the preceding NATO operations in the country. The Balkans were familiar ground for NATO, having been involved in various conflicts in the region since the early 1990s. The transition was made possible through the Berlin Plus agreement between the two organizations, concluded on March 17, 2003—only two weeks before the start of the EU mission. Unlike missions in Bosnia and Kosovo (in the case of NATO), or the DRC, Chad/CAR, and CAR (in the case of the EU), these missions did not involve UN operational engagement in the same theater. Lacking operational collaboration with the UN and instead coordinating their operations largely on their own terms, they nevertheless received endorsement from the Council in two resolutions. For the UN, in other words, this was the case where the UN cooperated with regional organizations through its decisionmaking powers alone. On the

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other hand—and this is another difference from the other NATO and EU operations—the UN resolution only endorsed rather than authorized the operations. It is with these differences in mind that I consider the implications of Security Council decisionmaking for NATO and EU peacekeeping. In so doing the case may also illuminate the EU and NATO’s thinking behind seeking Security Council decisions for their operations. The EU’s Operation Concordia and the preceding NATO missions were established as part of Europe’s support for the August 2001 peace agreement between the Macedonian government and the representatives of ethnic Albanians following the armed clashes earlier that year between Macedonian security forces and the National Liberation Army (NLA), an Albanian militant organization associated with the larger rebel group in Kosovo (Kosovo Liberation Army). The Ohrid Framework Agreement, in which the EU played a major mediating role with the United States, addressed the grievances of ethnic Albanians with regard to their representation and treatment within the Macedonian state. The agreement also underlined the importance of the ceasefire of July 5, 2001, whose implementation NATO forces would be deployed to assist.14 NATO already had a military presence in Macedonia as part of the KFOR, and it was this asset that NATO was called on to use for a succession of three short missions. The first, Essential Harvest, was a month-long operation (August 27–September 26, 2001) involving 3,500 troops to disarm Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. Operation Amber Fox (September 27–December 15, 2001) offered protection to EU and OSCE monitors through a smaller military presence of around 700 troops. In the case of the third operation, Allied Harmony, the deployment was reduced to 450 soldiers whose activities were in the main concerned with maintaining military presence, conducting liaison and monitoring operations, and offering military advice to local authorities. The last operation continued until March 31, 2003, when its operational component was transferred to the EU operation. EU’s Operation Concordia was similar in size to its predecessor, with its 357 troops coming from all EU states except Ireland and Denmark. Fourteen nonmembers also joined the mission.15 Several factors can be identified that explain why the EU’s first military mission took this specific form. One important factor was the Berlin Plus agreement mentioned earlier. The two organizations had been discussing the arrangements since the 1999 Cologne European Council,16 which suggests that they were searching for a testing ground to put the plan into action once the agreement would be reached. Though the negotiations dragged on until late 2002 due to objections

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and reservations on the part of several NATO members,17 there was consensus among European capitals that the Macedonian operation would be suitable for operationalizing the Berlin Plus arrangements. In fact, accounts suggest that NATO and the EU had been discussing the EU takeover of the NATO mission at the time of Amber Fox in late 2001, rather than NATO’s last mission, Allied Harmony.18 In other words, NATO-EU negotiations toward the Berlin Plus agreement took place concomitantly with those regarding the possible handover of operations in Macedonia. As Mace pointed out, “From an operational point of view, the EU would not have required NATO assets to launch an operation such as Allied Harmony. However, politics dictated that NATO assets and capabilities must be used, delaying a handover to the EU until the breakthrough on Berlin Plus was achieved in December 2002.”19 An important part of this politics revolved around diverging attitudes among EU members toward the Union’s military capability, with the Atlanticist states insisting that the Berlin Plus agreement should precede Concordia.20 Also, it was of course important that in Macedonia the successive NATO missions were largely drawn from European countries, because the main objective of the Berlin Plus arrangements was to enable the European part of the Alliance to operate autonomously (i.e., without the United States).21 Therefore, in operational as well as political terms, the NATO missions in Macedonia were ideal for the EU to take over. Operation Concordia depended on Berlin Plus as a framework for NATO-EU operational collaboration inasmuch as Berlin Plus required the concrete handover scenario in Macedonia. In terms of the decisionmaking process, these missions were grounded in decisions by multiple actors. NATO and the EU not only made decisions to set up their missions through their respective political organs but also devised the new interinstitutional cooperation framework for the transition (Berlin Plus). In addition, they were all based on the Framework Agreement as well as the explicit requests by the Macedonian government to deploy them. It is in this context of ample legitimizing sources that the Council’s two resolutions, Resolutions 1345 (March 21, 2001) and 1371 (September 26, 2001), can be assessed. Resolution 1345 broadly welcomed international efforts, including those of the KFOR, NATO, and the EU, in preventing the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area. And Resolution 1371, adopted at the start of NATO’s second operation, Amber Fox, further endorsed “the efforts of Member States and relevant international organizations to support the implementation of the Framework Agreement and strongly [support] in that regard the establishment of a multinational security presence” in Macedonia.22

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Why did the mission organizers need these resolutions, and what difference did they make for the missions? One way to measure the role of these resolutions is to trace the manner in which they were utilized by the mission organizers in their decisionmaking process. Since the three NATO missions and Concordia represent one continuous series of operational presences backed up by the Berlin Plus agreement, it would be useful to start with the last operation, EU’s Operation Concordia, in particular how UN authority was featured in the transfer from the preceding NATO missions. The EU-UN relationship was mentioned on two levels in this context. Within the EU, the Council’s decision to set up Concordia quoted Resolution 1371, arguing that this resolution welcomed “the Framework Agreement and supports its full implementation by the efforts of, inter alia, the EU.”23 This referred to a preambular paragraph of the resolution where the UN Security Council welcomed international efforts by the OSCE, EU, and NATO “to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area and to facilitate the full implementation of the Framework Agreement, thus contributing to peace and stability in the region.”24 At a broader, interinstitutional level, the Berlin Plus agreement was founded on respect for the UN in matters of international peace and security. This can be seen in the EU-NATO joint declaration of December 16, 2002, that laid out basic principles of EUNATO cooperation on which the Berlin Plus agreement would be based (Berlin Plus itself remains classified). The declaration cites six such principles, one of which reads as follows: Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions.25

The other five principles are partnership, effective mutual consultation, equality and due regard for decisionmaking autonomy, respect for member states’ interests, and coherent development of military capability.26 Respect for the UN was the only principle that mentioned an external authority. The principle said that the UN Charter underlies the founding treaties of the two organizations and provides an indispensable foundation for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. This was an argument that envisioned a multilayered security governance architecture

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with the UN at the center; equally important, this was also an argument that referred explicitly to the founding documents of the three organizations whose relationship is thereby articulated. This statement thus conveyed the idea that, from EU and NATO perspectives, their cooperation is at least in part founded on the overarching global authority of the UN (Charter). In this view, therefore, gaining a Security Council resolution for the proposed NATO-EU cooperation in Macedonia was deemed necessary by Europeans in order to achieve a sufficient level of political legitimacy for their operations and the transition.27 By nesting their operations within the global authority of the UN, they were able to legitimize their decisions to establish these missions. At this point it is important to note that the European states sought a global type of legitimacy, for their own purposes rather than for local political credibility in the region or in the eyes of a particular host government. After all, these operations were based on formal requests by Skopje, and as interventions by invitation there was no great need to bolster their local political standing per se. However, on the operational level, Security Council decisions did obtain some relevance for the missions. Specifically, the Council’s authority did matter in the context of potential use of force by the European peacekeepers. In order to understand this context clearly, one needs to go back further to the point where NATO established the first two missions in 2001. Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox were both tasked with the clear military roles of disarming local militias and protecting international monitors on the ground. Though the deployment of Essential Harvest was contingent on specific preconditions’ having been met, including a ceasefire and an agreed weapons collection plan that involved “an explicit agreement by the ethnic Albanian armed groups to disarm,”28 the situation was still fragile and potentially hostile to the mission. The ceasefire of July 5, 2001, saw many violations thereafter, and there were armed groups other than the NLA whose attitudes toward the peace process were not entirely clear.29 On July 19, three EU monitors were killed by a landmine in a rebel-controlled zone, and on August 27, when Essential Harvest started operations on the ground, a British soldier was attacked and killed.30 Setting up and maintaining an operation in this situation required a militarily credible posture. According to Mace, in fact, the NATO operations “interpreted their mandates robustly, mounting regular patrols in their heavy armoured vehicles to ensure maximum visibility and maximum impact,” and the follow-on EU mission benefited from the operational link with NATO in keeping this approach.31 Combined with this was the fact that NATO’s missions in Macedonia

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were connected, politically as well as operationally, to the much larger and more ambitious KFOR mission in Kosovo. Serving effectively as the province’s only security presence, the KFOR had been granted a Chapter VII authorization, in Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999), to use all necessary means to establish itself and carry out its broad stabilization mandate. It was in this underlying context of UN-NATO cooperation in the Kosovo conflict, in which the UN had provided an important legal ground for NATO’s military operation, that the latter’s new role in Macedonia was envisioned. Overall, therefore, ensuring the continuity of operational presence through various NATO and EU missions was important in maintaining their military credibility on the operational level; the Security Council’s authority played a subtle yet significant role in ensuring such continuity. It is important not to overstate this operational factor. For if conducting a robust operation in the fragile security environment had been the main consideration, there would have been a clearer Chapter VII authorization to use all necessary means like the one granted to the neighboring KFOR mission. Also important in this context is the fact that the most security-oriented of the four missions, Essential Harvest, did not enjoy clear Security Council endorsement—Resolution 1371 was adopted when this mission was terminating and transitioning into the much more modest and smaller mission of Amber Fox (Resolution 1345 endorsed NATO efforts only in broad terms). The chief importance of these resolutions, therefore, lies in strengthening the global legitimacy of the European missions in the context, especially, of their transitioning based on the Berlin Plus arrangements. On the other hand, one generic factor that did not feature prominently in this case was access to the UN’s financial and logistic support. The EU and NATO financed their missions themselves and sorted out logistical issues through Berlin Plus. There was no need to demand such assistance from the global organization, and accordingly the resolutions were not worded so as to obligate the UN to logistically and financially support the missions. So what were the overall effects of decisionmaking cooperation in this case? There are in the main two effects expected of Security Council resolutions: gaining global legitimacy for the proposed missions and their operational collaboration, and helping maintain their military credibility as a stabilization force. Security Council endorsement gave the missions a distinctly global basis of legitimacy. Since, as the resolutions’ language indicated, the endorsement took the form of endorsing the efforts of the EU and NATO, it had the effect of recognizing these organizations as peacekeeping actors and acknowledging their contribu-

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tion to regional and global security governance. The decisionmaking cooperation here was also predicated on, and reflected, a normative vision in which the regional organizations and their activities are nested within the global authority of the UN. The other expected effect was to bolster the image of military credibility in the context of NATO’s earlier engagements in the Balkans under UN authority. While, as argued above, this effect was not strongly evident in this particular case, this point highlighted a tendency for regional actors—European ones, at least—to seek Security Council authority in scenarios where peacekeepers might have to resort to military force at some level to restore law and order in a fragile operational environment or in response to hostile actions by some parties. Despite the several innovations with respect to NATO-EU operational collaboration, for our purposes the case of Macedonia does not tell us much about the effects of joint decisionmaking. This is partly because of the relatively weak (endorsement-based) nature of decisionmaking cooperation involved between the UN and its European counterparts, but also because these missions were not seriously tested once they started operation. Though marred by occasional outbreaks of violence that led to criticism of what was perceived as lack of response by European peacekeepers, the missions went smoothly overall. By working with other actors such as the OSCE, which was responsible for police training, they also contributed to confidence building and gradual improvements in the country’s security situation.32 On December 15, 2003, Operation Concordia was replaced by a police mission, Operation Proxima, which consisted of up to 200 police and other civilian personnel and continued for two years. To consider the effects and possible complications of joint decisionmaking in greater depth, therefore, it is necessary to look at other cases.

Afghanistan: 2001–2014 I continue my analysis with another NATO mission. As we saw in Chapter 3, there are only a few cases of regional or coalition peacekeeping that do not involve some form of operational collaboration with the UN. NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan was one such case: though it involved some collaboration with the EU’s police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan), there was no UN peacekeeping presence due to the light footprint approach adopted by the then special representative of the UN secretary-

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general for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi. There are numerous, mostly operation-related accounts, about this intervention, but for our purposes I focus on a rather narrow set of questions: What roles did Security Council decisionmaking play for the NATO mission, and what did this decisionmaking cooperation mean for the two organizations? Unlike the missions in Macedonia, as we saw, NATO sought periodic authorization from the Security Council for this mission until the end; a total of 14 resolutions, initially semiannually, then annually, were expended to establish, modify, and renew the ISAF mandate as a result. Each of the resolutions determined the situation in Afghanistan a threat to international peace and security, authorized action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and then authorized ISAF to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.” The ISAF mission initially started as a coalition operation whose command rotated among Britain, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands before it was taken over by NATO in August 2003. In terms of the Council’s decisions, however, ISAF remained the same mission until its transition to a small advisory mission in January 2015 (Operation Resolute Support). Insofar as NATO inherited its legal and political framework largely from its coalition predecessor, one needs to start by looking at how the latter mission started. ISAF was originally created following the US-led military operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government. After the collapse of the Taliban regime, which the United States accused of sponsoring the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks, an agreement for the formation of a provisional government was reached in Bonn on December 5, 2001. The Bonn Agreement provided for a basic structure of transitional governance and a roadmap for the transition. The creation of ISAF was requested in Annex I of the agreement: 1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves. To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all within their means and influence to ensure such security, including for all United Nations and other personnel of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan. 2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.

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3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centers and other areas. 4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s infrastructure.33 Referring to this international agreement, Afghanistan’s interim government requested on December 19 the deployment of an international security force “under Chapters VI or VII of the Charter” whose details should be agreed upon by the Afghan authorities. 34 On the same day, Britain officially offered to become the lead nation of the new force for the first three months. Importantly, Britain envisaged ISAF as having “a particular mission authorized by a Security Council resolution that is distinct from Operation Enduring Freedom,” the US-led counterterrorist military operation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.35 Resolution 1386, adopted the following day on December 20, then authorized the creation of ISAF and the use of “all necessary measures” by the force to fulfill its mandate. In recent Security Council parlance this specific terminology predominated in place of the more conventional “all necessary means” to authorize the use of force;36 combined with the recognition that this shall be a Chapter VII action, it was clear that ISAF was granted a robust use of force authorization to achieve its mandate of maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Finally, the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) setting out the status and obligations of the force was agreed on January 4, 2002, between ISAF and the Afghan government. Like the Macedonian case, therefore, ISAF was firmly built on agreements at the differing levels of conflict parties (Bonn Agreement), the host government (host government request and the MTA), and the UN (Resolution 1386). What differed between this force and the Macedonian operations was a clearer focus on UN centrality; the initiating provisions in the Bonn Agreement made it clear that this force shall be a UN mandated force, which should be authorized by the Security

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Council. Whereas NATO’s Macedonian operations were somewhat vaguely endorsed by the Council in such a way as to signify their connection to the KFOR, ISAF followed the example of the Kosovo operation in seeking a robust mandate under Chapter VII authority. At this point, it is interesting to note that choosing this configuration was not necessarily the only course potentially available to mission planners. On the one hand, it was possible, as Kabul indicated in its letter to the UN, to construct a weaker force under Chapter VI. This would perhaps involve deployment of a small mission whose main tasks would be limited to the monitoring of the Bonn Agreement as well as the provision of training and advice to local security forces. But this would clearly fall short of the rationale spelled out in the agreement, which acknowledged the limited capabilities of the Afghan government in the transition period and thus required the international force to assist the maintenance of security in Kabul and potentially other areas. On the other hand, since ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom were more or less drawn from the same group of nations, it was not inconceivable to build the ISAF force as part of an expanded coalition operation. As Britain’s acceptance letter suggested, however, a conscious decision was made to keep ISAF distinct from Enduring Freedom. Indeed, the latter operation was founded on a separate source of legitimacy: the norm of selfdefense. With regard to Security Council resolutions, Operation Enduring Freedom was not a UN-mandated force; instead, it was an international force whose activities were acknowledged in Resolution 1368 (September 12, 2001), which referenced “the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”37 In order to make ISAF a consensual (nonpunitive) stabilization force, it was necessary to give it a new Security Council authorization in connection with the other international and national agreements. In that sense, Resolution 1386 was indispensable in completing this process. Moreover, unlike the case of the KFOR, which was given the Security Council’s authorization only once with no time frame for future renewals (Resolution 1244, June 10, 1999), ISAF went through periodic renewals by the Council until the end of the operation. In this aspect, NATO went back to the Bosnian precedents (IFOR and SFOR); in doing so it also followed the norm of UN, EU, and (with growing regularity) AU peacekeeping. Following the decision on October 1, 2003, to expand the ISAF mandate outside the Kabul area as part of a new long-term Afghanistan strategy, NATO demanded that this new mandate be reflected onto “a specific Security Council resolution,” and this request was duly met in Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003).38 Through regular communications

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and periodic mandate renewals, NATO and the UN continued to maintain the status of the UN-mandated stabilization force that would be distinct from the counterterrorist operation active in the same country. For NATO, therefore, ISAF turned out to be the most sustained case of decisionmaking cooperation with the UN where the force was legitimized using the increasingly typical template of a UN-authorized robust peacekeeping mission. Following this template was important in making the force legitimate in the eyes of the international community and the host government; in differentiating ISAF from Operation Enduring Freedom; and, of course, in gaining proper authorization to use force for the implementation of the mandated tasks. Beyond these operational and political needs, the joint decisionmaking in the ISAF case can be seen as promoting broader NATO-UN cooperation in peacekeeping. One such effect is the development of UN-authorized peacekeeping in the Alliance’s portfolio of activities. Having started as air operations in support of UN peacekeepers on the ground in the Balkans, NATO engaged in stabilization operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In conducting these activities NATO demanded closer cooperation with the UN, as a result of which NATO’s peacekeeping has routinely involved a pattern of Security Council authorization that is similar to the one found in the other UN-authorized regional missions. While this implies UN recognition of NATO as a peacekeeping actor, NATO’s adherence to the accepted pattern of seeking UN authorization for regional peacekeeping missions also underlines the UN’s decisionmaking powers in legitimizing non-UN missions, thereby reinforcing the centrality of the global organization in peacekeeping cooperation. This awareness of converging interests and cooperation potentials was behind the Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation, signed by the secretaries-general of the two organizations on September 23, 2008. The declaration reaffirmed their commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security; made clear that NATOUN cooperation should be guided by the UN Charter, humanitarian principles, and consultation with national authorities; and underscored “the importance of establishing a framework for consultation and cooperation, including, as appropriate, through regular exchanges and dialogue at senior and working levels on political and operational issues.” These issues could include communication and information sharing; capacity building, training, and exercises; lessons learned, planning, and support for contingencies; and operational coordination and support. The main inspiration for this declaration was NATO’s peacekeeping work in support of the UN over the previous decade. Notably, the

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secretaries-general argued that the UN and NATO have “developed operational cooperation, for example, in peacekeeping in the Balkans and Afghanistan, where UN-authorized NATO-led operations work alongside UN peace operations.”39 This formulation reflects the UN and NATO perception of NATO operations as peacekeeping, and equally importantly, the recognition of UN-authorized NATO-led operations in support of UN missions (peacekeeping or smaller missions) as an emerging pattern of NATO practice. The joint decisionmaking on Afghanistan, combined with the previous operational collaborations in the Balkans, thus generated momentum for the clarification of principles for cooperation and efforts at better information sharing and consultation on all levels. These regulative and constitutive effects, however, were limited by several complications. One such limitation was the changing nature of ISAF. Since 2003 NATO expanded ISAF on several stages—to the north (2004), the west (2005), and the south and east (2006). The expansion especially to the volatile southern theater demanded a significant addition of combat troops who would be replacing the US-commanded Operation Enduring Freedom. “By dispatching combat troops and expanding its command to the embattled southern region,” Suhrke argued, “NATO had taken on the additional task of defeating the Taliban.”40 This reorientation was further reinforced by President Obama’s surge policy between 2009 and 2012, during which the number of US troops operating under ISAF peaked at 90,000.41 From what we have seen, it is obvious that these changes go against the careful carving out of the ISAF mandate and legitimacy basis as something distinct from the coalition operation. The gradual transformation of ISAF into an uneasy mix of stabilization and counterterrorist combat operations thus severely curtailed the potential positive effects generated through UN-NATO cooperation on the decisionmaking level. Added to this was a more fundamental problem concerning NATO. According to Harsch and Varwick, NATO was “still seen by many UN members and parts of the UN bureaucracy as a Cold War military machine and U.S. ‘tool box.’”42 Major contributors to UN peacekeeping from the global South voiced concerns that a reliance on NATO capabilities could undermine UN operational independence and decisionmaking autonomy. As a result, while NATO members who were also influential members of the UN Security Council continued to press for the adoption of the aforementioned joint declaration since they had first proposed the text during the 2005 UN Summit, the UN leadership demurred for three years until September 2008 before the declaration

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text was finally signed by Ban Ki-moon and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.43 Moreover, this declaration differed from the other UN-regional cooperation documents concluded at the time by expressly limiting the scope to the secretariat level and by not being officially published as part of UN documentation. Nevertheless, news of the joint declaration caused diplomatic uproar, especially from Russia. Perhaps unsurprisingly given all this, the joint declaration has resulted in meager results, with the appointment of a civilian liaison officer to the UN headquarters in addition to the military counterpart (already in place since 1999) being the only tangible achievement so far.44 The existence of these deep-seated suspicions in turn suggests a difficult transition that NATO will have to go through before it is considered a peacekeeping actor. After all, NATO has a long history since the Cold War of operating as a military alliance. The Alliance (as it is still called) declared its status vis-à-vis the UN under Article 51 (individual and collective defense); unlike many other regional organizations that have declared their relations with the UN under Chapter VIII (i.e., as regional organizations), NATO has maintained this status as a collective defense organization. Indeed, this aspect of NATO came back to the surface soon after the termination of ISAF in the context of the crisis in Ukraine. On February 5, 2015, NATO members agreed to create within the NRF a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) of 5,000 troops with appropriate maritime, air, and special operations units that will be deployable with a very short notice to deter aggression against NATO allies.45 This was followed by the NAC decision in July 2016 to establish an “enhanced forward presence” (around 4,000 troops) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.46 These developments show how NATO remains torn between its original purpose of military alliance and the new ambition of contribution to conflict management and regional and global security governance. Unlike the AU and the EU, both of which were more or less able to start from a blank slate as security actors, NATO must navigate its future course as a peacekeeping actor amid unique political and operational dilemmas that are deeply rooted in the history of the Alliance itself. As we saw in Chapter 3, however, the Alliance’s strategic assessment of the post–Cold War security environment means that NATO will continue to develop its crisis management and response capabilities despite the difficulties in doing so. Moreover, one can see additional evidence of this trajectory in the fact that, apart from its own commanded operations, NATO has played an important part in supporting

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African peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia.47 In this context, the ISAF case represents an important milestone for the evolution of NATO as a peacekeeping actor as well as the development of NATOUN cooperation in this field.

Democratic Republic of Congo: 2013– The Security Council decision in March 2013 to establish a brigade-size force within the UN’s MONUSCO mission may not seem an obvious case of joint decisionmaking, as the Force Intervention Brigade was officially part of the MONUSCO mission from the start; as such, it is not included in Table 5.1. But a closer look reveals that it is an interesting case of joint decisionmaking in covert form, leading to the inclusion of what was originally conceived as an African force into the UN mission. The MONUSCO FIB is therefore similar to the UNAMID case we saw in Chapter 4, but is different from the latter in one important aspect: whereas UNAMID was a hybrid force that allowed the retention of African command and control jointly with the UN, FIB troops were officially placed under the command of the MONUSCO force commander and did not report to the AU, the SADC, or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). What explains the different regional responses to the prospects of cooperation with the UN? Why did the originally regional initiative to deal with the threat of irregular armed groups in the eastern DRC come to be adopted by the UN? And what positive effects and complications did the joint decisionmaking by the UN and its African partners produce? The FIB case represents a complex process of interinstitutional coordination that led to a tangible result—the brigade would not have been possible without the backing of the Security Council through its resolutions—but not without potentially serious complications with regard to the ideas and norms on which peacekeeping should be conducted. As a concept, the FIB followed several earlier military interventions that operated alongside the UN peacekeepers in eastern DRC (see Chapter 4). The main threat, the M23, was the latest incarnation of Tutsi Congolese interests supported by neighboring countries. M23 members were largely drawn from former members of the CNDP.48 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this militarized political group had reached agreement on a peace deal with the government on March 23, 2009, and its members were subsequently integrated into the DRC

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armed forces, but they defected three years later, complaining about the lack of implementation of the peace agreements. Based in the border areas with Uganda and Rwanda (Rutshuru and Masisi), and reportedly gaining military support from Rwanda, they advanced southward fast toward the main North Kivu city of Goma, which they captured on November 20, 2012. Pressure from the Security Council and regional stakeholders resulted in a peace agreement (based on revisions of the 2009 agreement) on February 6, 2013, but this was followed by the breakup of the M23 and a rapid destabilization of the region due to clashes among its factions and with other armed groups such as the FDLR. Proposed and established in response to the rapid deterioration of the security conditions in the same region, the FIB was similar to earlier short interventions by Europeans, but it was Africans who took the lead (there was no serious proposal for a new EU military mission). At the special summit of the ICGLR on July 15, 2012, the region’s heads of state condemned the activities of the M23 and the FDLR, and decided to “direct the appropriate structures of the ICGLR to work with the AU and the UN for an immediate establishment of a neutral International Force to eradicate M23, FDLR and all other Negative Forces in Eastern DRC and patrol and secure the Border Zones.”49 In a follow-up meeting held early the next month, they decided to set up a subcommittee of the region’s defense ministers (Angola, Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda [chairman], and Tanzania) to agree on the details of the proposed force.50 Summit meetings were held several times in the remaining months of the year, but they produced little result.51 At this stage, negotiations for the African force moved from the ICGLR to the SADC. At the special summit on December 8, SADC heads of state (i)

reaffirmed the indivisibility and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo; (ii) expressed deep concern regarding the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in eastern DRC due to the prevailing situation; (iii) strongly condemned the M23 and all its attacks on the civilian population, United Nations Peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, as well as its abuses of human rights, including summary executions, sexual and gender based violence; (iv) decided to deploy the SADC Standby Force as a block in the Eastern DRC under the auspices of the Neutral International Force (NIF)

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(v)

welcomed the decision of the ICGLR to mandate the United Republic of Tanzania to appoint a Force Commander for the NIF to be deployed in the Eastern DRC; (vi) mandated the SADC Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the SADC Secretariat to work together with the ICGLR to engage the African Union Peace [and Security Council] and the United Nations Security Council for support to the deployment and sustenance; (vii) urged the UN to change the MONUSCO mandate to the United Nations Chapter VII; (viii) commended the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of South Africa for pledging one battalion and logistics support for the NIF respectively; and (ix)

commended the DRC for contributing funds for the deployment of the NIF.52

By the end of 2012, therefore, Tanzania and South Africa were already on board as main troop contributors. These two countries (South Africa was not an ICGLR member) now took the initiative through the SADC while Uganda and Rwanda, both suspected of connection with the M23, were quietly relegated to the sidelines. Another point of note from this communiqué was the demand to the UN to change MONUSCO into a Chapter VII mission. What this means becomes clearer (in practice, the communiqué’s demand was redundant because MONUSCO had been established under Chapter VII from the start)53 in the words of Tanzania’s spokesman, who said after the summit that “SADC member states want the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission . . . to be changed from the traditional peacekeeping role to peace enforcement activities to enable it to engage M23 rebels militarily if the need arises.”54 While this demand to turn MONUSCO into a peace enforcement mission was not made (at this point at least) in anticipation of merging the proposed NIF into MONUSCO, it reflected the sense of African frustration with MONUSCO and the modus operandi of UN peacekeeping in general. It also indicated the awareness that an NIF would have to operate in peace enforcement mode if it was to make a real impact on the ground. Despite the progress in force generation, however, it was clear that the SADC would not be capable of mounting such an operation on its own. Apart from allowing a South Africa–led multinational force under its name in Lesotho (Operation Boleas, 1998–1999),55 the organization did not have experience, human resources, management structure, or budget to run a peacekeeping operation at all.56 By late 2012, the UN

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and the AU both endorsed the subregional initiative while still assuming the NIF and MONUSCO would operate cooperatively but separately. For instance, the AU PSC’s communiqué in late November 2012 fully supported the NIF proposal and in that context requested “all the stakeholders concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the planned neutral regional arrangements so as to facilitate the implementation of their mandates.”57 But in early 2013, this assumption began to be challenged on the subregional level. After a ministerial-level meeting of the ICGLR on January 8, 2013, AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra said that the general direction of the discussion was toward “a creative formula” that would “amalgamate” MONUSCO with the proposed force.58 The new regional strategy for the stabilization of the DRC, signed by all the regional and international stakeholders in late February, served in this context to produce a game-changing effect. The Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (February 24, 2013)59 did not elaborate on that formula, but declared commitment to “a strategic review” of MONUSCO “that aims to strengthen support to the Government to enable it to address security challenges and extend State authority.”60 In interinstitutional negotiations, this pronounced commitment, whose guarantors included the UN, was seen as UN acknowledgment of the African demand;61 indeed, it was only three days after the framework’s signature that Secretary-General Ban proposed the establishment of an intervention brigade within MONUSCO in support of the objectives of the framework.62 Resolution 2098 authorizing the FIB as a new brigade under MONUSCO was adopted by the Council a month later, on March 28, 2013. The speed with which the NIF idea was brought onto the UN Security Council agenda was all the more remarkable for its origin as an African initiative. As we saw, African states and organizations have been promoting the principle of African ownership of and African solutions to problems on the continent. Moreover, as the shift from the ICGLR to the SADC indicated, the potentially explosive relations among regional powers around the NIF proposal (e.g., South Africa and Rwanda) appeared to be deftly managed by these countries themselves. There was no need to press Kinshasa to accept the force through the UN as the DRC was one of its original endorsers. Therefore, it was not because of constraints on the political level that the NIF was not realized as planned. This leaves the lack of resources that I indicated earlier with regard to the ICGLR and the SADC as the

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most likely explanation. The question therefore is why the AU was not able to take ownership of the NIF by turning it into an AU force. Since 2003, the AU had to cope with a growing demand for peacekeeping deployments on the continent; and the deployment took place at a time when the AU was struggling to develop its own peacekeeping capacity (see Chapter 6). Moreover, unlike the UN, the AU does not have a separate budget for its peacekeeping and instead relies mostly on the AU Peace Fund, which consists of voluntary contributions from foreign governments, civil society, the private sector, and individuals as well as appropriations from the AU regular budget. 63 This left the AU on shaky financial ground. With the AU thus constrained in leading a new peacekeeping mission and the situation requiring a swift response, the only option to realize the NIF was to bring it under the UN mission as it alone had a realistic chance of mobilizing financial, logistical, and managerial support through the UN system. For the UN as well, incorporating the NIF into MONUSCO had certain advantages. As a regional initiative with the support of the host government, there was no question about its legitimacy; the availability of a brigade-size force with offensive capability and mandate could empower the UN to regain the initiative on the ground vis-à-vis the M23 and other armed rebels; and the merger would avoid the situation of potentially embarrassing co-deployment where a smaller regional contingent would rescue a larger UN mission. These considerations led UN leadership and the Security Council to accept the African demand.64 But it should also be noted that the adoption of Resolution 2098 was made possible only through certain compromises. For the African actors, the FIB meant giving up the brigade’s command and control to the UN. For the UN, incorporating the NIF/FIB as part of MONUSCO required a pragmatic compromise in the long-standing distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping, as the FIB’s explicit mandate of “neutralizing armed groups” in the eastern DRC through “targeted offensive operations”65 clearly overstepped the traditional scope of peacekeeping. From our perspective, this case of joint decisionmaking suggests a picture of complex expectations and calculations on the part of the peacekeeping actors involved. On one hand, the case suggests the presence of a degree of shared expectations for each other’s role in peacekeeping cooperation, in particular with regard to the question of peacekeeping resources. As in the case of Darfur, the UN is here expected to complement African peacekeepers with financial and logistical resources

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that the UN could better generate, and Resolution 2098 provided a political framework in which such division of labor could take place. Another, related point that emerged from the process leading to the resolution concerns the principle of African ownership. The UN and the African actors seem to agree that the region’s endorsement of and initiative in such intervention mattered greatly and needed to be respected by the UN counterpart. Indeed, the African side took the initiative throughout the interinstitutional negotiations while the UN remained on the receiving end of changing African plans. Moreover, though the African states and organizations did lose formal command and control of the FIB to the UN, the African troop contributors did not lose influence over the operational objectives of the brigade. The fact that they did have great sway over its military planning can be seen from the lack of active military actions after the capitulation of the M23, especially against its rival FDLR. Despite repeated calls by the UN and much to the consternation of Rwanda, the DRC government as well as the FIB troop contributors (especially South Africa) were reluctant to take similar offensive operations against the Congolese Hutu militia in favor of a slow-moving disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program.66 The shared principle of African solutions to African conflicts thus provided African peacekeeping actors with a degree of diffuse influence, empowering these actors to demand necessary resources from the external donors while keeping substantive political direction over their forces. On the other hand, it is also clear that the UN and the African actors had different ideas about the use of force in a peacekeeping context. For whereas the UN maintained that the three constitutive principles of party consent, impartiality, and minimum necessary use of force differentiate peacekeeping from peace enforcement, it became increasingly clear that the Africans simply do not share such conceptual distinction. The rationale behind the NIF/FIB was to militarily engage with and eradicate the armed groups in the region; in UN parlance, the brigade was clearly a peace enforcement mission. The brigade’s mandate was of course defined by the immediate operational needs in the area at the time, but one can argue that the brigade also reflected African ideas about the role of their peacekeeping missions. For instance, in a 2012 report on AU-UN cooperation in peace and security, the AU argued, Given UN peacekeeping doctrine that it deploys when there is a peace to keep, in a situation like Somalia, it is unlikely that the UN would be able to deploy a peace mission in the immediate [future], even though significant advances have been made on the ground. The AU’s peace-

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keeping posture in Burundi, Darfur and now Somalia points to the emergence of a different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.67

Thus the AU’s vision of peacekeeping encompasses both keeping and creating the conditions for peace, through military means, if necessary. Given this posture that goes well beyond the UN’s concept of robust peacekeeping, as well as the predominance of African conflicts for peacekeeping engagement in recent periods (and perhaps in the foreseeable future), the FIB’s merger into MONUSCO at the insistence of the Africans can be seen as a long process of change in the nature of UN peacekeeping under African influence. This potential was of course resisted by many UN member states that have voiced concerns, and Resolution 2098 was in fact explicit in ruling out the precedent-setting implications of the FIB. Such caveats and reservations, however, did not prevent the adoption of the resolution; instead, they show the existence of contested areas within the overall shared need for cooperation. Unlike operational collaboration and capacity building, joint decisionmaking takes place on the political and strategic level. As such, the way cooperation is conducted on this level indicates how actors envisage peacekeeping cooperation and the extent to which they agree or disagree on the norms of cooperation. Security Council resolutions provide incentives for both the UN as well as regional and coalition groups to negotiate such terms of cooperation. In the case of the FIB, since the negotiation was aimed at producing a deeper operational collaboration—deep to the extent that the brigade officially becomes part of a mission by a different peacekeeping actor (UN)—it put into relief the areas of agreement and disagreement among the major mission organizers.

Effects on Global Security Governance In this chapter I studied three cases to analyze the motivations and effects of peacekeeping cooperation at the decisionmaking level. These cases present various effects, some of which overlap with those identified in Chapter 4, and yet some others involve unique complications to the nature of decisionmaking. Analysis suggests that joint decisionmaking does produce several positive effects conducive to peacekeeping cooperation. First, decisionmaking cooperation gives non-UN missions increased legitimacy. In Chapter 4 we learned that additional source of

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international legitimacy in turn helps constitute the regional actors as peacekeeping actors. Improved international legitimacy may also strengthen a mission’s relations with the host government, especially when operations take place within their own regions, while it was noted that the international dimension of a mission’s legitimacy does not necessarily translate into better acceptance of the mission within the local society. Analysis here does not suggest any fundamental solution to this last point—after all, joint decisionmaking takes place only at the global level—and yet it does suggest why and how the UN’s power to confer international legitimacy matters for regional missions, in two specific ways. One is related to the use of force in the peacekeeping context. Contemporary peacekeeping remains a consent-based technique of conflict management that nevertheless requires occasional use of force to maintain necessary security conditions. The power to authorize the use of all necessary measures is a unique asset of the Security Council that empowers and legitimizes regional peacekeepers, as a result of which major regional peacekeeping actors now routinely seek such authorization. And, as we saw in the cases of Macedonia and Afghanistan, having the Council’s backing on this front helps maintain the military credibility of the mission. Another aspect of the utility of international legitimacy is the power to endorse and encourage interinstitutional cooperation in peacekeeping. This was apparent in Macedonia, where the activation of the Berlin Plus agreement demanded proper reference to Security Council authority. A second positive effect conducive to peacekeeping emanates from increased legitimacy: reinforcement of a clearer normative framework with the UN at the center of peacekeeping cooperation. Since cases in this chapter deal with cooperation on the strategic level, we see this point more clearly. There seem to be certain shared expectations about the relationship between the UN and regional peacekeepers. The EU, NATO, and the AU all anchor their operations in the Security Council for international legitimacy, military credibility, and (in the AU case) relevant international assistance, while the UN expects the regional organizations to command their missions in coordination with the UN. A third positive effect of decisionmaking cooperation is the fostering of the peacekeeper role and identity in regional actors. The cases in this chapter all show that contemporary peacekeeping is increasingly nested in a troika of agreements—a peace agreement, Security Council resolution, and host government consent or request. As a result, non-UN peacekeeping is now typically molded on the model of a UN-authorized operation whose mandate is regularly renewed by the Security Council. It would

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seem that regional peacekeeping, in order to qualify as peacekeeping, is expected to conform to this set of premises. Inasmuch as this trend reinforces the principle of UN primacy in global security governance, it is equally important to notice that it encourages the creation within the regional actors of such a category of international activity. As far as joint decisionmaking is concerned, therefore, peacekeeping, despite its expansion beyond the UN, remains closely wedded to the idea of the UN as the central actor in the maintenance of international peace and security. All these effects, however, are not without constraints and potential complications. One constraint comes from the character of an actor’s preexistent identity. Here, NATO differs from the AU and the EU. The latter two are new actors in international security and enter the security governance field without heavy political baggage. NATO is in a similar process of developing broader security governance functions that deviate from its original collective defense role under Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter, but this transition is a difficult one due to the members’ differing interests and priorities, as well as the perception from outside the organization that NATO is predominantly a military alliance. This raises a broader point about institutional change. Indeed, this factor of preexistent identity might help explain why some other established regional frameworks, such as ASEAN and the OAS, have not been able to embrace peacekeeping. ASEAN has been gradually taking a regional security role through the creation of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting in 2006 and there have been talks of ASEAN peacekeeping in policy circles in the region.68 The OAS has engaged in small civilian missions in Haiti since the 1990s. But progress so far has been very limited, leaving peacekeeping demands in those regions mostly to the UN and multinational forces. At least part of the reason for this lies in the fact that the norm of noninterference has been seen by the members as fundamental to managing their relations. Though this attitude has been changing in favor of taking more active initiatives in security governance, the change comes only slowly and, as the NATO case demonstrates, has to be accompanied by a corresponding perception change from outside the organization. A second complication relates to the potentially differing scopes and purposes of the use of force in peacekeeping. The use of force authorization is a unique normative asset of the Security Council, and constitutes an important part of the primacy of the UN in peacekeeping cooperation at the decisionmaking level. But as such authorization is extended to operations commanded by non-UN organizations with the implied effect of legitimizing the use of force, the UN framework concerning the use of force in the peacekeeping context may be diluted and

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eclipsed by different ideas about permissive levels of force for peacekeeping purposes. This is most evident in the AU. As we saw in the 2012 AU report and the activities of the MONUSCO FIB, African peacekeeping nations and organizations see military peacekeepers in more intrusive and peace-creating roles than the UN doctrine would permit. Though not as obvious as in the AU, a similar observation might be made of NATO, whose ISAF operation ended up shouldering counterterrorist tasks in Afghanistan. This eventuality was of course due to the operational needs at the time, but it is also possible to argue that, on the doctrinal level, NATO’s comprehensive approach does not draw as neat a boundary between peacekeeping and peace enforcement as the UN does. Thus, despite regional actors’ aforementioned adoption of the UN peacekeeping model, the Security Council’s unique decisionmaking power with regard to the use of force does not necessarily mean preeminent UN control of the idea of the use of force by peacekeepers. Finally, the issue of dependency on the UN is worth revisiting here. The cases of operational collaboration in Chapter 4 showed the dependency of AU and EU operations on UN peacekeeping, although the forms of such dependency varied between the two organizations. The cases in this chapter indicate a slightly different picture. On one hand, the case of the FIB presents a rather extreme example of African nations’ current dependency on UN peacekeeping capacity. The FIB idea was initially proposed and developed at African forums, and when it was realized that the proposal would not have any realistic chance of implementation, it was brought to the UN for a creative formula. Negotiations at the decisionmaking level presented an opportunity for the AU and African states. On the other hand, UN endorsement of EU-NATO operational collaboration in Macedonia suggests the possibility that encouraging such cooperation among non-UN peacekeeping actors might be a useful solution to ameliorate regional peacekeeping dependency on the UN over the long term. Of course, such option is currently a distant prospect in many situations because it requires the partnering organizations to possess the capabilities to run the missions autonomously; the EU and NATO are the exceptions rather than the norm in this regard. But if new peacekeeping actors, especially in Africa, can develop credible peacekeeping capacity, it will greatly help address current capability shortfalls and thereby remove the barriers to more active and diversified operational collaboration. In this context, it is notable that the international community has been actively investing in peacekeeping capacity building with a focus on African states and organizations in recent periods. The next chapter looks at this aspect of peacekeeping cooperation.

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Notes 1. SCR 1132, October 8, 1997, para. 8. Several subsequent resolutions commended ECOMOG and noted its expected roles, but they also did not include wordings that would directly authorize the mission. 2. Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2002/28, October 18, 2002. 3. Statements by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2002/40, December 18, 2002; 2003/4, May 2, 2003; and 2003/30, December 22, 2003. A similar pattern can be found in MICOPAX. See SCR 2031, December 21, 2011; SCR 2088, January 24, 2013; Statements by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2010/26, December 14, 2010; and 2010/29, December 20, 2010. 4. See SCR 2121, October 10, 2013, preambular para. 18 and SCR 2127, December 5, 2013, para. 28 5. Thierry Tardy, “UN-EU Relations in Military Crisis Management: Institutionalisation and Key Constraints,” Studia Diplomatica 62, no. 3 (2009): 44. 6. SCR 788, November 19, 1992, paras. 1, 9. 7. See in particular SCR 866, September 22, 1993. 8. SCR 1497, August 1, 2003. 9. SCR 866, para. 6. 10. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Liberia, UN doc. S/26422, September 9, 1993, para. 24. 11. See SCRs 1162 (April 17, 1998), 1216 (December 21, 1998), and 1233 (April 6, 1999). 12. See, e.g., SCRs 1479 (May 13, 2003, para. 16) for ECOMICI; 1744 (February 21, 2007, para. 8) for AMISOM; and 1556 (July 30, 2004, para. 3) for AMIS. 13. See, e.g., SCR 1497, para. 3. 14. Ohrid Framework Agreement, August 13, 2001, para. 2.1. 15. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 231. 16. Catriona Mace, “Operation Concordia: Developing a ‘European’ Approach to Crisis Management?,” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 480–481. 17. Cascone, “ESDP Operations and NATO,” 145. 18. Ibid., 147. 19. Mace, “Operation Concordia,” 481. 20. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 232. 21. Mace, “Operation Concordia,” 480. 22. SCR 1371, September 26, 2001, para. 5. 23. Council of the EU, Joint Action, EU doc. 2003/92/CFSP, January 27, 2003, preambular para. 4. 24. SCR 1371, preambular para. 4. The resolution also welcomed the EU’s contribution in a main paragraph (para. 4), but this was mostly in reference to the activities of EU observers. 25. NATO, EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, Press Release (2002) 142, December 16, 2002. 26. Ibid.

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27. This point is further supported by the timing of the start of NATO-EU transfer negotiations. As pointed out earlier, talk of the transfer started at the time of Amber Fox, for which, unlike Essential Harvest, an endorsing resolution was specifically adopted by the Security Council. This suggests that Resolution 1371 can be seen as an endorsement not just for Amber Fox but also for the ongoing negotiations between the two organizations during this period. 28. Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, August 22, 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010822a.htm (accessed November 28, 2016). 29. Press Conference by NATO Spokesman, Yves Brodeur, Skopje, August 13, 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010813a.htm (accessed November 28, 2016). 30. “Reported Deaths of EU Monitors Shakes Macedonian Peace Process,” Agence France-Presse, July 20, 2001; “British Soldier Killed in Macedonia,” BBC News, August 27, 2001. 31. Mace, “Operation Concordia,” 481. 32. Dobbins et al., Europe’s Role in Nation-Building, chap. 4. 33. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, December 5, 2001, Annex I (emphasis added). 34. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2001/1223, December 19, 2001, Annex. 35. UN Security Council, Letter Dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2001/1217, December 19, 2001, Annex. 36. Niels Blocker, “Outsourcing the Use of Force: Towards More Security Council Control of Authorized Operations?,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, ed. Marc Weller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 213. 37. SCR 1368, September 12, 2001, preambular para. 3. 38. UN Security Council, Longer-Term Strategy for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Its International Security Assistance Force Role in Afghanistan, UN doc. S/2003/970, October 8, 2003, Annex I, Encl. 39. Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation, New York, September 23, 2008. 40. Astri Suhrke, “A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 2 (April 2008): 228. 41. Data for ISAF troops are drawn from “NATO and Afghanistan: ISAF Placemats Archive,” www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm (accessed November 28, 2016). By comparison, as of February 13, 2009, there had been 24,900 US troops for ISAF. 42. Michael F. Harsch and Johannes Varwick, “NATO and the UN,” Survival 51, no. 2 (April–May 2009): 5. 43. Ibid., 8–9; Harsch, Power of Dependence, 134, 166. 44. “Five Years of Strengthened Cooperation with the United Nations,” updated October 9, 2013, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_103374.htm?selectedLocale =en (accessed November 28, 2016).

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45. Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan, Press Release (2015) 027, February 5, 2015; “NATO Due to More Than Double ‘Rapid Response’ Force in Reaction to Ukraine,” Deutsche Welle, February 5, 2015. 46. Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Press Release (2016) 100, July 9, 2016, para. 40; “NATO Agrees to Reinforce Eastern Poland, Baltic States Against Russia,” Reuters, July 8, 2016. 47. For a summary of the activities, see “Assistance to the African Union,” www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8191.htm (accessed November 28, 2016). 48. The CNDP, established in 2006, was in turn originally drawn from members of a splinter group of the RCD-Goma whose military wing had been integrated into the FARDC after the 2002/2003 peace agreements. See, in particular, Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 4. 49. ICGLR, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the Security Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Addis Ababa, July 15, 2012, para. 4. 50. ICGLR, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the Security Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kampala, August 7–8, 2012, para. 3. 51. See, e.g., ICGLR, “4th ICGLR Extraordinary Summit on DRC to Take Place in Kampala,” www.icglr.org/index.php/en/component/content/article/138 -meganews/191-4th-icglr-extraordinary-summit-on-drc-to-take-place-in-kampala (accessed November 28, 2016). 52. SADC, Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government: Communiqué, Dar es Salaam, December 8, 2012, para. 7. 53. See SCR 1925, May 28, 2010. 54. “Southern Africa Pledges 4,000-Strong Force for Eastern Congo,” Reuters, December 8, 2012. 55. There is debate whether this operation was granted proper authorization by the SADC. See, e.g., David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), chap. 7. 56. The NIF was estimated to require $100 million to set up. “Southern Africa Pledges 4,000-Strong Force for Eastern Congo.” 57. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, 343rd meeting, AU doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXLIII), November 26, 2012, para. 7. See also SCR 2076, November 20, 2012, paras. 9, 15. 58. “DRC Neutral Force May Be Merged with UN Mission,” Agence France-Presse, January 8, 2013. 59. The framework was originally scheduled to be signed at the AU summit on January 28 but was delayed for what Secretary-General Ban called “procedural issues.” “UN Urges Long-Term Commitment to Today’s Peace Deal on DR Congo,” UN News Centre, February 24, 2013. 60. Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, Addis Ababa, February 24, 2013, para. 5.

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61. “Force Intervention Brigade: A Sea Change for UN Peace Operations?” Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2014:1 (March 2014): 2. 62. UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, UN doc. S/2013/119, February 27, 2013, para. 60. 63. See, e.g., Cillers and Pottgieter, “The African Standby Force,” 129–130; AU Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, African Union Handbook 2014 (Addis Ababa and Wellington), 165. In the AU regular budget five major members (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa) account for more than 60 percent of the total amount. African Union Handbook, 163–164. 64. Patrick Cammaert with Fiona Blyth, “The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” International Peace Institute, New York, July 2013, 2, 5. 65. SCR 2098, March 28, 2013, paras. 9, 12. 66. See, e.g., Darren Olivier, “How M23 Was Rolled Back,” African Defence Review, October 30, 2013; “UN Calls for Surrender of Rwandan Hutu Rebels in DR Congo,” Agence France-Presse, October 3, 2014. 67. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security, PSC/PR/2(CCCVII)), para. 71 (emphasis added). 68. See, in particular, David Capie, “Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN,” paper presented at the National Institute for Defense Studies International Symposium on Security Affairs 2014, www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event /symposium/pdf/2014/E-06.pdf (accessed November 28, 2016).

6 Capacity-Building Assistance and African Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping capacity building is a relatively new form of cooperation. As argued in Chapter 3, this pattern of peacekeeping cooperation is closely connected to operational collaboration in that both are based on the awareness of capacity shortfalls and the intention to address them. Operational collaboration also involves the sharing of operational experiences and lessons and the transfer of know-how from one actor to another. However, capacity building differs from operational collaboration and joint decisionmaking in its longer time frame and focus on institutional development. Capacity building is an effort by peacekeeping actors to help develop the diverse capacity needs of other, usually newer, peacekeeping actors. Whereas the other patterns of peacekeeping cooperation are bound in time and space to the crisis that peacekeeping seeks to address, capacity building does not have an obvious endpoint. Capacity building can therefore become a distinctive platform of cooperation in the peacekeeping field. Capacity building by its nature takes place in the form of the transfer of knowledge, skills, and experiences from the more established and endowed actors to the developing ones. In peacekeeping capacity building, Africa became the major focus of international efforts; this chapter also focuses on African peacekeeping. Indeed, the very concept of capacity building in the peacekeeping field is closely intertwined with the emergence of African peacekeeping. That is, capacity building as a major area of peacekeeping cooperation owes its emergence to the impending capacity needs of African countries and organizations in the post–Cold War period. As we saw in Chapter 2, the end of the Cold War ushered in efforts by many regional organizations to redefine their secu149

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rity roles. In Africa, where new or recurring conflicts produced serious regional implications, the OAU was rather quick to declare its intention to expand its role in conflict management, and the long-harbored ambition of a continent-wide security force was gradually concretized through the conflict management functions of the newly created AU. However, the AU and African subregional organizations have had to develop their peacekeeping systems while they were at the same time dealing with many conflicts in the region. Moreover, as these conflicts were no longer seen through the Cold War lens of proxy wars, they lost an angle that would have made clear strategic sense for outside powers to engage in (at least some of) these conflicts through military intervention or military assistance to warring parties. As a result, the major powers gradually shifted their mode of engagement to more indirect measures aimed at containing or managing the conflict rather than winning it.1 In short, African peacekeeping capacity building is based on a combination of African willingness to construct a robust conflict management structure on the one hand and a shift in the strategy of outside powers toward indirect assistance for conflict management on the other. The mutually shared interest in developing a regionwide peacekeeping capacity in Africa is not necessarily evident in other regions, either because of a lack of willingness to substantially possess such capacity (such as in Southeast Asia and South America) or due to different approaches to security engagement taken by major powers (such as direct engagement, military assistance to local forces, or some combination of these measures). Evidence of the focus on Africa can also be found in the policy documents of major peacekeeping actors and frameworks. The UN, for instance, has been most instrumental in guiding the AU toward building its own peacekeeping capacity. The 2008 UN Secretary-General’s report on cooperation with regional organizations focused almost exclusively on the AU, with recommendations on peacekeeping capacity building solely related to this and other African organizations: To strengthen and improve the delivery for capacity-building for peace support operations with regional organizations, the United Nations should: (a) Improve and better coordinate the various African peacekeeping training initiatives, including through the development of regional centres for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support. Such training should include human rights and international humanitarian law (pursuant to article 13, para. 13, of the

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Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council) as well as a module on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000); (b) Support the African Union to develop a comprehensive peace and security policy; (c) Support the establishment of relevant planning capability within the AU Peace and Security Directorate; working with the African Union in developing benchmarks for entry, end states, and exit strategies or possibility of the handover of mandates from regional organizations to the United Nations or other peace support arrangements; (d) Improve the African Union’s strategic and multidimensional operational level mission planning and management of peacekeeping operations; (e) Enhance the capacity of the African Union and subregional organizations in the financial and administrative management of peacekeeping operations; (f) Liaise with and, where appropriate, support coordination among international partners involved in support to AU peacekeeping capacity-building.2

Among such international partners the most prominent has been the EU. Because of geographical proximity and historical ties, Europe has a strong interest in Africa, and the EU has been a consistent supporter of the AU and its predecessor, the OAU.3 The EU was quick to initiate support for AU peacekeeping, deciding as early as December 2003 to spend 250 million euros from the European Development Fund to support African missions through the African Peace Facility (APF, created in 2004). In this initiative, according to Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, the EU and the UN are “sharing the financial burden of African capacity building: the UN is paying for the strengthening of the secretariat of the African Union while the EU will help pay for the operations.”4 But EU support has not been limited to funding assistance. The 2005 document on EU-African strategic partnership, adopted by the EU Council in December, declared the EU’s intention to “develop African capabilities, such as the AU’s African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support.”5 The APF, the main EU mechanism in this area, now counts three areas as major strands of APF activities: peace support operations, capacity building, and development of an early warning mechanism.6 Along with the UN, the G8 is another global framework whose capacity-building initiative was also heavily influenced by developments

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on the continent. The G8 action plan on global peacekeeping capacity building adopted at the 2004 Sea Island Summit built on and expanded the group’s commitment to African peacekeeping made at the 2003 Evian meeting (which in turn was based on G8 outreach to African leaders since the Okinawa meeting in 1999).7 The action plan consisted of five primary areas: peacekeeping training, capacity building in Africa, logistics, police peacekeeping, and building PSO capabilities worldwide.8 While the action plan did call for a globalized capacity-building effort, it was assumed that African peacekeeping would continue to receive the primary attention of G8 donors. In fact, most of the G8 discussions and decisions on the 2004 action plan, which continued in earnest until 2010, remained focused on Africa. Though there are capacity-building efforts in other regions, Africa has been the predominant arena of capacity building, and will likely be so in the near future. In this chapter, I analyze the African plans to build peacekeeping capacity and how these plans have received assistance from institutions outside the continent. In actuality, developing peacekeeping capacity requires developing a diverse range of specific capabilities. In order to understand the process and effects of this pattern of peacekeeping cooperation in greater detail, I look at two major dimensions of such capacity: operational capacity and mission management. Peacekeeping needs appropriately trained military, police, and civilian personnel as well as necessary equipment, logistics, and doctrine by which to achieve mission objectives. In the AU, the ASF plan draws out the list of operational capabilities that Africa should develop in the coming years. Capacity building in this dimension will involve transfer of knowledge, materials, and resources from the more developed peacekeeping actors to the AU and subregional organizations. Closely related to these operational capabilities is the ability to manage missions. Operational capabilities, of course, do not ensure operational success; they need to link up with and be supported by the secretariat of the organizing actor for proper political direction and mission sustenance. In the case of the AU, the PSC and the PSOD within the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission are intended to address the decisionmaking and management aspects of AU peacekeeping. In this chapter, I look at each dimension of capacity building in the African peacekeeping context. As suggested earlier, because of its longerterm, institutional nature, capacity building seems to hold greater promise as an area of peacekeeping cooperation. I examine how far current capacity-building efforts in Africa are progressing, especially in view of their potential to promote peacekeeping cooperation.

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African Standby Force This section is an overview of the ASF concept and what requirements its creation would entail for the AU and the international community. Building a system of peacekeeping deployment requires the establishment of operational capabilities and appropriate mission management structures. I first take a more detailed look at both aspects of the ASF plan in order to identify what capabilities the AU will need to develop for its operationalization. As we saw in Chapter 2, the PSC Protocol of July 2002 already called for the establishment of “standby multidisciplinary contingents” that would be composed of both military and civilian elements and be ready for rapid deployment.9 This was based on the AU Constitutive Act, which empowered the AU to intervene in an AU member state in case of “grave circumstances” (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity), promote peaceful coexistence, and respond to the member state’s request for AU intervention to restore peace and security.10 More specifically, the ASF would be used to organize missions in a variety of formats: a. observation and monitoring missions; b. other types of peace support missions; c. intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; d. preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement; e. peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; f. humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and g. any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.11

Following the adoption of the ASF proposal as part of the PSC Protocol, the AU needed a more detailed action plan for the required capabilities and an agreed schedule to develop them. The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee was adopted at the third meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff in May 2003 and eventually adopted by the AU Assembly in July 2004.12 The Policy Framework identified six conflict scenarios

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on the basis of which the AU’s required capabilities should be estimated: (1) AU military adviser deployed to external political mission; (2) AU observer mission co-deployed with UN mission; (3) stand-alone observer mission; (4) peacekeeping force with Chapter VI mandate and for preventive deployment; (5) complex, multidimensional peacekeeping mission equipped with capabilities to deal with spoilers; and (6) full-fledged military intervention in response to genocidal situations.13 The required capabilities are categorized into four levels: political-level mandating authority, strategic-level management, mission headquarters– level management, and mission components. The issue of mandating authority does impact the functioning of AU missions, but will not be the main focus of this chapter. In this section I review the list of operational and mission management capabilities identified in the Policy Framework for the operationalization of the ASF. According to the Policy Framework, the required components of AU missions vary with conflict scenarios, but a brigade-size military component provides a basic building block for most scenarios. In scenario 5 (complex peacekeeping), nonmilitary components will be added to the mission structure depending on mission mandates. Moreover, the Policy Framework states that missions in response to scenarios 1 through 4 as well as the military component of a scenario 5 mission should be able to deploy in 30 days; the rest of the scenario 5 mission in 90 days; and scenario 6 missions in 14 days. But given the prevailing types of peacekeeping demands, the AU’s limited resources, and the availability of other operational initiatives, especially by the UN, the ability to deploy complex missions (scenario 5), especially their military components, was given priority.14 In terms of sustainability it was assumed that scenarios 1 to 3 would involve deployment with selfsustainability for 30 days, and scenarios 4 to 6 for 90 days.15 Moreover, apart from these substantive requirements and assumptions, operationalizing the ASF demands the development of other capabilities, such as logistical and resupply infrastructure and systems; standardized equipment (especially in communications); sustainable funding and agreed rates of reimbursement; clarified command and control procedures; and standby mission headquarters to facilitate mission startup in rapid deployment scenarios.16 All in all, the Policy Framework identified four broad benchmarks that make up the ASF: (1) a reasonably staffed strategic-level headquarters (responsible for the staffing of mission headquarters) and specialist civilian components on the mission level; (2) a system of five subregional standby brigades, each with a core planning staff and standby support

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units; (3) a centrally (AU) managed high readiness brigade with a core planning staff and support units; and (4) an AU-managed system of military observers and police peacekeepers.17 However, the document also acknowledged the existence of “clear, significant and fundamental gaps” between these aspirations and the AU’s current capacity,18 and proposed the ASF as a long-term project that should be developed in two phases: up to June 2005 and thereafter until June 2010. As for the mission components, in phase 1 the AU should possess a system of core planning staff (15-member Planning Element [PLANELM])19 and standby brigade units on the continental (AU, high-readiness brigade) and subregional levels; a centrally managed roster of 300–500 military observers; a centrally managed roster of at least 240 police officers and a standby system of at least two company-level formed police units; and a centrally managed roster of mission administrators and civilian experts.20 For mission management, the Protocol provided for the creation of organs and positions for the management of the AU missions. An AU mission21 would be led by a civilian special representative who would report to the commission chairman, and a force commander who would report to the special representative. Each mission would be mandated by the PSC upon recommendation of the AU Commission. A Military Staff Committee (MSC), consisting of senior military officials of the PSC member countries, would be created to advise the PSC on military and security matters (the MSC can meet at the Chiefs of Defense Staff level).22 Importantly, the Protocol also stated that the AU Commission “shall, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, assist in the co-ordination of external initiatives in support of the African Standby Force capacity-building in training, logistics, equipment, communications and funding.”23 The Commission would be the focal point for the coordination of external capacity-building efforts; an equally important point to note is the already prominent role envisaged for the UN Secretariat in this endeavor. The Policy Framework elaborated on the strategic and mission-level headquarters. In phase 1, the AU should develop full-time capacity to manage and provide mission headquarters in up to scenario 3, while the regions should possess the capacity to manage and deploy mission headquarters for up to scenario 4 situations. In phase 2, the AU capacity would be further expanded to be able to manage and deploy mission headquarters for scenario 5.24 The ASF proposal has since undergone several changes.25 Delays in its implementation resulted in repeated changes in the deadlines: for instance, the two-phase implementation time line was revised several

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times and later changed into three phases to be completed by late 2010, and then a decision was made to extend the deadline for full operational capacity to 2015.26 More substantively, the deployment concept for scenario 6 situations came to be articulated in the form of the rapid deployment capability (RDC) concept. A roadmap document for a newly added phase 3 envisions capability within each region to be deployable for a short term (less than three months). It was assessed that the AU would need a roster of regional RDCs to ensure rapid deployability by two regions and a further refinement of the concept on the operational level. The deadline for the operationalization of the RDC element was initially set for 2012. 27 While RDC has since made little headway—one account in 2015 described the RDC as “non-existent” 28 —a new approach to make available a continental rapid response capability was proposed in April 2013 by AU Commission chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the context of the crisis in Mali, where the AU was seen as slow in response, the AU Assembly in May authorized the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), based on voluntary contributions by AU member states or the regional capabilities developed within the ASF, which provides the AU with a “flexible and robust force” of military or police capabilities for rapid deployment to emergency situations. 29 It will consist of a reservoir of 5,000 troops from which deployment will likely take place in the form of 1,500-strong battle groups; and it should be deployed within 10 days of the PSC’s authorization and be sustained autonomously for at least 30 days. 30 Somewhat akin to the EU’s framework nation scheme, the capability will be deployed upon a request by the organizing states and subsequent PSC authorization.31 With regard to the relationship with the existing AU structures, the ACIRC is understood as a transitional arrangement pending the full operationalization of the ASF and its RDC element, and its deployment will be within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 32 Following consultations in the latter half of 2013,33 the AU Assembly declared in January 2014 that the capability was operational with the participation of 12 countries. 34 As of this writing the ACIRC has not been deployed, and there has been much debate about the future of the scheme, especially the question of whether the ACIRC would hinder or facilitate the eventual development of the ASF’s RDC. The relationship between the ACIRC and RDC is also deeply political as it is connected to political rivalries between the main proponent of the ACIRC scheme (South Africa) and other less enthusiastic regional powers such as Nigeria, which are said

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to be reluctant to take on additional operational burdens and skeptical about South Africa’s intentions.35 Despite these changes, the Policy Framework continues to serve as the fundamental framework for ASF development. The list of capabilities in the framework draws out what kind of assistance the AU will need in order to operationalize the ASF. In adopting the ASF plan, the AU Assembly appealed to international partners, “in particular the G8, the EU and the UN, as well as the bilateral partners,” to provide the necessary capacity-building assistance.36 This shows the centrality of these three institutions to African peacekeeping capacity building. In fact, by the time of the Policy Framework’s adoption in 2004, these three actors were already engaging with the AU to launch their capacitybuilding initiatives. Before turning to these three primary actors, however, there is a small but influential multinational initiative that is worth mentioning in this context.

SHIRBRIG As mentioned in Chapter 2, the idea of an inter-African force has a long history reaching back to the days of decolonization in the 1960s. In more recent history the core elements of the ASF proposal such as the establishment of five subregional brigades under a continental command and control were already floated and agreed at the political level in the context of OAU reform.37 What differed from the past was the existence of the political will to realize this proposal. The AU needed to transform the ASF as provided for in the PSC Protocol into operational reality. An initial step that the AU took was therefore to look for models of force structure that would suit the assumptions of the ASF. Based on the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was a multinational standby system that proved to be the most instrumental at this early stage of ASF development. UNSAS and SHIRBRIG were two schemes developed in the mid1990s in an effort to equip the UN with a more predictable system of force generation for UN peacekeeping. First established in 1994, UNSAS functions as a database in which UN member states register information on their potential contributions. For unit-level contributions there are four levels, from Level I through the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL). Level I entry requires submission of a list of capabilities, while Level III demands a formal memorandum of understanding with the Secretariat that should contain information on

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potential contributions (such as the conditions of their use and the deployable time frames).38 The RDL was then added in July 2002 following the Brahimi panel’s recommendations. 39 Pointing out that the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is “often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers,” the Brahimi report famously called for the development of the operational capabilities to deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days.40 The RDL aims at securing the ability to deploy within this 30to 90-day time frame, for which an additional note verbale that includes precise details of the deployable components needs to be submitted to expedite the preparations.41 Because of its largely declaratory and political nature that makes it difficult to verify member state commitments when needed, UNSAS was seen as of limited direct utility for AU planners;42 the exception was the RDL, whose list of requirements could be useful to identify shortfalls for ASF development.43 However, UNSAS became a platform for the creation of SHIRBRIG. The Denmark-led multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations, or SHIRBRIG, was initiated in 1994 in close connection to UNSAS, and came to include 16 participating nations by the time of its closing in June 2009. SHIRBRIG was a unique standing arrangement of multinational forces whose force generation process was nevertheless based on UNSAS. As its founding document put it, SHIRBRIG was the pre-established (Non-standing), multinational brigade at high readiness, composed of contributions to the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System, providing a rapid deployment capability for deployments of up to 6 months duration in peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, including humanitarian tasks.44

In practice, SHIRBRIG was expected to provide a complete brigade, a smaller force, or an observer or monitoring mission; use of the brigade headquarters as the nucleus of a UN force headquarters; and assistance from the brigade’s PLANELM at the startup of a new UN mission.45 The idea of a sizable multinational pool of ready-to-deploy military units was originally developed following discussions between Danish officials and the then DPKO chief, Kofi Annan,46 who officially opened the PLANELM in 1997 as UN Secretary-General. UN expectations for the

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brigade were therefore high. Pointedly, the Brahimi report argued that UNSAS ideally should contain several coherent brigade-size forces drawn from groups of countries sharing common training, doctrine, equipment standards, and arrangements for the force’s operational control: To that end, the United Nations should establish the minimum training, equipment and other standards required for forces to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Member States with the means to do so could form partnerships, within the context of UNSAS, to provide financial, equipment, training and other assistance to troop contributors from less developed countries to enable them to reach and maintain that minimum standard, with the goal that each of the brigades so established should be of comparably high quality and be able to call upon effective levels of operational support. Such a formation has been the objective of the Standing High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) group of States, who have also established a commandlevel planning element that works together routinely.47

SHIRBRIG thus represented a model for multinational partnerships based on UNSAS.48 It is also notable here that one of the expected functions of SHIRBRIG-like formations was capacity building. SHIRBRIG’s record during its existence did include capacity building toward ASF and subregional efforts. 49 SHIRBRIG became a concrete model for developing the ASF concept both at the AU and subregional levels. The fact that SHIRBRIG was a brigade-size force on standby fit in particular the description of the subregional components of the ASF: in a SHIRBRIG document, the original idea of the ASF was “to establish 5 SHIRBRIG type brigades in Africa.” 50 The AU had learned about SHIRBRIG from the initial stage of ASF development. An annexed study document of the Policy Framework acknowledged SHIRBRIG was a “very good model” for the subregional brigade groups and that its structures “could well influence and guide the operationalization of the ASF and other SROs [subregional organizations].” 51 From the latter half of 2003 the AU requested SHIRBRIG for assistance in this area. SHIRBRIG’s presidency (presiding over its decisionmaking body, the steering committee, on an annual rotating basis) worked with the AU, the UN, and the G8 to develop a capacity-building plan, and at a committee meeting in October, SHIRBRIG launched its capacity-building program with the following options: 1. Assistance and advice in process of the establishment of the EASBRIG;

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2. Secondments to the PLANELM; 3. Participation in some SHIRBRIG training activities; 4. Planning assistance and in general terms the willingness of SHIRBRIG to help as much as possible.52 In 2004 SHIRBRIG was invited to draft the first roadmap for the development of the ASF. The Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (Roadmap I, March 2005) developed an action plan for Phase 1 (whose deadline was already extended by one year to June 2006).53 Using the embassies and resources of SHIRBRIG members (especially Denmark and Austria), SHIRBRIG maintained a presence in Addis Ababa and participation in ASF workshops. While SHIRBRIG’s early focus was on expertise contribution to the development of the ASF framework (for which they provided SHIRBRIG documentations and advice at workshops), the final few years of SHIRBRIG’s existence were spent providing training and planning assistance to the two subregional brigades in the west (ECOWAS) and the east (EASBRIG/EASF). In these, PLANELM proved to be the most influential part of SHIRBRIG on ASF development. The Policy Framework had already acknowledged that rapid deployment along the lines of the 30-day time lines or longer would require the existence of a permanent, fully staffed nucleus headquarters ready to deploy for a mission startup and that SHIRBRIG provided a good example of such structure.54 Between 2006 and 2008 SHIRBRIG conducted three EASBRIG joint planning exercises in Denmark and Nigeria, followed by a series of command post and field exercises with EASBRIG and ECOWAS. For ECOWAS, SHIRBRIG also assisted the initial establishment of its PLANELM through participation in their workshops. These activities were aimed at establishing the planning capabilities of the two subregional brigades modeled on the SHIRBRIG PLANELM.55 The impact of PLANELM was also helped by the fact that most of the actual SHIRBRIG deployments in Africa revolved around planning support and therefore PLANELM. Despite some concrete progress facilitated by SHIRBRIG staff at the subregional level, SHIRBRIG’s role as the main model of the ASF56 was severely hampered by a limited budget and gradual lack of interest by the UN in SHIRBRIG as a force generation model57 (which in turn was partly based on the perceived limited relevance and usability of UNSAS). The problem became worse as SHIRBRIG gradually lost momentum and struggled to maintain its profile. SHIRBRIG’s capacity-building program was cut short by the termination of SHIRBRIG in June 2009.

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The United Nations For the transition from the OAU to the AU and especially the development of peace and security functions (including peacekeeping) within the latter, it is clear that the UN has consistently played a major leading role. The issue of capacity building in fact dates back to the days of the OAU: for instance, at a meeting held September 8–10, 1993, the OAU and UN agreed on the following recommendations: (a) The organizations should engage in regular joint activities regarding peacemaking and peace-keeping in Africa, especially through OAU involvement with, and participation in, United Nations missions; (b) In such cases where OAU undertakes peace-keeping activities, such as cease-fire observations, the United Nations should provide technical assistance to OAU to help it carry out such activities successfully; (c) The United Nations should help to mobilize financial and logistic support to specific peacemaking and peace-keeping activities of OAU; (d) The United Nations should assist OAU in organizing training programmes for military contingents from its member States that may participate in United Nations peace-keeping activities.58

The OAU’s argument in making such demands was the now familiar one of reminding the UN of its Chapter VIII responsibilities. In a UNregional dialogue on the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the OAU suggested, “Where necessary, recourse could be had to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for OAU’s activities relating thereto, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations on international peace and security.”59 The AU has been remarkably consistent with its predecessor on this point. The PSC Protocol, for instance, presents an argument that is almost identical to the one a decade ago: Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.60

These arguments explicitly link the UN’s global responsibility for maintaining international peace and security with its obligations to

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support the efforts of regional security organizations, thus giving the AU a degree of diffuse influence. We saw this line of argumentation work in our cases of operational collaboration (Darfur) and joint decisionmaking (FIB). The UN on its part appears to share this vision of a global division of labor that it is expected to lead. At the Security Council’s first foreign minister–level meeting on Africa in 1997, for example, Secretary-General Annan remarked, “There is a new consensus that the primary responsibility for the solution of Africa’s problems rests with Africans themselves. . . . This new realization also calls for a re-evaluation of the role of the international community in support of Africa’s goals.”61 How then has the UN provided assistance to build the operational capacity of African peacekeeping actors? Apart from its extensive operational collaborations with the AU (providing practical lessons and onthe-job training for African peacekeepers), the UN’s major focus in African peacekeeping capacity building has been the AU’s mission management capacity, which in turn was part of the UN’s efforts to support the AU’s broader institutional development. The groundwork was already laid in the latter half of the 1990s. In discussions following the 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, the secretary-general suggested the posting of a UN liaison officer at the OAU headquarters; establishment of a staff exchange program to strengthen the newly created Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution; provision of logistical and planning expertise for future OAU missions; assistance to the establishment of an OAU situation room; and collaboration in conducting training programs for peacekeeping.62 The ensuing three years saw gradual realization of these and earlier suggestions. A UN Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa was established in July 1996 and a UN liaison office was created at Addis Ababa in April 1998;63 later, by early 2000, at least one military liaison officer was posted at the liaison office in connection with the conflict in the DRC.64 Resolution 1197 (September 18, 1998) broadly endorsed these developments and invited the SecretaryGeneral to assist the OAU and subregional organizations in determining the logistical and financial requirements of their peacekeeping operations. In February 1999, Kofi Annan further suggested expanding staff exchanges including through provision of funding to African military officers to visit and consult with UN peacekeeping staff and establishing a special peacekeeping program for African police officers.65 With the creation of the AU, the UN Secretariat’s support of its counterpart, the AU Commission, continued apace. In addition to the

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continuous provision of training opportunities for African peacekeepers (through seminars and training teams) as well as OAU staffs (through OAU-UN staff exchanges),66 it was closely involved in the development of the peace and security aspects of the newly created AU. Following the official launch of the AU on July 10, 2002, an interdepartmental task force was created within the UN Secretariat to respond to the AU’s request for the development of institutional capacity in peace and security fields.67 The Secretariat worked closely with the AU to coordinate assistance in finalizing the ASF plan.68 One example of close UN-AU cooperation in ASF development was the aforementioned Roadmap I to which the UN Secretariat was, along with the SHIRBRIG, a major contributor. This roadmap identified four priority areas in which the AU expected international assistance: (1) AU and regional PLANELMs and brigade headquarters including their “relevant activities and running cost”; (2) AU and subregional logistic depots and “mechanisms for the committal of donor-held equipment to ASF missions, including strategic air and sealifts”; (3) training of subregional brigades through support to regional training centers and activities and of ASF staff through their allocation into external training schemes; and (4) financial support to ASF deployments.69 In a sign that suggests continuous consultation between the AU and UN secretariats in this project, the roadmap’s four priorities closely corresponded to the four systemic factors that Annan had identified as needing improvement four months earlier in his report on African peacekeeping: the absence of a common doctrine and training standards (related to priority area 3 above); lack of equipment and adequate logistical support, including strategic sea and airlift capabilities (2); inadequate funding (4); and lack of institutional capacity for the planning and management of peacekeeping operations within the African Union and subregional organizations (1). 70 To address these four deficits, Annan proposed concrete measures such as provision of training to African midlevel police managers; establishment of a revolving fund to flexibly obtain needed equipment from other missions or sources; use of common or standardized equipment; expanded logistics training; and “a small core planning and advisory capacity” to support the AU’s mission planning and startup processes.71 This plan found support in the Special Committee, including for the assistance capacity.72 However, since this capacity (Assistance Cell) was initially implemented as a temporary measure to support the AMIS and was not allocated staff or budget dedicated to UN planning assistance on a sustainable basis (see Chapter 4), the Secretary-General separately pro-

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posed in December 2005 the creation of a full-time capacity within the DPKO that “could serve as a single point of contact for AU and other partners on matters related to AU peacekeeping.” 73 A Peace Support Team was endorsed by the Special Committee74 and its budget proposal was eventually approved by the General Assembly in 2006. In September 2006, the UN DPKO and the AU PSOD also agreed to create a Joint AU/UN Action Plan for UN Assistance to AU Peacekeeping Capacity Building for whose implementation the team would be responsible.75 Beginning in January 2007, the team (based in Addis Ababa and New York) ran a series of AU senior mission leadership courses, provided assistance in the review of the logistic base concept, and offered expert advice on financial management structures and procedures related to peacekeeping.76 Closely aligned to this series of developments, the AU Commission chai and the UN Secretary-General agreed on a Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union (TYCBP) on November 16, 2006.77 The TYCBP was in actuality a general declaration committing the UN to assistance in a comprehensive range of African capacity needs for a 10-year period ending in November 2016.78 Cooperation in the peacekeeping field thus spearheaded the TYCBP agenda. The Joint Action Plan has an explicit emphasis on the mission management capacity of the AU: the objective of the action plan is “to assist the AU to develop its long term institutional capacity to manage complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations and the development of ASF operational capability,” and the DPKO approach is focused on “a combination of knowledge transfer and capacity-building through the provision of advice and expertise.”79 As the AU and the subregional organizations gradually shifted their attention from the policies and frameworks of the ASF plan into the more concrete arrangements required for its operationalization, UN support for AU management capacity expanded. By April 2008 the Peace Support Team’s office in Addis Ababa consisted of six staff members (political affairs, military, police, logistics, administration/finance, and IT/communications) providing planning support to the AU’s ongoing missions, assistance to ASF development, and coordination of various training programs and workshops.80 The Peace Support Team then became part of the UNOAU in 2010, which started with a total of 65 staff drawn from the team as well as the UN Liaison Office to the AU, the UN planning team for AMISOM, and administrative elements of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism of UNAMID.81 While the integration meant a

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nearly one-third reduction of the total number of staff personnel under the previous arrangements (which had a total of 108 posts assigned to these four offices),82 it enabled a more streamlined structure. Led by a single head of office newly created on the assistant secretary-general level, the office has three substantive offices (political affairs, operational planning, and administrative planning). The functions of the support team are now spread in the Operational Planning and Advisory Unit (10 officers) and the Administrative Planning and Advisory Unit (8 officers). Whereas the operational unit is responsible for supporting ongoing and future operations by the AU, the administrative unit supports the AU Commission “in the development of its institutional and operational capacity in the areas of mission-related administration, information technology, communications, training, logistics, and contingent-owned equipment.”83 With a large and higher-profile presence in Addis Ababa (the UNOAU head was upgraded to the undersecretary-general level in 2013),84 the UN’s capacity-building assistance now covers a broad spectrum of mission management areas to be developed by the AU. In a 2009 report, the Secretary-General set out the following principles of UN capacity-building assistance to the AU in peacekeeping: (a) Consultation between the Secretariat and Commission prior to the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping operation for which the African Union may request United Nations Secretariat support for planning or other technical assistance; (b) Requirements to be identified by the African Union, as above, and driven by the African Union Commission’s capacity to absorb assistance; (c) United Nations support to be provided within the context of concurrent demands to support United Nations field operations; (d) The African Union would ultimately develop a capacity that is best suited to its own needs; United Nations systems must not be simply exported but should be seen as a resource that the African Union can adapt to meet its own unique requirements; (e) United Nations technical assistance would be provided to the extent possible by the highest calibre personnel with current field experience in African-based peacekeeping operations.85

These principles show UN priority for the mission planning and management capabilities of African peacekeeping as well as UN acceptance of the principle of African ownership. We saw how this argumentation has been invoked by the AU and its predecessor in seeking UN assistance; as

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in other patterns of peacekeeping cooperation with African organizations, this appears to have become a standard assumption in conducting capacity-building assistance to these actors. Another major capacitybuilding actor, the EU, also shares this assumption, but its assistance to African partners is focused on a different set of capacity needs.

The European Union The EU’s capacity-building assistance to African peacekeeping lies mainly in two areas: funding and training. As for the former, the APF is the EU’s main instrument. The APF was set up in response to the AU’s request at the Maputo Summit of July 2003 for the EU to create a funding facility to support AU peace operations. The thus created facility consisted of consolidated EU bilateral funding to AU members in this field, augmented by newly added resources from the European Development Fund. The APF was initially endowed with 250 million euros and given a time frame of three years,86 but the scheme was subsequently extended and expanded. By the end of the first period (2004– 2007) a total of 439.2 million euros was eventually provided through several replenishments to the initial allocation. For the following two periods (2008–2010 and 2011–2013) a total of 300 million euros was allocated to each, with two major replenishments (215 million euros in total) for the latter period.87 The Fourth Africa-EU Summit renewed EU commitment to African capacity building in peacekeeping after 2015, including through the APF.88 Along with financing the operational costs of African missions, capacity building has been the key pillar of the APF from its inception. Between 2004 and 2013 a total of 97.2 million euros or 8.3 percent of the total contracted amounts (1.16 billion euros) was spent for capacity building while 1.05 billion euros (90.4 percent) funded the ongoing missions (AMISOM in particular received most of this funding in recent years).89 The amount of funding for capacity building is understandably much smaller than the operational funding. Moreover, capacity-building funding under the APF has been used for a variety of objectives. Recent APF annual reports explain that the money under this category has been used to cover personnel training, office equipment, and policy development for APSA structures (APSA Support Programme); salaries to AU Commission personnel working in peace and security; costs related to the setting up and running of AU liaison offices in postconflict countries; sponsoring the Amani Africa cycles of exercises; contri-

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bution to African peacekeeping training centers; and support to the establishment of command, control, communication, and information systems for use by the AU, subregional organizations, and missions. The APSA Support Programme, the flagship program in this field with a budget of 40 million euros for 2011–2013, includes staff reinforcement, training, and office equipment for the ASF among its major outputs.90 In particular, five subregional organizations (ECCAS, SADC, ECOWAS, EASF, and NARC) received ASF-related funding in the range of 1–3 million euros each from this budget.91 The ASF component thus accounts for a relatively larger, if not predominant, part of this program. What appears to have received a higher level of EU attention and resources in this field is training assistance, including funding assistance to African training centers as well as the provision of expertise and planning assistance in the conduct of exercises by the AU and subregional organizations. For training centers, EU assistance through the APF started in 2012 with 11.4 million euros allotted in 2012–2014 to support peacekeeping centers at the AU and five ASF-constituent subregional organizations.92 This first allotment was intended as a pilot project93 that may well continue into the future. Another major component of training assistance is a combination of funding assistance and knowledge transfer through the Amani Africa exercises. This series was originally part of the French initiative to strengthen African peacekeeping. Officially launched in 1997 and managed by the French Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, France’s Reinforcement of African Capacities to Maintain Peace (RECAMP) program94 consisted of programs at the continental, subregional, and national levels. A continental-level exercise was a two-year cycle involving a politico-military seminar, strategic/planning conferences, and command post and field exercises. France conducted four such cycles until 2004 (see Table 6.1).95 Then, starting in 2008, this level of exercises was transferred to the EU while France continued the subregional and national levels on a bilateral basis. The context for the transfer was the AU’s launching and development of the ASF concept. The EU action plan for strengthening African peacekeeping, adopted by the EU Council in May 2007, proposed to “Europeanize RECAMP including supporting the operational certification ASF at continental level” as a matter of urgency.96 The EURORECAMP was also endorsed in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy of December 2007.97 The Amani Africa series was thus specifically intended as part of EU support for the operationalization of the ASF concept.98

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Under the EU there were two cycles: Amani Africa (2008–2010) and Amani Africa II (2011–2015). Modeled on the preceding French program, the cycle was revised for AU deployment through the ASF framework. With the widening of the scope and participation of the exercise, Amani Africa also focused on strategic and operational planning through a map exercise, workshops, and coordination conferences in preparation for the final command post exercise.99 Field exercise, which was not included in the first cycle, was revived in Amani Africa II. Originally scheduled in October 2014, the exercise finally took place between October 19 and November 7, 2015, at the South African Army Combat Training Centre, with the SADC serving as the host organization.100 As mentioned above, the APF has enabled the financing of the Amani Africa exercises.101 For the second cycle, a total of 5.2 million euros was allocated from the APF to cover the costs of training and planning activities, deployment of AU headquarters during the field exercise, postexercise activities, and human resource costs.102 In addition to sponsoring these events, the EU provided supporting capabilities to work with the African planners. For the first cycle, a five-man EURORECAMP project team led by French Brigadier General François Gonnet was established (the other members were from Britain, Italy, France, and Finland). The team was located within France’s Joint Training and Force Headquarters in Creil.103 For Amani Africa II, an EU

Table 6.1 French RECAMP Training Cycles Cycles

Main Region/Organization

Participants and Donors

Guidimakha, 1996–1998

West Africa/ECOWAS

4 participating nations 4 donors

Gabon 2000, 1998–2000

Central Africa/ECCAS

8 participating nations 8 donors

Tanzanite, 2000–2002

Southern Africa/SADC

16 participating nations 12 donors

Benin 2004, 2002–2004

West Africa/ECOWAS

13 participating nations 14 donors

Sources: “Historique, Concept et Cycle RECAMP,” www.recamp4.org/fr/hist_conc_cycle _benin2004.php; “Field PK Training,” http://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un /france_and_peacekeeping/field_pktraining_eng.htm (accessed March 2, 2011).

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Planning Team (EUPT) was created under the EEAS in April 2012 to form the EU part of an EU-AU Joint Planning Team. The EUPT consisted of a French EU official as director (Bernard Rambaud) and four other members from France, the UK, Italy, and Germany.104 Given its origin it is perhaps not surprising that France, the EU-designated framework nation for the Amani Africa cycles, has maintained major influence, and yet the assistance posture has been gradually Europeanized. In supporting the development of African conflict prevention and management capabilities, the EU Council has stressed that EU assistance “needs to be a demand-driven process, based on intensified dialogue with African partners, in full respect of African ownership.”105 Consistent with this orientation are the principles of the APF: • African Ownership The principle of African ownership implies that the missions and activities are initiated, planned and carried out by the African side. Therefore, a formal African request to the EU is necessary before initiatives can be funded through the APF instrument. The fact that only African-led operations can be funded is a specific feature of the APF. • African-EU Partnership The principle of Africa-EU partnership is the building block of the APF and the JAES [Joint Africa-EU Strategy] plays a central role in it. To facilitate close cooperation, the EU, AU, RECs [Regional Economic Communities] and interested African and European member states meet in annual meetings and participate in dialogues on peace and security issues to exchange views and information and to jointly plan future initiatives. • African Solidarity The principle of African solidarity is based on the recognition that peace and security on the continent is beneficial to all African nations. This means that they cooperate under the aegis of the AU and/or the RECs and share the financial and logistical burden of implementing missions. In respect to the APF, it also comprises the acceptance that funds are not distributed equally among the African states but used on a need-basis. . . . Furthermore, in the post-Lisbon context, this solidarity principle also means that non-ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] African countries that benefit from greater regional peace and stability are invited to provide contributions that will strengthen the APF and the impact of its actions on a regional and continental scale.106

The principle of African ownership, which was also prominently featured in the UN assistance policy, here serves as the underlying principle that informs and justifies the other two principles. The principle of African

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solidarity is clearly based on respect for African ownership and EU expectations for the initiative and cooperation of African actors; and this implies, in turn, the EU intention to shift the burden (financial and through other means) of capacity building onto Africans as soon as circumstances permit. In this and preceding chapters we have seen how the global acceptance of the principle of African ownership has resulted in African demand for and control of capacity-building and operational assistance. However, the EU appears to understand and use the same principle, in part at least, to produce the opposite effects—as a demand toward African nations to shoulder their own security burdens, and thereby as a future exit strategy for EU members. However, it would be unfair to equate EU assistance in this field to European assistance as a whole. Indeed, active and diverse assistance has been offered by European countries on a more bilateral basis. For example, while transferring continental-level training to the EU, France has continued to assist African countries and organizations by providing exercises, predeployment training courses, educational opportunities, as well as equipment. France conducts these activities on the basis of bilateral cooperation or partner agreements with African governments, and French presence on the continent in the form of troops (in Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon, and La Réunion) and depots (Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon) has been mobilized for these programs. In addition, around 270 “military cooperants” have been deployed to African militaries and defense ministries where they offer advice and training to African officers and officials as part of France’s “structural cooperation.”107 To point this out suggests a broader question of how multilateral mission organizers fare against national initiatives in this area. If capacity building continues to be conducted by national as well as international actors, what does this trend mean for peacekeeping cooperation? This question is especially pertinent here, because whereas operational collaboration and decisionmaking cooperation typically take place between multilateral mission organizers such as the UN, the EU, and the AU, capacity building continues to be conducted on diverse scales by many national actors. In considering capacity-building cooperation for peacekeeping, it is therefore necessary at this point to include major national efforts in our analysis. It is of course beyond the scope of this book to provide a comprehensive overview of national capacity-building programs. Instead, to have a good approximate sense of how national initiatives have been developing, I take up the case of the G8 in the remainder of this chapter.

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The Group of Eight As a peacekeeping actor the G8 is not exactly an organization in the sense that the UN or the EU is. Operating through a system of rotating host countries, it does not have a standing secretariat that would be responsible for implementing its decisions. Moreover, since its establishment in 1975 as a summit meeting of six governments (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States)108 the G8 was intended to be primarily a system of collective management in economic and financial matters, although the group did take up prominent political and security issues such as arms control from as early as the late 1970s.109 Despite these backgrounds, the summit meetings showed a concrete commitment to issues of peacekeeping from the early 2000s. Specifically, the G8 emphasized the development of peacekeeping capacity in Africa. The G8 action plan adopted at the 2004 Sea Island Summit—“G-8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations” (PSO Action Plan)—was a landmark in this respect, and the G8 deliberation continued until the 2010 Muskoka Summit. Closely aligned to the establishment of the AU and its ASF proposal, this development took place parallel to, and in some aspects even went ahead of, the other multilateral initiatives. As such the G8 initiative complements the multilateral efforts so far reviewed in this chapter. The case of the G8 deserves treatment here because it provides us with a useful vantage point from which to look at the major national efforts. Lacking implementing agency of its own, the G8 left the implementation of its stated commitments to the national members. The G8 members constantly referred to the G8 communiqués and statements in promoting their programs. Why did these major states decide to use the G8 as a major platform for peacekeeping capacity building in that period? And what difference did the G8 make in fostering this pattern of peacekeeping cooperation? Including the impact of national programs in capacity building helps put the role and contribution of the multilateral actors in better perspective. In this section I first look at the development of the G8’s agenda regarding peacekeeping capacity building, after which I consider what the reality of the G8 initiative suggests for capacity-building cooperation. The major impetus for the G8 agenda for African peacekeeping was the ASF, but there was an interest in Africa that actually preceded the ASF. The Genoa meeting (2001) produced the Genoa Plan for Africa, which urged “continued commitment to conflict prevention, manage-

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ment and resolution by the international community in partnership with African governments, the African Union and sub-regional organisation.”110 The G8 Africa Action Plan, adopted at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit further announced the intention to provide “technical and financial assistance” to African peacekeeping.111 At the Evian Summit of 2003, the G8 and African leaders agreed on a joint action plan for a “multidimensional field capability” in Africa.112 The Evian Joint Plan argued that this development would require 10 “early building blocks”: coherent multinational, multidisciplinary standby brigade capabilities; capacities to provide humanitarian, security, and reconstruction support; a continental early warning network; conflict prevention capacities; regional logistic depots; standardized doctrines and training; enhanced capacity in regional training centers; joint regional exercises; ongoing regional peacekeeping initiatives; and inclusion of peacekeeping-related assistance into the official development aid (ODA) category defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC).113 Clearly, these commitments dovetailed with the ASF proposal. Building on these earlier statements, the 2004 PSO Action Plan set out targets and introduced two new areas of potential action. This action plan committed the G8 members to the following: • Peacekeeping training: train and, where appropriate, equip a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010 and help enhance mission management capability of regional and subregional organizations. • Coordinated assistance to African peacekeeping capacity building: coordinate individual programs among G8 members as well as with partners such as the AU and the UN. G8 expert-level meetings (Africa Clearing House) will also be initiated for exchanging information. • Logistic assistance: develop transportation and logistics support arrangements for the deployment and sustenance of peacekeepers. • Development of police peacekeeping including FPUs: contribute to the training of gendarmerie- or carabinieri-like forces in interested countries, including through the establishment of an international center of excellence. • Building PSO capabilities worldwide: while maintaining a focus on Africa, expand the geographic scope of training and exercises to other regions by 2010.

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The last two elements (police peacekeeping and assistance to peacekeeping capacities beyond Africa) represented newly added areas. To this the Heiligendamm meeting of 2007 further added an emphasis on strengthening civilian aspects of peacekeeping in a way that the military and civilian components of the ASF “will be as closely intertwined as possible.”114 Again, this emphasis followed the idea to develop the ASF as a multidimensional capability. The 2010 Muskoka Declaration also acknowledged the “chronic shortage of ready and trained civilian experts” in Africa and globally, declaring their commitment to help build civilian capacity for security, governance, and rule of law in developing countries.115 The Muskoka meeting completed a sequence of the G8’s efforts in peacekeeping capacity building. The 2010 summit in fact issued a series of accountability reports including one on peace and security; the meetings in the following years have mentioned peacekeeping and peacebuilding in some statements, but without creating a new commitment by the members.116 As noted already, one cannot grasp the G8 initiative in peacekeeping without analyzing how it has been turned into practice. Specifically, the group’s stated commitments are made by its member states, which are thereby expected to act for their realization through their national programs, preferably in a coordinated manner. As we saw, the G8 agenda was expanded to cover almost the entire range of capabilities required for contemporary peacekeeping. In one of the statements at the 2009 meeting in L’Aquila, the group in fact summarized its approach to stabilization and reconstruction assistance as “comprehensive.”117 As I have reviewed in greater detail elsewhere,118 however, implementation by the G8 members fell short of the group’s ambitious goals, plagued by limited attention to some key areas (such as logistic assistance and assistance beyond Africa) and persistent problems of coordination among the national programs. One of the goals of the PSO Action Plan that appears to have been reached was training assistance to African countries and organizations. In this area of capacity building, G8 donors were actively engaged. According to a report published for the Muskoka summit, G8 countries trained approximately 130,000 peacekeepers, a figure that easily surpassed the Sea Island target of 75,000. The main provider of peacekeeping training was the US-led Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which trained 113,255 peacekeepers since 2005. Britain and France, both of which have their own peacekeeping training programs, have been the other major contributors in this regard. Regional

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peacekeeping training centers, most of them in Africa, also received financial and training support from several G8 countries.119 For the development of police peacekeeping capacity, Italy established in 2005 the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), which has conducted train-the-trainer and predeployment programs for police officers and FPU trainers (for the latter, it set a target of 3,000 trainers).120 The International School for Security Forces (EIFORCES), created in Cameroon in 2008 with the target intake of 1,000 officers (6 FPU and 160 individual police officers), has been receiving support from France, the EU, and Japan.121 Canada’s Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has also continued with its provision of training and equipment to police peacekeepers directly and in collaboration with African centers of excellence and training programs.122 In short, despite the comprehensive nature of the G8 framework, the actual implementation has been fairly uneven. This begs the question of why the G8 agenda evolved to become “comprehensive” in the first place. One explanation is that the agenda became comprehensive in such a way as to cover the entire spectrum of national programs that were conducted or contemplated by the G8 members. This is evidenced by the very way that the G8 agenda was developed, with each item matched by the existence of at least one national program. The PSO Action Plan of 2004, for instance, added two items (police peacekeeping and assistance beyond Africa), both of which corresponded to the policy priorities of the plan’s cosponsors, Italy and the United States.123 The Action Plan served to endorse Italy’s flagship initiative, CoESPU, which in turn was among the priorities of the US GPOI (the other priority areas were peacekeeping training and logistic assistance).124 The GPOI was global in its outreach, and its goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010 was identical with that of the Action Plan. The idea of an Africa Clearing House for better coordination of bilateral assistance programs was actually preceded by the US European Command-led Africa Clearing House, which had its first meeting in May 2004 and subsequently merged with the G8++ Africa Clearing House (ACH) from 2006.125 All in all, the G8 agenda that emerged as a result was effectively the sum of all these programs and initiatives by the G8 members. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the development of the G8 initiative for peacekeeping capacity building was donor driven, aiming not so much to direct and coordinate the national programs (as the PSO Action Plan declared) as to play a more limited role of legitimizing and promoting the national programs in a global framework. As for the group’s stated interest in coordinated assistance, it is reasonable to think

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that this posture was put forward by G8 states not so much in the literal sense of coordinating their own and other activities as to declare their intention to lead the agenda globally. In other words, the G8 served as a showcase for members’ national programs, as shown by strong interest in peacekeeping activities by some G8 members from the mid-1990s. In particular, Britain, France, and the United States launched peacekeeping capacity-building programs with a focus on Africa in that period and actively sought to seize initiative in this area internationally. In 1997, France launched the aforementioned RECAMP initiative. In the same year, the United States created the African Crisis Response Initiative, which, along with its successor African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, provided peacekeeping training to a total of 16,000 troops from 10 African countries.126 The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program, intended as a train-the-trainer program, was also initiated in 1998.127 In late 2004, the George W. Bush administration expanded and merged the two programs to establish the GPOI mentioned already. In 1996, Britain also began an African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme with a focus on training officers. This program was subsumed in April 2001 into the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.128 Under these initiatives Britain dispatched military advisory and training teams to Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, and it assisted Zimbabwe and South Africa to organize regional peacekeeping exercises in April 1997 and April 1999, respectively.129 Internationally, the three countries started the so-called P3 initiative. This initiative, officially launched in May 1997,130 aimed to coordinate the respective activities of the three countries in such a way as to create a well-trained and interoperative group of African peacekeeping troops.131 Beyond the coordination of their own activities, however, this initiative was also expected “to generate an overarching umbrella for a broad range of valuable individual programmes, and to seek out areas of possible joint co-operation in peacekeeping training.”132 They expected the initiative to serve as a catalyst for better coordination of African peacekeeping capacity-building programs around the world. In fact, the P3 states proposed to create an Africa Peacekeeping Support Group that would be open to all interested donors. The group’s first meeting took place in early December 1997 under the auspices of the UN and was attended by representatives from 59 UN member states. But this group failed to gain wider traction, as the Western failures of intervention in Somalia and Rwanda were fresh in the minds of African leaders who were suspicious of external assistance.133

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Against the background of this development, it is clear that the G8’s capacity-building agenda from the early 2000s represented a renewed effort by the P3 and other interested G8 members to lead this emerging field of peacekeeping cooperation by providing a high-profile framework for donor assistance. Unlike the previous attempt, using the G8 forum enabled member states to generate African endorsement for their initiative by incorporating the ASF proposal and inviting influential African leaders and stakeholders to take part in the deliberation of the Africa Action Plan and the Evian Joint Plan. The G8 was successful in highlighting the existence of peacekeeping capacity-building needs especially in Africa and promoting the relevance of major national programs in this light, but left little substantive impact beyond it. For the purposes of this chapter, the case of the G8 demonstrates the continuing strength of national programs, which poses a unique complication in developing capacity-building cooperation. Whether conducted nationally or through multilateral institutions, capacity building can serve to strengthen peacekeeping capacity. However, the way these programs are resourced and implemented appears to influence their choice of capacities they purport to address. This is clear from the G8 case: the provision of training for the national military and police for peacekeeping duties tends to receive a high priority in national programs because training assistance is the most visible area of bilateral cooperation whereas other types of assistance may be either less eye-catching (such as human resources and finance management) or politically sensitive (as may arise in the case of the transfer of military equipment). As long as capacity-building efforts remain in the national domain, therefore, the institutional and managementrelated aspects of peacekeeping capacity may continue to receive a relatively lower priority. This is problematic because, as Franke pointed out, the lack of management capacity at the AU has been identified as “the most serious impediment to the effective operationalization of the force” at the continental level.134 As we saw earlier, the UN and perhaps partly the EU are expected to shoulder the burden of building AU capacity for mission management, but it is not clear whether this represents a workable division of labor that is conducive to the successful implementation of the ASF plan and the promotion of peacekeeping cooperation.

Effects on Global Security Governance In this chapter I have reviewed four major capacity-building initiatives and frameworks for the operationalization of African peacekeeping.

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The review suggests how the ASF proposal, in the context of creating a continent-wide conflict management architecture, has triggered extensive mobilization of expertise and financial resources from outside the region. Indeed, one fundamental point to emerge from this chapter is that peacekeeping capacity building in Africa is becoming an increasingly prominent part of cooperation between multilateral institutions. The development of this form of cooperation will produce several positive effects for global security governance. But as in the other patterns of peacekeeping cooperation, the progress so far is not without several complications. In positive terms, capacity building can contribute to global security governance by addressing capability shortfalls and gaps in the operation and management of African peacekeeping missions, providing a platform for long-term institutional cooperation, and reinforcing the normative framework of peacekeeping cooperation. First, the evolving capacity-building cooperation has involved significant transfer of operational skills and management knowledge to African organizations. For instance, SHIRBRIG served as an early model for the ASF’s headquarters and subregional brigades. The UN Secretariat’s provision of advice to its AU counterpart in mission planning and administration involved significant transfer of knowledge, and the EU’s assistance teams also imparted professional advice about operational matters through the joint running of the Amani Africa exercises. This process of sharing knowledge can facilitate operational collaboration by improving mutual understanding about the management procedures of peacekeeping missions. Second, it is important to note that these assistance efforts have necessitated various forms of personnel exchange, regular training sessions, and consultations between the secretariats. These activities take place on the basis of mid- and long-term plans such as the G8’s PSO Action Plan and the Joint AU/UN Action Plan. These developments demonstrate the distinctly institutional nature of capacity-building cooperation. By committing these actors to a long-term cooperative relationship, sustained capacity-building actions may create a cognitive basis for the recognition that they are part of this collective effort. Third, we again see a degree of global consensus with regard to the normative framework of peacekeeping cooperation. On capacity building, this revolves around the international obligation to assist Africa’s conflict management efforts and the related principles of African ownership and partnership. The ownership principle in the context of capacity building is referred to in UN, EU, and G8 documents.135 For African states and

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organizations, this principle, combined with the widely recognized need to develop African peacekeeping capacity, has generated a degree of diffuse influence that empowers African actors to demand assistance from their global partners. Of particular significance here is the language of partnership that has been constantly used in the AU’s relationship with the external donors reviewed in this chapter. Indeed, the notion of partnership encapsulates the sustained and equal (based on the ownership principle) nature of the relationship that appears to be the norm in capacity-building cooperation. In a recent report on “partnership peacekeeping,” the Secretary-General suggests that the AU-UN partnership “has evolved from a capacity-building model to a partnership based on strategic convergence.”136 While, given the current state of ASF development, this assessment may seem premature, the statement shows the recognition that capacity building has laid the groundwork for the development of more equal peacekeeping partners in Africa. On the other hand, there are at least three interrelated challenges: strength of national programs, lack of coordination, and inherent limitations of capacity-building cooperation. One point that has emerged from the analysis here is that, unlike the other two patterns of peacekeeping cooperation, capacity building is more open to national initiatives, and donors active in this field have conducted their activities mostly on a bilateral basis. While some of these programs are conducted in conjunction with multilateral initiatives (such as through the G8) or even transferred to multilateral settings (as in the transfer of the continental leg of the French RECAMP to the EU), the choice of recipients and assistance areas in these programs is based on the policy priorities and perceived national interests of the donors. National commitment to capacity building is not necessarily an impediment to the expansion of global cooperation in this area—after all, multilateral initiatives are also eventually drawn from national resources—but from our perspective that sees capacity building as a pattern of multilateral cooperation among peacekeeping actors, the prevalence of national control over capacity-building programs means a correspondingly low level of contributed resources for multilateral capacity-building actors. Moreover and as argued already, it also leads to the continuation of the national preference for strengthening operational capabilities (especially personnel) rather than management capacity development. A second and closely related complication is the lack of coordination. This is, of course, an old problem. Reviewing the existing programs at the time, the 2004 Policy Framework already pointed out that external assistance “has not always focused on key African concerns. In particular, the

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OAU/AU has not been fully involved in determining the nature and scope of the initiatives.”137 Nevertheless, subsequent capacity-building actions for the ASF appear to be marred by the same problem. In practice, the UN and the now defunct SHIRBRIG have been the major contributors to the development of mission management capabilities of the ASF, while the EU and many of the national programs (including those under the G8 framework) have continued to invest in training provision. Though it is possible to see this situation as a certain division of labor between the UN and the other actors, one can also detect another version of the problem of dependency on the UN here, with regional and bilateral donors doing what they want while the less visible but potentially key aspects of African peacekeeping capacity are left to the UN. Another manifestation of poor coordination revolves around different conceptions of the normative principle of African ownership. While all the actors agree on its importance, the EU interprets the principle in conjunction with the principle of African solidarity and thereby as a potential exit strategy for the EU. As for the G8, the group’s declared commitment to African ownership is not necessarily backed up by the actual practices of the donors. Third, the analysis here suggests that there are inherent limitations as to what capacity building can achieve. That is, sharing information and know-how about mission management does not necessarily guarantee the sharing of the same substantive goals or ethos of peacekeeping. Whereas operational collaboration and joint decisionmaking take place mainly at the operational and strategic/political levels, capacity building takes place mostly at the relatively lower, management level through interaction between secretariats and training centers. The thus developed capabilities are then put to use through political decisions at higher levels. Cooperation to build the peacekeeping capability of a new peacekeeping actor facilitates the convergence of mission management procedures and styles to some extent, but may not provide much in the way of influencing the objectives for which peacekeeping is used by that actor. This is most prominent, in fact, in the AU. As mentioned in relation to the MONUSCO FIB case (see Chapter 5), the AU has developed a significantly different conception of peacekeeping than that of the UN, especially with regard to the use of force in the peacekeeping context. Demanding and receiving extensive assistance from outside the region do nothing to prevent the AU from having such a conception; indeed, the AU right to develop its concept of peace support operations is ensured by the principle of African ownership. In this and the preceding two chapters I have analyzed the three patterns of peacekeeping cooperation. In order to make sense of peacekeeping

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cooperation and its implications for global security governance, however, one needs to look at the three patterns of the cooperation as a whole. What does the current peacekeeping regime as practiced in various formats and at various levels tell us about the evolution of peacekeeping cooperation, and what is its significance for global security governance and international cooperation? I can now consider these questions.

Notes 1. Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa, 102–105. 2. Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (S/2008/186), para. 75. 3. See, e.g., Council of the EU, Council Decision of 20 October 1997 Concerning the Implementation of Common Position 97/356/CFSP Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, Concerning Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, EU doc. 97/690/CFSP. 4. Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace, “Operation Artemis,” 522. 5. Council of the EU, The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, EU doc. 15961/05, December 19, 2005, para. 4(a). 6. “African Peace Facility,” www.africa-eu-partnership.org/success-stories /african-peace-facility (accessed November 28, 2016). 7. G8, Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, Evian, June 1, 2003. 8. G8, G-8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, Sea Island, June 10, 2004. 9. PSC Protocol, art. 13.1. 10. The Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4. 11. PSC Protocol, art. 13.3. 12. AU Assembly, Decision on the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.35 (III), July 6– 8, 2004. For the process of the deliberation, see AU Executive Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Meeting of Ministers of Defence, January 20–21, 2004, and the Draft Policy Framework on the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), AU doc. Ex. CL/110 (V), June 23–July 3, 2004, and its annexes. 13. AU, Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), AU doc. Exp/ASFMSC/2(I), May 15–16, 2003, para. 1.6. 14. Ibid., para. 2.6–10. 15. Ibid., para. 2.29. 16. Ibid., para. 2.30–39. 17. Ibid., para. 3.4. 18. Ibid., para. 3.3. 19. The subsequent Ministers of Defence meeting in January 2004 recommended a phased expansion with an initial nucleus of five officers. Draft Policy Framework (EX.CL/110[V]), para. 6.

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20. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (Exp/ASF-MSC/2[I]), paras. 3.12–14. The subsequently developed roadmap document details the composition of the brigade as follows: Brigade HQ and Support Unit (up to 65 personnel and 16 vehicles); HQ Company and Support Unit (120 personnel); 4 Light Infantry Battalions (750 personnel and 70 vehicles each); Engineer Unit (505 personnel); Light Signals Unit (135 personnel); Reconnaissance Company (150 personnel); Helicopter Unit (80 personnel, 10 vehicles and 4 helicopters); Military Police Unit (48 personnel and 17 vehicles); Light Multi-Role Logistical Unit (190 personnel and 40 vehicles); Level 2 Medical Unit (35 personnel and 10 vehicles); Military Observer Group (120 officers); and Civilian Support Group with logistical, administrative, and budget components. AU, Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force, AU doc. EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I), March 22–23, 2005, Annex A, para. 5. 21. Though presumed in the Protocol to be organized using the ASF system, practically all of the AU missions so far have been established only on an ad hoc basis. But the Protocol’s provisions regarding mission management appear to be used for these missions. 22. PSC Protocol, art. 13.6–12. 23. Ibid., art. 13.16. 24. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (Exp/ASF-MSC/2[I]), paras. 3.8–11. 25. For detailed assessment of the progress in the operationalization of the ASF, see Cilliers and Pottgieter, “African Standby Force”; Benedikt Franke, “Steady but Uneven Progress: The Operationalization of the African Standby Force,” in Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century, ed. Hany Besada, 179–200 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010). 26. Following the conclusion of the Amani Africa II exercise in 2015, the AU’s Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security, at the level of chiefs of defense staff and heads of security services, declared in January 2016 that the ASF has attained “full operational capability.” However, the AU Assembly that held its 26th session a few days later did not explicitly endorse this declaration, suggesting a lack of consensus among AU members on this issue. See AU Assembly, Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security: Declaration, Addis Ababa, January 15, 2016, para. 4a; AU Assembly, Decision on the Specialized Technical Committees, AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.589(XXVI), January 30–31, 2016, para. 20. 27. See AU, The African Stand-by Force (ASF) Roadmap III, adopted at the 5th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Security and Safety, October 26, 2011, para. 14. 28. Peter Fabricius, “Standing By or Standing Up: Is the African Standby Force Nearly Ready for Action?,” ISS Today, July 23, 2015. 29. AU Assembly, Decision on the Establishment of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.489(XXI), May 26– 27, 2013, para. 2. 30. AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises,”

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AU doc. RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013, April 29–30, 2013, paras. 26–30. Three such battle groups, each including an infantry battalion (850 troops), combat support and logistics capabilities, and force headquarters, are envisaged; ibid., paras. 31–38. 31. AU Assembly, Decision on the Operationalisation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, AU doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.515(XXII), January 30–31, 2014, para. 4. 32. Decision on the Establishment of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (Assembly/AU/Dec.489[XXI]), para. 2. 33. For instance, South Africa organized a summit meeting of potential contributors in Pretoria on November 5, 2013. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa), “Consultative Summit for the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) 5 November 2013,” www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2013/acirc1104.html (accessed November 28, 2016). 34. Decision on the Operationalisation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (Assembly/AU/Dec.515[XXII]), para. 2. The participating countries include Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 35. Fabricius, “Standing By or Standing Up”; Jason Warner, “Complements or Competitors? The African Standby Force, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces in Africa,” African Security 8, no. 1 (March 2015): 63–64. 36. Decision on the ASF and the MSC (Assembly/AU/Dec.35 [III]), para. 3. 37. Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa, 94, 98. 38. Level II was introduced in 1998 for members contemplating Level III entry. This level demands submission of a Planning Data Sheet, which is expected to form the basis of a future MOU. 39. UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN doc. A/57/711, January 16, 2003, para. 33. 40. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305S/2000/809), Annex, paras. 87–88. 41. UN DPKO Military Division, United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook, 2003 edition, April 14, 2003, 7–8. 42. In a recent reform, UNSAS was replaced by a new UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System in July 2015. See “Overview,” https://cc.unlb.org/PCRS %20References/PCRS%20documents/PCRS%20Overview%20Sept%202016.pdf (accessed November 29, 2016). 43. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (Exp/ASF-MSC/2[I]), Part II, Annex E, para. 9. 44. SHIRBRIG, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Operation, Funding, Administration and Status of the Planning Element of the Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (MOUPLANELM), art. 2.1. 45. “SHIRBRIG: Facts,” www.shirbrig.dk/shirbrig/html/facts.htm (accessed February 5, 2007). 46. Presidency, SHIRBRIG Steering Committee (MOD Norway), SHIRBRIG: Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations, Oslo, n.d., 3.

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47. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305S/2000/809), Annex, paras. 115–116 (emphasis added). 48. Examples of such partnership include the Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support, formed in 1998 with the membership of Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland. The framework has not been used for actual deployments so far. Erwin A. Schmidl, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Austria,” updated August 2013, www .providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-austria (accessed November 29, 2016). 49. Other activities include deployment of PLANELM and an infantry battalion to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); deployment of a headquarters unit to UNMIS; and planning support to ECOMICI/UNOCI, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Darfur Planning Team (for UN support to AMIS and the latter’s transfer to a UN operation), AMISOM, and MINURCAT. International Peace Academy, “Seminar on Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG),” New York, n.d., www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/IPA-SHIRBRIG .pdf (accessed January 2006); UN Security Council, Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Sudan, UN doc. S/2005/579, September 12, 2005, para. 26 and Annex; SHIRBRIG Planning Element, “SHIRBRIG Disbandment 30 June 2009,” Høvelte, May 6, 2009. 50. SHIRBRIG Planning Element, “SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report,” Høvelte, June 1, 2009, 23. 51. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (Exp/ASF-MSC/2[I]), Part II, Annex E, para. 15. 52. SHIRBRIG Planning Element, “SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report,” 23. 53. Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4[I]), para. 7. 54. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (Exp/ASF-MSC/2[I]), para. 2.8 and 2–37. 55. SHIRBRIG Planning Element, “SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report,” 25–27. 56. Ibid., 27. 57. Ibid., 28. 58. UN General Assembly, Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/48/475/Add.1, October 15, 1993, para. 23. 59. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/25996/Add.3, June 15, 1993, para. 13. 60. PSC Protocol, art. 17.2. 61. SCOR, 3819th meeting, UN doc. S/PV.3819, September 25, 1997, 5. 62. UN General Assembly/Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/50/711-S/1995/911, November 1, 1995, paras. 9–10, 32, 37, 40. 63. UN General Assembly/Security Council, Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/54/63S/1999/171, February 12, 1999, para. 15 and Annex; UN General Assembly, Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/54/484, October 21, 1999, para. 6.

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64. UN Security Council, Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN doc. S/2000/330, April 18, 2000, para. 14 and attached deployment map. 65. Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (A/54/63-S/1999/171), para. 43. On January 21, 1999, the DPKO and the OAU also convened a meeting to discuss measures to strengthen African peacekeeping. Representatives of 27 African states joined the meeting. Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (A/54/484), para. 16. 66. See, e.g., UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/56/732, December 21, 2001, paras. 53, 56; Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (A/59/591), para. 16. 67. UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/57/711, January 16, 2003, para. 83. 68. Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/58/694), para. 94. 69. Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4[I]), para. 28. 70. Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (A/59/591), para. 18. 71. Ibid., paras. 19–32. 72. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Its Working Group, UN doc. A/59/19/Rev.1, January 31– February 25 and April 4–8, 2005, para. 120. 73. Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/60/640), para. 31. 74. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Its Working Group, UN doc. A/60/19, February 27–March 17, 2006, para. 143. 75. UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/61/668/Add.1, December 22, 2006, para. 45. For the initial budget proposal, see UN General Assembly, Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/60/727, March 23, 2006, paras. 108–119. 76. Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations (S/2008/186), para. 41. 77. UN General Assembly, Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, UN doc. A/61/630, December 12, 2006, Annex; see also UN General Assembly/Security Council, Review of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/65/716-S/2011/54, February 2, 2011. This in turn was based on the commitment made at the October 2005 World Summit, whose outcome document called for such a framework. General Assembly Resolution 60/1, October 24, 2005, para. 93, and SCR 1631, October 17, 2005. 78. The TYCBP was succeeded by another framework document that covers the period from 2017 through 2027. See UN Regional Coordination Mechanism

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for Africa, Framework for a Renewed UN/AU Partnership on Africa’s Integration and Development Agenda 2017–2027, March 2015. 79. Joint AU/UN Action Plan for UN Assistance to AU Peacekeeping Capacity Building, author’s copy obtained in January 2009. This document is a working document revised on a rolling basis; interview with DPKO official, January 28, 2009. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Relationship Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations (S/2008/186), para. 75. 80. UN General Assembly, Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/62/783, April 7, 2008, paras. 78–79; Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/63/767, March 16, 2009, para. 84. 81. UN General Assembly, Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/65/761, February 28, 2011, para. 69. The staff number was later reduced by three posts. UN General Assembly, Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 and Financing for the Period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, UN doc. A/67/756, February 25, 2013, paras. 65–68. 82. The substantive elements of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (11 staff) remained under UNAMID. UN General Assembly, Budget for the United Nations Office to the African Union: Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/64/762, April 30, 2010, paras. 15–16. 83. Ibid., para. 49. 84. Secretary-General Appoints Haile Menkerios of South Africa Special Representative to African Union, UN doc. SG/A/1406-AFR/2622-BIO/4473, May 17, 2013. 85. Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations (A/64/359-S/2009/470), para. 45. 86. AU Assembly, Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union, AU doc. Assembly/ AU/Dec.21(II), July 10–12, 2003; EU, Decision No. 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers on the Use of Resources from the Long-Term Development Envelope of the Ninth EDF for the Creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, EU doc. OJ L345/108–109, December 11, 2003. 87. European Commission, African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 8. 88. Declaration, Fourth EU-Africa Summit, Brussels, April 2–3, 2014, para. 12. 89. African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013, 8, 31. 90. Ibid., 13–15; European Commission, African Peace Facility Annual Report 2012, 15–16. In the preceding period (2004–2010) a total of 35 million euros was invested for the strengthening of the APSA structures. African Peace Facility Annual Report 2011, 15. 91. African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013, 31. 92. Ibid., 14. 93. Ibid. 94. France announced the program at the UN in December 1997 and at the French-African summit in Paris in November 1998. Bruno Charbonneau,

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France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 113; “Statement by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,” December 8, 1998, www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/991208_mae _presse_afrique.htm (accessed March 22, 2011). 95. “Presentation of the ‘Recamp 4’ Training Cycle,” www.recamp4.org /telechargement/presentation_recamp_uk.pdf (accessed March 3, 2011); “Benin 2004 Initial Planning Guidance,” www.recamp4.org/telechargement/dip_uk.pdf (accessed March 4, 2011). 96. Council of the EU, Action Plan for the Implementation of Proposals Relative to the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities, EU doc. 8551/2/07 REV 2, May 7, 2007, Annex. 97. Council of the EU, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint AfricaEU Strategy, EU doc. 16344/07, December 9, 2007, para. 18. See also First Action Plan (2008–2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, December 9, 2007, sect. 1. 98. “EURORECAMP Presentation: What Is EURORECAMP?,” March 11, 2008, www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article2&lang=en (accessed March 8, 2011). 99. “The Calendar of the Cycle,” October 6, 2010, www.amaniafricacycle .org/spip.php?article10&lang=en (accessed March 8, 2011). 100. “Launching of Amani Africa II Cycle,” www.au.int/en/sites/default /files/pressreleases/24602-pr-press_release_launch_amani_october_20 _20111.pdf (accessed November 29, 2016); EEAS, “Amani Africa II Cycle,” http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/content/20160313172652/http://eeas .europa.eu/amani-africa-ii/about/index_en.htm (accessed November 29, 2016); “African Standby Force Exercise in Lesotho Postponed Until March,” DefenceWeb, September 4, 2014; “Defence Hosts AMANI AFRICA II Field Training Exercise, 19 Oct to 7 Nov,” October 5, 2015, www.gov.za/speeches /defence-hosts-amani-africa-ii-field-training-exercise-19-oct-7-nov-7-oct-2015 -0000 (accessed November 29, 2016); “African Standby Force Starts First Military Exercises,” BBC News, October 19, 2015. 101. Council of the EU, EURO RECAMP—Financial Aspects of the Proposal, EU doc. 13053/07, September 20, 2007. 102. African Peace Facility Annual Report 2013, 14, and African Peace Facility Annual Report 2012, 16. 103. “EURORECAMP Presentation.” 104. “Amani Africa II Cycle.” 105. Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, 2760th General Affairs Council Meeting, November 13, 2006, para. 2. 106. APF Annual Report 2012, 9–10. 107. Interview, Paris, March 28, 2011. 108. Canada and Russia officially became members in 1976 and 1998, respectively, while the EC/EU has been represented since 1997. Although the EU had not hosted meetings, the EU stepped in to host the 2014 summit for the first time following the cancellation of the Sochi meeting under the Russian host due to the crisis in Crimea earlier that year. 109. Nicholas Bayne, Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), chap. 1; see also Robert D. Putnam and

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Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the SevenPower Summits, revised and enlarged edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), chap. 5. For a comprehensive review of the G7/8 framework, see Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 110. G8, Genoa Plan for Africa, Genoa, July 21, 2001. 111. G8, G8 Africa Action Plan, Kananaskis, June 27, 2002, para. 1.2. 112. Joint Africa/G8 Plan, para. 3.4. 113. Ibid., para. 5.1. 114. G8, Growth and Responsibility in Africa, Heiligendamm, June 8, 2007, para. 42; see also Chair’s Summary, Heiligendamm, June 8, 2007, sect. II. 115. G8, G8 Muskoka Declaration, Annex II, June 26, 2010, sect. I. 116. See, e.g., G8, G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting Chair’s Statement, Washington, DC, April 12, 2012. 117. G8, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future: Political Issues, L’Aquila, July 8, 2009. See also G8, G-8 Conference of Senior Officials on Capacity-Building, Gatineau, May 3–4, 2010. 118. See Hikaru Yamashita, “The Group of 8 and Global Peacekeeping, 2004–2010,” Global Governance 19, no. 3 (July–September 2013): 333–352. 119. G8, Muskoka Accountability Report, Muskoka, June 20, 2010, Annex Five, 2–4. 120. See, “Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU): Nature,” www.carabinieri.it/arma/coespu/english-version/nature (accessed November 29, 2016). 121. ECCAS, “Dossier Eiforces,” May 2009; Muskoka Accountability Report, 62. 122. Muskoka Accountability Report, Annex Five, 8. The center was subsequently closed in October 2013. 123. Nina M. Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, updated June 11, 2007, 11. 124. Ibid., p. 2. 125. Martin Plaut, “The Africa Clearing House,” African Security Review 13, no. 3 (2004): 97. The ACH had its first meeting in Washington, DC, in October 2004. Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah, and Fanny Calder, “The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of Current G8 and African Activities and Potential Areas for Further Collaboration,” Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, April 2005. From 2007 the G8++ Global Peace Support Operations Capacity Building Clearinghouse started with a specific focus on peacekeeping capacity building. Mike Smith, “Peacekeeping: International Forum Helps Turn Talk into Action,” February 4, 2010, https://blogs.state.gov/stories /2010/02/04/peacekeeping-international-forum-helps-turn-talk-action (accessed November 29, 2016). 126. Serafino, “Global Peace Operations Initiative,” 4. For its preceding programs, see also Russell J. Handy, “Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa,” Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 57–64; A. Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, “US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 1 (February 2008): 118–132.

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127. See US State Department, “GPOI History,” https://2001–2009.state.gov /t/pm/ppa/gpoi/c20197.htm (accessed November 29, 2016). 128. Eric G. Berman, “French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Working Paper 622, Oslo, February 2002, 13. 129. Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, “Constructive Disengagement: Western Efforts to Develop African Peacekeeping,” Institute for Security Studies Monograph 33, Pretoria, December 1998; Ministry of Defence (UK), “British Military Advisory Training Team West Africa (BMATT [WA]),” www.opera tions.mod.uk/africa/bmattwa.htm (accessed July 29, 2011); Ministry of Defence (UK), “British Defence Advisory Team (BDAT) Nigeria,” www.operations .mod.uk/africa/bdatn.htm (accessed July 29, 2011); Ministry of Defence (UK), “British Peace Support Team for East Africa (BPST [EA]),” www.operations .mod.uk/africa/bpstea.htm (accessed July 29, 2011); Ministry of Defence (UK), “British Peace Support Team in South Africa (BPST [SA]),” www.operations .mod.uk/africa/bpstsa.htm (accessed May 14, 2008). 130. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, “Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance,” International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 59. 131. Alice Walpole, “A British Perspective on the P3 Initiative for Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capability,” in “Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa,” ed. Mark Malan, Institute for Security Studies Monograph 21, Pretoria, February 1998. 132. Ibid. 133. Mark Malan, “Peacekeeping in Africa: Trends and Responses,” Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper 31, Pretoria, June 1998. 134. Franke, “Steady but Uneven Progress,” 197. 135. In the G8, the PSO Action Plan, for instance, says that all capacitybuilding activities by G8 members should be “implemented in close cooperation with the African Union and sub-regional organizations, in line with the African ownership principle.” 136. Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping (S/ 2015/229), para. 9. 137. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the MSC (Exp/ASF-MSC/2[I]), para. 2.28.

7 Global Security Governance and International Cooperation The emergence of the peacekeeping cooperation regime is a relatively new development in the international community’s search for security architecture after the end of the Cold War. Chapters 2 and 3 examined the context and articulated an analytical framework for this development. In Chapter 2, I contextualized the rise of the peacekeeping cooperation regime in major post–Cold War movements (increase in intrastate conflicts, redefined roles of international organizations, and UN peacekeeping reform), arguing that expanding peacekeeping cooperation meets the security interests and identity needs of peacekeeping actors in the new security environment. Chapter 3 introduced three theories of international cooperation (instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism) in order to draw out an analytical perspective. I proposed an eclectic approach combining three theories to articulate global peacekeeping cooperation as a regime of second-order cooperation where actors are already committed to the cooperative endeavor of peacekeeping but calculations of interest and considerations of identity influence the actual shape of the regime. The existence of the regime may be identified with reference to its patterns, procedures, and principles and norms. In peacekeeping cooperation there are three major patterns of cooperation (operational collaboration, joint decisionmaking, and capacity building), which involve the sharing of rules, procedures, principles, and norms. These elements, which mostly preside over the relationship between UN and non-UN actors, are still embryonic and evolving, but Chapters 4 through 6 demonstrated how actors’ behaviors were presumed on their shared recognition of the significance of the elements. In terms of its implications for global security, such regime 189

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generates regulative (by changing the actors’ calculations of interests) and constitutive (by influencing their sense of identity) effects toward the strengthening of the global collective capability and determination to manage conflicts and govern security challenges. Chapters 4 to 6 examined the three patterns of peacekeeping cooperation in greater detail to identify their effects and complications. In Chapter 4 I first conducted an overview of operational collaborations in recent decades and identified a loose hub-and-spoke system that depends in large part on the UN’s ability to provide comprehensive follow-on missions. The chapter examined how this emerging system functioned through cases in Darfur and the DRC. One broad point highlighted there was that the current practice of operational collaboration has provided enabling conditions for regional deployments via the UN and reinforced the international legitimacy and global security roles of the regional organizations. The principle of UN primacy/centrality was widely recognized and endorsed in this arrangement. Operational collaboration has also served as an important driver for encouraging a more formal and institutionalized form of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. On the other hand, this form of peacekeeping cooperation has been beset by various problems of coordination, which in turn are based on regional and national concerns for autonomy or ownership. The cases also indicated increasing regional dependency on the UN that is derived from different sources. For the AU, this is due to acute shortfalls in peacekeeping capacity in Africa against the reality of multiple conflicts on the continent; in the case of the EU, it appears to be linked to the Union’s diminishing interest in and sense of fatigue about peacekeeping engagement. The Darfur case also suggested limitations in boosting the local legitimacy of regional peacekeeping via the UN. In Chapter 5 I identified a growing tendency by regional peacekeepers to seek Security Council resolutions to obtain legal authority, political legitimacy, and access to UN logistical and financial support. In order to consider the impact of joint decisionmaking, the chapter took up cases of such decisions that did not involve operational collaboration between the UN and regional actors. The cases showed the development of a normative framework of decisionmaking cooperation centered on the Security Council’s authority. Non-UN peacekeeping actors increasingly anchored their operations in this authority for military credibility (especially via the use of force authorization), international legitimacy, and UN assistance. In addition to facilitating the constitution of regional organizations as peacekeeping actors, joint decisionmaking also put non-UN actors closer to the model of UN peacekeeping in which missions operate on the basis

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of Security Council resolution, host government consent, and peace agreement. While this last point suggested the convergence of regional peacekeeping around the UN model, there are still divergent views held by these actors about the issue of the use of force by peacekeepers. As the AU’s stance on this issue demonstrated, the UN’s central status in joint decisionmaking does not necessarily mean UN preeminent control of this crucial aspect of contemporary peacekeeping. A regional actor’s preexisting identity, such as a well-established one like NATO’s, can also present a constraint when it tries to establish itself as a peacekeeping actor. Finally, the UN’s perceived centrality in global peacekeeping creates the obvious problem of regional dependency on the UN, but the Macedonian case indicated that UN endorsement of operational collaboration among non-UN missions may help ameliorate this problem in the long term. Chapter 6 examined capacity-building assistance for African peacekeeping. The ASF in particular was quite successful in attracting capacitybuilding attention from major international institutions, effectively becoming the focal point in this area. By addressing the continent’s capacity shortfalls in the operation and management of peacekeeping missions, this form of cooperation reinforces global peacekeeping capacity. Capacity building usually involves regular exchanges of personnel and consultations between the secretariats of the peacekeeping partners, thereby serving as a platform for regularized institutional cooperation in peacekeeping. In conducting capacity-building cooperation the donors and the recipients also appear to share norms such as African ownership and partnership. However, in this chapter I also highlighted the existence of several challenges against the further expansion of capacity-building cooperation, such as the continuing strength of national programs and the lack of effective coordination among national and multilateral programs. Moreover, the priority given to training assistance in many national programs may leave the UN shouldering most of the key tasks of building the AU’s mission management capacity. Finally, I pointed out the limited influence of capacity-building cooperation over the recipient organization’s peacekeeping policy and strategic objectives. Then, what does the emergence of global peacekeeping cooperation mean for global security governance and international cooperation? With regard to global security governance, various positive effects as well as complications were identified. Overall, the evolving regime of peacekeeping cooperation brings reinforced capability, shared resources, and amplified legitimacy to the international community’s efforts to deal with regional conflicts and civil wars. Peacekeeping cooperation reinforces such capacity by enabling new peacekeeping deployments through oper-

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ational collaboration, which in turn are increasingly based on joint decisionmaking; and capacity building contributes to this process by facilitating the development of professional personnel, management procedures, and mission logistics for newer actors. Closely related, peacekeeping cooperation enables the sharing of logistical and financial resources as well as of operational skills and management knowledge between the partnering actors. And through the multiplying of decisions across the actors and their working together in the field, peacekeeping cooperation also enhances the international legitimacy of the missions and strengthens the peacekeeping identity of the mission organizers. In more specific terms, the evolution of the peacekeeping regime thus has the positive effects of institutionalization, the formation of normative consensus, and the reinforcement of the actor’s commitment to cooperative security management. First, cooperation in various manners leads the peacekeeping actors to organize their joint activities in a more regularized and institutionalized manner, as such cooperation creates the expectation that they will continue to engage cooperatively with each other in the future. Cases in Chapter 4 showed how operational collaboration among the cooperating actors actually generated such expectation. In order to consider why this has been taking place, it is important to notice the interactive nature of the relationship between this pattern of cooperation and the others. Operational collaborations have taken place concurrently with the gradual expansion of joint decisionmaking and capacity-building cooperation. Joint decisionmaking became increasingly customary around the authority of the Security Council, and capacity-building projects have been actively utilized to extend assistance to African peacekeepers. These developments and various operational collaborations have mutually reinforced each other to produce the momentum for institutionalized cooperation. A second effect conducive to global security governance is the formation of normative consensus on peacekeeping cooperation. These norms include UN primacy/centrality, regional ownership and autonomy, and the obligation to assist African peacekeeping. As discussed in the preceding chapters, these ideas were pronounced in the policy documents of the major actors and acted on through their activities. Overall, they point toward a normative structure anchored in the central role of the UN. For the AU, the combination of these norms has worked in such a way that it could draw a broad range of resources from the UN and (through the UN) the other donors. For the EU and others, it enabled them to engage in peacekeeping activities more or less on a selective basis, expecting the UN to follow up in sequential or concurrent deployments.

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A third effect is the expansion of a peacekeeping identity across various actors. Peacekeeping became a recognized and officially adopted role for many institutions and organizations beyond the UN. This not only meant the deepening of their commitment to conflict management but also required a change in the way they were expected to behave in this field. By interacting regularly and sharing the norms of cooperation, they have been socialized into a certain type of behavior expected from peacekeepers. As mentioned earlier, the major peacekeeping actors have adopted the UN model of peacekeeping. Repeated and regular engagement in peacekeeping will foster the actors’ cooperative (both with the other partners and parties to the conflict) attitudes toward conflict management and other collective efforts in security governance. However, the chapters have also made clear several complications that might hinder the further evolution of peacekeeping cooperation. These are the problems of coordination, normative divergence, and dependency on the UN. Lack of effective coordination is an old, oftmentioned problem in peace operations, and this study suggests its political nature. Whether in operational collaboration or capacity building, an actor’s resistance to or lack of interest in coordination with other actors comes from its quest for independence and autonomy. This quest can take various forms, such as the desire to leave the footprint of its own activities or the fear of losing control over its programs and resources. Moreover, as the case of EU engagement in the DRC suggested, such demand may be pronounced not just by the actor’s growing sense of confidence as a global security actor but also by its internal divisions and the resultant lack of cohesion. One can also note that poor coordination is closely related to the other two major problems. For one, it can arise with regard to shared norms. As pointed out earlier, the current regime consists in sharing a number of key notions about how peacekeeping actors should behave in cooperation, but there are a few observed tensions in norm-based interactions. In the African context, the idea of African ownership is widely acknowledged and committed to within the UN, and yet repeated African efforts to turn the UN centrality norm into the UN obligation to institute a system of regular funding for African operations have been resisted by the UN. Regional ownership was also used by the Europeans to justify their selective engagement into out-of-area conflicts. They also conceived African ownership to emphasize African responsibility for dealing with conflicts on the continent. In sum, the sharing of norms does not necessarily mean the compatibility of their interpretations by regime actors. Moreover and beyond such competing conceptions, the normative aspect of the

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current regime lacks consensus on two fundamental issues: feasible division of labor and the use of force in the peacekeeping context. Despite sharing the UN model of peacekeeping premises, global consensus on the scope and objectives of the use of force by peacekeepers appears to be thinning rather than thickening. As pointed out in Chapter 5, African actors have developed a conception of peacekeeping that includes a flexible use of military force to achieve stabilization and to create conditions for the peace process. With regard to the notions of complementarity, major peacekeeping actors have expressed commitment to building a feasible division of labor (see Chapter 3). However, divergent interpretations of the cooperation norms, widening gaps in consensus on the use of force issue, and the persistent lack of coordination in practice all make such commitment devoid of substance. A third significant complication is the current regime’s dependency on the UN’s peacekeeping capacity. The current practices of operational collaboration largely depend on the UN’s capability to provide logistical, financial, and operational support to regional missions; decisionmaking cooperation has increasingly converged around the Security Council’s power to authorize UN and regional missions; and in African capacity building the UN has been the only consistent provider of assistance to build the mission management and administrative aspects of African peacekeeping. This is a positive development insofar as it clarifies the central role of the UN in the peacekeeping cooperation regime and the global security governance architecture more broadly. However, the UN’s centrality here appears to entail shouldering extensive support to regional actors beyond realistic levels. As discussed in Chapter 2, it was precisely because of concerns about increasing demand on the UN that the UN turned to and facilitated regional peacekeeping in recent years. Solutions to this situation include the facilitation of region-toregion operational collaboration and the expansion of the base pool of regional capabilities through capacity building. The UN achieved the former with the EU and NATO in Macedonia (although the apparent dwindling of European interest in peacekeeping may be a cause for concern), but it may take some time before one sees similar collaborations among other regional entities. And, in order to see such scenarios of interregional collaboration more often in the future, the international community will have to invest more in capacity building, especially in Africa. However, there is a fine balance to be struck between capacity building and avoiding the culture of dependency, where extensive capacity-building efforts from outside the region may inadvertently exacerbate regional dependency on the UN. For instance, there are

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already suggestions that African governments have chosen to invest less in peacekeeping despite their wealth.1 These complications do not negate the value of peacekeeping cooperation or the existence of the cooperation regime. On the contrary, they may be seen as part of the evolving process of the regime where contentions and identified problems could lead to improved practice and expanded consensus. What does the future hold for peacekeeping cooperation? The discussion here suggests that the prospects for peacekeeping cooperation will depend on three interrelated factors: continued development of African peacekeeping capacity, the sustained leadership role of the UN, and further expansion of peacekeeping actors. Given the prominence of African peacekeeping demand and the burden it generates on global peacekeeping capacity, the AU’s progress toward a full-fledged multidimensional capacity will greatly influence the overall evolution of peacekeeping cooperation. The AU with such capacity will be able to sustain missions in Africa and even in other regions, thereby becoming a crucial operational partner for the UN in global peacekeeping. Second, an equally important question is the extent to which the UN can sustain its current leadership role, at least in the medium term. Though I argued in Chapter 1 that global peacekeeping cooperation owed its emergence to the proliferation of peacekeeping actors beyond the UN, this book highlighted time and again how such cooperation in practice depends on the UN. Because of its unique powers, normative stature, and experiences, it is likely that the UN will keep its role as a central hub in the global peacekeeping system. However, if the UN can count on regional peacekeepers to organize missions, the UN’s leadership role could usefully focus on fostering and managing a decentralized and truly globalized peacekeeping capacity instead of doing whatever is demanded by the other actors. Clearly, this depends on increased African and other regional capacities to deploy missions. And this point leads to a third factor: whether the regime is joined by newer actors that adopt peacekeeping as their official role, and how these actors move toward mutual cooperation in regularized manners. As pointed out already, the current regime is highly concentrated around African and European actors, but there are signs of emerging interest by the other regions in peacekeeping (e.g., the CSTO). If the regime, albeit slowly, continues to expand, its patterns, rules, and norms might change as they represent a new fusion of influences and ideas by newer actors. Overall, the future strength, salience, and nature of the peacekeeping cooperation regime will be shaped by these elements.

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Evolving Patterns of Peacekeeping

With regard to our understanding of international cooperation in general, this study characterized global peacekeeping cooperation as a second-order, developing, and informal regime of international cooperation with regulative and constitutive effects. The application of this framework to global peacekeeping cooperation suggests two points for the analysis of international cooperation. One is the importance of informal regimes. Peacekeeping cooperation (and indeed peacekeeping itself) developed and became a platform of active cooperation despite its largely informal character. There are other evolving security governance actions of growing importance—humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacebuilding, and cyber security, for instance—that are also driven by rapidly changing practice rather than negotiated rules. They are also characterized by an expansion of actors that have increasingly interacted with each other. Insofar as these actors may be seen as forming an informal regime, it would be useful to clearly grasp the totality of their interactions by means of this framework. Expanding the scope of application in this way may enable us to grasp how global security governance in the contemporary world is being organized through intensified cooperation in its subfields. Another implication is the need to take a long-term perspective in studying international cooperative actions. Unlike many manifestations of conflict and confrontation in global politics, cooperation usually does not have a clear endpoint. As discussed especially in Chapter 6, cooperation in a global (security) governance field requires building the necessary capacities for future use on a global scale, which by its nature has to be a long process. Only through such a broad, long-term perspective does it become possible to understand the complexity and comprehensiveness of today’s international cooperation.

Note 1. Paul D. Williams, “Peace Operations in Africa: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects,” paper presented at the National Institute for Defense Studies International Symposium on Security Affairs, Tokyo, November 5, 2014, www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2014/E-01.pdf (accessed November 28, 2016), 55.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACIRC ACH AFISMA AMIB AMIS AMISOM APF APSA ASEAN ASF AU BINUCA BONUCA CAR/RCA CEMAC CEN-SAD CFSP CIS CNDP CoESPU CPF CRO CSDP

African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises G8++ Africa Clearing House African-Led International Support Mission to Mali AU Mission in Burundi AU Mission in Sudan AU Mission in Somalia EU African Peace Facility African Peace and Security Architecture Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Standby Force African Union UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic Central African Republic Central African Economic and Monetary Community Community of Sahel-Saharan States EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States National Congress for the Defence of the People Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan) crisis response operation EU Common Security and Defence Policy 197

198

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CSTO DDR DFS DPA DPKO DRC/RDC EASBRIG EASF ECCAS/CEEAC ECOMIB ECOMICI ECOMIL ECOMOG ECOWAS EEAS EIFORCES ERRF ESDP ESS EU EUBG EUFOR EULEX EUPM EUPOL EUPT FARDC FDLR FIB FOMAC FOMUC FPRI FPU G8 GATT GPOI ICGLR IDP IFOR IGAD

Collective Security Treaty Organization disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration UN Department of Field Support Darfur Peace Agreement UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Democratic Republic of Congo Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Eastern Africa Standby Force Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) ECOWAS Mission in Liberia ECOWAS (Ceasefire) Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States European External Action Service International School for Security Forces European Rapid Reaction Force European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy European Union EU Battlegroup EU Force EU Rule of Law Mission EU Police Mission (Bosnia) EU Police Mission EU Planning Team DRC Armed Forces Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade (DRC) Multinational Force of Central Africa CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri formed police unit Group of Eight General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Global Peace Operations Initiative International Conference on the Great Lakes Region internally displaced person NATO Implementation Force (Bosnia) Intergovernmental Authority on Development

Acronyms and Abbreviations

IGADD IGASOM INTERFET IPTF ISAF ISPDC JCC JEM KFOR LAS M23 MAES MICIVIH MICOPAX MINUCI MINUGUA MINURCA MINURCAT MINURSO MINUSCA MINUSMA MINUSTAH MIPONUH MISAB MISCA MISSANG MLC MONUA MONUC MONUSCO

199

Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia International Force for East Timor International Police Task Force (Bosnia) International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) SADC Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee CIS Joint Control Commission (Moldova) Justice and Equality Movement NATO Kosovo Force League of Arab States March 23 Movement AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros International Civilian Mission in Haiti ECCAS Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) UN Verification Mission in Guatemala UN Mission in the Central African Republic UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements AU-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau Movement for the Liberation of the Congo UN Observer Mission in Angola UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

200

Acronyms and Abbreviations

MSC MTA NAC NARC NATO NIF NLA NRF OAS OAU OCHA ODA OECD-DAC

ONUB ONUC/UNOC ONUMOZ ONUSAL OSCE PF PKF PLANELM PSC PSO PSOD RAMSI RCD RDC RDL RECAMP SADC SCA SCE SCR SFOR SHIRBRIG

Military Staff Committee Military Technical Agreement North Atlantic Council North Africa Regional Capability North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neutral International Force National Liberation Army NATO Response Force Organization of American States Organization of African Unity UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs official development aid Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development UN Operation in Burundi UN Operation in the Congo UN Operation in Mozambique UN Observer Mission in El Salvador Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe CEN-SAD Peacekeeping Force (CAR) CIS Peacekeeping Force (Georgia) Planning Element AU Peace and Security Council peace support operation AU Peace Support Operations Division Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Rally for Congolese Democracy Rapid Deployment Capability Rapid Deployment Level Reinforcement of African Capacities to Maintain Peace Southern African Development Community Security Council authorization Security Council endorsement Security Council resolution NATO Stabilization Force (Bosnia) Multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations

Acronyms and Abbreviations

SLM/A TYCBP UN UNAMA UNAMIC UNAMID UNAMIR UNAMIS UNAMSIL UNASOG UNAVEM UNCPSG UNCRO UNIKOM UNISFA UNMEE UNMIBH UNMIH UNMIK UNMIL UNMIS UNMISET UNMISS UNMIT UNMOP UNMOT UNOAU UNOCI/ONUCI UNOGBIS UNOL UNOMIG UNOMIL UNOMSIL UNOMUR UNOSOM UNPOS UNPREDEP UNPROFOR UNPSG

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union United Nations UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Advance Mission in Cambodia AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda UN Advanced Mission in Sudan UN Mission in Sierra Leone UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group UN Angola Verification Mission UN Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia) UN Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia) UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission UN Interim Security Force for Abyei UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UN Mission in Haiti UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Mission in Liberia UN Mission in Sudan UN Mission of Support in East Timor UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan UN Office to the AU UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia UN Observer Mission in Georgia UN Observer Mission in Liberia UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda UN Operation in Somalia UN Political Office for Somalia UN Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia) UN Protection Force (Bosnia) UN Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia)

201

202

Acronyms and Abbreviations

UNSAS UNSMIH UNSMIS UNSOM UNTAC UNTAES UNTAET UNTMIH UPC VJTF WEU ZIF

UN Standby Arrangements System UN Support Mission in Haiti UN Supervision Mission in Syria UN Assistance Mission in Somalia UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium UN Transitional Administration in East Timor UN Transition Mission in Haiti Union of Congolese Patriots Very High Readiness Joint Task Force Western European Union Center for International Peace Operations

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Index

Aceh, 7, 10n13 ACIRC. See African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises ACH. See G8++ Africa Clearing House Addis Ababa, 79, 160, 162, 164, 165 Afghanistan, 128–135; Bonn Agreement and, 129–131; constitutive effects and, 132–133; ISAF and, 129–130; Macedonia and, 130–131, 142; peacekeeping missions and, 133; regulative effects and, 132–133; UN Security Council role in, 130. See also Kabul Africa: Annan on, 162; capacity building and, 3, 8, 65, 150, 152, 176–177, 178, 191; conflict management and, 169; EU and, 151, 166; G8 and, 171–172; post–Cold War and, 149–150; Sea Island Summit peacekeeping and, 152, 171–172; UN peacekeeping and, 150–151, 161–166. See also African Standby Force; African Union African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), 25, 156 African Crisis Response Initiative, 175 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 156; EU and, 166–167 African Peace Facility (APF), 166–167, 169 African Standby Force (ASF), 2, 20, 25– 26, 152; benchmarks of, 154–155;

capacity building and, 26, 152–157; civilian capabilities of, 155, 173; conflict management and, 177; full operational capability of, 181n26; initial operational capability of, 25; mission formats of, 153; operational capability and, 181n26; overview of, 153–157; SHIRBRIG and, 159–160, 177, 179. See also Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union African Union (AU), 2, 22–23; autonomy and, 105; capacity building and, 24–25, 34, 153–157, 161–162, 163–164; Darfur communique of, 81– 82; EU and, 151, 166; G8 with, 172; international partners for, 157; MSC and, 155; peacekeeping missions and, 22–23; peacekeeping vision of, 140– 141, 179; UN and, 162–166; UNSAS and, 158 Agenda for Peace, 9n2, 15, 33. See also Supplement to an Agenda for Peace Albania, 6, 31, 69 Amani Africa, 167–169, 177 AMIB. See AU Mission in Burundi AMIS. See AU Mission in Sudan AMISOM. See AU Mission in Somalia Angola, 89, 136, 182n34

223

224

Index

Angola Verification Mission, 31 Annan, Kofi, 36, 79–80, 82, 91–92, 158, 162, 163 APF. See African Peace Facility APSA. See African Peace and Security Architecture ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASF. See African Standby Force Asia, 2, 22 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 7, 143 Atlantic Charter, 143 AU. See African Union AU Commission, 79, 81, 85, 107n23, 152, 155, 156, 163, 165, 166 AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES), 72, 121 AU-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), 74, 76, 118, 119 AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), 23, 74, 118 AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 20, 25, 72, 87, 88, 119, 121, 145n12, 164, 166, 183n49 AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 78–80, 82–84, 86–87, 88, 103, 163 AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), 24–25, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 138, 152, 155, 156 AU Peace Fund, 139 AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), 80, 152, 164 Australia, 6, 11n15, 22 Austria, 160, 183n48 Authorization: endorsement and, 115– 119; motivations for, 120–121; non-UN peacekeeping and, 118–120; UN Security Council and, 115; use of force and, 118 Autonomy, 37, 58, 62, 144, 190, 193: AU and, 105; EU and, 98–99, 102–103, 104–105; NATO and, 124 AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 3, 81, 83–88, 121, 135, 164–165. See also Darfur Axelrod, Robert, 52 Balkans, 17, 22, 23, 29, 41n47, 122, 133. See also Bosnia; Kosovo; Macedonia

Ban Ki-moon, 100, 134; peacekeeping and, 34, 36 Belgium, 41n44, 98, 100 Berlin Plus, 122–125, 142 Blair, Tony, 95 Bonn Agreement, 28–29, 92, 129–130, 131 Bosnia, 29, 106n3 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 15, 31 Britain. See United Kingdom Brahimi, Lakhdar, 129 Brahimi report, 9n2, 33, 34, 158, 159 Brazil, 93 Bunia: Annan appeal for, 91–92; IDPs and, 92; massacres in, 91; militias in, 91. See also Eastern Congo; Ituri Burundi, 2, 7, 10–11n14, 23, 74, 90, 118, 136, 141 Bush, George W., 175 Cammaert, Patrick, 79 Canada, 93, 174, 186n108 Capacity building, 3, 55, 64–65, 149, 191; Africa and, 3, 8, 65, 150, 152, 176–177, 178, 191; ASF and, 26, 152–157; AU and, 24–25, 34, 153– 157, 161–162, 163–164; Brahimi report and, 34; complications of, 178– 179; Darfur and, 79–80, 86–88; effects of, 177–178; EU and, 105, 151, 166–170; G8 and, 151–152, 172–173; joint decisionmaking and, 55; OAU and, 161; operational capabilities and, 152; operational collaboration and, 55, 64, 149, 177; peacekeeping and, 149; Peace Operations 2010 and, 34; rules and procedures in, 55; SHIRBRIG and, 159–160; UN and, 79–80, 88, 150– 151, 159, 162–166 CAR. See Central African Republic Caribbean Community, 22 CEEAC. See Economic Community of Central African States CEN-SAD. See Community of SahelSaharan States Central African Republic (CAR), 69, 74, 76 Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support, 183n48 Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), 174

Index CFSP. See Common Foreign and Security Policy Chad, 22, 74, 89, 100, 113n136, 182n34 Chirac, Jacques, 93, 95 CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States Civilian capabilities: ASF and, 155, 173; EU and, 26–27, 102 Civilian Headline Goal, 27 CNDP. See National Congress for the Defence of the People CoESPU. See Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units Codeployment (COD), 72, 104 Cold War: end of, 13–15, 17; NATO and, 133–134; peacekeeping and, 14–15; proxy wars and, 150; regional organizations and, 16. See also Post– Cold War Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 2, 30, 38n16 Command authority, 85 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 26 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 26 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 2, 22, 72 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), 20, 71, 74, 121 Comoros, 2, 7, 10n14, 69, 119 Complementarity, 58–59 Conflict Data Program (Uppsala University), 13 Conflict management: Africa and, 169; ASF and, 177; crisis management as, 17; ECOWAS and, 24; EU and, 17, 23, 102; peacekeeping as, 6, 7, 37; regional organizations and, 15–16; UN and, 15, 31–32, 35. See also Conflict resolution Conflict resolution, 5 Constitutive effects, 9, 60, 61 Constructivism: context for, 52–53; identity for, 47, 66n9; institutionalism and, 49–50; international cooperation and, 46, 47; problems with, 53; shared identities and, 47–48; social environment and, 47 Cooperation: institutionalism and, 100– 101; joint decisionmaking and,

225

190–191; peacekeeping and, 119– 120; theory of, 8, 45–46; between the UN and the AU, 162–166. See also International cooperation; Peacekeeping cooperation Cooperative security actors, 61 Crisis management: conflict management and, 17; EU-NATO cooperation in, 28; EU and, 5, 17, 26–28, 41n43, 119; NATO and, 18, 29, 134; UN-EU cooperation in, 94–95 Crisis response operations (CRO), 5, 18, 29 Cronin, Bruce, 48, 50, 53–54 CSDP. See Common Security and Defence Policy CSTO. See Collective Security Treaty Organization Darfur, 77–88, 103, 190; Annan and, 80; AU communique on, 81–82; capacity building and, 79–80, 86–88; crisis in, 77–88; Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and, 78; hybrid operation in, 81, 83–86; IDPs and, 77; military in, 81, 82; NATO and, 29; operational collaboration and, 77; operational collaboration stages in, 78 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), 80 Decisionmaking cooperation: effects of, 127–128, 141–143; international legitimacy and, 142; ISAF for, 132; non-UN missions legitimacy with, 141; normative framework of, 190. See also Joint decisionmaking Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), 90, 100, 136, 140 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 2, 190; crisis in, 89–103; Darfur and, 103; militias in, 90; operational collaboration and, 89; in 2013, 135– 141. See also Bunia; Eastern Congo; Goma; Ituri; Kinshasa Denmark, 11n15, 123, 158, 160 DFS. See UN Department of Field Support Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana, 156 DPA. See Darfur Peace Agreement DPKO. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC. See Democratic Republic of Congo

226

Index

DRC Armed Forces (FARDC), 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 112n120, 147n48 Duke, Simon, 93 EASBRIG. See Eastern Africa Standby Brigade EASF. See Eastern Africa Standby Force Eastern bloc states, 17 Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), 25, 159, 160. See also Eastern Africa Standby Force Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), 25, 160, 167. See also Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Eastern Congo, 89–90, 101, 135–136. See also Bunia; Goma; Ituri ECCAS. See Economic Community of Central African States ECOMICI. See ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) ECOMIL. See ECOWAS Mission in Liberia ECOMOG. See ECOWAS (Ceasefire) Monitoring Group Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/ CEEAC), 20, 25, 71, 74, 167 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 1, 20, 24, 25, 55, 71, 72, 118, 119, 121, 160, 168tab ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS (Ceasefire) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 24, 39n20, 71, 72, 74, 118, 119, 121, 145n1 ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) (ECOMICI), 74, 76, 145n12, 183n49 ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), 72 EEAS. See European External Action Service EIFORCES. See International School for Security Forces Endorsement: authorization and, 115– 119; motivations for, 120–121; non-UN peacekeeping and, 118; UN Security Council and, 118, 146n27 Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program, 175 ERRF. See European Rapid Reaction Force

ESS. See European Security Strategy EU. See European Union EU Battlegroup (EUBG), 26; EUFOR and, 98; full operational capability of, 26; military guard and, 100; Operation Artemis and, 95 EU Force Althea, 28, 71 EU Force Libya, 20, 69 EU Force RCA, 76, 119 EU Force RD Congo, 90, 96–99, 102, 103 EU Force Tchad/ RCA, 75, 100–101, 113n136, 119 EULEX. See EU Rule of Law Mission EUPM. See EU Police Mission (Bosnia) EUPOL Afghanistan. See EU Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan EU Police Mission (EUPM, Bosnia), 74, 106n3 EU Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan, 106n3, 128 European External Action Service (EEAS), 28, 41n45, 101, 169 European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), 26, 92, 95 European Security Strategy (ESS), 26, 40n37 European Union (EU): APF and, 166– 167, 169; AU and, 151, 166; autonomy and, 98–99, 102–103, 104– 105; capacity building and, 105, 151, 166–170; civilian capabilities and, 26–27, 102; conflict management and, 17, 23, 102; crisis management and, 5, 17, 26–28, 41n43, 119; Macedonia operations of, 122; NATO cooperation with, 28–29, 92, 124– 126; military capabilities and, 26, 27, 41n44; operational collaboration and, 92–103, 124, 128; operational support structures of, 28; Operation Artemis and, 96; peacekeeping framework of, 26; peacekeeping missions and, 2, 3, 5, 7, 20–22, 23; political baggage of, 143; UN and, 35, 94–95, 96, 102– 103, 194; WEU and, 26, 28, 40n35. See also EU Battlegroup EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), 74 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations, 111n110 Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod), 52

Index FARDC. See DRC Armed Forces FDLR. See Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda FIB. See Force Intervention Brigade Finland, 11n15, 168 Follow-on deployment (FOD), 72, 74, 75 Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), 90, 135–141; African actors and, 138, 139–140; AU and, 138, 140–141; negotiations for, 136–138; UN and, 138, 139–140 Formed police unit (FPU), 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 89, 172, 174 FPRI. See Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri FPU. See Formed police unit Framework for the Ten–Year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP), 164, 184n78 France, 3, 6, 17, 28, 41n44, 76, 92, 93, 98, 100, 167, 168tab, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 185n94 Franke, Benedikt, 176 G8. See Group of Eight G8++ Africa Clearing House (ACH), 172, 174, 187n125 GATT. See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade Gelot, Linnéa, 86, 108n48 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 56 Generalized trust, 52, 67n26; peacekeeping cooperation and, 52 Geogia, 2, 22, 23 Germany, 9n1, 41n44, 93, 98, 100, 129, 169, 171 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, 90–91 Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), 173, 174, 175 Global peacekeeping cooperation, 1; cooperation theories and, 50–54; global security governance and, 3–4, 191–192; as regime, 8, 54–59; UN and, 37. See also International cooperation; Peacekeeping cooperation; Peacekeeping cooperation regime Global security governance, 1, 3–4; COD and, 104; complications for, 104–105, 143–144, 178–179, 193–195;

227

constitutive effects and, 61; definition of, 60; effects on, 103–106, 141–144, 176–180, 191–195; global peacekeeping cooperation and, 3–4, 191–192; implications for, 60–62; peacekeeping cooperation regime and, 60–62; regulative effects and, 60–61 Goma, 99, 136. See also Eastern Congo GPOI. See Global Peace Operations Initiative Great Britain. See United Kingdom Grotius, Hugo, 46 Group of Eight (G8), 171–176: action plans of, 172–173; Africa and, 179; AU with, 157, 172; capacity building and, 2, 151–152, 172–173; implementation of, 173–174; members of, 171, 186n108; overview of, 171; P3 initiative and, 175–176; as peacekeeping actors, 171; peacekeeping with, 2; Sea Island Summit (2004) and, 152, 171–172 Guéhenno, Jean-Marie, 34, 96–97 Guinea-Bissau, 2, 23, 69, 71, 121 Gulf War, 6 Hegemony, 49 Helsinki Headline Goal, 26 Helsinki Headline Goal 2010, 95 Hobbes, Thomas, 45 Humanitarian aid, 6 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (Darfur), 78 Hybrid operation, 83–85 Ibrahim, Khalil, 77 ICGLR. See International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Ideational, 51 Identity, 47, 52–53, 60, 61, 66n9, 189, 193; NATO and, 143, 191; regional organizations and, 15–18. See also Transnational identity; Shared identities IDPs. See Internally displaced persons IFOR. See NATO Implementation Force IGAD. See Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGADD. See Intergovernmental Authority of Drought and Development

228

Index

Indonesia, 7, 11n15, 43n78 Institutionalism, 48: anarchy and, 48; constructivist version of, 49–50; cooperation and, 48; hegemony and, 49; instrumentalist version of, 48–49; international cooperation and, 48–49; regimes and, 49; shared identities and, 49–50 Instrumentalism, 51; actors choice in, 47; anarchy and, 47; context for, 52–53; cooperation and, 47; insights from, 52; institutionalism and, 48–49; international cooperation and, 46; problems with, 51–52 Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), 5–6, 22, 75tab INTERFET. See International Force for East Timor Intergovernmental Authority of Drought and Development (IGADD), 24 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 24 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 77, 92 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), 135, 136– 139 International cooperation: constructivism and, 47–48; future of, 196; institutionalism and, 48–50; instrumentalism and, 47; peacekeeping and, 1, 196; peacekeeping cooperation and, 1, 4, 196; regimes and, 49–50; theories of, 45–50 International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), 6, 22, 31, 75tab International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, 2 International organizations, 15–16, 49, 52; post–Cold War and, 15–18 International School for Security Forces (EIFORCES), 174 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2, 5, 29, 128–135; Afghanistan and, 23, 128–129; for decisionmaking cooperation, 132; mission of, 129; Operation Enduring Freedom and, 130, 131; Operation Resolute Support and, 106n8, 129

Intrastate conflicts, 13–15, 31, 38n1, 53 Iraq, 23, 29, 98 Iraq War, 92, 93 ISAF. See International Security Assistance Force Italy, 168, 169, 171, 174 Ituri, 72, 91, 99. See also Bunia; Eastern Congo Ivory Coast, 2, 6, 74, 76 Japan, 11n15, 171 JEM. See Justice and Equality Movement Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 57tab, 167, 169 Joint AU/UN Action Plan for UN Assistance to AU Peacekeeping Capacity Building, 164 Joint decisionmaking, 3, 8, 55, 63–64, 190–191; ambiguities in, 104–105; authorization and, 115–119; capacity building and, 55; complications of, 143–144; cooperation and, 190–191; effects of, 141–143; endorsement and, 115–119; in 1990–2016, 116tab– 117tab; operational collaboration and, 55, 115, 121, 179; peacekeeping cooperation and, 141; peacekeeping expectations of, 139–140; political and strategic cooperation and, 55, 122, 141; rules and procedures in, 55; UN Charter and, 120; UN Security Council and, 115, 118, 192. See also Decisionmaking cooperation Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, 94 Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation, 132–133 Joint operation (JOP), 72, 74 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), 77, 80 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 89, 90 Kabul, 130, 131 Kant, Immanuel, 46 Kazakhstan, 30, 42n58 KFOR. See NATO Kosovo Force Khartoum, 77, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 88. See also Darfur Kinshasa, 97, 98, 99. See also Democratic Republic of Congo Kosovo, 5, 23, 29, 31, 34, 72, 74, 123,

Index 127, 132. See also NATO Kosovo Force Kosovo Liberation Army, 123 Kouchner, Bernard, 100 Krasner, Stephen D., 49, 66n16 Kyrgyzstan, 38n16, 42n58 Lamamra, Ramtane, 138 League of Arab States (LAS), 30 Legitimacy: international, 3, 36, 61, 63, 83, 84, 86, 104, 115, 118, 120, 126, 127, 141–142, 190, 191–192; local, 86, 104, 120, 126, 190; for military action, 118–119, 120, 127, 142; selfdefense norm and, 131 Lesotho, 69, 119, 137–138 Libya, 11n15, 20, 23, 89, 148n63 Lord’s Resistance Army, 6 M23. See March 23 Movement Macedonia, 2, 23, 28, 69, 71, 74, 76, 92, 106n1, 121, 122–128, 191, 194; Albanians in, 123; EU operations in, 122–123; government requests of, 124; NATO operations in, 123, 124; UN role in, 125–126, 191, 194 MAES. See AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros March 23 agreements, 90, 101, 135 March 23 Movement (M23), 90, 101, 135–136, 137, 139, 140 Materialist, 51 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (OAU), 16, 162 Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS), 24, 39n20 MICOPAX. See Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic Middle East, 2, 7, 15, 102 Military capabilities: African peacekeeping and, 140–141; authorization and, 118–119; EUBG and, 92–93, 100 Military Staff Committee (MSC), 155 Military Technical Agreement (MTA), 130 Militias, 77, 90, 91, 126, 140 Minnawi, Minni, 77 MINURCA. See UN Mission in the Central African Republic

229

MINURCAT. See UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINUSCA. See UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MISAB. See Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements MISCA. See AU-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), 121, 145n3 Mission management, 152, 153; African peacekeeping and, 155; capacity building and, 162–165, 179, 194 MONUC. See UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUSCO. See UN Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo MSC. See Military Staff Committee MTA. See Military Technical Agreement Multinational forces, 31, 75tab, 91, 137, 143, 158 Multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), 8, 157–161, 179; ASF and, 159–160, 177, 179; capacity building and, 159–160; creation of, 158; rapid deployment and, 158; UNSAS and, 157–158 Muskoka Summit (2010), 171, 173 NAC. See North Atlantic Council National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), 90, 99, 100, 101, 135, 147n48 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), 31, 71, 118, 131 NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), 31, 123, 124, 127, 131 NATO Response Force (NRF), 29, 42n52, 134 NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), 28, 31, 71, 118, 131 Netherlands, 129

230

Index

Neutral International Force (NIF), 136– 137, 138–139, 147n56 New Horizon agenda, 34–35 NIF. See Neutral International Force Nigeria, 74, 148n63, 157, 160, 175 9/11 attacks, 129 Nkunda, Laurent, 99, 100 Non-UN peacekeeping, 18–22; joint decisionmaking and, 63–64; limitations of, 33; operational collaboration and, 69–76; stand-alone missions of, 72; UN Security Council and, 64. See also Regional peacekeeping Norms, 56–59, 66n16 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 28, 134 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2, 17–18, 29, 134; Allied Harmony and, 124; Amber Fox and, 123; autonomy and, 124; crisis management and, 18, 29, 134; Darfur and, 29; Essential Harvest and, 123; EU cooperation with, 28–29, 92, 124– 126; ISAF and, 129, 132; joint decisionmaking and, 118–119; Kosovo intervention of, 6, 34; OAU recommendations of, 161; operational collaboration and, 72, 76, 124, 128; peacekeeping and, 134, 143, 191, 194; security role of, 17–18, 143; Strategic Concept and, 18, 29; UNAMID and, 3; WEU and, 17, 41n47. NRF. See NATO Response Force OAS. See Organization of American States OAU. See Organization for African Unity Obama, Barack, 133 OCHA. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Official development aid (ODA), 172 Ohrid Framework Agreement (Albania), 123, 124–125 Operation Alba, 6, 22, 31, 72, 121 Operational capability, 30, 152, 153, 158, 178 Operational collaboration, 3, 8, 63, 69, 190; capacity building and, 55, 64,

149, 177; complications of, 104–105; cross-regional instances of, 76, 194; Darfur and, 77; DRC and, 89; effects of, 103–104; EU and, 92–103, 124, 128; joint decisionmaking and, 55, 115, 121,179; NATO and, 72, 76, 124, 128; from 1990–2016, 70tab–71tab; operational experiences and, 149; Operation Artemis and, 97; patterns of, 72–74, 76; peacekeeping requirements and, 63; rules and procedures in, 55; UN and, 72, 75–76, 190, 194; UNMIS and, 78–79 Operation Allied Harmony, 123, 124 Operation Amber Fox, 123, 124, 126, 127, 146n27 Operation Artemis, 72, 90, 92–96, 97 Operation Boleas, 39n23, 72, 121, 137 Operation Concordia, 123, 124, 125, 128 Operation Deny Flight, 20, 72 Operation Enduring Freedom, 130, 131, 132, 133 Operation Essential Harvest, 123, 126, 127, 146n27 Operation Licorne, 6, 76, 120 Operation Palliser, 6, 121 Operation Resolute Support, 106n8, 129 Operation Sangaris, 76, 120 Organization for African Unity (OAU), 7, 11n14, 16, 22, 150, 161, 162, 163, 184n65 Organization of American States (OAS), 22, 39n17, 143 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 7, 38n16, 123, 125, 128 Oye, Kenneth A., 49 P3 initiative, 175, 176 Pan-African Peacekeeping Forces (Chad), 22 Partnership peacekeeping, 36: AU and, 87, 178; UN and, 34–35, 36–37, 58– 59; UNSAS and, 159. See also Peacekeeping cooperation Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FPRI), 91, 99 Patterns: of conflict, 18, 32; of cooperative behavior, 47, 48; of peacekeeping cooperation, 3, 8, 54–

Index 55, 62, 190–191; of operational collaboration, 72–74, 76 Peacebuilding missions, 69 Peace enforcement, 5, 31, 137, 139, 140, 144 Peacekeeping: actors of, 1; AU vision for, 140–141, 179; Ban Ki-moon and, 34, 36; Boutros-Ghali criticism of, 31; capacity building and, 149; CIS activities and, 22; conflict management and, 6, 7, 37; definition of, 4–7; diversification of, 4–5; EU and, 3, 5, 7, 20–22, 23, 26–27; G8 and, 2, 171; IGAD and, 24; international cooperation and, 1, 196; joint decisionmaking expectations for, 139–140; NRF and, 29; ODA and, 172; operational collaboration requirements for, 63; partnerships for, 178; peace enforcement and, 5, 31, 137, 139, 140, 144; post–Cold War and, 22, 37, 189; SADC and, 137; small missions of, 6–7; UN and, 1. See also Regional peacekeeping; UN peacekeeping; specific topics Peacekeeping actors: authorization for, 118–120; expansion of, 18–32; G8 as, 171; instrumentalism choice of, 47; mission management and, 152, 153; regional concentration of, 19; transnational identity and, 48; UN and, 193 Peacekeeping cooperation: challenges for, 178, 193–195; future of, 195; generalized trust with, 52; ideational motives for, 51; international cooperation and, 1, 4, 196; joint decisionmaking and, 141; materialist motives for, 51; patterns of, 3, 8, 54– 55, 62, 190–191; as regime, 8, 54–59, 192; second-order cooperation and, 53, 54; theoretical eclecticism and, 51; transnational cooperation and, 54. See also Global peacekeeping cooperation; International cooperation; Peacekeeping cooperation regime Peacekeeping cooperation regime: articulation of, 54–59; constitutive effects of, 61; emergence of, 189; global security governance and, 60–

231

62; international cooperation and, 196; norms in, 56–59, 57tab; post– Cold War and, 189; principles in, 56; procedures in, 55–56; regulative effects of, 60–61; rules in, 55–56; second-order cooperation and, 54, 189 Peacekeeping forces, 6, 30, 38 Peacekeeping missions: Afghanistan and, 132; ASF and, 25; AU and, 23; in Eastern Congo, 89–90; EU and, 2, 3, 5, 7, 20–22, 23; joint decisionmaking for, 115–118; OAU and, 22; operational collaboration of, 69–75 Peacekeeping operations, 19tab–20tab, 21tab. See also Peacekeeping; Peacekeeping missions Peacekeeping partnership. See Partnership peacekeeping Peace Operations 2010 reform process, 34 Peace support operation (PSO), 5, 87, 150–151, 152, 172 Peace Support Team, 86–87, 164 Petersberg tasks, 26, 40n35, 40n37, 92 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, 153–155, 157, 159, 160, 178, 181n20 Political missions, 7, 69 Post–Cold War: Africa and, 149–150; Cold War discontinuity between, 38n3; Eastern bloc states and, 17; international organizations and, 15– 18; intrastate conflicts and, 13–15, 53; peacekeeping cooperation regime and, 189; regional peacekeeping and, 22, 37, 189. See also Cold War Principles, 56, 66n16 Prisoner’s dilemma, 47, 52 Procedures, 55–56, 66n16 Prodi Report, 87, 88 Prodi, Romano, 87 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 25, 153, 155, 161, 181n21 Proxy wars, 150 PSC. See AU Peace and Security Council PSO. See Peace support operation PSOD. See AU Peace Support Operations Division

232

Index

Al Qaeda, 129, 130 Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), 90–91, 147n48 RAMSI. See Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands Rapid deployment: ASF and, 153, 154, 156, 160; EU and, 92, 95; SHIRBRIG and, 158; UNSAS and, 157 RCD. See Rally for Congolese Democracy RECAMP. See Reinforcement of African Capacities to Maintain Peace Regimes: constitutive effects and, 9, 60, 61; institutionalism and, 49; international cooperation and, 49–50; peacekeeping cooperation as, 8, 54– 59, 192; regulative effects of, 9, 60–61; salience of, 59; UN dependency of, 194 Regional arrangements: cooperation forms for, 31–32; UN Charter and, 58, 63, 120. See also Regional organizations Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 6, 22, 72 Regional leadership, 58–59 Regional organizations, 1, 15–22; Asia and, 22; Cold War and, 16; conflict management and, 15–16; identity and, 15–18; regional threats and, 15–16; strengths of, 36; UN dialogue with, 35. See also Regional arrangements Regional peacekeeping, 18–30; AU development of, 24–26, 153–157; CSTO development of, 30; EU development of, 26–28; institutional vacuum of, 24; NATO development of, 29; Post–Cold War and, 22, 37, 189; training centers of, 173–174; UN Security Council and, 115, 118, 192. See also Non-UN peacekeeping Regulative effects, 9, 60–61 Reinforcement of African Capacities to Maintain Peace (RECAMP), 167– 169, 175 Robust peacekeeping, 6, 10n10, 132 Ruggie, John G., 49 Rules, 55–56, 66n16 Russia, 17, 22, 38n16, 42n58, 134, 186n108

Rwanda, 5, 6, 7, 89, 91, 99, 100, 136, 137, 138, 140, 175 SADC. See Southern African Development Community Salim, Ahmed Salim, 16 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 100 Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 134 Sea Island Summit (2004), 152, 171, 172–173 Second-order cooperation, 52; peacekeeping cooperation as, 53, 54, 189 Security Council. See UN Security Council Seko, Mobutu Sese, 89 SFOR. See NATO Stabilization Force Shadow of the future, 47, 48, 52, 65n8, 87 Shadow of the past, 52, 65n8 Shared identities: constructivism and, 47–48; institutionalism and, 49–50 SHIRBRIG. See Multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations Sierra Leone, 2, 6, 74, 119, 121 Slim, Hugo, 14 SLM/A. See Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Small missions, 6–7, 23, 38n16, 39n17, 131 Smith, Adam, 46 Somalia, 2, 5, 6, 15, 20tab, 23, 24, 25, 31, 69, 72, 134, 140–141, 175 South Africa, 90, 91, 93, 137–138, 140, 148n63, 157, 168, 175, 182n33, 182n34 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 19, 22, 24, 25, 39n23, 39n24, 136–137, 168 Stabilization, 5, 28, 75, 78, 127, 131, 132, 133, 173, 194 Stanger, Allison, 52 Strategic trust, 67n26 Subregional organizations, 20, 24, 25– 26, 31, 33, 35, 74, 138, 150, 151, 152, 159, 162, 163, 164, 167, 172 Sudan, 77–88. See also Darfur; Khartoum Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), 77, 80

Index Suhrke, Astri, 133 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, 31– 32, 33, 37, 58, 162 Sweden, 11n15, 93 Switzerland, 97, 183n48 Taliban, 129, 130, 133 Theoretical eclecticism, 50–51, 189 Transnational cooperation, 53–54; transnational identity and, 48, 49 Transnational identity, 48; transnational cooperation and, 49, 53–54 Treaty of Maastricht, 26 Turkey, 29, 97, 129 TYCBP. See Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme Ukraine, 134 Uganda, 6, 89, 91, 136, 137, 182n34 UN. See United Nations UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), 78; UNMIS and, 79 UNAMID. See AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur UNAMIS. See UN Advance Mission in the Sudan Undefeatable Brotherhood exercise, 30 UN Department of Field Support (DFS), 10, 34 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 10, 34, 72 UN General Assembly, 1 UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 32, 74 United Kingdom, 3, 6, 17, 41n44, 93, 97, 98, 100, 129, 130, 131, 168, 169, 171, 173, 175 United Nations (UN): African peacekeeping and, 150–151, 161– 166; conflict management and, 15, 31–32, 35; EU and, 35, 94–95, 96, 102–103, 194; financial resources through, 121; future role of, 195; hybrid operations and, 83–85; leadership expectations for, 37, 195; logistic resources though, 121; NIF incorporation by, 139; operational capabilities and, 158; operational collaboration and, 72, 75–76, 190, 194; peacekeeping actors and, 193;

233

peacekeeping and, 1; primacy (centrality) of, 32, 37, 57–58, 64, 76, 94, 101, 102, 103, 130, 132, 143, 190, 192; PSO and, 5; regime dependency on, 194; responsibility of, 1, 58, 84, 94, 103, 162 United States, 3, 17, 18, 42n52, 79, 123, 124, 129, 171, 174, 175 UNMIK. See UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMIS. See UN Mission in Sudan UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), 69, 75tab UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), 74, 75, 100, 106n7, 183n49 UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 72–73, 78–79, 183n49 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), 69, 74, 76 UNOAU. See UN Office to the AU UNOCI. See UN Operation in Ivory Coast UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 20 UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), 86–87, 164, 165 UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI), 74, 75, 183n49 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 32, 89, 90, 91–92, 95, 96, 97–98, 99–100, 113n127 UN Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 90, 99, 101, 135, 137– 139, 141 UN peacekeeping: Africa and, 150–151, 161–166; deployments, 1990–2016, 73tab; reduction in, 31; reform of, 32–37; resources for, 33; surge in, 31, 32; UN General Assembly and, 1; uniformed personnel and, 75. See also Peacekeeping; United Nations UNSAS. See UN Standby Arrangements System UN Secretary-General, 15, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 58, 79, 80, 81–82, 84, 85, 91,

234

Index

93, 95, 100, 119, 121, 138, 150, 159, 162, 164, 165, 178 UN Security Council: Afghanistan role of, 130; authorization and, 115; endorsement and, 118, 146n27; engagement timing of, 118; joint decisionmaking and, 115, 118, 192; MONUSCO and, 135; NIF and, 138; non-UN peacekeeping and, 64; Prodi Report and, 87; regional peacekeeping and, 115, 118, 192; resolutions, 119, 127

UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), 157–158 UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 32, 75tab UN Truce Supervision Organization, 1 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VTJF), 134 Western Europe, 16, 17 Western European Union (WEU), 17, 26, 28, 40n35, 41n47

About the Book

Though historically the term peacekeeping has essentially been shorthand for UN peacekeeping, recent years have seen a proliferation of actors and initiatives in a shift to global peacekeeping cooperation. Hikaru Yamashita explores the motivations behind this development, what forms it is taking, and what it means for the international community. His comprehensive account of peacekeeping cooperation offers both an original theoretical framework and rich case studies drawn from Afghanistan, Congo, Macedonia, and Sudan. Hikaru Yamashita heads the Government and Law Division in the Security Studies Department of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies.

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