The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 0268004463, 9780268004460

Citation preview

The New Rhetoric A Treatise on Argumentation

The New Rhetoric A Treatise on Argumentation

CH. PERELMAN and L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA Translated by JOHN WILKINSON AND PURCELL WEAVER Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

UNIVERSITY NOTRE

OF

DAME

NOTRE

DAME

PRESS

Copyright © 1969 by University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 www.undpress.nd.edu First paperback edition in 1971 Reprinted in 1971, 1975, 1978, 1982, 1988, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2008 Manufactured in the United States of America

Originally published as La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l’Argumentation Presses Universitaires de France, 1958

ISBN 13: 978-0-268-00446-0 (pbk.) ISBN 10: 0-268-00446-3 (pbk.) ISBN 13: 978-0-268-00191-9 (hardback) ISBN 13: 978-0-268-17510-8 (web pdf) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 68-20440

This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [email protected]

∞ This book is printed on acid-free paper.

FOREWORD

On the o ccasion of the publication of the American edition of The New Rhetoric, I would like to extend my warmest thanks to those in the United States who have helped me make my ideas known here or who have facilitated the appearance of this book. I am grateful to Professor Richard P. McKeon of the University of Chicago, who in 1 95 1 recommemled to Ethics our first article to appear in America, "Act and Person in Argument." Mr. Henry vV. Johnstone, Jr. , was the first person to draw the attention of the Amer­ ican public to our work through his critical article published in Phi­ losophy and Phenomeno logica l Research in 1 954. It was through him and Professor Robert T. Oliver, past president of the American Speech Association, that I received a j oint invitation from the Departments of Philosophy and Speech at Pennsylvania State University, where I gave a seminar on "The Philosophical Foundation of Argumen­ tation." Thanks to Professor Oliver, I was able to present my ideas at an annual meeting of the American Speech Association at Denver in 1 963. These efforts at collaboration between philosophers and specialists in the techniques of speech and communication were con­ tinued in 1964 through a colloquium at Pennsylvania State University on the theme "Philosophy and Rhetoric," and have culminated in the appearance of a new review, Phi losophy and Rhetoric, in 1 968, under the editorship of Henry \.V. Johnstone, Carroll C. Arnold, and Thomas Olbricht. I also wish to thank those colleagues who have been kind enough to invite m e to present my ideas at the University of Chicago, C ornell University, Harvard University, and the University of Pennsylvania. The invitation which I received from Carl J. Friedrich , head of the Department of Political Science at Harvard, was preceded by a generous review which he had published in 1 962 in the Natura l Law Forum. It was through him that I first met the editor of this review,

VI

THE NEW RHETOH I C

Professor John T. Noonan, Jr. , presently at B erkeley, who published certain of my articles and recommended my work to the University of Notre D ame Press. I wish lo thank the director of that press, :\Iiss Emily Schossberger, for taking the risks involved in bringing out a work which is compactly written and demands close study from the very outset. Finally, my sincere thanks go to the Cen ter for the Study of De­ mocratic Institutions at Santa Barbara. Mr. John Wilkinson, who is its director of studies on the theme "The Civilization of Dialogue, " has enthusiastically propagated my ideas and has also translated part of the present treatise. But I know that withou t President Hobert M. Hutchins, who supported my efforts and granted a generous sub­ vention for translation , this volume would not have seen the light of day. I wish to thank him sincerely for his support and help. Ch. P .

CONTENTS

v

FOREWORD

1

INTRODUCTION

PART THE

§

ONE OF ARGUMENTATION

FRAMEWORK

1.

Demonstration and

8.

Argumentation The Contact of Minds The Speaker and His Audience The Audience as a Construction of the Speaker Adaptation of the Speaker to the Audience Persuading and Convincing The Universa l Audience Argumentation Before Single Hearer

9.

Self-Deliberating

2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

a

of

Argumentation

10.

The Effects

The Epidictic Genre

12.

Education and

13. 14.

THE

§

17 19 23 26 31 35

45 47

Propaganda

51

Ar umentation g

and

Violence

54

Argumentation

and

Commitment

59

TWO STARTING

POINT

OF

ARGUMENT

Agreement

I.

13 14

40

11.

PART

11

63 65

15.

The

16.

Facts

Premises and

17.

Presum

18.

Values

of

Truths

tions p

Argumentation

65 67 70 74

VIII

RHETORIC

THE NEW

19. Abstract Values and Concrete Values 20. Hierarchies 21. Loci 22. Loci of Quantity 23. L o ci of Quality 24. Other Loci 25.

Use

and

of

Systematization

Loci;

77 80 83 85

89 93 Classical

Outlook

and Romantic Outlook

II.

95

of Certain Special

26.

Agreements

27.

Agreements Pa rticular to

28.

Argumentation

of

The Choice

99

Audiences

Each Discussion

ad Hominem

Begging

and

Adaptation for

Data and Their

the

Question

104 110

Argumentative

Purposes

§

III.

115

29.

Selection

30.

The

Interpretation

of Data

and Presence

Interpretation

of the

31.

The

32.

Choice of Qualifiers

33.

On the Use of Notions

34.

Clarification

35.

Argumentative Usage

and

120 Discourse

Obscuration

and

Form

of

36.

Content

37.

Technical Problems i n

38.

Verbal

39.

Modalities

Forms in

Its

the

the

Discourse

the

of

of

149 1

Thought

Figu res

42.

Figures

Ch oice,

of

Audience

Argumentation

Presence,

Presentation

of

and the

I.

OF

General

of

the

A rgu1

79

185

A RGUMENTATION

1

Remarks

Quasi- Logical §

63

THREE

TECHNIQUES

§ 44.

54

171

Communion Elements

1

167

mentation P ART

42

1 43

Data

Form of the Discourse and Communion with the and

33

142

Presentation

Expression

30

1

Discourse

Rhetorical

and

26

138

Plasticity of Notions

and

41.

Status

123

1

1

of Notions

40.

43.

Problems

Argumentation

and th e

and

1

of Data and Form of

Presentation

§

of Data

115

45.

The

Contra d i cti o n

47.

Proce d ure s

for

48.

Techni

for

Character isti cs

qu

193

Arguments

46 .

es

compatible

a nd

87

of

Quasi-L ogical

1

Argumentation

Avoiding

Incompatibility

Presenting

Theses

as

Compatible

1 or

93

195

Incompatibility

97

In201

Contents The Ridiculous and Its R ole in Argumentation Identity and Definition in Argumentation 51 Analyticity, Analysis, and Tautology 5 2 . The Rule of Justice 5 3 . Arguments of Reciprocity 54. Arguments by Transitivity 5 5 . I nclusion of the Part in the Whole 56. D ivision of the Whole into Its P arts 57. Arguments by C omparison 58. Argumentation by Sacrifice 5 9. Probabilities 49.

205

50.

210 21 4

.

I I.

IX

218 221

227 231 234 242 248

255 261

Arguments Based on the Structure of Real ity

§ 60. General Considerations

261

6 1 . The Causal Link and Argumentation 263 62. The Pragmatic Argument 266 63. The Causal Link as the Relation of a Fa ct to Its Con270 sequence or of a Mea ns to Its End 273 64. E n d s a n d Means 65. Th e Argu m e n t of Waste 279 66. Th e Arg u m e n t of Di re ctio n 281 67. Unlimited D e v el o p m e nt 287 68. Th e Person a n d His A cts 293 296 69. Intera ction of Act a n d Person 70. A rg u m e n t f r o m A uth o r i ty 305 71. T e ch n i qu es of S e v e r a n ce a n d Restr a i n t Oppose d to th e Act-Person Interaction 310 72. Th e Speech a s an Act of th e Spe a k e r 316 321 73. Th e Grou p a n d Its Members 74. Oth er Rel a t i o n s of Coex i ste n c e : Act a n d Ess e n ce 327 75. Th e Sym bol i c Rel a ti o n 331 76.

Th e Dou b l e H i era rchy

Argu m e n t

as

Ap p l i e d

to

Se-

q u enti a l Rel a t i o n s a nd Rel a t i o n s of Coex i sten ce

77. I I I.

§

Argum e n t s Con cern i n g D i ffere n c e s of D egree a n d of Ord er

The Relations Es tablishing the Structure of Reality 78.

A rgu m en t a t i o n by Ex a m p l e

79.

I l l u stra t i o n

80. M o d e l a n d Anti -M o d e l 81 .

T h e Perfect B e i n g a s Mo d el

82.

Wh a t Is An a l ogy ?

83.

Rel a ti o n s B etwee n th e Term s of a n A n al ogy

84.

Effects of An a l ogy

337 345 350 350 357 362 368 371 375 381

X

THE

N EW RHETO R I C

85. 86. 87. 88.

How Analogy Is Used The Status of Analogy Metaphor Dormant Metaphors or Expressions with a Metaphorical Meaning

§ 89. Breaking of Connecting Link s and Dissociatio n

90. The "Appearance-Reality" Pair 91. Philosophical Pairs and Their Justification 92. The Role of Philosophical Pairs and Their Transformations 93. The Expression of Dissociations 94. Statements Prompting Dissociation 95. Dissociative Definitions 96. Rhetoric as a Process V.

398 405 411

The D issociation of Concepts

IV.

385 393

411 415

420 426 436 442 444 450

The Interaction of Arguments

460

97 Interaction a n d Strength of Arguments 98. Assessm ent of the Str e ngth of A rguments in Argum entation 99. I ntera ction by C onvergence 100. A m plitu d e of th e Argu m entation 101. The Dangers of A m p l i tu d e 102. Offs e t ti n g the Da ngers of A m pl itu de 103. Ord er a n d Persu a sion

460

§

.

104.

as a

Th e O r d e r o f th e Speech and Con d itioning of

d i en ce 105. Order a n d Meth od

Fa ctor 465

471 474 479

486 490 the Au­

495 502

CONCLUSION

509

BIBLIOGRAPHY

515

INDICES

543

INT RO D UCT ION

I The p ublication of a treatise dev o te d to subject's

argum entati o n and this

c onnection with the ancient tra dition of Greek rhetoric

a n d d ialectic constitutes a

due to Descartes

break w i th a con cep t of reason an d reason ing

which has set its

m a rk o n W estern

p h ilosophy

for the l a s t three centuries.1 Although it would scarcely o c cur to p ower of

a nyone to

d eliberation a n d argumentation is

a

deny th at th e

distin ctive

sign of

a rea s o n a b le being, th e s t u d y of the meth o d s of proof u s e d to secure

adherence

has

tem ologists due

b een

for

completely

th e last three

n eglected centurie s .

by

logici a ns

This

state

a n d epis­

of affairs

is

to th e n o n co m p u l s i ve elem ent i n th e a rg u m en t s a d d u ced in

s u p p o rt o f a th es i s

.

Th e very nature of d eli b er a ti on a n d arg u m e n ta

­

ti o n i s o p p o se d to n e c ess i t y a n d self-evid en ce, sin ce no on e delibera tes wh e re th e s o l u t i o n i s n e c essa ry o r a rg u e s ag ai n s t wha t is s el f evi d en t -

.

Th e d o m a i n of a rg u m e n t a ti o n i s th at of th e credible, t h e p l a u s i bl e t h e p r ob a b l e to th e d egree t h a t th e l a tter el u d es th e c erta i nty of ,

,

c a l cu l a ti o n s

.

first p a rt of for fa l se

Now

Descartes'

c o n cept,

The Discourse on the

c l e a rly exp res s e d

Method,

in

th e

w a s to "take well n i gh

everyth i n g whi ch w a s o n ly p l a u s i b l e

."

I t wa s th i s p h i l os­

o p h er wh o m a d e th e sel f-evi d e n t th e m a rk of rea son , a n d con si d ered ra ti o n a l

o n ly th o s e d em o n stra ti o n s wh i ch , st a r ti ng from cle a r a n d

d i sti n ct i d ea s , exten d e d , by m e a n s of

apodictic

th e s elf­

proofs ,

evi d en c e o f th e a xiom s to th e d erived th eorem s. R e a soning

more geometrico was

th e m o d el propo sed to p h i l o s oph ers

d esirou s o f c o n stru cti n g a s y stem o f th ought wh i ch m igh t a ttai n

1 Cf.

Perel m a n ,

"R a ison

etern ell e, raison

h istorique, "

L'homme

et

Actes du V I• Co ngres des Societes de Philosophie de langue fran raise, pp.

l 'his toire , 347-354.

2

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

to the dignity of a science. A rational science cannot indeed be content with more or less probable opinions; it must elaborate a system of necessary prop ositions which will impose itself on every rational b eing, concerning which agreement is inevitable. This means that disagreement is a sign of error. ""Whenever two men come to opposite decisions about the same matter, " says D escartes, "one of them at least must certainly be in the wrong, and app arently there is not even one of them who knows ; for if the reasoning o f one w a s sound a n d clear he would b e able so to l a y it b efore the other as finally to succeed in convincing his understanding also . "2 What is important to the p artisans of the experimental and induc­ tive sciences is not so much the necessity of prop ositions as their truth, their conform i ty with facts. The empiricist considers as evi­ dence not "that which the mind does or must yield to, but that which it ough t to yield to, namely, that, by yielding to which, its b elief is kept conformable to fact. "3 The evidence which the em­ piricist recognizes is not that of rational but of sensible intuition, the method he advocates is not that o f the deductive but o f the experimental sciences, but he is nonetheless convinced that the o nly valid proofs are those recognized by the natural sciences. What conforms to scientific method is rational, in the broader sense o f the word. Works on logic devoted to the study o f the methods o f proof, essentially limited to the study of deduction, usually supplemented by some remarks on inductive reasoning which merely consider the means not of constructing, but of veri­ fying hypotheses, seldom venture to examine the proofs used in human sciences. The logician is indeed inspired by the Cartesian ideal and feels at ease only in studying those proofs which Aristotle styled analytic, since all other methods d o not manifest the same characteristic of necessity. This tendency has been strongly re­ inforced during the last century, a p erio d in which, under the in­ fluence of mathematical logicians, logic has been limited to formal logic, that is to the study of the metho ds of proof used in the math­ ematical sciences. The result is that reasonings extran eous to the domain of the purely formal elude logic altogether, and, as a con­ sequence, they also elude reason . This reason , which Descartes hoped would, at least in principle, solve all problems set to man th e solution of which is already p ossessed by the divine mind, has b ecome more and more limited in its j urisdiction, to the point that whatever

2

Descartes , Ru les for the Direction of the Itlind, GBWW, vol. 31, p. 2.

3 Mill, A System of Logic, bk. I I I, chap . XXI, § 1, p . 370.

Introductio n

3

eludes reduction to the formal presents it with unsurmountable difficulties. Must w e draw from this evolution of logic, and fro m the v ery real advances it has made, the conclusion that reason is entirely incompetent in those areas which elude calculation and that, wh ere neither experiment nor logical deduction is in a position to furnish the solution of a problem, we can but abandon ourselves to irratio n a l forces, instincts, suggestion, o r even violence? Pascal made an attempt to provide for the shortcomings of th e geometrical meth o d resulting from the fact that fallen man is no longer uniquely a rational being by opposing the will to the und er­ standing, the "esprit de finesse" to the "esprit de geometrie," the h eart to the head, and th e art of persuading to th e art of convincing. The Kantian opposition of faith and science and the B ergsonian antithesis of intuition and reason have a similar purpose. B u t, wh ether we consider rati onalist or so-called " a n tirationalist" phi­ losophers, they all carry o n the Cartesian tra diti o n by the limita­ tion they impose o n the concept of reason. We feel, o n th e contrary, th at j ust here lies a perfectly unjustified and unwarran ted l im i ta t ion of the doma in of act ion of our faculty of reason ing and proving. Whereas a lr e a d y A ri s totl e ha d a n a lyz e d d i a l ecti c a l p roof s t o geth er with a n a lytic p ro o fs th ose which con cern th e probable together with those wh i ch are necessary , th ose which a re u sed i n deli bera t i o n a n d a rgu m entation to get her with those wh i ch a re u sed in dem o n stra t i o n , th e p o st-Ca rtesi a n c o n cept of ,

elements

i n terve n e

every t i m e th e obj ect o f k n owledge is n o t sel f-evi d e n t.

rea son obliges us to m a k e

cert a i n

irrati o n a l

Whether

these elements c o n s i st o f obsta cles to be s u rmou nte d-such

as

i m a gi n a ti o n , passi o n , or suggestion-

or of suprara tio n a l sources of

certi tu d e su ch a s th e h e a rt, gra c e ,

"Ei n fu eh l u n g , " or B ergson i a n

i n tu i ti o n , th i s con cepti on i n trod u ces a d i ch o tomy, a d i fferentiatio n between h u m a n faculties, whi ch i s com pletely a rti fi cia l a n d c o ntrary to th e r e a l processes of o u r th o u g h t . I t i s th e idea of se lf-eviden ce a s ch a ra cteristi c of rea so n , wh i ch we m u st a ssa i l , if we a re to m a k e p l a ce for a th eory of a rg u m en ta­ ti o n th a t will a ck n owledge th e u se of rea son in d i recti n g our own a cti o n s a n d i n flu enci n g th ose of oth ers.

Sel f-evi d e n c e is c o n ceived

b o th a s a force to wh i ch every n o rm a l m i n d m u st y i el d a n d a s a sign o f th e tru th of th a t wh i ch i m poses i t sel f beca u se it is self­ evi d e n t .4

Th e self-ev i d e n t wou l d c o n n ect th e psychologi cal with

4 Perel m a n , "De Ia preuve en philosoph i e , " in Perel m a n and Ol b rechts-Tyteca, Rhetorique e t p h i losoph ie, pp . 1 2 3 et seq.

4

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

the logical and allow passage back and forth between these two levels . All proof would be reduction to the self-evident, and wh at i s self-evident would have n o need of proo f : such is t h e immediate application by P ascal of the C artesian theory of self-evidence.5 Leibniz rebelled against th e limitation imposed in this w ay on logic. It was his wish "tha t means be shown or given t o demonstrate all axioms which are not primitive; without distinction of wh atever opinions men h ave of them, or being concerned with wh ether they y ield assent to them or not. "6 Now the logical theory of demon stration d eveloped following Leibniz and not Pascal; it has never allowed that what was self­ evident h a d no need of proof. In the same way, the theory of ar­ gumentation cannot be developed if every proof i s co nceived of a s a redu ction to the self-evident. I n d eed , the obj e ct of the theory o f argumentation i s the study of the discursive techniques allowing u s t o induce o r t o increase the m ind's adherence t o the theses presented for i ts assent. What i s characteristic of the a dherence of minds is its variable inten sity: n othing constrains us to limit our study to a pa r ti cu l a r degree o f a dheren c e c h a ra cterized by self-evidence, and n o th i n g pe rmit s us to consider a priori the degre es of a dhere nce t o a thesi s a s proporti o n al to i t s pro b a b i lity and to i d entify self­ evi dence w i th t ru t h It i s g o o d pra ctice n o t to c o n fu se, at th e begi n n i n g, th e a spects of r e a s o ni n g relative to truth a n d th o s e relati ve to a dh eren ce, but to stu d y th em sep a r a tely even th o u gh we m i g ht h ave to ex a m i n e l a ter th e i r possi b l e i nterf ere nce or co rres p o n d e n ce .

,

.

Only o n th i s condi ti o n i s i t possib l e to d evel op a th e ory of a rgu m enta ­ ti on with a n y ph i l o soph i c a l scope.

II A lth ou gh d u ri n g th e l a st th ree centu ri es e c clesi a sti c s h a ve pub­ l i sh e d work s on problems of fa i th a n d prea ch i ng7 a n d though th e 20th century h a s even been d escri bed a s th e cen tu ry o f a d verti s i ng a n d propa g a n d a , a n d a l a rge n u m ber of work s h a ve b een d evoted to th a t s u bj ect,8 l ogi ci a n s a n d modern p h i l osoph ers h a ve b e c o m e

5 Pa scal , On Geometrica l Demon s tra tion, Section I I :

Concern ing

the

A r t of

Pers u a s i o n , GBWW, vol . 3 3 , p. 4 4 3 . 6 Lei b n i z , D i e Phi loso p h ischen Sch rifte n , vol. V ,

Nouvea ux ess ais

s ur

l'en tende­

men t , p. 67.

7

Cf. W h ately's

Elemen ts o f R h e toric, first publish ed i n

1828; a n d C a rdi n a l

Newm a n 's G rammar o f A ss e n t , whi ch appeared i n 1870. 8 See

La sswel l ,

C a s ey,

and

Smith,

Propaga n da

and

Prom o t iona l

A ct ivities,

Introduction

5

It is for this reason that the present book is mostly related to the concerns of the Renaissance a n d beyon d th a t , to those of certain Greek and Latin authors, who studied the art o f persuading and of convincing, the technique of d eliberati o n a n d of discussion. O u r work, th erefore is presented a s a new rhetoric. totally d isinterested i n our subject.

,

,

O ur a n alysis c o n cerns the

proofs which Aristotle termed "dia­ lecti c a l , " whi c h h e exa m i n e s in his Topics, a nd the utilization of whi c h he i n d i c a tes in h i s Rhetoric. This appeal to Aristotle's term inol ogy w o ul d ju stify th e "rappro chemen t " of th e th eory of argumentati o n w i th dialectic, conceived by Aristotle himself as the art of re a s on i n g from ge n er a l ly accepted opinions (ev.A.oyo�).9 However, a n u mb er of r e a so n s have led us to prefer a "rapproche­ ment" The

with r h et o r i c . first

of th ese reason s

is

the

served

for

Hegel

a nd

c e n turies

to

u nder the

d e sign a te

infl u ence

return

to

Although th e term dialectic i tself,

logic

of

w h i ch a

confusion

Ari stotl e's terminology might p ro du ce .

si n ce

the

i n spi red

d o ctrines

ti me

of

him,

it

by

h a s a cq u i re d a m e a n i ng whi ch i s very remote from i ts origin a l one a n d whi ch h a s b e c o m e generally accepted in contemporary

philosophy.

Th e s a m e c a n not be s a i d for t h e term rhetoric, wh i ch h a s fa llen into s u ch

even mentioned, for

desu etu d e th a t i t i s n ot

L a la n d e' s

p h i los o p h i c a l

co n tr i b u t e to th e rev i va l

A s e c o n d r e a s o n, which

we

s i d ered

with

d i a l ecti c

,

r h etori c

and

p a r a ll el

ru n n i ng

as

A.

hope

m oti v a t e d our ch oice: th e very spirit in wh i ch c ern ed

in

example,

that our a ttempts will of a n a n cient a n d gl ori ou s tradition. we con si d e r m u ch more i mp orta n t has

l exi con:

with

.

A n tiq uity was con­

Dialectical

a n a lytic

reasoning

is

con­

bu t treating

reasoning,

of t h at whi ch is pr o b a bl e i n stead of d ea l i ng with propositions which

n ecessary.

are

Th e v ery

i . e ., theses which

notion th at

a d h ere d

are

to

d i a lectic

with

variable

concerns

opinions,

i ntensity ,

is

not

exp l o i te d .

O n e m igh t th i n k th a t t h e sta tu s of t h a t which is subject

to

i s i m p erso n a l

opin i o n

th a t

and

and all

of th e m i n d s th e

a n ci e n t

to

wh i ch

th e o ri e s

are not relative

opinions

to the

On t h e contrary, this idea of adherence

minds wh i ch a d h ere to th em . a

of

d i s c ourse

rh e t o r i c.

is

a d d re ssed

Our

is

essential in

"rapprochement"

t h e l a t t e r a i m s a t e m p h a s izing t h e fact t h a t i t is in terms

of

with

an

au­

dience that an argumentation develops; t h e study of t h e opinionable, as

An

d escri b e d

Annotated

munication, 9

A ri s t o t l e.

in

th e

Topics, will have a place in thi s framework.

Bibliography; and

and

Public

Tooics.

I.

Smith,

Op in ion. 1.

100a.

A

Lasswell, and

Comprehensive

Casey,

Reference

Propaganda, Guide.

Com­

6

THE NEW RHETOH I C

It i s clear, ho wever, that our treatise on argumentation will, in certain respects, go far beyo n d t h e b o u n d s o f t h e ancient rhetoric and at the same time neglec t certain asp ects of the matter which drew the attentio n of the ancient masters of the art. Th eir obj ect was primarily the art of public speaking in a per­ suasive way: it was therefore concerned with the use o f the spoken word, with discourse to a crowd gathered in a public square, with a view to securing its adherence to the thesis presented. It is evident that the aim of oratory, the adherence of the minds addressed, is that o f all argumentation. \Ve see, h owever, no reason to limit our study to the presentation of an argument by means of the spoken word a n d to restrict th e kind of audience addressed to a crowd gathered in a square. The rej ection of the first limitation is clue to the fact that our interes ts are much more those of logicians desirous of understanding the mechanism of thought th an those of masters of eloquence desirous of making people practice their teaching. It is sufficient to cite the Rhetoric of Aris totle to show that our way of looking at rhetoric can take pride in illu strious examples. Our study, which is mainly concerned with the structure of argumentation, will not therefore insist on the way in which communication with th e audience takes place. I f it is true that the technique of public speaking differs from that of written argu mentation, our concern being to analyze ar­ gumentation, we cannot be limited to the examination of spoken discourse. Indeed, in view of th e importance of and the role played by the modern printing press , our analyses will primarily be con­ cerned with printed texts. O n the other hand, we shall completely neglect mnemonics and the study of delivery or oratorical effect. Such problems are Lh e province of conservatories and schools of dramatic art, and we can dispense with examining them. The result of our emphasis on written texts, since these latter o ccur in the most varied forms, is that our s tudy is conceiYed wiLh complete generality; it will not be confined to discourses considered a s a n en tity of more or less conventionally admitted structure and length . In our opinion discussion with a single interlocutor, or even with oneself, falls under a general theory o f argumentation, so that it is clear that our concept of the obj ect of our study goes far beyond th at of classical rhetoric. What we preserve o f the traditional rhetoric is Lhe idea o f the a udience, an idea immediately evoked b y the mere thought of a speech . Every speech is addressed to an audience and it is frequently

I ntroductio n

7

forgotten that thi s a pplies to ev erything written as well. Whereas a speech i s conceived in terms of the au dience, the physical absence of his readers can lead a writer to b elieve that he is alone in the world, though his text is always co nditioned, wheth er consciously or unconsciously, by those persons h e wishes t o a d dres s . Thus , f o r reasons o f technical convenience, and i n order n o t to lose sight of the essential role played by the aud ience , when we u se the terms "discourse, " "speaker, " and "aud ienc e , " we shall under­ stand by them, respectively, th e argumentation, the one who presents the argument, and those to whom it i s addressed. We sh a ll not dwell on wh ether or not the presentation is spoken or written, or distinguish b etween formal discourse and the fragmentary expre ssio n of thought. Among the a n cients, rhetoric a p p eared as the study of a techniqu e for use by th e common man impatient to arrive rap idly at conclu sio ns, or to form an opinion, with out first of a ll taking the trou ble o f a preliminary serious investigation , 10 but w e h ave no wish to limit the study of argu mentation to one a d apted to a p u b lic of ign ora m u s es . It is th a t a spect o f rh etori c wh ich e xpl ai n s w h y P l a to opp osed i t s o fiercely in h i s Gorgias11 a n d which w a s pr o p i tiou s t o i ts d ecli n e · in t h e esti m a tion of p h i l oso p h ers . The ora tor ind eed i s o b l iged to a d ap t himse lf to h i s a u d i e n ce if h e wishes to h a ve a ny e f f e c t o n it a n d w e ca n eas i ly u n d er sta n d tha t t h e di scourse which is m ost effi c a c i o u s o n a n i n competent a u d i en ce i s not n ecessa rily th a t wh i ch wou l d w i n th e a s sen t of a p h i losopher. B u t wh y n ot a l low th a t a rgu me n t a ti o n s c a n be a d d ress­ ed to every ki n d of a u d i e n ce? When P l a to d rea m s , i n h i s Phaedrus,12 of a rh etori c wh i ch wou l d b e wort hy of a p h i l osopher , wh at h e recom m e n d s i s a tech n i q u e c a p a b l e o f c o n v i n ci n g th e god s th em­ selves.

A ch a n ge i n a u d i e n c e

m e a n s a ch a n ge i n th e a p p e a rance

of th e a rg u m entation a n d , i f th e a i m of a rgu m en t a tion i s a lways to a ct effecti vely on m i n d s , i n ord er to m a k e a j u d g m e n t of its v a l u e we m u st n ot l o s e s i g h t of th e q u a l i ty o f th e m i n d s wh i ch th e a rg u m en t h a s su c ceed e d i n con vi n ci n g . Th i s j u sti f i e s th e p a rti cu l a r i m porta n c e a c cord e d b y u s t o ph i lo­ s o p h i ca l a rg u m en t s , wh i ch a re tra d i t i o n a lly c o n s i d ered to be th e m o st "rati o n al," for th e rea son th a t th ey a re sup p o s e d to b e a d dressed to rea d ers u po n

whom

su ggesti o n , pressu re, or s e lf-i n t erest h a ve

l i ttl e effect . W e sh all show th a t the s a m e t e ch n i qu e s o f a rgu m e n t a -

1 0 Cf. Aristotl e , Rhetoric, I , 2 , 135 7a. 11 Plat o , Gorgias, n otably 455, 45 7a, 463 , a n d 4 71 d . 12 Plat o, Phaedrus, 2 7 3 e .

8

TH E NEW RHETOR I C

tion c a n b e e n c o u nt ered a t every

level,

discussion around

at that of

the family table a s w ell a s at that o f debate

in

a highly specialized

I f th e q u alit y of the mi nd s which adhere t o certain in highly speculative domains, is a guarantee of the

environm ent. argu m e n ts ,

o f these arguments,

value

the community of structure between use d in d a ily discussions explains why in understanding them.

these arg ume n ts and those

we

ho w

and

succeed

c o nsi der

Our treati s e will the

only the discursive

in the per s u ad e and

seq uel,

a dhere n c e of minds:

n

uses

e

to

l a gu a g

only

convince

T h is li mi ta t ion , i n our o p ini on ,

by

of obtaining

means

th e technique which

will

be

ex a mi n ed. implies that

no means

t ech ni q u e in q u e s t i o n is the mo�t efficacious way of affecting c on trar y is the ca se-

Th e

i

convinced t h a t

we a re firmly

often n ot even a d h e r en ce ,

o f s e c u rin g

i n tern a l

experien ce

m i tted ru l es.

n o t h i ng

is

m o re

or

agreem e n t on

on

external or

previously ad­

B u t , rec o u rse to a rgumentati o n i s una void a ble when­

ever these proofs a re q u es ti on ed by

is no

th a n

reli a ble

con fo rm;ng to

c a l cul a tio n

t h ei r

scope

or

one of

th e p arties, when th ere

on

i n terp retation,

th eir

Further,

any

a ction

d esigne d

to

obtai n

is l a ckin g in its s u p p o rt o .. i n terp reta t i on

:

a d h erence

outside language

falls

th ose wh o set a n e x a mple

for ot h e r p e o pl e with o u t s a yi ng a nyth i n g ,

who make u se

or th ose

stick or a c a r r o t , ca n obtai n a pp reci a bl e results.

terested

in

such

e x ampl e , by

for

Th ere are yet other c a se s-

t h ey

wh en

o n ly

pr oce d u r e s

of l a n g u a g e ,

way

value

th e i r rel a tion to th e problems deba ted.

th e r an ge of a rg u m e n t a ti o n to th e degree th a t the u se of

of a

proof,

A nd, when it i s a matter

m ade exp l i cit.

and

the most

without

s o l d b el i efs are th o s e wh i ch are not o n ly adm itted b u t very

the

minds.

resort to

for ex amp l e ,

are

We a re in­

emphasized

bl essi ng

by

or threats.

promises and

cursi n g

in

which l a n gu a g e is u ti l i z e d a s a d i rect, m agi ca l m eans of a cti on a n d n ot a s a me a n s of comm u n i c a t i o n . such

we

Agai n ,

tr eat

of

fr am e work

of

sh a l l

ca ses u n l e s s t h i s a c t i o n i s integrat e d into

th e

n ot

a rg u m e n t a t i o n .

an

On e

of

the

f a c t ors

essenti a l

of

propagan d a

as

it

has

d eveloped

a b o ve a l l i n t h e 20t h ce n t u ry , b u t the use of wh i ch was well known to

A n t i q u i ty ,

profi t a b l e au d i e n c e anyth i ng an

w i th

capable

the

R om a n

i n c o m p a ra b l e

of

e f fe c t

a ccessible also

which

C a t h oli c

a rt,

is

th e

Chu rch

n egl e c t

to

i n fl u e n c ing in

the

th em:

beh avi o r.

p reparing a rg u m ents we

sh a l l

the

t re a t

to

put

of

it.

in

to the

th a t u tilize

techniques

These

a u d i e nce,

p re s ented

has

c ondi t i on ing

by m e a n s o f nu m e ro u s a n d varie d techniques

u n d en i abl e

more will

use

and

have

rendering Our

of t h e c on d i t i on i ng

it

analysis of

the

Introduction

9

audience by the discourse alone, which will result in certain con­ sideration s o n the order in which arguments must be p resented to exercise their maximum effect. Finally, what Aristotle termed "extra-technical proofs"13 m e an­ ing those proofs which are not related to rhetorical technique­ will enter into our study o nly when there is dis agreement concerning the conclusions that can b e drawn fro m them . F o r w e a re les s interested in the complete development of a discussion than in the argumen tative schemes coming into play. The term "extra­ technical p ro ofs" is well designed to remind us th at wh ereas our civilization, characterized by a great ingenuity in the techniqu es intended to act o n things, has completely forgotten the th eory of argumentation, of action o n minds by means of discourse, it wa s thi s theory which, under th e name of rhetoric, was considered by th e Greeks the -cexv'Y/ "par excellence." III The theory o f argumentation whi ch , with the aid o f discourse, aims at s ec u ri ng a n effi cient action on minds might have been In deed, if arguments a re n ot treated a s a bra n ch of psyc h ol ogy compulsive, if they are not to b e n ecessarily convincing b u t on ly p osse sse d of a certain force, wh ich m ay m oreover vary with the audience, i s it not by th eir effect th at we c a n j u dge of th i s force? Th i s w o u l d m a k e th e stu d y of a rgu m e nt a ti on one of the objects of exp eri m en ta l psych ol ogy, wh e re vari ed a rgu m e nt s w o u l d b e tested o n varied a u di en ces wh i ch a re su ffi c i e n tl y well k n o w n for i t t o b e p ossi b l e to dra w fa i rl y ge n er a l c o n cl u s i o n s fro m these ex­ per i m ents A n u mber of A m erican psy ch o l ogi st s h ave b ec ome .

.

i n volved in s u ch stu d i es, th e i nterest of wh i ch is i n c ontesta b l e .14 We sh a l l h ow ever proceed d i fferen tly. ch a r a cterize the

We seek , first of a l l , to

d i fferent a rgu m en t a tive stru ctu res, th e a n a lysis

of whi ch m u st p re cede all experi mental tests of th eir effectiven ess . An d , on th e oth er h a n d , we do n ot th i n k th at l a b o rato ry m ethods c a n d eterm i n e th e va l u e sci en ces, l a w, a n d m eth o d o l ogy o f

of

a rgu m entati o n s u s ed in th e h u m a n

p h i l osophy;

a n d th i s f o r th e rea so n th at th e

psych ologi sts i s itself a n obj ect

of

c o n troversy

a n d l i es with i n th e scope of o u r stu dy.

13 Aristotl e , Rhetoric, I, 2, 1 35 5 b . 1 4 C f . Hol l i n gwort h, T h e Psycho logy o f t h e Audience; Hovl a n d, " E ffect s o f t h e M a s s Med i a of C om m u ni c a ti o n , " Handbook o f Socia l Psychology, p p . 1 0 62- 1 1 03.

10

THE

NEW

RHETOHIC

Our procedure will differ radically from that adopted by those philosophers who endeavor to reduce reasoning in social, political, and philosophical matters hy taking their cue from the models provided by the deductive or experimental sciences, and who rej ect as worthless everything which does not conform to the schemes which were previously imposed. Quite the opposite: we will draw our inspiratio n from the logicians, but only to imitate the methods which they have used so successfully for the last century or so. We must not indeed lose sight of the fact that logic, in the first half of the 1 9th century, enj oyed no prestige either in scientific circles or with the public at large . Whately15 could write in 1 828 that, if rhetoric no longer enj oyed the esteem of the public, logic was some degrees lower in pop ular estimation. Logic underwent a brilliant development during the last cen tury when, abandoning the old formulas, it set out to analyze the methods o f proof effectively used by mathematicians. Modern formal logic became, i n this way, the study of the methods of demonstration used in the mathematical sciences. One result o f this development is to limit its d omain, since everything ignored by mathematicians is foreign to it. Logicians owe it to themselves to complete the theory of demonstration obtained in this way by a theory of ar­ gumentation. We seek here to construct such a theory by analyzing the methods of proof used in the human sciences, law, and philo­ sophy. We shall examine arguments put forward by advertisers in n ewspapers, p oliticians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings, j udges in decisions, and philosophers in treatises. Our field of study is immense and it has lain fallow for centuries. We hope that our first results will incite other researchers to com­ plete and p erfect them.

15

Whately, Preface to E lements of Rhetoric (1893) p .

nr.

PART ONE

The Framework of Argumentation

§ The

1.

Demonstration

characteristics

special

inherent to its

of

Argumentation

argumentation

wi th

logic

formal

is

gi ci a n

The l o

l anguage

the

of

he

system

a re the axioms,

on

the tem.

force,

is

longer related to

building, free be used.

is

that

any rational

to

the

i s,

on ly

the

obligation

one

to

in the system, symbols,

expressions

the

rules

origin a

o

xi oma ti c

is

foreign

beyond

of

f the

is

must

axioms

is

or

is

Any the

to

him

ex pressions:

they

are

the

equal

builder

in

rules

of

of

form

dered

valid,

because

axioms,

of

to

in

in

no

even

led

attention

satisfied

if

the

in the is

as

to

avoid

hesitation,

even

sequence

is

to

sense

symbols

to

do

of

the

or

with

with

role

the

that the thought,

that

The

formalistic paid

axiom

an

consistent

the

question.

as

another

has

the

compelling

way

elaboration in

sys­

admitted

it

with

from

the

is

manner

that

the

manner,

formalism

has

a

deduction,

play this

a

trans­

axiomatic

their

symbols

same

in

formal

such

sequence

in

validity

without

possible, a

consideration

the

which

of

and

decide without

considered

the

rules

deemed

univocity in

f

o

consi

logic conceived

systems

be

fr o m the

the framework of

construct

evidence

symbols

the for

demonstrations

and

whether

it

deduction.

unquestionable

the

it

deducible

system to

symbols

It

whether

on

the

gives

establish

whether

exp ression

resting

which

th a t of choosing

mechanically,

an

fix

It is

may

expressions

other

doubt and ambiguity.

of

reason­

are

expressions,

The

systems,

more

system, and to say which the rules of i n trod u ces which will make it possible to deduce,

he

valid

and,

examination

mathematical

proof a s val i d i n his form a t i o n

the

is free to elaborate as he pleases the artificial

combin a ti ons of symbols that whi ch

problems contrasting

proof.

no

ing, the formal systems are

to

limited

In modern logic, the product of reflection

wha tever.

the

concept of demonstration which

of

of demonstrative methods

and

conveyed than by

study cannot be better

argumentation with the classical particularly,

and

it

goes

search

for

logicians

to

meaning

introduced

and

of

the

14

THE

RHETO R I C

NEW

transformation s concerning them are b eyond discussion. the i nterpretation of the

elements

the

of

They leave

axiomatic system to those

who will apply it a n d who will have to concern themselves with adequacy for the en d p ursued . When the demon stration of a pro p osition

is in

its

qu estion, it is suf­

ficient to indicate the pro cesses by mea ns of wh ich th e proposition c a n b e obtained as the fin al expression of a deductive series, which h a d its first el ements p ro vi d ed by th e constru ctor of th e axiom atic system within wh ich the d em o n stration is a ccomplish ed . elements

come

fro m ,

wheth er

th oughts, re su l t s of e x p eri m en t,

th e y

or

a re

impersona l

stu l a tes

po

Wh ere these

tru th s,

divine

pa rti cu l a r to th e auth or ,

th e s e are qu esti ons wh i ch th e l ogi ci a n con si d ers foreign to his di sci­ pli n e .

o

But wh en i t is a q uesti n of a rgu i n g , of u si ng d i scou r s e to i n ­

fl uen ce t h e i n ten si ty

of

an

a u di ence ' s

adheren ce

to

certa i n

theses,

to negl ect compl etely , a s irrel eva n cies, the

it i s n o l on ger possib l e

p sych o l o gi ca l a n d soci a l condi ti ons i n th e a bsen ce of wh i ch a rgu m en­ ta ti on would b e poi n tless a n d with ou t resu l t.

a l l argumen tation uery fact, assumes

For

a i ms a t ga i n ing the adherence of m i n ds , a n d , by th is the exis tence of an

i n te l lec t u a l con tac t .

For a rgu m en ta ti o n t o exi st, a n effecti ve comm u n i ty of m i n d s m u st be rea l i zed a t a given m om ent. in

p ri n ci ple,

There m u st fi rst of a l l be agreem ent,

th e form a ti o n of th i s i n tell ectu a l

on

com mu nity , a n d, sp eci fi c question together: n o w a u t om a ti ca l ly .

a fter th a t, on th e fa ct of deb a ti ng a th i s

does

Even

n ot

in

re q u i r ed

co m e

a bou t

th e realm

of

d el i berati on,

i n w a rd

certa i n

of h imself a s d i vi d ed i n to a t lea st two i n te rl ocu tors, gagi n g i n d el i b erati o n . d el i b er a ti on

w i th

th i s i n n er

o th ers .

d el i b er a t i o n

n e c es s a r y

con d i ti o n s

ap p ea rs to b e con stru cted H e n ce, we

for

m o st

of

m u s t expect to

th e

d i s cu s si on

pr obl e m s

prel i m i n a ry

co n d i t i o ns as th ey

wi th

a

sayin g

con ditions like

as

"Don ' t

t h ey

bri n g

§ 2. A

wh o l e

fective

set

of

Th e

a ffe c t th a t

oth er,

en­

Minds for

th e m od el of over

Th e fi rst, r e l a ting is

of

The C o n ta c t of req u i red

on

fin d carried

su ch

a

saying

as

h avi n g t o d o with pre­

obj e c t

m ore. "

m i n d s.

up

the

a ny

con d i t i o n s i s

c o m m u n i ty of

pa rti es

Ma ny expressi on s

oth ers.

affect p ers ons,

" D o n ' t l i ste n t o y o u r evi l g e n i u s. " l i m i n ary

two

a ssoci a ted with the

b e a r wi t n e s s t o t h i s , b u t two e x a m pl e s m ay su ffi ce. to

a re

A n d th ere i s n o warra n t for reg a rding thi s It

d i vi si o n a s n ecessary . to

con d iti ons

for a rgu m e n t a ti o n : i n p a rti cu l a r , a person m u st con ceive

the

a rgu m en tati on,

form a ti on

of

an

is

ef­

§ 2. The C o ntact of Minds

15

The indispensable mm1mum for argumentation appears to be the existence of a commo ii language, of a technique allowing communi­ cation to take place. But the minimum is not enough. No one shows this better tha n the author of Alice in Won derland. The beings inhabiting that country understand Alice's language, more or less, but her problem is to make contact and open a discussion, as in Wonderland there is no rea so n why discussions should begin. The inhabitants know no reason for speaking to one another. O n some occasions Alice takes the initiative , as where she plainly addresses the mouse with the vocative, " O , Mouse . "1 And she considers i t a success to have managed the ex­ change of a few rather p ointless remarks with the D uch ess. 2 How­ ever, in her earlier a ttempt at conversation with the caterpillar, a deadlock is reached i m me d i a tely : " I think you ought to tell me who you are, first, " she says. "Why ?" says the caterp illar.3 In our well­ ordered world, with its hierarchies, there a r e g e n era lly rules prescribi ng how conversatio n may be begun ; there i s a prelim i na ry agreement arising from the norms set by social life . B etween Alice and the in­ habitants of Wonderla nd, no hierarchy, precedence, or functions re­ q u i res one to an swer rath er than another. Even those co nversation s whi ch d o b egi n are apt to break off sud d e n ly. The lory, for in stan ce , pri de s h i m self o n hi s ag e : Thi s Alice wou l d not a l l ow without k n owi n g h ow old h e wa s , a n d a s th e l o ry p o sitively refu s e d t o tell i t s ag e , th ere w a s n o m ore ·

to b e s a i d . 4

Th e o nly p rel i m i n a r y con d i ti o n fulfilled h ere i s Alice ' s wish t o enter into conversation with th e b e i n g s of thi s n ew u n i v erse .

Th e set of th ose a s pea k e r wish e s to a d d ress may vary con s i d erably . F o r a ny parti cular speaker i t fall s f a r

short

of all h u m a n beings.

In

th e case o f a ch i l d , h owever, to whom th e a d u lt worl d i s in varyi ng m ea sure cl osed , th e u n iverse h e wa nts to a d d ress is corresp o n d i ngly exten d ed by th e i n cl u si o n of a n i m a l s a n d a l l th e i n a n i m a te obj ects h e rega rds a s h i s n a foral i nterl o cu tors. 5 Th ere a re b ei n gs with wh om a ny contact m ay seem su p erfl u ou s or u n d esira ble.

Th ere a r e som e o n e ca n n ot b e both ered to talk to .

Th ere a re oth ers with whom o n e d oes n ot wi sh to d i s c u s s thi ngs , but to wh om o n e m erel y gives ord ers. 1 Carroll , A lice 's A dven tures i n Wonderland, p . 4 1 . 2 Ibid., p . 82.

3 Ibid . , p . 65. 4 Ibid., p. 44. 5 C a s sirer, " L e l a n ga ge et la con stru ction du m on d e des obj et s , " Jo urna l de Psycho logie,

XXX

( 1 933), 39.

16

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

To engage in argument, a p erson must attach some importance to gaining the adherence of his interlocutor, to securing his assent, his mental cooperation. It is, accordingly, sometimes a valued honor to be a person with whom another will enter into discussio n . B e­ cause of the rationalism and humanism of the last few centuries, it seems a strange notion that the mere fact of being someone whose opinion is taken into account should com1titute a quality ; but in many societies a person will no more talk to j ust anybody than, in the pa st, a man would fight a duel with j ust anybody. It is also to be observed that wanting to convince someone always implies a certain modesty on the part of the initiator of the argument ; what he says is not " Gospel truth, " he does not p ossess that authority which would place his words beyond question so that they would carry immediate conviction. He a cknowledges that he must use persuasion , think of arguments capable of acting on his interlocutor, show some con cern for him, and be interested in his state of mind. A person - whether an adult o r a child - who wants to "count" with others, wishes that they would stop giving him orders and would, instea d , reason with h i m and concern them selves with his rea ctions. He wa nts to be regarded as a member of a more-or-less equalitarian society. A man who does not cultivate thi s kind of contact with his fellows will be thought a proud, unattractive creature as co mp a red with one who, however importa nt his fu nctions, takes pains to a d­ dress the p u b l i c in a m a n n er whi ch makes clear the value he attaches to i t s a ppre ci ati on B u t, a s h a s been said m a ny times, it is not always com m en d a bl e t o wish t o p e rs uade someone: th e conditions u n d er whi ch conta ct between minds takes place may, i n deed, appear to be rath er d i s­ h onorable. Th e re a d er will recall t h e s tory of A risti p p u s , wh o , w h en he was rep r o a c h e d for h a ving a bj ectly p ro stra te d him self a t th e feet of Di onysi u s th e tyra n t i n ord er to be heard by h i m , d efen ded h i m ­ .

self by sayi n g th a t th e fa u l t w a s n ot h i s, but th a t o f Di onysi u s wh o h a d h i s ears i n h i s feet.

Is th e positi on of the ears, th en , a m a tter of

i n d i fference?6 Th e d a n ger seen by Ari stotl e i n carry i n g on di scu ssion with som e people i s th a t th e spea ker m a y th ereby destroy th e q u a l i ty of h i s argu mentati o n : A m a n s h ou l d n ot en t e r into d i s c u s si o n with everyb o dy or p r a cti ce d i a l ecti c s with t h e fi rst com er as rea son i n g a l way s b e co m e s e m ­ bittered w h e r e s o m e p e o p l e a re concern e d . In d ee d , w h e n a n a d ­ ver s a ry tri e s by e v ery p o s s i b l e m e a n s to wriggl e o u t of a co rn er , 6

B a c o n , A dvanceme n t of Learn ing, GBWW, vol . 30, p . 1 1 .

§ 3. The Speaker and His Au d ience

17

it is legitimate to strive, by every po ssible means , to reach the conclusion ; but this procedure lack s elegance. 7 It is n o t enough for a m a n t o speak or write; h e must also be listened to or read.

It is no mean thing to h ave a p erson ' s attention, to

have

a wide audience, to b e allowed to speak u nder certain circum sta n ces , in certain gatherings, in certain circles.

We must not forget that by

listening to someone we display a willingness to eventually accept his p oint of view.

There is great significan ce in the attitu d e of a C hur­

chill forbidding British diplomats even t o listen to any peace proposals German emissaries might try to convey or in the attitu d e o f a p olitical p arty when it makes k nown its willingness to hear a ny propo sals

of

a p olitician engaged in forming a ministry, because they prevent th e establishment or recognize the existence of the c o n ditio ns preliminary to possible argumentation. A chievement of the conditions

preliminary

to

the

co ntact

of

minds is facilitated by such factors a s memb ership in the same soci al class, exchange of visits and oth er so cial relati o n s .

Frivolous discus­

sions that are lacking in apparent interest are not always entirely u nimpo rt ant,

i n a smuch as th ey contribute

to th e sm ooth working

of an indispensable s ocial mechanism.

§ Th e

3. The Speaker and His A udience

authors o f scientific reports and similar papers often think

th at if th ey m erely r ep o rt c erta i n ex p eri m en ts , m entio n certa i n fa cts,

or enu n ci a te a certain nu mber of t ru th s , thi s is enou gh of itself to

a utom atic a l ly arouse th e i nterest of their hearers or rea d ers .

Thi s

a tti tu d e rests on the illusion, wi d esp rea d in certa i n rati o n alistic a n d scientific circles, th at fact s speak for them selves and m a k e s u c h an

i n d elible i m pri n t o n a ny h u m a n m ind th at th e l atter i s forced to giv e i ts a d h ere n ce r ega r d l es s of its i n cl in a ti on. A n editor of a psych ologica l j ou rnal , K a th erine F. B ru n er liken s such a u th ors, wh o do n o t worry ,

very m u ch a bout their a u d i en ce, to discourteous visitors : Th ey slou ch i n to a ch a ir, staring glu m ly a t th eir sh oes, a n d a bruptly a n n o u n ce, to th em selves or n ot, we n ever know, " It h a s been sh own b y su ch a n d su ch . . . that th e fem a l e of th e wh i te rat resp o n d s n ega tively to el ectri c sh o ck . "

7

A ri stotl e , Topics, V I I I, 1 4, 1 64 b .

18

THE NEW RHETO R I C

"All right, sir, " I s ay . me first why

I

should

" So what ? care ; the n

Tell

I will

listen."8 I t i s true that these authors when addressing a learned so ciety, or publishing an article in a specialized j o urnal, can afford to neglect the means of entering into contact with their public, for the indis­ pensable link b etween speaker and audience is provided by a scien­ tific institution, the society , or the j ournal.

In such a case, then, the

author has m erely to maintain, b etween himself and the public, the contact already established by the scientific institutio n . B u t not everyone is in such a privileged position.

For argumen­

tation to develo p , there must b e s o m e attention paid to it by th o se to whom it i s directed. The prime concern of publicity a n d propaganda is to draw the attention o f an indifferent public, this b ei ng the in­ dispensable

condition

for

carrying

on

any

sort

of

argumentatio n .

I t i s true that in a large number of field s-such as those of educati o n , politics, science, the a dministration of j u stice-any so ciety p o ssesses institutions which facilitate and organize this contact of minds.

B ut

the importance of this p relim i n ary problem m u st not be u n d errate d on that account. Under normal circumsta n ces, some quality is necessary in order to speak and be listene d to. word has

In our civilization , wh ere the prin ted

become a commodity a n d u tilizes economic org an i z a tio n

t o draw a ttention to i tsel f thi s prel im i nary cond i tion i s seen clearly ,

only in c a s es wh ere contact between th e s p eak er a n d h is a u d i enc e cannot be b rough t a b o u t by th e tech niques of d i stri b u ti o n .

It i s a c­

c o rd i n gly b est see n wh ere a rgu m e nta ti o n i s d ev elo p e d by a sp ea k er

wh o i s orally a d dres sin g a specific a u d i ence, rath er th a n wh ere i t is contained in a book on sale in a b o okstore.

Thi s q u a li ty i n a s p ea k er,

with o u t whi ch he will n ot b e l i sten ed to, or even , in m a ny ca ses, a l­ lowed to speak, will vary with the circu m sta n ces.

Som etimes it wil l

he enough for th e s peaker t o a ppear a s a h u m a n b ei n g with a d ecent

s u i t of cloth es, som etimes he is required to be an a d u lt, someti m es h e m u st he a rank a n d fil e m em b er of a p a rti cul a r gro up , som etim es th e s p ok esm a n of thi s group.

U n d er certa i n circu m sta n ces or before

c erta i n a u d i en ces th e o n ly a d m i ssible a u th ority for sp eaking is th e exerci se of parti cul a r fu n cti o n s .

There a re fiel d s wh ere these m a tters

of q u a l i fi cation to speak a re regu l a ted in very great d eta i l . Thi s conta ct between th e speaker a n d h i s a u dien ce i s n ot co n fi n ed to th e conditi o n s prel i m i n a ry to a rgu m entati o n : i t i s equally n e ces8

Brun er, "Of Psych ological Writi n g, " Jou r n a l of A b n orma l and Soc ia l Psycho logy ,

37 ( 1 942), 6 2 .

§

4.

The Audience as a Construction of the Speaker

19

sary i f argumentation i s t o develop . For since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced. How may such an audience be defined ? Is it j ust the person whom the speaker addresses by name ? Not always : thus, a member of Parliament in England must address himself to the Speaker, but he may try to persuade those listening to him in the chamber, and beyond that, public opinion throughout the country. Again, can such an audience be defined as the group of persons the speaker sees before him when he speaks ? Not necessarily. He may perfectly well disregard a portion of them : a government spokesman in Parliament may give up any hope of convincing the opposition, even before he begins to speak, and may be satisfied with getting the adherence of his maj ority. And, on the other hand, a person granting an inter­ view to a j ournalist considers his audience to be not the j ournalist himself but the readers of the paper he represents. The secrecy of deliberations, by modifying the speaker's opinion of his audience, may change the content of his speech. It is at once apparent from these few examples how difficult it is to determine by purely material criteria what constitutes a speaker's audience. The difficulty is even greater in the case of a writer's audience, as in most cases it is im­ possible to identify his readers with certainty. For this reason we consider it preferable to define an audience, for the purposes of rhetoric, as the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumen tation . Every speaker thinks, more or less consciously, of those he is seeking to persuade; these people form the audience to whom his speech is addressed.

§ 4. The A udience as a Construction of the Speaker The a udience, as visualized by one undertaking to argue, is always a more or less systematized construction. Efforts have been made to establish its psychological9 or sociological1° origins. The essential consideration for the speaker who has set himself the task of persuading concrete individuals is that his construction of the audience should be adequate to the occasion.

9

Sullivan, The In terpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Millioud, "La prop agation des idees, " Revue phi losophique, 69 ( 1 9 1 0), 580-600 ; 70 ( 1 9 1 0), 1 68- 1 9 1 . 1o

20

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

This does not hold for someone engaged in mere essay-making, without concern for real life. Rhetoric, which has then become an academic exercise, is addressed to conventional audiences, of which such rhetoric can afford to have stereotyped conceptions. However, it is this limited view of the audience, as much as artificiality of sub­ j ect-matter, which is responsible for the degeneration of rhetoric. 11 In real argumentation, care must be taken to form a concept of the anticipated audience as close as possible to reality. An inadequate picture of the audience, resulting from either ignorance or an un­ foreseen set of circumstances, can have very unfortunate results. Ar­ gumentation which an orator considers persuasive may well cause opposition in an audience for which "reasons for" are actually "reasons against. " Thus, if one argues for a certain measure that it is likely to reduce social tension, such argument will set against the measure all those who would like to see disturbances. Accordingly, knowledge of those one wishes to win over is a con­ dition preliminary to all effectual argumentation. Concern with the audience transforms certain chapters in the clas­ sical treatises on rhetoric into veritable studies in psychology. For instance, in the passage in the Rhe toric dealing with the factors of age and fortune in audiences, Aristotle includes many shrewd descrip­ tions of a differential-psychological nature that are still valid today. 12 Cicero shows the necessity of speaking differently to the class of men which is "coarse and ignorant, always preferring immediate ad­ vantage to what is honorable, " and to "that other, enlightened and cultivated, which puts moral dignity above all else. " 13 Later, Quin­ tilian dwells on character differences, which are important to the orator. 14 The study of audiences could also be a study fo r sociology, since a man's opinions depend not so much on his own character, as on his social environment, on the people he associates with and lives among. As M. Millioud has said : " If you want an uncultivated man to change his views, transplant him . " 15 Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms of its dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises that it takes for granted without hesitation : these views form an integral part of its culture, and an orator wishing to persuade a particular audience must of necessity adapt himself to 11 Marrou, Histo ire de I' educa tion dans I ' A n tiqu ite, p . 2 7 8 . 12 . Aristotle, Rhetoric, I I, 1 2- 1 7 , 1 388b-1 3 9 1 b . S e e also De Coster, "L' idealisme des j eunes, " Mora le et enseignement, 1 9 5 1 -5 2 , nos. 2 , 3 . 13 Cicero , Partiliones Oraloriae, § 9 0 . 14 15

Quintilian, I I I, v m , 38 e t seq. Millioud, "La propagation des idees, " Reuue phi losophique , 70 ( 1 9 1 0), 1 73 .

§ 4. The Audience as a Construction of the Speaker

21

it. Thus the p articular culture of a given audience show s so strongly through the speeches a ddressed to it that we feel we can rely on them to a considerable extent for o ur knowledge of th e ch aracter of p a st civilizations. Among the sociological considerations of possible u se to an ora tor are those bearing on a very d efinite matter : the social function s exer­ cised by his listeners . It is quite common for members of an audience to adopt attitudes connected with the role they play in certain socia l institutions. This fact has been stressed by the originator of the p sy­ chology o f form : One can sometimes observe marvel o u s changes in i n d ivi d u al s , a s when some passionately biased person b ecom e s a mem b e r of a j ury, or a rbitrator, or j u dge, a n d when h i s actions then s h ow th e fine tran sition from bias to an h o n e s t effort to d e a l with the p ro b ­ lems a t i s s u e i n a j u st a n d obj ective fashion . 1 6

The same observation can be made of the mentality of a politician whose point of view chan g e s when, after years spent in th e opposition , h e becomes a responsible member of the government. The listener, then, i n h is new func ti o n s , assumes a n ew p ers on a l i ty which the orator ca n n ot a fford to di sregard . A n d wh a t is tru e of the i n d i v i d u a l l i sten er h o l d s e q u a lly tru e of wh o le a u d i en ce s , so m u ch so th a t th e th e or e ti ci a n s o f rh eto r i c h a ve fou n d it p o s si b l e to c l a ssify or a t ory o n th e b a s i s o f the role performed b y th e a u d i en c e a d d r e ssed . Th e writers of a n ti q u i ty recogn i z e d th re e typ e s of or a tory , th e d el i b­ erative, th e foren s i c , a n d th e epi d i cti c, w h i ch in th eir vi ew corres p o n d ed respectively to a n a u d i e n ce e n gaged i n d el i b era t i n g , a n a u d i en ce en­ g a g e d i n j u d gi n g, a n d a n a u d i en ce th at is m erely enj o y i ng the u n­ fold i ng of th e orator's a rgu m e n t with o u t h a v i n g to rea ch a c o n cl u si o n on

th e

m a tter

in

q u esti on . 1 1

We a r e presented h ere w i th a d i sti n cti o n of a p urel y pra cti ca l ord er, w h o s e d efects a n d

i n a d e q u a c i e s a re a p p a re n t .

P a rti cu l a rly u n s a ti s ­

fa ctory i s i t s ch a r a cter i z a t i o n o f th e ep i d i cti c typ e o f o r a tory , of wh i ch we sh a l l h a ve m ore to s a y l a ter. 1 8

Th o u gh th i s c l a ssi fi c a ti o n ca n n o t

b e a ccepted a s su ch for th e stu d y o f a rg u m en t a ti o n , it h a s n everth el es s th e m erit o f u n d erl i n i n g th e i m porta n c e w h i ch

a spea k er m u st give

to th e f u n cti o n s of h i s a u d i en ce . It o ften h a p p e n s th a t a n orator m u st p e r s u a d e a c o m p o si te a u d i en ce , em bra cin g p e o p l e d i fferi ng i n ch a ra cter, l oy a l ti e s, a n d fu n cti o n s . 16

\Verth ei m er, Productive Thinking, pp.

17

A ri s totl e , Rhetoric, I, 3, 1 3 5 8 b , 2 - 7 ; Cicero, Ora tor, § 3 7 ; Pa r t i l io nes

§ 1 0 ; Q u i nt i li a n , I I I ,

1 8 C f . § 1 1 , i n fra :

1v.

Th e Epi d i ct i c Genre.

To

1 3 5- 1 36 . Ora lor i ae ,

22

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

win over the different elements in his audience, the orator will have to use a multiplicity of arguments. A great orator is one who possesses the art of taking into consideration, in his argumentation, the com­ posite nature of his audience. Examples of this art may be found on close reading of speeches made before p arliamentary assemblies, a type of composite audience whose constituent elements are readily discernible. However, an orator does not have to be confronted with several or­ ganized factions to think of the composite nature of his audience. He is 1 ustified in visualizing each one of his listeners as simultaneous­ ly belonging to a number of disparate groups. Even when an orator stands before only a few auditors, or indeed, before a single auditor, it is p ossible that he will not be quite sure what arguments will ap­ pear most convincing to his audience. In such a case, he will, by a kind of fiction, insert his audience into a series of different audiences. In Tris tram Shandy-since argumentation is one of the main themes of this book, we shall often refer to it-Tristram describes an ar­ gument between his p arents, in which his father wants to persuade his mother to have a midwife : He . . . pl aced his arguments in all lights ; argued the matter with her like a Christian, lik e a heathen, lik e a husband, like a father, like a patriot , lik e a man. My mother answered everything only like a woman, which was a little hard upon her, for, as she could not as sume and fight it out b eh ind such a variety of characters, ' twas no fair match : 'twas seven to one. 19

Notice that it is not only the orator who so changes his mask : it is even more so his audience-his poor wife in this case-which his fancy transforms, as he seeks its most vulnerable points. However, as it is the speaker who takes the initiative in this "breaking down" of the audience, it is to him that the terms "like a Christian , " "like a heathen, " and so on, are applied. When a speaker stands before his audience, he can try to locate it in its social setting. He may ask himself if all the members fall within a single social group, or if he must spread his listeners over a number of different-perhaps even opposed-groups. If division is neces­ sary, several ways of proceeding are always possible : he may divide his audience ideally in terms of the social groups-political, occupational, religious, for example-to which the individual members belong, or in terms of the values to which certain members of the audience ad­ here. These ideal divisions are not mutually independent ; they can, however, lead to the formation of very different partial audiences. 19 Sterne, The L ife and Op inions of Tris tram Shandy, bk. I, chap . 18, p . 4 2 .

§ 5. Adaptation of down

The breaking

a

of

sub-groups

gathering into

position.

on the speaker ' s own

single

a m o d erate view ,

will

he

audience.

considering

as

inter­

if he holds

at least two

form ing

ques­

his

all

On the other hand,

them

see

23

will also depend

If he holds extremist vie ws on a

ti on , th ere is nothi ng to restrain him from lo cutors as forming a

the Audience

the Speaker to

distinct

a u d i en ces. 20

K n owl edge of

au dience

an

cannot

be

th e kn owledge of h ow to influence i t . an

a u d i en ce

is

i n d eed

Th i s term i mplies,

ti o n i ng .

w i th

of

the natu re

of

that

of

of

condi ­

its

factors extri nsic to

first sight,

at

problem

The

connected

i n timately

independently

conceived

th e

au­

conditioning assumes that thi s condi ­ ti o n i ng is con si dered a s applying to an ent ity wh ich would be th e a u d i en ce i t self . But, on a closer view, knowledge of an aud i ence i s a l s o k n owl edge of h ow t o bri ng a bout its conditioning, as wel l a s of t h e a m ou n t of con ditioning achieved a t any gi ven moment of the d i en ce.

And

all

of this

stu dy

d i scou rse.

agents a re available to increase o n e' s influence

Vari ou s con d i t i on ing

on a n a u d i e n ce : mu sic,

lighting,

d evi ces of s t a ge managem ent.

crowd

These

scenery,

effects,

means

past by primitive peoples, of t he Middle Ages. In h ave fostered the development

as

a n d h a ve b een u sed in t he R o m a n s,

th e Greeks, te c h n i c a l

i mprovem e nts

diti o n ers

to

ti a l

th e

elem e n t

B es i d e s w o rk ,

in

poi n t

th at

on

a c ting

of

c on d iti oning

th ere i s

th e

men

an d

are regarded

they

it

as

wa s

kind,

which

by

conditioning

at th e beginning. if

t h ere

is

by

n day,

ow

of

these

as

t he

con­ essen ­

the

end

of

can

conditioning

adaptation

scope

whi ch

itself, at the

s am e

of

form

Th is

beyond

is

speech

the

continuous

a

some

by

as

well

our

minds.

this

the a u dien ce no longer being ex actly the

a b o u t o n ly

var iou s

a nd

have always been known

of the

thi s

of

resu lts

the be

in

speech

brought

speak er

to

hi s

a u d i e n c e.

§ Vi c o

5.

A da p tation

wrote,

sp e a k er' s

" th e

a u d i e n ce,

end and

of

t he

Speaker

sought by el oquence he

must

govern

his

h eir op i n i o n s. " 21 In argumentation, the i n g wh a t th e sp e a k er regards true

t

a s

zo ti o n

ti o n ,

n

t

h

foun

d

C f.

"

Ps

Vic

e

yc o,

ob in h

o lo

O pere,

se rva t i o n s t h o se g

ic

a l e d.

wh

Re v

Fe rr

o

of h

L .

o ld

i ew ,

ar i,

to

Fe stinge r m o d e ra

vo l. v o l.

57,

II,

te n o. De

th e

5,

always

speech

in

esser

l

Se pt .

ten

"

d en

cy

Inform al

195 0 ,

Te mpo ri s

p.

depends

the

on

a c c ord ance

thing

i m portan t ,

vie wp oints:

N o s tr i

A u dience

i m po rt a n t

or

o n

the

but

is

n ot

with

k now­

know ing

the

toward

com m u n i c a­

Soc i al

C om m un i c a­

275. St u

di o t u

m

Ra t i o n e ,

p.

10.

24

THE

views

is

" lik

NEW

RHETOR IC

of th o se he i s a ddressing . To borrow Gracian' s simile, speech e a feast, at which the dishes are made to please the guests, and

n o t the cooks. "22 The great orator, th e

one

a

with

th is

his l isteners, case

Th is is not the

co n cern is

enth u si a st wh ose sol e

on

hold

by th e very m i n d of h i s au d i en ce.

se ems animated for the a rdent

with what he h im self considers im­

may have some effect on suggestible p erso n s, bu t gen era l ly speaking h is speech will strike his aud i ence a s u n reaso n a bl e. A ccording to M. Pradines, the enthusias t's speech, even i f cap a bl e of som e ef fect, does not yield a "true " sound, the emo­ ti o n a l real i ty " bursts through the mask of l ogic, " for, he says, " pas ­ s i o n a n d re a son s are n ot commensurable . " 23 The apparent explana tion for t h i s viewpoi nt is th a t th e m a n swayed by passion argues without taki ng su ffi ci e n tly i n to a ccount the audience he is addressing : carried away by h i s e n th u si a sm, he i m agi nes his audience to be susceptible A speaker of

p o rta n t .

kind

to t h e s a m e a rgu m en ts th a t persuaded him.

Thus ,

passion, in causing

t h e a u d i e n ce to be forgotten, creates less an absence than a poor choice of

rea son s.

a d o pted

B e c a u s e t h ey

repro a ch e d t h e l ea d ers

t h e p o p u l a c e when th ey even

the

" re s t s

wi t h

as

to

Your

all

d e s i re.

will

is

indeed

q u a l i ty

You

ga i n

c om p ar e d lan

22 23

gu

G r a ci a n

,

'

Pr a d i n e s,

25

D e m o sth e n

26

C f.

§ 2,

to

L ' h o mm e

B o s su e t,

t h en

a

Serm

ite o ns

e s, su p a : r

d e d e

,

no

n o orator,

n ot

Th

even

start

I I,

has

r

at

with

giv e

to

in

of

the

good,

you

whatever noble

a

you

m a jor

the

parasites

n ot

one

no

or

men

is

behavior

sentiments

p.

Su

will

having

the

to

it

ai m

relationship

th e i r

bad

for

orator

to

take

role

i

n

orators.

order

la

p ar o le

Or g an iz a tio n , § e C o n t a c t o f Min

36.

ds .

v ol. de

I I, Di e u ,

to

pp. p.

26

l isteners,

who " almost be

3241

53.

t hat

but

they

you

at

th i nk

counsel,

him

at

or

hi s

determining hav e

always i nv

325.

aim

a mbition and

base

85.

p syc h o lo gi e g t!n er a le ,

v ol.

On

must it,

orators:

either

who

which

and

Go u r,

you

the

choose ;

by

th eir

an d

a ry

of

th ey

th erefore

for

in

c o o ks,

2 4

but

ar gu m e n t

contr

Tr

you

n ot h i ng

ora tors,

to

ag e

for,

m ake

t h e a u di en ce

of

A lt h o u gh

a

n ever

wh i c h ever

b e w el l ,

w o rd . 25 It

Plato

" fla t tering "

i

performa n c e

th e

wi sh

el s e h e w i l l

th e

with

But

them.

ora tor,

orat ors

t h em

wh a t t h ey

you

sh ould have led

orator ,

clever

the

democracy

a u d i en

improve

make

Athenian

on

A th e n s,

so

t e ch

can a fford to neglect t h s effort of adap­ ce . " The m a king of a pre acher, " wrote Bossuet, h i s a u dience. "24 In his struggle against the demagogues D e m osth e n es c alls the people to i mprov e themselves

religi ou s

t a t i o n to h i s

at

niques of

t he

of the

ited

been speak

to f ine

§ 5. Adaptation

of the Speaker to

persuading

It shoul d n ot be thought,

an audience when he cannot persuade

of

it effectively except by the use

methods that are repugnant to

Th e problem of harmonizing

him.

concerned, th a t

is

argument

where

su cceed in persuasion, or

a lways h on ora bl e to

intention .

25

orator is nearly always

meals, " 27 it must not be overlooked that the at lib erty to give up

Audience

the

even

is

it

an

to have such man

the scruples of the

of

su bm i ssion to the audience received special a ttention from Q u i n ti li a n . 28 To him rhetoric as scientia bene di cendi29 i mplies th a t th e a ccompli sh ed orator not only is good at persuad i ng, but a lso s ay s wh a t is good . If, then, one allows the existence of audiences of h o n or with

corrupt p erson s, wh om one nonetheless does not want to give u p con­ if one looks at the quality of the speaker, one d i ffi culty , to m a ke d istinctions

vi n ci n g , a n d , at th e sam e time,

matter from

sta n dp oi n t of th e m oral i n o r d er t o solve t h e

n ot

do

that

coupli ng

Th e

a u d i en ce,

matter

a

l i mitation

of

audience

and di ssociations

a tt e n t i on if i n th e l east d i stracted,

adapt

to

an

to

has h ad

himself

or

two

s ee,

We d o n ot nical

for

Th ere i s on ly th e

a u d i en c e,

form lous

a re

If

a

the

hea rt

cons

i d er

28 29 30 31 32 L

e s

a

m a tter

matter :

this

nature.

of

princ iple ,

rhetoric

adaptation

cases.

in

tech­

di a lectic.

t he

speech

substance

may

circumstances

of

use

and of

that

A rguments

certain

ri d i cu l ou s,

t h em

3.

Q uintil i a n, Quin tili a n,

A r i s t otl e, Wh a t e ly, R ey e s ,

c re a te urs

th e

proofs

II,

El ,

ch

De s

IX, X I I,

vm; xv,

m e n ts

a p

ha d

v� l .

R h e t o r ic , El e

of

A

cases.

two

the

work

a

appear

li n

de ,

1 9,

to i ts

who

r eferring

would

suspension

y a ppeared

p.

cl aims

of proving

re ader

voluntary

th e

that

method

th e s ame

in

to

of

medical

a

w hen

i n teresting hypothesis

an

I I I,

in

d escribed

n ovel,

in

S a in t- E vre m o n d, p.

as

speech

to be valid i n particular

l ead away from

in

its

to

even t is

h i stori c a l

be a d opted J u l e s R om a i n s'

27

rule

whatever

the s a m e in

on e

appropriate

n ot

I I I,

sh ould

results.

of

30

to and

ridi cu­

oth e r s. 31

in

and

why ,

i nstance,

a rgu m en t a tion

only

seem

his

mob,

ma i n t a i n i ng

of

unfortunate

It h a s d i scred i t ed rh etori c, a nd has i ntroduced i n to the theory gen eral ru l e s which a ctu a l ly

to

incompetent

re asoning,

sustained

u n d erst a n ding

of

orator

the

the

the

oneself led,

course.

of

obligation on

of

wi th

i n c ap a bl e

as

com e

fi nds

j

sci entific

reality hav e

the

ac tion

al,

in

need

found

ourn

developed

Petroni u s,

be

mi ght novel. 32

a

Sat yri c o n,

T he

of

chap.

1.

3 4.

I,

of p.

I- VII.

2,

1 357a,

R h eto ri c 4 0.

Cf.

1 358a .

(Ha rp e r),

R o m

a in

Be lav a l,

s, L

es

Le

p t.

homm

s p h

I II,

il o s o

e s p he

c h ap .

I,

e t

le u r

de

s

bo n

ne

§

2,

l

pp.

vo lont e , a n gage ,

179

et

vol. p.

s e q.

XII:

138.

26

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

The procedures

to

in arguing are to

be a do pted

some extent con­

d itioned b y the size of the au dience, ind ependently of considerations

relati n g to the area of agreem ent taken as a basis for the argument, vary fr o m a u dien ce to audience . In d iscussing style as affected by the occasion of th e sp eech , J . Ma rouzeau ha s drawn att ention to

which

a

kind of deference and self- con s ci ou snes s

e steem of the listen er s , a b o ut win n i ng their app r o b ation

as

exp res s ed

in

by num bers, . . .

i mp o sed

qu alm s a bout ga ining the

a s intimacy decrea s e s , qu a l m s i n crea se ,

th eir appl au se or ,

l ook s

an d

at least,

attitu des . 33

Many oth e r observations might p erti nently be ma de on character­ i stics of a u d i e n c e s th at i n flu e n ce a sp ea k er ' s beh avior a n d mod e of argument. In o ur view, th e v a l u e of our stu dy depen ds on consid er­ a ti o n b ei n g given to th e m a ny d i sti n ct a s p ects of pa rti cu l a r au d iences i n a s con crete a m a n n er a s p ossi bl e. H owever , we wi sh to stress in th e foll owi n g four s ecti o n s th e ch ara cteri sti cs of certa i n a u d i en ces se­ l ected for th ei r u n q u e sti o n a bl e i mp orta n ce

to

gu m e n ta t i o n , a n d p a rti cu l a rly

Con vi n ci ng

§ 6. Pers u ading and We

to a ll con cern ed w i th ar­

phi l osoph ers.

h a v e sa i d e n o ugh to sh ow th a t

a u d i en ces are alm ost i n finite i n

their va ri ety , a n d t h a t , i n th e effort t o a d apt t o t h eir parti cu l ar char ­ a c teri sti c s , a spea ker fa ces i n n u m er a ble probl em s.

Th i s i s on e reason,

p erh aps, why th ere

in

is such

tremen d ou s interest

kin d s

a rgu m e n ta ti o n th a t w o u l d ap ply to a l l

to th ose compo sed of comp eten t or

tech n iqu e

a

of a u d i e n ces, or a t

ra ti on a l p eopl e.

of

l east

Correspondi ng to

this i d e a l , t o th i s d e sire to tra n sc en d h i stori ca l or l ocal parti cularities

so

t h eses d efe n d e d

th a t

m ay

for obj e cti vi ty , wh a tever th e a s H u sserl s ay s i n

cl e rk s and

sumed th o s e

th a t wh o

M a rou z e a u , Hu s serl ,

Ben d a ,

debate

for

Prec i s

D ie

de

Krisis

In

in

i

s ly l i s t qu e

La

t ra h i so n

des

th e from

c le rc s.

I n th i s en d ea vor ,

d efen d s

efforts

th e

sa m e spi rit, J . Ben d a

th ose

a c t i on .

fran�a ise,

the

a ccuses

con cern with wh a t i s etern al

a n d l o ca l va l u es. 35

between

e u rop ii i schen

1 5.

he

a re, i n ou r ph il osoph i ca l work,

b etween

o p i n i o n,

der

a ccepta n ce, i s the qu est

i n wh i ch

of t e mp ora l

rh et ors i n v ol ve d

34 35

d efe n se

age-o l d

33

V I , p.

to

sta n d

solute a n d

vol .

"we

of m an k i n d. "34

of tre a so n wh en t h ey t u rn

u n i vers a l

u n i versa l

m ovi n g sp e ech

a

r a ti o n a l t h o ugh t ,

west er n

of

p u b l i c serva n ts

wi n

n a tu re of t h i s m ay be.

wh o

sta n d

ph i l osoph ers

for

Here is

re­

truth

and

seeki ng

the

ab­

It

is ou t of th i s d ebate t h a t

p.

2 08 .

Wissenschaf ten

in

Ge samme. l t e

Werke,

§ 6. Persuading and Convincing

27

the distinction b etween persuading and convincing seems to arise. We wish to reconsider this distinction in the context of a theory of argumentation and of the role played by certain audiences. 38 To the person concerned with results, persuading surpasses con­ vincing, since conviction is merely the first stage in progression to­ ward action.37 Rousseau considered it useless to convince a child "if you cannot also persuade him. "38 On the other hand, to someone concerned with the rational char­ acter of adherence to an argument, convincing is more crucial than persuading. Furthermore, this rational character of conviction de­ pends sometimes on the means used and sometimes on the faculties one addresses. In Pascal's view, persuasion is something applied to the automation-by which he means the body, imagination, and feeling, all, in fact, that is not reason.39 Often persuasion is considered to be an unwarranted transposition of demonstration. Thus, accor­ ding to Dumas, "in being persuaded, a person is satisfied with affec­ tive and personal reasons, " and persuasion is often "sophistic. "'° But he does not specify in what respect this affective proof differs technical­ ly from obj ective proof. The criteria relied on to distinguish between conviction and per­ suasion are always based on a decision requiring isolation from a to­ tality, totality of procedures, totality of faculties, of certain elements conceived as rational. This process of isolation, it must be empha­ sized, is sometimes applied to the actual lines of reasoning. It may be shown, for instance, that a certain syllogism, while inducing con­ viction, will not induce persuasion : however, this way of speaking of a syllogism involves isolating it from an entire context, it supposes that the premises of the syllogism exist in the mind independently of the remainder, it transforms these premises into intangible and unshakable truths. We may be told, for example, that a certain per­ son, although convinced of the dangers of too rapid mastication, will not on that account cease the practice.41 Such a statement involves isolation, from the complete picture, of the reasoning which forms the basis of the conviction. It is overlooked, for instance, that this con36

Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Logique et rhetorique, " p p . 3 e t seq.

37

Whately,

Rhetorique e t

phi losophie,

E lements of Rhetoric

(Harper), pt. I I, chap. I, § 1. Cf. Stevenson, (Yale), pp. 1 39-140. Rousseau, Emile (Dent, Dutton), b k . I I I, p . 146. Pascal, Pensees, GBWW, vol. 33, p . 219, no. 252. Dumas, Tra i te d e psycho logie, vol. I I, p . 740. Scott, Influencing Men in Business . The Psychology of Argume n t and Sugges­ ( 1 920), p. 3 1 .

Ethics and Language

38 39 40 41

tion

28

THE NEW

RHETOR I C

viction may run up against another conviction affirming that time is gained hy eating more quickly. It is apparent, then, that the con­ cept of what constitutes conviction, though seemingly based on a singling out of the means of proof used or faculties called into play, often also involves the isolation of particular data from a far more complex totality. However, even if one refuses, as we do, to adopt these distinctions in actual thought, one must recognize that our language makes use of two notions, convincing and persuading, and that there is a slight and percep tible difference in the meaning of the two terms. We are going to apply the term persuasiue to argumentation that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term con vincing to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every ra­ tional being. The nuance involved is a delicate one and depends, essentially, on the idea the speaker has formed on the incarnation of reason. Every person believes in a set of facts, of truths, which he thinks must be accepted by every "normal" person , because they are valid for every rational being. But is this really the case ? Does not this claim to an absolute validity for any audience composed of rational beings go too far ? On this point, even the most conscientious writer can do no more than submit to the test of facts, to his readers' j u dgmenl.42 In any case he will have done all he can to con vince, if he thinks he is validly addressing such an audience. Despite the similarity in their consequences, we prefer our crite­ rion to that, quite different in principle, pul forward by Kant in his Cri tique of Pure Reason . Accordi ng to him, conviction and persuasio n are two different kinds of belief : If a j u dgment is valid for every rati onal b eing, then its ground is obj ectively sufficient , and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the part icular character of the sub­ j ect, it is termed a persuas ion . Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the j udgment, which lies solely in the subj ect, being regarded as obj ective. Hence a j u dgment of this kind has only private validity - - is only valid for the individual who j udges , and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot b e commu­ nicated. . . . Persuasion, acco rdingly, cannot b e s ubjective ly distin­ guished from conviction, that is , so long as the subj ect views its j u dgment simply as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire wh ether the grounds of our j udgment, which are valid for u s , produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though only subj ccti ve mean s , not, in­ deed, of producing conviction, but of detecting the merely p rivate validity of the j udgment ; in other words , of discovering that there

42 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface to the first edition, GB\VW, vol. 42, p . 3.

§ 6. Persuading and Convincing

29

is in it the element of mere p ersuasion. . . . Per suas ion I may keep for myself, if it is agreeable to me ; but I cannot, and ought not, to attempt to impose it as binding upon othe r s . 43

The Kantian view, though rather close to ours in its co n sequences , differs from it in making the opposition of subjective and objective its criterion for distinguishing between persuasion and convictio n . If conviction i s based on t h e truth o f its o bj ect, and is thereby valid for every rational being, then conviction alone can be p roved, and persuasion has no more than individual significance. From this it is clear that Kant accepts o nly purely logical p roof, and excludes from philosophy all argument that does not absolutely comp el ac­ ceptance. Kant's conception is defensible only if it is conceded th at what i s not necessary is not communicable, and this would exclude all argumentation directed to p articular audiences : but argumentation of the latter kind i s th e ch osen sphere of rhetoric . And from the mo­ ment one a dmits the exi stence of other mea n s of proof than neces­ sary proof, a rgumentation addressed to parti c ular audiences a ssumes a significance beyond mere subj ective belief. The distinction tha t we propose between pers u a si o n and con viction ex presse s in d i re ctly th e connecti on th at is frequ ently e stablish ed , th ough in a confused way, b etween persuasion and a ction , on the one h a n d , a n d , on th e oth er, between conviction and intelligen ce . In deed , th e timeless ch ara cter of certain audiences e xpla i n s why ar­ guments a ddressed to them make no call for immediate action. At first sigh t, th i s d i sti n cti o n , b a se d o n th e ch ara cteristics of th e a u dience a d dressed , d o e s n ot seem to ex p l a i n th e d i fference b etween c o n v i cti o n a n d persu a si o n a s i t i s experienced by th e h ea r er h i m self . B u t i t wil l re a d il y be seen th at t h e s am e c r i t eri o n ca n n ev erth el ess ap p l y , i f o n e bears i n m i n d th a t th e h ea rer i m agi n es the tran sfer to other a u d i en ce s of th e argu m en ts pr ese n te d to h i m a n d th at h e co n ­ cern s h i m self with

th e recepti on

th ey w o u l d

obta i n .

O u r v i ewp o i n t h a s th e a dv a n tage of sh owi ng th a t the b etween

th e

term s

convincing

a n d i n pra cti ce m u st rem a i n

and

so.

persuading

is

a l ways

d i fference u n preci se

For wh ere a s th e fro n ti er b etween

i n tel l i ge n c e a n d wi l l , b etween r e a s o n a n d th e i rra ti o n a l , ca n b e cl e a r­ ly

d ra w n ,

th e

making

of

d i sti n cti o n s

b etween

d i fferent

a u d i en ces

is a f a r l es s certa i n m a tter, p a rti cu l a rly a s th e representa t i o n th e sp eak­ er m a k es o f an a u d i en ce is th e resu lt of be

a b a n d on ed

and

an

effort th a t

Th e d i sti n cti o n we m ak e b etween p ersu a d i ng m a ny

can

a lways

r ep l a ced . and

c o n vin cing h a s

featu res i n com m on with th e d i sti n cti o n s m a d e b y wri ters i n

4 3 K a n t , Critique o f P u re Reas o n , GBWW, vol . 42 � p . 2 4 0 .

30

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

the past,44 even though we have not adopted their criteria . It also ex­ plains the use some writers make, out of modesty, of the word p er­ suasion as opposed to convictio n.

For instance,

Claparede,

in the

preface to one of his books, tells us that his decision to let the man­ uscript see the light of day was in accession "to the request of Madame Antipoff, who p ersuaded (but did not convince) me that the p ub li­ cation of these investigations was desirable. "45

In so

writing,

the

author has no thought of making a theoretical distinction b etween the two terms , but he makes use of the difference b etween them to express b oth the slight guaranteed o bj ective value and the p ower of the reasons given by his collaborator.

The difference in shades of

meaning conveyed by Claparede may correspond to th e Kantian co n­ cept, but seems to fit in even b etter with the fact that he was con­ fronted with reasons that were convincing to him, but which he tho ught might not be convincing to everybody. Thu s the nature of the audience to which arguments can be suc­ cessfully presented will determine to a great extent both the direc­ ti o n the arguments will take a n d the character, th e significance th at will be attributed to them .

What formulation can we make of au­

d i enc e s , which h ave come to play a norm a tive rol e , enabling us to j udge on the convincing character of an a rgument ? audiences are

apparently

regarded as

Three k in d s of

enj oying special

p rerogat i ves

as regards this function, both in current p r a cti ce a n d in the v i ew of phi l osophers .

The fi rst such a ud i en ce consists of th e wh ole of m a n ­

k i n d , or a t lea st, of a ll n orm a l , a dult p erson s ; w e sh all refer t o it a s th e

un i versal audience.

Th e sec on d consi sts of the single i n terlocutor

wh om a s p eak er a ddresses i n a d i a l ogu e . The third i s th e subjec t

him­

w h e n h e d eliberates or gives h i m self rea sons for h i s a ctions.

We

se l

f

h asten to a dd tha t i t i s o nly wh en the i n terl o cu tor in a d i a l o gu e a n d the m a n debati n g with h i m self a re regard ed a s a n i n ca rnation o f th e u ni versal a u dience, th a t they can enj oy th e p h i loso phic privil ege con ferred to rea son , by virtu e of wh i ch

a rgu mentati o n a d d ressed

to th em h a s often been assimilated to logi cal d i scou rse. E a ch speak­ er' s u n i versal a u dience ca n , i nd ee d ,

from

an

external

viewp o i n t,

be rega rded a s a p a rti c u l a r a u d i e n ce, but it n o n e th e less r em a i n s tru e th at, for ea ch spea k er a t ea ch m o m ent, th ere exi sts a n a u d i en ce tra n scen d i n g all oth ers, whi ch c a n n ot ea sily be forced with i n th e b o u n d s of a p a rti cu l a r a u d i ence.

On the oth er h a n d , th e i nterl o cu tor i n a

44 Cf. , in particu l a r, Fen el o n , " D i a logues sur I' elo q u e n ce , " Oeuvres, vol . )).X I, p . 4 3 .

45 C l a p a re d e , "L a gen ese d e l ' hypothese , " A rch ives de Psycho log ie, vol . X X IV, i n trod u ction .

§ 7. The Universal Audience

31

dialogue or the person engaged in deliberation c a n be considered as a p articular audience, with reactions that are known to us, or at least with characteristics we can study. Hence the primordial importance of the universal audience, as providing a norm for obj ective argumen­ tation, since the other party to a dialogue and the person deliberating with himself can never amount to more than floating incarnations of this universal audience.

§ 7 . The Un iversal A udience Argumentation aimed exclusively at a particular audience has the drawback that the speaker, by the very fact of adapting to the views of his listeners, might rely on arguments that are foreign or even di­ rectly opposed to what is acceptable to persons other than those he is presently addressing. This danger is apparent in the case of a com­ p osite audience, which the speaker has to resolve into its constituent p arts for the purposes of his argumentation. For a composite au­ dience, such as a p arliamentary assembly, will have to be regrouped as a single entity to make a decision, and it is extremely easy for the opponent of an incautious speaker to turn against him all the argu­ ments he directed to the different parts of the audience, either by setting the arguments against each other so as to show their incom­ p atibility or by presenting them to those they were not meant for. This explains the relative weakness of arguments that are accepted only by particular audiences and the value attached to opinions that enj oy unanimous approval, particularly approval by persons or groups who agree on very few matters. Naturally, the value of this unanimity depends on the number and quality of those expressing it. Its highest point is reached when there is agreemen t of the un iversal audience. This refers of course, in this case, not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into consideration those which are not part of it. Philosophers always claim to be addressing such an audience, not because they hope to obtain the effective assent of all men-they know very well that only a small minority will ever read their works­ but because they think that all who understand the reasons they give will have to accept their conclusions. The agreemen t of a universal audience is thus a matter, not of fact, but of right. The basis for relying on the adherence of those who submit to the data of experience or to the light shed by reason is the speaker's affirmation of that which

32

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

corresponds t o an objective fact, of that which con stitutes a true and even necessary assertion. Argumentation addressed to a universal audience mu st convince the reader that the reasons adduced are o f a comp elling chara cter, that they are self-evident, and p ossess an absolute and timeless va­ lidity, independent o f l ocal or historical contingen cies .

" Truth , " ac­

cording to Kant, " depends u p o n agreement with t h e obj ect, and co n­ sequently, with respect to this obj ect, the j u d gments of all under­ standings must be in agreement . "

Every obj ective b elief can be com­

municated, because it is "valid for the reaso n of every m an . " only such an assertion that can b e

affi rmed,

It is

that is, b e expressed " a s

necessarily valid for everyone. " 46 In fact, a j u dgment of this sort i s d e e m e d t o b e bin ding on every­ b ody, because the speaker himself is c o nvinced that it d o e s not a d mit o f any question .

This Cartesi a n certitude has b een d e s cribed very

expressively by Dumas :

,

C ertitu d e is th at compl ete b e l i ef, which entirely excl u d e s d o u bt ; it i s neces sary, u niversal affirmati on ; in oth e r w o rd s , t h e m an who

i s certain

does not c o n ce i v e the p o s s i b i l i ty o f p r efe r ri n g t h e con­

trary a ffi rm ation, but i m a gines his affirmation as n eces s arily c o m ­ m a n d i n g th e a ccep t a n ce o f e v eryb o dy in t h e s a m e circum stances . In s h o rt , it i s the state in wh i ch we a r e con sci o u s of th i n k i n g the truth ,

wh i ch

is

p recisely

this

u n i v er s a l

co n st r a i n t ,

th i s

m en ta l

o b l i gati o n ; s u bj ecti v i t y d i s app e a r s , a n d m a n th i n k s a s i n t e l ligen c e , a s a m a n a n d no l o n g e r a s a n i n d i vi d u a l .

The s t a t e of c ertitu d e

h a s often been d escribed with the h elp of s u ch m etap h ors a s l i gh t a n d l u m i n o s i t y ; b u t t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n bro u gh t by ra ti o n a l certitu d e c a r r i e s i ts own expl a n ation . It m ea n s r e s t a n d re l a xation , even if the certi t u d e is a p a i n fu l one, as i t p u t s a n end to the tension and th e worry o f sea rch and i n d ec i s i o n . W i t h i t comes a feeling o f power, but a l s o of a n n i h i l a ti o n ; one f eel s th a t prej u d ice, p a s s i o n , and i n d i v i d u a l c a p r i c e h av e d i s appeare d . . . . In ra t io n a l b e l i ef t h e tru th becom es o u r s a n d we b e c o m e the t ru th . 47 It is to b e o bserved th a t where r a ti o n a l self- ev i d e n ce c o m e s i n to p l a y , th e a d h eren ce of th e m i n d seems to be su sp e n d ed to a comp elli ng tru th , a n d n o role i s p l a y e d by th e processes of a rgu m en ta ti o n .

Th e

i n d i vi d u a l , with h i s fre e d o m of d e l i bera ti o n a n d of ch o i ce , d efers to th e c o n stra i n i n g force of rea s o n , w h i ch t a k e s from h i m a l l p o s si b i l i ty of d o u bt. versa l

Th u s , m a x i m a l ly effi ca ci o u s rh eto r i c , i n th e case of

R a ti o n a l i sm , with i t s cl a i m p h i l osophy, a n n o u n ced

to compl etely

eli m i n a te rh etor i c fro m

a v ery a mb i ti o u s progr a m wh i ch wo u l d bri ng

46 K a n t , C r i tique of Pure Reas o n , GBWW, vol . 47

a u ni­

a u d i en ce , i s rh eto r i c empl oyi ng n oth i ng b u t l ogi ca l pro o f .

D u m a s , Tra i te de psycho logie, vol . I I,

pp.

42, p.

240.

1 9 7- 1 9 8 , 200.

§ 7 . The U nive rsal Audience

33

about the agreement of minds through universal yielding to rational self-evidence. But the exig encies of t he Cartesian method had hardly been stated when Descartes, in th e name of these ex igencies, made some very q uestio n able assertio ns. H ow , indeed, does one distinguish between true a n d false self-eviden ce ? D oes a person suppose that there is re a lly obj ective va l i d i ty in w h at convi nces a un iversal audience, of which he co nsi der s himself the ideal representa tive ? Pareto ha s m ade the penetrating observa t i on that the u niversa l consensus i n voked is often m e r e ly the unwarranted genera liza tion of a n individual in­ tu i tion . 48 For thi s rea son it is a lways hazardous for a wri ter or speaker to i d e n ti fy with logic the a rgu m enta ti on i nten d ed for the u niversa l a u d i e n c e , a s he him self has conceived i t . Th e concepts th at men have f o rm e d , i n th e co u r s e o f h i sto ry , of " obj ective fa cts " a n d "obviou s tru th s " h a v e s u ffi ci e n tly va ri ed for u s to be wary i n th i s m a tter . I n ­ ste a d o f b el i e vi n g i n a u n i v ersa l a u d i en ce, a n a l ogou s to th e divine m i n d wh i ch c a n a s sent o n ly to th e "tru th, " we m igh t, wi th greater j u stifi c a ti o n , ch ara cterize ea ch sp ea k e r by th e i m age h e h imself h old s of th e u n i vers a l a u d i e n ce th at h e is tryi ng to wi n

to his view .

over

E very o n e c o n stitu tes th e u n i versa l a u d i en ce from what h e knows

to

of h i s fel l ow m e n , i n su ch a way as h e i s a w a re o f.

E a ch i n d i vi d u a l,

of th e u n i ver s a l a u d i en ce.

ti o n

be very i n stru cti v e , a s ti m es i n

Th e stu dy of t h ese variati ons would

a d d ressed

as

to

rea l,

and

true,

u n i versa l

th e

l a te d to c o n vi n ce d o es n ot convi n ce everybody , to

d isqu a l i fy i n g

n orm a l .

the

reca lc i tran t

by

a u d i en ce on e

cl a ssifyi ng

to th i s i d e a

ma ke

as

him

can

Th e r e

i n t ell e ct u a l

d i ence m u st

stupid

and

be

a ga i n st

set

means

infa l l i bl e

as t h o s e who

a u d i e n c e m ay

an

e ve n

L efeb vre ,

log ique d ia lectique,

be

en d owed

Th ose

t h e vi rtu ou s,

p.

29.

c o n fu se d

Socie ty, vol.

A la lum iere

du

if high

comm u n i ty

a n d t h e universal au­

a u d i en ce,

elite

of k n owl edge.

a pp e a l to

P a ret o , The M in d and

49 E . g.

ab­

If th i s da nger exi sts, recourse

wh o

to

wi t h

I,

§ §

wi th

5 89,

m a teria lisme

th e

599,

excep­

the m­ knowledge,

p r id e

beli evers,

end o w e d wi t h gra c e , s h ow t h e i r prefere n ce for an e l i te

48

or

be adheren ce

only

s e l v e s o n p o s se s s i o n o f a sup ern a t u r a l revel a t i on or mysti cal

elite

calcu­

and

of t h -0se banned a r e n ot so

va l u e

su ch a p ro ce d u r e ri d i cu l ou s.

m u st b e h a d t o a n o t h e r l ine of a rgu m e n tati on,

a s well

valid .

ca n a lways resort

o f ex c l u d i ng i n d i vi d u a l s from th e h u m a n

t h e n u m b er a n d

ti o n al

objectively

Th i s appro a c h , co m m on a m ong th i n kers i n th e Mi d dle Ages,

i s a l s o used by s o m e m o d ern wri ters. 49

a s to

few oppositions concep­

h a s th u s i ts own

wo u l d l earn from i t wh a t m en, a t differe nt

h a v e r e ga r d e d

h i st o ry ,

a rgu m e n ta ti o n

If

we

tra n scen d th e

ea ch cultu re,

men

or t o

au d i ence

;

this

perfect Being.

pp.

354,

dia lectique,

I,

36 1.

L ogique formelle,

34

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

The elite audience is by no means always regarded as similar to the universal audience. Indeed, the elite audience often wishes to remain distinct from the common run of men : if this is so, the elite is characterized by its hierarchic position. But often also the elite audience is regarded as a model to which men should conform in order to be worthy of the name : in other words, the elite audience sets the norm for everybody. In this case, the elite is the vanguard all will follow and conform to. Its opinion is the only one that matters, for, in final analysis, it is the determining one. The elite audience embodies the universal audience only for those who acknowledge this role of vanguard and model. For the rest it will be no more than a particular audience. The status of an audience varies with the concepts one has of it. Certain specialized audiences are readily assimilated to the uni­ versal audience, such as the audience of the scientist addressing his fellow scientists. The scientist addresses himself to certain partic­ ularly qualified men, who accept the data of a well-defined system consisting of the science in which they are specialists. Yet, this very limited audience is generally considered by the scientist to be really the universal audience, and not j ust a particular audience. He sup­ poses that everyone with the same training, qualifications, and infor­ mation would reach the same conclusions. The same holds good when we are dealing with morals. We expect our j udgments to be confirmed by the reactions of others. However, the "others" to whom we appeal are not j ust any "others. " We make our appeal solely to those who have duly "reflected " on the conduct we approve or disapprove. As Findlay says : We make our appeal above the unreflecting heads of present company, to the great company of reflecting persons , wherever they may be situated in space or time.50

This sort of appeal is criticized by J.-P. Sartre in his remarkable lectures on the audience of a writer : We have s aid that the writer addresses himself, in principle, to all men. But, immediately afterward, we observed that he is only read by some of them . From this gap between ideal public and real public originates the idea of abstract universality. In other words , the author po stulates a perpetual repetition over an indefinite future of the handful of readers he has in the present . . . recourse t o infinity in time tries to compensate for the failure in space (return to the infinite of the reasonable man of the seven50 Findlay, "Morality by Convention, " Mind, L i l l, new series, 1944, p . 160. Cf. Prior, L ogic and the Bas is of E thics, p . 84.

§ 8. Argumentation Before a Single Hearer

35

teenth century writer, extension to infinity of the writers ' club and of the public of specialists for the nineteenth century writer) . . . . B y concrete universality, o n the other hand, i s meant the totality of men living in a given society.51

Sartre upbraids writers for neglecting the concrete universality to which they could, and should, address themselves, in favor of an il­ lusory abstract universality. But is it not Sartre' s universal audience which will have to j udge the merits of this criticism and decide whether or not the writer has been harboring up to now a voluntary or invol­ untary illusion, whether up to now he has failed in his self-appointed "mission" ? And it is Sartre' s universal audience he himself addresses when he wants to explain his views on this question of abstract and concrete universality. We believe, then, that audiences are not independent of one ano ther, that particular concrete audiences are capable of validating a concept of the universal audience which characterizes them. On the other hand, it is the undefined universal audience that is invoked to pass j udgment on what is the concept of the universal audience appro­ priate to such a concrete audience, to examine, simultaneously, the manner in which it was composed, which are the individuals who comprise it, according to the adopted criterion, and whether thi s criterion i s legitimate. I t can b e said that audiences pass j udgment on one another.

§

8.

A rgumen ta tion Before a Single Hearer

All those who, in antiquity, proclaimed the primacy of dialectic over rhetoric, recognized the philosophic significance of argumen­ tation addressed to a single hearer, and granted its superiority over that addressed to a vast audience. Rhetoric confined itself to the technique of the long, sustained speech. But this kind of speech, with all the oratorical action involved in it, would be both ridiculous and ineffective before a single hearer.52 It is normal to take his reactions, denials, and hesitations into account, and when he notices them the speaker does not think of evading them. He has to prove the contested p oint, apprise himself of the reasons for his interlocutor's resistance, and thoroughly understand his obj ections. Discourse, of necessity, degenerates into dialogue. That is why, according to Quintilian, dia51 S artre, S i tuations, vol. I I, pp. 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 .

52

Quintilian, I,

between

n,

2 9 ; c f . also, Carnegie, Pub lic Speaking, a n d t h e distinction

"one-way communicatio n "

and

"two-way

communication "

made

by

Riezler, in "Political decisions in modern society, " E th ics, L X IV ( 1 954), 45-46.

36

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

lectic, as a technique of dialogue, was compared by Zeno to a clo sed fist, because of its more concise style of argumentation , whereas rhetoric was more like an open hand.53 There is indeed no doubt that the single hearer, h aving the opportunity to a sk questions and raise obj ections, gets the impression that the arguments he eventually ac­ cepts are more solidly supported than the conclusions of a speaker who unfolds his arguments in sustained discourse. In Plato ' s view, the dialectician concerned with gaining the agreement of his inter­ locutor at each step in his reasoning is more certain of remaining on the path of truth. This opinion is clearly expressed in this little speech Socrates makes to Callicles : Well then, we h ave s ett l e d o n e thing ; e v e r y time we are agree d o n a p o i n t , th a t point will be considered to b e s u fficiently t e s ted by b o t h of us examinati o n .

a n d will n o t need t o b e s u b m itt ed to a ny f u rther For you could not h a ve granted it to m e fro m l a ck

of knowl e d g e or exce s s of tim i d ity , n o r yet from a wi s h to dece i ve m e , for you a r e my fri end, a s y o u t e l l me you r s elf.

Th erefore our

a g reement will really prove t h a t we h a ve att a i n e d th e truth . 54 A s P a reto p o i n t s o u t,55 th i s way of tu rni ng th e a d h ere n ce of a

person

si ngle

i nto an i n d ex o f tru th w o u l d b e ri d i cu l o u s if Socra tes' i n t er­

l ocutor were expres si n g

pu rely p er so n a l p o i n t o f v i ew.

a

It wo u l d

p erh a p s be a n exa ggera t i o n t o s a y , a s G o b l o t does, th a t " P l a t o seem s confident th a t every i n terl ocutor woul d h av e to m a k e th e s a m e a n swer as th e person wh o i s speak i n g to h i m , " 56 b u t i t is at a ny rate c erta i n th a t

e a ch

of

S o crates'

th e m o st effecti ve on e-

i n terl o cu tors

is

th e

of p a rti s a n s of a

spokesma n-su p p o sedly

p a rti c u l a r

v i ewp o i n t a n d

th a t th eir obj ecti o n s m u st first b e d i sp o s e d o f i n o r d er t o fa cilita te public

a d h eren c e

to

th e

proposed

theses.

Th e i m p orta n ce o f d i a l ogu e as a p h i l o s o p h i c genre, a n d o f d i a l e cti c a s con ceived by Pl a to , d o es n ot l i e in th e a ctu a l a d h ere n ce of th e p a r­ ticu l a r i n terl o cu tor i n vol ved a m on g a n i n fi n i ty o f oth ers--

-wh o

is s i m p ly o n e p a rti c u l a r a u d i en c e

b u t i n th e a d h eren ce o f a n i n d i vid u a l , n o

m a tter wh o h e i s , wh o c a n n ot b u t b e y i el d i ng to th e evi d e n ce o f tru th b e c a u s e h i s c o n vi cti on fol l ows from a cl ose c o n fro n ta t i o n of h i s th o ugh t w i th

th a t

of

th e

speaker.

T h e rel a ti o n sh i p

b etween

d i a l ogu e

and

tru th i s su ch th a t E u gen e D u p ree! i s i n cl i n e d t o th i n k th a t Gorgi a s d i d n ot pra cti c e

5 3 Q u i n til i a n , I I,

d i a l og u e

xx,

o f h i s own a c cord : p a rti a l i ty for th e d i a -

7.

6 4 Plato, Gorgias, 487 d- e . 66 66

Pareto, T he M i n d a n d Society, vol . I, § 6 1 2 , p p . 3 6 8- 369 . G oblot, L a logique des juge me n ts de uale u r, p . 1 7 .

§ 8. Argumentation Before a Single Hearer

37

logue method, he believes, stems from Hippias of Elis, an opponent of rhetoric and a believer in the primacy of the only truth.57 Written dialogue, even more than spoken dialogue, assumes that the single hearer incarnates the universal audience. This conception seems justified, especially when, like Plato, one assumes that man is subj ect to the constraint of inner principles that guide the devel­ opment of his thought.58 Argumentation in a dialogue of this nature has no philosophic sig­ nificance unless it claims to be valid for all. It is easy to see how dia­ lectic, j ust like argumentation directed to the universal audience, could come to be identified with logic. This was the view held by the Stoics and the medieval thinkers. 59 We think of it as merely an illusion, or a method, which admittedly has played an important role in the development of absolutist philosophy, striving by every means to go from adherence to truth. The philosophic significance of the interlocutor' s adherence in dialogue is that the interlocutor is regarded as an incarnation of the universal audience. The hearer is assumed to have the same reasoning power at his disposal as the other members of the universal audience, the appreciation factors pertaining to purely techni cal competence being provided by the speaker or presumed to be abundantly at the hearer' s disposal because of his social position. The adherence of the interlocutor should not, however, be gained solely on the strength of the speaker's dialectical superiority. The one who gives in should not be beaten in an eristic contest but is supposed to yield to the self-evidence of truth. Dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a deba te, in which the partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their respective views, but rather a discussion, in which the interlocutors search honestly and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem. Certain contemporary writers who stress this heuristic viewpoint, as against the eristic one, hold that discussion is the ideal instrument for reaching obj ectively valid conclusions. 60 The assumption is that in discussion the interlocutors are concerned only with putting forward and testing all the arguments, for and against, bearing on the various m atters in question. When successfully carried out, discussion should lead to an inevitable and unanimously accepted conclusion, if the arguments, which are pre57 Dupree!, Les Sophistes. Pro tagoras , Gorgias, Prodicus, Il ippias, pp. 76, 7 7 , 2 6 0 , 263. 58 Cf. Perelman, The Idea of Jus tice and the Problem of A rgumen t, p p . 1 6 1 - 1 6 7 . 59 C f . D iirr, " D i e Entwicklung der Dialektik v o n Platon b i s Hegel , " D i a lect ica, I, 1, 1 94 7 ; McKeon, " Dialectic and Political Thought and Action, " E thics, LXV ( 1 954), 1 -33. 60 Cf. B aird, A rgumen tation, D iscussion, and Debate, p . 307.

38

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

sumed to weigh equally with everyone, have, as it were, been distribut­ ed in the pans of a b alance.

I n a d eb ate, o n the other hand, each in­

terlocutor advance s only arguments favorable to his own the si s , and his sole concern with arguments u nfavorable to him is for the p ur­ pose of refuting them or limiting their impact.

The man with a s ettled

position is thu s one-sided, and because of his bias and the consequ ent restriction of his effort to those p ertinent arguments which are fa­ vorable to him, the others remain frozen, as it were, and only app ear in the deb ate if his opponent puts them forward .

And as the latter

is presumed to adopt the same attitude, one sees how dis cussio n came to be considered as a sincere quest for the truth, whereas the protag­ onists of a debate are chiefly concerned with the triumph of their own viewpoint. Theoretically, this distinction may b e u s eful . rash generalization to

consider the

However, it is a very

p a rticip ants

in

a

d i si nterested

discussion a s spokesmen of the u niversal audien ce, and it is only through a rather schematic view of reality that the d eterminatio n of th e weight of argu ments can b e compared with the weighing of i ngots .

O n the

other hand, the d efen d er o f a p a rti cu l a r p oint of view is very often convinced th a t h e is s u staining wha t i s o bj ecti v ely th e be st th esis an d that its triu m ph will be th at of the best c a u s e . I n pra ctice, there are m a ny occa sions on wh i ch thi s d i stinctio n between discussion a n d debate seems h a r d t o d raw with a n y exa ctitu d e . In m ost c a s e s , i t is b ased on th e intenti o n wh i ch w e , rightly or wro ngly, a s cr i b e to th e p a rti ci p a nts in th e d i a l ogu e, a n d th i s i ntenti o n m ay

It i s o nly i n tho se sp eci a l ca ses

vary i n th e cou rse of th e d i a l o gu e .

wh ere th e a tti tu d e of th e p a rti c i p a nts i s governed by th e i n stitu ti on a l setti n g th a t we ca n k n ow beforeh a n d wh a t will b e th e sp eaker s ' i n ­ tenti o n s .

I n a j u d i ci al settlement, f o r ex a m pl e , w e k n ow th a t t h e

l a wy er f o r ea ch pa rty w i l l ten d to d evel o p a rgu m ents i n f a v o r o f a th esi s r a th er th a n to sh e d l igh t on term i n i n g th e i ss u e s to

be

s o m e q u esti o n .

d i scu ssed ,

Th e l a w , by d e­

favors th i s o n e- si d ed

a ttitu d e

a n d th e a d o p ti o n o f a d efi n i te sta n d po i n t b y th e a d vo c a te , wh o th en h a s m erely to press th i s p o i n t stea d fa stly a ga i n st h i s o p p on en t .

In

m a n y oth er ca ses, th e i nterventi o n of i n stituti o n s i s m ore su btle, b u t n everth el e s s effecti ve : a m e m b er- el ect d efen d i ng a th esi s aga i n st th e cri ti c i s m s of th e ex a m i n i n g c o m m i ttee, d efen d i ng h i s p a rty ' s progra m .

or a

m em ber of P a rl i a m ent

Fi n a l ly , th i s a ttitu d e m ay resu l t fro m

th e spea k er ' s c o m m i tm ents : if h e h a s pro m i sed so m eo n e h e w i l l sup­ p ort h i s ca n d i d a cy before a sel ecti o n

c o m m i ttee, th e d i a l ogu e h e wil l

m a i n ta i n w i th th e m em bers o f th e c o m m i ttee wil l , i n fa ct, b e m ore a p l e a d i n g th a n a sea rch for th e tru thof th e b est ca n d i d a te.

i n th i s c a s e th e d etermi n a ti on

§ 8. Argumentation B e fore a Single H earer Except,

39

then, where we know for what rea so n-institutional

other-the p articip ants adopt th e attitu d e o f plead ers

an d

or

conse­

quently wish to embarras s their opp onents, it is hard to maintain a clear distinction b etwee n a dialogue directed toward discovery of the truth and one that consists of a series of pleadings.

Such a dis­

tinction can b e m aintained o nly where there is a clear preliminary distinction between truth

an d error,

and this is something which ,

in the absence of bad faith , the very existence of the d iscussion makes it hard to establish. The heuristic dialogue, in which the interlocutor is an incarnation of the universal audience, a n d the eristic dialogue, which aims at over­ powering the opponent, are b oth merely exceptional cases .

In

or­

dinary dialogue the p articipants are simply trying to p ersuade their audience so as to bring about some immediate or future a ctio n ; m ost of o ur argum ents in d aily life d evelop at th i s pra cti cal level.

It is

a curiou s and noteworthy fact that this everyday a ctivity of persu asive discussion h a s received very scant attention from the theoreticians . Most auth ors o f treati ses on rh etoric have regard ed it as foreign to th eir discipline .

And the p h i l osop h er s wh o have ex amined dialogu e

h ave m ainly consi d ered it u n der th e very special a spe ct in which the interlocutor i n carnates the u n i versal a u d i e n ce

or

e l se u n d er the m ore

p sychological , but at the s a m e time more schola stic, a s p ect of eri stic dialogue, where the d o m i n a n t c o n c ern is with what S chop enha u er61 calls "Rechthaberei. "

Alfo n so R eyes h a s

righ tly

p oi n ted o ut62 th at

p riv a te d is c o urse is a field contigu o u s to th a t of a n ci ent rh etori c ;

it i s i n d eed in th e c o u rse of daily conversation th a t th e o pp o rtu n ity

to

engage

in

a rg u m entati o n

m o st

p rese n t s itself

c o m m o nly

.

Even w h e n th e s i n g l e h e a rer, wh eth er h e be ta k i ng a n a cti ve p a rt i n th e d i a l ogu e or m erely silen tly l i sten i ng to th e sp ea k er, i s a s th e i n c a rn a ti on

a l w ays th e u n i versa l a u d i en ce. th e

i n ca rn ati o n

of

regarded

of a n a u d i en ce, th e a u d i en ce h e em b o d i e s is n ot a

p a rti cu l a r

He c a n a l s o b e-

a n d very often i s­

a u d i en ce .

Th i s i s obviou sly th e ca se wh en th e s i n gl e h ea rer rep rese n ts a group of w h i ch h e i s th e d el egate or spokesm a n , a n d i n wh o se n a m e he c a n m a k e d eci si o n s .

B u t i t i s a l s o tru e wh en

th e

a s a specim e n of a wh o l e c a tegory o f l i sten ers .

a u d i tor

is

regard ed

A tea ch er, for ex a mple,

m a y c h o o s e to a d d ress th e stu d e n t wh o seem s to h i m th e d u m best, th e m o st i ntel l i g e n t stu d ent, or th e stu d en t s i tting wh ere h e i s l ea st a bl e

to

hear him .

61 Schopen h a u er , "Eristische D i a l ektik , " Siimtliche Werke ( Pip er) , vol . 6 , p . 62 R eyes,

El

Des l inde,

p.

203.

394 .

40

THE NEW RHETO R I C

The choice o f the single hearer who will incarnate the audience depends on the aims the speaker sets himself, but also on his idea of the way in which a group should be characterized. The choice of the person who will incarnate a particular audience will often influence the methods used in the argumentation. Bentham approved of the custom of addressing the Speaker in the House of Commons, because he thought it secured courtesy in debate.63 In this instance, the single hearer is chosen for his functions, not for his qualities; this is the choice which least commits the speaker and reveals least what opinion he has of his audience. In other cases, the choice of the hearer is much more revealing. From the choice of the person to incarnate a particular audience, we can learn b oth the speaker's conception of his audience and the ends he hopes to a ttain. When Ronsard addresses Ilelene, he sees her a s the incarnation of all young people who should heed the advice : "Gather the roses of life this very day . "64 B ut, addressed to Helene, this advice is bereft of didactic claims and merely reflects an emotion, an understanding, perhaps even a hope. \Ve shall encounter this technique throughout the history of literature and politics. It is very rare indeed that the individual to whom a published speech is ad­ dressed should not be regarded as the incarnation of a definite par­ ticular audience.

§ 9. Se lf-De libera ting The deliberating subj ect is often regarded as an incarnation of the u niversal audience. It does indeed seem that a man endowed with reason who seeks to convince himself is bound lo be contemptuous of procedures aimed at winning o ver other people. It is believed that he cannot avoid b eing sincere with himself and is in a b etter position than anyone else to test the value of his own arguments. To Pascal the best cri­ terion of the truth is "your own assent to yourself, and the constant v oice of your own reason. "65 This is also the criterion Descartes adopts, in his Medita tions, for proceeding from the reasons that convinced him to the affirmation that he has "reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth . "66 In contradistinction to dialectic--the 63 64 65 66

Bentham, "Essay on Political Taeties, " Works (Tait), vol . I I , pp. 362-363. Ronsarcl, "Sonnets pour Helene, " II, XLI I I , Oeiwres comp letes, vol. I , p . 260. Pascal, Pensees, G13WW, vol. 33, p. 220, no. 260. Descartes, "Preface to the Reader, " Meditations on the First Ph i losophy,

GBWW, vol. 3 1 , p. 72.

§ 9 . Self-D eliberating

41

technique of controversy with another person-and to rhetoric­ the technique of speech ad d ressed to a large number o f people- logic is identified, both by Sch openha uer'7 a nd by J . S. Mm, es with the r u l e s applied in the conduct o f o ne ' s own thought. And this because when a p erson is thinking, his mind wou l d not be concerned w ith pleading or with se eking on ly tho se a rguments tha t support a particular point of view, b u t would strive to a ssemble all a rguments that seem to it to have some value, wi th o ut su p pressi ng any , a nd then, after weighing the pros and cons, would de cide o n wh a t, to th e best of its k nowledge a n d b elief, appears to be the most sa ti sfa c tory solu tion . J ust as one a tta ch es more i m p orta n ce to a rgu m ents presented i n closed session th a n to those p re s e n ted at a pu bli c m eeti ng, th e secrecy of self-deli­ berati o n seem s to g u a r a n tee i ts va l u e a n d si n cerity . Th u s we find Cha ig n e t i n the l a st work i n French to con si d er rh etoric a s a tech­ n i q u e of p ersu a si o n , c on tr a sti n g persu a sion a n d convi ction i n these term s : "Wh e n we are con vi n ced , we a r e overcome only by ou rselves, ,

by o u r own i d e a s .

Wh en we a re persu a d ed , it i s a lways by a nother . "69

Some a u th ors h a ve co n ferred a preem i n e n t positi on to the m ethods co

of

n d u c ti n g

th i s qu estion a s the only

o u r own though t a n d rega rd

o n e wo rthy o f

a

phi l o so pher' s

i n t er est

.

Speech a d d ressed to an other

i s i n their v i ew simply ap pea ra n ce a n d

i ll u sion .

o u tl ook h a s d o n e m u ch to d i scred i t, n ot

only rh etoric, bu t, in genera l,

a n y theo ry of a rgu m enta ti o n . highly d e si r a bl e to argu m en t a ti o n .

feel, on th e contrary , that it is

We

con si d er self-d eli bera ti on a s a parti cular k i nd of

We d o n ot overlook th e fa ct th a t self- deliberation

h a s i t s own speci a l ch a ra cteri s t i cs, bu t by h e e d i ng Iso cra tes '

we

thi n k th ere

is

m u ch to gain

opi n i o n :

a rgu m en t s

Th e

Th i s i ndividu alistic

b y wh i c h

we

t o them a r e t h e s a m e a s t h o se

con vin ce

we u s e

ot h ers

wh en we

We c a l l t h o s e a b l e t o sp ea k t o t h e m u lt itu d e orators,

t h os e wh o a re d i s cern m en t. 70

ga rd a s p e r s o n s of s aga city wit h i n

It

also

t h em s elves

very

with

often

h appe n s

th a t

a bl e t o

d i scussion

with

m ea n s w e u se t o see t h i ngs m o r e cl ea rly

s i m ply a

t alk

speak

we

wh en

engage in

reflection.

an d

we

t hings

someone ou rselves.

re­

over

else

is

Agree­

m e n t with o n e s e l f i s m e rely a p a rt i cu l a r ca se of agreemen t with oth ers. A cc o rd i ngly, from o u r poi n t of vi ew , i t i s by a n a lyzi ng argumentation a d d ressed and

67 und

to

o t h ers

we ca n

be st

u n d ersta n d

self- deliberation,

n ot v i c e versa .

Schopenh auer,

Vors te l l u ng,

S ii m l l ic h e

Band

68

Mill ,

&9

Chaignct,

L a

Isocra t e s ,

N icoc les ,

10

th a t

S y s tem

of

I I,

L og ic ,

v ol.

r h e tor iq u e §

8.

et

J,

IX,

p.

I II:

Die

1 1 2.

I n t rod u ct i on ,

son

vol.

( Brock h a u s),

Werke

ch ap .

h is to ire,

p.

§

3,

93.

pp.

2,

3.

Welt

als

Wille

42

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

I n self-deliberation, can we not indeed discern reflections corres­ ponding to a discussion and others that are merely a search for ar­ guments in support of a previously adopted po sitio n ?

Can we wholly

rely on the sincerity of the deliberating s u bj ect to find o ut whether he is in quest of the best line of conduct or is plea ding a case within himself ?

D epth psychology has taught us to distrust even that which

seems unquestionable to our own consciousn ess. tinctions it makes between reasons

and

H owever, th e dis­

rationalizatio ns

cannot be

understood unless deliberation is treated as a particular case of ar­ gumentation.

The p sy chologist will say that the m otives given by

the subj ect in explanation of his conduct are rationalizations if they differ from the real m otives which caused him to a ct and of which the subj ect is unaware.

W e shall give a wider meaning to the term

rationalization, regarding it as immateria l whether or n o t the sub­ j ect is unaware of the real motives for his conduct.

At first sight,

it may seem ridiculous that a well-b alan ced p erson, who has a cted for very "reasonable" reasons, should try so hard, deep d own inside, to give qui t e different reasons for his a cts-reasons that are less plaus­ ible, b u t do place him in a m ore favora ble ligh t . 7 1

This kind of ra­

tionaliz ati o n is p erfectly explained if we regard it as a pl eadi n g tha t is th o u ght out in advan ce for th e benefit of others, and can even be a dapted to each p a rticular a n t icip a t ed audience.

This rationalization

does n o t m ean, as Schopenha u er claims , that o u r "intellect" m erely disguises th e real motives for o u r acts, th emselves completely irra­ t i o n al . 72

Acti o n s might h ave b een perform e d a fter carefu l consid er­

ati o n , b u t yet h ave other m otives tha n those on e tries to m ake one ' s conscience a d m i t to afterward s .

Those w h o d o not s e e , or will n ot

a l l ow, the i m p ort a n ce of a rg u m e n t a ti o n cannot a ccount for ra tiona li­

zation : for them it woul d be m e rely th e sha d ow

of

a sha d ow.

The s i g n i fi ca nce of our view m ay becom e clearer by consid eri ng the situ a ti on

descri bed

by J .

S. Mill in

the fol l owi ng p a ssage :

Alm ost every o n e k n ows Lord M a n sfiel d ' s a d vi ce to a m a n of soun d com m o n sense, wh o , being app ointed govern o r of a colony, h a d to presid e in its cou rts of j u stice with o u t previ o u s j u d i c i a l p r a ctice o r l e ga l e d u cation . The a dvice wa s to give h i s d eci s i on b o l d ly, for it wou l d probably be right, b u t n ever to vent ure on a s sign i n g rea s on s , for th ey wou l d a l m o st i n f a l l i bly b e wrong . 73 If Lord M a n sfi el d ' s a d vi c e here wa s goo d , thi s is b eca u se , a fter the govern or h a d given hi s d ecisi on b a se d

on

his sen se

of

equ i ty, his

71 Crawshay- Will i a m s , The Comforts o f U n reas o n , p p . 74 et seq . 72 Schopenh a u er, Siim t l ic h e Werke (Brockh a u s ) , vol . V I : Pare rga u nd Para li­ pomena, B a n d I I, ch ap . V I I I, " Z u r Ethi k , " § 1 1 8 , p . 2 4 9 . 73 Mil l , System of Logic, bk. I I , ch ap. I I I, § 3 , p . 1 24 .

§ 9 . Self-Deliberating

43

legally trained assista nts could "rationalize " the decision by adducing reasons which did not occur to the governor a nd were more in accord with the controlling la w than th e reaso ns he would have given in sup­ p ort of his decisio n . It is a common, and not necessarily regrettable, occurrence even for a magistrate who k nows the law to formulate his j u dgment in two steps : th e co nclu sions are first in spired by what conforms most closely with h is sen se of j u stice, the technical moti­ vation b ei ng added on later. M u st we con clu de i n this ca se that the d e ci si o n was made with out a ny preceding deli berati on ? N ot at all, a s the pros and cons may have b een weigh ed with th e greatest care, th o u gh n o t with i n the frame of con si d erati on s ba sed on l e g a l techni­ calities. S tri c tl y l ega l rea s on s a re a d d u ced only f or the purpose of j u stifyi ng the d e c i si o n to a n oth er a u d i en ce. T h ey a re not ad du ced, a s Mill su ggests i n h i s ex a mple , for th e purpose of making an expert fo rm u l a ti o n of th e gen era l m a x i m s of wh i ch th e governor ha d only a vagu e i d ea . M i l l ' s sci e n ti sm m a k es h i m th i n k of everything in terms of a

si n gle a u d i e n ce, th e u n i versa l a u d i en ce, a n d prevents h i m from

p r o vi d i n g

expl a n a ti on

a d e q u a te

an

ph en omen on . d eci si on, m ay consist of the tech n i ca l fra m ew or k, a s in the in­ th e

for

Fresh a rgu m e n t s , bro ugh t i n a fter th e i n sert i o n

of th e con cl u si on i n to a

j u st

sta n ce

cited .

B u t su ch a rgu m e n ts can a l so be of a nontech n ical

ch a ra cter, a s i l l u stra ted i n th e story by A n toi n e de L a Salle74 i n which a

feu d a l l o r d a n d h i s wi fe d i scu ss a gra ve m a tter

Th e l ord

m u st ch o o s e

b etween

sa cri f i c i ng

th e

d u ri ng

the night .

an d

sacrifi cing

town

Th e d e c i s i o n i s n ever i n d ou bt, but A ntoi n e d e L a Salle n on e­

h i s son .

th eless a tt a c h e s

g re a t

i mp orta n ce to th e wi fe ' s word s,

l a te s with a wea l th o f d eta i l .

wh i ch

he

re­

H er word s tra n sform th e way i n wh ich

th e d eci si o n i s fa c e d : sh e gi ves h er h u sb a n d a sen se of pri d e i n him self,

p oi se ,

c o n f i d e n ce ,

and

co n sol a t i on .

Sh e

gi v es th e d ec i s i o n i t s setti ng , a n d , i n like th e t h e o l o gi a n wh o provi d e s th e wh i ch

all

m em b e rs

of

the

so

pu ts

i n to

his

i dea s, She

is

ra ti on a l proofs for a d ogma i n

a lr e a dy

c h u rch

ord er

d oi ng , rei n forces i t.

b eli e ve.

In p o l i t i c a l l i fe t o o , o ii e fi n d s s i tu a t i on s i n wh i ch th e rea son s j u sti fying a

d eci si o n

o pi n i on can

ki ng

74

t h o ugh

A n a lyz e d

by

Neve,

75

a l t e r i ng i ts

A u erb a c h

n ot e :

as

th e

2 34 ,

in

M i mes i s,

2 35 .

Text

in

a dh e r en ce

publi c

of

For i n s t a n ce, when th e d eci si on,

Dargestellte "L e

A fri­

a n n ou n ced th a t th e Briti sh

by g i v i ng m ore d et a i l ed

A n to i n e de L a Sa l le, pp.

Tra n sl a t o r ' s

i mp a ti en ce,

j u stifi ca t i on .

exi l ed , t h e p r ess

n ot

to p u b l i c o p i n i on

Ui ndisc h e n L i te ra t u r, pp. in

wi t h

su ch

Seret s e75 wa s

govern m e n t , sion

awaited

a re

d ep e n d s o n

wou ld m ake a n d m ore

Wirklichkeit

a

conces­

sati sfa ctory

in

der

ab end­

recon fort de Ma d a me du Fresne, "

1 09- 1 4 0.

C h i ef- d e s ign a t e

of t h e B a m a ngwa t o

t r i be,

in Bechuan a land.

44

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

reasons in justification of what it had done. In other words, the gov­ ernment sought to give a justification which would be acceptable to the audience it was addressing. This preference for certain arguments may be due to the hearer's wish to have at his disposal arguments that would be valid for another audience, perhaps even the universal audience, and are thus capable of transfer to a modified situation. As appears from all we have j ust said about audiences, the rhe­ torical value of a statement is not, from our point of view, destroyed because the statement is predicated on argumentation thought to have been elaborated after the inner decision had been made nor be­ cause it involves argumentation based on premises tha t the speaker does not himself accept. In these two cases, which , although distinct, are in some way connected , the charge of insincerity or hypocrisy might be made by an observer or adversary. However, such an ob­ j ection is significant only when made from a quite different stand­ point than ours. Usually, moreover, the obj ector's perspective in such a case will be based on a well-defined conception of reality or personality. Our thesis is, on the one hand, that a belief, once established, can always be intensified, and, on the other hand, that argumentation is a function of the audience being addressed. Consequently, it is legitimate that the person who has acquired a certain conviction should be at pains to strengthen it for himself and, more especially, against possible attack from without. And he will naturally consider all ar­ guments capable of reinforcing that conviction. These new reasons may intensify his conviction, protect it against certain lines of attack he had not thought of originally, make its significance clearer. Moreover, it is only when a speaker is addressing an audience to which he is supposed to belong� which, of course, would be the case for the universal audience--that he can be reproached with any con­ flict there may be between the arguments he puts forward and those that convinced him. But even in this particular case, one cannot exclude the possibility that the speaker's inner conviction is based on elements peculiar to himself--an incommunicable intuition, for instance-- and that he is obliged to resort to argumentation in order to sha_re the belief these elements engendered. To conclude, we would say that, while the study of argumentation enables us to understand the reasons that have led so many writers to assign a privileged status to inner deliberation, this same study gives us also the means of distinguishing between the different kinds of deliberation and of understanding both what is well founded in the opposition between reasons and ra tionaliza tions and the real in-

§ 10.

The

Effects of Argumentation

terest, from the standpoint of argumentation, of rationalizations.

45

these over-despised

§ 1 0 . The Effec ts of A rgumen ta tion The goal of all argumentati on, as we have said before, is to create or increase the a d h erence of minds to the theses presented for their assent. An efficacious argument is one wh ich succeeds in increasing this intensity o f adh erence among th ose who hear it in such a way as to set in m oti o n the i n tended a cti on (a posi tive a ction or an ab­ stenti on from a cti o n) to

or

in

at l ea st j n crea ting

a ct whi ch will a pp ea r

at

th e h ea rers a willingness

th e right m om ent.

Practi c a l eloquen ce , i n cl u d i ng j u d i c i a l a n d d el i berative genres,

was

th e tra d i t i o n a lly fa vored fiel d of con fronta ti on of l i tiga nts and poli­ tici a n s even

who

d efen d e d ,

con tra d i ctory

by

a rgu m en tation,

th eses .

In

su ch

opposed

oratori ca l

sometimes

and

the adver­

contests,

s a ri e s wo u l d seek to wi n th e a d h eren ce of th eir a u d i en ce d ebated su bj ects, in wh i ch th e pros a n d con s wou l d often able a n d

a p p a rently

equ a l ly h on ora ble

on

certain

have

equally

d efenders.

Su ch a sta te of a ff a i rs wa s d eplored by th e d etra ctors of rh etoric,

for whom there wa s b u t a si ngle tru th i n e very

A ccording

m a tter .

to th em , th e protago n i sts of su ch d i scu ssi ons were

con du cti ng th ei r

d ivergen t a rg u m en t s by m ea n s of rea soni ngs wh i ch

coul d only have

i l l u sory v a l u e i n p ro d u cing convi cti on . th a t th e rh etori c worthy th e

go d s

of

Pl a to t el l s u s i n the Phaedrus

p h i l osophy ,

th a t

wh i ch

cou l d convince A n d,

th em selves , o ugh t to p u t i tsel f u n d er th e sign of truth .

twen ty centuries l a te r , L ei b n i z , wh o rea l i zed th a t h u m an knowledge is l i m i te d

and

often

i n capa b l e

of

fu rn i sh i ng

su ffi cient p roof

of

the

truth of a l l a ss erti o n s , d esired th a t the d egre e of a ssent given to a ny th esi s sh o u l d

at l e a st be proporti on a l to

the i n d i cati on s of the cal­

c u l u s of pro b a b i l i ti es or of presu mpti on s. 76 Th e a tta ck s m a d e by ph i l osoph ers on th e th eory of rea soned per­

su a si o n , wh i ch w a s d evel oped in works on rh etori c, a l l t h e m ore j u st i fi e d

in

appeared to be

th a t a rgu m e n ta t i on wa s l i m i ted,

t h e t h e oreti c i a n s were con cern ed, t o of conj ecture a n d of q u a l i fi c a t i on.

question s

a s fa r a s

red u ci ble t o problems

Probl em s of c onj ecture a re con­

c ern e d with fa cts, fa cts in th e pa st for j u d i ci a l proceedi ngs, facts in t h e fu t u re for p o l i t i c a l d e b a tes : "Di d X d o wh a t "Will

76

s u ch -a n d- s u ch

L ei b n i z ,

m e n t,

pp.

an

a ct

entail

D ie p h i losop h i sc h e n Schrif"ten , vol.

4 4 5- 4 4 8.

h e is

su ch-a n d- su ch

V,

Nouveaux

a

c

h a rg ed

with ? "

consequence ? "

e s sais

sur

l'ent en de­

46

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

This is the type of question we will describe as conj ectural. In pro­ blems of qualification, we ask if such-and-such a fact can be qualified in such-and-such a way. In both cases it was unthinkable that more than one point of view could honestly be defended. And it was u p to the philosophers, who carried o u t an impartial study of general problems, to provide and j u stify this p oint of view. The practical conclusions to be drawn from a study of the facts would impose them­ selves automatically on any reasonable mind. Now from such a standpoint argumentation, as we understand it, has no purpose. The facts, the truths, or at least the probabilities, subj ect to the calculus of probabilities, triumph of themselves. The speaker plays no essential role, since his demonstrations are timeless, and there is no cause to distinguish among audiences, since all men are supposed to yield to what is obj ectively valid. And it is unquestionably true, in the domain of purely formal sciences (such as symbolic logic or mathematics), as well as in the purely ex­ perimental domain, that this fiction which separates from the knowing subj ect the fact, the truth, or the probability has certain und eniable advantages. And, because this "obj ective" technique is successful in science, some are convinced that its use in other areas is equally legitimate. However, where no agreement exists, even among experts, can this affirmation that the advocated theses are the manifestation of a reality or of a truth before which unprej udiced minds must bow be anything but a device to be exorcised ? It seems to us, quite on the contrary, that there is less danger of oversimplifying and distorting the situation in which argumentation takes place by taking as a special, though very important, case that in which proof of the truth or of the probability of a thesis can be adduced within a domain which is formally, scientifically, or techni­ cally, circumscribed, with one accord, by all the interlocutors. Only then is the possibility of proving the pro and the con tra the token of a contradiction which must be eliminated. In the other cases, the possibility of arguing in such a way as to reach opposite conclusions actually implies that we are not in this special case with which the sciences have made us familiar. This will always be the case when the argumentation aims at bringing about an action which is the re­ sult of a deliberate choice among several possibilities, without pre­ vious agreement on a criterion by which to evaluate the solutions. Those philosophers who were indignant over the fact that one might not behave in accordance with the conclusion that appeared to be the only reasonable one, have been obliged to supplement their view of human nature by endowing man with passions and interests capable of opposing the teachings of reason. Returning to Pascal' s distinction,

§ 11.

The Epidictic Genre

47

to a ction on the mind we must add the means of a cting on the will. In this p erspective, whereas the task

of the

philoso p h er , in a smu ch

as he is addressing a particular audience, will b e to silence this au­ dience' s p articular passions in order to facilitate the " obj e ctiv e " con­ sideration of the problems under discussion , the sp eaker aiming at a particular action, to b e carried out at an opportune time, will, on the co ntrary, have to excite his audience so as to produce a sufficiently strong adherence, capable of overcoming both the unavoidable ap athy and the forces acting in a direction divergent from that which is d e­ sired. One might ask if the existence of two treatises on argumentation by Aristotle,

Topics

and

Rhetoric,

the first devoted to the th eoretical

discussion of theses, the second taking the particularities of au dien ces into

account,

has not favored

this traditi o n al

action o n the mind and action on the will.

d i stin ction b etw een

As for us, we b elieve that

this distinction, which presents th e first kind of a ctio n as comp l etely impersonal and timeless a n d the second as completely irrati onal, is based on an error and lead s to an imp asse.

Th e error is th at of con­

co mpletely i n d epen d ent faculties .

ceiving m a n as made u p of a s e t of

Th e im passe con sists i n removing all rati o n al j ustifi cati o n from ac­ tion b a sed o n choice, and th u s making the exercise o f human free­ dom absurd.

A rgumentatio n alone (of which d elib eration co n stitu tes

a specia l case) a llows u s to u n d erstan d our d eci s i o n s .

Thi s is why

we will con sider a rgumentation a b ove all in its practica l effects : o rient­ ed toward the fu tu r e , it s et s out to b ri ng a b o u t some a ction o r to pre­ p a re fo r it by a cting, by di scursive m eth o d s , on th e m i n d s of th e h e a rers . Th i s way of l o ok i ng at it a l l ows u s to u n d er s t a n d som e of its special

f e a tu r e s

,

i n p a rti cular the sign i f i ca n ce for i t ·of the o ra tori c a l genre

which th e a n cients

called epidictic. § 1 1 . The Ep idictic Gen re

A ri stotle a n d a l l theoreti ci a n s i n sp i red by him m a k e room in thei r treati ses on of oratory,

Rheto ric,

a l on g s i d e the deli bera t i ve a n d the l eg a l typ e s

for the epi d i cti c gen re .

The l a tter ha d ,

u n qu esti o n a bly,

a sserted

itself vigorou sly .

M ost

of the m a sterpi eces of a c a dem i c el oquen ce, the eu l ogies a n d p a n egyri cs o f a Gorgi a s or a n

lsocra tes, show-pieces fa m o u s thro ugho ut Greece,

were speeches of the e p i d i ctic ki n d .

U n l i ke

politica l

and

lega l

d eb a tes,

rea l contests i n whi ch two opponents s o u ght to ga i n the a dheren ce on deb a te d topi cs of a n a u d ien ce tha t wou l d deci de on the i ssue of a tri a l or on a cou rse of a cti o n t o be foll owed , epi d i ct i c sp eeches ha d

48

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

nothing t o do with all that. A single orator, who often did not even appear in public, but merely circulated his written composition, made a speech, which no one opposed, on topics which were apparently uncontroversial and without practical consequences. Whether it be a funeral eulogy, the eulogy of a city for the benefit of its inhabitants, or a speech on some subj ect devoid of current interest, such as the praise of a virtue or of a god, the audience, according to the theore­ ticians, merely played the part of spectators. After listening to the sp eaker, they merely applauded and went away. These speeches were a central attraction at festivals attended periodically by the inhabitants of a city or of a group of cities, and their most visible result was to shed luster on their authors. Such a show-piece was as­ sessed as a work of artistic virtuosity, but this flattering appraisal was considered as an end, not as the consequence of the speaker's having reached a particular goal. The speech was regarded in the same light as a dramatic spectacle or an athletic contest, the purpose of which seemed to be the displaying of the performers. Because of these special characteristics, the Roman rhetoricians abandoned its study to the grammarians, while they trained their pupils in the two other kinds of oratory which were deemed relevant to practical elo­ quence. 77 To the theoreticians, it was a degenerate kind of eloquence with no other aim than to please and to enhance, by embellishing them, facts that were certain or, at least, uncontested. 78 It is not that the ancients saw no other purpose to epidictic discourse. Ac­ cording to Aristotle, the speaker sets himself different goals depending on the kind of speech he is making : in deliberative oratory, to counsel what is expedient, that is, the best ; in legal oratory to establish what is j ust; and in epidictic oratory, which is concerned with praise and blame, his sole concern is with what is beautiful or ugly. It is a ques­ tion, then, of recognizing values. But in the absence of the concept of value-j udgment, and of that of intensity of adherence, the theo­ reticians of speech, from Aristotle on, readily confused the - concept of the beautiful, as the obj ect of the speech (which was, besides, equiv­ alent to the concept of "good") with the aesthetic value of the speech itself. 7 9 The epidictic genre of oratory thus seemed to have more connection with literature than with argumentation. One result is that the di­ vision into oratorical genres helped to bring about the later disinte77 Quintilian , I I, r , 1, 2 , 8, 9. Cf. Chaignet, La rMtorique e t son histoire, p . 2 3 5 . 7 8 C f . Gwynn, Roman Educa tion from Cicero t o Quinti lian, pp. 98-99. 7 9 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I , 3, 1 358b 2-7, and 1 358b 20-29. See also, discussion of the hearer as spectator in § 4 , supra : Speaker.

The Au dience as a Construction of the

§ 11.

The Epidictic Ge nre

49

gration of rhetoric, as the first two genres were appropriated by phi­ losophy and dialectics, while the third was i n cluded in literary pro se . Whately, writing in the

nineteenth

century,

will

criti cize Aristotle

for having p aid too much attentio n to epidi ctic rhetoric. 80 Our own view is that epidictic oratory forms a central part of th e art of p ersuasion , a n d the lack of u n d ersta n ding shown toward results from a false

conception

it

of the effects of argum entation.

The effectiveness of an exp osition designed to secure a pro p er de­ gree of adherence of an audience to the argume nts p resente d to

it

can b e assessed o nly i n terms of the actual aim the sp e a ker has set himself.

o b­

The intensity of the adherence sought i s not limited to

taining purely intellectual results, to a declaration that a certain th esis seems more probable than a nother, but will v ery o ften be reinforced until

the

d esired action i s a ctually p erform e d .

D em o sthenes,

sidered to b e o n e of t h e m o d els of cla ssical eloq u en ce ,

co n­

sp e nt m ost of

his efforts not j ust in getting the Athenians to make decisi o n s in co n­ formity with his wishes, but in urging th em , by every means at his command, to carry out the decisions once th ey were m a d e .

He wa nted

the Athen i a n s to wage a ga i n st Phil i p , not j ust "a wa r of d ecrees a n d

l et ters , b u t l o w- c iti z e n s

a war o f a ction . "81

H e h a d c o n st a n tly t o remi n d h i s fel­

that :

. . . a d ecree is worth l e s s in itself, u n l e s s you a d d to it the w i l lingnes s to carry o u t resolutely what you h a v e d ecree d , [for ] if d e cr e e s cou l d eith e r compel y o u to d o what h a s to b e d o n e o r a c comp l i s h th em ­ selves wh a t they prescribe, y o u wou l d n o t , after voti ng s o m a ny d ecre e s , h a ve

a ch i eved

so

l ittl e ,

or r a ther, n o thi n g .

...

82

The t a k i ng of a decision sta n d s halfway , so to s p ea k , b etween a

d i s p o si ti on to take a ction a n d the a ct i on i t sel f , b etw e en p u re l a ti o n a n d

The i n ten s i ty of a d here n c e , m ea su red

sp e cu ­

effective a cti o n . b y the

d egree o f

a i m i ng a t e ffe cti v e a cti on , ca n n ot b e

p ro b a b i l i ty

a ttri b u te d

to

the

a ccepted

a rgu m en t , b u t rath er by the ob sta cles overcom e by the a cti on a n d the sa cri fi ces a n d choi ces it l e a d s to a n d whi ch c a n b e j u sti fi ed by the a dherence.

The exi sten ce of a n i n terv a l , wheth er l o ng or short ,

between the ti m e of a dheren ce a n d the t i m e of th e a cti on it

wa s

de ­

signed to sti m u l a te83 expl a i n s the i n terve n t i o n i n to th e d eb a te , a fter

8 0 Wh a tely, E lemen ts o f Rhe toric ( H a rper) , p t . I I I, ch ap . r; § 6 . 8 1 Demosthenes, Firs t P h i l i p p ic , § 30. 82 D emosthenes , Third O lyn th iac, § 1 4 .

83 P a s s a ge o f time gen erally, b u t n o t always, d i m i n i s h e s t h e effect of a sp eech . A m erican psychologists were s u rprised t o f i n d a d eferred or " sl e ep er " e ffect u n d er some circu m st a n ce s .

Cf.

Hovl a n d , L u m s d a i n e,

and

S heffiel d ,

Exp erimen ts

on

50

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

it has supposedly ended, of values that had been overlooked or played down, or maybe of new elements that arose after the decision was made. This intervention, the likelihood of which is increased if in the meanwhile there has been a change in th� situation, has a two­ fold result : on the one hand it is hazardous to evaluate the effectiveness of a speech, and, secondly, the adherence gained by a speech can al­ ways advantageously be reinforced. It is in this perspective that epidictic oratory has significance and importance for argumentation, because it strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds. It is because the speaker's repu­ tation is not the exclusive end of epidictic discourse, but at most a consequence, that a funeral eulogy can be pronounced without lack of decency, beside an open grave, or a Lenten sermon can have a pur­ pose other than the renown of the preacher. Efforts have been made to show that the funeral oration of the Greeks was transformed by Christianity into a means of edification. 84 In fact, the type of speech remains the same, but it is concerned with different values. These new values are incompatible with a striving for earthly glory. So great is the fear that sacred discourse may be regarded as a spectacle, that Bossuet in his Sermon on the Word of God develops a lengthy analogy between the pulpit and the altar in order to reach this conclusion : . . . You should now be convinced that p reachers of the Gospel do not ascend into pulpits to utter empty speeches to be listened to for amusement. 85

And this is not a mere oratorical precaution, which might be j ust a pretense or the anticipation of an imaginary danger. There is no doubt that speeches-particularly those of the epidictic kind-are often considered as spectacles. La Bruyere writes derisively : . . . They are so deeply moved and touched by Theodorus' sermon that they resolve in their hearts that it is even more beautiful than the last one he preached. 86

Mass Communication, p p . 7 1 , 1 82 , 1 8 8-200. As to the interpretation of this pheno­ menon, see Hovland and ·weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communica­ tion Effectiveness, " Pub lic Opinion Q uarterly, 15 ( 1 952), 635-65 0 ; Kelman and Hovland, " ' Reinstatement ' of the Communicator in D elayed Measurement of Opinion Change , " Journal of Abnorma l and Social Psycho logy, 48 ( 1 95 3 ) , 327-33 5 ; Weiss, "A ' Sleeper Effect ' in Opinion Change, " Journal of A bnormal and Socia l Psycho logy, 48 ( 1 953), 1 73-180. 84 S aulnier, "L' oraison funebre au xvr • siecle, " Biblio lheque d' Human isme e l Renaissance, vol. X, pp. 1 2 6 , 1 2 7 . ' 8 5 Bossuet, Sur l a Paro le d e Dieu, Sermons , vol. I I, pp. 148-149.

86 L a Bruyere, "Les caracteres.

D e la chaire , " 1 1 , (Euvres comp letes, p . 460.

§ 1 2.

51

Education a n d Propaganda

Unlike the demonstrati o n o f a geometrical th eorem ,

which esta­

blishes once and for all a logical connectio n between spe culative truth s , the argumentation i n epidictic discourse sets out

to

increase the in­

tensity of adherence t o certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but m ay nevertheles s n ot prevail again st other values that might come into conflict with th em .

The speake r

tries to e stablish a sense of communion centered around p articular values recognized by the audience, and to this end he u ses the whole range of means available to plification

and

rhetorician

the

enhan cement.

In epidictic oratory every dev i ce

of literary

for

purp o ses

of am­

art is appro priate,

com­

it is a matter of combining all the factors that can promote this munion o f t h e audience.

It i s t h e o nly kind

of oratory

for

whi ch im­

mediately evokes literature, the o nly one that m ight be comp ared

to the libretto of a cantata, 8 7 the one which is most in da nger o f tu rn ­ ing into declamation, of becoming rh etori c in the u sual a n d p ej orativ e sense of the word. The very concept o f thi s

kind of

oratory-w hich, in Tarde' s phra se,

is more reminiscent of a processio n tha n of a strugg l e87&-

results in

its being prac tised by those wh o , in a s o ciety , d efen d th e tra diti on al and a ccepted values, th ose which

are th e

o bj e ct

of

edu cation, n ot

th e n ew and revolutio nary values which stir u p co n troversy and po ­

lemics.

There is a n o p timisti c , a lenient ten dency in

epidictic discourse

which has n o t es caped certain di s c e rning observers . 88

B eing

no

in

fea r o f contra d i cti o n , th e speaker rea d ily co n verts i n to u n iversa l va­ lu es , if n o t et ern a l tru ths, tha t which has a c q u i re d a certa i n s t a n d i ng thro u gh s ocial u n a n i m i ty .

Epi d i ct i c

s pee ches a re m o st p rone to ap­

p e a l to a u n iversal order, to a n a tu re, or a god th a t wo uld v o u ch for th e

u n q u e sti o n e d ,

and

supposedly u n q u e s ti o n a b le ,

v al u es .

epi­

In

d i ctic ora t ory, th e s p ea ke r t ur n s ed u ca t o r .

§ 1 2. Educa tion and P rop aganda S tu d y of th e ep i d i cti c form of ora t o ry, of i t s object a n d of the role

o f the orator in i t , ca s ts so me l ight on the con tro versi a l the

d i sti n ctio n

whi ch

between

87

and

pro p a g a n d a ,

a

q uesti o n

s o m a ny the o reti ci a n s a re cu rren tly p ayi ng a tten ti o n .

rece n t well - d ocumente d

. 87 a

e d u ca t i o n

q ue stio n of

book,

J.

Tarde, La logique socia le , pp. 439 .

88

Ti m o n ,

89

Driencou rt, L a propagande, Nou ve l le force p o l i t iq u e .

pp.

to a

Drienc o u rt89 ex a m i nes a n d rej ects

Boul an ger, A e lius A ristide, p . 94 . L ivre des orate u rs,

In

1 52- 1 7 2 .

52

THE

NEW

HHETOl U G

numerous attempts t o distinguish between edu cation and propaganda and reaches no satisfactory conclu sion, through failure to set his study in the framework of a general theory of argu mentation. The A merican specialist on these questions, Harold D. Lasswell, believes that the essential difference between the propagandist and the educator is that the latter deals with topics which are not an object of contro­ versy to his audience.90 The C atholic priest teaching the precepts of the Catholic religion to the children of his parish is doing the work of an educator, but he becomes a propagandist when, with the same obj ect, he addresses the adult members of another religious group. But, in our view, there is more to it than that. \Vhereas the propa­ gandist must, as a preliminary, gain the goodwill of his audience, the educator has been commissioned by a community to be the spokes­ man for the values it recognizes, and, as such, enj oys the prestige attaching to his office. Now, a moment's reflection enables one to see that, in this respect, the speaker engaged in epidictic discourse is very close to being an educator. Since wha t he i s going to say does not arouse controversy, since no immediate practical interest is ever involved, and there is no question of attacking or defending, but simply of promoting values that are shared in lhe community, the speaker, though he is assured in advance of the goodwill of his audience, must nevertheless have a high repu talion . In the epidictic, more than i n any other kind o f oratory, the speaker must have qualifications for speaking on his subj ect and must also be skillful in its presentation , i f he is n o t to appear ridiculous. For it is not his own cause or viewpoint that he is defending, but that of his entire audience. He is, so to speak, the educator of his audience, and if it is necessary that he should enj oy a certain prestige bC'fore he speaks, it is Lo enable him, through h is own authority, to promote the values Lhat he is upholding. The values eulogized by the speaker must be ones deemed worthy of guiding our action for otherwise, as Isocrates wittily remarks : ls it right to compose speeches such that they will do the m ost good if they succeed in convincing no one among tho se who hear

them ?91 The purpose of an epidictic speech is to increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker. The epidictic speech has an important part to play, for without such common values upon what foundation could deliberative and legal 90 Las swell, "The Study and Practice of Propaganda, " in Lasswell, Casey, and Smith, Propaganda and Promotional Activi ties, A n Annota ted Bib liography, p . 3. 91

Isocrates, Busiris, § 47.

§ 1 2.

E ducation and Propaganda

53

speeches rest ? Wherea s these two kinds of speeches make use of dispositi ons already present in the audience, and values are for them means that make it p ossible to in duce action, in epidictic speech, on the other hand, the sharing of v alues is an end pursued independently of the precise circumstances in wh ich th is comm uni on will be put to the test. Simone Weil, ex amining the m ea n s th a t th e Fren ch in Lond on might have used during World W a r I I to rou se their cou ntrym en i n Fra nce, included among them . . . expre s s ion , eit h e r o ffici a l ly or u n d er offi ci al san cti on, of some of th e thou ghts wh i ch , b e f o r e ever being pu blicly expressed , were already i n the h e a rt s of th e p eopl e , or i n th e h earts of certain a c­ tive e l em e n t s i n th e n a t i on . . . . If on e h ea rs th i s th ought expressed p u b li c ly by s om e o th er per s on, a n d especi a l ly by some one wh ose word s a re l i st en e d to with resp ect , i ts f orce is in crea sed a h undred­ fol d a n d c a n so m e ti m e s b ri ng a b o u t an i nn er tran sform a ti on . 92 Wh a t sh e b ri n gs o u t so clea rly i s precisely th e rol e of epi d ictic speech es : a pp ea l to common va l u es , u n d i sp u ted th ough by one who i s q u a l i fi e d to d o so, with the

o f a d h eren c e to th o s e va l u es wi th a

vi ew

to

i n th i s l i gh t, wh a t wa s ca l l ed propaga n d a deal

closer

to

It i s b e c a u s e

ed u ca tion

th a n

to

not formulated, ma d e s u en t strength ening possi bl e l a te r a ction . Seen from L on don wa s a good con eq

propaga n d a .

d i scou rse i s i n t en d ed to prom ote va l u es on

epi d i ct i c

w h i ch th ere i s agre em e n t th a t on e h a s a n i mpressi on of

misu se

when

i n a s p e e c h of th i s k i n d som eon e ta k es up a position on a controver­ s i a l q u esti o n , t u r n s th e a rgu m en t toward d i spu ted valu es an d intro­ d u ces a d i scord a n t n ote o n a n o cca si on th a t i s l i a bl e to prom ote com­ m u n i o n , a fu n era l cerem o ny for i n sta n ce . an

ed u ca t o r t u r n s

Th e sa m e a bu se ex i sts when

p ro p aga n d i st .

In ed u ca t i o n , wh a t ev er its obj ect , it i s a ssu m ed th a t i f th e speaker 's d i scourse

d oes

n ot

a l ways

expre ss

tru th s,

th a t

i s,

th eses

a ccepted

by eve ryo n e , i t wi l l a t l ea st d efen d va l u es t h a t a r e n ot a matter of c o n t r o v ersy i n

He

th e gro u p wh i ch com m i ssi oned h i m .

to enj oy su ch a l a rge m e a su re o f con f i d en ce th a t,

is supposed

u n l i k e any other begin with pro­

spe a k er , h e n e e d n ot a d apt h i m self to h i s h ea rers a n d p os i ti o n s kind

t h a t t h ey

call e d

a c cept ,

by

" d i d a ct i c "

"th e M a ster s a i d so . " m u st b e c o m e a and

m u st

92

Wei l ,

93

� ri st o t l e , O n

The

Need

for

a d opt

of t h e becau se

Wh i l e a spea k er engaged i n popularizing i de a s

prop aga n d i st

fit i t i n t o

a rguments

b u t ca n m a k e u se of

A ri stotl e93 t h a t h i s h e a rers

a

for

the

fra m ework

Roots,

So p h i s t ic a l

pp.

of

speci a l ity he a

com m on

1 90- 1 9 1.

R e f u ta t ions,

ch ap.

2,

1 65b.

is

c on cern e d with

kn owl edge, when

a

54

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

teacher sets out to introduce a particular discipline he will begin by stating the principles p articular to the discipline involved . 94

Similarly ,

when he is made responsible for instilling the values of a given so ciety into really young children, the educator must proceed by means of affirmations, without entering into a and cons are freely debated .

dis c u s sion i n which t h e pros

To do . so would be co ntrary to th e very

spirit o f primary e ducatio n , as all discussion presupposes adherence at the outset to certain theses, failing which no argument is po ssible . 95 Educational discourse,

like

the

epidictic one,

i s not d esigned to

promote the speaker, but for the creation of a certain disposition in Unlike deliberativ e and legal speech es, which aim

those who hear it.

at obtaining a decision to act, the edu catio nal and epidictic speeches create a mere disposition toward actio n , which makes them comp arable to philosophical thought.

Th i s distinction b etween kinds of oratory,

though not a lways easy to apply , offers the a dvantage, from our view­ point, of providing a single, uniform fram ework for the study of ar­ gumentation : seen in this way, all argumentation is conceived only in term s of the action for which it p aves the way or wh i ch it a ctu a lly brings about.

Thi s i s an additional rea son for which we prefer to

connect th e theory of argumentation with rhetoric rath er th an with the a ncients' d i al ecti c ; for the latter was confined to m ere speculation , wh erea s rhetori c gave first place to th e i n flu e n ce whi ch a sp eech h a s o n t h e entire p ers o n ality

of th e h earers.

E p i di cti c discourse, as well as all edu cation , is less d irected toward ch a n g i n g

b el i efs th a n t o stren gthen i ng the a dheren ce to wh a t is al­

rea dy a c cept e d .

Pro p a ga n d a ,

o n the other ha n d ,

profits from

th e

spect a c u l a r a spect o f the visible cha nges i t seek s to , a n d som eti m es does, bri n g a b o u t .

Neverth eless, to the extent that e d u c a ti on i n crea ses

resi sta n ce to a dverse pro p a ga n d a , the two a ctivities m ay a d v a n t ageo u s ­ ly

be regarded

a s forces work i n g in

opposite d i re cti o n s .

Moreover,

a s we sha l l see l a ter, a l l a rgu m en t a ti o n c a n be con si d ered as a sub­ stitu te for the physi c a l force whi ch wo u l d aim a t obta i n i ng th e s a m e kind

o f resu lts

by

§

compu l si on .

1 3. A rgumen ta tion and Violence

A rgu m entati on i s a n a cti on whi ch a l ways ten d s to ex i sti n g state of a ffairs.

i s why i t i s a rgu mentative. 9 4 Cf. § 26, i n fra :

m o d ify a pre­

Thi s i s tru e even of ep i d i cti c sp eech : thi s B u t whil e the p erson who ta k es th e i n -

A greemen t s o f Cert a i n S p eci al A u d i en ces.

95 Cf. Perel m a n , " E d u ca tion et rhet oriqu e , " pedagogie, X IV ( 1 952), 1 29- 1 38 .

Revue be lge de psycho log ie e t de

55

§ 13. Argumentation and Violence debate

iti ative in a

comparable to an aggressor, the one who to strengthen established values may be likened dikes under constant assault by the ocean.

sp eaking wishes the guard ian of

by

is

to

prizing its own values is therefore bound to promote epidictic speeches to be delivered at regul ar inter­ cerem oni es com m emorating past events of national concern,

A ny society

for

o pp ortu n i ti es vals :

the dead, and similar manifestat ions fosteri ng a c om mu n i on of m inds. The more th e leaders of the grou p thought, the more s e ek to i n cr ea se th eir hold over i ts m embers' n u m erou s wi l l be th e meeti ngs of an educational character, a nd some w i l l go a s fa r a s to u se threats or compulsion to make recalcitrants expose th emselves to speeches th a t wi l l i mpregnate them wi th the val u es h eld by th e commu n i ty . O n the other hand, the group leaders will regard a ny a tta ck on th e officially recognized values as a revolutionary a ct, a n d, by th e u se of su ch measures as censorship, an index, and c o n trol over all m ea n s of communicating ideas, t hey will try to make it d i ffi cult, i f n ot i mpossible, for their opponents to achieve the con­ d i t i o n s prel i m i n a ry to a ny argumentation. Their oppone nts, if the y wish t o con ti n u e th e struggle, will have t o resort t o force. O n e c a n i n d eed try to obtain a particular r esult either by the u se of v i ol en ce or by speech a i med at securing the adherence of mi nds. servi ces,

religi ou s

eu l ogies

i s i n term s of t hi s

It

con s

tu a l free d om a n d

of

a l ternative that

a t t a c h ed

is

m ea ns

of

to

the

ga ining

persu asion,

rea s on ed

The

adherence d

that

an

of

one

use

to one' s

s

of

fo r c e

a rgu me n­

that

a l one,

interlocutor

regardi ng

not

i

spir i­

between

opposition seen.

renounced resorting

t a t i on impl i es t h a t on e has va l u e

the

t r a int is m ost c l e ar ly

by

him

as

obj ect, but appealing to his free judgment. Recourse to argu m e n­ ta t i on a ssu m es th e esta b l i s h ment of com munity of m inds, whi ch, wh i l e i t l a s ts, ex clu des t h e of violence. 96 To a gree to d i scu ss i on an

a

use

m e a n s rea d i n e s s to

is

on eself

restri ct

b e l i efs

to

only to

will i n g

E.

D u p ree},

t i m e s, th e

5

even

Cf. "

We i l,

( 1 9 4 7),

T o ff a n in ,

7 6.

S to r

his

a lw ays, of

ia

de

l l'

a

de l a

rh

uma

l a

e t o ric

ph i l o s

n es im

a s

o ,

to

person

them.

that

d e

A ccording debate,

o p hie ,

la

th e

pp .

to

p.

i n terlocutor,

s

to

try i n g

one' s

to

justification, "

writes

toward

greater

a

step

argumentation to

eith er

own

persuade

them,

because

there the

is

some­ is

on ly

speak er

2 4.

c o n n a i ss a n tr iu

the

effect

i

one

act,

of

g iv e

" Every

resort

pretense.

th eo rie

and

m in d. " 97

cl aim a

viewpoint

m oderating

a rgum e n tative

p ou r

t o

the

to

a ssent

wh o

admits,

that

and

h eart

A s

he

extent

L ogiqu e

Fr a gm e n t s

what

essenti a l l y

those

s e m bl a n ce

96 97

or

give

of

a re

to

the

th ings from

see

th e

" is

commu n i o n Th ere

to

mph

1 73- 175.

of

ce

d e

M.

pe r s u a si on

E.

Dup re e ! , "

ov

e r

brute

Di a

l e c t i c a ,

fo r c e ,

s e e

56

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

imposes o n his audience the obligatio n to listen to him or because the audience is content to m ake a show of he aring wh at he has to say.

I n either case, argumentation is simply a delu sio n , and the agree­

ment reached is, in the first altern ativ e , a d isguised form of co ercio n and, in the second, a symbol of good will. ture of argumentative discussion

This opinion as to the na­

cannot be turned down

a pr i or i :

yet it is difficult to give a satisfactory explan atio n of th e resort to the mechanism of argument if, at least in some cases, th ere is n o real persuasio n .

In fact, any comm u nity , wh ether national or international ,

makes provision for legal ,

political,

o r diplom atic institutions that

will enable certain disputes to be settled without th e need for resort to violence.

However,

it is an illusion to im agine that the co n d itio n s natu rally . Since t h ey can n ot refer to nature, th e d efen ders of critical philosophy. such a s Gu i d o Cal o ger o , see in the willingness to u nders t a n d oth ers, in the very p rin ­

f o r t h i s communion o f minds occur

of dialogue, the absolute basis for a liberal eth i c . 98 of th e duty o f d i alogu e i s

ciple

C al ogero ' s

c o ncep t i o n

freedom to expres s our belief a n d to t r y it, with the ob l i ga ti on t o l et oth ers d o the ten to them with t h e s a m e wi l l i ng n ess to a n d make th em o u rs th at we d em a n d of

a n d co nvert oth ers t o s a m e with us, a n d to lis­

understa n d their truth s them fo r o u r own . 99

This " duty o f di a l o g u e " p u t forward by C a l og er o as a co mpro m i se betwee n th e a b solutism of Plato and the s c e pti c i sm of Protagora s i s certainly not a necessary truth , or even a s tatem en t that no one w o u l d contest. I t is a ctu a lly an i d ea l pursu ed by a v ery s ma l l n u m ­ b e r of people, th ose w h o a tt a ch m o re i m p o rt a n c e to th o u gh t tha n to a ction , and, even a m o ng them , th i s pri n c ip l e w o u l d b e v a l i d o n ly for th e n o n absoluti st p h i l o s o p h ers . Th ere are very few p eople wh o wou l d a l l o w th a t a l l q u esti o n s sho u l d b e s u b m itt ed t o d i sc u s s i o n . A ri stotl e ' s v i ew was th a t : Not every probl em , n ot every t h e s i s , s h o u l d b e ex a m i n e d , b u t o n l y o n e wh ich m i gh t p u z z l e o n e of t h o s e wh o n e ed a rgu m en t , n ot p u n i s h m en t o r percepti on . For people wh o a re p u zz l e d t o k n o w wh eth er o n e o u gh t t o h o n o u r t h e go d s a n d l o v e on e ' s p a ren t s n ee d p u n i sh m en t , wh i l e th o s e wh o a r e p u z z l e d to k n ow w h eth er s n o w i s wh i t e or n ot n ee d percepti o n . 1 00

98 Calogero,

"Why

Do We

A sk Why ? "

A c tes

du

X I•

C o ngres in terna tion a l

de p h i losoph i e (North- Holl a n d ) vol . X IV , p . 260.

99 Calogero, "Verite et l i b e rt e , " A c tes du X• Co ngres i n tern a t i o n a l de p h i losophie ( North - H ol l a n d) p. 9 7 .

Published also i n I t al i a n , as an appen d i x to Logo e D ia /ogo ,

p. 1 95 . 100

A ristotl e , Top ics, I, 11 , 1 05 a .

§ 13. Argumentation and Violence He goes proposition

even f u rth er , th a t

is

and advises or

" everythi ng is i n motion "

good , " or "to do i nj ustice is th i s i s j u st a d vi ce a d dressed

sion . "

and

An

est a bli shed

i

fa ct,

on

a rtl ess

a nd

a

d ared

ch i l d

to

tel l

th e

of

min d s

of

gu a ra n tee ra t i on a l

a

wa s

for th ey

a re

a c c epte d

va l u e

1 03

J o u rn ogy,

"beyond

di scu s ­ rul e,

a bsol ute

very

to

di f ficu lt

only

everyone

born

that

else,

of

ou t

to

i nnocent

an

fear to

m e re

,

it

made

V I I I ,

,

a

of

or

obj ective

person

character.

with t h e

i mpressive-

to

a

sol v e,

to did

help

came

example

to

e s t a bl i sh

which

humanity

i nfu sed

thanks

reason,

to

spread

to

edu cat ion,

reali zed

be

to

to

Thus

prison

un­

that

or

Ol ynthiac,

offense

a

to

to

an

ins titut i on.

m en t a l

may

be

to the

a l ludes

m erely

unanimi ty,

opposition

decision

a

of

th is

s ecure

force. 103

to

First

the

us

not

than

unthinkable.

even

and

often

is

else

everyone

dogmatic rationalism,

anxious

are

questioning

9,

less

the

a tt empt

capital

a

by more

an

foundation

value a

in

held and

propose

sev erely A then i an

legisla t ion

1 6 0 b.

Te chnique s

of

Sev erance

and

Opposed

Restrai nt

to

the

A

ct-

In t e r a c t io n .

A s

t o

th e

b y

t e n d e n cy

Ps yc h

Fe s t in g e r

a nd

Th r o u gh

( 1 9 5 1 ),

So c ia 9-

23.

a n l

m

un a n i

t o wa r d

o l og ic a

a l of A bn o r m a l

4 6

i ts

the

ib i d.

p o rt e d

of

that

though it it quickly

i llusory,

s oci e t i es

lea d

i n fr a :

71

social Th is

m ay

§

m u n i c a t i o n, "

fl u e n c e

all

A ri s t o t l e,

Pe r s o n

it

unanimity

data of

on

basis

the

action,

D em osth enes,

wh i c h

C f.

m ake

contrary

from

none

because

a wa re

o cca s i on,

p u n i s h e d.

l 02

on

by

fl eeti ng,

Neverth el ess,

101

an

truth,

a nd Germany furnish

but

prin ciples.

u n fo rtu n a t ely fa iled

d e cree

can

considered -

based

st able

a l l t h e pro bl e m s set

a n i m i ty

be

to

u topi an ,

c a th ol i c i ty

On

are

deserve

their unquestionable character, con argumentation. U nanimou s

broke the

devi a t ing

century Fra n ce

effor t-

would

declare,

so

communion

con si d e red-

E igh t e e n th

wi t h

opi n i on

an

a soci a l

i mp a i r

righ t ly

a

not

t ru th . 102

To h ol d

an

"do

unque stioned

rules

R emember the oriental tale in which

k i ng wa s n a ked a n d

of

certain

self- evident

propositions

pa rti cula r

th e

to

th a t

suggestions

ex cl u d i ng th e possi b i l i ty of pro and q u es t i o n th em .

of

admits the ex i stence

i t admits

c a r ry i n th em sel ves th e a ffirmation agreem e n t

as

such

"pleasure i s the " 101 It is true that

motion, "

better than to suffer i t .

certain

th a t

in

uphold a ny

to

conscienc e :

to

to dialecticians, but t refl ects the common­

a n d u nq u esti on a bl e tru ths;

d i s cu ssi on , "

not

readers

" nothing is

sense

Common

sen se a tti tu d e.

his

contrary

or

improbable

57

l

Re v iew,

Th ib d

So

57

a u t,

"

cia

Ps y c

l

ity,

In te r p

e

Fest i ng e r , 271 -

rs o n a l

h o lo gy ,

Co m m un ic a tio n , "

see

(1 950),

Jo u

Co

m m

al

o f

an

u n ic

(1 951),

46

rn

282,

"

Inform a l

d

the

at i o n

92- 99,

A bn or ma

in

an

l a nd

ex

Sm

d

Soc i a l

e p

Co m­

ri m e nt s al

by

l

Ba c k ,

So c i tl l

re ­

Gr oups , "

Ps y c

"In ­ ho

l ­

58

THE NEW

RHETORIC

surplus

that would alter the law on the utilization of the

revenue of

Athens.104

principle, there a re times when necessity for action. Regulation of de­ b a t e m ay cover n ot on ly su ch preliminary matters as the competence of speakers a n d h ea rers, an d li mitation of subject matter, but may exte n d to th e d u ration an d order of speeches, to th e way in whi ch Even when d iscussion is allowed in

i t i s cut s h o rt beca use of the

th e d i s cu ssi o n i s to be terminated, and to the conditions under wh ich it m ay b e resu m ed .

Th i s la st point is

c i ety req u i res i n d eed th a t co g n i z e d . d ee d

th ere m ay

But

p l a n n ed,

often

so

very

binding

the

is

a

goo d

there

that

no

is

v a r i a t i on s

pra cti ce.

in

to

need an

fu rth er

d eb a t e

is

oft e n provided

correspo n d s t o

a

d e ep

a

to resu m e debate,

a ct i s n e e d e d sti t u t i o n

itself

with

c o u rt s

its

ex a m ple We is

of

j u dica la

b e for e

the

a re

n ot

m ay

be

a

do

i n voked

of

so wa s

m a tter t h a t

r

zone

c u s t o m s.

of

a si gn

Th ere as

it

th i n g

1 0 4

s ee

i s, is

D em

Demos

of

is of

bicameral

a re

cou nt l ess

the

reexam i ­

particular decis ion:

j udi cial

the

system,

most

t he

provides

a

n o n-

th e

h owever, p

is

i t.

be

circle

typical

there

ption

of

by

and

its

of

of

From

o s t h e n e s , Fi r s t O lyn t h ( L o e b ), vo l. 2, n t h enes

ia c,

o te

n ot the

§

to

be

1 9;

pp .

f or

1 6,

a

fu

1 7.

t he

ll

e

f inal

li ne

allowable

bsol u te

a

a l lowance:

may

be

certain

j ust

from is

o

f

as

problems.

v erdict,

ati on

and

commu nity.

a

decis i on

of

a nd

traditions

detached

x p la n

Sciences

c l e ar

a

is

of

l i fe

debate

e n t irely

moment

of

between

question any

difference:

will

ly

ra re

complex

of

l ong

demonstrated,

A cademy

zone

the

gi v en

a

a s prohibition to

thus,

unconditional

extremely a s pect

principle

law:

debate

i ntermediate

n egl igible

m a j or

is

of

que stion

a

of

The

was

Paris

discussed.

life

d i scu s sion

su ch ,

courts

the

resum

l a rge

system.

the

by

social

resumption

one as

rece d e d

a

l egal

outside

l onger

when

i n t ol era n ce

c o n c e i ve d

th a t

i nitiative:

squaring

governed

m o st l y

is

Th i s

P ro h i b i t i o n m u ch

Th ere r e n ewed

the

egarded

n o

m igh t

i n d i ca te

forbi d d e n .

p roh i b i t i o n

th i s

the

which reexamination

in

even

We m u s t a l s o a d d th a t i n d em a rc a t i o n t o wh en

the

cassation ,

to

con fin ed

i mpo s s i bility

a ny a t te mp t t o as

ca ses

ob se rve th a t

m ay

a nd

a private

e x pected; i ts o rg anization Even where some i ni tiating very often regulated; t h e in­

is

t h is

to take

appeal

of

in ­

for

t h i s.

forbi d d en

res

on e

i n vites

re­

for and

necessity.

social

wait

generally speaking,

n at i o n of t h e qu e st i on does not have to wait for

so­

this is

and

and there

complete,

But,

in be

Life

decision

individual :

ex a mpl e.

In stitu t i on a l i z a ti on i s not a l ways s l igh t

the

of

be a renewal of discussion,

d e ci sion d ep e n d i ng on th e initiative of system

important .

force

as

taken,

the

l on g

e v ery­ t

he

all u o n, s i

§ 1 4 . Argumentation and C ommitment

59

social life of the community carries with it not merely the decision itself, but also the arguments that preceded it. This is tied in with a rather important theoretical problem : since the purpose of argumentation is to obtain an assent, it might be said that argumentation tends to destrciy the conditions preliminary to future argumentation. But rhetorical proof is never compelling, the imposed silence is not to be regarded as definitive, if, in other respects, the conditions permitting argumentation are fulfilled. The institutions that regulate discussion are important because there is a close connection between argumenta live though t and the action it paves the way for or brings about. It is because of its re­ lationship "' ith action, because it never develops in a vacuum, but in a situation that is socially and psychologically determined , that argumentation involves the practical commitment of those who take part in it. The final section of this first part of the book will be de­ voted to the problems connected with this commitment.

§ 14. A rgumen tation and Commi tmen t The impossibility of regarding argumentation as an intellectual exercise entirely divorced from all preoccupations of a pra ctical na­ ture compels us Lo transpose certain concepts pertaining to knowledge that have been developed in a quite different philosophical perspective, such as the opposition between obj ective and subj ective. Objectivity, as it relates Lo argumentation , must be reconsidered and reinterpreted if it is to have meaning in a conception that does not allow the sepa­ ration of an assertion from the person who makes it. Very often, when there is a debate in which parties con sidered to have an axe to grind uphold contrary theses, one hears people asking that appeal be made to third parties who will settle the debate by resorting to obj ective criteria. But has one merely to be entirely un­ connected with the interests involved to have at one' s disposal a n obj ective criterion which everyone would have to recognize ? If this were the case, would it not be simpler to gather in a volume all these obj ectively valid rules which would make it as simple to solve con­ flicts as problems of arithmetic ? There are, in fact, such works : the various treatises on law and morality, the rules recognized in a great variety of fields. But, as we know, these treatises and rules do not enj oy universal validity, nor are they perfectly univocal. If diffe­ rences can arise in good faith , in spite of the rules, it is either because at least one of the parties docs not recognize the validity of some rule or because the accepted rules are susceptible to different interpre­ tations. The difficulties are even greater when no rule governs the

60

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

matter; when it i s a question o f choosing th e best candi d ate for a res­ p onsible p o sitio n and there is no agreement on th e criteria th at will make it p o ssible to gra d e the available candidates ; when the problem is to make the b est p olitical d ecision but the decisio n is not covered by any ex isting rule.

Is it g o o d enough to say that one has m erely

to adopt the v i ewpoint of someone on Sirius, and be p erfectly disin­ terested , in order to be able to pro vide an o bj ectively valid opin i o n ? The inevitable reaction of the parties to the controversy in th e face of such a n i ntrusion would be surpri se, i f not i n dignation , th a t a stranger to the debate should d are to i nterfere in som ething th at is n o n e of h is business. Indeed, since these discussions must lead to a d e cisi o n , bring about an acti o n , the fact of being a disinterested sp ectator d o es n o t g i v e the right to p articipate in the di scussion and influ e n ce the out­ come.

C ontrary to wh at happens in science, where all th a t is n e c essary

for the solution of a pr o bl em i s kn owledge of th e tech n i q u es th a t enable th e soluti o n to b e reach ed, interference i n a controversy wh ose out­ come will a ffect a specific grou p

m ay be m a d e o n ly by one who is

a m ember of, o r closely bou n d u p with , th e grou p in q u e st i o n .

Wh er e

a n o p i n i o n i n fl u e n c e s a ct i o n , o bj ectivity is no l o n ger su ffi c i e n t , u nl es s

o n e means b y o bj e ctivi ty th e v i ewpo i n t o f a w i d er gr o u p e m b ra c i n g both the o p p o n e n t s a n d th e " n eu tra l . " n o t b ec a u s e he i s n e u tral

Th e l a tter i s q u a l i fi ed t o j u d ge

-a n y o n e c a n repro ach h i m

wi th

i ty i n t h e n a m e o f com m o n pri n c i p l es of ri gh t or j u s ti c eh e i s i m pa rti a l : b ei n g

imp artia l

i s not b ei n g

objective,

th i s n eu tra l ­ but because i t c o n si sts of

b el o n gi n g to th e s a m e gro u p a s th o se o n e i s j u d g i n g , with o u t h a vi n g previo u sly d e ci d ed

in f a v o r of a n y o n e of them .

In m a ny d i sp u tes,

th e problem of k n owi n g wh o is q u a l i fi e d to i n terfere , i n d ee d to j u dg e , i s a pa i n f u l a n d d e l i ca te o n e , b e c a u s e m a n y w i l l h a v e t a k e n a n d oth ers w i l l n o t b e m em b ers o f th e grou p .

si d e s ,

W h e n i t w a s a q u esti o n

of j u d g i n g th e a ttitu d e of th e Fren ch officers who p u t th ei r l oy a l ty a s s ol d i ers a bove c o n ti n u a n ce of th e wa r aga i n st the Germ a n s i n 1 9 40 , Fren ch m e n were i n a b a d p o s i ti o n to j u d ge beca u se they w ere b i a s ed , and

s o were forei g n ers,

p a rti cu l a rly n e u tra l s ,

b e c a u se th ey

did

not

b el o n g to th e gro u p i n volved . I m p a rti a l i ty, i f i t i s c o n ceived a s th e i m p a rt i a l i ty of a

sp e cta t or,

m a y a p p e a r to be th e a bsen ce of a n y a ttra cti o n , a n i n q u iry entire ly d i vorced from p a rti c i p a t i o n in th e d i scu s si o n , a n a tt i t u d e tra n s cen d i ng th e d i spute.

B u t i f th e i m p a rti a l i ty i s th a t of a n a ctor i n even ts , th en

i t sta n d s for a b a l a n ce of force s , m a x i m u m a tte n ti o n to th e i n terests a t i ssu e, b u t wi th th i s a ttenti o n equ a l ly d i v i d ed a m o n g th e d i fferent points 1 06

Cf.

of

view. 1 05

Garl a n , L ega l Rea lism and Jus tice,

p.

78.

§ 1 4. A rgumentation and C ommitment

61

Accordingly, i n spheres where thought and actio n are closely m ingled , impartiality stands between the obj ectivity which fails to qualify the third party for interference and the partisan spirit which positively disqualifies him. Under the sway of an abstract obj ectivism, there has too often been a failure to appreciate the fact that thought which leads to ac­ tion h a s a different status than the statements integrated in a scienti fic system. On the other hand, it is essential to foresee the po ssibility of dissociating our b eliefs from our interests and p assions. It is almost commonplace to insist on the w ay in which our ho p es and desires determine our beliefs. As P ascal observe d : a

A l l men whatsoever a r e a l m o s t a l w a y s l e d into b elief not b e ca u s e thing is p roved b u t b e c a u s e i t i s p l e a s i n g . 10&

H e sought to explain this phenomeno n by insisting on the fa ct th at : Things a re true o r fa l s e a ccording to the a s p e ct in w h i c h we l ook at them .

Th e wil l , whi ch p r efer s one

a s p e ct

to

a n other , turn s

away t h e m i n d fro m cons i d er i n g the q u a liti e s of a l l th at it do e s n o t l i k e t o s e e ; a n d thu s t h e m i n d , m o ving i n accord with t h e will ,

s t o p s to con s i der the a sp ect which it l ikes a n d so j u d ges by w h a t i t sees .107 William J a m e s j u s t i fied th e beliefs that fu rth er our desire s , as by strength eni n g t h e m t h ey m a k e the desires more l i k ely to b e fulfi l l ed . 1 08 Oth er m ore ratio n a l i stic writers d i scou nt th e effect of th i s d esi ra b i l i ty fa c to r , reg a r d i n g i t a s re s p o n si b l e for the irrati o n a l chara cter of our beli efs.1 09 But both vi ews m erely represent hypoth eses o f a genera l n a ture, wh i ch are d i ffi cult to verify i n th e a bs e n c e of criteria for a n "objecti vely ba sed " bel i ef. Th u s a stu d y o f th e k i n d m a d e by L u n d , 1 1 0 sh owi n g a correl a tion of 0.88 b etw e en th e d e si ra b i lity of given theses a n d th e d egree of convi cti o n th ey i nspired , wh i l e th e correl a t i o n be­ tween convi cti on a n d k n owledge, or b etween convi cti o n a n d elem e n ts of proof, wa s l ow, h a s been critici zed i n i ro n i c a l term s by B i rd , th e A m eri c a n

sociol ogi st :

I fea r, h owever, t h a t a n a l ys i s of t h e co effi ci en t s of correl a t i o n

l e a ve s m u ch t o th e i m a g i n a t i o n , s o t h a t d e s i re m ay h a ve d ete r­ m i n e d th e b el i ef th a t d e s i re determ i n e s bel i e f . 1 1 1

10 6 Pasca l , On Geometrica l Demo nstration, Section I I : Persu a sion , " GHWW, vol . 33 ,

p.

1 0 7 Pasca l , Pe nsees, GB\VW, vol . 33 , p . 1 9 1 . 1 08 Ja m es , Essays in P ragma tism, First Essa y : ( 1 960),

p.

31

" C o n ce rn i n g t h e A rt

of

440. " Th e S e n t i m en t of R a ti o n a l i ty "

.

1 0 9 Crawsh ay- Will i a m s , The Comfor ts of U n reaso n ,

pp.

8 et s e q .

1 1 0 L u n d , "The Psych o l o gy o f Belief, " Journa l of A bnorma l and Soc ia l Ps ycho logy ,

x x , ( 1 9 2 5 ) 1 3- 2 1. 1 1 1 B ird, Socia l Psycho logy, p .

21 1.

62

THE NEW RHETORIC

Whenever it is necessary to refute the accusation that our desires have determined our beliefs, it is essential that we furnish proof, not of our obj ectivity, whi ch is not p ossible, but of our impartiality, and that we indicate the circumstances in which, in a similar situation, we acted contrary to what might appear to be our interest, specifying, if possible, the rule or criteria we are following, which would be valid for a wider group comprising all the interlocutors, and identifiable, at the limit, with the universal audience. \Ve must not, however, forget that, even in this case, we are put­ ting forward our own conception of the universal audience and that the theses we claim should be valid for everybody may have their detractors who are not necessarily stupid or dishonest. Failure to a dmit this would lay us open to the charge of fanaticism. There can be no question of fanaticism where we are dealing with truths establish­ ed by appealing to criteria which are recognized as beyond discu ssion, since we are not then in a situation where it is possible to resort to ar­ gumentation . The fanatic is a person who adheres to a disputed thesis for which no unquestionable proof can be furnished, but who never­ theless refuses to consider the possibility of submitting it for free dis­ cussion and, consequently, rej ects the preliminary conditions which would make it possible to engage in argumentation on this topic. Equating adherence to a thesis with recognition of i ts absolute truth sometimes leads, not to fanaticism, but to scepticism. The man who requires that argumentation provide demonstrative proof of compelling force and will not be content with less in order to adhere to a thesis misunderstands a s much as the fanatic the essential characteristic of argumentative procedure. For the very reason that argumentation aims at j u sti fying choices, it cannot provide j ustifications that would tend to show that there is no choice, but that only one solution is open lo those examining the problem. Since rhetorical proof is never a completely necessary proof, the think­ ing man who gives his adherence to the conclusions of an argumentation does so by an act that commits him and for which he is responsible. The fanatic accepts the commitment, but as one bowing to an absolute and irrefragable truth ; the sceptic refuses the commitment under the pretext that he does not find it sufficiently definitive. He refuses adherence because his idea of adherence is similar to that of the fana tic : both fail to appreciate that argumentation aims at a choice among possible theses ; by proposing and j ustifying the hierarchy of these theses, argumentation seeks to make the decision a rational one. This role of argumentation in decision-making is denied by the sceptic and the fanatic. In the absence of compelling reason, they both are inclined to give violence a free hand, rej ecting personal commitment.

PART TWO

The Starting Point of Argumentation

CHAPTER 1

Agreement § 1 5 . The Premises of A rgumen tation Our analysis of argumentation will deal firs t with what is taken as the starting p oint of arguments and afterwards with the way in which arguments are developed through a whole set of associative and dis­ associative processes. This division of the subj ect is indispensable to our examination and should not be misunderstood. The unfolding as w ell as the starting p oint of the argumentation presuppose indeed the agreement of the audience. This agreement is sometimes on ex­ plicit premises, sometimes on the particular connecting links used in the argument or on the manner of using these links : from start to finish, analysis of argumentation is concerned with what is sup­ posed to be accep ted by the hearers. On the other hand, the actual choice of premises and their formulation, together with the adjustments involved, are rarely without argumentative value : it is a preparation for argument which not only establishes the elements but constitutes the first s tep in the utilization of these elements for p ersuasive pur­ poses. vVhen a speaker selects and puts forward the premises that are to serve as foundation for his argument, he relies on his hearers' ad­ herence to the propositions from which he will start. His hearers may, however, refuse their adh erence, either because they do not adhere to what the speaker presents to them as b eing accepted, or they may see that his choice of premises is one-sided, or they may be sho cked by the tendentious way in which the premises were a dvanced. Since the criticism of a single statement may bear on three different aspects, premises will be discussed in three chapters, devoted respec-

66

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

tively to the agreemen t on the prem ises, the choice of the prem ises, and

the presen tation of the premises. We shall begin by considering the question of what sort of agree­ ments can serve as premises. Our treatment of this question will obviously not attempt to draw a complete list of everything capable of constituting an obj ect of b elief or adherence : we shall merely in­ quire into the types of obj ects of agreement that play d ifferent roles in the arguing process . We think it convenient to d ivide these ob­ j ects of agreement into two classes : the first concerning the rea l, com­ prising facts, truths, and presumptions, the other concern ing th e pref­ erable, comprising values, hierarchies, and lines of argument relating to the preferable. The conceptions people form of the real can vary widely, depending on the philosophic views they profe ss However, everyth ing in ar­ gumentation that is deemed to relate to the real i s chara cterized by a claim to validity vis-a-vis the universal audience. O n the contrary, all tha t pertains to the preferable, that which determines our choi ces and does not conform to a pre ex iste nt re a l i ty w i l l be co nn ect e d with a specific viewpoint w h i ch i s n e cess a rily identified with some p ar­ ticular a u dience, t ho ug h it may be a l a rg e o n e It i s open to anyone to question the merits of our schem e for clas­ sifying typ e s of obj e c ts of agre e m e n t , but w e think i t difficult, with out recourse to such a scheme, t o attem p t a tech ni c a l a n aly si s of argu m en ­ tation a s it a ctu a lly occurs. E a ch a u d i e n ce wil l , of cou rs e a llo w o nly a cert a i n n u m ber of o b j ect s bel ongi ng to ea ch of th e vari ous typ es. B u t obj ects of ea ch ty p e occur i n the m ost varied kinds of a rgum en­ tation . Fu rth er, these obj ects turn up al so as typ e s of o bj e cts of d i s­ a greem ent, th a t i s , a s p oint s rou n d wh i ch a d i s p u te m ay aris e .

,

.

,

.

Besi d e s th e q u esti on of a greemen ts, we sh a l l dea l , i n th i s first ch a p ter, with con si dera ti on s of two d i fferen t ord ers : we will ex a m i ne the sta te of th e prem i se s , eith er i n v i ew of speci a l a greements th at govern cer­ ta i n a u dien ces, or i n view of the sta te of the d i sc u s si on .

C o n si dera ­

ti on s of the first order are rath er stati c, i n a sm u ch a s they i n volve stu d yi n g the ch a ra cter of the a greements of

certa i n

set

a u d iences ;

th e others a re of a m or e d yn a m i c n a tu re , si n ce they h a ve to d o wi th th e a greements a s they a re l i nked to the p rogress of th e d i sc u ssion . S i n ce we a re con cerned with prem i se s , ou r i n terest i n th i s dy n a m i c process will focu s on the spea ker ' s effort to detect the ex p l i ci t p l i c i t m a n i festa ti on s o f a n a d here n ce on wh i ch he

ca n

or

depen d .

im­

§ 1 6 . Facts and Truths

67

a) TYPES OF OBJECTS OF AGREEMENT § 1 6 . Fac ts and Tru ths

Obj ects of agreement relating to the real can be div ided into two main group s : the first consists of facts and truths, the second, of pre­ sumptions. It is not possible-nor would it be consistent with our purpose-to d efine "fact" in a way that would enable us, at a ny time or place, to classify this or that concrete datum as a fact. On the con­ trary, we must stress that, in argumentation, the notion of "fa ct" is uniquely characterized by the idea that is held of agreem ents of a certain type relating to certain data, those whi ch refer to an ob­ j ective reality and, in Poincare's words, designate essentially "wh at is common to several thinking beings, and could be common to all . "1 This quotation suggests at once what we have called the agreement of the u niversal a udience. The way in which the universal a udience is thought of, a n d the incarnations of this audience tha t are recognized, a re thu s determining fa ctors in deciding what, in a p a rticular ca se , will be considered to be a fact, characterized by adherence of the u n i­ versal audience, an adherence such as to require no fu rther strength­ ening. Facts are with drawn, at least for the time b eing, from a r­ gumentation, that is to say , there is no need to increase the intensity of the ad h eren ce or to g en e ra li z e i t a nd i t re q u ires n o j u sti f i c a ti on For the indivi d u a l , a d h erence will simply be a subj ective rea ction t o so m eth i n g th a t i s bi n di n g on everybo dy. Fro m th e stand p o i n t o f a rgu m e n tati o n , we are e6ftfronted with a fa ct o n l y i f we ca n p o stu l a te u n eontroverted, u n i vers a l agreem ent w i th respect to it. But it follows th a t no statement ca n be a s su r ed ,

.

of d efi n i ti vely enj oyi n g th i s statu s, beca u se the agreem ent ca n a l­ ways b e ca l l e d i n q u esti on l ater,2 a n d o n e of th e p a rties to th e deb a te N orm a l ly

m a y refu se to q u a l i fy h i s o p p o n en t ' s a ffirm a t i o n a s a fa ct.

,

th ere a re th u s two ways i n wh i ch a n event can l o se th e sta tus of fa ct : eith er d o u bt s m ay h a ve been ra i s e d with i n th e a u d ience to whi ch it wa s presen ted , or th e a u d i en ce m ay h a ve been exp a n d e d th rough th e a d d i ti o n of n ew m em b ers wh o a re recogn i z e d a s h a ving th e a bil i ty to j u d ge th e even t a n d wh o will n ot gra n t th a t a fa ct is i nvolved . The l a tter process com e s i n to play as soon as i t can effectively be sh own

1 Poin ca re, La v a le ur de la science, I n tro d u ction , 2 Cf. Perel m a n a n d Olbrech t s - Tyteca ,

p.

65 .

Rhetorique e t p h i losophie,

a n d Perel m a n , The Idea of Jus t ice a n d the P rob lem of A rgumen t,

pp .

pp.

2 et

seq .

1 69 et seq .

68

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

that the audience admitting the fact is o nly a particular au dience and that its views are in opposition to tho s e of an enlarged audience. We d o not hope to find a criterion that enables us, under all cir­ cumstances and independently of the hearers' attitude, to affirm that something is a fact. Nevertheless, we m ay recognize that there are c �rtain conditions favoring this agreement, rendering th e fact ' easily defensible in the face of an opponent' s m istru st or ill will. This will be the case, in p articular, when there is agreement on conditions for verification. H owever, by the time such an agreement has to be brought into effective operation, argumentation is in full swing. A fact serving as premise is an u ncontroverted fact. Mere questioning of a statement is thu s sufficient to destroy its privileged status . However, if an interlo cutor wishes to combat the prestige attaching to what has been admitted as a fact, he will not be satisfied in most cases with a simple denial th at might be considered j ust ridiculous. He will endeavor to j u st i fy his attitude either by showing the incompatibility of the statement in qu estion with oth er facts and attacking it for its inconsistency with the coherence of reality or by sh owi ng tha t the so-called fact is simply the co n clusion of an argument whi ch , by its very n at ure, i s n o t com p el l i n g . A fa ct loses its status a s soon a s i t is no l o n g er used as a p ossi b le starting point, but a s the co n clusion of an a rgu menta ti o n . It can recover this status o nly by be i n g d et a ch e d from the context of the argument; in other words, there must once again be a n agreem ent tha t d oes n o t d ep e n d o n th e term s of th e a rgu m e n t for its pro of . It is to be o bs erved th a t a fa ct' s l o s s of statu s, due to its insertion i n a n argu m entati v e context o f wh i ch i t i s n o l o n ger th e b a si s but one of th e c o n cl u s i o n s , often occurs in p h i l osophy, wh ere th e c o nstru cti o n of a system o f a rgu m e n ta ti o n often l e a d s t o con n ecti n g f a cts -p re­ vi o u sly ca s u al ly a d m i tted a s su ch -with a li n e of a rg u m en t th at cla i m s to esta bli sh th em . A ccepted fa cts m a y be either observed fa cts-th i s i s p erh a p s th e ca s e for m ost prem isesp o s si b l e or prob a bl e .

or s u p p o sed , agreed

fa cts,

fa cts th at a re

Th ere i s thu s a con s i d era ble m a s s o f elem e n ts

th a t i s com p el l i n g to th e h ea rer or wh i ch th e sp e a k er strives to m a ke com pel l i ng.

Th ey m ay all be ch a l l enged a n d , s o , l o se th eir sta tus

as fa cts. But, as l o n g a s th ey enj oy th i s statu s, th ey

m

u st conform

to th ose stru ctu res of th e rea l th a t are a ccepted by th e au di e n ce, a n d th ey will h a ve to b e d efen d ed a ga i n st oth er f aets th a t m ay comp ete with them i n th e s a m e a rgu m en t a tive context. Everyth i n g j u st sai d a bo u t fac ts i s equ a l ly a p p l i c a ble to wh a t a re called tru ths.

Th e term "fa cts " i s general ly u sed to d esign a te obj e cts

§ 1 6 . Fa cts a n d Truths

69

of precise, limited agreement, whereas the term "truth s " is preferably applied to more complex systems relating to connectio ns between facts. They may be scientific theories or philosophic or religiou s con­ ceptions th at transcend experience. A s Piaget has p ointed out,3 currently known p sychological d ata will not warrant our conceiving the possibility of arriving at isolated facts. Nonetheless, the distinction b etween facts an d tru ths seems to us helpful and legitim ate for our purpose, sin ce it corresponds to the usual practice in argumentati on of relying at one point on fa cts and at a nother on systems of wider import. We have no d esire to settle, once a n d for all, the ph ilo sophic problem of the relationship between facts and truth s : thi s relationship characterizes the con cep­ tions of variou s audiences. F or some people, fact is opposed to th eo­ retical tru th a s the contingent is to th e necessary, for others, as the real i s to the schematic. It is also poss i b l e to so conceive their re­ lationship th at the statem ent of a fact is a truth a n d th a t a ny truth enunci ates a fact. Wh en a primacy either of fa cts or of truth s follows from the way i n wh i ch th eir r el a t i o n sh i p i s considered , facts a n d tru th s c a nnot be u tilized on q u i te th e s a m e f o oti n g as a st a r t i n g p o in t i n argu m e n t a t i o n . Only one of th e two i s c o n s i d ered to h a v e th e full agree m en t of th e u ni versal a u d i en ce. It m u s t be rem e m b ered , h o wever, th at th e prim a cy of o n e over th e oth er i s u su a l l y i n v o k e d o n l y wh e n th e two types of obj ects are confronte d . I n e v e ry d a y p r a cti c e , on th e oth er h a n d , fa cts a n d sys t e m s c a n b oth e q u a l ly b e c o n s i d ered a s a s t a rti n g p oi n t for a rgu m enta ti o n . In m o st ca s e s , fa cts a n d tru t h s ( sci e n ti fi c th e o r i e s or relig i o u s tru th s , f o r i n s ta n c e ) a r e u sed a s s e p a r a t e o b j e c t s o f a g r eem e n t , betw e e n wh i ch th ere a re , h owever, con n ecti o n s th a t e n a b l e a tr a n s f e r of the agree­ m en t to he m a d e : certa i n ty o f fa ct A c o m b i n e d with b e l i ef i n system

S l e a d s to th e certa i n ty of fa ct B; i n o th er word s , a cc e p ta n c e of fa ct A pl u s t h e o r y S

am ou n

t to a ccepta n ce of B.

Th e con n e cti on b etween A a n d B , i n s tea d of b e i n g r eg a rd e d a s esta ­ b l i sh e d , m a y be o n l y a p ro b a b i l i ty : i t wi l l b e a d m i tt e d th a t th e a p ­

p e a ra n ce o f A

enta i l s , w i th a

pea ra n ce o f B.

Wh e n th e d egree of

certa i n d egree of prob a b i l i ty , th e ap­

p r o b a b i lity

of B ca n b e c a l cu l a t ed

i n term s o f fa cts a n d o f a th eory th a t a r e th e s u bj e ct o f u n q u e sti on e d a greem e n t , th e

p roba b i l i ty i n q u e st i o n

i s th e obj e ct o f a n ag reem en t

of ex a ctly th e s a m e n a tu re a s th e a g reem e n t co n cern i ng th e d efi n i te fa ct.

Th i s i s why we trea t a gre e m e n t s o n th e pro b a b i l i ty o f events

3 P i a get, Tra i te de logique,

p.

30.

70

THE

NEW

RHETOR I C

of a certain kind as equivalent to agreements on facts, insofar as agree­ ments of the former kind involve probabilities that are calculable. Kneebone4 quite rightly stresses, in this connection, that "likeli­ hood" attaches to propositions and especially to inductive conclusions, and hence is not a measurable quantity, whereas probability is a nu­ merical rela tion between two propositions that apply to specific, well­ defined, and simple data of an empirical J;J.ature. The domai n of prob­ ability is then connected with that of facts and truths, and it is in terms of these that it is characterized for each audience. § 1 7 . Pres ump tions In addition to admitting facts and truths, all audiences admit pre­ sumptions. But, although presumptions also enj oy universal agreement, adherence to them falls short of being maximum, and hearers ex­ p ect their adherence to be reinforced at a given moment by other elements. In fact, those who admit a presumption ordinarily reckon on this reinforcement. Preliminary argumentation may strive to establish the existence of certain presumptions, j ust as it may strive to show an audience that it is faced with a fact. But as it is in the very nature of presump­ tions to be reinforced , an important distinction must be made. Whereas there is always a risk that j ustification of a fact will lessen its status, this is not true of presumptions. In order to preserve their status, there is, accordingly, no need to detach them from a possible prelim­ inary argumentation. However, in most cases, presumptions are admitted straight away as a starting point for argumentation . We shall even see that certain presumptions can be imposed upon audiences governed by conventions. Use of presumptions yields s tatements whose likelihood is not de­ rived from a calculation based on factual data and could not be so derived even if the calculation were perfected. It is true, of course, that the boundary between likelihood and probability that can be calculated (at least theoretically) may vary with different philosophic conceptions-. B ut, in order to reduce statements resulting from pre­ sumptions to statements with calculable probability, it would, in any case, be necessary to change the formulation and the scope of the argument. Let us mention some common presumptions : the pre­ sumption that the quality of an act reveals the quality of the person responsible for it ; the presumption of natural trustfulness by which 4 Kneebone, " Induction and Probability, " Proceedings of the Aristote lian Socie ty, New Series, L ( 1 950), 36.

§ 1 7. Presumptions

71

o u r first reaction is t o accept what someone tells us as being true, which is accepted as long and insofar as we have no cause for dis­ trust; the presumption of interest leading us to conclude that any statement brought to our knowledge is supposed to be of i nterest to us; the presumption concerning the sensible character of any human action. I n each particular instance, presumptions are connected with what is normal and likely. A more general presumption than all those that we have mentioned is the existence, for each category of facts, and particularly for each category of behavior, of an aspect regarded as normal and capable of serving as a basis for reasoning. The existence of this connection between presumptions and what is normal is itself a general presumption a ccepted by all audiences. Until there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the normal will occur, or has oc­ curred, or rather that the normal can safely be taken as a foundation in reasoning.5 Is this foundation one that can be defined statistically in terms of rate of occurrence ? Doubtless, it cannot. And that is one reason why we are compelled to talk about presumptions and not about calculated probability. The most that can b e said is that, broadly speaking, the idea we form of the normal, in our reasonings, oscillates between certain different aspects. (We exclude cases in which the calculation of frequency of occurrence is effectively carried out, and the common concept of what is normal is abandoned in favor of the idea of distribution characteristics.) Using statistical language to describe these different aspects, we may say that the concept of normal usually covers simultaneously, and with a different emphasi!! in each particular case, the ideas of mean, of mode, and of more or less extensive portion of a distribution. The normal, where the capacity required o f a driver is concerned, is everything exceeding a minimum ; in the case of a vehicle that has knocked down a pedestrian, it is everything below a maximum. In other cases, attention centers on the whole central portion of a distri­ bution curve, and the normal is opposed to the exceptional. Thus, if we suppose a binomial distribution , the normal usually refers to the mode, together with a certain margin in both directions. Where characteristics of a population (in the broad sense of the term, for all sorts of elements, animate or inanimate, obj ects or be­ havior) are concerned , it is the mode rather than the mean which is dominant in all presumptions based on what is usual. The mode is likewise the point of comparison in estimates of what is b ig or sma ll. It forms also the basis of all reasoning concerning behavior, of the 5

Cf. Gonseth, "La notion du normal, " Dialectica, 3 ( 1 947), 243-252.

72

THE N EW RHETO R I C

presumptions that may j ustify Einfiihlung which are so profusely used by orators when they beg their listeners to put themselves in the place of those for whom they are pleading. Although a presumption based on the normal can rarely be reduced to an evaluation of frequencies or to the use of definite characteristics of statistical distribution, it is nevertheless useful to clarify the usual concept of "normal" by showing that it always depends on a reference group, that is, on th� whole category for whose benefit it was estab­ lished. It is to be observed that this group-which is often a social group-is hardly ever explicitly described, perhaps because interlocu­ tors rarely think about it; it is clear, however, that all presumptions based on what is normal imply agreement on this reference group. In most cases, this group is highly unstable. Indeed if certain in­ dividuals diverge in behavior from what is regarded as normal, their conduct may modify the norm (statistically, we will say it may modify the mean). But if a person deviates beyond certain limits, he will be excluded from the group, and thus, the reference group will be modified . The individual will be considered mad and be excluded from the community, or he will be regarded as too ill bred to be ad­ m itted to the company of respectable people. The following dialogue seems to involve an exclusion of this kind : "You, sir, " s aid Bloch , turning to M . d'Argencourt, to whom he had b een made known, with the rest of th e p arty, on that gentle­ m an' s arrival, "you are a Dreyfus ard, of course ; they all are, abroad . " " It i s a question that concerns only the French themselves , don' t y o u think ? " replied M . d' Argencourt with that p eculiar form o f insolence which consists in ascribing to t h e other person a n opin­ ion which one must, obviously, know that he does not hold since he has j ust expres sed on e directly its opposite. 6

The interlocutor is excluded from the ranks of well-bred persons for whom this opinion is normal, so that one can legitimately presume that they hold it. The reference group, besides being unstable, may be considered in different ways. Sometimes one thinks of the real or fictitious grou p acting in a certain manner, sometimes of the common opinion held with respect to those who act in this way or of the opinion of those regarded as spokesmen for this common opinion or of what is com­ m only considered to be the opinion of these spokesmen. These dif­ ferent conceptions of the reference group will often work against one another in argumentation. Variations in the reference group enter into all legal argument. The longstanding opposition between argument from the motives 6 Proust,

The Guerman tes Way, pt. I, pp. 337-338.

§ 1 7.

73

Presum ptio n s

of the crime and argument fro m the con duct of the accused corresp o nds to two different reference groups.

The reference grou p relating to

m o tives is wid er ; that relating to conduct is m ore sp e cific in the sense th at the presumptions are derived fro m what is normal for men wh o , all their life, have behaved like th e accused. I n general, any addition to the av ailable inform ation m ay bring ab out a change in the reference group and thereby m o d ify o ur ception of what is extraordin ary or sho cking.

con­

It will often be th e

task of the sp eaker to promote such a m o d ificatio n by co mmunicating fresh information .

When counsel for the accused urges extenu ating

circumstances, he is suggesting a change in the reference gro u p : thence­ forth the presumed b ehavior, which will serve as criterio n for j udgi n g t h e d efendant, will be the n ormal b ehavior of this new reference gro up . Again, if the circle of our relatio n sh i p s is extended , n a tur al gifts th a t seem to u s extraordinary n o l onger appear s o , b e cause w e sh a ll h ave occasion to encounter them m ore often .

Conversely ,

a

d eath among

th e inhabitants o f a b ig city is an a b s olutely routine m a tter, it strikes th e small circle of our a c q u ainta n ces, we find it

ex

b ut, if

t ra or d i n ary .

O p p o siti o n between th e two reference groups e n a bles s o m e to

b e a st o n ­

i s h e d th a t a m ortal being sh o u l d be dead a n d oth ers to b e a ston ­ i s h ed by thi s a sto n i sh m ent .

Since, th en, pr esu m p t i o n s attached to the n orma l are a n obj ect o f a gr ee m en t , there mu st also be a su b j a c e nt a greem en t with respect to th e referen ce gro u p for thi s n ormal.

Most arg ume n ts s tri v i n g

to

show th a t i t i s extr a ord i n a ry a n d c o n trary to any pre s u m p ti o n th at man sh o u l d h a ve been a b l e to fi n d a worl d scaled to h i s needs, a s­ su m e (with o u t u sually s ay i n g so) th a t th e referen ce gro u p , th a t of h a b i ta b l e worl d s , i s extremely l i m i t ed . On th e o th er h a n d , a n a stro n­ o m er , s u ch as Hoyle, wh o consi d ers th a t th ere are ex cee d i n gly n u ­ m er o u s h a b i ta b l e wo rl d s, c a n h u m o r o u sly rem ark th a t , if our world were n ot h a bi t a b l e , we woul d be s o m ewhere el se. 7 Often th e very con cepts u sed i n a rg u m e n tation a ss u m e th at th e n or m a l i s d eterm i n ed by o n e or m ore referen ce gro u p s , with o u t th i s b e i n g ex p l i ci t .

Th i s i s s o , f o r i n stan ce, with th e j u ri d i ca l con cept

o f n egligen ce : th e exi sten ce of th e d i fferent gro u p s wil l em erge on ly from th e d i sc u s si o n s rel a ti n g to th i s con cept. A greem en t b a se d o n th e pres u m pti on of th e n orm a l i s s u p p o se d to h a ve th e sa m e ord er of v a l i d i ty for th e u n i versa l a u d i en ce a s agree­ m e n t u po n esta b l i sh ed fa cts a n d u po n tru th s so th a t agreem en t o n presu m ptio n s i s often n o t easily d i sti ngu i sh a b l e from agreem ent on fa cts.

7

At a gi ven m o m ent, presu m e d fa cts a re trea ted a s eq u i va l e nt

Hoyle, The Na t u re of the U n iverse,

p.

90.

74

THE NEW

RHETO H I C

to observed facts and can serve, with equal authority, as a premise for argument. This is only true, of course, until the presumption is subj ected to discussion . There is thus a j ump, whereby the normal comes to coincide with something unique, that happened only once and will never happen again. It is to be observed that, by specifying in more and more detail the conditions that must be satisfied by the members of the reference group, one might actually end up by reducing the group to a single individual. Nevertheless, even then , the pre­ sumed behavior of this individual and his actual behavior do not merge, and the strange j ump of which we have spoken, making it possible to reason on presumed facts in the same way as on observed facts, still remains .

§ 1 8 . Va lues Besides facts, truths, and presumptions, characterized by the agree­ ment of the universal audience, our classification scheme must also find a place for obj ects of agreement in regard to which only th e ad­ herence of particular groups is claimed. These obj ects are the values, hierarchies, and loci of the preferable. Agreement with regard to a value means an admission that an ob­ j ect, a being, or an ideal must have a specific influence o n action and on disposition toward action and that one can make use of this in­ fluence in an argument, although the point of view represented is not regarded as binding on everybody. The existence of values, as obj ects of agreement that make possible a communion with regard to particular ways of acting, is connected with the idea of multiplicity of groups. In antiqu ity, statements about what we term values, in­ sofar as they were not treated as unquestionable truths, were included with any sort of likely statement in the undifferentiated group of opin ions. They were still considered in this way by Descartes when he laid the maxims of his provisional code of morals : And thus since often eno ugh in the actions o f life no delay i s permissible, i t i s very certain that , when i t i s beyond o u r power to discern the opinions which carry most truth , we should follow the most probable ; . . . and aflerwards consider it a s no longer doubt­ ful in its relationship to practice, but as very true and very cer­ tain, inasmuch a s the reason which caused us to determine upon it is known to be s o . 8

In this maxim, Descartes shows well the precarious nature of values, a s well as their indispensability. He speaks of opinions that are probable, s

Descartes, D iscourse on the Me thod, GB\VW, vol. 31, p . 49.

§ 18. Values

75

what is really involved is a choice with reference to what we would to day call values. What he calls a very true and very certai n reason is i ndeed, until philosophic certa inty is attained, the apparently un­ questionabl e val u e a tta ching to efficacious human conduct. V a l u es en ter , at some stage or other, into every argument . In rea­ so n i ng of a sci en tific nature, they are generally confined to the be­ but

gi n n i ng of th e form ulation of the

th e system con cerned a nd, va l u e, to th e con cl u si on .

concepts and rules that cons titu te the reasoning aims at the truth as possible, the actual unfoldi ng of and this exclusion is at a maxi mum

insofar as A s far

th e a rgu m en t i s free from values,

in th e ex a ct sci en ces. But i n the fi elds of law, politics, and phil osophy,

as

va l u es i n tervene

o p m ents .

ch oi ce s th a t

certa i n

rath er than others a nd, t h ey may

c h oi ce s so

it.

m u st give

be accepted

it is n ot possible someone who

In a d i scu ssion, d e nyi ng

a basis for argument

at

stages

all

of

the

d evel­

On e appeals to values in order to i nduce the hearer to make

J u st

most

and

of

that

those

simply

value

something

see

for h is a l l eg a t ion (" I don' t

rea son s

a

to escape from

contests

as

j us tify

to

a l l,

approved by others.

that, "

by

a

is

which

fact

is

the

something e lse " ) , so, when a value i s in qu estion, a p erson m ay di squ alify it, subordinate it to others, or i n terpret i t b u t m ay n ot rej ect all valu es a s a whole: t h i s would amou nt to leaving t h e real m of d i scu ssi on to enter that of force. The gangster who rates h i s p ers o n a l sa fety above a nything else do without any need for expl a n a ti on a s l ong a s he confines himself to the domai n of same a s

"I

sayi ng ,

see

can

so

ac­

t i o n.

B u t,

h i m sel f ,

i f h e wa n t s

he

to

fight

to

fa cts :

wh en

for,

sion ;

one of

a rgument

obj ecti on s

a re

raised

a g reem en t

which

others

v alues

this

v alues

of refusing

i mply

that

to

even

agai nst com­

a re

forward

puts

i n t erlocutors

will

or

marshaled

respect ,

under p ain

it,

th e

a n d i n gen era l,

In

the

of

to

primacy

other

them.

get rid

v a l u e, o n e m u s t a rgu e to

this

the

a ckn owledge

m u st

i t i n order t o be a bl e t o p a r a bl e

justify

other

a

discu s­

the

v alu es

are

a c c ept e d .

V a ri o u s o bj e c t s versal In

of

re a l ,

re a l ? not

th a t hard

can

be

it

wh erea s

if

t

he

d i sti n ction ,

n ot

conc

claim

the

s e e

it

h ow

fro m

p u rely

u n d e rs t o o d

are

attitu de

p o s s i bl e

as

are

n ot

more

to

say

that

enough

va lu es

d i s t i n gu i sh e d

m a ke s to

th i s

Is

d ?

B u t,

be

eption

our

not

that

adherence

v alu es of

the

are u ni ­

a u d i en c e.

mak i ng

o v e rl o ok e

th e

to

do

to

truth

confer

f orm a l rela t ing

with

concerned

toward s.

the It

on

it

c r i t e r ia

to

real

s tatu

can

what

is

and

an

s

its

of

differences

truths

attitude

express

t oward

universal,

were

only

is a

fundamental f acts

it

nonu ni v ersal its

be relevant.

commonly

own.

For

It a

is

the

could aspect

indeed

statement

considered

a

fact

76

THE

NEW

RHETO R I C

or to what i s co nsidered a v a lu e, dep ending on its place

in

the speech,

r ef ut e s , or corrects . Also , the status of statements system of b eliefs for which universal validity is claimed, values may b e trea ted as facts or truths. In the course of the a rgu me nta ti o n , an d sometimes by a rather slow process, it may perhaps come to b e recognized tha t on e is d ea ling with obj ects o f agreement th at cannot make a claim to the a dherence of the u ni­ on what it enunciates,

evolves : when inserted i nto a

versal a u d ience.

valu es,

But if thi s is, a s we cla i m , th e chara cteri sti c of such t h ing s wh i ch

as

Good,

th e True, t he

are r ea d i ly c o n si d ered

Th e c la i m

to

u n i vers a l

as

th e

Bea u tifu l ,

u niv ersa l

valu es ?

a b sol u te

or

a s far

agreement,

as

seem s to us to be d u e s o lely to their gen era l i ty .

what about

a nd the A bsol u te,

th ey

are concerned,

Th ey ca n be regarded

a s val i d for a u n iversal a u d i en ce on ly on con d i ti on th a t th eir content n ot be specifi e d ; a s so o n a s

we

try to go i n to d eta i l s,

we

m eet only

th e a d h eren ce o f p a rti cu l a r a u d i en ces . A ccord i n g to E. D u preel , u n i versa l va l u es d eserve to be ca l l ed "val u es of p ersu a si o n " b e c a u se th ey a re m e a n s of pe rs u as i o n wh i ch , fr om a s o ci ol ogica l vi ewpoint, a n d n o m o re can

tha n

tha t ; t h ey a re ,

are

tha t

a s it were, spi ritu a l t ool s whi ch

po s ­ t h e m om en t it i s u sed, a n d rem a i n i ng a v a i l a b l e , a s b efore , for ot h er occa si on s . 9

be comp l et ely s e p a r a t e d from t h e m a t eri a l th ey m a ke it

s i b l e to i n t a ct

s h ap e , a n t e r i o r to

a ft e r

u se ,

Th i s con ce pti o n d i splays e x tr e m e ly well th e rol e of th ese valu es i n

a rgu m e n t a t i o n .

Th e s e to o l s , a s D upree!

ca l l s th em, ca n be u sed for

a l l a u d i en ces : th e p a rti c u l a r va l u es ca n a lways be con n ected to th e u n i versa l v a l u e s a n d serve to m a k e th e l a tter m ore s pecifi c.

The a ctu al

a u d i en ce wi l l b e able t a co n si d er i t self a l l th e m ore cl ose to a univer­ s a l a u d i en ce a s th e p a rti cu l a r va l u e seem s to fa d e before th e universal It i s t h u s by v i rtu e of th ei r bei ng vague th a t

v a l u e i t d eterm i n es .

th ese va l u es ap p e a r a s u n i versa l s i m i l a r to th a t of fa cts.

va l u e s

a n d l ay

cl a i m t o a

status

To t h e exten t t h a t th ey a r e preci sely formula ted,

t h ey a re s i m ply seen to c o n form to th e a spi ra t i on s of pa rti cu l a r groups. Th e i r r o l e is a c c o r d i ngly to j u st i fy ch oi ce s on wh i ch th ere

is not u n­

a n i m o u s a greem e n t by i n s e rti ng th e s e ch oi ces i n a sort of empty frame with respect t o wh i ch

a

wi d er

agreem ent e x i st s.

m e n t is rea c h e d over a n e mp ty form ,

it is

Th ough

n on eth e l ess

t h is

agree­

of con si dera ble

sign i fi c a n c e : i t i s e vi d e n c e of t h e fa ct t h a t o n e h a s d eci d ed to tra nscend p a rt i cu l a r a gre e m e n t s , the

i m porta n c e

at

l e a st i n

a t t a ch i n g

v a l u e s m a k e i t possi b l e to

9

D u p re e l ,

S o c io log ie

gen era te,

to

the

i n t e n t i on , u n iversa l

a ch i ev e.

pp .

1 8 1 - 1 8 2.

and

th a t

on e

agreem ent

recognizes

wh i ch

th ese

§

1 9 . A bstract Val u e s a n d C o n crete Values

77

§ 19. "1 bs lract Va lues and Concrete Va lues I n argu mentati o n concerning values, there is a funda mental, but t o o often neglec ted , distinction to b e m a d e between a bstract values, such as j u stice or tru t h , and concrete values, s u c h a s France or Lhc Church .

A concrete value is one attaching to a living being, a specific

gro u p , or a particular obj ect, considered a s a unique entity.

There

i s a close connectio n b etwee n the value atta ched to what is co ncrete and to what is unique : by d isplaying the unique character of some­ thing we automatically increase its valu e .

B y revealing to u s the

unique character of certain b eings, gro u p s , or moments in history, the romantic writers have brought about, even in philosophical thought, a reaction again s t abs tract ratio nalism , a rea ction characterized by the prominent p o siti o n assigned to that preeminently concrete val ue-­ the h u m a n pers o n .

Though Western morality, insofar as i l is based

on Greco-Roman ideas, valncs m o s t the obedience to rules th at arc valid for all people and under all circumstances, there exist vir tues and forms o f beha vior th a t can b e conceived only i n relation to concrete values.

S u ch notions as obligation, fideli ty, loyalty, solid arity, and

discipline are of this kind .

Likewise Confu ciu s · five u niversally bin d­

ing o b ligations-between rulers and ruled , father and s o n , husband a n d wife, older brother and y o u nger bro ther, friend and friend10refl e ct the importance a ttached

to personal relations among beings

wh o constitute con cre te values for one another. Whatever tlw d ominant values may be in a

cultural milieu, the

life of th e mind ca nnot avoid relying o n abstract values as well a s con crete o n e s .

It seems that there have always been p eople who at­

tach more impo1 tancc to one set than t o th e other ; perhaps they form chara c terial fa milie s.

I n any case their d i s tinctive trait would not

b e comple te neglec t o f values o f one kind, but su b ordination o f these valu es to those of th e other.

We may contra s t Erasmus who pre­

ferred an u nj ust peace to a j us t war with the man who rated th e ab­ s tract value o f truth higher than Plato ' s friend ship . Argumentati o n i s based , a ccording to th e circumstances, now on ab stra ct values, now on concrete valu es : it is sometimes difficult to p erceive the role played by each.

When a person says that men are

equal because they are children of the same Goo , h e seems to b e re-

10

Kou

H o n g Ming

Tclwu ng-young,

ch a p .

and Borrey, L e Ca tech isme de Confucius, p. 69, following the

XX,

§ 7 , Pauthier, Confucius e t l\Ie n c i us,

p . 83.

Sec also

the Hs i a o K ing o r classic o f filial piety in L