New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness 9780300213331

Citation preview

New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness

新唯識論

Y6693.indb i

6/30/15 2:55:35 PM

WO R L D T H O U G H T I N T R A N S L AT I O N A joint project of Yale University Press and the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University, World Thought in Translation makes important works of classical and contemporary political, philosophical, legal, and social thought from outside the Western tradition available to English-speaking scholars, students, and general readers. The translations are annotated and accompanied by critical introductions that orient readers to the background in which these texts were written, their initial reception, and their enduring influence within and beyond their own cultures. World Thought in Translation contributes to the study of religious and secular intellectual traditions across cultures and civilizations. Series editors Stephen Angle Karuna Mantena Andrew March Paulina Ochoa Ian Shapiro

Y6693.indb ii

6/30/15 2:55:35 PM

New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness 新唯識論

Xiong Shili An Annotated Translation by John Makeham

New Haven & London

Y6693.indb iii

6/30/15 2:55:35 PM

English translation, translator’s introduction, and annotations copyright © 2015 by Yale University. Copyright © 1932 by Xiong Shili. Originally published in Chinese as Xin weishi lun by Zhejiang Provincial Library. Published in Chinese in 1973 by Wenjing Press and in 2001 by Hubei Education Press. Published by arrangement with Xiong Youguang. The calligraphy of the epigraph is reproduced courtesy of John Makeham. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Yale University Press books may be purchased in quantity for educational, business, or promotional use. For information, please e-mail [email protected] (U.S. office) or [email protected] (U.K. office). Designed by James J. Johnson. Set in Minion and Trajan type by Newgen North America, Austin, Texas. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Xiong, Shili, 1885–1968, author. [Xin wei shi lun. English] New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness / Xiong Shili ; an annotated translation by John Makeham. pages cm. — (World Thought in Translation) “Originally published in Chinese as Xin weishi lun by Zhejiang Provincial Library. This translation is based on the 2001 edition published by Hubei Education Press.” Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-300-19157-8 (Cloth) 1. Knowledge, Theory of.

I. Makeham, John, 1955–

II. Title.

BD168.C5H7513 2015 121—dc23 2014032430 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992 (Permanence of Paper). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Y6693.indb iv

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

Y6693.indb v

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

The way (dao) bestowed by heaven differs not between western barbarian [Indian] and Chinese; People’s endowment of the numinous is not restricted to insider or outsider. —Calligraphy by Pan Chonggui of a couplet, written by Yan Zhitui (531–591), from Hongming ji

Y6693.indb vi

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

T r a n s l at o r ’ s I n t r o d u c t i o n

xi

New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (新唯識論) Foreword by Cai Yuanpei Foreword by Ma Fu Introduction

1

3

9

15

Part A. On Cognitive Objects (境論) one. Explanation of the Thesis (明宗) t wo. Weishi (唯識)

19 21

28

three. Transformation (轉變)

94

four. Productive Power (功能)

124

five. Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上)

Y6693.indb vii

161

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

viii

Contents six. Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下) seven. Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

176

eight. Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

232

Works Cited Index

Y6693.indb viii

166

319

331

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Ms. Xiong Youguang 熊幼光 for granting permission to publish this annotated translation of her late father’s Xin weishi lun; to Professor Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇 for his good offices in facilitating contact with Ms. Xiong; to Professor Azuma Jūji 吾妻重二 for sending me a copy of his Japanese translation of the Xin weishi lun, long before I had commenced my own translation; to Steve Angle, as East Asian Editor, for recommending inclusion of the volume in Yale University Press’s World Thought in Translation Series; to Dan Lusthaus for his tenacious scholarship and endless patience in helping me better understand Yogācāra Buddhism; to my Australian National University colleague John Powers for his friendship and for sharing his knowledge of Yogācāra Buddhism in India and Tibet; to Peter Zarrow for constructive critical feedback on material included in the Translator’s Introduction and in the companion volume, Transforming Consciousness; and to Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國 for answering my naive questions nearly seven years ago when, in preparation for this translation, I took my first faltering steps into the world of the late-Qing revival of Yogācāra Buddhism. More recently, Professor Lin also secured for me a photographic reproduction of the original recension of the 1932 edition of the New Treatise. I am also grateful to the Dunhuang Studies scholar Professor Pan Chonggui 潘重規 (1908–2003), one of my teachers in Taiwan in 1982, who at the time kindly wrote the elegant calligraphy for the Chinese couplet that serves as the epigraph to this volume. The couplet was written by Yan Zhitui 顏之推 (531–591), a gifted “Confucian” scholar-official who also staunchly supported

ix

Y6693.indb ix

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

x

Acknowledgments

Buddhism. The sixth century was a period in Chinese history when Buddhism was fundamentally shaping the direction that Chinese philosophy would take, a direction that also shaped Xiong’s thought some 1,500 years later. The couplet states that Indian and Chinese thinkers both had similar insights into the fundamental nature of reality, again a message that we see developed by Xiong. I would also like to convey my appreciation of the hard work that both external readers have done in carefully reviewing the manuscript for the Press. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange and to the Australian Research Council for providing grants to carry out the research underpinning this annotated translation. John Makeham

Y6693.indb x

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

Translator’s Introduction John Makeham

In China, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) is typically regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. In standard works introducing Chinese philosophers to Western readers, he is also widely portrayed as a seminal figure. In 1963, historian of Chinese philosophy Wingtsit Chan went so far as to claim that Xiong “has influenced more young Chinese philosophers than any other contemporary Chinese philosopher.” More recently, Xiong has been described as “perhaps the most creative philosopher within Modern New Confucianism,” and he is “often considered to be one of the most innovative Chinese philosophers of the modern period. Few could match him when it comes to building his own distinctive comprehensive philosophical system.” Furthermore, “it is now almost universally held that in the New Doctrine (Xin weishi lun) Xiong built the most creative philosophical system in contemporary Chinese philosophy.” Ng Yu-kwan finds Xiong to have been a philosopher of such originality and importance that he is prepared to give the following assessment: “Whether judged in terms of depth and comprehensiveness in content or in terms of 1. Wing-tsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 765. 2. Lauren Pfister, “Xiong Shili,” in RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism, ed. Xinzhong Yao (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 2:706. 3. Tan Sor-hoon, “Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy,” in History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bo Mou (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 540. 4. Jiyuan Yu, “Xiong Shili’s Metaphysics of Virtue,” in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, ed. Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 128.

xi

Y6693.indb xi

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

xii

Translator’s Introduction

its theoretical vigor, Xiong’s philosophical achievements are great, and can be compared with those of Western philosophers such as Aristotle, Leibniz, Husserl, Heidegger, and Whitehead. In Chinese philosophy, his scope is on par with that of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and Wang Fuzhi.” Although such effusive appraisals are not universally shared, Umberto Bresciani perceptively points out that the “variety of judgments concerning Xiong’s thought is an eloquent indication of the complexity of his philosophical thought.” Indeed, New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xin weishi lun 新唯識論) remains one of the least understood major Chinese philosophical works of the twentieth century. Xiong’s philosophical training began with Buddhist philosophy—in particular, Yogācāra Buddhism. Just as a strong emphasis on logic exercised a formative influence on the development of the academic discipline of Chinese philosophy in the first two decades of the twentieth century, so too the revival of Yogācāra thought by leading Chinese intellectuals from the late 1890s to the 1930s played a key role in shaping currents in Chinese philosophy and modern Chinese thought more generally. Yogācāra (Yuqie xingpai 瑜伽行派; yogic practice) is one of the two most influential philosophical systems of Indian Buddhism, along with Madhyamaka. Historically, both weishi 唯識 (nothing but consciousness) and faxiang 法相 (dharmalaks.an.a; dharma characteristics) were used to refer to the Yogācāra school in China. After the Tang dynasty, faxiang was used to denote the famous pilgrim and monk Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (602–644) Yogācāra school but soon became a mildly derogatory expression used by its opponents, mocking the Yogācāras for pursuing the “characteristics of dharmas” rather than the real nature of dharmas ( faxing 法性). Despite this, Yogācāras later adopted the term, and in Japan it continues to be the official name of this school (Hossō in Japanese). 5. Ng Yu-kwan, “Xiong Shili’ s Metaphysical Theory About the Non-Separability of Substance and Function,” in New Confucianism: A Critical Examination, ed. John Makeham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 239. 6. Umberto Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement (Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 2001), p. 140. 7. Other names for the Yogācāra school include the Way of Consciousness (vijñānavāda) and Nothing but Cognition/Consciousness (vijñapti-mātratā). 8. The building blocks of complex physical and mental phenomena. Xiong treats them more simply as physical and mental phenomena.

Y6693.indb xii

6/30/15 2:55:36 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xiii

Yogācāra ostensibly begins with the fourth-century a.d. Indian thinkers Asan˙ga (無著) and Vasubandhu (世親); their ideas began to appear in China almost immediately. By the sixth century, competing traditions of Yogācāra thought had developed in China, with the Weishi 唯識 (vijñapti-mātratā; nothing but consciousness) school rising to preeminence in the seventh century. By the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), however, certain key commentaries of this school had ceased being transmitted in China, and it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a number of them were reintroduced into China from Japan, where their transmission had been uninterrupted. Crucial to the late Qing revival of interest in Yogācāra thought was the friendship between Japanese scholar Nanjō Bun’yū 南條文雄 (1894–1927) and lay Chinese Buddhist scholar Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911). Between 1891 and 1896, Nanjō sent 235 Buddhist texts to Yang, including thirty Yogācāra texts that had long ceased being transmitted in China. Within the context of a broader renewal of interest in traditional philosophical writings (including other indigenous Chinese Mahāyāna texts) in the late Qing (1644–1911), the corpus of Yogācāra writings attracted unparalleled attention. One of these texts, Kuiji’s 窺基 (632–682) Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記 (Commentary on Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness) is particularly important for providing crucial glosses on Cheng weishi lun, the foundational text of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition. China’s Yogācāra revival—specifically the Weishi 唯識 school—from the late 1890s to the 1930s was spearheaded by two generations of prominent intellectuals: monastics, lay believers, and secular figures alike. Xiong began his Yogācāra studies in Nanjing at the China Institute of Inner Learning (支那內學院) in 1920 under the tutelage of the Institute’s founder, Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943). Two years later, he was appointed to teach 9. Chen Jidong 陳繼東, “Shinmatsu ni okeru Yuishiki Hōsō tenseki no kankō ni tsuite 清末における唯識法相典籍の刊行について” (On the Publication of Yogācāra Texts at the End of the Qing Dynasty), Indogaku Bukkyūgaku kenkyū 44, no. 2 (1996): 811. 10. For an overview of these historical developments, see the introduction to Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China, ed. John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 11. For a comprehensive study of this revival, see the essays in Makeham, Transforming Consciousness. 12. The institute was not formally launched until 1922, but it had already been running since 1918, based on the grounds of the Jinling Sutra Press (Jinling kejing chu 金陵刻經處) in Nanking.

Y6693.indb xiii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xiv

Translator’s Introduction

Yogācāra philosophy in the philosophy department of Peking University, where he initially taught for two years. He subsequently led a peripatetic and frequently interrupted academic career, suffering various ailments for much of his life. After spending much of the second half of the 1920s in south China recuperating from illness, he returned to academic life at Peking University in 1932. As a refugee during the period of the Second SinoJapanese War (1937–1945), he moved between cities and towns in south and west China, living periodically in monasteries and teaching in small, private academies. He returned to Peking University in 1947, and in 1949 he made the decision to remain in China rather than relocate to Hong Kong or Taiwan. From 1954 until his death in 1968 he resided in Shanghai, but he continued to be employed by Peking University for most of that period. Over the thirty-year period from the early 1920s to the early 1950s, he moved from a largely uncritical belief in Yogācāra philosophy to a position where it served as a foil for his own constructive philosophy. His criticisms of Yogācāra grew progressively more trenchant over this period. The incremental nature of this transition is reflected in the different versions of his major philosophical writing, New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness. In 1923 he published Weishixue gailun 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning; 1923), based on his lectures at Peking University. In 1926 this book was revised, but the original title was retained. The next revised version, Weishi lun 唯識論 (Treatise on Yogācāra), was published in 1930. The literary redaction (文言文本) of New Treatise was published in 1932 and represents Xiong’s mature rejection of Yogācāra philosophy (although he still retained many elements of Yogācāra, deploying them for his own purposes). As Guo Qiyong has noted, the literary redaction of New Treatise represents his most foundational and important writing. With the pub13. This English rendering of the title is based on Xiong’s own idiosyncratic gloss of weishi 唯識. The Chinese title may well have been intended to carry a second level of meaning. Given that Xin weishi lun is presented as a critical response to Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (602–664) Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), an argument could be made that the title of Xiong’s work has the additional implicit sense of New Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness. 14. Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, Tiandi jian yige dushuren: Xiong Shili zhuan 天地間一個讀書人: 熊十力傳 (A Scholar Poised Between Heaven and Earth: A Biography of Xiong Shili) (Taipei: Yeqiang chubanshe, 1994), pp. 50–54, 61.

Y6693.indb xiv

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xv

lication of the 1932 literary redaction (hereafter New Treatise refers to this redaction), Xiong was catapulted to national prominence (and controversy). A vernacular redaction (語體文本) of New Treatise was published in 1944, and an abridged edition of the vernacular redaction was published in 1953. Even though the lengthy vernacular redaction is generally considered to be the fullest expression of Xiong’s mature philosophy, Xiong’s main arguments were already substantially in place in the 1932 literary redaction of New Treatise. The genesis of the vernacular version lies in Xiong’s unrealized plan to have a student translate the literary redaction into English. When the English version failed to materialize, Xiong had students translate several chapters into vernacular Chinese. Some of the translation was dictated by Xiong; some of it was not.

 . N EW T R E AT I S E : C ON F U C IA N OR BU DDH I ST ? Conventionally, Xiong is recognized as a founding figure of the modern New Confucian school of philosophy. Included among his students are such towering figures as Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–78), Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–82), and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–95), each of whom in turn spawned disciples and promoters. Since the 1970s, New Confucian philosophy has been growing in influence in “cultural China” to become the dominant philosophical current in Chinese philosophy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Its rise to preeminence in mainland China over the past two decades is nothing short of phenomenal. Over the past three decades, there has been a widespread tendency to portray Xiong narrowly as a Confucian philosopher who also happened to criticize Buddhist philosophy, but whose philosophical achievements lie in his accounts of the relationship between ti 體 and yong 用, the principle 15. One real philosophical difference is that Xiong extends his criticism—albeit with ample qualification—to Madhyamaka conceptions of emptiness. When reference is made to the 1944 vernacular redaction of Xin weishi lun, this will be clearly indicated. 16. In English, the term “New Confucian” is to be distinguished from “Neo-Confucian.” New Confucianism is a modern neo-conservative philosophical movement, with religious overtones. Proponents claim it to be the legitimate transmitter and representative of orthodox ru 儒 (“Confucian”) values. The movement is promoted and/or researched by prominent Chinese intellectuals based in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States.

Y6693.indb xv

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xvi

Translator’s Introduction

of change, and the two concepts “contraction” (翕) and “expansion” (闢) derived from the Book of Change. This tendency has no doubt been encouraged by the comments of such New Confucian luminaries as Mou Zongsan: “Only the lifetime of learning of my teacher Mr. Xiong Shili inherited, carried on, and advanced the teaching of humaneness of the Confucian sages, and also inherited, carried on, and advanced the aspirations of the great Confucians of the late Ming.” Making Xiong a vital link in the transmission of the “succession of the way” (道統) from late Ming times to the twentieth century has been a key strategy in the retrospective creation of the New Confucian school generally and in the revised succession of the way genealogy formulated by Mou Zongsan. Contemporary promoter of New Confucian thought Liu Shuxian 劉述先 similarly describes Xiong as the first person after the May Fourth period to have “mastered the fundamental wisdom of [Song and Ming] NeoConfucianism” and to have “applied his energies to reviving the thought of this tradition. . . . After the Song and Ming periods, the Qing Confucians lost the thread of the succession of the way once again, and it was not until the Republican period that Xiong Shili opened up the beginnings of New Confucianism.” Xiong’s sustained engagement with Buddhist philosophy has tended to be dismissed as a passing phase or inconvenient distraction rather than an 17. The following comments by Jiyuan Yu, “Xiong Shili’s Metaphysics of Virtue,” p. 129, are typical: “His major philosophical contribution has been, through appropriating some aspects of Buddhism and combining them with his sophisticated understanding of the Yijing, to provide Confucianism—which has traditionally been regarded as being only an ethics—with a more solid metaphysical basis and a more dynamic character.” 18. Mou Zongsan, Shengming de xuewen 生命的學問 (Vital Learning) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1970), p. 38. 19. For a detailed treatment of this concept in the context of New Confucian discourse, see chapter 7 of my Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008). 20. Liu Shuxian, Zhuzi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng 朱子哲學思想的發展與 完成 (The Development and Completion of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought) (1982; rev. 3rd ed., Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1995), 1980 preface, p. 4; pp. 425, 481. 21. Lin Anwu 林安梧 even departs from the conventional consensus that Xiong gradually changed his philosophical allegiance from Buddhism to Confucianism, instead insisting that Xiong had always adopted a Confucian stance. See his “Dangdai Ru-Fo lunzheng de yixie wenti: Li Xiangping xiansheng ‘Xiong Shili zhexue de queshi yu Ru-Fo huitong’ du hou

Y6693.indb xvi

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xvii

essential framework that could be used to tease out the complexity of his thought. Too often, Xiong’s uncompromising critiques of Yogācāra philosophy, in particular, seem to have provided a convenient pretext for ignoring other key elements of Buddhist philosophy in his constructive philosophy. This is not to deny that Xiong’s primary philosophical allegiance was with Confucian philosophy, an allegiance that grew remarkably more pronounced from the 1940s onward. At the same time, however, he also prided himself on his syncretism: “People might suspect that my New Treatise is Buddhist on the outside and Confucian on the inside. Only Zaiping [his close friend Lin Zaiping 林宰平 (1879–1960)] knows that it is a self-made system—it enters into and departs from the various schools of thought and is complete, rounded, and without hindrances.” In the 1944 vernacular redaction of New Treatise, Xiong explained this in more detail: There are people who say that my philosophy introduces Confucian [thought] into Buddhist [thought]. Now while this might seem a reasonable thing to say, in fact other people are not in a position to know what my own feelings are on this matter. Formerly there was a period when I was very much inclined toward Indian Buddhist thought. My motivation in studying Buddhist learning was certainly not to broaden my scholarship but rather to realize truth fully, a goal to which I was driven by my great wish to secure a meaningful life.Ｉhad received instruction about the school of Asan˙ga and Vasubandhu from Venerable Master Ouyang [Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943)], and had for a period resolutely adhered to the doctrines of that school. Later, I gradually moved away from the teachings of the various schools, both Buddhist and the others. Including the school of Confucius. I had no thoughts for anything other than “to seek within myself ” (反己自求). I held that truth is not something lying at a great remove from us and most certainly is not something that can be apprehended by immersing oneself in other people’s writings. Accordingly, I trusted only my own sincerity and humility, 當代儒佛論爭的一些問題──李向平先生「熊十力哲學的缺失與儒佛會通」讀後” (Some Issues in Contemporary Confucian-Buddhist Debates: On Reading Mr. Li Xiangping’s “Shortcomings in the Philosophy of Xiong Shili, and Confucian-Buddhist Interconnections”), Ershiyi shiji 48 (1998): 126. 22. Xiong Shili, Shili yuyao chuxu 十力語要初續 (The First Sequel to Selected Letters and Talks of Xiong Shili) (Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1990), pp. 29–30. This work was published in 1949, but the selections include material from the 1930s. 23. The text in a lighter font is Xiong’s interlinear autocommentary. It runs throughout the New Treatise and is integral to Xiong’s exposition, as he explains in his introduction.

Y6693.indb xvii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xviii

Translator’s Introduction

constantly guarding against the deceptive and blinding effects of personal bias, partial views and so forth. I sought nothing but what Chen Baisha 陳白沙 [1428–1500] referred to as “lodging one’s mind in not-having” (措心於無)—that is, remove all attachments and mistaken views—enabling the mind to become expansive, with no constraints at all. Only in this way could truth be personally experienced at every turn. After some time, what I came to realize through personal verification was a sudden feeling of profound intimacy with the meaning of the Book of Change as transmitted by the Confucius school. Accordingly, only then did I completely destroy Weishixue gailun 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning; 1923), which had been written using the views of the school of Asan˙ga and Vasubandhu and also make a pledge to revise it and write New Treatise so as to correct the mistakes of the former work. What I have obtained from Confucius has been not through books, but through personal experience. On this basis I then began to feel that it was verified by what Confucius said in books. It is impossible to tell most people of the difficulties involved. As for the Buddhist scriptures I most value, none surpasses the Āgama-sūtras (阿含經), Some of its methods of self-cultivation correspond with those of the Confucians (孔門). the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra; 大般若波羅蜜多經), [These teachings] remove all views derived from being impeded by habituated tendencies, and, with regard to things, there is no attachment at all. the Nirvān.a Sutra (Mahāparinirvān.a-sūtra; 涅槃經), Having refuted all forms of attachment, it then directly reveals the true and eternal Fundamental Reality of all dharmas. and the Flower Ornament Sutra (Avatam . saka-sūtra: 華嚴經). This sutra describes each and every manifestly apparent thing as god-like (神)—a pantheism. It also shows people how to aspire to good conduct and so draws near to conventional thought. Although the transformations within Buddhism are many and varied, this sutra is unique. All of these sutras have places that can merge comprehensively with the Book of Change of the Confucians. Note the word “have places that can”—it is not the case that they are completely the same. In the future I plan to write a separate essay on this, so I will not go into detail here. Most people say that I introduce Confucian [thought] into Buddhist [thought]—this sort 24. Chen Xianzhang 陳獻章, Ming dynasty Confucian thinker. 25. See Chen Baisha, “Yu Zhan Minze 與湛民澤” (Letter to Zhan Minze), in Ming ru xue’an 明儒學案 (Case Studies of Ming Ru), compiled by Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), vol. 1, p. 86. 26. A collection of early Buddhist discourses preserved primarily in Chinese translation. 27. A collection of sutras that articulate the doctrine of the perfection of wisdom. 28. A group of sutras called Mahāparinirvān.a-sūtra. 29. Key scripture for the Huayan school of Sinitic Buddhism.

Y6693.indb xviii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xix

of claim is made in complete ignorance of the meaning of learning and its difficulties.

Apart from providing a succinct intellectual autobiography, these comments highlight the syncretism that Xiong consciously employed to develop his thought. Writing in the mid-1930s, a year or so after the publication of New Treatise, he explains that this syncretism is premised on his conviction that Confucian and Buddhist insights into reality are identical: In regard to the verified experience (證會) of Fundamental Reality, there is no difference between Buddhists and Confucians. Fundamental Reality is absolute; it is beyond all differentiating characteristics. The only question of difference is that of being able to see it or not being able to see it. If it is seen, then there are no further differences that can be drawn. . . . The absolute Reality [that I refer to] in my New Treatise is not a matter on which there can be differences between Confucians and Buddhists. It was with a firm grasp of this principle that I established my discourse using the method of skillful/expedient means [upāya]. This is why my New Treatise is far from being misguided conceptual elaboration. However, as for the Buddhist view of life, the account in New Treatise is completely different: mental afflictions arise from mental afflictions, and the mundane world is the mundane world. These views are grounded in the Confucian idea that “physical form is heavenly nature.” Thus [Confucians] advocate vigor and creativity and have no fears about mortality, nor do they take delight in extinction, and because of this they ultimately belong to Chinese thought. Indeed this is a characteristic of Chinese thought. Buddhist thought about human life, from primitive Buddhism to the later Mahāyāna, consistently advocates transcending the ocean of mortality. . . . This is perhaps a special feature of the Indian people—there is no need for us to discuss its pros and cons. 30. Xiong Shili, Xin wei shi lun, vernacular redaction, pp. 136–137. 31. Also Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 8, p. 423, where he claims that New Treatise synthesizes Buddhism and Confucianism into an independent system. “It is the crystallization of Oriental philosophy.” 32. Xiong is using the concept in the sense of a hermeneutic strategy (1) for dealing with real and apparent differences between Buddhist and Confucian teachings and (2) to indicate the limits and limitations of language, but also the necessary role played by language in pointing toward the truth. 33. The idea that human life is “mandated” by heaven, that the transcendent is immanent in human life. 34. Xiong Shili, “Shili lunxue yu jiyao 十力論學語輯要” (Reconstructed Essentials of Xiong Shili’s Discussions of Learning), Xiong Shili quanji 熊十力全集 (The Complete Writings of Xiong Shili) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), vol. 2, p. 254.

Y6693.indb xix

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xx

Translator’s Introduction

Elsewhere, Xiong drew attention to the importance of Madhyamaka Buddhist thought in New Treatise, declaring that New Treatise “establishes its discourses using the method of convenient/skillful means to probe directly the essence of the Madhyamaka school.” He proceeds to explain that he identifies the doctrine of impermanence to be the key Madhyamaka teaching, and that this teaching lies at the heart of two central chapters of New Treatise, “Transformation” and “Productive Power”: Although the constructs I have devised in these chapters using the method of skillful means may seem to be different from [the teachings of the] Mahāyāna Madhyamaka School, they are in fact identical. . . . My New Treatise nominally (假 [ prajñapti]) talks about the “flow of Fundamental Reality.” Being based on the Confucian Book of Change, [it might be assumed that] there would be no necessary reason for the content of New Treatise to accord with Madhyamaka [teachings]. Now, this might seem to be correct. One must, however, understand that when Mādhyamikas establish words on the basis of skillful means, they do so purely to stop attachment. In other words, they directly lead people to cultivate the discernment of emptiness and thereby render their attachments empty.

In other words, Madhyamaka philosophical insights lie at the heart of New Treatise, in particular the view that emptiness and the phenomenal world ultimately are not two different things but rather are two characterizations of the same thing. Madhyamaka provided a deconstructive method, a radical apophasis, central to which is the concept of emptiness. Crucially, however, Xiong moves beyond a purely Madhyamaka perspective, to adopt a view that remains firmly entrenched in the conceptual genealogy of socalled nature origination (xingqi 性起), a doctrine developed in Huayan Buddhism to indicate “that all phenomenal appearances are nothing but manifestations of the nature. Nature origination . . . goes beyond conditioned arising in locating an ultimate ontological basis for the phenomenal 35. Followers of Madhyamaka. 36. Xiong Shili, “Shili lunxue yu jiyao,” pp. 252, 253. 37. It should be noted that in New Treatise, Xiong is not prepared to endorse any notion of nihilism, such as might be ascribed to Madhyamaka philosophy. In the 1944 vernacular redaction of Xin weishi lun, Xiong is more explicitly critical of Madhyamakan conceptions of emptiness. 38. In the context of Sinitic Buddhism, “the nature” refers to Buddha-nature; for Xiong, it refers to Fundamental Reality.

Y6693.indb xx

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxi

world.” The theory of nature origination provides an ontological basis for all phenomena by presenting phenomena as manifestations of the nature (which, in turn, is the functional equivalent of Suchness, the Absolute, Fundamental Reality, dharma realm [dharmadhātu], and so on). The influence of this doctrine is particularly evident in Xiong’s conception of the ti-yong conceptual model. At the same time, Xiong is highly critical of Yogācāra philosophy (as represented by major figures in the school such as Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla [護法; sixth century], Xuanzang, and Kuiji) for promoting what he regards to be ontological dualism and pluralism. At the heart of his critique is the charge that key Yogācāra thinkers had effectively substantialized the concept of seeds (bīja; 種子)—originally just a heuristic metaphor—by presenting seeds as the ontological basis of all things. Xiong’s critique of Yogācāra pluralism extends to the division of consciousness into eight groups, and to Dharmapāla’s/Xuanzang’s appropriation of the tripartite theory of consciousness put forth by Indian logician and philosopher Dignāga 陳那 (ca. 480–540). Xiong’s critiques are grounded in the Mahāyāna doctrine of dependent arising ( pratītya-samutpāda; 緣起)—everything arises from causes and conditions and has no inherent self-nature—and the doctrine that the phenomenal world is not ontologically distinct from undifferentiated absolute reality (dharmakāya), a thesis he develops using the ti-yong 體用 conceptual polarity. The central metaphysical problem Xiong grappled with in New Treatise— and indeed throughout his life—was the relation between the ontological 39. Peter N. Gregory, Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated Translation of Tsung-mi’s Yüan jen lun with a Modern Commentary (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), p. 18. 40. It is thus perhaps not entirely surprising that in 1933 the cleric Taixu 太虛 (1890– 1947) described New Treatise as representing a new kind of Huayan. See Taixu, “Lüe ping Xin weishi lun 略評新唯識論” (A Brief Review of New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness) Xiong Shili quanji, supplementary volume A, p. 32. 41. A student of Dignāga, this major sixth-century Indian Yogācāra scholar wrote an influential commentary on Vasubandhu’s Trim . śikā (Weishi sanshi lun song 唯識三十論頌; Thirty Verses), translated by Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka, vol. 31, no. 1586, the text on which Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun comments. Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun is said to draw heavily on Dharmapāla’s commentary and privileges many of its interpretations. See, however, note 44 below.

Y6693.indb xxi

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xxii

Translator’s Introduction

and the phenomenal. Opposed to ontological dualism, he sought to develop an ontological monism that was combined with a phenomenological dualism (experienced through ultimate truth and conventional truth) and encapsulated in his understanding of the ti-yong polarity. Identifying the ontological with the phenomenal, he insisted that phenomena are not different from Reality even if they are not identical. Ontologically they are not different; phenomenologically our experience of them is not the same.

 . T H E C ON T E N T OF N EW T R E AT I S E This volume is a translation of the literary redaction of New Treatise. It does not attempt to provide an intellectual biography covering major facets of Xiong’s long and productive career. This volume is first and foremost a translation of one book in Xiong’s life, albeit his most important book. To provide even a modestly comprehensive intellectual biography would mean introducing the philosophical content of all of his main writings from the 1910s to the 1950s. That would be a very different project—one well worth undertaking—but not in this introduction, which is focused on introducing the content of Xiong’s New Treatise. As indicated by the title, New Treatise is presented as a commentary on, or critical response to, Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun, a foundational text in East Asian Buddhism. New Treatise consists of an interpretive summary 42. See, for example, my essay “Xiong Shili’s Understanding of the Relationship between the Ontological and the Phenomenal,” in Chinese Metaphysics and Its Problems: An Introduction, ed. Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press). 43. I have used the recension in Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 2, collated against a photographic reproduction of the original recension first published by Zhejiang Provincial Library in October 1932 and republished in Taipei by Wenjing chubanshe in 1973. The photographic reproduction was made from a copy of the original recension provided by Tang Junyi to Zhou Shaoxian 周邵賢, a former student of Xiong. 44. Cheng weishi lun is a composite of commentaries on Vasubandhu’s Trim . śikā. In order to buttress his own claim as rightful successor to a lineage through Xuanzang, Kuiji claimed that Cheng weishi lun was strictly based on ten Indian commentaries, with the opinion of sixth-century Indian Yogācāra exponent Dharmapāla invariably prevailing. Hidenori Sakuma and Dan Lusthaus, however, argue that it is often the interpretations of the seventhcentury Yogācāra master Sthiramati that are the authoritative position (demonstrable by

Y6693.indb xxii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxiii

and discussion of key Yogācāra teachings that feature in Cheng weishi lun, a sustained critique of views Xiong attributes to the sixth-century Yogācāra master Dharmapāla, and a synthesis of Yogācāra thought with ideas derived from Madhyamaka Buddhism, various Sinitic traditions of Buddhism, the Book of Change, Laozi and Zhuangzi, and from Chinese Neo-Confucian thinkers associated with the Lu-Wang wing of Neo-Confucian philosophy, as well as Zhu Xi. Xiong was very much a syncretist. Xiong had originally intended that New Treatise would consist of two parts: On Cognitive Objects (境論) and On Epistemology (量論), but On Epistemology was never written. New Treatise thus consists of eight chapters that collectively constitute On Cognitive Objects. The main content of those eight chapters is introduced below.

2.1 Explanation of the Thesis (明宗) This opening chapter presents an overview of the main thesis underpinning New Treatise, the gist of which is expressed in the opening paragraph: “Reality (實體 [tattva]) is not a perceptual field (境界) detached from one’s own mind, nor is it a cognitive object of knowledge. . . . Moreover, the word comparing Sthiramati’s commentary, the only one of the supposed ten that is extant today, with Cheng weishi lun). See Hidenori Sakuma, “On Doctrinal Similarities between Sthiramati and Xuanzang,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29, no. 2 (2006 [2009]): 357–382; Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun, Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series (London: Routledge, 2002), chapter 15. 45. See my essay, “Xiong Shili’s Critique of Yogācāra Thought in the Context of his Constructive Philosophy,” in Makeham, Transforming Consciousness, where I prosecute this case. 46. Xiong had planned this division as early as 1923, as he relates in the opening paragraph of his Weishixue gailun, in Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 1, p. 45. There he also reveals that the title “Liang lun 量論” does mean “epistemology,” but he deliberately chose not to use the term renshilun 認識論 because it was a Japanese translation and it was also a term derived from “philosophers” (哲學家). Xiong drew a distinction between philosophy and what he termed “fundamental wisdom” (玄學). 47. Occasionally I have suggested what I believe would have been the particular matching Sanskrit terms, based on established Sinitic Buddhist usage. Inter alia, this serves the purpose of reminding readers that Xiong is drawing upon a long-established technical vocabulary, even though he often chooses to invest certain terms with new meaning.

Y6693.indb xxiii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xxiv

Translator’s Introduction

‘self-nature’ (自性) is but a different term for [Fundamental] Reality.” Reality is the underlying locus: it both ontologically grounds the phenomenal world yet is not different from the phenomenal world, just as the sea supports the waves yet is not different from the waves. It is the single most important concept in New Treatise and is invoked frequently, albeit under a variety of names. In the vernacular edition of Xin weishi lun, shiti 實體 is largely replaced by benti 本體. As Xiong points out, however, the meaning is the same: “ ‘Fundamental Reality’ (本體) is but a different term for the true nature (真性). As the real principle (實理) by which we and the ten thousand things live, it is called true nature. As for this true nature’s being the true aspect 實相 [tattvasya-laks.an.am] of myself and the myriad things as they inherently are (本然), it is also called Fundamental Reality. Here, ‘true aspect’ is the same as saying ‘Reality 實體.’ ” Elsewhere he explains that in Buddhist writings the term xing 性 is often used synonymously with the term ti 體 to express the meaning of “absolute truth” (絕對的真理), which in “Oriental philosophy” is expressed using the terms benti 本體, shiti 實體, or the ti 體 of ti-yong 體用. Later in New Treatise, both “mind” (心) and “the nature” (性) also equate with this ontological Reality that thoroughly inheres all phenomena. “The nature is that whereby we as humans live. In relation to the ten thousand existents, it is also nominally termed ‘constant transformation.’ ” One of Xiong’s main characterizations of Reality is as an uninterrupted holistic process of constant transformation. This concept is the subject of chapter 3. Xiong explains that Reality can be apprehended or realized only by seeking within, returning to one’s inherent mind (本心), where Reality, the true principle, can be realized. This realization is wisdom (智 [jñāna]), a concept that is to be distinguished from discernment (慧 [ prajñā]). Although Xiong does not discuss the concept of discernment further in this pithy first chapter, he does so in chapter 8: Discernment is concerned merely with discriminating cognitive objects, and so those who depend on discernment are always attached to things and so lose their innate wisdom (智) and have no means by which to realize truth. Ordinarily the word “truth” refers to: grasping those general principles, laws, 48. New Treatise, vernacular edition, Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 3, p. 20. 49. Xiong, Fojia mingxiang tongshi 佛家名相通釋 (Complete Explanation of Buddhist Terms) (Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1994 [1937]), pp. 45–46. 50. New Treatise, p. 142.

Y6693.indb xxiv

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxv

and so forth that, in the course of investigating things, have suitable applications for us. In the present context, however, “truth” has a particular meaning; this is because it is a word that implicitly refers to Reality. If one can seek within for “the wisdom that is self-nature” and hold fast to it, Here “the wisdom that is self-nature” has the same meaning as “self-nature is awareness,” as spoken of in the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis.” then purity (貞明) will shine everywhere, involving no deliberation. Even if one were once again to follow conventional distinctions, the boundaries would not exist. This is called “when there is the mysterious merging (玄同) with the nature, the myriad things are all in their proper order.” This is the realm of true wisdom, far removed from petty discernment.

Direct awareness of self-nature, being awoken to Reality, is wisdom (智). According to Yogācāra soteriology, it is by transforming the consciousnesses into “direct cognitions” that the eight consciousnesses cease and one attains non-conceptual wisdom (智). When all the seeds in the eighth consciousness are transformed into pure, undefiled seeds, one attains “perfect mirror wisdom” (大圓鏡智; mahādarśa-jñāna) enabling direct, unmediated cognition of things just as they are. Xiong similarly describes wisdom as direct, unmediated cognition of one’s inherent nature that is at the same time Fundamental Reality. Discernment, by contrast, serves only to provide knowledge of the phenomenal world, on the basis of discriminative constructions. Personal experience of Reality entails returning to one’s inherent mind, which is also one’s self-nature. The passage cited above, however, also has clear resonances with “One Mind, two aspects” (一心二門), a key concept in the most influential text of East Asian Buddhism: Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論). Starting from the premise that the One Mind is the ultimate 51. The five sensory consciousnesses are the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile. The sixth or mano-vijñāna (mental consciousness) is the thinking consciousness. It also brings together and differentiates the sensory impressions derived from the five sensory consciousnesses. That is, it can think about what the other five consciousnesses perceive; the five consciousnesses do not have this reflective capacity. The seventh or self-centered consciousness (manas) is the source of self-attachment, and the eighth, or storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), retains the impressions of past experiences and “perfumes” new experiences on the basis of that previous conditioning. 52. He does, however, reject the mirror analogy, as he explains in chapter 2. 53. Dasheng qixin lun is an apocryphal text written in China (late sixth century) but purports to be the work of a well-known second-century Indian scholar-monk named Aśvaghos.a. Traditionally, it was further claimed to have been translated by Paramārtha

Y6693.indb xxv

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xxvi

Translator’s Introduction

source of all phenomena, the scripture proposes that this One Mind has two aspects or “gateways.” The first aspect is characterized by an original, pristine, pure Buddha-nature intrinsic in all things (tathāgatagarbha), the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (dharmakāya; “truth body”; “true body of reality”). The second aspect is characterized as being subject to birth and death. Although this aspect of the One Mind is identified with the eighth or store consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), it is grounded in tathāgatagarbha. Only ignorance prevents us from realizing the fundamental unity of the two aspects of the One Mind. Intriguingly, the mind also plays a similar nodal role in Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s moral psychology, where it has an inner and an outer directionality. It is both the locus of the nature and that in which the emotional responses are rooted: “The mind refers to the combination of the nature and emotional responses. That which is referred to as combining the nature and emotional responses contains the nature and emotional responses. . . . The mind refers to the combination of ti and yong.” “Precisely because the mind is the locus of the nature, it is also the locus of the patterns (理) that constitute the nature. People have but one mind, and all the patterns in the world are assembled therein.” In citing these passages, my intention is not to suggest the influence of Zhu Xi on Xiong (although that (499–569). Although modern scholarship has shown that in language, style, vocabulary, and underlying models it has more in common with writers and translators other than Paramārtha, traditionally it was accepted as his text or as having been written by a member of his school. Dasheng qixin lun quickly struck a chord among East Asian Buddhists who assigned it a central role in their thinking. Today it remains one of the foundational texts in Korea and still strongly influences the thinking of East Asian Buddhists. Dasheng qixin lun proposed a version of Yogācāra blended with tathāgatagarbha (matrix of the buddhas; rulaizang 如來藏) thought that its interpreters took to mean a grounding of all reality in “one mind” that is originally enlightened. The tathāgatagarbha doctrine is the idea that the potentiality for buddhahood exists in all sentient beings but is hidden or obscured because of ignorance. In China it became closely associated with the doctrine of “Buddha-nature.” 54. This is the consciousness that retains the impressions of past experiences and “perfumes” new experiences on the basis of that previous conditioning. 55. Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 (Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu), compiled by Li Jingde 李靖德 (fl. 1263) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 2:475. Cf. 1:91: “The mind contains within itself the nature and the emotional responses. The nature is ti and the emotional responses are yong.” 56. Zhuzi yulei, 2:446.

Y6693.indb xxvi

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxvii

influence is clearly there, as is the influence of a wide range of Song-Ming Neo-Confucian thinkers). Rather, I intend to highlight the profound influence exerted on traditional Chinese thought not simply by the ti-yong polarity but more specifically by the “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm. Xiong was very much an heir to that tradition. The question of whether the mind is quiescent or moving occupied Xiong for much of his life and became a key issue of contention in the series of exchanges with Buddhist scholar and erstwhile fellow student Lü Cheng 呂澂 (1896–1989) in 1943. Throughout most of the 1920s Xiong had upheld the view that the ontological character of the mind was transformation alone. Under the influence of friend and mentor Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883–1967), however, beginning in 1929, Xiong had adopted the view that the mind was characterized simultaneously by transformation (change, activity, movement) and constancy (quiescence; being undisturbed). In this opening chapter of New Treatise, Xiong expresses this view as follows: “This mind does indeed flow incessantly, yet it is also profoundly tranquil and undisturbed. In regard to its incessant flow, it is nominally termed ‘moving.’ In regard to its undisturbed, profound tranquility, it is nominally termed ‘at rest.’ ” He continued to uphold this view until the mid-1950s, when he finally reverted to the view he had originally maintained in the 1920s. It is a view that runs throughout New Treatise.

57. As will become evident, Xiong would have no problem identifying with NeoConfucian Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 (1472–1529) thesis that “mind is not different from principle” (心即理), just as Xiong equally espoused the doctrine that “the nature is not different from principle” (性即理), associated with Neo-Confucians Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033– 1107) and Zhu Xi. 58. Ti and yong are conventionally translated as substance and function, but “substance” is incompatible with the process ontologies of Chinese philosophy more generally. For Xiong, this was a key conceptual pair, as we will see. 59. See Chen-kuo Lin, “The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism: Lü Cheng’s Critique of Original Enlightenment,” in Makeham, Transforming Consciousness. The question of whether the mind is active or quiescent has a long history in Sinitic Buddhism and became a central point of contention, and later accommodation, between faxing and faxiang traditions in the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries. 60. See Li Qingliang 李清良, “Lun Ma Yifu dui Xiong Shili Xin weishi lun zhi yingxiang 論馬一浮對熊十力《新唯識論》之影響” (The Influence of Ma Yifu on Xiong Shili’s Xin weishi lun). Taiwan Dong-Ya wenming yanjiu xuekan 7, no. 1 (2010): 201–232.

Y6693.indb xxvii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xxviii

Translator’s Introduction

2.2 Weishi (唯識) The two main sections that make up this chapter address two respective goals: to refute attachment to external objects and to refute attachment to consciousness. This division parallels yet differs from that in the opening sections of Cheng weishi lun, where it is self (ātman) and dharmas (both mental and “external world” objects) that are refuted. Xiong’s critical analysis focuses almost entirely on the distinction between material dharmas (external objects) and mental dharmas (consciousness—or more specifically, the eight consciousnesses—or the mind and mental associates). From the very opening paragraph he makes it plain that he is critical of what he identifies as a failing in Cheng weishi lun: to have successfully refuted attachment to external objects but at the price of having fallen into the trap of presenting consciousness as a real entity, a cognitive object. In doing so, Xiong also introduces the distinction between true mind and deluded consciousness. Again, this invites parallels with the two aspects of mind distinguished in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. The first of the chapter’s two major sections sets out a series of arguments used by Yogācāra masters to refute attachment to cognitive objects. Here “cognitive objects” refers to material phenomena, objects in the “external” world. Xiong identifies two broad categories of views or “presumptions” (計) used variously by early non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna thinkers to argue for the existence of external objects: those based on utility—the habits formed as a result of the use of things in everyday living—and those based on various Indian theories about atoms. The so-called presumption based on utility supports a belief both in the existence of discrete objects as well as in a life-world separate from our consciousness. The following theses are each briefly introduced: gross material objects exist independent of consciousness; the existence of gross material objects is proven by their integrated characteristics; the whiteness and solidity of a pot are external characteristics; solidity, whiteness, and other char61. For example, when the seventh consciousness takes up a mental image of the eighth consciousness or the inner cognitive objects that the sixth consciousness takes as cognitive objects. On the latter, see the account in chapter 7. 62. That is, the cognitive objects taken up by the first five consciousnesses as well as by the sixth consciousness.

ii

Y6693.indb xxviii

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxix

acteristics have external causes; experience confirms that solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics have external causes; the evidence provided by memory confirms that visual and other consciousnesses have previously sensed external cognitive objects; and the illusory nature of cognitive objects experienced in dreams is confirmed when one is awake, therefore the experience of cognitive objects when awake should be trusted and so external objects exist. Having attributed these views to Hīnayāna and non-Buddhist thinkers, they are then refuted in a dialectical fashion, one after the other. The so-called atomic presumption refers to non-Mahāyāna theories about atoms. These atomic theories are of two broad kinds—those premised on the belief that individual atoms serve as cognitive objects and those premised on the belief that clusters of atoms serve as cognitive objects. In response to each of the atomic theories—attributed variously to the ancient Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas, and the later Sarvāstivādins—Xiong sets out “the Mahāyāna school’s” responses, drawing largely on Yogācāran accounts of the workings of cognition. The ancient Sarvāstivādins represent the theory that there really are numerous atoms, each of which is distinguished to be a real cognitive object, and thus the cognitive objects of visual consciousness, for example, are individual atoms. Pots and so on, by contrast, are constituted through the clustering of many atoms and so have no “reality” (實體 [dravya]). The Yogācāra

63. The Sarvāstivādins were an early Indian Buddhist school of realist philosophy that emerged in the second or first century b.c. and is associated with the view that “everything exists.” See Collette Cox, Disputed Dharmas, Early Buddhist Theories of Existence: An Annotated Translation from San˙ghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra, Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series XI (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995), p. 24. 64. Sautrāntikas means “those who rely upon the sutras” rather than other scriptural or scholastic sources. They espoused a doctrine of extreme momentariness. According to Collette Cox, because there is no evidence of a separate Sautrāntika monastic disciplinary code, “they would appear to represent a particular doctrinal perspective, most likely the same doctrinal party within the Sarvāstivāda school.” See her entry, “Mainstream Buddhist Schools,” in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Buddhism (New York: Thomson Gale, 2004), vol. 2, pp. 501–506. 65. Possibly the term refers to the Vibhās.ā sub-branch of the Sarvāstivādins, in particular to the views expressed in Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra śāstra (阿毘達磨順正理論; Abhidharma According with Reason Treatise), attributed to the fifth-century scholar-monk Sam . ghabhadra.

Y6693.indb xxix

6/30/15 2:55:37 PM

xxx

Translator’s Introduction

refutation is that when consciousness gives rise to cognition on the basis of the mental appropriation of a cognitive object (所緣 [ālambana]), the image of the cognitive object that has been mentally appropriated must necessarily appear in consciousness. Thus, given that there are no images of atoms in the visual or other consciousnesses, atoms are thus not the cognitive objects from which the sensory consciousnesses—the first five consciousnesses— derive mental impressions. In turn, the Sautrāntikas represent the theory that there are actually numerous atoms that aggregate (和合 [samūha]) to constitute cognitive objects. Individual real atoms are not the cognitive objects of the visual and other consciousnesses, because there are no atoms in the visual and other consciousnesses. “If, however, many atoms aggregate to constitute jars and other gross cognitive objects, even though the entity is only nominal, because the images of these cognitive objects are in the visual and other consciousnesses, they are cognitive objects of the visual and other consciousnesses.” The Yogācāran refutation is that all “conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects” (所緣緣 [ālambana-pratyaya]) must have “real existence” if they are able to function as causal conditions leading consciousness forth, but clusters of atoms do not have real existence. Finally, the later Sarvāstivādins represent the theory that collections of numerous atoms, in close proximity to one another and supporting one another, contributes to a large image that in turn constitutes a cognitive object from which mental impressions are derived. For example, numerous blue atoms pool their blue quality to form a visible blue patch. The Yogācāran refutation is that atoms gathered in close proximity to support one another do not lead to the sensory consciousnesses’ mentally appropriating mutually supporting atoms. This is because any such mental appropriation would appear as images of atoms, but we never have the appearance of images of atoms in our cognition. The remaining parts of this chapter introduce Xiong’s views on change (易), his thesis that consciousness and cognitive objects form an indivisible unity, his revisionist interpretation of the concept of weishi 唯識, and his conviction that Indian Mahāyāna masters and Chinese sages or wise men share common insights into Reality. Collectively, these topics function as a transition between his use of Yogācāra theories to critique the view that there are real external objects, to his critique of Cheng weishi lun for effec-

Y6693.indb xxx

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxxi

tively treating consciousness as having real existence (despite Xuanzang’s claims to the contrary) and thus being philosophically just as flawed as the theories proposed to support the thesis that external objects are real, a thesis that the Yogācāra masters had themselves thoroughly criticized. Reiterating his criticisms of those who maintain that objects are separate from consciousness and exist independent of consciousness, he insists that consciousness and the appearance of cognitive objects constitute a single, indivisible whole that cannot be neatly separated into two pieces. “Accordingly, the term weishi 唯識 [serves] to refute only [the presumption of the independent existence of] external objects and does not mean that objects do not exist. Because cognitive objects and consciousness are the same whole and are not separated, hence it is said to be ‘weishi.’ Wei 唯 means ‘unique’ (殊特); it does not mean ‘only/solely.’ ” This is a radical reinterpretation of the term 唯 (mātra) as it occurs in such Sanskrit terms as vijñapti-mātra (唯識: cognition only; nothing but cognition) or citta-mātra (唯心: mind only; nothing but mind). There is no question that in Sanskrit it means “only,” “nothing but,” and not “unique.” Xiong further relates that the meaning of “cognitive objects are not separate from consciousness” was created and elucidated by the Mahāyāna school in India long ago. In China also, former wise men silently intuited its meaning; it is just that they were unwilling to develop this understanding in the form of treatises and discourses. He cites a range of Chinese texts and thinkers to support this claim: Doctrine of the Mean, Mencius, Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1084), Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan) 陸九淵 (象山) (1139–1193), Yang Cihu 楊慈湖 (1140–1225), and Wang Yangming. He concludes: “what Chinese and Indian wise men have realized is identical.” To this he adds

66. Cheng weishi lun specifically objects to the hypostatization of consciousness: “To oppose false attachment to the view that external to the mind and mental associates there are real existent cognitive objects, we say that nothing but consciousness exists. If you are attached to ‘nothing but consciousness’ as something truly existent, that is no different from being attached to external cognitive objects—that is, just another dharma-attachment.” Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA) edition of the Taishō Tripit.aka (Taishō Revised Tripit.aka), T31n1585_p0006c25–26. (All references to the Chinese Buddhist Canon are to the CBETA edition unless otherwise noted.) Xiong, however, directs his criticisms at Cheng weishi lun for treating the eight consciousnesses as discrete entities and also for hypostatizing the doctrine of dependent arising (緣起) into a doctrine of seeds.

Y6693.indb xxxi

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xxxii

Translator’s Introduction

the significant qualification: “Most of the Mahāyāna teachers, however, became narrowly concerned with phenomenal characteristics and their names (名相). Examples such as Weishi ershi lun 唯識二十論 [Vim . śatikā-vr.tti] and other treatises established [the principle] of weishi so as to refute [the existence] of external objects. In doing so they all used formal logic, and although reasoned arguments are repeatedly in evidence, these treatises suffer from an excess of empty theorizing that borders on sophistry. Nearly all Mahāyāna treatises suffer from this problem.” The second of this chapter’s two main sections is devoted to refuting attachment to consciousness (here referring to the eight consciousnesses). Xiong freely acknowledges that former Mahāyāna masters (= Dharmapāla /Xuanzang) had clearly maintained that attachment to the belief that consciousness is real is just as mistaken as the attachment to cognitive objects and had “therefore nominally talked about [consciousness’s] being generated by dependent arising (緣生) so as to show that the characteristics of consciousness are illusory and unreal.” Despite this, Xiong further maintains that Yogācāra philosophy (as principally represented by Cheng weishi lun) hypostatized the doctrine of dependent arising into a doctrine of seeds, which, as Shu-hsien Liu (Liu Shuxian) points out, suggests a structural realism. It also entails various forms of ontological dualism (seeds and consciousness [or so-called manifest activity]; seeds and mind/tathatā [Suchness]; pure and impure seeds) and even ontological pluralism, with seeds posited as the ontological basis of all things. All of these perspectives were antithetical to Xiong’s own ontological monism, which he develops in his theories of ti and yong and contraction (翕) and expansion (闢). For Xiong, consciousness has no self-nature (自性 [svabhāva]); it is generated by dependent arising. The images in consciousness are merely the deceptive manifestation of a multitude of mutually dependent causal conditions. Xiong equates “multitude of conditions” (眾緣) with “causes as condition” (因緣), the first of the Four Conditions (四緣). He develops his critique of the Yogācāra doctrine of seeds in the context of articulat67. Because Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun purportedly draws heavily on this commentary and privileges many of its interpretations, in Xiong’s hands, “Dharmapāla” effectively functions as a metonym for views expressed in Cheng weishi lun. 68. Shu-hsien Liu, “Hsiung Shih-li’s Theory of Causation,” Philosophy East and West 19, no. 4 (1969): 403.

i

Y6693.indb xxxii

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxxiii

ing his own revisionist account of the Four Conditions: causes as condition, continuous sequence of sameness condition (等無間緣), conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects (ālambana condition) (所緣緣), and contributory factors as condition (增上緣). The Four Conditions are crucial to Yogācāra accounts of causality—in particular, in explaining the causal relationship between seeds, consciousness, and cognitive objects. According to Xiong, a key defining characteristic of the standard view of causes as condition is that causes directly accomplish their own effects. Thus the seeds of visual consciousness, functioning as cause, directly bring about their own visual consciousness effects. Much of Xiong’s analysis and discussion is devoted to critiquing the Yogācāra view—or at least the Dharmapāla/ Xuanzang view that seeds (種子) are causes—in particular the idea that seeds are the cause of consciousness. “They presumed that the arising of mind-consciousness (心識) had an origin. Hence they established seeds as causes, and mind-consciousness was posited as the effect that seeds themselves had brought to completion.” For Xuanzang, seeds are a “potentiality that immediately engenders an actual dharma.” Real seeds, as distinct from nominal seeds, can function as causal conditions. This view contrasts with the view upheld in the Abhidharma (ancient scholastic Buddhism) literature, according to which seeds are not real existents with causal power (dravya) but simply metaphors. Thus Xiong remarks: “Conventionally it is presumed that rice and other things all issue from seeds. Now this is also presumed about mental dharmas (心法). Is this not a great mistake?” His point is that rather than treating seeds as a nominal/provisional ( prajñapti) device, an expedient means to refer to something that lacks inherent existence, these Yogācāra teachers had effectively substantialized seeds by attributing causal power to them. For Xiong, consciousness or mind-consciousness is not a product of seeds. It arises as an incessant flow of ever-renewing thoughtmoments; ever-renewing yet self-generating. Xiong also criticizes the view (espoused by Dharmapāla/Xuanzang) that “seeds are simultaneous [with their effects],” that cause and effect are simultaneous: just as manifest activity (the seven consciousnesses) perfumes seeds in the eighth consciousness, these newly perfumed seeds simultaneously generate a new seed of similar kind, engendering new manifest activity. “Thus understood, they classified mind and seeds as the two dharmas x

Y6693.indb xxxiii

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xxxiv

Translator’s Introduction

of subject and object, just like mother and child are two bodies. Are their fallacies not great indeed!” He further faults “former masters” for analyzing mind-consciousness into eight discrete constitutive entities, comparing it to the analysis of material objects into molecules and thus mistakenly comparing mind to matter. The “consistent and continuous condition” concerns the relation between successive manifest activities—successive moments of mind-consciousness— and does not rely directly on seeds to be established. Also, unlike seeds that must be simultaneous with their effects, the immediately preceding condition—a thought-moment of consciousness—is contiguous with, yet sequentially prior to, the following thought-moment of consciousness. This condition provides theoretical support for the key Buddhist concept of impermanence: all dharmas extinguish as soon as they are produced. Xiong presents the “continuous sequence of sameness condition” to be when an immediately preceding instant of consciousness “vacates” and simultaneously “induces” the following moment of consciousness; as the one is extinguished, the other is generated. Again he is critical of the “former Yogācāra masters” on several grounds. Whereas they treated each of the eight consciousnesses as discrete constitutive entities, Xiong champions a single, holistic notion of consciousness. Thus, although the seeing of colors and the hearing of sounds differ, this is a function not of different consciousnesses but rather of the different defining activities (行相)— the definitive activity that something engages in, by which it can be defined—present in one and the same overarching consciousness. “This is not like in the old accounts, according to which the visual and the rest of the eight consciousnesses are each independent entities.” Xiong further explains that because innumerable defining activities can all be accommodated and arise in consciousness, this is termed “continuous.” “This is a completely different sense of wu jian (無間) from that [proposed] by the former [masters].” An ālambana (所緣) is the mental appropriation of a cognitive (or sense) object (vis.aya; 境; 境界). Once taken up it forms a mental image (ākāra; 相) in the mind that resembles (sādr.śya; 似) the vis.aya. The “ālambana condition” refers to the condition enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects. Clearly based on the definition of “ālambana condition” given in Cheng v

Y6693.indb xxxiv

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxxv

weishi lun, Xiong identifies four component senses of the ālambana condition. (1) It is a cognitive object that has real existence and leads a particular consciousness (visual, auditory, and so forth) to arise simultaneously with it. (2) The cognizing consciousness is causally dependent on it. “Consciousness does not arise by itself since it necessarily depends upon cognitive objects. The [sensory] consciousnesses depend solely on sense objects (塵 [vis.aya]), whereas the sixth consciousness depends upon reflected images (影 [ pratibimba]). There must be that upon which they depend for it to constitute an [ālambana] condition.” (3) The cognitive object is closely borne by the cognizing consciousness such that this cognizing consciousness joins itself to the cognitive object to be a whole. For example, the cognizing capacity of the visual consciousness—seeing—combines with the cognitive object “white” to be inseparable. (4) It is that which is cognized by consciousness. If, to be an ālambana, a real dharma had only to be causally depended upon and to convey its own image, then even the reflections one sees in mirrors would qualify as doing the job of an ālambana, because the external thing is a real dharma (and thus is causally depended upon), and because when it functions so as to appear in the mirror, that is also taking the external thing as what it is causally dependent on and as conveying its image. Thus this fourth condition is necessary: consciousness must cognize; mirrors cannot cognize. Xiong’s account is generally in line with that in Cheng weishi lun; where he parts company is on the issue of “direct and remote” ālambana conditions, which he faults for being derived from the doctrine that each of the eight consciousnesses is a discrete entity. “The objects grasped by consciousness do not exist independent of consciousness, but it should be agreed that the

69. In his 1923 work, Weishixue gailun, Xiong defines the ālambana condition by citing the following line in Cheng weishi lun, which, based on Xiong’s understanding, might be translated as follows: “The third [condition] is the ālambana condition. This means it is an existent dharma and it conveys an image of itself that is the cognitive concern of the mind or mental associates and is what [cognition] depends upon. Such real [dharmas] are of two kinds: direct and remote” (三所緣緣。謂若有法是帶己相心或相應所慮所託。此體有 二。一親二疏). See Xiong Shili, Weishixue gailun, in Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 1, p. 103. 70. Xiong had in fact made this argument already in his 1923 work, Weishixue gailun. See John Makeham, “The Significance of Xiong Shili’s Interpretation of Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīks.ā,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 40:S, (2013): 205–225.

Y6693.indb xxxv

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xxxvi

Translator’s Introduction

relationship of objects to consciousness is that they function as ālambana conditions. What need is there to draw the further distinction of direct and remote? However, because this doctrine of the former masters maintains that the eight consciousnesses are each discrete entities, direct and remote were thus distinguished.” Xiong identifies the direct condition to be linked to what he considers the conceptually mistaken notion that there are individual consciousnesses (visual, auditory, and so forth), and the equally mistaken notion that these consciousnesses can, in turn, be bifurcated into an image part and a perceiving part. Xiong distinguishes two meanings for the category of “contributory factors as condition.” The first is when one particular dharma relies on another particular dharma for its continuing existence, however directly or indirectly. This condition has obvious resonances with the doctrine of dependent arising (緣起; pratītya-samutpāda). The second is when such a condition is compatible with or antagonistic toward other dharmas. For example, in relation to withered grain, frost and snow are compatible conditions; in relation to the former green-colored grain, they are antagonistic conditions. This is the one category of conditions where Xiong does not pass any sort of criticism. Having thus outlined his views on the Four Conditions, Xiong next asserts that mind-consciousness is merely an illusory manifestation; being a product of dependent arising, it lacks self-nature. Elsewhere he reveals his real target: “Vasubandhu and Asan˙ga gradually changed the meaning of what previous Buddhists had referred to as dependent arising. It seems that they looked upon each of the many conditions as single parts and thereupon began to construct [their notion of consciousness (心)] by regarding it as the aggregation of many conditions. In this way, they changed the doctrine of dependent arising into a kind of structuralism (構造論).” For Xiong, just as atomism is logically indefensible, so too is the idea that reality is constructed out of aggregations of atomic-like seeds. 71. Xiong, New Treatise, p. 34: “Visual consciousness’s direct ālambana condition (親 所緣緣) is its own transformation (所變) into ‘the image part of consciousness’ (相分). Its ‘remote ālambana condition’ (疏所緣緣) is the eighth consciousness’s ‘image part of consciousness’ (相分).” 72. Dependent arising is the doctrine that everything arises from conditions and has no inherent self-nature.

i

Y6693.indb xxxvi

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxxvii

Next he relates that the theory of dependent arising is an “apophatic mode of explanation” (遮詮) that provides an expedient means (方便 [upāya]) for dispelling attachment to the view that consciousness has selfnature: Since ancient times there have been many who have written on fundamental wisdom. The most sublime exponents of the apophatic mode of explanation are certainly the Buddhists, with the Emptiness Schools (空宗) being especially skilled. Only this school commanded a fully penetrating insight into principles and so their theses encountered no obstacles. With the arrival of the Existence School (有宗), only then did [Buddhists] begin to turn their back on the apophatic mode of explanation, instead advocating the manifestation of [Fundamental] Reality through function (即用顯體).

For Xiong, there is nothing in ontological Reality that can be established, so the proposition that it can be established through function is meaningless. “As a word, ‘function’ refers to the flow of Reality and describes the expression of Reality. In this expression there is no thing, and in this flow there is no abiding. Accordingly, it is not possible for there to be anything established in function.” His position can be seen to be consistent with the views expressed in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith in that the latter does not present the phenomenal world as ontologically distinct from the allpervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (dharmakāya). Rather, it posits ignorance as hindering us from realizing that the phenomenal world lacks independent existence, self-nature, reality. He asserts that Vasubandhu had privileged consciousness’s capacity to transform into a perceiving part and an image part, and this was termed “function” relative to “Suchness” (眞如 [tathatā]), which does not transform; that Vasubandhu posited consciousness as really existing in function; that Vasubandhu and Kuiji deemed seeds to be the Reality (體) of manifestly activated consciousness; and that function had self-nature (自體). “What Vasubandhu and the others referred to as manifestly activated consciousness and its seeds are dharmas that arise and cease, are ‘dharmas [that are generated by consciousness’s] capacity to transform,’ and are function. Suchness, however, is a dharma that does not arise and cease; a dharma that does 73. Argument developed on the basis of what may not be said of something; via negativa. 74. The Yogācāra school.

x

Y6693.indb xxxvii

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xxxviii

Translator’s Introduction

not transform. It is Reality. It is patently evident that they regarded Reality and function as two parts.”

2.3 Transformation (轉變) Here Xiong sets out his account of transformation (轉變 [ parin.āma]), the transformation of consciousness being a key concept in Yogācāra cognitive epistemology and soteriology. To establish his positive thesis, Xiong takes critical aim at the account of transformation presented in Cheng weishi lun, according to which consciousness—the mind—is bifurcated into two modes: consciousness-as-transformer (能變)—the capacity of consciousness to transform into a perceiving part and image part—and what consciousness becomes, what it transforms into (所變): the perceiving part and the image part. Cheng weishi lun presents all experience as contained within the transformations of consciousness. Consciousness’s transformations into a perceiving part (subject) and an image part (object) characterize a range of cognitive activities, including each of the eight consciousnesses. Karmic “seeds” (bīja) or potentials emerge from the eighth or store consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), giving rise to the “manifest activity” of the seven consciousnesses and causing or “perfuming” future seeds. As described by Tagawa Shun’ei: “The seeds stored in the ālaya-vijñāna function to generate manifest activities. From this perspective, the causes are the seeds. Then, the manifest activities that were generated by the seeds immediately perfume impression-momentum seeds in the ālaya-vijñāna, and in this way those manifest activities are the direct causes of those seeds. Thus there are two kinds of direct causes: seeds as direct cause and manifest activity as direct cause.” Xiong’s own account of transformation is presented as a direct challenge to, and radical departure from, the seeds-based causal theory found in Cheng weishi lun. Xiong seeks to develop and defend an ontological account of transformation in which Reality (實體; 本體 [tattva]) is presented as nothing other than an uninterrupted holistic process of constant transformation that cannot be reduced to subject-object characteristics. Doctrin75. Tagawa Shun’ei, Living Yogācāra: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism, trans. A. Charles Muller (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009), p. 50.

iii

Y6693.indb xxxviii

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xxxix

ally, it is consistent with such basic Mahāyāna teachings of emptiness (空; śūnyatā) and dependent arising, and its critical edge is closely and explicitly informed by standard Madhyamaka deconstructive ploys. To this are wedded concepts taken from the Book of Change, adapted here to characterize the inherent processual qualities of transformation. Xiong begins by asking two questions: What is able to transform? What is transformation? His reply to the first question is, “The universe has only ever been this constantly renewing transformation—how could it be possible for there ever to have been something into which it is transformed?” His reply to the second question is: “One contraction (翕) and one expansion (闢) is called transformation.” For Xiong, contraction is the basis for nominally (假; prajñapti) talking about material dharmas (色法), and expansion is the basis for nominally talking about mental dharmas (心法). Material dharmas are associated with the contracting tendency of constant transformation; mental dharmas are associated with the expanding tendency of constant transformation. For Xiong, however, the claim that there are real material objects and real minds is a misguided conceptual elaboration. Material and mental dharmas are devoid of self-nature. The various dharmas extinguish at the very moment of their generation. There is only instant upon instant of separate, sudden ceaseless flow that merely seems to be continuous. 76. The locus classicus of xi 翕 and pi 闢 is “Appended Statements, A” (“Xici, shang” 繫 辭上), Zhou Yi 周易 (Book of Change), 7.15a, Shisan jing zhushu 十三經注疏 (The Thirteen Classics with annotations and sub-commentaries) ed., compiled by Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764–1849) (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1985). Closer to Xiong’s own time, in the preface to his 1898 translation of T. H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics (1893), Yan Fu 嚴復 (1853–1921) had described xi and pi in similar terms. Yan was a pioneering figure at the turn of the twentieth century in translating many key Western writings in sociology, logic, and evolutionary theory. His translations had an enormous impact. See Yan Fu (trans.), Tian yan lun 天演論 (Evolution and Ethics) in Yan Fu heji 嚴復合集 (Combined Writings of Yan Fu), ed. Wang Qingcheng 王慶成 (Taipei: Caituan faren Gu Gongliang wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人辜公 亮文教基金會, 1998), vol. 7, p. 186. Similarly, Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919), “Zhelixue shi xu 哲理學史序” (Prolegomena to a History of Philosophy), Guocui xuebao 國粹學報, 3 (1905): 4a, 4b, states: “Only the great Book of Change and Doctrine of the Mean develop and illuminate the [Aristotelian] concepts of actuality (效實) and potentiality (儲能),” concepts he identifies with quiescence (翕) and activity (闢) of the Book of Change, and wei fa 未發 (not yet emerged into concrete manifestation) and zhong jie 中節 (emerged to be in a state of due modulation) of Zhongyong. He concludes: “Chinese philosophy has relied exclusively on these texts for its survival.”

x

Y6693.indb xxxix

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xl

Translator’s Introduction

Rather, the Reality of material and mental dharmas is “constant transformation” (恆轉). It should be noted that Xiong has a particular understanding of dharmas; for him they are phenomena (物; 事物)—mental and physical phenomena. Drawing on the Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses (大乘莊嚴經論; Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra), Xiong adduces an extended series of nine arguments (which I will not rehearse here) to support the thesis that no dharmas are able to abide even temporarily. Each argument takes the general form of Xiong’s refutation of an attempt to establish the claim that dharmas can be abiding and Xiong’s consistent appeal to the doctrine of sudden and continuous generation and extinction of all dharmas. Although not explicitly stated, Xiong would appear to be imputing to Xuanzang the view that dharmas can somehow abide temporarily. As Tao Jiang argues, Xuanzang had done away with the instantaneous nature of a movement—and hence dealt with the problem of continuity (“Is it possible to account for continuity without positing some persisting entity?”)—by recognizing a structure of past, present, and future within each moment that manifests itself in the semblance of the past and the future. “In other words, a moment is itself conceived as a continuum that is a horizon containing what immediately proceeds and immediately follows instead of a discrete instant.” Xiong then proceeds to develop his own account of “transformation,” characterizing it as having three meanings: (1) It does not mean “movement” (動) in the conventional sense: something proceeding from one locus to another locus. Rather, there is only instant upon instant of separate, sudden ceaseless movement that seems to be continuous. (2) It means “active” (活): “ ‘Active’ is a term used merely to forestall any notion of emptiness—it does not positively express some particular thing. . . . In general terms, . . . ‘active’ [means] ‘having no creator’ (作者).” He further characterizes “active” 77. In Abhidharma teachings (ancient scholastic Buddhism), dharmas are real and do not pass away; the composite things they constitute change from moment to moment, but dharmas remain. Madhyamaka theory construes dharmas as impermanent and dependently arisen. Xiong is clearly following this latter understanding. 78. Attributed to Asan˙ga; one of the treatises on which the Cheng weishi lun is purportedly based. 79. Tao Jiang, Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), pp. 77, 33.

Y6693.indb xl

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xli

as “illusory,” “real,” “perfect,” “intermeshed everywhere,” and “limitless.” (3) It means “cannot be conceptualized.” In addition to drawing comparisons with Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) understanding of movement and Zhuangzi’s “Discourse on Making All Things Equal” (齊物論), Xiong also draws variously from Madhyamaka and Huayan philosophical perspectives, again underscoring the vital presence of Mahāyāna thought in his systematic philosophy. The concluding section of this chapter begins with a discussion of Dignāga’s three parts theory of consciousness: the image part (相分), the perceiving part (見分), and the self-verifying part (自證分). Xiong relates that when Dharmapāla discussed epistemology (量), he established four parts, but when he discussed transformation, he still employed Dignāga’s three parts. The significance of the three parts theory is that it relates to Xuanzang’s opening comments in Cheng weishi lun (apparently following the lead of Dharmapāla) to the effect that self and the external world are to be explained by the transformation of consciousness. According to Cheng weishi lun, the transformation of consciousness is the result of being bifurcated into an image part and a perceiving part: “Transformation [of consciousness] refers to consciousness itself turning to appear as two parts. This is because both parts, the image part and the perceiving part, arise due to the self-verifying part of consciousness. Self and dharmas are posited on the basis of these two parts.” Drawing on the scholarship of Katsumata Shunkyō 勝又俊教, Tao Jiang points out that this was a departure from the original verse seventeen of Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses, and by adopting Dharmapāla’s explanation, Xuanzang was able to interpret the verse as stating that “the transformation of consciousness is the result of its being bifurcated into the discriminating and the discriminated. Because neither of the two exists outside consciousness, there can be nothing but consciousness.” Xiong notes that when Dharmapāla (presumably channeled by Xuanzang) discussed transformation, he broke it down into two types: seeds functioning 80. Henri Bergson was an influential French philosopher noted for his process philosophy and views on such concepts as duration, intuition, and vital impulse (élan vital). 81. This self-verifying or self-corroborating part is seen to be theoretically required because every moment of consciousness needs to be aware of itself if memory is to be possible; otherwise, there would be just an array of unconnected moments. 82. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0001b01–02. 83. Tao Jiang, Contexts and Dialogue, p. 52.

Y6693.indb xli

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xlii

Translator’s Introduction

as causes capable of bringing about transformation (因能變) in consciousness, and manifestly activated consciousness itself (現體)—the self-verifying aspect of all minds and mental associates (心所; caitta)—functioning as transforming effects (果能變). Xiong explains that “manifestly activated consciousness itself ” is a general reference to the self-verifying aspects of all minds and mental associates. Because each and every self-verifying part is, in turn, able to transform and be manifest as a perceiving part and an image part, these parts are referred to as “transforming effects.” The perceiving part and the image part represent what consciousness becomes, what it transforms into (所變). The reason the perceiving part and the image part together represent what consciousness transforms into is that both are needed for perception to occur. Consciousness-as-transformer (能變)—the capacity of consciousness to transform into a perceiving part and image part—provides the raw material one re-presents to oneself as what consciousness transforms into. Central to Xiong’s objections is this bifurcation of consciousness: “In regard to transforming effects, he held that seeds as transformer are manifest as that which is transformed. In sum, subject (能) and object (所) are each made separate. This is just like taking something that is already whole and then breaking it into fragments. How could this possibly explain what transformation is?”

2.4 Productive Power (功能) Xiong’s stated aim in this chapter is to set out three main differences between his understanding of productive power [śakti] and that of Dharmapāla. 84. Caitta means “belonging to thought.” These “mental associates” are analyzed at length in the last chapter of the New Treatise. 85. Lambert Schmithausen, On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng weishi lun (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2005), p. 13, notes that in Vasubandhu’s works the term bian 變 “is used as an action noun describing a process taking place in the continuum (sam . tāna, sam . tati) of a person or in the consciousness continuum or its latent stratum. . . . In [Cheng weishi lun], however, it refers to a detemporalized ‘transformation’ or ‘development,’ from the outset, into an image (相) of an object cognized (or into a duality of image 相 and vision 見 . . .). This image (or duality of image and vision) is called 識所變 (‘what vijñāna [consciousness] has changed, or developed, into,’ which is equivalent to a passive expression of ‘developed by vijñāna’) or, by way of ellipsis of 識, simply 所變.”

Y6693.indb xlii

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xliii

The first of these differences concerns the concept of “productive power.” Whereas for Dharmapāla productive power is synonymous with seeds, for Xiong productive power is a further characterization of Reality (albeit like all verbal characterizations it is employed nominally, as a skillful/expedient means). Xiong continues his criticism of Dharmapāla for assuming that the basis of the phenomenal world—“the realm of manifest activity” (現行界), the world created by consciousness—is constituted by hidden productive powers called causes as conditions or seeds. Adopting a Prajñāpāramitālike perspective, on which he elaborates more fully in the conclusion to this chapter, Xiong affirms his commitment to the view that the phenomenal world is inherently empty, having no self-nature, and that only by understanding this can Fundamental Reality be truly realized: “the characteristics of the phenomenal world have always been devoid of self-nature, and so one should not engage in conceptualizing the phenomenal world. Rather, what is manifest before one is nothing other than the presentation of Reality (真體).” Again, it may be noted that Xiong’s position is consistent with the notion of Suchness privileged in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith: a metaphysical locus upon which everything is ontologically grounded. The second of the main differences identified by Xiong between his understanding of productive power (功能) and that of Dharmapāla is that for Xiong, productive power is the totality of all things, whereas for Dharmapāla it is individuated: “Taking productive power to be the causal condition for the phenomenal world Dharmapāla divided the phenomenal world into numerous discrete entities.” Xiong is further critical of Dharmapāla for adopting seeds as a metaphor of productive power, as this reinforced the impression that seeds were real entities, and for adopting a view of seeds that aligned Dharmapāla with the views of the proponents both of atoms and of the ātman, as well as proponents of a mechanistic theory of the universe. The third main difference, according to Xiong, is Dharmapāla’s conflation of habituated tendencies with productive power by treating habituated tendencies as seeds. Habituated tendencies are the karmic residue of past actions: “It is like when burnt incense has extinguished and there still remains a lingering smell.” As Xiong explains, there are said to be two types of seeds: those which have always existed and are already stored in the ālaya consciousness when a sentient being is born and which give rise to the “manifest activity” of the seven consciousnesses, and seeds which begin to arise: “this is

Y6693.indb xliii

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xliv

Translator’s Introduction

due to the [first] seven consciousnesses’ perpetual perfuming of habituated tendencies (習氣),” thus causing future seeds. Dharmapāla’s “fundamental error” lay in “his conflation of habituated tendencies with productive power, thus leading him to say that in addition to productive power that has existed without a beginning, there is productive power that begins to arise.” Xiong instead proposes using the concepts of heaven (天) and humans (人)—in particular their association with what is ontological/ultimate and phenomenal/conventional—to understand the relationship between productive power and form-and-vital-stuff. “Productive power is a heavenly matter; habituated tendencies are a human capacity. To mix up the human with the heavenly is to be obscured by form-and-vital-stuff and be ignorant of the original condition of human life.” Xiong’s “concept matching” does not stop there—he further suggests that the relationship can be understood in terms of li 理 and qi 氣: “As for productive power, it is that by which form-and-vital-stuff is constituted and is the controller of form-and-vitalstuff. Thus its wondrousness (靈妙) can be described as god-like, and the norms it provides as it issues forth are also called principles (理).” The vexed issue of the relationship between li and qi was central to NeoConfucian metaphysics, due in large part to an obfuscation between the goal of giving li a logical priority over qi (so that there would be a “pattern/norm” for a given thing to conform to and hence exist) and the actual ontological and temporal privileging of li over qi. Although Xiong avoids the trap of granting Suchness/Reality/productive power a temporal precedence over the phenomenal world, the question of any ontological privileging of the former over the latter is more complex, as we will see. Later in this chapter he identifies li with the nature (性): “principle’s enabling the psycho-physical to coalesce is called the nature, Here the word “principle” implicitly refers to Fundamental Reality. and so one cannot talk of the nature independent of the psycho-physical. . . . The moral nature and the psycho-physical nature do not exist as two. . . . The nature includes vital stuff within it such that it is all pervasive; they cannot be separated into two.” Xiong then sets out three main differences between productive power and habituated tendencies, the first of which is that whereas productive power is dynamic, habituated tendencies are of fixed form. Significantly, productive power is also equivalent to “the nature” (性). The second difference is that whereas productive power is pure and undefiled, there are both pure

Y6693.indb xliv

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xlv

and defiled habituated tendencies, and because Dharmapāla had used the notion of “productive power” (seeds) to refer to both, Xiong argues that this committed Dharmapāla to the view that evil is grounded in human nature. Variations of this charge date to the Tang dynasty, when one of the main criticisms of Yogācāra was that a person’s potential for awakening was said to be determined by the good seeds already in one’s consciousness stream. This meant that one particular class of humans, the icchantika, deemed to lack any pure seeds whatsoever, was inherently incapable of enlightenment. This did not sit well with the traditional Mencian view of human nature and the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, also known as the doctrine of buddha-nature ( foxing 佛性), which had become popular in China from the sixth century, and according to which everyone has the potential for enlightenment. The third difference between productive power and habituated tendencies is that whereas productive power is continuous, habituated tendencies can be severed. Xiong uses this distinction to develop a much broader discussion of eternalism (常見) and nihilism (斷見), which, in this chapter’s conclusion, provides a basis for his understanding of the doctrine of the Two Truths and how this doctrine relates to his main philosophical goal: to elucidate Fundamental Reality. Eternalism usually refers to the view that the self exists in life and persists after death, and nihilism to the view that sentient beings cease when they die. In turn, the Middle Path—based on the doctrine of dependent arising— avoids these extreme views by claiming there is no independently existing entity with self-nature to exist eternally or to be annihilated in the first place. Xiong, however, uses the concepts of externalism and nihilism to highlight his own understanding of the relationship between Fundamental Reality (productive power, Original Nature, and so forth) and the form-and-vitalstuff (the body; the physical forms of the myriad things), echoing his previous discussion of li and qi. “Regarding the myriad forms, they are certainly each different; regarding the nature, it is the Reality of the myriad things, operating everywhere. . . . By virtue of the nature’s coalescing as bodily form and thereby controlling and being active within bodily form, bodily form is actually constantly being born anew, never ceasing for a moment.” Thus, on the one hand, nihilism is challenged by appealing to the nature/Reality— which is never ceasing—and eternalism is challenged by appealing to bodily form, which, by virtue of constantly being born anew, is not eternal.

Y6693.indb xlv

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

xlvi

Translator’s Introduction

What, then, of the phenomenal world? Although the phenomenal appearances of arising and ceasing, change and movement, never stop for a moment, they are not real and do not abide even momentarily. They are what they are because of what we mistakenly impute to them through deluded attachment. What Xiong is at pains to draw our attention to is that there is no dharma of change to be apprehended in the first place: Those who conventionally talk about change probably maintain that when things encounter differing conditions, they undergo certain transformations, and this is called change. Because they do not understand the import of never abiding for an instant, they actually regard change as an actual object undergoing transformation. This is not the case. As for what are conventionally presumed to be real objects, careful examination reveals that there never were things; there were only illusory images, renewed instant by instant and none abiding even temporarily. This is called change. Hence what is conventionally presumed to be a changing world of things and events is in fact unobtainable.

This, in turn, provides the key to interpreting a series of paradoxes and seeming contradictions: arising is non-arising because arising does not exist; ceasing is non-ceasing because ceasing does not rest; change is nonchanging because change is always constant; and movement is non-moving because movement does not shift. “Non-arising,” “non-ceasing,” “nonchanging,” and “non-moving” are all references to inherent nature, to Fundamental Reality. Arising, ceasing, change, and movement are references to phenomenal appearances. That which ontologically underpins non-existent phenomenal arising is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-arising. That which ontologically underpins phenomenal ceasing is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-ceasing. That which ontologically underpins phenomenal change is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-changing. And that which ontologically underpins phenomenal movement is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-moving. “From talking about arising without yet understanding that arising is non-arising, right through to talking about moving without yet understanding that moving is non-moving—this is to be attached to things. From talk86. Ceasing does not cease because there is nothing to cease since nothing arose in the first place.

Y6693.indb xlvi

6/30/15 2:55:38 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xlvii

ing about non-arising without yet understanding the arising of non-arising, right through to talking about moving without yet understanding the moving of non-moving—this is to be mired in emptiness.” Being attached to things is caused by a failure to understand that phenomenal appearances have no self-nature, by looking no further than conventional truth. “It is due to following conventional truth that the mundane world is accepted as proven. Earth is nothing but earth, water is nothing but water, right through to the myriad existents—all are differentiated and understood on the basis of specific and general attributes and do not run counter to the mundane world’s [conventional truth]. Because absolute truth is experienced, however, there is a categorical refutation of conventional knowing. Hence, earth is not thought of as earth, because earth’s nature is empty. What is manifest before one is Reality (真體), perfectly clear.” Despite this, Xiong still insists that phenomenal appearances—the world established by conventional truth—are, in fact, nothing other than Suchness (真 [tathatā]). “Reality cannot be sought independent of phenomena. The Ruler (真宰) is to be discerned among the flow [of phenomena].” Here Xiong might seem to affirm the Madhyamaka thesis that absolute and conventional truth are ultimately identical. However, whereas a thoroughgoing Madhyamaka perspective would insist that emptiness is itself empty—that is, that emptiness is also conditional because it depends on a network of conditions and has no self-nature—Xiong effectively posits Fundamental Reality/Suchness/inherent nature/the Absolute as the locus in which phenomenal/conventional reality is ontologically grounded.

2.5 Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上) This very short chapter returns to the topic of material dharmas—physical phenomena—and aims to provide an explanation for conventional accounts about the material world. At the heart of conventional accounts, we are told, is the view that physical phenomena offer physical resistance. Contrary to the conventional view, because of the nature of constant transformation, phenomena in fact offer no resistance. Resistance is nothing other than the illusory semblance of movement: matter moving through space. As the process of transformation coheres (攝聚), there is apparent contraction: “Contraction (翕) is the illusory construction of countless moving points.” As

Y6693.indb xlvii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

xlviii

Translator’s Introduction

stated in chapter 3: “Constantly coalescing, and so without any prearranged agreement, countless points of movement are illusorily constituted, the tendency of which seems to be toward solidifying—this is called ‘contraction.’ ” These moving points—analogous to atoms—appear to have material form but do not. The formation of these illusory moving points is attributed to differences of yin and yang (although he does not explain just what the ontological status of yin and yang is). In turn, as (illusory) moving points attract and repel one another, they variously combine to form different systems. The mutual attraction between two or more systems gives rise to the illusion of physical objects such as desks and human bodies. “The characteristics of things are but movement, and just as things are tending to contraction, they appear to offer resistance, yet actually offer no resistance. Hence it is said that the Reality of material forms is constant transformation.” The chapter concludes with a note on two Indian views on how the world came about. The Sām . khya transformation thesis is faulted for positing a notion of an external god, and the Vaiśes.ika theory of atomic clustering (集聚) is criticized for its materialist, mechanical view of the universe.

2.6 Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下) This short chapter is also devoted to the topic of physical phenomena, including the body. Xiong’s regular refrain throughout this chapter is that despite the appearance of a world constituted of separate, individual phenomena, in fact all things are interconnected and interpenetrating, forming a whole. The first part of the chapter addresses physical phenomena generally. Contrary to the conventional view, phenomena in the natural world do not abide or endure through time. This is because both phenomenal entities and time lack self-nature and so are not real. The natural world is nothing but countless moving points, illusorily manifested as semblances of coalesced matter. These moving points cease as soon as they arise. Xiong explains that the idea there is a brief interval between each instant of arising and instant ceasing is mistaken because the term “instant” does not refer to 87. A non-Buddhist Indian school that was active in debates with Yogācāras up to the seventh century.

i

Y6693.indb xlviii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

xlix

time in the conventional sense but rather is nominally posited. Similarly, the terms “preceding” and “following” used in reference to this process are also posited only nominally. “To speak of the ceasing of a preceding instant serves to highlight that it is not eternal. To speak of the arising of the following instant serves to refute attachment to nihilism.” The second part of the chapter first focuses on the body as interpenetrating the whole that is the natural world and vice versa, before Xiong moves to declare that the body and physical things have always been devoid of reality. Rather, both the body and the natural world are epiphenomena of “constant transformation,” illusorily generated through contraction (翕). The chapter concludes with some brief comments on the central nervous system.

2.7 Explaining the Mind, A (明心上) This is the first of two long chapters. The content of this first chapter is an extended, concatenated description of the concept and characteristics of mind. The chapter also reiterates a theme found throughout New Treatise: movement and stillness. Here Xiong variously describes constant transformation as absolutely still yet moving, and as having a constant nature that cannot be altered yet is incessantly transforming; being activated, it gives rise to myriad beginnings yet itself remains ever still. Similarly, the mind is said both to move and to be quiescent; both to issue forth and to be restrained; both to transform and to be constant; and both to move and to be stationary. Mind and constant transformation are both references to Fundamental Reality. Xiong returns to the concepts of contraction (翕) and expansion (闢) to elucidate mind and its relation to Reality. Mind, just like physical phenomena, does not have real existence—it is devoid of its own individuated selfnature. There is, however, a self-nature or Reality that makes mind possible. This self-nature or Reality of mind is called constant transformation. In relation to contraction, constant transformation is expansion, and in relation to things, it is mind: “mind and expansion are different in name but the same actuality.” Equally, however, the relative contrast of mind and things is merely constant transformation’s illusory manifestation of both contraction and expansion. In this sense, Xiong further insists, as the expression of the power of constant transformation’s self-nature, mind is not different from constant

Y6693.indb xlix

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

l

Translator’s Introduction

transformation and so is not different from Reality. “It is not the case that the mind is identical to Fundamental Reality (心非即本體也). Nevertheless, because the mind definitely is not transformed by things, therefore it may also be said that the mind is not different from Fundamental Reality (心即本體耳).” The implicit premise here is that Reality and mind stand in a relationship of ti and yong. Mind is yong, function, and thus is not ti; yet equally ti and yong are two sides of the same coin. This also helps to clarify Xiong’s statement that “the Reality (實性) of mind is not different from constant transformation—mind does not have a real self-nature within itself.” Mind is also transcendent: “this mind has no ‘you’ or ‘me,’ is not constrained by time or space, is an undifferentiated [whole] without duality and distinctions, and is inexhaustible and without end. . . . The mind of a single person or a single thing is the mind of heaven and earth and the myriad things. This is not something that physical substance can separate, and so they are thoroughly interconnected.” In providing this description, Xiong explicitly refers to the Huayan 華嚴 themes of “the mutual identity of one and many” and “[all things] are endlessly interdependent.” Mind is not, however, simply an undifferentiated flow—it controls as it flows, and that is why mind controls the body. Xiong refers to this as “life” (生命). This is what accounts for individual entities that are the transformed manifestation of Fundamental Reality. Although human nature innately possesses life, this life extends throughout the universe and is not impeded by the physical body. “Our life and the universe, from beginning to end, are not two entities.” Despite this, humans are subject to afflictions that take the form of habituated tendencies (習氣). Afflictions are defiled mental associates, the main topic of chapter 8. Afflictions are said to “arrive without being caused” and to be “without root.” It is thus incumbent upon us as humans to “[seek] within for the remnant sprouts of the inherently existing life force; that is, the incipient manifestation of the inherent mind. It is like what Mencius called ‘[the restorative] night air’s being [enough] to preserve [the vegetation on Ox Mountain].’ ” And although cognitive activity is not the mind, if we preserve and do not let go of our inherent mind, then cognitive activity with be nothing other than the expression of the mind. “Bodhidharma said, ‘It is in activity that [buddha-]nature is seen.’ ” After providing a substantially orthodox Yogācāran summary description of the eight consciousnesses, Xiong returns to his earlier critiques of certain

Y6693.indb l

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

li

“Mahāyāna masters” for dividing the one mind into eight discrete entities and for positing seeds as causal conditions (因緣). He begins with the account of seeds in Asan˙ga’s Mahāyānasam . graha-śāstra 攝大乘論 (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) and Vasubandhu’s commentary on the idea that each seed produces its own fruits or effects. Xiong’s critique is twofold: first, he objects to the idea that each of the eight differentiated clusters of seeds is able to generate mind or consciousness and mental associates, and second, he is opposed to the mechanistic clustering of seeds, mind, and mental associates: “Asan˙ga and Vasubandhu through to Dharmapāla, Xuanzang, and Kuiji all maintained this, and none of them altered this view at all. This is indeed an extreme pluralism (多元論), or alternatively it could be called a theory of clustering (集聚論) or mechanistic theory (機械論).” Xiong further compares it to the type of atomic clustering propounded by the nonBuddhist Vaiśes.ika (勝論) school. He also objects to the techniques of “breaking down” (分析): “When they broke-down mind-consciousness, the contents were extremely fragmented, in order to accommodate multiple seeds. It is just as if a material object was analyzed into atoms, molecules, right down to electrons.” The idea here is that consciousness was broken down into eight clusters, and these clusters were in turn attributed to seeds. He extends his criticism of the techniques of “breaking down” to the analytic methods used in science and philosophy. Xiong instead champions a monism, stating that learning concerned with fundamental wisdom (玄學) strives to apprehend That Which Holds All (總持 [dhāran.ī]): Fundamental Reality, original mind, or what Chan monks referred to as “one’s own lot” (本分事). This monism is non-reductionist in that it is not reducible to a single characteristic: “Although it has always been absolutely nothing, it is not nothing; although it gives rise to the myriad existents, it does not exist. Hence, dispel both existence and nonexistence; sever names and images at the ford of constant stillness. Roll up or release at will; cease verbal distinction-making [upon the realization of that which lies] beyond snares and traps.” The snares and traps are an allusion to the fish-trap and the rabbit-snare allegory in Zhuangzi. Just as snares and traps are used to catch game, once the game has been caught, one no longer needs 88. This clustering of concepts seems to be of Xiong’s own making; there is no particular textual source he is drawing on.

Y6693.indb li

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lii

Translator’s Introduction

the snares and traps; so too with words and what words refer to. To able to understand this Reality—which Xiong also variously refers to as the First Thing, and absolute principle—it must be personally realized, personally experienced. Having criticized Dharmapāla for choosing to adopt the method of “breaking down” over the method of “understanding through personal experience” (體認) or inner realization (內證), Xiong next identifies Vasubandhu as marking the actual beginning of misguided conceptual elaboration. In order to exonerate Asan˙ga (for reasons that are not immediately apparent), Xiong presents Asan˙ga’s true position as being that consciousness was merely a nominal construction, devoid of self-nature. “In this way, he made assertions with ingenuity, sweeping them away no sooner than he had made them, never establishing anything and thereby distancing himself from any misguided conceptual elaboration.” Vasubandhu, however, “started having consciousness subsume the various dharmas and so came to look upon the dharma of consciousness as something relatively real. Furthermore, if we infer on the basis of his account of seeds, since consciousness is generated from seeds, consciousness is therefore a real dharma (實法) with self-nature.” He also criticizes Vasubandhu for mechanically attributing the production of the universe to the causal role played by seeds and for talking about the mind in terms of defiled and pure seeds. Because Dharmapāla characterized innate seeds (本有種) as both pure and defiled, Xiong finds grounds to criticize him for identifying deluded consciousness with original mind. The chapter next addresses the topic of mind, thought, and consciousness. Mind, it is explained, is not different from the nature (心即性也), and the nature is a synonym for Fundamental Reality. As this Reality is also the same Reality for the myriad things, the mind is everywhere and has never been limited to one body. When the mind is pursued within oneself, it has a fixed orientation that is called thought (意). This fixed orientation “means developing in such a way that one is constantly in accord with one’s ever-renewing inherent nature (本性) and not willing to be transformed by things.” This fixed orientation is revealed only when one is mentally alone. This fixed orientation is expressed in life (生命) and revealed in solitude (獨體). The dominant sense of the term “mind” is “a whole” (統體), whereas the dominant sense of the term “thought” is the mind as it exists in individual people.

Y6693.indb lii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

liii

The term “consciousness” refers to the first six consciousnesses and was established so as to discern cognitive objects. Whereas mind and thought are expressions for Reality (體), consciousness is but a different expression for “function” (作用), which in turn refers to the flow or manifest expression of Reality. The first five or sensory consciousnesses cognize objects by means of direct perception (現量). “The cognizing consciousness (能緣識) directly apprehends the true aspect (體相) of a cognitive object that is taken as the cause of consciousness (所緣境). This is called ‘directly apprehending the cognitive object’s characteristics (境相).’ ” (We should continue to bear in mind [!] that in Yogācāra teachings, a cognitive object is the image part that arises from the transformation of one’s own consciousness [drawing on one’s mental seeds] in response to a stimulus.) Because the sensory consciousnesses of ordinary people are continually thrown into confusion by the chaotic sixth consciousness, ordinary people are unable to maintain this capacity for direct perception. The sixth consciousness is the cause of this confusion because by constantly conveying the characteristics of cognitive objects, the mind—expressed as the six consciousnesses—becomes transformed by things. We learn that the sixth consciousness functions not only by taking (putatively) external objects as cognitive objects but also by taking inner objects as cognitive objects. This inner activity has two aspects. The first aspect is being aware of “being aware of cognitive objects.” The second aspect is direct gnosis (冥) of self-nature: “ ‘Direct gnosis’ means inwardly to perceive selfnature so that one knows oneself and sees oneself. This is referred to as inner verification independent of words. In this case, that which realizes is that which is realized; indeed, there is no ‘that which [realizes]’ and ‘that which [is realized]’ that can be distinguished.” Xiong concludes what he calls “a general overview of the mind’s key features” with a detailed account of the so-called five states of mind produced by the perception of cognitive objects, based on Cheng weishi lun: the mind of first impressions, the actively seeking mind, the determining mind, the pure and impure mind, and the mind of the flow of sameness. This is followed by a series of objections and responses. The final section of this chapter takes up the topic of mental associates, also the main subject of chapter 8. This section might thus be regarded as a

Y6693.indb liii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

liv

Translator’s Introduction

kind of prolegomenon to chapter 8. We learn that mind relies on the support of mental associates to be able to distinguish the characteristics of cognitive objects. Equally, mental associates depend on the mind to arise. And although both take the same cognitive object as their respective cognitive object, they each have different defining activities (現行). In chapter 2 Xiong defines defining activities as follows: “ ‘Defining activities’ are the characteristics (相) [that appear] when consciousness actively engages cognitive objects; that is, the characteristics [that occur] when consciousness interprets cognitive objects. For example, seeing colors and hearing sound are not the same. These are the different defining activities in consciousness.” Here that definition needs to be expanded to include the images that arise when mental associates appropriate those same cognitive objects. According to Xiong, mental associates are the manifest activity of habituated tendencies. They are not innately endowed but rather are clusters of “delusional forces that consolidate and do not disperse.” The accumulation of habituated tendencies means that when cognitive objects are cognized, this leads to attachment to particular characteristics such as “pleasant” and “unpleasant” and so forth. This prompts Xiong to contrast mind and mental associates: “Mind is not different from the nature, whereas mental associates are but habituated tendencies. Their fundamental difference is as starkly clear as this.” So long as mental associates obey the mind, assist the mind, and remain subservient to the mind, then all will be well: mental associates will also be the nature because the mind is not different from the nature. If, however, defiled mental associates (染數) are given unbridled free rein, they will attack the nature. “When habituated tendencies attack the nature, the mind cannot be seen, and so the mental associates alone are taken to be the mind. This is what is referred to as deluded mind. Deluded mind is also called deluded consciousness.” When mental associates are in their concealed, yet-to-be-manifest mode, they are seeds. Xiong stresses that this is not seeds in the sense of “productive power” (功能) but rather is a metaphor for something that we are never aware of. “Hidden and manifest are merely a difference of state, not a difference of direct cause and the effect produced (能所). Former teachers said that mental associates are produced from seeds—that is, that hidden seeds are the direct cause (能生因), and manifest mental associates are the main effects produced (所生果). The two dharmas of cause and effect are

Y6693.indb liv

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lv

distinctly different, just as are the grain seeds that produce the grain. This view is confused.”

2.8 Explaining the Mind, B (明心下) This chapter is devoted to a detailed exposition of thirty-eight mental associates (心所). In this summary I provide a broad outline but do not discuss the substantive content, as that would entail duplicating much of Xiong’s text. The thirty-eight are based on the fifty-one listed in Cheng weishi lun, but with considerable rearrangement. My translation of the thirty-eight terms is based on Xiong’s description. Cheng weishi lun lists six groups of mental associates: 1. Five omnipresent mental associates (遍行) 2. Five object specific mental associates (別境) 3. Eleven wholesome mental associates (善) 4. Six primary afflictions (煩惱) 5. Twenty secondary afflictions (隨煩惱) 6. Four indeterminate mental associates (不定)

Xiong reduces these to four groups: 1. Six omnipresent mental associates (遍行) 2. Six object-specific mental associates (別境) 3. Nineteen defiled mental associates (染) 4. Seven wholesome mental associates (善)

As suggested by the name, “omnipresent mental associates” always occur together with the mind. “Object-specific mental associates” refers to mental associates that take specific cognitive objects as their cognitive objects and so do not always occur together with the mind. “Defiled mental associates” work against and block good mental associates. “Wholesome mental associates” counteract the afflictions of defiled mental associates, driving them into submission and eventually destroying them. 89. Typically caitta (心所) is translated as “mental factors,” but Xiong applies his own interpretation to the concept. For Xiong, they are mental activities that accompany and assist the functioning of the mind.

Y6693.indb lv

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lvi

Translator’s Introduction 2.8.1 Six Omnipresent Mental Associates (遍行)

“Desire” from the original group of object-specific mental associates has been moved here to make six omnipresent mental associates: contact (觸), attentiveness (作意), received sensations (受), desire (欲), conceptualization (想), and volitional impulse (思). 2.8.2 Six Object-Specific Mental Associates (別境)

This group consists of discernment (慧), general investigation (尋), detailed analysis (伺), uncertainty (疑), verification (解), and recollection (念). Xiong explains that these six mental associates take individual cognitive objects as their cognitive objects and hence are termed “object-specific mental associates.” From the original group of five object-specific mental associates, desire has been relocated to omnipresent mental associates, concentration (定) has been relocated to good mental associates, and discovery and scrutiny, from the original indeterminate (不定) mental associates, together with uncertainty from the original primary afflictions (本惑), have been moved into the six object-specific mental associates. 2.8.3 Nineteen Defiled Mental Associates (染)

This new category is a combination of the original primary afflictions and secondary afflictions. Of the original six primary afflictions, uncertainty (疑) has been relocated to the object-specific mental associates, leaving five: craving (貪), antipathy (瞋), ignorance (癡), pride (慢), and pernicious views (惡見). Among these five, Xiong further distinguishes eight different kinds of craving, three kinds of antipathy, seven kinds of pride, and three kinds of pernicious views. Furthermore, the five mental associates that constitute the primary afflictions can be divided into gross or fine. Both kinds need to be suppressed and eliminated. The means for doing so lies with the wholesome mental associates. Xiong reduces the twenty secondary afflictions (隨煩惱) listed in Cheng weishi lun to fourteen: anger (忿), animosity (恨), vexation (惱), hostility (害), jealousy (嫉), duplicity (覆), parsimony (慳), deception (誑), chicanery (諂), insolence (無慚), shamelessness (無愧), restlessness (掉擧), ennui (昏沉), and unruliness (放逸). The power of these secondary afflictions

Y6693.indb lvi

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lvii

to impede good mental associates is even greater than that of the primary afflictions. 2.8.4 Seven Wholesome Mental Associates (善)

From the original eleven, Xiong reduces the number to seven: concentration (定), conviction (信), contra-craving (無貪), contra-malevolence (無瞋), contra-ignorance (無癡), sustained effort (精進), and vigilance (不放逸). This was achieved by removing conscience (慚) and four other good mental associates, and adding concentration from the object-specific mental associates. The chapter concludes with several summary observations, including: the mind is the nature and it is innate; mental associates, however, are post-natal and based on experience; the nature is the mind in its original, pristine state; realization of our inherent nature requires cultivation, and this cultivation is necessary because the nature is the principle by which humans are able to live (吾人所以生之理). The final pages develop a sustained argument to the effect that cultivation/practice and learning are not different from the nature itself but rather are an expression of the nature, and that without cultivation/practice, the nature cannot be revealed. Xiong’s reaffirmation of the phenomenal world, the life-world, was in a sense dictated by the dialectical relationship between ultimate truth and conventional truth: Fundamental Reality/the nature/inherent mind has no meaning unless understood relative to, and personally realized in the context of, phenomenal existence. What motivated Xiong to go so deeply into the difficulties of Yogācāra scholasticism? Was he just working through his own emancipation from his roots in the Ouyang school? Or did he think that he could not make his own philosophy of ti-yong and so forth complete without it? I think the main reason relates to the Confucian side of his syncretism. Xiong’s strong rejection of nihilism (associated with Madhyamaka) provided the space for a morally inflected universe, and this is where the Confucian side of his syncretism gains added traction. The extended discussion of mental associates is strongly linked to moral concerns. According to Xiong, mental associates are the manifest activity (現行) of habituated tendencies. Afflictions are impure mental associates, clusters of “delusional forces that consolidate and do not disperse,” arising “only after the human form and spirit issue forth.” The accumulation of habituated tendencies means that when cognitive objects

Y6693.indb lvii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lviii

Translator’s Introduction

are cognized, this leads to attachment to particular characteristics such as “pleasant” and “unpleasant” and so forth, prompting Xiong to contrast mind and mental associates: “Mind is not different from the nature, whereas mental associates are but habituated tendencies. Their fundamental difference is as starkly clear as this.” Xiong describes how “good mental associates” counteract the afflictions of defiled mental associates, driving them into submission and eventually eliminating them. Further, to be able to recover our inherent human nature, we must rely upon pure dharmas (淨法) (pure habituated tendencies; good mental associates). If, however, defiled mental associates (染數) are given free rein, they will attack the nature. Yet even though defiled mental associates overcome and obstruct the mind/the nature, Xiong maintains that this is necessary: “If there were no afflictions, then there would be no prajñā either. Thus all defilements are the seeds of tathāgata (如來). Confucius said: ‘As long as the way prevails in the world, [I] will not join them in changing the world.’ ” This is because when one realizes the emptiness of afflictions, the role of dependent arising in their generation, and their fundamental lack of self-nature, then one’s perspective is able to move from conventional truth to ultimate truth.

 . T H E L E G AC Y OF X ION G’ S T HO U G H T Confucio-Buddhist syncretism is a hallmark also of Mou Zongsan’s thought. Mou is arguably the most important Chinese philosopher of the past century, and his philosophical legacy continues to exercise a profound influence on contemporary Chinese philosophy. Mou is relevant to our consideration of Xiong Shili because of Xiong’s formative influences on Mou. The most visible link between Xiong and Mou—other than their erratic mentor-student relationship—is the connection between them in the context of the retrospectively created genealogy of New Confucian philosophy. The movement is promoted and researched by prominent Chinese intellectuals based in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. Particularly noteworthy is the high critical regard in which New Confucianism has come to be held by a large number of mainland Chinese scholars since the late 1980s. Successfully transcending the geographical and political boundaries of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, since the mid-1980s, New Confucianism has increasingly played a leading role in bridging the cultural and ideologi-

Y6693.indb lviii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lix

cal divide separating mainland and overseas Chinese scholars by providing a shared intellectual discourse. New Confucianism has also proven to be the most successful form of philosophical appropriation, reinvention, and “creative transformation” of “Confucianism” in contemporary China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. It is the most influential expression of indigenous Chinese philosophical values of the past century. Xiong and Liang Shuming are now widely regarded as the founding fathers of the New Confucian movement. Yet even “internal participants” in the contemporary New Confucian movement have described the connection between Xiong and Mou as a “spiritual legacy” rather than one based on the transmission of a set of teachings or doctrines. This has been a regular refrain in Liu Shuxian’s 劉述先 writings: “Tang [Junyi], Mou [Zongsan], and Xu [Fuguan] were all Xiong’s students. Even Liang Shuming’s influence pales in comparison to that of Xiong. As the publicly acknowledged founding figure of this trend of thought [contemporary New Confucianism], his thought must be discussed. . . . In fact, that which Xiong bequeathed was a spiritual inspiration. There was certainly no one who genuinely transmitted his learning (xuewen).” Zheng Jiadong 鄭家棟 similarly relates that Mou Zongsan had completed the work Xiong had hoped to complete but was unable to do so, thereby enabling “learning of the nature of the mind” (心性之學) to become a system of thought that, “for the first time,” could be “grasped logically in respect of both its external structure and its inner normative principles (義理).” He further states that Mou’s development of Xiong’s thought was limited to a common “spiritual direction; in fact, in terms of their respective learning and inherent spiritual temperament, there was quite a distance between them.” 90. Liu Shuxian, “Pingxin lun Feng Youlan 平心論馮友蘭” (A Balanced Account of Feng Youlan), Dangdai 35, no. 3 (1989): 63. See also Liu Shuxian, “Duiyu Xiong Shili xiansheng wannian sixiang de zai fansi 對於熊十力先生晚年思想的再反思” (Some More Reflections on Mr. Xiong Shili’s Thought in His Later Years), Ehu, no. 3 (1992): 1–2. 91. Zheng Jiadong, “Xiandai xin Ruxue de luoji tuizhan ji qi yinfa de wenti 現代新儒學 的邏輯推展及其引發的問題” (The Logical Development of New Confucianism and the Issues Generated), p. 26, paper distributed at the Second International Conference on New Confucianism, National Central Library, Taipei, 1992. In the same year, Luo Yijun 羅義俊 similarly described Tang, Mou, and Xu as being the transmitters of Xiong’s legacy. “However, what they transmit is not the specific perspective of Xiong’s scholarship but rather the desire to open up a spiritual direction for the future path of Chinese culture.” Luo Yijun,

Y6693.indb lix

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lx

Translator’s Introduction

Despite these judgments that Xiong’s influence on Mou was limited to a “spiritual direction” and that no one subsequently transmitted Xiong’s learning, important affinities and influences are in evidence. At the most general level, the first such affinity is a shared virulent cultural nationalism. Xiong and Mou’s shared belief that Chinese philosophy must be genuinely Chinese (and not owe its origins to a foreign creed) and their commitment to the notion of an immanently transcendent, morally inflected, heavenly endowed human nature both contributed to their privileging of Confucian philosophy within their broader syncretistic projects. There was also a shared modernist agenda animating this promotion of Confucian philosophy as the spiritual marrow of Chinese national identity. Both Xiong and Mou upheld a view widely accepted by Chinese intellectuals throughout the twentieth century: although China had always possessed a rich philosophical tradition, that tradition lacked systematization, and the systematization of Chinese philosophy was one of the most pressing tasks for the modern Chinese philosopher. Crucial to this task of systemization was to provide Chinese philosophy with a robust epistemology. Mou is widely regarded as having completed the task Xiong set for himself but never accomplished: the development of a comprehensive philosophy that included a liang lun 量論 (epistemology). It should, however, be noted that for Xiong, there is no clear division between issues relating to epistemology and those relating to metaphysics; hence, many aspects of Xiong’s epistemology are revealed in his writings, and some of his key epistemological distinctions were adopted and developed by Mou Zongsan, such as the distinction between liangzhi 量智 (knowledge derived from measurement and inference) and xingzhi 性智 (direct insight into Reality gained

“Jin shiyu nian dangdai xin Ruxue de yanjiu yu suowei menhu wenti 近十餘年當代新儒學 的研究與所謂門戶問題” (The So-Called Problem of Factionalism in New Confucianism over the Past Ten-Plus Years), p. 15, paper distributed at the Second International Conference on New Confucianism, National Central Library, Taipei, 1992. 92. This is also reflected in Mou’s ranking of the Sinitic traditions of Huayan and Tiantai Buddhism over Yogācāra. 93. As previously noted, Xiong had originally intended that the New Treatise would consist of two major treatises: On Cognitive Objects (境論) (ontology) and On Epistemology (量論). On Epistemology was never written. Xiong’s 1956 publication, Yuan Ru 原儒, has an outline version.

Y6693.indb lx

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lxi

through realization of one’s nature), which Mou referred to as shizhi 識知 (enlightened intuitive knowledge) and zhizhi 智知 (cognitive knowledge), respectively. For both Xiong and Mou this distinction marked the difference between scientific knowledge and metaphysical knowledge. When we read Xiong’s New Treatise, we need to remind ourselves—just as Xiong reminds us—that the sustained critique of Yogācāra is matched by a profound respect for Madhyamaka philosophy and that Xiong’s appropriation of the ti-yong polarity and the concepts “contraction” (翕) and “expansion” (闢) are grounded in Madhyamakan philosophical premises. For Xiong, it was Buddhist philosophy that had inspired his commitment to developing both a jing lun 境論 (ontology) and an epistemology for his own systematic philosophy. Buddhist philosophy was also a key component of that systematic philosophy. Buddhist philosophy was also central to Mou Zongsan’s systematic philosophy. Mou’s engagement with, and appropriation of, facets of Buddhist philosophy are also germane to my contextualization of Xiong Shili’s philosophical thought as developed in New Treatise, as they serve to reinforce the importance of recognizing the vital role that Buddhist philosophy has played in the construction of New Confucian philosophy and the ongoing presence it still retains in the historical constitution of New Confucian philosophy. As Wing-cheuk Chan has reiterated, it is impossible to understand Mou’s philosophical contribution to the development of New Confucian philosophy without a proper understanding of his interpretation of Buddhism. And despite Mou’s ultimate and unambiguous privileging of Confucian philosophy over Buddhist philosophy, as Jason Clower has pertinently remarked: “What makes Mou noticeable . . . is his catholicity of interest and breadth of reading in Buddhist writings and willingness to proclaim the philosophical superiority of Buddhists to Confucians and the necessity for Confucians to submit themselves to Buddhist tutelage, and then to openly reorganize and reevaluate the whole Confucian philosophical tradition in an explicitly Buddhist way.” 94. Wing-cheuk Chan, “On Mou Zongsan’s Hermeneutic Application of Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 2 (2011): 174–175. 95. Jason Clower, The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism (Brill: Leiden, 2010), p. 3; see also Serina N. Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

Y6693.indb lxi

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lxii

Translator’s Introduction

The principal doxographical methodology to be applied to this reevaluation is Mou’s appropriation of the Sinitic Buddhist method of “doctrinal classification” (判教) and applying it to the whole of Chinese philosophy. Within this scheme, Mou identified the Tiantai paradigm of the Perfect Teaching (圓教) as providing a theoretical model to demonstrate how Kant’s ideal of due correspondence between virtue and happiness can be achieved without appeal to God. He further insisted that certain Song and Ming NeoConfucians had articulated the most perfect “Perfect Teaching.” (We should also note in passing that Mou’s Perfect Teaching can be seen to be indebted to Xiong’s emphasis on the non-separability of ti and yong.) Mou also adapted the “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm of the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, written in the late sixth century and eventually becoming the most influential text in East Asian Buddhism. Starting from the premise that the One Mind is the ultimate source of all phenomena, the scripture proposes that this One Mind has two aspects. The first aspect is characterized by an original, pristine, pure Buddha-nature intrinsic in all things (tathāgatagarbha)—the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (dharmakāya). The second aspect is characterized as being subject to birth and death. Although this second aspect of mind is identified with the store consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), it is grounded in tathāgatagarbha. Only ignorance prevents us from realizing the fundamental unity of the two aspects of the One Mind. (The influence of this vision on Xiong Shili’s thought is also strongly in evidence.) These views contrast sharply with sixth- and seventh-century Sinitic Yogācāra accounts that the constant transformation of seeds in the store consciousness is the basis of the phenomenal world and that ultimately the mind itself (ālaya-vijñāna and the mental factors associated with it) has to be transformed and replaced by the unmediated cognition of things just as they truly are if unmediated cognition of reality is to be realized. In New Treatise, one of Xiong’s key objections to Yogācāra is that by positing seeds

96. On this latter point, see the discussion in Clower, The Unlikely Buddhist, pp. 181–184. 97. Purporting to be an Indian scripture, it was probably written in China during the late sixth century.

Y6693.indb lxii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lxiii

as causes of cognitive objects, the mind becomes bifurcated into a subject part and an image part, and its inherent oneness thus becomes artificially and mistakenly severed. To address this, Xiong appealed to the inseparability of ti (ontological reality) and yong (its manifest functioning), criticizing the Yogācāra position as advocating the manifestation of ontological reality through function (即用顯體) where function is understood actually to exist, which for Xiong amounted to drawing a bifurcation of ontological reality and the phenomenal world: “As a word, ‘function’ refers to the flow of Reality and describes the expression of Reality. In this expression there is no thing, and in this flow there is no abiding. Accordingly, it is not possible for there to be anything established in function. This is because the ‘function’ under discussion has never been a real dharma.” Xiong’s position can be seen to be implicitly consistent with the views expressed in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, in that the latter does not present the phenomenal world as ontologically distinct from the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (dharmakāya). Rather, it posits ignorance as hindering us from realizing that the phenomenal world lacks independent existence, self-nature, reality. Mou Zongsan, by contrast, engaged and appropriated the “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm much more explicitly and substantively, developing it in quite a different direction from how Xiong had used it and making it a theoretical linchpin of in his “self-negation of innate moral consciousness” (良知自我坎陷) thesis. Mou’s signature departure from Kant’s metaphysics 98. Henry C. H. Shiu, for example, has recently argued that rather than following Xiong in interpreting the tathāgatagarbha doctrine as a kind of ontological monism, Mou attempted to interpret it “instrumentally,” as a “skillful means” employed to avoid Buddhism’s being regarded as kind of nihilism. See his “Nonsubstantialism of the Awakening of Faith in Mou Zongsan,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 2 (2011): 223–237. 99. That is, moral consciousness negates its inherent non-discriminating mode in order to allow the discriminating mind to arise and to effect action. Mou maintained that practical reason—the form of reason concerned with the a priori grounds for action, in particular moral choice according to the moral law—harbors an inexorable inclination for dialectical development that propels it toward its own “contradiction”: from practical reason to theoretical reason (理論理性), the type of reason that enables us to have knowledge of objects given in experience. It is in this connection that Mou proposed his thesis of “self-negation of innate moral consciousness.”

Y6693.indb lxiii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lxiv

Translator’s Introduction

is his argument that the faculty of intellectual intuition (智的直覺)—which enables direct intuition of supersensible objects—is innately possessed by all people rather than being exclusive to God. Thus, unlike Kant, who held that humans have no faculty of intellectual intuition, that noumena, or “thingsin-themselves,” can only be postulated and not directly intuited by humans, for Mou, noumenal reality (the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith analogue of which is tathāgatagarbha) can be directly intuited. Humans can apprehend both sides of the coin: the noumenal and phenomenal character of things. Mou’s core notion of intellectual intuition can also be seen positively as an attempt to provide philosophical support for Xiong’s repeated refrain about inner realization (內證), as well as Xiong’s insistence that innate moral consciousness (良知) is an unmediated presence and not a postulate, just as much as negatively it is a critical response to Kant’s view that noumena cannot be known. The “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm can also be regarded as the inspiration behind Mou’s dual ontology: a “phenomenal ontology” (現象界的 存有論)” or “attached ontology” (執的存有論) and a “noumenal ontology” (本體界的存有論) or “non-attached ontology” (無執的存有論). Whereas the former enables humans to realize their noumenal nature, the latter enables humans to function in the phenomenal world. Xiong’s analysis of phenomenon in the context of his ti-yong ontology can also be regarded as having found further development in Mou’s “phenomenal ontology.” Mou also echoed Xiong in endorsing the philosophical importance of Indian Buddhist translator and interpreter Paramārtha 真諦 (499–569). Xiong had identified Paramārtha as a representative figure in the “old” tradition of Yogācāra as transmitted in China in contrast to the “new” tradition, which he associates with Xuanzang and Kuiji but which has its roots in the Weishi 100. Because practical reason requires its antithesis—theoretical reason—it artificially or forcefully instigates its own negation. The creative activity of practical reason is not predicated on an opposition between subject and object because, strictly speaking, this distinction is inapplicable within the sphere of practical reason. When practical reason is transformed into understanding, into theoretical reason, the resulting understanding and theoretical reason are moral in that they are controlled by and subordinate to practical reason. This is why Mou maintained that his is a moral metaphysics, not merely a metaphysics of morals like Kant’s.

Y6693.indb lxiv

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lxv

teachings of Dharmapāla and Vasubandhu. According to Xiong, the key difference between the old and new traditions in China is that the latter group posited seeds as the ontological basis of all things and so was guilty of promoting an ontological pluralism. Xiong’s critique of the account of seeds in Cheng weishi lun is a central theme in his New Treatise. Similarly, Mou Zongsan identified Paramārtha to be the initiator of the so-called mature separation theory (終別教): the universality of innate Buddhanature; the doctrine that inherent enlightenment has merely been obscured by ignorance; that we all have a true mind or inherent mind we can return to; and that the phenomenal world is ontologically grounded in an immanently transcendent reality, as championed by various hybrids of Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha 如來藏 thought, such as the Southern Dilun school of Yogācāra that was active in the sixth century in China and which became associated most famously with the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith.

3.1 Critical Buddhism The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith also has a more contemporary connection with Xiong Shili. After Xiong published his New Treatise in 1932, two of his more trenchant critics were influential Buddhist layman Ouyang Jingwu—founder of the China Institute of Inner Learning—and Buddhist scholar Lü Cheng呂瀓. (Xiong had, in fact, first studied Yogācāra together with Lü Cheng under the tutelage of Ouyang.) Seeking to “return to the roots” of Indian Buddhism, Ouyang, Lü, and their colleagues sought to promote “true” Buddhism over “false” Buddhism, criticizing such core

101. Xiong Shili, Fojia mingxiang tongshi, B.256. 102. Xiong Shili, Fojia mingxing tongshi, B.262. 103. Jason Clower, The Unlikely Buddhist, pp. 112–135, provides a useful survey of this important doctrinal classification within Mou’s philosophical system. 104. The doctrine that all sentient beings have the innate potential to be buddhas. 105. Mou even attributes the authorship (or a leading role in the authorship) of the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith to Paramārtha. See his Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中國 哲學十九講 (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy) (Taipei: Xusheng shuju, 1983), pp. 289–290.

Y6693.indb lxv

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lxvi

Translator’s Introduction

Sinitic Buddhist doctrines as “original enlightenment” and “returning to the source.” In 1943, the year Ouyang died, Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili engaged in an extended series of polemical exchanges on the question of whether human nature is innately quiescent (性寂) or innately enlightened (性覺). At the most general level, this question touched upon the very legitimacy of the philosophical foundations of East Asian Buddhism. More specifically, this point of contention bears directly on a range of issues, including the interpretation of the doctrine that “the nature of the mind is inherently pure” (心性本淨) and methods of cultivation. In regard to these two matters, Xiong upheld the view that the already inherently awakened (and hence dynamic) nature of the mind can be personally realized through the “inner verification” of our own minds. (This view is associated in particular with the teachings of the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. Later, Mou Zongsan accorded “inherent enlightenment” a central role in his philosophical system by attributing to it the capacity for “intellectual intuition.” Lü Cheng, on the other hand, upheld the Yogācāra view (represented by Xuanzang and Kuiji) that although “the nature of the mind is originally pure” (心性本淨), realization of that purity requires a transformation of consciousness. In more recent times, the standoff between the views upheld by Xiong, on the one hand, and by Ouyang and Lü, on the other, has resurfaced in the context of controversies surrounding so-called Critical Buddhism. Critical Buddhism is an intellectual movement initiated in mid-1980s Japan by Buddhist scholars Hakamaya Noriaki 跨谷縣昭 and Matsumoto Shirō 松本 史郎. Critical Buddhism takes aim at any doctrine that posits an eternal, metaphysical substratum, underlying ground, or locus on which everything else is ontologically grounded, since it is contrary to the Buddha’s teachings on impermanence. In particular, Critical Buddhism regards Sinicized forms of Buddhism to be false Buddhism and incompatible with the project of modernity because they are not founded on rational critique. As Lin Chenkuo points out, “Like Habermas, the Critical Buddhists choose to carry out the project of modernity because they see that both the West and Buddhism 106. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (eds.), Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).

Y6693.indb lxvi

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

Translator’s Introduction

lxvii

share the same idea of enlightenment, namely as a quest for liberation from ignorance and domination.” In setting out his understanding of the concept of “transformation”—a metaphor for ontological reality—in New Treatise, for example, Xiong describes one of its characteristics in the following terms: “Wondrously transforming, unfathomable; the myriad things are unequal. Equal by virtue of being unequal, and so each is as it is.” This is precisely the sort of notion of equality that Critical Buddhists object to because, as Paul Swanson explains, “if one assumes a single basis and underlying reality for all things— that good and evil, strong and weak, rich and poor, right and wrong, are fundamentally ‘the same’—there is no need or incentive to correct any injustice or right any wrong or challenge the status quo.” In Xiong’s case, “a single basis and underlying reality for all things” is just what “transformation” is, in the same way that the pure Buddha-nature intrinsic in all things (tathāgatagarbha)—the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (dharmakāya)—functions in the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith is seen to be emblematic of so-called topical Buddhism or topical philosophy—“notions of a universal, ineffable, preconceptual ground or ‘topos’ from which all things are produced and to which they return at death”—because of such constructions as dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha (which seemingly contradict the doctrine of no-self ). These constructions, in turn, are foundational for such doctrines as inherent enlightenment (which appears to be inconsistent with the doctrine of dependent arising). As it happens, in modern China it has been topical philosophy (in the form of New Confucian metaphysics, especially Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism) that has emerged victorious over scholastic forms of Critical Buddhism (Ouyang Jingwu and Lü Cheng). Clearly, topical philosophy continues to have strong support in Chinese intellectual communities. Xiong’s 107. Lin Chen-kuo, “Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate Between Two Buddhisms,” in Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree, p. 305. 108. Paul L. Swanson, “Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism,” in Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree, p. 7. 109. Jacqueline Stone, “Some Reflections on Critical Buddhism,” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 26, no. 1 (1999): 161.

Y6693.indb lxvii

6/30/15 2:55:39 PM

lxviii

Translator’s Introduction

New Treatise provides us with the first substantive attempt to respond to the modernist challenge of providing Chinese philosophy with “system,” and Xiong did this in the form of an ontology. Thus understood, his New Treatise is also a response to modernism and, in its own Buddhist way, very much part of “a quest for liberation from ignorance and domination,” even if the path he followed was metaphysics rather than scientific rationality.

110. Since the early 1900s, Chinese scholars have sought to respond to claims initially made by Japanese scholars that Chinese philosophy lacked systemization, that in method and organization it was simple and naive, and that it fell far short of the standards set by Western philosophy. I discuss this is detail in “The Role of Masters Studies in the Early Formation of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline,” in John Makeham (ed.), Learning to Emulate the Wise: The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011), pp. 73–101. 111. Lin Chen-kuo, “Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation,” p. 305.

i

Y6693.indb lxviii

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

Foreword Cai Yuanpei

For two thousand years the Buddha’s teachings have been transmitted in China. During the Six Dynasties and the Sui and Tang periods, there was abundant translation of scriptures and treatises. Discourses, annotations, and recorded conversations by Chinese Buddhist followers were also voluminous. Faith is the principal basis for Buddhist followers, and in this respect Buddhism is no different from other schools of religion. Buddhist followers regard every word and sentence in the sutras and shastras as sacrosanct. Where there are inconsistencies [in the scriptures], they are reconciled simply by adopting the skillful means of [appealing to the notion of] the five teaching periods. As for those non-Buddhists who dismissed Buddhism as heterodoxy, they in turn held two kinds of attitudes. First, [there were those who,] despite not having read any Buddhist writings, castigated Buddhist followers on the grounds that they did not observe the cardinal bonds of human relations and that [monks] did not have proper occupations, using these as reasons to burn their writings. The likes of Han Changli 韓昌黎 proposed dealing with Buddhism by forcing monks to return to secular life and converting 1. A leading intellectual and educationalist, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940) was president of Peking University from 1917 to 1927. Cai invited Xiong to teach Buddhism at Peking University in 1922. 2. “The five teaching periods” refers to the five periods during Śākyamuni’s life after he attained enlightenment, when he employed different teachings to accommodate the needs of different audiences.

3

Y6693.indb 3

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

4

Foreword by Cai Yuanpei

temples to ordinary dwellings. Second, [there were those] who read the Buddhist scriptures and liked them and who moreover cited them to explain the meaning of Confucian writings such as Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, and Mencius; as well as those who regarded it as taboo to venture into Buddhism. The two branches of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism— represented on the one hand by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, and on the other hand by Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 and Wang Yangming—are as such. Today, a further two tendencies [can be discerned] among scholars, in regard to their work on Buddhist scriptures and treatises. First, [there are scholars such as] Baron A. von Staël-Holstein and Chen Yinque 陳寅恪 who seek out Buddhist scriptures written in Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Pāli and collate them with their various translated counterparts in Chinese, selecting examples of difference and similarity and providing explanations for those features. In the future, work on putting Buddhist texts in order will inevitably adopt this approach as its point of departure. Today, however, the tasks undertaken are preparatory efforts and have yet to generate issues 3. Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824) was a promoter of early Confucian teachings and a critic of both Buddhism and Daoism. The comments Cai Yuanpei refers to are from Han Yu’s celebrated essay “Yuan dao 原道” (Tracing the Way to Its Source), where the criticisms apply collectively to Buddhism and Daoism. See Han Yu, Changli xiansheng ji 昌黎先生集 (Han Yu’s collected writings), in Sibu beiyao 四部備要 (The Essential Collection of the Four Divisions) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1927–1936), 11.5b. 4. Cai Yuanpei is using the term Song-Ming lixue 宋明理學 to refer to what is now generally called Neo-Confucianism in English. Cheng Yi (1033–1107) and Zhu Xi (1130– 1200) are traditionally associated with the Principle-Centered Learning (理學) or Learning of the Way (daoxue 道學) wing of Neo-Confucian thought, whereas Lu Jiuyuan (1139–92) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529) are traditionally associated with the Mind-Centered Learning (心學) wing of Neo-Confucian thought. The Cheng-Zhu (Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi) branch was particularly critical of Buddhism. Because specific terms such as daoxue, xinxue, lixue, and so forth changed in their scope of reference during the Song and Ming periods, many scholars are more reluctant to reduce lixue or daoxue simplistically or uncritically to Cheng-Zhu learning, or xinxue to Lu-Wang (Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming) learning. 5. Baron A. von Staël-Holstein (1887–1937) was an Estonian-born German Buddhologist and philologist who, inter alia, taught Sanskrit and Tibetan at Peking University between 1918 and 1929. 6. Chen Yinque (alt. Yinke; 1890–1969) was a historian specializing in Six Dynasties and Sui-Tang history who had studied Sanskrit and Pāli at Harvard University, as well as Tibetan, Manchu, and Mongolian at Berlin University. He was trained in the United States, Europe, and Japan. For much of his eventful career he taught at Tsinghua University.

Y6693.indb 4

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

Foreword by Cai Yuanpei

5

concerning subtle points of profound meaning. Second, the China Institute of Inner Learning of Mr. Ouyang Jingwu principally specializes in promoting Yogācāra. Yogācāra seeks ultimate conclusions by means of logic and psychology and resembles scholastic philosophy of medieval Europe. The gentlemen of the China Institute of Inner Learning are still at the stage of putting [texts] in order, expounding, and propagating and so do not yet dare to voice any critical attitudes. At present, it is indeed [only] Mr. Xiong Shili’s New Treatise that is completely removed from the stale framework of the religious studies specialist, proposing new interpretations based on the perspective of the philosopher. Although Mr. Xiong is profoundly and thoroughly steeped in the teachings of Song and Ming Confucians, he does not regard it as taboo to venture into Buddhism and has long been studying Yogācāra theories. Because there was no penetrating explanation of Yogācāra ontology, he undertook to write a treatise to remedy this situation. In recent years, despite having been frequently ill, whenever there was a moment he would continue working on the manuscript. Now, after a decade, he has begun to complete the final version of the volume On Cognitive Objects, such is his zeal. Mr. Xiong maintains that ontology is the core of philosophy (哲學) (that is, “fundamental wisdom” [xuanxue 玄學]). He further maintains that Fundamental Reality (本體) and phenomena most definitely cannot be separated into two parts, but rather should be regarded as “being one yet being two” (一而二) and “being two yet being one” (二而一) [just as the Book of] Change combines the two senses of “change” and “unchanging.” Zhuangzi’s “Discourse on Making All Things Equal” and Huayan [Buddhism’s] “the one and the many interpenetrate” (一多相容) and “the three [divisions] of

7. Xiong generally distinguishes these two concepts—philosophy and fundamental wisdom—associating the former with Western philosophy. 8. Xiong employs benti in a particular sense: Fundamental Reality. From comments made below it seems that Cai understood benti 本體 in the sense of “noumenon,” which was one of the ways noumenon was rendered at that time. The extent to which the concept of noumenon also informed Xiong’s understanding of benti is difficult to determine. 9. That is, change is unchanging. 10. Zhuangzi (fl. 300 b.c.) was a celebrated Daoist philosopher. “Qi wu lun 齊物論” (Discourse on Making All Things Equal) is one of the most philosophically rich chapters in the eponymous book Zhuangzi.

Y6693.indb 5

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

6

Foreword by Cai Yuanpei

time are one time” (三世一時) were unable to be explained with the [concept of] a noumenon that transcends phenomena, and so he established a cosmology [based on] unceasing transformation, selecting the two terms “contraction” (翕) and “expansion” (闢) [from the Book of Change] to portray the unity of the relative and the absolute. The two words, “contraction” and “expansion,” are how the “Great Commentary” on the Book of Change explains the meaning of the Kun hexagram’s “propagating life.” Originally these two terms were assigned [to describe] matters concerning movement and stillness. To [his translation of Thomas Huxley’s (1825–1895)] Evolution and Ethics, Yan Youling 嚴幼陵 appended a translation of [Herbert] Spencer’s [1820–1903] explanation of evolution in which Yan began to use [the concepts of contraction and expansion] to describe a cyclical dynamism: “expanding so as to combine matter, contracting so as to exert motion, matter and motion are intermixed, adjusting to one another to constitute change.” Employing [the concepts of] yin and yang from the [Book of ] Change, and movement and stillness from the “Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate,” made it easy to convey to people the idea of mutual entailment, and so [Xiong] specifically used [the concepts of] contraction and expansion to portray [the unity of the relative and the absolute]. In addition to establishing a new ontology, Mr. Xiong also revised many of the moral categories in Yogācāra theory and rearranged their order. In all cases, every single word of his explanations was measured. 11. One of the traditional Chinese classics: a book of prognostication, natural philosophy, cosmology, and metaphysics. 12. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.15a. 13. Yan Youling is Yan Fu 嚴復 (1853–1921). This quotation attributed to Spencer is in Yan’s preface to his translation of Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics. The original quotation is: “Evolution . . . is a change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion and integration of matter.” See Yan Fu (trans.), Tian yan lun, p. 186; Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 3rd ed. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1875), p. 327. 14. Written by early Song Confucian Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), an influential contributor to Neo-Confucian cosmology and speculative philosophy. 15. This is referring to chapter 8 of New Treatise, “Explaining the Mind, B,” which is devoted to a detailed exposition of thirty-eight mental associates (心所). The thirty-eight are based on the fifty-one listed in Cheng weishi lun but with considerable rearrangement.

Y6693.indb 6

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

Foreword by Cai Yuanpei

7

I hope that his readers will be open-minded enough to use their own personal experience [to judge Mr. Xiong’s arguments] and not treat them lightly or turn their back on the noble aspirations contained within this work that Mr. Xiong wrote while frail with illness. 31 August 1932

 P O ST S C R I P T  This person is not a follower of Buddhism. [Mr. Xiong] completely identifies himself as a follower of Confucius’s teachings (孔教). Yet it is entirely because he holds that Buddhist scriptures and treatises are purely religious in nature that he adopted this attitude. In fact, even though Buddhist scriptures have a strong religious flavor, they also have significant philosophical content. This is because religions take the philosophical thought of their founders as their basis. Religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and so forth all have philosophical principles—it is just that [those of] Buddhism are more advanced and profound. People have different perspectives on things—it all depends on the point of view of a particular reader [how well he or she understands those philosophical principles]. It is a pity that for the past two thousand years [Buddhism] has been limited by the religious community. There has not yet been anyone who has employed the methods of the philosopher to analyze and to investigate, to speak of their doubts frankly, so that matters can be rectified. If there were such a one, the very first would have to be Mr. Xiong Shili with his New Treatise. 16. New Treatise was first published in October 1932. For some reason, the first edition did not include Cai’s preface. In fact, the first time the preface was appended to New Treatise was in the 2001 redaction published by Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe. The preface was first published in Gao Pingshu 高平叔 (comp.), Cai Yuanpei zhexue lunzhu 蔡元培哲學論著 (Cai Yuanpei’s Philosophical Writings) (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1985). 17. This is referring to Xiong’s self-identification as a follower of Confucius’s teachings. Cai is implying that Xiong was critical of Buddhism as a religion. Conversely, Cai’s following comments imply that Xiong respected Buddhism as a philosophy even if he criticized aspects of it. 18. Cai appended this final paragraph in the form of a postscript to his dated handwritten preface.

Y6693.indb 7

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

This page intentionally left blank

Foreword Ma Fu

There is no profound awakening (玄悟) greater than understanding transformation (化). There is no subtle word more difficult to talk about than change (變). The sole means by which to reveal fully the way of change and transformation is the effort [required] to reveal the nature fully. That which is common to the realization attained by sages is fully revealed in “one nature” (一性). If one fully reveals one’s own [nature], one will fully reveal [the nature] of [all] things [because] there are no things outside oneself. To understand the nature is to understand heaven. This is the inherent command of all things. The great origin that is change and transformation moves because it has no beginning and so cannot rest; it is all-pervasive because it has no locus and so cannot be departed from. Change says: “In the transformation and change of the way of Qian (male/heaven/creation), the nature of each of the [myriad things] as commanded [by heaven] is decided.” Is it possible that the nature and the way of heaven are two? As for

1. Ma Fu 馬浮, or Ma Yifu 馬一浮, was a scholar in the traditional mold. A native of Shaoxing in Zhejiang, he lived in retreat at West Lake. (In 1916 he had been offered the position of dean of humanities at Peking University but declined.) His friendship with Xiong began in 1929. He had a significant influence on the content of New Treatise. A decade later, Xiong Shili taught at Ma Yifu’s Fuxing Academy (復性書院) in Leshan County, Sichuan, with Ma as principal. 2. Cf. the first sentence of “The Doctrine of the Mean”: “That which heaven commands is called the nature.” 3. “Judgment” (彖) to the Qian 乾 hexagram, Book of Change, 1.6a.

9

Y6693.indb 9

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

10

Foreword by Ma Fu

[the proposition that] principle (理) can be obtained before images (象), this would certainly be [a case of] radical severance such that there was no mutual entailment. Words become exhausted [when it comes to describing] the true realm (真際); truly beyond sensory discernment, it is difficult to name. By turning within, however, there is genuineness; its way lies extremely close at hand. In [realizing that all] things are the same as oneself, there is no error. Ordinary existence is the true [realm]. Even though [the myriad entities] counter one another, one knows that they are similar, and even though they differ, one knows that they are interconnected. Only the most refined [intelligences] in the world are able to match this [level of awareness]. Afflictions are entwined with habituated, deluded thoughts, obscuring the hold one has on the constant [way]. Once confusion and understanding counter one another, the enlightened and the unenlightened are differentiated. Thereupon genuineness and falsity [engender] different responses, and truth and convention have different consequences. If the mysteries of the world are perceived, yet there is a failure to understand that they must not be regarded with disdain [but rather should be clarified], and if movement in the world is perceived, yet there is a failure to understand that it must not be allowed to perplex [by not explaining it], then this will lead those who aspire to truth to disappear into meditating on emptiness, and those who pursue things to become lost in their grasping. The wise worry that if the shade-cover provided by presumptions based on false discrimination is not removed, then the light of wisdom’s illumination will not arise. Only because [the sage] has the means to see that mysteries are all like one another, and that ultimate movement takes the One as its constant norm, 4. Here to be understood as ontological principles. 5. Here to be understood as phenomena. 6. Reality, truth. In Buddhist contexts it can refer to Suchness. 7. Based on the “Image” (象) to the Kui 睽 (Contrariety) hexagram, Book of Change, 4.18b. 8. Based on “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.16b. 9. Based on “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.16b. 10. Based on “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.16a. 11. Based on “Appended Statements, B,” Book of Change, 8.3a.

Y6693.indb 10

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

Foreword by Ma Fu

11

is [he] able to provide the myriad things with their beginnings, with none omitted. [Representing] the way that envelops the myriad things, [the sage] makes no mistakes. Like a mighty torrent flowing together with Great Transformation (大化) he is completely without desire, the ruler of the myriad images. This is what is meant by thoroughly revealing [the nature] of things; one comes to know heaven just like the palm of one’s hand. This is what the book by my friend Master Xiong Shili has created. Shili is exacting in enquiry and skilled at [analyzing] terms and principles. He provides a clear investigation of gnosis and his phrases are all sublime. Early [in his studies] he identified with the lineage of Dharmapāla, searching for mysteries in Yogācāra, but after having done so he realized that Dharmapāla[’s views] were contrary to the truth. After ten years of fine-grained reflection, he has first produced On Cognitive Objects, in which he clearly declares [the non-duality of] root and the traces (本跡), unites heaven and man, encompasses past and present, and evaluates China and India. Master Xiong wrote this book to prove that wisdom itself is not external, and so this is revealed in “Explanation of the Thesis.” Because he sought to argue that the illusions of consciousness [arise] according to conditions, therefore this is analyzed in “Weishi.” Because he sought to select the original [meaning] of the Great Dharma [that is, the teachings of Mahāyāna], this is contained in “Transformation.” Because he sought to reveal the unfathomable character of godlike function (神用), this is communicated in “Productive Power.” Because he sought to prove that the phenomenal world lacks reality, therefore this is made clear in “Demonstration of Material [Dharmas].” Because he sought 12. Based on the “Judgment,” Qian hexagram, Book of Change, 1.16a. 13. Based on “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.26b. 14. That is, what the book has created is the means, the teachings, by which to reveal thoroughly the nature of things and so know heaven. 15. This refers to Xiong’s challenge to Xuanzang’s account of “transformation” (轉變 [ parin.āma]): the transformation of consciousness. 16. In the chapter “Productive Power,” one of Xiong’s characterizations of the relationship between productive power and form-and-vital-stuff—that is, the ontological and the phenomenal—is described as follows: “As for productive power, it is that by which formand-vital-stuff is constituted and is the controller of form-and-vital-stuff. Thus its wondrousness (靈妙) can be described as god-like, and the norms it provides as it issues forth are also called principles (理).”

Y6693.indb 11

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

12

Foreword by Ma Fu

to examine how sentient beings are capable of seeking within, a summary account is provided in “Explaining the Mind.” The terms he uses are complex yet precise; his writing is nuanced, yet the meaning is able to be clearly expressed. Because Master Xiong has perceived the flow of Fundamental Reality, everything [he expresses] comes straight from within—ebullient and irrepressible. Despite having the full range of elaborate phrases available to him [to describe Fundamental Reality], he exclusively took [the method of] “untying the bonds” (懸解) as his standard, refuting the various accumulated accounts that [attempt to] name the mind, and instead established the meaning of contraction and expansion becoming transformation (翕闢成變). [Master Xiong’s account of contraction and expansion] would have been enough to make Sengzhao 僧肇 cup his hands together in obeisance and sigh with admiration, and cause [Xuan]zang and Kui[ji] to become tongue-tied. Comparing Master Xiong with wise men of the past, he particularly resembles [Wang] Fusi 王輔嗣, who received mysterious assistance in the way of Change, and Nāgārjuna, who propagated Contemplation of the Middle Way [Madhyamaka]. Of all the [thinkers] today who discuss [abstract thought], I have yet to encounter any who is able to 17. See “Da zong shi 大宗師” (Revered Ancestral Teacher), Zhuangzi 莊子, Zhuangzi yinde 莊子引得 (Concordance to Zhuangzi) ed., Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 17/6/53, where xuanjie 懸解 is given as xuanjie 縣解. In the present context, xuanjie 懸解 should be understood to mean beyond the constraints that language imposes. 18. Sengzhao (c. 384–414) was a monk influenced by Madhyamaka teachings who wrote an influential philosophical essay on movement. 19. Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249) is a representative figure in the so-called Profound Learning (玄學) tradition of metaphysics who wrote an influential commentary (and a set of essays) on the Book of Change. See Richard Lynn, The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 20. This is an allusion to a line in the “Explaining the Hexagrams” (說卦) commentary, Book of Change, 9.1b. 21. Nāgārjuna 龍樹 (second to third centuries a.d.) is a major figure in Madhyamaka Buddhism who wrote Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way). This work was translated under the title Zhonglun 中論 by Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什 (344–413).

Y6693.indb 12

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

Foreword by Ma Fu

13

surpass Master Xiong in the slightest. Indeed, he can be said to be one who profoundly understands [the principles] of transformation and is skilled at describing change. When one sees the glimmer of sunlight, then of course the fallen snow will dissolve; in the pure clarity of the early morning sun, [matters of] life and death can be put outside [of one’s concerns]. Words of truth having been clearly set out [in New Treatise], other explanations that merely have the semblance of being true will be circular and tortuous. Those who have fixed their minds on the Profound Ford yet remain confused in a net of doubt, who refer to their [own views] as philosophy but have yet to discern the true aspect of dharmas (諸法實相), if they were to read the open and expansive [insights of] this text [New Treatise,] then they would be able to realize that seeking for hidden mysteries is wasted effort and what is urgently required is to draw closer to one’s own [inherent nature] by returning to [its] incipient [expression]. Perhaps then misguided conceptual elaborations can be abandoned and self-nature can become clear. The substantive [content of New Treatise] cannot be denied. Is it conceivable that [Master Xiong could be dismissed] as one who has a reputation for being skilled at [mere] disputation? Because [Master Xiong] has mistakenly deemed me to be someone who truly understands [him], here I have briefly set forth the main purport [of his writings] and await gentlemen of true vision to draw from my account [as they see fit]. 22. Allusion to the ode “Jiao gong 角弓” (Horn-adorned Bow), Shijing 詩經 (Book of Odes), Shisan jing zhushu (q.v.), 15/1.14b. 23. A state of awakening. 24. Based on “Great Ancestral Teacher,” Zhuangzi, 17/6/41. 25. The teachings of Buddhism; Buddhist Dharma. 26. Variously a reference to Suchness, dharmakāya, emptiness, and nirvān.a. 27. The incipient manifestation of one’s inherent nature. 28. Zhiyan 知言 is synonymous with zhiyin 知音, a term that implies the sort of appreciation and understanding only a true equal is capable of. 29. Possibly an allusion to an aphorism cited in a number of early writings, such as “Shui lin xun 說林訓” (A Forest of Persuasions), Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Huainanzi), Sibu beiyao ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1936), 17.12b: “The farmer labors and the ruler is supported by that labor; the stupid speak and the wise draw from those words [as they see fit].”

Y6693.indb 13

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction

Two parts were planned for this book, the first of which is On Cognitive Objects (境論). That which is cognized (所量 [ prameya]) is termed “cognitive object” (境 [vis.aya]); implicitly it refers to self-nature (自性 [svabhāva]). Here “cognitive object” is the name given to that which is cognized. Because it implicitly refers to self-nature, it is called “cognitive object.” “Self-nature” is an alternative term for Reality (實體 [tattva]). See the note in the “Explanation of the Thesis” chapter of this book. The reason it is not only Reality ([實]體) but also cognitive objects that are mentioned is because, in line with the theses [to be set out in] On Epistemology (量論), these are what are cognized. However, in saying that these are what are cognized, this really only amounts to presenting oneself as one inherently is (自家本來面 目). Self-nature is detached from words, It has always been beyond words. but glosses and distinctions are provisionally generated—hence there is On Cognitive Objects. The second part is called On Epistemology (量論). Liang 量 ( pramān.a) is another name for knowledge. Cognitive objects are gauged to verify [their] reality. “Verify [their] reality”: prove that they are real. If some are not verified as real, then there should be further investigation to determine just what knowing is. Further details of the criteria for determining what is proven to

1. If it lacked self-nature, it could not function as a cognitive object. 2. The relevant autocommentary is found on the first page of that chapter. 3. The paragraph divisions and subheadings are those of the translator.

15

Y6693.indb 15

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

16

Introduction

be real and what is not should be sought in [identifying] what knowing in itself is. For this reason, On Epistemology follows [On Cognitive Objects]. The autocommentary in this book is employed to resolve difficulties in the text. [JM: The text in a lighter font is Xiong’s interlinear autocommentary. It runs throughout the New Treatise.] Sometimes, however, the phrasing is prolix and not suited to dividing and appending between sentences, and so it appears as a separate appendix. This is also one type of commentary. Each time a commentary is given I take great pains in what I write, and consequently sometimes I am too exacting and excessive in detail. Occasionally I use the vernacular language in the expectation that the meaning will be clearer. Striving to make the commentaries both profound and concise is simply not possible, as I fear this would, on the contrary, mean that they would no longer be commentaries. Compared with Buddhist [writings], this work is fundamentally innovative. In all of the terms I use, there are some where I continue to use the old term but change its meaning, “Old term” refers to terms used in old Chinese books and in Buddhist texts. I employ them frequently, but sometimes the meaning is completely different from the former meaning. It is up to the reader to seek it based on the main thread of the theses I set out in this book. Take, for example, the term hengzhuan 恆轉 (constant transformation). Old texts used it with reference to the store consciousness [ālaya or eighth consciousness], but now I use it to highlight Reality (體), thereby showing a fundamental difference from the former meaning. This is one example; subsequent examples can be inferred on this basis. and there are some where I adopt conventional language but change its meaning. Conventional language refers to the new terms prevailing today. In discussions by specialists, it has always been that case that each of the terms they employ has a precise meaning within their system of learning and cannot be used indiscriminately. You students should take note of this. This being so, why should old terms continue to be used or conventional language be adopted? Terms are for public use, and given [the principle of] “acceptance through common usage,” they cannot all be subjectively determined. Old terms of which the meaning is already fixed, as well as conventional terms that are newly created, can be both followed and used but given a new interpretation. This is a matter that those of former times and today who discuss learning are equally compelled to accept. Only On Cognitive Objects has been completed in this book; On Epis-

Y6693.indb 16

6/30/15 2:55:40 PM

Introduction

17

temology is still lacking. I started On Cognitive Objects in the winter of the tenth year of the Republic [1921]. “Tenth year of the Republic” is subsequently abbreviated as “Republic ten (民十).” Since that time I have revised the manuscript countless times. It has been almost eleven years until today before I first wrote the final version. Events are changing faster by the day and disease and illness wrack my body in turn. Over the past decade I have suffered from illness of the nerves, gastroptosis, frequent bouts of spermatorrhea, and a painful and weak backbone. It is only recently that things have improved. I want to continue and complete On Epistemology, but it is very difficult. When I talk about principle (理), as soon as matters touch upon recondite realms, then unless I am in an expansive frame of mind in which I achieve gnosis, I cannot put pen to paper. [In undertaking the] task of writing, one aims to be systematic and meticulous, but this is impossible without the energy to do so. The first draft of On Cognitive Objects was in fact [written from the perspective of] the lineage of Dharmapāla 護法 [sixth century]. When I taught it at Peking University in 1922, I managed only to get through half the text. The following year I suddenly came to be full of doubts about the old learning. Extremely uncomfortable about the lineage in which I had put my faith, I completely destroyed the first draft and began to draft New Treatise! My friend Lin Zaiping 林宰平 of Minhou 閩侯, style Zhijun 志均 [1879–1960], frequently criticized and reproached me on many important matters relating to this [system of] learning, such that I could not lightly dismiss those matters. He benefited me greatly. The first half of On Cognitive Objects was written in North China; the second half was written while nursing a cold at the West Lake in Hangzhou. Due to illness, during this ten-year period there have been few opportunities to write, and many opportunities to rest and ponder. On Cognitive Objects has been completed in fits and starts, so there are inconsistencies in the quality of writing. Since coming to the West Lake, I have often discussed doubtful meanings with my friend Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (Fu 浮), and he has been of 4. This refers to his notes of 1922 that were published in 1923 as Weishixue gailun (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning), based on his lectures at Peking University. 5. Indian Yogācāra exponent. See the translator’s introduction. 6. By this time, however, the first draft had already been published. 7. Friend and colleague of Xiong Shili. He taught in the philosophy department of Peking University during the same period when Xiong first taught there.

Y6693.indb 17

6/30/15 2:55:41 PM

18

Introduction

great help with many parts of “Explaining the Mind” (明心). In discussions of the transformation of the sixth consciousness in “Explaining the Mind, A” (明心上), the mental associate “vigilance” in “Explaining the Mind, B” (明心下), and the final paragraph, I have mostly adopted Yifu’s meaning. In those places where this book critiques the old doctrines, I first set out what they posited, making certain to try to be concise and to the point. I was particularly painstaking with my commentary. I wanted to ensure that even though the reader had not studied the old learning, he would still be able to follow the system of that learning on the basis of what I had written, discern its main import, and only then fully comprehend what was being proven by the new meaning.

8. This final paragraph refers to the divisions in the original 1932 edition of New Treatise and thus begins with “Because these seven mental associates are pure, and because they counteract, they are called wholesome mental associates” on p. 141 of the 2001 redaction.

Y6693.indb 18

6/30/15 2:55:41 PM

1

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

My aim in writing this treatise is to awaken those who study the learning that is concerned with fundamental wisdom (玄學) to understand that Reality (實體 [tattva]) is not a perceptual field (境界) detached from one’s own mind, nor is it a cognitive object of knowledge. This is because it is only by seeking within that there is correspondence with true realization. True realization is the self ’s recognizing the self, with absolutely nothing concealed. Correspondence with true realization is called wisdom (智 [ jñāna]) because it differs from the mundane world, which is established on the basis of discernment (慧 [ prajñā]). How are wisdom and discernment distinguished? On the one hand, it is because the meaning of wisdom is that self-nature (自性 [svabhāva]) is awareness, and because it is inherently without a basis. When we reflect within, brilliantly, in a thought-moment, there is clear awareness. This precisely is the awareness of self-nature; hence it is said “self-nature is awareness.” In fact, awareness is self-nature. It is simply that by joining [words] together, this word [“self-nature”] is formed. Moreover, the word “self-nature” (自性) is but a different term for [Fundamental] Reality. If one includes all things in the cosmos, and refers to their origin, it is called Reality. If one refers strictly to one’s own origin, it is called self-nature. This is because although verbally they are different, what they refer to is the same. “Without 1. See Xiong’s discussion of discernment as a mental associate, New Treatise, pp. 111–112 (pagination of the 2001 redaction). 2. See the matching description, New Treatise, p. 142.

21

Y6693.indb 21

6/30/15 2:55:41 PM

22

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

a basis”: this is because this awareness does not rely on sensory experience, nor does it rely on logical inference. On the other hand, it is because the goal of discernment is “to distinguish things,” and because this distinction arises from experience, wisdom and discernment Here, “discernment” equates to what is commonly called lizhi 理智 (reason) or zhishi 知識 (knowledge). should be distinguished. The details of this are to be found in my On Epistemology (量論). Now, for the sake of convenience, because here all I want to do is to provide an outline of Reality (體), students should please take note. When Reality is discussed in the mundane world, generally it is something pursued externally. Each person employs his knowledge, engaging in empty speculation, and in doing so, fabrications are securely established— this is great delusion! One who truly sees Reality returns to the inner mind. [When one sees real existence] nothing separates self and other, and one can realize that things and self share the same source. Here the “inner” of “inner mind” is not a term contrasting with outer. It is only nominally said to be inner. Here “mind” is what was earlier referred to as self-nature. This is because the term “mind” can refer to Fundamental Reality (本體) and also accord with [the sense of] functioning—they must not be confused. Students should make a determination according to the context. There is a saying: “If one person faces a corner, all the other people present will commiserate and be unhappy.” What is the reason for this? It is because the minds of all the people present [p. 11]

are the mind of that one person. This is because there simply was never a separation of self and other. This suffices for us to understand that this mind 3. This part of New Treatise was never completed. Xiong does, however, provide further discussion of the “wisdom”/“discernment” distinction on pp. 137–138 of New Treatise. 4. Jia 假 “nominally; provisionally” ( prajñapti) is a basic Buddhist concept used to convey the idea that something exists in name only—it has no inherent existence, no selfnature, no reality. It provides an expedient means by which to talk about things as if they did exist. 5. The pagination in square brackets, which runs throughout the translation, refers to the pagination in the second volume of the Xiong Shili quanji recension of New Treatise. This will facilitate finding the corresponding page of the Chinese text.

Y6693.indb 22

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

23

[reveals] that things and self are of the same source—this is what is meant by Reality. Whether moving or at rest, it is as one, dissolving the divisions of time and space. This mind does indeed flow incessantly, yet it is also profoundly tranquil and undisturbed. In regard to its incessant flow, it is nominally termed “moving.” In regard to its undisturbed, profound tranquility, it is nominally termed “at rest.” Being both in motion and at rest, it is devoid of the characteristic (相) of continuously arising (流轉), and so time cannot be securely established. Being both in motion and at rest, yet lacking a domain, space cannot be securely established either. Extremely subtle yet manifest; extremely close at hand yet god-like. Empty and devoid of characteristics, yet replete with myriad phenomena. Hence it says “Extremely subtle yet manifest.” Without arising from its seat, yet extending all over the dharmarealm (法界). A verse from the Flower Ornament Sutra says: “According to conditions, one follows one’s feelings and nothing is out of place, yet all the while one constantly occupies the seat of enlightenment.” This is a metaphor for the situation whereby near at hand the mind rules the body, yet in fact there is nowhere in the whole of the cosmos it does not reach. Hence this verse is borrowed to explain the meaning of “extremely close at hand yet god-like.” Accordingly, it is this mind alone that embodies the myriad things, omitting nothing. “Seeing the mind” amounts to saying “seeing Reality.” “To embody the myriad things” is saying that everywhere this mind is the Reality of everything and that there is no single thing that can be what it is without it; hence what is said. Here, however, the direct identification of the mind as Reality is a provisional teaching (權說). Refer to the chapters 6. This phrase is attributed to Cheng Yi in Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), Henan Cheng shi yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers), in Er Cheng ji 二程集 (Collected Works of the Cheng Brothers) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p. 153. 7. The dharma-realm is the universe as the Buddha sees it and so co-extensive with everything. This is the universe that features in the key scripture of Huayan Buddhism: Avatam . saka-sūtra (Huayan jing 華嚴經; The Flower Ornament Sutra). 8. Based on Dafang guangfo huayan jing 大方廣佛華嚴經 (the full title of The Flower Ornament Sutra), T10n0279_p0030a. 9. New Treatise, p. 83: “It is not the case that the mind is identical to Fundamental Reality (心非即本體也). Nevertheless, because the mind definitely is not transformed by things

Y6693.indb 23

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

24

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

“Explaining the Mind” (明心) [chapters 7 and 8]. It should, moreover, also be understood that the reference to “seeing the mind” is because the mind sees itself. This does not mean that a separate mind is used to discern the mind. That which the Doctrine of the Mean calls “genuineness completing itself,” or what the Book of Change calls “the self-illuminating illustrious virtue,” or the Analects calls “silently taking note” all mean that the mind sees itself. The mind is not transformed by things. If what is at issue here is perfunctorily explained away, then the import of what is being said will become irrelevant. The reason the mind can be said to be Reality is precisely because it is not transformed by things. Now, if we understand this in terms of our life, whereby it is only by dint of robust vitality that we are able to control things and not be led by them, then it may be said that this alone is the mind, and also that this alone is Reality. If one’s person becomes mired in the selfish desire for things such that one cannot extricate oneself—that is, one becomes completely transformed by material qualities—and one’s life (生命) disappears such that [it seems that one] never possessed a mind and has lost one’s intrinsic Fundamental Reality, then one is merely a heap of dead matter. Hence this illuminating Reality stands by itself and can be called wisdom (智 [ jñāna]). Because the mind is not transformed by material qualities, it is an aware, illuminating, pure, and clear Reality that stands by itself, relying on nothing. Accordingly, it is called “wisdom.” If one is able constantly to maintain this wisdom and not lose it, then one’s self will recognize one’s self without any impediments involved. What does it mean to say that “one’s self recognizes one’s self ”? It means that this recognition is detached from such discriminative markers as subject (能) and object (所), inner and outer, and sameness and difference, and therefore it may be said that the mind is not different from Fundamental Reality (心即本 體耳).” 10. “Zhongyong 中庸” (Doctrine of the Mean), Liji 禮記 (Book of Rites), 53.5a, Shisan jing zhushu ed. 11. “Images: commentary,” Jin 晉 (Progress) hexagram, Book of Change, 4.11a. 12. Analects (Lunyu 論語) 7.2. 13. According to the editorial changes listed in New Treatise, p. 146, note 2, Xiong later wanted this sentence to be amended to: “Wisdom thus has the function of serving as inner cognitive object (反緣). What is meant by ‘the self ’s recognizing the self ’ is unlike the situation of a mirror or similar object being unable to reflect itself.” Elsewhere Xiong uses the analogy of a lamp illuminating itself rather than illuminating other objects.

Y6693.indb 24

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

25

is in fact bright and clear because it recognizes itself from within. Hence it is not empty and nothing; nor is it an undifferentiated state of primal chaos. Hence nominally it is said that one’s self recognizes one’s self. “One’s self ” is also a term of nominal postulation. Understood in this sense, one may speak of “seeing one’s mind” and also “seeing Reality.” “Understood in this sense” refers to [p. 12]

the meaning of “the self ’s recognizing the self ” above. In these times, those who practice philosophy reject wisdom in favor of employing knowledge. Wisdom is something that everyone inherently possesses, but they do not know how to maintain it; hence it is said to be rejected. Having rejected it, they then fail to understand that they were originally in possession of it. What here is meant by rejecting zhi 智 is something absolutely different from what Laozi meant by rejecting zhi 智. The zhi 智 that Laozi rejected is called “knowledge” (知識), what I term hui 慧. Hence when they talk about Reality, they immediately assume that it pertains to the sphere of activity of conceptual fields. Si 思 is to construct mentally; yi 議 is to deliberate. In deliberation there are boundaries, and in mental construction there are images. As for Reality, however, it cannot be sought using images or measured using boundaries. Those who employ knowledge, however, are unaware of this and so regard Reality as pertaining to the sphere of activity of conceptual fields. They take it to be an external conceptual field detached from one’s own mind. Since they assume that it pertains to the sphere of activity of conceptual fields, they regard it as an external conceptual field detached from one’s own mind. In other words, they consistently seek principles (理) externally, just as one might observe things (物). From “Hence when they talk about Reality” up to here elucidates how the use of knowledge is as such. As for what is termed “knowledge,” it has always been developed on the basis of looking outward at things. In the universe that constitutes our everyday lives, because we regard that which our senses detect to be real cognitive objects (實在境) external to our mind, so we distinguish and deal with them accordingly. This is how knowledge has been developed. Hence knowledge is merely a tool by which to seek principles 14. Daode jing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and Its Power) or Laozi 老子, zhang 19.

Y6693.indb 25

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

26

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

externally. If this tool is used only in the universe that constitutes our everyday lives—that is, within the world of physical principles—of course it cannot be deemed inappropriate. If this tool is used carelessly, however, when one wants to solve metaphysical problems with this tool, and one posits Reality as a cognitive object of the external realm in order to trace its principles, one will be greatly mistaken. Ming dynasty Confucians Wang Yangming and Huang Lizhou criticized vulgar Confucians for “seeking principles externally,” and in their philosophy they indeed developed some unique insights. It is, moreover, a great pity that, hitherto, scholars have generally not understood that Wang and Huang set themselves limits beyond which they would not venture in their speech. A detailed consideration of this matter, however, should properly be undertaken in On Epistemology. They fail to understand that these principles can be sought only within. Returning to one’s inherent mind (本心), they are obvious and cannot be concealed. [The mind] simply does not allow even an iota of self-interest to be hidden within. From the mind’s grief [caused by selfishness,] we know what is not permissible. Thus we know that this mind is utterly genuine and true, indistinguishably forming one body with heaven, earth, and the myriad things. As for selfinterest, it happens to be a delusion that occurs after we are constituted with form-and-vital-stuff (形氣), and so of course it has absolutely no connection with Fundamental Reality. Thus by returning to one’s inherent mind, one will already discern Reality. Only this can be deemed “self-recognition.” “Self-recognition” refers to the statement above about “the self ’s recognizing the self,” what is called “inner realization detached from words.” [Those who pursue Reality externally] engage in empty speculation, and in doing so, fabrications are firmly established. Such as monism, dualism, pluralism, and so forth. On the strength of this, they eagerly flaunt their conceptual 15. Wang Yangming 王陽明 (Shouren 守仁; 1472–1529) was the most influential Confucian philosopher of the Ming dynasty; Huang Lizhou 黃梨洲 (Zongxi 宗羲; 1610–1695) was a famous scholar, reformer, and political theorist. 16. Often just a reference to the physical body; however, on p. 60 of New Treatise, Xiong writes: “in human life the existence of this body and also the physical world this body encounters are collectively called ‘form-and-vital-stuff.’ ” 17. See, for example, Ru lengqie jing 入楞伽經, T16n0671_p0542c04, translated by Bodhiruci (d. 527). This is the third of the four Chinese translations of Lan˙kāvatāra-sūtra (Sutra on the Buddha’s Entering the Country of Lanka).

Y6693.indb 26

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Explanation of the Thesis (明宗)

27

elaborations, not turning back even at the end of their lives. Since the cosmos amounts to nothing (空無), The “real” world, constructed by means of conceptualization and discussion, is just the same as the floral images [eidetic images] generated when you knead your eyes with your fingers. [p. 13]

human life is utterly devoid of any basis. If Reality is not perceived, then human life is but a bubble. Is this not greatly lamentable! If, however, one understands that the application of discernment (慧) is limited, then it would seem to be the eradication of knowing (知). Discernment (慧) pertains to the physical world. Because its application is limited, it cannot be used to perceive Reality. Hence, in philosophy, although one must eradicate knowledge (知識), in fact it is not a case of completely eliminating knowing; thus is said “seem.” To reveal the home of the mysterious mirror (玄覽), one should revere fundamental wisdom. “Mysterious mirror” is a term from Laozi. Here it is borrowed to serve as the ultimate meaning of fundamental wisdom (玄學) and does not necessarily match its original meaning. “Fundamental wisdom” is so named because wisdom is fundamental. If one is skilled at “returning” (反), then immediately [fundamental wisdom] will be there. There is no need for endless searching. The meaning of “returning” is well worth profoundly savoring. Only the dual application of calming (止) and cultivation of insight (觀) warrants being termed “returning to seek” (反求). If one follows one’s nature, then what appears before one will be genuine. There is no need to have a fondness for quiescence. This perhaps is the full scope of the teachings in this Treatise. As for indicating the aims of this Treatise, this has been briefly accounted for in the foregoing. As to the matter of elucidating weishi 唯識, it is appropriate to do so in detail after this. Hence, following next after this “Explanation of the Thesis,” I talk about weishi.

18. Laozi, zhang 10. 19. Calming (止) and cultivation of insight (觀) are two central practices in Buddhist meditation. The first involves cultivating a state of calm concentration on one’s meditative object. The second refers to gaining insight into its final nature, that is, Suchness or for Xiong, Fundamental Reality.

Y6693.indb 27

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

2

Weishi (唯識)

In the preface to his [Cheng] weishi [lun shuji] 成唯識論述記 (Commentary on the Treatise on Demonstrating Nothing but Consciousness), Tang dynasty Buddhist master Kuiji 窺基 states: “Wei 唯 (only; merely) is to refute [the view that] cognitive objects exist. Attachment to their existence misses what is true. Shi 識 (consciousness) is to be differentiated from the [false] view that the mind is empty. This says that consciousness is established so that it will be differentiated from the view that “the mind is empty.” Since Kuiji allows that consciousness is not empty, the mind is [therefore] also another name for consciousness. Being mired in emptiness is counter to reality.” See the preface to Cheng weishi lun shuji. The meaning here is not definitive. Deluded attachment [to the view that] there are real external cognitive objects certainly misses what is true, and must be refuted. Yet, because consciousness that grasps cognitive objects is precisely the mind that attaches, then it is deluded and not real, so how then could [consciousness] be said not to be empty? If one were to take deluded consciousness to be one’s real mind, presuming that it is not empty, this would be just like mistaking a thief for one’s own son. There is no greater error than this. Now, I say that cognitive 1. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0229b26–27. On Kuiji, see the translator’s introduction. 2. “Definitive meaning” (了義) is used to describe doctrines that require no further explanation because their veracity is evident.

28

Y6693.indb 28

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Weishi (唯識)

29

objects falsely construed as real exist only because of deluded consciousness, and in fact are not cognitive objects at all. By observing consciousness one will know that cognitive objects do not exist, and hence that there is nothing wrong in rejecting cognitive objects [as real]. Here, all the references to “cognitive objects” are to the external cognitive objects one attaches to. Deluded consciousness also exists by virtue of relying on the real mind, yet is actually at odds with what is real. “Consciousness” gets its name from its function. Because it gains illusory appearance through its function, yet lacks self-nature, and also because it is intermixed with habitual defilements (習染), it is said to be deluded. Function (用) relies on Reality (體) to arise. Thus it is said it is by relying upon real mind that deluded consciousness exists. For function to be able to arise, however, since it must be intermixed with habitual defilements, it is utterly at odds with what is real, and so there is the error of deluded attachment to external objects. [p. 14]

Once real [mind] is realized, one will know that consciousness is illusory, and hence it should be said that consciousness is empty. Real mind depends upon Fundamental Reality for its name. Having seen Reality, one can then know that the momentary illusory manifestation of function is fundamentally devoid of real dharmas. As for habitual defilements’ having no root, they have always been a matter of deception. However, those who do not see Reality simply take the flow of function’s admixture with habitual defilements to be real. This is a great mistake. Pursuing this goal, I will first employ weishi 唯識 to refute the attachment to cognitive objects. I will then refute the attachment to consciousness. 3. That is, visual consciousness sees, olfactory consciousness smells, and so forth. 4. For example, the idea that the visual consciousness “sees” or the auditory consciousness “hears.” 5. Alternatively, ranxi 染習. This is the propensity to act in certain ways due to bad habit or custom. 6. Hence Xiong’s criticism of Kuiji. 7. A real dharma is a dharma that has self-nature and causal function. 8. Again, a criticism directed at Kuiji. This is confirmed on p. 25 of the vernacular redaction of New Treatise.

Y6693.indb 29

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

30

Weishi (唯識)

. REFUTING ATTACHMENT TO COGNITIVE OBJECTS  First, refuting the attachment to cognitive objects. The Yogācāra masters of old [in India] had developed plentiful arguments on this. In ancient times, non-Buddhist schools and masters of the lesser [vehicle] were all attached [to the view that] there are real external objects, existing independently, separate from consciousness. “Masters of the lesser [vehicle]” refers to Hīnayāna masters. The former Yogācāra masters refuted them, one by one. This caused the followers of pernicious views, Views that are not correct are referred to as pernicious views. on hearing the refutations, to be bereft of a basis to support their views. One needs only to take a glance at Kuiji’s two commentaries [Weishi] ershi lun [shuji] 唯識二十論述記 and the Sanshi lun shuji 三十論述記. to see how finely wrought were the arguments developed by the Yogācāra masters. Their treatment of [technical] terms and [abstract] principles is brilliant and is especially useful as a resource for study and discussion.

1.1 Hnayna Views on Attachment to Cognitive Objects Summarily surveying the views of Hīnayāna masters in regard to the matter of attachment to cognitive objects, in turn I will briefly examine two presumptions, subjecting them to scrutiny and rectification. The first can be termed the Presumption Based on Utility. Based on the habits formed as a result of the use of things in everyday living, it is presumed that there are real objects existing externally. This is a consequence of relying on false presumption. This is the basis for the name of this presumption. The second is the Atomic Presumption. This presumption is in fact separated out from 9. All subheadings are introduced by the translator and do not exist in the original text. 10. The 1932 redaction of New Treatise does not have the character word lun 論 following ershi 二十. This title is a commentary on Vasubandhu’s Vim . śatikā (Weishi ershi lun 唯識二 十論; Twenty Verses). Twenty Verses presents a defense of basic Yogācāra teachings. Weishi ershi lun is the title of Xuanzang’s Chinese translation (two earlier translations were made by Bodhiruci and Paramārtha, respectively). 11. This reference is actually to Kuiji’s Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記 because Cheng weishi lun focuses on Vasubandhu’s Trim . śikā.

Y6693.indb 30

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Weishi (唯識)

31

the first presumption and is named on the basis of what is presumed, and because it is atoms that are presumed. 1.1.1 The Presumption Based on Utility

The Presumption Based on Utility refers either [to the view] that presumes the individuated existence of dharmas such as jars, vessels etc., and that they actually exist separate from consciousness, Although this is the conventional theory, the [views of the] Hīnayāna masters and non-Buddhist schools were actually based on it. or [to the view] that presumes the collective existence of the universe of our everyday life and that it actually exists separate from consciousness. This is based on the conventional theory, but considerably refined. It holds that the myriad images we encounter in our everyday life—what is called the universe—have objective existence and do not exist only by virtue of relying on one’s consciousness to cognize them. The Hīnayāna masters and non-Buddhist schools both belong to this category of presumption. In analyzing the basis of the material universe, those who subscribe to the Atomic Presumption say that there are real atoms and they exist separate from one’s consciousness. “Atoms” (極微) are also given the shorter name of wei 微. Modern people, with their atoms and electrons, are also of this ilk. Thus, in basing myself [on the arguments developed by] the Yogācāra masters of old, I make the following refutations. Gross Material Objects Exist Independent of Consciousness: Thesis and Refutation Some of those who subscribe to the Presumption Based on Utility hold that manifest before us are many gross material objects (粗色境) Such as jars and things. that exist independently, separate from consciousness. This is the conventional presumption. This is to fail to understand that if such cognitive objects were separate from one’s consciousness, there would be no things. Cognitive objects arise only as a result of conceptual discrimination 12. “Atoms” is the translation of jiwei 極微 or paramān.u (also translated as weichen 微塵), which in Indian philosophy refers to the smallest and hence indivisible body of matter. This is similar to the classical Greek concept of an atom.

Y6693.indb 31

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

32

Weishi (唯識)

([計度]分別). Conceptual discrimination is cognition. If separated from discrimination, these cognitive objects would not exist. That which is conventionally reckoned to be a jar is white when looked at and solid when touched. It is called a “jar” as a consequence of the sixth consciousness’s (意) integrating the characteristics of solidity and whiteness, etc. Those who are attached to the imaginatively constructed discrimination of gross material forms have always maintained that jar-objects actually exist independent of consciousness. Seeking what is the case in actual matters, [p. 15]

then if a jar-object were to be separated from the visual and tactile characteristics integrated in the [sixth] consciousness, then what object would we expect to remain? We thus know that neither as principle (理) nor as phenomena (事) do jar-objects exist. The Existence of Gross Material Objects Is Proven by Their Integrated Characteristics: Thesis and Refutation Someone might in turn raise the following objection: “Jars and other gross material forms do exist. When we see [jars] there is whiteness, and

13. Conceptual discrimination (abhinirūpan.ā-vikalpa) is one of the three kinds of discrimination (三分別) and concerns the conceptual discriminations made by the sixth consciousness. 14. Xiong is here referring to yishi 意識 (mano-vijñāna), or the sixth consciousness. In the vernacular redaction of New Treatise, p. 26, the corresponding passage uses the term yishi 意識. The sixth consciousness is the thinking consciousness. It also brings together and differentiates the sensory impressions derived from the five sensory consciousnesses. That is, it can think about what the other five sensory consciousnesses perceive; the five consciousnesses do not have this reflective and integrative capacity. 15. This is the first of the three natures (trisvabhāva; 三性) of cognition. The first nature is the nature of existence produced from attachment to imaginatively constructed discrimination (遍計所執性; parikalpita-svabhāva). The second nature is the nature of existence arising from causes and conditions (依他起性; paratantra-svabhāva), and hence ultimately is a false construct. The third nature is the nature of existence being perfectly accomplished (圓成實性; parinis.panna-svabhāva). As Dan Lusthaus observes, however, since the notion of self-nature “presumes self-hood, it too must be eliminated. Thus the three self-natures are actually three non-self-natures.” See Dan Lusthaus, “Yogācāra School,” in Buswell (ed.), Encyclopedia of Buddhism, vol. 2, p. 918. 16. That is, neither in principle nor in actuality.

Y6693.indb 32

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Weishi (唯識)

33

when we touch them there is solidity, and so when we integrate the characteristics of solidity and whiteness, we get jars. How can you say that jars in the external world are not real and that they are arbitrarily constructed by consciousness?” I would reply: “In regard to your objection, even if solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics are external objects and not tied to consciousness, each of these characteristics would need to be clearly differentiated, so by what means would the whole jar be apprehended? Your sixth consciousness integrates solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics to constitute a jarobject, and so this jar-object is purely a deluded construction on the part of your [sixth] consciousness. Separated from consciousness, how could such a cognitive object ever have existed? “The Whiteness and Solidity of a Jar Are External Characteristics: Thesis and Refutation “Furthermore, if you employ logic to deduce proof for whether solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics are external objects, it becomes extremely difficult to settle the matter. “Take your presumption that a jar’s characteristic of whiteness genuinely exists externally and does not depend upon consciousness to appear. If that were so, this whiteness should have a fixed characteristic. How, then, do you explain that when you view it from a distance and when you view it from close by, the whiteness varies? Moreover, when many people look together, the whiteness they apprehend is different in each case. This tells us that whiteness does not exist externally; rather it is manifest in accord with the visual consciousness. Thus it is difficult to find proof that the whiteness of a jar is external. “Further, you say that the solidity of a jar does not depend upon consciousness in order to appear—this is also groundless. If solidity were external, it too should have a fixed characteristic. Now, if one felt a jar’s solidity, from when young until when one is old, a person would apprehend different degrees of solidity. From youth until old age, a person’s body undergoes many changes. Indeed it is countless persons. It is only from the succession of characteristics that it comes to be regarded as one person. Because each person’s sensation of solidity is, in turn, different, we know that solidity does not exist externally; rather it simply relies upon the tactile consciousness in

Y6693.indb 33

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

34

Weishi (唯識)

order for its characteristic to appear. Hence, just as with the case of whiteness, there is no proof that the characteristic of solidity exists externally. Accordingly, the manifestations of solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics each depend on consciousness in order to appear, and to be integrated to constitute a jar. This arises purely from the conceptual discrimination of the sixth consciousness. The sixth consciousness deludedly engages in conceptual discrimination. Logically, it certainly cannot be established that externally there are gross material objects.” This is because to presume that there are gross cognitive objects outside of the mind is, logically, something that cannot be established. Experience Confirms That Solidity, Whiteness, and Other Characteristics Have External Causes: Thesis and Refutation Although the above refutes the conventional presumption, there are also those who possess keen intellects who are able not to be stubbornly attached to jars and other such substantial things, yet who, until the very end, presume that an external realm truly exists separate from consciousness. They presume that the universe of our everyday life actually exists separate from consciousness. Hence such a person might raise the following objection: “I accept that jars and other large cognitive objects do not truly exist, and I also have nothing to dispute. Although solidity, whiteness, and other such characteristics are manifest by means of consciousness, is it really that there are no external causes enabling consciousness to make them manifest? If there are not, it should be the case that when we are not looking [at white objects] our consciousness would continuously manifest whiteness, and when we are not touching [hard objects] our consciousness would continuously manifest solidity. Now, since this is not the case, then of course solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics have external causes. Logically, this should stand.” [p. 16]

I would reply: “For consciousness to manifest solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics, there must be a cognitive object as cause. I am prepared to accept this meaning. However, the cognitive object that functions as the cause certainly does not have an independent existence separate from consciousness. How so? This is because cognitive object and consciousness are a whole (一體). Because they are a whole, they resonate with one another

Y6693.indb 34

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Weishi (唯識)

35

(交感). Because they resonate with one another, we can say, nominally, that the cognitive object has the power to function as cause, conveying an image of itself [to consciousness] (帶己相). Dai 帶 has the sense of “to resemble” (似). See Cheng weishi lun shuji. The term ji 己 is posited as the cognitive object’s reference to itself. This is saying that it is only because cognitive objects have the power to act as causes that they are able to cause consciousness to manifest images that resemble cognitive objects. If [cognitive objects] are talked about as causes in this sense, then their existence should be accepted. Now, for you to state that there are external causes would be illogical. What is the reason for this? Because you presume [the existence of] external causes, you assert that [cognitive objects] are separate from inner consciousness and exist independently. [According to your reckoning,] inner and outer are separated, neither connecting with the other nor close to the other. Since there is no way for them to affect one another, how can there be a sense in which [cognitive objects] serve as causes? Thus your presumption that there is an external realm that causes the characteristics of solidity and whiteness to appear in inner consciousness is nothing more than your own erroneous presumption and rightfully cannot be accepted. There is no fundamental difference between those who are stubbornly attached to an external world and those who are attached to the imaginatively constructed discrimination of gross material objects: each is the source of deluded habits.” The explanation set out above is easy enough to understand, but people are blocked by [misguided] discriminations that are difficult to eliminate. They remain constantly mired in trivial habits, unable to realize the sublime import [of this argument]. The Hīnayāna masters of old employed direct perception (現量) to prove the existence of external objects, maintaining

17. For a cognitive object or dharma to cause a cognition of itself to appear in the mind of a perceiver, an ālambana (所緣; mental appropriation of a cognitive object) must act as the cause of the cognition, and it must convey an image of the cognitive object (vis.aya; 境). That image, which arises in the mind, is believed to resemble (sādr.śya; 似) that object. 18. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0500c02. “Dai 帶 means that the mind [comes to] resemble the image of the object [conveyed to it].” 19. One of the three ways of knowing: knowing by learning from the scriptures (āgamapramān.a; 聖教量), direct perception ( pratyaks.a; 現量), and logical inference (anumāna; 比量). Since the time of Dignāga (sixth century), only the latter two were held to be valid sources of knowledge. Dignāga was an influential philosopher and logician. In China he was

Y6693.indb 35

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

36

Weishi (唯識)

that the existence of dharmas is determined by means of knowledge, and that of all the means of knowledge, perception is superior. Accordingly, they cited this as evidence. It is like ordinary people who say, “Now I see color, and I am even able to make contact with perceptual fields (觸觸). Here the second 觸 character is a noun referring to all perceptual fields. If there were no real cognitive objects separate from consciousness, would I have this awareness? Now, I immediately realize cognitive objects just as they are!” Such is how they interpret matters. In talking about the existence of dharmas, it is proper to employ direct perception as the standard gauge. This is indeed a valid thesis. It is just that what they mean by perception refers to when the eyes contact visual objects or the body contacts with perceptual fields, then there is awareness of colors and so forth. Hence it is also called immediate awareness (現覺). This interpretation appears to be the case but confounds the truth. Actually, when there is awareness of visual and other objects—that is, when the perceiving has already passed—it is not called direct perception. Why? When the visual and other consciousnesses perceive and verify cognitive objects, the reason they do not become attached to them as external objects is because there is no conceptual discrimination (計度分別). In the following moment, the sixth consciousness is aroused, there is deluded discrimination, and only then is there attachment to external objects. Thus, awareness of visual and other cognitive objects is a function solely of the sixth consciousness. Awareness Discrimination by the sixth consciousness. and pure perception (正見) Direct perception by the sensory consciousnesses (感識). do not occur simultaneously, thus when there is this awareness the perceiving Direct perception by the sensory consciousnesses. has already passed by. Should one thus accept that having this perception verifies the existence of external objects? An inference should be formulated that states: When an awareness arises, it necessarily is not perception; it is the state of

considered to be part of the Yogācāra tradition. Dignāga’s Ālambana-parīks.ā—as translated by Xuanzang—played an influential role in the twentieth-century revival of Yogācāra. 20. The three sentences “It is like. . . . just as they are” are from Kuiji, Weishi ershi lun shuji, slightly modified: T43n1834_p0999b09. 21. The first five consciousnesses.

Y6693.indb 36

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

Weishi (唯識)

37

the “unrestrained mind” (散心). The unrestrained movement of the sixth consciousness is called “unrestrained mind.” [p. 17]

This is because the perceiver is no longer there. It is like the state of the unrestrained mind that takes as its cognitive object matters from one hundred thousand eons in the past. “To take as a cognitive object” (緣) is “to be cognitively concerned about” (思慮). As for what I refer to as direct perception, since it does not involve attachment to the external, this thus verifies that external objects do not exist. It differs from what you say. Further, as for what you said about when there is immediate awareness of color and so forth [cognitive objects], [actually] the manifestly [activated] perceiving consciousness (能見現識) of the instant before had already extinguished and so the manifest cognitive object that was perceived (所見現 境) also disappeared simultaneously with that perceiving. Hence, what you say about immediate awareness of color and other cognitive objects in fact no longer involves manifest cognitive objects because these cognitive objects have already ceased. Another inference can be formulated: when awareness occurs here, it is certainly not direct perception but rather the state of “unrestrained mind.” This is because the cognitive object is no more. It is like the state of the unrestrained mind’s taking as its cognitive objects things from one hundred thousand eons ago. It is also like when we are dreaming, etc. “Etc.” refers to illusory sensations. Even though there are no external cognitive objects, we still have the awareness that color and so forth [sensory objects] appear before me now. Yet are you able to accept that when I am dreaming and so forth there actually are color and so forth external objects? If you are not willing to accept this, then at other times of immediate awareness, by reason of which causes and conditions are you firmly attached [to the view that] these cognitive 22. This inference takes the form of a three-part syllogism (as developed in Buddhist logic and epistemology [ yinming 因明; hetu-vidyā]). (Thesis [宗]) “When a sensation occurs, it necessarily is not direct perception, but rather is the stage of ‘unrestrained mind.’ ” (Reason [因]) This is because subjective perception is no longer there. (Example [喩]) The unrestrained mind takes as it object (緣) matters from one hundred thousand eons.” 23. Color, sound, odor, taste, and tactile objects.

Y6693.indb 37

6/30/15 2:55:42 PM

38

Weishi (唯識)

objects really exist separate from consciousness? “Other times” refers to those times when one is not dreaming or having illusions. (a) The Evidence Provided by Memory Confirms That Visual and Other Consciousnesses Previously Sensed External Cognitive Objects; and (b) The Illusory Nature of Cognitive Objects Experienced in Dreams Is Confirmed When One Is Awake, Therefore the Experience of Cognitive Objects When Awake Should Be Trusted and So External Objects Do Exist: Thesis and Refutation In the past, Mahāyāna [masters] refuted [the arguments of the Hīnayāna masters], as related above. They [the Hīnayāna masters] did not, however, concede defeat, but posed counterarguments to save themselves. In order to prove the existence of external objects, one of them raised the case of memory (憶持), [arguing] that it still constitutes direct perception (現量). Yichi 憶持 is another term for memory (記憶). This master said that, at a past moment in time, the visual and other consciousnesses had sensed external color and so forth objects, but at the present moment in time, only the sixth consciousness is capable of retaining the memory. If previously [the external cognitive objects] had not been sensed, then now what is being remembered? Because of memory, it should be accepted that previous sense consciousness is real; that is, in the past the external cognitive objects that had been sensed and were manifest in consciousness definitely did exist. Accordingly, the explanation (義 [artha]) that the previously manifestly [activated] consciousness (曾現識) directly perceived a previously existing cognitive object (現量曾有境) [should be] accepted as proven. “Previous” means “in the past.” Another Hīnayāna master used dreams to prove his case, similarly believing that external cognitive objects exist. If the two states of consciousness— dreaming and being awake—are equally devoid of external cognitive ob24. In these three paragraphs, Xiong is clearly drawing on the argument developed by Vasubandhu in Vim . śatikā. For translations of the relevant passages, see Francis H. Cook (trans.), Three Texts on Consciousness Only (Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999), pp. 402–403. 25. Xiong is drawing on the argument developed in Vim . śatikā; see Cook, Three Texts on Consciousness Only, p. 402. 26. Xiong is reproducing an argument made in Vim . śatikā; see Cook, Three Texts on Consciousness Only, p. 403.

Y6693.indb 38

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

Weishi (唯識)

39

jects, and everyone in the world is able to know by themselves that objects experienced in dreams do not exist, then analogously, they should further understand by themselves that when awake there are no cognitive objects either. Accordingly, [he continued,] it should be asked: When dreaming, the mind has no cognitive objects, and when one awakes, then one knows that there were none. Yet [simply] because there are no cognitive objects for the state of awoken consciousness, how does one know by oneself that they do not exist? Since one does not know by oneself that [cognitive objects] do not [really] exist, can one also know that there are definitely no objects for the state of dreaming consciousness? In going back and forth to deduce proof, one should trust consciousness when awake. External objects definitely and truly exist. In examining these two counterarguments, [it is evident] that they are superficial and fail to investigate either the principles or the phenomena. I will commence by explaining the first counterargument. You maintain that the consciousness’s current memories are definitely derived from external material and other objects of consciousness directly sensed at a previous moment of time. [p. 18]

This explanation is not correct. It should be understood that what past sensory consciousnesses (過去感識) have taken as cognitive objects are not external objects. This must be accepted. They are not external objects for the reason that they are not separate from consciousness. This is because that which in the mundane world is erroneously discriminated and attached to as real cognitive objects, separate from consciousness, do not correspond with what I mean by cognitive objects. As such, those which past sensory consciousnesses have taken to be objects are not external objects and instantaneously both [consciousness and object] cease. Consciousness arises and ceases instantaneously; it is the same with objects. There are no dharmas 27. Amending bu 不 to zi 自 on the grounds of parallel structure and coherence. 28. The implication is that it would be necessary to be able to awaken from being awake for this even to be possible. 29. Xiong here is reproducing an argument made in Vim . śatikā; see Cook, Three Texts on Consciousness Only, p. 403. 30. This second-person reference does not actually refer to a real person.

Y6693.indb 39

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

40

Weishi (唯識)

that abide temporarily. It is simply that there is remnant habituation due to the potency of conceptualization (想). Conceptualization is one of the mental associates (心所). For details, see the section “Explaining the Mind, B” [chapter 8]. When the mind takes some object as its cognitive object, conceptualization and the mind collaborate to grasp the image of that cognitive object. Because the potent function of that conceptualization is not sterile, necessarily there are remnant habituated tendencies (習氣). Thus, these are what the images of the cognitive objects taken as the cause of consciousness (所緣境 [ālambana-vis.aya]) rely upon to maintain their existence. In the present moment of time, the sixth consciousness causes the habituations to arise by means of the power of memory (念). Habituations are remnant impressions of previous memories and conceptualizations. To be able to remember a previously [conceptualized] object is called memory. Nian 念 is memory (記憶) and is one of the mental associates. For details, see the section “Explaining the Mind, B” [chapter 8]. It is not because, in the past, consciousness took as its object an external object that later there is memory. You cite the example of memory to prove that former direct perceptions in fact had external objects [as their objects of perception]. The principle is truly not so. The truth of the matter is that in citing the example of memory, all that can be proven is that there was a past manifestly [activated] consciousness. That which was directly sensed, however, was not an external cognitive object. This is because, contrary to what you presume, in fact there was no external cognitive object that had been directly sensed. Hence, your evidence has been adduced in vain. Now I will elucidate the second counterargument. It is not the case that cognitive objects experienced in dreams truly exist outside of the mind. One must be awake before one is aware of them. So long as one is dreaming, one will be unaware that cognitive objects experienced in dreams do not exist. Cognitive objects experienced when awake similarly do not truly exist out31. Mental associates: cognitive activities that relate to the mind specifically. This topic is the focus of “Explaining the Mind, B.” Conceptualization is one of the so-called omnipresent mental associates that Xiong describes in “Explaining the Mind, B”: contact (觸); attentiveness (作意); received [sensations] (受); desire (欲); conceptualization (想), and volitional impulse (思). (Conventionally there are only five, but Xiong added desire to the group.) They are said to be omnipresent because they always operating in cognition. 32. One of the so-called five object-specific mental associates.

Y6693.indb 40

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

Weishi (唯識)

41

side of the mind. It is only when one has reached the step of true awakening that one knows this. Through habit, conventional erroneous discriminations becloud the mind—it is as if one were dreaming. None of that which is perceived truly exists, but until one has attained true awakening, one never knows this. Only when one has reached the state of true awakening can one truly understand that there are definitely no real cognitive objects that exist outside [of the mind] such as is conventionally held. This is not to disallow that there are cognitive objects; it is only to disallow that real cognitive objects exist outside [of the mind] such as is conventionally held. Given that you accept that when one awakens, in the conventional sense, from dreaming one understands that what one had formerly dreamed was not real, then you should accordingly accept that when one attains true awakening from delusion, one understands that the objects to which former delusory habituations are attached similarly do not exist. The explanation in both cases is consistent; what is to be gained in raising objections? 1.1.2 The Atomic Presumption

The above responses suffice to rectify confused thinking. Next, the Atomic Presumption should be examined and settled. Non-Buddhist Indian schools had already formulated doctrines about atoms. By the time of the Buddhist Hīnayāna masters, these doctrines became increasingly prolific. Although there is insufficient space here to examine these doctrines in detail, on the essential points most of the doctrines are similar, and these points can be discussed briefly. Most proponents of the Atomic Presumption maintain that atoms possess the characteristic of roundness and that seven atoms combined to constitute a material [particle] of an.u (阿耨色). At the center is one atom, [p. 19]

surrounded by four atoms, one located in each of one of the four cardinal directions, as well as one atom above and one atom below [in a threedimensional configuration]. When [this cluster of] seven atoms is combined 33. In the vernacular redaction of New Treatise, p. 34, Xiong describes aru se 阿耨色 as “the minute system constituted by seven atoms combined together” and glosses it as “small material particle.”

Y6693.indb 41

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

42

Weishi (唯識)

Cluster of seven atoms that make up an an.u. (Drawing by John Makeham.)

with others Multiple an.u. they are moved about in various permutations to form low tables and so forth, or the earth, or even innumerable worlds. Masters of the Treatise of the Great Commentary on the Abhidharma ([阿毘達磨大]毘婆沙[論]; [Abhidharma-vibhās.ā-śāstra]) say that atoms have no inclination to be in contact with other atoms. Wu chu 無觸 means that they are unable to draw near to one another, because they are removed from one another. According to this account, all the small an.u that make up this low table I am leaning on are really like countless solar systems. Nev34. An early commentary on the Abhidharma (lit. “higher doctrine”) corpus and associated with the realist Sarvāstivāda school. The Vibhās.ā masters were a sub-branch of the Sarvāstivādin school, which in turn was a major branch of Indian Abhidharma Buddhism. Abhidharma is a general term referring to scholastic presentations of Buddhist doctrine. The early Abhidharma was based on discourses attributed to the Buddha, and its practitioners attempted to synthesize their doctrinal statements into consistent dogmatic systems.

Y6693.indb 42

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

Weishi (唯識)

43

ertheless, my body is actually leaning on them, and I am not worried that it will fall down. Strange indeed! Overview of Non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna Schools’ Theories About Atoms: Theses and Refutations The Mahāyāna school did not accept that there exist real atoms, and it always rebutted the non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna schools either for maintaining that atoms have extension or for maintaining that atoms do not have extension. If it is said that atoms have extension, then since they have extension, atoms should be able to be broken down [into smaller components]. However, that which can be broken down is not a true atom. [Moreover], if it is said that because the characteristic of an atom is roundness, then what is posited as east cannot be east, and it is the same with west, because atoms do not have extension, The Sarvāstivādins advanced this presumption [that atoms do not have extension]. this would not be correct either. If atoms do not have extension, then they are not material-form dharmas (色 法). Hence an inference can be formulated: “[Thesis:] An atom does not constitute material form. [Reason:] This is because it cannot be shown to have characteristics such as east and west. [Example:] Atoms are just like mental dharmas (心法).” [This inference] establishes that atoms are not form dharmas. Further, you [Hīnayāna masters claim that] gross material forms are [actually] many atoms. [You claim that] apart from gross material forms, there are no atoms, and apart from atoms, there are no gross material forms. Another inference should be formulated: “That which you refer to as gross material forms should not be considered to be material forms. This is because they are constituted of atoms. This [argument] is just like [the first argument above] that your atoms are not material forms.” This establishes that gross material forms are not material forms. 35. If something is round it has to have sides—but without extension there can be no sides. 36. Form dharmas—material objects—are characterized as occupying space, offering physical resistance, and being subject to decay. The Sarvāstivādins maintained that phenomenal objects (dharmas) exist. 37. As distinct from physical objects. This inference takes the form of a three-part yinming syllogism. 38. That is, everything is made up of clusters of atoms.

Y6693.indb 43

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

44

Weishi (唯識)

Following on, a [third] inference can be formulated: “[If gross material forms are atoms], when a hand touches a wall and other such objects, there should be no resistance. This is because the wall is not a material-form dharma. It is like space etc.” The above three examples of inference (比量) provide counterevidence to the claim that atoms definitely have extension. By virtue of the reason that [something] has extension, necessarily it can be taken apart. Things that can be taken apart necessarily [p. 20]

have no real self-nature. Accordingly, your claim that atoms truly exist [as material dharmas] is untenable. In the past, in order to prove that atoms really exist, Hīnayāna masters such as the ancient Sarvāstivādin masters, the Sautrāntika masters, and the later Sarvāstivādin masters all maintained that the atoms, or the material forms created through the aggregation (和合) of atoms, are cognitive objects directly apprehended by the sensory consciousnesses (感識). The ancient and later Sarvāstivādins had different interpretations of how atoms become cognitive objects directly perceived by the sensory consciousnesses. The Mahāyāna school repeatedly refuted them one by one, as described in brief below. Ancient Sarvāstivādin Theory About the Aggregation of Atoms: Thesis and Refutation The ancient Sarvāstivādins maintained that there really are numerous atoms that are each distinguished to be a cognitive object. They presumed that each of the numerous atoms has “real existence” (實體 [dravya]). They said 39. Xiong is saying that suppose we accept that atoms exist, and they have extension (they are material dharmas); nevertheless the wall itself is not a material dharma but only a collection of atoms. As such, one should be able to pass one’s hand through. The fact that one cannot means that the claim that the wall is made up of atoms is problematic. 40. These “inferences” anticipate some of the following longer sections on atomism. 41. The first five consciousnesses. 42. A dravya (often mischaracterized in secondary literature as “substance” or “substantial”) means—in Buddhist contexts—what is real and has causal function. “Anger” is a dravya (it causes emotional, physiological, and karmic consequences). “Words,” “aging,” “time,” etc. are dravya according to Sarvāstivāda, but Sautrāntika and Yogācāra disagree, arguing

Y6693.indb 44

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

Weishi (唯識)

45

that in reality there are numerous atoms. For example, when jars etc. are the cognitive objects of visual consciousness, in reality the cognitive objects of visual consciousness are individual atoms. How is this so? The self-nature of each individual atom really exists. As for numerous atoms aggregating to form jars and other such grossly manifest cognitive objects, this is merely a case of aggregated nominal phenomena (和合假法). Jars etc. are constituted through the aggregation of many atoms and so have no real self-nature, and so this is termed “aggregated nominal [phenomena].” Visual consciousness takes real [phenomena] as its cognitive objects; it does not take nominal [phenomena] as its cognitive objects. This is because there must be a real entity (實體 [dravya]) for visual consciousness to arise. For more on the topic of the sensory consciousnesses’ taking real phenomena rather than nominal phenomena as cognitive objects, refer to the section “Explaining the Mind, A” [chapter 7]. The Mahāyāna [masters] refuted this argument as follows. Even if each separate atom were able to serve as the condition for the sensory consciousnesses, The Sarvāstivādins presumed that atoms have real existence because atoms are what are depended upon in leading to the production of the sensory consciousnesses. What is said here is [only] tentatively allowed to stand. it is certainly not what is grasped (所緣 [ālambana]) by the sensory consciousnesses. This is because they are not what the sensory words and so on are prajñapti, only nominal labels for more complex underlying actual causal chains. The components of those underlying chains would be dravya. So to label an atom as a dravya is automatically to confer causal status on it. Here I take Xiong to be using the term 實體 to convey the notion of dravya rather than tattva. 43. Pixels would be an analogy for this. 44. See the paragraph beginning, “The sensory consciousnesses take real objects, and not nominal dharmas, as their cognitive objects.” 45. That is, a sort of tautological argument: atoms cause consciousness to perceive them because they are real, and they are real because they are what cause consciousness to perceive them. 46. An ālambana 所緣 is part of an act of cognition—that is, a mental appropriation of cognitive objects. Once taken up, it forms a mental image (ākāra; 相) in the mind that resembles (sādr.śya; 似) the vis.aya. Xiong’s version of the argument might well draw from its formulation in Dignāga’s Ālambana-parīks.ā (Investigation of That Which is Mentally Grasped), a debate text in which Dignāga sets out to refute various early Indian realist ac-

Y6693.indb 45

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

46

Weishi (唯識)

consciousnesses take cognizance of (緣慮). What is the reason? It is because in regard to the cognition that arises in response to that which is mentally grasped, the image of the cognitive object that is taken as the cause of consciousness must appear in consciousness. Now, given that there are no images of atoms in the visual and other consciousnesses, it can be known that atoms are not what are grasped by the sensory consciousnesses. Sautrāntika Theory About Aggregations of Atoms: Thesis and Refutation The Sautrāntika masters maintained it is aggregations (和合 [samūha]) of multiple real atoms that constitute cognitive objects. Being in close mutual proximity in the same locus is termed he 和; drawn together to constitute the same object is termed he 合. According to this account, individual real atoms are not the cognitive objects of the visual and other consciousnesses because there are no atoms in the visual and other consciousnesses. If, however, many atoms aggregate to constitute jars and other gross cognitive objects, even though the entity is only nominal, because the images of these cognitive objects are in the visual and other consciousnesses, they are cognitive objects of the visual and other consciousnesses. Mahāyāna [masters] refuted this argument as follows. [Contrary to] your [presumption], it is not the case that aggregated material forms in consciousness are the condition (緣). Yuan 緣 here means “to rely on” (藉). Consciousness does not arise alone; there must be support. For example, only with counts of atomism. (Historically this text has different Chinese titles, just as it has different Chinese translations. Xuanzang’s rendering, Guan suoyuan yuan lun 觀所緣緣論, can be translated as Treatise on Investigating the Conditions Enabling the Mental Appropriation of Cognitive Objects. This was the rendering Xiong was familiar with). According to Guan suoyuan yuan lun: “[Thesis:] [Even if the Sarvāstivādins] posit that atoms are the condition for the five consciousnesses, they are not the ālambana, [Reason:] since there is no image of them in consciousness. [Example:] Just as with the visual and so forth sense organs.” (T31n1624 _p0888b10–11：極微於五識設緣非所緣。彼相識 無故。猶如眼根等。) In other words, just as the physical eye merely provides the basis or condition for seeing, yet does not cognize visible objects, so too atoms may function as conditions for the five consciousness (as claimed by the ancient Sarvāstivādins), yet they are not the ālambana. 47. Xin weishi lun, vernacular edition, Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 3, p. 33, and also in Fojia mingxiang tongshi, p. 342, Xiong glosses yuanlü 緣慮 as silü 思慮. This is a mental appropriation of cognitive objects (including mental objects). 48. These arguments and objections are possibly based on Guan suoyuan yuan lun, T31n1624_p0888b08–15.

Y6693.indb 46

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

Weishi (唯識)

47

the color blue being a condition can a visual consciousness that discerns blue be generated. Here what is being said is that the material forms [constituted by] aggregations [of atoms], such as jars etc., which the Sautrāntika [masters] refer to, most certainly are not the conditions that give rise to the visual and other consciousnesses. What is the reason? It is because those [aggregated material forms] actually lack [real] existence. “Those” refers to aggregated material forms. They lack real existence (實體) because they are nominal dharmas (假法). [p. 21]

It is because all “conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects” (所緣緣 [ālambana-pratyaya]) must have real existence if they are able to function as conditions generating consciousness. It is not the case that dharmas lacking real existence are able to function as conditions. Refer to the discussion of “conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects” below. Later Sarvāstivādin Theory About Combinations of Atoms: Thesis and Refutation The later Sarvāstivādin masters maintained multiple real atoms form collections (和集 [samcitta]) that constitute cognitive objects. For the meaning of he 和, see the explanation above [“Being in close mutual proximity in the same locus is termed he 和”]. That which is not a single entity is called a collection (集). According to this account, atoms at the same locus are in close proximity to one another, and operate to support one another, each one [contributing to] form a gross image, just as numerous atoms assemble to form a mountain etc. With numerous atoms each supporting one another, 49. The standard Indian example is blue and is typically rendered in Sinitic Buddhist contexts as qing 青. 50. These arguments and objections are possibly based on Guan suoyuan yuan lun, T31n1624_p0888b16–20. 51. Here they are assuming that atoms have extension and characteristics such as solidity. 52. This description is similar to that attributed to the Vaibhās.ika (a later branch of the Sarvāstivādins) author Sam . ghabhadra (fourth to fifth centuries). See Abhidharmanyāyānusāra śāstra (阿毘達磨順正理論; Abhidharma According with Reason Treatise), T29n1562_p0350c07–27. See also Malcolm David Eckel, Bhāviveka and His Buddhist

Y6693.indb 47

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

48

Weishi (唯識)

then each individual atom has the same measurable characteristics as that of a mountain etc. Hence, [these collections] serve as the ālambana condition (所緣緣) for the visual and other consciousnesses. The first yuan 緣 means “to take cognizance of ” (緣慮); the second yuan 緣 means “to rely on” (緣藉). Mahāyāna [masters] refuted this argument as follows. The self-nature of atoms that form collections, and the self-nature of atoms that do not form collections to support one another, is the same. How could lending support to one another possibly lead to a large thing that gives rise to sensory consciousnesses? An inference states: “[Thesis:] In regard to your [presumption] about mutually supporting atoms, it should not be granted that they serve as what is taken cognizance of by the sensory consciousnesses. [Reason:] This is because they [would have to] appear as images of atoms. [Example:] Such as when they are not combined to lend support to another.” Next, what you said also made the mistake about [atoms] also having the same measurable characteristics [as a mountain etc.]. If one hundred milOpponents (Cambridge, MA: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University, 2008), pp. 247–248, n. 57. 53. Again a pixel scenario; each atom has the characteristics of a mini-mountain and contributes to the overarching image that is the mountain. The problem here is that individual atoms do not have characteristics—the Sarvāstivādins’ position, however, claims that by virtue of being clustered together, individual atoms take on common characteristics. Here an unstated premise is that if there is a sufficient quantity of atoms a large object such as a mountain can be formed. Liang 量 ( parimān.a): measure of any kind—for example, circumference, length, size, weight, number, value, duration. 54. Unlike the Sautrāntika theory about aggregations (和合 [samūha]) of atoms, in which the aggregated whole is is not real (dravya) but nominal ( prajñapti), the later Sarvāstivādins maintained that collections (和集 [samcitta]) of atoms constitute real entities, not nominal ones. Xiong’s understanding of the later Sarvāstivādin position is not as convincing as the interpretation developed by the Ming dynasty commentator, Mingyu 明昱 (1527–1616) in his Guan suoyuan yuan lun huishi 觀所緣緣論會釋 (Collected Interpretations of the Ālambana-parīks.ā), X51n0830_p0811c07-13, where he advances the idea that it is collections of, for example, red atoms or bitter atoms or cold atoms that cluster together to “support” one another to form gross cognitive objects such as mountains. Xiong’s account is based on Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1834_p0993a02-03. 55. Again, this seems to be focusing on the ālambana’s being part of an act of cognition. 56. That is, to rely on as an enabling condition or support. 57. Atoms cannot appear in consciousness, since they do not exist. 58. It has already been refuted that individual atoms can be the objects of consciousness.

Y6693.indb 48

6/30/15 2:55:43 PM

Weishi (唯識)

49

lion atoms were used to make a jar and the same number of atoms were used to make a bowl, the characteristics of the jar should be the same as the characteristics of the bowl. This is because in each there is the [same] number of atoms supporting one another. Now, since the appearance of the jar and bowl differ, it can be known that it is not the case that the same number of mutually supporting atoms function as the causal condition of the sensory consciousnesses. The ancient and later Sarvāstivādin masters each maintained that atoms can be directly apprehended by the sensory consciousnesses. Their thesis was never based on actual testing but rather was derived from mental constructs. For this reason, one by one, the Mahāyāna [masters] negated them, leaving the Sarvāstivādin masters bereft. 1.1.3 Change Alone Is Reality

Someone asked: “The non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna masters were the first to develop the [theory of] atoms, which is quite close to modern scientific thought. The Mahāyāna [masters], however, stood alone in having consistently refuted the theory. Why?” I replied: “Mahāyāna [masters] use the perspectives of fundamental wisdom (玄學) to refute the theory that there are real atoms. [As such, their perspectives] are certain to be appropriate. It seems as if it is only within the context of its being accepted in the mundane world (世間極成) that the non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna masters hypothesize that atoms truly exist. Shijian jicheng 世間極成 means that in regard to actual life or the experiential world, it is postulated that the myriad images truly exist. Refer briefly to the Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom (大智度論; Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra) and the Chapter on Knowing Reality (眞實義品; Tattvārthapat.ala). It is certainly the case that just as with science—which is also in the 59. These arguments and objections are possibly based on Dignāga, Guan suoyuan yuan lun, T31n1624_p0888b22–29. 60. Commentary on the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, attributed to Nāgārjuna (second to third centuries), which emphasizes the doctrine of emptiness. 61. A section of Asan˙ga’s *Bodhisattvabhūmi (Stages of the Bodhisattva Path), which in turn constitutes the sixteenth section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師 地論; Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice). Tattvārtha-pat.ala was translated into English by Janice Dean Willis as On Knowing Reality (New York: Columbia University

Y6693.indb 49

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

50

Weishi (唯識)

experiential realm, and postulates that atoms (元子) and electrons are entities that really exist—the import in each case is the same. If discussed from the perspective of fundamental wisdom, the [erroneous views about] entities that either the mundane world or science assumes really to exist must be refuted and corrected. Why is this so? That which fundamental wisdom seeks is absolute reality. This refers to Reality. This is because when the entities that either the mundane world or science assumes really to exist are investigated from the perspective of fundamental wisdom, then the reality of their existence is erased, and they are uniformly subsumed within absolute truth. If the Reality of manifest images [phenomena] is clearly perceived, then it will be understood that manifest images [p. 22]

inherently do not really exist and that this Reality alone is the sole real existent. Someone asked: “Cannot the atoms and electrons you refer to be said to be Reality?” I replied: “How could they? What are you talking about? Reality refers to Supreme Change (太易) before it is manifest as vital stuff (氣). This is based on Yi Qian zao du 易乾鑿度 (Chiseling Open the Regularity of Qian of the Apocrypha of Change). Change possesses two modes: changing and staying the same. Although Change changes and does not stay put, it is always like its nature: both changing and staying the same. The Buddhists talk about it in terms of “not transforming” and “not moving” and thus seem to overemphasize the sense of “staying the same.” More sublime is the sense of both “transformation” and “staying the same” found in Supreme Change. This Reality is inherently unnamable; tentatively and contrivedly it is named “Change.” “Supreme” is a laudatory term. “Before it is manifest as vital stuff ” this Reality is Absolute Void (至虛) and does not belong to the realm of havPress, 1979). Bodhisattvabhūmi describes the practices and outcomes of those practices for the bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna tradition. An asterisk (*) before a Sanskrit name or title indicates that a particular name or title is not attested in Sanskrit, and is thus a tentative proposal. It is a reasoned guess, but is not certain. 62. A text dated to the first century b.c. Yi Qian zao du 易乾鑿度 A.5b, Chizao tang Siku quanshu huiyao 摛藻堂四庫全書薈要 (Condensed Library of the Four Treasuries) ed. (Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1986–89).

Y6693.indb 50

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

51

ing (有) [defining characteristics]. As for vital stuff, it is the most silent, the most subtle type of having [defining characteristics]. Before vital stuff has been made manifest, it is said to be absolutely devoid of any sound and odor. Nothing excels Change in talking about Reality. Xuanzang’s memorial to the emperor Taizong 太宗 [r. 626–649] stated: “Even though the one hundred things have correct names, this has no bearing on the realm of Suchness (真如).” Discussing Change in these terms, Xuanzang shows that he really did not understand it. Empty, it cannot be traced; Traces and images cannot be used to seek it. hence there is nothing it does not completely fill (充周). If it had traces, then it would have a location and so be unable to ceaselessly fill. Zhou 周 means it is perfect; chong 充 means it does not rest. Since everywhere it is the Reality of the myriad things, Because it completely fills, hence it is the Reality of the myriad things. how could it be talked of in terms of atoms and electrons? How could Reality be an assembly of minute parts (細分)? The non-Buddhist Vaiśes.ika [school] (勝論[宗]) said that atoms were also termed “minute parts.” They presumed that both the mind and things consisted of atoms and appear to have regarded atoms as Reality. Students today in China are very inclined toward materialism, and so it is quite common to come across people saying that Reality should not be talked about too mysteriously, as it is nothing more than atoms and electrons. 1.1.4 The Indivisible Unity of Consciousness and Cognitive Objects

In sum, in refuting the notion of external cognitive objects, the Mahāyāna [masters] had ample basis for their arguments. The term “consciousness” is highlighted vis-à-vis cognitive objects. As soon as one speaks of “consciousness” then there is “object.” How could there possibly be only consciousness and no object? Originally, cognitive object and consciousness were divided on the basis of their respective “meaning-function” (義用), 63. Xuanzang, “Xie Taizong Wen Huangdi zhi Sanzang shengjiao xubiao 謝太宗文皇帝 製三藏聖教序表” (Memorial to Thank Emperor Taizong [r. 626–649] for Writing a Preface to the Tripit.aka), in “Si Shamen Xuanzang shangbiao ji 寺沙門玄奘上表記” (Record of Memorials Presented by Monk Xuanzang), T52n2119_p0819b07. 64. One of the so-called six early Hindu schools of philosophy. This school maintained that all objects consist of a finite number of atoms. 65. As Xiong states below: “It is through being contrasted with cognitive objects that consciousness gets a name; [having a name,] then its form (形) is highlighted.”

Y6693.indb 51

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

52

Weishi (唯識)

Yiyong 義用: because their role-functions (作用) are different, their meaning is divided into cognitive object and consciousness. yet in reality, the whole flows and cannot neatly be separated into two segments. Because it is not an unchanging whole, however, it is illusorily manifested, taking on the aspects of subject (能) and object (所). Consciousness is named neng 能 because it is able to know. Objects are named suo 所 because they are that which are known. In terms of appearance only, subject and object are mutually entailing; it cannot be said that either issues from the other. As such, subject and object accompany one another with no identifiable boundary between them. No demarcation between consciousness and cognitive object can be found. Thus, even if one wanted to separate them, there is certainly no place even to begin. This is due to the so-called flow of the whole. From my own body to the sun, stars, and the earth, and even other bodies, Besides one’s own body, there are the bodies of all sentient beings. these are all cognitive objects. [To regard] one’s body as a cognitive object that is not separate from one’s consciousness is how, as a person, one knows it. [p. 23]

“To regard one’s body as an object” means to regard one’s body in relation to one’s consciousness, since one’s body is also a cognitive object, and this is how it is known. The sun, stars, and the earth, and even other bodies— all of these cognitive objects are contained and circulate within one’s consciousness and collectively form a whole [with one’s consciousness]. There has never been an “inner” and an “outer” for consciousness and objects to be divided into. What, then, is the basis for people’s being completely ignorant about this matter such that they hold that these objects are all separate from one’s consciousness and exist independently? The sun and the moon, shining high above, are not separate from my visual consciousness; the earth, broad and dense, is not separate from my tactile (履) consciousness. Lü 履 is tactile consciousness. Other bodies that exist in great profusion alongside one another are not separate from my feelings (情思). Accordingly, consciousness and all aspects of cognitive objects are the same whole. When there is a sensation [associated with an object of consciousness,] then there is interconnectedness [with consciousness] and the response [of consciousness] is god-like. The reason for this is that there has never been separation from the whole.

Y6693.indb 52

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

53

1.1.5 Defining Weishi

Accordingly, the term weishi 唯識 [serves] to refute only [the presumption of the independent existence of] external objects and does not mean that cognitive objects do not exist. Because cognitive objects and consciousness are the same whole and are not separated, hence it is said to be “weishi.” Wei 唯 means “unique” (殊特); it does not mean “only/solely.” Consciousness is able to discern cognitive objects; its potent function is unique. In referring to consciousness and terming it “unique,” [this is because] the referent (義 [artha]) also includes cognitive objects. How could one talk of weishi and then say that cognitive objects do not exist? Someone might, however, raise the following objection: “I am confident that even if cognitive objects are not separate from consciousness, all of the laws, axioms, and so forth relating to the everyday cosmos That is, the natural world. discovered by science are simply objective facts, and even though they have never been able to be discerned by consciousness, it is self-evident that these facts are true. If there were no scientific knowledge, such that most of the facts that science [has now] discovered were not able to be discerned, it is, nevertheless, self-evident that the facts [about the natural world] are true. What point, then, is there in insisting that cognitive objects are not separate from consciousness?” I would reply: “A line of argument becomes difficult to make when it becomes bogged down in minor issues. Weishi does not mean that there are no cognitive objects. It has never been denied that the laws, axioms, and so forth that you have spoken of are not facts. Rather, there is no need [for fundamental wisdom] to delve into these facts. Studies involving these facts should be the preserve of science. Hence there is no need for fundamental wisdom to delve into them. As for the example of consciousness’s discerning a cognitive object immediately before it (當境), this is definitely a case of a cognitive object’s not being separated from consciousness. Dang jing 當 境: because the cognitive object is immediately before it. As for cognitive 66. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading shute 殊特 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads teshu 特殊. 67. In his Fojia mingxiang tongshi, p. 189, Xiong explains this as follows: “Because no dharmas are separate from consciousness, it is called ‘weishi 唯識.’ Because this does not mean that there is nothing but consciousness, the term ‘wei 唯’ is used.”

Y6693.indb 53

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

54

Weishi (唯識)

objects that cannot be cognitively discerned, the key point is that they are also contained within the scope of cognitive inference (識量). It is, however, perhaps due to attentiveness (作意), that that part of consciousness consisting of what has been discerned is particularly manifest. On “attentiveness,” see “Explaining the Mind, B” [chapter 8]. That part of consciousness consisting of what is unable to be discerned, however, is merely hidden in the shadows in the domain of consciousness (識野). Because consciousness illuminates everywhere, it is only nominally referred to as “the domain of consciousness.” “Shadows” describes those places where discernment is not made manifest. It is certainly not the case that those cognitive objects that have not been discerned are distinct, separate entities, not interconnected with consciousness. If they are sought by means of attentiveness, these cognitive objects can also suddenly be made manifest. This can be used to confirm our knowing that when any cognitive object is unable to be discriminated, in fact it has never been the case that it has an independent existence separate from consciousness. You maintain that even if the laws, axioms, and so forth of science are unable to be discerned [by consciousness], it is self-evident that they are true. You use this to prove the existence of external cognitive objects. [p. 24]

Is it not the case that you have yet to glimpse the main point in my line of argument and have become bogged down in minor issues? The Common Insights of Indian Mahāyāna and Chinese Wise Men It is hardly the case that the meaning of “cognitive objects are not separate from consciousness” was created and elucidated solely by the Mahāyāna school in India long ago. In China, also, former wise men silently intuited its meaning; it is just that they were unwilling to develop this understanding in the form of doctrinal discussions. If one enquires into their subtle words, [their understanding] can more or less be discerned. “The way that combines the inner and outer” is the definitive meaning of the Doctrine of the Mean. 68. One of the five omnipresent mental associates described in the chapter “Explaining the Mind, B.” 69. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 53.5b. Xiong regards the Doctrine of the Mean as a book rather than a chapter.

Y6693.indb 54

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

55

“To combine the inner and outer” means that mind and cognitive object are indistinguishably blended. This is because genuine and clear-sighted (誠明) mind thoroughly resonates with all things under heaven with no impediment. This is what “cognitive objects transform in accord with mind” refers to; there is no appearance of discord born of opposition. “All of the myriad things are there within me” [contains] Mencius’s secret meaning. To integrate things into self (會物歸己) is the definitive meaning of weishi. If there is a thing that stands in contrast to me, then I am also simply a thing. Since there is no thing that is not me, there is thus nothing I depend on to be established, and so “me” is merely a nominally constructed term. Neither the aspect of “thing” nor the aspect of “me” exists—this is to be established without standing in contrast to something. Only having reached this point does one believe that one’s life has always been limitless. If one falls into [the trap of] “I and thing opposition,” then one loses one’s limitless life and so becomes a mere thing. “One who is humane forms an indistinguishable body with the myriad things” is the authentic realization of Cheng Hao. Cheng Hao’s words [refer to] regarding self and thing to be the same, but they mean the same as Mencius’s words. “The cosmos is not outside my mind” is the unconditional understanding of Lu Xiangshan. [Yang] Cihu’s 楊慈湖 [1140– 1225] “Ji Yi” 己易 (The Self and [the Book of] Change) strongly promoted his teacher’s doctrines. Coming to [Wang] Yangming, he frankly talked of there being “no things outside the mind.” As for the questions and objections raised by his followers, he dispelled their delusions in a few words. His Recorded Conversations states: The master journeyed to a southern town. Pointing to the flowers and trees on the cliffs, a friend asked him: “If there are no things outside the mind,

70. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 53.2b. 71. Mencius 7A.4. 72. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Henan Cheng shi yishu, p. 16 (where it is not attributed specifically to Cheng Hao). 73. Paraphrase of a comment made in the “Assorted Sayings” section of Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵, Lu Xiangshan quanji 陸象山全集 (Complete Works of Lu Xiangshan) (Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 1992), p. 273. Lu Xiangshan was an important Neo-Confucian thinker. 74. Yang Cihu was a disciple of Lu Xiangshan. 75. Wang Yangming, Chuan xi lu 傳習錄 (Record of Practicing What Has Been Transmitted), Sibu beiyao ed., 3.14a; see also 1.18b, 1.4b.

Y6693.indb 55

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

56

Weishi (唯識) then what about these flowers and trees in the remote mountains that blossom and wither of themselves—what have they to do with my mind?” The master replied, “Before you had begun to look at these flowers, both the flowers and your mind had reverted to a state of quiescence. When you came and looked at the flowers, then the color of the flowers suddenly became clear. From this it can be understood that the flowers do not exist outside your mind.”

What an incisive thesis this is! Hence [from these examples] it can be known that the principle (理) [in each case] is the same and that what Chinese and Indian wise men have founded (所建) is identical. Although Cheng Hao, Lu Xiangshan, and Wang Yangming had read a few Chan recorded sayings, they had certainly never read any Yogācāra (法相唯識) texts, yet what they had realized is a precise match with Yogācāra. Most of the Mahāyāna masters, however, became narrowly concerned with phenomenal characteristics and their names (名相). Examples such as Weishi ershi lun 唯識二十 論 [Vim . śatikā-vr.tti] and other treatises established [the principle] of weishi so as to refute [the existence] of external objects. In doing so, they all used formal logic, and although reasoned arguments are repeatedly in evidence, these treatises suffer from an excess of empty theorizing that borders on sophistry. Nearly all Mahāyāna treatises suffer from this problem. As for the various masters in China, although they were unwilling to flaunt doctrinal discussions, occasionally the deeply mysterious import of their vast yet profoundly subtle [awareness] is revealed in their notes and recorded conversations. Even a word or a phrase often has profound and far-reaching import that one can savor endlessly, yet it is only those with a special acumen who awaken to that import. It has always been the case that the gist of the definitive meaning of weishi is “assimilating things into self,” for in Reality (實際) there is absolutely no opposition [between self and thing]. Thing is self; [p. 25]

hence self is already completely devoid of any opposition and is only nominally termed “self.” “Reality” is a synonym for Fundamental Reality (本體). By assimilating “thing” and “me” within a single source, absolute and nonrelational/non-dependent (無待) Fundamental Reality is thereby made

76. Wang Yangming, Chuan xi lu, 3.14a.

Y6693.indb 56

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

57

manifest. The genuineness of human life, rather than an empty illusion of it, lies in this. Integrate the object (所) within the subject (能), and Fundamental Reality that is wisdom itself (智體) will brilliantly stand alone. Because the mind is able to discriminate cognitive objects, it is also able to re-create cognitive objects. Hence it is said “to be able” (能). Objects are merely that which is discriminated by the mind, and for this reason they transform in accord with the mind. Hence they are said to be “that which” (所). “Wisdom itself ”: wisdom is Fundamental Reality, and so it is called “wisdom itself.” For the meaning of wisdom, see the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis” [chapter 1]. If one were to speak about it in terms of what is close by, it is nothing other than inherent mind (本心). If someone were to ask what inherent mind is, I would reply as follows. When people are in hidden places, they have the clarity of self-reflection and cannot deceive themselves. This is inherent mind. This alone is the numinous clarity (神明) that humans possess innately and which has never been transformed into material form. Hence it is called inherent mind. The reason for refuting the [Hīnayāna masters’ and non-Buddhist schools’] attachment to [the belief that there are] external objects (外執). Attachment [to the belief] that there are external objects is called wai zhi 外 執. is the desire to make them realize this fundamental root (本根). Bengen 本根 means Fundamental Reality. Being attached, then, the inner and the outer will be in chaotic division. Being attached [to the belief that there] are external objects, then external objects and the inner mind or inner self will stand in opposition, and everything will be in chaotic division and not interconnected. Once awoken, then inner and outer dissolve. Once awoken to [the realization] that there are no external objects, then all aspects of chaotic division will be erased. Hence, in speaking of “dissolved,” what is meant is that all aspects melt and dissipate, and there is nothing left to be attached to. All the myriad things resonate and then connect; all that exists is within the range of thought. Hence, as soon as one mentions consciousness, this already includes cognitive objects, and as soon as one mentions cognitive objects this is [to speak of something] not separate from consciousness. Cognitive objects and consciousness are an indivisible whole. When manifest, both are manifest. When consciousness discriminates cognitive 77. This is the notion of vigilance in solitude (慎獨).

Y6693.indb 57

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

58

Weishi (唯識)

objects, it is made manifest, and cognitive objects are also made manifest with it. When quiescent, both are quiescent. When consciousness does not give rise to the discrimination of cognitive objects, this is referred to as “quiescence.” Cognitive objects, together with consciousness, are also quiescent. As a single whole they flow together—how could they possibly be distinctly separated? To insist that cognitive objects are separate from consciousness and exist externally amounts to dividing one’s own life and the cosmos into two slices—is this rational? Cognitive objects and consciousness are the same whole—there has never been an “internal” and an “external.” Despite this, why is it that, conventionally, everyone presumes that there are external cognitive objects? Human life cannot abandon actual living. All people rely on the myriad things in order to pursue growth in their life. Guo Xiang said: “In their lifetime, humans grow to less than two meters tall, but all of heaven and earth is there to serve them. Hence, heaven, earth, the myriad things, and all that exists— not even for one day is it possible to be without any of them. If any one is missing, then the living will have no means by which to live.” Although his words are easy to grasp, their significance is far-reaching. Because humans rely on things for their nourishment, they become habituated to (習) drawing on things The word xi 習is important. and so erroneously presume that things are cognitive objects external to the mind and in all sincerity run about in pursuit of them. After a long period of habituation, they regard these habits as their own mind and relentlessly pursue things without growing sated. [p. 26]

[Consequently] their attachment to external things becomes increasingly entrenched. Attachments can be broadly categorized into the general and the particular. For the particular, attachment is to [the belief that] there are real discrete things. Like jars and bowls. The characteristic of spatial exten78. Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312) was a noted Profound Learning (xuanxue) philosopher who wrote an important commentary on Zhuangzi that is reproduced in Zhuangji jishi 莊子集 釋 (Collected Explications of Zhuangzi), compiled by Guo Qingfan 郭慶蕃 (1844–1896) (Taipei: Muduo chubanshe, 1982). 79. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading yan 饜 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads yan 厭.

Y6693.indb 58

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

59

sion (方分空相) arises from this. If, based on a jar, it is held that there are the spatial divisions of east, west, and so forth, then these are the characteristics of space. As for the general, attachment is to [the belief that] there is a real external world. The so-called cosmos of everyday life. The characteristic of space as undifferentiated sameness (混同) arises from this. “Undifferentiated sameness” in all directions is an empty void. Because the undifferentiated is empty, there are no characteristics of difference. The human mind is always attached to [the belief that] there is a real external world and so presumes that there is an empty space, and hence the myriad existents are manifest within it. Because the characteristic of space arises, the characteristic of time arises with it. Because the horizontal and vertical differ, time and space are nominally distinguished. It is reckoned that on the horizontal axis there is the characteristic of space, and on the vertical axis there is the characteristic of time. Logically, in reality the characteristics of time are the characteristics of space—their form does not differ. The characteristics of the three worlds of past, present, and future are clearly demarcated. Moreover, they are each recorded using symbols Such as the ten heavenly stems (干) and twelve earthly branches (支) used to record years. and marked using instruments. Such as the second and minute [hands] on a clock. Hence the image of time in divisions is actually the transformed image of space. When attachment to external cognitive objects arises, the characteristics of time and space will definitely both occur. If there is no attachment to the existence of external cognitive objects such as jars etc., then how could the characteristic of spatial extension arise? If there is no attachment to the existence of a real external world, then the characteristic of space as undifferentiated sameness would of course also not occur. Since there is no characteristic of space, then there is also no characteristic of time. Using logic to advance proof, it can thus be known that the characteristics of space and time arise together because actually they are contingent upon attachment to external objects. Because the characteristics of space and time arise, attachment to external objects becomes increasingly entrenched. Because there are the characteristics of space and time, this further enhances the reality (實在性) of external objects. Their ongoing operation exacerbates confusion, and this is why there is no moment of awakening for the human condition. 80. That is, up, below, left, right.

Y6693.indb 59

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

60

Weishi (唯識)

. REMOVING ATTACHMENT TO CONSCIOUSNESS Having already refuted attachment to cognitive objects, the next step is to remove attachment to consciousness. Because of attachment to the belief that there are external objects, nominally weishi (nothing but consciousness) is spoken of so as to refute the belief [in the existence of external objects]. It is logical to accept the existence of cognitive objects that are not separate from consciousness. However, as for the conventional attachment to [a belief in] the independent existence of external objects separate from consciousness, such cognitive objects have never existed. It is just that—due to deluded consciousness—there is attachment to their existence through imaginatively constructed discrimination ([遍]計[所]執). Hence it is said that external objects are nothing but that which consciousness manifests. “Nominally spoken of ” because it is not the case that there is a real consciousness for there to be predicated “nothing but” (wei). This is explained below. If, moreover, there is deluded attachment [to the idea] that “inner consciousness” truly exists, then this is to make the same mistake as being attached to cognitive objects. It is through being contrasted with cognitive objects that consciousness gets a name; [having a name,] then its form (形) is highlighted—it is not just illusorily manifested as function. Whenever consciousness or the mind is talked about, at first the name is established on the basis of its function. [Consciousness or the mind], however, additionally has a different meaning, which is best nominally to regard as Fundamental Reality. Refer to the chapters [7 and 8] “Explaining the Mind.” In reality, [consciousness] and deluded habituated tendencies (妄習) are always together. The consciousnesses that pick out cognitive objects always contain deluded habituated tendencies and arise together with those deluded habituated tendencies. Habituated tendencies are said to be deluded simply because they have no basis. Since consciousness is intermixed with deluded habituated tenden81. As he explains in chapter 8, Xiong uses the term “mind” in two different senses: (1) as consciousness, and (2) as shorthand for inherent mind (本心), where it is synonymous with Reality. In the former sense it is associated with the category of “mental dharmas,” and just like material phenomena (material dharmas), mind does not have real existence—it is devoid of a discrete self-nature. There is, however, a self-nature or Reality that makes mind possible. This self-nature or Reality is called constant transformation. As the expression of the power of constant transformation’s self-nature, mind is not different from constant transformation and so is not different from Reality.

Y6693.indb 60

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

61

cies, it too is constituted of the deluded and is not able to be [part of] the flow (流行) of true mind. This point is crucial. Accordingly, consciousness has no self-nature (自性); just as [p. 27]

external objects are empty and so are not [external] things. Self-nature is the same as saying ziti 自體. This is because what is referred to as consciousness does not have independently existing self-nature (自體). Someone asked: “External cognitive objects really do not exist and so are said to be empty, yet consciousness is illusorily manifested as function and thus named—so it is not completely nonexistent. So why is it also said to be empty?” I replied, “External cognitive objects are said to be empty because they are inherently nonexistent. Because consciousness has no self-nature, it is said to be empty. Although the condition (情) of emptiness is different [from that of the case of external objects], [the fact of] consciousness’s being empty is just the same. Hence your being attached to the belief that consciousness really exists is just as deluded as being attached to external objects. In the past, Mahāyāna [masters] talked about nothing but consciousness (weishi) so as to refute attachment to cognitive objects. However, in also considering that attachment to [the belief that] consciousness is real is just as mistaken as the attachment to cognitive objects, they therefore nominally talked about [consciousness’s] being generated by dependent arising (緣生) so as to show that the images of consciousness are illusory and unreal. Yuan 緣 means “to rely on” (藉). Multiple characteristics rely on one another and hence are said to be causal conditions. Sheng 生 means “to arise” (起). The characteristics of consciousness are not real but rather arise as illusions, and so nominally [consciousness] is said “to be generated.” The characteristics of consciousness are a multitude of conditions relying on one another to be deceptively manifest and so are said to arise as illusions. If consciousness were a real existent (實有 [dravya]), it would have a real self-nature. By virtue of having self-nature, there would be nothing it relied on, and it would always be manifest [already] complete and whole. 82. Even though its manifestation as function (realized by being contrasted with external objects) is illusory, there must be something to be so manifested. 83. In the case of external cognitive objects, they have never existed externally but are an expression of consciousness. Both cognitive objects and consciousness are empty because they lack self-nature.

Y6693.indb 61

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

62

Weishi (唯識)

2.1 The Four Conditions Now, in having thus talked about the matter of [consciousness’s] being generated by dependent arising, it has been shown that the characteristics of consciousness [are a function of] the characteristics of a multitude of conditions. In other words, the characteristics of consciousness are nothing but the deceptive manifestation of a multitude of mutually dependent conditions. If they were removed, then there would be no separate characteristic of consciousness to apprehend. “Deceptive manifestation” is to say that even though there is the manifestation of characteristics, it cannot be upheld as real; hence it is named “deceptive.” Hence consciousness relies on [conditions] and is not manifest [already] complete and whole. It has always been devoid of self-nature. On self-nature, see above. It is not a real existent. The reason is agreed to and definite. To what does “the multitude of conditions” (眾緣) refer? Causes as condition (因緣), Causes are one sort of condition, and of the various conditions, they are the most important; hence they are ranked first [in the Four Conditions (四緣)] continuous sequence of sameness condition (等無間緣), ālambana condition (conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects) (所緣緣), and contributory factors as condition (增上緣). The meaning of the Four Conditions should be explained in sequence. 2.1.1 Causes as Condition

Former masters said that “causes as condition refers to conditioned dharmas’ (有爲法) directly accomplishing (辦) their own effects.” Only these 84. It is the condition under which seeds and “manifest activity” (consciousness) produce their own effects, simultaneously. 85. It concerns the relation between successive manifest activities—successive moments of mind-consciousness—and does not rely directly on seeds to be established. This condition provides theoretical support for the key Buddhist concept of instaneity: all dharmas extinguish as soon as they are produced. 86. This condition explains why consciousness alone is sufficient to explain our experiences. 87. Indirect causes and conditions, including those which merely do not interfere, disrupt, or hinder. 88. Dharmas that exist solely due to dependent arising.

Y6693.indb 62

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

63

were termed “causes.” See Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness, juan 7, and Commentary on Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness, juan 44, beginning on the first page. “Conditioned dharmas” refers to dharmas that function as causes. They have the ability to generate potent functions. Hence they are called “functional causes.” In Commentary on Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness, “to accomplish” (辦) is spoken of as “to execute.” Causes’ direct generation of their own effects is just like executing a business undertaking; hence the Commentary speaks of “executing.” Explained more precisely, “directly accomplishing [their own] effects” [means that] in relation to the effect, there is a sense of creative generation associated with the cause, “Directly accomplishing etc.” is because causes are able to create effects directly. and it also has a sense of being determinative. That is, in relation to the effect, the cause is able to determine the execution, and only for this reason does it say “directly accomplishing.” To discuss cause as such is certainly most consistent with the cause-effect concept formerly held in science. Since its mistake has already been corrected, there is no need to discuss it further. Now what needs to be disputed is the matter of following in the tracks of the established views of former masters who had first established seeds as causes. Cause (yin 因) is not [p. 28]

an empty term without reference. Hence to talk of yin, the term must have dharma-nature (法體). Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness, juan 89. Here the title Treatise on the Thirty Verses (三十論) is actually referring to Cheng weishi lun. See Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0040a21–22. 90. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0496a25 ff. 91. The reference here is oblique. The vernacular version of the text omits the reference entirely. It could be a general reference to Aristotle’s Four Causes (of which only efficient cause would in modern times be considered causation.) Alternatively, it could be a reference to quantum physics as opposed to Newtonian physics, but if so, the connection with Buddhist causality theories is obscure. Buddhism would be in the Newtonian camp. And there is no real “mistake” since the Newtonian view works perfectly well in ordinary situations and is viable in terms of the phenomena it attempts to describe. 92. Wu Rujun 吳汝鈞, Fojiao sixiang da cidian 佛教思想大辭典 (Dictionary of Buddhist Thought) (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1994), p. 318, under fati 法體: “In Abhidharma Buddhist teachings, dharmas were taken to be real, with self-nature (自體),

Y6693.indb 63

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

64

Weishi (唯識)

7, says “this dharma-nature [of causes as condition] is of two kinds. The first is called seeds.” For details, see Commentary on the Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness, juan 44, beginning on the first page. Now, these masters discussed the dependent arising of images in consciousness, and so they posited seeds alone as the cause [of consciousness]. They presumed that the arising of mind-consciousness (心識) had an origin. Mind and consciousness are spoken of together because of the convenience of referring to them with a binomial compound. Hence they established seeds as causes, Seeds were established to clarify the origins of mind-consciousness. and mind-consciousness was posited as the effect that seeds had directly brought to completion. Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness, juan 7, in the discussion of causes as conditions, explains the meaning of seeds’ generating manifest [activity] (現[行]). “Manifest” (現) refers to “manifest activity,” an alternative term for mind-consciousness. That is, it is saying that seeds are causes and thereby directly produce mind-consciousness. Seeds being inherently individuated They presumed that seeds are particular. Fa’er 法爾 means “inherently.” mind-consciousnesses were differentiated on the basis of seeds. Chabie 差別 means “not to be as one.” The former masters said that a person has eight consciousnesses: from visual consciousness and auditory consciousness, through to the store consciousness (阿賴耶識 [ālaya-vijñāna]). These eight are each independent entities. That is because the seeds from which they are generated differ. This is why “causes directly accomplish their own effects” refers to causes as condition. According to what they said, seeds are individuated, and [so] necessarily [they would] not accept that they might cause effects randomly. Accordingly, with the hence the term ‘dharma-hood.’ The Sanskrit for this term is svabāva. The term svabāva is usually translated as self-nature (自性); sva means ‘self,’ and bāva means ‘to exist; to be.’ Self-nature means self-existence: the self ’s possessing its own existence. Abhidharma Buddhist teachings maintained that all dharmas had their own self-nature that was constant and unchanging.” Xiong is arguing that Cheng weishi lun advocates that seeds have selfnature, a thesis he proceeds to attack. 93. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0040a22. The second kind is “manifest activity” (現行), which Xiong introduces on p. 52 (pagination of the 2001 edition). 94. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0496a29 ff. 95. The appearance of things in their manifest aspect in the seven consciousnesses as they emerge from seeds in the eighth consciousness; the world as it appears. 96. And hence they perfume only similar seeds.

Y6693.indb 64

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

65

seeds of visual consciousness functioning as cause, they directly accomplish their own visual consciousness effects; with the seeds of auditory consciousness functioning as cause, they directly accomplish their own auditory consciousness effects, and so too with the seeds of store consciousness functioning as cause, they directly accomplish their own store consciousness effects. Refer to the entry on “Each seed must generate its own peculiar manifestation and no other” (引自果) in the section where Vasubandhu explains the six meanings of seeds in his Commentary to the Compendium of the Great Vehicle (*Mahāyāna-sam . graha-bhās.ya; 攝大乘論釋). Given that the former masters did not realize that mind-consciousness is an intact whole of unimpeded flowing, but rather mistakenly broke it down into eight groups, this already fell into the error of comparing mind-consciousness with things (物). They broke down mind into eight [groups], just like breaking down material objects into molecules etc. This is to fail to realize that the mind is without dimension and form and mistakenly to compare it to matter. In further presuming that the mind is generated from seeds, with subject and object clearly distinguished, their fallacies multiplied greatly. Former masters said that “seeds” have six meanings, one of which is “Seeds are simultaneous [with their own effects].” This says that seeds are able to cause effects and that mind-consciousness is the effect that is caused. Thus effect and cause exist simultaneously; hence ‘seeds are simultaneous [with their effects].’ ” On examination, they classified mind and seeds as the two dharmas of subject and object, just like mother and child are two entities. Are their fallacies not great indeed! Now, since I hold that the former masters’ theory of seeds needs to be corrected, For details, see “Productive Power” (功能) [chapter 4] and the end of “Explaining the Mind, B” [chapter 8]. I cannot concur with their account 97. Vasubandhu’s commentary on Asan˙ga’s Mahāyāna-sam . graha; translated into Chinese both by Paramārtha (499–569) and by Xuanzang. Xiong is referring to Xuanzang’s translation: T31n1597_p0329c09–12. 98. Following Xiong’s marginal gloss to New Treatise as noted by the editors, p. 146, n. 3. 99. That is, seeds are momentary; they are simultaneous with their effects; they always accompany their respective consciousness; they must have the same moral character as their manifestations; they rely on many conditions to be manifest; they produce their own effects. See Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0009b08-b26.

Y6693.indb 65

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

66

Weishi (唯識)

of causes as condition, either. Now I revise the definition of causes as condition to the following: the appearance (現起) of mind-consciousness Here xian 現 is read in the sense that the term is used in the word faxian 發現, that is, in the sense of “to arise” (起). has always been self-animating and inexhaustible (不匱). Bu kui 不匱 means continuous movement with no concern about deficiency. It does not mean that because there are seeds, this necessarily entails a capacity to generate consciousness, and that only this can be given the name “cause.” This sentence starts with “it does not mean” and finishes here. As for consciousness, it arises as an incessant flow of ever-renewing thought-instants. That is, it is incessant and ever renewing yet self-animating. “An incessant flow of ever-renewing thought-instants, etc.”: mind dharmas flow incessantly. Because each thought-instant successively ceases, thought-instants are born anew. [p. 29]

Hence with reference to the interconnection of that which precedes and that which follows, it is called an incessant flow of ever-renewing thoughtinstants etc. Why is it said to be self-animating? Consciousness is without dimension and form. Without dimension and without form. Its sole characteristic is discernment (了別). Although it arises because of its dependence on the sense organs, Here “sense organs” refers to the five sense organs and the central nervous system. “To depend upon” (慿) is “to rely on” (憑藉). The mind has always been empty, relying on the sense organs to operate. Hence it is said “to depend upon.” in reality it controls the sense organs and so is not a by-product of the sense organs. The ears, eyes, and other sense organs are able to encounter things without being thrown into disorder simply because the mind is the controller of the sense organs. For this reason, it cannot be said that mental functions are a by-product of the brain. Although it arises by relying on perceptual fields (境界), In order to arise there must be perceptual fields that it relies upon. it is able to transform perceptual fields. None of the perceptual fields of color, sound etc. are able to throw the mind into disarray, yet in reality the mind relies upon them to manifest 100. Here Xiong is indicating the scope of the negative fei 非. 101. Discernment of cognitive objects.

Y6693.indb 66

6/30/15 2:55:44 PM

Weishi (唯識)

67

the functions of acuity of hearing and clear-sightedness. The mind is able to transform perceptual fields so that they do not obstruct the mind. Hence it is not a by-product of perceptual fields. Some say that the sense organs or the central nervous system reacts to the stimulus of the perceptual fields of color, sound etc., and it is this reaction that is said to be a function of the mind, and in reality there is nothing [that corresponds] to what is referred to as mind. This is to say that the function of the mind is also a by-product of the stimulating powers of perceptual fields. However, since the mind can transform perceptual fields yet is not transformed by perceptual fields, this proves that it is wonderfully unrestrained. Hence this objection is baseless. It is certainly the case that the realization of the arising of consciousness has always been self-animating. “Realize” (驗知) means to know it by personally experiencing it within. Indistinct, none has fathomed its beginnings; This is because its movement has no beginning. hazy, none has seen its form, This is because its movement has no form. vast and empty, devoid of anything; There is movement and nothing else. No real thing can be apprehended, and so it is an illusory image. yet it is dazzling and not empty. Its movement fiercely dazzles, and although illusory, it is not empty. Thus in refuting them for erroneously maintaining that mental functions are a by-product of the sense organs, I say consciousness’s arising has always been self-animating. Saying it is selfanimating is precisely to refute their fallacious claim. Because [my position] is based on the self-animating explanation, nominally this can be said to be the cause (因). Only self-animation is the fundamental cause. If, like the former masters, one were to establish seeds as the cause enabling generation, then how could conventional views attached [to beliefs about external] things suffice to illuminate the mind? Conventionally, it is presumed that rice and other things all issue from seeds. Now this is also presumed about mental dharmas (心法). Is this not a great mistake? Further, it should be understood that in saying that consciousness arises through its own animation, it has never been claimed that the mind has self-nature (自體). If mind had self-nature, then this would be no different from conventional 102. Xiong’s point is that rather than treating seeds as a nominal ( prajñapti) device, an expedient means to refer to something that lacks inherent existence, these masters have effectively substantialized seeds by attributing causal power to them.

Y6693.indb 67

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

68

Weishi (唯識)

attachment to [beliefs such as] ātman (神我) and the soul, given that they both presume that these are real things. This is because in temporarily appropriating movement’s impetus, it is named mind-consciousness. [Mindconsciousness] is thus an illusory image that has never had self-nature. Socalled mind-consciousness has never had independent self-nature. In other words, there is no real thing [there]. It is only the power (勢用) of a type of movement. Through personal verification, inwardly we see that this is the case and so establish a name for this power of movement, [p. 30]

calling it mind or consciousness. “Having appropriated etc.” says that with this [act of personal verification], the power of movement is simply appropriated and named “mind-consciousness”; this has never had a connection with Fundamental Reality. In other words, the inherent meanings associated with relying upon function to establish the term “mind-consciousness” are absolutely different from those associated with using Fundamental Reality to talk about mind-consciousness [as formulated] in the chapters “Explaining the Mind” [chapters 7 and 8]. Students should attend to examining and selecting those places in this Treatise in which there is this degree of difference in the demarcation of the meaning. “This is because in temporarily . . .” These words indicate that they do not apply in all cases. In talking about consciousness in this chapter, it is consciousness relative to cognitive objects; hence it is named on the basis of function. This [use of the term] is not consistent [throughout New Treatise]. Someone might raise the following objection: “Since you have spoken of self-animation, one suspects that it has self-nature. If it did not have selfnature, then who or what would be self-animating?” This fails to understand my account of “self-animating,” which simply emphasizes that movement is generated neither by the sense organs nor by perceptual fields. Why is this? This is because sense organs and sense objects are material things only, and material things are incapable of the function of producing non-material things. If it were the case that material things are capable of the function of producing non-material things, then material things would be mysteries and not be material things. Hence in regard to self-animation, my argument combines refutation and clarification, leaving no room for objections. It refutes those who erroneously maintain that the power of this movement

Y6693.indb 68

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

69

is generated by sense organs or by sense objects and clearly shows that the power of movement is not a function of material things. Hence “my argument combines refutation and clarification.” 2.1.2 Continuous Sequence of Sameness Condition (等無間緣)

Continuous sequence of sameness condition refers to a preceding instant of consciousness’s being the condition for the following instant of consciousness (前為後緣), to consciousness’s having unimpeded defining activity (行 相無間), and to its consistent inducing (等而開導). [When these are present] the continuous sequence of sameness condition is established. What is “a preceding instant of consciousness’s being the condition for the following instant of consciousness”? Consciousness is moving and not stationary. The preceding instant of consciousness ceases just as the following instant of consciousness arises. Thus it is said that the preceding instant of consciousness [also] looks to the following instant of consciousness as its condition. What is meant by “having unimpeded defining activity”? When consciousness is activated, it inclines to cognitive objects. Although Reality has no borders, defining activities are each unique. From seeing color, hearing sound, right through to discerning dharmas, each has its own separate defining activity. They do not impede one another; as the former ceases it brings forth the next—this is ever so. “Defining activities” are the characteristics (相) [that appear] when consciousness actively engages cognitive objects—that is, the characteristics [that occur] when consciousness interprets cognitive objects. For example, seeing colors and hearing sound are not the same. These are the different defining activities of consciousness. This is not like in the old accounts, according to which the visual and the rest of the eight consciousnesses are each independent entities. Jian 間 means “impede.” Because innumerable defining activities can all be accommodated and arise therein, this is termed “unimpeded.” This is a completely different sense of wu jian (無間) from that [proposed] by the former [masters]. What is “consistent inducing”? Dao 導 means “to induce.” Kai 開 has two 103. For example, the defining activity of the visual consciousness is to see, that of the auditory is to hear, and so forth. 104. This refers to the sixth consciousness.

Y6693.indb 69

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

70

Weishi (唯識)

meanings. The first meaning is “to vacate.” The second meaning is “to yield one’s place to one who arrives later.” When a preceding dharma vacates its position, it induces the following dharma, leading to its generation, and so attains the sense of “condition” (緣). It is only because kaidao 開導 contains the meanings of both kai 開 and dao 導 that it becomes this condition. If one of these meanings were lacking, it would not be termed a condition. This is based on the old interpretation. Next, someone might object: “The preceding dharma, having been vacated, has already ceased. [p. 31]

Having ceased, it has no self-nature, so what do you mean by ‘induce’?” You should understand that just as the preceding dharma has arisen [to vacate] its place, it is configured to look toward the following dharma so as to induce it. It is not that it acts to induce only after it has already ceased. Moreover, just as the preceding instant of consciousness ceases, the following instant of consciousness arises, and between ceasing and arising there is no gap in time. As such, who is able to perceive transformation’s hidden movements? The former masters said that consciousness was also interrupted. On the basis of consciousness’s defining activities, they dissected consciousness into separate, independent entities. They mistakenly presumed that when the defining activities, such as seeing color, etc., were not manifest, it was because the visual and other consciousnesses had been interrupted. As for deng 等, it means “consistent flow.” The preceding instant of consciousness induces the following instant of consciousness. Because the flow is undifferentiated, it is described as “consistent.” Summarizing the above, it can be understood that with the “continuous sequence of sameness condition,” the vacation of the preceding instant of consciousness induces the following instant of consciousness; just as the one ceases, the other arises. Mind-consciousness is able to flow uninterrupted only through constant renewal and a complete absence of abiding with the 105. In the vernacular edition of New Treatise, p. 57, Xiong writes: “The word deng 等 means ‘to resemble.’ This says that the preceding thought-instant of consciousness induces the following thought-instant of consciousness and that the following instant of consciousness resembles the former thought-instant of consciousness. There is not likely to be a situation in which there suddenly arises a completely metamorphosed thing that bears absolutely no similarity with that of the previous thought-instant.”

Y6693.indb 70

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

71

old. The extreme vigor of its potency is almost divine! If there was someone who did not understand “inducing” (開導) and simply presumed that [the movement of] mind-consciousness is from past to present and is then directed to the future, then this would be as if one had fallen back into conventional views and had not yet heard the Superior Truth (勝義). 2.1.3 Ālambana Condition (所緣緣)

In general terms, the ālambana condition has four component senses: (i) it is a dharma that is real (有體法), (ii) it is that upon which consciousness is causally dependent (為識所托), (iii) it is that which is conveyed by consciousness (為識所帶), (iv) and it is that with which consciousness is cognitively concerned (為識所慮). (i) “Dharmas that are real” (有體法) are dharmas that function as conditions. They must be real (有體 [dravya]) in order for them to have potent function (力用) and to be able to lead to the generation of consciousness. For example, a white color is not empty and lacking a material-object presence. Hence it is able to lead visual consciousness to arise simultaneously with it. Hence it is in this sense that they constitute conditions. If they did not exist, how could they function as conditions? The conventional assumption about how jars etc. are able to function as conditions is wrong-headed. In the world there is no such thing as a pure jar. Those who think that there is are merely attached through delusion. Now, if I were to ask you, “Just what is it that you apprehend in a jar?” you would certainly reply, “When looking 106. Xiong is taking lü 慮 both in the sense of being cognizant of, being sentient, and in the sense being concerned with—that is, a type of mental engagement. 107. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun: “三所緣緣。謂若有法是帶己相心或相應所慮所 託。此體有二。一親二疏。” (T31n1585p40c15–16). In his Fojia mingxiang tongshi, B.337, Xiong punctuates this as: [三所緣緣。] 謂若有法，是帶己相，心或相應，所慮所託，此 體有二，親二疏。Based on Xiong’s understanding, this might be interpreted as: “The third [condition] is the ālambana condition. This means it is an existent dharma and it conveys an image of itself that is the cognitive concern of the mind or mental associates and is what [cognition] depends upon. Such real [dharmas] are of two kinds: direct and remote.” Xiong then writes: “有法 refers to 有體法. They possess potent function (力用) and are able to lead to the generation of consciousness. This is because color and other such perceptual realms are real (體 [dravya]) and hence are able to cause the visual and other consciousnesses to arise. It is precisely these perceptual realms, in their relation to the cognizing [consciousness], that are termed ‘ālambana condition’ (所緣緣).”

Y6693.indb 71

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

72

Weishi (唯識)

at it, there is white and when touching it there is solidity, and so forth.” This being so, your visual consciousness merely apprehends “white” but never apprehends “jar” and your tactile consciousness merely apprehends “solidity” etc. but also never apprehends “jar.” Indeed, when your sensory consciousness’s perception has stopped, only then does the unrestrained sixth consciousness (意識) arise, recollecting the cognitive objects of white, hard, etc., that it falsely constructs into jars and other substantial objects. “Unrestrained sixth consciousness” refers to ordinary people. This is because their sixth consciousness is unrestrained. Accordingly, white, solid, and so forth objects do truly exist and are not nonexistent, otherwise they could not function as conditions. The jars etc. to which deluded sensibilities are attached are not real and do not qualify as referents (義 [artha]) of the term “condition.” Another person might say: “If only real dharmas (有體法) function as causal conditions, then when the sixth consciousness takes ‘sky flowers’ (空 華) as cognitive objects, [p. 32]

doesn’t consciousness lack an ‘ālambana condition’ (所緣緣)?” It should be understood that at that moment, the reflected image (影像 [ pratibimba]) that appears in the sixth consciousness resembles an ālambana (所緣), and [this image itself] is falsely understood to be a flower. Although there never was a flower, the image of the flower-object that appears in consciousness clearly did exist. Because this image did exist, it is also termed real (有體). Because this image is then able to be included as [the image] of a [putative]

108. Cf. Xiong’s earlier comment, “The unrestrained movement of the sixth consciousness is called ‘unrestrained mind.’ ” 109. The artha is that toward which intention is directed. 110. “Sky flowers” are the equivalent to the Western philosopher’s “unicorns” or “round squares”: actual things erroneously juxtaposed. 111. That is, because sky flowers are not real, how can they function as a condition for the causal support of consciousness? 112. Flower-objects have no self-nature and so cannot be an ālambana. Here the image of a non-existent flower is constructed by the sixth consciousness. It is the image itself that functions as the ālambana.

Y6693.indb 72

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

73

cognitive object, [on this basis the image] is able to become the “ālambana condition.” And it is only because of this condition that consciousness is able to be generated. Further, there are also those who presume that with the sensory consciousnesses, the following instant of consciousness takes the preceding instant of consciousness as its “ālambana condition.” The Tang dynasty worthy Puguang made this presumption. This is also incorrect. This is because all dharmas instantaneously arise and instantaneously cease, and do not abide even momentarily. A preceding instant’s cognitive object ceases in the preceding instant; how could it remain until the following instant to function as the cognitive object of the following instant of consciousness? For example, a preceding instant of consciousness’s blue object does not continue until the following instant of consciousness; the following instant of consciousness’s blue object simply arises anew. Truly, the visual and other consciousnesses’ perceiving passes in an instant. In the same instant, the cognitive object perceived by the sensory consciousnesses arises and ceases. The following thought-instant of the sixth consciousness rapidly continues [from the preceding thought-instant]. By means of the power of memory (念), Nian 念 is memory. it is possible to remember a previous cognitive object—that is, to make the reflected image (影像 [ pratibimba]) of a previous cognitive object appear resembling [that previous object] and to take it as a cognitive object. This image is what appears in the mind and was never the previous cognitive object. Despite this, the mind mistakenly interprets the image that appears in itself to be the preceding cognitive object. Failing to discriminate, the mind thinks it is still a case of a following instant of sensory consciousness’s being derived from the cognitive object of the preceding [instant of sensory consciousness]. In Buddhist epistemology and logic (因明 [hetu-vidyā]), this is called “pseudo perception” (似現[量]). In fact, the preceding [instant of 113. In other words, consciousness takes the image, the replica, to be a “real” sky flower, and it is this act that constitutes the ālambana condition. 114. Student of Xuanzang. See Puguang 普光 (d. 664), Jushe lun ji 俱舍論記 (Notes on the Abhidharma Compendium Treatise), T41n1821_p0448b27-c03. 115. Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v. “si xianliang 似現量”, www .buddhism-dict.net: “In Buddhist logic 因明, perception is defined, in part, as (1) devoid of conceptualization and mental constructions (kalpanāpod.ham . ; 無分別), such as notions

Y6693.indb 73

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

74

Weishi (唯識)

sensory consciousness] has already ceased and so is not real—so how could it constitute the “ālambana condition”? This account is illogical and should be revised and corrected. (ii) “That upon which consciousness is causally dependent” (為識所托). That is, real dharmas (有體法), in relation to the cognizing consciousness (能緣識), are that which are depended upon, enabling it to arise. “It” refers to the cognizing consciousness. Consciousness does not arise by itself since it necessarily depends upon cognitive objects. For example, if visual consciousness did not depend on blue and other visual objects (色境), necessarily it could not arise by itself. The [sensory] consciousnesses depend solely on sense objects (塵 [vis.aya]), whereas the sixth consciousness depends upon reflected images (影 [ pratibimba]). There must be that upon which they depend for it to constitute an [ālambana] condition. The sensory consciousnesses depend solely on cognitive objects in order to arise. This means that the visual consciousness depends solely on visual objects; auditory consciousness depends solely on sound objects; and tactile consciousness depends solely on tactile objects. By the time the sixth consciousness calculates all the various dharmas and has made use of conceptualization (想 [sam . jñā]) and recollection (念 [smr.ti]), it falsely imposes an appearance based on the images of the object, which are then mistakenly taken to

of name, class (jāti 類), memory, etc., and (2) a cognition (jñāna 智) that takes as its object the unique features (sva-laks.an.a 自相) of a perceptual object presently being perceived. When conceptual-linguistic constructions insinuate themselves into a perceptual act, and one mistakes the resultant pseudo-perception for a genuine perception, that is a 似現量.” 116. This is explained as follows in the vernacular edition of New Treatise, pp. 62–63: “Whatever is a dharma with self-nature, when it functions as ‘the ālambana condition’ to the sensory consciousnesses, it possesses an attracting power, which the cognizing consciousness (能緣識) comes to depend on, and which causes the cognizing to appear at the same time as ‘the ālambana condition.’ ” 117. Here this term is synonymous with jing 境. 118. One of the omnipresent mental associates, it refers to the process by which the images are appropriated and given names. 119. One of the specific mental associates. In chapter 8, Xiong writes: “Because it causes the mind to remember clearly and not forget those cognitive objects with which one was previously familiar, this mental associate is called recollection. Recollection relies upon a preceding thought-moment of conceptualization (想).”

Y6693.indb 74

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

75

be what is depended upon. Conceptualization and recollection are both mental associates (心所法). Refer to the section “Explaining the Mind, B” [chapter 8]. (iii) “That which is conveyed by consciousness” (為識所帶) refers to the cognitive object that is taken as the cause of consciousness (所緣境 [ālambana-vis.aya]) being closely borne (挾帶) by the cognizing [consciousness] (能緣[識]). Nengyuan 能緣 is consciousness. The cognizing [consciousness] mysteriously enters the ālambana to be just like a single entity. Hence the term “to bear closely.” Just as when the direct perception of the sensory consciousnesses verifies (證) a cognitive object, the cognizing [consciousness] and the ālambana blend together to be indistinguishable. It is like when visual consciousness directly perceives (現見) white, this does not give rise to conceptualizations or imagining; this seeing and the [color] white blend to form a single thing, in which the cognizing [consciousness] and ālambana are inseparable. This is because the cognitive object, as the [ālambana] condition, [p. 33]

causes the cognizing [consciousness] to directly convey (親挾) its selfnature. “Its” is a term of self-reference for the cognitive object. The meaning of “to bear closely” (挾帶) was first developed by Master Xuan[zang] 玄奘. At the time, Prajñāgupta 般若毱多 of the [Hīnayāna] Sam . mitīya-nikāya 120. That is, one mistakes the construction made from the images to be an actual integral object. 121. In his 1923 publication Weishixue gailun, p. 105, Xiong glosses xiedai 挾帶 as “To draw near and closely adhere to” (逼近親附). He retained this same definition in his 1937 publication Fojia mingxiang tongshi, B.339. 122. This seems to be a reference to the third of “the four aspects of cognition” (四分). In Dignāga’s tripartite theory of consciousness, he proposes that consciousness consists of an image part (相分; nimitta [*bhāga]), a perceiving part (見分; darśana [*bhāga]), and a self-verifying aspect, or that part which confirms the perceiving part (自證分; svasam . vr.tti). Asan˙ga’s Mahāyānasam graha (She dasheng lun 攝大乘論; Compendium of the Great Ve. hicle) had, in fact, already referred to two such “parts” or aspects. Dignāga, in turn, added a third part, the self-verifying aspect, or that part that confirms the perceiving part. Later, a fourth part was distinguished—confirmation of the self-verifying part. See also Xiong’s account in New Treatise, p. 52 (pagination of the 2001 edition); Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0319a22.

Y6693.indb 75

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

76

Weishi (唯識)

school (正量部) challenged the Mahāyāna doctrine of the “ālambana condition.” The Indian king Śilāditya 戒日王 (r. circa 606–647) invited Master Xuanzang [to be his guest] and held an eighteen-day-long ecumenical assembly. [During this period,] Master Xuanzang wrote “Treatise to Keep Pernicious Views in Check” (“Zhi e jian lun 制惡見論”) to rebut Prajñāgupta. In the “Treatise” he elaborated on the meaning of “to bear closely” (挾帶). The text, however, is no longer extant. (iv) “That with which consciousness is cognitively concerned” (為識所 慮). The first three senses are not enough to constitute [the ālambana condition]. What is the reason? If a real dharma, merely by functioning as that which is causally depended upon and as that which is conveyed, was thus able to constitute the ālambana condition, then it should be the case that the external material objects (外質) reflected in a mirror function as the ālambana condition. Because external material objects are real dharmas, then when reflections in mirrors etc. occur, it is also because external material objects function as that which is conveyed and as that which is causally depended upon. Reflections in mirrors etc. depend upon external material objects in order to appear at the same time [as when objects face the mirror]; hence this means that something is depended upon. Also, when external material objects are conveyed directly (親帶), images arise [in the mirror]; hence this means that something is conveyed. If this is admissible, then cognitive objects in relation to consciousness function as ālambana conditions, and external material objects in relation to mirrors etc. function as ālambana conditions. There is no difference in meaning between the two. Accordingly, it should be conceded that consciousness is also like a mirror etc. for the reason that the meaning of ālambana condition is not different. In order to refute this mistake, I will say some more about that which is of 123. Also known as King Harsha, he ruled over northern India and was well known as a patron of Buddhism. Xuanzang visited his kingdom in 636. 124. Some of it is preserved in Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0500c09–19. 125. Xiong’s point is that if, in order to be an ālambana, a real dharma only had to be causally depended upon and to convey its own image, then even reflections one sees in mirrors would qualify as doing the job of an ālambana, since the external thing is a real dharma (and thus is causally depended upon), and since when it functions so as to appear in the mirror, that reflection also takes the external thing as what it is causally dependent on, and as conveying its image.

Y6693.indb 76

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

77

cognitive concern. Because a cognitive object is real and has causal function, it is able to cause consciousness to depend on it, to convey it, and to be cognizant (緣慮) of it. Only then can it be asserted that in relation to consciousness it functions as the ālambana condition. The word “it” in each instance refers to “cognitive object.” Yuanlü 緣慮 means “to take cognizance of.” Because ālambana condition includes the sense of “that which is of cognitive concern” (所慮), the image appearing in consciousness is what is considered to be “that which is cognized.” This is not the same as some material dharma [being reflected] in a mirror. Thus it is said “nothing but consciousness” and not “nothing but cognitive objects.” In conventional truth it is accepted that consciousness exists; it is also accepted that there exist cognitive objects that are not separate from consciousness. It is only consciousness that cognizes; cognitive objects are that which are cognized. Thus in order to show special respect to consciousness, when speaking of consciousness it is said to be “nothing but.” Note: The cognitive function is a characteristic of mind-consciousness, and one should not explain cognition in terms of the relationship between sense organs and perceptual realms. If [it is claimed that] cognition is the product of the combination of sense organs and cognitive objects, this should not be deemed to be a thorough understanding. In the past, Indians said that the cognitive capacity of mirrors etc. was like that of consciousness. Nowadays there are also people who say that cameras are able to see things. Both are cases of misguided conceptual elaboration (戲論). Mirrors etc. and cameras are merely able to make the objects they face appear as if they are their reflections. However, these reflections are still controlled by the objects—there is certainly no cognitive function involved. So how can mind-consciousness be equated with material dharmas? The principle involved has always been utterly clear, yet in searching for it, matters have become ever more obscured. The delusions of mundane afflictions are often as such.

126. The term guanpin 官品 means “creatures with sense organs,” but here Xiong is using it to mean just “sense organs.” 127. In the vernacular edition of New Treatise, p. 65, Xiong attributes this view to Bertrand Russell.

Y6693.indb 77

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

78

Weishi (唯識) Cognition is part of the mind’s defining activity (行相). Its “defining activity” is akin to cognitive analysis. These [images associated with mirrors and cameras] and the reflections that appear in the mind

[p. 34] are fundamentally different. Not yet being able to make this distinction, conventionally we therefore say that cameras are able to see things. Thus in talking about weishi 唯識, already in the Tang dynasty there were people who did not make the distinction. [The monk] Wenbei [Munbi] [文]備 said: “It is simply because the mind is still and quiescent that all the images appear in the mind. Hence this is called “cognizing [literally, ‘grasping’] objects” (取境).” See Jie shenmi jing zhu 解深密經注 (Annotations on the Discourse Explaining the Thought), note 6, page 7. Daehyeon 太賢 said: “Images appear in the mind and hence are termed ‘that which is cognized.’ ” See Cheng weishi lun xueji [Seongyusingnon hakgi] 成唯識論學記 (Study Notes on Cheng weishi lun), juan 6, page 37. Neither understood that when the mind cognizes an object, its defining activity is involved. Instead they merely talked 128. Xiong provides no bibliographic details. Azuma Jūji 吾妻重二 (trans.), Shin yuishiki ron 新唯識論 (Osaka: Kansai Daigaku shuppansha, 2004), p. 260, note 33, identifies the edition of Jie shenmi jing zhu cited by Xiong as the 1917 edition published by Jinling kejingchu 金陵刻經處. This book was compiled by Ouyang Jingwu based on the annotations in Dunnyun 遁倫 (seventh century?; also known as Doryun 道倫), Yuqie lun ji 瑜伽論記 (Commentaries on the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice). Dunnyun was a native of Silla 新羅. For the annotation Xiong refers to, see Yuqie lun ji, T42n1828_p0778b10. Bi 備 is the Tang dynasty monk Munbi 文備. Along with other monks, Munbi had assisted Xuanzang in his translation of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地論; Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice) between 648 and 645. See Lü Cheng 呂澂, “Xuanzang fashi lüezhuan: yi sheng zhongyao xingshi, zhushu, suochuan zhuyao xueshuo 玄奘 法師略傳: 一生重要行事、著述、所傳主要學說” (Short Biography of Monk Xuanzang: Key Events, Writings and Main Doctrines Transmitted), in Xiandai Fojiao jiaoxue congkan 現代佛教學術叢刊 (Collectanea of Modern Buddhist Scholarship) (Taipei: Dasheng wenhua chubanshe, 1980), vol. 8, p. 3. 129. Daehyeon, Cheng weishi lun xueji, CBETA X50n0818_p0100b09–10. Daehyeon (alt. Taehyeon 太賢; eighth century) was also a native of Silla.

Y6693.indb 78

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

79

of the appearance of reflections in the mind. If that were so, how could one refute that mirrors etc. cognize and cameras are able to see? Accordingly, long has it been the case that this superficial and mistaken talk should be revised and corrected. Having summarized these four meanings, the definition of the “ālambana condition” is clearly demarcated, with virtually nothing out of place. However, masters in former times used this condition to distinguish direct and remote [ālambana conditions]. This doctrine derived from their maintaining that the eight consciousnesses are separately established. Investigating the basis for this doctrine [shows that] it does not warrant being agreed to (不足極成). The objects grasped by consciousness do not exist independent of consciousness, but it should be agreed that the relationship of objects to consciousness is that they function as ālambana conditions. What need is there to draw the further distinction of direct and remote? However, because this doctrine of 130. It is important to note that Xiong fully endorses the Yogācāra concept of the ālambana condition. 131. Cheng weishi lun, translated on the basis of Xiong’s interpretation: The third [condition] is the ālambana condition. Where there is a real dharma and it conveys an image of itself that is the cognitive concern (所慮) of the mind or mental associates and is what [consciousness] depends upon (所託), then such real [dharmas] will be of two kinds: direct and remote. If [the ālambana] is not separate from the cognizing [consciousness] itself and internally this [non-separated ālambana] is what the perceiving part, etc. are cognitively concerned about and what [consciousness] is dependent upon, then you should understand it to be a direct ālambana condition. If, however, [the ālambana] is separate from the cognizing consciousness itself, and is a stuff [bimba] capable of giving rise internally to what is of cognitive concern and to what [consciousness] is dependent upon, then you should understand it to be a remote ālambana condition. T31n1585_p0040c15–19: 三所緣緣。謂若有法是帶己相心或相應所慮所託。此體 有二。一親二疏。若與能緣體不相離。是見分等內所慮託。應知彼是親所緣 緣。若與能緣*雖相離。為質能起內所慮託。應知彼是疏所緣緣。 *Nengyuan 能緣 is the complement of suoyuan 所緣. Both are needed in order for perception to occur. It refers to the act of perceiving (hearing, seeing etc.) rather than what is perceived.

132. In Buddhist logic, bu ji cheng 不極成 (aprasiddha) is an axiom that either of the disputants considers unacceptable. Prasiddha (極成) means something that is considered to be established, agreed to, common knowledge, a non-problematic premise.

Y6693.indb 79

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

80

Weishi (唯識) the former masters maintains that the eight consciousnesses are each discrete entities, direct and remote were thus distinguished. For example, visual consciousness’s direct ālambana condition (親所緣緣) is its own transformation (所變) into “the image part of consciousness” (相分). Its “remote ālambana condition” (疏所緣緣) is the eighth consciousness’s “image part of consciousness” (相分). Visual consciousness depends on it to serve as the “basic stuff ” (本質 [bimba]) in order to turn it into its own image part of consciousness. Dharmapāla (護法) (sixth century) [maintained that] each of the eight consciousnesses has its own [field of] image parts and basic stuff serving as its direct and remote ālambana conditions. The definition of terms [involved] is tedious in its details, so I am not going to give an account that would in any case be dull. If one were to work on sorting through the complexities of arguments put forward by former masters, this would warrant a separate account.

133. Suobian 所變 is the transformation in one’s own mind (drawing on one’s mental seeds) in response to a stimulus. 134. That is, the eighth consciousness’s “image part of consciousness.” 135. According to A. Charles Muller, in standard Yogācāra works, bimba “refers to the bare form of an object of sense or of thought, before it has received any interpretation, overlay, or categorization through the cognitive process. Its counterpart is pratibimba 影像 . . . which is a reflected ‘image’ of the bimba, that which we actually ‘see’ on the surface of consciousness, having been interpreted and transformed by the cognitive process.” See his “Woncheuk 圓測 on Bimba 本質 and Pratibimba 影像 in His Commentary on the Sam . dhinirmocana-sūtra,” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 59, no. 3 (2011): 1272. 136. In terms of the three or four partitions of cognition (into the image part, the perceiving part, and the self-verifying part, etc.), the “direct ālambana” is immediately accessible to the perceiver. Since the image part is not separate from the cognizing mind, the cognizing mind directly bears this image part, taking it as cognitive object. If what is taken up as the “object” of a cognition is something that is not inner (that is, some perceptual object rather than a cognitive activity itself), then it is a “remotely” accessed ālambana. In order to arise, the basic “stuff ” has to have the ability to give rise to an inner cognition such that it is what the inner cognition is mentally concerned with and is causally dependent upon. For a more detailed account of Xiong’s early (and uncritical) interpretation of direct and remote ālambana or ālambana conditions, see my article, “The Significance of Xiong Shili’s Interpretation of Dignāga’s Ālambana-parīks.ā (Investigation of the Object),” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40:S (2013), 205–225.

Y6693.indb 80

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

81

2.1.4 Contributory Factors as Conditions (增上緣)

“Contributory factors as conditions,” in general terms, has two meanings. Zengshang 增上 (to contribute to) is like jiashang 加上 (to add to). Former masters glossed its meaning as “to support” (扶助). It refers to the following. Even if this particular dharma was not generated from that particular dharma, but has to rely on that dharma for its continuing existence, then it is said that that dharma functions as a contributory factor condition for this dharma. The first meaning is that it must have superior function (勝用), for only then could it serve to contribute to the resultant dharma (果法). If a dharma functions as a contributory factor condition, then it is said to be a causal dharma (因法). So-called superior function not only lends nearby support to the resultant dharma; one of its strengths is also simply not to impede the resultant dharma. This can be verified by taking an example from matters close at hand. When I stand up, all of the earth within ten paces definitely directly (親) contributes to my standing up. Directly provides support; hence it is called qin 親. Even beyond those ten paces, to the whole earth and even the solar system—all of these are connected to my standing up. If beyond ten paces a mountain should collapse or a river break its banks, or if an asteroid should deviate from its course and smash into the earth—all of these would interfere with my standing up. Hence [p. 35]

it can be understood that my standing here today is because from the earth to the solar system—everything has the superior function of “contributing to.” Their superior function results from their not harmfully interfering. In light of this, the scope of contributory factors as conditions has no limits, and its potential power is endless. Yet when people search for the contributory causes of a given matter, Contributory factors as conditions are termed causes in relation to the dharmas they contribute to. they always select what lies close at hand and leave out what is distant, and so their comprehensiveness is indeterminate. Take mental dharmas (心法) as an example. When a thought-instant of visual consciousness (色識) occurs, what limits are there to the contributory conditions it relies upon? The sensory consciousnesses’ discernment of color is also termed “visual consciousness”; the discernment

Y6693.indb 81

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

82

Weishi (唯識)

of sound is also called auditory consciousness; through to the discernment of touch, which is also called “tactile consciousness.” As such, sense organs as conditions (官緣), Guan 官refers to the eyes and the central nervous system, that is, what the material object consciousnesses rely upon in order to make [images of those material objects] manifest. Thus, they are contributory conditions. space as a condition, Kong 空, space, is also a contributory condition for material object consciousness. This is because if material object consciousness is blocked, then it is unable to operate. light (明) as a condition, Ming 明 is light (光). This is because without light, material objects could not be discerned. and habituated tendencies (習氣) as conditions— When visual consciousness arises, necessarily there are karmic impressions that contribute to it. If one suddenly sees the face of an enemy, then one spontaneously grows angry. This is the manifestation of old karmic impressions. Karmic impressions are mental associates (心所); hence, in relation to the mind, they function as contributory conditions. This is because they are able to assist the mind in grasping objects. Refer to “Explaining the Mind” [chapters 7 and 8]. [all] have an immediate relevance and cannot be omitted. When the other consciousnesses arise, they are the same. “Other consciousnesses” refers to the auditory through to the sixth consciousness. When the auditory consciousness arises, necessarily it has the ear sense organ and habitual defilements functioning as contributory conditions. When the sixth consciousness arises alone to think (思搆), necessarily it has habitual defilements etc. functioning as contributory conditions. There are countless kinds of habitual defilements. When minds arise, they all have habitual defilements functioning as contributory conditions. Note: The meaning of “contributory factors as conditions” is the most splendid. That which conventional types of learning This refers to the likes of science. mean by cause and effect corresponds to this. This is because they simply seek to elucidate the relationship between things. Shortly [after having made this remark,] someone asked: “If it is indeed as you state in your account of contributory factors as conditions, is it not then the case that regardless of which matter one might cite, the whole cosmos functions as cause?” I replied that this is in fact the case, but in searching for the causes of a particular matter, there is no need for students to

Y6693.indb 82

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

83

take the whole cosmos into their reckoning. They should always seek for verification in what lies closest at hand. If a scale is set up to measure how heavy something is, both gravity and air pressure will be causes [contributing to] the determination of what that weight is. Even the space between light and dark shadows or stars beyond the solar system all have a bearing, thus it is said: A single thing, yet the whole cosmos functions as its cause. However, in regard to this matter, students should only investigate its close causes, such as gravity and air pressure, [p. 36] in order to clarify what are its causes, then those matters you are competent at will be achieved. It is just the same with our ability often to proceed from one matter to understand a second matter, or to proceed from A to understand B. The second meaning of contributory factors as conditions is that it is able to be compatible with or antagonistic toward other dharmas (餘法). Yu fa 餘法 means “other dharmas.” Any matter can be raised to show what this means. For example, the addition of frost and snow to grain etc. is able to lead to the transformation of the green-colored [object] into a withered and perished [object]. Zhuan 轉 means “to transform.” When the grain etc. has withered and perished, all of its former green color ceases. “Transform” does not mean that the former green color did not cease and that it is able to change into the later withered and perished [grain]. Further, the rise of the withered and perished grain involves self-animating (自動) causes. For the withered grain, frost and snow are merely contributory conditions, hence use of the term “to lead” (牽). In conventional learning, discussions of biological creatures adapting to the environment mostly overlook the animating cause in things themselves. This is a great mistake. Someone asked: Are not frost and snow the cause of the cessation of the green color? I replied: Whenever a dharma ceases, the dharma ceases by itself. What reliance on causes is there? If its cessation relied on causes, then it should not be termed “cessation” but rather “arising” (生). This is because having causes is “to

Y6693.indb 83

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

84

Weishi (唯識) generate.” In relation to the withered and perished grain, frost and snow are compatible conditions; in relation to the former greencolored grain, they are antagonistic conditions. One compatible, one antagonistic—the incipient workings are unfathomable. It should, however, further be understood that with regard to the division of this second meaning into compatible and antagonistic, antagonistic conditions actually do not function as conditions for dharmas that have [already] ceased. As stated above, when frost and snow function as [compatible] conditions for the withered and perished grain, the former green-colored grain had already ceased. Now, if it were said that frost and snow function as antagonistic conditions for the former green-colored grain, then just what would the conditions serve, given that the greencolored grain had already ceased? Because the withered and perished grain is an antagonistic dharma of the former green-colored grain, and because [the frost and snow] are [compatible] conditions for the withered and perished grain, then logically [the frost and the snow] are antagonistic conditions for the former green-colored grain. [Although compatible and antagonistic are but] the front and obverse of a single matter—logically they are said to be two. Frost and snow are [compatible] conditions for the withered and perished grain—this is a “single matter.” Front and obverse—these are the two aspects of a single matter. [Frost and snow are compatible] conditions for the withered and perished grain—this is the front. Since [frost and snow] are compatible with the withered and perished grain, causing it to arise, they are antagonistic to the former green-colored grain, causing it to discontinue arising—this is the meaning of obverse. By following these two meanings [of front and obverse], compatible and antagonistic are explained. Let’s discuss this with an example. When good karmic tendencies are contributory conditions of the mind, being compatible they generate pure consciousness (淨識), and being antagonistic, they cause defiled consciousness (染識) not to be generated. 137. Based on Xiong’s gloss of yili 義理, vernacular edition of New Treatise, p. 71.

Y6693.indb 84

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

Weishi (唯識)

85

When bad karmic tendencies are contributory conditions of the mind, being compatible they generate defiled consciousness, and being antagonistic they cause a pure consciousness not to appear. The incipient manifestation of the compatible and the antagonistic—can it be ignored? Jing shi 淨識 is “good mind.” Ran shi 染 識 is “bad mind.” Is it possible that the mind has badness? With the expression of bad karmic tendencies, the mind becomes obscured, enabling badness to be realized. At this point, the mind has no standard by which to adjudicate, and takes bad karmic tendencies alone to be the mind; hence it is being said to be “a bad mind.” If good karmic tendencies are powerful enough to arise and so support the goodness of inherent mind (本心), then this will be antagonistic to the bad mind, causing it not to arise.

CONCLUSION In the above account of various conditions, because the arising of consciousness is self-animating, “causes as condition” is posited. What is mindconsciousness? It is merely a kind of power of movement. Although this power of movement depends on the stimulus of the brain and external objects in order to occur, [p. 37]

so long as it is not a by-product of material stuff (物質), then it can be said to be self-animating. It is in this sense that “causes as condition” is nominally spoken of. Because a preceding thought is able to draw forth, the “continuous sequence of sameness condition” is posited. This is because a preceding instant of consciousness is able to lead to the arising of a following instant of consciousness. Hence this condition is posited. Because there are cognitive objects that are grasped, the “ālambana condition” is posited. In conventional truth, it is not said that there are no cognitive objects; however, [Yogācāra masters] do not accept that there are external objects that exist separate from consciousness. It is not, however, the case that cognitive objects that are not separate from consciousness do not exist. Hence it is said that in order for consciousness to arise, there must be cognitive objects that are grasped, and so this condition is posited. In addition to these three

Y6693.indb 85

6/30/15 2:55:45 PM

86

Weishi (唯識)

conditions, the reliance on all sorts of relationships [is the basis for] positing “contributory factors as conditions.” For example, because the sense organs and the central nervous system, karmic tendencies, and so forth all play a supporting role in the function of the mind-consciousness, hence this condition is posited. Originally, the goal in examining these conditions was to analyze mindconsciousness. Nominally saying that [mind-consciousness] is generated by dependent arising (緣生) causes [one] to understand that mind-consciousness is only an illusory manifestation (幻現) and is not a true existent. If consciousness did truly exist, it would have self-nature (自體). Sometimes I use the compound term xinshi 心識; sometimes I use the single word xin 心 or shi 識. It varies from place to place in the text. Please note this when encountered in other places in the text. Now, in analyzing this consciousness, it is said to be the manifestation of an illusory image [generated by] the interdependence of many conditions. It is thus very evident that consciousness has no self-nature. Hence, with respect to dependent arising, [my purpose] is not to directly express (表) [the view] that consciousness arises due to the aggregation (和合) of many conditions, but rather is to refute effectively those who are attached [to the view] that consciousness really exists. In the 138. This anticipates his discussion of the “kataphatic mode of explanation” (表詮) and the “apophatic mode of explanation” (遮詮), below. 139. Note that this objection to consciousness is of the same form as the objection to atoms; Xiong is using Yogācāra to attack Yogācāra. 140. It is important to note who Xiong’s target is here. In a corresponding passage in the vernacular text, p. 73, he writes: If it leaves its various conditions, then there is no such thing as consciousness (心). In early times the way the Indian Buddhists talked about the meaning of dependent arising was no more than this, and this is as it should be. Later, however, the founders of the Mahāyāna Yogācāra school, the two great masters, Vasubandhu and Asan˙ga, gradually changed the meaning of what previous Buddhists had referred to as dependent arising. It seems that they looked upon each of the many conditions as single parts and thereupon began to construct [their notion of consciousness (心)] by regarding it as the aggregation of many conditions. In this way, they changed the doctrine of dependent arising into a kind of structuralism (構造論). It closely resembles [the belief that] material objects are composed through the aggregation of many parts. This sense is still not fully evident in Asan˙ga’s writings,* but in his way of speaking about things, there is already this tendency. As for Vasubandhu and later masters, compared with Asan˙ga, it is evident that they changed the doctrine of dependent arising into a structuralism.

Y6693.indb 86

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Weishi (唯識)

87

case of someone who fails to discern that a banana tree has no self-nature, one by one the tree’s leaves are peeled away, making the person understand that it is not real. The meaning is the same [in the case of consciousness]. Someone might raise another objection: “Explaining the principle of dependent arising shows that consciousness is without self-nature and that the image (相) of consciousness is empty. However, are the images of multiple conditions also empty?” Now, in response I say: The image of conditions (緣相) was nominally established to show that the image of consciousness is empty. Because the image of consciousness is empty, the image of conditions is also empty. This is because [the image of] multiple conditions supporting one another is only an illusory manifestation. As for the image of “causes as condition,” it is [but] the power of movement. This movement never stops—if it is not an illusion, then what is it? The image of “continuous sequence of sameness condition” refers to a preceding instant of consciousness. This also never stops—if it is not an illusion, then what is it? With the image of the “ālambana condition,” the visual, auditory, and other objects in fact instantaneously arise and cease, so this certainly is an illusory manifestation. With the perceptual form of the “contributory factors as condition,” since sense organs and the central nervous system etc. are material dharmas, they all instantaneously arise and cease. As for habituated tendencies moving at every thought-instant, never ceasing to arise and cease, this especially speaks for itself. Accordingly, we can understand that they are all illusory manifestations. Because the images of conditions are only illusory manifestations, they have no self-nature (自體). Because they have no self-nature, they are all empty. “Referring to the nominal and posing suppositions” is done in order to dispel attachment. Nominally positing multiple conditions serves to refute those who are attached to [the belief that] consciousness is a real existent. Discourse has a “kataphatic mode of explanation” (表詮) and an “apophatic mode of explanation” (遮詮). The kataphatic mode of explanation directly expresses some matter. It is like being in a dark room and calling *Asan˙ga is said to have composed Mahāyānasam . graha (She Dasheng lun 攝大乘論; Compendium of the Great Vehicle) and Prakaranāryavāca-śāstra (Xianyang shengjiao lun 顯揚聖教論; Acclamation of the Holy Teaching). In the Tibetan tradition, he is also said to have composed Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地論; Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice).

141. Infinite regress.

Y6693.indb 87

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

88

Weishi (唯識)

out to warn someone who does not see that there is a low table at some place. The apophatic mode of explanation [is as follows.] Because a confused person in the dark mistook a low table for a person or something strange, “Something strange” is a ghost or other strange phenomenon. then to [p. 38]

dispel this person’s confusion one uses all sorts of rational explanations to show how the table is not human or a ghost, without directly informing the person that it is a table, until finally the person understands that it is a table. Thus, in regard to dependent arising, this is simply to deal with a person’s not understanding that the self-nature (自性) is empty. Zixing 自性 is synonymous with ziti 自體. It is an expedient means (方便 [upāya]) for dispelling attachment, Because confused people are attached [to the belief] that consciousness really exists, in analyzing the various conditions it is thus said that the many conditions support one another to manifest the illusion of an image of consciousness. This is termed “dependent arising.” It is employed to dispel this attachment and is an expedient way of speaking. and hence is [an example of] the apophatic mode of explanation. Setting up refutations directed at attachment is why the apophatic mode of explanation is adopted. If someone were to maintain that the kataphatic mode of explanation served to express [the idea] that dependent arising meant that consciousness was generated by the aggregation of many conditions, then, on the contrary, this would descend into a view attached to [the existence] of things. Is this not absurd? In conventional truth it is presumed that a material body consists of an assembly of molecules. Now, those who presume that consciousness is generated by the aggregation of many conditions make the same error. Hence, knowing that there are both kataphatic and apophatic expressions, one must distinguish them. An examination of rhetoric used in the learning concerned with fundamental wisdom (玄學) [reveals] a crucial reliance on the apophatic mode of explanation. This is because the principle (理) elucidated by the learning concerned with fundamental wisdom has always been a general attribute (總相), what is referred to as “animating the myriad things” (妙萬物).

142. The locus classicus of the phrase is “Explaining the Hexagrams,” Book of Change, 9.6a. Following the interpretation of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Zhouyi zhexue yanjiang lu 周 易哲學演講錄 (Lectures on the Philosophy of the Zhou Book of Change) (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 2003), p. 130.

Y6693.indb 88

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Weishi (唯識)

89

“General attribute” refers to this principle’s functioning pervasively as the Reality of the myriad things. “Animating the myriad things” means not belonging to any part; not belonging to what has material form and material substance. Because this principle is recondite (玄微), Xuan 玄 means “to be suspended” (懸). Suspended in emptiness, there is nothing its principle does not cover, yet it cannot be sought using material things. Wei 微 means to be without a location and to be without form and image—so-called godlike. it becomes a hindrance (困) to express it in words. Saying it is kun 困 means that it is more than “difficult” (難). The functioning of discourse (名言) relies on its capacity to express things. The original meaning of all words (字) serves to represent real things and even if their meaning were extended so that they become extremely abstract terms (詞), they would always represent some kind of conceptual or sensory image. Now, to seek to express the principle that extends beyond things using words that [can only] express things Principle, qua general attribute (總相), is recondite and extends beyond things. will often [result in] speaking of them as if they are the same thing. Out of fear that those who are mired in the false discrimination of things will develop all sorts of mistaken interpretations when they hear [that words are being used to express the principle that extends beyond things], the words of those who specialize in learning concerned with fundamental wisdom, relying in particular on expedient means, frequently draw upon the apophatic mode of explanation. The abstruse contortions involved in this are certainly not something that ordinary people could understand. Since ancient times there have been many who have written on fundamental wisdom. The most sublime exponents of the apophatic mode of explanation are certainly the Buddhists, with the Emptiness schools (空宗) being especially skilled. Only this school commanded a fully penetrating insight into principles, and so their theses encountered no obstacles. With the arrival of the Existence school (有宗), only then did [Buddhists] begin to turn their back on the apophatic mode of explanation, instead advocating

143. That is, not to be constrained or defined relative to anything else. 144. Absolute; beyond reference and qualification. 145. The Madhyamaka school, represented in China by the Three Treatise school (Sanlun zong 三論宗). 146. The Yogācāra school.

Y6693.indb 89

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

90

Weishi (唯識)

the manifestation of [Fundamental] Reality through function (即用顯體). What they had lost was significant, and I feel compelled to provide a brief explanation. Those who talk about “the manifestation of [Fundamental] Reality through function” would certainly say that although function is also a real dharma it is not separated from Reality; [p. 39]

that is, Reality is manifest through function. This, however, is to fail to understand that since there is certainly nothing in Reality that can be established, then how can it be established in function? Suppose we presume that function can be established because it is a real dharma; then function already stands in contrast to Reality, so how can one talk about function’s being able to manifest Fundamental Reality? Since the beginning of the Existence school with Asan˙ga, talk about function has especially involved breaking down (分析). For example, such exegetical works as Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra; Madhyānta-vibhāga (辯中邊論; Differentiation of the Middle and Extremes); and Mahāyānābhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā ([大乘阿毘達磨]雜集論; Exegesis on the Compendium of Higher Doctrine), talk about such dharmas as aggregates (蘊), fields (處), and realms (界). All [of these works] concern function, but it is limited to analysis, which is fundamentally different from establishing [Fundamental Reality]. Coming to Vasubandhu, he initiated the establishment of [the doctrine] that consciousness is the transformer (能變) and thereby controls dharmas. Later, Dharmapāla and Kuiji elaborated the main components of his teachings and expanded them, adding detail 147. The vernacular edition of New Treatise, p. 79, explains that the term ti 體 here is a contraction of benti 本體. 148. Composed by Vasubandhu, this text focuses on epistemology and meditation theory and practice. 149. Compiled by Sthiramati (seventh century), this text is a commentary on Asan˙ga’s Abhidharma-samuccaya (大乘阿毘達磨集論; Compendium of Higher Doctrine), a Mahāyāna abhidharma work that incorporates aspects of non-Mahāyāna schools within an overarching Yogācāra framework. 150. The five aggregates (skandhas; 五蘊), twelve loci (āyatana; 十二處), and eighteen factors of cognition (dhātu; 十八界). 151. This refers to the capacity of consciousness to be transformed into a perceiving part and an image part.

Y6693.indb 90

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Weishi (唯識)

91

to [the function of] cause in [consciousness’s] transforming (能變因體). “Cause in [consciousness’s] transforming” refers to seeds. Crucially, everything that was established was done in regard to function, On the basis that all dharmas are grounded within consciousness, Vasubandhu privileged consciousness as the transformer. What he referred to as “dharmas [generated by consciousness] the transformer” (能變法) was termed “function” when contrasted with unchanging “Suchness” (眞如 [tathatā]). Since Vasubandhu had established consciousness so as to ground dharmas, he thus established it as really existing in function. Vasubandhu and Kuiji developed and elaborated this interpretation using the concept of “seeds.” Using “consciousness” to name the manifest activity [of seeds], consciousness’s existence was affirmed, and seeds were thus the cause from where “manifestly activated consciousness” (現行識) was generated, and so was also the Reality of manifestly activated consciousness. It is patently evident that they deemed function to have self-nature. Again, this was to establish [Fundamental Reality] in function and was in fact an elaboration of Vasubandhu’s thought. yet they did not realize that they had made the mistake of severing Fundamental Reality and function in two. What Vasubandhu and the others referred to as manifestly activated consciousness and its seeds are dharmas that arise and cease, are “dharmas [that are generated by consciousness’s] capacity to transform,” and are function. Suchness, however, is a dharma that does not arise and cease, a dharma that does not transform. It is Reality. It is patently evident that they regarded Reality and function as two parts. How can one talk about “manifesting Reality through function”? Since it is established in function, this presents function as actually existing (實在). From where, then, does the manifestation of Reality come? Hence, by the time of Dharmapāla and Kuiji, the learning of the Existence school had expanded; at the same time it also had become increasingly mistaken (差). Cha 差 means “mistaken.” I humbly submit that because Reality cannot be made manifest through discourse yet, since there is no alternative to discourse, then what harm is there provisionally to postulate it in some place where it cannot be established; that is, contrivedly posit some words in some place where words 152. Xiong’s implication here is that Dharmapāla had severed ti and yong, treating consciousness as yong relative to the ti of Suchness.

Y6693.indb 91

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

92

Weishi (唯識)

cannot be posited? Provisionally name it so as to highlight Reality. Reality cannot be named but in order to highlight it; it is provisionally given a name. In the following chapter, the terms “constant transformation” (恆轉) and “productive power” (功能 [śakti]) are the means by which to postulate it. Uttering the term “Reality” is already to include “function” within it. As soon as “Reality” is uttered, “function” is included within it. “Reality” cannot be named as simply empty. As a word, “function” refers to the flow of Reality and describes the expression of Reality. In this expression there is no thing, and in this flow there is no abiding. Accordingly, it is not possible for there to be anything established in function. This is because the “function” under discussion has never been a real dharma. To begin to grasp the import of what is being said here, it is necessary to read the section “Transformation” [chapter 3]. Accordingly, when it comes to weighing up Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, investigating [their respective] strengths and weaknesses, [p. 40]

how could a mistaken reliance on an understanding of words itself suffice, even temporarily, to illuminate the subtle import [of Reality]? Because I had discussed dependent arising’s being an apophatic mode of explanation, I ran on to this topic. To summarize the above, first I refuted the attachment to cognitive objects, showing that material dharmas (色法) are not external. Here se 色 is like saying “material things.” The scope of its inherent meaning is vastly different from color (色) that is apprehended by visual consciousness. Elsewhere in this text, the same distinction applies. Next I refuted attachment to consciousness, showing that mental dharmas lack reality. Minds are attached to taking cognitive objects to be real, not realizing that they [are a function of] dependent arising and are like an illusion. This is a great confusion on the part of conventional [views]. However, material form is not external; so why, then, is it repeatedly called “material form”? As stated above, since it is not accepted that there is an objectively existing realm of material form, then so-called material form that is not separate from consciousness is definitely not material form, so why is it repeatedly called “material form”? Mind is not real; so why, then, is it repeatedly called “mind”? Mind does not really exist, therefore what is referred to as “mind” is merely a nominal term. Yet what is the point in positing this nominal term? Is there really no basis to what

Y6693.indb 92

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Weishi (唯識)

93

is conventionally accepted? Material and mental dharmas are both conventionally accepted as existing. As such, that which is generally accepted by convention possibly has some basis in truth, otherwise the myriad images of material and mental dharmas should not be accepted if they have no basis. Hence these [topics] are investigated in “Transformation” [chapter 3].

Y6693.indb 93

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

3

Transformation (轉變)

I have heard that conditioned phenomena (諸行) are empty and contain nothing. Xing 行 means the flow of illusory images. Here the term is a noun. Zhu xing 諸行 is the general term for material dharmas and mental dharmas. Those who are mired in traces regard them as really existing. They take them to be real things. Those who understand truth (達理者) tentatively and nominally speak of them as “transformations” (轉變 [ parin.āma]). For the term “transformation,” see Cheng weishi lun shuji. Although a compound term has been chosen to render “transformation,” actually just the single word bian 變 would suffice. However, in talking about the meaning of transformation, I definitely do not base myself on the views of former masters. To understand me, students must not be attached to former accounts. It is transformation alone that moves but cannot be controlled; that changes but cannot be fathomed. Here “movement” is not what is conventionally called transference. The transference (轉移) of things is what is conventionally taken to be movement (動). Here, what I mean by movement is 1. Phenomena or dharmas that are subject to arising and ceasing. 2. These concepts feature prominently in the preceding chapter, “Weishi 唯識.” 3. In the context of Yogācāra thought, zhuanbian 轉變 refers to the transformation of consciousness—the continual renewal of consciousness from instant to instant. 4. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0240c07–08: “Relying on the transformations of the inner consciousness [= store consciousness] means that seed consciousness [= store consciousness] transforms into manifest activity, and manifestly activated consciousness transforms into seeds.”

94

Y6693.indb 94

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Transformation (轉變)

95

sudden illusory manifestation—not some real thing transferring from here to there. What is able to transform? Thus, the first question is posited. What is transformation? Hence, the second question is posited.

WHAT IS ABLE TO TRANSFORM? Transformation does not arise from the constant. This is because the constant is not the transformer (能變). If one considers [p. 41]

“myriads of transformations without end,” it will be understood there is not another constant entity separate from this. In ancient times, presumptions such as “Brahmā Heaven” (梵天 [brahma-loka)]) and “soul” (神我 [ātman]) are essentially all misguided conceptual elaborations. Transformation is not generated from nothingness because nothingness cannot transform. Since beginningless time there have been moment upon moment of transformations, and this has never stopped. Past transformations have left no traces and so are nominally said to be empty. Is it possible that beyond these transformations there is a separate realm of emptiness from which transformations issue? There is a great thing (大物), and it is called “constant transformation.” “Great thing” does not really exist, it is merely a provisional 5. In Yogācāra thought, the perceiving part and the image part (introduced in the previous chapter) represent what consciousness becomes, what it transforms into (所變). The reason the perceiving part and the image part together represent what consciousness transforms into is that both are needed in order for perception to occur. Consciousness-astransformer (能變)—the capacity of consciousness to transform into a perceiving part and image part—provides the raw material that one re-presents to oneself as what consciousness transforms into. Below, Xiong gives the term nengbian 能變 a new interpretation, as he is critical of the idea that consciousness, the mind, can be bifurcated into “the transformer” (能變) and “the transformed” (所變). 6. This is the idea of constancy in change. Constancy is a metaphor for Fundamental Reality. 7. The realm of the great heavenly king Brahma. It is said to be the first and lowest of the four meditation heavens in the world of form above Mount Sumeru. 8. Nominally, because there is no object that transformation refers to. Transformation is an endless flow of instantaneous arising and ceasing.

Y6693.indb 95

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

96

Transformation (轉變)

name. For example, “thing” in the phrase from the Doctrine of the Mean (中 庸), “As a thing, it is unique,” is also a provisional term. “Constant” means “without interruption”; “transform” expresses the sense of “not constant.” Not interrupted and not constant—moment by moment shedding the past and ceaselessly creating the new. This is the ultimate mystery of the principle of generation (生理). Profound, relying on nothing; This is because it has no cause. hidden, having no antecedents. It is not that it originally did not exist and then later did exist. It is for this reason it is said to have no antecedent. To have an antecedent is originally not to have existed. It resides in the obscure (卑) and does not rule. “Obscure” describes its being hidden and having no shape; it is not bei 卑 in the sense of “lowly.” “Does not rule” refers to its universally being Reality; it does not exist in the transcendence of things. Hence it differs from such erroneous presumptions as Brahmā heaven and soul. It preserves stillness yet does not grow weak. “Stillness” means “profoundly quiet.” It “does not grow weak” because it is not empty. This is “being able to transform” (能變)! “Having the capacity to transform” is a descriptive phrase. In order to refer specifically to the Reality of ceaseless transformation, it is contrivedly described as “being able to”; hence there is no “that into which [something] is transformed” (所變) to which it stands in contrast. The universe has only ever been this constantly renewing transformation—how could it be possible for there ever to have been something into which it is transformed? The answer to the first question stops here.

WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION? What is transformation? This repeats the second question. One contraction (翕) and one expansion (闢) is called transformation. These two “one” words simply highlight different tendencies in dynamism. This is not say9. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 53.6a. 10. Here “constant” has the sense of enduring and abiding. 11. Cf. Robin Wang and Ding Weixiang’s observation about Zhang Zai’s 張載 (1020– 1077) concept of taixu 太虛 (Ultimate Void): Taixu contains qi, yet it is not equal to or identical with qi. This is a central assumption of his ontology and moral teaching, and it enables Zhang to provide a metaphysical and ontological account of the myriad things. When qi coalesces the myriad things begin to exist; when qi disperses the myriad things disappear. This is analogous to the way water

Y6693.indb 96

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Transformation (轉變)

97

ing that contraction and expansion each have self-nature. Nor can one say that contraction precedes and expansion follows. It has always been [the case] that the movement of constant transformation is continuous and without end. Here “movement” is another name for “transformation.” Just as the first movement ceases, the next movement arises. It is like the uninterrupted flash upon flash of lightning—this is what is called “continuous.” It is not a previous movement’s continuing into a later moment of time that is called “continuous.” Unceasing movement is certainly not free-floating. Hence there is constant coalescence. The word “constant” is important. Constantly coalescing, and so without any prearranged agreement, countless points of movement are illusorily constituted, the tendency of which seems to be toward solidifying—this is called “contraction.” Conventionally, these moving points are not discerned, and so there is attachment to them as actual atoms (極微) or atoms (原子) and electrons. “Solid” refers to their tendency to be like this but not actually becoming solid material. When contracting, it seems as if it is moving such that it will become severed from its root. Although constant transformation exists, it is not a thing. When contracting, its tendency seems to be toward solidifying and about to become a thing. Hence it is understood that contraction is the movement of constant transformation such that it is about to lose its self-nature. However, because at the same time as there is contraction, there is constantly a potency within it, “At the same time” refers to at the same time as there is contraction. [and freezes when cold but evaporates when heated. These physical changes express a metaphysical necessity: “Ultimate Void cannot exist without qi; qi must coalesce to form the myriad things; the myriad things must disperse to return to the Ultimate Void.” The key point is that taixu is in both the dispersion and the coalescence of qi. Robin Wang and Ding Weixiang, “Zhang Zai’s Theory of Vital Energy,” in Dao Companion to NeoConfucian Philosophy, ed. John Makeham (New York: Springer, 2010), p. 47. 12. The connection with the Yogācāra concept of “continuous sequence of sameness condition” (等無間緣; see previous chapter)—in which the preceding instant of consciousness ceases just as the following instant of consciousness arises—is evident, and in part explains why Xiong is only minimally critical of this particular concept. 13. Here Xiong is flagging the importance of the concept of “discerning constancy in transformation”: the idea that ontological reality is a presence made manifest in change. 14. In the classical Indian sense of paramān.u, as discussed in chapter 2. 15. Root and self-nature are synonymous with Reality (實體). Constant transformation is another name for this.

Y6693.indb 97

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

98

Transformation (轉變)

this potency is able to be] vigorous (健) enough to control itself, thus this potency is unwilling to be transformed by contraction. This is because it ultimately takes constant transformation as always being what its nature is like. Unique, hence it is understood to have a [p. 42]

function that resembles that of a ruler. Because it has never possessed [the mental associate of] attentiveness (作意), the word “resembles” is used. By moving within contraction, it manifests its supreme vigor and therein is the image of victory. This “moving within contraction and thereby manifesting its supreme vigor” is called “expansion” (闢). One expansion, one contraction. It is as if they had been purposefully set in opposition so as to create transformation. This answers the second question. As contraction consolidates, it comes close to being matter. It is the basis for nominally talking about material dharmas. The vigor of expansion is such that it is utterly unimpeded (至神). It is the basis for nominally talking about mental dharmas. Because the material and the mental lack real entity, there is transformation only. “Entity” means constitutive entity. This is because neither material nor mental dharmas have real self-nature). Note: It is difficult to put into words the profound and far-reaching import of the principles of contraction and expansion. I add four more notes on the matter, set out below. (i) Viewed from the perspective of the tendency of its contractive mode, so-called constant transformation appears as if it has ceased preserving its self-nature. In other words, it seems as if it is transforming into matter (物質). This is why materialists mistake Reality to be matter. At the same time, viewed from the perspective of the tendency of its expansive mode, constant transformation definitely follows the flow of its self-nature and ultimately is never transformed into matter. The tendency of xi 翕 seems to 16. Again—constancy in transformation. 17. Zuo yi 作意 [sparśa] is one of the five omnipresent mental associates (五遍行) discussed at length in chapter 8, “Explaining the Mind, B.” There Xiong relates that “because attentiveness strenuously operates together with the mind and is vigilant over the mind, the mind’s clarity is enhanced.”

Y6693.indb 98

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Transformation (轉變)

99

be deliberate so as to highlight the tendency of its one and only pi 闢. If this were not the case, pi would be dispersed and lack the means by which to be highlighted. This is to describe pi as the mind and xi as material form. Material form is the body and the myriad things it comes into contact with. If this body and the myriad things did not exist, from where would the mind come? From this one can understand the reason for xi and pi. (ii) In discussing the Book of Change, Han dynasty scholars said: “When yang 陽 moves, it advances; when yin 陰 moves, it retreats.” Yang is to be unimpeded—it is the mind; yin is substance—it is material form. From this it can be inferred that that which advances by moving is the mind and that which retreats by moving is material form. The masters of the Song and Ming periods said that raising and lowering, ascending and descending, and contracting and extending and so forth, are each like [the two halves] of a tally. Now, in talking about xi and pi, the example of advancing and retreating further verifies their meaning. When [constant transformation] is contracting, it is as though it is about to lose its self-nature and so become transformed into a thing. This is the meaning of “retreating.” When [constant transformation] is expanding, it never loses its self-nature of vigor through movement. Transforming without traces and so constantly creating, its virtue lies in its being stable, even though it is constantly renewed. Hence it is able to transform things but not be transformed by things. This is the meaning of “advance.” (iii) On describing pi as the mind and xi as material form. The mind controls the body. In responding to things, it does not become a slave in pursuit of external things. This means expanding by making use of contraction and not being transformed by contraction. 18. See, for example, the Han apocryphal text relating to the Book of Change, Yi Qian zao du 易乾鑿度 (Chiseling Open the Regularity of Qian of the Apocrypha of Change), A.6b. 19. This refers to discussions of qi. 20. Here Xiong appears to be adapting a phrase from the “Image” commentary to the Qian hexagram in the Book of Change, 1.8a: “Heaven maintains vigor through movement.”

Y6693.indb 99

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

100

Transformation (轉變)

[p. 43] This being so, then contraction follows only expansion, and material form follows only mind. Contraction and expansion necessarily have no other tendency; that is, material form and mind necessarily are not two dharmas. (iv) If the incipient workings of transformation did not cohere, then there would be no contraction, and if there were no contraction, there would be no way to see expansion. Hence “cohering” is the way of Kun 坤. The way of Kun takes accord (順) to be what is correct, and consistently accords with [constant transformation’s] inherent nature of maintaining vigor through movement. Although Fundamental Reality does not contain even an iota of effort, students must first have made a sustained effort “to draw [the mind] together and keep it consolidated” (收攝保 聚) if their perception of Fundamental Reality is to be appropriate. Otherwise there will be no means for them to discern Fundamental Reality. Thus the effort of students is also modeled on contraction.

DHARMAS: ABIDING VERSUS SUDDEN GENERATION AND EXTINCTION Great indeed is transformation! Suddenly arising, suddenly extinguishing. Because of this, there have never been any (無少) dharmas that have been able to abide temporarily. This says that no dharmas are able to abide temporarily. Wu shao 無少 is to emphasize complete absence. The 21. This is the name of the second hexagram in the Book of Change and is associated with the female. 22. This term was used by Wang Yangming follower Luo Nian’an 羅念菴 (1504–1564) to describe a method of self-cultivation associated with “extending innate knowledge of the good” (致良知). For a detailed account, see Lin Yuehui 林月惠, Liang zhi xue de zhuanzhe: Nie Shuangjiang yu Luo Nian’an sixiang zhi yanjiu良知學的轉折─聶雙江與羅念菴思想 之研究 (Studies on the Thought of Nie Shuangjiang and Luo Nian’an) (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan Daxue chuban zhongxin, 2005), chapters 4 and 5. 23. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading ke rong 可容 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads yin rong 因容.

Y6693.indb 100

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Transformation (轉變)

101

Āgama sutras (阿含經) say: “The Buddha told me that dharmas are like illusions. They are extinguished dharmas, they are temporary dharmas. Here “temporary” is raised merely in reference to attachment to permanence. In fact, there is nothing “temporary” to speak of because notions of temporal divisions cannot be applied here. They do not abide even momentarily.” Here the text says that they do not abide even momentarily, and so we know that in talking about temporary dharmas, the text was not accepting that temporary dharmas exist. The contemporary figure [Bertrand] Russell maintains that what is temporary is real. This is still to be attached to this presupposition. This explanation is certainly true. Despite this, when regarded with conventional attitudes, none awaken to its truth. An examination of the basis for this explanation provides verification [of its veracity]. 1. The flow of dharmas as they continue from one another is called “arising” (起). If it were not the case that they cease as soon as they arise, then there would be no flow of dharmas continuing on from one another. “The flow of continuing on from one another” refers to the uninterrupted [process] of a preceding dharma ceasing and a following dharma arising. Because there is a flow of one replacing another, this is called “arising.” “Arising” means “to generate” (生). To cease at the moment of arising leaves no room for the slightest abiding and hence is said to be “uninterrupted.” If the preceding does not cease, then the following will not be generated. Hence, if it were the case that dharmas did not cease at the moment of arising, then there would be no flow of continuing on from one another. If one were to maintain, “Things do abide temporarily. At the following moment the 24. The Āgama sutras are a collection of early Buddhist discourses preserved primarily in Chinese translation. This particular passage is cited in Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra (大乘莊嚴經論; Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses); T31n1604_p0646b24–25. Attributed to Asan.ga, Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses was translated into Chinese by Prabhākaramitra (564–633) between 630 and 633 and is one of the treatises on which Cheng weishi lun is said to have drawn. 25. Bertrand Russell and Dora Black arrived in China in October 1920 and stayed nine months, based in Beijing and giving lectures across the country. Xiong began to teach at Peking University in 1921. In one of his lectures titled “Zhexue wenti 哲學問題” (Philosophical Problems), Russell remarked that “nothing in the world is more real than momentary things.” See Luosu ji Bolake jiangyan ji 羅素及勃拉克講演集 (Collected Essays of Russell and Black) (Beijing: Weiyiri baoshe, 1922), p. 11.

Y6693.indb 101

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

102

Transformation (轉變)

preceding ceases and the following arises. Hence this can be called continuing on from one another,” this would also be incorrect. This is because while a dharma is abiding temporarily, the following dharma would not exist. The following several explanations are developed on the basis of the Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses (Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra; [大乘]莊嚴經論). 2. If one were to maintain, “When dharmas stop arising, they will be able to abide,” would this be because dharmas are able to effect their own abiding, or would it be because their abiding is caused by other dharmas? If they are able to effect their own abiding, why are they unable to abide continually? If it is accepted that dharmas are able to effect their own abiding, then they should be able to abide continually and not be extinguished. If their abiding is caused by other dharmas, and it is not the case that independent and separate from the various dharmas there is a performer of actions [p. 44]

who can be said to effect this abiding, then who or what is the cause of the abiding? Neither alternative is the case. Effecting their own abiding and the abiding’s being caused by other dharmas are both incorrect. Hence, the argument is established that as soon as [dharmas] arise, they cease. Since abiding is not possible, it is understood that as soon as [dharmas] arise, they cease. 3. If one were to maintain, “Even though there is no cause of abiding, the cause of cessation is not yet in place, and so for this reason abiding is possible. When the cause of destruction is in place, then at a subsequent point in time there is cessation. It is like fire destroying black iron,” “A subsequent point in time” refers to the preceding abiding, before it had ceased. Here bian 變 means “to destroy” (變壞). This is to say that the fire is the cause of the destruction of the black image of the iron. If this cause of destruction were not yet in place, the black image would temporarily abide. If the cause of destruction were in place, the black image would then cease. Conventionally, it is deemed that in all cases the cessation of dharmas necessarily depends on causes. Until the causes for cessation have been encountered,

26. It is being implied that a dharma can continue from a previous moment to a following moment to abide temporarily before it ceases. Xiong is refuting this claim. 27. Based on Asan.ga, Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra, T31n1604_p0646b29-c02. 28. When iron is heated, it turns red.

Y6693.indb 102

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Transformation (轉變)

103

temporary abiding is possible. this would also be incorrect. This is because the cause of destruction ultimately lacks reality (體 [dravya]). Put in different terms, “the cause of destruction lacks reality” means that there is no cause for destruction. Extinction does not depend on causes. My discussion of contributory factors as conditions (增上緣) in the previous chapter already discussed this. As for the analogy of fire destroying the [black] iron, I deny that such a principle exists. When iron and fire are combined, the black image seems to cease and a red image seems to arise. When the black image ceases, this is when the red image arises. The active function (功用) of fire is its capacity to lead a red image to appear to arise. In reality, it is not the case that it is fire that destroys the black image. Conventionally, fire is taken to be the destructive cause of the black image, but in reality that is a great mistake. The cessation of the black image is simply a case of its naturally extinguishing itself. It does not rely on fire to extinguish it. As long as fire arises, then the red image will arise together with it. Accordingly, it can be said that fire has the active function of leading the red image to arise; it cannot be said that fire is the destructive cause of the black image. It is also like boiling water until there is very little left, then after which no more water arises. Again, this is not because fire is combined with water; rather it is simply that the water lacked reality. The cessation of the image of water is only self-cessation. Is it possible that fire has caused it to cease? Hence, the argument is established that as soon as [dharmas] arise, they cease, since cessation does not depend on causes. 4. If one were to maintain, “If things cease as soon as they arise—that is, they cease instant by instant—then this would be having succumbed already to [attachment to] extremes (邊).” Bian 邊 is one-sided attachment (偏執). This is because one is one-sided in attachment to cessation. This is incorrect. You should understand that instant upon instant of cessation is, in reality, instant upon instant of arising. On the one hand, it is said to be unceasing cessation; on the other hand, it is said to be ceaseless arising. The truth of the matter is as such, and it is difficult to fathom. 5. If one were to maintain, “If things newly arise, instant by instant, then 29. See his discussion of “antagonistic conditions.” 30. Based on Asan.ga, Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra, T31n1604_p0646c03–08. 31. Based on Asan.ga, Mahāyāna-sūm . rālam . kāra, T31n1604_p0646c10–11.

Y6693.indb 103

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

104

Transformation (轉變)

how does one account for former things within this [explanation]?” then it should be said to be due to similarity between the dharma that comes into being following the preceding dharma For example, the dharma of a former instant ceases as soon as it arises. The following instant, a dharma that resembles the former dharma arises and ceases in the same instant. From the third or subsequent instant onward, the process is the same. Hence [p. 45]

instant by instant, arising and ceasing are unending, and this is called “similarity between a dharma that comes into being following the preceding dharma.” that there is this understanding (知). Because the dharma that subsequently arises resembles the preceding dharma, knowledge of former things is able to arise. Take the example of a lamp flame. Because similarity [between the instances of flame] arises, this leads to awareness of the former flame, when in reality they are different. In reality the preceding flame and the following flame are different. This is because the former flame lacks reality. This is because when the following flame arises, the reality of the preceding flame has already ceased and does not exist. If you were to maintain, “Even though thought-instant by thought-instant the lamp flame ceases, is not the wick that is directly apparent actually abiding?” it should be understood that what you [think you] see is not what you [really] see. What you say about the wick that is directly apparent actually abiding is really [a function of the] distorted conceptual construction of the sixth consciousness. It is certainly not directly apparent. Because the [images] of wicks replace one another continuously, instant by instant, ceasing and arising—you will not be aware of it as it truly is. If one disregards the reality of instantaneous arising and ceasing continuing on from one another, then one will see the wick as abiding and not ceased; that is, one will not be aware of it as it truly is. If one were to maintain, “If phenomena are as instantaneous as the lamp flame, why is it that ordinary people are unaware of this?” then it should be said that this is because phenomena are distorted things. It has never been the case that there are real material and mental dharmas, yet, with abandon, ordinary people form attachments based on imaginatively constructed discrimination ([遍]計[所]執). Hence it is said that phenomena are distorted things. Instantaneously, a phenomenon comes into being following the pre-

Y6693.indb 104

6/30/15 2:55:46 PM

Transformation (轉變)

105

ceding phenomenon. Although this is beyond understanding, This principle is certainly not something that an unenlightened state of mind can understand by inference. in reality they each arise separately. Ordinary people say that this flame is the same as the previous flame. This generates distorted understanding. 6. If one were to maintain, “When things first arise, this is not transformative change,” it would be incorrect. This is because internal and external dharmas have no end boundary (後邊 [anta]) that can be grasped. “Internal dharmas” is a different name for mental dharmas. “External dharmas” is a different name for material dharmas. It was never the case that there were the internal and the external—I simply follow convention and am referring to them nominally. If, in all cases, dharmas were able to abide and not cease, then there should be an end boundary that can be grasped. Now, thought-instant by thought-instant my mind arises and ceases. Since there is no starting point that one can look for, there is also no end boundary that can be grasped. This is the same with material dharmas. If things are broken down into atoms and then broken down further, there would be nothing. It is nothing but the transformation of the continuous replacement of one by another. What end boundary is there? From the very beginning, there is transformation that gradually becomes clearly discerned. Take the example of milk to curd. Just at the moment the curd characteristic becomes apparent in [the change] from the milk stage to the curd stage, its altered characteristics are subtle, difficult to discern, with similar [characteristics to the milk stage] accompanying it, it is said that the [following characteristic] is the preceding object. It is for this reason that cessation at the moment of arising is able to be established. From milk to curd cannot be reached in one step. In between, countless instants of arising and ceasing must be passed through, in which similar [characteristics] accompany one another. The extent to which they are similar, however, is only a matter of degree, and so instant by instant, accompanying the dharmas that arise together with them and upon which they rely—such as heat, air, and so forth—[the characteristics] gradually grow subtly different. This is because, in every case, a following moment and its [immediately] preceding 32. Based on Asan.ga, Mahāyām . a-sūtrālam . kāra, T31n1604_p0646c13–15; T31n1604_p0 648b16–21.

Y6693.indb 105

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

106

Transformation (轉變)

moment are never completely similar to one another. Coming to the curd stage, owing to the gradual accumulation of many instances of subtle differentiation, its differing characteristics become particularly evident. In the conventional world, this is not investigated; rather it is assumed that at the very beginning milk abided and did not cease, later becoming [p. 46]

curd, and only then did the milk characteristic cease. This is to fail to understand that the milk before the curd stage had already arisen and ceased countless times and had never been a single thing. Due specifically to the degree of similarity that existed before the stark differences suddenly took form, it is still said to be the former thing. 7. You maintain, “Because dharmas’ leaving for other places is called departing (去), hence it can be known that abiding is possible.” Here qu 去 is what is conventionally called “moving” (動). In all cases, when something transfers from this place to that place it is called departing (去). [Xiong’s unnamed interlocutor:] Because there is departing it is known that things do not cease at the moment they arise. [Xiong:] If when they arise they already do not abide, then according to whom is it said that they cease? Everyone in the ordinary world conventionally makes this presumption [that things do not cease at the moment they arise]. This is incorrect. You are attached to dharmas as real things, and because [you assume] they are able to transfer (轉) from this place to that place, you call it “moving.” Here zhuan 轉 means “to transfer” (轉移), not “to transform” (轉變). This is to take a mechanical view drawn from daily habits to make inferences about the principles of the way things inherently are. It is confused and distorted, and not worth discussing. As I have said, dharmas are nothing but instant upon instant of ceasing and arising, arising and ceasing. The illusory images appear to be real. Uninterrupted, one continues after the other. One replaces the other, constant and without interruption. Although nominally termed “departing,” in reality there is no departing. Because arising and ceasing replace one another continuously, nominally this is called “departing.” There is no real thing that abides and is not extinguished and which, over a temporal passage from earlier to later, proceeds from this place to that place. Hence, in reality 33. Based on Asan.ga, Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra, T31n1604_p0646c19–22.

Y6693.indb 106

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

107

there is no departing. Thus, in your account of abiding, the proof adduced fails to establish the claim. Note: Here wu qu 無去 refers to “no moving.” [In understanding this,] however, one cannot be guided by what has been transmitted in the philosopher’s account of “accumulated motion constitutes stillness” (積動成靜). The philosopher is attached [to the view] that there are real things and further that time (時) and space (方) are real, Shi 時 is time and fang 方 is space. maintaining that at an earlier point in time a thing is at rest at locus A, and later it moves from locus A to locus B, to rest at locus B. The accumulated earlier and later movements are actually all at rest, and so it cannot be said that the object is moving. Thus, although a flying arrow moves, in reality it does not move. This is to flounder about, while obstinately being attached. Attached to space, attached to time, and attached to [the view that] there are things at rest. A mass of erroneous attachments solves nothing. It is difficult to talk about the transformation of that which lacks location (方) and physical form (體). Fang 方 means locus. Ti 體 means physical form (形體). To lack location and physical form is to say that it is not something real. My thesis is that because space is empty, It has always been the case that there is no real space. Wait for details [to be provided] in On Epistemology. space is also an illusion. My thesis is that what is meant by an instant (刹那) is not 34. Based on Asan.ga, Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra, T31n1604_p0647c03–14. 35. Here Xiong is referring to Zeno’s paradox about the arrow in motion: “If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless.” Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b5, translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, available at http://classics.mit .edu/Aristotle/physics.mb.txt. 36. “[Zeno’s] argument against motion explicitly turns on a particular kind of assumption of plurality: that time is composed of moments (or ‘nows’) and nothing else. Consider an arrow, apparently in motion, at any instant. First, Zeno assumes that it travels no distance during that moment—‘it occupies an equal space’ for the whole instant. But the entire period of its motion contains only instants, all of which contain an arrow at rest, and so, Zeno concludes, the arrow cannot be moving.” Nick Hugget, “Zeno’s Paradoxes,” available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/#Arr.

Y6693.indb 107

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

108

Transformation (轉變) the conventional sense of time. Again, the details are in On Epistemology. Thought-instant upon thought-instant of arising and ceasing. Here “thought-instant” is not what is usually meant by instant; that is, on the basis of uninterrupted arising and ceasing, it is nominally said that each arising and ceasing is one instant of time. In reality, arising and ceasing, ceasing and arising, cannot be divided and interrupted; that is, between each instant there are no gaps. It is not appropriate to apply the conventional

[p. 47] concept of time in this context. What thing moves? What thing abides? As soon as there is arising, there is ceasing—there have never been things. According to whom is there movement? According to whom is there abiding? In all cases, this is simply because those who presume there is movement and abiding are erroneously attached to [the belief] that there are time, space, and real things. This is why [my view] is vastly different from all the conventional views. Students must engage the full import of what I am saying. Only by adopting a transcendent and free-moving (神) interpretation can one avoid being impeded by such views.

8. Necessarily, dharmas gradually become perfect (圓滿), For example, mental powers develop from weak to strong, and sense organs develop from simple to complex. These are both images of perfection. yet if from the very beginning things abided and did not cease, then no sooner than they received their completed form then there would be no transformation, so how would it be possible for there to be gradual perfection? You maintain, “The new can be created without relinquishing the old. Hence, by accumulating up to the present, then the present can be advanced toward the future (來). It is like rolling a snowball; the more it is rolled, the larger it becomes.” Lai 來 is the future (未來). Once again, this would be incorrect. You presume that there is accumulation and retention—this is already to be attached to things. Does this suffice to give any glimpse into transformation? Transformation 37. Here the idea seems to be evolutionary rather than in the case of individuals.

Y6693.indb 108

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

109

is motion (運) without any accumulation. Here “motion” means “to flow,” “to be manifest as an illusion.” If there is accumulation, then it is a dead thing; being a dead thing, then there is no gradual great perfection. Accordingly, just as I have said, dharmas do not abide. Instant by instant they shed the past and create the new; transformation moves in obscurity, gradually advancing toward sublime transcendence (殊勝). Shu sheng 殊勝 refers to drawing near to great perfection. 9. You presume, “Dharmas are either eternal or destroyed.” Conventional views always fluctuate between the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism. It is like a tree. Because it has always been seen now and in the past, it is presumed to be eternal. Suddenly one notices that it has been wiped out by fire and so presumes that it is destroyed. Both views are badly mistaken. It should be understood that dharmas cease as soon as they arise. Thoughtinstant by thought-instant they are annihilated and so are not eternal. Jin 盡 is “to annihilate” (滅盡). Constantly generating anew; hence they are not severed. At one instant, the earth is at the same level as the surface of a body of water. At another instant, mountains and rivers are completely different. The principle involved here is quite ordinary and is not the same as talking about strange events. The “Great Ancestral Teacher” chapter of Zhuangzi states: “People say it is safe to hide a boat in a ravine or a mountain in a marsh. Yet in the middle of the night, a strong man carries them off on his shoulders, and in your ignorance you do not understand what happened.” Guo Zixuan 郭子玄 [Guo Xiang 郭象] interpreted this as follows: No power that comes from lacking power is greater than transformation. Carrying heaven and earth and moving to the new; shouldering the mountains and discarding the old. Hence, if there is no momentary stopping, suddenly one will already have entered the new, and so there has never been a time when heaven and earth and the myriad things were not moving. Everything in the world is new, but it is looked upon as old. The boat changes daily yet is regarded as if it were old. The mountain changes daily yet is seen to be as before. Now, what I closely encountered yet let pass by has all gone into

38. Based on Asan.ga, Dasheng zhuangyan jinglun, T31n1604_p0647b15–16. 39. These views represent the two extremes—viz. eternalism and nihilism—from which one is to seek the middle way. 40. Xiong here uses these images to describe the processes of constant transformation.

Y6693.indb 109

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

110

Transformation (轉變) the Darkness. Thus, the “I” of the past is longer the “I” of now. “I” and “now” pass together. Surely the past cannot be constantly preserved? Yet no one in the world is aware of this. Instead they say that what is encountered now can be bound, and so it exists. Is this not ignorance?

This explanation by Guo Xiang is sublime and wondrous. [p. 48]

Hence, the phrase “no momentary stopping” is precisely my thesis, which says that [dharmas] cease as soon as they arise. When the Great Dharma came east, it certainly was no coincidence that Profound Learning (玄學) first guided it. Summarizing what has been said, it is thus understood that dharmas suddenly arise and cease, and just like “sky flowers,” they cannot be grasped. Conventional presumptions about the existence of real material objects and real minds thus amount to misguided conceptual elaborations. In the West, idealists are attached [to the view] that there are real minds, and materialists are attached [to the view] that there are real material objects. It has always been the case that material and mental dharmas are devoid of selfnature. If one were to talk of their real nature (實性), then it would be constant transformation. Material dharmas are when the movement of constant transformation is contracting; mental dharmas are when the movement of the constant transformation is expanding. Fundamentally, contraction and expansion are separate and contrary trends in movement—this is transformation’s unpredictability. Thus it appears to be like arising and ceasing. Yet although it seems to be an illusion, it is real and not empty. Strange indeed, transforming thus and thus. Contraction and expansion are both trends in

41. Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi jishi, p. 244. 42. Xuanxue (dark/obscure/mysterious/abstruse/profound learning) thought might loosely be described as discussions of, and writings on, such abstract concepts as “to initiate no action” (無為), “emptiness” (xu 虛), “one and the many” (一多), “root and branches” (本末), “having and not having” (有無), and the “emotional responses” (情) and “pattern” (理). The trouble with such a description is that thinkers less readily identifiable as xuanxue thinkers also addressed many of these themes and concepts. Where does one draw the line? The xuanxue philosophy of the Zhengshi 正始 reign period (240–249) might better be characterized as using Daode jing (Classic of the way and virtue) to comment on writings such as the Analects and the Book of Change and perhaps vice versa.

Y6693.indb 110

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

111

movement. “Separate and contrary” means they are not one. “Appears to be like” is like an illusory manifestation.

THE THREE MEANINGS OF TRANSFORMATION In my earlier treatise, I elucidated “transformation” as having three meanings. In brief, they are as follows. 1. It does not mean “movement” (動). What is conventionally meant by “movement” has a different sense from what I mean by “transformation” (變 動). When transformation is talked about in conventional terms, it is taken to mean “movement.” “Movement” is when a thing proceeds from this locus to pass by another locus. It is precisely due to conventional truth that this erroneous attachment occurs. Transformation has never begun to have a thing [as part of what it is] and so has no locations to investigate. It is just like my hand’s moving (轉趣) in front of me. Zhuan 轉 means “to transfer” (轉 移), and qu 趣 means “to move toward” (趣往). Both have the conventional sense of “movement” (動). In fact, there is only instant upon instant of separate, sudden ceaseless movement that seems to be continuous. Constant and without interruption, as if continuous. If nominally it were said that a hand moves, yet there is no real hand that moves forward, There never was a real hand that moved from this locus to a locus in front. then by what manner of wondrous transformation can movement be thus explained? It has always been the case that transformation is utterly wondrous and unfathomable— how could it be thought about in terms of movement? The Doctrine of the Mean states: “transformation without moving.” This can indeed be said to be profound and mysterious. It is likely that this is a saying of the late Zhou ru 儒. It was not something that people in Han times were able to elucidate. In recent times, [Henri] Bergson has stated that movement is an undifferentiated whole that cannot be divided. The conventional view is that the 43. The reference is to his 1923 publication Weishixue gailun, pp. 53–55. 44. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 53.6a. 45. See, for example, Yanming An, “Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition: Cultural Context and the Evolution of Terms,” Philosophy East and West 47, no. 3 (1997): 337– 334, 339–340. Azuma Jūji, Shin yuishiki ron, p. 262, n. 4, implies that Xiong’s understanding of Bergson’s philosophy may have been based on Feng Youlan, “Bogesen de zhexue fangfa 柏格森的哲學方法” (Bergson’s Philosophical Method), Xinchao 3, no. 1 (1921): 13–24.

Y6693.indb 111

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

112

Transformation (轉變)

[spatial] extension (方分) through which movement passes can be demarcated, and so it is presumed that movement can also be demarcated. This is ridiculous. In talking about movement, Bergson’s thesis does not accept that extension can be randomly demarcated. This comes close to my thesis when talking about transformation and is different from the conventional view of movement. Nevertheless, to talk only about movement’s being undifferentiated and unable to be divided, yet not to talk about instant upon instant of continuous arising and ceasing, then this is [to say that] a moving body is able to move from a previous instant to a following instant. This is still not to be free from the perspectives of being attached to things and the presumption of permanance. This has no place in my doctrines! This is no minor difference. 2. It means “active” (活). “Active” is a term used merely to forestall any notion of emptiness—it does not positively express any particular thing. To say [p. 49]

that it is a particular thing would to be off target. 2.1. In general terms, the referent (義 [artha]) of “active” is the referent of “having no creator” (作者). Zuozhe is the same as saying “the creator” (造物主). Non-Buddhist schools presumed either that the Great Brahmā Heaven or the ātman is the creator. My fundamental position is that neither can be acknowledged to exist. If there were a creator, then one would need to differentiate if it was defiled or pure. If it were pure, it could not create what is defiled, and if it were defiled, it could not create what is pure. Yet they did not occur together; how could one talk of the world having two dharmas? Furthermore, if there were a creator, would it be constant or not constant? If it were to lack constancy, then it could not be named a creator; if it were constant, then being constant it would not create. And if a creator were posited so as to bring dharmas to completion, this creator would also rely on [dharmas] for its own completion. Over and over, creator and dharmas would thus depend on one another, there being no end to this error. 46. See the note on “Brahmā heaven” above. Xiong appears to be in error here. “Great Brahmā Heaven” is not the creator. In brahmanic systems, the god Brahmā is the creator, but he is often conceived as an emanation of another god who performs only one function: creating. He resides in the Brahmā heaven. He is also the keeper of Vedic lore in the Vedas. And in the Vedanta system, ātman is not a creator; Brahman is, and ātman is an aspect of Brahman. 47. Defiled and pure.

Y6693.indb 112

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

113

Moreover, in all cases, creators need to be able to create all manner of things. If they were a constant template, they would then lack wondrous function (妙用). Having thus repeatedly investigated fine points of argument, it is the case that “creator” as a referent cannot be established. From this it follows that there is no controller of transformation, and hence the referent of “active” is established. 2.2. The referent of “illusory” (幻有) is the referent of “active.” Although it is without a creator, it has productive power (功能). The self-nature of productive power is empty and inauthentic, just like clouds of vital stuff (氣). There is no real thing that can be apprehended in productive power; hence it is described as being empty and inauthentic. In regard to its being pure and non-dependent (絕待) and everywhere the Reality (實體) of the myriad things, it should also be said to be real. According to the different paths followed by words, the referent (義) in each case is not the same. Empty (闃然), it flows; it is also like a wind-wheel (風輪). This says that that which flows is an illusory manifestation. It flows incessantly but is not a real thing. 48. Here Xiong is trading on the alternate perspectives of absolute truth and provisional truth—a practice common in Madhyamaka literature. Elsewhere he explains that he used the concept of productive power as a skillful means, an expedient: In the chapters “Transformation” and “Productive Power” I nominally established [the concept] of constantly transforming productive power in order to highlight the flow of Fundamental Reality. I nominally established this term so as to show that mental and material dharmas both took flow or transformation as their basis. As with the Prajñāpāramitā literature [teaching of] the inherent emptiness of conditioned phenomena and their characteristics, this leads people to begin to grasp the import of Reality. Although the establishment of this concept [on the basis of] skillful means (方便) seems to differ [in approach] from that of the Mahāyāna Madhyamaka school, the end goal is certainly the same—this is beyond question. See Xiong Shili, “Jiangci 講詞” (Speech), Shili lunxue yuji lüe 十力論學語輯略 (Edited Collection of Xiong’s Shili’s Discussions on Scholarship), in Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 2, p. 253. The speech was given in 1935. 49. That is, from the perspective of absolute truth, productive power has no self-nature, being the product of causes and conditions; from the perspective of conventional truth, it does exist, qua causes and conditions. Whereas the Madhyamaka position is that there is no independence (everything is empty), from a Huayan perspective there is total interdependence through causes and conditions. 50. For Xiong, the wind-wheel is just a symbol of emptiness and illusion. In texts like Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa-bhās.ya (Apidamo jushe lun 阿毘達磨倶舍釋; Abhidharma Compendium Treatise, T29n1558_p0057a07), it refers to the four wheels on which the earth rests: wind, water, metal, and space.

Y6693.indb 113

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

114

Transformation (轉變)

Hence it is said to be empty. “Empty” is like “being devoid of things.” In an instant, the mountain peaks in clouds seem to be illusions, instantaneously transforming in shape—this is nothing but the productive power of activity (活能), suddenly arising, suddenly ceasing. The power of wind is vast and huge, churning seas into arrays of mountains—this is nothing but the productive power of activity; it has great dispositional power (勢力). Here “illusory existence” is not a term contrasting to “real existence” (實有). It is said to be illusory because it is not fixed, because it cannot be grasped. There is no value judgment being made with respect to this word. Students must understand it just as I have distinguished it. 2.3. The referent of “real” is the referent of “active.” How great is productive power! Everywhere it is the Reality of the myriad things! To speak in superlative terms of just how glorious it is, it is “in a single flower there is the whole dharmadhātu (法界)”; “in a single leaf there is a whole buddha (如來 [tathāgata]).” Dharmadhātu is another name for Reality. Originally, tathāgata is one of the [ten] epithets of the Buddha. Here it is used to refer to Reality. The layer upon layer of [reflection] in Indra’s net (帝網) is nothing other than [Fundamental Reality’s] condition of intrinsic purity (清淨本 然). That is, everywhere one looks is True Reality (真實). What else matches 51. Dharmadhātu is the universe seen correctly rather than the conventional universe seen by us. In seeing the universe this way, one’s mind can penetrate all things. In this universe all things interpenetrate; everything is present in everything else. Xiong’s views share obvious parallels with the Perfect Teaching of Huayan Buddhism: the claim that Suchness (tathatā) does not exist apart from conditions but actively takes part in the origination of the phenomenal world. 52. Indra’s net is a metaphor for mutual interpenetration drawn from the Huayan Avatam . saka-sūtra: Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net that has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each “eye” of the net, and since the net itself is infinite in all dimensions, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring. Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), p. 2.

Y6693.indb 114

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

115

this, other than that which is absolutely active? “Layer upon layer of [reflection] in Indra’s net” refers to the world’s being a tightly knit array of myriads of images. 2.4. The referent of “perfect” (圓滿) is the referent of “active.” Colossal transformation is nothing but productive power (能). Neng 能 is productive power. Perfect, wondrous, never static. The tip of the autumn hair depends on it to be a constitutive entity, and so there is not one thing that is deficient. There is nothing able to become an entity without productive power. Because this is so even for [something as fine as] an autumn hair, how much more so does it apply to everything else? Since the autumn hair in its entirety is productive power, then the autumn hair is not deficient. The situation for other things can thus be understood. If the attributes of things are removed so that you can point [directly] at their Reality, then what [p. 50]

they share in common is a single great productive power, with none being deficient. There is nowhere in the cosmos where the principle of transformation (化理) is not fully intact. Wang Chuanshan 王船山 said: “The Great Transformation flows everywhere. It is like small balls of medicine. No matter which ball you might choose to discard, it will be every bit as flavorsome [as the non-discarded balls].” This already provides some insight into the meaning of “perfect.” Examining this in the case of plants, if a section of the plant is severed, the branches will still grow fully intact. This is indeed so. No matter where our thinking extends to, it expresses the whole (全體). In a given instant, when our thinking extends to a certain matter or principle, it appears merely to have a particular sort of meaning and does not extend to the whole cosmos. In reality, in this instant of thought the whole universe is already expressed; it is just that some particular meaning is clearer [than others]. Hence, a single word holds all referents (義). For example, the word “human” (人) necessarily includes all people and all non-people; otherwise, 53. “Autumn hair” refers to the hair of wild animals, which is finest in autumn. The term is a metaphor for the extremely fine and, by extension, insignificant. 54. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (Chuanshan 船山) (1619–1692), Neo-Confucian thinker who developed a metaphysics central to which was the concept of qi 氣. 55. The quotation is a paraphrase of a passage in Wang Fuzhi, Du Sishu daquan shuo 讀 四書大全說 (Reading Notes on the Four Books), in vol. 6 of Chuanshan quanshu 船山全書 (Complete Works of Wang Chuanshan) (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1988–1996), p. 497.

Y6693.indb 115

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

116

Transformation (轉變)

the word could not be established. Thus when the word “human” is spoken, it already includes and gives expression to the whole cosmos. It cannot be broken down into fragments, saying that “this” is “this” alone and that there is no “that.” If it really could be broken down, then it would not be perfect. Because it cannot be broken down, the referent of “perfect” is established. All referents are expressed within a single word. This can be determined on the basis of the foregoing. Moreover, an instant contains 100,000,000 eons (億劫), Jie 劫 is time. and the limitless is contained within an atom. In all cases nothing is wanting, so how could there be divisions into parts? Discerning this crucial quality of “active” is an excellent means by which to cease making discriminative constructions. 2.5. The referent of “intermeshed everywhere” is the referent of “active.” Wondrously transforming, unfathomable; the myriad things are unequal. Equal by virtue of being unequal, and so each is as it is. Hence it is said that the myriad dharmas are thus, and fully possess one another. How can divisions be applied? Mount Tai and the tip [of an autumn] hair; an ugly

56. Nominal distinctions are based on comparing and contrasting. 57. For a heuristically useful interpretation of the related Huayan view that each part in a whole depends on that particular whole for being what it is, just as each part also depends on every other part of that whole for being what it is, see Nicholaos John Jones, “Mereological Heuristics for Huayan Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West 60, no. 3 (2010): 355–368. 58. Although the allusion here is to Zhuangzi’s essay “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” this reading might have been more immediately influenced by Zhang Taiyan’s 章太 炎 (1869–1936) Yogācāran reading of that essay: “To equalize that which is not equal is but the base attachment of lowly persons; [to realize] the equality of inequality is the profound discourse of the most exalted wisdom. Unless one abandons names and attributes, how can this wisdom become realized?” Zhang Taiyan, Qi Wu Lun shi ding ben 齊物論釋定本 (Definitive Edition of Explanation of “Discourse on Making All Things Equal”), in vol. 6 of Zhang Taiyan Quanji 章太炎全集 (Complete Works of Zhang Taiyan) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 61. 59. Dasheng qixin lun (Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith) may be an influence here as well. Cf. Dasheng qixin lun, T32n1666_p0576a11–13: “Therefore all phenomena from the very beginning have been free from characterizations of language, naming, and cognitive objects. They are ultimately the same, invariant, and indestructible. They are nothing but this One Mind, and therefore they are called “Suchness.” 是故一切法從本已來，離言說相、離名 字相、離心緣相，畢竟平等、無有變異、不可破壞。唯是一心故名真如 。 60. “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” Zhuangzi, 5/2/52: “In the whole world nothing is larger than an autumn hair and Mount Tai is small. None have lived longer than

Y6693.indb 116

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

117

[leper] and [the beauty] Xi Shi 西施. Following the path of transformation, with each adhering to its own affairs, naturally there is equality. To demarcate the great and the small; to distinguish fondness and disdain—these are falsehoods caused by presumptions grounded in false discrimination. How could they be used to measure the magnitude of transformation? When things proliferate in extreme numbers and each completely occupies the same place, this is not like the case where many horses cannot be contained within the same place. Rather, it is like the crisscrossing beams of light from many lamps forming a net. Person A’s cosmos and person B’s cosmos are both located at the same place, and each completely fills that place, yet they do not impede one another. Thus although you and I are not the same, we are not different. “Not the same” means that you are unable to enter my cosmos, and I am also unable to enter your cosmos. If your group of bandits and I were each in Beijing, in fact each of us would have our own Beijing. My Beijing would be quiet and empty, and the group of bandits would be unable to enter it. The Beijing of the bandits would be boisterous and crowded, and I would be unable to enter it either. Yet they are not different. My Beijing and the group of bandits’ Beijing each fully extends over the same place, yet they do not interfere with one another. Forgetting about traces of “noble” and “lowly” such that all is appropriate is due solely to [the referent of] “active.” Convention says that the giant Peng bird is noble because it stops only when it reaches the Pool of Heaven, and that small birds are lowly because they can fly only to the elm and sapanwood trees. This is to determine “noble” and “lowly” merely on the basis of traces. If one grasps principle (理) by forgetting traces, then there is no “noble” and “lowly.” To be sure, equality lies in [each thing’s] [determining] what is appropriate for itself. 2.6. The referent of “limitless” is the referent of “active.” Great Function (大用) does not become depleted. Naturally, there are the myriad particulars. Sentient beings are without limit; worlds are without limit. Nothing the dead infant and Pengzu was short-lived. Heaven and earth were created together with me and the ten thousand things are one with me.” 61. “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” Zhuangzi, 4/2/35: “Hence one can cite such examples as a small stem or a [large] pillar, a leper or [the beauty] Xi Shi—no matter how transmogrified or bizarre, the way interconnects them as one.” 62. See “Xiaoyao you 逍遙遊” (Free and Easy Wandering), Zhuangzi, 1/1/1–10. 63. Principle here is analogous to ultimate reality; tathatā.

Y6693.indb 117

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

118

Transformation (轉變)

[p. 51]

suddenly exists, and nothing suddenly ceases to exist. Accordingly, it has always been that living things depend on the turning [of transformation] and do not come to an end. This is referring to the Reality of all things. It does not suddenly exist, nor does it suddenly cease to exist, and so it is said to be without end. The foregoing is a brief account of the referent of “active,” poorly formulated. 3. “Transformation” means “cannot be conceptualized.” Here “cannot” is fundamentally a term of refutation. It is not “incapable” and is also different from “not necessary.” In order to show the reason for “cannot,” it is first necessary to understand fully the definition of “conceptualize” (思議). Si 思 is the mark (相) of the mind’s travels. Yi 議 is the mark of deliberation. “The mind’s travels”: where the mind journeys to is called “travels.” “Deliberation” means that when the mind grasps an image (像), if there is a presumption that this image is blue and not not-blue, and so on, then this is the mark of deliberation. This is defiled knowledge (染慧)—the perspective of the sixth consciousness when it grasps things. Because “defiled knowledge” refers to conventional cognition’s having become defiled, it is roughly equivalent to what is conventionally called “reason” (理智). The “grasping” of “grasping things” is like “being attached to.” When the sixth consciousness begins to conceptualize, it will necessarily have a plan, just like when analyzing material items. This is called “attachment to things.” This is because in the context of the needs of everyday living, the sixth consciousness’s deliberations are thoroughly infused with attachments to things, and so this is defiled knowledge. If the perspective of grasping things shifts to infer [the perspective of] the no-place (無方) that is transformation, “No-place”: transformation has not begun to have things—that is, it has no place. then this would be to give free rein to misguided conceptual elaboration, and the proliferation of distortions would be great. Hence “cannot be conceptualized” refers directly to [pursuing] principles to their ultimate. This is not something with which conceptualization can be associated. In other words, it is necessary to transcend the scope of defiled knowledge, and it is only by means of clear understanding that it can be comprehended. “Clear understanding” means no

64. Based on Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0422a17.

Y6693.indb 118

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

119

muddle-headedness. Details of this can be found in the discussion of mental associates (心所) [in chapter 8, “Explaining the Mind, B”]. Of those who do not realize that the meaning of “transformation” cannot be conceptualized, some presume that turning (運轉) is like a machine, and some conceive of Great Function (大用) as having a target. This is to predetermine (邀) the outlines of transformation and so become attached to it as a thing. Yao 邀 is to anticipate intentionally. Transformation has never been a thing; it has no outlines. However, because arising and ceasing seem to follow one another in succession, there is the illusory appearance of an outline’s being there. The foolish predetermine [that outline] and become attached to it in the mistaken belief that there is a thing there. Hence they trace it back to a thing in the past (曾) Ceng 曾 is a term for the past. just as if it had been mechanically reduplicated. In the opposite direction, they conjecture about it as a future (來) thing. Lai 來 means the future. It is just as if the target had been determined beforehand. In terms of the principle of the transformation of the cosmos, there has certainly never been any target. Naturally, effortlessly, it is without purposiveness. For humans or other living things, as they struggle to move forward along the long road of imponderables, they secretly wish to seek the path to perfection—this can be said to be a target. This is because the target is the source of their [desire] to struggle to move forward. These [two presumptions] are to use things to discern (觀) things, and both give free rein to the excesses of conceptualizing. They apply it in places where it should not be applied; hence the term “give free rein to.” Note: This chapter is the central section in this book, and the chapters before and after develop and elucidate it. [p. 52] My most fundamental doctrinal discrepancies with Dharmapāla are also completely revealed in this chapter. Now, you students may not have yet even crudely discussed Dharmapāla’s learning and so are not in a position to understand wherein my position differs. Accordingly, I will set out Dharmapāla’s position in broad terms, for reference and comparison. 65. See New Treatise, p. 135 (2001 edition pagination).

Y6693.indb 119

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

120

Transformation (轉變)

General Criticisms of Dharmapāla Dharmapāla established the eight consciousnesses (識). Shi 識 is also called mind (心). He maintained that the mind is a composite of many independent constitutive entities. In other words, the cosmos is simply a cluster of numerous elements. Each [consciousness] was further divided into mental associates (心所), Mental associates are all the dharmas in the mind. Each of the eight consciousnesses has accompanying mental associates. These various mental associates also constitute independent constitutive entities. and each mind and each mental associate was broken down into three components. When Dharmapāla discussed epistemology, although he established four parts, when he discussed transformation he still employed Dignāga’s three parts. Accordingly, here I will talk only about the three parts. The three are: the image part (相分), the perceiving part (見分), and the self-verifying part (自證分). Take, for example, the auditory consciousness. Sound is the image part. Cognition of the discernment of sound is the perceiving part. The image [part] and the perceiving [part] must have an entity as their basis, and that is the self-verifying part. Each mind consists of the combination of these three parts. Each mental associate also consists of the combination of these three parts. It is all minds and all mental associates alone that are collectively named “manifest activity” (現行). In general terms, manifest activity is presented in the appearance of the image [part] (相), hence the name. “Manifest activity” can function both as a particular name and as a general name. As a particular name, it is called manifest activity because it is associated with a particular mind or a particular mental associate. As a general name, it is called “the realm of manifest activity” (現行 界) because it interconnects each and every one of the three parts of all minds and all mental activities, and all manner of image,

66. A detailed account of mental associates is provided in chapter 8, “Explaining the Mind, B.” 67. The appearance of things in their manifest aspect in the seven consciousnesses as they emerge from seeds in the eighth consciousness; the world as it appears to consciousness.

Y6693.indb 120

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

121

and approximates what is conventionally called the phenomenal world (現象界). Manifest activity is not generated without a cause, and so additionally seeds were established as its cause. Each manifestly active mental dharma (心法) [=mind] has as its cause its own seeds. Each manifestly active mental associate (心所法) also has as its cause its own seeds. Since there are differentiations in manifest activity, This is because with respect to the manifest activity of each of the eight clusters of mind and mental associates, the entity that is the basis (體) and its characteristics (相) will in each case be different. seeds [alone] suffice to account for the myriad differences [in manifest activity]. In Yi ye lun 意業論 (Treatise on Thinking as a Karmic Activity), Bodhisattva Qingyi 輕意 says: “The limitless seeds are as numerous as raindrops.” See Yuqie lun ji 瑜伽論記 ([Yuga rongi] Commentaries on the Yogācārabhūmi), juan 51, p. 7. Indeed! Having distinguished seeds and manifest activity, Dharmapāla presumed that each seed and each manifest activity had its own self-nature (自體). when Dharmapāla discussed transformation, he also analyzed it into two types: seeds functioning as transforming causes (因能變); Because seeds function as causes, they give rise to manifest activity. and manifestly activated consciousness itself (現體) functioning as transforming effects (果能變). “Manifestly activated consciousness itself ” is a general reference to the self-verifying aspects (自證分) of all minds and mental associates. As the counterpart to “cause” in being modeled on seeds, it is called “effect.” Because each and every self-verifying part is able

68. Different consciousnesses have different functions. For example, the auditory consciousness hears but does not see. 69. For example, the auditory consciousness and sound will differ from visual consciousness and sight. 70. I have not been able to identify any Sanskrit equivalent for this name. 71. For this passage, see Dunnyun, Yuqie lun ji 瑜伽論記, T42n1828_p0592b27. Yi ye lun ceased being transmitted in Tang times. 72. According to Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, seeds function both as causes and as effects. The eighth consciousness engenders the seven consciousnesses by means of seeds

Y6693.indb 121

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

122

Transformation (轉變) to transform and be manifest as a perceiving part and an image part, they are referred to as “transforming effects.” This

[p. 53] is a general account. Cheng weishi lun shuji, juan 12, pp. 10–15, discusses transforming and transforming effects. Juan 2, pp. 18–22, explains the transformation of consciousness itself into the perceiving and image parts. Investigating the traces of Dharmapāla’s thesis on transforming causes and transforming effects is just like breaking down a static object and really has no glimpse into the meaning of transformation. In regard to transforming causes, he held that seeds as transformer are manifest as that which is transformed. In regard to transforming effects, he held that manifestly activated consciousness itself is transformer, and that the perceiving part and the image part are that into which it is transformed. In sum, subject (能) and object (所) are each made separate. This is just like taking something that is already whole and then breaking it into fragments. How could this possibly explain what transformation is? So long as he employed methods of breaking down, he could not avoid succumbing to so-called preconceived, piecemeal characterizations and was bereft of any means by which to elucidate the no-place (無方) that is transformation. The method he employed made this a certainty. It has been said that Dharmapāla advanced well-structured, numerous, and intricately constructed arguments. Fine human hair and [tightly knit] fishnets are inadequate similes. Examining his breaking-down and parallelism, An example of his breakingdown (分析) is categories such as the eight consciousnesses, the fifty-one mental associates, and the three parts (三分), each of just as the seven consciousnesses perfume the seeds in the eighth consciousness; moreover, cause and effect are simultaneous. 73. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0298b29 ff. 74. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0241a01ff. I have excised “同卷十二之果能 變” on the grounds that it duplicates information given in the previous sentence. 75. Perceiving part, image part, and self-verifying part.

Y6693.indb 122

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Transformation (轉變)

123

which he broke down into separate discrete constitutive entities. Other doctrines he similarly broke down in exhaustive detail. As for parallelism, originally the doctrine of the three parts was an epistemological matter, but because Dharmapāla used it to assert that each and every mind and mental associate was independent, he was compelled to ensure that parallelism was consistent. Accordingly, he stated that each and every one of the eight consciousnesses and fifty-one mental associates consisted of an image part, a perceiving part, and a self-verifying part. This is an example of his parallelism. As for other numerically based categories of Buddhist concepts (法數), he similarly applied his efforts to making forced parallels. [full of] plotting and machinations, are indeed fine examples of conceptualization taken to the extreme. As for those who have [dedicated themselves] to working on his doctrines, they are either so confused that they can make no sense of them at all, or they simply play around with the vast array of terms and definitions, failing to grasp the essentials. And even if they have penetrated deeply into this difficult terrain, it has not been easy for them to break ranks and wander independently. Little wonder that this learning soon ceased transmission in China not long after it was first introduced.

Y6693.indb 123

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

4

Productive Power (功能)

In the foregoing discussion of transformation, in directly treating Reality as a category, it was in fact called “constant transformation” (恆轉). With regard to constantly transforming Fundamental Reality, when the movement is broken down, it is said to be an alternation of one contraction (xi 翕) and one expansion. In directly treating incessantly transforming Fundamental Reality as a category, it is called “constant transformation.” “Constant transformation” is productive power [śakti]. This was not investigated in the previous chapter and so will be elucidated in what follows. [p. 54]

DIFFERENCES FROM DHARMAPĀLA’S UNDERSTANDING OF PRODUCTIVE POWER Although one might still examine Dharmapāla’s long-established [views on] productive power, my discussion here is completely different in its import from that of Dharmapāla’s views. For the interim, I will outline the main differences. 1. Productive power is Reality and is not causes as condition. Dharmapāla presumed the existence of “the realm of manifest activity” (現行界). On the basis of this, he further presumed that there are hidden productive powers constituting the basis of the phenomenal world called causes as condition. 1. The reference here is to seeds functioning as causes. In the previous chapter, Xiong attributed the following account to Dharmapāla: “Manifest activity is not generated without a

124

Y6693.indb 124

6/30/15 2:55:47 PM

Productive Power (功能)

125

“The realm of manifest activity” in shortened form is also called “the phenomenal world” (現界). The meaning is examined in my earlier commentary. This is a great mistake. He divided cause and effect, the hidden and the revealed into two layers. Productive power as the cause of the phenomenal world is hidden and not yet revealed. The phenomenal world as the effect of potent power is revealed and not hidden. Each pair is relative to the other pair; hence it is said that there are two layers. In the case of subject (能) and object (所), that which is real and has causal function and its characteristics are divided into two things. Productive power is that which generates, and its entity is real. The phenomenal world is that which is produced, and its characteristics are made manifest. Being severed in two pieces, they are certainly not one thing. Does that which is revealed and manifests characteristics not resemble a vessel? Does that which is hidden yet is real (有體 [dravya]) not resemble an artisan who made the vessel? Dharmapāla certainly treated “causes as condition” as analogous to a maker. My account of his presumptions is complete. Deluded attachments abound in profusion, and “sky flowers” are illusions. How can attachment possibly be removed if these are the means to do so? Dharmapāla also based himself on Prajñāpāramitā (般 若) when he talked about “contacting [that state in which] there is nothing to be apprehended” (觸無所得). Yet simply taking this teaching in order to establish a doctrine, it is not actually possible to remove attachment. cause, and so additionally seeds were established as its cause. Each manifestly active mental dharma (心法) [=mind] has as its cause its own seeds. Each manifestly active mental associate (心所法) also has as its cause its own seeds.” 2. In the previous chapter, Xiong wrote: “As a particular name, it is called manifest activity because it is associated with a particular mind or a particular mental associate. As a general name, it is called ‘the realm of manifest activity’ (現行界) because it interconnects each and every one of the three parts of all minds and all mental activities, and all manner of image, and approximates what is conventionally called the phenomenal world (現象界).” 3. The *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-hr.daya-sūtra (Bore boluomiduo xin jing 般若波羅蜜多 心經 ; Heart Sutra), T08n0251_p0848c15, has a reference to the phrase wu suo de 無所得, a state in which there is no attachment. The locus classicus of the phrase chu wu suo de 觸 無所得 is Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0049c03. The verse in which the line appears is as follows: The bodhisattva in the state of samādhi Contemplates images as being nothing but this mind. Referents and images have been eliminated, Discerning them to be merely his own conceptualization. Abiding in this way with inner mind,

Y6693.indb 125

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

126

Productive Power (功能)

I regard the self-nature (自性) of the phenomenal world to be inherently empty. Zixing 自性 here refers to ziti 自體. It exists only because of the attachments of false discrimination (妄情). “Phenomenal world” is the collective name for the material and mental dharmas that are conventionally attached to. If all of the material and mental dharmas appropriated by views based on false discrimination and the conceptions constructed by the sixth consciousness (意想) are cut away, then what thing can be named as the phenomenal world?” If one discerns that the phenomenal world in fact does not exist, then one knows that there is no means for causes as condition to be established. It is only because the phenomenal world to which false discriminations are attached is empty that inherent Reality, which is not empty, is able to be profoundly realized by means of proper attentiveness. “Inherent” means “inherently so of itself ” because it is not established by the conceptions constructed by the sixth consciousness. “Reality” is an alternative name for Fundamental Reality. “Attentiveness” (作意) means “Reflection through accurate cognition” (觀照). Correct wisdom reflected through accurate cognition tallies with the truth and is far removed from deluded misguided conceptual elaboration; hence it is said: “proper attentiveness.” There has only ever been this Reality. Apart from it there is no phenomenal world to which it stands in contrast. Grasping neither material nor mental images and also grasping neither non-material nor non-mental images; being far removed from all conceptual realms [constructed by] the sixth consciousness, in profound mystery that which is encountered is True, and in profound stillness Fundamental Reality is revealed. Could there additionally be a phenomenal realm to which this stands in contrast and which can be talked of? It is for this reason that in talking about productive power I define it on the basis of Reality and do not explain it in terms of causes as condition. Once the phenomenal world has been dispatched, what causes as condition are there to talk of? My position is worlds apart from that of Dharmapāla.

He realizes that the grasped does not exist; Then, that the grasper is also non-existent. Finally, he contacts [that state in which] there is nothing to be apprehended. This is based on the translation by Francis Cook, Three Texts on Consciousness Only, p. 305, significantly modified.

Y6693.indb 126

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

127

[p. 55] Note: All the words and phrases of my thesis are but expedient/ skillful means used to reveal (顯) Fundamental Reality. Xian 顯 means to make evident (顯明). Fundamental Reality is difficult to explain in words; hence it is necessary to adopt convenient means. When Fundamental Reality is seen, then there is no phenomenal world. The false discriminations of ordinary people are attached to images of mountains, rivers, the earth, and so forth. The wise understand that none of these images have self-nature, and so all are empty. The meaning of Reality (如實) is that the myriad images are nothing other than the condition of intrinsic purity. That is, it is to see in each and every one of the myriad images that they are nothing other than the condition of intrinsic purity. This is not, however, to say that it is when the myriad images, in some undifferentiated fashion, form a composite image that they start to be called “the condition of intrinsic purity.” There must be no mistaking this point. “The condition of intrinsic purity” is an alternative term for Fundamental Reality. This is because in reality there have never existed the images of mountains, rivers, and the earth in the manner in which conventional false discriminations are attached to, that can be apprehended. This does not amount to the nihilist thesis that absolutely nothing exists. It is simply to state that the mountains, rivers, the earth, and so forth images such as conventional false discriminations are attached to cannot be apprehended. The word “such as” in “such as conventional . . .” matches the “and so forth images” as terms indicating similarity. Hence, to see Reality is to understand that the phenomenal world is inherently empty; it is not simply my deliberately concocting fine phrases. Those who have awoken [to the truths revealed in] Prajñāpāramitā 般若 [literature] should [be able to] confirm this. Dharmapāla had simply never seen Reality, and so the argument he upheld was riddled with confusion and mistakes. 4. More specifically, this is probably another oblique reference to the Heart Sutra, as discussed above.

Y6693.indb 127

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

128

Productive Power (功能) Originally he had stated that Suchness was Reality. He then also allowed that there was a phenomenal world and sought to trace its origin. Thereupon he established productive power as the creator of causal conditions, positing productive power as the entity that is the basis (體 [dravya]) of the phenomenal world. If this were so, with these two entities (體) contrasted, what sort of relationship did he envisage between them? The phenomenal world nominally exists by conventional accord. If the superior referent (勝義; [= unqualified truth]) is taken as the basis, then the characteristics of the phenomenal world have always been devoid of self-nature, and so one should not engage in conceptualizing the phenomenal world. Rather, what is manifest before one is nothing other than the presentation of Reality (真體). What phenomenal world is there to apprehend? As for those who are attached to grasping the phenomenal world and who also presume that there is an entity, which they take to be the cause, hidden behind the phenomenal world, this is nothing but relying upon the arbitrary construction of deluded consciousness. Everything thus established is but a profusion of confused images—how can this lead to the discernment of Reality? Is this not to create a mist of confusion so as to delude oneself? As to the name “Suchness,” Mahāyāna [masters] have long taken it as a descriptive term for Reality. In early times “Suchness” (真如) was translated as “such-as-is-ness” (如如) so that Suchness could not be used as a foothold for misguided conceptual elaboration. Its later translation as “as-it-truly-is” (真如) seems to have lost some of its original meaning. At first they comprehensively removed attachment to images that fetter the mind. The various images upon which presumptions based on false discrimination are attached are collectively referred to as “images that fetter the mind.” Later, they subtly showed that Fundamental Reality is not empty. Because of the difficulty in giving it a name, they described

5. That which is real and has causal function. 6. (1) Productive power functioning as dravya, and (2) the phenomenal world/the realm of manifest activity/the collective name for the material and mental dharmas.

Y6693.indb 128

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

129

it as “Suchness” (真如). This is certainly unqualified truth (勝義), be it in the realm of humans or gods. Ever since Dharmapāla, however, Suchness has gradually become a topic of misguided conceptual elaboration. Dharmapāla [p. 56] acknowledged the existence of both the phenomenal world and of causes as condition as the entity that is the basis of the phenomenal world. This is patently layer upon layer of images that fetter the mind; thus what he referred to as “Suchness itself ” (真如體) is nothing more than yet another layer of images that fetter the mind. Previously, there has been no rectification of Dharmapāla’s learning. The reason I am disputing him is that I really feel I have no alternative. Although this is to offend against a venerable and virtuous gentleman, how dare I not do so!

2. Productive power is the totality of all things; it is not individuated. In establishing productive power, Dharmapāla certainly did not hold that the myriad sentient beings share the same origin and that the universe is a whole. According to his doctrine, each sentient being has its own productive power as cause, and this productive power is also called seeds, with the differences between the inherent nature [of each seed] being as numerous as grains of rice. “Sentient beings” is an alternative name for humans or the myriad living things. [In the phrase] “Differences between the inherent nature,” “differences” means “not being as one.” Taking productive power to be the causal condition for the phenomenal world, Dharmapāla divided the phenomenal world into numerous discrete entities; that is, in total he divided an individual person’s universe into eight consciousnesses, and further divided each consciousness into three parts: an image part (相分), a perceiving part (見分), and a self-verifying part (自證分), as we have already seen in the notes above. However, he also posited the perceiving part as subordinate to the self-verifying part, such that the perceiving part and the image part were contrasted as [two discrete images]. Take, for example, the two parts of visual consciousness: the image part is a color cognitive object and the perceiving part discriminates it, and that is all. On this basis, one can extrapolate to the situation with the auditory and other

Y6693.indb 129

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

130

Productive Power (功能)

consciousnesses. Accordingly, the myriad differentiations in the phenomenal world should be attributed to their causal conditions’ not being the same, and so [Dharmapāla] said that there are numerous productive powers, the entities of which [each] differ. Further, Dharmapāla presumed that productive powers also had such differences as defiled and undefiled or good and bad and so forth [as] their nature (性), and hence said there are differentiations in their nature. If this were so, their power would be tantamount to that of loose sand. What would be able to draw them together? Thereupon he established the store consciousness (阿賴耶識 [ālaya-vijñāna]), which functions as a repository. He presumed that a person has eight consciousnesses, with the ālaya as the eighth consciousness. Ālaya means “a store,” “a site,” and because of this it is the repository where the myriad seeds are stored. Because ālaya arises from seeds, Ālaya is also broken down into an image part and a perceiving part. In general terms, the image part includes everything from the five faculties to the solar system, the earth, and so forth of the phenomenal world. Former doctrines described the perceiving part as profoundly subtle and unknowable. The two parts of ālaya each have their own seeds as cause because they must have causes as conditions in order to arise. and moreover holds its own seeds and the other seeds, “Own seeds” refers to ālaya’s own seeds. “Other seeds” refers to the visual consciousness, hearing consciousness, olfactory consciousness, gustatory consciousness, tactile consciousness, thinking consciousness (意識 [mano-vijñāna]), and self-centered consciousness (末那識 [manas]), each having their own seeds. Ālaya stores everything, and its own seeds and the seeds of the other seven consciousnesses are all kept in ālaya and never become dispersed and lost. Someone asked: “It makes sense that the ālaya holds the seeds of the other consciousnesses. However, since ālaya is caused to arise from its own seeds, how can it hold its own seeds?” I replied: “Dharmapāla presumed that ālaya’s own seeds were its cause, and that ālaya was the effect. Since beginningless time, cause and effect have existed at the same time and not with cause pre-

7. Seeds function as causes capable of bringing about transformation in consciousness in which consciousness itself is bifurcated into the perceiving part and the image part. The immediate causal condition refers to the self-verifying part: the image part and the perceiving part both arise due to the self-verifying part of consciousness. 8. This is referring to the function of karma: nothing is ever lost.

Y6693.indb 130

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

131

ceding effect. It is for this reason that effect is able to support cause. therefore it is called “all seeds consciousness.” [p. 57]

This is why it is ever-renewing. Ever since beginningless time, thought-instant by thought-instant this consciousness arises and ceases. What precedes and what follows are transformed, Their constitutive entity is not enduring. yet they continue on from one another constantly and certainly without interruption. They never went the way of physical forms such that both became completely exhausted. Hence it is analogous to a raging torrent. A raging torrent is neither interrupted nor constant. The preceding water draws the following water, and hence it is not interrupted. The following water continues from the preceding water; hence [the water] is not constant. Retracing Dharmapāla’s [account of] productive power [reveals that] he also called it “seeds.” He divided them individually and had them contained in ālaya. “Contained in” means “to gather together and hold.” The abbreviated form of ālaya consciousness is ālaya. He did not realize that in taking “seeds” as an analogy, he was both making the mistake of treating ālaya as analogous to things Analogous to rice and other kinds of things. and, moreover, subtly conforming with [the views of] proponents of atoms. Non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna masters presumed that there are real atoms and that they are numerous. Here [Dharmapāla] also presumed that there are real seeds and that they too are numerous. Dharmapāla similarly presumed that there are real seeds and they are also innumerable. Is it possible that the universe consists of the aggregation of [myriads of] atomic parts? Is it likely that human life is the clustering of many basic units [元]? Therefore, Dharmapāla’s [notion of] productive power ultimately amounts to misguided conceptual elaboration. For example, he maintained that seeds operated continuously in the ālaya. “Operate continuously” means “continuing on [from one another].” He frankly asserted that throughout a person’s life, the sublime consciousness (神識) is greatly removed from the bodily form,

9. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0014b22. 10. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0007c19; T31n1585_p0014c05. 11. The idea here is akin to Heraclitus’s thesis that “you can’t step into the same river twice.”

Y6693.indb 131

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

132

Productive Power (功能)

and ever since beginningless time it has operated with uninterrupted continuity, and so [his position] was not very different from that of proponents of the ātman. “Sublime consciousness” is a general term that refers to the defiled and pure [seeds] of the eighth consciousness. In former times it was said that at the stage of ordinary people, the eighth consciousness was called ālaya because it stores defiled seeds. As for the level of those who had entered the stage of sages, this consciousness contains only pure seeds, and so rather than being called ālaya it was called “undefiled consciousness.” In sum, sublime consciousness can be employed as a name to refer to both defiled and pure [seeds]. Further, although this consciousness was later [also] established [in the doctrines] of the Mahāyāna, the Hīnayāna already had a concept that matched this meaning. See Cheng weishi lun. By and large, every Buddhist branch maintains that human life has no beginning and no end. In the conventional world, people all talk of Buddhist no-self, not realizing that Buddhists are extreme proponents of multiple-selves (多我論者). Buddhist talk of no-self probably refers to not becoming attached to self and so provides a way to be differentiated from proponents of ātman. It is said that the karmic power (業力) in sentient beings does not become exhausted with the physical body. Logically, this is a possibility. “Karma” means “actions” (造作). Buddhists maintain that all the various actions of ordinary people have ongoing power that is not cut off. These are called habituated tendencies (習氣) or karmic power. Juan 5 of Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom states: “This is because [of the three hindrances], karmic power is the greatest. For billions of eons, the concentrated accumulation of various karmas cannot be made to disappear, cannot be burned, cannot be destroyed. This [accumulated] karma is able to abide for a long time. If even the [Four Heavenly] Kings of Mt. Sumeru are unable to transform their karma, what then of ordinary people?” Examining this account of karmic power or habituated tendencies, then, since it is acknowledged that it abides for a long time, could this possibly mean that collective karma perpetually exists in a race of people or in a society? Although this also makes sense, the 12. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0013c23. 13. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0007c20. 14. Nāgārjuna (second to third centuries), Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra (Da zhidu lun 大智度論), T25n1509_p0100a13-T25n1509_p0100a17. This work is attributed to Nāgārjuna (second to third centuries) and translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (344–413).

Y6693.indb 132

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

133

original import of the Buddhists was quite different from this. They frankly stated that a person’s total karmic power or habituated tendencies intermix to form a concentration of power that gets born over and over. And even though this person dies, this concentration of power never disappears or dissipates. Rather, it constitutes a continuous life for the person after he or she dies. In broad terms this is how it is. Again, logically, it is a possibility. Reflecting upon the doctrine of sublime consciousness (神識) [p. 58]

—that is, each of the myriad sentient beings, naturally, has always possessed sublime consciousness—then this realm of the myriad sentient beings has always had a fixed number [of sentient beings], and thus the so-called reality of the universe amounts to being a collection of parts. This amounts simply to being a mechanistic theory. Surely this is not how things are? If it is agreed that karmic power or habituated tendencies never dissipate, then this is close in meaning to the concept of “generation through transformation” (化生) in Twenty Verses on Nothing but Consciousness. However, generation is called “illusory transformation” (幻化). Ultimately it has no real self-nature and arises subsequently. It is not the case that some discrete entity originally existed. As for the doctrine of sublime consciousness—that each of the myriad sentient beings, naturally, has always possessed sublime consciousness—it is illogical. Having refuted Dharmapāla’s presumptions, I must articulate my own explanation. What I mean by productive power is fundamentally different in purport from that of Dharmapāla. This is because I take productive power to be the great flow of the universe’s ceaseless generation. It is called “great flow” to highlight that it is not an individual thing. The body [of this great flow] is continuous, as if it exists, yet it has never had any discernible physical characteristics. Mysteriously, it moves in secrecy and, furthermore, is beyond physical discernment. Indifferent to material advantage, it is utterly empty. Hence, it is able to envelop the myriad sentient existents yet not be impeded. The term “envelop” is used here only because there is no suitable alternative. The myriad existents are in fact the expression of productive power. This is not to say that productive power externally transcends the 15. Vasubandhu, Vimśatikā-śāstra, T31n1590_p0075b10-T31n1590_p0075b13.

Y6693.indb 133

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

134

Productive Power (功能)

myriad existents, as a mother pregnant with them. Clear and pure, hence it is able fully to undergo a thousand transformations such that no one is able to fathom it. Heaven attains it in order to become heaven; earth attains it in order to become the earth; humans attain it in order to become humans; and things attain it in order to become things. With a multitude of categories and kinds, the myriad existents are unequal. From subtle divisions of light, and floating motes of fine dust, to sentient beings—from their beginning they all depend on the absolute inclusive wholeness (一元) of productive power for their mature forms to coalesce. None is lacking in any respect or inappropriate to its task. This is extremely strange! Hence if one were to observe their differences, then in the whole world, such differences would be without limit. If one were to bring them together on the basis of that which they have in common, then the myriad dharmas are all as one another. The principle for this is straightforward and beyond dispute and requires no additional discussion. The flow of the myriad things is not fragmentary and individuated. If the premise that the myriad things are of one body cannot be established, then the [things] will seem to be many fragments, each of which stands by itself. Yet, is this the case? The illusory transformations of the universe prove [that productive power is] perfect, unimpeded. “Illusory transformations” means “active”; it is not a term of criticism. Hence it is understood that it is only by virtue of having no differentiations that productive power is able to envelop the myriad existents and unite them as its body. It is not the case that there are many individual productive powers (多能) separately forming a body with each individual thing. Duo neng 多能 is an inclusive [truncated] reference to “many productive powers.” This premise having been established, then what point is there in harboring isolated doubts? 3. Productive power and habituated tendencies are not the same. Of the theses established by Dharmapāla, the most ridiculous is that which conflates habituated tendencies and productive power. He presumed that from

16. In his 1933 essay “Po ‘Po Xin weishi lun’ 破破新唯識論” (A Rebuttal of “A Rebuttal of New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness”), Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 2, p. 162, Xiong explains how the term yiyuan 一元 is used here and denies that it implies any sort of monism. He glosses yi to mean “not relative to/dependent on anything” (無待) and yuan as “leaving none of the myriad things out.”

Y6693.indb 134

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

135

all [types of] productive power, two [kinds] could be differentiated on the basis of a summary reckoning of their origins. [p. 59]

First, there was that which originally exists. This is because it inherently exists without a beginning. Second, there was that which begins to arise. This is due to the preceding seven consciousnesses’ perpetual perfuming (熏) of habituated tendencies (習氣). Not to exist originally but to be newly generated is called “to begin to arise.” “The first seven consciousnesses” refers to the visual consciousness through to the seventh consciousness, the manas. Seven is relative to the eighth consciousness; hence they are said to be “preceding.” “Perpetual”: this is because ever since beginningless time, there has been thought-instant upon thought-instant of perfuming, and generally this is called “perpetual.” Xi 習 means “habituation.” Qi 氣 means “energized tendency” (氣勢). “Habituated tendency” means the force constituted by habit. Xun 熏 is “to perfume.” It refers to when the first seven consciousnesses arise; each one of them is able to activate habituated tendencies that, concealed, enter the eighth consciousness, causing it to hold on to them firmly, where in turn they function as new productive powers. In talking about productive powers, Dharmapāla established both [productive power] that originally exists and [productive power] that begins to arise. In fact, although his account was based on other sources, today it is attributed solely to Dharmapāla because in upholding this account, he started to tighten its arguments. The more logical his account grew, the greater the harm it did to truth. Originally, productive power was restricted to [seeds] that originally exist; there was no separate [category of productive power] that begins to arise. Why? Productive power is an indivisible whole, replete with all manner of wonders. Since beginningless time, of itself the whole has flowed, never lacking in anything. Is it likely to depend upon new generation, with images increasing incrementally? If it were supposed that the originally existing 17. The distinction refers to inherent seeds and later acquired seeds. Productive power in this paragraph refers to seeds. 18. Perfuming refers to the idea that these tendencies condition the seeds that constitute the mental stream, similarly to the way in which perfume pervades a cloth. The general disposition of any given mental continuum is a reflection and function of these accumulated tendencies.

Y6693.indb 135

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

136

Productive Power (功能)

[productive] was insufficient and further relied on a subsequent addition, how would that [subsequent addition] constitute productive power? Hence it is understood that the dual establishment of (1) [productive power] that exists without a beginning and (2) [productive power] that begins to arise is nothing but misguided conceptual elaboration. Having traced Dharmapāla’s fundamental error, it can be seen to lie in his conflation of habituated tendencies with productive power, thus leading him to say that in addition to productive power that has existed without a beginning, there is productive power that begins to arise. Because he did not distinguish the differences between productive power and habituated tendencies, he thus said that “habituated tendencies” was “productive power that begins to arise,” in order to differentiate it from productive power that exists without a beginning. If it is understood that habituated tendencies cannot be conflated with productive power, then it can be known that productive power alone has always existed and that there is no so-called beginning to arise. Having enquired into what he means by habituated tendencies, I accept it. However, even though Dharmapāla meticulously broke down the dependent arising of habituated tendencies (習氣緣起)—saying that each of the first seven consciousnesses separately perfumes them He presumed that visual consciousness perfumes the habituated tendencies of visual consciousness. It is the same with the auditory and the other seven consciousnesses—he 19. As Azuma, Shin yuishiki ron, p. 264, n. 11, notes, Xiong has misrepresented “Dharmapāla’s” account. Dharmapāla had actually maintained that the first seven consciousnesses perfume the eighth consciousness with habituated tendencies and as such are “perfumers” (能熏); the eighth consciousness, in contrast, is that which is perfumed or perfumable (所 熏); Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0009c07-10a03. Xiong has attributed to the first seven consciousnesses the role of both the perfumer and the perfumed. In the vernacular edition of New Treatise, p. 257, Xiong revises his account to accord with Cheng weishi lun: Each of the first seven consciousnesses is able to generate habituated tendencies that steal into the eighth consciousness, causing it to receive and firmly hold onto them where they again become new productive powers. The Existence school (有宗) states that the first seven consciousnesses are perfumers, and the eighth alāya consciousness is the perfumed consciousness. Of the first seven consciousnesses, because the eye and the other four sense consciousnesses appropriate external objects, they are able to perfume [the eighth consciousness] with habituated tendencies. Because the sixth or thinking consciousness relies upon all cognitive objects in order to arise and because it is able to think by itself, it is able to perfume [the eighth consciousness] with habituated tenden-

Y6693.indb 136

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

137

still did not understand the reason for this. He was not thorough in his account of the reason for the perfuming. As for accounts that discuss this matter in depth, they actually trace how sentient beings store all past actions so as to aid future desires, thus leading all former actions to possess residual power that clearly forms a tendency, an uninterrupted flow of similarity (等 流); it is this that they call habituated tendencies. “Actions” is to say that it is created. From the slightest stirring of thoughts in the sixth consciousness right through to the manifest activation of body and speech, all are called “actions.” “Residual power” is such as when a past action—even though it does not abide for an instant—still has continuing and uninterrupted latent power. It is a “tendency” because every action’s residual power is concealed yet has a proclivity to arise and influence future life. “Flow of similarity” (等流). Deng 等 means “similar” and liu 流 means “to flow.” It is like when burnt incense has extinguished and there remains a lingering smell. Instant by instant resembles what was before, and this gives rise to uninterrupted flow. This is the analogy. This principle can be verified with our own lives. All we have previously experienced (曾更) Ceng 曾 is the past [p. 60]

and geng 更 is to experience. never disappears. This is true and can be verified. If previous experiences could not be retained, then we humans could not live. Accordingly, it is of course the case that habituated tendencies arise subsequently and definitely must not be conflated with productive power. In the past, I thought that if productive power and habituated tendencies were to be expressed in well-known Chinese terms, then this would

cies. Because the seventh or manas consciousness within itself is able consistently to presume and to be attached to the [concept of] self, it is able to perfume [the eighth consciousness] with habituated tendencies. Being stored in the alāya consciousness, habituated tendencies constitute a new type of power, one capable of generating all mental and material dharmas, and hence the name “newly perfumed productive power.” After Vasubandhu, those who discussed the origin of productive power have either asserted that productive power has always existed or asserted that it is newly perfumed. Dharmapāla accommodated the various theses, maintaining that the always existing and newly perfumed views should both be established. In China, Xuanzang and his disciple Kuiji followed this view.

Y6693.indb 137

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

138

Productive Power (功能)

be the distinction between heaven and humans. “Heaven” does not refer to an independently existing god in some external sphere but rather refers to the principles by which humans are able to live. “Humans” are all those who, ever since the beginningless existence of sentient beings, have brought to completion their productive power, retaining it with self-made [karma], so bringing to completion their own individual lives. The reference of this description is called humans. Productive power is a heavenly matter; habituated tendencies are a human capacity. To mix up the human with the heavenly is to be obscured by form-and-vital-stuff and be ignorant of the original condition of human life. Habituated tendencies begin together with the physical body. For example, in human life the existence of this body and also the physical world this body encounters are collectively called form-andvital-stuff. We have form-and-vital-stuff to enable us to live, and habituated tendencies commence together with them. As for productive power, it is that by which form-and-vital-stuff is constituted and is the controller of formand-vital-stuff. Thus its wondrousness (靈妙) can be described as god-like, and the norms it provides as it issues forth are also called principles (理). 20. The tradition from which these ideas spring can be traced to Dasheng qixin lun: “With regard to ‘habituation’: it is just like an ordinary piece of clothing that actually has no scent, but if someone perfumes it then it will be fragrant. This is just the same: the pure dharma Suchness is actually undefiled, and it is only because it is habituated by ignorance that it has the characteristic of defilement” (T32n1666_p0578a17–20). Later, the NeoConfucian thinker Zhang Zai maintained that when taixu (as qi) is manifested in individual humans it takes two forms: the nature bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) and the psycho-physical nature (氣質之性), in which the first is pure li 理, whereas the second is li as it is manifest in and through qi (Zhang Zai, Zhangzi quan shu 張子全書 [Complete Works of Zhang Zai], Sibu beiyao ed. [Taipei: Zhonghua shuju, 1965], pp. 2.3b, 2.18b–19a). Following Zhang Zai (and later Cheng Yi), Zhu Xi also drew a conceptual distinction between “heaven-and-earth-bestowed nature” (天地之性) and “psycho-physical nature” (氣 質之性). The former is pure pattern, and it is the latter pattern as it is manifested in and through qi. This distinction represents two modes or aspects of the nature: its fundamental aspect and its manifested aspect. In his preface to Zhongyong (which he treated as a book rather than as a chapter), Zhu described this distinction in terms of “the mind of the way” (道心) and the “mind of man” (人心), attributing a deficiency of the former in human nature to the deleterious effects of qi. See his “Zhongyong zhangju xu 中庸章句序” (Preface to Section and Sentence Comments on the Doctrine of the Mean), in Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 (Section and Sentence Comments and Collected Annotations on the Four Books) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), p. 14.

Y6693.indb 138

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

139

“The original condition of human life” refers to this, yet being obscured by form-and-vital-stuff, people are ignorant of it. Deluded error has been transmitted continuously for a thousand generations—truly enough to make one heave a great sigh of grief. Hence I have examined the differences and inconsistencies between productive power and habituated tendencies. Cha 差 means “difference” and wei 違 means “inconsistency.” The three main points of difference are set out below.

3.1 Differences Between Productive Power and Habituated Tendencies 3.1.1. Productive power is dynamic, and habituated tendencies are of fixed form. Productive power is life’s treasure storehouse. Productive power is Reality. It is said to be a treasure storehouse so as to describe its richness and grandeur. How replete is its wondrous utility: pure (精), firm (剛), decisive (勇), and resolute (悍). Undertaking (任), it [proceeds] directly ahead (直 前). Jing (精) is to be pure and without defilement. Gang (剛) is to be utterly vigorous and unwavering. Yong (勇) is to be sharp and unimpeded. Gan (悍) is to be firm, and there is nothing it does not overcome. Ren (任) is to act without being made to act. Zhi qian (直前) is to flow everywhere incessantly. This is certainly something that those who fully reveal their nature can understand for themselves by seeking within; hence it is called “dynamic.” Productive power is equivalent to what former wise men in this country called “the nature.” The Doctrine of the Mean talks of fully revealing the nature. “Fully reveal” means personally to understand how to put it into practice and realize it within oneself so that this principle within me is neither obscured nor deficient in the smallest degree. Productive power is the nature; it is the principle by which humans live; it has always been inherent [within us]. Humans, however, are unable to reveal it fully, and so they are merely slaves to physical form. Trapped by [physical] form, they do not discern the inherent principle that has always been there [within us]. If it should actually be the case that this principle was not something possessed by humans, then humans would certainly be unable to verify its existence for themselves. Those ordinary people who discuss human life often uphold 21. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 53.3a.

Y6693.indb 139

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

140

Productive Power (功能)

a mechanistic view and so are unable to believe that there is an inexhaustible, dynamic treasure storehouse. Long have humans severed themselves from the principles [that sustain] their lives. Habituated tendencies begin to arise when [physical] form and spirit develop and begin to arise. Having arisen, then these habituated tendencies accompany [p. 61]

sentient beings, and just like a trigger, they rely upon being touched before activating, to be used as tools for living. The activity of our innate vitality has always used habituated tendencies as a tool, with the consequence that this tool is taken to be life itself. Only those who are deep and incisive in reflection can understand this. Thus, the force with which habituated tendencies act is consistently certain yet uncontrollable, and accordingly it is called a “fixed form” (成型). The above reference to “trigger” is to a mechanical trigger and does not necessarily have a negative sense. It is only the contaminated (有 漏) habituated tendencies discussed below that have a negative sense. When contaminated habituated tendencies function as triggers, they become captivated by the body and activated by it. This is precisely what Wang Yangming meant by thoughts arising in response to the body. If there were no contaminated habituated tendencies functioning as triggers, then one could avoid being a slave to the body by according with the wondrous function of the principles of life as they inherently are [within us]. Both of them can be said to be trigger-like in their nature, but how they each function as triggers is extremely different. “Habituated tendencies accompany sentient beings” refers to habituated tendencies’ becoming the life of sentient beings. This is because these habituated tendencies are adopted incessantly. This is nominally said to be “accompanying.” “Fixed form” is the same as saying “mode” and again does not necessarily have a negative sense. 3.1.2. There is only uncontaminated productive power; with habituated tendencies there are also contaminated habituated tendencies. “Only” means nothing other than this. “Contaminated” means tainted dharmas. The analogy is that of a leaking container: [habituated tendencies cause 22. Chuan xi lu, 1.22a. 23. Habituated tendencies and contaminated habituated tendencies. 24. Lou 漏 literally means “to leak.”

Y6693.indb 140

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

141

people] to drop down as they follow things. Contaminated and uncontaminated derive their names from being opposites. “Also” implicitly refers to “uncontaminated.” This is because habituated tendencies not only are uncontaminated, they are also contaminated. Uncontaminated means pure and elevated; contaminated means defiled and fallen. Productive power is a whole that, of itself, has an unfathomable god-like application and so is called [our] “ocean-like nature.” Bright and shining, productive power is originally nothing but uncontaminated, and as such [ordinary] things are truly equal with sages. This is because a mote of dust or a mustard seed [share] the same Buddha-nature. Although their actions are confused, [humans] can return [to their inherent nature]. This is because they have no evil roots. As for Dharmapāla’s presumption that there are both contaminated and uncontaminated productive powers, Dharmapāla analyzed productive power into separate [entities], as already described above. He presumed that of the various productive powers, there are those that are contaminated and those that are uncontaminated, and hence he used “productive power” to refer to both. this is to hold living things in disdain, and resolutely to uphold [the existence of] the root of evil. His stupidity and boorishness were great indeed. He agreed that there has always been contaminated productive power—that the root of evil in humans is innately endowed. As to habituated tendencies, ever since the existence of humans, for countless eons the myriad threads of the uninterrupted flow of similarity caused by the residual power of all former actions have combined with one another, like bunched seeds (惡叉聚), their natures inconsistent, with the contaminated and uncontaminated clearly forming distinct categories. “Eons” means time, and “each other” means “mutually.” “Combined”: being in close mutual proximity in the same place is called he 和; not to form a single body is called ji 集. Countless habituated tendencies attach to one another to form a concentration of power—hence the term he 和. By the same token, it is not an indivisible composite devoid of distinctions—hence the term ji 集. “Bunched 25. Ocean is a metaphor for vastness and all-accommodating capacity. 26. According to the Foguang Buddhist Dictionary ( Foguang da cidian 佛光大辭典), under the entry echaju 惡叉聚, echaju is the name of the tree Eleocarpus ganitrus. The seeds of this tree are said to cluster together when they fall to the ground, and so the term is used as a metaphor for affliction, karma, and suffering. (The Foguang Buddhist Dictionary is accessible at http://www.fgs.org.tw/fgs_book/fgs_drser.aspx.)

Y6693.indb 141

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

142

Productive Power (功能)

seeds”: inedible seeds are popularly known as “seeds that no one will eat.” [They are called “bunched seeds”] because when they fall to the ground many are clustered together. Their name in Sanskrit is echaju [aks.a]. [p. 62]

This is a metaphor for numerous quantities of habituated tendencies that cluster together. Investigating into the origins of tainted and untainted habituated tendencies [reveals that] originally they were the remnant traces of our human life, and it indeed turns out that the content of [human] life is nothing but the totality of past actions. If the karma derived from thinking, through to the karma derived from the expression of that thought in action, “Thought” refers to mental karma (意業)—that is, to cogitate but not yet manifest that cogitation externally. “To express” is to reveal these thoughts through one’s physical actions and words such that they are manifest in affairs. This karma is then large [enough to be discernible]. arise through accommodating the self-centeredness of the physical body, then the effect of these karmas is real, and they all inevitably have remnant traces stored as concealed powers that come to constitute contaminated habituated tendencies. “Remnant traces”: the first stirrings of greed and desire are very slight and are one type of mental karma. Although this karma is extinguished as soon as the thought-instant passes, inevitably there are remnant powers that continue to arise incessantly—hence the term “remnant traces.” “Concealed powers”: remnants of previous karma come to constitute concealed powers—hence the term “concealed powers.” If the karma derived from thinking, through to the karma derived from the expression of that thought in action, both move in accord with principle (理) and are not constrained by the self-centeredness of the physical body, then the effect of those karmas is real, and they all inevitably have remnant traces stored as concealed powers that come to constitute uncontaminated habituated tendencies. In broad terms, the origin of tainted and untainted habituated tendencies is as such. As to tainted and untainted habituated tendencies also each having their own 27. Presumably Xiong’s point is that they accumulate over time precisely because they are not eaten by birds, animals, or humans. 28. Speech and physical activity are the other two kinds of karmic activity.

Y6693.indb 142

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

Productive Power (功能)

143

branches, in general terms, there are three main kinds of tainted habituated tendencies and four main kinds of untainted habituated tendencies. The three main kinds of tainted habituated tendencies are: habituation of craving, habituation of antipathy, and habituation of ignorance. These three are the roots of being tainted. All tainted dharmas arise based on these, and they are called the roots of being tainted. These will be discussed in the later section on mental associates (心所). All three arise due to stubborn attachment to the body. The four main kinds of untainted habituated tendencies are: discipline, compassion, concentration, and courage. These four are based on general accounts of wholesome mental associates and discussed accordingly. “Disciplined” is not to be dissolute. “Compassion” is to be without antipathy. “Concentration” is to focus on mental associates. “Courage” is sustained effort. Disciplined: because each thought-instant is not confused and because contaminated [habituated tendencies] are constantly kept at bay, it is called “disciplined.” If the effort expended on discipline is pure, it will be an augmentation of Fundamental Reality. Compassion: because there is sympathy (柔湣) and because there is the treatment of other as self, this is called “compassion.” Rou 柔 is to be kind; min 湣 is to take pity on. This is what is meant by the heart that sympathizes. The meaning of “The Bodhisattva treats the other as self ” as expressed in the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice and “one who is humane flows into others to form the same whole” as expressed by former ru is the same. Concentration: because obscurity (沉) and fragmentation (掉) are kept at a remove and because illumination is able to arise, this is called “concentration.” “Obscurity” means “dark and hidden”; “fragmentation” means “to fall away and separate.” Concentration is to be removed from both. “Illumination” is original wisdom; in order to arise it depends on concentration. Hence this is saying that [concentration] is able to give rise to illumination. “Courage”: because it fiercely advances and because it is capable of not retreating, this is called “courage.” “Advance”: to move upward and not to follow contaminated [habituated tenden-

29. The locus classicus of the term ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心 is Mencius 2A.6. 30. Maitreya (traditional attribution), Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地 論), T30n1579_p0642c15. 31. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Henan Cheng shi yishu, p. 16.

Y6693.indb 143

6/30/15 2:55:48 PM

144

Productive Power (功能)

cies]. “Not to retreat”: it is only through slacking off that confusion arises. Exerting effort is what correct awakening relies upon; hence here it says that [courage] is capable of not retreating. These four [uncontaminated habituated tendencies] all follow in accord with the pure ocean of inherent nature (性海). It is also called undefiled. [p. 63]

Someone might object: “Why are discipline and so forth “So forth” refers to compassion, concentration, and courage. described in terms of habituated tendencies?” It should be understood that when this mind is applied, then there is activity, and this activity is called “habituated tendencies.” Discipline and so forth are functions that arise by virtue of relying on the mind, and because they are active, they are habituated tendencies. Refer to “Explaining the Mind, B” [chapter 8] in the discussion of the mental factor “contact” (觸). In relation to the nature, habituated tendencies can accord with it or be contrary to it. If they accord with the nature, then they are undefiled, and if they are contrary to it, they are defiled. Discipline and so forth merely arise in conformity with the nature’s undefiled habituated tendencies. It is by means of undefiled habituated tendencies that the nature is realized. Although [undefiled habituated tendencies] are also called habituated tendencies, and the nature is active within them, they cannot thus be deemed to be the nature. Undefiled and defiled habituated tendencies both have distinct powers; when one waxes, the other wanes. When undefiled habituated tendencies wax, then defiled habituated tendencies wane, and vice versa. Following [the nature] is propitious; acting contrary [to the nature] is unpropitious. If [habituated tendencies] are undefiled, then they will accord with the nature and keep intact what is proper to life principles (生理), and so there will be good fortune. If [habituated tendencies] are defiled, then this will go against the nature, and because they are contrary to life principles, there will be misfortune. With inferior grades of sentient beings, however, it is only defiled habituated tendencies that consistently increase with them; their undefiled habituated tendencies are virtually undiscernible. Previously, had I not stated “productive power is a matter for heaven; habituated tendencies are a human capacity”? As the human comes to take control, the nature becomes hidden. Thus, with the accumulation of [habituated tendencies] on the physical body, it becomes difficult to follow one’s [nature] as it inherently is. Habituated tendencies

Y6693.indb 144

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

145

start together with the physical body, and so habituated tendencies are accumulations on the physical body. If they are defiled habituated tendencies, then they are always in close proximity to the physical body and are contrary to one’s inherent life principles. Although undefiled habituated tendencies accord with the heavenly bestowed nature, it is extremely difficult to foster and nurture them. Thus the text says it is difficult to follow to the utmost one’s [nature] as it inherently is. The benighted are satisfied with the manifest (見) traces Jian 見 here is read as xian 現. “Manifest traces” refers to defiled habituated tendencies. and do not investigate their origins. They do not fully fathom the origin of life as it has been mandated. And because defiled habituated tendencies flow in sentient beings, there are inherent impurities and flaws [impeding] the fathoming of life principles. Dharmapāla’s position that there have always been contaminated productive powers, and the rusheng [“Confucian”] claim that the nature is bad, are both equally perverse views. Unsurprisingly, in regard to the world of sentient beings, I have long harbored a boundless sadness. When one seeks to verify this with regard to human beings [to see if this sadness is still warranted], then on the basis of what has been expressed in the poems and songs throughout China’s literary history, the common aspiration is, in the end, to lament ignorance and pray for wisdom. This suffices to show that the nature we are born with is inherently undefiled; it moves in the formless and has never come to rest. The innumerable living beings, although lost, will eventually return. The way is said to be far—what is to be done? [Being exposed to] endless dangers and difficulties is how one’s strength is confirmed. The unimpeded quality of transformation is inexhaustible, and it is also because of this that there are extreme [situations], such as that exemplified by the Peeling (Bo 剝) hexagram. If there were no [situations such as that as exemplified by] the Peeling hexagram, then the universe would merely passively take on a fixed form and not transform. How could there be the marvels of the unimpeded quality of transformation? Because the ignorant are stuck on a lost path, those who had first awakened bequeathed their teachings and thoughts. The import of these teachings and thoughts can also be depended upon. If one is timid, one will mistakenly 32. This hexagram consists of five yin lines below one yang line, indicating imminent transformation to six yin lines: an extreme state. The top trigram signifies Mountain and the lower trigram signifies Earth, and this represents the image of Peeling.

Y6693.indb 145

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

146

Productive Power (功能)

guess how large the universe is, inevitably growing so fearful that one can make no sense of it at all. The way of Change concludes with the hexagram Not Yet Completed (wei ji 未濟)—it is not for the benefit of ordinary ignorant people that this is said. [p. 64] Note: When the draft of this Treatise was first shown to others, Professor Hu Yuanru 胡淵如 of Huaining 懷寧, having read a copy obtained from my friend Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 of Huangmei 黃梅, said to Mr. Tang: “Master Xiong’s distinction between productive power and habituated tendencies is excellent. Because he compared it to views developed by the ru [“Confucian”] lineage, he said that productive power is like the moral nature (義理之性) and that habituated tendencies are like the psychophysical nature (氣質之性)!” I say, these remarks are incomparable. Productive power is indeed pure, the way it has always been, and is a matching tally for the so-called moral nature. As for habituated tendencies, all of the residual powers created by human minds operate hidden and uninterrupted. This is also called the power of concatenated habituated tendencies (串習力). Although it begins together with the psycho-physical (氣質), it is not therefore psycho-physical. As for the psycho-physical, when form is born, talent (才) is imbued, and so it is called the psycho-physical. “Form” is bodily form. “Talent” (才) is ability (能). 33. This hexagram warns of imminent danger, “like trying to ford a river.” 34. Hu Yuanru (1867–1931) was a professor in the philosophy department of Dongnan (later renamed Zhongyang) University in Nanjing. 35. Tang Yongtong (1893–1964) was a renowned scholar of Chinese Buddhism and philosophy of the Wei-Jin and Six Dynasties period. Like Hu Yuanru, he was a professor in the philosophy department at Dongnan University, which he joined after graduating from Harvard University in 1922. He also taught Pāli at the China Inner Studies Institute (支那 內學院). In 1931 he was appointed to a position in the philosophy department of Peking University. 36. Cf. the earlier passage: “As to habituated tendencies, ever since the existence of humans, for countless eons the myriad threads of the uninterrupted flow of similarity caused by the residual power of all former actions have combined with one another, like bunched seeds (惡叉聚), their natures inconsistent, with the contaminated and uncontaminated clearly forming distinct categories.”

Y6693.indb 146

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

147

When the body is born, then talent is imbued therein; thus form and talent are not different, yet neither are they the same. For talent to be manifest, however, because it has form/bodily form as a template, it has a limit. When someone is born, then whether they are more intelligent or more stupid, or inclined to be weak or strong and so forth, it is all in accord with the possession of these various tendencies from the moment of birth. Here “talent” (才能) does not refer to productive power (功能). So-called psycho-physical is the collective term for bodily form and talent. It is an accomplishment that comes from Transformation’s (造化) “being without a [deliberating] mind.” It has never been the case that it was generated by the self-power [that derives from] having life, and so it cannot be deemed to be habitual tendencies. In all cases, for habituated tendencies to arise, they must depend on the psycho-physical, and in doing so it is also possible for habituated tendencies to correct the partialities of the psycho-physical. The psycho-physical is not identical with the nature. Nevertheless, the principle enabling the psycho-physical to coalesce is called the nature, Here the word “principle” implicitly refers to Fundamental Reality. and so one cannot talk of the nature independent of the psycho-physical. [Cheng] Yichuan 程伊川 said that the moral nature is simply the name given to the original goodness in the psycho-physical [nature]. In other words, it is simply to talk of principle’s enabling the psycho-physical [nature] to coalesce. Thus the moral nature and the psycho-physical nature do not exist as two. Many Ming ru ridiculed Yichuan for saying that there were two roots [to human nature]. They had not grasped Yichuan’s meaning. The [concept of the] psycho-physical nature had originally been developed by [Zhang] Hengqu 張橫渠, and the two Cheng brothers both adopted his teaching. [Cheng] Mingdao 程明道 also said: “To talk of the nature without talking of vital stuff (氣) is incomplete; to

37. Leading Neo-Confucian thinker Cheng Yi 程頤. 38. Zhang Zai 張載. 39. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao. 40. Cheng Hao.

Y6693.indb 147

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

148

Productive Power (功能) talk of vital stuff without talking of the nature is unclear. To treat them as two is wrong.” It is thus clear that the nature includes vital stuff within it such that it is all pervasive; they cannot be separated into two. In commenting on the passage in the Analects “[Humans] by nature are close to one another” [17.2], in his Collected Annotations on the Analects, Zhu Xi 朱熹 [1130–1200] said: “Here ‘human nature’ collectively refers to the psycho-physical.” He used the word “collectively” precisely because the innate nature exists within the psycho-physical.

[p. 65] Depending on the circumstances, the quality of the psychophysical varies. The principle with which the inherent nature of the psycho-physical is endowed has never not been the same. Rather than “the same,” however, the Analects speaks of “being close to” precisely because this nature is not something separate from the psycho-physical. The nature is that which coalesces the psycho-physical; however, when coalesced, the psycho-physical transforms into myriad particulars, making it difficult to achieve uniformity. Further, having become coalesced, [these particulars] naturally have powers, for although they are vessels to express inherent nature, they inevitably have their partialities and most certainly are incapable of being completely like their nature. Hence, depending on the particularities of the psycho-physical, the nature will be manifest or not. There is the psycho-physical of great excellence, and that which imbues it as the nature is able to be fully manifest; there is also the psycho-physical that is not excellent, and that which imbues it as the nature is unable to be fully manifest, 41. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Henan Cheng shi yishu, p. 81. For a detailed study of Cheng Hao’s single-rootedness thesis, see Wong Wai-ying, “The Thesis of Single-Rootedness in the Thought of Cheng Hao,” in Makeham, The Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. 42. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu 論語集注 (Collected Annotations on the Analects), p. 175. See also the discussion of this passage in John Makeham, Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), pp. 213–214.

Y6693.indb 148

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

149

and so [the nature] cannot be deemed to be of the same. What is at issue is simply whether the nature can be fully manifest and not that originally there are differences [in how it is manifest], and so it is said that [by nature humans are] close to one another. In explaining the nature, [Zhu Xi’s] Collected Annotations on the Analects says that it includes reference to the psycho-physical. This can truly be said to have profoundly grasped Confucius’s meaning. Now, given that by nature humans are close to one another, how is it that sages and the benighted (狂) are so far apart? Here kuang 狂 means “benighted” and is not being employed in the sense of “irrepressible,” as when the term is paired with “reserved” juan 狷. This is caused by habit. If habit accords with the nature and is thereby able to transform the psycho-physical, then one will grow increasingly wise! If habit is contrary to the nature and so becomes infused into the biases of the psychophysical, then increasingly one will become thoroughly immersed in baseness. Hence it is said that “[People] grow apart through habit.” Because we were discussing the distinction between habituated tendencies and the psycho-physical, our wide-ranging discussion has brought us to this. I intend to provide an alternative interpretation of the “By nature [humans] are close to one another” passage in the Analects but am unable to do so in detail here.

3.1.3. Productive power is continuous; habituated tendencies can be severed. “Can” is a term indicating that it is merely possible and not definite. Productive power is the Reality of the myriad things, interconnecting them all. It has never had a fixed location, and so there is nowhere it is not. It is without beginning and without end. If one were to be attached to eternalism (常見) in formulating arguments, this would amount to a great mistake. 43. The locus classicus of these paired terms is Analects 13.21. 44. Analects 17.1. 45. Following Xiong’s gloss of ti wanwu 體萬物 in the vernacular edition of New Treatise, p. 270. 46. The view that the self and objects exist and persist.

Y6693.indb 149

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

150

Productive Power (功能)

Similarly, if one were to adhere to nihilism (斷見) in making predictions of the future, it would also be a great mistake. Someone asked: “If someone has died and his body has dissipated and his nature is exhausted, “Exhausted” means to be extinguished. it is not likely that this person’s endowment of productive power is able to remain unsevered?” This is because the exhaustion of productive power is precisely the severance of the nature. This should be responded to as follows: “The body is the coalescence into an individual [entity] that [offers] resistance [to other bodies]. It is “individual” because it forms a discrete body. The nature is pure in its singularity yet is without a locus. Here “singularity” (一) is not the numerical “one” but the absolute. It is “without a locus” because it has no place of location. Human life relies for its beginning on the nature, “The nature” [p. 66]

means productive power. coalescing into an independent bodily form. The bodily form is a material thing and is certainly not a recovery of the nature (復性) as it inherently is. Ultimately, the nature alone is not transformed into a thing. Rather, in coalescing into the forms of the myriad beings, its relation to the myriad forms is as their Reality. From the perspective of the myriad forms, they are certainly each different; from the perspective of the nature, it embodies the myriad things, operating everywhere. It is absolute and cannot be dissected, cannot be destroyed. That which cannot be dissected or destroyed is purity, the virtue or character of the nature. After birth the human body most definitely relies constantly on the nature for its beginning. It is not the case that once completed, bodily form does not change. Hence it constantly relies upon the nature for its beginning. It is not that it relies [on the nature] only for the initial period of its birth. This is because later it relies [on the nature] on a daily basis; otherwise it would be incapable of being created anew. In other words, by virtue of the nature’s coalescing as bodily form and thereby controlling and being active within bodily form, bodily form is actually constantly being born anew, never ceasing for a moment. Once the body has been completed, however, it is a dis47. The view that sentient beings do not persist when they die.

Y6693.indb 150

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

151

crete thing that [offers] resistance [to other bodies]. Hence it is impossible for it not to be destroyed given that it has been completed. One should not, however, doubt that because when a body is completed it is discrete and [offers] resistance [to other bodies], and therefore the nature is tied solely to bodily form, and so conclude that when the body is destroyed the nature disappears together with it. The nature extends to all bodily forms to constitute an undifferentiated, constantly flowing whole. Although the bodily forms are each unique, with respect to their nature there is no difference. Self and other people as well as other things are each unique due to their bodily form. This is saying that by virtue of the nature, they are one whole. Although bodies meet with resistance, the nature has never had form (方相). Fangxiang 方相 is form. The nature is that whereby form is completed, but form cannot be sought in the nature. To suspect that the nature becomes exhausted with form simply because the body is inevitably destroyed is to fail to understand that the nature is the flow of Great Transformation (大化) and has never been something that one can get to be one’s own (私). To uphold bodily form so as to fathom the nature is to give rein to false discrimination and conjecture, and to be ignorant of the impartiality (公) of heavenly principles (天理). This is why the reasons for life and death are difficult to understand. Thus, the continuity of productive power is the authenticity (誠) of principle. If productive power were to be interrupted, then the primal forces of creativity (乾) and procreativity (坤) would cease, something that does not bear thinking about. Habituated tendencies have never been innately endowed. It is simply that, after birth, the residual powers of various actions—with no gap between defiled and pure If impure [habituated tendencies] are created, then there will be defiled powers, and if pure [habituated tendencies] are created, then there will be pure powers. and no distinction between new and former Those that were formerly created become former powers; those that are newly created become new powers.—become enmeshed with one another to form a bundle of power. Empty and illusory, as if flowing. “As if ” describes the appearance of movement. Although habituated tendencies are not real things, various powers support one another, never dispersing. Their store of talent is without end. “Store of talent” means all sorts of capacities. They are actually on par with the accomplishments of

Y6693.indb 151

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

152

Productive Power (功能)

Transformation (造化). Wang Chuanshan said, “It is Transformation that habituated tendencies [p. 67]

bring to completion.” Swiftly responding to incipient developments, habituated tendencies connect the resonance between things and one’s body. When things resonate with the body, and the body responds to them, this is due to habituated tendencies’ swift response to resonances. Hence it can be understood that even though habituated tendencies arise subsequently, their operation always increases with [the body], and their potent power is replete and great. The content of our lives is nothing but habituated tendencies. Virtually all of that which is outside our bodies in our existence is habituated tendencies. This can be made self-evident through introspection. [Question:] If the universe of our daily lives is indeed nothing other than habituated tendencies, Each person’s universe differs because each one consists of each person’s own habituated tendencies. For example, if I affirm that there is a concrete object before me called a desk, this is a function of habituated tendencies. If there were no habituated tendencies, would there be something like this desk to speak of here? Would there not be something like this desk to speak of? Many doubts would then exist. then could it be said that habituated tendencies are [our] life? If that were so, then, as with productive power, would habituated tendencies also be continuous? Reply: As already stated, productive power is definitely continuous. In the case of habituated tendencies, however, it is not definite that they are continuous, nor is it definite that they are severed. Why is this so? As previously stated, habituated tendencies are divided into two kinds: defiled and pure, which wax and wane in response to one another, unable to flourish together. 48. I have not been able to identify the use of this expression in the writings of Wang Fuzhi. As it happens, Xiong used this same expression in his 1913 essay “Zheng ren xuehui qi 證人學會啟” (Letter to the Society for Proving the Purpose of Human Existence), in Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 8, p. 3. A few sentences later he (mis)quotes a passage from Wang’s reading notes on Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑒 (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Governing), entitled Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑒論 (On Reading the Comprehensive Mirror) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), p. 274. Thus it seems possible that Xiong is confusing the expression “That which habituated tendencies bring to completion—this is Transformation” with a different quotation by Wang.

Y6693.indb 152

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

153

Just like two puppets—as one enters the stage, the other departs. If defiled habituated tendencies are acute, they impede pure habituated tendencies, stopping them from arising and making it seem that they are severed. Also, if pure habituated tendencies are created and gradually dominate, then even if defiled habituated tendencies always occur together with them from the time of birth, because pure habituated tendencies now dominate, they are able to cause defiled habituated tendencies to be gradually subdued and eventually to be extinguished. At first they subdue them, and eventually they must be severed. If one is severed, this leads to an increase in the other. If the defiled increase, then the pure are severed and vice versa. Thus in referring to them collectively as habituated tendencies, it can be said only that they can be severed and not that they are certain to be severed. With learning that is for oneself, The essence of philosophy consists of seeking within oneself, firmly realizing that one’s own life and the universe are not two. Confucius said: “In ancient times, those who learned did so for their own sake.” He was talking precisely about philosophy. no demands are placed on the nature; Not an iota of pressure can be placed on the nature. rather, demands are placed on practice. Cultivation is practice. By increasingly nurturing pure habituated tendencies, the nature’s talents begin to be manifest. By taking the conditioned (有為) to the limit, the unconditioned (無為) can be seen. The nature is unconditioned; practice is conditioned. Because pure habituated tendencies arise in accord with the nature, by taking practice to the limit one can verify what is manifest in the nature. Only by fully realizing human affairs is there unity with heavenly virtue. “Human affairs” refers to practice; “heavenly virtue” refers to the nature. This can be understood on the basis of what has been written above. The efficacy of practice is great indeed! However, even though people understand that the wisest course of action is to be vigilant about what they cultivate so that they advance toward pure habituated tendencies and abandon defiled habituated tendencies, ordinary people are rarely able to persist at this for long. Usually, if defiled habituated tendencies are continuously increased,

49. Following the 1932 edition of New Treatise in reading pu 僕 as pu 仆. 50. Here Xiong seems to have abandoned his earlier distinction between fundamental wisdom (玄學) and philosophy (哲學). 51. Analects 14.24.

Y6693.indb 153

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

154

Productive Power (功能)

then pure habituated tendencies will only be intermittently manifest among the accumulated defiled habituated tendencies. For example, the heart of sympathy and compassion that is produced should one suddenly see a small child about to fall into a well depends on the nature. This is an intermittent manifestation of pure habituated tendencies. If at birth one is endowed with poor qualities [p. 68]

and one succumbs to habituated tendencies and binds one’s body to them, then there will be no way to sever them. Is one not like a pig? Trussed in iron shackles, waiting for the day to be butchered. Hence, given the [continuous] flow of defiled habituated tendencies, if accumulating pure habituated tendencies to the maximum does not suffice to counter them, then defiled habituated tendencies will indeed never cease. Crucially, if pure habituated tendencies encounter defiled habituated tendencies and are blocked by them, then the pure habituated tendencies will be close to being severed. Note the words “close to.” [It is part of the] principle of pure habituated tendencies that they do not become completely severed; however, appearing only abruptly or intermittently, they are unable to use situations to their advantage and so they are weak and close to being severed. If defiled habituated tendencies encounter pure habituated tendencies when the latter’s power dominates and functions to counteract them, then there is nothing to stop them being severed. Accordingly, [defiled] habituated tendencies are fundamentally dissimilar to productive power. This is because productive power definitely cannot be presumed to be severable.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION In sum, the nature and [defiled] habituated tendencies are contrary to one another. “The nature” refers to productive power. This is abundantly clear, yet Dharmapāla insisted on conflating them and treating them as the same; I do not understand how he was able to do so. Now in the above account, I have neither favored habituated tendencies in order to conflate them with the nature, nor have I esteemed the nature and disdained habituated tendencies. Because human life is constrained by the physical body, however, then 52. Reference to Mencius 2A.6.

Y6693.indb 154

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

155

that to which one is habituated cannot have only the undefiled and lack the defiled. The precariousness of this situation is frightening. If we humans are indeed able to look within and so realize authenticity, then we will abandon ignorance and move toward clarity. [We will realize that authenticity] is right here and now; that our allotted endowment has never been deficient; and that defilements are, after all, adventitious. Whether one succumbs to or retreats from [defilement] does not depend on other people; rather, victory relies on oneself. The value of human life consists in just this. If one were to live free of [the fear caused by] precarious situations, one would indeed be a fearless hero—how else could one describe it? It is for this reason that my account of productive power differs from that of Dharmapāla. This should be generally evident from what has been distinguished in brief above. Another objection might be raised: “Sir, you say that productive power is a term for Reality (實性). Reality is the so-called dharma-realm of the one reality (一眞法界). Because it is not relative to anything, it is thus called the “one reality.” Because it is everywhere the Reality of the myriad dharmas, it is called “dharma-realm.” “Realm” means “body.” It has never been false and so is said to be real. It is constantly without change and so is said to be thus. In all places it is constantly as its nature is. It does not arise nor does it cease; it does not change nor does it move and so is called Reality. This is its definitive meaning (了義) and is indeed the ultimate. Now, sir, it seems you maintain that arising and ceasing, change and movement, and constant transformation and productive power are named Reality. What does this mean? If it were the case that arising and ceasing, and change and movement, are Reality, then the emptiness of the universe would be without limit, human life would be but bubbles and shadows—devoid of any basis—how could one find real meaning in life? If this is the case, you have clearly turned your back on the ultimate, and your transgressions are without limit. On what logical basis could your views possibly be established?” I would reply [as follows]. Your objections are excellent! The highest definitive meaning, that which the buddhas have profoundly realized, [p. 69]

I also resolutely affirm. I am incapable of turning my back on the ultimate. You suspect that I maintain that arising and ceasing, change and movement, 53. Another term for Suchness. Yizhen fajie is a key doctrine in Huayan Buddhism.

Y6693.indb 155

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

156

Productive Power (功能)

are Reality. Let me ask you: You mean that it is only by seeking beyond the dharmas of arising and ceasing, change and movement, [that there are] dharmas that do not arise and do not cease? If this is so, then the dharmas of arising and ceasing, change and movement, are separate and different from dharmas that do not arise and do not cease, and they have self-nature—so what need is there to establish dharmas that do not arise and do not cease as their Reality? There cannot be two Realities. Further, if Reality is nothing but that which intractably neither arises nor ceases, neither changes nor moves—that is, an empty nothing—how could it be termed the Reality of the dharmas? You have repeatedly tried to advance subtle points, yet each time you have failed. All matters considered, you have not yet truly understood the definitive meaning, so what grounds do you have for criticizing me? One must understand that I say arising and ceasing are not arising and not ceasing, and that I say that change and movement are not change and not movement. Why is this? This is because, instant by instant, so-called arising and ceasing illusorily manifest their characteristics, never abiding for a moment. For details, see “Transformation” [chapter 3]. In reality, there are no dharmas of arising and ceasing to be apprehended, Those who conventionally talk about arising and ceasing do not understand the import of not abiding for an instant. They acknowledge that there are things and matters that appear before one and maintain that all things that originally did not exist but which exist now have arisen. Once arisen, all things abide before finally reverting to destruction. This is called ceasing. In this manner, they regard arising and ceasing as real objects that arise and cease. This is simply deluded attachment. If it is understood that the various dharmas appearing before one are in fact instantaneous illusory manifestations that do not abide even momentarily, [then one will understand that] the dharmas appearing before one in fact had never previously arisen as the particular things [now seemingly before one]. Since they did not arise, there is also nothing that ceases. Hence, ultimately it is impossible to obtain things from the world of arising and ceasing. and so they have never arisen nor ceased. One’s inherent nature has always been just as it is. It has neither generated nor extinguished any thing or matter; thus it is said [to be] “neither arising nor ceasing.” This is because instant by instant, so-called change (變動) illusorily manifests its characteristics, never ceasing for a moment. In reality, there is no dharma of change to be apprehended, Those who conventionally talk about change

Y6693.indb 156

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

157

probably maintain that when things encounter differing conditions, they undergo certain transformations, and this is called change. Because they do not understand the import of never abiding for an instant, they regard change as an actual object undergoing transformation. This is not the case. As for what are conventionally presumed to be real objects, careful examination reveals that there never were things; there were only illusory images, renewed instant by instant and none abiding even temporarily. This is called change. Hence what is conventionally presumed to be a changing world of things and events is in fact unobtainable. and so there has never been change. One’s inherent nature has always been just as it is. Since it has not transformed into something different, it is said neither to alter nor to move. As such, arising is non-arising (生即無生) because arising does not exist (不有). “Does not exist” means that there is nothing serving as an obstruction (礙). [p. 70]

Ceasing is non-ceasing (滅即非滅) because ceasing does not rest (不息). [It] “does not rest” and so is not empty nothingness. Change is unchanging (變即不變) because change is always constant (貞). “Constant” is to be firm and immovable. Because something is always just like its nature, it is referred to as “ever constant” (恒貞). This is because with things and with people, with ordinary people and with sages, their natures never change. It is just like water—even though it is able to become ice, it does not lose its water nature. Movement is non-moving (動即非動) because movement does not shift. Master Zhao’s 肇公 “Things Do Not Shift” (物不遷論) develops this thesis. The Well (井) hexagram in Change says: “The well stays

54. This analogy seems to be based on Zhang Zai, Zheng meng 正蒙 (Correcting Ignorance), in Zhang Zai ji, p. 22. 55. This is a reference to the Buddhist monk Sengzhao 僧肇 (384–414?). Besides being a translator, he also wrote a series of philosophical essays on topics such as change, prajñā, emptiness, and nirvān.a, collected in the book Zhao lun 肇論 (Essays by Shi Sengzhao). In English, see, for example, Walter Liebenthal, The Chao Lun: The Treatises of Seng-Chao, 2nd rev. ed. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968). In the original text of Sengzhao’s essay “Things Do Not Shift” (“Wu bu qian lun” 物不遷論), the unstated premise here is that no event can depart from its moment of occurrence and move to another moment of occurrence (T45n1858_p0151a08–51c29). This enabled Sengzhao to argue that past things are stationary and do not move. Past things do not reach the present because they do not move

Y6693.indb 157

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

158

Productive Power (功能)

in its place, [but its water always] shifts.” “Shifts” is “to flow.” This says it flows inexhaustibly yet always stays in its place, and so it still means does not shift. When this is understood, each of the ten thousand images will be seen to be Suchness. Reality cannot be sought independent of phenomena. The Ruler (主宰) is to be discerned among the flow [of phenomena], The Ruler does not refer to a spirit or a god. The Ruler is said to be that which has regularity and cannot be thrown into disarray within this flowing. It is like when we are confronted by a bewildering array of feelings, yet in the midst of these feelings there is always a profound calm, all of one’s responses are perfectly appropriate, and one is able to have the restraint not to seek for things. This is the meaning of Ruler. and in activity it does not stop being still. Zhuangzi says: “To abide in silence and yet be as manifest as a dragon.” “To abide in silence” means to be still, and “to be as manifest as a dragon” means to be active. Both issuing forth and ceasing, movement and stillness, are one. From talking about arising without yet understanding that arising is non-arising, right through to talking about moving without yet understanding that moving is non-moving—this is to be attached to things. From talking about non-arising without yet understanding the arising of non-arising, right through to talking about moving without yet understanding the moving of non-moving—this is to be mired in emptiness. Thus it can be understood that the Absolute (實際理地) is recondite and difficult to put into words. The single greatest mistake lies in being mired in emptiness, followed next by being attached to things. Hence, given that [the Absolute] is patently not empty, with some effort comparisons can be made. “Comparisons” means descriptions. This is because this principle [of the Absolute] cannot be made explicit. Provisional glosses [for the Absolute] constantly

from the past to the present. If they moved they would not be past things. Here Xiong is not interested in this original argument. 56. “Appended Statements, B,” Book of Change, 8.18a. Xiong’s interpretation differs from the standard one given by Kong Yingda 孔頴達 (574–648) in Zhou yi zhushu, according to which it is the village or hamlet that changes over time but the well stays in its place. 57. See the Zhuangzi chapters “Zai you 在宥” (Letting Be and Exercising Forebearance), 26/11/15, and “Tian yun 天運” (The Turning Heaven), 39/14/63. 58. “Mired in emptiness”: attached to the view that absolutely nothing exists. 59. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading quan 詮 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads zhu 註.

Y6693.indb 158

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Productive Power (功能)

159

arise, causing us to awaken and so distance ourselves from eternalism and nihilism. Even [Dharmapāla’s] false account of productive power manifestly belongs neither to that which exists nor to that which does not exist. [The] principle [that is the Absolute] is inconceivable. The absolute [quality] of principle does not belong to the realm of the conceivable. It can be known only through internal self-realization. Names have only ever been traps and snares [to be put aside after having served their purpose]. If by inner reflection there is gnosis, then there will be no distorted interpretations to bind oneself—it is as if one’s confusion had suddenly melted away! Analyzing principles [to determine] if they are true or false [first requires] examining into the matter of the two truths (二諦): absolute and conventional. Details are provided in my On Epistemology. It is due to following conventional truth that the mundane world is accepted as proven. Earth is nothing but earth, water is nothing but water, right through to the myriad existents—all are differentiated and understood on the basis of specific and general attributes and do not run counter to the mundane world’s [conventional truth]. Because absolute truth is experienced, however, there is a categorical refutation of conventional knowing. Hence, earth is not thought of as earth, because earth’s nature is empty. What is manifest before one is Reality (真體), perfectly clear. Earth has no self-nature, and so it is said that the earth’s self-nature is empty. Water is not thought of as water because water’s nature is empty. What is manifest before one is True Reality, perfectly clear. This is so right through to all characteristics, which are not thought of in terms of any characteristics. [p. 71]

This is because of all characteristics, there is not one that has self-nature. What is manifest before one is Reality, perfectly clear. As such, a single principle equalizes, cognition vanishes, and words disappear. This is because of what is realized by nothing other than self-nature’s wisdom (智 [ jñāna]). If students fail to distinguish between absolute and conventional [truth], then what has been said above must fill one with trepidation, because you will think that since things and matters in the world of arising and ceasing, or 60. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading qu 曲 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads you 由.

Y6693.indb 159

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

160

Productive Power (功能)

the world of change, are unable to be apprehended, then of course the universe is completely empty. You do not understand that in this approximation of absolute truth—that is, extinguishing conventional [truth] and returning to absolute [truth]—as a generalized statement, it is said that there are no things. This amounts to getting rid of the characteristics of things and pointing out that none of those things that conventional [truth] nominally designates has self-nature and that they are all really Reality. Yet who would say that Fundamental Reality is completely empty? Hence it is understood that the ultimate principle [that is Reality] far transcends deluded consciousness, leaving no room for trepidation. In the foregoing, I nominally established productive power as a convenient means to reveal Reality. In the chapters that follow, I return to select those aspects of the meaning of material and mental [dharmas] that I had not fully explained in the previous chapter. “Transformation” [chapter 3]. These [chapters] are called “Demonstration of Material [Dharmas]” [chapters 5 and 6] and “Explaining the Mind” [chapters 7 and 8].

Y6693.indb 160

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

5

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上)

Conventional accounts of material dharmas define them as offering resistance. “Resistance” is the same as saying “physical resistance.” Because they offer resistance they are quantifiable, Such as “one stone” or “two trees” or “eight planets”—all record things according to number. This is what the [Zuo] Tradition refers to: “Only after things are generated are there images; only after there are images do they multiply; and only after they multiply are there numbers.” and so they can be broken down into smaller components. Such as when matter is broken down into molecules and even into atoms, electrons, and so forth. This is universally acknowledged in the conventional world. Accordingly, following conventional interpretation, material [dharmas] offer resistance. If they are interpreted according to [their] principle (理), however, the notion of resistance cannot be demonstrated. “If they are interpreted according to [their] principle . . .”: this is because if material [dharmas] are interpreted precisely in accord with the truth of their principle, there will be no mistake. Material [dharmas]: through the movement of “constant transformation” there is contraction; hence the Reality of material [dharmas] is to operate constantly, yet actually they offer no resistance. “Offering resistance” is nothing other than the illusory semblance of movement. [Material dharmas] 1. Zuo zhuan 左傳 (Zuo Tradition), Shisan jing zhushu ed., 12.14b. 2. In other words, the notion of resistance (and by implication, material dharmas) is mistaken. 3. Matter moving through space.

161

Y6693.indb 161

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

162

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上)

move, yet they cannot be without contraction; thus there is the semblance of resistance—yet could this be the Reality [of material dharmas]? The power of constant transformation is such that there has never been a place to which it has not extended nor has there been a place which it has not filled’ “Place” is used only because there is no alternative term—in reality there are no “places.” nevertheless its functionality exists in its cohering (攝聚). If it did not cohere, [p. 72]

then it would float about without a basis—how then could the movement of its power be seen? Cohering is the incipience of ceaseless generation; the sprouting of transformation. As soon as there is cohering, then there is contraction. Contraction is the illusory construction of countless moving points. Moving points give the illusory semblance of having material [substance] but actually are not material [substance]. If the atoms and electrons in conventional accounts are taken as definitely having real material [substance], then this would be a great mistake. The formation of moving points is not of a consistent nature, being distinguished [on the basis of] yin and yang. The responses of moving points to one another is not of a consistent character, attraction, and repulsion [accounting for] these differences. If there is an appropriate match between yin and yang, there is attraction and the illusory formation of a system of moving points therein. The composition of a system would be from many such points. And even though the distance between any two points might be great, by mutual attraction and affiliation they form a single system. However, of the countless points, there are those that do not match, and so there is mutual repulsion. This is why not only do these points form a single undifferentiated system, but each point is able to [align with] points to which they are mutually attracted and distinguish themselves [from the larger system] to form many other systems. In all cases, attraction and repulsion are generated solely on the basis of whether or not they are compatible with one another. There are situations where mutually repelling points operate within a 4. Cf. the earlier discussion of pi and xi: “If the incipient workings of transformation (造 化) did not cohere, then there would be no contraction, and if there were no contraction, there would be no way to see expansion. Hence ‘cohering’ is the way of Kun 坤.”

Y6693.indb 162

6/30/15 2:55:49 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上)

163

group of mutually attracting points to form particular differences; there are also situations where mutually attracting points permeate groups of mutually repelling points to engender particular differences without becoming diffuse. This is the secret of profound transformation. Thus, there is also attraction and repulsion between individual systems. The mutual attraction (愛合) between two or more systems He 合 means “mutually attracting” and does not mean “no separation.” forms large objects. For example, it is the many systems of moving points that give the illusion they constitute this large object that is the desk in front of me. This is also the case right through to the sun, the stars, and the earth. My body is also like this. Conventionally it is presumed that the resistance offered by the physical world is fixed and irrefutable. Now, does not this explanation of the world as countless moving points that illusorily manifest many characteristics strike one as unusually odd and peculiar? Those who are mired [in their attachment] to the characteristics of things regard [physical objects] as offering resistance. If, however, in regard to the characteristics of things, they were to undertake an incisive observation of movement, then they would understand that the characteristics of things are but movement, and just as things are tending to contraction, they appear to offer resistance, yet actually offer no resistance. Hence it is said that the Reality of material forms is constant transformation. Here in talking about it, I have traced matters to their core. If one were to follow convention, one would say that material forms offer resistance, that this is accepted by all, so what fault could we find with it? Note: In the past, when Indians discussed how the world came about, broadly there were two theses. First, there is the transformation thesis. This thesis is represented by the Sām . khyans (數論), who presumed it to be the case that the myriad things had been generated from the transformation of self-nature (自性 [*prakr. ti]). In establishing self-nature and individual consciousness 5. Dan Lusthaus, “Sām . khya,” available at http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/schools/ samkhya-uni.htm: Considered one of the oldest classical Hindu schools by Indian tradition, Sām . khya is most famous in Indian philosophy for its atheism, its dualist model of purus.a (passive, individual consciousness) and prakr.ti (nonconscious, cognitive-sentient body), and its

Y6693.indb 163

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

164

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上) (神我 [ purus.a]), however, the Sām . khya sought a dharma ex ternal to transformation, which is a gross fallacy. As is stated in our Change: “The heavenly way transforms” (乾道變化) and “the myriad things flow” (品物流行). The reference here to the heaven[ly way] means that transformation is ceaseless and

[p. 73] is indeed the Reality of the myriad things. It has never been separate from transformation or a dharma external to transformation. This is what is what is meant by “change does not change,” something the Sām . khya would never have heard of. Second is the clustering (集聚) thesis. The thesis is represented by [the] Vaiśes.ika [school] (勝論[宗]), [its proponents] presuming that the earth and other dharmas are all formed by the clustering of atoms. Those non-Buddhists and the Hīnayānists who established [theories about] atoms all belong to this group. Nowadays it is those scientists who talk of atoms and electrons who are of this ilk. This latter group is biased toward a mechanical view, not realizing that the universe has never consisted of the clustering of material points. The former group is more precise in its understanding of theory that effects pre-exist in their cause. In its classical formulation the purus.a/prakr.ti model is analysed into twenty-five components (tattva) that are intended to encompass the entire metaphysical, cognitive, psychological, ethical and physical world in terms of their embodiment as individuals and the creative and interpretive projection of that world as experience by and for individuals. Both the world and the individual, in other words, are considered a phenomenological refraction and projection of the underlying and constitutive components of the conscious body. . . . In Sām . khya purus.a signifies the observer, the “witness.” Prakr.ti includes all the cognitive, moral, psychological, emotional, sensorial and physical aspects of reality. It is often mistranslated as “matter” or “nature”— in non-Sām . khyan usage it does mean “essential nature”—but that distracts from the heavy Sām khyan stress on prakr.ti’s cognitive, mental, psychological and senso. rial activities. It is difficult to determine just how much of the technical import of the Sām . khya concepts prakr.ti and purus.a Xiong really understood. 6. Lusthaus, “Sām . khya”: “While orthodox Sām . khya, for instance, claimed that each individual possessed its own distinct purus.a, later commentators sought to ground this multiplicity of selves in a universal single Self.” 7. Qian hexagram, “Judgment” commentary, Book of Change, 1.6a.

Y6693.indb 164

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], A (成色上)

165

transformation yet did not establish [a theory of] moving points and so never developed an explanation for conventional presumptions about the material world. It is enough for students to consult both theories and then observe things to affirm whether the respective principles [of these two groups] match [what has been observed].

Y6693.indb 165

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

6

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

If all material dharmas are gathered together and given a name, it is “the container world” (器界 [bhājana-loka]). It is just as what is conventionally called the natural world. The material world appears as if each thing is independent, separate, and offering resistance. Yet actually all things are interconnected and interpenetrating, forming an undifferentiated whole. Surely a lotus flower does not need to be solitary to be particularly splendid? Actually, it depends on the most excellent products of nature’s bounty. How could it be that a grain of sand exists alone? Actually, it is supported by countless stars and planets. Thus it is understood that the natural world is actually a complete whole. Although its images are manifestly many different parts that are divided into all sorts of independent things and matters, ultimately each part is interconnected and interpenetrating. Crucially, there is no room for complete separation [from the whole].

THE SUCCESSION OF MOVING POINTS The common conventional view says that all phenomena in the natural world, once having been generated, then abide, continue to abide into the present, and should head into a future. Accordingly, it is said that the natural world can accommodate abiding over extended periods of time. This is because, even though this is not necessarily constant abiding, there is abid1. See Xiong’s earlier account of contributory factors as conditions.

166

Y6693.indb 166

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

167

ing for long periods of time. This is how it is interpreted in the conventional world. This thesis appears to be the case, but it is not how matters actually are. Is the natural world, after all, a real thing (實物) such that one can one speak of its “abiding over an extended period of time”? Now, since it has no reality, what then is it that “abides”? As previously stated, the natural world is nothing but countless moving points, illusorily manifested as a myriad of images. As soon as moving points arise, they cease. This word is important— this is because there is no temporary abiding. Instant by instant, separate [moving points] suddenly arise. One after the other, moving points [appear and disappear] in an instant. Each [p. 74]

one arising anew because none abides. “Separate” means they are not one. What precedes does not reach what follows, and here does not reach there. Actually, there are no such characteristics as what precedes, what follows, here, and there—here I am simply following convention and speak of them provisionally. Since there have never been things, then what is there to abide over an extended period of time? Conventionally, it is presumed that some moving points are minute material particles, so small that they cannot be broken down. In fact, moving points are illusory semblances of coalesced matter but have never been matter. The conventional perspective has yet to examine this. Someone objected: “Moving points are not matter, and logically this is correct. It is just that in regard to the succession of moving points, “The preceding ceases and the following arises” is called “succession.” people are already unable not to think of them in terms of preceding and following instances. In a preceding instant, a moving point ceases as soon as it arises, and in the following instant, a moving point newly arises, again without abiding. In transformation there is no lingering resistance, this is for sure, but in between a preceding instant and the following instant, there should be a small interval, This says that in between there is the minutest measure of time called a “small interval.” and so how could it be that transformation has no period of interruption?” I replied: “Oh! What are you talking about? You presume that there is a small interval. This is to use the conventional concept of time to speculate about the reasons for the way things inherently are. Because ‘an instant’ was

Y6693.indb 167

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

168

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

originally a nominally adopted term attached to the flow of false characteristics (妄相), it actually does not mean time in the conventional sense. Details in “On Epistemology.” Thus, although there is provisional talk of preceding instants and following instants, it is not possible to draw a separation between them, so how can one talk of an interval? This is why there is a succession of moving points arising and ceasing, ever renewing and not abiding. Just as the moving point of the preceding instant ceases, the moving point of the following instant arises. However, because the repetition of preceding cessation and following arising clearly flows, this leaves no room to imagine that between generation and extinction there is a measure of time. Accordingly, transformation is ever renewing, sloughing off the past so that it does not linger. Time is not real, and there being no interval, how can there be interruption? This is truly how things are. What further doubts could there be? As moving points succeed one another in procession, there is the illusory appearance of an object shifting. It is just as if some object moves from some state to a different state, like something that leaps forward. [Those who believe this] fail to understand that this is the ceasing and arising of the preceding moving point and the following moving point, following in succession like this. Just as the first ceases, the following arises. Instant by instant, arising and ceasing closely revolve, succeeding one another endlessly. There is the illusory appearance of something leaping, yet there is no real thing that moves from here to there. The profundity of this principle is such that it is difficult to investigate and verify. The absolute quality of this principle is such that fundamentally it cannot be inferred. Using knowledge to infer it is pointless and untrustworthy. Things cannot be used to verify it.” This person raised another objection: “Since an ‘instant’ is not the same as the conventional meaning of time, why do you still use ‘preceding’ and ‘following’ in reference to it?” I replied: “To speak of the ceasing of a preceding instant serves to highlight that it is not eternal. To speak of the arising of the following instant serves to [p. 75]

refute attachment to nihilism. In order to elucidate the meaning of neither nihilism nor eternalism (非斷非常), ‘preceding and ‘following’ are nominally spoken of. Unlike the conventional view, one must not be attached to

Y6693.indb 168

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

169

a [belief in the] real [existence] of the characteristics of ‘preceding’ and ‘following,’ and so they are spoken of nominally. Hence the ultimate principle (至理) fundamentally transcends space and time. To use words and thought to express it necessitates contrived boundaries and sequences. This must be properly realized because one cannot be attached to [a belief in the real existence of the characteristics of ‘preceding’ and ‘following’].” This person raised another objection: “If, instant by instant, moving points suddenly appear, is it not the case that the transformation of the universe is sudden [only] and not gradual?” I replied: “Transformation leaves no lingering traces, arising ever renewed. How is this not sudden? What you presume to be gradual [is as follows]. If we rely on the nominal account of preceding and following instants, according to which the preceding ceases as the following arises, this resembles continuity and can also be called gradual. However, because these characteristics of preceding and following are, after all, nominal accounts, if they are not to be attached to as real, then why should one be firmly attached to the notion of gradual?” This person raised another objection: “If it should be as the gradual transformation thesis would have it, would not transformation (造化) be absolute freedom?” I replied: “Freedom relies on restriction, and only then does it appear. The power of the universe’s transformations relies on nothing. Utterly wondrous, utterly sublime, it has never been constrained. This has nothing to do with so-called being free or not being free. This is because to use these notions to make conjectures about the principle of transformation is but the confusion of deluded consciousness. Suppose we presume that not being free—as stated above—is because there is no restriction, then what is not being free [about not being free]? Further, supposing we presume that being absolutely free is because of a lack of restriction, then how can it be regarded as being free? As for talk of absolute freedom, surely it is not the case that in 2. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading xu 須 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads shun 順. 3. Because freedom relies on restriction in order to exist, then conversely, the lack of freedom should rely on the lack of restriction in order to exist. 4. Because freedom relies on restriction in order to exist, then in the absence of restrictions there would be no way to ascertain freedom.

Y6693.indb 169

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

170

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

the transformations of the universe, instant by instant, perversity emanates from chaos such that there is a complete lack of any heavenly norms or a constant nature? “Heavenly norms” refers to natural principles. Thus it is understood that neither freedom nor the lack of freedom is appropriate to compare with Great Transformation (大化).” This person raised another objection: “Moving points follow one another in succession with absolutely no interruption. As already shown above, this meaning is proven. For a note on the meaning of “following in succession,” see above. However, systems with multiple moving points form gross material [objects]. Why is it that these gross material objects are not able to cease completely?” I replied: “The arising and ceasing of gross material objects is illusory. This is because their self-natures are empty. Because gross material objects have no real self-nature, it is said that their arising and ceasing are illusory. What need is there to put forward a thesis? Conventionally, however, it is presumed that gross objects really exist and are posited on the basis of false discrimination. It is only because false discrimination is followed that they are established. There is no need to refute [this].” This says that in the context of conventional truth there is no [need] to refute [the existence of] gross material objects. Just as it is conventionally presumed that desks, jars, basins, and so forth truly exist, one always accords with this view and says they truly exist.

THE BODY AND THE WHOLE Within what conventional [truth] refers to as the vast natural world, there is a unique part: [p. 76]

the bodies of we sentient beings (有情). “Sentient beings” is another name for the myriad living things. They are so called because sentient beings have feelings and consciousness. Bodies have always been a part of the natural world. It is not the case that they exist independently, separate from the nat5. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading chu 出 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads ye 也.

Y6693.indb 170

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

171

ural world. The confusion of human feelings, however, is such that there is attachment to [the belief] that the body is inner and a failure to understand that the natural world is not external. In reality, the body belongs to the natural world. How can one mistakenly become attached to a small part at the expense of seeing the whole? Yang Cihu 楊慈湖 put it well: Ever since there were first people, none has been able to discern our whole. Looking at the deep blue, pure clarity above them those who could first speak called it “heaven.” Looking at the pleasant vastness below them, they called it earth. This pure clarity is our own pure clarity, and this vastness is our own vastness, yet none is aware of it. Not understanding themselves, they point to and name things, saying to one another, “That is heaven, that is earth.” It is just like someone not knowing that it is his own hand and foot and saying, “that hand, that foot.” It is like someone not knowing that it is his own ear, eye, nose, and mouth and saying, “that ear, eye, nose, and mouth.” Is this not to be confused? Ever since there were first people, there have been ignorant people everywhere.

He also said: Failing to regard heaven, earth, the myriad things, the myriad transformations, and the myriad principles as oneself, instead merely being attached to the ears, the eyes, the nose, the mouth, and the four limbs as oneself, amounts to severing the whole in order to pick out a fragment of skin. This is to be selfishly bound to blood and breath and is self-demeaning. My body does not stop at five or six feet. If one sits in a well to observe heaven, one will be unable to realize heaven’s greatness. If one sits inside one’s body to observe one’s self, one will be unable to realize one’s vastness.

If one carefully examines what he says, it is replete with the import of normative principles. Among conventional views, some take one’s body to be a piece of the natural world, when in fact one’s body contains the natural world. The body and the natural world have always flowed together as a single body. Although there are other views according to which there are differences between whole and part, The natural world is the whole, and the body is a part of this whole. actually the part is the whole This is because the 6. Yang Jian 楊簡 (Cihu 慈湖) (1141–1226), “Ji Yi 己易” (The Self and [the Book of] Change), Cihu yishu 慈湖遺書 (Surviving Writings of Yang Jian), 7.1a–13b, Siming congshu 四明叢書 (Siming Collectanea) edition, ed. Zhang Shouyong 張壽鏞 (Taipei: Guofang yanjiuyuan and Zhonghua dadian bianyinhui, 1966). 7. Yang Jian, “Ji Yi,” 7.1a–13b.

Y6693.indb 171

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

172

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

part is the whole’s part. and the whole is the part. This is because the whole is the part’s whole. Naturally, the meridians of vital stuff circulate freely (氣脈流通). The myriad of things contain one another, are interconnected, with none that stand alone. [Of the myriad of things, there are those that are mutually] antagonistic [and there are those that are mutually] receptive, but this is no impediment to their having different functions. Of the myriad of things there are those that are compatible and mutually receptive; there are those that are incompatible and mutually antagonistic. The function of each is different. Crucially, they come together to constitute the wonder of the whole. [The myriad of things] was never a composite (一合相), This is borrowing a term from the Diamond Sutra [Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitāsūtra]. The sutra employs it to refer concisely to Fundamental Reality. Here it is employed to refer concisely to physical objects. This is so as to say that one’s body and the myriad of things support one another, just as if there were many component parts. but rather is complete and whole with no severed components. This is because one’s body and the myriad of things contain one another and are interconnected such that they constitute a whole. Marvelous! In regard to the parts, when they mysteriously come together in [p. 77]

the whole, then one’s body relies on the myriad existents and is not small. In regard to the whole, when its parts are not impeded, then even though one’s body contains the myriad things, it is not large. At the point when the perspectives of small and large disappear and the characteristics of whole and part both vanish, other and self mysteriously merge (玄同) to be lodged in no realm (寓諸無境). Human emotions, however, are one-sided in their attachments, being obsessed with divisions but blind to the whole. [People] have always been perfect—why do they diminish themselves? [People] have always been vast and huge—why do they constrict themselves? Is it not sad? Although it is said that the body is a part of the natural world, if one were 8. Jin’gang bore boluomi jing 金剛般若波羅蜜經 is the Chinese title of the Kumārajīva’s translation of the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra. For the reference, see T08n0235_p0752b12. 9. The phrase “lodged in no realm” is from the “Discourse on Making All Things Equal” chapter of Zhuangzi, 7/2/92.

Y6693.indb 172

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

173

to talk about the mutual stimulus and response between the body and physical objects, then the body is even central to the physical world. The things and events that circulate around my body range from those as close as the sound, light, and so forth, which are the objects perceived by the eyes, ears, [and other sense organs], to those that are as distant as being beyond the solar system or even other solar systems. These are variously close by or far away from my body, and as they circulate [around my body] there is stimulative interaction, With things close by, it is direct; with distant things, it is indirect. The stimulations of my body by things are extremely numerous and complex. A single stimulus has countless connections. For example, when a hand touches a grain of sand, although this is a direct stimulus, the grain’s existence is interconnected with the entire universe. Thus when the grain of sand directly uses its power to stimulate, in fact indirectly it brings with it the power of the entire universe. and my body is able to respond to each and every stimulus without the slightest sluggishness. In responding to these stimuli, my body is, moreover, able to make [objects in] the physical world alter their states according to the movements of my body. For example, strong people can lift heavy things just as if they were light. This is a case of the weight of an object varying, depending on the movement of my body. Another example is when a body is near something, it sees it as large, and when it is far from it, it sees it as small. This is a case of an object’s size varying, depending on the movement of my body. Having raised these two examples, the outlines are clear enough. It is just like a unified country. The myriad local areas vie with one another to be recommended to the central authorities, and the central authorities in turn issue edicts to be promulgated in the myriad local areas. As to what the myriad local areas hear and see changing in accord with [directives from] the central authorities—it is just as if the movement of my body caused all of the things around me to change accordingly. Thus, my body [which is said to be part of the natural world] is actually at the center of the great container world. “Great container world” (大器): this is because in former times, the container world was also called the great container world in order to describe its being large. This is just like what is conventionally called the natural world (自然界). There is an old oriental saying: “When the world was being set out, humans were positioned at the center.” This is also the same meaning. 10. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.15b.

Y6693.indb 173

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

174

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

Heaven and earth are but different terms for the natural world. “Set out”: When things are completed, then their image is evident. Hence it talks about deploying them. Humans are positioned in the center because the human body is the center of the natural world. The inexhaustible responsiveness of the body as the center of physical things is referred to as “going” (往). The endless stimulation that things exercise upon the center is referred to as “coming” (來). Hence, this coming is not from outside. This is because physical things are not external to the body. If it were external, there would be severance and so [p. 78]

what would it mean to say that “with coming there must be going”? Going and coming are simultaneous, a single event, thereby verifying the understanding that there is no severance. Further, going does not [mean] pursuing the external. To take something to be an external object and to pursue it is merely the conceptual discrimination of deluded consciousness. If it were external, there would be severance, and so what would it mean to say that “with going there must be coming”? This can be understood on the basis of the foregoing. Those who understand the incipient (幾) [manifestation of] going and coming understand that the body and physical things have always been devoid of reality. The body is that which, when it moves, goes; it is physical things that come. Thus the body and physical are things devoid of reality. There is only this going and coming of movement. Going and coming have no beginning; being manifest they do not cease. “Manifest” refers to the transformations of coming and going, revealed yet without a beginning. This is the true condition of the universe! Within it, stimulus and response are qualities of the body and physical objects[, respectively]. As for that which discerns when stimulated, and abides by the norms [of the universe] when responding, that is the mind. That, however, is a topic that I am not going to discuss here. Above it has already been made clear that the body and physical things are interconnected such that they form a whole. If, however, the whole is attended to at the expense of the parts, then what does “nearby take from what lies close at hand” mean? 11. “Appended Statements, B,” Book of Change, 8.4b.

Y6693.indb 174

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Demonstration of Material [Dharmas], B (成色下)

175

Reflecting on this, can this matter not be investigated? This is because even though the body is connected to the great whole, The great whole refers to the natural world. it has definitely been divided as a part, and as a part it is discrete. Because it forms a single whole, it is called discrete. How was it able to be divided as a part and so became discrete? Examining “constant transformation,” it has always been a great power, ever generating anew. It is an undifferentiated, absolute unity with no internal divisions. Like a raging torrent—how can its limits be fathomed? Through contraction (翕), however, it illusorily forms physical objects, and so within this undifferentiated unity the function of division inevitably occurs. If there were no division, it would be analogous to a torrent that overflowed and had no cohesion, so that in the end [the body] would lack the means to reveal itself. Thus, the body is divided [within this undifferentiated unity] to form a physical entity. That is, the actions of constant transformation’s great power reveal the true mechanism of continuous generation, and so [the body] has to come out from this. As for the central nervous system—that most intricate aspect of the body’s organization—the brain is indeed the “central administration.” Hence, it is especially those competent functionaries skilled at exercising their unique [qualities] that are located in the brain. If one were to draw an analogy for the body, it would be a sharp blade, and the brain would be the edge of the sharp blade. The keenness of a sharp blade is fully manifest in its edge, just as the acuity of the body is fully manifest in the brain. It is for this reason that the great power of continuous generation is given form in the brain yet also depends on the brain for it to be discovered, just like the various skilled workers need first to sharpen their tools. As for this power’s being fully concentrated in the brain, it is just like lightning as it moves to its tips— its power is swift. Who knows why this is so? Above I have elucidated [the concepts of] body and physical things, and so [the concept of] material dharmas is now reasonably clear. Now, there should follow a detailed account of mind dharmas.

Y6693.indb 175

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

7

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

Above, did I not say: “The mind is when the movement of constant transformation is expanding?” See [chapter 3,] “Transformation.” Hence the Reality (實性) of mind is not different from constant transformation— mind does not have a real self-nature within itself. This is because it is not the case that, should constant transformation be removed, the mind has a self-nature. Now, “sentient beings” are nominal, having always depended on the illusory manifestation of the mind and things for their name, On “sentient beings,” see the previous note. “Nominal” also refers to sentient beings. It is because the term [“sentient beings”] relies on other [conditions] that they are said to be nominal. “Things” is an alternative term for “material [dharmas].” Sentient beings rely solely on the illusory manifestation of the mind and things in order to be named. If the mind and things were removed, then there would be no basis on which to establish the term “sentient beings.” “Illusory manifestation”: this is because the mind and things have never been real dharmas, and because [merely] positing the mind and things as real dharmas does not then enable one to claim that mind and things have real existence (實體 [dravya]). and the Reality of mind and things when forcefully named is constant transformation. It is said to be forced because [the Reality of mind and things] cannot be named yet is given a name. 1. “Mental dharmas are when the movement of constant transformation is expanding.”

176

Y6693.indb 176

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

177

THE MIND AND CONSTANT TRANSFORMATION Constant transformation: absolutely still yet moving. “Still” refers to its having a constant nature that cannot be altered. Naturally well ordered, it cannot be put into disarray. “Moving” refers to its unfathomable transformations that incessantly generate anew. It has never yet begun to have materiality, It is devoid of physical substance and location. yet when it moves it inevitably draws in and consolidates; hence it contracts and so illusorily becomes things. This is how it manifests to resemble a material universe, giving rise to doubts that it does not preserve its self-nature. Actually, constant transformation is homogeneous and devoid of impurities. Being devoid of impurities means having no impediments. Firm and unyielding, Cannot be broken or overcome. is it thus likely to be something that is transformed by things and not preserve its self-nature? As for its contracting to become things, because it uses them as utensils Uses things as tools. it reveals the power of its self-nature. This point is crucial. Thus, proceeding with absolute vigor, Reality being manifest, hence it proceeds with firmness. What is conventionally spoken of as momentum (衝動) does not really have insight into Reality. It simply regards [free-]floating movement (浮動) to be the impulse of the life force (生機)—is this not ridiculous! Students, you will begin to grasp this if you read the second to last paragraph in “Productive Power” (功能) [chapter 4] with an open mind. it constantly makes things things (物物) yet is not made into a thing among things (物於物). In the phrase wu wu 物物, the first wu has the meaning of “to control” and “to transform.” This means to control things and transform them. In the phrase wu yu wu 物於物, the first wu means “to conceal.” “Not made into a thing by things” means not to be concealed among things. This power of [constant transformation’s] self-nature whereby it proceeds with firmness so as to make things things yet is not made into a thing among things is, in relation to contraction, called expansion and, in relation to things, called mind. Things are formed through contraction, thus are different in name [p. 80]

but the same actuality. The mind depends on expansion to be established; hence mind and expansion are different in name but the same actuality. 2. “Image” commentary, Book of Change, 1.8a.

Y6693.indb 177

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

178

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

The actuality being the same but the names differing, the phrases relating to them are to be demarcated. Constant transformation illusorily manifests contraction and expansion, forming the mutual reliance of mind and things. Wondrous! Hence as soon as it is named “mind,” then already it is relative to/contrasted with things It already belongs to the realm of the empirical (後天). and is not the constant transformation that is Fundamental Reality. Constant transformation is Fundamental Reality. “Constant transformation” is placed first because it is being used as the subject. Hence, if one were only to say that the Reality of the mind is constant transformation, one could not be reproached for implying that the mind is Reality. And so, if one were to regard this mind as not descending into the material but to be the expression of the power of constant transformation’s self-nature, The mind is the power of constant transformation’s self-nature; hence we need to investigate this for ourselves to confirm that indeed there exists an undifferentiated, replete, brilliant, clear, pure Reality (體段). [Wang] Yangming’s more decadent followers even declared that there was no mind independent of feelings. This is a truly deluded view. Fortunately, [Nie] Shuangjiang and [Luo] Nian’an rose up to set matters straight. then there would be nothing to stop one saying that the mind is not different from Reality. In other words, the mind is not different from the constant transformation that is Fundamental Reality. One’s own root, one’s own trunk—one cannot rely on something else in making an effort to seek it. To seek Fundamental Reality externally is to rely on something else. [The mind] itself is bright, is clear, and so [one can] already see Fundamental Reality appear before one. True principle [= Fundamental Reality] resides only with oneself, yet why is it that in the mundane world it is certainly the case that there are those who, as they pursue it, become increasingly separated and removed from it. Summarizing what has been said above, as constant transformation contracts, it forms things; that is, it makes use of one part of things—their so-called body—as the basis for revealing the power of its self-nature. The 3. Xiong probably has in mind figures such as Wang Ji 王畿 (1498–1583) and Wang Gen 王艮(1483–1581). 4. On Nie Bao 聶豹 [Shuangjiang 雙江] (1487–1563), Luo Hongxian 羅洪先 [Nian’an 念菴] (1504–1564), Wang Ji, and Wang Gen, see Cheng Chung-yi, “Philosophical Development Late Ming and Early Qing,” in History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bo Mou (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 433–444.

Y6693.indb 178

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

179

power of constant transformation’s self-nature is called mind. Because of this, we know that the mind is actually the controller of the body, and that for the mind, the body is merely an implement. Although this mind controls the whole body, the mind’s Reality cannot be circumscribed or limited by the body. “Circumscribed” means “demarcated”; “limited” means “quantify.” Spatially, [the mind] extends across the ether; temporally, it reaches the limits of eternity. There is nothing it does not carry, nothing it does not envelop. “There is nothing it does not envelop,” because being absolutely large, there is nothing beyond it. Here “large” means absolute—it is not a term relative to “small.” “There is nothing it does not carry,” because being absolutely authentic it is without interruption. What demarcation could there be to look for? What quantification could there be to reckon? In the past, it would seem that Luo Nian’an had personal experience of this. He said: At the moment of utmost tranquility, suddenly I become aware that this mind of mine is empty, devoid of things. All around me I am aware of endlessness, like a long cloud of flowing qi in the sky that has no end; like a fish in the ocean transforming into a dragon, devoid of any intermediate stage, with no discernible inside or outside, and no movement or stillness that can be differentiated. Above, below, and in the four cardinal directions, from past to present—all form an undifferentiated whole, nowhere yet everywhere. My body is where it emanates from, and it is certainly not something that physical substance can constrain. Accordingly, when I gaze into the distance even the entirety of heaven and earth does not fill my vision; when I incline

[p. 81] my ear even the entirety of heaven and earth does not extend beyond my hearing. When I still my mind, even the entirety of heaven and earth does not escape my thoughts. This says that heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things are not external to my mind. Although the ancients have passed, what their spirit had attained is something that my spirit has never lost; otherwise, when I learn about their conduct, how could I feel so awoken, so inspired? This says that the mind itself has no temporal segments. The four seas are far away, yet the suffering within the four seas is interconnected such that this suffering is also my suffering, thus [those in the four seas] have never really been far away; otherwise, how could it be that when I learn of their suffering I am able to feel compassion and suffer? This says that the mind itself has no spatial divisions. For this reason, I feel for my parents and act accordingly

Y6693.indb 179

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

180

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

toward them—there is no division between myself and my parents. If there were a division, this would not be treating my parents as my parents. I feel for the people and act benevolently toward them—there is no division between myself and the people. If there were, this would not be treating the people benevolently. I feel for things and express loving concern for them—there is no division between myself and things. If there were, this would not be loving concern. This says that the mind itself makes no distinction between self and other. Accordingly, it is innately received from heaven. This says that it is innately endowed. Thus it is said, “One who is humane forms an indistinguishable whole with [all] things.” “Indistinguishable whole” means that what is in me is also in things; that I and things are combined together as a single whole. This is what is I referred to earlier as empty and quiescent yet able to interconnect thoroughly, mixing above, below, the four cardinal directions, from past to present, inner and outer, movement and tranquility and treat them as one.

Here Luo Nian’an verifies [the above account of the mind] with reference to pure authenticity in the context of ethical praxis in which the ego-self ’s preoccupation with petty advantage is transcended. Matters such as aspiring to [the conduct of] former sages and being bound to the suffering within the four seas, as well as the profound sincerity of treating one’s parents as they should be treated, being benevolent to the people, and showing a sensitive concern for things, suffice to verify that this mind has no “you” and “me,” is not constrained by time or space, is an undifferentiated [whole] without duality and distinctions, and is inexhaustible and without end. This so-called inner realization is not something empty or deluded! The mind of a single person or a single thing is the mind of heaven and earth and the myriad things. This is not something that physical substance can separate, and so they are thoroughly interconnected. The principle is certainly the same, regardless of whether it is related by one person or by another. The Huayan doctrines of “the mutual identity of one and many” and “[all things] are endlessly interdependent” carry a profound import. Students should investigate them thoroughly. 5. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Henan Cheng shi yishu, p. 16. 6. Luo Hongxian, “Da Jiang Daolin 答蔣道林” (Reply to Jiang Daolin), in Nian’an wenji 念菴文集 (Writings of Luo Nian’an), 4.1b–2a, Wenyuan ge Siku quanshu 文淵閣四庫全書 (The Complete Collection of the Four Treasuries—Based on the Wenyuan Pavilion Copy) ed. (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983). Xiong’s quotation of this passage differs in places from the text of Wenyuan ge Siku quanshu. 7. Both notions are to be found in many Huayan writings.

Y6693.indb 180

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

181

By and large, Chinese students have all followed [the path of] pure authenticity in the context of ethical praxis, in which the ego-self ’s preoccupation with petty advantage is transcended, thereby [enabling them] to come to know the mind itself. The most prominent example is that raised in Mencius where [someone, upon] suddenly seeing a child about to fall into a well, [spontaneously manifests] a heart of pity and compassion. In functioning thus, the mind is definitely not defiled by any degree of ego self-interest nor impeded by the physical body. This is what is called acting without having tried to act. This relies upon the true mind itself being made manifest, which in turn enables one to come to know the mind itself. From Confucius, Mencius, to [p. 82]

the various masters of the Song and Ming periods—all of them applied themselves to this. They thoroughly fathomed the unimpeded quality [of the transformation of things] to understand transformation, and so they did not make up false and ridiculous claims. They personally experienced recondite [truths] and pursued wondrous [insights] to their limits. They did not take [the path] of emptiness and vacuity. Among living things, humans are the most evolved. They are able to join as one with the great vitality of the universe to reveal the ultimate value of the world of Fundamental Reality. Such are humans. Thus, humans have pure authenticity in the context of ethical praxis in which they transcend the ego-self ’s preoccupation with petty advantage, smash the fetters of material things, and accord with the genuineness of their true nature to create anew. They use the mind to transform things—expansion’s movement of contraction lies therein. Animals, however, lack this capability. It is indeed true that the theory of evolution has completely renewed the barriers around anthropocentrism. However, one cannot generalize to other things on the basis of what has been found to apply in the case of humans. When psychologists talk about the mind, they treat humans and animals as the same. The scope of their research has never had anything to do with Fundamental Reality. The techniques they employ are analysis and testing and do not make use of 8. Mencius 2A.6. 9. This phrase is based on “Appended Statements, B,” Book of Change, 8.10b.

Y6693.indb 181

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

182

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

reflecting on one’s own consciousness or the methods of practicing and preserving [what is obtained] in inner self-cultivation (操存涵養). Thus, what they refer to as mind and what Chinese fundamental wisdom (玄學) refers to as mind are two completely different things. Here, the implicit meaning of “reflecting on one’s own consciousness” is subtle and profound and extremely rigorous [in what it entails]. It is utterly different from what is referred to as the method of introspection (內觀法) of psychology, and the two must not be confused. “To practice and preserve [what is obtained] in inner self-cultivation” is a term unique to Chinese philosophy, and it is selfevident that inner self-cultivation is subtle and profound and extremely rigorous [in what it entails]. For all of these matters, I wish to wait until On Epistemology before explaining them in detail. Each time I meet someone who upholds the views of psychology, they cast doubts as to the basis of what I refer to as “mind.” This is to make the mistake of failing to understand [different] categories. Fundamental wisdom and science each have their scope, and it is appropriate to distinguish them as categories. How could this not be understood? Certainly there are those in the world who maintain that science is capable of anything. Such bias truly brings shame to the name of erudition. Ethical praxis is genuine and unrelenting. When one reflects within oneself, clearly there is something there. The word “something” here does not refer to an object but is a term describing the mind. The mind is ever the controller of the body—the so-called master. Hence it is spoken of in terms of there being a thing. With clarity one recognizes oneself. The “Webbed Fingers” chapter of Zhuangzi says: “What I call clarity does not refer to oneself seeing another but to self-seeing.” This thus refers to recognizing oneself. What am I? This mind. The mind is rapidly stimulated, yet it responds to things appropriately. Being activated, it gives rise to myriad beginnings yet itself remains ever still. Ever still, yet it moves to give rise to myriad beginnings. Slight, as if on the edge of existing, yet heaven and earth are rooted in it. Indistinct, it is the ground for understanding gained in solitude (獨知), yet the ten thousand things have their foundation in it. In one of his poems extolling pure knowing (良知), Wang Yangming said: “At the moment of understanding gained in solitude, there is no sound or smell—this is the 10. “Pian mu 駢拇” (Webbed Fingers), Zhuangzi, 21/8/30–3.

Y6693.indb 182

6/30/15 2:55:50 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

183

foundation for heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things.” That which is manifest before us is replete, bright; it does not fade. How could it be said to have no basis? Could it possibly [p. 83]

be inferred and observed using material things, and pursued to the end externally? The obfuscation brought about by human sentiments most certainly dulls the precious storehouse of numinous clarity (神明) This describes the mind, because it is endowed with a myriad of wonders. such that humans regard themselves as things. The ears, eyes, mouth, nose, viscera, and the various bones are all things. The sounds the ear picks out, the colors the eyes pick out, the smells and tastes the nose and mouth pick out, right up to that which the bones feel—in all cases it is nothing other than things interacting with things. If we were to suppose that the universe and human life really do seamlessly constitute a huge mass of material stuff, then what life (生命) is there to speak of? In actuality, however, things certainly are not as such. Ears are able to hear, for it is in listening to sounds that they reveal their acuity; eyes are able to see, for it is in looking at colors that they reveal their keenness of vision; right up to the various bones being able to feel, for it is in everything they touch that they reveal their awareness. Whenever “up to” is used, this implies that the things in between are not all listed. So now it should be asked, if acuity, keenness, and awareness issue from the ears, eyes, and other such things, then given that the ears, eyes, and so forth are things, how could they generate acuity, keenness, and awareness? Or is it the case that acuity, keenness, and awareness issue from sounds, colors, and other things? Sounds, colors, and so forth are likewise things, so how could they generate acuity, keenness, and awareness? Hence it can be understood that acuity, keenness, and awareness are the mind. The mind embodies things, not leaving anything out. It is not the case that the mind is identical to Fundamental Reality (心非即本體也).

11. Wang Shouren, “Yong liangzhi si shou shi zhu sheng 詠良知四首示諸生” (Four Poems Extolling Pure Knowing to Instruct Students), in Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集 (Complete Collected Writings of Wang Yangming) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997), p. 790.

Y6693.indb 183

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

184

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

Nevertheless, because the mind is definitely not transformed by things, therefore it may also be said that the mind is not different from Fundamental Reality (心即本體耳). By “embodies things” it is meant that the mind is the Reality of the myriad things, and nothing can be omitted [from its scope] and still be established as a thing.

LIFE FORCE By controlling the ears, eyes, and other such things it moves them among sounds, shapes, and other such things. If one were to talk in terms of its manifest [characteristics], it fills everywhere yet is inexhaustible. Being stimulated it then interconnects. No matter how far or how deep, there is nowhere it does not move. If one were to talk in terms of its hidden [characteristics], it is concealed yet unimpeded. It has never had a shape and it seems there is nothing in it, yet the beginnings of the ten thousand existents depend on it—what could be without it? Because it is meticulously and thoroughly concealed, it takes on form by not taking on form and so is never impeded. As an undifferentiated whole it controls as it flows. This is what is called “life” (生命). Someone asked me to define “life.” I replied: The meaning a term such as this gives expression to is that of a whole, which, perforce, means that a definition cannot be provided for it. If, however, we are able to recognize our inherent mind—that is, to recognize our own life— [then we will realize] that apart from this mind, there is no life of which one can speak. As for what conventionally is called “life,” it denies that one can recognize one’s own mind, and so I do not understand it. The universe is nothing but the expression of this life, and human life is nothing but the activity of this life. Being grounded in magnificent Reality, [the universe and humans] have no alternative but to act [as they do], [p. 84]

yet from the beginning it has never been the case that in doing so there was any purposefulness. When virtue/potency (德) is replete, it transforms [even] gods—is it not supreme? Those who are attached to things look upon 12. Amending wu jian 無間 to wu wen 無問, on the grounds of intelligibility.

Y6693.indb 184

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

185

the universe as though it was a machine and equate human life with dust— why do they not reflect within themselves? The life force (生命力) is revealed without any pre-arrangement, such that when it is manifest in things, its functionality has a god-like quality. Where there are no things, the life force seems just to drift, with nothing to control so that it can be made manifest. Once manifest as things, it divides up to become individual entities. The Fundamental Reality of life cannot be severed and separated, yet in its transformed manifestation as physical objects, [life] is divided to form individual entities. This is how the world of living things is propagated. On the basis of this mutual dependence with individual entities, one can see how powerful it is. “Mutual dependence” has two meanings. First, this is because the life force relies on individual entities in order to be revealed, and individual entities also rely on the life force in order to be completed. Second, this is because individual entities are mutually reliant; that is, they depend on one another in order to advance the expression of the life force. However, because the life force relies on things to be revealed, it often sinks into the material, becoming rigid and unable to be extricated. This can be verified by looking at plants and animals. Plants consist only of a physical frame. The life force [in them] has been almost completely materialized. As for animals, they are gradually endowed with sense faculties, yet the life force [in them] is constrained by the material, and so animals really do not surpass plants by much at all. Living things advance by way of accumulated gradations. Coming to humans, the central nervous system begins to be more developed, and so due to the silent operation of the hidden nurturing of the life force, humans have the means by which to change material things and take advantage of being able to make use of these changes. Hence, when the mind’s spirit is activated, it uniquely possesses the power of a ruler and so is capable of using things but not being used by things; transforming things yet not being transformed by things. Except for a very few exceptional individuals, however, the vast majority of people constantly let go of their minds so that they easily descend 13. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading geti yu geti 個體與個體 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads geti yu quanti 個體與全體. 14. Xiong clearly has an evolutionary model in mind here.

Y6693.indb 185

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

186

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

into the material. If they were to be bold and decisive, however, [the mind could still be realized] here and now. This is what the Book of Change means when it says “returning [from an error] that has not led one to stray far.” The nobility of the human ways lies in this. Human nature is endowed with the life force. “Human nature is endowed” means that it is innately possessed. Fully complete (圓成), it is real. Yuan 圓 means full, lacking nothing. Cheng 成 means to be already complete when it appears, not the product of being created. “Real” means genuine, clearly not to be empty and false. It has never been in decline. Although it is said that the physical body is minute, its life force certainly envelops the universe and conceals the myriad existents. Constantly flowing everywhere, the life force is not impeded by the physical body. This says that the life force of individuals is the great life force of the universe, so how could the physical body possibly impede it? The conventional view maintains that our human life force is [p. 85]

derived from a division of the great life force of the universe that occurs at the moment we are first conceived. After we are born, we are cut off from the universe because we are constrained by our physical body. We singularly fail to understand that the so-called great life force of the universe is an undifferentiated whole and so cannot be dissected and divided. Rather, everything that has a physical body is a consolidation of this whole, so what separation could there be? Thus, at the moment of our conception, we humans rely on the great life force of the universe to live. After we are born and for a unending period, we still constantly rely on the great life force of the universe to live. Our life and the universe, from beginning to end, are not two entities. Hence, our life is constantly connected to the universe’s ceaseless creating anew, and so there is no abiding by the old that could be preserved. The inexhaustibility of the life force and the ceaselessness of transformation are also like this. Master Wang Chuanshan elucidated this principle well before me. By virtue of being alive, however, humans cannot avoid being without affliction. This is because when they begin to develop their physical body,

15. This phrase is from the Fu 復 (Return) hexagram, “Line Statement,” Book of Change, 3.20b. 16. Wang refers briefly to bianhua 變化 in Si wen lu 思問錄 (Record of Reflections) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), pp. 23, 30, 34.

Y6693.indb 186

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

187

they suddenly become attached to it and are ignorant of its origins. This is called affliction. One’s “original face” does not take on physical form; it is devoid of a sense of “self ”; it lacks any defiled attachments. Since affliction starts together with the physical body, then through an extended process of enhancement, the physical body is increasingly regarded as “one’s own” and made smaller, until finally attachment to the physical body is even more entrenched, and daily one is unable to offer any resistance to being transformed by things. If the ears, eyes, and thought all sink without restraint into material desire, then this becomes a calamity in which deafness and blindness are given free rein. If within the brain there is not even a crack of clear expansiveness, then it becomes a spent thing. Having cut oneself off from the great life force of the whole universe, one is not part of it and interconnected with it. Although there was never any reason to warrant the separation of the physical body [from the life force], now attachment to it has become increasingly entrenched. Since it is regarded as private rather than shared, and made small and self-bound, I have raised the example of the physical body’s originally not being severed [and changing] to [a state in which] it has become severed [so as to show that] this is because life principles (生理) have been stripped away to the extreme, eventually leaving it as a spent thing. Even though the residual physical body has not yet dissipated, because it is a spent thing the pace of its decay grows ever more acute. Zhuangzi says: “Nothing is more lamentable than the mind dying.” This is what is meant. Thus, when people are born, even though they possess inexhaustible hidden treasures, “Hidden treasures” is an analogy for the mind and for the life force. there are unexpected dangers. What are the dangers? Afflictions start together with the physical body, gradually intensifying until [the body] is completely materialized (物化), stripped of its life-principles, and eventually losing its self-awareness.

AFFLICTION AND HABITUATED TENDENCIES Affliction is a yin image (陰象). Soft and not aroused; closed and not open; the descent of heavy, turbid [vital stuff ]. This is what is meant by a 17. A popular Chan metaphor for clarity of the mind. 18. That is, it is not seen as an extension of a larger whole. 19. “Tian Zifang 田子方,” Zhuangzi, 55/21/18.

Y6693.indb 187

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

188

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

“yin image.” Its origin is without root, suddenly arising; on becoming constituted as habituated tendencies (習氣), it reaches the point where it cannot be extirpated. We humans are innately endowed with a repository of brilliant treasure, so why in spite of this are we deprived of our treasure by this rootless thing? Our Book of Change under the Peeling (Bo 剝) hexagram has the following [p. 86]

warning: “The soft transforms the firm.” When yin is at fullness it erodes yang—this is what is referred to as “transforming the hard.” Originally our human life force was utterly firm and vigorous. Now, in our pursuit of things we have lost our vitality, are driven by afflictions, and so have lost our firmness. The Qian hexagram, however, admonishes [one] to be self-strengthening and make resplendent one’s great brilliance so as to battle and defeat the darkness of yin. “Their blood is dark and yellow”; reduplicated yin is destroyed. Precisely at this juncture our human life force is creative and reveals its glorious radiance: “At this moment, ride [the carriage] drawn by six dragons and drive across the sky.” “Six dragons” refers to pure yang, pure vigor, and describes the utter vigor of the life force. “Driving across the sky” highlights its advance upward with no falling back. It is god-like and cannot be compared to mere things. This is contraction moving with expansion; things transforming in accord with mind. Thereupon they return to Fundamental Reality, deficient in nothing, finally [changing] from [a situation associated with] the Peeling hexagram to [a situation associated with] the Return (Fu 復) hexagram. Hence the Return hexagram says “Do we not see Return in the mind of heaven and earth?” The mind is Fundamental Reality. It

20. “Judgment,” Bo hexagram, Book of Change, 3.16b. 21. Kun (female/earth/procreation) hexagram, line statement, Book of Change, 1.25b. 22. The previous quotation is from the top line statement of the Kun hexagram and refers to the imminent transformation of this hexagram, which consists of six yin lines. 23. “Judgment,” Qian hexagram, Book of Change, 1.6a. 24. This hexagram consists of one yang line at the top and five yin lines below it. The change refers to a situation where the yang line at top moves to become a yang line at the beginning (bottom) and hence the anticipation of new growth. 25. This hexagram consists of one yang line at the bottom and five yin lines above it. 26. “Judgment,” Fu hexagram, Book of Change, 3.19b.

Y6693.indb 188

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

189

is not the case that the mind is the same as Fundamental Reality, but it can be discussed in terms of Fundamental Reality. See above for the meaning of this. In the Book of Change it is called Qian 乾. That which Bo erodes is this. It is not the case that Fundamental Reality is eroded. However, people themselves have obstructed their Fundamental Reality and are transformed by things, so in people this is called Bo. That which Fu returns to it is simply this. If one does not return, one will be unable to see Fundamental Reality. In sum, human life is constrained by the physical body, and then there are the demons of affliction that arrive without being caused resulting in [humans’] misleading themselves about their origin. Being misled, hence they are not free (自在). Because they are not free, they have no alternative but to struggle against the demons of affliction. Through struggle, however, it is possible to rely on a solitary yang to expand [the life force within them] and fully develop it, even when impeded by the physical body [and mired in] the layered darkness of reduplicated yin. “Solitary yang” is an analogy for the continuity of life principles (生理). Even when Bo is extreme, when has there ever been a break in the continuity of Reality’s incessant generation and procreation? People, however, fail to take up this continuity; instead they follow in the pursuit of things, hastening to their own demise. How lamentable! If, however, the day comes that they are able to return to their inherent mind within this Reality, then naturally the life force will flow freely to fill them. Then they are able to develop and to create This development and creation are not without a basis: holding fast to this single yang to develop and create unremittingly and to generate anew endlessly. Thus development and creation become manifest after starting from the minute and head toward the new after getting rid of the old. That is to say, it is not the case that they exist after having been generated from nothing. and not be transformed by things. When life principles are not obstructed, there is daily renewal and replete virtue arrives. As such, things can be used, and there is no need to sever them. Naturally, things will all follow their heavenly norms with all being [a manifestation of the] flow of life principles— what is referred to as “the physical body is the heavenly nature.” Having thus recovered one’s original face, the Great Illumination (大明) continues 27. This refers to defiled mental associates, a topic taken up in detail below. 28. Mencius 7A.38.

Y6693.indb 189

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

190

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

in its fullness and one returns to freedom. A poem by Tao Yuanming says: “Long confined to a birdcage; This is a metaphor for the suffering caused by people’s being bound to things. Returned once again to nature.” This is a metaphor describing people who, once having seen clearly into their origins, become free. This is what is meant. [p. 87] Note: Someone asked: “If it is indeed as you say, that the creativity of our human life force consists only in returning to the beginning, For the term “returning to the beginning,” see Zhu Xi, Collected Annotations on the Four Books. “Beginning” is just the same as saying “original face.” then how is it that they complete each other yet are opposites?” If it is creativity, it is not called returning to the beginning, and returning to the beginning involves nothing called creativity. Hence [we are] calling them opposites. That which is called “the beginning” is “naturally to have always been so.” “Naturally to have always been so” implicitly refers to Fundamental Reality. If over a long period of time people are unable to keep intact that which they innately possess, then subsequently this will lead to their being harmed. “Subsequently lead to” refers to the types of affliction [brought about by] the pursuit of things. They begin together with the physical body. These types of affliction did not exist originally. “Subsequently leading to the harm” of that which originally exists is tantamount to injuring one’s life. That which originally exists is life. To harm that which originally exists is to injure one’s life. Having been injured, in some cases it may merely exist as sprouts. If one did not rely on these sprouts in cultivating good dharmas and removing bad dharmas with sustained effort so as to [nurture the] creation of life, and cultivate oneself so as to regenerate life, then there would only be ongoing injury until it was exhausted such that, being a thing spent,

29. Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 (365–427), Tao Yuanming ji 陶淵明集 (Collected Writings of Tao Yuanming) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), p. 40. 30. It occurs, for example, in Zhu’s Lunyu jizhu commentary to Analects 1.1, Sishu jizhu, p. 47.

Y6693.indb 190

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

191

it was transformed by things. How could it continue once again to be as it was originally? Thus creativity and renewal concern what has not been injured, [and involve] seeking within for the remnant sprouts of the inherently existing life force; that is, the incipient manifestation of the inherent mind. It is like what Mencius called “[the restorative] night air’s being [enough] to preserve [the vegetation on Ox Mountain].” “[The restorative] night air’s being [enough] to preserve [the vegetation on Ox Mountain]” is possible only when there is a brief calm in the troubled mind, and suddenly the shape of the inherent mind’s clear brilliance is revealed incipiently. This is precisely why the life force does not completely disappear. In the Book of Change, the manifestation of this beginning of goodness is the image of yang’s still being incipient [as depicted] by the first line of the Return hexagram. If one has personal understanding of this so that one expands and develops [the life force], preserves and nourishes it, and then cultivates good dharmas and removes bad dharmas with sustained effort, it will gradually grow and become fully developed. Through self-cultivation it is constantly regenerated, and so daily it grows more replete and splendid. Creativity relates to its full development; regeneration relates to its splendor. From the first moment when it is still incipient to when it is fully developed and splendid is instant upon instant of arising and ceasing, ceasing and arising. It is not the case that at the first thought-instant there is coalescence and no ceasing, that it extends to a subsequent thought-instant. If the first thought-instant did extend to a subsequent thought-instant, then once mental dharmas were formed they could not change. If this were so, then how is “gradual growth” and “daily growing more replete” possible in order for there to be creativity and regeneration? In this book I have consistently spoken about this, as you students will be aware. The reason this original thread is drawn out and extended is so that there might be nowhere whence injury might arise. Thus, 31. Mencius 6A.8. 32. The Return hexagram has one yang line at the bottom and five yin lines above.

Y6693.indb 191

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

192

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上) days where there is life are all days of creation and regeneration. Not for an instant is there an absence of creativity due to momentary rest, or an absence of regeneration due to attachment to what has passed. If there were a moment in which there was no creation and no regeneration, then at that moment one would no longer be living. However,

[p. 88] even if one fully realizes one’s capacities for creativity and regeneration, one would simply be giving expression to and completing that which one innately possesses. Crucially, it is not the case that one can enhance what is innately possessed. What is innately possessed does not depend upon its being enhanced. This principle is self-evident and beyond doubt. This is because this principle does not depend on the sense organs or on logical inference to be understood. Thus it is said to be self-evident. Hence it is said to be returning to the beginning. In human life, it is appropriate that they realize their human capacities in order to reveal that which they innately possess. “Reveal” here means “to reveal and to develop.” If someone were unable to realize his capacities, then that which he innately possesses would be unable to reveal itself. Thereupon, by becoming bound to the self-centeredness of the physical body, this noble frame will merely be a bundle of dead matter. How could it possibly return to its beginning? Hence, in talking here about creativity and regeneration, the reference is to human capacities. Human capacities have always relied upon that which humans innately possess in order for those capacities to be revealed and developed. That which humans innately possess cannot be further enhanced. This must be called returning to the beginning.

INTERIM SUMMARY

Mind and Cognitive Activity I will now summarize the gist of what has been said above. I first spoke about the mind in terms of Fundamental Reality in order to make the dis-

Y6693.indb 192

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

193

tinction that cognitive activity is not identical with the mind. The Chan school and the rujia both rebutted as false the notion that cognitive activity is the mind. The connotations of cognitive activity, as understood by them, are very broad and generally correspond with all the mental functions described in psychology. Although cognitive activity does also depend for its existence upon the mind, it is with respect to the functioning of such physical matters as the movement of the four limbs and the engagement of things and feelings that it has the greatest power, whereas [cognitive activity that] accords with the inherent mind’s expression is rare. Hence cognitive activity is not the mind and must be distinguished from the mind. If, however, we do not let go of our inherent mind and preserve it so that it is constantly the ruler within, then cognitive activity will be nothing other than the expression of the mind. Bodhidharma said, “It is in activity that [buddha-]nature is seen.”

Mind as Life Next I talked about the mind in terms of life to show how being bound by afflictions brought about through the pursuit of things makes it difficult to verify the mind. “Pursuit of things” means to be mired in things. “Bound by afflictions” means to be knotted with afflictions and unable to loosen the knots. Because people are bound by afflictions through their pursuit of things, all have lost their [inherent] mind, making it difficult for them to verify this mind. The mind is not different from Fundamental Reality—what is there to dissect? If it could be dissected, then it would not be Fundamental Reality. The mind is life and so is not an accumulated assembly. Life depends 33. Zhu Xi was critical of Chan Buddhists who equated cognitive activity with the nature. See Zhuzi yulei, vol 8. p. 302. In his Yuanjue jing dashu chao 圓覺經大疏鈔 (Subcommentary to the Great Commentary on the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment), Huayan (and Chan) patriarch Zongmi 宗密 (780–841) was critical of the disciples of the Chan patriarch Mazu 媽祖 (709–788), who attributed the existence of everything to Buddha-nature. See X09n0245_p0534b08–10. 34. Bodhidharma 菩提達磨 (sixth century) is the putative founder of the Chan school in China. 35. Jingde chuan deng lu 景德傳燈錄 (Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Published in the Jingde Period), T51n2076_p0218b12. This massive work was compiled by Daoyuan 道 原 (d.u.) and completed circa 1004. An important source for the history of the Chan school, it consists mainly of biographies of Chan patriarchs and other monks.

Y6693.indb 193

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

194

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

on the mind for its name. If it were the case that the mind was the accumulated assembly of numerous particles, then life would be like loose sand gathered together. Only material things have a nature that is an accumulated assembly, whereas life is an undifferentiated whole flowing incessantly, and this whole cannot be talked about in terms of accumulated assembly. This being so, why did former Yogācāra teachers say that a person has eight consciousnesses? In what follows I will investigate and discuss this.

The Eight Consciousnesses In the past, only six consciousnesses were spoken about in Hīnayāna. When Mahāyāna arose, it continued with the notion of six consciousnesses, but added [p. 89]

the manas and the ālaya to make eight consciousnesses. The names of the six consciousnesses are based on the six sense faculties. This is because visual consciousness relies on the sense faculty of sight; hearing consciousness relies on the sense faculty of hearing; olfactory consciousness relies on the sense faculty of smell; gustatory consciousness relies on the sense faculty of taste; tactile consciousness relies on the sense faculty of touch; and the sixth consciousness [mano] relies on the faculty of mental discrimination. 36. The editors of the 2001 edition of New Treatise, p. 146, n. 5, cite the following handwritten marginal comment by Xiong: In talking about the mind in terms of Fundamental Reality, this mind is the nature. It is also heaven, the command (命), and principle. It is what in the New Treatise I refer to as life force. “Flow” refers to the command. The ruler within the flow is referred to as heaven, and amongst humans [flow] is the principle by which humans live, and so is called the nature or life force. Further, in respect of [flow] controlling the body, it is called the mind. It is expressed in response to things and because a myriad different ordered patterns (條理) are all contained within it, it is referred to as principle. In talking about the mind in terms of function, what former ru referred to as the mind of cognitive activity is what contemporary psychologists refer to as the various cognitive, affective and volitional aspects of mind. In talking about the mind in terms of physiology, this is what is conventionally referred to as the heart, or what the Buddhists call the corporeal mind. It is in fact what contemporary psychologists refer to as the central nervous system and the brain and it is also the physical heart.

Y6693.indb 194

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

195

The sense faculties (根 [indriya]) that the visual and other consciousnesses rely on are called the pure sense faculties (清淨色根). The physical eyes and so forth are definitely not called the sense faculties. In Mahāyāna, the so-called pure faculties seem to be talked about with an air of mystery. Lin Zhijun 林志鈞 (Zaiping 宰平) of Minhou 閩侯 [1879–1960] has maintained that this notion lacks verification and is not credible. Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 of Guilin 桂林, however, maintains that it is what today is called the central nervous system. I say that it is still difficult to prove if the pure sense faculties are the central nervous system, and so I will leave this matter to one side for the time being. As for the faculty of mental discrimination (意根), Hīnayāna schools such as the Theravāda and so forth also had established the concept of sense faculties, referring to the physical object in the chest cavity that, in conventional terms, is called the heart. They definitely still did not understand that the function of mental discrimination (心意) relies upon the brain. As for the other [Hīnayāna] schools, they were not willing to establish the concept of sense faculties. Instead they maintained that when the preceding instant of consciousness had already been 37. Also known as shengyi gen 勝義根. According to Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism (www.buddhism-dict.net), s.v. this term refers to “the actual spiritual/sensory ability that resides in the given organ. . . . Thus, the sensory ability takes the physical organ as its residence, or basis.” 38. This is because these sense organs in themselves lack a capacity, a potent function. For example, visual perception is an activity of consciousness; the eye organ does not see. 39. A lay Buddhist friend and colleague of Xiong Shili, Lin taught philosophy and economics at Peking and Tsinghua universities in the 1920s and 1930s. 40. Liang Shuming was a lifelong friend (and sometimes critic) of Xiong. Employed in the Philosophy Department of Peking University from 1917 to 1924 to teach Indian philosophy (which for him was principally Yogācāra), he played an important part in the revival of Yogācāra in modern China. In 1924 Liang retired from his academic position to engage in the practical work of rural reconstruction in Shandong. Liang developed a cultural philosophy (文化哲學) based on an engagement with three philosophical traditions, as set out in his 1922 publication Dong-Xi wenhua ji qi zhexue 東西文化及其哲學 (Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies). Believing that Chinese culture was not yet developed to a stage that would enable it to enter a Buddhist cultural period (unlike India), Liang promoted Confucian moral values as a necessary preparatory stage on the path to Buddhism—a sort of convenient means or upāya. On Liang, see Thierry Meynard, “Liang Shuming and His Confucianized Version of Yogācāra,” in Makeham, Transforming Consciousness. 41. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0411c22.

Y6693.indb 195

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

196

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

extinguished in the sixth consciousness, this served as the faculty of mental discrimination. Coming to when the Mahāyāna established eight consciousnesses, they started saying that the seventh consciousness, manas, served as the faculty of mental discrimination. Possibly, the names of [the six consciousnesses] are based on [corresponding] cognitive objects; that is, visual consciousness is also called color consciousness (色識) because it discerns only colors. “Only” means to be limited to this and not to extend to something else. Future references to this term will be the same. The term se 色 has many meanings. Sometimes when it is used to refer to material dharmas, it functions as a synonym for material objects. Here, where it is being used to refer specifically to that which visual consciousness discerns, it means color, such as dark blue-green, yellow, red, white, and so forth. Hearing consciousness is also called sound consciousness because it discerns only sounds. Olfactory consciousness is also called scent consciousness because it discerns only scents. Fragrant and malodorous are both called scents. Gustatory consciousness is also called taste consciousness because it discerns only tastes. Bodily consciousness is also called tactile consciousness because it discerns only [varieties of physical] touch. In regard to what the first four consciousnesses discern, they directly pick out the four sense objects of color, sound, scent, and taste. That which bodily consciousness discerns, however, is “emptily” spoken of as touch and does not directly pick out some kind of sense object. This is because the sense objects that bodily consciousness discerns are the most broad, with countless examples, and so “touch” is used to refer to them. The sixth consciousness (意識) is also called dharma consciousness (法識) because it discerns all the various dharmas. Dharmas is the general name given to all things, regardless of whether or not they have form, as well as all referent principles (義理). The six consciousnesses listed above were established by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna masters. In addition to the first six consciousnesses, Mahāyāna [masters] also established a seventh and an eighth consciousness. They presumed that the five consciousnesses From the visual to the bodily consciousness. arise solely due to external objects (外門轉) Zhuan 轉 means to arise. All five 42. For example, touch can discern warmth, hardness, humidity, sharpness, and so forth.

Y6693.indb 196

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

197

consciousnesses arise by externally appropriating from perceptual realms (境界). because they must have a basis. The sixth consciousness arises due to internal and external objects. On the one hand, the sixth consciousness appropriates external cognitive objects; on the other hand, internally it appropriates mental objects. This is because even without external cognitive objects, it [is able to] arise by itself. Because its defining activity operates crudely, Defining activity [p. 90]

is the characteristic of the mind as it is activated in its relation to cognitive objects. it is not fundamental Because the sixth consciousness’s defining activity operates crudely, it is not fundamental. and needs to have a support. Because the sixth consciousness itself is not fundamental, it needs to have that which supports it, in the same way the five consciousnesses do. Accordingly, the eighth [consciousness] or ālaya-vijñāna was established to store the myriad existents and serve as fundamental support. Note the word “support.” They [the former Mahāyāna masters] presumed that the first seven consciousnesses each have seeds, and that these seeds are not generated directly from the ālaya but are only supported by the ālaya; hence the ālaya serves as the fundamental support. The ālaya is profound and subtle, concealed and not manifest. The first six [consciousnesses], Visual through to the sixth consciousness. however, are crude and manifest in the extreme, such that it seems as if inner and outer will sever. The ālaya is inner and the six consciousnesses are outer. Accordingly, it was supposed that a seventh [consciousness] or manas should be set up between them. The seventh was inserted between the eighth and the first six. The Great Discourse, [juan] 51, says: “Because there is the base consciousness, The ālaya is also called the base consciousness. there is the manas.” The meaning is worth savoring. Upon examination, the eight consciousnesses they established are broadly divided into three layers. The 43. But it does this only indirectly; it still has to rely on the five sensory consciousnesses to do this. 44. Great Discourse refers to Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra (大智度論; Great Discourse on the Perfection of Wisdom), a commentary attributed to Nāgārjuna on the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra and translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva. The quotation, however, is actually from Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地論; Discourse

Y6693.indb 197

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

198

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

first layer is the six consciousnesses. That is, from the visual through to the sixth consciousness. They collectively take the inner and the outer as cognitive objects (通緣內外). Although they operate crudely, they are functional. The next layer is the manas. The seventh. Internally, it continually takes the ālaya as its cognitive object and attaches to it as its own self. The word “continually” is crucial. This is because it [means] “without interruption.” The seventh is grounded in taking as its cognitive object the perceiving part (見分) of the eighth and [attaching to it as its own] self. Among them [the Mahāyāna masters], however, are those who generalized [by saying that the seventh consciousness took as its cognitive object] the ālaya. [They made this mistake] because they failed to pay due attention to the “four aspects of cognition” (四分). Although it seems to be quiescent, it is not. It exclusively takes the internal as its cognitive object and does not pursue the external and so appears to be quiescent. However, to think continually about the image of self is to be aroused in the extreme and indeed not be quiescent. The third layer is the ālaya. The eighth. It receives perfumed [seeds] and maintains hold of seeds. “Maintains hold of seeds” refers to the following. The ālaya maintains hold of all of the seeds that the ālaya itself has always possessed as well as its newly perfumed seeds, together with the seeds that the other seven consciousnesses have always possessed as well as their newly perfumed seeds. Hence it is the foundation of the myriad existents. “Receives perfumed seeds” refers to the following. The first seven consciousnesses each have habituated tendencies that perfume and are cast into the ālaya itself. The ālaya receives all of these perfumed habituated tendencies and stores them. They then become newly perfumed seeds. If it were the case that the ālaya did not receive perfuming, then would not the perfuming habituated tendencies (熏 發習氣) of the first seven consciousnesses scatter and disperse? It moves but lacks purposefulness. Its continuous transformation is just like a flow. This is what is meant by “moves.” It does nothing but receive and maintain hold of; on the Stages of Concentration Practice), T30n1579_p0580b15: “Because there is the ālayavijñāna it is possible for there to be the manas.” 45. Later in this chapter Xiong writes: “Whereas the sensory consciousnesses discern only external cognitive objects, the sixth consciousness discerns internal and external cognitive objects. Internal cognitive objects are the product of cognitive construction.” Internal cognitive objects includes objects constructed on the basis of the synthesis of data provided by the first five consciousnesses, such as “a white horse,” or more prosaically, “a jar.”

Y6693.indb 198

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

199

what purposefulness is there? The eight consciousnesses established by the Mahāyāna [masters] The Mahāyāna [masters] established eight consciousnesses; they did not stop at six. are, by and large, as such. It should, moreover, be understood that the Mahāyāna [masters] divided the one mind into eight. The mind has always been an undifferentiated whole—hence “the one mind”—yet the Mahāyāna [masters] divided it into eight. That is, these eight consciousnesses were each turned into discrete entities! However, each consciousness was not a simple [entity] either; rather, each consciousness was [said to be] constituted by the mind and mental associates (心所). The mind is also called “king” because it is the ruler. Expressed in full, “mental associates” (心所) means all the dharmas of the mind (心所有法) because they are [p. 91]

all of the dharmas of the mind. Mental associates are also called the “helpers and companions” because they are family relatives of the mind. Whereas the mind is only one, mental associates are many. Visual consciousness, for example, seems to be independent, but in reality it is a composite entity made up of the mind and numerous mental associates. It is definitely not a simple [entity], and it is said to be independent only in relation to the auditory and other consciousnesses. Just as with the visual consciousness, all the other consciousnesses through to the eighth consciousness or ālaya-vijñāna are the same. This is because each consciousness is a composite entity consisting of the mind and numerous mental associates. Thus, it is can be understood that to talk of “the eight consciousnesses” is to do so merely on the basis of their being grouped in the same cluster (聚) of eight; Ju 聚 means “to be grouped together in the same cluster-category (類聚).” it does not mean that this is so because the eight consciousnesses are eight simple entities. 46. “One mind” is a key concept in Dasheng qixin lun (The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith). 47. Simple in the sense of not being composite. 48. Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v. “xin wang 心王,” www.buddhism -dict.net: “The overall cognitive function of one’s consciousness, as opposed to the distinctive mental functions which belong to it (called 心所). In the Abhidharmakośa-bhās.ya 倶舍論, only one mind-king is conceived, but the East Asian Yogācāra 法相 posits eight, one for each of the eight consciousnesses.”

Y6693.indb 199

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

200

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

Seeds as Causes Functioning as Conditions Further, I will examine the matter of the Mahāyāna [masters’] positing seeds as “causes functioning as conditions” (因緣). Seeds are causes that function as conditions enabling consciousness to arise. Asan˙ga wrote the Compendium of the Great Vehicle, instructed [his younger brother] Vasubandhu (世親) on it, and elucidated the six characteristics of seeds. The fourth is “determinative” (決定). The seventh is “producing its own fruits” (引自果). Vasubandhu said: “ ‘Determinative’ means that this particular seed leads to a particular determining [effect]. It is not the case that every effect [can] follow from it, that everything is generated from it. The meaning here is that it is not the case that each and every seed is able to generate all dharmas. The seeds that accord with this thing return to generate this thing. The seeds for this thing return to generate this thing; they do not generate that thing—thus [the seeds for this thing are] determinative. ‘Producing its own fruits’ means that something’s own seeds generate (引) only its own fruits. Yin 引 is “to generate.” For example, the seeds of ālaya-vijñāna are able to generate only ālaya-vijñāna The situation for the other consciousnesses can be inferred on this basis. Also, whenever consciousness is being referred to, this includes reference to mental associates. Students should be aware of this. and so forth.” Accordingly, each of the eight cluster-categories of mind and mental associates is generated from its own seeds. Seeds (種子) can also be simplified as zhong 種. Take the cluster-category of visual consciousness. Its mind is generated in accordance with its own seeds, just as the numerous mental associates are each generated in accordance with their own seeds. Just as this is the case with the visual consciousness, the auditory consciousness through to the ālaya-vijñāna are also like this. Thus it can be understood that the eight cluster-categories of mind and mental associates are each discrete entities, Note the word “each.” In the case of the clustercategory of visual consciousness, because its mind has its own seeds, it is an independent entity. Because its numerous mental associates also each have 49. Attributed to Asan˙ga, Mahāyāna-sam . graha-śāstra (She dasheng lun 攝大乘論) is a textbook-like work that outlines the main features of the Yogācāra system in relation to various aspects of Buddhist thought. 50. Vasubandhu, *Mahāyāna-sam . graha-bhās.ya, T31n1597_p0329c06–07; T31n1597_p032 9c10–12.

Y6693.indb 200

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

201

their seeds, they are each independent entities. Just as this is the case with the visual consciousness, the case for the auditory consciousness through to the ālaya-vijñāna can similarly be inferred. and in fact [the Mahāyānasam.graha-śāstra] is not saying that the eight consciousnesses are eight simple entities. Asan˙ga and Vasubandhu through to Dharmapāla, Xuanzang, and Kuiji all maintained this, and none of them altered this view at all. This is indeed an extreme pluralism (多元論), or alternatively it could be called a theory of clustering (集聚論) or mechanistic theory (機械論). Because many independent elements combine with one another, it can be called clustering and so is also mechanistic. Comparing it to non-Buddhist schools in India, it is closest to the thought of the Vaiśes.ika (勝論) school. [p. 92]

Tracing the interpretations established by former teachers, they were based on techniques of breaking down. Thus when they broke down mindconsciousness, the contents were extremely fragmented in order to accommodate multiple seeds. It is just as if a material object was analyzed into atoms, molecules, right down to electrons. Their technique treats the mind as analogous to a [material] object. It is no exaggeration to say that this is misguided conceptual elaboration. In science, the technique of analysis [lit. “breaking down”] is most definitely depended upon as a powerful tool. Even in fundamental wisdom (玄學) it is similarly relied upon to elucidate human relations and to investigate things. Analysis also consists of fine-grained investigation and lucid distinction-making in regard to the obscure complexity of the principles of things and also the norms and aberrations in human relations. However, fundamental wisdom strives to apprehend That Which Holds All (總持 [dhāran.ī]). That Which Holds All refers to the unified whole of the myriad existents. It is a synonym for Fundamental Reality. Given the expectation that [Fundamental Reality] is to be understood with ease and simplicity, then analysis is not the primary undertaking of fundamental wisdom. Why? In all forms of learning, it is through the application of technique that mistakes 51. On this school’s theory of clustering, see the discussion in chapter 2. 52. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in omitting the duplicated characters yi xin ni wu 以心擬物.

Y6693.indb 201

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

202

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

are avoided. If the particular technique [of a domain of learning] is necessarily followed, then, as expected, this will be enough to enable the thorough investigation of a particular matter to be free of error. If it does not lead to this, then the technique cannot be relied upon. [And if one still insisted on following this faulty technique,] the smallest mistake [introduced by this faulty technique] might lead to the gravest of errors. Now, the matter which fundamental wisdom thoroughly investigates is the Reality of the universe. In referring to the term “Reality of the universe,” I am simply following convention. In fact, all [that this amounts to is] revealing one’s own lot (自家本分) and then calling it the Reality of the universe. When Chan monks discussed inherent mind, they often referred to “one’s own lot” (本分事). “Mind” here refers to Reality. This sense has already appeared above. If one releases [the constraints] on “one’s own lot,” it will fill the Six Enclosures; if one rolls it up, it can be concealed in a secret place. “Release [constraints on]” means “to be manifest everywhere.” “To roll up” means “to restrain.” “To restrain” means that there is firmness and vigor within and that it is not dissipated. It is manifest everywhere, and there is nothing greater beyond it. Hence it is said “to fill the Six Enclosures.” If there is constant restraint, there should be constant stillness, and so it is said “to be concealed in a secret place.” “To conceal” means to be profoundly hidden so that no traces remain; to run deep and be of unfathomable use. This is absolute secrecy. Although it has always been absolutely nothing, Nothing is to have no form. Because there is no form, it is hidden in secrecy and impenetrable to sight and hearing. it is not nothing. Here “nothing” means nonexistent. This is to say that it has never had a form, but its reality is not nonexistent. Although it gives rise to the myriad existents, “To fill the Six Enclosures” means everywhere to be the Reality of the myriad things. it does not exist. Everything that has already come to exist is no longer like Reality as it originally is. Reality cannot be seen if it is sought while one is attached to the image of existence. This is because reality is ultimately not part of existence, and so the text says “does not belong to existence.” Hence, dispel both existence and nonexistence; sever names and images at the ford of constant stillness. By realizing Reality and returning to stillness, names and images will both disappear. Roll up or release at will; cease verbal 53. The four cardinal directions, above and below; that is, the universe.

Y6693.indb 202

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

203

distinction-making [upon the realization of that which lies] beyond snares and traps. Having grasped the Reality of rolling up and releasing, then verbal distinction-making [p. 93]

will naturally cease. It is analogous to the situation where once the fish and rabbits have been caught, one forgets about the traps and snares. Are those who have not truly grasped what lies beyond the snares and traps capable of doing this? This must be incisive, personally experienced—only then will [one’s experience] accord with [what lies beyond]. Breaking down begins by distinguishing things because one wants to apply the technique of breaking things down to seek the principle of the First Thing (先物). What is called “Reality” (實體) refers to that by which the myriad things are congealed (凝成); hence it is said “First Thing.” Given that the First Thing is not a thing, why is it sought by means of the technique of distinguishing things? This is like wearing a pair of sunglasses and attempting to see the clear light of the sun. Even the most stupid knows it is impossible. Hence, in order to grasp the singularity of this principle, one must personally experience it. “Principle” here refers to Reality. “Singularity” means absolute. Only then can one rely on breaking down to grasp the particularity of its divisions. “Divisions” means divided [in the sense of individuated] principles (分理) and also carries the sense of rules and so forth. In our daily life, probably all the so-called principles of things and human affairs as found within the universe have rules pertaining to the principles of division. This is what is referred to as being extremely complex yet also unable to be thrown into disarray. Conventionally, it is often said [that some state of affairs] is chaotic and without order. This is simply because the object of cognition changes and runs counter to what emotions and reason have been accustomed to. Actually, rotting grass drooping to the ground does not lack order, and there is a sequential process involved in trees being uprooted by 54. The locus classicus of the fish-trap and rabbit-snare allegory is the “Wai wu 外物” (External Things) chapter of Zhuangzi, 75/26/48. The idea in Zhuangzi is that just as snares and traps are used to catch game, once the game has been caught, one no longer needs the snares and traps, so too with words and what words refer to. 55. That is, individuated or particular principles. This is drawing on the Neo-Confucian notion of “one principle, many individuated manifestations” (理一分殊).

Y6693.indb 203

6/30/15 2:55:51 PM

204

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

wild winds. As for the unbridled discussions of unengaged scholar-officials and the bickering of wives and mothers-in-law, it goes without saying that each will have [their views about] what is the case and what is not the case. There are general dharmas and particular dharmas, Based on the Flower Garland Sutra. and in learning there are unities and categories. Based on Xunzi. With unities, the task is to draw together and maintain, and the way resides in interconnecting as a single whole. Hence unities are concerned with bringing together to the fullest possible extent. With categories, the partial are observed, and the appropriate way [to distinguish categories] lies in difference. Hence categories are concerned with distinguishing things so as to understand what kind they are. The merits of breaking down may in some cases be revealed in difference. However, its shortcoming is presumption, because it leads to the error of partiality. Estimating and surmising are what is meant by presumption.

Personal Realization The supreme merit of understanding through personal experience (體 認) is that one is able mysteriously to intuit (冥契) interconnection as a single whole. One is able to realize this as a function of one’s thinking being sincere. To realize means actually to experience personally. Those [who use the method of breaking down] do not [use the method of] understanding through personal experience, Bu ji 不及 means never having used the method of “understanding through personal experience.” It does not mean that having sought to understand through personal experience, one was unable to realize Reality. and so they presume that Reality does not exist. Philosophers are unaware that there is the method of understanding through personal experience, and so to the end they are unable to grasp Fundamental Reality, with some of them even saying that it does not exist. Why are the universe and human life [like] bubbles and illusions? Some of those engaged in philosophy presume that Fundamental Reality is unable to be grasped, and so they retreat into the investigation of knowledge. Although this is also 56. Alternative terms for general and particular characteristics (相). 57. Avatam . saka-sūtra, T10n0279_p0181c25. 58. “Ru xiao 儒效” (The Achievements of the Ru), Xunzi 荀子, Sibu beiyao ed., 4.13a.

Y6693.indb 204

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

205

a positive reorientation, to the end they do not understand [the need] to escape from the nest of knowledge, seeking instead the path to understanding through personal verification. Thus they stay put investigating knowledge and even deem the pursuit of understanding through personal realization as something to be admonished. Even if their breaking down is intricate and nuanced, and their books and writings are systematic, to the end they are what Wang Yangming criticized as “directionless scholarship.” In former times this phrase was used to admonish students. I have appended it here as a note. Some engage in willful speculation, abandoning themselves to misguided conceptual elaboration When philosophers discuss Fundamental Reality, generally they indulge their own notions, speculating [p. 94]

widely. And although the argument might be eloquent and tightly structured such that it becomes a doctrine, it is even further removed from true principle [=Fundamental Reality]. Nothing can be done for those who spend their days engaged in misguided conceptual elaboration, yet remain impoverished within. Ma Fu (Yifu) of Shaoxing said: “Philosophers do not personally realize Reality but instead speculate and imagine, all the while mired in words and speech. It is like in Huainanzi where the fetus orphaned in the womb, [later on,] out of a sense of ritual propriety, went to the grave [of his or her father] to wail yet never had a father to be emotionally attached to.” This story profoundly illustrates the illness afflicting the philosopher. Those of this ilk are pitiable indeed! One who understands through personal experience lodges the spirit in emptiness and stillness. The spirit is also called the mind. Evil desires do not interfere; hence it is empty and still. Reflecting deeply within one’s mind, there is magnificence within, replete and brilliant. When one reflects, then one sees that there is a replete and brilliant Reality. “Replete” is to be utterly real with nothing lacking. “Brilliant” is to be pure with no defilements. “Magnificence” means to be splendid and great. “Within” describes that it exists but is not relative to “outside.” This Reality has no inner and outer that 59. See, for example, Wang Yangming, Chuan xi lu, 3.7a, where Wang is criticizing Zhu Xi. Wang uses tounao 頭腦 rather than just tou 頭. 60. “Xiu wu xun 修務訓” (Cultivating Effort) chapter of Huainanzi, 19.13b.

Y6693.indb 205

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

206

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

can be distinguished because there is no place that can be pointed to. All that can be said is that it exists and is not empty (空無). It cannot be specified in which part of the body it is located, much less where it is not located outside the body. As such, those who have fettered and destroyed (梏亡) their inherent mind no longer have the means to see for themselves this replete and brilliant Reality. This is why, if one does not trust oneself, one will be incapable of supporting [one’s inherent mind]. This is the revealed expression of Reality; know oneself, realize oneself. “Know oneself, realize oneself ” means knowing oneself without subject and object being able to be divided. At that moment there is no discriminative construction based on mental words (意言). When consciousness gives rise to conceptualization (想 [sam.jñā]), this is words and speech. They are called mental words because it is not necessary for them to be uttered in order for them to be words. “Discriminative construction”: mental words are discriminative constructions. When one knows oneself, realizes oneself, then this does not exist. Things and self both simply disappear; there is separation from all images. Images of self, things, time, space, names, intentional objects, all the way through to all images—they are all removed. In former times, this is what unconditional freedom (懸解) referred to. Xuan jie 懸解 is Zhuangzi’s term. It is the same as saying great liberation. For understanding through personal experience to reach this, beforehand there is also daily renewal through self-cultivation and the discipline honed through tasks. I will not dwell on the details. Because previously I had raised the matter of the error that Yogācāra masters in former times had made by breaking down consciousness, I came to discuss the method of breaking down as not being the primary undertaking of fundamental wisdom and that at the end of the day it is understanding through personal experience that should be accorded recognition as the primary undertaking. Even though my words have seemed to wander, in fact this is not so. For a detailed treatment, you will need to wait for my On Epistemology.

More Criticisms of Dharmapla The crux to Buddhist epistemology (量論) is inner realization (內證). What is referred to as the valid cognition of direct perception (證量). If 61. The locus classicus of the term guwang 梏亡 is the Ox Mountain parable in Mencius 6A.8.

Y6693.indb 206

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

207

I were to call it “understanding through personal experience” (體認), would it be any different? Yet why is it that former Yogācāra masters such as Dharmapāla and others committed themselves exclusively to breaking down? One needs to understand that as scholarship changes, theory becomes increasingly fine-grained. Through accumulated transmission, true meaning is gradually lost sight of. Buddhism is not unique in this regard. The rise of Yogācāra doctrines can be traced to Asan˙ga, and its maturation can be traced to Vasubandhu. [p. 95]

By the time of Dharmapāla it flourished even more so. When it arrived in China, Kuiji confirmed Dharmapāla as the most exalted [master in the tradition]. Such is the broad outline of the transmission of Yogācāra. Originally, discussions of the eight consciousnesses had already started when Mahāyāna first arose; they did not originate with Asan˙ga. However, in his teachings, consciousness and dharmas are of equal standing. For example, in his account of the five aggregates (五蘊 [skandha]), consciousness (識 蘊) and material form (色蘊) are treated as of equal standing. In this account of the eighteen realms (十八界), the six consciousnesses (六識), the six sense faculties (六根), and their six objects (六塵) are treated as of equal standing. He said that, as illusory images, both of them exist, and that their self-natures are absolutely empty. Further, even though consciousnesses and dharmas manifest their images in an ordered fashion, both lack a true selfnature and so are said to be empty. In this way, he made assertions with ingenuity, sweeping them away no sooner than he had made them, never establishing anything and thereby distancing himself from any misguided conceptual elaboration. And even though he further said there are eight consciousnesses, crucially, in characterizing them on the basis of [the notion of] deluded consciousness he [merely] nominally distinguished eight [consciousnesses], In making a characterization on the basis of [the notion of] external appropriation and on inner construction, [he could] nominally talk of the first six consciousnesses. In making a characterization on the basis of 62. The five compositional elements of human existence, the five aggregates [skandha]: material form, sensation, perception, volition/intention, and consciousness. 63. Two of the five aggregates. 64. “The eighteen realms” refers to the six sense faculties, their six objects, and the six consciousnesses.

Y6693.indb 207

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

208

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

[the notion of] a firm attachment to a self, [he could] nominally speak of a seventh consciousness. In making a characterization on the basis of [the notion of] deeply hidden, continuous habituated tendencies that have existed since beginningless time, [he could] nominally speak of an eighth consciousness. and using this was then [able to] counteract (對治) afflictions. Hence, my description of him as ingenious. With Asan˙ga, there was the beginning of a mature account of the eighth consciousness, and he led Vasubandhu to abandon Hīnayāna and enter [the path of] Mahāyāna. This amounted to guiding a beginner, and Vasubandhu was certainly not yet able to discuss matters in great depth. When Vasubandhu composed Lucid Introduction to the One Hundred Dharmas and other treatises, including Thirty Verses, he established [the doctrine of] “the uniqueness of consciousness (唯識),” Because he established consciousness so as to subsume within it the various dharmas—that is, consciousness is referred to as “unique”—so it is called “uniqueness of consciousness.” his thesis being that there are no dharmas separate from consciousness. As a word, wei 唯 serves to highlight consciousness’s uniqueness (殊特). This established consciousness and dharmas as not being empty. The various Mahāyāna masters before Vasubandhu consistently maintained that consciousness and dharmas have no self-nature; that is, they regarded them both to be empty. When Vasubandhu established [the doctrine of] the uniqueness of consciousness, he started having consciousness subsume the various dharmas and so came to look upon the dharma of consciousness as something relatively real. Furthermore, extrapolating on the basis of his account of seeds, since consciousness is generated from seeds, consciousness is therefore a real dharma with self-nature. And although he broke down consciousness into eight cluster-categories just as it had been previously, his account certainly was not [in accord with] the original intention of the former masters. The former masters had established nothing, thus in provisionally dividing [consciousness into eight cluster-categories] so as to counteract [the afflictions of] deluded consciousness, they were blameless. Vasubandhu, however, had established things. In elucidating [the principle] of dependent arising, he championed [the 65. Vasubandhu, Mahāyāna śatadharmā-prakāśamukha-śāstra (Dasheng baifa mingmen lun 大乘百法明門論), translated by Xuanzang.

Y6693.indb 208

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

209

notion that consciousness] is what does the transforming and conditionally produces the universe. He championed [the notion that consciousness] was able to do the transforming. This [thesis] was in order to elucidate the dependent arising of the universe. He divided [consciousness] into [eight separate] cluster-categories for each [consciousness], Divided them into eight cluster-categories. just like a machine. To explain the universe this way is truly inappropriate. Those who uphold a mechanistic theory mistakenly presume that the universe consists of a cluster of numerous particles. This view is that of the conventional attachment to things. Does it really have some glimpse into the truth of the universe? Furthermore, the sense in which he talked of mind included both defiled and pure [seeds]. The unimpeded [quality of mind] certainly has no defined boundaries, so to divide [the mind] is mistaken. To talk of the universe in mechanistic terms is already unacceptable; how much more unacceptable is it to talk about the mind in those terms? Moreover, in regard to Vasubandhu’s dividing the mind into eight cluster-categories, if he had simply treated these as a nominal division based on the deluded consciousness of someone at the defiled stages (染位) [of cultivation], [p. 96]

then there would certainly be nothing to object to. However, what he actually did was to include the pure stage (淨位) in his account. The pure stage is wherein inherent mind is presented (呈露); it is what is referred to as “being absolutely unimpeded; it is devoid of characteristics that resemble 66. This refers to the capacity of the eighth, seventh, and sixth consciousnesses to alter, as first described in Vasubandhu, Trim . śikā, T31n1586_p0060a27–60c02. 67. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0013c08–09, explains that the eighth consciousness has different names: “It may be called ‘mind’ [citta] because it accumulates seeds perfumed by various dharmas.” 68. I take this as a reference to the first of the three stages, bujing wei 不淨位, in the scheme of eighteen stages of cultivation taught in Asan˙ga’s Madhyānta-vibhāga (Zhong bian fenbie lun 中邊分別論; Differentiating the Middle from the Extremes), translated by Paramārtha, T31n1599_p0459c20. 69. I take this as a reference to the sixth stage, qingjing wei 淸淨位, in the scheme of eighteen stages of cultivation taught in Madhyānta-vibhāga, T31n1599_p0459c22. Xiong’s point is that Vasubandhu implied that the view of the division of consciousness into eight was an insight realized by adepts of an advanced level of cultivation.

Y6693.indb 209

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

210

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

anything.” Now, in also dividing consciousness into fragments, he simply never recognized this mind. His greatest mistake was this. Coming to Dharmapāla’s account of seeds, he established both innate and newly perfumed seeds. Dharmapāla established [the doctrine of] innate seeds (本有種) and newly perfumed seeds (新熏種). His “innate seeds” and what I call “productive power” have completely different meanings. His innate seeds are habituated tendencies and should definitely not be called “productive powers.” Refer to the chapter “Productive Power” [chapter 4]. Extrapolating from his account of innate seeds, it seems as if he simply identified deluded consciousness with inherent mind, “Inherent mind” is Fundamental Reality. It is the consciousness where innate seeds arise. Accordingly it should be inherent mind. Why? Because it is innate. One surely could not claim that what is innate is not the inherent mind. It is surely not the case that besides the innate, additionally there is something that the innate takes as Reality? Dharmapāla had originally talked about the deluded consciousness of someone at the defiled stages (染位); later he established [the doctrine of] innate seeds’ being within the deluded consciousness. He thus maintained that deluded consciousness is inherent mind. describing it [inherent mind] as a mixture of defiled and pure seeds. He said that some innate seeds were defiled and some were pure. His perversity is unfathomable. As to his dividing consciousness into eight cluster-categories, he continued the legacy of Vasubandhu and replicated his mistakes. Hence, on examining Dharmapāla’s theses, we know he consistently lacked realization. “Realization” is what I call “understanding through personal experience.” Having never recognized inherent mind himself, he depended solely on the method of breaking down, and in a state of deluded consciousness he indulged discriminatory thought processes, thus becoming so confused that he [identified deluded consciousness with inherent mind]. For the past one thousand years and several centuries, no one has sought to dispute him—is this not strange?

Mind, Thought, and Consciousness The truth is that the mind is an undifferentiated whole. There is, however, no harm in describing it from various aspects and so deriving meaning in accordance with its particularities (分殊) Particularities are different aspects.

Y6693.indb 210

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

211

and so its names will also proliferate. Mind is not different from the nature (心即性也). The nature is a synonym for Fundamental Reality. Because it is the ruler of my body, then in relation to the body it is called the mind. The Great Learning talks of rectifying the mind. Because the mind has been covered over, it is unable to function as the ruler of the body; it is said to be unrectified. Thus, rectifying the mind is how impediments to the mind are removed and the mind returns to what is correct. However, by being embodied in the myriad things, the mind is everywhere. “Being embodied in the myriad things” is the same as saying that it functions everywhere as the Reality of the myriad things. It has never been limited to one body. “Not being limited to one body” means that it exists in me and also in heaven, earth, and the myriad things. Now, in seeking for it within myself, hidden, it constantly has fixed orientation, which, if spoken of as such, is called thought (意). “Hidden”: to be deeply concealed, to be real. The word “constant” is crucial. This fixed orientation is always as such. There is no time when it is not as such. What does fixed orientation refer to? It means developing in such a way that one is constantly in accord with one’s ever-renewing inherent nature (本性) and not willing to be transformed by things. “Ever-renewing inherent [p. 97]

nature,” in short, means that inherent nature is unadulterated vigor and unadulterated purity. Being vigorous, one does not deteriorate; being pure, there are no impediments. “Transformed by things”: if people pursue things and lose their nature, then they sever the principle that enables them to live—this is called “being transformed by things.” Thus, that which has fixed orientation is life force, is solitude itself (獨體). That which Liu Jishan 劉蕺 山 [1578–1645] referred to as solitude itself is nothing other than the fixed 70. “Great Learning” (“Daxue” 大學), Liji, Shisan jing zhushu ed., 60.1b. 71. Late Ming Neo-Confucian thinker Zongzhou 宗周. On duti, see Liu Zongzhou quanji 劉宗周全集 (Complete Works of Liu Zongzhou), 5 vols. (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1997), 2:160. Chung-yi Cheng, “Liu Zongzhou on Self-cultivation,” in Makeham, Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy, p. 339: “Liu follows zhu Xi in interpreting the word ‘solitude’ as not only the state when one is physically alone but also the state when one is mentally alone, that is, the state of one’s innermost being which is known only to oneself. In addition, Liu emphasized that this innermost being

Y6693.indb 211

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

212

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

orientation of yi 意 (thought). In talking about “vigilance in solitude” (慎 獨), Great Learning says that one must be vigilant with respect to this and not conceal it. If one relies on this to establish self-control (我), Wo 我 means to control. This is not the wo in the sense of that which false discrimination is attached to. then even though there are myriad transformations, one resolutely upholds the unity [of everything]; this is what is meant by having control. Here yi 意 (thought) is the yi of cheng yi 誠意 (make one’s thoughts sincere) in Great Learning. Wang Yangming was greatly mistaken in explaining yi to mean “that which is expressed by the mind.” What would be the point of pursuing sincerity if yi has already been expressed? And if one were instead to talk of yi in terms of zhi 志 (intentions), then that too would be wrong. It is precisely this yi with a fixed direction—that is, Reality—that is the basis of zhi. Why then did Great Learning talk of thought (yi) in terms of being sincere? It is because since beginningless time, defiled habituated tendencies have constantly been able to conceal these thoughts and so orientate one in a different direction. We humans have always taken pleasure in the way habituated tendencies conform with subjective bias, and so we constantly obey the habituated mind (習心), regarding the thoughts of our innately endowed fixed orientation to be subtly deceptive and so change the direction they are orientated. This is what is meant by selfdeception. Self-deception is contrary to the reality of thoughts; hence [Great Learning] speaks of “making the thoughts sincere.” “Sincere” means “to be genuine,” and so this is saying only [that one should] seek what is genuine in thoughts. As for the sensing and then connecting, in which cognitive objects are appropriated by relying on the capacities of the sense organs, this is called sensory consciousness (感識). The capacities of the sense organs can also or solitariness is at the core of the moral heart/mind, and that the moral heart/mind thus is nothing but the state or condition of solitude (du ti 獨體).” 72. “Great Learning,” 60.2a. 73. “Great Learning,” 60.2a. 74. Wang Yangming, Chuan xi lu, 1.4b. 75. Cf. Kwong-loi Shun’s following comments made in respect of Zhu Xi’s understanding of cheng yi 誠意: “That yi (thoughts) rather than zhi (intentions) is emphasized in the inner management of the heart/mind is because such inner management should be directed at one’s thoughts as they emerge, before they crystallize into actual intentions and actions.” See his “Zhu Xi’s Moral Psychology,” in Makeham, Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy, p. 190.

Y6693.indb 212

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

213

form the basis for separately naming [the five sensory consciousnesses] as visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, through to tactile consciousness. As for that which, once activated, is continual “Continual” means inexhaustible. and does not rely on the capacities of the sense organs but independently gives rise to appraisal—it is called the sixth consciousness. That which the eyes do not see, the ears do not hear, through to that which the body does not have tactile sense of, the sixth consciousness alone is able to conceptualize and appraise. Conceptualization and appraisal also rely on the material of the past experiences of the sensory consciousnesses. However, given that past sensory consciousnesses have already ceased and that that which the sixth consciousness re-manifests is not the former material of the past but is merely a continuation resembling what was previously so, it is termed “re-manifesting.” When re-manifesting, the sixth consciousness certainly does not need to rely on the capacities of the sense organs. Further, it does not simply re-manifest. The sixth consciousness most certainly is in constant possession of vast, profound, and recondite innovations, such as the precision of logic, as well as all manner of scientific discovery, philosophically creative insight, and so on. And although it does not cease to depend on the material provided by the sensory consciousnesses, the difference in the scope of what it creates, relative to that material, is not something that a few analogies can hope to capture. Hence, the sixth consciousness has the ability to give rise [to creations] by itself—truly a mystery that cannot be understood. Thus, each of the three terms, mind, thought, and consciousness, [Here] the sensory consciousnesses and the sixth consciousness are jointly termed “consciousness.” Together with “mind” and “thought” referred to above, there are three terms altogether. has a [particular] meaning it picks out. The dominant sense of the term “mind” is “a united whole” (統體). In talking about mind, because it is the shared Reality of us humans and the myriad existents, it is said that the dominant sense of the term “mind” is “a whole.” This is not to say that the other two [p. 98]

terms do not have this sense. Rather, only with the term “mind” is this sense established as the focus, and so it is said to be the dominant sense. The dominant sense of the term “thought” is “possessed by each [person].” In talking about thought, the reference is to the mind as it exists in individual people;

Y6693.indb 213

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

214

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

hence it is said that the dominant sense of the term “thought” is “possessed by each [person].” However, it is not the case that consciousness lacks this sense. Rather, only with the term “thought” is this sense established as the focus, and so it is said to be the dominant sense. As for the term “consciousness,” it was established so as to discern cognitive objects. Both the sensory consciousnesses and the sixth consciousness get the name “consciousness” from discerning the characteristics of cognitive objects. Whereas the sensory consciousnesses discern only external cognitive objects, the sixth consciousness discerns internal and external cognitive objects. Internal cognitive objects are the product of cognitive construction. [Mind, thought, and consciousness] have never had a differing Reality; they just differ in name. “Differing” means not the same. Thus, given the difficulty of plumbing the depths of this mind’s profundity, in fathoming its meaning, one cannot be attached to a limited perspective. As for those former masters, they divided [the mind] into discrete entities such that the mind is like an accumulation of loose sand—how ridiculous! Note: The two terms, “mind” and “thought,” refer directly to, and name, Reality. They must be represented separately if their meanings are not to be confused. The term “consciousness” “Consciousness” includes both the sensory and the sixth. is but a different expression for “function” (作用). Suppose it was further asked, “What is function?” This should be answered as follows: “ ‘Function’: in talking about the flow of Reality or in describing the manifest expression of Reality, this is nominally said to be ‘function.’ ” Hence, function is talked about so as to reveal Reality. If it were said that in Reality there separately arises another power that, once arisen, is separate from Reality and is real, and as such begins to be termed “function” (用), then this would be to regard Reality and function as two parts. This is a wrong-headed view. As for the three terms “mind,” “thought,” and “consciousness,” each has its own inherent meaning that, of course, is uniquely determined. In the general course of things, however, the three terms 76. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading shi 識 rather than cheng 誠 on the basis of textual coherence.

Y6693.indb 214

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

215

can be interchanged, For example, “mind” can also be referred to as “consciousness” or as “thought.” or they can be combined to form compound terms. For example, yishi 意識 can also be referred to as xinyi 心意 or xinshi 心識, with no differences in meaning. The Twenty Verses on Nothing but Consciousness says: “ ‘Mind,’ ‘thought,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘cognition’ are but differences in name.” Here “cognition” (了) includes the sense of “discernment.” “Differences” means “not the same.” This is because what is called “mind” is also termed “thought,” “consciousness,” and “discernment.” It is just that the names are different. It is not the case, however, that these names each have a different meaning. This can be picked up in context.

The Sensory Consciousnesses The sensory consciousnesses’ cognizance (緣) of cognitive objects Yuan 緣 means to cognize (緣慮). is nothing but direct perception (現量). It is called direct perception because the characteristics of cognitive objects are apprehended directly. The cognizing consciousness (能緣識) directly apprehends the true aspect (體相) of a cognitive object that is taken as the cause of consciousness (所緣境). This is called “directly apprehending the cognitive object’s characteristics (境相).” For example, when visual consciousness takes the color blue as its cognitive object, consciousness accurately witnesses the characteristic of the color blue just the way it is, obscuring absolutely nothing. There is only witnessing; there is no [p. 99]

discriminative construction. The reason there is no discriminative construction is because it is up to a different consciousness, the sixth consciousness, to explain [subsequently] that “it is blue; it is not ‘not blue’ ” and so on. The words “it is not ‘not blue’ and so on” are used as nouns; that is, they refer 77. Vasubandhu, Vim . śatikā, T31n1590_p0074b27–28. 78. In Fojia mingxiang tongshi, pp. 33, 342, Xiong glosses yuanlü 緣慮 as silü 思慮. 79. One of the ways of knowing (量). 80. Unlike the sixth consciousness, the five sensory consciousness directly cognize particular aspects or characteristics of cognitive objects.

Y6693.indb 215

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

216

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

to red, white, and so forth. This is because [the sensory consciousnesses] merely witness unreflexively. This is because although they are aware, they make no distinctions. At this moment [of direct perception], the cognizing [consciousness] (能緣 [alambaka]) enters that which is mentally grasped (所緣 [ālambana]), with no separation at all, such that the cognizing [consciousness] and that which is mentally grasped are not divided, and they operate as an undifferentiated whole. This is called “directly apprehending the the image of the cognitive object.” Just as visual consciousness takes color as its cognitive object in this manner, so too does auditory consciousness take sound as its cognitive object, and so on through to tactile consciousness’s taking an object of touch as its cognitive object. The situation for all [the other individual sensory consciousnesses] should be extrapolated on this basis. Direct perception is to witness directly and be free of delusion (虛妄). Although ordinary people have [this capacity], they are not free to apply it at will. The direct perception associated with the sensory consciousnesses is possessed by ordinary people, but it is continually thrown into confusion by the chaotic sixth consciousness, with the consequence that ordinary people are unable to maintain [this capacity for] direct perception. Sengzhao said: “Long indeed has there been the confusion brought about by human sentiments. Eyes are directed toward the truth but are unable to awaken to it.” The sensory consciousnesses take real objects, and not nominal dharmas, as their cognitive objects. For example, a blue form is a real object. As for a form having such characteristics as long, short, and so forth, it is called a “nominal dharma.” For example, when visual consciousness takes color as its cognitive object, such characteristics in the color as long, short, and so on are established by the sixth consciousness. Characteristics such as long, short, and so on are apparent only relative to one another. The sixth consciousness’s power to discriminate is strongest, and because it comprehensively takes all dharmas as its cognitive objects, it observes them relative to one another and so discriminatively constructs this as being long or

81. Zhao lun, T45n1858_p0151a28. 82. According to Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0005a13, a nominal dharma is one that lacks dravya (being real and having causal function). 83. Stronger than the five sensory consciousnesses.

Y6693.indb 216

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

217

short. These have never been those which visual consciousness has taken as objects.

The Sixth Consciousness The sixth consciousness, however, always arises in quick succession to [visual consciousness]. Moreover, because [it has formed] habituated tendencies in association [with certain characteristics], it does not rely on making conjectures [about what the cognitive object is]. It is like the way visual consciousness cognizes. The sixth consciousness has always arisen in quick succession to visual consciousness. Moreover, because it has [formed] habituated tendencies in connection with the long, short, and other characteristics it previously took as cognitive objects, these characteristics reappear and so become associated with the sixth consciousness at the present moment. For this reason, in regard to the long, short, and so forth characteristics that are now taken as cognitive objects, the sixth consciousness at the present moment is aware of them without relying on making conjecture. It is like the way visual consciousness discerns with a single glimpse. The sixth consciousness mentally grasps all dharmas. This is what the Compendium of the Great Vehicle refers to in “[The sixth consciousness] has boundless defining activity (行相) and [by discriminating,] it transforms.” However, because the sixth consciousness develops through responding to cognitive objects, it always relies on the sensory consciousnesses as resources [because they] directly grasp the cognitive objects [presented] before them. “The cognitive objects [presented] before them” take their name from the appearance of the perceptual realms manifested before them. Its superior

84. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading yishi yuan yiqie fa 意識緣一切法 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads yishi yiqie fa 意識一切法. 85. The defining activity of the sixth consciousness is discerning (了) cognitive objects. 86. The passage cited is actually in *Asvabhāva’s (d.u.) commentary on Asan˙ga’s Mahāyāna-sam . graha: Commentary on the Compendium of the Great Vehicle (*Mahāyānasam graha-bhās . . ya; 攝大乘論釋), T31n1598_p0403c07: “Accordingly, the sixth consciousness has boundless defining activity and by discriminating, it transforms (分別).”

Y6693.indb 217

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

218

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

application lies in scrutinizing the shared attributes (共相) of cognitive objects and in making judgments on the basis of clear distinction-making. However, because the sixth consciousness is also always responding to cognitive objects, it does not preserve their self-nature. This is because when the sixth consciousness arises, it conveys the image of the cognitive object. For example, when it grasps color and so forth, in consciousness there necessarily appear reflected images (影像; [ pratibimba]) that resemble color and so forth. And even though the ālambana (所緣) [that which is mentally appropriated as the cognitive object] is inherently not an external cognitive object, in consciousness there still appears a reflected image that resembles the ālambana. This kind of reflected image also resembles an external cognitive object and so functions just the same as an “ālambana condition” (所緣緣) [conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects]. On “ālambana condition,” see the chapter titled “Weishi” [chapter 2]. Even in the case of the dharma of nonexistence (無), which gives rise to “nonexistent” understanding, consciousness still manifests an image resembling “nonexistence.” This dharma has never existed but [still] constitutes a cognitive object [p. 100]

within consciousness. Thus it is understood that the sixth consciousness constantly conveys the characteristics of cognitive objects, and that the strong becomes entrapped by perilous images. The mind has always been strong, but, expressed as the sixth consciousness, there is a fear that it will be transformed by things; thus the text talks of being entrapped by perilous images.

Inner Cognitive Objects However, the sixth consciousness functions not only by taking external [objects] as cognitive objects but also by taking inner [objects] as cognitive objects. Taking external [objects] as cognitive objects: [it is so called] because it involves taking external perceptual realms as cognitive objects, or appraising all manner of referent principles (義理). When normative principles are appraised, in consciousness there appears a reflection that 87. This reflection contrasts with it the original form of something.

Y6693.indb 218

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

219

resembles the ālambana. This reflection is also like an external cognitive object. A general account of taking inner [objects] as cognitive objects has two aspects. First, this is because when taking external [objects] as cognitive objects, one is aware of being aware [of them.] [In other words,] it is because just as when one is taking [some] material form as a cognitive object, consciousness itself is aware that it is “aware of the awareness of material form.” “To take as a cognitive object” (緣) is “to take awareness as a cognitive object” (緣知). “Being aware of being aware of material form” is a function of consciousness’s taking external [objects] as cognitive objects. Because at the same time it is also aware this is “being aware of being aware of material form,” this awareness is a function of consciousness’s taking inner [objects] as cognitive objects. The second aspect is in the complete absence of taking external [objects] as cognitive objects because one has direct gnosis (冥) of self-nature. Self-nature refers to Reality. “Gnosis” means profound realization. “Direct gnosis” means inwardly to perceive self-nature so that one knows oneself and sees oneself. This is referred to as inner realization independent of words. In this case, that which realizes is that which is realized; indeed, there is no “that which [realizes]” and “that which [is realized]” that can be distinguished. Whether spoken of as “investigating consciousness” or as “perceiving and reflecting,” both refer to the function of taking inner [objects] as cognitive objects. Because the power of taking inner [objects] as cognitive objects is profound, the cognitive objects that are discerned are nothing but mind, and there is no pursuit of [external] cognitive objects. Things are encountered as oneself, [and so] there is no attachment to things. Thereupon, the illuminating body (照體) is independent, completely separated from sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch (諸塵). Even when in a perilous [situation, one] is able to come out [unharmed]. Once the fundamental has been grasped, then distinctions present no impediments. [Although one] knows all dharmas, [one] does not remain [attached to] a single one; [even though one] makes all [differentiated] characteristics disappear, [one] does not reject

88. It is this awareness that functions as an inner cognitive object, as Xiong proceeds to explain. 89. That is, there is no subject and object distinction. 90. Does not rely on anything, and like a lamp it illuminates itself.

Y6693.indb 219

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

220

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

[differentiated] characteristics. This sort of knowledge (慧) is termed “true knowledge,” which [when applied] to the whole (全體) is wisdom, the wondrous function of which is to flow [and is not separable into parts]. On the distinction between wisdom and knowledge, see the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis” [chapter 1]. Although [dharmas and characteristics] manifest and arise in consciousness, they are nothing to be concerned about. This is because [it is only] when they are grasped that there is delusion; as long as grasping is kept at a distance, then there is truth. Since that which is cognitively grasped (所緣) has been dispatched, the cognizing consciousness (能 緣) will also be empty. Because the cognizing consciousness is empty, the characteristic of emptiness will also be empty; the characteristics of cognitive objects will not arise, [and so consciousness] will be untrammeled and so-of-itself [自然]. This is termed “the transformation of consciousness” or “liberation of consciousness.”

Five States of Mind When consciousness arises by taking a cognitive object, its functions are profuse. However, with the power of [consciousness’s] rapid operation, many thought-instants become subsumed within a single thought-instant, the whole moving forward unimpeded, its incipient tendency unfathomable. [I will now] provide a general account of the “five states of mind [ produced by perception of cognitive objects]” (五心) and roughly demonstrate their characteristics. The first is the mind of first impressions, the second is the actively seeking mind, the third is the determining mind, the fourth is the pure and impure mind, and the fifth is the mind of the flow of sameness. (1) The mind of first impressions is so called because it is [based on] the initial descent into [the realm of] cognitive objects. Consciousness’s first encounter with cognitive objects is called “descent.” This lasts for merely an instant. This is because at the next instant the actively seeking mind arises. (2) The actively seeking mind: when the mind of first impressions initially [takes a cognitive object] as its object, it does not yet understand what that 91. Where there is no division of subject and object. 92. That is, the proposition that “the characteristic of all things is emptiness” will itself become empty. 93. Based on Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0231a13–231b03.

Y6693.indb 220

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

221

cognitive object is, and so in order to understand, the actively seeking mind next arises in the hope (欲) of [occurring] together with recollection (念). Yu 欲 means to hope, because [this mind] hopes to make determinations about cognitive objects. Nian (念) is recollection. The past is recalled to serve as a comparative measure for currently manifest cognitive objects. If [a cognitive object]

[p. 101] is still difficult to understand, the actively seeking mind again arises. Hence the actively seeking mind is the interconnection of many memories. “Connecting many memories”: a previous memory is [the function of] an actively seeking mind; the following memory arises resembling the previous instance of mind but is another [instance of] an actively seeking mind. “Connecting many memories” does not mean that “many memories” always refers to the previous instances of mind. (3) Next arises the determining mind, because an interpretation is affirmed. The determining mind arises after the actively seeking mind. (4) The pure and impure mind: once determination has been made, differences in the perceptual realms are discerned, some of which lead to pleasurable feelings and some of which lead to painful feelings. These [respectively] constitute the pure and impure mind. Pleasurable feelings without anger are “pure”; painful feelings giving rise to anger are “impure.” (5) The mind of the flow of sameness: because the pure and impure mind has already been activated, the next memory arises by resembling the previous memory; hence this is termed “flow of sameness.” “Flow of sameness” refers to the flowing succession of resemblance. In this flow of sameness there is the capacity for many memories to arise. For the meaning of “many memories arise,” see my comments in (2), the actively seeking mind. Capacity varies and so there are [occasions] where in the flow of sameness no next memory arises, and instead there is a different cognitive object that is first taken up. Hence the use of the term “capacity.”

I will try using an example to elucidate the above account of the “five states of mind.” It is like when one hears the four sounds zhu xing wu chang 諸行無常 [dharmas are impermanent]. Each of the four words is a sound. When the sixth consciousness and the auditory consciousness reach the 94. One of the five object-specific mental associates discussed in the following chapter. 95. Rather it is the succession of previous and immediately following instances of mind that characterizes the “connecting of many memories.” 96. The word zhu 諸 simply functions as a pluralizer so as to make it clear that xing 行 is plural, not singular.

Y6693.indb 221

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

222

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

sound zhu, they begin taking up [this sound as] a cognitive object. This is termed “first impressions.” Once the mind of first impressions has [occurred], necessarily there is an actively seeking [mind] that arises continuing after the initial mind. The actively seeking mind is without end, constantly seeking, because it has not determined what zhu refers to. It does not know what it is that the word zhu refers to. Having taken the word zhu as a cognitive object and then arriving at the actively seeking [mind’s] being activated, suddenly the sound xing arrives. The mind of first impressions arises once again in relation to the word xing, as does the actively seeking mind as well as the determining mind. This is because the determining mind has understood zhu to refer to all xing. Although the word zhu has already been extinguished when the word xing is taken as a cognitive object, through the connection to perfuming (熏習), interpretations of zhu are still generated. “Perfuming” is another term for habituated tendencies. Although the mind [which arose by] taking zhu as a cognitive object has ceased, residual power continues uninterrupted, and it is called either perfuming or habituated tendencies. Hence the following [instant of] mind accommodates the habituated tendency of the preceding [instant of] mind’s taking the word zhu as a cognitive object. By connecting it with the current [instant of] mind’s taking the word zhu as a cognitive object, the interpretations [of zhu] are able to be generated. Having taken the word xing as a cognitive object and then arriving at the determining [mind’s] being activated, the sound wu suddenly appears. The mind of first impressions arises once again in relation to the word wu, as does the actively seeking mind, which seeks [to understand] what it is that dharmas (zhu xing) lack (wu). It is so as to speak of no-self; so as to speak of impermanence. Although both the words zhu and xing have ceased, when the word wu is taken as a cognitive object, there [still] is the connection to perfuming, just as described above. Having taken the word wu as a cognitive object and then arriving at the actively seeking [mind’s] being activated, suddenly the sound chang arrives. The mind of first impressions, the actively seeking mind, and the determining mind, as well as the mind of the flow of sameness, arise once again in relation to the word chang. It is the mind of first impressions that initiates the taking of chang as a cognitive object. Just when chang is being taken as

Y6693.indb 222

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

223

a cognitive object, even though the words zhu, xing, and wu that precede it once again cease, [p. 102]

because they have [a connection to] perfuming, when the mind arises that takes chang as a cognitive object, due to the power of memory, many words perfumed in the past The word “many” refers to zhu, xing, wu, and such words. have an [ongoing] connection with current words. “Current words” refers to the taking of the word chang as a cognitive object at the present [moment]. In an instant, the accumulation [of words] is made manifest. Thus, after [the mind of] first impressions, there arises the actively seeking [mind]. Is it the case that that which the dharmas lack (諸行所無) should be permanence? Once again, the determining [mind] arises to affirm that it is a lack of permanence. The determining mind having already arisen, then just at that moment, the pure and impure [mind] and the mind of the flow of sameness operate successively. Accordingly, when chang is taken as a cognitive object, the five minds are complete. Thus, the four sounds [functioning as] ālambana—from zhu to chang—have been experienced [as the objects of] multiple memories, and the threads that ultimately interconnect affairs collectively form a single memory. What was previously said about subsuming many memories within a single memory is, indeed, as such. Starting with taking zhu as a cognitive object and ending by taking chang as a cognitive object, the mind of first impressions and the other minds each arise anew with each individual word. If the heavenly stems and earthly branches system of measuring time were used to measure the multitude of instances through which these minds had passed, would the measuring stop even after the passage of eons? However, because the mind operates with god-like speed, long kalpas are contained within a single memory. Even those master painters who are able to capture vast distances within the tiny space of a picture and can be said to make the extremely long be contained within the extremely short cannot be compared to the wonders of the mind. 97. The traditional Chinese sexagenary cycle used for calendars. It combines a subcycle of ten (known as the heavenly stems) and a sub-cycle of twelve (known as the earthly branches) to generate a larger cycle of sixty.

Y6693.indb 223

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

224

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

It might be suspected that the power of the mind is always moving forward and does not wait to analyze and observe each single word. Just like when reading a text out aloud, the text is not imitated word by word; rather, so long as it is read in one fell swoop, naturally it can be recited with no mistakes. This is to fail to understand that although the words are recited through the mouth, they are actually rooted in the mind. The issuing of sound [by the voice] is like a machine, [making] it seem as if each word does not pass through the mind, when actually at the very moment they are uttered, the words that are mentally appropriated by the sixth consciousness and visual consciousness necessarily pass through the mind of first impressions and all the other minds. “Other” refers to the actively seeking mind, the determining mind, right through to the mind of the flow of sameness. The same applies in other situations [where different combinations of consciousness are involved]. Even though multiple memories are cognized, [the meaning of the whole string of words] cannot be apprehended if even a single word is overlooked [by the mind]. When consciousness operates, however, the speed at which it functions is inconceivable. Further, due to perfuming’s [ongoing] connection with the ālambana of subsequent memories, the accumulation [of words] leads to the generation of interpretations. Although the way this works is complex, its operation is effortless, hence [making it] seem as if not every word passed through the mind. Strange indeed! This person raised another objection: “Examining what you have said, are you not saying that the mind is to be understood specifically as moving?” I replied: “Nominally the mind is here interpreted using the characteristic of moving, yet actually it both moves and is quiescent, both issues forth and is restrained, both transforms and is constant, both travels and is stationary. Although it travels it is not in pursuit [of anything] When this mind flows, its intact genuineness [is revealed] here and now, and it is devoid of any 98. This is referring to Xiong’s statement made earlier on pp. 101–102 (2001 redaction pagination): “It is the mind of first impressions that initiates the taking of ‘chang’ as a cognitive object. Just when ‘chang’ is being taken as a cognitive object, even though the words ‘zhu,’ ‘xing,’ and ‘wu’ which precede it are once again extinguished, because they [still] have [a connection to] perfuming, when the mind arises which takes ‘chang’ as a cognitive object, due to the power of memory, many words perfumed in the past . . . have a [ongoing] connection with current words. . . . In an instant, the accumulation [of words] is made manifest.”

Y6693.indb 224

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

225

confused, deluded, frenzied pursuit [of things]. and hence is stationary. Although it transforms, it does so with regularity and so is constant. Although it issues forth, it does not disperse Does not scatter. and so is restrained. Although it moves, it does so without disarray and so is quiescent. [p. 103]

It is only because you are mired in words that you suspect that the mind is moving and so lacks quiescence. If you could be led to understand the mind’s ultimate mystery, then you would realize that quiescence is not the repression of movement.”

Mental Associates The foregoing completes the general overview of the mind’s key features. In this overview, the word “mind” (心) is not distinguished as mind, thought, or consciousness—it is merely spoken of as an undifferentiated whole. The sixth consciousness and the sensory consciousnesses are also all called mind. Elsewhere this applies also. In talking about the mind, however, I did not discuss mental associates and so have not yet fully investigated their transformation. Mental associates had already been established by former masters. See above. The term “[mental] associates” ([心] 所) Mental associates are also referred to in abbreviated form as “associates.” refers to their not being the mind but rather to their being possessed by the mind. Mental associates are not identical to the mind but are dharmas associated with the mind. Because they are attached to the mind They are always attached to the mind and not separated from it. they are termed “mental associates.” This describes why they are termed thus. In relation to the mind, mental associates have the two senses of “assisting with the completion of ” and “being associated with.” The function of each has particular strengths. What is “assisting with the completion of ”? The mind does not arise by itself; it must receive assistance from mental associates because only then will it be able to complete tasks. “Complete tasks” refers to the mind’s manifest arising and distinguishing the characteristics of cognitive objects (境相). In the completion of tasks, it must rely upon the support provided by mental associates. In former times it was said that the mental associates were also termed “assistants,” and this is why.

Y6693.indb 225

6/30/15 2:55:52 PM

226

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

What is “being associated with”? Mental associates depend on the mind to arise. They cooperate as one because both take the same cognitive object as cognitive object. However, the defining activity of the mind and of mental associates is different. “Defining activity”: the interpretative images that arise as the mind and mental associates [each appropriate] cognitive objects. The Thirty Verses says: “In regard to ālambana, the mind appropriates only general characteristics (總相). In regard to them, mental associates also appropriate particular characteristics.” “Also” is used because it is in addition to the appropriation of general characteristics. The Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice and other discourses have similar accounts. “Only general [characteristics] are appropriated”: such as when blue is taken as a cognitive object, then only blue is discerned, Blue is a general characteristic. because from blue there do not arise additional differentiated interpretations. “Differentiated interpretations” refers to what below are termed “agreeable,” “disagreeable,” and other such characteristics. “Also appropriate particular characteristics”: it is not only blue that is discerned because additionally “agreeable,” “disagreeable,” and other characteristics are attached to blue. When blue is discerned, if pleasant characteristics are produced, then they are termed “agreeable,” and if unpleasant characteristics are produced, they are termed “disagreeable.” These agreeable and disagreeable characteristics are characteristics of the mental associate [called] “received sensations” (受) since being compatible is a pleasant received [sensation] and being incompatible is a painful received [sensation]. “Other” refers to other mental associates. When blue is discerned, in some cases this gives rise to a fondness for defiled characteristics—that is, to characteristics of the mental associate [called] “craving” (貪). In some cases, this gives rise to 99. Xie 叶 is a variant of the standard xie 協. 100. In chapter 2, Xiong defines defining activities as follows: “ ‘Defining activities’ are the characteristics (相) [that appear] when consciousness actively engages cognitive objects; that is, the characteristics [that occur] when consciousness distinguishes cognitive objects. For example, seeing colors and hearing sound are not the same. These are the different defining activities of consciousness.” 101. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0026c16–17. 102. “Received sensations” is one of the five omnipresent mental associates present in all instances of consciousness. These are discussed in detail in “Explaining the Mind, B.” 103. “Craving” is one of the group of six mental associates called primary afflictions. These are discussed in detail in “Explaining the Mind, B.”

Y6693.indb 226

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

227

characteristics of vigilance—that is, to characteristics of the mental associate [called] “attentiveness” (作意). In some cases, this gives rise to seeking— that is, to characteristics of the mental associate “desire” (欲). The case for other mental associates can be inferred on this basis. According to former accounts, the mind appropriates only general [characteristics], just like a painter who prepares an outline, and the particular characteristics [that lend detail to] the general characteristics are like the students who fill in the outline with color. When blue is taken as a cognitive object, the mind discerns only the general characteristics of blue—this is an outline. When mental associates discern blue, however, they attach agreeable, disagreeable, and other characteristics to the general characteristics—this is [p. 104]

adding color to the outline. This can be deemed to be “drawing analogies from what lies close at hand.” What is the fundamental difference between these two dharmas? Mind and mental associates. This matter was not thoroughly investigated by former masters since even though they talked about differences based on seeds, They said that the mind and mental associates each have their own seeds. the meaning of “seeds” in each case was the same. According to their presumptions, mind has its own seeds and mental associates have their own seeds, and even though the seeds are not shared in common, the meaning of seeds is the same in each case, and so no fundamental differentiation is able to be made. Moreover, just as I have previously argued, it is misguided conceptual elaboration to break down mind into seeds just as one might break down form into atoms. In reality, “since mind is not different from the nature”—the meaning of which I have set out in detail above “The nature” means Reality, and mind is not different from the nature, for the reasons I have already stated.—it is thus understood that the functioning of this mind is [grounded in] the single-rootedness (壹本) that is inherently possessed,

104. “Desire” is one of the five object-specific mental associates. These are discussed in detail in “Explaining the Mind, B.” 105. Analogy based on Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0026c18. 106. Analects 6.30. 107. This refers to the mind’s being grounded in the nature.

Y6693.indb 227

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

228

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

and that which mind resonates and interconnects with is nothing other than what has been endowed by heaven.

Mental Associates, Habituated Tendencies, and Seeds As for mental associates, they are the manifest activity (現行) of habituated tendencies. Xian 現 is to manifest; xing 行 is to flow. They belong to what arises subsequently through human constructs. Mental associates are habituated tendencies, and habituated tendencies exist only after the human form and spirit issue forth; hence it is said, “arises subsequently.” “Human constructs” is the accumulation of all experiences over the course of our life by means of these habituated tendencies. [Habituated tendencies] were not originally innately endowed. They are but a cluster of delusional forces that consolidate and do not disperse. Accordingly they are called “human constructs.” I will further verify [that mental associates belong to what arises through human constructs] with reference to the previously cited example. If [only the] general characteristic of blue is discerned, agreeable and disagreeable [characteristics] are not grasped, then the pure white is not adulterated [with colors], and so this is heavenly endowment. If, however, one were to discern [the particular characteristics of] blue and, moreover, form attachments to agreeable, disagreeable, and such characteristics, then this would be due to the concatenation of habituated tendencies. This suffices to verify that [mental associates belong to what arises through] human constructs. In reality, mind is not different from the nature, whereas mental associates are but habituated tendencies. Their fundamental difference is as starkly clear as this. Because mind is not different from the nature, it is hidden and subtle. Human life is constrained by form-and-vital-stuff. Heavenly endowed nature is often difficult to express; thus it is said “hidden and subtle.” Because mental associates are habituated tendencies, they take control of situations in a coarse fashion. Habituated tendencies begin together with physical form and hence are coarsely manifest. Habituated tendencies become mechanical [in their functioning]; hence it is said “take control of situations.” Receiving 108. That is, the pure white of the paper canvas. 109. As Xiong relates on p. 142, form-and-vital-stuff (形氣) refers to the physical body.

Y6693.indb 228

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

229

the assistance of mental associates, the mind becomes powerful by acting together with mental associates. The mind is inherently subtle, but in receiving the assistance of mental associates, the mind acts together with mental associates such that the subtle becomes manifest. If the mental associates respond to the mind and do not, to any degree, usurp the ruler, The mind is originally the ruler and mental associates are originally the companion, but the companion can easily usurp the ruler and so care must be taken. then the mind will certainly not be different from the nature and all mental associates will be [in accord with] the nature. If, however, defiled mental associates ( 染數) are given unbridled free rein, [and one] becomes a slave to the body and mired in material objects Defiled mental associates are various afflicted mental associates; for details, see the following section. Shu 數 is another name for mental associates. Because there are numerous mental associates, they are also called shu (numerous). such that the mind becomes blocked by them and unable to be manifest, this then will be a situation where habituated tendencies attack the nature. When habituated tendencies attack the nature, the mind cannot be seen, and so the mental associates alone are taken to be the mind. This is what is referred to as deluded mind. Deluded mind is also called deluded consciousness. There is a vast profusion of habituated tendencies; they accumulate, yet do not disperse; profoundly complex, yet they do not become disarrayed. When they [p. 105]

appear, they are called mental associates; when they are concealed, they can also be called seeds. Former [teachers] took seeds to be another name for productive power (功能), but I do not accept this. See the chapter “Productive Power” [chapter 4]. If, however, habituated tendencies are hidden such that they are something we are never aware of, then one may nominally speak of them as seeds. Each of these countless seeds has a constant nature. If they are not counteracted, then they will not be severed, and so they have a constant nature. Seeds each have a cognitive function (緣用) Yuan 緣 means “to think.” Seeds are things that think and differ from matter that lacks thought, but as a feature of seeds, thinking is extremely slight. and, further, each belongs to a [different] category of habituated tendency. This is why there are the different categories of defiled and pure. With their different capacities

Y6693.indb 229

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

230

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

supporting one another, this leads to the formation of many different connections. Further, because these many different connections support one another, naturally they possess a unified form. Because they possess a unified form, it can be understood that they constitute a whole. In the past, that which Mahāyāna teachers referred to as the ālaya-vijñāna and the manas may perhaps have been nominally constructed (假立) by taking habituated tendencies as cognitive objects. Hīnayāna has what it refers to as “subtle consciousness” (xi shi 細識) Xi 細 is profoundly subtle. that is equivalent to this. Today, psychologists have what they refer to as the subconscious. It is even possible that they have some glimpse into the deep source of seeds and so talk about them [in such terms]. When habituated tendencies lie hidden, they are called seeds; when they are actively manifest, they are mental associates. Hidden and manifest are merely a difference of state, not a difference of direct cause and the effect produced (能所). Former teachers said that mental associates are produced from seeds—that is, that hidden seeds are the direct cause (能生因)—and manifest mental associates are the main effects produced. The two dharmas of cause and effect are distinctly different, just as are the grain seeds that produce the grain. This view is confused. Thus it is understood that seeds are not without cognition; it is just that the defining activity [of that cognition] is indistinct. This is what was referred to above as “Seeds each have a cognitive function (緣用).” Former teachers were greatly mistaken in claiming that the image part (相分) of the eighth consciousness lacks cognition and that it is only when the eighth consciousness generates consciousness that there is cognition. In order to understand the reason for this mistake, however, it is necessary to set out the full system of their doctrines, but I have no time to go into the details. 110. Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v. “xi yishi 細意識,” www.buddhism -dict.net: Consciousness of subtle unbroken attention. This consciousness, which was posited by the Sthaviras, is roughly equivalent to that of eka-rasa-skandha 一味蘊 formulated by the Sautrāntikas 輕量部, with both being attempts to account for the continuity of identity of the person in the face of the basic Buddhist principle of no-self, along with the fact that the thinking consciousness is subject to interruptions. Thus it is one of the notions in the history of the development of Buddhist consciousness theory . . . of a fundamental and enduring consciousness that is consummated in the positing of the ālayavijñāna in Yogācāra. 111. Because of their connection with mental associates.

Y6693.indb 230

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, A (明心上)

231

When, however, the part that is manifest as mental associates is compared to that part that is still hidden as seeds, the difference is one merely in degree of manifestation; there is no gap in class (層級). Some presume that because seeds are hidden, it would thus seem that in comparing them to when they are manifest as mental associates, there should be a division in class. This is quite wrong. The defining activities of countless habituated minds Here “habituated minds” is synonymous with habituated tendencies. always naturally spread out evenly. There being no impediments between all of the defining activities, hence it is said that they “spread out evenly.” Due to the needs of real life as well as a bias toward a certain proclivity, the manifest part Mental associates. is especially enhanced and operates together with consciousness. “Operates together with consciousness”: This is because they are associated with the first six consciousnesses. The other part Seeds. [p. 106]

is concealed and not manifest. Thus if consciousness is not examined with precision and rigor, it would be rare indeed to be able to understand just what one’s life-content is like. If defiled seeds increase, the inherent mind daily withers and disappears; that is, the life-content daily withers away, because by stripping away one’s innate principles by which to live (生理) in the pursuit of things, one remains unaware of this to the very end.

Y6693.indb 231

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

8

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

The foregoing account of mental associates as habituated tendencies has elucidated only general characteristics. The above account that mental associates are habituated tendencies elucidated only the general characteristics of habituated tendencies. Now the particular characteristics should be elucidated one by one. It has always been the case that the function of the realm of limitless seeds is strange and unusual. As described above, the name given to habituated tendencies in their hidden [mode] is seeds. Because seeds are limitless, this is termed “the limitless realm.” “Strange” is “odd.” “Unusual” is “uniquely different.” Because the function of the seeds is not consistent, they are described as strange and unusual. Rapidly concealed and then rapidly manifest, their transformations are many and various. Whenever mindfulness (念心) arises, at the same time there are certain to be many seeds with a common connection that arise from concealment to become suddenly manifest, associating with the mind to manifest their various functions. “With a common connection” [is specified] because the various seeds have always possessed many different connections. See the previous chapter. “Various functions”: because they are not the same, they are called “various.” On the basis of these various functions, particular names are distinguished and referred to as individuated mental associate dharmas. As for the particular characteristics of the “numerous,” “Numerous” is an alternative name for mental associates. Subsequent examples follow this usage. the former master Dharmapāla distinguished fifty-one [mental associate] dharmas. This is because he also continued to adopt a long-held

232

Y6693.indb 232

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

233

Mahāyāna view, appropriating that which sufficed to guide one in the practice of contemplation (觀行). “The practice of contemplation” is a term of Buddhist methodology. “Practice” is the advancement of cultivation, approximately equivalent to the meaning of what the Song and Ming ru referred to as gongfu (工夫). “Contemplation” is to examine consciousness within oneself. Because contemplation is practiced, it is called “the practice of contemplation.” He did, however, fault it for being too complex. Now, the old names continue to be used, but [the content] has been slightly simplified through the amalgamation of several mental associates, which are set out as follows. When seeking to comprehend these fifty-one mental associates, we need to regard them as a description of the content of our daily life. The harder one reflects, the more one will feel a genuine closeness to them. If one submits them to a perfunctory understanding, based solely on written accounts, one will feel that they are meaningless. Someone asked: “If judged from the perspective of modern psychology, are the six divisions [of the fifty-one mental associates] in fact appropriate?” I replied: “In the main, these mental associates describe the content of our daily life. Although most of them [are able to] make a contribution to psychology, [p. 107]

they are not concerned with psychology. This needs to be clearly understood.”

FOUR DIVISIONS OF MENTAL ASSOCIATES Former teachers grouped the various mental associates into six divisions. Originally they were called the six grades. Now I reduce them to four [divisions]. The nature [of mental associates] includes both the good and the defiled. [Those mental associates that] always occur together with the mind are called “omnipresent mental associates” (遍行數). “The nature includes both the good and the defiled”: here “the nature” is the nature of “moral nature” (德性), not the nature of “physical nature” (體性). Here “defiled” is 1. The six divisions of mental associates are: omnipresent (遍行), object-specific (五別 境), wholesome (善), primary afflictions (煩惱), secondary afflictions (隨煩惱), and indeterminate (四不定).

Y6693.indb 233

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

234

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

another term for “bad/evil.” Former teachers said that in addition to good and bad, there is the indeterminate (無記). It is called “indeterminate” because it is neither good nor bad. This account is not consistent with reason. The nature of the various mental associates is bad if not good and good if not bad. There are none that are neither good nor bad. The meaning of this warrants a separate discussion. The nature of “omnipresent mental associates” is good and is defiled; hence it is described as “includes both.” If the mind arises together with good mental associates, then the nature will necessarily be good. If the mind arises together with defiled mental associates, then the nature will necessarily be defiled. They always occur together with the mind because they are always associated with the first six consciousnesses. Until such time as consciousness arises, none of these six divisions of mental associates are associated with the mind; hence they are called omnipresent mental associates. The nature [of mental associates] includes both the good and the defiled. Because [there are mental associates that] arise by taking discrete objects as cognitive objects, they are called “object-specific mental associates.” The situation regarding the goodness or badness of these mental associates is just as above. Because the referents (義 [artha]) and cognitive objects (境 [vis.aya]) that are taken as the cause of consciousness mostly differ, [the mental associates that arise] are called “object-specific mental associates.” And because they arise only when specific cognitive objects are taken as cognitive objects, they do not always occur together with the mind. When the nature [of the mental associates] is nothing but defiled, [such mental associates] oppose and block good mental associates such that they do not occur together with them, [and so] they are called defiled mental associates. When the nature [of mental associates] is nothing but good, [such mental associates] are able to counteract the afflictions of defiled mental associates such that they are driven to submission and are severed, [and so] they are called good mental associates. Good mental associates are able to counteract the afflictions of defiled mental associates such that they are driven into submission and do not arise, eventually ceasing. In what follows I will provide a general account 2. This does not mean that they occur independent of mind but that, unlike omnipresent mental associates, they do not operate all the time.

Y6693.indb 234

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

235

of these four divisions. Of the six divisions in the old text, the indeterminate associates have been joined together with the object-specific mental associates, and the primary and derivative afflictions have been joined together and called defiled mental associates. Hence there are only four divisions. Note: In discussing mental associates in this section, although the categories by which they are named broadly follow the accounts of former masters, the interpretation is not necessarily completely consistent. Simply for the sake of brevity, in most cases when the explanations of the former masters are abridged or altered, no note is given. At other times, it is appropriate for a dedicated record to be provided in order to assist with reference.

. SIX OMNIPRESENT MENTAL ASSOCIATES In the account of former teachers, there are only five omnipresent mental associates. In the present account, “desire” from the object-specific mental associates has been added to the original five to make six omnipresent mental associates: contact (觸), attentiveness (作意), received [sensations] (受), desire (欲), conceptualization (想), and volitional impulse (思).

1.1 Contact (觸)  Because there is active pursuit (趣逐) of cognitive objects, it is called contact. Qu 趣 is “to head toward and to appropriate.” Zhu 逐 is “to pursue.” Its referent cognitive objects (境義 [vis.aya-artha]) are of two sorts. First, there are the sense objects (塵境), as when the sensory consciousnesses grasp color and so forth. Second, there are referents (義 [artha]) taken as cognitive objects (境 [vis.aya]), just as when the sixth consciousness independently gives rise to mental constructions, it names the referent principles (義理)

3. The reference is presumably to Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0026c27–29. 4. The mental associate that brings consciousness into contact with external objects. 5. Clearly, Xiong does not include the sixth consciousness as one of this group, although in other contexts this term can be understood to refer to the first six consciousnesses.

Y6693.indb 235

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

236

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

it takes as ālambana (所緣) to be conceptual objects. This is because, just as visual consciousness, for example, is taking up blue and so forth cognitive objects, The sensory consciousnesses can be divided and referred to as visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, right through to tactile consciousness. Details are in the previous section. at the same time it has the power (勢用) to pursue cognitive objects that arise together with [visual] consciousness. [This is the case] right through to [the example] of when the sixth consciousness independently engages in mental construction, because it too [p. 108]

has the corresponding power to pursue and grasp ālambana. When the sixth consciousness thinks about referent principles, it has a kind of power in respect of ālambana qua referent principles and pursues them exclusively. Such a power to pursue is called the mental associate of contact, but it is not identical with the mind. This power to pursue is precisely the manifestation of habituated tendencies such that they associate with the mind; hence it is called the mental associate of contact. Whereas the mind operates of its own accord, “The mind” is another name for consciousness. “Of its own accord” means to operate naturally and to be without purpose. “To operate” is to arise. mental associates (心數) have a purpose. Mental associates are the manifestation of habituated tendencies such that they become appended to, and operate together with, the mind. They arise mechanically, and the mind also makes use of them as a tool; thus mental associates necessarily have a purpose. In the case of the mental associate of contact—which gets its name from its power to pursue—pursuit is a type of purpose. Such is an overall comparison. It began with an account of the mental associate of contact and then revealed major differences between mental associates and the mind. This similarly applies in the following account of the various other mental associates.

1.2 Attentiveness (作意) Because of vigilance over the mind and over the other mental associates, [this mental associate] is called “attentiveness.” “The other mental associates”: the mental associates other than attentiveness that arise together with attentiveness. Because the mind operates of its own accord in regard

Y6693.indb 236

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

237

to ālambana, no calculating is involved. Because attentiveness strenuously operates together with the mind and is vigilant over the mind, the mind’s clarity is enhanced. Because the mind has been alerted, even though there is no calculating on its part, clear discernment of ālambana is necessarily enhanced. Further, with respect to the other mental associates that attentiveness operates together with, For the meaning of “operate” (轉), see above. because this alertness [on the part of attentiveness] is strengthened, attentiveness and the mental associates work together to assist the already formed mind to discern ālambana. Take the example of when one sees a car in the distance—one knows beforehand to avoid its path. This is due to attentiveness’s alerting the mental associate of recollection (念) to recall that this thing had previously injured people. Take further the example of being cognizant of some conceptual principle. Suppose that inference and investigation were required in order to grasp this mental referent. [In such a circumstance] the power of attentiveness would be particularly vigilant about the two mental associates of general investigation (尋) and detailed analysis (伺). This is because when inferring and investigating, there is always an active animating sense that accompanies it. This is attentiveness. Although mental associates function like machines, it is due to attentiveness that they are able to [function] of their own accord. When confusion rages and vigilance is tinged with alarm, clear understanding issues forth. This is precisely what the sutra means when it says “correct attentiveness.” Hence it is due to attentiveness that the mind can ultimately avoid being polluted. This is because the work of keeping alert rests upon attentiveness.

1.3 Received [Sensations] (受)  Because the [particular] characteristics of “agreeable” and “disagreeable” are received from cognitive objects, [this mental associate] is called “received 6. It has no predisposed attitude or agenda in relation to ālambana. 7. Above, Xiong glosses the term as “to arise.” 8. Both of which belong to the category of the five object-specific mental associates. 9. See, for example, Maitreya, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, T30n1579_p0302c28. 10. One of the five omnipresent mental associates. 11. Earlier, Xiong had identified these as particular characteristics associated with the defining activity of mental associates.

Y6693.indb 237

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

238

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

[sensations].” If agreeable characteristics are received, this is a pleasant received [sensation]. If disagreeable characteristics are received, then this is an unpleasant received [sensation]. Agreeable characteristics are pleasant characteristics; disagreeable characteristics are unpleasant characteristics. Although former masters distinguished different degrees [of received sensations], they were essentially far-fetched. In addition to pleasant and unpleasant received [sensations], former doctrines also established [a category of] “indifferent” received [sensations], referring to characteristics that are neither. This is because “indifferent” received [sensations] are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. [p. 109]

“That are neither”: because they are neither agreeable nor disagreeable. This is not logical. Actually, “neither agreeable nor disagreeable” refers to agreeable characteristics when they have receded to a low ebb. Once agreeable received [sensations] have been taken up for quite some time, they no longer feel agreeable. Since, however, there is an absence of disagreeable characteristics, they should be called agreeable, and it should not be said that they “are neither.” Hence the reasoning of the former teachers’ account of “indifferent received [sensations]” cannot be established.

1.4 Desire (欲) Because of a longing for pleasurable cognitive objects, [this mental associate] is called “desire.” Former masters had three explanations of “pleasurable” and so forth. First, with regard to delightful things, because there are the desires to see, hear, feel, and understand, there is longing. That is why on this account there is no desire for detestable things. Second, cravings arise as cognitive objects are either delighted in or detested. Even though delightful things have not yet been attained as one had hoped, the wish not to be apart from them is already there. Even though detestable things have yet to be avoided, the wish to be apart from them is already there. In both cases there is desire. Third, in regard to all things, wherever there is a desire 12. Based on Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0028a22. 13. Based on Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0028a24–26; 28–29.

Y6693.indb 238

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

239

to observe, desire is produced. If there is not a desire to observe, then by accommodating the power of the cognitive object and resigning [oneself] to conditions, there will be no desire. Summarizing these three explanations, neither the first nor the third is omnipresent, whereas according to the second explanation, irrespective of which cognitive objects are taken as a cognitive object, desires are produced. As such, the second explanation is correct. Because the scope of reference it establishes is broad, it should be said that desire functions everywhere. Former masters stated that in the case of neutral cognitive objects, because there is consistently a lack of desire, desire therefore does not function everywhere. This is not logical. This is because in talking of “neutral cognitive objects,” they were referring to cognitive objects that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable. Because they established rejecting and accepting [as a standard for gauging desire], there were “neutral cognitive objects.” This fails to understand that with respect to cognitive objects per se, there is nothing to be deemed agreeable or disagreeable. Delighting in and detesting arise only when sensations are received from cognitive objects. Once delightful cognitive objects have been taken up for some time, delightful characteristics gradually weaken, [leading to the] suspicion that they are not delightful [at all]. Since, however, there is no detesting [that is generated], these characteristics are still classed as “delightful,” and so there are no grounds for describing the cognitive objects as “neither agreeable nor disagreeable.” Here “neutral” refers to cognitive objects that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable. Once delightful cognitive objects have been taken up for some time, delightful characteristics weaken and grow bland. Crucially, it is not the case that desire is completely lacking; thus it should not be claimed that desire does not function everywhere. Someone might further object: “It is a natural human disposition that if having endured something detestable for a long time, and having sought unsuccessfully to be removed from it, then hope diminishes until the desire disappears. Thus considered, desire is surely not omnipresent.” This is to fail to understand that if over a long period people endure something 14. Based on Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0028b01–02. 15. Ones that are neither agreeable nor disagreeable. 16. Xiong is challenging the position espoused in Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun.

Y6693.indb 239

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

240

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

detestable and desire unsuccessfully to be removed from it, then although the desire to be removed from it diminishes until it disappears, desire is never completely absent. Moreover, this desire is necessarily directed toward an alternative object. A thought in the human mind is certainly not limited to taking only one thing as its cognitive object. For example, Zheng Ziyin 鄭子尹 sought refuge in a farmer’s house, staying together with the horses in the stable. [Despite this,] he read his books and was very happy. Confronted with the detestable cognitive object of horse manure, at first he sought to be removed from it. Being unable to do so, however, he never again hoped to be removed from it. Reading books while in this situation provided him with referent principles (義理) as alternative cognitive objects toward which he could direct his desire. It was not a case of there being no hope whatsoever. Human life and hope always occur together. If there is an instant where hope is severed, however, then human life does not issue forth. Hence the argument that desire is not omnipresent is [p. 110]

unable to be established. In the accounts of former masters, desire relies upon effort. Here I have not addressed this matter, and so one should distinguish different kinds of desire. Here I have merely sought to elucidate in general terms [the thesis] that desire is omnipresent and have not sought to go into details.

1.5 Conceptualization (想) Because images derived from cognitive objects are taken up, and all manner of names and words are put in place, [this mental associate] is called “conceptualization.” What is meant by “to take up images”? Because concep17. Zheng Zhen 鄭珍 (1806–1864) was a scholar and poet. In his poem “Zi Zhanyi chu Xuanwei ru Dongchuan 自霑益出宣威入東川” (Departing Zhanyi from Xuanwei and Entering Dongchuan), he describes staying overnight in a small village, sleeping with the horses and getting up in the morning with the pigs. In his Chaojingchao shi chao quanji 巢經巢詩鈔全集 (Complete Collection of Zheng Zhen’s Selected Poems), Zunyi Li shi kan 遵義黎氏刊 ed., (n.p.), 1897. 18. So as to name and describe the images.

Y6693.indb 240

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

241

tualization is extremely acute, it is able to take up distinct images [derived from cognitive objects], such as presuming that this is blue and not not-blue and so forth. What is meant by “putting names and words in place”? Because distinct images are taken up, all manner of names and words are able to arise. If distinct images were not taken up, there would be no differentiation between cognitive objects and names, and words would be unable to arise. Conceptualization forms within and relies on sound vibrations to be expressed without; thus conceptualization is actually names and words before they are verbalized. The Expanded Mahāyāna Treatise on the Five Skandas says: “What is conceptualization? It is being able to strengthen [the capacity] to take up images of cognitive objects. ‘Strengthen [the capacity] to take up’ means ‘to strengthen the ability to take up.’ It is like calling strongmen ‘strong.’ ” Having now carefully examined this matter, because conceptualization is able to take up distinct images derived from cognitive objects, it is said “to strengthen.”

1.6 Creative Impulses (思) Because it causes the mind to create, directing the mind to good or bad, [this mental associate] is called “creative impulses.” What does “cause the mind to create” mean? The mind operates freely. Its marvelous quality lies in its responding to stimulii—it does not create. Because the creative power of creative impulses is strong, it leads the mind to follow. It is solely because the mind is directed by the power of creative impulses that it is unable to rule itself. It follows creative impulses and creates by obeying creative impulses. Accordingly, it is said that creative impulses are able to cause the mind to act together with creative impulses to create. What is meant by “directs the mind to good or bad”? The mind is pure and undefiled, and so it is not called good. In order for the name “good” to be established, there must be defilement; since there is no defilement, then it is not named as “good.” Because the power of good nature’s creative impulses directs the mind, the mind also 19. *Pañca-skandha-prakaran.a-vaibhās.ya (Dasheng guang wu yun lun 大乘廣五蘊論), T31n1613_p0851b20. This work is attributed to Sthiramati, a seventh-century Indian Yogācāra master.

Y6693.indb 241

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

242

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

relies on them to create, thereby revealing the purity of the mind and so jointly contributing to the creation of goodness. “Rely on” means “to depend upon.” “Them” refers to good creative impulses. Because the categories of good creative impulses and [pure] intentions are similar, the mind is able to rely on these creative impulses to manifest its purity. Because the power of the defiled nature’s creative impulses directs the mind, the mind also obeys them when it creates, and so is unable to reveal its purity, thereby jointly contributing to the creation of evil. “Obey” means “to follow.” “Them” refers to defiled creative impulses. Because the categories of defiled creative impulses and [pure] intentions are different, the mind is directed by these creative impulses and so is unable to reveal itself. It is like a master being controlled by a servant, doing whatever the servant wishes, and so jointly contributing to the creation of evil. Thus it is said that creative impulses are able to direct the mind to follow in the tracks of goodness or evil. It should be noted that in the present context, si 思 [creative impulses] means “creation/create” and not “thinking/think.” This distinction should be noted. Because these six mental associates always occur together with the mind, See the note above. they are called omnipresent mental associates. In setting out a sequence for these six mental associates, contact is placed before mental attentiveness because of its exceptionally strong power to pursue [cognitive objects]. Hence contact is discussed first. Since, however, these six are called omnipresent mental associates, it needs to be understood that [in reality] they do not arise sequentially. Further, if these six mental associates were grouped within the psychological categories that correspond with cognition, emotion, and will, [p. 111]

then conceptualization (想) would be included within cognition; received sensations would be included within emotions; and contact, focusing of attention, desire, and volitional impulse would be included within the will. As for specific (別境) etc. mental associates, they too could all be included within cognition, the emotions, or the will. I did, however, see an essay by someone who said that the mental associate of contact is sensation (感覺) and that the mental associate of conceptualization is mental images (意象) or concepts (概念). This is not entirely accurate and should be discussed separately.

Y6693.indb 242

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

243

. OBJECTSPECIFIC MENTAL ASSOCIATES 別境 In the accounts of former masters there were only five categories of object-specific mental associates. Now [I have] rearranged them and settled upon six [object-specific mental associate] dharmas: discernment (慧), general investigation (尋), detailed analysis (伺), uncertainty (疑), verification (解), Included here is superior verification (勝解). and recollection (念). [From the original grouping of five,] desire has been entered into omnipresent mental associates; concentration (定) has been moved into [the grouping of] good mental associates; whereas discovery and scrutiny from the indeterminate (不定) mental associates, together with uncertainty from the primary afflictions (本惑), have been entered into the six object-specific mental associates.

2.1 Discernment (慧) Because making a determination is involved when scrutinizing cognitive objects, this mental associate is called discernment. Discernment arises due to the discrimination of things serving as cognitive objects, Things and matters serve as cognitive objects. but necessarily occurs together with conceptualization (想). Because conceptualization is one of the omnipresent mental associates, as discernment arises it necessarily occurs together with conceptualization. Because distinct images derived from cognitive objects are taken up, If distinct images from cognitive objects are not taken up, then the task of scrutinizing shared attributes (共相) could not be undertaken, so how could determination occur? general investigation (尋) and detailed analysis (伺) also necessarily occur at the same time, because first cursory and then more penetrating inferences are made with respect to cognitive objects. Cursory inference is called “general investigation”; penetrating inference is called “detailed analysis.” Details follow later. Only when deduction has been completed is there certainty, such as the certain knowledge that sound is impermanent. When one initially takes a sound as a cognitive object, one does not yet know if it is permanent or impermanent, and deduction invariably arises. Jars and so forth are produced, and all are impermanent. 20. One of the six main categories of mental functions. 21. Because it is produced by conditions.

Y6693.indb 243

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

244

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

Space is not created, and so it alone [not jars etc.] is permanent. Thereupon there is certain knowledge that sound is created, and hence it is impermanent. Commencing with deduction and proceeding to certainty is given the general term of “making a determination.” Hence, with a single thought in the mind, the making of a determination is completed. Although this actually relies on the method of inference (比量), within the mind there is no need to set out the method of the three-part syllogism (三支法). Here “a single thought” actually includes reference to many thoughts. When a determination has first arisen and become associated with the mind, this is only deduction. It is then necessary for deduction to continue over several thoughts before certainty is attained. Only when certainty has been attained is it called “completeness,” and then by relying on this completeness the preceding and following thoughts are united and called “a single thought.” For details on inference, see Logic (因明). As one’s mastery of the method [of deduction] matures, in the day-to-day taking of cognitive objects as objects of cognition, it always seems that determination is immediate and not achieved by means of deductive inference (比度), when actually this is not so. Further, discernment is concerned merely with discriminating cognitive objects, and so those who depend on discernment are always attached to things and so lose their innate wisdom and have no means by which to realize truth/true principle. Ordinarily the word “truth” refers to: grasping those general principles, laws, and so forth that, in the course of investigating things, have suitable applications for us. In the present context, however, “truth” has a particular meaning; this is because it is a word that implicitly refers to Reality. If one can seek within for “the wisdom that is self-nature”

22. A stock example is: (1) (Thesis) There is fire on the mountain; (2) (Reason) Because there is smoke there; (3) (Example) like a kitchen stove (and not like a lake). 23. Possibly a reference to Xiong’s own Yinming dashu shan zhu 因明大疏刪注 (Abridged Edition of Large Commentary on Introduction to Logic with Notes), pp. 271–272. These notes were based on lectures on Buddhist logic delivered by Xiong at Peking University in 1925. They are notes on Kuiji’s Yinming dashu 因明大疏 (Large Commentary on Introduction to Logic). Kuiji’s Yinming dashu or Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 is a commentary on Nyāyapraveśa (Yinming ru zhengli lun 因明入正理論; Introduction to Logic), an introductory text on Dignāga’s logic, compiled by Śam . karasvāmin (sixth century) and translated by Xuanzang. See Xiong Shili quanji, vol. 1, pp. 269–410.

Y6693.indb 244

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

245

[p. 112]

and hold fast to it Here “the wisdom that is self-nature” has the same meaning as “self-nature is awareness,” as spoken of in the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis.” then purity (貞明) will shine everywhere, involving no deliberation. Even if one were once again to follow conventional distinctions, the boundaries would not exist. This is called “when there is the mysterious merging (玄同) with the nature, the myriad things are all in their proper order.” This is the realm of true wisdom, far removed from petty discernment. For a more detailed account of the meaning of this, one should refer to On Epistemology. Why is discernment not an omnipresent mental associate? According to the accounts of former masters, the unenlightened mind lacks [the capacity] to choose (簡擇). Although discernment is incompatible with wisdom, it can be used to clarify principles and distinguish things, hence [because the unenlightened mind lacks the capacity to choose] it is extremely difficult for [discernment] to be developed. Those who are perverse and obdurate lack the power to choose, Because they lack [the capacity] to choose, people today who crave the despicable, take refuge in the perilous, exploit what is murky, and take delight in that which brings about their demise are all like insects and small beasts. and so discernment is not an omnipresent mental associate.

2.2 General Investigation (尋) Because it is a part of discernment, General investigation is the selection of differing interpretations [from among those formulated] at the first stage of discernment when discernment cursorily deduces images. Accordingly it is said to be “a part of discernment.” and because it operates crudely in the mental-chatter consciousness (意言境), it is called general investigation. “The mental-chatter consciousness”: “mental” is the sixth consciousness. Because verbal expressions are able to arise in the sixth consciousness, it is called “the mental-chatter consciousness.” The cognitive objects that the sixth consciousness takes up are called “cognitive objects of the mentalchatter consciousness.” It is said to “operate crudely” because its deductions are cursory.

Y6693.indb 245

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

246

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

2.3 Detailed Analysis (伺) Because it is a part of discernment This can be understood in the light of investigation (尋). and because it operates with precision in the mentalchatter consciousness, it is called “detailed analysis.” It is said to “operate with precision” because its deductions are penetrating. The common characteristic of general investigation and detailed analysis is deduction. Deduction must proceed from the cursory to the penetrating. The cursory contains a crude plan of the whole, just like making an outline. The penetrating then further investigates the profound and draws out the hidden [so that the result] is accurate and adds interest. It is like filling in colors according to the outline in order to reveal that which charms. Because a following thought-moment of discernment arises in continuation of a preceding thought-moment of discernment, their roles differ and so the cursory and the penetrating are divided. The role of cursory deduction is called general investigation; the role of penetrating deduction is called detailed analysis. Conventionally it is held that the function of deduction is first to observe the parts and then to synthesize the whole. This is not yet to have examined the matter carefully. Actually, the mental associate of discernment is associated with the mind in taking up cognitive objects, and as soon as deduction arises, it is furnished with a plan of the whole. When deduction arises initially, however, this plan of the whole is definitely in [a state of] indistinctness and transformation and is actually gradually tending toward dividing. “Dividing” refers to undertaking a thorough examination of component parts. Continuing to advance, the divisions gradually become distinct, and the plan of the whole also begins to become determinate through the divisions being distinct. “Continuing to advance”: it is not the case that the preceding thought-moment has not ceased and so remains just as it was before, constantly advancing; [p. 113]

this is because as the preceding thought-moment is extinguished, the following discerning thought arises, advancing with uninterrupted continuity. When, however, details are sought about the border divisions, this certainly is still not something [that can be determined] separate from the overall plan. It is just that the overall plan depends on the divisions being distinct

Y6693.indb 246

6/30/15 2:55:53 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

247

before it can be determined. Accordingly, doubt is cast on first observing the parts and then synthesizing the whole. Further, when proceeding from general investigation to detailed analysis, from the cursory to the penetrating—that is, from the overall plan down to detailed analysis of divisions—the function of discernment grows increasingly powerful, constantly using the power of contact to make the mind wily, just like a hunter when in pursuit of something. “Constantly using the power of contact”: “contact” refers to the mental associate of contact. This is because general investigation and detailed analysis also make use of the power of sustained contact. There is something to what former teachers said about general investigation and detailed analysis causing the mind to be anxious. General investigation and detailed analysis both depend on discernment to be established and so are not omnipresent mental associates. This is because discernment is not an omnipresent mental associate, as has been already been stated above.

2.4 Uncertainty (疑) Because of hesitancy with respect to cognitive objects, [this mental associate] is described as “uncertainty.” Former masters maintained that uncertainty was one of the primary afflictions. A detailed account of the primary afflictions is provided later. This is also slightly mistaken. If uncertainty is used with skill, then it is the incipient mark of awakening; if used without skill, it is the beginning of ignorance. The path of principle (理) is inexhaustible. To carry it out but not understand it, to practice it yet fail to examine it, is to be ignorant of its inexhaustibility. “To carry out and to practice”: everything each of the five sense faculties makes contact with, and which is impressed upon the body and mind, is what is carried out and practiced, yet despite this, the wherewithal to identify them one by one is lacking. “Understanding” is clarity of knowledge; “examination” is

24. The pursuit of cognitive objects. 25. Uncertainty (疑), craving (貪), antipathy (瞋), ignorance (癡), pride (慢), and pernicious views (惡見). 26. The absolute; Suchness.

Y6693.indb 247

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

248

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

the essence of consciousness. This is based on Mencius. The application of understanding and investigation, however, often depends upon uncertainty to lead the way. This is because people invariably fail to pay attention to their regular behavior and habits. Benighted, they do not look for solutions when in trouble—this is because they neither understand nor investigate. Further, there are those who are mired in legends Basing themselves on legends, they do not seek truth in facts—this also is neither to understand nor to investigate. and who are satisfied with shallow views. “Shallow views” refers to the inability to seek widely [for explanations] in order to bring together [those explanations] that make sense, and to the inability to experience profoundly so as to realize the incipient. Therefore, this again is neither to understand nor to investigate. Hence, there has never been clear understanding or detailed awareness of how one’s behavior and habits should be, and how they come to be as they are. Suddenly, uncertainty ponders what purpose one’s actions and habits serve. That which was never noticed before is now subjected to intense calculation. When uncertainty arises, it invariably performs all sorts of calculation. There is now a fundamental wavering [of trust] in those legends previously believed in, just as there is now a sudden awakening that the narrow views previously upheld were pure ignorance. Being discontented with oneself, one seeks the reason. Once the beginnings of uncertainty have arisen, then one is unable to stop [oneself from finding an explanation]. Through deepening, thinking becomes more penetrating by the day; and through being dissipated, vexations resolve themselves. As such, the many uncertainties can subsequently be made to disappear, and general investigation and detailed analysis can be anticipated. Hence it is said: “Being skilled at uncertainty is the incipient mark of awakening! The truly valuable thing about uncertainty [p. 114]

is that it can lead to awakening. If, however, one were to regard uncertainty as an accomplishment, and be unwilling to make any decisions based on 27. Mencius 7A.5: “To carry something out yet not understand it; to do so habitually yet fail to examine into it; and to follow it till the end of one’s days without understanding its way—such are the mass of people.”

Y6693.indb 248

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

249

examination, then to the end, one would cut oneself off from access to the door of truth. It must be understood that as uncertain thoughts grow, all manner of things become objects of calculation, which only adds to confusion. The difficulty besetting the thorough investigation of principle (窮 理), however, is that in seeking for proof among actual things, it is difficult to speak of the transcendent (上). “The transcendent” refers to the ultimate reach of principle. If it is sought by means of limited experience in the physical world, then this will have no bearing on it. If one were to purposefully seek to “wander in the profound” (游玄), then one’s thinking would grow vacuous. If, however, one were to understand that such seeking is excessively harmful, and one does not lightly stop one’s uncertainties, then as the inclination to uncertainty persists over time, one’s mental powers will grow more precise and avoid becoming snared in complications, and entrenched attachments will of themselves dissolve. Truth has always been self-evident; the concern is simply that one might be incapable of personally experiencing it with an empty mind. The two words “empty mind” are crucial. Only when the many biases and disturbances of deluded consciousness (情識) fall away entirely is this an empty mind. If uncertainty is excessive, then one will constantly be burdened by obstructions [in one’s mind], forming an impediment at every step—how then could one gain truth? Master Zhou said: “In the absence of clarity, uncertainty is generated; in clarity there is no uncertainty. This says that if one were to take the capacity to be uncertain as being the capacity to gain clarity, what limits would there be [to the uncertainty]?” This was said for the sake of those who are excessively uncertain, and indeed is good medicine. Thus it is said, “Unskilled uncertainty is the beginning of benightedness.” Although uncertainty can be carried out to excess, in the course of everyday life there is no need for uncertainty to arise with each and every thought. It is for this reason that uncertainty is not one of the omnipresent mental associates. Excessive uncertainty may be said to be confusion, but skilled uncertainty is the means to awakening. Former masters said that uncertainty belongs [to the category of mental associates called] primary afflictions—yet this is not entirely appropriate. Hence I have 28. Zhou Dunyi, “Tong shu 通書” (Penetrating the Book of Change), Zhou Lianxi ji 周濂溪集 (Collected Writings of Zhou Lianxi) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), 6.109. The original text does not have neng 能 before ming 明.

Y6693.indb 249

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

250

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

entered uncertainty among the object-specific mental associates. Objectspecific mental associates include both the good and the defiled.

2.5 Verification (勝解) Because the determination of cognitive objects is affirmed (印持), Yin 印 means “to verify”; chi 持 means “to uphold.” and because [this determination] cannot be swayed, this mental associate is called verification. Because the mental associate of verification is associated with the mind, This is saying that verification associates with the mind to take up cognitive objects. when the cognitive objects that serve as ālambana have been determined on the basis of examination, then there is affirmation that this matter is as such and not the case that it is not as such. Although it is said that it is only with the determination of cognitive objects that there is affirmation, this affirmation occurs simultaneously with determination. That is, precisely at this moment of affirmation, other ālambana are unable to exercise sway that would cause confusion (疑惑) separately occurring within this thought-moment. The import of “Other ālambana are unable to exercise sway etc.” is restricted to that particular thought-moment and does not restrict a preceding and following thought-moment from being compared. Thus even though a preceding thought-moment made a determination about a cognitive object and affirmed that determination, at the time of that thought-moment it is certainly not the case that other ālambana were able to exercise sway. By the time the following thought-moment occurs, however, [it might] suddenly feel that the preceding thought was in error, and so there is a new determination and affirmation. Hence it is only in connection with the determination of cognitive objects that verification is able to be as such. “The determination of cognitive objects.” It is following [a particular] means of knowing (能量) that is called “determination.” It is not only what is apprehended through direct perception and inference that determines cognitive objects; what is apprehended through mistaken perception also determines cognitive ob-

29. Given Xiong’s explicit reclassification of uncertainty as an individual mental associate (rather than continuing to identify it as one of the six primary afflictions), it seems likely that yihuo 疑惑 here means “confusion” rather than “the affliction of [the mental associate] uncertainty.”

Y6693.indb 250

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

251

jects. If someone sees a length of rope and says it is a snake, this semblance is a product of a cognitive object’s being apprehended by mistaken perception (非量). Such a cognitive object [p. 115]

has never been real, but at the time the knowing agent did indeed determine the cognitive object to be a snake. This was not because the knowing agent did not make a determination about the cognitive object on the basis of investigation; rather it was because there was no uncertainty. Thus, this cognitive object was named and determined in accord with the means of knowing. It is like deducing that because of rain upstream the stream is murky, when in fact the murky stream had other causes, and there had been no rain in the upper reaches. Here “rain” is analogous to the cognitive object apprehended by mistaken perception. Although that object was never real, at the time the knowing agent did indeed determine the cognitive object to be rain [from the upper reaches]. It is not because [the knowing agent] did not make a determination about the cognitive object on the basis of investigation; rather it is because there was no uncertainty. Thus, this cognitive object was also named and determined in accord with the [particular] means of knowing. In a hesitant mind no verification occurs at all. When an uncertain mind arises, there is a complete lack of verification occurring at the same time. And if it is not a mind that makes a determination on the basis of investigation, then there will be no verification either. “If it is not a mind that makes a determination on the basis of investigation” is so termed because it refers to the mind’s not making a determination of cognitive objects on the basis of investigation. Such a mind is also not different from mistaken perception. In conventional accounts about mistaken perception, there are some who only raise its similarity to direct perception and to inference. Actually, in being similar to direct perception and to inference, [the issue of semblance arises] not in respect of deductions not being made about cognitive objects but in respect of their not matching reality. This is what is called mistaken perception/inference. Then there is “pure false-perception” (純為 非量). This is when the unrestrained mind actually makes no deductions about ālambana generally, hence what is termed “not a mind that makes a 30. On the unrestrained mind, see the earlier discussion in New Treatise, pp. 16–17.

Y6693.indb 251

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

252

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

determination on the basis of investigation.” Accordingly, verification is not an omnipresent mental associate.

2.6 Recollection (念) Because it causes the mind to remember clearly and not forget those cognitive objects with which one was previously familiar, this mental associate is called “recollection.” Recollection relies upon a preceding thoughtmoment of conceptualization (想). Conceptualization refers to the mental associate of conceptualization. See above. Being associated with the mind, conceptualization takes up images from cognitive objects. Even though a given thought-moment ceases, there are still habituated tendencies lying hidden in which there is a continuity of sameness (等流). “Continuity of sameness”: “sameness” means “to resemble.” The residual power of conceptualization is called a habituated tendency. This habituated tendency is itself fundamentally [nothing but] instantaneous arising and ceasing. Because of the similarity between a preceding habituated tendency and a following habituated tendency, they continuously flow. Hence this is called “continuity of sameness.” It is only because the images of the cognitive objects taken as the cause of consciousness (所緣境像) rely upon the habituated tendencies of conceptualization that [these images] are able to have a latent existence. Once conceptualization has taken up images derived from cognitive objects, even though it has already ceased, its residual habituated tendencies still exist, and so the images of the cognitive objects also rely upon the habituated tendencies of conceptualization in order to have a latent existence. When there is recollection at the present moment of time, then there is a reappearance [of the matter recollected]. If it were not for the latent existence of the habituated tendencies of conceptualization, then how could images of cognitive objects that had already ceased in the past appear in recollection? It is, however, also the case that recollection arises by means of the power of vigilance. “Vigilance” is the mental associate of attentiveness. See above. Because the alertness previously experienced is not lost, there is recall and bearing in mind. Because recollection is able to recall what was previously experienced, it can infer the future on the basis of the past and so avoid the sufferings of ignorance. If there were no recollection, then one would be un-

Y6693.indb 252

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

253

able to make inferences about what is not yet known on the basis of what is already known, and human life would simply be cloaked in ignorance. Why is recollection not an omnipresent mental associate? Because it does not give rise to recollections of matters it has not previously experienced. Further, for those matters it has previously experienced but is unable to remember clearly, recollections are not produced. It is for this reason that recollection is not an omnipresent mental associate. Someone raised the following objection: “As to the matter of when one is unable to remember clearly those matters previously experienced, ‘no recollection’ refers simply to one’s having forgotten certain matters about what had been previously experienced. It is not the case that at this time [of recollection] the mind lacks additional [recollections]. “Additional” means “other [recollections]”. For example, if I cannot recall that in the past I had read History of the Han Dynasty (Han shu), [p. 116]

then in relation to the History of the Han Dynasty, this would be called forgetting. As this moment, however, spontaneously, my mind fully apprehends that there is a low table and so forth before me. Because I have previously experienced the low table and so forth, they do not lead to any unusual feelings. Now, with them [before me] recollection occurs spontaneously, and so I do not feel that they are unusual. Accordingly, even though there are occasions when one does not recall what has previously been experienced, Such as with the History of the Han Dynasty. it nevertheless remains the case that one is not completely without recollections at this moment.” Such as the low table and so forth. Subjecting this objection to examination, it actually fails to accord with the meaning of recollection and makes criticisms on the basis of mistaken characteristics. It must be understood that recollection has always derived its name on the basis of clear memory. Recollections arise when things previously experienced are vigilantly held on to and there are clear memories. These clear memories do not arise spontaneously—it is necessary for vigilance to provide particular support before they begin to be clearly apprehended. “To provide support” means “to assist.” What you say about “recollection occurs spontaneously” is not actually recollection; rather, what you

Y6693.indb 253

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

254

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

describe are those parts of the habituated tendencies of previous conceptualizations that have adapted to the needs of everyday life. On the habituated tendencies of conceptualization, see above. Because they [arise] freely and their operation is hidden, they do not occur together with the sixth consciousness in the appropriation of cognitive objects. They are “free” because they arise spontaneously and not due to vigilance. “Their operation is hidden” because these habituated tendencies of conceptualization still belong to the hidden part. And even though you say that the low table and so forth before you are spontaneously known, given that you state that this is spontaneous and involves no calculation or discrimination, then what you mean by “knowing” is extremely vague. In the previous chapter I talked about how habituated tendencies’ being hidden was called seeds and only when they are actively manifest are they called mental associates. These habituated tendencies of conceptualization also belong to the seed state; one might even describe them as semi-manifest seeds, although it would be unacceptable to describe them as mental associates. By and large, in the course of our daily lives, our responding to cognitive objects is a function of the hidden power of seeds, which is to say it is a power of which we are unaware. This type of power never occurs together with the clearly discerning sixth consciousness in the appropriation of cognitive objects and so is not called a mental associate. This is completely different from clear memories, and they cannot be talked about as if they were the same. Hence, what you said about the low table and so forth before you being spontaneously and fully apprehended still belongs to seed characteristics. This says that these are seed characteristics. This is because the hidden operation of the habituated tendencies of previous conceptualizations is called seeds. Necessarily, it is only when one reflects about the History of the Han Dynasty and, as expected, clearly remembers it that this is called recollection. If, however, one is unable to remember the History of the Han Dynasty just at the moment one reflects about it, this means that this recollection does not exist within the mind. Here “mind” refers specifically to a clear sixth consciousness. Thus it is manifestly apparent that recollection is not an omnipresent mental associate. 31. That is, seeds. 32. New Treatise, p. 106: “When habituated tendencies lie hidden, they are called seeds; when they are actively manifest, they are mental associates.”

Y6693.indb 254

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

255

The above six mental associates take as their cognitive objects specific cognitive objects and hence are termed “object-specific mental associates.”

. DEFILED MENTAL ASSOCIATES 染數 Former masters distinguished primary afflictions and secondary afflictions (煩惱 [kleśā]). Cheng weishi lun shuji, juan 1, says: “ ‘Troubled’ (煩) means ‘disturbed’; ‘vexed’ (惱) means ‘perturbed.’ ” Because a mind is disturbed and perturbed, it is termed “afflicted.” Because the secondary afflictions arise on the basis of the primary afflictions, [p. 117]

they are called “secondary.” They are also called “fundamental mental disturbances” and “secondary mental disturbances.” All the mental associates of affliction are collectively termed “mental disturbances.” This point really should be reflected upon. Zhuangzi said: “Is human life indeed so muddled?” Muddled also means disturbed. In Fu Manrong’s 伏曼容 explanation of the Decay (蠱) hexagram, he wrote: “All matters arise from disturbance.” Both comments are the product of deep insight. I will now treat them as a single category called “defiled mental associates.” Previous masters had divided primary and secondary into two levels—that is, two categories. This had not actually been examined with enough precision, and so I will group them together.

3.1 Primary Afflictions (本惑) Former teachers said that there are six primary afflictions. Because I have entered uncertainty (疑) into the individual mental associates, there 33. The six primary afflictions are listed below. 34. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0235c02. 35. “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” Zhuangzi, 4/2/20. 36. Fu Manrong 伏曼容 (421–502) was a scholar who worked as an official during the Liu Song, Southern Qi, and Liang dynasties. See Li Dingzuo 李鼎祚 (Tang, dates unknown), Zhouyi jijie 周易集解 (Collected Explanations of the Book of Change) (Beijing: Beijing shi Zhongguo shudian, 1984), 5.3b. 37. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0031b17–18.

Y6693.indb 255

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

256

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

are now five that remain: craving (貪), antipathy (瞋), ignorance (癡), pride (慢), and pernicious views (惡見). 3.1.1 The Mental Associate of Craving (貪)

Because yearning for cognitive objects arises, and because of deep contamination, Deeply contaminated by cognitive objects. it is called “craving.” The characteristics of craving are endless. They appear everywhere and so are difficult to exhaust. In a brief account of the main ones, I distinguish eight kinds. The first is called “cravings concerning one’s own body” (自體). Here ziti 自體 is synonymous with “body.” This is because one cherishes one’s body and conceals it to protect it. This kind of craving is very difficult to describe; “cherish and conceal to protect” is a forced description of its character. It is a human condition to cherish to the utmost one’s own body exclusively, yet one cannot explain to oneself why. It is also a human condition to conceal meticulously one’s own body to protect it exclusively, yet no one is willing to provide the slightest explanation. And it is not only humans—lower-order animals are especially so. In the Wanshoushan garden [of the Summer Palace] in Peking I once saw bark—more than two inches thick—on a tree move very quickly. Suddenly alarmed, I said: “Since the bark has become detached from the tree, how is it able to adhere to the tree and move without falling off?” Slowly I picked it up and observed it. Clearly it was a large piece of bark, and when I broke it open to look, sure enough, there was an insect inside. I did not know the name of this insect, but I sighed deeply at how keenly this insect cherished its body and concealed it to protect it. In biology, there have been many discoveries like this. Second is the craving for a future existence. [It is so called] because it refers to the desire for endless continued existence. This craving is a separate development emanating from cravings concerning one’s own body. Someone might ask: “Ordinary people who are nihilists know that they will cease once they die, and so it would seem appropriate that there is nothing worth craving for after death.” I would reply: “No, no. The power of yearning is not something that nihilism can change. Because yearning nourishes life, there is life.” People have life because the power of yearning nourishes life. 38. This is based on Maitreya, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, T30n1579_p0605a01.

Y6693.indb 256

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

257

The Śūram . gama-sūtra has an extremely penetrating discussion of this. You clearly understand that you shall extinguish in the future, yet despite this you still have strong cravings for living. It is thus obvious that the power of yearnings is not something nihilism can change. In future you will have yearnings—they do not disappear, as the nihilists would have it—because your life as it was yesterday has passed, your life today now already exists, and just as today’s life ceases, tomorrow’s life just comes into existence. Thus, how could one doubt that having future cravings is something innate in sentient beings? Third is the craving to have descendants. [It is so called] because it refers to the desire to have one’s seeds passed on without interruption. From plants to humans, everywhere there is proof of this. [p. 118]

Fourth is the craving for sex. [It is so called] because it refers to taking pleasure in lascivious desires. As evidenced by novels, odes, and songs, there is almost nowhere sexual desire is not manifest. Deep concern for the country is also given expression through [the literary device of] beauties and fragrant grasses. And when emotions are expressed through literary means, there is also extravagant talk about immortal ladies. Fifth is craving for supports for living. [It is so called] because it refers to taking pleasure in all types of supports for living. “Supports for living” is the general term for the food and drink of our daily lives, fields and dwellings, goods, servants, colleagues, power, fame, right through to anything that conveniences one in private affairs. The human craving for supports [for living] is something handed down through their animal nature. One often sees such supports as grass and grain stored in many of the nests and caves of birds and animals. Sixth is craving for craving. [It is so called] because it refers to the craving mind itself making manifest images of cognitive objects which it then craves, 39. Śūram . gama-sūtra, T19n0945_p0120b07–13. The full Chinese title is Dafo ding rulai mi yin xiu zhengliao yi zhu pusa wanxing shoulengyan jing 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸 菩薩萬行首楞嚴經 (The Sutra on the Mantra Spoken from above the Crown of the Great Buddha’s Head, and on the Hidden Basis of the Tathāgatas’ Myriad Bodhisattva Practices Leading to Their Verification of the Definitive Meaning). It has long been recognized as an apocryphal text written in China.

Y6693.indb 257

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

258

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

when the objects that were originally craved are unable to be attained. It is like someone who is fond of sex sometimes suspending an image of a beauty in their mind. Seventh is craving for what has been stored up. [It is so called] because it refers to still having fond desires for those things enjoyed in the past and so has the sense of storing up. “To store up” is to say that there is an unwillingness to release. Eighth is craving for what one sees. [It is so called] because it refers to being unable to refrain from taking pleasure in what one knows and sees, even though it is crass and perverse. Those who are severely afflicted with the craving for what they see find it difficult to talk about it. The characteristics of the eight kinds of cravings have [now] been briefly elucidated. Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice, juan 55, states that there are ten kinds of craving, listing the names but providing no explanation. The Sutra on Dependent Arising says that there are four types of yearning (愛) to show the characteristics of craving. I have selected from a combination of the two groups, saying that there are eight kinds. Students can verify this personally in their own body and mind and so not be blind to them. 3.1.2 The Mental Associate of Antipathy (瞋)

Because hatred arises in the various sentient beings, it is called “antipathy.” Section 59 of Dunnyun’s (Dunlun) 遁倫 Commentaries on the Yogācārabhūmi says that broadly there are three kinds of antipathy. First is the antipathy toward sentient beings. [It is so called] because antipathy is developed toward sentient beings. “Sentient beings”: all living things have sentient consciousness, hence the name. See previous note. “Antipathy toward sentient beings”: It is because antipathy is developed toward sentient beings that [this mental associate] is so named. Second is antipathy toward cognitive objects. [It is so called] because antipathy develops with respect to 40. Maitreya, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, T30n1579_p0603b13–15. 41. Pratītya-samutpāda divibhan.ga-nirdeśa-sūtra (Yuanqi jing 緣起經; Sutra of Dependent Arising), trans. Xuanzang, T02n0124_p0547c17. It actually lists only three types. This sutra discusses the so-called twelve links of dependent arising (十二因緣). 42. It is actually in section 55. 43. Dunnyun, Yuqielun ji 瑜伽論記, T42n1828_p0642b16–24.

Y6693.indb 258

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

259

displeasing cognitive objects. Third is antipathy toward the views [of other sentient beings]. [It is so called] because antipathy is generated toward the views of other sentient beings. Antipathy toward sentient beings. Because one [has the notion of] one’s own views, [the notion of] others’ views is produced. [The notions of] one’s own views and the views of others are simultaneously produced. Because there is [the notion of] the views of others, antipathy is produced. Antipathy is produced at the same time as these two views are produced. The characteristics of antipathy are without limit but can broadly be divided into gross and fine. In regard to the gross characteristics, because they are set in train by issues of power and advantage, reputation, and so forth, they function in a gross way, and so some of them are transformed into [such secondary afflictions as] anger and so forth. In regard to the fine characteristics, because they are profoundly subtle, then even though they are not set in train by issues of power and advantage, reputation, and so forth, often they still [seem to be] lofty and removed, making it difficult for them to be to people’s liking. In treating aloofness as a virtue, China’s scholar-gentry appealed to [such ideals as] rising above material and related pursuits. In doing so, they were unaware that this was a direct product of the affliction of antipathy. Confucius said, “With whom should I associate if not members of the human race?” This sort of temperament (氣象) has already severed connection with the seeds of antipathy. The later ru, Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi], was most unaffected. The myriad life forms are fond of antipathy and like to kill. World history reads largely as a book of mutual annihilation. The novels, odes, and songs of previous ages mostly treat martial valor as a superior [p. 119]

virtue. These are all obvious examples of antipathy. Someone asked, “It is certain that antipathy is something that appears late [among sentient beings]. This can be verified by Darwin’s theory of the survival of the fittest,

44. Analects 18.6. 45. Qixiang 氣象 has been variously translated, although “temperament” and “disposition” seem to come close to the mark. More particularly, it might be understood as an aura or quality—particularly one exuded by sages and worthies—that can be intuited by others.

Y6693.indb 259

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

260

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

according to which it should be that antipathy also arises from the need to survive. There is no need to deem it to be an affliction.” I replied, “The facts discovered by those who endorse the theory of mutualism are clearly at odds with Darwin’s thesis. In his interpretation of the Union (比) hexagram in the Book of Change, [Cheng] Yichuan 程伊川 also said: “It is only by closely helping one another that all living things between heaven and earth are able to live.” Everything he said was verified. It is thus understood that living existence requires close help and not competition. This being so, is it acceptable to say that antipathy is not an affliction but rather is responding to the requirements of living existence? Antipathy toward cognitive objects. This is a transformation of the antipathy toward sentient beings. Because there is antipathy toward sentient beings, cognitive objects become involved with that [antipathy]. Thus it is felt that hills and cave-like depressions in the ground are both rugged and precipitous, and that heavy rains in summer and very cold winters are both cause for resentment. When people are despised, then even their possessions are offensive; when states are attacked, then even their palaces are all like cesspools. Resentment is often extended to unexpected misfortune, [and its capacity for] extermination reaches as far as grass and trees. All of these are [examples of] the antipathy of sentient beings in its abundance and so, in all cases, it is out of all proportion to what is appropriate. “Antipathy toward the views [of other sentient beings].” Again, this refers to something that emanates from the antipathy toward sentient beings. Indeed, it has a causal relationship with one of the previously listed mental associates associated with craving: craving for what one sees (見貪). It is only because of craving one’s own views that one is unable to take into account the views of others. One thus detests what is straight, despises what is correct, and is biased in one’s preferences. In the past, it has always been for these reasons that there have arisen the calamities that befall cliques and the infighting that besets factional groups. Ordinary people are incapable of putting aside craving for their own views or antipathy toward the views [of other sentient beings], and so they rely on their own views as the benchmark for what is true and false, This can be called the logic of feelings. affording 46. Cheng Yi, Zhouyi Cheng shi zhuan 周易程氏傳 (Cheng Yi’s Commentary on the Book of Change), Er Cheng ji, p. 738.

Y6693.indb 260

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

261

them no time to seek the path of principle (理道). This is something that is difficult for human discourse to make equal. Such is a brief account of the characteristics of antipathy. Cheng weishi lun provides the following summary remark: “Antipathy perforce makes body and mind hot and bothered, leading to bad deeds.” 3.1.3 The Mental Associate of Ignorance (癡)

Because of confusion about principle and things, it is called “ignorance.” Former masters differentiated being confused about principle and being confused about things, but I do not follow them. Being confused about something is simply not to understand the principle of that thing. It is not the case that one can say that distinct from confusion about the principle there is a separate confusion about the thing. Thus, here, “principle and things” is referred to by using a compound term, for it means that there is actually only one principle. Principle encompasses both ultimate and conventional [truth]. In conventional truth, because principle is posited on a nominal basis, there are various mistaken views and attachments. In ultimate truth, the path of principle is consistent, and only in realization is it verified. This is because those who are confused make mistaken presumptions about conventional truth and do not seek realization in ultimate truth. The characteristics of ignorance are unlimited—some broad, some specific. This is because in terms of general characteristics, all defiled dharmas are covered under the category of ignorance. The general term for all defiled mental associates is “affliction.” Affliction is also another name for ignorance. In terms of specific characteristics, when cravings and other defiled mental associates arise, the power of confusion invariably operates in unison with them, and so this power is referred to as ignorance. For no particular reason, human life is endowed at birth with a mass of confusion. Note the 47. The allusion here is the Zhuangzi essay “Qi wu lun,” variously interpretable as “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” “Equalizing Discourse on Things,” or “Equalizing Human Discourse.” Xiong seems to follow the third sense. What he means here is that ordinary people—as distinct from those who are awakened—find it difficult to treat all views equally; instead they are biased toward their own preferred views. 48. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0031b23. 49. Defiled dharmas is an abbreviation of defiled mental associates ranxin suoyou fa 染心所有法.

Y6693.indb 261

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

262

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

phrase “For no particular reason.” This benightedness was never an intrinsic part of [p. 120]

inherent nature; it is just that when we are born, there is this confusion that occurs together with our life. “Occurs together”: because they merely exist with one another, one does not precede the other. Everywhere questions are asked that ultimately cannot be answered, If people ask themselves where do we come from before we are born and where do we go after we die, no one is able to answer these questions. And even though among philosophers of religion there are many who do give answers, this one answers in this way, and that one answers in that way, making it difficult to be sure. Furthermore, if we were to take any one of their answers and subject it to thoroughgoing investigation, in the end we would find that there was no answer. When we observe the various things from a distance, we suspect that they have myriad beginnings. No matter which topic one might investigate, when one asks scientists what something is called, they will provide all sorts of answers in terms of molecules, atoms, right through to electrons. When one further asks what is the cause of electrons, one finds that there is still no answer. As for those philosophers who step forward to provide answers, in the end it is just as if they had not answered, something that again needs no explanation. Extrapolating on the basis of this, is there anywhere where it is not just the same? yet questions are still asked without end and similarly answered without end. Is it possible that [these people] understand that questions and answers about matters of conventional truth are all but nominal designations (假名)? In the context of ultimate truth (勝義諦), there is utter indifference to questions and answers, with both receding into silence. [The passage beginning with] “Is it possible that [these people] understand” up to here should be read in one fell swoop. Sheng yi di 勝義諦 is another name for ultimate truth. It is called this because it means ultimate truth is unexcelled. If nominal statements are made in line with conventional truth, questions and answers will be appropriate to experiential [knowledge], and there is certainly nothing wrong with this. “Experiential [knowledge].” It is so called because it is to know with respect to cognitive objects. In conventional truth, based on the supposition that all cognitive objects exist, their principles are inferred. Thus, apprehending those principles is to know with

Y6693.indb 262

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

263

respect to cognitive objects and is called “experiential [knowledge].” However, so-called experiential [knowledge] is merely hypothesis. When subjected to thoroughgoing investigation it is not true understanding, and so it is said to be [merely] “appropriate to.” Wantonly making up explanations and conjecturing capriciously are already to have engaged in mistaken inference (非量), and so one fails to understand that it is by emptying oneself within (虛中) that one accords with principle. This is not experiential [knowledge]; it is, rather, being confused about the principles that inform conventional knowledge. Further, if, when confronted by the realm where questions and answers do not function, This refers to ultimate truth. one were still raucously to pursue questioning and blindly give abandon to answering, this would be like: thirsty deer rushing after a mirage, Yajñadatta’s (演若達多) being confused about his own head, losing the pearl hidden inside the garment of the impoverished youth, or grasping at the reflection of the moon in a clear pond. Being ignorant of the principle informing ultimate truth is analogous to these [descriptions]. If this is not utter stupidity, then what is it? This brings to an end [the discussion about] confusion over conventional and ultimate truth. As for deluded, benighted actions, “Benighted” means “muddled”; it also means “deluded.” That is why the three characters form a compound phrase. and being ignorant of former actions, “Former actions”: the bad karma produced by former actions. even though some people will make up their preposterous explanations, this only lends itself to ongoing confusion. This is just like those ignorant people of today who act in ways that threaten to destroy the country and wipe out our race; they always provide themselves with preposterous explanations believing that their actions are rational— they are stupid beyond salvation. 50. For a discussion of this term, see my Transmitters and Creators, pp. 40–41. 51. This refers to the story of one Yajñadatta (“Jack”) who, when he saw his eyebrows and eyes in the mirror but could not see them on his own face, thought he had been bedeviled by evil spirits and so ran away in a frenzy. See Śūram . gama-sūtra, T19n0945_p0121b10–13. 52. This is an allusion to the story where a rich relative hid a pearl in the lining of the clothing of a poor relation so that the poor relation would have financial resources in dire circumstances. The poor relation realized that he had the pearl only after much suffering and hardship. See *Saddharmapun.d.arīka-sūtra (Miao fa lianhua jing 妙法蓮華經; Lotus Sutra), trans. Kumārajīva, T09n0262_p0029a26-b21.

Y6693.indb 263

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

264

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

Another name for ignorance is “nescience” (無明). This does not mean “clarity is absent” (明無); actually, this confused habituated tendency has ever been transmitted, without a beginning. If it were said that it was called “nescience” due to there being an absence of clarity, then “the absence of clarity” would merely be an empty term and would not reveal that this habituated tendency existed. Taking the leading role as the premier affliction Among the twelve limbs [of interdependent arising], nescience is the first. and carrying sentient beings with its everlasting body, the ferocity of the power of nescience is such that even metaphors such as tumbling mountains and swirling typhoons are inadequate to convey it. [p. 121] 3.1.4 The Mental Associate of Pride (慢)

Because it is to be conceited on the basis of the belief in the existence of self (我見), it is called “pride.” Former teachers said that there are seven kinds of pride. I will now provide an account of their general features, making some slight modifications. I change the order of the seven by putting pride in the ego-self (我慢) first. 1. To regard one’s physical body as a private possession and presuming it to be one’s self is to be conceited in one’s self-assurance and is called “pride in the ego-self.” “Being conceited” is a characteristic of pride and needs to be personally investigated with a clear mind. 2. Saying that one is superior to those who are inferior, To say that I am superior to those whose innate intelligence is inferior to mine. saying that one is equal to those who are equal, To say that I am equal to those whose talents are equal to mine. and letting one’s mind grow conceited can all be said to be pride. Suppose someone raised the following objection: “Saying that one is superior when drawing a comparison (方) with those who are inferior Fang 方 is to draw a comparison. and saying that one is equal when drawing a comparison with those who are one’s equal is to know by measuring. Why do you erroneously call it pride?” I would reply: “When this pride transforms [according to differing] cognitive objects, it not merely measures—it 53. For the twelve links or “limbs” of dependent arising, see the entry “shi’er yinyuan 十二因緣” in Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, www.buddhism-dict.net, for a full list. 54. See the list of seven in Paramārtha’s translation of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhās.ya (阿毘達磨倶舍釋論; Abhidharma Compendium Treatise), T29n1559_p0254c28p0255a01.

Y6693.indb 264

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

265

actually leads the mind to become conceited. This is not being like a clear mirror that reflects objects with singular clarity. As such, the error is great and given the name of “pride.” 3. To say that one is superior when comparing oneself to those who are one’s equal To say that I am superior to those whose innate intelligence is equal to mine. and to say that one is equal to those who are superior To say that one is equal to those whose innate intelligence is superior to mine. is erroneously to advance oneself by a grade. This is called pride in regarding oneself as superior to equals and equal to superiors. 4. Presuming that one is superior to those who are superior exceeds even pride in regarding oneself as superior to equals and equal to superiors and is called pride in feeling superior to superiors. 5. To claim that one has already realized what one has not yet realized and to claim that one has realized a lot about that of which one has realized little leads the mind to become conceited and is called escalating pride. 6. To claim that one is only slightly inferior to those who are far superior and to claim that one is far inferior to those who are not inferior are both called pride in baseness. Despite knowing that one is base, one is still proud; hence it is called pride in baseness. A strong objection was raised to this: “If one were to compare oneself with those who are far superior and claim that there was not even a slight disparity, then one’s mind would be conceited, and this would certainly be a case of pride in baseness. If, however, one were to regard oneself as vastly inferior and claimed that others were not inferior, then the mind would not be conceited, so how would this constitute conceit?” [I replied:] “This is to fail to appreciate that when this person stands before those who are superior and reflects upon his own person, then despite being aware of his vast inferiority, in his mind he is still profoundly selfrespectful. Because the characteristics of pride are indistinct and imperceptible but not completely absent, this constitutes pride in baseness.” 7. Although one is not really a virtuous person, yet one regards oneself as virtuous, is to be conceited on the basis of evil—this is called pride in evil. Those of excessive pride do not respect virtue and commit evil acts. Wickedness begins with smugness, Since the mind harbors conceit, it is smug. moves toward shamelessness, until finally [one regards oneself] as beyond comparison with other people. If the mind is conceited, then it will lack the humility to receive incipient goodness, and so daily it will be completely [mired in] contamination. Thus, students should first overcome pride.

3.1.5 The Mental Associate of Pernicious Views (惡見)

Because distorted inferences are made about cognitive objects, discernment and ignorance occur together The object-specific mental associate of discernment

Y6693.indb 265

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

266

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

[p. 122]

and the primary affliction of ignorance occur together to constitute pernicious views. and so this is called “pernicious views.” Because views are not correct they are called pernicious. Because the characteristics of pernicious views are complex, they cannot be fully investigated, and so from a selection of the most important ones, I will briefly discuss three pernicious views: belief in the existence of a self, extreme views, and false views. Belief in the existence of a self is also called “belief in personal identity.” In Sanskrit it is called sajiaye [ jian] 薩迦耶[見] [satkāya-dr.s.t.i]. Because [people] do not know their self-nature (自性 [svabhāva]), On self-nature, see the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis” [chapter 1]. they regard the physical body as a private possession and presume there is a self and that which appertains to the self. This is called belief in the existence of a self. Reference to belief in the existence of a self includes the notion of “that which appertains to the self.” Because there is a presumption of self, simultaneously there is a presumption of that which appertains to the self. What is “that which appertains to the self ”? It is called this because [it refers to] all the dharmas that appertain to me. For example, in presuming that the physical body is the self, because simultaneously there is a presumption that it appertains to me, it is said that this is my body. As to the dharmas external to my body, they are simply presumed to be that which appertain to me. This is because my wife and children, fields and house, goods and chattels, position, reputation— right through to everything I own—are that which appertain to me. Hence to have a belief in the existence of a self is thus to have that which appertains to me. This is the root source of selfishness, whence myriad evils arise. Someone asked: “When psychologists talk about the concept of self, by and large they take it to be the formal unity of cognitive functioning. In ancient times, non-Buddhist schools also established [the concept] of ātman. They did not, however, necessarily presume that the self was the physical body.” I replied: “In using the formal unity of cognitive functioning to explain the concept of self, psychologists actually do not presume a belief in the existence of a self. They simply say that cognitive functioning is not scattered or fragmented, but rather concerns personality. This is quite different in meaning and should 55. That is, they are not also presumed to be one’s self, even though they are concurrent with self-identity.

Y6693.indb 266

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

267

not be introduced here to draw comparisons. As for non-Buddhist accounts of ātman, derived from the sixth consciousness’s erroneous discriminative constructions, an ātman is fabricated and posited as the ruler of the body. This is what is called ‘attachment to a self by discriminative construction.’ The characteristics of what I am referring to as the presumption that the body is the self are profoundly intricate. This is because at every moment the human mind is indistinctly and imperceptibly attached to [the belief] that the body is the self, and not for one breath is this attachment abandoned. This is innate, yet one does not realize this is so. This is what is called ‘innate attachment to the self ’ and is not unique to humans. Animals are also attached to physical form as self-entity—this is self-attachment. Plants also cling to [physical form] as self-entity and have an indistinct belief in the existence of a self, but it is extremely undefined. By and large, living things confine [their belief in the existence of a self] to the physical body and are ignorant of where they have originally come from. Failing to discern that in self-nature there have never been various differentiations between self and other, they presume that the body is a discrete entity and are attached to it as the self. In reality, it is not the self but merely an erroneous presumption. It is just like when a diseased eye sees ‘sky flowers.’ In fact there are no flowers in the sky; rather, it is because the eye is diseased.” The mental associate “extreme views” is also called “a view from being attached to an extreme.” Because there is attachment to an extreme, it is called “a view from being attached to an extreme.” Generally speaking there are two: the extreme view of eternalism and the extreme view of nihilism. The extreme view of eternalism arises due to the increase in power from the belief in the existence of a self “Increase in power” means “to add to.” This says that the extreme view of eternalism arises due to the power added by the belief in the existence of a self. and presumes that the things manifest before us cling on and do not let go. [p. 123]

In claiming that these things should be [regarded as] eternally abiding, [proponents] fail to discern that, fundamentally, all things arise and cease 56. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading yue 曰 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads ri 日.

Y6693.indb 267

6/30/15 2:55:54 PM

268

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

instantaneously; they have never been real dharmas; and they are only nominally spoken of as things. Things change without being noticed. [Things] in the present are already not as they were in the past, yet the deluded regard them as if they are the former things, presuming that [what they observe] are the characteristics of continuity and call this eternal. This is to fall into the error of the extreme view of eternalism. Because of the increase in power from the belief in the existence of a self, the extreme view of nihilism turns [the observation that] one cannot depend on things to [abide] eternally into the presumption that things become eliminated. And because in the conventional world it is observed that the wind moves, the clouds fly, mountains collapse, and rivers run dry—all suddenly disappearing without trace—[it is inferred] that the body and the natural world are similarly transformed and extinguished. As the sutra says: “The conflagration at the end of the age blazes fiercely, and the one billion worlds are all annihilated.” Thus [proponents of the extreme view of nihilism] say the various dharmas that existed in the past now are no more, and those that now exist will no longer exist in the future. This is to fall into the error of the extreme view of nihilism. If one is aware that things fundamentally have no reality, then on what basis can one talk of elimination? It is thus understood that the extreme view of nihilism is also conditioned by the grasping of objects. It should, however, be further understood that the two extreme views of eternalism and nihilism basically take turns in destroying one another. “Destroying one another”: sometimes the extreme view of eternalism is avoided only to fall into the extreme view of nihilism, and sometimes the extreme view of nihilism is avoided only to fall into the extreme view of eternalism. The mental associate “false views” is also called “erroneous views.” These are generally spoken of as two: imputed views and negationist views. Imputed views mistakenly construct something when there never was anything. In imputing such characteristics as a pot etc. to dharmas of material form etc., From visual consciousness grasping only color, right through to

57. Ren wang huguo bore boluomiduo jing 仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經 (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra for Humane Kings Protecting Their Countries), T08n0246_p0840b15. This is an apocryphal text composed in China. 58. As with the extremist view of constancy.

Y6693.indb 268

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

269

tactile consciousness grasping only firmness—there never was a pot and so forth [that was actually being grasped]. Thus the characteristics of pots and so forth are imputed on the basis of material form etc. the imputed pot etc. that arises has no constant characteristics. It is merely layer upon layer of imputation. When it comes to the physical body, because it is not something that can be known as real, the image of self is erroneously imputed. “Because it is not something that can be known as real”: The body is fundamentally a kind of illusion—it does not exist independently, it is not real, and it has no controlling function. Thus, if material form is broken down into atoms, the characteristics of atoms are also empty, and so there is no body to be apprehended. Now, this cannot be known by virtue of correspondence with reality, and [so] it is said that [the body] “is not something that can be known as real [and that] the image of self is erroneously imputed.” To presume that the body is the self is, without any basis, to impute the characteristics of a self onto the body. And because inner realization is not sought within selfnature, characteristics are erroneously imputed to an external reality. Philosophers who talk about Fundamental Reality regard it to be something external, separate from the mind. Not knowing self-nature, they externally fabricate a layer of reality—this is imputation. Imputed views thus illusorily construct the universe, just like a conjuror This refers to a magician. conjuring up all sorts of physical objects such as horses and elephants. Negationist views mistakenly presume that things which originally do exist, do not exist. Those who work on old books pick and choose what to accept or reject as their fancy takes them and are unwilling to believe the confirmed records of the ancients. There are certainly doubtful accounts in the old books, but equally it cannot be said that they are all fabrications. For example, it should indeed be the case that Yi was in charge of mountains and marshes and that Yu controlled the floods, yet today there are those who are unwilling to believe that there was such a person as Yu—what is this if not a nihilistic view? Those who are born and live in remote 59. Mencius 3A.4. 60. This is almost certainly a reference to the so-called doubters of antiquity. The “doubting antiquity” movement is generally traced to Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980), who in 1926 argued that in many Warring States through to Han writings, the later a mythical emperor appeared in a text, the earlier the claim was made for when that figure lived. See his “Yu Qian Xuantong xiansheng lun gushi shu 與錢玄同先生論古史書” (Letter to Qian

Y6693.indb 269

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

270

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

[p. 124]

and desolate places have limited experiences, and when they hear about other places and different things, they compare them to strange tales by Qi Xie. Those of shallow views, being unaware of the profound and farreaching, disparagingly dismiss the words of fundamental wisdom (玄言) as nonsense. Essentially, by relying on their limited experiences to draw inferences about how things actually are, they are incapable of apprehending how things actually are and so fall into the trap of negationist views. This is a common fault of unskilled scholars. As for being mired in material desires, not seeing self-nature, and [regarding] the universe and human life to be the same as a machine, this is to have no regret about negating one’s primary undertaking (本分事)—extreme folly. All imputed views take what does not exist to exist, and all negationist views take what does exist not to exist. However, because imputation and negation necessarily rely constantly upon one another, neither arises alone. For example, since people in the past said that the earth is still, in attributing the characteristics of stillness to the earth, at the same time they were taking a negationist view about the characteristic of movement. [This example shows that] the principle of imputation does not arise alone. And since an erroneous characteristic has been imputed, necessarily it will damage the real situation. This being so, since there is nowhere in human life where knowledge is not the imputation of false characteristics, what then is real? Some say that if one conducts affairs and draws distinctions among things by making sure that the foremost consideration is to accord with principle, then one will not be engaging in imputation. This is to fail to understand that from the perspective of ultimate truth, everything exists because it is nominally posited—it is not the case that anything fundamentally really exists. What, then, is not imputed? Having thus summarized the above three views, [it is apparent that] false views are the broadest and include all mistaken understandings. Former teachers listed only the various presumptions held by the non-Buddhists Xuantong on Ancient Historical Writings), in Gu Jiegang (ed.), Gu shi bian 古史辨 (Disputing Ancient History), vol. 1. (Shanghai: Pushe, 1926), p. 60. 61. Qi Xie 齊諧 is here understood to be a recorder of strange tales. The reference is to the opening passage of the “Xiao yao you 逍遙遊” (Free and Easy Wandering) chapter in Zhuangzi, 1/1/3.

Y6693.indb 270

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

271

in the categories of extreme views and false views. The detailed account in Cheng weishi lun shuji, 36, is well worth consulting. Each of the five mental associates that constitute the primary afflictions can be divided into gross or fine. The gross are powerful; when activated they harm the self and others. When the gross ones are activated, they necessarily cause disturbances in the mind that are harmful to oneself. Moreover, they necessarily are not beneficial to others and so harm others. The fine are weak, freely heed the mind, and are not harmful to others. “To heed the mind” means accepting regulation by the mind and not being willful. As such, the gross need to be rigorously counteracted so that they do not appear. The fine always operate together with omnipresent mental associates and occur together with the mind. “Operate together with omnipresent mental associates etc.” means to operate in tandem with omnipresent mental associates and to occur together with the sensory consciousnesses and the sixth consciousness in order to grasp cognitive objects. They need to be rigorously counteracted so that they are suppressed and eliminated. The means to do so all lie among the good mental associates. Someone said: “The five primary afflictions of craving, antipathy, ignorance, pride, and pernicious views are the necessary means for preserving individual life. If there were living things that decisively severed these afflictions, it would be certain that they would be unable to continue living. For example, in the mental associate of craving, there is craving for self-entity. If this was completely severed, how could one live? From this one can infer what would be the case with the other sorts of cravings. The mental associate of antipathy is also most crucial to the preservation of the individual body. If living things did not have this, then how could there be diversification and propagation? It is the same with the mental associate of ignorance. From plants to humans, all live in benightedness. It is the same with pride. If one did not feel superior, [p. 125]

how could preserve oneself? Lower-order creatures also manifest a sense of their own superiority. Take, for example, how Chinese people today are 62. Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji, T43n1830_p0446a04 ff. 63. Xiong above: “Because I have entered uncertainty (疑) into the individual mental associates, there are now five which remain: craving (貪), antipathy (瞋), ignorance (癡), pride (慢), and pernicious views (惡見).” 64. The idea here seems to be that in order to propagate one needs to fend off enemies.

Y6693.indb 271

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

272

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

so base relative to the outside [world]. By slavishly imitating without understanding and willingly enduring humiliation through subservience, we also lose our common nature with other living things. Further, how could there be a complete absence of pernicious views? If one did not presume [the existence of] a self, one would lose one’s individual entity. If extreme views and imputed views did not arise, how could one make any progress in dealing with real-life matters? Therefore, these five primary afflictions are the necessary means by which the lives of individual entities are maintained. A sutra says: ‘Even bodhisattvas who have reached the eighth level [bhūmi] still preserve afflictions so as to nourish life,’ and so it can be understood that life necessarily occurs together with afflictions. The gross ones can be suppressed and eliminated, but the fine ones cannot be severed.” This is what he said, and it means that all living things are living because of afflictions. Now, while this is so in conventional truth, it is not acceptable in ultimate truth. My friend Ma Yifu said: “The meaning of ‘preserve afflictions so as to nourish life’ is deeply hidden in the extreme.” A sutra says: “A bodhisattva does not abide in unconditioned [dharmas]—he never ceases [involving himself with] conditioned [dharmas].” This is because if a bodhisattva were to rest content, abiding in quiescence and simplicity, then his marvelous function would be unable to proliferate and flourish. This is analogous to river dragons not living in stagnant pools of water. Yet even though he returns from the realm of truth to enter the conventional world, the functioning of wisdom remains pure, just as a blazing fire is not a place where mosquitoes nest. It is just as the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra 65. The implication seems to be that the Chinese people have lost so much of their pride or self-respect that they have fallen lower than the lower-order creatures. 66. Based on Huayan master Zhanran 湛然 (711–782), Fahua wenju ji 法華文句記 (Subcommentary on the Lotus Sutra), T34n1719_p0156c20, with some modification. 67. Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra (Weimojie suo shuo jing 維摩詰所說經; The Teaching of Vimalakīrti), translated by Kumārajīva, T14n0475_p0554b06. 68. Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, www.buddhism-dict.net, s.v. “dayong 大用,” www.buddhism-dict.net: “Marvelous function. Commonly seen in Chan records when referring to the words and deeds of a greatly enlightened master, whose every small action is guided by attunement to his/her essence 體—his original mind.” 69. The “stagnant pools of water” is a metaphor for abiding in quiescence and simplicity. 70. The “blazing fire” is a metaphor for the conventional world.

Y6693.indb 272

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

273

says: “[The bodhisattva] apparently acts with craving, yet is removed from the various afflictions. He is apparently attached to anger, yet there are no impediments in his dealing with sentient beings. He apparently acts in nescience, yet he uses wisdom to regulate and discipline his mind.” This is the expedient manifestation of the characteristics of affliction in order to accept sentient beings [into the fold of the Buddha]—it is not that the bodhisattva really has these afflictions. In the Book of Change it is called “shows his clear-sightedness by keeping it obscure,” and in the Chan lineage it is called “mixing together with other [types of] beings [in order to make them liberated].” This is to share the concerns of [people] through times of good fortune and bad, as well as to share their anxieties and joys. Even though the bodhisattava’s body lodges in defilement, in actuality his mind is devoted to the ultimate. The bodhisattva emerges from the mud, yet is not defiled. And even though he steps on the tiger’s tail, it does not bite him. How could one claim that there are still residual seeds of affliction in the mind of the sage? As for sentient beings, it is solely because they are afflicted that antidotal factors occur at all. If there were no afflictions, then there would be no prajñā either. Thus all defilements are the seeds of tathāgata (如來). Confucius said: “As long as the way prevails in the world, [I] will not join them in changing the world.” If one is able to scrutinize profoundly the characteristics of affliction and realize that afflictions are fundamentally empty and must be severed, then how can one maintain that ignorance is a component of life and that there are indeed these mental associates that maintain individual entities? Confucius said: “Man’s very life is uprightness—without it he will be lucky indeed if he 71. Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra, T14n0475_p0549a06–7. 72. “Judgment” commentary, Mingyi 明夷 (Suppression of Clarity) hexagram, Book of Change, 4.14a, modified. 73. For example, Daoyuan, Jingde chuandeng lu, T51n2076_p0257c01. 74. Based on “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.27a–b. 75. Zhou Dunyi, “Ai lian shuo 愛蓮說” (On the Love of the Lotus) in Zhou Lianxi ji, 8.139. 76. “Line Statement,” Lü 履 (Treading), Book of Change, 2.18a. 77. A reference to the buddhas who have shown the way. 78. This is Confucius’s response in Analects 18.6 to the suggestion that he, too, might join some recluses and flee the conventional world. The inference is that Confucius realized that the conventional world provides the ground for awakening.

Y6693.indb 273

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

274

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

escapes with his life.” This is the doctrine that life is fundamentally without affliction. It is different from the doctrine that life and affliction occur together. The principle involved is profound and I am not going to discuss it now, yet it is something that students should understand.

3.2 Secondary Afflictions (隨惑) Former masters said that there are twenty secondary afflictions; I have reduced them to fourteen: anger (忿), animosity (恨), vexation (惱), hostility (害), jealousy (嫉), duplicity (覆), parsimony (慳), deception (誑), chicanery (諂), insolence (無慚), shamelessness (無愧), restlessness (掉擧), ennui (昏沉), and unruliness (放逸). 3.2.1 Anger (忿)

It is part of antipathy Anger is the crudest part of antipathy. because when there are disagreeable cognitive objects manifest before one, one loses one’s temper. “Lose one’s temper”: because anger reaches a climax, it is expressed. Examples of disagreeable cognitive objects are when someone deprives me of some advantage or his views are contrary to my views. One who has an extreme loss of temper [p. 126]

will inevitably express unwholesome activity associated with the body and with speech, and if he is not restrained he will inevitably harm himself and others. If anger is stirred, this will inevitably lead to the defilement of the mind and moreover be harmful to the body. This is to damage oneself. Further, it will inevitably harm people. This is to damage others. Birds and insects fight ferociously with claw and tooth; humans raise armies to kill and attack—it is all because of anger.

79. Analects 6.19. 80. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0034c25 ff. 81. Aśvaghos.a (second century), Daśākuśalakarmapathanirdeśa (Shi bushan ye dao jing 十不善業道經; Scripture on the Way of Ten Unwholesome Activities), T17n0727_ p0457c09ff, identifies ten types of unwholesome activities (karma) that it groups in three categories: those related to the body, speech, and the will.

Y6693.indb 274

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

275

3.2.2 Animosity (恨)

It follows next after anger. Because it does not relinquish its embrace of repugnance and is deeply entangled with resentment, it is called “animosity.” Animosity is also a part of antipathy. It is like [the venom of] a snake or scorpion and is even more [poisonous] than anger. 3.2.3 Vexation (惱)

It follows after anger and animosity. Because it concerns the recollection of past experiences of explosive anger and cruelty, it is called “vexation.” “Recollecting past experiences of explosive anger”: this is because the recollection of previous occasions on which one had expressed anger and animosity is painfully bitter. “Explosive anger”: this refers to the venom of explosive anger being like a fierce fire burning within. “Cruelty”: this is because when antipathy is extreme, tenderness is completely severed. Vexation is also part of antipathy. Its venom exceeds that of animosity and so completely abandons human nature. 3.2.4 Hostility (害)

Because it harms and oppresses the various sentient beings and is without compassion, it is called hostility. Birds and beasts devour one another; humans hunt birds and beasts to eat—they are also cruel to their own kind. In all cases this is due to hostility. Where there is much hostility, because it is constantly being expressed, one is not aware of it. It remains constantly with humans. Plying a skip on a clear lake, the rippling of translucent waves, a large fish jumps and twists. The sense of beauty penetrating; suddenly I lose myself.

Ordinary people, however, want only to catch the fish and cook it for a meal. This is their hostile mind insidiously arising in an instant, yet they are not aware of it. Is it not lamentable that the demise of human nature comes to this? Hostility is also part of antipathy but must occur together with craving and ignorance. 82. Reading hen 很 as hen 狠.

Y6693.indb 275

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

276

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下) 3.2.5 Jealousy (嫉)

Because of the pursuit of personal fame and advantage, there is jealousy of others, and so it is called “jealousy.” Former teachers maintained that jealousy and happiness are incompatible. When those who are jealous hear about the achievements of others, they become deeply resentful, are constantly ill at ease, and so are not happy. Jealousy is also part of antipathy. Its unwholesomeness is treacherous and something the gentleman finds shameful. 3.2.6 Duplicity (覆)

Because transgressions are concealed, it is called “duplicity.” Duplicity is also a craving part because most of the transgressions involving duplicity arise from a fear of losing wealth, reputation, and so forth. “Craving part” means “a part of craving.” Duplicity is also a part of ignorance. Even though transgressions involving duplicity grow increasingly entrenched, [the transgressor] does not realize that this is something to fear, and so this is ignorance. 3.2.7 Parsimony (慳)

Because there is indulgence in and attachment to goods and to teachings, which are coveted and not relinquished, it is called “parsimony.” “Goods”: Material goods, profit, as well as things advantageous to oneself are all called “goods.” “Teachings”: skills acquired through scholarly learning are also called “teachings.” Parsimony is also a part of craving. The mind is fond of base things and niggardly hoards them. Those who are parsimonious with goods also always hoard those things they do not need. [p. 127]

Those who are parsimonious with teachings conceal their knowledge and skills and are unwilling to pass them on to others. This is also a variation of being parsimonious with goods. Thus parsimony is despicable because it is base and selfish. And because it pursues things at the expense of losing the principle for living, it is pathetic indeed. 3.2.8 Deception (誑)

In the pursuit of self-interest, because dissemblance is used to conceal what is not real, and energies are directed at being cunning, this is called

Y6693.indb 276

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

277

“deception.” Because deception arises from craving, those who deceive invariably harbor selfish defilements. And because deception also arises from ignorance, where clear understanding is lacking, then there is inward deception, hence the dissemblance presented to the outside world. Because there is inward deception, there is an insufficiency of inner strength. The unwholesomeness of deception is greater than that of duplicity. One who is duplicitous still fears others’ knowing; the deceitful show no restraint whatsoever, recklessly broadcasting their unwholesomeness among the myriad sentient beings, even claiming that they have succeeded in their schemes. As the deceitful become practiced over time, both self and others are deceived. Hence, with deceit, unwholesomeness reaches its apex. Social psychologists would certainly understand that in ages of decline, deceit becomes habituated among all the people. Those who harbor deceit, just like the germs in rotting filth, no longer possess the principle by which to regenerate and so quickly disappear. 3.2.9 Chicanery (諂)

Because some pretext is set up to engage in wrongdoing so as to fool others, “To fool” means “to swindle.” it is called “chicanery.” Anyone who practices chicanery is certain to be without true understanding and correct views, making it difficult for them to stand upright by themselves, and so chicanery arises due to ignorance. Being focused on profit and reputation, they worry about personal gains and losses—this in turn arises from craving. Chicanery necessarily involves habitually trying to anticipate what others will do and frequently setting traps. Some secretly investigate what a person likes and dislikes, recklessly using underhanded means to achieve their ends. Others observe popular fashions and craftily adapt themselves accordingly. This is why it is said to be wrongdoing. 3.2.10 Insolence (無慚)

Because the worthy and the good are disdainfully rejected, it is called “insolence.” Because insolence arises from ignorance, [one who has no shame] fails to value himself and is happy to demean himself; thus when he sees worthies, he disrespects and is contemptuous of them, and when he hears 83. Hence the need to conceal what is not real.

Y6693.indb 277

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

278

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

about the good, he is unhappy and opposes them. No shame issues from his mind; he is drunk with arrogance, and the principle of what it is to be human has disappeared. 3.2.11 Shamelessness (無愧)

Because cruelty and ferocity are esteemed, it is called shamelessness. Compared with insolence, [shamelessness is grounded] even more acutely in ignorance and ferocity. Not being content with being contemptuous of worthies, [the shameless person] exalts cruelty; not being content with opposing the good, he esteems ferocity even more. Champions of cruelty and extreme examples of ferocious behavior, such as is recorded in historical records, are frequently emulated by the people. When an era is in decline this is especially in evidence. Insolence and shamelessness are collectively referred to as “being without humiliation.” 3.2.12 Restlessness (掉擧)

Because the mind is excited and animated “Excited” means “to be agitated”; “animated” means “to be aroused constantly.” it is called “restlessness.” It serves as the basis for wayward cognitive enquiry Confused thinking. Sometimes, moreover, on account of recollection, previous instances of habituated tendencies such as love, hate, and so forth suddenly appear. Love and hate are craving and antipathy. Hence excitement and animation generate one another. In terming agitation [p. 128]

“restlessness” and separately calling constant arousal “distraction,” former masters failed to understand that where there is no excitement, there is animation; just as where there is no animation, there is excitement. Hence now I have included distraction within restlessness and have not set it up separately. 3.2.13 Ennui (昏沉)

Because it leads to the mind’s being confused, it is called “ennui.” Growing from ignorance, it becomes confusion. Confusion is first established as listlessness. Hence here I will not talk about the mental associate of listlessness separately. Former masters treated listlessness as a separate mental associate. Those who are profoundly confused are completely transformed by

Y6693.indb 278

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

279

things (物化), leading one to suspect that their lack of purpose renders them comparable to animals and plants. This is very frightening. This is because lower-order animals and plants are nothing other than [sentient beings] who are excessively confused. 3.2.14 Unruliness (放逸)

Because it leads to the mind’s becoming dissolute, it is called “unruliness.” Unruliness is disrespectfulness and serves as the basis for restlessness and ennui. The secondary afflictions are more or less as described above. Compared to the gross [characteristics] of the primary afflictions, Each of the five primary afflictions can be divided into gross and fine [characteristics], as has already been described above. they even exceed them. The gross [characteristics] of the secondary afflictions are even grosser than those of the primary afflictions. For example, the gross characteristics associated with the secondary affliction of parsimony are more powerful than those associated with the primary affliction of craving, just as the gross characteristics associated with the secondary affliction of anger are more powerful than those associated with the primary affliction of antipathy. The case for the others can be inferred on this basis. Hence, when active, they harm self and others Note: see above. and must be rigorously counteracted so that they become completely severed. It is just like extracting poison [from a wound]: the poison must be extracted from the bone and not just stop with the skin. In the past, as a young man Cheng Mingdao [Cheng Hao] was fond of hunting but later said that he no longer cared for hunting. Zhou Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi] remarked: “That’s easy enough to say. Nevertheless, [the desire to hunt] remains latent in the mind, and when it is activated things are just as they were originally.” Twelve years later, on seeing some hunters, Cheng Mingdao became delighted without even realizing it. As it turned out, he had indeed not ceased to care for hunting. One can thus appreciate how difficult it is to sever habituated tendencies. Fear of difficulty, however, fails to avoid sliding

84. New Treatise, p. 124: “Each of the five mental associates that constitute the primary afflictions can be divided into gross or fine. The gross are powerful; when active they harm the self and others.” 85. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Henan Cheng shi yishu, p. 96.

Y6693.indb 279

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

280

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

into unruliness. Even in secluded places one is being watched; every instant [one should] skillfully cultivate [one’s inherent nature] in its hidden place. Once the root of wholesome [mental associates] has been established, then the various afflictions will of themselves come to be severed. One begins to understand human life by first overcoming difficulties and later reaping the benefits of doing so. It is only by gaining benefits as a result of victory secured in the midst of difficulties that the richness of human life is understood. Lacking the skills to [overcome] submitting to [defiled habituated tendencies] is to be no different from a thing. “Thing” refers to birds and animals. Because they submit to the defiled habituated tendencies that start together with physical form, they do not understand how to deploy the skills needed to counteract them. Because primary and secondary afflictions are defiled and because they counter and impede wholesome [mental associates], they are called “defiled mental associates.”

. WHOLESOME MENTAL ASSOCIATES 善數 Former teachers said that there are eleven, but now I have reduced the number to seven by removing some and adding some: concentration (定), conviction (信), contra-craving (無貪), contra-antipathy (無瞋), contraignorance (無癡), sustained effort (精進), and vigilance (不放逸). I have removed conscience (慚) and four other wholesome mental associates, and added concentration from the object-specific mental associates. [p. 129]

4.1 Concentration (定) Because it causes the mind to be drawn together and consolidated, and because it directly counteracts torpor and agitation, “Torpor” refers to the 86. The literal reading, “ten eyes and ten hands scrupulously point and watch,” is an allusion to “Great Learning,” Liji, 60.2a. Implicit here is the notion of “vigilance in solitude.” 87. The other four are sense of shame (愧), serenity (輕安), indifference (行捨), and not causing harm (不害). 88. Cf. Luo Nian’an’s concept of “to draw [the mind] together and keep it consolidated,” discussed previously.

Y6693.indb 280

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

281

secondary affliction of ennui, and “agitation” refers to the secondary affliction of restlessness. it is called “concentration.” Due to the power of correct attentiveness, concentration is produced. For “attentiveness,” see above. “Correct”: if attentiveness occurs together with affliction, then it is defiled. Here, however, attentiveness rejects affliction and accords with true principle. By being profoundly self-admonishing, it induces the inherent mind to be expressed. This is wholesome and so is called “correct attentiveness.” Concentration must be induced by way of correct attentiveness. Concentration is drawing together and consolidating, and by focusing the power of this consolidation internally, it assists the mind to perceive inwardly, “Focus” means to concentrate the attention. “To assist” means to be associated with. This is because concentration uses the mind’s drawn-together and consolidated power to respond in assisting the mind, and so observe profoundly within. and so [the mind] does not follow the familiar path of afflictions. Ever since beginningless time, because afflictions occur together with life, they are intimately connected to the physical form and have never been severed. Hence, when they appear, it is like following a familiar path, and so they arise automatically without one even being aware of it. Now, this drawn-together and consolidated power is one’s own newly created power of concentration. It wants to act free of afflictions and is not willing to follow the familiar path. This is because it makes it possible to activate one’s own inherent mind within, thereby depriving the afflictions of any means of conveyance. “Within” means that this is because this inherent mind is not welded on to us from outside. “Own”: because this inherent mind is self-nature and is not derived from other [sources]. “The afflictions having no means of conveyance”: because the inherent mind has been expressed by means of concentration, it becomes the ruler, and so there is no place for afflictions to exist. The inherent mind has always been quiescent and perfectly bright, without an iota of imperfection, “Quiescence” is ultimate purity, and in responding it is constantly still. “Perfectly bright” is ultimate spirituality, the brilliance of which is constantly all-pervasive. but afflictions arise to cover it, and so the mind is unable to reveal itself, effectively rendering it lost. This is why people in the past talked of the “lost 89. Later, Xiong glosses true principle as self-nature. 90. An allusion to Mencius 6A.6.

Y6693.indb 281

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

282

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

heart/mind.” Yet even though the mind is covered, ultimately it has never ceased to exist. Thus even though afflictions circulate, the mind operates by itself and is unable to be completely concealed. Just as the drifting clouds conceal the sun so that it is said there is no sun, in reality the sun never ceased to exist. And even if more clouds gathered to form a layer of obstruction, this would not amount to a complete absence of even a slight amount of sunlight appearing through the clouds. Rather, it is only that the sun’s functions are weak, and so it is said that there is no sun (陽). No yang 陽 means no sun. Concentration uses its function of drawing together and consolidating in order to steer the movement of inherent mind so that it does not become completely obscured, just like when there is dim sunlight. This leads concentration to consolidate even more, so that there is no concern about it disappearing. If inherent mind is gradually revealed, finally becoming abundant, then the various afflictions will also gradually be subdued, eventually being extinguished. Thus the power of concentration is truly able to counteract the afflictions. “The [p. 130]

afflictions” refers collectively to all defiled mental associates. As for saying that concentration “directly counteracts torpor and agitation,” because the characteristics of concentration and those of torpor and agitation are diametrically opposed, this is referred to in terms of overcoming. Having thus laid out matters frankly reveals it should be understood that concentration is not limited to the matter of counteracting torpor and agitation. This being so, then the other powers of counteraction This refers to the other wholesome mental associates’ powers of counteraction. can be similarly regarded.

4.2 Conviction (信) Because it leads the mind to be pure, and directly counteracts insolence and shamelessness, it is called “conviction.” By and large, what is conventionally referred to as conviction belongs to the category of verification and 91. Mencius 6A.11. 92. Two of the fourteen secondary afflictions listed by Xiong. 93. One of the five object-specific mental associates listed by Xiong.

Y6693.indb 282

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

283

is not the same as conviction. For the mental associate of verification, see above. What is commonly referred to as conviction includes common examples such as seeing a blue form and believing that it is blue, or measuring meteorological phenomena to calculate that it will rain tomorrow and on that basis believe that tomorrow it will rain. These examples are actually the characteristic of affirmation associated with verification and are not conviction. Take the example of the religious specialist who has a conviction about the existence of God. What the religious specialist refers to as “conviction” is affirmation and is not actually conviction. What is conviction? Due to the power of correct attentiveness (作意), the power of purity is drawn forth. That is, because this power of purity cooperates with the mind, working with it to mentally appropriate cognitive objects (所緣), it is called “conviction.” “Power of purity” is abbreviated as jingshi 凈勢. It arises simultaneously with correct attentiveness. Xiehe 叶合 means “to cooperate.” Briefly, there are two intentional objects (義境) that conviction [working with the mind] takes as cognitive objects. 1. Because of the desire for true principle Here it is provisionally stated that true principle is a cognitive object from which conviction derives mental impressions. [True principle] implicitly refers to self-nature. We humans are impeded by afflictions and do not see [our] self-nature. Not being content to be ignorant like grass, trees, birds, and animals, we are certain to want to understand fully the profound secrets of the universe and human life. In other words, we want to know for ourselves what has always been there. This is the desire to seek for true principle. and because true [principle] is able to be seen, conviction arises. Because self-nature is seen, this is called seeing true principle. Conviction arising from seeing true [principle] is possible only by seeking within for true verification. 2. Conviction arising from self-power. That is, since one relies on self-nature to develop superior practices, [one gains the] profound conviction that self-power is obtainable and is able to be realized. “Practice” is “to create.” From the slightest thought to the most manifest verbal and physical expressions, all creation, all actions are collectively called “practices.” “Superior practices”: because these practices rely on self-nature, 94. Arises simultaneously with the mind. 95. This is possibly based on the notion of “the perfection of one’s powers” (balapāramitā), one of the “ten perfections (daśa-pāramitā).”

Y6693.indb 283

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

284

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

they give rise to pure, undefiled good and so are called “superior practices.” Because these practices develop by following the nature, it can be profoundly believed that self-power can be obtained and not be lost; that it can be realized and remain undefiled. Thus, in resisting aggressive invasion, the Indian sage [Mohandas Karamchand] Gandhi [1869–1948] had no afflicted habituated tendencies whatsoever. He followed his nature [in resisting] that which was unacceptable and thus profoundly believed that self-power could be obtained and realized in his practices. Confucius said: “I no sooner wish to be humane than lo!—humaneness is at hand.” This quotation has the same import. Thus the meaning of conviction is very strict. What is conventionally called “superstition” [(literally “confused conviction”) refers to] mistaking “conviction” to be “verification” (勝解), hence the confusion. There is [the object-specific mental associate of] verification in both confused and enlightened minds. Conviction, however, is real and is not confused. For this reason, the Analects [p. 131]

values resolute conviction. Because the characteristic of the purity of conviction is the diametrical opposite of the characteristic of the turbidity of insolence and shamelessness, Turbidity reaches its extreme in insolence and shamelessness. it is said [above] that conviction “directly counteracts insolence and shamelessness.” Conventionally, conviction means affirming beyond doubt the determination of cognitive objects. Actually, this is merely affirmation and is not conviction. As for conviction, it is nothing other than the self-conviction that arises from self-understanding and self-knowledge. This is what the Book of Change calls: “Realizing things in silence, trusting without being told to do so, this depends on virtuous conduct!” My friend Ma Yifu says: “Here self-conviction is what the various [Sinitic] schools of Buddhism call ‘self-confirmation.’ ” What wonderful words! How profound and far-reaching! Only with self-understanding and self-knowledge is there self-confirmation. To have attained this is to be towering, imperturbable, 96. Analects 7.30. 97. One of the five object-specific mental associates described above. 98. Analects 8.13. 99. Two of the fourteen secondary afflictions identified by Xiong. 100. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.33a.

Y6693.indb 284

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

285

and steadfast—the stuff of dauntless heroism. Despite this, ordinary people all willingly abuse and demean themselves—how could they possibly understand “self-confirmation”?

4.3 Contra-Craving (無貪) Because it directly counteracts cravings and has no impure attachments, it is called “contra-craving.” Because concentration and conviction are associated with the mind, the power of contra-craving operates together with them. Contra-craving refers to the meticulous discernment of the habituated tendency of craving such that it is thoroughly prohibited. “Contra” (無) is a term of prohibition. The body is not something that is privately possessed. It has always been interconnected as a single whole with heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things. By placing the body in the shared place of heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things, then just the same as the others, each one obtains. Each gets its proper place. Why be constrained by the physical body, erroneously generating cravings and attachments, [finally] fettering and destroying self-nature? Although it is used to draw a division between other and self, the nature has always been without differentiation. If people treat the physical body as their own so that they become attached to it, then they will be certain to fetter and destroy their self-nature. Having by themselves forfeited their original genuineness (本真), they are thus deeply pitiable. As such, one should cease craving self-entity. This does not mean severing self-entity but only to cease craving self-entity. To become unshakably attached to treating one’s self-entity as private is craving and hence must be stopped. The ten thousand things are naturally generated, yet there is 101. Mencius 4A.10. 102. One of the five primary afflictions described by Xiong. 103. Xiong is using wu 無 in the sense of wu 勿. 104. The phrase tong yan jie de 同焉皆得 is from the following passage in the “Pian mu 駢拇” (Webbed Fingers) chapter of Zhuangzi, 21/8/16: “Hence, all under heaven are naturally generated yet they know not how it is they are generated; just the same as the others, each one obtains, yet they do not know how it is that they obtain.” 105. Again, the term guwang 梏亡 is a reference to the Ox Mountain parable in Mencius 6A.8. 106. Emending you yan 誘焉 to youran 誘然 on the grounds of intelligibility and on the basis of the wording of the “Pian mu 駢拇” chapter of Zhuangzi, 21/8/16.

Y6693.indb 285

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

286

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

actually no characteristic of “arising” to be obtained because ceaseless arising does not abide, This is because they instantaneously cease. and because there is no abiding there are no things. Because they lack self-nature, it is said that there are no things. Change says: “Ceaseless arising is called Change” and “Change is devoid of entity.” This shows that arising has never had an independently existing self-entity, the import of which is actually consistent with that found in Perfection of Wisdom [literature]. Since there are no things, then there is actually nothing that arises in arising. Since arising is nonarising, then is it not a delight to place arising in non-arising and lodge it in the limitless?! Why not awaken to the illusory transformation of arising and [to the fact] that desires depend on it; to erroneous attachment to the arising of a single self and the hope it will continue to exist in the future? “Why not” up to here is one sentence. The phrase “illusory transformation” has no negative connotations. Because “arising” has always instantaneously arisen and instantaneously ceased, and is not something that abides, it is referred to as “illusory transformation.” Details of the meaning of this are set out in the chapter “Transformation” [chapter 3]. “Erroneous attachment and so forth”: generation is the continuous flow of great transformation. There has never been a “single self,” but because people crave a future existence, they are erroneously attached to [the belief] in the arising of a single self. Accordingly they are confused. [p. 132]

Thus, craving a future existence should accordingly be stopped. This does not mean stopping a future existence but merely to stop craving for future existence. Falsely presuming self-entity in their life—that is, they selfishly conduct their own life—they hold fast to it. This is craving and so should be stopped. As for [my descendants, they are] the flow of great arising (大生). It is named “great arising” because the myriad things arise as the same whole. If I were to have descendants, it would also be because of the uninterrupted flow of great arising. Whereas things are attached to their physical form and identify self-interestedly with the progeny of their kind, In passing on seed, animals and plants each identify self-interestedly with their own kind. if they were to follow their nature, how could humans possibly iden107. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.13a, 7.10b.

Y6693.indb 286

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

287

tify self-interestedly with “my descendants”? Liezi says: “Your body is not for you to own; it is a mixture of vital stuff entrusted by heaven-and-earth. Your descendants are not for you to own; they are but exuviae entrusted by heaven-and-earth.” To treat descendants as one’s private possessions is to be attached to the physical body and ignorant of the nature itself and so be greatly confused. Thus craving for descendants should be stopped. This does not mean stopping [having] descendants but only severing the craving for descendants. To identify self-interestedly with descendants, treating them as if they belong to you, is a craving and so should be stopped. The function of the union of man and woman is procreation. With love there is respect, and so the nature is followed. Respectful love is not craving. In seeking [to satisfy cravings] through the physical body, love becomes dissolute, and the human way becomes reduced to that of birds and beasts. According to Chinese ritual teachings, it is mutual respect that should be valued in the proper relationship between husband and wife, and so romantic passion is not given expression in speech or behavior. This conforms with heaven. Westerners, however, talk of romantic love. Calling love romance is really a defiled attachment, and being mired in the physical, the nature is lost. Thus sexual craving should accordingly be stopped. It is not that sex should be stopped but only the craving for sex. If sexual union is indecorous, relations are improper, and conduct in the home is indecent and lacking in respect, then this is an expression of craving and should be stopped. The inherent nature is replete in its endowment and does not rely on pursuing things externally. Where are the deficiencies in people’s inherent nature? It is only because of pursuit of the external that deficiencies arise. There have always been limitations on what is needed to nurture the physical [body]. If one acts freely within the bounds of one’s allotment, this will not damage one’s nature. If one dissolutely indulges cravings without end, then the inherent [nature] has actually already been cut off. Losing one’s nature through the pursuit of external things is to cut off one’s original [nature]. Thus, craving for the supports for living should accordingly be stopped. It is not that the supports for living should be stopped but only stopping the craving for the supports for living. To concentrate on the pursuit of external 108. “Tian duan 天端” (Edge of Heaven), Liezi 列子, Sibu beiyao ed., 1.15b; see also the “Zhi bei you 知北游” (Knowledge Wandered North) chapter of Zhuangzi, 58/22/26. 109. The qualities and capabilities one is born with (anyatamānyatama).

Y6693.indb 287

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

288

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

things leads to the loss of oneself. This is excessive craving and so should be stopped. The “Free and Easy Wandering” chapter of Zhuangzi says: “Like a hazy memory, he had forgotten about his empire.” The “Tai Bo” chapter of the Analects says: “The Master said, ‘How majestic! Shun and Yu possessed the empire, yet it was as if it were nothing to them!’ ” These are examples of being able to stop the craving for the necessities of livelihood. Craving for craving and craving for what has been stored up See under the mental associate of craving. are like making a spider’s web to bind oneself: the mind is transformed by things, and the life force becomes extinguished. Thus, these two types of craving should accordingly be stopped. When the nature is truly seen, there are no “self views” that can be attached to. Because the self has never been established, how could there be attachment to “self views”? It exists as if it does not exist. Its fullness is as if empty. To follow the [principle of] things and not contravene, [that principle] is called wisdom. It does not involve using personal perspectives. “To follow the [principle of] things . . .” means following the actuality of the principle of things; it does not mean using [p. 133]

“self views” to conjecture and to contravene [that principle]. Zhuangzi said: “The way has never had borders, and speech has never had that which makes it constant.” When wisdom (知) is used for one’s own personal ends, [Zhi 知] is read as zhi 智. borders begin to be established and “the paths of affirming and denying are inextricably confused.” Thus, craving for “what one sees” should accordingly be stopped. The foregoing is a rough account of eight kinds of antidotes [to craving], and my account of contra-craving is more or less complete.

4.4 Contra-Antipathy (無瞋) Because it directly counteracts antipathy and because there is a lack of hatred, it is called “contra-antipathy.” Because concentration and conviction

110. “Free and Easy Wandering,” Zhuangzi, 2/1/34. 111. Analects 8.18. 112. “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” Zhuangzi, 5/2/55. 113. “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” Zhuangzi, 6/2/70.

Y6693.indb 288

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

289

are associated with the mind, the power of contra-antipathy operates together with them. “Contra-antipathy” refers to the meticulous discernment of the habituated tendency of antipathy such that it is thoroughly prohibited. Among sentient beings, causal factors relating to benefit, harm, and so forth give rise to hatred. When recollections of these arise, by reflecting inwardly on one’s innate mind, the feeling of commiseration [that one will spontaneously express] will be as keen as a wound and one will not be bothered about verifying it. Jiao 校 is to check (計較). Mind embodies things such that it is all pervasive because there is nothing in the whole world that it does not look upon as not being me. Innate mind is not different from the nature. The nature: things and me are the same whole/body; hence it is said “mind embodies things such that it is all pervasive.” When, however, the power of antipathy is replete, it seems as if it wants to deceive the mind, giving full rein to its afflictive hindrances. This is nothing out of the ordinary and hence is referred to as the battle between principle and desire. At this point it is necessary to rely on the power of contra-antipathy to assist the mind in order for it to be possible to overcome this affliction. As heavenly bestowed clarity (天明), the mind is not different from the nature. It is difficult for the nature to reveal itself, and it needs to rely upon pure habituated tendencies in order to operate. As a pure habituated tendency, the mental associate contra-antipathy arises by according with the nature, and so the mind is able to rely on this pure habituated tendency in order to be revealed. By following their nature, people are able to avoid losing [the qualities of] kindness and gentleness brought about by antipathy toward things [through considerations of] benefit and harm. It is through the embodiment of things that genuineness (誠) comes to be established. Embodying things: because the myriad things and I form a single body/whole it is through contra-antipathy that genuineness is fully realized. Fully including the [myriad] things is the means by which to preserve humaneness. Because of contra-antipathy, things are fully included. If there is antipathy, then it will be deleterious to things and they will not be able to be fully included, so my humaneness will be harmed. When humans most fully stand erect, they are far removed from birds and animals. It is not that birds and animals lack a nature but because their vital stuff is turbid or heavy their heavenly endowed nature is completely submerged and their inherent mind is completely concealed. Because of this they understand only [matters of] benefit and harm and nothing else. As for their skills in pursuing

Y6693.indb 289

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

290

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

food and their sharpening of talon and tooth to ward off trouble—in each case this is motived by self-interest in matters of benefit and harm, as they are incapable of finding the strengths they possess to free themselves from [considerations of] benefit and harm. With people, it is different. They are able to develop their heavenly endowed nature and inherent mind and so possess the illumination of such wholesome mental associates as contraantipathy, contra-craving, and contra-ignorance. This is whereby they differ from birds and animals. Suppose someone were to raise the following objection: “Does not being confronted by someone who is violent also lead antipathy to arise?” I would reply: If antipathy were to arise in passive response to someone’s violence, it would not actually be antipathy. [In such a case], the antipathy would be in accommodation of that person and not be because of self-interest. “The antipathy would be in accommodation of that person”: The violent behavior of that person is harmful to sentient beings and unacceptable to universally accepted norms (公理); thus, accommodating that person with antipathy is not antipathy that arises from self-interest in matters of benefit and harm. By freely acting in accommodation, there is never a moment in which antipathy has accumulated [within one]. Thus even if this [accommodation were to take the form of] killing, [p. 134]

this would [still] not be antipathy because it would be in accommodation of that person[’s actions]. Accommodating the fact that he should be killed, I kill him. Because my actions are devoid of self-interest, this is not antipathy. 114. Views shared by Zhu Xi (and Cheng Yi) appear to be in the background here. In Zhu Xi’s Lunyu jizhu commentary to Analects 6.3, for example, Zhu Xi relates that Confucius’s disciple Yan Yuan (Yan Hui) did not harbor a store of anger that he would transfer to objects and people. This does not mean that Yan had no emotional responses, but that he responded to the anger he encountered in his dealings with the world by making sure that his emotional responses were in line with the appropriate principle. If they were, then he responded by being angry. Since this principle was part of his nature and mind, he had direct access to it. Zhu cited Cheng Yi on this point: “Yan Hui’s anger depended on other things and not on himself. Accordingly, he did not transfer it. . . . . Since joy and anger were dependent on particular matters, then he dealt with a particular matter by matching it with an appropriate level of joy or anger. Since [his emotions] were not dependent on his own temperament, he did not transfer joy or anger.” Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, p. 84.

Y6693.indb 290

6/30/15 2:55:55 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

291

Some conventional ru 儒 say that the abhorrence of evil should not be too severe—these are the words of the hypocritical village worthy. Since evil should be abhorred, when should it not be severe? If it is not severe, then it must be the case that the genuineness of one’s own fondness for goodness and hatred of evil has yet to be realized, and so one indulges the self-interest of being lenient. It must be understood that the severe [abhorrence] of evil is also in accommodation of someone’s evil, and it is not permissible to allow self-interested notions of leniency or severity to come into play. If the hypocritical village worthy’s words were carried out, then the violent people would always have their way—this must be guarded against! The most difficult matter to differentiate is whether antipathy is motivated by self-interest or not; it is not the case that self-interest and the lack of self-interest are difficult to differentiate. It is difficult to differentiate because it is in the human character always to present one’s self-interest as being devoid of self-interest, thus deceiving oneself. Take, for example, someone who passes himself off as a “revolutionary.” When he does not hold office, he expresses antipathy toward the violence of those who are in office, and he shows support for the masses. It most definitely seems as if his antipathy is not motivated by self-interest. In reality, he has absolutely no sympathy for the wishes of the masses. He wants only to indulge his rapacious cruelty and is frustrated that he is unable to realize his desires. He presents himself as one of the masses solely in order to give the deceptive appearance that his revolutionary stratagems are not motivated by self-interest. Having thus deceived himself, over time he is no longer aware that it is self-interest, and so when it comes to pass that his violence is even more ferocious than it was formerly, only then do the masses discern his concealed motives. Despite this, he still does not admit that it is self-interest. If it should be the case that someone’s antipathy was not subjectively biased, then when hatred arises in the accommodation of some matter, concealed within there is also sure to be pity and grief. The account of Zengzi’s saying [to his student Yang Fu] that in the course of trying criminal cases,

115. A reference to the “village worthy” mentioned in both the Analects 17.13 and Mencius 7B.37. Following the 1932 redaction of the literary edition of New Treatise in reading xiangyuan 鄉愿 rather than the 2001 redaction, which reads xiangyuan 鄉願. 116. Again amending xiangyuan 鄉願 to xiangyuan 鄉愿.

Y6693.indb 291

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

292

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

when you have got to the truth of the matter, be aggrieved for [those who are guilty] rather than be glad is one that greatly pleases me. This [is an illustration of] the genuineness that welled forth from his innate mind as he personally experienced the feelings of other people without allowing any degree of self-interest to intervene. If antipathy issues from self-interest, then afflictions arise and the innate mind is already lost. This is because the mind is obscured by afflictions. [When this happens,] then things and self are severed and all that is seen is that which is detestable about others, so how can there be any pity and grief? These words are crucial. If one retaliates to the violence of others with antipathy, then one also becomes caught up in it, unaware that this is so. Is there anything more frightening? Hence, antipathy in sentient beings must be severed. Being at ease in one’s place (土), humaneness can be realized with diligent sincerity. This is based on the “Appended Statements” Commentary to [the Book of] Change. Tu 土 is perceptual field (境界). This is saying that if objects transform [according to mind], one will be at ease, and that this is how one’s humaneness can be realized with diligent sincerity. No matter where one enters, one will “get it from/by/within oneself.” The Doctrine of the Mean says: “No matter where he enters, the gentleman is able thereby to get it from/by/within himself.” If the mind is fettered by cognitive objects, then even though heaven-and-earth are huge, the poet still lamented that there was nowhere to ride to. If cognitive objects transform according to the mind (境隨心轉), then even living in a mean lane is not unbearable, 117. Analects 19.19. 118. Literally, “embodied things.” 119. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.10a. 120. That is, the mind transforms objects and is not transformed by objects. 121. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 52.9b. 122. An allusion to “Jie nan shan 節南山” (Mao #191): I yoke my four steeds, My four steeds, long-necked. I look to the four quarters [of the kingdom]; Distress is everywhere (蹙蹙); there is nowhere I can drive to. Shijing 詩經 (Book of Odes), Shisan jing zhushu, 12/1.8a; James Legge (trans.), The Shû King, Shih King and Hsiâo King, in The Sacred Books of the East, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1879), p. 353. Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127–200), however, glossed cucu 蹙蹙 as “very small”; this is clearly the reading Xiong follows.

Y6693.indb 292

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

293

since worthies naturally have their own source of contentment at hand. Thus [responding] with antipathy to perceptual fields must be severed. Being attached to notions of what is the case and what is not the case is always limited by the constraints of deluded consciousness. It is impossible to draw all perspectives together if one upholds only the view of some narrow perspective. Regardless of whether one accepts some view or goes to the other extreme and rejects it, necessarily there will be bias. That whereby the illumination of something is established is precisely that whereby its concealment is achieved. Zhuangzi said: “That whereby what is the case and what is not the case come to be highlighted is that whereby the way comes to be diminished. That whereby the way comes to be diminished is that whereby subjective preferences are realized.” Here “subjective preferences” belong to the category of cognitive afflictions. Illumination and concealment are mutually entailing. When attachment to hindrances runs rife, arguments [p. 135]

arise in contention, there is deprecation and fault-finding, and [those involved] treat one another as archenemies. Thus non-Buddhist schools in India went so far as to demand their opponents’ heads [if their opponents lost in debate], and even here in China we have the metaphor of attacking someone with his own weapon. Such examples show the harm caused by

123. Allusion to Analects 6.11. 124. “Discourse on Making All Things Equal,” Zhuangzi, 5/2/42. 125. Cognitive afflictions (所知障) refers to the mistaken belief that dharmas, phenomena, have real existence. 126. There are a number of references to this practice in the literature. See, for example, the story involving Āryadeva 提婆, the third-century Indian monk who was a disciple of Nāgārjuna, and his exchange with some non-Buddhist opponents, in Tanyao 曇曜, and Kivkara 吉迦夜 (fifth century compilers and translators), Fu fazang yinyuan zhuan 付法藏 因緣傳 (Account of the Causes and Conditions of the Transmission of the Dharma Treasury), T50n2058_p0319b18–24. This text is an early chronicle of Indian Dharma transmission but was probably compiled in China. 127. The idiom alludes to an exchange between He Xiu 何休 (129–182) and Zheng Xuan, in which He Xiu concedes that Zheng Xuan was able to turn He’s own arguments against him by drawing on the very same texts that He had used. See “Zheng Xuan zhuan 鄭玄傳” (Biography of Zheng Xuan), Fan Ye 范曄 (396–446), Hou Han shu 後漢書 (History of the Later Han) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), 35.1204.

Y6693.indb 293

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

294

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

antipathy. One who sees his nature is not constrained by deluded consciousness and so is able to accommodate both what is the case and what is not the case, mysteriously merge self and other, cease speaking and abandon conceptual distinction-making, and rest on the potter’s wheel of heaven (天鈞). One should understand that the efforts of those who engage in distinction-making are like [the efforts] made by midges [as they fly] between heaven and earth. Although they have to speak, it is consistently worthless. Hence, when wisdom and principle tacitly correspond, delight and anger no longer function—are there likely still to be the vexations of argumentation? Hence, when antipathy is seen, it must be severed.

4.5 Contra-Ignorance (無癡) Because it directly counteracts ignorance and has clear understanding of principles and things, it is called “contra-ignorance.” How does contraignorance arise? Due to the power of concentration, in the just visible inherent mind, [contra-ignorance] is drawn together and enhanced. “Just visible inherent mind”: Because the mind is concealed by afflictions it cannot be manifestly expressed and is barely manifest through the concealment; hence it is said to be just visible. Refer to the [previous discussion of] the mental associate of concentration. Due to the power of conviction, [the mind’s] inherent purity is led forth and developed. “Inherent purity”: This says that the innate mind has always been pure but because it has been concealed by afflictions, it depends on the power of conviction to lead it forth and develop it. Thereupon the wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature arises. “The wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature” is the inherent mind. The inherent mind has always been the pervasive illumination of perfect brightness; hence it is termed wisdom. In humans it is the principle whereby humans live and hence is spoken of as human nature. Refer to my note in the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis.” Due to the wisdom [inherent in] one’s own na128. Following the gloss provided in marginal note 19 of the 2001 redaction of New Treatise. 129. On this passage from the “Discourse on Making All Things Equal” chapter of Zhuangzi, see Brook Ziporyn (trans. and comp.), Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009), p. 14. 130. New Treatise, p. 10 (2001 redaction pagination): “When we reflect within, brilliantly, in a thought-moment, there is clear awareness. This precisely is the awareness of self-nature,

Y6693.indb 294

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

295

ture, clear understanding arises. “Clear understanding” is another term for contra-ignorance. Clear understanding has always belonged to the category of that which is obtained subsequent to [what has been innately endowed]. Clear understanding relies upon knowledge of self-nature in order to arise and is itself not knowledge of self-nature. Because it is a pure habituated tendency, it is said to be “obtained subsequent to [what has been innately endowed].” It mostly operates with respect to cognitive objects, gradually expanding. “Mostly operates with respect to [external] cognitive objects”: Fundamentally, clear understanding is the cognition of cognitive objects. It is, however, also able to turn inward to take self-nature as its cognitive object. For this reason, with respect to taking [external things] as its cognitive objects, it is said to be “mostly.” “Gradually expanding”: This is because as clear understanding increasingly hones the depth of its capacities, correspondingly, its power is broadly and continuously disseminated. The first signs of its power do not suddenly appear without cause; in order to arise, it must have knowledge of self-nature at its fundamental support. For example, the burning of fire and the reach of a spring’s [flow of water] both have a basis. The Treatise on the Great Vehicle Abhidharma explains that “clear understanding” is “discernment” (慧), but Cheng weishi lun did not accept this explanation. On balanced consideration, the Cheng weishi lun view should hence it is said ‘self-nature is awareness.’ In fact, awareness is self-nature. It is simply that by joining [words] together this word [‘self-nature’] is formed. Moreover, the word ‘selfnature’ (自性) is but a different term for [Fundamental] Reality. If one includes all things in the cosmos, and refers to their origin, it is called Reality. If one refers strictly to one’s own origin, it is called self-nature. This is because although verbally they are different, what they refer to is the same.” 131. Asan˙ga, Abhidharma-samuccaya (Dasheng apidamo ji lun 大乘阿毘達磨集論), trans. Xuanzang. 132. Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0030a09–12: “What is contra-ignorance? It is the nature of this mental associate clearly to understand principles and things. Its function is to counteract ignorance so that good can be accomplished. There is an interpretation which says that the nature of contra-ignorance is discernment [because] the Treatise on the Great Vehicle Abhidharma [T31n1605_p0664b12–13] says that it has as its true nature the certitude that comes from retribution, teaching, verification, and knowledge.” Cheng weishi lun immediately [T31n1585_p0030a14–15] proceeds to cite an alternative interpretation which says that the nature of contra-ignorance is not discernment but has a separate nature of its own “because it is directly opposed to ignorance and as with contra-craving and contra-antipathy, it is included as a root of goodness.”

Y6693.indb 295

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

296

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

be followed. In the past I have said that clear [understanding] (ming 明) and discernment share a few similar traces, but actually they are completely different. “Clear understanding” can also be abbreviated as ming 明. A few similar traces they share are as follows: (1) Since discernment discriminates cognitive objects, That is, phenomena. so too does clear understanding. This is the first vaguely similar characteristic. (2) Further, with the case of precise discernment, in its discrimination of cognitive objects, the certainty provided by clear verification is sure to find its matching tally. This says that its discrimination of cognitive objects is certain to provide verification that tallies with [p. 136]

principle. If one is first to overcome difficulties and later to reap the benefits of doing so, it is necessary to be vigilant about happenstance. Principle is not attained by happenstance. When clear understanding discriminates, because it is also like this, [discernment and clear understanding are thus said to be similar]. This is the second vaguely similar characteristic. Actual differences. (1) Discernment always pursues cognitive objects and transforms together with them “Transforms together with them”: When discernment arises, it necessarily is manifest resembling an image of the cognitive object. And even if it is an extremely abstract concept [that functions as the cognitive object], discernment still manifests resembling an image of that cognitive object. and so loses its innate “wisdom of self-nature” (自性智) and does not understand how to seek it. Discernment is concerned with discriminating cognitive objects. In other words, it looks outward at things and so is incapable of inwardly taking self-nature as inner cognitive object. If one uses discernment to seek self-nature, it will be unable to grasp anything and so become greatly confused. For this reason, old maxims often scorn knowledge for being an impediment to this principle. When there is clear 133. Cf. New Treatise, p. 128: “One begins to understand human life by first overcoming difficulties and later reaping the benefits in doing so. It is only by gaining benefits as a result of victory secured in the midst of difficulties that the richness of human life is understood.” 134. New Treatise, p. 135: “The wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature” is the inherent mind. 135. Here principle refers to self-nature.

Y6693.indb 296

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

297

understanding, then open and expansive observation Because it is capable of not being constrained by cognitive objects, it is said to be expansive observation. is able to apprehend the general characteristic (總相). “General characteristic” refers to self-nature. With regard to its presence in people, it is called “self-nature”; with regard to its being the Reality of the ten thousand things pervasively, it is called “the general characteristic.” This is because even though it [discernment] does not directly realize self-nature, it does take self-nature as a remote ālambana [condition]. “Does not directly realize self-nature”: If the wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature were to be directly presented, then it would realize itself—that is, “to realize directly.” Now, clear understanding is simply that which arises with the wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature as its basis and already is not the “wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature” itself. And although it can turn to look upon its own selfnature, it simply assesses it be “the general characteristic,” and so it is said to take [self-nature] as a remote cognitive object. Because it does not itself directly realize it, it is thus said that it takes [self-nature] as a remote ālambana [condition]. Yet even so, this is extremely far removed from those who are so completely confused that they do not even understand how to seek it. This is the first actual difference. (2) Further, in making determinations about things even though discernment is said to be [wisdom] based on discrimination (如量[智]), because it remains attached to [phenomenal] characteristics, it is still ignorance and is not truly capable of [wisdom] based on discrimination. What is the reason? In conventional truth it is postulated that all things certainly exist; in absolute truth, however, they all lack reality. Take, for example, the use of discernment to make deductions (比知). Bizhi 比知 is deduction (比度). The earth moves and [therefore] is not still. Those who employ discernment are certain to say that this is [wisdom] based on discrimination. Actually, when discernment takes up cognitive objects, it is strongly attached to the [phenomenal] characteristics of earth and movement. [To see that this is so,] it would be necessary to investigate consciousness at the very thoughtmoment [it takes up these cognitive objects]. Attachment to characteristics is ignorance. Because it is at odds with reality, how can it be said to be [wisdom] based on discrimination? “Because it is at odds with reality”: if there is attachment to characteristics, then this will not correspond with the principle of truth (真諦理). Clear understanding thus differs from discernment.

Y6693.indb 297

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

298

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

And although in the context of conventional [truth] things are provisionally posited as existing, when the principle (理) of these things is analyzed, there is no attachment to characteristics. This point is crucial. When earth tremors and fissures arise [in consciousness,] in reality there has never been any attachment to the characteristics of earth or images of movement. The worthy masters of various Buddhist schools had achieved this stage. Thus, this is not ignorance; it is genuine [wisdom] based on discrimination. This is the second actual difference. Summarizing the foregoing, it is not the case that clear understanding is the same as discernment. This meaning has been definitively established. Ordinary people, however, are not capable of possessing clear understanding. This is not to say that they have not always had it. Although each and every person is innately endowed with this great treasure-store, they do not [p. 137]

take it upon themselves to develop it, and so it is said [they are] “not capable of possessing it.” Clear understanding arises by cleaving to the wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature (自性智). If this wisdom is unable to be revealed, then clear understanding is not produced. The wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature is also simply referred to as “wisdom.” Yet even though this wisdom is not revealed, by no means is there an absence of wisdom— rather, it is simply that it is due to its being impeded by afflictions that it is not revealed. Over time, one who continuously employs discernment and who is richly imbued with the desire to seek true principle “True principle” is the same [concept discussed in] the account of the mental associate called “conviction.” Refer to my annotation in [my account of] the mental associate called conviction. will come to feel that discernment is of limited use and that if the profound secrets of the cosmos and human life are to be realized, then this cannot be achieved by means of observations made on the basis 136. Conviction is one of Xiong’s seven wholesome mental associates. In his above account of conviction, he writes in his auto-commentary: “[True principle] implicitly refers to self-nature. We humans are impeded by afflictions and do not see [our] self-nature. Not being content to be ignorant like grass, trees, birds, and animals, we are certain to want to understand fully the profound secrets of the universe and human life. In other words, we want to know for ourselves what has always been there. This is the desire to seek for true principle.”

Y6693.indb 298

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

299

of extrapolating from things. More incisive efforts must be made to seek for what lies within oneself. Thereupon there will be self-understanding and selfknowledge, and the wisdom inherent in one’s nature will finally be revealed and developed from therein. A line from a Song lyric poem best captures this: “In this crowd I’ve searched for her a hundred times / Then suddenly I wheel around and here she is! / At this very spot where lanterns fade.” When the wisdom [inherent in] one’s own nature arises, then its Reality is established and its function operates of itself. Extending the wondrous application of this wisdom to things, such that each attains its due principle, is clear understanding. All of this is said to explain clear understanding. Clear understanding is the functioning of wisdom and operates in connection with things. It is always the case that the more it is honed, the clearer it becomes. Thus, clear understanding arises also in taking discriminated things as cognitive objects, and so it is said to be “subsequently obtained” (後得). Because clear understanding involves the discrimination of things, and depends on being honed for it to be increased, it is explained as “subsequently obtained.” “Subsequently obtained” means that it is habituated. An objector might hold that if one maintains that [clear understanding] is subsequently obtained, then it should be explained exclusively in empirical terms, and there should be no explanation in terms of the “functioning of wisdom” being intermingled with concrete things. This, however, is to fail to understand that in talking about the empirical it is necessary to have an experiential subject. In this connection, the experiential subject is called “clear understanding.” As for “clear understanding,” of course it is not without a basis, and so it is said to be the “functioning of wisdom.” And because it is the functioning of wisdom, it is said to arise on the basis of wisdom. As it happens, this is the sole difference between discernment (慧) and wisdom. It must, however, also be understood that as soon as we begin talking about function—acting when sensing things, moving in response to things—it is already a matter of arising subsequently and not of our inherent self-nature’s original discernment (了). And if it were not for our responding to things, then there would 137. Xin Qiji 辛棄疾 (1140–1207) “Qing yu an. Yuan xi 青玉案。 元夕” (To the Tune Sapphire Jade Plate. Night of the Lantern Festival), in Jiaxuan ci biannian jianzhu 稼軒詞 編年箋注 (Annotated Chronology of Xin Qiji’s Lyrical Poems) (Shanghai: Gudian wenxue chubanshe, 1957), p. 175. Translation by Dongbo available at http://www.mountainsongs .net/poem_.php?id=727.

Y6693.indb 299

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

300

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

be no way to perceive this functioning. Hence it is further stated that clear understanding arises by taking discriminated things as cognitive objects. Accordingly, as the functioning of wisdom, clear understanding is indeed subsequently obtained. Logically this is beyond doubt. In talking about clear understanding, former masters also called it “true discernment,” True discernment: [it is called this] so as to differentiate it from ordinary discernment. which I still find unsatisfactory since it is somewhat indiscriminate. In reality, clear understanding arises on the basis of wisdom, and because it is the functioning of wisdom it can also be termed “wisdom”; or, in relation to self-nature, it is termed “subsequently attained wisdom.” Thus explained, the terms “clear understanding” and “discernment” are not indiscriminately [employed]. Someone might also ask: “We have learned that clear understanding arises on the basis of wisdom, but does discernment also have a basis?” Now, I would reply: It is not the case that discernment does not also rely on the wisdom [inherent in] self-nature (自性智). Those who say that discernment derives from experience are also correct. It is the case, however, that even though discernment relies on experience [p. 138]

to arise, crucially it has its own experiential subject function. It is precisely this function that is discernment itself. This, of course, is not fused from outside, and since it is not fused from outside, it too arises on the basis of the wisdom [inherent in] self-nature. Imagine if we were not endowed with the wisdom [inherent in] self-nature—we would then be soulless dead things. How then could discernment arise and so constitute experiential subjects? Then again, why is it also the case that one cannot say that discernment relies on wisdom to arise? Although wisdom is innate in people, ever since they are alive they are constantly constrained by form-and-vital-stuff, creating various habituated tendencies, and thus causing inherent nature-wisdom Self-nature’s [inherent] wisdom can also be referred to as nature-wisdom. to be continually blocked and so unable to be revealed. Hence, as to the matter of [discernment’s experiential] function flowing among impediments, since it is intermixed with the selfishness [that arises from] form-and-vital-stuff 138. Maitreya, Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, T30n1579_p0388a16.

Y6693.indb 300

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

301

and habituated tendencies, then in perceiving cognitive objects, it assumes the power of a thing interacting with things. This is why discernment is not able to be termed the functioning of wisdom and so cannot be described as arising on the basis of wisdom. This passage is very difficult to explain, and furthermore, people today have never paid attention to this matter. Hence it is necessary to await for nature-wisdom to be revealed, and only then will the clear understanding that arises on the basis of wisdom serve as the unadulterated marvelous functioning of wisdom—something that discernment cannot measure up to. The way wisdom is revealed is by creating pure habituated tendencies so as to draw it forth. This section [on wholesome mental associates] began with concentration (定) and conviction (信), [individual] pure habituated tendencies that are the first sign of [nature-wisdom]. Just as light can overcome darkness, so it is said that contra-ignorance (無癡) can counteract ignorance. If nature-wisdom is unable always to be master within, then clear understanding will not be replete, and discernment will frequently occur together with ignorance, throwing the mind into confusion. The effect of recovering the nature (復性) is such that it will not allow this to happen. Recovering the nature is when one’s own nature-wisdom is always in control within. Furthermore, [Wang] Yangming’s pure knowing (良知) links nature-wisdom and subsequently obtained wisdom and talks about them indiscriminately (渾淪), revealing his personal experience. Change says: “The sun appears above the earth. Jin [Advance]. By following, one will adhere to this great brightness.” This is the image of contraignorance.

4.6 Sustained Effort (精進) Because [sustained effort] counteracts afflictions and because it enables the mind to be courageous and valiant, it is called “sustained effort.” Because of correct attentiveness (如理作意), the powers of courage and valor arise together with it [sustained effort], and collaborate in the mind, operating together. All those people who do not make a sustained effort because they are enslaved to [their physical] form and imprisoned by afflictions are unable to 139. “Judgment” commentary, Jin 晉 (Advance) hexagram, Book of Change, 4.11a, slightly misquoted.

Y6693.indb 301

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

302

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

undertake anything. In abandoning their minds, they lose their lives. They are unable to undertake anything: unable to bear anything, unable to endure anything, just like plants, trees, birds, and animals. “Abandon”: to lose. They do not, of their own accord, preserve and nourish their minds; hence they are abandoned. The mind is the principle by which [humans] are able to live. If the mind is abandoned, then the principle by which [humans] are able to live will be lost. One who makes a sustained effort strengthens himself relentlessly. His whole is utterly firm and includes the ten thousand things. Here “whole” means “integrated.” Human nature originally is firm and great. Being enslaved to [bodily] form and imprisoned by afflictions, however, people lose their nature. Thus, [p. 139]

sustained effort must be animated so as to integrate the nature that was originally firm and great. It is for no other reason than because it is firm and great that the nature is the origin of the myriad transformations. Only one who follows his nature is able to fully reveal his wisdom and talents; hence the text speaks of “including the ten thousand things.” Utmost sincerity is established so as to rule the many actions. “Sincerity”: genuine and without falsehood—also a reference to the nature. To establish sincerity is to reveal the nature fully. If the many actions are all controlled by sincerity, then everything one does will accord with the nature. With everything being genuine, there will be no duplicity, and hence this is sustained effort. Through daily renewal one’s former ways are no longer followed. Change says: “Daily renewal is called making one’s virtue replete.” It is for no other reason than being firm, vigorous, sincere, and genuine that one constantly creates anew and does not hold onto former ways. Constantly advancing with no place for stopping. “Constantly advancing” is a term from [Zhang] Hengqu. Hence it is within the mind that the attributes of courage and valor are to be located. Sustained effort arises and collaborates [with courage and valor] in the mind, forming a power within the mind; hence the statement “located within the mind.”

140. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.13a–b. 141. Zhang Zai (Hengqu 橫渠), “Da Fan Xun zhi shu 答范巽之書” (Reply to Fan Xun), Zhang Zai ji 張載集 (Collected Writings of Zhang Zai) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978), p. 349.

Y6693.indb 302

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

303

Former masters said that there are five kinds of sustained effort. The first is the sustained effort of wearing armor (被甲精進). This refers to the initial stirrings of fierce excitement, just like the awe that comes with donning armor to enter battle. The second is the sustained effort of application (加行精進). [This is made possible] because of the ensuing expediency [entailed by] resolute striving. That is, only by adopting resolute striving as an expedient means is uninterrupted sustained effort achievable. Here “resolute” is crucial. The third is sustained effort without disdain (無下精進). Having personal realization, there is no self-disdain because the more one applies oneself, the more one’s goal is fulfilled. The fourth is sustained effort with no retrogression (無退精進). Enduring various sufferings to advance ferociously [is sustained effort with no retrogression]. [It is called this] because despite encountering the sufferings of cyclic existence, there is no retrogression. Although it says “without disdain,” when suffering is encountered, sometimes this is not the case, and so the next [of the five kinds of sustained effort] is no retrogression. The fifth is sustained effort that is without satiation. Because there are many broad and vast [endeavors], this leads to people’s growing wearisome of them. Confucius said, “I never grow tired of learning nor weary of teaching.” He also said: “He becomes so absorbed that he forgets to eat, takes such pleasure in it that he forgets his worries, all the while unaware that old age is approaching.” And again: “Forgetting he is old, he is unaware that the years left to him will not be enough [to complete his undertakings], pressing on his way with earnestness from day to day, and only giving up when he dies.” In each of these passages Confucius provides an outline of his own sustained effort. In sum, it is only in sustained effort that the vitality of human life becomes apparent, and the moment there is not sustained effort, humans become dead things. Thus, sustained effort reaches no point of satiation. Sustained effort is harmony between body and mind. Former 142. The five are closely based on those listed at Maitreya, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, T30n1579_p0617b15–17. 143. Paraphrase of Analects 7.2. 144. Analects 7.19. 145. “Biaoji 表記” (On Self-Presentation), Liji, 14.8b; Li Ki, trans. James Legge, in The Sacred Books of the East, ed. Max Müller, vols. 27 and 28 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885), p. 335, modified.

Y6693.indb 303

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

304

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

masters separately established [a category for the wholesome mental associate] of serenity (輕安). I do not follow them. Sustained effort has a different meaning from what we ordinarily call diligence (勤). For example, to do bad things diligently would still be consistent with what is ordinarily meant by diligence. This, however, is actually debasement and is not sustained effort.

4.7 Vigilance (不放逸) Because this mental associate counteracts afflictions and because it [causes] discipline (戒 [śīla]) always to be maintained, The word “always” is crucial. it is called vigilance. Because of correct attentiveness, the powers to be wary and fearful arise together with it [vigilance], collaborating in the mind, operating together, leading to the mind’s being constantly alert, to afflictions being unable to arise, and to providing a basis for concentration (定). Of the three Buddhist practices (三學), discipline is fundamental. Concentration arises from discipline, and so discipline is the basis of concentration. Vigilance includes discipline. In the past, the Confucians had interpretations about maintaining stillness (主靜) [p. 140]

and maintaining reverent composure (主敬), with some students suspecting that these were two [distinct notions]. Such suspicions, however, fail to understand that by not losing hold of reverent composure, one can begin to quell disturbance. And if one is exclusively concentrating [on one matter] and without distraction (主一無適), then inner desires will not sprout, and this is stillness. Here, in explaining concentration, it should be stillness 146. Serenity is the harmonious state of the mind and body attained in meditation. See Xuanzang, Cheng weishi lun, T31n1585_p0031a26. Xiong evidently subsumes this mental associate within that of sustained effort. 147. Guarding against error through moral discipline. 148. Discipline, concentration, and wisdom (the study of doctrine). 149. Associated with Zhou Dunyi. 150. Notions associated with Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. For a comparative study of the two concepts, see Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, “Zhujing yu zhujing 主敬與主靜” (Maintaining Reverent Composure and Maintaining Stillness), Taiwan zongjiao yanjiu 9.1 (2010): 1–27. 151. Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Henan Cheng shi cui yan 河南程氏粹言 (Choice Words of the Cheng Brothers), Er Cheng ji, p. 1173: “Someone asked master Cheng about reverent

Y6693.indb 304

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

305

that is maintained; in saying that vigilance is the basis of concentration, it should be reverent composure that is maintained. That which is subtle and difficult to see is the mind; that which is fierce and controls power is afflictions. If the mind has no ruler, then afflictions control it, usurping its place, and the mind becomes dispersed. It is just like when robbers invade, the ruler is driven away. The [Book of] Rites says: “Where there is no dignity or respect, then violent and disrespectful minds will necessarily enter; where there is disharmony and unhappiness, then boorish and treacherous minds will be sure to enter.” Where there is respectfulness, then naturally there will be empty stillness; where there is reverent composure, naturally there will be harmony and happiness; and so where there is disharmony and unhappiness, there will be disrespectfulness. Thus, one must be firm and unambiguous, solemn and composed, drawing [the mind] together to restrain it. The hexagram name Great Restraint (大畜) is taken from the word “restrain” (畜). To restrain means to preserve and is the opposite of dispersed. If the human mind is not restrained, it will wander aimlessly. All empty clambering is aimless wandering. This mind, however, is a slight and subtle Reality (體) that cannot be seen or heard and comes to be manifest only in hidden and private places—yet its powerful functioning (用) constantly shines. Silence exists “in alterations and transformations, and in words and deeds,” and does not become dispersed in the pursuit of things. Change says: “It is manifest in its benevolence [yet] is concealed in its functioning.” This is what is meant. Having recognized this Reality, one needs to look after it diligently. One must make unremitting efforts to improve oneself and to be cautious, fearful that one might lose it. One must do this with the same gravity as if receiving a guest or as if officiating at a ceremony. Even if harried or in dire straits, one will not renege. In exercising caution and prudence, one should not overlook incipient developments. In self-discipline, there should be no momentary lapses. composure: ‘Why is exclusive concentration called composure?’ The master replied: ‘No distractions is called concentration.’ ” Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, p. 49. 152. See “Yue ji 樂記” (On Music), Liji, 39.17a; and “Ji yi 祭義” (The Meaning of Sacrifices), Liji, 48.4a for close examples. 153. Indiscriminate mental construction. 154. “Appended Statements (B),” Book of Change, 8.23b. 155. “Appended Statements (A),” Book of Change, 7.12b.

Y6693.indb 305

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

306

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

Stop calamity before it has yet started; be vigilant before one speaks and acts. In this way, [the mind] can assume its proper place and not be attacked by afflictions. Hence, the Confucians say: “If falsehoods are put to rest, then of itself sincerity will exist” and also “if there is no reverent composure, then there will be wantonness.” The Chan school says: “[For the mind even] to be temporarily absent is to be the same as a dead person.” These are all teachings related to vigilance, and what they say is extremely incisive. In the Odes, [ancestor Di] said to King Wen [of the Zhou dynasty,] “Be not like those who reject this and cling to that; Be not like those who are ruled by their likings and desires.” These are attributes of vigilance. Students, you should understand that from ordinary people right through to enlightened beings, the task of being wary and fearful does not let up even for a moment; hence it is said: “Be fearful until completing what was started and do not be self-indulgent (縱任).” The term zongren 縱任 can be interpreted in a positive sense to mean “freedom”; it can also be interpreted in a negative sense to mean “unrestrained.” Here it is used in the negative sense. In times of stability, do not forget danger; in times of order, do not forget disorder. Because there are sentient beings who do not sever their afflictions, even buddhas (如來 [tathāgata]) cannot forget to be wary and fearful. From the perspective of inherent mind, sentient beings and buddhas have always been a whole. The marks of affliction [suffered by] sentient beings are the numbing tiredness in the mind of buddhas—how could they possibly not be wary and fearful? A sutra says [Ānanda said to the Buddha]: “If even a single sentient being has yet to achieve buddhahood, I will not enter nirvān.a.” This is what is meant. Understanding incipience makes one godlike, [and to this end] one should strengthen oneself unceasingly. Hence, reverent composure 156. “Wenyan 文言” (Words of the Text) commentary, Book of Change, 1.12b. 157. Source unidentified. 158. Daoyuan, Jingde chuan deng lu, T51n2076_p0315a09. 159. “Huang yi 皇矣” (Mao # 241), Shijing, Shisan jing zhushu, 16/4.9a; The Shû King, Shih King and Hsiâo King, trans. James Legge, in The Sacred Books of the East, ed. Max Müller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1879), p. 391. 160. “Appended Statements (B),” Book of Change, 8.23a. 161. Śūram . gama-sūtra, T19n0945_p0119b17. Ānanda was a chief disciple of the Buddha. 162. “Appended Statements (B),” Book of Change, 8.13a.

Y6693.indb 306

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

307

[p. 141]

is that whereby one completes the beginning and also completes the end. Now, I have placed vigilance at the end of the various wholesome mental associates. The significance of this is profound, and you students should reflect on this properly. Someone might suspect that if one was constantly wary and fearful, it would seem as if one was constrained, thus forming an impediment to the mind. This, however, would be to fail to understand that constraint arises from affliction. If one is wary and fearful, affliction is unable to take control, enabling one not to lose the mind’s inherent openness and ease and so benefit from it right here and now. Hence, being wary and fearful always takes harmony and happiness as its support. Why should there be any anxiety caused by being constrained? The way in which being wary and fearful look after this mind is like the way a helmsman holds the helm steady, not daring to be the least bit careless. At first it seems in vain to attend to the task, but over time strength and skill reach maturity and one’s body becomes the helm. It is just like the way Cook Ding had plenty of room to move his knife-edge [between bones and sinews] when dissecting oxen. As [Lu] Xiangshan said: “Working from a position of strength saves energy.” Thus the proposition that being wary and fearful is a kind of constraint is baseless. Because these seven mental associates are pure, and because they counteract defiled mental associates, they are called wholesome mental associates. When former masters discussed mental associates, they simply enumerated and named them but provided little explanation. One by one, they contrasted defiled and pure mental associates—it was just as if one were treating the head when suffering a headache or treating the foot when suffering a sore foot. There was a complete lack of any path to establish what 163. This story forms the main content of the “Yang sheng zhu 養生主” (Essentials for Nurturing Life) chapter in Zhuangzi. 164. Despite the attribution to Lu Xiangshan 陸象山, the saying actually seems to be that of Song dynasty Chan master Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲 (1089–1163). See Dahui Pujue Chanshi shu 大慧普覺禪師書 (Letters of Chan Master Dahui Pujue), in Dahui Pujue Chanshi yulu 大慧普覺禪師語錄 (Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Dahui Pujue), T47n1998Ap0922b07. 165. The idea here seems to be that these former masters would prescribe the cultivation of certain positive mental associates to counteract certain negative mental associates.

Y6693.indb 307

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

308

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

is fundamental. As such, how could there be any counteraction? By and large, beginning with Vasubandhu, those who discussed Yogācāra traveled down the path of discriminating [phenomenal] characteristics and their names, and they did very little in the way of further cultivating that which is obtained of/from/by oneself (自得). Xuanzang and Kuiji introduced this learning into China, and although it flourished for a period, it was unable to endure. The various schools [of Sinitic Buddhism] quickly arose and replaced it—there was surely a reason for this. Summarizing the foregoing, because the mind is not different from the nature (心者即性), it has always been there. Mental associates are habituated tendencies and arise subsequently. That which has always been there is free. It operates freely. That which arises subsequently is conditioned (有為). That which has always been there is pure and without defilement; that which arises subsequently brings together both wholesome and defiled mental associates. That which has always been there is “host.” It is this inherent nature alone that is the life of humans. Accordingly, in relation to subsequently arising habituated tendencies, it is said to be the host. The subsequently arising defiled mental associates obstruct the inherent [nature] and so, on the contrary, the host becomes the “guest.” To be without a basis is to be a guest. Being obstructed, the inherent mind is not revealed, although it exists it is as if it does not; hence it is said to be the “guest.” That which arises subsequently is the guest; defilements, however, overcome and obstruct that which has always been there, and so the guest becomes the host. In our human life, it is the case that there is only that which has always been there. Because we fail to see our self-nature, however, we always take habituated tendencies to be our life. Everything we think, learn, do, and make serves only to nourish defiled habituated tendencies, and by relying on them we take them to be our life, while our true life is damaged to the point of disappearing. This is utter stupidity. The meaning of this has already been briefly explained above. Here I wish further to state that if one wants to realize inherent mind, then one must value learning. Our original human nature must rely upon

166. They were attending to the symptoms, not the causes. 167. Zhu Xi was very fond of this notion. 168. They are not inherent in the nature. 169. It is unconditioned and non-deliberative.

Y6693.indb 308

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

309

pure dharmas (淨法) in order to begin to be able to be revealed. And even though we are situated within impurities, because of the power of this selfnature, pure dharmas continuously arise. “Arise” means to “create.” Because of the reliance on the power of self-nature, pure habituated tendencies are able to be generated continuously, and so self-nature is constantly revealed and is not transformed by things. Relying on these pure dharmas is called “learning.” To generate pure habituated tendencies means that having recognized one’s own life, one creates unceasingly. [p. 142]

The functioning of this self-recognition and self-creativity is collectively referred to as “awakening” (覺)—and it is this alone that constitutes true learning. Should one pursue things externally, grasping and becoming attached to them, and merely create impure dharmas but not realize one’s self-nature, then this is not what is meant by learning. These remarks are a comment on all forms of conventional learning. Thus, as a word, “learning” means “awakening.” In learning, the thorough realization of principle (窮理) is fundamental, and fully revealing the nature (盡性) is its final goal. Thoroughly tracing dharmas to their source is what is meant by “thorough realization”; being neither deficient nor in excess is what is meant by “fully revealing.” The nature is not different from inherent pure mind, and principle is not different from the principle by which the mind is self-sufficient. They are not fused from outside, nor are they to be sought from others. It is up to you students to experience them personally and to discern them clearly. Here I will briefly raise two teachings so as to explain the importance of learning. First, [it is important] because [it is due to learning that] form does not impede the nature, from when [the nature is] imperceptible through to when it is manifest. It is how the nature is kept intact. Inherent mind is barely perceptible (本心唯微) and needs to be drawn out and developed 170. Pure habituated tendencies, good mental associates. 171. Again, a reference to Mencius 6A.6. 172. Here form should be understood as shorthand for form-and-vital-stuff (形氣), the body. 173. Shangshu 尚書 (Book of Documents), Shisan jing zhushu, 4.8b: “The human mind is precarious; the mind of the way is barely perceptible. Be discerning and single-minded; hold fast to the mean” (Wilson, Genealogy of the Way, p. 86 mod.). According to Zhu

Y6693.indb 309

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

310

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

before it is manifest. Wei 微 has two senses. The first is “hidden,” which refers to the nature’s being able neither to be seen nor to be heard. The second is “negligible,” which refers to that which enables the nature to exist to be something slight (幾希). There are many who, once having coalesced as form-and-vital-stuff, are transformed by things, but very few who preserve their self-nature so that they are not transformed by things. In the waxing and waning that occurs in [the Book of] Change, [in the transformation] of Meeting (姤) to Peeling (剝), there is left only one yang line. The principle involved here is exceedingly difficult to put into words. Refer to the chapters “Transformation,” “Demonstration of Material [Dharmas],” and the first part of “Explaining the Mind, A.” In order to grasp it, one must personally fathom the principles of expansion and contraction within the deep reaches of one’s own mind. As we have already seen above, “inherent” is a synonym for the nature. The nature is that whereby we as humans live. In relation to the ten thousand existents, it is also nominally termed constant transformation. “Form-and-vital-stuff ” refers to the body. This is what is formed when constant transformation contracts. In other words, even though form-andvital-stuff is the expression of the inherent nature, once form-and-vital-stuff has arisen, then it illusorily constitutes crude things and suddenly seems to be different from the inherent nature. Thus, when the nature comes to this, it is almost completely materialized, and those who are able to preserve their self-nature such that they are not completely transformed into things are indeed very few, just like the single yang line that remains on the Peeling hexagram in the Book of Change. This little bit of pure yang is life itself; it is what the schools of [Sinitic] Buddhism call “original face,” and it is definitely the master of form-and-vital-stuff. This is what Wang Bi’s Brief Illustration of the Principles of the Book of Change referred to as “the few are able to Xi’s genealogical account of the daotong, Confucius was the transmitter of the “sixteencharacter” secret instruction about understanding the import of the Doctrine of the Mean as handed down by the sages of antiquity. See Wilson, Genealogy of the Way, pp. 86–87, for translation and discussion. 174. Mencius 4B.19. 175. The Meeting hexagram consists of five unbroken or yang lines over one broken or yin line. The Peeling hexagram consists of only one yang line on top over five yin lines. The structure of the Meeting hexagram suggests that imminent rise of yin.

Y6693.indb 310

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

311

control the many.” This is indeed so. However, even though this is talking only about the principle of the matter, [this principle] should not be something that can be evaluated on the basis of a partial understanding. If this little bit of pure yang is unable to be made manifest—that is, if it is unable to master form-and-vital-stuff and so becomes controlled by things—then [the consequences of this] can be verified all around us. Thus, a partial understanding should not be used to cast doubt on the principle. Although this sole surviving true yang That is, the nature. operates everywhere within form-and-vital-stuff, concealed as the master, its unceasing operation is certainly naturally so of itself (法爾自然) and not purposive. Fa’er 法爾 means to be self-so (自然). The reason it is not directly said to be self-so is because the meaning of fa’er is profound. References to self-so that occur below are to highlight that it is without purposiveness—this is slightly different in meaning from self-so in its ordinary sense. [p. 143]

Yet once form-and-vital-stuff is born, it then has its own powers. Form-andvital-stuff ’s powers fundamentally conform with the nature—yet these powers are also not able to conform with the nature. Thus, because the operation of the nature within form-and-vital-stuff accommodates (因任) “initiating no action” (無為), “Accommodates”: This is because it follows (因) and undertakes (任) [to initiate no action]. form[-and-vital-stuff ] can even make the nature follow it, becoming just the same as the movement of form-andvital-stuff. In abbreviation, form-and-vital-stuff (形氣) is referred to as xing 形. “Can even” is a phrase implying that more is meant than was said. The control form-and-vital-stuff has over the nature is not how things inherently are; thus it is said “can even.” “It” [literally, “self ” (己)] is posited as 176. “Zhou yi lüe li 周易略例” (Brief Illustration of the Principles of the Book of Change) consists of several of Wang Bi’s 王弼 (226–249) interpretive essays on the Book of Change. The quotation is from the essay “Ming tuan 明彖” (Clarifying the Judgments), Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋 (Critical Edition of the Works of Wang Bi, With Explanatory Notes), ed. Lou Yulie 樓宇列 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), p. 591. 177. That is, the limited perspective that fails to be aware of the principle. 178. In other words, particular events should not be used to call into doubt the general principle.

Y6693.indb 311

6/30/15 2:55:56 PM

312

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

the form-and-vital-stuff ’s self-reference. Thus it seems as if the nature has lost its power as master. This is what is meant by [the mind] originally being barely perceptible. “As if lost” does not mean that it has really lost [control]. The movement of form-and-vital-stuff precisely is the nature. [The nature] would be said to be “lost” if, when moving, it merely obeyed form-and-vitalstuff and was unable to control it. In actuality, however, because the mind does not obey form-and-vital-stuff, it is not truly lost. This being so, is form-and-vital-stuff harmful to the nature? The answer to this is certainly no. If there were no form-and-vital-stuff, then the nature would also be unable to be seen. Form-and-vital-stuff is the coalescence of the nature—that is, form-and-vital-stuff is nothing other than the nature. Thus Mencius said: “Physical appearance is heavenly endowed nature.” How could form-and-vital-stuff impede the nature? It is not the case that the control form-and-vital-stuff has over the nature is how things inherently are—rather, it is a unique transformation of conditions. Just as if water does not flow downward but is made to [gush up] so that it passes one’s forehead or [is dammed so that it goes up] a hill, surely this is not how water inherently is? Habituated tendencies and form-and-vital-stuff begin together, and subsequently they grow together. Because habituated tendencies and form-and-vital-stuff protect one another, increasingly they obscure [recognition of] how each inherently is, Because habituated tendencies and psycho-physical form protect one another, students find it difficult to transform their psycho-physical [nature (氣質之性)]. thereby leading the inherent nature to be divested of any means to be expressed and so unable to be revealed, just as the luster of gold embedded in ore is unable to be seen. Conversely, when the nature controls form-and-vital-stuff, the power of wholesome habituated tendencies increases and becomes associated with the nature that is drawn out and expressed continuously, and so the whole suddenly appears. In the waxing and waning that occurs in [the Book of] Change, from the single yang line of the Return (復) hexagram there is a gradual [transformation] that culminates in the [six] pure [yang lines] of the 179. Mencius 7A.38. 180. Based on Mencius 6A.2. 181. According to Zhang Zai 張載, when Ultimate Void (taixu 太虛) (as qi) is manifested in individual humans, it takes two forms: the nature (xing) bestowed by heaven and earth (天地之性) and the psycho-physical nature (氣質之性). See Zhang Zai ji, p. 23.

Y6693.indb 312

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

313

Qian (乾) hexagram. In the smelting of ore to produce gold, it is the ore that is not valued. As the master, however, the nature also operates within form-and-vital-stuff, and so former ru had the doctrine of “using the body to fully reveal the nature” so that seeing could be absolutely clear and hearing could be absolutely acute, with the illumination of the whole being allpervasive. Zhang Zai said: “If virtue subdues vital stuff (氣), then the nature is commanded by virtue. If virtue does not subdue vital stuff, then the nature is commanded by vital stuff.” This is saying that when the nature controls form[-and-vital-stuff,] then this is the meaning of “the nature is commanded by virtue.” And it is saying that when form[-and-vital-stuff ] commands the nature, then this is the meaning of “the nature is commanded by vital stuff.” Zhang’s words, however, are pithy, and there are perhaps some students who have yet to understand them. Now, even though my account is somewhat wordy, I wanted to make it easy for people to understand. Further, the waxing and the waning of the images (象) in the Book of Change actually provide an excellent description of the revealed and hidden [expressions of the] mind. Because the human mind is shackled by self-interest associated with form-and-vital-stuff, this leads to the inherent nature’s being stifled and unable to be revealed. Despite this, regardless of how materialized (物化) it becomes, this inherent nature actually can never be fully dissipated, just like in the old saying: “When in dire straits, people return to the root.” When they are worn out and exhausted, [p. 144]

they invariably cry out to heaven. When they are in pain and suffering, they inevitably call out to their parents. Further, as the saying goes, “When a person is about to die, they utter kind words.” This is [an expression of] formand-vital-stuff ’s deferential retreat; this is the nature’s being expressed from within. That which the Book of Change refers to as: “When the Peeling (剝) hexagram reaches all the way to the top, the Returning (復) hexagram is 182. The Qian hexagram represents the male, heaven, and so forth and is the fullest expression of yang, and it consists of six yang or unbroken lines. 183. Allusion to Mencius 7A.38. 184. Zhang Zai, Zheng meng 正蒙 (Correcting Youthful Ignorance), Zhang Zai ji, p. 23. 185. Literally, “transformed by things.” 186. Analects 8.4.

Y6693.indb 313

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

314

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

generated below” is an expression of this image. The Buddhists say that when the five aggregates (五陰) are replete, this is [the cause of] suffering because these aggregates cover over the mind of the matrix of the buddhas (如來藏心). If one transforms one’s understanding of the five aggregates from that of the perspective of sentient beings to that of the perspective of the true nature of things (法性), then the gatekeepers of the six sense faculties will all become pure qualities. The import is the same as “using the body to fully reveal the nature.” Second, it is due to the combined virtue of heaven and man, and the non-duality of the nature and practice, that learning is realized. Change says: “That which continues this is goodness; that which completes it is the nature.” The whole that is the nature gives rise to practice, and this is called “continuing.” The nature is the incessant flow of the whole; it is the full endowment of the myriad good qualities. Hence, by relying on it to give rise to cultivation, then all of the myriad good qualities will be accomplished. This is what is meant by “the whole that is the nature gives rise to practice, and this is called ‘continuing.’ ” Full cultivation’s dependence on the nature is called “completion.” The full efficacy of cultivation depends on the nature in order to arise. This is because it consists solely in expanding and fully developing (擴充) the nature rather than adding what is not in the nature. Thus 187. This is a mixed paraphrase of two sources: the “Hexagram Sequence” (序卦) commentary, Book of Change, 9.12b, and Zhouyi Cheng shi zhuan 周易程氏傳 (Cheng Yi’s Commentary on the Book of Change), in Er cheng ji, vol. 2, p. 817. The Peeling hexagram has one yang line over five yin lines; the Return hexagram has five yin lines over one yang line. 188. Xiong is deviating from standard Buddhist accounts of wu yin sheng ku 五陰盛苦, which refers to suffering caused by human existence’s consisting of nothing other than the five aggregates [skandha]: material form, sensation, perception, volition/intention, and consciousness. This is one of the “four and eight kinds of suffering” (四苦八苦). 189. The six sense faculties pursue the five sensory fields and the thought-field, and only then are the six consciousnesses produced. “Gatekeepers” is simply another name for the six sense faculties. 190. The contrast between the nature—representing ultimate truth, tathatā, and so forth—and practice is a tension that has a long history in Chinese Buddhism. Here Xiong is presenting them as parts of a whole. 191. “Appended Statements, A,” Book of Change, 7.11a–12a. “The alternating procession of yin and yang is the way; that which continues this process is goodness, and that which completes this process is the nature.”

Y6693.indb 314

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

315

it is said “Full cultivation’s dependence on the nature is [called] completion.” The purity of the innate nature is due to heaven; the subsequent arising of pure habituated tendencies is due to humans. Hence it is said: “If it were not for heaven, then there would be no cause. The nature is heaven. If humans did not have their innately (天然) fully endowed nature, then by what cause could they do good? If the heaven-[given] is not [acted upon] by humans, then there would be no completion.” The subsequent arising of pure habituated tendencies is due to human effort. Even though humans have a heavenly endowed nature, if human effort is not fully applied, then there would be no way for the heavenly nature to be revealed, and so how could that which is heavenly endowed be completed? Both of these expressions are based on Yang Xiong’s Exemplary Figures. Thus people must use the power of sustained effort (精進) to create pure habituated tendencies in order to follow their inherent nature, drawing it out and causing it to be revealed. In the Book of Change, Qian 乾 is the way of heaven and Kun 坤 is the way of humans. Kun succeeds heaven by according with it, and so by doing good it continues the virtue of Qian’s vigor. The Kun hexagram represents things that arise subsequently [to the nature]. When we humans, by ourselves, create pure habituated tendencies and so give expression to our heavenly endowed nature, this is Kun emulating the images of heaven. Therefore, when you students continue [the virtue of Qian’s vigor by doing] good things and completing that which is [heavenly endowed], it is the nature that is involved therein. The Analects says: “People are able to make the way great; it is not the case that the way makes people great.” When the Analects speaks of the way, it matches what here is called the nature. By themselves people are able to create pure habituated tendencies so as to reveal the heavenly ordained nature—this is people’s making the way great. If people fail to understand to realize the nature fully, then they will be transformed by things, and there will be aspects of the nature that are not preserved—hence it is said that it is 192. In other words, it is inherently so; it is due to the nature. 193. Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 bc–ad 18) was an influential and creative thinker during the Han dynasty. Fayan 法言 (Exemplary Figures) is one of his main writings. See Fayan, Sibu congkan ed., 10.4a. 194. One of the wholesome mental associates. 195. Analects 15.29.

Y6693.indb 315

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

316

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

not the case that the way makes people great. In succinct terms, for Confucians the goal of making the way great lies in following the five virtues, whereas for Buddhists it lies in diligently practicing the six perfections. The five virtues are endowed in the inherent nature; their utility necessarily depends upon their being fully developed before [the nature is] completed. The six perfections are practiced by following the nature; the phenomena [they relate to] depend on conditions coming together before these phenomena are made evident. The six perfections of which the Buddhists speak mostly elucidate phenomena. They do not measure up to the five virtues of which the Confucians speak in being as precise in pointing directly to Fundamental Reality. Thus it is said, “There is nothing which does not flow forth from the dharma realm (法界 [dharmadhātu]) and nothing which does not return to it.” The dharma realm is but another name for [p. 145]

the nature. This is what is meant by “the combined virtue of heaven and man, and the non-duality of nature and cultivation.” With respect to these expressions, if students understand what should be grasped and followed, this will include being able to master the precise meaning [of these expressions] so that they can be put to use, and [determining] what can be used to establish oneself and so enhance virtue. Someone asked: “How can one who is fettered by multiple defiled [habituated tendencies] learn?” I replied: “Defiled and pure habituated tendencies are mutually entailing; the transformation of the defiled into the pure occurs in a thought-moment—so what do you mean that they cannot learn? 196. Although there are various lists of “five virtues,” the most likely is humanness, rightness, ritual propriety, wisdom, and living up to one’s word. 197. The six perfections ( pāramitā; 波羅蜜): charity, discipline, forbearance, vigor, contemplation, and wisdom. 198. Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v. “fajie 法界,” www.buddhism-dict .net. “In Sinitic forms of Mahāyāna teaching, 法界 refers to a religious basis or principle— the origin of all things. In this kind of teaching, where the whole universe is taken as phenomena, it is understood as the manifestation of true thusness.” 199. This saying appears in a wide range of Chinese Buddhist texts. 200. This is consistent with Dasheng qixin lun, where the dharmadhātu is identified with one mind (一心). 201. “Appended Statements, B,” Book of Change, 8.10a.

Y6693.indb 316

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

317

Although defiled [habituated tendencies] conceal the root (本), Ben 本 includes reference to “what has always been there” (本來). Defiled habituated tendencies conceal what has always been there. they are also the cause which draws forth and develops what has always been there. Because there are defiled [habituated tendencies,] awareness is not free. Because it is not free, there is a desire for change, One changes oneself. and then pure habituated tendencies are created. Because of the power of pure habituated tendencies, what has always been there is able to be drawn forth and developed, thereby completing the nature. Although the nature inherently exists, if it is concealed and not revealed, then it does not constitute the [fully realized] nature. Hence the fact that people themselves are able to create the power of pure [habituated tendencies] so as to recover the nature (復性) means that this inherently existing nature is no different from one constituted through people creating it anew. According to an old saying: “In a thought-instant, one returns to the pivotal state [before thought-instants arise,] then it will be just as it was when originally received.” This is to awaken to the pure function (淨用) of one’s mind; that there has never been anything separating us from [our inherent nature]; that afflictions are fundamentally delusory; and that upon illumination they [are seen] to be empty. If one is not content to remain in ignorance, then why should one worry about being lost (弱喪)? Hence that which is of foremost importance to you students is to fix your mind on the goal—in the end you will create the ability to achieve it. The Book of Change says: “Sages create the ability.” People are able by themselves to create pure habituated tendencies in order to reveal and develop their nature—this is “creating the ability.” All of this is to employ wisdom as master. Wisdom itself is originally pure 202. The inherent nature. 203. It should be borne in mind, however, that without the inherent nature this capacity to create the nature anew would not be possible. 204. Daoyuan, Jingde chuan deng lu, T51n2076_p0219c16. 205. That is, by overcoming defiled habituated tendencies, ignorance, one realizes one’s inherent nature. The term “pure function” (淨用) comes from Dasheng qixin lun, T32n1667_ p0586c01. Even ignorance is ultimately “perfumed” by Suchness. Pure habituated tendencies allow us to realize this. 206. Ruo sang 弱喪 refers to a young person who has been displaced due to some disturbance. 207. “Appended Statements, B,” Book of Change, 8.24a.

Y6693.indb 317

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

318

Explaining the Mind, B (明心下)

and not subject to afflictions. Whether distinguishing afflictions or severing afflictions—in all cases it is wisdom. The generation of pure habitual tendencies lies in the uninterrupted flow of the illumination of this Fundamental Reality. Draw from it and it does not become exhausted; use it and it issues forth even more. Endow oneself with the powers of enlightenment and strength, and sever the restraint of that soft thread. The Doctrine of the Mean says: “Although ignorant, you are sure to become enlightened; although weak, you are sure to become strong.” The Book of Change says: “Tied to a metal brake-drag, a soft thread restrains.” “Soft thread” refers to being defiled by afflictions because all defiled phenomena have softness and darkness as their characteristics. The virtue of yang is firmness and brightness; naturally it is incompatible with softness and darkness. For this reason the wise are not afflicted. Just as the bright sun in the sky completely dissipates the haze, it can be understood that defilement by afflictions can certainly be severed and that one’s self-nature can certainly be completed. These are true words that accord with reality; they are the ultimate aim of learning. Thus it is said: “If you want to fully understand your inherent mind, then you must value learning.”

208. “Doctrine of the Mean,” Liji, 53.2a. 209. “Image” commentary to the Gou 姤 (Meeting) hexagram, Book of Change, 5.5a. Xiong mistakenly gives kun 困 instead of xi 繫. As previously noted, the Meeting hexagram consists of five unbroken or yang lines over one broken or yin line. The structure of the Meeting hexagram suggests the imminent rise of yin.

Y6693.indb 318

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Works Cited

An, Yanming. “Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition: Cultural Context and the Evolution of Terms.” Philosophy East and West 47, no. 3 (July 1997): 337–362. Analects. See Lunyu 論語. Aristotle. Physics. Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. The Internet Classics Archive by Daniel C. Stevenson, Web Atomics, 1994–2000. Available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/ physics.mb.txt. Asan˙ga (fourth century). Abhidharma-samuccaya (Dasheng apidamo ji lun 大乘阿毘達 磨集論; Compendium of Higher Doctrine). Trans. Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1605. ———. Madhyānta-vibhāga (Zhong bian fenbie lun 中邊分別論; Differentiation of the Middle from the Extremes). Trans. Paramārtha (499–569), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1599. The “spiritual” author is traditionally attributed to the bodhistattva Maitreya. ———. Mahāyāna-sam . graha-śāstra (She dasheng lun 攝大乘論; Compendium of the Great Vehicle). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1595. ———. Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra (Dasheng zhuangyan jing lun大乘莊嚴經論; Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses). Trans. Prabhākaramitra (564–633), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1604. Asvabhāva (d.u.). *Mahāyāna-sam . graha-bhās.ya (She dasheng lun shi 攝大乘論釋; Commentary on the Compendium of the Great Vehicle). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1598. As´vs´aghos.a. Das´ākus´alakarmapathanirdes´a (Shi bushan ye dao jing 十不善業道經; Scripture on the Way of Ten Unwholesome Activities). Trans. Śiks.ānanda, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 17, no. 727. Avatam . saka-sūtra (Dafang guangfo huayan jing 大方廣佛華嚴經; The Flower Ornament Sutra). Trans. Buddhabhadra et al., Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 9, no. 278. Azuma Jūji 吾妻重二 (trans.). Yū Jūriki 熊十力 (Xiong Shili), Shin yuishiki ron 新唯識論. Osaka: Kansai Daigaku shuppansha, 2004. Book of Change. See Zhou Yi.

319

Y6693.indb 319

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

320

Works Cited

Bresciani, Umberto. Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement. Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 2001. Buswell, Robert E., Jr., ed. Encyclopedia of Buddhism. 2 vols. New York: Thomson Gale, 2004. Cai Yuanpei zhexue lunzhu 蔡元培哲學論著 (Cai Yuanpei’s Philosophical Writings). Compiled by Gao Pingshu 高平叔. Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1985. Chan, Serina N. The Thought of Mou Zongsan. Leiden: Brill, 2011. Chan, Wing-cheuk. “On Mou Zongsan’s Hermeneutic Application of Buddhism.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 2 (2011): 174–189. Chan, Wing-tsit. A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. Chen Baisha 陳白沙 (1448–1500). “Yu Zhan Minze 與湛民澤” (Letter to Zhan Minze). In Ming ru xue’an 明儒學案 (Case Studies of Ming Ru), vol. 1, compiled by Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610–1695). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985. Chen Jidong 陳繼東. “Shinmatsu ni okeru Yuishiki Hōsō tenseki no kankō ni tsuite 清末 における唯識法相典籍の刊行について” (On the Publication of Yogācāra Texts at the End of the Qing Dynasty). Indogaku Bukkyūgaku kenkyū 44, no. 2 (1996): 809–811. Cheng, Chung-yi. “Liu Zongzhou on Self-Cultivation.” In Makeham, Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy (q.v.). ———. “Philosophical Development in Late Ming and Early Qing.” In Mou, History of Chinese Philosophy (q.v.). Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107). Zhouyi Cheng shi zhuan 周易程氏傳 (Cheng Yi’s Commentary on the Book of Change). In Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Er Cheng ji (q.v.). Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085). Er Cheng ji 二程集 (Collected Works of the Cheng Brothers). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981. ———. Henan Cheng shi cuiyan 河南程氏粹言 (Choice Words of the Cheng Brothers). In Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Er Cheng ji (q.v.). ———. Henan Cheng shi yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers). In Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Er Cheng ji (q.v.). Clower, Jason. The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism. Brill: Leiden, 2010. Cook, Francis H. Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra. College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. ———, trans. Three Texts on Consciousness Only. Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999. Cox, Collett. Disputed Dharmas, Early Buddhist Theories of Existence: An Annotated Translation from San˙ghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series XI. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995. ———. “Mainstream Buddhist Schools.” In Buswell, ed., Encyclopedia of Buddhism (q.v.), vol. 2, pp. 501–506. Daehyeon 太賢 (alt. Taehyeon 太賢; eighth century). Cheng weishi lun xueji [Seongyusingnon hakgi] 成唯識論學記 (Study Notes on Cheng weishi lun). Xin zuan xu zang jing ed. (q.v.), vol. 50, no. 818.

Y6693.indb 320

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Works Cited

321

Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲 (1089–1163). Dahui Pujue Chanshi shu 大慧普覺禪師書 (Letters of Chan Master Dahui Pujue). In Dahui Pujue Chanshi yulu 大慧普覺禪師語錄 (Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Dahui Pujue), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 47, no. 1998A. Daode jing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and Its Power) or Laozi 老子, Sibu beiyao ed. (q.v.). Daoyuan 道原 (d.u.) (comp.). Jingde chuan deng lu 景德傳燈錄 (Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Published in the Jingde Period), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 51, no. 2076. Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論 (Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 32, no. 1666. Attributed to As´vaghos.a but the text is of Chinese provenance. Dignāga 陳那 (ca. 480–540). Ālambana-parīks.ā (Investigation of That Which Is Mentally Grasped). Translation by Xuanzang rendered as Guan suoyuan yuan lun 觀所緣緣論 (Treatise on Investigating the Conditions Enabling the Mental Appropriation of Cognitive Objects), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1625. “Doctrine of the Mean.” See “Zhongyong 中庸.” Dunnyun 遁倫 (seventh century?; also known as Doryun 道倫). Yuqie lun ji 瑜伽論記 (Commentaries on the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 42, no. 1828. Eckel, Malcolm David. Bhaviveka and His Buddhist Opponents. Cambridge, MA: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University, 2008. Fan Ye 范曄 (396–446). Hou Han shu 後漢書 (History of the Later Han) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976). Feng Youlan 馮友蘭. “Bogesen de zhexue fangfa 柏格森的哲學方法” (Bergson’s Philosophical Method), Xinchao 3, no. 1 (1921): 13–24. Foguang da cidian 佛光大辭典 (Foguang Buddhist Dictionary). Taiwan, 2011. Available at http://www.fgs.org.tw/fgs_book/fgs_drser.aspx. Gregory, Peter N. Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated Translation of Tsung-mi’s Yüan jen lun with a Modern Commentary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980). “Yu Qian Xuantong xiansheng lun gushi shu 與錢玄同先 生論古史書” (Letter to Qian Xuantong on Ancient Historical Writings). In Gu shi bian 古史辨 (Disputing Ancient History), vol. 1, ed. Gu Jiegang. Shanghai: Pushe, 1926. Guo Qingfan 郭慶蕃 (1844–1896) (comp.). Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋 (Collected Explications of Zhuangzi). Taipei: Muduo chubanshe, 1982. Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇. Tiandi jian yige dushuren: Xiong Shili zhuan 天地間一個讀書人: 熊 十力傳 (A Scholar Poised Between Heaven and Earth: A Biography of Xiong Shili). Taipei: Yeqiang chubanshe, 1994. Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824). Changli xiansheng ji 昌黎先生集 (Han Yu’s Collected Writings). Sibu beiyao ed. (q.v.). Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Huainanzi), Sibu beiyao ed. (q.v.). Huayan jing 華嚴經; see Avatam . saka-sūtra. Hubbard, Jamie, and Paul L. Swanson, eds. Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Hugget, Nick. “Zeno’s Paradoxes.” n.d. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ paradox-zeno/#Arr.

Y6693.indb 321

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

322

Works Cited

Jiang, Tao. Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006. Jones, Nicholaos John. “Mereological Heuristics for Huayan Buddhism.” Philosophy East and West 60, no. 3 (July 2010): 355–368. Kuiji 窺基 (632–682). Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記 (Commentary on Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 43, no. 1830. ———. Weishi ershi lun shuji 唯識二十論述記 (Notes on Twenty Verses), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 43, no. 1834. Lan˙kāvatāra-sūtra (Ru lengqie jing 入楞伽經; Sutra on the Buddha’s Entering the Country of Lanka). Trans. Bodhiruci (d. 527), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 16, no. 671. Laozi 老子. See Daode jing 道德經. Li Dingzuo 李鼎祚 (Tang, dates unknown). Zhouyi jijie 周易集解 (Collected Explanations of the Book of Change) (Beijing: Beijing shi Zhongguo shudian, 1984). Li Ki: Book of Rites. Trans. James Legge (1815–1897). In The Sacred Books of the East, ed. Max Müller, vols. 27 and 28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885. Li Qingliang 李清良. “Lun Ma Yifu dui Xiong Shili Xin weishi lun zhi yingxiang 論馬一浮 對熊十力《新唯識論》之影響” (The Influence of Ma Yifu on Xiong Shili’s Xin weishi lun), Taiwan Dong-Ya wenming yanjiu xuekan 7, no. 1 (2010): 201–232. Liebenthal, Walter. The Chao Lun: The Treatises of Seng-Chao, 2nd rev. ed. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968. Liezi 列子, Sibu beiyao ed. (q.v.). Liji 禮記 (Book of Rites), Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.). Lin Anwu 林安梧. “Dangdai Ru-Fo lunzheng de yixie wenti: Li Xiangping xiansheng ‘Xiong Shili zhexue de queshi yu Ru-Fo huitong’ du hou 當代儒佛論爭的一些問題— 李向平先生「熊十力哲學的缺失與儒佛會通」讀後” (Some Issues in Contemporary Confucian-Buddhist Debates: On Reading Mr. Li Xiangping’s “Shortcomings in the Philosophy of Xiong Shili, and Confucian-Buddhist Interconnections”). Ershiyi shiji 48 (1998): 124–130. Lin Chen-kuo. “Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate Between Two Buddhisms.” In Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree (q.v.). ———. “The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism: Lü Cheng’s Critique of Original Enlightenment.” In Makeham, Transforming Consciousness (q.v.). Lin Yuehui 林月惠. Liangzhixue de zhuanzhe: Nie Shuangjiang yu Luo Nian’an sixiang zhi yanjiu良知學的轉折─聶雙江與羅念菴思想之研究 (Studies on the Thought of Nie Shuangjiang and Luo Nian’an. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan Daxue chuban zhongxin, 2005. Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919). “Zhelixue shi xu 哲理學史序” (Prolegomena to a History of Philosophy). Guocui xuebao 國粹學報 3 (1905): 4a–4b. Liu, Shu-hsien. “Hsiung Shih-li’s Theory of Causation.” Philosophy East and West 19, no. 4 (1969): 399–407. Liu Shuxian 劉述先. “Duiyu Xiong Shili xiansheng wannian sixiang de zai fansi 對於熊十 力先生晚年思想的再反思” (Some More Reflections on Mr. Xiong Shili’s Thought in His Later Years). Ehu, no. 3 (1992): 1–2. ———. “Pingxin lun Feng Youlan 平心論馮友蘭” (A Balanced Account of Feng Youlan). Dangdai 35, no. 3 (1989): 53–67.

Y6693.indb 322

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Works Cited

323

———. Zhuzi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng 朱子哲學思想的發展與完成 (The Development and Completion of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought). 1982; rev. 3rd ed. Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1995. Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578–1645). Liu Zongzhou quanji 劉宗周全集 (Complete Works of Liu Zongzhou), 5 vols. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiusuo choubeichu, 1997. Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (Xiangshan 象山) (1139–1193). Lu Xiangshan quanji 陸象山全集 (Complete Works of Lu Xiangshan). Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 1992. Lü Cheng 呂澂. “Xuanzang fashi lüezhuan: yi sheng zhongyao xingshi, zhushu, suochuan zhuyao xueshuo 玄奘法師略傳: 一生重要行事、著述、所傳主要學說” (Short Biography of Monk Xuanzang: Key Events, Writings, and Main Doctrines Transmitted). Xiandai Fojiao jiaoxue congkan 現代佛教學術叢刊 (Collectanea of Modern Buddhist Scholarship). Taipei: Dasheng wenhua chubanshe, 1980, vol. 8, 1–9. Lunyu 論語. Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.) Luo Hongxian 羅洪先 (Nian’an 念菴) (1504–1564). “Da Jiang Daolin 答蔣道林” (Reply to Jiang Daolin). In Nian’an wenji 念菴文集 (Writings of Luo Nian’an), 4.1b–2a, Wenyuan ge Siku quanshu文淵閣四庫全書 (The Complete Collection of the Four Treasuries—Based on the Wenyuan Pavilion Copy) ed. Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983. Luo Yijun 羅義俊. “Jin shiyu nian dangdai xin Ruxue de yanjiu yu suowei menhu wenti 近十餘年當代新儒學的研究與所謂門戶問題” (The So-Called Problem of Factionalism in New Confucianism over the Past Ten-Plus Years), p. 15. Paper distributed at the Second International Conference on New Confucianism, National Central Library, Taipei, 1992. Luosu ji Bolake jiangyan ji 羅素及勃拉克講演集 (Collected Essays of Russell and Black). Beijing: Weiyiri baoshe, 1922. Lusthaus, Dan. Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun. Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series. London: Routledge, 2002. ———. “Yogācāra School.” In Buswell, ed., Encyclopedia of Buddhism (q.v.), vol. 2, 914–921. ———. “Sām . khya.” n.d. Available at http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/schools/samkhya -uni.htm. Lynn, Richard. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-hr.daya-sūtra (Bore boluomiduo xin jing 般若波羅蜜多心經; Heart Sutra). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 8, no. 251. Maitreya. Yogācārabhūmi-s´āstra (Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地論; Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice), trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 30, no. 1579. In East Asia its authorship is traditionally attributed to the bodhisattva Maitreya, but in Tibet its authorship is attributed to Asan˙ga. Makeham, John, ed. Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. New York: Springer, 2010. ———. Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008. ———, ed. New Confucianism: A Critical Examination. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Y6693.indb 323

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

324

Works Cited

———. “The Significance of Xiong Shili’s Interpretation of Dignham, Ālambana-parīks.ā.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40:S (2013): 205–225. ———, ed. Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. ———. Transmitters and Creators: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003. ———. “Xiong Shili’s Critique of Yogācāra Thought in the Context of His Constructive Philosophy.” In Makeham, Transforming Consciousness (q.v.). ———. “Xiong Shili’s Understanding of the Relationship Between the Ontological and the Phenomenal.” In Chinese Metaphysics and Its Problems: An Introduction, ed. Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, in press. Mencius. See Mengzi 孟子. Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius), Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.). Mingyu 明昱 (1527–1616). Guan suoyuan yuan lun huishi 觀所緣緣論會釋 (Collected Interpretations of the Ālambana-parīks.ā), Xin zuan xu zang jing ed. (q.v.), vol. 51, no. 830. Mou, Bo, ed. History of Chinese Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2009. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. Shengming de xuewen 生命的學問 (Vital Learning). Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1970. ———. Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中國哲學十九講 (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy). Taipei: Xusheng shuju, 1983. ———. Zhouyi zhexue yanjiang lu 周易哲學演講錄 (Lectures on the Philosophy of the Zhou Book of Change). Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 2003. Muller, A. Charles, ed. (1995– ). Digital Dictionary of Buddhism. Available at www.buddhism -dict.net. ———. “Woncheuk 圓測 on Bimba 本質 and Pratibimba 影像 in His Commentary on the Sam . dhinirmocana-sūtra.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 59, no. 3 (2011): 1272–1280. Nāgārjuna (second to third centuries ad). Mahāprajñāpāramitā-s´āstra (Da zhidu lun 大智 度論; Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom). Trans. Kumārajīva (344–413), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 25, no. 1509. Ng Yu-kwan. “Xiong Shili’s Metaphysical Theory about the Non-Separability of Substance and Function.” In Makeham, New Confucianism (q.v.) Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943) (comp.). Jie shenmi jing zhu 解深密經注 (Annotations on Discourse Explaining the Thought). Nanjing: Jinling kejingchu 金陵刻經處, 1917. Pfister, Lauren. “Xiong Shili.” In RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism, ed. Xinzhong Yao. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Pratītya-samutpāda divibhan˙ga-nirdes´a-sūtra (Yuanqi jing 緣起經; Sutra on Dependent Arising). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 2, no. 124. Puguang 普光 (d. 664). Jushe lun ji 俱舍論記 (Notes on the Abhidharma Compendium Treatise), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 41, no. 1821. Ren wang huguo bore boluomiduo jing 仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經 (Perfection of Wisdom Sutra for Humane Kings Protecting Their Countries), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 8, no. 246. This is an apocryphal text composed in China.

Y6693.indb 324

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Works Cited

325

*Saddharmapun.d.arīka-sūtra (Miao fa lianhua jing 妙法蓮華經; Lotus Sutra). Trans. Kumārajīva, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 9, no. 262. Sakuma, Hidenori. “On Doctrinal Similarities Between Sthiramati and Xuanzang.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29, no. 2 (2006 [2009]): 357–382. Sam . ghabhadra (fourth to fifth centuries). Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra ´sāstra (Apidaomo shun zheng li lun 阿毘達磨順正理論; Abhidharma According with Reason Treatise). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 29, no. 1562. Schmithausen, Lambert. On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng weishi lun. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2005. Sengzhao 僧肇 (384–414?). “Wu bu qian lun 物不遷論” (Things Do Not Shift), Zhao lun 肇論 (Essays by Shi Sengzhao), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 45, no. 1858. Shangshu 尚書 (Book of Documents), Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.). Shijing 詩經 (Book of Odes), Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.). Shisan jing zhushu 十三經注疏 (The Thirteen Classics with Annotations and SubCommentaries). Compiled by Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764–1849). Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1985. Shiu, Henry C. H. “Nonsubstantialism of the Awakening of Faith in Mou Zongsan.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 2 (June 2011): 223–237. The Shû King, Shih King and Hsiâo King. Trans. James Legge. In The Sacred Books of the East, ed. Max Müller, vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1879. Shun, Kwong-loi. “Zhu Xi’s Moral Psychology.” In Makeham, Dao Companion to NeoConfucian Philosophy (q.v.). Sibu beiyao 四部備要 (The Essential Collection of the Four Divisions). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1927–1936. Sibu congkan 四部叢刊 (The Four Divisions collection). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1919; supplements 1934–1936. Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903). First Principles, 3rd ed. London: Williams and Norgate, 1875. Sthiramati (seventh century). *Pañca-skandha-prakaran.a-vaibhās.ya (Dasheng guang wu yun lun 大乘廣五蘊論; The Expanded Mahāyāna Treatise on the Five Skandas), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1613. Stone, Jacqueline. “Some Reflections on Critical Buddhism.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 26, no. 1(1999): 159–188. *Śūram . gama-sūtra, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 19, no. 945. The full title is Dafo ding rulai mi yin xiu zhengliao yi zhu pusa wanxing shoulengyan jing 大佛頂如來密因修證 了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經 (The Sutra on the Mantra Spoken from above the Crown of the Great Buddha’s Head, and on the Hidden Basis of the Tathāgatas’ Myriad Bodhisattva Practices Leading to Their Verification of the Definitive Meaning), an apocryphal text written in China. Swanson, Paul L. “Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism.” In Hubbard and Swanson, Pruning the Bodhi Tree (q.v.). Tagawa Shun’ei. Living Yogācāra: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism. Trans. A. Charles Muller. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009. Taishō Tripit.aka (Taishō Revised Tripit.aka), Taishō shinshū dai zōkyō 大正新脩大藏經 (Taishō Revised Tripit.aka), Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1935 as found in

Y6693.indb 325

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

326

Works Cited

the CBETA corpus of Buddhist texts, Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA). Available at http://www.cbeta.org/ Taixu 太虛. “Lüe ping Xin weishi lun 略評新唯識論” (A Brief Review of New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness). Xiong Shili quanji, supplementary volume A (q.v.). Tan Sor-hoon. “Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy.” In Mou, History of Chinese Philosophy (q.v.). Tanyao 曇曜, and Kivkara 吉迦夜 (fifth century compilers and translators). Fu fazang yinyuan zhuan 付法藏因緣傳 (Account of the Causes and Conditions of the Transmission of the Dharma Treasury), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.). vol. 50, no. 2058. Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 (365–427). Tao Yuanming ji 陶淵明集 (Collected Writings of Tao Yuanming). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979. Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Jin’gang bore boluomi jing 金剛般若波羅蜜經; Diamond Sutra). Trans. Kumārajīva, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 8, no. 235. Vasubandhu (fourth century). Abhidharmakos´a-bhās.ya (Apidamo jushe shi lun 阿毘達磨倶 舍釋論; Abhidharma Compendium Treatise). Trans. Paramārtha, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 29, no. 1559. ———. Mahāyāna ´satadharmā-prakās´amukha-s´āstra (Dasheng baifa mingmen lun 大乘百 法明門論; Lucid Introduction to the One Hundred Dharmas). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1614. ———. Trim . ´sikā (Weishi sanshi lun song 唯識三十論頌; Thirty Verses). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1586. ———. Vim . ´satikā (alt. Vim . ´sikā) (Weishi ershi lun 唯識二十論; Twenty Verses). Trans. Xuanzang, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 31, no. 1590. Vimalakīrti-nirdes´a-sūtra (Weimojie suo shuo jing 維摩詰所說經; The Teaching of Vimalakīrti). Trans. Kumārajīva, Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 14, no. 475. Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249). “Ming tuan 明彖” (Clarifying the Judgments). In Wang Bi ji jiaoshi 王弼集校釋 (Critical Edition of the Works of Wang Bi, with Explanatory Notes), ed. Lou Yulie 樓宇列 Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (Chuanshan 船山) (1619–1692). Du Sishu daquan shuo 讀四書大全說 (Reading Notes on the Four Books). In Chuanshan quanshu 船山全書 (Complete Works of Wang Chuanshan). Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1988–1996. ———. Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑒論 (On Reading the Comprehensive Mirror). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975. ———. Si wen lu 思問錄 (Record of Reflections). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010. Wang, Robin, and Ding Weixiang. “Zhang Zai’s Theory of Vital Energy.” In Makeham, Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy (q.v.). Wang Shouren 王守仁 (Yangming 陽明) (1472–1529). Chuan xi lu 傳習錄 (Record of Practicing What Has Been Transmitted). In Yangming quanshu 陽明全書 (Complete Writings of Wang Yangming), Sibu beiyao ed. (q.v.). ———. “Yong liangzhi si shou shi zhu sheng 詠良知四首示諸生” (Four Poems on Pure Knowing to Instruct Students). In Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集 (Complete Collected Writings of Wang Yangming). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997.

Y6693.indb 326

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Works Cited

327

Wilson, Thomas A. Genealogy of the Way: The Construction and Uses of the Confucian Tradition in Late Imperial China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. Willis, Janice Dean. On Knowing Reality. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Wong Wai-ying. “The Thesis of Single-Rootedness in the Thought of Cheng Hao.” In Makeham, The Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy (q.v.). Wu Rujun 吳汝鈞. Fojiao sixiang da cidian 佛教思想大辭典 (Dictionary of Buddhist Thought). Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1994. Xin Qiji 辛棄疾 (1140–1207). “Qing yu an. Yuan xi 青玉案。 元夕” (To the Tune Sapphire Jade Plate. Night of the Lantern Festival). In Jiaxuan ci biannian jianzhu 稼軒詞編年箋注 (Annotated Chronology of Xin Qiji’s Lyrical Poems). Shanghai: Gudian wenxue chubanshe, 1957. Translation by Dongpo available at http://www.mountainsongs.net/poem_.php?id=727. Xin zuan xu zang jing 新纂續藏經 (New Revised Supplement to the Buddhist Canon). Shin zoku zōkyō 新纂續藏經, Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1975–1989, as found in the CBETA corpus of Buddhist texts, Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA). Available at http://www.cbeta.org/ Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968). Fojia mingxiang tongshi 佛家名相通釋 (Complete Explanation of Buddhist Terms). 1937; Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1994. ———. “Jiangci 講詞” (Speech), Shili lunxue yuji lüe 十力論學語輯略 (Edited Collection of Xiong’s Shili’s Discussions on Scholarship). In Xiong Shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 2. ———. “Po ‘Po Xin weishi lun’ 破破新唯識論” (A Rebuttal of “A Rebuttal of New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness”; 1933). Xiong Shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 2. ———. Shili yuyao chuxu 十力語要初續 (The First Sequel to Selected Letters and Talks of Xiong Shili). Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1990. ———. Weishixue gailun 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning). In Xiong Shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 1. ———. Xin weishi lun 新唯識論 (New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness). Literary redaction (文言文本), Zhejiang Provincial Library in October 1932; photographically reproduced and republished in Taipei by Wenjing chubanshe in 1973. ———. Xin weishi lun 新唯識論 (New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness). Literary redaction (文言文本), Xiong Shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 2. ———. Xin weishi lun 新唯識論 (New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness). Vernacular redaction (語體文本), Xiong Shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 3. ———. Yinming dashu shan zhu 因明大疏刪注 (Abridged Edition of Large Commentary on Introduction to Logic with Notes), Xiong Shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 1. ———. “Zheng ren xuehui qi 證人學會啟” (Letter to the Society for Proving the Purpose of Human Existence; 1913), in Xiong shili quanji (q.v.), vol. 8. Xiong Shili quanji 熊十力全集 (The Complete Writings of Xiong Shili), 10 vols., ed. Xiao Jiefu 萧萐父. Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001. Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664). Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), Taisho Tripit.aka, vol. 31, no. 1585. ———. “Xie Taizong Wen Huangdi zhi Sanzang shengjiao xubiao 謝太宗文皇帝製三藏聖 教序表” (Memorial to Thank Emperor Taizong [r. 626–649] for Writing a Preface to the

Y6693.indb 327

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

328

Works Cited

Tripit.aka). In “Si Shamen Xuanzang shangbiao ji 寺沙門玄奘上表記” (Record of Memorials Presented by Monk Xuanzang), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 52, no. 2119. Xunzi 荀子, Sibu beiyao ed. (q.v.). Yan Fu 嚴復 (1853–1921), trans. Tian yan lun 天演論 (Evolution and Ethics). In Yan Fu heji 嚴復合集 (Combined Writings of Yan Fu), vol. 7, ed. Wang Qingcheng 王慶成. Taipei: Caituan faren Gu Gongliang wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人辜公亮文教基金會, 1998. Yang Jian 楊簡 (Cihu 慈湖) (1141–1226). “Ji Yi 己易” (The Self and [the Book of] Change), Cihu yishu 慈湖遺書 (Surviving Writings of Yang Jian), Siming congshu 四明叢書 (Siming Collectanea) ed., ed. Zhang Shouyong 張壽鏞. Taipei: Guofang yanjiuyuan and Zhonghua dadian bianyinhui, 1966. Yang Rubin 楊儒賓. “Zhujing yu zhujing 主敬與主靜” (Maintaining Reverent Composure and Maintaining Stillness). Taiwan zongjiao yanjiu 9, no. 1 (2010): 1–27. Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 b.c.–a.d. 18). Fayan 法言 (Exemplary Figures), Sibu congkan ed. (q.v.). Yi Qian zao du 易乾鑿度 (Chiseling Open the Regularity of Qian of the Apocrypha of Change), in Chizao tang Siku quanshu huiyao 摛藻堂四庫全書薈要 (Condensed Library of the Four Treasuries) ed. Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1986–89. Yu, Jiyuan. “Xiong Shili’s Metaphysics of Virtue.” In Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, ed. Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Zhanran 湛然 (711–782). Fahua wenju ji 法華文句記 (Subcommentary on the Lotus Sutra), Taishō Tripit.aka ed. (q.v.), vol. 34, no. 1719. Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869–1936). Qi Wu Lun shi ding ben 齊物論釋定本 (Definitive Edition of Explanation of “Discourse on Making All Things Equal”). In Zhang Taiyan quanji 章太炎全集 (Complete Works of Zhang Taiyan), vol. 6. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1986. Zhang Zai 張載 (Hengqu 橫渠) (1020–1077). Zhang Zai ji 張載集 (Collected Writings of Zhang Zai), ed. Zhang Xichen 章錫琛. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978. ———. Zhangzi quan shu 張子全書 (Complete Works of Zhang Zai), Sibu beiyao ed. Taipei: Zhonghua shuju, 1965. Zheng Jiadong 鄭家棟. “Xiandai xin Ruxue de luoji tuizhan ji qi yinfa de wenti 現代新儒 學的邏輯推展及其引發的問題” (The Logical Development of New Confucianism and the Issues Generated), p. 26. Paper distributed at the Second International Conference on New Confucianism, National Central Library, Taipei, 1992. Zheng Zhen 鄭珍 (1806–1864). “Zi Zhanyi chu Xuanwei ru Dongchuan自霑益出宣威入 東川” (Departing Zhanyi from Xuanwei and Entering Dongchuan). In Chaojingchao shi chao quanji 巢經巢詩鈔全集 (Complete Collection of Zheng Zhen’s Selected Poems), Zunyi Li shi kan 遵義黎氏刊 ed., n.p., 1897. “Zhongyong 中庸” (Doctrine of the Mean). In Liji 禮記 (Book of Rites), Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.). Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (Lianxi 濂溪) (1017–1073). “Ai lian shuo 愛蓮說” (On the Love of the Lotus). In Zhou Lianxi ji (q.v.). ———. “Tong shu 通書” (Penetrating the Book of Change). In Zhou Lianxi ji (q.v.).

Y6693.indb 328

6/30/15 2:55:57 PM

Works Cited

329

———. Zhou Lianxi ji 周濂溪集 (Collected Writings of Zhou Lianxi). Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936. Zhou Yi 周易 (Book of Change). In Shisan jing zhushu (q.v.). Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200). Lunyu jizhu 論語集注 (Collected Annotations on the Analects). In Sishu zhangju jizhu (q.v.). ———. Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 (Section and Sentence Comments and Collected Annotations on the Four Books). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983. ———. “Zhongyong zhangju xu 中庸章句序” (Preface to Section and Sentence Comments on the Doctrine of the Mean). In Sishu zhangju jizhu (q.v.). Zhuangzi 莊子, Zhuangzi yinde 莊子引得 (Concordance to Zhuangzi) ed., HarvardYenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement no. 20. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956. Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 (Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu). Compiled by Li Jingde 李靖德 (fl. 1263). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986. Ziporyn, Brook, trans. and comp. Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009. Zongmi 宗密 (780–841). Yuanjue jing dashu chao 圓覺經大疏鈔 (Subcommentary to the Great Commentary on the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment), Xin zuan xu zang jing ed. (q.v.), vol. 9, no. 245. Zuo zhuan 左傳 (Zuo Tradition), Shisan jing zhushu ed. (q.v.).

Y6693.indb 329

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

This page intentionally left blank

Index

An asterisk (*) before a Sanskrit name or title indicates that a particular name or title is not attested in Sanskrit and is thus a tentative proposal. It is a reasoned guess, but is not certain. Āgama-sūtras, xviii, 101 ālambana: and attentiveness, 236–237; defined, xxx, xxxiv, 35n17; direct vs. remote, 80n136; inseparability from cognizing capacity, 75, 216; and memories, 224; and the mind of first impressions, 223; in refutation of atomist theories, 45–46; and the sixth consciousness, 72, 218–219, 235; and verification, 250–251. See also under Four Conditions Ālambana-parīks.ā (Dignāga), 35–36n19, 45n46 ālaya-vijñāna. See eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) Analects (Confucius), 24, 110n42, 148, 273n78, 284, 288, 315. See also Confucius animals, 181, 185, 267, 279, 286, 302 apophatic mode of explanation, xxxvii, 88, 89, 92 Aristotle, 63n91 Āryadeva, 293n126 Asan.ga: and doctrine of dependent arising, xxxvi, 86n140; and doctrine of seeds, li, 200; as founder of Yogācāra, xiii, 207; texts attributed to, xl(n78), 49n61, 200; Xiong’s exoneration of, lii *Asvabhāva, 217n86

Abhidharma Buddhism, xxxiii, xl(n77), 42n34, 63–64n92 Abhidharmakośa-bhās.ya (Vasubandhu), 113n50, 199n48 Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra śāstra, xxix(n65) Abhidharma-samuccaya (Asan.ga), 90n149, 295 Abhidharma-vibhās.ā-śāstra, 42 afflictions (惑): anger, 273, 274, 279, 290n114; animosity, 275; antipathy, 143, 258–261, 274, 275, 279, 288–294; being without root, l; and the bodhisattva, 272–273; chicanery, 277; controlling the mind, 305; deception, 276–277; and deluded thoughts, 10, 193; duplicity, 276, 277; and the eighth consciousness, 208; empty nature, 317; ennui, 278–279; hostility, 275; and the human body, 186–187; insolence, 277–278, 282, 284; jealousy, 276; as mental associates, lv, lvi, lvii; parsimony, 276, 279; pernicious views, 265–274; pride, 264–265; primary, 255–274, 279; restlessness, 278, 279; secondary, 274–280; shamelessness, 278, 282, 284; uncertainty, 247, 249–250, 255–256; unruliness, 279–280; vexation, 275; as yin image, 187–192. See also craving (貪); ignorance (癡)

331

Y6693.indb 331

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

332

Index

Aśvaghos.a, xxv(n53), 274n81 ātman, xxviii, xliii, 68, 95, 112, 132, 266–267 atomic presumption, xxix–xxx, 30–31, 41–43 atomist theories, xxviii–xxx, xlviii, li, 41–49, 131, 162, 164 Avatam . saka-sūtra, xviii, 23, 114n52, 204 Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith: authorship, lxv(n105); concept of “one mind,” 199n46, 316n200; concept of “One Mind, two aspects,” xxv, xxviii, lxii; on habituated tendencies, 138n20; influence on Xiong, 116n59; notion of pure function, 317n205; ontological stance, xxxvii, xliii, lxiii; topical philosophy, lxvii Azuma Jūji (吾妻重二), 78n128, 136n19 Bergson, Henri, xli, 111–112 Bodhidharma, l, 193 Bodhiruci, 26n17, 30n10 *Bodhisattvabhumi (Asan.ga), 49n61 bodhisattvas, 49–50n61, 272–273 the body: and afflictions, 186–187, 190, 229, 256, 274; and attachment to self, 256, 264, 266–267, 269, 285; control by the mind, l, 23, 179, 182, 194n36, 211; devoid of reality, xlix, 174; as form-and-vital-stuff, 310; and habituated tendencies, 143, 152; as material form (xi), 99–100; and the nature, 150–151, 170–175, 189, 313, 314; and perception, 36, 173 Book of Change: “animating the myriad things” in, 88n142; “Appended Statements,” xxxix(n76), 292, 314n191; and Buddhist texts, xviii; on change and transformation, xxxix, 5, 9, 286; on clearsightedness, 273; commentaries on, 12n19, 110n42, 310, 311n176; concept of yin and yang, 6, 99, 314n191; “contraction” and “expansion” in, xvi, xxxix; on contraignorance, 301; on daily renewal, 302; Decay hexagram, 255; on defilement by afflictions, 318; Fu (Return) hexagram, 186, 188, 189, 191, 312, 313–314; on the heavenly way, 164; Kun hexagram, 100, 162, 188n21, 315; Meeting hexagram, 310; Not Yet Completed hexagram, 146; Peeling (Bo) hexagram, 145, 188, 189, 310, 313, 314n187;

Y6693.indb 332

Qian hexagram, 188, 189, 311–312, 315; “seeing the mind” in, 24; on self-conviction, 284; on silence, 305; Union hexagram, 260; waxing and waning in, 312–313; Well hexagram, 157–158 Book of Odes, 306 Book of Rites, 305 Brahmā-heaven, 95, 96, 112 Bresciani, Umberto, xii Buddhism. See Abhidharma Buddhism; Chan Buddhism; Critical Buddhism; Hīnayāna Buddhism; Mahāyāna Buddhism; nonBuddhist thought; Yogācāra Buddhism Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培), 3n1, 4n4 central nervous system, 67, 175, 185, 194n36, 195 Chan, Wing-cheuk, lxi Chan, Wing-tsit, xi Chan Buddhism, 56, 187n17, 193, 202, 272n68, 273, 306 Chen Baisha (陳白沙) (Xianzhang 獻章), xviii Chen Yinque (陳寅恪) (Yinke), 4 Cheng Hao (程顥) (Mingdao 明道), xxxi, 55, 56, 147, 279 Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論) (Xuanzang): on antipathy, 261; definition of ālambana condition, xxxiv–xxxvi; Dharmapāla and, xxi(n41), xxxii(n67); on discernment vs. clear understanding, 295–296; doctrine of seeds, xxxii–xxxiv, 63–64, 94n4, 121n72; on the eighth consciousness, 209n67; Kuiji’s commentary on, xiii; list of afflictions, lvi; list of mental associates, lv, 6n15; locus classicus of phrase chu wu suo de (觸無所 得), 125n3; and Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra, xl(n78), 101n24; and New Treatise, xxii; on nominal dharmas, 216n82; refutation of self and dharmas, xxviii; theory of consciousness, xxx–xxxi, xxxviii, xli, liii, 94n4, 121n72, 136n19; use of term bian (變) in, xlii(n85) Cheng weishi lun shuji (成唯識論述記) (Kuiji), xiii, 28, 30n11, 35, 255 Cheng Yi (程頤) (Yichuan 伊川): on accommodating antipathy, 290n114; branch of

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

Index Neo-Confucianism, 4; doctrine that “the nature is not different from principle,” xxvii(n57); on heaven-and-earth-bestowed vs. psycho-physical nature, 138n20; on the moral nature, 147; notion of reverent composure, 304nn150–151; as source for New Treatise, 23n6; theory of mutualism, 260 China Institute of Inner Learning, xiii, 5 Clower, Jason, lxi Collected Annotations on the Analects (Zhu Xi), 148, 149, 190, 290n114 Compendium of the Great Vehicle. See Mahāyānasam . graha-śāstra Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Governing, 152n48 conceptualization (想): and discernment, 243; and habituated tendencies, 40, 252; inclusion in cognition, 242; and language, 206, 241; and memory, 252; as a mental associate, lvi, 240–241; and past experience of sensory consciousnesses, 213; and the sixth consciousness, 74–75 Confucius: on changing the world, lviii; on human nature and life, 149, 273–274, 284; on learning, 153, 303; path of authenticity, 181; and transmission of Doctrine of the Mean, 309–310n173; Xiong and, xviii, 7 consciousness. See deluded consciousness (情識); eight consciousnesses; eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna); Four Conditions; mental associates (心所); sensory consciousnesses (感識); sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) contraction (翕): as basis for discussing material dharmas, xxxix, 98; in the Book of Change, xvi, 6; and constant transformation, xlix, 96–98, 124, 175, 177–178; defined, xlvii–xlviii, 162; and expansion, 99–100, 177–178, 181, 188; in Madhyamaka philosophy, lxi. See also expansion (闢) Cox, Collette, xxix(n64) craving (貪): and antipathy, 260; contra-, 285–288; and deception, 277; and duplicity, 276; as fondness for defiled charac-

Y6693.indb 333

333

teristics, 226; and hostility, 275; as mental associate, 256–258; as tainted habituated tendency, 143 Critical Buddhism, lxvi–lxvii Daehyeon (太賢), 78 Dahui Zonggao (大慧宗杲), 307n164 Daode jing (道德經), 110n42 Daoyuan (道原), 193n35 Dasheng qixin lun (大乘起信論). See Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith Daxue (大學) (Confucius), 4, 211, 212 deluded consciousness (情識): constraining true understanding, 293, 294; construing cognitive objects as real, 28–29, 60, 128, 174; distinguished from true mind, xxviii, lii, 210, 249; and notion of eight consciousnesses, 207, 208, 209; taking mental associates for mind, liv, 229; transcended by Reality, 160 dependent arising, doctrine of: as apophatic mode of explanation, xxxvii, 88, 92; and consciousness, 61, 86–87; and contributory factors as condition, xxxvi; and doctrine of seeds, xxxii; and the Middle Path, xlv; Vasubandhu and Asan.ga’s alteration of, 86n140, 208–209; in Xiong’s critique of Yogācāra, xxi, xxxix Dharmapāla: and Cheng weishi lun, xxii(n44), xxxii(n67); and doctrine of seeds, xxi, lii, lxv, 121, 210; on the eight consciousnesses, 80, 120, 129; elaboration on Vasubandhu’s teaching, 90–91; list of fifty-one mental associates, 232; theory of productive power, xlii–xlv, 124–139, 154, 159; on transformation, xli–xlii; Xiong’s criticisms of, 120–123, 206–210; Xiong’s early adherence to, 11 dharmas: of change, xlvi, 156; conditioned, 63; form, 43n36; nominal, 216; of nonexistence, 218; real, 29n7, 71, 74, 176; temporary, 101; Xiong’s use of term, xii(n8). See also material dharmas (色法); mental dharmas (心法) Diamond Sutra, 172 Dignāga, xxi, xli, 35n19, 45n46, 75n122, 120, 244n23

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

334

Index

Dignāga’s three parts theory of consciousness, xli–xlii, 120, 129 Ding Weixiang, 96n11 discernment (慧): in Cheng weishi lun, 295–296; and detailed analysis, 246–247; and general investigation, 245; and ignorance, 265; as mental associate, lvi, 243–245; and mind, 215; pertaining to the physical world, 27; by sensory consciousnesses, 81–82, 120; vs. wisdom and clear understanding, xxiv–xxv, 21–22, 295–301 discourse, 87–89, 91–92, 206, 261 Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice. See Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra Doctrine of the Mean: and Buddhist texts, 4; concepts of actuality and potentiality, xxxix; and Confucius, 309–310n173; on humaneness, 292; opening sentence, 9n2; on revealing the nature, 139, 318; on “seeing the mind,” 24; “thing” in, 96; “to combine the inner and outer” in, 54; on transformation, 111; on unity of consciousness and cognitive objects, xxxi; Zhu Xi’s preface to, 138n20 dreams, xxix, 37–38, 38–39, 40–41 Dunnyun (Dunlun) (遁倫), 78n128, 258 eight consciousnesses, 194–199; Asan.ga’s account of, 207–208; defining activities as basis for, 70; Dharmapāla’s establishment of, 120, 129; and the doctrine of seeds, 64, 197–198; Xiong’s rejection of, xxxiv, xxxvi, li, 65, 79–80 eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna): and ālambana condition, 80; as “all seeds consciousness,” 130–131; establishment in Mahāyāna thought, 196, 197; generating only ālaya-vijñāna seeds, 200; and habituated tendencies, xliii–xliv, 135, 136n19, 198, 208, 230; and “One Mind, two aspects,” xxvi, lxii; and “perfect mirror wisdom,” xxv; and the seven consciousnesses, xxxiii, xxxviii, xliii, 121–122n72, 197–198; and the seventh consciousness, 198; and “sublime consciousness,” 132; the term hengzhuan (恆轉) for, 16 Emptiness school. See Madhyamaka school

Y6693.indb 334

eternalism, xlv, 109, 149, 168, 267–268 evolution, theory of, 181, 185n14, 259–260 Evolution and Ethics (Huxley), xxxix(n76), 6 Exemplary Figures (Yang Xiong), 315 Existence school. See Yogācāra Buddhism Expanded Mahāyāna Treatise on the Five Skandas, 241 expansion (闢): as basis for discussing mental dharmas, xxxix, 98; in the Book of Change, xvi, 6; and constant transformation, xxxix, xlix, 96–97, 124, 177–178; and contraction, 99–100, 162n4, 177, 181, 188; in Madhyamaka philosophy, lxi. See also contraction (翕) Faxiang (法相) school, xii, xxvii(n59) Faxing (法性) school, xii, xxvii(n59) Fayan (法言) (Yang Xiong), 315n193 Flower Ornament Sutra, xviii, 23, 114n52, 204 Fojia mingxiang tongshi (佛家名相通釋) (Xiong Shili), 53n67, 71n107, 75n121, 215n78 Four Conditions, xxxii–xxxiii, 62–85; ālambana, xxxiv–xxxvi, 48, 62, 71–80, 85, 87, 218; causes as, xxxiii, 62–69, 85, 87, 124–125, 126, 200–204; continuous sequence of sameness, xxxiv, 62, 69–71, 85, 87, 97n12; contributory factors as, xxxvi, 62, 81–85, 86, 87, 103 Fu Manrong (伏曼容), 255 fundamental wisdom (玄學): aim, li, 201, 202; apophatic mode of explanation, xxxvii, 88, 89; concept of mind, 182; distinguished from philosophy, xxiii(n46), 5, 153n50; distinguished from science, 49–50, 53, 182; use of analysis, 201, 206 Fuxing Academy (復性書院), 9n1 Gandhi, Mahatma, 284 Great Discourse. See Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra Great Function (大用), 117, 119 Great Learning (Confucius), 4, 211, 212 Great Transformation (大化), 11, 115, 151, 170 Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom, 49, 132, 197

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

Index Gu Jiegang (顧頡剛), 269n60 Guan suoyuan yuan lun (觀所緣緣論) (Xuanzang), 46n46 Guan suoyuan yuan lun huishi (觀所緣緣論 會釋) (Mingyu), 48n54 Guo Qiyong (郭齊勇), xiv Guo Zixuan (郭子玄) (Xiang 象), 58, 109–110 habituated tendencies (習氣): and affliction, l, 187–188; as conditions, 82; deluded, 60–61; difficulty of severing, 279–280; distinguished from productive power, xliv–xlv, 134–154; and doctrine of seeds, 210; and the eighth consciousness, 135, 198, 208; and five states of mind, 222; and form-and-vital-stuff, 312; Gandhi’s freedom from, 284; as karmic power, 132–133; and learning, 316–317; and memory, 40, 252; and mental associates, liv, lvii–lviii, 228–229, 232, 236, 254, 308; perfumed by first seven consciousnesses, 135, 136–137, 198; pure, 289, 295, 309, 315; and the sixth consciousness, 217; and subjective bias, 212; tainted and untainted, 143 Hakayama Noriaki (跨谷縣昭), lxvi Han Yu (韓愈) (Changli 昌黎), 3, 4n3 He Xiu (何休), 293n127 Heart Sutra. See *Mahā-prajñāpāramitāhr.daya-sūtra Heraclitus, 131n11 Hīnayāna Buddhism: Asan.ga and Vasubandhu’s abandonment of, 208; atomist theories, 43, 44, 131; concept of sense faculties, 195; concept of sublime consciousness, 132; on existence of external objects, xxviii–xxix, 30–31, 35–36, 38; notion of six consciousnesses, 194; notion of “subtle consciousness,” 230 Hu Yuanru (胡淵如), 146 Huainanzi (淮南子), 13n29, 205 Huang Lizhou (黃梨洲) (Zongxi 宗羲), 26 Huayan (華嚴) school: doctrine of dharmarealm of the one reality, 155; doctrine of nature origination, xx, 114n51; on endless interdependence, l, 113n49, 180; key scripture, 23n7; Mou Zongsan’s ranking

Y6693.indb 335

335

of, lx(n92); on mutual identity of one and many, l, 5, 180; and New Treatise, xxi(n40), xli; on parts and the whole, 116n57 human life: attachment to external world, 58–59, 183; being without beginning or end, 132; and the body, 26n16, 138, 154–155, 171–174, 256; compared with other life, 181, 185–186, 267, 287, 289; defined, 138; and desire, 240; faculty of intuition, lxiv; and habituated tendencies, xliv, l, 137–139, 141–142, 212, 228; and sustained effort, 303–304 human nature. See the nature (性) ignorance (癡): attachment to characteristics, 297; and duplicity, 276; and hostility, 275; and insolence, 277; as mental associate, 261–264; occurring with discernment, 265, 301; and shamelessness, 278; as tainted habituated tendency, 143 inherent mind (本心): and the apprehension of Reality, xxiv, xxv, 26, 206, 210; and cognitive activity, l, 193; and concentration, 281–282, 294; effect of defiled seeds on, 231; and importance of learning, 308, 309–310, 318; and karmic tendencies, 85; and the Mencian Ox Mountain parable, 191; and phenomenal existence, lvii; in the pure stage, 209; the recognition of, 184; and unity of sentient beings and buddhas, 306; and wisdom, 57, 294 intrinsic purity, condition of, 127 Ji Yi (己易) (Yang Cihu), 55 Jin’gang bore boluomi jing (金剛般若波羅蜜 經), 172n8 Jingde chuan deng lu (景德傳燈錄), 193n35 Kant, Immanuel, lxii, lxiii–lxiv karma, 85, 130n8, 132, 138, 141, 142, 263, 274n81 kataphatic mode of explanation, 87–88 Katsumata Shunkyō (勝又俊教), xli Kivkara, 293n126 knowledge (知識), 25–26, 27, 204–205, 220, 263. See also discernment (慧) Kong Yingda (孔頴達), 158n56

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

336

Index

Kuiji (窺基): commentaries, xiii, xxii(n44), 244n23; and Dharmapāla, 136–137n19, 207; as major figure in Yogācāra school, xxi, lxiv–lxv, 308; theory of consciousness, xxxvii, 28, 90–91; theory of “inherent enlightenment,” lxvi Kumārajīva, 12n21, 132n14, 172n8 Lan.kāvatāra-sūtra, 26n17 Laozi (老子), 25, 27 Later Sarvāstivādin school, xxix–xxx, 47–49 Liang Shuming (梁漱溟), lix, 195 life force, l, 184–187, 191, 194n36, 211, 288 Lin Anwu (林安梧), xvi(n21) Lin Chen-kuo, lxvi–lxvii Lin Zaiping (林宰平) (Zhijun 志均), xvii, 17, 195 Liu Shipei (劉師培), xxxix(n76) Liu Shuxian (Shu-hsien) (劉述先), xvi, lix Liu Zongzhou (劉宗周) (Jishan 蕺山), 211 Lü Cheng (呂澂), xxvii, lxv, lxvi Lu Jiuyuan (陸九淵) (Xiangshan 象山), xxxi, 4, 55, 56, 307 Lucid Introduction to the One Hundred Dharmas (Vasubandhu), 208 Lunyu jizhu (論語集注) (Zhu Xi), 148, 149, 190, 290n114 Luo Nian’an (羅念菴), 100n22, 178, 179–180, 280n88 Luo Yijun (羅義俊), lix(n91) Lusthaus, Dan, xxii(n44), 32n15 Ma Fu (馬浮) (Yifu 一浮), xxvii, 9, 17–18, 205, 272, 284 Madhyamaka school: on absolute and conventional truth, xlvii, 113n48; apophatic mode of explanation, 89; deconstructive methods, xxxix; doctrine of impermanence, xx, xl(n77); influence on Xiong Shili, xx, xli, lxi; nihilism, lvii Madhyānta-vibhāga (Asan.ga), 90, 209nn68–69 Mahāparinirvān.a-sūtra, xviii *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-hr.daya-sūtra, 125n3, 127n4 Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra, 49, 132, 197 Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, xviii, 49n60

Y6693.indb 336

Mahāyāna Buddhism: the bodhisattva in, 49–50n61; concept of the eight consciousnesses, 132, 194, 195, 196–197, 208; doctrine of emptiness, xxxix; on illusory nature of consciousness, 61; influence on Xiong, xxxix, xli; rejection of atomism, 43; sophistical treatises, xxxii, 56; on the unity of consciousness and cognitive objects, xxxi. See also dependent arising, doctrine of Mahāyāna śatadharmā-prakāśamukha-śāstra (Vasubandhu), 208 Mahāyānābhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, 90 Mahāyānasam . graha (Asan.ga), 86–87n140 *Mahāyāna-sam . graha-bhās.ya (Vasubandhu), 65 Mahāyānasam . graha-śāstra (Asan.ga), li, 200–201 Mahāyāna-sūtrālam . kāra, xl, 101n24, 102 manas (seventh consciousness), xxv(n51), 135, 136–137n19, 196, 197, 198, 208 mano-vijñāna. See sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) material dharmas (色法): and atomism, 44; and constant transformation, xxxix–xl, xlvii–xlix, 105, 110, 161–162; as the container world, 166; and habituated tendencies, 136–137n19; vs. mental dharmas, xxviii, 98, 105; non-externality, 92; and “phenomenal world,” 126; terms for, 94, 176, 196. See also mental dharmas (心法) Matsumoto Shirō (松本史郎), lxvi mature separation theory, lxv Mazu (媽祖), 193n33 meditation, 27n19, 304n146 memory (念): and the actively seeking mind, 221; and attentiveness, 237; and cognition of words, 223, 224; and externality of cognitive objects, 38–39; as a mental associate, lvi, 252–254; in pseudo-perception, 73; and self-verifying consciousness, xli(n81); and the sixth consciousness, 38, 40, 74–75; and vexation, 275 Mencius (孟子): and Buddhist learning, 4; Ox Mountain parable, l, 191, 206n61, 285n105; on physical appearance, 312; on

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

Index the undefiled mind, 181; on understanding and examination, 247–248; on the unity of consciousness and cognitive objects, xxxi, 55; view of human nature, xlv mental associates (心所): attentiveness, 236–237, 252, 281, 283, 301; concentration, 280–282, 294, 304; contact, 235–236, 247; contra-antipathy, 288–294; contra-craving, 285–288; contra-ignorance, 294–301; conviction, 282–285, 294, 298; creative impulses, 241–242; defiled, lvi–lvii, 229, 234, 235, 255–280; dependence on mind to arise, liv; desire, 238–240; detailed analysis, 246–247; of the eight consciousnesses, 120; four divisions, 233–235; general investigation, 245; and habituated tendencies, 228–229, 232, 236, 254, 308; object-specific, lvi, 234, 235, 243–255; omnipresent, lvi, 233–234, 235–242; received sensations, 237–238; relation to the mind, 199, 225– 226; seeds as cause of, liv–lv, 121, 227, 230, 232; serenity, 304; sustained effort, 301–318; uncertainty, 247–250, 251; verification, 250–252, 282, 284; vigilance, 227, 304–308; wholesome, lvii–lviii, 280–318; Xiong’s list of thirty-eight, lv, 6n15. See also afflictions (惑); conceptualization (想); discernment (慧); memory (念) mental dharmas (心法): and atomism, 43; and constant transformation, xxxix–xl, 105, 110, 176n1; and doctrine of seeds, 67, 121; exemplifying contributory factors as condition, 81; and habituated tendencies, 136–137n19; lacking reality, 92; and “mind,” 60n81; and “phenomenal world,” 126; vs. material dharmas, xxviii, 98, 105. See also material dharmas (色法) mental-chatter consciousness (意言境), 245–246 mind (心): and constant transformation, xxvii, 60n81, 176, 177–184; control of the body, l, 23, 179, 182, 194n36, 211; five states, 220–225; and the nature, xxvi, lii, lvii, 194n26, 211, 227, 289, 308; and pure habituated tendencies, 289; and Reality, xlix–l, lii–liii, 22–25, 183–184, 188–189, 213–214, 227–228; unrestrained, 37, 251–252. See also

Y6693.indb 337

337

inherent mind (本心); mental associates (心所); mental dharmas (心法) Mingyu (明昱), 48n54 Mou Zongsan (牟宗三), xv, xvi, lviii–lxv, lxvi, 88n142 Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (Nāgārjuna), 12n21 Muller, A. Charles, 80n135 Munbi (文備), 78 Nāgārjuna, 12, 49n60, 293n126 Nanjō Bun’yū (南條文雄), xiii natural world, 166–167, 170–171, 173 the nature (性): being without differentiation, 285, 287; and bodily form, xlv, 150–151, 310–314; Chan Buddhist view of, 193n33; Confucian view of, 145; as constant transformation, xxiv; craving for descendants, 286–287; fundamental vs. manifested aspects of, 138n20; and habituated tendencies, 144–145, 153–154, 317; and the inherent mind, l, 294, 308–309; innate capacities, 192, 315; and learning, 308–309; “mandated” by heaven, xix(n33), lx; and mental associates, liv, lvii, 228–229; and the mind, xxvi, lii, lvii, 194n26, 211, 227, 289, 308; mind as principle for, 302; and the nature, xxiv, lvii, 139, 150, 194n36; not being different from principle, xxvii(n57), xliv; and productive power, xliv, 139, 150; and the psycho-physical, 147–149, 312n181; and Reality, 27; realized through learning and cultivation, lvii, 153, 284, 302, 309, 314–317; as synonym for Reality, lii; and tathāgatagarbha doctrine, xlv; and wisdom, 245, 301 Neo-Confucianism, xv(n16), xxiii, xliv, lxii, 4n4, 203n55 New Confucianism, xv, xvi, lviii–lix, lxi, lxvii New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xiong Shili): On Epistemology, xxii, lx(n93), 15–16, 26, 182; interlinear commentary, xvii(n23), 16; plan of the book, xxiii, 15–17; reception, xii, xxi(n40); versions, xiv–xv, 17 Ng Yu-kwan, xi Nie Bao (聶豹) (Shuangjiang 雙江), 178

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

338

Index

nihilism: challenged by the nature/Reality, xlv; and the condition of intrinsic purity, 127; as a conventional, extreme view, 109, 268; and the power of yearning, 256–257; and productive power, 150; refuted by arising of the following instant, xlix, 168; and the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, lxiii(n98); Xiong’s rejection of, xx(n37), lvii non-Buddhist thought: accounts of ātman, 266–267; arguments for the existence of external objects, xxviii, 30, 31, 57; atomist theories, xxviii, xlviii, 41, 43–44, 49, 51; criticisms of Buddhism, 3–4; presumptions about the creator, 112; treatment of opponents, 293 Nyāyapraveśa (Śam . karasvāmin), 244n23 “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm, xxv– xxvii, lxii, lxiii–lxiv Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses, xl, 101n24, 102 Ouyang Jingwu (歐陽竟無), xiii, lxv, 5, 78n128 *Pañca-skandha-prakaran.a-vaibhās.ya, 241 Paramārtha, xxv–xxvi(n53), lxiv, lxv, 30n10, 65n97, 209n68 perception: defined, 73–74n115; direct, xlii, liii, 35–37, 38, 40, 206, 215–216, 251; mistaken, 251; as one of the five skandhas, 207n62, 314n188; pseudo-, 73; pure false-, 251; subjective, 37n22 personal realization, 204–206 plants, 115, 185, 267, 279, 286, 302 Prabhākaramitra, 101n24 Prajñāgupta, 75–76 Prajñāpāramitā, 113n48, 125, 127 Prakaranāryavāca-śāstra (Asan.ga), 86–87n140 Pratītya-samutpāda divibhan.ga-nirdeśa-sūtra, 258 productive power (功能), 124–160; distinguished from causes as condition, 124–129; distinguished from habituated tendencies, xliii–xlv, 134–154; and doctrine of seeds, xliii, 129–132, 210, 229; and formand-vital-stuff, 11n16; as the nature, 154; as

Y6693.indb 338

the totality of all things, xliii, 129–134; and transformation, 113–115, 124, 155–160 psychology, 181–182, 193, 194n36, 230, 233, 266, 277 Puguang (普光), 73 Qingyi (輕意), 121 Reality: apprehended through personal experience, lii, lvii, 202–206; and atomist theories, 49–51; and condition of intrinsic purity, 127; constancy as metaphor for, 95n6; as constant transformation, xxiv, xl, xlviii–xlix, 98, 100, 155–159, 161–164; as dharmadhātu, 114, 316; and form-andvital-stuff, xlv, 150, 179; identification with self-nature, xxiii–xxiv, 15, 21–22, 97n15, 219, 294–295n130, 297; identification with the nature, xxi, xxiv, xlvi, lii, 211; and integration of subject with object, 56–57; manifestation through function, xxxvii–xxxviii, lxiii, 29, 89–92, 214; and mind, xlix–l, lii–liii, 22–25, 60n81, 183–184, 188–189, 213–214, 227–228; and the phenomenal world, xxii, xxiv, xlvii, lvii, 126, 127; as principle, xliv, 147; and productive power, xliii, xlv, 113–115, 124, 139, 149, 155–156; shared Confucian and Buddhist insights on, xix; and ti-yong polarity, xxi–xxii; and wisdom, xxiv–xxv, 21, 24, 25–27, 57, 299; Xiong’s monist, syncretic understanding of, xix–xx, li recollection. See memory (念) Recorded Conversations (Wang Yangming), 55–56 Ren wang huguo bore boluomiduo jing (仁王 護國般若波羅蜜多經), 268n57 Ru lengqie jing (入楞伽經) (Bodhiruci), 26n17 Russell, Bertrand, 77n127, 101 *Saddharmapun.d.arīka-sūtra, 263n52 Sakuma, Hidenori, xxii(n44) Śākyamuni, 3n2 Sam . ghabhadra, xxix(n65), 47n52 Śam . karasvāmin, 244n23 Sām . khya school, xlviii, 163–164 Sam . mitīya-nikāya school, 75–76

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

Index Sanshi lun shuji (三十論述記) (Kuiji), 30 Sarvāstivādin school, xxix–xxx, 42n34, 43, 44–46 Sautrāntika school, xxix–xxx, 46–47, 230n110 Schmithausen, Lambert, xlii(n85) seeds (bīja), doctrine of: as the cause of consciousness, xxxiii–xxxiv, xxxviii, 94n4, 121–122n72, 130–131; in Cheng weishi lun, lxv, 63–64; and doctrine of dependent arising, xxxii; and Four Conditions, xxxii– xxxiii, 67; and habituated tendencies, xliii–xliv, 210, 229–230; and mental associates, liv–lv, 121, 227, 230; and productive power, xliii, 129; and transformation, xli– xlii; Vasubandhu’s view of, lii; in Yogācāra Buddhism, xxi, lxii–lxiii Sengzhao (僧肇), 12, 157, 216 sensory consciousnesses (感識): and ālambana condition, 73; and atomism, xxx, 45–46, 48; conditioned by sense organs, 81–82, 212–213; dependence on sense objects, 74; direct perception by, 36, 75, 215–217; and habituated tendencies, 135, 136; and the mind of first impressions, 221–222, 224; and sixth consciousness, 32n14 seventh consciousness (manas), xxv(n51), 135, 136–137n19, 196, 197, 198, 208 Shiu, Henry C. H., lxiii(n98) Shun, Kwong-loi, 212n75 Śilāditya, King, 76 sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna): and ālambana condition, 236; defiled knowledge, 118; defining activity, 197, 217; deluded conceptual discrimination, 34, 36, 126; dependence on reflected images, 74; as dharma consciousness, 196; habitual defilements, 82; and habituated tendencies, 135, 136–137n19; and inner cognitive objects, 218–220; and memory, 38, 40, 74–75, 213, 254; and mental-chatter consciousness, 245; and the mind of first impressions, 221–222, 224; and notion of ātman, 267; reliance on sense faculty of mental discrimination, 194; role and function, xxv(n51), 32, 33, 69, 213, 215, 217–218; as “unrestrained mind,” 37, 72

Y6693.indb 339

339

Southern Dilun school, lxv Spencer, Herbert, 6 Staël-Holstein, A., Freiherr von, 4 Sthavira school, 230n110 Sthiramati, xxii(n44), 90n149, 241n19 sublime consciousness, doctrine of, 131–133 Śūram . gama-sūtra, 257, 263 Sutra on Dependent Arising, 258 Swanson, Paul, lxvii Tagawa Shun’ei, xxxviii Taixu (太虛), xxi(n40) taixu (太虛), 96n11, 138n20, 312n181 Taizong (太宗) emperor, 51 Tang Junyi (唐君毅), xv, xxii(n43), lix Tang Yongtong (湯用彤), 146 Tanyao (曇曜), 293n126 Tao Jiang, xl, xli Tao Yuanming (陶淵明), 190 tathāgatagarbha doctrine, xxvi, xlv, lxii, lxiv, lxv, lxvii Tattvārthapat.ala, 49 Thirty Verses (Vasubandhu), xli Tiantai school, lx(n92), lxii time, concept of, xlviii–xlix, 23, 44n42, 59, 107–108, 167–168 ti-yong (體用) polarity: component characters, xxiv; Dharmapāla’s severance of, 91n152; and Madhyamaka Buddhism, lxi; and the mind, xxvi–xxvii, l; and Mou Zongsan’s “phenomenal ontology,” lxiv; non-separability, lxii, lxiii; and theory of nature origination, xxi–xxii; in Xiong Shili’s work, xv–xvi topical philosophy, lxvii transformation (轉變), 94–123; attraction and repulsion in, 162–163; and the body, 175, 186; in the Book of Change, 6, 9, 145–146, 310, 312; of consciousness, xli–xlii, lxvi, 130n7, 220; constancy in, 95–96; as contraction and expansion, xxxix, 6, 12, 96–100, 161–162; Dharmapāla’s two types, 121–122; distinguished from transference, 94–95; and the doctrine of seeds, xxxviii, 94n4, 130n7; and habituated tendencies, 152, 316; the mind and, xxvii, 60n81, 176, 177–184; the nature and, xxiv;

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

340

Index

transformation (轉變) (continued) non-Buddhist accounts of, 163–165; as productive power, 113–115, 124, 155–160; Reality as process of, xxxviii–xl, lxvii, 16, 50, 92, 124, 155; as sudden generation and extinction, 100–111; three meanings of, xl–xli, 111–119; and time, 168 Treatise of the Great Commentary on the Abhidharma, 42 Trim . śikā (Vasubandhu), xxi(n40), xxii(n44), xli, 208, 209n66, 226 Two Truths, doctrine of the, xlv Ultimate Void, 96n11, 138n20, 312n181 utility, presumption based on, xxviii–xxix, 30, 31 Vaiśes.ika school, xlviii, li, 51, 164, 201 Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, 172 Vasubandhu: division of mind into eight categories, 209; and doctrine of dependent arising, xxxvi, 86n140; and doctrine of seeds, xxi, xxxvii, li, lii, 65, 200; theory of consciousness as transformer, 90–91; Thirty Verses, xxi(n40), xxii(n44), xli, 208, 209n66, 226; Twenty Verses, 30n10, 38n24, 133, 215; use of bian (變) in works by, xlii(n85); Weishi teachings, lxiv–lxv; and Yogācāra Buddhism, xiii, 207 Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra, 272–273 Vim . śatikā (Vasubandhu), 30n10, 38n24, 133, 215 Wang, Robyn, 96n11 Wang Bi (王弼) (Fusi 輔嗣), 12, 310, 311n176 Wang Fuzhi (王夫之) (Chuanshan 船山), xii, 115, 152, 186 Wang Gen (王艮), 178n3 Wang Ji (王畿), 178n3 Wang Yangming (王陽明) (Shouren 守仁): on the analytical approach, 205; criticism of “seeking principles externally,” 26; followers, 100n22, 178; mistaken explanation of yi (意), 212; and Neo-Confucianism, 4; on pure knowing, 182–183; on there being “no things outside the mind,” 55–56; thesis

Y6693.indb 340

that “mind is not different from principle,” xxvii(n57); on thoughts arising in response to the body, 140; on wisdom, 301; Xiong’s citation of, xxxi weishi (唯識), 28–93; component characters, 28; and images in the mind, 78; refuting the existence of external objects, xxxi, xxxii, 60, 61; Xiong’s concept of, xiv(n13), xxx–xxxi, 53–59 Weishi ershi lun (唯識二十論) (Xuanzang), 30n10, 56 Weishi ershi lun shuji (唯識二十論述記) (Kuiji), 30 Weishi (唯識) school, xii, xiii, lxiv–lxv Weishixue gailun (唯識學概論) (Xiong Shili), xiv, xviii, xxiii(n46), xxxv(n69) Wenbei (文備), 78 Willis, Janice Dean, 49n61 wisdom (智): and the bodhisattva, 273; as cognition of one’s inherent nature, xxv; as dependent on concentration, 143; distinguished from discernment, xxiv–xxv, 21–22, 220, 245, 297, 299–301; distinguished from knowledge, 25; following the principle of things, 288; identification with Reality, 24, 57, 159; as inner cognitive object, 24n13; and pure habituated tendencies, 317–318. See also fundamental wisdom (玄學) Xin weishi lun (新唯識論). See New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xiong Shili) Xiong Shili (熊十力): career and education, xiii–xiv, 9n1, 11; influence, xi–xii, xv; syncretism, xvii–xxi, xxiii, lvii Xu Fuguan (徐復觀), xv, lix Xuanzang (玄奘): adherence to Dharmapāla’s view on productive power, 136–137n19; and faxiang term, xii; introduction of Yogācāra to China, 308; memorial to Taizong, 51; and “new” tradition of Yogācāra, lxiv; theory of consciousness, xxi, xxxi, xxxiii, 121n72; theory of transformation, xl; on “to bear closely,” 75–76; translations, 35–36n19, 45–46n46, 65n97,

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM

Index 78n128, 208n65, 244n23. See also Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論) (Xuanzang) Xunzi (荀子), 204 Yan Fu (嚴復) (Youling 幼陵), xxxix(n76), 6 Yan Yuan (Hui), 290n114 Yang Jian (楊簡) (Cihu 慈湖), xxxi, 55, 171 Yang Wenhui (楊文會), xiii Yang Xiong (揚雄), 315 Yi Qian zao du (易乾鑿度), 50, 99n18 Yi ye lun (意業論) (Qingyi), 121 Yijing (易經). See Book of Change Yinming dashu (因明大疏) (Kuiji), 244n23 Yinming dashu shan zhu (因明大疏刪注) (Xiong Shili), 244n23 yin-yang (陰陽) duality: and affliction, 187–188, 189, 191, 318; and concepts of contraction and expansion, 6, 99; and form-and-vitalstuff, 310–311; and illusory moving points, xlviii, 162. See also Book of Change Yogācāra Buddhism: accounts of causality, xxxiii; advocacy of Reality through function, 89–90; Chinese terms for, xii; concept of mind-kings, 199n48; on habituated tendencies, 136n19; historical development, xiii, 308; methods, 5; refutation of Hinayana views, 30; and tathāgatagarbha doctrine, xlv; Weishi school, xii, xiii, lxiv–lxv Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: authorship, 86–87n140; *Bodhisattvabhūmi section of, 49–50n61; on compassion, 143; on dharmas, 90; on mental associates, 226; on the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, 197–198n44; on types of craving, 258; Xuanzang’s translation of, 78n128 Yu, Jiyuan, xvi(17) Yuqielun ji (瑜伽論記) (Dunnyun), 78n128, 258 Zeno’s paradox, 107nn35–36 Zhang Taiyan (章太炎), 116n58

Y6693.indb 341

341

Zhang Zai (張載) (Hengqu 橫渠), 96n11, 138n20, 147, 302, 312n181, 313 Zhanran (湛然), 272n66 Zheng Jiadong (鄭家棟), lix Zheng Xuan (鄭玄), 293n127 Zheng Zhen (鄭珍) (Ziyin 子尹), 240 Zhonglun (中論)(Kumārajīva), 12n21 Zhongyong (中庸). See Doctrine of the Mean Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤) (Lianxi 濂溪), 6n14, 249, 259, 279, 304n149 Zhou Shaoxian (周邵賢), xxii(n43) Zhou yi zhushu (Kong Yingda), 158n56 Zhouyi (周易). See Book of Change Zhu Xi (朱熹): on Confucius, 309–310n173; criticism of Chan Buddhists, 193n33; on emotional responses, 290n114; on “heaven-and-earth-bestowed” vs. “psycho-physical” nature, 138n20; on human nature, 148; moral psychology, xxvi; notion of reverent composure, 304n150; and Principle-Centered Learning, 4n4; on “returning to the beginning,” 190; and “the nature is not different from principle” doctrine, xxvii(n57); understanding of cheng yi (誠意), 212n75; Wang Yangming’s criticism of, 205n59; Xiong compared with, xii Zhuangzi (莊子): on afflictions, 255; commentaries on, 58n78; Cook Ding episode, 307; on craving, 288; “Discourse on Making All Things Equal” chapter, xli, 5, 172n9, 261n47; figure of Qi Xie, 270; “Great Ancestral Teacher” chapter, 109; on illumination and concealment, 293; on the mind dying, 187; on movement and stillness, 158; rabbit-snare allegory, li, 203n54; term for unconditional freedom, 206; “Webbed Fingers” chapter, 182, 285(nn104, 106) Zizhi tongjian (資治通鑒), 152n48 Zongmi (宗密), 193n33 Zuo Tradition (左傳), 161

6/30/15 2:55:58 PM