The Management of UN Peacekeeping: Coordination, Learning, and Leadership in Peace Operations 9781626376014

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The Management of UN Peacekeeping

A joint project of the International Peace Institute

and the University of Konstanz

The Management of

UN Peacekeeping Coordination, Learning, and Leadership in Peace Operations

edited by

Julian Junk, Francesco Mancini, Wolfgang Seibel, and Till Blume

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2017 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2017 by the International Peace Institute, Inc. All rights reserved by the publisher

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Junk, Julian, editor. Title: The management of UN peacekeeping : coordination, learning, and leadership in peace operations / edited by Julian Junk, Francesco Mancini, Wolfgang Seibel, and Till Blume. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016041273 | ISBN 9781626375857 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781626375864 (pbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: United Nations—Peacekeeping forces—Management. Classification: LCC JZ6374.M363 2017 | DDC 355.4—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016041273

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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Contents

Foreword, Terje Rød-Larsen Acknowledgments

vii ix

Introduction: The Management of UN Peacekeeping Julian Junk and Francesco Mancini 1

Coordination, Learning, and Leadership: Challenges of Peace Operations Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf

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Part 1 Coordination 2

Coordination and Networks Anna Herrhausen

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Network and Transaction Costs Theories: Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina Michael Lipson

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Peace Operations as Temporary Network Organizations Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters

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Integrated DDR: Lessons for Coordination in Peace Operations? Tobias Pietz

111

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The Elusive Coherence of Building Peace Cedric de Coning

125

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The Coherence Conundrum in Peace Operations Asith Bhattacharjee

141

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Contents

Part 2 Learning 8 9

Organizational Learning and Peace Operations Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann

161

Learning and Identity in the Field

191

Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring 10

Bureaucracy and Learning at Headquarters Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann

217

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Organizational Change in International Bureaucracies Michael Bauer, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill

239

Part 3 Leadership 12

Leadership in Organizations: A Review Sabine Boerner

267

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Leading the United Nations: A Secretary or a General? Simon Chesterman and Thomas M. Franck

289

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Leading Peace Operations: The Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General Manuel Fröhlich

301

Role Models of Leadership in Peace Operations: Lessons from Kosovo Frederik Trettin

331

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Part 4 Conclusion 16

Linking Coordination, Learning, and Leadership Francesco Mancini and Julian Junk

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

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369 373 415 419 433

Foreword Terje Rød-Larsen, President, International Peace Institute

THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) IS PROUD TO PRESENT THE

Management of UN Peacekeeping: Coordination, Learning, and Leadership in Peace Operations, a collaborative project of IPI and the Department of Politics and Public Administration of the University of Konstanz in Germany. The volume addresses an understudied aspect of peacekeeping operations: management. Since 2000, when the United Nations started introducing reforms to strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain peacekeeping operations, few scholars and practitioners have focused on the contribution that the theory and practice of management can make to peacekeeping. This volume fills this literature gap with a collection of articles by both scholars of organization theory and public administration management and peacekeeping practitioners. With a growing number of staff working on a widening array of tasks in environments that are ever more challenging and complex, the need for effective and efficient management of peace operations is evident. In response, the volume focuses on the analysis of three interrelated phenomena of organization—coordination, learning, and leadership—which also correspond to fundamental challenges in peace operations. While the contributions highlight the value added that organization theory and public administration lenses bring to the enhancement of peace operations, the analysis also sheds light on the limits imposed on effective management by the politicization of international organizations at both the headquarters and field levels, challenging the assumption of organizational ideal types and emphasizing the importance of transformative leadership, creative coping, and second-best solutions.

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Foreword

The Management of UN Peacekeeping continues IPI’s tradition of projects aimed at strengthening the way UN peace operations across the globe are managed. In fact, IPI (then named the International Peace Academy, IPA) developed the very first handbook for UN peacekeepers, The Peacekeeper’s Handbook, in 1978. The 2012 Management Handbook for UN Field Missions is the latest example of IPI’s publications that aim to introduce critical concepts of management theory while offering practical tools and real-life examples of good management practice from UN field missions. More broadly, with its Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, IPI today continues to contribute to deepening the understanding of peace operations around the world and to develop policy ideas to improve their chances of success. Multidisciplinary expertise is much needed today to improve the performance of peace operations. Our hope is that this volume will inspire a dialogue between scholars of management and organization theories and peacekeeping practitioners, for whom this work represents only a first step.

Acknowledgments

WE ARE GRATEFUL TO A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WERE INSTRUMENTAL

in the publication of this book. First and foremost, our thanks go to the contributors to the volume, who worked through several drafts and continued to give their support throughout the length of the project. They are the source of the book’s insights, while all responsibilities for shortcomings rest with us. For their support in the editing process, we would like to thank Laura Albarracin, Anne Lange, Marilyn Messer, and Till Papenfuss for their work on earlier versions of the chapters; and Marisa McCrone, Thong Nguyen, Madeline Brennan, and Albert Trithart for their subsequent copyediting. Special thanks go to Adam Lupel, IPI’s vice president, for helping us steer the work to conclusion. We would also like to express our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of each chapter as well as to the two anonymous reviewers of the whole volume, whose feedback helped to improve an early version of our manuscript. We thank Lynne Rienner Publishers’ project editor, Lesli Brooks Athanasoulis, for making this into a finished product. We also owe a debt of thanks to the generous financial support of IPI’s donors, as well as to the Center of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Integration” at the University of Konstanz and to the German Foundation for Peace Research, which generously funded the initial authors’ conference. —the Editors

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The Management of UN Peacekeeping

Introduction: The Management of UN Peacekeeping Julian Junk and Francesco Mancini

“THE WORLD IS CHANGING AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS MUST CHANGE

with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security.”1 With these words, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in October 2014, the latest in a long series of reform efforts in peacekeeping that the UN has been carrying out since 1992, when An Agenda for Peace established the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.2 Since then, things have never gotten easier for peacekeepers.3 Today, UN-mandated peace operations can contain more than 300 individual functions that fall under more than 20 broad categories, including: protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); electoral assistance; human rights monitoring; security sector reform; justice reform; and the rule of law.4 They incorporate elements of peace enforcement and peacebuilding, often operating in precarious security environments with political instability, little peace to keep, and multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests and positions. They include uniformed personnel (troops, military observers and experts, and police) as well as civilians. They are deeply political institutions, multicultural and temporary in their nature. Their unique managerial challenges are the core theme of this book.

Why Management: Context and Relevance At least since 2000, with the publication of the so-called Brahimi Report, a landmark document that assessed the shortcomings of the peacekeeping 1

Introduction: The Management of UN Peacekeeping Julian Junk and Francesco Mancini

“THE WORLD IS CHANGING AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS MUST CHANGE

with it if they are to remain an indispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace and security.”1 With these words, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in October 2014, the latest in a long series of reform efforts in peacekeeping that the UN has been carrying out since 1992, when An Agenda for Peace established the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.2 Since then, things have never gotten easier for peacekeepers.3 Today, UN-mandated peace operations can contain more than 300 individual functions that fall under more than 20 broad categories, including: protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); electoral assistance; human rights monitoring; security sector reform; justice reform; and the rule of law.4 They incorporate elements of peace enforcement and peacebuilding, often operating in precarious security environments with political instability, little peace to keep, and multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests and positions. They include uniformed personnel (troops, military observers and experts, and police) as well as civilians. They are deeply political institutions, multicultural and temporary in their nature. Their unique managerial challenges are the core theme of this book.

Why Management: Context and Relevance At least since 2000, with the publication of the so-called Brahimi Report, a landmark document that assessed the shortcomings of the peacekeeping 1

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The Management of UN Peacekeeping

system at the time and made specific recommendations for change, organization and management issues have been on the UN reform agenda and broadly acknowledged as important elements to strengthen the capacity of peace operations. Still, despite much emphasis on its relevance, management is widely seen as a suboptimal feature of UN peace operations, and of the UN as a whole for that matter.5 The report of the above-mentioned HIPPO carried the same disparaging message that, when it comes to systems, structures, resources, and leadership: “UN administrative procedures are failing missions and their mandates. . . . Headquarters is not delivering the leadership, management or support required for the challenges facing UN peace operations today.”6 So, why, despite multiple reform efforts and a broad agreement on its importance, does management remain a weak point of peace operations? The answer resides in the very nature of peace operations, which is deeply political. This is not only because the most critical element of success for peace operations is to get the political process that leads to peace and stability right. It is also because political compromises, underpinned by different and often conflicting interests among member states and bureaucratic infighting, define every feature of such missions. The UN Secretariat, which runs peace operations, is no different, being “a political institution, a place where UN member states compete for power and influence of others.”7 In such an environment, management is generally considered an afterthought, relying more on personal intuitions and cultural habits than on established or innovative methods and techniques. Training in management skills remains a largely unmet need.8 Managerial reforms and institutional changes cannot be pursued without the commitment of member states and the results are always the fruit of political compromises that seldom take into consideration management and organization knowledge and practice. It is our opinion that the political nature of peace operations leads to at least three principal interrelated limitations in management and organization. First, organizational structures are not primarily dictated by the functions a peace mission has to perform. Organization design is generally by template. “We don’t want designer missions: we do template missions,” the New York headquarters told Ian Martin, a former special representative of the UN Secretary-General, in the course of planning for the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).9 The result is that often structures limit, rather than support, the achievement of the mission’s goals. To cite again the 2015 HIPPO report, “The current Headquarters configuration is hampering the effective assessment, design and conduct of UN peace operations and, more generally, the Secretariat’s work in support of international peace and security.”10 Second, bureaucratic rules and procedures impede rather than facilitate management, even when they are established with good intentions and in reaction to specific shortcomings or crises. Internal processes are cumber-

Introduction

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some and a risk averse organizational culture constrains mission leaders and administrators from making commonsense decisions in pursuit of the mandate. Success is “generally achieved in spite of the system rather than thanks to it,” wrote former under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno.11 Third, financial and human resources as well as equipment, often used as leverages in the fight over power and influence among member states, are regularly overstretched, which tests the managerial and organizational capacity of field operations. While we fully agree that the greatest challenges for peace operations are political, and not technical, we argue that it is precisely because peace operations face political, bureaucratic, and resource constraints that more organization and management knowledge need to be injected into the UN system. Management—the art of aligning means and ends and thus the capacity to marshal resources, lay out plans, conduct work, and spur effort—is central to the accomplishment of any human purpose.12 Good structures and management can sometimes make the difference between success and failure. To use again the words of Guéhenno, “The success of [peace operations] is all in the art of implementation.”13 In complex environments such as the ones in which peace operations are deployed, effectively organizing and managing scarce resources becomes both more daunting and more essential. In fact, if managed well, environmental complexity can increase the resilience of an organization and enhance its ability to adapt, learn, and thrive in challenging contexts.14 And since legitimacy also depends on effectiveness, peace operations that deliver can go a long way in regaining some of the ground lost by the UN. More will be said on the importance of management and organization in the first chapter of this book. At this stage it is important to remember that, notwithstanding the political nature of peace operations, good management practices and solid organizational arrangements can help strengthen peacekeeping on multiple fronts: its efficiency, optimizing the use of scarce resources to achieve the mission’s goals; its effectiveness, enhancing the mission’s capacity to deliver results; and its legitimacy, showing that a mission is able to make a difference in the lives of those who are affected by conflict.

Objectives of the Book While there is a vast literature in management, public administration, and organizational theory as well as a large stock of evaluations of best and worst practices, little of these bodies of work focus on UN peace operations.15 Conversely, the large literature on peace operations emphasizes history and trends, politics and strategies, and mandates and performances

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The Management of UN Peacekeeping

rather than managerial and organizational elements.16 To bring these two worlds—the management and the UN knowledge—into dialogue seems key to improving the understanding of managerial challenges and solutions for peace operations. This book offers a start in establishing this dialogue to facilitate cross-fertilization between the two fields by focusing on three interrelated phenomena of organization and management: coordination (organizing resources among various organizational entities to enable the successful carrying out of plans), learning (managing knowledge for organizational improvement), and leadership (directing resources to achieve the organization’s mission). All three areas also correspond to fundamental challenges in peace operations. While the book does not aim to be a management training manual, it seeks to serve four purposes.17 First, it aims to advance specific organizational theories for the use of UN peace operations in conflict and postconflict contexts (theory development). Second, it identifies insights from the theoretically led, but essentially empirical, literature on a wide array of organizations, from the private sector to public administration and international organizations, to shed light on the managerial challenges of peace operations (theory application). Third, it seeks to identify specific organizational needs of peace operations that are related to coordination, learning, and leadership (capacity description). Finally, the exchange between organization scholars and peace operation practitioners aims to draw recommendations to strengthen management capacities and operations in keeping and building peace (capacity improvement). The contributions in this volume seek to utilize the analytical potential of administrative science and organization theory to offer remedies for a range of problems that occur in UN peace operations. In doing so, the authors do not attempt to address the full complexity of peace operations, and indeed political constraints are addressed in the concluding chapter of the volume as main factors that should lead to the so-called second-best choice in management. In fact, many aspects of international relations, national foreign policies, and geopolitics may contribute to the very organizational challenges addressed in the book. For example, lack of coordination may result from the divergent interests of UN member states or from the varying degrees of commitment to the implementation of a mandate. The limits of organizational learning may be due to an unwillingness of UN member states to accept the lessons. The performance of top-level UN officials is as much a matter of leeway and circumstances as it is a matter of personal leadership. Still, these important factors in securing successful peace operations fall outside the remit of this project, whose main objective is to deepen the understanding of the managerial and organizational challenges of peace operations. And as many contributions in this volume indicate, skillful management can help to navigate these complex political waters.

Introduction

5

The result is that, while highlighting the value added that organization theory and public administration lenses bring to the enhancement of peace operations, the analysis also sheds light on the limits imposed on effective management by the politicization of international organizations both at headquarters and in the field. This challenges the assumption of organizational ideal types and emphasizes the importance of transformative leadership, creative coping, and second-best solutions.

Structure of the Book The book begins with a chapter that summarizes the state of the literature in coordination, learning, and leadership, and identifies avenues on how to apply this vast knowledge to UN peace operations. In doing so, Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf provide an indepth conceptual rationale for the importance of these three areas of management theory and practice. Following this introductory chapter, the three subsequent sections of this volume dig into each element more thoroughly, with a mix of contributions from the management, public administration, and peace operations fields, which have been collected and revised over the past few years. Each section starts with chapters that provide an overview of the main insights from management and public administration literature followed by chapters that confront those insights with the empirical reality of implementing peace operations. Part 1: Coordination Chapters 2 through 7 in this section show that, despite substantive advances in doctrine and guidelines at the UN, coordination remains a persistent challenge in peace operations. Anna Herrhausen introduces the topic by reviewing the literature on organizational forms and coordination. She shows that organization forms—that is, hierarchy, network, and market— and the way in which coordination happens within each form are inextricably interlinked. Herrhausen suggests that network organization is the most appropriate coordination form for peace operations and develops recommendations to strengthen the network character (interoperability and complementarity) and to improve network governance (common culture and access restrictions). Michael Lipson partially challenges this conclusion in his chapter, exploring the limited utility of network theories and transaction costs in explaining interorganizational coordination in peace operations, drawing from the international experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters further explore the network character and provide a careful review of the state of the art of network theory. They

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The Management of UN Peacekeeping

highlight that UN peace operations are temporary in nature and, therefore, are characterized by high cognitive, strategic, and institutional uncertainty. Raab and Soeters then focus on the coordination tensions that arise within the different national components of the military and between the military and other actors such as the civilian officers, donor agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, with lessons drawn from peace operations in Lebanon and Liberia. Coordination mechanisms can also be identified in specific activities such as DDR of former combatants, argues Tobias Pietz in his analysis of early lessons learned in the program pilot implementation in Haiti and the Sudan. When discussing coordination in peace operations, the term coherence remains underdefined and its meaning is ambiguous. Asith Bhattacharjee and Cedric de Coning seek to fill this void by offering a better conceptualization in peacekeeping and peacebuilding contexts, respectively. Bhattacharjee draws lessons from his experience in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to illustrate the three main dimensions of coherence: (1) between the Security Council’s mandate and the peace operation on the ground; (2) within the UN system operating in the country; and (3) between the UN system and the hosting government. On the other hand, de Coning identifies the limits of coherence and challenges the conventional wisdom that more coherence results in more effective peace operations. He makes clear that, beyond a certain point, the marginal benefit of investing in more coherence decreases and eventually produces negative effects. Part 2: Learning Learning, both seen as a cognitive process and a means for organizational change, is the focus of Chapters 8 through 11. Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann provide an overview of the organizational learning theories, which so far have hardly been applied to the realm of international organizations, let alone peace operations. Lessons from the UN peace operation in the Sudan are used to illustrate different patterns of organizational learning: (1) field-based learning practice; (2) standard training, capacity development, and staff diversity; and (3) results-based budgeting as an organizational learning process. The chapters that follow in the section dig deeper into specific aspects of organizational learning. Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann lay the conceptual foundations for analyzing learning in international bureaucracies and identify the key stages of a learning process, crucial factors for planning and implementing peace operations. They then investigate the process of organizational learning at the headquarters level of the UN peace operations bureaucracy. Melanie Mai, Rüdi-

Introduction

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ger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring emphasize the role of collective identities in learning processes through a case study on Liberia. Their chapter shows how the multitude and diversity of actors involved undermine the learning dynamics in the mission. They emphasize the importance of a shared identity as a learning enabler and unifying factor in a mission; hence, they connect organizational theories presented in the first section to learning. Organizational learning becomes a means for coordination. Closing this section, Michael Bauer, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill discuss the relevance of organizational change theory to the study of organizational learning. They transfer insights from organizational reforms of a variety of international organizations, including the World Food Programme and the European Central Bank, to the field of peace operations. Part 3: Leadership While many contributors in the previous two sections highlight the importance of leadership for successful coordination and learning, Chapters 12 through 15 zoom in on the role of leaders in peace operations. Sabine Boerner analyzes the principal leadership theories, including the trait and skills approach, the style approach, the situational approach, path-goal theory, goal-oriented leadership, leader-member exchange, and transformational leadership. Through these theories and with an emphasis on transformational leadership, Boerner identifies the key leadership traits of a successful mission leader. Simon Chesterman and Thomas Franck analyze the role of the UN Secretary-General and the tension inherent in that title: whether the leader is more “secretary” or more “general.” After a review of the history of this tension among the different heads of the world body, the authors formulate recommendations on how the Secretary-General’s voice can be their strongest leadership asset. Manuel Fröhlich provides a detailed overview of the legal and political basis of the work of special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the means of influence they have at their disposal, and the various styles of leadership. His analysis is supported by a comprehensive and original dataset that charts the varieties of tasks and mandates of SRSGs throughout the years and the diversity of their geographical origins as well as their assigned regions. Frederik Trettin, on the other hand, uses role theory to address the question of what roles an SRSG performs and what he or she instead delegates, and how much these choices influence the success of a peace operation. To do this, he compares the tenures of two consecutive SRSGs of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), namely, Hans Haekkerup and Michael Steiner. Our conclusion, before summarizing the main findings of the three sections of the book and identifying the linkages and tensions, focuses briefly

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The Management of UN Peacekeeping

on the main constraint that all management-related recommendations for the planning and implementation of peace operations necessarily face—the dominance of politics. We suggest that, given the political nature of peace operations, weaknesses in coordination, learning, and leadership can only be mitigated, but not entirely eliminated, by managerial efforts. At the end we propose three broad statements that, together with the recommendations we summarize in this final chapter, can help inform future efforts to enhance the organization and managerial skills of UN peace operations. First, we stress that the joint analysis of theories of organizational coordination, learning, and leadership, together with practices and case studies of UN peace operations, highlights how these three fundamental areas of management are mutually reinforcing. Second, we advocate for second-best choices in organization and management, dictated by the political nature of peace operations. And finally, we call for the contextualization of organization and management knowledge, rather than the application of textbook models, given the diversity of the contexts and the high variability of the circumstances in which peace missions operate.

Notes 1. Ban Ki-moon, “Secretary-General’s Statement on Appointment of HighLevel Independent Panel on Peace Operations” (New York: UN, October 31, 2014), www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8151. 2. The list of UN reform proposals is long. A good history of peacekeeping reform is available at the UN Peacekeeping website at www.un.org/en/peacekeep ing/operations/history.shtml. For a comprehensive review of all reforms proposals since 1997, see Four Nations Initiative on Governance and Management of the United Nations, Towards a Compact: Proposals for Improved Governance and Management at the UN Secretariat (Stockholm: Four Nations Initiative, September 2007), pp. 61−69. See also Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), pp. 134−144. 3. For a review of the trends in UN and non-UN mandated peace operations, see Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Trends in Peace Operations, 1947−2013,” in Joachim Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul Williams, eds., The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 13−42. 4. See Jack Sherman and Benjamin Tortolani, “Implications of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in United Nations Mandates,” in Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force (New York: Center on International Collaboration, 2009), p. 15. 5. See, for example, Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Management of the United Nations Oil-For-Food Program,” September 7, 2005; US Government Accountability Office, “United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program Indicate the Need to Strengthen UN Internal Control and Oversight Activities,” Report to Congressional Committees, April 2006; Washington, DC; UN General Assembly, “Comprehensive Review of Governance and Oversight Within the

Introduction

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United Nations and Its Funds, Programmes, and Specialized Agencies,” Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/60/883, July 10, 2006. 6. UN, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership, and People, UN Doc. A/70/95/2015/446 (New York, June 16, 2015), excerpts from paras. 289 and 307. 7. Myint-U and Scott, The UN Secretariat, p. x. 8. UN, Integrated Training Service, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Report on the Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment” (New York: UN, October 2008). 9. Ian Martin, “All Peace Operations Are Political: A Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN Reform,” in Review of Political Missions 2010 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2010), p. 9. 10. UN, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 89. 11. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), p. 295. 12. Gary Hamel, The Future of Management (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007), p. x. 13. Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace, p. 294. 14. See International Peace Institute, The Management Handbook of UN Field Missions (New York: International Peace Institute, 2012), p. 1. 15. Notable exceptions include the work of a few of this volume’s contributors, including Thorsten Benner, Till Blume, Julian Junk, Michael Lipson, Francesco Mancini, Philipp Rotmann, and Frederik Trettin, in addition to the work of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Susanna Campbell, Lise Morjé Howard, and Dirk Salomons. Reports that focus on managerial issues include: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peace-building Missions, Recommendations Report of the Forum on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Shaping the UN’s Role in Peace Implementation, Fafo Report No. 266 (Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 1999); Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kasperson, Randolph Kent, and Karin von Hippel, “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” Independent Study for the Expanded UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Core Group (London: King’s College; Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005); A. Sarjoh Bah and Bruce Jones, “Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements” (New York: Center for International Cooperation, May 2008); Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations (New York: International Peace Institute and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009); Fabrizio Hochschild, In and Above Conflict: A Study on Leadership in the United Nations (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, July 2010). 16. The literature that focuses on history, strategy, and political aspects of peacekeeping operations is too vast to be summarized here. Good literature reviews can be found in Ian Johnstone, “Peace Operations Literature Review,” Center on International Cooperation Project on Transformations in Multilateral Security Institutions: Implications for the UN, August 2005, www.peacekeepingbestpractices .unlb.org/pbps/library/Peace%20operations%20final%20literature%20review.pdf;

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and Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” in Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer, eds., Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile States (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 310−326. Recent additions to the literature include Donald C.F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta, eds., Peace Operations: Trends, Progress and Prospects (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008); Paul Diehl, Peace Operations (Cambridge: Polity, 2008); Richard Kareem Al-Qaq, Managing World Order: United Nations Peace Operations and the Security Agenda (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009); Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010); Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011); Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations, Peace Operations and the Cold War (New York: Pearson Longman, 2011); Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Laura Zanotti, Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in Post−Cold War Era (State College: Penn State University Press, 2011); Joachim Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul Williams, eds., The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 17. For this purpose, see International Peace Institute, The Management Handbook for UN Field Missions.

1 Coordination, Learning, and Leadership: Challenges of Peace Operations Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf

COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS ARE INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS OF

regularly interacting organizations and organizational units that are involved in common enterprises such as creating a secure environment, reconciling warring parties, engaging in institution building, and even reconstructing failed states. By their nature as international and multiorganizational arrangements, peace operations are confronted with conflicting institutional, political, and organizational pressures and, thus, are faced with a series of unique challenges relating to organizational cohesion.1 Acknowledging the complex nature of peace operations, we argue that three organizational and management elements are critical for effective peace operations: coordination, learning, and leadership. And all three are particularly difficult to achieve. Despite considerable progress in the theory and practice, coordination in peace operations remains an open quest. Peace operations are fragmented conglomerates of a variety of organizations that are in principle independent, but de facto are mutually dependent. Even the various mission functions and actors in so-called integrated missions are, due to the nature of the United Nations, characterized by organizational and cultural diversity.2 The relationships between national military units, the UN, and its various agencies and programs, regional and subregional organizations, local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local representatives are characterized more by interorganizational networks than by classical vertical integration. This reduces organizational coherence and performance substantially and, as a result, the coordination capacity of the officials in charge.3 Peace operations are organizational arrangements working under high levels of stress. This stress has, by and large, two sources. One is external 11

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and relates to the complex and at times conflicting environment in which peace operations are deployed. The second source is endogenous due to internal dilemmas and contradictions peculiar to peace operations, including: the mobilization of international political and financial resources versus efficient implementation; interim character of intervention versus sustainable reconstruction; organizational diversification versus central accountability; and implementation of the mandate versus local ownership. These tensions require both civilian and military UN staff to continuously mitigate tensions and compromise. Both sources of stress not only reduce performance, but also reduce learning capacity. Leadership is the third critical element. Peace operations are, by nature, multicentered. They are governed by the international community, typically represented by the membership of the UN Security Council and by a number of “sponsoring nations”; for instance, donors or troop and police contributors.4 Yet the strategy and the interests of the players involved are usually not constant or free of contradictions. In most cases, divergent interests and varying degrees of commitment to UN peacekeeping missions reduce the clarity of goals and tasks in peace operations’ mandates. At the same time, this leaves the implementers considerable leeway to adapt strategies and operational tactics, if they are prepared to use this room to maneuver. As a consequence, the success of peace operations may depend on a secondary consensus among the various actors at the field level and their ability to make a virtue out of necessity. The extent to which the definition of tasks and priorities on this secondary level takes place is a question of leadership.5 Besides the necessity to compromise, peace operations suffer from what has been called “organizational hypocrisy.”6 Politicians in the sponsoring nations are often tempted to suppress information toward their home constituencies concerning the full scale of operational necessities and the risks of peace operations that, through the Security Council, either leads to suboptimal mandates or to insufficient capabilities, or both. Mandate restrictions may affect the use of force, the size of the peace operation (especially of the military component), and the budget approved—three kinds of resources that the domestic constituencies of UN member states do not easily agree to increase. As a result, a gap exists between how the mandates, equipment, and organizational arrangements of peace operations are designed and how they should ideally be established, based on the extensive knowledge and expertise accumulated by field-level and Secretariat officials. Bridging the gap between what is necessary and what appears to be legitimate and viable for both the target territories and the sponsoring nations is a particular task of leaders or “policy entrepreneurs,” which can be found at both the headquarters and field levels.7

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Complex UN peace operations share characteristics that most formal organizations have in common, and problems of coordination, learning, and leadership are crucial components of those characteristics. In this chapter, we address these characteristics from the point of view of international administration and suggest that contingent factors and second-best options of coping and compromising need to be taken into account. We argue that certain organizational factors, known well in governance research, play major roles in complex peace operations: authority, reciprocity, informational structure, and cognitive factors (values, identities, beliefs). Contingent on these organizational factors, the challenges of coordination, learning, and leadership can be related to more specific political and managerial coping mechanisms. If combined with two ideal types of organizational setups (hierarchy or network), sets of strategies can be deduced. Coordination, learning, and leadership are crosscutting issues of peace operations as well as of scholarly endeavors. Overcoming the effects of an academic division of labor is a tedious, if not hopeless, task since it is a prerequisite of necessary specialization, which inevitably leads to segmented and method- rather than problem-driven research practices.8 Nevertheless, in this chapter, we seek to bring together the state-of-the-art research on all three organizational phenomena and to apply this vast knowledge to the field of UN peace operations. The concepts in this chapter derive from two main strands of literature. One component is connected to organization theory and management science, the other to political science, economics, and organization sociology. In organization theory and management science, research on coordination, learning, and leadership has produced a stock of knowledge and powerful theorems. Research in political science, economics, and organization sociology addressing issues of coordination, learning, and—to a much lesser extent—leadership is part of the nouveau vague under the heading of “governance.” This research is primarily concerned with the variety of political and managerial mechanisms of organization and control. Although there are certainly overlapping zones of research interests and theory building, organization theorists and management scholars are primarily dealing with coherent formal organizations such as firms and public bureaucracies while political scientists, economists, and organization sociologists focus more on general structures and the mechanisms of coherence and control in a “world of organizations.”9 The following sections, as a first step, address the standard concepts associated with coordination, learning, and leadership both in organization theory and management science. Second, we elaborate on these three concepts by introducing other organizational factors into the equation and by refining the three identified broad political and managerial challenges into

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more specific coping mechanisms. Third, we propose a set of strategies on the backdrop of two ideal types of organizational setups prevalent in the designs of peace operations. Thus, in this chapter we aim to open up and structure a new systematic research agenda on peace operations.

Political and Managerial Challenges: Coordination, Learning, Leadership Coordination A theoretical conception of coordination could refer to a three-dimensional phenomenon. Coordination may mean enabling people or entire organizations to work together for the achievement of common goals.10 This is a task-oriented perspective.11 However, coordination may also mean that actors reach agreements for achieving goals that the same actors are not necessarily committed to. This is a resource- and power-oriented perspective.12 A third perspective refers to the necessity of reaching common views among actors. This is called a strategy-oriented perspective.13 The classic reference for the task-oriented perspective on the coordination problem is James D. Thompson and his distinction among the common pool, sequential, and reciprocal relationships between organizational subunits.14 Thompson offered an ideal typical description of the nature of intraorganizational interdependencies and the complexity of coordination: when units use a common pool of resources, which is mutually exclusive, the coordination task consists of ensuring that no more than one unit has access at the same time. When the interdependence of units is sequential, in the sense that Unit B can fulfill its tasks only if Unit A has fulfilled its own, the coordination task consists of supervising the necessary time sequence. When the interdependence of units is reciprocal, in the sense that Units A, B, and C have to interact constantly when assuming a common task, coordination consists of making that interaction possible. Thus, the content of coordination and the task of the coordinator vary in opposite senses. Although common pool problems are relatively simple in nature, their solution requires a third-party coordinator under any circumstances. Sequential interdependence, by contrast, does not represent a complex coordination problem, but the chance for self-coordination is high since Unit B cannot assume its task unless Unit A signals that its respective job is done. Thirdparty coordination is reduced to the control of the sequence itself. Reciprocal interdependence requires a much more intensive interaction between units than common pool and sequential interdependencies and, therefore, necessitates horizontal self-coordination while the external coordinator only has to guarantee that interaction takes place at all.

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Resource- and power-oriented perspectives on coordination have been covered in the literature either as a variant of common pool or reciprocal interdependencies of bureaucracies and political actors and institutions or as purely political interaction problems, regardless of the material tasks to be assumed or the problems to be solved. This strand of literature goes back to the early days of “policy science” and its successors,15 in the form of theories of the budget-planning process16 and the research on the implementation of public policy programs.17 The core message is that what makes coordination problems hard to solve is that interdependencies at the task level (in the Thompsonian sense) may be eclipsed by resource- and power-related rivalries or conflicts. Put another way, coordination might be easy in terms of tasks, but may be impossible due to the political rivalries and conflicts the tasks are connected to. While some authors deplored the resulting stalemate when it comes to political decisionmaking and implementation of public policies18 (George Tsebelis delivered a preliminary generalization using game theory),19 others claimed that the differentiation of power, the checks and balances, and the resulting political inertia are fundamental characteristics of democracy and, consequently, represent the price to be paid for freedom and liberty.20 As this debate highlights, the notion of cooperation sometimes competes with the notion of coordination, especially in the political science literature. While cooperation refers, at least in the political science discourse, to the sphere of decisionmaking as such,21 coordination has the connotation of being connected to the tasks to be assumed, the problems to be solved, and so forth, regardless of whether or not this is being done through decisionmaking or other types of human action. The strategy-oriented perspective on coordination is reflected in the literature on the role of so-called epistemic communities and on the framing phenomena in public policy. The underlying assumption is that it is one thing to make actors act together, but yet another thing—and, basically, even a more fundamental challenge—to make them perceive the task at hand the same way and to reach a common understanding of the problems to be solved. While the literature on epistemic communities puts the emphasis on the strategic alliances of a handful of actors able and willing to engage in concerted efforts to shape the perception patterns of politicians and the general public in a way that makes their own preferred solution appear natural or self-evident,22 the literature on mental and communicative framing puts forward the argument that social reality depends on a frame of reference. Just as a frame shapes the perception of a picture, the way information is presented influences how it is perceived.23 This theory has its root in Erving Goffman’s basic idea of the “performative” quality of social action.24 The common denominator of the epistemic community and the framing concept is, however, that people can be made to act the same way once their thinking is organized in the same way.25

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Learning There are two major approaches on organizational learning: Chris Argyris’s and James March’s theories are possibly the most influential ones in the field.26 Their respective prominence stems from their diametrically opposed views on the potential of learning in organizations. In a nutshell, Argyris proposes an optimistic perspective on organizational learning while March provides a deeply skeptical view. Argyris’s basic idea is that learning in organizations takes place at different levels, but not just in the sense that organizational learning represents an aggregate phenomenon based on the learning of human individuals. Argyris claims that individuals may learn within the framework of a given “theory in use” established by the common practice in their organization or it can go beyond that framework by transcending the written or unwritten rules27 of what is “normal” in the organization.28 It obviously makes a difference whether individuals learn in the sense that they improve their own performance by, for example, enhancing their skills and deepening their knowledge within the standard operational procedures of the organization or whether they become aware of some substantial flaws in those procedures and requirements and start to engage in changing the framework. The first, rather restricted, type of learning is what Argyris calls “single loop learning” while the second, an enhanced type, is called “double loop learning.” Double loop learning is obviously superior to single loop learning and the survival of an organization may depend on its ability to allow for, or even to actively stimulate, double loop learning. Argyris calls the institutionalization of this kind of superior learning strategy “deutero learning.” By contrast, March establishes a different concept of organizational learning.29 March conceptualizes learning as a cycle in which human interpretation of undesirable organizational outcomes leads to the change of rules governing the organization that, in turn, leads to a change of human action within the organization that then results in the desired state of outcomes. As simple and intuitive as this is, March reminds us of the inevitable incompleteness of that learning cycle.30 Not only are organizational rules often too rigid to be changed ad hoc, but the interpretation of outcomes is also based on judgments that usually are subject to considerable uncertainty and interpersonal dispute. Even if those obstacles can be overcome and a common interpretation is reached leading to a change of rules, those changes do not necessarily lead to decisive changes of actions. As a result, the ultimate outcome might very much resemble the original one put forward at the beginning of the presumed learning cycle: people stick to their initial beliefs and adjust their interpretation of good or bad experiences according to these beliefs, regardless of the changes formal rules require. Ultimately, success and failure “are not uniquely defined by

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17

the outcomes. Not only do decision makers adjust their aspiration levels, they also adjust their definitions of what is valuable. Typically, the adjustment is self-congratulatory in the sense that decision makers come to value what they achieve.”31 Some authors have tried to identify the conditions under which organizational learning is likely to occur by combining the optimistic and pessimistic approaches to organizational learning.32 One example is the distinction between the inner and the outer learning environments. The inner learning environment refers to the intraorganizational conditions influencing the learning process whereas the outer learning environment represents the real-world circumstances outside the organization. An indicator of a learning-friendly outer environment would be clear and unambiguous information and a medium level of stress—not too low to allow for stimulation and not too high to avoid triggering coping mechanisms that might reduce the information-processing capacity. A learning-friendly inner environment is characterized by a capacity of the organization to engage in boundaryspanning activities,33 thus enabling the organization to receive information from the environment and to buffer uncertainty caused by that information.34 Boundary-spanning units may, for instance, play a positive role in establishing a learning cycle that does not share the intraorganizational flaws identified by March, as their task is the handling and processing of information regardless of the idiosyncratic evaluation schemes inherent in the organization. By contrast, barriers to successful learning include impermeable boundaries, unquestioned assumptions and rituals, and a reluctance to share information. This analysis now leads to another ingredient that improves the ability of organizations to learn: the so-called absorptive capacity, referring to the ability to recognize the value of new information as well as its assimilation and application.35 Successful learning in organizations requires both filtering and opening communication to avoid information overload and to facilitate the flow of information necessary for the development of new ideas. These innovative concepts constitute the adaptive capacity of the organization.36 This also includes the disposal of old knowledge and overcoming the rigidity of cognitive maps. In a way, unlearning can be a precondition for successful learning. Leadership also might be a crucial factor in learning processes at various levels, as subsequent chapters in this volume will show. Leadership The literature on leadership is abundant and relatively well organized. The bulk of the relevant literature comes from the management sciences (for an excellent overview, see Chapter 12). An exception is the theory on political

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or policy entrepreneurship, which is derived from the bounded rationality approach within organization theory and communication theory. Within the latter, theories on political agenda setting deserve special attention. The concept of “policy entrepreneurs” is connected to the work of John Kingdon who defines them as advocates willing to invest their resources— time, energy, reputation, financial, and so forth—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gains in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits.37 This concept draws heavily on the extreme version of the bounded rationality approach to intraorganizational decisionmaking, also known as the “garbage can model” of organizational choice.38 The core idea is that the linkage between problems to be solved and the solutions promoted by influential actors are independent from each other. Instead, they are driven by contingent configurations of opportunities to make a decision and time sequences rather than by rational calculations of means and ends. According to Kingdon, policy entrepreneurs are waiting for windows of opportunity to insert a preferred combination of different streams (the politics stream, the policy or solution stream, and the problem stream) into a political decisionmaking process. These streams are combined in accordance with the specific opportunity and the respective institutional setting that defines the space in which the streams can be coupled. Successful policy entrepreneurs are connecting those streams, thus shaping the dominant public discourses and, consequently, the public policy agenda in a way that favors the acceptance and ultimate implementation of the policy solution they advocate. The policy entrepreneur concept is not a leadership theory in the conventional sense. Policy entrepreneurs have no followers and they do not necessarily hold senior hierarchical positions. They are networkers and their particular skills reside in their ability to engage others in collective action through boundary-spanning activities that glue together human resources, support, and commitment from a variety of arenas to promote a particular political project.39 The role of a policy entrepreneur might ideally be assumed, for instance, by a person outside of the formal hierarchical order. Conventional leadership theory, by contrast, is based on the dichotomy of a leading person and a distinct group of followers under the assumption that their respective roles are defined by formal rules. Most leadership theories distinguish between transactional and transformational leadership styles. “Transactional theories” conceptualize a leader-follower relationship as some sort of exchange or reciprocal linkage while the deviant case is labeled “transformational leadership.”40 Within the group of transactional theories of leadership, three subgroups dealing with leadership problems in complex organizations can be identified: trait theories, behavioral theories, and cognitive resource theories.

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For many decades, the most influential debate in leadership theory involved trait-related and behavior-related approaches. Trait theory on leadership is based on the assumption that a personal trait defines and shapes the personal capacity to lead. While the empirical findings did not ultimately support this general hypothesis, this avenue of research nonetheless revealed that intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability are positively related to leadership.41 By contrast, behavioral theories on leadership are based on the assumption that the ability to lead is an acquired personal attribute, which accordingly can be subject to training and learning. The famous Ohio State Leadership Studies, for instance, identified two basic behavioral patterns of leadership behavior. Whereas one focused on the motivational structure of the subordinates, the second concentrated on the task to be fulfilled. Ideally, both impulses are equally strong but, in reality, leadership behavior can be located in a two-dimensional space with varying degrees of consideration of subordinates in relation to concerns for production and target achievement.42 A subvariant of the behavioral approach in leadership theory is the managerial grid concept put forward by Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton.43 They transformed the two-dimensional distinction of “consideration for subordinates” and of “focusing on production and target achievement” developed by the Ohio State Leadership Studies into a grid allowing for the identification of several distinctive leadership styles. These refer to authority compliance, team management, country club management, middle of the road management, and management depending on whether concern for production or concern for people is being combined (with authority compliance [high concern for production, low concern for people] and impoverished management [low concern for people and production] representing the extreme cases). A third approach within the transactional theory paradigm entailing important elements of the earlier trait theories refers to cognitive resources that enable leaders to cope with particular challenges, especially the direct stress arising in critical situations of decisionmaking. This strand of research found that cognitive ability mattered most when the overall leadership style was directive (instead of democratic or follower oriented). Furthermore, stress seemed to significantly reduce the mobilization of cognitive resources and, thus, the ability of a leader to make appropriate decisions. This effect is mitigated, though, by the professional or biographical experience a leader has at his or her disposal.44 The transformational leadership approach developed by Bernhard M. Bass45 is based on the premise that “leader and followers raise one another to higher levels of morality and motivation.”46 Transformational leadership, according to Bass, raises the aspirations and the motivations of followers

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through mutual trust, admiration, loyalty, and respect. This approach emphasizes the role of ideas, moral values, and visions as promulgated by leaders who instill these ideals in the minds and hearts of the followers and, thus, foster their self-awareness, self-esteem, and identity as a group committed to a common cause. In a way, this concept is related to the classic idea of charismatic leadership as elaborated by Max Weber in his theory of legitimate rule.47 Transformational leadership is, however, much more specific. Bass, for instance, emphasizes the relative importance of several elements of trust, loyalty, and respect (charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration). Using an appropriate configuration of these elements, a leader can indeed transform the motivation and performance of his or her followers far beyond initial expectations. 48 In this vein, empirical studies reveal a relatively strong correlation between “leader prototypicality”; that is, the behavioral model of the leader, including self-sacrifice and fair procedures, and the selfesteem and ultimate performance of followers.49 Few approaches link the environment in which the leader is positioned and the resulting options for leadership.50

Refining the Concept: Organizational Dimensions and Coping Mechanisms To refine the challenges of coordination, learning, and leadership for peace operations’ environments, we take into account the organizational conditions under which these activities operate. These include features of organizational structure and control as identified in the crosscutting literature on governance. The governance school strand advances a comprehensive concept of both institutional differentiation (the structure-related aspect) and dimensions of political and organizational control (the agency-related aspect).51 In the case of structures, the governance perspective differentiates between hierarchies and networks. Conceptualized as international bureaucracies, complex peace operations are both hierarchical entities governed by general rules and authoritative instruction and incoherent organizational conglomerates representing networks rather than hierarchies. Given this dual characteristic, peace operations are subject to governance practices that are largely underresearched.52 When it comes to political and organizational control, the governance school of thought identifies four dimensions that are relevant for the study of complex peace operations: authority, reciprocity, informational structure, and cognitive structure (values, beliefs, and identities).53 The governance-related literature has established a strong consensus on the typical mechanisms of vertical and horizontal integration that are con-

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ceived as being either authoritative or reciprocal in nature. This includes works ranging from Ronald Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” to Robert Dahl’s and Charles Lindblom’s juxtaposition of polyarchical governmental structures and interagency bargaining to Oliver Williamson’s characterization of markets and hierarchies as coordination mechanisms.54 The cybernetical school of policy analysis of the 1960s contributed information to the catalog of crucial ingredients of governmental and organizational action55 while psychological research on political decisionmaking made influential contributions to the analysis of how information is being used and misused in political practice referring to cognitive variables such as misperceptions and misjudgment.56 Although an offspring of a different theoretical source, a similar strand of literature emerged from Erving Goffman’s research on social performances and framing patterns,57 stimulating political science research on the impact that cognitive framing has on political perception and communication patterns.58 Similarly, an influential strand of the international relations literature has emphasized the role of norms and values in shaping political conflict and public policies.59 Norms and values also became crucial variables in organization theory and management science in the 1980s, mainly stimulated by scholars whose academic background was sociology.60 So-called organizational myths as a form of collective memory and intraorganizational identity pattern were also identified as crucial to organizational integration and cohesion (see Chapter 9 on the role of identity for learning and coordination in peace operations).61 Coming back to peace operations, a governance approach allows for a fine-grained conceptualization of the identified political and managerial challenges into more specific mechanisms for coping with the fundamental challenges of institutional cohesion and control. Relating these challenges to the previously mentioned organizational dimensions, a taxonomy of coping mechanisms is presented in Table 1.1. Authority and Coercion Authority is a classic condition of organizational coherence and securing performance. It is so ubiquitous and self-evident that it serves for many scholars and practitioners as a synonym for organization.62 Authority implies that the will of the person in charge can be enforced by fiat and, if necessary, through coercion. Cell 1: Coordination based on authority occurs in the form of hierarchy. Cell 2: Learning based on authority may occur as a quest for social control or legitimacy. It is, however, questionable whether learning under the condition of authority and coercion can take

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Table 1.1 The Dimensions and Challenges of Organizational Coherence and Performance Organizational Dimensions and Challenges

Authority and Coercion

Reciprocity

Coordination

1. Hierarchy

4. Bargaining

7. Information sharing

10. Mimetic isomorphism

2. Social control, legitimization pressure

5. Trial and error (rising costs of wrong decisions)

8. Evaluating information, avoiding groupthink

11. Changing framing patterns, double loop learning

3. Becoming central

6. Proven problemsolving capacity

9. Controlled information sharing, securing transparency and trust

12. Performing the leadership role, being framed as a leader

Learning

Leadership

Informational Structure

Cognitive Structure

place at all. If so, it might be restricted to single loop learning, as explained by Argyris. Cell 3: For many, leadership is also a synonym for authority. However, if leadership is not identified as a hierarchy per se, the strategy through which a leader will try to exert authority in nonhierarchical settings, such as interpersonal networks, is to strive for centrality.63 Reciprocity In the literature, reciprocity, in the sense of a generalized exchange among actors, is perceived as the alternative to authority as a mechanism of organizational coherence. The theoretical source is microeconomics, with the basic premise that human interaction is based on a rationale of mutual benefit and calculated give-and-take. Cell 4: Reciprocity as a dimension of coordination typically occurs in the form of bargaining between actors who do not necessarily have to cooperate. Therefore, bargaining in political science is traditionally conceived as a mechanism of cooperation when a hierarchy is either absent, not desired, or unachievable.64 Typically, this concept is generalized as a coordination mechanism in game theory.65 Cell 5: Reciprocity as a dimension of learning may occur in trial-anderror sequences in which the rising costs of wrong decisions lead to the readjustment of behavior. Learning of this sort has

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also been extensively conceptualized in game theory as a constitutive part of evolutionary game theory. The general premise is that, under the assumption of repeated games, the successful strategies are played more frequently in the long run. Much effort has been invested in game theoretical research on the stability of equilibria resulting from strategy changes (i.e., through learning).66 Cell 6: Most leadership theories belonging to the transactional school implicitly assume that reciprocity is a dimension of leadership. More specifically, research on leadership has revealed that followers are especially sensitive to what they perceive as the payoffs of successful leadership (see Chapter 12).67 The reciprocal relationship between leaders and followers is, apparently, connected to the capability of a leader to solve the substantial and existential problems of the organization since followers are preeminently interested in the survival of the organization.68 Informational Structure The most trivial, but also most important, dimension of coordination refers to the sharing and evaluation of information. Both are sensitive matters in complex organizations due to the risk of information overload, the costs of filtering information and enforcing information-processing rules, and the possibility of information being misused as a source of personal power. Cell 7: Despite these cautions, information sharing is an indispensable dimension of coordination. The challenge is to separate the information to share from the information to keep (which, among other things, is an important quality of good leadership as depicted in Cell 9). Cell 8: It is equally obvious that the evaluation of information is a crucial prerequisite of learning in organizations. The evaluation of information is both a qualitative and a quantitative challenge. Quantitatively, evaluation means filtering information. Qualitatively, evaluation means interpreting information. However, it is also obvious that the appropriate evaluation of information as a learning mechanism can be heavily impeded by prefabricated evaluation patterns, by the denial of unwelcome information, and by groupthink in the sense of adopting the interpretation patterns dominant in a group of decisionmakers. Cell 9: Information as a dimension of leadership requires the person in charge to decide which information to share and which information should not be disseminated. The handling of informa-

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tion by leaders is also a matter of transparency and trust, both important ingredients to help garner the general support followers are ready to grant to the organization. One problem connected to information sharing in complex organizations is the presence of different hierarchical levels. Leaders need to choose which information to share and at which level. Accordingly, transparency and trust will always remain limited. Under certain circumstances, sharing no information at all may be more trust building than sharing information selectively. It is at this precise point where the responsibility and the ability of leadership come to bear. Cognitive Structure Creating, structuring, and reproducing cognitive patterns are an elementary function of any organization. Cell 10: Cognition—values, beliefs, and identities—as a dimension of coordination often remains unrecognized precisely because it is extraordinarily effective. It has been termed “unobtrusive control” because its coordination function is fulfilled without direct human interference in terms of orders or coercion.69 Most of what is considered to be normal in an organization is more or less automatically internalized by individuals joining the organization. Cognitive factors thus represent a substantial coordinating power per se.70 Cell 11: It is a truism that cognition is the very basis of learning. As stated earlier, cognition as a coordination mechanism, however, makes it evident that cognitive patterns such as values, beliefs, and identities can be both a dimension of and an obstacle to learning. Breaking up deeply rooted belief systems could be needed for learning, but might also at the same time destroy identities and consequently weaken the commitment of organization members. This represents a classic dilemma of organizational learning. This is precisely where, in Argyris’s sense, the crucial impediments of higher-level learning occur. Changing cognitive frames, thus, is both a prerequisite of substantial learning and a potential threat to organizational stability. Cell 12: In accordance with the previous analysis, we conclude that leadership—as well as policy entrepreneurship—is a question of careful cognition management. Not only should the leader take into consideration the values, beliefs, and identities of

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followers, but he or she should also be aware of his or her own role in terms of social performance.71 The cognitive quality of leadership may also include the manipulation of the perception of leadership itself. Performing the leadership role and taking responsibility for being a leader—for example, through appropriate media coverage—can be as important for leadership effectiveness as networking, proven problem-solving capacity, or control of information-sharing processes.72

Conclusion Returning to the double nature of complex peace operations as both hierarchical bureaucracies and interorganizational networks, the final section of this chapter combines the coping mechanisms identified in the previous sections with the two ideal types of organizational arrangements. Type I is the cohesive organization of the bureaucratic-hierarchical type while Type II is the fragmented organizational structure of the network type. There is empirical evidence that peace operations and their environments are much closer to Type II than to Type I.73 Peace operations involve polyarchical governance structures in fragmented- and network-type organizational settings.74 These operations are typically conducted under high levels of stress and when their legitimacy is shaky, in the target region and within the donor and troop contributing nations. The work is carried out in high-security environments where information is routinely blocked; for example, by classification needs. For these reasons, coordination is weak, learning occurs at random, and leadership has only limited institutional backing. Despite all these obstacles, peace operations are highly centralized and hierarchical organizations, which are nevertheless surrounded by an environment characterized and penetrated by network structures. For illustration purposes, the presumed coping mechanisms in relation to coordination, learning, and leadership in Type I organizations are framed in dark gray in Table 1.2. The mechanisms typical for Type II organizations are framed in light gray. What can be assumed, then, is that Type I organizations have an inclination to combine the variants of coordination, learning, and leadership as depicted in Cells 1, 6, 7, 8, and 11. Unified, coherent, and centralized single-unit organizations will typically solve their coordination problems by means of hierarchy and information sharing. They are not expected to develop structural obstacles to the evaluation of information or to double loop learning, as described by Argyris. Finally, problem-solving and highlevel performance is exactly what a leader in a Type I organization is both expected and, in principle, should be able to do.

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Table 1.2 Coping Mechanisms Related to Organizational Ideal Types Organizational Dimensions and Challenges

Authority and Coercion

Reciprocity

Coordination

1. Hierarchya

4. Bargainingb

7. Information sharinga

10. Mimetic isomorphism

2. Social control, legitimization pressureb

5. Trial and error (rising costs of wrong decisions)b

8. Evaluating information, avoiding groupthinka

11. Changing framing patterns, double loop learninga

3. Becoming centralb

6. Proven problemsolving capacitya,b

9. Controlled information sharing, securing transparency and trust

12. Performing the leadership role, being framed as a leader

Learning

Leadership

Informational Structure

Cognitive Structure

Notes: a. ■ Presumed mechanism in cohesive organizational environments of the bureaucratic/hierarchical type. b. ■ Presumed mechanism in fragmented organizational environments of the network type.

By contrast, in a Type II structure—the fragmented, decentralized, and multiunit structure that characterizes peace operations—coordination takes place in the form of bargaining instead of hierarchy (although the shadow of hierarchy may remain part of a carrot-and-stick strategy). Learning, if it occurs at all, will take the form of giving in to legitimization pressure and of sequences of trial and error due to the relative absence of a coherent and unrestricted evaluation of past experiences, though learning in peace operations has improved considerably over the years.75 Effective leadership, while remaining connected to the necessity of getting the job done and solving problems, is much more dependent on the acquisition of a power base within the interpersonal and interorganizational networks that characterize Type II structures. Becoming central—being the individual who is frequently contacted, who has good access to information and people, and who controls the interaction of others is imperative to leaders in Type II structures. Both Type I and Type II organizations or organizational arrangements include additional mechanisms of coordination, learning, and leadership as depicted in the toolbox in Table 1.1. Intraorganizational bargaining occurs in a unified standard organization on a daily basis, as does mimetic isomorphism; that is, imitating what others do well or better (benchmarking). In Type I organizations, learning is a matter of legitimization pressure and of trial and error. Becoming central is the strategy of any ambitious leader in any standard-type organization. Conversely, hierarchy does occur in fragmented, decentralized, multiunit organizational arrangements; unfettered

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information sharing, the imitation of presumed successful patterns of organizational performance, and coordination mechanisms are also used. In Type II structures, systematic efforts are invested in the careful evaluation of available information, the avoidance of groupthink, and the achievement of double loop learning in the sense of changing entire paradigms of organizational strategies. As a matter of fact, UN peace operations have undergone several cycles of double loop learning since An Agenda for Peace was released in 1992 by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Successful leadership in Type II structures, as prominent examples show, is closely connected to deliberate strategies of framing and the management of expectations for the sake of credibility when it comes to the enforcement of the UN mandate as the will of the international community. Despite these unpredictable configurations, there are good reasons to assume that different types of organizations or, respectively, organizational arrangements are dominantly linked to typical mechanisms of coordination, learning, and leadership. This assumption is helpful for both analytical and normative purposes. Analytically, there is a better understanding of organizational behavior when the dimensions of coordination, learning, and leadership are combined to better determine what they have in common when it comes to formulating coping mechanisms. This leads to a more realistic understanding of organizational coherence and performance for several reasons. First, it can be assumed that coordination, learning, and leadership represent, to a large extent, functional equivalences. Learning may compensate weak coordination and vice versa while high performance leadership may also make up for insufficient coordination and learning. Second, this implies, that the coherence and performance of an organizational arrangement are based on a combination of types of coordination and learning and on strategic sets of the coping mechanisms. Third, these combinations are not entirely contingent on situational factors. Rather, it is safe to assume a certain dominance of both bargaining and networking as a leadership strategy in a fragmented, decentralized, multiunit setting. Neither hierarchical coordination nor taken-for-granted attitudes with respect to the actual strength of formal authority are feasible or effective techniques that secure coherence and performance in that particular kind of structural arrangement. Normatively, recombinant patterns of coordination, learning, and leadership mechanisms allow for more realistic prescriptions than idealized or best solutions. Accordingly, there are several preliminary conclusions that can be derived from this theoretical approach: • In Type I designs of peace operations, actors should focus more on building trust and transparency across units, creating flexibility,

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allowing for trial-and-error learning of subunits, and legitimizing the delegation of responsibilities to lower levels; and • Type II organizational arrangements should enhance informationsharing capacities and create centralized and coordinated patterns of evaluation and decisionmaking. In sum, Table 1.2 provides a toolbox that could help to identify contingent coping mechanisms and sets of strategies for effective coordination, learning, and leadership within complex peace operations. Its prescriptions are further illustrated and challenged empirically throughout this volume. Rather than focusing on the analytically limited and practically unfruitful disputes on optimal organizational designs and strategies, these contributors advocate a perspective that takes contingencies and second-best options of coping and compromising into account. Despite the existence of ideal combinations of mechanisms, secondbest solutions might be preferable, depending on the context. This kind of contingency approach has some tradition in organization theory and management science. The idea is to compromise on “sufficiently satisfying” coping mechanisms, instead of focusing on optimal solutions.76

Notes 1. The most prominent approach conceptualizing the conditions for successful peace operations is the so-called peacebuilding triangle conceived of by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. According to this model, the chances of success are determined by the hostility level in the territory, the local capacities, and the international will committed to the operation. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 779−801. Contrary to this volume’s focus, however, Doyle and Sambanis’s comprehensive approach focuses on macrolevel factors. Similarly, the analysis of performance conditions presented by Roland Paris concludes that the chances for success are better if the international community focuses on putting a rudimentary network of domestic institutions in place before the processes of democratization and marketization are tackled. Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For the challenges of institution and state building in war-torn territories, see Francis Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Those macrofactors are certainly of great importance, but they are, by and large, well researched. The analysis of organizational factors has, however, been discovered as an important field of analysis only in recent years. See, for instance, Thorsten Benner, Andrea Binder, and Philipp Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Till Blume, Framing Peace: Public Information and Security in UN Peace Operations (Baden-Baden, Germany:

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Nomos, 2011); Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Lise Morjé Howard, “UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 1 (2002): 99−132; and Elisabeth Schöndorf, Against the Odds: Successful UN Peace Operations—A Theoretical Argument and Two Cases (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2011). For excellent reviews on the literature on peace operations, see Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 337−365; and Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 283−301. 2. Joseph Soeters and Miepke Bos-Bakx, “Cross-cultural Issues in Peacekeeping Operations,” in Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler, eds., The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 283−298. 3. Keith Provan and H. Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-sector Organizational Networks,” Public Administration Review 61, no. 4 (2001): 414−423. 4. Michael Wesley created the term “sponsoring coalition” to describe the group of main governmental decisionmakers and troop-contributing countries in the context of peace operations. See Michael Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1997). For a systematic analysis of the influence of the degree of the sponsoring coalitions’ heterogeneity on the institutional design and the implementation performance of the newer types of peace operations, see Julian Junk, “Function Follows Form: The Organizational Design of Peace Operations,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6, no. 3 (2012): 299−324. 5. See, for example, Dirk Salomons, “Good Intentions to Naught: The Pathology of Human Resources Management at the United Nations,” in Denis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 111−139. See also Michael W. Doyle who remarks, self-critically, that the concept of the peacebuilding triangle lacks the dimensions “of leadership and of strategy at the tactical level,” which contributes to the 25 percent failure to predict the performance of peace operations. Michael W. Doyle, “The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace,” Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007): 2. 6. Michael Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 1 (2007): 5−34. 7. See, for example, John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); and Nancy C. Roberts and Paula J. King, Transforming Public Policy: Dynamics of Policy Entrepreneurship and Innovation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996). 8. Ian Shapiro, The Flight from Reality in the Social Sciences (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). 9. Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1989). 10. See Chapter 2 by Anna Herrhausen in this volume and her earlier publication on this topic, Anna Herrhausen, Organizing Peacebuilding: An Investigation of Interorganizational Coordination in International Post Conflict Reconstruction Effort (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009). 11. For empirical applications, see Johannes M. Pennings, “Interdependence and Complementarity: The Case of a Brokerage Office,” Human Relations 28, no. 9

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(1975): 825−840. For theoretical foundations, see James D. Thompson, “Boundary Spanning in Different Types of Organizations,” in James D. Thompson, ed., Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 66−73; Andrew Van De Ven, Andre L. Delbecq, and Richard Koenig Jr., “Determinants of Coordination Modes Within Organizations,” American Sociological Review 41, no. 2 (1976): 322−338; and Karl Weick, “Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems,” Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1976): 1−19. 12. For applications to the context of peace operations see, for example, Holohan, Networks of Democracy; and Fritz W. Scharpf, “Inter-organizational Policy Studies: Issues, Concepts and Perspectives,” in Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf, eds., Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control (London: Sage, 1978), pp. 345−370. 13. For a classical reading on the framing phenomenon, see DeWitt C. Dearborn and Herbert A. Simon, “Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identifications of Executives,” Sociometry 21, no. 2 (1958): 140−144; Peter M. Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 26, no. 1 (1992): 1−35; Rodger A. Payne, “Persuasions, Frames and Norm Construction,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 37−61; and Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse, “Deliberately Changing the Discourse: What Does Make Arguing Effective?” Acta Politica 40, no. 3 (2005): 351−367. 14. James D. Thompson, “Boundary Spanning in Different Types of Organizations.” 15. See Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-economic Systems Resolved Basic Social Processes (New York: Harper and Row, 1953); and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951). 16. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2004); and Charles Lindblom, “Rational Policy Through Mutual Adjustment,” in Charles Lindblom, ed., The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1965), pp. 3−17. 17. Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland or Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). 18. Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf, eds., Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control (London: Sage, 1978); Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation. 19. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (New York: Sage Publications, 2002). 20. Charles Lindblom, ed., The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Collier Macmillan, 1965). 21. Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 22. See, for example, Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”; and Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds., “Policy Change and Policy-oriented Learning: Exploring an Advocacy Coalition Framework,” Policy Sciences 21 (1988): 123−278. 23. See Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, and Jason L. Mast, eds., Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Till Blume, Framing Peace; and Erving Goffman,

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Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974). 24. Goffman, Frame Analysis. 25. Again, the resource- and power-oriented perspective and the strategyoriented perspective overlap at some point. Overcoming the undesirable effect of intraorganizational divisions of labor, especially when eclipsed by resource- or power-related rivalries, is the normative core of the resource- and power-oriented approach. A classic reference in the relevant literature is Dearborn and Simon’s article on selective perception that refers to the “mental mapping” resulting from the division of labor in a formal organization. Dearborn and Smith, “Selective Perception.” The German research on public policy planning of the 1970s (Planungsforschung) took Dearborn and Simon’s article as a point of departure as it was felt that they did not pursue the cognition theory approach that it entailed. 26. See Chris Argyris, On Organizational Learning (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999); and James G. March, ed., Decisions of Organizations (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988). See also Chapter 8 in this volume. For a more comprehensive overview on organizational learning, see Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 27. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka, “A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation,” Organization Science 5, no. 1 (1994): 14−37; and Thomas Rid, War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2007). 28. Argyris, On Organizational Learning. 29. March, Decisions of Organizations. 30. James G. March and Chip Heath, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (New York: Free Press, 1994); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976). 31. March and Heath, A Primer on Decision Making, p. 88. 32. See Chapter 8 in this volume. See also Rainer Breul, “Organizational Learning in International Organizations: The Case of UN Peace Operations,” master’s thesis, Fachbereich Politik-und Verwaltungswissenschaft, University of Konstanz, 2005, http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus16477/ Organizational_Learning_in_International_Organizations_FINAL.pdf?sequence=1. 33. Howard E. Aldrich and Diane Herker, “Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure,” Academy of Management Review 2, no. 2 (1977): 217−230. 34. See, for example, Kathrin Böhling, “Zur Bedeutung von Boundary Spanning Units für Organisationslernen in Internationalen Organisationen,” Discussion Paper No. FS II 02 (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2001); and John Child and Sally J. Heavens, “The Social Constitution of Organizations and Its Implications for Organizational Learning,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 308−326. 35. Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation,” Administrative Science Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1990): 128−152. 36. This adaptive capacity is often reflected in a particular strand of learning literature dealing with the issue of reform. Only reluctantly have reform processes within international organizations and, in particular, with regard to the conduct of peace operations gained more attention. See, for instance, Chapter 11 in this vol-

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ume; William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003); Christoph Knill and Michael W. Bauer, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007); and Volker Rittberger, “Weltorganisation in der Krise: Die Vereinten Nationen vor radikalen Reformen,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., Weltordnung durch Weltmacht oder Weltorganisation? USA, Deutschland und die Veinten Nationen, 1945−2005 (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2006), pp. 41−62. 37. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. See also Roberts and King, Transforming Public Policy; and Howard H. Stevenson, H. Irving Grousbeck, and Michael J. Roberts, New Business Ventures and the Entrepreneur (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1989). 38. Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” in James G. March, ed., Decisions of Organizations (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 294−334. 39. Neil Fligstein, “Social Skill and the Theory of Fields,” Sociological Theory 19, no. 2 (2001): 105−125. 40. Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998). 41. See Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa, “Validation of the Five-Factor Model of Personality Across Instruments and Observers,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52, no. 1 (1987): 81−90; and Ralph M. Stogdill, “Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature,” Journal of Psychology 25, no.1 (1948): 35−71. 42. Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid: Key Orientations for Achieving Production Through People (Houston, TX: Gulf, 1964); Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1974). 43. Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid III: A New Look at the Classic that Has Boosted Productivity and Profits for Thousands of Corporations Worldwide (Houston, TX: Gulf, 1985); Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid: Key Orientations for Achieving Production Through People (Houston, TX: Gulf, 1964). 44. Fred E. Fiedler and Joseph E. Garcia, New Approaches to Leadership: Cognitive Resources and Organizational Performance (New York: Wiley, 1987). 45. Bernhard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: Free Press, 1985); Bernhard M. Bass, “Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational Leadership,” European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 8, no. 1 (1999): 9−32. See also Bernhard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, Transformational Leadership (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006). 46. James M. Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 20. 47. Max Weber, “Legitimate Order and Types of Authority,” in Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar D. Naegele, and Jesse R. Pitts, eds., Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 229−235. 48. Bass, “Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational Leadership.” 49. See, for example, David De Cremer, Barbara van Knippenberg, Daan van Knippenberg, Danny Mullenders, and Florence Stinglhamber, “Rewarding Leadership and Fair Procedures as Determinants of Self-esteem,” Journal of Applied Psychology vol. 90, no. 1 (2005): 3−12; and Barbara van Knippenberg and Daan van Knippen-

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berg, “Leader Self-sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Leader Prototypicality,” Journal of Applied Psychology 90, no. 1 (2005): 25−37. 50. For an exception, see Donald C. Hambrick and Sydney Finkelstein, “Managerial Discretion: A Bridge Between Polar Views of Organizational Outcomes,” Research in Organizational Behavior 9, no. 2 (1987): 369−406. 51. This double nature of governance is based on the premise that modern liberal democracies produce a broad variety of institutional structures and mechanisms of integration and control that are mutually dependent, but in an unpredictable way. See Joachim Blatter, Governance: Theoretische Formen und Historische Transformationen: Politische Steuerung und Integration in Metropolregionen der USA (1850−2000) (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007); Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); and Rod A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1999). 52. Important approaches in management science and organization theory as well as in organizational sociology and political science were developed at a time when holistic theories attempting to build all-encompassing models of societal structure and human action—Marxism, systems theory, cybernetics, and structural functionalism—were dominant. In the 1970s, these theories were on the decline. The divides between macrotheories and micro-level-oriented behavioralism began to characterize scholarly thought in the social sciences or—to put it in present-day parlance—societal structures and human agency fell apart in social science theorybuilding. Where structure and agency were still being taken seriously as a theoretical challenge, it happened at an abstract level. 53. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, “Rechtsstaatlichkeit als Governance-Ressource in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit,” Projektantrag Teilprojekt A3, SFB 700 (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2005). 54. Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4, no. 16 (1937): 4386−4405; Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare; Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications—A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization (New York: Free Press, 1975). 55. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1966). 56. See Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 57. Goffman, Frame Analysis; Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959). 58. See, for instance, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (2000): 611−639; William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructivist Approach,” American Journal of Sociology 95, no. 1 (1987): 137−177; Thomas E. Nelson and Donald R. Kinder, “Issue Framing and Group-centrism in American Public Opinion,” Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1996): 1055−1078; and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453−458. 59. See Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996):

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325−347; Gary Goertz, International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 60. See, for example, Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (1983): 147−160. 61. See Stuart Albert and David A. Whetten, “Organizational Identity,” Research in Organizations Behavior 14, no. 2 (1985): 263−295; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340−363; and David A. Whetten and Paul C. Godfrey, eds., Identity in Organizations: Building Theory Through Conversations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998). 62. Kenneth Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York: Norton, 1974). 63. Centrality has a variety of meanings in network analysis. It may be attributed to (1) actors who interact frequently with other actors or organizations (degree centrality) and who are able to contact other actors or organizations quickly, directly, and without their taking action or even their will (closeness centrality); or (2) actors who are able to control the interactions among other actors because they are situated between those actors (betweenness centrality). See, for example, Stanley Wassermann and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 64. Dahl and Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare. 65. See, for example, John F. Nash, “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 18, no. 2 (1950): 155−162; Ariel Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica 50, no. 1 (1982): 97−109; and Fritz W. Scharpf, Games in Hierarchies and Networks: Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study of Governance Institutions (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 66. Two examples from this extensive literature are David Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 150−156; and Graham Romp, Game Theory: Introduction and Applications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 234−238. 67. Sabine Boerner, Führungsverhalten und Führungserfolg: Beitrag zu einer Theorie der Führung am Beispiel des Musiktheaters (Wiesbaden, Germany: Gabler, 2002). 68. Consequently, followers react with utmost resentment to leadership failure at their own expense, as was demonstrated by a series of management scandals in both the US and European business worlds in recent years (e.g., the discussion on the Airbus restructuring at Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS) or the failed merger between Daimler-Benz and the Chrysler Group; the most influential case, with regard to media coverage and the subsequent legislation processes, was the Enron scandal in the United States in late 2001). Regarding the international political sphere, the oil-for-food scandal provides an example of serious management failure. The Security Council, in Resolution 986 of April 1995, established a program to regulate the exchange of Iraqi oil for food, medicine, and humanitarian needs. Nine

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years later, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed an independent high-level inquiry committee, chaired by Paul Volcker, to investigate allegations of large-scale fraud and corruption including failure of oversight and leadership in this regard. See Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime, October 27, 2005, www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf. 69. Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986). 70. Cognition-based coordination also takes place between organizations. Both organization morphology and the cross-organizational homogeneity of standard operating procedures are subject to strong adaptive pressure exerted by the symbolic value of rules, standards, common practices, and so forth, and thus create the sort of organizational isomorphism that is the very basis of modern organizational culture which, in turn, guarantees an interorganizational compatibility and operability. 71. Alexander, Giesen, and Mast, Social Performance. 72. Part of the social performance of leaders as leaders is being considered someone who, to some extent, combines the determination to act with a vision far beyond reality. As James G. March and Thierry Weil point out, “Ignoring the evidence of reality, leaders look for the actualisation of an ambitious and far-reaching dream (Joan of Arc, Martin Luther King Jr., Anouar el Sadate, Bronislaw Geremek, or Vaclav Havel). They shield that dream from criticism of their entourage and from setbacks that seem to prove them wrong, as most interesting visions initially seem to be unrealistic and do not immediately produce results. Leaders often keep their visions intact by reinterpreting the failures that occur when they are first brought to fruition. . . . Such course is obviously dangerous, for it restricts learning from experiences; but visionaries protect themselves from reality by ignoring or reinterpreting it” (James G. March and Thierry Weil, On Leadership [Oxford: Blackwell, 2005], pp. 81−82). 73. Holohan, Networks of Democracy. 74. Certainly, there have been many attempts to counter this lack of structure by integrating mechanisms at both the headquarters and field levels, which have considerable impact to move the core peace operation or parts of it closer to Type I. We assume, however, that all in all our decision to group peace operations into Type II organizational arrangements holds true given the complex multi-level institutional field. 75. Major and systematic learning and reform efforts connected to, for instance, the UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, the Peacebuilding Support Office, and individual UN initiatives such as the Challenges Project are already showing some effects (see Chapters 8 Chapter 10 in this volume). 76. Schöndorf, Against the Odds.

2 Coordination and Networks Anna Herrhausen

NOTWITHSTANDING A NUMBER OF EFFORTS DIRECTED AT IMPROVING

interorganizational coordination in UN peace operations, a coordination problem persists. In a comprehensive analysis published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s minister of foreign affairs, acknowledged that “although the United Nations has taken important steps and adopted new and innovative policies, significant challenges remain in the quest for increased cohesiveness of multilateral efforts in countries affected by or emerging from conflict.”1 Taking this disconnect between mandates and outcomes regarding peace operations as a point of departure, in this chapter I address the coordination problem from a theoretical perspective, based on a review of approaches that have been helpful in this regard. Rather than starting with the practical coordination problems experienced in the field or at UN headquarters, I first propose a theoretical framework for interorganizational coordination. I then lay out several examples of how these theoretical insights might be applied to the UN. By investigating this matter in a theoretical manner, I hope new insights can be generated and known ones substantiated in a way that, discussed in light of peace operations, will yield a set of practical recommendations for improving interorganizational coordination at the United Nations.

Coordination and Organization Theory Organization theory is the result of the academic study of organizations and their constituents. It considers individual and group dynamics in an organi39

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zational setting as well as the nature of organizations themselves. According to organization theory, specialization (the breaking down of a production process into subprocesses and the assignment of workers accordingly) and coordination (the reconnection of the various subprocess outcomes) are the essential characteristics of organization. Specialization and coordination can take place within different organization forms. In this chapter, I distinguish organization theory among three basic categories: hierarchies, markets, and networks.2 In reality, there is an abundance of hybrid organization forms but, for conceptual clarity, it is helpful to consider the abstract ideal types. Organization form is important because coordination cannot be discussed without reference to the organization form within which coordination takes place. Hence, choosing a particular organization form means limiting the options for available coordination mechanisms. A hierarchy consists of one organization. A characteristic element of a hierarchical organization is that it features differentiation according to functional tasks and capabilities (horizontal differentiation) as well as according to command and control (vertical differentiation). Functionally, distinct units on the same hierarchical level are brought into alignment by a common superior. This can happen either through direct personal interaction or via impersonal means such as procedural rules, job descriptions, predetermined actions, and plans. 3 The latter is possible because hierarchies are suitable for transactions (or processes in general) that happen repeatedly. These transactions or processes can be standardized, and rules according to which these tasks ought to be carried out can be specified in advance. Juxtaposed with the hierarchical form of organization is a market that encompasses an indeterminable number of organizations. Each organization creates its own product or service. Functional differentiation becomes important between organizations, rather than within a single organization (although intrainstitutional differentiation, of course, continues to exist). Linkages between the organizations exist only for the time that a transaction is performed across organizational boundaries; that is, whenever a product or service is exchanged between two organizations. Thus, ex ante, uncoordinated individual activities are brought into order by the invisible hand of the price mechanism: a price for a given good or service is agreed on and the transaction is carried out. Here, coordination is primarily a result, a nonpurposeful, outcome of the rules of the market.4 A network exists when organizations, though independent, repeatedly transact with one another and thus form permanent, albeit, loose ties. I argue that of the three forms, the one with the best fit to the UN system— the Secretariat, specialized agencies, funds and programs, and so forth—is the network. Diagnosing and describing a network requires the observation

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of the interactions between organizations over a period of time. Connections between organizations may have been established initially to complete one particular market-like transaction. Over time, however, personal relationships and, perhaps, even information technology (IT) or capital-related connections may have been added, thereby contributing to the durability of the tie.5 In the car manufacturing industry, for example, there are many suppliers that manufacture individual parts or systems of a car. The end product—the car—is the output of a network consisting of the chief manufacturing company and many suppliers and subcontractors. Networks, compared to hierarchies, have a somewhat more flexible makeup: some organizations may participate in the network for a certain amount of time and then exit again while other organizations may decide to discontinue their relationship. For a prolonged period of time, however, the network holds together despite the fact that it lacks “a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.”6 It does so because the individual goals of its organizations (e.g., profit maximization in the private sector) are aligned with the overall goal of the network7 and because the ties are maintained by relaying information or other resources.

The Network as Best Model for UN Peace Operations One set of questions that organization theorists have considered extensively is the choice of organization form. What determines which actions and transactions are to be carried out within one organization (e.g., in a hierarchy), and what determines what happens across organizations (e.g., in a market or a network)? Which organization form is the most applicable in which kind of environment? Transaction cost economics (TCE), one of the main schools in organization theory, treats these questions comprehensively. The central proposition of TCE is that an organization’s purpose is to facilitate transactions between different units at the lowest possible transaction cost. Transactions can be exchanges of goods and services, of information, or of resources, for example. TCE holds that the kind of goods being exchanged, the frequency of the exchange, the complexity of the environment, and the character of the exchange partners should all be considered in choosing the best organization form. An in-depth discussion of the details of TCE would go beyond the scope of this chapter. For present purposes, it should suffice to say that, according to TCE, one-off transactions—in which the subject of exchange is easily quantified and valued—are best carried out in a market because the market is the most efficient forum in this case. In contrast, repeated transactions and transactions of goods—which are difficult to specify or

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more intangible—are best carried out within one hierarchical organization. Networks, finally, are “most useful when resources are variable and the environment uncertain.”8 They are more flexible than hierarchies and, therefore, adapt better to changing circumstances, all the while maintaining their network ties. At the same time, they allow for the exchange of tacit knowledge, joint problem solving, and result in organizational learning in ways that markets could never do. “Under conditions of high heterogeneity and instability, organizational performance is enhanced by flat functional divisions of labor, which are linked together by specific integrative mechanisms.”9 Based on this description of basic organization forms as well as the conditions under which they thrive, the argument can be made that the network is the most appropriate model for the coordination of UN peace operations. It can be argued not only that UN peace operations already include forms of networked organizations, but also that they should function like networks given the advantages they have vis-à-vis other organization forms. The collective of UN departments, funds, programs, and specialized agencies involved in peace operations broadly defined (peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions) most closely approximates a network in terms of its basic makeup: it consists of a number of organizations that enjoy varying degrees of independence. Many of these organizations are active in peace operations; for example, contributing resources and personnel to peace missions and implementing projects.

Coordination in Networks Prerequisites for Network Governance First, it should be noted that organizations in a network share an overall goal. Each organization contributes to the successful achievement of this goal, which is the reason they are participating in the network in the first place. This common vision helps align and, if necessary, discipline participating organizations. Second, each organization contributes its particular expertise toward this common goal, meaning there is functional differentiation across the network. Certainly, there must be some relationship among the organizations and some familiarity with the other organizations’ outputs. There may, in fact, be some areas of overlap in terms of operations. What makes the network strong is that it draws on the proficiencies of the individual organizations to produce something that one organization could not produce alone, at least not as efficiently and effectively. This is also an incentive for each organization to cultivate relationships with other network members;

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each organization is aware of the interdependence that results from functional differentiation. Third, the network has to maintain its ties. In its most basic form, these ties resemble channels across which information and resources are exchanged between and among organizations. These connections are important for social control mechanisms to work and for information to be relayed throughout the network. For example, the sharing of performance data is an important factor in the network as it enables other organizations to draw lessons and, as a result, take appropriate corrective measures. Fourth, it is reasonable to assume that employees in networks need to have unique functions. This holds true especially for network managers and boundary spanners; that is, those employees who direct individual network units or organizations and those who bridge the gaps between them (individual employees can certainly have overlapping functions).10 For network governance to function well, communication plays a crucial role and a large proportion of network employees must be good communicators. They must filter, process, and relay information throughout the network; they should facilitate exchanges with other people and organizations and be actively engaged in this task. Furthermore, because of the relative independence of the individual units, employees in network organizations should have the capacity for strategic thinking and action. Because of the expectation that they perform their tasks with little or no supervision, they need to be selfstarters and take initiative, always keeping in mind the goals of the entire network. Gunnar Hedlund proposes that network managers must, among other things, have the aptitude for searching and combining elements in new ways, the skill to communicate ideas and rapidly put them into action, a strong loyalty to the organization, and, at the same time, have the willingness to take risks and experiment.11 Thus, a common goal, functional differentiation, information, resource flow, and staff-unique functions are highlighted as the key prerequisites for network governance. Network Governance: Social Control Elements Coordination and conflict resolution in networks are exercised via social control; for example, via informal communication. This is possible because transactions in a network are structurally embedded.12 According to Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, and Stephen P. Borgatti, Network governance involves a select, persistent and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environ-

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Coordination mental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially, not legally, binding.13

As with the other topics in organization theory, there is an extensive body of literature that tackles specific aspects of network governance, and these works are sometimes not easily reconciled.14 Nevertheless, some general themes have emerged and are detailed below. Furthermore, I have attempted to order them in such a way that the relationship between the different elements of network governance is clarified. Network governance should both coordinate network partners and safeguard exchanges between them; that is, protect the network members from harm, for example, from fraud or the reneging on commitments. There are mechanisms that fulfill the former (coordination), mechanisms that fulfill the latter (safeguarding) role, and some that fulfill both. Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti identify reputation and collective sanctions as mechanisms for safeguarding exchanges and organizational culture as a mechanism for coordination. Access restriction, a fourth mechanism, serves both purposes.15 Access restriction means limiting the number of organizations that can participate in the network. According to Walter Powell, “By establishing enduring patterns of repeat trading, networks restrict access.”16 Organizations in a network first and foremost interact with one another; thus, the total number of organizations is limited. First, having a limited number of organizations in a network safeguards exchanges as it caps the amount of network monitoring needed. Second, when there is a limited number of organizations that can interact with one another, each organization knows that it is in a situation of “repeated games”: the chances that it will deal with the same organization again are highly likely. This shadow of the future increases the incentive to cooperate and behave faultlessly or, conversely, decreases the incentive to shirk commitments and seek short-term, instead of long-term, profit. Third, having fewer partners that interact often enhances the social embeddedness of interactions. Organizations that interact with one another get to know each other better, they understand the others’ motives and reasons for behaving in a certain way, they can more easily find common ground, and they perceive their respective interests as aligned.17 As a result, there are fewer misunderstandings and, therefore, fewer events where active coordination is called for. Fourth, repeated interactions permit organizations to institutionalize or formalize their relationship in a certain way; for example, by developing communication protocols or work routines.18 Organizational culture is another coordinating mechanism. It provides “broad, tacitly understood rules for appropriate action under unspecified

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circumstances.”19 In this context, organizational culture is understood as “ideas [and] values . . . that are specific to a given organization and have special relevance to its members.”20 Organizational culture also exemplifies the trade-offs between values such as consensus versus efficiency or quality versus cost. Organizational culture facilitates coordination because it is embodied in routines that describe the way things are done around here to all employees. If internalized, employees will have a shared understanding of the practices of the organization, and their assumptions, expectations, predictions, and evaluations of other employees’ actions are more likely to be accurate. Furthermore, “it becomes possible to rapidly share information, interpret the meaning of events in and outside the organization in similar ways, and see opportunities for local action in the interest of the global good.”21 The same can, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, work across organizations in a network. Charles C. Snow, Raymond E. Miles, and Henry J. Coleman Jr. assert that “networks operate efficiently when member firms voluntarily behave as if they are all part of a broader organization sharing common objectives and rewards. . . . The network must somehow create an organizational ‘culture’ that transcends ownership.”22 Organizations within a network should share the same values and ideas as well as the prioritization of them. These values could then translate into identical or at least similar (explicit or implicit) rules of behavior and performance criteria. Edward E. Lawler III holds that, “when a common set of values can be defined, self-managing units can focus on goals and performance results that are consistent with those values.”23 Cultures are assimilated or a shared culture develops when employees interact frequently with one another or when there are occupational exchanges between employees of different organizations such as later transfers. Acculturation is furthered when independent authorities, such as a professional school, a union, a lobbying group, or a prominent leader, articulate and structure norms, rules, and understandings of a particular profession. Shared cultures, therefore, “evolve out of long-term repeated transactions but . . . are sustained by an institutional infrastructure.”24 They help coordinate the actions of different organizations. Information regarding the character, skills, and reliability of an organization is often conveyed to other network members.25 Consistent behavior and performance over time give an organization a certain reputation; negative reputations can, of course, be quite damaging. Concerns regarding reputation can be relayed by one organization to members of another organization without the two having actually made contact. Thus, under conditions of uncertainty, it allows one organization to at least partially forecast the

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other organization’s behavior. Based on this information, one organization might decide whether to proceed with working on a joint project with the other organization, whether to transmit information, or whether to take information received from another organization at face value. Organizations are aware that they are being monitored and, as a result, should have an interest in maintaining a good reputation. This, in turn, discourages organizations from seeking short-term gains at the expense of other network members. It is easy to see that without the potential for invoking sanctions, reputation, as such, is of little relevance. Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti hold that collective sanctions mean that network members can punish those that do not behave according to shared norms and goals; sanctions can range from “gossip and rumors to ostracism and sabotage.”26 Joel Baum and Paul Ingram also find that individual organizations in a dense network are likely to be cooperative because they understand that density entails collective monitoring and sanctioning.27 Access restriction, culture, reputation, and sanctions are described as the main social control elements of network governance. It should be noted that these constitutive mechanisms are mutually reinforcing; for example, restricted access engenders repeated interaction by those in the network. This, in turn, contributes to the development of a shared culture. It also means that individual organizations seek to build a good reputation and that collective sanctions can be taken if values and norms are breached. On the other hand, there is some degree of interdependence between the social control mechanisms, which implies network governance cannot be achieved by one mechanism alone. Network Governance: Structural Elements So far, network governance, as described, has said nothing about the makeup or structure of a network. Networks generally operate on notions of parity, not hierarchy. However, it has been noted that a “hierarchical element” can sometimes be introduced to networks to enhance efficiency. 28 Accordingly, Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler assert that “although rather decentralized, somewhat polycentric and a possible outcome of collective strategies, an interorganizational network may well be strategically led by some focal or ‘hub’ organization.”29 In a similar vein, Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton introduce the concept of the coordinating agency, a “formal organization whose major purpose is to order behavior between two or more other formal organizations by communicating pertinent information . . . , by adjudicating areas of dispute . . . , by providing standards of behavior . . . , by promoting areas of common interest . . . , and so forth.”30

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Litwak and Hylton’s account should be noted at this point because the authors identify standardization of the units to be coordinated as one of the prerequisites for coordinating agencies to develop and thrive. Only those instances that occur repeatedly and where the process can be standardized, at least to some extent, can be subject to coordination by so designated agencies. Seung Ho Park and Gerardo Ungson agree that the institutionalization of what they call “a proper governance mechanism” cannot be forced on network members. Because organizations forgo some of their independence when they set up such governance mechanisms, Park and Ungson believe that the only relevant incentive to do so is the belief that such action would lead to “sufficient economic gains.”31 It not only is the prerequisites for the establishment of dedicated coordinators that are different in networks and in hierarchies; the measures that these coordinators have at their disposal are different as well. That is, given that a coordinating agency cannot impose orders or sanctions, it must focus primarily on setting incentives for other organizations in order to improve coordination. Network management must be facilitative, not directive. According to Litwak and Hylton,32 coordinating agencies communicate, adjudicate, provide information, and promote common areas of interest. How do they, however, become effective in doing so? In this regard, most authors agree on a logic that can be summarized as follows: a central organization has a privileged position vis-à-vis other organizations in the network. 33 It has established more links to other organizations in the network than any single one of them has individually. As a result, it can serve as a communication channel and link parties to one another by transferring resources or information. Because these functions are most effectively and efficiently carried out by the central organization, this organization gains status vis-à-vis the others in the network and becomes a primus inter pares, a first among equals. This status is reinforced because the central organization can then use its privileged position to exert influence upon the network itself. The central organization actively shapes network culture—the way things are done around here—and, in doing so, it can further consolidate its own predominance in the network. Therefore, centrality entails mutually reinforcing asymmetries in the network.34 It is important to reiterate that, despite this structural advantage, the central organization must rely on so-called soft powers for network governance (i.e., mediating between different organizations rather than giving orders). Daniel A. Wren, for example, claims that “persuasion, negotiation, and exchange of information are the key to integration. Information exchange rather than authority can solve the problems of interorganizational coordination.”35

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Improving Coordination in UN Peace Operations Caveats remain when aiming to transfer observations from the private sector—on which organization theory mainly focuses—to the UN system. In this sense, two broad observations need to be made. First, although of the three ideal organization forms, the UN system most resembles that of the network, there are significant deficits vis-à-vis such an ideal form. This means that certain prerequisites of network governance may not be fulfilled adequately. Second, in peace operations, too few efforts have been directed at strengthening social control mechanisms and enabling network centrality. Instead, the introduction of new coordination structures has been the preferred approach to attempt strengthening coordination. Notwithstanding these caveats, lessons can be drawn from the summarized literature above that are useful for addressing the challenge of coordination in peace operations. Due to the complex nature of peace operations, the United Nations must be a nimble organization, with the ability to perform different tasks and to change course as needed. In other words, the suggestion that “form must follow function,” put forward in the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions should be considered as essential guidance when dealing with organizational issues in peace operations.36 As we will see in the subsequent chapters of this section, each country’s or region’s situation is different and the international response should be tailored accordingly.37 For example, in Chapter 4 Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters rightly point out that, within a peace operation, there are a number of supporting subnetworks (the military, nongovernmental organizations, local as well as regional and subregional organizations, etc.) that demand further flexibility with regard to coordination mechanisms. Every reform in peace operations should, therefore, enable the organization to be more flexible and, at the same time, to build on the cumulated knowledge and expertise. It is important to note that coordination should be facilitated, not forced. To improve coordination, individual units, and unit staff should be enabled to coordinate. They should have enough resources to do so (time, money, staff, IT support, etc.). They should have the tools to do so (e.g., communication and negotiation skills and a shared frame of reference), and they should have incentives to coordinate in terms of personal as well as organizational goals.38 The trade-offs that this approach entails should, arguably, be smaller than those put forward in past UN reform efforts, which tend to prescribe structural solutions and process outcomes.39 Therefore, recommendations on how to improve coordination should aim toward the following two goals: first, bringing the UN system closer to the ideal network form by strengthening network characteristics; and, second, enhancing network governance.

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Improving the UN Network A first set of measures from which UN peace operations could significantly benefit could be directed toward improving the flow of resources and information across the UN network. Improvements in this area, which, of course, would entail changes in current processes and most likely systems, could have a significant impact if approached in the right way. Resource and information flow across the UN system should be such that the necessary resources and information are available in the appropriate places as quickly as possible.40 With regard to information, this is a question of knowledge management: the process of identifying, acquiring, codifying, and disseminating the knowledge available throughout an organization. Concerning other resources, such as personnel or equipment, this is a question of apt administrative procedures. For both realms, the goal that should be pursued is interoperability. One of the most effective ways in which interoperability can be established is through the introduction of standards. Considerable efficiency improvements could be reaped, and coordination could function more smoothly, if systemwide standards in knowledge management as well as in support processes were introduced. Countering the organic growth that departments and agencies experienced in the past decades with regard to their areas of operation, their interfaces, and their support systems, standardization should now take precedence over customization. The way information is currently handled at the UN is not very effective. This is largely due to the lack of standards: there is neither a universal terminology nor a universal reporting format. Reports are almost always written in intricate and lengthy prose, and the authors are rarely identified, making it impossible to capitalize on their expertise for follow-up and further guidance. In addition, it is arguable that much of what is learned by individuals during their time of duty is lost when their posting comes to an end. As a result, large parts of the width and depth of experience and knowledge gathered across missions are not fully utilized across the organization. By consequence, coordination does not function smoothly, efforts go into searching for information otherwise easily available, and mistakes are repeated with disturbing regularity. Knowledge management, however, does not end with the availability of knowledge. Its creation, application, and refinement should also be built into training, evaluation, and compensation systems. Furthermore, better interoperability between IT hardware and software across the organization could contribute to better information flow across the system.41 Knowledge and learning will be further addressed in the following section of this volume. Simplification and standardization of administrative processes, rules, and regulations across the UN system could also help a great deal in

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improving interoperability between individual units. Over time, different agencies have developed their own staff rules, suited first and foremost to the needs of the individual organization. However, as interdependencies become more apparent, and cooperation across organizations becomes a fact of life, tailored solutions should be forgone in the common interest of improving effectiveness. With regard to human resource policies, for example, the High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence asserts that “human resource policies must enable mobility of the staff across the system and the transferability of pensions.”42 Such a recommendation entails many significant changes in the current set of rules and regulations; however, it points toward the right direction. To enable mobility of the staff across the system, for example, positions and remunerations should be aligned to allow personnel to move laterally or higher from one organization to another. Other support functions (e.g., budgeting, procurement, and accounting) should also be harmonized and supported by a common IT infrastructure. The current practice of applying different rules and regulations and maintaining different systems depending on agency, location (headquarters or field), or type of budget results in a large and cumbersome administrative burden that slows down operations. In many cases, so-called support functions can impede rather than support, especially when it comes to teamwork across different units under urgent circumstances. Finally, the goal of interoperability also requires that the job descriptions of staff postings be adjusted so that they encourage and value expertise in a multitude of functions across the organization rather than rewarding years of service in the same department. The interconnectedness that the desired mobility implies should be reflected in training policies that promote better communication skills, multitasking, team building, and leadership.43 Overall, the organization could benefit from a new mix of specialists and generalists. The United Nations should, indeed, be a place for the best people with cutting-edge expertise and sound experience in a particular field, be that functional (e.g., how best to provide security in refugee camps) or country specific (e.g., how to negotiate with warlords in Afghanistan). Peace missions also need effective boundary spanners who can relay information and build alliances across organizational boundaries. They need staff who can see the interdependencies between the different units and who realize how their own decisions may have an impact on the operating environment of the UN system as a whole. This is not to say that a new type of position should be created to transfer information between units. Gathering and sharing information should not be separate from one’s actual work. The boundary-spanning role should be an integral part of any leadership position. The boundary spanners should also be the main agents to reinforce a common culture and to advocate the organizations’ primary objectives. Selecting personnel that can play this role is one of the most

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important tasks that the UN needs to master to enhance coordination in peace operations. A more difficult, but arguably not impossible, feat for the various UN departments, agencies, and programs to undertake is a return to their core competencies in order to limit their areas of activity. On the one hand, the recognition of the interdependencies of security and development, as well as among prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and postconflict reconstruction, has led many agencies to expand their areas of activity over the past several years. On the other hand, these readjustments have resulted in too much functional overlap. This has caused confusion at best and competition at worst. Chadwick Alger underscores that, “in a complicated social network, it is absolutely necessary for all involved to know the nature of the entire network, where they fit in the network, and how they are linked to, and interdependent with, other roles.”44 Given the many UN organizations involved in peace missions, it is likely that after individual organizations have trimmed their respective mandates, all necessary functions in a postconflict setting would continue to be available. Furthermore, with organizations clearly articulating the limits of their activity, it should be easier for all organizations to determine what action is still needed and where others may fit in.45 Improved resource and information flow, as discussed above, should help guarantee that the network, as a whole, coordinates efficiently and effectively providing the necessary services to foster peacebuilding. Enhancing Network Governance In addition to reinforcing the network characteristics of the UN, network governance should also be enhanced, particularly in light of several restructuring initiatives including the Integrated Mission Planning Process, One UN, and the creation of the Department of Field Support. Central organization can greatly enhance coordination in the network. However, the total number of centers should be limited. Failing to do so will ultimately encourage competition among different focal points and water down the positive effect that network centrality could have. A large number of coordination linkages might be perceived as having little instrumental value in meeting the organization’s objectives.46 With regard to network’s social control mechanisms, improving coordination via a common culture could be the most promising measure in the UN, in terms of implementability as well as in terms of effect. In Chapter 9, Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring draw similar conclusions with reference to learning and identity. The challenge relating to organizational culture for each subunit is threefold: (1) to define an organizational culture; (2) to make this organiza-

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tional culture fit with the UN systemwide organizational culture; and (3) to ensure that the core elements of these complimentary cultures are consistent over time and locations. Committing to a particular organizational culture should go hand in hand with the definition of the organization’s core activities mentioned above. Formulating or, if necessary, reformulating a mission statement and restructuring the organization accordingly should serve both of those purposes. The improvement of information and resource flow advocated above could further strengthen a UN systemwide culture. It has been repeated time and again that personal relationships among staff from different organizations are vital to making those organizations work well together in the field. To further promote mutual knowledge, understanding, and cooperation, the establishment of personal relationships should be actively supported. This can be done by creating more points of contact between organizations by way of, for example, lateral transfers of personnel, by conducting joint programs and joint trainings, and by holding seminars dedicated primarily to the understanding, sharing, and assimilation of such soft factors as organizational culture. A suggestion in this regard has already been made in the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions and it is worth reiterating: The Study Team sees common training as a valuable tool for enabling better interoperability between conflicting organizational cultures, yet this is seldom adequately reflected in mission structures or in HQ [headquarters]. The DPKO [UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations] Training Advisory Group and the attempts to establish a DPKO integrated training strategy are steps in the right direction. If intended to cater to an integrated mission, however, attempts to establish joint training programmes must be developed with genuine buy-in from the overall UN community.47

To ensure consistency of the culture over time and in different locations, senior leadership should nurture the organization’s culture as an important function of their positions. To encourage sustained coordination among organizations, senior managers should be held accountable not only for their individual performance, but also for how well they help other staff succeed. Organizations should take into account the programs and actions of other organizations, show their support, and, if necessary, adjust their own programs accordingly. Joint assessments could evaluate where interorganizational coordination worked particularly well and, where it did not, why. These could then be made available across the UN system, so that successful alliances can be repeated. Finally, the concept of access restriction should be considered in depth. The large number of UN, and non-UN, organizations working in conflict and postconflict countries is often overwhelming for the limited capacities

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of the local governments and societies. Susan Woodward describes this problem well: Despite the concept of an integrated mission, this reality of proliferating actors, activities, and aspirations appears to stand in the way of its realization in mission design. . . . Programmatic partnerships and greater coordination appear aimed at the resource problem through increased efficiency of agencies in their field programs or cost-savings through cooperation and a division of labor, but the resource problem is equally or more the lack of mechanisms to set priorities within budget constraints.48

Figuring out exactly how such a prioritization could be realized and which activities are mutually reinforcing is arguably a major challenge in UN coordination. To complicate the task further, the mix and sequencing of activities that can positively contribute to building peace and institutions vary from country to country. In this chapter, I therefore did not venture into the debate about what kind of prioritization should be implemented and what kind of peace should emerge as a consequence.49 It should be reiterated, however, that restricting access, by way of limiting the types of activities that are undertaken at the same time, limiting the types of activities one organization undertakes in a country, and limiting the number of organizations that are operational at any one time, should be pursued to simplify interorganizational coordination. Table 2.1 outlines my recommendations to achieve this.

Table 2.1 Summary of Recommendations Strengthening the Network Character

Improving Network Governance

Interoperability • Identify, codify, disseminate knowledge using standard formats, templates, terminology • Harmonize human resources rules and regulations • Strengthen boundary-spanning capacities among leaders

Overall • Have central organizations take on a coordination role in the network or subnetworks

Complementarity • Have agencies focus on their core competencies

Common culture • Facilitate joint teams, training, and working groups • Incentivize coordination (i.e., in career advancement) • Discourage opposition to coordination (i.e., through assessments of coordination) Access restriction • Have agencies focus on their core competencies • Sequence and prioritize tasks

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Notes 1. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: A Report on Findings and Recommendations (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2008), p. 6. 2. Originally, organization theory differentiated between markets and hierarchies only and, for some time, it was debated whether a network existed merely as a hybrid form between market and hierarchy, or whether it had distinct stand-alone qualities. Walter W. Powell argued strongly for the latter and it has now become standard practice to refer to markets, hierarchies, and networks as the three basic types. See Walter W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 295−336. 3. Andrew Van de Ven, Andre L. Delbecq, and Richard Koenig Jr., “On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations,” American Sociological Review 41, no. 3 (1976): 322−338. 4. Grahame F. Thompson, Between Markets and Hierarchy: The Logic and Limits of Network Forms of Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 38. 5. Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler, Management Interorganisationaler Beziehungen (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994). 6. Joel Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review of Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 57−76. 7. Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler define a “network” as follows: “Ein Unternehmensnetzwerk stellt eine auf die Realisierung von Wettbewerbsvorteilen zielende Organisationsform ökonomischer Aktivitäten dar, die sich durch komplex reziproke, eher kooperative denn kompetitive und relativ stabile Beziehungen zwischen rechtlich selbständigen, wirtschaftlich jedoch zumeist abhängigen Unternehmen auszeichnet” [A network is a form of organizing economic activities whose objective is the realization of competitive advantage while maintaining complex reciprocal, cooperative rather than competitive and relatively stable relationships between legally independent, but economically dependent, businesses.] (Sydow and Windeler, Management Interorganisationaler Beziehungen, p. 79). 8. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” p. 322. 9. Gayls D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, “Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988): 254. 10. Boundary spanners operate at the periphery of an organization and fulfill two main functions: (1) they filter and relay information about the environment to the organization; and (2) they represent the organization externally. See, among others, Richard Leifer and Andrew Delbeq, “Organizational/Environmental Interchange: A Model of Boundary Spanning Activity,” Academy of Management Review 3, no. 1 (1978): 40−50; and Howard Aldrich and Diane Herker, “Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure,” Academy of Management Review 2, no. 2 (1977): 217−230. 11. Gunnar Hedlund, “The Hypermodern MNC: A Heterarchy?” Human Resource Management 25, no. 1 (1986): 9−35. 12. See, for example, Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Paradox of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481−510; and Brian Uzzi, “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness,” Administrative Science Quarterly 42, no. 1 (1997): 35−67. 13. Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, and Stephen P. Borgatti, “A General

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Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms,” Academy of Management Review 22, no. 4 (1997): 914. 14. See Charles C. Snow, Raymond E. Miles, and Henry J. Coleman Jr., “Managing 21st Century Network Organizations,” Organizational Dynamics 20, no. 3 (1992): 5−20; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, “A General Theory of Network Governance”; Uzzi, “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks”; Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler, “Steuerung von und in Netzwerken—Perspektiven, Konzepte, vor allem aber offenen Fragen,” in Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler, eds., Steuerung von Netzwerken: Konzepte und Praktiken (Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), pp. 2–24; and Thompson, Between Markets and Hierarchy. 15. Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, “A General Theory of Network Governance.” 16. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” p. 305. 17. Of course, frequent interactions can, in theory, also mean frequent opportunities to relish in and increase reciprocal animosities. In that case, however, it is safe to assume that the network could break apart or weaken and that no further network governance would be needed. 18. See Andrew Van de Ven, “On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations,” Academy of Management Review 1, no. 4 (1976): 24−36; Peter Smith Ring and Andrew H. Van de Ven, “Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships,” Academy of Management Journal 19, no. 1 (1994): 90−118; and Paul W. L.Vlaar, Frans A.J. Bosch, and Henk W. Volberda, “Coping with Problems of Understanding in Interorganizational Relationships: Using Formalization as a Means to Make Sense,” Organization Studies 27, no. 11 (2006): 1617−1638. 19. Colin Camerer and Ari Vepsalainen, “The Economic Efficiency of Corporate Culture,” Strategic Management Journal 9 (1988): 115–126. 20. See, for example, Suzana Braga Rodrigues, “The Political Dynamics of Organizational Culture in an Institutionalized Environment,” Organization Studies 27, no. 4 (2006): 538; and Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, “What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning,” Organization Science 7, no. 5 (1996): 502−518. 21. Hedlund, “The Hypermodern MNC,” p. 25. 22. Snow, Miles, and Coleman, “Managing 21st Century Network Organizations,” p. 18. 23. Edward E. Lawler III, “Substitutes for Hierarchy,” Organizational Dynamics 17, no. 1 (1988): 5−15. 24. Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, “A General Theory of Network Governance,” p. 930. 25. Ibid., p. 932. 26. Ibid., p. 931. 27. Joel Baum and Paul Ingram, “Interorganizational Learning and Network Organization: Toward a Behavioral Theory of the Interfirm,” in Mie Augier and James G. March, eds., The Economics of Choice, Change, and Organization: Essays in Memory of Richard M. Cyert (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002), pp. 191−218. 28. David A. Whetten, “Interorganizational Relations: A Review of the Field,” Journal of Higher Education 52, no. 1 (1981): 1−28. In addition, see Chapter 1 in this volume on hybrids between Type I and Type II designs. 29. Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler, “Organizing and Evaluating Interfirm Networks: A Structurationist Perspective on Network Processes and Effectiveness,” Organization Science 9, no. 3 (1998): 267.

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30. Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, “Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies,” Administrative Science Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1962): 399. 31. Seung Ho Park and Gerardo Ungson, “Interfirm Rivalry and Managerial Complexity: A Conceptual Framework of Alliance Failure,” Organization Science 12, no. 1 (2001): 47. 32. Litwak and Hylton, “Interorganizational Analysis,” pp. 395–420. 33. The terms central, focal, hub, or linking pin organization are used interchangeably in the literature. 34. See Daniel A. Wren, “Interface and Interorganizational Coordination,” Organization Science 7, no. 5 (1967): 502−518; Whetten, “Interorganizational Relations”; Graham Astley and Paramjit S. Sachdeva, “Structural Sources of Intraorganizational Power: A Theoretical Synthesis,” Academy of Management Review 9, no. 1 (1984): 104−113; Kogut and Zander, “What Firms Do?”; and Sydow and Windeler, “Organizing and Evaluating Interfirm Networks.” 35. Wren, “Interface and Interorganizational Coordination.” 36. Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karin von Hippel, “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” Independent Study for the Expanded UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Core Group (London: Kings College; Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005). 37. Alan Doss asserts that “just as conflicts are never identical in their origin, evolution or duration, the institutional response to them can never be exactly replicated.” Alan Doss, quoted in Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: A Report on Findings and Recommendations (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2008), p. 21. 38. The report Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations also notes that “a major obstacle to enhancing coherence in integrated UN missions is the current administrative, procedural and legal constraints that effectively limit interoperability and integration at both administrative and operational level.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, p. 25. 39. See, for example, UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Assistance and the Environment. Delivering as One, UN Doc. A/61/583, November 9, 2006. 40. Shepard Forman, “Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable Peace,” paper prepared for the Center on International Cooperation seminar “Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management,” June 8−9, 2004, p. 2. 41. Detailed recommendations on how to improve knowledge management at the UN are also made in the Report of the Low Level Panel, Practical Steps to a More Effective and Efficient United Nations, February 6, 2006. 42. UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on System-wide Coherencepar. 87. 43. Thomas G. Weiss and Peter J. Hoffman, “Making Humanitarianism Work,” in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), p. 308. 44. Chadwick F. Alger, “Challenges for Peace Researchers and Peace Builders in the Twenty-first Century: Education and Coordination of a Diversity of Actors in

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Applying What We Are Learning,” International Journal of Peace Studies 5, no. 1 (2000): 1−13. 45. Susanna P. Campbell and Michael Hartnett issue a similar recommendation in their report. Susanna P. Campbell and Michael Hartnett, “A Framework for Improved Coordination: Lessons Learned from the International Development, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Humanitarian and Conflict Resolution Communities,” paper presented at the Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review Program, Washington, DC, October 31, 2005, p. 30. 46. Whetten, “Interorganizational Relations,” p. 18. 47. Eide et al., “Report on Integrated Missions,” p. 39). 48. Susan Woodward, “Peace Operations: The Civilian Dimension: Accounting for UNDP and the UN Specialized Agencies,” paper prepared for the Center on International Cooperation seminar “Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management,” Copehagen, June 8−9, 2004, p. 9. 49. Ulrich Schneckener outlines four broad strategies: liberalization first, security first, institutionalization first, and civil society first. Schneckener holds that the strategy different parts of the international community employ ultimately depends, among other things, on their respective understandings of the role of the state, the conduct of local actors, and the reasons for fragile statehood. Since different actors probably employ different strategies, conflicts and contradictions are bound to occur. Ulrich Schneckener, Internationales Statebuilding. Dilemmata, Strategien und Anforderungen an die deutsche Politik (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007).

3 Network and Transaction Costs Theories: Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina Michael Lipson

COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING INVOLVES A RANGE OF DIVERSE ACTORS,

including the UN system, regional organizations, the national militaries and foreign affairs ministries of troop contributors, and nongovernmental aid and humanitarian relief organizations.1 These actors are interdependent; to greater or lesser extents, their ability to accomplish their objectives depends on the activities of the other organizations involved in these operations. Thus, coordination is essential for complex peace operations to succeed. Yet it has often been lacking. Not only is interorganizational coordination a prerequisite to operational success, but coordination failure can have dysfunctional effects beyond a particular mission. Frustration with difficulties coordinating actors in complex peace operations can lead powerful states to avoid multilateral engagement, as was the case when the United States initially sidelined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan as a result of the difficulties of peace enforcement in Kosovo.2 In Bosnia, attempts to avoid problems encountered in UN-NATO coordination prior to the Dayton agreement (formally, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina; also known as the Dayton Peace Accords) contributed to the design of a dysfunctional coordination structure for Dayton implementation.3 Thus, coordination failures not only undermine the missions in which they occur, they can reverberate in later crises. Coordination, then, is an urgent problem in peace operations, which is also highlighted by Tobias Pietz in Chapter 5 and Cedric de Coning in Chapter 6 of this volume. The issues involved are central to the fields of public administration and organization theory. And yet the intellectual resources of those fields have not been adequately tapped for insights and 59

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lessons learned related to coordination4 (see Chapter 2 by Anna Herrhausen in this volume for an exception). Various strands of organization theory promise insight into the problems of interorganizational coordination in complex peacekeeping.5 Transaction cost and relational contracting analysis generates propositions regarding the conditions under which more or less hierarchical coordinating mechanisms and structures are likely to be adopted and efficient.6 Network theory offers insights into sources of “coordination without hierarchy.”7 Principal-agent theory suggests causal mechanisms by which efforts at coordination by hierarchical control may be frustrated due to problems of agency control.8 Resource-dependence and contingency theories propose hypotheses about the conditions under which different forms of coordination will emerge and be more or less effective.9 Coordination may arise from the propagation of common standards within institutional environments as described by sociological institutionalism.10 Social scientific study of the determinants and effectiveness of alternative methods of peace operations coordination is in its early stages.11 While organization theory offers a rich body of knowledge about coordination in complex organizational settings, deriving practical lessons from these theories for peace operations design is a challenging undertaking requiring an iterative process of testing propositions derived from organization theory against evidence from peace operations cases, refining theories based on such evidence, and subjecting refined theories and models to more rigorous tests based on further cases. This chapter is only a first step in such a research program. As an initial step, I explore the utility of transaction cost and network theories for explaining interorganizational coordination in complex peacekeeping through an illustrative case study of coordination in Bosnia, selected for the variety and complexity of coordination challenges and structures it provides.12 These two approaches were selected because of their prominence in the study of interorganizational coordination and because my preliminary research indicated that they held promise for explaining the Bosnian case.13 I do not attempt to systematically test these theories. Instead, I apply the two perspectives to the case of Bosnia to establish the utility of further research from the perspective of each theory—a practice known in social science methodology as a plausibility probe—and to investigate determinants of the form of coordination structure used in complex peace operations.14

Theories and Propositions Organization theory offers insights into both formal and informal means of interorganizational coordination. Formal coordination involves redrawing

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organizational charts, explicit assignment of authority and responsibility, and specification of procedures. Informal coordination develops more organically through social networks and ad hoc responses to interdependence. They are at least partially complementary and each depends on the other to function effectively. Yet informal behavior can defeat the intended purposes of formal measures, and dysfunctional formal arrangements can inhibit potentially salutary informal responses in addition to failing to achieve their own goals. Transaction Costs and Coordination Transaction cost economics (TCE) explains organizational structures as arising from actors’ economizing on the costs of arranging and implementing the contracts governing exchange. Originally focused on explaining why bureaucratic firms are necessary to mediate economic exchanges in markets, the theory claims that firms come into existence, and take the forms they do, because the exchanges conducted within the firm can be done more efficiently within a hierarchy than through the market. Thus, “the boundaries of the firm occur at the point where the cost savings from transacting within the firm are, at the margin, just offset by” the costs of hierarchical authority.15 While originally formulated to explain private economic organizations in capitalist economies, the framework has been adapted by international relations theorists to explain the creation and persistence of international regimes and the structure of international security arrangements. 16 The basic claim is that the more effort cooperation requires, the greater the benefits of formal bureaucracy in streamlining such cooperation. Thus, as transaction costs increase, the benefits of hierarchical organizational structures will more likely outweigh the costs of creating and maintaining a bureaucracy, and coordination will increasingly take place through hierarchical structures. This logic can be applied to coordination within complex peace operations, suggesting that the structure of coordination mechanisms should reflect the relative transaction cost efficiency of alternative means of coordinating interorganizational relations in peacekeeping. All other things being equal, where transaction costs of coordination are high, we should expect more hierarchical coordinating mechanisms (Hypothesis 1).17 According to this hypothesis, as coordinating the different organizational participants in a peace operation becomes more complex, the peace operation will develop formal structures to make coordination more efficient. In peace operations, these may take forms such as formalized pillar structures governing different functional areas of a peacekeeping mission, with explicit reporting lines and delegations of authority. A related hypothesis arises from the consideration of asset specificity, the extent to which actors have invested in skills, resources, or capital that

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are specific to a relationship.18 When an organization requires its personnel to invest in acquiring skills and knowledge unique to that organization, the staff becomes dependent on the organization as the effort invested and skills acquired may not be transferrable to another organization. To induce investment in specific assets, organizations may have to provide reassurance that the relationship concerned will not be disrupted (e.g., by firing employees who have invested in organization-specific skills). This can be accomplished through employment contracts and other means of formalizing relationships in hierarchical structures.19 Specific assets in peacekeeping, such as knowledge of UN rules and procedures or equipment for interoperability with NATO forces, may produce a tendency to more hierarchical coordinating mechanisms in peace operations. A second transaction cost hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), then, is that hierarchy of coordination mechanisms increases with asset specificity. Since different actors involved in complex peace operations will have different relationships characterized by different levels of transaction costs and asset specificity, we should expect forms of coordination to vary across actors, but to do so in patterned ways reflecting these factors. In addition, if transaction cost economizing influences the choice of coordination mechanism, we should expect that existing mechanisms will be used where feasible to avoid the transaction costs of creating new structures from scratch (Hypothesis 3).20 Informal Coordination: Peacekeeping Networks The concept of networks is playing an increasingly significant role in the analysis of both organizational behavior and international relations.21 Networks are “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.”22 In a seminal article, the prominent organizational sociologist Walter W. Powell challenged the then prevalent view of organizational forms as arrayed along a spectrum from market to hierarchy, with particular organizational structures determined by transaction costs and asset specificity. Instead, he argued, networks constituted a distinct organizational form—not merely a midpoint between market and hierarchy—and the sources of network development lie predominantly in factors other than transaction cost economizing.23 Powell notes that networks are “lighter on their feet” then [sic] hierarchies. In network modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they involve neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the hierarchy. basic [sic] assumption of network relationships

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is that one party is dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources.24

Network theorists hold that networks are increasingly prevalent due to societal trends at both the domestic and international levels. Caroline Alter and Jerald Hage argue that economic, social, and technological change— including changed consumer preferences emphasizing innovation over standardization, higher levels of education, technological developments, and the emergence of local and sectoral industries exhibiting “a culture of cooperation and trust”—have made coordination through interorganizational networks increasingly effective.25 Alter and Hage predict that, due to these trends, “this new institutional form will increasingly replace both markets and hierarchies as a governance mechanism.”26 Powell argues that networks are better able to facilitate cooperation in economic settings involving significant tacit knowledge (or know-how), need for rapid responses, and reliance on trust, reciprocity, and shared understandings.27 Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Anne Marie Slaughter similarly argue that globalization advantages networks of transnational actors relative to hierarchies such as states and international organizations, though they differ on the form transnational networks should be expected to take.28 Many of the factors these authors (Powell, Alter and Hage, Mathews and Slaughter) portray as promoting networks are characteristics of complex peacekeeping, as highlighted by Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters in Chapter 4 of this volume. With regard to globalization in particular, Mary Kaldor and Peter Viggo Jakobsen have attributed, respectively, the intrastate conflicts to which complex peacekeeping often respond, and the transformation of peacekeeping that produced complex peacekeeping, to aspects of globalization.29 Donald Chisholm argues against the tendency to assume that coordination requires formal organization. Creating hierarchical structures to coordinate across organizations may, by increasing the system’s complexity, actually complicate matters further.30 Instead, Chisholm concludes that “following the rule of the lowest common denominator is probably the most effective strategy: use the minimum mechanisms necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of coordination.”31 That minimum varies with the nature of interdependencies among parts of a multiorganizational system. Chisholm draws a distinction between “multilateral” interdependence, in which the organizational nodes of the system and issues of concern in the system are tightly coupled and nodes are multiply linked, and “bilateral” interdependence, in which pairs of nodes are tightly coupled to each other but loosely coupled to the rest of the system.32 Formal coordination measures are appropriate to deal with sets of organizations that are multilaterally interdependent. However, where a set of organizations is characterized by multiple bilaterally connected organizations, the system “can be

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considered as a series of smaller problems of coordination.” Such systems are “decomposable.”33 Coordination of decomposable systems, according to Chisholm, is best addressed through informal networks. Much of the interdependence in complex peace operations is bilateral rather than multilateral (in Chisholm’s usage) as, for example, when a humanitarian nongovernmental organization (NGO) needs information about the security situation in an area or a civil affairs unit needs to obtain supplies for a building project from a local source.34 In such instances, network theory predicts that informal structures will likely be both adequate and superior to more hierarchical formal arrangements.35 Chisholm argues that networks are most effective in complex environments characterized by different interests and the risk of system failure. In addition to the decomposability of at least some aspects of complex peace operations, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are clearly characterized by “complex operating environments, diverse interests, and potential technical and organizational failures,”36 the conditions under which Chisholm holds that informal coordination methods will better balance the need for coordination with other organizational imperatives. According to network theory, hierarchical coordination mechanisms can be dysfunctional, even dangerous, in gray area peace operations in which core principles of traditional peacekeeping, such as consent and impartiality, do not apply.37 For example, including humanitarian NGOs within the formal structure of an integrated peacekeeping mission with a robust mandate permitting use of force beyond self-defense can compromise the perceived neutrality on which NGOs rely to operate in conflict zones.38 Informal networks often flow around formal structures that are overly cumbersome or otherwise problematic.39 They may do so when the path through the formal structure is slow, blocked, or inappropriate to the task at hand.40 For example, a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)−chaired working group on Liberia took on functions of the formal Integrated Military Task Force established for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which proved too large and unwieldy.41 On the one hand, such arrangements may complement formal structures by compensating for their weaknesses. However, organizational and inter-organizational activity may come to be conducted primarily through informal methods, bypassing formal structures and rendering them largely ceremonial.42 Powell identifies three factors that promote network organization— dependence on know-how or tacit knowledge, rapid response, and trust.43 All three are critical components of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Network theory, then, suggests the following hypotheses regarding peacekeeping coordination: Hypothesis 4: the greater the dependence of peace opera-

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tions on specialized skills and experience, the more likely that coordination will be conducted through network forms of coordination; Hypothesis 5: as the need for rapid and flexible responses increases, network-based coordination becomes increasingly likely; and Hypothesis 6: reliance on trust between individual and organizational actors in peace operations increases the likelihood of coordination via networks. The significance of these factors—skill, flexibility, and trust—will, in turn, depend on factors such as the nature of Security Council mandates and the field environment of the peacekeeping mission. Specialized skills will be more critical in multidimensional peacekeeping missions with complex mandates and the need for rapid adaptation at a premium in unstable environments. To the extent that shared backgrounds—such as common professional training—form the basis of trust within networks, different cultures of military and humanitarian actors in peace operations can be a limiting factor, though regular interaction in complex emergencies in the 1990s somewhat reduced these cultural differences.44 According to Powell, the development of networks is more likely “when partners are involved in ongoing, complementary activities” and “in circumstances that require operational integration or under conditions of uncertainty about how to obtain desired outcomes.”45 These are the circumstances that prevail in complex peacekeeping. Complex peacekeeping, therefore, seems on first assessment to fit the conditions that organization theorists have identified as being conducive to a shift from formal and hierarchical coordination structures to informal networks. And observers have noted such networks in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.46 Alex Morrison and Stephanie Blair have distinguished two types of such networks, characterized by contact between organizations and personnel (Type I) or exchange of information (Type II)47 (see Chapter 1). The former operate through direct contacts within missions and through the intermediation of organizations such as the Pearson Centre, the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), the International Peace Institute (IPI), and other peacekeeping-related organizations. The latter develops through various fora, from Reuters AlertNet and the academic journal International Peacekeeping, to NGO e-mail listservs.48 NGOs have also developed such informal networks. Daniel Byman et al., noting that “NGOs have no formal arrangements to promote coordination at the operational level, either within a single NGO or across all NGOs,” observe that “although NGOs appear anarchic, they have informal webs that promote coordination.”49 The following case study and analysis consider the extent to which the perspectives and hypotheses presented above apply to peacekeeping coordination in Bosnia. The case study focuses on coordination after the 1995 Dayton agreement, but begins with an overview of coordination issues prior to the Dayton agreement because of their later repercussions.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Illustrative Case Both before and after the 1995 Dayton agreement, international operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibited problematic coordination among various organizations as well as adaptations of varying degrees of effectiveness. Prior to Dayton, NATO and the UN encountered significant problems with the so-called dual key arrangement for joint approval of NATO air strikes. However, humanitarian coordination saw effective adaptation in a “lead department” capacity by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).50 Implementation of the Dayton accords was plagued by lack of coordination between the military and civilian sides of the mission. Because the Dayton agreement established an elaborate structure to oversee international activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary in considering peacekeeping coordination in this country to distinguish between coordination before and after Dayton. Pre-Dayton Coordination During the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), coordination of international involvement took place through various means.51 Diplomatic coordination took place in Security Council deliberations, within NATO, through bilateral contacts, and most significantly, through the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), a joint European Union (EU)−UN forum, and the Contact Group (comprised of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and Germany). Political oversight was provided by the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) (from 1993), who oversaw civil affairs coordinators (CACs) in regional offices. Operational coordination within UNPROFOR took place in the field, under the authority of the mission commander and the Bosnia and Herzegovina commander. Because national contingents reported to national commanders and capitals, and held “red cards” by which they could refuse orders from the UNPROFOR commander, this was not a simple matter of hierarchical command and required intramission bargaining.52 With respect to air strikes and coercive diplomacy, coordination between the UN, NATO, and key member states of both organizations was necessary. As mentioned above, NATO and the UN worked out the dual key arrangement for authorizing NATO air strikes. Under this arrangement, air strikes could be undertaken only with the approval of both organizations.53 NATO approval authority rested with the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC delegated authority to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe. Initially, the UN’s authority rested with the Secretary-General, later it was delegated to the SRSG and then predelegated to the UN force commander

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after the July 21, 1995, London conference. Dual key approval also required the acceptance of participating states. NATO members that were also UNPROFOR troop contributors were particularly concerned about retaliation against peacekeepers in response to air strikes. Thus, even after NATO’s key was delegated from the NAC (with its consensus decisionmaking) to NATO commanders, Britain and France still held veto authority through their personnel serving as UNPROFOR commanders.54 The dual key system was regarded with frustration by NATO and the United States. They felt that the UN withheld approval for air strikes necessary for effective coercive diplomacy until the summer of 1995, when the control over the keys was delegated to field commanders. This dissatisfaction reverberated in the design of the implementation structures for the Dayton agreement. Post-Dayton Coordination The Dayton agreement established a complex dual structure for implementation. The agreement divided responsibility for military and civilian aspects of the accords’ implementation. On the military side, a peace Implementation Force (IFOR) was headed by NATO. On the civilian side, there was a complex structure in which a high representative (HiRep) was appointed with the responsibility, but not the authority, to coordinate the range of civilian organizations playing roles in civilian implementation— the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) overseeing civil affairs, mine removal, and policing functions; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); international financial institutions; UNHCR; NGOs; the EU; and other actors. As Ivo Daalder notes, The structure for the civilian implementation effort that was finally agreed at Dayton is perhaps as unwieldy as it possibly could be. In addition to creating the clear and unbridgeable separation between military and civilian implementation efforts, the civilian efforts were themselves subdivided among multiple international organizations and agencies, each of which derived its authority from a different body—be it the United Nations, European Union, World Bank, or OSCE.55

The division between the civilian and military sides was itself a reaction to the difficulties encountered with the dual key arrangement, with the United States determined to prevent the UN or other civilian authorities from interfering with NATO’s command of IFOR.56 The HiRep, in turn, was placed under the authority of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a reformulation of the ICFY, in part due to US unwillingness to place the civilian implementation aspects of the agreement under UN authority.57 Within the PIC, comprising fifty-five countries and

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international agencies, a Steering Board was established. The Steering Board is made up of representatives of the Group of 8 (G8) countries, the EU presidency and European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Steering Board appoints the HiRep, who subsequently chairs its meetings.58 A December 1997 meeting of the PIC expanded the HiRep’s authority, which was subsequently used to impose decisions of the HiRep on recalcitrant Bosnian representatives. A number of mechanisms for coordination in Bosnia evolved in practice and became institutionalized over time. For political coordination, regular consultations known as “principals meetings” were established, chaired by the HiRep, and attended by the SRSG, commanders of IFOR, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) that succeeded IFOR, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), UNHCR’s special envoy, and the OSCE head of mission. For economic issues, a parallel Economic Task Force, also chaired by the HiRep, included international financial institutions and development agencies. In addition, thematic coordination groups and regional offices were established.59 The Dayton agreement mandated the creation of a Joint Civilian Commission to oversee coordination among the civilian agencies, IFOR, and parties to the agreement. In 2002, in an effort to rationalize coordination of international efforts, a Board of Principals was established “to serve as the main coordinating body of International Community activity in BiH.”60 The board, chaired by the HiRep, consisted of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), SFOR, OSCE, UNHCR, European Union Police Mission (EUPM), and the European Commission (as permanent members), with representatives of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and UN Development Programme (UNDP) regularly attending the weekly meetings in Sarajevo. In addition, Paddy Ashdown was dual hatted as HiRep and the first European Union special representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2002. The establishment of the EUSR was part of a greater emphasis on international peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on moving the country toward eventual EU membership, warranting an increased role for the EU. The EUPM took over from the IPTF and UNMIBH in 2003 and the European Union Force (EUFOR) from SFOR in December 2004.61 Thus, many different organizations have been involved in different capacities in postconflict reconstruction in Bosnia. The record of these various arrangements for civilian implementation is generally regarded as problematic, plagued by inadequate provisions for coordination. The military component of Dayton implementation was designed to be separate from the civilian side, and to possess a clear and unified chain of command to prevent perceived political interference. This was largely a consequence of dissatisfaction with the UN’s pre-Dayton role as well as problems with UN missions in Somalia and Rwanda. As Daalder explains,

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Since Washington blamed the United Nations—in particular its chief representatives, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his special representative Yasushi Akashi—for failing to authorize the forceful use of air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets in 1994 and 1995, excluding the UN from a decision-making role was judged to be crucial to the success of any future mission.62

Thus, IFOR (later replaced by SFOR) had a chain of command separate from and parallel to that of the HiRep and civilian agencies (themselves not under overall UN authority). SACEUR George Joulwan reportedly contacted US negotiator Richard Holbrooke to insist on there being no mixing of the military and civilian authority.63 While Annex 10 of the Dayton agreement (on civilian implementation) mandates that the OHR “exchange information and maintain liaison on a regular basis” and “remain in close contact” with the IFOR commander or his or her representatives, IFOR was deliberately insulated from the civilian implementation aspects of Dayton, with the result that coordination was inhibited.64 Notwithstanding a politically driven and unrealistic planned deployment duration of only one year, IFOR was generally successful at its narrowly drawn mission and, with its unified chain of command, suffered much fewer coordination problems than the number that emerged on the civilian side. However, where problems spanned the military and civilian sides, coordination had to be largely improvised. IFOR’s reluctance, in particular, to take on policing tasks that UNMIBH was unprepared to perform due to a lack of civilian police for the IPTF threatened to undermine IFOR’s efforts to establish a safe and secure environment until arrangements were reached between the two sides of the mission. Assessment The arrangements for implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia were far from ideal in terms of providing for effective coordination. As one analysis concludes, “The weakness of the High Representative’s mandate, the absence of integrating structures at the strategic and operational levels, and the plethora of international organizations, NGOs, and private companies involved, all created an almost unmanageable situation for civilian implementation.”65 Similarly, a RAND report asserted that “the arrangements for Bosnia are so complex as to appear unworkable. Indeed, they would be unworkable if the major powers did not share a common understanding of the goals and promote these goals in various venues, including the Security Council, the North Atlantic Council, the Peace Implementation Council, the OSCE, and the Contact Group.”66 Thus, to the extent that coordination was achieved in Bosnia, it was largely despite the formal arrangements established by the Dayton accords.

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Transaction Cost Hypotheses The coordination structures for Dayton implementation were clearly not designed for transaction cost efficiency. Rather, the design of the formal structure was determined by politics. To the extent that operational efficiency and effectiveness were considered, they were filtered through politicized calculations. The United States’ insistence on sidelining the UN and separating the military and civilian elements was driven by a genuine— though widely regarded in retrospect as mistaken—perception that greater UN involvement would endanger operational effectiveness. The United States also reversed an initial inclination to grant significant authority to the HiRep when it became clear that the post would be filled by a European rather than a US official. Instead, the United States sought to limit the OHR’s authority to prevent civilian interference with military tasks reproducing what the United States perceived as the UN’s obstruction of NATO in the dual key arrangement.67 The politically driven sidelining of the UN also meant that new structures, such as the OHR, had to be created from scratch, instead of employing existing arrangements such as the office of the SRSG. For the same reason, the OSCE was put in charge of election supervision instead of the UN.68 While later adjustments, such as the 2002 establishment of the Board of Principals to oversee the OHR, arose from efforts to reduce transaction costs, the Dayton agreement’s initial choices regarding coordinating structures did not. These choices are clearly inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, that existing structures are preferred to economize on the transaction costs of creating new ones. The importance of political interests in determining the form of coordination structures does not fit well with the propositions from transaction cost analysis discussed above.69 It is possible, however, that if policymakers were more attentive to the transaction cost implications of political choices, institutional efficiency in peace operations might be enhanced. Moreover, while the overall structure of Dayton implementation does not conform well to transaction cost expectations about the choice of institutions, the varying degrees of hierarchy between the civilian and military sides of the Dayton agreement appear more consistent with hypotheses relating transaction costs to hierarchy (Hypothesis 1).70 Military organizations are famously hierarchical, a clear instance where transactions are more efficiently performed within the organization than through a market. NATO provided an overarching formal bureaucracy to coordinate implementation of Dayton’s military elements. While formal bureaucracies—including the OSCE, EU, and UN—were charged with different aspects of civilian implementation, no similarly hierarchical coordination structure existed on the civilian side. Carl Bildt, the first

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HiRep, observed in his memoirs that, “while my little organization was characterized by informal flexibility, IFOR was an operation in which even minor matters sometimes had to be passed on to SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] in Mons before a decision could be made.”71 This difference appears consistent with Hypothesis 2, that hierarchy rises with asset specificity, as asset specificity was much greater in highly institutionalized NATO than in the OHR.72 It also conforms to conventional wisdom regarding the respective appropriateness of hierarchy and unitary command for military operations, and relatively less hierarchical arrangements for activities involving NGOs and other civilian actors. However, this variation, too, appears to have been the product of political rather than transaction cost factors. Placing civilian implementation under the OHR rather than the more hierarchical UN bureaucracy was a political choice driven by US assessments of UN capacity, not by expectations that the OHR would be more efficient in transaction cost terms relative to the UN. The evidence I have presented here suggests that transaction cost factors do not appear to account well for the structure or effectiveness of peace operations coordination mechanisms in Bosnia. Network Theory Hypotheses The network theory hypotheses (Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6) identified above hold that network forms of coordination are more likely to be employed when coordination problems are characterized by exchanges of intangible knowledge and skill (Hypothesis 4), a need for quick response and adaptation (Hypothesis 5), and actors possessing shared trust and common understandings (Hypothesis 6). Evidence from the Bosnia and Herzegovina case is broadly consistent with these hypotheses: 1. Knowledge and skill: Though political considerations were a factor, the Dayton agreement allocated responsibilities to different organizations on the basis of, in Powell’s terminology, “distinctive competencies.”73 NATO was given command of the implementation force while UNHCR was given responsibility for refugee return. Various organizations with human rights expertise were assigned responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights.74 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with experience in postcommunist transitions, was made responsible for the establishment of agencies for public service provision.75 DPKO was charged with the civilian policing mission, a task in which it had prior experience. OSCE, however, was placed in charge of elections, though it lacked experience in that field at that time.76

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2. Rapid response and adaptation: Bildt, the first HiRep, recounts emphasizing the need for rapid progress on reconstruction at the first donors conference for Bosnia in December 1995, arguing that “when winter turned into spring and the snow melted away in the valleys and the plains it would have to be clear that things were improving and that reconstruction was under way. This called for an unconventional assistance program, in which we had to achieve results within a few months to support a political process, rather than help a country develop over the course of several decades.”77 In early 1996, he initiated the design of fundamental political and economic institutions and regulations, called the “Quick Start Package,” in recognition of urgency similar to that in the reconstruction field.78 The creation by the OHR and UNMIBH Civil Affairs Unit of a common license plate for Bosnia is also an example of the need for adaptation in Bosnia. Previously, license plates of different political entities had served as indicators of the occupants’ ethnicity, facilitating ethnic harassment and inhibiting free movement.79 The establishment of the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) to promote refugee return is a further example of networked coordination to support such adaptation.80 3. Levels of trust and shared understanding were initially somewhat wanting in both UNPROFOR-NATO coordination and Dayton implementation, but improved over time. Bildt writes, for instance, that by September 1996, “relations between the NATO forces and the civilian side and myself had improved. Originally, they had tended to look down on us, seeing us as little more than something which could be blamed for things that were difficult to sort out, and being far more interested in managing its PR [public relations] apparatus than in going into complicated situations. But reality had brought us together.”81 Similarly, international efforts to promote the return of ethnic minorities to areas from which they had been ethnically cleansed were initially fragmented and inconsistent. The establishment of the RRTF achieved greater coordination with some positive results.82 The factors that network theory expects to give rise to networked forms of coordination were present in Bosnia. Cooperation involved specialized skills and expertise and required timely, sometimes innovative, responses. Trust and shared understandings, while initially lacking, developed over time. This supports an expectation that networks should have played a significant role in coordinating implementation activities of the international community prior to and under the Dayton agreement. In fact, there is significant evidence in the record of interorganizational coordination in Bosnia that fits the expectations of network theory.83 Much of the coordination that has been achieved was developed through networks

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and informal arrangements developed on an ad hoc basis, some of which were then institutionalized. Such arrangements include the Contact Group, the principals meetings, the OHR sectoral task forces for Dayton civilian implementation, and NGO networks. Georgios Kostakos refers to the principals meetings in Bosnia as “an on-the-ground improvisation out of necessity,” consistent with Chisholm’s portrayal of informal networks as emerging to fill gaps and compensate for weaknesses of formal structures.84 The development of civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), of which post-Dayton Bosnia was an early case, illustrates the role of networks in Bosnian peace operations. The CMOCs were developed as an ad hoc adaptation to coordinate across intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and military forces.85 They bring together different actors—military officers, humanitarian NGO personnel, UN agencies, representatives of regional organizations, local actors, and host government officials—to exchange information and coordinate activities involving interdependence among participants. They represent the sort of informal, reciprocal, and horizontal interaction that defines network organizations.86 The Bosnian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Center, an early example of the CMOC model, represents anecdotal evidence supporting the network hypotheses. OHR principals meetings and thematic coordination groups are further examples. Thus, network forms of organization do appear to have played a significant role in coordinating Bosnian peace operations, consistent with network theory.

Conclusion The preceding discussion constitutes a preliminary plausibility probe of propositions regarding interorganizational coordination in complex peacekeeping derived from organization theory. The results challenge the transaction cost perspective and provide tentative support for network hypotheses. A few lessons can be derived from the Bosnia case: 1. Coordination is political. The coordination of peace operations is not merely a technical or operational challenge. It is inextricably tied up with the interests and influence of powerful states and organizations. The choice of coordination structures and mechanisms in Bosnia was driven as much by politics as by considerations of efficiency and effectiveness—and the latter were filtered through political lenses.87 Models of coordination that neglect the primacy of politics, such as the transaction cost perspective, will be at best incomplete. 2. Networks are not enough. Networks may, under some circumstances, provide means of working around dysfunctional structures produced by

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political, not operational, logics. But they cannot entirely replace effective coordinating authority, particularly when organizations with partially conflicting mandates and organizational cultures require coordination. 3. As Salman Ahmed puts it, “No size fits all.”88 Bosnia represented an extremely complex and varied case of peacekeeping coordination. While unique, it also encompassed many challenges and problems that have arisen in other settings such as the need to coordinate the activities of different organizations, within and outside the UN system, and to effectively adapt to changing circumstances. In the Bosnian case, no single model of coordination would have been adequate for the different coordination challenges that existed before and after Dayton, and in the different functional activities for which peacekeepers and peacebuilders were made responsible. Nor can any single model be prescribed for peace operations in general. The challenge, instead, is to identify conditions under which different forms of coordination are more or less likely to be feasible and effective. To that end, organizational theory offers a promising basis for further research. Meanwhile, the above lessons may assist practitioners in addressing obstacles to effective coordination. Policymakers, recognizing that coordination is political and that politics may lead to suboptimal coordination arrangements, may nonetheless be able to enhance coordination effectiveness by seeking to limit political constraints on operational coordination and avoid imposing structures that unnecessarily increase transaction costs of coordination. Field-level staff should work to establish network arrangements to deal with problems requiring coordination that formal structures do not provide while recognizing that networks are not a panacea. Both standard coordination structures and informal networks should be adapted to particular settings and circumstances.

Notes 1. “Complex peacekeeping,” a term prominently employed in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report, named after the panel’s chair Lakhdar Brahimi), encompasses peace operations that are sometimes referred to as second- and third-generation peacekeeping—missions incorporating peacebuilding and peace enforcement functions. United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. 2. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), p. xxvii. 3. See, for example, Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000); and Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 4. Anna Herrhausen, Christer Jönsson, and Karen Mingst are further excep-

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tions, developing theoretical analyses of interorganizational relations among international organizations. Anna Herrhausen, “Coordination in UN Peacebuilding: A Theory-guided Approach,” Discussion Paper No. SP IV 2007-301 (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2007); Christer Jönsson, “Interorganization Theory and International Organization,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1986): 39−57; Karen Mingst, “Inter-organizational Politics: The World Bank and the African Development Bank,” Review of International Studies 13, no. 4 (1987): 281−293. The literature on linkages among international regimes is also relevant. See, for example, Oran Young, “Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives,” Global Governance 2, no. 1 (1996): 1−24; and Vinod K. Aggarwal, ed., Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). Anna Fosdick develops models of decisionmaking within organizations to explain the development of complex peacekeeping. However, she does not address coordination as a central issue. See Anna Fosdick, “Using Organization Theory to Understand International Organizations: Four Models of Multilateral Decision Making,” International Public Management Journal 2, no. 2 (1999): 327−370. Antonia Handler Chayes, Abram Chayes, and George Raach draw on the management literature for lessons applicable to coordination in complex peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. However, they do not draw on the broader organization theory literature. See Antonia Chayes, Antonia Handler, Abram Chayes, and George Raach, “Beyond Reform: Restructuring for More Effective Conflict Intervention,” Global Governance 3, no. 2 (1997): 117−146. 5. To keep chapter length manageable, other potentially relevant approaches within organization theory—including resource dependence and contingency theories—are bracketed here and left for consideration elsewhere. 6. See, among others, Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,” Journal of Law and Economics 22, no. 2 (1979): 233−261; David Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Katja Weber, Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000). 7. Donald Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). On network theory, see also Walter W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 295−336; Caroline Alter and Jerald Hage, Organizations Working Together (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993); and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 8. See, for example, Mark A. Pollack, “Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997): 99−134; and Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, “Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-agent Theory,” in Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 3−38. 9. For in-depth discussions of these hypotheses, see James D. Thompson, ed., Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); and Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Con-

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trol of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). 10. See John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340−363; and Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 11. See, among others, Nancy C. Roberts and Raymond Trevor Bradley, “Organizing for Peace Operations,” Public Management Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 111−133; Herrhausen, “Coordination in UN Peacebuilding”; Sebastiaan J.H. Rietjens, Civilmilitary Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill? (Boston, MA: Brill, 2008); and Roland Paris, “Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem’ in Postwar State-building,” in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 53−78. 12. The central figure in the development of transaction cost analysis, Oliver E. Williamson, shared the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences with Elinor Ostrom. 13. Michael Lipson, “Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Peace Operations: Perspectives from Organization Theory,” paper presented at the conference “Public Administration Meets Peacebuilding: Peace Operations as Political and Managerial Challenges,” University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany, June 15−16, 2007. 14. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79−137. The related issue of the effectiveness of alternative means of coordination remains to be addressed in further research. 15. Oliver Hart, “An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,” in Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, expanded edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 157. 16. Oliver E. Williamson describes TCE as applying to economic organization (see Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,” in Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, expanded edition [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], pp. 223−224); Robert O. Keohane develops a transaction cost-based theory of international regimes (see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984]); David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran develop a theory of transaction cost politics (see David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999]); and David Lake and Katja Weber explain the structure of security institutions in terms of transaction costs (see Lake, Entangling Relations; and Weber, Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy). 17. David Lake and Katja Weber present models including factors that modify the relationship between transaction costs and hierarchy (e.g., costs of opportunism). Their models concern security-seeking states and are not easily adapted to relations between international organizations. See Lake, Entangling Relations; and Weber, Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy. 18. Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics.” 19. Celeste Wallander relates asset specificity to the adaptability of international

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institutions. Assets can be specific to relationships, locations, and purposes. See Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 708. 20. On networks in organization theory, see Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy”; Alter and Hage, Organizations Working Together; and Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review of Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 57−76. On international relations perspectives, see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (1997): 50−66; Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; and Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). In his classic book, Harold K. Jacobson uses “webs of international organization networks” as a central metaphor, but did not explicitly theorize networks as an institutional form (see Henry K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For more policy-oriented analyses that have addressed networks’ dark side, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 1−25; and Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Policy, no. 134 (2003): 29−37. For networks’ potential contributions to global governance, see Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Francis Deng, with Jan Martin Witte, Thorsten Benner, Beth Whitaker, and John Gershman, Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2000). Emilie HafnerBurton and Alexander H. Montgomery analyze networks of states in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), arguing that “cliques” and social networks within IGOs have consequential effects for levels of interstate conflict. However, their networks are composed entirely of states. I conceive peacekeeping networks as involving different kinds of actors, mostly nonstate. See Emilie Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Power Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 1 (2006): 3−27. 21. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 103. 22. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 8. 23. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” p. 322. 24. Ibid., p. 303. 25. Alter and Hage, Organizations Working Together, pp. 13−42. 26. Ibid., p. 13. 27. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” p. 324. 28. Mathews, “Power Shift”; Slaughter, A New World Order. 29. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1999); Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s: Adding Globalization to the Conventional ‘End of the Cold War’ Explanation,” Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 3 (2002): 267−282. The aspects of globalization emphasized by Kaldor and Jakobsen are distinct from those emphasized in the network theory literature. 30. See Thomas G. Weiss for a discussion of this argument as it applies to UN humanitarian coordination. Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian Shell Games: Whither UN Reform?” Security Dialogue 29, no. 1 (1998): 14. 31. Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy, p. 63. 32. Ibid., pp. 52−62. On loose and tight coupling see, for example, Karl Weick, “Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems,” Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1976): 1−19; Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with

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High-risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and J. Douglas Orton and Karl E. Weick, “Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization,” Academy of Management Review 15, no. 2 (1990): 203−223. 33. Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy, p. 63, following Herbert A. Simon. See Herbert A. Simon, “The Architecture of Complexity,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106, no. 6 (1962): 467−382. Both Simon and Chisholm contend that most systems are decomposable. 34. Other aspects of peace operations are more complex. For example, in Bosnia, a number of factors were multilaterally interdependent and tightly coupled in the process leading to the Dayton accords. NATO bombing had an interactive effect with the successful joint Bosnian and Croatian offensive; by pinning down Serb forces and damaging the Serb communications system, the air strikes indirectly supported the Bosnian and Croatian offensive, itself the major factor in bringing the Serbs to the table. See Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 135, note 47. However, air strikes themselves were only politically feasible due to the prior strengthening of UNPROFOR capabilities with the deployment of a rapid reaction force, making the risk of Serb retaliation against peacekeepers in response to the air strikes acceptable. See Pauline Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR, and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,” Survival 38, no. 4 (1996−1997): 48. 35. Stated as a hypothesis: Bilateral/decomposable interdependence generates informal coordination through networks. Conversely, multilateral interdependence gives rise to formal coordination. This hypothesis is not tested here due to a lack of available measures of decomposability. 36. Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy, pp. 186–187. 37. On traditional peacekeeping principles, see Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” International Affairs 69, no. 3 (1993): 451−464. The Brahimi Report asserts the continued centrality of the core principles of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force except self-defense (interpreted since 1973 to also include defense of the mission). See UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 38. For an example of this argument, see Anna Jefferys and Toby Porter, “Viewpoint: Ivory Coast is a Case of Too Much U.N. Coordination,” Reuters AlertNet, November 26, 2004. In addition, see Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, “Response: U.N. Says Coordination Not the Enemy in Ivory Coast,” Reuters AlertNet, December 1, 2004, http://reliefweb.int/node/159478; and Adele Harmer, “Integrated Missions: A Threat to Humanitarian Security,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (2008): 528−539. 39. Of course, informal networks may introduce their own dysfunctionalities. Podolny and Page argue that this has been a blind spot of network theory. See Podolny and Page, “Network Forms of Organization”. 40. Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy, pp. 65−69. 41. William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 48. 42. Ernest R. Alexander notes that informal coordination through networks “is likely to be much more difficult, and probably less successful, in a more complex and less decomposable multiorganizational system made up of organizations deploying different technologies, with different organizational membership, different disciplinary languages, and dissimilar goals.” Ernest R. Alexander, How Organizations Act Together: Interorganizational Coordination in Theory and Practice (Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach, 1995), p. 101. This certainly describes peace

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operations. He also notes that “enforceability and accountability of informal arrangements may be a problem.” 43. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” p. 324. 44. See, for example, Hugo Slim, “The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-military Relations in Peace Support Operations,” International Peacekeeping 3, no. 2 (1996): 123−140; Laura L. Miller, “From Adversaries to Allies: Relief Workers’ Attitudes Toward the U.S. Military,” Qualitative Sociology 22, no. 3 (1999): 181−197; and Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000). 45. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy,” p. 325. 46. See Michael Lipson, “Interorganizational Networks in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief: An Institutional Theory Perspective,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28−31, 2003. 47. Alex Morrison and Stephanie A. Blair, “Transnational Networks of Peacekeepers,” in Muthiah Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., International Security Management and the United Nations (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999), pp. 253−260. 48. How to categorize electronic contact between peace operations staff, such as in DPKO’s electronic communities of practice, is not entirely clear. On information networks in Kosovo, see Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 93−114. 49. Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman, Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), pp. 89−90. 50. Thomas G. Weiss and Amir Pasic, “Reinventing UNHCR: Enterprising Humanitarians in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991−1995,” Global Governance 3, no. 1 (1997): 41−57. 51. By UNPROFOR, I refer throughout this chapter to the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as distinct from UNPROFOR as initially established in Croatia. Also, I use “Bosnia” as shorthand for “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 52. Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: Harvill Press, 1998), p. 23. 53. NATO’s 1993 Operation Deliberate Force; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 131. 54. William J. Durch and James A. Schear, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia,” in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 243. 55. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 159. 56. Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR, and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,” p. 50. 57. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, pp. 153−155; Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR, and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,” p. 51. 58. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 156. 59. Georgios Kokastos, “Division of Labor Among International Organizations: The Bosnian Experience,” Global Governance 4, no. 4 (1998): 467. 60. For a brief description of the PIC’s Board of Principals, see the website of the Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, http://www .ohr.int/?page_id=1236.

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61. NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, “Important Step in NATO EUFOR Cooperation,” February 9, 2015, http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/hqsarajevo/page98324436 /important-step-in-nato-eufor-cooperation. 62. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 155. 63. Ibid. See also Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 276. 64. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 10, “Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement,” http:// www.ohr.int/?page_id=63269. 65. George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, Civilian-military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998). 66. Byman et al., Strengthening the Partnership, p. 84. 67. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1998), pp. 130−132; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, pp. 156−159. 68. Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, p. 46. 69. Williamson notes that politics can produce institutional designs that are inefficient in transaction cost terms. See Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,” pp. 218−219. See also Terry M. Moe, “The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy,” in Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 116−153. 70. It should be noted that the hypothesized relationship between transaction costs and hierarchy was subject to a ceteris paribus qualification, a complicated comparison between the very different civilian and military settings. 71. Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 307. 72. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability.” 73. Elizabeth M. Cousens and David Harland, “Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in William J. Durch, ed., Twenty-first-century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 70. 74. Powell, “Neither Market Nor Heirarchy,” p. 325. 75. Cousens and Harland, “Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” pp. 64−65. 76. Ibid., p. 70. 77. Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 242. 78. Ibid., p. 251. 79. Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, p. 77. 80. Cousens and Harland, “Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” p. 108; See also Roberto Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 139. 81. Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 301. 82. Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, pp. 78−79. 83. Holohan describes the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as an interorganizational network, but one requiring a hierarchical component of the network to provide leadership. Holohan, Networks of Democracy. Paris argues for networks containing elements of hierarchy to improve peacebuilding coordination. Paris, “Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem’ in Postwar State-building.” 84. Kokastos, “Division of Labor Among International Organizations,” p. 467; Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy, pp. 65−68.

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85. See, for example, Michael C. Williams, “Civil-military Relations and Peacekeeping,” Adelphi Paper No. 321 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 37; Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Civil-military Operations, Joint Publication No. 3-57 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Department of Defense, February 8, 2001), pp. IV7−IV-19. John Howard Eisenhour and Edward Marks note that the CMOCs established by the US military have tended to try to dominate other actors, despite instructions to avoid doing so in relevant US military doctrine, Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Civil-military Operations (retained in the 2008 revision). John Howard Eisenhour and Edward Marks, “Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-military Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 22 (1999): 86−90. The 2001 version of US military doctrine for civil-military operations states that the Bosnia CMOC was formally titled a CIMIC, but “performs basically the same functions as a CMOC” (Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Civil-military Operations, p. IV-11). Edward Flint states that “at the military level, Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) have been a regular feature of complex emergencies since Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq during 1991.” Edward Flint, “Civil Affairs: Soldiers Building Bridges,” in Stuart Gordon and Francis H. Toase, eds., Aspects of Peacekeeping (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 244. 86. Peter Andreas documents the operation of networks for smuggling and organized crime in Bosnia. Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 87. This implies that approaches in organization theory such as resource dependency theory that are attentive to considerations of power may be particularly suited to analysis of peace operations coordination. 88. Salman Ahmed, “No Size Fits All,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 162−169.

4 Peace Operations as Temporary Network Organizations Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PEACE OPERATION IS DETERMINED BY A COM-

plex and changing mix of factors that are also at the roots of the conflicts that the operation seeks to address.1 However, from an organizational perspective, and in our view, mission composition and coordination have a great influence on the effectiveness of peace operations (see Chapter 2 by Anna Herrhausen and Chapter 3 by Michael Lipson in this volume).2 These are areas in which many scholars have suggested the need for improvement.3 In this chapter, we aim to contribute to the enhancement of peace mission coordination with the focus on two aspects: that peace operations represent a network form of organization and that they are temporary in nature. Some authors posit that the network form of organization is the best model for the coordination of peace operations; these operations are most often carried out by multiple actors—political, civilian, and military—and rely heavily on the political will of member states, the availability of resources and personnel, and military capabilities. A perceived disunity of effort can give rise to questions of legitimacy of a peace operation and undermine its effectiveness. Moreover, the challenges that peace operations confront often resemble so-called ill-structured4 or even wicked5 problems. These are problems that are characterized by a high cognitive, strategic, and institutional uncertainty.6 Networks are considered the best available governance form to deal with these kinds of problems.7 The mandates of peace operations are temporally limited as the overarching goal is that territories receiving assistance from a UN peacekeeping mission should return to governing themselves as quickly as possible.8 The legitimacy of UN interventions is premised on this goal, both from the per83

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spectives of the host country and of the troop- and police-contributing countries. Peace missions are therefore, by default, limited in duration, which can have far-reaching consequences for their organizational setup even if by de facto they continue for several years. In this chapter, we concentrate on the interaction between the military and politics, between the military and nongovernmental organizations, and among the militaries themselves. These forms of interaction can be better understood by applying specific elements from organization and administrative science.9 The following discussion focuses on field research regarding the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This fieldwork has been limited to the military components,10 but we occasionally refer to the civilian part of peace operations. The chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive framework to explain the dynamics of UN peace operations. Rather, we hope to provide a link between the community of peacekeeping practitioners and the world of organization and administrative sciences.

Temporary Network Organizations Network Organizations and Network Management In this contribution, we categorize networks as a form of governance;11 that is, an organizational system that consists of multiple more or less autonomous parties. A network has bargaining as its functional logic, a horizontal social structure, is integrated through the exchange and pooling of resources (as well as through the definition of a common problem or goal) and is characterized by multilateral decisionmaking.12 Due to globalization, the progression of information and communication technologies, and expanding markets, technologically and politically interdependent networks have become the dominant way of organizing in today’s societies.13 In Chapter 1 of this volume, Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf refer to this organizational form as a Type II organization as opposed to a bureaucratic-hierarchical type of governance (Type I organization). This perspective implies that peace operations should be looked at as deliberately created multiparty arrangements designed to coordinate the actions of their members in such a way that jointly set goals can be achieved. To better understand the effectiveness and dynamics of peace operations as network forms of organization, we draw on the literature on the management of public sector networks.14 The following four questions concerning network organizations and management are specifically relevant for the understanding of UN peace operations: (1) Which different types of

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networks can be identified? (2) How are or can networks be governed? (3) Which types of control mechanisms are or can be applied? and (4) Which organizational tensions do or can occur in networks and how can they be managed? Questions 1 through 3 refer to the central issues concerning the coordination of networks. While until quite recently networks were treated as a catchall category for forms of coordination besides markets and hierarchies, newer research has emphasized that there are, in fact, different types of networks that need to be managed and controlled differently to be effective. We first lay out the different network forms to later identify them in two empirical cases. Question 4 refers to the fact that, in all organizational forms, inherent tensions exist that cannot be resolved; these pose important managerial challenges in terms of coping with them. We provide a brief description of the tensions identified for networks, and discuss them later in the two illustrative cases. Different Types of Networks In summarizing and analyzing the network literature, Brinton Milward and Keith Provan distinguish four types of networks in public management,15 which are appropriate in the case of peace operations. This differentiation is significant given that peace operations are tasked to carry out a wide range of duties ranging from traditional peacekeeping to institutional capacity building, which require different types of networks that function differently. The first type consists of service implementation networks in which services for third parties are jointly produced by its members. Examples are networks that provide services for the mentally handicapped, where different medical services are combined with support services like housing and professional development. Key management tasks include the fostering of cooperation, negotiating contracts, and planning to integrate new participants and to manage growth. The main management implications for this type of network are that stability is positively related to effectiveness and that centralized collaboration promotes effectiveness. The second type refers to information diffusion networks in which the primary focus is on the exchange of information across the departmental boundaries of different government bodies. The key network goal is to shape the government’s response to problems through better communication and coordination. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States largely resembles this type of network. The main management implications of this type of network are that the focus is on the diffusion of new knowledge and best practices, that the goal is problem shaping rather than problem solving, and that conflict should not be avoided because it helps clarifying different positions.

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The third type pertains to problem-solving networks. The main focus is on solving existing complex problems rather than building relationships to cope with future problems. An example is the network that was developed to facilitate the privatization of large industrial conglomerates in the crisisridden sectors in East Germany after the 1990 German reunification.16 The relationships between the participating organizations may be temporary until a specific problem is solved and then become dormant until the next problem arises, thus laying the foundation for recurring temporary organizations. The management implications depend on the situation; that is, whether the network is designed or emergent. If it is emergent, as in the case of the recovery and cleanup of the World Trade Center site after the September 11 attacks, timely expertise is critical, prior relationships that can be activated fast matter, and centralized and visible leadership is vital. In the case of designed networks, the command structure should be set up in advance, scarce resources must be mobilized to the maximum extent possible, and feedback loops should be built in so that lessons can be learned over time from recurrent operations. Last but not least, the problem to be tackled must be a known unknown and should be divisible into parts that have been dealt with before. The fourth type refers to community capacity-building networks in which the primary aim is to build social capital in the targeted communities. The network’s purpose is oriented toward both current and future problems. These networks may be created by organizations within a community (bottom up) or by private and government agencies that fund them to stimulate cooperation and capacity building (top down). The network of participating organizations should be mapped to understand the structure and functioning and to identify communication and collaboration gaps. Community leaders should be involved to identify, evaluate, and make suggestions to fill these gaps. This assessment should be done repeatedly to monitor progress. Modes of Network Governance Keith Provan and Patrick Kenis distinguish three alternative forms of network governance17 that also occur in the field of peace operations.18 These are: (1) the self-governed network; (2) the lead organization network; and (3) the network with a network administrative organization (NAO). First, the self-governed network is characterized by the more or less equal participation of its members in decisionmaking and coordination. There is no special administrative entity installed. Consequently, decisionmaking is decentralized and the optimal number of participants is low in order for the network to function well. The advantages attributed to this network form are the participation and commitment of members and the easiness of establishment. Some of the problems with this form of network are that frequent

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meetings are needed, it is difficult to reach decisions, and the network tends to become inefficient rather quickly. Moreover, the network as an organizational entity remains amorphous to outside observers since there is no focal organization or person to address. An example in the realm of crisis management is a spontaneous collaborative effort by civilian and military units to provide relief during a natural disaster such as a flood or earthquake. A UN peacekeeping mission, comprised of different national troops dispersed across various areas of a country, has elements of self-governance even though there is an administrative and commanding nucleus at the headquarters of the mission. Second, the lead organization network is characterized by the fact that one of the participating organizations functions as the organizational entity of the network as a whole and thus becomes the focal point; moreover, decisionmaking is centralized. The size of this network form can vary widely and it is still able to function with a large number of members. The advantages lie in the efficiency of decisionmaking and coordination while disadvantages can be found in the domination of the lead organization and a possible lack of commitment from the members. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, conducted by an alliance of more than twenty countries led by the United States, is a prime example of this type of network governance. Third, the network administration organization is characterized by the fact that a new entity is created to take over management and coordination tasks. The new organization is staffed by its own personnel and can also be distinct in legal form. The number of members can vary; the efficiency gains, however, will be reaped only with a larger number of members. Decisionmaking is mixed since strategic decisions will likely be made by a board of representatives from the member organizations while operational decisions will be made by the administrative organization. The main advantages of an NAO lie in the efficiency of day-to-day operations and the strategic involvement of members, which make it likely that the network can sustain its activities over a longer period of time. The disadvantages are the perception of hierarchy, the cost of operation, the complex administration and coordination procedures, and a possible tendency of the administrative unit to become detached and overly independent. UN peacekeeping missions can be regarded as such network organizations even though, as noted above, the autonomy of the troop contributors contains elements of self-governance. Control of Networks Patrick Kenis and Keith Provan identify five types of control mechanisms and apply them to networks.19 This typology is relevant to peace operations because control and the ability to direct continuously are integral parts of managing a mission. In addition, given the nature of peace operations and the

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diversity of participants, it cannot be assumed that hierarchical control, which is the dominant form of control in military operations, will persist. The question then arises: what forms of control are, in general, possible in networks? First, personal centralized control is the hallmark of hierarchy. It is based on the idea that decisions are made at the center of a network followed by direct personal surveillance of their execution. Second, the concept of formal bureaucratic control assumes that formal rules laid out in written manuals create an ex ante control and a benchmark for process control by standardizing and making expectations about the appropriate behavior explicit. Third, output control focuses on the results of the behavior independent of how they came about. Outputs are measured and compared to some previously defined criteria or goals. Fourth, the clan control type is based on the idea that network members could be socialized in such a way that they would automatically behave in the appropriate manner and strive to reach the network goals. Fifth, reputational control is a specific form within network control; it is based on monitoring the relational patterns within a network and building confidence in network participants to promote the goals of the network. Management of Tensions in Networks Brinton Milward and Keith Provan stress that network management involves both managing in networks and the management of networks.20 Management in networks refers to tasks related to the participating organizations and their relationships; that is, the organizational tasks that are necessary for the network to function as a whole. This is important since organizations tend to follow their own routines, generating problems for which they already have the solutions (e.g., Starbucks’s expansion strategy in 1983). This may create problems in network arrangements because generating and solving problems individually may not easily align across the partnering organizations. It is, therefore, of high importance to coordinate intra- and interorganizational approaches to improve both the organizations’ and the network’s performances.21 With regard to the management of networks, i.e., the overall coordination to achieve the network goals, Provan and Kenis regard it as vital to cope with network specific tensions.22 Since networks consist of multiple organizations from different sectoral or cultural backgrounds, they are often characterized by tensions that cannot be resolved. These tensions will need to be managed by trying to balance or buffer them. This is, as shown below, exactly the situation confronted within peace operations, particularly in cases where military units from different cultures have to cooperate to stabilize a country. Kenis and Provan also identify three fundamental tensions inherent in the network form of governance:

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• First, they argue that every network has to balance the need for efficiency with the need for inclusiveness in decisionmaking; that is, involving the participating organizations while still being able to take decisions and avoid blockages. • Second, a key management task in networks is to achieve internal and external legitimacy—that is, legitimacy inside and outside of the network (among the partnering organizations themselves and as experienced by the outside world) to stabilize the organizational form and to ensure that the operation is sustainable.23 Competing organizations must be convinced to cooperate and many partners need to be involved in the decisionmaking process. In addition, external legitimacy is more easily achieved through a network facilitator. This can be realized either by a participating organization acting as the lead organization or by an additional organizational entity taking over the network administration thus providing “the external ‘face’ of the network.”24 Such an external face is recognizable to external constituents and makes it possible for them to efficiently deal with the network as a whole. However, this might lead to an unwanted power concentration around the network facilitator which, in turn, could potentially damage the internal legitimacy since the network is based on the equal influence of the participating organizations. Moreover, building external network legitimacy might involve actions that benefit the whole network, but not necessarily the individual participants (at least not directly or in the short run). • Third, networks are often claimed to be “lighter on their feet”; that is, more flexible than hierarchies in achieving goals by combining complementary resources.25 At the same time, they must achieve a certain level of stability to sustain their operation and gain both internal and external legitimacy.26 Therefore, a key management concern in networks is to strive for stability in operations while securing and exploiting their flexibilities.

Peace Operations as Temporary Organizations Although considerable time is needed to achieve the goals of a peacekeeping mission—stabilizing a country, protecting civilians, guaranteeing a cease-fire, and supporting the peace process by facilitating the reconstruction of the physical and institutional infrastructure—peacekeeping missions are conceived of as temporary. A permanent status can neither be legitimized within the country itself nor with the states that supply troops. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are set up to end at predetermined times, after reaching a specific event (e.g., the establishment of a government after free elections) or after a certain state is achieved (e.g., the indigenous police force is strong enough to maintain public safety and order). Even though peace operations often lack clear benchmarks by which a mission is

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to end—leading to repeated extensions of the mandate, as in the cases of Cyprus and Lebanon—a principle of peacekeeping missions is their limited duration. Time limits create specific conditions for the organization of peacekeeping missions and, in fact, they may even be characterized as having a “double temporality.” Not only is the mission itself of limited duration, but the participation of individuals or whole contingents is temporary as they are continuously rotated throughout a mission’s existence. Not only do nations supply troops for a given period of time (e.g., the Swedish in Liberia from 2004 to 2007 or the Dutch in Lebanon in the 1970s), but the organizational units and personnel of military contingents are usually deployed for a limited period (from six to twelve months on average). Even the number of employees with permanent contracts in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), which represent the main entities responsible for managing peace operations, is minuscule (7.4 percent at DPKO and only 1.1 percent at DFS).27 In comparison, the majority of civilian UN staff have contracts for periods of two to three years. Temporary organizations necessitate a different perspective concerning time and different endogenous dynamics compared to permanent systems.28 Martyna Janowicz-Panjaitan, René M. Bakker, and Patrick Kenis emphasize that the “shared awareness of impending termination” by the members of temporary organizations changes their time horizons, utility calculations, and perceptions of relationships. In turn this affects the social processes within temporary organizations including how they are set up and managed.29 In analyzing the differences between permanent and temporary organizations, Rolf Lundin and Anderson Söderholm argue that “permanent organizations are more naturally defined by goals (rather than by tasks as in the case of temporary organizations), survival (rather than time), working organization (rather than a project team), and production processes and continual development (rather than transition).”30 Hence, temporary organizations can best be characterized by the key words: task, time, project team, and transition. The central idea in setting up a temporary organization is to implement a concept of time “as a sequence of linearly ordered phases from ‘birth’ to ‘death’” that distinguishes temporary organizations from permanent.31 Thus, the primary goal is to move as smoothly as possible through the different phases of a life cycle of a temporary organization: from the concept phase to the development, implementation, and termination phases with each phase containing specific tasks. The task of a temporary organization can be compared with the goal(s) of permanent organizations. However, while the former focuses on action,

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the latter serves as a general guideline for decisionmaking. Task-related activities are at the center of temporary organizations; in fact, the foundation of a temporary organization is based on a particular task that must be achieved. This feature comes close to the category of problem-solving networks discussed above, which includes peace operations. Project teams in temporary organizations are always formed around the task. Membership in the team is limited from the start, thus creating specific expectations at the individual level. Being a temporary organization means that organizational members have second or third organizational affiliations before the temporary organizations comes into existence, during its operation, and after the temporary organization has been terminated. On the one hand, these affiliations—applying more often to military personnel than to civilians in UN missions—may help because they secure the external legitimacy of the temporary organization. On the other hand, these relationships might also hinder because the primary focus is not on achieving the task at hand but, rather, on pleasing external actors. This, in turn, may lead to tensions within the team and a lack of focus on the solution to a problem, thus not taking advantage of the temporary organization’s isolation from the environment. Therefore, temporary organizations should carefully manage the tensions between external legitimacy and internal commitment building and task focus.32 If there is a lack of coherence between intra- and interorganizational coordination mechanisms, overall network effectiveness will be hampered. Because of the double temporality of peacekeeping missions, additional problems may arise and, therefore, extra effort will be needed to ensure organizational learning during and across missions. It will be essential to build, continue, and rebuild trust relationships between the different people and organizations participating in a mission. Furthermore, it is implicit that peacekeeping missions be extensively prepared as they bring together various organizations to form interorganizational networks. From an organizational perspective, a modular approach might, therefore, be appropriate.33 This means that entire units, ideally those that have worked together before (if not in peacekeeping operations then in a different context), are selected to complete various tasks. On the one hand, this modular nature imports stability into the temporary organization since the modules follow the design principles of their parent organizations. On the other hand, the temporary organizations lose flexibility because the modules are predesigned for the known unknown; they may have difficulty adapting to situations of the unknown unknown which, in turn, presumably limits the suitability of modular design for peacekeeping missions. Even in temporary organizations, some elements are transformed or changed as a consequence of fulfilling the task. Thus, by focusing on transition, temporary organizations can overcome the inertia that often affects

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permanent organizations.34 There is, however, the danger that experiences and solutions that have been developed will not be transferred to, integrated in, and distributed within the permanent organizations, but will instead be retained in the minds of the participating individuals and lost once they leave their posts. The current theoretical discussion on networks and temporary organizations as summarized above emphasizes the following issues that are of relevance for the analysis of peace operations: (1) there is a wide variety of networks depending on the goals and tasks, governance mode, the organizational context and conditions under which they operate, and their composition; (2) choosing the right configuration in terms of tasks, size, composition, context, and mode of governance versus the appropriate management tools in terms of managing tensions, control, and creating commitment is vital to achieving the best possible outcomes; and (3) peace operations are temporary in nature, which presumably has an effect on the social dynamics within these operations and on the possibility of achieving a continuous learning process within a single operation and across operations (see Chapter 8 by Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann in this volume). In the following section, we explore the general characteristics of networks in UN peace operations before turning to the specific cases of Lebanon and Liberia. Pursuing this analysis, we determine to what extent these organizational characteristics and their presumed consequences occurred, what problems they created, and how these difficulties were dealt with in both peacekeeping missions.

Networks in UN Peace Operations The effectiveness of UN peace operations was harshly criticized in the early 1990s (Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia).35 Strengthening peace operations and their learning mechanisms has since been an ongoing endeavor (see Chapter 8).36 In particular, the Brahimi Report, published in 2000, has been influential in revitalizing and improving UN peacekeeping; and these improvements have been taken further since then (e.g., see the 2009 UN report, A New Partnership Agenda37). In the Brahimi Report, a number of recommendations were put forward including the need to deploy troops within standard periods of time (between thirty and ninety days), the need to ensure that troop-contributing countries—particularly the developing countries—have sufficient resources available (e.g., transport mechanisms such as helicopters), and the need for standard doctrinal guidelines and (ethical) training programs for all participating troops. In fact, the Brahimi Report recommends that member states

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enter into partnerships with one another to form several coherent brigadesize forces. It also urges troop contributors to work together in the context of Type I instead of Type II organizations; hence, less polyarchy and negotiation (network governance) and more coherence, hierarchy, and straightforward implementation of commands and intentions. A step in this direction was the formation of the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). Established in 1996 and declared available to the UN in January 2000, SHIRBRIG was comprised of fourteen European countries—Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden—in addition to Argentina and Canada. These countries agreed to participate in UN peacekeeping missions on a case-by-case basis organized through one chain of command. SHIRBRIG participated in four peacekeeping missions: the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000; UNMIL in Liberia in 2003; and the UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) and the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) both in 2005. It closed operations in 2009. The question remains, if it so difficult to effectively organize Type I organizations for deployment to UN missions, what exactly are the fundamental characteristics—and problems—inherent to these missions? To answer this question, in the following subsections we outline the three types of networks that prevail in UN peace operations and describe the difficulties that can emerge within these networks. Military-political Networks Although international organizations, such as the United Nations, have become increasingly independent actors,38 concerns over national sovereignty and national interests have often guided international politics and, consequently, the development of peacekeeping policies and arrangements. While the United States has engaged strongly with the UN in many occasions, it has also kept a clear distance, particularly when it comes to the use of military force. Other larger Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, are equally hesitant to get involved in military action under the aegis of the UN, which they feel they are unable to control. Precise descriptions of operational movements in the field indicate that national politics and military command and control lines prevail even when troops are deployed in an international chain of command. This was the case, for instance, in Kosovo where Turkish troops were integrated within the Dutch forces. The Turkish troops did not automatically comply with the Dutch commander’s orders, but rather relied on the approval of their national government—one phone call away—to ensure that domestic political constituencies were in concurrence.39

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Most UN peacekeeping missions are network forms of organization that supersede the autonomy of national armed forces and national political bodies and, at times, that of supranational bodies such as the European Union (EU) or the African Union (AU). This premise underlines the selfgovernance aspect of UN missions. This autonomy, however, is unlikely to be surrendered. As a result, a mission’s execution is less likely to be as smooth and effective as one would expect from the execution of such tasks by a hierarchical organization. Moreover, nations have different operational styles and, sometimes, conflicting interests as well as varying degrees of resource availabilities. Finally, the loyalty of military personnel is to their national government and secondarily to the UN mission and its mandate. This may create divergences within a mission, with troops refusing to execute orders when they do not fit with their national political priorities. Having national military troops under another command, in particular under the command of a supranational political and civilian body such as the UN, may create conditions for friction and less than straightforward working relationships. Hence, the most efficient network forms from an organizational perspective—lead organization and NAO—come with considerable political baggage. In general, the UN lacks the authority and capacity to compel contributing contingents to comply with mission requirements and, hence, cannot effectively resolve such tensions.40 Military-NGO Networks UN peace operations involve various kinds of organizations, not just military ones. In particular, the collaboration with humanitarian relief organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Oxfam, and many others, is extremely important in conflict and postconflict situations. However, as discussed elsewhere, the military and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) make “strange bedfellows.”41 As detailed mission accounts from Albania, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Afghanistan have demonstrated, there is a lack of coordination among the military and NGOs because both groups of actors are in competition over competencies and the work itself—how it should be performed and how it should be discussed in the media.42 In general, the military personnel and NGOs provide different forms of assistance, have different organizational charters, and display different time frames.43 As a result, rivalries emerge that do not fit the idea of cooperation within the context of networks and partnerships. Of course, this is not always the case, but there are at least two fundamental arguments that NGOs raise against a military-NGO relationship in conflict situations. The first relates to the issue of political neutrality. Many NGOs claim that the military is unable to take a neutral stance in conflict situations.

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Even though UN peace operations presuppose absolute neutrality, NGOs posit that armed forces cannot be neutral because they are connected to nation-states that take positions in the problems at stake. (By contrast, humanitarian NGOs usually have one organizational charter and a strategy that is aimed at helping people in need, irrespective of their religious, ethnic, or political background.) For that reason, NGOs prefer to keep the military at a distance, even though they sometimes make extensive use of the militaries’ logistical resources and facilities.44 Many NGOs argue that the larger the nation involved, the less likely that they can be neutral. As a result, NGOs do not want to be “mixed up” with the military.45 Obviously, in using this line of argument, NGOs are far from being neutral themselves; these arguments serve their own interests of gaining more resources, influence, and power in the field.46 The second issue pertains to the time dimension. The military, in general, has a scope of actions that is limited in time.47 Peacekeepers are deployed to a crisis area to carry out a specific action (e.g., to restore public order and safety) and, after the completion of their task, the troops will withdraw and redeploy to their national military bases. If the peacekeeping mission is established for more than a couple of months, personnel will rotate out requiring a continuous rebuilding of working and interpersonal relations. As NGOs rightly argue, crises, and their aftermaths, generally take much longer than four to six months to resolve. Furthermore, certain activities and assistance will need to be sustained even though the conflict itself has ended. For that reason, NGOs prefer not to have the military involved in what they consider to be their field of work; that is, activities focused on development and reconstruction. NGOs and militaries do their utmost to protect their own domain. Occasionally, this may trigger dysfunctional behavior and organizational hypocrisy (e.g., when parties on both sides engage in aggrandizing their own achievements and disparaging others).48 In fitting with this strategy, NGOs state that the military should stick to their own competencies; namely, the use of force, disarmament, and law enforcement. They can accept a military’s involvement in providing humanitarian aid in emergency situations including logistics and medical facilities at great speed, but only for limited periods of time. For its part, a primary objective for the military is the development of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), which it deems essential to restoring public order and safety in the conflict areas where troops are deployed. Military-military Networks As much as nations differ, national armed forces differ from one another in terms of political ambitions and positions, doctrinal styles, operational cul-

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tures, and modes of interaction with the host nationals as well as general value systems.49 Concerning collaboration between national armed forces (a prerequisite in UN peace operations), many case studies have shown that such multinational cooperation rarely develops smoothly. Even though UN peace operations are characterized by an ideology of transnationalism and transculturalism, multinational military cooperation does not always come easily.50 Multinational cooperation depends in part on cultural proximity. For instance, the English-speaking countries easily work together due to a long common history and shared policies and intelligence, but they do not fare as well with other national armed forces. In addition, multinational cooperation depends on organizational features such as the structure and setup of the mission, task division, leadership, power balances, and the level of perceived threat. Moreover, some troops tend to think, speak, and act in a more or less condescending way toward other nations’ troops, especially when these personnel are considered to be less trained or are from developing countries. Within national armed forces, there are considerable differences between the various services and specialized units. Laura Miller and Charles Moskos51 assert that within US forces, some units (e.g., paratroopers) are much more inclined to strive for the ideal of being a warrior whereas other units (e.g., medical units) are viewed as being humanitarian. The warrior type of soldiers is said to dislike peacekeeping because they see too little action and it is not what they are trained for whereas other military personnel prefer not to be involved in violent actions. Given this list of general challenges and tensions in networks and partnerships in peace operations, one may wonder how these operations can in fact exist and do what they are tasked to do. How does this cooperation in the form of partnerships and networking actually develop? Observations from the field in Lebanon and Liberia may help provide some answers to these particular questions; they may also help answer the research question that aims to connect theoretical insights regarding temporary and network organizations with everyday practice in the field of UN peacekeeping.

Implications from the Peace Operations in Lebanon and Liberia The UN Interim Force in Lebanon Since 1978, UNIFIL has been one of the responses from the international community to cope with the problems manifesting themselves mainly in the Lebanese-Israeli border region. More than thirty years later, this “interim” force remains in place with a quasi-permanent status. As a result of the hos-

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tilities in the summer of 2006, UNIFIL’s mandate expanded a second time with the number of troops increasing considerably to 12,500.52 In the current mission, there are many forms of cooperation and partnerships: between the various national armed forces, between the military and the civilian UN staff in New York and in Lebanon, between UNIFIL commanders and the other major military forces in the region (i.e., the Israeli Defense Force [IDF] and the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF]) and, of course, between the military and NGOs as well as local authorities and political actors such as Hezbollah. Clearly, UNIFIL is comprised of numerous networks and partnerships.53 The operation’s aims are to monitor the cessation of hostilities in the region, to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations, and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. In this connection, UNIFIL troops work closely with the LAF—whose main objective is to secure its borders and maintain the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel—assisting with training and supporting deployments in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL also provides support for the reconstruction of the region’s infrastructure to reestablish normal living and working conditions. To this end, the mission regularly conducts patrols, engages in demining activities, and supports humanitarian activities by providing medical facilities and infrastructural reconstruction. The mission’s effectiveness is measured on the basis of a political and military assessment of the general situation (e.g., “hostilities have ceased, public order and safety have been restored”) as well as using figures of produced output (the number of explosive devices and bombs that have been defused, the number of medical contacts with the local population, the amount of money spent on projects). The mission’s commanders register these statistics and provide them in tables and graphs when evaluating the results they have achieved during their deployment. Mild tensions have surfaced, with peacekeepers voicing complaints that their civilian commanders at UNIFIL’s headquarters do not respond to their questions and requests. They dislike the fact that civilians are not always available the way they are—that is, twenty-four seven—which, in turn, reduces the speed, efficiency, and effectiveness that they are used to. Belgian officers, for example, expressed that they prefer to work in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) context because only there—among militaries—can they function optimally. They also criticized the high degree of formality, bureaucratic rules, and paperwork required by the UN budget and expenditure process. These frictions, however, did not lead to outright conflicts within the mission; rather they reveal that civilian-military cooperation can be cumbersome and, at times, difficult. When looking more closely at the differences between armed forces, one notices differences in national operating styles. For example, the

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French contingent in Lebanon is known for its visible and audible nighttime tank patrols that were much disliked by the local population. French participation in UNIFIL has produced additional waves of indignation among Lebanese citizens and political factions for several reasons: (1) Lebanon was once a French protectorate; (2) French politicians occasionally intervene in the country’s politics; and (3) France has a tradition of taking sides in conflicts in the Middle East.54 Consequently, local factions, such as Hezbollah, do not allow the locals to interact with the French military, even though these factions approve of UNIFIL’s existence in the region. In the UNIFIL case, French politics—past and present—has encroached on the overall intentions of the UN mission. By contrast, the Belgian troops refrain from taking actions or making statements of a biased nature (as is the case with many of the other smaller contingents deployed in Lebanon).55 They maintain a strictly neutral position, not questioning any party’s actions or opinions on either side of the border (although, informally, they complain about the mission’s powerlessness regarding the actions of the rivaling parties, the IDF and the Hezbollah militia). Asian contingents, such as those from the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, are also reluctant to interfere in the local political arena. Instead, they prefer to focus on protection and good relations with the host nationals. Differences in operating style can sometimes give rise to tensions and friction where military-military partnerships are concerned. This is nothing new. By the 1970s, national operating styles and the preservation of national autonomy were already evident among the different national contingents; each contingent was independent in its ability to access its national ministries and Middle East embassies by means of the rear-link radio.56 These accounts mostly revolve around military-military networks and military-political networks in the mission; issues in military-civilian networks predominantly refer to tensions between civilians and military staff within the UN mission. NGOs working outside of the mission, other than Hezbollah’s local welfare institutions, are far less dominant in this region. The United Nations Mission in Liberia and Its Predecessors Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has experienced a large number of atrocious civil wars. Well-known cases include Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Sudan in East Africa and Sierra Leone and Liberia in West Africa.57 The latter two nations have seen rebel forces dominating everyday life, including the forced enlistment of child soldiers.58 In addition, “dark networks,” in the form of arms-trafficking gangs, emerged exchanging diamonds for guns and military hardware with dubious clients and spreading terror among the population.59 Anarchy prevailed for many years.

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To cope with emerging conflicts in the area, African peace operations were installed under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a military force formed by member states of ECOWAS from units of their national armed forces. Its first operation was conducted in Liberia from 1990 to 1997.60 Forces from various African countries participated in these operations, including Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mali. After a less successful UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) from 1993 to 1997, the UN intervened again in Liberia in 2003, installing the UN Mission in Liberia. Troops were contributed from many developing countries—including, once again, Nigeria—but also from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. UNMIL also received the support of countries from the developed world (e.g., Sweden and Ireland). As a result of intervention, the situation in the country has improved considerably. The first democratic elections in almost two decades were held in 2005, leading to the election of a woman president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Notorious war criminals, such as former president Charles Taylor and his accomplice from the Netherlands, Gus Kouwenhoven, were arrested and, as of this writing, are on trial at the UN Special Tribunal in Sierra Leone and the Dutch Supreme Court respectively. Many lower-level war criminals have eluded jail time and have taken up ordinary jobs such as taxi driving; in fact, people in the streets are quick to point out which taxi drivers had committed atrocities on a daily basis.61 For the moment, the country has stabilized and, at least to some extent, the conditions for everyday life have been repaired. In terms of the various networks discussed earlier—military-political networks, military-NGO networks, and military-military networks—the following points were observed concerning UNMIL.62 Like the military contingents participating in UNIFIL, the troops taking part in the ECOMOG operations preferred those missions over the first UN mission in the area because “consent is not necessary”; “the overburden of the bureaucracy of the UN is avoided,” which “saves time”; and there also is “more commitment, more integration and it is more cost effective.” Finally, the military considered the previous UN mission to be too much geared toward “peaceful settlements . . . , whereas the use of force is the only language rebels understand.”63 Soldiers prefer working with other militaries, but there are possible tensions in these relations as well. National troops from developed countries are much better equipped, fed, and accommodated than those of developing countries, see shorter periods of deployment, and get higher financial allowances. This can create tensions and jealousy. In general, there was and is a lack of uniformity in all aspects of logistics. For example, for the troops that deploy for a considerable period of time (up to eighteen to twenty-four months), the intermittent shifts from peace enforcement (fighting) to peace-

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keeping (policing) posed problems in terms of behavior and demeanor among some of the soldiers.64 As for the ability to perform in the African cultural, linguistic, and climatic context, African military personnel deem themselves better suited to do the job in their mother continent than troops from other parts of the world. Indeed, it took considerable effort for the Swedish and Irish troops to just stay healthy in Liberia.65 Funmi Olonisakin observes a large degree of cultural similarity among the African troops, which has produced positive effects for the missions in that region.66 A sense of pan-Africanism or pride of participating in a real African mission pervaded the ECOMOG operation. This sense of pride was much less prevalent in UNMIL, which was much more diverse in the number and variety of contributing troops.67 In general, compared to assessments of other UN missions, evaluations of UNMIL indicate that the degree of interorganizational coordination in UNMIL could be improved, implying a reduction of overlap in participants’ tasks and responsibilities, strengthening the idea of One UN, and allocating more resources to boundary-spanning activities.68

Analysis in Terms of Networks and Temporary Organizations Connecting network theory and the concept of temporary organizations to the empirical descriptions above, it is possible to formulate a number of conclusions. We posit that UN peace operations in Lebanon and Liberia are problem-solving and community capacity-building networks.69 They are problem-solving networks because they aim to restore public order and safety through patrolling, disarming rebels, and securing borders and entry points. They are also community capacity-building networks because the mandates of these missions are to ensure that the conditions are in place for societies and communities to get back on their feet. These operations do so by helping to reconstruct the infrastructure, by training and professionalizing the armed and police forces, and by assisting in developing institutions of good governance. They intend to rebuild and support the social and administrative fabric of these societies, a major step forward on their way to normalcy. Pursuing this chapter’s theoretical analysis relating UN peace missions to temporary network organizations a bit further, we suggest nine points for managerial and administrative attention in peace operations:70 1. UN peace missions should be prepared to face the known unknown. They do so by breaking down the mission into parts that have been dealt with before. One organizational mechanism to do so is the principle of modular organizing.71 This organizational principle involves building a large organization or project from relatively independent elements that can

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work well together. Yet it creates new forms of inflexibility because every module is necessarily limited in experiences, resources, and scope; hence, the fit does not always happen as smoothly as one would wish. More importantly, however, is that, for organizations operating in areas of conflict outside their own hemispheres and comfort zones, the world is not easily converted into the known unknown. This has managerial implications for the composition of missions and the need to include troops in a mission that are more familiar with and have more legitimacy in the local environment—for example, African troops participating in African conflicts; Turkish, Indonesian, and troops from other Islamic societies participating in Afghanistan or Lebanon; and Melanesian troops in the Pacific region.72 2. As noted earlier, military operations, such as in the invasion of Iraq, are often conducted by lead organization networks. UN peace operations, on the contrary, have the form of the network administration model with elements of national self-governance.73 This implies that a board, or staff unit, consisting of representatives from the various member organizations makes the strategic decisions while the implementation of the decisions has been delegated to the contributing contingents. In this regard, it is important to have all partners on board in the administration and the strategic decisionmaking of the peace operation. However, these processes are often dominated by Western countries, as in the nationality of the commanders or the language in use (most often English). The network administration form is appropriate for the strategic involvement of members, which makes it likely that the network can sustain its activities for a longer period of time. There are, however, disadvantages in terms of the cost of the operation as well as the complexity of administrative and coordination procedures. Clearly, managing networks in peace operations requires the ability to have everyone involved (inclusiveness: getting along), which may come at the expense of the need for efficiency (getting things done). 3. The sustainability of the network (and the mission) is a prerequisite and can indeed be guaranteed, at least in a quantitative manner, by a certain degree of flexibility: if some countries leave, others can step in. Of course, this flexibility comes at the expense of qualitative sustainability. Changing personnel frequently does not enhance the quality of the job to be done or the relationships that need to be built. As a result, it is not surprising that A New Partnership Agenda74 stresses the need to extend the rotation cycle of uniformed personnel in an attempt to limit the negative consequences of temporariness. After all, the flexibility of the mission should not come at the expense of its stability. 4. Due to these difficulties, the management process is very much geared toward determining which organizations are responsible for which tasks and outcomes.75 Formulating clear mission goals and compliance with network goals, as opposed to the single organization’s goals, needs to be

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monitored and enforced. Therefore, it is extremely important to align intraand interorganizational (i.e., mission) coordination mechanisms. Free riders should be identified, although it needs to be repeated that the UN’s ability to prevent such challenges within the networks has so far been limited. Agreement on the vision and policies with the host nationals should be stressed as much as possible; this seemed to be suboptimal in the UNIFIL case. Managing external as well as internal legitimacy is important since the network’s success is dependent on it. The level of internal legitimacy has a direct effect on commitment, which was the case for UNMIL. External legitimacy is essential in securing the sustained support of the host countries. 5. Controlling partnership relations is a major managerial task as there are inevitable information asymmetries, time inconsistencies, and incomplete agreements among the participating organizations.76 Such problems may be alleviated by establishing “performance bonds”—agreements concerning key resource areas on which results must be achieved by the partners in a particular area and time period—and by introducing social, coercive, or reputational sanctions, thus enhancing the mission’s effectiveness. Although the reputational mechanisms in UN missions work to some extent, the instrument of performance bonds has not been tried before, at least not officially. Nonetheless, it is important for the UN to design and establish standards for performing essential mission tasks and to define “success” in peacebuilding.77 6. The specific control of UN peace operations networks78 is exercised by formal bureaucratic control mechanisms.79 This mode of control—manifest in headquarters’ requests for information regarding input of resources and compliance with the rules—is so dominant that it encounters criticism from the military. The military continues to express frustration that it spends too much time processing detailed information on its work activities and budgets. This is remarkable, given the fact that the military itself is known for its high degree of bureaucracy. In line with the increasingly important ideas of new public management, output control and performance measurement have become the preferred tools among Western commanders to show what they are actually doing and achieving.80 Nonetheless, there is still a lot to be gained by introducing the previously mentioned performance bonds (or similar contractual instruments). Additionally, in the ECOWAS operation, a sort of cultural or clan control had emerged—the “African way of peacekeeping”—creating a sense of operational unity and commitment that is so often lacking among UN troops.81 Obviously, if an operation is dominated by English-speaking countries—the so-called Australia, Britain, Canada, and America but also including New Zealand (ABCA) community—there is a strong Anglo-Saxon form of cultural control.82 Cultural control is also apparent in the UN’s attempts to control troop

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behavior—via training and guidelines—concerning ethics in general and sexual abuse in particular. In UN peace missions, it is important to develop an acceptable mixture of the various sorts of control. 7. Whether or not peace operations are influenced by personal centralized control is to a certain degree dependent on the personality of who is in charge. Leadership obviously plays a large role in a mission’s success. However, the impact of the force commander’s role should not be overstated. We contend that the context of the mission, the availability of resources, the organizational setup, and the clarity of the mission’s goal are more important than the personality of the commander. This goes against the military form of the “romance of leadership”83—admiring strong leaders and commanders and attributing organizational performance to them. As is known from leadership theory, organizational features and control mechanisms can substitute for the role of leadership to a great extent (see Chapter 12 by Sabine Boerner in this volume). Relational and reputational control comes close to lateral control regimes and is manifest in the way in which each party views the other troops’ actions. This is connected to ideas about what is proper and professional military behavior. These views are expressed by means of praise and blame gossip both within and outside of the mission as well as in the host countries. 8. Another central organizational issue mentioned above is the nature of peace operations as temporary organizations. Temporary organizations are more successful when they are immune from the effects of time. To what extent does this apply to peace operations? Since peacekeeping missions most often work in the known unknown, the parent organizations need to do their utmost best to learn from previous experiences. Because peacekeeping missions are said to have “shallow memories,” learning processes, based on clear-cut evaluations not only by the participating organizations but also by the parent organizations and host nation stakeholders, need to be encouraged.84 This type of knowledge management would preferably be conducted on the basis of mutual exchange and participative discussion based on experiences and ideas, during and after the completion of a mission. There is no need to be pessimistic about this. Lise Morjé Howard convincingly demonstrates that UN missions can be successful if they apply proper mechanisms of organizational learning.85 At all times, it is important that UN peace operations work on collaborative learning and knowledge transfer as well as on collaborative communication and mission memory.86 9. Participating organizational units nearly always belong to much larger parenting organizations, be they NGOs, the UN, or the various national militaries. These institutions do have organizational memories and, hence, negative lessons learned from missions will live on much longer than the actual missions. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are not immune

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to aspects of time, and it will be a managerial challenge to maximize the use of interactive learning experiences.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have presented an analysis of UN peace operations on the basis of general insights and the specific observations from the UN peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Liberia. Connecting these to theoretical insights from network theory and the concept of temporary organizations, we hope, on the one hand, to gain additional insights for the development of network and organization theory and, on the other hand, to draw lessons from theory-guided real-life observations to help improve the understanding of the dynamics and effectiveness of peace operations. We conclude that peace operations can provide interesting insights into organization and network theories with respect to the following factors: • The level of diversity in many peace operations is considerably higher than what is usually observed in standard network forms of organization, be they private, public, or mixed. This leads to an even more difficult situation for the management of tensions that might emerge from these partnerships. • Peace operations represent organizations that are characterized by a double temporality. Not only are the operations in principle limited in duration, but key personnel are frequently rotated and are present for only a limited time; this has a considerable impact on institutional and social relations within a mission. • Peace operations frequently operate under much more difficult and serious conditions (life-threatening situations) than the networks from which our theoretical insights were derived. • Studying peace operations with the analytical lens proposed here can reveal interesting insights for network management since they operate under an organizational paradox that requires elements of Type I and Type II organizations. With regard to the more practical lessons that emerged from this analysis, we therefore conclude that peace operations need more Type I instead of Type II organizing (see Chapter 1). Surely, there will be more attempts to introduce more one chain of command elements in such UN missions. In addition, it can be expected that more control mechanisms will be introduced to create more uniformity in the UN’s peace operations in terms of logistical, operational, ethical, and financial standards.87

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However, many of the Type II organizational mechanisms and, hence, elements of network governance will remain because every single element of these missions is based on the willingness of nations to sacrifice their sovereignty. Therefore, given the organizational and political conditions under which peace operations operate, a certain extent of suboptimal performance must, on the one hand, be accepted for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, as we have demonstrated, the inherent tensions in multiparty operations and their temporary organizational character make it necessary to implement mechanisms and buffers to manage these tensions. Insights from organizational theory lead us to believe that it is increasingly likely that the management of tensions will be more successful in arrangements that look more like a network with loosely coupled units and organizational slack, than a strict tightly coupled hierarchy. This in itself is a tension for peace operations since military operations prefer a tightly coupled hierarchy with its clear command and control structures, especially in life-threatening situations. The important lesson here is that either the goals have to be adjusted to the available means or an organizational setup has to be found that insulates the units that need a Type I organization from ones that need a Type II organization. Peace operations resemble a governance form that comes close to a fragmented, decentralized, multiunit conglomerate that has to be managed and made operational by people who in their own units and parent organizations are used to working and living in relatively closed communities and strong hierarchies. The needed change of attitude and mind-set with regard to the management of and within networks will hopefully contribute to improving the lives of so many people who are suffering in the numerous war-ridden parts of the world.

Notes 1. Joseph Soeters, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars (London: Routledge, 2005). 2. Joseph Soeters, Paul C. van Fenema, and Robert Beeres, eds., Managing Military Organizations: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2010). 3. See, for example, Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006); and Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 4. Herbert Simon, “The Structure of Ill Structured Problems,” Artificial Intelligence 4 (1973): 181−201. 5. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155−169. 6. Ellen M. van Bueren, Erik-Hans van Klijn, and Joop Koppenjan, “Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13, no. 2 (2003): 193−212.

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7. See, for example, van Bueren, van Klijn, and Joop Koppenjan, “Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks.” 8. UN, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, July 2009). 9. Soeters, van Fenema, and Beeres, Managing Military Organizations. 10. The fieldwork in Liberia was conducted in October 2006 with colleagues from the Swedish armed forces and focused on the Swedish-Irish cooperation in UNMIL’s Quick Reaction Force near Monrovia. The second project was conducted by Belgian armed forces in Lebanon, in close cooperation with Delphine Resteigne; this fieldwork took place in February 2007 and in January 2008. 11. See, for example, Walter W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Research in Organizational Behavior 12 (1990): 295−336; Tyrone S. Pitsis, Martin Kornberger, and Stewart Clegg, “The Art of Managing Relations in Interorganizational Collaboration,” Management 7, no. 3 (2004): 47−67; and Keith Provan and Patrick Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18 (2008): 229−252. 12. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy.” 13. Ard-Pieter de Man, The Network Economy: Strategy, Structure, and Management (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004). 14. Brinton Milward and Keith Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006); Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance.” 15. Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. 16. Jörg Raab, “Where Do Policy Networks Come From?” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12, no. 4 (2002): 581−622. 245 Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance.” 17. Joseph Soeters and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, “Towards Cultural Integration in Multinational Peace Operations,” Defence Studies 10, nos. 1−2 (2010): 272−287. 18. Patrick Kenis and Keith Provan, “The Control of Public Networks,” International Public Management Journal 9, no. 3 (2006): 227−247. 19. Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. 21. See, for example, Jody Hoffer Gittell and Leigh Weiss, “Coordination Networks Within and Across Organizations: A Multi-level Framework.” Journal of Management Studies 41, no. 1 (2004): 127−153. 22. Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance.” 23. Sherrie Human and Keith Provan, “Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small Firm Multilateral Networks,” Administrative Science Quarterly 45 (2000): 327−365. 24. Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance,” p. 243. 25. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy.” 26. Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance.” 27. Frederik Trettin and Julian Junk, “Bureaucratic Spoiling: Dissent-shirking, Obstruction, and Sabotage in International Public Administrations,” paper presented at the Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, September 9−11, 2010. 28. Matthew Miles, “On Temporary Systems: Innovation in Education,” in Matthew Miles, ed., Innovation in Education (New York: Columbia University, 1964), pp. 437−490. 29. Martyna Janowicz-Panjaitan, René M. Bakker, and Patrick Kenis, “Research

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on Temporary Organizations: The State of the Art and Distinct Approaches Toward ‘Temporariness,’” in Patrick Kenis, Martyna Janowicz-Panjaitan, and Bart Cambré, eds., Temporary Organizations: Prevalence, Logic and Effectiveness (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 79. 30. Rolf Lundin and Anderson S derholm, “A Theory of the Temporary Organization,” Scandinavian Journal of Management 11, no. 2 (1995): 439. 31. Ibid., p. 450. 32. Janowicz-Panjaitan, Bakker, and Kenis, “Research on Temporary Organizations.” 33. Jörg Raab, Joseph Soeters, Paul C. van Fenema, and Erik J. de Waard, “Structure in Temporary Organizations,” in Patrick Kenis, Martyna JanowiczPanjaitan, and Bart Cambré, eds., Temporary Organizations: Prevalence, Logic and Effectiveness (London: Routledge, 2009). 34. Lundin and Sőderholm, “A Theory of the Temporary Organization.” 35. See, among others, Polman, We Did Nothing: Why the Truth Doesn’t Always Come Out When the UN Goes In (London: Viking, 2003); Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books, 2004); Michael Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 1 (2007): 5−34; Michael Lipson, “A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping,” Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007): 79−98; Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises,” International Journal of Peace Studies 7, no. 2 (2002): 35−56; and Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. 36. Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows,” pp. 35−56; Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. 37. UN, A New Partnership Agenda. 38. Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 699−732. 39. Joseph Soeters, Erhan Tanercan, Abdulkadir Varoğlu, and Űnsal Siğri, “Turkish-Dutch Encounters During Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 354−368. 40. Luke T. Jones, “A Framework for Appreciating and Managing the Cultural Adaptation of Multinational Peace Operations Forces to Local Environments: With Case Studies of Bougainville and Timor-Leste,” doctoral dissertation, Oxford University, 2006. 41. See, for example, John Mackinlay, “Military Responses to Complex Organizations,” in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows.” 42. Sebastiaan J.H. Rietjens and Myriame Bollen, eds., Managing Civil-military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2008). 43. Jones, “A Framework for Appreciating and Managing the Cultural Adaptation of Multinational Peace Operations Forces to Local Environments.” 44. Ibid. 45. For example, see Rietjens and Bollen, Managing Civil-military Cooperation. 46. Polman, We Did Nothing. 47. Rietjens and Bollen, Managing Civil-military Cooperation. 48. See Alexander Cooley and James Ron, “The NGO Scramble,” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 5−39; Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?”; Lipson, “A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping”; and Polman, We Did Nothing. 49. See, among others, Eyal Ben-Ari and Efrat Elron, “Blue Helmets, White

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Armor,” City and Society 13, no. 2 (2001): 275−306; Soeters, van Fenema, and Beeres, Managing Military Organizations; Joseph Soeters and Philip Manigart, eds., Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations: Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response (London: Routledge, 2008); and Soeters and Tresch, “Towards Cultural Integration in Multinational Peace Operations.” 50. Ben-Ari and Elron, “Blue Helmets, White Armor.” 51. Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, “Humanitarians or Warriors? Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,” Armed Forces and Society 21, no. 4 (1995): 615−637. 52. See Efrat Elron, “Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN, and the International Community: New and Renewed Partnerships and Their Effect on Mission’s Effectiveness,” in Cees M. Coops and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, eds., Cultural Challenges in Military Operations (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007), pp. 90−108; and William Mooney, “Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-building,” Parameters 37 (2007): 28−41. 53. For an analysis of the dynamics in the mission’s headquarters, see Delphine Resteigne and Joseph Soeters, “Inside UNIFIL’s HQ in Lebanon,” in Gerhard Kümmel and Joseph Soeters, eds., New Wars, New Militaries, New Soldiers: Conflicts, the Armed Forces and the Soldierly Subject (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2012), pp. 93−108. 54. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface (London: Unwin, 1989), pp. 84−86. For a recent study on operational styles of four contributing national armed forces in Lebanon, see Chiara Ruffa, “What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian and Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” Armed Forces and Society 40, no. 2 (2014): 199−225. 55. Delphine Resteigne and Joseph Soeters, “Belgian Troops in UNIFIL,” in Cees M. Coops and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, eds., Cultural Challenges in Military Operations (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007), pp. 184−200. 56. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers, p. 60. 57. Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: Free Press, 2005). 58. See, among others, Quentin Outram, “It’s Terminal Either Way,” Review of African Political Economy 24, no. 73 (1997): 355−371. 59. Jörg Raab and Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public Administration and Theory 13, no. 4 (2003): 413−439. 60. See, for example, Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000); Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); and Funmi Olonisakin, “African Peacekeeping and the Impact of African Military Personnel,” in Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler, eds., The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 299−309. 61. Erik Hedlund, Louise Weibull, and Joseph Soeters, “Swedish-Irish Cooperation in Liberia,” in Joseph Soeters and Philippe Manigart, eds., Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations: Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 153−165. 62. Olonisakin, “African Peacekeeping and the Impact of African Military Personnel.”

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63. Ibid., p. 307. 64. Ibid. 65. Hedlund, Weibull, and Soeters, “Swedish-Irish Cooperation in Liberia.” 66. Olonisakin, “African Peacekeeping and the Impact of African Military Personnel.” 67. Hedlund, Weibull, and Soeters, “Swedish-Irish Cooperation in Liberia.” 68. See, for example, Sebastian Döring and Melanie Schreiner, “Inter-agency Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding: Practical Implications from a Microlevel Analysis of the United Nations Family in Liberia,” Project Report No. 01 (Konstanz, Germany: University of Konstanz, 2008). 69. Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. 70. Pitsis, Kornberger, and Clegg, “The Art of Managing Relations in Interorganizational Collaboration.” 71. Erik J. de Waard and Joseph Soeters, “How the Military Can Profit from Management and Organization Theory,” in Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Approach (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 181−196; Raab et al., “Structure in Temporary Organizations.” 72. Soeters, Tanercan, Varoğlu, and Siğri, “Turkish-Dutch Encounters During Peace Operations”; Jones, “A Framework for Appreciating and Managing the Cultural Adaptation of Multinational Peace Operations Forces to Local Environments.” 73. Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance”; Soeters and Tresch, “Towards Cultural Integration in Multinational Peace Operations.” 74. UN, A New Partnership Agenda. 75. Ibid. 76. Jones, “A Framework for Appreciating and Managing the Cultural Adaptation of Multinational Peace Operations Forces to Local Environments,” p. 161. 77. See UN, A New Partnership Agenda; and Charles T. Call, “Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success,” Civil Wars 10, no. 2 (2008): 173−194. 78. Provan and Kenis, “Modes of Network Governance.” 79. Paul W.L. Vlaar, Frans A.J. van den Bosch, and Henk W. Volberda, “Coping with Problems of Understanding in Interorganizational Relationships: Using Formalization as a Means to Make Sense,” Organization Studies 27, no. 11 (2006): 1617–1638. 80. See Jones, “A Framework for Appreciating and Managing the Cultural Adaptation of Multinational Peace Operations Forces to Local Environments”; Resteigne and Soeters, “Belgian Troops in UNIFIL”; and Soeters, van Fenema, and Beeres, Managing Military Organizations. 81. Olonisakin, “African Peacekeeping and the Impact of African Military Personnel,” p. 308. 82. John Ballard, “Mastering Coalition Command in Modern Peace Operations,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 13, no. 1 (2002): 83−101. 83. James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, “The Romance of Leadership,” Administrative Science Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1985): 78−102. 84. Jones, “A Framework for Appreciating and Managing the Cultural Adaptation of Multinational Peace Operations Forces to Local Environments.” 85. Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.

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86. Pitsis, Kornberger, and Clegg, “The Art of Managing Relations in Interorganizational Collaboration.” For an analysis of UN peacekeeping using guidelines from pragmatism, see Patricia Shields and Joseph Soeters, “Pragmatism, Peacekeeping, and the Constrabulary Force,” in Shane J. Ralston, ed., Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 87−110. 87. See UN, A New Partnership Agenda.

5 Integrated DDR: Lessons for Coordination in Peace Operations? Tobias Pietz

Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor in determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals—such as democratization, justice and development—have little chances for success.1

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) CAN BE

seen as an avant-garde issue for systemwide coordination at the UN as it combines civilian and military actors and aims to bridge the developmentsecurity gap. It is at the forefront of the United Nations’ comprehensive approach to the development of integrated guidelines to direct activities, establish common standards, enable joint assumptions, and frame tasks and principles of integrated work within the various DDR phases and processes. From 2005 to 2006, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR steered a process to develop the integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards (IDDRS) based on a detailed analysis of experiences, lessons learned, and best practices in DDR programs to date. The IDDRS were meant to counter the perceived failures of DDR programs in the past, especially those related to the inefficient coordination of the numerous actors involved in postconflict DDR initiatives. They can be considered as a guiding reference and have been continuously updated based on the experiences of DDR program officers in the field. Moreover, the IDDRS can also be seen as a way of facilitating the coordination of all players in UN DDR programs. If successful, such standards could also be established in other areas of UN peace operations. They could work as a bottom-up content-driven approach, complimentary to the evolving struc-

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tures of integrated units and missions, clusters, or the Peacebuilding Commission within the UN family. The IDDRS could thus constitute an example of successful knowledge management for improved coordination. In this chapter, I try to highlight some basic deficiencies in the implementation of DDR programs, which created the demand for joint standards. After a brief introduction describing the development and functions of the IDDRS, I also strive to provide thoughts on the impact of the IDDRS during the first implementation phase on the ground (the so-called rollout of IDDRS between 2006 and 2008) and on the prospects for the use of such standards for improved coordination within UN peace operations.

DDR Programs Between Success and Failure When the United Nations initiated its first UN DDR mission in Namibia in 1989, it was the beginning of a new breed of peace operations in the post−Cold War era. The rise of these operations reflected the growing number of civil wars in the 1990s, which created new demands for peacebuilding. Downsizing armed forces, disbanding armed groups, and recognizing the needs of unemployed combatants after a conflict is over had been done before, but rarely had they been done in a structured and phased way as the acronym DDR suggests. Since then, the United Nations has implemented DDR programs in over twenty countries.2 The World Bank, another key player in DDR, began its involvement in this issue in 1992 and has led or been part of almost thirty demobilization programs. In addition, smaller multilateral organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as a number of bilateral agencies have implemented elements of DDR programs. At present, DDR is a central activity of almost all peace operations in postconflict countries. Unfortunately, DDR is often seen as a panacea for several of the challenges faced in peace operations: restoring peace, stability, economic development, and reconciliation; all of these goals are assumed to be achievable through DDR programs. For instance, Edward Bell and Charlotte Watson emphasize in a report describing the role of the European Union (EU) in DDR programs that DDR is “a political, social and economic process that has long term development implications.”3 Robert Muggah, Desmond Molloy, and Maximo Halty renew such high expectations by referring to DDR as a process that can “organically combine strategic and socio-economic imperatives to bridge the gap between war and peace.”4 Such notions that DDR programs can help promote development on the ground have set the bar too high on the potential contributions of DDR. Indeed, DDR programs are sometimes the largest or only interna-

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tional support activities in postconflict contexts that come at an early stage and with a lot of beneficiaries and economic investment. Thus, they should and can bridge some of the gaps before wider development activities start. Nevertheless, DDR remains first and foremost a measure targeting combatants, not societies as a whole. In general, DDR has turned into a key issue and, occasionally, a buzzword for international policymakers, and thus attracts major funding from various donors. According to a survey on national and international financial support for the UN Programme of Action (PoA) on small arms and light weapons, DDR missions received $458 million between 2001 and 2005, which were mostly administered by international organizations such as the UN and the World Bank.5 Forty-five percent of this funding was spent on reintegration measures. Africa, the continent where most DDR programs have been implemented to date, received the highest share of funds between 2001 and 2005.6 While some DDR programs were implemented in a systematic way, others, such as those in Liberia in 2003 and in Bosnia in 1996, were created ad hoc due to a limited amount of preparation time. Many DDR programs also lacked structured evaluations to guide future missions.7 Unfortunately, quite a number of DDR programs must be judged as a partial or even total failure. For example, some countries in which DDR programs were implemented slipped back into full-scale war such as Angola in the early and mid-1990s where DDR had been tried twice. The same breakdown happened in Eritrea and Ethiopia in the mid-1990s, where DDR seemed to be fairly successful in the beginning but was completely reversed after war broke out in 1998.8 In Sierra Leone in 2000, the DDR program was temporarily disrupted by the outbreak of renewed fighting. In unstable situations and transitional societies, DDR and many other peacebuilding measures often fail, mostly because no state or external power is in place to hold parties accountable to their agreements on peace and the demobilization of troops. Incomplete or failed DDR produces negative outcomes that are difficult to quantify. Often, structured and comparative analyses are lacking because implementing agencies began recording best practices and known mistakes of their DDR programs only in the past years. Potential outcomes of failed or incomplete DDR include increasing crime rates, domestic violence, and the suicides of ex-combatants. Moreover, DDR programs sometimes inadvertently spurred the growing migration of huge groups of excombatants to urban areas with all different kinds of infrastructural and social consequences. The support or inclusion of veterans’ associations in DDR activities often boosted the entrenchment of ex-combatants’ selfperceptions as “fighters,” which made it easier for these associations and political parties to manipulate them.9 Such a phenomenon can interfere with

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building sustainable peace. Massimo Moratti and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess claim that, in Bosnia and Herzegovina where DDR was not implemented in a systematic fashion, “politically powerful veterans’ associations undermined civilian victims by empowering ethnically based authorities, breaking the cohesiveness of victims groups, and competing with war victims for government funding.”10 In addition, former combatants in the Western Balkans have been able to use veterans’ associations and informal networks for organized crime.11 Often, DDR practitioners have to cope with a variety of factors that hinder the efficient implementation of DDR (i.e., scarce resources, tight time lines, and internal political and economic factors). In such environments, “perfect DDR” might never be possible and it is important to set realistic expectations for what DDR programs can deliver. Public disappointment can spoil not only the image of DDR in a country, but also the sustainability of the international intervention or presence altogether.

Structural Problems There has always been a structural deficiency when it comes to linking the “two Ds with the R,” linking the disarmament and demobilization phases with reintegration.12 Instead of a continuous and to some extent parallel flow of activities within the three phases, the reality shows a clear gap between the short-term relatively cheap and quick disarmament and demobilization measures and the resource-intensive and long-term social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants.13 The first two phases of a DDR operation, classically camp based and implemented by an international military presence mandated by the UN, often provide donors with short-term success stories. The reintegration phase, however, requires long-term commitment to activities with outcomes that are hard to foresee and difficult to measure as compared to the largely quantitative output of the demobilization and disarmament phases. The postponement of reintegration support to demobilized combatants has varied from a couple of weeks to months or even years. Particularly in cases where ex-combatants are placed in demobilization camps, the overall effort of DDR can be spoiled the moment that frustration and boredom settles in. This often leads to aggression and violence or even (re-)recruitment of combatants to take part in renewed or ongoing conflict. In Mozambique, for example, combatants in demobilization camps even took UN personnel hostage, blocked roads, and commandeered vehicles to get out.14 Unfortunately, this reflects not only flaws in the early DDR operations in the 1990s, but also in the experiences in Sierra Leone in 200415 and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006.16

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There are various reasons for such failures in DDR programs. Sometimes, ambitious Security Council mandates are not matched with adequate resources and time lines. More often, different actors are not communicating or coordinating sufficiently to enable consecutive support for ex-combatants. Poorly planned and synchronized resource mobilization activities combined with unnecessary duplication of administrative structures—as was seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the parallel DDR programs set up by the World Bank and the IOM—frequently lead to confusion among DDR planners and implementers.17 Quite often, there is a funding gap. In the past, most programs have experienced a lag of about a year from the time funds were pledged at a donors’ conference to the time they were received in the field. In addition, the assessed peacekeeping budgets often struggle with late submissions of requests for funding, which then delay disbursements. Fortunately, in 2005, based on a note by the Secretary-General on DDR definitions, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/59/296 on “reinsertion support” (de facto reintegration measures) for ex-combatants under the assessed budget for up to one year.18 This may provide just enough time to bridge the gap before funds for long-term reintegration arrive. The efficiency of it is still tested in current DDR programs, as reinsertion projects led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) easily conflict with reintegration measures planned by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN agencies. Nonetheless, the need for cooperation and joint standards and goals in DDR continues to be high to provide cost-efficient and sustainable support for reintegration.

Integrated DDR Standards The Brahimi Report of August 2000 stresses the need for all UN actors to work toward the same goal. It recommends, among other things, the establishment of so-called Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) as a standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support.19 The results of the first IMTFs have been mixed. 20 Nevertheless, the Brahimi Report introduced the concept of “integration” into the agenda of the United Nations and it has remained there ever since. In 2004, DPKO began to develop the so-called Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which was intended to lead to more coherent planning in headquarters and field missions. The UN Secretary-General endorsed the guidelines for the IMPP in 2006. Since then, DPKO facilitates the process of familiarizing UN personnel with the IMPP for current and future peace operations. As a direct response to the perceived fragmented approach toward DDR in peace operations and in line with these overarching calls for inte-

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gration, six UN agencies, departments, funds, and programs came together in 2004 to develop a new set of policies, guidelines, and procedures for UN-supported DDR measures in Peace Support Operations (PSO). From this group derived the IAWG on DDR that was formally established by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security in March 2005 with a mandate to improve the UN’s performance on DDR. From 2005 to 2006, the IAWG developed the IDDRS based on an analysis of experiences, lessons learned, and best practices in UN DDR programs up to that point. Fifteen UN departments, agencies, funds, and programs, as well as the IOM, worked jointly with representatives from member states and NGOs and with individual DDR experts to establish these standards. The IDDRS, along with its operational guide, are meant not only to inform UN-led DDR operations, but also to function as a tool for all organizations working on DDR issues.21 Some experts have already called the IDDRS a “loose doctrine for decision-makers and practitioners.”22 The aims of the IDDRS have been set quite high: “1) to give DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions based on a clear, flexible, and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR activities; 2) to serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated operational planning of DDR at Headquarters and at the country level; and 3) to function as a resource for the training of DDR specialists.” 23 The Operational Guide to the IDDRS stresses that the IDDRS would provide the necessary information for “defining a common and integrated international approach to support national DDR efforts in a particular country.”24 Accordingly, the IDDRS and the Operational Guide formulate policy advice on extensive integration in every area and phase of UN DDR programs and their implementation. Institutionally, the IDDRS refer to the existing framework of the IMTFs and propose the early establishment of a DDR subgroup in each task force at headquarters. This subgroup is meant to plan the design of integrated staffing structures, common lines of authority, a division of responsibilities, an integrated task management system, and the creation of an overall budget for DDR. In addition, the respective UN country team (UNCT) is advised to create an integrated DDR task force, which will bring together all agencies and ensure that the responsibilities defined in an integrated DDR strategy will be adhered to and fulfilled by all actors. Although the authors of the IDDRS are aware of the potential threat to integration of different administrative and financial procedures as well as the different implementation methods among UN entities, their overall aim is a completely integrated DDR unit in the field chaired by the deputy special representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) and a DDR Steering Group including the force commander, head of police, chief

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of civil affairs, chief of political affairs, chief of administration, chief of public information, and the chief of the DDR unit itself. Even though the IDDRS are quite clear about the final goal of a full integration of all actors involved in DDR, including non-UN agencies, donors, and local partners, they fall short of assigning the respective tasks and phases to concrete agencies, departments, or programs. Most of the content-contributing agencies to the IDDRS could easily be aligned to crosscutting or special themes in the IDDRS such as women (UN Women), health (the World Health Organization, WHO), or food (the Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO), but even these IDDRS modules give neither a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities nor helpful suggestions. There is also no indication of how hierarchies and decisionmaking mechanisms should look in practice and whether they are meant to involve personnel and resources from DPKO, UNDP, IOM, or the World Bank, to name a few. Rather, the IDDRS remain a collection of mostly technical and comprehensive guidelines in all areas related to DDR in a peace operation. This is, no doubt, a major achievement, especially for knowledge management in DDR. However, although the IDDRS provide guidance on structural setups of integrated DDR units, they stay away from the delicate political questions attached to the kind of integration they actually strive for: who should be in charge of what and how should coordination be managed within an integrated DDR program? An analysis of the first pilot IDDRS shows that this area has been the main cause for the failure of an integrated DDR in the way that the drafters of the standards had envisioned.

The Rollout of the IDDRS and the Establishment of Integrated DDR Units The IDDRS were first launched in the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in 2006 and in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2007. In these cases, DPKO and UNDP advocated for the creation of joint DDR units or sections within the missions with unified decision-making processes and budgeting.25 In both missions, the results to date have not been very promising with integrated DDR pilots stalling. According to Robert Muggah, this is mainly due to differing basic assumptions on DDR processes by UNDP and DPKO personnel. While DPKO placed an emphasis on the technical side of DDR and its importance for security (thus often promoting the old camp-based approach) in both missions, UNDP stressed implementation through a wider developmental and community-based DDR agenda.

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Haiti In Haiti, gangs and communities were the target groups for DDR programs rather than rebel movements and military structures. In addition, the issue of different funding mechanisms and resources, as discussed above, had not yet been resolved within the option of reinsertion support. Instead, UNDP and DPKO argued over the control of funds, reporting lines, and accountability. As a result, the integrated DDR unit in Haiti disintegrated and DPKO and UNDP administered two separate DDR programs,26 with the latter now running a community violence reduction (CVR) program as a substitute for DDR. Desmond Molloy, former head of the integrated DDR section in Haiti, came to the conclusion that the “experimental hybrid” in Haiti did not succeed because the original 2004 integrated DDR unit was built from scratch, and was rather ad hoc with no clear guidance available at that time.27 As such, the DDR program in Haiti ran parallel to the development of the IDDRS and could not directly benefit from the results of that process. But according to Molloy, the difficult political factors and deteriorating security in Haiti had an even bigger impact on the growing problems of the DDR program than its failed integration—though the ad hoc integration, with its lack of institutional guidance, surely contributed to it. However, Molloy denies that the failure of integrated DDR in Haiti shows that formal integration is not possible in UN DDR programs.28 Instead, he argues for continuous testing of integrated DDR programs based on the IDDRS over a number of years before any final conclusions can be made. The Sudan In the Sudan, the early failure of the integrated DDR unit did not lead to a complete split of UNDP and DPKO personnel, although personal animosities seemed to have almost terminated the integrated DDR unit at some point in 2006−2007.29 Tensions were always surfacing over mandates and priorities, especially when budget and personnel were limited as was the case during the inception of the DDR unit at UNMIS. Even the IAWG, at this time still a very young, but nevertheless, widely accepted interagency process at headquarters level, had difficulties easing these tensions. In June 2007, UNDP Sudan and UNMIS signed the “Administrative and Operational Arrangements for the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit in the United Nations Mission in Sudan,” which were meant to stipulate the duties and responsibilities of both parties in the so-called integrated DDR unit. According to these arrangements, the position of the chief of the integrated DDR unit in the UN mission was assigned to a member of the peacekeeping mission,

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UNMIS. The deputy chief of the integrated DDR unit was seconded from UNDP, although the peacekeeping mission provided the deputy chief with administrative and logistical support. The chief and deputy chief were installed as a unified leadership team that had to work in close partnership to plan and manage all aspects of the DDR program. Nevertheless, the deputy chief was also the program director for the attached UNDP DDR program. In that way, UNDP had the lead for the reintegration part of the DDR program while UNMIS/DPKO was in the lead for the disarmament and demobilization processes. However, the DDR process in Sudan started slowly in 2009 and, by 2011 when UNMIS closed, still had not gone far. Following the independence of South Sudan and the subsequent departure of UNMIS, the DDR program was formally split between two countries— one covering the Republic of South Sudan and the other covering the Republic of the Sudan. It is therefore hard to assess the effectiveness and level of integration of the DDR up to this point. An evaluation of the UNDP-administered Sudan DDR published in 2012 did not even bother to cover the pre−July 2011 period. Yet the IAWG itself made varying conclusions about the lessons learned from the process of integration and application of the IDDRS in the Sudan. Since 2004, the IAWG has tried to establish a continuous review and assessment process for the development of the IDDRS and the work of the IAWG in general. This includes official biweekly meetings at headquarters, and also yearly retreats and meetings of the IAWG together with DDR practitioners from the field and other DDR experts from academia or training institutions. A 2007 meeting report states that the difficulties in the implementation of the IDDRS in the integrated units in the Sudan and Haiti can be solved only by establishing clear institutional arrangements with Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) detailing tasks, roles, and responsibilities.30 This is exactly what happened just a month later with the signing of an agreement among UNMIS, UNDP, and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in the Sudan. The report also warns that the different perspectives of agencies at headquarters are still replicated at the country level, thus leading to turf wars and hindering closer cooperation and coordination. However, only a year later at the IAWG retreat in May 2008, representatives from UNMIS claimed that the inherent structural differences among UN agencies will not change, especially not in the case of UNDP and DPKO funding lines and processes (even after the signing of the MoU).31 In that case, participants argued for a common DDR approach rather than an integrated DDR unit (e.g., through a common work plan and co-location). Nevertheless, it seems odd that with the IAWG cochaired by UNDP and DPKO, and the IDDRS coauthored by these same institutions, the basic assumptions on DDR by UNDP and DPKO could be so different that coordination in the field was not possible.

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Again, it came down to structural differences and personal reservations between various UN agencies and programs on what integration means: colocation, shared budgets, a common work plan? Even in an area like DDR, where practitioners, policymakers, and academics have all accepted the need to bridge the development-security gap, the main players—UNDP and DPKO, among others—seem to continue to hold back from integration if it means shared decision-making and responsibilities. Perhaps the IDDRS have been too ambitious in calling for integrated units. As Anna Herrhausen points out in Chapter 2 of this volume, the UN might have focused too heavily on creating new coordination structures. With structurally independent actors like UNDP and DPKO, the introduction of hierarchical coordination systems for DDR operations has failed so far. In addition, the persisting differences of UNDP and DPKO in ideas, assumptions, and priorities for DDR remain in place and are a major source for coordination problems in the field. Contrary to this, the IDDRS have already become a useful asset as a resource for the daily work of practitioners in the field. The one-year assessment of IDDRS, a survey and analysis conducted by an independent consultant in the spring of 2008,32 revealed that already more than 80 percent of the responding DDR experts from the field have read the IDDRS, with roughly 50 percent consulting them on a regular to systematic basis for their daily work.33 Approximately 80 percent of the respondents felt that the IDDRS have contributed to creating a “better understanding of DDR operations.”34 However, only about half of the respondents felt that the IDDRS actually contributed to “better management of DDR operations” or “improved planning & design of operations.”35 More than 60 percent replied either “no” or “not applicable” when asked whether or not the IDDRS contributed to “integration and coherence of DDR operations.”36 This is striking since one of the main goals of the IDDRS is better operational integration and coherence in the field. Moreover, the report stated that a “large number of respondents from the field are from Haiti and Sudan,” the two cases with the most discontented DDR personnel—probably the reason why they were more responsive to the survey than program officers from other DDR programs. In the cases of Haiti and Sudan, it appears that the hierarchal structure of the DDR units as prescribed in the IDDRS was not applicable to the field context.37 Thus, it was not the integrated DDR standards that failed, but rather the overly ambitious policies to create integrated structures for their implementation in the field when UN agencies and programs are still too far apart in terms of the structures, budget lines, roles, responsibilities, and mind-sets. The dominant push by headquarters for field integration actually led to a “process of disintegration” in both missions.38

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Conclusion The IDDRS can be seen as a product of an attempt to reach common visions and integrated approaches within the UN system. It is part and parcel of the UN’s overarching goal for more coherence and better coordination in peace operations. Its close association with the IMPPs and the IMTFs has put the IDDRS in the spotlight as a tool to ease tensions between the different UN communities (developmental, humanitarian, and security) and to reduce friction resulting from different procedures and funding lines by arguing for integration based on standards that have been informed by the experiences of DDR practitioners in the field. So far, the IDDRS have received praise from academics and practitioners within the DDR community as a much-needed DDR resource that should be consulted by practitioners in a systematic way. These standards now form the foundation for most DDR training courses at the UN and other international training institutes. Thus, a common multiagency vision of DDR, as provided by the IDDRS, is gaining influence in current DDR activities worldwide. In addition, the IAWG on DDR itself, cochaired by UNDP and DPKO, and with sixteen agencies involved, has become a functional forum for coordination within the UN system. This alone is a remarkable and useful achievement and a potential role model. It suggests that coordination is much more about facilitation than hierarchical decisionmaking. The IAWG and the IDDRS, however, were not immediately able to steer a process of integration on DDR in the field. The first integrated DDR units in the Sudan and Haiti did not prove that integrated structures are more effective and efficient for coordination. The IDDRS “do not issue concrete options for integrating planning and programming.”39 Even on an issue like DDR, where all actors can agree that close cooperation between civilian and security structures is needed, operational integration does not seem feasible. This reflects the general problems that integrated planning faces throughout UN system. The main challenges are the differing mindsets, assumptions, and priorities of civilian and military personnel of peace operations,40 not only in DDR. The UN family might have a common goal for peace, but it lacks a joint organizational culture with common ideas and priorities on how to achieve it. In particular, the two main actors in DDR and peace operations—UNDP and DPKO—differ greatly in their approaches. This conclusion reflects what in Chapter 2 Herrhausen sees as a lack in improving social control mechanisms at the United Nations. Such social control mechanisms could help to achieve a UN network that shares the same values and ideas as well as the prioritization of them. Nevertheless, the concept of integrated standards can bring coherence to UN peace operations and to other areas if applied as a knowledge man-

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agement tool.41 The strong reference to the word and concept of “integration” in the IDDRS does not benefit its main purpose of being a contentdriven device to improve each and every aspect of DDR activities. The overall problem related to the UN’s path toward integration is for the IMPP to resolve. The modules on the structural setup of an integrated DDR unit should be removed from the IDDRS. Rather, the standards should focus on the content of DDR programs. The structural issues were the main reason for the vast problems encountered by integrated DDR units on the ground. The IDDRS were not able to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and decisionmaking processes to ease these problems. As a guiding reference, the IDDRS have a chance to contribute to organizational change by creating awareness among UN personnel on the benefits of close coordination and joint assumptions on DDR. The difficulties experienced by integrated DDR units in the field reveal that “alternative approaches emphasizing coordination may be more effective than full-scale integration.”42

Notes 1. UN, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 2, 2004. 2. Robert Muggah has counted more than sixty documented DDR programs since the late 1980s. See Robert Muggah, ed., Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 6. 3. Edward Bell and Charlotte Watson, “DDR: Supporting Security and Development: The EU’s Added Value” (London: International Alert, September 2006), p. 3. 4. Robert Muggah, Desmond Molloy, and Maxmo Halty, “(Dis)integrating DDR in Sudan and Haiti? Practitioners’ Views to Overcoming Integration Inertia,” in Robert Muggah, ed., Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 209. 5. Kerry Maze and Sarah Parker, International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey (Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2006), pp. 9−12. 6. Ibid. 7. Kees Kingma, “Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 2 (2002): 181−201. 8. Ibid., pp. 184−185. 9. A prominent example is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s powerful war veterans’ associations that have been used for years by all three ethnic groups, especially for political rallies. 10. Massimo Moratti and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009), p. 1.

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11. Ibid., p. 3. 12. This is also reflected in the continuous use of the acronym DD&R instead of DDR by some authors and project managers. 13. Béatrice Pouligny, “The Politics and Anti-politics of Contemporary Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs” (Paris: Centre d’études de recherché internationales, 2004), p. 21. 14. Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, Disarmament, Demobilization, and the Social and Economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants: Lessons from the World Bank Africa Experiences (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001), p. 6. 15. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone (New York: Center for Globalization and Sustainable Development, Columbia University, 2004), p. 3. 16. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army (London: Amnesty International, August 2006), p. 4. 17. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Tobias Pietz, Turning Soldiers into a Work Force: Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2004), p. 29. 18. UN, “Note by the Secretary-General on the Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Doc. A/C.5/59/31, May 24, 2005. 19. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, par. 217. 20. In particular, in the preparation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), where Lakhdar Brahimi himself sidelined the already launched IMTF by putting together his own planning team. 21. UN, Operational Guide to the IDDRS (New York: Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 2014), p. 14, http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf. 22. Robert Muggah, Reflections on the Last Decade: Innovations in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Policy and Research (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), p. 10. 23. UN, Operational Guide to the IDDRS, p. 3. 24. Ibid., p. 15. 25. Robert Muggah, “Great Expectations: (Dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti,” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, no. 37 (2007): 25−27. 26. Ibid. 27. Desmond Molloy, DDR: A Shifting Paradigm & the Scholar/Practitioner Gap (Ottawa, ON: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2008). 28. Ibid., p. 10. 29. Former UNMIS representative in Monrovia, interviewed by the author, Monrovia, 22 April, 2008. 30. Internal Report of IAWG Retreat, New York, May 2007. 31. Participant of IAWG retreat, interviewed by the author, Monrovia, 25 April, 2008. 32. Internal IDDRS Assessment, July 2008. 33. Internal survey conducted by the IAWG with 130 respondents, approximately 50 percent being DPKO and UNDP DDR personnel. 34. Ibid., p. 27 35. Ibid., p. 28.

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36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., p. 34. 38. Muggah, Molloy, and Halty, “(Dis)integrating DDR in Sudan and Haiti?” p. 214. 39. Ibid., p. 218. 40. Ibid., p. 216. 41. The IDDRS are an example of a set of measures that Anna Herrhausen in Chapter 2 asserts will improve “the flow of resources and information across the UN network.” 42. Muggah, Molloy, and Halty, “(Dis)integrating DDR in Sudan and Haiti?” p. 218.

6 The Elusive Coherence of Building Peace Cedric de Coning

WHY IS COHERENCE SO HARD TO ACHIEVE AMONG PEACEBUILDING

actors?1 In this chapter I consider the challenge of coordination not only within the UN system, but also with the many peacebuilding actors that engage in postconflict countries along with UN peace missions. Peacebuilding is used here as an overarching concept that encompasses many activities that typically are core to peace operation mandates, including rule of law; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform; governance; support for economic revitalization; and human rights. Despite almost universal agreement that the security, development, political, human rights, and humanitarian elements of peacebuilding are interlinked, coherence remains a challenge on the ground. In the pages that follow, I consider the role of coherence in a peacebuilding context, analyze the perception that coherence is causally linked to effectiveness and sustainability, and probe the limits of achievable coherence.

Peacebuilding In the post–Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was associated with maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change.2 The nexus between development, peace, and security has become central both in academic and policy debates,3 and peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which peace, security, development, rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at the country level.4 The 125

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term peacebuilding was introduced in 1992 by then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace, as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”5 According to this model, the UN response to conflict, in its simplest form, was first to prevent conflict (preventive diplomacy). If that fails, the next step was to make peace (peacemaking) by gathering all the parties around the negotiating table. If a cease-fire or an agreement was reached, the UN could deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the cease-fire and, otherwise, assist with the implementation of the agreement. Finally, the UN could assist to rebuild a country with a specific focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to ensure that the conflict would not reoccur again (peacebuilding). This original conceptualization and its chronological model have an enduring impact on policymakers’ thinking and practice. Many international, regional, and national actors have institutionalized this model conceptually, programmatically, and, even, structurally. For instance, the UN Secretariat has separate departments for peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The bureaucratic dynamics among these departments and offices ensure that there is a healthy dose of competition for resources and influence among them and, although they cooperate in many meaningful ways, these tendencies also reinforce their different identities and, thus, the very notion that prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are separate phases or facets of a peace process. However, over the past two decades, the understanding of the peace instruments has been refined through practice and analysis. They are now broadly understood to be interdependent and interlinked aspects of the same process, rather than chronological steps or stages in a linear conflict management continuum. Various initiatives have been, and continue to be, under way to integrate different parts of the UN and improve coordination with other actors. The current focus on coherence can thus be seen as an attempt to put these different tools back together again and to improve the way the UN system functions as a whole. Coherence, in this context, is understood as an integral part of what peacebuilding is about; that is, a range of measures at various levels that are carefully prioritized and sequenced to pursue the common objectives of sustainable peace and development. While there is no one common approach or model for peacebuilding that has gained widespread acceptance, a number of common characteristics can be identified that have emerged over the past decade and a half of peacebuilding practice.6 The first aspect is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with securing or consolidating the peace. In the short term, peacebuilding is aimed at consolidating the peace by addressing those conflict factors that may threaten a lapse or relapse into violent conflict. In the long term, peace-

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building tries to transform the root or underlying causes of conflicts that, if left unaddressed, may undermine peace and form the basis for a new outbreak of violent conflict. In Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, for instance, such short-term conflict factors may include land and ownership disputes, youth unemployment, poor social services, and impunity caused by weak justice systems while the root causes are related to the structural inequalities inherent in these societies. However, many actors, including those intimately engaged with peacebuilding on a daily basis, still find it difficult to operationalize the concept. On the one hand, it is challenging, if not impossible, to distinguish peacebuilding from some aspects of stabilization, peacekeeping, and related political peacemaking and reconciliation work. On the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish it from early recovery and development action. The second aspect is that peacebuilding is a systemwide undertaking that spans several dimensions. The UN Secretary-General’s report, No Exit Without Strategy, argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by: (1) consolidating security; (2) strengthening political institutions; and (3) promoting economic and social reconstruction.7 The World Bank has summarized these three dimensions as: security, governance, and development. These are essentially the same three dimensions that are reflected in the so-called diplomacy, development, and defense (3D) or whole-of-government approach.8 Coherence refers to the need for these different dimensions to be aligned, so that their combined and collective output can have a systemwide impact. Humanitarian assistance should be highlighted as a dimension that is treated differently. While humanitarian action is independent from the transformative agenda and core peace consolidation objectives of peacebuilding, some models, including the UN integrated approach, include humanitarian assistance within their coherence-seeking arrangements, although they recognize that it is an independent dimension that takes place parallel to peacebuilding efforts.9 In any case, humanitarian assistance needs to be considered in the context of the overall peacebuilding coherence and be factored into planning and coordination mechanisms.10 The third aspect relates to the interdependence among peacebuilding actors. While they exist as independent entities with their own mandates, programs, and resources, these actors are also interdependent so as to achieve their respective objectives and the overall goal of sustainable peace in a country. Most peacebuilding-related programs make sense only as part of a larger system of related programs. Disarmament and demobilization programs, for instance, rely on the assumption that other actors will provide a series of reintegration programs and they all rely on the assumption that there are other programs in place that will create security and improve

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opportunities for education and health care. This tension between the independence and interdependence of various actors and programs lies at the core of the challenge to achieve coherence in peacebuilding. While there is no one common approach or model for peacebuilding that has gained widespread acceptance, I identified three common characteristics above: peacebuilding is primarily concerned with peace consolidation; peacebuilding is a multidimensional undertaking; and peacebuilding actors are both independent and interdependent entities. Coherence thus needs to be an integral part of the peacebuilding concept.

Coherence For the purposes of this chapter, coherence is defined as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law, and security dimensions of a peace operation toward common strategic objectives. While it is recognized that coherence is not an absolute end state that can ever be achieved, it should be possible to distinguish between operations where there is less or more coherence. Coherence is thus a matter of degree. The notion of coherence is closely linked to assumptions about sustainability in peacebuilding. In fact, coherence results in more effective peacebuilding action and this, in turn, results in a more sustainable peacebuilding impact. This assumption is based on numerous evaluation studies and reports that have found that inconsistent policies and fragmented programs entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, and difficulty in meeting goals.11 In brief, these studies argue that such shortcomings ultimately result in a reduced capacity for delivery.12 Consequently, the international policy community has come to believe that by improving coherence, the efficiency of operations will also improve, and that more efficient operations will ultimately translate into more effective and more sustainable results.13 For example, the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects (implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Norway in the 1990s) and identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a “strategic deficit,” as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding.14 The Utstein Study found that more than 55 percent of the programs it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. The evaluation studies that I cite in this chapter have consistently found that the peacebuilding interventions undertaken to date have lacked coherence and that this has undermined their sustainability and ability to achieve their strategic objectives.

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What do these studies understand coherence to mean? It is possible to distinguish between four elements of coherence in the peacebuilding context, namely: (1) agency coherence, that is, consistency15 among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of the different policies and programs of this agency; (2) whole-of-government coherence, that is, consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country; (3) external coherence, that is, consistency among the policies pursued by the various external actors in a given country context (e.g., the Rome Declaration on Harmonization of 2003); and (4) internal/external coherence, that is, consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context (e.g., the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005).16 To assess the degree of coherence of a specific peacebuilding operation, all four elements should be considered. Agency Coherence Agency coherence refers to consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or program. Two examples are the internal coherence of a ministry of foreign affairs or an agency such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Consistency in this context refers to avoiding one agency working at cross-purposes with itself. This does not imply that there is no room for differences and debate during the policy formulation and review process but, once a policy or intervention has been agreed on, it needs to be implemented in such a way that all the different parts of the agency contribute to the overall objective in a complementary fashion. Whole-of-government Coherence Whole-of-government coherence refers to consistency among the policies and actions of different departments and agencies of the same government or multilateral institution; for example, among the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and international development assistance of the United Kingdom. The Canadian government’s 3D concept is the classic example and is aimed at ensuring that its peacebuilding interventions are supported coherently by all the relevant arms of government.17 At the multilateral level, the UN, European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are each engaged in various initiatives aimed at improving coherence. The UN’s integrated approach refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN

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family are integrated into a single country-level UN system when undertaking complex peacekeeping operations.18 External (Harmonization) Coherence External coherence refers to the consistency among the policies pursued by the various international actors in a given country context. One aspect is the relationship among donors, both bilateral and multilateral, which addresses the need for donors to harmonize their policies and practices so as to limit the transaction costs associated with their support. Another aspect is the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference.19 As the Utstein Study and other studies cited earlier have pointed out, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy is, in fact, a critical shortcoming in most past and contemporary peace operations. It would be challenging to pursue coherence if a strategic framework, against which the various external actors can benchmark coherence, has not been developed and shared. At the same time, however, strategic frameworks that are too topdown, inflexible, and detailed are likely to cause dysfunction as a result of the simplification that any such central planning process would have to impose.20 For an overall peacebuilding strategy to be a meaningful vehicle for systemwide coherence, it needs to be transparent, readily available to all actors, open for input and consultation, and regularly revised and updated.21 The degree to which such a strategic planning system is currently absent goes a long way toward explaining the lack of coherence of peacebuilding efforts. Internal/External (Alignment) Coherence Internal/external coherence refers to the consistency between and among the policies of the internal and external actors—in other words, the host nation and international actors—in a given country context. The inability of the external actors to give meaning to their stated policies and principles of alignment is one of the most significant shortcomings in the context of peacebuilding coherence. It is also one of the most challenging, with few obvious solutions and extensive entrenched practices and established relationships.22 It will require considerable political will and focused attention to improve but, without meaningfully addressing this shortcoming, peace operations will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and success. One positive example is an agreed national strategic framework between the international community and a host government such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy of Liberia.

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This typology is not meant to suggest that coherence is pursued exclusively at one or another level. To the contrary, international peacebuilding actors should pursue coherence at all four of the levels where they are active. For instance, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry might be concerned with coherence in connection with its policies toward, for example, Afghanistan, and would be likely to pursue coherence at the same time: first, among the various units within the foreign ministry; second, in a whole-of-government context with other government agencies; third, in the interagency context among donors or as a member state of NATO, the EU, or the UN; and, fourth, in the internal/external coherence context in its bilateral relations with Afghanistan and its participation in collective efforts at international-local coherence such as international donor conferences. Hence, all four levels of coherence will determine the degree to which a state actor can be considered to be more or less coherent. These four elements of coherence can be related to Anna Herrhausen’s categorization of organizations as hierarchies, markets, and networks in Chapter 2 of this volume. Agency coherence refers to a hierarchy. Whole-ofgovernment coherence has both hierarchical and network characteristics, depending on to which degree the different agencies are integrated or to which degree they act as independent parts of a government. Both harmonization and alignment coherence take place in the marketplace, but it is possible that parts of the system, for instance, UN agencies, have formed networks and that both market place and network characteristics are thus relevant.

The Limits to Coherence The research and evaluation data cited earlier in this chapter indicate that peacebuilding efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted coherence dilemmas.23 For instance, Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk contend that peacebuilding should be understood as inherently contradictory, with competing imperatives facing the internal and external actors, both between and among themselves, that constitute “vexing policy dilemmas” that require trade-offs between multiple mandates, needs, and priorities without any obvious solutions.24 Coherence also needs to be understood in the context of the natural tensions and inherent contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different peacebuilding actors. The actors that are responsible for programs and campaigns may often have to settle for second-best or partially coherent solutions to establish a coherent workable framework. Coherence also has negative effects, as illustrated by Michael Lipson in Chapter 3 of this volume. First, in some cases, short-term political and

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security considerations may override longer-term development considerations and this may undermine the very socioeconomic rehabilitation on which sustainable peacebuilding depends.25 Second, undue pressure on internal actors may materialize when external actors form a coherent block on certain issues.26 Third, the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of humanitarian action may be negatively affected when integrated with political and security activities. Fourth, high levels of coherence imply that the system is finely tuned to its specific context. In a relatively stable context this state implies efficiency but, in a dynamic environment, the loss of robustness implies that the cost of adaptation and the risk of failure for such a system will be high. In a dynamic system a lower level of coherence, which allows maximum diversity, implies a more robust and, thus, more effective system in the medium to long term. Roland Paris also cautions that coordination can create a sense of “false-coherence” where fundamental tensions and differences are glossed over for the sake of operational expediency only to resurface and undermine cooperation at critical moments when cohesion is most needed.27 When assessing the added value of coherence in any specific context, the balance that has been struck among the four elements of coherence should be carefully considered as well as the transaction cost in terms of the time and resources invested in coordination (see Chapter 3) and any unintended consequences that may have come about in the process.28 The response to the apparent contradiction between the high regard for coherence that exists at the policy level and the degree to which it is resisted in practice can be handled in a number of ways. One approach could be to argue that the gap is caused by poor or insufficient policy implementation. If so, the coherence deficit can be addressed by more coordination; better training; and improved organization, systems, and processes. It would be fair to say that this is the most common and prevalent policy response. Another approach, championed by Paris and Sisk, could be to argue that the gaps between policy and practice in the field are caused, at least in part, by inherent contradictions in the mandates, interests, and value systems of some of the actors and, as a result, the degree to which these actors can be coherent with each other is limited.29 Both of these responses have value and can, in fact, complement each other. Improved coherence can be achieved by working harder to find common ground. However, there will also be a point at which doing more will no longer yield further benefit (see Chapter 3). There may, thus, be limits to how much coherence can be practically achieved, even in areas where it may be theoretically possible to further expand the room for coherence. If these limits are not recognized, the system will keep on trying to improve coherence beyond reasonable expectations, and the energy and time invested in this effort will be wasted. Pursuing coherence beyond certain

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limits will, therefore, have a perverse effect, generating the exact opposite outcome than intended; in these circumstances, pursuing coherence could actually contribute to inefficiency and ineffectiveness. To understand these nuances better, a closer look is needed at some of the factors that may be working against coherence. In the next section, I explore two such factors: long-term impact versus short-term output; and conflicting values, principles, and mandates. Long-term Impact Versus Short-term Output Most actors do coordinate and cooperate with each other on a range of issues at the operational levels. They exchange information and adjust their actions to avoid obvious overlap and duplication. They cooperate when it is in their own best interest to do so; in other words, when cooperation would meet their interests more efficiently and effectively. From a strategic or systemic peacebuilding perspective, however, the focus is on actors working together for the common good, measured as sustainable impact on a peace process over time. Peacebuilding coherence thus implies that actors need to adjust their understanding of what is in their best interest at the operational and strategic levels. To do so, they need to view their roles from a systemic perspective; that is, seeing their contribution in the context of what would best inform the longer-term sustainability of the peace process they are trying to influence. In other words, success at the strategic level is measured as long-term sustainable peace while success at the operational or output level is measured as maximizing the role and image of the individual actor within a specific time frame, annual budget cycle, or in the context of an application (e.g., the next funding period). Strategic coherence assumes that peacebuilding actors are motivated by the former; the empirical evidence suggests they are motivated by the latter. The overall effect of the combined activities of peacebuilding actors is observable from only a system-level impact perspective and the sustainability of their individual activities and its combined effect can be measured only over the long term. The interdependence among the actors, and the benefits of improving coherence among them are thus not immediately obvious to the actor at the output level, especially not in the short- to medium-term time frame within which they have to make operational decisions. As a result, there is a disconnect between those measuring progress at the system or impact level and those measuring progress at the program or output level. However, few operational peacebuilding actors work at the system or impact level and those that do, for instance, the special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) or resident coordinators, are typically posted for relatively short periods of time and in specific contexts.30 They

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are, thus, less influential over the long term than the organizations that work primarily at the output level and that do so persistently over time and in many different contexts. This tension between impact and output, between what is good for the system as a whole as measured over the long term and what is in the best interest of the individual actor as measured in the short to medium term, consistently undermines coherence. Conflicting Values, Principles, and Mandates The values, principles, and mandates of some of the actors in peacebuilding are inherently incoherent and contradictory. Actors operate in specific areas: humanitarian, military, human rights, development, law enforcement, and so forth. Furthermore, each actor has been schooled in the values, principles, philosophy, and theories of change specific to that discipline or profession. At the same time, they are interdependent, at least from a long-term system impact perspective, in that these actors cannot achieve sustainable peace on their own. Differences in values, principles, and mandates will typically manifest themselves in fundamentally different theories of change, and disagreements will arise concerning which aspects to prioritize. Political and security actors may prefer to, or be mandated to, give priority to stability rather than, for example, investigating human rights violations or dealing with issues such as corruption, black markets, racketeering, or narcotics, especially if actors they perceive to be the key to stabilizing the situation are also suspected of being responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behavior. Those actors for whom justice and human rights are paramount will have a directly opposing view. They are likely to argue that enforcing national and international laws and safeguarding human rights will have a far greater medium- to long-term stabilizing effect because it will also have a deterrent effect, including on others in future conflicts. In Darfur, this kind of fundamental peace versus justice tension drove the debate between those arguing for the indictment of President Omar-al Bashir on the one hand and those favoring some kind of arrangement that would give priority to the peace process on the other. In some cases, the timetable of one actor or dimension may be in conflict with the principles of another. A case in point is the elections timetable in Liberia in 2005 that motivated those responsible for the elections to encourage the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to return to their original communities to be registered there to vote. The SRSG of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) put pressure on those actors responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return by offering them reintegration support in their communities of origin. These actors, however, disagreed with the return timetable proposed by UNMIL because their assess-

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ments informed them that conditions in the original communities were not yet conducive to sustainable returns. This situation caused tension between the political and humanitarian actors because their respective short-term versus longer-term goals as well as their objectives, basic values, and principles brought them into direct opposition with one another.31 The different approaches highlighted in such examples reflect fundamental differences in the mandates, value systems, and principles of some of the actors engaged. It would be naïve to assume that these differences can be resolved through coordination. In the end, such differences will need to be negotiated and trade-offs agreed on a case-by-case basis. These casespecific trade-offs cannot resolve the fundamental underlying value differences. In addition, they often leave the specific actors less tolerant toward each other because the trade-off would have been determined by their relative power and respective leverage in that given context. The end result of such trade-offs is not likely to be conducive to greater coherence among the actors on other issues in the short to medium term. And yet, such trade-offs are necessary in a given situation to overcome the practical impasse and to find a workable solution that will enable all actors to move beyond that point so that they will be able to continue to carry out their respective mandates. Such ad hoc transactions should not be confused with strategic coherence, which aims to achieve a common understanding of a situation as well as a common strategic response.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have analyzed the coherence dilemma in the context of peacebuilding efforts. In the first part of the chapter, I addressed the role of coherence in a peacebuilding context. Peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which the diverse range of independent, but also interdependent, actors can be interlinked in a common process. While there is no one common approach or model for peacebuilding that has gained widespread acceptance, a number of common characteristics have emerged. The first aspect is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with peace consolidation. However, it can be observed that peace consolidation is a rather vague principle to foster coherence among a highly divergent set of actors. The second aspect is that peacebuilding is a multidimensional or systemwide undertaking. Coherence, in this context, refers to the need for these different dimensions to be aligned, so that their combined and collective output can have a systemwide impact. The third aspect relates to the interdependence among peacebuilding actors. I noted that the tension between the independence and interdependence of these various actors lies at the core of the coherence dilemma.

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In the second part of this chapter, I analyzed how coherence is perceived to be linked to effectiveness and sustainability. I argued that there is a widely held assumption in the peacebuilding research and policy community that improving coherence will result in more effective peacebuilding action and that this, in turn, will result in more sustainable peacebuilding impact. I cited a number of evaluation studies that found that the peacebuilding interventions undertaken to date have lacked coherence and that this has undermined their sustainability and ability to achieve their strategic objectives. This has resulted in policy consensus that coherence should be enhanced with the aim of ultimately improving effectiveness and sustainability. In the third part of the chapter, I probed the limits of coherence. I argued that feedback from the field indicates that at the operational levels, many of the assumptions about coherence are, at best, challenged and, at worst, flawed. Peacebuilding efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted tensions and inherent contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different peacebuilding actors. I noted that coherence could also have negative effects by pursuing coherence beyond certain limits, thus generating the exact opposite outcome than intended. I argued that the tension between impact and output, between what is good for the system as a whole as measured over the long term, and what is in the best interest of the individual agent, as measured in the short to medium term, consistently undermines coherence. Some peacebuilding actors seem to have inherently contradictory values, principles, and mandates. These typically manifest themselves in fundamentally different theories of change and, thus, lead to disagreements on, for instance, prioritization and how to measure progress. There are, therefore, limits to the degree to which coherence can be achieved in the peacebuilding context. The exact limits are context specific and will need to be delineated on a case-by-case basis. Pursuing coherence blindly, as if it is a good in and of itself, is likely to have perverse effects. My overall conclusion in this chapter is that, while pursuing coherence is an integral part of peacebuilding, the commonly held causal assumption that more coherence will automatically result in more efficient and, thus, more sustainable peacebuilding operations is flawed. While the causal link itself has not been disproven, I found that the assumption of linear automaticity (i.e., that more of the one will necessarily result in more of the other) has been found to be far more complex than generally understood. There seems to be a threshold beyond which, at first, pursuing more coherence seems to yield little additional benefit and, beyond that, pursuing even more coherence starts to have perverse effects. In addition, the degree to which a reasonable level of coherence—for instance, the adoption of a

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common strategic framework among a core group of internal and external players—is likely to be achieved, appears to be context specific. That is, the threshold within which coherence can have a positive causal effect on system-level effectiveness and sustainability seems to be linked to context, rather than the type of coherence model being pursued or the extent to which the actors are interconnected. While changes in the latter can yield small improvements in coherence, the most important factor is the type of environment with which the peacebuilding system is engaged. Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friss have proposed a model that links types of coherence, ranging from unity to coexistence to the degree of volatility in the system, and it seems that the highest degrees of coherence are achievable in postconflict peacebuilding contexts where violence has stopped and a relapse is unlikely in the short to medium term.32 The degree to which coherence can be anticipated to be achievable in a given context could also serve as an indicator of the likelihood of a sustainable outcome. The key variable is context. Any major shifts will result in changes in the degree to which the level of coherence can be maintained and, as a result, the prospects for sustainable outcomes.

Notes 1. In this chapter, actors is used as a collective term for all peacebuilding players; that is, those entities that execute programs or otherwise undertake activities with the intent to engage in peacebuilding action. This includes international military forces; peace operations; developmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); UN agencies, departments, funds and programs; operational donor agencies; states engaged in bilateral peacebuilding actions; and local authorities and local communities. 2. Mark Duffield, Sue Lautze, and Bruce D. Jones, Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996−1997: An Independent Study for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 1998). 3. Peter Uvin, “The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 1, no. 1 (2002): 5−24. 4. See, for example, UN, Report of the Secretary-General. In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005, March 21, 2005; and UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Assistance and the Environment. Delivering as One, UN Doc. A/61/583, November 20, 2006. 5. UN, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping—Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992, par. 21. 6. For a good overview of the different conceptual approaches, see Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, and Laura Sitea, “Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?” Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007): 35−58.

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7. UN, Report of the Secretary-General. No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. S/2001/394, April 20, 2011. 8. Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Assessing “Whole of Government”: Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), p. 52. 9. Various models, such as the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding, the UN’s integrated approach, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa include humanitarian assistance. Many in the humanitarian community argue, however, that humanitarian assistance falls outside the scope of peacebuilding and should not be included in peacebuilding models. See, for example, Erin A. Weir, Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative, Monograph No. 4 (Accra, Ghana: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, June 2006). See also Uwe Kievelitz, Gabriele Kruk, and Norbert Frieters, Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding: National Report on Germany (Eschborn, Germany: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003); and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa (Midrand: New Partnership for Africa’s Development—NEPAD). 10. UN, Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision 2008/24: Integration, 25 June 25, 2008. 11. See, among others, Nicola Dahrendorf, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change (London: King’s College, 2003); Toby Porter, An External Review of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) (New York: Evaluation Studies Unit, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 18, 2002); Marc Sommers, “The Dynamics of Coordination,” Occasional Paper No. 40 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 2000); Nicholas Stockton, Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2002); Antonio Donini, “The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda,” Occasional Paper No. 22 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996); Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience (London: Overseas Development Institute, June 2001); and Duffield, Lautze, and Jones, Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996−1997. 12. See, for example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development,” Policy Brief (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 2003). 13. According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002), efficiency is “a measure of how economically resources and inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results” (p. 20). Economy, in this context, refers to the absence of waste for a given output: “an activity is economical when the costs of the scarce resources used approximate the minimum needed to achieve planned objectives” (p. 20). Effectiveness refers to “the extent to which a development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (p. 21) Sustainability is defined as “the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed” (p. 36).

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14. Dan Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2004), p. 16. 15. Consistency in this context is not necessarily ethical, that is, doing like under like circumstances with respect to any one rule or norm (e.g., avoiding double standards); instead, it refers to one agency, government, or system not working at cross-purposes with itself in a more general sense. I am grateful to Ramesh Thakur for pointing out this difference. 16. See Robert Picciotto, Fostering Development in a Global Economy: A Whole of Government Perspective (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005). See, especially, “Introduction: Key Concepts, Central Issues,” p. 13, where he identifies internal coherence; whole-of-government coherence; donor coherence; and country-level coherence. 17. Patrick and Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its Parts, p. 56. 18. UN, Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision 2008/24: Integration. 19. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. 20. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007). 21. Cedric de Coning, “Planning for Success,” in Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations (New York: International Peace Institute and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009), p. 26. 22. Ole Jacob Sending, “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive to Context,” Working Paper No. 755 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2009). 23. See notes 6 and 7. 24. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2009). 25. Weir, Conflict and Compromise. 26. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. 27. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 28. Aoi, de Coning, and Thakur, The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations. 29. Paris, At War’s End. 30. Cedric de Coning, “Mediation and Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in UN Integrated Missions,” Global Governance 16, no. 2 (2010): 281−299. 31. For an in-depth analysis of UNMIL, see Chapter 7 by Asith Bhattacharjee in this volume. 32. Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, “Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach,” Journal of International Peacekeeping 15, nos. 1−2 (2011): 243−272.

7 The Coherence Conundrum in Peace Operations Asith Bhattacharjee

COHERENCE IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF UN PEACE EFFORTS. IT HAS

often been called for in Security Council mandates,1 in the planning and implementation of peace operations, and in the nature of the delivery of mandates on the ground.2 Nevertheless, coherence remains singularly underdefined in peace operations and in the realm of public policy in general. Its meaning differs so widely with each institution, entity, or individual that any rational conclusion or uniform understanding of coherence becomes difficult. This is perhaps the reason for the term often being conjoined with concepts like cohesiveness, consistency, collaboration, cooperation, synergy, or integration. These definitional vagaries have prompted arguments that there cannot be one common framework or even a single understanding of coherence, and that it is contextual, subjective, and different in different circumstances. While this may be so, how much of it is itself related to the absence of a common understanding of what coherence means and what it entails is a moot question. A lack of a common understanding of what is meant by coherence, however, may make its achievement difficult on the ground. In this chapter, I seek to contribute to a better conceptualization of coherence in a peacekeeping environment by analyzing the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from a coherence angle.

Understanding Coherence The concept of coherence seems to be better understood in the area of the physical sciences.3 With regard to optics, for example, any physics textbook would say that two beams of light are coherent when their phase dif141

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ference is constant; they are noncoherent if there is a random or changingphase relationship. Such a definition of coherence would entail that to be coherent, any two beams of light need to be correlated in a positive and predictable manner, and they must mutually reinforce and strengthen (and not cancel or neutralize) each other. If we borrow this understanding of coherence and apply its logic to UN peace operations, the implication is that mandates, strategies, plans, programs, initiatives, structures, processes, and networks should have a high degree of correlation among themselves and they should not only mutually reinforce, but also strengthen each other and deliver outputs that are larger than merely the sum of their individual outcomes.4 Unlike optics, however, peace operations are the result of human endeavors; that is, the achievement of coherence is dependent on the intentions of key actors as well as on the nature of the activities they undertake. Taking this into account, coherence in peace operations can be visualized as a compact among often different, diverse, and competing interests5 operating in uncertain6 and risky environments. Any compact should consist of: (1) end goals; (2) self-correlated working relationships; and (3) logical processes and structures (both formal and informal, including networks) that serve to attain those goals. A compact can consist of several other compacts underpinned by the same logic. In peace operations, the first compact would be the political mandate that sets the contours for operations on the ground. The second compact would be within the UN family in the field— the peacekeeping mission, the UN country team (UNCT), and the Bretton Woods Institutions. The third compact would be between the ground-level UN system operations and the host state. Further, crosscutting compacts could be formed within the larger framework, for example, between the peacekeeping military engineering units, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the national public works departments for rehabilitating roads. Such crosscutting compacts usually have multiple outcomes; for example, improved security coverage, better humanitarian access, and economic recovery.

Constructing Peace Operations: Complexities and Coherence UN peace operations are complex undertakings, which involve huge, multifarious, and rapid efforts. While these may appear initially chaotic to the eye, they do have a logic, a sequence, and multiple interrelationships. Precisely because of their complexity, opportunities abound for incoherence and illogical constructs. These may not be visible when operations are first launched, but they do take a visible toll in the end. In this process, there are three areas where systemic incoherence can potentially occur. They relate

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to the mandate, the structure, and the functioning of the UN system on the ground and, finally, to the nature of relations between the UN operations and the national authorities. Mandate: The First Compact The critical starting point of any UN peace operation is the Security Council mandate. Mandates need to be precise, logical, and its elements logically assembled, interrelated, and internally correlated into one single compact. The preparatory work done by the UN Secretariat is the first step in drawing up the elements of a mandate. The institutional mechanisms to undertake this task are the Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), the technical assessment missions (TAMs), and the integrated strategic frameworks.7 The IMTF/TAM conjoin the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with actors such as UNDP, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to carry out a preliminary study and submit an internal report, based on which the Secretary-General presents his or her report to the Security Council, recommending elements and the structure of a mandate. The Security Council acts on these recommendations to create a mandate. After this stage, the IMTF is supposed to convert itself into a standing body at UN headquarters to provide coordination and to act as an interface between the field and headquarters. As has been seen, the report of the IMTF/TAM is critical in shaping the mandate. Process and information flaws at this point can have long-term negative consequences. It is necessary to point out that arriving at consensus by including everything that each UN agency or office wants to see in a mandate seldom leads to coherent mandates. Instead, the attempt to include all areas of the UN’s work often results in unclear mandates. The Brahimi Report, which launched the concept of multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping in 2000, stated that mandates must be “clear, credible, and adequately resourced.”8 Clarity and credibility (apart from resources) are important. However, the report did not highlight another important aspect: the precision of mandates. Arguments that mandate precision is usually a victim of political negotiations in the Security Council, and that vagueness may be deliberately introduced to find full support of the Council members, are not credible. In reality, to address any peace and conflict issue the Security Council must first put the conflict issue on its agenda. Following this, a resolution that frames the mandate is adopted. Accepting this argument would imply that the Security Council itself does not expect that on-the-ground operations would be successful. That not being the case, the reality is that there is an underlying dilemma between integrating several dimensions and tasks into one composite mandate while at the same time keeping it precise. When crafting

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mandates, the Security Council has mostly followed the Brahimi recommendation of a multidimensional approach. The result has often been a listing of tasks, without intertask correlations being specified at the outset either temporally or substantively. Similarly, mandates seldom contain indications of how a determination is to be made that they have been achieved or not achieved. Indicators of progress or periodic review benchmarks remain conspicuous by their absence. Most often, mandates do not clearly delineate between immediate and long-term tasks, which adds to difficulties in prioritization on the ground. Most mandates contain tasks in a wide array of thematic areas (e.g., security, humanitarian, rule of law, recovery, governance, and human rights) and call for all of them to be addressed by the peace operation. Not all can either be started or fulfilled during the life cycle of a mission. Except for security, protection, or humanitarian emergencies—the immediate concerns for peace stabilization—other tasks are longer term and, ultimately, the responsibility of national governments. While these shortcomings are well known, they, however, serve to introduce imprecision in mandates and make operations on the ground difficult. This could be mitigated if mandates were created keeping in mind compacts as their fundamental logical paradigm. UN Field Operations: The Second Compact How a mandate is operationalized is critical to its success. On the ground, integrated mission structures are put in place. Simultaneously, operating processes are developed. Strategic planning also starts through the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).9 This is supplemented with sectoral plans or work plans and a concept of operations (ConOps). Processes and structures for evaluation and monitoring are crafted at the same time. How planning instruments, structures, processes, and initiatives as well as resources—both material and human—are organized, while keeping in mind that field operations are temporary and finite, is important. They need to take the shape of a system and process-wide UN compact on the ground. Generating such a unified UN field-level compact is crucial not only for coherent functioning, but also for coherent delivery of outputs. The Brahimi Report also recommended an integrated mission concept for peacekeeping and most operations since then have followed this approach. Integration was sought to be attained by unifying humanitarian coordination and coordination of the UN country team and putting them together under one pillar headed by a deputy special representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). Earlier, the UNCT independently led this area, which often caused tensions between peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. In the integrated mission approach, with the security side under a separate pillar and the humanitarian (and also recovery) side under

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another, integration was sought to be achieved structurally. In reality, however, structural mission integration may not necessarily lead to coherence. Coherence is more than structural integration or introducing multidimensionality in a peace operation. Coherence is more about designing an architecture that promotes synergies and built-in self-correlation in structures and processes that channel the implementation of initiatives and programs. In the compact approach, posited above, however, structures could be autonomous, processes may be independently launched, national actors may pursue aims that should, in any case, go well beyond what a temporary Security Council mandate prescribes, but the underlying foundation is that they should be logically compacted. National Partners: The Third Compact As mentioned earlier, any UN system compact cannot be coherent unless it is conjoined with the priorities and goals of national partners. There has to be a logical correlation in partnering with national governments. Standard examples of consultation, collaboration, and coordination with national governments, which actually are compacts, include the Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) led by the Bretton Woods Institutions. These processes necessarily require a different focus in postconflict settings as compared to a normal country situation. In postconflict situations, they need to be conflict sensitive; i.e., they have to be instruments that do not inadvertently exacerbate conflict drivers while, at the same time, strive to eradicate these conflict-causative issues. Therefore, compacts set out by the UN system with national authorities in postconflict situations necessarily need to be multidimensional and multilayered. Such compacts would, for example, contain several aspects like security, reconciliation, human rights, humanitarian, and recovery elements. The Three Compacts: A Triad The three compacts described above should ideally form an interlinked triad and, thus, the basis for coherence. The efforts of managers of peace operations should aim to draw together these compacts into one larger and single compact that encompasses the triad. When considering the three compacts, it becomes immediately apparent that, ideally, all three need to be consciously constructed to achieve an optimal and coherent overall outcome. In addition, they are interlinked in nature and, thus, can either result in successful and predicable outcomes or they can impinge on each another depending on the strengths or weaknesses in each of them. For example, if there is no semblance of a compact with national partners, it

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will be almost impossible to implement the Security Council mandate. If, on the other hand, there is a symbiotic relationship between them, even some weaknesses in mandates can be overcome in collaboration with national authorities. It may be useful to point out that the three compacts have different ways of being generated and take different shapes. However, the overarching goal of peace and security remains common to each of them. Mandates can be seen as legislation born out of political negotiations in the Security Council. Implementing the mandate is the responsibility of both the field missions and the host state. Peacekeeping missions are created and designed in accordance with the delivery requirements of the Security Council mandate. The host state’s responsibility is to prioritize its requirements for consolidation of peace and to take ownership of the deliverables of the mission that, ideally, should be symbiotically generated with the national governments.10 Any dysfunction here can cause failures or a protracted presence of missions in postconflict countries. It is obvious, therefore, that in the triad, the mandate is the politico-legal fountainhead and all other actions are necessarily a consequence of its creation. As a result, the other two compacts are relatively more dynamic in nature, where structures, processes, organizational behavior, and the intent of the leadership and managers (of both the UN mission and the host state) count a great deal in giving shape to a master compact encompassing the mandate, the mission, and the host state. In promoting coherence at all levels, however, it is likely that managers will face several challenges in generating compacts. First, systemwide coherence at the field level is directly affected by a lack of systemwide coherence at the headquarters level of UN entities.11 This is because policies, initiatives, and programs delineated by the Security Council within a mandate ultimately trickle down to the operational level on the ground through the UN Secretariat and the headquarters’ structures of the funds, agencies, and programs. Achieving headquarters-level coherence is a major challenge, given the different mandates, governance, decisionmaking structures, budgets, and reporting lines of the various UN bodies. In addition, other international institutions, such as the World Bank, have their own corporate existence and priorities. Since institutions and bodies dealing with different aspects or tasks of a mandate are diverse and different at UN headquarters, efforts on the ground to coordinate and create compacts assume greater significance. Second, compacts are not created in a vacuum and neither does the triad of compacts work in one. In peace operations, the influence of highly uncertain environments where missions are deployed intrinsically exacerbates the risk of failure of initiatives and programs and can put limits to coherent functioning. These uncertainties emerge from a host of reasons

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that differ from one postconflict situation to another. Nevertheless, there are some common areas where risks are usually present. Broadly speaking, these relate to security; vulnerability (protection) of the population, including displaced persons; the breakdown of governance systems, including the rule of law; and economic distress. Addressing or internalizing risks in these broad areas while creating compacts is crucial when policies and programs are designed or implemented. Therefore, an obvious goal of managers in peace operations is to seek ways and means of reducing risks and improving predictability. The triad of compacts has the advantage of allowing collective anticipation of risks, threats, and uncertainties and their better internalization into strategies, policies, and programs.

The UN Mission in Liberia and Coherence Based on the above discussion, in the remainder of this chapter I examine three aspects of coherence in UNMIL: (1) whether UNMIL’s mandate had internal logic and correlation; (2) whether operations were conducted in a planned manner with a results-based approach; and (3) what was lacking in terms of coherence and in what aspects UNMIL succeeded. The Security Council Mandate Establishing UNMIL: Was It Coherent? In recommending UNMIL’s mandate to the Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral’s report12 extracted sixteen tasks out of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord (ACPA) of August 18, 2003. In doing so, it recognized the ACPA as the capstone document, and its timely implementation as the first task of the mandate. While selecting sixteen tasks, some critical elements that were part of the ACPA were not articulated within the Secretary-General’s mandate proposal to the Security Council, leaving room for criticism that issues that were critical to the sustainability of peace were glossed over. The omission of references to the Governance (Reform) Commission, the Contracts and Monopolies Commission, and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights, Corruption, and Natural Resource Management were not helpful on the ground. Nevertheless, it goes to the credit of the SecretaryGeneral that reconciliation (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) found specific articulation in his report even though Annexure 3 of the ACPA (for obvious sensitivities) did not list this as a task.13 In a similar vein, the Security Council also selectively extracted elements from the ACPA while formulating the mandate.14 While doing so, it gave preponderance to the Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of June 17, 2003, which formed Annexure 1 to the ACPA and which was very military specific.

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Selective extraction of elements from a peace agreement raises questions. Does picking and choosing mean that only the chosen elements are priority and that the rest are not or, at best, are secondary? If parts of peace agreements are deliberately selected or deliberately left out while creating a mandate, the agreement as a whole tends to get diluted and starts to assume less significance in terms of enforceability on the ground. Peace agreements are, by nature, finely tuned political documents and tinkering with their balance, either through selectivity or by modifying language, lets disparate interests get a convenient hook to argue whether this or that part of a peace agreement is included or excluded from the purview of a mandate. As stated above, selectivity affected enforceability. The ACPA (Article IV, par. 3b) called for a UN international stabilization force to “Investigate violations of security aspects of this agreement (emphasis added) and take necessary measures to ensure compliance.” The words “this agreement” referred to the ACPA as a whole. This enforceability provision of the ACPA underwent a de facto abridgement since the mandate overemphasized the Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, rather than the agreement as a whole. There was an element of confusion in the mandate concerning the stage at which UNMIL would cease to exist. This is evident through an examination of three documents: the ACPA provisions, the Secretary-General’s recommendation in his report to the Security Council, and the mandate itself. The ACPA’s Annexure 3 (the implementation timetable) delineated the holding of national elections in October 2005 as the last task of this timetable. This end state—the holding of national elections—was also subsumed in Article XXXV of the ACPA, which stated that constitutional sovereignty would be restored to Liberia with the inauguration of a new government. The Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council stated: “The holding of free and fair elections by October 2005 and the installation of a democratically elected Government in January 2006 would be important milestones in the peace process in Liberia. The exit strategy for the Mission should however be based on precise and realistic benchmarks relating to progress in the consolidation of peace, to be defined in due course.”15 This statement is open to bipolar dual interpretation. Mentioning “exit” after a sentence on elections could be interpreted as contemplative of mission exit after elections; an opposite interpretation could be that though elections were an important milestone, exit would, however, be based on realistic benchmarks related to peace consolidation. In hindsight, it is not clear which interpretation was meant in the Secretary-General’s report. On the other hand, the mandate, which was the legal foundation for UNMIL, stated in operative paragraph 3(s) of Security Council Resolution 1509 as the last item: “to assist the transitional government, in conjunction with ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] and other inter-

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national partners, in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than the end of 2005.”16 Thus, an examination of the ACPA, the SecretaryGeneral’s report, and the mandate, bolsters the theory that UNMIL was not meant to stay after elections. An inexplicable aspect of UNMIL’s mandate was that the Security Council failed to pick up the critical proposal of the Secretary-General calling for a clear articulation of an exit strategy for the mission to “be based on precise and realistic benchmarks relating to progress in the consolidation of peace, to be defined in due course.”17 Indeed, this report was one of the few in the Security Council in those years that expressly called for such a mechanism on which determination of successful achievement of tasks could be made. These benchmarks were later developed by UNMIL sui generis and proved extremely useful, not only in evaluating progress, but also in determining when and how the mission could draw down and withdraw. The exercise of political judgment by the Security Council in anticipating pitfalls and risks is crucial for coherent operations on the ground. Unfortunately, both the Secretary-General’s report and the Security Council mandate failed to anticipate the implications of politically sensitive dispensations in the ACPA that could potentially create serious trouble on the ground. For example, Article XXXV of the ACPA, in essence, stated that whenever the ACPA militated against the provisions of the national constitution, the accord itself would reign supreme. Further, Article XXXV, subsection (e), “deems restored, constitutional sovereignty” once a newly elected government was formed. It also adds that “all legal obligations of the transitional government shall be inherited by the elected government.” Working backwards, this implied that tasks undertaken under the ACPA provision of constitutional suspension would automatically turn illegal or unconstitutional once the constitution was restored. A good example of this was the disbanding of the security apparatus required under ACPA provisions and the Security Council mandate. Constitutionally, this mechanism was not permitted without parliamentary legislation, but was undertaken on the basis of the ACPA article suspending the constitutional requirement. After the elections, the disbanded elements of the former Armed Forces of Liberia claimed that their disbandment was constitutionally illegal. The ACPA also explicitly made the elected government obliged to inherit the legal obligations of the transitional government that functioned until the elections in October 2005 while, as stated above, the return of constitutional sovereignty made them ultra vires. This prompted discourse among a variety of actors on whether the constitutional suspension clause of the ACPA itself turned illegal from the day that constitutional sovereignty was restored. Others held the view that the suspension clause of the ACPA and acts under it were de facto amendments to the constitution itself.

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These politico-legal conundrums were not foreseen by the Security Council and added uncertainty to the environment in the postelection period. In the above discussion, I attempted to deconstruct UNMIL’s mandate. The flaws that crept into it had to do with selectivity (the handpicking of elements from the ACPA) and the absence of a logical arrangement of the mandate’s elements as well as the absence of measurement tools like benchmarks and evaluation methodologies. If the attributes of a compact described earlier were deliberately built in or kept in mind as a paradigm, the mandate could have been cohesive and stronger with clear benchmarks and deadlines. The Ground Compact: UNMIL Field Operations Despite weaknesses inherent in UNMIL’s mandate, progress did take place, moving from initial peace enforcement and security stabilization to elections, and further to a phase of peace consolidation and the beginning of a drawdown. A question that arises from the coherence angle is whether this progress was preordained, calculated, and coherently thought out in terms of strategic planning and implementation. To answer this, it may be useful to look at two general criticisms levied at UNMIL primarily during the early phase of its deployment (2003 to 2005); namely, (1) that UNMIL’s arrival on the ground caused humanitarian agencies to be sidelined and marginalized; and (2) that no advance planning was undertaken by UNMIL beyond the security-stabilization stage, right at the start of mission.18 On the first assertion, it must be remembered that UNMIL was established at a time when the integrated mission concept was itself nascent. The mandate, as discussed earlier, did not help either. A lack of balance between the immediate need to hold the cease-fire and at the same time undertake humanitarian actions generated criticism from the humanitarian community on the ground. By all accounts, UNMIL leadership, at the initial stage, oriented itself heavily on military aspects, and comments that humanitarian operations were not evenly keeled with security appear valid. Also, there is evidence that a reasonably longer-term view was not taken beyond the holding of elections. There appeared to be little planning on what road map to follow once the elections were over. The latter is evident in the Integrated Mission Plan (IMP) produced by UNMIL in early 2004. The UNMIL IMP delineated a few core tasks and programs based primarily on security elements in the mandate; for example, the cease-fire, the disarmament and demobilization of warring groups, the deactivation of former elements of the national armed forces and the police, and preparations for holding national elections. Probably because of the overfocus on security aspects, the IMP was more UNMIL centric, in con-

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trast to developing a broader-based UN systemwide plan by integrating the UN country team. Even in crosscutting areas, such as in the disarmament and demobilization process, collaboration and cohesion with the humanitarian side was thin. There were complaints from the UNCT that they had neither been consulted, nor had their views found expression in the IMP. In this sense, the IMP—the core business plan—was not readily owned by all parts of the UN family in Liberia. It also lacked peace sustainability elements such as recovery, local capacity building, impunity issues, and the management of natural resources. Despite these weaknesses, the IMP did serve a useful purpose in giving shape to the immediate requirements of the mandate. On the second point, whether there was advance planning for the postmilitary–oriented stabilization stage right at the start, one must admit that this was not the case. For this lacuna, more than UNMIL, perhaps the mandate must take the blame. As discussed earlier in this chapter, elections appeared to be the final tasking of the mission. It can, thus, be safely assumed that a longer-term view of the existence of the mission beyond this last task was perhaps not found warranted at the start of the mission. It must also be remembered that, at the time the mandate was created, the prevailing ethos leaned toward elections being visualized as the final act of the United Nations for postconflict peace. Although, in the case of Liberia, a similar election and an immediate UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) exit thereafter in 1997 resulted in reigniting the conflict and should have been a lesson for the international community. How, then, is UNMIL cited today as an example of a successful integrated mission? The answer appears to lie in the deliberate efforts at crucial stages to create compacts, although they were never called “compacts.” Some of these compact-building efforts and their contexts are described below. Compact-building Efforts in UNMIL Elections marked a definitive turning point in the life cycle of UNMIL and the UN country team. The high voter turnout and visible enthusiasm regarding the democratic process were welcome developments. However, Liberians’ high expectations for a rapid change in their lives in itself constituted a high security risk. Exacerbating this were the unfinished tasks in reforming the war-related security apparatus, an unfinished process of reintegrating former combatants, and, inter alia, a lack of resolve in addressing the root causes of war through a reconciliation process. For the newly appointed leadership of UNMIL, this was a major realization and a challenge. The fact that there had been no forward planning at the start for such a potential scenario was brought home hard. A reorientation, replanning,

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and reexamination of the fundamentals of operation of the mission became immediately necessary. From this perspective, the end goals required recasting, retooling, and benchmarking, in conjunction with the newly elected government. There were three imperatives at this stage. The immediate imperative was to launch a package of peace dividend initiatives designed to fulfill some of the postelection expectations of the people and provide them with a stake in the peacebuilding process. In consultation with the UN, donors, and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), the new government finalized a plan of “150 day deliverables.”19 It contained immediate doable projects, including street lighting, rehabilitation of schools, and provision of drinking water. The second imperative was to maintain a tighter security envelope since war structures still had to be broken down, new institutions erected to enable democratic governance, accountability ensured under the rule of law, and respect for human rights affirmed. The final imperative was to ramp up longer-term recovery and build institutions for sustained peace. Early consultations between the UN and the government-elect resulted in joint priority setting and, eventually, the building of a strong compact. In consultation with UNMIL and donors, the government identified four pillars (security, governance and the rule of law, infrastructure, and economic revitalization) to embark on the road to eventual recovery and sustained peace. Coordination of these efforts was vested in a newly created body— the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC)—under the chairmanship of the president, and with the four thematic groups (mentioned above) under it. Each working committee is led by respective cabinet ministers and cochaired by UNMIL and includes as its members, UN agencies, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, NGOs, donors, and regional groups and associations. An innovation for extending the writ of the state was proposed by the UN and accepted by the government. This was the establishment of county support teams (CSTs) for each of Liberia’s fifteen counties, under the chairmanship of the county superintendents, and in line with the membership and structure of the four pillars of the LRDC. In essence, the LRDC was replicated throughout the country’s fifteen provinces. The CSTs not only served to extend state authority in the provinces, but also became symbols of impartial administration to the conflict-affected population.20 The compact generated between the national authorities and the UN in Liberia had twofold implications for UNMIL. It was clear that UNMIL needed to be retrofitted to be able to deliver on the common priorities and joint initiatives with the government. Therefore, first, UNMIL’s Integrated Mission Plan needed to be reworked and reoriented to be fully aligned with national imperatives; and, second, there had to be a benchmarked and

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results-based strategic exit plan upfront, which had to be consistently monitored and evaluated. To address the first point, the Integrated Mission Plan was immediately revised and restructured in 2006 to harmonize with the four LRDC thematic pillars. It now included key interventions of all parts of the UN family in consonance with the nationally defined imperatives. With regard to the second point, the process of planning benchmarked and calculated transit stages began with a view toward eventually exiting and handing over responsibilities, including security, to the government. This, it was realized, had to be based on outcomes or results of programs and strategies rather than on arbitrary time lines. In relation to planning of successive transit stages before exit, it was determined that completion of all security-related tasks constituted a peace consolidation stage. The recovery stage was conceptualized as a longerterm goal of reaching a point where UNMIL could start considering to draw down its forces. The final stage was deemed to be a peace-steady state where all parts of the government would be fully functional. At this stage, withdrawal could be undertaken and UNMIL would gradually cease to exist. The only UN ground presence, subsequently, would be the UN agencies, funds, and programs under the UNCT. Thus, a results-based intertemporal plan for “Consolidation, Drawdown, and Withdrawal” evolved and, practically speaking, formed a master compact in every sense. The transition from one stage to another was to be effectuated only after periodic and systematic assessments and not in an ad hoc manner. For this purpose, the UN, the national government, and external partners, including donors, developed jointly a set of benchmarks with related indicators of progress, which were monitored by UNMIL in collaboration with all stakeholders.21 Security Council Resolution 1712 endorsed the proposed transition stages and the related benchmarks.22 Benchmarks and indicators of progress do not necessarily constitute effective instruments for coherent functioning, unless they are rigorously assessed and evaluated on the basis of independent on-the-ground verification. In the words of Robert Picciotto, “because of the imponderables of implementation, monitoring must complement evaluation in order to facilitate course corrections. But monitoring without evaluation has limited value.”23 To do this, however, scientific data collection, both qualitative and quantitative, is imperative. In postconflict situations, data collection and assessment depend on physical access to areas and places where the security situation may not be conducive, the means of communication restricted, or both. UNMIL devised an innovation that has, today, become a model in the UN for periodic mission assessments and evaluation. Joint security assessment teams (JSATs), composed of UN (UNMIL and UNCT) and Liberian government personnel, fanned out deep into the country and car-

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ried out surveys in 2007, for the first time producing region-by-region security assessments identifying security or instability flash points. The evaluations and assessments proved effective since they were based on a joinedup approach. Between the end of the consolidation stage, and the beginning of the drawdown stage, however, the question of convincing the Security Council of the fundamental correlation between military and nonmilitary benchmarks was considered to be desirable by UNMIL. Traditionally, the Security Council is oriented toward thinking of peacekeeping mainly in militarily terms. Issues like food prices vis-à-vis security (note that the Liberian war was ignited with rice riots), public frustration, high unemployment in a milieu of a large number of ex-combatants, and other such risks to stability are often seen as secondary, if not, negligible. Drawdown is, thus, visualized by the Security Council as mostly a military calculation of numbers of brigades, air assets, or police personnel. To introduce softer recovery and governance elements into the picture, UNMIL’s planning team separated the benchmarks into core and contextual. The core benchmarks were primarily security oriented while the contextual benchmarks were identified as those that directly and significantly impinged on security and stability. The Security Council, in Resolution 1777 of 2007, took this distinction into account by mentioning core and contextual benchmarks.24 Carefully considered, UNMIL depicts an example where faults in the mandate, lack of advanced planning, lack of resources, a difficult disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) process, and a stymied security sector reform (SSR) process did not lead to failure. This was because compacts were created in every aspect of UNMIL’s work in cooperation with national actors and the government. They may have been labeled “coordination,” “One UN,” “partnerships” with national authorities, or “civil-military coordination” but, in the end, they were functional compacts and networks that brought results.

Conclusion I began this chapter by asserting that coherence is vital in any organization, more so in temporary organizations such as peace operations. A common understanding of coherence in public policy, particularly in peace operations, is crucial if conflicts are to be resolved and international peace and security maintained. In searching for a common meaning of coherence, I postulated a conceptual definition of coherence as compacts and subcompacts. I then examined an actual peace operation, UNMIL, from this angle. My analysis showed that, even though UNMIL did not factor in coherence

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as a strategic or operational need at the very beginning, it de facto pursued compact building two years into its life cycle and, therefore, succeeded. UNMIL demonstrates the utility of compacts, both as a strategy and as an analytical tool, for coherent functioning of temporary organizations like peace operations. The UNMIL experience has also shown that compacts involve identifying a critical minimum path over a period of time as well as creating a logical symmetry of larger objectives and goals with a broad operational direction. Compacts are logical pathways to progress, within constraints, toward common goals. The greater the inclusiveness, the more optimal and harmonious is the overall compact (e.g., the LRDC and CSTs). Compacts do not come about automatically. They have to be crafted, created, and nourished by managers. They require well-thought-out strategic actions and need concentrated effort. An intertemporal and results-based visualization of compacts is also necessary, particularly since peace operations are temporary organizations and mandates have to be fulfilled within a finite time frame, (see Chapter 4 by Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters in this volume). Field operations tend to define internal priorities and make informed choices on actions or initiatives while trying to predict outcomes within a reasonable time frame. As an example, when deciding whether to construct a road for military access to a province, the results-based planning team would not only focus on military access, but also on elements of recovery since improved transportation of goods and services for the population would enhance economic activity. Good strategies attempt to lock such intertemporal outcomes into coherent strands. Evaluating and monitoring results or outcomes of actions or initiatives are significantly improved if this lock-in is deliberately factored into strategic plans at the outset of the peace operations. Clearly, for any planner and manager, compacts provide a useful lens for coherence from the planning to the concluding stages of a peace operation. While conceptualizing the initial outline or rationale of any organization, a planner needs to administer, as stated before, the litmus test of whether structures, initiatives, contemplated processes, networks, and information channels are all compacted into one single mass, and whether that mass has the internal logic for the achievement of the intended goals with the best utilization of resources. In the operating phase, a similar lens can be applied as initiatives and programs are monitored and evaluated and midway corrections contemplated. Interlocked benchmarks as opposed to noncorrelated benchmarks are a critical component in judging whether predetermined markers to signify progress have been achieved (the CSTs in Liberia were a good example of the intermeshing of security, humanitarian, human rights, and recovery benchmarks). In the end stage of a peace oper-

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ation, or even in evaluating whether an end stage has arrived, the compact approach is a useful vehicle to assess whether and when to coherently terminate such a temporary organization. Finally, compacts do not have a unique identity. Liberia was one example of UN compact building. There can be others that have a different shape, nature, and structure. However, the single common thread among them is the requirement of logic and positive correlation that should bind them into one whole to attain coherent functioning.

Notes 1. See Bruce Jones, Richard Gowan, and Jake Sherman, “Excerpts from Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty,” in Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force (New York: Center for International Cooperation, 2009), pp. 19−38; and Nicola Dahrendorf, “MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: The Case of the DRC,” in Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, eds., Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008), pp. 67–112. 2. See, for example, UN, Report of the Special Committee on Peace Operations and Its Working Group at the 2006 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/60/19, March 22, 2006; UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304, June 11, 2009; and UN, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” UN Doc. S/PRST/2010/7, April 16, 2010. 3. In physics [coherence] refers to the force by which molecules are held together, the “constant phase relationship” of waves or the viscosity of a substance. In philosophy, coherence theory holds that “the truth of a proposition consists in the coherence of that proposition with all other true propositions. These are precise concepts. By contrast, in the social sciences, the term is new and untested.” See Robert Picciotto, “Key Concepts, Central Issues,” in Fostering Development in a Global Economy: A Whole of Government Perspective (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005), pp. 9−19. 4. Such an understanding corresponds to and builds on other articulations of the meaning of coherence in the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding; see, for example, Cedric de Coning, who defines “coherence” in Chapter 6 of this volume as “the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding operation towards common strategic objectives.” 5. My definition of competing interests is the differing organizational mandates and priorities of actors and institutions. For example, in peacekeeping environments, humanitarian actors may want to immediately provide aid to civilians behind the lines of combatants. However, the combatants may use that aid to strengthen themselves and prolong the conflict. Therefore, peace enforcement could potentially become a problem. These are competing (and not necessarily conflicting) interests. 6. I define uncertain operating environment as a situation where predictability between application of policy levers and their outcomes are vitiated due to a host of reasons. In a postconflict scenario, this could range from activities of nonintegrated

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ex-combatants, former warlords working against a peace process, or simply lack of information or communication as well as the governance capacity of a state. 7. These mechanisms were based on the recommendations of the Brahimi Report and were intended to ensure mission integration. 8. See UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, par. 6(b). 9. See UN, Integrated Missions Planning Process, Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, June 13, 2006. 10. Government priorities may intersect with UN field-level operations up to only a certain point since national priorities may well go into areas beyond a mandate. 11. Refer to the ongoing discussions in the UN General Assembly in UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Assistance and the Environment. Delivering as One, UN Doc. A/61/583, November 20, 2006. 12. UN, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia, UN Doc. S/2003/875, September 13, 2003. 13. A commission to hear witnesses and the truth of the widespread killings could have, subject to evidence collected, potentially implicated persons or groups who were negotiating peace. 14. UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1509, September 19, 2003. 15. UN, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia, par. 52. 16. The Security Council postponed the election deadline from October 2005, as had been stipulated in the ACPA, to “no later” than the end of that year, messaging that there was flexibility in the ACPA and thereby weakening its sacrosanct nature. 17. UN, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia, par. 52. 18. See, for example, Xavier Zeebroek, “Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Burundi and Liberia Country Studies” Briefing Paper (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, July 2006), pp. 16, 21−24, and 32. 19. See Government of Liberia, 150-Day Action Plan: A Working Document for a New Liberia (Government of Liberia, Monrovia, April 2006). 20. Erin McCandless, “Lessons from Liberia: Integrated Approaches to Peacebuilding in Transitional Settings,” Paper No. 161 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2008), p 7. 21. These are detailed in the UN, Twelfth Progress Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2006/743, September 12, 2006, p. 15. 22. UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1712, September 29, 2006, op. par. 4. 23. Picciotto, “Key Concepts, Central Issues.” 24. UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1777, September 20, 2007, op. par. 5.

8 Organizational Learning and Peace Operations Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann

LEARNING IS RECOGNIZED AS BEING FUNDAMENTAL FOR EVERY INDI-

vidual, group, and organization. It is a key notion in both official United Nations documents and scholarly literature that deals with the UN system in general and with peace operations in particular.1 The experiences of the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, along with internal audit processes, triggered the UN to finally take key strategic steps toward institutionalizing organizational learning (OL), which had been outlined in An Agenda for Peace from 1992 and, as a first step, resulted in the establishment of the so-called Lessons Learned Unit (LLU), among other measures. The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, referred to as the Brahimi Report, outlined an array of lessons to be learned for planning and implementing peace operations. Improvements are still in the making, but the creation of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) within the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 2001 made learning into an even stronger organizational focal point after the establishment of the LLU in the 1990s. Other reform initiatives were also developed and partly implemented such as the Guidance Project. Yet as the Introduction to this volume outlines, performance at headquarters, and, to an even larger degree, in the field, are subject to learning constraints that may stem from power asymmetries, political compromises, organizational compartmentalization, or even from intended ignorance and spoiling.2 Scholars have only belatedly established organizational learning in peace operations as a field of study. Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, for instance, examine the emergence of an internal learning infrastructure for peace operations, mainly at the headquarters level.3 Rainer Breul accentuates the role that crises play in facili161

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tating large-scale reform and learning processes (e.g., the Brahimi Report) while noting that incremental change is constantly observable.4 This incremental change is investigated by Gisela Hirschmann, who analyzes the learning processes that have led to a change of peacekeeping exit strategies from an election-based approach to a more comprehensive peacebuilding strategy.5 Lise Morjé Howard specifies that first-order learning (i.e., the improvement of existing processes) is the most probable and practical modus operandi in the field.6 However, the literature is still nascent and has not yet drawn much on the many empirical lessons offered by the private sector and public administrations. Building on the well-established insight that peace operations consist of network-like and heterogeneous organizational structures (see Chapter 1 by Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf in this volume), in this chapter we provide an overview of key concepts from the organizational learning literature, that are applicable to peace operations; we illustrate them with three empirical examples of learning attempts at the field level in the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The chapter incorporates a dialogue from three perspectives: organizational and public administration theory (specifically, organizational learning and organizational culture), international relations and international organization research, and field experiences and research within peace operations at both headquarters and field levels.

Setting the Stage Peace operations are established for a specific purpose such as to facilitate the process of reaching a negotiated agreement between conflict parties, to monitor the implementation of such an agreement, to provide support for its implementation, or to govern a territory and perform interim administrative functions. They are mandated to perform functions that are stated in a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution and stipulated in a peace agreement, alongside policies of a general or universal nature approved by the UN General Assembly, which are binding for all UN activities. Their multinational personnel are recruited under contracts that are limited in duration. Some are seconded to a peace operation from a UN system organization. Career paths are not clearly defined and mission tasks regularly change during the course of an operation requiring staff to perform simultaneously different sets of functions. The closing of a mission generally implies the end of the employment period. The activities associated with peace operations range from complex political negotiations and providing “good offices,” to planning and implementing technical tasks such as the demobilization of former combatants or assisting the parties in performing civil administra-

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tion functions, to regular monitoring and observation of certain territories, groups of people, or events as provided for in a peace agreement and mandated by the UNSC. Other tasks relate to administering the operation itself and include providing services to all staff and ensuring that administrative rules and regulations are observed along with reporting to the UNSC on the implementation of the mandate. Peace operations are temporary organizations, as Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters analyzed in Chapter 4 of this volume. Their lifespan depends to a large degree on external factors, determined by an external authority such as the host country government and the conflict parties, as well as the UN Security Council (UNSC), which mandate an operation that reflects internal Council divisions. The UNSC may decide to renew the mandate, normally for a period of twelve months, though sometimes for half of that period. A successful peace operation is ideally dissolved—or in UN terminology “liquidated”—the moment that peace is sustainably achieved or the parties consider external intervention as no longer acceptable. In general, little is known about organizational learning in temporary or transitional organizations,7 and even less about those operating in a war zone or under complex, unstructured, and unpredictable circumstances. These multifaceted and often rapidly changing conditions make peace operations complex and both externally (involvement of member states) as well as internally (frictions between military and civilian components of a mission) highly politicized organizations. They are different from private national or multinational companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and national public administrations, which are generally the focus of the organizational learning literature. Even though all large organizations have complex characteristics and some of them are multinational, temporary, or network-like, the literature does not address learning in organizations that combine all of these features together. Political organizations hardly receive any attention at all while studies on hierarchical and smaller organizational entities dominate the scene. However, organizational learning theories offer a set of lenses for exploring the factors that enable or impede the ability of UN peace operations to effectively draw on the knowledge gained from previous experiences, even if their organizational design and their mandates differ widely. One key advantage of these theories is that they allow zooming in on different organizational levels and constellations such as organizational entities with complementary or competing functions. It is possible to focus on specific learning processes within a single unit in a mission, such as the Political Affairs Division or the mission’s administration, or to examine learning across different missions in the New York headquarters or learning between levels (e.g., between DPKO in New York and a field mission). Scholars have identified several forms of learning and have demonstrated that the

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ability to engage in each of these forms, depending on the needs of the situation, represents a core organizational competence. These concepts and insights can be used to diagnose whether the appropriate learning forms are being applied in the organization and whether other learning forms need to be developed to address current and emerging challenges. Not only practitioners who can benefit from looking at the field of peace operations through the lenses of organizational learning theory— the analysis also offers scholars the opportunity to refine their understanding of organizational phenomena. It expands the range of organizations under study beyond the predominant focus on private and public sector organizations. Research on peace operations reveals insights into organizational processes of an ad hoc and temporary character that are often of a highly political nature. The multiplicity of organizations involved in an operation and the multidimensionality of tasks permits scholars to assess complex processes of interorganizational learning. In particular, the interaction of international public administrations, military organizations, private sector companies, and civil society organizations can be observed as through a prism. Yet another reason that organizational learning theory can benefit from analyzing peace operations is that it may contribute new insights to the debate about the role of crises in organizational learning.

A Closer Look at Organizational Learning Theories Organizational Learning as a Cognitive and Behavioral Process In the thirty years that the field of organizational learning has been developing, numerous definitions of organizational learning surfaced, each emphasizing different aspects. This chapter applies a comprehensive definition of organizational learning: it encompasses processes of acquiring, sharing, interpreting, using, and storing knowledge within and between organizations to expand the shared repertoire of how to make sense of and respond to changes in the sociopolitical, economic, cultural, natural, and technological environment. Thus, organizational learning refers to cognitive and behavioral processes; it is about perceptions and actions in organizations, and about the conditions or context of organizational performance and behavior. The term organizational learning is at times also used to refer to the outcome of these processes (see Chapter 11 by Michael Bauer, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill in this volume), though the focus here is on the processes themselves. The advantage of this broad definition that encompasses multiple dimensions is that it lays the groundwork for examining processes in

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complex, multidimensional, and multilevel settings such as those which characterize peace operations: • This definition highlights the process dimension of organizational learning by specifying the different phases in which such learning occurs: acquisition, distribution, and interpretation of knowledge, its use in action, and storing what has been learned in organizational memory.8 The process of moving from one phase to another is neither linear nor automatic; rather, it is iterative and subject to interruptions. This aspect of the definition lays the groundwork for diagnosing barriers and gaps in organizational learning processes. For example, it is worth exploring whether some organizations involved in peace operations tend to skimp on or even skip certain phases of organizational learning. Furthermore, for civil as well as military components, an additional phase for some degrees of un-learning may be needed to readapt to new codes of conduct and new routines in order to once again fulfill their customary tasks after being sent back to their home organization. • The definition expands the focus of attention beyond the boundaries of a single unit to include learning between units within a larger organization or, as Wolfgang Seibel and his coauthors (see Chapter 1) call them, “conglomerates” of organizations. This extended focus is especially relevant for understanding peace operations as they are comprised of multiple actors each answering to their own goals and interests. Applied, for example, to a UN Development Programme (UNDP) field office, this focus makes it possible to consider how all of the units involved manage their own learning processes and their shared learning. This approach also permits an analysis of an intentional exclusion of learning or change to protect the integrity or mandate of the organization. In addition, learning processes have to cross four levels: (1) the level of international politics among member states; (2) the supranational level of international bureaucracies that are to some degree autonomous from their principal member states (see certain characteristics that Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann discuss in relation to DPKO in Chapter 10 of this volume); (3) the organizations implementing the mandate on the field level; and, often forgotten, (4) the various international, regional, and local organizations that comprise the daily local partners within the country of deployment and to which the peace operation needs to hand over responsibilities at some point, in line with agreements negotiated with the parties such as the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo. The local partners (e.g., parties, new administrative staff, or newly trained police and military) have to learn very quickly, especially, considering that the process of assuming responsibility is ongoing and may not be completed once the mission leaves. Not all of the learning that they do is constructive, however. Some actors learn how to use the pres-

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ence of a peace operation for their own advantage as “spoilers”—and, thus, hamper the implementation of peace agreements.9 • The definition avoids the narrow problem-solving focus that has been criticized in some of the literature on organizational learning.10 It draws attention to the fact that the organization’s complex environment is open to interpretation, that there are different definitions of problems and solutions, and that sensemaking of this environment might entail one focus of a learning process as well.11 Herein lies one of the significant challenges for interorganizational learning: the culture, goals, and purpose of each organizational setting not only widely differ, but sometimes even exclude one another (e.g., political processes and humanitarian principles), often leading to different interpretations of situations and to a different set of limited choices for how to respond (see also Chapter 9 by Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring in this volume). The multiplicity of international, regional, and local organizations involved in peace operations, each with their culture and purpose, leads us to expect them to have to grapple with these barriers to intra- and interorganizational learning. In sum, our broad definition of organizational learning offers numerous advantages for studying peace operations by taking their fundamental characteristics into account: their process character, their interorganizational setup, their organizational diversity, and their opposed and conflicting mandates. Having clarified what we mean by organizational learning and having started to indicate the kinds of difficulties that are inherent to the related learning processes, we now turn to levels, agents, and types of organizational learning. Levels of Organizational Learning Researchers have grappled with the question of who learns ever since work in this field began.12 The pioneers, Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön point out that organizational learning is obviously based on individuals, but it is more than the sum of individual learning. It requires “a recognizable ‘we’ that can make decisions and translate these decisions into action.”13 The form that the recognizable we can take varies widely in size, legal structure, and organizational purpose. International comparative research suggests that there is not one single organizational form that is more conducive to organizational learning than others. This volume analyzes processes of organizational learning at three levels of peace operations: individual-, intraorganizational-, and interorganizational. Individual learning. Organizations learn through human agency and an

increasing number of learning agents has gained recognition in the litera-

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ture in recent years. Researchers originally focused primarily on top management as the agents responsible for knowing what the organization needed to know and to learn (see Chapter 12 by Sabine Boerner in this volume; and Philip Sadler 200114). Applied to the organizational core of peace operations at the country level, this corresponds to the role of the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as the head of the mission and its leadership team, comprised of the deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGS), force commander, police commissioner, chief of staff, and chief administrative officer (on SRSGs see Chapters 14 and 15 by Manuel Fröhlich and by Frederik Trettin, respectively, in this volume). As important as the leaders are in enabling or hindering organizational learning processes, it is clearly not sufficient to focus on them as the sole agents, especially since studies have shown how senior management and oversight boards can impede organizational learning by becoming blind to problems, resistant to changes, and deaf to different voices.15 Middle management, which is often vilified as a barrier to organizational learning, has been identified as a potential source of leadership for learning processes. Research in Japan has revealed the significant contribution that middle management makes through its hinge position between the perspectives of top management and the concrete knowledge of employees in production and in the market.16 In peace operations, heads of different departments (e.g., civil or political affairs), of (regional) field-based teams, or of military outposts assume this pivotal role. Below, we illustrate how the potential contribution offered by best practices officers—who are assigned to facilitate learning processes and to communicate them across levels—is used (or not used) in peace operations, and we show how participants involved in the budget process can also trigger learning processes. Individual agents can both passively and actively hinder organizational learning.17 Interviews with staff members within peace operations highlight various passive barriers to learning, such as inflexible adherence to established routines, nonparticipation in wider discussions and opportunities for knowledge transfers, or lack of motivation. Such behavior is not surprising when learning is experiences as a risk—to the suitability of their own abilities to perform their job, for instance—and when it is not to rewarded institutionally. In addition to such passive barriers, scholars have also uncovered active ways that leaders and staff members may act as bureaucratic spoilers by engaging in dissent shirking, obstruction, and sabotage to avoid such learning processes.18 Intraorganizational learning. The knowledge and perspectives of indi-

vidual agents are by nature limited to the specific context in which they are rooted. So in order for the organization as a whole to learn, processes of knowledge sharing are needed between organizational units and the center.

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Studies have revealed the important roles played by “communities of practice”—people in different parts of the organization who share knowledge and experience to address new problems at work.19 Communities of practice were originally invisible to management because they were self-organized and often cut across units and levels, but managers have since learned that such networks are worth stimulating and nurturing. To that end, organizations comprising peace operations have created online networks that connect people with similar functions and interests and explicitly call them “communities of practice.”20 Some studies have dealt with the dynamics of organizational learning between the center (e.g., headquarters) and the periphery of the organization (e.g., salespeople or people working abroad). People and units at the periphery of the organization who are in contact with diverse external stakeholders and deal with operational issues in the environment tend to bring in fresh knowledge and perspectives that agents at the center of the organization do not have to or may not recognize.21 While the sharing of knowledge for organizational learning may seem evident, difficulties abound in practice. The willingness of agents to share knowledge horizontally across departmental boundaries or vertically to the top of an organization, on the one hand, and to recognize the value of knowledge coming from other units, on the other, is often limited by differences in power and organizational cultures.22 Each peace operation suffers, to a greater or lesser degree, from communication barriers within mission functions; for example, between the military and the civilian components or between different functions (e.g., civil, political, and humanitarian affairs) and technical functions. Sometimes they can be productively mitigated, but sometimes leadership and middle management of a mission fail to establish a constructive atmosphere, resulting in dysfunctionalities and learning barriers. In addition, communication barriers exist between the mission and the host communities, be it the government, the parties, or civil society. The scarce amount of organizational literature on peace operations has not yet looked beyond the walls of the mission, an analytical gap that has consequences for the peace process. Interorganizational learning. Other agents of organizational learning

who have recently received more attention in organizational science and management literature are external stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers, and outside organizations) and boundary spanners (e.g., consultants and advisory boards). They are considered to be useful sources of knowledge from the environment, and organizational and individual agents whose different perspectives can challenge established ways of seeing and doing things within the organization. Research has revealed that these advantages do, however, come at a cost. For example, an organization’s capacity to absorb, make sense of, and use knowledge can be overwhelmed by too many, often conflicting, external perspectives; the organization’s ability to

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buffer itself is also important.23 Furthermore, the organization risks becoming overly dependent on the expertise of externally based boundary spanners, rather than growing its own capacities. In peace operations, it is useful to distinguish between two broad types of interorganizational learning, corresponding roughly to the internal and the external learning environment: • Learning among entities that form the organizational field of a peace operation is referred to as internal interorganizational learning. An organizational field comprises those organizations that collectively constitute a recognized area of organizational life.24 Internal interorganizational learning encompasses knowledge creation and sharing among the strategic-level institutions such as the UNSC, the troop-contributing countries (TCCs), the Secretariat, the UN agencies and funds under the New York–based umbrella of the UN resident coordinator system, and the operational-level institutions at the field level. • Learning among the organizational field and various organizations in the environment of the organizational field is referred to as external interorganizational learning. Those organizations might be local organizations, other international organizations such as the financial or development institutions (e.g., the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), regional organizations (e.g., the African Union, although they are sometimes mandated to be the core of peace operations in peacekeeping partnerships or hybrid missions), nongovernmental organizations, key donor organizations and governments of affected UN member states, and private organizations and investors. Communication and knowledge-transfer constitute the basis of any learning process. The UN has a variety of mechanisms and strategic frameworks that can contribute to enhancing communication and knowledgetransfer across and beyond the UN system such as the UN Development Assistance Framework, (Humanitarian) Consolidated Appeal Processes, interinstitutional Poverty Reduction Strategies, Results Focused Transitional Framework, Integrated Mission Planning Processes (IMPPs), or the integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards (IDDRS; see Chapter 5 by Tobias Pietz in this volume). The Peacebuilding Commission could also be an agent of knowledge sharing for peace operations in which the countries involved are on its agenda. Scholars have analyzed these tools from the perspective of interinstitutional cooperation, coordination, integration, and coherence (see Chapter 2 by Anna Herrhausen and Chapter 6 by Cedric de Coning in this volume), but their impact on organizational learning has rarely been investigated. This brief review of the literature on the question of who learns shows that there are numerous potential agents of organizational learning in peace

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operations. The ability of an organization to learn depends on the interaction among the actors and the agreement reached on common goals and joint action; each type of agent can of course both enable and impede organizational learning—be they individuals or organizations. Forms of Organizational Learning From the inception of this field, scholars have recognized the usefulness in distinguishing among different forms of organizational learning. A core distinction was introduced by Chris Argyris and Don Schön is between “single loop,” “double loop,” and “deutero” learning.25 Single loop learning refers to learning that is intended to improve existing processes, and “is sufficient where error correction can proceed by changing organizational strategies and assumptions within a constant framework of norms for performance.”26 It is similar to simple trial-and-error, case-by-case learning and adaption. It does not necessarily mean that the basic routines and norms of an organization are improved or changed. Double loop learning refers to learning that challenges existing ways of seeing and doing things. It entails setting new priorities and changing organizational norms.27 Deutero learning refers to organizational processes of learning from experience. It refers to the ability to “reflect on and inquire into previous episodes of organizational learning, or failure to learn.”28 This form can be summarized as learning to learn. The complexity and intrusiveness of these three forms thus increases from single loop to double loop to deutero learning, but all are equally important. Howard, for instance, emphasizes the importance of first-order learning in peace operations and their volatile environment as well as the ad hoc nature of the activities.29 Beyond these central forms of organizational learning, other researchers have added several more concepts. We introduce a few that we find most relevant for peace operations and use them in our case analysis. First, by introducing the concepts of exploration and exploitation, James G. March emphasized the need for organizations to engage in complementary forms (single loop, double loop, or deutero) of learning simultaneously or sequentially.30 Second, the concept of unlearning highlights that learning cannot be treated as a purely cumulative process owing to the fact that knowledge and skills gained in the past sometimes need to be put aside in order for new ones to be developed.31 Organizational memory can take many forms (e.g., routines, formal and informal rules, data banks, or documents), and it is both essential and a potential hindrance for learning.32 Third, imitation learning refers to learning from the experience of others. Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón show that such learning requires a creative process of translation, based on a deep understanding of the con-

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textual nature of knowledge.33 In other words, it is not a simple transplantation of knowledge and practices from one place to another, as is too often assumed in the distillation of “best practices.” Fourth, Ikujiro Nonaka, Ryoko Toyama, and Toru Hirata have developed a model that offers a different way of looking at organizational learning, which they refer to as “knowledge creation,” emphasizing the creative nature of the process even more explicitly.34 Their rich model, which they are continuing to develop, is based on four forms of learning: (1) socialization, whereby members of an organization share the implicit knowledge they have developed through experience, by observing each other and working together; (2) externalization, which is the process of creating knowledge by making implicit knowledge explicit, for oneself and for others; (3) combination, which refers to knowledge creation that results from bringing together different bodies of explicit knowledge; and (4) internalization, when explicit knowledge is integrated into routines and practices in an organization and becomes part of the body of implicit knowledge. The four forms of knowledge creation are complementary. An aspect that is often neglected is the willingness or readiness to initiate a learning process. This entails defining a problem or an opportunity and generating a sense of urgency to learn.35 As we show below, crises can play a pivotal role in triggering organizational learning, and the willingness of the leadership to begin such a process is fundamental. In peace operations, the best practices officers could play this role, for example, in the largest multidimensional mission, the one in Sudan or in a mission that has gone through a multitude of mandate changes and organizational expansions, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, their role is still underutilized (see below). The conclusion that emerges from the literature is that there is no one best way to learn; organizations need to engage in each of these forms of learning. An organization will have periods during which one learning form is needed, and periods during which a different one should be pursued. For example, the start-up phase of a peace operation provides a learning environment that is fundamentally different from learning in the implementation phase. During the early phase that requires quick fixes and adaptations, the mission should focus on first-order learning; in later phases, more reflexive and deep forms of learning should be prioritized. Unfortunately, however, as we illustrate below, this does not always happen. Lise Morje Howard’s research implies that first-order or single-loop learning might be more realistic for the volatile environments in which peace operations operate.36 Even though these learning processes might not resolve strategic incoherence or dysfunctional institutional designs, a mission might be able to learn from mistakes. Similarly, it might be dangerous

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for peace operations to simply transfer what has been learned in one mission to another context, using template structures and policies. A case in point is the uncritical adoption of the template of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Mission staff need to be aware of the particularities of each place to which they are sent and have a solid understanding of the mandated tasks—partial unlearning is key. It should be noted in this context that mandates are primarily a reflection of the compromise reached by the UNSC, rather than representing the best possible solution to a civil conflict. Barriers and Enablers of Organizational Learning A further strand of the literature addresses the factors that impede or enable organizational learning. This section presents the most important barriers and enablers for UN peace operations: Learning leaders. A key finding in the organizational learning literature is

that leadership at all levels of the organization matters. Mission staff in diverse functions can initiate learning processes, independently from their title and status, be they SRSGs or junior level staff. This finding represents a shift away from assigning primary responsibility for organizational learning to the top of the organization, and it has implications for conceptualizing training and coaching for mission staff; encouraging entrepreneurship and nurturing managerial skills is essential. This goes beyond training that merely addresses standards, rules, and principles, which is still dominant in peace operations. Perhaps even more significantly, the literature suggests that leaders must be viewed as engaging in learning themselves. This implies overcoming the barriers in hierarchical organizations whereby leaders define learning objectives only for their staff.37 Scholars and managers have shown interest in experiences with After Action Reviews (AARs) in the US and Israeli military, in which the normal rules of hierarchy and status are temporarily suspended to enable learning from and by all participants in an exercise.38 As we illustrate below, AARs are now quite common tools in peace operations, but the insights they generate unfortunately do not necessarily always result in learning. The absorptive capacity is an equally important enabler, which we discuss in the next section. Absorptive capacity. Studies have shown that the ability to harness prior related knowledge, to recognize the value of new information, and then to assimilate and apply it is critical in organizational learning.39 The absorptive capacity of an organization is impeded by a lack of previous knowledge and by rigidities in routines and procedures or other role-constraining structures that make the infusion of new knowledge difficult. The frequent staff rota-

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tions and the rigid structures (particularly, in procurement) certainly lower the absorptive capacities of peace operations. While these routines and procedures protect the individual from information overload and reduce uncertainty, they also block new and useful information. Knowledge-sharing hostility and the existence of a high degree of unquestioned assumptions are further barriers to developing absorptive capacity and, thereby, also to organizational learning. We show some of these patterns in our case studies of UNMIS. Permeability of boundaries. A closely related factor affecting the flow of

knowledge for organizational learning is the permeability of internal and external boundaries. Intra- and interorganizational learning are severely constrained when boundaries between units in an organization, as well as those between the organization and other actors in its environment (i.e., problems, technology, political demands, and norms and principles) are impermeable. Here, communication is key. Compared with business or national organizational settings, international peace operations are subject to greater divergence of stakeholder interests (e.g., conflicting demands from various donors, Group of Friends, and members of the UNSC). Boundaries with grater permeability (i.e., channels of communication among organizational units and with an organization’s environment) are likely to improve the organization’s responsiveness to changing demands and conditions in the environment.40 All too often, peace operations are organized according to templates or standard organizational charts rather than in response to field requirements. Bringing in communication platforms and fora for interaction with various UN bodies, member states, NGOs, and other interest groups while also promoting flexible organizational designs are effective ways of making boundaries more permeable. Sense of urgency. Crises have received extensive attention in the literature

as potential triggers for organizational learning. Many accounts of significant changes in organizational procedures start with a crisis. This is when management recognizes that the established ways of doing things are the cause of the problem.41 The high degree of media visibility that accompanies crises draws the intense attention of individual or systemic actors to a problem and can induce subsequent policy or organizational changes—and an aggregation of crises reinforces this effect.42 Some authors claim that in difficult learning environments, external shocks and crises are the pivotal triggers for attempts to overcome inertia and to spur the demand for information.43 Crises offer an opportunity to unlearn or to turn hidden or tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, if participants seek the opportunity to put forward solutions that they have already developed.44 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that crises are always conducive to organi-

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zational learning. Responses to crisis situations can also resort to routine action or, even worse, to operational barriers, if people pay more attention to what has happened than to why it has happened. In the case of peace operations, learning might not occur since at least external crisis in the form of erupting conflicts among the parties or a general difficult security situation is the normal modus operandi of a mission. However, devastating failures, such as in Srebrenica or Rwanda, have triggered slow but fundamental learning processes. Learning in the limelight. Intense, critical observation by the media and

external stakeholders can serve as both an enabler and a barrier for learning. Once in the limelight, an organization and its leadership need to demonstrate that they take a problem seriously and respond to public demands for improvement, which, can trigger learning processes. The drawback to learning in the limelight is that mistakes are not tolerated, so safe solutions are preferred and ways are sought to avoid being associated with a problem. It would be instructive to study the conditions under which learning in the limelight is an enabler in peace operations and when, instead—given the context and the agents—rhetorical action or symbolic adaptation processes may predominate. From our interviews, we gained the impression that, when peace operations are in the limelight, the key actors tend to resort more to established standards and learning is thereby blocked. The higher the extent of public exposure and pressure, the stronger the defensive or conservative approach and the lower the risk taking. Cultural and environmental diversity. As they can agree on what needs to be done and how to do it better, relatively homogeneous organizations find it easier than culturally diverse organizations to engage in single loop learning. On the other hand, culturally homogeneous organizations find it more difficult to engage in double loop learning since it is difficult to introduce diverse views that could challenge the organizational paradigm. Culturally diverse organizations have the advantage of being able to draw on multiple perspectives, though extremely diverse organizations are likely to encounter difficulties in establishing a common understanding of new directions to take and might resort to either no learning or single loop adaption in subunits. In their cultural diversity, peace operations are likely to find a barrier to organizational learning. Symbolic gestures, such as an oath of office or guidance notes emphasizing UN principles, are attempts to neutralize cultural diversity. They indicate that peace operations view cultural diversity as a problem rather than as a potential resource for organizational learning. These enablers and barriers matter greatly for organizational learning in peace operations. The challenges faced by most managers in peace oper-

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ations are that most of these factors are ambivalent; they need to try to nurture the enabling side. In the next section, we explore some of the agents, forms, and types of learning in the case of the UN Mission in the Sudan. Concentrating on a single mission is a well-established procedure in case study design (in this case, a congruence analysis), when there is a high degree of theoretical complexity and the intention is to illustrate the plausability of the main concepts.45 We decided to focus on UNMIS for several reasons: first, in keeping with the focus of this volume, it is a complex multidimensional peace operation; second, UNMIS was one of the first two missions to include a best practices officer46; third, we had contacts in the mission who provided access to documents and interviewees. Within the scope of this chapter, it is not possible to analyze all details (levels, forms, and agents) of learning within UNMIS. Our aim here is to illustrate the mechanisms of enablers and barriers within the mission.

Organizational Learning Meets UN Peace Operations: Patterns of Learning in UNMIS The unprecedented surge in peacekeeping over the past decade is at the center of a policy debate on UN peace operations, challenging major policy principles and operational procedures. The UN has recognized these challenges and the importance of learning in peace operations in many documents, including An Agenda for Peace in 1992, the Brahimi Report in 2000, the DPKO’s Capstone Doctrine in 2008, and the DPKO and Department of Field Support’s nonpaper A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping in 2009. While organizational learning, or the failure to learn, is not explicitly at the center of most debates, it is recognized as playing an important and institutionalized role. Examples of the ways it is being institutionalized are the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section that was created in 2001 and is now under the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) as well as the introduction of best practices officers (in UN terminology “Field Network of Best Practices Officers and Focal Points”) who are deployed in specific multidimensional peacekeeping missions. The officers usually report directly to mission senior management and are globally coordinated at the UN headquarters. PBPS has also developed a best practices toolbox for field missions, which explains how to conduct After Action Reviews and it has introduced a best practices reporting mechanism as well as e-mail networks connecting people with similar functions and interests called communities of practice.47 Knowledge generated by these activities informs the section’s policy and advising work. However, in the absence of regular, mandatory, and independent evaluation of the per-

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formance of peace operations at large, as well as specific policies and functions, the PBPS depends on unsystematic and often incomplete information gathered from the field. While the work of the PBPS and the UN Secretariat’s capacity to learn have been the subject of many studies (see Chapter 10 for a complete overview), learning at the field level has attracted surprisingly little attention. We examine three illustrative cases within the Sudan missions to illustrate types, forms, barriers, and enablers of learning identified in the literature: first, best practices activities within a peace operation; second, standard training and capacity development; and third, the introduction of results-based budgeting at the field level.48 Field-based Best Practice Activities Intended to Foster Intraorganizational Learning As indicated above, DPKO and PBPS initially established best practices units initially within large and multidimensional missions. This followed extensive negotiations with a number of missions since the additional costs had to be reallocated from other areas of the budget. In 2005, UNMIS and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) established these units and agreed to exchange experiences. In the case of the Sudan, the unit reported to the chief of staff and, as such, was part of the overall office of the SRSG. A UN volunteer (UNV) supported the best practices officer—the best practices office consisted of only one UNV. Other human resources had to be mobilized on a case-by-case basis. The unit was responsible for supporting intraorganizational learning based on examples of best practices generated locally or advised by the headquarters in New York. Hence, it provides a useful basis for illustrating the concepts of learning between units and levels, the permeability of boundaries within and across organizations, and the role of agents in learning. To enhance the absorptive capacity of the mission (one enabler of organizational learning in peace operations), there were principally three instruments for the organizational learning tasks of knowledge acquisition, sharing, interpretation, and storage: after action reviews, handover reports, and regular and ad hoc reports. After action reviews. During the start-up phase, the UNMIS leadership

realized that there was a need for the capacity to review and evaluate specific events, which had put the growing organization under stress (see below). The outcome of this internal discussion was the decision to entrust the best practices unit reporting directly to the chief of staff to establish an after action review system (thus giving it some degree of clout and access to additional resources). Mission leadership intended to use it to foster

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learning from civilian as well as military operations. Priority was to be given to events of a crosscutting nature that affected more than one function of the mission and of interest to the entire organization—for instance, a security incident when the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacked in South Sudan in 2005. The procedure for activating an AAR entailed several steps. The senior management team (SMT), which met daily to review and initiate activities and to provide policy guidance, tasked the best practices unit with investigating unusual events affecting the overall performance of the mission. Following this, a review was conducted on site by the best practices officer with support organized by the chief of staff in consultation with the SMT, either drawing from existing capacities of the unit or through temporary assignment of other staff. Most of the reviews dealt with security-related incidents such as an attack by the LRA on a mission team site bordering Uganda or large-scale security incidents inside the cease-fire zone. Other reviews were initiated to look at the internal functioning of the organization, such as training, conduct, and discipline, staff welfare, and other related matters, in most cases designed as an attempt to enhance intramission dialogue and joint action, in particular between civilian and military (security) functions. The findings of these reviews were presented to the SMT with specific recommendations for action. In theory, the idea of introducing AARs into peace operations was a good one. However, reviews undertaken by UNMIS until 2007 had neither resulted in changes of operational policies nor in the improvement of operational performance. This applies in particular to the security and safety of team sites as well as to protecting the civilian staff and population under imminent threat: they were at best first-order learning activities. With a reshuffle of staff, AARs stopped at the end of 2006. A UN volunteer who was given their tasks by the best practices unit of DPKO soon replaced the best practices officer. One interviewee described the situation afterward as follows: “the best practice office has been an example of worst practice. They remember to send around a paper from time to time and then take a long rest.” Certain individual mission functions started to organize their own reviews. For example, in 2010 Civil Affairs undertook stock taking exercises: one on work done on “governance” in cooperation with best practices in New York and the second on practices applied in the area of “conflict mitigation and management” in cooperation with an international NGO. Hence, agency and leadership matters. More involved leadership could have given the necessary support to make AARs the basis of secondorder learning. Handover reports. Another potentially relevant knowledge source for learning is a system of handover reports using a structured format and

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voluntary written end-of-assignment documents. Middle and senior managers leaving the mission were requested to produce these reports prior to their departure, and the administration of this system was the responsibility of the mission’s best practices officer. However, the analysis of these reports, in particular those written by senior staff, is done by headquarters in New York and the results are not necessarily communicated systematically down to the field level, not even in a generic manner by way of periodic advisories or other such instruments. The boundaries of the single organizational levels were not permeable enough. The contents also varied: some read like an application for a higher-level position and lacked discussion of critical incidents while others voiced harsh criticism of the mission’s performance and the overall peace operation system. The effects for organizational learning are, by and large, limited and very selective. There was great room for improvement on various management levels, especially in the communication channels between New York and Khartoum. Regular and ad hoc reports. Each subunit or mission function contributes

to regular reports, either as mandated by the Security Council (mandate reports), required as part of a procedure, or determined by mission management. Reports are consolidated at the level of the respective DSRSGs and the SRSG. These reports provide the most consistent and transparent information about organizational performance if read consistently in relation to a standard set of quality criteria and over a longer period of time. Unfortunately, this information is neither systematically reviewed nor analyzed. The reports include statistical information about staffing, including vacancy rates, and observations about strengths and weaknesses of the peace process. Unfortunately, however, this information is neither systematically reviewed nor analyzed. In the absence of other systematically documented descriptions of mission performance, ignoring these reports entails a significant loss of potential organizational learning. Taken together, there were quite a few efforts to initiate learning processes within and across peace operations. They included making tacit knowledge explicit, reflecting on crises and incidents, and evaluating the effectiveness of routines. UN staff frequently cite these three sources as enablers of organizational learning. The Sudan experience, however, shows its limits. In particular, it highlights the dependency on field leadership in supporting the translation of knowledge into learning. Overall, the institutional capacity to absorb lessons and the permeability of its boundaries appear to be low. The interviews we conducted within the mission showed very little institutional knowledge about organizational learning concepts and findings.

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Standard Training, Capacity Development, and Staff Diversity Training is a core part of organizational learning. In practice, training and learning are often used interchangeably. In peace missions, training generally takes place right before and during deployment or secondment. In-mission training is coordinated by the mission training unit, which is part of the administrative support services function, with a co-director or deputy director with a military background. Military and civilians go through different training programs. In the following, we briefly describe the mechanisms in place before assessing their impacts on organizational learning processes. Uniformed personnel. Military peacekeepers and police personnel are seconded to a mission by UN member states. During their deployment, they remain employed by their respective national governments and are normally rotated after six to twelve months. They undergo a predeployment training (General Assembly Resolution 49/37 of 9 December 1994), in line with UN Pre-deployment Training Standards.49 UN DPKO Integrated Training Service provides assistance to contributing countries on request and based on the training provided, as well as in conformity with UN peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards. Training needs and the development of training standards are assessed in a joint process involving the Integrated Training Service and UN member states. The effectiveness of predeployment training is difficult to assess due to considerable differences in the capabilities and competencies among contingents from different nations. In-mission training of uniformed personnel is normally conducted by the national contingents themselves, as they are often deployed in different areas of a country and speak different languages. Lower ranks are frequently unprepared to operate in a multicultural context. The mission training unit limits its contribution to training mandated by the General Assembly such as on HIV/AIDS and sexual exploitation and abuse; military training is not provided. The training of military observers takes place after their arrival in the mission. This includes the use of modern communication and navigation tools such as global positioning system (GPS) equipment, radio and satellite communication equipment, working in multicultural teams, and reporting skills. Police personnel undergo separate training and briefing programs, depending on their specific tasks and location. The international civilian workforce. Civilians may be seconded from

the UN Secretariat, UN regional commissions, and UN specialized agencies

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and funds. This is the smallest portion of civilian staff in a mission. However, they tend to occupy strategically relevant positions. Others are transferred or recruited from ongoing peace operations or those in the process of being dissolved perform general service support and security-related functions. The majority of staff who perform civilian managerial or technical professional functions are recruited externally; they are entitled to a minimum of five training days per year. The civilian staff have diverse experience, come from different cultural settings, and have their own expectations and motivations. Forming them into a coherent professional workforce and designing suitable training programs to enhance their technical skills and ensure compliance with rules and regulations, including a common code of conduct, are major challenges in any setting, even more so in volatile and unstructured situations with fragile oversight and performance management. The majority of national civilian staff performs general service and support functions, ranging from security guard to driver, translator, interpreter, or junior technical assistant. A minority of them may have worked previously with a program by a UN organization operating in the country. The vast majority applies for any job with a mission in the hope to qualify for a position commensurate with their formal training and work experience. A national driver or security guard with a postgraduate degree is not an exception. The problem is that UN administrative rules prevent the move into the national professional category, from general service, which is the entry level for an international assignment of a locally recruited national staff member. This blockage is one of the primary reasons for discontent and protest. In addition, there are international and national contractors. They are not considered UN staff, but they work side by side with mission staff and often are not easily distinguishable. Nevertheless, they cannot take part in mission training programs. Organizational learning in peace operations is not well supported by rules for career development and professional advancement. Structural learning incentives remain low: UN staff members promoted while on mission duty might lose the promotion on return to the seconding UN entity. National staff recruited as support staff cannot be promoted to the professional category, they need to apply again and compete with newcomers. Externally recruited staff are rarely promoted, and if at all, the process takes such a long time that the promotion usually coincides with the end of the assignment. Staff performance and motivation therefore appears to be different in a temporary and multidimensional organization, such as a peace operation, as compared to an established organization staffed by international civil servants with respective privileges and responsibilities at the UN headquarters in New York. Despite regular appeals and policy statements issued at the highest level of the organization, there is ample room for improvement to exchange staff from headquarters to the field level and vice versa.

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Training of civilian staff consists of three categories: strategic, technical, and special-to-mission training.50 In the reality of a mission such as UNMIS, all newly arrived civilian staff, including police and, under certain circumstances also military observers, participate in a week-long induction training program. They receive information about the country they are sent to, UN peacekeeping policies and rules, and the mandate and intended structure of the mission, including a briefing provided by key mission functions such as civil affairs, human rights, protection, and democratization as well as administrative and support issues and the mission security system. In addition, they receive detailed orientation about key UN policies such as HIV/AIDS, gender issues, sexual exploitation and abuse, and security. Furthermore, they are advised on conduct and disciplinary matters, including sanctions in case of failure to comply. Overall, there is a clear tendency to focus on imitation learning and rigidity instead of creativity—the latter would be an essential part of any attempt to foster organizational learning. Nevertheless, mission leadership has some leeway in that it decides on the overall structure and training content of the induction program with the core content prescribed by UN DPKO training policies.51 Often the induction program is opened by the head of mission or one of the deputies, with heads of units requested to provide a presentation of the function under their responsibility. During the initial years of UNMIS, SRSG Jan Pronk used the induction program to explain his policy priorities in the mission. He drew attention to five points to characterize the salient features of UNMIS as a “unified mission” as well as to provide up-to-date information on the mission itself. The SRSG often used these presentations to highlight lessons learned and to explain institutional changes and decisions, so under his leadership the induction programs can be considered as a part of an organizational learning process within the UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) and UNMIS—in particular, during the mission start-up in the years 2004 and 2005. However, the arrival of ever increasing numbers of staff caused the induction program to suffer from “training fatigue,” with declining participation of department heads. Evaluations of these programs showed that a majority of the participants wished for a repeat induction program a few months after their arrival. Mission leadership did not respond to these requests primarily due to limited capacity of the training unit, which was also charged with organizing rest and recreation programs and with providing counseling services for all civilian and uniformed mission staff. The dual function of the training unit—training and staff counseling— as well as the diversity of autonomous training procedures for the variety of staff types resulted in competing and misunderstood priorities. It impeded the development of a strategic learning orientation with a clear focus on mission strategic goals and an informed discourse on the purpose, limitations, and achievements of the mission. Due to capacity as well as compe-

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tency deficits, the UNMIS Integrated Training Unit did not play a decisive role in making the overall mission a learning organization. Instead, training became even more fragmented: some subunits organized additional induction programs covering their specific submandates—such as civil affairs and humanitarian affairs. In general, those subunit events were of a voluntary nature, conducted ad hoc rather than as part of the mission training plan. They seem to have had more the character of a briefing than a wellorganized and structured training activity. While mission leadership encouraged these activities, the organizers did not receive greater recognition or the funding needed: budgets of peace operations have only marginal provisions to fund training events provided outside of the training unit. The results of this review are quite dismal, revealing how many barriers exist to ensuring that the investments in training and developing people actually result in organizational learning. Keeping in mind our theoretical discussion in the previous section, several recommendations can be formulated at this point. (1) Planning and conducting training and capacity-building programs within a mission need to be systematically linked to and developed in close cooperation with best practices units and the mission leadership. It must be based on training and capacity needs assessments and must respond to specific organizational development needs in different phases; for example, the mission start-up phase, consolidation of functions, or expansion of field operations. (2) Staff counseling should be treated as a separate function that neither substitutes nor competes with training. The extent to which staff counseling may be a part of organizational learning remains to be clarified. (3) Programs should pay more attention to the multicultural nature of the mission’s staff. (4) Broader and strategic issues of organizational learning should remain central throughout the lifespan of a mission, even though during the start-up phase training requirements are substantively different compared to those after the mission has reached normal staffing levels and has commenced implementing programs specific to mandate implementation. Requests for more training arise as the mission begins to implement the mandate. However, a lack of resources to provide skilled trainers is an impediment to effective learning. It is a challenge to meet these demands and overall strategic training needs. The emergence of new responsibilities—such as protection of civilians, rule of law, improving monitoring and assessment of mandate performance, military and security expertise, and also planning and implementation of joint activities, particularly to enhance civil-military cooperation—is not yet sufficiently reflected in the training programs. Critical policy issues are also absent, such as exit strategies and mandaterelated strategic issues, including building capacity for preventive diplomacy, mediation, or peacebuilding. The lack of conceptual clarity of key mission functions has added to confusion about tasks to be performed and

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the skills and knowledge required. Both the best practices and the mission training unit rely on training needs identified by the Secretariat in New York. Field-based observations rarely lead to tailor-made training solutions, even though there has been some improvement in recent years. The introduction of new training standards and the attempts to generate new capacities do not necessarily mark the end of organizational learning processes. They might preserve old routines and serve as a barrier to learning. Mission staff may have the required technical experiences to perform their assigned functions but they are rarely competent trainers. In sum, training and capacity development can play a crucial role in a successful organizational learning cycle. Despite improvements, such as the production of a training policy for UN peacekeeping personnel, training and career development have so far fallen short of reflecting best practices procedures and strategic change and have also failed to provide staff with incentives for unlearning old routines and learning creatively new skills and approaches.52 Results-based Budgeting as an Organizational Learning Process There are only rare moments when a mission’s course or design shifts. As discussed above, leadership can use those windows of opportunity to foster learning processes. In the following, we present one such moment in a mission’s life cycle: the preparation of the budget. Mission administrative support services under the overall responsibility of the director of administration is in charge of the budgeting process in peace operations. The budget section prepares the budget and issues instructions and templates to collect relevant information from all mission entities. In addition, they conduct briefings and provide technical advice. Based on General Assembly Resolution A/Res/55/231 of January 23, 2001, the UN Bureau of Management introduced a “results-based budget process” for all UN Secretariat entities, emphasizing the need to articulate measurable goals.53 Hence, during the budget preparation process for financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007, the mission leadership of UNMIS decided to fully apply the results-based budgeting (RBB). Instead of treating it as a purely administrative process as most missions did, UNMIS linked strategic policy goals and operational planning with the budget process as a joint endeavor across the entire mission and the full approval process, including DPKO, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and the Fifth Committee. This approach provided UNMIS with a unique organizational learning opportunity: it mandated all heads of departments or sections to think through their own priorities within overall mission strategic goals, formulate achievable results with their own staff,

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and define the resources required. The agreement reached with all managers was that this approach would also be applied for future budgets and that they would be held accountable for the results to which they had committed. The chief of staff of UNMIS, already entrusted with the overall coordination of mission planning and having been formerly involved in the development of UNDP’s approach to results-based management, was put in charge of coordinating the budget preparation with the director of administration—a rather unique approach at the time. The mission best practices unit, being part of the office of the chief of staff, participated in the budget preparation. RBB aims to achieve a higher level of accountability for the use of resources. It helps units to think through their own contribution toward the achievement of strategic goals of the mission operation and allows the top management to hold managers accountable for the achievement of results. During the first implementation of the RBB in UNMIS, it became obvious that neither managers of units nor technical support staff were in a position to define realistic and achievable goals. One major factor of uncertainty frequently articulated during planning meetings was the unknown and untested ability of staff to perform in accordance with agreed time lines and standards of quality. To assist the mission in articulating acceptable results, DPKO issued guidelines and provided examples of measurable and realistic results in addition to briefing and orientation packages. Once results were established and the budgets approved, managers often tended to forget about the results they had committed to achieving. Neither regular reporting requirements nor performance reviews were based on results. Yet the exercise was generally regarded as having been useful in questioning and disrupting some routines and establishing new ones, indicating that it did generate some degree of organizational learning. The RBB process within UNMIS revealed yet another organizational challenge relevant for all peace operations: by comparing intended results across subunits and reviewing human resource requirements in particular—skills and experiences—overlaps between functions became apparent. In the area of protection of civilians, for instance, functions such as human rights, rule of law, civil affairs, as well as humanitarian operations all claimed that their activities resulted in the protection of civilians. The budget process forced the mission to jointly review planned activities and either make adjustments or at least agree on a coordination mechanism. The identification of opportunities for the more effective use of resources and more targeted training and staff development was one obvious outcome. Mission leadership soon realized that the planning and preparation of a budget that was focused on results could also serve as a coordination and learning tool. The prerequisites for this tool to work were twofold: the organization had to subscribe to the process without exception; and it had

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to treat budget preparation as a substantive mission planning exercise instead of as an administrative resource allocation process. Meeting these two conditions over extended periods of time in the organizational culture of peace operations requires ongoing leadership attention. Finally, in its new training policy, DPKO and the Department of Field Support listed RBB as an integrative management system, to be addressed as part of “strategic and cross cutting individual and collective training” with the objective “to enhance skills, competencies or performance across major areas of UN peacekeeping.”54 In sum, the introduction of RBB provided UNMIS with a rare opportunity to influence and partly change the strategic course and the organizational structure of the overall mission—a perfect example of organizational learning, which could not be found among the usual and intentional suspects of best practices and training. Organizational learning and the dynamics and phases of the mission seem to be closely related. After the dynamic start-up phase, peace operations appear to go through a phase of hibernation, not only in terms of learning but even more so in developing creative approaches to overcome organizational standstill. While during the first phase, organizational learning dynamics might be easier to achieve and are more likely to be observed, learning during the second phase might rather be related to maintaining an organizational status quo. Only shocks or crises can disrupt this: the March 2004 riots in Kosovo provide a drastic example here in that they triggered a deep organizational learning process within UNMIK, the UN peace operation in Kosovo.55 Similar observations were made in the Sudan following the Malakal incidents in October and November 2006.56

Conclusion What lessons can we draw from this chapter in terms of the practice of peace operations and for the theories of organizational learning? Despite the dedication of people working in difficult circumstances and building years of experience in many different contexts, a look at the state of the art of peace operations through the lens of organizational learning theories is sobering: although there are multiple potential agents of organizational learning and there have been numerous attempts to introduce structures and mechanisms for learning, most have proven far less effective than originally hoped. This is particularly true for learning at the field level and across peace operations. The evidence from UNMIS that we presented in this chapter illustrates some of the many factors that have colluded to hamper organizational learning in peace operations so far. Individuals as agents of learning have

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little scope or incentives to do so because, though they are expected to work together across organizational boundaries, the rules and incentives for learning and development (e.g., training and promotion) of the organizations render the boundaries—often unintentionally—quite impermeable. It greatly depends on the leadership of a mission to make learning mechanisms at least partially effective. Mechanisms, such as after action reviews, which have proven effective in other organizational contexts, become timeconsuming bureaucratic exercises while reports whose purposes are to share tacit knowledge are often perverted into empty routines by organizational politics. Training standards, which could be a relevant tool for institutionalizing lessons learned, remain elusive in systematically reflecting insights and changing patterns of best practices procedures and strategic shifts. Ten years after the approval of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, a number of recommendations addressing training, learning, and capacity issues remain to be implemented. Peace operations continue to be truly both managerial and political challenges that are cloesly intertwined. Given the extreme institutional complexity and the speed with which the diverse actors have to learn to work together and deliver their services in dangerous environments, it is surprising to find any evidence of organizational learning at all. As such, it might be useful at this point to focus on the glimmers of light: there were, in fact, various agents of organizational learning in the field and at headquarters, and, as our case study on introducing results-based budgeting reveals, both first- and second-order organizational learning can be achieved. Organizational learning potentially plays an important role in peace operations; however, it will not serve as the solution to address the increasingly fractured relationship between peace operations and the ability to end deadly conflict. A perfectly functioning and vigorous learning peace operation may still be confronted with ongoing armed conflicts and the dishonoring of agreements for ending hostilities. The Brahimi Report has called for the imperative of a political process and established the basic benchmark for deployment that there must be a peace to keep. Without addressing these highly political issues, peace operations will remain fractured. We began this chapter by exploring how the field of organizational learning can learn from the practices and experiences in the special setting of peace operations. The outcome of this review is humbling for organizational learning scholars. Concepts derived from past studies on companies, schools, and hospitals need to be expanded to have value in an environment as complex, politically charged, risky, and fast paced as peace operations. The difficulties faced in multinational companies seeking to learn at the local level, from the periphery, and at headquarters, are minor when compared with the size of the challenge between UN headquarters and peace operations in the field. For instance, what does “absorptive capacity” mean

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when operations have to be created and dismantled within a few years to address different conflict settings and mandates? The examples we described reveal how factors that are presented in the literature either as enablers or barriers to learning often turn out to be both—depending on the constellation in which they appear. We unfortunately know too little about such constellations to be able to provide clear guidance on when each factor is likely to produce which kind of effect. The literature contains extensive discussions about the role of crises in stimulating organizational learning, but we cannot yet say much about learning in organizations whose purpose it is to work in crisis situations, with real risks and threats and when the failure to learn can be deadly. The conclusion for research from this review is that the range of our concepts and theories is far too limited. It is high time that scholars heed the call to move from the comfort zone of university offices and corporate suites and venture out to study reality in unconventional contexts, such as peace operations; this will put our ideas to the test and expand their scope of relevance.57 Can we really afford not to learn?

Notes 1. See, for example, UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000; UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008); UN, A New Partnership Agenda—Charting a New Horizon For UN Peacekeeping (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, July 2009); Thomas Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN—An Unfinished Journey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 2. Frederik Trettin and Julian Junk, “Bureaucratic Spoiling: Dissent-shirking, Obstruction, and Sabotage in International Public Administrations,” paper presented at the Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, September 9−11, 2010. 3. Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations. 4. Rainer Breul, “Organizational Learning in International Organizations: The Case of UN Peace Operations,” master’s thesis, Fachbereich Politik-und Verwaltungswissenschaft, University of Konstanz, 2005, http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/ bitstream/handle/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-16477/Organizational_Learning _in_International_Organizations_FINAL.pdf?sequence=1. 5. Gisela Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning in United Nations’ Peacekeeping Exit Strategies,” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 3 (2012): 368−385. 6. Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 7. An exception is Kathrin Böhling, “Learning in Temporary Organizations:

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The Case of the UNI Global Conferences,” in Ariane Berthoin Antal, Peter Meusburger, and Laura Suarsana, eds., Learning Organizations. Extending the Field (Dordrecht, NL: Springer), pp. 157–175. 8. Anthony J. DiBella, Edwin C. Nevis, and Janet M. Gould, “Understanding Organizational Learning Capabilities,” Journal of Management Studies 33, no. 3 (1996): 361−379; George P. Huber, “Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures,” Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 88−115. 9. Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5−53. 10. Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge Creating Company (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 11. Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1995). 12. Daniel H. Kim, “The Link Between Individual and Organizational Learning,” Sloan Management Review 34, no. 3 (1993): 37−50. 13. Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 9. 14. Philip Sadler, “Leaders and Organizational Learning,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 415– 427. 15. Risto Tainio, Kari Lilja, and T. Santalainen, “The Role of Boards in Facilitating or Limiting Learning in Organizations,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 428−445. 16. Nonaka and Takeuchi, The Knowledge Creating Company; Ikujiro Nonaka and Ryoko Toyama, “Managing Ba to Co-create a New Reality: Learning from a ‘Band of Misfits’ at DoCoMo,” in Ariane Berthoin Antal and Camilla KrebsbachGnath, eds., Wo wären wir ohne die Verrückten? zur Rolle von Aussenseitern in Wissenschaft, Politik und Wirtschaft (Berlin: Edition sigma, 2001), pp. 218−232. 17. Chris Argyris, “Learning in Organization,” in T.G. Cummings, ed., Handbook of Organization Development (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), pp. 53−67. 18. Trettin and Junk, “Bureaucratic Spoiling.” 19. John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation,” Organisation Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 40−57; Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning—Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 20. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, Policy—Knowledge Sharing—Ref. 2009.4 (New York: UN, 2009). 21. Ariane Berthoin Antal and Camilla Krebsbach-Gnath, “Internal Outsiders Transform Tradition-bound Organizations,” Reflections 4, no. 2 (2002): 23−31. 22. Scott D. Cook and Dvora Yanow, “Culture and Organizational Learning,” Journal of Management Inquiry 2, no. 4 (1993): 373−390; Laura Empson, “Fear of Exploitation and Fear of Contamination—Impediments to Knowledge Transfer in Mergers Between Professional Service Firms,” Human Relations 54, no. 7 (2001): 839−862; Kenneth Husted and Seijna Michailova, “Diagnosing and Fighting Knowledge Sharing Hostility,” Organizational Dynamics 31, no. 1 (2002): 60−73. 23. Kathrin Böhling, Opening Up the Black Box: Organizational Learning in the European Commission (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007). 24. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institu-

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tional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (1983): 147−160. See also Chapter 9 in this volume for enlisting in more detail the organizations involved in the organizational field of peace operations. 25. Argyris and Schön, Organizational Learning. 26. Ibid., pp. 20−21. 27. Ibid., p. 22. 28. Ibid., p. 24. 29. Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. 30. James G. March, “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 71−87. 31. Bo Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn,” in Paul C. Nystrom and William H. Starbuck, eds., Handbook of Organizational Design (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 3−27. 32. Michael D. Cohen and Paul Bacdayan, “Organizational Routines Are Stored as Procedural Memory,” in Michael D. Cohen and Lee S. Sproull, eds., Organizational Learning (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), pp. 403–429; James P. Walsh and Gerardo R. Ungson, “Organizational Memory,” Academy of Management Review 16, no. 1 (1991): 57−91. 33. Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón, “Introduction,” in Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón, eds., Translating Organizational Change (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 13−48. 34. Nonaka and Takeuchi, The Knowledge Creating Company; Ikujiro Nonaka and Ryoko Toyama, “Managing Ba to Co-create a New Reality”; Ikujiro Nonaka, Ryoko Toyama, and Toru Hirata, Managing Flow—A Process Theory of the Knowledge-based Firm (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 35. Christiane Kerlen, Die Problemdefinition als Startpunkt organisationalen Lernens (Berlin: edition sigma, 2003). 36. Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil War. 37. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2010). 38. Victor Friedman, “Individuals as Agents of Organizational Learning,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 398−414. 39. Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation,” Administrative Science Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1990): 128. 40. Rüdiger Klimecki and M. Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen-Eine Bestandsaufnahme der Forschung” (Konstanz, Germany: University of Konstanz, 1997), www.unikonstanz.de/FuF/Verwiss/Klimecki/Downloads/diskussion.html#Diskus sionsbeitrag%20Nr.18. 41. William H. Starbuck and Bo Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn from Success and Failure,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujuro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 327−350. 42. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), pp. 99−105. 43. Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Matthias Ecker, and Yasemin Topcu, “Lernen in der Außenpolitik: Das Auswärtige Amt und die Politik der Humanitären Hilfe,” in Horst Albach, Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthon Antal, and Kristina Vaillant, eds., Organ-

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isationslernen-institutionelle und kulturelle Dimensionen (Berlin: WZB Jahrbuch, 1998), pp. 269−287; Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy; Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 279−312; Ikujiro Nonaka, “A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation,” Organization Science 5, no. 1 (1994): 14−37. 44. Morten H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974). 45. Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, Designing Case Studies—Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 46. The second mission to include a best practices officer was the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). However, the best practices officer was not centrally included in the chief of staff’s office. Furthermore, at the time of deployment of the best practices officer, this mission was not a complex multidimensional peace operation in the sense of this volume. 47. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, Policy—Knowledge Sharing—Ref. 2009.4. 48. The findings are by and large based on firsthand experiences and field research conducted by us and relate to the first three years of a mission start-up period in the Sudan (UNAMIS and UNMIS, 2004−2007). 49. Chief of Integrated Training Service, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, DPKO, Policy on Support to Military and Police Pre-deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2009, http://hdl.handle.net/11176/89499. 50. First, “strategic and cross-cutting individual and collective training” such as “generic cross-cutting issues,” “management and leadership training,” “training in support of succession management and career and learning paths,” and “mandatespecific operational training.” Second, “job-specific and technical training” and, third, “special-to-mission training needs.” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Department of Field Support (UNDFS), Policy-Training for UN Peacekeeping Personnel—Ref. 2010.20 (New York: UN, 2010). We assume strategic training to be most likely to include issues indicating a second-order organizational learning process. 51. The mission leadership is itself subject to training in form of, for instance, the senior mission leadership training programs and the annual retreat of heads of missions. 52. UNDPKO and UNDFS, Policy—Training for UN Peacekeeping Personnel— Ref. 2010.20 (New York: UN, 2010). 53. During the mid-1990s, UNDP had already developed results-based management as the mandatory management approach for all country offices and programs of assistance. 54. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, Policy—Training for UN Peacekeeping Personnel—Ref. 2010.20. 55. Till Blume, Julian Junk, Elisabeth Schöndorf, and Wolfgang Seibel, Discourse at the Juncture: The Explanatory Power of Discourse Theory and Policy Analysis for Understanding Peace Operations and Humanitarian Intervention (Konstanz, Germany: Konstanz Online Publication System, 2006). 56. International Crisis Group, Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report No. 154 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2009). 57. Peter A. Bamberger and Michael G. Pratt, “From the Editors: Moving Forward by Looking Back—Reclaiming Unconventional Scholarship,” Academy of Management Journal 53, no. 4 (2010): 665−671.

9 Learning and Identity in the Field Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring

A CHALLENGE FOR CAPACITY BUILDERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO LEARN

about learning. How do organizations, institutions, and societies develop and transform themselves as a result of it? Are there ways of learning that are more or less effective? The new demands on modern states’ institutions and organizations entail new expectations of the individuals working with and for them. What demands does that place on the activities supported by the United Nations system?1 Organizational learning (OL) has been identified as a paramount requirement within the UN system to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. This also applies to the strategies and operations of the UN and its various programs, agencies, and funds in the context of UN-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.2 In the field, the need for OL is particularly high because actors are facing complex, dynamic, and unfamiliar environments and are confronted with ill-structured issues and problems. Generally, current UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities are characterized by: (1) their broad scale and scope comprising security, political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, economic, and social aspects; (2) their fragile security environments in which sudden outbreaks of violence may require rapid action; (3) the limited administrative and governmental capacity of local actors that require UN actors to address multiple issues that may not lie in their usual area of expertise and are hard to anticipate a priori; (4) high, and often contradictory, pressures from various stakeholders with different demands; and (5) a high need for cultural sensitivity and adaptability because of the inter-cultural interactions between the international and host country actors. Given these adverse conditions and the high stakes at risk, actors in peace operations need to be 191

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flexible, fast, and creative to adapt successfully to their environment and to accomplish their objectives. The network form of organizing in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding context further complicates the tasks, as shown by Anna Herrhausen in Chapter 2 of this volume. In this chapter, we address organizational learning in the context of peace operation networks and, in particular, the question of how the multitude and diversity of actors involved influence the learning dynamics at the field level in ongoing peace operations. In the chapter, organizational learning is understood as a process in which an organization’s knowledge base is collectively refined and enlarged to increase the organization’s problem-solving capacity. OL is embedded in the action and interaction of organizational members3 and their interplay in the OL process determines how the knowledge base and, as result, the problem-solving capacity evolve. Hence, actor characteristics and, in particular, their diversity (e.g., based on age, gender, and professional or organizational background) should have consequences for OL dynamics and results.4 Theoretical reasoning allows for the prediction of both the positive and negative effects of such diversity on outcomes. On the one hand, according to the information or decisionmaking perspective, actor diversity in expertise, knowledge, and perspectives may promote collective learning and problem-solving capacity.5 On the other hand, diversity can also undermine learning because large differences in actors’ learning backgrounds (i.e., their cognitive reference frames, values, norms, practices, and experiences) may cause a lack of understanding of each other; and differences, of whatever kind, may trigger unproductive in-group–out-group behavior among actors such as unwillingness to engage on behalf of the entire collective, noncooperation, defense of one’s own claims, or derogation of other actors that are perceived as belonging to an out-group.6 Social identity theory explains these negative effects. Work teams composed of individuals who belong to and identify with different social categories and who enact those identities experience a high potential for conflict that impairs team functioning and the realization of diversity benefits. Both of these adversarial effects are a result of actors belonging to and identifying with different social entities. These entities each have their own goals, cognitive reference frames, values, norms, principles, and practices. These elements make up their unique collective identity with which their members come to identify and which facilitates collective learning and integrated and coherent action. In other words, under conditions of actor diversity, OL may be hampered because a shared identity to which all the actors involved subscribe is missing. Many UN actors carry out tasks in a country where a peace operation is deployed, including UN funds, agencies, programs, and, of course, the peacekeeping mission. These actors are heterogeneous, although symboli-

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cally, they are convened under the UN logo and in some cases work as One UN.7 Yet stemming from their different mandates and tasks, as well as organizational experiences and histories, the New York−based Secretariat and its departments8 and the various UN agencies, funds, and programs9 have developed diverging systems of goals, reference frames, values, norms, principles, and practices. Furthermore, concrete questions of legitimacy complicate the achievement of integrated and coherent action. Most obvious and pronounced are the military-humanitarian as well as the reliefdevelopment divides. Overall, the learning capabilities of diverse actors in the peace operations network tend to be largely restricted by the lack of a shared identity as a common learning background and uniting force. Having outlined the tension between the high need for learning in peace operations and the restricted learning capabilities, the gist of our argument is as follows: to achieve substantial learning in terms of enlarged problem-solving capacity to match the complex and dynamic environment, actors in peace operations first need to accomplish learning with respect to the development of some kind of shared identity; in essence, they need to elaborate on and define a consensus on what “One UN” in a particular context stands for. This shared identity serves as a common and uniting background for learning to solve the issues and problems at hand. Hence, two complementary learning processes—identity related and problem related— are vital for developing peace operations’ problem-solving capacity and impact on the ground. While our argument is theoretically derived, we are confident that it holds important implications for the practice of managing, leading, and staffing of current and future UN peace operations. Empirically, this is supported by an investigation of the learning process and experiences of the Liberian UN peacebuilding community. In the remainder of this chapter, we illustrate our conceptions and provide some empirical evidence based on the initial findings of our field research. We chose Liberia as a case study because it is widely considered by the international community to be one of the UN’s best-integrated peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.10 To gather the data, two of us spent a total of nine weeks in Liberia to study the operations of the UN system in the country. The UN system in Liberia includes sixteen UN agencies, funds, and programs—including, for example, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO)—as well as a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which operate collaboratively to build peace and to assist in the reconstruction of the country after decades of civil war. To provide the best possible assistance to its Liberian beneficiaries, the various parts of the UN system have committed themselves to work together as One UN. The focus of this investigation lies, in particular, on the learning dynamics within spe-

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cific interorganizationally working groups that are part of the integrated effort. The teams studied are functionally crosscutting domain-centered interorganizational teams (e.g., for gender issues, HIV/AIDS, monitoring and evaluation, communication, and joint programs) in which representatives of the relevant UN organizations plan and implement collaborative actions on behalf of the entire UN system in Liberia. The researchers gathered data through semistructured face-to-face interviews with almost all current members of the four groups investigated.11 In addition, interviews were conducted with several heads of agencies, including the deputy special representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) and the resident coordinator; participants were observed in team meetings; and officials were interviewed at UN headquarters in New York and the UN office in Geneva. From the field investigation in Liberia, we conclude that actors in peace operations should pay more attention to the interactive and communicative aspects of OL and promote learning with adequate measures and means. This also implies that OL, in the context of peace operations, needs to be promoted in a localized manner in the area of operation and tailored to the specific mission context. Finally, the diverse identities of organizations and their delegates should be carefully taken into account since they might undermine collective learning processes. Overall, we provide some tentative empirical evidence for our conclusions and demonstrate how UN peace operations might make use of these findings to better meet the challenges posed by the highly turbulent environment of these operations and in the face of the complexity of the tasks involved.

The Concept of Organizational Learning A General Learning Model of Individuals and Organizations Today, OL is considered as being of paramount importance for every organization to adapt to rapidly changing environments and to secure effectiveness and efficiency. As the concept of OL is elusive to many in research and practice, an articulation of our view of OL is necessary. Most OL conceptualizations adhere to a cognitive understanding of learning and view organizations as independent systems of cognition and action. At the core of cognitive theories lies the observation that social systems (e.g., organizations) similar to psychological systems (e.g., individuals) construct conceptions of reality and use them to position themselves in their environment.12 Hence, learning describes the process of information processing through which the existing conceptions of reality that represent the system’s knowledge base are refined and advanced.13 Conceptions of reality comprised of particular worldviews, frames of reference, mental models for action, as well as

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cause-effect relationships, and so forth, provide the guiding measures for the system’s behavior. Successful learning implies that individual or collective learners advance their knowledge base in a way that the conceptions of reality are adequate to address the dynamic demands of the environment or useful to actively influence environmental dynamics toward desired ends.14 The learning process comprises a sequence of: recognizing relevant information; interpreting this information; and storing or institutionalizing the derived knowledge in the learner’s knowledge base.15 First, signals or cues about changes in the relationship between the system and the environment are recognized as information and subjected to an interpretative process.16 For signals to be recognized and transformed into information, they need to have at least some relationship to the existing knowledge base. Second, during interpretation, incoming information is related to existing knowledge and processed as to fit the system. Third, storage of information completes the learning process; however, even information that has already been interpreted and deciphered does not automatically find its way into the system’s knowledge base. This general model of learning applies to learning by individuals as well as by social systems. While learning by individuals is a psychological process, the learning of a social system is an interactive and communicative one.17 Individuals initially act as the system’s learning agents because insights and ideas occur only to individuals, not social systems.18 However, collective learning is a genuine social phenomenon mediated by communication processes in which signals, information, and interpretations are collectively processed; ideas are transformed; common meanings are developed; and actions are taken.19 Individual, group, and organizational levels are coupled in feed-forward and feedback processes. Collective learning requires the informative input of individuals who are—via socialization in the system’s goals, reference frames, values, norms, principles, and practices—linked to the collective level in feedback loops.20 Hence, based on a cognitive perspective, organizational learning is defined analogously to individual learning in its basic processes, antecedents, and outcomes. However, while both concepts are functionally equivalent due to particular features of organizations as social systems, major differences in the structure exist. We address those differences in the following subsection by discussing a more detailed conceptualization of the organizational learning process. The Process of Organizational Learning and Its Influencing Factors In contrast to individuals, the social system’s “organization” is characterized specifically by its functional differentiation and division of labor, a specific range of products and services, and a certain organizational culture

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and identity that all influence the learning of organizations. In accounting for these features, various theorists have developed different models of OL; however, various elements and components of OL theories can be usefully integrated into a general process model of OL.21 For structuring the process, we follow Rüdiger Klimecki, Hermann Lassleben, and Markus Thomae22 and rely on five formal components of OL. These factors were subsequently checked against the realities in the UN peace operation in Liberia: (1) learning triggers; (2) learning agents; (3) learning media; (4) learning factors; and (5) learning results (see Figure 9.1 and Chapter 8 by Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann in this volume). Learning triggers. The first component of the general OL model, triggers

for learning, results from the perception of discrepancies between prior experiences, worldviews, defined goals, ideas, opinions, or one’s own reality conceptions and current reality perceptions, or what others’ reality conceptions are. In one way or another, the perceived reality does not match the existing cognitive conception of reality as embodied in the observers’ cognitive frames of reference, mental models, and so forth.23 The information derived from these comparisons is not objective; it rather emerges within the system from the contrast between the system’s existing knowledge base and the perceived environmental state. Concurrent with this conception, most learning processes that we witnessed in the Liberian UN

Figure 9.1 The Process of Organizational Learning: Components and Elements Learning triggers • Expectation/results • Idea/reality • Own/others’ conceptions • Conception A/conception B

Old knowledge base

Learning agents Learning media Learning results • Entire system • Management systems • Incremental/ • Formal subsystems • Organizational culture fundamental change • Informal subsystems • Proto/Deutero learning

information processing

New knowledge base

Learning factors • Meaning and ambiguity of information • Congruency of interpretation • Relatedness of knowledge Source: Adapted from Rüdiger Klimecki, Hermann Lassleben, and Markus Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen: Ein Ansatz zur Integration von Theorie, Empirie und Gestaltung,” Management Forschung 10, no. 1 (1999): 63–98.

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community were caused by a discrepancy between perceived current reality and the way things were envisioned in the cognitive reference frames of actors. An example of this inconsistency was the UN’s decision to increase its presence and support in the Liberian counties after an increasing number of cases of authority abuse and fraud were recognized. This indicated a lack of capacity of local government representatives to fulfill their basic administrative functions and the inadequacy of current measures taken to build up a functional country-wide public administration. However, authority abuse and fraud cases became a trigger for learning only because they were perceived as being in contradiction to the goal of a democratic and corruptionfree administration. Likewise, in early 2005 in the southeastern port of Harper, unexpected mob violence overwhelmed the UN’s capacity for deescalation indicating that existing security and communication regulations— regarded to be appropriate until that point—were not sufficient. The incident made the UN actors recognize their lack of capacity to effectively carry out their mandate. Apart from unexpected environmental changes triggering learning, we also found more deliberate efforts to be learning triggers. For example, officially endorsed independent evaluations of current practices, such as a joint field visit to Liberia by the Executive Boards of UNDP and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF, and the World Food Programme (WFP) in early 2007, led to the recognition of malfunctioning in the system.24 A targeted review of practices initiated by senior mission leadership, specifically by the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the DSRSG, resulted in a joint UN initiative aimed at building the capacity of local government at the county level.25 Learning agents. The second component of the general OL model con-

cerns the learning agents. Learning agents can be individuals, formal or informal subsystems, or the organization as a whole. In organizations, functional differentiation allows for a division of labor in learning among levels. Thus, the entire organization does not necessarily need to learn all the time; it may suffice that departments, working teams,26 or informal networks of members composed around particular problem domains learn.27 If the outcomes of this vicarious learning are relevant for the whole organization, coupling between organizational, group, and individual levels should be secured. In Liberia, we found formal interagency working groups such as the Gender Theme Group (GTG), UN Communications Group (UNCG), and county support team (CST) in the northern Liberian county of Lofa to be examples for core learning agents. These groups recognized discrepancies at an operational and technical level that were related to their work practice as well as to their problem-solving approaches. Through frequent and inten-

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sive formal and informal communication among group members, they eventually developed better routines of how to work together (e.g., development of terms of reference and common goal definitions) and advanced new problem-solving approaches (in the form of coordinated action and joint programs). However, these learning processes took considerable time, and only in the case of the group-based learning dynamics of the CST around the One UN office did we observe a coupling between the subsystem and the entire operation. The positive results in the CST were eventually recognized by the DSRSG and SRSG who endorsed them as a best practices within the entire peace operation and even beyond.28 Overall, this hints to the need to pay more attention to the localized nature of learning: on the one hand, in supporting local agents in their learning with appropriate measures in their specific contexts and, on the other hand, to capitalize more on existing local learning by coupling with the organizational level. Learning media. The third component of the OL model addresses the learning media through which agents learn. Different learning media serve the purpose of an arena and catalyst for learning insofar as they guide members’ communication around particular topics. Some media are institutionalized and manifest (e.g., management systems) while others are fluid and latent (e.g., organizational culture and practices).29 Management systems can be located at: the individual level (e.g., job descriptions or career schemes); the group level (e.g., departmental or team goals or quality circles); and the organizational level (e.g., planning systems or organizational structures).30 These institutionalized media comprise mental models, which describe the existing and open consensus on how things should be done— the espoused theory of action of organization members. In contrast, organizational culture and practices represent the theories-in-use—those often tacit theories that are implicit in what is actually done by organizational members in contrast to what is said to be done (e.g., as laid down in official documents).31 In practice, we observed a large number of manifest media such as particular working guidelines, monitoring and evaluation systems, and core planning tools, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), on every level. Yet it appeared that they often do not represent the actual practice; in particular, if developed and implemented top down. This may imply that, functionally, they simply do not fit the local situation, or that they try to impose actions on local actors that are resisted for various reasons. On the other hand, culture as a learning media tended to be more promising as exemplified, again, by the CST in Lofa county: coming to the CST as replacements for colleagues moving on to other positions, several individuals recounted how intensely they experienced the specific work

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style of the local UN community and how they quickly adopted this style themselves as the natural way things are done around here (i.e., the local practices and theory in use). Learning factors. As a fourth component, the recognition-interpretation-

storing process of OL is influenced by various learning factors. In the recognition phase, the perceived cues or signals can vary in degree of importance and ambiguity (i.e., higher or lower in relevance), and it can be more or less difficult to detect and extract their meaning and significance.32 Hence, informational signals can be strong or weak, clear or ambiguous. In the case of Lofa county, for instance, a sudden absence of boys from school can mean different things. On the one hand, it might signify that the harvest has started and the boys are out in the fields. On the other hand, warlords might be recruiting new child soldiers. Without additional information and knowledge, the mere fact of the boys’ absence is hard to interpret. Next, during the interpretation phase, the congruency of organizational members’ mental models and cognitive frames of reference play a pivotal role. The more members diverge in this respect, interpretation of new information will be more heterogeneous.33 In the Liberian context, different cognitive frames, exhibited by individuals with different backgrounds, caused long struggles in some working groups to agree on a common interpretation of the issues at hand, common goals, priorities, and action plans. Apparently, most actors were initially limited to their very specific interpretations and only, if ever, after considerable communication and interaction were they able to reconcile their perspectives. Consequently, while quick and efficient action was desirable, it took some learning agents (e.g., working groups) a long time to come up with appropriate responses. Eventually, in the storing or institutionalizing phase, the new knowledge must be related to existing knowledge, otherwise it cannot be anchored in the knowledge base on a continuous basis. In the reality of the Liberian peace operation, we found the high turnover, especially within the military and police components of the mission, to be a vital challenge for the institutionalization of knowledge. Moreover, in the storing phase of the learning process, the willingness to incorporate new and potentially deviant knowledge requires the capacity to actively “unlearn.”34 In Liberia, we witnessed several individuals seeking to apply concepts, ideas, and behaviors that they previously used in other postconflict scenarios as expressed in statements such as “But when I was in XY we did it this way and it worked.” The tendency to reject new knowledge and revert to known problem-solving routines (i.e., a lack of unlearning) prevented the adoption of new knowledge and behavioral changes that would have been necessary to creatively develop appropriate solutions for the specific

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Liberian context. To sum up, the learning factors’ meaning and ambiguity of information, the congruency of interpretations, and the relatedness of new to existing knowledge crucially influence the information processing in OL processes. Learning results. Finally, in the integrated OL model, learning results can be differentiated according to their reach and transferability.35 The reach of learning depends on its impact for the organizational conceptions of reality. Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön’s single and double loop learning is the most frequently used differentiation to this end.36 Incremental or single loop learning only improves the existing organizational theories of action as manifest in management systems; double loop learning includes fundamental changes with new theories of action that also become embedded in organizational culture. It thereby signifies not only that the application of existing knowledge is refined, but also that completely new knowledge is brought to bear. Transferability relates to extent of learning to learn, or how far a particular learning experience is the subject of reflection with the aim to identify how learning was achieved in that instance. The insights about what makes a learning process successful—called deutero learning—are the basis for managing future learning processes irrespective of their content.37 Within the Liberian UN peace operation, the top-down-driven learning that was initiated by external reports and directives by senior UN leadership was mostly confined to single loop learning. Actors developed fundamentally new knowledge and increased problem-solving capability (i.e., double loop learning), in particular, through employee-initiated bottom-up processes driven by extensive communication within several of the working groups. Deutero learning was observable in the GTG in which members succeeded in learning how to learn through the communicative process of developing the group’s own terms of reference as well as by working its way through the development of a first joint program on a particular issue. While this took the group several years, the second joint program was quickly developed in several months. In summary, the depicted model integrates the general learning model with formal components of OL that derive from its communicative nature (learning agents and media) and its underlying information-processing sequence (learning triggers, learning factors, and learning results). This model not only is useful to clarify the concept of OL, but also to map empirical OL processes and to capture different configurations of triggers, agents, and so forth that characterize OL in a particular empirical context. Yet it does not imply an explicit statement about learning success or failure. The OL literature has addressed various reasons why organizations fail to learn. First is a limited cognitive capacity to adequately process all infor-

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mation that may be relevant and useful impedes learning.38 In Liberia for instance, many agencies, as well as UNMIL itself, permanently struggled with a shortage of personnel so that relevant information went unnoticed (learning is not triggered) or, if recognized as potentially important, could not be acted on (information is not processed). Second, the dearly held insights of prior learning are often defended against new ideas (no unlearning) or they may simply have no relevance for changed circumstances (e.g., insights gained from other peace operations that do not fit the Liberian context ).39 Third, learning may be undermined to advance particular interests or goals; that is, in political games, actors actively prohibit learning for their own good, but to the disadvantage of the organization.40 To achieve this end, an actor may undermine the OL process at various stages to prevent information from being recognized or adequately processed. Fourth, structural and cultural features of organizations may be diametrical to OL; for instance, organizational communication lines that inhibit adequate information processing or the common practice of blaming the bearer of bad news that leads to concealment of errors and failures that could trigger learning.41 All of these reasons for not learning are relevant in the context of the Liberian peace operation. However, we also witnessed that severe limitations to learning derived from the diversity of actors and, in particular, that the observed learning processes were mostly embedded in action and social processes between actors. These limitations have rarely been addressed in theory, not least because of the general cognitive bias emphasizing individual and organizational information processing in OL, and a neglect of the group level of learning that naturally calls for an inclusion of sociopsychological factors influencing learning.42 Despite its low prominence in the literature, the initial findings from the peace operation in Liberia suggest that such a communicative group dynamic is a pivotal influencing factor for OL processes. The Social Nature of Organizational Learning Our findings concerning the processes and components of OL in the Liberian context are in line with OL research that emphasizes the social nature of learning and knowing as well as the sociocultural context and material settings in which it takes place.43 The learning dynamics in the working groups investigated basically followed “situated learning” approaches, which propose that learning occurs within communities of practice and that learning agents acquire and develop new knowledge only within the settings and situations that would actually engage this knowledge. Learning occurs as learning-in-working rather than the acquisition of abstract knowledge. 44 Many of the interviewees were often not subject matter

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experts on the topic of the working group they were mandated to attend. Yet they reported that through their participation in the group, rather than through the study of technical documentation, they became more knowledgeable on the topic and, furthermore, were able to identify what they and their organizations could contribute to further the cause. In general, social interaction and collaboration provide essential opportunities to understand communities’ workplace activities and work practices that embody certain cognitive frames and behaviors to be acquired (including values, norms, and relationships). However, the engagement of actors depends on the development of an identity that mediates a sense of belonging and commitment to the community.45 Consequently, the processes through which the identities, artifacts, ideologies, rules, language, morality, and interests of different actors are connected and impact each other in collective learning take center stage.46 Constructing identities in relation to relevant communities can be seen as an essential prerequisite for participation and learning.47 Therefore, identity issues become crucial factors influencing OL processes and they call attention to potential conflicts between differing community members and the processes needed for their negotiation and reconciliation. For the specific context of peace operations, these theoretical propositions carry at least two implications. First, the communicative and social aspects of learning are of prime importance if peace operations’ learning abilities are to improve. This requires a focus on structural and social factors that may foster or impede an individual’s participation in the collective learning process rather than on particular best practices that may work in one context but not in another. This also implies paying more attention to the localized learning that occurs in the areas of operations because it is here where actors actually develop new approaches that engender changes of theories-in-use rather than espoused theories. While traditional classroom teaching and best practices approaches administered by mission training centers and UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) may support localized communities, their practical impact seems to be rather low since it is in contrast to the communicative and social learning-bydoing principle. 48 Second, in the context of peace operations, detached communities with the same topical focus at different levels of the organization may and do develop very different practices that are—if at all—not easily connected. This explains, at least partly, the misunderstandings and sometimes counterproductive results that actions on one level have on work done at another. Because basic identification and identity processes are so crucial for participation in learning communities and for learning to occur, in the following section we concentrate on the cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects involved in identity processes in organizations.

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Organizational Learning and Identity Organizational Identity and Organizational Identification Because of their influence on many organizational behaviors, Stuart Albert, Blake E. Ashford, and Jane E. Dutton assert that identity and identification are root constructs in organization theory.49 Research on identity phenomena in organizations has advanced in two separate, yet inherently related, streams: research on the identity of organizational entities at the meso and macro levels (e.g., the entire organization or subgroups within organizations); and research on individuals’ identification with the organization as a whole or its subgroups at the micro level (e.g., departments or working groups). The first strand draws its impetus from a metaphorical transfer of the psychological concept of individual identity to the organizational level; the second strand mainly borrows from social identity theory (SIT), as developed in social psychology, and applies its insights to organizational settings. Organizational identity is seen analogously to individual identity. However, organizational identity has only the same functions as individual identity, but not the same structure. For example, identity composition, formation, and change are different because organizations are social systems with many actors and are different from individuals’ internal psychological system (not that the same applies for individual and organizational learning). In general, organizational identity is seen as organizational members’ shared beliefs concerning the question of who are we as an organization in differentiation to other organizational entities. The organizational features that members perceive to be central, distinctive, and enduring represent the organizational identity references that members use when they are acting or speaking on behalf of their organization. In our interviews, for instance, UNHCR members often referred to their organization as an “emergency-oriented organization” in contrast to more development-oriented organizations. Moreover, UNICEF employees highlighted their focus on the well-being of children and their excellent communication capabilities as the defining characteristics of the fund. Identity claims are most likely invoked when members have to deal with profound, fork-in-the-road decisions. 50 Organizational identity is said to be strong when it is perceived as unique and perceptions about its content are widely and deeply held by its members. For example, questions of organizational identity are frequently invoked by humanitarian actors when it comes to the protection of humanitarian activity through military actors or even more far-reaching coordination and cooperation with these protagonists. In particular, humanitarian actors often feel their impartial-

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ity and independence—which represent central, distinctive, and enduring attributes—threatened. Organizational identification, in contrast, is conceptualized at the individual level and represents a specific form of social identity as developed in SIT. Individuals are said to have a unique personal identity but, in addition, may also have other identities that derive from their relationships and through belonging to various social groups. Motivated by the needs for self-enhancement, uncertainty reduction, and inclusion and differentiation, individuals derive part of their sense of self from the defining characteristics of social groups (e.g. nationality, gender, profession, organizations, or working group) of which they are a member and to which they feel they belong.51 As mentioned earlier, individuals may have a whole range of social identities. And the salience of a particular social identity in a particular situation depends: (1) on its accessibility determined by the relative importance of the group to the self-concept or perceptual salience in the situation; and (2) on the fit with the given context determined by the potential to account for similarities and differences among people and their behaviors. Once a social identity becomes salient, self-perception and conduct become aligned with the prototypical characteristics and behavioral standards of the group. Thus, the macro-level organizational identity and the micro-level organizational identification are connected insofar as organizational identity serves organizational members as a target for identification so that part of their identity is derived from the defining characteristics of the organization and they adapt behaviorally to the organization’s standards. In Liberia and elsewhere in the UN system, many of the interviewees were strongly identified with their respective organization. One person summarized that “internally [within the UN community], even among the agencies in our own self-perception, our identity formation is agency-based. . . . We [as individuals] see ourselves as WFP, we see ourselves as UNDP, as UNICEF.”52 Organizational identity and identification are important because they may enhance organizational performance by promoting cooperative and coordinated behavior.53 A shared social identity to which group members subscribe motivates them to cooperate to achieve common goals even at the expense of individual interests. It represents a resource for actors in terms of a collectively held reference frame that: allows members to congruently interpret issues, roles, responses to problems, and to take action in a coordinated manner; and helps them to address internal tensions and conflicts. In networked organizational settings, a shared identity supports attaching importance to an issue, collectively investing time and energy in it, committing to compromises, taking collective risk, and securing support from their respective organizations.54

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Shared Identity as a Prerequisite for Learning As outlined above, research has corroborated that a shared identity promotes cooperation and provides congruent mental models and common cognitive frames of reference for those for whom it is salient. It is with regard to these two features that identification and a shared identity are highly relevant for OL processes.55 The notion of some kind of consensus or unitarism is found in most conceptions of OL.56 The assumption is that shared visions, values, cultures, and identities are required for successful OL57 and that learning success depends on the actors’ engaged participation in the OL process and on the constructive communication and dialogue between them. Thus, OL success depends on individuals’ willingness to relate positively with others—including the commitment to the organization’s goals, active participation in relevant learning or practice communities, and willingness to share knowledge. A shared identity to which members of an organizational entity subscribe (i.e., identify with) positively affects this kind of engagement and cooperative attitudes and, therefore, helps to realize OL. But what happens to OL when identities and the associated visions, values, and cultures are diverse or contested? A situation that is very common to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Research on OL has been mainly silent with regard to these issues.58 However, the effects of group members’ different social identities on group dynamics and processes have been at the heart of SIT research. Once social identities that are not connected to the present group but to other organizational entities become salient, well-documented effects may include biased perceptions, judgment, and behavior. Group members favor the in-group and its products and perceive out-groups as less trustworthy and capable than their in-group.59 This has adversarial effects on cooperation and coordination between members of different groups and, eventually, on outcomes.60 These dynamics are further amplified by threats to the group’s domain or resources.61 In networked organizational settings, comprising actors with different “home organizations,” members often revert to their respective home organization’s identity because the interorganizational context renders this social identity accessible and the category fits with their delegate status.62 The perceived differences undermine the basis for the development of a shared group identity because perceived similarity is critical for feelings of attraction to and willingness to communicate with other group members.63 Thus, differential organizational membership triggers ingroup−out-group categorization and subsequent intra- and intergroup processes that tend to increase the divide between group members.64 Rather than relating positively to others—participating, engaging, and exerting effort on behalf of the group—behavioral differentiation enforces the divide between members and, as a result, impairs group functioning. Thus, we

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suggest that for diverse groups lacking a common sense of what the group is about (i.e., a shared identity) and members’ identification with it, it is a necessary prerequisite to first develop that identity before collective learning related to the issues and problems at hand can be achieved. We conceptualize this identity development in itself as a learning process aimed at answering the question of who are we. Through collective information processing shared views of the organizational entity itself are developed and stored and continuously refined and advanced. Yet successful learning related to the development of a shared identity is also influenced by the existence of common mental models, reference frames, values, norms, and experiences as a base on which this can happen. This notion points to the tension between strong identity requests to develop appropriate problem solutions and restricted learning capabilities with respect to the development of a shared identity, which is seen as a major prerequisite for the first process. However, with a more refined and complex interpretation of the central tenets of SIT, undergirded by extensive laboratory research on identity construction processes in group settings, SIT researchers concluded that the predominant paradigm of individuals inferring their social identity automatically from supraordinate social structures is complemented by social identity as constructed by consensual and shared identity formation through communication and action.65 To summarize, successful OL depends on organizational members’ active engagement in the learning process. The commitment to the organization’s goals, active participation in relevant learning or practice communities, and willingness to share knowledge are positively influenced by organization members’ identification with the collective. In diverse organizational settings, it thus becomes important to limit or overcome the learning barriers that result from a lack of shared identity and identification. The development of a shared identity can be seen in itself as a learning process. In the next subsection, we report our preliminary findings from the case study in Liberia contrasting a rather successful peace operation with a failed learning process. The Development of Shared Identity as a Learning Process: Evidence from the Liberian Peace Operation Community 66 In the four Liberian interagency working groups that we examined, we found strong evidence for a positive relationship between a shared group identity and the degree of cooperative behavior among group members and their problem-solving capability. In groups that had formed some sense of a shared group identity, the members exhibited a great willingness to engage in the group—to participate in the community of practice—to develop and implement solutions for the topical issues at hand. Practically speaking, this engagement included, among other things, frequent participation in meet-

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ings, active contributions to discussions, volunteering with regard to concrete activities, advocating and mobilizing resources on behalf of the group in the home organization, keeping promises, and an active search for compromises with respect to conflicting issues. Furthermore, both the group’s working atmosphere and the achieved results (e.g., the group’s work plan as well as joint actions and programs related to the topical issue) were regarded as superior to other work settings by group members. In contrast, the lack of a shared identity severely hampered the potential of a multiorganizationally staffed team to develop problem-solving capabilities and integrated responses to domain-specific problems. A missing common sense of who are we and what is this group about resulted in a lack of participation of group members in meetings, lengthy debates about formal but not substantive issues, and, most severely, almost no progress in formulating and implementing sustainable problem responses in a short- as well as a longterm perspective. With the data from the Liberian field investigation, we were also able to trace the processes of the development of a shared group identity. These insights were derived from the parts of the interviews that were dedicated to the exploration of the incidents, behaviors, and processes that occurred while the groups grew closer together over time. We also asked for incidents, behaviors, and factors that were presently, or at one point in the group’s history, perceived as impeding members’ identification with the group. In the remainder of this subsection, we illustrate our findings, with the help of examples from two specific inter-agency working groups. Out of the four groups that were part of the investigation, two were chosen because they constituted the most different cases in terms of group identification and, therefore, allowed a systematic comparison of a successful peace operation with a failed developmental process. For the group whose task performance was considered good,67 members reported independently from one another that their sense of belonging to the group had increased with group tenure and that they felt that group members had developed an affective bond among one another. Most individuals recalled that they had joined the group with only a vague conception of what the group was about and what their own role would be within it. However, attendance of retreats and the bimonthly meetings served as arenas to engage the members first, as individuals, and second, as a group, in an ongoing process of gathering, interpreting, and storing information about themselves and the group. Yet this process not only was promoted through formal discussions on the group’s actual agenda and topical issues, but also in informal conversations and social interaction. The attempts to advance the topic triggered: (1) the discovery of others’ reference frames, values, and so forth, as well as their action possibilities and constraints; (2) others’ conceptions about the group’s goals and objectives and each member’s role and responsibility; and (3) recognition of similarities and discrep-

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ancies among group members’ conceptions. The discussion engaged group members in reflection, asking questions, getting and seeking feedback, and testing assumptions. Eventually, this led to a reconciliation of differences and discrepancies and the emergence of a common understanding of who are we as a group, the common goals and objectives, the role and responsibility of different members, how to work together, and appropriate behavior within the group. The media through which the information was transported was initially fluid and latent; during their work together, members implicitly developed common norms and standards for behavior and aligned their different views. Work on formal media, like work plans, activity maps, or joint programs as discussion topics supported the process. Sometimes, the implicit norms were formalized through the definition of terms of reference for the group. The whole process was greatly influenced by the group’s leadership. The chairman cultivated an inclusive and engaging leadership style; for example, expressed in collectively oriented rhetoric (always talking about the group as “we”) and considerate and people-oriented leadership behavior. For instance, the leader initiated that meetings be held on a rotational basis in each group member’s facility to share the burden of traveling and to give each agency the opportunity to present its headquarters. Also, the group leader ensured follow-up on action points and engaged in securing senior leadership support from UNMIL and agency heads. This helped to foster members’ perception of the importance of the topic as well as their recognition of the instrumentality of the group for their own agenda. Despite these positive elements, a lack of members’ input and unequal burden sharing in terms of financial and human resources had a negative impact on the process of identity development. However, in this group, the positive features outweighed these negative influences. The process of coming up with congruent information interpretation and the subsequent transformation into agreed-on views about the group and participating in it can be interpreted as a learning process. Hence, we preliminarily deduce that, over time, two separate, consecutive, and yet interdependent learning processes occurred in this group. In the first process, related to identity formation, through intense communication and dialogue, group members learned about their own and others’ roles in the group before they could act as purposeful members of the group. This dialogue continued into the second process of communicative negotiation about a collective understanding of the team. At the end of the cycle, team members had developed some common reference frames, norms, values, and practices to which they all subscribed and that defined the identity of the group. The group members interpreted the development of this sense of a shared group identity as a shared success that increased the collectively perceived functionality and prestige of the group and conveyed a sense of positive ownership to them. As outlined above, it also vitally served the development of adequate solutions for the problems at hand that were con-

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sidered successes, further deepening identification with the group. Of course, the outlined processes are fragile and may fail at several stages. We formulated the following conclusions from interviews with members of a second sample group that was consistently regarded as ineffective, slow, and self-revolving. The same interview guidelines were used although, in comparison to the other group, it was noticed that respondents were rather reserved when asked about their sense of belonging to the group with some interviewees out rightly contesting the existence of a shared group identity. Therefore, the conversations with respondents from this group revolved more around the perceived reasons why group integration was so hard to achieve. Despite the fact that a resilient identification with the group was not in place, the incidents reported by members of this group supported the pattern of identity formation found in other groups. In those cases in which group members spoke about the difficult emergence of we-ness and their sense of belonging to the group, they often alluded to the problems of understanding their own role, as well as the role of their colleagues and the entire team, and its negative effect on the development of shared values and practices. Members of this group only infrequently engaged in information sharing and exploring the different conceptions held by the various team members. Infrequent meetings and low participation did not leave much room for these activities. Dialogue did not gain momentum because there was insufficient time granted for it and the free exchange of ideas, both informally as well as formally, that would have allowed a discovery and disclosure of similarities and differences in conceptions and eventually reconciliation. A lack of appropriate leadership almost from the group’s inception was also a major impediment. The chairman, for instance, clearly separated himself from the group (speaking of “You as the UN XY Group” rather than “We as the UN XY Group”). Furthermore, administrative leadership that would include supporting the functioning of the group with appropriate documentation, information dissemination, actively engaging group members, and follow-up was not present. The support of individual group members by their home organization’s senior leadership was also low and the group leadership did not secure this backing. These measures—if taken by the group’s leadership—would have served to clarify the meaning and reduce ambiguity of information, initiate dialogue about the group’s meaning (role?) and objectives, thus fostering homogeneity of mental models and cognitive reference frames. Finally, we also observed that the process in this group was hampered by repeated restarts because of considerable and frequent changes in membership. A self-supporting shared group identity to which new members could be socialized was lacking. Although group members generally showed a weak identification with the group, most of them mentioned at least a number of incidents or behaviors that they associated with some sort of belonging to the group. For example,

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respondents congruently reported that they perceived the group’s thematic domain as very important and drew implicit and explicit connections between the significance of the theme and their positive attitude toward the group. However, at the time of the field visit, it appeared that the group and its members were highly demotivated and were stuck in a deadlock. As a result, the group was unable to overcome these obstacles or to make a fresh start, even with the support of a newly engaged leadership. Overall, by tracing the development of both groups, we found evidence that a shared identity plays an important role for the groups’ performance. With respect to the development of such an identity, we found that the developmental process comprises the exchange, collection, interpretation, and transformation of relevant information to foster a shared and stable conception of members’ roles and responsibilities, the meaning of the group, what it is about, and how it should function. This information processing should not be at odds with the initial diversity of group members so that productive dialogue and discussion can proceed hampered. However, it appears that the process is not an automatism, but needs support in several ways. The main influencing levers that surfaced from the interviews conducted were: (1) interaction intensity (i.e., the extent to which members of the group can and do meet, both socially and professionally) and engage in dialogue; (2) group leadership performance (i.e., the extent to which the designated facilitator of the group is able to motivate and engage the group members and to secure assistance and backing from senior UN officials); (3) group resources (i.e., the extent of decisionmaking authority and the availability of resources for the group in terms of personnel, finances, and time); and (4) group member attitude (i.e., referring to the behaviors, values, and attitudes of the individual team members toward the group). While largely positive incidences of these factors were found in the better-performing group, in the low-performing group we observed mainly negative incidences that impeded group development and group task performance. The above considerations led us to the promising conclusion that identity construction can be actively influenced. This gives considerable leeway for managerial interventions to initiate a virtuous cycle in which successful identity learning feeds into problem-related learning which, in turn, feeds into identity learning and so forth.

Conclusion In this chapter, we explored the relevance of organizational learning for UN-led peace operations and its interplay with social identity and the diversity of actors involved. We outlined the general cognitive conception of OL, described its social nature, and explored how identity diversity affects OL

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processes in networked organizations. In particular, we elaborated on the tension between strong identity requests and restricted learning capabilities and established the idea that, in networked organizational settings, OL with respect to problem-solving and the development of a shared identity is necessary. Based on initial findings from field research in the Liberian UN peacebuilding community, we illustrated our conceptions and provided some initial evidence for our claim that two complementary learning processes are vital for developing peace operations’ problem-solving capabilities and for improving their impact on the ground. As a consequence of this research, we detected three rather broad implications that may hold relevance for the implementation of current and future peace operations. First, the social and interactive nature of OL needs much more consideration when the diverse actors involved in peace operations want to improve their learning performance. Special emphasis should be given to the communicative aspects of learning; that is, for sustainable OL to occur, interagency forums and self-managed crosscutting groups that involve participation of all concerned UN organizations need to provide opportunities for dialogue and information processing by the actors involved. Second, this implies that OL, in the context of peace operations, should be fostered locally in the area of operation and tailored to the specific mission context. It appears that top-down processes (e.g., the distribution of best practices from [individual] agency headquarters to the field level and the like) are not suitable. In particular, this is because they often (1) are too decoupled from the local context; and (2) usually do not account for the learning barriers among a diversity of actors and the discursive nature of learning. Rather than promoting the learning results as captured by best practices for example, it could be more useful to develop guidelines on how to steer or influence the process of learning itself. Third, this suggests that the leadership in interagency contexts needs to account for the organizational identity salience of the various UN actors as the images, values, beliefs, and practices that may be associated with membership in a specific organization might impede an individual’s participation in the collective learning process. Furthermore, this would require developing and training leaders in appropriate management practice for interagency contexts. In our view, the initial findings, with respect to the particular features of the learning process, bear a number of important implications for the micromanagement of UN peace operations. While it is clearly not our aim in this chapter to develop specific guidelines for organizational learning in UN peacekeeping operations, it is hoped that the chapter will inspire those professionals engaged in the implementation of such complex endeavors to think about managerial means, measures, and behaviors that might be appropriate in their particular working context.

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Notes 1. UN, Report of the Secretary General. United Nations System Support for Capacity-building, UN Doc. E/2002/58, May 14, 2002, par. 11. 2. See, among others, Thorsten Benner and Philipp Rotmann, “Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 1 (2008): 43−62; and Chapter 10 by Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann in this volume. 3. See, for example, John Child and Sally J. Heavens, “The Social Constitution of Organizations and Its Implications for Organizational Learning,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 308−326; and Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, “Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks,” Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1993): 357−381. 4. John Child and Suzana B. Rodrigues, “Social Identity and Organizational Learning,” in Marjorie A. Lyles and Mark P.V. Easterby-Smith, eds., The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 535−556; Kevin G. Corley and Dennis A. Gioia, “Semantic Learning as Change Enabler: Relating Organizational Identity and Organizational Learning,” in Marjorie A. Lyles and Mark P.V. Easterby-Smith, eds., The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 623−638. 5. See, for example, Deborah Gladstein Ancona and David F. Caldwell, “Demography and Design: Predictors of New Product Team Performance,” Organization Science 3, no. 3 (1992): 321−341; and Karen A. Jehn, Gregory B. Northcraft, and Margaret A. Neale, “Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups,” Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 4 (1999): 741−763. 6. See Sujin K. Horowitz and Irwin B. Horwitz, “The Effects of Team Diversity on Team Outcomes: A Meta-analytical Review of Team Demography,” Journal of Management 33, no. 6 (2007): 987−1015; and Katherine Y. Williams and Charles A. O’Reilly III, “Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research,” in Barry M. Staw and Robert I. Sutton, eds., Research in Organizational Behavior (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1998), pp. 77−140. 7. See UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Systemwide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Assistance and the Environment. Delivering as One, UN Doc. A/61/583, November 20, 2006. 8. Most relevant for peace operations are the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support (DFS), Department for Political Affairs (DPA), and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). 9. For instance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UNICEF, UNDP, UN Women, UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNHCR, WFP, UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), WHO, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), to name the most important actors. 10. This view was also corroborated by interview partners in Liberia. Although the authors do not want to convey the impression that there is not much room for improvement in Liberia as well, the general positive view of the functioning of the UN in Liberia can be summarized in one interviewees’ statement: “If you think this mission is a mess, you haven’t seen others.” See also Lara Olsen and Hrach Grego-

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rian, “Interagency and Civil-military Coordination: Lessons from a Survey of Afghanistan and Liberia,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 1 (2007): 1–48; UN, The Example of “County Support Teams” as an Integrated Mission Approach at the Local Level in Liberia, Joint UNDP-DPKO Study on Local Governance Support in Liberia (New York: UN Development Programme and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, November 2007); and Xavier Zeebroek, “Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Burundi and Liberia Case Studies,” Briefing Paper (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center Tufts University, July 2006). 11. All interviews were audiorecorded and transcribed verbatim. The interviews lasted between 30 and 120 minutes (with an average of approximately 60 minutes) and included questions on the respondents’: (1) personal and organizational background; (2) participation in the working group; (3) perceived outcomes of the team’s work; (4) issues related to team learning and problem-solving capability; (5) the management and team leadership; and (6) issues related to their identification with the home organization and the team as well as the group’s identity. A special emphasis was put on eliciting a temporal narrative account from respondents on these issues, usually since they first joined the group. The interviews were held in a semistructured, yet loose form so that sufficient freedom was left to explore issues and topics that were deemed particularly relevant for the study’s topic. Research was undertaken through three interview visits to UN headquarters in New York and Geneva and two field trips to Liberia (in March and October 2008) with a total field presence of thirteen weeks by the first and second author. On these visits we conducted 115 face-to-face interviews with personnel from over twenty UN organizations. 12. See, for example, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); and Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 13. Rüdiger Klimecki, Hermann Lassleben, and Markus Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen: Ein Ansatz zur Integration von Theorie, Empirie und Gestaltung,” Management Forschung 10, no. 1 (1999): 63−98. 14. Rüdiger Klimecki, Gilbert J.B. Probst, and Peter Eberl, “Systementwicklung Als Managementproblem,” Management Forschung 1, no. 1 (1991): 103−162. 15. Mary M. Crossan, Henry W. Lane, and Roderick E. White, “An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution,” Academy of Management Review 24, no. 3 (1999): 522−537; Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen.” 16. Richard L. Daft and George P. Huber, “How Organizations Learn: A Communication Framework,” Research in the Sociology of Organizations 5, no. 1 (1987): 1−36; George P. Huber, “Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures,” Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 88−115. 17. See, among others, Crossan, Lane, and White, “An Organizational Learning Framework”; Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen”; and Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-creating Company (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 18. Nonaka and Takeuchi, The Knowledge Creating Company. 19. Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Crossan, Lane, and White, “An Organizational Learning Framework”; Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen.” 20. Crossan, Lane, and White, “An Organizational Learning Framework”; Bo Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn,” in Paul C. Nystrom and William

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H. Starbuck, eds., Handbook of Organizational Design (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 3−27; Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen.” 21. Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen.” 22. Rüdiger Klimecki, Hermann Lassleben, and Markus Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen: Ein Ansatz zur Integration von Theorie, Empirie und Gestaltung,” Management Forschung 10, no. 1 (1999): 63−98. 23. For details, see ibid. 24. UN, Report of the Joint Field Visit to Liberia of the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme, 25 February−5 March 2007, UN Doc. DP/FPA/2007/CRP.1 - E/ICEF/2007/CRP.7, April 25, 2007. 25. UN, The Example of “County Support Teams” as an Integrated Mission Approach at the Local Level in Liberia. 26. See, for example, John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation,” Organisation Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 40−57. 27. Fred Kofman and Peter Senge, “Communities of Commitment: The Heart of Learning Organizations,” Organizational Dynamics 4, no. 1 (1995): 5−23. 28. UN, The Example of “County Support Teams” as an Integrated Mission Approach at the Local Level in Liberia. 29. Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen.” 30. Paul Shrivastava, “A Typology of Organizational Learning Systems,” Journal of Management Studies 20, no. 1 (1983): 7−28. 31. Argyris and Schön, Organizational Learning. 32. Richard L. Daft and Karl E. Weick, “Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation Systems,” Academy of Management Review 9, no. 2 (1984): 284−295. 33. Marlene C. Fiol, “Consensus, Diversity, and Learning in Organizations,” Organization Science 5, no. 3 (1994): 403−420. 34. Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn.” 35. Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen.” 36. Argyris and Schön, Organizational Learning. 37. See, for example, Gregory Bateson, Ökologie Des Geistes (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983). 38. Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn”; Barbara Levitt and James G. March, “Organizational Learning,” Annual Review of Sociology 14, no. 1 (1988): 319−340. 39. Argyris and Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective; Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1995). 40. Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Management as Symbolic Action: The Creation and Maintenance of Organizational Paradigms,” Research in Organizational Behavior 3, no. 1 (1981): 1−52. 41. See, for example, Mark Dodgson, “Organizational Learning: A Review of Some Literatures,” Organization Studies 14, no. 3 (1993): 375−394; and Hedberg, “How Organizations Learn and Unlearn.” 42. Amy C. Edmondson, “The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in Organizations: A Group-level Perspective,” Organization Science 13, no. 2 (2002): 128−146. 43. See, for example, Brown and Duguid, “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-practice”; Scott D. Cook and Dvora Yanow, “Culture and Organiza-

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tional Learning,” Journal of Management Inquiry 2, no. 4 (1993): 373−390; Karen Handley, Andrew Sturdy, Robin Fincham, and Timothy Clark, “Within and Beyond Communities of Practice: Making Sense of Learning through Participation, Identity and Practice,” Journal of Management Studies 43, no. 3 (2006): 641−653; and Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 44. Brown and Duguid, “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-practice.” 45. Handley, Sturdy, Fincham, and Clark, “Within and Beyond Communities of Practice,” p. 642. 46. Mark Easterby-Smith, Mary M. Crossan, and Davide Nicolini, “Organizational Learning: Debates Past, Present and Future,” Journal of Management Studies 37, no. 6 (2001): 783–796. 47. Wenger, Communities of Practice, p. 4. 48. Various actors across the UN system have engaged in considerable efforts to increase organizational learning by this means. Our empirical evidence suggests, however, that the impact of headquarters-issued guidelines and reports on the ground is limited. For instance, UN Women provides a guideline on the setup and management of Gender Theme Groups in developing and postconflict countries. Given the recommendations in the guideline and the situation in the field, the GTG participants in Liberia either have not read the guidelines or, for other reasons, did not follow them. 49. Stuart Albert, Blake E. Ashford, and Jane E. Dutton, “Organizational Identity and Identification: Chartering New Waters and Building New Bridges,” Academy of Management Review 25, no. 1 (2000): 13. 50. For a detailed discussion of this conceptualization, compare Stuart Albert and David A. Whetten, “Organizational Identity,” Research in Organizational Behavior 14, no. 2 (1985): 263−295; and David A. Whetten, “Albert and Whetten Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of Organizational Identity,” Journal of Management Inquiry 15, no. 3 (2006): 220−221. 51. For more details, see Michael E. Hogg and Deborah J. Terry, “Social Identity and Self-categorization Processes in Organizational Contexts,” Academy of Management Review 25, no. 1 (2000): 122−126. 52. Unpublished interviews with individuals who wish to remain anonymous. 53. See, among others, Blake E. Ashforth and Fred Mael, “Social Identity Theory and the Organization,” Academy of Management Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 20−39; Jane E. Dutton, Janet M. Dukerich, and Celia V. Harquail, “Organizational Images and Member Identification,” Administrative Science Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1994): 239−263; and Cynthia Hardy, Thomas B. Lawrence, and David Grant, “Discourse and Collaboration: The Role of Conversations and Collective Identity,” Academy of Management Review 30, no. 5 (2005): 58−77. 54. Hardy, Lawrence, and Grant, “Discourse and Collaboration.” 55. Child and Rodrigues, “Social Identity and Organizational Learning.” 56. Tony Huzzard and Katarina Östergren, “When Norms Collide: Learning Under Organizational Hypocrisy,” British Journal of Management 13, no. 1 (2002): 47−59. 57. See, for example, Cook and Yanow, “Culture and Organizational Learning”; Klimecki, Lassleben, and Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen”; Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge Creating Company; and Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990).

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58. Huzzard and Östergren, “When Norms Collide.” 59. Henry Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985), pp. 7−24. 60. Ashforth and Mael, “Social Identity Theory and the Organization”; and Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” 61. Ashforth and Mael, “Social Identity Theory and the Organization,” p. 31. 62. See Donald C. Hambrick, Jiatao Li, Katherine R. Xin, and Anne S. Tsui, “Compositional Gaps and Downward Spirals in International Joint Venture Management Groups,” Strategic Management Journal 22, no. 11 (2001): 1033−1053; and Jiatao Li and Donald C. Hambrick, “Factional Groups: A New Vantage on Demographic Faultlines, Conflict, and Disintegration in Work Teams,” Academy of Management Journal 48, no. 5 (2005): 794−813. 63. Donn Byrne, The Attraction Paradigm (New York: Academic Press, 1971). 64. Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” 65. Tom Postmes, S. Alexander Haslam, and Roderick I. Swaab, “Social Influence in Small Groups: An Interactive Model of Social Identity Formation,” European Review of Social Psychology 16, no. 1 (2005): 1−42; Tom Postmes, Russell Spears, Antonia T. Lee, and Rosemary J. Novak, “Individuality and Social Influence in Groups: Inductive and Deductive Routes to Group Identity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89, no. 5 (2005): 747−763. 66. We caution readers that the analysis of our empirical material is still a ‘‘work-in-progress” and, therefore, the reported findings should be regarded as tentative. 67. The evaluation of task performance was based on: (1) statements and evaluations made by group members in personal interviews; (2) results from a standardized follow-up survey completed by all group members; and (3) interviews with external issue experts.

10 Bureaucracy and Learning at Headquarters Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann

UN PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE TRADITIONALLY MADE HEADLINES FOR

their disposition to repeat mistakes rather than for their ability to learn from past experience and new knowledge.1 As a prominent observer has argued, “Learning has not . . . been one of the strengths of the United Nations.”2 Over the past decade, the UN peace operations bureaucracy has attempted to change this picture by designing mechanisms and processes to enhance the organization’s ability to draw on knowledge and experience in a more systematic and coordinated manner. Under the leadership of then UN under-secretary-general Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) developed the Peace Operations 2010 reform strategy that placed a particular emphasis on knowledge management and doctrine development, a focus that was replicated in DPKO’s July 2009 A New Partnership Agenda report.3 After several failed attempts in the past, and in light of the many structural and cultural obstacles to organizational change and learning at the UN, this renewed drive to transform the peace operations bureaucracy into a learning organization has already made significant inroads in the first three years of its existence.4 This push toward turning the UN peace operations’ apparatus into a learning organization presents researchers with a fruitful area of study. How does the UN (not) learn from past experience and new knowledge? Which factors facilitate or hinder organizational learning (OL)? There are few studies that address these questions.5 The single study devoted to learning in UN peace operations scantily addresses organization-wide processes.6 In particular, it gives short shrift to knowledge management and learning across different missions and between field missions and headquarters, one

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of the goals of the Peace Operations 2010 agenda. The fluid organizational character of the field presence and the comparatively low degree of previous institutionalization (in terms of doctrine, standard operating procedures, and guidance) at an organization-wide level make the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy a particularly interesting case. That said, the framework developed here can and should be applied to other international bureaucracies with the goal of a comparative research agenda. In this chapter, we present elements of a framework for analyzing organizational (non)learning in the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy; that is, those parts of the UN Secretariat that are regularly tasked with planning, managing, and supporting peace operations, including the actual missions on the ground.7 First, we draw on various disciplines to develop a framework for tracing processes of OL, taking into account different dimensions and levels of learning. Second, we discuss the specific character of the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy and provide a preliminary analysis of the factors that enable or hinder learning processes and that merit further research. These include factors from the organization’s environment as well as structural and process factors from within the organization. In the third and final part of the chapter, we outline possible directions for future research.

Learning in International Bureaucracies In this section, we introduce the different elements of building a conceptual framework for analyzing learning: by reviewing the theoretical underpinnings for studying OL in international organizations; and by taking a closer look at the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy and identifying factors that will likely influence learning in this context. The Paucity of Research on Organizational Learning in International Bureaucracies Do international bureaucracies learn and, if so, when and how? Which factors influence their capacity to learn? It is surprising that few studies have attempted to answer these essential questions. In the field of international relations (IR), the pioneering work of Ernst Haas has been a towering exception.8 But in the past twenty years, few IR scholars have taken up the issues laid out in Haas’s innovative typology of learning in international bureaucracies. Research on OL in other disciplines such as sociology, public administration, and business-focused organization theory has ignored international bureaucracies as research objects. It is quite symptomatic that

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neither of the two most prominent volumes taking stock of research on OL made any reference to international bureaucracies.9 In the past ten years, this picture has changed considerably. Many international bureaucracies, starting with the World Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), have caught up with private sector rhetoric and now present themselves as knowledge-based organizations that are making significant efforts to develop and implement knowledge management systems. They have readily adopted the language of “best practices” and “lessons learned” inspired by the management literature. The UN Secretariat and the peace operations’ bureaucracy in particular are the most recent additions to the list of converts to the gospel of learning and knowledge management. One might assume that this would have transformed international bureaucracies into attractive objects of study for students of OL in IR and related disciplines. An increasing number of studies, indeed, point to a growing interest in studying OL in international bureaucracies in general.10 Developing a Research Framework: The Key Challenges The diversity of approaches adopted by these studies underlines the challenges of developing a research framework that allows for an easy comparison of findings and results. Toward this end, research on OL in international bureaucracies will need to address three serious concerns: normative bias, conceptual fuzziness and proliferation, and effective multidisciplinarity. Confronting bias. As critics have pointed out, research on learning often

suffers from the bias of researchers to present their own views under the neutral guise of “learning.”11 To the extent that explicitly normative research has gone out of fashion, studying learning provides a convenient way to bring in normative concerns through the backdoor. That is, scholars often use learning as a synonym for their own expectations of best behavior of international organizations. To overcome such temptations, normative judgments on whether the content of learning is desirable or not should represent only a second and optional step and should build on a solid analysis of learning processes. Related and equally problematic is the extent to which a scientific and technocratic bias informs the scholarship on OL in international bureaucracies. A number of studies assume the following model: an epistemic community (i.e., a group of like-minded scientists) reaches a consensus on (re)conceptualizing a problem and an adequate response (e.g., how chlorofluorocarbons damage the ozone layer and how this problem can be

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averted). An enlightened international bureaucracy adopts this scientific wisdom and thereby learns. While this is a viable analytical tool to investigate particular environmental problems, this model is far less relevant when there is no clear-cut scientific consensus within a solidly entrenched and respected epistemic community; for example, as with regard to multidimensional peace operations. There is no science of peacebuilding that could reach consensus on how to deal with the complex challenges of building a lasting peace after war. In the absence of monolithic authoritative truth, however, competing factions within an international bureaucracy have incentives to use scientific results strategically to their own political ends. Confronting conceptual fuzziness and proliferation. There is no generally accepted definition of OL. OL is, at present, more akin to a widely applied metaphor than to the bedrock of a well-developed research paradigm. This is a reflection of both the level of fragmentation of research on OL and the inherent complexity of the process of learning itself. Transferring the concept of learning from the individual to the organizational level adds to the challenges of clearly defining and operationalizing the concept. A definition of OL, in line with the outlined challenges, therefore, needs to meet two criteria. First, its basic elements must allow for operationalization, rather than remaining at the metaphorical level. Second, it should build on concepts already in use instead of creating additional ones while, at the same time, adapting them to the context of international organizations. Effective multidisciplinarity. The lack of analytical approaches in international relations dealing substantively with the internal workings of international organizations requires borrowing from the OL literature, a subfield of organization theory.12 However, organization theory itself does not offer tested models tailored to the analysis of learning in international bureaucracies, for two reasons. First, the field of OL suffers from a significant degree of heterogeneity. In the words of two leading contributors to this literature, “Research in OL has suffered from conceptions that were excessively broad, encompassing nearly all organizational change, from ontological complaints that organizations cannot learn, and from various other maladies that arise from insufficient agreement among those working in the area on key concepts and problems.”13 Second, the literature on OL focuses almost exclusively on business organizations, often relying on quasi-Darwinian market forces as explanatory factors while critically underemphasizing the political factors in organizational processes, as highlighted by Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann in Chapter 8 in this volume. The analogy does not hold; international organizations rarely operate in a market-like environ-

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ment where they are likely to go out of business based on the forces of supply and demand. While the OL literature does not offer a tailor-made framework for the analysis of international bureaucracies, it is useful to rely on elements of the current OL literature for two purposes: as building blocks for our heuristic model of learning; and to deduce hypotheses on the key factors that affect learning. In this view, the literature on OL offers promising avenues, clearly demarcating itself from earlier approaches. The traditional understanding of organizations as closed systems in the 1970s gave way to a more open concept that allowed for the interaction between an organization and its environment. However, the new scholarly recognition of such interaction remained limited to a one-way relationship; namely, that the institutional environment determines the organization’s goals and the instruments to reach them. More recent approaches see the organization and its environment as mutually constitutive.14 In the following sections, we present one approach to the study of OL in international bureaucracies. This approach was developed for an analysis of OL in the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy for a pilot project covering a dozen individual processes of learning across the policy areas of security, governance, welfare, and mission integration.15 Defining Organizational Learning in International Bureaucracies Our approach to OL in international bureaucracies builds on the following premises: (1) OL is a collective process driven by groups of individuals to become effective at an organization-wide level;16 (2) OL is a process with a strong cognitive dimension,17 in which (3) the organization interacts with its environment and that (4) manifests itself in the acquisition of knowledge and the development of new rules and routines. In this vein, organizational learning should be defined as a knowledgebased process of questioning and changing organizational rules to change organizational practice. A process is considered learning only if the negotiations about these new rules and routines are significantly based on reflection and knowledge. A change of rules and routines that occurs only due to a change in power relations should not be included in the definition of OL. The difficulty of tracing the interaction between power and knowledge is evident, and clearly power is always part and parcel of OL processes. However, a cognitive component is essential to this conception of OL and also helps to distinguish OL from other forms of changes in rules and routines. This definition combines the knowledge-based approach of Haas with that of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore who focus on the impor-

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tance of rules as the basic modus operandi of international bureaucracies. According to the latter, “Bureaucratic rules are the standard operating procedures that allow the organization to respond more effectively and predictably to environmental demands.”18 Change of rules applies to a broad continuum, from operational procedures to grand doctrines. Stages of the Learning Process Based on this proposed definition, OL should be empirically observable as a process involving different individuals and groups within a bureaucracy. Similarly to many common models in OL, we distinguish three stages of the learning process, each with distinct challenges and logics of operation: knowledge acquisition; advocacy and decisionmaking; and institutionalization. Ideally, these three stages add up to a full learning cycle; that is, the institutionalized rules that would be subject of continuous review and further learning.19 1. Knowledge acquisition. Initially, the organization either actively searches for, or passively receives, knowledge from the external environment or converts its own previous experience into knowledge. 2. Advocacy and decisionmaking. After knowledge acquisition, the carriers of knowledge spread the word about the new knowledge in the organization and develop knowledge-based proposals for new rules. Building coalitions and negotiating the relevance of their new knowledge and rule-changing proposals, they try to convince key decisionmakers to accept their newly acquired knowledge and its implications for rule adaptation. In this phase, we examine how knowledge is formed into proposals for new rules and how these proposals gain (or do not gain) momentum within the organization. The advocacy stage ends with an authoritative decision on whether and how to change the rules. 3. Institutionalization. Once a decision has been made, it must be codified and implemented. The new rules are integrated within the existing body of rules and disseminated among concerned units and staff. The learning process is completed when the newly made rules are applied. In an ideal learning process, the implementation is followed by an evaluation of the new rule that activates a feedback loop and the learning process restarts. This is a stylized model that does not allow us to make predictions on how different factors influence individual processes of learning and nonlearning. Furthermore, we do not assume that every learning process actually reaches

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the final stage of institutionalization—in fact, we often find incomplete learning cycles. It remains an empirical question to determine where learning processes are typically interrupted and why. Taxonomies of Learning OL scholars have proposed a number of ways to distinguish different types of learning. The most common approach is based on different qualities of learning that are generally defined in metaphorical terms. The dichotomy between single loop and double loop learning, for example, contrasts learning processes that take place within a given set of rules and a given organizational structure with those that lead to the creation of entirely new procedures, approaches, or strategies.20 This rigid distinction of qualities of learning has proven hard to operationalize and has attracted considerable criticism, as the empirical picture suggests more of a continuum than a sharp divide between such poles.21 With a view of ultimately identifying some basic types of learning processes that might be driven by different combinations of causal influences, we focus on three dimensions upon which to build a typology of learning. The first dimension relates to the levels of bureaucratic and political hierarchy at which learning processes take place. At the working level, immediate reactions to problems or implementation of knowledge within a departmental or mission unit constitute a type of less formalized low-level learning. Mid-level learning has a broader reach and involves the departmental level, often using and producing more elaborate formal evidence such as articles, reports, or reviews.22 This, however, does not involve the top leadership or require member state authorization in an international bureaucracy, as would be the case for top-level systemic learning. In peace operations, this type of learning involves top management decisions and member states’ consent on new doctrines, reallocation of resources, or redesign of organizational structures. A second dimension of importance in a fragmented decentralized organization such as the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy is that of organizational scope. This refers to the distinction between local learning within a single mission (intramission learning) and systemwide learning across and between missions (intermission learning, either within the same country across successive missions or across different territories). As argued above, existing research has by-and-large focused on intramission learning.23 Both levels are important subjects of research, however, since comparative differences might be observed as to the enabling and constraining factors for learning. Furthermore, given the larger bureaucratic context of UN peace operations, a sober analysis of systemwide intermission learning is an important complement to the studies focusing on intramission learning.

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A third dimension is the level of contestation against the lesson or against what is being learned. Theoretically, a lesson may be contested on either of two grounds: first, because proponents and opponents disagree on whether the underlying evidence is true or false and whether the proposed lesson, therefore, works or does not work; and, second, because the lesson is seen as a matter of normative judgment rather than empirical truth, the debate will be about whether the proposed lesson is good or bad. In a matter as inherently political, yet also as practical as peacebuilding, normative contestation is often intertwined with or disguised as empirical doubts. However, whether an attempt to learn is seen more as a pragmatic improvement or an ideological quest, how contested it is overall will likely shape its reception by other members of the organization or its political stakeholders.

Processes of Organizational Learning in UN Peace Operations Having laid the general conceptual foundations for analyzing learning in international bureaucracies, in this subsection we take a closer look at the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy and its environment. We subsequently analyze a list of factors that we believe are of particular relevance in the peace operations context. These factors may also be of significance for other organizations. The Focal Organization and Its Environment Any analysis of OL requires a clear definition and understanding of the organization whose learning record is being analyzed. In the case of UN peace operations, there is a vast network of actors providing political, security, humanitarian, and development assistance to war-torn territories under the blue flag of the United Nations (see Figure 10.1). Many of these actors, such as UNDP or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), cannot be considered part of a single bureaucracy under the leadership of the UN Secretary-General. These distinct organizations, with their own principles and priorities, management structures, and even intergovernmental oversight bodies and field operations are only tenuously linked by the symbolic bond of the UN Charter and, increasingly, through a web of institutional links, interagency bodies, and working groups promoting an integrated approach. At the core of this system, there is a distinct bureaucratic organization that we call the “peace operations’ bureaucracy,” which manages the core aspects of peace operations and acts as a hub for coordinating with other actors within and beyond the larger UN family. We conceptualize the focal

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organization as distinct, but “deeply enmeshed with and dependent on [its] environment.”24 Since the internal reorganization in 2008, the peace operations’ bureaucracy is comprised of two closely integrated departments of the UN Secretariat as well as its peacekeeping field operations around the world.25 When the Security Council mandates a peace operation, it tasks the Secretary-General with its implementation. Within the Secretariat, DPKO takes the lead on the political and operational planning and management of peacekeeping missions in close collaboration with the Department of Field Support (DFS), which is responsible for providing administrative and logistical services. The UN peace operations’ bureaucracy has a number of structural and procedural instruments in place that are designed to support OL. There are dedicated organizational units (marked in bold in Figure 10.1), such as DPKO’s Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (which includes the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, PBPS) and smaller teams within a growing number of substantive policy units (e.g., the Police Division’s Strategic Policy and Development Section). A best practices officer is now regularly attached to each field operation to help busy managers on the ground to use new knowledge management tools such as communities of practice and dedicated intranet resources. These officers are tasked with promoting learning from sources internal as well as external to the organization, as described in Chapter 8. They are prime examples of what the literature on OL calls “boundary spanning units.”26 Boundary-spanning units operate at the interface between the focal organization and its environment, facilitating the flow of information and knowledge. At the same time, according to Christopher K. Ansell and Steven Weber, “[They] aim at modulating, regulating, and sometimes controlling what kinds of resources, signals, information, and ideas pass in and pass out . . . of the organization.”27 In this way, boundary spanners in the peace operations’ bureaucracy interface with other Secretariat departments and UN agencies, intergovernmental bodies, individual member state representatives, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, think tanks, academics, and consultants. In addition to the structured interaction with external actors, PBPS is driving a number of formal processes aimed at: identifying best practices and lessons learned from field staff; facilitating knowledge sharing between individuals and field missions; and developing a body of formal guidance based on best practices and consultations with practitioners in the field.28 DPKO’s Integrated Training Service has begun to develop a training strategy to improve the knowledge and skills of the more than 100,000 personnel working in the field, many of whom come with no prior experience in peace operations and have yet to be familiarized with specific training measures. Similarly, an Evaluation Section within the Policy, Evaluation,

Figure 10.1 The UN Peace Operations Bureaucracy and Its Environment

Security Council

Peacekeeping Commission

General Assembly Fourth Committee (Spc Pol Affairs)

Fifth Committee (Budget)

Spc Committee on Peacekeeping

ACABQ

Secretary-General Peacebuilding Support Office Coordinating committees: Policy Committee, ECPS, ECHA

Department of Political Affairs Policy Planning and Mediation Support

Department of Peacekeeping

Department of Field Support

Joint Office: Chief of Staff, Public Affairs, Situation Center

field support divisions Thematic divisions Regional divisions Office of Operations

Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions

regional divisions Police Division Integrated Operational Teams Office of Military Affairs substantive divisions

Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory

Policy, Evaluation, and Training Peacekeeping Best Practices Integrated Training Section Evalution Team

DDR Section Partnership Team Mine Action Service Reports to DPKO

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

DSRG Operations Police Commissioner

Force Commander peacekeeping contigents under UN command

Director of Mission Support

DSRSG/HC/RC

Economic and Social Coucil

Member States

Other UN actors

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UN Development Programme

Policy Development and Studies

UNDG Office

Non-UN actors

UNHCR

World Bank

INGOs

Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

OCHA Office

UNDP Field Office

other agency field offices

World Bank Country Office

INGO Country Offices

Academic Community and Think Tanks

local actors

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and Training Division is tasked with facilitating a more regular and rigorous approach to the assessment of progress on the ground. Some of these boundary-spanning and internal knowledge management units might come into play only at particular stages of the learning cycle. Training units, for example, are not important for knowledge acquisition, but rather come into play for effectively implementing new policies or practices; evaluators are important for assessing established policies and initiating new learning. However, taken together, these bureaucratic actors are at the center, as driving forces or facilitators, of OL processes within the peace operations’ bureaucracy. Of course, empirical research should not focus solely on these units, as innovative ideas might take other paths to the decisionmaking stage, depending on the particular constellation of factors driving it. Factors Influencing the Learning Process Existing research points to a multitude of “factors,” “conditions,” “antecedents,” and “triggers” that are in one way or another said to be causally linked to learning.29 In contrast to approaches focusing on single dominant causes or triggers of learning, most often a crisis,30 we believe that a more fine-grained process of tracing and analyzing different factors that (co)influence learning/nonlearning has the potential of presenting a richer analysis of OL. This is not to say that crises do not provide opportunities for learning. The history of UN peace operations shows ample evidence of stalled learning processes that were released only through severe crises, the most prominent being the Brahimi Report that emerged out of the failed missions of the 1990s. Focusing on additional less obvious factors can, however, shed light on the enabling and constraining conditions for learning in the absence of crisis; that is, in everyday bureaucratic and political practice. Environmental factors. As a first step toward organizing and prioritizing enabling and constraining factors for learning in international bureaucracies, we compiled a number of context-specific factors. Further research is necessary to link these preliminary factors more systematically to processes and outcomes. With regard to the environment within which UN peace operations operate, two factors are most prominent:

1. Power of the principals. The exercise of power on the part of the principals (based on the interests of member states) has an effect on learning processes, especially those of high political salience. Basic IR conceptualizations define “power” as “the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would

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not.”31 Hence, the interest of member states toward a particular learning process can result in three distinct effects: active support (politically or by specific financial or in-kind contributions toward it); benign neutrality; or some form of obstruction, either active or passive. Active obstruction occurs when an influential group of member states opposes a particular learning process while passive obstruction is the case when learning gets caught in an unrelated political conflict among member states. 2. State of knowledge. For OL to occur, “there must be sufficient consensual knowledge available to provide the rationale for the novel nesting of problems and solutions.”32 Concretely, this means that knowledge needs to be both available in a sufficiently policy-relevant form and applicable in the eyes of practitioners. We distinguish three states of knowledge: (1) consensus, which means that applicable knowledge, in line with the proposed lesson, is sufficiently available which should, ceteris paribus, promote learning; (2) contested knowledge, which denotes a situation in which there are competing claims to knowledge or truth as parts of a generally mature and applicable knowledge base. Effectively, there is a pool of knowledge to draw lessons from, but those lessons are easily contestable; and (3) lack of knowledge, which refers to a case in which there is a consensus about the lack of sufficiently applicable knowledge, resulting in a generally negative environment for learning. Structural factors. In addition to these environmental factors, other criti-

cal factors come from within the organization. These can be divided into structural and process factors and can either support or hinder OL. Structural factors constitute the organizational infrastructure of learning and can support or obstruct learning in different degrees. A strongly supportive learning infrastructure consists of “structures and strategies so as to enhance and maximize organizational learning” and, thus, to become a “learning organization.”33 Concretely, within the organizational infrastructure we systematically distinguish five influences on learning: openness; learning procedures; resources; individual incentives; and organizational culture. While each of these factors is analytically distinct, all of them are closely interrelated. 1. Openness. The very structure of the bureaucracy has effects on learning processes. Structural barriers to learning come vertically in the form of highly centralized decisionmaking processes, making it harder for working-level or middle management proposals to reach the top decisionmaking level (and vice versa). Barriers can also be horizontal, in the form of strict separation of functional parts, which

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hamper informal communication and force decisionmaking to proceed along excessively hierarchical lines. Headquarters-field as well as field-field relations are a variation of the same problem, with even stronger negative effects due to geographic distance and time difference. A high degree of organizational openness implies little hierarchical centralization and a permissive environment for horizontal collaboration and decisionmaking and, therefore, the absence of structural barriers to learning. 2. Learning procedures. The presence or absence of formal and informal procedures for knowledge management and learning also impacts on the organization’s capacity to learn. For a long time, the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy did not sufficiently invest in the establishment of such procedures. Only recently has the bureaucracy developed formal processes and tools for knowledge management such as an intranet and thematic online communities for practitioners in the field.34 3. Resources. A related issue is the availability of sufficient resources for learning, comprising dedicated staff time, posts, and funding for developing a concrete proposal and shepherding it to the point of implementation; time should also be set apart for knowledge acquisition. In an organization operating under constant stress, such as the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy, the ability to learn critically depends on whether time is set apart for knowledge management tasks (e.g., documenting experience) and on whether the core functions of learning and knowledge management (e.g., guidance development, training, and evaluation) are protected from day-to-day operational demands. This can include dedicated best practice officers or units that have no or few other tasks but to facilitate learning processes, although learning cannot be delegated entirely to these specialists. 4. Individual incentives and human resources management. Incentives and career interests also work to support or obstruct learning. To enable learning, staff incentives should put a premium on the contribution to learning processes. In contrast, the lack of medium- and long-term career prospects for civilians in peace operations hampers individuals’ sense of identification with the larger knowledge creation efforts of the entire organization. 5. Organizational culture. OL scholars have noted that “effective OL requires a climate or culture that fosters inquiry, openness, and trust.”35 If structures and procedures constitute the “hardware” of OL, then organizational culture is best described as the “software.”36 In this sense, culture refers to the interpretative frames and cultural norms that are prevalent within subunits or the whole organization.37

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An organization can have competing subcultures, each with its own interpretative frame. Within the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy, there are several interpretative frames. One is that of the traditional peacekeeping approach that relied on a small cadre of individuals running missions as an old boys network based on their individual experience. The other competing frame is that of a professionalized knowledge-based organization, as initiated under then UN under-secretary-general Guéhenno’s tenure. Traditionalists see this approach as a threat since they are worried about losing the very “constructive ambiguity” that allows UN peacekeeping to survive, and sometimes succeed, in the face of extremely complex situations on the ground and contradictory political pressures from member states. Another subcultural divide exists between headquarters and the field. Sergio Vieira de Mello, a former UN special representative of the Secretary-General, described the tension between “headquarters thinking we are all a bunch of Colonel Kurtzes, and the field people thinking ‘These guys who just sit behind their nice desks don’t understand anything.’”38 Last but not least, another important cultural element is the relative openness of the bureaucracy to outside knowledge at both the field and headquarters levels. Internal process factors. These composite factors determine the value of the organizational infrastructure. As such, a positive organizational infrastructure represents a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for systematic OL. Indeed, even in the perfect learning organization, the following internal process factors can inhibit learning.

1. Bureaucratic politics. The study of bureaucratic politics has repeatedly pointed to the fact that often the right and most appropriate policies are not pursued by bureaucracies because individual bureaucratic actors pursue their own interests. In governmental or international bureaucracies, actors have “competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions; problems are much more varied than straightforward, strategic issues; the management of piecemeal streams of decisions is more important than steady state choices; making sure that the government does what is decided—and does not do what has not been directed—is more difficult than selecting the preferred solution.”39 Accordingly, bureaucratic actors seek to maximize their influence, power, or competences and, therefore, contribute to the distortion of a rational political outcome. For example, experience might indicate that a particular service could be more efficiently delivered by a different department or working unit. Due to bureaucratic politics, the original

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provider of the service will be an internal advocate against the implementation of the learning and, depending on his or her power position, may also completely or partly hinder the learning process. In practice, this factor can manifest itself in three different manners: consensual, unclear, or conflicting views on the division of labor and, therefore, on who is in charge on the learning matter. Hence, bureaucratic infighting comes into play only as a constraining factor while its absence does not in itself serve as an enabling factor for OL. 2. Leadership (see Chapter 1 by Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf and Chapter 12 by Sabine Boerner in this volume). At the United Nations, leadership exists at three different levels: external (e.g. national bureaucracies, politicians, or member state representatives); internal senior (e.g., Secretary-General or special representatives); and internal mid-level (e.g., directors or heads of field units). Each group has a role in “establishing a culture conducive to OL, if necessary by transforming the embedded legacy of the past from a barrier to an asset.”40 Preliminary empirical data and anecdotal insights point to the importance of individuals in either facilitating an environment that is receptive to learning or actively promoting a certain lesson within the organization. An active supporter or an effective leadership alliance appear to be key factors in driving a certain lesson toward its institutionalization.

Outlook: Advancing Organizational Learning in Peace Operations As Peter M. Haas and Ernst Haas pointed out fifteen years ago, [In] the absence of a dominant state willing to lead, a strong shared universal vision, or a world government, collective responses to the global problematique depend on international institutional mechanisms. Only flexible institutions with expanding organizational visions can respond effectively to these problems. . . . While ad hoc and disjointed responses to these challenges are likely to occur through most processes of international relations, robust and resilient responses are possible in multilateral settings characterized by welldeveloped processes of organizational learning.41

This conception also applies to the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy. Further research should help to illuminate to what extent the UN peace operations’ apparatus has indeed moved toward becoming a learning organization; what the obstacles, pitfalls, and roadblocks are; and what kinds of strategies might help to overcome some of them. In this chapter, we outline

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some core elements of a research framework for investigating these processes. The state of research cannot be anything but deeply frustrating to the practitioner who needs improvements today, instead of what often appear to be gold-plated solutions that are far from political and organizational realities. At the same time, the complex and normatively charged nature of peace operations means that one needs to be cautious of the fact that an apparent pragmatic solution—such as the uncritical adoption of templates that seem to be working elsewhere—may turn out to be a costly mistake. Making these kinds of judgments is perhaps the most critical part of any learning process in peace operations: what can be generalized about this situation and how can such (mostly uncertain) general knowledge be applied to another specific situation? As of yet, scholarship cannot provide guidance on how to create a learning organization that excels at asking and answering these questions, day by day, on many different issues. As policymakers and professionals continue to make these calls based on their experience and their individual learning from earlier missions, they would be well advised to not ignore the potential dangers and pitfalls of a professional approach to lessons learned and knowledge management in the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy. Michael Barnett argues that the natural operating mode of an international bureaucracy, such as the UN, is based on universal and generalized rules, which is dangerous in the highly contextdependent business of peacebuilding: In order to be the rationalized, efficient actors that they present themselves to be, [UN officials] must flatten diversity and ignore contextual variations. . . . Generalized knowledge that overlooks local contexts can lead to a tremendous mismatch between the activities of international actors and the needs of those on the ground.”42 It should be clear that learning cannot and should not equal the search for a “one-size-fits-all template” or “cookiecutter approach.”43

Barnett also points to a wider problem: the kind of knowledge and the kind of professional qualifications that international bureaucracies privilege. In his words, “Expertise derives from either professional training or general rules that encode past experiences. Those with this sort of expert knowledge generally see it as superior to local or informal knowledge.”44 Those individuals involved in lessons learning, evaluation, and policy formulation in peace operations need to be mindful of the kinds of knowledge and the sources of knowledge that international bureaucracies use as a basis for decisions. A decade ago, Thant Myint-U and Elizabeth Sellwood asked an essential question that remains unanswered today: “How did the UN ‘know’ what it believed it ‘knew’ about the countries in which it intervened, and how did this matter?”45 As much as the professionalization of peace

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operations and OL has begun to pay dividends in the realm of standardized doctrine and common procedures, even the most reliable general knowledge is only one side of the coin. The other side is an understanding of the local context. Without progress on both, neither is likely to have a strong effect on organizational performance. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, tracing processes of learning and nonlearning is already a tall order for researchers. The existing scholarship has only begun to make a contribution toward illuminating learning as a dependent variable, uncovering some of the key factors that influence processes of learning. In this chapter, we highlighted that in addition to factors from the organization’s environment (i.e., the power of principals and the state of knowledge), both structural and process factors from within the organization critically influence OL. These internal factors, such as the organizational infrastructure of learning as well as bureaucratic politics and leadership, are important reference points for policymakers seeking to improve an organization’s learning capacity. Further research will be necessary to systematically assess the relative importance of these different factors. Such scholarship should systematically analyze variation: Can we observe variation at all between different processes of learning? Is there variation of the relative importance of factors across issue areas (e.g., highly politicized security issues vs. more technocratic issue areas, areas where there is a consensus in an outside epistemic community and areas where such a consensus is lacking)? Do certain factors play a larger role at certain stages of the learning cycle? Has the relative importance of certain factors changed over time? In most cases, it is unlikely that a single factor will be decisive. Instead, researchers will be able to observe a combination of different enabling and constraining factors. Research should, therefore, focus on identifying patterns of factors and characteristics that are particularly prone to enabling or hindering OL. However, to frame learning as a dependent variable is only a start. Further research will need to investigate the impact of learning on organizational performance by framing learning as an independent variable. Many scholars, such as Haas and Haas, clearly presume that learning has a positive impact on the ground for the work of the UN and other organizations. So far, however, research has little to say on the impact of learning and nonlearning toward the success of peace operations on the ground. Standard models, such as the ones proposed by Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis,46 do not bother to open up the black box of the UN peace operations’ bureaucracy to see whether and how processes of learning (or, indeed, any property of the mission other than resource levels and numerical manpower) can have an impact on the outcomes on the ground. Lise Morjé Howard made an ambitious attempt to move beyond this approach by put-

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ting intramission learning explicitly forward as one of three critical factors explaining the success or failure of peace operations (the other two covering the conflict environment in the country and the constellation of interests in the Security Council). The operationalization of this approach proved to be fraught with methodological pitfalls. These challenges notwithstanding, future research will have to move further in this direction.

Notes The literature and empirical information presented in this chapter are current as of January 2011. 1. This article builds on research supported by the German Foundation for Peace Research. Our book The New World of UN Peace Operations. Learning to Build Peace? (2011) presents the full results of our project, which analyzed learning processes over the past decade in four distinct issue areas: police (within the area of security), judicial reform (within the area of governance), reintegration of ex-combatants (within the area of welfare), and mission integration (as a crosscutting issue). 2. Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 256. 3. UN, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, July 2009). 4. Thorsten Benner and Philipp Rotmann, “Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 1 (2008): 43−62. 5. The overviews of the field underline this observation. See Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” Annual Review of Political Science, no. 11 (2008): 283−301; and Oldrich Bures, “Wanted: A Mid-range Theory of International Peacekeeping,” International Studies Review 9, no. 3 (2007): 407–436. 6. Lise Morjé Howard focuses mostly on learning processes within missions (what we call intramission learning) and, only in passing, touches on what she calls “second-level organizational learning” (inter-mission learning in our terminology); she defines this type of learning as change in “the organization’s overall means, structures, and goals in response to new understandings of problems and their causes.” See Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 330. Her definition is very much in line with our earlier research on the subject. See Thorsten Benner and Philipp Rotmann, “Operation Blauhelmreform: Ban Ki-Moons umstrittener Umbau der Hauptabteilung Friedenssicherungseinsätze,” Vereinte Nationen 55, no. 5 (2007): 177−182. And it builds on the work by Ernst B. Haas. See Ernst B. Haas When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). The fact that Howard mostly deals with 1990s peace operations might explain why she devotes little attention to intermission learning. Most of the 1990s did not see any concerted efforts of intermission learning on the part of the UN. The UN Secretariat leadership acknowledged this in 2007 when pointing out that the UN’s “methodology for learning lessons was not having a suf-

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ficient impact at the Headquarters planning level, nor did it have sufficient reach into the field.” UN, Report of the Secretary-General. Peacekeeping Best Practices, UN Doc. A/62/593, December 18, 2007, p. 2. 7. At UN headquarters in New York, DPKO and DFS are the central parts of the peace operations’ bureaucracy. See Figure 10.1 for details. 8. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power; Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, “Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance,” Global Governance 1, no. 3 (1995): 255−284. 9. Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, Meinolf Dierkes, and Ikujiro Nonaka, “Organizational Learning and Knowledge: Reflections on the Dynamics of the Field and Challenges for the Future,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 921−939; Mark Easterby-Smith and Marjorie A. Lyles, eds., The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). 10. Eva Senghaas-Knobloch, Jan Dirks, and Andrea Liese, Internationale Arbeitsregulierung in Zeiten der Globalisierung: Politisch-organisatorisches Lernen in der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (IAO) (Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 2003); Rainer Breul, “Organizational Learning in International Organizations: The Case of UN Peace Operations,” master’s thesis, Fachbereich Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft, University of Konstanz, 2005, http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de /bitstream/handle/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-16477/Organizational _Learning_in_International_Organizations_FINAL.pdf?sequence=1; M. Leann Brown, Michael Kenney, and Michael J. Zarkin, eds., Organizational Learning in the Global Context (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006); Kathrin Böhling, Opening Up the Black Box: Organizational Learning in the European Commission (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007); Benner and Rotmann, “Operation Blauhelmreform”; Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars; Chapter 1 in this volume. There is also now a series of studies that apply organizational learning approaches to military bureaucracies such as the US Army (Thomas Rid, War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq [London: Routledge, 2007]) or the US and the British armies in comparative perspective (John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002]). 11. Markus Jachtenfuchs alerted us to this problem in his presentation at the Social Science Research Center in Berlin (WZB) and the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) workshop “International Organizations and Organizational Learning: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges,” Berlin, April 23, 2007. 12. For an overview, see Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, Meinolf Dierkes, and Ikujiro Nonaka, “Introduction: Finding Paths Through the Handbook,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1−7; and Easterby-Smith and Lyles, eds., The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management. 13. Michael D. Cohen and Lee S. Sproull, “Introduction,” in Michael D. Cohen and Lee S. Sproull, eds., Organizational Learning (London: Sage, 1991). 14. This perspective is in line with sociological institutionalists considering structure and agency as mutual constitutive. See, for example, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Cornelia Ulbert, “Sozialkonstruktivismus,” in Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler, eds., Theorien der Interna-

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tionalen Beziehungen (Opladen, Germany: UTB, 2003), pp. 409−440; and Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 335−370. See also Klaus Dingwerth and Sabine Campe, “Organizing the World: Ein Tagungsbericht,” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 13, no. 1 (2006): 119−131; W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (London: Sage, 1992); and W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism (London: Sage, 1994). 15. Benner and Rotmann, “Operation Blauhelmreform.” 16. It is taken as a given that individuals in an organization learn; however, learning becomes consequential only at the group and organizational levels. A detailed examination of the learning processes within an international bureaucracy, therefore, starts at the group level. 17. Rüdiger G. Klimecki, Hermann Lassleben, and Markus Thomae, “Organisationales Lernen: Ein Ansatz zur Integration von Theorie, Empirie und Gestaltung,” Management Forschung 10, no. 1 (1999). 18. Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, p. 18. 19. Mary Crossan, Henry W. Lane, and Roderick E. White, “An Organizational Learning Framework: From Intuition to Institution,” Academy of Management Review 24, no. 3 (1999): 522−537; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976). 20. Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978). 21. Ikujiro Nonaka, “A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation,” Organization Science 5, no. 1 (1994): 14−37. 22. Rid, War and Media Operations, p. 43. 23. Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. 24. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power, p. 207. 25. To be precise, the peace operations’ bureaucracy comprises the relevant parts of the Secretary-General’s Executive Office, PBSO, DPKO, DFS, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and deployed peace missions. 26. Bertoine Antal, Child, Dierkes, and Nonaka, “Organizational Learning and Knowledge”; James D. Thompson, “Boundary Spanning in Different Types of Organizations,” in James D. Thompson, ed., Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 66−73. 27. Christopher K. Ansell and Steven Weber, “Organizing International Politics: Sovereignty and Open Systems,” International Political Science Review 20, no. 1 (1999): 82. 28. UN, Report of the Secretary-General. Peacekeeping Best Practices, UN Doc. A/62/593. 29. Hari Babuji and Mary Crossan, “From Questions to Answers: Reviewing Organizational Learning Research,” Management Learning 35, no. 4 (2004): 397−417; Mark Dodgson, “Organizational Learning: A Review of Some Literatures,” Organization Studies 14, no. 3 (1993): 375−394; George P. Huber, “Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures,” Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 88−115; Senghaas-Knobloch, Dirks, and Liese, Internationale Arbeitsregulierung in Zeiten der Globalisierung. 30. Breul, “Organizational Learning in International Organizations.” 31. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 40. 32. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power, p. 164.

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33. Dodgson, “Organizational Learning,” p. 377. 34. Benner and Rotmann, “Learning to Learn?” 35. Raanan Lipshitz, Micha Popper, and Victor J. Friedman, “A Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning,” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 38, no. 1 (2002): 78−98; Argyris and Schön, Organizational Learning. 36. Victor J. Friedman, Raanan Lipshitz, and Wim Overmeer, “Creating Conditions for Organizational Learning,” in Ariane Berthoin Antal, Meinolf Dierkes, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 757−774. 37. Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, p. 39. 38. Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (New York: Penguin, 2008), p. 314. 39. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24 (Spring 1972): 44. 40. John Child and Sally J. Heavens, “The Social Constitution of Organizations and its Implications for Organizational Learning,” in Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, John Child, and Ikujiro Nonaka, eds., Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 308−326. 41. Haas and Haas, “Learning to Learn,” p. 256. 42. Michael Barnett, “Illiberal Peacebuilding and Liberal States,” paper presented at the “Roundtable on Humanitarian Action,” Social Science Research Council, New York, February 8, 2005, p. 5. 43. Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-torn Societies,” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 1 (2008): 14–15. 44. Barnett, “Illiberal Peacebuilding and Liberal States,” p. 5. 45. Thant Myint-U and Elizabeth Sellwood, Knowledge and Multilateral Interventions: The UN’s Experiences in Bosnia and Cambodia (London: Centre for History and Economics, King’s College London, 1999), p. 1. 46. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

11 Organizational Change in International Bureaucracies Michael Bauer, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE IMPORTANT PARTICIPANTS IN

the realm of world politics. An area in which this has become highly visible is United Nations peace operations. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations have increased in number and geographical focus as well as in their overall complexity.1 Numerous case studies on more recent UN peacekeeping missions show how their scope and their level of ambition are moving well beyond the principles of earlier peacekeeping missions. In the most complex cases, the presence of international organizations has begun to assume the character of de facto protectorates,2 with international organizations such as the UN, the European Union (EU), or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) imposing globalized models of public administration on failed or war-torn states. In the literature, this establishment of transitional administrations is described as “humanitarian occupation,”3 “benevolent foreign autocracy,”4 “international protectorates,”5 or simply as “international administrations,”6 a terminology that points to the paradoxical fact that international organizations have gone as far as to temporarily assume the powers of national governments, thereby turning traditional perceptions of sovereignty and of the relationship between (some) nation-states and intergovernmental organizations upside down.7 So far, much of the scholarly analysis of the changing role of international organizations in international politics has focused on high-level intergovernmental decisionmaking among member states. Consequently, with regard to UN peace operations, most studies have focused on the role of the UN Security Council.8 Significantly less attention has been paid to changes of the internal structures, administrative procedures, and self-perceptions of international organizations. As a consequence, virtually nothing is known 239

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about the impacts these changes may have on the performance of international organizations. In other words, the dynamics as well as the impacts of administrative reform in international bureaucracies constitute a blind spot in international relations and public administration research. Against this background, we argue in this chapter that to fully understand the role of international organizations in international peace operations, the dominant intergovernmental and interorganizational perspective has to be complemented by an organizational perspective that (1) systematically explores how the internal structure and culture of international organizations changes; and (2) develops hypotheses as to how these changes may affect organizational performance. Thus, while more traditional approaches to international relations would explain the changing role of international organizations in the field of peace operations, mainly as a result of changing state preferences in the aftermath of the Cold War,9 an organizational perspective adds changes within the administrative corpus of international organizations as a further and independent category of explanatory factors.10 Often, these changes result from organizational learning (see the other contributions in Part 2 of this volume). However, as Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann note in Chapter 10, organizational learning is only one among several potential causes of change and reform in international organizations.11 Other potential causes of administrative reform include, for example, changes in the membership or the voting rules of international organizations, changes in their leadership, the imitation of organizational traits observed elsewhere, and the external imposition of organizational models by other, more powerful, actors. By opening its focus to the entirety of factors and mechanisms that promote or obstruct administrative reform in international organizations, we sketch out the broader context within which processes of organizational learning may occur. Although the “organizational turn”12 in the study of international organizations is still in its infancy, scholars in the area of peace operations have slowly begun to incorporate internal organizational dynamics in their analyses. For example, in an empirical study on UN peacekeeping in civil wars, Lise Morjé Howard observes that part of the changes in UN operations during the 1990s can be explained by an increased political and managerial autonomy of multilateral organizations vis-à-vis their member states: There is indeed mounting evidence that the Secretariat often now functions as something significantly more than a talk shop or the handmaiden of the Security Council, and that it is even beginning to take on state-like qualities. For example, in many peacekeeping operations, members of the Secretariat are in positions to make foreign policy and even life and death decisions for people in states emerging from civil war.13

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From a learning perspective, Thorsten Benner, Andrea Binder, and Philipp Rotmann and Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann in Chapter 10, have begun to analyze the emergence of an internal infrastructure for organizational learning in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.14 They find that, only belatedly, systematic management reforms have been initiated that are aimed at improving the UN’s institutional memory and promoting processes of institutional learning within the organization. However, Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf point out in Chapter 1 of this volume, the success or failure of organizational change and learning in the area of peacekeeping and the establishment of transitional administrations can be adequately explained only if one takes into account the specific governance structure of international peace operations, its inner and outer organizational environment (see Chapter 8 by Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann in this volume). This governance structure is characterized by a complex and often problematic interplay between the intergovernmental arena, where states act according to their perceived national interests, and the organizational arena, where international bureaucrats and policy experts try to learn from past experiences and design effective transitional administrations for war-torn and contested territories. In a similar vein, Alex Veit and Klaus Schlichte argue that to fully understand organizational behavior in the field of peace operations, the complex interplay of three interconnected arenas needs to be analyzed: multilateral negotiation and decisionmaking among nation-states; the interpretation and concretization of these decisions within an international organization’s central bureaucracy; and their execution by field personnel.15 What these few examples demonstrate is that the analysis of international organizations in world politics can clearly benefit from an explicit organizational research perspective. This is particularly true for the analysis of peace operations. Central to this organizational research perspective is a focus on organizational change in general and on administrative reform in particular. In the next section of this chapter, we briefly outline the contours of this slowly emerging research program that analyzes international bureaucracies as dynamic organizations rather than as static instruments of intergovernmental policymaking. Then we narrow the analytical focus to the question of administrative reform in international organizations, building on the results of a set of case studies on the United Nations, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international organizations to develop a set of hypotheses about the substance, timing, and the potential outcomes of administrative reforms in international organizations under varying conditions and in different organizational environments. In the final section of the chapter, we offer four generalized recommendations as to how researchers and practitioners should proceed to improve the understanding

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of administrative reforms in international bureaucracies in general and in peace operations in particular. With its focus on organizational reform, this chapter serves as a theoretical complement to Chapter 1, which focuses on organizational learning.

International Bureaucracies as Formal Organizations: Contours of an Emerging Research Program Although international organizations have been the focus of scholarly interest for many years, there is little systematic understanding of the factors and conditions that determine changes of their internal administrative structure.16 On the one hand, international relations (IR) has treated international organizations primarily as a sort of a device or platform for intergovernmental decisionmaking rather than as actors in their own right. International organizations were conceived of as the deliberate creation of dominant nation-states and were assumed to emerge, change, and eventually disappear as a result of these states’ strategic interests and preferences. By contrast, the bureaucratic interior of international organizations deliberately remained outside the analytical focus of much of the IR literature. This neglect was justified by the empirical observation that until the end of the 1980s, the role and performance of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, was determined predominantly by the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and only to a small extent by the internal bureaucratic dynamics of these organizations. On the other hand, the subdisciplines of public administration and policy analysis, which typically place great emphasis on the understanding of administrative structures and dynamics, have also shown surprisingly little interest in the internal workings of intergovernmental organizations. Even comparative studies of administrative reform tend to ignore international organizations and focus solely on the similarities and differences between national administrative systems.17 The only international organization that so far has received significant attention from public administration scholars is the European Union. What could be termed the “public administration turn” of studying the European Union18 has provided us with a number of important insights into the internal dynamics of the European Commission and its effects on supranational institution building and domestic policy outcomes.19 And even though the interest in the European Commission as a supranational administration originated in the 1970s,20 it is only since the dramatic resignation of the Commission under the presidency of Jacques Santer in 1999 that the issue of administrative reform in the European Commission has received wider academic attention.21 In other words, despite interest in the EU administration, the literature on international organiza-

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tions is characterized by a significant lack of empirical case studies about administrative reforms in international organizations. The need for a more systematic research program that explicitly treats international organizations as independent actors to better understand their behavior, and that is genuinely interested in their specific quality as organizations or bureaucracies, has been expressed before.22 However, only in the past years do we see the gradual emergence of a more comprehensive set of studies that explicitly treats international bureaucracies as formal organizations.23 The main characteristics of this “organizational turn in international organization theory”24 are: • International organizations are seen as (partially) independent actors in international politics. • As such their actions and, therefore, their contribution to processes of international governance are determined not only by external factors, but also by their internal structures and dynamics. In other words, “organizations themselves are important units of analysis, precisely because they take on a life and character of their own.”25 • To reach a better understanding of these internal processes, international organizations should be analyzed as formal organizations, thereby making use of the analytical perspectives and tools of public administration and organization research. In particular, organizational analysis of international administrations should explain how, why, and to what effect administrative reform takes place. In sum, what is at stake in this emerging research program is a partial shift of focus from the organization to the organizations of the international system.26 Ideally, this emerging research program would go hand in hand with a more systematic exchange of information between practitioners in international organizations and academics studying the internal structures and dynamics of these organizations. Such an exchange of information would need to work both ways: with practitioners providing inside information to academic researchers and, at the same time, using the findings of scholarly research for improving the performance of the individual organization. An important element of such a dialogue between scholars and practitioners could be the systematic comparison of individual instances of administrative reform in international organizations. In the remainder of this chapter, we try to open the black box of intergovernmental organizations by presenting the comparative findings of eleven case studies of administrative reforms in international bureaucracies (conducted by both academics and practitioners), and, as a result, we develop a preliminary set of hypotheses about their causes and mechanisms. These case studies explore the administrative reform processes within a variety of international organizations:

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namely, the United Nations; World Bank; World Food Programme (WFP); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); International Labour Organization (ILO); UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); OECD; European Commission; European Parliament’s General Secretariat; European Central Bank (ECB); Nordic Council; and Council of Baltic Sea States. By focusing on a broad range of examples of administrative reform rather than restricting this review to those cases that can ex ante be identified as instances of organizational learning, we hope to get a more complete and unbiased picture of the factors that increase or reduce the potential for internal reform in international organizations and that can be transferred to the study of the organizational dimension of peace operations. We focus on the determinants of administrative reform rather than on the substantive proposals of what could or should be reformed in international peacekeeping operations. We are convinced that the biggest obstacle to reform in international organizations is not the lack of innovative proposals about what could be improved, but the lack of strategic knowledge on how to actually implement some of the existing reform proposals. In other words, we agree with Edward C. Luck’s argument that scholars and practitioners “might utilize their time more productively in thinking through how to advance existing proposals than in developing new ones that have little chance of implementation.”27

Administrative Reform in International Bureaucracies: Empirical Findings As we argued in the previous section, scholarly understanding of administrative reforms in international organizations, in both theoretical and empirical terms, is still rather limited and few theoretical attempts have been made to link the findings of existing studies to broader and more general theories in the fields of organizational studies and public administration. This research gap is particularly pronounced in the study of UN peace operations where scholars are only reluctantly beginning to address the issue of administrative reform in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and to explore its causes and effects. At the same time, the long history of failed attempts to reform the UN bureaucracy underscores the need for a more systematic identification of the opportunities for and the obstacles to intentionally changing the organizational structure of international organizations.28 In this section, we, therefore, identify in an explorative manner the most important factors that have been found to either foster or hamper attempts to reform the administrative structure of international organizations and develop a set of hypotheses about how these factors may or may not trans-

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late into administrative reform. In addition to the aforementioned eleven original case studies, we draw on additional empirical studies from the gradually emerging literature on internal structural change in international organizations. Administrative reform can be caused by internal or external factors.29 In the following subsections, we apply this distinction for a first systematization of their empirical material. The Influence of External Factors External factors comprise those influences that emerge from the organization’s broader environment. In most of the case studies analyzed, external factors were found to be an important, albeit not the only, source of administrative reform. This finding is in line with previous research, most notably a series of case studies on change in the internal decisionmaking procedures of intergovernmental organizations in a volume edited by Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, which found external forces, especially nationstates, to be the single most important causal factors.30 We distinguish two types of external factors that may cause or inhibit administrative reform in international organizations. These are effects of the organizational domain (i.e., the specific structure and the actor constellations of the policy areas where an international organization operates) and effects of a changing constituency (i.e., the constellation of an international organization’s member states). Organizational Domain: The Structure of the Policy Sector The findings from the eleven case studies indicate that the organizational environment in which international organizations operate can have an important impact on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of administrative reforms. This causal relationship, however, goes beyond a mere mechanistic linkage of domain changes leading to respective organizational responses. Such an assumption not only would mean overlooking the fact that organizations may have considerable autonomy from their environment and are capable of shaping and affecting this environment,31 but also neglect—and this is the central argument we are able to induct from the various cases studies—the fact that specific characteristics of the organizational domain affect its influence on administrative reform. Of particular importance in this respect is the homogeneity of the organizational domain. It makes a difference whether an international organization fulfills narrowly defined tasks within a rather homogeneous organizational environment or whether the organization is active in a variety of different sectors, implying that it operates within a much more heteroge-

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neous domain. Modeling the relationship between an organization and its relevant environment in terms of a “signaling game,”32 we expect an organization to receive clearer and less ambiguous signals (e.g., to reform in order to combat organizational deficits) if it operates in a homogenous domain than is the case for organizations operating in a more heterogeneous domain. In the latter case, it is quite conceivable that organizations receive contradictory signals and, hence, remain more hesitant when deciding on respective changes. To illustrate this point a bit further, it is helpful to consider the examples of the European Central Bank, United Nations, European Commission, and OECD. The ECB has a single major task and operates in a professional environment of great homogeneity (with regard to the efficiency-driven norms and concepts of the economic sector) in which management standards are generally undisputed and well accepted. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the ECB has undertaken considerable reform of its internal management practices and, hence, responded to the rather clear signals from its domain.33 The UN, European Commission, OECD, and other organizations engaged in the large-scale rebuilding of states through peace operations, by contrast, are responsible for a huge variety of outputs and, hence, are confronted with highly differentiated environments. Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise that those organizations have for many years been and, in the OECD case, still are reform laggards.34 This becomes particularly clear in the case of the UN where successive failures to improve interdepartmental coordination mechanisms and information flows or to reform human resource management35 correspond with an extremely complex and heterogeneous organizational environment.36 Based on these considerations, we formulate the following hypotheses: • Hypothesis 1: The extent to which changes in the organizational domain trigger administrative reforms in international organizations depends on the degree of domain homogeneity. The more homogeneous the organizational environment, the more we expect far-reaching and swift changes to close potential gaps to developments in the organizational domain. By contrast, the great heterogeneity of the organizational domain that characterizes the United Nations in general, and UN peace operations in particular, can be expected to constitute a significant obstacle to administrative reform, especially if this reform is aimed at a better coordination between the different levels of the organizational hierarchy or between the different UN agencies operating in different policy areas.37 • Hypothesis 2: Domain heterogeneity can be expected to increase with the number of tasks for which an organization is responsible. The speed and scope of administrative reforms should be more pro-

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nounced in single-purpose organizations, for example, the European Central Bank, than in multipurpose organizations, for example, the UN as a whole, as well as individual peace operations. Due to their aforementioned three-tiered structure,38 the organizational environment of UN peace operations is characterized by a particularly high degree of complexity and heterogeneity. The different political arenas within which peace operations are located—the central UN bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the field offices, on the other—may send diverging signals and, consequently, obstruct the chances for administrative reform. A case in point is the direct transfer of the administrative model of the international administration in Kosovo to East Timor, a decision made by UN headquarters in New York. Although the administrative model developed in Kosovo was soon regarded as inadequate to the situation in East Timor, UN field officials did not succeed in adapting it to the Timorese reality.39 Organizational Constituency: The Member States In addition to the characteristics of an organization’s domain, one might expect similar influences emerging from the nature of its constituency. Do the reform orientations and reform developments in the member states of an international organization make a difference in terms of administrative reforms? Furthermore, does it make a difference whether the member states reflect a rather homogenous group in terms of socioeconomic and political conditions? Interestingly, the evidence of the cases that we analyzed does not support these expectations. There seems to be no clear and straightforward linkage between constituency characteristics and administrative reform developments. For instance, reform developments in the ECB and the European Commission differ sharply, notwithstanding the fact that they have almost the same constituency.40 In addition, we found that administrative reform in the European Commission is more pronounced than within the OECD, although in the OECD there is a higher number of member states that can be classified as pioneer states of public management reforms.41 We, thus, expected much more reform activity in the OECD than in the European Commission. These findings are rather surprising from the perspective of intergovernmentalist approaches,42 which expect that international organizations are highly responsive to the interests of their members. However, they do confirm the findings of a study by Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman who argue that the way in which an international organization responds to its external constituency depends to an important degree on the “congruity between the organizational culture and the content of the environmental pressures.”43 In their study on organizational change in the Inter-

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national Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Barnett and Coleman found that marked differences between INTERPOL’s organizational identity and the external demands of nation-states to focus more strongly on political crimes led the organization to adopt strategies of avoidance or defiance, thus refuting external demands for organizational and programmatic change. INTERPOL gave up its opposition to the demands of its constituency only when states started to create new international organizations to fulfill the desired functions which, in turn, threatened INTERPOL’s organizational standing in the area of crime control and prevention. In their analysis of organizational learning in the Liberian peace operations community in Chapter 9 of this volume, Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring identify a similar impact of organizational identity. However, while Barnett and Coleman found a strong and homogeneous organizational identity to partially immunize international organizations against external demands, Mai, Klimecki, and Döring argue that it also increases their internal capacity for strategic learning and problem solving and, thus, seems to be an important determinant for organizational change from within. While the nature of the constituency appears to have an ambiguous impact and is strongly dependent on further intervening factors such as “organizational security,”44 the opposite is the case when it comes to changes in the constituency. Several case studies report strong increases in reform activities as a result of such changes. This holds true not only for the respective developments in the Nordic Council (where membership decreased),45 but also in the European Commission and the European Parliament, where prospects of enlargement constituted an important driving force for administrative reforms.46 Similar evidence is presented by Dimitris Bourantonis in his account of UN Security Council reform. In his historical study, he found that the increasing size of the UN’s membership was the single most important factor pressing for change in the composition of the Security Council. Regarding the reason for the 1963 reform that led to an increase in the number of Security Council members, he writes that “the dramatic increase in UN membership, which continued unabated until 1963, upset the ratio of the total number of members of the UN to the number of seats in the Security Council and brought about pressures for a reconsideration of the original composition of the Security Council and, more particularly, its non-permanent category.”47 Another prominent example where significant changes in the UN membership triggered reform initiatives is the Jackson Report on the UN development system.48 This administrative capacity study was a direct response to the accession of a large number of developing countries that had gained independence from their former colonial powers in the course of the 1960s and the related substantial increase in the UN system’s development budget projected for the

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coming years.49 Finally, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace50—which offered recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient the UN’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping—followed a rapid increase in UN membership. In this case, however, as in other reform initiatives in the area of UN peace operations, situational factors such as the end of the Cold War and actual performance deficits clearly played a more important role as triggers of reform. The great influence of an increase in the number of member states on change and reform in international organizations is also supported by the pathbreaking empirical study on decisionmaking in international organizations by Cox and Jacobson. In an early overview of this and other studies on change and reform in international organizations, Lawrence S. Finkelstein comes to the conclusion that “the greatest motor of change . . . has been the generation of new states which have both altered the composition and voting balances of the international organizations they joined in a massive influx and also posed a new agenda of problems to be dealt with.”51 In this context, however, it should be emphasized that constituency changes per se may only be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for triggering reforms. As indicated in the case studies, increases or decreases in membership were typically linked to the perception among the member states of existing performance deficits that were expected to further increase with membership changes.52 Consequently, for the European Central Bank, due to its absolute independence from its constituency and its high degree of agenda-setting power, “enlargement . . . has not proved to be a catalyst for transformative institutional change.”53 Similarly, Bourantonis’s study of UN Security Council reform shows that increases in the number of UN member states do not automatically result in organizational change and reform. Due to the strong resistance of the permanent Security Council members, on the one hand, and disagreement among the reformoriented member states on the other, an increase in the number of member states in the 1990s and a widely shared desire for reform did not result in further changes to the size or composition of the Security Council.54 These considerations suggest the following hypotheses on constituency effects: • Hypothesis 3: The characteristics of an international organization’s constituency (in particular, with regard to homogeneity of public management orientations and socioeconomic and political conditions) have no significant effect on the speed and scope of management reforms in the organization. • Hypothesis 4: The speed and scope of administrative reforms in international organizations increase with the extent to which preexisting

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concerns on performance gaps coincide with changes in the organization’s constituency. In the case of the United Nations, such a coincidence of changes in priorities and interests of member states and an awareness of existing performance deficits was found, for example, in the area of development assistance. In the future, however, a significant growth of UN membership is rather improbable. Consequently, impetus for change can be expected from changes in the relative power or the interests of member states, rather than from changes in their number. The Influence of Internal Factors Whether or not international organizations change their internal administrative structures is also affected by factors that are endogenous to the organization in question, including the nature of the organization, its size, its leadership and internal politics, and its organizational culture and identity as well as the internal origin of reform attempts. The nature of the organization: supranational versus intergovernmental. It seems plausible that the nature of an organization and, in par-

ticular, its status as a supranational or intergovernmental body, has an impact on respective administrative reforms. This argument is based on the assumption that supranational organizations have a higher degree of autonomy from their members than is the case for their intergovernmental counterparts. As a consequence, a much higher responsiveness from intergovernmental organizations to changes in their member states’ preferences should be expected; hence, also implying that the speed and scope of administrative reforms should be more pronounced than in supranational organizations. This expectation, however, is not supported by the case studies. On the contrary, rather far-reaching reforms were found in the ECB,55 the European Parliament,56 and, with some delay, in the European Commission.57 Reforms in intergovernmental organizations, however, remained rather piecemeal and were certainly not more pronounced than those in the supranational bodies studied.58 How can this puzzling finding be explained? We argue that there is no contradiction to existing theories in which the degree of organizational autonomy is seen as an important factor affecting the policymaking capacity and policy impact of international organizations. It is hardly disputed that a supranational organization, such as the European Commission, in contrast to intergovernmental organizations, enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy and, hence, has independent influence on policymaking within the European Union.59 (However, while autonomy may make an important

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difference for an organization’s role in policymaking, this need not necessarily be the case when it comes to questions of internal operational autonomy and internal affairs.60) It is well conceivable that member states leave to international organizations (regardless of their status as either supranational or intergovernmental bodies) rather broad leeway, as these issues do not directly interfere with their domestic or foreign policy interests. Indeed, various case studies underline that while the level of autonomy with regard to policy delivery of international organizations may vary, virtually all organizations appear to be rather independent when it comes to the regulation of their internal administrative affairs. Hence, the supranational or intergovernmental nature of international organizations seems to be of limited relevance when accounting for the speed and scope of reforms of their administrative structure. These considerations are addressed in Hypothesis 5: • Hypothesis 5: The nature of an international organization (in particular, its status as supranational or intergovernmental body) has no significant effect on the speed and scope of management reforms in the organization. Organizational size. The extant literature on change in international organizations also suggests that the size of an international organization has an impact on the scope as well as the procedural patterns of administrative reforms. In this context, size is not only a matter of the number of staff per se, which can range from dozens to several thousand civil servants, but is also closely related to the extent to which international organizations have been designed for single or multiple tasks. More specifically, the smaller an organization is, the less likely it will be able to independently influence its organizational environment. Consequently, small organizations may be much more responsive to developments and challenges emerging in their domain. Administrative reforms in smaller international organizations, therefore, should be more likely to reflect a pattern of continuous incremental adaptations. Tobias Etzold’s case study on reorganization processes in the Nordic Council illustrates the assumption that smaller organizations, with a rather limited spectrum of responsibilities, are more responsive to their environment and, therefore, are more apt to respond to changing requirements through incremental but continuous internal reforms.61 For larger organizations, by contrast, reform patterns may reflect a less responsive pattern, assuming that these organizations either have a more autonomous position toward their environment as a result of their higher influence in their domain or that these huge bureaucratic entities are just less apt to adapt quickly to changing requirements. In a historical account

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of administrative reform initiatives in the UN Secretariat from its creation through the 1980s, W. Andy Knight finds that “the reform of the Secretariat has been among one of the most difficult tasks because of the resistance such efforts encounter from the UN staff members, some member state representatives and the International Civil Service Commission.”62 The reform patterns of large international organizations will, hence, reveal a less continuous, but also less incremental pattern. As larger organizations can afford to leave a bigger gap between their own structures and their environment, reforms (when actually perceived as being necessary) are more likely to go beyond merely piecemeal adjustments. This can be expected at least in terms of reform rhetoric, leaving issues of deficient implementation aside. The much delayed, but far-reaching, so-called Kinnock reforms of the European Commission, which only became possible when the Commission came under severe legitimating pressures, serves as a prominent example of this pattern.63 Hypothesis 6 taps into the relationship between organizatinal size and responsiveness to the organizational environment: • Hypothesis 6: The smaller an international organization is in terms of size, the more responsive it is to changes in its environment, implying that administrative reforms follow a pattern of continuous and incremental adjustments. Leadership and internal politics. The adoption and implementation of

administrative reforms require a certain degree of consensus among the actors involved. This consensus, however, can hardly be expected to emerge out of the blue since reforms, in many instances, are highly contested between potential reform beneficiaries and reform opponents seeking to preserve the status quo or favoring other reform options and directions. Against this background, successful reformers not only are required to build coalitions for achieving the necessary majorities in the decisionmaking process, but they also have to ensure the compliance of important stakeholders during the implementation stage. Successful administrative reforms in international organizations are strongly dependent on the strategic and tactical capabilities of their leadership to overcome internal resistance to change. In other words, internal reform processes matter for the magnitude of administrative reform, and the design of these processes is strongly affected by the existence of committed political entrepreneurs within the organization and their leadership skills.64 A comparison of the successive UN Secretaries-General shows that leadership skills and norm entrepreneurship vary considerably among these officeholders and these attributes can be decisive for the success of a variety of reform efforts.65 A case in point is Ian Johnstone’s account of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s entrepre-

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neurship in establishing the United Nations’ Responsibility to Protect norm. Johnstone argues that without the strong engagement and the skillful leadership of Annan, this conceptual basis for modern peace operations may not have been adopted in its present form.66 Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann support this argument in Chapter 10 of this volume. In their analysis of organizational learning in the UN peace operations bureaucracy they argue that “an active ‘supporter’ or an effective ‘leadership alliance’ appear to be key factors” in organizational learning processes and in driving “a certain lesson toward its institutionalization.”67 Four decades ago, Robert W. Cox already pointed to the importance of leadership for organizational change in intergovernmental organizations noting that “the quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization[s].”68 The relevance of this argument becomes apparent throughout the literature on change and reform in international bureaucracies, but is most pronounced and empirically demonstrated in a comparative study by Soo Mee Baumann, Markus Hagel, and Barbara Kobler on the role of “reform brokers” in the modernization of eight international organizations.69 This leads to the following hypothesis: • Hypothesis 7: The speed and scope of administrative reform in international organizations increases the more committed and skillful leadership exists within the organization. This applies both to universal international organizations, such as the United Nations as a whole, and to suborganizations, such as transitional administrations established by the United Nations in postconflict territories. The impact of organizational crisis. What is the impact of organizational

crisis on the speed and scope of administrative reforms? Case studies indicate that there is no straightforward relationship between crisis perception and reform. This can be traced to three aspects: 1. While the existence of a crisis can be seen as an important condition for administrative reforms to take place, this does not automatically lead to the actual adoption of respective reforms. There may still be powerful actors within the organization who successfully oppose reform proposals. 2. It is well conceivable, and often the case, that organizations reform themselves in the absence of crisis. Change without crisis can occur either because organizations anticipate potential problems in the future or react to them at an early stage. Moreover, change without crisis can occur as a result of isomorphic adjustments to developments in the organizational environment. In the case studies analyzed, reforms in organizations were rarely seen in the face of open crisis but, rather, in response to organiza-

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tional changes within their peer group or as a preemptive measure in view of alternations in their environment. In other words, questions of organizational legitimacy seem to be more important than issues of functional performance to bring about organizational change.70 This point is driven home by various case studies: in particular, Tim Balint and Christoph Knill’s analysis of the reform of human resource management in the OECD;71 Etzold’s study on reorganization processes in the Nordic Council and the Council of the Baltic Sea States;72 Michael Kerler’s analysis of administrative reform at the World Bank;73 and Veith Mehde’s account of administrative reforms as a means to enhance the legitimacy of the European Commission.74 From a realist or a principal-agent perspective, this finding may be surprising. But if one takes into account that legitimacy is one of the major sources of international organization (IO) authority,75 and a principal reason why states regularly seek the mandate of an international organization before engaging in critical actions such as peace enforcement operations,76 it becomes apparent that the quest for international legitimacy constitutes an important source of organizational change. 3. The link between crisis and reform is further complicated by the fact that the very nature of organizational crisis matters. As argued by Balint and Knill, it makes a difference whether a crisis stems from a kind of dissatisfaction with the performance of an international organization or whether it is the result of a search for a new organizational identity and mission.77 In the case of performance challenges, one would expect administrative reforms to be seen as useful devices to improve the situation. Johan P. Olsen, therefore, rightly characterizes performance crises as useful “reality checks.”78 Cases in point are the failures of peace operations in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia in the course of the 1990s, which constituted the single most important trigger for the far-reaching structural and programmatic reforms proposed in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report).79 Organizational identity crises, by contrast, may have a paralyzing effect.80 Without a clear idea of the future mission of an organization, reform momentum may easily be lost. Would-be reformers do not know with certainty what is most important to focus on and where to start improvement. An example of how an internationally operating organization can be paralyzed when its core function is openly disputed is provided by Barnett and Coleman in their study on organizational change at INTERPOL.81 Hypothesis 8 addresses the impact of organizational crisis on the speed and scope of adminstrative reforms: • Hypothesis 8: The extent to which the existence or perception of crises affects administrative reforms in international organizations

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depends on the nature of the crisis. The more crises are linked to the organization’s very identity (implying that its core functions are disputed) rather than mere operational performance gaps, the more diminished is the organization’s capability of responding swiftly and comprehensively to the challenges. The more a crisis affects an organization’s core, the lesser is the likelihood that crisis actually triggers systematic reform endeavors. Political versus administrative origin of organizational reforms. A fundamental dichotomy that may affect results, goals, and processes of administrative reforms refers to the question of whether these reforms are initiated predominantly by administrative actors or by political leaders within the organization in question. As political and administrative actors may pursue rather different reform objectives and be guided by different interests, it seems plausible that this distinction has an impact on the speed, scope, and very character of administrative reforms. Administrative reformers seem to be concerned primarily with issues of functional performance. This implies that reforms dominated by the administration of an international organization are more directed toward incremental adjustments in order to improve and optimize the organization’s operative capacities. If, by contrast, reforms are politically driven, issues of legitimacy toward the organizational environment rather than aspects of functional performance may play a dominant role. Moreover, as politicians generally have an incentive to demonstrate a profound impact of their activities, they strive for more fundamental rather than piecemeal developments. At the same time, however, the potential ignorance toward functional issues may imply that one-sided political reforms may suffer from far-reaching implementation problems if they are not supported by the administration. As a consequence, there is a higher potential that politically driven reforms will instead remain at a symbolic level, with fundamental reform announcements being trimmed down to minor changes during the implementation stage. These considerations suggest the following hypotheses:

• Hypothesis 9: The more administrative reforms of international organizations are dominated by administrative actors, the more incremental changes will be observed to improve functional performance. By contrast, the more reforms are driven by political actors, the higher the probability of more fundamental reform attempts to increase an organization’s external legitimacy. • Hypothesis 10: The more political actors dominate administrative reforms of international organizations, the higher the likelihood of implementation deficits, given the gap between political legitimacy

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concerns and issues of functional performance advocated by the organization’s administration.

Conclusion Our account of the causes and conditions of administrative reforms in international bureaucracies is primarily an explorative exercise. Based on a set of case studies of administrative reforms in international organizations, the generalizations and preliminary hypotheses we presented are attempts to gather facts, systematize observable patterns, and propose possible explanations for the wide array of organizational reforms that are regularly observed at the international level. In other words, our results are the starting point for future discussion rather than a synthesis to settle competing claims and theories. In view of this explorative character of our analysis, we conclude this chapter with four recommendations as to where, in our opinion, researchers interested in analyzing the planning and implementation of peace operations as well as practitioners in that field may want to focus their work and what they should keep in mind to further improve the understanding of administrative reforms of international organizations. Invest in Good Description First, and above all, more reliable empirical data on the phenomenon of administrative reform in international bureaucracies is needed. There is an unjustified disdain in contemporary social science for describing political events. While the primary aim of social sciences is to make causal inferences, it should not be forgotten that causal explanations need to be based on sufficient and adequate description. However, with respect to explaining administrative reform in international organizations, there is still not enough known about the factual and potential cases for developing already well-specified concepts and general explanations. In particular, better tools are needed for evaluating and comparing the speed and scope of administrative reform. Furthermore, more is needed to be known about the various elements of administrative reforms (financial and budgetary, personnel and institutional) and their respective importance for organizational change on the whole. Thus, more research is needed on ways to optimize categories of change and on exact operationalization to relate empirical observations more precisely to theoretical concepts. Good description is an indispensable requirement for the development of sound theories. The emergence of an organizational turn in the study of international organizations may provide the necessary impetus for political science scholarship to broaden the

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empirical foundation for a better understanding of processes of organizational change in international bureaucracies. For practitioners, this means that more time should be invested in trying to understand why past reform attempts have succeeded or failed. Instead of developing new reform ideas, practitioners should focus on improving the conditions for the successful implementation of existing ones. Although many of the determinants of administrative reform in the international organizations that we identified in this chapter are structural in nature, and thus cannot be actively changed, reform entrepreneurs within or outside the organization can derive valuable cues for future action from a systematic analysis of the obstacles to previous reform attempts. Focus on the Actors A further challenge is to connect macro-level reform change with microlevel behavior of real-world human actors. The understanding of individual actors’ preferences and their utility functions as well as the implications of culturally or nationally bound behavioral patterns, is very limited. For example, it may be that culture and nationality are not significant factors since such differences are business as usual for transnational administrative elites like the cosmopolitically educated and socialized workforce of international organizations. However, as mentioned above, the case studies we analyzed suggest that reform promoters often have a background of a particular administrative reform culture through their experience in their home country. In fact, little is known about whether, and to what extent, particular role understanding, images of political order, particular career paths (predominant national or international socialization), particular patterns of staff representation and unionization, and flexible or rigid career structures actually affect administrative reforms in international organizations. This intraorganizational level of analysis has so far been widely neglected in the study of international organizations. Encourage Dialogue Between the Subdisciplines It would be a huge mistake to analyze administrative reforms in international bureaucracies only from the perspective of distinctive academic subdisciplines. Rather, the challenge is to identify common ground and to combine tools, theories, and explanations from the various related subdisciplines (i.e., public administration, international relations, organization theory, and political science). However, as it stands now, a problematic division of labor is seen among the disciplines where “international lawyers remain hard at work proposing new IOs or proposing institutional reforms to correct the ‘birth defects’ of the IOs that we now have”82 while scholars

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of international relations continue to play down or even deny the autonomous agency of intergovernmental organizations as well as their independent influence on international governance processes. Political scientists and IR scholars who are acquainted with the driving forces of organizational reform in international administrations as well as the political and institutional obstacles that prevent an optimal design of international organizations could contribute a more cautious note to the often overly optimistic debate among national policymakers and international lawyers. Do Not Lose Sight of the So What Question Finally, we encourage researchers intending to explore the field of administrative reforms of international organizations not to lose sight of the so what question. In other words, we should not stop at describing and explaining organizational change as the dependent variable. It is, rather, an important step of further research to take administrative reforms of international organizations as the independent variable and ask what difference particular patterns of reforms make for actual policy outputs and policy outcomes. If we know more about these relationships, the discussion of organizational change in international bureaucracies could be fruitfully linked to questions of policymaking under the conditions of multilevel governance that are of crucial importance for policy analysts, organizational sociologists, and scholars of international relations as well as professionals and politicians. In sum, in this chapter we attempted to systematize empirical findings on the determinants of administrative reform in international bureaucracies. So far, the study of change in international organizations has focused either on the institutional rules of intergovernmental decisionmaking or on the substantive goals and programs of international organizations. Administrative reform within the bureaucratic apparatus of international organizations, by contrast, is only beginning to attract the attention of scholars in the fields of public administration and international relations. This is especially true for the analysis of UN peace operations. Only belatedly are scholars paying closer attention to the administrative underpinnings of peace operations and the ways in which administrative reforms both within the UN bureaucracy and within individual peacekeeping programs can improve their performance. By summarizing insights from empirical studies of administrative reform in a variety of international organizations and across a wide range of policy areas, we aim to contribute to the emerging literature. However, instead of developing concrete proposals for reforming the organizational basis of UN peace operations, we presented inductively derived generalizations and preliminary hypotheses about the determinants of and obstacles to organizational change in international organizations. As

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such our results, on the one hand, constitute a starting point for practitioners in their attempt to improve the organizational foundations of UN peace operations and, on the other hand, provide a set of hypotheses that can be further tested and refined by scholars of public administration and international relations.

Notes 1. See, for example, Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, eds., United Nations Interventionism, 1991−2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Wolfgang Seibel, “Moderne Protektorate als Ersatzstaat: UN-Friedensoperationen und Dilemmata internationaler Übergangsverwaltungen,” in Gunnar Folke Schuppert and Michael Zürn, eds., Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), pp. 499−530. 2. Seibel, “Moderne Protektorate als Ersatzstaat; Simon Chesterman, “East Timor,” in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, eds., United Nations Interventionism, 1991−2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 192−216. 3. Gregory H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 4. Simon Chesterman, “Transitional Administration, State-building and the United Nations,” in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), pp. 339−358; Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 5. Robert O. Keohane, “Introduction,” in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1−11. 6. Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 7. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation. 8. See the contributions in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, eds., The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 9. Paris, At War’s End, pp. 13−16. 10. Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 13. 11. Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, “Internationale Bürokratien und Organisationslernen: Konturen einer Forschungsagenda,” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 16, no. 2 (2009): 203−236. See also Chapter 10 in this volume. 12. David C. Ellis, “The Organizational Turn in International Organization Theory,” paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, March 26−29, 2008. 13. Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, p. 340.

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14. Thorsten Benner, Andrea Binder, and Philipp Rotmann, “Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework,” Research Paper Series 7 (Berlin: German Foundation for Peace Research and the Global Public Policy Institute, 2007); Chapter 10 in this volume. 15. Alex Veit and Klaus Schlichte, “Internationale Organisationen als verkoppelte Arenen: Wieso scheitern State-builder?” in Klaus Dingwerth, Dieter Kerwer, and Andreas Nölke, eds., Die Organisierte Welt: Internationale Beziehungen und Organisationsforschung (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2009), pp. 95−115. 16. Andrea Liese and Silke Weinlich, “Die Rolle von Verwaltungsstäben internationaler Organisationen: Lücken, Tücken und Konturen eines (neuen) Forschungsgebiets,” in Jörg Bogumil, Werner Jann, and Frank Nullmeier, eds., Politik und Verwaltung (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 491−524. 17. B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 5th ed. (London: Routledge, 2001). 18. Adrienne Héritier and Christoph Knill, “Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison,” in Adrienne Héritier, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch, and Anne-Cécile Douillet, eds., Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 257−294; Christoph Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 19. For an overview, see Michael W. Bauer, “The European Commission,” in M. Peter van der Hoek, ed., Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union (Boca Raton, FL: Taylor and Francis, 2005), pp. 149−176; and Morten Egeberg, ed., Multilevel Union Administration: The Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 20. Hans J. Michelmann, “Multinational Staffing and Organizational Functioning in the Commission of the European Communities,” International Organization 32, no. 2 (1978): 477−496; David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the EEC (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970). 21. This development is best illustrated by the fact that Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert included a chapter on the European Commission only in the second edition of their seminal study on public management reform. See Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also Michael W. Bauer, “The Politics of Reforming the European Commission Administration,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (BadenBaden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 51−69. 22. Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, “Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988): 245−273. 23. See, for example, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Bauer and Knill, Management Reforms in International Organizations; Dingwerth, Kerwer, and Nölke, Die Organisierte Welt; Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds., Delegation and Agency in International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Chapter 10 in this volume.

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24. Ellis, “The Organizational Turn in International Organization Theory.” 25. Ness and Brechin, “Bridging the Gap,” p. 270. 26. Ibid., p. 246. 27. Edward C. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress,” Occasional Paper Series No. 1 (New Haven, CT: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 2003); Edward C. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress,” in Jean E. Krasno, ed., United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 350−397. 28. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations”; W. Andy Knight, A Changing United Nations: Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 111−129. 29. For this distinction see, for example, Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, p. 42; Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973); and Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman, “Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2005): 593–620. For a more general examination of the relationship between internal and external determinants of organizational change, see James G. March, “Footnotes to Organizational Change,” Administrative Science Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1981): 563−577. 30. Cox and Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence. 31. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1995); Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, eds., Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations (London: Routledge, 1998). 32. Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese Jr., “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union,” International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 505−535. 33. Gabriele Glöckler, “From Take-off to Cruising Altitude: Management Reform and Organizational Change of the European Central Bank,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 84−95; Michael W. Bauer and Helen Foerster, “Tagungsbericht administrative Reformen in internationalen und supranationalen Organisationen,” Integration 29, no. 4 (2006): 344−349. 34. Emmanuell Schön-Quinlivan, “Administrative Reform in the European Commission: From Rhetoric to Relegitimization,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (BadenBaden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 25−36; Bauer, “The Politics of Reforming the European Commission Administration”; Tim Balint and Christoph Knill, “The Limits of Legitimacy Pressure as a Source of Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the OECD,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 117−131. 35. Dirk Salomons, “Good Intentions to Naught: The Pathology of Human Resources Management at the United Nations,” in Denis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, eds., Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 111−139; Jean-Marc Coicaud, “International Organizations as a Profession: Professional Mobility and Power Distribution,” in Andres Solimano, ed., The International Mobility of Talent: Types, Causes, and Development Impact (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 263−297.

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36. On the problems created by the heterogeneous organizational environment of the United Nations and its peace operations, in particular, and the existence of multiple principals and fragmented constituencies, see also Michael Wesley, Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1997); Luck, “Reforming the United Nations”; and Julian Junk, “Designing Multidimensional Peace Operations: The Cases of the Interim Administrations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor,” master’s thesis, University of Konstanz, 2006, http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/urn:nbn :de:bsz:352-opus-18228/JunkJ.pdf?sequence=1. 37. See Luck, “Reforming the United Nations,” for a similar argument. 38. Veit and Schlichte, “Internationale Organisationen als verkoppelte Arenen.” 39. Seibel, “Moderne Protektorate als Ersatzstaat.” 40. Glöckler, “From Take-off to Cruising Altitude”; Bauer, “The Politics of Reforming the European Commission Administration.” 41. Christoph Knill and Tim Balint, “Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 5 (2008): 669−690. 42. See, for example, Andrew M. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 43. Barnett and Coleman, “Designing Police,” p. 595. 44. Ibid. 45. Tobias Etzold, “Reorganization Processes in Small International Organizations: The Nordic Council and the Council of the Baltic Sea States,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007) 149−161. 46. Schön-Quinlivan, “Administrative Reform in the European Commission”; Bauer, “The Politics of Reforming the European Commission Administration”; Tarvo Kungla, “‘Raising the Game’: Administrative Reform of the European Parliament General Secretariat,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 71−82. 47. Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform (London: Routledge, 2005); Luck, “Reforming the United Nations.” 48. UN, A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, UN Doc. DP/5, 2 vols. (Geneva: UN, 1969). 49. Johan Kaufmann, “The Capacity of the United Nations Development Program: The Jackson Report,” International Organization 25, no. 4 (1971): 938−949; Dennis Dijkzeul, Reforming for Results in the UN System: A Study of UNOPS (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000). 50. UN, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping—Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992. 51. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, “International Organizations and Change: The Past as Prologue,” International Studies Quarterly 18, no. 4 (1974): 497; Cox and Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence. 52. See, also, the contributions in Edward Best, Thomas Christiansen, and Pierpaolo Settembri, eds., The Institutions of the Enlarged European Union: Continuity and Change (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008). 53. Kenneth Dyson, “The European Central Bank: Enlargement as Institutional Affirmation and Differentiation,” in Edward Best, Thomas Christiansen, and Pier-

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paolo Settembri, eds., The Institutions of the Enlarged European Union: Continuity and Change (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 120−139. 54. Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, pp. 77−82. 55. Glöckler, “From Take-off to Cruising Altitude.” 56. Kungla, “‘Raising the Game.’” 57. Anchrit Wille, “Senior Officials in a Reforming European Commission: Transforming the Top?, in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 37−50; Hussein Kassim, “‘Mission Impossible,’ but Mission Accomplished: The Kinnock Reforms and the European Commission,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 5 (2008): 648−668. 58. Daniele Alesani, Mariannunziata Liguori, and Ileana Steccolini, “Strengthening United Nations Accountability: Between Managerial Reform and Search for Legitimacy,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 97−115; Balint and Knill, “The Limits of Legitimacy Pressure as a Source of Organizational Change”; Michael Kerler, “Triggering World Bank Reform: When Member States, NGOs and Learning Get Important,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 133−147; Etzold, “Reorganization Processes in Small International Organizations.” 59. For an account of the European Commission’s considerable degree of policy autonomy, see Jarle Trondal, “The Anatomy of Autonomy: Reassessing the Autonomy of the European Commission,” European Journal of Political Research 47, no. 4 (2008): 467−488. 60. For a systematic account of the distinction between political and operational (or managerial) autonomy, see Koen Verhoest, B. Guy Peters, Geert Bouckaert, and Bram Verschuere, “The Study of Organisational Autonomy: A Conceptual Review,” Public Administration and Development 24, no. 2 (2004): 101−118. 61. Etzold, “Reorganization Processes in Small International Organizations.” 62. Knight, A Changing United Nations, p. 118. 63. Bauer, “The Politics of Reforming the European Commission Administration”; Hussein Kassim, “The Kinnock Reforms in Perspective: Why Reforming the Commission Is an Heroic, but Thankless Task,” Public Policy and Administration 19, no. 3 (2004): 25−41. 64. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, “Organizational Change ‘From Within’: Exploring the World Bank’s Early Lending Practices,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 4 (2008): 481−505. 65. See Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN SecretaryGeneral in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 66. Ian Johnstone, “The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 123−138. 67. With regard to the motivations of these reform entrepreneurs, the case studies we examined suggest that, at least in some cases, a background of a particular administrative reform culture acquired through experience in their home country played a significant role. See Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007). 68. Robert W. Cox, “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 205.

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69. Soo Mee Baumann, Markus Hagel, and Barbara Kobler, “Management in Change: The Reform Broker Concept,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 175−189. 70. See the contributions in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, eds., The Legitimacy of International Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001). 71. Balint and Knill, “The Limits of Legitimacy Pressure as a Source of Organizational Change.” 72. Etzold, “Reorganization Processes in Small International Organizations.” 73. Kerler, “Triggering World Bank Reform.” 74. Veith Mehde, “Creating a Missing Link? Administrative Reforms as a Means of Improving the Legitimacy of International Organizations,” in Michael W. Bauer and Christoph Knill, eds., Management Reforms in International Organizations (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2007), pp. 163−174. 75. Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World. 76. Katharina P. Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jean-Marc Coicaud, “International Democratic Culture and Its Sources of Legitimacy: The Case of Collective Security and Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s,” in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, eds., The Legitimacy of International Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press), pp. 256−293. 77. Knill and Balint, “Explaining Variation in Organizational Change.” 78. Johan P. Olsen, “Reforming European Institutions of Governance,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 590. 79. Mats Berdal, “The Security Council and Peacekeeping,” in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, eds., The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 175−204. 80. For an account of UNESCO’s reevaluation of its organizational identity and the resulting organizational as well as programmatic reforms, see Vincenzo Pavone, “From Intergovernmental to Global: UNESCO’s Response to Globalization,” Review of International Organizations 2, no. 1 (2007): 79−95. 81. Barnett and Coleman, “Designing Police.” 82. José E. Alvarez, “International Organizations: Then and Now,” American Journal of International Law 100, no. 2 (2006): 339.

12 Leadership in Organizations: A Review Sabine Boerner

LEADERSHIP IS A UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON. AMONG OTHERS, PHILOSO-

phers, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and economists have addressed leadership issues. Depending on the research discipline, leadership is examined from a variety of different perspectives. It is, thus, not surprising that meaningful, and at the same time consistent, definitions of leadership are lacking. In organizational psychology, “most definitions of leadership reflect the assumption that it involves a process whereby intentional influence is exerted by one person over other people to guide, structure, and facilitate activities and relationships in a group or organization.”1 In addition, leadership processes are incorporated in an organizational context, providing particular options and restrictions for effective leadership. While leadership has traditionally been studied in (mainly US) large private sector organizations, the focus has shifted to public and not-for-profit organizations.2 In particular, some studies on leadership in peace operations exist;3 however, a coherent analysis based on leadership theory is still lacking. Approaching the topic can, thus, be best accomplished by reviewing existing conceptions of leadership. Despite their heterogeneity, peace operations always include two essential management tasks: (1) the management of complex political tasks in an uncertain environment; and (2) the management of a diverse workforce. Leadership in peace operations therefore requires the skills to accomplish these two main tasks which, in turn, are complicated by a whole array of challenges, scarce resources, and bureaucratic obstacles. For reasons of clarity and space limitations, the following overview of leadership in organizations is limited to the most prominent leadership approaches.4 It serves as a theoretical introduction. The chapter’s conclud267

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ing section provides some conjectures about leadership in peace organizations, with a particular emphasis on the potential analytical value and effectiveness of the transformational leadership style.

Perspectives in Leadership Research Intense research on leadership issues has generated a large number of different leadership conceptions. Among other things, these conceptions differ with regard to the type of variable that is the focus of the analysis; that is, the leader, the followers, or the interaction between the leader and the followers. Following Diether Gebert’s research, these variables are used to organize the introductory overview on basic leadership approaches detailed below.5 Focus on Leaders Leadership can be understood by looking at the characteristics of leaders. One of the earliest approaches for studying leadership, the trait approach, examined leaders’ attributes such as personality, motives, or values as predictors of leadership effectiveness. This approach was based on the assumption that “leaders are born rather than made”6 (i.e., some people are natural leaders due to certain traits not possessed by others). The style approach emphasized leadership behavior instead of leadership traits. The main question was which leadership style (e.g., authoritarian vs. democratic) is beneficial for leadership success (e.g., productivity, creativity)? This question has been investigated in a large number of field studies. One prominent approach was introduced by the Ohio State Leadership School. Based on factor analyses, two dimensions of leadership behavior were identified; namely, consideration and initiating structure. While consideration is a supportive style concerned with good leader-member relations and the followers’ well-being, initiating structure is focused on improving output by criticizing followers and then helping them to get more work accomplished. Albeit often criticized, this two-dimensional description of leadership behavior has strongly shaped further research on leadership. Today, the behavioral approach is particularly concerned with the so-called transformational leadership style.7 Empirical research on the behavioral approach revealed that the same leadership style was sometimes positively, often not at all, and occasionally negatively correlated with leadership effectiveness (i.e., follower satisfaction and performance). These findings gave rise to the third basic approach in leadership research, the situational approach. Its basic premise is that the relationship between a certain leadership behavior and a certain criteria for

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leadership effectiveness varies according to the situation; a leadership style that proves of value in one situation may be disadvantageous in another situation. Fred E. Fiedler was the first to suggest a contingency approach to leadership, thus replacing the credo “it depends,” widely used by practitioners, with the research question, “What does it depend on?”8 The aim of this leadership approach is to identify aspects of a given situation that leaders should consider when deciding on their leadership behavior. Several researchers have developed a range of situational concepts.9 Today, most leadership research includes situational variables to a greater or lesser extent.10 Trait approach and skills approach. The trait approach was one of the first academic attempts to investigate leadership. In the early stages, particular emphasis was placed on the identification of the qualities of great persons in social, political, and military contexts. Attempts to reanalyze early trait studies came to different conclusions about which traits were positively associated with leadership.11 In his review of the trait approach, Peter G. Northouse identified five central traits of persons who are perceived as leaders; namely, intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability.12 With the emergence of the five-factor personality model, the trait approach has experienced a renaissance.13 In this model, personality is described by the “Big Five”; that is, neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. In a qualitative review, extraversion was found to be the factor most strongly associated with leadership, followed by conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness, and agreeableness.14 The skills approach is closely related to the trait approach. However, while traits are considered as more or less innate or fixed, leadership skills can be trained and developed. Whereas the first skills approach was formulated by Robert L. Katz as early as 1955,15 more recent approaches were developed in the early 1990s. In their attempt to explain the underlying elements of performance in the armed services, Michael D. Mumford et al. suggested a three-component model of leadership skills, understanding competence as a mediator of the relationship between individual attributes (i.e., cognitive ability, motivation, or personality) and leadership outcomes (i.e., effective problem solving and performance).16 In this model, leadership competence includes problem-solving skills, social judgment skills, and knowledge. According to Mumford et al., leaders can improve their performance through job experience and training. Both the trait approach and the skills approach focus on a leader’s characteristics as the main determinants of leadership success. Although intuitively appealing, the major weakness of these approaches is the disregard of all other aspects that may be relevant for leadership (see Chapter 1 by Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf in

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this volume). Nevertheless, the findings of the trait approach and the skills approach can serve as a baseline for decisions about personnel selection and development in organizations. Style approach. The central concern of the style approach is to identify the most efficient leadership behavior. Since the beginning of the research following this paradigm17 to recent conceptions,18 different efforts have been made to classify leadership behavior. Based on Sabine Boerner’s earlier research,19 the broad range of leadership styles discussed in leadership theory and practice can be reduced to two central distinctions:

1. Autocratic and directive leadership styles can be distinguished from democratic and participative leadership styles. The Iowa Studies investigated the impact of different leadership behaviors (authoritarian, democratic, laissez-faire) on the behavior of children.20 In subsequent studies, the distinction between authoritarian and democratic leadership behaviors was focused on four aspects; namely, follower participation, follower orientation, social distance, and punishment and coercion.21 Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt established a continuum from authoritarian to “delegative” leadership style, including paternalistic, consulting, and participative leadership styles.22 The continuum from directive to participative leader behavior has been integrated in different leadership concepts (see below).23 A directive leader plays an active role in problem solving and decisionmaking whereas a participative leader enables followers’ participation (ranging from consultancy or active integration in the decision process to complete delegation).24 2. Task behaviors can be distinguished from relationship behaviors. The Michigan Leadership Studies found that efficient and less efficient leaders differ with respect to their degree of production and employee orientation.25 Assuming that employee orientation will enhance follower satisfaction, the Michigan School recommended this leadership style. Based on studies using the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ), the Ohio State Leadership Studies identified two leadership dimensions,26 consideration (including building camaraderie, appreciation, respect, trust, and liking between leaders and followers) and initiating structure (including organizing work, giving structure to the work context, defining role responsibilities, and scheduling work activities). In contrast to the studies by the Michigan School, these dimensions are assumed to be independent and that a leader is able to simultaneously apply both consideration and initiating structure. Possible combinations of these leadership styles have been explored in the managerial grid suggested by Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton.27 They recommended a 9.9 style, combining high levels of both leadership behaviors. A more recent version of this approach considers sit-

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uational variables, pointing to a situational approach as will be discussed below.28 In sum, the style approach assumes that leadership success is, primarily, the result of the appropriate leadership behavior. The main strength of the style approach is to shift the focus from a leader’s personality to a leader’s behavior. However, results from empirical studies on this approach are contradictory. The style approach has, thus, failed to identify a universally effective leadership behavior. Considering the number of aspects that may be relevant for leadership effectiveness, this finding is not surprising. Rather, one could expect that a leader’s behavior is beneficial in one constellation while being detrimental in another. The situational approach elaborates on this main concern. Situational approach. The first attempt to integrate situational variables

into leadership theory was made by Fiedler in the mid-1960s.29 In his contingency theory, he suggests that leaders’ effectiveness depends on the fit between their leadership style and the context. The leader’s style is built on the distinction between task behaviors and relationship behaviors, albeit in a one-dimensional conception and with a new operationalization (the Least Preferred Coworker Scale). Fiedler introduced three contextual variables: leader-member relations; task structure; and the leader’s position power. In combination, these three factors determine what Fiedler called the favorableness of the situation. Based on empirical results, he claims that task-oriented leaders will be effective in both very favorable and very unfavorable situations whereas relationship-oriented leaders will be effective in moderately favorable situations. William J. Reddin integrated leadership style, situation, and leadership success into his development, diplomacy, and defense (3D) management style theory.30 Based on the two dimensions of the Ohio School (i.e., consideration and initiating structure), he identified four basic leadership styles, namely, related, integrated, separated, and dedicated. Reddin did not recommend one of these styles in particular; rather, leadership effectiveness is assumed to depend on the fit between boundary conditions (e.g., task requirements) and the selected leadership style. Based on Reddin’s approach, Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard used the Ohio dimensions to develop their situational leadership model.31 Combining consideration and initiating structure, Hersey and Blanchard distinguish among four leadership styles: directing, coaching, supporting, and delegating. The “development level” of subordinates, defined as the degree to which the followers are competent for and committed to accomplish a given task, is introduced as a situational variable. Effective leaders have to determine where to place their followers on the developmental continuum and to

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adapt their leadership style accordingly. For example, while a directing leadership style may be appropriate for an employee at a low development level, contend Hersey and Blanchard, highly developed followers should be led in a “delegative” leadership style. In their normative decision theory, Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton discuss five different leadership styles that differ in the degree of followers’ participation (including two varieties of autocratic decision, two varieties of consultation, and one variety of joint decisionmaking).32 Their approach is based on one-dimensional conceptions of leadership. The effectiveness of the five leadership styles depends on several aspects of the decision situation. Vroom and Yetton specify seven such aspects, including, for example, the importance of the decision and the followers’ assumed acceptance of autocratic decisions. This model provides a set of rules to identify the appropriate leadership style for a given situation. It was revised by Victor H. Vroom and Arthur G. Jago, who incorporated additional situational aspects and decision rules, offering more options to answer the situational question.33 In sum, all situational approaches to leadership studies suggest moderators of the relationship between leadership behavior and leadership success. Leadership success is, thus, explained by the particular relationship of these three variables. The approaches differ in the selection and the range of the considered leadership behaviors, moderators, and criteria for leadership success. Moreover, they differ considerably in their degree of model complexity. One of the major strengths of situational approaches is the specification of a range of relevant aspects of the situation. However, this strength makes for one of their major weaknesses; namely, the difficulty to test them empirically. Nevertheless, situational approaches provide a worthwhile heuristic for managers. Although there is no further theoretical work on these approaches, situational variables are included in most recent empirical studies on leadership.34 Transformational leadership approach. With their full range of leader-

ship theory, Bernhard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio intended to cover all relevant leadership styles by combining transactional leadership with transformational leadership.35 Transactional leadership includes continuous rewards, management-by-exception (active and passive), and laissez-faire. Transactional leadership emphasizes the exchange relationship between a leader and his or her followers. Followers show effort and enhance their performance in exchange for the fulfillment of their needs (i.e., specific rewards). Laissez-faire, sometimes called the nonleadership factor, is characterized by only minimal leadership interventions. Transformational leadership, attempting to transform followers’ needs and goals, goes far beyond this exchange relationship. Based on James M.

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Burns’s distinction between transforming and transactional political leadership,36 Bernhard M. Bass first introduced the concept of transformational leadership into the organizational context. Its basic assumption is that transformational leaders succeed in motivating their followers to do their best and perform “beyond expectations.”37 By articulating an attractive vision, developing an emotional attachment, and transforming central attitudes, beliefs, and values, transformational leaders move their followers to transcend their own self-interest for a higher purpose or vision. According to Bernhard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, transformational leadership consists of the following four components:38 1. Idealized influence refers to the charismatic role model behavior of transformational leaders. When followers accept their leader as a role model, they trust and respect that leader and, as a consequence, want to emulate him or her. 2. Through inspirational motivation, transformational leaders provide meaning to followers’ work, developing and communicating an appealing vision for the team or the organization. 3. Intellectual stimulation is the component by which transformational leaders encourage followers to challenge existing assumptions, reframe problems, and approach old situations in new ways. 4. Individualized consideration includes coaching and mentoring behaviors that take individual differences between followers into account. Although these components are designed to be conceptually different, there is empirical evidence for a high interdependence of these four components. Due to this finding, the dimensionality of the construct transformational leadership has been repeatedly doubted.39 Transformational leadership has proved to be efficient in many organizational settings.40 Empirical evidence suggests that transformational leadership is related to individual-, group-, and firm-level performance.41 At the individual level, transformational leaders enhance follower task performance as well as more discretionary forms of individual performance such as organizational citizenship behavior (i.e., positive organizational behaviors that go beyond the formal requirements of one’s job). Concerning group-level outcomes, a positive effect of transformational leadership has been found, for example, in sales performance in bank branches42 as well as in unit performance in army platoons.43 While Uldarico R. Dumdum, Kevin B. Lowe, and Bruce J. Avolio found transformational leadership to be more effective in the public sector than in the private sector,44 the meta-analysis by Timothy A. Judge and Ronald F. Piccolo revealed that the validity of transformational leadership can be generalized across study settings (i.e.,

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business professionals, college students, the military, and participants from the public sector).45 In particular, transformational leadership is regarded as a promising approach to engender follower performance when tasks are complex and environments are turbulent and insecure,46 requiring creative solutions to problems. Three major reasons can be identified for this finding:47 1. Transformational leaders do not settle for current states, but articulate an appealing and challenging future vision. Promoting the necessity for change is, thus, an inherent element of the transformational leadership style. In addition, transformational leaders are expected to enhance followers’ self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation. By doing so, they help followers reach the future states delineated in the vision; 2. Transformational leaders serve as role models for being innovative by displaying unconventional and creative behavior. Transformational leadership stimulates both followers’ personal identification and a strong emotional attachment. Striving for emulation of their leaders, followers will thus show innovative behavior. 3. Transformational leaders encourage followers to think “out of the box”48 and to be disposed to an explorative way of thinking by providing intellectual stimulation. Within the transformational approach, leadership success is explained by followers’ extraordinary effort, stimulated by a leader’s idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. Transformational leadership is intuitively appealing and seems to be consistent with popular notions of what leadership is about. It is considered to be the most popular approach in leadership research at present49 and has received great attention in empirical leadership research, which often confirmed the so-called augmentation effect (stating that transformational leadership is more effective than transactional leadership). Major weaknesses of this conception lie in the distinctiveness of transformational and transactional leadership dimensions, in problems related to clearly measuring the four transformational dimensions (see above), and the lack of concern about the potential detrimental effects of a transformational leadership style.50 Focus on Followers Leadership can be conceptualized from the perspective of the followers. This perspective is relatively new.51 It seems appropriate because follower behavior, (e.g., an employee’s effort) is likely to be decisive for leadership

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success. The results of individual followers aggregate into the overall leadership success of the unit under consideration (i.e., the group, the department, or the organization). To some degree, follower behavior mediates the relationship between leadership style and leadership success. Follower behavior can, thus, be seen as a basis for the explanation of the relationship between leader behavior and leadership success. According to the situational approach, contemporary research is concerned with how and under what conditions a particular follower behavior (e.g., effort) is related to follower success. In addition, how a particular follower behavior can be explained needs further investigation. Similar to leadership behavior, follower behavior could be interpreted as a function of both personal and situational variables. Apart from their qualification, followers’ traits such as self-efficacy,52 patterns of attributions,53 or forms of motivation54 have proved to be relevant predictors of follower success. Moreover, from the followers’ perspective, leadership behavior is a central aspect of the situation. Hence, research is concerned with the question of how leadership behavior can affect both the followers’ personal dispositions and their behaviors. For example, a delegative leadership style, emphasizing followers’ self-regulation, may activate learning behavior, which in turn reinforces followers’ feelings of self-efficacy (see Chapter 8 by Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann in this volume). Prominent approaches are the path-goal theory55 and goal-oriented leadership suggested by Diether Gebert and Joachim G. Ulrich.56 Path-goal theory. The path-goal theory of leadership was introduced by Martin Evans and Robert J. House, who based their conception on motivational theories. According to this approach, a leader’s main task is to pave the way for the followers to reach organizational goals by removing motivational obstacles. Hence, the core of this approach is to specify the motivational preconditions for followers’ effort. Drawing on value-expectancy theory,57 followers’ effort will be high if (1) the task to accomplish itself provides intrinsic motivation, (2) followers expect their efforts to result in a certain outcome which provides intrinsic motivation and is (3) likely to be appreciated by (4) a worthwhile gratification. This conception offers several starting points for leadership behavior. For example, delegative leadership and job enrichment will enhance followers’ intrinsic motivation. Followers’ expectation to reach a certain outcome can be stimulated by designing job demands, training, or individual coaching. A fair and transparent reward system is likely to encourage followers’ expectation that their efforts will be appreciated and individualized incentives will enhance their individual benefits. In addition, path-goal theory provides a framework specifying four different leadership styles (i.e., directive, supportive, participative, and achievement-oriented leadership) and a set of assumptions

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about how they will interact with the characteristics of subordinates (e.g., authoritarian vs. autonomous) and the work setting (e.g., ambiguous or repetitive) to affect followers’ motivation. This approach, thus, extends the spectrum of leadership behaviors introduced by the Ohio School approach and includes situational variables. According to the path-goal theory, leadership success is the result of followers’ effort, which in turn is motivated by the individual benefit they expect to receive in return. The central strength of this approach is certainly the integration of expectancy theory and leadership theory. Nevertheless, empirical confirmations of the path-goal theory are still rare. Goal-oriented leadership. A common characteristic of situational approaches to leadership is that they define leadership behavior ex ante and check, subsequently, whether the relationship between their understanding of leadership behavior and leadership success varies depending on situational variables. This approach is challenged by the idea of starting the research process with the intended leadership success instead of the defined leadership behavior. Assuming that leadership behavior enables leadership success via follower behavior, Gebert and Ulrich suggest the following order of research questions: (1) Which goal (e.g., turnover, productivity, or innovation) is the follower supposed to contribute to? (2) According to theoretical assumptions, which follower behavior is likely to enhance the attainment of the identified goal (considering the situational variables of the given context)? and (3) According to theoretical assumptions, which leadership behavior is assumed to encourage the above follower behavior (considering the situational variables of the given context)? Following this heuristic, leadership behavior is identified at the end instead of at the beginning of the research process. This allows for a better alignment between leadership behavior and the goal to be attained. This approach, as a result, renounces the idea of specifying basic dimensions of leadership or defining a universe of relevant leadership behaviors. Instead, the substance of leadership remains open and is adapted as the case arises. Only the order of the above-mentioned questions is constant. Different leadership goals are likely to result from different follower behaviors which, in turn, require different leadership behaviors. It can, therefore, be assumed that a leadership behavior that stimulates, for example, innovation, is irrelevant for enhancing turnover. In an attempt to test their approach, Gebert and Ulrich were able to demonstrate the differential impact a particular leadership behavior has on different leadership goals.58 The goal-oriented leadership is the only approach to renounce a substantial explanation for leadership success, providing instead a heuristic to systematically identify leadership behavior according to the intended leadership success.

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Focus on Interaction Between Leader and Followers Leadership can be analyzed by focusing on the interaction between a leader and the followers. In the literature, an indirect form of leadership is distinguished from a direct form. Indirect leadership summarizes instruments that influence follower behavior by task and organization characteristics, such as formalization or standardization, often called substitutes for leadership.59 In contrast, direct leadership relates to straight communication between the leader and the follower, thus constituting a process of social interaction. It is this understanding of leadership that we address in this chapter. Since leadership is understood as a process of reciprocal influence between the leader and the follower, leadership success is regarded as the result of the social interaction; that is, mutual leadership and the situation. A prominent approach in the interaction perspective of leadership has been suggested by the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory.60 This approach describes the role-making processes between a leader and each individual subordinate and the exchange relationship that evolves over time. To analyze leadership from the interaction perspective, constructs from social psychology and sociology are involved such as power and dependency, micropolitics, trust, fairness, and justice. To reduce complexity, leadership is often understood as a process within a leader-member dyad. However, recent approaches in leadership studies suggest an extension to the group level.61 However, the group level is not sufficient. The interaction processes that are constitutive for leadership are embedded in complex networks62 that go beyond the group level (see Chapter 9 by Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring in this volume). Leader-member exchange theory. The focus of this approach is on the

interaction between a leader and the followers. George B. Graen and Mary Uhl-Bien analyze this interaction on the dyad-level between the leader and the follower.63 They assume that a leader has different relationships with each of his or her followers. A good leader-member relationship is characterized by high levels of mutual respect, trust, and obligation between the leader and the follower. In the prescriptive part of their approach (leadership making), Graen and Uhl-Bien suggest that leaders should develop a high-quality relationship with all of their followers, including the opportunity to take on new roles and responsibilities.64 In the LMX approach, leadership success is thus explained as the result of high-quality relationships between a leader and each of his or her followers. One of the major strengths of this approach is its focus on the interaction process between leaders and followers. Since other approaches have emphasized leaders, followers, situational variables, or a combination of these, the leader-member exchange is unique. Although empirical studies

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suggest that the practice of LMX theory is related to positive organizational outcomes, the measurement of leader-member exchanges is still discussed controversially.65 Table 12.1 summarizes the different leadership styles delineated above and, consequently, outlines the different recommendations for leadership practice that may be deduced. Searching for a universal leadership style would, thus, be misleading. Instead, following the situational leadership approach, identifying the appropriate leadership style in a given situation requires a careful analysis of that particular case. Accordingly, the analysis of leadership effectiveness in peace operations should start with a look at the particularities of the leadership context.

Considerations for the Leadership of Peace Operations Although diverging considerably in mandate, resources, and context, peace operations always include two essential management tasks: the management of complex political tasks in an uncertain environment and the management of a diverse workforce (see Chapter 1). The leadership of peace operations will, at least, need to face these two challenges. According to recent leadership research, transformational leadership could be a promising approach in this context. In a speculative attempt to transfer results from transformational leadership in organizational teams to leadership in complex UN missions, in this concluding section we shed light on the potential of transformational leadership in peace operations. Researchers agree that the leaders of peace operations are confronted with uncertain environments and must deal with a range of complex tasks.66 Such settings require both the development of creative and useful conceptions of how to resolve the problems at hand and the realization of these conceptions. Similar to complex problem solving in organizations, the leadership of peace operations needs to manage both the process of knowledge generation and the process of knowledge integration. Knowledge generation refers to the creative process of jointly developing new and useful ideas.67 Knowledge integration describes the process of combining the suggested alternatives and transferring them into a workable solution (see Chapter 8 by Berthoin Antal, Junk, and Schumann and Chapter 10 by Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann in this volume). Successful problem solving requires both processes. Knowledge integration is impossible if no alternatives have been generated; similarly, generated ideas and alternatives have to be integrated to result in workable solutions. The processes of knowledge generation and knowledge integration are mutually dependent and cannot be compensated by each other.68 From this perspective, the challenge of accomplishing complex tasks in

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Table 12.1 Overview of the Most Popular Leadership Approaches Main Recommendations for Leadership

Leadership Theory

Focus

Main Authorsa

Trait approach and skills approach

Leader’s personality

Stogdill, 1948, 1974; Mann, 1959; Lord, DeVader, and Alliger, 1986; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991; Judge et al., 2002; Mumford et al., 2000

Select or develop successful leaders

Style approach

Leader’s behavior

Fleishman, 1953; Fleishman et al., 1991; Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958; Katz and Kahn, 1952

Apply the most effective leadership style

Situational approach

Interaction of context, leadership style, and leadership success

Fiedler, 1964, 1967; Reddin, 1970; Hersey and Blanchard, 1993; Vroom and Yetton, 1973

Select leadership style according to the situation

Path-goal theory

Motivational preconditions for follower’s effort

Evans, 1970; House, 1971

Select leadership style according to followers’ motivation

Theoretical link between aspired goal, follower behavior, and leader’s behavior

Gebert and Ulrich, 1991

Use heuristic to identify the unique features of each case

Quality of relationship between leader and follower

Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995

Develop a high quality relationship with all followers

Goal-oriented leadership

Leader-member exchange

Transformational leadership

Transformation of Bass and Riggio, 2006 followers’ needs and goals

Apply a transformational leadership style

Note: a. Full source information for these citations can be found in the Bibliography.

peace operations translates into the problem of enabling and assuring both processes. A second challenge typically faced in peace operations is the diversity of human resources. This involves actors with inconsistent, if not conflicting goals; different functional competence; diverging demands for legitimacy and logics of action; varying degrees of professionalism; and diverse cultural, ethical, and religious backgrounds (see Chapter 9). Despite increasing diversity in organizational teams, the literature has not been able to specify the direct effects of diversity that generalize across different studies and contexts.

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Rather, diversity is assumed to entail positive as well as negative effects on the accomplishment of complex tasks.69 More precisely, team members’ diversity is likely to positively affect the process of knowledge generation, but negatively affect the process of knowledge integration. The positive effects of diversity on team performance can be analyzed from an information decisionmaking perspective.70 When team members differ with regard to their functional competence, degrees of professionalism, and cultural, ethical, and religious backgrounds, they are likely to develop different alternatives and viewpoints on how to resolve the problems at hand. From this perspective, diversity is likely to stimulate the process of knowledge generation via the elaboration of task-relevant information since the potential of ideas and perspectives is enlarged. However, analyzed from a similarity-attraction or social categorization perspective, diversity bears the risk of hindering the process of knowledge integration.71 If team members have conflicting goals, diverging demands for legitimacy and political interests, cooperation, and communication in the group may be jeopardized, which in turn will impede the process of combining the suggested alternatives and transferring them into a workable solution. Since both knowledge generation and knowledge integration are necessary when solving complex problems, the role of workforce diversity in peace operations appears to be ambiguous. One of the main challenges for the leadership of peace operations, therefore, is to reinforce the positive consequences of diversity while at the same time cushioning its negative effects. However, looking at leadership studies, empirical investigations of the role of leadership in diverse teams are rare.72 To date, only three published studies have analyzed the link between diversity, leadership, and team performance. Anit Somech analyzed leadership in functionally diverse teams (i.e., including members from different organizational functions such as marketing or finance).73 He found a participative leadership style to be positively linked to team reflection and stimulating team innovation, but negatively related to team in-role performance. When functional diversity was low, however, a directive leadership style was positively associated with team reflection. Shung J. Shin and Jing Zhou found transformational leadership to moderate the relationship between educational specialization diversity and team creativity.74 Under high levels of transformational leadership, the relationship between educational specialization diversity and team creativity was rather high than low. In their study on diversity in age, nationality, and education, Eric Kearney and Diether Gebert confirmed both collective identification and the elaboration of task-relevant information to mediate the relationship between diversity and team performance.75 Transformational leadership was found to be a moderator in this model: it moderated the relationship of diversity and the elaboration of task-relevant information, which in turn stimulated team

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performance; and it moderated the relationship between diversity and collective team identification, which in turn enhanced the elaboration of taskrelevant information. Given the results of the empirical studies described above, it could be assumed that transformational leadership may be a particularly successful tool in managing peace operations. First, transformational leadership is likely to stimulate the process of knowledge generation since the transformational leadership components of intellectual stimulation and individual consideration will encourage participants’ creativity.76 Moreover, transformational leadership has proved to be particularly successful under high levels of uncertainty and effective in absorbing the actors’ feelings of stress.77 Second, transformational leadership has the potential to reduce the negative effects of diversity in peace operations. Empirical studies confirm that transformational leaders contribute to establishing collective team identification and provide mutual trust among team members.78 Thereby, transformational leaders are likely to enable a cooperative climate, which in turn will alleviate communication and cooperation and, hence, will facilitate negotiations between the parties and the members of the international community. Focusing on task complexity and workforce diversity as main characteristics of peace operations, and integrating the scarce empirical results from organizational research, it could be assumed that transformational leadership may be beneficial in peace operations. However, since theoretical-guided research on transformational leadership in peace operations is nonexistent, it will require further research to put this assumption to a test. Should future studies confirm the beneficial effects of transformational leadership in peace operations, we formulated set of recommendations shown in Table 12.2 for consideration by the head of a peace operation, the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Mutual trust and respect are central preconditions for a transformational leader-follower relationship to be established. Therefore, transformational leadership requires personal face-to-face interaction between the SRSG and the actors involved in a peace operation. Only through direct personal relationships will the leader’s idealized influence on his or her followers be effective. This dimension seems to be particularly relevant to the SRSG’s role as a diplomat, where personal authority, mutual trust, confidence, and credibility with the parties are essential.79 Moreover, idealized influence will enhance the SRSG’s personal integrity, which is required to accomplish the “moral dimension” of his or her task.80 As a result of an SRSG’s display of high personal integrity, followers may be willing to accept the SRSG as a role model. Inspirational motivation is probably the most important dimension of transformational leadership in peace operations. The SRSG is not only

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Table 12.2 Recommendations for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Dimensions of Transformational Leadership

Recommendations for the SRSG

Idealized influence

Develop personal relationships Establish mutual trust, confidence, and credibility Act as a role model

Inspirational motivation

Create and communicate an attractive vision

Intellectual stimulation

Encourage participants to challenge existing assumptions, reframe problems, and approach old situations in new ways

Individualized consideration

Engage in coaching and mentoring behaviors that take individual differences into account

responsible for bringing a practical and functional interpretation to the mission mandate. The greater challenge for the SRSG is to make this interpretation as attractive as possible for the participants in the operation. Since a common goal is likely to reinforce a common identity, a convincing vision expressed by the SRSG will help him or her to “bring all parties to the table.”81 Moreover, a high commitment by all parties to this vision will ease the process of implementation. Intellectual stimulation is the dimension by which transformational leaders encourage followers to challenge existing assumptions, reframe problems, and approach old situations in new ways. In the case of the SRSG, intellectual stimulation could help resolve existing conflicts between the involved actors and overcome doubts and objections concerning the mission. Moreover, intellectual stimulation could motivate followers to produce new unconventional ways to solve problems that arise during the implementation of the mission mandate. Given the rapidly changing political circumstances in peace operations, careful and well-balanced decisionmaking is critical. In conclusion, transformational leadership could be a promising approach for managing peace operations. Since peace operations are carried out in exceptional situations, with ambiguous goals and under rapidly changing circumstances, the need for transformational leadership seems rather high. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that particular difficulties and barriers exist in organizational networks such as peace operations that may complicate the application of a transformational leadership style. In particular, a peace operation is highly dependent on international political will, political compromises, and the local politics in the postconflict

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country. Furthermore, an SRSG’s formal authority is limited by the decentralized nature of the UN system. Since transformational leadership is based on personal authority, strengthening the position of the SRSG is a prerequisite for an effective transformational leadership style.

Notes 1. Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006), p. 3. 2. Bruce J. Avolio, Fred O. Walumbwa, and Todd J. Weber, “Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future Directions,” Annual Review of Psychology 60 (2009): 422. 3. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peace-building Missions, Recommendations Report of the Forum on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Shaping the UN’s Role in Peace Implementation, Fafo Report No. 266 (Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 1999). 4. Selected and undoubtedly relevant topics like team leadership, culture and leadership, strategic leadership, leadership and power, or leadership and ethics, to name a few, have not been considered. 5. Diether Gebert, Führung und Innovation (Stuttgart, Germany: Kohlhammer, 2002). 6. Ken W. Parry and Alan Bryman, “Leadership in Organizations,” in Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, Thomas B. Lawrence, and Walter R. Nord, eds., The Sage Handbook of Organization Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2006), p. 448. 7. See Bernhard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, Transformational Leadership (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006). 8. Fred E. Fiedler, “A Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness,” in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Academic Press, 1964), pp. 149−190. 9. See, for example, William J. Reddin, Managerial Effectiveness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970); Victor H. Vroom, Work and Motivation (New York: Wiley, 1964); and Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1993). 10. Lyman W. Porter and Grace B. McLaughlin, “Leadership and the Organizational Context: Like the Weather?” Leadership Quarterly 17, no. 6 (2006): 559−576. 11. See, among others, Ralph M. Stogdill, “Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature,” Journal of Psychology 25 (1948): 35−71; Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1974); Robert G. Lord, Christy L. DeVader, and George M. Alliger, “A Meta-analysis of the Relation Between Personality Traits and Leadership Perceptions: An Application of Validity Generalization Procedures,” Journal of Applied Psychology 71, no. 3 (1986): 402−410; and Shelley A. Kirkpatrick and Edwin A. Locke, “Leadership: Do Traits Matter?” The Executive 5, no. 2 (1991): 48−60. 12. Peter G. Northouse, Leadership: Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007). 13. Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa, “Validation of the Five-Factor Model

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of Personality Across Instruments and Observers,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52, no. 1 (1987): 81−90. 14. Timothy A. Judge, Joyce E. Bono, Remus Ilies, and Megan W. Gerhardt, “Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review,” Journal of Applied Psychology 87, no. 4 (2002): 765−780. 15. Robert L. Katz, “Skills of an Effective Administrator,” Harvard Business Review 33, no. 1 (1955): 33−42. 16. Michael D. Mumford, Stephen J. Zaccaro, Francis D. Harding, T. Owen Jacobs, and Edwin A. Fleishman, “Leadership Skills for a Changing World: Solving Complex Social Problems,” Leadership Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2000): 5−9. 17. See, for example, Edwin A. Fleishman, “The Description of Supervisory Behavior,” Personnel Psychology 37, no. 1 (1953): 1−6. 18. Edwin A. Fleishman, Michael D. Mumford, Stephen J. Zaccaro, Kerry Y. Levin, Arthur L. Korotkin, and Michael B. Hein, “Taxonomic Efforts in the Description of Leader Behavior: A Synthesis and Functional Interpretation,” Leadership Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1991): 245−287; Yukl, Leadership in Organizations; and Northouse, Leadership. 19. Sabine Boerner, “Führungsstile und–konzepte,” in Georg Schreyögg and Axel V. Werder, eds., Handwörterbuch Unternehmensführung und Organisation (Stuttgart, Germany: Schaeffer-Poeschel, 2004), pp. 316−323. 20. Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph K. White, “Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climates,” Journal of Social Psychology 10, no. 2 (1939): 272−301. 21. Bernhard M. Bass, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, & Managerial Applications, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1990). 22. Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt, “How to Choose a Leadership Pattern,” Harvard Business Review 36, no. 2 (1958): 95−101. 23. See, for example, Hersey and Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior. 24. Bass, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership. 25. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, “Some Recent Findings in Human-relations Research in Industry,” in Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, eds., Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, 1952), pp. 650−665; Daniel Katz, Nathan Macoby, Gerald Gurin, and Lucretia G. Floor, Productivity, Supervision, and Morale Among Railroad Workers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1951). 26. Stogdill, “Personal Factors Associated with Leadership”; Fleishman, “The Description of Supervisory Behavior.” 27. Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid: Key Orientations for Achieving Production Through People (Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing, 1964). 28. Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid III: A New Look at the Classic that Has Boosted Productivity and Profits for Thousands of Corporations Worldwide (Houston, TX: Gulf, 1985). 29. Fiedler, “A Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness”; Fred E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (New York: Wiley, 1967). 30. Reddin, Managerial Effectiveness. 31. Hersey and Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior. 32. Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, Leadership and Decision Making (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1973). 33. Victor H. Vroom and Arthur G. Jago, The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988).

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34. Porter and McLaughlin, “Leadership and the Organizational Context.” 35. Bernhard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio, “Transformational Leadership and Organizational Culture,” International Journal of Public Administration 17, no. 3-4 (1994): 541−555. 36. James M. Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). 37. Bernhard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 15. 38. Bass and Riggio, Transformational Leadership. 39. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations; Timothy A. Judge, Erin F. Woolf, Charlie Hurst, and Beth Livingston, “Charismatic and Transformational Leadership: A Review and an Agenda for Future Research,” Zeitschrift für Arbeits-und Organisationspsychologie 50, no. 4 (2006): 203−214. 40. Ibid. 41. Julian Barling, Tom Weber, and E. Kevin Kelloway, “Effects of Transformational Leadership Training on Attitudinal and Financial Outcomes: A Field Experiment,” Journal of Applied Psychology 81, no. 6 (1996): 827−832. 42. Ibid. 43. Bernhard M. Bass, Bruce J. Avolio, Dong I. Jung, and Yair Berson, “Predicting Unit Performance by Assessing Transformational and Transactional Leadership,” Journal of Applied Psychology 88, no. 2 (2003): 207−218. 44. Uldarico R. Dumdum, Kevin B. Lowe, and Bruce J. Avolio, “A Meta-analysis of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Correlates of Effectiveness and Satisfaction: An Update and Extension,” in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammerino, eds., Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead (Oxford: Elsevier, 2002), pp. 35−66. 45. Timothy A. Judge and Ronald F. Piccolo, “Transformational and Transactional Leadership: A Meta-analytic Test of Their Relative Validity,” Journal of Applied Psychology 89, no. 5 (2004): 755−768. 46. David A. Waldmann, Mansour Javidan, and Paul Varella, “Charismatic Leadership at the Strategic Level: A New Application of Upper Echelons Theory,” Leadership Quarterly 15, no. 3 (2004): 355−381. 47. Silke A. Eisenbeiss, Dean van Knippenberg, and Sabine Boerner, “Transformational Leadership and Team Innovation: Integrating Team Climate Principles,” Journal of Applied Psychology 93, no. 6 (2008): 1438−1446. 48. Dong I. Jung, Chee Chow, and Anne Wu, “The Role of Transformational Leadership in Enhancing Organizational Innovation: Hypotheses and Some Preliminary Findings,” Leadership Quarterly 14, no. 4-5 (2003): 525−544. 49. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations; Julian Barling, Amy Christie, and Colette Hoption, “Leadership,” in Sheldon Zedeck, ed., APA Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2011), pp. 183−240. 50. Judge et al., “Charismatic and Transformational Leadership”; D.S. DeRue, J.D. Nahrgang, N. Wellman, and S.E. Humphrey, “Trait and Behavioral Theories of Leadership: An Integration and Meta-analytic Test of Their Relative Validity,” Personnal Psychology 64 (2011): 7–52; D. van Knippenberg and S.B. Sitkin, “ A Critical Assessment of Charismatic-transformational Leadership Research: Back to the Drawing Board?, Academy of Management Annals 7 (2013): 1–60. 51. Avolio, Walumbwa, and Weber, “Leadership.” 52. Albert Bandura, Self-efficacy: The Exercise of Control (New York: Freeman, 1997). 53. Bernhard Weiner, An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion (New York: Springer, 1986).

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54. Teresa M. Amabile, Karl G. Hill, Beth A. Hennessey, and Elisabeth M. Tigheeth, “The Work Preferences Inventory: Assessing Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivational Orientations,” Journal of Psychology and Social Psychology 66, no. 5 (1994): 950−967. 55. Martin G. Evans, “The Effects of Supervisory Behavior on the Path-goal Relationship,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 5, no. 3 (1970): 277−298; Robert J. House, “A Path-goal Theory of Leader Effectiveness,” Administrative Science Quarterly 16 (1971): 321−328. 56. Diether Gebert and Joachim G. Ulrich, “Benötigen Theorie und Praxis ein verändertes Verständnis von Führung?” Die Betriebswirtschaft 51, no. 6 (1991): 749−761. 57. Vroom, Work and Motivation. 58. Gebert and Ulrich, “Benötigen Theorie und Praxis ein verändertes Verständnis von Führung?” 59. Steven Kerr and John M. Jermier, “Substitutes for Leadership: Their Meaning and Measurement,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 22, no. 3 (1978): 375−403. 60. George B. Graen and Mary Uhl-Bien, “Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Approach,” Leadership Quarterly 6, no. 2 (1995): 219−247. 61. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations. 62. Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 63. Graen and Uhl-Bien, “Relationship-based Approach to Leadership.” 64. George B. Graen and Mary Uhl-Bien, “The Transformation of Professionals into Self-managing and Partially Self-designing Contributions: Towards a Theory of Leadership Making,” Journal of Management Systems 3, no. 3 (1991): 33−48. 65. Northouse, Leadership. 66. See, for example, Bruce Jones, “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination,” in Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 89−115; Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007); Béatrice Pouligny, Peacekeeping Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006); and Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 67. Willow A. Sheremata, “Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in Radical New Product Development Under Time Pressure,” Academy of Management Review 25, no. 2 (2000): 398−408. 68. Diether Gebert, Sabine Boerner, and Eric Kearney, “Fostering Organizational Innovation by Simultaneously Implementing Opposing Action Strategies: A Unifying Framework,” Organization Science 21, no. 3 (2010): 593−608. 69. See, among others, Daan van Knippenberg and Michaela C. Schippers, “Work Group Diversity,” Annual Review of Psychology 58, no. 1 (2007): 515−541; Gebert, Boerner, and Kearney, “Fostering Organizational Innovation by Simultaneously Implementing Opposing Action Strategies”; and Katherine Y. Williams and Charles A. O’Reilly III, “Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of Forty Years of Research,” in Barry M. Staw and Robert I. Sutton, eds., Research in Organizational Behavior (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1998), pp. 77−140.

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70. See, for example, Gwen M. Wittenbaum and Garold Stasser, “Management of Information in Small Groups,” in Judith L. Nye and Aaron M. Bower, eds., What’s Social About Social Cognition? Research on Socially Shared Cognition in Small Groups (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), pp. 3−28. 71. John C. Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 72. Hendrik Hüttermann and Sabine Boerner, “Fostering Innovation in Functionally Diverse Teams: The Two Faces of Transformational Leadership,” European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 20, no. 6 (2011): 833−854. 73. Anit Somech, “The Effects of Leadership Style and Team Process on Performance and Innovation in Functionally Heterogeneous Teams,” Journal of Management 32, no. 1 (2000): 132−157. 74. Shung J. Shin and Jing Zhou, “When Is Educational Specialization Heterogeneity Related to Creativity in Research and Development Teams? Transformational Leadership as a Moderator,” Journal of Applied Psychology 92, no. 6 (2007): 1709−1721. 75. Eric Kearney and Diether Gebert, “Managing Diversity and Enhancing Team Outcomes: The Promise of Transformational Leadership,” Journal of Applied Psychology 94, no. 1 (2009): 77−89. 76. Bass and Riggio, Transformational Leadership. 77. Ibid. 78. See, for example, ibid. 79. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle. 80. Ibid., p. 30. 81 Ibid., p. 25.

13 Leading the United Nations: A Secretary or a General? Simon Chesterman and Thomas M. Franck

THOUGH A SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN MANY

ways invented peacekeeping as a doctrine, the office holds an ambiguous position in leading contemporary peace operations. The UN Charter establishes the Secretary-General as a mere chief administrative officer of the organization, yet he—masculine pronouns are used throughout this chapter and the ones that follow in reference to the Secretary-General because all eight Secretaries-General so far have been men, and because masculine pronouns are used in the quotations from the UN Charter in reference to the Secretary-General—also fulfills a nominal role as commander in chief of the world’s peacekeepers. At the same time, he is the servant of the UN Security Council and dependent on member states for resources. In practice, this has led to confusion and buck-passing in the formulation of strategy while, at the operational level, success or failure has often depended on factors outside the Secretary-General’s control. Where a Secretary-General has made a difference, this has tended to be in circumstances where major states had little interest in a conflict, or—more rarely—where he has been prepared to stand up to those states that appointed him and that provided him with resources, either directly or through using the bully pulpit of the office to reach the global media. In this chapter, we consider the unusual role thus occupied by the Secretary-General in the politicized bureaucracy described throughout this volume by reference to the tension inherent in his title: whether to be more “secretary” or more “general.” This tension has challenged every incumbent, begging the question of whether the Secretary-General should truly be considered a “leader” in the sense used by Sabine Boerner in Chapter 12 in this volume. (Ironically, the special representatives that he appoints, in 289

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practice, often enjoy far more authority and discretion.) The first SecretaryGeneral, the Norwegian Trygve Lie (1946−1952), memorably welcomed his successor to New York’s Idlewild Airport with the words: “You are about to enter the most impossible job on this earth.”1 On January 1, 2007, the eighth Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, a former foreign minister of the Republic of South Korea, took office. As in previous appointment years, intense speculation focused on who the SecretaryGeneral would be. The appointment of Kofi Annan—Ban’s predecessor—coincided with the early days of the Internet, but on this occasion dedicated websites tracked the gossip on candidates, frequently situating the choice of candidates in the context of larger geopolitical chess games. Despite murmurings of transparency, including an important nonpaper circulated by the government of Canada,2 the process took place largely behind closed doors. It was dominated by the permanent members of the Security Council, each of which holds a veto on the selection: China wanted an Asian; Russia did not want an Eastern European; the United States wanted a reformer; Britain wanted someone competent; and France wanted someone who spoke French. Lost in this process was the question of what the Secretary-General’s job should be. The formal responsibilities are few and ambiguous. The UN Charter defines the position as “chief administrative officer” of the UN organization, a capacity in which he serves the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council as well as performing “such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs” (UN Charter, Articles 97−98). At the same time, the Secretary-General is granted significant institutional and personal independence: the Secretariat he leads is itself a principal organ of the United Nations; the Secretary-General and the staff serve as international officials responsible to only the organization; and the Secretary-General is given a wide discretion to bring to the attention of the Security Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN Charter, Articles 99−100). The manner in which these responsibilities have been fulfilled over the past six decades has depended as much on politics as it has on personality, a conclusion echoed in other chapters in this volume. The Cold War severely constrained the ability of the United Nations to play a significant role in major issues of peace and security, yet it created an opportunity for a littleknown Swedish cabinet minister, Dag Hammarskjöld (1953−1961), to carve out an independent space in which the Secretary-General could conduct what he called “informal diplomatic activity.”3 The end of superpower rivalry created larger possibilities for the United Nations, but mismanaged expectations and Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s (1992−1996) abrasive manner led to a crisis of confidence in the organization’s political role. His successor, Annan (1997−2006), was widely respected for his diplomatic skills, but ten-

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sions with the United States over the 2003 invasion of Iraq coincided with revelations of corruption and mismanagement in the UN Oil-for-Food Programme, severely undermining his own tenure and efforts at reform. A central question for each Secretary-General has been the extent to which he could pursue a path independent of the member states that appointed him. Soviet chairman Nikita Khrushchev is said to have dismissed the very idea of a truly international civil servant: “While there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men.” Walter Lippmann, who interviewed Khrushchev on this subject in 1961, interpreted the Soviet position as being that the “political celibacy” called for in the ideal British civil servant was, in international affairs, a fiction.4 Hammarskjöld, in articulating his vision of precisely such an individual, archly suggested that it was possible to be politically celibate without being politically virgin.5 U Thant (1961−1971), who took office after Hammarskjöld and was killed in a plane crash over the Congo, was more modest in his rhetoric and emphasized the harmonizing function of the office.6 His successor, Kurt Waldheim (1972−1981), was even more reticent in asserting himself and was described by an Israeli at a Middle East peace conference as “walking around like a head-waiter in a restaurant.”7 The last Cold War Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982−1991), also espoused a minimalist view of the office—he was said to be the type of person who would not make a splash if he fell out of a boat—while at the same time quietly laying the foundations for a more activist role through his mediation in the Iran-Iraq War.8 The limits of such activism depend, crucially, on relations with the member states of the United Nations. The Secretary-General is sometimes said to be a kind of secular Pope, recalling Joseph Stalin’s underestimation of the pontiff for his lack of military divisions.9 As Brian Urquhart observes, however, if he is indeed a Pope, then he is one who also frequently lacks a church.10 Key tests have been whether the Secretary-General has been able to say no to the member states that direct him and, whether, in the face of international indifference to a crisis, he could sometimes cajole them into saying yes. Achievements in both areas have been modest, with states being most enthusiastic about the independence of the Secretary-General only when his decisions have coincided with their national interests. On occasion, Annan, like some of his predecessors, was heard to joke that the abbreviation used within the United Nations for his position—“SG”—stood for “scapegoat.”11

193 Problems The problems of the Secretary-General are as many as the number of member states of the United Nations. Although the UN Charter merely desig-

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nates him as chief administrative officer, the position is much more and much less than that. In the vexed, and too often adversarial, relationship of the office to the members of the organization, the Secretary-General is sometimes treated as an errand boy and punching bag. This is partly the fault of shortsighted foreign offices, but also of the contradictions in the way the job is described in the Charter. That instrument seems to establish him both as an important independent force, but also as a mere servant of the political organs of the organization. The problems that have afflicted the various incumbents mostly result from those contradictory designations. Yet this is not the only contradiction of the office. Quite apart from whether the Secretary-General is intended to be a secretary or a general, the appointment process is designed to avoid selecting either: it is a political rather than a professional process, but one that is geared to choosing the weakest rather than the strongest candidate. This is not to disparage the various incumbents, but those who have stood tallest in the role have been those who most exceeded expectations. Even within the two dominant functions of the position, the SecretaryGeneral frequently lacks sufficient internal authority to be an effective administrator of the organization while also lacking the resources to exercise his external functions with credibility. The selection of good personnel can have a significant impact on the manner in which the United Nations carries out its various responsibilities: as Manuel Fröhlich shows in Chapter 14 in this volume, the discretion given to the various representatives of the Secretary-General is significant and, therefore, the individuals chosen are more important than in many other bureaucracies. This is particularly true of peace operations: a strong special representative and force commander can magnify the impact of a mission; weak leaders can doom it to irrelevance or failure. Yet each Secretary-General, on assuming office, has found that his room for discretion in administrative matters is sharply circumscribed by the micromanagement of the General Assembly and its committees—especially in financial and personnel matters. This is not much ameliorated by the Charter’s proviso prohibiting states from seeking to instruct the Secretary-General or seeking to influence him in the discharge of his responsibilities (UN Charter, Article 100(2)). Similarly, the formal title of commander in chief of the world’s peacekeepers rarely means actual command authority over national contingents, even when they wear Blue Helmets. Controversies over the dual key structure for authorizing the use of force in Bosnia and command and control problems in Somalia in the early 1990s exemplified the problems.12 Yet these apparent design flaws are far from accidental. Neither, in many ways, are they improper: the legitimacy of a Secretary-General derives, ultimately, from the member states that constitute the United Nations. Whether the office can go beyond that foundation, acquiring a

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legitimacy independent of those states, has been the source of the gravest challenges to the men who have held it. Three sets of contradictions—in the nature of the role, the manner of appointing a person to fill it, and the resources available to carry out its stated functions—suggest the constraints of the office, but may also point to some of its most important possibilities for the UN organization in general and peace operations in particular.

Secretary or General? The framers of the Charter gave the Secretary-General two distinct and seemingly unrelated functions. He is to run an international civil service while also being designated the head of a “principal organ of the United Nations,” a status the Secretariat shares with the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice. The power given by Article 99 of the Charter to bring matters to the attention of the Security Council, though only rarely invoked by name, has provided the basis for a strategic expansion in the Secretary-General’s role, over time making the office an independent actor in the UN system of institutionalized diplomacy. In discharging that function, each Secretary-General has appointed various expert commissions, panels, and special representatives. Whether by reason of the personal distinction of these agents or the power of the facts and ideas they have generated, the Secretary-General has acquired an important voice. In annual reports to the General Assembly, or in other public statements before UN organs, press conferences, and leading universities, that voice has reached out to a global audience. While creating that space for independent initiatives, however, the Charter also relegates the Secretary-General to the role of servant of the political organs. In that role, he is instructed to “perform such other functions as are entrusted to him” (UN Charter, Article 98). Thus, while the good offices role as impartial fact finder and mediator has grown in usefulness, it has been constrained by the agendas and parameters established by the political decisions of the members.13 These contradictions have deepened as the Charter has undergone sixty years of adumbration through institutional practice. The functions of the Secretary-General have broadened to include operational responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking—indeed, the word “peacekeeping” does not appear in the Charter, though Hammarskjöld mischievously located it in “Chapter VI½.”14 As the Secretary-General has increasingly come to serve as the Security Council’s designated executor of important political and military tasks, these duties imposed on him by states have undercut his other status as an honest broker of emerging disputes.

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Successes in this area generally coincide with unusually unified international support. This was present, for example, during the first years of the administration of East Timor and the supervision of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon—a rare situation in which the United Nations played a significant role in the highly politicized Middle East. Yet the Secretary-General can also play an important role when international interest is noteworthy for its absence. In orphaned or marginal conflicts, the relative power or legitimacy of the Secretary-General may be high, as demonstrated in the peacemaking role played between Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, or between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Failures occur and difficulties arise when the Secretary-General and his agents are thrust into a highly politicized dispute, such as the Middle East peace process or Iraq, and the organization itself becomes a proxy battleground for the conflict. An obvious step toward resolving this first tension is to delegate the Secretary-General’s administrative responsibilities to a deputy. This was attempted with the appointment of the first deputy secretary-general in March 1998, an experiment that was at best partly successful.15 Effective delegation may remove some of the strain of the office, perhaps enabling a deputy to take seriously the human resources component of the job and to recruit high-quality senior staff, manage them effectively, and fire those who do not perform. It will not, however, change the ambivalence of member states as to whether the Secretary-General should be able to give orders as well as take them, a problem particularly acute in the direction of complex peace operations.

Compromised Candidates Even if one could resolve the question of whether the Secretary-General is intended to be more secretary or more general, the appointment process laid down by the Charter and subsequent practice is not geared toward selecting a candidate skilled in either area. The lack of debate in the General Assembly, as stipulated by the Assembly itself in 1946,16 avoids a divisive spectacle, but at the expense of any transparency. Passing responsibility for selection to the Security Council has meant handing it to the five permanent members. It is far from clear that an open election campaign in the Assembly would be an improvement—in particular, if it led to 193 vetoes instead of 5 or if it saw the appointment of a Secretary-General openly opposed by a significant group of member states. An alternative would be the model of a confirmation, with an opportunity to hear in a public forum what a candidate sees as the priorities of the office. Such a process could ensure that the incoming Secretary-General had a mandate to follow through on and an agenda declared in advance.17

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This might improve the authority of the officeholder, but it would not necessarily improve the quality of the candidates. Focusing more on the managerial responsibilities of the office, one solution could be to conduct a professional search akin to the appointment of a corporate executive. A nominating committee could take advice from member states, the Secretariat, or private consultancies, in turn proposing names to the Security Council. A form of process was established by the Wisnumurti Guidelines in 1996, but this limited the nomination of candidates to member states, excluded Secretariat staff from involvement, and threw a veil of secrecy over the process.18 These two aspects of the appointment process—authority and quality— are linked. Quite apart from the political limitations on acceptable candidates, such as excluding nationals of the five permanent members of the Security Council and privileging regional rotation, there is some evidence that high-profile potential candidates are deterred from seeking the office because of the uncertainty of the process of selection and the powers transferred once selected.

Neither Secretary nor General In their role as subordinate executor of missions and tasks designed by the Security Council and the General Assembly, past Secretaries-General have encountered a third contradiction: between the tasks assigned to them and the resources placed at their disposal by the political organs and member states. The Secretary-General is routinely given operational responsibilities without the means to carry them out successfully, with the Security Council and the General Assembly making available political, fiscal, and military capacities entirely insufficient to accomplish objectives that may themselves be vaguely defined. Creative responses have been found in some situations, notably the mobilization of Group of Friends to provide political, economic, and other capacities for conflict resolution.19 But this is not always enough. After debacles in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations stopped just short of recommending that the Secretary-General should simply refuse to take on tasks that are ill conceived, ill defined, or underresourced.20 The theoretical best practice of such operations is that a political strategy should be agreed on, a mandate formulated to carry out that strategy, and resources devoted to achieving the mandate. The actual practice tends to be that states determine the level of resources they are prepared to devote to a problem, formulate a mandate around those resources, and hope that some acceptable political resolution will be forthcoming. The ability of a Secretary-General to solicit resources from member states—either

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directly or through indirect pressure using the global media—is, therefore, an implicit requirement for the position. The fact that the Secretary-General lacks a serious capacity to participate in such decisions is linked to a larger constraint in forming strategic assessments independent of the political organs of the United Nations. The Secretary-General’s power under Article 99 of the Charter is to bring to the Security Council’s attention any matter which “in his opinion” may threaten peace and security. Common sense would suggest that his opinion should be an informed one, and yet there has been long-standing resistance to the Secretary-General acquiring any significant analytical support. An illustration is provided by the Asia and Pacific Division of the Department of Political Affairs, which supports UN activities in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, and North Korea: its total number of professional staff is around a dozen. Resistance to providing a capacity for analysis derives, in part, from the general wariness that member states have for early warning, a function that might see the United Nations prying into issues perceived as lying solely within the domestic jurisdiction of its member states, but it is also driven by the concern that an informed Secretary-General may be in a position to challenge the foreign policy priorities of leading member states.21 This has led to predictable problems in peace operations, some of which are described in this volume (see, in particular, Chapter 1 by Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf in this volume). Similar problems also arise in purely internal UN matters, however. Even when making minor decisions pertaining to the allocation of human and fiscal resources, the Secretary-General must defer to the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). Member states appear to feel free to put pressure on the Secretary-General’s exercise of discretion, especially in matters of staffing and purchasing. Each incumbent has had ample reason to complain that he had been subjected to accountability, but without being vested with commensurate responsibility—a defensible interpretation of the oil-for-food scandal.22 Further evidence of this was provided in the reaction to reform proposals put forward by Annan in 2006 that would have strengthened the Office of the Secretary-General in personnel and financial decisions at the expense of micromanagement by member states. Developing states, in particular, expressed concern that this would reduce their oversight and influence on decisions made within the United Nations. One response to this situation is to embrace it and cease examining the office through the lens of secretary or general,23 for the uniqueness of the position lies not in the power to run an organization or to trump the interests of member states, but to transcend those interests.

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Speaking Truth to Power This public role and its importance derive not simply from the limitations of the office as it is defined, but from the nature of the world and its problems. The issues that are likely to land on the agenda of the United Nations, and where the Secretary-General can make a significant difference, will rarely be those topping the foreign policy agendas of the most powerful states. The Secretary-General’s voice can be his strongest asset—though it must be used with discretion. When employed effectively, in the right circumstances, it can provide an authoritative legal interpretation or cultivate the creation of a new norm. The embrace of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, for example, can be attributed in significant part to Annan’s championing of the idea, first articulated in less palatable form in 1999, that the protection of vulnerable populations should not be sacrificed on the altar of sovereignty.24 The Millennium Development Goals are another example of how a Secretary-General can change the terms of debate, in this case about development assistance—though they are also an example of the limits of the office’s power, with few of the actual goals having been seen as realistic targets for the nominal deadline of 2015. Determining when the circumstances are right, moreover, can be extraordinarily difficult: the arc of a Secretary-General’s political capital may be well out of his control. Annan’s legacy, for example, may be dominated by his inability to prevent the powerful few from doing wrong in Iraq or to make the many do right in Darfur.25 So what lessons may be learned from the preceding catalog? It is certainly true, as Julian Junk and Francesco Mancini emphasize in the Introduction, that leadership can make an enormously important contribution to the success or failure of a peace operation. But perhaps the most important lesson from a survey of past Secretaries-General can be summed up in a single word: no. It is a word that needs to be spoken far more frequently in private and, when necessary, in public by the Secretary-General and his senior staff. It is a word that needs to be uttered when a diplomat petitions to place a crony or national in a job for which that candidate is unsuited. It needs to be used when the General Assembly seeks to associate the Secretary-General with a contentious or tendentious political position that may undermine his potential for mediation. It needs to be used when the budgetary process is skewed to permit a powerful committee chair to micromanage administrative processes and priorities. But most importantly, it needs to be used whenever the Security Council proposes to vest the Secretary-General with a complicated task for

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which the allocated resources are insufficient or the means are ill defined. For it is before an operation is authorized and deployed that the SecretaryGeneral has the most leverage; beyond that point, the failures of implementation—even if foreseeable in advance—will tend to rest not on the Council that produced an unworkable mandate or the members that drafted it, but on the amorphous “UN” that sought to implement it. A Secretary-General cannot easily say no, of course, to diplomats representing sovereign states. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Charter that prevents a Secretary-General from saying no if, in doing so, he has garnered the support, or at least the understanding, of a substantial majority of the members and is willing to pay the inevitable price of protecting genuine independence. Hammarskjöld’s defiance of Soviet intimidation may be an example of such a stand; the end of Boutros-Ghali’s first term and Annan’s second, perhaps, are examples of its price. For the future, that price is best named and paid for before, not after, the commencement of a Secretary-General’s term of office. It is a price that is not incalculable: the clearest message that an incoming Secretary-General could send is to announce, before assuming office, that he is unavailable for reappointment to a second term. At present, the tradition is for the Secretary-General to be appointed for one term, during which time he is almost inevitably vulnerable to the pressures and concerns that go with a well-established expectation of appointment to a second term. These concerns might be set aside at the insistence of the candidate who could renounce any expectation of a second term. (He must then stick to this position, unlike Boutros-Ghali who reversed himself.) Such a renunciation might sensibly coincide with an agreement to give the Secretary-General a term longer than five years. Since the Charter is entirely silent as to all of these matters, it is largely up to a candidate to negotiate the terms of his appointment with the Security Council and the General Assembly. This would hardly guarantee a more successful tenure— Annan’s second term was far more troubled than his first—but such a declaration of independence might usefully change the tone of a SecretaryGeneral’s relations with the member states, the political organs, and the Secretariat itself. The United Nations, as Hammarskjöld once said, was created not to take humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell.26 The Secretary-General, though appointed by 193 member states, has no democratic mandate and cannot make decisions for the almost 7 billion people now embraced by the phrase “we the peoples of the United Nations.” The office is, nevertheless, a unique position from which to promote issues that transcend national interest and to mobilize opinions and resources for crises triggering insufficient political will. And even if he cannot force the right decisions when confronted by opposing governments, it is the job of the Secretary-General

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to make it harder for an international community to make manifestly wrong decisions or to make no decision at all.

Notes This article draws on material first published by the authors in Simon Chesterman (ed.), Secretary or General? The United Nations Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and in “Does the UN Need a Secretary or a General?” Kokuren Kenkyu Vol. 9 (2008). 1. Shashi Tharoor, “‘The Most Impossible Job’ Description,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 33. 2. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, ON, “Canadian Non-paper on the Process for the Selection of the Next Secretary-General” (Ottawa, ON: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, February 15, 2006) www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/state ments-declarations/general_assembly-assemblee-generale/5029.aspx ?lang=eng&view=d., reprinted in in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 254. 3. Dag Hammarskjöld, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact, Lecture Delivered to Congregation at Oxford University, May 30, 1961,” in Wilder Foote, ed., Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations 1953−1961 (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 335. 4. Walter Lippmann, “Interview with Chairman Nikita Khrushchev,” New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1961. 5. Hammarskjöld, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,” p. 331. 6. U Thant, View from the UN (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), p. 31. 7. Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 121. 8. James Cockayne and David M. Malone, “Relations with the Security Council,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 69−85. 9. Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings, translated by Leif Sjöberg and W. H. Auden (London: Faber 1964), p. xviii. 10. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 51. 11. Tharoor, “‘The Most Impossible Job’ Description,” p. 42. 12. See, for example, Edward C. Luck, “The Secretary-General in a Unipolar World,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 218; and Edward Newman, The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era: A Global Peace and Security Mandate (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 33. 13. Thomas M. Franck, “The Secretary-General’s Role in Conflict Resolution: Past, Present and Pure Conjecture,” European Journal of International Law 6, no. 2 (1995): 360−387; Teresa Whitfield, “Good Offices and ‘Groups of Friends,’” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 86−101. 14. Cockayne and Malone, “Relations with the Security Council,” p. 73.

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15. Colin Keating, “Selecting the World’s Diplomat,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 47−66. See UN General Assembly, Res. 11(I) (January 24, 1946). 16. See ibid. 17. Keating, “Selecting the World’s Diplomat.” 18. The guidelines are reprinted in Simone Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 249−252. 19. Whitfield, “Good Offices and ‘Groups of Friends.’” 20. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, pars. 58−64. 21. Simon Chesterman, Shared Secrets: Intelligence and Collective Security (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006). 22. Cockayne and Malone, “Relations with the Security Council.” 23. David Kennedy, “Leader, Clerk, or Policy Entrepreneur? The SecretaryGeneral in a Complex World,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 158−182. 24. Ian Johnstone, “The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur,” in Simon Chesterman, ed., Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 123−138. 25. James Traub, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006). 26. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, “World Politics: Continuity and Change Since 1945,” in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 18.

14 Leading Peace Operations: The Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General Manuel Fröhlich

WHEN THE NOBEL COMMITTEE DECIDED TO AWARD THE NOBEL PEACE

Prize for 2008 to Martti Ahtisaari, a career UN diplomat and former president of Finland, it honored “his important efforts, on several continents and over more than three decades, to resolve international conflicts,” stating that “these efforts have contributed to a more peaceful world and to ‘fraternity between nations’ in Alfred Nobel’s spirit.”1 Among Ahtisaari’s achievements, the committee singled out his mediation, peace, and reconciliation efforts in Aceh, Kosovo, and Namibia. While he worked under the auspices of his own Crisis Management Initiative in Aceh, both the Kosovo and Namibia assignments were pursued on behalf of the United Nations. In Kosovo, Ahtisaari worked as the special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Future Status Process for Kosovo and, for most of his time in Namibia, he held the title of special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Although this title sounds rather bureaucratic and technical, the words of the chairman of the Nobel Committee in measuring Ahtisaari’s role in Namibia clearly indicate a special and personal role played by the laureate in Africa: “No single diplomat did more than he did to deliver Namibia’s independence.”2 The role and function of SRSGs or special envoys thus seems to allow for quite individual and even crucial leadership in the resolution of conflicts. With his multiple assignments in different parts of the world, Ahtisaari can be seen as the epitome of a type of individual actor that has continually gained prominence in UN history. The varying titles—special envoys, heads of mission, special advisers, personal representatives, or transitional administrators—can be summarized under the common shorthand SRSG.3 They have become an important part of the UN’s worldwide activities for the maintenance of international peace and security. 301

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SRSGs are appointed by the Secretary-General to fulfill various functions in the realm of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. They either work in a concrete conflict situation or on transregional issues. Their activities can range from discreet mediation efforts to conducting a peace operation and, in some cases, virtually running a country. Both their number and the tasks entrusted to them have increased dramatically over the past three decades. Their roles and responsibilities are often linked to the requirement of exercising leadership, which has become commonplace in the writings and assessments of UN activities. The 2000 Brahimi Report stated that “effective dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes.”4 This reference to leadership as a sort of self-evident imperative in peace operations is now ubiquitous. Dealing with “The Art of Successful Mandate Implementation,” a section from the 2008 Capstone Principles issued by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), is a further case in point: “Mission leaders [i.e., usually SRSGs] must underscore the need for all components to work towards shared objectives under the leadership of a cohesive and collaborative mission leadership team.”5 This imperative and the relevance of SRSGs does, however, stand in sharp contrast to the fact that they have, for a long time, been neglected in academic research with only a handful of articles and reports explicitly dealing with them.6 Drawing from a research project funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research, in this chapter I elaborate on the role of SRSGs in four steps by: (1) exploring the emergence as well as the legal and political basis of the work of the SRSGs; (2) tracing their quantitative development as a specific type of actor in conflict resolution; (3) discussing their contribution to leadership in peace operations; and (4) offering some concluding observations on the rationale, requirements, and characteristics of leadership of the SRSGs.

The Legal and Political Basis of the Work of SRSGs There is no direct reference to SRSGs in the Charter of the United Nations. As with the widely known Blue Helmets, the role of SRSGs was established and developed over the years, as the UN tried to adjust to the demands of varying challenges in the maintenance of peace and security around the world. In contrast to the Blue Helmets, the establishment of SRSGs as a systematic tool of conflict resolution did not get much public and political attention.7 The obvious lack of information and analysis regarding SRSGs may have to do with the fact that the first SRSGs usually

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engaged in private diplomacy and did not seek a public role. Their use was confined to a rather small number of individual mediators and diplomats whose actions could not easily be categorized into overarching patterns of qualifications and behavior. Although the use of envoys and mediators is a constant feature of diplomatic activity, the more specific use of SRSGs can be traced back to the tenure of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and his efforts to alleviate Cold War tensions through his own style of private diplomacy as well as an enlarged concept of technical assistance to the host of newly independent countries.8 The overarching framework for these activities can be seen in Hammarskjöld’s concept of a UN presence. According to this concept, a UN deployment could take many forms—from a strong peacekeeping force of several thousand soldiers to a single diplomat working confidentially on sensitive issues. While the first big deployments of UN peacekeepers—after the Suez crisis and in the Congo—illustrate the former, the dispatch of the head of the UN Geneva office, Piero Spinelli, to the volatile situation in Jordan in 1958 can be seen as an example of the latter.9 Going beyond peacekeeping and peacemaking, the early use of SRSGs by Hammarskjöld also points toward other functions of peacebuilding entrusted to them. In 1959, the Secretary-General sent Adrian Pelt, a former UN staffer and then secretary-general of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, as his special representative to Guinea to appraise the needs for and options of UN technical assistance to the newly independent country.10 Pelt was an interesting cast for that mission because, following up on a mandate of the UN General Assembly, he had administered the independence of Libya as UN commissioner in that country from 1950 to 1951. This assignment was surely quite unique, but it also paved the way for the future use of SRSGs in similar circumstances and finds an interesting recurrence in the more recent roles played by SRSGs in the transitional administrations of Kosovo and East Timor. Although the tasks and mandates of SRSGs may vary, the Charter provisions give some basic orientation regarding their role and scope of action. Their role is obviously tied closely to the office of the SecretaryGeneral as they “represent” or, in the case of envoys, are “sent by” the Secretary-General. Chapter XV of the UN Charter on the Secretariat (Articles 97−101) has some relevance for the appointment of SRSGs (see Chapter 13 by Simon Chesterman and Thomas M. Franck in this volume).11 Article 97, for example, identifies the Secretary-General as the “chief administrative officer of the Organization” with the concurrent power to lead and appoint an international staff. This prerogative, to select appropriate individuals for UN assignments, as stipulated in Article 101, thus ultimately lies with the Secretary-General and also applies to the selection of SRSGs. As international civil servants, they need to observe the strict stan-

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dards of international loyalty and impartiality as laid out in Article 100. This article not only protects the staff from pressure and undue influence by member states, but assigns them to work for the fulfillment of the aims and principles of the Charter laid down in Articles 1 and 2. Chapter XV contains two additional provisions that deal with the political competence of the Secretary-General and, by analogy, apply to the work of the SRSGs representing him. Article 98 states that the Secretary-General “shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by the other main UN organs (the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council).” This provision opens the door for all major organs of the UN to give specific mandates to the Secretary-General that can, and indeed do, go well beyond purely administrative services. Among the most concrete tasks entrusted to him in the past were the management of various peace missions. As the Secretary-General cannot personally carry out the coordination and supervision of peacekeeping missions, he typically appoints an individual or individuals to represent him in the field. Just by way of example, the wording of Security Council Resolution 1590 (relating to the situation in Sudan) illustrates this particular mechanism when it asks the Secretary-General to coordinate all UN activities in a given country “through his Special Representative.”12 The Secretary-General’s political activities are, however, not limited to tasks directly entrusted to him by the major UN organs. Article 99 states that he “may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Unspectacular as it may sound, the potential of this provision is quite remarkable. Not only does it link the Secretary-General to the UN organ that has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”— the Security Council according to Article 24 of the Charter—it also explicitly gives him an area of personal discretion. It is up to him to decide what kind of situation or event could threaten international peace and security. Against this background, the Secretaries-General have engaged in fact-finding missions13 and have provided the use of their “good offices.”14 In these endeavors, the Secretary-General can either involve himself personally or send a representative. The development of the post of SRSG, thus, largely coincided with the establishment of the Secretary-General as a political actor on behalf of the organization’s interests.15 Over the years, the sheer number of assignments and conflicts on the agenda of the UN and of its chief executive made the delegation of some of his work inevitable. SRSGs are a practical necessity: “Special representatives are conceived as surrogates for the Secretary-General, essentially as extensions of his person who do what the Secretary-General would and could do

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if he were personally present.”16 Other than often vague resolutions from the major UN organs, the special representatives seldom have more guidance for their work than a short letter of appointment.17 But this lack of detail can, on the other hand, be regarded as flexibility and as an invitation for a personal role and, indeed, for leadership in peacekeeping missions. SRSGs are, in any case, appointed by the Secretary-General and, depending on the nature of the conflict and the UN engagement, either report to the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) or to the DPKO. Amid the effort to build more coherent and integrated peacekeeping missions, the SRSG was also given a special status in the field, as the Note “Guidance on Integrated Missions” from Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in 2006: The SRSG is the senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations. He/she represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the United Nations in a given country. The SRSG establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach.18

An SRSG usually holds the rank of under-secretary-general, which gives him or her further standing. The actual funding of these posts varies considerably: some SRSGs are employed under the UN’s regular or peacekeeping budgets while others work on a “when actually employed basis” or from specially designated trust funds.19 Attractive as the entailed scope of action may be, the various contexts of conflicts, scarce resources, and other requirements may at the same time limit and impede an SRSG’s role or at least call for multitasking on the part of the SRSG. The most basic distinction with regard to the SRSG’s functions and tasks would be to label him or her as “part diplomat and part manager” (see also Chapter 15 by Frederik Trettin in this volume).20 But this distinction can be further developed: First, SRSGs must be effective diplomats able to assume a third-party role in resolving disputes and at the same time be willing and able to bring the full weight of the international community to bear on a problem, including offering negative assessments when necessary. Second, SRSGs must be practical but also visionary managers, capable of both effective planning and quick decision-making in rapidly changing political circumstances. Thirdly, an SRSG must be an effective communicator with the ability to convey persuasively his or her vision and the willingness to engage directly and personally the people of a war-torn society. Finally [there is] the moral dimension of the work of the SRSG. An SRSG speaks for the highest ideals of the international community, and is often asked to do so in the most inhospitable of circumstances, where war, violence, hatred and even genocide have left indelible marks on every person and every family.21

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Focusing on the SRSGs engaged in peacekeeping contexts, the 2003 Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations further distinguishes three roles of SRSGs, namely: facilitator of the political process; head of the UN presence or mission; and transitional administrator.22 In yet another attempt to identify the range of tasks entrusted to SRSGs, Annan, whose tenure in office saw the biggest increase in SRSG deployments so far, listed four roles: the personification of the UN; leader of a peace process; head of a peacekeeping/political or peacebuilding mission; and a unifying force for all UN activities in the field.23 Although SRSGs may even be working before the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement, their tasks not only stem from the UN Charter in general terms, but from the texts of peace agreements in concrete terms. A small survey of examples illustrates the ensuing broad range of activities: preparing an international conference and helping to restore national institutions (as in the 1997 mandate for the SRSG for the Great Lakes region);24 assisting in the implementation of specific Security Council resolutions (as, e.g., in Lebanon in 2007);25 or leading a transitional administration (as in Kosovo in 1999).26 The range of SRSG activities in implementing comprehensive mandates and complex peace operations is, indeed, sometimes congruent with the whole range of what conceptual efforts in peace and conflict research have identified as the constitutive elements of peace promoting endeavors.27 Thus, the SRSGs in Haiti and Sudan or the executive representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi led missions whose mandates include: peace consolidation and governance; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and reform of the security sector; promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity; and donor and UN agency coordination.28 To sum up, the legal and political basis of the work of SRSGs parallels that of the UN Secretary-General: scarce specific guidance comes from the Charter and, more often than not, from ambiguous mandates that necessitate improvisation. Successful incumbents of these offices may be able to establish themselves as important actors in furthering the cause of peace in various ways and missions. Regardless of their individual tasks as good officers in negotiations or heads of peace operations, the basis of their work remains fragile and lends itself to criticism and blame. As detailed below, SRSGs are regularly burdened and surely sometimes overburdened with a multitude of simultaneous tasks. Here, another parallel between the Secretary-General and his special representatives emerges. In 1969, Robert W. Cox had already argued that “the quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization,” concluding that “the executive head, in this vision, is cast in a role comparable to that of the proletariat in a betterknown dialectical proposition—a heavy load of historical expectations for

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a rather lonely figure to bear.”29 Notwithstanding all the manifest problems that stem from such an overburdening with tasks and expectations, the weakness of the Secretary-General and the SRSGs, on the other hand, could also be their strength since the lack of hidden agendas and partial interest implies a mandate and obligation for action on behalf of the United Nations. The tasks and roles of SRSGs are multifaceted and have developed from early experiments in the 1950s to become a standard tool of conflict resolution. Before turning to the how of these SRSG activities, a closer look at the who and where is in order.

The Development of the SRSG as a Specific Actor in Conflict Resolution Following up on the early practice of Hammarskjöld, his successors in office all used the instrument of the SRSGs. Their use did, however, increase dramatically after the end of the Cold War. Boutros Boutros-Ghali “developed the personal envoy and special representative function into one of the most intriguing and promising aspects of UN diplomacy of the post−Cold War era.”30 His successor, Annan, carried on with this practice amidst frequent calls for an intensification of the mediatory and good offices functions of the Secretary-General—i.e., the 2005 World Summit Outcome document,31 which, among other things, led to “the coming-of-age of UN mediation as it emerges from the gentlemanly and frequently lastminute practice of the Secretary-General’s ‘good offices’ into a more rigorous and finely tuned part of UN core business.”32 The quantitative development corroborates this finding: while the skilled mediators and interlocutors of early days transformed themselves into the heads and managers of multidimensional peace operations, their number significantly increased in the 1990s. The database on SRSGs, funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research, for the first time systematically traces the development of this type of actor. The data contains a number of remarkable trends.33 Increase in Use and Presence of SRSGs The use and presence of SRSGs rose sharply over the past three decades. Taking the year 1980 as a starting point, the number of SRSGs (understood in the broad sense as introduced above), roughly speaking, more than doubled every ten years. In 1980, there were a dozen SRSGs while in 1990 their number had already passed twenty-five. Ten years later the number had risen again to about seventy SRSGs operating worldwide. The upward trend continued through 2010 with about ninety appointments.The number

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of SRSGs has, thus, increased more than sevenfold over the course of thirty years. Decrease in Intrastate Conflict The increase in SRSGs coincides with a remarkable decrease in intrastate conflict since the 1990s,34 as highlighted by the Human Security Report in 2005.35 Although the report discusses various factors that could account for this development (e.g., the end of colonialism, the spread of democratic governance, increased state capacity, and international accountability for domestic conduct36), the “upsurge of international activism” was selected as “the single best explanation for the extraordinary decrease” in intra-state conflicts since the 1990s.37 While other international organizations and the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also mentioned in the Human Security Report, reference is made predominantly to the United Nations: (1) UN preventive diplomacy missions have increased from one (1990) to six (2002); (2) UN peacemaking missions grew from four to fifteen; (3) the number of “Friends of the Secretary-General”38 actively supporting various peace processes rose from four (1990) to twenty-eight (2003); and (4) the number of peacekeeping operations doubled between 1988 and 2004. The presence of SRSGs did grow from five to over twenty deployments and, thus, coincides with the steep decline in the number of intrastate conflicts in that period of time. This result, far from establishing a direct causality between SRSG presence and the decline of intrastate war, ties in with the findings of a study by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis that illustrates “multidimensional peace operations” as “extremely significant and positively associated with strict [peacebuilding]”39 since these missions are routinely headed by an SRSG. Referring to the findings of the SRSG database, the authors of the Human Security Report argued that “if a single indicator is used, SRSGs are . . . the most appropriate indicator of UN activism on the global security front.”40 The Human Security Brief 2007 identified SRSGs as “a good proxy measure for the UN’s overall efforts to enhance security in a region.”41 SRSG Activity in Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding SRSG activity has been found in various manifestations in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Taking a closer look at the different actors summarized under the term special representatives of the Secretary-General, three subgroups emerge with a view toward the respective titles employed: representatives, envoys, and advisers. 42 Although the labels do not follow any strict procedure and do originate with such

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diverse rationales as tradition, preference of the officeholder, and, last but not least, preference of the country to which they are deployed, a rough distinction can be made. Representatives usually have peacekeeping tasks whereas envoys are more or less focused on peacemaking tasks; advisers form a third group with a variety of tasks, usually working on crosscutting or transnational issues, and are frequently based at UN headquarters in New York.43 This observation ties in with the attempt by former undersecretary-general for political affairs Marrack Goulding to define “SRSGs” as: Senior civilians appointed to support the Secretary-General’s efforts in the peace and security field enjoy a bewildering variety of titles. Special Representative, Personal Representative or Representative tout court, in that order of seniority, are the most frequent. Most of these are based in the field as heads of peacekeeping operations or peacemaking missions. Special Envoys and Personal Envoys are more likely to be based in New York or, if they are engaged—as many are—on a “when actually employed” basis, in their home cities. They are usually involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Special Advisers and Senior Advisers are also usually based in New York, with wider and more generic areas of responsibility than their field-based colleagues. There are also a few Special Coordinators and High-Level Coordinators. But there are no standard criteria for who should be called what and exceptions exist to all the above generalizations.44

Again, the numbers illustrate a remarkable trend. Representatives are more engaged in the leadership of complex peace operations covering both peacekeeping and peacebuilding components and have nearly quadrupled from 1980 to 2010 when over fifty appointments could be counted. At the same time, envoys—a title which did not appear in the 1980 count— dramatically rose to eighteen in 2010. While peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities have seen a steady increase in SRSGs over the years, the 1990s saw a remarkable upsurge in peacemaking mandates. Diverse Geographic Origins of SRSGs SRSGs come from all parts of the world and work worldwide. Without looking at titles, but rather at regional aspects, the following picture emerges from an in-depth look at the SRSGs posted in 2006: roughly a third of them worked on transregional issues (i.e., on child soldiers or gender issues); another third worked in Africa; 13.06 percent worked in Asia and the Pacific; 10.06 percent worked in Europe; 9 percent worked in the Middle East; and 6.1 percent worked in the Americas. Looking at the origins of the SRSGs deployed in 2006, a similarly diverse picture emerges: About 40 percent of the SRSGs came from Europe; 24.2 percent from the Americas; 15.1 percent from Africa; and 13.6 percent from Asia.45 While

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this is just a small glimpse at the regional aspects of the SRSGs and their work, it shows their international character. Specific Qualifications of SRSGs SRSGs constitute a distinct group of diplomats with specific qualifications. Going beyond the regional perspective, a closer look at a 2006 sample reveals even more information. Setting aside the SRSGs working on transregional issues and focusing on those working in specific conflict situations, the following is an assessment of their characteristics: about 65 percent of those SRSGs had a career in the foreign service of their home country, which is not surprising. More interesting was the fact that about 25 percent of them had represented their country at the UN and roughly the same share of the sample had worked as an ambassador in one of the five countries of the permanent members of the Security Council (multiple classifications being possible). About forty percent had experience with other regional multilateral bodies—the same percentage also applies to people that had worked directly at the UN before their assignment as an SRSG. The average age of the SRSGs was sixty-three years old with only a small margin of deviation. Last, but not least, as of December 2006 all of the selected SRSGs were men. There have been some female SRSGs, but the field is clearly dominated by men, which, given the continuous increase in SRSG mandates, has led to calls to employ more women more often for these tasks.46 One of the most striking insights from the 2006 sample is, however, the fact that over half of the SRSGs working in December 2006 (55 percent) had previously worked on a different SRSG assignment. The Secretary-General obviously has an important say in the selection of SRSGs and these individuals seem to emerge from “interpersonal networks of people whose international careers have intersected.”47 Apart from the Secretary-General, the consent of the Security Council, the host country, the main troop contributors, and other stakeholders or parties to the conflict is important.48 Notwithstanding the need for intensive consultations, the Secretaries-General “have resisted formalizing, institutionalizing, or in any sense routinizing the appointing and dispatching of special representatives: each mission is considered sui generis; each is instructed ad hoc, staffed as fully or meagrely as resources allow and executed as ambitiously or cautiously as the Secretary-General thinks appropriate.”49 The rationale to choose a specific SRSG, therefore, has to take into account various factors. Former SRSG Pierre Schori recalls: When UN Secretary-General (SG) Kofi Annan asked me to be his Special Representative (SRSG) for Cote d’Ivoire, he argued that the situation called for a person who had executive and legislative experience in government and

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parliament, insider experience dealing with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), one who came from a country with no colonial past and a tradition of supporting the liberation struggle in Africa, who spoke French and personally knew African leaders.50

SRSGs, thus, have established themselves as a prime instrument and indicator of the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace and security. The sixfold increase in their numbers over the past three decades makes them susceptible to more systematic analysis. The observations and numbers drawn from the SRSG database point to the fact that SRSGs have similar professional and diplomatic experience, notwithstanding the differences in origin or task assigned. The job descriptions and political and legal mandates for these posts require the exercise of leadership skills. I now look at the final question; namely, how SRSGs work.

The Contribution of SRSGs to the Leadership of Peace Operations In his classic study on the relevance of personality in politics, Fred Greenstein listed three conditions that determine the personality factor in politics: 1. Personal impact increases when the environment admits restructuring. Postconflict situations call for restructuring, but at the same time they show formidable obstacles to restructuring. 2. Personal impact increases when the actor is “strategically placed” in the environment. There should be no doubt that this is the case for SRSGs. 3. Personal impact depends on the strengths and weaknesses of the individual actor.51 Illustrative examples such as Ahtisaari in Namibia, Lakhdar Brahimi in Afghanistan,52 Alvaro de Soto in El Salvador,53 or the more contested role of Yasushi Akashi during the Yugoslavia conflict,54 underline this point. SRSGs act in difficult circumstances and “almost always have to navigate by sight.”55 In these situations, the “cognitive maps” or “operational codes” of actors are highly relevant,56 personality matters,57 and leadership emerges as a distinct feature of the tasks of SRSGs. This gives credibility to the emphatic words of Annan before a workshop for former SRSGs: “You personally have the power to make an enormous difference.”58 The relevance of leadership by SRSGs is also underlined by the fact that the comprehensive “peacebuilding triangle” that was developed by Doyle and Sambanis is able to explain about 75 percent of the successes

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and failures of the peacebuilding situations between 1945 and 1999 that they analyzed. The interaction of the three sides of the triangle—hostility, international capacity, and local capacity—can account for much, but “always [leaves] a significant factor not predicted by the analysis: This we argue is a product of differences of leadership and strategy at the tactical level.”59 If one were to allocate the responsibility for leadership and strategy at the tactical level, one would inevitably end up with the individual role of the SRSG in a given operation. This is definitely not to say that SRSGs alone can account for the success or failure of a mission, but their work takes place amid a number of structural context factors that determine peace operations.60 Again, the leadership factor can add to either success or failure; the potential of leadership can also be seen as the problem of leadership. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson’s “Framework for Success: Societies Emerging from Conflict” illustrates this challenge by listing “critical leadership responsibilities”: Build unity of purpose among the military, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), government authorities, and the private sector; develop and execute integrated plans that are based on the peace agreement or mission mandate; ensure involved players have the authority they need to succeed and adequate financial and staff resources; build and maintain legitimacy; engage the international community; establish peaceful relations with neighboring countries; build constituencies for peace; deploy effective strategic communications and public awareness campaigns; identify and address original and emerging drivers of conflict; manage spoilers; collect and use intelligence; manage information effectively; and manage transitions from military to civilian and from international to local control.61

Even a superficial look at the respective mandates of SRSGs shows that, more often than not, they are burdened with each and every one of these leadership responsibilities. They not only represent the SecretaryGeneral, but also epitomize the whole UN effort and, thus, mirror the complex structure of modern peace operations. This position is inevitably tied to a number of problems. For example, the fundamental assumption of strategic thinking is the existence of a predetermined goal that sets the direction of any strategy. The thirteen responsibilities outlined above do, however, show that the relevant aims, constituencies, and instruments may not necessarily all point in the same direction.62 The tasks get even more complex when taking into account the list of twenty-five sectors of peacebuilding activities detailed in the UN’s Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory.63 The central challenges identified by this inventory, which was based on interviews and analysis of thirty-one entities within the UN system, were the need to agree on a clear framework for peacebuilding and to enhance the integration among UN entities. Again, the various tasks and actions may

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not easily reinforce each other; in addition, the skills employed to reach one goal may not be called for in the realization of a different goal. SRSGs are inevitably forced to play various roles simultaneously. This multitude of possible roles can be understood as an extension of the basic roles of the Secretary-General himself who, by virtue of the UN Charter’s provisions and the will of member states, is asked to work simultaneously as manager of an administration (leading a bureaucracy), manager of conflict (acting as mediator), and manager of ideas (upholding, adopting, and defending the core values and principles of the Charter).64 The experiences of former SRSGs support this view.65 Against this background, evaluating SRSG leadership is a rather complex undertaking. Evaluating SRSG Leadership The diversity of mandates and challenges with which SRSGs are confronted clearly rules out a static set of rules and procedures for all missions. The concept of leadership is difficult to assess and analyze in a systematic way. Oran R. Young, in dealing with leadership in regime formation, argues that “leadership is a complex phenomenon, ill-defined, poorly understood, and subject to recurrent controversy among students of international affairs.”66 Specific research on the conceptualization and empirical testing of leadership by SRSGs is still in its early stages. Stefanie Gräber applies Robert E. Quinn’s “comprehensive values framework”67 in her study of SRSGs in Liberia.68 This innovative adoption of a holistic framework for organizational effectiveness does, indeed, offer a systematic appraisal of important aspects of leadership by SRSGs. The leadership roles integrated in Quinn’s framework—mentor and facilitator; innovator and broker; producer and director; and monitor and coordinator—do, certainly, allow for a detailed look at the activities of SRSGs in various fields of action. The ideal exercise of these different leadership roles in the form of a master manager emerges as a demanding, but also suitable framework to study the performance of SRSGs. The concrete application of this framework to the experiences of Jacques Paul Klein and Alan Doss, two former SRSGs in Liberia, reveals a number of systematic insights that Gräber ties to findings from organizational theory by elaborating an organizational life cycle model. Each stage of that life cycle, from the entrepreneurial stage to the elaboration of structure, calls for a different emphasis of leadership roles and areas of activity. Trettin (see also Chapter 15 in this volume) uses three roles to measure the performance of two former SRSGs in Kosovo, Hans Haekkerup and Michael Steiner.69 The roles of politician, manager, and communicator require the abilities to create momentum for a peace process, to find sup-

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port among diverse stakeholders, to develop the institutional and procedural setting for operative success, and to communicate a coherent message to a multitude of actors. These distinctions allow for a relatively broad assessment of leadership performance and also stress the interconnectedness of these areas to the overall success of a mission. Trettin uses the dual specification of “fulfilled” and “not fulfilled” as well as the specification “delegated” to assess leadership performances, thereby alluding to the roles of deputy SRSGs and the chiefs of staff of a peace operation. Drawing from the literature on leadership skills and requirements in business, André Schuster conducted a comparative study of five SRSGs in Kosovo.70 Rather than speaking of roles, Schuster introduced three functions that SRSGs should provide; namely, orientation, organization, and mediation. The underlying thesis of his study is the assumption that leadership success depends on the extent to which these different functions are carried out by an SRSG. Schuster also introduced a number of standards and measures for the fulfillment of these functions, ranging from the existence and articulation of a specific agenda and a list of priorities to concrete modes for the inclusion of stakeholders. Both Trettin and Schuster focus on communicative action, with the latter citing former SRSG in Kosovo Sören Jessen-Petersen’s dictum “Dialogue at various levels is key.”71 The importance of communication is also present in Connie Peck’s assessment that the work of SRSGs requires “constant negotiation with a wide range of actors,” not only in the field, but also with headquarters, donors, troop contributors, and so forth, “to engender political support, to mobilize leverage, and to find the resources needed to sustain the mission and make a significant impact on the mission area.”72 Schuster’s framework allows for a detailed assessment of the various SRSGs, which he tries to express in quantitative terms: a grading system allows for the attribution of a strong or weak fulfillment of SRSG functions. Notwithstanding all of the other variables of context and circumstance that may impact an SRSG’s work and the ultimate mission success, the provision of the three functions of orientation, organization, and mediation emerges as a sound indicator for leadership success. A fundamental assumption in the context of assessing SRSG leadership is that SRSGs are usually challenged to show “transformational leadership.”73 They not only are asked to uphold, coordinate, and continue a mission or peace operation while the particular conflict structure remains largely unaffected, but their mission is also to actively transform a conflict situation.74 Given its institutional and situational context, their leadership can be characterized as transformational leadership since it relies mainly on the communicative tools of arguing, bargaining, and persuasion. The emphasis on the personal and even charismatic influence of individuals, on the need to reframe problems and to inspire through motivation and intel-

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lectual stimulation, and on the ethical values of a leader’s vision and that of his potential followers all tie in with what constitutes the work of SRSGs.75 Starting from these observations, certain dimensions of leadership by SRSGs can be identified. Three Dimensions of Leadership Going beyond business leadership approaches, the theory of international relations frames the problem in terms of the relationship between agency and structure.76 In that context, Philipp Cerny has distinguished four different constellations of agency and structure. While there is either “tight” or “loose” structural coherence, one can also distinguish between “structure bound” versus “transformational actor orientation.”77 The special situations of SRSGs seem to be working amid loose structural coherence in postconflict situations with transformational actor orientation. In such cases, Cerny speaks of “articulated restructuring” as the modus operandi that is characterized by wide latitude, high risk, and uncertainty as well as “a complex range of opportunities and constraints.”78 Seen from this perspective, the role of SRSGs emerges as relevant because it lies at the juncture of the fundamental social dynamics of conflict situations, on the relationship between leadership and context in general.79 In his study on leadership and regime formation, Young introduces three forms of leadership: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual: The structural leader translates power resources into bargaining leverage in an effort to bring pressure to bear on others to assent to the terms of proposed constitutional contracts. The entrepreneurial leader makes use of negotiating skill to frame the issues at stake, devise mutually acceptable formulas, and broker the interest of key players in building support for these formulas. The intellectual leader, by contrast, relies on the power of ideas to shape the thinking of the principals in processes of institutional bargaining.80

Each of these forms of leadership follows its own rationale and process and has its own problems and merits. These three general forms of leadership are also discernible in some of the tasks of SRSGs and can be combined with the compatible, albeit different, three-dimensional assessment of the roles of the Secretary-General that I introduced earlier in this chapter. A few examples illustrate these manifestations of leadership. Manager of administration. An illustration of this context can be taken

from the experiences of Sergio Vieira de Mello, a former SRSG in Yugoslavia, where he had to manage the differences among the humanitarian, military, and political actors associated with the UN presence there. According to his biographer, “Vieira de Mello knew that political envoys

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tended to view humanitarians as expendable ‘grocery deliverers’ who would play no important role in high-stakes political talks.”81 In contrast to this view, Vieira de Mello, based on his own experience, tried to establish an integrative approach that would involve all the different actors, judging that “the most difficult thing in a peacekeeping mission is the internal peacekeeping.”82 Once again, such tasks are primarily communicative: “The SRSG must also provide leadership and be able to communicate effectively with the diverse international and local staff . . . to keep them working toward the same objectives and to maintain morale.”83 These efforts can be linked to what Bruce D. Jones has called “strategic coordination.” Strategic coordination is shorthand for efforts to respond to three common challenges facing third-party implementers of peace agreements: incoherence between the mediation and the implementation of peace agreements; conflicting approaches within a given phase; and fragmented contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy.”84 Jones also sees the SRSG as holding a special position to deliver strategic coordination: “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General can provide an important source of policy coordination and coherence, both among UN agencies and between the UN and other international actors. . . . There can be little doubt that there is a high correlation between effective strategic coordination and the presence and good management of an SRSG or equivalent.”85 The importance of SRSGs, in that regard, also permeated the recommendations of the Fafo study on managing UN peacebuilding missions86 as well as those of a more recent independent study commissioned by the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) on successfully leading an integrated peace mission.87 Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, on the other hand, pointed to the problematic implications of a strong administrative leadership role: SRSGs ignore at their peril the administrative and logistics aspects of missions comprised of tens of thousands of military, police and civilian personnel, with budgets of up to one billion dollars per annum. SRSGs cannot shirk their leadership responsibilities to ensure good order and discipline of personnel, proper management of mission assets and effective integration and unity of effort across components. Attention to the managerial role, however, can come at the expense of the political role, and vice versa.88

They recommend delegating administrative duties to a single principal deputy. This highlights the fact that leadership by an SRSG is also a team challenge,89 including efforts for continuous coordination90 and integration91 of the mission.92 In addition to representatives in the narrow sense of leaders of peacekeeping operations, deputy SRSGs emerge as relevant actors in this dimension of leadership. Leadership in this context calls for a useful division of labor.93 In that vein, former UN under-secretary-general for

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peacekeeping operations Alain LeRoy stated: “At the level of the mission, we need to build leadership teams with a good combination of political leadership, technical expertise, and management acumen. We will never find all the characteristics required in one SRSG, rather he or she must lead a complementary team.”94 The leadership of an SRSG may then presuppose the (contested) freedom to assemble one’s own staff, which, for example, Vieira de Mello repeatedly insisted on. 95 The potential for an integrative approach, as sought by Viera de Mello in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, also leads to the intersection of administrative and political duties, as he was keen to “use humanitarian progress to try to forge common ground among the bitter enemies.”96 Manager of conflict. A good example of leadership by an SRSG in the

effort to promote peace in a postconflict environment is the innovation of actively engaging a so-called Group of Friends consisting of the main stakeholders in a peacemaking and peacebuilding effort.97 This mechanism fulfills various functions including lending support and providing guarantees with respect to implementation. Such a group also integrates diverse mediation efforts under one common roof “[enhancing] the room for independent action of the secretary-general and his representatives, [bringing] leverage to bear on both parties, and [bolstering] the equilibrium between them.”98 For Alvaro de Soto, who first employed this concept in El Salvador, one of the purposes of the group of friends, rather symptomatically, was “to intimate that we [the United Nations] were in the lead.”99 Aldo Ajello, who worked with a similar approach in Mozambique, described the group as a sort of “mini Security Council” giving him further leverage in trying to structure the peace process: “What I was doing was simple. When I briefed them each week, I was basically dictating the reports they would write to their capitals—which had two good results. First, I knew they were sending the right information. Second, I knew they were all sending the same information at the same time. So, all the capitals were reacting in the same way.”100 Another example dealing with the perennial question of who to include and exclude in a given peace process can be taken from the UN’s experience in Cambodia. In June 1988, SRSG Rafeeuddin Ahmed decided that after meetings with Prince Sihanouk in Paris, he should also contact the Khmer Rouge leadership. With the backing of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Ahmed visited Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen. Ahmed explicitly understood this move to be in the same category as Hammarskjöld’s mission to Peking in 1955 when the Secretary-General had operated under the “Peking Formula,”101 basing his actions not on a specific resolution by a major UN organ, but directly on his peace and security mandate and under Article 99 of the UN Charter.102 Again, different commu-

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nicative actions are encountered that shape the distinct leadership of individual SRSGs. Their personal experiences, professional backgrounds, and personal as well as ethical values may have an impact on their actions: With whom are they interacting? What kind of role do they envisage for themselves and the United Nations? Do they follow a preconceived agenda of peacemaking or are they constantly adjusting towards the fluid situation on the ground? And are they focusing on political and security aspects or do they concentrate on development questions?103 An important role of the SRSG as manager of conflict can also be seen in his preparation of reports to the Security Council. He or she would usually prepare the Security Council statements by the Secretary-General for the relevant meetings of the Council and, on occasion, could be asked to make a presentation to the Council. Leadership, in that situation, can be measured by fulfilling what the Brahimi Report called the imperative to “tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.”104 The SRSGs may also use this opportunity to present their individual assessment and suggestions for action, as did former SRSG Jan Pronk in September 2006 when he introduced a five-point plan for the promotion of the peace process in the Sudan.105 Peck stresses the fact that “SRSGs [should] view themselves not as passive recipients of mandates but rather as key actors who can, through their careful analysis and well-argued recommendations, assist the Council in the formulation or tailoring of appropriate mandates.”106 This also means that when confronted with a marginalization of their role, lack of support by the relevant stakeholders, and, above all, the danger of compromising the imperative of impartial mediation as embodied in Article 100 of the Charter, SRSGs should seriously consider stepping down from their position. De Soto’s end of mission report concerning his simultaneous roles as UN special coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process/personal representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority and as envoy to the Quartet is a case in point. Faced with the increasing limitation of his scope of action, he did not seek a prolongation of his contract and wrote: “We are not in the lead, and the role we play is subsidiary at best, dangerous at worst. . . . [T]he UN must get over this tendency to allow itself to be pushed around. This will require not just a steel-spined envoy but also the determination of Headquarters, from the Secretary-General on down, to close ranks and back him up.”107 Conflict management, thus, includes the necessary support not only from the conflict parties, but also from headquarters. This dimension of working as a manager of conflict points to the third dimension of leadership; namely, manager of ideas. Manager of ideas. A clear example of this effort can be found in Pronk’s

work in the Sudan. His criticism of government-sponsored raids and skir-

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mishes in Darfur led the government in Khartoum to declare him persona non grata.108 It is noteworthy to stress that Pronk was sanctioned, not because of any specific action using material resources, but rather because of communicative action. His weblog—its very establishment can be seen as an expression of leadership since there was no specific mandate asking or allowing him to open this route of communication and information— from November 27, 2006, contains an ample statement in the context of an SRSG’s role as manager of ideas: The Government is still violating peace and ceasefire agreements as well as principles, norms and values of the UN. It continues to do so, despite having signed these agreements and despite that Sudan, as a member state of the United Nations, is bound to uphold these principles. In my capacity as Special Representative of the United Nations I still consider it my duty to disseminate these norms and values and to report about violations.109

This rather unusual and, as has been proven, risky manifestation of SRSG leadership can be seen as an example of the imperative that Cyrus Vance and David A. Hamburg distilled from practical experiences in the field: “International interests and norms are [to be] injected into . . . negotiations by the special representative.”110 The DPKO Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peace Operations also highlights this context stating that the SRSG “personifies the will of the international community.”111 Such statements tie in with the more theoretical considerations that Martha Finnemore and Kathyrn Sikkink stress in their description of “norm entrepreneurship” of individuals in promoting and diffusing norms in the international system: Persuasion is central to most of the empirical case studies about normative influence and change. It is the mission of norm entrepreneurs: they seek to change the utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitment. Persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective.112

Once again, the transformative intention of leadership emerges as a special leadership feature of SRSGs: “These actors are making detailed means-ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.”113 Such theoretical insights also find an echo in the description by a staff member portraying Vieira de Mello’s negotiations with Yugoslav authorities: “It was as if the UN Charter was speaking through a person.”114 Leadership by an international civil servant in that context can consist of small gestures; for exam-

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ple, the decision regarding whom to shake hands with or not. Another example is Vieira de Mello’s conscious decision to decline the offer of the former Yugoslav foreign minister to talk in Viera de Mello’s native Portuguese; he chose to deliver the message of the institution he represented in English.115 Looking at peacemaking assignments, the double question of who to include and who to exclude in peace processes and when to employ public or private diplomacy seems to define the central landmarks for the exercise of leadership by SRSGs. Leadership by SRSGs, therefore, implies the individual creation, interpretation, and realization of a mandate for action understood as an administrative, political, and normative task. Their role is shaped by three rather special rationales: 1. Much the same as the Secretary-General in his efforts to maintain international peace and security, SRSGs regularly have to “invent themselves”116 (i.e., they have to create a space for the UN and its mission or try to activate norms and values in a situation that regularly is defined by the absence of these very norms and values). Enriched with experience from the field, then under-secretarygeneral for political affairs Kieran Prendergast delivered a message from Annan to a UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) seminar for SRSGs illustrating this rationale: “Often you and your staff have to lead without the leading mandate, coordinate when no one wants to be coordinated, and respond to unimaginable situations without the necessary resources.”117 2. Guiding SRSG activities is a formidable paradox. Having established their roles and leadership, SRSGs should use this potential to make themselves superfluous and, ultimately, end their mandates. 3. The work of SRSGs may finally be illustrated in cases “where Secretaries-General have appointed highly visible international notables whose real, but unspoken, function has been to absorb the brunt of diplomatic failure and thereby buffer the Secretary-General and the United Nations.”118 Once again, this function is also an analogy of what constitutes the world of the Secretary-General on a more general level and what has found an apt unofficial translation in the acronym SG or scapegoat.

Conclusion SRSGs play an important role in various peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts. Their work is an extension of the Secretary-General’s functions under the UN Charter and fulfills various tasks in the execution

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of mandates by the UN’s major organs, most notably the UN Security Council. The qualitative and quantitative growth and development of these posts over the past three decades make them a valid indicator of the UN’s overall efforts to maintain international peace and security. Although their titles, mandates, and theaters of operation vary considerably, a number of biographical and professional commonalities characterize them as truly global actors. The academic task of assessing and analyzing this special form of leadership should start by identifying the multitude of often contradictory tasks and corresponding activities of SRSGs who, depending on their respective focus, can be subdivided into representatives (emphasis on peacekeeping tasks), envoys (peacemaking tasks), and advisers (crosscutting challenges that can pertain to peacebuilding efforts). While such a categorization of SRSGs can inform their quantitative analysis, the concrete work of SRSGs, more often than not, is characterized by the intersection of these three tasks. Once again, mirroring the promise and the problems of the uniquely structured office of the UN Secretary-General, SRSGs are called on to work as managers of administration, managers of conflict, and managers of ideas— a combination of tasks that do not easily support one another and that invite both an overburdening of the incumbents as well as an underrating of the problems they will have to deal with. The delegation of some tasks to deputies is only one step to address this problem. The principal work of SRSGs is shaped by the rationale of first creating a space for themselves and their mission and, at the same time, having a view toward making themselves superfluous since their actions should resonate with actors and interests on the ground. This marks the special character of SRSG leadership as transformational leadership. The performance of SRSGs inevitably depends on personal as well as professional experiences and, ultimately, on such individual features as values, political ethics, charisma, and courage. Based on the legal and political foundations of their role, their development as actors in conflict situations, and their contributions to peace missions, leadership by SRSGs emerges not only as an option but rather as an obligation. While it cannot solely account for the success or failure of peacekeeping missions, it is a constitutive feature of an actively pursued effort for the maintenance of international peace and security. Notes This chapter draws from the research project “Individual and International Leadership: The Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research. It was written as a follow-up to the conference “Public Administration

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meets Peacekeeping” at the University of Konstanz in 2007 and updated in 2009 and 2011. Parts of the chapter utilize sections of previous papers and publications: see Manuel Fröhlich, “The Peace-makers: Zur Rolle der Special Representatives des UN-Generalsekretärs,” paper prepared for the trilateral meeting of Political Science Associations, Vienna, Austria, November 30−December 2, 2006; Manuel Fröhlich, Maria Bütof, and Jan Lemanski, “Mapping UN Presence: A Follow-up to the Human Security Report,” Die Friedens-Warte 81, no. 2 (2006): 13−31; Manuel Fröhlich, “The Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General,” in Bob Reinalda, ed., Routledge Handbook of International Organization (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 231-243; and Manuel Fröhlich, “Representing the United Nations: Individual Actors, International Agency, and Leadership,” Global Governance 20, no. 2 (2014): 169–193. 1. Ole Danbolt Mjøs, Presentation speech by the chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2008, www.nobelpeaceprize.org/en _GB/laureates/laureates-2008/presentation-2008. 2. Ibid. 3. Connie Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” in David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 337−338. 4. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, par. 92. 5. UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008), p. 65. 6. See, for example, Donald J. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” in Leon Gordenker and Benjamin Rivlin, eds., The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making “The Most Impossible in the World” Possible (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 81−97; Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997); Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peace-building Missions, Recommendations Report of the Forum on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Shaping the UN’s Role in Peace Implementation, Fafo Report No. 266 (Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 1999); and Peck, “Special Representatives of the SecretaryGeneral”; and Connie Peck, “The Role of Special Representatives of the SecretaryGeneral in Conflict Prevention,” in Anders Mellbourn and Peter Wallensteen, eds., Third Parties and Conflict Prevention (Hedemora, Sweden: Gidlunds Förlag, 2008), pp. 223−232. For more recent studies see Manuel Fröhlich, “The Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General,” in Bob Reinalda, ed., Routledge Handbook of International Organization (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 231–243; Manuel Fröhlich, “Representing the United Nations: Individual Actors, International Agency, and Leadership,” Global Governance 20, no. 2 (2014): 169–193 and Connie Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds., The UN Security Council in the 21st Century (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2016), pp. 457–474. 7. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” p. 82. 8. See Manuel Fröhlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General (New York: Routledge, 2008).

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9. See Manuel Fröhlich, “‘The Unknown Assignation’: Dag Hammarskjöld in the Papers of George Ivan Smith,” in Beyond Diplomacy: Perspectives on Dag Hammarskjöld from the Papers of Georg Ivan Smith and the Ezra Pound Case, Critical Currents Occasional Paper Series No. 2 (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, March 2008), pp. 21−22; Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 294−296. 10. Urquhart, Hammarskjold, pp. 378−379. 11. Fröhlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations, pp. 15−48. 12. See UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1590 (March 24, 2005), par. 3. 13. See, among others, Karl-Josef Partsch, “Fact-finding and Inquiry,” in Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 61–62; M. Christiane Bourloyannis, “Fact-finding by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 22, no. 4 (1990): 641–669; and Thomas E. Boudreau, Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary-General and the Prevention of International Conflict (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 17−19. 14. Vratislav Pechota, The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace (Geneva: UN Institute for Training and Research, 1972); Thomas M. Franck and Georg Nolte, “The Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General,” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 143−182. 15. See Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives”; Vance and Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace; and Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.” 16. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” p. 82. 17. There may be other, usually not public, guidelines and instructions that define the parameters of what is and what is not in line with the general policy of the United Nations. See Alvaro de Soto, “The Peacemaker: An Interview with UN Under-Secretary-General Alvaro de Soto,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 26, vol. 1 (2002): 88. 18. UN, Note from the Secretary-General, “Guidance on Integrated Missions,” January 17, 2006, par. 5, www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Pages /PUBLIC/ViewDocument.aspx?docid=738&cat=15&scat=0; Even Fontaine Ortiz, “The Role of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Resident Coordinators: A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence and Integration Within the United Nations System,” UN Doc. JIU/REP/2009/9 (Geneva: Joint Inspection Unit, 2009). 19. UN, Report of the Secretary-General. Special Representatives, Envoys, and Related Positions, UN Doc. A/C.5/50/72, September 20 1996; see also Vance and Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace, p. 10. 20. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 13. 21. Ibid., p. 30. 22. UN, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, December 2003), p. 13. 23. UN, Remarks by the Secretary-General, Seminar for Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys, UN Doc. SG/SM/7760, March 30, 2001. 24. See UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1097 (February 18, 1997). 25. See UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1559 (May 9, 2007).

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26. See UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 27. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006); Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2007). See also the spectrum of recommendations on peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in UN, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacebuilding and Peace-keeping—Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277S/24111, June 17, 1992. 28. See UN Security Council, Res. S/RES/1719 (October 25, 2006). 29. Robert W. Cox, “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 205, 207. 30. Vance and Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace, p. 2. 31. See UN General Assembly, Res. A/RES/60/1 (September 16, 2005), par. 76. 32. Martin Griffiths, Talking Peace in a Time of Terror: United Nations Mediation and Collective Security (Geneva: Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005), p. 3. 33. Numbers refer to SRSG Database 1946-2008 v1.0 with additions to 2010. See also Manuel Fröhlich, “The Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General,” in Bob Reinalda, ed., Routledge Handbook of International Organization (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 236–238. 34. Manuel Fröhlich, Maria Bütof, and Jan Lemanski, “Mapping UN Presence: A Follow-up to the Human Security Report,” Die Friedens-Warte 81, no. 2 (2006): 13−31. 35. Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). There have been several arguments about the nature and scope of that decrease. See, for example, Håvard Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 243−252 as well as the other articles in that special issue on conflict duration. For a discussion of Human Security Centre, Human Security Report, see Hans J. Giessmann, “Der Human Security Report: Neue Fakten, neue Mythen?” Die Friedens-Warte 81, no. 2 (2006): 39−48; Lotta Mayer, “Weniger Kriege? Zweifel am Optimismus des Human Security Report,” Die Friedens-Warte Journal of International Peace and Organization 81, no. 2 (2006): 49−57; and the rejoinder by Andrew Mack and Eric Nicholls, “Interrogating the Human Security Report,” Die Friedens-Warte 82, no. 1 (2007): 117−123. 36. See also Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-determination Movements, and Democracy (College Park: University of Maryland, 2005). 37. Human Security Centre, Human Security Report, pp. 150, 155. 38. Teresa Whitfield, “Groups of Friends,” in David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 311−324; Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007). 39. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 791; see also Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

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40. Mack and Nicholls, “Interrogating the Human Security Report,” p. 117. 41. Human Security Project, Human Security Brief 2007 (Vancouver, Canada: Human Security Project, Simon Fraser University), p. 30. 42. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle. 43. In this chapter, I focus on country- or conflict-related SRSGs, largely setting aside the more thematically oriented SRSGs. “These SRSGs are assigned to raise awareness of . . . major problems, to develop relevant policy, and to work with member states and the UN system to ensure that the problems receive appropriate attention and action.” Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” pp. 328−329. Examples include the special envoys on climate change or the special representative for migration. 44. Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: Murray, 2002), p. 16. 45. See Manuel Fröhlich, “The Peace-makers: Zur Rolle der Special Representatives des UN-Generalsekretärs,” paper prepared for the trilateral meeting of Political Science Associations, Vienna, Austria, November 30−December 2, 2006, www.oegpw.at/tagung06/papers/ak6_froehlich.pdf. 46. This demand can be found in United Nations, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/39, October 29, 2008. As of 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had appointed a number of women to crucial SRSG positions in the field: Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia) as SRSG with the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA); Ellen Margarethe Løj (Denmark) as SRSG with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); Karin Landgren (Sweden) as SRSG with the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN); and Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh) as SRSG with the UN Integrated Mission in TimorLeste (UNMIT). 47. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” p. 83. 48. Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” p. 326; Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 39. 49. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” p. 84. 50. Pierre Schori, “Leadership on the Line: Managing Field Complexity,” in Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations (New York: International Peace Institute and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009), p. 28. 51. Fred I. Greenstein, “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush,” American Political Science Review 60, no. 3 (1967): 629−641. 52. Janka Oertel, “Lakhdar Brahimi: Troubleshooter, Mr. Peace,” case study for the research project, “Project Peacemaker: The Role of SRSGs,” Department of Political Science, Jena University, Jena, Germany, 2009. 53. “The Peacemaker: An Interview with UN Under-Secretary-General Alvaro de Soto,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 26, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2002): 83. 54. See, for example, Yasushi Akashi, “The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation,” Survival 37, no. 4 (1995): 83−98; Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset, eds., UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), p. x; Boutros BoutrosGhali, Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga (New York: Random House, 1999) pp. 141–149; and Chapter 15 by Frederik Trettin in this volume. 55. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 12. 56. See Robert M. Axelrod, ed., Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); and Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political

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Leaders and Decision-making,” in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), pp. 165−190. 57. See, for example, Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagen, “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (1998): 124−137; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Raise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back in,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 107−146; and Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decision,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 3 (2006): 289−306. 58. UN, Remarks by the Secretary-General, Seminar for Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys; Fafo, Command from the Saddle, p. 29. 59. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, pp. 2−3. 60. See Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Jaïr van der Lijn, “If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-building Operations,” Journal of International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (2009): 45−71. Van der Lijn distinguishes eleven clusters of factors that are partly beyond the reach of SRSG leadership and partly fall within the scope of action of SRSGs: consent, willingness, and sincerity; impartiality and the nonuse of force; cooperation from important outside actors; sense of security of the parties; a clear, appropriate, and achievable mandate; timely deployment and at the right time; competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures; sufficiently long duration; internal and external coordination; ownership; and causes of conflict. 61. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson, “A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging from Conflict,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 371. 62. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding,” Foreign Policy, no. 94 (1994): 69−83. 63. UN, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, “Inventory: United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding,” September 2006, www.undp.org/cpr/iasc/content /docs/Oct_Links/doc_4.pdf. 64. Manuel Fröhlich, “Weltorganisation und Individuum: Kofi Annans Dekade als UN-Generalsekretär,” Vereinte Nationen 55, no. 3 (2007): 96−102. 65. Peck, “The Role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in Conflict Prevention.” 66. Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society,” International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 281. See also James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Ludger Helms, “‘Politische Führung’ als politikwissenschaftliches Problem,” Politische Vierteljahreschrift 41, no. 3 (2000): 411−434. 67. Robert E. Quinn, Beyond Rational Management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Competing Demands of High Performance (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988). 68. Stephanie Gräber, “The Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as ‘Master Managers’: Role Patterns of Leadership in UN Peace Operations,” master’s diploma, University of Konstanz, 2008. 69. Frederik Trettin, “Die Sondergesandten des UN Generalsekretärs: Politiker oder Manager?” bachelor’s thesis, University of Konstanz, 2007. See also Chapter 15 by Trettin in this volume. 70. André Schuster, “Führung von Friedenseinsätzen. Analyse der Sondergesandten des UN-Generalsekretärs am Fallbeispiel der UN-Mission im Kosovo,” master’s thesis, University of Jena, 2008.

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71. Ibid., p. 104. See also Fröhlich, “Weltorganisation und Individuum.” 72. Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” pp. 327−328. 73. Bernard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, Transformational Leadership, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006). 74. Fröhlich, “Weltorganisation und Individuum.” 75. Bass and Riggio, Transformational Leadership; Sabine Boerner, Silke Astrid Eisenbeiss, and Daniel Griesser, “Follower Behavior and Organizational Performance: The Impact of Transformational Leaders,” Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 13, no. 3 (2007): 15−26. For a theoretical overview, see Chapter 12 by Sabine Boerner in this volume. 76. Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 335−370; Fröhlich, “Weltorganisation und Individuum.” 77. Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,” International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 595−625. 78. Ibid., pp. 437, 440−441. 79. Margaret G. Hermann, “Ingredients of Leadership,” in Margaret G. Hermann, ed., Political Psychology (London: Jossey-Bass, 2006), pp. 169−173; Kent J. Kille, From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-Generals of the United Nations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 234−247. 80. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” p. 307. 81. Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), p. 203. 82. Ibid., p. 157. See also Wolfgang Seibel, “Moderne Protektorate als Ersatzstaat: UN-Friedensoperationen und Dilemmata internationaler Übergangsverwaltungen,” in Gunnar Folke and Michael Zürn, eds., Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), pp. 499−530. 83. Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” p. 327. 84. Bruce D. Jones, The Challenges for Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars, IPA Policy Series on Peace Implementation (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), p. 2. 85. Ibid., p. 10. Coordination thus appears as relevant to, but not fully congruent with, leadership in that respect. On the challenge, see Dan Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004) as well as Chapter 1 by Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf in this volume and its useful triad of coordination, learning, and leadership applied to peacekeeping operations from a public administration point of view. 86. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 25. 87. Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen von Hippel, “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” Independent Study for the Expanded UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Core Group (London: King’s College; Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005). 88. Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2008), p. 4. 89. Schori, “Leadership on the Line.” 90. Jones, The Challenges for Strategic Coordination; Anna Herrhausen, Orga-

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nizing Peacebuilding: An Investigation of Interorganizational Coordination in International Post Conflict Reconstruction Efforts (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009). 91. Eide et al., “Report on Integrated Missions”; Brahimi and Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace, p. 4. 92. Building on the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, coordination and mission integration has been improved through, for example, the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces and integrated missions in the field, which aim for a common approach under the One UN and are supported by UN country teams or mission leadership teams with the SRSG in charge of the entire UN presence in the particular country. See UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, p. 53. Simple hierarchical models of command and order do not, however, work in such a complex environment where coordination is best described as coordination of not only one network, but rather “a web of networks.” See Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations (New York: International Peace Institute and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009), p. 6; Herrhausen, Organizing Peacebuilding; and the detailed recommendations in Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: A Report on Findings and Recommendations (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2008). See also Manuel Fröhlich, “Keeping Track of UN Peacekeeping: Suez, Srebrenica, Rwanda and the Brahimi Report,” in Jochen A. Frowein and Rüdiger Wolfrum, eds., Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 5 (2001) (Heidelburg, Germany), pp. 185−248. 93. See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, p. 38; Schori, “Leadership on the Line”; and Power, Chasing the Flame, p. 268. 94. Alain LeRoy, quoted in Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations (New York: International Peace Institute and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009), p. 17. 95. Power, Chasing the Flame, p. 268. 96. Ibid., p. 156. 97. Whitfield, “Groups of Friends”; Whitfield, Friends Indeed, pp. 51−78. 98. Whitfield, Friends Indeed, p. 75. 99. Alvaro de Soto, “Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 367. 100. Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” p. 333. 101. Manuel Fröhlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations, pp. 132−148. 102. Christoph Sperfeldt, “Peacemakers and Peacebuilders in Cambodia: The Role of Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General Between 1979 and 2008,” case study prepared for a research project, “Project Peacemaker: The Role of SRSGs,” Department of Political Science, Jena University, Jena, Germany, 2008; Rafeeuddin Ahmed, “The UN’s Role in Bringing About Peace in Cambodia,” in Nassrine Azimi, ed., The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 77. 103. Brahimi and Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace, p. 4. 104. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, par. 64. 105. Jan Pronk, “Statement on the Sudan and Darfur in the UN Security Coun-

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cil,” October 26, 2006, www.janpronk.nl/speeches/english/statement-on-sudan-and -darfur-to-the-un-security-council-october-2006.html. 106. Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” p. 330. 107. Alvaro de Soto, “End of Mission Report,” May 2007, pp. 43, 50, http://www.miftah.org/Doc/Reports/2007/DeSotoReport.pdf. 108. Steve Bloomfield, “Sudan Expels UN Envoy over Darfur Military Losses,” The Independent, October 23, 2006. 109. Jan Pronk, weblog of November 27, 2006, www.janpronk.nl/weblog/english /november-2006.html#b290. 110. Vance and Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace, p. 4. 111. UN, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, p. 15. 112. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 914. See also Susan Park, “Theorizing Norm Diffusion within International Organizations,” International Politics 43, no. 3 (2006): 342. 113. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 910. 114. Power, Chasing the Flame, p. 261; in a similar way, see also Peck, “The Role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in Conflict Prevention,” p. 226. 115. Power, Chasing the Flame, p. 261. 116. Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. and What the US Can Do About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 117−133. 117. UN, “Secretary-General, in Message to Special Representatives, Envoys, Stresses Importance of Integrated, Effective Responses to Demands in Field,” UN Doc. SG/SM/9536, October 13, 2004. 118. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” p. 83. See also Whitfield, Friends Indeed, p. 87.

15 Role Models of Leadership in Peace Operations: Lessons from Kosovo Frederik Trettin

THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (SRSGS)

have been an instrument of the United Nations since the early days of the organization, but their relevance and range of tasks have grown considerably over the past three decades (see Chapter 14 by Manuel Fröhlich in this volume). The number of these actors has increased from four in 1980 to more than sixty in 2010, and today, their tasks and functions no longer merely include mediation efforts between conflict parties.1 Some of these high-level appointees, for example, have been assigned to raise awareness for such issues as children in armed conflict or to develop policies to address specific problems such as the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, with the increase in the number of UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War, SRSGs have become an especially important instrument in the area of peace and security.2 SRSGs have been deployed as heads of complex peace operations with increasing frequency and, as such, they need to meet various demands and are faced with many challenges. In this chapter, I focus solely on the nonthematic SRSGs who head a UN peace operation. Like the Secretary-General, who finds himself caught in the dilemma of whether to be more secretary or more general (see Chapter 13 by Simon Chesterman and Thomas M. Franck in this volume), SRSGs are situated between the poles of politics and administration. On the one hand, they need to facilitate and negotiate complex peace processes and, sometimes, exercise extensive authority and perform governmental functions while heading a UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) or UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). On the other hand, they are the head of mission and, as such, need to manage large and administratively 331

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complex peace operations. As in the case of the largest UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)—now the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)—these missions can include an overall staff of more than 18,000 military and civilian personnel. Part of the SRSG’s job is to guarantee that even such sizable missions run smoothly and that the various components of the mission act in concert. Given the multitude of responsibilities and the complexity of the job, it is unlikely that all of these demands on the SRGS’s leadership position can be met by a single individual. Otherwise, the SRSG must be able “to walk on water, swim with piranha fish, and fly with angels” as Derek Boothby ironically describes the qualities of an ideal SRSG.3 Therefore, the following questions arise: What roles do SRSGs effectively perform? Which roles do they delegate to other senior leadership positions? And do the different roles and their actual realization influence the success or failure of an SRSG? Of particular importance is the last question since SRSGs are regarded as a group of powerful “individuals within the UN system [who] can exercise significant influence.”4 It seems only logical, given the wide-ranging responsibilities and competencies that the position of the SRSG entails, that the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations noted: “Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes. That is, the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.”5 Secretary-General Kofi Annan also acknowledged that “individuals matter, and the success or failure of UN missions can rest on SRSG’s performance.”6 Despite these findings, SRSGs have received astonishingly little academic attention. For a long time, the actual work of international bureaucracies like the United Nations has been neglected by the scholarly world, and political scientists have paid little attention to the phenomenon of personality and leadership in political and administrative institutions.7 Therefore, some scholars have called for a new research agenda because a “better understanding of leadership and the characteristics of bureaucratic actors in general will greatly add to our understanding of organizational outcomes.”8 In this chapter I seek to contribute to this new research agenda. After a brief overview of the current state of research, I present an analytical framework that has been developed to systematically examine and compare the role of SRSGs; this framework is derived from normative role descriptions and definitions as articulated in UN doctrines and reports. Then, in line with the idea of structured, focused comparison, 9 I use the analytical framework to compare the tenures of two consecutive SRSGs of UNMIK, Hans Haekkerup and Michael Steiner.

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An Academic Mystery There is considerable literature focusing on the dimensions that determine the success or failure of peacekeeping operations or peacebuilding efforts. Besides the general academic discussion of how to assess success,10 most studies focus on factors external to a mission; for example, the robustness of a mandate11 or the involvement of a major power.12 Although a few studies have focused on local factors, such as the influence of spoilers on peace processes13 or the possibility of exerting pressure on the parties to a conflict,14 potential determinants inside a mission have not been addressed. Despite the fact that there are clear hints that internal factors like leadership matter,15 there is a lack of studies that focus on the determinants for the success or failure within the organizational structures of a mission, especially its management. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis conducted a largescale comparative study of successes and failures in peacebuilding in UN peace operations.16 Although their peacebuilding triangle provides a structural explanation and explains about 75 percent of the examined successes and failures, it fails 25 percent of the time. They argue that the factor not predicted by their analysis “is a product of differences of leadership and of strategy at the tactical level.”17 The scholarly debate provides only a few systematic studies that analyze mission leadership as a determinant of success for peace operations and, in this context, little scholarly attention has been given to the specific role of SRSGs.18 Only recently have studies paid attention to the role of SRSGs, but this research is limited solely to their mediation efforts.19 In reviewing the academic literature, it is striking that no systematic study or theoretical framework exists that analyzes and compares the leadership of SRSGs in UN peace operations. Indeed, many authors discuss the importance of the role and personality of SRSGs,20 but their insights are mainly based on narratives or they only incidentally compare the leadership performance of SRSGs.21 With respect to the role that SRSGs should fulfill, most reports and studies are merely limited to normative descriptions of role models or job profiles. One study did analyze the role patterns of two SRSGs in Liberia and “found that significant responsibility for role fulfillment is delegated to staff of the senior management team,” and that the “results furthermore underline the proposition of a ‘manager-diplomat’ distinction in SRSG leadership” indicating that SRSGs delegate internal mission management to his or her deputies.22 In conclusion, most scholars examine factors external to the UN system to explain the successes or failures of peace operations and do not view peace operations as organizations per se. Thus, organizational studies that analyze the internal management of peace operations are, for the most part, missing. A statement made by Donald J. Puchala in 1993 remains

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valid today: “The phenomenon of special representation on behalf of the Secretary-General remains an academic mystery.”23

Expected Roles and Leadership: Role Theory A detailed empirical review of peace operations discovered “that the role of and personality of the SRSG have invariably had a critical influence on the direction and evolution of the mission” (emphasis added).24 Therefore, in this chapter I assume that the leadership behavior of an SRSG is not only influenced by his or her personality, but also by the particular organizational context. Based on the concept of role theory, a role is defined as the sum of normative behavioral expectations on the holder of a position whereas “role expectations are the manager’s perception of how other people such as superiors, peers, and subordinates want the managerial role to be carried out.”25 Using role theory as a theoretical underpinning for this analysis is reasonable, as it combines a psychological and organizational perspective. It suggests that the performance of leaders is a function of the individuals’ personality and their perception of their role in the organization,26 consistent with the findings mentioned earlier. For example, Gary A. Yukl presents a model of situational determinants of leadership behavior based on role theory concepts. According to his model, a leader’s behavior is influenced by his or her personal characteristics and perceived role requirements. These requirements are influenced by organizations by means of the role expectations communicated via written job descriptions or, orally, from superiors. Furthermore, concerning the position and personalities of SRSGs, there are many normative descriptions and expectations that make it possible to determine the various roles that SRSGs are expected to fulfill. Hence, it is suitable and obvious to draw on those approaches that take this into account and that view leadership in terms of roles and expectations as developed by the leaders themselves as well as by the organizational context. Finally, in comparison to the large number of leadership approaches that lack empirical validation, role theory has an advantage in that it “is most firmly buttressed by research findings.”27

What Is Expected of an SRSG? A survey of the existing literature reveals a certain set of characteristics and role models that analysts claim to be important for an SRSG. United Nations peace operations, “by their very nature as internationally created and multi-organizationally implemented arrangements . . . are facing a

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series of political and managerial challenges.”28 Accordingly, Cyrus Vance and David A. Hamburg diagnose that “the requirements of SRSGs . . . include a host of difficult management and operational responsibilities.”29 They argue that SRSGs have “to assume large, difficult, and highly visible responsibilities that require management as well as diplomatic skills.”30 Hence, an SRSG should perform, at least, two different roles. On the one hand, he or she should act as a diplomat; for example, when leading a peace process. On the other hand, as the head of a mission, he or she should act as a manager, effectively administrating the mission. Since the SRSG executes the authority of the Secretary-General in the field, it is worthwhile to see how the Secretary-General describes the role of his surrogates in the field. In 1998, Secretary-General Annan outlined four attributes that he expected from SRSGs: “First, SRSGs must be effective diplomats. . . . Secondly, . . . practical but also visionary managers. . . . Thirdly, . . . [an] effective communicator. . . . Finally, . . . an SRSG speaks for the highest ideal of the international community.”31 In his remarks to a seminar for special representatives in 2001, he reiterated his views concerning the role of SRSGs as follows: First you are, in a very real sense, the personification of the United Nations in the country or region in which you serve. Second, you are leaders of a peace process, the international community’s link and main interlocutor with the parties. Third, you are the head of a peacekeeping operation or a political or a peacebuilding mission, in which management is a key requirement. And fourth, I count on many of you to be the unifying force of all United Nations activity in the field—the political leader of the United Nations team in the country or region where you serve.32

In sum, these attributes suggest the following roles for the SRSG: a diplomatic and political role as the leader of a peace process and as the representative of the Secretary-General in the field; a managerial role as the head of a mission; and a communicative role as a conveyor of the goals and ideals of the UN system to a wide range of external actors. The Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations identifies four different responsibilities and roles of an SRSG: 1. Facilitator: the SRSG contributes to the interpretation and implementation of the mandate and is the main interlocutor for the parties to the conflict. 2. Head of UN presence: as the representative of the Secretary-General, the SRSG is the highest-ranking official of the UN in the field. In this capacity, the SRSG establishes the political framework and

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provides leadership to the UN system on the ground, ensuring coordination of all activities. 3. Head of mission: the SRSG manages the mission and provides guidance to all components while setting the operational direction. He or she is responsible and accountable for the budget and allocation of resources, security, and safety of personnel as well as good order and discipline. 4. Interim or transitional administrator: when the UN governs areas under a transitional administration mandate, the SRSG exercises wide-ranging governmental functions, including managing the local assets or running governmental entities.33 Although these descriptions do not match precisely, they suggest two main roles for an SRSG: “[He or she] must be part diplomat and part manager. He or she must be capable of negotiating between the parties and the members of the international community, as well as managing a mission whose functions are directly related to the progress of the peace process on the ground.” 34 Although this dichotomy is reminiscent of the classic debate over task sharing in public administration—Max Weber’s distinction between politicians and administrators—according to normative descriptions, an SRSG must perform both roles equally. 35 Manuel Fröhlich argues that these different aspects of an SRSG duties can best be described as a “variously shaped communication process.” 36 Indeed, the reports and doctrines that I reviewed consistently stress the importance of communication with many different actors; for example, the members of the UN Security Council, the international community, regional organizations, local actors, and nongovernmental organizations as well as the population of the mission area. Based on the assumption that “peace operations are institutional networks of regularly interacting organizations and organizational units,” 37 which require coordination, it is obvious that communication is important. Although one might argue that the communicative role is already inherent in the political one, in this chapter I assert an additional discrete role as communicator for the following reasons: on the one hand, this role is explicitly mentioned in UN documentation;38 on the other hand, the recurrent emphasis on communication issues justifies a separate role. Additionally, other more indistinct task descriptions, such as personification of the United Nations and representing the ideals of the organization, can very well be subsumed under the communicative role making the SRSG a spokesperson of the UN and the international community. Based on the analysis of publicly available descriptions of an SRSG’s position and functions, the following three roles can be emphasized: diplomat/politician, manager, and communicator.

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The SRSG as Diplomat/Politician, Manager, and Communicator The SRSG job descriptions that I reviewed do not explicitly draw a clear distinction between the SRSG as a diplomat versus politician. For example, the Fafo report states that the SRSG should partly act as a diplomat, but refers in a subsequent description of this role to an “SRSG’s political functions.”39 Given these blurred normative expectations, it is assumed that in the context of peace operations, the diplomatic and political functions of the SRSG overlap and cannot be differentiated from each other. Depending on the specific context of a mission, one role might become more important as compared to the other. For example, in peace operations mandated as interim administrations, SRSGs exercise extensive governmental functions and, thus, the “political role of the SRSGs becomes more prominent as she or he becomes a political advocate in and for the area.”40 Generally, as diplomat/politician, the most important task is to organize the peace process, to offer political guidance, and to establish a precise political framework for the mission derived from the often intentionally ambiguous mandate provided by the Security Council. As a manager, the SRSG is expected to guarantee the smooth and effective operation of a mission. This requires the political goals of the mandate to be translated into concrete operative tasks and strategic overarching goals for a mission. Because complex peace operations involve a multitude of actors, the coordination and guidance of their different efforts is important to avoid duplication or adverse effects. Furthermore, as head of mission, the SRSG’s responsibilities include, inter alia, the effective management of available resources, the safety of mission personnel, and the maintenance of discipline and morale.41 As the highest-ranking representative of the United Nations in the field, the SRSG serves as a spokesperson of the organization and is moved into the spotlight of public interest. He or she represents the various objectives of the mission mandate to the actors involved including the broader international community, to maintain the interest and commitment of the member states providing financial and material resources. To ensure unity of effort, the mission’s objectives should be communicated to all partners in the field as well as to the local population to gain their support. This can be carried out through press releases, public statements, or direct dialogue.

Considerations Regarding the Success of SRSGs Before evaluating the success of SRSGs, one should clarify what effective leadership means. Similar to definitions of leadership (see Chapter 12 by

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Sabine Boerner in this volume), one will not find an ultimate conception of leadership effectiveness42 since astonishingly little attention has been paid to the final product of leadership: leadership success. Applying what Oswald Neuberger describes as a “quodlibet strategy” (whatever you like), many different conceptual frameworks and indicators have been used to measure leadership effectiveness.43 Nevertheless, some considerations concerning the success of SRSGs can be offered. First, the point of reference should be determined. Is the personal success of the SRSG being referred to (e.g., his or her reappointment) or is the benchmark the overall success of the mission? Indeed, a reappointment might be a reliable indicator of a successful SRSG, since it can be inferred that his or her superiors were satisfied with the performance; otherwise, they may not reappoint the same person. Although reappointment might be a good indicator of success, some SRSGs may be reappointed for reasons unrelated to their performance; for example, powerful member states may exert pressure on the Secretary-General to reappoint a particular individual. Some SRSGs have declined a reappointment for personal reasons such as health or family matters. Second, it may not always be accurate to attribute the success or failure of a mission to the leadership ability of an SRSG. On the one hand, it is questionable how, for example, the successful implementation of a mandate can be directly related to the leadership of an SRSG since there exist various factors that influence a mission’s success. On the other hand, a mission can be doomed to fail from the beginning due to a lack of resources provided by member states, a highly ambiguous mandate, or the absence of a peace to keep. Consequently, it is difficult to directly link the failure of a mission to the quality of SRSG leadership. Due to a lack of reliable and objective indicators to assess the success of an SRSG, often the determination as to whether an SRSG was successful or not remains quite subjective. Frequently, an SRSG is described as exceptionally successful or that he or she was more successful as compared to his or her predecessor. Indeed, this is not a satisfactory indicator but, as a start, the assessment of experts and peers seems to be a pragmatic workaround. According to role theory, leadership success is defined as the greatest possible congruence between the expectations towards a leadership position and their realization. As mentioned earlier, given the numerous responsibilities, it is unlikely that an SRSG can fully perform all roles and, hence, he or she may delegate certain tasks to his or her deputy. The functionalistic approach of role theory takes this assumption into account as it focuses not on the individual person, but on the superordinate system. Therefore, it does not matter who performs a function. It is more essential that the function is performed. 44 See Figure 15.1 for further details.

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Research Design and Case Selection Given the lack of quantitative indicators, the comparative case study method that I applied in this chapter is based on John Stuart Mill’s method of difference. My main purpose is to generate initial hypotheses on the role of SRSGs in peace operations. Based on the criteria described earlier, I systematically compared the tenures of SRSGs Haekkerup and Steiner, two former heads of UNMIK. Both SRSGs were confronted with the same conflict, the same mission structure, and the same tasks. The communicational pattern of SRSGs is an important variable to be examined as well as a mission’s Department of Public Information, which plays a crucial role in advising an SRSG on public affairs. Therefore, a comparison of SRSGs Haekkerup and Steiner is particularly suitable, given that UNMIK’s Department of Public Information was headed, for the most part, by the same person during their tenures. Susan Manuel was the mission’s spokesperson from June 1999 through December 2002. Finally, both SRSGs have similar professional backgrounds and were posted to UNMIK during the same phase of the mandate implementation.45 Despite these similarities, the dependent variable—the success of an SRSG—varied significantly. Several experts, independent of one another other, described Steiner as much more successful than Haekkerup.46 With regard to the latter, former staff members of the mission described Haekkerup as a disaster,47 adding that appointing him was quickly regarded as a major mistake.48

The Context: The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Before turning to an analysis of Haekkerup’s and Steiner’s role performances, it is important to recall the context and the specific role of the Figure 15.1 Model of Role Performance and Success of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs)

Independent variables

Dependent variable

Politician Success or failure of SRSG

Manager Communicator

Contextual factors

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SRSG in Kosovo. The mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999, and authorized the Secretary-General to: Establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.49

To “ensure that all activities of the international community will be carried out in an integrated manner with a clear chain of command,”50 an SRSG, at the rank of under-secretary-general, was appointed with the “overall authority to manage the Mission and to coordinate the activities of all United Nations agencies and other international organizations operation as part of UNMIK.”51 Moreover, the SRSG was “responsible for facilitating a political process designed to determine the future political status of Kosovo.” With regard to the administration of Kosovo, legislative and executive authority, including the administration of the judiciary, was given to the SRSG. A list of the former SRSGs of UNMIK can be found in Table 15.1.

SRSG Hans Haekkerup The former longtime Danish minister of defense, Haekkerup, was appointed SRSG in Kosovo on December 8, 2000, succeeding Bernard Kouchner as head of UNMIK. His priorities included “the establishment of a legal framework for provisional self-government; the development of an effective law enforcement and judicial system; economic reconstruction; and the

Table 15.1 SRSGs of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 1999−2016 SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil) Bernard Kouchner (France) Hans Haekkerup (Denmark) Michael Steiner (Germany) Harri Holkeri (Finland) Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) Joachim Rücker (Germany) Lamberto Zannier (Italy) Farid Zarif (Afghanistan)a

Term June 1999 (interim) July 1999−January 2001 February 2001−December 2001 January 2002−July 2003 August 2003−June 2004 July 2004−June 2006 September 2006−June 2008 June 2008−July 2011 August 2011−2016

Source: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, “Former SRSG’s,” www.unmik online.org/srsg/former.htm. Note: a. Acting representative.

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establishment of regular dialogue with the [former Republic of Yugoslavia] FRY and Serbia.”52 He unexpectedly resigned on December 28, 2001, despite the fact that he was supposed to stay for two years.53 SRSG Haekkerup as Politician Haekkerup’s arrival brought a new impetus to the implementation of the UN’s mandate to establish substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, which had stagnated after the local elections in October 2000. For that purpose, the plan was to work out a so-called Constitutional Framework for a provisional self-government and to provide the legal and political basis for the establishment of self-government and new local political institutions. Haekkerup quickly managed to broker an agreement among the quarreling political parties and, consequently, the Constitutional Framework on Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo was signed on May 15, 2001, with general elections for the Assembly scheduled to take place on November 17, 2001.54 Just a few weeks after his arrival in Kosovo, between February 23 and 26, 2001, SRSG Haekkerup undertook his first international tour to meet with important regional actors such as the European Union’s General Affairs Council and the North Atlantic Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels.55 During his term as SRSG, Haekkerup kept in constant contact with the US and European allies and met, inter alia, with US president George W. Bush to ask for additional support to train the police and judiciary in Kosovo.56 His rally for support included frequent personal briefings to the members of the Security Council in New York.57 SRSG Haekkerup attached considerable importance to improving the mission’s contact and relations with the Yugoslav government and described an improvement in the relations between Pristina and Belgrade as an essential element of UNMIK’s strategy. Therefore, he repeatedly met with high-ranking representatives from Belgrade as well as with the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The intense negotiations between the deputy prime minister of the Republic of Serbia, Nebojša Čović, and Haekkerup led to a significant betterment in the relations between UNMIK and Belgrade. These negotiations culminated in the socalled Haekkerup-Čovi agreement that, inter alia, identified areas for future cooperation and collaboration.58 SRSG Haekkerup as Manager To improve the efficiency of law enforcement and the judicial system, Haekkerup adjusted UNMIK’s organizational pillar structure. In May 2001, the police and justice sectors were transferred from the civil administration

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pillar to a separate pillar. The new police and justice pillar was temporarily headed by the principal deputy SRSG.59 My interviews with former UNMIK senior staff members confirmed that the daily micromanagement was delegated to the management team of the mission.60 Nevertheless, as the restructuring of the pillar structure indicates, the macromanagement of the mission remained in the hands of the SRSG. SRSG Haekkerup as Communicator In comparison to his lively and popular predecessor, Kouchner, The Economist wrote on the occasion of Haekkerup’s assumption of office that “the contrast could hardly be sharper. . . . Hans Haekkerup . . . is a quieter, cannier steadier sort of fellow.”61 In his detailed evaluation of UNMIK’s first years, Thomas Mühlmann describes Haekkerup as stiff and unapproachable, noting that the SRSG brought his own confidants into the mission who shielded the SRSG and, thus, kept information within an inner circle.62 Haekkerup was not accessible to the staff and virtually practiced a closeddoor policy. Moreover, during internal meetings and briefing sessions, he spoke exclusively in Danish, which was understood by his inner circle of staff members only, leaving the rest of the team in the dark about what was discussed.63 Hence, internal communication deteriorated significantly and staff members were left uninformed regarding the direction in which the mission was headed. Consequently, this headstrong way of communicating quickly led to a deteriorating work environment within the mission. Not only did the internal flow of communication deteriorate, but communication with important partners of the mission, such as the military, also worsened. Mühlmann reports that the relationship between the commander of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops and Haekkerup noticeably cooled when Haekkerup took over the mission’s leadership.64 A former UNMIK official concluded that Haekkerup’s team was only brilliant in requesting reports on short notice and they never let anyone know what happened with these documents.65 Reviewing the available press releases and transcripts from UNMIK press conferences, I found it striking that Haekkerup rarely tried to be in contact with the local population or to travel throughout Kosovo. Former UNMIK staff members confirmed this observation and described him as unwilling to get to know the country and its people, as he apparently felt uncomfortable in the presence of the local population.66 His noncommunicative personality influenced his understanding of public relations and he, consequently, regarded communication and interaction as negligible and unimportant factors. At the beginning of Haekkerup’s tenure, UNMIK’s Division of Public Information tried, unsuccessfully, to bring the new SRSG into the field to tour the enclaves and to meet with the minorities and the Albanian population, but he showed little interest.67 On the rare occa-

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sion when Haekkerup left his office, he did so surrounded by heavily armed bodyguards, thus blocking him off from the people.68

SRSG Michael Steiner Steiner, a high-ranking German diplomat who succeeded Haekkerup, was appointed the SRSG in Kosovo in January 2002 and assumed his office in mid-February 2002. He was posted to Kosovo for eighteen months before becoming the permanent representative of Germany to the UN office at Geneva.69 Unlike Haekkerup, Steiner had previous experience in the Balkans since he had served, inter alia, as the principal deputy high representative in Sarajevo from 1996 to 1997. In this capacity, he became so popular that people demonstrated on the streets and collected signatures for Steiner’s return after he had departed.70 During his tenure as SRSG in Kosovo, his main priorities included law enforcement, institution building, providing a safe environment for repatriates, and economic reconstruction.71 SRSG Steiner as Politician In his first month as SRSG, Steiner managed to break the political deadlock that occurred after the first general elections in November 2001. He facilitated a crucial agreement between the main Kosovo Albanian parties concerning a government and president for Kosovo.72 This agreement was another important step toward building institutions for self-government in Kosovo and for the subsequent transfer of authority from UNMIK to these new institutions. Moreover, concerning UNMIK’s role in the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status as stipulated by paragraph 11e of Security Council Resolution 1244, Steiner developed the so-called standard before status strategy. This concept became the core of Steiner’s political agenda and defined eight benchmarks that had to be met before negotiations for the final status could commence. To efficiently integrate and facilitate the return of Kosovo Serbs, Steiner presented a Concept Paper in May 2002 on the “Right to Sustainable Return.” It laid out the basic principles to guide the return of displaced persons and refugees to Kosovo and called for a “unified mission-wide approach . . . to achieve breakthroughs in minority returns during the summer and autumn of 2002, to effect a change in climate and to build momentum for more significant numbers of returns during 2003 and 2004.”73 Also in his first weeks as SRSG, Steiner traveled to Brussels, Berlin, Washington, DC, London, and Moscow to meet with important partners from the international community as he “lobbied for Kosovo.”74 He did this repeatedly during his term as SRSG.75 Furthermore, he reported directly to the Security Council to request continuing support for UNMIK.76

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SRSG Steiner as Manager In an interview with me, Steiner himself confirmed that the bulk of management and daily administration of the mission was conducted by his chief of staff.77 Given the mission’s size, it was essential that the chief of staff and the principal deputy SRSG handle many of the management tasks and, therefore, the role of the manager was in fact delegated. SRSG Steiner as Communicator Reviewing the press releases from Steiner’s tenure, I found it striking that he traveled quite often throughout Kosovo and tried to be in contact with the local population.78 Steiner confirmed that he traveled to the various villages and cities of Kosovo, and visited schools or farmers’ markets to engage with the local population.79 Furthermore, Steiner showed no fear of this contact and regularly made use of the media;80 for example, speaking to the public at the University in Pristina to explain UNMIK’s ideas for economic reconstruction.81 Shortly after he arrived in Kosovo, he personally addressed the population via radio and explained his priorities and ideas for the reconstruction of Kosovo; he did this again a year later in 2003.82 In these New Year speeches, he not only presented the priorities for the coming year, but also advocated for the achievements of UNMIK as well as his own accomplishments. He presented facts to strongly argue against the socalled Kosovo blame game; that is, “we haven’t got the competences, we can’t do anything, or it’s the international community’s fault.”83 In addition to directly addressing the population, he routinely held press conferences where he personally explained UNMIK’s course of action. The communication within UNMIK as well as among the other international partners improved considerably under Steiner’s leadership. For instance, he invited KFOR officers to the mission’s daily briefings.84 In general, Steiner tried to integrate more people into the daily briefings and invited the various local administrators and representatives of ministries as necessary.85 A report of the International Crisis Group concurred, noting that Steiner “dedicated much of his attention and energy to ensure that UNMIK, and especially its SRSG, were in the spotlight.”86

Steiner and Haekkerup in Comparison In comparison, my empirical analysis of the roles actually performed by both SRSGs shows the following conclusions. Based on the active political initiatives of Haekkerup, and according to the operationalization of the role of politician for SRSGs, one can contend that he realized this role suffi-

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ciently. This is well justified by his active endeavors to reconcile the conflict parties and to press ahead with implementing important political projects as identified in the mandate of the mission such as the Constitutional Framework, the Kosovo-wide elections in November 2001, and the creation of the framework for the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). Based on the same indicators, one can conclude that Steiner skillfully performed the political role. With his standard before status strategy, Steiner clearly managed to transform the vague objectives of Security Council Resolution 1244 into a more precise political strategy and work plan. Moreover, from the beginning, he actively tried to sustain the interest of the international community in Kosovo and to initiate a reconciliation process between the former conflicting parties. In summary, it can be stated that both SRSGs effectively performed their political role. Concerning their role performance as a manager, both Haekkerup and Steiner delegated most of the managerial tasks to their deputies or chiefs of staff. Nevertheless, like a chief executive officer, they retained macromanagement control as Haekkerup’s restructuring of the mission’s pillars or Steiner’s personal statements show. This delegation of managerial tasks is well in line with the administrations of other SRSGs.87 The biggest difference between the two SRSGs is found in their performance of the communicative role. As the analysis showed, under Haekkerup’s leadership not only did the communication within the mission deteriorate, but the interactions with external partners, such as KFOR, also suffered. Taking a closer look at the UNMIK press releases during Haekkerup’s eleven-month period in office, there is only one reported visit within Kosovo. This lack of effective communication with important stakeholders and his reluctance to engage with the local population is also confirmed by former UNMIK staff members. Therefore, Haekkerup did not sufficiently realize the role of the communicator, and the reported dissatisfaction of UNMIK staff underlines the fact that the delegation of communicative tasks did not take place. In contrast to his predecessor, SRSG Steiner showed no fear of contact and, additionally, made regular use of the media to explain UNMIK’s mission and policies to a wider audience. Analyzing UNMIK’s press releases for Steiner’s eighteen-month presence in Kosovo, the especially high number of twenty-nine reported local visits within Kosovo is striking. His explicit will to engage as much as possible with the local population not only was confirmed by SRSG Steiner himself, but also by a former UNMIK spokesperson.88 Furthermore, compared to Haekkerup, the communication within UNMIK as well as among the other international organizations improved considerably under Steiner’s leadership. For example, as mentioned above Steiner invited KFOR officers to the daily briefings, which had not been the case under Haekkerup’s leadership. SRSG Steiner thus fully realized the communicative role, both internally and externally.

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In conclusion, a direct comparison of the performed roles between SRSGs Haekkerup and Steiner shows that both representatives realized the role of the politician, but mainly delegated their managerial role. Only the role performance of the communicator differs significantly between Haekkerup and Steiner. Haekkerup performed this role to a much lesser degree, whereas Steiner was quite effective and his tenure is characterized by an active communication with various actors. The result of the comparison is illustrated as in Table 15.2.

Conclusion As I mentioned in the introduction, “individuals matter, and the success or failure of UN missions can rest on an SRSG’s performance.”89 Consequently, the Fafo report brought the individual back into the focus of analysis on potential factors contributing to the success or failure of UN peace operations. My main objectives in this chapter were to develop an analytical framework based on the normative role expectations for the position of the SRSG, to empirically check these targets against actually performed roles, and, subsequently, to draw initial conclusions about the relationship to the degree of success of an SRSG. By doing so, this chapter not only broadens the research agenda which, to date, mainly concentrates on macro-level variables, but it also addresses an “academic mystery”; namely, the special representatives of the Secretary-General. Assuming that a peace process is primarily a political process, it is not surprising that the analysis of the actually realized roles showed that SRSGs Haekkerup and Steiner delegated their managerial role and mainly concentrated on their political role. Moreover, the normative descriptions that I outlined in this chapter indicate a balance between the managerial and political role of SRSGs. In light of these results, this balance should be questioned unless the description of the managerial role solely focuses on the macromanagement of a mission. Therefore, one can hypothesize that the performance of the political role is a necessary condition for a successful SRSG or, as a former SRSG quite clearly described it, “You can’t use a Table 15.2 A Comparison of the Role Performance of SRSGs Hans Haekkerup and Michael Steiner Independent Variables Politician

Manager

SRSG Haekkerup Effectively performed

Delegated

SRSG Steiner

Delegated

Effectively performed

Dependent Variable Communicator

Degree of Success

Not sufficiently performed Less successful Sufficiently performed

More successful

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bureaucrat—no way! A bureaucrat would make a mess, because he doesn’t understand the political issues and he has a tendency to build up some kind of strong protection with a mountain of paper, asking instructions for everything he does.”90 Furthermore, these results show that it is a worthwhile exercise to compare theory and practice since the expected roles for an ideal type SRSG do not necessarily match with their actual performance. The direct comparison of the tenures of SRSG Haekkerup and SRSG Steiner showed that the only significant variance in their role performance was found in the communicative role. It should be mentioned, before interpreting this result, that both SRSGs headed an interim administration and their position was granted extensive authority and responsibilities. Therefore, the SRSGs were the central public figures and represented the international community and, to a certain extent, the government of Kosovo. All powers became manifest in the person of the SRSG and, thus, his communication pattern toward the local population considerably enhanced or diminished the credibility and acceptance of the mission. Simon Chesterman notes regarding the interim administration in Kosovo that “more important than the benevolence of intention is the acceptance of the subject population that power is being exercised for ends that are both clear and achievable.”91 This can be achieved only by a sufficient realization of the communication role by the SRSG. The comparison indicates that the degree to which the role as communicator was performed was, indeed, a relevant variable for the degree of success. Moreover, my findings support the argument that the performance of the important functions of the SRSG can best be described as a “variously shaped communication process.”92 In conclusion, sufficient internal and external communication by the SRSG is an important prerequisite for the successful leadership of a UN peace operation, especially with regard to interim administrations. Finally, a number of caveats should be noted regarding my findings in this chapter. First, one should be cautious when interpreting the results concerning the importance of the communicative role of the SRSG. A deterministic relationship between the performance of the SRSG as communicator and the degree of success should not be assumed. Concerning the analyses of leadership success in UN peace operations, the respective contextual factors—the intensity of the conflict, the availability of resources in terms of troops and money, the leeway for decisionmaking, and so forth— should be taken into account. Second, due to the explorative character of this study and the small number of cases examined, one should be cautious on drawing inferences. Further research needs to be conducted, for example, comparing more SRSGs across various missions. Third, my analysis does not rely solely on written documents, but also on the assessment of perceived leadership performance by peers and subordinates through interviews. These firsthand reports of poor leadership performance should be

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interpreted with caution, as they may be biased and used to settle personal scores. Nevertheless, given the fact that SRSGs have been an academic mystery to date, the identified normative roles of SRSGs proved to be an easily applicable analytical framework to systematically analyze an SRSG’s performance; to assess the gap between expectations and reality; and to demystify the ideal type SRSG who, as described by Boothby, should be able “to walk on water, swim with piranha fish, and fly with angels.”

Notes 1. See Manuel Fröhlich, “The Peace-makers: Zur Rolle der Special Representatives des UN-Generalsekretärs,” conference paper, Länder-Tagung ÖGPW, “Politik und Persönlichkeit,” Vienna, November 30–December 2, 2006. The current list of the special and personal representatives and envoys of the UN Secretary-General is available at the UN Secretary-General’s web page, http://www.un.org/en/peace keeping/sites/srsg/table.htm 2. Connie Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,” in David M. Malone, ed., The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 325−339. 3. Derek Boothby, “The Application of Leverage in Eastern Slavonia,” in Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C.F. Daniel, eds., Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 131. 4. Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), p. 75. 5. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, p. 16. 6. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peace-building Missions, Recommendations Report of the Forum on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Shaping the UN’s Role in Peace Implementation (Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 1999), p. 29. 7. Wolfgang Seibel, “Suchen wir immer an der richtigen Stelle? Einige Bemerkungen zur politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 44, no. 2 (2003): 226. 8. Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, “International Bureaucracies: The Contours of a (Re) Emerging Research Agenda,” paper presented at the German Political Science Association (DVPW) International Relations Section Conference, Darmstadt, Germany, July 14, 2007, p. 10. 9. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 67−72. 10. See, for example, Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Duan Bratt, “Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” International Peacekeeping 3, no. 4 (1996): 64−81; Duan Bratt, “Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal Conflicts,” International Peacekeeping 4, no. 3 (1997): 45−70; and Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010). 11. See Simon Chesterman, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, External Study for the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit,

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2004, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/useofforceunpko.pdf; Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, The UN’s Role in Nation-building: From Congo to Iraq (Washington, DC: RAND, 2005). 12. Lise Morjé Howard, “UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 1 (2002): 99−132. 13. Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5−53. 14. Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C. F. Daniel, eds., Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 15. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 16. 16. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis Nicholas, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 17. Michael W. Doyle, “The John W. Holmes Lecture: Building Peace,” Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007): 3. 18. Notable exceptions are Donald J. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” in Leon Gordenker and Benjamin Rivlin, eds., The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making “The Most Impossible in the World” Possible (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 2007); Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle; Peck, “Special Representatives of the Secretary-General”; Connie Peck, “The Role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in Conflict Prevention,” in Anders Mellbourne and Peter Wallensteen, eds., Third Parties and Conflict Prevention (Uppsala, Sweden: Gidlunds Förlag, 2008); and Fröhlich, “The Peace-makers: Zur Rolle der Special Representatives des UN-Generalsekretärs,” paper prepared for the trilateral meeting of Political Science Associations, Vienna, Austria, November 30December 2, 2006, www.oegpw.at/tagung06/papers/ak6_froehlich.pdf. 19. See, for example, Cedric de Coning, “Mediation and Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in Integrated Missions,” Global Governance 16, no. 2 (2010): 281−299; Timothy D. Sisk, “The SRSGs and the Management of Civil Wars,” Global Governance 16, no. 2 (2010): 237−242; and Marie-Joelle Zahar, “SRSG Mediation in Civil Wars: Revisiting the ‘Spoiler’ Debate,” Global Governance 16, no. 2 (2010): 265−280. 20. See Boothby, “The Application of Leverage in Eastern Slavonia” pp. 117– 140; Dirk Salomons, “Probing the Successful Application of Leverage in Support for Mozambique’s Quest for Peace,” in Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C. F. Daniel, eds., Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 81−115; and Nicola Dahrendorf, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change—Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan (London: Conflict Security and Development Group, King’s College, 2003). 21. Jonathan Moore, The UN and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions (Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development, 1996). 22. Stefanie Gräber, “The Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as ‘Master Managers’: Role Patterns of Leadership in UN Peace Operations,” master’s thesis, University of Konstanz, 2008, pp. 136−137. 23. Puchala, “The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives,” p. 82.

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24. Dahrendorf, A Review of Peace Operations, p. 139. 25. Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 148−149. 26. See, for example, Theresa M. Welbourne, Diane E. Johnson, and Erez Amir, “The Role-based Performance Scale: Validity Analysis of a Theory-based Measure,” Academy of Management Journal 41, no. 5 (1998): 540−555; Rolf Wunderer, Führung und Zusammenarbeit: Eine unternehmerische Führungslehre, 4th ed. (Neuwied, Germany: Luchterhand, 2001); and Oswald Neuberger, Führen und führen lassen: Ansätze, Ergebnisse und Kritik der Führungsforschung; mit . . . zahlreichen Tabellen, 6th ed. (Stuttgart, Germany: Lucius and Lucius, 2002). 27. Bernard M. Bass, Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership Theory, Research, & Managerial Applications, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 17. 28. Wolfgang Seibel, Julian Junk, Till Blume, and Elisabeth Schöndorf, “Public Administration Meets Peacebuilding,” in Public Administration Meets Peacebuilding: Peace Operations as Political and Managerial Challenges (Konstanz, Germany: University of Konstanz, 2007), p. 3. 29. Vance and Hamburg, Pathfinders for Peace, p. 7. 30. Ibid., p. 2. 31. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 30. 32. UN, Remarks of the Secretary-General to a Seminar of Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys, UN Doc. SG/SM/7760, March 30, 2001. 33. UN, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, 2003). 34. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 13. 35. UN, “Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Representatives and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in Africa,” UN Doc. S/2002/1352, December 12, 2002. 36. Fröhlich, “The Peace-makers,” p. 10. 37. Seibel et al., “Public Administration Meets Peacebuilding,” p. 3. 38. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, pp. 13, 30; Edward Newman and Roland Rich, The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), p. 26. 39. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 26. 40. UN, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, p. 21. 41. For a more detailed description, see ibid., p. 9. 42. Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organizations, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1994), p. 5. 43. Neuberger, Führen und führen lassen, pp. 434, 436. 44. Ibid., pp. 326−327. 45. For the deployment phases of UN peacekeeping operations, see United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine). New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008, pp. 61–62. 46. Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dzihic, Die Kosovo-Bilanz scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft? (Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 2005), pp. 251−254; Newman and Rich, The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, p. 26. 47. Arad Benkö, senior political adviser to SRSGs Bernard Kouchner and Hans Haekkerup, phone interview by the author, Kostanz, Germany, March 6, 2008.

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48. Norbert Mappes-Niediek and Beqe Cufaj, “Ende eine unmöglichen Mission,” Die Zeit, August 29, 2003. 49. UN Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999), par. 10. 50. Ibid., par. 2. 51. Ibid. 52. Dahrendorf, A Review of Peace Operations, p. 139. 53. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/676, December 28, 2001. 54. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/581, SRSG Signs Constitutional Framework, May 15, 2001. 55. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/515, SRSG Hans Haekkerup addresses North Atlantic Council, February 28, 2001. 56. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/617, SRSG Hans Haekkerup meets US President Bush, July 24, 2001. 57. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/646, SRSG Briefs UN Security Council on UNMIK Progress, September 18, 2001. 58. Martin Prochazka, “Vom Krieg zur UN-Verwaltung. Kosovo 1999−2004,” in Wolfgang Petritsch and Robert Pichler, eds., Kosovo-Kosova: Der lange Weg zum Frieden (Klagenfurt, Austria: Wieser Verlag, 2004), pp. 316−320. 59. Thomas Mühlmann, “Internationale Verwaltung am Beispiel des Kosovo,” doctoral dissertation, 2004, University of Vienna, pp. 45−46. 60. Arad Benkö and Peter Schumann, former high-ranking UN officials who held various positions within the civil administration pillar of UNMIK, separate phone interview by author, Kostanz, Germany, March 31, 2008. 61. The Economist, “Hans Haekkerup: A Danish Proconsul for Kosovo,” September 16, 2000. 62. Mühlmann, “Internationale Verwaltung am Beispiel des Kosovo,” p. 55. 63. Benkö interview; Schumann interview. 64. Mühlmann, “Internationale Verwaltung am Beispiel des Kosovo,” p. 439. 65. Michael Daxner, Ohne Alternative? Mein Bericht vom Planeten Kosovo (Oldenburg, Germany: Bibliotheks und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg, 2004), p. 143. 66. Benkö interview; Schumann interview. 67. Susan Manuel, former head of UNMIK’s Division of Public Information (June 1999−December 2002) and UNMIK spokesperson (January 2001−December 2002), phone interviewed by the author, Kostanz, Germany, April 1, 2008. 68. Benkö interview. 69. UN, UN Doc. SG/A/784, January 23, 2002; UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/690, February 12, 2002. 70. Kramer and Dzihic, Die Kosovo-Bilanz scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft? p. 251. 71. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/690, February 12, 2002. 72. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/698, February 28, 2002. 73. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/738, May 21, 2002. 74. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/703, March 11, 2002. 75. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/774, July 11, 2002; UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/ PR/814, September 7, 2002; UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/865, November 6, 2002. 76. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/792, July 30, 2002. 77. Michael Steiner, former SRSG to Kosovo, phone interview by the author, Kostanz, Germany, March 17, 2008. 78. See UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/762, June 23, 2002; UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/786, July 25, 2002; UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/796, August 1, 2002; UN

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Doc. UNMIK/PR/836, September 30, 2002; and UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/949, April 18, 2003. 79. Steiner interview. 80. Schumann interview; Manuel interview. 81. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/718, April 18, 2002. 82. UN, UN.Doc. UNMIK/PR/693, February 28, 2002; UN Doc. UNMIK/PR /907, January 20, 2003. 83. UN, UN Doc. UNMIK/PR/907. 84. Christian Millotat, “Fortschritt im Kosovo,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 2 (2003): 419−428. 85. Schumann interview; Manuel interview. 86. International Crisis Group, Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, Europe Report No. 148 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 3, 2002), p. 2. 87. Pierre Schori, “Leadership on the Line: Managing Field Complexity,” in Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations (New York: International Peace Institute and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2009), p. 28. 88. Manuel interview. 89. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, Command from the Saddle, p. 29. 90. Connie Peck, On Being a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Geneva: UN Institute for Training and Research, 2006), p. 12. 91. Chesterman, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, p. 239. 92. Fröhlich, “The Peace-makers,” p. 10.

16 Linking Coordination, Learning, and Leadership Francesco Mancini and Julian Junk

IT IS A WELL-KNOWN FACT TO PRACTITIONERS AND OBSERVERS OF THE

United Nations that peacekeeping operations have continued to grow in complexity, making the very label “peacekeeping” misleading, as peace missions do much more than keeping the peace: they support political processes that aim to reach durable peace, security, and stability. This is reflected in the expanded scope of the mandates of these missions, now including mediation, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, support to the organization of elections, protection and promotion of human rights, and assistance in restoring the rule of law. With a budget over $8 billion a year, more than 90,000 troops, 13,000 police, and 16,000 civilians deployed in 16 missions, over time the organizational and management gaps have only become more evident. Structures, processes, and resources at headquarters and field levels struggle to manage bigger and more complex operations. Stovepiping still inhibits coordination, as UN departments and offices move with different agendas and paces incompatible with the needs of the operational area. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy remains “a rules-bound caste culture far removed from modern management techniques and tangled up in petty politics.”1 It is precisely this growing complexity and those gaps that call for a better understanding of management theory and practice, as well as stronger skills, in the three fundamental tasks on which this book has focused: coordination, learning, and leadership. Since 2000, when the United Nations started introducing reforms to strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain peacekeeping operations, few scholars and practitioners have focused on the contribution that the theory and practice of manage355

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ment can give to peacekeeping. In this volume, we sought to fill this literature gap with a collection of contributions by scholars of organization theory and public administration management, as well as peacekeeping practitioners, who explored the analytical potential of administrative science and organization theory for enhancing the management of UN peace operations. Before summarizing the main findings of the three sections of the book and identifying the crosscutting lessons, we focus briefly on the main constraint that all management-related recommendations for the planning and implementation of peace operations necessarily face: the dominance of politics.

The Political Nature of Peace Operations The theories and cases presented in this volume provide a solid argument for how improvements in organization and management can enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy of UN peace operations. At the same time, the analysis also sheds light on the limits imposed on effective management by the politicization of the United Nations at both the headquarters and field levels, challenging the assumption of organizational ideal types and the utility of technocratic solutions to political problems. Given the political nature of peace operations, weaknesses in coordination, learning, and leadership can only be mitigated, but not entirely eliminated, by managerial efforts. For instance, poor coordination is often the product of diverging political interests among different players within the UN system. As Asith Bhattacharjee points out in Chapter 7, the selectivity with which the UN Security Council chose to include tasks in a mission’s mandate and the absence of a logical arrangement of its elements, as well as the absence of measurement tools such as benchmarks, created the base for lack of coordination in the mission in Liberia. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is little evidence that transaction costs played any role in determining the structure and coordination mechanisms of the mission. Before the Dayton Peace Agreement, the biggest challenge for coordination surrounded the so-called dual key arrangement for joint UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approval of NATO air strikes. Subsequently, eagerness to prevent a similarly cumbersome arrangement led to a hard separation of military and civilian components of the peacekeeping mission. As a result, Michael Lipson writes in Chapter 3, post-Dayton civil-military coordination became unwieldy, posing major challenges for the success of the mission. It clearly emerges how coordinating the different organizational entities in which peace operations are structured requires both political understanding and managerial skills. Similarly, organizational learning can be nullified by preconceived political priorities while leadership can be undermined by

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diverging national interests and political disagreements in the UN Security Council. We will say more on this at the end of this concluding chapter.

Lessons from Organization and Management Theories Despite the caveats posed by the political hegemony in UN peace operations, the authors of these chapters make a solid argument on the importance of harnessing organizational and management theories to improve peace operation performance. Indeed, operating in a political environment does not imply that management becomes a marginal consideration, but quite the opposite. Precisely because political, bureaucratic, and resource constraints characterize UN peace operations, leveraging good practices in management becomes essential to achieving the goals of a mission. When the mission is less effective than it could be or needs to be, the enterprise of building a durable and stable peace will pay a price. Political contexts and politicized decisionmaking should not be excuses for bad management or poor results. In fact, applying sound management theories and practices can increase the resilience of an organization and enhance its ability to change, learn, and thrive in challenging environments. In the following, we draw together elements from each chapter and highlight the key lessons in each thematic section for peace operations’ management, before outlining a few crosscutting conclusions. Coordination The authors in Part 1 of this book sought to advance the understanding of those complex dynamics that challenge coordination of the different components of peace operations, both endogenous to the UN peace mission and the broader UN system, as well as with other external actors such as the hosting authorities and populace, regional and subregional organizations, influential governments, and civil society organizations. In Chapter 2, Anna Herrhausen reviews several organization forms and finds for several reasons that a network structure, a form of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange, is the most suitable structure for UN peace operations, in particular at the field level. First, networks are more flexible than hierarchies and, therefore, adapt better to changing operational environments and availability of resources. Second, peace operations have a double temporality nature. As Herrhausen as well as Jörg Raab and Joseph Soeters in Chapter 4 highlight, not only are peace operation mandates limited in duration, but also the participation of individuals—civilians and especially military and police—are subject to high rotation patterns. Temporary organizations tend to deal with

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four main challenges. First, time is of the essence, with a clear life cycle from the beginning to the end, rather than a continuing regeneration of cycles as in permanent organizations. Second, they generally have specific tasks carried out by temporary teams, as opposed to pursuing multiple longterm goals of permanent organizations. Third, staff of temporary organizations have secondary long-term affiliations and loyalties, which reduce their commitment to the temporary organization and can lead to additional tensions. Finally, to the extent that the temporary organization achieves its task, it has to deal with staff rotations and transition with a frequency not comparable to permanent structures. Based on this analysis, Herrhausen advances a number of suggestions to strengthen coordination in UN peace operations. First of all, she suggests measures that improve the flow of information and resources—such as standard knowledge management techniques, harmonizing information technology and human resource practices and rules, and strengthening boundary-spanning capacities—which are generally located within individuals that have a generalist knowledge of various parts of the UN and can therefore link them together.2 In other words, coordination can be enhanced by the proper use of already existing mechanisms and capacities. This militates against the UN practice of building new structures with coordination tasks, rather than creating incentives within the existing ones to work together. This is the case with the UN’s integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards (IDDRS), as Tobias Pietz illustrates in Chapter 5. While the IDDRS were considered to be a step forward toward improved coordination, the overemphasis on new concepts and modules, rather than on incentives to coordinate needs of existing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, led to a disappointing outcome. Second, Herrhausen makes suggestions to enhance network governance; that is, improving the functionality of the UN network structure. These include appointing a unique lead coordinator for the network or one for each subnetwork; fostering a common culture through joint teams, training, working groups, and coordination assessments; and restricting access, which implies that UN agencies and departments should focus on their core value added to peace operations, rather than continuously expanding the range of their activities and overlapping with the tasks of other bodies. Although a degree of redundancy, seen as excess capacity that provides options in the face of uncertainty, should be welcome in complex organizations, Herrhausen emphasizes complementarities to reduce duplications.3 Restricting network access can be achieved by limiting: (1) the types of activities that are undertaken at the same time; (2) the types of activities that a single organization undertakes in a country; or (3) the number of organizations that are operational at any given time. Donor countries can incentivize this behavior by providing a premium for joint proposals and

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interagency funds, rather than stimulating competition among different agencies over the same set of activities. However, networks are not the panacea to peace operations’ coordinating problems. Network theory, in fact, helps to identify important tensions that can undermine a network’s coordination capacity. The most relevant of these trade-offs is between efficiency and inclusiveness in decisionmaking. Networks tend to facilitate fast decisions to the detriment of inclusiveness and consensus building, which remains the dominant practice in UN peace missions to enhance legitimacy. Still, we argue that a more efficient peace mission can lead to more effective outcomes, which in turn contribute to the legitimacy of the mission, insofar as they compensate for less inclusive decisionmaking. Second, networks hardly find a balance between their inherent organizational flexibility and the need for hierarchy in UN peace operations. This implies that the flexibility of a network structure will also be muted to some extent by the rigid hierarchy of UN bureaucracy. Lipson suggests ways to overcome these tensions, drawing lessons from the peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reminding us that coordination within peace operations is always quite political, inextricably tied to the diverse interests and influence of the states and organizations involved, coordination needs to be contextual since the realities peace operations face on the ground usually escape predesigned structural templates. Political realities should influence the choice of structural design and coordination mechanisms of UN missions.4 This is confirmed in Raab and Soeters’s analysis, which claims that the right structures (coordination and governance) and management should be determined case by case. No model of coordination may be suitable in its entirety to all of the coordination challenges that arise in different peace operations. Rather, a better understanding of the theory and practical options at their disposal helps staff to know when to apply what solution. This section also sought to explore coherence, acknowledging that structural coordination is only part of the story. Coherence, as the effort to direct a wide range of activities toward common strategic objectives, has often been called for in Security Council mandates as well as in the planning and implementation of peace operations. Still, in Chapter 6 Cedric de Coning makes clear that more coherence does not automatically produce more efficient peace operations. He identifies a threshold beyond which, at first, pursuing more coherence seems to yield little additional benefit and eventually can lead to negative effects. Building on Herrhausen’s and Lipson’s chapters, de Coning argues that there are considerable limits to achievable coherence, which can be traced back to two trade-offs: first, the tension between the need to deliver both short-term outputs and long-term impact; and, second, the conflicting values, principles, and mandates among the many actors involved in building peace.

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These are limitations that need to be taken into consideration when leaders seek to achieve more coherence in a peace mission. As a possible avenue toward more coherence, Bhattacharjee suggests a threefold compact. First, he recommends an effort at the headquarters level to obtain Security Council mandates that logically set out the elements of a peace operation on the ground. Second, he suggests pursuing a systemwide compact in the field that promotes synergies and integration among the involved actors. Finally, Bhattacharjee adds a compact with the hosting state that takes into consideration national priorities and interests. Thus, peace operations should aim at being as well coordinated as they possibly can, but they need to acknowledge the challenges and even limitations on that path. Thinking in terms of network structures might help to identify some coping mechanisms that go beyond inflexible one-size-fits-all solutions. In addition, the authors in Part 1 repeatedly find that there are already a plethora of coordinating structures in place that can be reformed without adding new layers of structures, which tend to develop a bureaucratic life of their own fighting to expand their niches. To design institutions accordingly, a proper learning environment is key and the authors in Part 2 on learning also contribute to the understanding of coordination. Learning Since its establishment in 1992, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made enormous strides in organizational learning. Peacekeeping missions now have a variety of mechanisms in place to collect and share lessons while, in the New York headquarters, best practices and lessons learned are much more integrated in the strategic process than in the past. However, as the contributions in Part 2 show, real learning is much more than structures and procedures, and vast areas of improvement are still possible. In fact, power asymmetries, organizational compartmentalization, and diverse national and professional identities continue to impede an optimal learning process. To adequately support decisionmaking, lessons need to be enshrined in new routines and old habits have to be unlearned. As Ariane Berthoin Antal, Julian Junk, and Peter Schumann point out in Chapter 8, organization learning is a cognitive and behavioral process that includes acquiring, storing, sharing, interpreting, and using knowledge to adapt the organization to environmental changes. They identify those organizational and contextual characteristics that impact learning both as enablers and as barriers, including the learning leaders, the permeability of boundaries, a sense of urgency and limelight, the diversity, and the absorptive capacity of the organization. Evidence from the Sudan missions, for example, depicted the many factors that have hampered organizational learning, including the lack of incentives for individuals to act as agents of

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learning, the dependency on the mission’s leadership, and the elusiveness of training standards. Some of these impediments can be overcome with a leadership capable in steering learning processes. This remedy, however, is not sustainable institutionally and has only temporary effects linked to the personalities deployed at any given time in a mission. Learning can also foster, and be fostered by, a collective identity with shared cognitive references, values, norms, principles, and practices that help more deliberate coordination. Collective identity is the foundation for a second learning process; namely, the dynamic adaptation of collective actions to achieve the organization’s common objectives under changing environmental conditions. Collective identity leads to collective action strategies that can cope with a fluid and unstable context. The weak learning capabilities of temporary network organizations such as peace operations, however, make this learning process particularly hard to achieve, therefore constraining the ability to develop a strong collective identity and by consequence limiting its impact on coordination. Melanie Mai, Rüdiger Klimecki, and Sebastian Döring in Chapter 9 point to the connection between learning and coordination, on which we say more in the Crosscutting conclusions. Here, it suffices to mention that it is a two-way relationship. While successful organizational learning depends on a certain degree of organizational coherence, suboptimal learning processes can hamper organizational coordination. Challenges to learning are also coming from the multitude and diversity of actors involved in peace operations, as emerges from Mai, Klimecki, and Döring’s field research. To cope with these obstacles, they suggest a twofold learning process that can help establish a shared identity and enhance problem-solving capabilities. First of all, actors in peace operations should pay more attention to the interactive and communicative aspects of organizational learning, instead of focusing on its structural components and top-down processes. Second, learning should always be contextualized, and not separated from the local context in which it was generated. In addition, Mai, Klimecki, and Döring stress that an engaged and well-trained leadership could help foster collective identity development and therefore facilitate the learning process of the organization. Once headquarters’ challenges are factored in, as Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann do in Chapter 10, the presence of capable leadership with an eager interest in knowledge becomes even more relevant to promote organizational learning within and across peace missions. Because of the constellations of interests among UN member states and the diverse knowledge needs of each mission, learning processes at the headquarters level require that they be actively managed and made applicable to each specific policy context. These learning processes should be designed with a high degree of organizational open-

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ness and sufficient funding and personnel to foster a more permissive learning culture. Learning can also foster organizational change, as analyzed in Michael Bauer, Helge Jörgens, and Christoph Knill in Chapter 11. However, in international bureaucracies like the UN where the membership’s dynamics, voting rules, political leadership, and external imposition of organizational models greatly influence any reform process, learning might take a back seat. Once again, the political dynamics within and outside the UN can promote or obstruct organizational structures and learning processes more than management skills. Still, as Part 2 has shown, there is plenty of room for improvement on the managerial side ranging from strategies aimed at establishing a culture of learning by focusing on interactive, rather than topdown, processes to selecting leaders who encourage learning. Leadership Throughout Parts 1 and 2, leadership emerged as an important element that impacts both coordination and learning. Part 3 examined the mixture of entrepreneurship, personal charisma, and political guidance that form the main ingredients of effective leadership in peace operations. The dependency of a mission’s success on leadership both from the field and headquarters cannot be overstated. In Chapter 12, Sabine Boerner reviews the most popular leadership theories that analyze the dynamics between leader and followers. Transformational leadership emerges as the most promising model for peace operations, although searching for a universal leadership style would certainly be misleading. Transformational leaders succeed in motivating their followers to do their best and to perform beyond expectations, particularly when tasks are complex and environments are turbulent and insecure, thus requiring more creative solutions to the challenges at hand. Accordingly, the key leadership traits of a successful head of UN peacekeeping missions—the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)—include high personal integrity, the ability to develop personal relationships, the capacity to establish mutual trust and respect and to challenge and mentor personnel, and excellent communication skills. Manuel Fröhlich in Chapter 14 delves into the leadership of SRSGs in more detail. His analysis is supported by an original dataset that charts throughout the years a series of variables related to SRSGs, including the varieties of their tasks and mandates, their geographical origins, and their countries of deployment. It emerges that the majority of SRSGs were career diplomats in their respective foreign services, with more than a third of them having represented their country at the United Nations, and slightly less than 50 percent having worked at the UN before their appointment as

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SRSG. Three factors influence their selection: (1) the recommendation of the Secretary-General; (2) the interpersonal networks built during their previous diplomatic career; and (3) the consent of the permanent members of the Security Council, the mission’s host country, and the major troop -contributing countries. In some cases, the consent of a key regional player is also a determinant. Fröhlich’s research shows that the establishment of the post of the SRSG largely coincided with the development of the Secretary-General as a political actor. As the role of the Secretary-General’s office grew, so did the need for the delegation of the coordination and management of peace operations around the world. The leadership functions of the SRSGs reflect the multihatted role of the Secretary-General: general as head of the peacekeeping missions, political leader as chief diplomat and mediator, secular Pope in championing the UN Charter’s values and principles, and chief executive officer as manager of a complex bureaucracy. All of these roles are intertwined and complementary, and sometimes in tension with each other, but personal traits and skills can influence very different levels of performance in each one of them. Indeed, Fröhlich underscores that the SRSGs’ performance inevitably depends on personal as well as professional experience and, ultimately, on such individual assets as values, political ethics, and charisma. These conclusions are further confirmed in Chapter 15 by Frederik Trettin. He compares the tenures of two consecutive SRSGs of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), namely, Hans Haekkerup and Michael Steiner. With the support of role theory, Trettin suggests that the performance of a leader is a function of the individual’s personality and perception of his or her role in the organization. The comparison reveals that both SRSGs were able to realize the role of political leader while both delegated their managerial role. Their performance as communicators, however, differed significantly, with Steiner being much more active and effective in this regard. Caution is needed here in assuming a causal link between the performance as communicator and the degree of success of the peace operation since contextual factors such as intensity of the conflict, availability of resources, and leeway in decisionmaking should be taken into account. However, communication skills, a fundamental trait of transformational leadership, as Boerner indicates, emerge above other features of effective leadership in peace operations. Some of the tensions inherent to the multifunctional leadership in peace operations play out in the role of the Secretary-General as well, as highlighted by Simon Chesterman and Thomas M. Franck in Chapter 13, who asked whether the Secretary-General is more “secretary” or more “general.” This tension has challenged every incumbent of the post, begging the question of whether the Secretary-General should truly be consid-

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ered a leader. According to Chesterman and Franck, the Secretary-General frequently lacks sufficient internal authority to be an effective administrator of the organization while also lacking the resources to exercise his external functions with credibility. However, their analysis confirms the centrality of communication as a leadership trait. The Secretary-General’s voice can be his strongest leadership asset—though it must be used with discretion. Chesterman and Franck recommend that the word “no” be more frequently uttered by the Secretary-General and his SRSGs, in private and, when necessary, in public, because the job of these global leaders is ultimately to make it harder for the international community to make manifestly wrong decisions or to make no decision at all. This reflects what famously the Brahimi Report emphasized more than fifteen years ago when it comes to peace operations: “The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.”5 This is yet another reason that suggests communication skills are a fundamental asset for a successful peace operations manager. In sum, the theories and practices examined in this book show the multiple contributions that organization and public administration management theories can give to peace operations. The chapters on coordination confirm and supplement mainstream interpretations of managerial challenges posed by complex organizations. While nonhierarchical modes of coordination are crucial in the sphere of interorganizational networks that characterize peace operations and their environments, classic hierarchy and bureaucracy remain important, if not dominant, components. Rather than overemphasizing informal coordination in the form of networking, future reform efforts should focus on coupling the network structure of field missions with the tight chain of command and optimize hierarchical accountability. Harmonizing the use of existing policies, such as human resource practices, can do more to enhance coordination than inventing new coordinating mechanisms. Investing in boundary-spanning capacities, which are generally located within individuals that have a generalist knowledge of various parts of the UN, is another emerging recommendation to enhance coordination. Learning is a key notion shaping both the work and recent scholarly literature on UN peace operations. Triggered by the traumatic experiences of the 1990s in Rwanda, Somalia, and Srebrenica, the UN has made substantive strategic and organizational progress in organizational learning. Still, field missions are subject to learning constraints that result from power asymmetries, organizational compartmentalization, and national and professional identities. These also limit the development of collective identities, with shared cognitive references, values, norms, principles, and practices that help in both learning and coordination. Focus should be on the interactive and communicative aspects of organizational learning, rather than on

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top-down mechanisms, on the need to contextualize knowledge, and on well-trained leadership. Leadership, indeed, is more than a distinct component of management, and rather an all-encompassing activity that, among other things, includes effective coordination and successful learning. Social and political entrepreneurship, personal charisma, and political guidance—traits of transformational leadership—are among the main ingredients of effective leadership in UN peace operations. Communication skills and the use of voice emerge above the mix of skills of a successful leader. Yet the authors in Part 3 stop short of suggesting one universal leadership style for peace missions, as changing political circumstances may require the adoption of different approaches.

Crosscutting Conclusions Taken as a whole, these contributions lead to three broad conclusions that, together with the recommendations summarized above, can help inform future efforts to enhance the organization and managerial skills of UN peace operations. These conclusions can be recapped in the following statements: • The joint analysis of theories of organizational coordination, learning, and leadership, together with practices and case studies of UN peace operations, highlights how these three fundamental areas of management are mutually reinforcing. • The political nature of peace operations dictates that, in organization and management, second-best choices might be in order. • The diversity of the contexts and the high variability of the circumstances in which peace missions operate call for the contextualization of organization and management knowledge, rather than the application of textbook models. The Coordination-Learning-Leadership Link Coordination, learning, and leadership are intrinsically linked in organizations. Efforts to enhance one area should be mindful of the impacts, both positive and negative, of the other two. The limits posed by the temporary nature of peace operations, for example, can be tempered by improved flows of information, learning systems, and the boundary-spanning capacities of leaders. Organizational learning can become a means for coordination because, if knowledge is well managed and shared, it helps to create collective identity, an enabler of both stronger coordination and learning as well as a specific challenge in UN peace operations with their

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multitude and diversity of actors involved. Learning processes can help to reconcile the conflicting goals, various functional competencies, diverging demands for legitimacy, logics of action, and degrees of professionalism, thereby contributing to organizational effectiveness. Transformative leadership, capable of devising and communicating solutions to confront managerial challenges in a highly politicized environment, can improve coordination. Second-best Choices The political nature of peace operations, as we highlighted at the beginning of this concluding chapter, makes management in practice a lot messier than in theory. Poor coordination may be due to a problem of political cooperation among key UN member states, tensions over the budgeting process, or the presence of peace spoilers in the host country. Poor learning efforts, let alone learning effects, may be due to an “ability to afford not to learn” which, according to an often quoted phrase of Karl W. Deutsch, one of the pioneers of international relations theory, belongs to the “insignia of real power.”6 Poor leadership may be just the flip side of staff being confronted with problems beyond their political reach. These suboptimal conditions in the UN can be mitigated by managerial efforts, but hardly eliminated. This implies that second-best choices might be often required, rather than the ideal solutions, because the optimal conditions are rarely satisfied. In legal, political, and economic theories, second-best solutions are the most desirable options when the first best of a system cannot be achieved due to a constrained variable.7 Managers need to understand the political angle of a problem before jumping to the theory-based conclusion that, for example, more coordination will always lead to an efficient system. Degrees of incoherence might be necessary and transaction costs might make additional coordination not worth it, due to overly expensive mechanisms and time-consuming procedures. The double organizational nature of peace operations provides another good example of a second-best solution. Since peace missions are both a hierarchical bureaucracy and an interorganizational network, it would be erroneous to apply network theory in its ideal conditions. Choosing the second-best solution could lead to implementing networks at a micro level of management, for example at the project level, to maximize the local impact of an initiative while leaving a hierarchical structure in place at the mission leadership level. Ultimately, second-best choices represent an additional reason to promote management skills in the UN at all levels, not just at the director level, because managerial skills are not linked to ranks but to functions and tasks. With adequate managerial skills percolating throughout

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the organization, managers are more equipped to identify not only idealtype solutions, but suitable second-best options. The Need for Contextualization Peace operations are deployed in very different contexts with a high variability of circumstances. Accordingly, mere normative statements intended to improve coordination, learning, and leadership may turn out to be misleading. Textbook solutions may be illusive. Rather, realities on the ground should influence the choice of structural design and coordination mechanisms. Lessons learned should not be separated from the local context in which they were generated and should always be tailored to the specific mission environment in which they are applied. No leadership style works for all seasons. Knowledge and experience about the nature of coordination, learning, and leadership in complex organizations remain essential prerequisites of successful management in UN peace operations. Once organization and management knowledge is absorbed, however, pragmatism, adaptation, and creative copying should guide leaders to successfully address the complex managerial challenges of peace operations. As stated at the beginning of the volume, this book represents an attempt to fill the gap between organization theory and the practice of management in peace operations. It is intended as the first step of a dialogue between scholars and practitioners of these different fields that we believe to be essential for enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy of peace operations. It is clear that an effort is needed on both sides: academia needs to be much more concerned with the organizational traits of peace operations and further study in the field is imperative while practitioners must devote more attention to the lessons of scholarly managerial research. We hope to have started this conversation.

Notes 1. Richard Gowan, “Parting Shot: Can Ban Ki-moon Save U.N. Peacekeeping?” World Politics Review, September 15, 2015. 2. More on the role of boundary spanning in organizational learning can be found in Gisela Hirschman, “Organizational Learning in United Nations’ Peacekeeping Exit Strategies,” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 3 (2012): 368−385. 3. On redundancy in organization theory see, for example, Martin Landau, “Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap,” Public Administration Review 29, no. 4 (1969): 346−358; and Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986). 4. Ian Martin, former UN head of mission in East Timor, Nepal, and Libya, has also stressed the political nature of peace operations and the need for “designer mis-

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sions.” See Ian Martin, “All Peace Operations Are Political: A Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN Reform,” in Review of Political Missions 2010 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2010), pp. 8−14. 5. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, p. 12. 6. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government—Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 102. 7. The theory of the second best was formalized by Richard Lipsey and Kevin Lancaster in 1956. See R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of Economic Studies 24, no. 1 (1956): 11–32.

Acronyms

AAR ABCA ACABQ ACPA AU BICC CAC CCA CIC CIMIC CMOC ConOps CST CVR DDR DDRR DFS DPA DPET DPKO DSRSG ECB ECHA

after action review so-called Australia, Britain, Canada, and America but also including New Zealand (ABCA) community UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord African Union Bonn International Center for Conversion civil affairs coordinator Common Country Assessment crisis information center civil-military cooperation center civil-military operations center concept of operations country support team community violence reduction disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration UN Department of Field Support UN Department of Political Affairs Policy, Evaluation and Training Division UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations deputy special representative of the Secretary-General European Central Bank UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs 369

370

Acronyms

ECOMOG ECOWAS ECPS EU EUFOR EUPM EUSR FAO FFU FRY G8 GPPi GTG GPS HIPPO HiRep IAPTC IAWG ICFY ICGL IDPs IDDRS IDF IFOR IGOs ILO IMP IMPP IMTFs INGO INTERPOL IO IOM IPA IPI IPTF IR JSAT KFOR

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse European Union European Union Force European Union Police Mission European Union special representative Food and Agriculture Organization Environmental Policy Research Centre Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Group of 8 Global Public Policy Institute Gender Theme Group global positioning system High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations high representative International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers UN Inter-Agency Working Group International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia International Contact Group on Liberia internally displaced persons integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards Israeli Defense Force Implementation Force intergovernmental organizations International Labour Organization Integrated Mission Plan Integrated Mission Planning Process Integrated Mission Task Forces international nongovernmental organization International Criminal Police Organization international organization International Organization for Migration International Peace Academy International Peace Institute International Police Task Force international relations joint security assessment team (Liberia) NATO-led Kosovo Force

Acronyms

LAF LBDQ LLU LMX LRA LRDC LSE MINUSTAH MONUC MONUSCO MoU NAC NAO NATO NEPAD NGOs NUPI OCHA OECD OHR OL OSCE PBPS PBPU PBSO PIC PISG PoA PRSP PSO RBB RC RRTF SACEUR SFOR SG SHAPE SHIRBRIG SIPA

371

Lebanese Armed Forces Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire Lessons Learned Unit leader-member exchange Lord’s Resistance Army Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee London School of Economics UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Memorandum of Understanding North Atlantic Council network administration organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Partnership for Africa’s Development nongovernmental organizations Norwegian Institute of International Affairs UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development NATO Office of the High Representative organizational learning Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Peacekeeping Best Practices Section UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit UN Peacebuilding Support Office Peace Implementation Council Provisional Institutions of Self-Government Programme of Action Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Peace Support Operations results-based budgeting resident coordinator Reconstruction and Return Task Force supreme allied commander Europe Stabilization Force Secretary-General (UN) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations School of International and Public Affairs

372

Acronyms

SIT SMT SRSG SSR SWP TAM TCCs TCE 3D UNAIDS UNAMA UNAMIS UNCG UNCT UNDAF UNDG UNDP UNEP UNESCO UNFPA UN-HABITAT UNHC UNHCR UNICEF UNIFIL UNITAR UNMEE UNMIBH UNMIK UNMIL UNMIN UNMIS UNMIT UNOMIL UNOPS UNPROFOR UNSC UNTAET UNV WFP WHO WZB ZIF

social identity theory senior management team special representative of the Secretary-General security sector reform Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik technical assessment mission troop-contributing countries transaction cost economics diplomacy, development, and defense UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UN Advance Mission in the Sudan UN Communications Group UN country team UN Development Assistance Framework UN Development Group UN Development Programme UN Environment Programme UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UN Population Fund UN Human Settlements Programme UN Humanitarian Coordinator UN High Commissioner for Refugees UN Children’s Fund UN Interim Force in Lebanon UN Institute for Training and Research UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UN Mission in Liberia UN Mission in Nepal UN Mission in the Sudan UN Mission in Timor-Leste UN Observer Mission in Liberia UN Office for Project Services UN Protection Force UN Security Council UN Transitional Administration in East Timor UN volunteer World Food Programme World Health Organization Social Science Research Center in Berlin Center for International Peace Operations

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The Contributors

Michael Bauer is Jean Monnet Professor for Comparative Public Administration and Policy Analysis at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer. Thorsten Benner is cofounder and director of the Global Public Policy

Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. Ariane Berthoin Antal leads the research stream on “Artistic Interventions in Organizations” in the Research Unit “Cultural Sources of Newness” at the Social Science Research Center in Berlin (WZB). She is also honorary professor of organizational change and cross-cultural management at the Technical University of Berlin and distinguished research professor in the International Affiliate Faculty at the Audencia Nantes School of Management. Asith Bhattacharjee served as ambassador of India to Tajikistan from

2010 to 2015. Prior to this appointment, he was director-general for UN political and peacekeeping issues in India’s Foreign Office, and also held numerous senior UN posts. Till Blume, on the staff of the German Federal Foreign Office, was a

research fellow in the Department of Public Administration and Management at the University of Konstanz and a guest researcher at the Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics (LSE) and at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. Till Blume contributed to this volume in his personal capacity; the views reflected in the respective chapter are entirely his own. Sabine Boerner holds the chair of management, strategy, and leadership at

the University of Konstanz. 415

416

The Contributors

Simon Chesterman is dean of the National University of Singapore Fac-

ulty of Law, as well as editor of the Asian Journal of International Law and secretary-general of the Asian Society of International Law. Cedric de Coning is a senior adviser on peacekeeping and peacebuilding for ACCORD, a senior research fellow in the Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Research Group at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and a special adviser to the head of the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union Commission. Sebastian Döring works for Audi AG, Germany. He previously was a research fellow at the Center of Excellence (Cultural Foundations of Integration) and chair of management, strategy, and leadership at the University of Konstanz. Thomas M. Franck was Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus

at New York University; he passed away in May 2009. Manuel Fröhlich holds the chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy at Trier University. Anna Herrhausen is a director with Deutsche Bank AG, Berlin. She also spent six years as a management consultant at McKinsey & Company, Inc. Helge Jörgens is senior lecturer in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the Freie Universität Berlin and managing director of the university’s Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU). Julian Junk is a research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and the Goethe University Frankfurt working in the field of international organizations and with the Cluster of Excellence Programme on normative orders. Rüdiger Klimecki was professor of management and organizational behav-

ior in the Department of Politics and Management at the University of Konstanz and director of the Academy for Scientific Professional Development; he passed away in June 2009. Christoph Knill is professor at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich where he holds the chair of Empirical Theory of Politics in the Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science. Michael Lipson is an associate professor of political science at Concordia

University in Montreal.

The Contributors

417

Melanie Mai was a postdoctoral research fellow at the chair of management

in the Department for Politics and Management at the University of Konstanz. Francesco Mancini is assistant dean and visiting associate professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, nonresident senior adviser at the International Peace Institute, and adjunct associate professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Stephen Mergenthaler is director of the Centre for Global Strategies at

the World Economic Forum in Geneva and a nonresident fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi). Tobias Pietz is a senior researcher at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. From 2003 to 2006, he was a researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC). Jörg Raab is associate professor of policy and organization in the Depart-

ment of Organization Studies at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. Philipp Rotmann is associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute

in Berlin. Elisabeth Schöndorf was a researcher with the German Institute for Inter-

national and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. From 2005 to 2009, she worked as a research associate and lecturer in the Department of Politics and Management and at the Center of Excellence “Cultural Foundations of Integration” at the University of Konstanz. Peter Schumann was the former regional representative and chief of staff

of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). Wolfgang Seibel is professor of politics and public administration at the University of Konstanz and adjunct professor of public administration at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin. Joseph Soeters is professor in management and organization studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Tilburg University. Frederik Trettin was a research fellow in the Department of Politics and

Public Administration at the University of Kostanz.

Index

AAR. See After action reviews Absorptive capacity: impediments of, 172–173; in OL, 17; situational meaning of, 186–187 ACABQ. See UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord (ACPA), 147; interpretations of, 148; UNMIL influenced by, 148–149; violations by, 148 Administrative reform: Brahimi Report proposing, 254; case studies for, 241, 243–244; causes of, 240; comparative studies of, 242; crisis impacting, 253–255; culture influencing, 257; determinants of, 244; dialogue on, 257–258; DPKO strategies for, 217; external factors influence on, 245; functional performance improved by, 255–256; hypotheses for, 246–247; as independent variable, 258; initiators of, 255; internal process factors influencing, 250–256; in international bureaucracies, 240, 243, 244–245, 258; in international organizations, 256–259; in Kosovo, 247; leadership dependency of, 252, 253; from OL, 240; organizational

change needing, 256; organizational constituency and, 247–250; for peace operations, 100–103, 258; size influencing, 251–252; tools for evaluation of, 256; understanding of, 241–242 Africa, 301; civil wars of, 98; DDR programs in, 113; peacekeeping way of, 102; war criminals in, 99 African Union (AU), 94, 129 After action reviews (AAR): procedures for, 176–177; as productive, 177 An Agenda for Peace, 1, 27, 126, 161, 249 Ahmed, Rafeeuddin, 317 Ahmed, Salman, 74, 316 Ahtisaari, Martti, 301 Ajello, Aldo, 317 Albert, Stuart, 203 Alger, Chadwick, 51 Alter, Caroline, 63 Annan, Kofi (Secretary-General), 252– 253, 290, 291, 297, 298, 305 Ansell, Christopher K., 225 Argyris, Chris, 16, 166, 170, 200 Ashford, Blake E., 203 Asia and Pacific Division of the Department of Political Affairs, 296 AU. See African Union Authority, 20; coercion and, 21–22; of

419

420

Index

OHR, 70; reciprocity as alternative to, 22; Secretary-General lacking, 292; UN lack of, 94 Avolio, Bruce J., 272, 273 Balint, Tim, 254 Ban Ki-moon (Secretary-General), 1, 290 Barnett, Michael, 233, 247–248, 254 Bass, Bernhard M., 19–20, 272, 273 Bauer, Michael, 7, 362 Baum, Joel, 46 Baumann, Soo Mee, 253 Behavioral theories, 18, 19, 205–206 Bell, Edward, 112 Benchmarks: Brahimi Report establishing, 186; as contextual, 154; as core, 154; as measurement tools, 356; as progress indicators, 153 Benner, Thorsten, 6, 161, 240–241, 361 Berthoin Antal, Ariane, 6, 360 Bhattacharjee, Asith, 6, 360 Bildt, Carl, 70–71, 72 Blair, Stephanie, 65 Blake, Robert R., 19, 270 Blanchard, Kenneth H., 271 Blue Helmets, 292, 302 Blume, Till, 5, 84 Boerner, Sabine, 7, 289, 362–363 Boothby, Derek, 332, 348 Borgatti, Stephen P., 43, 46 Boundary-spanning: examples of units of, 225; in learning cycle, 228; role of, 50 Bourantonis, Dimitris, 248 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 290, 298, 307 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 311, 316 Brahimi Report, 1–2, 115, 161; benchmark established by, 186; emergence of, 228; leadership stated by, 302; mandate statement by, 143– 144; peacekeeping integrated mission from, 144; recommendations of, 92– 93, 295, 328n92; reforms proposed in, 254 Bretton Woods Institutions, 142, 145 Breul, Rainer, 161–162 Bureaucratic politics, 231–232 Burns, James M., 272–273 Bush, George W. (President), 341

CACs. See Civil affairs coordinators Capstone Principles (2008), 302 Centrality: meanings of, 34n63; as reinforcing networks, 47 Cerny, Philipp, 315 Chesterman, Simon, 7, 347, 363–364 Chisholm, Donald, 63–64 CIMIC. See Civil-Military Cooperation Center Civil affairs coordinators (CACs), 66 Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CIMIC), 73 Coase, Ronald, 21 Coercion, authority and, 21–22 Cognition: coordination represented by, 24, 34, 35n70; as learning basis, 6–7, 24; as OL basis, 24, 164, 195, 202, 210, 360; structures of, 21, 24–25, 202; theories of, 18 Coherence, 6; compacts as basis for, 145–146, 155–156, 360; context as variable for, 137; coordination creating false, 132; definition of, 128; EU improving, 129; factors against, 133; as internal and external, 129; levels of, 128–131; limits to, 131– 133; NATO improving, 129; negative effects of, 131–132; as peace operation conundrum, 141; of peacebuilding, 125–128, 135; in physical science, 141–142, 156n3; pursuing of, 359; strategic success and, 133; sustainability for, 136; synergy promoted by, 145; system compared to impact level of, 133; trade-offs for, 135; for UN, 141; UNMIL from angle of, 141, 147, 154–155; as whole-of-government approach alignment, 127. See also Harmonization coherence; Organizational coherence Cold War, 98, 239, 240, 290 Coleman, Henry J., Jr., 45 Coleman, Liv, 247–248, 254 Collective identity: for action, 361; limiting of, 364 Compacts: challenges in, 146; as coherence basis, 145–146, 155–156, 360; as crosscutting, 142; of diverse and competing interests, 142; mandate as, 143–144; as

Index multidimensional, 145; national partners as, 145; as symbiotic, 146; UN field operations as, 144–145, 155; UNMIL efforts to build, 151– 152 Conceptual proliferation, 219, 220 Coning, Cedric de, 6, 59, 137, 156n4, 359 Consistency, as not ethical, 139n15 Contextualization, 8, 367 Control mechanisms, 87–88 Cooperation: coordination compared to, 15; cultural proximity needed for multinational, 96; for efficiency, 133; specialized skills for, 72 Coordination: central issues of network, 85; cognition as basis for, 24, 34, 35n70; cooperation compared to, 15; effective forms of, 74; about facilitation, 121; false-coherence created by, 132; without hierarchy, 60; hypotheses for peacekeeping, 64– 65; IDDRS identifying mechanisms of, 6, 120; identities for learning and, 20–21, 191; improving of interorganizational, 39; as informal, 78n41; information sharing as dimension of, 23; interorganizational networks needing, 100, 102; learning, leadership and, 11, 13, 25, 26tab, 355, 365–366; limitations for interorganizational, 53; military and NGO lacking, 94–95; network organization as best model of, 83; networks and, 39, 42; organization theory and, 39–41; organizational culture as mechanism for, 44–45; in peace operations, 357–358; peace operations hypotheses of, 64–65; peace operations improving, 48, 111; peace operations success dependent on, 59; as political, 73; as postDayton agreement, 67–69; as preDayton agreement, 66–67; problems in, 14–16, 15, 39; RBB as tool for, 184; reciprocity as dimension of, 22; strategies for, 57n49; structures strengthening, 48; tasks of, 14; tensions in, 6; transaction costs of, 61; as UN challenge, 5; in UNMIBH, 66, 68, 69

421

Coping mechanisms, 13–14; patterns in, 27; sufficient satisfying of, 28 County support team (CST), 152, 197–198 Cox, Robert W., 245, 253, 306 Creative coping, 5 Crosscutting, 117, 309, 365–367; areas of, 151; challenges as, 321; compacts as, 142; as domain-centered, 194; events as, 151; issues as, 13; lessons as, 356; literature as, 20; priority for, 177; as self-managed, 211 CST. See County support team Czarniawska, Barbara, 170–171 Daalder, Ivo, 67, 68–69 Dahl, Robert, 21 Dayton agreement, 59, 65, 356; coordination post, 67–69; coordination pre, 66–67; implementation structures for, 67, 68; networks role in, 72 DDR. See Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration De Soto, Alvaro, 311, 317 Department of Field Support (DFS), 51, 90, 225, 302 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 64, 90, 115, 121; best practices unit of, 177; Capstone Principles (2008) by DFS and, 302; reform strategies of, 217; training policies of, 181 Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 305 Deutero learning, 16; as experiential learning, 170; as insightful, 200 Deutsch, Karl W., 366 DFS. See Department of Field Support Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), 1, 111, 113 Diversity: knowledge integration hindered by, 280; leadership, team performance and, 280; learning undermined by, 192; as OL advantage, 174; of peace operation actors, 192–193, 210; positive influence of, 280; social identity theory explaining, 192. See also Workforce diversity Döring, Sebastian, 6–7, 248, 361

422

Index

Doss, Alan, 313 Double-loop learning: as challenging, 170; frequency of, 200; peace operations undergoing, 27; as problem-solving capability, 200; single-loop learning contrasted with, 223; as superior, 16 Doyle, Michael W., 28n1, 29n5, 234, 308, 333 DPA. See Department of Political Affairs DPKO. See Department of Peacekeeping Operations Dumdum, Uldarico R., 273 Dutton, Jane E., 203 ECB. See European Central Bank ECHA. See Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 99, 102 Environmental factors, 3, 228–229, 234 Epistemic communities, 15 Etzold, Tobias, 251, 254 EU. See European Union EUFOR. See European Union Force European Central Bank (ECB), 7, 246, 247, 250 European Commission, 242, 246, 247, 250 European Union (EU), 66, 94, 239; coherence improved by, 129; IDDRS role of, 112; insights provided by, 242; policy making within, 250–251 European Union Force (EUFOR), 68 Evans, Martin, 275 Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), 316 Fiedler, Fred E., 269, 271 Finkelstein, Lawrence S., 249 Finnemore, Martha, 221, 319 Franck, Thomas, 7, 363, 364 Friss, Karsten, 137 Fröhlich, Manuel, 7, 292, 336, 362, 363 Gebert, Diether, 268, 275, 276, 280 Gender Theme Group (GTG), 197, 200, 215n48 General Assembly, 294; mandate of, 303; micromanagement of, 292; status of, 293

Goffman, Erving, 15, 21 Goulding, Marrack, 309 Governance: dimensions of, 20; double nature of, 33n51; literature surrounding, 20–21; in peace operations, 20, 21, 105; structure of, 241. See also Network governance Gräber, Stefanie, 313 Graen, George B., 277 Greenstein, Fred, 311 Group of Friends, 295, 317 GTG. See Gender Theme Group Guéhenno, Jean-Marie, 3, 217, 231 Haekkerup, Hans, 7, 313, 332, 363; communicative role of, 342–343, 345; international tour of, 341; as manager, 341–342; SRSG appointment of, 340; Steiner compared to, 339, 344–345, 346tab, 347; UNMIK participation of, 342 Hage, Jerald, 63 Hagel, Markus, 253 Halty, Maximo, 112 Hamburg, David A., 335 Hammarskjöld, Dag (Secretary-General), 290, 293, 298, 303, 307 Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 306 Handover reports, 177–178 Harmonization coherence, 130 Hass, Ernst, 218, 232 Hass, Peter M., 232 Herrhausen, Anna, 5, 120, 121, 357, 358 Hersey, Paul, 271 Hesterly, William S., 43, 44, 46 Hezbollah, 97, 98 Hierarchies: appropriateness of, 71; in bureaucracies, 25; coordination without, 60; in network governance, 46; networks compared to, 41, 47; in OHR, 71; OL suspending, 172; as organization theory, 40; transaction costs related to, 70 High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 1, 2 High representative (HiRep), 67, 68 HIPPO. See High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Hirata, Toru, 171

Index HiRep. See High representative Hirschmann, Gisela, 162 HIV/AIDS, 179, 181 Holistic theories, dominance of, 33n52 House, Robert J., 275 Howard, Lise Morjé, 103, 162, 170, 171, 234–235, 235n6, 240 Human Security Report (2005), 308 Humanitarian assistance organizations, 94, 127 Hun Sen (Prime Minister, Cambodia), 317 Hylton, Lydia F., 46–47 IAPTC. See International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers IAWG. See Inter-Agency Working Group ICFY. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ICGL. See International Contact Group on Liberia IDDRS. See Integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards Identities: as contested, 205; formation of, 204; issues with, 202; for learning and coordination, 20–21, 191; within network organization, 205; organizational identity compared to individual, 203–205, 210; as social, 204. See also Organizational identity; Shared identity; Social identity theory (SIT) IDPs. See Internally displaced persons IFOR. See Implementation Force IGOs. See Intergovernmental organizations Ikujiro Nonaka, 171 Imitation learning, 170–171, 181 IMP. See Integrated Mission Plan Implementation Force (IFOR), 67, 68, 69 Implementing United nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, 39, 56 IMPP. See Integrated Mission Planning Process IMTFs. See Integrated Mission Task Forces Information sharing: as coordination dimension, 23; enhancing of, 28; in

423

leadership, 23–24; organizational culture promoting, 45; for peacekeeping, 51 Information technology (IT), 41 Ingram, Paul, 46 Inspirational motivation, 281 Institutionalization, 222 Integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards (IDDRS): alternative approaches to, 122; clear role distribution needed by, 117; community-based agenda of, 117; coordination mechanisms in, 6, 120; of EU, 112; failures in, 111, 115–118; goals of, 113, 116, 120; Haitian target groups of, 118; IAWG review of, 119; implementation deficiencies in, 112; integrated standards of, 111, 115–118; as overly ambitious, 120; realistic expectations for, 114; structural problems in, 114–115; tensions of, 118, 119 Integrated Mission Plan (IMP), 150, 153 Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), 51, 115, 121, 144 Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), 115, 143 Intellectual stimulations, 282 Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG), 111, 116, 118, 119, 121 Interdependence: as bilateral, 64; in learning, 208; as multilateral, 63; in organizations, 14 Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 77n20 Internal process factors: administrative reform influenced by, 250–256; bureaucratic politics as, 231–232; leadership as, 232; OL influenced by, 234; value determined by, 231 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 134 International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), 65 International bureaucracies: administrative reform in, 240, 243, 244–245, 258; examples of, 219; as formal organizations, 242; knowledge sources of, 233; OL in, 217, 218, 221; openness in, 231; organizational

424

Index

change in, 239; scientific adoption by, 220 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), 66 International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), 152 International Court of Justice, 293 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), 248, 254 International Organization for Migration (IOM), 112 International organizations: administrative reforms in, 256–259; examples of, 239, 243–244, 246; as intergovernmental, 250–251; legitimacy of, 254; organizational change in, 258–259; policy delivery of, 251; political analysis of, 241; research program needed for, 243; responsiveness of, 247; role of, 240; size of, 251–252; as supranational, 250–251. See also International bureaucracies International Peace Institute (IPI), 65 International Police Task Force (IPTF), 68 International relations (IR), 218 Interoperability, 49, 50 Interorganizational networks, 25, 100, 102, 366 INTERPOL. See International Criminal Police Organization Intramission learning, 223, 235, 235n6 IOM. See International Organization for Migration IPI. See International Peace Institute IPTF. See International Police Task Force IR. See International relations IT. See Information technology Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, 63 Janowicz-Panjaitan, Martyna, 90 Jessen-Petersen, Sören, 314 Jing Zhou, 280 Johnstone, Ian, 252–253 Joint Civilian Commission, 68 Joint security assessment teams (JSATs), 153 Joint Utstein Study, 128, 138n9 Jones, Bruce D., 316

Jones, Candace, 43, 46 Jörgens, Helge, 7, 362 Joulwan, George, 69 JSATs. See Joint security assessment teams Judge, Timothy A., 273–274 Junk, Julian, 5, 6, 84, 297, 360 Justice reform, 1 Kaldor, Mary, 63 Katz, Robert L., 269 Kearney, Eric, 280 Kenis, Patrick, 86, 87, 90 Kerler, Michael, 254 Khrushchev, Nikita, 291 Kingdon, John, 18 Klein, Jacques Paul, 313 Klimecki, Rüdiger, 6, 161, 196, 248, 361 Knight, W. Andy, 252 Knill, Christoph, 7, 254, 362 Knowledge acquisition, 222, 229 Knowledge creation, 171 Knowledge integration, 278 Knowledge sharing, 49; difficulties in, 168; hostilities in, 173; as OL basis, 169, 171; shared identity and, 209 Kobler, Barbara, 253 Kosovo, 59, 301; administrative reform in, 247; lessons from, 331; SRSGs in, 314. See also UN Mission in Kosovo Kostakos, Georgios, 73 Kouchner, Bernard, 340 Lassleben, Hermann, 196 Lawler III, Edward E., 45 LBDQ. See Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire Lead organization network, 87 Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ), 270 Leader-member exchange theory (LMX), 277 Leadership: administrative reform dependent on, 252, 253; ambitious dreams of, 35n72; appropriate identifying of, 278; behavioral theories for, 19, 270; Brahimi Report stating, 302; challenges of, 280; communicative actions for, 317–318, 365; conventional theory of, 18; definition lacking for, 267;

Index dimensions of, 270, 315; as direct, 277; distinctive styles of, 19; diversity, team performance and, 280; effectiveness of, 268, 271; as engaging, 172; as entrepreneurial, 315; failure in, 34n68; follower behavior in, 275, 277; follower management in, 271–272, 274–275; as goal-oriented, 276; importance of, 7–8, 177; as indirect, 277; information sharing and evaluation in, 23–24; as intellectual, 315; internal politics and, 252–253; as internal process factor, 232; learning, coordination and, 11, 13, 25, 26tab, 355, 365–366; literature on, 17; most popular approaches to, 279tab; in OL, 172, 186, 253; path-goal theory of, 275; peace operation success depending on, 362; in peace operations, 267, 278, 289, 347, 362, 365; peacekeeping success requiring, 103; perspectives in research on, 268; as political and managerial challenge, 17–20; quality of, 253; reciprocity in, 23; responsibility of, 25; role models of, 331; role theory as approach to, 334; shared identity influenced by, 210; situational approach to, 268– 269, 271–272; SRSG recommendations on, 282tab; SRSG responsibility for, 311–312, 313–315, 321; strategies of, 26; as structural, 315; style approach of, 268, 270–271; style differentiation in, 270–272, 275–276; substitutes for, 277; success in, 276, 338; training for, 182, 190n51, 211; trait approach of, 268; as transactional, 18, 272; as universal phenomenon, 267. See also Transformational leadership Learning: boundary-spanning in cycle of, 228; as cognitive process, 6–7, 24; as collective, 195, 221; coordination, leadership and, 11, 13, 25, 26tab, 355, 365–366; description of, 194; diversity undermining, 192; guiding measures for, 194–195; identities for coordination and, 20– 21, 191; as individual, 166–167, 195; interdependence in, 208; as

425

interorganizational, 166, 168–169; intraorganizational, 167–168, 176; media of, 198–199; as political and managerial challenge, 16–17; reciprocity as dimension of, 22–23; results of, 200; as situated, 201; as stress reducing, 12. See also Deutero learning; Double-loop learning; Imitation learning; Intramission learning; Organizational learning (OL); Single-loop learning Lebanon, 6, 294 Legitimacy: direct effects of, 102; internal and external, in networks, 89, 90; of international organizations, 254; peace operations enhancing, 359 LeRoy, Alain, 316 Liberia, 6; field investigations of, 194, 206–210, 211; SRSGs in, 313; UN agencies in, 194; UN functioning in, 212n10 Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC), 152 Lie, Trygve (Secretary-General), 290 Lindblom, Charles, 21 Lippmann, Walter, 291 Lipson, Michael, 5, 131, 356, 359 Literature: on epistemic communities, 15; on governance practices, 20–21 Litwak, Eugene, 46–47 LMX. See Leader-member exchange theory Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 177 Lowe, Kevin B., 273 LRA. See Lord’s Resistance Army LRDC. See Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee Lundin, Rolf, 90 Mai, Melanie, 6–7, 248, 361 Mancini, Francesco, 297 Mandates: Brahimi Report statement on, 143–144; as compact, 143–144; competing interests in organizational, 156n5; of General Assembly, 303; of peace operations, 83, 225; of Secretary-General, 294, 298–299; of UNMIL, deconstruction of, 150; from UNSC for SRSGs, 312, 318, 320– 321; from UNSC for UNMIL, 147 Manuel, Susan, 339

426

Index

March, James G., 16, 170 Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, 63 Mergenthaler, Stephan, 6, 161, 240, 241, 253, 361 Michigan Leadership Studies, 270 Middle East, 294 Miles, Raymond E., 45 Militaries: coordination lacking in NGO and, 94–95; deployment of, 90, 92; loyalty within, 94; national differences in, 95–96; as not neutral, 95; operating styles of national, 98; politics interacting with, 84; time dimensions of, 95; warriors compared to humanitarians in, 96 Mill, John Stuart, 339 Millennium Development Goals, 297, 331 Miller, Laura, 96 Milward, Brinton, 85, 88 Mission leaders, 7 Mobility, of staff, 50 Molloy, Desmond, 112, 118 MONUC. See UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Moratti, Massimo, 114 Morrison, Alex, 65 Moskos, Charles, 96 Mouton, Jane S., 19, 270 Muggah, Robert, 112, 117 Mühlmann, Thomas, 342 Multidisciplinarity, 220 Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), 93 Mumford, Michael D., 269 Myint-U, Thant, 233 NAC. See North Atlantic Council Namibia, 301 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase), 21 NEPAD. See New Partnership for Africa’s Development Network governance: enhancing of, 48, 51–53; hierarchies in, 46; improvement recommendations for, 53tab; mechanisms for, 44; mental tensions inherent to, 88–89; modes

of, 86–87; prerequisites for, 42–43; social control elements of, 43–46; structural elements of, 46–47; transactions in, 43–44; as unnecessary, 55n17 Network organizations: as best coordination model, 83; identities within, 205; management and, 84–85; promotion factors of, 64 Network theories: hypotheses of, 71–73; peace operations and, 104; tensions identified by, 359 Networks: access restriction in, 52–53, 358–359; as best peace operation model, 41–42; central issues of coordination of, 85; centrality as reinforcing, 47; community capacitybuilding, 86; as complex, 62–63; control mechanisms applied to, 87– 88; coordination and, 39, 42; cost theories of, 59; Dayton agreement role of, 72; definition of, 62; as flexible, 42, 89; general characteristics of, 92; hierarchies compared to, 41, 47; information diffusion, 85; internal and external legitimacy in, 89, 90; management balance of, 88; as military-military, 95–96; military-NGO, 94–95; as military-political, 93–94; NGOs developing informal, 65; OHR supporting, 73; as organization theory, 5, 40; within peace operations, 92–93; as problemsolving, 86; service implementation, 85; social control mechanisms of, 51; sustainability in, 101; tension management of, 88–89; types of, 85– 86; of UNIFIL, 97. See also Network governance; Network organizations; Network theories; Temporary network organizations Neuberger, Oswald, 338 A New Partnership Agenda, 101, 217 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 138n9 NGO. See Nongovernmental Organization No Exit Without Strategy, 127 Nobel, Alfred, 301

Index Nobel Peace Prize, 301 Nongovernmental Organization (NGO), 64, 65, 94–95, 308 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 66–67 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): air strikes of, 66–67; coherence improved by, 129; command of, 71; as transitional administration, 239 Northouse, Peter G., 269 OECD. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of Higher Representative (OHR): authority of, 70; hierarchy in, 71; mandates for, 68–69; networks supported by, 73 Ohio State Leadership Studies, 19, 268, 270 OHR. See Office of Higher Representative OL. See Organizational learning Olonisakin, Funmi, 100 Olsen, Johan P., 254 One UN, 51, 193, 328n92 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 241, 246, 247, 254 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 67, 68, 70, 71 Organization theory: approaches to, 81n85; categories of, 40, 54n2; central issues of, 59–60; coordination and, 39–41; hierarchies as, 40; insights into, 60, 105; lessons from, 357; management practice and, 367; markets as, 40; networks as, 5, 40 Organizational change, 7; administrative reform importance for, 256; as dependent variable, 258; focus on, 241; in international bureaucracies, 239; of international organizations, 258–259 Organizational coherence, 21–25, 26tab Organizational constituency, 247–250 Organizational culture: assimilation within, 45; challenges of, 51–52; committing to, 52; as coordination mechanism, 44–45; environmental

427

pressures on, 247–248; hypocrisy in, 12; information sharing promoted by, 45; reputations created by, 45–46; sanctioning in, 46; as structural factor, 230–231 Organizational identity, 203–205, 210 Organizational learning (OL): absorptive capacity in, 17; actor differences in, 165–166; administrative reform from, 240; advancing of, 232–235; advocacy and decisionmaking in, 222; agents of, 197; approaches to, 16; barriers and enablers of, 172– 175; bias confronted in, 219–220; budgeting as process of, 183–185; clarifying of, 200; cognition as basis of, 24, 164, 195, 202, 210, 360; communicative practices in, 201, 202; concept of, 194; contestation in, 224; crises role in, 164, 171, 173, 185, 187, 228; definition of, 164– 166, 220, 221–222; diversity as advantage for, 174; as effective and efficient, 191; environmental influence on, 197; factors influencing, 228; focus on, 364–365; forms of, 170–172; hierarchies suspended by, 172; incentives for, 180; increase in, 215n48; information processing in, 199–200; institutionalization in, 222; internal process factors influencing, 234; in international bureaucracies, 217, 218, 221; judgments in, 233; knowledge acquisition in, 222, 229; knowledge sharing and, 169, 171; leadership critical for, 172, 186, 253; levels of, 165, 166–170; media observation influencing, 174, 198; patterns of, 6; peace operations initiatives for, 178, 194, 210, 224; for peacekeeping, 360–362; permeability of boundaries constraining, 173; phases of, 165; problem-solving focus of, 166; process and influencing factors of, 195, 196fig, 198, 224; RBB in, 183– 185; refining of, 192; research on, 28n1, 219; shared identity important for, 205, 210; social nature of, 201– 202; structural factors of, 229, 231;

428

Index

taxonomies of, 223–224; tracing processes of, 218; training as core of, 179–183; triggers of, 196, 197; UNMIS patterns of, 175 Organizational structures, 2; features of, 20; of peace operations, 162, 241, 365; TCE explaining, 61 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Paris, Roland, 131, 132 Path-goal theory, 275–276 PBPS. See Peacekeeping Best Practices Section Peace Implementation Council (PIC), 67 Peace operations: administrative reform points for, 100–103, 258; bureaucracy of, 102, 217, 218, 224–225, 226fig; challenges of, 3, 11, 279, 367; characteristics of, 13; coherence as conundrum of, 141; collaboration within, 103; communication barriers in, 168; complexities in, 4, 11, 78n33, 142–147, 281; coordination improved by, 48, 111; coordination necessary for success of, 59; diversity of actors in, 192–193, 210; double loop learning undergone by, 27; effectiveness of, 83; environment influence on, 146–147, 228–229, 247; failures of, 254; governance practices in, 20, 21, 105; hostilities in, 186; hypotheses of coordination in, 64–65; implications from, 96–100; as interorganizational networks, 25; IR studying, 259; leadership in, 267, 278, 289, 347, 362, 365; learning aspects needed in, 7, 202, 211; legitimacy enhanced in, 359; management tasks of, 8, 267, 364; mandates of, 83, 225; as multicentered, 12; nature of, 356– 357, 366; network theories learned by, 104; networks within, 92–93; OL processes in, 178, 194, 210, 224; organizational structures of, 162, 241, 365; principals power in, 228–229; relevant issues for analysis of, 92, 104; risk reduction in, 147; singleloop learning for, 171–172; SRSG contribution to, 311, 331; as

temporary network organizations, 6, 83, 84–85, 89–92, 163; trends in, 8n3; trust building in, 27–28; UN departments relevant for, 212n8; UNSC and, 83, 225; weak point of, 2; workforce diversity in, 281 Peace Support Operations (PSO), 116 Peacebuilding: activities of, 125; actors as entities in, 137n1; as case-by-case, 135, 136; coherence of, 125–128, 135; complex challenges of, 220; as conflict addressing, 126–127; conflicting principles and values in, 134–135; dimensions of, 127; environment factor in, 137; humanitarian assistance in, 127; as multidimensional, 135; SRSGs functions in, 303, 320; sustainability in, 128, 133 Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory, 312 Peacebuilding triangle, 28n1, 29n5, 311, 333 Peacekeeping: activity characterization of, 191; African way of, 102; Brahimi Report integrated mission concept for, 144; budgets for, 355; characteristics of complex, 63, 355; as complex, 75n4; coordination hypotheses for, 64–65; information sharing needed for, 51; leadership required for successful, 103; mission preparation for, 91; missions of, 89, 304; OL for, 360–362; reform history of, 8n2; SRSG activity in, 308–309; structures for, 61; time limits of missions of, 90, 103–104; traditional approach to, 231; UNMIL as bestintegrated effort of, 193; UNSC perspective of, 154 Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS), 161, 175–176, 225 Pearson Centre, 65 Peck, Connie, 314, 318 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (SecretaryGeneral), 291, 317 PIC. See Peace Implementation Council Picciotto, Robert, 153 Piccolo, Ronald F., 273–274 Pietz, Tobias, 6, 59, 358 Plausibility probe, 60 Policy entrepreneurs, 18

Index Policy science, 15 Policy sector, structure of, 245–246 Powell, Walter W., 44, 54, 62–65 Pronk, Jan, 181, 318–319 Provan, Keith, 86, 87, 88 PSO. See Peace Support Operations Puchala, Donald J., 333–334 Quick Start Package, 72 Quinn, Robert E., 313 Raab, Jörg, 5–6, 63, 155, 163, 357, 359 RBB. See Results-based budgeting Reciprocity: as authority alternative, 22; as coordination dimension, 22; in leadership, 23; as learning dimension, 22–23; reliance on, 63 Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), 72 Reddin, William J., 271 Resource- and power-oriented perspective, 14, 31n25 Responsibility to Protect doctrine, 253, 297 Results-based budgeting (RBB): accountability achieved by, 184; as coordination tool, 184; function overlaps revealed by, 184; as integrative management system, 185; as OL process, 183–185; UNMIS applying, 183; UNMIS influenced by, 185 Riggio, Ronald E., 273 Role theory: as expected roles and leadership, 334; leadership success defined by, 276, 338 Rotmann, Philipp, 6, 161, 165, 240, 253, 361 RRTF. See Reconstruction and Return Task Force Rule of law, 1 Sabic-El-Rayess, Amra, 114 SACEUR. See Supreme Allied Commander Europe Sambanis, Nicholas, 28n1, 234, 308, 311, 333 Schlichte, Klaus, 241 Schmidt, Warren H., 270 Schön, Donald A., 166, 170, 200 Schöndorf, Elisabeth, 5, 84

429

Schori, Pierre, 310–311 Schumann, Peter, 6, 360 Schuster, André, 314 Secretary-General: appointment process of, 295, 298; authority lacked by, 292; candidate quality for, 295; contradictions of office of, 293; delegation of, 294; mandate of, 294, 298–299; participation lacked by, 296; prerogative of, 303; problems of, 291–293; responsibilities of, 290, 293; special representatives of, 301; SRSG parallels with, 306, 310; title importance of, 297–298; as UNSC servant, 289 Security sector reform (SSR), 1, 154 Seibel, Wolfgang, 5, 84 Sellwood, Elizabeth, 233 Serwer, Daniel, 312 Seung Ho Park, 47 Sevón, Guje, 170–171 SFOR. See Stabilization Force SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Shared identity: benefits of, 204; common goals promoted by, 207– 208; influences of, 206; interviews on, 213n11; knowledge sharing and, 209; leadership influencing, 210; OL importance of, 205, 210; problemsolving increased by, 208 SHIRBRIG. See Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations Shung J. Shin, 280 Sihanouk (Prince), 317 Sikkink, Kathryn, 319 Single-loop learning: double-loop learning contrasted with, 223; frequency of, 200; intention of, 170; for peace operations, 171–172; as restricted, 16 Sisk, Timothy D., 131 SIT. See Social identity theory Situational approach, 268–269, 271, 272, 275 Skills approach, 269–270 Slaughter, Anne Marie, 63 Snow, Charles C., 45 Social identity theory (SIT): diversity influence explained by, 192; group

430

Index

dynamics influencing, 205; organizational identity as form of, 203; refining of, 206 Söderholm, Anderson, 90 Soeters, Joseph, 5–6, 48, 63, 357, 359 Special representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), 7, 66, 68, 133, 281, 301; as administration manager, 315– 317, 321; appointment of, 305, 363; attention for, 332; communication skills necessary for, 316, 336, 339; as conflict manager, 307, 317–318, 321, 325n43; definition of, 309; development of, 302; examples of, 311; funding for, 305; geographic origins of, 309–310; grading system of, 314; as ideas manager, 318–320, 321; in Kosovo, 314; leadership recommendations for, 282tab; leadership responsibility of, 311–312, 313–315, 321, 362; in Liberia, 313; mandates of, 312, 318, 320–321; peace operations contributed to by, 311, 331; peacebuilding functions of, 303, 320; peacekeeping activity of, 308–309; personalities of, 334; presence and use of, 307–308; requirements of, 305, 334–335; role performance and success of, 339fig; roles of, 302, 306, 333, 335–336, 339, 346–348; scope of action of, 326n60; Secretary-General parallels with, 306, 310; success of, 337–338; transformational leadership demonstrated by, 314, 319; as UN instrument, 311; as UN personification, 335, 336; of UNMIK, 340tab; UNSC mandates for, 312, 318, 320–321 Spinelli, Piero, 303 Sponsoring coalition, 29n4 SRSG. See Special representative of the Secretary General Stabilization Force (SFOR), 68 Stalin, Joseph, 291 Steiner, Michael, 7, 313, 332, 363; communicative role of, 345; Haekkerup compared to, 339, 344– 345, 346tab, 347; as manager, 344; as politician, 343; SRSG appointment of, 343

Strategy-oriented perspective, 14, 15, 31n25 Stress, 11–12 Structural factors: constitution of, 229; incentives as, 230; learning procedures as, 230; openness as, 229–230; organizational culture as, 230–231; resources as, 230 Style approach, 268, 270 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 66 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 71 Sydow, Jörg, 46, 54n7 Tannenbaum, Robert, 270 Task-oriented perspective, 14 TCE. See Transaction cost economics Team performance, diversity, leadership and, 280 Temporary network organizations: analysis in, 100–104; peace operations as, 6, 83, 84–85, 89–92, 163; permanent systems compared to, 90; project teams in, 91; tasks of, 90– 91; time influencing, 103; transition focus of, 91–92 Thant, U, 291 Thomae, Markus, 196 Thompson, James D., 14 Thomson, Patricia, 312 Toyama, Ryoko, 171 Training: capacity development and, 182–183; categories of, 181; challenges in, 182; DPKO policies for, 181; imitation learning in, 181; of international civilian workforce, 179– 180; for leadership, 182, 190n51, 211; as OL basis, 179–183 Trait approach, 18–19, 268–269 Transaction cost economics (TCE), 41, 61 Transaction costs: awareness of, 70; coordination of, 61; hierarchy related to, 70; hypotheses for, 70–71; theories of, 59 Transferability, 200 Transformational leadership, 7, 18–20; components of, 273; concerns for, 274; creative solutions found in, 274; inspirational motivation in, 281; as

Index promising, 282; SRSGs demonstrating, 314, 319; transactional leadership combined with, 272 Trettin, Frederik, 7, 313–314 Uhl-Bien, Mary, 277 Ulrich, Joachim G., 275–276 UN (United Nations), 244, 246; administrative procedures of, 2; assignments of, 304; authority lacking in, 94; career path definition in, 162; coherence for mandates of, 141; coordination as challenge for, 5; deployment forms of, 303; improving of, 49–51, 126; interoperability improved by, 49–50; knowledge of rules of, 62; learning strength of, 217; Liberian agencies of, 194; member state relations of, 291; members of, 298; membership changes of, 248; peace operations departments, 212n8; reform efforts of, 48; relationships of, 11; resource flow through, 49; SRSG as personification of, 335, 336; SRSG as prime instrument of, 311; structural differences in agencies of, 120; US assessing, 70–71 UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), 93, 181 UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), 296 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 193, 203 UN Communications Group (UNCG), 197 UN country team (UNCT), 116, 142, 144, 151, 305 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 68, 115, 117–121, 142, 165, 184, 219 UN field operations, 144–145, 155 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 66, 68, 71, 193, 203, 224 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 84, 96, 97, 98 UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 5, 67, 115; coordination in, 66, 68, 69; evidence and hypothesis on, 71; lessons from, 59

431

UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), 93 UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 7, 80n81, 172, 185, 331, 339, 340tab, 363 UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 6, 64, 84, 93, 98–100, 193; ACPA influencing, 148–149; coherence angle of, 141, 147, 154–155; elections in, 148–152; failures of, 154; field operations of, 150–151; IMP of, 150; leadership support from, 208; learning triggers from, 197; mandate deconstruction of, 150; personnel shortage in, 201; realities of, 196; UNSC mandate for, 147 UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), 2 UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), 93, 117, 162, 175–176, 181, 183, 185 UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 176, 190n46, 332 UN Security Council (UNSC), 12; failures of, 149; mandate of, 143– 144; peace operation mandates by, 83, 225; peacekeeping perspective of, 154; reform in, 248; role of, 239; Secretary-General as servant of, 289; SRSG mandates from, 312, 318, 320–321; status of, 293; UNMIL mandate from, 147 UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 172, 331 UNAMIS. See UN Advance Mission in the Sudan UNCG. See UN Communications Group UNCT. See UN country team UNDP. See UN Development Programme Ungson, Gerardo, 47 UNHCR. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNIFIL. See UN Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations. See UN United States (US), 70–71 UNMEE. See UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UNMIBH. See UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIK. See UN Mission in Kosovo

432

Index

UNMIL. See UN Mission in Liberia UNMIN. See UN Mission in Nepal UNMIS. See UN Mission in the Sudan UNSC. See UN Security Council UNTAET. See UN Transitional Administration in East Timor Urquhart, Brian, 291 US. See United States Vance, Cyrus, 319, 335 Veit, Alex, 241 Veith, Mehde, 254 Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 231, 315, 317, 319–320 Vroom, Victor H., 272 Waldheim, Kurt, 291 Watson, Charlotte, 112

Weber, Max, 20, 336 Weber, Steven, 225 WFP. See World Food Programme Whole-of-government approach, 127, 129 Williamson, Oliver E., 21, 76n12 Windeler, Arnold, 46, 54n7 Wisnumurti Guidelines, 295 Woodward, Susan, 53 Workforce diversity, 280–281 World Bank, 112, 244, 254 World Food Programme (WFP), 7, 197, 204 Wren, Daniel A., 47 Yetton, Philip W., 272 Young, Oran R., 313, 315 Yukl, Gary A., 334

About the Book

THIS GROUNDBREAKING BOOK BRINGS THE INSIGHTS OF ORGANIZATION

and public administration theories to the analysis and enhancement of complex peace operations. Focusing on three essential and interrelated aspects of organizations—coordination, learning, and leadership—the authors bridge the gap between research on UN peacekeeping and the realities confronted both in the office and in the field. Julian Junk is research fellow at both the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and the Goethe University of Frankfurt. Francesco Mancini is nonresident senior adviser at the International Peace Institute, assistant dean and visiting associate professor at the National University of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and adjunct associate professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Wolfgang Seibel is professor of politics and public administration at the University of Konstanz. Till Blume serves on the staff of the German Federal Foreign Office.

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