Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies) 3031385969, 9783031385964

Citation preview

RETHINKING PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES SERIES EDITORS: OLIVER P. RICHMOND · ANNIKA BJÖRKDAHL · GËZIM VISOKA

Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations

Edited by Alexander Gilder · David Curran · Georgina Holmes · Fiifi Edu-Afful

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

Series Editors Oliver P. Richmond, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK Annika Björkdahl, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden Gëzim Visoka, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland

This agenda-setting series of research monographs, now more than a decade old, provides an interdisciplinary forum aimed at advancing innovative new agendas for peace and conflict studies in International Relations. Many of the critical volumes the series has so far hosted have contributed to new avenues of analysis directly or indirectly related to the search for positive, emancipatory, and hybrid forms of peace. Constructive critiques of liberal peace, hybrid peace, everyday contributions to peace, the role of civil society and social movements, international actors and networks, as well as a range of different dimensions of peace (from peacebuilding, statebuilding, youth contributions, photography, and many case studies) have been explored so far. The series raises important political questions about what peace is, whose peace and peace for whom, as well as where peace takes place. In doing so, it offers new and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of the international peace architecture, peace processes, UN peacebuilding, peacekeeping and mediation, statebuilding, and localised peace formation in practice and in theory. It examines their implications for the development of local peace agency and the connection between emancipatory forms of peace and global justice, which remain crucial in different conflict-affected regions around the world. This series’ contributions offer both theoretical and empirical insights into many of the world’s most intractable conflicts, also investigating increasingly significant evidence about blockages to peace. This series is indexed by Scopus.

Alexander Gilder · David Curran · Georgina Holmes · Fiifi Edu-Afful Editors

Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations

Editors Alexander Gilder School of Law University of Reading Reading, UK Georgina Holmes School of Social Sciences and Global Studies The Open University Milton Keynes, UK

David Curran Centre for Trust, Peace, and Social Relations Coventry University Coventry, UK Fiifi Edu-Afful Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Accra, Ghana

ISSN 1759-3735 ISSN 2752-857X (electronic) Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies ISBN 978-3-031-38595-7 ISBN 978-3-031-38596-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover design by © MC Richmond This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Marketing Text

Bringing together multidisciplinary perspectives on the future of UN peace operations, this book explores the interrelated dynamics of UN peace operations and peacebuilding practices through the lenses of conflict resolution, protection and accountability. The collection includes coverage of issues ranging from strengthening partnerships between regional institutions and the UN; improving UN policing and stabilisation mechanisms; the application of new technologies in peace operations and implementing security sector reform; to ending sexual exploitation and abuse and enhancing the protection of children. Authors place people at the centre of peacekeeping by interrogating current and past UN initiatives, chart how peacekeeping is evolving in response to changes in global security, assess reform and norm change within missions themselves, and offer original perspectives on the future of UN peace operations. Contributions also include new and innovative theoretical and empirical research located across multiple disciplines, including political science, history, law, gender studies, and criminology.

v

Contents

The Future Trajectory of UN Peace Operations Alexander Gilder, David Curran, Georgina Holmes, and Fiifi Edu-Afful

1

Reforming Security Reforming Security Institutions: Implications of Local Actors’ Incorporation on the Construction of Democratic Security Environments Alessandra Jungs de Almeida and Juliana Viggiano International Policing and/as the Future of UN Peace Operations Charles T. Hunt

21

43

Resolving Conflict and Ensuring Protection Attack Helicopters: Key Enablers for Peace Enforcement and the Protection of Civilians A. Walter Dorn The Future Dynamics Between UN Stabilisation and UN Peace Operations: Conflict Management Versus Conflict Resolution Shannon Zimmerman

71

91

vii

viii

CONTENTS

UNTSO: The Future of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East Diego Salama

113

Strengthening Partnerships The Future of United Nations-African Union (UN-AU) Cooperation on Peace and Security: Lessons Learnt from the AU-UN Joint Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Ruth Adwoa Frimpong The Islamic Conception of Peacebuilding (Hifz Al-Salam) Under the Auspices of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Nation’s Sustaining Peace Agenda Mohammad Sabuj Advancing a Children, Peace and Security Agenda for the Future of UN Peacekeeping Dustin Johnson, Catherine Baillie Abidi, Laura Cleave, and Shelly Whitman

131

151

173

Ensuring Future Accountability Accountability for Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse: Rethinking Relationships Sabrina White

197

Safeguarding Children from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Lessons for the Future Sarah Blakemore, Rosa Freedman, and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert

223

An Alternative Approach: The African Union’s SEA Regulatory Framework Ai Kihara-Hunt and Róisín Burke

245

Index

273

Notes on Contributors

Catherine Baillie Abidi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Child and Youth Study at Mount Saint Vincent University, in Nova Scotia, Canada. She has extensive experience practising, researching and teaching in the areas of children, peace and security, violence prevention and transformation, security sector reform and participatory social action. As a scholarly practitioner, she prioritizes participatory research with communities and has over twenty-five years of humanitarian and community social action experience which has led to new social policy and enhanced children’s rights frameworks. She oversees multiple research projects exploring the interconnections between peacekeeping, gender, childhood and moral injury and has established an international community of practice focused on children and armed conflict. She has also authored/co-edited three books exploring peace and conflict, with particular emphasis on children’s and youth’s perspectives, including: Pedagogies for Building Cultures of Peace: Challenging Constructions of an Enemy (Brill). Sarah Blakemore is CEO of Keeping Children Safe Global, President and CEO of Keeping Children Safe USA. She is a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Reading School of Law and a Doctoral Researcher at Brunel University London, College of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences. She leads a team to deliver capacity-strengthening and advocacy on child safeguarding, PSEAH and other abuses of power in over 120 countries, with a specific focus on context-specific, culturally sensitive and ix

x

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

survivor-centred approaches to safeguarding. She previously worked with International Campaign to Ban Landmines—Cluster Munition Coalition, End Water Poverty, Save the Children UK, Oxfam, and as a freelance journalist. Róisín Burke is an Assistant Professor of Public International Law at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM), Utrecht University, Netherlands. Her present and past work, publications and teaching have cut across the areas of international criminal law, international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, women peace and security (WPS), peace operations, international security law, rule of law programming in conflict-affected states, legal pluralism and public international law. She is leading an NWO project related to WPS, transboundary water security and environmental peacebuilding in the South Caucasus. She has been consultant on projects related to gender, human rights, IHL, mercenaries and peacebuilding with NGOs, and international and regional bodies. Previously, she was a Senior Law Lecturer at the University of Canterbury and worked as Political Advisor to the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN. She holds a doctorate from the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, University of Melbourne (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Status Quo and Responsibility under International Law (Brill, 2014)). She holds a LL.B. in Law and European Studies (UL) and an LL.M. in International Human Rights Law (Irish Centre for Human Rights) and is admitted as an Attorney in New York State. Laura Cleave is the Gender, Youth and Social Inclusion Lead at Vanguard Economics in Kigali, Rwanda, where she leads a team of young qualitative researchers and supports a wide range of social development projects, from researching the impact of climate change on women in Rwanda to the access of youth to dignified and fulfilling employment opportunities. Previously, she worked as a Research and Learning Advisor for the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security, where she worked on the Knowledge for Prevention (K4P) project to develop an early warning system for children’s engagement in conflict, organized an annual international research symposium on child protection and recruitment prevention, and led the K4P Youth Advisory Committee and K4P Community of Practice. She also worked for the Government of Canada on consultation and accommodation policy with Indigenous groups, for the Senate of the Republic of Ireland and for various human rights

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xi

driven NGOs in Canada, Morocco and South Korea. She has a M.Phil. in International Peace Studies from Trinity College Dublin and a BSS in International Development and Globalization from the University of Ottawa. David Curran is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations. His primary research investigates the interaction between the fields of conflict resolution and military peacekeeping. He has investigated this in his monograph More than Fighting for Peace?: Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Training Military Personnel, published with Springer (2016). He has authored articles on the evolution of peacekeeping doctrine, civilian protection and the United Kingdom’s relationship with UN peacekeeping in International Peacekeeping, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Global Governance, and Civil Wars. A. Walter Dorn is Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and the Canadian Forces College. He teaches officers of rank Major to Brigadier-General from Canada and about 20 other countries. As an “operational professor”, he also assists international organizations and participates in field missions. For instance, he served as a UN Electoral Officer for the 1999 referendum in East Timor and a Visiting Professional with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2010. The UN’s Department of Peace Operations has frequently hired him, including for service in 2014 on the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping. In 2020, during sabbatical leave, he served with the UN as a “Technology Innovation Expert” exploring technologies for testing, piloting and employing in UN field operations. Two of his books are Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, 2014) and Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology, and Innovation in UN Peace Operations (UNU Press, 2011). He is also developing digital simulations of peace operations for training and education (www.peacek eepingsim.net). His website, with selected publications, is found at www. walterdorn.net. Fiifi Edu-Afful is a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). He was an Adjunct Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Rhodes University, University of Professional Studies (Ghana) and the Ghana Armed Forces

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Command and Staff College (GAFCSC). He has nearly 12 years’ experience authoring, teaching and facilitating on conflict, peace and security. Between 2013 and 2014, he served as an Advisory Team Member for the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN peacekeeping. He has also served as a lead facilitator and consultant for the African Centre for the Study & Research on Terrorism (ACSRT/CAERT) and has been a specialist on KAIPTC courses on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in Fragile, Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations. He is a 2013 laureate for the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal. He is currently undertaking research on inclusive peacebuilding and peacekeeping exit frameworks, Domestic Security Implication of UN peacekeeping, improving Response Capacities to Terrorism in Peacekeeping Theatres in Africa and Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Conflict. Rosa Freedman is the inaugural Professor of Law, Conflict and Global Development at the University of Reading. She received her LL.B., LL.M. and Ph.D. from the University of London and is a non-practising barrister and member of the Honourable Society of Gray’s Inn. Freedman’s research focuses on the UN and human rights. She has published extensively on UN human rights bodies and systems, and on UN peacekeeping and accountability for human rights abuses. She is a Visiting Fellow at the London Centre for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism. She is a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Civil Society Advisory Board on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, is a Specialist Adviser on safeguarding to the UK government International Development Committee and sits on the UK FCDO Steering Committee. Ruth Adwoa Frimpong is a researcher on peace and security. She holds a Master of Arts degree in Conflict, Peace and Security from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science with Geography and Resource Development from the University of Ghana. She currently serves as an advisor on the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security’s Youth Advisory Committee. In 2022, she was selected as one of the beneficiaries from the fifteen ECOWAS member states to participate in a one-year professional programme with ECOWAS. While there, she worked as a security analyst (terrorism and violent extremism) with the Directorate of Early Warning under the Office of the Vice President. Her publications cover

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xiii

thematic areas such as human security, peacebuilding, gender and peace support operations and security sector governance. Her recent publication in 2023 with the Institute of Security Studies borders on Partnerships for the Implementation of the African Union’s Human Security Agenda in African Perspectives and Assessments of the AU at 20: Challenges and Prospects. Alexander Gilder is Associate Professor of International Law and Security at the School of Law, University of Reading, UK, and Associate Faculty at the School of Humanitarian Studies, Royal Roads University, Canada. His research investigates various aspects of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding including stabilization, counter-terrorism, the rule of law, the protection of civilians and security sector reform. His monograph, Stabilization and Human Security in UN Peace Operations, was published by Routledge in 2022. He has authored articles in journals such as International Peacekeeping, Global Policy, the Journal of Conflict & Security Law and the Netherlands International Law Review as well as contributing to major works such as The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies. He is a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of International Peacekeeping and the Asian Yearbook of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Georgina Holmes is Lecturer in Politics and International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the Open University, UK, and a Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK. Her research investigates gender and international security governance, with specific focus on norm implementation and practice change in international organisations and in militaries engaged in peacekeeping. She has conducted extensive field research with militaries and training academies in Rwanda, Ghana and the UK. She is an academic advisor on Women, Peace and Security for the British Army’s training team; co-founder of the BISA Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Working Group and a trustee of the British International Studies Association. Her work is published in Security Dialogue; International Peacekeeping; Millennium: Journal of International Studies; Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding; Genocide Studies and Prevention and The RUSI Journal. She is the author of Women and War in Rwanda: Gender, Media and the Representation of Genocide (I.B Tauris, 2013, paperback 2020).

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Charles T. Hunt is Associate Professor of Global Security in the School of Global, Urban & Social Studies at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. He is also Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research and Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Security Studies (Addis Ababa). His research is focused on the changing nature of UN peace operations, international policing, human protection and peacebuilding in conflict-affected states. He has worked extensively across Africa including recent field research in South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. She is author/editor of six books and over forty peer-reviewed articles and chapters, Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly journal Global Responsibility to Protect and on the editorial boards of International Peacekeeping and the Journal of International Peacekeeping. His work aims to combine academic rigour with practical engagement to improve policy. He has wide-ranging knowledge and experience of the UN policy community and has been commissioned to write numerous policy papers, practical handbooks and guidance on issues of peace and security including for the Australian government, the United Nations and selected member states, the African Union and a number of international NGOs. Dustin Johnson is a Research Advisor at the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada, where he has worked as a researcher since 2016. He is also a fourth year doctoral student in peace and development research in the School of Global Studies at the University of Gothenburg in Gothenburg, Sweden. His research focuses on gender and child protection in United Nations peacekeeping, alongside research interests in early warning systems in armed conflict, children and armed conflict, and the politics of childhood. Previous to the Dallaire Institute, he worked in NGO and university research positions in the United States, Canada and Mongolia, and he holds a masters in resource and environmental management from Dalhousie University. Alessandra Jungs de Almeida is a Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) and a visiting student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where she works as a research assistant at the Data + Feminism Lab, MIT. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) and a B.A. in International Relations from the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), with a period

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xv

of studying in International Studies at the University of Santiago de Chile (USACH). Her main research agenda explores gender and feminist dimensions in International Relations research, specifically the transnational activism on sexual and reproductive rights, violence against women and peacebuilding. Ai Kihara-Hunt is Professor at the Graduate Program on Human Security, the University of Tokyo. She is also Director of International Law Training and Research Hub and Director of the Global Research Center for Sustainable Peace at the University. She also serves as Secretary at the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS). Her main area of research is UN Peace Operations, in particular the UN Police, accountability and human rights. In 2016, she served on the UN Police Doctrinal Development Group as the representative of Japan. Between 1998 and 2016, she worked for the UN Office of the High-Commissioner for Human Rights (UN-OHCHR), UN High-Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Peace Operations (UNTAET, UNAMET), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and in academia, in Nepal, East Timor/Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Japan. Her position included trainer and security sector focal point, as well as project manager and mapping officer for the first transitional justice project at the UN-OHCHR in Nepal. She has PhD (Law) from the University of Essex. Her main publication is Holding UNPOL to Account: Individual Criminal Accountability of UN Police Personnel (Brill, 2017). Nicolas Lemay-Hébert is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. His latest books are Normalization in World Politics (co-authored with Gezim Visoka, University of Michigan Press, 2022) and the Law and Practice of Peacekeeping (co-authored with Rosa Freedman and Siobhan Wills, Cambridge University Press, 2021). His research interests include resistance to international peacekeeping; mapping practices and interventions; chromatology of security; and the political economy of interventions. Mohammad Sabuj is a Lecturer in Law at Royal Holloway, University of London. He teaches Islamic Law, Public International Law and Land Law in the School of Law and Social Sciences. He has published widely

xvi

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

on Islamic Law and Public International Law issues. He is the author of The Legitimacy of Use of Force in Public and Islamic International Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). He was called to the Bar of England and Wales by the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, London, in 2014. Diego Salama is a Ph.D. candidate in the History of International Relations at Leiden University. His research focuses on the history of the United Nations in the Israel-Arab conflict with an emphasis on InterOperation Collaboration between the peacekeeping operations working in the region and evaluating the extent to which the Secretariat played an effective political role in conflict management. Juliana Viggiano is an Associate Professor of International Politics in the Department of Economics and International Relations at Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil. She is a Researcher at the Institute of Memory and Human Rights (IMDH-UFSC) and the International Relations Research Center (NUPRI-USP). Her research interests are currently on security sector transformation, human rights in Latin America and security issues in Latin America. Sabrina White is a Ph.D. student in Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds, UK. Her Economic and Social Research Councilfunded research focuses on gender and accountability in global governance, particularly the integrity system for addressing sexual exploitation and sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping. This work has also been supported by the United Nations Association-UK and their Mission Justice Campaign on accountability of UN peacekeepers. She is also a gender consultant working on anti-corruption in conflict-affected contexts and victim and survivor-centred approaches to sexual violence. Shelly Whitman is the Executive Director of the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security based at Dalhousie University, Canada. As the Executive Director, she has spearheaded the establishment and growth of the organization as an internationally recognized institute. She has been instrumental in creating a number of key, international agreements and policies on the protection of children but most notable was the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in 2017. Prior to her work with the Dallaire Institute, she worked on the inter-Congolese dialogue and the OAU Rwanda Genocide Report. She has also enjoyed an academic career teaching in International Development Studies and Political Science at

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xvii

Dalhousie University, Saint Mary’s University and the University of Botswana and currently is an Adjunct Professor at Dalhousie University. Shannon Zimmerman is a Lecturer at Deakin University and the Australian War College. Prior to this, she was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. Her research investigates peace operations, specifically the protection of civilians in conflict environments characterized by asymmetric threats. She also studies misogyny motivated terrorism, looking at the online groups in the “Manosphere”. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Queensland in 2019 and her Masters in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University in 2012.

List of Figures

Attack Helicopters: Key Enablers for Peace Enforcement and the Protection of Civilians Fig. 1

Fig. 2

a. Map of Central African Republic and its major towns and b. close-up of the Bria-Ippy-Bambari axis, with fires used to indicate clashes (Sources (A) Wikipedia from CIA [public domain], and (B) drawn from Google Maps) The Mi-35 Attack Helicopter deployed in MINUSCA by Senegal. The camera pod is at the very front of the aircraft below the abbreviation “UN.” Also observable is a slim rocket on one stub wing alongside the larger external fuel tank. The Gatling gun is next to the gunner station, and the pilot sits higher up in the aircraft (Source MINUSCA, 2017)

78

80

Accountability for Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse: Rethinking Relationships Fig. 1

Fig. 2

References to sexual misconduct in peacekeeping missions in reports of the Secretary-General on gender mainstreaming, 1997–2021 Normative references in reports of the Secretary-General on SEA, 2004–2021

206 209

xix

The Future Trajectory of UN Peace Operations Alexander Gilder, David Curran, Georgina Holmes, and Fiifi Edu-Afful

The Need to Look to the Future As the United Nations (UN)’s efforts to keep the peace constantly evolve, those working in and researching UN missions must regularly ask, ‘What should the future of UN peace operations look like’? In a process of continual learning and innovation, the UN has shifted both the activities and key priorities of UN peacekeepers over the decades, notably with the introduction of the protection of civilians (PoC) mandates in the 2000s. From small missions that observe well-established ceasefires to large multidimensional missions that implement broad peacebuilding mandates,

A. Gilder (B) School of Law, University of Reading, Reading, UK e-mail: [email protected] D. Curran Centre for Trust, Peace, and Social Relations, Coventry University, Coventry, UK e-mail: [email protected] G. Holmes School of Social Sciences and Global Studies, The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_1

1

2

A. GILDER ET AL.

future missions could take many forms as conflict evolves. However, there have been no new UN peace operations since 2014, while in 2022 all five of the peace operations deployed by regional organizations have been criticized for being more focused on military intervention than on promoting and protecting human rights and building institutions (Pfeifer 2023). Pressures within the Security Council to downsize UN peace operations and do more for less (Coleman 2020; de Coning 2021); seismic geopolitical shifts, including the rise of China as a financial and military global power (Karlsrud 2023) and the growing rivalry between Russia and the West; increasing fragmentation and concomitantly, multilateralism within the international system, has meant practitioners and researchers are driving forward thinking on how to keep UN practices relevant and appropriate to respond effectively to conflict while ensuring both UN member states and host states remain committed to peacekeeping. Existing militarized, liberal interventionist approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding are increasingly perceived to be inadequate (Moe and Stepputat 2018; Karlsrud 2019). Large-scale missions in the 2010s such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) faced numerous challenges that were unprecedented for UN peace operations. For example, to implement their PoC mandate, UNMISS converted its bases to PoC sites that at their peak housed upwards of 200,000 civilians (Gilder 2021). MINUSMA was tasked with working alongside the French Operation Barkhane and regional G5 Sahel Joint Force to counter extremism and terrorist activity in the north of Mali (Karlsrud 2019). MINUSCA needed to extend state authority beyond the capital, Bangui, and has sought to end impunity through its support for a hybrid court to prosecute crimes committed during the conflict (Gilder 2022). Lastly, MONUSCO was mandated to include a Force Intervention Brigade in 2013 which sought to ‘neutralize’ rebel groups, an unprecedented shift into the realms of peace enforcement (Tull 2018).

F. Edu-Afful Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

3

However, these missions, while still deployed to this day, have all faced challenges and changes in circumstances that draw into question what the future holds for UN activities in Mali, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). After two military coups and the introduction of the Wagner Group to the conflict, Mali has lost much of its support from the international community. Multiple states had been willing to intervene in Mali and the wider Sahel region to prevent the further entrenchment of extremism and spread of terrorist activity. In particular, European states have been said to have externalized their borders into Africa which incentivized both EU missions in the region and an increased contribution from EU and NATO member states to MINUSMA (Charbonneau 2021). On 15 May 2022, Mali withdrew from the G5 Sahel and halted its contribution to the G5’s Joint Force that was using offensive force to defeat terrorist groups in the region (United Nations 2022b). This decision triggered a chain reaction throughout the year which saw the French Operation Barkhane withdraw in November 2022 after over 8 years using military force to combat terrorism alongside Malian forces. Similarly, the European Union’s Takuba Task Force that was operating alongside Malian Forces withdrew in June 2022. Facing a radically different security environment MINUSMA needed to operate in the absence of the transitional government the mission supported for much of its deployment and without international forces using offensive force to quell terrorist activity. With these difficulties coming to a head in 2023, MINUSMA was asked to withdraw ‘without delay’ by Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2690 specifying that the mission aims to complete its withdrawal by 31 December 2023 (United Ntions 2023b). The 2020s have also seen a shift in South Sudan and the DRC and an increase in peacekeeper fatalities. The UN described UNMISS’ PoC sites as ‘uncharted territory’ as peacekeepers sought to provide protection from outside threats as well as internal threats from within the PoC sites (United Nations 2014). UN forces provided perimeter security but long-term internal security on these large PoC sites was something the UN had not prepared for, nor had had previous experience of managing (Sharland and Gorur 2015; Paddon Rhoads and Sutton 2020). The UN was essentially governing large cities which it was not prepared for in terms of powers under the mandate or the policies in place (Ibreck and Pendle 2016). Until late 2020, UNMISS’ protection of civilian (PoC) sites housed approximately 170,000 civilians (United Nations 2020a).

4

A. GILDER ET AL.

But since September 2020, the UN has been working towards the redesignation of its PoC sites to internally displaced persons camps under the jurisdiction of the South Sudanese government. By 2021, all but one of the PoC sites had been redesignated with only the Malakal site remaining under UN control in 2023. MONUSCO faced backlash in 2022 after long brewing dissatisfaction with the mission’s inability to protect civilians. In July 2022, violence broke out between MONUSCO and protesters (Weenink 2022). Protesters forcibly entered bases, looted and destroyed UN property, set fire to UN residences, and took weapons from Congolese police and used them to open fire on UN peacekeepers (UN 2022a). The UN has condemned these actions as war crimes committed against peacekeepers, but there must also be recognition of how broad PoC mandates have contributed to the conditions leading to the violent protests. Several days after protests began, UN peacekeepers opened fire for ‘unexplained reasons’, killing two protesters (United Nations 2022c). With 36 people killed during the protests in July, MONUSCO has found itself in a ‘crisis of confidence’ (United Nations 2022d). This example exemplifies where the UN has raised the expectations of local communities and failed to deliver the sense of security expected. How then can the UN better temper expectations and simultaneously improve its performance in the future?

Past Reform and Current Challenges As mission-led evolution has been at considerable pace, the UN Secretariat has often sought to keep up or stay ahead of the pace of change. These efforts may arrive at the strategic level, manifested through landmark reports and initiatives led explicitly by the Secretary-General, senior actors external to the UN apparatus (Riis Andersen 2018, p. 5), or driven by partnerships with external organizations (de Coning 2021). The efforts are also built on through the development of guidance and policy which turns the aspiration into some form of reality for those working in operations. As this short chronological survey of the evolution of ideas associated with robust peacekeeping and peacebuilding shows, peace operations have been subject to varying degrees of policy change and reform. The 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (known as the ‘Brahimi Report’) was the first attempt at reshaping UNDPKO practice

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

5

following the failures of missions in the 1990s, such as UNAMIR and UNPROFOR (United Nations 2000), while at the same time reacting to the problematic UNAMSIL intervention in Sierra Leone. The report offered significant challenges to accepted approaches to peacekeeping. Firstly, it advocated robust peacekeeping, whereby UN peacekeepers be authorized to use force against what it termed as ‘spoilers’ to a peace process. Brahimi argued that Rules of Engagement (ROEs) should ‘not limit contingents stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are charged to protect’. It also hinted at a proactive element of using force, stating that in ‘particularly dangerous situations’, ROEs should not ‘force United Nations Contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers’ (UN 2000, p. 9). As well as being tied to sources of fire against peacekeepers themselves, this also had effects on another area of expansion in UN peacekeeping, the capacity of missions to protect civilians in areas of deployment. Here, the report advocated that peacekeepers ‘who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means’ (United Nations 2000). Another key area of reform driven by the Brahimi Report was in institutionalizing multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping, incorporating peacebuilding at the micro- and macro-levels. The report took issue with past practices for their ‘fundamental deficiency in the way it… conceived of, funded and implemented peacebuilding strategies and activities’ (United Nations 2000). The panel recommended the use of quick impact projects (QIPs) to provide rapid and real improvements to quality of life. This is needed to ‘make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission area’ (United Nations 2000). In addition, the report suggested that elections must take place alongside effective civilian governance and respect for human rights. Instead of merely documenting unacceptable behaviour, the UN police forces would be asked to train local police and other civilian contingents of judicial and human rights experts may be needed for the establishment of the rule of law. This paved the way for the crucial role we see today where the mission assists the host state in realizing its human rights obligations and materially supports rebuilding the rule of law. The publication of the United Nations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine) followed the changes regarding the areas outlined above and demonstrated the solidifying of commitments

6

A. GILDER ET AL.

made at a strategic level through the development of operational guidance. With regard to the use of force, the Capstone Doctrine has been described as a move towards robust peacekeeping (Gerchicoff 2013). The Capstone Doctrine supported the mandating of missions to use of all necessary means to ‘deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/ or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order’ (United Nations 2008). The Capstone Doctrine distinguishes between, but does not denounce, robust peacekeeping which uses force at the tactical level with the consent of the host nation and peace enforcement where, under Chapter 7, the Security Council authorizes force without consent of the main parties. The Capstone Doctrine importantly elaborates on the peacebuilding activities of operations, formalizing various practices that were trialled in late 1990s and early 2000s missions. The Doctrine outlines that for sustainable peace, there needs to be progress in the following areas; restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain public order, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights, support the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes, and promote social and economic recovery. Recognizing that peace operations are not able to carry out this work alone, the Doctrine explains that the UN regularly plays a supportive role in achieving these goals through DDR, de-mining, security sector reform, protection and promotion of human rights, electoral assistance, and supporting the entrenchment of state authority. Many of these aforementioned activities feature in missions to this day as missions continue to implement wide-ranging multidimensional mandates. As peacekeeping entered the 2010s, the requirement for reflection on peace operations remained. The 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was established to comprehensively assess the current state of peace operations giving special attention to issues facing operations such as the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, challenges to peacebuilding and good office, administrative and planning challenges, human rights and the protection of civilians (United Nations 2015). As a result, the HIPPO report places ‘persistent emphasis’ on strengthening the political, rather than the military, aspects of UN deployments (Riis Andersen 2018, p. 17). The term ‘peacekeeping’ is placed within a broader framework of ‘peace operations’, incorporating political missions, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

7

report identifies the benefit in this approach, as under this umbrella, all UN deployments are embraced as a ‘single spectrum of peace and security missions’, thereby facilitating seamless transition between each (UN 2015, p. 15). The report took a nuanced view of robust peacekeeping, suggesting that different levels of force would ideally be proportionate to the type of threat that was posed by ‘spoiler’ groups in the conflict zone (spoilers defined as ‘those who lie outside and seek to undermine the peace process including through violent means’ [UN 2015, p. 29]). This would range from deterrence, containment, via deterrence and coercion, to direct confrontation, particularly when civilians or peacekeepers are at risk (UN 2015, p. 33). Yet the HIPPO report outlines three different ways in which UN operations are entering uncharted territory regarding the use of robust force. Firstly, it notes that peacekeeping missions, traditionally established for ‘peace implementation’, are assuming a ‘conflict management role’. Missions asked to undertake conflict management are deployed amidst violent conflict, in areas where there exists an absence of a viable peace process, or where the peace process has effectively broken down. Operations assuming this role are expected to help in deterring escalation, containing conflict, protecting civilians and attempting to start or revive a peace process, thus necessitating necessary military capabilities, and a ‘robust deterrent posture’ at mission start-up (UN 2015, p. 29). Secondly, the report notes that missions were undertaking counter-insurgency style campaigns, particularly in Mali (MINUSMA), and made clear that ‘due to their composition and character’, peacekeeping operations ‘are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations’ (UN 2015, p. 31). This followed concern that the MINUSMA operation—outlined by the force commander of the mission itself—was engaging in a ‘a terrorist-fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate or adequate training, equipment, logistics or intelligence to deal with such a situation’ (UN 2014; Boutellis 2015, p. 2). Thirdly, HIPPO outlined the emergence of ‘stabilization’ missions deployed over the previous decade, whereby three current UN Missions (MINUSMA, MINUSCA, MONUSCO) have the word ‘stabilization’ in the title. The report notes that: the Security Council and the Secretariat have used the term ‘stabilization’ for a number of missions that support the extension or restoration of state authority and, in at least one case, during ongoing armed conflict.

8

A. GILDER ET AL.

The term stabilization has a wide range of interpretations, and the Panel believes the usage of this term by the United Nations requires clarification. (UN 2015, p. 30)

The HIPPO report’s recommendations on the impacts of these new operating environments appear cautious. This highlights what Riis Anderson sees as a debate between the authors of the report, who demonstrate scepticism towards peacekeeping becoming overtly robust, and member states on the UN Security Council who are more enthusiastic about increasing military responses to violent conflict. As a result, Riis Anderson notes no ‘broad based consensus on prioritizing political solutions and conflict prevention over a militarized emphasis on countering violent extremism’ (Riis Andersen 2018, p. 19). As can be seen from how these three reports approach these two areas, contradictory processes of change are often articulated in UN policy, with the UN Secretariat simultaneously seeking to shape, guide and push back against key policy developments. Since the HIPPO Report, the conditions have changed yet again. The UN budget for its peace operations steadily declined year on year from $8.27 billion in 2015/16 to $6.37 billion in 2021/22. Amidst a declining budget, we have seen contestation within the UN over the role that its peacekeepers should play in conflict resolution. For instance, conflation between stabilization and peacebuilding activities presents continued challenges to deciphering best practices and the pathways for mapping the future of UN peace operations (Hunt and Curran 2020). Russia, China and others remain sceptical of the protection of civilians and increasingly robust uses of force that threaten to undermine the sovereignty of states (Sharland 2019; Barelli 2022). The establishment of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in 2000 with the endorsement of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent related resolutions concerning preventing and responding to Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), has raised awareness of the UN’s lack of accountability mechanisms; the requirement to better train peacekeepers and establish due diligence around legal responsibility for wrongful acts (Basu and Confortini 2017; Freedman 2018; Hirschmann 2019; Westendorf 2020). The push for more gender-responsive peacekeeping and the requirement to work with regional partners to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

9

also remain central priorities for the UN in shaping current and future missions (Holmes 2020). Concurrently, the UN has initiated several initiatives aimed at driving forward consensus on peacekeeping practices and changing the organization’s approach to conflict resolution. In 2018, the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) launched to ‘create peacekeeping operations fit for the future’ (United Nations 2018b). Through a focus on various aspects of peace operations, such as finding lasting political solutions for sustainable peace, increasing the participation of women in peace processes, adopting preventative steps to reduce sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and engaging with a wide range of partners such as the AU and EU to better plan and strengthen missions, A4P aims to shape ongoing discussions within the organization and build consensus with member states and troop contributing countries. The HIPPO report and the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (hereafter AGE report) also launched the Sustaining Peace Agenda in 2016. This has driven the UN to change its approach to conflict by increasingly prioritizing national and local ownership to promote the prevention of conflict (United Nations 2018a). The UN has committed to strengthening partnerships with civil society and other actors to work together on sustaining peace while recognizing the UN’s development programmes and agencies are key for conflict prevention. Despite these holistic efforts to move discussions towards viewing UN peace operations as part of the wider UN apparatus for conflict prevention and sustainable peace, tensions between peacekeeping and peacebuilding continue to slow progress (von Billerbeck 2016). In 2021, UN Secretary-General Guterres published Our Common Agenda, a wide reaching report intended to drive reform of the UN to mark its seventy-fifth anniversary. Part of this is a proposal for a ‘new agenda for peace’, which focuses on six areas: • Reducing strategic risks. • Strengthening international foresight and capacities to identify and adapt to new peace and security risks. Reshaping our responses to all forms of violence. • Investing in prevention and peacebuilding. • Supporting regional prevention.

10

A. GILDER ET AL.

• Putting women and girls at the centre of security policy. With regard to the impact on peacekeeping operations, there are two notable points. Firstly, there is a significant focus on prevention and peacebuilding throughout the report, ranging from deep long-term conflict prevention (through arms control and reduction of weapons of mass destruction), short-term prevention (resourcing programmes focused on conflict prevention at national and international level), through to adequate and regular funding of peacebuilding programmes in the UN (such as the Peacebuilding Fund), and increased resourcing of the Peacebuilding Commission so it can expand its role thematically and geographically. The second impact is in supporting regional prevention efforts. The broader point the Secretary-General makes in this report is that the relations between the UN and regional actors require ‘further consolidation’ in order to prevent and respond to insecurity (United Nations 2021, p. 44). More specifically, it has led to proposals relating to predictable and sustainable financing of African Union peace support operations. This initiative has been led by the Secretary-General, who argued in 2023 that: [T]his is an opportune, timely moment for the [UN] Security Council to rise to the challenge of laying the foundation for a new generation of African Union-led, United Nations- supported peace operations on the African continent that blend the respective strength of both organizations in a manner that prioritizes political solutions and maximizes the impact of both uniformed and civilian capabilities. (United Nations, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council (United Nations 2023a)

These initiatives provide scope for researchers and practitioners to collaborate to generate new thinking on UN peace operations alongside the active reconsideration of how the UN should both keep and build peace. In 2022, the UN peace operation budget grew for the first time since 2015 (Forti 2022). While this may not be the strongest sign that the international community intends to commit to the growth of peacekeeping, there may be opportunities for those working on peacekeeping issues to drive changes in policy that help maintain the hard-fought

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

11

consensus on current operations. In this edited book, contributors specifically delve into a variety of challenges faced by UN peace operations and make proposals for the future that may help sustain contributions to peacekeeping, incentivize cooperation between member states and reshape UN approaches to peacekeeping. Exploring processes of adaptation and change in different bureaucratic and mission contexts, the book specifically engages with the future of UN peace operations to provide an important resource for scholars and practitioners interested in the evolution of current and future UN missions.

A Pragmatic Future for UN Peace Operations Moe and Stepputat (2018) call for a ‘pragmatic turn’ in peacebuilding to mitigate against the failings of liberal interventionist approaches. They contend that pragmatic responses incorporate a series of toolkits that bring into dialogue ‘perspectives on the realpolitik of stabilization, the apparent retreat of liberal idealism, and the bottom-up focus on contextualizing efforts to sustain peace’ (Moe and Stepputat 2018, p. 295). This may require new actors and organizations to respond to the complexities of contemporary and future peace challenges. Karlsrud (2023, p. 8) also observes a pragmatic turn in peacekeeping noting, for example, that UN support missions may operate in parallel to ‘regional and ad hoc counterterrorism operations’ while drawing on the bureaucratic and logistical of the UN’ without ‘needing to adhere to UN principles of impartiality, consent and non-use of force’. With constantly shifting partnerships and security environments, the UN cannot always wait for strategic-level change and instead must take a pragmatic view of how to facilitate incremental reform that will respond to the needs of TCCs, host states and local populations. In a similar vein, the contributors of this book adopt a pragmatic approach to reform to identify future pathways for UN peace operations. Above all, they reflect on how the UN could more effectively implement the Sustaining Peace Agenda and related strategic priorities aimed at making peace operations more people-centred. Bringing together a range of academics and practitioners, the book provides multidisciplinary understandings on current issues in peacekeeping and peacebuilding to address many of the pressing questions facing current and future crises. Overall, the central research question asked is, how can we re-envision peace operations to become more responsive and adaptive in the future?

12

A. GILDER ET AL.

Contributors are located across multiple academic disciplines, including political science, history, law, global development and sociology. Scholars apply a range of critical and theoretical perspectives including gendered and postcolonial perspectives to critically assess current trends and to identify pathways for future peace operations. To achieve this, the editors have prioritized voices that are often marginalized in the mainstream debates on peacekeeping and have ensured there is strong representation from women, early career researchers and scholars from the Global South. This has led to a large geographic spread, with the inclusion of authors researching peacekeeping and peace missions from Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Ghana, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and US. Contributors adopt a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods to offer new and critical perspectives on how to address deficiencies identified by the research, with the concerted aim to generate new thinking on the future of UN peace operations. The chapters included in the book have been organized into four themes: reforming security, resolving conflict and ensuring protection, strengthening partnerships and ensuring future accountability. In the first theme, reforming security, Alessandra Jungs de Almeida and Juliana Viggiano each discuss local actors in security sector reform. They identify a failure by the UN to outline the role of local actors in security sector reform (SSR) processes; they consider how informal security mechanisms could be more responsive to the needs of communities and argue that a fundamental shift in the approach to peacebuilding and UN reporting would improve the outcomes of SSR. Drawing on recent research in the disciplines of criminology and sociology, Charles T. Hunt examines how the design and configuration of missions can shift to place police at the centre. Building on the advantages brought to missions by police contingents, the UN can reorientate existing approaches to elevate the role of police to create viable opportunities for peacekeeping success. Under the second theme, which focuses on resolving conflict and ensuring protection, Walter Dorn and Shannon Zimmerman each offer an original critique of current protection approaches to investigate practical limitations that arise when protection strategies are implemented in UN peace operations. Dorn assesses the use of attack helicopters and other technologies that allow UN peace operations to more effectively balance peacekeeping and peace enforcement through air power. Dorn suggests missions should be better equipped to demonstrate overwhelming force and consequently deter violence. Improving access to airpower would be

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

13

one way of achieving this and building on the successes of implementing airpower in recent years. Zimmerman employs theories of change to demonstrate how stabilization missions have become distinct from traditional missions and the repercussions this brings for the future of peacekeeping. By examining the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Zimmerman is able to show how major changes to conflict management have taken place throughout the course of UN peacekeeping as the UN adapts to new conflicts and challenges. Diego Salama offers a new historical analysis of what can be learnt from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to bring new ideas forward for how to resolve conflict and maximize the potential for positive outcomes from such missions. A small and enduring mission, UNTSO does not often receive much attention in contemporary literature. Salama shows how the mission remains relevant and suggests how traditional observer missions may still be useful in other modern conflicts. When examining the strengthening of partnerships, Ruth Adwoa Frimpong looks back at UN and African Union (AU) cooperation in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) providing suggestions for how future UN-AU missions can encourage synergies and foster an improved division of labour. Frimpong calls for the AU to improve its capacity for maintaining peace and security alongside improved communication channels with the UN to better respond to the emergence of conflicts in Africa. Mohammad Sabuj examines practices relevant for peacekeeping in the Middle East, and the wider Islamic world, drawing on his scholarly expertise in Islamic law to critique Islamic conceptions of peacebuilding within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Drawing on the concept of hifz al-salam, Sabuj outlines how Islamic states could lead on peacekeeping operations in the Islamic world in the event of the UN Security Council being unable to act on a threat to international peace and security. This contribution provides a new and pragmatic way of thinking about conflict in Islamic states and the potential for an emerging regional partnership approach to peacekeeping. Then, Dustin Johnson, Catherine Baillie Abidi, Laura Cleave and Shelly Whitman’s advancement of a children, peace and security agenda calls for greater attention to be paid to the importance of partnerships in

14

A. GILDER ET AL.

their vision of a new security agenda. Building on the importance of child protection by UN peacekeepers, the authors suggest that the narrowness of the current approach, in terms of seeing children as passive victims and failing to take preventative steps, undermines the effectiveness of child protection. Three contributions explore accountability to provide fresh examinations of policies on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and provide new ways of thinking about solutions. Sabrina White offers a theoretical reconceptualization of how to provide accountability for sexual exploitation. White contends that affected individuals and communities should be engaged in the accountability agenda and participation is merely a starting point in the process of generating new relationships for accountability processes. Sarah Blakemore, Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert draw on extensive fieldwork to offer solutions on how to best safeguard child victims of SEA. The authors present a clear framework for child safeguarding and explain how they have built and implemented a toolkit to assess an organization’s strengths and weaknesses in safeguarding children. The innovative toolkit helps organizations and contributing states to know how and when to take action. Our final contribution on accountability delves into the African Union’s regulatory framework on SEA. Ai Kihara-Hunt and Roisin Burke provide a clear explanation as to why the UN will continue to have a difficult relationship with the AU due to its due diligence obligations and draw out flaws in the AU’s current policies and approaches. For greater effectiveness and collaboration between the UN and AU, Kihara-Hunt and Burke explain how greater transparency is needed to evaluate the AU’s SEA policies. By asking the contributors to focus on the future and make suggestions relevant for policymakers in the field, we hope the chapters in this book provide a critical assessment of the ‘where next ’ for UN peacekeeping. While not providing all the answers, projects such as this, which encourage scholars to think critically and practically about the future of the field, are an important exercise that we hope others will replicate.

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

15

Bibliography Barelli, Mauro. 2022. China and Peacekeeping: Unfolding the Political and Legal Complexities of an Ambivalent Relationship. Asian Journal of International Law 12: 157. Basu, Soumita, and Catia Confortini. 2017. Weakest “P” in the 1325 Pod? Realizing Conflict Prevention through Security Council Resolution 1325. International Studies Perspectives 18: 1. Boutellis, Arthur. 2015. Can the UN stabilize Mali? Towards a UN stabilization doctrine? Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4 (1): 1–33. Charbonneau, Bruno. 2021. Counter-Insurgency Governance in the Sahel. International Affairs 97 (6): 1805–1823. Coleman, Katharina P. 2020. Downsizing in UN Peacekeeping: The Impact on Civilian Peacekeepers and the Missions Employing Them. International Peacekeeping 27 (5): 703–731. de Coning, Cedric. 2021. The Future of UN Peacekeeping and Parallel Operations. New York: International Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2021/01/Future-of-Peace-Operations-and-Parallel-Forces-js. pdf. Forti, Daniel. 2022. The 2022 UN Peacekeeping Budget: Signs of Progress or a Fleeting Moment of Consensus. International Peace Institute Global Observatory. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/07/2022-un-peacekeepingbudget/. Accessed 17 February 2023. Freedman, Rosa. 2018. UNaccountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse. European Journal of International Law 29 (3): 961–985. Gerchicoff, Brent. 2013. Keeping Capstone in Context: Evaluating the Peacekeeping Doctrine. Strategic Analysis 37 (6): 729–741. Gilder, Alexander. 2021. UN Peace Operations and the Role of the Local in (Re)Building the Rule of Law’. Utrecht Law Review 17: 70–86. Gilder, Alexander. 2022. Stabilization and Human Security in UN Peace Operations. Abingdon: Routledge. Hirschmann, Gisela. 2019. Cooperating with Evil? Accountability in Peace Operations and the Evolution of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Cooperation and Conflict 22 (4). Holmes, Georgina. 2020. Strengthening the UK’s Support for Gender Responsive, People-Centred Peacekeeping in Africa. The RUSI Journal 165 (5–6): 36–45. Hunt, Charles T., and David Curran. 2020. Stabilization at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Global Governance 26 (1): 46–68.

16

A. GILDER ET AL.

Ibreck, Rachel and Pendle, Naomi. 2016. Customary Protection? Chiefs’ Courts as Public Authority in United Nations Protection of Civilian Sites, South Sudan. Justice and Security Research Programme. JSRP Paper 34. Karlsrud, John. 2019. From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism. International Peacekeeping 26 (1): 1–21. Karlsrud, John. 2023. ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping’ in Practice: Exist Liberal Peacekeeping, Enter UN Support Missions? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17502977.2023. 2198285. Koops, Joachim, MacQueen, Norrie, Tardy, Thierry and Williams, Paul D. 2015. Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century: 1999–2013. In The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, eds. Koops, Joachim, MacQueen, Norrie, Tardy, Thierry and Williams, Paul D. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moe, Louise W., and Finn Stepputat. 2018. Peacebuilding in an Era of Pragmatism: Introduction. International Affairs 94 (2): 293–299. Pfeifer, C. 2023. ‘Multilateral Peace Operations in 2022: Developments and Trends’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Multilateral peace operations in 2022: Developments and trends | SIPRI, Accessed 16 June 2023. Rhoads, Emily Paddon, and Rebecca Sutton. 2020. The (Self) Protection of Civilians in South Sudan: Popular and Community Justice Practices. African Affairs 119 (476): 370. Riis Andersen, Louise. 2018. The HIPPO in the Room: The Pragmatic PushBack from the UN Peace Bureaucracy Against the Militarization of UN Peacekeeping. International Affairs 94 (2): 343–361. Sharland, Lisa (ed). 2019. Special Report: Evolution of the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.jstor. org/stable/resrep23103.1. Sharland, Lisa and Gorur, Aditi. 2015. Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on the Protection of Civilians. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CICDecember-2015-FINAL-web-003.pdf, Accessed 17 February 2023. Tull, Dennis M. 2018. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. International Peacekeeping 25 (2): 167–190. United Nations. 2000. Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the SecretaryGeneral to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. A/55/305–S/2000/809. United Nations. 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. New York: United Nations.

THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

17

United Nations. 2014. Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan. S/2014/ 158. United Nations. 2015. Uniting our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. New York: United Nations. United Nations. 2018a. Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace. A/72/707–S/ 2018/43. New York: United Nations. United Nations. 2018b. Secretary-General’s Remarks to Security Council HighLevel Debate on Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-03-28/sec retary-generals-remarks-security-council-high-level-debate. United Nations. 2020a. Situation in South Sudan. S/2020/890. United Nations. 2020b. Situation in South Sudan. S/2020/1180. United Nations. 2021. Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General. A/75/982. United Nations. 2022a. Guterres Strongly Condemns Attack on Peacekeepers in DR Congo Which Left 3 Dead, Amid Protests. https://news.un.org/en/ story/2022/07/1123372. United Nations. 2022b. Mali’s Withdrawal From G5 Sahel, Joint Force ‘A Setback’ for the Region. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118582. United Nations. 2022c. DR Congo: Guterres ‘Outraged’ Over Peacekeepers’ Aggression, Calls for Accountability. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/ 07/1123692. United Nations. 2022d. Security Council 9142nd Meeting. S/PV.9142. United Nations. 2023a. Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council. S/2023/ 303. United Nations. 2023b. Resolution 2690. S/RES/2690. Von Billerbeck, Sarah. 2016. Whose Peace? Local Ownership and UN Peacekeeping. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Westendorf, Jasmine. 2020. Violating Peace: Sex, Aid and Peacekeeping. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Weenink, Jonatan. 2022. Is the UN Overstaying its Welcome in the Democratic Republic of Congo? IPIS Briefing October/November 2022. 28 November 2022. https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/is-the-un-overstaying-its-wel come-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/ Accessed 17 February 2023.

Reforming Security

Reforming Security Institutions: Implications of Local Actors’ Incorporation on the Construction of Democratic Security Environments Alessandra Jungs de Almeida

and Juliana Viggiano

Introduction Security sector reform (SSR) is a central part of United Nations (UN) peace operations. Despite considerable efforts directed into this process, better civilian control and legal oversight of state security institutions are largely insufficient in post-conflict scenarios. Local ownership, an idea present in UN narratives and practices for quite some time, has also been a focus of criticism. Deemed as a means of legitimizing reform initiatives in post-conflict countries, it has not yet reversed the critical negative record in conforming the security sector of post-conflict countries to the expected standards of liberal democratic states as UN peace operations

A. Jungs de Almeida (B) · J. Viggiano International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] J. Viggiano e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_2

21

22

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

envision. Literature criticisms have pointed out excessive focus on effectiveness rather than on transforming the reality of conflict, the limited and instrumental access of SSR processes given to locals and nationals, and a lack of consideration to previous existing state and non-state structures left after the conflict before starting and throughout the process of reforms. Alternative perspectives, encompassed under the label hybridism, highlight how dynamics associated with local formal and informal institutions are incorporated into practices of new institutions created in SSR and how such processes impact democratizing prospects of the security environment. In line with this debate, this chapter focuses on the interaction of international, national, and local actors in the Liberia security sector reform under the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In particular, it identifies how Liberian local and regional security councils functioned as an intermediate and legitimizing mechanism for reinstating security forces, articulating this reality with the UN peace operation, with no long-term or structural transformation of their security environment. In this chapter, we argue that alternative and complementary institutional arrangements to the traditional liberal democratic template to meaningfully incorporate local state and non-state actors in decisionmaking and implementation processes related to the security sector can be a promising avenue to deal with more pressing security threats for communities, although not as a given. This implies redefining the priorities of peacebuilding operations and assessing from a different perspective the post-conflict realities in which they operate. It presents a qualitative analysis of a case study in which United Nations Security Council mandates and Secretary-General reports for Liberia are analyzed to identify where and when local and non-state actors or the local level were addressed in these documents. In addition, we analyze the Liberian National Security Council and its county and district councils as an example of an alternative institutional structure that, considering contextual factors from its conception, had some positive outcomes, albeit not enduring. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the Liberian peacebuilding and reconstruction process through documentary analysis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandates and Secretary-General reports about the country. The second section investigates the development of the National Security Council (NSC) by

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

23

the Liberian government and the UN. The third section reviews the literature on local ownership in the post-conflict SSR context through the hybridism lens. This approach considers the participation and incorporation of local and indigenous practices in transforming security government institutions and governance. This perspective can potentially help explain and advance UN peace operations in post-colonial countries.

Liberian Peace Process: UNMIL, SSR, and Local Actors Liberian civil conflict lasted from 1989 to 2003, with a two-year ceasefire (1997–1999). It was a conflict with different groups contesting and disputing state power. Still, in the last years of the war, rebel groups were far from inactive. The rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) was advancing in the suburbs of Monrovia; the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) group had taken over large parts of the lucrative forestry industry. In addition, there was considerable pressure from the United States, African leaders, and world powers to end the war (Atkinson 2008; Harris 2012). In this context, the only international actor willing to lead a peace process was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which then agreed to send a stabilization force. The organization operated through its military troops in Liberia (ECOMIL). They were authorized by UNSC Resolution 1497 to enter the country as a Multinational Force (UNSC 2003a). These were to be replaced by UN troops within two months (Kabia 2016, 158). In 2003, under pressure from the international community and the Liberian civil society, different fighting and civil society groups signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra (CPA 2003; Fyanka 2014). The CPA allowed then-president Taylor to remain in power for the two subsequent months and created an interim administration. Named the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), such administration incorporated ministers from Taylor’s government, representatives of the LURD and MODEL groups, political parties registered under Liberian laws before the peace agreement, and civilian members, all present during the CPA negotiations (Kabia 2016). The NTGL managed to keep factions in peace during its two-year existence (Harris 2012). In the same year (2003), the UN Security Council resolution 1509/ 2003 established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The

24

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

resolution, among other things, aimed to support the security sector reform in the country (UNSC 2003b, 4). Between 2003 and 2018, UNMIL’s mandate was expanded several times.1 In 2016, the final resolution (2333/2016) on the subject was published, which extended the mission until March 30, 2018 (UNSC 2016; UNMIL 2018, 14–16). In this last term, the reform of security institutions still was one of the UNSC objectives (UNSC 2016). Security reform was addressed in the UN peace agreement and the Liberian CPA. In the CPA, the reform process focused on the dissolution of irregular forces, the reform of the Liberian Armed Forces, and the Liberian National Police alongside other security services (CPA 2003, pp. 9–10). Regarding civil society, the CPA was restricted. For instance, although civil society and parties participated in elaborating the CPA, they were not appointed to the Military Advisory Committee. The Committee was formed to advise the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) on restructuring the Armed Forces and was located inside the Ministry of Defense (Ebo 2005, 17; L. Andersen 2006, p. 4). Thus, in the initial transitional moment, SSR was driven by the NTGL and the parties in conflict (Ebo 2005). The UNSC resolutions gradually transferred competences and decisions to other national actors. The first mandate resolution (1509/2003) on Liberia was published in September 2003 and supported the security reform foreseen in the CPA (UNSC 2003b). This mandate highlighted two items: Assistance to the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force, and the formation of new armed forces (UNSC 2003b, p. 4). Both armed forces and police would be strengthened in these first years in cooperation with “ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested states” (UNSC 2003b, p. 4). The following UN mandates emphasized the need for the Liberian government to take the lead in security reform and to formulate a concrete plan to develop the security sector, detailing the necessity of drafting a law related to police decentralization (UNSC 2013; UNSC 2014). In 2014, UNMIL defined its function concerning SSR as assisting Liberia in developing and implementing its national SSR strategy, scaling up national security and justice services, and advising the government to 1 The UN mandates were extended in 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, with the first extension mandate in September 2006 and the last in December 2016.

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

25

coordinate this work with bilateral and multilateral donors (UNSC 2014). In the last mandate document of December 2016, the UN reinforced the need to continue reforms to decentralize security institutions, especially the police (UNSC 2016). UNSC’s 2016 resolution extended the mission until March 30, 2018. Missions mandates’ evident emphasis on SSR being led by the national level in all resolutions since 2003 is compatible with the absence of agency for local non-state actors. There is, however, a concern with police decentralization, which can also be considered a local, governmental, in this case, level of engagement. Police decentralization, according to UN documents, would allow a better understanding of security threats in the countryside, which has less state presence and control and where most of the Liberian population lives (UNSC 2003b; LISGIS 2008, A1–A2; Stig 2009). The ‘local’ became more present in the Secretary-General’s reports for the UNSC on UNMIL. More than thirty reports were released during the country’s sixteen years of operation. The reports highlighted several local issues that affected peace and stability during the mission. Like in the mandates, there was a preoccupation with decentralizing and restoring the public confidence in the police and guaranteeing the state-local communities’ communication through public radio (UN Secretary-General 2003; UN Secretary-General 2006; UN Secretary-General 2008; UN SecretaryGeneral 2009a). In these documents, the UN also recognized the joint efforts of UNMIL and the government with local authorities to build reconciliation. Examples were the work with local and traditional leaders to solve property disputes or contain riots (UN Secretary-General 2005; UN Secretary-General 2009b). However, the reports and the UNSC’s mandates privilege a rather technical approach, defining procedures to be carried out and focusing on traditional structured security institutions (military, border forces, and the police). Although building classic liberal state security institutions remained at the center of SSR initiatives, the reports acknowledge non-state actors’ roles as providers of security and justice and their eventual mobilization for contributing to conflict resolutions. In general, UNSC documents did not initially consider non-state local agencies and structures in political and financial terms. Almost annually, a new UNMIL mandate extended the term of the operation in the country, which created a great level of financial insecurity for the government and peacekeepers, besides difficulties in thinking of long-term policies.

26

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

However, the Liberian case offers an interesting example of how the local dynamics became seen in the course of the operation. The National Security Council (NSC) and its branches are the main institutional structures in which it manifested itself in the SSR framework.

The National Security Council (NSC) After 14 years of war, Liberia was experiencing a polarized political scenario between the parties previously involved in the armed conflict. These disputes and the prominent participation of those same groups in power made it difficult for the population to gain trust in the state and its institutions as security providers even after the peace agreement. Throughout the country, informal security arrangements reinforced local identities motivated by land disputes, resulting in open violence in 2008, when 15 people died (International Crisis Group 2009, p. 8; Bøås and Stig 2010, p. 297). In the same year, UN documents demonstrated awareness of the potential for conflict in some Liberian regions and the possibility of widespread nationally (UNSC 2008, p. 3). This scenario illustrates that allowing the entire state apparatus to be in the hands of a few can result in serious governance problems, especially in the country’s interior (Stig 2009; Bøås and Stig 2010). A hybrid decentralization, however, was discarded by the UN as an instrument to improve security responsiveness and control. In 2008, the Liberian government released its National Security Strategy, prepared with the support of the UN. Even though the strategy received criticisms from Liberians for having suffered considerable interference from international actors (Bøås and Stig 2010), it suggested the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) and regional and local councils: County and District Security Councils (CSCs and DSCs). The NSC and its branches were created to ensure coordination between the central government and the local government, traditional leaders (i.e., chiefs and elders), civil society, and other stakeholders (Liberia 2008, 14–15). This initiative considered the decentralization of the reform outside Monrovia, transforming state structures to accommodate a formal locus of political decision, with some authority assigned to traditional actors and their means of mediation and conflict resolution (Vapnek et al. 2017). In the NSC, local subcommittees are integrated by regional and district traditional leadership, among other formal actors. They are authorized to deal with local security concerns through mediation and formal state

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

27

agencies, recurring upper in the chain of the decision-making process if issues cannot be solved locally: from the district to county to NSC. These structures are planned to act as early-warning mechanisms on security issues in the counties through a forum for managing local security concerns in a coordinated way, including border security (Mbzibain et al. 2022). They are not expected to have any technical control over security issues or to interfere in the activities of security and justice agencies (Liberia 2018). Furthermore, “the CSC in each county shall comprise the Superintendent as chairman; the county heads of all national security agencies (Police, Immigration, NSA, LNFS, etc.) assigned therein, the Paramount, Clan, and Town Chiefs” (Liberia 2018). The CSCs and DSCs are mechanisms that simultaneously enable the national government to be aware of local disruptions and security threats. It allows communitybased solutions to problems they face of more immediate or medium/ long-term character (Vapnek et al. 2017). However, since its creation, lack of funding has been the main obstacle to keeping the DSCs and CSCs working (Mbzibain et al. 2022). For instance, an additional level of consultation was created through a program named Mitigating Land Disputes in Liberia Project (MLDL), funded between 2012 and 2020 by the US State Department and implemented through an organization, Tetra Tech DPK (Vapnek et al. 2017; Mbzibain et al. 2022). Two counties (Nimba and Lofa) were selected for the pilot project, launched in 2011. It established an additional consultation instance, the Community Forums, which had a wider reach into communities beyond the framework of participation contemplated by the CSCs and DSCs. MLDL aimed “to improve the relationship between citizens and local institutions and to collect vital information on community concerns and security issues” (Vapnek et al. 2017, 290–291). According to Vapnek et al. (2017), the experience successfully prevented different situations of potential violence through the early-warning/early-response system, improved relations with a mining company, resolved a school strike, prevented mob violence, and solved a long-term land dispute between two communities in Nimba. External financing also assisted with capacity building on mediation and conflict resolution, material and equipment support, and the MLDL program, which emphasized “traditional community-based concepts of justice rather than more punitive and retributive measures” (Vapnek et al. 2017, p. 295; Mbzibain et al. 2022) dominant in western states. In this sense, working with a more flexible normative framework of democratic practices gave latitude for more

28

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

lateral participation of external actors and mixing strategies to deal with threats of violence. After the MLDL program, however, the CSCs became dormant, being reactivated by a UNDP and IOM cross-border project in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire (Mbzibain et al. 2022). Since the National Security and Intelligence Act was released in 2012, NSC has already implemented County Councils in all Liberian counties (15 in total) (Mbzibain et al. 2022). However, some of these regional councils were only established at the end of the UNMIL’s mandate in Liberia in 2017 (United Nations Peacekeeping 2017a, 2017b). And only in 2019 were three county councils established in Northwestern Liberia, in Lofa County (News Public Trust 2019). In addition, funding for its continuous functioning is not always granted by the national government, with eight being self-supported in 2017 and four dependent on the financing of the MLDL project (Vapnek et al. 2017, p. 294; Mbzibain et al. 2022). The Liberian experience in creating the NSC, its subcommittees and Community Forums demonstrate possibilities to institutionalize mechanisms that encourage local participation, from grassroots to local leadership, engage local agencies, and offer a dialogue space. Considering that long-term and in-depth policies are needed to rebuild actual legitimate security governance institutions, NSC, DSCs, and CSCs seemed promising steps forward in addressing conflict-arising problems in rural areas of the country, especially in which concern an institutional arrangement with local participation in the governance process (Opoku-Agyakwa 2020). Caution against excessive optimism also seems prudent, though. The democratizing effects of participatory initiatives have shown their limitations (Donais 2018), some related to the inability of institutional design to properly overcome social inequality reproduced in participatory dynamics inside those spaces (Dacombe 2018; González and Mayka 2023). Given the possibility of solving this indispensable issue, those spaces potentially confirm an important platform to redefine intersubjective meanings that can be transformative to societal context. None of these issues are clear yet in the case of Liberia. Even open accessed spaces such as Community Forums can induce mechanisms that reproduce cleavages in disadvantaged ways for democratization purposes. In addition, it is essential to consider if the alternative locus of participatory practices as complementary initiatives to traditional security institutions is an appropriate and/or desired path to accomplish structural changes that

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

29

lead to sustainable peace and a democratic ethos. A deepening understanding of numerous participatory experiments in security governance in post-conflict and transitioning states could give some clues to its validity. Furthermore, attention to issues such as funding, the role that formal agencies, local and international, assume, as well as patterns of power conflicts in participatory dynamics, are of central concern to capture the long-term social transformative potential of initiatives of that sort. As discussed in the previous section, the UN mandates do not mention local actors. Exceptions are noted in the NSC in the Secretary-General’s reports. In the 2016 report, the document states that “further development of the county and district security councils will be vital steps towards strengthening accountability across the sector, ensuring a participatory approach to security and enhancing the response of the relevant institutions to the security needs of communities” (UN Secretary-General 2016a). However, in the same year, three out of fifteen Liberian counties still did not have local councils (UN Secretary-General 2016b), established only in 2019. From the beginning, the NSC and its branches were not well funded and became an important feature of the peace process only at the end of the peace operation, in 2016, thirteen years after its beginning. This belated recognition resulted in a change of narrative in UN documents. Such a change demonstrates that UN peace operations should allocate resources, time, and disposition to understand the local context and its power distribution.

Hybridism and Local Actors in Post-Conflict SSR Contexts: A Step Forward? Liberia’s security councils reflect the preoccupation of the UN with incorporating local actors in decision-making processes alongside investing in more ambitious state-building objectives. These local institutions are complementary to the classical liberal state’s security apparatus focusing primarily on authority allocation and technical expertise in internal security forces and the military. Local and regional councils were created to integrate local non-state actors in positions of power and liberal democratic security institutions, giving some attention to concepts of justice closer to traditional practices, although maintaining legal authority with formal institutions. What has been called the ‘local turn’ in the peacekeeping literature widely recognizes the importance of incorporating

30

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

locals as meaningful actors in ensuring peace and security in these regions. How to do it remains a considerable challenge to SSR in the present. Security sector reform (SSR) objectives in peacebuilding contexts aim to provide security, prevent violence, keep the rule of law, and guarantee security institutions’ effectiveness and efficiency (Brzoska 2006). From a holistic perspective, SSR aims to transform the post-conflict security system of a country into a democratic security sector. Such a perspective usually includes different roles, actions, and actors, such as the army, intelligence agencies, the judiciary, civil society, legislative, and non-state actors and institutions (e.g., warlords, community guards, rebel forces) (Anderlini and Conaway 2007; Sending 2009; Edmunds 2012; Richmond 2012; Ansorg 2017). As argued by the literature, an SSR holistic approach would provide legitimacy for the security sector, mainly because this perspective considers who is affected by the security institutions beyond the military perspective (Rees 2006; L. R. Andersen and Engedal 2013; Toft 2018). Given SSR’s relevance in the overall mission of stabilization and peacebuilding, incorporating local actors into those practices and decisions has been largely discussed in the literature and policy papers (L. Andersen 2006; Donais 2009; Stig 2009; Bøås and Stig 2010; Jarstad 2013; Gordon 2014; Ansorg 2017; Bangura 2017). As a consequence, at least on paper, local dynamics have received greater attention (Donais, 2018). UN documents (UNSC 2008; UNSC 2014) and reports from research institutes, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002), agree that internal dynamics should guide SSR proposals. Historically, one of the main incentives for the increase in the local ownership debate came from donor countries and agencies. In SSR contexts, such concern was addressed in documents from donor countries and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Nathan 2008, p. 19; Donais 2009, p. 119; Billerbeck 2011, p. 328; Gordon 2014, p. 126), a major player in establishing guidelines for reforms on security governance in post-conflict countries. These documents usually conditioned foreign assistance to explicitly incorporate ownership practices in reform plans (Billerbeck 2011). Therefore, in recent years, such practices have regularly included considerations of local actors. That was the case in Lebanon and Sierra Leone. In Lebanon, interactions between the international community, national elites in Beirut, and local communities through non-state actors, notably Hezbollah, increased

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

31

the SSR’s legitimacy among the local population (Newby 2017, pp. 9– 14). Sierra Leone also engaged local communities as UNAMSIL became more decentralized, with the direct involvement of non-state actors in a program to access justice and security (Bangura 2017, p. 7). Although examples as such demonstrate that practitioners have recognized local ownership, criticism from the ‘local turn’ literature and authors that align with an agenda proposed for a second-generation of SSR studies identify “a reluctance to engage more closely methodologically and empirically with it” (Schierenbeck 2015, p. 1029), resulting in the inclusion of local communities within pre-specified institutional and normative settings. Many academics have pointed to legitimacy problems related to reforms normatively conceived by external actors and the constraints it imposes on the local agency (Ansorg 2017; Donais 2018; Jackson 2018; Jackson and Bakrania 2018; Ansorg and Gordon 2019). Excessive focus on effectiveness rather than on structural transformation of post-conflict institutional contexts, which would presuppose committed engagement with local communities, has also been highlighted as a shortcoming of SSR (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016; Donais 2018; Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018). Prioritizing effectiveness can be evidenced by social engineering efforts or exceedingly technocratic approaches (Egnell and Haldén 2009; Jackson and Bakrania 2018), which are more dependent on international experts and their perspectives on how to (re)construct security institutions than on locals’ experiences and daily obstacles (both state and non-state agents). In Liberia, for instance, in 2006, the United States hired RAND Corporation, a US private company, to conduct research and define SSR guidelines for the country (Gompert et al. 2007). This document was expected to be the starting point of a national dialogue on SSR (Ebo 2007). Despite consultation with locals about their perceptions, RAND Corporation did not invite Liberians to participate in the preparation of the final document, which was not well received at that time in the country (Ebo 2007). Focusing on effectiveness also becomes an obstacle to training local staff and developing institutional capacities in host countries, a process that usually takes time. Local actors’ engagement discussions come hand in hand with debates associated with constructing hybrid institutions. In general terms, hybridism is a perspective that highlights the need to recognize the existence of previous formal and informal institutions that structure the fabric

32

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

of social and political life in post-conflict regions. In this scenario, contextual knowledge is indispensable to be taken into account when devising (or reforming) institutional arrangements in the security sector (Ebo 2007; L. R. Andersen and Engedal 2013; Ansorg and Gordon 2019). In a context of fragile formal institutional structures (Williams 2000) and widespread violence and political fragmentation (Atkinson 2008), as most post-conflict states are and where many of the current peacebuilding operations take place, political action is intensely permeated by non-state intermediaries (Bagayoko et al. 2016). In such an environment, local-based networks and policies are devised to compensate for the lack of a central and legitimate authority and its failure to deliver essential services (ibid.), creating governance structures that are both vertically and horizontally linked (Risse 2011). SSR processes have neglected the particular social and political dynamics of these intermediary actors among themselves and with state institutions, prioritizing formal state security and justice governance based on Western democracies. These formal instances are usually less accessible and intelligible to local communities, hindering legitimacy and trust (Lemay-Hébert 2013; Marijan 2017). In hybrid political orders, formal and informal elements coexist, overlap, and intertwine (Podder 2013). Through hybridity, top-down peacebuilding projects meet local actors through a constant process of negotiation (Mac Ginty 2010, p. 393; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). This notion of hybridity moves the discussion beyond binary conceptions (e.g., modern versus traditional) that risk simplifying the understanding of a peace operation (Mac Ginty 2010, p. 397). Therefore, hybridity can be understood as the product of interactions involving international and local elements— actors, institutions, norms, resources, and practices—manifested during the peacebuilding process (Podder, 2013, p. 356). It involves social negotiation, co-optation, resistance, domination, coexistence, and assimilation (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). In accepting the relevance of context in the configuration of social institutions, these approaches highlight how aspects of communitarian life have historically been consolidated into regular practices, shaping features of state-society relations (Egnell and Haldén 2009; Jones 2010). Understood contextually, rooted interpretations about structuring concepts of collective ordering such as legitimacy, security, and authority become comprehensible to external eyes. Boege and Rinck (2019, p. 5) suggest a relational approach to peacebuilding in which the focus should be on the local/international interface: “While the local and the international are

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

33

of course highly diverse in themselves—with all kinds of power asymmetries, internal differences and frictions which matter for peacebuilding (…) [this] interface is of particular significance, shaping the actual process and their outcomes substantially, because the actors involved in peacebuilding position themselves as ‘local’ or ‘international,’ and from this position define and engage with the other.” Proposed as an agenda centered on the interaction of state-society levels, considering practices of resistance and adaptation (Jackson and Bakrania 2018, p. 12), hybridism is particularly concerned with the instrumental incorporation of local actors but also cautions against the potential inability of such practices to overcome social cleavages, privileging the participation of elite strata in society, in particular national elites (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Donais 2018). Overall, these alternative approaches to current peacebuilding missions suggest that SSR programs need to be more locally aware, taking into account the experiences and perspectives of local actors, and be more attuned to existing state and non-state structures to address the root causes of violence and improve democratic practices in the security sector. Widespread debate on a necessary reorientation of international community involvement in peacebuilding operations has had limited reach so far. Two issues seem to contribute to explaining it. The first, of a methodological nature, refers to the operational difficulty in creating specific institutional designs based on context for each of the countries/ regions in which peacebuilding operations are intended to occur. Projects of such nature would demand adequate human and financial resources as well as sophisticated contextual analysis and data collection in amounts the international community is currently unwilling to provide. However, the already significant number of, at the very least, less than successful experiences demonstrates that social realities are complex and dynamic and that external social engineering is not an enterprise easily done nor controlled (nor desired for that matter). Given the mentioned constraints, making it work depends, on the one hand, on redefining SSR priorities and creating a flexible template capable of incorporating contextual specificities2 ; on the other hand, equipping practitioners with skills and knowledge that fit the prospective challenge in sight. Deeper contextual knowledge is indispensable for the unavoidable political and social negotiation that comes with fostering democratic social institutions that

2 Argument also defended by Boege and Rinck (2019).

34

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

aspire to stimulate structural transformation—of central importance to sustainable peace and security. Despite the inescapable engagement and continuity that contextual understandings demand, it is possible to develop concepts with enough latitude for short-range applicability in more than one setting. Tilly and Goodin (2008, pp. 13–15) explain: “Mechanism-based accounts select salient features of episodes or significant differences among episodes, and explain them by identifying within those episodes robust mechanisms of relatively general scope. (…) mechanism-based explanations aim at modest ends: selective explanation of salient features by means of partial causal analogies. (…) Social mechanisms concatenate into social processes: combinations and sequences of mechanisms producing relatively similar effects. (…) Mechanisms and processes compound into episodes, bounded and connected sequences of social action.” In other words, peacebuilding efforts should recognize they can no longer ignore the complexity of social realities and direct their efforts to attend to the needs of contextual-based initiatives. It will demand different skills and knowledge from practitioners and a conscious attempt to identify how, when, and in what-fashion mechanisms, processes, and episodes, to follow Goodin and Tilly’s suggestion, exist and can be useful in a particular case. “So,” the same authors contend, “context matters, and context often varies. But these contextual effects are not random. There are patterns to be picked out and understood within each distinct historical, cultural, and technological setting” (idem, p. 25). It is a messier, less predictable, and a continuous analytical endeavor but with greater potential of addressing social transformation in regard to the use and control of violence. The second issue that should be mentioned concerns the normative framework guiding peacebuilding. Democratic liberal principles and values that inform peacebuilding operations have different meanings and, therefore, social implications for collective life due to particular backgrounds (historical, religious, geographical, and so on). Once again, context. If it is not up to debate the pursuit of democratic practices as an intended goal of social transformation, incorporating concepts closer to communitarianism views in interpreting—or redefining—principles and values of democracy may add to the understanding of the limits, opportunities, and wishes of these communities. That is in itself a challenge, and very sensitive matters such as the security sector have no other extensive structured model to mirror. For example, countries that have adopted democratic structures after transitioning from authoritarian

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

35

regimes somewhat try to make up for the shortcomings of representative democracy with complementary initiatives, much of which are participatory and intermediate institutions (Dammert 2006; GuarnerosMeza 2017; Zaremberg et al. 2017). Participatory initiatives have also been part of peacekeeping missions as a regular feature and have shown their own (many) limitations. There is no easy answer to the problem. Still, deepening discussions about normative perspectives can contribute, alongside an awareness of social and political local dynamics, intersubjective meanings, and ordering principles, to open some avenues of alternative institutional possibilities. Equally important, problematizing normative concepts offers peacebuilding operations and practitioners deeper empathy and a sense of understanding about the communities they are working with, shortening the distance, at least in normative terms, between realities of local and international actors. Although this distinction among actors deserves further qualification,3 there are evident remnants of colonial perceptions in the relationship between these groups. Once in place, international actors become part of the local dynamics, immersed in the conflicts and power relations that structure social interactions. Instead of an intent to control the process and transfer knowledge, there has to be a shift in the mindset of practitioners as to what can be learned from local communities and how their own presence changes the landscape of dispute; a more genuine sense of appreciation and equality that perhaps an expansion of normative democratic interpretation can help to achieve. Not only do international actors become part of the game, but they also hold significant power in these processes. Being aware of that fact allows agents to better understand how pursued strategies interfere in the dynamics of social disputes, which contextual perspectives can contemplate in their analysis. It is also necessary to be attentive to repercussions and movements of processes in the configuration of social forces. As the term implies, state-society relations are not static and subject to (minor or major) changes and adaptations that often cannot be predicted or anticipated. As a final note, two interconnected issues precede, and in that sense surpass, the debates on the performance and objectives of peacebuilding 3 It is worth drawing attention especially to the heterogeneity within groups within this classification—international and local—whose affinities and alliances can cross categorical boundaries.

36

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

operations in the academia that deserves mentioning: the legitimacy of interventions themselves and the root causes of violent conflict that leads to intervention. Power unbalance between international and local actors reflects the structural inequality of the international system; addressing how to level international power structures would be perhaps the arena that could have the most impact on the search for emancipation. That agenda should not be overshadowed and goes beyond peacekeeping/ peacebuilding concerns. Redesigning peacebuilding operations may have a positive incremental impact on emancipation, though, and while there is no significant rearrangement of international structures in sight, accessing and problematizing the parameters of such operations can be a critical manner to address the pressing matter of (in)security for groups and communities.

Conclusion This analysis shows a contradiction between the UNSC documents and the UN support on the ground. While the mandates and reports fail to explicitly mention the place of local actors’ involvement in SSR processes except for national instances, supporting the creation of NSC and its subcommittees encompasses a concern for reaching beyond the capital city. The technical perspective in the UNSC documents shows a great emphasis on social engineering and its ambitious goals, such as forming a state allied to a democratic project in the field. In the case of the Liberian reform, these characteristics appeared in the documents when focusing on training and forming functional state security institutions while neglecting the political process involving local actors. The disconnect between the documents and the peace operation implementation on the ground may serve as an example of how the post-conflict reality may modify the documentary narrative and how this type of change could be diminished by context understanding. Because of flaws like this, the literature on the Liberian SSR emphasized that this reform did not consider the country’s political and historical issues over the years of implementation, although local and regional councils have looked more carefully at such issues. Furthermore, even though alternative security actors (nonstate) are not considered in the UN mandates on Liberia, their relevance in this process was considered in the UNSC’s Secretary-General reports and its implementation was done in a less planned and more synchronous way.

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

37

The Liberian case brings important conclusions regarding the engagement with local communities in more difficult contexts as well as lessons of success and failures that can be incorporated into the development of future SSR practices. In complex contexts, despite the UN attempts to engage with local communities, informal security mechanisms have shown to be more responsive to the pressing needs of communities, in addition to being potentially more affordable and intelligible to the population, as Burian argues (2017). From the Liberian case, one of the lessons drawn for future UN peace operations is the necessity of reform leaders to take responsibility for incorporating unequal realities into policy design, then not risking adverse outcomes for peace if diversity is not addressed on the ground. Furthermore, as presented in this case, ‘reform’ in the security sector may demand sacrifice on short-term gains for the benefit of meaningful transformations in the security environment. Ultimately, successful security sector reform is a complex and ongoing process that requires a sustained flow of resources and long-term commitment from all parties involved.

References Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi, and Camille Pampell Conaway. 2007. Security Sector Reform. In Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action, 31–40. International Alert, Women Waging Peace. Andersen, Louise. 2006. Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership—The Case of Liberia. Danish Institute for International Studies. Andersen, Louise Riis, and Peter Emil Engedal. 2013. Blue Helmets and Grey Zones: Do UN Multidimensional Peace Operations Work? 29. Danish Institute for International Studies. Ansorg, Nadine. 2017. Security Sector Reform in Africa: Donor Approaches Versus Local Needs. Contemporary Security Policy 38. Routledge: 129–144. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1278343. Ansorg, Nadine, and Eleanor Gordon. 2019. Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 13. Routledge: 2–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/175 02977.2018.1516392. Atkinson, Philippa. 2008. Liberal Interventionism in Liberia: Towards a Tentatively Just Approach? Conflict, Security & Development 8. Routledge: 15–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800801977062. Bagayoko, Niagale, Eboe Hutchful, and Robin Luckham. 2016. Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and

38

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

Legitimate Public Authority. Conflict, Security & Development 16. Routledge: 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136137. Bangura, Ibrahim. 2017. The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone—Sierra Leone. CSG Papers. Billerbeck, Sarah Von. 2011. Whose Peace? Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding: Paper Presented at ‘The Future of Statebuilding: Ethics, Power and Responsibility in International Relations, University of Westminster, 9– 11 October 2009. Journal of intervention and statebuilding (trykt utg.). Routledge: 322–365. Bøås, Morten, and Karianne Stig. 2010. Security Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uneven Partnership without Local Ownership. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4. Routledge: 285–303. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977. 2010.498934. Boege, Volker, and Patricia Rinck. 2019. The Local/International Interface in Peacebuilding: Experiences from Bougainville and Sierra Leone. International Peacekeeping 26. Routledge: 216–239. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312. 2018.1561185. Brzoska, Michael. 2006. Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations. International Peacekeeping 13. Routledge: 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13533310500424603. Burian, Alexander. 2017. Summary of Key SSR Developments and Trends 2005– 2017. International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). CPA. 2003. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties. Dacombe, Rod. 2018. Rethinking Civic Participation in Democratic Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-588 25-8. Dammert, Lucía. 2006. Lucía Dammert—Participación Comunitária en Prevención Del Delito en América Latina ¿De Qué Participación Hablamos? Scribd. Donais, Timothy. 2009. Inclusion or Exclusion? Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. Studies in Social Justice 3: 117–131. https://doi.org/ 10.26522/ssj.v3i1.1027. Donais, Timothy. 2018. Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Vertical Integration. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12. Routledge: 31–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426681. Ebo, Adedeji. 2005. The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia—GSDRC. Occasional Paper 09. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

39

Ebo, Adedeji. 2007. Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies. In No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform, ed. Laurie Nathan, 78–85. University of Birmingham. Edmunds, Timothy. 2012. Security Sector Reform. In The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations: Routledge. Egnell, Robert, and Peter Haldén. 2009. Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory. Conflict, Security & Development 9. Routledge: 27–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/146 78800802704903. Fyanka, Bernard B. 2014. Security Sector Reforms and Governance in PostConflict Environment: An Assessment of Nigeria and Liberia. The IUP Journal of International Relations, VIII (4). Gompert, David C., Olga Oliker, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Keith Crane, and K. Jack Riley. 2007. Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector. RAND Corporation. González, Yanilda, and Lindsay Mayka. 2023. Policing, Democratic Participation, and the Reproduction of Asymmetric Citizenship. American Political Science Review 117. Cambridge University Press: 263–279. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/S0003055422000636. Gordon, Eleanor. 2014. Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8. Routledge: 126–148. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977. 2014.930219. Guarneros-Meza, Valeria. 2017. Citizen Security in Mexico: Examining Municipal Bureaucracy from the View of the Intermediation–Representation Debate. In Intermediation and Representation in Latin America: Actors and Roles Beyond Elections, eds. Gisela Zaremberg, Valeria Guarneros-Meza, and Adrián Gurza Lavalle, 1st ed. 2017 edition. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Harris, David. 2012. Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Hendrickson, Dylan, and Andrzej Karkoszka. 2002. The Challenges of Security Sector Reform. In SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 175–202. International Crisis Group. 2009. Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform. Africa Report 148. Jackson, Paul. 2018. Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12. Routledge: 1–10. https://doi. org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426384. Jackson, Paul, and Shivit Bakrania. 2018. Is the Future of SSR Non-linear? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12. Routledge: 11–30. https:// doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426548.

40

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

Jarstad, Anna K. 2013. Unpacking the Friction in Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan. Peacebuilding 1. Routledge: 381–396. https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.813179. Jones, L. 2010. (Post-)Colonial Statebuilding in East Timor: Bringing Social Conflict Back In. Kabia, John M. 2016. Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL. London: Routledge. https://doi. org/10.4324/9781315587592. Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas. 2013. Everyday Legitimacy and International Administration: Global Governance and Local Legitimacy in Kosovo. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7. Routledge: 87–104. https://doi.org/10. 1080/17502977.2012.655622. Liberia. 2008. National Security Strategy. Liberia. 2018. County Security Mechanism (CSM) Documentation. LISGIS. 2008. Analytical Report on Population Size and Composition. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2010. Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace. Security Dialogue 41. Sage Publications, Ltd.: 391–412. Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver Richmond. 2016. The Fallacy of Constructing Hybrid Political Orders: A Reappraisal of the Hybrid Turn in Peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping 23. Routledge: 219–239. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13533312.2015.1099440. Mac Ginty, Roger, and Oliver P. Richmond. 2013. The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace. Third World Quarterly 34. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: 763–783. Marijan, Branka. 2017. The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina—Bosnia and Herzegovina|ReliefWeb. Center for Security Governance. Mbzibain, Aurelian, Kam Oleh, and Matins J. Sopp. 2022. Cross-border Engagement between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to Strengthen Social Cohesion and Border Security. UNDP, IOM. Nathan, Laurie. 2008. The Challenge of Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice. In Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais, Aufl ed. edition. Zürich: LIT Verlag. Newby, Vanessa F. 2017. Positive Hybridity? Unpacking UN Security Sector Reform in South Lebanon. Contemporary Politics 23. Routledge: 156–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1233756. News Public Trust. 2019. 3 more District Security Structures Set Up in Northwestern Liberia, with US Funding. News Public Trust, February 1, sec. Liberian News. Opoku-Agyakwa, Samuel. 2020. The Politics of Decentralizing Criminal Justice Systems in Postconflict Societies: Insights From Liberia (2011–2017). PhD Dissertation, Walden University.

REFORMING SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: IMPLICATIONS …

41

Podder, Sukanya. 2013. Bridging the ‘Conceptual–Contextual’ Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 7: 353–380. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2013. 770242. Rees, Edward. 2006. Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: “Improvisation and Confusion” from the Field. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Richmond, Oliver P. 2012. Beyond Local Ownership in the Architecture of International Peacebuilding. Ethnopolitics 11. Routledge: 354–375. https://doi. org/10.1080/17449057.2012.697650. Risse, Thomas. 2011. Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction and Overview. In Governance Without a State?: Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, 1–35. Columbia University Press. Schierenbeck, Isabell. 2015. Beyond the Local Turn Divide: Lessons Learnt, Relearnt and Unlearnt. Third World Quarterly 36. Routledge: 1023–1032. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1043991. Sedra, Mark. 2018. Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-Level Realities: The Transition to a Second-Generation Model. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 12. Routledge: 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977. 2018.1426383. Sending, Ole Jacob. 2009. Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context. 755. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Stig, Karianne Quist. 2009. Promoting Self-Governance Without Local Ownership : A Case Study of the Security Sector Reform in Liberia. Master thesis. Tilly, Charles, and Robert E. Goodin. 2008. It Depends. In The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, eds. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Toft, Monica Duffy. 2018. A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States. LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development. UN Secretary-General. 2003. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia (2003/875). UN Secretary-General. 2005. Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. UN. UN Secretary-General. 2006. Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. UN. UN Secretary-General. 2008. Seventeenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. UN. UN Secretary-General. 2009a. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. UN Secretary-General. 2009b. Nineteenth Progress Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. UN.

42

A. JUNGS

DE

ALMEIDA AND J. VIGGIANO

UN Secretary-General. 2016a. Thirty-First Progress Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2016/169). UN Secretary-General. 2016b. Thirty-Second Progress Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2016/706)— Liberia|ReliefWeb. United Nations Peacekeeping. 2017a. Regional Officers Trained on Early Warning and Information Sharing Mechanisms by NSCS. United Nations Peacekeeping. United Nations Peacekeeping. 2017b. UNMIL Facilitates the Forum to Assess the State of Liberia’s County Security Councils. United Nations Peacekeeping. UNMIL. 2018. The Story of UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia. UNMIL. UNSC. 2003a. Resolution 1497 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4803rd Meeting, on 1 August 2003. UN. UNSC. 2003b. Resolution 1509 (2003): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th Meeting, on 19 September 2003. UN. UNSC. 2008. Seguridad, paz y desarrollo: el papel de las Naciones Unidas en apoyo de la reforma del sector de la seguridad. UNSC. 2013. Resolución 2116 (2013). Aprobada por el Consejo de Seguridad en su 7033 a sesión, celebrada el 18 de septiembre. UNSC. 2014. Resolución 2190 (2014). Aprobada por el Consejo de Seguridad en su 7340a sesión, celebrada el 15 de diciembre. UNSC. 2016. Resolución 2333 (2016). Aprobada por el Consejo de Seguridad en su 7851a sesión, celebrada el 23 de diciembre. Vapnek, Jessica, Alfred Fofie, and Peter Boaz. 2017. Resolving Disputes and Improving Security in Post-Conflict Settings: An Example from Liberia. Arbitration 83. Williams, Rocklyn. 2000. Africa and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform— GSDRC. In Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium, eds. J. Cilliers and A. Hilding-Norberg, 19–27. Pretoria. Zaremberg, Gisela, Valeria Guarneros-Meza, and Adrián Gurza Lavalle. 2017. Introduction: Beyond Elections: Representation Circuits and Political Intermediation. In Intermediation and Representation in Latin America: Actors and Roles Beyond Elections, eds. Gisela Zaremberg, Valeria Guarneros-Meza, and Adrián Gurza Lavalle, 1st ed. 2017 edition. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

International Policing and/as the Future of UN Peace Operations Charles T. Hunt

Introduction 75 years since their inception, the future of the United Nations’ (UN) peace operations looks uncertain. Macro trends including the redistribution of power in the global system and the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are combining with micro-level developments such as changing conflict dynamics and actors to render old models of peace making, keeping and enforcement out-moded and in need of rethinking. As stated in the UN’s Our Common Agenda report, “our collective peace and security is increasingly under threat as a result of emerging risks and dangerous trends for which traditional forms of prevention, management and resolution are ill suited” (UN 2021a, p. 59). More directly, the UN Secretary-General’s policy brief outlining ‘A New Agenda for

C. T. Hunt (B) School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] Centre for Policy Research, United Nations University, Geneva, New York, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_3

43

44

C. T. HUNT

Peace’ called for a “reflection on the limits and future of peacekeeping” (UN 2023, p.24). As will be demonstrated, a number of the trends in conflict and violence that peace operations may need to stare down in the near future—including increased urban conflict, transnational organised crime and the proliferation of non-state groups that blur the lines between criminal and political violence—often require policing responses rather than military or indeed state-centric approaches. As such, there has been cautious but growing support among member states and the UN’s peace operations bureaucracy at headquarters for: an increased focus on policing capabilities; countenancing more police-centric mission designs; and, even seeing peace operations more explicitly as a form of international policing. While the future of policing in peace operations has long interested scholars and practitioners (e.g. Smith et al. 2007; Durch 2010), the relevance of police and policing models for addressing new and emerging challenges warrants deeper investigation. Drawing on recent fieldwork in field missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, as well as interviews with peace operations officials in New York during regular visits over the past 5 years, this chapter examines the significance of police to the future of UN peace operations.1 In doing so, it considers the comparative advantages and potential of police peacekeepers and more police-centric mission designs for responding to need and breaking the reliance on supply-driven models that are losing popularity and unlikely to (re)gain support going forward. The chapter proceeds in four parts. The first charts the recent contraction of the UN’s peace operations portfolio that suggests a turn away from the large multidimensional military-centric peace operations witnessed in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The second section identifies a number of trends, likely to continue into the next decade, that will shape the demand for international peace support efforts and international policing responses in particular. The third part details how and why UN police have grown in popularity

1 The interviews cited in this article were conducted as part of research approved by the RMIT University College Human Ethics Advisory Network (Approval reference #: CHEAN B 21048-08/17). In accordance with this approval, informed written or verbal (on interview recording) consent was obtained from all participants. All interview data in this paper are anonymised and non-identifiable.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

45

as an option for addressing precisely these challenges while providing a more acceptable form of third-party assistance to host states. In the fourth section, the implications for those authorising, implementing and receiving more police-centric UN peace operations are discussed and a range of recommendations are made for how to prepare the UN’s policing apparatus with the skills and capabilities required to meet the challenges of tomorrow’s conflicts.

Peace Operations in Retreat (Again)? As we approach the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century, UN peace operations are going through a period of contraction. It is nearly a decade since the UN Security Council authorised any new large multidimensional missions (i.e. MINUSCA-CAR in 2014)2 and the closure of long-standing missions in Haiti (2017), Cote d’Ivoire (2017), Liberia (2018) and most recently Darfur (2021)3 has equated to a more than 30% reduction in uniformed personnel UN website (n.d) and a 24% reduction in civilian personnel since 2015 (Coleman 2021).4 This ‘down-sizing’ was partly precipitated by, but certainly coincided with, downward pressure on the peacekeeping budget because of the policies of the US Trump administration (Coleman 2017; Williams 2018). Since 2015, the peacekeeping budget has shrunk by approximately US$2 billion or around a fifth. Beyond the practical implications for missions on the ground, the economic costs of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic—and fears of a global recession on the horizon—have only increased the fiscal austerity of member states that is flowing through to further financial pressure on peace operations (de Coning 2020; World Bank 2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the expanded use of the Wagner Group, along with heightened tensions between China and the West over Taiwan/Xinjiang, have added to deepening great power divisions in the UN Security Council. The consensus that was until recently arrived at consistently on existing peacekeeping files has become

2 Noting that new SPMs were created in Colombia, Yemen and Darfur region of Sudan. 3 NB: UNAMID transitioned into UNITAMS. 4 At the time of writing, the misison in Mali (MINUSMA) is in the process of drawing down-ahead of planned exit by the end of 2023-further accentuating these trends.

46

C. T. HUNT

increasingly difficult to reach or sustain (Boutellis 2020).5 As Richard Gowan (2020) has argued, “P5 tensions have … effectively ruled out the use of peacekeeping as a conflict resolution tool in a number of geopolitically significant conflicts.” In this context, it is difficult to imagine agreement among the permanent members of the Council on any major new deployment. While the headquarters climate has grown less favourable, missions on the ground have floundered. The ‘protection traps’ and seemingly ‘perpetual peacekeeping’ in places like South Sudan have resulted in further disillusionment among Member States (Russo 2021; Day and Hunt 2022, 2023) resulting in doubts about the efficacy of these operations. Meanwhile, host states and local populations have increasingly challenged the legitimacy of UN peace operations creating what experts have referred to as a crisis of consent (Dayal 2022). The corollary degradation of safety and security including direct attacks on peacekeepers6 has led to major troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs) growing increasingly concerned about their personnel in dangerous and unpopular missions from the DRC to Mali—two missions that are also headed towards theexit door. Given these developments, UN peace operations are coming under pressure from multiple directions. They are losing support from host states and local populations (bottom-up) as well as from their political masters and major contributors (i.e. top-down). Despite efforts to reenergise commitment such as the various iterations of the ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ initiative, all this has led some to ring the death knell for UN peace operations. Yet, the end of UN peacekeeping/operations has been incorrectly foretold many times before. When we take a longer view, what has actually happened is ebb and flow with adaptation and at times significant innovation to forge new models and unprecedented action. For example, a long period of Cold War inactivity was followed by the emergence of large-scale multidimensional peacebuilding efforts (Williams and Bellamy 2021). Similarly, a period of retreat following the catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid-90s was followed by the ambitious transitional authority missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

5 For instance disagreement over renewal of mandates for MINUSMA in Mali (See Security Council Report 2022). 6 For example in the DRC in late 2022 (See Russo 2022).

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

47

More recently, damaging protection failures in the 2010s—particularly but not only in the DRC—led to the robust/stabilisation ‘turn’ (Bellamy and Hunt 2015, 2021; Hunt 2017). Rather than the demise of UN peace interventions then, as Williams and Coleman (2021) have argued, “peace operations are far more likely to continue evolving than to become extinct.” If so, then the question, as Osland and Peter have posed, is “not whether UN peace operations will continue to exist, but how they will and could look like” (2021, p. 198). More pointedly, how will future peace operations respond to the challenges of tomorrow? Dorussen (2020) and others have predicted further contraction of the peace operations file. According to Novosseloff (2022), this could mean scaling back the ambition of any future missions and a likely return to traditional forms of interposition missions or politically focused missions with only a small or perhaps no military footprint. While the UN Security Council is likely to outsource more often to ad hoc coalitions in an era of ‘pragmatic peacekeeping’ (Karlsrud 2023) and de Coning (2021) has argued that when it comes to missions conducted by the UN, “[t]he most likely adaptation is a shift away from the large peacekeeping and stabilization operations of the 2000s towards a variety of smaller more specialized peace operations.” Indeed, this would be consistent with the ‘mood music’ at UN headquarters and the stated preference of the current Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, who sees special political missions as more in keeping with his prevention agenda (Boutellis and Novosseloff 2017, p. 4). Yet, one of the major problems facing UN peace operations across the decades and different generations of missions has been its supply-driven nature (Benson and Kathman 2014). In other words, regardless of the conflict dynamics or the security challenges at hand, an ‘off-the-shelf’ peace operation with the standard military, police and civilian components and ‘copy-and-paste’ mandate language has invariably been the norm. Addressing this inertia, Osland and Peter (2021) have identified rule of law reform and more bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding as most likely to have traction in future peace operations facing transnational conflict dynamics in an increasingly multi-polar global order. Along similar lines, others have argued that the likely light footprint missions of tomorrow will demand a reconceptualization of UN peace operations with more police-centric thinking or even police-led models (Osland 2019; Hunt 2019).

48

C. T. HUNT

The following section looks at some of the prevailing trends in conflict to glean some of the demand-side factors that may require addressing in future UN peace operations, particularly if we should expect them to be smaller and less militarised.

Conflict Trends While there are many trends that should be considered when projecting conflict trends, this section focuses on four that stand to shape the context for future UN peace operations: urbanisation of (violent) conflict; transnational organised crime; proliferation of armed criminal/political groups; and, the emergence of new technology and the growth of conflict over/in cyberspace. Urbanisation of (Violent) Conflict Urbanisation is a major demographic trend that will impact future peace operations. Today, over half the world’s population resides in urban centres and by 2050 around 6.4 billion people will be city-dwellers (Saghir and Santoro 2018). It is expected that 90% of that growth will take place in the cities of Asia and Africa (de Boer 2015). Continued urbanisation brings opportunities but it also promises disruption to established patterns of socio-political order, economic modalities and identities (Herbst 2006). With disruption comes heightened risks of instability and the potential for urban violence in general and violent urban conflict in particular (Cockayne et al. 2017). Contestation over political authority and resistance to state oppression as well as attempts to control lucrative markets such as protection rackets and/or trafficking routes, place violence more and more in cities (Cockayne 2016). As new urban arrivals face a range of horizontal inequalities and other exclusionary practices, the risk that this conflict can escalate into large-scale violence is exacerbated. This presents as a challenge for peace operations. The military—by far the largest component of default supply-driven mission designs—are trained for and more accustomed to conventional battlefield armed confrontations and remote battalion-sized deployments. Consequently, they are not well-suited to operating in densely populated urban centres (at least not

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

49

in a defensive, protective posture).7 Future peace operations are therefore likely to require models that can provide for urban public security. The Rise and Rise of Transnational Organised Crime 75% of today’s missions are deployed to places where Transnational Organised Crime (TNOC) is a key characteristic of the conflict system, including links between organised crime and global terrorist groups (Boutellis and Tiélès 2019, p. 171). In addition to special political missions in Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Colombia, the big multidimensional operations in DRC, CAR, Malis and South Sudan, are deployed in regions replete with trafficking in persons, arms, drugs and natural resources (de Boer and Bosetti 2015). Illicit economic activity often involves and invariably fuels armed groups and constitutes a driver of instability in many UN peace operations contexts (von Einsiedel 2017, pp. 4–5). TNOC poses threats to civilians, including through linkages to armed groups (see below). It also degrades the authority of the state by acting as an alternative service provider (security but also health and education) and competing for legitimacy with central government (Podder 2014). The dangers of TNOC are increasingly recognised by the UN Security Council (Vorrath 2018) but to date peace operations have been provided with neither the mandate nor the resources to disrupt criminal political economies that perpetuate conflict.8 It is the view of experienced peacekeepers on the ground that the violent conflicts peace operations are increasingly sent to address cannot be resolved without addressing TNOC.9 Blurring of Lines Between Criminal and Political Violence Related to the trends on urban instability and TNOC is the proliferation of (non-state) armed groups and the increasingly blurred line between political and criminal violence. Today’s parties to conflict around the world rarely fall neatly into discrete categories of state or non-state, licit 7 Regarding the deployment locations of UN peacekeepers, see Ruggeri et al. (2018). 8 Less than 50% of resolutions mandating these operations reference organised crime

and even less mandate UN operations to tackle criminal groups spoilers directly. 9 Author interviews with MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSCA officials—Mali (2017, 2019) DRC (2018), South Sudan (2018) and CAR (2019).

50

C. T. HUNT

or illicit, criminal or terrorist. Often, this diverse range of actors are simultaneously driven by local grievances and identity, linked to national elites and conflict dynamics, while being sponsored or funded by networks and actors that transcend countries’ national boundaries. For example, a jihadi in northern Mali may be a terrorist to Western donors, but a lynchpin in global trafficking routes for international crime syndicates and de facto policeman to the local villagers. They are also not fixed or static. Nonstate (armed) groups splinter and fragment while making and unmaking ephemeral strategic alliances over time. As a result, the identities are fluid; political leaders can be criminals, criminals can be militia leaders, individuals and the groups they represent can contain multitudes. They are liminal or more accurately have composite identities (Williams 2020).10 This presents significant challenges for peace operations and their efforts to safeguard civilians—particularly when missions are requested to operate in contexts where insecurity escalates quickly from threats of a more criminal to a more military nature. New Technology and Cyber-Security While a vast area, it is clear that the rapid rate of change in new technology and cyber-security will have ramifications for future UN peace operations—presenting challenges but also opportunities. Tomorrow’s conflicts are likely to feature new weapons technologies—including digitally enabled Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) but also non-lethal ones (Dorn 2016; UN 2021b). Whether providing a credible deterrent, a security guarantee or protecting civilians, being able to match armed actors in these evolving domains will be important. Another long-standing but growing trend is the information operations or dimensions of conflict, including targeted dis- and mis-information campaigns. The advent of social media and widespread access in deployment areas has heightened the extent to which missions need to have the capabilities to analyse social media and other parts of the information ecosystem as well as respond and counter fake news and dis/mis-information campaigns through more adroit strategic communications (Trithart 2022). The next phase of ICT is only likely to further 10 NB: To some extent, this resonates with what Paul Williams’ paper referred to as: “War in weak states persists but often blurs with organized crime, atrocities, and state repression.” See Williams (2020).

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

51

complicate this space and demand that future missions are innovative and tech-enabled (Williams and O’Neil 2023). Lastly, cyberspace is an emerging domain of conflict and lawlessness and cyber-crime is an area expected to proliferate in conflict zones (Clarke and Knake 2010). Attacks on critical infrastructure, for example, may become more common as the technology for mounting and executing such attacks becomes more readily accessible to parties to conflict and other spoiler groups. This is another aspect that may require support from UN peace operations— particularly those in strong partnerships with host states (i.e. most current and likely more future missions) (Hansen 2023). Furthermore, missions themselves are likely to come under cyberattack (Dorn and Webb 2019). Protecting encrypted mission databases that include sensitive information (e.g. details of classified intelligence sources, human rights investigations, etc.) against attacks by malicious state and non-state actors will be critical to the effectiveness and credibility of future missions (Dorn 2017). To summarise, in the next five to ten years, it is likely that many of the trends discussed in the previous section will continue. Some may develop comparatively more quickly or with bigger impacts, but it is unlikely that any of them will disappear. And while many of these trends are set to continue other new ones are likely to emerge. In order to respond to diverse and dynamic conflict environments, and shifting geopolitical tectonics, the design, configuration and objectives of the UN’s operational responses will need to adapt. Indeed, given the nature of these challenges, it is to be expected that peace operations will indeed evolve in response (Coleman and Williams 2021, p. 243). There are some who have identified rule of law reform and more bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding as the most likely to have traction in future peace operations facing transnational conflict dynamics in an increasingly multi-polar global order (Osland and Peter 2021). Others have argued that these trends demand a reconceptualization of UN peace operations with more police-centric thinking or even police-led models (Osland 2019; Hunt 2022). The following section examines the relevance and likely traction/relative acceptance and support of UN police peacekeepers and police-oriented mission concepts and configurations for tackling these enduring challenges.

52

C. T. HUNT

Police as Panacea: More ‘Blue’ Less ‘Green’? Since first deployed in the Congo in 1960 police peacekeepers have played important roles in temporarily filling a public security gap and then working to (re)build the criminal justice architecture. Indeed, these efforts have increasingly become a prerequisite for mission transitions and a cornerstone of their exit strategies (Greener 2011; Mailhot et al. 2022). As the nature of conflict has changed, so too have the roles and responsibilities of police peacekeepers expanding into areas such as the protection of civilians, combatting organised crime and even countering/preventing violent extremism (den Heyer and Albrecht 2021; Hunt 2020, 2022). Although still significantly outnumbered by the military component,11 the perceived comparative advantages over their military counterparts and specific skill-sets of UNPOL—providing interim operational support and working towards long-term sustainable rule of law—in addressing the trends raised above have generated a groundswell of support among member states and some peacekeeping experts for including more police-centric concepts and countenancing more policecentric missions designs.12 This section examines the arguments for and against moving towards more police-oriented ways of doing peace operations. Comparative Advantages and Salient Skill-Sets First, major recent developments and innovations in the field contribute to the growing belief that UNPOL may be better placed to respond to the locations, sources and means of threats to the peace posed by emerging and future conflict dynamics.13 For example, due to their training, methods and equipment, police are much better placed to address the types of social unrest, criminality/criminal violence and threats to civilian well-being that occur in the urban spaces discussed above (Hills 2013). 11 UNPOL constitute on average 12% of total uniformed personnel deployed across the UN’s peace operations. 12 NB: this has not necessarily manifested within the Secretariat which remains skewed towards military approaches or translated into commensurate increases in resources needed for the effective implementation of the tasks for the Police Division or for police components. 13 NB: this is not the case in all settings—particularly the non-permissive environments such as Mali.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

53

UNPOL has been called upon to help stabilise and restore public order as well as take a leading role in protecting civilians in these settings. For example, MINUSCA in CAR has utilised a Joint Task Force for Bangui (JTFB) to maintain order and stabilise the capital—with a particular focus on key hotspots such as the PK5 district—and authorised them with Urgent Temporary Measures (UTM) to arrest and detain criminal actors. The use of formed police units (FPUs) to patrol and secure IDP/ POC sites in South Sudan is another example where police have proven to be advantageous compared to their military counterparts. Police are also deemed best-suited to address criminal violence and they are often the first responders to disorder attributed to criminal gangs.14 Second, in the absence of clear strategic direction, dealing with TNOC in mission settings has often fallen to the police components (Osland 2019, p. 191).15 In addition to regional initiatives in areas where peace operations are deployed (e.g. West African Coast Initiative (WACI) tackling drug trafficking), specific UNPOL components have undertaken a range of operational activities to tackle TNOC (UN Police Website). For instance, the MINUSMA police component created a Serious Organised Crime (SOC) support unit containing 20 individual police officers dedicated to supporting the Malian authorities with training and equipment to respond to TNOC issues.16 Similar units have been created in MINUSCA and MONUSCO.17 In the latter case, there have also been innovative efforts including employing an expert analyst on TNOC and the involvement of the armed groups in eastern DRC.18 Police can play an important role in responding to this emergent challenge but they must be part of a coordinated systemic response that addresses the social and economic aspects of the problem as well as the criminal justice one.19

14 Author interviews with MINUSCA JTFB officials—Bangui, CAR, August 2019. 15 Author interviews with UNPOL officials—New York (2017), Mali (2017, 2019)

DRC (2018), South Sudan (2018) and CAR (2019). 16 Author interview with MINUSMA UNPOL SOC official—Bamako, Mali, April 2017. 17 Author interview with MINUSCA and MONUSCO UNPOL officials—Bangui, CAR (August 2019) and Goma, DRC (May 2018). 18 Author interview with MONUSCO official—Goma, DRC, May 2018. 19 Author interviews with UN senior leadership—Bamako, Mali (April 2017), Kinshasa,

DRC (June 2018) and Bangui, CAR (August 2019).

54

C. T. HUNT

Third, UNPOL’s community-oriented policing approach has become a pillar of mission local engagement strategies, facilitating more peoplecentred operations (Henigson 2020) and reducing local forms of inter-/ intra-communal violence (Smidt 2020). They are seen as playing important roles in early warning, providing visible presence in risky areas, and a sense that the local police cannot predate in that area, enhancing missions’ credibility with the populations they serve (UN 2018; Whalan 2017, p. 309). Fourth, police in the form of FPUs could provide a security presence for special political missions as with the examples of the guard forces deployed to defend/protect personnel and installations in UNSMILLibya, UNAMA-Afghanistan and UNSOM-Somalia. This provides a less concerning alternative to host state authorities notwithstanding some concerns that the para-militarising of policing in this way sets a bad example to local police (Ciorciari 2020). Fifth, police reform as part of broader rule of law reform has been seen as an important aspect of peace operations transitions and exit strategies for some time (Bull 2008; Paris 2010). The failures of liberal peacebuilding models in the 1990s and early 2000s have led some to question the effectiveness of this approach. Nevertheless, supporting the reform and capacity-building of reliable and accountable security and justice sector institutions remains a critical piece of the war to peace transition puzzle. As a number of missions have become quagmired with exit strategies proving elusive, this change theory—i.e. re-establishing the rule of law after violent conflict as a cornerstone for building sustainable peace and enabling mission closure—has become increasingly popular in recent years adding further support to the role of UNPOL as increasingly mission-critical (Hunt 2015; Osland 2019, p. 191). The completion of major missions in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia (as well as earlier in Sierra Leone) is often used as evidence of successful implementation of mandates and transition predicted on reformed and strengthened national security and justice institutions.20 This is particularly seductive at a time when expensive missions such as MONUSCO and UNMISS are floundering in $1billion per year ‘holding patterns’ without a clear exit strategy in sight.

20 Author interviews with Ambassadors of Permanent members of the Security Council—New York, USA, August 2019.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

55

Sixth, a greater focus on policing and the rule of law may also lend itself to more focus on realising the goals of the sustaining peace agenda and the Secretary-General’s Prevention Agenda. The role of police peacekeepers in supporting and building the capacity of local actors to enhance resilience and ownership of fundamental security and justice considerations contribute to preventing the recurrence of conflict or prevent conflict itself. It also necessarily brings together more closely the UN’s peace/security and development pillars. This orientation can also be seen to respond to the SG’s Prevention Agenda, transforming the institutional arrangements that have been generative of conflict and laying the foundations for future preventive capacity. Finally, and related to the previous point, a more police-centric approach is also likely to be more popular with a broader range of stakeholders at a time of waning interest in UN peace operations. This is particularly true of those receiving/host states in the Global South who may fear the encroachment on their sovereignty posed by robust intervention and prefer efforts to build state capacity and extend state authority in order to address the challenges discussed above such as the threats posed by TNOC and new technology. It can also be understood to align well with established frameworks aimed at strengthening peace operations such as the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative—particularly the pillar on sustaining peace and peacebuilding—and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) via SDG16.21 Both the SDGs and A4P enjoy broad-based support from member states—importantly those in the Global South—making traction and acceptance more likely. Downside Risks However, leaning more heavily—or in some cases, entirely—on police for future mission configurations also presents a number of challenges and potential downside risks. There is some evidence to suggest state-centric police capacity-building can improve state-society relations in contexts like Liberia (Karim 2020). However, business as usual police and justice sector reform—primarily through technical train and equip programming—promises to achieve 21 SDG 16 aims to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.

56

C. T. HUNT

little more than strengthening illiberal states (Gordon 2014). This is perhaps more important than ever given that for future missions the “underlying liberal democratic goals on which [peace operations] are based, can no longer be assumed” (Cassin and Zyla 2021). Doubling down on extant modes of public security system reform does not really constitute a ‘radical break’ with existing approaches. Osland and Peter (2021, p. 204) have argued that “streamlined peacebuilding”—a sort of a pared-back ‘thin’ version of rule of law reform that focuses on local ownership and bottom-up approaches—can avoid the pitfalls of earlier more ambitious attempts. However, this runs the risk of becoming a kind of ‘liberal peacebuilding lite’—eschewing unrealistic calls to create new flawless institutions but not meaningfully addressing the abusive and corrupt practices of existing ones. More genuine local engagement and ownership of rule of law (criminal justice sector) reform is clearly important to overcoming current legitimacy and local consent deficits in future peace operations (Gippert 2017; Sabrow 2017). But it is also the case that recognising and working with a wider range of non-state policing and justice providers in mission settings can also risk empowering abusive or discriminatory actors (Felbab-Brown 2016; Idris 2019). The proposal that police substitute for military components of peace operations may get around difficult sovereignty and use of force questions, but it would also generate problems for third-party interventions. It would render missions impotent in the face of widespread threats to civilians—particularly when those are emanating from the state security forces. It may be that future peace operations will simply not be able to promise widespread physical protection to civilians that have proven difficult to deliver on anyway (Day and Hunt 2022). Yet the inability to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence will recreate the scenarios of the mid-90s and threaten the credibility of any UN presence that became bystanders to human rights violations and atrocities (Hunt and Zimmerman 2020). Furthermore, even the most militarised FPU presence is unlikely to be a credible coercive deterrent to conflict parties and therefore will struggle to provide the security guarantees at the heart of traditional peacekeeping models designed to underwrite ceasefires and peace agreement implementation (Diehl and Balas 2014). Another major consideration is the political will and staying power to deliver on the rule of law and police reform strategy. With strong host state buy-in ‘quick wins’ are possible and peace dividends could be forthcoming. However, police reform takes a long time. As the World

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

57

Bank (2011, p. 109) has estimated, such reform programming requires decades—even generations—to succeed in its most ambitious aims. Any pivot to police and police capacity-building that does not adequately factor in the costs or underestimates the scope and duration of commitment needed to reform police and justice architectures would likely be doomed to fail and end up costing more than it saved. Despite the potential risks, the comparative advantages and skill-sets of police discussed above have contributed to a zeitgeist among a growing number of UN member states, officials and expert analysts pitching peace operations with a bigger police presence as a possible panacea for a range of different roles and phases of missions, including laying the foundations for sustainable peace and enabling mission exit strategies. It is quite possible then that the role of police within UN peace operations will become increasingly important while achieving their objectives is likely to become more difficult in more challenging operating environments. In order to live up to the expectations and avoid the pitfalls highlighted above, UNPOL capabilities and skill-sets as well as conceptual and policy frameworks will need to be adjusted and augmented if the UN and its police peacekeepers are to meet the challenges of the future.

Implications: Preparing for More Police-Centric Peace Operations This part of the chapter identifies a range of UNPOL profiles, skills and capabilities that the UN should seek to build up to prepare for what lies ahead. Recognising several significant reform initiatives in recent years and others currently underway, the following recommendations include suggestions for strengthening and augmenting existing capabilities but also propose reconceptualising key aspects of UNPOL’s work and several new UN police functions in response to emerging threats. A number of capabilities discussed would be useful for both direct implementation by UNPOL themselves as well as a skillset that can be transferred/imparted to local counterparts in order to develop long-term sustainability. Reforming UNPOL Generation and Recruitment Processes Whatever the specific roles of UNPOL in future missions, the way in which they are provided, recruited and retained needs overhauling. PCCs often have vastly different experiences with implementing mandates in

58

C. T. HUNT

different missions and provide officers with varying levels of preparedness for doing so. Business as usual will not generate sufficient quantity and suitable quality of human resources and equipment to do the job and close the gap between heightened expectancies and implementation realities (Durch and Ker 2013). Going forward the UN and PCCs should renegotiate to provide a more relevant baseline for recruitment by the UN Police Division. The top 10 PCCs currently provide approximately 65% of all deployed UNPOL (UN Police Division website, n.d). Parallel efforts to broaden the base of police providers—reaching out to new and re-engaging dormant PCCs—should also be undertaken. Meeting future demands will also mean making different requests of PCCs. In all scenarios, UNPOL of better quality—with more relevant skills-sets (e.g. French—and potentially Arabic-speaking, culturally sensitive, police who can bridge between missions and locals as well as work directly with communities)—will be required. This has implications for pre-departure and in-mission training (Neubauer 2022). Future demands for new technologies and specialist equipment may also warrant exploring the possibility of ‘equipment contributing countries’ or ‘enabling states’ to provide high-end capabilities (see below on weaponry).22 DPO should also get more creative and think outside the current orthodoxy in terms of numbers, enablers, equipment and taskings of current configurations. For example, policing units capable of splitting into smaller rapidly deployable, self-sustaining platoons is one development that would empower missions to use scarce resources more effectively. It is also worthwhile thinking through how this could be combined with increased use of Specialised Police Teams that are gaining traction and offer an alternative mode for contributing personnel and focusing effort (UN 2019; Tøraasen 2021). Mastering New Technology and Cyber Capabilities UNPOL will need to be conversant and operational in a range of new technologies to effectively operate in the conflict theatres of tomorrow. Ability to use and/or confront new non-lethal weapons technologies will likely become important for police. However, so too will being able to use machine assistance to overcome logistics challenges (shipping/access/ 22 This, for example, could be pursued under the Specialised Police Team concept where one member state can supply equipment while another/others supply personnel.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

59

resupply convoys) and produce more on site such as equipment for local police using 3D printing. Another key area for up-skilling on new technology and techniques relates to cyber-crime and security techniques. As a minimum, skill-sets around modern cyberspace intelligence gathering techniques and software familiarity (e.g. social media and successor platforms) will be necessary. Being able to navigate information landscapes typified by misinformation will also be essential for: (i) accurate and timely conflict and crime analysis to guide responses; and (ii) informing force protection in situations where peacekeepers are targeted. Forensic cybersecurity capabilities will likely be required by missions and UNPOL will be part of those expected to use and maintain them. Protecting encrypted mission databases that include sensitive information (e.g. details of classified intelligence sources, evidence of human rights investigations, etc.) against attacks by malicious state and non-state actors will be critical to the effectiveness and credibility of future missions. Where UNPOL is engaged in capacity-building with national police, it is likely they will need to transfer the know-how to tackle cyber-crime that may target critical infrastructure and systems that underwrite stability in society (e.g. food, financial systems, etc.). DPO should look to build collaborative relationships between UNPD and existing UN capacities such as the “Digital Blue Helmets” unit in the Office of Information and Communications Technology to enhance cyber-security preparedness, resilience and response. A Comprehensive Approach to Rule of Law and Security and Justice Sector Reform The focus on reform, restructuring and rebuilding of police services will likely remain an important part of the equation but, if it is to remain relevant, the UN will need to embrace the messy reality of hybrid security governance (Bagayoko et al. 2016). In order to grasp the nettle of non-state policing (and justice) and rethink the form and substance of liberal peacebuilding templates (Osland and Peter 2021, p. 204), DPO and UNPOL should therefore extend the current notion of ‘stakeholder engagement’ and retool to develop modalities for working with unorthodox partners (Hofmann and Schneckener 2011). This will likely include community watch/vigilante groups, self-defence militia, moto riders associations, traditional authorities and private sector actors to establish the order from which more sustainable forms of locally

60

C. T. HUNT

constructed peace can emerge (Albrecht and Buur 2009). Even in scenarios where the UN is required politically to double-down on statecentric approaches to securing law and order, a better understanding of the way that empirical everyday order is continually produced through the interactions of multiple and diverse providers of security and justice will help UNPOL develop a clearer sense of what they are competing with and seeking to displace (Day and Hunt 2020). Whatever the shape of future UN peace operations, locating police peacekeeping work within the broader effort to address the rule of law or criminal justice chain will be essential to their continued relevance. Whether a state-centric institutional focus or decentralised diffuse models of governance, strengthening the connections between police, justice and corrections as an interdependent order-generating system will be essential. DPO can build on the Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections to improve cross-system coordination, including with the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, the Peacebuilding Fund, and a range of other agencies, funds and programmes (e.g. the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Women). They could also be tasked with building working relationships and promoting coherence with external partners working alongside missions to support security and justice sector reform, including regional organisations, bilateral donors and international financial institutions such as the World Bank.

Conclusion As Cassin and Zyla (2021) have suggested, the changing global order may well dictate that the next generation of UN peace operations need to operate with less control, impose less from the top-down and focus on more locally driven efforts to prevent and resolve conflict. Yet, as de Coning (2021, pp. 220–221) has argued, “UN peace operations have shown a remarkable resilient capacity to continuously adapt to new challenges over the past 75 years, and there is no evidence to suggest that it will not continue to do so into the future.” While large-scale multidimensional peace operations cannot be ruled out, it is more likely that smaller, political and peacebuilding missions with no—or a much smaller—military footprint will constitute the next generation of UN peace operations. Although only one aspect of a required comprehensive agenda and spectrum of possible operations, the dual capability of police as a security

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

61

presence and well-placed to support the preventive and peacebuilding efforts makes them important to thinking through that future. As has been shown in this chapter, police already enjoy comparative advantages for responding to a number of prevailing conflict trends that are likely to continue into the future. Therefore, in thinking about what future peace operations should look like, rather than transformational change or overhaul, reorienting existing approaches and elevating the roles of police—particularly in the short to medium term—may be a viable and potentially fruitful avenue for addressing the war, conflict and security challenges of the next decade. ‘Our Common Agenda’—the UN’s latest attempt to adapt to the shifting tectonics of global governance—laid the groundwork for a ‘New Agenda for Peace’ (UN 2023). While peace operations did not feature as centrally as they did in Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s original Agenda for Peace (UN 1992) over three decades ago, its call to reflect on the limits and future of peace operations still presents an opportunity to think anew about how this important UN innovation can remain relevant to the global security challenges of tomorrow. As the UN reflects on three-quarters of a century of peace operations, it should not be consumed with how to survive with its current models. It should be transforming peace operations into a tool that meets the challenges of tomorrow’s conflicts. The role of police, policing and the very idea of international policing is likely to have an important part to play. Acknowledgements Research for this article was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DE170100138). Some of the ideas contained here originally appeared in a working paper commissioned by the UN Department of Peace Operations. I am very grateful to them—particularly the Department for Policy, Evaluation and Training and the Police Division—for the opportunity to discuss and develop these arguments and recommendations.

References Albrecht, P., and L. Buur. 2009. An Uneasy Marriage: Non-state Actors and Police Reform. Policing and Society 19 (4): 390–405. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10439460903375182. Bagayoko, Niagale, Eboe Hutchful, and Robin Luckham. 2016. Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and

62

C. T. HUNT

Legitimate Public Authority. Conflict, Security & Development 16 (1): 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136137. Bellamy, Alex J., and Charles T. Hunt. 2015. Twenty-first century UN peace operations: Protection, force and the changing security environment. International Affairs 91 (6): 1277–1298. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346. 12456. Bellamy, Alex. and Charles T. Hunt. 2021. Using Force to Protect Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Survival 63 (3): 143–170. https://doi.org/10.1080/003 96338.2021.1930411 Benson, Michelle, and Jacob D. Kathman. 2014. United Nations Bias and Force Commitments in Civil Conflicts. The Journal of Politics 76 (2): 350–363. Boutellis, A. 2020. Rethinking UN Peacekeeping Burden-sharing in a Time of Global Disorder. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 13 (2): 193–209. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-019-00274-2. Boutellis, A., and A. Novosseloff. 2017. Road to a Better UN? Peace Operations and the Reform Agenda. International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst. org/2017/11/peace-operations-and-the-reform-agenda. Boutellis, Arthur, and Stephanie Tiélès. 2019. Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Still Foggy? In United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, ed. Cedric de Coning and Mateja Peter, 169–190. Springer International Publishing. Bull, Carolyn. 2008. No Entry Without Strategy: Building the Rule of Law Under Un Transitional Administration. Tokyo/New York/Paris: United Nations University Press. Cassin, Katelyn, and Benjamin Zyla. 2021. The End of the Liberal World Order and the Future of UN Peace Operations: Lessons Learned. Global Policy 12 (4): 455–467. Ciorciari, J.D. 2020. Sharing Sovereignty in the Streets: International Policing in Fragile States. International Peacekeeping 27 (5): 732–759. Clarke, R.A., and R. Knake. 2010. Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It. New York: HarperCollins. Cockayne, James. 2016. Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime. London and New York: Hurst/Oxford University Press. Cockayne, James, Louise Bosetti, and Nazia Hussain. 2017. Preventing Violent Urban Conflict: A Thematic Paper for the United Nations—World Bank Study on Conflict Prevention. Conflict Prevention Series: No. 2. New York and Tokyo: United Nations University. Coleman, K. P. (2017, July 10). The Dynamics of Peacekeeping Budget Cuts: The Case of MONUSCO. IPI Global Observatory. https://theglobalobserv atory.org/2017/07/monusco-drc-peacekeeping-budget-cuts/.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

63

Coleman, K.P. 2021. Downsizing in UN Peacekeeping: The Impact on Civilian Peacekeepers and the Missions Employing Them. International Peacekeeping 27 (5): 703–731. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2020.1793328. Coleman, Katharina P., and Paul D. Williams. 2021. Peace Operations Are What States Make of Them: Why Future Evolution Is More Likely Than Extinction. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (2): 241–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13523260.2021.1882802. Day, Adam C., and Charles T. Hunt. 2020. UN Stabilisation Operations and the Problem of Non-linear Change: A Relational Approach to Intervening in Governance Ecosystems. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 9 (1): 1–23. Day, Adam, and Charles T. Hunt. 2022. Distractions, Distortions and Dilemmas: The Externalities of Protecting Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping. Civil Wars 24 (1): 97–116. Day, Adam, and Charles T. Hunt. 2023. Endless Wars, Perpetual Peacekeeping? In How Wars End: Theory and Practice, ed. D. Kingsbury and R. Iron, 221– 235. Abingdon: Routledge. Dayal, Anyali. 2022. A Crisis of Consent in UN Peace Operations. Global Observatory. New York: International Peace Institute. https://theglobalobs ervatory.org/2022/08/a-crisis-of-consent-in-un-peace-operations/. de Boer, John. 2015. The Sustainable Development Fight Will be Won or Lost in Our Cities. Word Economic Forum, September 24. de Boer, John, and Louise Bosetti. 2015. Examining the Interactions Between Conflict and Organized Crime, Our World, United Nations University. https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/examining-the-interactions-between-con flict-and-organized-crime. de Coning, C. 2020. The Impact of COVID-19 on Peace Operations. IPI Global Observatory, April 2. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/04/ impact-covid-19-peace-operations/. de Coning, Cedric. 2021. The Future of UN Peace Operations: Principled Adaptation Through Phases of Contraction, Moderation, and Renewal. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (2): 211–224. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13523260.2021.1894021. den Heyer, Garth, and James F. Albrecht. 2021. Police and International Peacekeeping Missions: Securing Peace and Post-conflict Rule of Law. Cham: Springer. Diehl, P.F., and A. Balas. 2014. Peace Operations. Wiley. Dorn, A. Walter. 2016. Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations. International Peace Institute. Dorn, A. Walter, and Stewart Webb. 2019. Cyberpeacekeeping: New Ways to Prevent and Manage Cyberattacks. International Journal of Cyber Warfare

64

C. T. HUNT

and Terrorism (IJCWT) 9 (1): 19–30. https://doi.org/10.4018/IJCWT.201 9010102. Dorn, W. 2017. Cyberpeacekeeping: A New Role for the United Nations Safety & Security. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 18: 138–146. Dorussen, Han. 2020. Peacekeeping After COVID-19. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 26 (3). https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0022 Durch, W. 2010. United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks. GRIPS Policy Research Center GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces in Post-Conflict Peace-Support Operations. January 27–28th. http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~pinc/data/10-03.pdf. Durch, William J., and Michelle Ker. 2013. Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment. Providing for Peacekeeping, Paper No. 6. November, New York: IPI. http://www.ipinst.org/ media/pdf/publications/ipi_e_pub_police_in_un_peacekeeping.pdf. Felbab-Brown, V. 2016. Hurray for Militias? Not So Fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police Experience. Small Wars and Insurgencies 27 (2): 258– 281. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169. Gippert, B.J. 2017. Local Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Pathways to Local Compliance with International Police Reform. Taylor & Francis. Gordon, Eleanor. 2014. Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or Its People? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 8 (2–3): 126–148. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014. 930219. Gowan, R. 2020. UN Peacekeeping in a Fragmenting International Order. International Crisis Group Speech, November 25. https://www.crisisgroup.org/ global/un-peacekeeping-fragmenting-international-order. Greener, Bethan K. 2011. The Rise of Policing in Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping 18 (2): 183–195. Hansen, A.S. 2023. Peacekeeping in the Digital Age: Future Threats and Capability Requirements. The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, 229–249. Cham: Springer. Henigson, Harley. 2020. Community Engagement in UN Peacekeeping Operations: A People-Centred Approach to Protecting Civilians. New York: International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/2020/11/communityengagement-in-un-peacekeeping-operations-a-people-centered-approach-toprotecting-civilians. Herbst, Jeffrey. 2006. Population Change, Urbanization, and Political Consolidation. In The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hills, A. 2013. Policing Post-conflict Cities. Zed Books.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

65

Hofmann, Claudia, and Ulrich Schneckener. 2011. Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State-and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (883): 603–621. Hunt, Charles T. 2015. UN Peace Operations and International Policing: Negotiating Complexity, Assessing Impact and Learning to Learn, Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. London: Routledge. Hunt, Charles T. 2017. All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the ‘Robust Turn’ in UN Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping 24 (1): 108–131. Hunt, Charles T. 2019. Rhetoric Versus Reality in the Rise of Policing in UN Peace Operations: ‘More Blue, Less Green’? Australian Journal of International Affairs 73 (6): 609–627. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019. 1685936. Hunt, Charles T. 2020. Protection Through Policing: The Protective Role of Un Police in Peace Operations. New York: International Peace Institute. Hunt, Charles T. 2022. ‘To Serve and Protect’: The Changing Roles of Police in the Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations. Civil Wars, OnlineFirst. Hunt, Charles T., and Shannon Zimmerman. 2020. Twenty Years of the Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: Progress, Problems and Prospects. Journal of International Peacekeeping 23 (1–2): 50–81. https://doi.org/10. 1163/18754112-20200004. Idris, I. 2019. Non-state Policing in Fragile Contexts. K4D Helpdesk Report 664. Institute of Development Studies. Karim, Sabrina. 2020. Relational State Building in Areas of Limited Statehood: Experimental Evidence on the Attitudes of the Police. American Political Science Review 114 (2): 536–551. Karlsrud, John. 2023. ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping’ in Practice: Exit Liberal Peacekeeping, Enter UN Support Missions? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding: 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2023.2198285. Mailhot, Cameron, Michael Kriner, and Sabrina Karim. 2022. International Involvement in (Re-)Building Police Forces: A Comparison of US and UN Police Assistance Programs Around the World. Small Wars & Insurgencies: 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2041367 Neubauer, Philipp. 2022. Making the International Work: Police Training Experts as Brokers for International Missions. International Peacekeeping 29 (3): 522–547. Novosseloff, Alexandra. 2022. A Comparative Study of Older One-Dimensional Un Peace Operations: Is the Future of Un Peacekeeping Its Past? Oslo: NUPI. https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/A-compar ative-study-of-older-one-dimensional-UN-Peace-Operations-Is-the-Future-ofUN-Peacekeeping-its-Past.pdf.

66

C. T. HUNT

Osland, Kari M. 2019. UN Policing: The Security-Trust Challenge. In United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order. ed. Cedric de Coning and Mateja Peter. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Osland, Kari M., and Mateja Peter. 2021. UN Peace Operations in a Multipolar Order: Building Peace Through the Rule of Law and Bottom-up Approaches. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (2): 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13523260.2021.1898166. Paris, R. 2010. Saving Liberal Peacebuilding. Review of International Studies 36 (2): 337–365. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000057. Podder, Sukanya. 2014. Mainstreaming the Non-state in Bottom-up StateBuilding: Linkages Between Rebel Governance and Post-conflict Legitimacy. Conflict, Security & Development 14 (2): 213–243. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14678802.2014.889878. Ruggeri, A., H. Dorussen, and T.-I. Gizelis. 2018. On the Frontline Every day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers. British Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 1005–1025. Russo, J. 2021. Militarised Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Third World Quarterly 42 (12): 3070–3086. Russo, Jenna. 2022. Protests Against UN in Eastern Congo Highlight Peace Mission’s Crisis of Legitimacy. The Conversation, July 31. https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highli ght-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932. Sabrow, Sophia. 2017. Local Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Peace Operations by the Un, Regional Organizations and Individual States—A Case Study of the Mali Conflict. International Peacekeeping 24 (1): 159–186. Saghir, J., and J. Santoro. 2018. Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 12. https:/ /www.csis.org/analysis/urbanization-sub-saharan-africa. Security Council Report. 2022. Mali: Council Vote to Renew the Mandate of MINUSMA. What’s in Blue, June 29. https://www.securitycouncilreport. org/whatsinblue/2022/06/mali-council-vote-to-renew-the-mandate-of-min usma.php. Smidt, Hannah M. 2020. United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (2–3): 344–372. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200271985 9631. Smith, Joshua G., Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch. 2007. Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-conflict Policing and Rule of Law. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, November. http://www.stimson. org/pub.cfm?id=483.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING AND/AS THE FUTURE OF UN …

67

Tøraasen, M. 2021. The Future of UN Policing? The Norway-led Specialized Police Team to Combat Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Haiti 2010– 2019. CMI Report 3. Trithart, Albert. 2022. Disinformation Against UN Peacekeeping Operations. New York: IPI. UN. 1992. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Report of the Secretary-general Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 3 January 1992. New York: United Nations. UN. 2018. Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operations. REF 2018/04. New York: United Nations. https://www.police.un.org/ sites/default/files/manual-community-oriented-poliicing.pdf. UN. 2023. A New Agenda for Peace. Our Common Agenda Policy Brief No.9. New York: UN. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-commonagenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf United Nations. Police Division Website. https://police.un.org/en/serious-andorganized-crime United Nations. Troop and Police Contributors. https://peacekeeping.un.org/ en/troop-and-police-contributors. Accessed 7 February 2023. United Nations. 2019. Guidelines for Specialized Police Teams on Assignment with United Nations Peace Operations. Ref. 2019.34, New York: UN DPO and DOS. United Nations. 2021a. Our Common Agenda. Report of the Secretary-General, September. https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/#dow nload. United Nations. 2021b. Strategy for the Digitial Transformation of UN Peacekeeping. New York: Department of Peace Operations (DPO)/Department of Operational Support (DOS)/Department of Management Strategy, Policy And Compliance (DMSPC), September. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/str ategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping. von Einsiedel, Sebastian. 2017. Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict. Occasional Paper 10. Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research. Vorrath, Judith. 2018. Organized Crime on the UN Security Council Agenda Action Against Human Trafficking Reveals Opportunities and Challenges. SWP Comment, No. 38, October. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/2018C38_vrr.pdf. Whalan, Jeni. 2017. The Local Legitimacy of Peacekeepers. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11 (3). https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017. 1353756. Williams, Paul D. 2018. In US Failure to Pay Peacekeeping Bills, Larger UN Financing Questions Raised. IPI Global Observatory, October

68

C. T. HUNT

23. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/10/in-us-failure-pay-peacekeep ing-bills-larger-financing-questions-raised/. Williams, Paul D. 2020. The Future of Peace Operations: A Scenario Analysis, 2020–2030. New York: UN DPO. Williams, Paul D., and A.J. Bellamy. 2021. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity. Williams, M., and M.G. O’Neill. 2023. The Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping and the Role of the Irish Defence Forces. In Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security, ed. E.U. The, 253–271. Cham: Springer. World Bank. 2011. Conflict, Security and Development: 2011 World Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, DC: World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/ June, 37224/9781464818431.pdf.

Resolving Conflict and Ensuring Protection

Attack Helicopters: Key Enablers for Peace Enforcement and the Protection of Civilians A. Walter Dorn

In the twenty-first century, the multidimensional peace operations of the United Nations have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of attack, with the usual caveat of “within mission capabilities and areas of deployment.” Too often, however, UN operations do not have sufficient capabilities to respond to threats and impending attacks. In particular, stopping an attack that is imminent or underway requires robust forces and special equipment, as well as a means for rapid transit and precise movement. In theory, air power provides such capacities but it is under-used and under-evaluated, especially systems like attack helicopters. This chapter presents a case study from the mission in the Central African Republic to highlight the actual use of attack helicopters. In 2017, these UN helicopters from Senegal stopped armed attacks on Bambari and, in an impartial manner, helped defuse a threatening situation within the town. The chapter demonstrates how attack helicopters have proven very useful, while also identifying key shortcomings and

A. W. Dorn (B) Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Kingston, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_4

71

72

A. W. DORN

pitfalls. It draws upon interviews with UN leaders and field visits, in addition to UN documents and the academic/practitioner literature. This case shows how air power can help future UN peace operations apply force effectively to achieve the appropriate balance between peacekeeping and peace enforcement for the protection of civilians.

Introduction: Learning from Failure The idea of “attack helicopters for peace” may seem oxymoronic, or at least incongruous with the idea of peacekeeping, but these advanced weapons systems have become an important part of modern UN peace operations. Attack helicopters have been used in this century for protection and for peace enforcement in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R. Congo), the Darfur region of Sudan, and in Mali. By contrast, during the traditional peacekeeping operations of the Cold War, attack helicopters were never used, and force was rarely applied by any means.1 To begin to understand why such fearsome weapons systems came to be a part of the “arsenal of peace” in the twenty-first century and how they can be better used in the future, one must look at the troubled past of peacekeeping after the Cold War, particularly in the mid-1990s. In Bosnia and Croatia, peacekeepers in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992–1995) were attacked with impunity, and the lightly-armed UN personnel had little capability even for self-defence.2 Observation posts came under fire and were stormed as peacekeepers could do little but duck into bunkers or surrender their positions or even let themselves be taken hostage. More ominously, several areas in Bosnia that had been declared UN “Protected Areas” were overrun with 1 Armed force was first used by UN peacekeepers serving in the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) when Norwegian soldiers returned fire after Egyptian forces opened fire and threw hand grenades at them in Port Said on 14 December 1956. Findlay (2002, p. 27). 2 At times, the local population saw that UNPROFOR was much more concerned about protecting itself rather than the locals, so they dubbed the mission “UNSPROFOR” for UN Self-Protection Force (Findlay 2002, p. 230). There were times when UNPROFOR did use force, including a Canadian unit against Croats committing ethnic cleansing in the Medak Pocket (Off 2004). In Rwanda, locals critiqued the UN mission by distorting its French acronym “MINUAR” to “MINUA,” apparently meaning “moving the mouth” in the Kinyarwanda language, saying that “UNAMIR talked big, but didn’t act” (Dorn et al. 2000). Later, in Haiti in 2004 to 2007, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) became known as “TOURISTAH,” because its forces were perceived to be acting more as tourists than protectors.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

73

no resistance. In the Srebrenica protected area, in particular, the peacekeepers vacated under coercion before Bosnian Serb forces slaughtered more than 7,000 Bosniak men and boys from 12 to 22 July 1995. In the capital Sarajevo, UNPROFOR peacekeepers felt helpless as Serb forces in the hills above rained fire with impunity on their positions. “Sniper Alley” in Sarajevo became a deadly symbol of the UN impotence in the face of brute force against peacekeepers and civilians alike. It was only when NATO aerial firepower was forcefully applied in August and September 1995 that the Serb forces withdrew from Sarajevo, and their leaders finally negotiated in earnest. The December 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement succeeded where many previous peace accords had failed. They were backed not by weak UN peacekeepers but by much more robust forces from NATO’s first peace support operation, the Implementation Force (IFOR), renamed a year later as the Stabilization Force (SFOR). The NATO-led forces used advanced technology, including aerial combat power and night vision, to enforce the peace agreement with the show of overwhelming force against the formerly conflicting forces. Meanwhile in Rwanda in 1994, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and its force commander, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, were far from able or even authorized to enforce the Arusha peace agreement. Rather they watched in horror as a genocide, which began in the capital Kigali, claimed some 800,000 lives, almost entirely Tutsis and moderate Hutus, in just 100 days. With little capacity even for intelligence-gathering and robust enforcement, Dallaire felt “deaf and blind” in the field and helpless to save lives. However, his courageous peacekeepers did continue patrols and gave safe-haven to some, saving over 20,000 from slaughter. Still, the peacekeepers suffered psychological trauma, which was compounded by their inability to act with force. In the early years of the new century, the United Nations also struggled with mass atrocities. However, lessons had been learned from its “baptism by fire” in the challenging missions of the mid-1990s, and from examples of robust peace support operations by NATO in Bosnia.3 The United Nations also benefited from a crucial study chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi

3 The NATO operations in Bosnia—Implementation Force (IFOR 1995–1996) and Stabilization Force (SFOR 1996–2004)—utilized a strategy of projecting overwhelming force and information dominance. Attack helicopters played a key role, including Apache, Cobra, and Kiowa helicopters from the United States. The NATO-led force in Kosovo (KFOR 1999–) also employed Apache attack helicopters.

74

A. W. DORN

in 2000. The Brahimi Report encouraged the world organization to give its forces the capability for self-defence, defence of the peace process, and protection of civilians (POC). Particularly after Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999) on the Protection of Civilians, which was spearheaded by Canada, all multidimensional UN missions included a POC mandate.4 With these extremely ambitious mandates, it was incumbent upon the United Nations to increase the capacity of UN forces to deter and respond to atrocities against civilians. In addition to protecting civilians, peace operations must also protect the peace process. Using force for either goal can be considered peace enforcement. One practical definition of peace enforcement is the use of armed force against a party violating a peace agreement or fundamental human rights, while still seeking the party’s participation in a peace process.5 Force is usually applied after a party has repeatedly committed grave atrocities, the UN warnings have gone unheeded, and the likelihood of further atrocities is high. To carry out peace enforcement, a UN peace operation needs both the will and the means to act in a coordinated fashion, usually with joint air and ground forces. The United Nations turned to the attack helicopter (AH) as one of the most robust tools for peace enforcement.6 Attack helicopters are 4 Multidimensional missions differ from traditional (Cold War) missions in that they include mandates for activities well beyond military functions. They include human rights work, nation-building, security sector reform, etc. 5 This definition of peace enforcement is suggested by the author. Other definitions include: “A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force” (NATO 2017); and “Coercive action undertaken with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (United Nations 2008). The UN definition does not sufficiently distinguish peace enforcement done during a peace operation and “enforcement” done by coalitions (e.g. in Korea 1950, Gulf War 1991, and Libya 2011). 6 Attack helicopters, including the Cobra AH-1, were deployed by the United States in 1993 to assist the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) but they were under United States, not UN control. The Black Hawk utility helicopters (UH-60 and MH-60) in the famous “Black Hawk Down” incidents of October 1993 were engaged in ambitious US operations that were not cleared or coordinated with the United Nations mission. Attack helicopters were first deployed by the United Nations in Eastern Slovenia: Mi-24 from Ukraine in the UNTEAS mission in 1996–1997. At the time NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) was already using attack helicopters (Apache AH-64 and Kiowa OH-58) in Bosnia.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

75

one of two main types of military helicopters; the other being utility helicopters (UH). UH are used mostly for transport, while AH are specifically designed for deterrence and combat.7 The first AH provided to UN missions, and still its mainstay, was based on the Soviet built Mi-24. Seeing the need for a robust show of force in the Balkans after the debacle in Bosnia, the United Nations obtained two Mi-24 units from Ukraine for the mission in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES 1996–1998).8 India deployed the same type of helicopters9 to apply armed force in two UN operations: first in the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000, where they proved essential during dramatic hostage rescue operations10 ; then in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (known by its French acronym MONUC) in 2003. In 2007–2008, the helicopters helped stop an imminent attack on Goma. In addition to the application of lethal force, the helicopters were used for observation and troop-carrying (Dorn 2014b, pp. 241–253). The use of Mi-24s in peacekeeping lies in stark contrast to the warfighting origin of the attack helicopter. During the Cold War, the Soviet Mi-24 helicopter was infamous. Known to NATO under the reporting name “Hind,” the Mi-24 was viewed with great concern by the West as a “tank buster.” In Africa, the 7 Other categories do exist: CH (Cargo Helicopter); HH (Heavy Helicopter); MH (Special Operations Helicopter); OH (Observation Helicopter); RH (Minesweeping Helicopter); SH (Anti-submarine Warfare Helicopter); and TH (Training Helicopter). The term “helicopter gunship” is often used synonymously with attack helicopters but that category also includes less robust helicopters having rockets and/or machine guns. Some helicopters, like the Griffons used by the Canadian Armed Forces in Mali, do not qualify as attack helicopters though they are equipped with machine guns in the doors. 8 UNTAES stands for United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (1996–1998). Ukraine provided two squadrons of Mi-24 for a total of 10 helicopters. 9 In Sierra Leone and the D.R. Congo, the Indian contingent flew the Mi-35 helicopter,

the export versions of the Mi-24 helicopter. 10 After many embarrassments in 1999–2000, the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) brought in three Indian attack helicopters. They helped successfully rescue over 200 UN peacekeepers held hostage by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The Mi-35 used its rockets and guns to provide fire support for advancing UN columns and Mi-8 transport helicopters and neutralised RUF rebels who had ambushed UNAMSIL forces, engaged them in entrenched positions, carried out dissuading attacks, and prevented RUF reinforcements from arriving. In a separate UK-controlled operation in September 2000, independent British forces used Lynx helicopters to assist a rescue operation of five British soldiers in UNAMSIL who were held by the West Side Boys militia group.

76

A. W. DORN

helicopter was an instrument of oppression by African dictators, supplied by their Soviet patrons. The deployment of the Mi-24 in peacekeeping signified a remarkable conversion from a fearsome warfighting machine, typically painted in camouflage colours, to a peacekeeping tool, painted white and with large UN lettering. The aircraft still had a Gatling gun and pylons on stub wings for missiles and rockets, but the purpose, rules of engagement, and mindset governing its use were all very different. Like the use of force in modern peace operations more generally, the story of AH use has hardly been told.11 This paper starts to tell this story, offering a detailed case of the use of the Mi-35 (export version of the Mi-24) in the Central African Republic (CAR). These Senegalese Mi-35, operating within the UN mission, showed how complex peace enforcement measures could be successfully applied for protection of a civilian population under imminent attack.

Attack Helicopters: Protecting Civilians in Central Africa The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was created in April 2014 with a POC mandate, primarily to protect civilians in towns threatened with regular attacks by armed groups. The conflict flared up after a coup d’état in CAR in March 2013, as animosities between different groups intensified, based loosely along religious lines. The Séléka alliance was predominantly Muslim and opposing anti-Balaka forces were predominantly Christian.12 The Muslim population was forced to flee from almost all areas of the capital, Bangui. Clashes between Séléka groups and anti-Balaka continued throughout the country. 11 The use of force in peace operations is the subject of at least two books. The classic work of Findlay (2002) covers use of force in the twentieth century. Peter Nadin (2018) has edited a volume on the subject, which includes a chapter on protection of civilians in Haiti. For case studies of Mi-35 in MONUC, see Dorn (2014b, pp. 241–253). Mi-35 was also used in the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), including to remove President Gbagbo who refused to cede power after losing the 2010 election. 12 The title “anti-balaka” is slang for “anti-machete,” “anti-bullets,” or “anti-AK-47,” arising from the belief of some of Anti-balaka adherents that the grigris they wore could stop Kalashnikov bullets.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

77

After the dissolution of Séléka in September 2013 by its leader, fighting broke out between constituent groups, now called ex-Séléka. One prominent example was the armed rivalry between two armed groups: Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), and the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC), which was in a coalition with other groups (including anti-Balaka groups, ironically).13 The UPC and its leader, Ali Darassa, were based in Bambari, capital of the Ouaka prefecture, where groups fought over control of the regional diamond mines. In late 2016 and early 2017, after numerous clashes, the FPRC threatened to attack Bambari. To prevent such an attack, MINUSCA declared a “red-line” around Bambari––not be crossed by attackers––and set up a UN temporary operating base (TOB) in nearby Ippy (see maps in Fig. 1). The United Nations also sponsored high-level talks with the leaders of the two groups to stop human rights violations, enhance POC, and promote peace, while at the same time declaring the UN’s determination to use robust measures to prevent attacks against civilians.14 On 21 January 2017, a UN patrol spotted 150 armed FPRC coalition elements in Mbroutchou, about 35 km West of Bria. The UN mission’s regional leaders instructed the FPRC fighters to stop their movement westward towards a UN-declared “red line.” One part of the red line was declared on the Bria-Ippy-Bambari axis (Route Nationale 5 & 2), 15 km from Ippy towards Bambari. The deterrence effect of UN forces functioned, and the warning was successful; the fighters turned back. Contrary to the UN demands, however, on February 10–11, the FPRC moved a larger attack force of about 300 men in a column towards Bambari along the same route. They were armed with automatic weapons (AK-47) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and were assisted by 13 The FPRC formed a coalition with the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) as well as Le Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ), and RPRC forces. In a general sense, the UPC is also an ex-Séléka group (majority Muslim forces). It split off from FPRC in September 2014. Though they fight each other, they also often fight against anti-Balaka (majority Christina) forces. Human rights violations are committed by all armed groups, though not equally. 14 “On 25 January, in Bambari, Ouaka prefecture, DSRSG-P Corner met with antiBalaka and Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) leaders to urge the two groups to avoid clashes in the Bambari area and stop abuses against civilians. She reiterated MINUSCA’s priority to protect civilians and its robust response, including if red lines are not respected. Lastly, she warned UPC leader Ali Darassa of alleged human rights violations committed by UPC elements near Bambari in recent weeks” (MINUSCA Sage, 2017).

78

A. W. DORN

Fig. 1 a. Map of Central African Republic and its major towns and b. close-up of the Bria-Ippy-Bambari axis, with fires used to indicate clashes (Sources (A) Wikipedia from CIA [public domain], and (B) drawn from Google Maps)

seven pickup trucks. Their goal was to attack and sack the town of Bambari and remove the UPC leader Darassa. With the crossing of the UN’s red line, the UN Force sent a Mi-35 attack helicopter (shown in Fig. 2) on 11 February to a location near the village Ngawa (12 km East of Ippy), where it observed and reported the rebels’ movement with the Mi-35’s high-zoom cameras in a pod fixed to the front of the aircraft. The pod could take images in both the visible and infra-red parts of

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

79

Fig. 1 (continued)

the electromagnetic spectrum with its gyrostabilized cameras. This system achieved positive identification of armed and/or uniformed personnel on the ground and also enabled precise targeting. The UN Force Commander had already signed a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to allow the Mi-35 to engage with force, with tactical control (TACON) assigned to Joint Task Force Bangui. After firing a warning shot, at 1421 hours, the Mi-35 engaged the armed convoy with rockets and machine-gun fire, destroying four pickup trucks and scattering the rebels into the bush. The rebels may have fired at the helicopter with their semi-automatic rifles, but on return to the UN airbase in Bangui, post-flight checks found no damage to the aircraft. The UN action had successfully stopped the rebel movement to Bambari and demonstrated deterrence and prevented an imminent attack by using UN force. Most of the rebels retreated to Ippy. There were an unknown number of fatalities from the action; four injured people were brought to the Ippy health centre. UN military observers received

80

A. W. DORN

Fig. 2 The Mi-35 Attack Helicopter deployed in MINUSCA by Senegal. The camera pod is at the very front of the aircraft below the abbreviation “UN.” Also observable is a slim rocket on one stub wing alongside the larger external fuel tank. The Gatling gun is next to the gunner station, and the pilot sits higher up in the aircraft (Source MINUSCA, 2017)

a report that the man leading the FPRC column, “General” Joseph Zoundeko, was killed during the incident.15 Post-script: Consequence Management with Attack Helicopters The use of force often has both positive and negative consequences. In this case, on the positive side, a direct threat of military action against a provincial capital was averted. The mission also experienced negative consequences or “blowback” (a term commonly used in the intelligence community). The FPRC leader, Azor Kalite, vehemently condemned the UN attack on his forces, accusing the mission of favouring his enemy, the UPC. When a MINUSCA representative contacted him, he threatened that, if his FPRC forces were not allowed to move on Bambari, they

15 Information on this case study is from UN staff involved in the use of force, including conversations with the Senegalese Aviation detachment on 27 March 2018, email exchanges subsequently, and documentation from MINUSCA (10 February 2017).

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

81

would “target MINUSCA staff, vehicles and NGOs wherever they can.” (MINUSCA, 10 February 2017). He also threatened to use anti-aircraft weapons against MINUSCA helicopters and attack UPC members in Bria and other locations. Kalite stipulated, “the only way to prevent further clashes is to remove the UPC leader Ali Darassa from Bambari.” Fearful of violent retaliation from the FPRC, the UN field offices in the region (namely in Bambari, Bria, Kaga Bandoro, Ndélé, and Birao) raised the threat level and took self-protection measures. UN staff and civilians were moved close to safe havens and were restricted from further movement for their own safety. Troops from MINUSCA’s Mauritanian Battalion, reinforced by Bangladeshi Special Forces, were tasked to stop any FPRC movement towards Bambari. In the early morning of February 12, the UN force took a blocking position at the Tagbara Bridge (65 km NE of Bambari, see Fig. 1b) to prevent FPRC movements towards Bambari. In talks with MINUSCA, Kalite had also threatened that “the safety of Fulani [a large ethnic group] civilians cannot be guaranteed” (MINUSCA, 10 February 2017). Some 200 local civilians, particularly from the Fulani ethnicity, moved to the UN’s TOB in Ippy, settling in a school building on the premises. As a result, security had to be increased, particularly since the Ippy area was an FPRC stronghold, with about 200 armed elements. MINUSCA built up its position in Ippy to stop future FPRC movement towards Bambari. The UN mission realized that the continuing presence of UPC leader Ali Darassa in Bambari was a liability. MINUSCA had to act impartially and to be seen to be doing so, especially by the FPRC. In coordination with the government of CAR, it requested the Darassa to leave Bambari. He was using the town’s population as a de facto human shield against attack, and the United Nations could not permit the possibility of fighting in populated areas. To encourage his departure, it made a strong show of force, surrounding Darassa’s house and even positioning the Mi-35 attack helicopter directly above it (Dorn 2019).16 Known as Operation Bekpa, the action increased MINUSCA’s presence in the town and stabilize the

16 Dorn, A. Walter. Conversation with MINUSCA Force Commander Lieutenant General Balla Keita, Montreal, 12 June 2019; also United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic,” S/2017/473 of 2 June 2017, pp. 3–6.

82

A. W. DORN

security situation in case of pro-Darassa demonstrations, which were often fomented by Darassa himself. The crisis was alleviated when Darassa announced that he would leave Bambari, which actually happened on February 21. Meanwhile, Darassa’s Christian and Muslim supporters gave MINUSCA a jointly signed memorandum expressing support for him, declaring that he helped create social cohesion between the Muslim and Christian communities. They were also fearful that Bambari would be less secure following Darassa’s departure. A crowd, mostly of women and children, blocked the gates of the UN compound in Bambari in protest against the UN’s initiative to force Darassa to depart. UN staff could not leave their offices at the end of the day on February 20 so they stayed through the night. In the morning, local authorities dispersed the crowd, and a UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) escorted UN staff out of the office (MINUSCA 20 February 2017). The FPRC also had used the crowds to pressure MINUSCA; for example, by calling for demonstrations on 13 February. Fortunately, these were successfully contained by the United Nations. However, tragically, FPRC elements ambushed a UN patrol made up of Mauritanian forces on February 21, wounding four, one severely. During the combat action, the FPRC suffered from the UN’s responsive fire: an estimated nine were killed and three were wounded. The United Nations later sent out additional patrols (MINUSCA 21 February 2017). One patrol spotted approximately a thousand FPRC coalition elements moving near Bambari. But no attempt was made to attack the town. Apparently, the FPRC had learned a lesson from the Mi-35 helicopter intervention during the FPRC’s earlier failed attempt to reach Bambari. The United Nations proved capable of using force both to prevent aggression, namely imminent attacks on Bambari, and to support a peace process, when the parties realized that they could not achieve their objectives by force. Indeed, the FPRC and UPC signed a ceasefire agreement on 9 October 2017 in Ippy, though both groups continued to commit human rights violations afterwards. In May 2020, the FPRC leader, Azor Kalite, was arrested by UN forces, after a series of attacks against civilians by his forces and an attempt to rush against the Portuguese Quick Reaction Force, one of MINUSCA’s most robust units. He was put on trial before the Special Criminal Court, established to judge mass atrocity crimes in CAR.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

83

Case Conclusions Despite the blowback, MINUSCA demonstrated in 2017 that it could engage in POC tasks and successfully protect civilians threatened with imminent attack. The conflicting parties learned that a UN-declared “red line” was meaningful and would be enforced by significant force. The world organization was able to back up its declaration with military might, thanks in part to the presence of the Mi-35 attack helicopters provided by Senegal. Not only were these helicopters equipped with effective weapons systems and defensive armour, but they also had advanced surveillance technology enabling day and night intelligence-gathering.17 Being deployed from Bangui, the Mi-35 had significant freedom of movement over hundreds of square kilometres of the country and easily overcame the natural barriers that ground forces faced, like poor and impassable roads. And armed groups in CAR lacked the sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities required to pose a significant threat to military helicopters. For the United Nations, the Mi-35 was a key enabling technology for peace enforcement and POC. Much more sophisticated attack helicopters have been deployed in other missions. In the Congo, South Africa deployed the Rooivalk AH. In Mali, The Netherlands deployed the Apache AH and Germany deployed the Tiger AH. While case studies on their use and utility have not yet been published broadly, the indications are that the Western AH have also proven effective. Unfortunately, both The Netherlands and Germany suffered separate accidents due to mechanical failures and pilot errors: crashes that cost the lives of the two pilots in each of the helicopters. Despite the setbacks, the lessons are clear.

The Utility of Combat Air Power Airborne technology has proven to be a key component of peace enforcement in the twenty-first century. The present case study has shown how air power stopped imminent attacks, as did earlier uses of Mi-35 AH in the D.R. Congo (Dorn 2014b, 2023; Williams 2023). These twentyfirst-century cases contrast with the conclusions drawn by Findlay, based

17 The Mi-35 system has a Controp DSP-1 pod, which contains a high-definition visible light camera and an infra-red (IR) cameras, along with a Laser Range Finder to determine the distance to targeted objects.

84

A. W. DORN

on the UN experience in the twentieth century. (Findlay 2002, p. 252) Findlay published his classic work on the use of force in peacekeeping in 2002. He documents very well the UN policies, dilemmas, struggles, and evolving practice on the use of force over the previous half-century. However, his evaluation of combat air power in UN operations has not withstood the test of time. Still, it is worth looking at his critique to identify its flaws and strengths: (1) Air power, Findlay states, is “difficult to use directly, discreetly, proportionately, reliably and accurately.” The experience with attack helicopters in UN missions has shown the opposite: precision strikes are possible for proportionate responses that utilize reliable and accurate targeting systems aboard the helicopters, even those of developing countries. (2) Air power, according to Findlay, “is constrained by too many physical limitations, including the danger of collateral damage to peacekeepers and other innocent parties.” Again, the practice in CAR, the Congo and Mali shows that collateral damage can be minimized, if not eliminated. Shooting from the air often allows a degree of precision and peacekeeper-safety that ground forces do not have. Of course, when combined together, air and ground forces are even more effective than either alone. (3) That “air strikes are too politically charged to be used routinely” has also been shown to be false. The number of UN missions that have used airstrikes from attack helicopters since Findlay’s book (2002) has grown from Sierra Leone to the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, CAR and Mali. However, concerns about collateral damage in urban areas did cause MINUSTAH (2004–2017) to avoid arming their helicopters; so, attack helicopters were not used in Haiti.

Findlay’s critiques may be applicable to some fixed-wing aircraft, especially fast-flying jets. But certain jets and turboprops, like the Pilatus PC-9 and Super Tucano EMB314, can arguably detect and target with the same precision of attack helicopters, at less cost and vulnerability.18 In any case, it is beyond the current capabilities and means of the United Nations to manage and use fast jets in targeting, something only done once (successfully) in UN peacekeeping history (Congo 1961–1963, see Dorn

18 Comment to the author by Robert Owen, Professor in the Department of Aeronautical Science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 14 August 2018.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

85

2014a).19 Findlay does correctly note that NATO airpower “did prove its effectiveness in helping coerce the parties [in Bosnia] to the negotiating table, despite widespread skepticism that it could do so” (Findlay, p. 269). Aircraft provides many advantages over ground forces. Ground travel is slow and subject to numerous geographic and political constraints. The United Nations can send aircraft to fly more directly at higher speeds and with fewer, if any, obstacles, though usually limited to established airfields and established zones for takeoff and landing. Typical maximum velocities are: vehicle (100 km/hr), helicopter (200 km/hr), and passenger jets (1,000 km/hr). However, air travel has high financial costs (e.g. $3,000/ hour for a helicopter). This is rarely cheaper than ground vehicles. So, the United Nations carefully controls the total number of flying hours, with the responsibility to authorize flights given to a civilian Director of Mission Support rather than the Force Commander (UN 2021). It is often safer to fly personnel than move by vehicles on dangerous roads through thick forests or jungles, which provide rebels with locations to ambush or halt UN forces. At the same time, it is possible to shoot down aircraft, including attack helicopters, e.g. as demonstrated in wars: in Afghanistan by local forces with surface-to-air missiles against Soviet Mi-24 in the 1980s; with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in Somalia against US Black Hawk helicopters in the early 1990s; and against Mi-24 during the Russian war in Ukraine in 2022. While some UN utility (transport) helicopters have been shot down (e.g. in Angola), no UN attack helicopters have been shot down, though in the Congo, the Mi-35 have received shots to the fuselage. Attack helicopters are strongly armoured against assault rifle fire, the most common type of fire in conflicts where peacekeepers are deployed. Moreover, AH can fly at higher altitudes (e.g. above 1,500 feet) to avoid most small arms fire, including rocket-propelled grenades. Simply the presence of UN attack helicopters in the vicinity of rebel groups can act as a significant deterrent against attack since rebels feel

19 The United Nations made good use of jets in the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Ethiopian Sabre jets, Indian Canberra bombers and Swedish J-29s (“flying barrel” bombers) were used effectively to deal with mercenaries and rebel forces in the break-away Katanga province. See Dorn (2014).

86

A. W. DORN

vulnerable against air attack.20 Often opposing forces quickly retreat when they see or hear UN attack helicopters approaching (Dorn 2014b, p. 250). Among the benefits of attack helicopters are the ability to provide close air support to ground forces when they are under attack, and provide high-quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (e.g. still and video imagery). For the United Nations, the challenges or drawbacks of attack helicopters include: their expense (for lease and fuel), heavy maintenance, lack of personnel with the unique skill sets (e.g. pilots and forward air controllers), susceptibility to grounding in poor weather, the difficulty operating in harsh conditions, and vulnerability to attack while on the tarmac (including from indirect mortar fire) as with any aviation assets. Given that they are expensive aircraft and much in demand, only a few AH can be made available to peace operations, certainly not enough for the large areas that must be covered. For this reason, most deployments are limited, and even wealthy G7 nations tend not to keep their attack helicopter units in UN missions for long periods, though the UN pays for a portion of the costs.21 The United Nations is chronically short of attack helicopters, as evidenced by the recurrent requests in the quarterly “Uniformed Capability Requirements” document issued quarterly by UN headquarters. There is typically a shortfall of 10 AH in UN peace operations (Novosseloff 2017, p. 4; Sherman et al. 2012). In CAR, DRC and Mali, UN missions frequently faced situations where attack helicopters were required but unavailable. The missions’ AH may have been already tasked elsewhere, were undergoing maintenance, or out of range (typically 200 km). When they were available, sometimes they arrived too late 20 The benefit of air power to the UN’s Mali mission is demonstrated by the experience of Major General Michael Lollesgaard in Mali, who observed that no ground forces were attacked during his term Force Commander of MINUSMA (2015–2017) when they had air cover. Furthermore, no shots were fired against UN helicopters. (Insight shared with the author, Oslo, 31 August 2018.). 21 In Mali, the Netherlands rotated out its Apache attack helicopter unit in 2017 and the German Tiger AH unit that replaced it departed in 2018. The Canadian replacement for the German contribution is not providing an AH capability, just armed utility helicopters (Griffons) for escort of the Canadian Chinook heavy transport aircraft. However, El Salvador has been providing the small Defender (MD-500) multirole helicopter to support Mali. It is equipped with missiles and a machine gun. In D.R. Congo, the Rooivalk AH from South Africa might be in 2018, which would leave only the Mi-24 unit from Ukraine.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

87

to be effective (even travelling at 250 km/hr), and sometimes could not locate well-hidden targets, even with a suite of advanced sensors. In the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2014, The Netherlands contributed four Apache AH-64, which were used to protect towns facing attack. When a town in Northern Mali was being targeted by mortar fire and the attackers did not respond to warnings, the AH fired on them, thus stopping the attack. After an accidental crash in 2015, the Apache contingent withdrew and was replaced by four Germany EC665 Tiger AH. After an accidental crash in 2017, Germany withdrew its German Tiger AH. El Salvador helped fill the void by providing six light AH (MD500E) to the mission (Trevithick 2022). Canada provided machine-gun equipped CH-146 Griffon helicopters during a one-year deployment in 2018–2019 but only used those helicopters to escort and protect the larger CH47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters. No shots needed to be fired by the Griffons, possibly because of their deterrent power. The sensor suites on these helicopters vary from the rather lowresolution night vision devices found on the Senegalese Mi-35 to the very sophisticated IR cameras on the Apache and Tiger AH of the European contributors in the Mali mission.

Conclusion: Learning from Success The United Nations and its member states can learn not only from the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s but also from the successes of the 2000s. Unfortunately, the world’s media and most scholars tend to focus on the failures and weaknesses of UN operations, which are also proclaimed in media headlines. By contrast, successes are rarely recorded, not to mention analyzed for lessons. This chapter has sought to help balance the record and highlight some of the successes in one of the most challenging and controversial tasks of such operations: peace enforcement. As shown, attack helicopters in CAR proved to be crucial enablers for peace. Nevertheless, the lessons need to be tempered by a realistic estimate of the degree of air power actually deployed: the United Nations remains underequipped with the aircraft, as evidenced by the continuing call for

88

A. W. DORN

them.22 Local populations often complain that the United Nations is not doing enough to protect their communities, especially remote ones. The United Nations has sparingly few attack helicopters and has limits on the amount of technology it can get from its technologically advanced member states, which have much less interest in peacekeeping than in defence and warfighting. The main troop contributing countries (TCCs) are from the global south, with fewer technological resources to offer. However, some developing nations have to be lauded for providing useful AH, like Senegal, Ukraine, and India with their Mi-35s. Furthermore, some technology contributing countries (“TechCCs”), like The Netherlands and Germany, have provided some of the world’s most advanced AHs as well as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), so far unarmed. More generally, Western countries can contribute much more equipment, technology, and technical training to make peacekeeping more effective, even as they tend to avoid large-scale deployments of their troops (Dorn 2016). The optimal level of force in peacekeeping is far less than what is needed in warfighting, but it does not follow that it is none. Though some missions can do without peace enforcement, most modern operations require a measure of force to provide a deterrent effect, incentivize parties to pursue peace further, and provide the force required to repel attacks. In the eternal struggle between power and principle, the side with the moral “right” needs to have the capacity to stop the immoral “might” from committing atrocities with impunity. But for that, UN missions need to be ready to deal with the tactical and strategic consequences, including the possibility of retaliatory attacks on UN forces or civilian personnel, as seen in the Bambari case. Ideally, UN missions would be adequately equipped and staffed so that they could demonstrate to the conflicting parties the capacity for overwhelming force, demonstrable deterrence, have excellent situational awareness, and act proactively and pre-emptively. This way, they can deter violence and, ironically, through the show of force, reduce the degree of violence that needs to be used in these conflict zones. Finding the appropriate level and type of force can be challenging. Peace enforcement 22 The UN call to its Member States, titled “Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping” (quarterly), almost always lists attack helicopters as a priority, including the requirements reports issued before Peacekeeping Ministerial.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS: KEY ENABLERS FOR PEACE …

89

remains an intellectual challenge of great practical importance. Peaceenabling technologies, especially attack helicopters, will remain crucial tools for robust peace operations.

References Dorn, A. Walter. 2014a. Peacekeepers in Combat: UN Fighter Jets and Bombers in the Congo, 1961–1963. In Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace, ed. A. Walter Dorn, 17–39. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Dorn, A. Walter. 2014b. Combat Air Power in the Congo, 2003–. In Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace, ed. A. Walter Dorn, 241–253. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Dorn, A. Walter. 2016. Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations, Providing for Peacekeeping No 13. New York: International Peace Institute. Dorn, A. Walter. 2019. Conversation with MINUSCA Force Commander Lieutenant-General Balla Keïta, Montreal, June 12. Dorn, A. Walter. 2023. Peacekeepers in Combat: Protecting Civilians in the D.R. Congo. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 26 (2023): 31–54. Dorn, A. Walter., Jonathan Matloff, and Jennifer Matthews. 2000. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwanda Genocide? Journal of Conflict Studies 20 (1): 9–52. Findlay, Trevor. 2002. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission). 10 February 2017. Daily Situation Report Covering Period: 9 February 2017 (0001–2400) (covers to 13 February). MINUSCA. 20 February 2017. Sage report (incident and event database), Bambari. MINUSCA. 21 February 2017. Sage report, citing Ippy-Bambari/21 Feb (C3 Maurbatt Flash Report). Nadin, Peter (ed.). 2018. The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping. Routledge. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. AAP-06, 2017. Novosseloff, Alexandra. 2017. Keeping Peace from Above: Air Assets in UN Peace Operations. International Peace Institute, 4. Off, Carol. 2004. The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada’s Secret War. Toronto: Random House of Canada. Sherman, Jake, Alischa Kugel, and Andrew Sinclair. 2012. Overcoming Helicopter Force Generation: Challenges for UN Peacekeeping Operations. International Peacekeeping 19 (1): 77–92.

90

A. W. DORN

Trevithick, Joseph. 2022. Armed UN Little Bird Helicopters Are a Big Deal for Peacekeepers in Mali. The Drive, 29 June 2019. https://www.thedrive.com/ the-war-zone/16433/armed-un-little-bird-helicopters-are-a-big-deal-for-pea cekeepers-in-mali. United Nations. 16 October 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (aka “Capstone Doctrine”). United Nations. April 2021. United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Aviation Unit Manual, Second Edition, para. 1.2.2. Williams, Paul D. 2023. How Peacekeepers Fight: Assessing Combat Effectiveness in United Nations Peace Operations. Security Studies 32 (1): 32–65.

The Future Dynamics Between UN Stabilisation and UN Peace Operations: Conflict Management Versus Conflict Resolution Shannon Zimmerman

Introduction Over the past 20 years, mandates for UN peacekeepers have expanded to include civilian protection, extending state authority, and now, tasks that verge on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. These mandates exceed the “outer limits” of both traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. To meet the requirements of these tasks, the UN has begun to field a new form of militarised peace operations—stabilisation operations. Stabilisation operations engage theories of change vastly different from traditional and multidimensional peace operations. Traditional peacekeeping plays the role of a neutral third party with the aim of implementing a peace agreement. Stabilisation operations, however, focus on restoring state order by containing aggressors, making them partial to the government and potentially hostile to non-state actors engaged in the conflict. The former aims for conflict resolution while the latter focuses S. Zimmerman (B) Deakin University and the Australian War College, Canberra, ACT, Australia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_5

91

92

S. ZIMMERMAN

on conflict management. This indicates that traditional peacekeeping and stabilisation operations engage different theories of change and are far more different in character and outcomes than initially understood, with serious implications for peacekeeping outcomes on the ground. This chapter explores the emergence of UN stabilisation operations over the past ten years. It then explains the importance of “theories of change” within peace operations and demonstrates how stabilisation operations engage a theory of change distinct from that engaged by traditional UN peacekeeping. It highlights these differences by comparing the traditional United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) to the UN’s most recent stabilisation operation, the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The final section of this chapter illustrates the broader repercussions of employing the theory of change of conflict management on other UN programmes and agencies which work in tandem with peace operations.

Diverging Theories of Change: UN Peacekeeping Operations Versus UN Stabilisation Operations Broadly speaking, UN peace operations are UN-led interventions authorised and managed by the UN. Traditional peace operations emerged early in the Cold War as a compromise between the collective security ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and the emerging great power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Building on conflict resolution mechanisms left over from the League of Nations, peace operations interposed themselves as a buffer between belligerent states to prevent conflict escalation while a peace agreement was negotiated (Kenkel 2013; Williams and Bellamy 2021, pp. 175–176). Over the next twenty years, multiple other UN missions deployed with similar mandates to interpose themselves between conflict parties and support those parties in observing ceasefires and crafting and implementing peace agreements (Diehl and Balas 2014, pp. 45–46).1 While limited in scope, this approach to peacekeeping allowed the UN a level of effectiveness in addressing conflicts and managing decolonisation within the constrained political environment of the Cold War. It also normalised the intervention

1 There are some notable exceptions to this such as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

93

of the international community in international conflicts (Diehl and Balas 2014, p. 45). With the thawing of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping activities expanded to include peacebuilding tasks that ranged from election supervision, assisting with the implementation of peace agreements, and monitoring disarmament to addressing humanitarian emergencies and promoting democracy. These new multidimensional peace operations were much larger and more complex than traditional peace operations and were primarily deployed within states rather than between them. At the same time, the emerging norm of civilian protection pushed the UN to deploy peacekeepers earlier into conflicts to prevent atrocities. This resulted in the creation of “robust” peace operations with offensive force postures and mandates to “use all necessary means” to achieve their expanded mandates (United Nations 2009; Tardy 2011; Hunt 2017). Most recently, some peace operations have deployed into active conflicts with mandates including “extend state authority” and “deter armed threats”. Deployed on behalf of the host state and actively engaging force to implement their mandates, these recently deployed UN Stabilisation Operations bear very little resemblance to traditional peace operations (Gao et al. 2015; Zimmerman 2020). Theories of Change The theory of change, initially described by Carol Weiss, unpacks the approach and process by which a desired goal is achieved (Weiss 1995). It both asks and answers the question “what is our long-term goal or outcome” and “what conditions must be in place for us to reach that goal” (Brown 2016)? Most importantly, theories of change make causal connections by linking activities and outcomes to both how and why change happens (Clark and Anderson 2004). For a theory of change to work, both a starting point and a final goal must be identified. From there, a theory of change “fills in” the causal logic of an intervention to connect activities to the desired goals being achieved (Center for the Theory of Change 2022). The identification of a starting point begins with identifying the implicit and explicit assumptions which underpin that theory and assumes its effectiveness (Weiss 1995, pp. 66–67; Ashton 2007). This includes the orientation of the theory of change, which will determine how situations are understood, what approaches are conceived as viable and appropriate, and expectations

94

S. ZIMMERMAN

for outcomes (Neufeldt 2011, p. 347). Put simply, a theory of change assesses and makes visible implementing actors’ assumptions about how change will occur and their expected outcomes (Serrat 2016, p. 239). The identification of a theory of change for peace operations requires an additional level of complexity, however, as peace operations are limited in their ability to control the context in which they deploy. It is still necessary to identify the core assumptions underpinning the creation of those missions, but these assumptions must be paired with the reality of conditions on the ground. It is both factors that then dictate the mission mandate, composition, and force posture. The end goal of a theory of change is the creation of conditions that equate to “success” in each context. For peace operations, this would be the achievement of their mandated goals. While some mandates include specific activities that would count as inputs, the larger goal would be the primary task or end state identified by the mandate. For example, primary tasks for the UN Mission in Mali include assisting the transitional authorities in implementing the transitional road map, for the purpose of reaching the end state of the “full restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Mali” (United Nations Security Council 2013b, para 16 (b)(i)). With this end goal in mind, a theory of change in action can be identified by conducting a “backwards mapping” from the long-term goal desired to the starting point. This mapping identifies the preconditions (or outcomes) that must be met to achieve the long-term goal, and from there, the interventions (inputs/activities) required to create these preconditions (Brown 2016). There are a wide array of peace operations. These include unarmed or lightly armed observer missions, traditional “interpositional” operations, transitional administrations, multidimensional operations, and stabilisation operations. This analysis looks at the two types of armed operations most distinct from each other, traditional or “Hammarskjöldian” peace operations and stabilisation operations. Assessing the different assumptions, mandates, and actions of these operations, this chapter finds that traditional operations engage a theory of change which relies on maintaining the status quo of the conflict, while facilitating the implementation of solution agreed to by all conflict parties. Alternatively, stabilisation operations seek to change the status quo to favour the state government and enforce a solution dictated by the host government and international actors. Looking at these types of peace operations through their theories of change highlights their substantial differences, with serious implications for the continued legitimacy and effectiveness of peace operations on the ground.

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

95

Traditional Peacekeeping Traditional peace operations can be understood as a set of activities in support of the UN Charter’s Chapter IV “Pacific Settlement of disputes” (Koops et al. 2015, p. 2). The first armed peace operation was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) which was deployed in 1957 to address the Crisis in the Suez. The operation monitored the ceasefire between the conflict parties and supervised the withdrawal of military forces. UNEF I also acted as a buffer between Arab and Israeli forces.2 The restrictive political environment of the time resulted in the mission prioritising state consent, impartiality in its relationships with the conflict parties, and the non-use of force except in self-defence. While explicitly noted as contextual, these initial principles were adopted as peacekeeping norms by an international community looking for an effective conflict resolution tool in the polarised era of the Cold War (Findlay 2002, p. 49). The theory of change that emerged during initial peacekeeping efforts coalesced around several key expectations around the operational environment (context) and assumptions about the intent of conflict actors. Most notably, traditional operations expected that they would be deployed to contexts where fighting had largely stopped, managed by a peace agreement or ceasefire. At the same time, the main conflict actors—who were almost always states, were ready and willing to find a political solution to the conflict, if they had not done so already. This means traditional operations deploy where there is a peace to keep, however fragile. To effectively operate in tense but non-violent contexts and facilitate a political solution, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld determined that peace operations needed to strictly maintain their neutrality (later redefined as impartiality) as political actors and should therefore limit their use of force to self-defence and deploy only with the continued consent of the conflict parties. These three principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force are what underpin traditional peace operations. As the UN peacekeeping Capstone Doctrine states, consenting to a peace operation indicates a “commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process” (United Nations 2008). Consent, therefore, implies “acceptance of the UN mandate and any peace or ceasefire agreements associated with that mandate” (Boulden 2018, p. 12). The presence of 2 For more on this see Diehl (2015).

96

S. ZIMMERMAN

consent explains traditional peace operations’ reliance on the effectiveness of a ceasefire. At the same time, it highlights the assumption that conflict is between clearly identified groups, usually state armies, who are adequately controlled by the leadership which has agreed to stop fighting. This, in turn, assumes that those leaders are legitimate, committed to the ceasefire, and will continue to provide their consent. Expecting minimal conflict and assuming legitimate conflict parties and a genuine commitment to a political solution, traditional UN peace operation mandates focus on activities designed to preserve the existing peace and facilitate the creation and implementation of peace agreements. These activities are made possible by the peace operation maintaining a neutral or impartial approach to conflicts, holding no position other than to acknowledge that there is a conflict that needs to be resolved. This neutrality extended beyond political positions to include implementation of their mandate. As neutral/impartial actors, peacekeepers were to be seen as detached from involvement in internal or local problems and “separate and distinct from activities by national authorities” (United Nations General Assembly 1958, para 165). As Brian Urquhart, a former undersecretary of the UN, noted, “peacekeeping forces [have] no “enemies”, just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients” (Urquhart 1987, p. 293). To maintain consent and ensure their neutrality, traditional peace operations were restricted in their armaments, rules of engagement, and mandate to use force. Lessons from UNEF I made it clear that “…men engaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms…” (United Nations General Assembly 1958, para 179). The guiding principles later set out by the UN Secretary-General at that time emphasised that there was “no intent…to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict” (United Nations General Assembly 1956, para 8). The limited use of permissible violence made peacekeepers legitimate intervenors who were “morally distinct” from forces engaged in warfare and raised the expectation that they would be protected from violence as neutral actors (Levine 2014). Reflecting on the UN Emergency Force, UN SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld noted that, while peacekeeping forces were paramilitary in character, and more than an observer corps, they explicitly did not have military objectives or any military functions beyond what was “necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

97

parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly” (United Nations General Assembly 1958, para 15).3 From assessing the activities and doctrine emerging from traditional peace operations, a conflict resolution focused theory of change becomes evident, based on having a peace to keep, and assumptions of legitimate political parties with goodwill. This context allows peacekeepers to remain neutral and focus on maintaining the negotiated status quo through nonviolently upholding existing ceasefires or peace agreements to create the political space necessary for a longer agreement to be reached. This theory of change relies on peacekeeper’s support for a solution crafted by the conflict parties, the UN, and other relevant bodies. Assumptions/context

Inputs

Activities

Outputs

Outcomes

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Ceasefire or peace agreement Political will of parties States are the key actors (interstate conflict) Conflict parties have adequate command and control Short-term deployment Unarmed/lightly armed peacekeepers Limited mandates focused on observing agreements and fostering political space Neutral political and military stance Observation Mediation, Arbitration, and Facilitation at the tactical level Use of force only in self-defence Maintenance of ceasefire/preservation of peace Implementation of peace agreement Political space to negotiate Creation/implementation of peace agreement Addresses grievances/new status quo Long-term impact

The theory of change underpinning traditional peace operations can be seen in the deployment and operation of the United Nations IndiaPakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).4 UNIPOM deployed in 1965 “to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of armed personnel” (United Nations Security 3 Emphasis added by author. 4 This mission was in addition to the United Nations Military Observer Group to India

and Pakistan (UNOMOGIP) which observes the ceasefire in the states of Jammu and Kashmir. See Shucksmith and White (2015).

98

S. ZIMMERMAN

Council 1965b). Both India and Pakistan agreed to the ceasefire and were left wholly in charge of ensuring the withdrawal of their personnel. When this failed to happen immediately, the UN called on the states to demand full implementation of the ceasefire illustrating the UN’s expectation that the states were operating in good faith and in control of their forces (United Nations Security Council 1965c). The UN then deployed UNIPOM, which consisted of less than 100 lightly armed military observers who oversaw monitoring a ceasefire line that covered more than 1000 miles. From there, the Secretary-General worked with India and Pakistan to organise the withdrawal of military forces. During this time, UN peacekeepers relied on their neutral position to negotiate with military forces on either side to limit air activity and intervene in cases of ceasefire breaches (United Nations Security Council 1965a, 1966). UNIPOM concluded after six months of operations, upon the completed withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops. The theory of change pursued by traditional peace operations is one focused on conflict resolution through a political settlement facilitated by the space provided by neutral peacekeepers. The approach relies on the idea that peace is best created and preserved through state commitment to peaceful settlement over war and restricting the use of force for the punishment of aggression (Gordenker and Weiss 1993, pp. 3–7). For the next thirty years this approach, based on the three principles of peacekeeping helped peace operations enjoy relative success and established them as a legitimate mechanism for intervening in international conflicts (Diehl and Balas 2014, pp. 44–45). United Nations Stabilisation Operations The end of the Cold War and the shift from interstate to intra-state conflict challenged the efficacy of traditional peace operations. This was exacerbated by the emergence of protection of civilians as a peacekeeping priority which pushed the UN to deploy peace operations into contexts where there was no real peace to keep. The result was major peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda that brought peacekeeping to the point of “strategic failure”.5 5 By the UNs own admission, this was not entirely the fault of peacekeeping missions themselves but rather the result of the Security Council’s choice to send peacekeepers into contexts where belligerents failed to observe peace agreements and the Security Council

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

99

The failures of multiple peace operations in the early and mid-1990s and a period of reflection within the UN led the newly elected UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to push for peace operations adaptation. Annan argued that “[c]lassical peacekeeping would be a neat solution, but if you restrict yourself to it, you’re excluding the main new sources of threat”.6 Ostensibly, the core principles of peacekeeping remained but were redefined to mean impartiality, consent of the host state, and nonuse of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate. Operations became more robust, with stronger force postures, and permission to use “all necessary means” to achieve their expanding mandates. Re-building state authority began to appear in peacekeeping mandates, and it was not long before peace operations were “…frequently mandated as statebuilders, helping to create legitimate, functioning state structures in the aftermath of violent conflict. Some peace operations – now labelled UN Stabilisation Operations7 - even began to take offensive roles on behalf of states; functioning as state surrogates to extend the authority of fragile states challenged by spoilers to the peace” (Karlsrud 2015; Sherman and Tortolani 2009, p. 3; England 2009). Even though the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations reaffirmed the “Primacy of Politics” and argued that peace operations need to be enablers, not enforcers, and convenors, not implementors a “pragmatic turn” in peacekeeping has led to some UN peace operations being conceived with an entirely new theory of change (High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2015; Andersen 2018, p. 360).

was unable to authorise and adequately equip sufficiently robust missions. For a thorough overview of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR-Croatia/UNPROFOR– Bosnia and Herzegovina), The United Nations Operation in Somalia I/II (UNOSOM I/II), and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I) please see Koops et al. (2015). 6 Here Annan is referencing the internal threats that marked recent UN failures, specifically state violence against civilians. Prager, K., “The limits of peacekeeping”, Time, 23 October 1995: 33. Cited in Findlay (2002). 7 The use of the term stabilisation is contested. In many cases, there is no discernible

difference between an officially named stabilisation mission and a more robust peacekeeping mission. However, all stabilisation missions have a robust posture. Key differences include stabilisation missions’ ability to use force at the strategic level. Something that is normally prohibited for Member States by Article 2(4) of the Charter except with permission from the Security Council.

100

S. ZIMMERMAN

Four factors distinguish stabilisation operations from more traditional peace operations (de Coning 2015). The former operate in ongoing conflicts and have mandates to restore and maintain order, including protecting the government and civilians against aggressors. They may also directly support local authorities and undertake robust or even offensive operations (de Coning 2015). These differences indicate several major changes in the assumptions held by the implementors and suggest a new theory of change is being engaged. First and foremost, UN Stabilisation operations deploy where conflicts are ongoing and, often, where no peace agreement or ceasefire exists and political processes are stalled or non-existent.8 These missions are deployed without a political framework due to time sensitive concerns. For example, the 2013 mission in Mali was deployed because the collapse of the state appeared imminent. The 2014 mission to the Central African Republic was deployed due to spiralling sectarian conflict, mounting atrocities against civilians, and fears of ethnic cleansing. These are radically different contexts than traditional operations, with active conflicts and no political processes in place. The 2015 High-Level Panel on Peace Operations noted that missions deployed into these contexts should be considered “conflict management” missions, distinct from missions deployed to monitor ceasefire agreements or facilitate the implementation of peace agreements (High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2015). Second, the states that host stabilisation operations are generally weak, contested, or non-existent, and poor governance is the norm. State actors have varied levels of capacity, territorial control, and ability to control their own forces and continually vie with conflict actors for legitimacy with the local population. In most cases, state actors are a major cause of the conflict and responsible for atrocities (Chesterman et al. 2005, p. 2). These deployment contexts directly impact the inputs and activities of stabilisation operations because they require a robust force posture for both UN troop and civilian protection, and mandates that are partial and necessitate the strategic use of force. Despite low state capacity and legitimacy, stabilisation operations must still obtain and maintain host-state consent to deploy per peacekeeping

8 This was the case for the UN Stabilisation operations in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

101

principles. The UN peacekeeping capstone doctrine states that operational deployment requires the consent of the “main parties” to conflict (United Nations 2008). With no political settlement for operations to support, they must look for a legitimate political authority—which in the case of peace operations, must be the host state (Peter 2015; Gilder 2019, pp. 50–51). The main parties can also include non-state parties but, in the absence of a political agreement legitimising other groups—and likely in the face of host-state opposition—identifying and liaising with these groups ranges from challenging to impossible. This limited consent means that stabilisation operations are partial to the host government and intervene directly on their behalf (Bellamy and Hunt 2015). The UN missions in Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Mali, all have mandates which include extending state authority and supporting the host state or parallel actors in reclaiming territory from non-state actors (Gorur 2016, p. 21; United Nations Security Council 2014, para 30(b)). Whereas peacekeeping’s original intent was to act as a neutral third party to facilitate conflict resolution, stabilisation operations deploy on in contexts that de facto result in their deployment on behalf of host-state governments to pursue conflict management where UN forces use military force to contain aggressors and restore state order (Osland and Peter 2021, p. 202). In their activities to both protect civilians and extend state authority, stabilisation operations use force to achieve their objectives. The most notable example of this is the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) that deployed as part of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo. The FIB has a mandate to “carry out targeted interventions” to neutralise and disarm armed groups (United Nations Security Council 2013a). With a clear mandate to address a specific group which threatens civilians and the stability of the state, stabilisation operations undertake actions designed to change the conditions on the ground. Assumptions/ Context

• Active conflict. No ceasefire and no/stalled or unviable political process • Limited consent (state only or “main” parties but missing key conflict actors) • Illegitimate or weak states/actors who lack legitimacy and control of their forces (continued)

102

S. ZIMMERMAN

(continued) Inputs

Activities

Outputs

Outcomes

• Heavily armed peacekeepers • Partial peacekeepers (on the side of the government and may have identified enemies) • Expansive mandates allowing “all necessary means” • Use of force at the tactical level to achieve objectives • Coercive management of spoilers • Stabilisation activities • Extension of state authority • Reinforcement of state will • Exclusion of spoilers • Limited political space • Return to status quo • Restoration of pre-conflict situation • Fails to address underlying causes of conflict • Short-term impact

This conflict management focused theory of change is clearly demonstrated in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA deployed in 2013, due to fears that an Islamist Insurgency would successfully overthrow the Malian state. Deployed without a peace agreement, MINUSMA has an unprecedented mandate to act “[I]n support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilise the key population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas” (United Nations Security Council 2013b, p. 7). The UN mission, working alongside the French counter-terrorism operation Serval, was successful in pushing back the Islamist insurgency and restoring state authority to some parts of the country. At the same time, the low capacity of the Malian state—in particular the security sector—was being addressed by training support from the European Union (European Council 2013). Supported by both the French and the EU, the Malian government resisted MINUSMA’s efforts to engage in a political process with the multiple armed groups in the country, limiting political progress. While a political agreement was reached in 2015, the Malian government and armed parties have shown little inclination in taking a leading political role in its implementation, leading to an unstable peace (Pellerin 2020). Despite the continued presence of MINUSMA in the country, Mali experienced a military coup in August 2020, and again in May 2021. In June of 2023, the Malian interim military government asked MINUSMA to withdraw.

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

103

The theory of change pursued by stabilisation operations is one focused on managing violent conflicts to protect civilians and restore and extend state authority facilitated by targeted support from the stabilisation operation. This approach relies on the assumption that the restoration of the state will restore stability and the state will take over its obligations to protect civilians from armed groups.

The Challenges of Stabilisation Operations With their visible differences, stabilisation operations have been described as a “new category” or “distinct phase” of peacekeeping or, at the very least, a new form of peace operations somewhere between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (de Coning et al. 2017, p. 299; Curran and Hunt 2020; Boulden 2018, pp. 20–21). Despite this, there has been limited acknowledgement of these differences within the UN, beyond the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ recommendation that the term stabilisation be clarified (High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2015, para 114). Subsequent bureaucratic reforms of the UN peacekeeping architecture in 2019 subsumed all military peacekeeping under the broader umbrella of peace operations with the hope that this would alleviate the divisions between peacekeeping and other types of UN deployments (Osland and Peter 2021, pp. 197– 198). Rather than distinguishing stabilisation operations from traditional operations, this move reaffirms stabilisation operations as part of a peacekeeping continuum and fails to acknowledge their differing theories of change. This oversight undermines the effectiveness of both types of operations, prevents the UN from clarifying the ambiguity that continues to hinder their effectiveness, and negatively impacts the UN and non-UN entities that peace operations work with (Nel 2020). The theory of change engaged by stabilisation operations is explicitly partial and requires the use of force to achieve its end goal. Failure to acknowledge this fundamental difference has left “UN peacekeeping…at the deep end of the pool, without solid footing for its operations” (Karlsrud 2015, p. 50). Stabilisation operations have been deployed into conflict contexts with robust but still insufficient mandates and force postures that continue to cleave to the core principles of peacekeeping. As a result, these operations struggle to achieve their mandates and protect themselves, civilians, and other UN entities and personnel (Bellamy and Hunt 2015). These higher-risk deployments and the expectation for

104

S. ZIMMERMAN

peacekeepers to use force has led some troop contributing countries to refuse to contribute troops to stabilisation operations, resulting in further capability gaps. When expectations exceed capabilities, the resulting loss of legitimacy impacts the UN as a whole. The failure to acknowledge the partial nature of stabilisation operations has also seen some UN entities failing to take additional security precautions, instead relying on their assumed neutrality. Even if these organisations are not directly affiliated with the stabilisation operations, this distinction may not be made by conflict actors, and they may be targeted regardless. Attacks targeting both peacekeepers and other UN and UN-affiliated organisations are increasingly common (Bellamy and Hunt 2015, pp. 1287–1288). Failing to acknowledge the weakness of the host state, and its potential disinclination to seek and support a peace agreement, has resulted in stabilisation operations finding themselves in political stalemates. Partial support to the state shifts the balance of power, making it less likely for political elites to make the concessions necessary to craft a viable political agreement (Zimmerman 2022; de Coning 2018). Additionally, by supporting host-state military forces, UN operation have found themselves accessories to atrocities as state forces attempt to further sway the balance of power and take revenge against armed groups and those affiliated with them. For example, a 2020 UN report found that Malian forces have committed atrocities against civilians between 2012 and 2018, including killing civilians suspected of having links with armed groups (Africanews 2020). Understanding that stabilisation operations engage a unique theory of change makes it clear that it will be difficult, and potentially counterproductive, to accommodate stabilisation within the existing peacekeeping norms and structures of the UN. In addition to the operational challenges noted above, stabilisation operations also push peace operations in the opposite direction of broader UN initiatives designed to ensure the future effectiveness and relevance of UN peace operations. The first of these is the UN Secretary-General’s Sustaining Peace Agenda which is focused on preventing crises before they arise and ensuring the engagement of civilians—particularly women—and civil

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

105

society in peacebuilding.9 The Agenda calls for peacekeeping missions to be more integrated with other UN departments, however, the partial and militarised nature of stabilisation operations not only makes cooperation and coordination more difficult but also could potentially label other UN agencies and civil-society partners as targets. The Agenda also calls for better integration between peace and security, and development and human rights, but stabilisation operations’ mandates require them to prioritise state security and they can find themselves engaging in or supporting militarised responses over the wellbeing of the civilian population (Zimmerman 2020). Regarding development, the Agenda stresses the need to re-centre development within conflict prevention and sustaining peace and explicitly warns against its securitization. However, stabilisation operations utilise humanitarian aid and short-term development projects to reduce hostility towards the mission (Marín 2017). Lastly, the Agenda seeks to better integrate the strategic, political, and operational aspects of peace operations to address the causes of conflict, but the partial nature of stabilisation operations often makes inclusive political processes impossible. Maintaining stabilisation operations as part of peacekeeping—and currently some of the largest deployed operations—while pursuing the Sustaining Peace Agenda seems contradictory at best and self-defeating at worst. The other notable initiative is the UN Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P). This initiative is designed to strengthen peacekeeping through facilitating collective action by peacekeeping organisations in pursuit of 45 mutually agreed commitments across 8 areas.10 However, the very nature of stabilisation operations, and their theory of change, make progress in several of these areas difficult. Most notably, the first and sixth A4P focus areas are advancing political solutions to the conflict, specifically sustainable political solutions, national reconciliation, rule of law and human rights (area 1) and strengthening the impact of peacekeeping on sustaining peace (area 6). Stabilisation operations make inclusive and sustainable political solutions difficult to achieve because they actively change the balance of power on the ground to favour the 9 The Sustaining Peace Agenda is laid out in numerous UN Secretary-General Reports and related UN General Assembly Resolutions. See United Nations General Assembly (2017, 2018, para 3). 10 The Declaration of Shared Commitment for A4P can be found at: https://peacek eeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf.

106

S. ZIMMERMAN

state—regardless of state legitimacy (Day and Hunt 2020). As a result, they undermine alternative viewpoints and close off political space thereby limiting inclusive peace (Curran and Hunt 2020). Next, A4P’s second focus area is implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. However, the militarised nature of stabilisation operations makes it extremely difficult for women to work within or with such operations. Their military-focused mandates sideline gender perspectives and gender equality initiatives, rely on gender tropes, and may even instrumentalise women in their efforts to obtain their military objectives (Von Hlatky 2022). Lastly, A4P’s focus areas three and four are improving civilian protection and the safety and security of peacekeepers. Stabilisation operations often deploy specifically to protect civilians. However, these missions push the capabilities of many of the usual troop contributing countries which struggle with appropriate training and capacity for deployment into such contexts. This challenge was acknowledged in the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations which noted that the “credibility gap” … “between what is asked and what peace operations can deliver has widened in more difficult environments” (High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2015, p. ix). At the same time, the presence of peacekeepers, particularly if they have a mandate to extend state authority, might make them a target and endanger civilians by association. Because they deploy into conflict contexts, peacekeepers may also lack the capacity, skills, and mandate to protect themselves, regardless of mandate. This can clearly be seen in the case of MINUSMA, which is one of the deadliest peace operations ever deployed.11

Conclusion Utilising two case studies, this chapter has shown that the different operational environments inhabited by traditional operations versus stabilisation operations trigger different mandates from the UN Security Council, which, in turn, necessitate different activities and inputs and overall different theories of change. At their core, traditional operations are neutral actors deployed to support existing peace agreements and maintain the status quo conditions under the assumption that the conflict

11 See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities.

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

107

parties will craft and implement a political solution. This allows traditional operations to be lightly armed and neutral because conflict parties consent to their deployment and have the capacity and will to implement the political agreement. These conditions allow traditional operations to pursue a theory of change based on conflict resolution, where common ground has been found and the political solution strives to address the drivers of conflict to craft a sustainable peace. Stabilisation operations deploy into active conflict contexts with limited consent provided by a weak host state and no or non-viable peace agreements. They actively engage in the conflict to protect civilians and extend state authority and cannot rely on the state or other conflict actors to push for and implement political solutions. Their mandate is to change circumstances on the ground to support a weak state and enforce a political solution to the conflict (Peter 2015, p. 353). This conflict management theory of change is necessitated by the intractable nature of the conflict and focused on mitigating its most negative effects. Political agreements associated with stabilisation operations, if they exist at all, are likely to be tied to the existing government, exclude key parties, and overlook the underlying drivers of conflict. The conflict management theory of change necessitated by deployments into conflict environments, which drive stabilisation operations, is incompatible with the core principles of peace operations. Further, these operations exist in opposition to and undermine major UN initiatives intended to revitalise peace operations. To ensure continued support for UN peacekeeping, the UN needs to align its peacekeeping initiatives with the missions it wants to deploy, which means it needs to address what role it envisions for stabilisation operations in the future. Peace operations are likely to remain a tool used by the international community to manage conflicts (de Coning 2021; Coleman and Williams 2021). The active contexts into which stabilisation operations deploy necessitate their different approaches to conflict. However, these changed approaches pose major challenges to the core principles of peace operations and to broader initiatives of the UN. The UN’s current approach of encompassing all peacekeeping efforts under the umbrella of peace operations ignores the different theories of change used by stabilisation operation, despite the fact that these operations are at odds with the goals of major UN initiatives.

108

S. ZIMMERMAN

References Africanews. 2020. Malian Army Accused of War Crimes Says UN Probe. Africanew & AFP. Andersen, Louise Riis. 2018. The HIPPO in the Room: The Pragmatic PushBack from the UN Peace Bureaucracy Against the Militarization of UN Peacekeeping. International Affairs (London) 94 (2): 343–361. Ashton, Carolyne V. 2007. Using Theory of Change to Enhance Peace Education Evaluation. Conflict Resolution Quarterly 25 (1): 39–54. Bellamy, Alex J., and Charles T. Hunt. 2015. Twenty-First Century UN Peace Operations: Protection, Force and the Changing Security Environment. International Affairs 91 (6): 1277–1298. Boulden, Jane. 2018. The Protection of Civilians and Stabilization in Peace Operations Mandates: An Analysis of Their Impact on Consent Impartiality, and the Use of Force. Peace Research 50: 9–28. Brown, Ann-Murray. 2016. What Is This Thing Called ‘Theory of Change’? In Learning Lab. US Agency for International Development. Center for the Theory of Change. 2022. What Is a Theory of Change. Center for the Theory of Change. https://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theoryof-change/. Accessed 8 August. Chesterman, Simon, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Chandra Thakur. 2005. Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance. Tokyo, New York: United Nations University Press. Clark, Heléne, and Andrea A. Anderson. 2004. Theories of Change and Logic Models: Telling Them Apart. Atlanta, Georgia: American Evaluation Association. Coleman, Katharina P., and Paul D. Williams. 2021. Peace Operations Are What States Make of Them: Why Future Evolution Is More Likely Than Extinction. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (2): 241–255. Curran, David, and Charles T. Hunt. 2020. Stabilization at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 26 (1): 1–23. Day, Adam C., and Charles T. Hunt. 2020. UN Stabilisation Operations and the Problem of Non-Linear Change: A Relational Approach to Intervening in Governance Ecosystem. Stability 9 (1). de Coning, Cedric. 2015. What Does ‘Stabilisation’ Mean in a UN Peacekeeping Context? January 19. https://cedricdeconing.net/2015/01/19/what-doesstabilisation-mean-in-a-un-peacekeeping-context/#:~:text=So%2C%20in% 20peacekeeping%20the%20aim,in%20important%20ways%20from%20peaceke eping. Accessed 26 April 2023. de Coning, Cedric. 2018. Is Stabilization the New Normal? Implications of Stabilization Mandates for the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations. In

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

109

The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping, ed. Peter Nadin. Milton, UK: Taylor & Francis Group. de Coning, Cedric. 2021. The Future of UN Peace Operations: Principled Adaptation Through Phases of Contraction, Moderation, and Renewal. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (2): 211–224. de Coning, Cedric, John Karlsrud, and Chiyuki Aoi, eds. 2017. UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats. New York, Oxon: Routledge. Diehl, Paul F. 2015. First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). In The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diehl, Paul F., and Alexandru Balas. 2014. Peace Operations. Oxford, UK: Polity Press. England, William Durch with Madeline L. 2009. 2009 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, ed. Center on International Cooperation. Boulder, London: Lynn Rienner. European Council. 2013. Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali). European Union 56: 19–21. Findlay, Trevor. 2002. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gao, Jue, Ilke Denizli, Fabrice Eliacin, Meghann Perez, Madeline Vellturo, Madeline Hubner, and Claire Williams. 2015. Extending Legitimate State Authority in Post-Conflict Countries: A Multi-case Analysis. Columbia School of International and Public Affairs/United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. Gilder, Alexander. 2019. The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace Operations. Netherlands International Law Review 66 (1): 47–73. Gordenker, Leon, and Thomas G. Weiss. 1993. The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics. In Collective Security in a Changing World, ed. Thomas George Weiss. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gorur, Aditi. 2016. Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions. Washintgon, DC: Stimson Center. High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 2015. Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership and People. New York: United Nations. Hunt, Charles T. 2017. All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the ‘Robust Turn’ in UN Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping 24 (1): 108–131.

110

S. ZIMMERMAN

Karlsrud, John. 2015. The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of PeaceEnforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali. Third World Quarterly 36 (1): 40–54. Kenkel, Kai. 2013. Five Generations of Peace Operations: From the “Thin Blue Line” to “Painting a Country Blue.” Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional 56 (1): 122–143. Koops, Joachim A., Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams, eds. 2015. The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levine, Daniel H. 2014. The Morality of Peacekeeping. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Marín, Alejandro Pozo. 2017. Perilous Terrain: Humanitarian Action at Risk in Mali. Medecins sans Frontieres. Nel, Michelle. 2020. From Peacekeeping to Stabilisation: Interorganisational Cooperation, Challenges and the Law. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 14 (2): 237–252. Neufeldt, Reina C. 2011. Interfaith Dialogue: Assessing Theories of Change. Peace & Change 36 (3): 344–372. Osland, Kari M., and Mateja Peter. 2021. UN Peace Operations in a Multipolar Order: Building Peace Through the Rule of Law and Bottom-Up Approaches. Contemporary Security Policy 42 (2): 197–210. Pellerin, Mathiew. 2020. Mali’s Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years on: An Uneasy Calm. International Crisis Group. Peter, Mateja. 2015. Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. Global Governance 21 (3): 351–370. Serrat, Olivier. 2016. Knowledge Solutions: Tools, Methods, and Approaches to Drive Development Forward and ... Enhance Its Effects. Springer. Sherman, Jake, and Benjamin Tortolani. 2009. Implications of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in United Nations Mandates. International Forum Challenges of Peace Operations. Shucksmith, Christy, and Nigel D. White. 2015. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). In The Oxford handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Tardy, Thierry. 2011. A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping 18 (2): 152–167. United Nations. 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. Capstone Doctrine. New York: United Nations. United Nations. 2009. DPKO/DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support: Office of Military Affairs. New York: United Nations.

THE FUTURE DYNAMICS BETWEEN UN STABILISATION …

111

United Nations General Assembly. 1956. Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan for an Emergency International United Nations Force Requested in the Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956 (A/3302). New York: United Nations. United Nations General Assembly. 1958. Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General. A/3943. New York: United Nations. United Nations General Assembly. 2017. Restructuring of the United Nations Peace and Security Pillar. Report of the Secretary-General. A/72/525, October 13. New York: United Nations. United Nations General Assembly. 2018. Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Report of the Secretary-General. A/72/707-S/2018/43, January 18. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 1965a. Report of the Secretary-General on the Observance of the Cease-Fire Under Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September 1965. S/6710/Add.14, December 30. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 1965b. Security Council Resolution 211 (1965), S/RES/211, September 20. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 1965c. Security Council Resolution 214, S/ RES/214, September 27. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 1966. Report of the Secretary-General on the Observance of the Cease-Fire Under Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September 1965. S/6710/add.15, January 7. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 2013a. Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013). S/RES/2098, March 28. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 2013b. Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013). S/RES/2100, April 25. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 2014. Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014), S/RES/2149, April 10. New York: United Nations. Urquhart, Brian. 1987. A Life in Peace and War. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2022. Deploying Feminism: The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Weiss, Carol. 1995. Nothing as Practical as a Good Theory: Exploring TheoryBased Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families. In New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives. Concepts, Methods, and Contexts. Roundtable on Comperhensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families, ed. James P. Connell. New York, NY: Aspen Inst. for Humanistic Studies. Williams, Paul D., and Alex Bellamy. 2021. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity.

112

S. ZIMMERMAN

Zimmerman, Shannon. 2020. Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 9 (1): 16. Zimmerman, Shannon. 2022. Parallel Lines in the Sand: The Impact of Parallel French Interventions on UN Stabilization Operations in Mali and the Central African Republic. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 28 (1): 58–79.

UNTSO: The Future of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East Diego Salama

I think that UNTSO no longer has any meaningful task and therefore has very little time left. No, no, Mrs Siilasvuo, UNTSO and Israel are eternal1

Introduction Seventy-four years ago, while the UN was in its infancy, the Security Council started dealing with the Middle East. The War of 1948, which turned out to be the opening salvo of many more to come, highlighted the necessity of constantly having international involvement in the region. The Israeli-Arab conflict turned out to be one of the most prolonged and demanding situations, the UN has faced throughout its existence. In fact, “It is often remarked that the United Nations devoted more time 1 A conversation in 1970 between Miguel Marin, UNTSO Political Advisor and Mrs Siilasvuo, wife of Lt Gen Ensio Siilasvuo, then UNTSO Chief of Staff and later Chief Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East.

D. Salama (B) Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_6

113

114

D. SALAMA

to the Arab-Israeli conflict than any other matter in its history” (Forsythe 1972). Between 1948 and 1978, the Security Council’s tool of choice for managing the conflict was peacekeeping. Indeed, the Council authorised the deployment of five2 peace operations, three of which are still on the ground today. This paper will focus on the oldest and arguably most important one: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The fact that there seems to be no end in sight makes it easier to dismiss UNTSO as a failure. After all, if there is no real peace to keep or even a real possibility to foster it, why is UNTSO still on the ground? Is UNTSO’s permanence a sign of its importance or inability to tackle the conflict? Can the Security Council use UNTSO as a model for future operations? These are the chapter’s guiding questions. This chapter will critically assess UNTSO’s history and its future. One of the critical highlights of this study is that UNTSO plays an important yet understated role in the Israeli-Arab conflict and that its presence provides a unique benefit to the Security Council and the operation’s hosts. The operation’s longevity is not entirely a product of inertia. Instead, it is a conscious choice the Security Council makes to keep a mechanism to manage potential crises and, in a more idealistic scenario, facilitate peace. UNTSO is a unique peacekeeping operation. To understand its positioning and prospects, it is fundamental to study its history. UN peacekeeping in the Middle East has a rich and long history. Understanding the role the operations played throughout their time on the ground provides valuable insights and context when trying to understand a current conflict. While multiple international efforts and actors worked in the conflict, UNTSO was and continues to be the most constant. UNTSO’s history is a lens through which we can understand the conflict’s long-term dynamics, and, at the same time, it is a very rich source of policy lessons for future operations. It is important to preface the analysis of UNTSO’s past and future, remarking that it does not act alone or in a vacuum. As the conflict evolved, the UN started to deal with conflict in a holistic manner. The UN System has exponentially expanded its regional presence beyond peace 2 The UN Emergency Force I (1956–1967) & the UN Emergency Force II (1974– 1978) in the Sinai Peninsula, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights (1974–) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (1978–).

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

115

operations. Within UNTSO’s area of operation, there are now around 20 agencies, funds, and programmes with offices in every country. The Secretariat took several steps to streamline the cooperation between all UN entities, including the operations. First, after the Oslo Accords of 1994, the UN created the Office of Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process (UNSCO), which is the focal point of political and diplomatic work and provides an umbrella for all. The Special Coordinator serves as the Secretary-General’s representative. The Deputy Special Coordinator also serves as a Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator of the UN Country Team (UNCT) for the Palestinian Territories. Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan also have their UNCTs, which work towards maximising coordination and alignment of everyone working on the ground. The fact that the UN has a robust and diverse representation in and of itself does not call into question whether the operation is relevant. After all, in the countries with the largest peacekeeping operations, the rest of the UN has a substantial presence. The UN built an entire architecture of entities around UNTSO, which begs the question: how did an operation with a mandate as old as the UN itself continue to work in the region? The answer to that question requires us to examine UNTSO’s history and structure. The chapter first reviews UNTSO’s history, particularly from 1967 to 1978. There are two reasons why this period is essential. First, this was the busiest time for the operations; the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War and the first Lebanon War saw significant changes in the regional peacekeeping architecture. The former saw the withdrawal of UNEF I, and the latter saw the deployment of UNEF II, UNDOF. In addition, the conflict in Southern Lebanon required the deployment of UNIFIL. UNTSO was vital in the quick deployment of all these operations. Moreover, to this day, it provides them with invaluable expertise and political acumen. During this period, the Security Council created the role of Chief Coordinator of Peacekeeping in the Middle East, which greatly enhanced the coordination and effectiveness of all operations. UNTSO played a very significant role in each of those instances. Second, during this period, the Secretariat decided to coordinate the work militarily and politically. Second, the chapter analyses how that period shaped the current peacekeeping architecture in the region. Third, the chapter discusses UNTSO’s current role before it finishes with concluding remarks. The chapter seeks to shed light on how an operation with a mandate written in the half of the twentieth century is adapting to the challenges of the twenty-first century and, at the same time, to what extent future operations can learn from it.

116

D. SALAMA

Historical Background: UNTSO as the Keystone of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East Scholars paid considerable attention to UNTSO’s activities between 1948 and 1982 (Myers and Dorn 2022; Novosseloff 2022; Theobald 2009, 2015; Thakur 2008; Nachmias 1996; Siilasvuo 1992; Erskine 1989; Sommereyns 1980; Jonah 1975). The Security Council authorised UNTSO through resolution 50 (1948), however, its mandate primarily was later outlined by resolution 73 (1949). The operation performs activities inter alia mediation between Israel and its counterparts; it deploys UN Military Observers (UNMOs) across the entire region, provides firsthand information to the Council, and establishes communication between the United Nations and all relevant actors. In addition, throughout its history, the UNTSO provided invaluable support to the other operations subsequently deployed in the area (Higgins 1970). In the history of UN peacekeeping, UNTSO is a one-of-a-kind. “It is a highly specialised force, unique in its duties, organisational structure, function and longevity […] UNTSO’s humble beginning to creating a vast peacekeeping establishment” (Nachmias 1996). Even at its peak, UNTSO is a small operation with a predominantly military component. UNTSO welcomes mostly Captains, Majors and a few Lieutenant Colonels. These officers bring a certain level of gravitas and experience, which serves them well as they navigate one of the world’s most complex and protracted conflicts. The operation’s Chief of Staff and Head of Mission is always a General officer3 appointed by the Secretary-General. As of July 2022, UNTSO has 153 military observers, 81 international staff, and 148 national civilian staff. Second, the operation’s arm reaches across the entire region. UNTSO maintains liaison offices in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria and its headquarters in Jerusalem.4 No other UN operation has permanent representation in so many countries and engages with all governments in its broad area of operation. Essentially, UNTSO has a regional mandate, which allows it to build a strong network within every country (Hylton 2013). UNTSO’s ability to mediate between the parties and defuse tension remains one of its most essential qualities (Theobald 2015).

3 In newer multidimensional operations, the Head of Mission is a civilian. 4 The Jerusalem Headquarters also serves as the liaison office for Jordan.

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

117

Third, when the Security Council authorised the other operations, UNTSO provided them with invaluable assistance to complete their mandate. The Middle East was the first region that experienced interoperation collaboration in peacekeeping operations. Today, UNTSO trains UN Military Observers and detaches them to work with UNDOF and UNIFIL (Sommereyns 1980). As the chapter reflects, the practice of inter-operation collaboration and UNTSO’s central role in this process is one of the best examples of the operation’s importance. In other words, to understand the UN’s history vis-à-vis the Israeli-Arab conflict, one must study UNTSO and the degree to which it cooperates with its regional counterparts. Indeed, the notion of Inter-Operation Collaboration between operations is an understudied mechanic to measure success.

Inter-Operation Collaboration of Peacekeeping Operations Between 1967 and 1978, UNTSO had two important landmarks warrant mentioning. First, right before the 1967 Six-Day War, the government of Egypt expelled UNEF I from its territory (Rikhye 1980), which opened the door for the Six-Day War. During the conflict, UNTSO was under extreme pressure from both sides to get out of the way and, to make things matters even worse; the operation became homeless when Israel captured its Headquarters from Jordanian forces. Moreover, after the war, the Security Council had no interest in sending another peacekeeping operation, which meant that UNTSO had to continue to perform its duties and, at the same, increase its presence in the Sinai to try to fillin the vacuum left by UNEF (Siilasvuo 1992). Overall, “UNTSO was able to reposition itself – literally as well as figuratively – to respond to the new environment after 1967” (Londey et al. 2020, p. 251). UNTSO continued to staff observation posts throughout the region. It is important to remark that the period between 1967 and 1973 was highly volatile and violent. UNTSO’s observers in the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon borders kept things relatively quiet. However, the operation did not have the necessary tools to prevent the War of Attrition or the Yom Kippur War (Korn 1992). Fortna (2004) argues that UNTSO’s inability to avoid these two conflicts demonstrates its inefficacy. It is impossible to deny that UNTSO’s presence did not deter the parties whenever they engaged

118

D. SALAMA

with each other. However, one must look at what happened after the Yom Kippur War to understand UNTSO’s long-term benefit. UNTSO’s finest hours came after some of the darkest for the region: the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1978 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon. First, after the month-long war of 1973, the Security Council almost immediately authorised the creation of the second UNEF. However, there was no time to wait until the Secretariat assembled a new operation, which meant they relied on UNTSO to fill the vacuum. The operation redeployed its assets to the Sinai Peninsula, and within 24 hours, they had boots on the ground (Sommereyns 1980). In addition, UNTSO staff took care of all administrative and logistical needs of the incoming operation. It is essential to underscore that these decisions, while they might appear self-evident to the outside observer, required the UN to move assets and resources from one operation to the other; this level of flexibility was not the norm; each function had its budget and structure. A few months later, in 1974, and after a lengthy negotiation, Israel and Syria agreed to UNDOF’s deployment in the Golan Heights. In 1978, at the behest of the United States, the UN had no choice but to deploy and operate in Lebanon (Urquhart 1987). The Council wanted boots on the ground quickly, and to protect the UN’s ability to react to the crisis on a timely fashion, it authorised UNTSO to fill the vacuum. “For all operational, administrative and logistical planning purposes, UNTSO HQ was reorganised to serve as the Rear HQ for UNIFIL” (Erskine 1989). The practice of UNTSO coming to the rapid aid of newly created operations was not accidental. Secretary-General Waldheim, in a letter sent to then UNEF’s II Force Commander Lt Gen Ensio Siilasvuo in 1974, stated that “Throughout the years, we have tried, as you know, to keep an element of personnel in UNTSO who would be called on at short notice to assist new United Nations Operations as they might occur” (UNA 1974). The Secretariat expected UNTSO to support all operations in the Middle East by being an interlocutor between the parties and sharing its expertise.

One General to Coordinate Them All: The Role of Lt Gen Ensio Siilasvuo Lt Gen Ensio Siilasvuo was a Finnish peacekeeper with a 20-year career with the United Nations. He served in various capacities, including as Commander of the Finnish Battalion in UNFICYP, Deputy Chief of

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

119

Staff and Chief of Staff in UNTSO, and Force Commander of UNEF II. In 1973, he was appointed as the Force Commander of UNEF II, which was a seminal decision for two reasons. First, it established the tradition that the Force Commander of an incoming operation would come from UNTSO. Second, Siilasvuo was a key player in political and military matters during this time. Siilasvuo also played a quasi-diplomatic role, serving as the chair of the first military meetings between Israel and Egypt. These negotiations led to the Six-Point Agreement, which considerably lowered the tensions in the Sinai. In addition, Siilasvuo led a UN team that brokered the Israel-Syria disengagement and paved the way for UNDOF’s deployment. Siilasvuo realised that there was a high concentration of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and proposed to the Secretary-General to consolidate the three functions into one command to optimise the operator’s work. However, the Secretariat pushed against the notion of unification. It offered a counter-proposal where there would be one Chief Coordinator, with the operations continuing to report to the Secretariat but working more closely together. Siilasvuo was appointed to the role of Chief Coordinator, which was an acknowledgement that coordination at the operational and strategic levels was of paramount importance. During this period, two decisions cemented UNTSO’s role within the peacekeeping architecture in the Middle East. First, UNTSO observers were embedded in UNDOF and UNIFIL to support their work. Second, UNTSO fostered military dialogue between the parties, which helped build relationships and ensure regional stability. These decisions have had lasting implications for UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and demonstrate the critical role that UNTSO has played in the region. Peacekeeping evolved significantly since the 1970s; the heads of operations are now Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, who currently play a significant role in managing the operation and engaging their host countries (Karlsrud 2013). Moreover, the UN created coordination mechanism such as the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). However, inter-operation collaboration has never been as efficient and profound as in the Middle East during Siilasvuo’s time. As Angelo (2011) reflects, many administrative and political roadblocks prevent peace operations in Africa from fully collaborating, which prevents them from maximising efficiency and effectiveness. The UN, as a whole and the Department of Peace Operations in particular, are facing significant pressure to streamline their work and deal with

120

D. SALAMA

budget cuts. Therefore, adopting inter-operation collaboration can ensure more efficient use of resources and pool and share expertise, thereby avoiding duplication of effort and reducing the overall cost of peacekeeping operations. In other words, cooperating is the solution to the ever-present request from Member States to do more with less. Furthermore, Siilasvuo’s appointment as Chief Coordinator showed the Member States that the Secretariat understood that managing this conflict required a regional strategy. Moreover, UNTSO’s regional arm allows its staff members to build a vast network and establish relationships and trust. The Chief Coordinator and UNTSO complemented each other because the former focused on politics, and the latter purely worked on military affairs. This division of labour should serve as the best practice for future operations deployed in a conflict with regional dynamics. The UN adopted this lesson already in Africa by way of creating UNOWAS. Successful peacekeeping operations must deeply understand the regional dynamics to deal with the regional conflict spillover. Furthermore, they must ensure they coordinate their actions with other peace operations in their vicinity and the UN Country Teams. Siilasvuo’s role successfully pooled and shared resources between functions, providing strategic oversight, which freed the heads of operations to focus on implementing their mandate.

UNTSO’s Future: If Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It UNTSO’s regional reach continues to support the operations and provide a broader perspective than its counterparts. Siilasvuo and subsequent Chiefs of Staff made a point of cementing UNTSO’s central through two regional avenues and one global. First, the operation provides an essential service to UNDOF and UNIFIL, and it does so through a unique selling point, which they do not have. Second, UNTSO continues to perform its nice duties, which no other by other actor within the UN System can (Hylton 2013). Third, the Secretariat relies on UNTSO to provide worldwide support and knowledge for peacekeeping. The following sections of the chapter will discuss UNTSO’s current role and the operation’s future.

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

121

Military Observers: All Roads Pass Through Jerusalem In a recent contribution, Myers and Dorn (2022) made a very poignant argument explaining UNTSO’s current relevance. The operation’s ability to evolve to meet the contemporary challenges within the confines of its mandate allowed it to solidify its place in architecture. Their contribution eloquently explains the importance of their role. UN Military Observers have a myriad of complex duties which go far beyond patrolling. They have to provide detailed reports of troop movements and evaluate what kind of weapons and assets the parties have adjacent to the operation’s area of operation. These tasks require a nuanced understanding of the conflict, military decisions and expert situational awareness. To this day, UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan supports UNDOF through direct observation and reporting to ensure that both parties abide by their agreements (Lindley 2010; James 1987). However, this still begs the question, why is this still the case? After all, UNDOF and UNIFIL have many decades in the field and have their observers. The fact is that having the observers start their journey in the Middle East in Jerusalem and then proceed to UNDOF and UNIFIL gives them a significant understanding of the conflict. This is not a symbolic or purely administrative gesture. UNTSO provides them with invaluable formal training that focuses on the conflict dynamics and challenges they can expect in their duty stations. Moreover, the observers meet critical local actors and receive detailed briefings on best practices to achieve their objectives. That said, the observers are not the only ones who start their journey in Jerusalem; the newly appointed Force Commander and other senior officers from UNDOF and UNIFIL may do so. UNTSO always stands ready to provide in-depth briefings that allow them to hit the ground running. Siilasvuo’s policy of placing UNTSO as the rear headquarters and de facto training centre continues to pay dividends for the three operations today.

UNTSO as a Regional Intermediary UNTSO has the gravitas and experience to facilitate contact between the parties. In addition, it has a unique mandate, which allows it to interact with the entire region. On numerous occasions, it has served as an intermediary between Israel and her neighbours. After the 1948 War, the

122

D. SALAMA

parties signed armistice agreements with Israel. To monitor the situation on the ground, the parties agreed to have Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) which inter alia supervised the truce and investigated incidents on the floor. UNTSO played a role in the commissions. The Chief of Staff chaired the meetings, gathered information from both sides, usually in the form of complaints and reported to the Secretary-General (Mcdermott 1996). While the MACs were far from optimal, they provided a forum that diffused tensions. After the Six-Day War, however, Israel no longer participated in the MACs, which reinforced the necessity of having a communication channel between the parties. In another recent contribution, Alexandra Novosseloff (2022) reviewed “old missions” and concluded that UNTSO, much like other old operations continue to perform an essential service to peacekeeping. The author stresses that UNTSO often facilitates contact between the parties and thereby helps reduce the tension and prevents minor incidents from escalating. In other words, UNTSO can “relieve uncertainty, foster confidence, cultivate rapport and influence the parties towards non-offensive action” (Novosseloff 2022, 23). Over the last few decades, the UNTSO had to deal with new challenges within two countries within its area of operations: Lebanon and Syria. After the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which resulted in the broadening of UNIFIL’s mandate and a significant increase of boots on the ground, UNTSO had to adapt how it works in Lebanon. The observers attached to UNIFIL work monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, observe and report on any violations to the Security Council. While there is no peace to keep in Southern Lebanon, UNTSO and UNIFIL do as much as possible to prevent another war. UNTSO has been working to address the broader security challenges in the region, including the threat posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons. The operation liaises with key players such as the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israeli Defence Forces to counter terrorism and address the root causes of violence and instability. In addition, UNTSO remains a reliable intermediary between these two military forces. Since the outbreak of violence in Syria in 2011, UNTSO has played a critical role in supporting international efforts to bring about a ceasefire. Despite the challenging security environment and the nature of the conflict, UNTSO has provided impartial and independent observations and reporting on the ground, which has been instrumental in informing the international community about Syria. UNTSO has been

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

123

working closely with other UN agencies, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), to support the delivery of humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict. Two important caveats warrant discussion. First, while UNTSO’s work continues to be instrumental to UNDOF, UNIFIL, and the rest of the UN System working in the region, it is not a silver bullet, and it cannot escape the reality of the situation. As of early 2023, there is no peace to keep in either Syria or Southern Lebanon, and the prospects of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are almost non-existent. The UN System and the operations, in particular, do their best within their mandate, resources and political climate. A significant benefit UNTSO can bring is that they could be the critical factor in implementing ceasefires and, eventually, peace agreements in the region. The Security Council would not need to adapt the mandate or change the area of operations. Second, UNTSO deals with observation and military matters, while the latter deals with diplomacy and politics. The fact that the Secretariat and the Security Council respected the integrity of UNTSO’s mandate signals that they see the work of both entities as complementary. UNTSO can continue to engage its military counterparts to discuss issues related to its observation duties. This is beneficial because the operation does not have to deal with the conflict’s stretched and protracted political questions.

Bonus Track: UNTSO as a Rapid Response Force and a Think Tank While both Novosseloff and Myers & Dorn highlight UNTSO’s relevance within the Middle East, the operation has played an important role elsewhere. UNTSO’s successful record in quickly redeploying itself to cover immediate needs and to lay the groundwork for a new operation ensured the Security Council had a rapid response force. An essential and underrated example came in 1984 when UNTSO sent observers to Bagdad and Tehran to investigate allegations of indiscriminate shelling against civilians (James 1990). UNTSO had boots on the ground in both countries within 48 hours. UNTSO’s success in aiding these operations turned it into a rapid response force. Over the years, the Department of Peace Operations required UNTSO to assist operations beyond its area of operations. UNTSO has the institutional memory of helping operations in crises—such as during the

124

D. SALAMA

start-up phase of UNEF II and UNIFIL—and throughout times of relative stability. In Cyprus, UNTSO has been working closely with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to monitor the ceasefire. The island’s proximity to the Middle East makes redeployments quick. UNFICYP cooperated with UNTSO to deploy observers to the Sinai Peninsula in 1973. Without this partnership, the Secretariat would not have been able to have boots on the ground within 72 hours after the Security Council authorised the operation. UNTSO has also supported UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Balkans and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). UNTSO assisted them in establishing monitoring and observation mechanisms and liaising with local partners. UNTSO’s ability to adapt to new challenges and changing circumstances, assist beyond its area of operations and continue to perform its duties demonstrate that it is an asset for the Secretariat that goes beyond the Middle East. While this in and of itself does not justify its quasi-permanent presence, it certainly speaks for it. UNTSO is very well equipped to assist operations that deal with “frozen” conflicts; it could also play a critical role in ongoing crises such as the Russia-Ukraine War. The recent re-emergence of interstate war in Central and Eastern Europe, exemplified by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has highlighted the need for effective third-party interventions to mitigate conflict escalation. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, such interventions would ideally focus on de-escalation, demilitarisation, and the observance of ceasefires. In this regard, UNTSO possesses valuable experience in managing these kinds of day-to-day activities. Furthermore, UNTSO’s history of providing indicative forces during the start-up phase in similar conflict theatres underscores its potential relevance and applicability to the contemporary challenges faced in Ukraine and elsewhere. Consequently, extrapolating UNTSO’s operational experience may offer valuable insights for developing strategies to address the complex security dynamics emerging in Ukraine and beyond. Should the Security Council agrees to deploy a peacekeeping operation, it could quickly redeploy troops serving in Jerusalem to Ukraine, so they can assist the newly formed operation in the start-up phase: set up the observation posts, create the framework for the monitoring of the ceasefire, reporting incidents to the Security Council and develop confidence-building measures. In addition, the Security Council could establish a Military Armistice Commission, as it did in 1948 in Israel.

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

125

The Israel Mixed Armistice Commissions (IMACs) worked to monitor the enforcement of the ceasefire agreements between Israel and its neighbours. UNTSO maintained the organisation of the MACs and acted as a neutral third party in the discussions. However, UNTSO’s roadmap requires complementing for newer tools the UN is already successfully using elsewhere. Indeed, the mandate of a potential operation in Ukraine could include military observers similar to those in Jerusalem and, at the same time, a political office which can help with the ceasefire negotiations. In addition, UNTSO became a quasi-think tank for UN peacekeeping. The Secretariat asked the operation to prepare contingency plans for potential peacekeeping operations worldwide. The operation’s institutional memory and expertise became a resource for UNIFIL, UNDOF, and peacekeeping. “UNTSO is a [living] repository of skills and knowledge […] which New York fortunately appreciate and are ready to exploit” (Erskine 1989, p. 148). The fact that UNTSO has made positive contributions quickly and beyond its area of operations is a significant yet understudied element of its relevance. This only confirms that while scholars and some politicians might question UNTSO’s effectiveness, the Secretariat and the Security Council continue to rely on its expertise.

Conclusion The United Nations will continue to deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict as long as peace remains elusive. While the System has expanded the type of support it provides to the local population across the region, the fact is that no entity can do what UNTSO does. The operation is unique in its regional setup, and its institution continues to be important in conflict management. UNTSO is a clear example that peacekeeping operations with a traditional mandate still have an essential part in conflict management. While the process cannot solve the conflict, its presence allows the parties to lower the pressure. In addition, its work relieves UNSCO from dealing with observation and military affairs, and its continuous expert briefings shape the thinking of the Secretariat and, to a lesser extent, the Security Council. UNIFIL and UNDOF rely on UNTSO for its liaison capacity and for recruiting and training military observers. The operation works amidst a large and complex system of UN entities working on the ground. However, UNTSO has successfully maintained its niche,

126

D. SALAMA

and none of the UN entities has the expertise or capacity to perform its duties. The Security Council, the Troop Contributing Countries and even the Secretariat have expressed that large multidimensional peacekeeping operations will not be the default choice for future operations (Autesserre 2019). Operations like MONUSCO in the DRC, MINUSMA in Mali and UNMISS in South Sudan are costly; they require significant resilience from the Troop Contributing Countries and are a challenge from a management perspective. This is not to say they are ineffective; multidimensional operations have succeeded in various areas, such as protecting civilians. Moreover, the Security Council will undoubtedly keep this alternative on the table (Day and Hunt 2020). Future peace operations might take a page out of UNTSO’s book and deploy observers to verify disengagements. Most conflicts before the Security Council do not require an operation with a heavy footprint, and UNTSO continues to show that smaller operations perform well. Moreover, a lighter footprint might be more feasible in the eyes of the Member States, particularly those of the largest financial and troop-contributing countries. However, this is only half the formula. Suppose the Council decides to deploy an operation like UNTSO. In that case, it must modernise its mandate by giving it the necessary tools to gather intelligence and have a mechanism for early warning. In addition, future small-scale operations need to engage in the political process on the civilian front. While it is unlikely that the Security Council and the Secretariat see the need to appoint a regional coordinator like Siilasvuo, it is fundamental to ensure coordination among peace operations deployed nearby and, equally important, ensure that the operation works in lockstep with the rest of the UN System. It is undeniable that UNSTO does not have the mandate to get the parties to make peace and that quasi-permanent presence means that the Security Council keeps it on the ground because they do not have a better mechanism to tackle the conflict. In other words, for the time being, UNTSO is as good as it gets. However, that only paints part of the picture. UNTSO is a unique operation that continues to provide an essential service in the Middle East and beyond. UNTSO’s accomplishments and relevance must be evaluated through the lens of what it can achieve, how they cope with emerging challenges and whether its expertise helps other operations. By that standard, we can conclude that UNTSO works rather well, and as long as the United Nations is involved in this never-ending conflict, it will rely on UNTSO.

UNTSO: THE FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING …

127

Bibliography Angelo, Victor. 2011. Inter-Mission Cooperation: Reflecting on Sudan and Central Africa Experiences. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Autesserre, Séverine. 2019. The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can’t End Wars. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/crisis-peacekeeping. Day, Adam, and Charles Hunt. 2020. Why COVID-19 Offers a Chance to Transform UN Peacekeeping. The Conversation, May 28. https://theconversation. com/why-covid-19-offers-a-chance-to-transform-un-peacekeeping-139416. Erskine, Emmanuel A. 1989. Mission with Unifil: An African Soldier’s Reflections. London: Hurst & Company. Forsythe, David P. 1972. Review: The UN and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: What Has Been Learned in 25 Years? International Organization 26 (4): 705–717. Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Higgins, Rosalyn. 1970. United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967 Documents and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hylton, Judy. 2013. Middle East Peacekeeping Operations After Peace Accords on the Syria and Lebanon Tracks. Journal of International Peacekeeping 17 (1–2): 1–45. James, Alan. 1987. The United Nations on Golan: Peacekeeping Paradox? International Relations 9 (1): 64–84. James, Alan. 1990. Military Attacks on Civilians in the Iran—Iraq War (1984– 1988). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Jonah, James O. C. 1975. Peacekeeping in the Middle East. International Journal 100–122. Karlsrud, John. 2013. Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as Norm Arbitrators? Understanding Bottom-Up Authority in UN Peacekeeping. Global Governance 19 (4): 525–544. Korn, David A. 1992. Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970. New York: Westview Press. Lindley, Dan. 2010. UNDOF: Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned. Defense & Security Analysis 20 (2): 153–164. Londey, Peter, Rhys Crawley, and David Horner. 2020. The Long Search for Peace: Observer Missions and Beyond, 1947–2006. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mcdermott, Anthony. 1996. The Arab-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commissions of Yore. Relevant Today? Geopolitics and International Boundaries 1 (1): 93– 114. Myers, Zachary, and Walter Dorn. 2022. UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East: A Twenty-First Century Review. International Peacekeeping 29 (3): 413–435.

128

D. SALAMA

Nachmias, Nitza. 1996. UNTSO: Obsolete Peacekeeping? Peacekeeping & International Relations 25 (1): 1–6. Novosseloff, Alexandra. 2022. A Comprehensive Study of Older One-Dimensional UN Peace Operations. Friedrich-Eber-Stiftung, The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network. Rikhye, Indar Jit. 1980. The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 . London: Frank Cass and Company Limited. Siilasvuo, Ensio. 1992. In the Service of Peace in the Middle East, 1967–1979. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. Sommereyns, Raymond. 1980. United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in the Middle East. Brooklyn Journal of International Law 6: 1–53. Thakur, Ramesh. 2008. Peacekeeping in the Middle East from United Nations. Australian Outlook 38 (2): 81–89. Theobald, Andrew. 2009. Watching the War and Keeping the Peace: The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East: 1949– 1956. Kingston: A Thesis Submitted to the Department of History of Queens University. Theobald, Andrew. 2015. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Andrew Theobald, 121–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNA. 1974. UNA, S-1783-0000-0030, File 2, March 14, The SecretaryGeneral, Administrative Support for UNEF. Urquhart, Brian. 1987. A Life in Peace and War. New York: W.W. Norton.

Strengthening Partnerships

The Future of United Nations-African Union (UN-AU) Cooperation on Peace and Security: Lessons Learnt from the AU-UN Joint Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Ruth Adwoa Frimpong

Introduction Issues of African peace and security have morphed over the years. The incidence of protracted interstate conflicts in the 1990s to political disorder resulting from unconstitutional change of governments have been the bane of democratic consolidation on the continent (Matlosa 2006). In recent years, the emergence of contemporary and nontraditional security issues such as maritime crimes, transnational organised crimes, violent extremism and terrorism as well as pandemics such as the Ebola virus, SARS and the recent COVID-19 continue to pose significant threat to human survival as well as to the political and socioeconomic advancement in Africa. In 1963, the Organisation of African

R. A. Frimpong (B) Formerly with Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_7

131

132

R. A. FRIMPONG

Union (OAU) made the first attempt to address its own security challenges (Ajayi 2008). However, this was encumbered by the inadequacy of funds, logistics and technical know-how. For example, the OAU’s failure to resolve conflicts in Nigeria (1967–1970), Chad (1981) and Burundi (2003–2004) exposed the organisation’s limitations in resolving African security issues (Ajayi 2008). History has it that cooperation between the UN and Africa has undergone several alterations. On the international scene, there were few independent African states during the drafting of the UN Charter nonetheless, the decolonisation of African states in the 1960s made the UN gain new members (Lehmann 2008) and offered a platform for African states to put forward interests such as economic development and decolonization. The focus of the AU’s partnership with the UN was soon to transition to one that hinged on peace and security in 1965. This included engagements of the UN with Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) which stemmed from a plethora of conflict situations on the continent and the overarching objective of both organisations to promote collective security on the international scene (Williams and Boutellis 2014). One such engagement is partnership peacekeeping. It was initially agreed upon in July 2010 that partnership peacekeeping was to assist in the monitoring and evaluation of response mechanisms to Africa’s peace and security challenges (Williams and Boutellis 2014). Subsequently, in September 2010, the UN and AU established the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security (JTF) and had their first meeting in September 2010 (Williams and Boutellis 2014). This formed the basis for the operationalisation of activities aimed at preventing conflict, fostering and sustaining peace and peacekeeping in Africa in collaboration with the UN. Eight years after, challenges that arose from peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa where security threats such as terrorism and violent extremism complicated efforts to foster peace and caused an increase in civilian and peacekeeper fatalities, birthed the UN SecretaryGeneral’s initiative, Action for Peacekeeping (A4P). The initiative also established that cooperation and mutual commitment between Member States, RECSs and the UN were necessary in addressing the challenges of peacekeeping especially in Africa, home to majority of UN peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2018). Murithi (2007) establishes that relations forged between the UN and African states were done between a balance of paternalism and partnership (Murithi 2007). This asymmetrical and top-down unidirectional

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

133

relationship has featured in the UN’s cooperation with the AU on peace and security issues where the UN formulates and designs policies, programmes, plans and frameworks for African states in the areas of peace and security. De Coning (2019) in the same vein states that the partnership between the AU and UN has since long been unequal and characterised by a donor-recipient one (De Coning 2019). This is evident in areas of technical assistance and funding of African peace and security activities by the UN and has set the tone for the unequal balance of power between the UN and the AU in peace and security issues. The relationship between the AU and UN has received significant attention due to the changes in the nature of security issues on the continent and the need to respond to them in a transformative, context-specific and strategic manner. The current relationship between the UN and Africa has been described as contradictory because, while there is much debate about Africa’s peace and security issues, there is even less talk about Africa itself and its position in the UN. In the wake of this paradox of a relationship, collaborations between the two organisations continue to be characterised by the struggle for power and primacy, duplication of roles and the debates concerning the lack of an African voice on the permanent seating of the UNSC (International Crisis Group 2019). The AUPSC establishes that the dilemma of this symbiotic collaboration is the glaring fact that although it has more political and doctrinal leeway to deploy forces, it lacks the requisite finances to do so Almost two decades after the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 16311 which identified priority areas for collaboration between the UN and regional organisations, partnerships between the UN and the AU have birthed a number of significant initiatives such as the development of coordination structures such as the Joint Task Force, annual “desk-to-desk” meetings among UN and AU technical officials, annual conferences, and standing meetings between the UN Security Council (UNSC), the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), and the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This shaped the creation of the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Recently, the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace

1 This all-important document was adopted in 2005 and laid the basis for member states and relevant international organisations to contribute to strengthening the capacity of African regional and sub-regional organisations]in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabilization, including through the provision of human, technical and financial assistance.

134

R. A. FRIMPONG

and Security Council developed a ten-year Capacity Building Program to strengthen the AU and its sub-regional organisations’ ability to resolve the challenges to human security in Africa (Williams and Boutellis 2014). It is the expectation that the decade-long capacity building programme will transform the AU–UN relationship into an effective strategic partnership which addresses the existing challenges and loopholes in the duo’s partnership on peace and security. The chapter analyses the UN–AU cooperation on peace and security issues by exploring the duo’s partnership in the UNAMID peace operations that span from July 2007 to December 2020. It argues that although co-dependency highlighted the cooperation between the AU and the UN in the Darfur mission, the hybrid mission was a depiction of the existing asymmetrical relations between the two institutions. The chapter provides an overview of the Sudanese conflict and the political and security mandates of the joint mission in Darfur and brings to the fore the joint efforts made by the AU and the UN in sustaining peace and security in Darfur. The chapter further explores the various operational and technical challenges in the joint mission. As a result of these challenges, the mission struggled to create a mission strategy in its early years, focusing almost solely on operational issues and thereby leaving the political process to the separate Joint AU/UN mediation. The chapter establishes that although the partnership between the AU and the UN in executing the mandates of UNAMID was envisioned to be a pacesetter for strategic relations between the two institutions, it opened a can of worms and exposed the fault lines in the norms and power balance in the cooperation between the AU and UN in African peace and security issues. From the challenges posed by the nature of the cooperation between the AU and UN in Darfur, the chapter draws lessons from UNAMID and explores how durable and strategic UN-AU collaborations should be formed in addressing issues of African peace and security in the coming years.

Trajectory of the Joint Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) To better comprehend the joint efforts made by the two institutions in the Darfur war, an overview of the cause of the Darfur war is important to provide understanding to first, the roles of the various stakeholders in the conflict, second, the capacity and impetus of the AU in addressing

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

135

the conflict, third, the need for an external intervention by the UN and finally what necessitated the need for a hybrid mission, whether it was birthed from the mere fulfilment of political necessities or a wake-up call for a strategic and equal partnership between the two institutions in responding to African peace and security issues in a way and manner where the AU is seen as a legitimate leader in directing the affairs of regional peace and security. It is worth noting that the Darfur war was caused by multiple causes.2 Its roots dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century where it transitioned from a local war to a full-blown civil war between southern and northern part of Sudan (1985–2005) (Salama 2016). On one side of the war, there were Darfur rebels, particularly the—movements JEM—Justice and Equality Movement and SLM/ A—Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (representatives of the Africans) whereas on the other side, there was the Sudanese government availing services of the SAF—Sudan armed forces and militia Janjaweed/Janjawid (representatives of the Arabs) (Danielová 2014). After the first haul of conflict, there was the decision by regional actors to bring both parties, that is, the Sudan People´s Liberation Movement and Sudanese Government to a peaceful settlement through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) also known as Naivasha Agreement). In 2004, the African Union deployed a small observer mission to Darfur (AMIS) after the signing of the N’djamena humanitarian ceasefire agreement. The mission’s preliminary mandate was underlined by the pre-existing deployment of AMIS, deep divisions within the Security Council and strong resistance by the Government of Sudan to any UN-led intervention in Darfur. Notwithstanding, the mission was saddled with significant operational issues as well as growing questions about its financial viability and logistical sustainability. This regional-led mission was to later transition to a United Nations-led one (UNMIS) in 2004. To accelerate peace efforts3 made by AMIS, the UN Security Council on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, deployed a special political mission by resolution 1547

2 The five most important causes include extreme drought and desertification, Arab supremacism, authoritarianism, the disenfranchisement of the black Africans at the hands of the Sudanese government and an ever-increasing bellicosity in the region. See Totten, S., 2011. An Oral and Documentary History of the Darfur Genocide [2 Volumes]. ABCCLIO. 3 These include the signing of the Agreement on Wealth Sharing on 7 January 2004 and the Protocol on Power Sharing on 26 May 2004 at IGAD-led talks.

136

R. A. FRIMPONG

(2004), the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) (United Nations n.d.). UNAMIS was tasked with facilitating interactions with the parties involved and the preparation for the deployment of a future UN peacekeeping mission. In the following months, however, UNMIS was not able to deploy to Darfur due to the Government of the Sudan’s opposition to a peacekeeping operation undertaken solely by the United Nations as envisaged in Security Council resolution 1706 (2006). The UN then embarked on an alternative, innovative approach to commence with the stabilisation of the region through the strengthening of AMIS, before transferring authority to a joint AU/UN peacekeeping operation. In 2007, as a result of the threat the Darfur crisis could pose to international peace and security, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 which authorised the deployment of the first-ever hybrid peacekeeping operation (PKO): UNAMID (United Nations 2021). After a series of political talks coupled with the government of Sudan’s unwillingness to approve to expansion of the United Nations Operation in Sudan into Darfur, UNAMID4 assumed authority from AMIS, with an initial mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The mandate of the joint mission as of 2007 was to: Provide support to the peace process and good offices, including monitoring and various implementation support roles; Provide security, including the monitoring and reporting of violations of the peace agreement, the protection of civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, and the disarmament and disengagement of armed groups; Promote the rule of law, governance and human rights; and Facilitate of the provision of humanitarian assistance and access (United Nations 2014a). Following that, there have been a number of mandate renewals and extensions5 over the years in the bid to restore peace and security to the Darfur region. Thereafter, the Security Council issued resolution 2173 (2014) soon after the joint AU/UN report on Darfur and highlighted the exit strategy for UNAMID. It also tasked the UN to identify 4 This was the first hybrid African Union-United Nations mission deployed on 31 December 2007. 5 UNAMID’s mandates were renewed and extended under the following UNSC Resolutions: 1828 (2008), 1881 (2009), 1935 (2010), 2003 (2011), 2063 (2012), 2109 (2013), 2173 (2014), 2228 (2015), 2296 (2016), 2363 (2017), 2429 (2018), 2479 (2019) and finally 2525 (2020).

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

137

those tasks that could be progressively handed over to the UN Country Team (UNCT), based on an assessment of where it had a comparative advantage (United Nations Security Council 2014). On 3 June 2020, the UNSC established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) under Security Council resolution 2524 to transition the mission from a peacekeeping one to that of peacebuilding with the overarching aim of supporting the Sudanese democratic transition. This peacebuilding mission was mandated to assist the political transition, progress democratic governance, protect and promote human rights as well as support peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, the mobilisation of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian assistance (United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 2020). Thereafter on 22 December 2020, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2559 (2020) to facilitate an orderly and safe drawdown of UNAMID’s military and police components in line with United Nations best practice. The 13-year mission mandate was officially terminated on 31 December 2020. Regardless of the relative peace and stability the mission provided, it is argued that UNAMID’s political function was at best a secondary priority of the Security Council, resulting in a muddled mandate and a difficult start for the mission’s efforts on the peace process. The mission’s drawdown exposed the difficulties of doing away with deeply entrenched bureaucratic cultures in the UN in order to deliver on ambitious mandates. Also, during the transition, the issue of funding and assistance to shift the mission’s mandate from a humanitarian one to that of building peace and development was present.

UN-AU Cooperation in Sustaining Peace and Security in Darfur The cooperation between the AU and the UN in the joint mission was mainly seen as co-dependent one yet fraught with friction due to its asymmetrical nature. This co-dependent and constitutive partnership between the two institutions resulted in a modest impact on the political situation in Darfur at the end of the mission despite the fact that the AU and UN did not have a consistent political approach to the Sudanese government on Darfur. It was observed in the operations of UNAMID that political work to resolve the Darfur conflict preceded the mission’s

138

R. A. FRIMPONG

deployment. These political processes contributed to the restoration of order in Darfur. One such process is the support and conclusion of the Doha peace talks which ushered in a new political order in April 2011. The “Darfur-based Political Process” was an avenue for Darfur residents to promote and implement the peace agreement reached in Doha between the government and rebel leaders prior to the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. This was initially hampered by a lack of support from rebel groups and their constituencies (Human Rights Watch 2011). The hybrid mission is credited for facilitating and concluding the peace deal between the Sudanese government and two of the three original rebel groups, 17 years after the Darfur conflict began. UNAMID created a platform for social inclusivity in the political processes by bringing Darfuri voices, including those of women and civil society representatives, to political discussions that might otherwise have been the sole business of politicians and soldiers. The mission also in conjunction with the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation (DIDC) mechanism promoted dialogue and confidence-building by encouraging reconciliation and unity among the people of Darfur, in particular, and Sudan, in general, and was instrumental in reducing tribal conflicts (United Nations 2014b). In the event of UNAMID’s closure, a UN political mission (UNITAMS) continues to monitor and facilitate the political transition. Since UNAMID’s exit in December 2020, the transition mission through its Resistance Committees in Khartoum State has completed its political charter and is engaging in dialogue with committees in the other states. In addition, there has been the facilitation of a Sudanese-led process with the inclusion of a delegation of women drawn from throughout Sudan. This was done with the broad objective of bringing together the expertise and diversity of these women to deliberate on political issues that concern Darfur. Another contribution of the hybrid mission is the security it provided the government and people of Darfur through operational activities of its military and police personnel. This was hinged upon the execution of the mission’s mandate to protect the civilian population. The considerable improvement in the security situation in Darfur has been one of the key justifications for UNAMID’s drawdown. In general, Darfur violence has declined dramatically since 2014 and 2015, with no significant reversals of security gains in regions where UNAMID has vacated (International Peace Institute 2019). Through activities such as community policing, border patrolling, training workshops organised for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as well as disarmament, demobilisation and

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

139

reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and child soldiers, Darfur’s volatile security situation has been improved upon since the commencement of the mission. In addition to this, the mission provided humanitarian assistance to the people of Darfur. For example, the mission in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) distributed food supplies to some 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and others affected by the unstable conditions in Darfur (United Nations 2014). As part of the mandate to provide protection for civilians as well as humanitarian assistance, the mission provided escorts to vehicles carrying food and non-food items from the main WFP warehouse to sector warehouses and from sector warehouses to distribution points. Other humanitarian benefits UNAMID provided include the conduct of an emergency operation covering the whole of North Darfur and the provision of food assistance to more than one million recipients every month, including IDPs (United Nations 2014). With respect to promoting the rule of law in Darfur, the hybrid mission advanced justice and enforced public accountability. Through the signing and establishment of an agreement over a comprehensive transitional justice, provisions were made for prosecution, truth seeking, reconciliation, institutional reforms and vetting as espoused in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) (UNAMID n.d.). In addition, a new special prosecutor was appointed together with the Government of Sudan’s commitment to establish the Special Court to prosecute the gross violation of human rights and breaches to International humanitarian law committed in Darfur since 2003.6 In collaboration with Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the mission’s technical cooperation activities focused on capacity building by its Human Rights Section. These activities provided law enforcement officials, local actors and civil society groups with the requisite skills and knowledge in handling civilians and also deal with the rights of victims and perpetrators alike. For instance, during the course of 2013, UNAMID collaborated with the UNCT to provide support to the Sudan’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) (Human Rights Public Report 2013). UNAMID also interacted with and facilitated the work of judges in some areas where critical assessments of backlog of 6 This benefited some 326,000 IDPs who receive monthly cash vouchers (value equivalent to in-kind food), in areas where there is access to local markets, creating diversified options on food intake and improving livelihoods.

140

R. A. FRIMPONG

cases and detentions had stalled, amounting to human rights violations especially, in Kabkabiya and Kutum, North Darfur (Human Rights Public Report 2013). These contributions7 by UNAMID were instrumental as it complemented progress made by the Government of the Sudan in addressing issues affecting human rights in Darfur. The asymmetrical nature of the cooperation between the AU and the UN in restoring peace and security in Darfur was such that while the UN was perceived as the “money bag” that provide the needed funding and logistical funding for the mission, the AU played the “leader” because of how beneficial its role would be in gaining consent from the Darfur government and also because it had gained experiences from the deployment of AMIS. However, the latter has been contended as it was observed that the AU lacked ownership of the peace and security process in Darfur (Spandler 2020). Frictions arose from differences in normative frameworks and organisational practices which were evident in how operations were carried out in the mission. These manifested in the inability of the duo to effectively synergise the visions, objectives and unique yet distinct cultures and standard of operations of the two organisations. For instance, in the operationalization of the hybrid mission, there were debates over departmental ownership, funding and logistics for UNAMID and UNITAMS revealed not only the divergent perspectives of DPPA and DPO on UN assistance for Sudan, but also their long-standing differences (Spandler 2020). The unequal nature of the cooperation between the AU and UN in Darfur coupled with the frictions that existed resulted in various operational and technical challenges in the course of the hybrid mission. According to the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network’s (EPON) assessment of UNAMID, both the AU and UN forces “dutifully fulfilled mandated tasks”, nonetheless the cooperation between the two institutions projected the institutional and normative differences that exist between the AU and UN (Furlow 2021). These brought about operational setbacks in the execution of the mission’s mandates such as issues 7 Notable among these contributions include the launch of a 5 Year National Strategic Plan (2012–2016) to combat violence against women, the establishment of State Committees to Combat Violence against in two of the five Darfur States and the launch of a 10 year National Human Rights Action Plan for the protection of human rights in Sudan, which focused on eight major priorities including human rights education, legislative reform, awareness-raising and capacity building for human rights and international humanitarian law, and strengthening partnerships between governmental institutions.

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

141

of ownership and authority. For instance, although the UN had made it clear that the AU was the lead organisation in Darfur, there was no authorization of the delegation. This resulted in the lack of host government consent and weak UN Security Council political which hindered peace efforts (Furlow 2021) even after the exit of UNAMID. In the take-off stage of the hybrid mission, the absence of a comprehensive political settlement, persistent threats to civilians from state and nonstate actors, and deep-seated structural drivers of conflict were some of the issues that confronted the AU and the UN in their quest to restore peace and stability in Darfur (Forti 2019). UNAMID also faced challenges, including a host Government who overwhelmingly was unwilling to accept its deployment into Sudan, a massive displaced population that remained at acute risk to attacks by the belligerents, and a peace agreement that was essentially dead on arrival with the parties. In the initial stage of the mission’s deployment, the Darfur government, led by President Bashir, stood against a UN-led intervention in the country. Consequently, the hybrid mission focused much attention on dealing with administrative and technical bureaucracies and bottlenecks such as “thousand daily cuts of an obstructionist host State, drafting notes verbales to extricate containers from impoundment, quietly removing senior staff from the mission area to avoid public expulsion, asking vainly for flight clearances that were never forthcoming in time for a rapid protection response” (Day 2020, p. 59). Prior to this, the transition period was encumbered by the absence of a peace agreement involving all armed groups in Darfur, uncertainty over the legitimacy of the mission’s national partners and the potential militarization of the handover process, a lack of clarity on the mission’s benchmarks, and the UN country team’s significant funding and capacity gaps. These dynamics were further complicated by divisions within the international community, including competing views about the future of Sudan and its political leadership and disagreement in the Security Council over whether (and how) the national political transition risks aggravating instability in Darfur (International Peace Institute 2019). These operational and technical challenges of UNAMID provide the opportunity to go back to the drawing board, revise and re-examine the policies that underpin peacekeeping operations as well as explore the best ways to augment the UN and the AU’s future partnerships on peace and security.

142

R. A. FRIMPONG

The Future of UN-AU Partnerships on Peace and Security: Equality, Mutualism, Durability and Strategy Hybrid peacekeeping model has the prospect to create a paradigm shift in how missions are planned and governed. In the case of UNAMID, the Herculean of a task hybrid mission was that it hinged on cooperation between the UN and regional bodies. The relationship between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) has been described as one that is “characterized by considerable conflict, mistrust, and tension, often hindering the predictability and conduct of effective peace operations” (Williams and Boutellis 2014, p. 254). Evidently, the AU was able to cope with the mandate entrusted to it by the UN Security Council. However, the relationship was not symmetrical, and the AU displayed deficiencies that hindered its ability to meet its operational duties. For instance, in deployment of UNAMID, the Union was financially handicapped as it lacked the necessary budget to contribute to the mission. In the trajectory of peacekeeping missions in the region, the AU has been dependent on the UN’s budget and resources. This, however, does not water down the ability of African states to field considerable numbers of troops for missions in and out of the region. Nevertheless, this paints a picture of equality by de jure and not by de facto as the UN continues to wield influence over African peacekeeping missions. Realistically, the AU cannot be expected to wield economic power over the UN because the latter was established before the former and as such, this power balance continues to make the UN have an upper hand in peace and security cooperation even on foreign soils. The question then is how should future AU-UN peace and security partnerships be forged in a way that hybrid PKOs create equal partnerships between unequal partners? The future of UN-AU partnerships on peace and security requires charting a new course on how partnerships are forged, sustained or maintained. To be considered an equal game player in peace and security partnerships, the AU must begin to chart a new course in peace and security collaborations. African scholars and policymakers have rallied around the phrase “African solutions to African problems” for a long time without addressing the root causes of these home-grown problems in themselves. Since the 1990s, insecurities in Africa have emanated from protracted intrastate conflicts resulting from unconstitutional change of

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

143

governments, irregular militaries and insidious form of political tampering with ethnically recruited military organisations that foster loyalty through shared identity. At the heart of these insecurities are the bane of bad governance, corruption, the repression of the civil and media spaces by governments of state, marginalisation and socio-economic inequalities just as in the case of Darfur. However, the AU has been handicapped in providing solutions to these African problems over the last two decades and has most often than not resorted to the UNSC to assist in intervening and responding to these African problems. It is said that “nobody has ever gone to war with another man’s purse”. However, this is exactly what is currently happening in AU-UN peace and security partnerships and in the case of UNAMID, the mission was completely funded through the UNDPKO regular channels. African governments cannot continue to create security issues which it cannot address on its own, logistically and financially, yet expect the UN to pay for them and expect to be treated equally as a partner. There is a need to touch base by performing housekeeping activities in the region. To address the financial power balance between the two organisations, the African Peace Fund (APF) must be up and running to ensure an African ownership of peace efforts. Established under Art 21 of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU, the APF was envisioned to finance the AU’s peace and security operations. However, almost three decades after its establishment in 1993, this is yet to be operationalised as funds from member states totalling over US$231 million have not been used as intended in conflict and crises on the continent (Institute of Security Studies 2021). Having reached a consensus on the modalities and criteria for disbursements from the Peace Fund, financial oversight mechanisms and funding windows for conflict prevention, management and resolution, what remains is the political will to implement the decisions taken on the disbursement of funds. Other issues that need to be resolved in the implementation of the APF are the assessment for countries’ contributions and the fund replenishment strategy as well as a unanimous agreement by member states on the percentage the AU must contribute in financing Africa’s peace and security activities (Institute of Security Studies 2021). In ensuring durability in the duo’s partnership, there needs to be periodic, clear and effective communication. In the case of the AU and UN, there have been difficulties in communication between New York and Addis Ababa in times past. This is attributable to the poorly laid out communication channels between the PSC members’ embassies in

144

R. A. FRIMPONG

Addis Ababa and the AU Permanent Observer Mission in New York. This resulted in instances where both parties were not privy to events happening in the UNSC and AU PSC respectively and further created a situation where the two council members misinterpret the priorities and processes of each other. Over the years, there have been calls for the two councils to interact and engage face to face. While this is necessary, the effectiveness of future AU and UN peace and security collaborations is dependent on both organisations’ ability to establish formal, efficient and sustainable communication procedures. A house divided against itself cannot stand yet alone sustain durable and effective collaborations with other “houses”. There is also the issue of internal communication and collaboration hitches especially within the UN system. Towards the end of UNAMID, attempts to pursue more integrated and coordinated transition planning ran into entrenched bureaucratic roadblocks. The process became bogged down in rigid, dichotomous views of special political missions and peacekeeping operations, despite the UN’s efforts to make it innovative and utilise the resources of the entire organisation (Forti 2021). This exposed deeply ingrained institutional cultures inside the UN’s pillar of peace and security. These internal communication and collaboration mishaps need to be enhanced at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The UN Secretariat should facilitate further dialogue within the organisation as to how best to resolve these roadblocks to overall collaborations with the AU. In addition, the DPPA and DPO must put aside individual differences and work hand-in-hand towards the achievement of organisational objectives and in this context, global peace and security. Another priority area in achieving a durable, strategic and mutual partnership on peace and security between the UN and the AU is the synchronisation of bureaucratic and administrative procedures of the two organisations. While it is certain that every organisation has its own set of modus operandi and procedures, the peace and security council of the AU (AU PSC) and that of the UN (UNSC) must come to a resolution about how best to synergise procedures relating to peace and security on the continent. This is achievable through frequent information and analysis sharing, joint messaging by principals and aligned programming activities (Forti and Singh 2020). By doing so, both organisations will be on the same page concerning the formulation and implementation of security plans and mechanisms. It will also promote equal division of labour/roles thereby resolving the issue of unequal partnerships.

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

145

Forging strategic partnerships call for a clarification and reshaping of political and policy perspectives on peace and security. It is worth noting that reforms and policies that guide the conduct of peace and security activities by both organisations may differ in nature and context and as such interpreting and implementing them may be problematic. For Africa, differing stance on policies and how they are implemented in the region also plays a critical role in shaping its overall partnership with the UN on peace and security. In response to this, heads of African states and leadership of RECs should be more active in utilising sub-regional and regional decision-making organisations on the continent to define and formalise the political and ethical principles, as well as strategic aims, that underpin the African peace and security initiative (Gelot 2012). Future AU-UN collaborations of peace and security must stem from harmonised and coordinated policies and reforms of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of both the Union and the UN. In light of this, ongoing reforms and policy reviews at the AU, future collaboration on peace and security should capitalise on the provision of space for more coherency on long-term peace and security priorities. This must be forged on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage and must feature in revised policies and mechanisms that guide peace and security in the region. A year before the UNAMID drawdown in December 2020, the AU and UN published a joint special report outlining the parameters for a new political strategy for Sudan as well as options for a follow-on configuration to UNAMID (Forti 2021). The hybrid mission transitioned to UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) with the mandate to assist the political transition, progress democratic governance, protect and promote human rights as well as support peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, the mobilisation of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian assistance (United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 2020). In the transitioning process from UNAMID to UNITAMS, both the AU and the UN were jointly involved in the three planning phases of the priority areas. For example, the leader of the Sudan Planning Team consulted with the AU and the World Bank and participated in the biweekly meetings of the UNAMID/UN Country Team (UNCT) Joint Transition Cell (Forti 2021). Notwithstanding, just like in AMIS, the AU faced

146

R. A. FRIMPONG

financial and logistical setbacks in supporting the mission’s exit. It is in light of this the chapter recommends that the AU must begin to position itself as a strategic peace and security actor, capable of managing its own affairs. By doing so, the AU will be able to respond, intervene and address African peace and security matters without external interference and will gain credibility and recognition as an indispensable partner in global security governance by enhancing its capacity. In addition, the Union must capitalise on the establishment of the APSA to generate information and responses through early warning mechanisms from its five RECs, preventive diplomacy, force deployment and post conflict reconstruction. The rise to prominence of the AU as a leading peace and security actor in Africa implies that there are revisions in the UN’s policies and doctrines regarding the hierarchy between the PSC and the UNSC especially concerning the mandate to intervene in a member state under certain conditions vis-a-vis the ultimate legal mandate to authorise the use of force.

Conclusion Five decades and half of AU-UN partnership on peace and security have birthed significant achievements such as the development of coordination structures such as the Joint Task Force, annual “desk-to-desk” meetings among UN and AU technical officials, annual conferences and standing meetings between the UN Security Council (UNSC), the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) initiatives. In the chapter, the trajectory of the conflict in Darfur and the deployment of the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) revealed how deep-seated the root causes of the conflict were and how initial political processes were hampered by the relapse into further conflict. It brought to the limelight the inadequacies of the AU in restoring peace and security to Darfur which led to the deployment of the first partnership peacekeeping in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007. The chapter discussed the AU-UN peace and security collaborations in light of the operational and technical challenges of the hybrid mission. It is argued that for future of peace and security partnerships to be based on equality, mutual respect and integrity, both the AU and the UN must be strategic in their collaboration and encourage synergies that foster a better division of labour at strategic and operational levels, including through better harmonisation of agendas,

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

147

joint analysis and mission design, and implementation of communiques and decisions. The AU must also build the capacity of its peace and security architecture (APSA) and APF in order to be considered as an equal security player. Finally, the effectiveness of future partnership/ hybrid peacekeeping between the UN and the AU hinges on effective and periodic communication channels as well as the understanding of the needs and capacities of both organisations. It is therefore both the AU PSC and the UNSC’s call to evaluate each very carefully and use its own unique strengths to compensate for any weaknesses (Salama 2016).

References Ajayi, Titilope. 2008. The UN, the AU and ECOWAS: A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Africa? Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Development Policy. Danielová, Veronika. 2014. Darfur Crisis of 2003: Analysis of the Darfur Conflict from the Times of First clashes to the Present Day. Ethnologia Actualis 14 (1): 37–59. https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/eas-2014-0003. Accessed 15 April 2022. Day, Adam. 2020. Peacekeeping Without a Partner: A Review of UNAMID’s Political Strategy in Darfur. https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/09/3-PeaceOps-2020-1245-Darfur.pdf. Accessed 11 May 2023. De Coning, Cedric. 2019. Africa and UN Peace Operations: Implications for the Future Role of Regional Organisations. In United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, eds. Cedric de Coning and Mateja Peter, 213– 229: Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/9783-319-99106-1_11 Accessed 19 December 2022. Forti, Daniel. 2019. Navigating Crisis and Opportunity: The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur: International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/1912_Transition-in-Darfur.pdf. Accessed 19 May 2022. Forti, Daniel, and Singh, Priyal. 2020. ‘Sustain the Silencing the Guns Agenda Beyond 2020’, ACCORD. https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/howa-strong-african-union-united-nations-partnership-can-sustain-the-silencingthe-guns-agenda-beyond-2020/. Accessed 21 June 2022. Forti, Daniel. 2021. Walking a Tightrope: The Transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS in Sudan, International Peace Institute. Available at https:/ /www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Walking_a_Tightrope_ Sudan.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2022.

148

R. A. FRIMPONG

Furlow, Rachel. 2021. The Legacy of UNAMID and the Future of Hybrid Peacekeeping Missions https://democracyinafrica.org/the-legacy-of-unamidand-the-future-of-hybrid-peacekeeping-missions/. Accessed 27 June 2022. Gelot, Linea. 2012. AU-UN Synergy: Envisioning Credible Ownership of African Peace and Security Architecture? https://kujenga-amani.ssrc.org/ 2012/11/19/au-un-synergy-envisioning-credible-ownership-of-africanpeace-and-security-architecture/. Accessed on 21 June 2022. Human Rights Watch. 2011. Darfur in the Shadows: The Sudanese Government’s Ongoing Attacks on Civilians and Human Rights. https://www.hrw. org/reports/sudan0611webwcover.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2022. Human Rights Public Report. 2013. Human Rights Situation in Darfur. https:/ /www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SD/UNAMID_OHCHR_situat ion_Darfur2013.pdf. Accessed 13 May 2022. International Crisis Group. 2019. A Tale of Two Councils: Strengthening AU-UN Cooperation. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/279-tale-two-cou ncils-strengthening-au-un-cooperation. Accessed 22 December 2022. International Peace Institute. 2019. Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case of UNAMID. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2019/06/1906_The-Case-of-UNAMID.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2022. Institute of Security Studies. 2021. Peace Fund Lies Dormant as Member States Discuss its use. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/peace-fund-liesdormant-as-member-states-discuss-its-use. Accessed 21 June 2022. Lehmann, Volker. 2008. The relationship between Africa and the UN: From Disenchantment to a more Effective Cooperation. https://library.fes.de/ opus4/frontdoor/index/index/docId/12689. Accessed 14 April 2022. Matlosa, Khabele. 2006. Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Challenges for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. conflict Trends 2006, no. 1: 9–15. https://doi.org/10.10520/EJC15903. Accessed on 5 December 2022. Murithi, Tim. 2007. Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations. https://library. fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04676.pdf. Accessed 19 December 2022. Salama, Diego. 2016. Is Hybrid Peacekeeping a Model of Success? The Case of UNAMID. Spandler, Kilian. 2020. UNAMID and the Legitimation of Global-Regional Peacekeeping Cooperation: Partnership and Friction in UN-AU Relations. Journal of Intervention and State-Building 187–203: 2022. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/17502977.2020.1725729.Accessed10May. United Nations and African Union Joint Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). n.d. Human Rights. https://unamid.unmissions.org/human-rights. Accessed 11 May 2022.

THE FUTURE OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION …

149

United Nations. 2014a. UNAMID Continues to Assist Humanitarian Actors in Darfur. https://unamid.unmissions.org/unamid-continues-assist-humani tarian-actors-darfur. Accessed 12 May 2022. United Nations. 2014b. Security Council Resolution 2148. Digital Library. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-securitycouncil-2014. Accessed 7 May 2022. United Nations Security Council. 2014a. Security Council Resolution 2173. Digital Library. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/778983?ln=en. Accessed 7 May 2022. United Nations. 2014b. UNAMID. Darfur’s All-Inclusive Dialogue Process Beginning. https://unamid.unmissions.org/darfur%E2%80%99s-all-inclusivedialogue-process-beginning. Accessed 10 May 2022. United Nations. 2018. Action for Peacekeeping (A4P). https://peacekeeping. un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p. Accessed 11 May 2023. United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. 2020. UNITAMS. https:// dppa.un.org/en/mission/unitams. Accessed 19 May 2022. United Nations. 2021. S/2021/1099: Letter dated 28 December 2021 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/letters-exchan ged-between-secretary-general-and-president-security-council-2021. Accessed 7 May 2022. Williams, Paul D., and Arthur Boutellis. 2014. Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship. African Affairs 113 (451): 254–278.

The Islamic Conception of Peacebuilding (Hifz Al-Salam) Under the Auspices of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Nation’s Sustaining Peace Agenda Mohammad Sabuj

Introduction Islamic law recognises peacebuilding as an important method of seeking conflict resolution. The Islamic Shari’a unequivocally supports use of force for keeping peace amongst Muslim populations. This is known as abolition of fitna (persecution leading to breach of peace) from Islamic society. Islam also recognises the necessity to use force to save civilian populations from conflicts. For this purpose, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) can play a key role in undertaking peacekeeping operations in the member states where the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) does not obtain a legal or political mandate. This is because the Muslim populations need to have a voice in peacekeeping practices

M. Sabuj (B) Department of Law and Criminology, Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_8

151

152

M. SABUJ

involving them in order for the UN to obtain a legal or political mandate. The OIC can play a key role to get this voice aloud to the UN and rest of the world. Also, it can work together with the UN peacekeepers by contributing troops and other logistic supports. Preventing conflict and achieving sustainable peace are the fundamental responsibilities of the UN. To discharge these responsibilities, the UN member states, its agencies, programmes, and Secretariat play a key role. However, the UN’s Sustaining Peace Agenda shows the need for a greater legal-political platform for the UN to discharge its responsibilities. The agenda emphasises the need for building a productive UN partnership through regional cooperation. For this purpose, it offers to build joint peacebuilding frameworks with regional organisations such as the Joint UN-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. This chapter will explore the potential of the UN to build joint peacebuilding framework with the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation). OIC is a regional organisation consisted of fifty-seven Muslim states. These member states, non-state actors operating within these states, and populations have accepted, expressly or by implication, the Islamic conception of peacebuilding (hifz al-salam) as a legitimate method of maintaining sustainable peace. More importantly, the OIC member states are also members of the UN. As a result, these states are bound to observe the UN Charter which has encouraged the formation and function of regional organisations in the promotion and protection of international peace and security. Similarly, Islamic law has also accepted the treaty obligation of the OIC member states under the UN Charter as binding. Therefore, both Islamic law and UN sustaining peace agenda can potentially complement each other in a plural fashion. However, while the UN Peacekeeping operations have been assessed strategically the Islamic conception of peacebuilding remained underexplored. The main reason behind this is a misconceived yet a popular claim that these two legal frameworks cannot complement each other. This chapter sheds some light to show that these two legal frameworks can formulate a productive platform that can potentially implement the UN sustaining peace agenda, particularly in the Muslim states. The chapter begins with an outline of the Islamic conception of peacebuilding (hifz al-salam). It discusses the recent UN sustaining peace agenda and how it can formulate a joint platform with the Islamic conception of peacebuilding. While discussing the formation of a potential joint

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

153

platform this chapter analyses the legal-political legacies of these two frameworks by scrutinising the law and practices of the UN and OIC member states in taking preventive action and adopting post-conflict peacebuilding strategies. The chapter shows that, although there are plain disparities in the legal-political legacies between the two frameworks when they use independently, there is a scope to overcome the disparities if these frameworks work in a plural fashion. It concludes that the Islamic conception of peacebuilding and the UN’s sustaining peace agenda can jointly play a key role in preventing conflict and implement post-conflict peacebuilding strategies in the Muslim states and particularly in the OIC member states.

The Islamic Conception of Peacebuilding (Hifz Al-Salam) The Islamic conception of peacebuilding (hifz al-salam) is based on four pillars, namely umma (Muslim community), peace, justice, and security. It advocates for a cross-pillar coordination not only as a matter of political goals but also in the context of legal requirements. For instance, it requires a review of the scope of the umma in modern world from the perspectives of achieving a legitimate political aim as well as following the law. In the similar fashion, the remaining three pillars must engage in a legal-political and cross-pillar coordination. This section discusses this coordination. It calls for a bottom-up system to function under the auspices of Islamic law which can bring on a mutual understanding of peace, justice, and security at the local, regional, and international levels. The ‘right to peace’ holds a strong presence in Islamic law. It calls for a defragmentation of endeavour and efforts by authorities at the national, regional, and international levels. Therefore, the local authority, state government, regional organisation, and international organisation must build a partnership together to keep peace and prevent conflict in the umma. It also professes the importance of a coherent effort to promote peace and security. Unlike the UN sustaining peace agenda, it does not sustain a holistic approach but a coherent approach to peace operations that offers solutions to the issues which a particular society face. In other words, the Islamic conception of peacebuilding is based on peace of the umma. Umma is the core element of hifz al-salam, which is primarily based on the principle of ‘welfare of the Muslim community at large’. Therefore,

154

M. SABUJ

there is a strong link between the Islamic conception of peacebuilding and umma. For instance, hifz al-Salam calls for a common vision for sustainable peace within the umma, which is a single community of Muslims beyond the boundaries of the nation states (Al-Ahsan 1992; Khan 2001). However, as most Muslim states have now accepted the modern nation-states style of sovereignty the scope of umma includes not only the Muslim states but also any other states where Muslims are living as minorities (Khan 2001). Additionally, the principles of dar al- ‘Ahd and dar al-’Sulh (those states which have peace treaties and reconciliation agreement with Muslim states) have extended the scope of umma beyond Muslim majority and minority states (Melis 2017). In other words, umma includes Muslim majority states, Muslim minority states, and those nonMuslim states with which Muslim states have a valid treaty in force. In this setting, the modern conception of ‘umma’ includes the entire world because Muslim states have now signed and ratified the UN Charter which is a global treaty framework that prohibits use of force unless under certain exceptional circumstances, namely self-defence, collective security (UN Charter, art. 2(4), 39, and 51). There are a few scholars who argued that non-Muslim states are within the category of dar-al-harb (abode of war with Muslim states) (Calasso 2017). However, this argument is inconsistent with the treaty obligations of the Muslim states as well as in the context of the modern world. As discussed above, most of the Muslim states have now signed the UN Charter so they have agreed to abide by the underlying provisions of the charter to uphold peace and comply with the general prohibition of use of force. Moreover, during the formative period of the umma fighting to conquer land from the control of dar-alharb was a norm. The term dar-al-harb is being used by Muslim scholars to include the land which was not under the control of the umma, or the latter did not have a peace treaty or reconciliation agreement with the former’s rulers (Hitti 1970). In these circumstances, the umma includes the entire world under a common vision of sustainable peace. Islam is known as a religion of peace and stability in the umma. The nature of peace and stability which Islamic law advocates for is active peace and stability as opposed to passive ones. So, Islamic law of peacebuilding advocates for the co-existence of peace and justice but not at the expense of each other. Therefore, sustainable peacebuilding is a key principle of Islamic law. Also, the Prophet Muhammad himself entered into reconciliation with non-Muslims to begin peacebuilding process. For instance, the concept of Dar al-’Sulh (abode of reconciliation) can be traced back

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

155

to the treaty that the Prophet had signed with the Christian population of Najran when he was in Medina (Kalin 2013). However, a few scholars understood peace as a political decision-making as opposed to legal one (Kalin 2013). While this is true that political decision-making can bring peace, it is also true that sustainable peace requires provision for justice. This is because without justice, peace can only live for a fleeting time or at the expense of justice which can be a fatal blow to sustainable peace. For instance, where a group of armed rebels have agreed to stop their atrocities on the condition that immunity would be granted for the crimes that they have committed. In this situation, peace can be politically achieved by granting immunity to the rebel group but that would be at the expense of justice. This is a short-term fix which can only bring peace for the time being. However, without implementing the provision for justice according to the law such breach of peace is likely to reoccur. Therefore, both legal and political determination of peace is necessary. In other words, peace and justice must complement each other to secure sustainable peace. The fourth pillar of hifz al-salam is security. According to this pillar, making provisions for justice to punish those who are responsible for breach of peace would not suffice. There must be security within the umma of certain rights of people. For instance, right to life, freedom from torture, and free from discrimination and victimisation must be respected in a society. Hifz al-salam advocates for these basic securities which must be enforceable by justice. Islamic peacebuilding, therefore, requires securities of basic rights at the local and international levels. As a result, the idea of a regional organisation’s contribution is not recognised in Islamic law. Islamic conception of peacebuilding advocates that peace and stability to be supported at the local level by the ruler or government, and any breach of peace to be punishable by justice. So, the role of regional organisation is limited in the Islamic conception of peacebuilding. Whereas a reginal organisation can help to overcome the consent requirement and a legal or political mandate, but this may be subject to abuse by the powerful members of the organisation. For instance, Saudi’s influence in the Middle East and their military action in Yemen. Similarly, the intervention by African Union (AU) in Somalia in 2007 to support the weak Transitional Federal Government met with disapproval from many Somalis who regarded it as illegal on the basis that powerful state, which is Ethiopia, was directly shaping the AU’s position on the conflict to uphold their self-interest (White and Ölgen 1997; Paliwal 2011). So, a careful

156

M. SABUJ

approach to regionalisation must be taken according to Islamic law. A regional organisation often upholds the interest of the region or powerful members of the region, so it is likely to sustain a conflict of interest. So, a mutual understanding of sustaining peace is exceedingly rare. As a result of this, the OIC has failed to actively engage in the peacebuilding process. However, a regional organisation can work as a facilitator of peace within a region. This is a political argument which can be supported by the principle of public arbitration (shura) in Islamic law (Ahkam-I-Adliya 1967). Shura advocates for resolution of public disputes or decision-making by arbitration where the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators can make decision to launch peacebuilding operations in a Muslim state under the auspices of a regional organisation such as the OIC. When there is a crisis of peace, Islamic law requires Muslim state authorities to restore peace of its own people living within the borders of that state. Also, it requires another Muslim state to be readily available to start peace operations in any affected Muslim state where necessary if the former is capable to do so. However, any treaty provision must be honoured (Bsoul 2008). Which means, if there is any treaty in force between a Muslim state and another non-Muslim state where both states have agreed not to interfere with each other’s sovereignty that must be respected.1 However, if either state revokes the treaty, then restoration of peace is incumbent on any Muslim state. Therefore, state consent is not the only validating factor for peace operations under Islamic law but also the responsibility for protecting the peace within the umma and following any overriding treaty obligations. For instance, a Muslim state must respect the UN Charter and only act to engage in peace operations under the UN Charter and Islamic law. So, if the UN is unable to engage in peace operations in a Muslim state where the UNSC is unable to get a mandate passed then another Muslim state can do that due to their obligations under Islamic law. In this situation, the consent of the Muslim state is necessary under the UN Charter and customary international law. However, a Muslim state has the mandate under Islamic law to restore peace of another Muslim state without the consent of the latter as long as the UN Charter does not prohibit it. In other words, Islamic law allows a 1 The Qur’an proclaims that, “… But if they (Muslims who have not come into exile) seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom you have a treaty of mutual alliance. And Allah sees all that you do” (Al- Qur’an 8:72, Abu Yusuf translation).

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

157

Muslim state to intervene when it is not possible to obtain state consent in situations such as where no state authority is in control of the territory or holds a legal or political mandate to give such consent. In case of any dispute about the ‘state consent’ or validity of a peace operation that must be referred to public arbitration (shura) where OIC can function as a facilitator as discussed above.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) OIC is the global organisation of Muslim majority states. It is also known as the ‘Muslim United Nations’. OIC is composed of fifty-seven Muslim majority states,2 which are also the states parties to the United Nations Charter.3 Besides the fifty-seven member states of OIC, there are now forty-three Muslim majority states, of which twenty-three have declared Islam as state religion (Shah 2013). The OIC was founded in 1969 under the name of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.4 Since foundation it has been engaged in peace and conflict resolution (Kayaoglu 2015). This section shows that despite the key aim of the OIC to function as a regional organisation to help sustainable peacebuilding within the member states in collaboration with the UN and regional organisations, the conflict of interests between the member states has failed to generate a mandate to engage in peace operations within the region. It also shows that the OIC can contribute as a facilitator to peacekeeping operations. In the OIC’s charter, this intergovernmental organisation has made a pledge to preserve and promote global peace (OIC Charter, art 1(6)). In the last decade, the organisation ventured into new political and military issues amongst which the formation of the Peace, Security, and Mediation Unit (PSMU) is worthy of noting. This unit, together with the Wise Persons Council (WPC), has taken initiatives to operationalise the

2 Although OIC Charter states that the state parties are from Muslim majority states, it must be noted that it is not exclusively composed of Muslim majority states. For instance, Cameroon is a state party to OIC, but it does not have a Muslim majority population. However, the requirement of a Muslim majority state is imposed in respect to new membership according to art. 3 of the OIC Charter. 3 Except Palestine, which is not a state party to the UN Charter. Its current status is a non-member observer state. 4 The Organisation of Islamic Conference became the OIC in 2011.

158

M. SABUJ

OIC conflicts resolution mechanism. This shows a shuffle in the OIC’s role in peacebuilding which is consultative and mediatory to support the peace initiatives of the OIC (OIC News 2016). This is due to the disparity of political interest amongst the OIC member states. In this setting, the OIC has failed to generate a stronger mandate compared to the UN Peace operations. The diverse political interests of the member states and the dominance of the powerful states outweigh the key aims of the OIC to function as a regional organisation to help sustainable peacebuilding within the member states. Moreover, the OIC lost its potential to generate a strong mandate for peace operations by not presenting Islamic law as a potential source of legal solution to the problems of the existing international law. This is because, the OIC Charter states that, ‘all Member States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means and refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations (OIC Charter, art 2)’. As a result, the OIC’s position still is to function as a facilitator in the peacebuilding process in the member states. However, this position is an especially important one to implement the Islamic conception of peacebuilding and uphold sustainable peace and stability within the OIC member states. As a facilitator, OIC can arrange arbitration in case of an absence of consent by a Muslim state which is subject to breach of peace or threat to a breach of peace. The panel of expert arbitrators can help to gain consent or decide on launching peacebuilding operations under Islamic law. However, in order to do this the OIC Charter must commit for observing Islamic law and international law in launching and managing peace operations under the Islamic principle of peacebuilding. This is a challenge for the OIC but without accomplishing this milestone its role and influence in the peacebuilding process are likely to be symbolic. In the earlier section, the Islamic conception of peacebuilding has been outlined. The key points to reiterate here are, namely (a) Islamic law does not require state consent to start peace operations but a legal justification to do so; (b) legal justification includes ending fitna (persecution of the people), obtaining a mandate from other Muslim states; and (c) accountability of the peacekeeping operations. On this basis, a Muslim state can offer to start peace operations in another Muslim state without consent in order to end persecution of people. The OIC can function as a facilitator to decide whether the people are being persecuted. Additionally, other Muslim states can join in a peacebuilding operation by sending their troops, funds, and other logistical support. In this way, the peace

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

159

operations can obtain a stronger mandate under the auspices of the UN. Additionally, the contributors to a peace operation must remain accountable under the law. As the OIC Charter has acknowledged the validity of international law and its adherence by the member states, any violation of the law, whether Islamic or international, can be addressed by judicial scrutiny.

Peacebuilding Strategies Under the Auspices of UN Sustaining Peace Agenda and OIC The UN’s peacekeeping operations are found to be strategically tested methods to maintain international peace and security. Although a few operations have been criticised, i.e. Mali, CAR (Central African Republic) based on the integrity of the forces, a number of operations have been successful, namely Sierra Leone, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Haiti, and Kosovo (UN Peacekeeping 2022). As a result, UN peacekeeping operations hold a strong international mandate. However, the requirement of state consent often halts many peacekeeping operations. For instance, no state consent was available for a peace operation in Syria, Yemen, and Ethiopia. In those circumstances, peace enforcement can be a way to circumvent the situation. However, peace enforcement operations lack support of many states at the Security Council and General Assembly (Shaw 2021). In this circumstance, the UN Security Council retains the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and remains the single largest source of peacekeepers, some regional organisations, particularly in Africa and Europe, are playing increasingly important roles (Williams and Bellamy 2021). Although the UN has never had a monopoly on peacekeeping, regional organisations have conducted peace operations since the 1940s. The rise in regional operations reflected a broader trend of regional organisations assuming greater roles in responding to peace and security challenges (Crocker et al. 2011). As a result, support of a regional organisation may overcome the mandate issue especially when such regional organisation has obtained mandate to pursue a legitimate aim under the principle of hifz al-Salam. However, state consent or support from a regional organisation would not suffice in the absence of support from the Security Council. For instance, whereas the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979 envisaged the deployment of UN force to supervise the limited forces zones established by the parties, the mandate of the UN force soon expired due to

160

M. SABUJ

Soviet action.5 As a result, a special Multinational Force and Observers unit was established by the parties and the United States, independently of the UN (Shaw 2021). Therefore, both support of a regional organisation and the UN is necessary with an added requirement for the former to have obtained a valid mandate. In 2018, the UN Secretary-General published a report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The report invited the member states to work together to sustain peace at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions (UNSG 2018). It stressed that sustaining peace was imperative to prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict. The two resolutions (hereafter referred to as ‘the twin resolutions’), one by the General Assembly and another by the Security Council, recognised that sustaining peace should be broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population were taken into account.6 These resolutions also recognised sustaining peace as a shared task and responsibility of Government and all other national stakeholders which should flow through all three pillars of the United Nations’ engagement (namely, peace and security, development, and human rights) at all stages of conflict. The twin resolutions further reaffirmed the primary responsibility of national governments and authorities in finding, driving, and directing priorities, strategies, and activities for sustaining peace and emphasised that inclusivity was key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives (UNSG 2018). They also recognised that efforts to sustain peace were necessary not only once conflict had broken out but also long beforehand, through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes (UNSG 2018). The report calls for closer strategic and operational partnerships amongst the United Nations, national Governments, and other key stakeholders, including international, regional, and subregional organisations, international financial institutions, civil society organisations, women’s groups, youth organisations, and the private sector, considering national priorities and policies (UNSG 2018). It also encourages different UN bodies to work together to obtain the aims of

5 Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter required regional organisations to obtain authorisation from the SC before taking any enforcement action. 6 General Assembly resolution 70/262, and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016).

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

161

the peacebuilding and sustaining peace agenda. For this purpose, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can work together. The three pillars of the UN engagement as emphasised in the 2018 report are Peace and security, development, and human rights (UNSG 2018). The UNSG advocates for a cross-pillar coordination. While this coordination is necessary to implement the sustaining peace agenda, it is not consistent with the aim ‘to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population were taken into account’. This is because the scope and application of ‘human rights’ in the West vary from that in the East. In other words, a mutual understanding of human rights in the West and East is hardly achievable. Moreover, ‘human rights’ as commonly understood in the West cannot be imposed on the East. So, achieving a common vision of a society ensuring the needs of all segments of the population is questionable. As a result, merely a coordination between the pillars would not suffice to implement the sustaining peace agenda. On this basis, a bottom-up approach is necessary to develop a structure of peace operations. For instance, the following steps can be followed: (a) Local peacebuilding activities by United Nations country team programmes to strengthen national abilities for prevention; (b) Political cooperation with regional responsibilities which will support a more holistic approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace through the development of regional strategies and approaches, enhanced partnerships with regional organisations, and more effective support to the Peacebuilding Commission; (c) International mutual understanding and efforts of peacebuilding. While the above steps can be taken to implement peace operations at the local and regional levels, the same may not be possible at the international level. This is because, although peace and security, and development are consistent with the Islamic conception of peacebuilding, this is not the same in respect to human rights. This is due to lack of a common vision of development and human rights between the West and the East. In this circumstance, Islamic conception of peacebuilding can fill in the gap by

162

M. SABUJ

engaging Muslim states and OIC member states to work together with the UN peacekeepers. However, regional strategies which are based on a holistic approach, as shown in the next section, are questionable. This is particularly true where security has been emphasised as a preventive measure and there are no provisions for justice. As a result, the development prospect is also inconsistent. On the contrary, the human rights pillar is like the security pillar in Islamic conception of peacebuilding. However, there is a lack of mutual understanding between human rights in the East and West. Whereas the West upholds a top to bottom system the East criticises that as a forceful imposition of novel rights on the East. Therefore, UN peace operations must adopt a bottom-up approach. UN Sustaining Peace agenda seems to be comprehensive and robust. However, it has a big gap to fill which is created by the agenda itself. As discussed above, this gap has been created by the absence of a common vision about the pillars of peacebuilding between the UN agenda and that of Islamic conception of peacebuilding. Also, the record of UN peacekeepers, increasingly deployed into situations where there is ‘no peace to keep’, in Darfur, the DRC, and South Sudan, has raised questions about their ability to bring stability to conflict-ridden countries and act effectively on the Security Council’s mandates (Einsiedel et al 2015). This has created the question of the effectiveness of the UN peace operations. The UN Charter has made provisions for the formation and function of regional organisations for the protection of international peace and security (UN Charter, art 52 (1)). The regional organisations aimed high to support a stronger mandate and more effective peace operations within their respective region. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed an African-led international support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in 2012/2013 which worked with (MINUSMA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (UNSC Res 2085 and 2100). Together with the mandate from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the ECOWAS brought a stronger mission for peacebuilding assistance in Mali. The aim of MINUSMA was to satisfy the needs of a failing government in re-establishing its authority on the one hand, and to efficiently respond to the needs of the community by providing meaningful improvements to security on the other (Gilder 2022). While this aim includes supporting a regime against rebels and other non-state armed groups it also includes the protection of the local population form serious

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

163

human rights violations. But the question begs ‘whether a Mission like this can prefer one over the other’. As a result, a peacekeeping mission often contributes to or works together with the government’s force by implication in carrying out gross human rights violations. For instance, during the Mission Malian forces have been accused of carrying out enforced disappearances, torture, summary executions, arbitrary arrests, and violations of humanitarian law (UNSC 2019, UNGA 2020). This situation also brings up trust issues with the local community (Gilder 2022). In these situations, Islamic law of peacebuilding can contribute to choosing the overriding objective of a Mission like this. For instance, under the principle of hifz al-Salam, the Mission must operate to end persecution ( fitna) from the community, and this must be the primary objective. Based on this, the peacekeeping Mission can refrain from providing support to restore the authority of the government where the latter is involved in carrying out the persecutions. Hifz al-Salam provides a stronger mandate under the Qur’an to prefer the ‘end of persecution’ over ‘restoration of authority of a tyrant government’. MINUSMA carried out operations to neutralise threats, provide stability, and protect civilians (UNSC 2016). Whereas neutralising threats was a key objective of the Mission, it can potentially lack the capacity to achieve other key objectives stated above without active engagement in hostilities. In other words, in order to actively provide stability and protect civilians a UN peacekeeping Mission often needs to engage in hostilities. Therefore, it often requires the forces to participate in armed activities which can lead them to become a party to the conflict i.e. combatants (Attree et al 2018). As a result, UN peacekeeping forces cannot continue to absolve themselves from actively taking part in hostilities without disregarding a few key objectives such as providing stability and protect civilians (Hatto 2013). However, the UN does not have the institutional frameworks in place to discharge the responsibility of a combatant under the Geneva Conventions and its two additional protocols (Murphy 2007). Hence, the UN forces often jointly operate with other forces. For instance, both the French troops and FC-G5S are said to support MINUSMA to deter the terrorist threat in the North of Mali (UNSC 2015). There are two issues arise here namely, (i) involvement in the joint operation like this would undermine the trust and confidence of the civilian population; and (ii) the forces that joined to the UN force

164

M. SABUJ

often do not distinguish between the rebel armed groups seeking selfdetermination and terrorist groups operating in the territory (Charbonneau 2017). In these circumstances, the first issue can be addressed by including the OIC’s mandate in the joint operation. As discussed in the above section, this would provide the necessary mandate under Islamic law to formulate a joint peacekeeping Mission to end persecution and provide stability. The second issue can be addressed by applying the Islamic law of rebellion which provides a legal framework on the use of force ( jus in bello) by maintaining a clear dividing line between the rebel and terrorist groups (Badar, Sabuj 2019). In Islamic law of rebellion, the right to use force by and against rebel groups has been recognised under a distinctive set of legal principles which the Geneva conventions and its additional protocols do not so recognise. Also, it provides the right to use force against terrorism under the principle of strict punishments (Hir¯ ab¯ a) which are applicable to those who committed highway robbery. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was originally an African Union mission (MISCA) that was handed over to the UN. This Mission shares a similar mandate to MINUSMA in that both missions are expressly identified as ‘stabilization’ missions and tasked with extending state authority, using robust force, protecting human rights, and entrenching the rule of law (Gilder 2022). MINUSCA has urgent temporary measures which are beyond the normal law enforcement capabilities of peace operations and have allowed the Mission to carry out law enforcement-based operations against criminal enterprises in the CAR (UNSC 2014). As a result, one of the key challenges of this Mission was to gain the descriptive legitimacy i.e. gaining trust and confidence of the civilian population who were going to be mostly affected by this (Sabuj 2021). This is because the conflict is a result of persistent socioeconomic, political, and governance deficiencies with the marginalisation of some communities (Gilder 2022). Also, the frequent attack on the ethnic minorities, the killing and maiming of civilians, and the lack of an operational criminal justice system added further challenges to MINUSCA. Another important factor of this Mission was that the rebel group Séléka are a predominately Muslim group and therefore there is a significant scope of recognition and acceptance of the Islamic conception of peacebuilding (hifz al-salam) among the members of this group. However, this is a missed opportunity to adopt this principle by the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

165

(MISCA), which could generate a stronger mandate. This is evident in the statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations who stated that ‘religion is not at the heart of the difficulties facing the Central African Republic (CAR)’ (UNSC 2015). This Mission can potentially fail if the Muslim population does not have a voice in the CAR and cannot withstand future instability without the need to flee (Gilder 2022). Moreover, the MISCA/MINUSCA Mission has been criticised for being biased towards the strategic interests of the (African Union) AU (Williams and Bellamy 2021). Further example includes the intervention by AU in Somalia in 2007 to support the weak Transitional Federal Government that met with disapproval from many Somalis who regarded it as illegitimate on the basis that power state, which is Ethiopia, was directly shaping the AU’s position on the conflict to uphold their selfinterest (White and Ölgen 1997; Paliwal 2011). These practices are against the principle of ‘impartiality’ which is a core principle of UN peacekeeping (Tsagourias 2006, 2015). UN Mission like those discussed above can hardly overcome the challenge of operating as an impartial force when they will have to admit government forces who could be biased and violent towards their political opponents as seen in the MISCA and MINUSCA Missions. However, the use of force to restore stability and sustainable peace through the process of national reconciliation is achievable by adopting hifz al-salam. This is because, unlike the UN Mission in Mali where the use of force to support the host state government was the priority hifz al-salam allows a peacekeeping mission to use force against any armed groups including the government forces where necessary to protect civilians and maintain peace. However, conflict of geopolitical interests between the member states at regional organisation like the OIC has failed to achieve a mandate, if any. Also, domination of the powerful states in the region has reduced the functionality of the OIC to a substantial extent. As a result, the OIC’s position as a regional organisation in upholding the peace within the member states is still limited. However, the OIC can potentially make a few particularly important contributions despite having limited scope. For this purpose, the OIC’s objective to function as a facilitator to mandate peace operations within the member states can potentially contribute to overcome some of the obstacles. For instance, it can negotiate with member states to obtain a stronger mandate to peace operations under Islamic conception of peacebuilding where more Muslim states agree, explicitly or by arbitral decisions, to

166

M. SABUJ

contribute to peace operations. Also, it can help to build partnership between a state affected by conflict and instability and other Muslim states. The UN peace operation forces are often outsourced. They often come from armed forces from different member states. As a result, the UN does not have its own peacekeepers. These peacekeepers are often not familiar with the culture and religion of the people where they are being deployed. In this setting, the people for whom they are sent to oversee peace are likely to accept them as alien. Therefore, a joint peace operation by forces from Muslim states and UN member states bears more legitimacy and a stronger mandate. This will have greater legitimacy than deployment of the UN forces only. The proximity between Muslim states and their responsibility to keep peace as part of the umma necessitates this structure of peace operation in Muslim states. Also, the Islamic conception of peacekeeping requires Muslim states to be readily available to help each other to keep peace in the umma. So, to be more legitimate, the peace operations must be accepted by those who are most likely to be affected by them. For instance, a Muslim state has a duty under Islamic law to contribute to the peacebuilding process in a neighbouring Muslim state because the former is directly or indirectly affected by the instability of the latter. It is crucial to undertake peace operations effectively and without delay. This is because, a very urgent and necessary peace operation can be suspended or revoked by the Security Council or General Assembly due to disagreement and controversy between the member states. In this situation, involvement of the neighbouring states under the auspices of a regional organisation with a stronger mandate to keep peace and stability within the region may be the only legitimate choice for restoring peace and stability. Similarly, this choice can be invoked where one or more permanent member states at the Security Council cannot agree on a peace operation. Therefore, Islamic conception of peacekeeping can fill a gap where politics at the UNGA and UNSC cannot agree an imminent and incumbent peace operation. Also, the criticisms that exist surrounding ‘impartiality’ of a neighbouring force who has other interests in the stability of the country can be overcome in the OIC member states under the principle of hifz al-salam which generates legitimacy of a Mission on the basis of fitna (persecution) and voice of the civilian population.

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

167

The Islamic conception of peacekeeping can also be delivered within the ambit of the UN sustainable peace agenda. The UN agenda emphasises on proving a cogent link between inclusivity, sustainable development, cooperation, conflict prevention, and sustaining peace. The Islamic conception of peacekeeping follows this agenda by setting up a cross-pillar coordination under the auspices of OIC and a legal-political structure of the peace operations. This is a coherent approach that UN sustaining peace agenda can adopt to implement this agenda not least in the Muslim states under the auspices of OIC. Also, the implementation of the Islamic conception of peacekeeping under the auspices of a politically mandated regional organisation can be adopted by the UN in their own peace operations. This will resolve the concerns discussed above concerning the holistic approach to the UN sustaining peace agenda.

Conclusion The Islamic conception of peacebuilding has the essential mechanism to address the issues surrounding mandates, consent, and regional cooperation in peacekeeping mission. Where the UNSC fails to deliver the necessary mandate for a peacekeeping mission Islamic law can deliver such mandate under the principle of hifz al-salam. This principle allows a Muslim state to engage with peacekeeping process in another Muslim state where the UNSC is paralysed due to a lack of agreement between the member states. The mandate is primarily based on the overriding duty of a Muslim state to protect the Muslim populations in another Muslim state from persecutions. However, this is subject to the limitations imposed by the UN Charter on the use of force as most Muslim states are parties to the charter. Hence, a Muslim state cannot intervene in another non-Muslim state to protect the persecuted Muslim population as the former is obliged to follow the prohibition of use of force under the UN Charter unless the latter has given consent. It also overcomes the issues on ‘state consent’ where a Muslim state cannot give consent due to the lack of a political authority that is in control of the territory or holds a mandate to do so. In this challenging situation, the Islamic conception of peacebuilding paves the way for a regional organisation like the OIC to function as a facilitator so it can engage to facilitate peacekeeping operations in cooperation between the UN and Muslim states. It can act as an arbitrator in order to resolve the issues surrounding state consent and making the voice of the persecuted Muslim populations heard in

168

M. SABUJ

this process. This will not only provide the necessary legitimacy of the mission by listening to the voice of persecuted Muslim populations but also prevent the peacekeepers from supporting any biased groups in the conflict i.e. the government or rebel forces, from supporting their partisan agenda. Islamic conception peacekeeping not only acts to prevent conflict by engaging in treaty obligations but also responds actively to peace operations. Also, it requires the state engaging in peace operations to restore peace, justice, and security in the society or state which is part of the umma (in a modern sense). While it is challenging for a regional organisation to decide on peace operations in its member states, it is essential that a regional organisation can function as a facilitator in removing any paralysis at the international organisations i.e. the Security Council. In this respect, the Islamic conception of peacekeeping can fill the gap by enhancing the function of OIC and obtaining a stronger mandate to remove any obstacles to peacekeeping operations. This mandate is necessary for launching and maintain a legitimate peacebuilding process in a state that has been affected by conflicts and instability. The degree of proximity between the OIC member states based on religion and their commitment to uphold peace in the umma can legally and politically contribute to overcome the challenges of UN peace enforcement operations within the region.

References Al-Ahsan, Abdullah. 1992. Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society. Leicester: Islamic Foundation. Attree, Larry et al. ‘United Nations Peace Operations in Complex Environments: Charting the Right Course’ (Saferworld, September 2018). https:/ /www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1183-united-nations-peaceoperations-in-complex-environments-charting-the-right-course. Accessed 19 February 2023. Badar, M. and Sabuj, M. 2019. The Potential of Islamic Law of Rebellion to Complement Public International Law on the Use of Force. Journal of International and Comparative Law 365. Bsoul, Labeeb. 2008. International Treaties (Mu‘ahadat) in Islam: Theory and Practice in the Light of Islamic International Law (Siyar) according to Orthodox Schools. New York: University Press America.

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

169

Calasso, Giovanna. 2017. Constructing and Deconstructing the dar al-Islam/dar al-harb Opposition: Between Sources and Studies. In Dar al-Islam/dar alharb: Territories, People, Identities, edited by Giovanna Galasso and Giuliano Lancioni, 21–47. Netherlands: Brill. Charbonneau, Bruno. 2017. Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 415–431. Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 9 Int. Leg., 332. Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, adopted 14 March 2008, entered into force 3 September 2009, replacing the Charter of the Islamic Conference, adopted 4 March 1972, entered into force 28 February 1973, 914 UNTS 110. Crocker, C., F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds. 2011. Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press. Einsiedel, Sebastian von et al. 2015. Introduction. In the UN Security Council in the 21st Century, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel et al, 2. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gilder, Alex. 2022. Stabilization and Human Security in UN Peace Operations. London: Routledge. Hatto, R. 2013. From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: The Evolution of the role of the United Nations in Peace Operations. International Review of the Red Cross. Hitti, Philip. 1970. History of the Arabs. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Khan, Saad. 2001. Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kayaoglu, Tarun. 2015. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation. London: Routledge. Kalin, Ibrahim. 2013. Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Traditions. In War and Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihad, edited by Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad, Ibrahim Kalin and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. 235. Jeddah: MABDA. Melis, Nicola. 2017. Some Observations on the Concept of dar al-‘ahd in the Ottoman Context (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries). In Dar al-Islam/dar alharb: Territories, People, Identities, edited by Giovanna Galasso and Giuliano Lancioni, 182–204. Netherlands: Brill. Majallahel-Ahkam-I-Adliya. 1967. Trans. Tyser, C. R. Demetriades, D. G., and Effendi, Ismael. Lahore: Punjab Educational Press. Morgan-Foster, Jason. 2005. Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the International Human Rights. Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal. 83.

170

M. SABUJ

Murphy, Ray. 2007. UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, ‘OIC Operationalizes its Conflicts Resolution Mechanism’ (18 May 2016). https://www.oic-oci.org/topic/?t_id= 11205&t_ref=4407&lan=en. Accessed 22 August 2022. Paliwal, Suyash. 2011. The Primacy of Regional Organisations in International Peacekeeping: The African Example. Virginia Journal of International Law. 185. Report of the UN Secretary General. 18 January 2018. Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace. Sabuj, Mohammad. 2021. The Legitimacy of Use of Force in Public and Islamic International Law. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Shah, Niaz. 2013. The Use of Force under Islamic Law. European Journal of International Law. 363. Shaw, Malcolm. 2021. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tsagourias, N. 2006. Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension. Journal of Conflict and Security Law. Tsagourias, N. 2015. Self-Defence, Protection of Humanitarian Values, and the Doctrine of Impartiality and Neutrality in Enforcement Mandates. Weller, M. Ed. The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Our Success’ (2022). https://peacekeeping. un.org/en/our-successes#:~:text=Since%201948%2C%20the%20UN%20h as,%2C%20Mozambique%2C%20Namibia%20and%20Tajikistan. Accessed 22 August 2022. UN General Assembly, ‘Situation of human rights in Mali Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali’ (15 January 2020) A/HRC/43/76 para 27. UN Security Council, Resolution 2085 (20 December 2012) S/RES/2085. UN Security Council, Resolution 2100 (25 April 2013) S/RES/2100. UN Security Council, Resolution 2149 (10 April 2014) S/RES/2149. UN Security Council, ‘adopted by the Security Council at its 7474th meeting’ (29 June 2015) S/RES/2227 para 17; S/PV.7578. UN Security Council, Resolution 2227 (29 June 2015) S/RES/2227. UN Security Council, 7578th Meeting (14 December 2015) S/PV.7578. UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (29 September 2016) S/2016/819. UN Security Council, ‘Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel’ (11 November 2019) S/2019/868 para 29; S/2018/541.

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF PEACEBUILDING (HIFZ AL- …

171

White, Nigel, and Ölgen, Özlem. 1997. The Security Council and the Decentralised Military Option: Constitutionality and Function. Netherlands International Law Review. 388. Williams, Paul, D., and Bellamy, Alex, J. 2021. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Advancing a Children, Peace and Security Agenda for the Future of UN Peacekeeping Dustin Johnson, Catherine Baillie Abidi, Laura Cleave, and Shelly Whitman

Introduction The United Nations was created “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (United Nations 1945, 2) by disrupting and suppressing threats to peace and engaging in collaborative violence prevention (United Nations 1945, art. 1). The UN Charter details key principles, membership, principal organs, functions, and powers as well as allowable actions in response to threats or acts of aggression (United Nations 1945,

D. Johnson (B) · S. Whitman Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada e-mail: [email protected] D. Johnson School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden C. Baillie Abidi Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, NS, Canada L. Cleave Vanguard Economics, Kigali, Rwanda

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_9

173

174

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

art. 38). This framework envisioned peacekeeping as joint forces collaborating in the context of armed conflict waged between states. Over time, the context of peacekeeping operations has shifted significantly and is becoming increasingly complex due to a range of influences, including the changing nature of conflict dynamics, the diversification and fluidity of parties to conflicts, global fragility stemming from the climate crisis, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the disturbing legacy of colonialism, and the deep-rooted sex and gender-based violence that continues to sabotage efforts toward sustainable peace. These compounding complexities are further complicated by the strategic and evolving engagement of children in armed violence. Addressing and preventing grave violations of children’s rights, particularly the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, emerged as a peace and security concern of the United Nations following the 1996 Machel Report (Machel 1996). Child protection has been integrated into UN peacekeeping missions starting with MONUC in the early 2000s and is now an important component of the Protection of Civilians agenda. Since then, there has been considerable institutionalization of child protection and the development of a range of policy, training, and guidance materials, practice, and knowledge about child protection. However, the children and armed conflict (CAAC) mandate faces challenges from under-funding, lack of acknowledgment of its importance for building and sustaining peace, gaps in how it aims to prevent and not just remedy violations of children’s rights during war, and lack of meaningful engagement of children in peace and security. The authors argue that by centering children in the peace and security agenda, the focus of peacekeeping will shift from disrupting conflict to transforming conflict, an essential transition to the future success of peacekeeping. A Children, Peace and Security (CPS) agenda would compliment existing frameworks including Action for Peacekeeping+ (A4P+) while also addressing children’s unique challenges and experiences in conflict contexts. Adopting a multi-disciplinary approach, the chapter draws on existing literature on peacekeeping, armed conflict, and children from diverse disciplines including political science, security studies, and feminist international relations. The chapter also draws on field research on early warning, gender in peacekeeping, and children and armed conflict which includes extensive document analysis and qualitative interviews as well as observations drawn from practical experience gathered by the authors in these fields over the past 20 years. This chapter will examine current approaches

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

175

to child protection in UN peacekeeping and suggest areas for future development and improvement. It will consider the current structure and practices of UN peacekeeping child protection, and the extent to which children and their protection are seen as central to building and sustaining peace. It will then focus on three areas important for evolving how UN peacekeeping can better protect children and prevent violations of their rights during armed conflict: putting children on top of the peace and security agenda; encouraging increased focus on early warning and prevention; and creating more nuanced understandings of children’s gender and agency in UN peacekeeping policy, training, and practice.

Theoretical Framework This chapter brings into conversation three principal areas: constructions of children and childhood, and in particular their agency; literature on violence prevention and conflict transformation; and early warning systems. The current child protection approach in UN peacekeeping is largely about shielding children from direct harms of the conflict and ending direct violence against children by parties to the conflict. In this approach, children are treated largely as helpless victims of adult wars (Jacob 2015; Johnson 2022). In the broader international response to children and armed conflict, and particularly the recruitment and use of children in armed violence, children are constructed almost entirely as passive victims of adults (Denov 2012; Drumbl 2012; Tabak 2020). Children are often depicted as lacking any meaningful agency in the context of armed conflict, as can be seen in putting quote marks around “voluntary” when discussing recruitment and use. By agency, we refer to the capacity of an individual to make relatively independent decisions about their actions (Beier 2018; Tabak 2020). Such a view of children’s lack of agency is based in part on a linking of agency to the rational, adult male actor, with women and children constructed as less rational and agential. This gendered construction of adulthood and agency has been thoroughly challenged in academic work, yet remains prevalent in child protection (Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999; Tabak 2020; Vigh 2009). Several United Nations (UN) resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 2250, highlight “young people’s inclusive participation and positive contribution to building peace in conflict and post-conflict situations,” (United Nations Security Council 2015, 1). Furthermore, there has been considerable research demonstrating the many ways in which children exercise

176

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

agency during war, such as choosing to join an armed group, evading recruitment, or resisting and escaping from an armed group despite being forcibly recruited (Brett and Specht 2004; Denov 2012; Vigh 2006). A more complex understanding of agency is required, where both children and adults have varying degrees of agency depending on such factors as their knowledge, experience, capacities, access to resources, and location in intersecting hierarchies, rather than seeing agency as something one either has or does not have (Vigh 2009). This chapter is constructed on the notion of complex agencies and positions children and childhood within a broader peace and security context which responds to the enhanced vulnerabilities experienced by children in armed conflict due to their exclusion from social, political, and economic decision-making (Galtung 1969), and to the agency children demonstrate against armed conflict constructs. Unpacking the experiences of children and armed conflict, and contemporary approaches to peacekeeping, also requires a multidimensional analysis of violence. Johan Galtung’s (1969; 1996) violence triangle, which articulates an intersection between direct (i.e., visible acts), structural (i.e., inequitable rules), and cultural (i.e., discriminatory norms) violence, forms the foundation of our conceptual framework on violence prevention and conflict transformation. This framework enables our prevention-oriented analysis to consider cycles of violence, beyond traditional emphases on direct acts of violence. In particular, the cultural and structural elements of the violence triangle enable a more comprehensive frame to analyze intergenerational normalizations of violence. Direct violence is observed and monitored in peacekeeping in order to disrupt violence and protect people affected by armed conflict. Focusing on the many demonstrations of direct violence, without recognition of the structural and cultural elements that sustain violence, offers an incomplete picture of how cycles of violence continue. Recognizing that violence is a social construction (Walby 2009), influenced by relations of power (Baillie Abidi 2018) and histories of colonial injustice (Mohanty 2003), and is essential to the future of peacekeeping. Equally essential is the ability to identify the beginnings of cycles of violence before manifestations of direct violence occur and before discriminatory structures become embedded in communities. In this chapter, we leverage the violence triangle as our conceptual framework and illustrate through our investigation of early warning approaches to violence transformation, how shifting conceptualizations of violence toward structural and cultural elements are

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

177

key to effective peacekeeping moving forward. In summary, the work of peacekeepers could be improved through greater consideration of children beyond their victimization through their involvement in conflict transformation and acting more preventatively based on comprehensive analyses of violence, including early warning approaches.

Methodology This chapter is informed by two research projects carried out by the authors connected to the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security. One project, running from 2019 to 2023, focused on gender and child protection in UN peacekeeping with a particular emphasis on interactions between peacekeepers and children, and constructions of gender and childhood in peacekeeping discourse. The project focused on two sources of empirical material: semi-structured interviews with military, police, and civilian peacekeepers and other professionals working in peacekeeping contexts for the UN and humanitarian organizations, and UN documents relevant to peacekeeping child protection practice. Documents were selected by reviewing UN websites1 for relevant documents, following references in documents under review, and asking interviewees about what documents were important in their work. The focus was on practice-oriented documents such as training materials, guidelines, and manuals as these are most directly relevant to what peacekeepers do in the field and indicate the translation of high-level policy such as Security Council Resolution into (intended) practice (Bueger 2014). Interviewees were selected via snowball sampling, starting with contacts of the authors’ and connections provided by the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and were carried out online and in person between January 2021 and December 2022. In-person interviews were carried out in Juba, South Sudan in March 2022 and in Montevideo, Uruguay in November–December 2022. A total of 36 people were interviewed for this project, of whom 54 percent were women, and 67 percent were military. The interview process, consent script, and interview guide

1 These included the UN peacekeeping webpage on child protection (https://peacek eeping.un.org/en/child-protection), the UN peacekeeping resource hub (https://peacek eepingresourcehub.un.org/en/introduction), and the UN digital library (https://digitalli brary.un.org/?ln=en).

178

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

were approved by Dalhousie University’s Research Ethics Board.2 All interviewees consented to the interviews and their responses have been anonymized. The second research project, running from December 2020 to June 2021, focused on how children were factored (or not) into existing conflict early warning systems. This project focused on two sources of empirical materials: an extensive literature review on conflict early warning and interviews with early warning researchers and practitioners from a variety of sectors, including the security sector. The interviewees were selected from the researchers’ professional networks based on a mapping of existing early warning systems. A total of 20 people were interviewed, of whom 40 percent were women. The interviews took place between February 2021 and May 2021 and were conducted online with Zoom or MS Teams. The project was approved by Dalhousie University’s Research Ethics Board.3 These two projects address critical gaps in improving prevention, and not just reaction, to grave violations of children’s rights during war, and in understanding the gendered dimensions of children’s involvement in armed conflict and peacekeepers’ interactions with them. These findings are combined with the authors’ experiences working on children and armed conflict at the Dallaire Institute and for NGOs, academia, and the UN to develop the chapter’s arguments and conclusions.

Evolution of Peacekeeping and Responses to Children and Armed Conflict Early conceptions of peacekeeping recognized children as members of a vulnerable population and typically as passive recipients requiring care and protection. Children’s lived experiences, diverse positionalities, and their agency, rarely, if ever, featured into mandates and missions. For instance, children are not referenced in the UN Charter at all. The children and armed conflict (CAAC) agenda emerged from the growing recognition in the 1980s and 1990s about the severe impacts of armed conflict on children, particularly their recruitment and use by armed forces and groups. The institutionalization of the CAAC agenda at the UN beyond UNICEF 2 File number 2020–5152. 3 File number 2020–5369.

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

179

began with the 1996 General Assembly report authored by Graça Machel (Machel 1996) and Security Council Resolution 1261 (1999). It has since been expanded with a series of Security Council Resolutions and has been included in the mandates of the large multidimensional peacekeeping missions. These Resolutions and contemporary mandates are complemented by many child protection instruments that have been introduced since 2000 such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000), the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007), the Safe Schools Declaration (2015), and the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers (2017). The evolution of these instruments presents an increasingly nuanced understanding of children’s lived experiences in armed conflict and the complexities and contradictions of their vulnerabilities and agency. Despite these advances, children continue to be marginalized and are largely considered in relation to care and protection, rather than seen as strategic to global peace and security. Most prominent of the CAAC Security Council resolutions is Resolution 1612 from 2005, which established the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations of children’s rights: recruitment and use by armed forces and groups, killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction, denial of humanitarian access, and attacks on schools and hospitals (United Nations Security Council 2005). These Six Grave Violations of children’s rights are the core focus of the CAAC agenda, and violators of them can be listed in the Secretary-General’s annual report. Violating groups must then sign an action plan with the UN to end their commission of violations and be delisted. Peacekeepers play an important role in the implementation of the CAAC mandate in missions with a specific child protection mandate and are primarily focused on protecting children from violence, supporting the MRM and action plans, and coordinating with external actors to provide support to affected children. This is intended to be complementary work carried out in relation to the mandates of both UNICEF and the OSRSG for CAAC, which are closely involved in the MRM, carry out advocacy and research related to CAAC, and in the case of UNICEF, provide services to children. Consequently, child protection has become a cross-cutting concern within missions and is supported by specific military, police, and civilian roles, policy and manuals, and specialized training (Johnson 2022).

180

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

The CAAC agenda’s development in UN peacekeeping has taken place alongside the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Protection of Civilians (POC) agendas, which has been both helpful for its institutionalization, and challenging as it created competition for a limited pool of funding (Kullenberg 2020). For instance, in the four large multidimensional missions (UNMISS, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, & MINUSCA)4 , the HQ-level military child protection focal point is combined with the focal point roles for POC, WPS, and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) due in part to lack of funding for dedicated positions in each mandate area (Johnson 2022). While gender has been a key consideration in the CAAC agenda since its inception, drawing attention to the shared and different impacts of armed conflict on boys and girls, consideration of gender in CAAC has often drawn on stereotypical assumptions or depictions of boys primarily as victims of recruitment and use and girls primarily as victims of sexual violence (Johnson 2022; Lee-Koo 2019). As discussed further below, this contributes to insufficient gender analysis of conflict dynamics involving children (Johnson 2022). There is also a lack of recognition of children’s gender beyond a binary conception (Kapur and Thompson 2021).

Children at Top of the Peace & Security Agenda A Children, Peace and Security (CPS) agenda is needed to complement existing and mutually reinforcing frameworks, that do not specifically address children’s unique challenges, including: the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda; the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) Agenda; Early Warning and Genocide Prevention Networks; and Human Security, Security Sector Reform and Economic Security Frameworks. While critical to peace and security, these existing frameworks overlook the diverse and intersecting experiences and needs of children. The YPS Agenda, in particular, offers important insights into the experiences of youth and overlaps with a CPS Agenda, while also demonstrating gaps in recognition of the lived experiences of younger children within peace and security frameworks. Resolution 2250 (2015) that launched the YPS agenda defines youth as ages 18–29 (United Nations Security Council 2015), excluding children, and contrasts other definitions of youth used by the UN that 4 Note that this analysis was written before the sudden end of MINUSMA mandated by the Security Council in June 2023.

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

181

start at age 15. Information from the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) on its implementation of the YPS agenda indicates that the 18–29 definition of youth is the primary one that applies in peacekeeping (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d. a). Consequently, while older children are often acknowledged as youth with a role in the political world, this is restricted in contexts of armed conflict where their voices and interests are particularly important. Such an approach is important in the current global context. Global peacefulness has continued to deteriorate over the past decade (OECD 2020; Institute for Economics & Peace 2022). This trajectory is alarming given conflict, insecurity, and poverty are projected to steadily increase over the next decade (World Bank 2020). This bleak forecast is coupled with the reality that over 41 percent of the world’s population (children and youth between the ages of 0–24 (United Nations Population Division 2019, 2022)), are growing up in situations where violence is normalized, where education is disrupted or not accessible, and where prospects for employment or even meeting basic needs are uncertain. These trajectories perpetuate cycles of inequality and violence that manifest over generations, and without sharpening our collective focus on children, and with children, these debilitating cycles will sustain. Children are essential to long-term peace and security, and there is an urgent need to prioritize children’s involvement and protection at the top of the global peace and security agenda. An estimated 426 million children, or 1 in 6 globally, live in fragile and conflict-affected areas (Østby et al. 2020) and 337 million, or 1 in 8, live in places where they are vulnerable to recruitment and use (Østby et al. 2022). We must understand the contexts and experiences that heighten children’s vulnerability to insecurity and extreme violence and that limit their ability to contribute to transformative change (Minasian et al. 2022). This is a new strategic approach to creating peace and security as a necessary response to address the complexities of preventing conflicts today. Effective conflict prevention requires a shift from reacting to the consequences of violence to instead implementing proactive policies, planning, and practices that recognize the significance of children to long-term peace and security (Whitman and Baillie Abidi 2020). Responding to violence is critical work, yet it is extremely costly, both economically and culturally, as this approach fails to disrupt cycles of violence leading to consequential impacts, sustained insecurity and normalizations of violence (World Health Organization 2016; Baillie Abidi 2021). Protecting the

182

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

rights, wellbeing, and development of children is key to conflict prevention and lasting peace, however, this work is particularly challenging given the rights of children in fragile and conflict environments are among the least guaranteed (UNICEF 2016). Protecting children from grave violations is central to disrupting cycles of violence, but in order to do this effectively, the genuine participation of children in peace and security is necessary. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) articulates the importance of children’s right to participate in matters which affect them and encourages meaningful participation for sustainable peace. The global community has failed to harness children’s potential and perspectives as significant stakeholders to create peace. This has resulted in the exclusion of children’s perspectives and prioritization in foreign policy, national security, and defense policies despite several international protocols and commitments to children’s rights and protection. In situations of armed conflict and in matters of defense and foreign policy, children’s right to protection has been prioritized over their participation rights to the detriment of both children’s realization of their rights and the overall effectiveness of building and sustaining peace (Willow 2021). It is therefore timely to re-evaluate our meaningful inclusion of children’s protection and prioritization in re-framing our approaches to building peace and security. This can be started by creating an international agreement on the CPS agenda, creating national CPS action plans, advocating for the ratification and endorsement of key children’s rights treaties, including children’s perspectives in peace processes, national security, defense and foreign policies, and setting adequate financial targets to properly resource a CPS agenda (Minasian et al. 2022).

Consideration of Children in Early Warning and Peacekeeping It is well documented that children have become a defining element of most modern conflicts (Haer and Böhmelt 2016); however, they remain overlooked as part of the conflict early warning landscape (Cleave and Watkins 2020). Since the failure of the international community to intervene in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, early warning has become an important part of the peacekeeping field (Levine-Spound 2021). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines armed conflict related early warning as a process that “(a) alerts

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

183

decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation, and resurgence of violent conflict; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflict” (OECD 2009, 22). In this context, early warning is envisioned to support UN missions to collect information around emerging or existing threats against civilian populations and to inform the necessary actions to prevent or mitigate violence. Effective response, thus, requires strong links between those disseminating, receiving, and responding to alerts (Levine-Spound 2021, 4). Over the past several years, the UN has made a concerted effort to include early warning under key peacekeeping mandates and policy. The UN’s Policy on the Protection of Civilians provided a foundation for early warning in peacekeeping and directed missions to include early warning mechanisms as part of the Protection Action Plans and related activities. The revised policy in 2019 further documented early warning responsibilities of senior mission personnel, emphasizing the link between community engagement and effective early warning (Department of Peace Operations 2019). And yet, consideration for children remains absent from this work. The Security Council has included early warning as key mission responsibilities under the Protection of Civilians mandate in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Mali (MINUSMA), and South Sudan (UNMISS). The 2020 Protection of Civilians (POC) in UN Peacekeeping Handbook emphasizes that peacekeeping missions must understand the indicators that precede violence against civilians and speak to the complementarity of the POC agenda with the Children and Armed Conflict agenda, Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), and other human rights frameworks (United Nations 2020). It notes that recruitment and use are important threats to consider as part of the Protection of Civilians agenda. Presently, the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting (MRM) mechanism exists to capture violations against children, including recruitment and use, representing the main protection-related framework for children. The system is typically implemented through a partnership between UNICEF and the UN peace operation in-country (UNICEF 2014). Although not designed to be an early warning system, the MRM seeks to collect data to support effective advocacy and response to protect children against grave violations. The effectiveness of the MRM to facilitate response to violations of children’s rights, however, has been a question for debate. A study by Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict on the implementation of the

184

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

MRM in Colombia and South Sudan found that “different actors have different expectations about the MRM’s goal and purpose” (Cerna-Turoff and Page 2016, 1). Humanitarian service providers disputed whether the MRM could be used to better inform response, which Watchlist concluded “perpetuates a source of tension around unfulfilled expectations, and leaves unexplored alternative systems for collecting and/ or verifying violations” (Cerna-Turoff and Page 2016, 19). Although the MRM represents an important system for data collection and accountability, the difference in perspectives on the utility of the MRM shows that the peacekeeping field still lacks a system for early and timely prevention of violations of children’s rights (Cerna-Turoff and Page 2016). When children are considered in early warning systems within the humanitarian, development, and peace triple nexus, it is typically through macro-level indicators related to children’s nutrition and education rates. No conflict early warning system specifically engages indicators around children’s recruitment and use in conflict (Baillie Abidi and Cleave submitted). This is alarming considering children’s engagement in violence persists across the globe, particularly in the three countries hosting the largest peace missions—the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali (Kupper and Young 2020). In 2021, the UN verified 23,982 grave violations against children, which affected 19,165 children (13,633 boys, 5,242 girls, 290 sex unknown) in 22 situations of concern—with recruitment and use listed as the second most frequent violation (United Nations 2022). Furthermore, research shows that situations where children are engaged in conflict and violence not only increase the duration of the conflict, but also the likelihood of its reoccurrence (Haer and Böhmelt 2016). Prioritizing children in early warning and preventing their engagement in conflict not only protects the child, their families, and communities alike, but also provides strategic importance for preventing future outbreaks of conflict and violence. Additional critiques of early warning in the peacekeeping landscape have been raised beyond the absence of consideration for children. The Centre for Civilians in Conflict argues that “while there have been notable innovations over the past decade, policy and guidance on EW/RR [early warning and rapid response] in UN peacekeeping remain in a nascent state” (Levine-Spound 2021, 1). Limitations in effectively responding to warnings, inconsistent community engagement, lack of military logistics, poor security, and unreliable telecommunication networks, among other factors, influence early warning success (Nyheim 2015; Levine-Spound

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

185

2021). The 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) speaks to challenges with rapid deployment and mobility as a result of under resourcing, where some missions “lack critical enablers, while others operate under rules that prevent the full use of those capabilities…” (United Nations 2015, para. 95). Operational responses of UN missions to incidents related to the Protection of Civilians mandate average around 2.8 days, showing the challenge that UN missions face in translating warning into action (Duursma and Karlsrud 2020). Furthermore, in an investigation of an early warning response failure, peacekeepers shared that they were unaware of “proactive protection and warning techniques that could have maximized their capacity to intervene when the attacks took place” (MONUSCO and OHCHR 2011, para. 17). These limitations, coupled with the lack of consideration for children within conflict early warning, highlight significant areas for improvement in the evolution of peacekeeping. Ultimately, consolidated efforts in the early warning sphere to engage children’s perspectives and to prioritize the prevention of their recruitment remain limited. On the value of early warning to conflict prevention, former Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, Edward Luck, stated “Our goal should be early understanding, not just early warning. We need to understand why certain things are happening, not just what is happening” (United Nations General Assembly 2010, 3). Thus, without fully understanding the conditions and factors that increase children’s vulnerability, the early warning and peacekeeping fields will continue to miss opportunities to not only better protect children, but strategically prevent further instances and normalizations of violence across societies (Baillie Abidi 2021).

Addressing Stereotypes of children’s Gender and Agency A third area of concern for the future of peacekeeping and improving protection of children is ensuring policy and practice based on more nuanced and contextualized understandings of children themselves and not stereotypes. This is vital as policies are in part premised on constructions of who their targets are, and different constructions of children in peacekeeping settings can lead to very different policies (Hansen 2006). Thus, constructions of children that differ from their lived experience and situation may hamper efforts to improve their protection. Similar

186

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

constructions of children’s agency are present in UN documents on child protection, particularly the training materials for military peacekeepers. They contain frequent statements and examples that reinforce children’s vulnerability and lack of meaningful agency. Yet, they also have implicit acknowledgment of children’s agency, particularly for children recruited and used as soldiers. For instance, they discuss the possibility of children self-demobilizing from an armed group, which may be an even more difficult and informed choice than joining in the first place, and the importance of considering that recruited children may see themselves more as an adult soldier than as a child and treating them, to an extent, as such (Johnson 2022). Military, police, and civilian peacekeepers express a wider range of views on children’s agency. Civilian staff with a longer experience working in child protection often have a more nuanced view, appreciating the simultaneous combination of victimization and agency many children who are recruited and used as soldiers experience, or the contextual differences between different children, armed groups, or settings.5 Explicitly and better acknowledging children’s agency in peacekeeping policy, training, and practice would likely result in more informed ways of ensuring their protection (Johnson 2022), and would recognize children seriously as being involved in peace and security as a CPS agenda would call for. Understandings of children’s agency in peacekeeping locations also relate to gender dynamics involving both peacekeepers and children. Stereotypical and essentialized views of gender are all too prevalent in peacekeeping and child protection, such as assuming only boys carry weapons and fight, only girls are subjected to sexual violence, or women are inherently suited for child protection roles or community engagement (Denov 2012; Johnson 2021; 2022). This tends to further deny any acknowledgment that girls might exercise agency, while constraining what roles women peacekeepers can serve in. Such stereotypes also have a variety of negative consequences for peacekeeping effectiveness in child protection or more broadly, such as failing to recognize context- and gender-specific differences in threats to children, negative attitudes toward host state civilians that may affect protection (Henry 2015; Jennings 2019), deploying women without proper training on the assumption their gender qualified them (Holmes 2019), or failing to

5 Interviews with two civilian peacekeepers, February and March 2021.

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

187

deploy women in needed locations on the assumption they need to be protected (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Baldwin 2021). Current peacekeeping training materials and policy make some efforts to challenge and overcome these stereotypes and essentializations. The specialized training materials on child protection for military peacekeepers, for instance, reinforce the need to consider gender dynamics in child protection, though do little to challenge gender stereotypes about children affected by armed conflict (Johnson 2022). These materials encourage peacekeepers to ask questions such as “[h]ow do [children’s] experiences…differ due to their different gender roles?” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2018, §1 handout p. 2) and state in bold that “[a]s peacekeepers, you should be keenly aware of these gender differences” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2018, §1 p. 19). Most examples presented that mention the gender of children portray boys as combatants and girls as victims of sexual violence, calling into question how in depth the gender analysis performed by peacekeepers will be without influence from other, more nuanced education on gender dynamics (Johnson 2022).6 The shift in peacekeeping from viewing community engagement primarily as a women’s practice to a gendered one requiring men and women is also a positive step in changing gender dynamics in peacekeeping (Baldwin 2021). However, there remains a lack of deeper understanding of gender dynamics in the uniformed side of peacekeeping missions, and many of the cultural changes needed to challenge these stereotypes have to happen in troop contributing countries’ militaries where the UN has relatively little influence (Huhtanen 2022). Shifting toward a CPS agenda in the future of peacekeeping would have several positive affects in this area. It changes the way children are understood in peace and security in ways that better recognize their agency and participation in the world, and can contribute to addressing the gaps in gender and childhood between the CAAC and WPS agendas (Lee-Koo 2019). It could also contribute to member-state-centric efforts such as the Vancouver Principles and National Action Plans under the WPS agenda that may have greater influence over peacekeeping culture and practice than UN policy does.

6 A new version of these training materials has been released since the authors carried out this analysis.

188

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

Conclusions Child protection and the CAAC agenda have become an important part of UN peacekeeping mandates, responding to serious violations of children’s rights and aiming to enhance the protection of a large part of the population in peacekeeping contexts. This field of peacekeeping practice has been structured by a range of Security Council Resolutions, international laws, best practice principles, and UN policy and training, and is meant to complement the efforts of other UN bodies such as UNICEF and the OSRSG for CAAC, and external organizations such as national governments and NGOs. However, the CAAC agenda in peacekeeping suffers from a number of challenges that limit its effectiveness and transformative potential. These include a narrow focus on seeing children primarily as passive victims who need to be protected, ignoring the importance of seeing children as strategic for peace and security and as actors in their own right; a reactive approach to violations of children’s rights rather than a proactive and preventative one that would be strengthened through increased focus on early warning; and a continued reliance on stereotypical and essentialized views of gender and childhood that can limit engagement with children in positive ways or more effective and gender inclusive peacekeeping practice. Addressing these challenges, alongside increased funding and dedicated capacities in peacekeeping missions, would help UN peace operations be better equipped to prevent grave harm against children in the future. The current Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) agenda advanced by the SecretaryGeneral since 2018 to guide the future development of UN peacekeeping, and reaffirmed with A4P+ for 2021–23, provides several useful openings for concrete action on better addressing children in peacekeeping, while continuing to not directly center or prioritize children. Several of the original A4P commitments would be complemented and reinforced by attention to CPS. For instance, putting a priority on addressing children’s roles in peace and conflict could encourage proper resourcing of child protection functions in peacekeeping, in line with A4P commitment 1.4 on coherence between mandates and resources, and help both center children in political solutions to conflicts and fulfill YPS commitments to including youth in peace processes. Adopting more nuanced understandings of gender and children’s agency will be important for successfully integrating gender perspectives across peacekeeping under

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

189

A4P commitment 2.11. With children forming a large portion of peacekeeping host populations, their presence, perspectives, and needs must be considered continuously in improving protection and community relations. The Vancouver Principles provide a starting point for this work, but focus on peacekeeping responses to the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups. A CPS approach takes a broader and more preventative approach to both the impact on and involvement of children during war. Concerted action by member states, the Secretariat, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and civil society however will be needed to focus more attention on children in peacekeeping and provide the necessary political support and resources. For instance, DPO’s current webpage on the Future of Peacekeeping and the commissioned policy papers linked there make almost no mention of children (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d. b). To support these efforts, we suggest several areas where further research will be instrumental in supporting a CPS agenda in peacekeeping. Child protection in peacekeeping in general remains an under researched area, both academically and by civil society organizations, and more studies are needed on its effectiveness, practices, political dynamics, and unintended impacts. An emphasis on children’s agency during war also calls for better understanding of how to balance children’s participation and protection rights in order to both prevent grave violations and prevent unintended harms and risks from children’s participation. Finally, there is still much to be understood about strategic, tactical, and incidental reasons for grave violations against children during war and underlying risk factors that can be used to inform better early warning and early action responses. Acknowledgements This article draws on research supported by an Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (number 435-2019-1124) and a grant from the Waverley House Foundation.

References Abidi, Catherine, B. 2018. Pedagogies for Building Cultures of Peace: Challenging Constructions of an Enemy. New York, New York: Brill/Sense Publishing. Abidi, Catherine, B. 2021. Prevention, Protection and Participation: Children Affected by Armed Conflict. Frontiers in Human Dynamics 3: 624133. https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2021.624133.

190

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

Baillie Abidi, Catherine, and Laura Cleave. Submitted. Translating Early Warning into Early Action: Preventing the Recruitment & Use of Children as Soldiers. Civil Wars. Baldwin, Gretchen. 2021. From Female Engagement Teams to Engagement Platoons: The Evolution of Gendered Community Engagement in UN Peace Operations. New York: International Peace Institute. Beier, J. Marshall. 2018. Ultimate Tests: Children, Rights, and the Politics of Protection. Global Responsibility to Protect 10: 164–187. https://doi.org/ 10.1163/1875984X-01001009. Brett, Rachel, and Irma Specht. 2004. Young soldiers: Why they Choose to Fight. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Bueger, Christian. 2014. Pathways to practice: Praxiography and International Politics. European Political Science Review 6: 383–406. https://doi.org/10. 1017/S1755773913000167. Cerna-Turoff, Ilan, and Gilles-Philippe. Page. 2016. The United Nations’ 1612 Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism: Lessons from Colombia and South Sudan. New York: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict. Cleave, Laura, and William Watkins. 2020. Child Soldiers and Early Warning. Allons-Y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security 4: 61–72. https://doi.org/ 10.15273/allons-y.v4i0.10084. Denov, Myriam. 2012. Child Soldiers and Iconography: Portrayals and (Mis)Representations. Children & Society 26: 280–292. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1099-0860.2010.00347.x. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2018. UN Military Specialised Training Materials on Child Protection. New York: United Nations. Department of Peace Operations. 2019. Policy—The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping. New York: United Nations. Drumbl, Mark. 2012. Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duursma, Allard, and John Karlsrud. 2020. Predict and Prevent: Overcoming Early Warning Implementation Challenges in UN Peace Operations. Berlin: Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze. Edkins, Jenny, and Véronique Pin-Fat. 1999. The Subject of the Political. In Sovereignty and Subjectivity, edited by Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persram, and Véronique Pin-Fat, 1–18. Critical Perspectives on World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Galtung, Johan. 1969. Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research 6: 167–191. Galtung, Johan. 1996. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Haer, Roos, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2016. Child Soldiers as Time Bombs? Adolescents’ Participation in Rebel Groups and the Recurrence of Armed Conflict.

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

191

European Journal of International Relations 22: 408–436. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1354066115581910. Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Taylor & Francis. Henry, Marsha. 2015. Parades, Parties and Pests: Contradictions of Everyday Life in Peacekeeping Economies. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9: 372–390. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1070021. Holmes, Georgina. 2019. Situating Agency, Embodied Practices and Norm Implementation in Peacekeeping Training. International Peacekeeping 26 (1): 55–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1503934. Huhtanen, Heather. 2022. Global MOWIP Report: Fit-for-the-Future Peace Operations: Advancing Gender Equality to Achieve Long-term and Sustainable Peace. Geneva: DCAF. Institute for Economics & Peace. 2022. Global Peace Index 2022: Measuring Peace in a Complex World. Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace. Jacob, Cecilia. 2015. ‘Children and Armed Conflict’ and the Field of Security Studies. Critical Studies on Security 3: 14–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/216 24887.2015.1014675. Jennings, Kathleen M. 2019. Conditional Protection? Sex, Gender, and Discourse in UN Peacekeeping. International Studies Quarterly 63: 30–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy048. Johnson, Dustin. 2021. A Critical Feminist Approach to Implementing Vancouver Principle 11. Allons-Y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security 5: 58–74. https://doi.org/10.15273/allons-y.v5i0.10216. Johnson, Dustin. 2022. Women as the Essential Protectors of Children? Gender and Child Protection in UN Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping 29: 282–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2021.2024761. Kapur, Nidhi, and Hannah Thompson. 2021. Beyond the Binary: Why Gender Matters in the Recruitment and Use of Children. Allons-Y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security 5: 20–34. https://doi.org/10.15273/allons-y.v5i0. 10214. Karim, Sabrina, and Kyle Beardsley. 2017. Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace, and Security in Post-Conflict States. Oxford Studies in Gender and International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kullenberg, Janosch Neil. 2020. Overlapping Agendas and Peacekeepers’ Ability to Protect. International Peacekeeping 28: 661–688. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13533312.2020.1846528. Kupper, Claire, and Liza Young. 2020a. Peace operations and children protection: turning early warning into early detection. Bruxelles: Observatoire BoutrosGhali du maintien de la paix. Lee-Koo, Katrina. 2019. WPS, Children, and Armed Conflict. In The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security, Katrina Lee-Koo, edited by Sara E.

192

D. JOHNSON ET AL.

Davies and Jacqui True, 607–617. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https:/ /doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190638276.013.47. Levine-Spound, Daniel. 2021. Early Warning and Rapid Response Takes Root in UN Peacekeeping. Washington, DC: Centre for Civilians in Conflict. Machel, Graça. 1996. Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. A/51/306. New York: United Nations. Minasian, Lianne, Sarah Douglas, Shelly Whitman, Anthony Di Carlo, Madeline Zutt, and Catherine Baillie Abidi. 2022. Children, Peace and Security: A Policy Checklist on Building the Agenda Together. Halifax, NS: Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security. Mohanty, Chandra. 2003. Feminism Without Borders. Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. MONUSCO and OHCHR. 2011. Final Report of the Fact-Finding Missions of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into the Mass Rapes and Other Human Rights Violations Committed by a Coalition of Armed Groups along the Kibua-Mpofi Aix in Walikale Territory, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August 2010. Kinshasa: MONUSCO. Nyheim, David. 2015. Early Warning and Response to Violent Conflict: Time for a Rethink? London: Saferworld. OECD. 2009. Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2020. States of Fragility 2020. Paris: OECD. Østby, Gudrun, Siri Aas Rustad, Roos Haer, and Andrew Arasmith. 2022. Children at Risk of Being Recruited for Armed Conflict, 1990–2020. Children & Society: chso.12609. https://doi.org/10.1111/chso.12609. Østby, Gudrun, Siri Aas Rustad, and Andreas Forø Tollefsen. 2020. Children Affected by Armed Conflict, 1990–2019. 06, 2020. Conflict Trends. Oslo: PRIO. Tabak, Jana. 2020. The Child and the World: Child-Soldiers and the Claim for Progress. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press. UNICEF. 2014. Field Manual: The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations Against Children in situations of Armed Conflict. New York: UNICEF, OSRSG-CAAC, and UN DPKO. UNICEF. 2016. The State of the World’s Children 2016: A fair chance for every child. New York: UNICEF. United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: United Nations. United Nations. 2015. Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (HIPPO Report), UN A/70/95-S/2015/446. New York: United Nations. United Nations. 2020. The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook. New York: United Nations.

ADVANCING A CHILDREN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA …

193

United Nations. 2022. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (A/76/871-S/2022/493). New York: United Nations. United Nations General Assembly. 2010. Statement by Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General. New York: United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping. N.d. A. Promoting Youth, Peace and Security. New York: United Nations. Accessed 9 February 2023. https://peacekeep ing.un.org/en/promoting-youth-peace-and-security United Nations Peacekeeping. N.d. b. Future of Peacekeeping. New York: United Nations. Accessed 9 February 2023. https://peacekeeping.un.org/ en/future-of-peacekeeping United Nations Population Division. 2019. World Population Prospects 2019. New York: United Nations. United Nations Population Division. 2022. World Population Prospects 2022: Summary of Results. New York: United Nations. United Nations Security Council. 2005. Resolution 1612 (2005). S/RES/1612 (2005). New York: United Nations. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N05/439/59/PDF/N0543959.pdf?OpenElement United Nations Security Council. 2015. Resolution 2250 (2015). S/RES/2250 (2015). New York: United Nations. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N15/413/06/PDF/N1541306.pdf?OpenElement Vigh, Henrik. 2006. Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea-Bissau. New York: Berghahn Books. Vigh, Henrik. 2009. Motion squared: A Second Look at the Concept of Social Navigation. Anthropological Theory 9: 419–438. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1463499609356044. Walby, Sylvia. 2009. Globalization and Inequities: Complexity and Contested Modernities. Los Angeles, CA & London: Sage Publications. Whitman, Shelly, and Catherine Baillie Abidi. 2020. Preventing Recruitment to Improve Protection of Children. Allons-Y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security 4: 24–36. https://doi.org/10.15273/allons-y.v4i0.10081. Willow, Carolyne. 2021. United they Stand: Moving Beyond the ParticipationProtection Divide. London: Save the Children. World Bank. 2020. Violence without Borders: The Internationalization of Crime and Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/9781-4648-1452-5. World Health Organization. 2016. Global Plan of Action to Strengthen the Role of the Health System within a National Multisectoral Response to Address Interpersonal Violence, in Particular Against Women and Girls, and Against Children. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Ensuring Future Accountability

Accountability for Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse: Rethinking Relationships Sabrina White

Introduction United Nations (UN) peacekeeping actors have evolved their approach to accountability for sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (SEA) in peacekeeping operations since allegations emerged in 1992. More recently, the UN Secretary-General announced a ‘new’ approach to the problem, promising to put victims first, end impunity, engage with civil society, and improve transparency (UN Secretary-General 2017). This chapter is concerned with the emergence of normative frameworks in the UN’s integrity system for SEA in the new approach and how it establishes a framework for evaluating the integrity of governance in UN peacekeeping. Drawing on UN documentation as a discursive site of the production of knowledge, this chapter includes analysis of the frame within which accountability is articulated for peacekeeper abuse of power in 84 reports of the Secretary-General on SEA and gender mainstreaming, reports on accountability in the UN system, and documents on recent peacekeeping initiatives produced between 1992 and 2021. There is

S. White (B) University of Leeds, Leeds, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_10

197

198

S. WHITE

evidence of emergent changes in the UN’s strategic and conceptual approach to accountability with the adoption of the UN SecretaryGeneral’s (2017) new approach that seeks to ‘reconnect’ to UN values and principles in strengthening accountability. I argue that closer integration of relevant normative frameworks constitutes a significant discursive shift, but that this has yet to change the shape of accountability relationships with victims and affected populations in new initiatives, which stalls accountability progress. Critically, accountability should be understood as answerability, where affected individuals are the primary subjects answered to in accountability arrangements. This indicates a commitment to prioritising and harnessing feedback loops between affected individuals and populations and UN institutional actors. This chapter will first introduce a concept of accountability in global governance and its associated principles of legitimacy, integrity, and transparency that frame debates on accountability of the UN. It then discusses the background of internal UN deliberations regarding accountability of the organisation that frame the political space within which the SEA agenda emerged. Following this, it analyses the shifts in the UN’s discursive understanding of accountability prior to and following the adoption of the new approach by focusing on the normative framing of accountability in the SEA agenda, identifying significant shifts integrating gender equality and empowerment of women into the policy and accountability space. I identify some of the limitations of how this space has been constituted and argue for greater prioritisation of accountability mechanisms that answer to those affected by peacekeeper abuse of power.

Accountability Accountability in the broadest sense refers to means of constraining the behaviour of those in positions of power (Grant and Keohane 2005) through norms and processes that promote checks and balances on the use of power (Dubnick 2011). It entails normative obligations for powerwielders to explain their behaviour to a defined actor or actors through a set of processes that constrain power (Caplan 2005; Scholte 2011). Yet accountability is also a social space of interaction constituted by relations of power (Dubnick 2011) that constitute a moral relationship between ‘accountability subjects’ (Schweiker 1993). The notion of answerability is often used to characterise accountability relationships (Grant and Keohane 2005), and norms and regulations play a core role

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

199

in defining what behaviours require an answer, by whom, to whom, and how (Scholte 2011). The feminist legal scholarship on accountability for peacekeeper abuses largely focuses on challenges with respect to transnational legal barriers to criminal liability of individual perpetrators characterised by overlapping national and international laws. Legal accountability is especially complicated by the immunities afforded to UN personnel and the complex transnational legal landscape characterised by overlapping national and international law (Quénivet 2007). Scholars writing on accountability of perpetrators together identify a problem with the mapping of the legal space within which justice and accountability claims can be pursued to hold perpetrators to account (Wills 2013; Deen-Racsmány 2015; Freedman 2018). Work has advanced with member states to address the legal challenges of holding individual perpetrators to account. A series of General Assembly resolutions were adopted on criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission as a ‘temporary’ measure in advance of adoption of a recommended international convention on criminal accountability of UN personnel (Group of Legal Experts 2006; UN Secretary-General 2013). Annual resolutions have been adopted by the General Assembly every year since 2007, but no convention has yet been agreed. The political will of member states in criminal accountability is a critical area of action. Yet holding individual perpetrators accountable is not the sole meaning of, nor approach to accountability. Not all forms of SEA constitute criminal acts that would activate criminal law. The UN leads the accountability policy agenda and there are several accountability processes managed by the UN, including the regulatory framework governing peacekeeper sexual behaviours (the zero-tolerance policy), complaints mechanisms, some investigations, assistance, and support to victims, and how knowledge regarding progress is produced in transparency mechanisms of annual reports and other materials. Accountability is also a question of the mapping of the political space within which constraints on power and accountability relationships are constituted. Its shape in governance institutions like UN peacekeeping is largely dependent on how political actors understand their responsibilities in normative terms and how they define those to whom they are accountable. In global governance, accountability is often equated with the principles of legitimacy, integrity, and transparency that are often equated with good governance (Ball 2009; Aulich 2011; Huberts 2018; Da Veiga and

200

S. WHITE

Major 2019). Good governance is a principle of the UN (UN General Assembly 2012, para. 12), and the UN and its member states identify integrity, transparency, and accountability as core principles mutually reinforcing elements of an ethics infrastructure and cornerstones of good governance (Armstrong 2005). The principle of legitimacy is concerned with the authority of governance actors to play a role in global rulemaking (Le Moli 2017). The principle of integrity is linked to the “moral quality of the governance process” (Huberts 2018, p. 27) and is related to establishing mechanisms for promoting ethical behaviour and redressing violations. Lastly, the principle of transparency relates to the visibility of the actions and performance of global governance actors (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, p. 426). The accountability scholarship identifies the need to evaluate the emergence of accountability agendas in global governance to better understand how governance actors interpret their accountability responsibilities, constitute accountability relationships, and bring meaning to accountability (Barnett and Duvall 2004; Yang 2012; Koppell 2014; Rached 2016; Huberts 2018). Recent developments in accountability studies have centralised the principle of integrity and integrity systems as a crucial issue in accountability in governance institutions (Huberts 2018; Huberts and van Montfort 2021). The practice of integrity differs from the principle of integrity because it involves specific tools, including performance monitors and evaluations, a shift from codes of conduct to broader values and principles frameworks, and an expansion of mechanisms to promote ethical behaviour and monitor its progress (Evans 2012). The practice of integrity includes a combination of “institutions, laws, regulations, codes, policies, and procedures, which together combine to form a framework” for integrity (Aulich 2016, p. 119). They include policies or ethical or normative frameworks that establish the rules of expected behaviour, risk assessment and risk mitigation strategies, specific institutions or agencies including audit bodies, ombudspersons, independent oversight bodies, and safeguarding strategies to monitor and evaluate compliance with rules, and a set of practices (Six and Lawton 2013). The next section discusses the emergence of an integrity system within the UN amidst debates and reforms regarding the definition and responsibilities for accountability.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

201

Context of Internal UN Accountability Debates Reforms themselves are related to accountability (Dubnick and Yang 2011) and can be motivated by accountability demands (Dubnick 2011; Olsen 2015). However, reforms are often characterised by disagreements regarding “what constitutes improvement and for whose benefit improvements are made” (Christensen and Lægreid 2015, p. 212). The challenge for addressing accountability in UN peacekeeping is that there are multiple sites of governance, multiple governments involved, and multiple possible subjects due an answerThere are multiple possibilities of who counts as a subject of answerability. This complex context contributes to the idea that there is an accountability gap for addressing SEA (Boon 2015; Burke 2016; Westendorf 2017; Le Moli 2017; Mudgway 2017). The UN has been increasingly concerned with what accountability entails for the organisation since peacekeeping dramatically expanded in terms of scale and scope in the 1990s. Disciplinary measures for misconduct of UN personnel were introduced in 1989 (UN Secretary-General 1989a, para. 12; UN Secretary-General 1989b), and by 1992 the Office of Human Resource Management issued guidance on the equal treatment of men and women and on sexual harassment of other UN employees (Office of Human Resources Management 1992). The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), which is the only independent oversight body of the UN system, has considered accountability of the Secretariat regularly since 1993 (see Joint Inspection Unit, 1993) and supported the establishment of a new oversight body: the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), mandated to address corruption and misconduct within the UN. Evidence of corruption, criminality, and sexual misconduct led to political attention to the UN’s accountability responsibilities (see Joint Inspection Unit 1993; UN Secretary-General 2000; Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 2008). These concerns with accountability reflected the increased expansion and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations. Protection failures in Rwanda and Bosnia accelerated international discussions on the reform of peacekeeping mandates, functions, and conduct. The expansion of normative frameworks, notably on Women Peace and Security and Protection of Civilians, coincided with emerging global public awareness of sexual activity between international UN peacekeeping personnel and host populations.

202

S. WHITE

The SEA agenda and other concerns with corruption, particularly following the 2005 oil-for-food scandal (BBC News 2005), and other forms of misconduct and mismanagement led to the development of a definition of accountability within the UN system. Between 2004 and 2012 there were pressures within the UN system to “specifically define what is meant by accountability in the United Nations context” and to establish parameters for implementing and enforcing it (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 2006, para. 6). Attention was granted to accountability in the UN Secretariat, which houses the Department of Peace Operations (formerly Department of Peacekeeping Operations). In 2006 Kofi Annan proposed a new policy on public access to Secretariat information which defines the objectives of accountability and transparency as inherently connected to “facilitating public inquiries into the operations of the Organization in a manner that is consistent with public expectations for global governance in the twentyfirst century” (UN Secretary-General 2006, para. 25). This transparency policy brought global publics into the accountability space by connecting accountability relationships to public expectations of the UN (see Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 2006, para. 9). Ban Ki-Moon also spearheaded an agenda for reform of the Secretariat, proposing a definition of accountability and an accountability framework for the Secretariat in 2010 (UN General Assembly 2010). Later that year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution clarifying the definition of accountability in the United Nations: Accountability is the obligation of the Secretariat and its staff members to be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken by them, and to be responsible for honouring their commitments, without qualification or exception. Accountability includes achieving objectives and high-quality results in a timely and cost-effective manner, in fully implementing and delivering on all mandates to the Secretariat approved by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and other subsidiary organs established by them in compliance with all resolutions, regulations, rules and ethical standards; truthful, objective, accurate and timely reporting on performance results; responsible stewardship of funds and resources; all aspects of performance, including a clearly defined system of rewards and sanctions; and with due recognition to the important role of the oversight bodies and in full compliance with accepted recommendations. (UN General Assembly 2010, para. 8)

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

203

This definition was built under the primary framework of the UN Charter and includes both organisational (UN Secretariat) and individual accountability, indicating that both the organisation and individuals under its remit have accountability obligations. It entails a set of obligations for conduct, performance and mandate implementation, rewards and sanctions, and a role for oversight bodies (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 2012, para. 9) and includes the notion of accountability as answerability, but it does not specify to whom the Secretariat and its staff members should answer. In 2011 the UN’s external oversight body, the Joint Inspection Unit, clarified that accountability is a mutual relationship “to and of member states” (Joint Inspection Unit 2011, para. 21). The definition narrowed the political space within which accountability relationships could be constituted between the UN as a governance institution and the array of stakeholders it affects. From 2008 SEA was incorporated into this developing accountability agenda (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 2008) largely through performance measures. In 2015 the SecretaryGeneral stated that the UN was “accountable to its member states as regards measures taken to implement” its strategy on addressing SEA, including through producing reports evaluating the status of implementation of the strategy (United Nations 2015, para. 15.4). This clarification of accountability relationships between the UN and member states is built on the idea of accountability as a matter of measuring performance, in which the UN has a duty to share the facts of its performance with its member states. In the UN’s accountability agenda, SEA sits under a framework of ethical standards and integrity, which refers to commitments of the organisation and its personnel to “uphold the highest ethical standards and integrity, as reflected in the mechanisms, policies, principles and values that set the standards for the conduct and behaviour of United Nations personnel” (UN Secretary-General 2018a, para. 14). These reforms coincided with the first internal integrity review on SEA, which began to link accountability for SEA more closely to gender-related normative frameworks.

204

S. WHITE

Normative Shifts in the SEA Accountability Agenda Peacekeeping operations have normative goals of promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law, and peacekeeping personnel are expected to behave in line with these normative expectations (DPKO 2008, p. 23). The problem of the isolation of SEA from other normative areas of the UN work has been highlighted more recently in the feminist scholarship (Westendorf and Searle 2017; Westendorf 2017, 2020; Mudgway 2017; Freedman 2018). Reforms that began in 2013 accelerated following the fallout from the public crisis in 2015. The UN began to dramatically reframe SEA as a system-wide matter rather than a sole issue affecting peacekeeping and humanitarian entities, which brought in wider normative areas of work. Transformations in the mapping of the political space for accountability for SEA began in 2013 and accelerated following the public international crisis of allegations of sexual abuse of boys and the mismanagement of the allegations by the UN in the Central African Republic in 2015. The first substantial integrity review of UN action on SEA was released internally to the UN in 2013 (see Awori et al. 2013), prompting a few shifts that moved the UN’s understanding of accountability from a matter of establishing rules and standards to viewing accountability as a matter of performance. The damning review on the four peacekeeping missions with the highest numbers of allegations identified the failure of the UN ‘to protect the most vulnerable’ and argued that the UN was “more focused on UN personnel than on victims” (Awori et al. 2013, p. 15, italicised in original). It found that the integrity system established since 2002 was not working and that attention to gender inequality should be a priority (Awori et al. 2013). The feminist international relations literature emphasises intersectional gendered structural issues as drivers and barriers to preventing sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (Higate and Henry 2004; True 2014; Simi´c 2016). These bodies of work have contributed to understanding the root causes of the abuse and issues with the UN’s regulatory response to the problem. The politics of race, colonialism, and imperialism has been expressed by other scholars in this area who emphasise the important context of historical power relations that endure in missions and promote militarisation bound in nationalist ideologies that reproduce gender and racial violence (Whitworth 1998, 2004; Agathangelou and Ling 2003;

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

205

Razack 2004). These are problems of sexism, racism, misogyny, and colonial attitudes that for Marsha Henry (2013) reinforce notions of superiority of interveners and inferiority of the host population. These attitudes are especially problematic because the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations relies, in part, on relationships established with the host population (Westendorf 2020). The UN has acknowledged the role of gender in its broader work on addressing gender-based violence, violence against women, sexual violence, and conflict-related sexual violence as areas inhibitive to achieving the normative agenda of gender equality and maintenance of international peace and security. There is little clarity in how SEA is referred to, either as SEA specifically, as sexual violence, as gender-based violence, as violence against women, and as part of the Women Peace and Security Agenda (WPS). The WPS agenda refers to the series of resolutions borne out of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) which formally links the insecurity of women and the insecurity of states and advances concerns with “women’s participation, the gendered nature of conflict, and women’s postwar priorities” (Björkdahl and Selimovic 2019, p. 429). While a few authors have picked up on these inconsistencies (Westendorf and Searle 2017; Luedke and Westendorf 2017; Chinkin 2018), much of the literature on SEA neglects to address it or assumes that SEA falls under a specific framework or set of frameworks. Yet, SEA action has only recently been situated within gender frameworks. There were some initial connections made to gender equality and empowerment of women in the early 2000s, evidenced in reports of the Secretary-General on gender mainstreaming between 1997 and 2021 (see Fig. 1). The figure below is divided into four time periods, covering the years prior to the formal establishment of the SEA policy agenda (1997–2002), the establishment of an integrity system on SEA (2003– 2012), the years following the internal integrity review on SEA and prior to the new approach (2013–2016), and the years following the adoption of the new approach (2017–2021). Across the 451 pages of twenty-two reports of the Secretary-General on gender mainstreaming in the UN, sexual exploitation and abuse were referenced only thirteen times between 1997 and 2021. The first two references were both made in 2005, during the previous strategic review on SEA (see Al-Hussein 2005) and explicitly framed sexual exploitation and sexual abuse as a matter of gender-based violence (UN Secretary-General 2005, para. 72).

206

S. WHITE

This framing was removed in the reports that followed until 2017–2021, where there were eleven mentions. The references since 2017 mostly come from 2021 where, in a significant discursive shift, the report frames ‘enhanced accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse’ under the header ‘advancing the gender equality agenda’ (UN Secretary-General 2021a, para. III.16) and connects SEA action to gender mainstreaming efforts (UN Secretary-General 2021a, para. 86). Interestingly, concerns with sexual harassment in UN peacekeeping were frequently mentioned, particularly between 2017 and 2021 when the problem of sexual harassment internally among UN personnel was added to the SEA agenda (UN Secretary-General 2019). Connections were drawn between the sexual behaviour of UN personnel towards their colleagues and sexual conduct towards host populations. But sexual harassment had been on the UN internal agenda since 1992 (Office References to sexual misconduct in peacekeeping missions in reports of the Secretary-General on gender mainstreaming, 1997-2021 Sexual harassment SEA directly connected to gender mainstreaming Protection from SEA Task Force Vetting personnel Strategies, action plans and frameworks Survey on SEA Victim-centred approach Zero-tolerance policy Peacekeeper training Sexual exploitation and abuse 0

5

10

15

20

25

Number of mentions 1997-2002

2003-2012

2013-2016

2017-2021

Fig. 1 References to sexual misconduct in peacekeeping missions in reports of the Secretary-General on gender mainstreaming, 1997–2021

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

207

of Human Resources Management 1992; Joint Inspection Unit 1993). Indeed, SEA was first framed as a sexual harassment issue (Colm 1992), but it was soon disconnected. The connection established between SEA and sexual harassment since 2017 reflects greater attention to power inequalities, gender bias, and other drivers of abuse of power. When Secretary-General António Guterres took his oath of office in December 2016, he declared his intention to reach full gender parity in high-level positions (Guterres 2016, n.p). Guterres framed SEA more seriously than his predecessors by explicitly naming them as sexual violence and as crimes, stating that the UN had not done enough to respond to violence and crimes “committed under the UN flag against those we are supposed to protect” (Guterres 2016, n.p). Not all forms of SEA are necessarily criminal acts in every jurisdiction, but the sexual violence and crime framing add a weight and seriousness largely absent previously. In 2017 the Secretary-General’s report on SEA explicitly connects gender inequality and discrimination against women to the root causes of SEA (UN Secretary-General 2017, para. 9). From 2002 to 2012 there were no references to gender in the annual reports of the SecretaryGeneral on SEA. From 2013 to 2016 there were minor mentions of the need for gender expertise and empowerment of women, but it was not until 2017–2021 that gender balance, gender mainstreaming in planning and programming, and empowerment of women and promotion of gender equality appear in these documents. This marks a distinct shift in the normative frame of gender equality and empowerment of women converging with the SEA agenda. The connection to wider normative frameworks has had some influence on the integrity system for SEA. The reports of the Secretary-General from 2018 to 2021 detail updates to policies and codes of conduct across the system to reflect the victim-centred approach that has become the cornerstone of the new strategy (UN Secretary-General 2021b), and numerous efforts to reconfigure a system-wide response and improve the quality of data on allegations, victims, communications, and outcomes. Discourse on mainstreaming gender perspective especially gains more traction, especially through the High-level Steering Group on preventing SEA (UN Secretary-General 2018b) to work of the Victims’ Rights Advocates and a commissioned study by the Working Group in SEA “to analyse the causes and consequences of [SEA] from a gender perspective”, linking it to the UN’s “broader goals on women’s human rights, gender equality and women’s empowerment” (UN Secretary-General 2018b,

208

S. WHITE

para. 21). There is consistency in language of root causes of “unequal power relations, abuse of power and gender bias” (UN Secretary-General 2019, para. 2) and the intention to transform organisational culture, including through tackling discrimination in an intersectional perspective (UN Secretary-General 2021b, para. 20). These discursive shifts coincide with reforms made to the 2012 UN System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (UN-SWAP) for UN entities and Country Teams that sought to advance commitments made in 2006 to gender equality and empowerment of women in the UN system (UN Women, n.d.). The action plan has as its first priority “the United Nations system’s ability to hold itself accountable” for gender equality and empowerment of women (Kamioka and Cronin 2019, p.iv). UN-SWAP came into its 2.0 phase in 2018 and aligned the action planned with the Sustainable Development Goals. In 2019 the action plan led to the first system-wide overview of progress on gender equality and the empowerment of women, which includes an accountability framework (Kamioka and Cronin 2019). The idea of accountability for gender equality and empowerment of women is linked to the gender justice norm (Reilly 2007; Goetz 2007). Gender justice broadly refers to the idea that institutions be made accountable to women for gender inequality (Aroussi 2011; UNIFEM 2012). At its core gender justice is inextricably linked as a process to accountability that “adds an element of redress and restitution that is not always present in discussions of women’s empowerment” (Goetz 2007, p. 31). The gender justice norm is concerned with redressing gendered power and unjust patterns of authority through a politics of transformation that centralises accountability of governance actors and states for promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women (Reilly 2007). Gender justice goes farther than gender equality because it is not about making sure that women are put into already male or masculinised structures, but it is about dismantling those very structures and creating the capacity for something new in gender structures, social relations, economics, politics and so on (Evans 2016). Particularly since 2017, SEA and gender inequalities have increasingly become a matter of good governance for the UN and for UN peacekeeping. From 2017 UN action on SEA is framed in terms of good governance (Fig. 2), indicating greater concern with the legitimacy, integrity, and transparency. Secretary-General António Guterres has articulated aspirations “to make the United Nations an example of best

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

209

practice and global leadership” (UN Secretary-General 2017, para. 78) on SEA and by 2018 the problem was connected to the UN’s three pillars (peace and security, human rights, development) and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for the first time (UN Secretary-General 2018b, para. 76). In 2019 SDG Goal 5 on gender equality and the empowerment of women and Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions are explicitly linked to progress on SEA (UN Secretary-General 2019, para. 76). Guterres began to reframe action in terms of the UN’s values. In pressing member states for more action, greater attention is granted to transparency, accountability, protection, and effective remedies to victims (Guterres 2016, n.p). This coincides with a greater connection between Normative references in reports on SEA Accountability to Affected Populations Good governance Sustainable Development Goals Protection of civilians Child protection Human rights Gender mainstreaming Women Peace and Security Gender equality & empowerment of women Violence against Women 0

10

20 2004-2012

30 2013-2016

40

50

60

2017-2021

Fig. 2 Normative references in reports of the Secretary-General on SEA, 2004– 2021

210

S. WHITE

SEA action and ‘universal values and ensuring protection for civilians’ in 2016 (UN Secretary-General 2016, para. 37) and “the Organization’s values” (UN Secretary-General 2018b, para.2). Ebrahim (2009) describes this as a shift from framing accountability as a governance and performance matter to a mission frame, which connects accountability to the mission of an institution. The increased connection between values and normative frameworks indicates, at least discursively, an integration of SEA into understandings of structural inequalities and normative frameworks that are meant to address these inequalities and their impacts. But the normative focus has yet to connect back to rethinking accountability relationships with victims, survivors, paternity claimants, and affected populations. The latest peacekeeping strategy, the Action for Peacekeeping plus initiative, has as priorities implementation of the WPS agenda, and accountability to and of peacekeepers (United Nations 2021a). What is missing from the Action for Peacekeeping plus initiative is a priority of accounting to victims, survivors, paternity claimants, and affected communities for the abuse of power of UN personnel.

Peacekeeping Fit for the Future The UN’s accountability developments emerged alongside another rising and alternative accountability framework. From 2002 there were also increased questions regarding the challenges of “the question of accountability towards beneficiaries and host governments” in peacekeeping and humanitarian contexts (United Nations 2002, para. 334). The UN’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), who coordinates inter-agency delivery of humanitarian assistance, established a framework on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) in 2011 to actively “use power responsibly by taking account of, giving account to, and being held to account by the people humanitarian organisations seek to assist” (IASC 2015, n.p). The framework constitutes a set of commitments that are meant to enhance partnerships with actors at the local, national, and international levels in its humanitarian work. AAP involves three dimensions: taking account of community needs by cultivating space for them to influence decision-making, giving account through transparency, and being held to account by communities who can assess and possibly sanction actions of humanitarian organisations (IASC, n.d.).

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

211

The system-wide nature of the AAP framework and wider concerns with accounting to host populations demonstrates a shift towards downward or local accountability, in which host communities are the actors answered to by UN institutional actors in accountability arrangements. The merger between the IASC’s Protection from SEA Task Force and its AAP Task Force in 2013 (UN Secretary-General 2014, para. 59) signified a connection between efforts to rethink the constitution of accountability relationships with people in host communities. In 2018 these two frameworks were linked to risk analysis and mitigation, trust in feedback and complaints mechanisms, awareness of the standards of behaviour that host populations should expect from UN and humanitarian personnel, and awareness of and assistance to those affected by abuse of power at the hands of international interveners (IASC 2018). The AAP framework constituted a rethinking of the mapping of the political space in the UN’s humanitarian work, and by merging with action on SEA it linked more closely to the UN’s peacekeeping work. Peacekeeping reform efforts through the Action for Peacekeeping Initiative (2018) complement this framework by setting commitments to “support inclusive and participatory approaches” that include “all segments of the local population” (para.17). But there is little progress. According to the 2018 review of the humanitarian system, modes of engagement with affected populations have been limited by how participation has been viewed as a means of information collection rather than collaboration (ALNAP 2018, p. 156). This view of participation has been met with poor progress on accountability and few options “for redressing grievances or imposing sanctions” (ALNAP 2018, p. 157) and “a lack of joined-up activity on the ground” to address SEA (p. 157). The 2022 Humanitarian Accountability Report also identified that the problem of preventing and responding SEA rested in part on “a lack of participatory communication between organisations and crisis-affected people on expected staff behaviour” (CHS Alliance, 2022, p. 9). The presence of policies has not translated to implementation or sustained attention at the inter-agency level to SEA (ALNAP, 2018, p. 166). While work is ongoing to establish standard means of receiving reports of SEA (United Nations 2021b), to fill funding gaps for the unfunded victim assistance mechanism, and provide direct support to victims through a very small team of Victims’ Rights Advocates (UN 2019; United Nations 2020; United Nations 2020), there is far to go

212

S. WHITE

to fulfil basic accountability responsibilities to victims, survivors, paternity claimants and their communities. Very few have ever received any form of assistance (OIOS 2015, 2021) and there remains a “lack of adequate and sustainable funding and resourcing to provide for the assistance and support to victims” (Office of the Victims’ Rights Advocate 2020, p. 3). One area of assistance that is ‘largely unavailable’ is legal aid the support accountability of perpetrators, including for paternity claims (UN Secretary-General 2021b, para. 34). There are innumerable hurdles to participation in accountability processes that, were there an adequate legal and regulatory framework, would lead to accountability of individual perpetrators. Those writing on WPS have also foregrounded the neglect of prioritisation of women’s meaningful participation, and women’s rights, particularly their rights to access relief and recovery (Hewitt 2016; True 2016; Kirby and Shepherd 2016; Basu 2017; Reilly 2018). The normative framing of the SEA agenda within gender-related frameworks indicates greater attention to the principle of integrity among UN peacekeeping governance actors. The practice of integrity, however, has yet to locate those directly affected by abuse of power as the core subjects of moral relationships of integrity in accountability approaches.

Conclusion Integrating the gender justice norm and its related frameworks, including WPS, requires a rethinking of the political space within which accountability relationships are constituted. In February 2022 (which is outside the time period for the scope of the study), for the first time, the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse acknowledges the idea of accountability to victims and communities (UN Secretary-General 2022, para. 44). The form of accountability presented in this report is largely procedural as a matter of holding individual perpetrators accountable for their sexual behaviours. UN peacekeeping actors should constitute accountability relationships that situate victims, survivors, and paternity claimants as core subjects of answerability in accountability relationships, and they should have a say in the form of the answer provided in accountability processes. Critically, to grant meaning to the normative frameworks, particularly the gender justice norm shaping recent reforms, affected individuals and communities should be the key political and ethical priorities

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

213

in the accountability agenda. Meeting basic responsibilities to victims’, survivors’, and paternity claimants’ safety and security and supporting their ability to participate in accountability processes in the first place are a starting point, but not an end in itself. Connecting the dots between normative agendas and new initiatives in peacekeeping offers an opportunity to reframe the political space within which victims and affected populations are constituted as subjects of answerability in accountability transformations.

References Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 2006. Investing in the United Nations for a Stronger Organization Worldwide: Detailed Report, A/60/870. United Nations. https://www.un.org/ga/ acabq/document/a60870. Accessed 20 March 2023. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 2008. Accountability Framework, Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control Framework, and Results-Based Management Framework, A/63/457. United Nations. https://www.un.org/ga/acabq/document/a63457. Accessed 20 March 2023. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 2012. Progress towards an Accountability System in the United Nations Secretariat. A/66/738. United Nations. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/259/54/PDF/N1225954.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 20 March 2023. Agathangelou, Anna M., and L. H. M. Ling. 2003. Desire Industries: Sex Trafficking, UN Peacekeeping, and the Neo-Liberal World Order. The Brown Journal of World Affairs 10 (1): 133–148. Al-Hussein, Prince Zeid Raad Zeid. 2005. Comprehensive Review of a Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. A/RES/59/300. United Nations. https://digitallibrary. un.org/record/603855. Accessed 17 October 2018. ALNAP. 2018. The State of the Humanitarian System. London: ALNAP/ ODI. https://www.alnap.org/help-library/the-state-of-the-humanitarian-sys tem-sohs-2018-full-report. Accessed 5 December 2022. Armstrong, Elia. 2005. Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent Trends, Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues. Economic and Social Affairs. New York: United Nations. https://demolive.insightsonindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 09/integrity-transparency-un.pdf. Accessed 19 January 2021.

214

S. WHITE

Aroussi, Sahla. 2011. “Women, Peace and Security”: Addressing Accountability for Wartime Sexual Violence. International Feminist Journal of Politics 13 (4): 576–593. Aulich, Chris. 2011. Integrity Agencies as One Pillar of Integrity and Good Governance. Public Policy and Administration 10 (1): 41–52. Aulich, Chris. 2016. Integrity and Public Sector Governance: A Democratic Deficit? In From Abbott to Turbull: A New Direction? Australian Commonwealth Administration 2013–2016, edited by Chris Aulich, 119–141. Victoria: Echo Books. Awori, Thelma, Catherine Lutz, and Paban J. Thapa. 2013. Final Report on Expert Mission to Evaluate the Risks to SEA Prevention Efforts in MINUSTAH, UNMIL, MONUSCO, and UNMISS. Report Prepared for UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. https://static1.squarespace. com/static/514a0127e4b04d7440e8045d/t/55afcfa1e4b07b89d11d35ae/ 1437585313823/2013+Expert+Team+Report+FINAL.pdf. Accessed 1 October 2018. Ball, Carolyn. 2009. What Is Transparency? Public Integrity 11 (4): 293–308. Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2004. Power in Global Governance. In Power in Global Governance, edited by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 1–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Basu, Soumita. 2017. The UN Security Council and the Political Economy of the WPS Resolutions. Politics & Gender 13 (4): 721–727. BBC News. 2005. Q&A: Oil-for-Food Scandal, September 7. http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4232629.stm. Accessed 21 December 2022. Björkdahl, Annika, and Johanna Mannergren Selimovic. 2019. WPS and Civil Society. In The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security, edited by Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, 428–438. New York: Oxford University Press. Boon, Kristen. 2015. The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility. Chicago Journal of International Law 16 (2): 341–385. Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. 2006. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. Ethics & International Affairs 20 (4): 405–437. Burke, Roisin. 2016. Central African Republic Peacekeeper Sexual Crimes, Institutional Failings: Addressing the Accountability Gap. New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 14 (1): 97–127. Caplan, Richard. 2005. Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia. International Peacekeeping 12 (3): 463–476. Chinkin, Christine. 2018. International Human Rights, Criminal Law and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. LSE Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series 12: 1–8. https://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/assets/ documents/2018/wps12Chinkin.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2022.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

215

Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2015. Performance and Accountability— A Theoretical Discussion and an Empirical Assessment. Public Organization Review 15 (2): 207–225. CHS Alliance. 2022. Humanitarian Accountability Report 2022: Accountability Is Non-Negotiable. Geneva: CHS Alliance. https://www.chsalliance.org/getsupport/resource/har-2022/. Accessed 11 March 2023. Colm, Sara. 1992. U.N. Agrees to Address Sexual Harassment Issue. Phnom Penh Post, October 11. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/un-agr ees-address-sexual-harassment-issue. Accessed 17 November 2022. Da., Veiga, and Maria do Rosário, and Maria Major. 2019. Governance as Integrity: The Case of the Internal Oversight at the United Nations through the Lens of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 32 (1): 67–91. Deen-Racsmány, Zsuzsanna. 2015. Towards a Convention on the Criminal Accountability of UN Personnel Including UN Military Experts on Mission and UN Police Officers. Military Law and the Law of War Review 54: 195. DPKO. 2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/cap stone_eng.pdf. Accessed 15 October 2018. Dubnick, Melvin J. 2011. Move Over Daniel: We Need Some “Accountability Space.” Administration & Society 43 (6): 704–716. Dubnick, Melvin J., and Kaifeng Yang. 2011. The Pursuit of Accountability: Promises, Problems, and Prospects. In The State of Public Administration, edited by Donald C. Menzel and Jay D. White, 171–186. New York: Routledge. Ebrahim, Alnoor. 2009. Placing the Normative Logics of Accountability in “Thick” Perspective. American Behavioral Scientist 52 (6): 885–904. Evans, Mark. 2012. Beyond the Integrity Paradox—Towards “Good Enough” Governance? Policy Studies 33 (1): 97–113. Evans, Matthew. 2016. Structural Violence, Socioeconomic Rights, and Transformative Justice. Journal of Human Rights 15 (1): 1–20. Freedman, Rosa. 2018. UNaccountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse. European Journal of International Law 29 (3): 961–985. Goetz, Anne-Marie. 2007. Gender Justice, Citizenship, and Entitlements In Gender Justice, Citizenship, and Development, edited by Mukhopadhyay Maitrayee and Navsharan Singh, 15–57. New Delhi: Zubaan. Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. American Political Science Review 99 (1): 29–43. Group of Legal Experts. 2006. Report of the Group of Legal Experts on Ensuring the Accountability of United Nations Staff and Experts on

216

S. WHITE

Mission with Respect to Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations. A/60/980. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A% 2F60%2F980&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. Accessed 17 October 2018. Guterres, António. 2016. Secretary-General-Designate António Guterres Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office. United https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12Nations. 12/secretary-general-designate-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-oath-office-speech. Accessed 23 September 2022. Henry, Marsha. 2013. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: Problematising Current Responses. In Gender, Agency, and Coercion, edited by Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips, and Kalpana Wilson, 122–142. Basingstoke: Springer. Hewitt, Sarah. 2016. Overcoming the Gender Gap: The Possibilities of Alignment between the Responsibility to Protect and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Global Responsibility to Protect 8 (1): 3–28. Higate, Paul, and Marsha, Henry. 2004. Engendering (In)Security in Peace Support Operations. Security Dialogue 35 (4): 481–498. Huberts, L. W. J. C. 2018. Integrity: What It Is and Why It Is Important. Public Integrity 20 (sup1): 18–32. IASC. 2015. Accountability to affected populations (AAP): a brief overview. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. https://interagencystandingcommittee. org/accountability-affected-populations-including-protection-sexual-exploitat ion-and-abuse/documents-24. Accessed 2 December 2022. IASC. 2018. Results of Collaboration/Linkages between AAP and PSEA. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. https://interagencystandingcommittee. org/system/files/final_aap_and_psea_linkages_visual_19_nov_2018_002.pdf. Accessed 28 November 2022. IASC. 2022. Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP): A Brief Overview. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. https://interagencystandingcommittee. org/system/files/iasc_aap_psea_2_pager_for_hc.pdf. Accessed 2 December 2022. Joint Inspection Unit. 1993. Accountability and Oversight in the United Nations Secretariat. JIU/REP/93/5. Geneva: United Nations. https://digitallibrary. un.org/record/181087?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. Joint Inspection Unit. 2011. Accountability Frameworks in the United Nations System. JIU/REP/2011/5. Geneva: United Nations. https://digitallibrary. un.org/record/718334?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. Kamioka, Keiko, and Eileen A. Cronin. 2019. Review of the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. Joint Inspection Unit JIU/REP/2019/2. Geneva: United

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

217

Nations. https://www.unjiu.org/sites/www.unjiu.org/files/jiu_rep_2019_2_ english_0.pdf. Accessed 3 November 2022. Kirby, Paul, and Laura Shepherd. 2016. Reintroducing Women, Peace and Security. International Affairs 92 (2): 249–254. Koppell, Jonathan G. S. 2014. Accountable Global Governance Organizations. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, edited by Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans, 370–388. Oxford: OUP. Le Moli, Ginevra. 2017. Autonomy and Accountability of the UN in Peacekeeping Operations: The Case of the Central African Republic. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 20 (1): 213–238. Mudgway, Cassandra. 2017. Sexual Exploitation by UN Peacekeepers: The “Survival Sex” Gap in International Human Rights Law. The International Journal of Human Rights 21 (9): 1453–1476. Office of Human Resources Management. 1992. Guidelines for Promoting Equal Treatment of Men and Women in the Secretariat. ST/IC/1992/67. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/153708?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. Office of the Victims Rights Advocate. 2020. “Voices from the Field” Briefing by United Nations Field Victims Rights Advocates and Dedicated Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Coordinators. United Nations. https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/con tent/events. Accessed 1 July 2021. OIOS. 2015. Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/ sixth/70/docs/oios_report.pdf. Accessed 1 October 2018. OIOS. 2021. Evaluation of the Prevention, Response and Victim Support Efforts against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Secretariat Staff and Related Personnel. A/75/820. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un. org/record/3921843?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. Olsen, Johan P. 2015. Democratic Order, Autonomy, and Accountability. Governance 28 (4): 425–440. Quénivet, Noëlle. 2007. The Dissonance between the United Nations ZeroTolerance Policy and the Criminalisation of Sexual Offences on the International Level. International Criminal Law Review 7 (4): 657–676. Rached, Danielle Hanna. 2016. The Concept(s) of Accountability: Form in Search of Substance. Leiden Journal of International Law 29 (2): 317–342. Razack, Sherene. 2004. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Reilly, Niamh. 2007. Seeking Gender Justice in Post-Conflict Transitions: Towards a Transformative Women’s Human Rights Approach. International Journal of Law in Context 3 (2): 155–72.

218

S. WHITE

Reilly, Niamh. 2018. How Ending Impunity for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Overwhelmed the UN Women, Peace, and Security Agenda: A Discursive Genealogy. Violence against Women 24 (6): 631–649. Scholte, Jan Aart. 2011. Global Governance, Accountability and Civil Society. In Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance, edited by Jan Aart, Scholte, 8–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schweiker, William. 1993. Accounting for Ourselves: Accounting Practice and the Discourse of Ethics. Accounting, Organizations and Society 18 (2): 231– 252. Simi´c, Olivera. 2016. Policing the Peacekeepers: Disrupting UN Responses to “Crises” Over Sexual Offence Allegations. Journal of International Peacekeeping 20 (1–2): 69–85. Six, Frédérique and Lawton, Alan. 2013. Towards a Theory of Integrity Systems: A Configurational Approach. International Review of Administrative Sciences 79 (4): 639–658. True, Jacqui. 2014. The Political Economy of Gender in UN Peacekeeping. In Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security, edited by Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto, 243–262. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. True, Jacqui. 2016. Explaining the Global Diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. International Political Science Review 37 (3): 307–323. UN General Assembly. 2010. Towards an Accountability System in the United Nations Secretariat. A/RES/64/259. New York: United Nations. https:// digitallibrary.un.org/record/679477?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN General Assembly. 2012. Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. A/RES/67/1. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/ 738646?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General 1989a. Administration of Justice in the Secretariat. A/C.5/44/9. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/76953? ln=en. Accessed 20 December 2022. UN Secretary-General 1989b. Amendments to the Staff Rules. A/C.5/44/ 2. New York: United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/76865? ln=en. Accessed 20 December 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2000. Accountability and Responsibility. A/55/ 270. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/424301?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2005. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Report of the Secretary General A/59/ 782. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/547945?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

219

UN Secretary-General. 2006. Addendum: Improving Reporting Mechanisms Including Public Access to United Nations Documentation. A/60/846/ Add.4. United Nations. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N06/346/91/PDF/N0634691.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2013. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Report of the Secretary General A/67/ 766. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/746674?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2014. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Report of the Secretary General A/68/ 756. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/766869?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2016. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Report of the Secretary General A/70/ 729. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/822192?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2017. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse: A New Approach. Report of the Secretary General A/71/818. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/ 861703?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2018a. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Report of the Secretary General A/72/ 751. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1476262?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2018b. Seventh Progress Report on the Accountability System in the United Nations Secretariat: Strengthening the Accountability System of the Secretariat under the New Management Paradigm. Report of the Secretary-General A/72/773. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un. org/record/1483786?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2019. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. Report of the Secretary General A/73/ 744. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3795467?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2021a. Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective into All Policies and Programmes in the United Nations System. E/2021a/52. United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3925333?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022. UN Secretary-General. 2021b. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. A/75/754. United Nations. https://digitallibrary. un.org/record/3905458?ln=en. Accessed 20 June 2022.

220

S. WHITE

UN Secretary-General 2022. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. A/76/702. New York: United Nations. https:// digitallibrary.un.org/record/3964674?ln=en. Accessed 2 April 2022. UN Women. 2023. Promoting UN Accountability (UN-SWAP and UNCTSWAP). UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/un-sys tem-coordination/promoting-un-accountability. Accessed 28 March 2023. UNIFEM. 2012. Gender Justice: Key to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. UN Women. https://www.refworld.org/docid/4fa2588d2.html. Accessed 10 May 2019. United Nations. 2002. Women, Peace and Security. Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). New York: United Nations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/477163?ln=en. Accessed 1 November 2018. United Nations. 2015. Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions. United Nations. https://unmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ policy_on_accountability_for_conduct_and_discipline_in_field_missions_3007-2015.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2018. United Nations. 2019. 2017 and 2018 Report: Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. United Nations. https://www. un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/sites/www.un.org.preven ting-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/files/tf_annual_report_june_2019_vf.pdf. Accessed 1 November 2021. United Nations. 2020. 2019 Annual Report: Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. United Nations. https://www.un.org/preven ting-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/projects-and-reports. Accessed 1 November 2021. United Nations. 2021a. Action for Peacekeeping + Plan. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/action_for_peacekeeping_ plus_plan.pdf. Accessed 1 March 2023. United Nations. 2021b. Fact Sheet on the Secretary-Generals Initiatives to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. United Nations. https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/sites/www. un.org.preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/files/fact_sheet_un_systemwide_sea_initiatives.pdf. Accessed 1 March 2023. Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim. 2017. WPS, CRSV and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Making Sense of the Missing Links. LSE Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/ 10/05/wps-crsv-and-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-in-peace-operations-mak ing-sense-of-the-missing-links-jasmine-kim-westendorf-92017/. Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim. 2020. Violating Peace: Sex, Aid, and Peacekeeping. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

221

Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim, and Louise Searle. 2017. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Trends, Policy Responses and Future Directions. International Affairs 93 (2): 365–387. Whitworth, Sandra. 1998. Gender, Race and the Politics of Peacekeeping. In A Future for Peacekeeping?, edited by Edward Moxon-Browne, 176–191. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Whitworth, Sandra. 2004. Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Wills, Siobhán. 2013. Continuing Impunity of Peacekeepers: The Need For a Convention. Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 4 (1): 47– 80. Yang, Kaifeng. 2012. Further Understanding Accountability in Public Organizations: Actionable Knowledge and the Structure-Agency Duality. Administration & Society 44 (3): 255–284.

Safeguarding Children from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Lessons for the Future Sarah Blakemore, Rosa Freedman, and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert

Introduction In the early 2000s, two pivotal reports were published about widespread sexual exploitation and abuse of children by UN peacekeepers and by personnel working for the UN’s humanitarian implementing partners in three West African countries: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (UNHCR and Save the Children 2002; United Nations 2002). The reports shone

This chapter draws upon research for the project Safeguarding in Peacekeeping Operations, funded by the British Academy Tackling the International Challenges Fund (IC160151), the Sexual Violence and Peacekeeping Network funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/P005241/1) and UKRI (EP/X528274/1). The authors wish to thank UN Assistant Secretary-General Jane Connors, Alex Dressler, Ambassador Ian Duddy, Captain Timothy Graham, Dr. Craig Mills, and Isaac Sinclair for their assistance and support at different stages of or throughout this project. The authors are grateful to all interviewees at UNHQ, troop-contributing countries, peacekeeping training centres, and within UN missions and implementing partners. S. Blakemore Department of Life Sciences, Brunel University of London, London, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_11

223

224

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

light on adults demanding sex from children in exchange for providing them with goods and favours such as food, money, hygiene products and other ‘luxuries’ including mobile phones, perfume, rides in NGO vehicles and being granted access to entertainment venues. Along with the follow-up report by Save the Children in 2008 (Csásky 2008), these reports highlighted the vulnerability caused by severe economic deprivation, lack of any opportunities for education or work, pressure from peers or parents, children living on their own or heading households comprised of younger siblings or children living in extended families. Although not dissimilar to many other peacekeeping and humanitarian contexts, there was an expectation that the UN had learned lessons from grave violations in the preceding decade, and there was significant disappointment and outrage that the protection mandates—including on human rights and on responsibility to protect—that had been created in the aftermath of grave abuses and failures had been inadequate. Despite those efforts, some 15 years later staff of Oxfam in Haiti were alleged to have sexually exploited and abused women, and potentially also minors, demonstrating that the policies in place are not robust enough. As Kevin Watkins, the Chief Executive of Save the Children, said during the oral evidence at the House of Commons, both of those reports that you mentioned [Save the Children Reports of 2002 and 2008 on SEA] highlighted the role, essentially, of powerful men as gatekeepers to food, shelter and security, and the fears and concerns of the people they were there to serve who felt threatened by them, unsafe and unprotected. What has come to light over the past couple of weeks cautions all of us against complacency. (UK House of Commons 2018)

The UN Secretary-General himself notes in Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa that, although the genesis of this ‘crisis’ was in Liberia, the United Nations is addressing the R. Freedman (B) School of Law, University of Reading, Reading, UK e-mail: [email protected] N. Lemay-Hébert Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Acton, Canberra, Australia

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

225

issue on a global basis (UN 2002, para. 5; Blakemore et al. 2019). The first reports of widespread sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping and humanitarian contexts had come to light in the 1990s, with particular attention paid to the UN and its implementing partners’ roles in child prostitution in Cambodia (Mackay 2001) and sex trafficking rings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s (HRW 2002). Many widespread harms and abuses had come to light, but perhaps the most egregious were the reports of SEA of children in the most fragile societies to which the UN had been deployed to protect. Not only did the Save the Children report highlight just how little had changed, it was also the first systematic report to uncover the breadth and depth of the problem and to analyse the systemic failures by all entities tasked with protecting children in those contexts. Crucially, those reports became the catalyst for the UN to take its first concrete steps to holistically address sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by its staff engaged with peacekeeping operations.1 The UN’s first significant response to the reports from West Africa was the issuing of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin setting out a zero tolerance approach to sexual exploitation and abuse (UN 2003; Dahrendorf 2006; Mendelson 2005). An internal policy for UN employees, the Bulletin set out that there should be no sexual contact between UN staff members and local persons whom they served, irrespective of whether the sexual contact was lawful (UN 2003, 3d). That Bulletin, while frequently criticised today for being too vague and for setting out employment rather than criminal standards, was a significant step insofar as it set out a policy that went beyond international and national laws, and that sought to hold UN employees to the highest possible standards. The zero tolerance policy is the basis for the Secretary-General’s annual report with data on allegations and information on measures being taken to strengthen prevention, enforcement and remedial action.2 Some other measures, such as Zeid’s proposed criminal law treaty, have been sidelined by the UN or its member states (UN 2005a, 2005b). Others, such as proposals for better pre-deployment training, have simply tinkered around the edges 1 It is worth noting that even when those steps started to be taken, similar abuses were being perpetrated at around the same time in Eritrea by UN peacekeepers, and as a consequence, Italian, Danish and Slovak peacekeepers were expelled from Eritrea in separate incidents for sexual abuse of children (Barth 2004). 2 Annual reports may be accessed here: https://conduct.unmissions.org/reports-secret ary-general-special-measures-protection-sexual-exploitation-and-sexual-abuse.

226

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

of a problem that requires practicable and significant solutions. As a result, nearly 20 years later, and despite many attempts to effect local and systemwide reforms and changes, much remains to be done to protect people from sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping and humanitarian contexts. It is important to underline that there is also a specific child-focused agenda in the context of peacebuilding (protecting children from peace custodians) that emerged after almost a decade of normative development on the broader issue of children and armed conflict (Berents and Mollica 2022; Huynh et al. 2022). This normative evolution was followed by key international statements on the Responsibility to Protect for instance, giving attention to questions of child protection and the need ‘to conceive of children not merely as objects in need of protection, but as people with agency, whose voices need to be heard and perspectives understood’ (Glanville 2018, p. 13; Jacob 2018). The international agenda was arguably launched by a report written by Graça Machel entitled ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’, submitted to the General Assembly in 1996 (UN 1996), which was subsequently followed by the first UN Security Council on that question (UN 1999), and by the crucial Security Council Resolution 1612 (UN 2005c), considered ‘fundamental for the day-today workings of child-protection-mandated agencies’ (Schusterman and Godwin 2018, p. 21). More recently, the Child Protection Working Group has highlighted the fact that ‘although the primary responsibility to protect children from harm rests with government, all child protection responses should seek to make children more secure, facilitate children’s and families’ own efforts to stay safe, and reduce children’s exposure to risks’ (Child Protection Working Group 2012, p. 29). In this context, the literature has noted a general move towards ‘systems approach’ (Wessells 2016), meaning a move away from fragmented programming on discrete individual child protection risks—child trafficking, children working or living in the streets, child labour—towards a systems strengthening approach (Schusterman and Godwin 2018, p. 34). There is a vibrant, critical, literature on international peacekeeping and aid analysing the (gendered) power differential between international and local actors (cf. Highgate 2007; Kappler and Lemay-Hébert 2019; Lemay-Hébert 2011). This literature notably discusses the ‘peacekeeping economy’ that occurs when peace missions are established in what are normally impoverished and war-torn societies (Jennings and Boas 2015; Lemay-Hébert and Murshed 2016). This research does agree that these

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

227

structural factors certainly help explain the prevalence of predatory and opportunistic sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) practices by peacekeepers and other actors in position of authority (Freedman et al. 2021; Westerndorf 2020). However, the aim of our research is to bring the attention back to the local level (meaning, at the same time, national level and field level for peacekeepers) and to offer actionable feedback and evidence-based solutions of how to implement safeguarding across scale3 so that it will be meaningful at the local level. The research is the result of joint work by scholars with very different backgrounds and perspectives on these issues, including one scholar-practitioner working in the field of child safeguarding, one international law and human rights expert and one international peacekeeping expert. The chapter draws upon our research project and work over the past seven years, including with UN headquarters, multilateral organisations, Troop Contributing Countries, peacekeeping training centres, international NGOs, UN peacekeeping operations and country teams, and communities and beneficiaries on the ground. The focus of that project has been to design and implement context-specific safeguarding across all relevant actors involved in UN peacekeeping. We have piloted the implementation of that context-specific child safeguarding in one TCC national military (Uruguay [Freedman et al. 2018]), 31 of the largest implementing partners for the UK FCDO (KCS 2020a; FCDO 2022) and through an online open-access training course for peacekeepers (KCS 2020b; KCS and UoR 2020). The safeguarding we implement upholds international standards while also being specific both to the mission and values of each organisation and specific to the context in which they operate. In this chapter, we set out our child safeguarding framework that combines adherence to the highest international standards while also being context-specific. We explain how the framework works across scale, from the local through to the international, and explain the ways in which that framework operates to protect individuals from abuse and to provide support and remedies where harms are perpetrated. The chapter demonstrates the need for a holistic and streamlined approach, and we provide the methodology for moving forwards in such a way that safeguarding becomes a standard and central feature for all entities involved 3 There is a wealth of literature on scale, but only an emerging literature on law and regulations across scale, for example Vadi (2018).

228

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

with peacekeeping operations. This chapter is intent on bringing together prescriptive and analytical dimensions, and we conclude on specific policy recommendations in the light of our research findings.

Introduction to the Child Safeguarding Framework We understand child safeguarding as the responsibility that organisations have to ensure their staff, partners, operations and programmes do no harm to children. This implies that they do not expose children to the risk of harm and abuse, and that they respond appropriately if abuse occurs. An overall approach to child safeguarding is rooted in understanding the risks to children from the organisation, including its staff, programme, partners and operations. Ensuring organisations meet these requirements involves a robust and comprehensive process that begins with the development or strengthening of a child safeguarding policy, and then requires organisational development in the form of allocating staff time, ensuring background checks are conducted, staff are trained and supervised, developing safe, accessible reporting and responding mechanisms that prioritise the rights and safety of victims and survivors, and consultation and communication with children and communities on safeguarding including their right to be safe and how to report concerns. There also needs to be sound processes for planning, implementation, monitoring and review, to ensure the policy is rolled out effectively. An organisational culture that prioritises child safeguarding and leaders who model attitudes and behaviours that facilitate accountability, respect for all and non-discrimination are critical. All decisions on safeguarding should be made in the best interests of the child or children, which are paramount. Such measures help ensure that an organisation has done all it can to prevent harm to children, and if an incident should occur, the organisation has appropriate response procedures in place. To achieve this, we put forward that all organisations—including academic institutions—need to consider seven specific questions in order to assess whether or not effective child safeguarding structures are in place: (1) Where, when and how do programmes, partners, staff and operations impact upon children, and what risks may these present?; (2) What policies and procedures are needed to prevent harm and how are concerns responded to appropriately?; (3) How to recruit safely?; (4) What safeguarding induction and training is needed to ensure staff know

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

229

what the organisation expects of them and what should be done if they have a concern?; (5) Does the organisation have a clear code of conduct so that all staff understand their professional boundaries when working with children and what is and is not acceptable behaviour?; (6) Who is the appropriate designated person/people to act as the focal point in an organisation to receive and manage any safeguarding concerns and subsequent inquiry/investigation?; and (7) Is there a context-specific and appropriate reporting and responding process for incidents and concerns? One can assess whether or not an organisation is effectively mitigating the risks to children based on the answers to these questions. In turn, the answers to these questions can be structured around four specific standards, outlining key elements that should be in place to keep children safe and provide a comprehensive benchmark for preventing harm to children that are complimentary to other international standards and principles. Standard 1—Policy: The organisation sets clear policy that describes how it is committed to promoting the well-being of children, preventing abuse and creating a positive environment for children wherein their rights are upheld and they are treated with dignity and respect. Standard 2—People: The organisation communicates clearly its commitments to keeping children safe and the responsibilities and expectations it places on staff and associates in particular, its partners—through relevant policies, procedures and guidance, and that staff and associates (and other relevant actors, including children) are supported in understanding and acting in line with those rules. Standard 3—Procedures: The organisation implements a systematic process of planning and implementation of child safeguarding measures. Standard 4—Accountability: The organisation has in place measures and mechanisms for monitoring and review of safeguarding measures and to ensure both upward and downward accountability in relation to child safeguarding. When fully implemented, child safeguarding measures offer a set of practical tools for tackling a culture of impunity around child abuse. Children are safer because, when the Standards are properly implemented, every individual within an organisation receives clear instructions on their obligation to act to prevent and report abuse and the sanctions they will face if they fail to comply. The existence and implementation of the standards act as a powerful deterrent to abusers before they even apply for a job; and they ensure that organisations in positions of trust are held to account.

230

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

The framework is implemented within an organisation through (i) a full assessment of current policies and practices, (ii) a robust mapping of relevant local and international laws and practices on child safeguarding, (iii) developing context-specific policies and procedures based on the organisation and the legal mapping, (iv) training and (v) follow-up. These 5 steps combined provide robust and holistic methods for ensuring child safeguarding standards are raised, implemented and complied with across an organisation. The framework is written in a way that makes the standards relevant and achievable in all contexts, but of course there needs to be specific methods of assessing and implementing in different contexts, particularly fragile ones such as peacekeeping operations. However, they may be more difficult or challenging to implement in some countries and local contexts than in others. For example, reporting abuse to local or national authorities may not be straightforward if the reports are not handled properly. There are, however, always organisations working nationally and locally that can provide advice on reporting cases, and local mapping will identify these. Another example is the difficulties in applying standards of practice that are not supported by national law; for example, where the age of consent is less than 18 years and where young people under 18 are legally able to work can be problematic. However, International Standards apply definitions in line with international law and are designed to prevent harm to all children under 18.4 What we have developed using this framework and through research in peacekeeping operations and contexts is an overview of what an entity or actor involved with peacekeeping needs to do to meet the international standards on child safeguarding. Before explaining and applying those standards to peacekeeping contexts, it is first important to understand the particular complexities and difficulties of child safeguarding in peacekeeping contexts, based on the data we have gathered in peacekeeping operations. Doing so provides the foundations for demonstrating how and why a child safeguarding framework is crucial for effecting robust system-wide change that safeguards children in these situations.

4 A more comprehensive discussion of the Standards can be accessed on the Keeping Children Safe website: https://www.keepingchildrensafe.global/blog/category/resourcelibrary/.

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

231

Child Safeguarding in Peacekeeping Entities and Actors A key problem within conflict and crisis settings is that laws, policies and practices operate at different scale, including at the international, regional and local levels. This means that peacekeeping entities and actors operating in these contexts require knowledge and understanding of the (often overlapping or, indeed, contradictory) range of laws, policies and contexts that apply. This is particularly difficult when organisations have to enter an emergency setting quickly, or when rule of law has broken down. In these most fragile settings, the opportunity to commit harm with impunity is significantly higher than in other contexts. One of the principal reasons that we have focused on this area over the past seven years is that so few effective solutions have been proposed (let alone designed or implemented) to address the causes and consequences of SEA in those fragile settings. We have therefore adapted the International Child Safeguarding Standards and Toolkit to provide robust, evidence-based solutions through a victim-centred approach which foregrounds human rights5 and human experiences. Research Findings Initially, our work focused on peacekeeping operations, and the need to implement child safeguarding with international organisations, troopcontributing countries and peacekeeping training centres and among other actors involved with peacekeeping and peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict societies.6 Throughout our research we found examples of good practice and areas of weakness or challenge, all of which informed the toolkit that we developed. Some of those findings are as follows in relation to the questions that any organisation needs to ask when implementing child safeguarding. Where, when and how their programmes, partners staff and operations affect children and what risks this may present: Gold standard child safeguarding requires all peacekeeping entities to carry out pre-deployment

5 On a human rights based approach to PSEA, more generally, see Freedman (2018). 6 See reports and resources on the Safeguarding Children In Peacekeeping project

website: https://research.reading.ac.uk/safeguarding-children/.

232

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

risk assessments, identifying where, when and how personnel and associates (civilian, military, implementing partners and external contractors) come into contact with children; assessing the possible risks of harm such contact may pose; and developing strategies to mitigate the risks. This appeared to be a standard practice in UNMIL, MINUSTAH and other peacekeeping operations. There was evidence of some but not all UN entities (funds, programmes and agencies) operating in-country where peacekeeping operations are ongoing. We had similar findings for other, non-UN, implementing partners. Among the TCCs we focused on, there was varied practice about the nature and standard of pre-deployment risk assessments, but none had specific focus on children. What policies and procedures are needed to prevent harm and how to respond to concerns appropriately: This means the reporting procedures must be transparent, efficient, safe, confidential and clearly communicated to children using child-friendly resources, so that victims and survivors know how to lodge and track complaints. This is also key for the subject of the complaint to know when and how their case will be definitively decided; and for those responsible for the investigation to keep track of the whole process. Procedures should be in place to hold all staff to account on their responsibilities, duties and obligations in respect of reporting and for designated staff, tracking and investigating complaints. Where any staff member, including those in mission leaderships and command authorities, fails to take action, they should be subject to disciplinary procedures. In the peacekeeping operations, we visited the UN policy setting out zero tolerance of SEA and the UN reporting procedures were clear, highly visible and extensive efforts were made to communicate them widely. However, there is a need to develop a specific child safeguarding policy alongside the zero tolerance policy to address the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children, as well as to address other types of risks to children, for example, physical or emotional abuse. How to recruit safely: A clear challenge in peacekeeping operations is screening and vetting procedures to weed out potential abusers. Even if police background checks are possible at national or international levels, they are only good up the date they are done on, they only show what the individual has been caught doing and they only reveal child safeguarding violations that are actually against the law in that particular country. They are particularly difficult in countries without universal birth registration, which poses challenges for safe recruitment for local hire staff in some peacekeeping operations. At the international level, despite ClearCheck

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

233

being introduced within the UN system, there remains the issue of safe recruitment where there have been allegations made against humanitarian workers that have not been investigated or upheld, and therefore, do not appear on any background checks. Despite this, there are methods of good practice that need to better be implemented in a streamlined manner, including scrupulous reference requests and follow-up. What safeguarding induction and training is needed to ensure staff know what the organisation expects of them and what to do if they have a concern: Training on prevention of SEA and zero tolerance policy was mandatory for almost all personnel across peacekeeping entities. As a result, we determined to create context-specific open-access training on child safeguarding for peacekeeping personnel. There is also a need for all designated investigatory staff to undertake training in investigating serious child safeguarding allegations, so that when a complaint is made all actions are taken in the best interest of the child. In particular, this should include specialist training on investigative interviewing of children, witnesses and suspects of complaints to avoid re-traumatising the child and to secure high-quality evidence. Does the organisation have a clear code of conduct so that all staff understand their professional boundaries when working with children and what is and is not acceptable behaviour: The code of conduct was extensively promoted, via a number of channels, in peacekeeping operations. For example, in some missions every individual was required to wear a zero tolerance of SEA badge alongside their UN badge. The text on this badge reads: “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse is unacceptable behaviour. Failure of command and control regarding SEA is also subject to appropriate disciplinary measures. It you have concerns, or if you witness SEA you must report it” (Freedman et al. 2017). It gave a number and email address for reporting and had been translated into a number of languages. In other missions, all personnel were given wallet-sized ‘No Excuses’ cards setting out what is expected in terms of PSEA. However, across almost relevant entities there was not sufficient clear focus on or explanation of the code of conduct in relation to children. However, there was less evidence of similar practices among TCCs or implementing partners. And for all entities, there was not a specific focus on children. Who is the appropriate designated person/s to act as the focal point in an organisation to receive and manage any safeguarding concerns and subsequent inquiry/investigation: For UN peacekeeping personnel it is

234

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

clear that this is the Conduct and Discipline Team. In other UN entities, there are clear focal points and reporting structures, and the same exists in TCCs. However, public access to this information let alone to the designated focal points varies across the different entities and actors. Is a locally appropriate reporting and responding process for incidents and concerns in place: We found a wide range of internal and external outreach activities both to prevent SEA and facilitate reporting. This included extensive outreach to schools and community leaders, the development of a wide range of communications materials with prevention of SEA messages and a reporting hotline. For example, t-shirts, posters, exercise books and wristbands. For example, the UNMIL radio station— which reached more than 80% of the population—broadcasted regular programmes addressing this issue and has developed prevention of SEA jingles in a range of community languages. In addition, the radio station broadcasted segments that are run ‘by children for children’ and hosted monthly sessions by the CDT. Everywhere we went in Liberia, the radio station was mentioned as one of the most influential sources of information (Blakemore et al. 2019). Internally, within UN entities, communications materials on prevention of SEA and the reporting were highly visible. Posters, badges, a regular newsletter and a focus on capacity building and communications so that the rules were fully understood and integrated. The peacekeeping operations we visited had implemented a series of enforcement measures which, taken together, have made significant improvements over the past 15 years. However, problems persist, many of which are as a result of gaps in national laws, rules, policies, measures and mechanisms. One significant challenge was the time taken by TCCs to respond to allegations. This suggests that a positive way forward could be that where required, support and technical advice should be made available to TCCs to progress criminal proceedings on SEA within their domestic jurisdictions, with efforts made to promote exchange of information on good practice on tackling SEA of children between TCCs. Research Outcomes As a result of working with these actors, we developed a toolkit to assess each organisation and its strengths and weaknesses, carried out a comprehensive mapping of laws and practice on safeguarding in the countries in which the organisation operates, and then produced and implemented

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

235

safeguarding measures that take into account national laws, institutional policies and context-specific laws and policies. For example, our work with national armed forces in key troop-contributing countries incorporates the policies of the international organisations to which they contribute peacekeepers, their domestic and military laws and the local laws of the countries to which they are deployed. Organisations must be prepared and know how to take action locally when concerns arise; they will therefore need to have information on local services and to identify authorities to whom to report and local organisations which can provide support. These context-specific child safeguarding measures are then integrated into an organisation’s systems and processes in a way that takes account of different country and local contexts. For example, although definitions of ‘child’ and ‘child abuse’ may differ according to national and cultural understandings, organisations need to be clear that in international law ‘children’ are defined as all those under 18 years of age, and that ‘child abuse’ includes the range of acts, intentional or otherwise, which harm children. We piloted implementing child safeguarding for different entities and actors involved in peacekeeping operations. The following—brief— case studies demonstrate the ways in which these were implemented in order to achieve a gold standard of child safeguarding in peacekeeping operations. National Militaries of TCCs: Uruguay became the first country in the world to formalise its commitment towards child safeguarding with the signing of a policy7 for personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping missions (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional 2021). That move followed a series of workshops and technical support based on the toolkit, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defence and personnel from the Uruguayan Peacekeeping Training School. A Training of Trainers guidance (ToT) was developed and personnel serving on UN Peacekeeping missions undertake pre-deployment training on child safeguarding (KCS 2022). Funders and Implementing Partners: We used and adapted our approach and toolkit in order to support funders in assessing safeguarding measures in humanitarian organisations and implementing (which include adults at risk of harm as well as children) and make recommendations to

7 Available at: https://www.keepingchildrensafe.global/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 03/mdn_1342.pdf.

236

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

address any gaps. In one such project, working with the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), the project team designed an assessment framework and conducted initial assessments of thirty-two of the largest UK-funded non-governmental organisations and worked with them to identify areas of strength and weakness across the six main areas of DFID’s safeguarding standards: safeguarding, whistleblowing, human resources, risk management, code of conduct and governance and accountability (KCS 2020a; FCDO 2022). Peacekeepers: We are developing an online, open-access training course for safeguarding children from sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping. Alongside that course, we will produce an accompanying course for communities so that they know their rights and what they can expect in terms of safeguarding. This ground-breaking introductory course is being co-produced with military advisers, serving personnel, legal scholars, safeguarding practitioners and communities affected by peacekeeping operations. The course explains the important differences between child protection and child safeguarding, and the various international agreements that underpin these concepts. It provides an introduction of responsibilities, relevant theory and examples of good practices to help participants understand how to better safeguard children from abuse and exploitation in the context of peacekeeping.

A Proposal for a Child Safeguarding POC Workstream As a result of this research, we have created a proposal for future peace operations to ensure that children are better protected from sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as other forms of harm. No standards can offer complete protection for children, but following these standards and implementing this toolkit minimises the risk of harm to children. The United Nations is mandated to protect some of the most vulnerable people in the world. That protection agenda includes during conflicts, humanitarian crises and disasters. The Protection of Civilians (PoC) agenda has developed over the past 25 years and includes focus on people at particular risk, and on specific thematic issues (Willmot and Sheeran 2013), within which there are workstreams relating to children and to sexual exploitation and abuse. However, there is no specific workstream focused on safeguarding children from sexual exploitation and abuse, which is a gap in the UN’s protection agenda, particularly given the

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

237

specific risks children face in these contexts, and the widespread reports of such harms being perpetrated during current and historic UN operations. As such, we propose that there is a need for a Child Safeguarding PoC workstream; and in this section, we set out what that would entail and how it could be given effect. The United Nations Security Council gives mandates to peacekeeping, which now focus mainly on Protection of Civilians (Gilder 2023), which began with Agenda For Peace in 1992 (UNSG 1992), and has developed significantly since peacekeeping failures in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, among others, and that have continued in more recent years. Protection of Civilians is the responsibility of the whole peacekeeping mission, with each component playing a role. The main ways in which this responsibility is implemented are (i) Protection through dialogue and empowerment, (ii) Providing Physical Protection and (iii) Establishing a Protective Environment. Although Protection of Civilians encompasses a broad range of areas, there are other workstreams aimed at protecting specific groups of civilians or protecting civilians from specific types of harms. Each has its own legislative basis and machinery and has developed at different times, with different penholders, and although there may be overlap each has its own key focus. PoC has come to encompass some of the following areas: Children and Armed Conflict; Genocide Prevention; Humanitarian Relief; Protection of Civilians; Sexual Exploitation and Abuse; Sexual Violence in Conflict; and Women Peace and Security. Each workstream focuses on different forms of harm from which individuals require protection and sets out how actors ought to behave. Two key groups at risk are singled out as requiring specific forms of protection: women and children. That is not to say that others are not at risk, but rather that women and children experience specific, widespread harms that require particular attention within peacekeeping mandates and operations. Where it comes to the specific experiences of children in peacekeeping contexts, the relevant workstreams are: Children and Armed Conflict, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Yet, these mandates are not sufficient to ensure delivery of child safeguarding within peacekeeping operations. Since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1261 (UN 1999) the issue of children and armed conflict has been placed on Security Council’s agenda owing to the disproportionate impact of war on children and identified them as a main group of victims of armed conflict.

238

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

Key focus areas include protecting children from being (i) recruited or used in hostilities, (ii) killed, maimed, raped or sexually abused and (iii) abducted. Implementing this workstream in a peacekeeping mandate typically includes: condemning violations against children; calls for accountability; calls for release, rehabilitation and reintegration of children; child protection tasks, including monitoring, reporting and dialogue, encouraging pre-deployment and in-mission child protection training for peacekeepers. To date there has been no specific guidance for how to achieve those objectives. This is why we are proposing the need for a Child Safeguarding Workstream with concrete requirements for achieving that central aim and related objectives. The workstream would provide a method for complementing and drawing upon the work of the UN Victims’ Rights Advocate in this area. A New Child Safeguarding Workstream As we have demonstrated, child safeguarding within any context requires safeguarding measures that comply with International Standards on Child Safeguarding and the safeguarding must be context-specific and streamlined across an organisation. Creating context-specific child safeguarding measures requires joint-production between the mission and the host state, ensuring that standards adhere to International Standards on Child Safeguarding, laws and policies binding UN personnel and local laws. Children face specific risks, experiences and needs within peacekeeping contexts. In such contexts, not only are children more likely to be abused, but safeguarding measures from prevention through to accountability and remedies are unlikely to exist. Safeguarding children from abuse in those contexts is therefore of paramount importance. Under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1989) all children have the right to be protected from exploitation and abuse and all states party have the responsibility to keep children safe within their jurisdictions. The UN Committee of the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women have identified particular risks and harmful practices faced by girls (OHCHR). Some missions or UN entities within peacekeeping contexts have recognised the need for child safeguarding measures, and implemented some such measures, usually in an ad hoc manner, although there are some examples of best practice include child-focused information on sexual exploitation, on reporting, and on follow-up. The UN ought to have a

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

239

central focus on safeguarding children from the outset of all peacekeeping operations beginning with the mission mandate. As has been highlighted and evidenced by the Victims’ Rights Advocate, the Special Representative on Childre and Armed Conflict, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, children face particular risks and require specific protections. To that end, there is a need for a new PoC workstream focused on child safeguarding. Within peacekeeping operations, there is a clear need to provide specific child safeguarding to protect children from harms caused by parties to the conflict, peacekeeping personnel and other international interveners partnered with the UN. It is the responsibility of the mission to ensure safeguarding, although that does not negate the State’s responsibility to do the same. Implementing comprehensive child safeguarding measures will ensure that the UN upholds its responsibility to ensure that its personnel, programmes and partners do not harm children. The advantages of implementing the Standards include: (a) Children are better protected. No standards can offer complete protection for children, but following these Standards minimises the risk to children of harm. (b) Organisation staff and associates are protected. By implementing these Standards, all staff and associates will be clear about how they are expected to behave with children and what to do if there are concerns about the safety of a child. (c) The organisation and its reputation is protected. By implementing these Standards organisations make clear their commitment to keeping children safe. The Standards will help them to move towards best practice in this area. The Peacekeeping Toolkit provides a robust methodology for contextspecific child safeguarding that adheres to the highest standards. (i) Mapping of relevant laws, norms and standards. (ii) Assessment of existing safeguarding measures. (iii) Co-production of context-specific safeguarding measures. (iv) Training. (v) Follow-up. The mapping of international, UN and TCC/PCC laws, norms and standards will be contained in a central database held by the UN. As a result, any mapping for a new mission will only require a mapping of

240

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

the local laws in order to produce context-specific safeguarding measures. Knowledge of laws and practices provides an essential evidence-base for co-producing and implementing robust and context-specific safeguarding measures. Assessment will occur with the UN entities already on the ground and with the SRSG and Force Commander/Police Commissioner during mission start-up. The assessment identifies gaps and weaknesses that need to be addressed through jointly-produced safeguarding measures. The co-production of safeguarding measures will ensure that they are context-specific, they adhere to International Standards on Child Safeguarding, and that they are streamlined with all other UN peacekeeping operations. Safeguarding within each UN entity in the host state. A Focal Point will be appointed for all UN entities, and it will be their responsibility to ensure that safeguarding measures are implemented and followed. Follow-up will occur periodically throughout the mission, as well as ad hoc when the mission requests support. The toolkit is being trialled and tested in a UN mission and in a large TCC, in order to produce a gold standard of child safeguarding that can be adapted and implemented in all UN peacekeeping entities and actors. To give effect to a PoC workstream that focuses on child safeguarding requires a coalition of UN member states, UN actors, NGOs and other entities to join together to ensure that this issue if foregrounded and championed. Implementing child safeguarding in the UN could take place through a Security Council instruction to the Secretary-General to ensure that this is enacted as part of UN peacekeeping policies, or via a specific Security Council resolution that creates the mandate (as a thematic issue) and then each mission would have to be specifically mandated to carry out that task.

Conclusion Safeguarding children requires each and every individual to understand their obligation to act to prevent and report abuse and the sanctions they will face if they fail to comply. This is crucial for the future of peacekeeping operations, and this chapter has shown why and how child safeguarding must be implemented in all UN peacekeeping operations. Central to that objective is leadership and organisational culture. The head (Special Representative of the Secretary-General—or SRSG) and deputy head (DSRSG) of peacekeeping operations need to provide strong

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

241

leadership and emphasis on combatting sexual exploitation and the importance of this top-down leadership and direction cannot be overstated in addressing the issue. This includes monitoring of what happens to complaints within the system, and clear lines of responsibility, duties and obligations with regard to carrying out investigations and tracking of outcomes. Leadership also needs to come through member states foregrounding child safeguarding in all peacekeeping mandates. It also needs to come via every donor requiring specific child safeguarding within all of implementing partners. Effective safeguarding of children in the context of peacekeeping will require an ongoing commitment to leadership and continuing accountability on safeguarding measures at all levels, and in every organisation involved in peacekeeping. Individual TCCs, the UN Secretariat, UN agencies and civil society organisations in both the TCCs and host states. Without such a commitment, children will continue to be harmed by the very people sent to protect them in conflicts and crises.

Bibliography Barth, E. F. 2004. “The United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia: Gender(ed) Effects” In Gender Aspects of Conflict Interventions: Intended and Unintended Consequences, eds. Louise Olsson et al. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Berents, H., and C. Mollica. 2022. Reciprocal Institutional Visibility: Youth, Peace and Security and ‘Inclusive’ Agendas at the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict 57 (1): 65–83. Blakemore, S., R. Freedman, and N. Lemay-Hébert. 2019. Child Safeguarding in a Peacekeeping Context: Lessons from Liberia. Development in Practice 29 (6): 735–747. Child Protection Working Group. 2012. Minimum Standards for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action, September. Csásky, C. 2008. No one to turn to: The Under-Reporting Of Child Sexual Exploitation And Abuse By Aid Workers And Peacekeepers. London: Save the Children UK. Dahrendorf, N. 2006. Sexual Exploitation And Abuse: Lessons Learned Study, Addressing Sexual Exploitation And Abuse in MONUC, UNDPKO: Best Practices Unit. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 2022. ‘FCDO’s approach to Enhanced Due Diligence Safeguarding’, available at: https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/dfid-enhanced-due-diligence-safeguarding-for-ext ernal-partners/child-safeguarding-due-diligence-for-external-partners.

242

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

Freedman, R. 2018. UNaccountable: A New Approach To Peacekeepers And Sexual Abuse. European Journal of International Law 29 (3): 961–985. Freedman, R., N. Lemay-Hébert, and S. Wills. 2021. The Law and Practice of Peacekeeping, 89–115. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freedman, R, S. Blakemore, and C. Barker. 2017. “Safeguarding Children from UN Peacekeeper Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Liberia,” available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/288346177.pdf. Freedman, R., Blakemore, S., Dressler, A., & Lemay-Hébert, N. 2018. Safeguarding Children from UN Peacekeeper Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Uruguay, available at https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/89432/1/KCS_Report_ URUGUAY_042018.pdf. Gilder, A. 2023. “The UN and the Protection of Civilians: Sustaining the Momentum.“ Journal of Conflict and Security Law. Glanville, L. 2018. Children and R2P: An Introduction. Global Responsibility to Protect 10: 7–17. Highgate, P. 2007. Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation. Men and Masculinities 10 (1): 99–119. Human Rights Watch. 2002. Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/11/26/hopes-betrayed/tra fficking-women-and-girls-post-conflict-bosnia-and-herzegovina. Huynh, K., B. D’Costa & K. Lee-Koo. 2015. Children and Global Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jacob, C. 2018. R2P and the Prevention of Mass Atrocities: A Child-Centric Approach. Global Responsibility to Protect 10: 75–96. Jennings, K., and M. Boas. 2015. Transactions and Interactions: Everyday Life in the Peacekeeping Economy. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9 (3): 281–295. Kappler, S., and N. Lemay-Hébert. 2019. From Power-Blind Binaries to the Intersectionality of Peace: Connecting Feminism and Critical Peace and Conflict Studies. Peacebuilding 7 (2): 160–177. Keeping Children Safe. 2020a, ‘Safeguarding standards with FCDO’, 1t April 2020, available at: https://www.keepingchildrensafe.global/blog/2020/04/ 01/working-with-dfid/. Keeping Children Safe. 2020b. ‘The Safeguarding Children in Peacekeeping Toolkit’, 2nd February 2020, available at: https://www.keepingchildrensafe. global/blog/2020/02/02/the-safeguarding-children-in-peacekeeping-too lkit/. Keeping Children Safe and University of Reading. 2020, ‘Safeguarding Children in Peacekeeping: Guide to the Toolkit’ available at: https://www.keepingch ildrensafe.global/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/KCS_GuideToolkit_102 017.pdf.

SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION …

243

Keeping Children Safe. 2022. ‘Uruguayan Military Acts to Safeguard Children’, 27 February 2022, available at: https://www.keepingchildrensafe.glo bal/blog/2020/02/27/uruguays-military-leads-on-child-safeguarding/. Lemay-Hébert, N. 2011. The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: Assessing the Gap Between Internationals and Locals in State-Building Processes. Third World Quarterly 32 (10): 1823–1841. Lemay-Hébert, N., and S.M. Murshed. 2016. Rentier Statebuilding in a PostConflict Economy: The Case of Kosovo. Development & Change 47 (3): 517– 541. MacKay, A. 2001. “Sex and the Peacekeeping Soldier: The New UN Resolution,” Peace News 2443, available at: https://peacenews.info/node/3602/sex-andpeacekeeping-soldier-new-un-resolution. Mendelson, S. 2005. Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeeping and Human Trafficking in the Balkans. Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. 2021. ‘Uruguay presentó Guía de capacitación para instructores en protección infantil en el ámbito de las Misiones de Paz’, 16 August 2021, available at: https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nac ional/comunicacion/noticias/uruguay-presento-guia-capacitacion-para-instru ctores-proteccion-infantil. OHCHR, ‘Revision of Joint General comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices and General recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/31/REV.1 - CRC/C/GC/18/Rev.1, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-andrecommendations/revision-joint-general-comment-no-18-committee. Podder, S. 2022. Peacebuilding Legacy: Programming for Change and Young People’s Attitudes to Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shusterman, J., and M. Godwin. 2018. ‘Children Heard, Half-Heard?’: A Practitioner’s Look for Children in the Responsibility to Protect and Normative Agendas on Protection in Armed Conflict. Global Responsibility to Protect 10: 19–56. United Kingdom House of Commons. 2018. Oral Evidence: Sexual Exploitation in the Aid Sector, HC 840, 20 February Q99. UN General Assembly. 1989. ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’, 20 November 1989. United Nations, Treaty Series 1577: 3. United Nations. 1996. “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”. UN. Doc. A/ 51/306, 26 August. United Nations. 1999. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1261, ‘Children in Armed Conflicts’, UN. Doc. S/RES/1261, 25 August. United Nations. 2002. Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees By Aid Workers in West Africa, Note by the Secretary-General, UN. Doc. A/57/465, 11 October

244

S. BLAKEMORE ET AL.

United Nations. 2003. Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special Measures For Protection From Sexual Exploitation And Sexual Abuse, UN. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/ 13, 9 October United Nations. 2005a. A Comprehensive Strategy To Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation And Abuse In United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN. Doc. A/59/710, 24 March; United Nations. 2005b. General Assembly Resolution 59/300 on Comprehensive Review of a Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN. Doc. A/RES/59/300, 22 June. United Nations. 2005c. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612, UN. Doc. S/RES/1612, 26 July. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children-UK. 2002. Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001, February, available at: https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/content/dam/ global/reports/health-and-nutrition/sexual_violence_and_exploitation_1.pdf. United Nations Secretary-General. 1992. ‘An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping’, 17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/ 277 Vadi, V. 2018. The Power of Scale in International Law and its Micro-histories. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. 46 (4): 315–348. Wessells, M. 2016. Children and Armed Conflict: Introduction and Overview. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 22 (3): 198–207. Westendorf, J.-K. 2020. Violating Peace: Sex, Aid, and Peacekeeping. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Willmot, H., and S. Sheeran. 2013. The Protection of Civilians Mandate in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Reconciling Protection Concepts and Practices. International Review of the Red Cross 95 (891–892): 517–538.

An Alternative Approach: The African Union’s SEA Regulatory Framework Ai Kihara-Hunt

and Róisín Burke

Introduction How peace operations evolve in the future is likely to be dependent on the UN’s partnerships with external actors. The UN is increasingly reliant on regional organisations in the implementation of international peace and security. This chapter focuses on the UN’s increasing reliance upon regional organisations the African Union (AU), and an aspect of this, AU policies around sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and on conduct and discipline applicable to AU peacekeepers. Such partnerships would work better if the partnering organisation aligns with UN peacekeeping norms and policies on SEA, and in accordance with the UN’s Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces, not least given possible legal implications. That stated, if standards are to be implemented, they must come from the implementing partner

A. Kihara-Hunt (B) University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] R. Burke Public International Law, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4_12

245

246

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

and be tailored to the partner’s practical realities and needs. Any topdown approach is unlikely to be tolerated. Evolving norms and standards pertaining to SEA in AU peacekeeping need to be adapted to the AU context through its lens. Merry and others have referred to this as ‘vernacularization’, a process of translation of norms, adapting them to more localised contexts and value systems (Levitt and Merry 2009; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The AU is an increasingly important player in peace operations in Africa, with the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA includes the Peace and Security Council created in 2002, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Continental Early Warning System (AU 2015; Yamashita 2012). The AU has deployed peace operations to Somalia, Darfur, Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Comoros, and Burundi amongst others. AU peacekeepers have contributed much to peace and security and the protection of civilians in the African region and have often proven willing to deploy to highly volatile environments. The AU often operates prior to or in parallel with the UN and other regional actors, and under a UN Security Council (SC) mandate (AU 2022). To facilitate the UN-AU partnership, a Joint UN-AU Framework for enhanced partnership between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission (AUC) for Peace and Security in the African Continent was signed in 2017 (UNOAU 2022). The most significant AU peace operation proceeding this is the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which transitioned from the prior AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in April 2022 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2022). One issue presenting a potential obstacle to partnerships in peacekeeping between the AU and UN is how accountability for SEA is addressed in AU missions. This aligns with UN goals under its Action for Peacekeeping + initiative, as discussed below. It is vital that SEA incidents in AU missions are addressed in accordance with principles of accountability and transparency, especially considering the UN’s obligation to ensure the human rights compliance of its partners under UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) (UNGA/SC 2013; Burke 2017a, b).1 Where the UN support’s financially, or otherwise, AU peace operations then need to comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 1 On the importance of the HRDDP in the context of the relationship between the AU and UN in peacekeeping, see further, Róisín Burke. (2017a, b). “Due Diligence and

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

247

and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Any failures in this regard could render both the AU and the UN complicit in wrongdoing. Many instances of SEA may constitute violations of IHL and human rights law, in addition to domestic criminal and military laws. Moreover, any failures to address SEA or other serious misconduct by AU peacekeepers will undermine trust in both the AU and UN, and the protection of local populations. AU peacekeepers are deployed to numerous peace operations and are increasingly re-hatted to UN peace operations within short mission transition periods. Moreover, the AU has made strong commitments at a policy level to addressing conflict-related sexual violence and women’s empowerment, including in the context of its Women Peace and Security agenda commitments (‘African Union Legal and Policy Documents’). Research suggests that SEA is rife across the humanitarian community and crimes committed by UN uniformed and civilian peacekeepers as well as NGO practitioners have been well documented (UK House of Commons 2018). Allegations made against UN peacekeepers include rape, forced prostitution, sexual abuse of children, and human trafficking (Simic 2004; Tallyrand 2000; Human Rights Watch 2002). When the issue first became a public concern in the 1990s, many scholars linked the prevalence of SEA in peacekeeping operations to a ‘hyper-masculine culture’ of military institutions (Whitworth 2004; Higate 2004). Other scholars have linked SEA to underlying gender power dynamics, sexism, and race in civil-military relations (Westendorf 2018; Henry 2013). However, the existing scholarly literature on SEA has placed little attention on regional peace operations, such as the African Union, and on how they deal with the issue of SEA. This includes differing standards and policies between peacekeepers in the context of hybrid AU-UN operations, which also causes difficulty in the context of re-hatting of peacekeepers from one organisation’s mission to another. This chapter contributes to existing debates by examining how the AU deals with SEA accountability and by advancing understandings of UN-AU cooperation in this area of peacekeeping governance. Given a general lack of reporting mechanisms and accurate statistics on SEA in AU peace operations, SEA prevalence is difficult to ascertain. However, sufficient information exists to indicate that SEA incidents are not rare in operations led by or UN Support for African Union Security Forces” Journal of International Peacekeeping. 21: 1–62.

248

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

involving the AU. In 2014, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report documenting SEA allegations by AMISOM peacekeeper. It was alleged that sometimes SEA occurred within AU camps, and that instances included rape, transactional sex, prostitution, and sexual abuse of minors (Human Rights Watch 2014). Further SEA allegations were published in UN reports, as highlighted below. While the veracity of the allegations in the HRW report was questioned by the AU, the report nevertheless highlighted the need for adequate regulation of such conduct (Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM 2014). The report and the AU’s response provided some detail on the AU’s regulatory and policy framework applicable to SEA allegations at the time. These response mechanisms were inadequate, not least regarding applicable standards of the AU on SEA and on conduct and discipline of peacekeepers, compliance and accountability mechanisms of the AU when an allegation arises, lack of transparency of what happens to allegation of SEA, little reported tracking of misconduct, unclear SEA reporting mechanisms, inadequate vetting of troops and police personnel, and a lack of remediation for victims (Burke 2017a, b). Allegations of SEA with respect to AU troops also arose in the context of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the AU International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA). In 2015, a leaked United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report highlighted widespread SEA, including of children, implicating non-UN security forces. The report’s focus was on French troops but also identified peacekeepers from AU MISCA. While a subsequent independent investigation into the CAR scandal focused on UN failures adequately handle the allegations, it also illustrated the broader problem of SEA by non-UN security personnel involved in peace operations and a lack of regulation (Deschamps et al. 2015). Rapid re-hatting of AU MISCA peacekeepers in 2014 to the subsequent UN MINUSCA operation reportedly caused difficulties with personnel screening, the integration of contingents with poor human rights records, and likely some uncertainty on applicable codes of conduct (Leaked memo 2017). Human rights concerns arose in the context of the operation in Mali (Di Razza and Sherman 2020). In recent UNSG reports on SEA, allegations of reported SEA by non-UN security forces are recorded (UNGA 2017). SEA allegations were also documented by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) Inspection and Evaluation Division (IED) report

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

249

concerning AU re-hatted peacekeepers in Mali and the Central African Republic (2018). Further SEA allegations towards AU peacekeepers have arisen outside the above contexts, yet AU regulatory responses continue to be slow and lack transparency (UNSOM 2017; MINUSCA Force Commander 2017; Williams 2013; AFP 2013). The AU has acknowledged the need to build on its prevention and response mechanisms for dealing with SEA and broader conduct and discipline issues. This aligns with the AU’s pronounced commitments to the UN’s Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda’s implementation. Indeed, the AU established an Office of the Special Envoy for WPS in 2014, but the role of the office in addressing SEA issues has been minimal. The trend to disconnect SEA from the WPS agenda is not new and undermines progress. The Envoy has stressed the need for monitoring mechanisms and conduct and discipline policies for AU-led peace operations. Under the AU’s Women, Gender, and Development Directorate (WGDD), the AU developed a plan to mainstream gender in AU work. The Directorate developed a Gender Training Manual for African Peacekeepers, which incorporated material on SEA and conduct and discipline (CD) at the time to fill a policy gap. Efforts exerted by the AU over the past few years include two AU policies finalised in 2018, in coordination with the UN: (1) the AU Policy on Prevention and Response to SEA for Peace Support Operations (‘SEA Policy’), and (2) the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for Peace Support Operations (‘CD Policy’). This chapter examines the two main AU policies on SEA accountability. Amidst increasing UN-AU cooperation in peacekeeping the effectiveness and practicality of these policies for AU operations while meeting the UN’s human rights due diligence requirement is important for future UN-AU cooperation. How effectively the two institutions work in the formulation and implementation of these policies may then influence the way UN-AU cooperation develops in peacekeeping, or more widely, in hybrid UN-AU peace and security operations. To examine the AU’s 2018 SEA and CD policies and investigate the context in which they were devised, we undertook an extensive desk-based review of AU and UN documents and policies and gathered quantitative data from existing

250

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

public sources, including that produced by the UN Conduct and Discipline Unit, UN SG Report, and the OIOS.2 The project took place over the course of the past 2.5 years. In this chapter, we will first critique the AU’s developing CD and SEA regulatory framework, providing particular focus on how the framework could be better implemented to support SEA victims. We will focus on the content of 2018 AU SEA and CD policies and explore issues relating to rationale, assumptions, definitions, and immunity coverage (namely the extent to which different categories of AU peacekeepers have different forms of legal immunities from host state jurisdiction and thereby investigation and possible prosecution by the host State). We will then examine issues related to the structure and processes for implementing the policies, including immunities; SEA and CD reporting and investigation mechanisms; and responsibilities of AU and sending states entities. Finally, we will reflect on emerging issues concerning victim assistance and redress and provide some recommendations.

AU-UN Coordination on SEA and CD The AU and the UN have been coordinating their work on SEA in peacekeeping and in establishing prevention and response policies and mechanisms for the past few years. Exchanges of experience, including workshops, have taken place between UN bodies, such as the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the AUC, on compliance with IHL and IHRL by peace operations, and in finalising the AU’s CD and SEA policies. A UN-AU experts roundtable took place in December 2014 in which CD, SEA, and whistle-blower policy drafts were discussed. An Annex to Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with personnel-sending states on CD and SEA issues was also considered, in addition to the establishment of a misconduct database tracking system. The AU’s CD and SEA policies were advanced and finalised with the UN’s involvement. However, little is known about what further progress was made with respect to the whistle-blower policy, or towards developing and implementing monitoring and surveillance tools, such as the establishment

2 Many sources are available through the following link: https://conduct.unmissions. org/.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

251

of a misconduct database tracking system, the creation and roll out of pre-deployment risk assessments, and peacekeeping personnel screening. IHL, human rights, and CD compliance by AU peace operations are closely tied with issues of cooperation and financing between the UN and AU. This partly relates to concerns around human rights due diligence in operating with or lending support to non-UN security forces, and liability risks. Addressing and preventing SEA, and improving accountability, are a formative part of this. The UN is conditioning human rights compliance, and the development and implementation of associated conduct and discipline frameworks, including for SEA, to financing arrangements for AU operations mandated by the UN (International Crisis Group 2020). This also relates to UN policy developments, orientating the UN towards increased partnerships with regional actors as stated above. The UN is also continuing to work with the AU on policies and mechanisms relating to personnel vetting and screening, a case management system, data collection on allegations and the establishment of an AU database system, accountability, and other measures to assist aligns with UN goals under its Action for Peacekeeping + initiative accountability for CD of peacekeepers, and wherein WPS is also a cross-cutting theme. How the AU’s, SEA, and CD policies are tailored to the AU’s needs while also meeting the UN’s human rights due diligence demands, and how effectively UN-AU cooperation works in the formulation and implementation of these policies, are important factors that may indicate future UN-AU cooperation in peacekeeping, and more broadly in peace and security initiatives on the African continent. While the AU’s policies are largely derivative of the UN’s, they are not merely a copy. Some elements of the policies are more ambitious, while other elements are more restrictive, and they differ in rationale, misconduct definitions, assumptions regarding victims, responsible entities, and reporting mechanisms. Policy implementation is the responsibility of the AU, yet the UN must work closely with the AU on the alignment of SEA policies if the UN is to expand cooperation.

AU’s CD and SEA Regulatory Framework The core of the AU’s regulatory framework lies within the Peace and Security Council (PSC), established in 2002. The AU peace and security architecture is therefore in its early phases. In the past, AU responses to SEA allegations appeared to be largely ad hoc and reactionary

252

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

(Burke 2017a, b; UNSG 2003). One known policy is the non-binding AMISOM-specific SEA policy, which has existed since 2013. This was largely framed on the UN Secretary-General’s (UNSG) 2003 Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (AMISOM 2013). It is unclear whether this policy is still in use with the release of the 2018 system-wide policies on SEA and CD (‘AU Policy on Prevention and Response’; ‘AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline’). At least prior to the issuance of the AU’s 2018 policies, ad hoc Boards of Inquiry (‘BOI’) were reportedly established by the AU to investigate allegations of SEA by AU peacekeepers (UNSOM and OHCR 2017). However, questions arose around possible bias and their overall adequacy (HRW 2014; Doc AMISOM/HOM/14/343.14, 5). Otherwise, capacity for minor misconduct incidents existed only within the AU Formed Police Units (FPUs) on mission (HRW 2017, p. 68).

2018 AU SEA and CD Policies In late 2018, the AU’s SEA and CD policies were released. Both the SEA and CD policies are to be read conjunctively as they inform one another in terms of standards and processes (SEA Policy, s.3.3, 10.24). Yet, there appears to be little concrete evidence on the extent of these policies’ operationalisation, despite efforts to obtain such information via interviews with international officials and an extensive desk-based search. Implementation appears to be slow and lacks transparency. It is possible that progress has stalled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Policy Context---Rationale, Assumptions, Definitions, and Scope The 2018 policies entail various procedures for addressing SEA according to the category of the accused personnel. The two policies appear to have addressed many of the critiques of the UN’s approach to SEA (UNGA 2005; UN Doc, 2016, A/71/99). For example, they addressed victims’ rights more holistically and set clear time limits for investigations, reflecting on UN experience. However, as discussed below, in some respects the wording is confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and could be considered ambitious in scope, given staffing and funding constraints within the AU. A CD Unit (CDU) and focal points are to be established. This should work some way towards centralising responsibility for

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

253

SEA allegations to be tracked. It is not clear, though, if the CDU is operational. The rationale of the SEA and CD policies is somewhat problematic. The two policies’ common rationale focuses on reputation management, including ‘image, credibility, impartiality and integrity of the AU’ and ‘[a]ctions to safeguard the image and reputation of the PSO and the AU’, in addition to effectiveness of the mission’s mandate delivery. This gives the impression that the AU is more concerned about its image than possible SEA victims. However, it is positive that the SEA Policy refers to the protection and involvement of victims. This is also in line with increasing UN focus towards SEA. However, the SEA and CD policies themselves are not formulated with the rationale of protecting victims’ rights, as Sabrina Wright discusses in Chapter 5. Another issue with the SEA Policy is the exact scope of conduct actually prohibited, peacekeeping personnel covered by the policy, and the geographic areas covered by the policy (within the mission host state, or also beyond when peacekeepers are overseas on leave or otherwise). In terms of conduct, the 2018 SEA Policy refers to sexual abuse and sexual violence and provides these with different definitions. The former has an emphasis on coercing, threatening, or forcing the victim to engage in sexual activity, which the policy considers evidence of unequal power relations. This definition is confusingly close to the characteristics of exploitation, as an unequal relationship is not a condition for sexual abuse. The latter is explained in a similar way, but includes ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any other form of sexual aggression of comparable gravity’. This may mean that sexual violence is considered more serious than sexual abuse. However, the distinction does not seem to make any difference in terms of the response to the conduct set out in the AU’s policy. Secondly, ‘transactional sex’ is defined very widely. It involves sexual relationships wherein the giving of not necessarily predetermined gifts or services plays an important factor. This may have broader implications for relationships and be dependent on the local culture. Yet, whether it is realistic to prohibit all kinds of transactional sex is questionable. Thirdly, the definition of SEA includes ‘other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour’, but not all humiliating or degrading behaviour is exploitation. Issues around prohibition of all transactional sex have already been the subject of much critique in the academic literature on SEA, and there is a view that the concepts used in policy discourse may undermine victims’ agency

254

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

by diverting attention from underlying factors such as poverty, social justice issues, and gender inequalities. In addition, the narrow concept of exploitation often used in policy discourse risks prohibiting what might sometimes be ordinary sexual relationships (Higate 2004; Simic 2009; Otto 2007). The AU SEA Policy’s provision of two different definitions of sexual exploitation also undermines coherence. The AU’s SEA policy also conceptualises sexual violence and abuse in a problematic, narrow way, focusing solely on sexual violence by men against female victims. This is likely largely based on assumptions that sexual violence is only perpetrated by men against women and girls, yet peacekeeper complicity in SEA has at least also targeted boys. The SEA Policy describes circumstances where sexual abuse occurs as ‘under coercive conditions, which are often reflective of unequal power relations and harmful behaviour’, and the circumstance where sexual exploitation occurs as when ‘a particular person would have had no substantial option’ (Sect. 6.2). Male to male abuse and exploitation, or abuse and exploitation involving minors may not be responded to effectively with this policy. This is apparent in the assumption of the vulnerability and lack of education of the victims the policy describes; in the way assistance to victims is discussed; and also in the way that the policy refers to children born ‘as a result of misconduct’. Furthermore, the CD Policy seems to assume that SEA is committed exclusively, or at least largely, by military contingents and FPU members, rather than all personnel, including civilian personnel. This is problematic given that previous research indicates that more SEA incidents are committed by civilian personnel than uniformed personnel who are often deployed under stricter conduct and discipline regulations of military institutions (Kihara-Hunt 2017). The assumption that SEA perpetrators are military personnel is reflected in the way in which the CD Policy discusses its rationale, as well as the vulnerability of victims, and the assistance and redress needs of victims. It is also apparent from the processes following misconduct allegations, focusing on States sending personnel. For civilian personnel, Individual Police Officers (IPOs), and consultants/contractors, there is generally no contributing State as they are individually contracted to a post and not sent by a state as a unit as is the case with military contingents and FPUs, as discussed below (UN ECOSOC 2005). In fact, IPOs do not appear at all in the CD Policy. The type of personnel covered by the two policies is also confusing. The policies apparently cover all peace operations personnel, including consultants, contractors, and local personnel (SEA Policy, s.3.1; CD

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

255

Policy, s.3.1). Both policies discuss AU member states deploying personnel, but consultants or contractors are not deployed by their states. Their relationship with the AU is not governed through their States. Moreover, the policies’ standards are not incorporated into the bilateral binding legal agreements with deploying States, minimising their standing. The two AU policies set out obligations and responsibilities of countries deploying civilian personnel, which is far-reaching in comparison to equivalent UN policies (SEA Policy, s.15.3; CD Policy, s.8.1.e and 10.10). However, the majority of civilian personnel are deployed under an individual employee contract with the AU and include those who are locally employed.3 In addition, the AU’s, SEA, and CD policies reference ‘countries sending civilian personnel’ as if the only civilian personnel deployed are foreign nationals. This may be related to the SEA Policy’s strong discouragement of sexual relationships between any member of the mission and anyone in the local population (SEA Policy, s.6.4). However, obviously this does not work in relation to local personnel who will often be embedded in the local community and have relationships with members of the local population that they themselves are part of. The geographic scope of the policies also invites confusion. While the two policies state they apply both inside and outside the ‘mission area’ (CD Policy, 3.2; SEA Policy, s.3.1) (otherwise known as the host State), the policies assume that peacekeeping personnel are within the mission area and that the codes they are subject to are those that are only applicable in the mission area (SEA Policy, Definition 3 and s.13 (i)). It is unclear whether the policies apply outside the mission area where the peace operation has been deployed, for example when a person goes on leave outside the mission area, and what codes apply outside the mission area. There is also a different interpretation of the geographic scope between the two policies. The CD policy applies to personnel conduct outside the mission area regardless of whether the individual was on an official duty at the time of the offence, applying ‘at all times, at the workplace and outside of the workplace, on duty and off-duty, including when on leave’ (s.3.2.; s.12.1). This contradicts the SEA Policy, which applies to personnel conduct outside the mission area only when the individual is on an ‘official duty and/or performing tasks in the name of the mission or 3 As given in the SEA Policy’s Definition 5, which states “‘Civilian Personnel’ comprises of all individuals in the service of the PSO… who are not members of the police or military component…”.

256

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

the AU’ (s.3.1). If both policies are to be read conjunctively, this wording needs to be revised for clarity and coherence and in their current existence may provide a convenient loophole to allow states to dodge accountability issues. More positively, the link between SEA and WPS, as well as the relationship between SEA and inequality, discrimination, and patterns of violence, is clearly written in the SEA policy (s.1.3, 9.1). This is noticeable in comparison to the UN’s SEA policy, which lacks reference to such links, and the aforementioned tendency to disconnect considerations around SEA from the WPS agenda.

Immunity and the Status of Personnel In order to pursue individual accountability for SEA, immunity can work as a legal or practical obstacle. It is therefore important to discuss immunity and personnel status as a determinative factor for immunity. The two AU policies have several unique characteristics. The first is that, as discussed, they assume that civilians, not only military and police, are deployed by contributing States. The second characteristic is that police peacekeepers are generally discussed as FPUs. For example, where the CD policy discusses disciplinary proceedings, it states that disciplinary proceedings should be in situ for police and military. FPUs are treated in the same way as military contingents in terms of their status and immunity. This is different from the UN’s approach, where police, including FPUs, are clearly differentiated from military contingents. This may be suitable, given the nature of the police’s work in AU missions and the history of sending police to overseas missions under military command. Overall, police peacekeepers in AU policies are imaged as militarised actors. Immunity Coverage Like UN peacekeepers, AU peacekeepers are granted immunity from host state jurisdiction. The immunities afforded to individuals depend on the category of AU personnel they belong to. High-ranking members of AU missions, including the Special Representative of the Chairperson or

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

257

the Head of Mission (HoM), are given diplomatic immunity in accordance with the OAU General Convention on Privileges and Immunities.4 Other officials are given Experts on Mission status, which means they are accorded functional immunity (CD Policy, s.8.3.1 and 8.3.2). The meaning of ‘Officials’ therefore is different from that in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (‘Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’) (1946, p. 16). Civilian personnel are given a unique status in AU missions, governed by the General Convention and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) (CD Policy, s.9.3). Except for ‘Officials’, they are subject to legal proceedings in the host State as well as in their country of origin (CD Policy, s.4.9). This is more explicitly stated than in the UN’s immunity policy. Where invoking immunity may be against the interest of justice, immunity may be waived by the AU Chairperson (CD Policy, s.9.2). Military contingent personnel are subject to the Troop Contributing Country (TCC)’s exclusive criminal jurisdiction under Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the TCC, and the Status of Forces Agreement or Status of Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA), as is the case with UN peace operations. Unlike in the case of the UN Police, FPUs in AU missions are subject to the contributing State’s exclusive criminal jurisdiction and immune from prosecution in the host State (CD Policy, s.11.2). The status and immunity granted to IPOs and Individual Military Officers are to be governed by an agreement between the AU and the sending State, and by the SOFA/SOMA (CD Policy, s.11.3). This leaves a possibility that IPOs are treated differently from FPUs.

Procedure for Dealing with Misconduct Allegations by AU Personnel Even where it is legally possible to pursue individual accountability for SEA, if the related procedures are non-existent, insufficient, or inappropriate, accountability may not be sought in practice. It is thus important to discuss the procedure of dealing with SEA allegations in the case of the AU. The AU’s CD policy entails a set of complicated, sometimes 4 General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity. Resolution adopted by Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU on 25 October 1965 (Hereinafter ‘General Convention’).

258

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

unclear, and ambitious procedures. It sets out a lengthy, non-exhaustive list of entities within the AU and its peace operations to which an SEA report can be submitted. Beyond the AU itself, other ‘designated’ entities, including NGOs, are also referred to (CD Policy, s.8.12).5 SEA allegations should be filtered by the AU’s CDU. The CD policy stipulates that this will enable confidential reporting (CD Policy. s.8), but it is not evident how this will operate in practice, not least given the multitude of actors involved. Feasibility is questioned on other points as well. The CD Policy requires the Police Unit Commander or Military Contingent Commander to report all allegations of misconduct to the PC or Force Commander (FC) and the CDU/focal point. It also demands that the HoM share all information regarding all cases of misconduct that they are informed about with the AUC (CD Policy, s.8.2.7, 10.6, 11.6). This means all information, reliable or not, including information concerning minor misconduct. Yet, questions around how feasible this is remain. Once an allegation is received, procedures for handling the allegation depend on the seriousness of the allegation (with SEA constituting serious misconduct), and on the alleged perpetrator’s status. The procedures mirror to some extent that of the UN in terms of the responsibility of military contingent commanders, and indeed those of FPUs. Commanders are obligated to report on and take action against alleged perpetrators of SEA and to inform the Force Commander or Police Commissioner (CD Policy, s. 8.2.4–8.2.5, s.10.4, 11.4, s.10.5, 11.5). Yet, the policies remain ambiguous concerning how to deal with individual military or police personnel, or whether this also falls under the jurisdiction of the national police or military contingent commander. Within the AU mission, the HoM has discretion to instigate a Board of Inquiry (BOI), which will operate as a parallel investigation to any national investigation. This consideration is linked to the seriousness of the misconduct, ‘interests of the mission’, and reputational concerns (CD Policy, s.10.12, 11.12, 13), rather than victim rights. Where misconduct is substantiated, the BOI can lead to a variety of administrative measures by the AU, 5 These include, the HoM and Deputy HoM; FC; PC; CDU or focal point; HoM Support; representatives of personnel in mission; supervisory, commanders and chiefs of contingents, components, offices; Offices or Units of Protection, Gender, Human Rights, Child Protection and Civil Affairs; Office of Administration and Human Resources Management; Medical Units; Police Offices; ‘Designated Offices and/or officials in the regions’; ‘Designated NGOs, Community Organizations and host government offices’; and ‘Any other office that the HoM designates’.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

259

such as repatriation, or withholding of mission subsistence (CD Policy, s.10.12–10.16, 11.12–11.16). One unclear point regarding procedures is those for civilian personnel and consultants and contractors. These personnel are regulated in accordance with the terms of their contract (CD Policy, s.9.3, s.9.8), but it is unclear what the procedure is when a crime is perpetrated. While misconduct can be subjected to AU international disciplinary procedures, including possible review by a Disciplinary Board or a BOI, the HoM,and the Director of Administration and Human Resources Management are all non-judicial mechanisms. The process may result in administrative measures only, since any criminal jurisdiction rests with states. Notwithstanding these issues, the establishment of time limits for investigations is a progressive policy. After specified periods, investigative authority can shift. This can work as an encouraging factor for national actors to take action. These time-limit settings are now integrated in the UN’s approach to dealing with SEA in its operations.

Entities Responsible for Implementation of the Policy Framework These procedures involve numerous actors. In various sections of the 2018 policies, the responsible actors and the extent of their authority or obligations are unclear. A number of entities within and outside the AU system may receive reports of SEA. The Peace Support Operations Centre (PSOC), the WGDD, and the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS are also vaguely referred to as partially responsible for policy guidance, operationalization, and support (SEA Policy, s.1.5, 9.1). A CDU at the headquarters and the mission-level focal points are to be established to provide a confidential reporting mechanism for misconduct. On top of that, the PSC maintains a degree of oversight of and guidance on mission-related conduct and discipline (CD Policy, s.15.2). The policies require the AUC to develop an implementable work plan, including progress indicators. The AUC is tasked with establishing a ‘capacity’ on CD at their inception. It must encourage state action wherein nationals commit SEA. It must also work towards sensitisation on CD and SEA policies, and build operationalization capacities. A core AUC task is, then, to ensure the establishment of an effective screening mechanism to prevent deployment or redeployment of ‘prior offenders’ (CD Policy, s.15.4).

260

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

The HoM is another important actor, holding ‘overall’ responsibility for good CD and implementation of the 2018 policies. While the HoM is to be supported by the CDU, ‘others’, and a ‘multifaceted working group’, the policies’ language is rather non-specific in this regard. The HoM must ensure proper procedures are in place to deal with misconduct allegations against peace operations personnel. The HoM must also ensure policy dissemination, develop a mission-specific SEA work plan, ensure investigations are conducted when SEA allegations arise, and maintain data on mission-related conduct and discipline allegations (CD Policy, s.15.5). States’ responsibilities are unclear with regard to misconduct by civilian personnel. Under CD policy, States sending military contingents and FPUs must screen personnel, vest their commanders with the authority to take action when misconduct arises, investigate allegations, refer cases to national authorities, and update the HoM on conduct and discipline matters. Moreover, States need to appoint a national liaison point for CD matters (CD Policy, s.15.3). Such liaison points may better enable the processing of child support claims, investigations, and subsequent legal processes within national jurisdictions (CD Policy, s.15.3). Manager’s and commanders’ responsibilities are also set out in the policies. Both are responsible under the CD policy for taking measures to prevent misconduct and to address it where it arises (s.12.3, 12.4). This mirrors the UN’s revised Model MOU, which embeds command responsibility (A/C.5/63/18, Article 7). Command and managerial responsibility have over the years been identified as pertinent to the prevention of, and response to, SEA in the context of UN peace operations (Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010). Accordingly, the AU’s policies setting out these responsibilities are commendable.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

261

Victim Assistance Appropriate redress and assistance to victims6 are at the core of accountability. Here, the term ‘redress’ means making the wrong (in this case damage caused by SEA) right, including by providing material and symbolic reparations (UN OHCHR 2023). Assistance, on the other hand, has a narrower meaning: mostly material support. In this regard, the AU’s SEA and CD policies are detailed in scope on a proposed victim assistance framework. However, issues remain in that the policies lack clarity in places, and certain parts appear overly ambitious. Problematic assumptions regarding victims may also have something to do with these issues. SEA policy indicates that the AU takes a ‘victim-focused approach’. Presumably, what is meant is a ‘victim-centred approach’. This concept is commonly used in policy circles dealing with conflict-related sexual violence and in transitional justice discourses. A victim-centred approach advocates for shifting focus from the perpetrator and the crime, to the needs and rights of the victim, including the right to a remedy, and integrating the victim’s voice in that process (Freedman 2018). For example, UNHCR’s Policy on a Victim-Centred Approach in UNHCR’s response to Sexual Misconduct Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment states that protection and the rights and dignity of victims are core to any response to sexual misconduct. A key aspect of developing such a response is to ensure that victim voices are listened to regarding their needs, re-traumatization is avoided, victim safety and wellbeing are prioritised, and systematically focuses on their safety (UNHCR 2020). Indeed, the UN Victim Rights Advocate in recent years has been advocating for a victim-centred approach to victims of SEA by UN peacekeepers, centring victims’ voices, dignity, and rights to SEA responses (2019). The AU’s policies appear to be influenced by this approach. Nevertheless, the UN lacks a common understanding of what such an approach practically entails (OIOS IED 2021). Some difficulties with applying a victim-centred approach include: ascertaining who a victim is,

6 Note that the term survivor is favoured by many. In this chapter the term victim is used, as it aligns with the terminology used in AU and UN policy documents. This is not intended to detract from the position of survivors of SEA and their agency, or to victimise them.

262

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

determining which victims’ voices matter, and recognising the reality that victims’ voices and needs differ (Rudling 2019). The AU SEA Policy acknowledges the right of victims to a remedy, including of children born as a result of SEA. It notes that a remedy may entail ‘access to justice, reparations and being informed about the process’. The AU indicated in 2014 in response to the HRW report, that it is working on a compensation policy for SEA victims, but there is no public evidence of progress on this (HRW 2014; AU Letter annex, 3, 7). The AU SEA policy stipulates that outcomes of investigations and any subsequent process ‘should’ be communicated with SEA ‘victims’, framing this in non-obligatory language. One would imagine that ‘victims’ in this context was meant to cover complainants. The policy further recommends that they should be involved in the criminal justice process if possible. There are then issues of unclear responsibilities amongst numerous actors at multiple levels apparently involved in victim assistance and redress. The SEA Policy stipulates that, where any AU mission personnel are found to have committed SEA, they must provide ‘assistance’ or ‘pay redress’ to the victims, which includes their families (s.8.1.d). It is unclear what is meant by this assistance, financial or otherwise, nor how to pursue this. This would need to be facilitated by the AU and sending States. The same policy sets out that the ‘AUC, PSOs, P/TCCs and countries sending civilian personnel’ should ‘consider’ cases for assistance. These multiple avenues may actually serve to undermine the provision of assistance and/ or redress. It should be made clear in the wording of the SEA and CD policies exactly how and who decides which victims/complainants need assistance and types of assistance required. The term ‘consider’ further suggests that redress and/or assistance is not a legal right. Likewise, the SEA policy states that a mechanism, that it may establish in the future, may ‘consider’ appointing a Victim Advocate (s.10.40). According to the CD policy, responsibility for establishing a mechanism to support victims rests with the HoM, and the establishment of such a mechanism is particularly necessary when IHL or IHRL allegations arise (s.14.7). Yet, criminal conduct may or may not constitute IHL or IHRL violations. The SEA policy states that the HoM should be assisted by the CDU, CD focal point, ‘and/or the gender, civil affairs, political or human rights offices or units’ (s.14.3). However, it is unclear what this victim support mechanism constitutes. Moreover, the appointment of a Victim Advocate is discretionary, leading again to a lack of clarity. Even

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

263

where a Victim Advocate is appointed, they may be drawn from the local community or NGO, which may jeopardise victim confidentiality unless carefully protected. From the wording of the two policies, any assistance mechanism established should at least cover all types of serious misconduct. It would therefore be logical that such a mechanism should not be ad hoc, given the scope of conduct covered. The problematic assumption in the SEA policy that ‘victims’ are presented as vulnerable, powerless, disadvantaged, and uneducated further justifies the appointment of a Victim Advocate or ‘victim facilitator’ in the CD policy (s.14.6.a). However, this generalised portrayal of survivors of SEA as homogenous, passive victims may not be helpful in assisting them because it further entrenches the idea they have limited agency. The use of the term victim also contradicts the two policies’ emphasis on a tailored approach to ‘victim assistance’ since it suggests mechanisms will meet the needs of all (CD Policy, s.14.5, 14.6(a); SEA Policy, s.10.40(a)). Yet this mirrors many of the stereotypes of Sexual or Gender Based Violence (SGBV) victims, foremost seen as vulnerable females, already prevalent in the international humanitarian community (Anholt 2016; Holmes 2013). The SEA policy does not address the victim’s informed consent to avail of the assistance of an Advocate, nor their input in choosing one. However, the policy indicates that is good practice to obtain the consent of the victim to provide any assistance or redress (CD Policy, s.14.6(b); SEA Policy, s.10.40(b)). This should be framed in obligatory language. Under the CD policy, victims have an entitlement to assistance or redress from the perpetrators’ country of origin or ‘other sources’ deemed appropriate. It is not apparent that the AU has sufficient resources to realise assistance from its own resources, especially taking into consideration that both the CD policy and the SEA policy require assistance to be considered for all cases (s.14.6; s.10.40). The CD policy also requires the AUC to provide victims with support in pursuing such claims (SEA Policy, s.10.32). The forms of support the AUC will provide are not elaborated on. The SEA Policy states that the AUC will establish a mechanism to support the provision of assistance and/or redress to victims and their families. However, the policy also states that the primary responsibility for the provision of redress or assistance remains with the state contributing personnel (SEA Policy, s.10.33.). Further clarity is needed if this is to be implemented effectively. Firstly, it is unclear whether this also covers individual police or military personnel. Secondly, it is not apparent whether

264

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

the AUC’s proposed mechanism will provide actual assistance or redress, or rather merely support assistance/redress provided by the sending State, or possibly the perpetrator. Thirdly, to date, there is no publicly available evidence on a support mechanism has been established. Finally, the authors recommend that primary responsibility for the provision of assistance and/or redress in case of civilian personnel would be better situated with the AUC. More questions remain. The AU SEA policy is intended to revolve around three considerations in providing assistance or redress: the best interests of victims and children born as a result of SEA; resources available to the peace support operation; and the minimisation of ‘disparities amongst similar or comparable cases’ (SEA Policy, s.10.30(a)-(c); CD Policy, s.14.6(c),(d),(f)). However, little is known concerning how decisions are expected to be made regarding the best interests of victims and children, by who, and how these decisions are to be balanced with the rights of the child to assistance and redress. In addition, the AU is faced with funding challenges and there are no clear channels of funding dedicated to supporting survivors of SEA (UNSC 2017). The third consideration is also problematic if it means that SEA victims will get insufficient assistance/redress in a host State where victims of sexual violence generally do not receive much assistance/redress. In Somalia, for example, support to victims of sexual violence is poor, partially due to a lack of safe houses throughout Somalia, gender and customary norms, the need for capacity building of the justice system and service providers on sexual violence, and difficulties with navigating the plural legal system (Legal Aid Providers 2014). If other local victims’ experiences of SGBV go unaddressed, does the AU SEA policy hold that such cases are comparable? If it does, are possible victims of SEA committed by AU personnel to be similarly limited? It is not apparent whether the policy is suggesting that assistance/redress must be lowered to match the local reality. Moreover, the rationale of this section is ambiguous, as is how such a comparison/decision is to be made, and how it relates to victims’ rights. One progressive aspect of the AU SEA policy is its explicit acknowledgement of children born as a result of SEA (s.8.1.e.). This may be because gaps in UN policy in this regard spurred calls for change at the UN level (Blau 2016). The AU SEA Policy states that they must be assisted in obtaining child support, ‘including through legal, diplomatic and other appropriate means’ (SEA Policy, s.10.41). However, the policy

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

265

does not further expand on whose responsibility it will be to facilitate this. AU policies are also progressive in the follow-up requirement of victim assistance/redress. The above-mentioned victim support ‘mechanism’ is intended to follow-up on assistance or redress provided. It is the responsibility of the mission to develop a system to track and follow-up on victim assistance (CD Policy, s.14.8–14.9), and the tracking of victim assistance has been introduced at the UN only in 2019 (Action for Peacekeeping 2019). Questions also arise concerning the completion of victim assistance. The CD policy requires assistance to be provided until there is an ‘outcome’ (s.14.2), yet the policy does not indicate what the parameters of this should be. Nor does the policy outline how longer-term implications and lasting damage caused by SEA should be addressed. Read in parallel with the SEA policy, a case would be considered closed once redress is received and acknowledged by the victim, or it is deemed that the victim is fully assisted and can address ‘the needs arising from the misconduct independently’ (s.10.36). One questionable requirement is that complainants and victims should receive individually tailored assistance, such as logistical, medical, legal, and/or psycho-social support, and safe shelters (CD Policy, s.14.5; SEA Policy, s.10.35). Such assistance would have to be provided by the AUC or mission, and feed into a network of local NGOs and medical care providers, like in the case of the UN (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2005). The SEA policy notes the need to consult with local communities in reviewing cases and requests for assistance, but how these consultations will be conducted and the impact they may have is not clear in the policy (SEA Policy, s.10.34). Victims themselves should foremost be consulted. The provision of assistance is not a form of reparation,7 and can be provided to both victims and complainants (SEA Policy, s.10.40.c). It does not amount to recognition of responsibility. Unlike the CD policy, the SEA policy recognises that SEA victims are not homogenous and that their needs and priorities vary. The situation of SEA victims will differ, and intersect with variables such as gender, socio-economic situation,

7 Within the UN’s response, SEA victims have rarely been assisted. Carla Ferstman, ‘Reparations for sexual exploitation and abuse in the (post-)conflict context: the need to address abuses by peacekeepers and humanitarian workers’, in eds. Carla Ferstman and Mariana Goetz, Reparations for victims of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2020, 271–97.

266

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

age, geographic location, capabilities, minority status, empowerment, and other experiences. While not stated in the SEA and CD policies, taking victim agency as the starting point is critical to a victim-centred approach, enabling them to inform the processes, content, and responses to their experiences. The need for a victim-centred approach in addressing sexual violence is increasingly called for in transitional justice and postconflict state-building contexts where gendered needs are included. In this context, the AU policies appear to be progressive in recognising the need for the victim’s voice, possibly because of the AU’s empowerment focus in their general policy (Holmes 2020).

Conclusion This chapter showed how the AU’s 2018 CD and SEA policies respond to a gap in the regulation of SEA in AU peace operations. They set out detailed obligations and responsibilities for AU entities and AU troop and police contributing countries. However, the policies are at times confusing, ambiguous, or contradictory, not least in terms of their inclusion of multiple lines of responsibility for enforcement and prevention. Some provisions only state that the AU mission has an obligation to do something (CD Policy, s.14.7, 14.8, 14.9, 15.5.(a)). In such a case, it is unclear whose responsibility each action is—whether the head of mission, the TCC, PCC, or the AU. There is little evidence that some procedures and tools referred to in the Policies, such as the Misconduct Tracking and Analysis Database (MTAD) and Checklist for TCCs/PCCs, are yet in place or are being implemented (CD Policy, s.15.4.(g) and 15.4.1). This chapter has shown that several issues remain with the AU’s SEA and CD policies: their reputation-centred rationales, coherence, and transparency in their implementation. It will be necessary to revisit them to clarify the definitions, the scope of the policies, various types of personnel including non-contingent-type personnel, and accountability procedures for each type of personnel, to ensure feasibility. In addition, the manner in which assistance and redress are conceptualised within the AU’s CD and SEA policies is vague, and often the term assistance is used interchangeably with redress, or as an alternative to redress. Moreover, substantive consideration of witness and victim protection measures is missing from the AU’s policies. Reformed processes and structures must include a specific Victim Assistance Strategy as well as focal points for the provision of such assistance. This should be supported

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

267

by a specific fund for the provision of assistance to SEA victims. An SEA Trust Fund was established for SEA victims at UN level, which has funded several projects focused on the provision of both indirect and more direct support to SEA victims and their communities, outreach, and livelihood support projects, despite being underfunded (OIOS IED 2021). If the AU is to create a similar fund, the regional body should outline clearly the purpose of the fund and indicate how funds would be allocated to assist SEA survivors directly. In line with UN Security Council Resolution 1888, vetting, screening, and state-written certification of UN military and police personnel deploying in contingents or units are required prior to deployment to UN peace operations, to better ensure that those deployed have not committed human rights or IHL violations, or ‘have been repatriated on disciplinary grounds from a UN operation’ (UNSC 2009). A similar approach with regards to AU peacekeepers seems warranted. In conclusion, the AU’s SEA and CD policies appear to reflect lessons learned from the UN’s experience, adjusted in part towards the AU’s needs, but a number of issues remain. Policy implementation seems to be largely left to the AU without much transparency. Currently, the UN has no means, at least publicly, to know how the SEA accountability framework is working in the AU. This makes it difficult for the UN to expand cooperation with AU while strictly observing due diligence. It may take some time, but it is important for the UN to closely work with the AU on the alignment of SEA policies if the UN is to expand cooperation.

Bibliography Action for Peacekeeping. 18 December 2019. Fact Sheet: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse - Peacekeeping Initiatives in Action, 3. https://peacekeeping.un. org/sites/default/files/sea_fact_sheet_1.pdf. African Union, African Union Policy on Conduct and Discipline for Peace Support Operations, https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/english-final-au-pol icy-for-conduct-discipline-in-pso.pdf. ———. African Union Policy on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for Peace Support Operations. https://www.peaceau.org/upl oads/english-final-sea-policy-for-au-psos.pdf. ———. Specialised Technical Committees, https://au.int/en/stc, accessed 19 August 2022. ———. “The Peace & Security Council,” https://au.int/en/psc. accessed 18 August 2022.

268

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

———. AU Doc PSC/PR/2(DII) 29 April 2015. http://www.un.org/en/afr ica/osaa/pdf/au/cap_peaceops_2015.pdf . AFP. 20 August 2013. Somalia gang rape victim accuses African Union force, Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/world/somalia-gang-rape-vic tim-accuses-african-union-force, accessed 18 August 2022. AMISOM. September 2013. Easy to Read Guide on AMISOM SEA Policy, https://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Easy-to-read-guide_ AMISOM-SEA-POLICY.pdf. ———. 19 October 2014. Letter to HRW from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of AMISOM. Doc AMISOM/HOM/14/343.14, 5. Anholt, R. 2016. Understanding Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Cutting Ourselves with Occam’s Razor. Journal of International Humanitarian Action. 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-016-0007-7. Blau, L. 2016. Victimizing Those They Were Sent to Protect: Enhancing Accountability for Children Born of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by UN Peacekeepers, Syracuse J Intl Law & Commerce 44: 121. Burke, R. 2017a. Due Diligence and UN support for African Union Security Forces: Peacekeeper Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Abuse. Journal of International Peacekeeping 21 (1–2): 1–61. https://doi.org/10.1163/187 54112-02101001. ———. 2017b. Due Diligence and UN Support for African Union Security Forces: Peacekeeper Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Abuse. Journal of International Peacekeeping 21: 1–61. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946. UN Treaty Series 1946–1947 , 16. COE Manual/Revised Model MOU, UN Doc. A/C.5/63/18, Article 7. Deschamps, M., Jallow, H. and Sooka Y. 17 December 2015. Taking Action on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic, pp. 34. Di Razza, N. and Sherman, J. April 2020. “Integrating Human Rights into the Operational Readiness of UN Peacekeepers,” International Peace Institute, p 5. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2004_Integra ting-Human-Rights.pdf. Finnemore, M. and Sikkink K. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, pp. 887–917. Freedman, R. 2018. “UNaccountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse,” European Journal of International Law, 29(3): 961–985. https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/29/3/961/5165638#124222700.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

269

Henry, M. 2013. ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: Problematising Current Responses’, eds. Sumi Madhock et al., Gender, Agency and Coercion, London: Palgrave Macmillian, 122–142, 125–126. Higate, Paul. 2004. “Gender and Peacekeeping Case Studies: The DRC and Sierra Leone.” Institute for Security Studies Monograph 91: 6–63, 22–23, 43– 44 Holmes, G. 2013. Women and War in Rwanda: Gender, Medial and the Representation of Genocide, London/New York: I.B Tauris; Georgina Holmes. Women and War in Rwanda: Gender, Media and the Representation of Genocide. London: I.B. Tauris. Holmes, G. 2020. Strengthening UK Support for Gender Responsive, PeopleCentred Peacekeeping in Africa. The RUSI Journal 165 (5–6): 36–45. ‘Hopes: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina’. 26 November 2002. Human Rights Watch (online), 14 http://www. hrw.org/reports/2002/bosnia/. Human Rights Compliance Framework. 2020. “The Price of Peace: Securing UN Financing for AU Operations,” Report No. 286, Section B. International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/286-price-peace-securingun-financing-au-peace-operations. Human Rights Watch. 8 September 2014. The Power These Men Have Over Us: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-menhave-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces . Kihara-Hunt, A. 2017. Holding UNPOL to Account, Leiden: Brill: 104–105. Legal Aid Providers Supporting Gender Based Violence Survivors in Somalia: Report and Recommendations (Legal Action Worldwide, UNDP, UNFPA, 2014), pp. 1–96, https://www.legalactionworldwide.org/gender-equalitygbv/report-legal-aid-providers-supporting-gender-based-violence-survivorsin-somalia/. Letter to HRW from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM (19 October 2014), amisom/hom/14/343.14. Letter dated 2 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. (5 January 2013) UN Doc s/2015/3, p. 6. Levitt, P. and Merru. S. 2009 Vernacularization on the ground: local uses of global women’s rights in Peru, China, India and the United States, 9 GLOBAL NETWORKS 441, pp. 446–447. MINUSCA Force Commander to DPKO Military Advisor for Peacekeeping Operations. (12 May 2017), Leaked memo, 8, https://static1.squarespace.com/ static/514a0127e4b04d7440e8045d/t/593704c246c3c490c3ee0b24/149 6777924587/CAR+memo.pdf.

270

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

———. 14–16 March. Leaked Memo, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 514a0127e4b04d7440e8045d/t/59370 . OIOS IED. 12 February 2018. “Evaluation Report: Evaluation of re-hatting in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional”, Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Assignment No. IED-18–002. ———. 19 March 2021. Evaluation of the prevention, response and victim support efforts against sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations Secretariat staff and related personnel, 41–42, 45, 39, 135. Otto, D. 2007. Making Sense of Zero-Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Economies. In Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements, ed. Vanessa Monro and Carl Stychin, 260–270. Cavendish: Routledge. OVRA. 2021 “Frequently Asked Questions: On the work of the Victims’ Rights Advocate and Senior Victims’ Rights Officers”, https://www.un.org/preven ting-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/sites/www.un.org.preventing-sexual-exp loitation-and-abuse/files/un-ovra-qa-booklet.pdf, pp. 14. Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010. UN Doc A/64/19, pp. 48, 52. Rudling, A. 2019 ‘What’s Inside the Box? Mapping Agency and Conflict within Victims’ Organizations’. International Journal of Transitional Justice, pp. 458, 464–466. OUP. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijz025. Simic, O. 2009. Rethinking ‘sexual exploitation in UN peacekeeping operations. Women’s Studies International Forum 32 (4): 288–295. ‘Somalia gang rape victim accuses African Union force’, Fox News (online), 20 August 2013. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SO/Rep ortProtectionofCivilians.pdf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Data and Trends on Multilateral Peace Operations”, https://www.sipri.org/research/conflict-peaceand-security/peace-operations-and-conflict-management/data-and-trendsmultilateral-peace-operations, accessed 18 August 2022. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Aid Sector 31 July 2018. UK House of Commons, International Development Committee, HC 840, https://public ations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/840/840.pdf. Simic, O. 16 November 2004. ‘Accountability of UN Civilian Police Involved in Trafficking of Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, University for Peace and Conflict Monitor (online), http://www.monitor.upeace.org/pdf/bosnia.pdf. Tallyrand, I. 2000. Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and Abet International Trafficking in Women. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce. 27: 166.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE AFRICAN UNION’S SEA …

271

UN, African Union Legal and Policy Documents on Gender, Women, Peace and Security, https://www.un.org/shestandsforpeace/content/african-unionlegal-and-policy-documents-gender-women-peace-and-security. UN Department of Peace Operations, Department of Operational Support. (May 2021) United Nations Manual for the Generation and Deployment of Military and Formed Police Units to Peace Operations, 36–38. ———. Gender Unit. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations: Progress Report, 14. https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/ files/dpko_gmprogressreport_2005_0.pdf. UN ECOSOC. 7 July 2005. ‘Working paper on the accountability of international Personnel Taking Part in Peace Support Operations Submitted by Françoise Hampson’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/42. 6–9. UNGA. 24 March 2005. ‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, UN Doc. A/59/710. ———. 7 March 2008. United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel, Annex (‘SEA/VAM’), [6]-[7]. Sixty-second session. A/RES/62/214. ———. 23 June 2016. ‘Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic’, UN Doc. A/71/99. ———. 28 February 2017. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach Report of the Secretary-General. UN Doc A/71/818: para. 8, para. 32–35. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/N17/054/00/PDF/N1705400.pdf?OpenElement. UNGA/SC. 5 March 2013. Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces, Annex to “Identical letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council” UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110. UN OHCHR. ‘Reparations’, https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice/ reparations, accessed 2 April 2023. UNHCR. April 2020. Policy on a Victim-Centred Approach in UNHCR’s response to Sexual Misconduct: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment, https://www.unhcr.org/5fdb345e7.pdf. UNSC. 30 September 2009., Resolution 1888, 3. ———. 20 September 2017. Resolution 2378. S/RES/2378. UNSG. 9 October 2003. Secretary-General’s Bulletin —Special Measures for the protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abus e. UN Doc ST/SGB/ 2003/13. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/405ac6614/secret ary-generals-bulletin-special-measures-protection-sexual-exploitation.html.

272

A. KIHARA-HUNT AND R. BURKE

UN. SEA Fact Sheet, 2. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/sea_ fact_sheet_1.pdf. UNSOM and OHCR. 10 December 2017. Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia, 32, 70. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/protection-civilians-buildingfoundation-peace-security-and-human-rights-somalia. United Nations Office to the African Union, “Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security.” https://unoau.unmissions. org/sites/default/files/jount_un-au_framework_for_an_enhanced_partne rship_in_peace_and_security.pdf., accessed 18 August 2022. Westendorf, J. 2018. ‘WPS and SEA in Peacekeeping Operations’, eds. Sara Davies and Jacqui True, The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security, New York: OUP, 222–23, 226 Whitworth, S. 2004. Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Williams, P. 2013. ‘The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges’, 2(2) International Journal of Security and Development http:// www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bz/. Yamashita, H. 2012. ‘Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations’, 38 Review of International Studies, 165.

Index

A Accountability, 8, 12, 14, 29, 139, 158, 184, 197–203 Accountable, 54, 55, 159, 199, 203, 208, 212 Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), 9, 46, 55, 105, 106, 132, 174, 188, 189, 210, 211, 246, 251, 265 Afghanistan, 49, 54, 85 Africa, 3, 13, 48, 75, 119, 120, 131–134, 142, 143, 145, 146, 159, 246 African-led international support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), 162 African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), 164, 165, 248 African Union (AU), 9, 10, 13, 14, 132–137, 140–147, 152, 155, 165, 245–252, 254, 256–258, 260–267 African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), 246, 248, 252

Aircraft, 76, 78–81, 83–87 Asia, 48 Atrocities, 50, 56, 73, 74, 82, 88, 93, 100, 104, 155

B Bambari, 71, 77–82, 88 Bosnia, 46, 72–75, 85, 98, 99, 201, 225 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 225 Bottom-up, 11, 46, 47, 51, 153, 161, 162 Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 61 Brahimi Report, 4, 5, 74 Burundi, 132, 159, 246

C Cambodia, 225 Cameroon, 157 Canada, 12, 74, 87 Capacity-building, 54, 55, 57, 59 Capstone Doctrine, 5, 6, 95, 101

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Gilder et al. (eds.), Multidisciplinary Futures of UN Peace Operations, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38596-4

273

274

INDEX

Central African Republic (CAR), 3, 44, 45, 49, 53, 71, 76, 78, 81–84, 86, 87, 100, 101, 159, 164, 165, 184, 204, 246, 248, 249 Chad, 132 Chapter VII, 6, 136 Child protection, 14, 174, 175, 177, 179, 180, 186–189, 226, 236, 238 Children, Peace and Security (CPS) Agenda, 174, 180, 182, 186, 187, 189 Child safeguarding, 14, 227–233, 235–241 China, 2, 8, 45 Chinook, 86, 87 Civilian protection, 91, 93, 100, 106, 137, 145 Climate, 46, 123, 174 Colombia, 45, 49, 184 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 23, 135 Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), 8, 183 Congo, 52, 83–85, 101 Cote D’Ivoire, 45 Counter-insurgency, 7 Counter-terrorism, 7, 11, 102 Coup d’etat, 76 COVID-19, 43, 45, 131, 174, 252 Cyberattack, 51 Cyber-crime, 59 Cyberspace, 48, 51, 59 Cyprus, 124

D Darfur, 45, 72, 84, 134–141, 143, 146, 246 Decolonisation, 92, 132 Democracy, 34, 35, 93

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 2, 3, 44, 46, 47, 49, 53, 72, 86, 100, 126, 162 Department for International Development (DFID), 236 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 6, 139 E Early response system, 27 Early warning system, 175, 178, 183, 184 Ebola, 131 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 23, 24, 162 ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), 23 Egypt, 116, 117, 119 Empirical, 60, 177, 178 Empowerment, 198, 205, 207–209, 237, 247, 266 Enforcement, 2, 6, 12, 43, 72–74, 160 Ethiopia, 155, 159, 165 European Union (EU), 3, 9, 102 F Feminism, 174, 199, 204 Fieldwork, 14, 44 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), 227, 236 Formed police units (FPUs), 53, 54, 252, 254, 256–258, 260 Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC), 77, 80–82 G Gender, 8, 106, 174, 175, 177, 180, 186–188, 197, 198, 203–208,

INDEX

212, 247, 249, 254, 262, 264, 265 Genocide, 73, 135, 182 Germany, 83, 87, 88 Guinea, 223 Guinea-Bissau, 49 Guterres, Antonio, 9, 47, 207–209 H Hammarskjöld, Dag, 96 Helicopters, 12, 71–75, 81, 83–89 Hezbollah, 30, 122 Hifz al-salam, 13, 152–155, 159, 163–167 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 6, 103, 106, 185 Hybridity, 32 I Immunities, 199, 250, 256 Impartiality, 11, 95, 99, 165, 166, 253 Impunity, 2, 72, 73, 88, 197, 229, 231 India, 75, 88, 98 Inequality, 28, 36, 181, 204, 207, 208, 256 Insecurity, 10, 25, 50, 142, 143, 181, 205 Instability, 48, 49, 122, 141, 165, 166, 168 Intelligence, 7, 30, 51, 59, 73, 80, 83, 86, 126 International Criminal Court (ICC), xi International humanitarian law (IHL), 139, 140, 246, 250, 251, 262, 267 International human rights law (IHRL), 247, 250, 262

275

Intersectionality, 204, 208 Interventionist, 2, 11 Israel, 116–119, 121, 122, 124 J Janjaweed, 135 Jerusalem, 116, 121, 124, 125 Juba, 177 K Kigali, 73 Kofi Annan, 99, 202 Korea, 74 Kosovo, 46, 73, 159 L Leadership, 26, 28, 53, 96, 141, 145, 209, 240, 241 Lebanon, 30, 115–118, 122, 123 Legitimacy, 30–32, 36, 46, 49, 56, 94, 100, 101, 104, 106, 141, 164, 166, 168, 198–200, 208 Liberia, 22–24, 26–29, 31, 36, 45, 54, 55, 159, 223, 224, 234 Libya, 49, 54, 74 Localised, 246 M Mainstreaming, 197, 205–207 Malakal, 4 Mali, 2, 3, 7, 13, 44, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 72, 75, 83, 84, 86, 87, 94, 100–102, 126, 159, 162, 165, 184, 246, 248 Marginalisation, 143, 164 Masculinities, 208 Militarization, 141 Militia, 50, 59, 75, 135 Minesweeping, 75 Minorities, 154, 164

276

INDEX

Misconduct, 201, 202, 247, 248, 250–252, 254, 258–261, 263, 265 Mobilisation, 25, 137, 145 Monitoring, 24, 93, 98, 124, 132, 136, 228, 229, 238, 241, 249, 250 Multilateralism, 2

N National Security Council (NSC), 22, 26–29, 36 National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), 23, 24 Nation-building, 74 Negotiations, 23, 119, 125 Netherlands, 12, 83, 86–88 Neutralise, 2, 101 Neutrality, 95, 96, 104 Nigeria, 132 Non-discrimination, 228 Non-governmental Organizations (NGO), 224, 247, 263 Norms, 32, 95, 104, 134, 176, 198, 239, 245, 246, 264 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3, 73, 75, 85

O Operationalisation, 132, 252 Operation Barkhane, 2, 3 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 132, 257 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 151–153, 156–158, 162, 164–168 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), xv

P Pakistan, 98 Palestine, 157 Participatory, 6, 28, 29, 35, 211 Partnerships, 4, 9, 11–13, 51, 133, 140–146, 160, 161, 210, 245, 246, 251 Paternalism, 132 Peacebuilding, 1, 2, 4–6, 8–13, 22, 30, 32–36, 46, 47, 51, 54–56, 59–61, 93, 105, 137, 145, 151–158, 160–168, 226, 231 Peace enforcement, 2, 6, 12, 72, 74, 76, 83, 87, 88, 103, 159, 168 People-centred, 11, 54 Pluralism, 152, 153, 264 Police-centric, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 55 Poverty, 181, 254 Protection of civilians (PoC), 1–4, 6, 8, 52, 72, 74, 76, 77, 83, 98, 136, 174, 180, 183, 185, 201, 236, 237, 239, 246

Q Qur’an, 156, 163

R Realpolitik, 11 Regionalization, 156 Reparations, 261, 262, 265 Responsibility, 8, 37, 85, 136, 156, 159, 160, 163, 166, 224, 226, 228, 237–241, 251, 252, 258, 260, 262–266 Russia, 2, 8, 124 Rwanda, 46, 72, 73, 98, 182, 201, 237

S Safeguarding, 14, 200, 227–241

INDEX

Sahel, 3 Sanctions, 202, 203, 211, 229, 240 Security sector reform (SSR), 6, 12, 21, 22, 24–26, 30–33, 36, 37, 74, 180 Séléka, 76, 77, 164 Self-defence, 59, 72, 74, 95, 99, 154 Self-determination, 164 Self-protection, 81 Senegal, 71, 80, 83, 88 Serious and organised crime (SOC), 53 Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), 8, 9, 14, 180, 197–199, 201–212, 223, 225–227, 231–234, 236, 237, 245–267 Slovenia, 74 Sociology, 12 Soldiers, 72, 75, 138, 139, 174, 186 Somalia, 46, 49, 54, 85, 98, 155, 165, 246, 264 Srebrenica, 73 Stabilization, 7, 8, 11, 13, 23, 30, 47, 100, 101, 103–107, 133, 164 Statebuilding, 29, 266 Sudan, 45, 72, 135, 136, 138–141, 145, 246 Suez, 95 Survivors, 210, 212, 228, 232, 263, 264, 267 Sustainability, 57, 135 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 55, 208, 209 Sweden, xiv Switzerland, xv T Taiwan, 45 Takuba Taskforce, 3 Terrorism, 3, 7, 11, 102, 122, 131, 132, 164 The Peacebuilding Fund, 10, 60

277

Timor-Leste, 46, 159 Top-down, 32, 46, 60, 132, 241, 246 Trafficking, 48–50, 53, 225, 226, 247 Transitional justice, 139, 261, 266 Troop-contributing countries, 126, 231, 235 U Ukraine, 45, 74, 75, 85, 86, 124, 125 UN Country Team (UNCT), 115, 120, 137, 141, 145, 161, 208 UN General Assembly (UNGA), 105, 200, 202 UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), 246 United Kingdom (UK), 12, 75, 224, 227, 236, 247 United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 13 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (MINUAR), 72 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 5, 72, 73, 99 United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), 54, 249, 252 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 178, 179, 182, 183, 188, 248 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 114, 115, 117–121, 123, 125 United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 13, 95, 96, 115, 117, 118, 124 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 139, 185, 238, 250, 261 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 123, 161, 223, 261

278

INDEX

United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), 92, 97 United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), 137 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 114, 115, 117–125 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), 124 United Nations Military Observer Group to India and Pakistan (UNOMOGIP), 97 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), xv United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 22–25, 28, 232, 234 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 5, 31, 75 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 2, 3, 49, 54, 126, 180, 183 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 135, 136 United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 75, 76, 174 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 2, 3, 7, 13, 46, 49, 53, 86, 87, 92, 102, 106, 126, 162–164, 180, 183 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), 2, 7, 45, 49, 53, 76, 77, 80–83, 164, 165, 180, 183, 248 United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 76

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 85, 92 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 2, 4, 7, 49, 53, 54, 101, 126, 180, 183, 185 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 118, 124 United Nations Police (UNPOL), 52–54, 57–60 United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 5, 72, 73, 99, 124 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 22–26, 30, 36, 74, 94, 98, 101, 102, 137, 144, 146, 147, 151, 156, 162–167, 175, 179, 180, 237, 264, 267 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 72, 84, 232 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), XV United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 13, 113–126 United States (US), 12, 23, 27, 31, 45, 73, 74, 85, 92, 118, 160 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 50, 88 UN Military Observers (UNMOs), 79, 116, 117, 121 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 60 UN Peacebuilding Support Office, 60 UN Secretary-General (UNSG), 9, 25, 29, 96, 99, 104, 105, 197, 199, 201–203, 205–212, 252 UN Women, 60, 208 Uruguay, 177, 227, 235

INDEX

Use of force, 6, 11, 56, 76, 80, 84, 95, 97–100, 102, 103, 146, 151, 154, 158, 164, 165, 167 V Vehicles, 81, 85, 139, 224 Vernacularization, 246 Vetting, 139, 232, 248, 251, 267 Victim-centred, 207, 231, 261, 266 Victims, 14, 139, 175, 180, 187, 188, 197–199, 204, 207, 209–213, 232, 237, 248, 250–254, 261–265, 267 Vulnerability, 84, 86, 181, 185, 186, 224, 254

279

W Wagner Group, 3, 45 Warfighting, 75, 88 Whistle-blower, 250 Withdrawal, 95, 97, 98, 115 Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS), 8, 106, 180, 187, 205, 210, 212, 249, 251, 256, 259 World Bank, 45, 57, 60, 145, 181 Y Yemen, 45, 155, 159 Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), 180, 181, 188 Yugoslavia, 237