The Lives of SEATO 9789814376617

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous organisation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre fo( scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of modernization and development, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represent,ed the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication. or extracts therefrom. without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore."

The Lives of SEATO

by

Justus M. van der Kroef

Occasional Paper No. 45 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Price:

S$ 5 .oo

Publications Committee Pr o fess or Ker ni al S. Sandhu (Chairman ) Dr . Cor az o n M. Si ddayao Kr s . C . P . Ch i n Dr. Huynh Kim Khanh Krs . P . Lim Pui Huen Kr. M. Ra)a retnam Mrs . Ch r istine Tan

(Co- o rdinato r )

The Lives o f S EATO is the forty-fifth i n the Occas ional

aeries published by the Institute o f S outheast Stu iea . Pa~ra

~s i an

Juatua M. van der Kroef is Charles Anders o n Dana Pro feaaor and Chairman o f the Political Scien ce Depar tme nt He h o lds a in the University of Bridgepo rt, Conne ctic u t . and has rk, Yo New University, Columbia from Ph.D. degree arch Rese the in Fellowships h c held Po stdocto ral Resear ity , and Univers a Columbi f o Affairs Institute on Communist He ia . ral t Aus isbane, Br in the University of Queensland, , ty i Univers has served as Visiting Professo r i n Nanyang Singapore, the University of the Ph ilippi nes, Vidyodaya University of Sri Lanka, and the Unive rs i ty o f Br iti sh Col umbia, Vancouver. He has been a Consultant f o r resear c h projects of the Center of Strategic and Internati o nal Studies, Georgetown Univeraity, Washin gt o n, D. C ., and the Fo reign Policy Research Inat i tute, Philadelphia . He is a member o f the edito r i al board• o t Ae ia n Tho ugh t and Soaiet~ and the J ourna L o f Ae ia n Af fai r s . He ia a Director of the American-Aai an Educatio nal Exc hange, New York . Among hia publication• are b oOk • on communism in Indoneaia and in Malayaia and Singapore . Hia mo at recent book is I ndon ssia Si n o• S ukarn o (Si ngapo re: Asia Pacific Press, 1971). The respo ns i bility for facta and o p i ni o n• exp r essed 1n the wo rk that follows resta exclusive l y with Pro fessor van der Kro ef and his interpretatio ns d o n ot necessaril y refle ct the views o r policy o f the Institute o r its s uoporte r s.

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The Institu te publishes books and papers fr om time t o tLme i n the following series: BOOKS / MONOGRAPHS: specialized studies on t opics relating to Southeast Asia. SOUTHE AST ASI AN AF FAIRS: an annual review o f significant politi cal , eco n omic and social devel o pments in the region, with emph asis on t he ASEAN count r ies. Contents include analyses in depth o f topics o f regional conce rn and of spe cific issues on a country-by -count ry basis.

FIELD REPORTS: studies embodying the results of , and based exclusively on , the Institute's research programme; OCCASIONAL PAPERS: professional papers issued periodically on a variety of topics of regional interest; RESEARCH NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS: contributions which represent the tentative results of ongoing research, and of discussions, printed for the purpose of stimulating further thought on specific subjects. TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: papers and proceedings of

Trend s seminars held on individual Southeast Asian countries; INTERNATIONAL CONFE RENCES: publications based on proceedings of International Conferences sponsored by the Institute itself or in conjunction with o t her organ1zations; CURRENT ISSUES SEMINARS: publications growing out of the Institute 's Cu rrent Iss~es series of seminars , the objective of which is to bring together knowledgeable and interested people to discuss topics of cur rent concern and importance to the region. SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES : aimed at wider circulation of Southeast Asian thinking, these publications are original contributions in English of Southeast Asians or translations o f their s1gnificant papers and monographs appearing 1n one of the local or national languages of the region; ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME: publ1cat1ons based on the oral memoirs o f persons who have made notable contribution to, or have first-hand information to impart on, certain aspects of the development of Singapore and Ma lays ia; LIBRARY BULLETINS: papers on Southeast Asian librarianship and bibliography. 4th November 1976

Director Institu te of Southeast Asian Studies

On 24 September 1975 , a decision was reached to phase the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) out of existence within a two - year period . This was at the meeting of the Ministerial Council of SEATO in New York, attended by representatives of the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines , and 30 June 1977, SEATO ' s SEATO's fiscal year ' s end , posed the final deadline. Secretary General , Sunthorn Hongladarom of Thailand , was requested to write a plan to bring about the organization ' s orderly dissolution . Only two years previously, the SEATO Ministerial Council at its eighteenth meeting , also in New York , had formulated measures "to ensure SEATO ' s future programmes • • • appropriate to the new situation in the Treaty area brought about by recent i n ternational developments." These measures were to include, first , "greater emphasis " on the " internal security and development programme" of Thailand and the Philippines (the " two regional members"); secondly , a reduction in m~litary activities (not further specified); and thirdly , a possible increase in " multilateral or bilateral social and economic aid" to the "regional member However, at the September 1975 meeting , the countries" . l SEATO Minister~al Council deemed that "changing circumstances" warranted the organization ' s dissolution, a phrase which some diplomatic sources close to the meeting explained as referring to the end of the Indochina conflict. Yet , even as the Council agreed to SEATO's dissolution, it referred to ~he usefulness of the organization ' s projects and activities , pointing out that possibly these could be continued under diffe rent auspices , and with bilateral and mul tilateral technical a n d economic assistance.2 The decision finally to terminate SEATO seemed, to some, an unnecessarily much -de layed aoup de graae to a long moribund strategic basketcase, whatever the surprise of the three months relat~ve suddenness of the decision itself: before the September 1 975 ministerial meeting , Secretary General Sunthorn Hongladarom, in conversat~on with this author at the SEATO headquarters in Bangkok, still professed he was unaware of any new decision on the organization ' s

1

"Eight:eenth Council Meet.ing . Coun cil Pre ss Statemen"C," SEATO Press New York City, 28 September 1973.

Re Ze as~ ,

2

"SEATO Council Press Statement , " SEATO Press Retease , Bangkok, 2.) September 1975, and Th~ Sarawak Tribune tKuching), L6 September 1975.

2

Over ~he y ears, the allege d i rrele v ance , o r future. 1mpotence, o f SEATO b e came s omething o f a s ource o f wear1 l y g r1m amusement amo ng many SEATO o ff icials t hemselves . One o f them once had a , pe r h aps, re p resentat ive react i on t c a n ad v Prs e press comment when he remarked t o the author ~h a t h e dis cerned th a t " SEATO i s dead a g a i n" Yet, even 1n So uth east Asia, n o nmember critl c s o f SEATO have been 1n c on si s tent 1n thei r po:icy f ormulatio ns o n national and c o llective secu r 1ty strategy , an 1 n c o ns ~sLe n cy wh1ch , if anyth1n g , t ends t o reflect someth i ng o f ~ he very I ndones1a, f o r examole , c omm1 tt ed need and purpose o f SEATO . ~ o a n "1ndependent " position 1n 1ts f o reign p o li cy st n ~ e tts 1nception as a nati o nal state i n 1945, has alwa y s been Ind onesia's Fo re 1qn o ff ic 1a1 ly o ppo sed to t he o r g a ni zat ion. 1n a comment on 2, 7 M1nis~ er Adam Malik, on 22 November 19 th at w ith drjN o l sed Pakistan ' s decision to leave SEATO , pra1 t ha~ " P a kt s a n mean~ l a nd went on t o say t h at th is Wlthdrawa One o f Jak ~rta ' s . lsts" l n ow 1s no mo re a stooge of the i mperia 1975 de c ts l o n er mb e Sept 4 iead1 n g da1l 1es , t a k i ng n ote o f the 2 in s o f ~ r as ly n i erta c to phase o ut SE ATO , editor i al1zed that 1t s mil1tary purpose was conc erned, SEATO wa s a fa1 lure , a nd that , 1n f ac t, 1t had helped the commun i st c ause , 1n v iew o f 1ts d1v1si ve effect , both upon the d o mesti c an d th e externa l More over, t h e same pol1cies o f the count ries of the reg1on . editor1al declared, "all def e nce all1ances unf aill n g ly adh e re to t he ph11os o phy o f confr ontat i on.") Curi o usl y , however, a lready four years a go , t o p lnd o ne s1an m1litary and o the r strateglc dec 1 s1 o n maker s , desp1te Malik's own reluctan ce, began press1ng f o r a regi o nal mllltar1zat1on, something that could event ua l ly amount t o a fonn of " SEATO - lza tion" o f ASEAN (Th e Associat1 on o f Southeast As ian Na t1 ons, forme d in 1967 ,and compr is1ng Th a 1land, the Phi~ipp1nes, Malays ia, Indones1a and Slngapo re ) . 4 Even ASEAN ' s much - vaunted ideal of "neutra li zing• the reg1 on and keeping 1t from 1nvolvement 1n b1g powe~ r ivalr1es has o n o cc as1 o n been viewed as re qu1r1ng an ade quate re g1 ona. d e fe n c e p o sture . ASEAN' s "missing l1nk", as one J akarta da1ly once

9 7S .

3

"D i Sbo lu ti o n o f SE ATO," The I ndcnss ia Ti m€s (J akarta ) , 2 9 September

4

See, f o r example , Kompas (J akarta). 28 J an ... c.ty 19 71 ; : l'td.,;..c; .-:. .z.. - ~ ~ .: f' ) 'i-d Revi ew , Oc tober 1973, p . 29 .

15

Michael Le1.fer, Cambodi a and Neu tPat~ty (Canberra: Work1ng Paper, Department of International Re:latior.s, The Aus ·t ral1an Nat1.or1al Universl.ty , 1962) , pp. 7-8

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should say the symbolic meaning, of SEATO has served as a policy instrument of the organizatio n ' s participants. We have already seen how SEATO ' s symbol i c meaning can be used, as changing circumstances dictate, in the case of the prev i ously noted Kukrit - Marcos c o mmun1que o f July 1975. The degree to which unanimi ty was expected to pre v ail amo ng the SEATO members in order f o r them to take appropriate act1on is a matter of speculation . The text of the Manila Treaty provides that "unanimous agreement among SEATO members" must prevail in designating those states or areas, which though not members of SEATO, yet fall within its "Treaty area" and therefore are subject to the Treaty ' s Unanimous agreement of the members is security prov1sions. also required bef o re any new state, if it so wishes, can But the whole quest1on of "accede" to the Manila Treaty . unanim1ty should also be seen against the backdrop of strong British reservations, amplified by those in war weary France, ab o ut the earlier menti o ned Dulles idea in Marc h and Ap r1l 1954 of taking "united action" in Indo ch1na. Dulles proposed such action even in advance of the scheduled Genev a Co nference 1n April in order to prevent a French defeat there at the hands of the communists. Th e fai l ure o f Dulles ' idea, which had been backed b y a de c 1si o n o f the National Se c urity Coun c il in Wash1ngton, t o the effe c t that US interventi o n in Indochina t o save the French wa s des1rable i f Am 6 r i~u ' s alli~s would s~pp ~ r ~ tt , gave, to be sure, an impetus to the creat1on o f SEATO, as perhaps, 1n Dulles ' percept1on, the next best thing. 16 Yet in light o f the Br1tish and French views on the Indoch1na problem, it also underscored again the relative frailty of the SEATO instrume nt itself , on c e it hadbeen created , and That caution, as the cauti o n with wh1ch it had to be used. ha s been n o t e d ab o ve, had already beco me apparent in Dulles' attitude at the 1954 Manila conference when SEATO was f o rmed , and at the subsequent first SEATO Coun c il meet1ng in The principal touchst o ne of suc h Bangkok the next year. cautious use o f SEATO was considered to be unanimity among the members, and the final communique o f the SEATO Council ' s f i rst meeting in Bangkok on 25 Februa r y 1955 said, therefore, that "De c 1s ions o f the Coun c il will be taken by unani mou s

16

On the s e devel o pments, see Le i c e s ter C. We bb, "Austr a lia and SEATO", pp . 58-59, in Geo rge Mode l. s k i , e d., S6'A1'0: Si:r.. Stt-.diiis (Melb ou r ne , Sydney, Canberra: F.W. Ch es hir e , 1962) .

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17 In light of what was to happen , one wonders agreement". about the desirability of a British or another SEATO member's veto power over subsequent US strategy in Southeast Asia as the American involvement in Vietnam deepened. However, on 6 March 1962, us Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, issued a joint stateme nt in Washington, D.C., which declared, inter alt.a, that (1) in the event of a "Communist armed attack" on Thailand, the US intended to give "full effect" to its duty under the Manila Treaty to act and meet the "common danger", but that (2) this obligation of the US "does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is In a press conference individual as well as collective". a few weeks later, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman stressed the significant change that had now come about in SEATO' s unan1.m1. ty principle. "According to the present charter all decisions must be taken by unanimity", Khoman said, but "that joint communique [that is, the Rusk-Thanat communique of 6 March 1962] says that even if the decision is not endorsed by all, any individual c o untry or countries may agree to take action, even though there is no consensus, no demand for unanimity within SEATO". Whether 18 or not Khoman' s reading of the charter as such ....,as correct, 17

Cited in Alan Watt, The Evo~ut i on of Australi an Fo~ign Policy , l938- L965 (Cambr i dge University Press, 1968, paperback edition) , p. 150. One may soeculate that the unanimity rule, at the time, refle c ted US concern not to be dragged into a war in Southeast Asia without its explicit consent. A few months earlier, in his 10 November 1954 report on the Manila pac t t o the US Senate, Dulles had made it a point to stress that the US r e tained freedom of action under the pact, and that (l) no "material changes" had become necessary in US military planning, as a result of the Manila pact , and (2) that US forces in the Pacifi c remained powerful enough . " to str ike at an aggressor "by means and at plac es of our choost.ng (my italics). Cited in W. Macmahon Ball, "A Political Re-examination of SEATO," International Organizaticm , Winter, 1958, p. 19.

18

Khoman may have been referring t o the decision of the 25 February 1955 SEATO Council meeting that decisions of the Council would be taken by unanimous agreement, rather than to the SEATO charter as such. The Manila Treaty specifies unan imous agreement only to the desianation of non-SEAIO memb e rs as falling under the Treaty's security concern and to the entry of new member states into the oraanization .

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a few years later, when coun se l for a US Senate Subcommittee on US security agreements abroad was querying the US Ambassador to Thailand as to whether the Rusk-Thanat communique "adds anything to our SEATO commitment " , Ambassador Leonard Unger answered in the negative , saying that the communique "was simply a means of clearing up a question, not in our minds but possibly in the minds of others", and that "we ourselves [had] always believed [that ] SEATO could be read as it is , in fact, i~~erpreted or restated in the Rusk - Thanat communique. " " Reading SEATO" on the basis of the Rusk- Thanat communique does not , in fact, seem explicitly contrary to the wording of the Manila Treaty , to be sure , except in so far as the question of new members adhering to the treaty, or of designating nonmember states for security protection in the treaty area is concerned (articles IV and VII of the Manila Treaty). Moreover, according to Unger, Thailand , Australia, and the Philippines publicly, and officials of the United Kingdom and New Zealand "orally", all expressed agreement with the Rusk- Thanat communique. But Unger , in his previously noted testimony before the US Senate Subcommittee on US security arrangements abroad, also said, however, that France and Pakistan had become "very reluctant to identify themselves at all with even SEATO expressions", and that i t had begun to seem as if any SEATO decision might be obstructed by " one or another of these members if it was a question of unanimous decision " so that "for this reason " the US, in effect, wanted the formulation of a right to take independent action under the Manila Treaty as provided by the Rusk- Thanat communique. Still, that the US , in any case, would have the right to act on its own under the Treaty may well be argued in different ways . It has been repeatedly pointed out, for example , that the Manila Treaty uses the basic concepts 19

US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of ThaiLand Hearings op.cit . • pp. 676- 677 . Ambassador Unger's attempt to explain the Thanat-Rusk communique as but a crystallization of what the US allegedly , had "always believed" regarding SEATO's security r ole, should be seen , however , in the context of Thai concerns that any SEATO action against the communists in Laos in the course of 1960-61 had been r endered impossible be cause of French and British oppositi on . See, for example , M.S . Venkataramani , "The United States and Thailand , " Internationa~ Studies (New Delhi), Januar yMarch, 1973 , pp. 100- 101 .

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of the Monroe Doctrine, in the sense that, f:;.. rst, a common dest1ny l1nks the US with certain o ther nat 1ons; secondly , even withdrawal o f a party from the Treaty still leaves the Treaty 1n f o rce, s1nce 1t is based o n a recognit1on o f a principle o f indef1nite durati o n that an armed attack on o ne party Wlth in a g1ven re g 1o n 1s dangerous to all; and thirdly that, ultimately , one i s not so much deal1ng with a contractual arrangement among equal parties~ but rather w1th the dom1nant protec~ iv e powe r of one. 0 Nevertheless, the Rusk-Thanat commun1que marked a departure from a previously asserted unanim1ty rule, t hus presumab l y offering a legalization o f a rap1dly expand1n g US involvement, not only in the V1etnam War , but als o o f the log1stical underpinnings , that involvement elsewhere, via m1litary commitments and facili~ies in Tha1land, ~he Philippines, and in the "treaty area" generally .

III SEATO's relationship to the Vietnam War may pe rh aps be considered briefly at th1s po1nt. The US re luc tance to include South Vietnam formally among SEATO 'S members no doubt was influenced by the opposition registered by People ' s Republic of China at the ~ime o f the 1954 Geneva Conference to membership of Vietnam, or for that matter of Laos or Cambodia , in any future Southeast As1an defence arrangements . Vietnam, along with Laos and Cambodia, were covered by a p r otocol to the Manila Trea~y extending the Treaty's security provisions t o them, but th1s was clearly a less than satisfactory compromise to the Sa1gon In the course of 1 956 the Diem Government, in Government. fact, indicated its wish to become a member of SEATO , but Dulles reJected the idea while assur1ng Diem of US a1d 1n the event of a cr1sis.21 20

See Lei ce ster Webb, op .cic. • p. S3, and the v1ews of the one-tlme Australian External Affairs Mintster, R C. Casey, FrieY. d..3 ~d Neighbcwl'S { ~lbourne: P .W. Cl1eshire, 1954 ) , p. 82.

21

Geor(}e M:xielski, "'!he AslCI'l States' Participatirn in SEATO, ·· in Modelski, SEA TO : Six Studies . op . c it . , pp l4 l - l4S.

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As the Vietnam fighting in the course of the nin eteen-sixties intensified, and the US involvement in it deepened, the role of SEATO as such seemed to reflect both US concern to apply military pressure incrementally, for fear presumab l y of provoking a Chinese reaction, and to permit some kind of significant, but essentially independent response on the basis of the Rusk-Thanat communique, so as not to cause a further disenchantment with SEATO on the part of France and Pakistan which had rather early their doubts about US policy in Vietnam. Then , too, as it turned out, SEATO ' s other Asian members, the Philippines and Thailand, while not exhibiting the same degree of opposition to military involvement in Vietnam as exhibited by Pakistan, nevertheless showed but limited enthusiasm and had to be prodded into larger commitments , including m.~litary manpower 4 The formula eventually used to keep SEATO as such out of Vietnam, while permitting incremental military inputs or other aid on an individual basis on the part of SEATO'S members to the Saigon Government , was to be found in the text of the Manila Treaty itself. Article IV of that Treaty provides that " no action" on the territory of any non - SEATO member state designated by the SEATO members as falling under the security concerns of the Treaty shall occur, unless it is at the "invitation or with the consent of the government Applying its leverage on the South Vietnamese concerned" . Government, the US saw to it that in all the years of the V~etnam War, no Saigon Government ever formally requested SEATO's assistance . SEATO spokesmen during the sixties, somewhat dis~ngenuously, asserted that : 22 The Government of South Vietnam may request the collective assistance of the SEATO powers if it so wishes . In fact , however, it has made no such approach, preferring to secure aid on a bilateral basis . SEATO publ1 c~ty releases , however, emphasized that "all eight SEATO member governments" , along with more t:.han a score of other nations, were engaged at one time or another in providing assistance to South Vietnam "with i n their

22

Letter of A. D. M, Curnow, Deputy Director, SEATO Public Information Office , 10 May 1966 .

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23 The US, Australi a , New ZeaLand , respect1ve capabilit1es" . Thailand and the Ph1~ippines pr1mar1~y found 1t poss1ble to render such ass1stance in terms of combat zone troops lwith the US bearing most o f the cost of the Tha1 and Philipp1ne contingen~s j , wh1le Pak1s~ani a1d, for example , was largely conf1ned to prov1d1ng flood rel i ef, and Br1~ain and France predom1nan~ly prov1ded techn1cal assistance , The new US 1nterpretation of 1ts stra~eg1c righ~s in SEATO not only l1nked Thailand to the deepen1ng Vietnam conflict, but to other Indoch1na battle zones as well The build- up of US a1r power 1n Thailand 1nthe mon~hs after the Rusk - Thanat c.;ommunique 1 also to be used eventuaL.. y in operat1ons 1n V1etnam 6 1s well known < Anot her maJOr cause of the rap1dly increasing US m1l1tary inputs 1n Tha1land were ~e developments in neighbour1ng laos , and the slow escalation of comrnun1st insurgency 1n Thailand itself , Already 1n May 1961, the Thai GoveLnment had public ly charged the Ch1nese Pe ople's Republic and the Democrat1c Repub~ic of Vietnam with inst1gat1ng a plot to seize Northeast Tha1land, a n d a policy proclamat1on of the undergrcund Commun1st Party ot Thailan d, about the same time, called for the " national liberation ' of Tha1land by means of a broadbased, "patriot1c " , democrati c , u:n1~ed front . 24 Acc.;ording ~o off1cial Thai sources , beg1nn1ng in 1962 both 1n ~he communis~ Pa~het Lao controlled sect1ons of Northern laos, and 1n Nor~h Vietnam , camps for the train1ng of Tha1 1nsurgents were established 9s~ch tra1ning had been given 1n Pathet lao controlled sect1ons of Southern laos since 19581 . 25 In Laos itself, t h e contused factional struggle si n ce ~he 1954 Geneva Conference and ann1stlce agreement seemed, in t h e early weeks of 1962 , inexorably to be moving toward expans1on of c.;ommunist power . The capture by Pathet Lao forces 1n May 1962 of Nam Tha, a r1ghtist stronghold, signalled their campaign of general occupat1on of a l l of Northwest Laos ~ and " destroyed whatever mil1tary balanc e of power that had

V~etnam ~ "

SE'A'IO i?r-ees Reteast:, S May l.96S, Lcndon ..

L3

" A~d

24

Th€: Comrrr~..mieT; 1'hr-eat t;; Tha1.- Zand t Bar,gkok:

t.o Sout.h

fiO _ 44:

25

~ 96 7 ):

SEATO Shott Paper

r

p .. ~8

Royol Tha1 Gc Jernmenc , Communist Suppress1on Operat lvns Ccmmdnd , 27 -28 . Co'7i11124m.S!: J-ns~,.r-gen6y '1.-n Thaitan.d \Bangkok, i9 72) , pp

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. L aos ,; . 2 6 Th e Path et Lao campa~gn · e d- ~n went o n, e v en as yet another conference ~n Geneva , wh~ch had begun on 16 May 1961 struggled to give renewed meaning to a US endorsed concept of a neutral and independent Laos . However 1 even agreement ~n Laos on format~on of a new coalition government structure, and the sign1ng of Neutral~ty Declaration for Laos on 23 July 1962, at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, could not seem to alter the incremental growth and steady sol1dification of Pathet Lao power. . t ex~s

The Rusk-Than at conununique, and the w~dening US conunitments under ~t, are not only to be seen against the background of these developments, but. should also beconsidered in the context of the obvious lack of enthusiasm among all but the most outspoken r1ghtwing Laotian political figures and offlcials (bent on provoking an open American intervention in Laos , in any case) for the protection of the SEATO shield , Such protection , according to a protocol attached to the 1954 Manila Treaty had been extended to Laos, as well as Cambodia , and to "the free territory under the jurlsdictlon of the state of Vietnam" < But , as early as the conservative government of Katay D. Sasorith (1954 - 56), Laotian regimes had been concerned that through the application of the SEArr·o protocol provision Laos would become even more of an international pol~tical and military bat t leground than i t already was and, more particularly, that possible SEATO 1ntervention would primarily become a means by wh~ch neighbouring Thailand, so often in h1storic confrontat1on w1th Laos , would seek to dominate the country . 27 mi~itary

As any hope of internal Laotian stabllity became illusory after the 1954 Geneva Conference , allegations of covert Thai and US military operat~ons aga~nst the Pathet Lao and its successor , the Lao People ' s Liberation Army , had only tended to confirm the wot:st fears of Laotian neutralists seeking to keep their country out of an international conflict . A turning-polnt came progress~vely

26

Mactin E. Goldstein, Ameriaan Polioy Toward Laos (Rutherf o rd ~ Mad1son, Teane ck~ NJ : Fa1rle1gh D1ckinsen Univers1ty Press, 1973) > pp . 256-25 7.

27

Donald P . Wh1 taker, et. aL • Area Handbo':lk fo:r Lacs (Was h i ngron ~ D. C. : US Government Print1ng Offi c e, 1972), p . 201

16

with the Kennedy Administration . Pres1dent John F . Kennedy 's announcement in March 1961 1n which he s1multaneously had declared US support for Laos' neutral1ty and 1ndependence and also had, in effect; 1nvoked SEATO as )UStificat1on for a possible US i ntervention if there was further aggression aga1nst Laos from whatever s1de , seemed under the circums tances n ot only paradoxical but , 1n the absence of any enthus1asm from any SEATO member save Tha1land, of little practical s1gnificance . Especially to those inside Laos and outside of it clinging to the hope that the cause of neutrality , if only in the form of (as one old SEATO hand once put it to the author) "a hazy, unprovocative stalemate", was not altogether lost even after the 1961 - 62 Geneva Conference , ~he Rusk - Thanat communique could not but seem to be a rationale for a grow1ng US military involvement in Southeast As1a . In a memorandum prepared by the US State Department's Legal Adv1ser and submitted on 8 March 1966 to the Senate Commi~tee on Foreign Relat1ons on the subject of the legal1ty of the US involvement in the Vietnam War, the c onst1~utional right of the US Pres1dent to decide whether an "armed attack" has occurred that endangers the peace and safety of the US is specifically linked to the provis1on of the Man1la Treaty tha~ each SEATO member will act "1n accordance with its constitutional processes ". So that, according to this memorandum , the US ' s un1lateral decision to intervene 1n the V1etnam fighting 1s made to rest both on the rationale of such intervention afforded by the Rusk - Thanat commun1que and on 28 const1tut1onal ly described Presiden~ial powers . The same memorandum , it might be noted inter a~~ap also seeks to counter certain cr1ticisms of the use of the SEATO Treaty for purposes of justifying US involvement in Such criticism had po1n~ed out that , at the time V1etnam. arrangement 1 s formulation and acceptance by SEATO of the ~he US, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had test.1f1ed that the US d1d not intend to es~abl1sh a land army in Southeast Asia and that , 1n any case, the SEATO organizat1on was n ot to be 11ke NATO and, for e~le,would not have an 1ntegrated, multinat1onal, armed forces command structure and standing mil1tary forces of 1~s own , Accord1ng to the memorandum, however, ~he obliga~1on 1n

28

Departmen~

of State

~u~letin,

28 Mar ch 1966 , p . 485 .

17

arti cle IV pa r ag r aph l o f the Manil a Treaty t o meet t he c o mmon dan ger 1n c a se o f armed a gg ress ion "is n o t l1mite d t o par~icular mo de s o f m1l1ta r y ac t1 o n" and , in an y e vent , appro priate mil 1tary acti o n ma y ch ange . Just because, in 1954, milltary J Udgement might ha ve been aga i nst the us e o f " substant i al United S~a tes g r o un d f o r c es i n Vt etnam" does n o t p re c lude the Pr e sident f rom rea ching a d1f fe rent mil it ary JUdg eme nt in altered ci r cumstanc es more t han a decade la t er One might l1nk th1s p art icul ar argument o f the US State Depa rtment ' s Legal Advis er o n th e uses o f SEATO , to an observation o f Thai Fore1gn M1n1ster Thanat Khoman made when comment i ng o n the s1gnif1cance o f the Rusk-Thanat commun ique o f 6 March 1962. Acco r ding t o Thanat, o n that occasion, " the ch arter o f the SEATO ta lks about o pen aggress1 on by convent1onal means", although "the o ther s i de" had been res ort1 ng t o o ther methods o f war fare , that is , what the Tha1 d1pl omat called "a composite warfare", cons ist1 ng of "wars of nat iona l liberation". And the " understand i ng" now ref lected 1n the Rusk - Thanat commun ique is , accord1n g t o th e Tha1 Foreign Min ister, that if aggression should occur " i n the form of th at composite warfare", both side s "•..,.o u ld consider acti o n under SEATO" . 29 Whether, in fact , the SEATO "char ter" (dld Khoman mean the 195 4 Manila Treaty ?) refe rs in wo rd o r spi rit only to " open aggression by conventi onal mean s" may well be doubted. These wo rds do n o t appear as su c h i n the Treaty. In fact , a rticle II of t he Treaty refers t o the need to "prevent and counter sub ve rs1ve a c t1 v1 t1.es fr o m without" against th e territo ry of memher states, as well as to the need t o res1st lconvent lonal? ) "armed attack". But perhaps t h e point to be made 1 s, that f o r Tha1land, as well as the US , the 1ntent and text of the treaty as well as the earlier estab li shed u nan1m1ty princlp~e came 1n the cou rse o f the s1xt1es t o be 1nterpret.ed s o as t o accommodate an option f o r un1lateral involvement 1n a c o nfl ict and a use o f m1litary oower pro bab ly n o t foreseen at the t1me the Man1~a Treaty was drafted. Perhaps, too, the very consi derations which had ultimately led the US t o endorse the SEATO c o ncept 1n the f1rst place had tended ~ o develop the1r own d yn am1cs ,

29

U. S .

Sec~..ari r-y Agr·t~o men U;

Tha~l ar.d,

CD'ld Corrmt" t-mel'lto Abrcad,

op.ctt . , p . b77.

X t 11g ~ ~f

18

Fo r , leading ~o the Rusk - Thana t c cmm~1 que ' s pe rce pt1 c n . at the t1me ~hat the Man il a Trea tv was d~scussed 1n and out of ~he US Senate , there aopeared to have been ::onsiderable American expe c tat ions , e vidently shared by Dulles himself, that a much l a r ger number o f As 1an state s Wlth wh1ch no bilateral US secur1ty relat1ons had b een concluded would also align themselves w1 t h S EATO , and t he Man ila Treaty ( art1cle VIIi spec 1fically spells o ut the procedure by which such states can J Oln t h e o r1g1na l s 1 gnat o ries. 30 In the measure that n o t o nl y th:...s expec~ati on was not real1zed, but that the deepen1ng I ndochina cr1sis, that is, in Laos as well as V1etnam, appeared to worsen , the pred1spos:...t1 o n t oward un il ate:a l US action in the reg1on tended t o be augmented as well. To th:...s, finally , one must add ~h e part1cular US percepti on of the People ' s Re publ1c o f Ch1na , a perception shared by the US's SEATO all1e s 1n As1a and the Pac1f1c \~ough progress1vely less so by Pak1stan 1 , but not 1n the same degree by ~he United K1ngdom and Fran ce. Th a t percept 1 o n evolved from th e vis1 on o f an esse:1t.1ally mo nol1~ic Sino- Soviet threat , prevail:ng 1n the Dulles era, ~o a c o ncept d ominant in the SlXt.les , after t he Sino- Soviet rupture , of a Pe op le's Republ1c of Ch1n~ 1n which Chinese amb1tions of hegemon y 1n the Southeast Asian area were considered a s an amalgam o f h1 st o r1c Ch1nese strateg1c concerns and a conte mpo rar y comm•.m1st. expans1on1st miss1on.31 Based on a l 1 teral accept.ilnce of Lin P1ao ' s charac t erizati on o f the people ' s wa r and liberation in the Thi r d World as a kind of gl obal. " rural " con fron tation of the " urban " 1ndustria l West , and n o t.tng China ' s self-conceive d support1ve role f o r such l1berat.ion wa rs , the US v~ewed SEATO as a means t o be empl o yed 1n America ' s own s e lf - de f ence, w h e~her o r n o t o~her SEATO all1es were necess a rily or wholly conv1nced of t h e same pe rcept1on of the Pe ople · s Republlc of Ch1na . Hence, in the sixties the d is~inctive ant1 - Ch1 nese character o f a

30

G. Wolf gang Poll ak, "What Were SEATO's AlmS I\lt:nt :>' Yea r s Ago? " , op. c.1 t . , p. 11:> .

31

Fe r a good analys1s o f th1s per ~e pt io~ see Goraon Gretcwoud and No rmar. Harper, eds., Aust~ Zi a i n tt1or l.d Afj':J LI'S Z9o :- Z9-J[. (Me lbou rne , Canberra , Sydnty : F W. Cne sh1re , Austrdilan Institute o f World Affairs, 1968) , p 317.

19

US d~nated SEATO seemed to become even more pronounced litary tban in the previoua decade, even as t.he us commitment in the Vietnam conflict deepene ~ . Notwithstand ing the fa ct that b oth t he o ffi ci al per ceptio n of an expansioniat China , an d the desirability o f t h e American involvement in Indochina came under 1n creas1nq questi on in the sixties , Wash i n gton 's self - conceived taak of utilizing SEATO, if necessary e ven desp i te the d oubts and hesitations among it s own all i es 1n the orga n1 ~ at1on, yet appeared to become more firml y entrenched .

IV

It seems worth stress i ng, theref o re , that the US ' s As ian allies in SEATO, at the time o f the Manila Tre a~y, wi shed at least to have the collective aecurlty me chanl sms of the treaty accompanied by a mo re positive , regi o n lly ~ntegrative o rganizati on , partlcularly 1n the econ oml c senae, since they realized o n ly t oo well the d&nq ra t o their own internationa l credibllity and t o thelr domeatl c stabilities of a continued relian c e o n th Weatern colonial powers in an age of rapld decol o n1 z at1on od tr1umphant nationalism . The answer to theae con c ern• wa the Pac1 f1 c Charter, signed on 8 Spetmber 195 4 1n ~an1l , the same day that the " Southeast Asia Colle c t1ve Defense Treaty" or Manila Treaty which established SEATO waa a1qned. The Pacific Charter, as a concep t, has had a history As early as 1936, Australian of f1 c 1als of some durat ion. 5Qggested the desirabillty of a Pac1f1c regi on security ~reaty and co-operative o rgan 1 rac1on , and in January 19 4 9 Philippine President Elp1d1o Qu1r1no proposed creat1 o n of an alliance of noncommunist nations 1n South and Sou t heast Asia, t o be headquartere d in Manila, and h av1nq prlmarily economic and seco ndarily milltary an d pol l tlca co-operatlon as its aims . A conference o f a number o f South and Southeast Asian nat1ons, all strong ly commltted to an anticolo n1al1st p olicy pos1t1on , but otherw 1se hav1nq little i n common , met 1n Jakarta chat same month t c d 1s cus s creat1on of a •pacific Unlon" , but n o agreement was By 1953, however, Quir1no's successo r, Ramon reached. Magsaysay, had raised the i dea of such a un1on aga1n, also w~shing to give 1t dist1nct1ve ant1colon1a list and economic aspects, a long w1th an avowed ant1communis t

20

In the 1954 Pacific Charter ultimately or1entation agreed t o by the Man ila Treaty and SEATO signato r 1es , equality and the right of self-determi nation for all pe oples are upheld, as is t he aff i rmat ion o f the principle of securing by " every peaceful means" self-gove.rnm ent and political independence f o r t h o se wh o wish it and who "are able t o undertake 1ts responsibili ties. But , alth o ugh the As1an participants 1n the Man 1 ~a Treat y Confere n c e had wished to emphasize the need f o r eco n o mic c o -ope rat ion and reciprocal ass ist ance, this wa s r e s1sted by the US , Britain , and Auscral1a , which bel1e ved tha t th i s kind of economic co- o pe rati o n and a1d mechan1sm was already being provided f o r by o th e r 1nte r nat1 o na l arrangeme nts such as the Co lombo Plan . St1ll, the Man ila Treaty 's preamble embo dies the langu age o f the Pac i f1 c Charter and the sc r ess o n the prin ciples o f selt - determlnat lon and promo t ion o f self - gove rnment, wh lle the text o f Lhe Treaty ( arti cl e Ill ) pr ov ides that ~he s1g nat o r1es wjll co-operate with ea c h o cher in the " furthe r deve lopment o f econ o mic measures , including t e chn1cal a ss 1stan c e" 1.n o rder t o pr o mote eco n o mic and s ocial devel o pment . 32 To be sure , SEATO ' • activities 1 n educa ti o n and in extend1 n g of va r ioua forma o f aid were always fav o urite , if o c c as1onal, topics in the public addresses of lte spokesmen.33 As SEATO ' & va lue in f o r mal m1l1t ary terms came t o be questioned more and mo re during the sixties and seventies , 1n ~he degree ~hat US i n volvemen t 1n t h e Vletnam War als o becan~ incr~as1ngly controvers ial , 1t was prec1sely SEATO ' & economi c a n d technical assistan ce functions that c ame t o be plac ed sign i f ica nt ly i n the fozeground in the o rgan1 z ati o n's own reports and ln o ne suc h re port , i ss ued 1 n 197 4 , publ1c1ty releases . for example , 1t l& n o ted that the Ma n1la Treaty cal led for a " colle c t1ve def ence act ion" aga1nat armed attac k o r in counter in g subversion dire c te d "f r o m with o u t ", but adds that "the Treaty has always been con ceived as a means o f ~he

32

Pollak t op.cit., pp . 108- 1 11 ; Webb, o p .c it . , p . 67; Watt , op . c lt . , p. 118 ; Fitie:.ld , o p . it . • p 103 .

33

S e , for ex.ampl6, SEATO Se retcn y Gent!tal Po te S&raSln' & add ress . " The Cul tural, Educational . and Economi c. Side o f SEATO . " del1vcred t o the Bana kok Ro tary Club , 14 May 19S9

21

providing a framew o rk of stabil1ty , pe ace and freedom within wh ich the regi on ca n pursue econ om1c and social betterment". 34 Th e same r eport declare s that "the e con omic and soci a l r o le t h at SEATO has played con tinues und1m inished and un ch al le nge d" , that "pri o rit y 1s t od a y accorded t o proJects t o improve rura l living standards and educational facilities , stressing co-operati ve managements and other f orms of popular participat 1on ", and that countering the threat o f subversi on is the " corollary of a positive programme o f econ omic and social uplift ". One particularly n otes i n this and similar repo rt s the stress be i ng pl aced on rural h e al t h se rvices i n Thai l and and the Philippines that are spon sored by SEATO ( " The Role of Medicine i n Counter- Subvers ion and Counte r Insurgen cy " is a con tribut ion by the medical staff ~~ficer or o f SEATO 's now diss olve d Military Plann ing Office ) , g well-drillln and , igation irr , chi ld care programmes proj ects i n conjuncti on with the Tha1 Gove rnme nt' s " clean water" c ampaign in the ru ral areas , o r commun 1ty devel opment (complete with a SEATO " Vi llage o f the Year Award" }, SEATO funds f o r the constructio n o f multipurpose v1llage centres where education , medical a nd othe r services are available, and so on. Eve n bef o re the reor ganization o f SEATO f o rmally anno unced at the SEATO Council of Ministers meeting on 28 Sep tember 1973, which saw the ab o liti on of the M1litary Planning Offi c e, SEATO Secretary General Sunthorn Hon glada r om had i ndicated a new emphasi s on "civili an activ1t1es" and had called attent ion to the o rganizat ion ' s " several peaceful pr o je cts", in clud1ng agricultural research, a v eh icl e-rebu lld~ng workshop and training programme , and medical and cultur al programmes. 36 The new emphasis on SEATO 's "peaceful " miss1 o n was, it seems, in la rge measure the result o f t h e "N1xon

34

SEATO Today (Bangkok :

Southeast Asia Treaty Or ganizati on ,

1974), p . 1.

35

Lt . Col. Ramon C. Cor tes , Jr , "The Role of Medi c ine in Counter-Subversion and Coun t er-Insur gency , " Sot4r:heast As ian Speotrum ( Bangkok: SEATO, Jan~ary 1973), pp 20-23.

36

The Djakarr,a Times , 13 April 19 73 ; "SEATO Re-Organ iza t ion Plan Emphasises Ci vil Ac tiv it ies 1 " SEATO Press Release , Ba ngkok , 23 July 1973 .

22

Doctrine" , and concomitantly of the progressive scaling down of the direct US military involvement in the Vietnam fighting . From the beginning, therefore, in their analyses of the effects of the "Nixon Doctine", attempts were made by SEATO spokesmen to relate the new emphasis being placed on article III of the Manila Treaty (which provides for economic co-operation, it will be recalled) to the con tinuing security needs of the Treaty signatories . But as the realignment of post- Vietnam power interests accelerated, even this relationship carne to be viewed with some - though by no rreans universal - skepticism in the region and beyond i t . The organization's "civilian activities"p however intrinsically useful, were increasingly considered by critics as anachronistic, duplicatory, andp i n any case, as requiring a different administrative horne . As early as April 197lf the then SEATO Secretary General, Jesus Vargas, declared that under the "Nixon Doctrine" the "free Asian nations" could expect that the withdrawal of American forces from the region would not only be accompanied by a commensurate increase in quantity and variety of US military and economic assistance, but that SEATO military exercises , held annually since 1956, would be more important than ever as the countries of the region began to do more in their own defence . The reason for this enhanced importance, according to Vargas, was that assistance in manpower and materieZ to Southeast Asia might now have to be brought in "from bases more removed from the combat zones" than originally contemplated , and that, apart from the need to meet any threat of aggression from outside, SEATO was currently also placing "greater emphas is " on " counter-subversion and counter- insurgen cy work". Vargas noted that the aid being provided to SEATO's Asian members under article III of the Manila Treaty was designed to alleviate "problem situations" which "Communists" could and would use in order to foster popul~7 discontent to the point of "subvers ion and insurgency" . Thus, in the context of the "Nixon Doctrine", SEATO

37

SEATO Gaared to Meet ChaUenges of thf: 70 's. An Inter-view with SEATO Secretary General. ~ Lt. Gen . Jesus Vargas (Bangkok: Southeast As i a Treaty Organization, 1971), pp . 2- 3.

23

In this was essentially expected to turn more 1nward . annual report for 1975 Secretary General Sunthorn Hongladarom wrote that " our programs" were presently directed toward helping the governments of Thailand and the Philipp1nes to promote "social and econom1c development" as well as ma1ntain "security" in those areas of thj two countries subjected to "insurgency and subversion ''. 8 The seventeen-page 1975 report spends less than two pages on " security" , and nearly seven on "development" , detailing in the latter category such varied activit1es as assistance to the Tribal Research Center and the Hill Tribe Rad1o Station in Chiang Mai , Thailand , the construction of fifteen low cost irr1gation water catchments for use by Northern Thai Hill Tribe communities , a grant for the construction of a poultry feed mill in Thailand's Nan province, support for construction of a science and vocat1onal wing in a high school for use by the Philippine tribal community of the Ikalahan, aid to a local farmers ' co- operative at Bahay Pare in the Philippines, funds for child care centres 1n Manila slums, aid to a Dental Tra1ning Centre at Cholburi , Thailand, and to the Rural Health and Development project of Chiangmai University, Thailand , project funds for a Tropical Disease Control Laboratory in Sorsogon , the Philippines, aid to a "Protein Expansion Program for Rural Areas" and other agricultural assistance facilities in Thailand, educational courses for Thai Hill Tribe teachers , aid to a pilot proJect to train bilingual teachers (Tha1 and Malay) in Thailand ' s southern provinces of Yala and Patani, a grant to the Magalang Vocationa l Training School and the Pampanga Agricultural College and provisioning of funds for teachi n g equipment at an area rehabilitation centre in Cebu City , the Philippines , and help for a programme of postgraduate and undergraduate scholarships which , between 1958 and 1976t will have enabled 59 Thais, 58 Filipinos, and 44 PakisLan1s to have obtained their degrees, including 28 doctorates . 39 Even the brief section on "security" 1n the 1975 SEATO report stresses instances of "m1litary c1vic action" ,

38

SEATO Report, l9?5 by His Exaellenc:y , Mr. Sur.thorn Hongladarom, Secretary Gener-al, Southeast Asi a Treaty Organization ( Bangkok: Sou~heast Asia Treaty Organization , 1975), p . 2.

39

Ibid . , pp . 3-10 .

24

in which mi li tary medica l personnel aided i n he alth care and s ocial welfare proj e c ts . Among the latter were the socalled " Nagaraj" exerc i se , 1.n which medical and denta l treatment was provided t o some 50, 0 00 peoples in provinces in North and Northeast Thail and, and a p roJect linked t o mi l itary exer c ise "Sea Fox" in the Sub1.c Bay area of the Philippines , where support was given to a drug abuse research centre. The kind of security fo c us SEATO operat1.ons prefer these days are proJects like the socalled Aw Paw Paw (a Thai acro nym for Volunteers f o r Self Development and Security), a kind of mobile vil lage work force , integrated wi th the rural security programme of the Thai Government , and providing manpower for both local development and counter- insurg e ncy projects supervized by police and m1.l1.tary. The Philippines and Thailand , compelled to realign their foreign poli cy priorit1.es in the post- Vietnam war era, obviously prefer today to turn the " development " rather than the " security" face of SEATO ' s Janus to their Asian neighbours . Particularly so , as Thai and Philipp1.ne membership in ASEAN and e n dorsement of ASEAN ' s soc alled " Kuala Lumpur Declaration" of 1971 commits them t o strive , along with other ASEAN states, to make Southeast Asia into a "z one of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any f orm o r manner of i n terference by outside powers " . 40

v Realization of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration may be altogether illusory. But there is no deny1.ng that the ASEAN states , including SEATO members Thailand and the Philipp1.n es have, since the promulgation of the " Nixon Doctrine" , become 1.ncreasingly active in establishing thei r own security priorities and in attempting to de velop their own defensive framework in the1r own way.

40

On t he o r1g1ns and rami f i c ations o f the Kuala Lumpur Declaration , see, f or examp l e , D1 ck Wi 1son, The Neutra l i z at~on of So~theast Asi a (New York~ Washi ngton, London : P ra~ ger Publ1shers, 19 75) , and J ustus M van der Kroef , "ASEAN 's Se cur i cy Needs and Pol1 c ies ," Pacnfia Affai r·s , Summer 19 74 , pp . 154-1 70 .

25

In light of this it is noteworthy that the US Department of State sent its spokesman to the US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee as recently as 6 March 1974 to explain not only the continuing need for the Man~la Treaty and the SEATO organization in terms of the region's strategic security concerns, but also to disparage ASEAN's potential in this connection, while also claiming, however, that SEATO's 1973 internal reorgan ization marked a desirable adjustment to the new era of de t en t e . The spokesman, Assistant Secretary Robert s. Ingersoll, declared categorically that "no serious alternative to the collective security arrangements of the Manila Pact has yet developed and none is in sight", that the Manila Treaty and SEATO were particularly important to Thailand " as it adjusts to an uncertain future", that ASEAN comprises only half of the Southeast Asian nations, and that the latter "have evinced no interest" in a formal security arrangement of their own . Ingersoll also said, however, that all members of SEATO "recognize that the cold war is over", and that the SEATO structure should take account of changed conditions. Hence, according to Ingersoll, SEATO military planning had been suspended as of September 1973, its military exercises had become less frequent, there had been a sharp reduction in headquarters staff (from eighty-eight to thirty- four professionals), and SEATO ' s " Information Office has been el iminated along with its old strident anti -Commun ist output". Withdrawal from SEATO or the Manila Treaty by the US would be undesirable, Ingersoll implied, as such an action would carry a "symbolic significance" out of all proportion . 41 However, by September 1975, eighteen months later, US perceptions had apparently changed so greatly that the significance, symboli c or otherwise, of a US endorsement of the idea first formulated by Thailand and the Philipp1nes two months earlier, that is , to phase out SEATO, was no longer considered a problem. The collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam in the first half of 1975, and the final debacle of us policy in Indochina also, it appeared at first, was dragging SEATO more rapidly into oblivion, as Thailand and the Philippines accelerated a change in their diplomatic attitudes toward communist Asia's capitals . Yet, by the close of 1975 , a basic theme

41

The Department of State BuUetin 9 l April 1974 , pp. 345-348 o

26

of In g ers oll 's remarks o n SEATO the yea r before was t o be heard again 1n President Gerald F o rd's 7 December 1975 "Pacific Doct r i ne" sta t e ment , wh1ch asserted, i r. te r al1a , " o ur con tinuing stake in the s tabi ity and secur1ty o f ( Fo r the t1me be1ng, Ingers oll had sa1d , Southeast Asla" . nat ion s o f Southeast Asia " continue to look t o the establ1shed defense rela t1or.sh1ps Wlth the Un1 ted States f or the1r secur1ty", and , hence , the US preferred ma1nta1n1ng the Man ila Treat y a nd SEATO " as part. o f th e e qu1librium pr ocess " , wh1l e th e countr1es o f the reg ion began t o a s sume more o f th e1.r own secur1ty bu rdens". ) Was SEATO , 1n the very process o f be1ng "phased o ut" , a cq u1r1ng yet another new lease o n l1fe , JUSt as t he patte rn o f amb1 v alent attitudes that had attended 1ts b1 rth more than tw o decades ago , and wh ich had e ve n then seemed t o f o redoom th e or gani z atlon to but a brief e x 1sten ce , had bec o me a hardened cocoon i n whi ch SEATO ' s " symbol1c s1gn1fi ca n c e" l1ved o n and o n?

VI In retr o spect the very o rg an1za t1 o n al structure dnd o perat1 o nal parame t ers o f SEATO s eemed l1k e ly t o en cou r age Th1s disappo1ntment amo ng its more sangu1 ne admirers. has been less t he case perhap s w1th SEATO 's c1v1lian "w 1 n g " than Wl th i ~s military o per a tion. 4 2 Th ough na v 1 n g

42

The p rinci pal c ivilian or ganuan on o f SE ATO consuts u f OJ a CoL n ci l, a ttended by the ForElgn M1 n1s ters o f tn e st gn ato ry sta t es, who mee t once a year , (i) d SE ATO Council Rcpresentat 1ve s Gr oup , LOnsisting of the Amb assadors of the signat o ry sta t es stat toned in Bar.gk ok • who meet cn ce a month . and ( 3) a Pe nnanent Wo rk1 n g Group , con sist1ng o t d1plomat1c pers onne l of the member states' embass1es 1n Bangkok , who meet once a wee k t o impl eme nt the de c1 s1 ons of the t wo previ ous de c 1ston-making levels . Addlti onally, in the perman~nt SEATO Sec retar l at in Bangkok th e r e &re o t fl.:es o f adm1ni stra tion , se curlty affa1rs, and s o..: 1al c.nd e onomt c atf6trs . Stuay g r oups, ~ o ns1st1n g of spe Llo l lsts 1n t1el ds ran g1ng f r om cc unter-insurgc nty t o o...o nm~ur. 1 ty ae: vel c pmcnt . and from land tenure r c. labour pr blt:ms , ho\'e been regu l arly conveneo co p r e viae aav1 e and und~r t4k e spe~lal t escar ch p! OJ e Ctb . The resear ch con l ribu tl o n o f man y o r the stuay gr oup s and o t s ome

27

no standing armed forces, like NATO, SEATO did develop over the years a rather elaborate military consultative and intelligence structure including , first, initially biannual conferences of its Military Advisory Group (among them , most of the time, the US Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and the Australian General Staff Chief}; secondly, implementation of the Adviser's decisions by a Military Advisers' Representat1ves Committee, consisting of represent.a'C.lves of the Military Advisers resident at SEATO headquarters, and interacting with, thirdp operations of a Military Planning Office ("integrated" with the civi l Secretar1at since 1 973, the head of the MPO becoming deputy Secretary General, and with , fourth,lower-tier JUnior military "planners" committees, and finally a military secretariat . 43 Addit1onally , co-operation of these un1ts with the armed forces' staffs of the individual s1gnatory countries, and with military assistance prcgrarnrne in Thailand and the Philipp1.nes, has been continuo·us . Yet, even in the middle and later sixties, at the he i ght of the fighting 1n Vl.etnarn , but 1n accordance with the proviso that since South Vietnam had not requested SEATO 1ntervention as such and hence any assistance of SEATO members to the Saigon Government had to be on a bilateral bas1.s , SEATO's military offices had little or no actual operational responsibility or 1.mpact, even though Thai, F1lip1no , Australian and New Zealand contingents operated along with US forces in Indochina . The s1.gn1f1cance of the V1.etnarn War for the Southeast Asian region's political and strategic future can hardly Yet, considering the earlier noted rationale be m1n1m1zed . noninvolvement as such in that war, SEATO's given for what circumstances a distinctively under wonder one might In SE~TO military re sponse would ever have been made . emergence the of note took he which in lecture a 1969, 1n of a "mult i - polar~ ' international system , and of the growth of Southeast Asian "regionalism", among others, SEATO

of tne offices 1n the permanen t secretar1at has been very An ever recurr1ng grievance voiced ~onside1abl e over the years . by personnel engaged in some of rhese pro jects in conversat ion w1th this writer has been an alleged lack of implement ation due to feat of enc roachment on Thai , Phi lippine or other member states ' bureaucratic preserves , 43

George Modelski, "SEATO: lts Function and Organ1zation," 1n Modelaki , SEATO, Six Studies , op .cit . , pp . 24-25 .

28

Secretary General Jesus Vargas defined SEATO ' s militar~ strategy as essentially being the same as in the past: 4 Stated briefly it continues to be a systematic containment of an enemy overt attack with the use of indigenous military forces, until such time as pledged forces f r om SEATO allies reach the war zone where they become i ntegral components of a SEATO force operating in accordance with a pre-ar anged command structure , A " SEATO force " operating under a " pre - arranged command structure " would hardly then have been triggered, however, or be set in moti on even now short of, say , a massive Chinese or North Vietnamese invasion of Thailand . From Vargas' analysis one does not get the impression that either the " people's war " character of the Vi etnam fighting , or the continuing insurgency problem in the region as a whole , was deemed to fall within the purview of SEATO mitit:ary strategy. Rather , what Vargas at the time also noted as a shift of SEATO ' s security concerns from " direct " aggression to problems of " covert aggression o:r- subversion ", necessitated an " overall " SEATO involvement, according to the SEATO Secretary General , wi t h new political and economic measures ( " The development of a climate of economic progress in vulnerable areas " , or " establishment of effective organization by member 2ov ernments to ensure internal stability and protection . " ) 5 Obviously the compl exity and wide-reaching policy implications of these measures went far beyond SEATO 's planned scope or even persuasive powers, and one can only speculate what practi c al contribution , given the domestic political realities of the countries of Southeast Asia, Vargas actually expected SEATO to make to them. Meanwhile , the endless rounds of intelligence gathering and dissemination in which , initially , an " Intelligence Assessment Committee", meeting twice a year, played a leading

44

Lt . Gen . Jesus Var gas, "SEATO: Its Organizat ion , Strategy and Future Role ," mi meographed, unpubl ished lecture to the Army War College of Thailand, 2 December 1969, p . 11 .

45

Ibid,, PP • 1 7- 18.

29

role, and the d~scussions, report wr~ting, and "braintrusti ng" were, in the opinion of various military personnel attached to SEATO with whom the author taiked in recent years, useful but hardly ind~spensable. After the internal SEATO reorganization of 1973, a separate Office of Security Affairs (OSAJ became "primarily respons~ble" for providing SEATO ass~stance to the Thai and Phi lippine secur1ty / development programmes through a separate "Intelligence and Insurgency Analysis Division", a Training and an "Exercise Plann~ng" Divis~on. At the same time, SEATO generally was expected to place "greater emphasis", henceforth, on support for the internal security and development efforts of ThaiLand and ~he Ph1l~pp~nes. This occurred , furthermore, when in both ~hose countries varied forms of guerilla resistance were rising . Yet , even w~th th1s reorganization and operaLlOnal emphasis, questions couid be raised as to whether the o rgan1zat1on's counter-lnsurgency seminars, comp1lation and exchange of intel ligence, and security plann 1ng, all presumably ref lective of this new opera tional approa c h, contribuLed anyth1ng that was n o t already kn own to the Thai and Philipp1ne m1litary staffs, or to the US and ANZUS intelligence services. Certainly w1th the reduct lcn in frequency and extent of f o rmal SE ATO military exercises, the OSA's new "Exercise Planning and Support D1v1sion" has had little more to d o than keep track of 1ncreasingly bilateral counter-lnsurgency conferences and naval and other manoeuvres of ASEAN states.46

46

The SEATO Secretary General's Repo rt f ur 197L-7 3 st1.ll lists "f our SEATO military exercises" ht: ~d dunng t hE: repo r t penod . Two were naval exercises held ir. the So uth China Sea 1.n February an.d October l9i2:, 1.nvolv1n& ve &s els ~tno cur c raft from Austral1.a , New ZealMnd, UK, Philippines, Thalland, and the US . The other two were " Goamand po st" t:xeHi~es, held 1.n Bangko k, in Jur1e 1 972 and May 1973, i n or der "to te&t cvmmcandE:rs and s t cift o ffi c ers 1.n the deployment of SEATO f o r ces" . OftlLtrs and staff from all act1.ve SEATO members parti c ipaled and wh~c is d~s c r1bed as "related c iv1c. .sc t1. on" a ccompany1ng these " o amdnd post e xe.c ci ses" dedit" with a water supply installotl.On and wich a drink1.ng wat~r proje Lt, bo th in Th&lldnd Ne1ther the l 9 i 3-74 nor th e 19 75 SEATO Secretary Gt:necdl 's Rtpo rrs lis~ any further In J.snuary 19 76 , SEATO , a cco rding to a m1llra cy exer c i~tes . report by Maniia's Far Easte rn Bc o ad ~as c1ng Cot porar 1. on , was said to be condu c ting an "engtnecnng ond c 1 v 1 ~ a i. tlOn exerdse" in the rural a re& s of Luzo n, s~~ c. 1f1. ca lly t oad (v nstru ~ tton and

30

Then, too, even within 1ts new, post-1973 security context, the funds provided for SEATO assisted development projects have been quite limited (for example, US $2 , 000 for a village well-drilling project in Thailand, US $11 , 000 toward construc~~on of a dam for the Ikalahan project, and US $20,000 for a weaving train~ng c e ntre ~n Bangor; La Un~on province , both in the Ph~lippines). SEATO ' s overall budget 1 n the nine~een f1fties flu ctuated between approximately US $1 .3 and US $ 1.6 m~llion , and has remained largely the same over the years (1n 1972 - 73 , for example, it was US $1.7 m1ll1on, and 1n 19 7 5-76 US $1.3 mill1on J . Member states originally made percentage contributions to the budget on the basis o f a f orm~la adop~ed f1rst in 1958, that 1s , of th e US 25 %, the UK 16% , Australia 13 . 5%, Franc e 13 . 5% and New Zea land , Pakistan, the Phil1pp1nes and Tha1land 8% each. Pakis tan f ormally withdrew from SEATO on 7 November 197 3 , wh1le Fran c e , wh1ch since 1967 had w1thdrawn from all SEATO military activit1es, has as of 30 June 197 4 declin e d t o make any further financ1al cont r1but1on t o SEATO, th ough it has no~ announced 1~s disavowal of the manila Treaty. The French and Pakistani budget shares have been taken over proport1ona l ly by the rema i n i n g SEATO members . The SEATO budget , however , has not i nc l uded various indiv1dual contr lbutions made by the member states t o SEATO progra mmes, especially 1n the development t1e l d , and t o the m~l1tary exercises Cons 1der1ng , ftnally , the h1 gh qual1ty of b o th c1v1l and mtl itary experts appointed and made ava1lable t o SEATO part1c1pants and , 1ndirectly, ( f o r example, through recen t SEATO spons ored counter-tns urgency semi n ars attended by Indonestan and malaysian military staff pers onnel) to some n on-SEATO members o f ASEAN as well and the very l1m1ted use that has actually been made of tha~ expert1se, the impression 1s once aga i n confirmed that SEATO , above all, has had t o play a symbolic r ole as an always present , strateg1 c potent1al , without much a c tual operat1 o nal power

The 1mprovements oi trrigation systems and school bu t ldt ngs exer c i&E: was r eported t o llluscrate ''the wtlllngnes s and cibtli ty " of the partt ctpating natt on& (the Phtltpptnes, US , UK, Thatland , and New z~al and) t o "assl!it tn the devel o pmen t of m~mber nanons , " FBlS . 22 January 1976

31

VII This symbolism, paradoxically, has been a major reason for SEATO ' s persistence over the years , and at the same time, the cause of criticisms and disavowals by member and affected nonmember states alike. After France, under de Gaulle , withdrew from the integrated organization of NATO in 1966 (though remaining in the Atlantic Alliance} its cessation in SEATO militar-y activities in 1 9 67 was a natural corrollary. Yet, paral l el with France ' s continued participation in the Atlantic Alliance, there has remained continued French adhesion to the Manila Treaty, despite the French Government ' s further decision to cease making financial contributions to SEATO after 30 June 1974 . One might speculate whether the " French model", that is, continuance of the Manila Treaty without the SEATO structure eventually did not commend itself to the other SEATO members, just as the concept of an Atlantic Alliance , without or else with a significantly modified , NATO structure , appears to be a futu re possibility . Whatever the significance of a new, Southeast Asian " Gaullism " , following the Indo- Pakistani crisis over the secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971- 72, Pakistan ceased to be a SEATO and Manila Pact membe r on 7 November 1973. Pakistan ' s original entry into SEATO had largely been prompted by fear of India - a concern not shared by other SEATO members anyway . Withdrawal from SEATO became , from the point of view of a domestic stabilizing of West Pakistan , a highly desirable act once the Rawalpindi Government had decided to chastise the US for its alleged failure to assist Rawalpindi in its confrontation with India over the Bangladesh problem. Significantly , however , Pakistan has felt no urge to withdraw from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) , with its essentially anti- Soviet implication , and in the context of the current Sino- Indian Friendship Treaty of 9 August 1971 , Pakistan has particularly look ed toward the People's Republic of China as a balancing factor in South Asian affairs. Withdrawal from SEATO , with its traditional anti - Chinese orientation, seemed thus doubly desirable for the Rawalpindi Government - at least at that time , Since then, however, Peking's interest in preserving a US strategic presence in Asia to offset feared Soviet inroads in the region , and a Chinese realization that even a residual SEATO serves to

32

underscore that US presence, may perhaps have provoked second thoughts in a new, post- Bangladesh War Pakistan about the ea rlier withdrawal from the Man ila Treaty and SEATO, particularly als o 1 n ligh t o f Rawalpindi's rapidly 1mprovin g relat ions with the us. In retrospec t, probably mor e fateful for SEATO than the recently changed pos1tions o f France and Pakistan toward the organi zat1 on, were t h e earl1er d1 s avowals of SEATO on the part o f Laos and Carnbod1 a , There is little question that these disavowals carne as a resul~ of US policy de cisions . Though no~ s1gnatories to che Man1. la Tre a ty . Laos and Cambodia al on g with " the free terr1.tory under the JUrisdic t ion of the Stace o f Vi etnam", 1.t w1.ll be re called , had been named i n a protocol t o che treaty , as fa lli ng, 1.n the u n animous v1 ew o f the Treaty This s1.gnatories , within the s ocalled " treaty are a" meant that 1f the territ o rial 1ncegr ity , sovereignty o r pol1t1.cal 1nde pendence o f Laos, Cambod1a and South Vie tnam we re threatened " by any fact or s1 tuatlon " , the s1gnator1.es would l.mrnediately consul t o n che common However, no SEATO acc1on on defence t o be undertaken. the cerr1.tory o f t hese three sta t es could be taken excepc at the invi~ac1.on and w1 th the con sent o f the governme nt \.Je have al ready concerned (article ! V, subsections 2 and 3) seen how the carefully US orchestra ted, absence o f such an inv1tat1on to 1 nter vene on the part o f the governmen c of South V1 etnam 1orrnally precluded any SEATO role 1n the As has been n oted earl1er, also 1n Laos , con fl1.ct the re neutral1st r eg imes had had no var1.ous , 60 pr1. o r to 19 desire t o 1nvolve SEATO i n the country's domestic con flicc. Bul during 1960-61 , 1n the midst of a resurgence o f fighting, a new Laotian Gove rn ment headed by Prin ce Boon Ourn expressed a readiness t o appLy f o r SEATO membershi p. The US in December 1960 reJe cted th1s overture as being Pers1.stent Pathet Lao pressure demanded some provocatl.ve. sort o f response, h owe ver , and in March 1961, with Presldent John Kenn e dy taking d strong stand, the SE ATO Councl.l agreed that 1f an attempc to seize contr o l o f Laos contl.nued .( "a ppropriate" acti o n would be taken by SEATO members . 4 t Yec, there was l1ttle des1re on the part o f mo st SEATO members to become act1vely 1nvol ved In the Lao t i an struggle, and the chance o f fered by the br1ef

47

Model&kl, "SEATO: ed • SI!.'ATCJ :

lt.s Fun ... uon and Organt2.:1l l0n ," tn Modelski ,

S~ .c S tudi ~B , op - lt:

,

p

14 .

33

existence of the avowedly pro -SEATO Boon Oum Government passed, never to return in the continuing fighting during the decade following the 1961-62 Geneva Conference between CIA backed Laotian armed forces and the Hanoi supported Pathet Lao, the fiction of maintaining the country ' s offici a l "neutrality" ruled out SEATO concern, and the Vient1ane Government, like that o f Norodom S1han o uk in Cambodia , reaffirmed its repudiation of SEATO' s protocol placi ng Laos with the "treaty area" . Cambodia's disenchantment with SEATO had occur r ed After Vietminh forces had i nvaded seven years earlier. Camb odl. a in April 195 4, the Phn om Penh Governmen t had wan ~e d a US protect i ve guarantee o f its territo ry and in re~urn was prepared to prov ide the US with military bases . The May 1955 US a1d agreement with Cambodia , finally arr i ved at after protracted d1.s cuss1ons , did not offer Earl i er at the Septembe r such guarantees, however. 195 4 conference at Man ila wh ich founded SEATO, the prev1ously n o ted US reluctan ce to extend unequivocal ml.litary g u arantees t o t he Southeast As ian regi on was reflected i n th e phraseolog y o f the Manila Treat y relating ~ o the o pen-ended application o f the SEATO security But it Th1s had n o t been l o st o n S1hano uk . me ch anl.sm wa s , apparently, Indian Pr ime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ' s vi sl t t o Phn om Penh in November 1954, al o ng with Ch1 nese Premier Chou En-lai 's pers onal assurances o f peaceful co-ex lstence given Si hanouk at the Asi an-Afri can Conference i n Bandung in April 1955, which c o nvin c ed the C ~ o dl.f~ l eader o f the advantages o f a neutral is t f o reign p olic y . Even as th1s policy er oded 1n the yeats ahead, amidst a ste ady p o larizatl o n o f d o mestic facti o ns and the press ure o f Han o i ass1sted Camb od1an c o mmunist f o rces, SEATO and the US p ol icy in As1a generally rema i ned conven1ent wh1pping boys f or Sihano uk, fl o gged p erhaps By the t lme that the with the 1re of a rejected su1tor . Rusk-Thana~ commun i que o f 6 March 19 62 opene d the p o ssibility o f a mo re d1re c t and f o rceful appl1cati on o f the SEATO securl.ty mechan1sm, both Vietiane and Phnom Penh had r epeatedly and specifically r epudiated the Manil a Treaty's protocol as l.t appl1ed t o La o s and Cambo d1a, and, 1n a ny case, the f ocal p oi nt o f US con c erns, and that o f its

48

Leif~r . Cambo d~a

and

Neu traL ~ ty ,

o p . 1t . , pp . b- 11 .

34

SEATO allies, had by then primarily become South Vietnam. Among the unresolved issues in SEATO's history - as indeed in the history of the US involvement in the Vietnam conflict - is whether the preservation of the original unanimity principle in SEATO security action , instead of its abandonment by the Rusk- Thanat formulation, would have prevented or at least minimized not o nly the widening US military commitment in Vietnam, but the consequent polarization of the factional struggle in Laos and Cambodia as well, so that , in the end , US policy in Vietnam , and its eventual debacle, also meant the doom of the neutralist position in Laos and Cambodia , and the seemingly growing irrelevance of SEATO. On the other hand, one might speculate what a more forceful SEATO i nvolvement in Cambodia i n 1954-55 , and later in Laos in 1960-61 , might have accomplished, if either there had been "unanimity" among the SEATO members on the matter, or an earlier In that case , however , Rusk - Thanat type of formulation. an intervention by the People's Republic of China which , reportedly, at the 1954 Geneva Conference , had already warned that it would not accept the participation of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in any forthcoming, Western sponsored, collective securi~y system for Southeast Asia , would have had to be seriously considered.49

VIII What of the future? Proclaiming the end of SEATO has as much or as little significance as proclaiming the end of the Cold War. One can appreciate the circumstances producing the need for the symbolic gesture in both cases, while realizing at the same time that the dynamics of conflict, certainly those that gave rise to and kept SEATO going for as long as it did , will persist . If anything, there has been a growing realization ,

49

Mode1ski, "The Asian States' Part ic ipat:ion in SEATO," in Mode1ski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies , op. cit., p. 141.

35

particularly ev1dent in the Southeast Asian region since the Laot1an crisis of 1960-61 , but go1ng back to the guerilla movements in a number of countries of the area during the immediate aftermath of World War II, that security mechanisms must still be devised to counter, not a mass1ve armed attack from abroad, but the slower moving , less immediately pressing, yet seriously and pxogressively debilitating 1mpact of externally supported insurgency. Amidst grow1ng evidence of assistance to Thai communist guerillas from Hanoi and from the new communist Laot ian Government,SO t he Thai Army Commander- in - Chief has expressed concern recently that the communist insuxgency problem 1s flaring "in sensitive areas all ovex the country " . Tha1 Pr1me Minister Kukr1t Pramoj has warned that " our country is now facing its most important problem - the pxoblem of Communism", and the Thai Armed Forces Supreme Commander, Admiral Sa-ngat Chaloyu , has noted that " Commun1s t elements" have infiltrated "the rank and file in aimost all c1rcles " in the c ountry . The Thai National Secux1ty Council has recent l y submitted new security pol1cy gu1delines to the government which puts the suppression of terror1sts at the top of the priority lis t, yet sen1or US analysts, after visiting the region , repor t that Malaysia and Indonesia have litt le confidence in Tha1land's abil1ty to deal with the gxowing insurgency problem . 51 "It is encourag1ng to know , " Bangkok ' s leading English language da1ly ed1tor1al1 zed last September, "that the government while scrapping the organization is not go1ng to tear up the Man1la Treaty which gave ris e t o SEATO."S2 In the Philippines, 1n recent months , the allege d communist threat is being accentuated again . One official Phil1ppine perceptual linkage is that between the Maoi s t

50

On c urrent Vietnamese and Laottan support for ~he Thai ~ommunisc guer t11 as see FaP Eastern Eaonomic Revt ew , 22 August 1975, Sec also the tnterview with the then Thai premier pp 10-11 Kukrit PramoJ 1n FaP Eastern Eaonomi~ Review , 12 December 1975, p . 20
ibune , 25 October 1975 .

INSTTTUT'E OF SOUTHEAST A SIAN ST\JDtES

UST Of PU8UCATlONS

Occ as1onl l Pi pe rs 1

Harry J . Bend a , Re•earch in Sou t heast As ian St~di•s in Si n gapo r e , 1970 . l Opp . Gratis (OUt o f print)

2

P . Lim Pui Huen , New s pape r s pwbtis hed i n t~e NalaNsi~ Area : With a union li s t o f Loca l hotdi~~s , 19 70 . 42pp . Gratis (Out of p r i n t )

3

Chan Heng Chee , Na tion- BuiLding in Southeast As ia: Th