The Lectura Thomasina in Its Context: Philosophical and Theological Issues (Recherches De Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales - Bibliotheca, 18) 9789042942905, 9789042942912, 9042942908

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Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médievales Bibliotheca 18 The Lectura Thomasina in Its Context Philosophical and Theological Issues

Edited by

Andreas Speer, Andrea Colli, and Francesca Bonini

PEETERS

THE LECTURA THOMASINA IN ITS CONTEXT

Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales

BIBLIOTHECA

Editorial Board Russell L. Friedman, Wouter Goris, Guy Guldentops, Maarten Hoenen, Andreas Speer, Carlos Steel, David Wirmer

Bibliotheca is a series published by the editorial board of Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. It contains studies on medieval thought and editions of medieval philosophical and theological texts.

Bibliotheca 18

The Lectura Thomasina in Its Context Philosophical and Theological Issues

Edited by

Andreas Speer, Andrea Colli, and Francesca Bonini

PEETERS LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT 2020

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. © 2020 – Peeters – Bondgenotenlaan 153, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. D/2020/0602/96 ISBN 978-90-429-4290-5 eISBN 978-90-429-4291-2

CONTENTS

Preface by Andreas Speer, Andrea Colli, and Francesca Bonini .......... 7 List of Contributors .......................................................................13 I. Text and Sources The Lectura Thomasina: an Early Thomistic Sentences Commentary ................................................................................ 15 Francesca Bonini From the Condemnations to the Schools. The Correctorium Literature in the Lectura Thomasina ............................................... 35 Andrea Colli Le Commentaire de Bruges est-il à proprement parler une Lectura Thomasina ? ....................................................................... 67 Maxime Mauriège Appendix A: Anonymus Brugensis, Questiones super IV Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, dist. 12, q. unica .......................................... 95 (edidit Maxime Mauriège) Appendix B: Lectura Thomasina, Lib. II, dist. 12, q. 1 .................. 105 (edidit Andrea Colli) II. Doctrine Angelic Knowledge of Distant Things: From Thomas Aquinas to the Lectura Thomasina ....................................................................... 121 Alessandro Palazzo William of Peter of Godin on Matter........................................... 161 Fabrizio Amerini

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III. Context and Influence Does Unity Entail Distinction? Godinus and Scotus on the Principle of Individuation ............................................................ 191 Wouter Goris James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin on the Procession of the Holy Spirit (and the Generation of the Son) ...................... 211 Chris Schabel Appendix: Iacobi Metensis In primum librum Sententiarum, dd. 6 et 10-12 .............................................................................. 233 (edidit Chris Schabel) Dominican Debates on the Intensification of Qualities at the Beginning of the 14th Century: Hervaeus Natalis against James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain ....................................... 293 Jean-Luc Solère Index of Names ........................................................................... 347 Index of Manuscripts ................................................................... 353

PREFACE In 1926 Martin Grabmann described William of Peter of Godin (†1336) as “one of the most influential personalities of the Dominican Order between the end of the 13th and the first decades of the 14th century”.1 This characterisation reflected both Godin’s prominent political profile and his theological work. As a biographical description of the French theologian was issued by Paul Fournier a year earlier,2 Grabmann focused on Godin’s Lectura Thomasina (ca. 1300), providing the first analysis of the text. Although the work displays specific characteristics of a commentary on the Sentences (four books subdivided into distinctions and questions), the manuscript tradition gives the text this atypical title because of the conspicuous number of verbatim quotations from Aquinas’ writings (e.g. Summa theologiae, Summa contra Gentiles, De aeternitate mundi, Quaestiones de veritate). Therefore, Grabmann concluded that the Lectura Thomasina is essentially a faithful and clear summary3 of the “Thomistic” positions. More than seventy years later, Wouter Goris and Martin Pickavé emphasized the same aspect: in this text – they point out – Thomas’ arguments are “in part simply paraphrased”.4 On the other hand, the act of transcribing, paraphrasing and summarizing Aquinas’ sentences could be considered a (first) example of the gradual process of reworking Aquinas’ writings in late medieval teaching activity before his canonization. Moreover, 1. M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino (†1336) und seine Lectura Thomasina,” in: Divus Thomas 4 (1926), pp. 385-403, [repr. in: id., Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, vol. II, München 1936, pp. 559-576], here p. 385 [559]. 2. P. Fournier, “Le cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin,” in: Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 86 (1925), pp.100-121. 3. M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino (†1336) und seine Lectura Thomasina,” p. 572. 4. W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260–1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Mélanges offerts au Père L. E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 10/1), pp. 83–109, here p. 85 (our translation).

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as emphasized by Bruno Decker,5 Lothar Ullrich6 and also by Wouter Goris and Martin Pickavé,7 a systematic study of the Lectura Thomasina could give the opportunity to place the first reception of Aquinas’ thought in its proper historical context, by discovering connections with the theological works of some other leading figures of the late medieval theological debate. The first critical edition of Godin’s commentary on the Sentences, now in preparation at the Thomas-Institut of the University of Cologne,8 represents an initial contribution to the development of some of these aspects: an in-depth analysis of the text and an extensive survey of the sources are the first steps in delineating the understanding and transmission of Thomas Aquinas’ thought in the theological schools during the period between his death and his canonization. The workshop “Freedom of Teaching and Educational Policy. Censures, Condemnations, Corrections in the Late Medieval Schools,” held in Cologne in February 2017,9 was essentially conceived in the framework of this editing project: the contributions principally aimed at exploring the nature, sources, and diffusion of Godin’s Lectura Thomasina, paying particular attention to its reception within the Dominican schools. The articles collected in this volume are to a great extent based on this workshop. However, our intention is not just to present the proceedings of a particular conference. The volume is rather intended as an attempt to provide a comprehensive and updated study on the Lectura Thomasina and its philosophical and theological context. 5. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Münster 1967 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42/1), pp. 24–31. 6. L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob Von Metz O.P.: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300, Leipzig 1966 (Erfurter theologische Studien, 20), pp. 82–83. 7. W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260–1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” pp. 83–109. 8. Francesca Bonini is editing the first half of the first book (dist. 1–27) in the framework of her PhD thesis (University of Salento – University of Cologne). Andrea Colli is editing he first half of the second book (dist. 1-22) in the context of Horizon 2020 – Marie Skłodowska-Curie Action “TEACHPOL: Freedom of Teaching and Political Control: The Case of Thomas Aquinas’ Assimilation in William of Peter of Godin’s Lectura Thomasina (14th C.)” (http://thomasina.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/). 9. For a summary of the workshop, cf. A. Colli’s Conference Report “Freedom of Teaching and Educational Policy. Censures, Condemnations, Corrections in the Late Medieval Schools,” in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 59 (2017), pp. 292-300.

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The first section is devoted to a textual analysis of the Lectura and its sources. Francesca Bonini presents a comprehensive overview of the structure of Godin’s text and its characterizing aspects by giving a detailed analysis of the manuscript tradition and of currently available secondary literature. According to Bonini, Godin’s intention was not just to provide a series of quotations, but rather to combine and reasonably arrange different Thomistic theses. Even though the notion of “Thomism” begins to gain true significance after Aquinas’ canonization, the Lectura might be considered a first example of an “early Thomistic text.” Andrea Colli focuses on another fundamental source of the Lectura Thomasina: the Correctorium literature. A detailed survey of the large number of verbatim quotations from the different versions of the Correctoria corruptorii reveals that both the condemnation of 1277 and William of La Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae considerably influenced Godin’s approach to many controversial topics and his assimilation of Aquinas’ doctrines. Maxime Mauriège’s paper analyses the question on the matter of superior and inferior bodies in book II, distinction 12. He compares Godin’s account of this issue to the same passage in the anonymous Sentences commentary in manuscript Bruges, City library, 491, attributed by Josef Koch to Meister Eckhart. Moreover, the study examines the reception of both Aquinas and Eckhart in the aforementioned question. The second section highlights some doctrinal issues in Godin’s theology and philosophy. Alessandro Palazzo compares the subject of angelic knowledge of distant things in Thomas Aquinas and in the Lectura Thomasina. However, and somewhat surprisingly, this subject does not seem to be as valuable in Aquinas’ writings as both the Correctorium literature and Godin claimed. This means that, concerning this specific topic, Godin’s intention was not simply to repeat a “Thomistic doctrine,” but rather to use Aquinas’ quotations in order to support his own original position. Fabrizio Amerini establishes some textual correspondences between Godin’s quaestio utrum informitas materiae praecesserit tempore formationem suam and the article of Aquinas’ Summa theologiae specifically devoted to this subject. The goal seems just to be that of re-organizing Thomas’ opinions in a simplified way. But the Lectura Thomasina also aims at defending Thomas’ position through discussing the criticism addressed to him. Then Godin refers also to quodlibetal questions (e.g. Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, John Peck-

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ham), Correctorium literature (e.g. John of Paris and Robert of Orford), and commentaries on the Sentences (e.g. John of Paris). The last section is devoted to Godin’s historical environment and his influence on the Dominican tradition. Wouter Goris takes into consideration one of the most fascinating aspects of Godin’s theological works: the magisterial dispute that William of Peter of Godin and John Duns Scotus held in Paris over the question whether matter is the principle of individuation. Goris’ contribution provides evidence for the claim that the magisterial dispute between Godin and Scotus negotiates a unified account of individuation on the level of transcendental attributes of being. Chris Schabel’s paper examines James of Metz’s discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit (and the generation of the Son). The study includes an edition of book I, distinction 11, question 1 of James’ Sentences commentary. Moreover, all versions of this question are analysed in order to discover the development of James’ thought. His position is then compared to that of Godin and to the Franciscan doctrines on this matter. With the contribution of Jean-Luc Solère the attention shifts from the Lectura Thomasina to debates among the Dominicans in the first years of the 14th century. The question of intensification/remission of qualities, involving Harvey of Nédellec, James of Metz, and Durand of St. Pourçain, represents a privileged point of view to observe it. Thus, the present book covers new historical and theoretical problems by offering a strong incentive for the investigation of several topics in greater detail: the nature and the features of Godin’s Lectura Thomasina, the role played by Godin’s text in the Dominican schools, considering new cases and examples; the understanding of “Thomism” before Aquinas’ canonization; the cultural environment in Paris at the beginning of the 14th century. Then, transcriptions (or editions) of a considerable number of not yet edited texts, presented in all articles, make this study a precious and essential contribution to future studies devoted to these particular topics. At the end, we would like to thank both the contributors to this volume and the participants in the workshop, in particular, Stephen F. Brown, Guy Guldentops, Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, Catherine König-Pralong, Fiorella Retucci, and Thomas Jeschke, who presented stimulating papers and comments not included in the present book.

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We would like to thank the European Commission CORDIS (Community Research and Development Information Service), which financed the workshop held in Cologne in 2017, one of the many dissemination activities of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Project TEACHPOL (Project number 657033). We would also like to thank the editorial board of the Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, the Research Council of the University of Cologne, and Thomas-Institut’s secretariat – without their help this volume would have never been possible. Andreas Speer Andrea Colli Francesca Bonini

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Fabrizio Amerini Dipartimento di Discipline Umanistiche, Sociali e delle Imprese Culturali Università di Parma Via M. D’Azeglio, 85 – I 43125 Parma [email protected] Francesca Bonini Thomas-Institut Universität zu Köln Universitätsstraße 22 – D 50923 Köln [email protected] Andrea Colli Thomas-Institut Universität zu Köln Universitätsstraße 22 – D 50923 Köln [email protected] Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Università del Piemonte Orientale via Galileo Ferraris, 116 – I 13100 Vercelli [email protected] Wouter Goris Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn Lehrstuhl für Philosophie, insb. des Mittelalters Am Hof 1 – D 53113 Bonn [email protected]

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Maxime Mauriège Thomas-Institut Universität zu Köln Universitätsstraße 22 – D 50923 Köln [email protected] Alessandro Palazzo Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia Università di Trento Via Tommaso Gar, 14 – I 38122 Trento [email protected] Chris Schabel Department of History and Archaeology University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537 – CY-1678 Nicosia [email protected] Jean-Luc Solère Department of Philosophy Boston College Stokes Hall N219 Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA [email protected] Andreas Speer Thomas-Institut Universität zu Köln Universitätsstraße 22 – D 50923 Köln [email protected]

THE LECTURA THOMASINA: AN EARLY THOMISTIC SENTENCES COMMENTARY Francesca Bonini 1. Introduction The so-called Lectura Thomasina is the Sentences commentary of the Dominican master of theology and later cardinal William of Peter of Godin (ca. 1260-1336).1 Owing to the Acta capitulorum provincialium Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum of the first province of Provence,2 we 1. The Latin form Guil(l)elmus Petri de Godino has been vernacularized in several ways. In English, one can find the following: Guillaume Pierre Godin, Guillaume de Pierre Godin, Guillaume de Peyre Godin, Guillaume de Peyre de Godin, William Peter Godin, William Peter of Godin, William of Peter of Godin; the last one is adopted here. On this subject and on the other Latin versions of the name, see e.g. C. Fabian, Personennamen des Mittelalters. PMA. Namensformen für 13,000 Personen gemäss den Regeln für die alphabetische Katalogisierung (RAK), München 20002, p. 540. For biography and works, see: P. Fournier, “Le cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin,” in: Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 86 (1925), pp. 100-121; id., “Guillaume de Peyre de Godin, cardinal,” in: Histoire littéraire de la France 37 (1938), pp. 146-153; M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino (†1336) und seine Lectura Thomasina,” in: Divus Thomas (Frib.) 4 (1926), pp. 385-403, [repr. in: id., Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, vol. II, München 1936, pp. 559-576]; id., Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift ‘In Boethium de Trinitate’, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1948, pp. 359-362; R. Darricau, “Le cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin, des Frères Prêcheurs (1260-1336),” in: Société des sciences, lettres et arts de Bayonne 129 (1973), pp. 125-141; W.D. McCready, The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Fourteenth Century. Guillaume de Pierre Godin, Tractatus de causa immediata ecclesiastice potestatis, Toronto 1982, esp. pp. 7-10; T. Kaeppeli – G. Mollat, “Guillaume de Peyre de Godin,” in: R. Aubert, Dictionnaire d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques, Paris 1988, t. 22, coll. 896987; A. Rucquoi, “El Cardenal legado Guillaume Peyre de Godin,” in: Revista española de derecho canonico 47 (1990), pp. 493-516; R. Imbach – D. Nienhaus, “Guilelmus Petri de Godino,” in: P. Schulthess – R. Imbach (eds.), Die Philosophie im lateinischen Mittelalter. Ein Handbuch mit einem biobibliographischen Repertorium, Zurich – Düsseldorf 1996, vol II, p. 450; M. Gerwing, “Wilhelm Petrus von Godino,” in Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. IX, München 1998, col. 183, n. 98; P. Porro, “Guglielmo di Pietro di Godino,” in: V. Melchiorre, Enciclopedia Filosofica, Milano 2006, vol. VII, p. 5070. 2. C. Douais, Acta capitulorum provincialium Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum, Première province de Provence, Province Romain – province d’Espagne (1239-1302), Toulouse 1894, esp. pp. 248, 259, 267, 275, 295, 304, 332, 350, 328, 455, 367, 404, 418 n. 4, 456 n. 4.

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can reconstruct the stages of Godin’s academic career. Born around 1260 in Bayonne, he studied the Naturalia in Béziers and was, after that, entrusted with the office of lector in natural philosophy at several convents of the province. From 1284 to 1286, he then studied theology at Montpellier and subsequently became lector in theology in 1287 at Bayonne and in 1290 at Montpellier. In 1292, he was sent to Paris to study theology and might have actually arrived in Paris only in 1293.3 In 1296, he was appointed to lecture on the Sentences of Peter Lombard sub magistro in Toulouse. Moreover, the acts of the provincial chapter of Cahors (1298) mention him as lector Tholosanus, suggesting the continuity of his role for that year and describing the assignment for the following year: lecturing on the Sentences in Paris. This second stay in Paris probably lasted until 1301, when he was elected Prior Provincial of Provence, as we can read in the acts of the provincial chapter of Agen. Since Godin commented on the Sentences twice in his career – first in Toulose in 1296-98 and then in Paris in 1299-1300 –, Bruno Decker suggests that this commentary cannot be considered the work of a beginner. Moreover, the scholar hypothesised that Godin could have benefitted not only from his previous experience as a teacher but also from the teaching material he brought with him from the province. His work is then defined by Decker4 as a “sorgfältig gearbeitete Ordinatio” that should have been completed and released around 1300-01, shortly after Godin’s second lecture. The text is handed down either in a complete or in a fragmentary version by sixteen manuscripts:5 3. See A. de Guimarães, “Hervé Noel († 1323): étude biographique,” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 8 (1938), p. 27. 4. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42,1), Münster 1967, pp. 28-29. 5. See W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Parvi flores. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, (FIDEM. Textes et études du Moyen Âge, 10,3), Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 83-109; iid., “Von der Erkenntnis der Engel. Der Streit um die species intelligibilis und eine quaestio aus dem anonymen Sentenzenkommentar in ms. Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek 491,” in: J.A. Aertsen – K. Emery – A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28), Berlin – New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2001, pp. 125-177. Codex W contains two versions of books II and III. Therefore, the aforementioned studies distinguish between W1 (books I-IV, ff.

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Ba: Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. B III 6, 14th century: ff. 1ra-29va Prologue and Book I; ff. 29vb-30vb Tab. quaest. Book I-II; ff. 31(34) ra-64(67)vb Book II; ff. 65(68)ra-66(69)rb Tab. quaest. Book III-IV; ff. 67(70)ra-90(93)rb Book III; ff. 90(93)rb-123(127)vb Book IV. Be: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, ms. Theol. lat. Fol. 557, 14th century: f. 1v Tab. quaest. Book I (from dist. 8) and II; ff. 2ra-33rb Book I (from dist 8); ff. 33va-69rb Book II; ff. 69rb-103ra Book III; ff. 103r Tab. quaest. Book III; ff. 107ra-135ra Book IV. Bol: Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, ms. A 986, 15th century: ff. 1ra-40vb Prologue and Book I; ff. 40vb-50rb and 52ra-72rb Book II; f. 72va-100ra Book III; ff. 100ra-125vb Book IV. E: Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 505, 15th century: ff. 1ra71ra Prologue and Book I (until mid. dist. 47); ff. 71rb-137rb Book I; ff. 137rb-199vb Book III; ff. 199vb-263ra Book IV; ff. 263ra-265ra Book I (from dist. 47); ff. 266ra-272vb Tab. quaest. G: Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, half of 14th century: ff. 1ra28rb Prologue and Book I, ff. 28rb-66rb Book II; ff. 60rb-77va Book III; ff. 78ra-99rb Book IV; ff. 99rb-102rb Tab. quaest. Kl: Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, ms. 281, 14th century: ff. 1ra40va Prologue and Book I; ff. 40va-76vb Book II; ff. 77ra-107rb Book III; ff. 107va-133rb Book IV; f. 133v Tab. quaest. (Book I). N: Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, ms. VII C 30, 14th century: ff. 1ra36vb Prologue and Book I; ff. 37ra-70va Book II; ff. 70va-96ra Book III. P: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 3039, 14th century: ff. 1r-2r Tab. quaest. (Book I-II-III incompl.); ff. 3ra-31va Prologue and Book I; ff. 33ra-58va Book II; ff. 59ra-81ra Book III (till. middle dist. 2). Pi: Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile di S. Caterina, ms. 44, th 14 century: ff. 1ra-35ra Prologue and Book I; f. 35ra Tab. quaest. (Book I); ff. 35va-65vb Book II; ff. 65vb-66rb Tab. quaest. (Book II); ff. 66va95rb Book III; ff. 95rb-95vb Tab. quaest. (Book III); ff. 96ra-124vb Book IV; ff. 124vb-125rb Tab. quaest. (Book IV). W: Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, ms. 1590, beginning of 14th century: ff. 1ra-25ra Prologue and Book I; ff. 26va-45rb Book II; ff. 46ra-62ra Book III; ff. 63ra-77ra Book IV; ff. 105ra-126ra Book III; ff. 151-164vb Book II (till dist. 24). 1r-77r) and W2 (books II and III, ff. 105r-126r and 151r-164v); see W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina,” p. 90 n. 20 and iid., “Von der Erkenntnis der Engel,” p. 160. The fragment here called W3, collated with the other witnesses in the edition, has been added to their list.

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Fragments of the work are also present in: A: Arras, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 751 (1032), 14th century: ff. 25ra-54vb Book III dist. 31 and Book IV. H: Helsinki, Kansallis Kirjasto, F.m. V.TH.AA.69,6 14th century: 2 sheets with excerpts from Book I and II. Kr: Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, ms. 1583, 14th century: ff. IVvaIVrb excerpts from Book I dist. 6 and 7. P2: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 17266, 14th century: ff. 160ra-191vb Book I (dist. 8-48). V: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Vat. Lat. 869, 13thth 14 century: ff. 166-189r Book I (from dist. 8); ff. 189r-199v Book II (part of dist. 2 and dist. 17-41). W3: Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 2165, 14th century: f. 78va.

Godin’s commentary is known either as Lectura Thomasina or as Thomasinus, and an explanation of this name is provided by manuscript 44 of the Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile of S. Caterina in Pisa (f. 1ra): “Incipit opus super sententias secundum fratrem Guillelmum petri ordinis predicatorum Magistrum in theologia. Qui fuit lector curie et nunc est cardinalis. Et appellatur istud opus thomasina, quia in omnibus tenet cum thoma.” The complete formula Lectura Thomasina is used only in this witness, whereas the work is simply called Thomasina in the manuscripts Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, 281 (f. 133rb); Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII C 30; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3039 (f. 2v and 58va) and again in Pisa, f. 125v. The variant Thomasinus can be found in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B III 6 (f. Ar, 30vb and 66rb); Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 505 (f. 272vb), Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, 475 (f. 102rb) and in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 2165 (ff. 35v marg. sx., 78va, 88r marg. inf., and 100v marg. inf.). Occurrences of the term Thomasinus can be found also in the margins of the following codices: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 14383

6. The fragment is mentioned in W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina,” p. 90 with its previous signature: Helsinki, Yliopiston kirjesto fragment scholastik (without number). The signature changed in 2007 when the Helsinki University Library became the National Library of Finland.

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(f. 48va in marg); Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 1583 (ff. 20v, 30r, 64v, 84r, 87r, 83r, 89v, 93r, 94 r-v, 97r, 98r, 98v, 100r); Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana, Plut. XVI dextr. 1; Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. 722 (ff. 109r-111v contain the question Utrum aliquid possit fieri contra voluntatem diuinam based on book I, dist. 47 of the Lectura Thomasina) and Soest, Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek, Cod. 21a. As Martin Grabmann has already noticed,7 the masculine variant of the name, reported in library catalogues8 and in the abovementioned codices, refers to the book rather than to the author. We do not know whether this title was provided by the author himself or (with higher degree of probability) by posterior readers and catalogue compilers. For sure, it has a programmatic meaning in accordance with the author’s intention. According to Grabmann, who has been the first to analyse the text9 and to express the desire for an edition, the Lectura Thomasina testifies to the adherence of the author not only to the doctrines but also to

7. M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus,” p. 576. 8. See P. Lehmann, Bistum Mainz. Erfurt (Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz II), München 1928, p. 172 n. 8: “Thomasinus super tres libros sententiarum. Datum per mag. Johannem Wartperg”; p. 191, n. 21: “Item Thomasinus super tres primos libros sentenciarum”; T. Gottlieb, Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Österreichs, Bd. I: Niederösterreich, Wien 1915 [rist. Aalen 1974)], p. 350,40-41: “H 38. Thomasinus super quatuor libros sentenciarum, incipit: Queritur de sacra theologia”; Ibid., p. 357,1920: “I 48. Thomasinus super libros sentenciarum preter quartum, ut supra [i.e. H 38]”; p. 358,8-9: “I 54. Thomasinus super sentencias, incipit: Cupientes aliquid, ut supra I 48”; P. Lehmann, Die Bistümer Konstanz und Chur (Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz I), München 1918 [rist. München 1969], p. 182: “Item Thomasinus, id est summa, includentem quatuor summas sancti Thome incipientem ‘Utrum preter philophicas disciplinas necessaria sit alia doctrina’.” Goris and Pickavé are cautious in judging the above listed mentions of the Thomasinus and do not deny the possibility of missattributions and other works besides the commentary of Godin bearing the exact same nickname, as the following case seems to suggest: Stamser Katalog, ed. H. Denifle, Arch. Lit. Gesch. 2 (1886), pp. 226-240 [Now corrected in: G. Meersseman, Laurentii Pignon Catalogi, Roma 1936, pp. 56-67], p. 64: “50. Fr. Iacobus Lausanensis scripsit super Sententias lecturam thomasinam.” Cf. W. Goris-M. Pickavé, Die Lectura Thomasina, p. 85 n. 7 9. Grabmann was particularly interested in the presence of a question in book I, distinction 8, dealing with the real distinction of created beings, traditionally considered of great importance for both Aquinas and the so-called Thomist authors. In the text, Godin undermines Henry of Ghent’s refusal of the real distinction thanks to Giles of Rome’s Quaestiones de esse et essentia. So far, this represents the only case of a positive usage of Giles’ texts in the Lectura Thomasina. See F. Bonini, “The Lectura Thomasina of William of Peter of Godin and the question Utrum esse et essentia differant in rebus creatis,” in: Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur XXI (2015), pp. 97-126.

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the texts of Aquinas. In fact, as it will be discussed in more detail in the following pages, Godin made an extensive use of Aquinas’ texts, explicitly quoting and paraphrasing them. 2. The LECTURA THOMASINA, early Thomism, and the THOMATISTAE We are here analysing a work that in omnibus tenet cum Thoma. More specifically, given the composition date suggested by Decker, the text has been ascribed to the so-called “Early Thomistic School.” Andrea A. Robiglio highlighted how some recent historiography has dated the rise of the so-called “Early Thomistic School” already at the aftermath of Aquinas’ death.10 For example, in Frederick J. Roensch’s reconstruction, this intellectual movement is outlined as very precocious in finding a doctrinal unity and in organising itself as a school. For this reason, Roensch’s book – bearing a revealing title11 – has faced a significant amount of criticism.12 On the other hand, Luca Bianchi has outlined how the success of the Thomist movement was due to a widespread ideological control that was gradually imposed within the Dominican order.13

10. A.A. Robiglio, “Tommaso d’Aquino tra morte e canonizzazione (1274-1323),” in: A. Ghisalberti – A. Petagine – R. Rizzello (eds.), Letture e interpretazioni di Tommaso d’Aquino oggi: cantieri aperti. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studio (Milano, 12-13 settembre 2005), Quaderni di Annali Chieresi, Istituto di filosofia S. Tommaso d’Aquino, Torino, 2006, p. 197; id., La sopravvivenza e la gloria. Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV), (Sacra Dottrina Bibliotheca 53), Bologna 2008; p. 15. 11. F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque-Iowa 1964. 12. On this subject, see: A.A. Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria, p. 16 and M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden. Lehrtradition bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters,” in: M.J.F.M. Hoenen – R. Imbach – C. König-Pralong (eds.), Deutsche Thomisten des 14. Jahrhunderts: Lektüren, Aneignungsstrategien, Divergenzen / Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 57 (2010), p. 261 n. 3. 13. L. Bianchi, “Ordini mendicanti e controllo ‘ideologico’: il caso delle provincie domenicane,” in: Studio e studia: le scuole degli ordini mendicanti tra XIII e XIV secolo. Atti del XXIX Convegno internazionale. Assisi, 11-13 ottobre 2001, Spoleto 2002, pp. 303-338.

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Some of the attempts to establish the teaching of Aquinas as the major doctrinal line of the order already date back to the beginning of the 14th century, as the chapter of Metz (1313) testifies.14 Already in the first decade after Aquinas’ death, the interest in and respect for his texts gradually developed within and outside the order.15 Nevertheless, these attempts are not characterised by strong doctrinal elements, typical of a school. In fact, as stated by particularly cautious scholars, one will have to wait for as long as sixty years after Aquinas’ canonisation to speak of a “Thomistic School” in the proper sense.16 Therefore, one needs to be careful in the adoption of the expression “Early Thomistic School.” On the other hand, it is undeniable that the Lectura Thomasina contains some elements that prompted Roensch to list Godin among the leading figures of this intellectual movement.17 In fact, as we shall see in more detail on the following pages, Godin does not only paraphrase and quote – both implicitly and explicitly – the texts of Aquinas, but also openly states that the opinion of Thomas is truer than that of others,18 defends it against his opponents and undermines the arguments of authors expressing a different view. Even if it seems better to avoid the expression “Early Thomistic school,” Godin’s intellectual choice should not be judged as a solitary action. In fact, doubting the existence of a school in a strong doctrinal sense does not necessarily mean that the existence of an early Thomistic milieu in a broader sense should be questioned. Certainly, one can 14. B.M. Reichert, Acta capitulorum generalium, vol. II (1304-1378) (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, t. IV), Roma-Stoccarda, 1898-1905, p. 64,2731: “Cum doctrina venerabilis doctoris fratris Thome de Aquino sanior et communior reputetur, et eam ordo noster specialiter prosequi teneatur, inhibemus districte, quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius, quod communiter creditur de opinione doctoris predicti.” 15. In particular Elizabeth Lowe, in the introduction to E. Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas. The Controversies Between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourcain, London 2003, has described how, for more than half a century after the condemnation of 1277, the members of the Dominican Order, openly working against the grain, chose the via Thomae. This reconstruction has been partially criticised in A.A. Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria, p. 20 n. 12. 16. For example, S.-T. Bonino, “La scuola tomista nel XV secolo,” in: I. Biffi – C. Marabelli (eds.), La “via moderna”: XIV e inizi del XV secolo, (Figure del pensiero medievale 6), Roma 2010, pp. 175-188. 17. F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School, pp. 120-124. 18. “est tertia opinio et vera venerabilis doctoris Thomae” (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 1rb,51-52); “opinio fratris Thomae, quae est verior [...]quod probat in prima parte Summae, q. 1, art. 7” (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 2ra,23-24).

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already speak of some early groups of avid readers of Aquinas’ texts, who gradually began to defend his teachings. Such intellectuals were not moved by a strong doctrinal and philosophical awareness typical of a school, but by what Isabel Iribarren calls esprit de corps.19 The first mentions of these groups of Aquinas’ followers are particularly significant. Robiglio20 has highlighted that the very first reference to them is to be found in a letter of Peter of John Olivi to a confrere whose identity is still uncertain, but who is called frater R.21 Olivi’s letter dates back to 1283, but the first explicit mention of the thomatistae is contained in the works of the Catalan physician and philosopher Arnald of Villanova. Probably before 1304, he wrote a polemic treatise bearing the significant title Gladius veritatis adversus thomatistas or Gladius iugulans thomatistas.22 In this work, Aquinas is identified with the authority inspiring the “bicolor exercitus”23 of Dominican friars standing against him and his doctrines. Olivi and Arnald share not only a certain philosophical affinity, but also the same opponents: the Dominicans from the region of Provence. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the followers of Thomas, or thomatistae, mentioned by them were Dominicans from this province. In fact, they played a relevant role in the preservation of Thomas’ doctrines, and it should not be forgotten that during the General Chapter of Milan (1278), Raymundus de Medullione and Iohannes Vigorosus from the studium of Montpellier were sent to England to investigate the case of those brothers who criticised Thomas’ writings.24 Moreover,

19. I. Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain. A Dominican theologian in the shadow of Aquinas, Oxford 2005, p. 267. 20. A.A. Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria, pp. 26-28. 21. Petrus Johannis Olivi, “Epistola ad fratrem R.,” éd. S. Piron – C. Kilmer – E. Marmursztejn, in: Archivum franciscanum historicum 91 (1998), p. 61,338-340: “Hoc est enim dicta hominum quasi idola venerari, ex quo pericula sectarum et scismata oriuntur, ita ut quidam dicant Ego quidem sum Pauli, ego autem Aristotelis, ego vero Thome.” 22. The text is partially edited in F. Ehrle, “Arnaldo di Villanova e i ‘Thomatistae.’ Contributo alla storia della scuola tomistica,” in: Gregorianum I (1920), pp. 475-501 and is also analysed in A.A. Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria, p. 28 n. 25. According to Ehrle, the expression thomatistae should not be regarded as a pejorative term but as a mere variant of thomistae. The treatise was probably composed after Arnald’s theories had been criticised in the diocese of Marseille and is directed against the Dominicans who refused his calculations on the coming of Christ and accused him of heresy. 23. F. Ehrle, “Arnaldo di Villanova e i ‘Thomatistae’,” p. 500.

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also Bernard of Trilia, one of the first followers of Aquinas’ teachings who extensively quoted Thomas’ texts, was a lector in Montpellier and Toulouse.25 Even if it is inaccurate to characterise these medieval scholars as exponents of a homogenous and doctrinally strong Thomistic school, their link to the order’s studia and their role in teaching should not be underrated. Therefore, it is not irrelavant that Godin’s academic career developed not only in Paris but also between Montpellier and Toulouse, in the French Midi, where what can be called a “regional early Thomism” flourished already in the aftermath of Aquinas’ death. Furthermore, the link between Aquinas and the city of Toulouse should not be forgotten. The city, from 1369 onwards burial site of Thomas’ relics, was not casually chosen by Godin for his own burial. The cardinal funded the building of the church of the Jacobins in Toulouse, where a doublesided crucifix portraying also Godin is preserved.26 Thus, Godin can be considered a reader of Thomas’ texts and follower of his doctrines, with a writing style and method probably adopted in Provence. 3. Sources, Style, and Composition Technique As far as the writing style of the author is concerned, one of the first things that can be noticed is that – besides the mention of authorities such as Augustine, Avicenna, Dionysius, etc. – the only authors mentioned in the text are Thomas, occurring nine times in the four books

24. B.M. Reichert, Acta capitulorum generalium, vol. I (1220-1303) (Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica t. III), p. 199,1-4; A.A. Robiglio, Tommaso d’Aquino tra morte e canonizzazione, p. 208. 25. C. Douais, Acta capitulorum provincialium, pp. 114-115: “Assignamus lectores. Apud Montempessulanum […] ad secundum lectionem fratrem B. de Trilia” (Limoges 8 September 1266); p. 207: “Assignamus lectores [...] Tholose, fratrem Bernardum de Trilia” (Agen 15 August 1276). 26. M.-H. Vicaire, “Le financement des Jacobins de Toulouse. Conditions spirituelles et sociales des constructions (1229-ca.1340),” in: La naissance et l’essor du gothique méridional au XIIIe siècle (Cahiers de Fanjeaux, 9), Toulouse 1974, p. 244; M.L. Testi Cristiani, “Circostanze avignonesi. Il Crocifisso double-face del Cardinale Godin a Tolosa,” in: Critica d’arte series 6 vol. 55/4 (1990), pp. 42-61; M.-H. Laurent, “Le testament et la succession du Cardinal Dominicain Guillaume de Pierre Godin,” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 2 (1932), pp. 84-231.

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(3 times in the first book, 3 times in the second, and once in the third), and Iohannes Parisiensis, appearing only once in the second book.27 The name of Aquinas is followed by reverential epithets or expressions like venerabilis doctor or vera opinio. The other authors are designated as aliqui magistri, doctores moderni, moderni, doctores or simply quidam or aliqui. This choice, not unique in medieval Sentences commentaries,28 possibly aimed at raising Thomas to a higher rank, both among his contemporaries and among his predecessors. The explicit mention of John of Paris can be explained as a sign of admiration also for this author; in fact, Godin drew heavily on his works (both the Lectura super Sententias and the Correctorium circa). As far as the nature of the quotations is concerned, the author literally quotes or paraphrases his sources, condensing the content and at the same time preserving the verbatim character of the citations, which could thus easily be traced back to the original texts.29 The main source of this work is certainly Aquinas, and in the margins of the manuscripts Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. B III 6; Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, ms. Theol. lat. Fol. 557 and Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, we can find references to the passages quoted in the text. In particular, the Commentary on the Sentences and the Summa theologiae are cited, but we can find excerpts also from the Summa contra Gentiles, the works De veritate, De spiritu-

27. Lectura Thomasina, I, Prol., q. 1: “est tertia opinio et vera venerabilis doctoris Thome;” Libro I, Prol. q. 2: “Ideo est alia opinio fratris Thome, que est verior;” Lectura Thomasina, I, dist. 7, q. unica: “Ideo tertia opinio est Thome;” Lectura Thomasina, II, dist. 13, q. 1 (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 32ra,17-18): “Ad rationem autem eorum, per quam solvunt rationem Thome;” Lectura Thomasina, II, dist. 3, q. 1 (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 32va,50-51): “Ad illud quod dicunt ad rationem Thome;” Lectura Thomasina, II, dist. 9, q. 2 (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 36rb,5): “Et ratio etiam Thome secundum eos ad hoc non est efficax;” Lectura Thomasina, III, dist. 27, q. unica (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 70ra,10-11): “Sed dicendum quod prima ratio Thome est bona;” Lectura Thomasina, II, dist. 7, q. 1:“Iohannes Parisiensis in responsione dicit” (Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 35rb,3). 28. M. Michèle Mulchahey has highlighted that also John of Sterngassen in his Sentences commentary quoted the opinions against Thomas, such as that of Henry of Ghent, using the vague term alii. See M.M. Mulchahey, “The role of the conventual ‘Schola’ in Early Dominican Education,” in: Studio e studia, p. 138 and W. Senner, Johannes von Sterngassen OP und sein Sentenzenkommentar, Berlin 1989, Teil II: Texte. 29. Examples of Godin’s paraphrases of his sources are provided in W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina” as well as in the articles of Andrea Colli and Alessandro Palazzo.

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alibus creaturis and De aeternitate mundi, as well as the commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics. Among these works, pride of place is given to the Super libros Sententiarum and to the Summa theologiae. In fact, the work probably aimed at expounding Lombard according to the mind of Thomas. At the same time, Godin wanted to defend the venerabilis doctor Thomas against his opponents, for instance, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Richard Middleton, and the Correctorium fratris Thomae.30 The Lectura Thomasina also literally quotes several passages from the commentary on the Sentences of John of Paris (Quidort). This work, handed down in the form of a reportatio, is the source from which the highest number of verbatim quotations is taken, and it is not surprising that in the manuscript of Bologna, the Lectura Thomasina had been falsely assumed to be the commentary of Quidort.31 The connection between the two texts is witnessed also by the presence of some fragments from the Lectura Thomasina and references to the work of Godin in the margins of the codex Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbiliothek, 2165, handing down the commentary of John. This author lectured on the Sentences in Paris between 1293 and 1294/95, and in 1295/96, the reportatio of his Sentences commentary was probably already available. Verbatim quotations from the work of John can be found especially from the prologue to the eighth distinction of

30. On Henry of Ghent in the Lectura Thomasina, see W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Von der Erkenntnis der Engel”; on Giles of Rome in the Lectura Thomasina, see M. Pickavé, “An Early Witness of the Reportatio of Giles of Rome’s Lecture on the Sentences. Note on the Edition of Concetta Luna,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 72/1 (2005), pp. 175-185; on the presence of the Correctoria as well as other sources see the contributions of Andrea Colli, Alessandro Palazzo and Fabrizio Amerini. 31. The manuscript Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, ms. A 986 (15th century) contains, in the margins of f. 1r, annotations from two later hands. The first one, dating back to the 16th century (according to Giuseppe Mazzatinti), has written in the upper margin: “Super 4or Li. Sententiarum Johannis Parisiensis ord. pred. hic fecit correctorium corruptorii”; the second one, from the 18th century (according to Mazzatinti), has written in the lower margin: “Nota quod auctor istius libri debet esse Johannes Parisiensis dictus Pungensasinus, non Surdus vel Suardus, quia hic non ponitur ab Echard auctor super omnes quatuor, sed tantum super primum Librum. Quod si est Pungensasinus, cum sit antiquior D. Thomas, non potest esse auctor Correctorii ut supra dicitur.” See G Mazzatinti, Inventari dei manoscritti delle Biblioteche d’Italia, t. XXXII, a cura di A. Sorbelli, Firenze 1925, p. 125.

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the first book in Godin’s text, and the literal nature of these passages suggests that Godin had John’s text at hand while copying. Even more interesting are the striking similarities with the anonymous Sentences commentary handed down by manuscript 491 of the City library in Bruges, identified by Josef Koch32 with the lost commentary of Meister Eckhart – an attribution no longer accepted by scholars. In a letter addressed to Koch, and dated 26th July 1943, Bruno Decker describes his discovery of these parallel passages as “eine sensationelle Entdeckung”33. If Grabmann’s interest was focused on the Thomistic nature of the Lectura Thomasina, from this moment onwards, the attention had shifted to the relations between Godin’s work and other commentaries, such as the anonymous of Bruges ms. 491 and those of James of Metz, Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain.34 Especially after Thomas Kaeppeli discovered that, from 129394, Eckhart acted as Bachelor of the Sentences in Paris, Decker and Koch focused their attention on the years that Godin spent in Paris as a student, suggesting that it was highly probable that Godin, as a nonFrench Dominican coming from the Province of Provence, attended Eckhart’s lecture on the Sentences35. According to this hypothesis, the Lectura Thomasina offers Godin’s written and personal elaboration of

32. J. Koch, “Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund: der Sentenzenkommentar,” in: Forschungen und Fortschritte 19 (1943), pp. 20-23 [repr. in: id., Kleine Schriften I, Roma 1973, pp. 239246]. 33. The letter is preserved in the Meister-Eckhart-Archiv at the Thomas-Institut of the University of Cologne TI MEA-GGA-I-BW-1943-07-26. 34. L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300 (Erfurter theologische Studien, 20), Leipzig 1966, esp. pp. 75-90; B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42,1), Münster 1967, esp. pp. 24-31; T.W. Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P. (Studia Anselmiana, 58), Roma 1971, esp. pp. 180-184; T. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus. Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im Reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293-1320), Leiden – Boston 2011, pp. 371-374. According to Ludwig Ott, Durand’s commentary on the Sentences contains very few traces of the Lectura Thomasina, see L. Ott, Lehre des Durandus de S. Porciano OP von Weihesakrament, München – Paderborn – Wien 1972, esp. p. 132. 35. See T. Kaeppeli, “‘Praedicator monoculus’. Sermons parisiens de la fin du XIIIe s. (1293-1294),” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 27 (1957), pp. 120-167 and Koch’s letter addressed to Decker in the Meister–Eckhart–Archiv TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1956-07-14: “In der Hs., in der noch mehr Dominikaner aus jenem Schuljahr genannt werden, kommt weder Joh. v. Paris noch Godinus vor!”

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Eckhart’s lectures, while the Bruges commentary could either be the abbreviated transcription of Eckhart’s lectures or an abbreviated copy of a written reportatio of his course. Koch tried not only to connect the works of Eckhart and Godin, but also to match their biographies in his Kritische Studien zum Leben Meister Eckharts.36 Soon, the enthusiasm for the discovery of parallels was replaced by the problem of establishing a chronological priority of one of the two texts. The parallels can be found in each of the four books of the Lectura Thomasina and of this anonymous commentary, which is probably the copy of a longer reportatum produced sometime between 1293/94 and 1309, and, for Koch and Decker, they represented an intricate enigma. From the comparison of the two woks, it sometimes seemed that the Bruges commentary was copying the Lectura Thomasina while at other times the relation seemed to be the other way round. The Gordian knot was cut thanks to the comparison with the Sentences commentary of John of Paris. Since the anonymous reportatum does not contain any trace of Quidort’s work, it should have been a source for Godin, who collected his material from this anonymous text (or from its Vorlage) as he did from the commentary of Quidort.37 Highly problematic for Decker were the passages in which the authors described by Godin with the form aliqui are identified by the anonymous with high precision. If we consider the occurrences of authors’ names in the Lectura Thomasina analysed

36. The fact that the theological evaluation emerging from John of Basel’s Decem responsiones tends to be far harsher against Eckhart’s doctrines than the papal bull led Koch to think of a mediation, whose main silent and invisible protagonist would have been Cardinal Godin. He was, so to speak, the right man, in the right place, at the right time: Cardinal at that time, possibly in Avignon at that time, with some experience in the field, as he was entrusted with the evaluation of the orthodoxy of both the doctrines of the Spirituals and the Postilla in Apocalypsim of Peter John Olivi and with the process against Hubert of Casals. Nevertheless, the sources are silent on the matter. Koch adds that Godin should have been in Paris also between 1302 and 1303, during Eckhart’s first mastership, even if in 1301 Godin becomes provincial of Provence and in 1303 provincial of the province of Toulouse. See: J. Koch, “Kritische Studien zum Leben Meister Eckharts,” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 29 (1959), pp. 5-51 and 30 (1960), pp. 5-52 [repr. in: id., Kleine Schriften, vol. I, Roma 1973, pp. 247-347]; G. Meersseman, “De Sententiënkommentaar (Cod. Brugen. 491) van de Gentse lektor Philip OP (1300-04),” in: Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymund Josephi Martin, Ordinis Praedicatorum s. theologiae magistri LXXum natalem diem agentis, Bruges 1948, pp. 383-40. On the basis of this document, Rucquoi has hypothesised that in 1328 Godin must have already been ill; see A. Rucquoi, “El Cardenal legado,” p. 513. 37. See W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina,” esp. p. 108.

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above, we can affirm that Godin makes an extensive usage of the terms aliqui/alii. This is different from the method of the anonymous commentator, who often mentions not only the criticised authors by name but also adds the titles of their works. 4. The LECTURA THOMASINA: a SORGFÄLTIG GEARBEITETE ORDINATIO or an unfinished Patchwork? The relation between Godin’s text and its sources, especially the manuscript Bruges 491, requires further investigation. In this sense, the palaeographical and stylistic elements as well as the doctrinal content of both the Lectura Thomasina and the Bruges anonymous commentary must be analysed. In the parallel places, changes in words, expressions, the occurrence of lacunae and of mistakes due to mishearing need to be taken into consideration. In order to collect some elements, I have conducted a preliminary analysis limited to the changes in verbal forms in the parallel passages from book I and II; the results are, of course, partial and show the need for a more thorough investigation. I have focused my attention on the language adopted and on the permanence or change in stylistic and grammatical elements, in particular on the verbs and pronouns in the first or second person singular, for example: ego, tu, dico and dicis, and on the impersonal forms like dicitur and dicendum est. Generally speaking – but not necessarily –, the forms of the first kind can be considered closer to an oral style and reproduce a dialogue, while those of the second type may convey a more formal style to the text. Certainly, these two linguistic registers are present in both texts, but if the parallel places are taken into account, we can see how there are cases in which the first and second person in Bruges 491 are also present in the Lectura Thomasina: 38

38. The texts have been lightly normalized: u and v have been distinguished and j is not used; punctuation and capitalization have been modernized and the abbreviations solved. The text of the Lectura Thomasina has been reconstructed through the collation of all the manuscript witnesses. In this a preliminary edition significant variants useful for the textual

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Bruges 491, Super Sent. II, d. 13, q. 1, (f. 303vb,21-26)

Lectura Thomasina II, dist. 13, q. 1

Contra: eadem enim condensatio partium et materiae aggregatio est in hieme et aestate, maxime cum sol in hieme est nobis propinquior. Si dicas: licet sit propinquior, tamen aspectus eius in aestate est perpendicularior, habebo duo. Unum est quod aliquid corporale et sensibile est vis activa, aliter enim perpendicularitas nihil faceret ad rem nec est aliud dare quam lucem. Item aliud habeo, scilicet quod motus non potest dici vis activa, quia nec adhuc faceret quidquam perpendicularitas.

Si autem dicas (: dicatur P), sicut alii dicunt, quod quamvis sit nobis propinquior in hieme quam in aestate, tamen quia in aestate est nobis perpendicularior, habeo duo contra te (: ex hoc habentur duo contra hoc dicentes P). Primum quod aliquid sensibile et corruptibile est vis activa solis, aliter perpendicularitas nihil faceret ibi, nec potest aliud sensibile dari quam lux. Secundo habeo (: habetur P) quod non influit per motum, quia ad motum nihil faceret perpendicularitas.

39

Here the first and second person singular have been changed into the impersonal forms only in one manuscript of the Lectura Thomasina. However, there are also some changes from the first and second person singular into the more formal impersonal formulas:

comparison have been reported in brachets. I am thankful to Dr. Colli for the text of the second book of Lectura Thomasina and to Dr. Mauriège for the material from ms Bruges 491. 39. See Ba f. 43rb; Be f. 49ra; Bol f. 55rb; E f. 99va; G f. 39ra-b; Kl f. 56ra; N f. 51ra; P f. 43vb; Pi f. 48rb; W1 f. 34va; W2 f. 160ra.

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Cod. Bruges 491, Super Sent. I, d. 19, q. 4, (f. 287ra,2-5)

Lectura Thomasina I, d. 19, q. 3 40

Ad primum dico quod falsum est, quia sanitas est in humoribus sicut in causa, tamen nobiliori modo est in animali, ubi est sicut in subiecto.

Ad primum dicendum, quod propositio intelligitur de causa efficienti principali et per se non instrumentali et secundaria, ut patet, quod sanitas est in humoribus debito modo proportionatis, sicut in causa formali, et in dieta sicut in effectivo, non tamen est nobiliori modo quam in animali, ubi est sicut in subiecto.

Cod. Bruges 491, Super Sent. II, d. 12, q. 1, (f.303va,3-6)

Lectura Thomasina II, dist. 12, q. 1 41

Si dicas quod partes sunt colligatae in homine, non autem in caelo

Et si dicatur quod non est simile de homine et caelo, quia partes hominis sunt ad invicem colligatae, non autem in caelo

So far, elements recalling the oral discourse, mediated by the sources, are present in the work and sometimes may have been changed. These changes in Godin’s work seem to confirm the chronological priority of the Bruges commentary over the Lectura Thomasina. Furthermore, the cases where these forms have not been changed could suggest that Godin did not revise his work systematically. If we have a look at the structure of the Lectura Thomasina, we notice that in some points it is quite short and compendious, especially considering the last distinctions of book I and II. Those of books III and IV are, in some cases, only a column long or even only half of it.

40. See Ba f. 14ra; Be f. 15vb; Bol f. 22rb; E f. 39rb-va; G f. 15rb; Kl f. 22rb; N f. 19va; P f. 17vb; P2 172rb; Pi f. 21va; V 176ra; W f. 16rb. 41. See Ba f. 41rb; Be f. 47ra; Bol f. 53vb; E f. 96va; G f. 38ra; Kl f. 54va; N f. 49va; P f. 42vb; Pi f. 47ra; W1 33vb; W 2f. 158vb.

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Sometimes, also the contra arguments to the questions are reduced to the short formulas Contrarium in littera ( book I, dist. 5, q. unica) or Augustinus in littera (book I, dist. 25, q. 1). Sometimes, the contra argument is even missing and many questions lack the arguments at the beginning (for instance, book I, dist. 16, q. 2: “Iuxta hoc quaeritur sine argumentis, quare in talibus specibus facta sit missio visibilis et non in aliis”; book I, dist. 17, q. 2: “Iuxta hoc quaeritur sine argumentis, utrum caritas sit ex caritate diligenda”). Certainly, the length alone may not be a decisive criterion but may reflect the author’s concern for a deeper analysis of some issues and the lack of interest for others. Concerning the presence of the second person plural – which can be found in many reportationes, as it indicates the act of the teacher addressing himself to the class –, neither occurrences of the pronouns vos, vobis, vester, -a, -um and so on, nor verbs expressing the second person plural have been found in the Lectura Thomasina. Nevertheless, also in the Bruges reportatum this element is lacking. Moreover, it is worth noting that, at the end of the last question of distinction 12, just before the beginning of distinction 13, there is a passage in which the author refers to the issue he will deal with in the following distinction. The interesting element is that we find the expression in sequenti lectione there, which might represent a reference to the lecture’s course. Lectura Thomasina II, d. 12, q. 4 42 […] Utrum autem ista informitas materiae sic praecesserit duratione quod materia non potuit esse sine forma in sequenti lectione forte quaeretur.

Since this sentence stems neither from Quidort’s work nor from the Bruges anonymous commentary, its origin raises some questions: can this sentence simply be a rhetorical device, maybe similar to the reference to the course of lectures made by Thomas in his commentaries to Aristotle? However, if this is so, why did the author use the expression only in this case?

42. See Ba f. 41va; Be f. 47va; Bol f. 54ra; E f. 97ra; G f. 38rb; Kl f. 54vb; N f. 49va; P f. 43ra; Pi f. 43rb; W1 f. 33vb; W2 f. 159ra.

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For the moment, not enough elements have been collected for a final judgement on the matter, but it is certain that this work contains some elements of orality, and not all of them may be interpreted as rhetorical devices. This work has been defined as an ordinatio because of the literal nature of the quotations, which the author could have done only by having the book at hand. However, the large quantity of passages excerpted from other works, the corresponding lack of an evident reworking of this material, and the absence of strong personal judgements – typical for a mature and “sorgfältig gearbeitete Ordinatio” – might suggest that we are dealing with a work in progress. As explained above, it was difficult to understand whether the Lectura Thomasina quoted excerpts from the anonymous commentary of ms. Bruges 491, or vice versa; likewise it was hard to determine whether Godin’s treatise De causa immediata ecclesiastice potestatis quoted the Tractatus de potestate papae by Pierre de La Palu, or vice versa, it was Pierre who cited the De causa43. Godin’s tendency to insert long excerpts from other works, preserving at the same time their verbatim nature, may be the cause of this difficulty. Conclusion: a Mosaic of Quotations “Item scribere quod alius scripsit, est illi auferre et sibi usurpare nomen auctoritatis; quia plerique nostri temporis faciunt, qui nihil de suo et omnia ab aliis habentes, tamen quaedam nova volunt videri scribere, quando sub alio ordine et aliis verbis sua faciunt quae sunt aliorum.”44 With these words, Albert the Great, in his Commentary on the Gospel of Mark, approaches what Zénon Kaluza45 called the issue of plagiarism in the Middle Ages. As Kaluza noticed, Albert’s remarks can easily be connected to the description of the commentator’s work given by Bo-

43. See McCready’s analysis in W.D. McCready, The Theory of Papal Monarchy, pp. 9-33. 44. Albertus Magnus, “Prologus super Marcum,” ed. I.M. Vosto, in: Angelicum 9 (1932), p. 369, 29-35 45. Z. Kaluza, “Auteur et plagiaire: quelques remarques,” in: J.A. Aertsen – A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? (Miscellanea mediaevalia, 26), Berlin–New York 1998, pp. 312-320. See also F.-X. Putallaz, “Chercher l’auteur! Un curieux manuscrit du XIVe siècle,” in: J.A. Aertsen – A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie, pp. 304-311.

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naventure: “scribit aliena, addendo, sed non de suo.”46 According to Kaluza, these two quotations seem to prove the fact that even medieval thinkers reflected on the act of copying the words of other authors. Nevertheless, copyright in the modern sense was not an issue for the forma mentis of the medieval commentator and author,47 who, according to Konrad of Megenberg, should love truth more than originality and creativity.48 The modern reader, who usually values texts according to their original content, often labels the production of highly derivative texts containing extensive quotations from other works negatively as “plagiarism” and considers those texts unappealing. The fact that a great amount of medieval texts has been composed according to these standards, highlights how problematic originality is as a criterion for judging these works. The goal of Godin’s work was, above all, to convey unity and coherence to the production of Aquinas, creating a fil rouge connecting his early works with the texts of the later theologian. For this reason, the text might have been used by students and teachers of the early Thomistic tradition as a primary way to access the teaching of Thomas. Godin’s work should be valued exactly for this attempt to follow Thomas’ woks.49 In fact, as it has been mentioned above, Godin considered Thomas’ texts true.50 The Lectura Thomasina may appear as a mere patchwork of quotations. However, if we take into account that a quotation is never a meaningless act, because it presupposes an in-

46. Bonaventura de Balneoregio, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, In librum I, Proem., q. 4, in: Opera Omnia, I, Quaracchi, 1882, pp. 14-15 47. In this regard, Alfonso Maierù has written: “Il commentatore, e in genere l’autore medievale, non si pone problemi di copyright”; A. Maierù, “Formazione culturale e tecniche di insegnamento,” in: Studio e studia, p. 30. 48. Conradus de Megenberg, Yconomica, III.15, ed. S. Krüger, in: MGH. Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters. III. Die Werke des Konrad von Megenberg, V (1984), p. 30,2-3: “ut plus amet veritatem quam quod preferat singularitatem.” Alfonso Maierù, commenting on the passage, translates singularitas with “originality” (Italian originalità), A. Maierù, “Formazione culturale,” p. 30 n. 87. 49. The progressive sacralisation of Thomas’ texts and some attempts to conserve both the verba Thomae and the verborum ordo by suceeding Thomists are described in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Thomas von Aquin, pp. 274-275. 50. As mentioned above, Godin declares the doctrines of Thomas to be true. Nevertheless, this statement is still far from being a proper form of sacralisation of Aquinas’ texts, typical of the period after his canonisation. See S.-T. Bonino, “La scuola tomista,” p. 181.

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tentional choice, this work can be considered of great value for the historian of philosophy and theology, insofar as it produces intertextual links, connecting texts and ideas. The result of this action is a new text, which can be described as a patchwork,51 as a lectura secundum alium,52 or as a bricolage textuel.53 In conclusion, the Lectura Thomasina of Godin can be characterised as a mosaic of quotations, probably unfinished or not completely revised, surely composed by using other authors texts. Nevertheless, the work proves useful to understand the historical context and the academic debates at the University of Paris between the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century and can shed new light on the complex process of the reception of Thomas’ texts and doctrines within the Dominican Order both in Paris and in the provinces.

51. M. Pickavé, “An Early Witness,” p. 184: “William’s commentary is best described as a patchwork drawing on three major sources: Thomas Aquinas himself, the Sentences commentary of John of Paris, and the anonymous commentary from Bruges.” 52. D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book Lore,” in: Augustiniana 6 (1956), pp. 146-274, esp. pp. 251-255. For Trapp’s formula being a neologism, see P.J.J.M. Bakker – C. Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century,” in: G.R. Evans (ed.), Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002, vol. 1, p. 439. On Trapp’s remarks and for some examples of this method for commenting on the Sentences among the Franciscans, see: U. Zahnd, “Easy-Going Scholars Lecturing Secundum Alium? Notes on Some French Franciscan Sentences Commentaries of the Fifteenth Century,” in: P.W. Rosemann, Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Leiden-BostonKöln 2015, vol. 3, pp. 267-314. 53. M.Brînzei Calma, “Plagium,” in: I. Atucha – D. Calma – C. König-Pralong – I. Zavattero (eds.), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 57), Porto 2011, p. 568: “Le bricolage textuel n’est pas une catégorie valorisante impliquant une validation de l’auteur ou des ses production intellectuelles, mais c’est un instrument descriptif ” and p. 568: “le bricolage dévoile un certain esprit encyclopédique et la haute érudition du bricoleur car sa manipulation des sources s’appuie avant tout sur des lectures solides.” On quotations and paraphrases in Godin’s text see also: A. Colli, “Transcriptions, Paraphrases and Abbreviations. Rewriting Thomas Aquinas in the Lectura Thomasina,” in: M. Meliadò-S. Negri (eds.), Praxis des Philosophierens, Praktiken der Historiographie (Geist und Geisteswissenschaft, vol. 2), Freiburg i. Br. 2018, pp. 21-42.

FROM THE CONDEMNATIONS TO THE SCHOOLS: THE CORRECTORIUM LITERATURE IN THE LECTURA THOMASINA* Andrea Colli 1. Introduction Censures, condemnations, and corrections animated the debate around Thomas Aquinas’ works between the end of the 13th and the first decades of the 14th century. The Condemnation of 1277 in Paris, the censure promoted by Robert Kilwardby at the University of Oxford, the criticism of John Peckham, and the two versions of the Correctorium fratris Thomae written by the Franciscan master William de la Mare clearly reveal the hard line particularly adopted by the ecclesiastic institutions and the Franciscan school for limiting the teaching and the diffusion of some of Aquinas’ theories.1 *This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 657033. 1. Cf. P. Glorieux, “Comment les thèses thomistes furent proscrites à Oxford, 12841286,” in: Revue Thomiste 32 (1927), pp. 259-291; D.A. Callus, The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford, London 1946; P. Glorieux, “Pro et contra Thomam. Un survol de cinquante années,” in: T.W. Kohler (éd.), Sapientiae procerum amore. Mélanges médiévistes offerts à dom Jean-Pierre Müller O.S.B. à l’occasion de son 70ème anniversaire, Roma 1974, pp. 255-287; R. Wielockx, “Autour du procès de Thomas d’Aquin,” in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen, Berlin / New York 1988 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 8); pp. 413-488; J.F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” in: The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995), pp. 233-272; R. Hissette, “L’implication de Thomas d’Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 44 (1997), pp. 3-31; R. Hissette, “Philosophie et théologie en conflit: Saint Thomas a-t-il été condamné par les maîtres parisiens en 1277?,” in: Revue Théologique de Louvain 28 (1997), pp. 216-226; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome,” in: Vivarium 35 (1997), pp. 72-101; J.F. Wippel, “Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A Separate Process against Aquinas?,” in:

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The vast majority of the Dominican theologians were constantly striving to support and endorse the most discussed and unconventional theses of their master. The four versions (Circa, Quare, Quaestione, Sciendum) of the Correctoria corruptorii2 and Rambert of Primadizzi’s Apologeticum veritatis3 certainly represent the most considerable effort of defending Aquinas’ teaching. As is well known, these texts cannot, however be considered as a systematic exposition of the “Thomistic” doctrines: their purpose is just to reply to the criticism of the Franciscan theologians on a case-by-case basis.4 In fact, verbatim quotations from Thomas’ writings are not even frequent: John of Paris, Rambert of Primadizzi and the authors5 of the other versions of the Correctoria Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 44 (1997), pp. 117-136; R. Hissette, “Thomas d’Aquin compromis avec Gilles de Rome en mars 1277?,” in: Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique 93 (1998), pp. 5-26; R. Hissette, “Thomas d’Aquin directement visé par la censure du 7 mars 1277? Réponse à John F. Wippel,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma Magistra Mundi. Itineraria culturae mediaevalis. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, vol. 1, pp. 425-437; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Censures and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400, Philadelphia 1998; R. Wielockx, “A Separate Process against Aquinas. A Response to John F. Wippel,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma Magistra Mundi, vol. II, pp. 1009-1030; R. Wielockx, “Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin. Réponse à J.M.M.H. Thijssen,” in: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 83 (1999), pp. 293-313; P. Porro, Tommaso d’Aquino. Un profilo storico-filosofico, Roma 2012, pp. 464-480. 2. Cfr. P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes I: Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Le Saulchoir-Kain 1927; P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes II: Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Sciendum’, Paris 1956; J.-P. Müller, Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa” de Jean Quidort de Paris, Roma 1941; J.-P. Müller, Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione.” Texte anonyme du ms. Merton 267, Roma 1974. 3. Rambertus de Primadizzi, Apologeticum veritatis contra Corruptorium, ed. J.-P. Müller, Città del Vaticano 1943. 4. For a survey on the Correctorium literature, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The literary reception of Thomas Aquinas’ view on the probability of the eternity of the world in de la Mare’s Correctorium (1278-9) and the Correctoria Corruptorii (1279-ca.1286),” in: J.B.M. Wissink (ed.), The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries, Leiden 1990, pp. 39-68, in particular, pp. 39-46; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Being and Thinking in the Correctorium fratris Thomae and the Correctorium corruptorii Quare. Schools of Thought and Philosophical Methodology,” in: J.A. Aertsen - K. Emery - A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Berlin 2001, pp. 417435, in particular, pp. 417-424. 5. The earliest Correctorium corruptorii, that is, the Quare, was probably written by Richard of Knapwell. Robert of Orford is held to be the author of the Correctorium corruptorii “Sciendum.” Then, William of Macklesfield may have been the author of the Correctorium “Quaestione.” In any case, the only reliable information on the authorship regards the Correctorium corruptorii “Circa” und the Apologeticum veritatis. Cf. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The literary reception of Thomas Aquinas’ view”, p. 40, in particular notes 8-11.

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use mostly general references. For this reason, some critical studies on the late medieval posterity of Aquinas’ thought prefer to identify the effective starting point of the “Thomism” only after his canonization.6 A still unsolved problem, however, is to establish what actually happened between the condemnations, with relative reactions, and the diffusion of some Thomistic doctrines in the Dominican studia and, more gene-rally, in the 14th-century theological schools. The Lectura Thomasina of William of Peter of Godin (†1336) seems to typify this passage of Thomas Aquinas’ thought from the condemnations, characterizing the last decades of the 13th century, to teaching activities of the 14th-century schools. The text follows the division into distinctiones usually adopted by any commentary on the Sentences. However, the conspicuous number of verbatim quotations not only from Aquinas’ Super libros Sententiarum, but also from his Summa Theologiae, Summa contra Gentiles, De aeternitate mundi, and Quaestiones de veritate, makes the Lectura a unique case study of that time.7 Godin does not aim at writing a mere collection of Thomas’ dicta, but rather an original teaching handbook. These peculiarities make the Lectura Thomasina a fundamental piece to the mosaic of the reworking of Aquinas in late medieval teaching activity before his canonization. However, a detailed analysis of all of the aspects which characterize Godin’s text is not provided here.8 The present study rather intends to focus on a circumscribed (but thorny) problem within the framework

6. A.A. Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria. Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV), Bologna 2008, esp., pp. 53-54; A.A. Robiglio, “Se un ‘savio omo’ diventa santo. Un aspetto della reputazione di Tommaso d’Aquino per gli studenti del Trecento,” in: Studia, studenti, religione. Quaderni di storia religiosa XVI (2009), pp. 159-173 7. On the rewriting of Aquinas’ sentences in the Lectura Thomasina see my study, “Transcriptions, paraphrases and abbreviations. Rewriting Thomas Aquinas in the Lectura Thomasina” in: M. Meliadò – S. Negri (eds.), Praxis des Philosophen, Praktiken des Philosophiehistorikers. Perspektiven von der Spätantike bis zur Moderne, Freiburg, forthcoming. 8. In this regard, see B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Münster, 1967, pp. 24-31; W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guillelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Parvi flores. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 83-109. Finally, see F. Bonini, Edizione critica della Lectura Thomasina di Guglielmo di Pietro di Godino (libro I, Prol.-dist. 27) / Kritische Edition der Lectura Thomasina des Guillelmus Petri de Godino (Buch I, Prol.dist. 27), Diss. [University of Salento / University of Cologne].

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of such a vast subject: the influence of the condemnations on the teaching activity in the Dominican theological studia and consequently the presence of verbatim quotations from the Correctorium literature. 2. The Parisian Condemnations in the LECTURA THOMASINA9 Godin wrote his Lectura Thomasina around 1300.10 It had been almost thirty years since the archbishop of Paris, Stephan Tempier, promulgated his condemnation. Also, the Correctorium literature had, in theory, not been on the agenda for more than a decade.11 Nevertheless, both considerably influence Godin’s approach to some particular topics. Before examining the massive presence of quotations from the different versions of the Correctoria corruptorii, explicit references to the Condemnation of 1277 should be taken into account, as the 219 propositions censured by Tempier form the basis of the principal discussions between Franciscan and Dominican theologians. Godin almost never quotes his sources or his opponents. Therefore, it is remarkable that among the very few names explicitly mentioned in his Lectura, we can count four direct references to the bishop of Paris. All four quotations are included in the second book of his commentary on the Sentences, namely in distinction 2, q. 3 (two explicit mentions), in distinction 13, q. 1 and in the distinction 15, q. 1. In the first case, the subject under discussion is the plurality of angels in the same species (circa distinctionem istam quaeritur utrum possint esse plures angeli eiusdem speciei).12 The structure of the question is

9. For an updated catalogue of the manuscripts, see Bonini’s article in this volume. The text of the Lectura Thomasina is quoted here according to the Graz (G) manuscript. The quoted passages have been classicized: u and v have been distinguished and j is not used; the Latin classical diphthongs have been used; punctuation and capitalization have been modernized and the abbreviations solved. Significant variants included in the other manuscripts will be opportunately notified. 10. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, p. 28. 11. According to Hoenen, “Generally speaking, the Correctoria Corruptorii originated between 1279 and ca. 1286.” cf. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The literary reception of Thomas Aquinas’ view,” p. 40. 12. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina (= Lect. Thom.), II, dist. 2, q. 3 (G 31rb).

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the following:13 firstly, by adopting an “anti-Thomistic” view (videtur quod sic),14 Godin quotes verbatim two arguments and one counterargument included in Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences;15 secondly, a series of long word-for-word quotations from Correctorium corruptorii “Sciendum” form the basis of Godin’s responsio; thirdly, counterarguments against this solution are derived from some critical remarks formulated by William de la Mare in his Correctorium fratris Thomae; finally, Godin’s replies are again modeled on the Correctorium literature. We shall return to this interesting mosaic of quotations from the correctoria in the next paragraph. For the moment, we will focus on the explicit mention of the condemnations, included in the second part of the question: Modo contra istam positionem arguunt aliqui et dicunt eam esse contra fidem catholicam, quia cum multitudo angelorum in eadem specie non sit opus naturae, sed potius divinae potentiae , dicere quod impossibile | sit duos angelos esse eiusdem speciei, est dicere hoc Deum non posse facere vel fecisse.16

(add. istud autem est condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem Be; add.

istud autem est condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem ergo est contra fidem catholicam Bol W2; add. istud est autem condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem, ergo est contra fidem catholicam E; add. quod est condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem ergo est contra fidem catholicam Kl N P; add. istud quod est condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem ergo est contra fidem catholicam Pi; add. illud quod autem est condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem ergo est contra fidem catholicam W1)17

13. On this topic see F. Amerini’s article in this volume. 14. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 2, q. 3 (G 31rb). 15. Thomas de Aquino, Super Sent., II, 3, 1, 4, arg. 1; arg. 3; s.c. 2, ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, p. 96. 16. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 2, q. 3 (G 31va-vb). 17. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 2, q. 3 (Be 38ra; Bol 44rb; E 79va; Kl 45rb; N 41ra; P 36ra; Pi 38vb; W1 29ra; W2 153vb).

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By considering the criticism coming from William de la Mare’s Correctorium, Godin alludes here to the proposition 81(=43) censured by Stephan Tempier, i.e. to quod, quia intelligentie non habet materiam, deus non posset plures eiusdem speciei facere,18 and as all manuscripts (except Graz) certify, he explicitly mentions the bishop of Paris (est condemnatum per episcopum parisiensem). Even though this passage is written in total accordance with William de la Mare’s formulation (arguunt aliqui),19 the fact that Godin again quotes the Condemnation of 1277 a few lines below, is a sign and a confirmation that he does not only intend to rewrite some passages of the Correctorium literature, but rather aims at personally facing the content of the censured proposition: Tamen quia ille articulus condemnatus est Parisius, quidam volentes sustinere quomodo Deus duos angelos posset facere eiusdem speciei, dicunt quod individuantur illa supposita per esse, quod probant sic.20

Here, the opinion of Giles of Rome (quidam volentes sustinere) is presented. The Augustinian theologian does not seem to completely reject Tempier’s syllabus on this point, but he rather provides an alternative solution.21 In any case, after having expounded Giles’ position, Godin concludes that ratio non concludit.22 After all, the reasoning of the French Dominican theologian is closely connected to Thomas Aquinas’ convictions on this topic: a complete or partial justification of Tempier’s censure is thus not an option. These first examples illustrate well the two different elements characterizing Godin’s approach to the Condemnation of 1277: the Correctorium fratris Thomae forms the basis of his quotations; on the other hand, in some cases, he seems to look into the matter, thus elaborating Tempier’s proposition in a wider context.

18. Cf. D. Piché, La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle édition du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire, Paris 1999, p. 104. 19. Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium fratris Thomae, included – as is known – in the Correctorium corruptorii “Quare,” 11, p. 60. 20. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 2, q. 3 (G 31vb). 21. Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta, II, 8, resp., Louvain 1646 (repr. Frankfurt 1966), 68a. 22. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 2, q. 3 (G 31vb).

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The reference to “condemned error”,23 included in distinction 13 (q. 1), effectively confirms the first trend. By rephrasing the words of William de la Mare,24 Godin alludes to proposition 43 (= 68), quod primum principium non potest esse causa diversorum factorum hic inferius, nisi mediantibus aliis causis, eo quod nullum transmutans diversimode transmutat, nisi transmutatum:25 Et ideo, cum dicitur quod Deus non potest dare materiae esse, sine forma, est propinquum errori damnato (Parisius),26 quod Deus non potest producere effectum causae secundae sine causa secunda.27

By contrast, the explicit quotation of proposition 212 (=74), i.e. quod intelligentia sola voluntate movet caelum,28 in distinction 15 (q. 1) draws on a typical example of a personal reworking of the Condemnation of 1277 by Godin. After formulating the problem with Thomas’ words,29 the French Dominican theologian develops the discussion, by rejecting the opinions of aliqui doctores moderni.30 In this case, however, there are no verbatim quotations that offer some precise indication regarding Godin’s polemical target. Moreover, his reference to the condemned proposition quod intelligentia sola voluntate movet caelum is rather original: the Franciscan tradition does not seem to ascribe this sentence to Thomas Aquinas. Et praeterea dicunt articulum condemnatum esse Parisius, angelum sola voluntate movere corpus, sed posset tamen probabiliter sustineri quod non per virtutem aliquam ab intellectu et voluntate movet corpus, cuius ratio potest esse, quia sicut se habet cognitio nostra ad intellectum angeli, ita omnis appetitus noster et omnis vis motiva consequens appetitum ad voluntatem eius.31 23. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 13, q. 1, G 38va (add. Parisius Ba 39vb; Be 47vb; Bol 54va; Kl 55vb N 50ra; Pi 47va; W1 34ra; W2 159rb). 24. Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium fratris Thomae, in Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’, 27, p. 114. 25. Cf. D. Piché, La condamnation parisienne de 1277, p. 94. 26. See note 23. 27. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 13, q. 1 (G 38va). 28. Cf. D. Piché, La condamnation parisienne de 1277, p. 144. 29. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, I, 70, 3, arg. 2, 5, s.c. 30. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 15, q. 1 (G 40rb). 31. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 15, q. 1 (G 40rb).

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As observed by Roland Hissette,32 both in his Declarationes and in his Correctorium fratris Thomae, William de la Mare, who is usually very meticulous to identify and criticize the controversial points of Thomas Aquinas’ thought, does not take this proposition into account. Still, also another Dominican theologian, John of Naples, a few years after the composition of the Lectura Thomasina, considers proposition 212 (=74) as a censure against Thomas Aquinas.33 Thus, this seems to represent a proof that the topic was on the agenda in the first debate between “Thomism” and “anti-Thomism.” However, there are no sufficient elements to shape the contour of the debate on this particular point. For concluding this broad overview on the explicit references to the Condemnations of 1277, and before exploring in detail the already announced strong presence of the Correctorium literature in the Lectura Thomasina, we must say – in order to give a full picture of the problem – that Tempier’s syllabus is actually not the only ecclesiastical condemnation openly quoted in Godin’s commentary on the Sentences. In Book II, distinction 9 (q. 2), the French Dominican theologian aims at exploring the connection and the distinction between the different angelic hierarchies (utrum connexio hierarchiarum et distinctio ordinum sit a natura),34 by accepting the thesis advanced by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae35 as working hypothesis. In defending Aquinas’ position, and consequently his own position against four possible counterarguments, Godin mentions a condemned article (articulus condemnatus est):

32. R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, p. 135; cf. T. Suarez-Nani, Les anges et la philosophie, Paris 2002, p. 178. 33. C. Jellouschek, “Quaestio Magistri Ioannis de Neapoli O. Pr. «Utrum licite possit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusiones eius» hic primum in lucem edita.” in: Xenia thomistica, III, Rome 1925, p. 99: “Octavus articulus est articulus 212: “Quod intelligentia sola voluntate movet caelum, error. – Responsio: Secundum doctrinam fratris Thomae angelus non sola voluntate immo etiam intellectu et essentia sua principio primo quo movet caelum. Vel dicendum et melius, quod angelus per suum intellectum et voluntatem non posset movere caelum nisi supposita divina ordinatione et voluntate aliquo alio motu quam moveat, cum a tali motu videantur tota spera activorum et passivorum quantum ad generationem et corruptionem et alterationem quae in eis apparet dependere secundum doctrinam Philosophi in I Meteor., propter quod non posset angelus motu recto movere vel alias quam moveat, nisi Deus vellet.” 34. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 9, q. 2 (G 36ra). 35. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, I, 108, 4, resp.

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Primo, quia dicunt quod articulus condemnatus est, si quis dicat quod angeli secundum quod meliora naturalia habuerunt secundum hoc de necessitate habuerunt maiorem gratiam. Istud autem quod hic dicitur parum vel nihil differt a praedicto articulo.36

As William de la Mare’s criticism forms the basis of this and of the other counterarguments advanced by Godin in this specific question, a clarification of the significance of this reference to an articulus condemnatus can be sought precisely into William de la Mare’s Correctorium. There, the Franciscan theologian refers to a condemned article a Domino Guillelmo, venerabilis memoriae Parisiensi episcopo.37 Then, as suggested by Palemon Glorieux, the articulus condemnatus is evidently not part of Tempier’s syllabus, but it is rather the proposition 9 censured by the bishop of Paris William of Auvergne in 1241.38 Thus, both in the Correctorium literature and in the Lectura Thomasina, the Condemnation of 1241 seems to play a significant role in the debate pro and contra Aquinas’ position. The number of examples might be too limited to right away draw conclusions regarding actual presence of the Parisian condemnations in the Lectura Thomasina. Therefore, we shall return to this subject after a more thorough study on the quotations from the Correctorium literature, which – as we have already anticipated – has a decisive function in Godin’s approach to the most debated doctrines of Aquinas’ thought. For now, it can be observed that the ecclesiastical interventions on the theological and philosophical debates, albeit mediated by William de la Mare’s Correctorium, significantly influence Godin’s approach to some particular matters. In this respect, two hypotheses can be formulated: either the Lectura Thomasina discusses outdated problems or the effect of the condemnations (not only of 1277, but also of 1241) constantly spreads into late medieval teaching activities and, in particular, into the reception of Aquinas’ thought before his canonization. By taking this last consideration into account, we can now examine the role that the different versions of the Correctorium corruptorii played. 36. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 9, q. 2 (G 36ra). 37. P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes I: Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’, p. 92. 38. Chart. Univ. Paris., I, 170, art. 9; Cf. P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes I: Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’, p. 92, note (a).

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3. The Influence of the CORRECTORIUM Literature on the LECTURA THOMASINA If we exclude the conspicuous number of verbatim quotations from Thomas Aquinas’ writings, the word-for-word quotations from the four different versions of the Correctoria corruptorii are certainly the most frequent in the Lectura Thomasina. The references (verbatim quitations or, in some cases, paraphrases) are mostly concentrated in the second book of Godin’s commentary on the Sentences, and a survey of the collocation is drawn in the following table:

Contra39

x

x

II, d. 2, q. 3: Utrum possint esse plures angeli unius speciei

x

II, d. 3, q. 1: Utrum omnes angeli reducantur ad unum genus

x

x

x

II, d. 4, q. 2: Utrum angeli intelligant per species innatas vel acquisitas

x

x

x

II, d. 6, q. 1: De angelis superioribus. Utrum intelligant per species magis universales

x

II, d. 7, q. 1: De voluntate daemonis. Utrum sit totaliter obstinata in malo

x

x

x x

x x

x x

x

x

x x

II, d. 9, q. 2: Utrum hierarchiarum connexio et distinctio ordinum sit a natura diat locutionem unius angeli cum alio

x x

II, d. 7, q. 2: Utrum daemones verum effectum naturale possint inducere

II, d. 11, q. 1: Utrum distantia localis impe-

Scien.

Quaest.

Quare

Circa

Scien.

Quaest.

Quare

Circa II, d. 1, q. 4: Utrum anima composita sit ex materia et forma

Ad

x x

x

x

x x

x

x

39. Of course, the counterarguments are derived from William de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae. However, not only Quare, but also the other versions of the correctoria corruptorii entirely or partially rewrites William’s syllabus. The distinction thus aims at identifying which formulation of William’s Correctorium seems to have influenced Godin’s quotations more significantly.

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Contra

Scien.

Quaest.

x

Quare

x

Circa

IV, d. 50, q. 3: Utrum distantia localis impediat cognitionem animae separatae

x

Scien.

aliquae rationes seminales

Quaest.

II, d. 18, q. 1: Utrum in materia corporali sint

Quare

II, d. 15, q. 1: Utrum corpora caelestia sint animata

Circa II, d. 13, q. 1: Utrum informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem suam

Ad

x

x

x

x x

In general, the counterarguments against Aquinas’ (and consequently Godin’s) position are presented through expressions such as modo contra positionem istam arguunt aliqui or modo contra ista arguitur ab aliquibus. Then, by referring to aliqui or ab aliquibus, Godin quotes (very frequently word-for-word) passages from William de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae. Obviously, we can only theoretically reconstruct these quotations by referring to the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’. In fact, in some instances, it is also possible that Godin quotes the same passages according to the formulation used by John of Paris in his Correctorium corruptorii ‘Circa’ or by William of Macklesfield (?) in the ‘Quaestione’. In any case, the point is the central function assumed by William de la Mare’s Correctorium: in developing some particular questions the criticism of the Franciscan theologian represents the starting point for Godin’s stronger defense of Aquinas’ positions. This approach is adopted for covering some specific topics: the definition of the human soul, the nature and the properties of the angelic creatures, and the problem of the informed matter. In general, Godin quotes William de la Mare’s Correctorium, when attending to the most disputed questions of “Thomists” and “Anti-Thomists.” The only exception concerning the use of this method is presumably when he addresses the thorny problem of the eternity of the world. Even though this causes a conflict between the Franciscan school and the Dominican (“Thomistic”) theologians, Godin never quotes the Correctorium in this regard. However, an explanation is that the Franciscan theologian criticizes Thomas Aquinas’ position without mentioning his most ex-

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haustive treatise on this topic, i.e. De aeternitate mundi.40 On the other hand, for his part, Godin bases his arguments on long verbatim quotations from this text.41 Basically, the French Dominican theologian does not refer to the Correctorium, as William de la Mare’s criticism on this point was de facto out of date for him. As regards the arguments advanced by Godin in his replies the main source is primarily the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’. Further, some verbatim quotations also come from the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Circa’. By contrast, quotations from ‘Quaestione’ and ‘Quare’ are relatively rare. In any case, by looking at some concrete uses of the Correctorium literature in the Lectura Thomasina, we can determine now more precisely which function it assumes in the framework of Godin’s reflection. 4. A Model for Approaching and Defending Aquinas’ Controversial Doctrines The first representative example concerns one of the most controversial points of Aquinas’ thought: the hylomorphism of the soul-body relationship. Godin poses the problem through a series of verbatim quotations from Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences and Summa theologiae.42 Thus, the pars destruens is de facto modeled on the counterarguments advanced by William de la Mare in his Correctorium. The Franciscan theologian handles this thorny problem in article 28 (quod anima non est composita ex materia et forma), in which quaestio 75 of the Summa Theologiae (prima pars) is discussed. Without explicitly mentioning Correctorium fratris Thomae, Godin quotes exactly three main objections against Aquinas’ theory of the soul, raised by William de la Mare in his syllabus:43

40. Cf. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The literary reception of Thomas Aquinas’ view,” p. 41. 41. Cf. J.W. Peck SJ – C. Schabel, “James of Metz and the Dominican Tradition on the Eternity of the World, ca. 1300,” in: Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della filosofia medievale, 40 (2015), pp. 265-330, in particular, pp. 321-330. 42. Thomas de Aquino, Super Sent., II, 3, 1, 1, arg. 4, p. 85; Super Sent., II, 3, 1, 1, s.c. 2, p. 86; Summa theologiae, I, 75, 5, resp. 43. Identical terms are emphasized in italics.

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Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 4 (G 30rb)

Corr. corrupt. Quare, 28, pp. 119-120

Primo arguunt sic contra conclusionem. Dicit enim Commentator Super I De anima, inquirens de intellectu materiali, utrum sit ens et utrum sit compositus ex materia et forma. Dicit quemadmodum, inquit, sensibile dividitur in materiam et formam, sic omne intelligibile oportet consimiliter dividi in aliquid simile formae et aliquid simile materiae. Et necesse est hoc ponere in omni intelligentia abstracta, quae intelligit aliquid; aliter enim non esset, dicit ipse, multitudo in formis abstractis Secundo ostenditur quod haec positio est contra philosophiam. Hoc enim habet omnis philosophia, ut dicunt, quod potentia rei numquam attribuitur nisi ratione materiae et actio nisi ratione formae. Ergo si anima esset pura forma, omnes potentiae eius essent activae et nulla passiva, cum non habeat materiam; quod patet falsum esse. Tertio dicunt quod istud est contra fidem, quia tam secundum sanctos quam philosophos omnis receptio attribuitur rei ratione materiae; ergo amovens materiam ab anima, tolleret ab ea receptionem poenae et gloriae, quia nihil secundum quod est actu recipit, sed secundum quod est in potentia. Omnis autem potentia reducitur ad materiam secundum Commentatorem XI Metaphysicae.

Huic videtur concordare Commentator super Im de Anima ubi inquirit an intellectus materialis sit aliquod ens et non est aliqua forma nec prima materia, sic dissolvit: quemadmodum enim sensibile dividitur in materiam et formam, sic intellectuale omne oportet dividi in consimilia his duobus, scilicet in aliquod simile formae et in aliquod simile materiae; et hoc necesse est ponere in intelligentia abstracta quae intelligit aliud, etsi non esset multitudo in formis abstractis. Item, dicta positio est contra philosophiam quae tantum potentiam rei attribuit ratione materiae et actionem ratione formae. Si anima ergo esset pura forma non composita ex materia et forma, omnes eius potentiae essent activae et nulla passiva, quod patet esse falsum. Item videtur esse contra fidem quae dicit animam capacem poenae et gloriae; omnis autem passio et receptio, tam secundum philosophos quam secundum sanctos attribuit ur rei ratione materiae; quod patet quia nihil secundum quod est actu recipit sed secundum quod est in potentia; omnis autem potentia passiva reducitur ad materiam, ut habetur XIo Metaphysicae.

William de la Mare’s Correctorium forms the basis also for two further possible rationes against the Thomistic opinion. Even though, in this case, Godin does not – as in the previous cases – quote the arguments advanced by the Franciscan theologian verbatim, the correspondence between the two texts appears to be rather close:

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Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 4 (G 30rb)

Corr. corrupt. Quare, 28, p. 120-121

1) Ad rationes autem solvunt et dicunt quod anima secundum se totam considerata est forma corporis; ergo non potest esse materia secundum aliquam partem sui. Dicunt quod non sequitur, quia in omnibus compositis ordinatis ad ulteriores perfectiones, ipsa materia cum forma prima habet rationem materiae respectu formae ultimae, ita quod ipsa materia animae habet rationem formae respectu corporis quod informat, inquantum autem informatur a parte animae, quae erit forma ulterior, dicitur materia.

Ad secundum, cum quaerit utrum anima sit forma secundum se totam vel secundum aliquam partem sui, dicimus quod secundum se totam; et cum infert: ergo impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia quia materia est aliquid tantum in potentia, forma inquantum forma est actus, dico quod sicut in materiis compositis, hoc est in omnibus materiis citra primam, est aliquid quod est in potentia, scilicet materia prima, et aliquid vel aliqua quae sunt actus, scilicet formae superadditae quae disponunt ad formam ultimam, et tunc illud compositum dicitur materia formae ultimae, quia formae disponentes cedunt in partem materiae. Ad tertium cum arguit quod anima intellectiva debet esse penitus absoluta a materia quia cognoscit res absolutas, per formas absolutas a materia, formae autem absolutae a materia non possunt recipi nisi in substantia a materia absoluta, quia receptum est in recipienti per modum recipientis et non per modum recepti, dicendum quod illud non plus cogit quod anima intellectiva sit immaterialis quam sensitiva.

2) Ad aliam rationem dicunt quod non plus concludit argumentum quam quod potentia intellectiva sit magis immaterialis quam sensitiva, et arguunt contra rationem, quia si oportet esse intellectum immaterialem, quia recipit speciem immaterialem, ergo cum sensus recipiat speciem sive obiectum suum sine materia, tunc est immaterialis, quod apparet esse falsum. Et ideo ratio non concludit, ut dicunt, quia oportet in omni receptione receptum assimilari recipienti.

Godin reacts against these three counterarguments and to these two rationes by using some answers provided by Robert of Orford in the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’. However, in contrast to the close connections with William de la Mare’s Correctorium, the quotations are here only partially a verbatim transcription: Godin indeed reworks and rewrites the text of Sciendum. Nevertheless, it appears to be clear that the French Dominican theologian uses this particular version of the Correctorium corruptorii as the basis for his own reflection.

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Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 4 (G 34rb-va)

Corr. corrupt. Scien., 28, p. 119

Ad 1) Dico ab obiecto, ex quo cognoscitur potentia, quia omnes illae potentiae, quae efficiunt obiectum suum, ut vegetativae, activae sunt potentiae, ut patet etiam de intellectu agente, qui facit obiectum suum abstrahendo a phantasmate. Similiter alimentum est obiectum nutritivae, sed potentiae sensitivae sunt passivae, quia non faciunt obiecta sua, sed ab eis factis aliunde informantur, ut patet de colore, qui est in re extra, quia per actionem lucis abstrahitur secundum speciem informantem visum.

Illa quidem potentia quae efficit obiectum suum, illa est activa; quae vera non, sed perficitur ab obiecto ut agat, est passiva. Unde omnes potentiae sensitivae sunt passivae; color enim secundum esse suum reale est extra visum, et per actionem lucis extrahitur ut sit potens informare visum.

Corr. corrupt. Scien., 28, p. 121 Ad 2) Ad aliam rationem non solvunt, cum dicunt quod potentiae sensitivae recipiunt speciem sine materia et tamen tales sunt materiales; dico quod, licet hoc faciant, non tamen sine condicionibus materiae. Intellectus autem eas recipit sine condicionibus Propter hoc quod dicunt ad quartum, scienmateriae. Unde advertendum quod, si ani- dum est quod si anima haberet materiam, ma intellectiva habet materiam, cum ipsa sit formae reciperentur in ea ut individuales, non principium individuationis formae, recipe- solum in essendo, per comparationem ad subierentur in ea individuales non tantum in essen- ctum, sed etiam in repraesentando, per compado per comparationem ad subiectum, sed certe rationem ad obiectum; sicut sunt formae recepetiam in repraesentando per comparationem tae non dico in sensu, sed in organo corporali ad obiectum, sicut sunt omnes formae receptae cuius perfectio est anima sensitiva. in organo corporis.

By considering these series of quotations from the Correctorium literature in the framework of the structure of the question, we can already make a few comments. The quaestio utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma typifies Godin’s way of approaching what are the most controversial topics of Thomas Aquinas’ thought. He usually adheres to the following pattern:

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- Presentation of the problem: quotation from Aquinas’ writings; - Presentation of counterarguments: quotations from William de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae; - Presentation of replies to the advanced counterarguments: quotations from the correctoria corruptorii literature, prevalently from Sciendum.

The analysis of a second significant example, namely the quaestio utrum omnes angeli reducantur ad unum genus, not only strengthens the plausibility of this model, but also provides further details for describing it more accurately. The problem of the unity of the angelic species and genus is another bone of contention in the debate on the first reception of Aquinas’ thought, as there are other decisive issues behind the angelological question: the definition of the principle of individuation, the idea of matter and separation. Thus, the Correctorium literature, and consequently Godin’s Lectura Thomasina, devotes a lot of attention to these topics.44 As in the previous case, the quaestio utrum omnes angeli reducantur ad unum genus45 opens with some verbatim quotations from Aquinas’ writings (in this case, from the Commentary on the Sentences).46 In a certain sense, Godin lets Thomas Aquinas raise the issue, without mentioning him. Then, he seems to give his own answer to the question (Responsio. Ad declarationem quaestionis tria sunt per ordinem investiganda, etc.), but he actually transcribes long extracts from the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’. Here are two examples: Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (G 32rb)

Corr. corrupt. Scien., 12 (69-70)

Quantum ad primum sciendum quod, cum genus et differentia pertineant ad naturam cuiuscumque speciei, oportet in omni specie, cuius quidditas est forma simplex per se subsistens, quod ab eadem forma ratio generis et differentiae sumatur, ita quod genus et differentia dicant explicite per modum plurium id quod dicit quiddi-

Propter duodecimum articulum, sciendum quod cum sola species definiatur, definitio autem logica sive formalis, quod dico ad differentiam definitionis materialis et naturalis, - constat ex genere et differentia, quidditas enim rei pertinet ad speciem, quando quidditas est forma simplex subsistens oportet quod ab eadem

44. See Amerini’s article in this volume. 45. Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (G 32rb). 46. Thomas de Aquino, Super Sent., II, 3, 1, 5, arg. 1, pp. 98-99.

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tas speciei implicite et per modum unius. Et inde est, cum esse rei sit extra quidditatem et differat ab ea realiter, impossibile est quod a quidditate sumatur ratio generis et ab esse sumatur ratio differentiae.

Qualiter autem a forma simplici sumantur ista duo? Advertendum quod forma cuiuslibet angeli hoc habet quod est immaterialis et intellectualis naturae et in potentia ad suum esse, sicut subiectum in potentia est ad suum proprium accidens per se. Habet etiam eadem quidditas quod sit immaterialis et in potentia ad determinatum essendi gradum, per quem differt a quidditate angeli alterius cuiuslibet secundum quod quilibet tanto plus participat de actualitate et minus de potentialitate quanto plus appropinquat ad Deum qui est actus purus a quo procedunt omnia ordine quodam, quia quae a Deo procedunt, ordinata sunt.

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forma sumatur genus et differentia, quae dicunt explicite et per modum plurium quod ipsa quidditas dicit implicite et per modum unius; quia non est dicendum quod genus sumatur a quidditate et differentia ab esse, quia differentia intrat definitionem et ita indicat quidditatem rei; esse autem est extra quidditatem; unde esse pertinet ad quaestionem an est, quidditas ad quaestionem quid est. Qualiter autem sumatur genus et differentia ab eadem simplici forma existente, patet sic: forma cuiuslibet angeli hoc habet quod est immaterialis, et natura intellectualis et etiam in potentia ad suum esse sicut subiectum est in potentia ad suum proprium accidens per se. Ab ista proprietate communi qua convenit natura unius angeli cum aliis sumitur ratio generis. Item, ista eadem quidditas sic immaterialis et sic in potentia, habet determinatum gradum essendi, et sic differt a quidditate cuiuslibet alterius angeli, secundum quam quilibet plus participat de actualitate et minus de potentialitate secundum quod plus appropinquat ad Deum, qui est actus purus, a quo omnia quodam ordine procedunt; quae enim a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.

The impression is that Godin does not only intend to quote some passages of Sciendum, but rather to embrace them within his own arguments. In another question, namely the aforementioned quaestio utrum possint esse plures angeli unius speciei,47 Godin even goes so far as to write si primo modo, sic dico,48 and then adds a verbatim quotation from Sciendum. In other words, Godin uses the first person singular (dico) for de facto expressing the opinion of Robert Orford. 47. Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31rb). 48. Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31rb).

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Then, after this series of word-for-word quotations from Sciendum, Godin identifies some possible objections against “his” theses (modo contra ista arguitur ab aliquibus)49 by using the counterarguments presented by William de la Mare: Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (G 32va)

Corr. corrupt. Quare, 10, pp. 49-50

1) Modo contra ista arguitur ab aliquibus. Dicunt enim quod est error hic: quod genus et differentia sumantur ab una natura, et hic error fundatur in duobus. Primum est quod natura angeli non est composita ex materia et forma. Secundum est quod in una re non est ponere, nisi unam formam substantialem. 1a) Quod autem in angelis sit materia, ostendunt sic. Quia secundum Augustinum, ubi est mutatio, ibi est materia, ergo, a destructione consequentis, ubi non est materia, nec aliqua mutatio. Sed solus Deus est immutabilis secundum fidem, ergo ipse solus est immutabilis.

Item, quaestione, articulo, in responsione principali dicit - Thomas quod angelus non est compositus ex materia et forma; primo, quia si haberet materiam esset distincta, et hoc non nisi per quantitatem, qua remota remaneret indistinguibilis, ut habetur in I Physicorum; sed in angelo non est quantitas; ergo nec materia. Secundo, quia fides tenet et Scriptura dicit solum Deum esse immutabilem. Dicit autem Augustinus, XII Confessionum: ubi mutatio ibi materia; ergo, a destructione consequentis, ubi non est materia, ibi nec est mutatio aliqua; et ita si angelus non habet materiam, est omnino immutabilis, et per consequens Deus, quia hoc soli Deo proprium est. Corr. corrupt. Quare, 12, pp. 64-65

2) Praeterea, si ab eodem sumitur ratio generis et differentiae, tamen a diversis secundum considerationem, tunc apud eundem intelligentem numquam genus et differentia essent simul, quia quando aliquis intelligit rem aliquam, ut indeterminatam, non intelligit eam determinatam. Et ita quando intelligit eam sub ratione generis, non potest ei copulare intellectum differentiae, quod falsum est. 49. Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (G 32va).

Quod autem dicit hic, patet esse falsum; quia si ita esset nunquam in rebus immaterialibus simul essent genus et differentia apud eumdem intelligentem. Quando enim quis intelligit rem illam ut indeterminatam non eam intelligit ut determinatam; et ita quando intelligit eam sub ratione generis, non potest ei copulare rationem differentiae, neque e converso; quod patet esse falsum.

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3) Praeterea propter considerationem nostram non attribuuntur rebus materialibus vel immaterialibus praedicata accidentalia. Nam si considero aliquem (angelum Bol Kl P Pi),50 ut est bonus (bonum Bol Kl N P Pi W1),51 non propter hoc est bonus, et sic de aliis. Sic etiam est de ipsis naturalibus (materialibus Be Bol E Kl P Pi),52 quia propter hoc non est corvus albus, si considero eum ut album. Si ergo consideratio nostra non potest attribuere praedicata accidentalia, multo minus essentialia, scilicet genus et differentiam.

Item propter considerationem nostram non attribuuntur rebus immaterialibus neque materialibus praedicata accidentalia; nam si considero angelum ut bonum vel ut malum, non propter hoc est bonus vel malus; vel ut scientem quae ventura sunt usque li ad mille annos, non propter hoc ipse ea scit. Similiter de rebus materialibus: si considero corvum vel ethiopem ut intenso colore album, non propter hoc sunt tales. Ergo si consideratio nostra non potest attribuere praedicata accidentalia, multo minus praedicata essentialia; talia autem sunt genus et differentia. 4) Unde ad rationem dicunt quod non Ad argumentum dici potest quod illud habent pro inconvenienti, quod scilicet in quod habet pro inconvenienti, scilicet quod bruto sit anima perfectior quam sensitiva, in bruto sit alia forma nobilior quam sensiimmo hoc etiam antiquitus ponebatur. tiva, non est inconveniens; immo hoc consuevit poni antiquitus communiter.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that Godin combines two different articles of William de la Mare’s Correctorium, namely quod angelus non est compositus ex materia et forma53 and quod genus et differentia accipiuntur secundum considerationem determinati et indeterminati.54 Even though this seeems to be a minor detail, this actually reveals his personal reworking of the Correctorium literature. Of course, we can also suppose that the French Dominican theologian refers here to an existing anthology of passages from William de la Mare’s Correctorium. On the other hand – and this is my opinion –, it is far more plausible that he himself reworks the content of the Correctorium literature. After all, the primary goal of a teaching compendium – like the Lectura Thomasina – is to combine, clarify and summarize different texts and sources. 50. Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (Bol 46rb; Kl 46rb; P 36vb; Pi 39vb). 51. Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (Bol 46rb; Kl 46rb; N 42ra; P 36vb; Pi 39vb; W1 29va). 52. Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (Be 39rb; Bol 46rb; E 81vb; Kl 46rb; P 36vb; Pi 39vb). 53. Corr. corrupt. Quare, 10, pp. 49-59. 54. Corr. corrupt. Quare, 12, pp. 64-67.

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The answers to the objections raised by William de la Mare are again founded on the Correctorium literature. However, in this case, Sciendum does not appear to be the only source: the Dominican theologian combines these quotations with some passages from the other correctoria corruptorii. Here is the structure of Godin’s replies with the corresponding sources: Ad 1: (a) Sciendum, 11, p. 67; (b) Circa, 7(8), p. 48, ll. 19-21; Quaestione, 8, p. 48, Quare, 8, pp. 45-46;(c) Quaestione, 10, p. 60. Ad 2: (a) Sciendum, 12, p. 71; (b) Godin’s additional remarks. Ad 3: (a) Quare, 12, p. 66; (b) Sciendum, 12, p. 71; Ad 4: Quare, 12, p. 67; Sciendum, 12, p. 70

It is especially difficult, as regards Ad 2(b) and Ad 4, to establish with certainty which version of Correctorium is mentioned here, also because the quotation is not verbatim. Lect. Thom., II, d. 3, q. 1 (G 32va)

Circa, 7(8), p. 48, ll. 19-21

Quaest., 8, p. 48

Quare, 8, pp. 45-46

Si autem tu dicas quod in caelo est materia eiusdem rationis et tamen materia sub una stella existens non est in potentia ad aliam stellam, quia sua potentia totaliter satiatur.

Et contra Commentatorem, super illud Caeli et Mundi: Volumus dicere de figuris stellarum etc.: Omnia, inquit Commentator, corpora caelestia sunt multa individua specie.

et contra Commentatorem super illud De caelo et mundo: Volumus de figuris stellarum dicere, Omnia, inquit Commentator, corpora caelestia sunt eiusdem naturae specie et corpora caelestia sunt multa individua in specie.

Item hoc est contra Philosophum, II Cœli et mundi qui dicit ibidem quod corpora rotunda sunt multa propter generationem; et est contra Commentatorem super illud Coeli et Mundi: volumus dicere de figuris stellarum, etc.; omnia, inquit, corpora coelestia sunt eiusdem naturae specie, et corpora coelestia sunt multa individua in specie

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Lect. Thom. II, d. 3, q. 1 (G 32va) Ad illud quod dicunt ad rationem Thomae dicendum quod est magnum inconveniens quod in bruto sit nobilior forma sensitiva, quia ex hoc sequitur ipsum habere intellectum cum anima sensitiva immediate secundum ordinem formarum subordinetur intellectivae.

Quare, 12, p. 67

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Sciendum, 12, p. 71

Quod vero tertio dicunt, Quod vero dicunt solvendo ad

argumentum

Thomae rationem Thomae, quod in

respondendo, quod non est brutis est alia forma nobilior inconveniens aliam formam quam sensitiva quia hoc annobiliorem quam sit sensitiva tiquitus ponebatur, dicenponi in animali bruto, nimis dum quod non est verum, est brutaliter dictum. Ex hoc quia sic haberent animam enim sequeretur quod habe- intellectivam rent intellectum, sive animam intellectivam quae secundum philosophos omnes immediate in ordine forma-

secundum aliquem gradum; sola enim intellectiva est supra sensitivam sicut sola sensitiva supra vegetativam.

rum substantialium sequitur animam sensitivam.

In the first case, Godin’s aim is evidently to refer to the passage of De caelo et mundo55 with the corresponding Averroes’ commentary,56 as confirmed by the example de figuris stellarum. Therefore, the most likely hypothesis is that he knew this argument as included in three versions of the correctoria, of which however he gives a summary, without mentioning the Peripatetic sources. The second case is clearer: even though this is not a verbatim quotation, Godin undoubtedly uses the argument advanced both in Sciendum and in Quare. Finally – for concluding the description of the structure of the text – Godin concludes his reflection with two passages from Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences,57 in order to give an answer to the argument posed at the beginning of the quaestion. To sum up, as in the previous example, the French Dominican theologian seems to adopt an established model for approaching and defending controversial Thomistic doctrines. In this case, however, the structure seems to be even more precise: 55. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo, II, 3, 286b6-7. 56. Averroes, Commentum magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis, II, comm. 21, ed. F.J. Carmody – R. Arnzen, Leuven 2003 (vol. II), p. 305, ll. 6-18. 57. Thomas de Aquino, Super Sent., II, 3, 1, 5, ad 3, pp. 100-101.

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- Presentation of the problem: quotation from Aquinas’ writings (Commentary on the Sentences or Summa theologiae); - First series of solutions based on Sciendum; - Presentation of counterarguments: quotations from William de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae; - Presentation of replies to the advanced counterarguments: quotations from the correctorium literature, mainly from Sciendum; - Conclusion with quotations corresponding to Aquinas’ writings mentioned in the presentation of the problem.

This pattern, with the appropriate differences, can be applied to all other cases in which Godin considers the Correctorium literature as his primary source. But, from both the aforementioned examples as well as all other loci, two different approaches emerge: on the one hand, the French Dominican theologian seems to offer mere transcriptions of the correctoria corruptorii, in particular of Sciendum; on the other hand, he proposes some modifications or additions that seem to imply a specific reworking for including these texts in his teaching compendium. 4.1. The LECTURA THOMASINA as ‘Florilegium’ of the CORRECTORIUM Literature Question 3 of the Lectura Thomasina, Book IV, dist. 50 (G 98vb), typifies the first way of using the Correctorium literature. The problem at issue is the local distance as an impedimentum for the separated soul’s cognition (utrum distantia localis impediat cognitionem animae separatae). Godin indeed addresses the issue through quotations from Sciendum. In this case, however, he does not limit himself to quoting verbatim some confined passages. The entire question is de facto a transcription (sometimes a rewording) of the text of Sciendum:

Lect. Thom., IV, d. 50, q. 3 (G 98vb)

Sciendum, 38, p. 161

Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum distantia loca- Similiter in cognitione animae separatae lis impediat cognitionem animae separa- est duo considerare, scilicet speciem infusam tae. Dicendum quod non. Eius ratio est, repraesentantem et lucem. Quod autem

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quia in cognitione animae separatae est duo considerare, scilicet speciem infusam repraesentantem et ipsum lumen. Sed ex parte speciei non impeditur cognitio animae separatae, quia ipsa anima separata sic non intelligit per species ipsas, quasi ipsa agat in res vel res agat in ipsam, cum ipsa non abstrahat a rebus, sed per eas intelligit, inquantum ipsae species repraesentant res extra animam. Res autem aequaliter repraesentatur ab ipsis speciebus sive praesentes sive absentes sive distantes sive propinquum sint. Imago Herculis ipsum repraesentat ubicumque fuerit. Similiter etiam potentiae sensitivae dum tamen fuerunt in cognoscendo, non in accipiendo scientiam, aequaliter cognoscunt propinquum et distans; aequaliter enim imaginamur hominem aliquem sive Romae sive Parisius. Similiter anima aequaliter intelligit solem et lunam cum tamen luna sit nobis propinquior quam sole; ergo ex parte speciei nihil impedit distantia cognitionem animae separatae. Similiter nec ex parte luminis, quia illae species sunt influxae ex divino lumine quod aequaliter respicit propinquum et distans cum etiam localis distantia non impediat actionem luminis corporalis, scilicet scientiae quin eodem instanti totum mundum illuminet et multo minus actionem luminis intellectualis impedit distantia localis. Sed si anima separata cogitaret abstrahendo a rebus, quia oporteret ipsum lumen quo intendit attingere res ipsas; ideo necessario distantia localis huius cognitionem eius impediret. Sic ergo videtur dicendum, quod si loquamur de scientia animae quo ad usum specierum, tunc localis distantia non impedit cognitionem animae

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distantia localis non impediat eius cognitionem potest patere et a parte specierum et a parte luminis. A parte specierum patet sic: non enim intelligit anima separata per istas species quasi agat ipsa in res vel res in ipsam, cum non abstrahat separata, ut dictum est, quia medium corporale per quod fieret actio impediret eius cognitionem; sed intelligit per eas, quae repraesentant res extra animam; res autem repraesentant aequaliter sive sint distantes sive propinquae, sicut imago Herculis repraesentat Herculem ubicumque fuerit; similiter potentiae sensitivae, dummodo sint in cognoscendo, non in accipiendo notitiam, aequaliter cognoscunt propinquum et distans; aequaliter enim imaginor hominem qui est Romae et qui est Parisius; et similiter anima intelligit solem et lunam aequaliter cum tamen luna sit propinquior sole; sic igitur et per species infusas aequaliter intelligit anima separata distans et propinquum; non igitur ex hac parte distantia localis cognitionem eius impedit. Similiter nec ex parte luminis; quia istae species sunt influxae ex divino lumine quod aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans; et ita nec ex hac parte distantia localis eius cognitionem impediet, cum nec talis distantia impediat actionem luminis solis corporalis cum in uno instanti totum mundum illuminet. Si autem anima separata intelligeret abstrahendo a rebus, oporteret quod lumen quo abstraheret attingere ipsas res, et ita necessario distantia localis impediret eius cognitionem. Sic igitur videtur esse dicendum quod si loquamur de scientia animae quantum ad usum scientiae, ad usum scilicet specierum, dicendum est quod localis distantia non impedit cognitionem

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separatae nec coniunctae quantum ex parte specierum. Si autem loquamur quantum ad acceptionem specierum, sic localis distantia impedit cognitionem animae coniunctae quae accipit a rebus, non autem animae separatae quae a rebus nihil accipit, sed a Deo, ubi species aequaliter se habent ad distans et propinquum.

animae separatae, neque coniunctae, quantum est ex parte specierum; si vero loquamur quantum ad acceptionem scientiae, dicendum est quod localis distantia impedit cognitionem animae coniunctae quae accipit a rebus, non autem animae separatae quae accipit a Deo suas species, non a rebus.

Even though this topic is one of the most debated in the first reception and assimilation of Aquinas’ thought, Godin spends only few lines on it (the entire question is actually transcribed in the table above). He confines himself to transcribe the text of Sciendum. The French Dominican theologian is certainly familiar to this working strategy, as in some cases he raises a particular question exclusively by arranging a sort of patchwork of Aquinas’ verbatim quotations.58 However, it seems rather strange that in this specific instance Godin does not look into the matter: for example, he does not take Aquinas’ writings as his own starting point, and he does not refer to the counterarguments advanced in William de la Mare’s Correctorium. There are two kinds of explanation for this. On the one hand – however strange this may sound –, Godin may have had no intention and maybe no time to comment on and elaborately analyze the entire Liber Sententiarum. When considering his brilliant ecclesiastic and “political” career,59 this hypothesis is likely: the acade-mic career was not his priority. On the other hand – and this is a more speculative hypothesis –, as the Lectura Thomasina was conceived as a school textbook, the author did not intend to approach all topics equally comprehensively. In other words, Godin covered some subjects but left others out, and – in this second case – he merely repeated what had already been discussed in the Correctorium literature. After all, this is what happens regarding any teaching compendium nowadays as well. In any case, we shall return to these considerations in the conclusions.

58. For example, Lect. Thom., II, d. 22, q. unica (G 43vb-44ra)

59. cf. P. Fournier, “Le cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin,” in: Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 86 (1925), pp. 100-121; P. Fournier, “Guillaume de Peyre de Godin, cardinal,” in: Histoire littéraire de la France 37 (1938), pp. 146-153.

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4.2. The LECTURA THOMASINA as a ‘Updated Version’ of the CORRECTORIUM Literature. There is a second point of view for interpreting the close connection between the Correctorium literature and the Lectura Thomasina. Even if both the Correctorium fratris Thomae and the different versions of the correctorium corruptorii form the basis of Godin’s approach to the most discussed problem of Thomistic thought, this does not necessarily imply that the work of the French Dominican theologian is only to produce a mosaic of quotations from the Correctorium literature. In many cases, he actually combines the arguments from these texts with opinions or solutions advanced by other of his contemporaries (although without mentioning them by name). Thereby, he provides the Dominican scholars with a sort of updated version of the dispute “Thomism-anti-Thomism.” Thus, Godin does not only aim at rewriting the counterarguments included in William de la Mare’s Correctorium and the corresponding replies written by the authors of the different correctoria corruptorii. Quite the contrary, in many cases, one gets the impression that he intended to incorporate the Correctorium literature into a wider-ranging discussion that involves also other sources. A first typical example is represented by the already mentioned quaestio utrum possint esse plures angeli eiusdem speciei. After having posed the problem of the unity of the angelic species through the words of William de la Mare and Robert Orford (Sciendum), Godin considers the solution proposed by Giles of Rome in his Quodlibeta. As we have seen, the Dominican master does not consider it reasonable.60 Nevertheless – and this is the interesting aspect – , Godin adds a new element for reconstructing the first reception of Thomism and his main criticisms. The point is not only to restate the position defended by the authors of the correctoria, but also to identify further elements that contribute to the depiction of a more exhaustive presentation of a particular topic. A similar situation is to be found in the quaestio utrum distantia localis impediat locutionem unius angeli cum alio.61 As usual, Aquinas’ words62 are the starting point of Godin’s reflection. Then, the French 60. See p. 40. 61. Lect. Thom., II, d. 11, q. 1 (G 36vb). 62. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, I, 107, 4, arg. 1, arg. 2, s.c.; I, 56, 2, resp.

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Dominican theologian proposes a first series of solutions, by combining quotations from the different versions of the correctoria corruptorii, in particular from Sciendum and Circa.63 Then, by moving to this “standard model,” Godin mentions also the criticism of aliqui that faciunt distinctionem de hoc quod dictum est, quod quando ordinat angelus id quod concipit ad manifestandum alteri, tunc loquitur cum ipso. Et istud sufficit ad excitandum ipsum.64 Behind this opinion there is once again William de la Mare, but here Godin does not refers to Correctorium, but rather to the Commentary on the Sentences.65 Moreover, a similar position is also defended by the Dominican theologian Robert Kilwardby.66 Therefore, Godin’s polemical target here seems to be not only the Franciscan school, but also the anti-Thomistic trend within the Dominican Order. When considering the scope of the Lectura Thomasina, the mentioning of this second source is noteworthy. As in the previous case, what appears to be a slight modification of the typical structure of these kinds of question, is actually relevant, as Godin here de facto proposes a revised version of the possible criticism against Aquinas’ controversial doctrines. In distinction 6 (q. 4: utrum angeli statim post unum actum meritorium sint consecuti beatitudinem) the topic is at least partially covered by article 23 of William de la Mare’s Correctorium (quod diabolus statim post primum instans suae creationis peccavit), but nevertheless Godin seems to polemically target Bonaventure.67 Then, in the already mentioned distinction 13 (q. 1: utrum informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem suam), the additional source is Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta, X, 7.68 When extending the analysis to other questions, not modeled on the basis of quotations from the Correctorium literature, but nevetheless focused on other controversial aspects of Aquinas’ thought, it becomes even more evident that Godin intended to engage fully in a 63. Correctorium corruptorii Sciendum, 42, pp. 181-182; Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Correctorium corruptorii Circa, 41(42), p. 224. 64. Lect. Thom., II, d. 11, q. 1 (G 36vb). 65. Guillelmus de la Mara, Scriptum in secundum librum Sententiarum, 10, 4, ed. H. Kraml, München 1995, p. 148, ll. 20-27. 66. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, 41, ed. G. Leibold, München 1992, p. 129, ll. 20-27. 67. Cf. Bonaventura, II Sent., dist. 4, 1, 2 ed. Quaracchi, pp. 133-134. 68. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 13, q. 1, (G 38vb). Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet X, 7, ed. R. Macken, Leiden 1981, p. 164, ll. 57-61.

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dialogue with his contemporaries. In other terms, he conceived his Lectura Thomasina to provide as complete a picture as possible of the discussion concerning Thomas’ doctrines in the last years of the 13th century. In distinction 1 (q. 1: utrum mundus possit fuisse ab aeterno), for example, the arguments against Aquinas’ groundbreaking position on the eternity of the world are not derived – as aforementioned – from the Correctorium literature, since William de la Mare’s criticism was maybe not so suitable in this case.69 However, Godin transcribes a long series of passages from Richard of Mediavilla, and he alludes also to the opinions of other Franciscan theologians: Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 1, p. 321, ll. 6-1270 Richardus de Mediavilla, Super Sent., II, d. 3, q. 4 (17b)71 Sicut enim creatio est a non ente in ens, ita Item sicut creatio est a non ente in ens, annihilatio est ab ente in non ens; ita quod ita adnihilatio est ab ente in non ens. Ita sicut in creatione non ens est loco termi- quod sicut in creatione est loco termini a ni a quo, ita in annihilatione non ens est quo non ens: ita in adnihilatione, est loco loco termini ad quem. Ergo sicut se habet termini ad quem: ergo sicut se habet infiinfinitas durationis a parte post in re quae nitas durationis a parte post, ad rem quae annihilatur, ita se videtur habere infinitas adnihilatur: ita videtur se habere infinitas durationis a parte ante in re quae creatur. durationis a parte ante ad rem, quae creSed annihilatio non compatitur infinitam atur. Sed adnihilatio, quia est ab ente in durationem a parte post in re quae annihi- nullo modo ens, non compatitur in re, latur. Ergo nec creatio compatitur secum quae adnihilatur infinitatem a parte post: infinitam durationem a parte ante in re ergo similiter, cum creatio sit a simpliciter quae creatur. non ente in ens, non compatitur in re, quae creatur infinitam durationem a parte ante. Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 1, p. 321, ll. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super Sent., 13-23 II, d. 3, q. 4 (17b) Praeterea. Possibile est quo posito in esse, Item secundum Philosophum primo prinon sequitur impossibile; sed posito quod orum, possibile est, quo posito in esse, mundus ab aeterno fuit, sequitur ex hoc nullum sequitur impossibile. Sed si Deus 69. See p. 46.

70. The quotations from the text of Lectura Thomasina, II, dist. I, q. 1 are based on the Graz manuscript, according to the transcription provided in J.W. Peck SJ - C. Schabel “James of Metz and the Dominican tradition on the Eternity of the World,” pp. 265-330. 71. Richardus de Mediavilla, Quaestiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum, II, Brixiae 1591 (repr. Frankfurt am M. 1963).

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impossibile; ergo non fuit possibile. Maior scribitur I Priorum. Minor probatur, quia ex hoc sequitur Deum ex necessitate mundum creasse, quod est inconveniens. Probatio: quia non potuit eum non creare quando creabat, quia esse, quando est, necesse est esse; nec potuit eum non creare antequam creavit, quia ante aeternum nihil est; nec potuit eum non creare postquam creaverat, quia illud non potest fieri: quod illud quod factum est non fuerit. Ergo similiter quando creabat necessarium erat creare. Si ergo fuit ab aeterno, ergo necessarium fuit ipsum a Deo creari, quod est inconveniens.

creasset mundum ab aeterno ex hoc secutum fuisset impossibile, scilicet, quod Deus de necessitate mundum creasset. Probatum est enim in libro primo, quod Deus non potuit creare mundum de necessitate, nec de necessitate naturae, nec de necessitate voluntatis. Restat ergo, quod mundum ab aeterno creari fuit impossibile. Quod autem Deus mundum de necessitate creasset, si ipsum ab aeterno creasset: patet sic, quia non potuisset ipsum non creare quando creabat: quia secundum Philosophum libro primo Perihermen. omne quod est, quando est, necesse est. Nec potest dici, quod potuisset ipsum non creare antequam creasset, quia ante aeternum nihil. Nec potuisset ipsum non creasse, postquam creasset: quia non potest facere, quod illud, quod factum est, non fuerit factum: secundum Augustinum vigesimosexto lib. contra Faustum. Et ita patet, quod si mundum ab aeterno creasset, ipsum de necessitate creasset, quod est impossibile.

Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 1, p. 322, ll. 24-28

Richardus de Mediavilla, Super Sent., II, d. 3, q. 4 (16b)

Contra. I Topicorum dicitur quod quae- Item Philosophus primo topicorum dicit dam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus quod sunt probleumata de quibus rationem rationem non habemus, ut utrum mundus non habemus cum sint magna, ut utrum sit aeternus. Sed si fuisset impossibile mun- mundus sit aeternus, vel non. Sed si non dum fuisse ab aeterno, habuissemus rationes fuisset possibile mundum esse ab aeterno: demonstrativas ad probandum ipsum ab ae- haberemus necessariam rationem ad probanterno non fuisse. Ergo non fuit impossibile dum ipsum ab aeterno non fuisse. Ergo fuit mundum ab aeterno fuisse.

possibile ipsum ab aeterno creari.

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Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 1, p. 325, ll. 147-150

Bonaventura., Super Sent., II, 1, 1, 1, 2 (21,75-22,6)72

Primo aliqui adducunt demonstrationem de animabus, quia constat si mundus fuit ab aeterno, tunc generatio fuit ab aeterno, et sic infiniti homines praecesserunt. Sed anima humana est incorruptibilis. Ergo est ponere infinita in actu.

Impossibile est infinita simul esse; sed si mundus est aeternus sine principio, cum non sit sine homine – propter hominem enim sunt quodam modo omnia – et homo duret finito tempore: ergo infiniti homines fuerunt. Sed quot fuerunt homines, tot animae rationales: ergo infinitae animae fuerunt. Iohannes Peckham, Quaest. disp. de aetern. mundi, 2 (585, 11-20)73 Item, mundus duravit duratione infinita; sed mundus est propter hominem; ergo infiniti homines praecesserunt. Cum ergo animae rationales sint immortales, sunt actu infinitae

Lect. Thom., II, 1, 1, p. 325, ll. 152-156

Bonaventura, Super Sent., II, 1, 1, 1, 2 (21,35-53)

Secundo arguunt de circulationibus solis. Impossibile est infinita pertransiri; sed si Quia infinitae circulationes solis praeces- mundus non coepit, infinitae revolutiones serunt sole existente ab aeterno, ergo vel fuerunt: ergo impossibile est illas pertransire: infinita contingit pertransire vel numquam ergo impossibile fuit devenire usque ad hanc. est devenire ad circulationem hodiernam. Si tu dicas, quod non sunt pertransita quia Primum reputat Philosophus inconveniens, nulla fuit prima, vel, quod etiam bene poset est. Secundum patet inconveniens esse ex sunt pertransiri in tempore infinito; per hoc evidentia facti. Adducunt autem aliqui ratio- non evades. Quaeram enim a te, utrum alinem istam fortificando eam: constat quod in qua revolutio praecesserit hodiernam in infiomni circulatione et qualibet potuit Deus nitum, an nulla. Si nulla: ergo omnes finitae creare lapidem unum, et sic, cum infinitae distant ab hac, ergo sunt omnes finitae, ergo

72. Bonaventura, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, ed. Quaracchi, Grottaferrata 1882-1889. 73. Iohannes Peckham, Quaestiones disputatae, ed. G.J. Etzkorn – H. Spettmann, Grottaferrata 2002.

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circulationes praecesserunt, erunt etiam in- habent principium. Si aliqua in infinitum finiti lapides remanentes. Et cum isti lapides distat: quaero de revolutione, quae immediapossint coniungi ad invicem, erit non tan- te sequitur illam, utrum distet in infinitum. tum infinitum secundum multitudinem, sed Si non: ergo nec illa distat, quoniam finita etiam secundum magnitudinem.

distantia est inter utramque. Si vero distat in infinitum, similiter quaero de tertia et de quarta et sic in infinitum: ergo non magis distat ab hac una quam ab alia: ergo una non est ante aliam: ergo omnes sunt simul.

Apparently, Godin provides a series of references, in some case of verbatim quotations, from the texts of his contemporaries. By doing so, his Dominican students get a clear picture of the problem at hand as well as of the main arguments and counterarguments pertaining to it. Richard of Mediavilla, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Bonaventure, and John Peckham are just some of the names behind expressions such as aliqui, quidam, doctores moderni. Moreover, in many passages of other questions that discuss the most controversial aspects of Aquinas’ thought, the sources still remain unidentified. For example, in distinction 15 (q. 1: utrum corpora caelestia sint animata) in which Godin is faced with the opinions of some unidentified aliqui magistri74 or in 16 (q. 1: utrum omnium hominum sit unus intellectus possibilis vel numeretur secundum numerationem hominum), in which the French Dominican theologian shapes the contours of the debate between Thomas Aquinas and the Latin Averroists, by advancing the arguments of some unidentified aliqui that contra istud arguitur multipliciter.75 The impression is that the French Dominican theologian generally alludes to the theses defended by some Parisian masters of Arts. His source is, however, currently unknown. In conclusion, the Correctorium literature certainly is one of his primary source when Godin takes into account some controversial aspects of Aquinas’ thought. Nevertheless, his way of proceeding cannot be reduced to a mere transcription of what has already been stated by the 74. Lect. Thom., II, dist. 15, q. 1 (G 40va). 75. For an overview of this topic see my “Il problema dell’unità dell’intelletto agli inizi del XIV secolo. Guglielmo di Pietro di Godino in difesa della noetica tommasiana,” in: Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, CXII (2020), pp. 147-164.

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authors of the four versions of the correctoria corruptorii. The presence of all aforementioned sources and the long transcriptions from other texts corroborate that the Lectura is the result of a more in-depth work. 5. Conclusions The Lectura Thomasina is basically a text written for introducing Dominican students to Thomas Aquinas’ doctrines. The innumerable verbatim quotations from Aquinas’ writings unequivocally confirm this.76 In a certain sense, this is the first attempt to summarize and systematize the Thomistic thought in one text, and this also explains a certain – at least apparent – absence of “creativity.” In fact, the novelty of Godin’s approach exactly consists in the combination of different quotations from Aquinas. In this particular exposition of Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Godin attempts to include the principal criticisms against the “Thomistic” theories. Of course, it is debatable whether this effort was successful or not. In any case, quotations from the Condemnation of 1277 and, above all, from the Correctorium literature must be considered in this light. As in the case of quotations from Aquinas’ writings, Godin does not intend to compile a miscellaneous collection of dicta. If he wanted to do this, he presumably would have mentioned the author of each quotation. However, this does not happen, even when his questions appear to be a summary of a Correctorium corruptorii. The Lectura Thomasina is thus not conceived as a florilegium, but rather as a school textbook. In light of these last remarks as the relevant point of view, the shift from the condemnations to the schools typified by the Lectura Thomasina is certainly clearer. If the primary objective of Godin’s commentary on the Sentences is to offer a first overview of Aquinas’ principal theses to the Dominican students, the second and consequent objective is certainly to warn them of the most frequent criticisms against Thomas Aquinas in the Parisian theological landscape. In this sense, when Godin quotes William de la Mare’s Correctorium, Richard of Mediavilla’s Com-

76. A. Colli, “Tommaso prima del tomismo. Annotazioni per un’edizione critica della Lectura Thomasina (II libro),” in: Divus Thomas 120 (2017), pp. 163-194.

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mentary on the Sentences, or other 13th-century theologians involved in the debate between “Thomism” and “anti-Thomism,” he actually does not aim at contrasting these authors, but rather at improving his exposition of Aquinas’ theses by referring to hypothetical objections and to the corresponding counterarguments. After all, it may hardly be assumed that Godin, who wrote the Lectura Thomasina at the beginning of 14th century, polemically targeted writings that were published thirty years earlier. By contrast, it is more plausible that he intended to retrace the first stages of the reception of Thomas Aquinas’ theology. And in this process of assimilation the Correctorium literature certainly plays a crucial role. The Lectura Thomasina – apparently not distinguished by originality – represents a first significant attempt to rework Thomas Aquinas’ writings for an educational context. The mosaic of quotations from the Correctorium literature and the references to prominent 13th-theologians was not aimed at providing students with a sort of cheat sheet or a simplified version of the Summa theologiae or other writings by Aquinas, not least because in many cases the Dominican scholars directly read these texts. Rather, it is a precious resource for putting Aquinas’ thought into the context of its first assimilation. This is may be the first example of Thomistic secondary literature.

LE COMMENTAIRE DE BRUGES EST-IL À PROPREMENT PARLER UNE LECTURA THOMASINA ? Maxime Mauriège 1. Aperçu historique des recherches sur le COMMENTAIRE DE BRUGES, la question de son attribution et sa parenté avec la LECTURA THOMASINA Attirer l’attention sur l’étroite parenté qui existe entre la Lectura Thomasina du cardinal dominicain Guillelmus Petri de Godino et le commentaire anonyme sur les Sentences conservé dans le codex 491 de la Bibliothèque communale de Bruges1, n’a en soi rien de nouveau2. 1. Voir la description de ce manuscrit (= Br) effectuée par le Père Antoine Dondaine dans : A. De Poorter, Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque publique de la Ville de Bruges, Gembloux-Paris 1934, pp. 561-570. 2. Voir B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Thèse d’habilitation en théologie (exemplaire dactylographié), Mainz 1955, éditée post mortem par R. Haubst, Münster 1967 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42,1), pp. 49-72 ; J. Koch, « Kritische Studien zum Leben Meister Eckharts (Erster Teil – Von den Anfängen bis zum Strassburger Aufenthalt einschliesslich) », dans : Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 29 (1959), pp. 5-51, pp. 13 sq. [réimprimé dans : id., Kleine Schriften, vol. I, Rom 1973 (Storia e Letteratura, 127), pp. 247-344, pp. 256 sq.] ; L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300, Leipzig 1966 (Erfurter theologische Studien, 20), pp. 75-90 ; B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, pp. 49-72 ; J.T. Ernst, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vollkommenen Erkenntnis Christi. Ein Versuch zur Auslegung der klassischen Dreiteilung: visio beata, scientia infusa und scientia acquisita, Freiburg – Basel – Wien 1971 (Freiburger theologische Studien, 89), pp. 254-263 ; T.W. Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P., Roma 1971 (Studia Anselmiana, 58), pp. 184-186 ; W. Goris – M. Pickavé, « Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336). Ein Beitrag zur Textund Überlieferungsgeschichte », dans : J. Hamesse (éd.), Roma, magistra mundi: Itineraria culturae medievalis. Mélanges offerts à Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, vol. 3, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998 (Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales. Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 10.3), pp. 83-109, pp. 95 ad finem ; W. Goris – M. Pickavé, « Von der Erkenntnis der Engel. Der Streit um die species intelligibilis und eine quaestio aus dem anonymen Sentenzenkommentar in ms. Brügge, Stadsbibliotheek 491 », dans : J.A.

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C’est à Bruno Decker († 1961) qu’il revient en effet de l’avoir constatée en premier, dès 19433. À l’époque, il en informa aussitôt par courrier, et avec un enthousiasme non dissimulé, Josef Koch († 1967), sous la direction duquel il collabora peu après à l’édition critique des œuvres latines de Maître Eckhart4, entreprise sous les auspices de la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft depuis 19335 : « Très cher Professeur, avanthier je fis, selon moi, une découverte sensationnelle: j’ai découvert une source pour le livre I du commentaire d’Eckhart sur les Sentences, à savoir la Lectura Thomasina de Guillelmus Petri de Godino. […] et je n’en croyais pas mes yeux lorsqu’à longueur de lignes je constata des

Aertsen – K. Emery – A. Speer (éds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Berlin–New York 2001 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28), pp. 125-177, pp. 154-162 ; L. Hödl, « Die Eckhartsentenzen im Sentenzenkommentar des Wilhelm von Macclesfield OP († 1303) in der Brügge-Stadtbibl.-Hs. 491 », dans: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 61 (2014), pp. 359-388, pp. 370-372; A. Colli, « Transcriptions, Paraphrases and Abbreviations. Rewriting Thomas Aquinas in the Lectura Thomasina », dans : M. Meliadò – S. Negri (éds.), Praxis des Philosophierens, Praktiken der Historiographie: Perspektiven von der Spätantike bis zur Moderne, Freiburg–München 2018 (Geist und Geisteswissenschaft, 2), pp. 21-42, pp. 41 sq. 3. Cf. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, p. 51. 4. Voir J. Koch, « Zum Gedächtnis an Bruno Decker », dans : Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 1 (1961), pp. 14-16, p. 15 : « Seine editorische Fähigkeiten entdeckte ich während meiner Arbeit an der Edition von Meister Eckharts Auslegung des Johannesevangeliuns durch die kritische Briefe, die er [scil. Bruno Decker] mir über die ersten Lieferungen schrieb. Als mein Mitarbeiter Prof. Dr. K. Christ am 16. Dezember 1943 bei einem Bombenangriff in Berlin ums Leben kam, bat ich Decker, Christs Stelle zu übernehmen. […] Decker […] leistete bei den ersten beiden Bänden durch seine positive Kritik eine immer angenehm empfundene Hilfe ». 5. Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke, herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Berlin–Stuttgart 1936 sqq. Voir T. Schaller, « Die Meister Eckhart-Forschung von der Jahrhundertwende bis zur Gegenwart (III. Die Inangriffnahme der kritische Edition 1934) », dans : Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 15 (1968), pp. 403-426, p. 407 ad finem. Lors d’une réunion organisée le 14 juillet 1933 à la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft fut constituée une « Commission pour l’édition des œuvres de Maître Eckhart », au sein de laquelle Josef Koch s’est vu confier la direction de la section latine et Joseph Quint († 1976) celle de la section allemande (cf. « Niederschrift einer Besprechung in der Notgemeinschaft am 14. Juli 1933 über die wissenschaftliche Erschließung der Schriften Meisters Eckhart », p. 3, document conservé dans le fonds documentaire Meister-Eckhart-Archiv au Thomas-Institut de l’Université de Cologne [signature : TIMEA-GGA-I-BW-1933-08-18-2-U]). – Pour plus d’informations sur la documentation conservée dans ce fonds et notamment son apport à l’historiographie des recherches sur le Commentaire de Bruges, voir A. Speer – W. Goris, « Das Meister-Eckhart-Archiv am Thomas Institut », dans : Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 37 (1995), pp. 149-174.

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concordances littérales qui ne se laissent point expliquer par le biais de Thomas comme source commune »6. Précisons d’abord que Decker ne faisait là que présumer de la paternité eckhartienne dudit commentaire – surtout pour ce qui est du premier livre – en se référant expressément aux conclusions préliminaires de Koch dans son « Fundbericht », publié au début de la même année7 : un « bref compte-rendu » à travers lequel Koch souhaitait pour l’heure uniquement établir sa découverte « en tant que telle », c.-à-d. « la redécouverte d’une œuvre jusqu’alors inconnue du Maître, à savoir son commentaire sur les Sentences », et faire au passage valoir l’importance de ce desideratum pour l’édition et l’interprétation des œuvres d’Eckhart ainsi que pour mesurer l’évolution de sa pensée8. Or, même s’il était absolument convaincu, et ce dès le début, de détenir enfin un témoin de « la première œuvre systématique du grand penseur allemand »9 – moyennant entre autres une analyse à nouveaux frais des

6. Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Altlandsberg, 26. Juli 1943, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGA-I-BW-1943-07-26) : « Sehr verehrter Herr Professor! Vorgestern machte ich eine für mich sensationelle Entdeckung: ich habe eine Quelle für Eckharts SK I entdeckt, nämlich die Lectura Thomasina des Guillelmus Petri de Godino. […] und ich traute kaum meinen Augen, als ich zeilenlange wörtliche Übereinstimmungen feststellte, die sich nicht durch Thomas als gemeinsame Quelle erklären lassen » (trad. personnelle). 7. Ibid. : « Im folgenden unterstelle ich, daß der SK I ganz von Eckhart stammt, was, wie Sie in Ihrem Fundbericht mit Recht hervorheben, keineswegs feststeht ». Cf. J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund: der Sentenzenkommentar », dans : Forschungen und Forstchritte, 19. Jahrgang Nr. 1/2, Berlin, 1. und 10. Januar 1943, pp. 20B-23A. Concernant l’authenticité eckhartienne du livre I, Koch concédait alors qu’il n’était « pas encore parvenu à des conclusions définitives » et en donna les raisons (p. 21A-B). Mais dans une version retravaillée plus de vingt ans après et parue après sa mort (dans : id., Kleine Schriften, vol. I [nt. 2], pp. 239-246), il admettra tout compte fait ne pas en être certain du tout (p. 244). 8. Ibid., p. 21A : « Die Edition erfährt nun eine erwünschte Erweiterung durch die Wiederauffindung eines bisher unbekannten Werkes des Meisters, nämlich seines Sentenzenkommentars. […] An dieser Stelle möchte ich einen kurzen Vorbericht geben, damit der Fund als solcher festgelegt wird » ; p. 22B : « So hat das Werk sowohl für die Interpretation der Schriften des Meisters wie für die Beurteilung seiner inneren Entwicklung entscheidende Bedeutung ». 9. Id., « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », p. 22B : « Die große Bedeutung des Fundes dürfte für jeden, der sich überhaupt mit Meister Eckhart befaßt hat, klar sein. Wir besitzen nunmehr das erste systematische Werk des großen deutschen Denkers » ; id., Kleine Schriften, vol. I (nt. 7), 244 sq. : « Hier darf ich die Echtheit des Ganzen voraussetzen und einige Worte über die Bedeutung des Fundes sagen. Wir haben das erste und bisher – ich füge die Worte 1965 ein – einzige systematische Werk Eckharts vor uns »]. Fin 1940, Koch informait déjà la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft de sa découverte en des termes similaires : « Hierdurch möchte ich die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft davon unterrichten, daß ich einen außerordentlich wichtigen neuen Eckhart-Text gefunden habe, nämlich seinen Sentenzenkommentar, d.h. das erste systematische Werk, das wir überhaupt von ihm besitzen » (Brief von J. Koch an

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trois passages en marge desquelles figure le nom d’Eckhart dans le codex brugeois10 (celle de Martin Grabmann, effectuée 15 ans auparavant11, étant ici jugée erronée12) –, Koch se devait encore néanmoins d’en apporter « la preuve exhaustive », dont il annonçait d’ores-et-déjà la publication ultérieure, à paraître dans les Untersuchungen13 (en comdie Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Breslau, 15. November 1940, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde [signature du dossier archivé: BArch R 73/10815] ; une copie de cette lettre a été intégrée au fonds Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature : TIMEA-GGA-IBW-1940-11-15]). Après avoir en effet envoyé un de ses étudiants à Bruges durant l’été 1939 pour effectuer des reproductions photographiques du commentaire complet, sur la base de quoi furent ensuite réalisés des agrandissements des livres II à IV afin d’en laisser retranscrire l’intégralité par son assistante, Koch s’adonna à un examen approfondi de l’œuvre et confia alors dans sa lettre à la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft qu’« il ne fait désormais pour [lui] aucun doute que nous avons affaire ici au cours d’Eckhart sur les Sentences d’après la transcription d’un étudiant intelligent » (« […] nun besteht für mich kein Zweifel, daß wir hier die Sentenzenvorlesung Eckharts in der Nachschrift eines intelligenten Studenten vor uns haben »), ajoutant que « même le premier livre pourrait être d’Eckhart » (« Auch das erste Buch dürfte von Eckhart sein »). Pour pouvoir confirmer cette dernière allégation, il s’avérait toutefois « absolument nécessaire » de recourir directement au codex brugeois, la partie supérieure des feuillets concernés étant détériorée par l’humidité, rendant la lisibilité des premières lignes particulièrement difficile, voire impossible, au moyen de photocopies. Par conséquent, Koch pria expressément la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft de bien vouloir l’aider dans sa demande de prêt du manuscrit (ibid.). Il lui fallut cependant encore attendre 1942 avant d’obtenir, après plusieurs tentatives, le consentement des autorités compétentes et pouvoir ainsi faire venir le manuscrit à Wrocław (Breslau) afin de l’examiner personnellement (cf. J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », p. 21A ; id., Kleine Schriften, vol. I, p. 240). Voilà pourquoi son compte-rendu préliminaire ne parut qu’au début de l’année 1943. 10. J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », pp. 21B-22A : « An drei Stellen findet sich Eckharts Name am Rand: heccar’ – heckardus – heck’. […] Es läßt sich ohne Schwierigkeit zeigen, daß Eckharts Name da steht, wo der Verfasser zu wort kommt. […] Ergibt sich aus der Analyse der drei Qq., daß Eckhart wirklich ihr Verfasser ist, so kann mann diesen Beweis erheblich durch einen Vergleich dieser Qq. mit den übrigen uns bekannten lateinischen Werken des Meisters verstärken. Nicht nur inhaltlich lassen sich viele Parallelen nachweisen, sondern auch in der Methode und Ausdrucksweise. […] Da nach dem Gesagten feststeht, daß Eckhart der Verfasser der drei Qq. ist, und da, wie oben gesagt, der Kommentar zu Sent. II-IV ein einheitliches Werk ist, so folgt, daß er der Verfasser des Ganzen ist ». 11. Voir M. Grabmann, Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts und ihre Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgange. Untersuchungen und Texte, München 1927 (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften : Philosophisch-philologische Klasse 32/7), pp. 120 sq. [réimprimé dans : id., Gesammelte Akademieabhandlungen, Paderborn – München – Wien – Zürich 1979 (Veröffentlichung des Grabmann-Instituts zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie. Neue Folge 25 / I), pp. 261-381. 12. J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », p. 21B : « M. Grabmann, der die Hs. vor 15 Jahren in München untersucht hat, glaubte, daß es sich hum drei Eckhart-Zitate handele, daß Eckhart also […] mit seinen Ansichten angeführt und widerlegt werde. Das ist aber ein Irrtum ». 13. Ibid., p. 21A : « In den Untersuchungen, welche die Ausgabe begleiten sollen, werde ich den ausführlichen Beweis dafür bringen, daß das Werk wirklich von Eckhart stammt,

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plément de l’édition programmée de ce commentaire dans le volume V des Lateinische Werke14). Mais sa démonstration d’une telle attribution se voyant ensuite confrontée à de nouveaux problèmes et difficultés soulevés par Decker et certains confrères dans leur correspondance avec Koch, celui-ci préféra donc au préalable s’employer à répondre à toutes les objections formulées, afin de s’assurer de la validité de chacun des résultats de son analyse en cours, ce qui en retarda l’achèvement jusqu’à une date indéterminée15. Ne l’ayant toujours pas publiée en 1948 lorsque parut la remarquable étude de Gilles Meersseman entièrement consacrée à ce commentaire et l’attribuant à un dénommé « Philippus lector » du couvent de Gand16, Koch s’en justifia auprès de son collègue de la manière suivante: « J’avais déjà entendu, il y a de cela un certain und es in seiner Bedeutung für die Eckhartforschung würdigen ». Dans une lettre adressée à Karl Griewank (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) datant du 1 décembre 1940, Koch affirmait déjà travailler « actuellement comme un fou (« wie ein Wilder ») à la rédaction de ses preuves » (Brief von J. Koch an K. Griewank [DFG], Breslau, 8. Dezember 1940, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature du document : TIMEA-GGA-I-BW-1940-12-01]). 14. Lorsqu’il informa fin 1940 la Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft de sa découverte (voir ci-dessus nt. 9), Koch souligna certes qu’il se devait d’abord de prouver que l’œuvre est bel et bien d’Eckhart, mais d’ores et déjà aussi qu’« une place doit maintenant bien sûr être faite pour ce commentaire dans notre édition », mentionnant à cet égard deux possibilités: soit l’éditer dans le volume VI des Lateinische Werke, jusqu’ici réservé pour les Indices, si bien que ces derniers feraient alors l’objet d’un septième volume ; soit – « de manière idéale » – dans le volume V, moyennant son réagencement : 1. Collatio in Libros Sententiarum, 2. Lectura super IV libros Sententiarum, 3. Quaestiones parisienses, 4. Sermo die b. Augustini Parisius habitus, afin de réserver ce volume aux écrits parisiens d’Eckhart, ce qui impliquerait d’y retirer le Tractatus super Oratione Dominica déjà publié et de le replacer à la fin du volume II, où il serait « à une place plus convenable, étant donné qu’il constitue bel et bien une partie du commentaire perdu d’Eckhart sur Matthieu ». Koch était toutefois parfaitement conscient que « cette solution idéale » demeurait quasi impossible, précisément en raison des textes déjà publiés dans les deux premiers fascicules du cinquième volume et par conséquent des renvois qui y ont été faits dans les autres volumes (Brief von J. Koch an die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Breslau, 15. November 1940). Toujours est-il qu’en 1965, Koch évoquait encore, dans la version retravaillée de son Fundbericht, une publication de ce commentaire dans le volume V (voir Kleine Schriften, vol. I, p. 245). 15. Brief von J. Koch an die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Breslau, 12. November 1943, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (signature du dossier archivé : BArch R 73/10815) [une copie de cette lettre a été intégrée au fonds Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEAGGA-I-BW-1943-11-12)] : « Das Manuskript für das von mir vorgesehene Beiheft über den Sentenzenkommentar (Echtheitsnachweis usw.) ist zum Teil fertig. Da ich aber in der Korrespondenz mit befreundeten Forschern und einem meiner Schüler [à savoir Bruno Decker] auf neue Probleme und Schwierigkeiten gestoßen bin, kann ich auch da keinen Termin für die Ferstigstellung dieser Arbeit angeben. Ich möchte die Ergebnisse meiner Untersuchung so nach allen Seiten sichern, daß wir auf ihr vertrauensvoll aufbauen können ». 16. Voir G. Meersseman, « De Sententiënkommentaar (Cod. Brugen 491) van de Gentse Lektor Philip OP », dans : Studia Mediaevalia in honorem admodum reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin OP, Brügge 1948, pp. 383-405 (un résumé en français est donné pp. 406 sq.).

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temps, que le Père Dondaine17 et vous même ne voulaient rien savoir de mon attribution. […] Nos interprétations divergent fondamentalement. Or, j’aurais depuis longtemps présenté ma thèse de manière très, très détaillée, si je n’avais pas perdu mes matériaux de recherche à Breslau18. […] Je pense à présent qu’il est peut-être d’abord plus sensé d’essayer d’éclaircir ma thèse face à vous et au Père Dondaine. Cela n’a aucun sens d’imprimer tant de papier s’il s’avère par la suite que la thèse n’est toutefois pas soutenable. En ce qui me concerne, la situation est telle que je ne soumets pas seulement une thèse à la discussion, mais que je suis éventuellement responsable d’intégrer le[dit] commentaire sur les Sentences parmi les œuvres d’Eckhart ! »19. Sa thèse ne parvenant

17. Le Père dominicain Antoine Dondaine († 1987), qui effectua la description détaillée du ms. Bruges 491 (voir ci-dessus nt. 1), collabora à l’édition critique des Magistri Eckardi Opera latina entreprise sous les auspices de l’Institut historique de Sainte-Sabine à Rome, laquelle faisait donc concurrence à celle des Lateinische Werke dirigée par Koch en Allemagne (voir ci-dessus nt. 5). Pour diverses raisons (la plupart n’étant malheureusement pas d’ordre scientifique), seul trois fascicules de cette édition dominicaine parurent entre 1934 et 1936, dont le dernier était consacré aux Quaestiones Parisienses, éditées par le Père Dondaine (= Fasciculus XIII, Leipzig 1936). Après avoir signalé, dans sa « Préface » plusieurs parallèles repérés dans le Commentaire de Bruges, il exprimait déjà son scepticisme quant à l’authenticité eckhartienne de cette œuvre : « […] nescio an potius ad ipsum Commentarium Sententiarum eum spectavisse censeamus, quod opus Eckardi non repertum est » (ibid. p. X). 18. Dans une lettre datant du 13 avril 1948 adressée à un collègue polonais, Koch relate qu’avant de quitter Breslau lorsque les russes s’en approchèrent en janvier 1945, il a mis en sécurité deux caisses remplies de ses papiers de recherche les plus importants dans le couvent des sœurs de Sainte-Élisabeth, afin qu’ils survivent au siège de la ville. Parmi ces matériaux se trouvaient entre autres une transcription et les photocopies du commentaire sur les Sentences d’Eckhart, ainsi qu’un travail sur son authenticité (« Brief von J. Koch an Dr. Grzadziel, Wrocław, 13. April 1948 », Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature : TIMEA-GGAII-BW-1948-04-13]). C’est seulement durant l’été 1949 qu’il put enfin les récupérer – non sans difficultés – et donc se remettre au travail, ce dont il fit part aussitôt à Meersseman : « Erfreulicherweise habe ich mein manuskript, das über die Autorfrage in extenso handelt[,] zurückbekommen. Darum kann ich jetzt wieder an die Arbeit gehen, natürlich in erster Linie unter Berücksichtigung Ihrer scharfsinnigen Kritik. Es würde mich freuen, wenn wir schließlich doch einig werden » (Brief von J. Koch an G. Meersseman, Breslau, 19. August 1949, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1949-08-19]). 19. Brief von J. Koch an G. Meersseman, Breslau, 29. Januar 1949, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1949-01-29) : « Ich hatte schon längere Zeit davon gehört, daß P. Dondaine und Sie von meiner Zuteilung nichts wissen wollen. […] Wir gehen im wesentlichen in der Interpretation auseinander. Nun hätte ich längst meine These sehr, sehr ausführlich dargelegt, wenn ich nicht mein Material in Breslau verloren hätte. […] Ich meine nun, daß es vielleicht zunächst sinnvoller ist, wenn ich versuche, Ihnen und P. Dondaine meine These klarzumachen. Es hat keinen Sinn, viel Papier zu bedrucken, wenn sich nachher herausstellt, daß die These doch nicht haltbar ist. Für mich ist die Lage ja die, daß ich nicht nu reine These zur Diskussion stelle, sondern daß ich eventuell dafür verantwortlich bin, den SK unter die Werke Eckharts aufzunehmen! »

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jamais à faire l’unanimité, y compris chez ses coéditeurs des Lateinische Werke20, Koch s’abstint donc finalement d’en publier de plus amples justifications. Quant au commentaire, il n’a depuis – malgré l’intérêt répété qu’il continue de susciter (indépendamment de la question de son attribution) – toujours pas été édité dans son intégralité21, Koch laissant dans ses papiers un ouvrage inachevé à la postérité22. Pourtant, en s’efforçant de faire progressivement la lumière sur la « sensationnelle découverte » de Decker, Koch – bien aidé par l’expertise et la perspicacité de Decker23 – y gagna des arguments donnant davantage de crédit à sa thèse. Certes Decker a premièrement soutenu, « sur la base de critères paléographiques, stylistiques et liés au contenu, […] que le commentaire transmis par le manuscrit de Bruges s’est servi de la Lectura Thomasina et non l’inverse »24, de sorte que la datation de cette source posait, au regard de celle alors présumée du cours d’Eckhart sur les Sentences, des difficultés chronologiques notables, mais pas insurmontables, à la thèse de Koch25. Or, prié par ce dernier de reconsidérer la dépendance constatée, et après avoir donc examiné à nouveaux frais les deux textes, Decker révisa sa position, préférant désormais revenir à « l’hypothèse » – au départ rejetée – « d’une source commune », étant donné que « cet inconnu X reste probablement l’unique possibilité d’une solution ». Il précisa cependant que « peut-être la formulation “source 20. Voir J. Koch, Kleine Schriften, vol. I, p. 245. 21. Dans les Lateinische Werke ne furent intégrés finalement, et ce récemment, que quelques fragments des trois questions en marge desquelles figure le nom d’Eckhart (comme « témoignage de sa tâche d’enseignement à Paris ») ; voir Magistri Echardi Fragmenta Parisiensia, éd. L. Sturlese, dans : Die lateinischen Werke [LW] I/2, Stuttgart 2015, pp. 483-487). 22. Voir sur ce point A. Speer – W. Goris, « Das Meister-Eckhart-Archiv », p. 152. 23. Koch en vint lui-même à avouer directement à Decker que ce dernier le devançait sur beaucoup de points concernant l’appréciation du Commentaire de Bruges, si bien qu’il le convia à écrire avec lui, ensemble, l’étude destinée à paraître dans les Untersuchungen (Brief von J. Koch an B. Decker, Köln-Lindenthal, 14. Juli 1956, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1956-07-14] : « Sie [sind] mir bez. der Beurteilung des SKs in Br. in vielem voraus, und ich lade Sie ein, die “Untersuchung” mit mir zusammen zu schreiben. Überlegen Sie sich das schon einmal! »). 24. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, p. 62 : « Auf Grund paläographischer, stilistischer und inhaltlicher Kriterien dürfen wir also […] von der Voraussetzung ausgehen, daß der in der Brügger Hs. überlieferte Kommentar die Lectura Thomasina benutzt hat und nicht umgekehrt ». 25. Voir B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, pp. 52, 62 et 71. Peu après la découverte de Decker, Koch soulignait déjà cette difficulté chronologique soulevée par une dépendance du Commentaire de Bruges à l’égard de la Lectura Thomasina : « damit wird die Zeitspanne für Eckharts Autorschaft ziemlich knapp » (Brief von J. Koch an Erich Seeberg, Breslau, 16. Dezember 1943, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGAI-BW-1943-12-16).

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commune” est fausse et l’inconnu X ne servit pas ex aequo de modèle à Godin et Bruges 491 », ce qui le conduisit à postuler que « Bruges 491 n’était rien d’autre qu’une copie diversement bonne du vrai commentaire d’Eckhart sur les Sentences, qui a pour sa part influencé jusqu’au mot la Lectura Thomasina en beaucoup de parties »26. Selon Decker, « la solution la plus simple » pour expliquer cette non-dépendance d’un commentaire par rapport à l’autre malgré leurs multiples concordances « est bel et bien que l’étudiant en théologie Godinus entendit en 1293/94 à Paris le bachelier en théologie Eckhart et qu’il est lui-même le reportateur de chaque passage qui figure également en Bruges 491. La source commune X serait ainsi le cours d’Eckhart sur les Sentences entendu collectivement »27. Ce raisonnement, somme toute séduisant, répercutait l’importante découverte, faite entre temps par Thomas Kaeppeli, de la reportation d’un sermon latin donné à Paris le jour de Pâques par « frère Eckhart, lecteur des Sentences »28. En effet, comme l’expliqua Koch (auquel Kaeppeli donna la primeur de sa découverte afin d’en solliciter l’« éminent avis » sur l’authenticité de cette attribution29) : « Grâce à l’analyse 26. Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Ingelheim (Rhein), 12. Juli 1956, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1956-07-12) : « Heute möchte ich auf Ihre Frage in Ihrem Brief vom 2. Juli zurückkommen. […] Ist es nicht möglich, daß umgekehrt Godin von Brügge (Eckhart) abhängig ist? […] In meiner Arbeit habe ich nach dem Grundsatz ‘principia sine ratione sufficienti non sunt plurificanda’ die Hypothese einer gemeinsame Quelle, die Godin und Brügge ziemlich wörtlich ausgeschrieben hätte, abgelehnt. Aber vielleicht ist die Formulierung ‚gemeinsame Quelle’ falsch, und die Unbekannte X war nicht ex aequo Vorlage für Godin und Brügge 491. Vielmehr war es so, daß Brügge 491 nichts anderes als die unterschiedlich gute Kopie des wirklichen Sentenzenkommentars Eckharts war, der seinerseits die Lectura Thomasina in vielen Partien bis aufs Wort beeinflusst hat ». 27. Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Ingelheim (Rhein), 24. Juli 1956, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1956-07-24) : « Bei näherem Zusehen komme ich doch zu der Überzeugung, daß erstens Brügge 491 (also diese konkrete (Kopie der) Reinschrift einer Nachschrift) nicht von der Lectura Thomasina abhängig ist, daß aber zweitens die Lectura Thomasina auch nicht aus Brügge 491 abgeschrieben ist. Die einfachste Lösung ist wohl die, daß der stud. theol. Godinus 1293/94 beim bacc. theol. Eckhart in Paris hörte und er selbst der Reportator jener Stücke ist, die auch in Brügge 491 vorkommen. Die gemeinsame Quelle X wäre also die gemeinsame gehörte Sentenzenvorlesung Eckharts ». 28. Voir T. Kaeppeli, « Praedicator monoculus. Sermons parisiens de la fin du XIIIème siècle », dans : Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 27 (1957), pp. 120-67, pp. 159 sq. 29. Brief von T. Kaeppeli an J. Koch, Rom, 27. Mai 1956, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1956-05-27) : « Setzen Sie sich in Ihren behäbigen Prälatenstuhl und hören Sie. Habe letzten Herbst bei einem Besuche in Kremsmünster in extremis eine Hs. angeschaut, die, wie bald sehen konnte, vom Katalog falsch attribuiert war. Da ich aber abreisen musste, konnte ich sie damals nicht näher prüfen. Sie schien mir

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pointue du Père Thomas Kaeppeli du recueil de sermons et collations académiques parisiens qu’il a découvert dans le ms. 83 de Kremsmünster, nous avons fait un pas décisif en avant. Il est parvenu à assigner sans ambiguïté ce recueil à l’année scolaire 1293/94. Dans ce recueil, le sermon pascal (18. Avril 1294) est attribué à “frater Eckhardus, lector sententiarum”. Avec la découverte de ce sermon […] et sa datation en 1294, [Kaeppeli] a fourni un nouveau fondement pour l’étude des débuts d’Eckhart »30. Cette donnée chronologique non négligeable autorise certes à affirmer que le cours d’Eckhart sur les Sentences « se situe avant les cours des célèbres dominicains parisiens au tournant du XIIIe siècle », notamment de Godin31, et, par suite, à légitimement présupposer qu’il pourrait avoir constitué une source pour ce dernier ; mais, en définitive, cela ne suffit pas à prouver qu’une reportation dudit cours soit la « source commune » permettant d’expliquer une telle parenté entre la Lectura Thomasina et le Commentaire de Bruges, ni que le second en soit uniquement une copie plus ou moins soignée32. aber interessant und so liess ich sie auf dipl. Wege nach Rom kommen und habe sie hier in S. Sabina. Sie enthält Pariser Univ. Predigten, meistens anonym, ein gewisser Prozentsatz hingegen ist bestimmten Autoren (etwa 10) zugeschrieben. Zwei an Eckhart und zwar als Sententiar: fr. Ekhardus lector Sententiarum. Sie wissen besser als ich, wie wichtig es nun sein wird, die Sammlung richtig zu datieren und so den ersten Pariser Aufenthalt Eckharts zu fixieren. An der Echtheit kann man, so viel ich sehe, kaum zweifeln. Möchte über die Sammlung im Archivum 1957 eine Beschreibung und Untersuchung bringen und brauche dafür Ihren erlauchten Rat ». 30. J. Koch, « Kritische Studien zum Leben Meister Eckharts », p. 9 : « Durch Kaeppelis scharfsinnige Untersuchung der von ihm in der Hs. 83 von Kremsmünster entdeckten Sammlung von Pariser akademischen Predigten und Collationen sind wir einen entscheidenden Schritt weitergekommen. Es gelang ihm, diese Sammlung eindeutig dem Schuljahr 1293/94 zuzuordnen. In ihr wird die Osterpredigt (18. April 1294) dem “frater Ekhardus, lector sententiarum” zugewiesen. Mit der Entdeckung dieser Predigt […] und ihrer Datierung auf 1294 hat er für die Erforschung der Frühzeit Eckhart seine neue Grundlage geschaffen ». 31. Ibid., p. 14 : « Man darf überhaupt die allgemeinere Bedeutung des von Kaeppeli festgelegten Datums für die Sentenzenvorlesung nicht übersehen: sie liegt vor den Vorlesungen der bekannten Dominikaner um die Wende des 13. Jahrhunderts, der Johannes Quidort, Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Jakob von Metz, Herveus Natalis und Durandus de S. Porciano ». 32. Finalement, selon Decker, nous serions seulement autorisés à dire qu’« il se trouve aussi bien dans la Lectura Thomasina que dans le Commentaire de Bruges des matériaux eckhartiens. L’auteur de la Lectura Thomasina est cependant […] Guillelmus Petri de Godino. L’auteur du Commentaire de Bruges peut donc tout aussi bien être un autre étudiant d’Eckhart, pas Eckhart lui-même. L’application de critères intertextuels – de parallèles, quant au contenu, avec les écrits authentiques d’Eckhart – ne permettra jamais de résoudre la question de l’auteur. Sinon […] on pourrait tout aussi bien à première vue tenir la Lectura Thomasina de Godin pour une œuvre de Thomas, puisque les considérations, expressions et textes de ce dernier constituent la majeure partie de l’ouvrage. En vérité, nous avons ici

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À cet égard, la datation du Commentaire de Bruges s’avère tout autant déterminante, afin d’établir si elle coïncide avec celle du cours d’Eckhart sur les Sentences. Pour ce faire, il convient de s’appuyer sur des faits établis33 : 1) Étant donné que les folios 85v et 86v, demeurant vierges, ont plus tard été utilisés pour y transcrire, à la mine plomb, le compte-rendu d’une élection priorale qui s’est tenue à Gand le 31 juillet 130934, il faut en déduire que le manuscrit a dû non seulement être rédigé, mais aussi relié avant cette date, ce qui nous fournit le terminus ante quem le plus extrême. 2) Étant donné que le Commentaire de Bruges et la Lectura Thomasina dépendent d’une « source commune », et sachant que Godin a d’abord lu les Sentences à Toulouse à partir de 1296, puis de nouveau à Paris à partir de 1299, si bien que la recherche fixe la rédaction de son commentaire sous forme d’ordinatio peu après, c.-à-d. en 130035, nous obtenons un nouveau terminus ad quem antérieur à cette date. 3) Étant donné que la Lectura Thomasina est pareillement dépendante du Commentaire sur les Sentences de Jean Quidort36, dont on ne trouve la moindre trace dans le Commentaire de Bruges37, et que la fixation par écrit du cours de Quidort advint au plus tard en 129638, il convient somme toute de fixer le terminus ante quem à cette date, même si un tel argument e silentio oblige à une certaine prudence. 4) Quant au terminus a quo, il se laisse déduire à partir de l’œuvre la plus récente à laquelle se réfère explicitement le Commentaire de Bruges, à savoir le Neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines39, dont la un matériel thomasien, mais pas Thomas lui-même. De même en Bruges 491: ici et là un matériel eckhartien, mais pas encore Eckhart lui-même ». (Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Ingelheim (Rhein), 13. Oktober 1957, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature : TIMEA-GGAII-BW-1957-10-13]). 33. Voir W. Goris – M. Pickavé, « Von der Erkenntnis der Engel », pp. 155 sq. 34. Voir P. Glorieux, « Une élection priorale à Gand en 1309 », dans : Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 7 (1937), pp. 246-267 ; G. Meersseman, « De Sententiënkommentaar (Cod. Brugen 491) », p. 402. 35. Voir B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, pp. 24-29. 36. Voir ibid., pp. 37-44. 37. Voir B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, p. 56. 38. Voir J.-P. Müller, « Introduction », dans : Johannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation, Livre I, éd. critique par J.-P. Müller, Rom 1961 (Studia Anselmiana 47), p. XXX. 39. Cf. Commentaire de Bruges, Lib. III, dist. 15, q. 1, ms. Bruges 491, f. 310rb37-38 : « Item, G in quodam Quolibet questione, ubi queritur utrum intelligere sit exercere aliquem actum negat species » = Godefridus de Fontibus, Quodlibet IX, q. 19, éd. J.

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date de rédaction communément admise n’excède pas 1293/9440. Par conséquent, on peut circonscrire avec une relative précision la datation du Commentaire de Bruges à un intervalle de trois années académiques s’étalant de 1293/94 à 1295/96. Il s’agit là d’un argument de poids, car c’est précisément la période durant laquelle Godin effectua son studium en théologie à l’Université de Paris41, où il était, en tant que provençal, rattaché à la chair des dominicains non-français, pour laquelle officiait donc, au moins durant la première année, Frère Eckhart en qualité de bachelier sententiaire42. Mais indépendamment d’une toujours plausible attribution de ce commentaire à Eckhart, l’ensemble des éléments exposés jusqu’à présent nous permettent déjà d’apporter une première réponse à l’interrogation formulée dans le titre de cette contribution. En effet, puisque le cours sur les Sentences reporté dans le ms. Bruges 491 ne peut aucunement avoir été influencé par celui de Godin, il n’y a pas lieu de le considérer, du point de vue référentiel, comme une Lectura Thomasina, c.-à-d. comme une filiation ou, pour ainsi dire, un ‘sous-produit’ de celle-ci. À l’inverse, par le renversement du jeu des influences, ne faut-il pas plutôt se demander si la lecture consignée dans cette reportation n’avait pas valeur, comme l’assura tout récemment Hödl, d’ « apparat d’une Lectura Thomasina » avant la lettre – et, du coup, « d’enseignement Hoffmans, dans : Le Quodlibet huit, neuf et dix de Godefroid de Fontaines (texte inédit), Louvain 1931 (Les Philosophes Belges IV), pp. 270-281. Le Commentaire de Bruges s’appuie ici sur une version abrégée de cette question copiée avec nombre d’autres sous le titre « Quodlibet Godefridi » au sein du même manuscrit (cf. ms. Bruges 491, f. 244ra7-rb14 [question incomplète] : « Queritur vtrum intelligere sit exercere aliquem actum vel recipere speciem »). 40. Voir J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington (DC) 1981, p. XXV ; W. Goris – M. Pickavé, « Von der Erkenntnis der Engel », p. 156, nt. 117. 41. Voir B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, pp. 24-26. Certes, le frère Godin était censé être envoyé en tant qu’étudiant à Paris dès 1292 (suivant la décision du chapitre annuel de la province de Provence tenu le 15 août à Brive), mais il dut très vraisemblablement attendre l’année d’après que lui soit d’abord trouvé un successeur au poste de sous-lecteur à Montpellier (cf. A. de Guimarães, « Hervé Noel. Étude biographique », dans : Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 8 [1938], pp. 5-81, p. 27 et nt. 10). 42. Cf. Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Ingelheim (Rhein), 24. Juli 1956 : « Die Jahreszahl 1293/94 wird auch durch die Forschungen von Guimaraes bestätigt, wonach die nichtfranzösischen Dominikaner im Schuljahr mit ungerader Jahreszahl, die französischen Ordensbrüder aber im Schuljahr mit gerader Jahreszahl die Sentenzen in Paris lasen [cf. Guimarães, « Hervé Noel », p. 29, nt. 16]. Da Godinus als Provençale nicht Franzose im engeren Sinne war, war er als Student, Bakkalar, Magister dem Lehrstuhl der Nichtfranzosen zugeordnet. Da er sein Pariser theologisches Studium 1293 begann, war also Eckhart der für ihn zuständige Bakkalar ».

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phare » et « de travail préparatoire » pour le commentaire de Godin43, éveillant donc chez lui un ‘copieux’ intérêt ? Déjà Decker avait « l’impression qu’il s’agit à vrai dire d’une Lectura Thomasina ; car pour l’essentiel, il expose Thomas, qu’il défend en de nombreux passages contre Gilles », si bien qu’« on est tenté d’émettre la théorie d’une double source. Thomas serait la source positive, Gilles la “négative” »44. Decker ira même jusqu’à affirmer qu’« ici tout demeure bien “sagement” thomiste », avouant alors peut-être forcer quelque peu le trait45. Quant à Koch, il estimait que, « malgré son appartenance à l’école thomiste, le commentaire n’en demeure pas moins – […] surtout pour ce qui est des livres II à IV – une contribution autonome majeure »46. Pour tenter de faire la part des choses, il importe d’une part de rappeler brièvement certaines similarités et différences entre ces deux œuvres dans leur ensemble, puis d’autre part de chercher à évaluer par nousmême le degré d’orthodoxie thomiste du Commentaire de Bruges moyennant un exemple probant, c.-à-d. au révélateur d’une quaestio choisie. 2. Comparaison de la ‘matière’ dans les deux commentaires Sur un plan général, le Commentaire de Bruges et la Lectura Thomasina se rattachent premièrement par leur genre littéraire, celui du commentaire sententiaire, un exercice scolaire qui fut d’ordinaire la première œuvre 43. L. Hödl, « Die Eckhartsentenzen », pp. 360, 363 et 272. 44. Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Altlandsberg, 26. Juli 1943 : « Bei der Lektüre […] hat man den Eindruck, er ist eigentlich eine Lectura Thomasina. Denn im Wesentlichen trägt er Thomas vor, den er an vielen Stellen gegen Ägidius verteidigt. […] Man ist somit versucht, eine Zweiquellentheorie aufzustellen. Thomas wäre die positive, Ägidius die “negative” Quelle ». 45. Brief von B. Decker an J. Koch, Altlandsberg, 8. September 1943, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv (signature : TIMEA-GGA-I-BW-1943-09-08) : « Hier ist alles ganz “brav” thomistisch. […] Vielleicht übertreibe ich etwas ». 46. J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », 22B : « Das ganze Werk ist in seiner Grundhaltung thomistisch. […] Trotz der Zugehörigkeit zur thomistischen Schule ist der Kommentar – ich denke vornehmlich an Sent. II-IV – eine bedeutende selbständige Leistung ». Cette constatation d’une obédience thomiste du Commentaire de Bruges incitait pour lors Koch à soutenir qu’il « résout ainsi une fois pour toute la question de l’école dont est issue Eckhart, à savoir celle de Thomas », considérant par conséquent « la tentative […] de mettre Eckhart en étroite relation avec Albert le Grand comme vouée à l’échec ». L’avancée des recherches sur le sujet lui donnant tort, Koch reformula son propos dans la version remaniée de son « Fundbericht », jugeant dorénavant « comme une tâche nécessaire de suivre les traces d’Albert dans l’œuvre d’Eckhart, les questions sur les Sentences ne devant bien sûr pas en être exclues » (id., Kleine Schriften, vol. I [nt. 7], p. 245).

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majeure d’un futur magister47. Or, à partir de la deuxième moitié du XIIIème siècle, « lire », c.-à-d. commenter cursorie les Sentences de Pierre Lombard ne fut plus seulement considéré par les bacheliers comme une étape obligée du cursus et, donc, de toute carrière universitaire, mais s’affirma aussi progressivement comme un moyen privilégié, y compris par les maîtres retravaillant leur commentaire, de prendre part et position concernant les disputes théologiques et philosophiques actuelles48 – en se détachant a fortiori toujours plus du modèle lombardien, de sorte que « le procédé de la quaestio a ici phagocytée le travail d’exégèse de la lectura »49. Reflétant ce phénomène, le Commentaire de Bruges et la Lectura Thomasina s’inscrivent en outre dans le même contexte polémique, à savoir la querelle des Correctoires opposant thomistes et antithomistes50, tant et si bien que, malgré leur genre littéraire, ils viennent s’ajouter à la liste des écrits dominicains répliquant tantôt au

47. Voir P. Glorieux, « L’enseignement au moyen âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la faculté de théologie de Paris, au XIIIe siècle », dans : Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 35 (1968), pp. 111-118. 48. Voir R.L. Friedman, « The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination », dans : G.R. Evans (éd.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Current Research, vol. I, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2002, pp. 41-128, p. 42 : « In these years the Sentences commentary really came into its own as a preferred medium of scholastic theological (and philosophical) discourse, certainly rivaling, and often outshining, other vehicles of theological expression (e.g. Quodlibetal questions, Summae, Biblical commentaries) » ; cet aspect est développé dans la deuxième partie de l’article, pp. 84-100 (« The Changing Structure and Role of Sentences Commentaries, 1250-1320 »). 49. J.-P. Genet, « Scolastique », dans : C. Gauvard – A. de Libera – M. Zink (éds.), Dictionnaire du Moyen Âge, Paris 2002, pp. 1299-1311, p. 1307. 50. Voir entre autres F. Ehrle, « Der Kampf um die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fünfzig Jahren nach seinem Tod », dans : Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 37 (1913), 266-318 [réimprimé dans : id., Gesammelte Aufsätze zur englischen Scholastik, éd. F. Pelster, Rome 1970 (Storia e Letteratura, 50), 183-250] ; L. Hödl, « Geistesgeschichtliche und literarkritische Erhebungen zum Korrektorienstreit (12771287) », dans : Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 33 (1966), pp. 81-114 ; T. Schneider, Die Einheit des Menschen. Die anthropologische Formel „anima forma corporis“ im sogenannten Korrektorienstreit und bei Petrus Johannis Olivi. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne, Münster 1973 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Neue Folge 8), pp. 64-180 [« Der geschichtliche Ablauf des sogenannten Korrektorienstreites » ; P. Glorieux, « Pro et contra Thomam – Un survol de cinquante années », dans : T.W. Köhler (éd.), Sapientiae procerum amore. Mélanges Médévistes offerts à Dom Jean-Pierre Müller O.S.B. à l’occasion de son 70ème anniversaire (24 février 1974), Rome 1975 (Studia Anselmiana, 63), 255-287 ; M.D. Jordan, « The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits of the Metaphysics », dans : Speculum 57 (1982), pp. 292-314 ; D. Burr, « The Correctorium controversy and the Origins of the Usus Pauper Controversy », dans : Speculum 60 (1985), pp. 331-342.

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Correctorium Fratris Thomae rédigé par le Franciscain Guillaume de la Mare vers 1277/79, tantôt aux théologiens scolastiques qui, à la suite et à l’instar du réquisitoire de ce ‘Corrupteur’, s’attaquèrent également aux conceptions professées par l’Aquinate51. Contribuant ainsi, dans une commune intention, à la défense de la doctrine thomasienne, ces deux « lectures » sur les Sentences n’ont pourtant pas joui de la même notoriété. La raison tient, entre autres, à leur mode respectif de fixation. La Lectura Thomasina, telle qu’elle nous a été transmise dans son intégralité par la tradition manuscrite52, « donne l’impression d’une ordinatio soigneusement travaillée » par Godin en vue de sa publication53, à la suite de quoi elle marqua de toute son influence le développement de la première école thomiste54. Avec le Commentaire de Bruges, au contraire, nous avons seulement affaire à « un reportatum, c.-à-d. la copie au propre d’un cahier de notes de cours »55, lequel n’était manifestement pas destiné à une large diffusion, 51. Voir L. Hödl, « Die Eckhartsentenzen », p. 387 [« Zusammenfassung »] : « Beide Kommentarwerke sind nicht nur dem (Sentenzen-)Scriptum des Thomas verpflichtet, sondern wollten die Sentenzen des Thomas nach dessen gesamtem Schrifttum ausrichten und gegebenenfalls nach der vielseitigen Kritik im Korrektorienstreit und in der Auseinandersetzung mit Heinrich von Gent und Aegidius von Rom auch revidieren, wie es später 1309 das Generalkapitel des Predigerordens in Zaragoza beschlossen hat ». 52. Voir W. Goris – M. Pickavé, « Die ‘Lectura Thomasina’ des Guilelmus Petri de Godino », pp. 87-92. 53. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, p. 29 : « Die Lectura Thomasina macht aber den Eindruck einer sorgfältig gearbeiteten Ordinatio und nicht den einer Schülernachschrift ». 54. Voir W. Goris – M. Pickavé, « Die ‘Lectura Thomasina’ des Guilelmus Petri de Godino », pp. 85 sq. 55. J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », p. 22A : « […] sei nun ausdrücklich hinzugefügt, daß wir hier nur rein Reportatum, d. h. die Reinschrift eines Kollegheftes, vor uns haben, nicht die Ordinatio, d. h. die vom Verfasser gebilligte Textform, die der Veröffentlichung diente ». Afin de réfuter la thèse de Meersseman selon laquelle l’auteur du Commentaire de Bruges serait la personne qui en a copié de sa main les livres II à IV dans le manuscrit (voir ci-dessous nt. 56), Koch présenta à son collègue dans la lettre susmentionnée (voir ci-dessus nt. 19) une liste exhaustive d’« erreurs typiques d’un reportateur » : « Sie stellen zum Schluß Ihres Aufsatzes eine Anzahl von Thesen zusammen, für die Sie mehr oder weniger Gewißheit annehmen. Ich möchte aus allen die Frage herausgreifen, ob der SK des Autors X eigenes Werk in Reinschrift ist oder rob es die Reinschrift eines Reportatums ist. Wenn ein Autor sein eigenes Werk ins Reine schreibt, dürfen wir annehmen, daß er das, was er schreibt, versteht und darum nur selten einmal ein sinnstörender Fehler unterläuft. […] Nun finden sich in Sent. II-IV soviele sinnstörende Fehler, daß ich nur annehmen kann, hier liegt die Reinschrift eines Reportatums vor. Ich setze Ihnen folgende Liste hier her. […] Entschuldigen Sie diese schier endlose Liste. Glauben Sie wirklich, daß einem Autor bei seiner Reinschrift all das passiert? Ich nicht. Das sind alles typisch Reportatenfehler ». L’ampleur de cette liste conduisit ainsi Meersseman à remettre en cause sa

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puisqu’on n’a jusqu’ici retrouvé aucun autre exemplaire de cette reportation. C’est pourquoi il est somme toute difficile d’établir dans quelle mesure la version dont nous disposons restitue avec fidélité le cours recueilli, ou bien si elle fit a posteriori l’objet d’un quelconque remaniement rédactionnel. Toujours est-il que, malgré son caractère abrégé, le texte copié à la fin du ms. Bruges 491 fait preuve, à la différence de la Lectura Thomasina, d’un effort de précision dans l’indication des sources contemporaines utilisées (surtout pour les livres II à IV), dont le codex brugeois transmet directement une partie parmi la littérature préalablement compilée, constituant ce qu’on pourrait appeler le dossier privé d’un thomiste avisé56. Restreignons à présent notre champ d’investigation à une seule question, tirée de la douzième distinction du second livre et portant sur le statut de la matière dans les corps supérieurs et inférieurs (Vtrum vna sit materia omnium corporum superiorum et inferiorum)57. Le choix de cette quaestio se justifie pour plusieurs raisons : 1) parce que cette question nous fournit une équitable proportion entre correspondances58 et divergences, sans quoi – c.-à-d. dans le cas d’un trop grand ou bien trop faible recoupement – l’exemple ne saurait être probant ; 2) parce que cette question donne l’occasion aux deux commentaires de répondre tout spécialement au même adversaire, Gilles de Rome

thèse : « Was mir am meisten unsicher machte, waren die spatia vacantia. Diese und einige schlimme Verschreibungen sind wohl die stärksten Argumente gegen den Autographcharakter unserer Hs. ». (Brief von G. Meersseman an J. Koch, Rom, 8. Oktober 1949, Meister-Eckhart-Archiv [signature : TIMEA-GGA-II-BW-1949-10-08]). 56. G. Meersseman, « De Sententiënkommentaar (Cod. Brugen 491) », p. 384 : « het dossier van een up-to-date thomist ». Selon Meersseman, « l’auteur du dossier thomiste n’est pas un copiste quelconque, mais un professeur qui rassemblait les éléments nécessaires à la préparation de ses cours, pour les mettre en valeur dans son commentaire sur les Sentences » (ibid., p. 406). Ce codex serait par conséquent « un manuel destiné à l’usage privé du compilateur » (ibid., p. 395) – un avis partagé par Koch : « Die Hs. Brügge 491 ist die persönliche Sammlung eines Theologen, dessen charakteristiche Schrift uns von der ersten bis zur letzten Seite begegnet, wenngleich außer ihm noch andere Schreiber beteiligt sind ». (Kleine Schriften, vol. I, p. 240). Pour plus de détails sur les « mains » à l’ouvrage dans le ms. Bruges 491, voir G. Meersseman (op. cit.), pp. 387 sq. (3 mains identifiées) et P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes, II: Le Correctorium Corruptorii « Sciendum », Paris 1956 (Bibliothèque thomiste, 31), p. 26 (5 mains identifiées). 57. Tous les renvois suivants à ladite question dans le Commentaire de Bruges et la Lectura Thomasina se rapportent à l’édition qui en est respectivement proposée en « Appendix A » et « Appendix B » de la présente contribution. 58. Voir L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P., pp. 83-85.

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et sa doctrine sur l’unité de la matière première59. En effet, s’opposant de manière polémique à la conception thomasienne d’une diversité de la matière entre les corps célestes et les corps sublunaires60, l’ermite de Saint Augustin, pourtant disciple du Maître d’Aquin, s’attira les vives critiques de théologiens dominicains, y compris donc de la part de Godin et de l’auteur anonyme du Commentaire de Bruges, tous deux directement en prises avec cette dissidence doctrinale et pareillement soucieux de la rectifier61; 3) parce que cette question, la première des trois mentionnant nommément Eckhart en marge du Commentaire de Bruges, était considérée par Koch comme celle posant le plus de difficultés, si bien qu’elle fut complètement laissée de côté dans son « Fundbericht »62 ; 4) parce que cette question est aussi la seule dont j’ai pu, à ce jour, retrouver une autre transmission, dans un codex provenant de la Bibliothèque de l’abbaye de Clairvaux, mais ayant appartenu auparavant à un dominicain du couvent d’Orléans. Ce manuscrit en parchemin de 70 feuillets à deux colonnes, datant de la fin du XIIIe siècle et désormais 59. Voir P. Duhem, Le système du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, t. IV : Le reflux de l’aristotélisme – Les condamnations de 1277, Paris 1954, pp. 311321 ; S. Donati, « La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla fine del tredicesimo secolo », dans : Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 12 (1986), pp. 229-280 ; S. Donati – C. Trifogli, « Natural Philosophy », dans : C. Briggs – P. Eardley, A Companion to Giles of Rome, Leiden– Boston 2016 (Brill’s Companion to the Christiam Tradition, 71), pp. 73-113, pp. 84-90. 60. Voir S. Donati, « Ägidius von Roms Kritik an Thomas von Aquins Lehre der hylemorphen Zusammensetzung der Himmelskörper », dans : A. Zimmermann (ed.), Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen, Berlin–New York 1988 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 19), pp. 377-396. Pour un aperçu historique et doxographique du développement de cette discussion scolastique, voir N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie des Franciscus de Marchia. Texte, Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts, Leiden–New York–Kopenhangen–Köln 1991 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 28), pp. 81-183. 61. En s’appyant sur Edgar Hocedez ( « Gilles de Rome et Saint Thomas », dans : Mélanges Mandonnet, t. I, Paris 1930 [Bibliothèque thomiste 13], pp. 385-409, p. 385), il convient à ce sujet de rappeler ici la manière dont le Père Pierre Mandonnet caractérise la position doctrinale de Gilles : « Gilles est disciple de saint Thomas et l’on doit, sans forcer la note, le ranger parmi les thomistes, non pas en ce sens qu’il faille passer par lui pour aller au fond de la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin, mais dans ce sens qu’il a adopté toutes les grandes thèses du docteur dominicain. […] Les dissonances doctrinales de Gilles d’avec Thomas parurent toutefois suffisantes pour que quelques frères prêcheurs tentèrent de le rectifier » (« La carrière scolaire de Gilles de Rome », dans : Revue de Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 4 [1910], pp. 480-499, pp. 497 et 499). 62. Voir J. Koch, « Ein neuer Eckhart-Fund », p. 21B : « Da die Dinge bei der ersten Frage (In II Sent., d. 12 q. 1: Utrum una sit materia omnium corporum superiorum et inferiorum) am verwickeltsten liegen, lasse ich sie hier ganz beiseite ».

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conservé à la Bibliothèque municipale de Troyes sous la côte ‘Ms 145’, contient le second livre du Commentaire sur les Sentences de Pierre de la Tarantaise63. Le texte a été copié par un certain « Frère P. » ayant également inséré plusieurs extraits ou résumés de divers textes de Thomas d’Aquin (In II Sent. et Sum. theol.) ; à la suite de quoi, quelques années plus tard, une seconde main anonyme l’enrichit à son tour d’une série de 17 questions d’auteurs différents, dont Odon Lottin en publia l’incipit dans son étude « À propos du Commentaire des Sentences de Pierre de Tarantaise »64. Sept d’entre elles (3, 7, 8, 9, 14-16) doivent être attribuées à Godefroid de Fontaines, dont trois le sont explicitement65. Pour le reste, Lottin estimait qu’il s’agissait de « résumés de la pensée de Godefroid transcrits ou composés par B », bien qu’étant convaincu de se trouver là « en terre dominicaine », puisque « les solutions s’inspirent de la tradition thomiste »66. Or, je fus à même d’en identifier deux autres qui confirment ces dires : l’une (question 11) incombant à Jean Quidort67, l’autre (question 1) reprenant un fragment de celle du Commentaire de Bruges que nous avons choisi d’examiner – et qui, dans le codex troyen, a été copiée juste en dessous de la question correspondante du commentaire de Pierre (Vtrum vna sit materia omnium corporalium)68. Qui plus est, il importe de souligner que ledit fragment ne transmet que la partie exposant puis réfutant deux thèses propres à Gilles de Rome (qualifiées ici d’opiniones solemnes), ce qui inclut la

63. Voir La bibliothèque de l’Abbaye de Clairvaux du XIIe au XVIIIe siècle, II : Les manuscrits conservés, Première partie: Manuscrits bibliques et théologiques, notices établies par J.-P. Bouhot – J.-F. Genest sous la direction d’A. Vernet, Paris-Turnhout 1997 (Documents, études et répertoires publiés par l’Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes), pp. 606 sq. La reproduction numérique en couleur de ce manuscrit (= Tr) est accessible en ligne sur le site des Médiathèques de Troyes Champagne Métropole, URL : https://portail.mediatheque. grand-troyes.fr/iguana/www.main.cls?surl=search&p=*#recordId=2.1839&srchDb=2. 64. O. Lottin, « À propos du Commentaire des Sentences de Pierre de Tarantaise », dans : Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 13 (1946), pp. 86-98 [une version légèrement modifiée a été reprise dans : id., Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, t. VI : Problèmes d’histoire littéraire de 1160 à 1300, Gembloux 1960, pp. 336-352]. 65. Voir ibid., pp. 97 sq. 66. Ibid., p. 98. 67. Tr, f. 70rb = Johannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation, Livre II, q. 14. d. 3, q. 3, éd. J.-P. Müller, Rome 1964 (Studia Anselmiana, 52), pp. 60,4-65,126. 68. Cf. Tr, f. 20r in marg. inf. Précisons en outre qu’on ne constate aucun rapprochement avec le traitement de cette question par Pierre de la tarantaise.

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réponse attribuée à Eckhart dans le codex brugeois69, nous laissant penser que sa prise de position sur le sujet n’était point dénuée d’intérêt70. Pour dès lors évaluer son apport à la discussion, sa teneur thomiste et, par suite, la nature de sa résonnance chez Godin, abordons maintenant le contenu même de cette question. Après avoir présenté deux arguments pro et un contra (déjà avancés par Thomas71), notre commentateur livre une première réponse négative assez brève à la question posée, afin simplement de fixer la problématique générale qui sous-tend la suite du développement: « Il faut dire que, si la matière est comprise au sens propre, dans la mesure où elle signifie la puissance à l’acte d’être, par le mouvement et le changement, et à la corruption, elle n’est ainsi d’aucune manière la même »72 – sous-entendu, car ces derniers sont par nature incorruptibles. Il précise en outre qu’il ne convient cependant pas de nier l’existence d’une matière véritable dans le ciel (allusion faite à la théorie d’Averroès73), car il s’y trouve du mouvement et de la quantité74. Comme il se doit, notre commentateur fait ensuite état d’opinions contraires à la sienne, à commencer par celle d’Avicenne, voire d’Avicébron75, tous deux argumentant à partir de la

69. Une juxtaposition des deux versions (Br et Tr) est donnée dans l’Appendix A, ll. 43-144. 70. Quant à savoir si ce fragment – ornementé d’un grotesque dessiné à la plume et représentant un dragon – a été copié à partir du texte transmis par le ms. Bruges 491, il est difficile de l’affirmer, même si ce dernier s’avère meilleur et légèrement plus complet. On notera tout particulièrement qu’un argument supprimé par les signes « va–cat » dans le ms. Bruges 491 ne figure plus dans le fragment retrouvé. Cf. Appendix A, l. 132. Il convient en outre de signaler que le résumé de la question 8 du Cinquième Quodlibet de Godefroid ajouté à la fin du codex troyen (cf. Tr, f. 70vb : Vtrum intellectus agens sit pars imaginis que dicitur memoria) correspond à celle qu’on retrouve parmi la série de quodlibets du même auteur copiés dans le codex brugeois (cf. Br, f. 256ra24-rb15), lequel transmet « un texte abrégé différent de celui que contiennent d’autres copies des quodlibets abrégés de Godefroid » (J. Hoffmans – A. Pelzer, Études sur les manuscrits des Quodlibets, Louvain 1937 [Les Philosophes Belges. Textes et études 15], p. 298). 71. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 1-9 et les sources indiquées dans le second apparat. 72. Ibid., ll. 10-12. 73. Voir N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie des Franciscus de Marchia, pp. 121-179. 74. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 12-13. 75. Le nom d’Avicébron a en effet été ajouté dans la marge, sans que celui d’Avicenne ne soit rayé ou bien exponctué dans le texte (cf. Appendix A, l. 14). Ceci se laisse vraisemblablement expliquer par le fait que Thomas d’Aquin fait tantôt référence au premier dans son Commentaire sur les Sentences (cf. II, d. 12, q. 1, art. 1, corp.), tantôt au second dans la Somme de théologie (Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp.).

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raison de corporéité comme seule forme commune à tous les corps, si bien qu’elle conduirait à admettre l’existence d’une matière unique76. Or, notre commentateur répond que si cet argument est valable d’un point de vue logique, il n’en demeure pas moins faux du point de vue physique, « étant donné que rien de ce qu’on peut recevoir communément n’est corruptible et incorruptible de manière univoque » (puisant chez Thomas cet enseignement d’Aristote tiré du livre X de la Métaphysique)77. « Du reste », ajoute-t-il, « s’il n’existait qu’une seule et même matière, le ciel serait dès lors corruptible »78. Cette objection enjoint subséquemment notre commentateur à se confronter aux arguments de ceux qui tentent de la solutionner sans affecter le principe d’unicité de la matière première. Certains soutiennent en effet que l’incorruptibilité du ciel résulterait non pas d’une diversité de la matière première, mais du fait que sa forme ne connaît aucun contraire, puisque la corruption des corps inférieurs, dont la matière est en puissance à plusieurs formes, se voit ainsi causée par la contrariété de leurs mouvements, tandis que rien n’est contraire au mouvement circulaire du ciel, dont la matière est par nature pourvue de ce qui lui permet de poursuivre et mener à bien son inclination naturelle. D’autres allèguent quant à eux que l’incorruptibilité du ciel ne résulterait pas de sa nature, mais de la grâce divine, c.-à-d. de la capacité de Dieu à préserver le ciel de la caducité de la matière. Aux premiers, notre commentateur rétorque, d’une part, qu’il s’agit là d’un raisonnement a posteriori puis, d’autre part, qu’« aucune forme essentielle n’a directement de contraire » ; aux seconds, il répond qu’une telle préservation ou bien adviendrait par quelque chose dont le ciel serait pourvu par nature, et donc par une cause naturelle, ou bien, si ce n’est pas le cas, elle adviendrait avec violence, si bien que, conformément à l’axiome aristotélicien « nullum violentum est perpetuum », le mouvement du ciel ne serait pas continu et, par conséquent, sa matière ne saurait être incorruptible79. Une fois ces deux arguments rejetés, la parole est alors donnée à « une autre opinion » – plus actuelle – de la partie adverse, à savoir celle défendue par Gilles de Rome80, lequel « suit, en cette question de la

76. Voir N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie des Franciscus de Marchia, pp. 111-121. 77. Appendix A, ll. 16-19 et les sources indiquées dans le second apparat. 78. Ibid., l. 19. 79. Cf. ibid., ll. 20-42. 80. Cf. ibid., ll. 43-44.

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matière première, une voie qu’il a frayée et qui l’écarte de son maître Thomas d’Aquin »81, d’où l’attention particulière que lui accorde notre commentateur dominicain, entraîné par un esprit de dispute. « Sa théorie nouvelle », qu’il a exposée « avec une entière clarté » dans ses Questions sur la matière du ciel, « est assurément l’une de celles qui lui sont les plus chères; c’est aussi une de celles auxquelles [les théologiens scolastiques] attacheront de la manière la plus ferme le nom de Gilles de Rome »82, comme en atteste le Commentaire de Bruges, qui restitue ici l’argumentaire de Gilles propre à établir l’identité des deux matières : « Il est impossible que deux étants distincts se tiennent à égale distance de l’être premier ou bien du néant ; mais si je soustrais tout acte à l’une et l’autre matière, il ne reste en chacune qu’une pure potentialité. C’est pourquoi »83. S’appuyant sur un raisonnement formulé par Thomas, notre commentateur répond que « la matière se dit par rapport à l’acte » – c.-à-d. la forme – et se diversifie donc du fait même qu’elle est ordonnée – c.-à-d. en puissance – à divers actes, de sorte que l’ordo potentiarum siue materierum suit et correspond à l’ordo actuum84. Or, puisque ce dernier est déterminé par le degré d’éloignement de la forme actualisant la puissance de la matière par rapport à l’être premier et au néant, puis diffère ainsi dans les corps célestes et sublunaires, il faut admettre que cette différence de distance implique une différence de matière85. À celui qui en viendrait toutefois à contester la validité de ce principe sous prétexte qu’il se laisse appliquer également aux éléments conformément à la différence de noblesse de leur forme respective, ce qui aurait pour effet de poser une diversité dans la matière élémentaire86, notre commentateur apporte une double réponse : 1) que la matière du ciel est seulement en puissance à sa forme propre, tandis que la matière des corps inférieurs et existant sous la forme de tel élément n’en demeure pas moins en puissance à la forme d’un autre – « voilà pourquoi l’ordre de la matière correspondant à la forme du feu est identique à celui correspondant à la forme de la terre »87 ; 2) que la matière du ciel est seulement en puissance 81. P. Duhem, Le système du monde, p. 312. 82. Ibid. 83. Appendix A, ll. 45-50. 84. Ibid., ll. 51-54 et la source indiquée dans le second apparat. 85. Cf. ibid., ll. 54-57. 86. Cf. ibid., ll. 58-62. 87. Ibid., ll. 63-73.

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au lieu, c.-à-d. à un changement local, tandis que la matière des corps inférieurs est de surcroît en puissance à un changement de qualité, c.à-d. à l’altération, à la corruption et à l’augmentation – « c’est pourquoi ne se trouvent pas à égale distance ni de l’être premier ni du néant »88. Revenant par là même à la conception égidienne, notre commentateur lui objecte maintenant que, si la matière est partout la même et ne saurait être privée de son inclination naturelle vers la forme, alors « la matière de la terre sera en puissance à la forme du ciel et inversement »89 – autrement dit, les corps inférieurs et supérieurs seraient donc interchangeables entre eux ; ce à quoi Gilles répliqua que « cela est vrai pour autant qu’il en aille de la raison de la matière ; mais étant donné que la forme ne connaît pas de contraire, par conséquent »90. Cet aspect ayant déjà fait l’objet d’une solution91, notre commentateur enchaîne donc immédiatement avec une autre allégation, selon laquelle la matière du ciel aurait été différemment ordonnée à la forme par Dieu, tout comme il le fera pour les éléments lors de la transfiguration du monde après le jour du Jugement dernier92. Dans sa réponse, notre commentateur se refuse pour sa part à légitimer une explication « miraculeuse », c.-à-d. surnaturelle, à propos d’une question qui touche à l’ordre de la nature. En outre, si l’on s’en tient à cette explication, sachant qu’être ordonné à une forme relève de la puissance de la matière, c.-à-d. de son essence même, celle-ci connaîtra par conséquent un changement, si bien qu’il en résultera une matière différente93. On en arrive enfin au passage où figure en marge du texte le nom d’Eckhart (« eccar̕ »)94, proposant une autre manière de répondre à la conception égidienne de l’incorruptibilité du ciel95. Cette réponse, venant s’ajouter à celle foncièrement thomiste précédemment donnée,

88. Ibid., ll. 74-79. 89. Ibid., ll. 80-88. 90. Ibid., ll. 88-91. 91. Cf. ibid., ll. 91-92. 92. Cf. ibid., ll. 93-95. 93. Cf. ibid., ll. 96-104. 94. Étant donné que les autres sources scolastiques indiquées en marge du Commentaire de Bruges (Gilles de Rome, Henri de Gand, Pierre de la Tarantaise, Siger de Brabant) s’avèrent correctes, il n’y a pas lieu de douter de la véracité de celles faites à Eckhart. 95. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 105-106. Voir S. Donati, « La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti », p. 262, nt. 88.

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maintient certes qu’une matière unique, nonobstant la noblesse de la forme, entraînerait nécessairement de la corruption, mais prend toutefois soin d’ajouter que « cela est vrai seulement si cette forme [la forme suprême (Tr)] ne contenait pas virtuellement les autres formes ou bien en elle la vertu des autres formes », car, dans ce cas, « jamais sa matière ne serait en puissance à une autre forme ». Or, le sententiaire Eckhart était d’avis qu’« il en va ainsi de la forme du ciel, ce qui est évident, parce qu’elle meut vers chaque forme », c.-à-d. que le ciel concourt à la mise en mouvement des corps sublunaires. « Voilà pourquoi, du fait que la forme du ciel précontient (prehabet) les autres formes, advient le repos (quietatio) »96, c.-à-d. la cessation de tout appétit naturel de la matière qu’elle informe pour d’autres formes. L’exemple ici fourni – typique d’Eckhart – est celui de la béatitude, puisqu’elle consiste dans la vision de Dieu seul, en qui se trouvent les perfections de toutes choses, de sorte que la quête de béatitude conduit au repos en Dieu97. Citant ensuite une fable antique rapportée au livre III de la Métaphysique, Eckhart explique que ceux qui goûtèrent cette manne et ce nectar les rendant incorruptibles ne sauraient alors se mettre en quête d’une autre perfection particulière98, laquelle serait forcément moindre et les éloignerait par conséquent de l’être premier. Cette autre manière de répondre diverge donc sur ce point de l’enseignement thomasien, suivant lequel la matière actuée par une forme reste toujours en puissance aux autres formes, y compris si cette forme « est plus parfaite et contient en elle-même virtuellement les autres formes, parce que la puissance a en tant que telle un comportement indifférent à l’égard du parfait et de l’imparfait »99. Outre cette divergence doctrinale somme toute inhabituelle chez un bachelier dominicain, il importe aussi de souligner que Gilles de Rome lui-même, conscient de la difficulté à sauvegarder l’incorruptibilité du ciel si l’on admet que sa matière est identique à celle des corps inférieurs et donc naturellement

96. Appendix A, ll. 106-119. 97. Cf. ibid., ll. 120-123. 98. Cf. ibid., ll. 123-129. 99. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp. : « Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum ».

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en puissance à toutes formes corruptibles100, recourait déjà à pareille notion de contenance virtuelle pour solutionner le problème dans ses premières œuvres – à savoir dans la question correspondante des Questiones metaphysicales (VIII, q. 3, dont le ms. Bruges 491 transmet la version originale) et de sa Lectura super libros Sententiarum (d’après la reportation qui en a été faite)101. Étant donné que l’utilisation de ces deux œuvres égidiennes dans l’ensemble du Commentaire de Bruges atteste d’un recours direct aux textes et, par suite, d’une connaissance précise de leur contenu, il est inconcevable que notre commentateur ait pu ignorer que Gilles y prônait ladite solution. Or, bien que généralement prompt à nommer ce dernier (à plus de vingt reprises) lorsqu’il y fait référence (notamment trois fois explicitement à sa Lectura102), notre commentateur se garde ici de lui reconnaître cette autre réponse possible, car il la rattache à une autre source, à savoir celle indiquée en marge du codex brugeois, c.-à-d. Eckhart. En effet, tandis que Gilles en vint plus tard à abandonner cette solution après avoir reconsidére les arguments de Thomas la réfutant103, Frère Eckhart en fit malgré tout son parti… sans que l’on puisse constater a posteriori chez lui un réel changement d’avis (aussi bien dans son œuvre latine que dans sa prédication en langue vernaculaire)104, ce qui ne l’empêcha pourtant pas de soutenir, comme Thomas, que « le ciel et la terre n’ont pas de matière commune et, par conséquent, ne peuvent être réunis sous un seul genre, si ce n’est sous le même genre logique »105. 100. Cf. Aegidius Romanus, Questiones metaphysicales, VIII, q. 3 (Br, f. 116ra20-22) : « Et quia nos secundum Philosophum ponimus simpliciter corpora celestia incorruptibilia de se, ideo difficilis est ista questio, scilicet vtrum sit eadem materia in superioribus et in inferioribus » ; id., Reportatio Lecturae super libros I-IV Sententiarum, II, q. 45 (dist. 12) (ed. C. Luna, dans : Aegidii Romani opera omnia, III/2, Firenze 2003 [Testi e studi per il Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, 17], p. 285,57-59) : « Propter hoc dicendum quod eadem materia corporalium omnium. Sed tunc est difficile salvare qualiter superiora sunt incorruptibilia et inferiora sunt corruptibilia, cum habent eandem materiam ». 101. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 116-119 et les sources indiquées dans le second apparat. Voir sur ce point S. Donati, « La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti », pp. 261-265 et ead., « Ägidius von Roms kritik », pp. 384-386, en particulier nt. 37. 102. Sur l’utilisation de la reportation de la Lectura de Gilles de Rome dans le Commentaire de Bruges, voir M. Pickavé, « An Early Witness of the Reportatio of Giles of Rome’s Lectures on the Sentences. Note on the Edition of Concetta Luna », dans : Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 72/1 (2005), pp. 175-185, pp. 179-184. 103. Voir S. Donati, « La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti », pp. 265-267 ; ead., « Ägidius von Roms kritik », pp. 387 sq. 104. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 116-119 et les sources indiquées dans le troisième apparat. 105. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. II, n. 22 (LW I, p. 492,7-8) : « ‘caelum’ et ‘terra’ non communicant in materia et per consequens nec in genere conveniunt nisi logice solum ».

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Cette autre manière de répondre, proposant une alternative inorthodoxe à la réponse principale, traduit-elle ainsi une prise de position propre à notre commentateur, introduite avec la retenue seyant à un bachelier dominicain par égard pour l’autorité du Maître d’Aquin ? À mon sens, l’emploi au conditionnel du verbe respondere à la forme passive et à la troisième personne du singulier (« Aliter posset responderi ») ne saurait avoir une teneur impersonnelle et distanciée (‘on’ signifiant ‘quelqu’un’), afin juste d’exposer une tierce opinion à réfuter; car, dans ce cas, notre commentateur aurait recouru à la forme active du verbe dicere à la troisième personne du pluriel et précédée d’un quidam, aliqui ou alii, comme il a par ailleurs l’habitude de le faire. Par conséquent, l’expression « On pourrait répondre autrement » doit manifestement être ici comprise comme inclusive, notre commentateur signifiant ainsi assez prudemment son adhésion à cette seconde explication106. De fait, les quatre brèves remarques qui s’ensuivent ne s’avèrent pas être des réfutations, mais seulement quelques réserves, dont trois sont même explicitement tempérées par la locution « ad minus »107. Du reste, dans la quaestiuncula « Existe-t-il une matière de même nature parmi les corps célestes ? », traitée subséquemment, notre commentateur en vient certes dans un premier temps à réfuter la conception d’Algazel – lequel admet une différence de matière en chacun d’eux afin de parer à toute supposition de leur transmutabilité respective108 – en réitérant que les corps célestes sont uniquement en puissance au lieu et non à l’être109, mais il en enjoint aussi et surtout à retenir au final une solution alternative s’appuyant précisément sur le concept de repos de la matière exposé dans la réponse eckhartienne : « Ou plutôt il faut dire que l’ensemble du ciel ne constitue qu’un seul corps, et comme il ne s’y trouve qu’une seule matière, ainsi il n’y a là qu’une seule forme. […] C’est pourquoi la matière se rapporte au tout, non à la partie. […] Et parce que le tout Cf. id., In Eccli., n. 46 (LW II, p. 275,4-5) : « , quod cum elementis nullam habet materiae convenientiam » ; id., In Ioh., n. 602 (LW III, p. 525,5-7) : « Caeli sunt pura et altissima in corporibus. Item non communicant in materia cum istis inferioribus ». 106. Nous avons en effet recensé trois autres emplois comparables du verbe respondere : II, dist. 14, q. 1 (Br, f. 304ra17) ; IV, dist. 4, q. 1 (Br, f. 312vb3) et dist. 12, q. 1 (Br, f. 313va5). 107. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 130-144. La première de ces quatre remarques a été évincée du texte par un « vacat ». La question qui se pose désormais, et restera pour l’heure en suspend, est de savoir si ces remarques, en tant que subordonnées à l’autre manière de répondre et formant donc avec elle un bloc textuel, relèvent aussi de l’autorité d’Eckhart. 108. Cf. ibid., ll. 147-149. 109. Cf. ibid., ll. 150-153.

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trouve le repos en tant que la forme tout entière conduit au repos la matière tout entière quant à chacune de ses parties, elle conduira au repos chacune d’elles, parce que la forme se rapporte d’abord au tout et conduit par conséquent les parties à leur perfection »110. * Qu’en est-il chez Godin ? Dans la Lectura Thomasina, son propos s’articule en trois points clairement distincts : 1) prouver qu’il y a de la matière dans le ciel et 2) qu’elle est nécessairement différente de la matière des corps inférieurs, pour enfin 3) poser – et réfuter – certaines objections de l’opinion adverse111, en particulier celles avancées par Gilles de Rome. Après avoir brièvement expédié le premier point112, Godin en vient quant au second à d’abord restituer de manière quasi-littérale l’exposé thomasien résumant la divergence philosophique sur cette question entre la conception métaphysique de Platon et celle physique d’Aristote113, puis, comme Thomas, à faire de la différence établie par le Stagirite entre l’incorruptibilité du ciel et la corruptibilité des éléments – liées respectivement à un mouvement naturel exempt de contrariété ou bien soumis à la contrariété – le fondement argumentatif de l’affirmation d’une diversité de matière entre les corps célestes et sublunaires114. L’explication fournie par Godin se contente de paraphraser la démonstration thomasienne de l’impossibilité du contraire115, en s’appliquant toutefois à faire ressortir – dans un but didactique – les deux prémisses sous-jacentes à ce raisonnement apagogique, afin de montrer que l’argumentatio ad impossibile de l’Aquinate consiste juste en une reductio ad contradictionem de la mineure. En effet, sachant que « tout ce qui est en puissance à quelque chose et en est dépourvu porte en soi la privation qui y est associée » (= Maior), « si la matière du ciel est identique par essence à la matière des corps inférieurs, elle-même est en puissance aux formes des éléments » (= Minor). Or, puisqu’« il apparaît 110. Ibid., ll. 154-174. 111. Cf. Appendix B, ll. 18-22. 112. Cf. ibid., ll. 23-36. 113. Cf. ibid., ll. 37-56 et les sources indiquées dans l’apparat. 114. Cf. ibid., ll. 56-62. 115. Cf. Thomas d’Aquin, Sum. theol. Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp. : « […] Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam sit una materia ».

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qu’elle en est dépourvues, la matière du ciel est donc » – conformément à la prémisse antécédente – « soumise à la privation » ; d’où, puisque « cette une disposition est le fait du corps corruptible », cela « revient à dire que les corps incorruptibles sont corruptibles, ce qui implique une contradiction »116. Pour étayer cette réfutation de la mineure, Godin argue enfin – en s’appuyant de nouveau tacitement sur Thomas, mais suivant cette fois la réponse formulée par ce dernier dans son Commentaire sur les Sentences, et non plus dans la Somme théologique – qu’« on ne trouve aucune puissance naturelle qui puisse naturellement amener la matière du ciel à l’acte d’une autre forme » (étant donné que son mouvement circulaire naturel n’admet pas de contraire), si bien qu’« elle ne fut donc jamais en puissance à ces formes inférieures » et « n’est par conséquent pas identique à la matière des corps inférieurs, puisqu’elle est dépourvue de telles formes »117. La mise en avant de ce dernier argument conduit ensuite Godin à se confronter à une autre solution : « Or, certains répondent à cet argument et […] soutiennent l’explication suivante: Le fait que la matière soit en puissance à certaines formes est dû au fait que tout son appétit n’est pas rassasié par la forme qu’elle possède, comme on le voit pour la matière existant sous la forme de l’air. Mais la forme du ciel rassasie totalement l’appétit de sa matière, de sorte qu’il n’y a pas lieu qu’elle soit en puissance à certaines formes des corps inférieurs et surtout, comme ils le soutiennent, parce que la forme du ciel contient en soi virtuellement toutes les formes inférieures »118. De quelle source immédiate est ici redevable Godin ? S’agit-il d’une reformulation assez libre de la réponse attribuée à Eckhart dans le Commentaire de Bruges ? À première lecture, cela ne saute pas aux yeux ; car même si le contenu de ce passage s’y apparente en substance – mettant pareillement l’accent sur la notion de contenance virtuelle –, il ne restitue pas le concept central de quietatio ni l’exemple de la vision béatifique, qui illustre profitablement et pour ainsi dire ‘personnalise’ cette autre manière de répondre attestée dans le codex brugeois. Godin ne ferait-il dès lors pas plutôt référence à la solution initialement avancée par Gilles de Rome pour sauvegarder l’incorruptibilité du ciel quant à une communauté de la matière céleste et sublunaire ? Mais dans ce cas, Godin ne se devait-il pas normalement 116. Appendix B, ll. 62-85. 117. Ibid., ll. 85-91. 118. Ibid., ll. 92-99.

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d’en traiter, comme annoncé, dans le troisième point de son développement, où « sont posées certaines objections contre la thèse fixée », Gilles s’avérant être de surcroît le principal adversaire visé119 ? Le fait que cette solution soit déjà examinée par Godin dans le cadre du second point amène par conséquent à supposer qu’il ne la rattache pas à l’autorité de Gilles, ni ne la tient pour une objection de l’opinion adverse, à l’instar du le Commentaire de Bruges. À défaut d’une concordance littérale avec l’autre manière de répondre posée dans ce dernier, nous aurions donc quand même affaire ici à une correspondance partielle, signe d’une dépendance textuelle, de sorte que l’expression introductive « Ad hanc rationem aliqui respondent » ferait d’abord et surtout allusion à la position soutenue par le bachelier sententiaire Eckhart (dont Godin devait assurément avoir connaissance, puisque – rappelons-le – l’étudiant qu’il fut à l’Université de Paris était tenu, selon le règlement, d’assister au cours de son confrère dominicain). Du reste, le parallèle ne s’arrête pas là, et il devient même des plus instructifs si l’on se penche sur la suite du texte, à commencer par la réaction de Godin à l’égard de cette solution, qui contraste alors très fortement avec la circonspection modérée dont fait montre le Commentaire de Bruges. Godin assure en effet, sans concession aucune, que « cette solution ne vaut rien », lui objectant premièrement la conception thomasienne de l’indifférence naturelle de la puissance envers la noblesse de la forme qui l’actualise120. Puis, pour compléter cette objection, il reprend à son compte la série de remarques faites à ce sujet dans le Commentaires de Bruges (exceptée toutefois celle supprimée par un « vacat » dans le codex brugeois), lesquelles n’ont désormais plus pour but de tempérer ladite solution (Godin prenant soin de ne pas user à son tour de la locution « ad minus »), mais bel et bien de la réfuter121. C’est pourquoi, dans la question subsidiaire sur la transmutabilité des corps célestes, traitée à la fin sous la forme d’un dubium, la réponse fournie par Godin reprend certes quasi-textuellement le développement qu’en donne le Commentaire de Bruges122, abstraction faite cependant du dernier argument, puisqu’il met à profit le concept de repos de la matière exposé dans la réponse eckhartienne123. 119. Cf. ibid., ll. 113-188. 120. Ibid., ll. 100-103. 121. Cf. ibid., ll. 104-112. 122. Cf. ibid., ll. 189-215. 123. Voir ci-dessus, nt. 110.

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3. Conclusions Bien que Godin ne se prive pas de copier jusqu’à la lettre le Commentaire de Bruges, il ne convient toutefois pas d’affirmer que ce dernier puisse avoir été une Lectura Thomasina avant la lettre. En jouant ainsi sur les mots – et en fin de compte sur les idées –, on pourrait alors dire qu’il n’est aucunement permis de soutenir ici la thèse d’une unicité de la matière textuelle entre ces deux commentaires sententiaires, et ce en raison de leur inclination naturelle respective. En effet, la Lectura Thomasina demeure seulement in potentia ad unam formam, celle de l’enseignement du Maître d’Aquin, rassasiant à ce point le ciel intellectuel de Godin, que ce dernier en devient incapable d’engendrer une nouvelle forme de pensée, puisqu’il ne tolère ni altération… ou alternative, ni corruption… ou corrupteur. Quant au Commentaire de Bruges, il consent, le cas échéant, à être in potentia ad aliam formam, telle la femme adultère124 ; car notre commentateur anonyme, bien qu’étant lié par son Ordre à l’enseignement de Thomas, tend pourtant naturellement vers la forme de pensée d’un autre dominicain, à savoir Eckhart, un théologien propre à engendrer « le nouveau et le rare, qui offrent à l’esprit une stimulation plus agréable que l’habituel »125, ce qui l’amène parfois à des actes d’infidélité doctrinale à l’égard de l’orthodoxie thomiste, bien loin d’apporter une vision bienheureuse à Godin. À la lumière de la question étudiée, on s’aperçoit alors qu’avant de puiser dans le Commentaire de Bruges, Godin se livra au préalable à un examen rigoureux de son contenu, afin de n’en retenir que les passages méritant d’être intégrés (verbatim ou ad sensum) à sa Lectura Thomasina, certaines prises de position eckhartiennes faisant du coup les frais d’une telle lecture discriminante et discriminatoire. La comparaison que nous avons effectuée révèlerait donc deux types d’attitudes et, par là même, de personnalités: l’auteur du Commentaire de Bruges fait figure à nos yeux de ‘progressiste’, témoignant d’un certain esprit d’ouverture; Godin, au contraire, est pour ainsi dire un stricte ‘conservateur’, un « Thomasien » digne de ce surnom, s’évertuant à démontrer que la doctrine du Docteur angélique ne souffre aucun débat, voire même qu’elle n’admet aucune contrariété. 124. Cf. Appendix A, ll. 7-9. 125. Meister Eckhart, Prologus generalis in Opus tripartitum, n. 2 (LW I, p. 149,1).

APPENDIX A

Anonymus Brugensis QUESTIONES SUPER IV LIBROS SENTENTIARUM Lib. II, dist. 12, q. unica (ms. Brügge, Stadsbibliotheek, 491 [= Br], f. 303ra45-va27 et ms. Troyes, Bibliòtheque municipale, 145 [= Tr], f. 20r in marg. inf.) edidit Maxime Mauriège

Vtrum vna sit materia omnium corporum superiorum et inferiorum Circa duodecimam distinctionem queritur vtrum vna sit materia omnium corporum superiorum et inferiorum. Et videtur quod sic, quia vna est forma, scilicet corporeitas; ergo vna materia. Item Augustinus: Creata fuit vna materia distincta per diuersas 5 formas. Contra: Priuacio et potencia consequuntur materiam istorum 1-3 Circa ... materia] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 12, art. 1, arg. 1.; id., Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, arg. 2 et 3. Cf. Aristoteles, Met. V, c. 6, 1016a 24. 4-5 Item ... formas] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 12, art. 1, arg. 2; id., Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, arg. 1. Cf. Augustinus, Conf. XII, c. 6. et 12; De Gen. Ad litt. II, c. 11, n. 24. 6-7 Contra ... celo] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 12, art. 1, s. c. 2. 6-7 Priuacio ... celo] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. I, n. 37 (LW I, p. 213,13: « privatio semper sequitur et adhaeret materiae, etiam stanti sub forma perfectissima ».

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inferiorum, quod negamus in celo. Vnde Raby Moyses dicit quod sapiens materie proprietatem attribuit mulieri adultere que habens virum semper alium appetit. Dicendum: Si materia proprie accipiatur, prout dicit potenciam ad 10 303rb esse per motum et altera|cionem et ad corrupcionem, sic nullo modo est eadem. Set quia in celo est motus et quantitas, ideo non est neganda ibi materia. Auicenna autem ponit vnam materiam ratione dicta de forma, quia est vna, scilicet corporeitas. 15 Set ad hoc respondeo, quia hoc potest esse dupliciter, scilicet logice, et sic est verum, uel naturaliter et realiter, et sic est falsum, quia nichil receptibile commune vniuocum est corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Item si vna materia, ergo celum corruptibile. 8 materie] sup. lin. add. Br 14 Auicenna] Auicebron in marg. add. Br 18 vniuocum] in marg. add. Br 7-9 Vnde ... appetit] cf. Maimonides, Dux neutrorum, III, c. 9 (ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 74r,13-20): « Natura vero materiae et veritas eius, quod nunquam est nisi coniuncta priuationi […]. Quia dulcia sunt verba Salomonis in sapientia sua, cum comparat et assimilat materiam mulieri vagae et coniugatae […] ». 14-15 Auicenna ... corporeitas] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, corp.: « Avicenna enim, videtur ponere unam materiam esse omnium corporum, argumentum ex ratione corporeitatis assumens, quae cum sit unius rationis, una sibi materia debetur » (cf. Avicenna, Sufficientia, I, c. 3); id., Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp.: « Avicebron posuit unam materiam omnium corporum, attendens ad unitatem formae corporalis » (cf. Avicebron, Fons vitae, I, 17). 16-19 Set ... corruptibile] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1: « dicendum, quod corporeitas secundum intentionem logicam univoce in omnibus corporibus invenitur; sed secundum esse considerata, non potest esse unius rationis in re corruptibili et incorruptibili »; id., Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, ad 2: « dicendum quod si genus consideretur physice, corruptibilia et incorruptibilia non sunt in eodem genere, propter diversum modum potentiae in eis, ut dicitur X Metaphysicae. Secundum autem logicam considerationem, est unum genus omnium corporum, propter unam rationem corporeitatis ». Cf. Aristoteles, Met. X, c. 10, 1058b 28. 7-9 Vnde ... appetit] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. I, n. 33 (LW I, p. 210,13-15): « Semper formam aliam materia appetit stans sub alia quacumque. Propter quod apud Salomonem Prov. 5 mulieri adulterae comparatur, aut potius Salomon describit materiam sub metaphora mulieris adulterae, sicut Rabbi Moyses exponit praedictum verbum: ‘mulier vaga quietis impatiens’ etc. »; ibid., n. 45 (p. 218,6-9); id., In Exod., n. 89 (LW II, p. 93,1-3); id., In Eccli., n. 42 (LW II, p. 271,6-12): « Verbi gratia: materia prima infinita est ad omnes formas generabiles infinitas. Propter quod, licet nunquam sit sine forma et sic semper edat, semper tamen aliam et aliam formam appetit et esurit, quia nullam invenit in qua sint omnes. Propter quod Rabbi Moyses l. III c. 9 ipsam materiam dicit a Salomone Prov. 5 describi sub metaphora mulieris adulterae quae virum habet et semper alterum appetit »; id., In Exod., n. 89 (LW II, p. 93,1-3); id., In Ioh., n. 176 (LW III, p. 144,8-13): « Exemplum secundi modi parabolarum est Prov. 5, ubi Salomon materiam primam describit sub similitudine mulieris adulterae dicens: ‘ne intenderis fallaciae mulieris; favus enim distillans labia meretricis’ etc., tam in eodem capitulo quam in aliis eiusdem libri. Mulier enim adultera iuxta nomen suum virum habet et semper nihilominus alterum appetit. Sic materia prima numquam est sine forma et semper tamen appetit alteram ».

super sent. ii, dist. 12, q. unica 20

25

30

35

40

97

Ad hoc soluunt quod ideo est incorruptibile solum, quia forma celi non habet contrarium, non ex diuersitate materie. Non valet, quia tu accipis a posteriori, quia materia istorum inferiorum est in potencia ad diuersas formas. Hoc autem non posset fieri, nisi fieret corrupcio, quod non fit nisi per contrarium. Ideo natura indidit materie talia, quibus exsequi possit et consequi suam naturalem inclinacionem. Et hoc non est, quia forma non habet contrarium, immo nulla forma essencialis habet directe contrarium. Propter incorruptibilitatem celi dicebat Empedocles ipsum celum esse compositum ex quatuor elementis et amicicia, que non habet contrarium, et non lite. Plato aliter dixit quod celum est incorruptibile non natura, set gracia. Vnde dicit in persona dei: »O dii deorum« etc. Et racio est, quia ipse deus est efficacior in conseruando et continendo quam materia deficiat in corrumpi. Set hoc non valet, quia illa conseruacio aut fit per aliquid naturaliter inditum celo, et sic est naturalis causa, quod ipsi negant sequentes posicionem Platonis; aut non, et sic erit violentum. Set »nullum violentum est perpetuum«, et sic non est incorruptibile. Si dicas: Ergo anima conseruabit violenter suum corpus post diem iudicii, non valet, quia anima est forma que naturaliter est incorruptibilis. Iterum contrarietates cessabunt. Iterum corpus habebit dotem impassibilitatis. 32 etc.] in de anima add. Br. 20-21 Ad ... contrarium] cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo I, c. 2, 269a 2-b 17. 20-27 Ad ... contrarium] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, art. 5, arg. 2 et q. 2, art. 5, corp.; id., Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp. 26-27 nulla ... contrarium] cf. Aristoteles, Cat., c. 5, 3b 24; id., Met. XI, c. 12, 1068a 10. 28-30 Propter ... lite] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sentencia libri de anima, I, 12, ed. Leon. 45.1, Roma/Paris 1984, pp. 59,135-60,143): « Sciendum enim quod, sicut dictum est, Empedocles posuit omnia ista inferiora esse composita ex quatuor elementis et ex lite et amicicia; et generatio et corruptio in rebus prouenit ex istis duobus, scilicet lite et amicicia; celum uero dixit esse deum et dixit quod erat compositus ex quatuor elementis et amicitia, set non ex lite, et ideo est incorruptibilis ». 31-32 Plato ... gracia] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 50, art. 5, ad 2. 32 O ... deorum] cf. Plato, Timaeus, 41A; Auct. Arist., Sequuntur auctoritates Platonis In Timaeo, n° 12 (ed. J. Hamesse, p. 297,48-50); ibid., Sequuntur auctoritates IX Metaphysicae [Commentator], n° 238 (p. 135,18-19). 37 nullum ... perpetuum] cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo II, c. 3, 286a 17 sq.; cf. Auct. Arist., Sequuntur auctoritates II libri De caelo et mundo, n° 50 (ed. J. Hamesse, p. 163,34).

98

ANONYMUS BRUGENSIS

Alia est opinio, et est Egidii, quod omnium sit vna materia, quod probat sic: Impossibile est quod aliqua duo equaliter distant a primo siue a nichilo; set subtracto omni actu ab vtraque materia remanet vtrobique pura potencia; ideo etc. Responsio: Materia dicitur in ordine ad actum; secundum ergo ordinem actuum erit ordo potenciarum siue materierum. Set actus siue forma materie celi et inferiorum corporum non distant equaliter a primo et a nichilo; ideo etc. Si dicas quod non valet, quia forma ignis est nobilior quam forma terre et minus distat a primo, ergo et materia ignis minus distat a primo quam terre secundum te, respondeo: non valet, quia sicut forme distinguntur in celo et in inferioribus, ita materie, quia ista est in potencia ad formam huius solum et illa ad formam alterius.

Due opiniones solemnes: vna dicit quod est eadem et probat sic: Impossibile est quod aliqua 45 duo equaliter distant a primo; set subtracto omni actu ab vtraque materia remanet in vtraque materia pura potencia; ideo etc.

43 Egidii] Br 47 nichilo] nichili Br 48 actu] actui Br 50 potencia] coni.: puro Br 57 nichilo] nichil Br 67 alterius] ut de sole et luna add. sed exp. Br

43 vna] Egidius sup. lin. add. Tr 48 materia] potencia praem. sed del. Tr 63 quia] sup. lin. add. Tr.

50

Responsio: Materia dicitur in ordine ad actum; secundum ergo ordinem actuum erit ordo potenciarum siue materie. Set actus siue forma materie celi et inferio- 55 rum non distant equaliter a primo; ideo nec materie. Si dicas quod non valet, forma ignis nobilior et minus differt a primo quam forma terre, 60 ergo per te et materia ignis minus distabit a primo quam terre, respondeo: non valet, quia sicut forme distinguntur in celo et in inferioribus, ita materie, quia ista 65 est in potencia ad solum illa ad illud. Sic non est in proposito quia

43-50 Alia ... etc.] cf. Egidius Romanus, Questiones metaphysicales, VIII, q. 3: Vtrum eadem sit materia in corporibus celestibus et in istis inferioribus (Br, f. 116rb13-27: « Impossibile est enim aliqua duo diuersa per essenciam equaliter distare a primo. […] ». 50-53 materia ... materierium] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, ad 4: « dicendum quod, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, ens in potentia est diversum ex hoc ipso quod ordinatur ad diversum actum ». 65-67 ita ... alterius] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp.: « Relinquitur ergo quod materia corporis caelestis, secundum se considerata, non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet ».

super sent. ii, dist. 12, q. unica

70

75

80

85

99

Sic non est in proposito, quia materia terre non est in potencia solum ad terram, et sic de aliis, set ad ignem; ideo non est simile. Vnde idem est ordo in materia respectu forme ignis et terre. Iterum alia hic et ibi potencia, quia ibi est potencia solum ad vbi, hic autem ad vbi, alteracionem, corrupcionem et augmentum. Et sic non equaliter distant nec a primo nec a nichilo. Et quando obicitur contra eum quod inclinacio naturalis materie est ad formam, quia materia vel est sua potencia vel potencia est differencia constitutiua ipsius materie, et cum nichil priuetur sua inclinacione naturali, materia terre erit in potencia ad formam celi et e conuerso, dicit: verum est quantum est de racione materie.

materia terre non est in potencia solum ad terram et sic de aliis, set ad ignem; ideo non est simile.

79 nichilo] nichil Br 82 materia] sup. lin. add. Br

87 celi] huius praem. sed del. Tr 89 verum] unum (dub.) praem. sed del. Tr

Vnde idem ordo est in materia respectu forme ignis et terre. Iterum alia hic et ibi potencia, quia ibi est potencia ad vbi solum, hic autem ad corrupcionem et augmentum. Et sic non equaliter distant a primo. Et quando obicitur contra eum quia inclinacio naturalis materie est ad formam, materia quia vel est sua potencia vel potencia et differencia constitutiua ipsius materie, et cum nichil priuetur sua inclinacione naturali, materia terre erit in potencia ad formam celi vel illa in potencia ad aliam formam, dicit: verum est quantum est de

72-73 Vnde ... terre] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, corp. 74-77 Iterum … augmentum] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp.: « Unde illa forma sic perficit illam materiam, quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, ut Aristoteles dicit [cf. Met. XI, c. 4, 1069b 26] ». Cf. In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, ad 5. 88-89 dicit ... materie] Egidius Romanus, De materia celi, q. 2, ad 6 (Br, f. 118va13-14): « dicendum quod ‘que non sunt ad inuicem transmutabilia non conueniunt in materia’ verum est vt est transmutationis et est privacioni admixta, set falsum est si accipiatur materia secundum suam nudam essenciam ». 82 materia … 85 materie] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. I, n. 36 (LW I, p. 213,8-9): « Ipsa potentia ad esse est differentia constitutiva substantiae materiae ».

100

ANONYMUS BRUGENSIS

Set quia forma non habet contrarium, ideo etc. Hoc solutum est ex dictis. Ideo aliter dicitur quod deus indidit materie alium ordinem, sicut fiet elementis post diem iudicii. Responsio: hoc erit miraculose, set hic querimus de ordine naturali. Vnde turpe est in ordine nature siue naturali adducere miraculum. Preterea, ex quo deus indidit alium ordinem, cum ordo non sit nisi potencia materie, que est sua essencia; ergo erit mutata essencia materie; ergo erit alia materia. Aliter posset responderi quod celum est incorruptibile. Quando dicitur: si vna est materia, non obstante nobilitate forme, erit ibi corrupcio, verum est nisi illa for-

racione materie. Set quia forma 90 non habet contrarium, ideo etc. Hoc solutum est ex dictis. Ideo aliter dicit quod deus indidit materie alium ordinem, sicut in elementis post diem iudicii. 95 Responsio: hoc erit miraculose, set hic querimus de ordine naturali. Vnde turpe est in ordine nature siue naturali adducere miraculum. Preterea, ex quo deus 100 indidit alium ordinem, cum ordo non sit nisi potencia materie, que est sua essencia, erit alia materia. Aliter posset responderi quod 105 celum est incorruptibile. Quando dicitur: si vna sit materia hic , non obstante nobilitate forme, erit ibi corrupcio, verum

94 alium] illi praem. sed exp. Br 105 Aliter] Heccardus [ eccar̕] in marg. add. Br 90-91 Set … etc.] Egidius Romanus, De materia celi, q. 2, ad 12 (Br, f. 118va55-57): « dicendum quod materia stans sub forma contraria non est simpliciter in potencia ad omnes formas nisi ad formas habentes contrarium, cuius non est forma celi ; et ideo materia existens sub forma elementi non est in potencia ad formam celi ». Cf. id., Reportatio Lecturae super libros I-IV Sententiarum, II, q. 45 (dist. 12) (ed. C. Luna, p. 285,60-64). 91-92 Hoc ... dictis] cf. supra, ll. 20-27. 93-95 Ideo ... iudicii] cf. supra, ll. 31-38. Cf. Egidius Romanus, Reportatio Lecturae super libros I-IV Sententiarum, II, q. 45 (dist. 12) (ed. C. Luna, p. 283,6-12 et pp. 285,65-286,84). 97 set … naturali] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp.: « Hanc autem positionem Aristoteles reprobat, per motus naturales corporum » (cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo I, c. 2, 269a 30). 109-112 nisi … formarum] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, corp.: « Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum »; cf. id., In II Sent., dist. 12, q. 1, corp.: « [...] cum materia prima secundum se considerata sit in potentia ad omnes formas naturales, non poterit tota ejus potentia terminari nisi per adeptionem omnium formarum. […] Unde etsi forma caeli sit nobilissima, nihilominus tamen, recepta in materia prima, non terminabit totam potentiam ejus, nisi simul cum ipsa recipiantur omnes aliae formae; quod est impossibile ».

super sent. ii, dist. 12, q. unica ma in virtute haberet alias formas siue in se virtutem aliarum formarum. Vnde si anima humana haberet in se virtutem omnium aliarum formarum, nunquam 115 materia sua esset in potencia ad aliam formam. Sic est de forma celi, quod patet, quia mouet ad omnem formam. Vnde, quia alias formas prehabet, fit quietacio. 120 Exemplum: Quia beatitudo est in 110

101

est nisi vltima forma in virtute haberet alias siue in se virtutem aliarum. Vnde si anima humana haberet in se virtutem omnium aliarum, nunquam materia sua esset in potencia ad aliam formam. Sic est de forma celi, quod patet, quia mouet ad omnem formam. Vnde, quia alias prehabet, fit quietacio. Exemplum: quia beatitudo

116-119 Sic ... quietacio] cf. Egidius Romanus, Questiones metaphysicales, VIII, q. 3 (Br, f. 116rb42-48): « Sicut igitur, si hic inferius esset aliquid quod haberet perfecciones omnium formarum que possunt esse in materia generabilium, non mouetur omnino ad aliquam formam non propter hoc quod in ipso esset diuersa materia nunc et prius, ita est in corporibus celestibus quod, virtualiter continent omnes formas corporales, ad nullam mouentur; immo, per formam celi terminatus est totus appetitus materiae celi, non quia in se sit diuersa materia in celo et in istis inferioribus ». Cf. id., Reportatio Lecturae super libros I-IV Sententiarum, II, q. 45 (dist. 12) (ed. C. Luna, p. 287,117-122): « patet idem ex parte forme. Non enim est ex nobilitate forme celi quod saciet totum appetitum materie, sed hoc est quia in ipsa virtualiter reseruatur omnis forma. Vnde celi quodammodo est omnis forma, quia per eam omnis forma introducitur. Et ideo quod ipsa forma celi saciat totum appetitum materie, non solum sumenda est causa ex nobilitate sua, sed ex continencia eius virtuali ». 117-118 quia … formam] cf. Meister Eckhart, Quaest. Paris. 4, n. 4 (LW V, p. 73,7-8): « corpus caeleste est perfectum primo, ideo minime movetur et locatur, sed omnia movet et omnia locat ». 118-119 Vnde ... quietacio] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. I, n. 172 (LW I, p. 317,1-4): « res omnis locata ab alio extra locum suum inquieta est, locum sitit et in loco suo quiescit. Caelum autem non locatum ab alio, sed locus potius locans omnia. Ipsum in loco suo movetur, et motus suus vita est, et esse est sibi moveri; quod si non moveretur, non esset caelum » (cf. ibid., n. 49 [pp. 220,4-221,4]); id., Pred. 103 (DW IV/1, pp. 479,55-480,56): « diu materie niemer engeruowet, si enwerde denne ervüllet mit allen formen, die ir mügelich sint »; id., Pred. 104 (DW IV/1, p. 595,342-344). 118-119 quia ... prehabet] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. I, n. 109 (LW I, pp. 262,15-263,2): « “corpora” superiora “causa sunt”, ut prius, “inferiorum”. Igitur “proprietates” inferiorum “praeexsistunt in ipsis corporibus caelestibus” exemplariter secundum ordinem situs sive naturae ipsorum caelestium »; id., Sermo XLIV/1, n. 440 (LW IV, p. 396,3-4): « ‘Caelorum’, tum quia prima corpora suprema praehabent omnia inferiora, quodlibet includit quodlibet inferius »; id., Pred. 71 (DW III, p. 218,3-6): « […] der himel niht vremdes învluzzes enhât noch enpfâhennes von nihte enhât. Er hât alliu dinc in im ; er berüeret alliu dinc, und er blîbet unberüeret. Dennoch daz viur, swie hôch daz sî an sîner obersten stat, ez enrüeret doch den himel niht ». Cf. Pred. LXVII: Virtutes caelorum movebuntur (Luk. 21,26) (ed. F. Pfeiffer, pp. 210,28-211,17). 120-122 beatitudo ... sunt] cf. Meister Eckhart, Von dem edeln Menschen (DW V, pp. 116,28117,2): « daz êrste, dâ sælicheit ane geliget, daz ist, sô diu sêle schouwet got blôz. Dâ nimet si allez ir wesen und ir leben und schepfet allez, daz si ist, von dem grunde gotes und enweiz von wizzenne niht noch von minne noch von nihte alzemâle. Si gestillet ganze und aleine in dem wesene gotes, si enweiz niht dan wesen dâ und got ».

102

ANONYMUS BRUGENSIS

visione dei, non aliorum que in ipso sunt. Et hoc est, quia perfecciones omnium sunt in eo. Vnde III Methaphysice: »illa incorruptibilia que gustauerunt manna et nectar«, quasi diceret: qui habet illud in quo est omnis perfeccio, non querit aliam perfeccionem particularem. Dicendum ad hoc quod, si materia sit eiusdem racionis hic et ibi, 303va ad minus | sequitur quod materia aeris sit in potencia ad formam celi, quia vbi eadem materia, ibi idem appetitus; vel aliter, quia materia est sua potencia, ergo sublata potencia non erit eadem materia que prius; vel aliter, quia aer posset conqueri, cum appetitus naturalis non sit frustra, et idem

est in visione dei, vbi est omnis perfeccio; ideo beatus nullam aliam perfeccionem querit. 125

130

Dicendum, si materia sit eiusdem racionis hic et ibi, ad minus sequitur quod materia aeris est in potencia ad formam celi, quia vbi eadem materia, ibi idem 135 appetitus; vel aliter, quia materia est sua potencia, ergo sublata potencia non erit eadem materia que prius.

124 III Metaphysicae] Aristoteles, Met. III, c. 4 (1000a 11-14) 132 sequitur] sequitur quod materia , que sunt sub forma lune, sit in potencia ad formam solis, cum forma lune non contineat tot perfecciones sicut forma solis. Item ad minus praem. sed per va-cat del. Br 124-126 illa ... nectar] cf. Aristoteles, Met. III, c. 4 (1000 a 11-14). 132-136 materia … potencia] cf. Thomas de Aquino, In I Sent., dist. 3, q. 4, art. 2, ad 4. 139-140 appetitus … frustra] cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo I, c. 4, 271a 33; id., De anima III, c. 9, 432b 21. 122-123 perfecciones ... eo] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Exod., n. 57 (LW II, p. 63,2-4): « Hinc est quod qui ipsum deum videret per se ipsum, per essentiam dei scilicet, non ex aliis nec per alia media, videret unicam perfectionem et per ipsam et in ipsa videret omnes perfectiones, non ipsam per illas ». 123-126 Vnde … nectar] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Ioh., n. 693 (LW III, p. 610,1-4): « Et hoc est quod quaedam in entibus “propter longe distare a primo sunt corruptibilia” ut ait philosophus, et antiqui dicebant quod illa in entibus, quae gustaverunt manna et nectar, facta sunt incorruptibilia, quae vero non gustaverunt, ipsa sunt corruptibilia, non obstante identitate principiorum hinc inde, ut narrat ipse philosophus ». 132-136 materia … potencia] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Ioh., n. 147 (LW III, p. 122,13-14). 139-141 appetitus naturalis … vtraque] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Ioh., n. 612 (LW III, p. 534,13535,2): « Nunquam enim desiderium frustra est in natura, secundum illud Prov. 41: ‘desiderium suum iustis dabitur’; sed etiam in natura appetitus non est frustra, sed nec potentia naturalis ».

140

super sent. ii, dist. 12, q. unica

103

sit appetitus in materia vtraque, quare ille terminatur et iste non, et ad minus ibi esset potencia ad augmentum. 145 Set vtrum sit ibi materia. Dicendum quod sic, quia mouetur et quia quantum est, que materiam consequuntur. Vtrum eiusdem racionis materia in corporibus celestibus ad inuicem. Si sic, ergo erunt transmutabilia. Propter hoc dicit Algazel in II sue Methaphysice quod non est eiusdem rationis. 150 Set posset aliter solui, quia sunt in potencia ad vbi, non ad esse. Sic ergo in angelis, licet sit ibi materia eiusdem racionis, non tamen in potencia ad esse, erunt incorruptibiles, cuius contrarium supra dictum est d. 3 a. 1. Vel dicendum quod totum celum est vnum corpus, et sicut est vna 155 materia, ita est ibi vna forma; quod patet, quia si homo constaret ex tota sua materia, esset vnus et incorruptibilis nec diuersitas parcium faceret pluralitatem in homine in quantum homo. Sic in celo. Vnde materia est propter totum, non propter partem.

145 Set] questio in marg. add. Br 147 Vtrum] questio in marg. add. Br 148 Algazel] algazer Br 148-149 in ... Methaphysice] sup. lin. add. et in 2 metaphysice circa principium [ī 2 mece ccᷓ pn ] in marg. add. Br. 148 Si ... transmutabilia] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 66, art. 2, s.c. 148-149 Propter ... racionis] cf. Algazel, Metaphysica II, 2 (ed. J. T. Muckle, p. 142,2-4.1113). 152-153 cuius ... 1] cf. Br, f. 302ra6-14: « Responsio: Si materia sit eiusdem racionis in angelis, cum prima forma inuestiat totam materiam et illa non distinguatur per quantitatem nec per ordinem, primus angelus totaliter inuestiet eam et sic alii nichil habebunt de ea. Iterum posito quod tu dicis, tamen inconueniens videretur quod primus angelus, cum sit nobilissimus, haberet materiam eiusdem racionis cum materia infimi angeli et materia nullam haberet nobilitatem per aliquid additum, cum careat omni disposicione accidentali. Nec valet quod tu dicis de celo, quia ibi est vna materia et vna forma et vnum corpus. Hic autem non sic. Sed impossibile est quod vna materia sub diuersis formis maneat incorruptibilis, quia ex quo est eiusdem racionis, idem erit appetitus. Ergo qua racione vna appetet esse sub alia forma, eadem racione et alia sub alia ». 157 Sic … celo] cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. theol., Ia, q. 68, art. 4, arg. 2: « omne quod constat ex tota sua materia est unum tantum. Sed caelum est huiusmodi, ut probat philosophus in I de caelo » (cf. Aristoteles, De caelo et mundo I, c. 9, 279a 7). 158 materia ... partem] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Gen. II, n. 205 (LW I, pp. 697,13-680,2).

104

ANONYMUS BRUGENSIS

Si dicas quod partes sunt colligate in homine, non autem in celo, dicendum quod materia vnitur forme secundum modum forme. Vnde 160 cum anima habeat multas operaciones, requirit diuersa membra ad exsecucionem earum, quod non posset fieri, nisi essent colligata toti corpori; aliter non diffunderetur virtus anime ad membra. Et sicut ad operacionem anime requiritur colligacio debita in membris, ita ad operacionem partium celi requiritur distinccio sine colligacione racione 165 motus celi. Et cum alique partes habeant motus distinctos, requiritur quod non sit ibi continuacio. Si dicas: Ergo non differunt specie, falsum est, immo sicut pes et oculus. Vnde non differunt specie a toto, set pars a parte, nec materia vnius partis est in potentia ad formam alterius partis, quia materia est 170 propter totum et ipsum respicit, non partem, nec est propter partem. Et quia totum quietatur, in quantum tota forma quietat materiam totam quantum ad omnem partem sui, quietabit eam, quia forma etiam respicit totum primo et perficit et consequenter partes et organa.

161 habeat] haberet ante corr. Br

163-174 sicut … organa] cf. Meister Eckhart, In Exod., n. 89 (LW II, p. 92,11-15): « materia rerum generabilium non plus quiescit sub forma nobilissima, puta hominis, quominus appetat quamlibet etiam minimam, quam e converso sub ipsa minima forma, puta formicae, iam adepta. Rursus oculus non minus videt pedi nec plus sibimet, sed aequaliter utrique, quia toti corpori sive toti homini primo et per se »; ibid., n. 128 (pp. 118,10119,9); id., In Sap., n. 238 (LW II, p. 572,1-2); id., In Ioh., n. 385 (LW III, p. 328,5-8); ibid., n. 724 (pp. 633,12-634,3); Sermo XL/2, n. 397 (LW IV, p. 340, 10-12 et nt. 5); Quaest. Paris. 4, n. 6 (LW V, p. 76,3); Pred. 76 (DW III, p. 317,3-6). Cf. id., In Ioh., n. 325 (LW III, p. 274,5-8): « Movetur enim caelum secundum partes et secundum formam sive dispositionem, quiescit autem secundum subiectum, id est secundum totum ».

APPENDIX B

LECTURA THOMASINA Lib. II, dist. 12, q. 1 edidit Andrea Colli List of Manuscripts:1 Ba: Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. B III 6, ff. 37ra-38rb Be: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, ms. Theol. lat. Fol. 557, ff. 46rb-47rb Bol: Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, ms. A 986, ff. 53ra-53vb E: Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 505, ff. 94vb-96va G: Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, ff. 37va-38ra Kl: Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek, ms. 281, ff. 53va-54va N: Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, ms. VII C 30, ff. 48vb-49va P: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. lat. 3039, ff. 42ra42vb Pi: Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile di S. Caterina, ms. 44, ff. 46rb-47ra W1: Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, ms. 1590, ff. 33rb33vb W2: Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, ms. 1590, ff. 158rb158vb

1. In the edited text u an v have been distinguished and j is not used; the Latin classical diphthongs have been used; punctuation and capitalization have been modernized and the abbreviations solved.

LIBER SECUNDUS Distinctio duodecima

Utrum corporum superiorum et inferiorum una sit materia secundum essentiam Circa distinctionem 12 quaeritur primo utrum corporum 5 superiorum et inferiorum una sit materia secundum essentiam. Videtur quod sic. “Omnia quae conveniunt in genere, conveniunt in materia, ut innuitur V Metaphysicae. Sed omnia corporalia in genere corporis conveniunt. Ergo omnium corporum et rerum corporalium una est materia”. 10 »Praeterea. Omnis distinctio est per formas et actum, sed materia Ba 37rb considerata secundum se est in potentia, ergo in materia | secundum se nulla est distinctio; omnium ergo rerum eadem est materia«.

7 Omnia ... 10 materia] Thom., S.th., I, 66, 2, arg. 2 8 ut ... Metaphysica] cf. Arist., Metaph., V, 16, 1021b30-1022a1: transl. Guill. 11 Praeterea ... 13 materia] cf. Thom., S.th., I, 66, 2, arg. 4 1 distinctio 12] om. Ba Be Bol E G Kl N Pi W1 W2 3 utrum ... 4 essentiam] om. Ba Be Bol E G Kl N P W1 W2 5 circa] antep. haec de angelicae naturae condicione etc. et add. illam Bol; antep. haec de angelicae etc. N; antep. haec de angelicae naturae etc. P; antep. haec de angelicae naturae condicione etc. et add. illam Pi (Lomb., Sent. II, 12, 384,4-5) | circa ... 12] hic Kl | distinctionem 12] inv. Bol Pi | primo] om. E G; principaliter N 6 et inferiorum] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba | una sit] inv. E G | materia] natura sed corr. G | secundum essentiam] om. E G N 7 sic] non Be; add. quia Bol N P Pi | conveniunt] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba 8 innuitur] dicitur E G N P; suppl. ut patet per Philosophum i.l. Be | corporalia] corpora N 8 in ... 9 conveniunt] conveniunt in genere corporis Ba P 9 corporis] corporalis N | ergo] add. et in materia N | omnium] om. N | corporum] om. Ba P N | et] om. Bol P N | rerum] om. Bol N | corporalium] om. Be Bol Kl N Pi W1; suppl. al.m. s.l. W2 10 una ... materia] est una materia E P; erit una materia G; om. N 11 et actum] om. Ba 12 considerata ... se] secundum se considerata Ba G P | in] sua N | ergo] igitur E | secundum se] om. N 13 omnium ergo] inv. Ba E G P | ergo] igitur W1 W2 | rerum] add. corporalium P | eadem est] inv. Ba G N; est una P

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“Contra. | Quaecumque conveniunt in materia, sunt ad invicem E 95ra transmutabilia, ut dicitur I De generatione et corruptione. Sed corpora caelestia et inferiora non sunt ad invicem transmutabilia. Ergo non conveniunt in materia”. Responsio. Quia ista quaestio supponit in corporibus caelestibus esse materiam, ideo sunt hic per ordinem tria declaranda. Primo 20 ostendetur in caelo esse materiam. Secundo ostendetur quod necessario est alia materia caeli et corporum inferiorum. Tertio ponentur quaedam obiectiones contra determinata. »Primum breviter sic ostendo. Quia omne quantum quod localiter movetur est materiale, sed caelum movetur localiter, | ut de se patet, P 42rb 25 est etiam in eo quantitas, ut de se patet, ergo necessario est ibi materia. Quod autem omne quantum mobile habeat materiam, probatur per Philosophum, unde ipse dicit, II Metaphysicae, oportet intelligere materiam in re mota«. 15

14 15 23 27

Contra ... 17 materia] Thom., S. th., I, 66, 2, s.c. ut ... corruptione] cf. Arist., De gen. et corr., I, 6, 322b18: transl. Guill. Primum ... 28 mota] cf. Thom., Super Sent., II, 12, 1, 1, arg. 5 (301) Philosophum ... II Metaphysicae] cf. Arist., Metaph., II, 2, 994b26-27: transl. Guill.

14 quaecumque] omnia quae N 15 I] prius sed al.m. corr. Ba 16 ergo] ideo G 18 responsio] om. N; add. dicendum Bol E G Pi | quia] quod Bol E G Pi | ista] illa Be W1 19 sunt ... tria] tria sunt hic per ordinem Ba | sunt ... declaranda] oportet hic facere tria N | hic] om. G P | per ordinem] om. E G P | per ... tria] tria per ordinem Pi | tria declaranda] inv. Be Bol W2 | declaranda] videnda G 20 ostendetur] ostenditur G N P | ostendetur] ostenditur G P; om. N | quod] om. G; add. sit N; add. est P | necessario] necessarium P 21 est] add. esse Bol P Pi; esse G | alia materia] aliam materiam Bol G P Pi; alia ab ista N | corporum] istorum P | caeli ... inferiorum] om. N | ponentur] ponuntur Ba G 22 determinata] add. et solventur P 23 breviter ... ostendo] ostendo breviter sic Ba | ostendo] ostenditur P | quantum] om. E; add. et N 23 localiter 24 movetur] inv. P W1 | movetur localiter] inv. E; om. N | patet] add. et E; add. movetur localiter N 25 est ... patet] in eo etiam est quantitas E G; om. Kl; et est quantum N | est etiam] et est Be | ut] om. Ba Bol | de se] etiam P | est ibi] inv. N 26 omne quantum] add. al.m. in marg. Ba; om. G | quantum] om. E | mobile] add. inquantum mobile Ba | materiam] utramque sed al.m. corr. Ba 26 probatur ... 28 materiam] om. (hom.) E 27 unde] om. N | ipse dicit] om. N | Metaphysicae] add. ubi dicit N 27 intelligere 28 materiam] inv. N

108

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Item certum est quod omnis quantitas sequitur compositum ratione materiae. Et ideo ubi est quantitas extensa, oportet ponere materiam, ut materiam. Nec videtur quod ipsa forma possit esse subiectum quantitatis, nisi mediante materia. Item omnis forma simplex secundum se intelligibilis est et etiam se intelligens si sit separata, quia “immunitas a materia est causa intelligibilitatis”. Si igitur forma caeli sit separata a materia, oportet eam esse intelligibilem, quod falsum est. Ideo ibi est materia. Quantum ad secundum sciendum quod “Plato et omnes philosophi alii ab Aristotele, posuerunt omnia corpora esse de natura quattuor elementorum. Unde cum quattuor elementa conveniant in materia, oportet secundum eos dicere quod omnium corporum sit eadem materia”. »Hoc autem improbat Philosophus, per motum caeli diversum a motu elementorum, quia omne quod est de natura alicuius elementi habet motum similem illi elemento, quia quae sunt eiusdem naturae, eodem modo moventur. Quia igitur motus caeli est diversus a motu cuiuslibet elementi, quia nullum elementum secundum suam naturam

34 immunitas ... 35 intelligibilitas] Thom., De spirit. creat., 1, ad 12 (18,591-592); cf. Avic., De an., V, 5-6 (126-133) 37 Plato ... 41 materia] Thom., S.th., I, 66, 2, resp. 37 Plato ... 38 philosophi] cf. Arist., De cael., I, 270b19-25 42 Hoc ... 56 corruptibilia] cf. Thom., S.th., I, 66, 2, resp. 42 Philosophus] Arist., De cael., I, 270b26-31

29 item] praeterea P; suppl. praeterea al.m. in marg. W1; om. W2 | certum est] inv. N est] add. etiam W2 31 ut materiam] om. (hom.) Ba Be E G N W1 W2 | nec ... forma] cum ipsa forma non Bol P Pi; cum ipsa forma Kl; unde videtur quod forma non N | esse] suppl. in marg. G 33 item] ideo W1 | simplex] om. N | intelligibilis est] inv. N P 33 est ... 34 intelligens] om. (hom.) E 34 se intelligens] inv. Ba | si sit] sicut anima alia Bol | separata] add. a materia E | a] om. E | materia] add. secundum quic Ba; om. E 35 intelligibilitatis] intelligentis sed intelligibili al.m. corr. Ba | igitur] ergo Kl | a materia] om. W1 36 esse intelligibilem] inv. G | falsum est] inv. P | ideo] ergo N 37 omnes] add. alii G 38 philosophi] add. alii E W2 | ab] sub E | Aristotele] add. alii Ba Be Kl N W1 39 quattuor] om. E G | unde] vel N | cum] suppl. al.m. s.l. Ba; suppl. quia al.m. in marg. W1 | quattuor elementa] inv. N | conveniant] conveniunt E N W1 40 oportet] add. quod P | secundum ... dicere] dicere secundum eos Ba | quod] om. N | sit] om. N 41 eadem] una E G; una esse N 42 Philosophus] Aristotiles N | per] om. N 43 omne] om. Bol; add. est E 44 similem] naturalem W1 45 modo] motu E N | quia igitur] sed Ba | a motu] suppl. al.m. in marg. W1 46 suam naturam] inv. G

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movetur circulariter | sicut caelum, ideo oportet ipsum caelum esse alterius naturae a quattuor elementis et quia motus sequitur naturam | mobilis motus, qui non habet contrarium, sequitur naturam mobilis, 50 cui non admiscetur contrarium. Et ideo, cum motus caeli, qui est circularis, non habet contrarium et omnis generatio et corruptio fit ex | contrariis, sequitur quod illud mobile, quod sequitur talis motus secundum naturam suam, | sit incorruptibile, non sic autem quattuor elementa, quia motus eorum contrarietati subicitur. Et cum generatio 55 et corruptio sint ex contrariis, oportet quod ipsa elementa quattuor sint corruptibilia«. Et quia corruptibile et incorruptibile non sunt eiusdem naturae, ideo necessario sequitur quod corpus caeleste non sit eiusdem naturae cum quattuor elementis. Ergo non oportet quod conveniant in materia caelum et elementa propter identitatem naturae. 60 Sed supposito quod sint eiusdem naturae, caelum autem sit incorruptibile, elementa autem | corruptibilia, adhuc dicendum quod alia est materia corporis caelestis et inferiorum. | Et hoc ostendo sic:

47 ipsum] del. al.m. Ba; om. E G 49 mobilis] motus sed al.m. corr. Ba; mobiliter Bol | motus] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba | mobilis] om. Ba 50 et ... 51 contrarium] om. (hom.) N 51 habet] habeat Be E W1 52 contrariis] creaturis sed al.m. in marg. corr. W1 | illud] id Be W2 | mobile ... motus] om. Ba 53 naturam suam] inv. G W2 | sit incorruptibile] inv. E | quattuor] om. Be E G N 54 motus] tota natura N | eorum] add. sunt ad invicem contrarii et ideo non eorum Ba | subicitur] subiecta sed corr. N 55 sint] sit Be Bol Kl P Pi W2 | ex] suppl. al.m. s.l. Ba | elementa quattuor] inv. E G P | quattuor] om. N | sint] sit P; sit sed al.m. s.l. corr. W1 56 corruptibilia] om. Kl | et] om. N | et incorruptibile] om. E | eiusdem] add. rationis vel P 56 ideo … 57 naturae] om. Kl | ideo ... elementis] om. Bol P Pi 57 necessario] om. W1 | sit] est Be 58 conveniant] conveniat Be 59 caelum ... elementa] om. N | naturae] om. Ba 60 sed … naturae] om. (hom.) N | autem] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba; om. Bol | sit] om. Kl; est N 61 incorruptibile] add. quattuor P; corruptibile Pi | elementa autem] inv. P | autem] om. Ba | adhuc] ad hoc Be; add. est E; quare non conveniunt in natura ideo nec in materia N | dicendum] add. est ergo N; est dicendum P 62 est] om. Pi | materia] add. corruptibilis sed al.m. exp. W1 | corporis caelestis] caeli N | et] add. alia N | et hoc] quia Ba; quod E G N ostendo sic] inv. N | sic] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba

Kl 53vb E 95rb

Be 46va Bol 53rb

Pi 46va Ba 37va

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GUILLELMI PETRI DE GODINO

Omne quod est in potentia ad aliquid et caret eo, habet in se annexam privationem. Sed si materia caeli est eadem secundum essentiam cum materia inferiorum, ipsa est in potentia ad formas elementorum. Et constat quod caret ipsis, ergo ipsa privationi subicitur. Sed illa est dispositio corporis corruptibilis habere formam privationi subiectam. W2 158va Ergo ipsa corpora caelestia necessario essent | corruptibilia; dicere N 49ra ergo quod incorruptibilia habeant | materiam eiusdem rationis cum corporibus corruptibilibus est dicere corpora incorruptibilia esse corruptibilia, quod implicat contradictionem. Maior, de se est evidens, »quia nihil aliud est privatio quam carere forma ad quam aliquid secundum se est in potentia. Unde habere formam aliquam in actu et esse in potentia ad aliam est esse simul sub forma et privatione, sicut patet de materia existente sub forma aeris, quae caret forma ignis«. Minor etiam declarabitur, videlicet si E 95va eadem est materia caeli cum istis inferioribus, | tunc ipsa materia caeli in potentia erit ad formas inferiores, quia quando aliquid secundum se est commune ad diversa secundum se consideratum, est in potentia ad omnia illa, quibus est commune, sicut materia inferiorum formarum, quia una communis est respectu omnium illarum, ideo est in potentia respectu cuiuslibet.

72 quia ... 76 ignis] cf. Thom., S.c.g., III, 4, 4 (§1892) 63 omne] add. illud Ba | eo] add. quod E 64 secundum essentiam] om. Pi 65 est ... potentia] in potentia est Be Bol Kl N Pi W1 | et] sed N 66 ipsa] add. materia P | privationi subiicitur] inv. Ba | illa] ista Ba Kl P 66 est 67 dispositio] condicio est N 67 corporis] om. G | corruptibilis] add. scilicet E G P | formam] materia in marg. corr. Be; add. corruptioni sed exp. P | privationi subiectam] inv. Ba Be 68 ipsa] om. Be | essent] erunt E W2 | corruptibilia] corporalia N 69 quod] add. corpora P | incorruptibilia] corruptibilia P | habeant] habent Ba; add. eandem N | eiusdem] add. scilicet N 70 corporibus] om. Bol G | corruptibilibus] incorruptibilibus P | corpora] om. E G | incorruptibilia] corruptibilia P 71 corruptibilia] incorruptibilia P 72 de se] om. N | est evidens] inv. G | quia] quod Bol Kl | nihil] om. Kl | aliud] om. G P | aliud est] inv. Ba N 73 aliquid] om. E G N W2 | est ... potentia] in potentia est Be W1 Kl 74 aliam] aliquam E | est] cum N 75 sub] cum Bol P Pi 76 etiam] om. W2 | declarabitur] declaratur Ba P W2; patet N | videlicet] scilicet E G N W2 77 eadem] etiam Kl 78 in ... erit] erit in potentia Ba E G P W2; est in potentia N | aliquid secundum] inv. E 78 secundum ... 79 est] est secundum se N 79 est commune] om. W2 | ad ... se] suppl. in marg. W2 80 illa] om. N; ista W1 | sicut] add. ipsa Ba | formarum] om. Bol N P Pi 81 una ... est] una est communis Ba; est una communis W2 | illarum] istarum Ba Bol P Pi W1; aliarum formarum N | ideo] ergo N

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Si ergo materia caeli est eadem cum materia istorum inferiorum constat quod ipsa communis erit et formae caeli et formis elementorum, 85 ergo secundum se erit in potentia ad eas. Tunc arguo | “nulla potentia W1 33va passiva est in materia cui non respondeat potentia activa naturalis, potens eam ad actum reducere; alias illa potentia esset frustra. Sed nulla potentia naturalis | invenitur quae possit naturaliter materiam caeli ad G 37vb actum alterius formae reducere”. Ergo numquam fuit in potentia ad 90 formas istas inferiores. Et si non fuit in potentia, ergo non fuit eadem cum materia inferiorum cum formis talibus careat. Ad hanc autem rationem aliqui respondent et dicunt quod materia caeli non est in potentia ad formas elementorum. »Et rationem dicunt talem, quia quod materia sit in potentia ad formas aliquas, hoc est pro 95 tanto quia totus appetitus non satiatur per formam habitam, sicut patet de materia existente sub forma aeris. Sed forma caeli totaliter saciat appetitum materiae suae, ita quod non restat iam quod sit in potentia ad aliquas formas inferiorum corporum et maxime, ut dicunt, quia forma caeli virtute contineat in se omnes formas inferiores«.

85 nulla ... 90 reducere] Thom., Super Sent., II, 12, 1, 1, sol. (302) 92 aliqui] Sig. de Brab., Quaest. in Metaph., V, 13 (317,22-318,41) 93 Et ... 99 inferiores] cf. Aeg. Rom., De mat. cael., II (87vb) 83 si ergo] inv. Ba | ergo] igitur G | istorum] illorum Be; om. N 84 communis erit] inv. Ba P; communis est W2 | erit] est E G N; erat W1 | et] om. G | elementorum] inferiorum W2 85 ergo] add. se N | secundum] om. N | secundum se] om. G | erit] est E G N W1 W2 | eas] illas W2 | tunc] ex hoc P | arguo] add. et N; sic P 86 materia] natura Ba | respondeat] respondet Bol N | naturalis] naturaliter E 87 eam ... reducere] ad actum eam reducere E; ad actum reducere Kl; eam reducere ad actum N P | alias] add. ex E; add. ergo Kl | alias ... frustra] alioquin esset potentia illa frustra Ba | illa] ista W1 88 naturalis] add. quae sed exp. G | possit naturaliter] inv. Ba | naturaliter] totaliter G 89 actum] add. reducere sed del. N | alterius] illius E | alterius formae] inv. W2 | fuit] add. ad Bol | potentia] add. passiva Ba 90 formas istas] inv. Ba P W2 | istas] om. E G N | fuit] est N P 91 cum] om. N | formis talibus] inv. Ba P 92 aliqui respondent] inv. Ba W2 92 ad ... 94 quia] sed aliqui qui sunt de contraria opinione dicunt quod harum materiarum naturalis diversitas non est causa quod caelum non sit in potentia ad formas elementorum sed hanc assignant rationem N 93 et ... 94 talem] et assignat talem rationem P 94 sit] est Bol Kl P Pi | sit ... potentia] in potentia sit Be E W1 95 quia] quod Ba E G N | appetitus] add. materiae N 96 aeris] animalis N 97 suae] om. P | iam] om. P Pi | quod] quo Be; add. iam Kl | sit] add. iam Be Bol P Pi W1 98 inferiorum corporum] inv. E G N 99 quia] quod E W2 | contineat] continet Ba Bol P Pi W2; continent W1 | in ... inferiores] omnes formas inferiorum in se W2

112

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GUILLELMI PETRI DE GODINO

Sed ista solutio nihil valet, quia potentia de se aequaliter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum. Unde existens sub forma ignis iam materia non minus est in potentia | ad formam ignobiliorem, scilicet formam aeris. »Et praeterea. Dato quod caelum propter suam perfectionem totum appetitum | materiae terminaret, tamen adhuc materia existens sub forma elementi esset in potentia ad formam caeli, et per virtutem corporis caelestis et substantiae separatae ad actum talem reduceretur. | Et sic caelum | esset generabile et corruptibile vel posset conqueri ipse aer | quod non posset reduci ad formam caeli, quia appetitus naturalis numquam est frustra. Praeterea. Si materia est sua potentia, ergo amota potentia non est materia eadem«. Modo sunt aliqui qui contra rationem istam arguunt et ostendunt tribus rationibus, quod materia corporum inferiorum et superiorum sit eiusdem rationis.

104 Et ... 112 eadem] cf. Appendix A, ll. 130-144. 113 aliqui] cf. Aeg. Rom., De mat. cael., II (88vb) 100 ista] illa Be Pi | solutio] add. seu ratio N | nihil] non E | aequaliter] aliter Pi | se] om. N 101 perfectum ... imperfectum] perfectionem et imperfectionem G | unde] add. materia P | materia] om. P 102 scilicet] sed habet N; add. ad P | formam] om. W2 104 suam] add. propriam G | perfectionem] imperfectionem N 105 adhuc] ad hanc Ba 106 caeli] iter. Pi 107 ad ... reduceretur] reduceretur ad talem actum P 108 et] ut E W2 | sic] si E | generabile ... corruptibile] corruptibile et generabile Ba Be Bol Kl Pi W1 | vel] et W1 109 quod] quia Pi | posset] possit G | quia] add. eius N 111 est] esset Kl | est] erit Be Bol P Pi W1 111 materia 112 eadem] inv. E G 113 modo] add. tertio P | rationem] positionem Ba | rationem istam] inv. G W1 W2 | istam] illam Bol 113 modo ... 115 rationis] et sic remanet idem quod prius quod haec duae materiae non sunt eiusdem rationis nec naturae sed adhuc contra hoc arguunt aliquibus rationibus N 114 corporum] om. W2 | inferiorum ... superiorum] superiorum et inferiorum Kl P W2 | sit] sint Kl

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»Primo sic. Quae plus de actualitate habent plus appropinquant ad Deum, ita scilicet quod non sunt duo entia in natura distincta, quae aequaliter a primo distent, ergo illa quae aequaliter a primo distant, impossibile est ea esse distincta. Sed materia caeli et elementorum, cum 120 utraque sit in potentia pura, aequaliter distant a primo. Ergo sunt una materia«. Secundo sic. »Materia est quid medium inter nihil et ens actu secundum Commentatorem. Sed inter duo extrema impossibile est invenire | duo media aeque distantia ab extremis. Sed constat quod Bol 53va 125 utraque materia aequaliter distat ab ente actu et nihilo, quia utraque est potentia pura. Ergo impossibile est invenire inter ipsas duas distinctiones, sed oportet quod sit eadem materia secundum essentiam«. | Pi 46vb Tertio sic. Materia de se quid indistinctum dicit, quia omnis distinctio fit a forma. Ergo si consideretur natura materiae in caelo, cum 130 nihil actualitatis habeat, non poterit in se habere quo distinguatur ab

116 Primo ... 121 materia] cf. Aeg. Rom., De mat. cael., II (89ra-vb) 122 Materia ... 127 essentiam] cf. Aeg. Rom., De mat. cael., II (89vb) 123 Commentatorem] cf. Averr., Phys., I, 70 (41rD); V, 7 (211rC); cf. Averr., Metaph., XII, 11 (297rD). 116 quae] quod E | de ... habent] habent de actualitate E G P W2 116 appropinquant ... 117 Deum] Deo appropinquant N 117 Deum] eum sed corr. Be | ita] suppl. al.m. in marg. W1 | sunt] sit dare Ba | duo] om. E | entia] aequalia W1 | in natura] om. Be E G N W2 | distincta] om. W2 118 a ... distent] distent a primo Ba P W2 | illa] ista N W1 | a ... distant] distant a primo P; add. ergo ista quae aequaliter in natura distant W1; distant a primo ergo illa quae aequaliter distant a primo W2 119 impossibile est] inv. P | ea] om. N W2 | esse distincta] inv. G W2 | elementorum] obiectorum sed corr. Be 120 utraque sit] inv. Ba Be Kl Pi W1 | in] om. Ba Be Bol Pi W1 | pura] passiva E G N; pura sed in marg. corr. W2 120 sunt una] inv. Be Bol Kl N Pi W1 121 materia] natura Ba Be Bol Kl P Pi W1 122 secundo sic] praeterea N | quid] om. E G N W2 | medium] media N | nihil] om. Bol 123 sed] om. Be W1; sicut E 124 invenire] venire sed corr. Be | duo media] inv. Be Bol Kl Pi W1 | aequa] aequae Be Pi | constat] add. autem N 125 distat] om. N; distet W1 | et] add. a Ba | nihilo] add. distent N | est] add. in W2 126 pura] passiva E G N; pura sed corr. W2 | invenire ... distinctiones] inter ipsas invenire distinctionem G; eas esse inter se distinctas N | duas] om. E 127 sit] sint G | sit ... materia] eadem materia sint Be; eadem materia sit Bol Kl P Pi W1 128 de] secundum W2 | quid] om. E | quid ... dicit] dicit quid indistinctum Ba P; dicit quid distinctum N | quia] quod Bol E 129 a forma] per formam N | ergo si] inv. G | in] om. G | caelo] caeli G 130 actualitatis] add. in se Bol; actu actualitatis Kl | poterit] potest G N | habere] add. per Be | quo] quod Ba Be Kl N; quod sed al.m. corr. W1

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alia materia, nisi per formas. Sed ipsae formae sunt extrinsicae respectu naturae materiae. Ergo talis distinctio | non est secundum essentiam materiae, sed per aliquid extrinsecum. Et sic idem quod prius. »Unde dicunt isti quod ipsa materia non est secundum se in potentia ad formas naturales, nisi secundum quod subicitur contrariis. Unde 135 cum agens non attingat immediate essentiam materiae, sed materia transmutatur ab agente, secundum quod subicitur contrario, cum in caelo ista materia non subiciatur contrario, non est in potentia ad formas aliquas nec poterit reduci ab agente naturali ad actum aliarum formarum inferiorum«. 140 E 96ra Sed ista | positio deficit in modo ponendi et in rationibus suis. Primo quod dicit quod materia non est in potentia ad formam, nisi ratione contrarii cui subicitur. Hoc videtur esse falsum, quia secundum hoc est aliquid in potentia ad perfectionem aliquam, quo per eam perficitur. Certum est autem quod materia immediate perficitur a forma sine 145 aliquo contrario medio. Et ideo non per contrarium medium est in potentia ad formam.

N 49rb

134 Unde ... 140 inferiorum] cf. Aeg. Rom., De mat. cael., II (89vb) 131 nisi] nihil N sed] quia Pi W1 ipsae] om. W1 | sunt extrinsice] inv. N | extrinsice] intrinsice Pi 132 naturae] om. N W2 | ergo] modo Pi | est] erit Ba Be Bol Kl Pi W1 133 per] om. Pi | extrinsecum] extrinsecus N | et sic] ergo E G 134 isti] ipsi sed corr. Bol; ipsi W1 | ipsa] om. W1 | non est] suppl. in marg. Be; suppl. al.m. in marg. W1 | secundum ... potentia] in potentia secundum se E G 135 nisi] suppl. s.l. Be | secundum quod] ut E G | unde] om. N 136 cum] om. Bol materia] tantum N 137 transmutatur ... agente] suppl. in marg. W2 | secundum quod] ut G; suppl. in marg. W2 | contrario] contrariis E 138 in ... contrario] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba | ista] illa Bol | est] erit Ba Kl W1 139 formas aliquas] inv. Ba; alias formas ideo N | aliquas] alias Bol Kl Pi | nec] add. etiam Ba; ut Bol Kl P Pi; non N | poterit] possit Bol P Pi | aliarum] om. G; add. istorum P 139 ad ... 140 formarum] ad actum naturali sed corr. W2 | aliarum formarum] inv. Be Kl Pi; formarum aliorum W1 141 ista] illa N W1 | deficit] add. et Ba E W2; add. etiam Kl | ponendi] om. Kl | suis] add. et P; om. W1 | primo] add. in hoc N 142 quod] quia Bol P | dicit] dicunt Kl | formam] formas Pi W1 | nisi] add. in W1 143 subicitur] add. G Kl Pi | hoc] add. enim N | esse] om. Ba | esse falsum] inv. E G | est] om. E 143 est 144 aliquid] inv. G W2 144 quo] quod G; qua N | eam] om. N 145 est autem] inv. Be E Kl W2 146 non ... 147 formam] non est in potentia ad formam per medium contrarium G; nec per contrarium medium est in potentia ad formam W2 | per] add. aliquod P

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Et praeterea. Commentator in De substantia orbis dicit quod “materia substantificatur per posse”. Constat autem quod unumquodque per 150 substantiam suam substantificatur, | ergo ipsa potentia est de essentia W2 158vb ipsius materiae et sic secundum se est in potentia ad formam. Praeterea. Vel oportet necessario quod sit potentia pura vel quod sit actus purus, | vel compositum ex utroque. Sed constat quod nec est Ba 38ra actus purus, nec compositum. Ergo ipsa secundum se est in potentia, 155 sed non nisi respectu ad formam, ergo etc. Nec valet quod ipsi dicunt quod nullum agens immediate | attingat Kl 54rb essentiam materiae. Per hoc enim posset probari quod intellectus non immediate intelligit, quia certum est quod intelligibile numquam attingit intellectum sine sensibus. Dico igitur quod, quamvis materia 160 non attingatur ab agente a principio, attingitur tamen in fine transmutationis respectu ipsius esse. Item ad hoc quod agens aliquid generet, requiritur generatio et alteratio praecedens. Quamvis ergo non attingatur materia ab agente secundum alterationem, attingitur tamen secundum generationem.

148 materia ... 149 posse] cf. Averr., De subst. orb., I, 1 (3vL-M)

148 et] om. G N | praeterea] add. dicit W2 | Commentator] add. dicit N; om. W1 | in] om. W2 | dicit] om. W2 149 substantificatur ... posse] per posse substantificatur Ba Bol Kl N W1; per se substantificatur Pi 149 pro ... 150 substantificatur] om. (hom.) E | per ... substantificatur] substantificatur per substantiam suam Ba 150 substantiam suam] inv. N | suam] om. W1 | potentia] substantia sed corr. W2 151 ipsius] om. G W2 | est ... materiae] de essentia ipsius materiae est Bol N Pi W1 | secundum] per N | secundum ... est] est secundum se W1 152 vel] om. W2 | necessario quod] inv. N | quod] add. vel W2 | pura] passiva N 152 quod 153 sit] om. E G W2 153 vel] add. quod sit P | ex utroque] om. N | constat] patet N | quod] add. non est Ba | nec] non Kl N | est] om. Ba E W2; sit Kl N 154 purus] om. Be Bol Kl Pi W1 | secundum se] om. W2 | in] om. Ba P W2 | potentia] add. pura P 155 nisi] add. E G | ergo] ideo G 156 immediate attingat] inv. Bol Pi | attingat] attingit Ba Kl N 157 posset] possit Bol; possunt E | intelligit] add. ipsum intelligibilem in marg. G 158 quia] quod N | quod] quid Kl; suppl. al.m. in marg. W1 | intelligibile] visibile W1 159 intellectum] add. intelligitur Be; om. et add. intelligitur E; add. immediate in marg. et add. quia et add. non s.l. et add. intelligitur G | igitur] ergo G Kl Pi 160 a] in Ba Bol P Pi 162 item] om. N | hoc] add. enim N | aliquid] om. G 163 materia] om. N

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Ad | rationes suas dico ad primam quod distinctio istarum materiarum est in ordine ad actum. Unde quia ipsi actus non aequaliter distant a primo, nec ipsae potentiae materiae. Praeterea. Dico quod aliter distant ipsa entia in actu a primo et G 38ra aliter ipsae potentiae, | quia entia in actu distant per formas et actus proprios, sed diversae potentiae propter diversum ordinem ad actum, qui tamen ordo nullam ponit actualitatem in materia. Ad secundum dico quod duplex est medium inter duo extrema. Unum, quod dicitur per abnegationem utriusque extremi, quod non est alterum extremorum, sicut dicimus quod pallidum est medium E 96rb inter album | et nigrum. Aliud est medium per aequam distantiam ab utroque extremorum, sicut punctus signatus in medio lineae. Si loquitur de primo medio, dico quod maior est falsa, quia pallidum et rubeum hoc modo sunt media inter album et nigrum. Si autem loquamur de secundo medio, sic est vera, sed nihil ad propositum, quia ens in potentia sive materia non est medium aeque distans ab ente actu et nihilo, immo a nihilo differt in infinitum. Nec potest reduci, nisi per agens infinitae potentiae. Sed per agens naturale potest reduci ens in W1 33vb potentia | ad ens actu. Be 47ra

165 suas] om. N; ergo eorum P | dico] dicendum N; est dicendum P | primam] primum E N W1 | distinctio] distinctiones N | istarum] illarum Be N P 166 in] secundum Ba | ordine] ordinem Ba | ipsi] ipsa Bol P Pi; ipse N | actus] actio Bol P Pi 167 distant] distat Bol; distet N; distat P | primo] add. ita Ba Kl P W2 | distant ... primo] a primo distant W2 | nec] add. ita Bol W1 | potentiae] primae Ba Bol N | potentiae materiae] materiae primae Kl 168 quod ... et] om. Bol Pi; quando dicitur P | distant] add. prima sed del. N | ipsa] om. Ba N entia] essentia W1 | ipsa ... et] a primo ipsa entia in actu et W2 169 aliter] alicuius W2 | ipsae] add. eadem Bol | potentiae] add. etc. P | quia] quod P | entia] etiam Bol | in] om. Pi | actu] add. non W2 171 nullam ... actualitatem] ponit nullam actualitatem N | ponit actualitatem] inv. Ba W1 | in] add. ipsa Ba 172 secundum] secundam Pi | dico] dicendum P 173 unum] unde sed al.m. corr. Ba; unde W1 | quod] quia G | dicitur] om. N | per] om. N | quod] quia N; add. scilicet P 174 sicut] ut E G; add. cum N | pallidum] pallidus W1 175 aequam] aeque N 176 ab] alio Bol | signatus] signatum G | si] add. ergo G P W2; add. autem E; add. igitur N 177 loquitur] loquimur Kl; om. N; loquamur P Pi | primo medio] inv. E | quod] om. E G | est] om. N 179 loquamur] loquitur E G; om. N | sic] add. maior Bol | sed] et tunc Bol P Pi | nihil] add. aliud N 180 ens] om. N | sive] sine N | est] erit N | actu] in actu Bol P Pi W2 181 immo ... nihilo] om. (hom.) Bol Kl P Pi | a] om. E | differt] distat E G N W2 | nec] quia nihil non N | reduci] add. ens in potentia in nihil Bol; add. ad actum N 182 naturale] add. non sed del. N | reduci] add. ad actum N 182 per ... 183 actu] ens in potentia potest reduci ad ens in actu per agens naturale P 183 ad ... actu] om. N | ens] add. in Bol Pi

165

170

175

180

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Ad tertium dico quod, cum potentia dicatur proprie ad actum, distinctio eius est ex ordine ad actum completive; tamen ipsa habitudo ad talem actum, quae est de essentia materiae, est intrinseca ipsae materiae, ita scilicet quod principium distinctionis inest intrinsice ipsis materiis, sed formalis et completiva distinctio est a formis. »Modo restat unum magnum dubium, quia dictum est quod si 190 materia eiusdem rationis est in istis inferioribus et in caelo, tunc illa corpora sunt ad invicem transmutabilia cum caelo. Ergo cum eiusdem rationis sit materia in diversis | stellis et planetis, quae differunt speciem, tunc unum erit in aliud transmutabile. Posset dici quod, licet sit materia eiusdem rationis, non tamen | illa materia est in potentia ad 195 esse, sed ad ubi tantum, quod | habet talis | materia ex dignitate | sua et formae suae. 185

188 Modo ... 214 continuatio] cf. Anon., Super Sent., II, 12, cod. Bruges, 303va

184 tertium] tertiam Pi | dico] dicendum Ba P | cum potentia] composita Ba Be; add. proprie Bol N W2; composita sed al.m. s.l. corr. W1 | dicatur] dicuntur Ba Be; dicitur E G; dicuntur sed dicatur al.m. s.l. corr. W1 | proprie] om. Bol N W2 | proprie ... actum] ad actum proprie Ba | actum] add. et per se Ba E G 185 distinctio ... est] distinctionem etiam habet N; eius distinctio est P | ex] in E G N W2 | ordine] om. E; ordinatione W1 | ad] om. E | actum] actu E | tamen] om. Be N W1 | ipsa] add. enim N 185 completive ... 186 actum] om. (hom.) Bol Kl P Pi 186 quae] om. W2 | de] om. Kl | est] om. Bol; et W2 | ipsae] ipsi E Pi W1 187 materiae] add. scilicet E | scilicet] om. E G | ipsis] ipsius E 188 materiis] contrariis Ba Be Kl Pi; contrariis sed al.m. corr. W1 | sed ... formis] om. N | formalis ... completiva] completiva et formalis W2 | distinctio] distinctionis P | formis] add. sed P 189 magnum] om. G | quia] quod E W1 | quod] om. E G 190 materia] add. est Bol Pi | est] om. Be Bol; esset N | in ... et] om. Bol Kl P Pi | istis ... caelo] caelo et in inferioribus Ba | et] est Be | illa] ista Ba E G W1 191 transmutabilia] add. cum istis inferioribus et Kl | cum caelo] sicut in istis inferioribus Bol P Pi | ergo cum] om. (hom.) Ba | cum] add. materia G | eiusdem] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba 192 materia] om. G | sit materia] inv. Bol N W2 193 tunc] om. E; add. enim N | erit] est Pi | in aliud] om. Pi | in ... transmutabile] transmutabile in aliud Ba W1 W2; transmutabile in aliud ad quod N; transmutabile in aliud ad hoc P | posset] potest P | licet] add. ibi P 194 sit materia] inv. Bol E G | non] si Kl | illa ... est] est illa materia Ba | ad] add. aliud N 195 quod] quia N | habet ... materia] talem materiam habet N; illa materia P; talis materia habet W1 | ex] a Bol 196 suae] add. et si sic dicatur P; add. sed W2

Bol 53vb P 42vb Ba 38rb / Pi 47ra N 49va

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Tunc est contra illud, quod dictum est supra de angelis, ubi probatur quod non esset ibi materia, quia si esset eiusdem rationis, tunc angeli essent transmutabiles et corruptibiles. Et ideo potest dici quod totum caelum est unum corpus. Et sicut ibi est una materia in toto caelo, ita 200 est una forma. Unde videmus quod, si homo constaret ex tota materia sua, esset unus homo incorruptibilis non obstante diversitate speciei in partibus, ita possumus dicere in caelo. Et ideo non sequitur quod materia, quae est sub una parte, sit in potentia ad aliam, quia materia E 96va / Kl 54va propter partem non est, | sed propter | totum. 205 Et si dicatur quod non est simile de homine et caelo, quia partes hominis sunt ad invicem colligatae, non autem in caelo, dicendum quod materia unitur formae secundum rationem formae et modum suum. Unde cum anima diversas operationes habeat, requirit diversa membra ad executionem earum, quod non esset, nisi essent colligata 210 toti corpori, quia aliter virtus animae ad membra non diffunderetur.

197 tunc] add. hoc W2 | est] om. Pi | illud] id Be E Pi; om. W2 | quod] om. W2 | est] om. W2 | ubi] quando P | probatur] probabatur Ba Be P; probabitur Kl 198 non] om. N | materia] add. dicebatur eum ibi P | esset] add. materia Kl; add. et N | rationis] add. esset N; add. talis materia P 198 eiusdem ... 199 essent] ibi esset ad invicem W2 200 et] quia Bol P Pi | ibi est] inv. Ba E N | in ... caelo] om. N | ita] sicut N 201 unde] add. sicut Ba 201 materia 202 sua] inv. Bol P Pi | incorruptibilis] corruptibilis sed al.m. corr. Ba 203 possumus] potest P | dicere] dici P | in] de P 203 in ... 204 sit] om. E 204 una parte] inv. Bol 205 propter ... est] non est propter partem Ba G P | partem] add. in partibus ita possumus dicere in caelo et ideo non sequitur quod materia quae est sub una parte sit in potentia ad aliam quia materia propter partem non est E 206 et] om. P | si] sic Be | non ... simile] simile non est W1 207 sunt ... invicem] ad invicem sunt Be Bol Kl P Pi W1 209 anima] alia Be | diversas ... habeat] habeat diversas operationes Ba P | operationes habeat] habeat potentias N 210 essent] om. W2 | essent colligata] inv. Bol N Pi W1 | colligata] colligatae G; alligati sed corr. et add. erunt W2 211 aliter] alias P | virtus ... diffunderetur] non diffunderetur virtus animae Ba | ad] add. diversa W2 | membra] totum corpus P

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Unde sicut ad operationem requiritur debita colligatio in membris, ita ad operationem partium caeli requiritur sine colligatione distinctio ratione motus caeli. Unde cum partes aliquae motus habeant distinctos, 215 requiritur quod ibi non sit continuatio«. »Ad primum argumentum principale dicendum quod | loquendo Be 47rb physice non sunt unum genere corpus corruptibile et incorruptibile; tamen loquendo logice bene conveniunt in genere«. Ad secundum patet solutio ex dictis, quia “cum potentia dicatur ad 220 actum, ex hoc ipso est ens in potentia diversum eo quod ordinatur ad actum diversum”. | W2 159ra

215 Ad ... 217 genere] cf. Thom., S. th., I, 66, 2, ad 2 218 cum ... 220 diversum] Thom., S. th., I, 66, 2, ad 4

212 operationem] add. hominis E G P; operationes animae W2 | colligatio] cogitatio sed corr. N 213 requiritur] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba | sine ... distinctio] distinctio sine colligatione Ba | distinctio] distinctione sed corr. P 214 partes aliquae] inv. Ba | motus habeant] inv. P | habeant] add. motus Ba; habent N 215 requiritur] om. Kl | quod] quia E | ibi ... sit] non sit ibi Ba | continuatio] add. ad argumenta in oppositum dicendum P 216 argumentum] om. P | principale] om. N P W1 | dicendum] om. P | quod] add. ad sed del. Ba 217 unum] add. in E | incorruptibile] add. et W1 218 tamen] sed Bol P Pi | tamen loquendo] inv. N | loquendo logice] inv. G | bene] om. W2 219 quia] quod Kl | cum potentia] inv. W2 220 hoc] om. E G | est ... potentia] ens in potentia est W2 | in potentia] om. P 220 ex ... 221 diversum] suppl. al.m. in marg. Ba

ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE OF DISTANT THINGS: FROM THOMAS AQUINAS TO THE LECTURA THOMASINA Alessandro Palazzo During the course of the second half of the 13th century, angelic knowledge became a key topic in the field of medieval angelology, attracting growing attention from scholastics.1 Thomas Aquinas dedicated an increasing number of articles to angelic understanding throughout his scholarly career: five in the Sentences commentary, seventeen in the De veritate, twenty-three in the De summa theologiae. By the last quarter of the century, angelic epistemology became a particularly hot topic in the Correctoria literature. Angelic cognition was one of William de la Mare’s priviledged targets in his Correctorium Fratris Thomae.2 The so-called Correctoria Corruptorii of William’s Dominican opponents took great pain to answer the critiques made by the

1. On medieval angelology, see Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry. Their Function and Significance, I. Iribarren – M. Lenz (eds.), Aldershot-Burlington, VT 2008; A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy, T. Hoffmann (ed.) (Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition, 35), Leiden-Boston 2012. For a concise overview of the various traditions underlying late medieval angelology, see T. Suarez-Nani, “Individualität und Subjektivität der Engel im 13. Jahrhundert. Thomas von Aquin, Heinrich von Gent und Petrus Johannis Olivi,” in: Das Mittelalter 11 (2006), pp. 29-48: 29-31. 2. Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare.” Les premières polémiques Thomistes: I. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare”, éd. par P. Glorieux (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 9), Kain 1927, aa. 18-20 (nn.18-20), pp. 79-91: “Quod omnes species per quas angeli cognoscunt sunt eis connaturales”; “Quod intellectus non potest ducere ad esse intelligibile istas formas materiales nisi prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum imaginatarum”; “Quod angelus superior intelligit per species pauciores”; aa. 41-42 (nn.41-42), pp. 180-187: “Quod angeli superiores quidquid a Deo recipiunt subiectis impartiuntur”; “Quod distantia localis nullum facit impedimentum in locutione angelorum”; a. 7 (n.93), pp. 378-379: “Quod substantiae spirituales superiores intelligunt per species pauciores.” See also the following related issues: aa. 36-38 (nn.36-38), pp. 169177: “Quod anima separata intelligit per species ex influentia divini luminis participatas”; “Quod anima separata cognoscit seipsam per seipsam”; “Quod distantia localis non impedit cognitionem animae separatae.”

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Franciscan theologian,3 and introduced new arguments to the debate. Late 13th and 14th-century Sentences commentators, while increasingly selective in their choice of topics, continued to pay great attention to angelic knowing, thus keeping these discussions very much alive.4 In accordance with this tendency, the Lectura Thomasina also devotes considerable space to angelic epistemology. The Lectura Thomasina – a Sentences commentary written by the Dominican William of Peter Godin – is one of the most significant 3. On the disputes between the Correctoria see e.g. P. Glorieux, “Pro et contra Thomam. Un survol de cinquante années,” in: T.W. Köhler (ed.), Sapientiae procerum amore. Mélanges Médiévistes offerts à Dom Jean-Pierre Müller O.S.B. à l’occasion de son 70ème anniversaire (24 février 1974), Roma 1974, pp. 255-287: 261-270; M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits of Metaphysics,” in: Speculum 57 (1982), pp. 292-314; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas’ View on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in de la Mare’s Correctorium (1278-9) and the Correctoria Corruptorii (1279-ca 1286),” in: J.B.M. Wissink (ed.), The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 27), Leiden-New York-København-Köln 1990, pp. 39-68; L. Hödl, “Korrektorienstreit,” in: Lexikon des Mittelalters, Bd. 5, München 1991, col. 1448; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Being and Thinking in the ‘Correctorium fratris Thomae’ and the ‘Correctorium corruptorii Quare.’ Schools of Thought and Philosophical Methodology,” in: J.A. Aertsen – K. Emery – A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28), Berlin-New York 2001, pp. 417-435, and further bibliographical references listed in these publications. On the so-called “First Thomistic School” and the Dominican cultural strategies on Aquinas’ doctrinal legacy, see F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, Iowa 1964; C. Viola, “L‘École thomiste au Moyen Âge,” in: G. Fløistad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy. A new survey. Vol. 6. Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages. Part 1, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1990, pp. 345-377; M.M. Mulchahey, “First the Bow is Bent in Study...” Dominican Education before 1350, Torono 1998, pp. 141-167; I. Iribarren, “Responsio secundum Thomam and the Search for an Early Thomistic School,” in: Vivarium 39 (2001), pp. 255-296; A.A. Robiglio, “Tommaso d’Aquino tra morte e canonizzazione (1274-1323),” in A. Ghisalberti – A. Petagine, R. Rizzello (eds.), Letture e interpretazioni di Tommaso d’Aquino oggi: cantieri aperti. Atti del Convegno internazionale di studio (Milano, 12-13 settembre 2005), Torino 2006, pp. 197216; id., La sopravvivenza e la gloria. Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV) (Sacra Dottrina. Bibliotheca, 53), Bologna 2008, pp. 24-25; G. Koridze, “The Formation of the First Thomistic School,” in: F. Amerini (ed.), Dal convento alla città. Filosofia e teologia in Francesco da Prato O.P. (XIV secolo), Firenze 2008, pp. 133-160; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden. Lehrtraditionen bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters,” in: M.J.F.M. Hoenen – R. Imbach – C. König-Pralong (eds.), Deutsche Thomisten des 14. Jahrhunderts: Lektüren, Aneignungsstrategien, Divergenzen / Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences (Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 57 [2010]), pp. 260-285; P. Porro, Tommaso d’Aquino. Un profilo storico-filosofico, Roma 2012, pp. 464-476. 4. T. Suarez-Nani, “L’innato e l’acquisito: Pietro Aureolo e la conoscenza degli angeli,” in: L. Bianchi – C. Crisciani (eds.), Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria Elena Reina (Micrologus’ Library, 61), Firenze 2014, pp. 135-194: 138.

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witnesses to the disputes over Aquinas’ intellectual legacy.5 William was twice Bachelor of the Sentences, first in Toulouse between 1296 and 1298 and then in Paris between 1299 and 1300;6 the composition of the Lectura should therefore, it has been suggested, be placed between 1296 and 1300-1301.7 It is not clear whether the work is a simple reportatio, as the concise form of several quaestions seems to indicate, or an ordinatio, as the reworking of some of the sources quoted suggests. Godin quotes mainly, but not exclusively, from Thomas’ works (the Sentences commentary and the Summa theologiae especially, but also the Summa contra Gentiles, the Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, De spiritualibus creaturis, the commentaries on Physics, Metaphysics and Posterior analitics). This heavy reliance on Aquinas’ works led, in one manuscript, to the Lectura being called Thomasina. Godin also has frequent recourse to the Sentences commentary of John Quidort, whose lectures on the Sentences date to the period between 1292 and 1296 and provide a useful terminus post quem. Another source is the Sentences commentary contained in the Brügge, Stadtbibliothek, ms. 491 and long ascribed to 5. On the Lectura Thomasina, see M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino († 1336) und seine Lectura Thomasina,” in: Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, Bd. 2, München 1936, pp. 559-576; L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung von Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300 (Erfurter theologische Studien, 20), Leipzig 1966; B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42,1), Münster 1967, pp. 24-31; W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Parvi flores. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 10,3), Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 83-109; W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Von der Erkenntnis der Engel. Der Streit um die species intelligibilis und eine quaestio aus dem anonymen Sentenzenkommentar in ms. Brügge, Stadtsbibliothek 491,” in: J.A. Aertsen – K. Emery – A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277, pp. 125-177; J.W. Peck SJ – C. Schabel, “James of Metz and the Dominican Tradition on the Eternity of the World, ca. 1300,” in: Medioevo 40 (2015), pp. 265-330: 265-297; F. Bonini, Edizione critica della Lectura Thomasina di Guglielmo di Pietro di Godino (libro I, Prol.-dist. 27), tesi di dottorato, Dottorato internazionale in filosofia: forme e storia dei saperi filosofici, Università del SalentoUniversität zu Köln. 6. On William of Peter Godin‘s life, see P. Fournier, “Le cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin,” in: Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 86 (1925), pp. 100-121; id., “Guillaume de Peyre de Godin, cardinal,” in: Histoire littéraire de la France, 37 (1938), pp. 146-153; M.-H. Laurent, “Le testament et la succession du Cardinal Dominicain Guillaume de Pierre Godin,” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 2 (1932), pp. 84-231; R. Darricau, “Le cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin, des Frères Prêcheurs (1260-1336),” in: Société des sciences, lettres et arts de Bayonne 129 (1973), pp. 125-141. The most up-to-date biographical profile is to be found in F. Bonini, Edizione critica della Lectura Thomasina, pp. IX-XXVII. 7. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, pp. 28-29.

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Eckhart, an attribution no longer accepted by scholars. Whereas Martin Grabmann asserted that Godin subscribed slavishly to all of Aquinas’ teachings, and described the Lectura Thomasina as merely “eine getreue und klare Darstellung und Zusammenfassung der thomistischen Theologie,”8 later studies have revised this evaluation: today the thesis that the Lectura Thomasina simply summarizes Aquinas’ writings is, for several reasons, no longer accepted. Above all, the polemical nature of the Lectura, which defends Aquinas’ thought against the criticisms of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Richard of Middleton, and William de la Mare, has been pointed out.9 As Decker remarks,10 the Lectura is sometimes quoted instead of Aquinas’ original writings. This is due to the fact that Godin succeeded in presenting Aquinas’ points of view on all the main theological issues and resolving the doctrinal contradictions that emerge in the latter’s works, particularly the Sentences commentary and the Summa theologiae. The Lectura Thomasina, in other words, promotes a coherent image of Aquinas’ thought, avoiding any inconsistencies between Aquinas’ early positions in the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum and the doctrinal developments in later works.11 As stated above, the Lectura Thomasina is particularly concerned with angelic knowledge. In Book 2, at least seven questions are explicitly dedicated to issues related to how angels cognize:12 d. 3, q. 15: “Utrum angeli intelligant per essentiam”; d. 4, q. 19: “Utrum casum suum presciverint et quid appetierint”; d. 4, q. 20: “Utrum intelligant per species innatas vel acquisitas”; d. 6, q. 23: “Utrum superiores intelligant per species magis universales”; 8. M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino († 1336),” p. 575. 9. See W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336),” p. 85; P. Porro, “Guglielmo di Pietro di Godino,” in: Enciclopedia filosofica, VII, Foer-Hatt, Milano 2010 (Ediz. spec.), p. 5070; F. Bonini, Edizione critica della Lectura Thomasina, pp. IX-XXVII. 10. B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz, pp. 30-31. 11. The Lectura Thomasina was not the only work intended to eliminate the contradictions within Thomas’ corpus: the collections of Concordantiae had the same purpose: see P. Glorieux, “Pro et contra Thomam. Un survol de cinquante années,” pp. 267-268, 275, 285-286. Instead, the Articuli in quibus Frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis listed the points of divergence between the Sentences commentary and the later Summa theologiae: see R.A. Gauthier, “Les Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis,” in: Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale 19 (1952), pp. 271-326. 12. Godin also deals with issues of angelological epistemology elsewhere in the Lectura (e.g., III, d. 14, qu. 1): see W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Von der Erkenntnis der Engel,” pp. 163-177.

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d. 7, q. 30: “Quod propter peccatum [scil. daemones] non sunt obtenebrati in cognitione”; d. 10, q. 38: “Utrum angeli secundum suas species cognoscant futura vel non entia”; d. 11, q. 40: “Quod unus angelus alium intelligit.”

Two others deal with angelic locution: d. 11, q. 39: “Utrum distantia localis impediat locutionem unius angeli cum alio”; d. 11, q. 41: “Que sit locutio unius angeli cum alio.”

All these questions are among the longest and most elaborate of Book 2 and must therefore be considered to be particularly significant. This paper raises a specific – and apparently marginal – issue concerning angelic cognition: the question of whether local distance represents an impediment to angelic knowledge. I will focus on q. 20, d. 4 of Book 2: Whether angels know by innate or acquired species (“Utrum intelligant per species innatas vel acquisitas”).13 This is the context in which Godin deals with the topic of local distance as a possible obstacle to the act of knowledge of spiritual substances. This issue is closely related to other questions regarding angelic cognition: can they know individual things? all natural things? non-existents? future events? Godin develops the argument concerning local distance as an impediment as it relates to all these questions. Moreover, this topic provides an epistemological framework in which besides the functioning of the angelic mind, Godin and his sources explore the mechanism of human cognition. Indeed, in the Middle Ages angelic knowledge was often used as an explanatory model for understanding human cognitive processes. Standing midway between God and the human soul in the hierarchy of being, angels share features 13. I am grateful to Andrea Colli for letting me use the provisional text of Book 2 of Godin’s Sentences commentary, which he is currently editing. For the medieval debate on the species theory with regard to angelic cognition, see W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Von der Erkenntnis der Engel,” pp. 125-153; T. Suarez-Nani, “Pierre de Jean Olivi et la subjectivité angélique,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 70 (2003), pp. 233-316: 284-297; A. Boureau, “Un débat sur l’inné et l’aquis dans l’intellect des anges. La question disputée 12 de Richard de Mediavilla,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 77 (2010), pp. 157-191: 161-164; T. Suarez-Nani, “L’innato e l’acquisito,” pp. 135-194.

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with both: like the human souls they understand through species; like God, their knowledge is independent of sensible things. Debates about angelic epistemology thus not only elucidate the modes, acts, and objects of the cognition of spiritual substances, but also provides a conceptual tool with which to clarify the characters of human and divine knowledge and the differences between the two. As has already been pointed out, angelic epistemology often underlies medieval discussions about speculative psychology, theory of knowledge, the philosophy of language, anthropology and theory of time.14 The explanatory function of angelology is also clear with regard to the subject of this paper, for the question of whether local distance affects angelic cognition sheds fresh light on how sense perception and intellectual knowledge combine in the human mind, giving rise to cognitive acts. This paper is divided into two main sections: I will first reconstruct the doctrinal background to Godin’s analysis by exploring Thomas Aquinas’ seminal text and the reactions to it within the Correctoria lit14. See e.g. T. Suarez-Nani, “Conoscenza e tempo: la simultaneità del conoscere angelico in Egidio Romano,” in: G. Alliney – L. Cova (eds.), Tempus, aevum aeternitas. La concettualizzazione del tempo nel pensiero tardomedievale. Atti del colloquio internazionale. Trieste, 4-6 marzo 1999, Firenze 2000, pp. 67-87: 87; ead., Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome, Paris 2002; ead., “Il parlare degli angeli: un segreto di Pulcinella?,” in: Micrologus. Natura, Scienze e Società Medievali 14 (2006), pp. 79-100: 79-80; T.B. Noone, “Saint Bonaventure and Angelic Natural Knowledge of Singulars: A Source for the Doctrine of Intuitive Cognition?,” in: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85,1 (2011), pp. 143-159; id., Of Angels and Men. Sketches from High Medieval Epistemology (The Etienne Gilson Series, 34), Toronto 2011. C. Panaccio, “Angel’s Talk, Mental Language, and the Transparency of the Mind,” in: C. Marmo (ed.), Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth-XIVth Century), Turnhout 1997, pp. 323-335. According to D. Perler, “Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology,” in: I. Iribarren – M. Lenz (eds.), Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry, pp. 143-153: 144: “Medieval discussions about angels often had the status of thought experiments in which basic problems were posed and discussed under idealized conditions. When asking how angels can have cognition or how they are able to communicate with each other, medieval philosophers intended to analyze how cognition and communication work in general.” Yet, angels were considered within these thought experiments not as fictitious entities, but “as real creatures that transcend the material world and therefore enable us to examine cognitive activities in its purest and most ideal form.” On a critical assessment of the conception of medieval angelological analyses as thought experiments, see B. Roling, Locutio angelica. Die Diskussion der Engelsprache als Antizipation einer Sprechakttheorie im Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Leiden-Boston 2008, p. 8. In this context it is important to emphasize Bazán’s attempt to expel angels from the philosophical discourse: see B.C. Bazán, “On Angels and Human Beings: Did Thomas Aquinas Succeed in Demonstrating the Existence of Angels,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 77 (2010), pp. 47-85: 80: “since there are no valid philosophical demonstrations of their existence, separate substances should no longer be a subject of philosophical consideration.”

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erature. The Lectura Thomasina is directly indebted to this debate, as we shall see. I will then examine the arguments that Godin adopts in his demonstration that local distance does not affect angelic cognition, and trace them back to their respective sources. 1. Thomas Aquinas Aquinas holds that angels acquire knowledge by three distinct means: through innate species they know creatures;15 by their own essence they acquire self-knowledge;16 the Divine Word, or essence, is the supernatural knowledge given with beatific vision.17 Thanks to a direct infusion from God, they are born with an intellect already equipped with species.18 These species are, in fact, similitudes of God’s essence.19 Therefore, angelic cognition works differently to that of humans: whereas the human intellect abstracts species from sensory information, the species through which the angelic intellect knows are formal cognitive principles which preexist external objects.20 This account, given in the Summa within the section devoted to angelic knowledge (Part 1 questions 54-58), remains substantially unchanged in all Thomas’ discussions of the subject.21 The question of whether local distance affects angelic cognition must be 15. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 55, a. 2, Cinisello Balsamo 1988, p. 265. 16. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 56, a. 1, sol., p. 267. By their own essence, angels can also have natural knowledge of God, insofar as the image of God is impressed on their own nature: Summa theol., Ia, q. 56, a. 3, sol., p. 269: “Quia enim imago Dei est in ipsa natura angeli impressa, per suam essentiam angelus Deum cognoscit, inquantum est similitudo Dei.” 17. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 57, a. 5, sol., p. 273: “Est autem alia angelorum cognitio, quae eos beatos facit, qua vident Verbum et res in Verbo.” 18. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 55, a. 2, sol., p. 265: “Substantiae vero superiores, idest angeli […] suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum intellectuali natura.” 19. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 57, a. 2, sol., p. 271: “[…] species a Deo inditas […] inquantum sunt quaedam repraesentationes multiplicatae illius unicae et simplicis essentiae”; ad 2, p. 271: “[…] species intellectus angeli, quae sunt quaedam derivatae similitudines a divina essentia […].” 20. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 55, a. 3, ad 1, p. 266; q. 57, a. 1, ad 3, p. 270. 21. See e.g. Thomas de Aquino, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, t. II, II, dist. 3, qu. 3, aa. 1-3, ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, p. 112: “Deinde quaeritur de cognitione angelorum, et circa hoc quatuor quaeruntur: 1° utrum angelus cognoscat per species; 2° utrum in superioribus sint species magis universales; 3° utrum per species istas, singularium cognitionem habere possint [...]”; id., Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 8 a. 8, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, 22,2.1), Roma 1970, pp. 245-248: “Octavo quaeritur utrum angelus res materiales cognoscat per formas aliquas an per essentiam sui cognoscentis”; a. 9, pp. 248-251: “Nono quaeritur utrum formae per quas Angeli cognoscunt res materiales, sint innatae, vel a rebus acceptae.”

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considered within this context. In particular, Thomas introduces the problem in qu. 55 art. 2, which addresses the issue of whether angels know by acquired or innate species. Thomas’ solution is that angelic understanding takes place by means of connatural species (“species per quas Angeli intelligunt, non sunt a rebus acceptae, sed eis connaturales”) which angels received, together with their intellectual nature, from God’s intelligible infusion (“et ideo suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequuntur per intelligibilem effluxum, quo a Deo species rerum cognitarum acceperunt simul cum intellectuali natura”).22 In the third argument contra, however, Thomas argues for angelic knowledge by sense perception. Praeterea, species quae sunt in intellectu, indifferenter se habent ad praesens et distans, nisi quatenus a rebus sensibilibus accipiuntur. Si ergo angelus non intelligit per species a rebus acceptas, eius cognitio indifferenter se haberet ad propinqua et distantia: et ita frustra secundum locum moveretur.23

The intelligible species are not affected by place-related accidents except insofar as they are received from sensible things. Therefore, if angels did not understand by the species received from things, they would have knowlege indifferent to the local position of the things to be known and they would move in vain. The argument is based on the assumption that angelic motion is ordered to collect sensory information. Upon careful scrutiny, one realizes that angelic motion is the very core of this argument: since angels move, their motion cannot be without purpose, but must serve knowledge, which means that angelic knowledge, at least initially, must be by experience and thus conditioned by the local distance of its objects. Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio angeli indifferenter se habet ad distans et propinquum secundum locum. Non tamen propter hoc mo-

22. On Thomas’ views concerning angelic knowing, see T. Suarez-Nani, Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d’Aquin et Gilles de Rome, Paris 2002, pp. 17-76; ead., “Tommaso d’Aquino e l’angelologia: ipotesi sul suo significato storico e la sua rilevanza filosofica,” in: Letture e interpretazioni di Tommaso d‘Aquino oggi, pp. 11-29: 14-20. By commenting on the article 2 of qu. 55 (pp. 27-32), Suarez-Nani describes the intellectual emanation from God (per intelligibilem influxum) as one of the most salient points of Thomas’ conception. 23. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 55, a. 2, 3, p. 265.

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tus eius localis est frustra: non enim movetur localiter ad cognitionem accipiendam, sed ad operandum aliquid in loco.24

In the reply, Thomas resolutely declares that angelic understanding is not influenced by local distance (“indifferenter [...] ad distans et propinquum”) – this is the logical consequence of his magisterial solution (angels know by connatural species). Nevertheless, he says, angels do not move locally in vain, for the purpose of their motion is not knowledge, but operation in place. Even though both argument and counter-argument are brief and cannot be compared with the longer, more detailed, treatments of later theologians, Thomas’ analysis contains a few key points which will mark the later debate. First, he specifies that if the species are already actualized (“quae sunt in intellectu”), they are unaffected by local extension. They are, however, affected by local distance only insofar as they are abstracted from sensory data.25 Secondly, by reading both argument and counter-argument one can hardly distinguish between the species of angelic cognition and the ones acquired by the human intellect. Elsewhere, by constrast, Thomas makes it clear that the former are cognitive principles that stem from the divine exemplars in God’s mind and preexist created things, they are thus structurally different from the species obtained by abstraction from experience and caused by extramental realities.26 Ne24. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 55, a. 2, ad 3, p. 265. Thomas understands angelic local motion as the succession of different contacts of an angel’s power in different places: see Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 53, a. 1, sol., p. 257: “Quia enim angelus non est in loco nisi secundum contactum virtutis [...] necesse est quod motus angeli in loco nihil aliud sit quam diversi contactus diversorum locorum successive et non simul.” For an account of the debate on angelic motion, see T. Suarez-Nani, “De la théologie à la physique: l’ange, le lieu et le mouvement,” in: A. Paravicini-Bagliani (ed.), L’Angelos, (Micrologus 23 [2015]), pp. 427-443; R. Cross, “Angelic Time and Motion: Bonaventure to Duns Scotus,” in: T. Hoffmann (ed.), A Companion to Angels, pp. 117-147. 25. On Aquinas’ species theory, see L. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge I. Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, Leiden-New York-Köln 1994, pp. 156174. 26. For this difference, see T. Suarez-Nani, Connaissance et langage, p. 29. H. Goris, “Angelic Knowledge in Aquinas and Bonaventure,” in: T. Hoffmann (ed.), A Companion to Angels, pp. 159-161, adds another difference, pointing out that human abstracted species represent external objects only in their universality, while angelic innate species represent extramental beings in their particular and individual features too. On Thomas’ doctrine of divine ideas, see at least J.F. Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas, Toronto 1993; V. Boland, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Sources and Synthesis, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996; G.T. Doolan, Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes, Washington dc 2008. Unfortunately the fine volume Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth Century), ed. by J.F. Falà – I. Zavattero, Roma 2018, came to my attention only when this contribution was already ended.

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glecting this difference leads to ambiguity in relation to the nature of angels’ species which affects the subsequent development of the debate in the Correctoria. Finally, by saying that angels move in order to execute operations in place rather than to acquire sense knowledge, Thomas completely dissociates angelic motion from the question of the impact of local distance on angelic understanding. It is not by chance that both the Correctoria and the Lectura Thomasina subsequently avoid the issue of angelic motion with regard to the topic under discussion. The question of whether local distance interferes with angelic knowledge is thus revealed to be a marginal issue for Thomas, addressed within the article of the Summa dedicated to angelic knowledge by inborn species. Thomas does not use this issue of angelic epistemology as a key to explaining the processes of human knowing. The attitude of the Correctoria is radically different, they accord much more significance to the issue of angelic knowledge of distant things and devote considerably more space to the topic. Furthermore, their analysis of the impact of distance on angelic cognition gives them the opportunity to explore key aspects and problems of knowledge acquisition. Local distance as an impediment to the act of knowledge of separate substances is also mentioned in a passage of Thomas’ Summa contra Gentiles. Item manifestum est in eisdem quod localis distantia cognitionem substantiae separatae impedire non potest. Localis enim distantia per se comparatur ad sensum: non autem ad intellectum, nisi per accidens, inquantum a sensu accipit; nam sensibilia secundum determinatam distantiam movent sensum. Intelligibilia autem actu, secundum quod movent intellectum, non sunt in loco, cum sint a materia corporali separata. Cum igitur substantiae separatae non accipiant intellectivam cognitionem a sensibilibus, in eorum cognitionem distantia localis nihil operatur.27

Since the Summa contra Gentiles was not among the sources of the Franciscan William de la Mare’s Correctorium Fratris Thomae, this quotation was not included in his compilation of errors;28 the passage therefore 27. Thomas de Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles Libri III, II, 96, n. 9 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, 13), Romae 1918, p. 527. 28. On the presence of the Summa contra Gentiles in the Correctoria, see M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “The Literary Reception,” pp. 43-44.

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went unnoticed during the debate on the relationship between local distance and angelic intellection. Godin, too, makes no mention of it in his discussion of the issue. 2. CORRECTORIUM FRATRIS THOMAE William de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae, composed between 1277 and 1279, inaugurates the Correctoria controversy on Thomas Aquinas’ doctrinal heritage.29 Local distance in relation to angelic cognition first becomes a relevant issue in this text by William, and his Dominican opponents, in their subsequent Correctoria, pay increasing attention to the topic. In article 18, William de la Mare critizes Aquinas’ view that the species by which angels know are connatural (Quod omnes species per quas angeli cognoscunt sunt eis connaturales). This is the main thesis, quoted from the First Part of the Summa, qu. 55, art. 2, solution – “all the species by which angels intellectually understand are connatural, and not received from things”30 –, of a doctrine which includes two other theses, as derived consequences: “angelic cognition is indifferent to whether a thing is locally distant or close,” from the First Part of the Summa, qu. 55, art. 2, reply to the third argument, and “angels do not acquire knowledge from things,” from the First Part of the Summa, qu. 58, art. 1, solution.31 William declares all three theses to be 29. M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria and the Limits of Metaphysics,” in: Speculum, 57 (1982), pp. 292-314: 292-293. The Correctorium is edited in Les premières polémiques Thomistes: I. – Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare”, éd. P. Glorieux. On the Correctorium, see also R. Hissette, “L’implication de Thomas d’Aquin dans les censures Parisiennes de 1277,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 64 (1997), pp. 3-31: 6, n. 21. Few years after completing the first version, William substantially revised the Correctorium. The second revised and enlarged version, however, neither took into account the rejoinders of the Correctoria which had already been written, nor had any impact on the subsequent development of the debate: see M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria,” p. 295; R. Hissette, “Trois articles de la second rédaction du ‘Correctorium’ de Guillaume de la Mare,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 51 (1984), pp. 230-241. For a doctrinal profile of William the la Mare, based on an examination of his Sentences commentary, see F. Caldera, “Guglielmo de la Mare tra Bonaventura, Tommaso d’Aquino e Pietro di Tarantasia: dipendenze testuali e originalità del Commento alle Sentenze,” in: Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 98 (2005), pp. 465-508. 30. Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, a. 18, p. 79: “omnes species per quas angeli intelligunt sunt eis connaturales, non a rebus acceptae.” 31. Ibid.: “cognitio angeli indifferenter se habet ad distans et propinquum secundum locum. [...] angeli non accipiunt cognitionem a rebus.”

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false.32 I will now examine his analysis of the second error (concerning the relationship between angelic knowledge and local distance) and then consider the counter-arguments put forward by the Correctoria and Godin’s Lectura Thomasina. The other two theses will only be dealt with as they relate to the question of knowledge and distance. William’s criticism is of fundamental importance because the arguments and concepts that it introduces set the stage for the debate that is then pursued in greater depth in the other Correctoria and the Lectura. Item secundus articulus qui dicit quod cognitio angeli indifferenter se habet ad distans et propinquum secundum locum sequitur ex praecedenti. Si enim angeli intelligunt per species connaturales, cum in speciebus connaturalibus non fiat variatio propter distantiam rerum et propinquitatem, sequitur quod non fiat per eas diversa cognitio, sive res sint distantes sive propinquae. Sed contra, videtur nobis falsum. Manifeste enim experimur quod non aliter cognoscimus distantia quam simpliciter non entia; et voco distantia, sicut ipse vocat ut existimo, ea quae extra prospectum nostrum sunt; si enim aliquid corrumpatur talium in penitus nihil non magis ipsum scimus non esse quam prius, nec aliam habemus notitiam de eius esse vel non esse magis nunc quam prius. Unde manifestum est quod distantia et non exsistentia eodem modo se habent ad notitiam. Si ergo angeli per species connaturales possunt cognoscere distantia sequitur quod per easdem possunt cognoscere futura et non entia, quod est contra Damascenum qui dicit, libro II, capitulo 3: Futura quidem angeli neque daemones noverunt. Praetera si diabolus praescivisset quod superandus fuisset a Christo et a beato Iob nunquam petivisset tentare eos.33

According to William, we manifestly perceive (manifeste enim experimur) that our knowledge of distant things is not different from that of non-existents. Distant things may be called – and this is a crucial step in William’s reasoning – those entities which are “out of our sight” (extra prospectum nostrum), for if one of these things perishes, we do not know now more than earlier that it does not exist nor do we have now more than earlier any cognition of its existence or non-existence. Therefore, 32. Ibid.: “Primum non credo esse verum licet multi illud dixerunt”; ibid., p. 80: “[...] videtur nobis falsum”; ibid. p. 81: “Tertium quod dicit, scilicet quod angeli non accipiunt cognitionem a rebus, quod similiter falsum reputamus [...].” 33. Ibid., pp. 80-81. My italics here and in the other texts quoted.

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with regard to knowledge (ad notitiam) distant things are equivalent to non-existents. In other words, William implies that things beyond the reach of our sense powers and non-existents are equally (eodem modo se habent) unknown to us. At the very end of his argument, William demonstrates the implications of these remarks on human epistemology for angelic knowledge: if angels are able to know distant things by innate species – as Thomas holds –, it follows that they are also able to obtain knowledge of future contingents and non-existents (possunt cognoscere futura et non entia), an absurd conclusion, which contradicts Damascene’s authority (angels and demons do not foreknow the future)34 and the Bible (William is referring to Job and Christ, both unsuccessfully tempted by Satan). Thomas’ doctrine is therefore untenable, both on a rational basis, for what does not exist or does not yet exist cannot be known, and because it does not accord with the theological tradition.35 As Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen points out, William’s polemical strategy is to describe Thomas’ views as conflicting with, on the one hand, Christian faith and the teachings of the Saints, and, on the other, philosophical reasoning.36

34. See Iohannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, translatio Burgundionis, cap. 18, 3 [Migne II, 4, 877], ed. E.M. Buytaert (Franciscan Institute Publications. Text serie, 8), St. Bonaventure 1955, p. 76,25. 35. William does not elaborate any further on future contingents, which, as we shall see, will be done by the authors of the other Correctoria, especially the Correctorium “Quaestione”. On future contingents in the late Middle Ages, see at least C. Normore, “Future Contingents,” in: N. Kretzmann – A. Kenny – J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, pp. 358-381; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought, Leiden-New York-Köln 1993, esp. pp. 157-193 for the debate between 1250-1330; W.L. Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez, Leiden 1988; J. Söder, Kontingenz und Wissen. Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes Duns Scotus (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 49), Münster 1999; C. Schabel, Theology at Paris, 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents, Aldershot-Burlington-Singapore-Sidney 2000, esp. pp. 17-63 for the late medieval debate and its roots; id., “Parisian Secular Masters on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents in the Early Fourteenth Century, Part i: John of Pouilly’s Quaestio ordinaria i,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 78 (2011), pp. 161-219; id., “Parisian Secular Masters on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents in the Early Fourteenth Century, Part ii: Thomas Wylton’s Quaestio ordinaria ‘utrum praedestinatus possit damnari’,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 78 (2011), pp. 417-479, esp. pp. 418-437 (for a study of the edited texts); S. Knuuttila, “Medieval Theories of Futures Contingents,” in: Stanford Ecnyclopedia of Philosophy, substantive revision Thu Oct 22, 2015 https://plato. stanford.edu/entries/medieval-futcont/; J. Bornholdt, Walter Chatton on Future Contingents. Between Formalism and Ontology, Leiden-Boston 2017. 36. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Being and Thinking in the ‘Correctorium fratris Thomae’,” p. 420.

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William’s argument centres on the concept of “out of our sight” (extra prospectum nostrum): only when distant things are understood as entities beyond the reach of sense perception can they be equated with non-existents. Clearly, this conception of distant things is only meaningful in relation to human processes of knowledge acquisition, which begin with sense perception. Thomas maintains that angels lack sensory access to things, for they know by innate species and, consequently, can always know distant things. Unsurprisingly, William’s critics were to insist – in a way or another – that his reasoning was based on the wrong assumption that the angelic intellect knows by a process of abstraction that does not differ from the human. 3. CORRECTORIUM CORRUPTORII QUARE According to Mark D. Jordan, the Correctorium “Quare” was compiled in England “after 1280, perhaps in 1283.”37 Its authorship has long been debated, but it is now generally attributed to Richard Knapwell.38 Knapwell vigourosly counters William’s critique of Aquinas, expanding on the issue at hand and confirming and amplifying a tendency already evident in William’s treatment of the question: with regard to the relationship between local distance and angelic knowledge, Knapwell’s analysis focuses more on the general mechanics and problems of intellectual understanding than on specific issues of angelic epistemology. Ad tertium dicendum quod nulli habenti intellectum sanum vertitur in dubium quod propinquitas localis ad actum cognitionis intellectivae nullatenus requiritur. Quando ergo dicunt ipsi quod experiuntur quod non aliter cognoscantur distantia quam omnino non entia, manifestum est omni experto quod mentiuntur. Quod enim non est nullo modo est cognoscibile; quod vero distans est et extra prospectum visus nostri qui in videndo iuvatur propinquitate proportionata sui obiecti et nimia ipsius impeditur distantia, non minus est intelligibile quam prius dummodo eius species intelligibilis quae a situ non dependet, habeatur perfecte ab intellectu; quoniam nec praesentia nec etiam actualis existentia requiritur ad hoc quod res ipsa intelligatur, alioquin 37. M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria,” p. 293, n. 6. 38. See M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria,” pp. 293-294; F.E. Kelly, “Introduction” to Richardus Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, ed. F.E. Kelly (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 44), Paris 1982, pp. 18-23.

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non intelligeremus cum vellemus, quod est contra Philosophum. Et hoc certe si attendissent, auctoritatem II de Anima pro se non adduxissent cum sit manifeste contra eos sicut patet omni intelligenti. Si autem ponatur quod aliquid talium omnino annihiletur, quod nec habeat esse in anima nec extra animam ut obiciunt, tunc planum est quod non est amplius intelligibile. Quod vero subdunt: si angeli cognoscunt per species innatas distantia, ergo eadem ratione possunt cognoscere futura per easdem, manifestum est cuilibet quod consequentia non valet. Quod enim futurum est, nec est nec habet similitudinem; per consequens, nec aliquam speciem in intellectu per quam cognoscatur; licet autem aliquid sit distans, nihilominus species in intellectu existens est similitudo quidditatis seu entitatis eiusdem, ut patet ex dictis. Unde quod adducunt de Damasceno quod angeli non cognoscunt futura nisi per revelationem, futura dico contingentia, concedendum est.39

The starting point of Knapwell’s reasoning is not, as is William’s, sense perception, but intellectual cognition: nobody having a sound intellect (nulli habenti intellectum sanum), Knapwell maintains, can seriously think that intellection requires its object to be located close by. From this intellectual perspective Knapwell rejects William’s proposed empirical identification of distant things with non-existents (Quando ergo dicunt ipsi quod experiuntur quod non aliter cognoscantur distantia quam omnino non entia, manifestum est omni experto quod mentiuntur [...] sicut patet omni intelligenti). Whereas what has no being is completely unknowable (Quod enim non est nullo modo est cognoscibile), an entity that is out of our sight can be known by the intellect, insofar as the intellect perfectly grasps its intelligible species (species intelligibilis [...] habeatur perfecte ab intellectu), which is independent of place. By pointing out that distant things do not equal non-existents, Knapwell thus draws a sharp distinction between sense perception, which is enhanced or impeded by the nearness or distance of the things to be known, and intellectual knowledge, which is not affected by their location: while a non-existent is per se unknowable, a distant thing can be grasped by the intellect, even though it eludes sense perception. Knapwell goes on to link the problem of the understanding of distant things with a passage from Aristotle’s De anima Book 2 (5, 417b24) – which is destined to become a standard reference in this context and 39. Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare”, ed. P. Glorieux in: Les premières polémiques Thomistes: I. – Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare”, a. 18, pp. 83-84.

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will later be cited also by Godin – according to which we cognize intellectually whenever we want (intelligimus, quando volumus).40 Thanks to the quotation Knapwell makes it clear that angelic understanding of distant things involves the analysis of the process of intellection. For an act of intellection to take place, neither the presence nor the actual existence of the things to be known is required, otherwise it would be impossible for us to cognize intellectually whenever we want. For instance, a winter rose does not have to have actual existence in order to be known by our intellect, provided that the species of the rose which is actually in the intellect is perfectly understood. If a human intellect can understand a winter rose although it does not exist, an angelic intellect is assuredly even more capable of such knowledge.41 Only if a distant object is completely annihilated, with the result that it has neither mental nor extramental being, will it be a non-existent and therefore unknowable. Knapwell’s primary concern appears to be the accurate description of the act of intellectual cognition. Intellectual knowledge requires the presence in the intellect of the intelligible species that represents the cognized object. This is the basis upon which distant things can be clearly distinguished from non-existents, for the former always have corresponding intelligible species, while the latter are not knowable because they have no intelligible representations in the mind of the knower. Future contingents have the same epistemological status as non-existents, they neither exists, nor have any similitude (Quod enim futurum est, nec est nec habet similitudinem). Accordingly, there is no species in the intellect by which a future event can be known, because the species is the structural and intelligible representation (similitudo) either of its 40. The passage was first quoted by William within a larger objection to angelic knowledge through innate species: see Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, a. 18, p. 80: “Item si cognoscerent per species connaturales, tunc non indigerent existentia rerum ad cognoscendum; sed indigent; ergo, etc. Probo maiorem, secundum Philosophum III° de Anima dicentem: Intelligimus cum volumus quia intelligibilia, scilicet species intelligibiles sunt praesentes intellectui: non autem sentimus quando volumus quia sensibilia non semper praesentia sunt sensui; sic patet maior. Minor patet per Augustinum IV super Genesim, capitulo 35: Minor, inquit, notitia vespertina est dicta quam notitia matutina quam sane praecedebant quae fiebant, quia praecedit cognitionem quidquid potest cognosci.” 41. Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare”, a. 18, p. 82: “Istud in intellectu humano, qui longe inferior est per naturam, manifestum est: non enim ad hoc quod intelligat rosam in hieme vel aliam rem quamcumque, existentia eius in actu requiritur sed per speciem actu in intellectu existentem perfecte intelligitur.”

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quiddity or its existence.42 Lastly, Knapwell cites – and accepts – the Damascene authority which states that angels cannot know the future except through revelation. However, while William had taken the quotation as proof that Thomas’ theory was false, Knapwell interprets it differently. If according to Thomas’ theory angels know distant things by innate species, William had argued, and distant things and future contingents are epistemologically identical, the absurd consequence follows that angels know future events, a conclusion which runs counter to both Damascene’s words and several Biblical passages. Knapwell, in constrast, holds that Thomas’ theory is perfectly compatible with the theological view that the future is known only to God and to those who receive a divine revelation. 4. CORRECTORIUM CORRUPTORII SCIENDUM The Correctorium “Sciendum” is also believed to have been written in England, possibly in Oxford, around 1283, by Robert Orford.43 Ad hoc quod opponunt contra secundum principale, dicendum quod nos sic non cognoscimus distantia secundum locum, quae scilicet sunt extra prospectum nostrum, sicut nec non entia; et hoc est quia intelligimus per species abstractas, in qua abstractione sensibilia aliquo modo agunt in animam et anima in sensibilia. Quia ergo operatio ista egreditur a virtute finita, requiritur determinata distantia. Non sic autem intelligit angelus, sed per species innatas quae aequaliter repraesentant rem in quacumque distantia fuerit; et ideo non est simile de angelo et nobis. […] Sed, sicut species innata aequaliter repraesentat rem ubicumque sit, ita species abstracta; igitur, sicut distantia non impedit cognitionem per speciem innatam, sic nec per acquisitam. Ad hoc dicendum quod in acquirendo scientiam, distantia localis impedit acquisitam; et hoc est propter hoc quod sensibilia agunt in sensum, et intellectus abstrahit a speciebus sensibilium; actiones autem sensibilium non aequaliter se habent ad distans et propinquum; sed in utendo scientia acquisita non plus impedit distantia localis in speciebus abstractis quam in innatis, quia ex hoc actu intelligimus quod species in intellectu repraesentat 42. The species intelligibilis is not simply a pictorial image, but an instrumental representation of the essence in its features: on this point, see L. Spruit, Species intelligibilis, pp. 156-160. 43. M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria,” p. 295.

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intelligibile; hoc facit aequaliter species sive res propinqua sit sive distans, sicut imago Herculis aequaliter repraesentat Herculem ubicumque fuerit; et aequaliter intellectus cognoscit solem qui plus distat, sicut lunam quae minus distat, quia species eius aequaliter repraesentatur: similiter imaginatio aequaliter imaginatur hominem propinquum et distantem. Unde ipsa verba solvunt: abstrahere contingit intellectum in acquirendo scientiam.44

Sciendum agrees with William’s view that human intellect knows neither distant – out of our sight – things nor non-existents. According to Sciendum, the abstractive nature of our knowledge, which is based on sense perception, implies the mutual interaction between the sensible things and the soul: since the senses are limited cognitive powers, they can only act until a certain distance. This limitation pertains however only to human understanding, because the angelic intellect knows by innate species, which represent objects in the same way (aequaliter) however far they are. Sciendum’s most relevant contribution to the debate is that it shifts the focus to the concept of an intelligible species considered independently of its origin. An abstracted species, like an innate species, can represent an object in the same way regardless of the object’s location (sicut species innata aequaliter repraesentat rem ubicumque sit, ita species abstracta). This means that knowledge by species acquired from experience – like cognition by innate species – is not impeded by local distance.45 In order to clarify this point, which seems to contradict something he says just a few lines before, Sciendum makes a subtle distinction between the acquisition (in acquirendo scientiam) and the use of science (in utendo scientia acquisita). Whereas distance plays an important role in the former, due to the sensible character of perception, once science has been acquired the use of the intelligible species, whether innate or obtained through sense perception, is no longer affected by the location of the object of 44. Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” ed. P. Glorieux, in: Les premières polémiques thomistes: II. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” Paris 1956 (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 31), a. 18. p. 89. 45. The fact that whatever its origin – whether nature or experience –, intelligible species always works in the same way is confirmed in a previous passage where, with regard to De anima Book 2 (5, 417b24), it is argued that it is also found within the angelic intellect in absentia rei, whether angels know through innate species or by means of acquired ones: Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” a. 18, p. 88: “Ad hoc quod dicunt de Philosopho, dicendum quod hoc concludit indifferenter sive ponatur angelus cognoscere per speciem innatam sive abstractam, quia utrobique species intelligibilis praesens est intellectui in absentia rei.”

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knowledge. At this point, the intelligible species represents the object in the same way – no matter how close or distant that object is. Interestingly, in another passage of Sciendum, which Godin later quotes verbatim, the distinction between the acquisition of science and its use is recast as a distinction between the potency to receive species and the potency to use species. Here, Sciendum argues that angels stand midway between the absolute actuality of God and the twofold potentiality of the human souls, which, before learning, have the potency to receive the species, and once the species have been acquired, have the potency to use them. Angels only have the latter kind of potency, for the first was actualized at their creation (ab initio angeli), when they were endowed with innate species.46 5. CORRECTORIUM CORRUPTORII CIRCA John of Quidort (John of Paris) began to write the Correctorium Circa late in 1283 or in 1284, but never completed it; interpolations – based on Quare and Sciendum – were later introduced, in another hand, but Circa still only goes as far as article 60 of the Quare numeration.47 Quidort advances original arguments in his treatment of the impact of local distance on angelic cognition; he considers some major implications for human understanding and makes explicit references to philosophical sources. Not surprisingly, the Lectura Thomasina, as we will see, quotes extensively from Quidort’s discussion. Note that no trace of the question of whether local distance affects angelic knowledge is found in the Reportationes of Quidort’s Sentences commentary.48 46. Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” a. 18, pp. 86-87: “quanto aliqua creatura est Domino propinquior qui est actus purus, tanto plus participat de actualitate et minus de potentialitate; angeli autem ordine naturae sunt Deo propinquiores quam humanae animae; cum igitur in anima sit duplex potentia in intelligendo, une quae est ante addiscere et invenire, quae est potentia ad recipiendum speciem intelligibilem, alia est potentia ad utendum specie iam habita, in angelo non erit nisi una illarum. Sed non solum prima, quia prima includit secundam; igitur solum secunda. Prima ergo potentia oportet quod ab initio angeli in actum fuerit reducta, hoc non est nisi quia habuit species sibi concreatas.” 47. M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria,” pp. 295-296. J.-P. Müller, “Introduction” to: Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa,” ed. J.-P. Müller, Roma 1941, pp. XXXIV-XXXVII: XXXVI, argues for a slightly earlier dating: 1282-1284. 48. Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation. Livre II, éd. par J.-P. Müller, Roma 1964 (Studia Anselmiana, 52), d. 4 q. 4, pp. 76-81: “Utrum intelligant materialia per species abstractas ab ipsis materialibus vel acceptas.”

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Ad aliud cum dicitur, quod iam non indigeret angelus exsistentia rerum, dicendum, quod indiget exsistentia rerum non ut a rebus exsistentibus accipiat speciem, sicut est in nobis, sed ut res ipsae speciei angelo concreatae assimilentur, facto motu in rebus non in angelico intellectu. Vel dici potest quod duplex est cognitio de re: Quaedam est simplicis intelligentiae, quae est cognitio quid res est absolute. Alia, qua cognoscitur quia res est, quae in nobis est per comparationem intellectus componentis hoc cum illo. In angelo autem non est cognitio per comparationem, sed cognitio compositionis. Angelus ergo per solam speciem intelligit de re quid sit per essentiam, etiam de re non exsistente, sicut in nobis contingit, quod scimus quid sit rosa vel eclipsis vel cometa, nullo istorum exsistente, per speciem horum. Sed hoc quod sciat angelus rem esse, indiget exsistentia rei, non autem ut speciem a rebus exsistentibus accipiat, ut dictum est, sed ut ipsa res speciei illi assimiletur non solum per essentiam, sed per exsistentiam actualem. Essentiae enim, ut essentia est, accidit esse et non esse, ut probat Avicenna et Algazel in Metaphysicis suis.49

Circa illustrates two modalities of apprehension: the first is a purely intellectual grasp of what a thing is (quid res est) absolutely; the second – knowledge that an object is (quia res est) – is of another kind, possible to us because our intellect composes quiddity with existence. The first modality allows the angelic intellect to comprehend the quid est of a thing essentially (per essentiam) through the sole species regardless of its existence in re, just as we happen to know a rose or an eclipsise or a comet through their own species, even though they do not actually exist. The ways in which human beings and angels know the quia est of something, however, differ. The human intellect needs external reality from which to receive intelligible species. The angelic intellect, already endowed with innate species, needs the existence of a thing not in order to receive a species from it, but in order for the thing to be assimilated to the corresponding innate species in accordance with both its essence and its actual existence. Interestingly, Quidort ends his argument with an appeal to Avicenna’s (Metaphysics, Book VI ch. 1)50 and Algazel’s (Metaphysics, Part 1, tr. 1, 2, 3)51 distinction be-

49. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa” de Jean de Quidort de Paris, ed. J.-P. Müller, Roma 1941, a. 18, pp. 97,19-98,34. 50. Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive de scientia divina V-X, VI, 1, ed. S. Van Riet, Louvain-Leiden 1980, pp. 291-300. 51. Algazel, Metaphysica, pars I, tr. 1, 2, 3, ed. J.T. Muckle, Toronto 1933, p. 29.

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tween essence as essence and existence or non-existence as accidents of the essence; acceptance of this metaphysical essence-existence distinction ultimately guarantees both levels of angelic knowledge – that of the quid est and that of the quia est. Quod ipsi calumniantur contra id quod dicit, quod angeli cognitio indifferenter se habet ad distantia secundum locum et praesentia, patet quod valde improbe et irrationabiliter istud infirmare nituntur, quia hoc etiam verum est de intellectu nostro. Aequaliter enim scit aliquis per speciem leonis vel cometae quidditatem et naturam utriusque, si non sint praesentes, quia similitudo istorum in anima aequaliter repraesentat absentia sicut praesentia […] Hoc enim est proprium sensitivae potentiae exterioris, quod non cognoscit rem nisi praesentem secundum locum, eo quod non cognoscit nisi prout movetur a re ipsa immediate. Unde dicere quod angelus non cognoscit aequaliter absentia secundum locum sicut praesentia, est favere, immo necessario ponere cum Apuleio Platonico daemones et angelos animalia esse cum sensibus corporeis, quorum est moveri a rerum praesentia secundum locum.52

Quidort goes on to address the issue of angelic cognition as it relates to local distance. He dismisses the attempt to deny that the angelic intellect is unaffected by the location of its object as rude and irrational, for even the inferior human intellect is unimpeded by local distance. Even if a lion or a comet are not present, we can know their quiddity through their corresponding species in the same way (aequaliter), because the species, as formal representations (similitudo) of the objects in the soul, represent these objects in the same way, whether they are close or distant. This is not the case with sense perception: the external sense power only knows nearby objects because, as passive faculty, it requires the impact of the sensibles. Quidort believed that it was absurd to claim that angels did not know close and distant things in the same way, since such a belief would entail adherence to Apuleius’ view that angels and demons have natural sensible bodies and are thus affected by things present in place.53 In other words, according to Quidort, William de la Mare’s attack on Thomas’ theory that angels know by innate species

52. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa,” a. 18, p. 98,36-49. 53. The reference is to Apuleius, De deo Socratis, 13, ed. C. Moreschini, StuttgartLeipzig 1991, p. 23,10-11.

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and that their intellectual cognition is not subject to local conditions leads to the absurd denial of the incorporeity of spiritual substances.54 Quod opponunt, quod non entia simpliciter et distantia secundum locum, illa scilicet, quae sunt extra conspectum nostrum, eodem modo se habent ad notitiam nostram, dicendum quod falsum est omnino. Unumquodque enim quantum habet de entitate, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate. Nam eodem modo se habet unumquodque ad entitatem et veritatem, ut dicitur III Metaphysicae. Non entia ergo, quae nec sunt in suis essentiis, nec sunt in suis causis, ut futura contingentia, illa sunt omnino extra genus cognoscibilitatis quia et entitatis, nisi soli Deo, cui determinata sunt ut praesentia. Sed distantia secundum locum, cum non sic cedant extra genus entitatis et cognoscibilitatis, ideo de ipsis distantibus secundum locum habet angelus cognitionem ad minus quid sunt, etiam forte quia sunt, non obstante distantia, quia imitantur speciem angelo concreatam, quantum essentiam et existentiam, licet localiter distent. In nobis autem species intelligibilis accepta a rebus propter sui imperfectionem repraesentativa est rei essentiae solum et non rei existentiae. Ideo per ipsam de re absolute cognoscitur quid sit, non quia sit.55

Finally, Quidort rejects William’s thesis that our knowledge of distant things and non-existents is the same; his rebuttal is based on the contention that everything posseses being (de entitate) to the same extent as it possesses knowability (de cognoscibilitate). To support his claim, Quidort refers to the principle from Metaphysics Book 2 (1, 993b30-31) that everything stands in the same relation to being as to truth. Non-existents, like future contingents, neither exist in their essences nor in their causes, thus they fall outside the genera of both knowability and entity, being only in God as present beings. Distant things, however, fall within the genera of both entity and knowability, and angels can therefore know their quid est and possibly (forte) their quia est, distance notwithstanding. Indeed – in both their essence and their existence – distant objects imitate the innate species in the angelic mind. The human 54. Analogously, in the De veritate, Thomas argues that knowledge by abstracted species implies that spiritual substances have natural bodies: see Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 8, a. 9, resp., pp. 249,133-250,137: “Unde si angeli intellectus a rebus materialibus formas aliquas acciperet, oporteret habere angelum potentias sensitivas, et ita habere corpus naturaliter sibi unitum.” 55. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa,” a. 18, pp. 98,50-99,65.

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intellect, in contrast, knows through the intelligible species abstracted from the extramental object. Therefore, human cognition is limited to the quid est of distant things, and cannot reach their quia est. Quidort’s analysis thus shifts from merely an epistemological perspective to a metaphysical approach. Thomas’ theory that angelic intellection occurs through the innate species is based on the distinction between quidditative understanding (quid est) and existential comprehension (quia est), and this distinction is underpinned by the Avicennian concept of the indifference of essence. 6. CORRECTORIUM CORRUPTORII QUAESTIONE The Correctorium “Quaestione” – attributed to William Macclesfield – is dependent on Circa, to which it seems to be chronologically very close, having probably been completed already in 1284.56 Localis enim distantia per se comparatur ad sensum, non autem ad intellectum, nisi per accidens, in quantum a sensu accipit. Et hoc ideo, quia sensibilia secundum determinatam distantiam movent sensum. Intelligibilia autem actu, secundum quod movent intellectum, non sunt in loco, cum sint a conditionibus materialibus separata. Cum igitur substantiae separatae non accipiant cognitionem a sensibilibus, in eorum cognitione distantia localis nihil operatur.57

Insisting on the difference between human and angelic understanding, Quaestione maintains that local distance is related to the sense power in itself, and to the intellect only accidentally (nisi per accidens), insofar as the intellect obtains its intelligibles from the senses. The sensibles have an impact on a sense power only within a certain range, beyond it they are ineffective and cannot be perceived. This does not happen with the intelligibles when they are actually understood (intelligibilia […] actu secundum quod movent intellectum): indeed, they are not located in place and are free from material conditions. Since separate substances do not know by experience, their knowledge is not affected by local distance. 56. M.D. Jordan, “The Controversy of the Correctoria,” p. 296; J.-P. Müller, “Introduction” to: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione.” Texte anonyme du ms. Merton 267, éd. par J.-P. Müller, Roma 1954, pp. xxiii, xxvi. 57. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione.” Texte anonyme du ms. Merton 267, ed. J.-P. Müller, Roma 1954, c. 18, p. 94.

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Quaestione succeeds in explaining very clearly that William’s mistake is rooted in his confusion of sense perception with intellectual understanding: only the latter is proper to separate substances, for they do not acquire knowledge from sensory data, but know by species impressed directly upon them by God.58 Sense knowledge is only possible for beings with natural bodies endowed with sense organs. Like Quidort before him, also Quaestione makes an explicit connection between the incorporeity of angels and the theory of their cognition by innate species.59 The original contribution of Quaestione to the question of local distance and angelic knowledge mainly appears in its careful analysis of the attitude of angels to future contingents and non-existents. Quaestione quotes from Thomas’ De veritate, where it is argued that knowledge can be aquired in two ways. Similiter et aliquis incipit de novo cognoscere dupliciter: uno modo per hoc cognoscens accipit de novo formam cogniti, et sic nos de novo cognoscimus quae prius omnino nescivimus; alio modo per hoc quod cognitum de novo pervenit ad formam quae est in cognoscente, et hoc modo angelus cognoscit de novo actualiter exsistentia quae prius tantum cognovit ut possibilia esse vel ut futura, sicut etiam nos aliter cognoscimus praesentia et aliter absentia. Sic ergo patet quod, species in mente angelica sine aliqua sui immutatione vel variatione potest repraesentare rem, non tantum sub una dispositione, sed etiam sub quacumque, in quantum est imago quaedam et derivata similitudo divinae essentiae quae perfecte omnia repraesentat, ut dictum est.60

Either the knower receives the form of the object known for the first time (de novo) – this is the pattern of human understanding, which is based on the perception of external things, and this is how we for the first time come to know that which we were previously completely ignorant of –; or the object known for the first time (de novo) comes to the form which is already in the knower. The angelic intellect func-

58. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 92: “[…] ita angeli per species a Deo sibi inditas cognoscunt perfecte naturas omnium rerum, inquantum illae species sunt repraesentationes quaedam imitantes divinam essentiam.” 59. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 91: “Cognitio autem sensitiva solum illis convenire potest, quae habent corpus naturaliter unitum. Hoc autem angeli non habent. Impossibile est ergo quod ex rebus sensibilibus cognitionem accipiant.” 60. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 93. See Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 8, a. 9, ad 3, p. 251,217-236.

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tions in the latter way, for an angel for the first time comes to know those things as having actual existence which it previously knew only as possible or future.61 The cognitive ability of an angel depends on the representational power of the innate species in its mind. Without change or variation, the innate species can represent a thing whatever its disposition, regardless of its temporal condition. Indeed, the innate species is an image and resemblance drawn from the divine essence, which represents everything perfectly (Quaestione here draws heavily upon the First Part of Thomas’ Summa, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2); angels are thus credited with a certain kind of knowledge of future events. As we shall see, this is not real foreknowledge, which is a prerogative of God. Quaestione elaborates on the connection between angelic knowledge of future events and Augustine’s traditional doctrine of morning and evening knowledge.62 There are three sorts of angelic cognition. In the Word (Verbum), angels know what has to be done before it is done according to the species bestowed upon them by God: this is cognitio matutina. Then, by the same species, an angel cognizes a thing actually existing under a disposition that it previously did not have, with no change occurring in the species: this is cognitio vespertina. The third kind of knowledge allows angels to see things in the exemplars in the Word, whether these things are actually present, or future, or possible.63 61. A divergence between the De veritate and Quaestione is noteworthy on this point. Thomas affirms that angels, for the first time, know as present things that before were future: Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 8, a. 9, ad 3, p. 251,229-230: “Et hoc modo angeli de novo cognoscunt praesentia quae prius fuerunt futura.” For its part, Quaestione insists that those things were known by angels as future, also mentioning possible things: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 93: “et hoc modo angelus cognoscit de novo actualiter exsistentia quae prius tantum cognovit ut possibilia esse vel ut futura [...].” The fact that angels have two different levels of knowledge of objects – one when the object is present and the other when it is still to be present – is crucial to the argument of Quaestione. Thomas’ sentence, leaving the reference to knowledge of future things implicit, seems to Quaestione to be inadequate. 62. On the reception of Augustine’s theory in Thomas, see B. Faes de Mottoni, “Tommaso d’Aquino e la conoscenza mattutina e vespertina degli angeli,” in: Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della filosofia medievale 18 (1992), pp. 169-202. 63. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, pp. 93-94: “Sciendum est enim, quod triplex est cognitio in angelis: una, qua per species sibi a Deo influxas prius cognoscant aliqua esse facienda quam facta sint [...] Alia cognitio est, qua per eandem speciem cognoscit rem iam actu existentem sub dispositione quam prius non habuit, nulla facta mutatione vel variatione circa speciem quae est principium cognoscendi, ut dictum est. Tertia cognitio est, qua angeli boni vident res, sive actu existentes, sive futuras, sive fieri possibiles, in rationibus quae sunt in Verbo. [...] Et secundum hanc cognitionem dicit ibi Augustinus, quod angeli cognoverunt res in Verbo a principio conditionis creaturae. Quia videlicet matutina cognitione cognoverunt Verbum in natura sua relucere, et per species in eadem natura impressas, quae etiam sunt quaedam similitudines Verbi divini, cognoverunt res fiendas per Verbum, quae

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Ad primum ergo quod obiciunt, dicendum quod quicquid isti experti sint, solus Deus eodem modo cognoscit entia et non entia, praesentia et futura, apud quem nulla est transmutatio nec vicissitudo. Angeli autem etsi cognoscant quaedam quae nondum sunt, tamen aliter cognoscunt ea quando sunt, et aliter quando non sunt, sicut supra dictum est. Quia tamen actualis exsistentia non est de essentia rei, potest essentia alicuius speciei eodem modo cognosci, sive sit actu existens sive non. Individuum autem quod subsistit in illa specie, quia addit supra rationem speciei materiam signatam, cui impressa est forma speciei, aliter cognoscitur antequam sit, et aliter quando iam actu est. [4] Aliter enim cognoscitur aliquid ut in se ipso est, et aliter in sua causa. Eorum etiam quae non sunt nisi in suis causis, differentia quaedam attendenda est: quaedam enim ex necessitate ex suis causis proveniunt, et talia certitudinaliter praecognosci possunt, sicut solem oriturum cras; quaedam vero eveniunt ut in pluribus, et haec coniecturaliter solum praesciuntur, sicut medicus praecognoscit sanitatem infirmi; quaedam vero proveniunt ut in paucioribus, sicut casualia et fortuita, et talia solus Deus praenoscit cuius intuitus fertur in cuncta futura sicut in praesentia, ut supra dictum est. Et sic intelligendum est quod Damascenus dicit, quod nec angelus nec homines noverunt futurum, scilicet contingens, vel futurum ut est in se ipso. Hoc enim soli Deo convenit, ut supra dictum est.64

Quaestione argues that the distinction between actually existing things and future or possible events rests on the Avicennian essence-existence distinction. Indeed, any creature can be understood even though it does not actually exist. So it is possible to understand things which do not really exist such as a phoenix or a winter rose.65 The distinction between essence and actual existence explains why angelic cognition falls short of the divine knowledge of all of reality. Only God, being changeless, knows existing and non-existing realities, present and future events in the same way (eodem modo). Angels cannot antequam fierent causaliter praeexistebant in Verbo. In secunda autem cognitione res cognita est prius secundum naturam in sua propria natura existens quam sit cognita. Et de hac cognitione ibi subiungit, quod notitiam vespertinam, quae scilicet est rerum in propria natura [...].” See Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram, IV, 32, ed. J. Zycha (CSEL, 28), Prag-Wien-Leipzig 1894, pp. 129,19-131,22. 64. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, pp. 94-95. 65. Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 93: “[...] in rebus creatis nullius rei essentia est suum esse. Et ideo quaelibet res creata potest intelligi absque hoc, quod actu sit. Sicut possum intelligere phoenicem, quamvis nulla sit, et rosam in hieme, sicut Avicenna dicit.” It must be noted that, as has already been said, the other Correctoria also had recourse to the Avicennian essence-existence distinction, and the example of the rose; however in Quaestione this concept was reinterpreted in connection with Augustine’s theory of angels’ morning and evening knowledge.

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do this. Even though angels know things that do not yet exist, they know them in one way as existing, in another as not existing. This is because, while the essence of a species can be known in the same way whether a thing exists or not, the individual belonging to that species is known in one way before it comes to exist, in another while it actually exists. Similarly, something future is known differently in its causes and in itself. Here, Quaestione adopts the pattern devised by Thomas in the First Part of the Summa theologiae (q. 57 a. 3).66 Knowledge of things in their causes is subdivided into three categories according to the modal intensity of the effects (“necessarily”, “mostly”, and “rarely”). So, effects that necessarily (ex necessitate) follow from their causes (a sunrise, for instance) can be known with certainty (certitudinaliter); effects wich mostly (in pluribus) manifest (i.e. the recovery of a patient predicted by a doctor) are only known conjecturally (coniecturaliter solum praesciuntur). Neither the human nor the angelic intellect is permitted to grasp the third kind of effects, which occur only rarely (in paucioribus), like casual and fortuitous events. Only God foreknows such events, for He intuits all future occurences as if they were present. Indeed, God’s eternal mode of being means that His knowledge is outside the temporal order. His nature gives Him the prerogative of seeing future events in themselves, namely events which may or may not occur before they actually occur.67 Damascene’s statement that neither angels nor men came to know future contingents is based upon such reasoning.68 In conclusion, what were, in the previous Correctoria, interesting remarks – prompted mainly by Damascene quotation – on the nature of future events and their relationship with non-existents and distant things have now become, in Quaestione, a far deeper and more complex reflection on the question of whether and to what extent angels can cognize future contingents. 66. On this text, see T. Suarez-Nani, Connaissance et langage des anges, pp. 54-58. On angelic knowledge of future contingents, see H. Goris, “Angelic Knowledge in Aquinas and Bonaventure,” pp. 178-182. 67. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 14, a. 13, sol., p. 83, holds that future contingents, while remaining indeterminate in relation to their causes, are the object of the infallible knowledge of God, inasmuch as they are subject to His timeless intuition in their presentiality. On Thomas’ views on divine foreknowledge and future contingents, see W.L. Craig, “Aquinas on God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents,” in: The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 54 (1990), pp. 33-79. 68. The Lectura Thomasina quotes this text verbatim and approprietately within the question entitled “whether angels by their species know future events or non-existents” (Utrum angeli secundum suas species cognoscant futura vel non entia): Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 10, q. 38 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, ff. 36rb-va).

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7. LECTURA THOMASINA In Book 2 dist. 4 question 20 of the Lectura Thomasina69 Godin deals with the question of whether local distance impacts on angelic cognition; the question is one of the longest dedicated to angels and, unlike several other questions, which are limited to the presentation of the thesis and a solution, has an articulated structure, containing the main solution and three supporting arguments, four counterarguments, and four replies to the contra. - “Iuxta hoc quaeritur sine argumentis utrum angeli intelligant per species innatas vel acquisitas” - Solution: “Dicendum quod intelligunt per species innatas” - Three arguments for the solution: “Quod patet dupliciter (recte tripliciter)” Consequence concerning the impact of local distance on angelic cognition by species innate: “Ex hoc apparet quod localis distantia non impedit cognitionem substantiae separatae” - Four objections to the solution: “Modo contra illa arguitur multipliciter” - Four replies to the objections: “Ad omnia illa dico (...)”

For the most part, Godin borrows his arguments for and against the solution from Aquinas’ Summa and the Correctoria, so at first sight the question seems to be a mere compilation of quotations. On closer examination, however, the text proves to be an original rearrangement and reinterpretation of the sources quoted. Godin starts the question by giving the solution without preamble: angels understand through inborn species (Iuxta hoc quaeritur sine argumentis utrum angeli intelligant per species innatas vel acquisitas. Dicendum quod intelligunt per species innatas).70 Then, he supports the solution with three arguments. The first, quoted verbatim from Sciendum, points to the ordo rerum. It is argued that angels owe their cognitive acts to their privileged position within Creation. Within the hierarchy of intellectual beings, they are closer to God – pure act – than to the human mind. Consequently, angels and 69. Rambert de’ Primadizzi’s Apologeticum veritatis, the fifth and last Correctorium, which was composed between 1286 and 1287, is not taken into consideration here because it only goes as far as article 16 of William’s list, so it does not address the issue at hand. 70. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va).

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human minds share the potency to use the species when it is already possessed in act, but angels do not have the potency to receive it.71 The second argument stems directly from Thomas’ Summa and is grounded on the principle that going from one extreme to the other is impossible without passing through the middle. The being of the form in the imaginative faculty – form without matter, but not without material conditions – stands midway between the being of the form incorporated in matter and the being of the form in the intellect, abstracted from matter and material conditions. Therefore, the angelic mind cannot give its material forms an intelligible being, unless it first reduces them to the condition of imagined forms. But angels are devoid of an imaginative faculty. As a result, they can only cognize through connatural species, and not through species abstracted from external things.72 71. Ibid. (see f. 33va): “Quod patet dupliciter (recte tripliciter?), quia quanto aliqua creatura Deo est propinquor, qui est actus purus, tanto plus participat de actualitate et minus de potentia. Angeli autem ordine naturae sunt Deo propinquores quam animae humanae. Cum igitur in anima humana sit duplex potentia intelligendi: una quae est ante addiscere et invenire, quae est potentia ad recipiendum speciem intelligibilem; alia est potentia ad utendum specie habita. Ideo iam in angelo, qui est actualior tanquam Deo propinquor, non est nisi una potentia tantum. Non potest autem poni prima tantum quae est ad recipiendum, quia illa includit aliam. Qui enim non habet speciem, non potest uti specie; ergo oportet quod solum sit in potentia secunda, scilicet ad utendum specie cum actu habeat species. Et sic non recipiunt species a rebus, sed sunt eis concreatae.” For Sciendum, see above, n. 46. The same conception of a universal order underlies several arguments of Thomas’ Summa. See Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 57, a. 1, sol., pp. 269-270: “Respondeo dicendum quod talis est ordo in rebus, quod superiora in entibus sunt perfectiora inferioribus: et quod in inferioribus continetur deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter, in superioribus continetur eminenter et per quandam totalitatem et simplicitatem. Et ideo in Deo, sicut in summo rerum vertice, omnia supersubstantialiter praeexistunt secundum ipsum suum simplex esse, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom. – Angeli autem inter ceteras creaturas sunt Deo propinquiores et similiores: unde et plura participant ex bonitate divina, et perfectius, ut Dionysius dicit, 4 cap. Cael. Hier. Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis angelis praeexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus; multiplicius autem et imperfectius quam in Deo. Omne autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Angeli autem secundum suam naturam sunt intellectuales. Et ideo, sicut Deus per suam essentiam materialia cognoscit, ita angeli ea cognoscunt per hoc quod sunt in eis per suas intelligibiles species.” It must be noted, however, that here Aquinas does not emphasize the difference between angelic knowledge and human understanding as much as the concept of essential causality, in particular the principle that the inferior is pre-contained in the superior in a more perfect way. On the concept of hierarchical order, see also Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 55, a. 2, sol., p. 265, the beginning of which is also quoted by Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum”, a. 18, p. 86: “sicut est ordo in corporibus ita et in spiritibus quia quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt sic igitur oportet intelligere distinctionem et ordinem spirituum sicut est ordo et distinctio, etc.” 72. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va): “Secundo hoc idem patet sic, quia non potest deveniri ab extremo ad extremum nisi per medium. Esse autem formae in imaginatione, quod est quid sine materia, non tamen sine condicionibus materiae, medium est inter esse formae in materia, et esse formae in intellectu per abstractionem a materia et a condicionibus materiae. Unde

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For the third argument Godin turns again to Sciendum in an attempt to demonstrate that abstracted species are useless when it comes to knowing particular things. Since abstracted species are general, they must be applied to particular things. Then, there are two possibilities. Either a particular thing is already known to an angel, in which case the application is superfluous; or the thing to be known is still unknown, and the application thus occurs by chance.73 The conclusion of the reasoning is that in no way can angels know by aquired species; on the contrary, they know by means of inborn species (ergo angeli nullo modo possunt intelligere per species acquisitas, sed innatas). Finally, Godin explains – borrowing from Sciendum – why innate species can be said to be natural: they are properly given to the angelic nature and angels therefore know all natural things. He clarifies that it is not because they are caused by natural principles.74 Note that, for quamquam sit potens intellectus angelicus, non posset formas suas reducere ad esse intelligibile, nisi prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum imaginatarum. Istud autem est impossibile, cum careant imaginatione; et ideo non videtur quod angelus possit intelligere per species a rebus abstractas, sed sibi a principio concreatas.” For the quoted text, see Thomas de Aquino, Summa theol., Ia, q. 55, a. 2. ad. 2, p. 265. This text of the Summa is also alluded to by Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” a. 18, p. 87. William de la Mare includes this position of Thomas as an error in his list: see Guillelmus Lamarensis, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, a. 19, p. 85: “Quod intellectus non potest ducere ad esse intelligibile istas formas materiales nisi prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum imaginatarum.” 73. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va): “Tertio arguitur sic. Si angelus cognoscit per speciem abstractam a re, cum omnis actio sit secundum modum formae, quae est principium agendi, et illa species abstracta sit a condicionibus materialibus, non poterit per talem speciem cognoscere nisi communem naturam rerum; igitur particularem non potest cognoscere nisi applicando speciem abstractam ad ipsum particulare. Aut igitur novit particulare cui applicat aut non. Si novit, ergo non oportet applicare. Et praeterea si per aliud cognosceret quam per speciem abstractam et non nisi per infusam, ergo illa superflua erit. Si vero non novit cui applicat, ergo casualiter applicat. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo possit istam speciem ad particularia applicare et sic nec cognoscere; ergo angeli nullo modo possunt intelligere per species acquisitas sed innatas.” See Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” a. 18, p. 87: “Si angelus intelligit per speciem abstractam a re, cum omnis actio sit secundum modum formae quae est principium agendi, et ista species abstrahitur a conditionibus particularibus, non potest per illam speciem cognoscere nisi naturam communem rei, rem particularem non potest cognoscere nisi applicando speciem abstractam ad ipsum singulare. Aut igitur novit cui applicat aut non; si non, ergo casualiter applicat; item non potest ad aliquid alterum applicare, ut videtur, nisi illud alterum sit aliquo modo praecognitum; qui enim novit medium, scilicet applicationem, oportet quod sciat extrema. Si igitur praecognoscit, quaero per quid. Non per speciem illam abstractam; igitur vel per sensum aut per imaginationem, quod falsum est, aut per speciem innatam. Non igitur est ponere abstractum quia superflueret.” The theory criticized stems from Bonaventure: see T.B. Noone, “Saint Bonaventure and Angelic Natural Knowledge of Singulars,” pp. 153-159. 74. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va): “Sed sciendum quod sicut iustitia originalis dicebatur naturalis, non quia causatur a principio naturae, sed quia cum natura conferebatur ut quoddam donum gratiae naturae humanae divinitus collatum, sic illae species dicuntur naturales, non quia causentur a principiis naturae, sed quia convenienter naturae angelicae conferuntur.

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this first section of question 20, Godin’s main source is Sciendum: apart from the second argument, which is quoted from Part 1 of Thomas’ Summa and only alluded to by Sciendum, the rest of the section is taken from Sciendum. The latter, in fact, provides the blueprint for Godin’s argument in favour of angelic cognition by innate species. It is at this point, having made clear that angels know all natural things by innate species, that Godin introduces the problem of the impact of local distance on angelic cognition. According to Godin local distance does not constitute an impediment to the cognition of separate substances, but their knowledge of things is unaffected by whether they are distant or close. If angels know by connatural species, it follows that they know things whether they are present or absent since these species do not change, whatever the location of things may be. Ex hoc apparet quod localis distantia non impedit cognitionem substantiae separatae, sed indifferenter extenditur eius cognitio “ad distans et propinquum secundum locum. Si enim intelligant angeli per species connaturales, cum in speciebus naturalibus non sit variatio per distantiam et propinquitatem rerum, sequitur quod fiat per eas cognitio, sive res sint praesentes sive absentes”.75

The text, in fact, draws heavily on William de la Mare’s presentation of the problem, the only substantial difference between the two texts being that Godin speaks of “present” and “absent” things (sive res sint praesentes sive absentes), whereas William uses the terms “distant” and “close” (sive res distantes sint, sive propinquae). This divergence seems to prepare the ground for the arguments in which Godin deals with intellectual knowledge and intelligible species. Clearly, Godin takes William’s treatment as the true Per istas igitur species intelligit angelus omnia naturalia.” See Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” a. 18, pp. 87-88: “Sed sciendum quod sicut iustitia originalis dicebatur naturalis, non quia causabatur ex principiis naturae, sed quia erat quoddam donum gratiae naturae humanae collatum, sic istae species dicuntur connaturales, non quia causantur a principiis naturae sed quia communiter naturae angelicae conferuntur. Per istas igitur species intelligit angelus omnia naturalia non autem supernaturalia.” Apparently, Godin deems the fact that innate species are principles of angelic natural knowledge to be self-evident. He therefore omits the reference to the supernatural realities found at the end of Sciendum. 75. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va); see: Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 90: “Secundus articulus, qui dicit quod cognitio angeli indifferenter se habet ad distans sicut ad propinquum secundum locum, sequitur ex praecedenti. Si enim angeli intelligunt per species connaturales, cum in speciebus connaturalibus non sit variatio per distantiam vel propinquitatem rerum, sequitur quod non fiat per eas diversa cognitio, sive res distantes sint, sive propinquae.”

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origin of the debate on the local distance as it relates to angelic cognition – he does not once mention Thomas in this context. Having presented these three reasons supporting angelic cognition by innate species, Godin raises four objections, two of which have no direct bearing on the question of local distance. The first, a direct quote from William, shows that the species – in this case both kinds, i.e., innate and acquired species, come under attack – are useless when it comes to knowing singular things, which are changeable and countless.76 Godin refutes the objection without difficulty, quoting Sciendum’s77 presentation of Thomas’ theory that each species, though unchangeable, represents a singular thing in all its changes and its particular accidents, because it is a resemblance of the idea in the divine mind.78 The third counter-argument reveals the contradiction implicit 76. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va): “Contra primum arguitur primo: Video quod ipsa singularia sunt mutabilia et variabilia omnia. Modo quaero, an angelus habeat tot species unius rei quot modis ipsa variatur, aut tantum unam. Si primo modo, ergo habebit infinitas, quod est incoveniens. Si autem unam tantum habebit, aut variabilem et mutabilem secundum variationem rei aut immutabilem et invariabilem. Si immutabilem et invariabilem, numquam per talem speciem cognoscit rem perfecte, nisi quando est in illa una dispositione ipsa res quam representat illa una species, et ita plura ignorabit de illa re quam cognoscat, cum ipsa res sit diversimode mutabilis. Si vero habet speciem mutabilem secundum mutationem rerum, eadem ratio erit de mutatione cuiuslibet rei alterius. Ergo infinitae mutationes erunt in angelis continue, vel ad minus tot erunt in eis mutationes quot sunt mutationes et motus in mundo”; see Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Le Correctorium corruptorii “Quaestione,” c. 18, p. 90: “Primum multi et magni dixerunt, non tamen credo quod sit verum, quia video quod singularia omnia variabilia sunt et mutabilia. Modo quaero, an angelus habeat tot species unius rei quot modis ipsa res variatur, aut tantum unam. Si primo modo, ergo infinitas. Si habet tantum unam, aut variabilem et mutabilem secundum variationem rei, aut invariabilem. Si invariabilem, numquam perfecte cognosceret rem per illam speciem, nisi quando res est in illa unica dispositione quam repraesentat illa species, et ita necessario plus incomparabiliter ignorabit de qualibet re quam cognoscit, quod est inconveniens. Si vero habet speciem mutabilem secundum mutationem rei, eadem ratio erit de specie cuiuslibet alterius rei. Ergo infinitae mutationes erunt in angelis continue, vel ad minus tot mutationibus et motibus subiacebunt continue, quot sunt motus et mutationes in mundo.” 77. Correctorium Corruptorii “Sciendum,” a. 18, p.88: “[…] angelus per suam speciem invariabilem cognoscit omnem varietatem singularis quia cognoscit per eam non solum singulare in sua substantia sed etiam secundum omnia accidentia eius; et ideo cognoscit cuicumque accidenti subsit singulare variatum. Sed hoc habet species ex hoc quod est participata similitudo ideae in mente divina, quae totum quod est in creatura repraesentat.” Here, Sciendum, followed by Godin, rephrases Summa theol. Ia, q. 57, a. 2, where Thomas addresses the question of whether angels know singular things: see above, n. 19. 78. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb): “Ad omnia illa dico, et primo ad primum, quod angelus per unam speciem cognoscit rem in se et quantum ad omnia accidentia sua, ita quod illa species in se invariabilis est representativa omnis variationis cui subiacet singulare. Hoc autem habet ipsa species inquantum est participata similitudo ydeae existentis in mente divina.”

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in the connection between innate species and numbers. Since angels have all innate species of things and the species of numbers are infinite, the angelic intellect must contain infinite species, with the result that angels know infinita by these species.79 Godin’s reply is that even supposing there are infinite species of numbers, angels have only species of natural things. These species are finite, so angels do not need infinite numbers to count them.80 The second objection – a compilation of different passages from William’s Correctorium Fratris Thomae that have already been examined here – states that if angels knew by connatural species, they would also know both non-existents and future events as if they were present, which they do not. Lect. Thom., II, d. 4, q. 20 (Graz, Uni- Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctoversitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va) rium Fratris Thomae, in: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione”, a. 18, p. 90 Secundo sic. Si cognosceret per spe- Item, si cognosceret connaturales [...] cies naturales,

per

species

Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Correctorium Corruptorii “Quare”, a. 18, p. 80 Si ergo angeli per species connaturales tunc aeque posset cognoscere non possunt cognoscere distantia sequitur entia et futura sicut praesentia quod quod per easdem possunt cognoscere futura et non entia [...] tamen falsum est ideo etc.

79. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33va-b): “Tertio arguitur sic. Si habet omnes species rerum innatas, cum infinitae sint species numerorum, infinitae erunt species in intellectu suo; et sic, cum cognoscat omnia quorum species habet, cognoscet infinita.” 80. Ibid. (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb): “Ad tertium dico quod, supposito quod species numerorum sint infinitae, non oportet quod habeant infinitas numerorum species, quia tantum habent species rerum naturalium quae sunt finitae ad quas numerandas non requiritur infinitas numerorum.”

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Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Quaestione”, a. 18, p. 90 Probatio maioris. Dicitur III De anima quod pro tanto intelligimus cum volumus, quod intelligibilia, scilicet species intelligibilium, sunt praesentes intellectui nostro. Non autem sentimus cum volumus, quia sensibilia non sunt semper praesentia nobis; sed sive res sint sive non sint, semper species sunt praesentes intellectui angeli.

Probatio maioris per Philosophum, III De anima: Intelligimus cum volumus, quia intelligibilia, id est species intelligibilium sunt praesentes intellectui. Non autem sentimus cum volumus, quia sensibilia non sunt semper praesentia sensui.

The internal structure of the objection is far from convincing: Godin’s objection is seriously flawed by its overly synthetic form – a summary of William’s reasoning which leaves too much implicit for us to properly understand William’s argument. The text begins with the hypothesis that angels cognize by innate species, but does not mention distant things (distantia). Therefore, the connection between cognizing by connatural species and knowing non-existents and future events is not made evident. Most probematically, Godin does not refer to the concept of “out of our sight” (extra prospectum nostrum), the bridge – according to William de la Mare – between knowledge by innate species and non-existents, as is clear in the fourth and final objection, which explicitly deals with local distance. Godin is only able to prove the major premise of the reasoning (i.e., angels know by connatural species). He appeals to the well-known quotation from Aristotle’s De anima81 (intelligimus quando volumus), which suggests that intelligible species are always present to our intellect – obviously, since the angelic intellect is more perfect than the human one, this must also be true of it. Thus, regardless of the actual existence of extramental objects, angels always have species of these objects in their intellect and consequently know by innate species and not by sense experience. The fourth objection is also a reworking of William’s argument on local distance, with a syllogistic structure. 81. Aristoteles Latinus, De anima, II, 5, 417b24.

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Contra hoc quod dicitur quod angeli possunt cognoscere aequaliter distantia et propinqua, arguitur sic. “Quia ad notitiam eodem modo se habent distantia et non entia” “et vocantur distantia quae sunt extra conspectum nostrum”;82 sed constat quod non entia non possumus cognoscere per species innatas; ergo nec distantia. Probatio maioris. Quia “si aliquod distans a nobis omnino corrumpitur, non magis scimus ipsum non esse nunc quam prius,”83 quando fuit non ens. Ergo distantia et non entia aequaliter se habent ad cognitionem.84

The major premise is that, with regard to their knowability, distant things, which are out of our sight, are tantamount to non-existents; however, – this is the minor premise – we cannot know non-existents by innate species. Consequently, we cannot even cognize distant things. The major premise is based on the assumption that if something which is distant ceases to exist, we are now no more aware of its actual non-existence than we were earlier. It is worth observing that Godin disarticulates William’s criticism of Thomas’ theory that local distance does not interfere with angelic cognition; he deals separately (in the second and fourth objections and the replies to them) firstly with future things, and then with distant things. In the reply to the second objection, Godin first gives the right interpretation of Aristotle’s passage, which must not be misunderstood to be a key argument in a reasoning that leads to the possibility of knowing non-existents and future events. Rather, “we understand whenever we want” refers to those things which we know to have existed at some time, whether or not they now exist, and whether they are known through abstracted or impressed upon species.85 Implying the unknowability of non-existents and future events, this argument lays 82. Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa”, a. 17 (18), p. 91,31-33: “Quia non entia simpliciter et distantia, illa scilicet quae sunt extra conspectum nostrum eodem modo se habent ad notitiam nostram.” 83. Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium Fratris Thomae, in: Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa,” a. 17 (18), p. 91,33-34: “Si enim aliquod distantium a nobis corrumpitur, non magis scimus ipsum esse quam prius.” 84. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb). 85. Ibid. (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb): “Ad secundum dicendum quod maior patet esse falsa et quando dicitur de Philosopho quod ‘intelligimus, cum volumus’, etc., dicendum quod Philosophus intelligit de illis, quae per species iam intelleximus quae fuerunt aliquando entia, et tunc intelligimus cum volumus, sive sint res existentes sive non, sive per species abstractas sive infusas.”

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the ground for the reply to the fourth objection, in which Godin makes a radical distinction between the ontological status of non-existents from that of distant things. In the second part of the reply – an abridged version of a passage from Quidort’s Circa that has already been examined – Godin’s intention is to clarify the peculiarity of angelic understanding. Whereas human knowing is based on abstraction from sensory representations and intelligible species in human mind always presuppose sense perception, the species employed in angelic understanding do not originate from extramental things and so do not necessarily imply the existence of things. This means that, whether or not a thing is actually existent, angels only acquire knowledge of its quiddity through their innate species; their knowledge of the existence (quia est) of things only occurs when the thing to be known assimilates itself to the species in the angelic intellect not only according to its essence, but also to its actual existence.86 The unknowability of non-existents is rehearsed in the reply to the last and fourth objection, where Godin makes his final remarks on the angelic cognition of distant things. He asserts that distant things and non-existents (which include future contingents) do not stand in the same relation to knowledge because the knowability and the being (entitas) of everything is necessarily correlated. Since this claim is a quotation from a text of Circa which we have already examined, there is no need to consider it further here. Ad quartum dicendum secundum ordinem eundem quod falsum est quod eodem modo se habeant ad cognitionem non entia et distantia. Unumquodque enim tantum habet de cognoscibilitate quantum de entitate. Non entia ergo, quae nec sunt in suis essentiis, nec in suis causis, cum sint futura contingentia, illa sunt omnino extra genus cognoscibilitatis et etiam entitatis, nisi soli Deo, cui determinata sunt sicut praesentia. Sed distantia secundum locum non sic cadunt extra genus entitatis quare 86. Ibid. (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb): “Secundo dico quod non est simile de speciebus angeli et intellectus nostri, quia cum illae sint a rebus acceptae existentes in intellectu semper repraesentant et supponunt rem fuisse in phantasmate. Sed species angeli non supponunt rem fuisse, quia ab ea non accipitur; et ideo non semper per ipsam res intelligitur, nisi quando est, quia tunc solum incipit res speciei angeli assimilari, non solum quoad essentiam, sed etiam quoad actualem existentiam facto motu quidem non in intellectu angeli, sed in rebus. Quantum enim ad essentiam cognitionis quid est angelus, aequaliter cognoscit rem non existentem sicut existentem, sicut etiam cognoscimus quid est rosa, non existente rosa in hieme. Sed ad cognoscendum de re, quia est quoad actualem existentiam, requiritur quod actualiter ei assimiletur per hoc quod actu existat.”

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nec cognoscibilitatis, ideo de ipsis angelus habet cognitionem ad minus quid sunt, et forte quia sunt, non obstante distantia, quia imitantur vel assimilantur speciei angelo concreatae, non solum quoad essentiam, sed etiam quoad existentiam, licet localiter distent. In nobis autem species intelligibilis accepta a rebus quae propter sui imperfectionem repraesentativa est solum rei quoad essentiam non quoad existentiam. Ideo per ipsam solum cognoscimus de re quid sit, non quia sit.87

Godin does, however, make an important addition to the Circa text when he clarifies that the knowability of distant things and non-existents is only equivalent in the sphere of human understanding. Since the starting point of human knowledge is sense perception, only an already existing thing can have intelligible species and human understanding is therefore subject to physical conditions and influenced by the local position of its objects of knowledge. In sharp contrast, angelic cognition is independent of local restrictions, since the species, preceding the object of knowledge, functions as an a priori cognitive device. Godin’s addition, while merely confirming the distinction between angelic cognition and human knowledge made in the previous reply, does also emphasize the peculiar features of human cognitive process. Ad maiorem dicendum quod maior est vera in nobis, non tamen in angelis. Ratio est, quia non possemus habere speciem intelligibilem, nisi re prius existente. Ideo intelligimus cum volumus propter phantasma quod habemus de re. Sed non est sic de angelo, quia habet speciem antequam sit res quae est principium intelligendi rem.88

87. Ibid. (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb); see Le Correctorium Corruptorii “Circa,” a. 17 (18), pp. 98,50-99,65: “[...] non entia simpliciter et distantia secundum locum, illa scilicet, quae sunt extra conspectum nostrum, eodem modo se habent ad notitiam nostram, dicendum quod falsum est omnino. Unumquodque enim quantum habet de entitate, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate […] Non entia ergo, quae nec sunt in suis essentiis, nec sunt in suis causis, ut futura contingentia, illa sunt omnino extra genus cognoscibilitatis quia et entitatis, nisi soli Deo, cui determinata sunt ut praesentia. Sed distantia secundum locum, cum non sic cedant extra genus entitatis et cognoscibilitatis, ideo de ipsis distantibus secundum locum habet angelus cognitionem ad minus quid sunt, etiam forte quia sunt, non obstante distantia quia imitantur speciem angelo concreatam quantum ad essentiam et exsistentiam, licet localiter distent. In nobis autem species intelligibilis accepta a rebus propter sui imperfectionem repraesentativa est rei essentiae solum et non rei exsistentiae. Ideo per ipsam de re absolute cognoscitur quid sit, sed non quia sit.” 88. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lectura Thomasina, II, d. 4, q. 20 (see Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, f. 33vb).

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Conclusion The scholastics of the late-medieval period were fascinated by the large constellation of topics related to angelic knowledge (whether angels know by innate or abstracted species; whether a superior angel knows by fewer species; whether angels may know singulars, material things, future contingents, hidden things and secrets of the heart; whether spiritual substances are granted natural cognition of God; the nature of morning and evening knowledge; etc.) and devoted considerable energy to their comprensive examination.89 Standing midway between God and human beings, angels owe their peculiar being and their specific operations to this central position within the hierarchy of intellectual realities. Interest in the angelic creatures was thus also prompted by metaphysical concerns, for understanding the structure and dynamism of Creation entails defining the nature of angels. Acts and modes of angelic cognition had to be investigated in relation to the intermediate position of spiritual substances. Due to their particular ontological status, spiritual creatures also provide an invaluable hermeneutical key to understading the mechanics of human knowledge. Since angels are pure intelligences devoid of body, their acts of intellection are not influenced by sense perception. In their study of angelic knowledge, the scholastics were thus able to concentrate on the intellectual level of knowledge acquisition. The debate on the question of whether local distance affects angelic knowledge confirms this instrumental approach to angelic epistemology. Indeed, this issue became the pretext for investigating the nature and role of the species intelligibilis taken as the formal representation of the quiddity and existence of an object of knowledge, regardless of whether the species was innate or abstracted. Local distance in relation to angelic cognition therefore served as the framework for analysis of the species intelligibilis as a cognitive device through which objects become cognitively accessible, whether the intellection was performed by an angelic or a human intellect. Much attention was also paid to a locus from Aristotle’s De anima 2 (5, 417b24 “intelligimus, quando volumus”). According to 89. It is no surprise that one of the questions disputed by Eckhart while Master in theology in Paris in 1300-1301 – one of the few extant questions from his time in Paris – is devoted to a topic of angelic epistemology: Eckhart, “Utrum intelligere angeli, ut dicit actione, sit suum esse,” in: Meister Eckhart, Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Die lateinischen Werke, Bd. 5, A. Zimmermann – L. Sturlese (hrsg. v.), Stuttgart 2006, pp. 49-54.

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this passage, the intellect – not only the angelic intellect, but also the human intellect – is in itself capable – in any given moment – of bringing into act the intelligbles which are potentially at its disposal.90 From a historico-philosophical point of view, it is worth noting that it was William de la Mare’s Correctorium Fratris Thomae that first brought the problem of the relationship between local distance and angelic knowledge to the prominence that provoked the subsequent controversy analyzed in this paper. In Aquinas’ Summa theologiae – William’s source – the issue had only been touched upon, but by including the short argument contained in the Summa in his list of doctrinal errors, William made it the subject of specific discussion. The replies in subsequent Correctoria gave rise to an authentic debate and their authors – who developed new and sophisticated arguments and increasingly drew upon philosophical sources – turned the relationship between local distance and angelic knowledge into a topic of philosophical significance. Each of the Correctoria made an original contribution to the debate: Quare insisted on the distinction between sense perception and intellectual cognition; Sciendum emphasized the distinction between the acquisition and the use of science; Circa illustrated the two modes of knowledge (according to quia and quid est) and their metaphysical foundation (the essence-existence distinction); Quaestione focussed on non-existents and future contingents. As a result, what had been a peripheral argument merely alluded to by Thomas became the centre of a constellation of important epistemological and metaphysical concepts and topics: non-existents, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, angelic knowledge of individuals, intelligible species, indifference of essence, morning and evening knowledge, etc. It is hardly surprising that when dealing with local distance and angelic cognition, William of Peter Godin turned to the Correctoria controversy. William de la Mare’s critical account provided him with the topic and his objections to Aquinas’ view that angelic understanding is indifferent to the position of its objects. Godin’s own position, however, was strongly influenced by Quidort’s analysis, with which Godin 90. The controversy on local distance as it relates to angelic cognition enabled medieval authors to adopt and refine notions and arguments which they then went on to adapt to other conceptual and doctrinal contexts. One may safely claim that reflections on angelic knowledge of distant things and non-existents introduces to the discussion on intuition of non-existents: on this debate, see e.g. D. Piché, “L’intuition du non-existant selon Gérard de Bologne et Hervé de Nédellec,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 77 (2010), pp. 87-105.

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concurs in making a radical distinction between distant things and non-existents on the basis of Metaphysics Book 2 (1, 993b30-31). Since all things are related equally to being and to truth, a non-existent cannot be known at all. Godin also asserts that angels, through their innate species, can have cognition of an object’s quiddity, whether the object actually exists or not. Angelic cognition of the existence (quia est) of a thing, however, only occurs when the thing to be known assimilates itself to the species in the angelic intellect according not only to its essence, but also to its actual existence. Godin, of course, did not merely copy and paste other people’s texts. As said above, the passages quoted are rearranged and subject to his own, original, interpretation: small textual changes reveal clever conceptual moves. This analysis of the issue of local distance and angelic cognition confirms the tendency of recent scholarship to abandon the old cliché of the Lectura Thomasina as an unoriginal compilation of borrowings from Aquinas. This case, however, allows us to make a step forward. Godin’s originality has only ever been measured with regard to his relationship with the work of Thomas. From this perspective, scholars have recently drawn attention to Godin’s development of a well-structured strategy of defence of Thomas’ views in response to the latter’s later opponents (Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome).91 Godin’s contribution to the formation of a coherent and harmonious set of consistent Thomistic teachings has also been emphasized. I hope this paper will lead to a new appreciation of the relationship between Godin and his direct sources (in particular the Correctoria and John of Quidort’s Sentences commentary) as mediators of Thomas’ thought. Future scholarship should – I believe – endeavor to determine the hermeneutical and doctrinal strategy adopted by the Lectura Thomasina in his treatments of these texts. Perhaps, more importantly, an attempt should be made to understand whether these sources had an impact – at least implicitly – on the way Godin selected, combined, merged, and interpreted Thomas’ texts. To this end, it is hoped that my contribution on the question of whether local distance impedes angelic knowledge may provide a useful example, in that it demonstrates that Godin’s understanding of Thomas’ views was significantly influenced by the arguments put forward by the Correctoria within the polemical atmosphere that preceded the composition of the Lectura Thomasina. 91. See above, n. 9.

WILLIAM OF PETER OF GODIN ON MATTER Fabrizio Amerini Preface What does it mean that, for Aristotle, the being of matter consists in being in potency to form? Can matter exist in potency before existing in act with a given form? In the Middle Ages, both theologians and philosophers address these questions. In theology, the problem of matter arises when a Christian thinker has to explain the meaning of creation ex nihilo. Normally, Latin theologians account for matter as the first thing created by God, directly from nothing. According to Augustine’s wellknown interpretation of the beginning of the Book of Genesis, for example, God first creates matter and then inserts all the possible forms into it, in a state of latent or virtual being.1 For Augustine, matter is something between nothing and being, closer to the former than to the latter, prope nihil as he calls it. Matter cannot be completely nihil, though. Since it is created, it received a certain being at the moment of creation, a being that is different from the being of the form and from that of the composite of matter and form that results from it. This leads the theologian to the main question: Regardless of whether God created matter in time or eternally, did God have an exemplar for matter when He created it? And if He did, could God make matter exist without a form? In the Convivio (1304-1307), Dante notes that this question is one of the most difficult for a Christian thinker. We can argue that (prime) matter exists – he says –, but we cannot know what (prime) matter in itself is.2 1. See e.g. Augustinus, Gn. litt. inp., 15, ed. I. Zycha (CSEL 28, 493-496); Augustinus, Gn. adv. Man., I, 6-7, 10-11, ed. D. Weber (CSEL 91, 76-78). 2. Dante Alighieri, Convivio, IV, 1, 8 in Dante Alighieri, Opere, vol. II, ed. G. Fioravanti, Milano 2014, pp. 544-546; III, 8, 15, p. 438; III, 15, 6, p. 500. For more on Dante’s views of matter, see C. Vasoli, “Materia,” in: Enciclopedia Dantesca, Rome 1971, pp. 861-864; M. de Bonfils Templer, “La prima materia de li elementi,” in: Studi Danteschi 58 (1986), pp. 275-291; G. Sasso, “Se la materia delli elementi era da Dio intesa,” in: La Cultura 39/3 (2001), pp. 365-393.

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Dante’s note reveals that in his day the question of matter’s nature was considered compelling. In the same years that Dante composed the Convivio, the Dominican Master Remigio de’ Girolami disputed, in Rome or in Perugia, two Quodlibeta (1303/1304-1307).3 The first question of both Quodlibeta confirms Dante’s note, for Remigio begins his quodlibetal disputations by asking “whether God can make matter exist without a form.” Remigio’s Quodlibeta are historically interesting insofar as they give a state-of-the-art of the positions on this issue. In particular, Remigio puts Thomas Aquinas in dialogue with contemporary philosophers and theologians such as Henry of Ghent, John Peckham, and William de la Mare.4 According to Remigio, in his time theologians share two beliefs. First, stating that God cannot create something does not amount to limiting God’s omnipotence. Impossibility in creation is due to the nature of the created thing, not to God’s power to create. Second, contradictory things cannot exist at one and the same time. Remigio points out that, despite these points of agreement, there is disagreement on the nature of matter and on the reasons for conceding or denying that God can make matter exist without a form. In his response, Remigio explains that Thomas Aquinas’s answer to this question is negative and follows in Aristotle’s footsteps insofar as it presupposes the co-implication of form and act:5 this means that it assumes that a thing’s being in act necessarily depends on its having a form and, vice versa, that 3. On Remigio de’ Girolami’s life and works, see S. Gentili, “Remigio dei Girolami,” in: Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vol. 56, Rome 2001, pp. 531-541, and E. Panella, Remigio de’ Girolami (http://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/remigio2/8700.htm) to which I refer for other bibliographical references. 4. As noted by Emilio Panella, a parallel text occurs in Extractio questionum per alphabetum in ms. G3, fol. 129ra-b (for the sigla of the manuscripts of Remigio, see E. Panella, Remigio de’ Girolami). Aquinas deals with this issue in Quodl., III, 1, ed. Leon., Paris/Rome, 1996, pp. 241-243; S.th., Ia, q. 66, a. 1; De pot., q. 4, a. 1, ed. Marietti, Torino 1965, pp. 33-34. Henry of Ghent disputes this same question in Quodlibet I, q. 10, ed. R. Macken, Leuven 1979, p. 68. See also Guillelmus de la Mara, Correctorium fratris Thomae, 27, in P. Glorieux, Les premières polémiques thomistes: I. Le Correctorium corruptorii ‘Quare’, Cain 1927, p. 114 (see also 31, p. 129-131; 102, p. 396 , and 108, pp. 409-410); Iohannes Peckham, Quodlibet romanum, q. 1: Utrum Deus possit facere materiam esse sine omni forma, ed. F.M. Delorme, in F.M. Delorme, Quodlibeta quatuor, Roma 1989, pp. 174-176. 5. This is a commonplace in the Correctoria literature. See e.g. Iohannes Parisiensis, Correctorium corruptotii ‘Circa’, 26, in J.-P. Müller, Le Correctorium corruptorii ‘Circa’ de Jean Quidort de Paris, Rome 1941, p. 139, ll. 71-92. John contests the opponent’s view that among the philosophers, in Paris, there was agreement on the possibility of matter’s existing without form. Compare Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Correctorium corruptorii ‘Circa’, 26, p. 137, ll. 18-19, with p. 142, ll. 85-86.

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a thing’s form necessarily entails the thing’s being in act. Given this co-implication of form and act, it is simply contradictory to say that matter exists, i.e. is in act, without a form.6 The theological question of the presence in God of an exemplar for matter underlies the question disputed by Remigio and others whether God can make matter exist without a form. On the philosophical plane, the discussion of this possibility has consequences for the answer the philosopher gives to the question of the principle of individuation of created things. Thomas famously called on matter to play the double role of the individuating principle of a form and of the distinguishing principle of two individuated forms. Matter makes a form individual by multiplying numerically the instances of that form, which is by itself one in species. The Dominican followers of Thomas will disagree on his definitive position on matter, so they will disagree on the principle of individuation as well. In what follows, we shall reconstruct one of the many interpretations of Thomas’s position on matter and individuation: that proposed by William of Peter of Godin in his Lectura Thomasina. 1. William of Peter of Godin on Matter The Lectura Thomasina is of uncertain date, but was likely composed in Paris at the end of the 13th century or so. The Lectura is an important witness to what has been called the “early Thomistic school.”7 Like 6. To be precise, Aquinas solves this question by introducing a distinction, which Remigio does not mention. Thomas holds that God cannot have an exemplar for matter as such, because matter in itself is a merely potential being; nonetheless, since God creates matter, God has in some way (aliqualiter) an exemplar for matter. Thomas’s point is that God possesses an exemplar for matter but it is not proper to matter, since it is not different from the exemplar God has for matter when He actually creates it as the material part of a certain composite of matter and form. See e.g. Thomas de Aquino, Sent., I, d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2, ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris, pp. 844-845; Thomas de Aquino, Quaest. disp. de ver., q. 3, a. 5, ed. Leon., Paris/ Rome, p. 111-112. For an introduction to Thomas Aquinas’s view of matter, see J.E. Brower, “Matter, Form, and Individuation”, in B. Davies– E. Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, Oxford 2012, pp. 85-103, and J.E. Brower, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects, Oxford 2014 (to which I refer for further bibliographical references). 7. See F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School, Dubuque, Iowa, 1964, pp. 120-124; G. Koridze, “The Formation of the First Thomistic School,” in: F. Amerini (ed.), Dal convento alla città. Filosofia e teologia in Francesco da Prato O.P. (XIV secolo), Florence 2008, p. 145. For the chronology of the Lectura, see M. Grabmann, “Kardinal Guilelmus Petri de Godino

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other works inspired by Aquinas, the Lectura extensively borrows from him, on the one hand, but on the other, it also attempts to combine Thomas’s doctrines with other sources. The upshot is a sort of “reasoned patchwork,” which puts forward a simplified and updated version of Thomas’s teaching, particularly suitable to students’ scholastic training. Two questions from Book II of the Lectura are especially relevant for the subject of matter and form. (Q1) The first question is the third of distinction 2: it is devoted to angels and asks whether there can be more than one angel under an angelic species. In this question, there is an interesting digression on the principle of individuation, which probably predates by some time the debate between William and John Duns Scotus in Paris around 1305 – a debate that is conserved, as responsio Petri, only in ms. Erfurt, Wissenschaft Bibliothek der Stadt, Amplon. 2° 369, fols. 71vb-75ra.8 (Q2) The second question is the second of distinction 13. After introducing (in the previous distinction) the problem of the nature of matter, by discussing the question “whether there exists only one matter for all things,” in distinction 13 William focuses on the beginning of creation and asks the biblical question “whether the informity (informitas) of matter preceded in time its formation”, namely whether matter was created in a state of complete privation of forms before receiving them. To this question, William adds the question we are interested in here: whether God can make matter exist without a form. These questions are important cases for assessing the features and significance of William’s alleged ‘Thomism’. Let me invert William’s order and start with the second question (Q2), i.e. whether God can make matter exist without a form.

(†1336) und seine Lectura Thomasina,” in: Divus Thomas 4 (1926), pp. 385-403; B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts Münster 1967, pp. 24-31, and, more recently, W. Goris – M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” in: J. Hamesse (ed.), Roma, magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Parvi flores. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 83-109. On Peter of Godin’s works, see T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. II: G-I, Rome 1975, pp. 152-155. In this paper, all quotations from the Lectura Thomasina refer to the text as conserved in ms. Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, ms. 475, which I shall abbreviate as G, according to the conventions established by W. Goris - M. Pickavé, “Die Lectura Thomasina,” pp. 87-92. This manuscript is also consultable on-line at URL= http://manuscripta.at/m1/hs_detail.php?ID=8059. 8. On this debate, see Wouter Goris’s essay in this volume.

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2.1. Whether God Can Make Matter Exist without a Form As said earlier, William’s positions are closely, and often literally, based on Thomas’s writings. Long is the list of the points of doctrine that William shares with Aquinas. With respect to matter and form, for example, William subscribes to the doctrines of the unicity of substantial form and human soul, and of its non-hylomorphic composition,9 proving that only if one holds that the human soul is immaterial, can one preserve its incorruptibility.10 He also defends the radical priority of substantial form over all accidental forms,11 rejecting the Stoic doctrine of seminal reasons.12 William gives arguments for reconciling the claim that the human soul is the form of the body with the claim that the human soul is separated from the body as to its (intellective) operation and hence as to its being.13 Yet, William believes that in one sense, we may account for the powers of the human soul as accidents, while in another sense, we must say that the powers necessarily flow from the essence of the soul and are identical with it.14 William also believes that the human soul immediately informs the body and that it extends itself over the whole body.15 Finally, William rejects Origen’s heterodox doctrine that human souls are created before they are infused into the body,16 and the heretical view that human souls are parts of God.17 He also counters any form of traducianism: God creates human souls immediately, once the body reaches its perfect organization, at which point it is in proximate potency to receiving the human soul.18 Given this general anthropological background, in distinction 13 of Book II William discusses the possibility for matter to exist before receiving a form. Here William closely follows Thomas’s pronouncements in the Summa theologiae, although he affirms he wants to extend the question by expressly discussing whether God can make matter 9. Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 5: Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma. 10. Lect. Thom., II, d. 19, q. 3: Utrum anima humana sit incorruptibilis. 11. Lect. Thom., I, d. 8, q. 9: Utrum anima sit eius potentie. 12. Lect. Thom., II, d. 18, q. 1: Utrum in materia corporali sint alique rationes seminales. 13. Lect. Thom., II, d. 1, q. 6: Utrum anima rationalis debuit uniri tali corpori; II, d. 16, q. 2: Utrum anima unitur corpori ut forma. 14. Lect. Thom., I, d. 3, q. 4: Utrum anima sit eius potentie. 15. Lect. Thom., I, d. 8, q. 8: Utrum anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. 16. Lect. Thom., II, d. 17, q. 1: Utrum anima sit creata a Deo extra corpus. 17. Lect. Thom., II, d. 17, q. 2: Quod non sit de substantia Dei. 18. Lect. Thom., II, d. 18, q. 1: Utrum anima immediate producatur a Deo and II, d. 18, q. 2: Quod anima ex semine creari non potest.

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exist without a form. This additional question has no counterpart in Thomas’s Summa, but not unsurprisingly, it does in other of Thomas’s works, namely in Quodlibet III, q. 1 (belonging to the second Parisian series of Quodlibeta, 1268-1272), and in Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 25 (dating to the beginning of the 1260’s). William divides the question into two sub-questions. The first asks whether the informity of matter preceded in time its formation. Here, William repeats Thomas almost verbatim, as Table 1 below shows. The first argument in contrarium is indeed the third one given by Thomas in the Summa, while the second corresponds to the second one. Thomas’s first argument, derived from Augustine, is, on the other hand, not present in William: Table 1 Lect.Thom., II, d. 13, q. 1 (G 38rb)

S.th., Ia, q. 66, a. 1, arg.

Circa distinctionem XIII queritur utrum informitas materie precesserit tempore formationem suam. Et ut extendatur quero utrum Deus possit facere materiam primam sine forma existere.

Ad primum sic proceditur.

[1=3*] Videtur quod sic, quia materia est potior accidente, cum materia sit pars substantie; sed Deus potest facere accidens sine omni subiecto, ut patet in sacramento altaris; ergo et materiam sine omni forma sua.

[1*] Videtur quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem ipsius. Dicitur enim Gen. 1, terra erat inanis et vacua, sive invisibilis et incomposita, secundum aliam litteram; per quod designatur informitas materiae, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo materia fuit aliquando informis, antequam formaretur. [2*] Praeterea, natura in sua operatione Dei operationem imitatur; sicut causa secunda imitatur causam primam. Sed in operatione naturae informitas tempore praecedit formationem. Ergo et in operatione Dei. [3*] Praeterea, materia potior est accidente, quia materia est pars substantiae. Sed

[2=2*] Preterea, quod informitas precesserit patet sic, quia natura in operatione sua operationem divinam imitatur, sicut causa secunda primam; sed in operatione nature informitas precedit formationem; ergo et in opere Dei in illis 6 diebus.

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[s.c. 1=s.c. 1*] Contra, imperfectio effectus arguit imperfectionem in agente; sed agens perfectissimum est Deus, quia Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ergo opus suum nunquam fuit informe.

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Deus potest facere quod accidens sit sine subiecto; ut patet in sacramento altaris. Ergo potuit facere quod materia esset sine forma. [s.c. 1*] Sed contra, imperfectio effectus attestatur imperfectioni agentis. Sed Deus est agens perfectissimum, unde de eo dicitur, Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ergo opus ab eo creatum nunquam fuit informe. [s.c. 2*] Praeterea, creaturae corporalis formatio facta fuit per opus distinctionis. Distinctioni autem opponitur confusio, sicut et formationi informitas. Si ergo informitas praecessit tempore formationem materiae, sequitur a principio fuisse confusionem corporalis creaturae, quam antiqui vocaverunt chaos.

In the response, William continues to follow Thomas (see below, table 2). He observes that with Basil, Ambrose and Chrysostomus, we may say that the informity of matter preceded in time its formation, but only if (i) by ‘informity’ we understand the privation of the last and perfect act of formation and not the absence of any form, and (ii) by ‘time’ we refer to a thing’s temporal duration (duratione). With Augustine, on the other hand, we may also assert that it is impossible that informed matter preceded in time the same matter formed. The privation of form can precede the acquisition of form only according to an order of origin or nature, only according to an order of nature, like is that which holds between potency and act: in fact, a thing that is in potency to a form can be considered to be in a state of privation of that form and hence to be naturally prior to itself as being in act with that form. Since Genesis 1,2, says that earth, once created, was without form, William explains that the text of Genesis hints at three kinds of formation that were absent at the beginning of time: the diaphanous sky lacked the beauty of light, and the earth lacked two beauties, for it was covered by water and still deprived of herbs and plants:

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Table 2 Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 1 (G 38rb-va)

S.th., Ia, q. 66, art. 1, sol.

Quantum ad primum dicendum quod Augustinus aliter posuit informitatem [materie add. in marg.] precedere et alii. Cum enim Augustinus posuit omnia simul creata et distinctas secundum species suas, posuit informitatem huius natura precedere, non tempore vel duratione, accipiens per informitatem materie materiam nudam sine forma. Unde posuit informitatem eo modo precedere quo potentia prior est actu in creatura et pars toto. Alii vero, sicut Basilius et Ambrosius et Chrysostomus, dicunt informitatem materie etiam duratione precedere formationem eius. Per istam autem informitatem non accipiunt carentiam omnis forme, quia illud est impossibile, ut patet, sed dicitur informitas secundum quod excludit formositatem et decorem qui postea fuit, sicut etiam nunc apparet in creatura corporea.

Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sanctorum. Augustinus enim vult quod informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius, sed solum origine vel ordine naturae. Alii vero, ut Basilius, Ambrosius et Chrysostomus, volunt quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem. Et quamvis hae opiniones videantur esse contrariae, tamen parum ab invicem differunt, aliter enim accipit informitatem materiae Augustinus quam alii. Augustinus enim accipit informitatem materiae pro carentia omnis formae. Et sic impossibile est dicere quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit vel formationem ipsius, vel distinctionem. Et de formatione quidem manifestum est. Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem. Nec etiam potest dici quod habuit aliquam formam communem et postmodum supervenerunt ei formae diversae, quibus sit distincta. Quia hoc esset idem cum opinione antiquorum naturalium, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod corpus in actu, puta ignem, aerem aut aquam, aut aliquod medium. Ex quo sequebatur quod fieri non esset nisi alterari. Quia cum illa forma praecedens daret esse in actu in genere substantiae, et faceret esse hoc aliquid;

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Triplex autem talis formositas deerat in principio ipsis rebus creatis, ut accipi potest ex primo capitulo Genesis, propter quod proprie informitas dicebatur. Deerat enim a toto corpore dyafano, quod dicitur celum, pulchritudo lucis, unde dicitur quod tenebre erant super faciem abissi. Deerat secundo terrae duplex pulchritudo. Una quam habet ex hoc quod aquis est discooperta, et quantum ad hoc dicitur quod erat inanis et invisibilis, quia propter aquas

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sequebatur quod superveniens forma non faceret simpliciter ens actu, sed ens actu hoc, quod est proprium formae accidentalis; et sic sequentes formae essent accidentia, secundum quae non attenditur generatio, sed alteratio. Unde oportet dicere quod materia prima neque fuit creata omnino sine forma, neque sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis. Et ita, si informitas materiae referatur ad conditionem primae materiae, quae secundum se non habet aliquam formam, informitas materiae non praecessit formationem seu distinctionem ipsius tempore, ut Augustinus dicit, sed origine seu natura tantum, eo modo quo potentia est prior actu, et pars toto. Alii vero sancti accipiunt informitatem, non secundum quod excludit omnem formam, sed secundum quod excludit istam formositatem et decorem qui nunc apparet in corporea creatura. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod informitas materiae corporalis duratione praecessit formationem eiusdem. Et sic secundum hoc, quantum ad aliquid cum eis Augustinus concordat, et quantum aliquid discordat, ut infra patebit. Et quantum ex littera Genesis I, accipi potest, triplex formositas deerat, propter quod dicebatur creatura corporalis informis. Deerat enim a toto corpore diaphano, quod dicitur caelum, pulchritudo lucis, unde dicitur quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Deerat autem terrae duplex pulchritudo. Una, quam habet ex hoc quod est aquis discooperta, et quantum ad hoc dicitur quod terra erat inanis, sive invisibilis, quia corporali aspectui patere non poterat, propter aquas undique eam cooperientes.

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undique visui non patebat. Deerat etiam terre alia pulchritudo quam ex hoc habet quod est ornata herbis et plantis, et quantum ad hoc dicitur quod erat vacua vel incomposita, secundum aliam litteram, idest non ornata. Et sic informitatem illorum duorum, scilicet terre et celi, tangere cum dicitur quod tenebre erant super faciem abyssi et terra erat inanis et vacua [Gen. 1,2].

Alia vero, quam habet ex hoc quod est ornata herbis et plantis, et ideo dicitur quod erat vacua, vel incomposita, idest non ornata, secundum aliam litteram. Et sic, cum praemisisset duas naturas creatas, scilicet caelum et terram, informitatem caeli expressit per hoc quod dixit, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi, secundum quod sub caelo etiam aer includitur, informitatem vero terrae, per hoc quod dixit, terra erat inanis et vacua.

If we compare table 1 and table 2, we realize that in the first sub-question William only sticks to summarizing what Thomas said in Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 66, a. 1. William’s technique of composition of the Lectura becomes clearer in the second sub-question, where his argument progresses in two steps. As quite expected, he constructs his argument by borrowing from other texts of Thomas. As a first step, William proves that God can create whatever is not a contradiction, nor implies a contradiction. Non-contradiction is the core meaning of ‘being’, which designates the first and proper effect of God’s creation. Since ‘being’ (i) denotes an existent thing and (ii) connotes its dependence on a cause, God could not create something that violates either of these two conditions. For example, God could not create another God, for God cannot depend on any other cause; nor could God create a non-being, for ‘non-being’ does not denote an existent thing. For this reason, God could not even create matter without a form, for otherwise this act of creation would imply a contradiction, violating the second condition. This argument condenses Thomas’s reasoning in Summa contra Gentiles, II, ch. 25, as the following table shows: Table 3 Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 2 (G 38va)

S.c.G., II, 25, nn. 1018-1021, 1024-1025

Quantum ad secundum sciendum quod nulla potentia potest habere operationem sibi debitam ubi deficit ratio sui obiecti, sicut quia obiectum potentie visive est visibile quod non potest habere rationem visibilis, nec potest a potentia visiva apprehendi.

Rursus. Quia potentiae activae obiectum et effectus est ens factum, nulla autem potentia operationem habet ubi deficit ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus non videt deficiente visibili in actu: oportet quod Deus dicatur non posse quicquid est contra rationem entis inquan-

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Modo certum est quod proprium obiectum potentie divine est ens, quia esse est proprius effectus Dei, ut supra declaratum fuit. Ergo omne illud quod potest esse obiectum potentie divine oportet quod secundum se rationem entis habeat et quidquid rationem entis habere potest a Deo fieri potest. Inde est quod Deus alium deum non potest facere quia de ratione entis est utique factum est quod ab aliqua causa dependeat, Deo autem dependere ab alio repugnat. [Illud ergo Deus non potest facere quod repugnat entis rationi, sed solum non ens repugnat [om. homeot., add. in marg.] enti, quia non ens tollit ens secundum quod ad idem refertur, et ideo non potest facere unum et idem simul esse et non esse, qui implicat contradictionem. Nec potest etiam facere contraria vel privativa respectu eiusdem, quia contradictio includitur in contrariis et in oppositis privative, quia si album est, non est nigrum, et si est videns, non est cecum. Sed materiam creare actu sine forma implicat contradictionem. Ergo hoc non potest Deus facere.

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tum est ens, vel facti entis inquantum est factum. Quae autem sint huiusmodi, inquirendum est. Primo quidem igitur contra rationem entis est quod entis rationem tollit. Tollitur autem ratio entis per suum oppositum: sicut ratio hominis per opposita eius vel particularum ipsius. Oppositum autem entis est non ens. Hoc igitur Deus non potest, ut faciat simul unum et idem esse et non esse: quod est contradictoria esse simul.

Adhuc. Contradictio contrariis et privative oppositis includitur: sequitur enim, si est album et nigrum, quod sit album et non album; et si est videns et caecum, quod sit videns et non videns. Unde eiusdem rationis etiam est quod Deus non possit facere opposita simul inesse eidem secundum idem. Amplius. Ad remotionem cuiuslibet principii essentialis sequitur remotio ipsius rei. Si igitur Deus non potest facere rem simul esse et non esse, nec etiam potest facere quod rei desit aliquod suorum principiorum essentialium ipsa remanente: sicut quod homo non habeat animam […]. Sunt etiam quaedam quae repugnant rationi entis facti inquantum huiusmodi. Quae etiam Deus facere non potest: nam omne quod facit Deus, oportet esse factum. Ex hoc autem patet quod Deus non potest facere Deum. Nam de ratione entis facti est quod esse suum ex alia causa dependeat. Quod est contra rationem eius quod dicitur Deus, ut ex superioribus patet.

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After proving that God cannot create a contradiction, as a second step, William explains why God’s act of putting matter into existence without a form would imply a contradiction. Contradiction arises in this case because time can measure the duration only of things that exist in act, and, if the informed matter preceded in time its receiving forms, it should exist in act. But the being of matter consists in being in potency and nothing in potency can, at the same time, be in act. Now, only form can actualize the matter’s potency, for only what is in act can actualize what is in potency, and only form is in act. Thus, if God could create matter without a form, He could create a thing that, at one and the same time, is and is not in act, has and has not a form, and this is clearly a contradiction. This argument, as we shall see later, conflates two arguments of Thomas, extracted from Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 66, a. 1, and Quodlibet III, q. 1, as the following table shows: Table 4 Lect. Thom., II, dist. 13, q. 2 (G 38va)

S.th., Ia, q. 66, a. 1

Quia autem contradictionem implicat patet sic, quia si materia precessit ipsam formam, oportet necessario quod fuerit actu. Cuius ratio est quia si duratione precessit et tempore, cum tempus non mensuret nisi actum existendi, quia res durare non dicitur dum est in potentia, oportet necessario, si precessit formam in ipsa duratione et tempore, quod ipsa materia actu fuerit. Vel igitur materia est actus vel potentia participans actum. Non potest dici quod sit ipse actus, quia ratio materie est potentia distans(?) ab omni forma in actu. Unde VII Metaphysicorum dicitur quod essentia materie est alia ab essentia cuiuslibet predicabilis, idest forme. Relinquitur igitur quod non potest esse actu nisi inquantum participat actum; sed actus participatus a materia est forma, dans esse materie. Ergo dicere materiam

Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem. Quodlibet III, q. 1: Omne enim quod est actu: vel est ipse actus, vel est potentia participans actum. Esse autem actu repugnat rationi materiae, quae secundum propriam rationem est ens in potentia.

Relinquitur ergo quod non possit esse in actu nisi in quantum participat actum. Actus autem participatus a materia nihil est aliud quam forma; unde idem est dictu,

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tempore precedere formam et esse actu est diceremateriam non habere formam et formam habere, et istud est clare contradictio. Ergo Deus hoc facere non potest, scilicet quod materia possit actu existere sine forma.

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materiam esse in actu, et materiam habere formam. Dicere ergo quod materia sit in actu sine forma, est dicere contradictoria esse simul; unde a Deo fieri non potest.

The above argument of William appears circular in that it stipulates that a thing’s being in act necessarily depends on its having a form (this is what we called above the co-implication of form and act) and simply concludes the impossibility for God to make matter exist in act without a form from such a stipulation. In the question, William avoids discussing the positions mentioned by Remigio that distinguished different kinds or meanings of being in order to defend the possibility for matter to exist without a form. If we compare, for example, William’s question with Remigio’s first question of Quodlibet I, or even with the first question of Quodlibet VI by Hervaeus Natalis, the General Master of the Dominican Order, we see that William reserves only but little space to the arguments in oppositum. Even Remigio and Hervaeus Natalis accept the co-implication of form and act, but they discuss many arguments either for proving this co-implication or for rejecting rival positions.19 William instead limits himself to discussing three arguments. Except for the second, clearly fallacious as we shall see, the first and the third argument introduce the two most popular strategies for rejecting Thomas’s response. Both insist on the need to reject the co-implication of form and act. I could not identify the exact source from which William took these arguments, but as far as I can tell, the first is inspired by Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet I, q. 10, disputed at Paris during the Christmas session of 1276. In that question, Henry defends the possibility for matter to exist without a form and he does so by qualifying the notion of being: 19. Remigio starts with rejecting Henry of Ghent’s tripartition of being, which was very popular in his time. Hervaeus Natalis too refers to such a distinction at the beginning of his Quodlibeta, VI, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1513, ff. 129va-130ra, esp. in a. 1, f. 129va-b. Hervaeus’s Quodlibet VI is of uncertain chronology and also its authenticity is doubtful. On this, see R.L. Friedman, Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, in: Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, p. 438 ff. and J.-L. Solère’s article in this volume p. 308 note n. 45. For Remigio’s arguments, see http://www.e-theca.net/emiliopanella/remigio2/8300. htm. On the ‘paradox’ of matter as pure potentiality, see R. Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes. 1274-1671, Oxford 2011, p. 35 ff.

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Hic primo oportet excludere falsam imaginationem quam habent quidam de materia, videlicet quod nihil sit nisi potentia quedam et ita quantum est de se, non est, quia quod solum est in potentia in quantum huiusmodi non est, ita quod in sua natura tantum appropinquat non-enti […]. Est igitur secundum iam dicta in materia considerare triplex esse, scilicet esse simpliciter, et esse aliquid duplex, unum quo est formarum quedam capacitas, aliud quo est compositi fulcimentum.20

In William’s question, the first opponent simply looks for a case that allows him to reject the co-implication of form and act, and “being” offers in this respect a good case. Being is indisputably an act but not a form (on the argument that the form too is in potency to being and nothing can be in potency to itself), so, when God confers being on a thing, He is not also conferring a form on it. The third argument, finally, illustrates the second strategy, which instead appeals to God’s “omnipotence.” If the form can make the matter exist, a fortiori God can do it. Every form is indeed the principle of the being of matter, but no form is as powerful as the first principle. The third opponent is implicitly referring to the Liber de causis when he states that the primary cause can produce the same effects produced by a secondary cause even in the absence of the secondary cause. If, as the case of the Eucharist shows, this is possible in the case of accidents, it is a fortiori possible in the case of matter, which is more a being than accidents are. Thus, we arrive at the same conclusion as before: God can non-contradictorily confer being on matter while not conferring any form on it. Note that the third argument applies to the case of the relation between form and matter the same argument Thomas used in Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, for defending the possibility that an accident exists without its subject of inherence. Since Thomas accepts that accidents can exist separately from their subject of inherence, the opponent seems to suggest that Thomas would be inconsistent if he refused to accept that matter could exist separately from form.21 This argument was particularly 20. Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q. 10, p. 63, ll. 21-25, p. 68, ll. 43-45. 21. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 2 (G 38va): “Modo contra hoc arguunt aliqui multipliciter. Primo sic: quamvis enim forma sit actus, non tamen est omnis actus, quia non est esse. Ergo ipsum esse poterit inesse alicui sine forma, cum non sit idem, scilicet forma et esse. Quod autem non sint idem patet sic, qui nihil est in potentia respectu sui; forma autem est in potentia respectu esse; ergo non sunt idem. Secundo sic: quecumque possunt separari secundum intellectum nostrum, Deus potest ea separare secundum esse; sed materia potest separari a forma secundum intellectum nostrum; ergo Deus potest eam a forma separare. Tertio sic:

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popular among the Franciscan theologians. It is for example the core of John Peckham’s reply to Thomas in his so-called Quodlibet Romanum and William seems to have in mind precisely this text when he formulates the argument.22 William thinks that it is not difficult to neutralize such arguments. Before responding to them, however, he underscores a point: only ‘being in potency’ can express the true being of matter; neither ‘being in act’ nor ‘being nothing’ can do it.23 He does not explain why “it is evident” (de se patet) that being in act cannot express the being of matter, a position that was instead defended by Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus and others. He only repeats that the question in discussion concerns a thing’s being in time and no thing can exist in time if not by virtue of a form. It is unclear, however, what this specification exactly means, whether William is here attributing to matter a being that is not the being of form or he is considering priority in time as the only relevant priority for the case at hand (we have seen, in fact, that there can be a sense of priority – priority according to an order of nature – according to which matter can be said to be prior to form). What is clear, anyway, is that, in the response to the first argument, William vigorously resists the idea that something can be in act without having a form, and he does so by emphasizing the formality of being itself. If being could make matter exist without and before a form, being would formally inhere in matter and hence be the first form of matter. This entails that being would be something formal quamvis enim forma sit principium essendi materie, non tamen est principium primum; sed Deus est tale; ergo constat quod Deus potest producere omnes effectus causarum secundarum sine ipsis causis secundis, qui ipse Deus plus influit in causatum cause secunde quam quecumque secunda, cum ipse sit prima causa. Ergo sine forma potest dare esse materie. Et ideo cum dicitur quod Deus non potest dare materie esse sine forma, est propinquum errori dampnato, quod Deus non potest producere effectum cause secunde sine causa secunda. Unde dicunt quod de ratione materie non est [solum exp.] esse in potentia simpliciter, sed est [etiam exp.] esse solum in potentia secundum cursum nature inditum rebus. Unde esse in actu secundum potentiam simpliciter nullam et esse in potentia secundum cursum nature non dicunt contradictionem. Unde ipsi dicunt quod esse materie non dependet tantum ab esse forme, sed etiam a primo principio. Ergo non est contradictio dare materiam sine forma.” 22. Cf. Iohannes Peckham, Quodlibet romanum, q. 1, ed. F.M. Delorme, p. 175, ll. 26-46 (see also p. 174 for the sources of Peckham’s question). 23. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 2 (G 38va): “Sed isti in positione deficiunt et in rationibus suis. Primo quod dicunt, quod non est de ratione materie simpliciter esse in potentia tantum. Planum est quod falsum dicunt, quia aut est de ratione materie esse in actu tantum, aut in potentia tantum, aut esse in nichilo. Non in actu, quod de se patet; nec quod sit nichil, qui tunc generatio, que est de materia, esset de nichilo et sic generatio esset creatio. Ergo de ratione materie est in potentia esse simpliciter, et hoc patet, quia omnis potentia in istis inferioribus reducitur ad potentiam materie; illud autem ad quod omnia reducuntur unde tale, oportet quod sit simpliciter tale, sicut igitur ad quod reducuntur omnia calida est simpliciter calidum.”

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in itself and that, therefore, in every case a form would be required for the matter to be in act.24 In the response to the second argument, moreover, William introduces a second reason for excluding the possibility for matter to exist before or without a form. William first notes the fallacy of the argument, namely the invalid implication from thought to being. There could be a sense in which we may say that matter is cognized without form, since we can think of matter without thinking, through the same act, of form. But it is fallacious to conclude from this ‘therefore matter can exist without a form’. But he finds a stronger reason for rejecting it in an argument by Giles of Rome. It occurs in his Quodlibet III, q. 13, a question Giles disputed in Paris in the academic year 1277/1278, and states the impossibility that matter be cognized when taken in separation of form. As Giles argues, if something can be cognized, it is necessary it be in act; accordingly, what exists only in potency cannot be cognized in itself; if what exists only in potency is cognized, it can be only in force of the relation it has with some form:25 Table 5 Lect. Thom., II, dist. 13, q. 2, (G, f. 38vb) Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibet III, q. 13, ed. Leuven 1646, fol. 84rb Ad secundum dicendum quod intelligere unum sine alio potest intelligi dupliciter26. Uno modo quod intelligatur unum sine alio sicut possum intelligere hominem sine Sorte, et hoc modo non possum intelligere materiam sine forma. 24. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 2 (G 38va-b): “Sed quod postea dicunt, quod esse in actu non dependet ab esse forme, dico quod falsum est, quia esse actu de quo loquitur nunc, quod duratione transmutatur actu existendi, non potest esse nisi ab actu forme, et si dependeat a Deo ipsum esse, hoc est effective, tamen formaliter dependet a forma. Ad primam rationem, quando dicunt quod quamvis forma sit actus, non tamen est omnis actus, dico quod immo est omnis actus dans esse materie, quia non est possibile quod materia esse habeat nisi per formam. Quod patet, quia certum est quod si materia subsistit in esse, oportet quod illud esse formaliter sibi insit et sit forma eius, et tunc non est materia nuda sine forma, cum formalissimum inter omnia sit esse. Preterea, dicunt aliqui quod simpliciter idem sunt forma et esse, sed solum ratione differunt. Preterea non valet: non sunt idem, ergo unum potest esse sine alio; constat enim [autem] quod forma non potest esse sine esse, [non tamen sunt idem add. in marg.], ergo argumentum nichil probat.” 25. On Giles’s Quodlibeta, see G. Pini, Giles of Rome, in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century, Leiden-Boston 2006, pp. 233-286. 26. On the two ways in which we can understand a thing without understanding a different thing, see Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibet III, q. 13, ad arg., ed. Leuven 1646, fol. 85rb.

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Cuius ratio est quia quod per se intelligitur oportet ipsum esse ens actu, quia quod subterfugit actum, subterfugit esse intellectum per se: unde IX Metaphysicorum dicitur quod ‘quamdiu aliquid est in potentia est latens, quando autem fit actu, tunc apparet’.

Numquam ergo aliquid est obiectum intellectus nisi ut est actu vel ordinem habet ad actum. Sed quia materia non dicit de se actum, sed dicit ordinem ad actum, ideo secundum se non est intelligibilis, nisi per analogiam ad formam.

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Ex iis autem tribus possumus tres rationes colligere et formare, ex quibus colligamus quod materia non intelligatur nisi per analogiam ad formam. Prima est quod oporteat illud quod per se intelligitur esse quid in actu; quod enim subterfugit actum non potest per se intelligi. Ideo ostendit Philosophus in IX Metaphysicorum quod ‘quamdiu est quid in potentia est latens, quando autem fit actu, tunc apparet, et tunc scitur ut quod quadratum sint duo trianguli latet nos, quia sunt due trianguli in potentia; sed quando ducitur linea de angulo ad angulum, et actu secatur quadratum in duos angulos, statim apparet quod quadratum sint duo trianguli’. Numquam ergo aliquid est obiectum intellectus nisi secundum quod est quid actu vel secundum quod cooperatur ad actum, et quia materia de se non dicit aliquem actum, ideo secundum se non est apta vel nata a nobis intelligi, sed si intelligatur, hoc erit per analogiam ad actum.

Alio modo potest intelligere aliquid sine alio quod scilicet intelligitur esse sine eo sicut homo sine albedine, et tunc certum est quod materia etiam non potest intelligi sine forma, ut visum est. Sic ergo nullo modo potest intelligere materiam sine forma, et sic nec esse a quocumque agente. Vel dicendum quod non sequitur ‘potest intelligi, ergo et esse’: possum enim intelligere animal sine hoc animali, non tamen potest animal esse sine hoc animali.

Summarizing what emerges from the texts we quoted so far in the tables and in the footnotes (n. 21-24), in the response to the first and second argument, William thinks he has rejected the first strategy mentioned above, which consisted, as will remember, in giving a case that

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allows breaking the co-implication of form and act. In the response to the third argument, William concludes his reply by rejecting also the second strategy, the one of John Peckham, which resorted to God’s omnipotence to defend the possibility for matter to exist without a form. William does this by qualifying God’s omnipotence: God can replace a secondary cause in efficient causation, but not in formal causation. For example, not even God can make a white thing exist without whiteness, although God can make a white thing not exist at all. So the Parisian condemnation referred to by the opponent must apply to efficient and not to formal causation.27 We shall return to this argument in the conclusion of this essay. Once he has rejected the three main arguments, William ends the question by defending Thomas from the implicit accusation of inconsistency. William makes it clear that the case of accidents is not the same as that of matter, because accidents are beings in act, while matter is a being in potency; thus, although extraordinarily, accidents can exist separately from their subject of inherence, but matter can never exist separately from form, since matter’s being in act depends on its having a form.28 William’s discussion of the possibility for matter to exist without a form reveals how close to Thomas his solution is. The above tables very clearly show that William regularly borrows materials from Aquinas and resorts to other sources only occasionally. In the case in discussion, we 27. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 2 (G 38vb): “Ad tertium dico quod Deus potest facere quod [faciunt add. in marg.] secunde cause. Verum est quantum ad efficientes, non quantum ad formales. Et primo modo est condemnandum, secundo modo non. Sed nec est error dicere quod Deus non potest dare album esse sine albedine.” 28. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 13, q. 2 (G 38vb): “Ad argumenta dicendum ad primum quod non est simile de accidente et materia, quia accidens actus est, sed materia est ens in potentia, et ideo magis repugnat materie esse sine forma quam accidenti esse sine subiecto, cum esse sit a forma, accidens autem quedam forma est. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est simile de Deo et natura, quia natura producit ens actu de ente in potentia per motum, et ideo oportet quod ens in potentia precedat tempore, non tamen sine omni forma; sed Deus producit ens actu ex nichilo, ideo secundum magnitudinem virtutis sue potest statim producere effectum.” The responses to the first and second argument are derived, again, from Thomas. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 66, a. 1, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens, cum sit forma, est actus quidam, materia autem secundum id quod est, est ens in potentia. Unde magis repugnat esse in actu materiae sine forma, quam accidenti sine subiecto,” and ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod natura producit effectum in actu de ente in potentia, et ideo oportet ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus producit ens actu ex nihilo, et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suae virtutis.” On the refusal of the parallelism between accidents and matter, see also Thomas de Aquino, Quodl., III, q. 1, ad 1, p. 242, ll. 65-73.

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have seen that he takes the argument for the unintelligibility of matter from Giles of Rome, who shared with Thomas the presupposition of the co-implication of form and act. This theological discussion provides the basis for understanding William’s solution to the problem of the individuation of material things. 2.2. Whether Matter Is the Principle of Individuation of Material Things Let us turn now to the first question mentioned above, (Q1) “whether many angels can exist under the same angelic species,” and focus on William’s position on individuation. William’s starting-point in this question is that, given the convertibility of ‘being’ and ‘being one’, one and the same must be the explanation for a thing’s unity and for a thing’s being. This implies that that in virtue of which a thing exists is also that in virtue of which a thing is one, i.e. indivisible in itself and divisible from other numerically different things, similar or dissimilar in species. But what is the item in question? William explains that neither matter in itself nor form in itself can be the cause of the individuation of a material composite substance. Each in itself is common, so only form as taken as contracted by the individual matter can be the cause of the being and of the being one of a thing. More precisely, (common) form and (common) matter contract reciprocally each other so that both play the role of principles of individuation and principles of limitation of a thing. Here we find William no longer cite from Thomas, but from the Correctoria literature. In particular, the Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’, attributed to Robert of Orford (1282/1283ca.), seems to be his principal source. Except for Robert’s reference to Porphyry (see next page, at the beginning of right column), which William drops, the entire text is but a literal quotation of his Correctorium, as the following table clearly shows: Table 6 Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31va)

Corr. corrupt. Scien., 29, p. 124

Cum ens et unum convertantur, ab eodem Cum ens et unum convertantur, a quo res habet res unitatem et esse. Et quia unum est habet esse, ab eo habet unitatem. Unum auin se indivisum et divisum ab aliis, eo autem tem est ens in se indivisum et divisum ab ali-

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quo aliquid dividitur ab aliis individuatur in se, oportet a primo ad ultimum quod ab eo a quo aliquid habet esse habeat individuari. Res autem composita ex materia et forma constituitur in esse per materiam et formam, quia materia et forma intrant constitutionem rei. Oportet ergo quod individuatio causetur vel a materia vel a forma. Non potest autem causari a forma secundum se, ut forma, quia sic forma est communis. Ergo oportet quod hoc fit a forma ut est in materia. Sed non ut est in materia speciei, quia illa etiam est communis; ergo oportet ex hoc, scilicet quod individuatio fit a forma ut est in materia individui que habet rationem primi subiecti; prima enim dicitur substantia que proprie et principaliter dicitur substare. Unde materia et forma mutuo se coartant in materia individui, quia materia antequam recipiat formam est in potentia ad multas, sed una recepta per illam terminatur, et similiter forma in se considerata communis est ad multas, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia fit determinata huius rei, sicut et accidens contrahit subiectum et e converso.

Sed quia materia secundum se est in potentia essentiali ad formam et nichil reducit se ipsum de potentia ad actum, ideo requitur illud ipsum agens singulare habens formam in materia, per cuius actionem simile producatur ex simili. Cum ergo forma talis agentis sic limitata per materiam in qua recipitur habebit unitatem et operationem limitatam, ergo producit effectum limitatum quantum ad materiam et formam. Ergo causa indi-

is; eo autem quod aliquid ab allis dividitur, eo et individuatur; igitur a primo ad ultimum, eo quo est ens et unum eo individuatur. Sed res composita ex materia et forma, de qua nunc est sermo, constituitur in esse per materiam et formam; nam materia et forma sunt causae intrantes constitutionem rei. Sed a forma unde forma non individuatur, quia forma unde huiusmodi communis est, sicut obiectum est. Igitur a forma ut est in matena. Sed non ut est in materia speciei, quia illa communis est; igitur ut est in materia individui quae habet rationem primi subiecti; prima enim substantia dicitur quae proprie et principaliter et maxime substare dicitur; primum autem subiectum quod in alio recipi non potest. Materia vero et forma mutuo se coarctant; materia enim antequam recipiat formam est in potentia ad multas, sed cum recipit unam terminatur per illam; similiter forma in se considerata communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia fit determinata huius rei; sicut accidens contrahit subiectum et e converso, quia secundum Porphyrium homo albus est in minus quam homo et similiter in minus quam album quia multi homines sunt albi et multa sunt alba ab homme, ut nix, cignus et huiusmodi. Sed quia materia est in potentia ad formam, et hoc in potentia essentiali quia in potentia ad esse, nihil autem sic existens in potentia reducit seipsum in actum, ideo requiritur agens quod oportet esse singulare, quia actiones sunt singularium; debet etiam esse agens habens formam in materia, ut simile ex simili generetur; igitur forma sua qua agit est limitata, cum sit recepta in materia, igitur et virtus sua, quare et operatio.

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viduationis istius compositi certe est causa Igitur non potest nisi super effectum suum limitationis. limitatum; determinatam igitur formam inducit in materia determinata; et sic oportet et materiam et formam contrahi et per consequens totum compositum quod ex eis individuatur. Causa igitur individuationis est causa limitationis formae ad materiam determinatam.

William’s answer to the question of the principle of individuation follows from the stipulation mentioned above that that in virtue of which a thing exists is also that in virtue of which a thing is one. As table 6 shows, William finds this stipulation in Robert of Orford and seems to consider it as the best interpretation of Thomas’s doctrine of individuation. According to this stipulation and the current terminology of his time, William goes on by distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic principles of individuation.29 The extrinsic principle is the (particular) agent that actualizes the matter’s potency, while intrinsic principles are the form and the matter. Matter, though, can be considered in two ways, i.e. commonly and particularly, that is, under quantitative dimensions. Only when matter is actualized by a form and hence is considered in the second way, can it actually play the role of principle of individuation of a thing. But matter could not actually individuate anything if it were without quantity, so quantity must be considered as a concomitant and necessary condition (condicio sine qua non) for matter to play the role of principle of individuation of a thing. Quantity is temporally simultaneous with matter, but ontologically matter precedes quantity; for this reason, matter is the remote principle of individuation of a thing, quantity a concomitant principle. As William expresses himself, matter qua in29. This distinction is a commonplace among the Dominicans at the beginning of fourteenth century. Hervaeus Natalis and Durand of St.-Pourçain, for example, endorse it. See M.H. Henninger, Hervaeus Natalis (b. 1250/60; d. 1323) and Richard of Mediavilla (b. 1245/49; d. 1302/07) and Durand of Saint Pourçain (b. ca. 1270; d. 1334), in: J.J.E. Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation: 1150-1650, New York 1994, pp. 299-318 and 319-332. See also M. Pickavé, The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in ‘Quodlibeta’ (1277-CA. 1320): a Forest Map, in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages, pp. 19-79, esp. pp. 59 ff., for the positions of the late XIII-Century Dominicans; and F. Amerini, Le Thomisme en Italie au XIVe siècle: d’Hervé de Nédellec à François de Prato, in Memorie domenicane 46 (2015), pp. 499-512, for the influence of Hervaeus Natalis’s position on some Italian Dominicans.

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trinsic cause can be considered in two ways, as a per se cause or as a sine qua non cause. The reciprocal contraction of (common) matter and (common) form to the individual matter – as described above in table 6 – makes the individual matter as the cause per se of individuation. But since matter can do so only through quantity, it follows that quantity is a sine qua non cause. Quantity cannot be a per se cause because being it but an accident, cannot it cause anything. Even in this case, William reveals his indebtedness to Robert of Orford’s Correctorium: Table 7 Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31va)

Corr. corrupt. Scien., 29, pp. 124-125

Hiis premissis, quando queritur que est causa individuationis istius compositi singularis, dico quod si loquatur de causa extrinseca, sic agens est causa individuationis. Si autem loquaris de causa intrinseca, tunc distinguo, quia vel loquaris de causa per se, vel de causa sine qua non. Si primo modo, sic dico quod materia individui que habet rationem primi subiecti est causa individuationis; sed quia materia non intelligitur distincta a materia nisi ut est sub quantitate dimensiva, ideo concomitative est individuatio a quantitate sicut a causa sine qua non. Non solum autem a materia vel a forma ut intelligitur sine quantitate dimensiva, quia certe quamvis forma recepta in materia, circumscriptis per intellectum dimensionibus, haberet rationem individui existentis in genere substantie, tamen tale individuum primum non esset demonstrabile ut hic et nunc sine dimensionibus terminatis. Et ideo dicitur quod materia cum dimensionibus est causa individuationis, non quia dimensiones individuationem causent, cum accidens non causet suum subiectum, sed per dimensionem numeratur individu-

Si igitur de causa quaeratur extrinseca, sic agens est causa individuationis. Si de causa intrinseca, sic est distinguendum; quia vel est loquendum de causa per se vel de causa sine qua non. Si de causa per se, sic materia individui, quae habet rationem primi subiecti, est causa individuationis. Sed quia materia non invenitur distincta a materia nisi prout est sub quantitate dimensiva, ideo concomitanter est individuatio a quantitate sicut a causa sine qua non, quod erat aliud membrum distinctionis, non autem per se; sic autem a materia et forma. Cum enim forma in materia recipitur, circumscriptis per intellectum dimensionibus, fit aliquid existens in genere substantiae, habens rationem individui; sed non est demonstrabile ut sit hic et nunc sine dimensionibus terminatis; et ideo dicitur quod materia subiecta dimensionibus est causa individuationis, non quod dimensiones causent individuum, cum accidens non causet subiectum suum, sed per dimensiones monstratur individuum hic et nunc, sicut per signum proprium individui et inseparabile.

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um hic et nunc, sicut signum proprium individui et inseparabile. Quia igitur forma materialis existens in individuo coartatur per materiam et e converso, et tamen secundum se pluribus est communis, cum in eadem parte materie non possit esse nisi una forma numero, nec per istam materiam signatam salvatur amplitudo et communitas ipsius forme, inde est quod alias diversas partes materie nata est perficere talis forma, et quia hoc non potest facere manens eadem numero, inde est quod opertet causa plurificari secundum numerum. Et sic patet primum.

In the final motivation of the text above (Quia igitur forma materialis existens …), William explains that the reciprocal contraction of (common) form and (common) matter to an individual matter makes the form one in number. Nonetheless, since this contraction does not prevent form from being contracted to other individual matters, this allows form being numerically multiplied. This motivation summarizes what Robert of Orford said in article 11, when he discussed the possibility for many angels to exist under the same angelic species.30 By quoting the Correctorium, William keeps together different suggestions he could find in Thomas’s writings. William seems to consider Robert of Orford’s Correctorium a source that aptly systematizes Thomas’s scattered observations on individuation and makes them cohere with each other. In particular, Robert seems appreciated by William since he accurately describes the role played by each actor in Thomas’ narrative of individuation (matter, form, quantity), offering in this way a unified account. Thomas’s observations as presented by Robert led William to assume that the form can be numerically multiplied only through the matter as taken under quantitative dimensions. This implies that, for William, where there is no matter, there is no individuation, properly speaking. This precisely holds in the case of angels. William often emphasizes that the individuation of a form only obtains by virtue of matter, as the individuation of an accident 30. See Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’, 11, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris 1956, pp. 67-68.

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only obtains by virtue of the subject of inherence. As two accidents of the same species (e.g. two whitenesses) separated from their subjects of inherence would dissolve into one and the same accident in number, so too would two forms of the same species separated from their individual matter resolve into one and the same form in number.31 Moreover, even supposing the presence of matter in angels, matter by itself would not yet be enough to guarantee that two numerically different angels can exist under the same angelic species. For, as said, the being of matter consists in being in potency to form, and ‘being in potency’ still expresses a generic and not a specific property of a thing. Thus, William concludes that it does not clash with Christian faith to affirm that God cannot make two numerically different angels exist under the same angelic species. Contradiction would arise, rather, if the opposite case held. The question on angelic individuation continues with counter-arguments and responses to these arguments, which we can leave to the side here. For our purposes, it suffices to note that the discussion on angels reveals that William’s strategy of understanding Thomas on individuation consists in “differentiating the cases.” At the end of the question on angelic individuation, in fact, William observes that there are two kinds of form: forms that only exist in matter and forms that can subsist separately from matter, and the process of individuation is different in each case: diversimode autem individuantur ille forme, quia forma materialis individuatur per hoc quod habet esse in hac parte materie per quam contrahitur et limitatur ipsa forma, ex quo habet habitudinem ad hoc quod perficiat aliam partem materie, cum per illam partem materie sua communitas non fit impleta nec satiata, et quia diversas partes materie non est intelligere sine dimensionibus quantitatis, ideo dicitur quod dimensiones sunt radix individuationis. In illo ergo subsistente quod est ens per formam est 31. See Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3, (G 31va): “Ex hiis statim apparet sit declarandum, quia ea que conveniunt in specie, differant autem numero, conveniunt in forma et materialiter distinguntur. Remota enim distinctione materie, impossibile est intelligere diversas formas secundum numerum tantum. Sed in angelis non est materia, cum non sint compositi(?) corpores anime rationali, de qua probatum est quod caret materia. Ergo impossibile est esse plures angelos unius speciei. Et confirmo rationem, quia cum accidens distinguatur per subiectum, sicut impossibile est esse plures albedines separatas, ita cum distinctio secundum numerum sit per materiam, amota ea, impossibile est formam secundum numerum plurificari.”

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duo considerare, scilicet ens et esse, et utrique respondet propria mensura. Mensura autem entis est locus, sed mensura esse transmutabilis est tempus, ergo mensura huius entis est hic locus et mensura huius esse est hoc tempus, ideo dicimus quod condiciones individuationis sunt hic et nunc.32

The distinction between the two types of form indicates that, for William, only matter can properly be called “principle of individuation” of a thing. Instead of speaking of different processes of individuation, therefore, we should say that, for him, individuation is possible only in the case of material things. Of course, William is aware that there are theologians who, while respecting the condemnation of 1277, propose a way for differentiating numerically two angels under the same angelic species. Their suggestion is that of attributing to “being” the role of matter, in the case of angels.33 William explains that the rationale behind such a proposal is to maintain a parallel between material and immaterial forms. The restriction-process of the form operated by the matter/ being is the common explanatory factor for the individuation and multiplication of that form. William finds this proposal unacceptable: Et dicendum ad hoc quod ratio non concludit, quia cum esse respondeat et proportionetur essentie, si essentia simplex est, et esse. Modo secundum principia philosophie esse cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisibili, cum forme rerum sint sicut numeri. Ideo videtur quod numquam possit a Deo creari 32. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31vb). It is not a surprise to find William here to cite again from Robert of Orford’s Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’. Cf. Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’, p. 67: “Propter primum quod obiciunt, sciendum quod duplex est forma: quaedam est recepta in materia, quaedam non sed in se subsistens; forma quae recipitur in materia ut forma substantialis vel in subiecto ut forma accidentalis individuatur per hoc quod est in hoc; forma enim de se communis est, sed cum recipitur in materia contrahitur ad illam partem materiae, quia non potest simul perficere duas materias. Materiam autem habere partem non est intelligere nisi prout est sub dimensionibus quae primo subiciuntur divisioni naturali; et ideo dicitur quod dimensiones sunt radix individuationis; sed materia sub dimensionibus est causa indivisionis et contractionis ipsius formae. Ex materia igitur et forma fit unum ens; ens enim est participium et signat actum unitum substantiae indefinitae; sic individuum dicit formam quae est actus unitus materiae quae est substantia infinita, quia de se est infinita sed per formam finitatur. Hoc autem ens non est suum esse. Sunt igitur ibi duo ens et esse, et utrumque habet suam mensuram: mensura entis extra est locus, mensura esse, scilicet transmutabilis est tempus; igitur mensura huius entis est hic locus et mensura huius esse hoc tempus. Et ideo dicitur quod conditiones individuantes sunt esse hic et nunc.” 33. See Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31vb): “tamen quia ille articulus condempnatus est Parisius, quidam volentes sustinere quod Deus duos angelos posset facere eiusdem speciei dicunt quod individuantur illa supposita per esse.” William is here referring to a. 41 (96) and 16 (81), in D. Piché, La Condamnation Parisienne de 1277, Paris 1999, p. 296 and p. 298.

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aliqua species cui desit aliquid de perfectione essentiali speciei, et tamen remaneat(?) species, ita dico de esse: cum sit indivisibile, cuicumque communicatur, oportet quod totum communicetur. Unde videntur ymaginari quod esse substantie separate, quod speciei debetur, habeat quamdam latitudinem que restringitur per hoc a Deo quod eadem forma secundum speciem recipit unam partem ipsius esse et alia aliam ut(?) sic in diversis partibus esse recipiatur diversa forma numero, quod patet ex dictis arguendo, et hoc autem falsum est.34

The text just quoted is interesting in that it reveals another source of William. In this case, in fact, William’s answer is inspired by John of Paris’s Correctorium corruptorii ‘Circa’.35 William rejects the idea that “being” can play a matter-like individuating role in angels. Being is indivisible in itself, so it cannot be multiplied and, by consequence, it cannot multiply any form. More generally, William rejects the idea that the plurification of a form through different supposits can be described as the fragmentation of a form that is one in number or in species. We already noted that, for William, form is common in itself and, for this reason, it cannot be the principle of individuation of anything. Here we find William underscoring a second feature of form, which he again derives from Giles of Rome. Every form is like a number, in itself indivisible so it cannot be numerically multiplied and extended if not in virtue of something extrinsic to it. William therefore argues that it would be better to describe the process of plurification of a form as the restriction of the form’s natural disposition to be common and communicable to all the things that can receive it. Plurification is the logical consequence of the impossibility for a form, which is like a number, to be present in different parcels of matter while remaining numerically one and the same. As a result, plurification generates instances of form that are numerically different from each other: Quod autem dicunt quod forme materiales multiplicantur quia in una parte materie perfectum esse non habent, quia coartantur per materiam, non est intelligendum quod in quocumque individuo non sit ratio speciei et etiam totum substantiale ipsius speciei, quia utrumque est indivisibile, sed pro tanto multiplicantur quia cum omnis forma quantum est de se sit 34. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31vb). 35. Cf. Correctorium corruptorii ‘Circa’, a. 10, ed. J.-P. Müller, p. 67, l. 41 ff.

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communis et communicabilis omni eo quod potest eam recipere, cum materia sub ista parte quantitativa non possit totam suam communicationem satiare et totum suum appetitum, quia non est tota materia cui communicabilis est forma, cum etiam alia pars materie possit recipere et eadem [forma add. in marg.] numero non possit in pluribus partibus esse, ideo multiplicatur. Non autem sic potest multiplicari forma immaterialis cum esse suum non habeat partem et partem, sicut materia per quantitatem, et sic non valet. Unde impossibile videtur simpliciter quod sit plus quam unum suppositum in una specie.36

In the text just quoted, William argues that a material form can be multiplied because it can be received by matter and since no part of matter can impede that form from being received by another part of matter, material forms can be numerically multiplied. But an immaterial form, being something indivisible, cannot be received by one part or another of matter or anything else (non habet partem et partem), so it cannot be numerically multiplied. Understood in this way, multiplication cannot hold in the case of unmattered forms. As William further explains, if there were different angelic supposits, they would be different either in virtue of essence or in virtue of being. If in the first way, angels would differ in species, since each supposit is associated with one essence and species. If in the second way, either such being is identical to essence, and so, again, angels would differ in species, or it is different, but if so, being would not be the principle of individuation since it is more common than essence. Nor can one escape this conclusion by saying that it is not being in general but a qualified being, a being-such (esse tale), that multiplies an angelic species, for this kind of being depends on essence and not vice versa, so one would fall back into the previous case.37 Having rejected the proposal that being serves, in the case of angels, the same function as matter, William rejects a last hypothesis. He insists that, in order to distinguish two angels under the same angelic species, one cannot even invoke a spiritual matter that is not subjected to quantity and that can be multiplied numerically (per multiplicitatem numerabilitatis), just like one single point in act can be considered as a plurality of points in potency. William calls this a “trivial imagination” (trivialis 36. Cf. Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 31vb-32ra). 37. See Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3 (G 32ra).

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ymaginatio), for if the same spiritual matter that is in one angel in act were in another angel in potency, it would be simply unable to explain the numerical multiplicity of such angels “in act.” The same happens with points, since at a given time there is only one point in act.38 In conclusion, William is of the opinion that only (individual, i.e. quantified) matter can numerically multiply a form and differentiate two things that share that form, so only in the case of material things we can properly query about their individuation. As has been seen, William follows Robert of Orford, Giles of Rome and John of Paris and tries to harmonize the different claims of Thomas concerning individuation. He does so first, by attributing to each item that Thomas considers in the process of the individuation and multiplication of a form its proper function and second, by explaining their interaction. The impression is that, for William, only the interplay between form and matter on the one hand, and matter and quantity on the other, can explain how and why a thing is one, i.e. indivisible in itself and divisible from other numerically different things, similar or dissimilar in species. 3. Conclusion As we have seen, William closely follows Thomas, in most cases simply echoing what the Doctor Angelicus said. We find him copying or summarizing Thomas’ reasoning from the Summa theologiae on most occasions, but also occasionally selecting and collecting arguments from other works. The goal seems to be that of re-organizing Thomas’ pronouncements in a logically ordered and simplified way.39 But the Lectura Thomasina also aims at defending Thomas’ position through discussing the criticism addressed to him by subsequent philosophers and theologians. As to the subject of matter and form, we have seen that William uses different sources: quodlibetal questions (e.g., Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, John Peckham), Correctoria literature (e.g. John of Paris and Robert of Orford), commentaries on the Sentences (e.g. John of Paris). The forthcoming critical edition is expected to clarify these features of his work and to identify all the sources. 38. See Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 3, ad rationem (G 32ra). 39. On this, see A. Colli, “Tommaso prima del tomismo. Annotazioni per un’edizione critica della Lectura Thomasina (II libro),” in: Divus Thomas 120 (2017), pp. 163-194.

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It is not easy to assess a work that seems to be nothing other than a patchwork of arguments and positions. If such a re-organization of materials may appear philosophically disappointing, incapable of pushing discussion ahead in any way, historically speaking it is instead significant. In a way, it inaugurates the Sentences commentaries secundum viam Thomae. It also confirms what M. Michèle Mulchahey noted in her book on the Dominican education, namely the increasing centrality of Thomas’s Summa, instead of his Sentences Commentary, for the theology of the Dominicans of the so-called “first Thomistic school.”40 There are different examples of lecturae thomasinae and they all defend Thomas and simplify his theology, and in all of them, Thomas’s theological masterpiece is central. Specifically, the Lectura witnesses that at the beginning of the 14th century discussions about the possibility for God to make matter exist without a form were still passionate. As noted by Catherine König-Pralong, the thesis we have discussed in this essay was never officially condemned. It is not present in the syllabus of the prohibited propositions promulgated in Paris in 1277 and in Oxford in 1286. It is only mentioned in the process against Giles of Rome. Nonetheless, it was fiercely opposed after the death of Thomas, both in Paris and Oxford, as John of Paris observes in his Correctorium.41 William confines himself to noting that according to some adversaries, this thesis is close to the condemned article that God cannot produce the effects of a secondary cause in absence of the secondary cause;42 it must therefore be rejected because it impinges on God’s omnipotence. This is a leitmotif among Franciscan theologians. William agrees considering the case of matter as a case touched upon the condemned article, but it limits the application of such a condemnation to efficient causation, as said.43 This rests on his fundamental and, philosophically speaking, ‘essentialist’ conviction that, for a thing, to be amounts to be a thing of a certain species, and a thing’s species causally depends on the substantial form of that thing, so that it is impossible for a thing to exist in act and not to have a form. 40. See M.M. Mulchahey, “First the Bow is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education before 1350, Toronto 1998, p. 155 ff. 41. Cf. C. König-Pralong, Avènement de l’aristotélisme en terre chrétienne. L’essence et la matière: entre Thomas d’Aquin et Guillaume d’Ockham, Paris 2005, pp. 129-187, esp. p. 150. 42. Cf. Articuli condemnati, n. 35 [=63], ed. D. Piché, La condamnation Parisienne de 1277, Paris 1999, p. 295. See above, note n. 21. 43. See above, note n. 27.

DOES UNITY ENTAIL DISTINCTION? GODINUS AND SCOTUS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION Wouter Goris It is often taken for granted that medieval metaphysicians discuss the problem of individuation on the level of the transcendental attributes of being as such.1 In reality, however, this is a major event. It not only imposes constraints on traditional metaphysical concepts like being, essence, form, unity and plurality, actuality and potentiality or – as will be important below – possibility. But it also forces explanations as to the principle of individuation to cover in a unified account all levels of reality, material and immaterial, created and uncreated.2 A unified account of individuation is the main point at issue in the magisterial dispute that William of Peter of Godin and John Duns Scotus held in Paris on the question whether matter is the principle of individuation. Debating the ratio essentialis individuationis, the cen1. See e.g. Thomas de Aquino, Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis, c. 108: “(...) unumquodque enim secundum quod habet esse, habet unitatem et individuationem”; De Spir. Creat., art. 9, ad 3. 2. See G. Pini, “The Individuation of Angels from Bonaventure to Duns Scotus,” in: T. Hoffmann (ed.), A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy, Leiden/Boston 2012, pp. 79-115. If Aquinas’s refusal to allow for the angel’s multiplication under a species was indeed a watershed in the medieval debate, it was especially objectionable because it abandoned a unified principle of explanation, by reason of which “the individuation of angels was ... singled out as posing a specific difficulty,” having “a deep metaphysical structure different from that of the substances of our everyday experience.” (p. 82) Accordingly, the Franciscan objection that Aquinas’s position posits a limit on God’s omnipotence, although inaccurate in itself, reflects a deeper concern: “What is troubling in Aquinas’s position is that angels are given such an exalted status that they are actually set apart from any other creature because of the way they are individuated.” (p. 96) Furthermore relevant for the present contribution is the context described in the chapter on the specific difference of angels in L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300, Leipzig 1966, pp. 262-85; and more generally T.W. Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P., Rome 1971.

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tral issue turns out to be whether a thing’s unity entails distinction from other things. If the common nature is indifferent to singularity and universality, as Scotus holds – following Avicenna and Henry of Ghent –, and numerical plurality is compatible with the common nature’s less than numerical unity, then numerical multiplication under one species is a possibility for any common nature as such, and hence cannot be denied of angelic nature. On the contrary, if it is not by the same feature that something is one and that it is distinct from others, as Godinus claims, distinctness from others has to be explained differently according to the diverse genera of things. Numerical multiplication under one species is not a possibility for every common nature as such, but requires a real potentiality resulting from the essential features of a given nature – a condition that is not satisfied in the case of angelic nature. The dispute whether unity entails distinction hence opposes possibility to potentiality as rival explanations of numerical multiplication under one species. The following contribution provides evidence for the claim that the magisterial dispute between Godinus and Scotus negotiates a unified account of individuation on the level of the transcendental attributes of being. The debate on what causes that something is hoc signatum, this signate something, hereby turns into a debate on transcendental unity. Godinus and Scotus agree that only the level of transcendental unity is fully explicative of created and uncreated individuation. Such mutual understanding, however, only gives sharper contrast to their doctrinal differences. Godinus insists that multiplication under one species is a regional phenomenon confined to material beings, and argues that a unified account of individuation is not just compatible with, but indeed requires regional explanations – which Scotus rejects. 1. The Individuation of Angels and Rational Souls The disputed question Utrum materia sit principium individuationis contained in the Ms. Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana 2o 369, is the literary representation of a ‘magisterial dispute’ between the Dominican master William of Peter Godinus and the Franciscan master John

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Duns Scotus, held presumably in 1304/05 at the University of Paris.3 The magisterial dispute – and its textual representation – is organized in a way different from the standard structure of a medieval quaestio disputata.4 After four initial objections to the thesis presented by the title of the question, series of answers and further objections alternate with each other. A somewhat opaque text is the result, in which it is not prima facie evident who is talking where at every point in the text – which induced the scribe to identify the different sections by adding the names ‘Guilelmus Petri’ and ‘Scotus’ in the margin. The text is central to the philosophical projects of Godinus and Scotus. William of Peter Godinus authored the Lectura Thomasina, a Sentences-commentary in search of thomistic orthodoxy 25 years after the death of the great Dominican master. Since Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation by matter was heavily attacked in both the condemnations of 1277 and by the Correctorium fratris Thomae of the Franciscan master William of La Mare, its defence is a central concern of the Dominican correctoria from which the Lectura Thomasina draws. And since the problem of individuation is one of the main points of crystallization of Duns Scotus’s new metaphysics, the magisterial dispute between Godinus and Scotus on the question whether matter is the principle of individuation stages a confrontation between the doctrines of Aquinas and Scotus, additionally informed by doctrinal developments of the 1280’s and 1290’s, in particular the debate between Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome and the Korrektorienstreit.5 3. Cf. C. Stroick, “Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306: Die Verteidigung des thomistischen Individuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guilelmus Petri de Godino OP,” in: W.P. Eckert (ed.), Thomas von Aquino: Interpretation und Rezeption. Studien und Texte, Mainz 1974, pp. 559-608. Anton Vos suggests the year 1306 in his The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, Edinburg 2006, pp. 93-96; Tim Noone suggests 1304/5 in his “Scotus’s Critique of the Thomistic Theory of Individuation and the Dating of the ‘Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum’, VII, q. 13,” in: L. Sileo (ed.), Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, Rome 1995, pp. 391-406. 4. On the various techniques of disputation in the medieval university, cf. O. Weijers, In Search of the Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity to Early Modern Times, Turnhout 2013, pp. 119-176. 5. For a useful overview of the debate in this period; see M. Pickavé, “The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in Quodlibeta (1277- ca. 1320): A Forest Map,” in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Leiden/ Boston 2007, pp. 17-79. The magisterial dispute between Godinus and Scotus contains discussions of the relation between esse essentiae and esse existentiae and of the relevant articles condemned in 1277, witnessing its adherence to the Parisian milieu at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century.

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The individuation of angels and rational souls is the classical problem in any explanation of matter as the principle of individuation and hence is at the center of the discussion in the magisterial dispute. In the present contribution, I will deal with the problem of the individuation of angels and rational souls only under the aspect of a unified explanation; it is important to see, however, that the magisterial dispute has many textual parallels in other known works of our protagonists. In all three versions of his commentaries on the second book of the Sentences, Duns Scotus inserts an objection regarding the rational soul into the question on the individuation of angels under one species.6 The objection, as originally formulated in the Lectura, goes against Scotus’s recourse to the rational soul in discarding the correlation between formal and specific difference in the case of angels: since separate souls differ by their forms, but not specifically, the correlation does not hold. But souls differ by their inclination towards bodies, the objection states. Scotus answers the objection by a denial that souls differ by their inclination towards bodies, since the soul is determined in itself prior to its inclination to the body and differs from other souls in this prior determination.7 In the Ordinatio and the Reportatio, this argument is confirmed by two additional observations: that the relation is not part of the formal aspect of the soul as something absolute, and that the inclination already presupposes a soul’s being this soul and hence is not the ground for the soul’s being a this.8 6. For Scotus’s doctrine of the principle of individuation see esp. S.D. Dumont, “The Question on Individuation in Scotus’s Quaestiones super Metaphysicam,” in: Via Scoti, pp. 193-227; T.B. Noone, “Scotus’s Critique of the Thomistic Theory of Individuation,” in: L. Sileo (ed.), Via Scoti, pp. 391-406; T.B. Noone., “Individuation in Scotus,” in: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995), pp. 527-542; G. Pini, “Scotus on Individuation,” in: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 5 (2005), pp. 50-69. 7. Iohannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 7, nn. 213-215, ed. Vat., p. 297: “Dices quod differunt per inclinationem ad corpora. Contra: ista inclinatio non est primum ens, neque substantia, nec dicitur ad se, igitur sequitur naturam quae dicitur ad se; et non erit de ratione alicuius naturae quae dicitur ad se; ergo illa natura erit prior: in illo priore distinguitur ab omni eo quod non est ‘ipsum’. Igitur non per inclinationem ad corpus distinguitur anima ab anima.” 8. Cf. Iohannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 7, nn. 231-233, ed. Vat., p. 502: “Quod si dicas quod animae habent inclinationem ad diversa corpora et ita habent aptitudinem perficiendi materiam, et ideo per diversas habitudines distinguuntur; contra: ista inclinatio non est entitas absoluta, quia non potest aliquid inclinari ad se; igitur praesupponit aliquam entitatem absolutam et distinctam, et ita in illo priore distinguitur haec anima ab illa. Ergo animae sine huiusmodi habitudinibus, ut sine formali ratione distinguendi, distinguuntur. Confirmatur, quia ista aptitudo non potest esse de formali ratione animae, quia

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The same position is found in Scotus’s final list of objections on the individuation of rational souls in the magisterial dispute with Godinus. The argument that the soul is determined in itself prior to its inclination to the body and differs from other souls in this prior determination, is presented in the second objection: Second, it is demonstrated that, if the soul is produced prior by nature, it is something singular and actual before it is unified, for creation terminates in an existent singular; therefore, what is produced prior by nature is prior this existent singular.9

The argument that the relation is not part of the formal aspect of the soul as something absolute, is presented in the fourth objection: Fourth, it is demonstrated that the relation of the soul to the body is not the cause for it that it is this, for this does not pertain to the relation as such, since a relation does not turn the foundation into something absolute; but the singular being of the soul is absolute being.10

est respectus; respectus autem non est de formali ratione alicuius absoluti. Item, quia est haec anima, ideo habet hanc inclinationem, et non e converso (quia forma est finis materiae, et non e converso); igitur haec inclinatio non est ratio essendi hanc animam, sed praesupponit eam.” Iohannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis, II, d. 3, q. 1, ed. Paris, p. 581: “Item, animae intellectivae separatae distinguuntur et sunt quidditates separatae a materia, sicut angeli. Dicitur quod non est simile, quia illae animae habent aptitudinem ad perficiendum corpora, non sic angeli. Contra istud: ista aptitudo non est de prima ratione animae, quia non est nisi respectus ad corpus, et probatum est prius quod respectus non est de formali intellectu absoluti formaliter, licet ille respectus non esset res alia; igitur possibile est in intellectu concipere quidditatem animae sine isto respectu. In illo priori, quaero quo distinguitur haec anima ab alia? Non illo respectu, certum est; igitur, etc. Item, non quia haec apitudo est, haec forma est, sed e contra, quia forma est finis materiae II Physicorum, igitur prius natura est haec forma, quam haec aptitudo; non est igitur haec per aptitudinem.” 9. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis (Ms. Erfurt, Bibl. Ampl., Cod. Nr. 2o 369, ff. 71vb-75rb; in C. Stroick, “Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306: Die Verteidigung des thomistischen Individuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guilelmus Petri de Godino OP,” p. 604, ll. 26-29: “Secundo probatur quod, si anima prius natura producitur, prius est quid singulare et actu quam uniatur, nam creatio terminatur ad singulare existens, ergo quod prius natura producitur, prius est hoc singulare existens.” The edition by Stroick contains some errors; in the following, quotations are silently corrected against the Erfurt-manuscript. 10. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 604, ll. 39 ff.: “Quarto probatur quod habitudo animae ad corpus non est ei causa quod sit haec, nam hoc non convenit habitudini, inquantum est relatio, quia relatio non dat fundamento esse aliquid absolutum, sed esse singulare animae est esse absolutum.”

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Finally, the argument that the inclination already presupposes a soul’s being this soul and hence is not the ground for the soul’s being a this corroborates the fourth objection: “Furthermore, the soul does not have a relation to the body, because it is a soul, but because it is this soul.”11 The same constellation presents itself in the list of objections by Scotus which opens the magisterial dispute: It was said that matter is not the principle of individuation, since the rational soul is without matter and still there are many within one species. Neither does it count, if it were said that the soul is multiplied not in itself, but from the inclination and the relation towards matter. For nothing is distinguished by something preceding which it is preconceived to be in itself. But the soul is understood to be created before its union (to the body), for what is not, is not unifiable. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, nothing is distinguished by something posterior to the distinct, since the cause precedes the effect. But the relation of the soul to the body is posterior to the soul in itself. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, no accident is the cause of the distinction of its subject, but rather the other way around. But such a relation of the soul to the body is in the soul as in the subject. Therefore, etc.12

The magisterial dispute hence registers Godinus’s answer to the objection which in all versions of Scotus’s Sentences-commentary is Scotus’s answer to an objection in favour of Aquinas’s position. Under scrutiny is the assumption, shared by Godinus and Scotus alike, that rational souls are numerically multiplied under one species. How is this possible, since a rational soul is immaterial? Godinus defends the position that the rational soul is not multiplied in itself, but by the inclination and relation towards the body. Since the soul is created a part of the entire composite, it is ordered towards the being of the whole, which 11. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 605, ll. 1-2: “Praeterea, anima non habet habitudinem ad corpus, quia anima, sed quia haec anima.” 12 Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 581, ll. 1-11: “Dicebatur quod non, quia anima rationalis caret materia, et tamen multae sunt unius speciei. Nec valet, si dicatur quod multiplicatur non in se, sed ex inclinatione vel habitudine ad materiam, quia nihil distinguitur per illud, ante quod praeintelligitur in se esse; sed anima intelligitur creari ante unionem, quia quod non est, non est unibile; ergo etc. Praeterea, nihil distinguitur per aliquid posterius distincto, quia causa praecedit effectum. Sed habitudo animae ad corpus est posterior ipsa anima in se, ergo etc. Praeterea, nullum accidens est causa distinctionis sui subiecti, sed potius econverso. Sed huiusmodi habitudo animae ad corpus est in anima ut in subiecto, ergo etc.”

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is the terminus of the creation. The relation to the body is not some reality added to the soul, but an essential inclination that comes to rest in the union with the body. Two aspects of Godinus’s position in the magisterial dispute can be traced back to his Lectura Thomasina: on the one hand, the distinction between the efficient cause of individuation and its internal cause (matter and quantity with dimensions),13 on the other hand, the assertion that the soul is not created in itself, but in relation to the body: “although the soul is a simple form, it is not created nor does it receive being but in the body, and from the body it has individuated being.”14 The most important feature of his stance on individuation, however, has its source in Quidort, who systematically distinguishes between the principle of individuation and the principle of the multiplication of individuals under one species.15 2. In Search for A Unified Account If the magisterial dispute between Godinus and Scotus negotiates a unified account of individuation on the level of the transcendental attributes of being, this is because Godinus and Scotus agree that only 13. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lect. Thom., II, d. 2, q. 9 (G 31va): “Hiis praemissis quando quaeritur quid est causa individuationis istius compositi singularis, dico quod, si loquaris de causa extrinseca, sic agens est causa individuationis. Si autem loquaris de causa intrinseca, tunc distinguo, quia vel loqueris de causa per se vel de causa sine qua non. Si primo modo, sic dico quod materia individui, quae habet rationem primi subiecti, est causa individuationis. Sed quia materia non intelligitur distincta a materia, nisi ut est sub quantitate dimensiva, ideo concomitative est individuatio a quantitate sicut a causa sine qua non.” This text is part of a larger quotation taken from the Correctorium Sciendum (ed. Glorieux, pp. 124-125); thanks to Andrea Colli for sharing his transcription of the Lectura Thomasina with me. See also the contribution of Fabrizio Amerini to this volume. 14. Guillelmus, Lect Thom., II, d. 2, q. 9, ad 1 (G 31va): “Quamvis anima sit forma simplex, non tamen creatur, nec recipit esse nisi in corpore et a corpore habet esse individuatum.” For Godinus’s position in the Lectura thomasina see L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P., p. 283. 15. See Iohannes Parisiensis, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 3, ed. J.-P. Müller, Rome 1964, p. 67, l. 207-p. 68, l. 208: “Aliud est principium individuationis et aliud principium multiplicationis individuorum sub una specie”; “Quaestio de causa individuationis,” ed. J.-P. Müller, in: J.-P. Müller – H. Kohlenberger (hrsg.), Virtus politica. Festgabe zum 75. Geburtstag von Alfons Hufnagel, Stuttgart 1974, pp. 343-356, here pp. 348-349: “Ideo nulli opinioni praeiudicando, videtur ad praesens opinio secundo recitata superius esse probabilior, scilicet quod materia sit principium individuationis et quantitas principium multiplicationis sub una specie.” See M. Pickavé, “The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in Quodlibeta (1277- ca. 1320): A Forest Map,” pp. 66-67.

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the level of transcendental unity is fully explicative of created and uncreated individuation. Debating on the ratio essentialis individuationis, the central issue will be whether unity entails distinction from others. Godinus and Scotus disagree as to the extent in which a unified account of individuation is compatible with regional explanations; hence, their dispute whether unity entails distinction will oppose possibility to potentiality as rival explanations of numerical multiplication under one species. We take the definition of an individual in Scotus’s mature account in his commentary on the seventh book of the Metaphysics as a starting point: The individual is numerically one, not divisible in subjective parts and numerically distinguished from everything else. The question accordingly is, what in the individual is repugnant to its being divided into subjective parts. It must be some positive feature, but neither matter nor form nor actual being qualify, for each of them is communicable. Scotus himself resorts to the haecceitas as an individual or singular difference.16 The same account of individuation we find in Scotus’s contribution to the dispute with Godinus. In answer to the objection that matter does not qualify as an explanation of individuation, since it is as indistinct as form, Godinus distinguishes a twofold cause of individuation: the agent, whose action necessarily terminates in some signate this, and the receiving subject, by which the received form acquires unity and singularity. Although matter does not have the first cause of individuation from itself, but from the agent, it has the second from itself as the first foundation of nature, unlike the form. Scotus takes Godinus’s answer as an occasion to specify the ratio essentialis individuationis. Godinus conceives here of a twofold causa sive ratio individuationis, one common to matter and form, i.e. being

16. Iohannes Duns Scotus, In VII Metaph., q. 13, nn. 115-120 (Opera phil. IV, pp. 257-259): “Notandum quod individuum, sive unum numero, dicitur illud quod non est divisibile in multa, et distinguitur ab omni alio secundum numerum. Prima pars sic intelligitur: quod sibi repugnat divisio in partes subiectivas. Haec repugnantia non potest esse nisi per aliquid quod inest individuo. (…) Sic ergo, supponendo conclusionem probatam, quaerimus quid sit illud in individuo per quod sibi repugnat divisio in partes subiectivas tales, scilicet quarum quaelibet sit ipsum. (…) Non materia, nec forma, nec esse actu, si differt a forma, propter argumenta facta superius. Contra etiam omnia ista est: quia quodlibet istorum est communicabile. Ergo de ipso est quaerendum: per quid sit hoc, vel per quid repugnat sibi dividi in partes subiectivas.”

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the terminus of action, and the other proper to matter, i.e. not being received in something else. But the singularity under discussion, Scotus objects, is that something is one by itself among beings, for which it is repugnant to be divided into subjective parts. And this repugnance can have only one cause. If, on the one hand, the cause of this repugnance is common to matter and form, then matter is not the principle of individuation, which is what Scotus wants to prove. If, on the other hand, the cause of this repugnance is matter’s not being received in something else, this is not an adequate determination of the ratio essentialis individuationis. For to all matter it pertains not to be received in something else. Hence, this is a vague concept of individuation. But the issue is not vague individuation, but by which something is this signate thing. It is not because it is unreceivable in a certain way, that it is this matter, but the other way around. Hence, not being received in something else is not an adequate determination of the ratio essentialis individuationis as that by which something is this signate thing. According to a proper determination of the ratio essentialis individuationis, therefore, matter is not the principle of individuation.17 In his response to Scotus’s objections, Godinus readily accepts the challenge to formulate a unified account of individuation, as an explanation why something is “this signate something.” But such a unified account, he insists, is compatible with a differentiation of causes. In fact, Godinus assigns distinct causes to the various aspects of Scotus’s definition of the individual, i.e. being this signate something, and being (potentially or actually) distinct from other things – in this way, he saves the difference between the individuation of material and immaterial beings:

17. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 596, ll. 5-19: “Item, de ratione essentiali individuationis dictum est quod duplex est causa vel ratio individuationis, una communis materiae et formae, quia sicut terminus actionis, alia est propria materiae, quae est non esse receptum in alio. Contra: singularitas, de qua quaerimus, est illa quae est aliquid per se unum in entibus, cui repugnat dividi in partes subiectivas. Istius repugnantiae non potest esse nisi una causa, ergo si esse terminum creationis est causa istius repugnantiae, habeo propositum. Si autem ponatur alia propria causa, scilicet non esse receptum in alio, contra: nos non quaerimus de individuatione vaga, sed de qua aliquid est hoc signatum. Omni autem materiae competit non recipi in alio et hoc est vagum, quaero ergo, per quid haec materia est hac receptione non recepta, et non potest reddi ratio nisi quia haec negatio praecedit affirmationem, ergo non est haec materia, quia non est recepta hac receptione, sed potius econverso, quia haec materia non recepta hac receptione.”

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As to the manifold cause of individuation, one has to say that, although according to the same genus of cause and for one effect there has to be one cause per se, nevertheless there can be many causes according to a diverse genus of being. Therefore, the cause for this, that this is this, is the efficient cause, the action of which necessarily terminates in a this, for every operation is a this. Therefore, this is the universal cause to be a this, whether material or immaterial. But the cause that it can be a this, distinct from everything else that has the same definition, is matter, such as it is in potency towards many forms of the same definition. But the cause, why they are actually distinct, is formally the quantity.18

Godinus replies here to the basic worry raised by Aquinas’s account for the individuation of angels: The same ‘deep metaphysical structure’ explains why material and immaterial beings are a signate this, namely the individual operation of the efficient cause necessarily terminating in an individual effect. To that extent one can already speak of a unified account of individuation. But although this account ranges over material and immaterial beings, it does not cover uncreated being. Furthermore, what Scotus requires the principle of individuation to explain, i.e. that by the same feature something is not divisible in subjective parts and numerically distinguished from everything else, Godinus assigns to different causes. The argument by means of which Scotus dismissed additional causes for individuation, i.e. that unreceivability amounts to vague individuation, is rejected by Godinus on the ground that such vagueness is implied in any universal explanation: “If vague is taken as to be common, then it is necessary that the ‘ratio (essentialis individuationis)’ be large and common.”19 Not to be received in

18. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 599, ll. 24-32: “Ad secundum de multiplici causa individuationis dicendum quod, licet secundum idem genus causae et unius effectus oporteat esse unam causam per se, tamen plures esse possunt secundum diversum genus causae. Unde causa huius, quod hoc sit hoc, est efficiens, cuius actio necessario terminatur ad hoc, quia quaelibet operatio est haec. Unde haec est causa universaliter essendi hoc, sive sit materiale sive immateriale. Sed causa quod possit esse hoc distinctum ab omni alio eiusdem rationis, est materia ut in potentia ad plures formas eiusdem rationis; sed causa, qua actu sunt distincta, est formaliter quantitas.” 19. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 599, ll. 34-45: “Ad tertium de individuatione vaga dicendum quod, si vagum accipitur pro communi, tunc necesse est quod ratio sit larga et communis. Unde illud quod est praecisa ratio Socratis et Platonis, quod sint albi, est albedo; unde vanum est dicere quod Socrates sit albus albedine hac, quia haec, ita quod ly haec dicat rationem per se esse, sed hoc non convenit ei, quia

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something else is essential to matter, since it is the first foundation of nature, without which nothing has the possibility to exist in nature – note the regular connection between matter and a mere potentiality for distinctness. Individual matter is unreceivable because it is matter, not because it is this matter. 3. Transcendental Unity and the Principle of Individuation As we have seen, Godinus differentiates between a thing’s individuation and its distinctness, in order to explain multiplication under one species. In the case of material physical beings, matter is the first root and cause of a thing’s distinctness under a common nature. But for the actualization of its being distinct from others, matter is in need of quantity. Hence, matter and quantity are per se causes of distinction of material physical beings, although under different aspects. Underlying this account of the multiplication of material substances under one species is a more sophisticated distribution of the one and the many, which is in itself a transcendental account of the relation between being and unity. Godinus’s full argument runs as follows: One has to know that a thing has from something else that it is ‘this signate something’, and from something else that it is a numerically undivided one that is divided from others and multipliable under a common nature. For it has its being ‘this signate something’ from the fact that it is the terminus of the action of the agent; for this has the aspect of what is produced per se. (...) But a thing does not have that it is something undivided from the unity of its nature or from the unity of its natural principles. But that things can be many under one common nature, this a thing has from the nature of matter, which has by itself

haec, sed quia albedo. A simili dicendum de materia quae est non recepta hac receptione, non quia haec materia, sed quia materia; hoc enim convenit ei per essentiam, et ideo huic vel illi materiae convenit irreceptibilitas, quia sunt materia. Ad illud quod additur ‘quaero, per quid haec materia etc.’ et quare materiae convenit irreceptibilitas, dicendum quod quia convenit ei esse primum fundamentum naturae, ita quod nihil est possibile esse in natura sine ea. Istam igitur negationem hanc materiam esse non receptam hac receptione praecedit haec affirmatio, scilicet quia est materia.”

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the possibility to have many dispositions to forms of the same definition. (...) That things are actually many, this is on account of quantity or dimensions, by which it is actually having parts. (...) The individual, in order to be something actually distinct from others, is formally from quantity, although by way of origin it stems from the disposition to it. For although quantity gives matter to have parts, nevertheless that matter is in potency to this or that form, this matter has from itself, just like by itself it is united to the form.20

The basic claim is a differentiation of four aspects active in individuating any actually existing material substance as such. Its being a ‘signate this’ stems from its maker as an external cause; its unity as being undivided in itself from an internal cause, from its nature if it is simple or from its natural principles if it is composed; its being potentially distinct stems from matter; and its being actually distinct from quantity and dimensions. That is to say, after a primary distinction between external and internal causes of individuation, a further distinction explains multiplication under one species as confined to material beings. Scotus accuses this account of individuation of resorting to heterogeneous principles of explanation: the cause of individuation is made to differ in the case of things simple and composite. As to the uncomposed individual, insofar as it is an undivided one in itself, its cause of individuality is the unity of its nature; for composite things, it would rather be the unity of their principles according to the principle of 20. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 587, l. 26 - p. 588, l. 5: “Sed sciendum quod ab alio habet res quod sit hoc aliquid signatum, et ab alio quod sit unum numero indivisum et ab alio divisum et multiplicabile sub natura communi. Habet enim quod sit hoc aliquid signatum ex hoc quod est terminus actionis agentis, hoc enim habet ratio producti per se. (...) Sed res non habet, quod sit indivisum quid, ab unitate suae naturae vel ab unitate principiorum naturalium. Sed quod possint esse multa sub una communi natura, hoc habet a natura materiae, quae de se est possibilis habere dispositiones plures ad formas eiusdem rationis. (...) Quod autem sit actu multa, hoc est per quantitatem vel dimensiones, per quas fit habens actu partes. (...) Ideo individuum ad hoc, quod sit quid distinctum ab aliis actu, est formaliter a quantitate, licet radicaliter sit ab habilitate ad hoc. Licet enim quantitas det materiae habere partem et partem, tamen quod est in potentia materia ad hanc formam et ad illam, hoc habet materia a seipsa, sicut de se unitur formae.” In this division of causes, William of Peter Godinus might rely on Peter of Auvergne; see E. Hocedez, “Une Question inédite de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation,” in: Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie 41 (1934), pp. 355-86; p. 384: “Unde dicendum est quod substantia speciei est hoc aliquid in quantum est terminus huius generationis huius agentis” and broader the differentiation of causes for being a hoc aliquid, and potential and actual individuation.

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matter. Scotus consistently insists upon a unified account of individuation and requires the same feature to explain that something is undivided in itself and divided from others, in the case of simple and of composite things alike. He refers to the unity of human nature to back this claim. If what causes man as a composite being to be indivisible in itself differred from what distinguishes him from others, man would be individuated by an accidental principle (i.e., quantity governed by matter). But Socrates is in himself one, not by his quantity, but by his essential principles. And by his essence too, he is connumerable with Plato. That means, Scotus concludes, that what causes man to be indivisible in itself does not differ from what distinguishes him from others. Since to be distinct from something is caused by the same feature as to be connumerable with it, man is distinct from others by his essential principles, and not by quantity.21 A principle of individuation has to explain why something by its very essence is undivided in itself and divided from others; it cannot rely on regional principles to answer a problem on the level of being as such. This transition to the metaphysical level is particularly important, since it forces both Godinus and Scotus to a fully unified account of individuality applicable to created and uncreated being. Accordingly, the opponents are required to take issue with each other’s deepest metaphysical commitments. What are these? I take the most basic difference to be that, according to Scotus, numerical multiplication of a common nature is a matter of sheer possibility, whereas for Godinus, it requires a real potentiality. As a consequence, Scotus will argue that any common nature as such is indifferent to singularity and universality, which implies that every species is fundamentally compatible with its instantiation by many individuals. Godinus, on the contrary, will dismiss this stance as simply the result of a mental abstraction. One can readily describe everything on the transcendental

21. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 590, ll. 38-44: “Secundo contra hoc quod dicitur quod individuum, prout dicit quid unum indivisum in se, causa individuationis est unitas naturae in simplicibus, in compositis autem est unitas principiorum, sed principaliter materiae. Contra: per idem est aliquid in se unum et connumerabile aliis. Sed ut ponitur Socrates, non per quantitatem, sed per principia essentialia est unum in se, ergo per suam essentiam est connumerabilis Platoni. Sed per idem est aliquid distinctum ab alio, per quod est connumerabile illi.”

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level as something one in itself and distinct from others, but in order to account for multiplication under one species, one has to argue from the essential features of the particular nature thus instantiated. 4. Levels of Unity Now that the search for a unified account of individuation has entered its properly transcendental phase in the magisterial dispute between Godinus and Scotus, and the question whether unity entails distinction from others is amenable to a transcendental clarification, Godinus is challenged to explain why transcendental multitude does not account for multiplication under one species. Godinus introduces the distinction between transcendental and categorical unity to argue that numerical multiplication of a common nature requires a real potentiality. Scotus instead recurs to the distinction between a major and minor unity to reduce the numerical multiplication of a common nature to a matter of sheer possibility. Although Godinus can and will concede that transcendental unity is compatible with distinction from others, he derives the multiplication under one species from the essential features of the particular nature that is instantiated. Hence, Godinus differentiates between transcendental and quantitative unity and insists that actual numerical plurality formally requires quantity. One has to say that ‘the one’ is taken in a twofold sense. In one way, such as it is convertible with being. Thus everything by the feature that it is one is connumerable with everything else that is not itself, be it created or uncreated. Thus, speaking in this way it is said truthfully that God makes three like Peter, Gabriel and a donkey; thus, it is inessential for these three numerated to be of one or many definitions, to be in the same or in different categories. In another way, ‘the one’ is the principle of number. And in this way, according to Aristotle it follows the division of the continuum and every number is composed from such unities. If, therefore, it is said that Socrates and Plato are connumerated with each other by their proper essences, one has to say that if they are considered as being absolute entities, it is true; but if they are considered as belonging to

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the same species and genus, it is false; for they are only connumerable in this way or distinct by matter in regard of origin, but actually and formally by quantity and primarily.22

The argument is intricate and can be construed as conceding on the transcendental level what it rejects on a categorial level, namely that unity entails distinction from others. On the one hand, Godinus recognizes that on the level of transcendental unity, every being is by its essence undivided in itself and divided from others; he emphasizes that this principle of individuality applies to created and uncreated being alike. On the other hand, Godinus argues that transcendental multitude is not an adequate explanation of numerical multiplication under one species, since the latter is bound to quantity. As absolute entities, individual essences of one species can be numbered. But it is not on account of their essences that they are numbered under one species. Even matter as an essential constituent of these essences is not sufficient to explain numerical plurification under one species in a formal sense as something actually the case, but only quantity does. Hence, it is not by the same feature, i.e. its essence, that something is undivided in itself and divided from others. Scotus rejects Godinus’s answer by dismissing the recourse to quantity as inconclusive, and claims that the singularity to be discussed must also explain God’s individuality – what Godinus had already conceded to him: the principle of individuality must apply to created and uncreated being alike. Scotus infers that the principle of individuation should not be limited to quantitative unity, but be discussed on the transcategorical level proper.

22. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 592, l. 33 - p. 593, l. 4: “Ad secundum dicendum quod unum accipitur dupliciter: uno modo, ut convertitur cum ente. Sic unumquodque per illud quod est unum, est connumerabile cuicumque alteri quod non est ipsum, sive sit creatum sive non creatum. Unde sic loquendo vere dicitur: Deus fecit tres ut Petrum, Gabrielem et asinum, sic etiam numeratis accidit esse eiusdem rationis vel diversae, sive in eodem genere vel diverso. Alio modo ut est principium numeri, et sic secundum Philosophum sequitur divisionem continui, et omnis numerus compositus est ex talibus unis. Cum ergo dicitur quod Socrates et Plato connumerantur sibi per essentias suas, dicendum quod, si talia considerantur ut sunt entia absoluta, verum est, sed si considerentur ut sunt eiusdem rationis specie vel genere, falsum est, non enim sunt connumerabilia sic vel distincta per materiam nisi originaliter, sed actu et formaliter per quantitatem et primo.” For the distinction between transcendental and categorical unity in the Lectura Thomasina see T.W. Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit, pp. 180-4.

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Against the response on the one that is convertible with being and the other one, I counter: When we investigate singularity, we do not investigate quantity, for that proposition is understood to be true in God, in whom there is no continuous quantity; hence it should not be limited to unity in the continuum, for in every category we find the singular just as the universal. You also concede that Socrates and Plato are two by a transcendental unity apart from quantitative unity. From which I argue thus: Just like the same quiddity constitutes something as quidditatively one in itself and quidditatively different from others, in the same way the same thing is a singular in itself and by the same feature it is distinct from every other singular. In these things, therefore, there is not only quidditative unity, but also singular unity; and therefore, in the same way as quiddity relates to quiddity, singularity relates to singularity.23

Scotus insists that the principle of individuation should not be limited to quantitative unity, but be discussed on the transcategorical level, in order to explain individuation or singularity on the level of uncreated being. Numerical unity and the less than numerical unity, properly called quidditative unity, present the same structure: the same feature accounts for something being one in itself and distinct from others. Hence, unity indeed entails distinction from others. The question to what extent a unified account of individuation allows for regional differentiation involves different doctrines of unity; Scotus replaces the traditional distinction between transcendental and quantitative unity by the distinction between numerical and a less than numerical unity.24 Ultimately, as we will see now, the debate on the 23. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 597, ll. 3-13: “Contra responsionem de uno quod convertitur cum ente et alio uno; contra: cum quaerimus de singulari, non quaerimus de quantitativo, quia propositio illa intelligitur esse vera in Deo, in quo non est quantitas continua, ergo non debet arctari ad unitatem in continuis, in omni enim genere invenitur singulare sicut universale. Concedis etiam Socratem et Platonem esse duo unitate transcendente praeter unitatem quantitativam. Ex quo sic arguo: sicut eadem quiditas est constituens unum in se quiditative et differens ab alia quiditative, sic idem est in se singulare et per idem est distinctum ab alio singulari. In his ergo non solum est unitas quiditativa, sed etiam singularis, et ideo sicut quiditas ad quiditatem sic singularitas ad singularitatem.” 24. For the Scotistic theory of transcendental unity, which surpasses the traditional distinction between numerical and trancendental unity and introduces a gradation of unities (among which the difference between unitas maior et minor) instead, see my study Transzendentale Einheit, Leiden/Boston 2015. Since Scotus has defended different explanations of transcendental unity in different phases of his work, it is notable that the discussion in the magisterial dispute matches the later doctrine of transcendental unity in his commentary on the Metaphysics.

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principle of individuation is about levels of unity. Whereas Godinus dismisses the position that unity could explain its opposite, i.e. the distinction underlying multitude, Scotus argues that unity on the specific level is compatible with distinction on the numerical level. Thus, Godinus assumes that something one is distinguished from something else by different features and under different aspects; and this difference in aspects is important, for the distinction between transcendental and numerical unity relies on it. On the one hand, if we take Socrates as a singular being that possesses one nature, abstracting from everything added that contracts this nature, we can say that he is distinguished by the intellect from every other nature, created or uncreated. According to such an understanding of Socrates’s unity, it is inessential whether that from which he is distinguished shares the same definition or not. This is what constitutes transcendental unity, which is found in every category; and the multitude opposed to it is taken in a large sense. On the other hand, if we take Socrates as something distinct from something else that shares the same definition, our intellect necessarily involves quantity in this definition. On account of quantitative unity, he is one and undivided in himself and divided from everything else that has quantity by its matter. The multitude that is opposed to this unity, is called number in a strict sense, which follows the division of the continuum. Now, division primarily and essentially belongs to quantity, and since the name ‘individuum’ is taken from the privation of division, one cannot omit quantity in the explanation of individuality.25 With the concept of a less than numerical unity, Scotus attacks his opponent’s claim that by the feature by which something is one and indistinct, others cannot be distinguished. Aristotle had distinguished 25. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 600, l. 39 - p. 601, l.7: “Ad decimum de uno dicendum quod non est inconveniens unum distingui ab alio per aliud et aliud, et hoc secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Socrates igitur ut est quoddam singulare habens unam naturam secluso omni addito contrahente, per intellectum distinguitur ab omni alia natura, sive creata sive increata. Unde sic accipiendo unitatem Socratis accidit ei ut ea a quibus distinguitur, sint alterius rationis vel unius ab ipso, et sic dicitur unum unitate transcendente, et invenitur in omni genere. Multitudo etiam ei opposita accipitur large. Sed Socrates, prout accipitur ut quoddam distinctum ab alio eiusdem rationis, sic includitur in eius ratione quantitas, per cuius unitatem dicitur unum et indivisum in se et divisum ab alio habente aliquam quantitatem. Multitudo autem opposita isti unitati dicitur proprie numerus, qui sequitur divisionem continui. Divisio autem per se et primo competit quantitati. Nomen autem individui sumitur a privatione divisionis.”

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different modes of unity in the fifth book of his Metaphysics: specific, generic, and numerical unity. If one sticks to one mode, e.g. specific or numerical unity, the claim is true: such an identical aspect does not distinguish. But if unity is taken according to different modes, the claim is false, for the same feature, e.g. specific unity, allows things to be numerically plurified. This compatibility of specific unity and numerical plurality is endorsed with reference to Avicenna, according to whom the form is one by a quidditative or specific unity, which abstracts from singularity. Hence, Scotus argues: The multitude that is opposed to numerical unity is compatible with a less than numerical unity. But numerical plurality opposes numerical unity, which is a higher degree of unity than specific unity, which is taken from merely the form by itself. Therefore, Scotus concludes, numerical multitude is compatible with specific unity.26 According to Godinus, however, this refutation does not live up to his argument. His argument claimed that the one insofar it is one can by itself only be the formal cause of something one, for otherwise, the same according to which it is the same would be the cause of its opposite. Therefore, the specific form, since it is by itself one and indivisible, cannot be the cause of multiplication, unless by something added.27 Scotus’s refutation of this argument, Godinus claims, is unsound. Whether one takes unity according to the same mode or different modes, the proposition is true that the one insofar as it is one is not the cause of multitude. Since the genus is not the cause of its distinction in species, the species which is one in an even more univocal and real

26. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 602, l. 40 - p. 603, l. 7: “Primo arguebatur sic: per quod aliquid est unum et indistinctum, non possunt alia distingui. Dicendum quod secundum Philosophum quinto Metaphysicae unum dicitur specie, genere et numero. Si unum accipiatur uniformiter, scilicet vel specie tantum vel numero tantum etc., maior vera est. Si autem difformiter, falsa est, nam per illud quod est unum specie, possunt aliqua plurificari numero. Sed forma secundum Avicennam est una unitate quiditativa vel specifica, quae abstrahit a singularitate. Unde econtra sic arguitur: multitudo opposita maiori unitati stat cum minori unitate. Sed pluralitas numeralis opponitur unitati numerali, quae est maior quam unitas specifica, quae est a sola forma per se, ergo multitudo numeralis stat cum unitate specifica.” 27. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 605, ll. 18-22: “Ad primum de uno et indistincto dicendum quod diminute rationem accipit, nam ratio in hoc stabat quod unum inquantum unum non potest esse causa formalis de se nisi unius, idem enim secundum idem esset causa oppositi, ergo forma specifica, cum sit de se una et indivisibilis, non potest esse causa multiplicationis nisi ex adiuncto.”

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sense, i.e. as the common nature in individuals that are distinct under it, cannot be the reason for their being distinguished under it. Hence Godinus concludes: to be plural or not under one species, does not belong to the concept of specific nature, insofar as it is a form or nature, but belongs to the concept of this nature or that nature, as far as they are this or that nature, e.g. a material form received in something else or an immaterial and irreceptable form that is subsistent by itself.28 5. Conclusion What does it mean to address the principle of individuation on the level of the transcendental attributes of being as such? A transcendental account facilitates a unified explanation of the individuation of created and uncreated being, yet metaphysical abstraction threatens to replace real differences by mere logical distinctions. In the magisterial dispute between Godinus and Scotus, which negotiates a unified account of individuation, both opponents ultimately differ on the issue whether unity entails distinction from others. Their respective answers result in a fundamental opposition between possibility and potentiality: Whereas Scotus claims that numerical instantiation under one species is possible for any common nature as such,29 Godinus binds such possibility to the real potentiality of matter towards a plurality of forms.30 Their accounts of the principle of individuation vary accordingly.

28. Quaestio disputata utrum materia sit principium individuationis, p. 606, ll. 8-13): “Unde dicendum quod nec esse plura sive posse esse nec non esse sive non posse esse plura sub eadem specie, non est de ratione naturae specificae, secundum quod forma inquantum huiusmodi vel natura, sed posse esse vel esse unum vel plura vel non esse, est de ratione huius naturae vel illius, secundum quod sunt talis et talis naturae, ut puta forma materialis recepta in alio et forma per se subsistens immaterialis irreceptibilis.” 29. Iohannes Duns Scotus, Ord. II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 7, n. 237, pp. 504-505: “Dico igitur quod omnis natura quae non est de se actus purus, potest – secundum illam realitatem secundum quam est natura – esse potentialis ad realitatem illam qua est haec natura, et per consequens potest esse ‘haec’; et sicut de se non includit aliquam entitatem quasi singularem, ita non repugnant sibi quotcumque tales entitates, et ita potest in quotcumque talibus inveniri. In eo tamen quod est ex se necesse-esse, est determinatio in natura ad esse ‘hoc’, quia quidquid potest esse in natura, est ibi – ita quod determinatio non potest esse per aliquid extrinsecum ad singularitatem, si possibilitas sit in natura de se ad infinitatem; secus est in omni natura possibili, ubi potest cadere multiplicatio.” 30. See notes 18 and 20.

JAMES OF METZ AND WILLIAM OF PETER OF GODIN ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT (AND THE GENERATION OF THE SON) Chris Schabel* James of Metz’s discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit (and the generation of the Son) is crucial for the historical information it contains about his career. It has also attracted the attention of a number of scholars for its doctrinal content, and in 2002 Ludwig Hödl even included an edition and study of book I, distinction 11, question 1, of James’ questions on the Sentences in an article on the trinitarian theology of Anselm and its reception.1 Although involving a more ambitious edition of the same question, this paper has a different focus: what does a critical edition and examination of all versions of James of Metz’s questions on the procession of the Holy Spirit (and the generation of the Son) tell us about the development of James’ thought vis-à-vis that of his contemporary Dominican confrère William of Peter of Godin, within the context of the evolving Franciscan tradition on this issue, which was to culminate in the doctrine of John Duns Scotus soon after James completed his Parisian lectures? James of Metz’s questions on Lombard’s Sentences present a complex redactional puzzle.2 While books III and IV survive in relatively few manuscripts, books I and II were rather popular. Recent critical editions and studies of James’ question on divine foreknowledge towards the end of book I and the first question of book II on the eternity of * This paper was largely written at the IRHT in Paris under the aegis of Monica Brînzei’s ERC project THESIS. I thank Francesca Bonini, Russ Friedman, and Guy Guldentops for comments and materials. 1. L. Hödl, “Das trinitätstheologische Fundamentalprinzip des Anselm von Canterbury. Ursprung und Geschichte,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 69 (2002), pp. 172-214, at 200-204 (discussion) and 205-214 (text). 2. See now C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” in: R.H. Pich – A. Speer (eds.), Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought. A Tribute to Kent Emery, Jr., Leiden 2018, pp. 342-426.

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the world have helped clarify things. The latter question survives in more witnesses than any other question for book II, thus providing the best opportunity to explore the manuscript tradition for that book.3 The former question is unique in that James criticizes Thomas Aquinas explicitly, unlike in other contexts where his disapproval of his order’s teaching doctor is more cautious.4 With regards to the redactional problem for book I, however, a more rewarding approach would be to edit in parallel the questions on the intension and remission of forms and on the procession of the Holy Spirit. Doctrinally James’ distinction 17 on intension and remission is fascinating, as demonstrated by the paper in this volume by Jean-Luc Solère. In the so-called Correctorium Iacobi, Hervaeus Natalis or a follower attacked James on this issue in defense of Aquinas. In contrast, the Hervaeist, if not Hervaeus himself, mostly left James alone regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit. James of Metz asked several questions on the issue of procession and these are found in a number of different versions in which the material is rearranged and repositioned. Generally, one finds four versions of the text, but there is at least one passage that exists in six different contexts, four of them from the most interesting manuscript, Troyes, Médiathèque Jacques Chirac 992. In three versions of this passage, two in Troyes 992 and the other in the most popular redaction, James refers to what Magister Rambertus had heard from Thomas Aquinas, meaning the Dominican Rambert of Primadizzi of Bologna, and this has long provided crucial evidence for dating James’ activities, although the evidence is more ambiguous than previously thought. The questions relating to the procession of the Holy Spirit also preserve an example that seems to place what is considered the first redaction outside Paris: “If someone wishes to go to Paris, it is necessary for him to ride there” 3. J.W. Peck, SJ – C. Schabel, “James of Metz and the Dominican Tradition on the Eternity of the World, ca. 1300,” in: Medioevo 40 (2015), pp. 265-330, building on the studies of book II in R.M. Martin, La controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIVe siècle. Textes inédits, Louvain 1930; L. Ullrich, Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300, Leipzig 1966; and T.W. Köhler, Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P., Rome 1971. 4. C. Schabel, “Dominican Anti-Thomism: James of Metz’s Question on Divine Foreknowledge, with a Rebuttal from the Correctorium Iacobi Metensis,” in: Przegląd Tomistyczny 20 (2014), pp. 35-72. See also M. Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis, Münster 2010, with an edition of the redactions of the Prologue (pp. 22-81) and a manuscript study (pp. 1-8).

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[I.6.1§11].5 The parallel passage in another version omits this example, suggesting that James first read outside of Paris and then lectured at Paris. On the basis of the above and other data, it is probable that William of Peter of Godin and James of Metz both delivered two sets of lectures all dating between 1296 and 1301, such that Godin lectured outside Paris (in Toulouse, apparently), then James (probably in Reims), then Godin in Paris, then James. Recent research allows us to specify that Parisian lectures on the Sentences in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries took place over one academic year, not two, and that Remigio dei Girolami read the Sentences in 1297-98, Bernard of Auvergne in 1298-99, Godin in 1299-1300, and James in 1300-01.6 Previous studies, including those of contributors to this volume, have demonstrated that there is a link between Godin and James. The main goal of the present paper is as already stated: to use the context of the procession of the Holy Spirit to examine the relationship between William of Peter of Godin and James of Metz.7 The overall doctrinal context is provided by Russell Friedman’s monumental Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University.8 No other single publication contains so much information on the procession of the Holy Spirit during the classic century of scholasticism. Even Friedman has his limits, however, and he was content with a short paragraph on William of Peter of Godin and another on James of Metz, referring the reader to Bruno Decker’s habilitation of 1955, published posthumously as a book in 1967, concerning James and the Dominican tradition in the early fourteenth century, in which one of Decker’s main concentrations was trinitarian theology. Decker in turn was building on the pioneering article of Joseph Koch on James, published in 1930, which followed Koch’s 1927 book on Durand of Saint-Pourçain, which brings us back to the early work of the future founder of the Thomas Institut. In addition, Michael Schmaus

5. I will cite the texts in the appendix by book, distinction, question, and paragraph. 6. C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” pp. 349-359; W.O. Duba – C. Schabel, “Remigio, Scotus, Auriol, and the Myth of the Two-Year Sentences Lecture at Paris,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 84 (2017), pp. 143-179. 7. Francesca Bonini kindly provided me with her preliminary edition of the parallel questions from Godin in distinctions 6 and 10-13 of book I. I will not cite the Latin text in the notes below. 8. R.L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University. The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350, Leiden 2013, pp. 420-421.

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had numerous references to both Godin and James in part two of his Der Liber propugnatorius of 1930, although his purpose was not to link the two together, but to deal with the entire history of trinitarian thought at the time. In Decker’s lengthy discussion of James on the procession of the Holy Spirit, however, he devoted a paragraph to Godin, linking him not to James, but to Aquinas and Giles of Rome, although the reader can draw his or her own connections with James.9 The quarter century surrounding Godin’s and James’ activities was probably the most feverish philosophically in the history of the Dominican Order. From John (Quidort) of Paris and John of Sterngassen to Peter of Palude and James of Lausanne, the period from the early 1290s to the late 1310s included the likes of Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of Saint-Pourçain, and John of Naples, in addition to at least another ten Dominicans who have left us major works in philosophical theology relating to Sentences lectures, quodlibetal debates, or ordinary disputations. In contrast to this score or so of significant Dominican thinkers, the next quarter century produced only around a half dozen Dominican authors of note, mostly before the early 1330s, culminating in the correctorium of Durand by his namesake Durand of Aurillac, whose identity William Duba has recently solidified.10 (Robert Holcot is the main anomaly in this scenario.) It was in the era partly inspired by Godin and James (early 1290s-late 1310s) that the Friars Preacher hammered out their common doctrine, based on but not necessarily slavishly duplicating that of Thomas Aquinas. This development occurred not only in Paris, but also in Oxford and in the provincial studia of the order. This Golden Age of Dominican theology partly overlaps with the great quarter century of the Franciscans, who forged their own common doctrine between the Subtle Doctor’s death in 1308 and the

9. J. Koch, Durandus de S. Porciano OP. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Münster 1927; id., “Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 4 (1929-1930), pp. 169-232, reprinted in id., Kleine Schriften, Rome 1973, Band I, pp. 133-200; M. Schmaus, Der Liber propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, II Teil: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen, Münster 1930; B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, ed. R. Haubst, Münster 1967 (from Habilitationsschrift of 1955), p. 320. 10. W.O. Duba, “Aristotle in Hell and Aquinas in Heaven: Hugo de Novocastro, OFM and Durandus de Aureliaco, OP,” in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 56 (2014), pp. 183194.

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early 1330s, adopting but also adapting the teachings of their unofficial leader, Doctor Noster, John Duns Scotus, as Duba has shown in his book on William of Brienne, The Forge of Doctrine.11 Given the sheer number of pertinent texts produced in these decades, together with the relative homogeneity of doctrine, arguments, and authorities within the separate Dominican and Franciscan traditions on the procession of the Holy Spirit around 1300, it would be premature and beyond my present capacities to fit James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin securely and fully into their trinitarian doctrinal context. Indeed, in his 1000-page, two-volume book, one of the sacrifices Friedman still had to make was basically to skip most of the Dominicans active in this period, barely mentioning John of Paris, Meister Eckhart, Remigio dei Girolami, Nicholas Trivet, John of Sterngassen, and some anonymous authors of pertinent surviving texts, all active just before and after Godin and James. With my more limited goals in mind, let us turn to what Godin and James have to say about the procession of the Holy Spirit and how they relate to each other. In what follows, I will take as a starting point my hypothesis about the relationship between the various versions of James of Metz’s questions on the Sentences, a hypothesis based almost exclusively on the internal relationship between the versions, partly in the questions discussed here.12 By comparing these versions with the text of William of Peter of Godin, we might obtain a clearer picture of how James and William are related. First, for easier reference, here is a chart of the manuscripts that contain book I of James of Metz’s questions on the Sentences: Manuscript

Book I redaction, notes

G = Graz, Universitätsbibliothek 475

2

K = Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1583

2

11. W.O. Duba, The Forge of Doctrine: The Academic Year 1330-31 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris, Turnhout 2017. For trends, especially among the Dominicans, see R.L. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in: G.R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. I, Leiden 2002, pp. 42-128; id., “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330,” in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, Leiden 2007, pp. 401-491; id., Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, in particular pp. 419-423; C. Schabel, “Reshaping the Genre: Literary Trends in Philosophical Theology in the Fourteenth Century,” in: S.E. Young (ed.), Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities, Leiden 2011, pp. 51-84. 12. For the redactional issue in distinctions 10-13 of book I, see C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” pp. 369-371.

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L = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Palat. lat. 373

2

M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3749

2

N = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14383

2 (+ mixed), to mid-d. 37

P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12331

2

T = Troyes, Médiathèque Jacques Chirac 992

1, + additiones (= A)

V = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. lat. 122

2

W = Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1321

mixed, to mid-d. 36

Godin’s distinctions 6 and 10-13 are somewhat brief, the equivalent of about 17 printed pages of this size (without apparatus). Although all versions of James’ text for the same distinctions take up about 67 printed pages (without apparatus), not including over 20 pages of additional material of uncertain provenance in Troyes 992 and in Munich 14383, the average version of James would require only about 21 pages, so the two Dominicans’ texts are on the same order of magnitude. Given the goal of this paper, I will proceed numerically from distinction 6 to distinction 12 (the texts are in the appendix; I skip distinction 13 because of space limitations), but I will focus on what I find to be interesting along the way. The following chart has the questions asked by Godin and by James in what seem to be his two lecture series: Godin

James I

James II

6.1: Utrum Pater genuit 6.1: Utrum Pater genuit Filium natura. Filium natura. 10.1: Utrum in divinis sit aliqua persona quae procedat per modum amoris et voluntatis.

10.1: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat per modum naturae vel per modum voluntatis.

10.1: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio per modum voluntatis.

10.2: Utrum in divinis sint 10.2: Utrum Spiritus Santantum tres personae vel ctus sit proprium nomen plures. personae in divinis. 10.3: Utrum possint esse tres Spiritus Sancti. 11.1: Utrum Spiritus 11.1: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio. Sanctus distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo.

11.1: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio dato quod non procederet ab eo.

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11.2: Utrum Spiritus 11.2: Utrum Pater et Filius Sanctus distinguatur a Filio sint duo Spiratores. dato quod non procederet ab eo. 12.1: Utrum Spiritus 12.1: Utrum generato sit Sanctus procedat a Patre prior in divinis quam proet Filio in quantum sunt cessio. unum. 12.2: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus per prius et perfectius procedat a Filio quam a Patre. 13.1: Utrum sint plures 13.1: Utrum sint plures 13.1: Utrum sint plures processiones in divinis. processiones in divinis. processiones in divinis. 13.2: Utrum sint tantum 13.2: Utrum Spiritus Sanduae. ctus possit dici ingenitus. 13.3: Utrum differant.

In general, there are some similarly entitled questions in all three columns, and all questions asked in James’ second lecture series are parallel to questions asked by Godin and in James’ first lecture series. In addition, two of James’ questions from his first lecture series that are omitted in the second series are parallel to ones that Godin asked. Still, three questions by Godin and three questions in James’ first series have no clear parallels in the other Dominican, and in one or two cases overall the parallel that does exist is rather loose. Given that Godin and James are both Dominicans and the battle lines with the Franciscans had already been formed on this issue, we should not be surprised to find general doctrinal agreement between the two. Nevertheless, the question titles suggest that, while we can anticipate some commonalities and perhaps even connections between Godin and James in this context, we can also expect some clear differences, at least in emphasis and presentation. Distinction 6 is already quite instructive. Godin asks “Whether the Father begat the Son by nature,” the identical question that James has in his first redaction in Troyes 992 [I.6.1§1]. No other manuscripts of James’ text contain this question except Vienna 1321, which often appears to preserve a transitional stage between the first and second redactions. All three texts have the indicative genuit rather than the subjunctive genuerit, but this is normal for question titles in the perfect tense, and that is what Thomas Aquinas has in the parallel article in his own distinction 6. Since the second redaction of James’ questions on book I has no distinction 6

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at all, any link between James and Godin is to be found in James’ first redaction. In the opening arguments, both James and Godin rely on Aquinas, but independently of one another, with James choosing three quotations from Hilary of Poitier’s On Councils and Godin opting for a passage from John of Damascus [I.6.1§§2-4]. Thus Godin could not have been the sole inspiration for James, nor vice-versa. In the body of the question, they both depart from Aquinas’ structure by rearranging his three articles in the sequence 3, 1, 2, on whether the Father begat the Son by nature, by necessity, and by will respectively. Both agree that the Father begat the Son by nature, not just by nature as a principle of action, because this would not be exclusive to the Son’s production, since it would apply to the Holy Spirit’s production as well; rather the Father begat the Son by nature as a mode of action. Nevertheless, James and Godin stress different points in their presentation. While Godin is largely content to concentrate on the distinction between the aforementioned ways of understanding “by nature,” James emphasizes, for example, that the Son proceeds from the Father as the Word by way of intellect, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love by way of will, which focus Godin does not share in this particular place. It is in this context that James clarifies that the Son does not proceed from the Father by an act of the intellect, as if in understanding Himself the Father produced the Word, and in the margin we read: “Nor is this Thomas’ intent, as Friar Rambert, master in theology, heard from the man himself ” [I.6.1§10]. James also points out the following general scientific and psychological principle, which foreshadows his opinion on the Filioque: We see in natural agents that, when one agent is sufficient for producing an effect, two agents never concur in producing that effect. But in agents through will, it happens that one finds that there are indeed two agents with respect to one effect either of which is sufficient for producing the effect by itself. Thus the Son proceeds by way of nature because from one, the Holy Spirit by way of will because from two, namely the Father and the Son [I.6.1§10].

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Not only is this sentiment absent in Godin’s distinction 6, as is any explicit reference to multiple agentia in all of distinctions 6 and 1013, but this passage and the Friar Rambert reference found their way into James’ later redactions in distinction 10, where the topic is the Holy Spirit’s proceeding by way of will. There, at the end of article one, Vienna 1321 interjects that “in the Scriptum, Thomas says that the Father begat the Son by nature,” a reference in both the main, second redaction of James’ questions and in the so-called Additiones, also in Troyes 992. These last two versions also have in the text what the first redaction has in the margin, with the second redaction relating that “Thomas said this in the schools publicly, that it was not his understanding that the Son proceeds from the Father by an act of the intellect, as Master Rambert heard from him,” while the Additiones repeat the context of the first redaction in distinction 6 and begin thus: “Master Rambert of Bologna says in Paris in his schools that he heard from Friar Thomas that his intent was not that the Son proceeds by an act of the intellect.” Then, following a quotation from Hugh (actually Richard) of Saint-Victor in all redactions, but not found in Aquinas or Godin, James begins article 2 with the principle quoted above, not as it was in the first redaction in distinction 6, but as reworded in the first redaction’s distinction 10. See the parallel columns on the following pages. There is none of this in Godin’s distinction 10, although James’ remark about Rambert was important enough that, whoever authored a ‘new quire’ inserted into Troyes 992, which carries a text with much in common with the distinction 10 of Hervaeus Natalis, saw fit to instruct the scribe as follows: For this reason the other opinion is to be held. Say it as is had in the reportationes, because it is done well. And add that this is the way of Friar Thomas, as Friar Ymbert the master recited in Paris that he heard from Friar Thomas himself, saying that it was never his understanding that the Son was produced by an act of intellect, nor the Holy Spirit by an act of will, but per modum.

Redaction 1 (d. 10) (T)

Quia circumscripto per intellectum quod Spiritus Sanctus non haberet voluntatem nec intellectum, adhuc esset similis vel idem Patri et Filio in natura. Ergo illud quo Pater et Filius producunt Spiritum est natura, non voluntas. Et hoc est quod dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore, VI De Trinitate.

Ratio est quia in productione quae est per modum naturae in creaturis, supposito quod agentia sint perfecta et sufficientia ad productionem effec-

Redaction 1 (d. 6) (TW)

Circumscripto enim per intellectum a Deo quod non haberet attributum quod est esse intellectum, adhuc Pater in quantum natura communicaret essentiam suam Filio, ut dictum est. Eodem modo de Spiritu Sancto. [Mg T: Nec est de intentione Thomae, ut ab ipsomet audivit frater Rembertus magister in theologia]

Videmus enim in agentibus naturalibus quod, ubi unum agens est sufficiens ad producendum aliquem effectum, numquam duo agentia concurrunt ad producendum

Unde dicit magister Raymbertus Bononiensis Parisius in scolis suis quod audivit a fratre Thoma quod intentio eius non erat Filium procedere per actum intellectus, ita quod Pater intelligendo se formaret Verbum. Circumscripto enim per intellectum quod non haberet attributum quod est esse intellectum, adhuc posset in quantum natura communicare essentiam suam Filio et communicaret, et eodem modo de Spiritu Sancto.

Additiones (d. 10) (T)

Ratio est quia in productione quae est in modum naturae in creaturis, supposito quod agentia sint perfecta et sufficientia ad productionem effec-

Unde Thomas in Scripto dicit quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Et Hugo de Sancto Victore dicit, c. De Trinitate, quod...

W (d. 10) Propter quod tenenda est alia opinio. Dic eam sic habes in repor tationibus, quia bene est. Et adde quod ista est via fratris Thomae, sicut frater Ymbertus magister recitavit Parisius quod audivit ab ipso fratre Thoma dicente quod numquam intellexit quod per actum intellectus produceretur Filius nec Spiritus Sanctus per actum voluntatis, sed per modum.

New Quire (d. 10) (T)

Ratio est quia in productione quae est per modum naturae in creaturis, supposito quod agentia sint perfecta et sufficientia ad productionem effectus, unus effectus

Quinto sic...Et hoc dixit frater Thomas Parisius in scolis publice, dicens quod non intelligebat Filium procedere a Patre per actum intellectus, sicut audivit magister Rambertus ab eo. Unde dicit Thomas in Scripto quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Et hoc est quod dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore, VI De Trinitate...

Redaction 2 (d. 10)

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illum effectum, sed in agentibus per voluntatem bene contingit invenire duo agentia respectu effectus, quorum tamen utrumque est sufficiens ad per se producendum effectum. Filius ergo procedit per modum naturae quia ab uno, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis quia a duobus, scilicet Patre et Filio.

tus, unus effectus ab uno solo producitur, ita quod numquam duo concurrunt si sint aeque perfecta. Quia igitur Filius ab uno, ideo per modum naturae. Sed in productione voluntaria possunt duo agentia aeque perfecta et singulariter sufficientia ad unum productum confluere. Unde quia Spiritus Sanctus a duobus, ideo dicitur procedere per modum voluntatis. Et hoc est ex parte producentium.

Unde dicit Thomas in Scripto quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Et adde illud de Hugone quod est in alio quaterno in fine quartae rationis... Nec umquam dixit Thomas quod Filius procedat per actum intellectus, sed per modum intellectus. Et similiter Spiritus Sanctus procedit non per actum voluntatis, sed per modum voluntatis. Et vide rationem in alio quaterno.

tus, unus effectus ab uno solo producitur, ita quod numquam duo concurrunt si sint aeque perfecta et signa sufficientia ad unum effectum concurrere. Ideo quia Spiritus Sanctus a duobus ideo procedere dicitur per modum voluntatis, et hoc est ex parte producentium.

ab uno solo producitur, ita quod numquam duo agentia ad unum effectum concurrunt, si unum sufficiat. Quia igitur Filius est ab uno, scilicet a Patre tantum, ideo dicitur procedere per modum naturae, Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque, ideo per modum voluntatis, et hoc est ex parte producentium.

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Despite the close relationship between Godin and James in other contexts, and the common structural elements in distinction 6, the differences are thus striking. The brief section in distinction 6 on whether the Father begat the Son of necessity [I.6.1§11], where in the first redaction James has his example of having to go to Paris on horseback, James and Godin agree doctrinally but use different terminology. For example, while Godin distinguishes between per se and per aliud necessity, James speaks of absolute and conditional necessity. The issue of whether the Father begat the Son by will [I.6.1§12], also brief in both authors, reveals different inspirations: on both topics, James stays closer to Aquinas than does the author of the so-called Lectura Thomasina. As the question-chart shows, in the second redaction, perhaps an ordinatio written after the Paris lectures, James abandoned distinction 6 altogether, probably because most of what he had to say there he repeated later on, especially in distinction 10, where the Additiones even remark: “Note that this question is the same as the one that was asked above, distinction 6, whether the Son proceeds by way of nature” [I.10.1§6, note]. As we have seen, in distinction 10 Godin does not share James’ concern with Aquinas’ precise opinion and, more significant, throughout his treatment of the procession of the Holy Spirit Godin never links the mode of this procession to the number of ‘sources’. Again there is a striking difference in their focus and terminology: there are 21 instances of the word emanatio in just the first question of Godin’s distinction 10, while in all of James’ questions on these distinctions combined he only employs the term four or five times. The titles of the parallel questions in distinction 10 for Godin, on the one hand, and for both of James’ redactions, on the other, differ in such a way that the opening arguments and argument contra cannot correspond completely. Thus Godin cannot be expected to employ James’ argument contra, most likely taken from Aquinas’ Contra errores Graecorum II, chapter 31, a quotation from the pseudo-Athanasian Ad Serapionem: “If you see men flying through the air with Elias, walking dry-footed through the seas with Moses and Peter, unless they say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son naturally, do not

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receive them” [I.10.1§5]. This quotation, applied here to the mode of procession, was used by others as an authority in favor of the Filioque itself.13 The structural similarity between Godin and James in distinction 6 does not continue in their parallel questions in distinction 10. Godin’s first question is rather brief and is divided into three short articles, whereas James’ is much longer and consists of two articles, the second of which has three parts. Godin’s first article maintains that, supposing a Trinity and divine emanations, it is necessary that one person proceed by way of love and will. Because in creatures there are two types of emanation, by nature and by will, these two must reflect the situation in the divine, since whatever is of perfection in creatures, shorn of any imperfection, applies to the divine. To a certain extent this is similar to James’ claim about causation in creatures, but without James’ general rule about causes and without the result that the Filioque is thereby defended. As is hinted in the quotation from the pseudo-Athanasius in the argument contra, much of James’ question is devoted to expanding on distinction 6, doing some of the things in distinction 10, moreover, that Godin did in distinction 6, concerning how to take nature, intellect, and will regarding the divine processions. Godin’s extremely brief second article does not seem to correspond to anything in James. The third article, that “the person proceeding as love is properly called the ‘Holy Spirit’,” is similar in title to James’ short question 2 for distinction 10, which is only in the first redaction: “Is ‘Holy Spirit’ the proper name of a person in the divine?” [I.10.2§1]. Nevertheless, the similarity goes little further. Nor do Godin’s brief questions 2 and 3 for distinction 10 have parallels in James. Peter Lombard devoted distinction 11 to the Filioque, and by 1300 it was routine to ask two types of question on the Filioque, one de facto and the other counterfactual. James asks no de facto question at all, but Godin includes a shortish question, his first for distinction 11: “Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?” The second of his two arguments concerns the counterfactual issue, parallel to James’ only question for that distinction: “Would the Holy Spirit be distinguished from 13. E.g. the Cistercian Gottschalk von Pomuk (Paris, fl. 1367) in his question for dd. 11-13, followed by his confrère Jakob von Eltville (Paris, 1369-70) in his question for dd. 9-10: see C. Schabel, “Cistercian University Theologians on the Filioque,” in: Archa Verbi 11 (2014), pp. 124-189, at pp. 137-138 and 173, §37.

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the Son if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son?” This sort of odd formulation, perhaps the unique counterfactual in questions on the Sentences, arose in reaction to Thomas Aquinas’ rather extreme position vis-à-vis the Greeks: the Filioque is necessary to preserve a distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, entailing that the Greeks’ denial of the Filioque amounts to a denial of the Trinity itself. Whatever their motivation, Aquinas’ opponents, primarily Franciscans, began asking the counterfactual question and often responding in opposition to Aquinas. Although this is not his focus, Russell Friedman’s research has provided much of the history of this debate in the second half of the thirteenth century, which is linked to discussions of individuation, innascibility, filiation, and passive spiration.14 Ludwig Hödl published his edition of James’ distinction 11 in part because it fit in with his theme, Anselm on the Trinity. William of Peter of Godin cites Anselm three times in all of his questions relating to the procession of the Holy Spirit in distinctions 6 and 10-13 of book I of the Sentences, two of them consisting of an opening argument in the second question of distinction 11 and its refutation and the third an offhand remark in distinction 12. (Godin has few citations in general, in these questions three to John of Damascus, two to Augustine, and one each to Aristotle, Athanasius, Boethius, Avicenna, and Averroes.) In the second question of distinction 11, in the second opening argument, Godin refers loosely to Anselm in stating that the Holy Spirit is not from the Father by being born, unlike the Son, so in this alone they are distinct and would be even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son. Godin’s response is that they would have some distinction if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone, but this distinction is insufficient for a “real distinction.” Thus Godin reserves a minor place for Anselm, one in which Anselm’s position appears to lend support to the opposing view. In contrast, James of Metz features Anselm in his argument contra, specifically presenting Anselm’s rule [I.11.1§4]: the three persons of the Trinity are altogether the same except where the opposition of relation gets in the way. Thus without a relation of opposition, whereby one person proceeds from the other, the Son and the Holy Spirit would be

14. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, pp. 91-340.

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completely the same. Interestingly, James does not seem to obtain his Anselm ‘quotation’ from Anselm himself, nor from Aquinas, who does not employ Anselm in this way, but from faulty memory or from someone else, perhaps Bombologno da Bologna, who wrote two or three decades earlier and whose paraphrase of Anselm matches James’ alleged quotation of the same.15 In presenting the contrary opinion, James employs Anselm once again: “If there were no other cause except because the Son proceeds by being born and the Holy Spirit by spirating, the Son and the Holy Spirit would still be plures” [I.11.1§13]. Here, too, however, James is merely paraphrasing Anselm, not quoting verbatim, and certainly not at length. Finally, James ends article two with another paraphrase of Anselm to the effect that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son because it is God from God. Thus in the Father the essence communicates but is not communicated, in the Son the essence both communicates and is communicated, while in the Holy Spirit the essence is communicated but does not communicate [I.11.1§25]. In his particular use of Anselm, James is again in contrast with Godin, who employed him merely in favor of the opposing Franciscan opinion, rather than in support of the traditional Dominican stance.16 Yet James quoted Anselm neither directly nor extensively, despite Hödl’s decision to include an edition of James’ question as an appendix to an article on Anselm’s trinitarian theory. Godin and James, being good Dominicans, agree against the Franciscans that the Filioque is necessary to preserve the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. Godin first presents his own opinion and then the opposing one, while James does the reverse. When describing the opposing opinion, moreover, Godin responds to each argument in turn, but James reserves a third article for the refutation. James’ treatment is more than twice as long as Godin’s as well, and although many of the points that Godin makes are found more or less in James’ question, as one would expect from two contemporaries from the same order, the overlap is rather loose and limited. For Godin, even the opponents agree that there are only two processions in the divine, by way of intellect and by way of love or will. Since what is loved must first be conceived, therefore, Godin argues that love 15. For Bombologno on the Trinity, see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, pp. 188-196, in particular pp. 189-190, n. 33. 16. On the conflicting uses of Anselm in this period, see, e.g., Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, pp. 333-337.

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must come from a concept or a word, which in the divine is the Son. If the Holy Spirit does not come from the Son, it cannot proceed by way of love, so it must proceed by way of intellect. In this case, however, the Holy Spirit would be the Son. A second argument maintains that the Holy Spirit would only proceed from the Father alone if spirating were repugnant to the Son. The only reason for something to be repugnant to the Son, however, is because it is proper to the Father. But with respect to the procession of the persons, the only act proper to the Father is generation. Thus spiration from the Father alone would be the same as generation, and again the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be distinct. These arguments had a long prehistory, but Greeks and probably some Franciscans would have received them as we do the witch trial from Monty Python and the Holy Grail. Thus Godin’s third argument is simply a flat denial that disparate relations between the Son and the Holy Spirit are sufficient for a distinction. That is, even supposing that the Holy Spirit could proceed by way of love from the spirating Father alone, the fact that the Son proceeds from the Father differently, by way of intellect, is not enough: only an opposite relation of origin suffices, with one coming from the other, i.e., the Holy Spirit from the Son. This flat denial, as ridiculous as it would seem to a Greek, is the essence of James’ opinio propria, although presented as the opinio verior as opposed to the opinio minus vera. In contrast to Godin, James goes to great length to explain and defend this denial. The biggest difference between the two questions, however, is in James’ rejection of the opposing position, but more on this later. Once the de facto and counterfactual issues relating to the Filioque had been considered in distinction 11, by 1300 it was customary in distinction 12 to ask questions about the relationship between the Father and the Son with respect to the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The Filioque was made official at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, by chance only a few years after the Fourth Crusade. Although the council was the occasion for the reformation of the Church in former Byzantine lands, the determination that included the Filioque was apparently not aimed at the Greeks. Perhaps in response to Greek criticism of the Latins’ alleged ‘double procession’, although there were antecedent debates among the Latins, at the Second Council of Lyon in 1274 it was specified that the “Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle; not by two spirations, but by one single spiration.” (Spiritus Sanctus aeter-

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naliter ex Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit.) The new pronouncement eventually provoked some fascinating discussion, after the acts entered canon law collections under Boniface VIII in the Liber Sextus of 1298, but James of Metz does not seem to have been concerned.17 In James’ first redaction he asks a second question for distinction 11, “Are the Father and the Son two spirators?” [I.11.2§1]. Yet this is merely perfunctory, since in 30 words James responds: “Those things that indicate acts in the divine, whether verbs or participles or verbal nouns, are made plural in the divine according to the plurification of the supposits, because acts are of supposits. Thus the Father and Son are two spirators” [I.11.2§2]. This could hardly have been very intelligible to the students in Reims, and James avoided the question in his second redaction. The next question, the first of distinction 12 (also omitted in the second redaction), concerns whether there is a relationship of priority between generation and procession, and although it is more substantial, it does not touch on the Lyon II issue [I.12.1]. Even the following question in the first redaction, “Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father in a prior and more perfect manner than from the Son” [I.12.2§1], is only related tangentially to Lyon II, affirming that “the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit via one spirative power in number” [I.12.2§9]. In sum, James avoids confronting the Lyon II pronouncement in his first redaction and omits distinction 12 altogether in the second redaction. Godin, in contrast, includes this question for distinction 12: “Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son insofar as (in quantum) they are one?” In the opening argument Godin deals with the subject of James’ second question for distinction 12 in the first redaction, responding in the negative that the Holy Spirit proceeds in a prior and more full manner from the Father. Godin’s argument contra is just that nothing simple, like the Holy Spirit, can proceed from diverse 17. See on these issues C. Schabel, “Pope, Council, and the Filioque in Western Theology, 1274-1439,” in: Medieval Encounters 21 (2015) pp. 191-213; C. Schabel – N. Tsougarakis, “Pope Innocent III, the Fourth Lateran Council, and Frankish Greece and Cyprus,” in: Journal of Ecclesiastical History 67 (2016), pp. 741-759; and C. Schabel, “Why Was the Filioque Formula Changed at the Second Council of Lyon?” in: A. Bucossi – A. Calia (eds.), Contra Latinos et Adversus Graecos. The Separation between Rome and Constantinople from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century, Leuven 2020, pp. 359-370.

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sources except insofar as they are one, so the Father and the Son must produce the Holy Spirit insofar as they are one. Godin draws a distinction according to whether the question involves reduplication and, if so, in what way, such that the proposition can be taken in three ways: (1) “The Father and the Son, who are plures, spirate the Holy Spirit”: this is true, but not per se. (2) “The Father and the Son, who are plures, insofar as they are one, namely in one harmonious will to spirate, spirate the Holy Spirit”: this is true per se. (3) “The Father and the Son, insofar as they are plures, spirate the Holy Spirit”: this is false. One can also draw a distinction concerning whether in quantum refers to the agent, in which case it is false, because the Father and the Son are distinct supposits, or to the form by which the agent acts, and in this way it is true because the Holy Spirit proceeds from “one most simple act” and “by one most simple form.” There follows an objection by “aliqui,” which takes up the bulk of the question. The dialogue, however, seems to have more to do with Giles of Rome and his opponent Robert of Orford than with Lyon II.18 Thus far this paper has turned up mostly negative findings about the relationship between William of Peter of Godin and James of Metz: on the subject of the procession of the Holy Spirit, there is little evidence that either of them read the other, let alone copied his ideas or words. Thus I have not been able to confirm their relative chronology, assumed to be Godin-James-Godin-James, with any influence reflected in the written record going from Godin to James. There is some hope, however, that further work will allow us to better position James, if not Godin, in the overall discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit. In James’ question for distinction 11, the counterfactual question on the Filioque, there is considerable evolution in his treatment from the first to the second redaction compared to distinctions 10 and 13. First, James replaces the opening arguments, moves those in his first redaction to his presentation of the opposing position in article 1, and offers additional arguments for that opposing opinion 18. On Giles in this context, see, e.g., Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, pp. 205-216 and 283-285.

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in the second redaction. More interestingly, in refuting the arguments of the opposing stance, while James simply rejects the first argument in the first redaction in Troyes 992, in the later versions he continues that this solution is insufficient. In the second redaction James follows this with an “Ideo dicunt alii” paragraph, which James also considers inconclusive. Then all versions except Troyes 992 conclude with James replying “aliter” [I.11.1§§26-30]. Within the responses to the additional arguments in the second redaction there are also hints of a dialogue with opponents and allies [I.11.1§§38-45]. Furthermore, in the mixed redaction in Vienna 1321 James experiments with the sequence and arguments, in the second redaction he sometimes returns to the first redaction, but he changes his mind again in the Additiones. The next step, therefore, is to look more carefully at this dialogue and other texts from this time to see whether James is responding to contemporary developments or simply engaging more deeply with the issue. Finally, there remain two additional anomalies in James of Metz’s manuscripts linked to our subject. First, one of the manuscripts of the second redaction, Munich 14383, which is idiosyncratic in many ways, seamlessly continues the question for distinction 10 in the second redaction by adding, without any break at all, a lengthy rejection of James’ opinion, supporting a contrary opinion and concluding with a pointby-point refutation of James. Who was the author of this reply to James of Metz? References to Aquinas’ and Peter of Tarantaise’s distinctions 6 suggest that this is by a Dominican. Although James’ incomplete questions on I Sentences in Munich 14383 follow immediately after some quodlibetal questions by Hervaeus Natalis, the refutation is not found in the so-called Correctorium Iacobi Metensis in Le Mans, Bibliothèque de la Ville 231, written from the perspective of Hervaeus (if not by Hervaeus), James’ frequent opponent, nor in Hervaeus’ questions on the Sentences, his pertinent questions 6-7 of Quodlibet VI, or question 6 (De processione Spiritus Sancti) of his De divinis principiis, a treatise against Henry of Ghent.19 On the other hand, there are similarities be19. Russ Friedman provided me with his working edition of Hervaeus’ De processione Spiritus Sancti. It should be noted that Mikołaj Olszewski has shown both that there are two redactions of Hervaeus’ questions on the Sentences and that the printed version does not correspond to the contents of any of the surviving codices, so it is still possible that Hervaeus was behind the refutation. See Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads, pp. 9-12, on the Correctorium pp. 314-315, and Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” p. 379.

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tween the doctrine espoused by the anonymous Dominican attacker of James and that of William of Peter of Godin (e.g., emanatio 19 times), so perhaps it was Godin or a follower who added the reply to James. This text is printed in the appendix for future analysis [I.10.1§§23-55]. Second, and more curious, Troyes 992 has a ‘new quire’ inserted at one point in which some of the questions concern the procession of the Holy Spirit, one each for distinctions 10-12, totalling about 14 printed pages of the present size. The title of the one labelled distinction 10 is parallel to what James himself asked, but those for distinctions 11 and 12 are not. Traditionally, the ‘new quire’ has not been attributed to James of Metz, even though Troyes 992 is the James of Metz manuscript that is closest to the author. The question for distinction 10 in the ‘new quire’ has two scribal references to “the reportationibus,” one mentioned above regarding Master Rambert, and the other instructing the reader or scribe to “afterwards solve the arguments as you have in the reportationibus.”20 It seems at first glance, given the scribe’s practice elsewhere, that these references are to James’ own reportationes. Nevertheless, because there is a definite link between some of the material in the ‘new quire’ and Hervaeus Natalis’ question 1 for distinction 10, and Hervaeus was thought to be independent of James, the ‘new quire’ was not assigned to James.21 Recently, however, Mikołaj Olszewski argued that Hervaeus in fact knew James’ work well and even copied from him.22 Thus the existence of passages found in Hervaeus in a manuscript otherwise attributed to James does not mean that these passages do not also originate with James. The other two of the three pertinent questions in the ‘new quire’ correspond to rather glaring omissions in James: the de facto question, for distinction 11, “whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son” and the second, for distinction 12, “whether the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are one.” The first

20. “Circa 10 distinctionem quaeritur utrum Filius procedat per modum intellectus et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis... Postea solve argumenta ut habes in reportationibus... Dic eam sic habes in reportationibus, quia bene est, et adde quod ista est via fratris Thomae, sicut frater Ymbertus magister recitavit Parisius quod audivit ab ipso fratre Thoma... Videbitur magis in sequenti distinctione” [T 28vb-29vb]. 21. Hervaeus Natalis, In quatuor libros Sententiarum I, d. 10, q. 1 (ed. Venice, 1505, ff. 26rb-27vb). On the ‘new quire’, see Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” pp. 380-382. 22. Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads, e.g., pp. 332-333.

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question, written against the Franciscans from a Dominican perspective, without parallel in Hervaeus Natalis’ printed questions on the Sentences, is rather long and interesting, with the second of two articles asking how the Greeks can be excused. The question for distinction 12 is abbreviated and refers the reader at the beginning and at the end to Romanus, probably either Giles OESA or Roman OP of Rome.23 If we accept that James of Metz himself is likely responsible for at least three versions of the questions discussed here, the so-called first and second redactions and the Additiones, it would not be so unusual for James (or a follower) to fill in some gaps in the most important witness to his questions, Troyes 992, adding new treatments in a ‘new quire’. Indeed, there are specific parallels between the de facto question in the ‘new quire’ and the other questions printed below, including a possibly distinctive example of an axe (dolabra): compare I.11.1§§37-38 with §27 in the distinction 11 in the ‘new quire’, which is also offered in the appendix. On the other hand, there are also similarities between this question and John (Quidort) of Paris’ distinction 11, which even includes a small question “whether the Greeks can be excused for not having posited that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.” Much more work needs to be done to attempt to determine the relationship between these texts and the contemporary writings of the various Dominicans, Franciscans, and others active in the 1290s and early 1300s. The comparison between James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin, along with the Dominican refutation of James’ distinction 10 in Munich 14383, reveals significant differences and even disagreements within an order that was otherwise united against the Franciscans on this issue. Assuming that James read Godin and not the other way around, the lack of apparent influence of Godin on James in the context of the procession of the Holy Spirit suggests once again how independent James was. A cursory glance at later Dominican texts also indicates that James’ questions on the procession of the Holy Spirit had an impact. Let us hope that the Thomas Institut’s mission to edit

23. “Circa XI distinctionem quaeritur utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio...” [T 29vb-30rb]; d. 12: “Utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum in quantum unum. Vide in Romano... Vide in Scripto Romani” [T 30rb-va].

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the major Dominican texts of the Golden Age of the Friars Preacher continues after Durand and Godin. Surely for each ostensibly new article on Thomas Aquinas we should see an actually new article on how his order absorbed his doctrine. To contribute to this, I publish here some of James of Metz’s questions. Appendix Although I have fully collated all redactions of distinctions 6 and 10-13 of James of Metz’s questions on book I of the Sentences, transcribed the pertinent material in the ‘new quire’, and transcribed the refutation of the second redaction of distinction 10 in Munich 14383, it would not be feasible in terms of space both to print critical editions and to place them in the necessary parallel columns. For maximum economy and utility, reducing the apparatus to a minimum, the appendix contains (a) the questions in the first redaction in Troyes (occasionally corrected by W, with some of W’s additions marked in a smaller font) that are not paralleled in the second redaction, (b) the question for distinction 10 in the second redaction based on all witnesses, with very reduced apparatus criticus, using a smaller font for major differences and notes in the Additiones, (c) the refutation of the second redaction’s distinction 10 found in Munich 14383, (d) the first question of distinction 11 in all four versions in parallel columns with very reduced apparatus criticus for the second redaction, which is based on all witnesses, and (e) the de facto question in the ‘new quire’ in Troyes 992. Unless noted in the limited apparatus criticus, the ratio edendi for the second redaction accords with the previously published stemmata in Olszewski and Schabel.25 Words in these \brackets/ indicate marginalia or things written above the lines; words in these are omitted words. In the text in parallel columns, a few obvious errors in the three texts that are contained in only one witness have been corrected tacitly. The paragraphs in the parallel columns are numbered according to the second redaction (in Roman numerals for paragraphs not in that redaction), so that the reader can visualize when changes in the sequence of arguments have been made. 24. Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads, pp. 8 and 333, and Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” p. 368.

Appendix Iacobi Metensis In primum librum Sententiarum, dd. 6 et 10-12

[1] Utrum Pater genuit Filium natura. [2] Videtur quod non: generatio naturalis est necessaria; sed Pater non genuit Filium de necessitate, Hilarius, libro De synodis: “Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium”; ergo etc. [3] Item, in Deo idem est natura et voluntas; | sed Pater non genuit W 15rb Deum Filium voluntate, sic enim produxit creaturas, unde libro De synodis dicitur: “Si quis voluntate Dei tamquam unum aliquid de creaturis Filium factum dicat, anathema sit”; ergo etc. [4] Contra. Hilarius, libro De synodis: “Creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, sed natura Filio dedit.” [5] Videnda sunt tria principaliter.

[6] Primo, quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Ad cuius evidentiam praemittendae sunt duae distinctiones. Propter primam sciendum quod omnia quae de Deo dicuntur idem sunt essentialiter praeter ea quae ad relationem pertinent. Relationes enim in divinis ponuntur realiter, ea autem quae essentialiter idem sunt bene differunt ratione, ut attributa. Potest ergo considerari essentia divina dupliciter: vel secundum se et absolute, et sic non est principium alicuius actus nisi forte essendi; vel secundum quod induit rationem attributi, et sic est principium diversorum actuum, puta secundum quod est intellectus est principium intelligendi, secundum quod est voluntas principium amandi, secundum quod natura principium naturalis operationis, puta generationis. Actus enim in divinis diversificantur secundum diversitatem attributorum. Unde si circumscriberetur per intellectum in divinis aliquod attributum, puta intellectus, non esset in divinis actus intelligendi, esset tamen ibi actus amandi in quantum esset ibi bonitas vel voluntas. Item, actus naturalis generationis in quantum esset natura quaedam,

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verbi gratia ignis, et est ignis et corpus et substantia; circumscripto ergo quod non haberet actionem in quantum ignis, adhuc tamen haberet actionem in quantum corpus; similiter de substantia. Circumscripto igitur uno attributo, adhuc remanent in divinis operationes et actus respectu aliorum attributorum. [7] Secunda est quod aliquid potest dici esse ab alio natura dupliciter: uno modo1 ita quod natura dicat principium actionis vel generationis, alio modo ita quod natura dicat modum actionis. Verbi gratia, dicimus quod Christus potuit generare. Item, produxit Adam de terra. Igitur Adam est a Christo natura in quantum li ‘natura’ absolute dicit principium productionis, sed non modum. Sed si Christus generasset, filius eius fuisset ab eo natura quantum ad modum productionis2 naturalis per3 generationem. [8] Quando ergo dicitur, ‘Pater genuit Filium natura’, li ‘natura’ potest dicere principium generationis absolute vel modum generationis naturalis. Si primo, dico quod non solum Pater Filium genuit natura, immo etiam Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum Sanctum natura. Ratio est duplex. Primo, quia dictum est prima distinctione quod essentia non est principium actus nisi secundum quod induit rationem attributi, actus naturae est communicare se, ergo essentia divina dicitur ‘natura’ in quantum communicat se; sed natura communicatur non solum Filio a Patre, sed etiam Spiritui Sancto ab utroque; ergo principium utriusque actionis est natura. Secundo, quia illud est principium in quo producens assimilat sibi productum; sed Filius est Patri similis, immo idem in natura, Spiritus etiam Sanctus idem cum Patre et Filio in natura; ergo Filius procedit a Patre natura et Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio. [9] Si autem natura dicat modum generationis, sic dicitur communiter quod Filius procedit a Patre natura, id est, per modum naturae, non autem Spiritus Sanctus. Ratio videtur assignari communiter quia Filius procedit ut verbum per modum intellectus. De ratione autem verbi est quod sic sit simile rei de qua formatur. Intelligere est per assimilationem. Sed Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut amor per modum voluntatis. [10] Ista possunt habere duplicem intellectum. Cum enim dicitur quod Filius procedit per modum intellectus, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo quod procedat per actum intellectus, ita quod Pater 1. modo W] om. T 2. productionis] perductionis T 3. per] pro T

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intelligendo se producat verbum, et hoc non videtur habere veritatem. \Nec est de intentione Thomae, ut ab ipsomet audivit frater Rembertus, magister in theologia/.4 Circumscripto enim per intellectum a Deo quod non haberet attributum quod est5 esse intellectum, adhuc Pater in quantum natura communicaret essentiam suam Filio, ut dictum est. Eodem modo de Spiritu Sancto. Alio modo potest intelligi quod Filius procedit per modum intellectus quia, sicut in intellectu est unum ab uno et per assimilationem, ita Filius unus ab uno per assimiliationem naturalem. Unde Filius secundum hoc procedit per modum naturae, non Spiritus Sanctus. Videmus enim in agentibus naturalibus quod, | ubi unum agens est sufficiens ad producendum aliquem effectum, T 36vb numquam duo agentia concurrunt ad producendum illum effectum. Sed in agentibus per voluntatem bene contingit invenire duo agentia respectu effectus, quorum tamen utrumque est sufficiens ad per se producendum effectum. Filius ergo procedit per modum naturae quia ab uno, Spiritus Sanctus | per modum voluntatis quia a duobus, scilicet W 15vb Patre et Filio. \Secundum principale/ [11] Secundo videndum quo modo Pater genuit Filium necessitate. Sciendum quod duplex est6 necessitas: quaedam absoluta per comparationem7 ad causas intrinsecas, quaedam condicionata per comparationem ad causas extrinsecas. Condicionata duplex: quaedam ex potentia seu virtute agentis, quae dicitur ‘violentia’ in rebus inanimatis et ‘coactio’ in rebus animatis; quaedam ex suppositione finis. Et haec duplex: vel finis simpliciter vel finis congrui. Finis simpliciter, ut necesse est hominem comedere si velit vivere. Finis congrui dupliciter: vel sine quo nullo modo potest haberi finis congruus, ut si vult homo ire ultra mare necesse est eum navigare; vel sine quo non potest bene haberi finis congruus, ut si vult aliquis ire Parisius necesse est eum equitare.8 Nullo istorum modorum Pater genuit necessitate. Absoluta duplex: quaedam ex parte materiae, qua necesse est corrumpi compositum ex contrariis; alia ex parte formae, quae est idem quod immutabilitas, et hoc solo modo Pater genuit Filium necessitate, quia non potest non esse. 4. nec est... theologia] om. W 5. quod est] inv. T 6. duplex est W] om. T 7. comparationem W] comparatione T 8. ut si vult... equitare] om. W

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\Tertium principale/ [12] Tertio utrum genuit Filium voluntate. Sciendum quod voluntas quandoque fertur in aliquid ut in obiectum quod voluntas vult, ut volo me intelligere, et haec voluntas dicitur ‘concomitans’. Et hoc modo possumus dicere quod Pater genuit Filium voluntate quia placuit sibi quod genuit. Alio modo voluntas fertur in aliquid in rationem9 principii, sicut voluntas fertur in actum proprium. Et hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo quod velit de novo quod prius non volebat, et haec voluntas dicitur ‘accedens’, quae non ponitur in Deo; alio modo quod velit aliquid in futuro, et haec voluntas dicitur ‘antecedens’ et ponitur in Deo respectu creaturarum solum. [13: ~2-3] Per haec patet solutio ad obiecta.

[1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio per modum voluntatis. [2] Quod sic, quia ubi sunt plures productiones et plura principia productionum, si una productio reducitur ad unum principium, et alia ad aliud; sed in divinis est productio Filii et productio Spiritus Sancti. [3] Item, principia productionum ponuntur intellectus et voluntas, ergo cum productio Filii reducatur ad modum intellectus, productio Spiritus Sancti fiet per modum voluntatis. [4] Item, aut Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum naturae vel intellectus, quod pro eodem accipitur, aut per modum voluntatis. Non per modum naturae, quia quod sic procedit potest dici vere genitum, si procedat in identitatem naturae; sed Spiritus Sanctus procedit in identitatem naturae; ergo, si cum hoc procederet per modum naturae, diceretur genitus, quod falsum est. [5]10 Contra. Dicit Athanasius Ad Serapionem: “Si videris homines aliquos volantes per aera cum Helia, ambulantes sicco pede per maria cum Moyse et Petro, nisi dixerint Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Patre et Filio naturaliter, non recipias”; ergo videtur quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum naturae. [6] Duo sunt videnda.11 9. rationem W] ratione T 10. §5 Additiones: Contra sicut in alio quaterno. 11. Additiones: et nota quod ista quaestio est eadem cum illa quae quaeritur supra, VI distinctione, utrum Filius procedat per modum naturae

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[7] Primo duae suppositiones ad intellectum quaestionis. Quarum prima est quod, secundum Boethium, in divinis omnia sunt unum secundum rem ubi relatio originis non distinguit, ut sapientia, bonitas, etc. Nihilominus tamen essentia secundum quod absolute sumitur non est principium alicuius operationis nisi forte essendi, quia ‘esse’ dicitur ab essentia, sed est principium specialis operationis secundum quod induit rationem specialis attributi, ut volendi, secundum quod induit rationem voluntatis,12 et intelligendi, secundum quod induit rationem intellectus, vel etiam secundum quod induit rationem alicuius alterius specialis rationis quam attributalis, puta glorificatoris vel redemptoris. Est enim principium glorificandi non secundum quod habet rationem intellectus vel voluntatis, sed secundum quod habet virtutem glorificativam, quae tamen non est ratio attributalis, quia non convenit creaturae; et similiter habet rationem creatoris secundum quod habet virtutem creativam; et similiter communicat naturam divinam secundum quod habet virtutem communicandi naturam, ita quod sicut in creaturis communicatio naturae non attribuitur intellectui vel voluntati, sed virtuti generativae, ita in divinis communicatio naturae divinae est per essentiam divinam, non secundum quod voluntas vel intellectus, sed secundum quod natura. Et haec est prima suppositio. [Additiones:

Sed cum dicitur quod natura est de natura, quia in natura est virtus communicandi naturam eo ipso quod natura est, non quia est intellectus vel voluntas, modo dico quod si non esset in Deo intellectus et voluntas, adhuc natura communicaret se, dato quod non haberet nisi naturam et rationem entis. Ideo principium quo producuntur est natura, sicut principium quo homo intelligit est intellectus.]

[8] Secunda est quod, quando dicitur quod Pater genuit Filium natura et Spiritum Sanctum voluntate, li ‘natura’ potest accipi vel pro principio quo, et tunc est sensus quod Pater produxit Filium natura, ita quod principium productionis fuit natura, sicut principium quo ignis calefacit est calor naturalis ignis. Secundo, li ‘natura’ potest accipi non pro principio productionis, sed pro modo, et hoc refert a primo quia Adam fuit a Deo13 natura ut natura dicit principium quo, quia processit per virtutem naturae divinae, non tamen fuit a Deo per modum 12. Additiones: et verum est quod Thomas dicit... Modo addo ad dictum Thomae quod hoc verum est secundum rationes non solum attributales, sed etiam alias... 13. deo MW] christo AGKLNPV; deo p.c. GK

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naturae, quia non per naturalem propagationem. Et haec duo requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquis sit filius, scilicet quod principium producendi ipsum sit natura et quod modus sit naturalis. Unde Adam non dicitur filius Dei naturalis, quia deficit sibi modus. Et hic est primus articulus.

[9] Secundo est videre utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat per modum voluntatis et Filius per modum naturae. Dicendum quod productio Filii a Patre et Spiritus Sancti ab utroque potest comparari vel ad principium productionis quo producuntur, vel ad supposita producentia, vel ad ordinem productionis. Si ad principium virtute cuius producuntur, dico quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus producuntur non per intellectum vel voluntatem, sed per naturam, ita quod principium quo producuntur est natura et non actus intelligendi vel volendi. Et probatur quinque rationibus.14 [10] Primo sic: illius productionis principium est natura quae esset in divinis circumscriptis omnibus aliis et manente sola natura; huiusmodi est productio Filii a Patre et Spiritus Sancti ab utroque; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia ideo nos dicimus quod principium intelligendi est intellectus divinus, non voluntas, quia posito per impossibile quod Deus haberet intellectum sine voluntate, adhuc intelligeret per intellectum. Idem dico de sapientia, et bonitate, et virtute creativa, et omnibus aliis attributis. Minor etiam patet,15 quia circumscripto actu intelligendi et volendi, adhuc natura divina esset sui communicativa, ita quod Pater produceret Filium et ambo Spiritum Sanctum. Et ideo quia, circumscripto intellectu et voluntate, natura in divinis esset sui communicativa, sicut in creaturis, ideo dicimus quod natura est de natura, non autem quod essentia de essentia. Hoc est incidens. [11] Secundo sic: illius productionis principium est natura in qua producens de necessitate producit, nec potest non producere, nec aliter producere; sic est hic; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia haec est differentia inter productionem artis et naturae quod illa productio dicitur naturalis in qua producens de necessitate producit et sic quod non aliter, 14. Additiones add. mg.: Probatio quod per voluntatem sicut quo, quia sicut se habet fecunditas vel memoria fecunda ad verbum, sic fecunda voluntas ad amorem; sed fecunditas memoriae paternae in divinis producit verbum hypostativum per se subsistens; ergo fecunda voluntas similiter producet amorem hypostativum et per se subsistentem. Talis est Spiritus Sanctus, ergo etc. 15. etiam patet P] etiam declaratur A; patet G; s.l. K; om. LMNV

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quia da oppositum quod possit aliter agere, iam non agit naturaliter, sed voluntarie. Modo nos loquimur de divinis sicut invenimus apud nos. Minor patet, quia Pater genuit Filium de necessitate immutabilitatis, sicut ignis ignem, licet non de necessitate coactionis, et similiter Pater et Filius Spiritum Sanctum. Nec aliter possunt, quia tunc esset ibi potentia frustra, quia numquam exiret in actum suum, quod est inconveniens. [12] Tertio sic: productionis quae est a voluntate ut natura est principium est natura; productio Spiritus Sancti est a voluntate divina ut natura est; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia hoc quod est in quantum semper reduplicat principium actionis, ut ignis calefacit in quantum calidus, id est, principium calefactionis, est calor. Minor, quia illud dicimus procedere apud nos a voluntate ut voluntas est quod possumus velle et nolle, ut dicimur voluntarie comedere quia possumus non comedere, sed illud quod non possumus nolle dicitur procedere a voluntate ut natura est, sicut velle finem; modo Spiritus Sanctus procedit immutabiliter in divinis, ita quod non potest non procedere; ergo etc. [Addi-

tiones: ideo procedit a voluntate ut natura est quia sicut homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem et non potest non velle, ita Deus suam bonitatem. Unde sicut in nobis velle beatitudinem est a voluntate ut natura est, ita Spiritus Sanctus procedit a voluntate divina ut natura est.]

[13] Quarto sic: illud est principium productionis in quo primo productum assimilatur producenti; tale est natura; ergo etc. Maior patet,16 quia productio fit virtute principii et productio tendit ad assimilationem, et ideo illud est principium productionis in quo primo fit assimilatio. Minor patet,17 quia secundum nostrum modum intelligendi, posterior est voluntas in divinis quam intellectus, sicut apud nos, quia praeintelligimus quae volumus, licet non secundum ea sit ordo secundum rem in divinis; modo in me natura praecedit intellectum et voluntatem; ergo similiter in Deo assimilatio prius fit in natura quam in voluntate vel in intellectu; ergo etc. [14] Quinto sic: illud est principium productionis virtute cuius productum habet quicquid habet ex quadam concomitantia; haec autem est natura, non autem intellectus, respectu Filii, natura, non voluntas, respectu Spiritus Sancti; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia productum nihil habet nisi virtute productionis. 16. patet AGKPW] om. LMNV 17. patet AGP] s.l. K; om. LMNV

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Minor, quia posterius non est causa

[Additiones] Minor etiam, scilicet quod

prioris, immo e converso; prius autem

natura sit illud quo Filius et Spiritus

est habere naturam quam intellectum

Sanctus habent quicquid habent, non

vel voluntatem; et ideo Filius non habet

intellectus vel voluntas. Volo enim osten-

naturam quia habet intellectum a Patre,

dere quod Filius non haberet a Patre in

nec Spiritus Sanctus habet naturam ab

divinis esse volentem vel intelligentem

utroque quia habet voluntatem ab ipsis,

nisi haberet ab ipso prius – secundum

immo e converso, ideo habent intellec-

nostrum modum intelligendi – naturam,

tum et voluntatem quia habent naturam,

quia ubi aliquid habet de virtute produc-

et ideo patet minor, scilicet quod virtute

tionis primam perfectionem, potest habe-

naturae fit communicatio in divinis. Sic

re posteriores, sed non e converso. Modo,

ergo principium quo procedit Filius a Pa-

secundum nostrum modum intelligendi,

tre in divinis non est intellectus, sed na-

prius est habere naturam quam esse vo-

tura, et similiter principium quo procedit

lentem vel intelligentem, et ideo per hoc

Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque est natura,

quod aliquis habet naturam potest habe-

non voluntas.

re alias perfectiones sequentes, et non e converso, quia non de necessitate sunt causa primae perfectionis, quia posterius non est causa prioris. Unde videmus in nobis quod non ideo habemus naturam quia habemus intellectum et voluntatem, sed e converso, quia habemus naturam humanam, ex quadam concomitantia habemus intellectum et voluntatem. Ita si principium productionis Filii est natura, ex quo communicat sibi naturam, bene sequitur quod communicat sibi aliam, sicut sapientiam et bonitatem. Sed sicut non sequitur quod, si communicaret sibi sapientiam, quod communicaret sibi esse volentem, ita nec e converso. Et ita probata est minor, quod scilicet Filius quicquid habet habet virtute naturae, non virtute intellectus, et Spiritus Sanctus virtute naturae, non voluntatis. Et ideo principium quo procedit Filius a Patre et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque est natura, non actus intelligendi vel volendi.

JAMES AND GODIN ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

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[15] Et hoc dixit frater Thomas Parisius

[15 Additiones] Unde dicit magister

in scolis publice: quod non intelligebat

Raymbertus Bononiensis Parisius in

Filium procedere a Patre per actum in-

scolis suis quod audivit a fratre Thoma

tellectus, sicut audivit magister Ramber-

quod intentio eius non erat Filium pro-

tus ab eo. Unde dicit Thomas in Scripto

cedere per actum intellectus, ita quod

quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Et hoc

Pater intelligendo se formaret verbum;

est quod dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore,

circumscripto omni per intellectum quod

VI De Trinitate: “Quia,” inquit, “Spiritus

non haberet attributum quod est esse in-

Sancti processio non talis est ut possit dici

tellectum, adhuc posset in quantum na-

Filius, ideo non dicitur genitus, sed quia

tura communicare essentiam suam Filio

per modum naturae est, ideo non potest

et communicaret, et eodem modo de Spi-

dici ingenitus.” Item, idem Hugo dicit

ritu Sancto. Unde dicit Thomas in Scripto

quod processio Filii et Spiritus Sancti

quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Et adde

non differt nisi secundum modum magis

illud de Hugone quod est in alio quaterno

principalem et minus principalem.

in fine quartae rationis. [Note: this applies only to the first redaction in T]

[16] Secundo dico quod processio Filii et

[16 Additiones] Secundo dico quod potest

Spiritus Sancti potest comparari ad sup-

comparari ad supposita producentia, et

posita producentia, et sic Filius procedit

sic Filius procedit per modum naturae et

per modum naturae et Spiritus Sanctus

Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis.

per modum voluntatis, et hoc tam ex

Nec umquam dixit Thomas quod Filius

parte producentium quam ex parte pro-

procedat per actum intellectus, sed per

ductorum. Ratio est quia in productione

modum intellectus. Et similiter Spiritus

quae est per modum naturae in creatu-

Sanctus procedit non per actum volun-

ris, supposito quod agentia sint perfecta

tatis, sed per modum voluntatis. Et vide

et sufficientia ad productionem effectus,

rationem in alio quaterno. Et adde instan-

unus effectus ab uno solo producitur, ita

tiam hanc: Forte dices: ex quo unus est

quod numquam duo agentia ad unum

aeque perfectus sicut aliter, unus super-

effectum concurrunt, si unum sufficiat.

fluit. Frustra sunt duo, ut videtur.—So-

Quia igitur Filius est ab uno, scilicet a Pa-

lutio: non sunt frustra, quia agunt per

tre, tantum, ideo dicitur procedere per

unam virtutem numero. Et ideo dicimus

modum naturae. Sed in productione vo-

quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut amor

luntaria possunt duo agentia aeque per-

quia per modum voluntatis, ita quod li

fecta et singulariter sufficientia ad unum

‘amor’ nominat amatum, non autem

effectum confluere. Unde quia Spiritus

actum amoris, sicut dicerem, ‘istud pro-

Sanctus procedit a duobus, ideo dicitur

cederet ut artificiatum, quia procedit

procedere per modum voluntatis, et hoc

per modum artis’, quia est artificiatum.

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CHRIS SCHABEL

est ex parte producentium. Ex quo etiam

Vel aliquid potest dici voluntarium quia

sequitur ex parte producti quod ipsum

procedit a volentibus per modum volun-

denominetur voluntarium, id est, pro-

tatis.

ductum per modum voluntatis. Sicut enim aliquid denominatur artificiatum quia productum per modum artis ab artifice, sic voluntarium quia productum a volentibus.

[17]18 Tertio potest processio Filii et19 Spiritus Sancti comparari ad ordinem processionis, et tunc dicitur quod Filius procedit per modum verbi et naturae et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis ex parte producti, non ex parte productionis. Quod declaratur sic: in quacumque substantia intellectuali est reperire duas operationes, scilicet actum intelligendi et actum volendi, sic quod operatio volendi dicitur secunda respectu operationis intellectus, quae dicitur prima. Item, per primam, scilicet intellectus, formatur verbum, per secundam procedit amor. [18] Possumus ergo considerare verbum dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod procedit et formatur per actum intellectus, et hoc modo dicitur quod Filius non procedit in divinis ut verbum, sic enim ratio formalis Filii esset esse intellectuale. Alio modo potest considerari verbum ut formatum prima productione, quae est per actum intelligendi, et hoc modo dicitur Filius procedere per modum verbi, quia videlicet prima productione procedit, et etiam per modum naturae, quia productio naturalis tamquam prima supponitur in omni alia productione, puta in artificiali. Sed Spiritus Sanctus ut productus est dicitur productus secundum nostrum modum intelligendi secunda productione, quae supponit productionem Filii, a quo Spiritus Sanctus procedit. Ideo dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, non quod procedat per actum volendi, sed quia secunda productione procedit, quod competit productioni per modum voluntatis, non quod sint ibi duae productiones per modum voluntatis, quarum una sit prior alia, sed quia una est per modum intellectus, quae est prior, alia per modum voluntatis, quae accipitur ut posterior secundum nostrum modum intelligendi. 18. §§17-19 Additiones: Tertio, processio Spiritus Sanctus vel generatio Filii possunt comparari ad ordinem processionis vel generationis etc. Vide articulum hunc in alio quaterno [Note: applies better to first redaction in T than to second]. 19. processio Filii et M] processio... vel generatio Filii A; om. GKNPV; productio L; productio Filii et W

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[19] Et ut concordentur dicta doctorum, sciendum quod aliquid procedit a divina voluntate ut voluntas est sicut creaturae, quia possunt produci et non produci; aliquid a natura ut natura est, ut Filius; aliquid a natura ut voluntas est, ut Spiritus Sanctus, prout in processione sua distinguitur a Filio, Spiritus enim Sanctus, etsi naturam accipiat a Patre et Filio, hoc tamen est per modum voluntatis, ut dictum est; aliquid a voluntate ut natura est, ut idem Spiritus Sanctus prout in processione sua differt a creaturis, quae procedunt a voluntate ut voluntas est, ut dictum est.

[20: ~2] Ad rationes. Ad primam, dico per interemptionem minoris. Non enim principium productionis Filii est intellectus, id est, actus intelligendi, quia intellectus et voluntas non distinguuntur in Deo nisi ratione, nec similiter intelligere et velle. Tamen bene conceditur quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis et Filius per modum intellectus comparando processiones eorum ad supposita producentia, ut dictum fuit. [21: ~3] Ad secundum, dico quod, licet Spiritus Sanctus procedat in similitudinem naturae, non tamen per modum naturae, quia procedit a duobus. Ideo non dicitur genitus. [22: ~4] Ad tertium, eodem modo penitus, quia licet principium productionis Spiritus Sancti sit natura, tamen modus non est naturalis. 20

[23: ~7] Alia est opinio huic contraria improbans hanc quantum ad omnia. Volunt enim isti quod numquam natura divina sit principium alicuius emanationis suppositi divini nisi sub aliqua ratione attributali, intellectus vel voluntatis, primo sic procedendo a creaturis ad divina, ut ipsi procedunt, quia fundantur super hoc ut prima ratio [§10] eorum ostendit quod natura est sui communicativa. [24] Contra: natura ut natura est numquam est principium communicationis suae infra se, ut patet in creaturis, sed semper alterius in numero, ut patet, sed hoc solum competit naturae intellectuali ut in20. §§20-22 Additiones: Rationes solve sicut ibi.

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tellectiva est, ut probabo; sed emanationes divinae sunt infra essentiam divinam manentem eandem numero; ergo natura divina non ratione qua natura, sed21 qua intellectiva, est principium emanationum et suppositorum divinorum. Maior patet, quia natura non est nisi quidam impetus, quia est principium motus, ut patet III Physicorum. Unde generatio est via in naturam a quodam in quiddam, scilicet differens numero secundum naturam a primo. Quod etiam sola natura intellectualis ut intellectiva est habet actiones immanentes quae sunt velle et intelligere patet per Philosophum, IX Metaphysicae. Et quia ipsa est sola conversiva super suum actum, minor patet de se. [25] Item, natura ut eadem vel eiusdem secundum speciem semper est principium eiusdem et eodem modo, unde si sit principium diversorum, hoc erit solum differentium numero; sed emanationes personarum divinarum non differunt solo numero, nec eodem modo emanant duo supposita divina, quia sic utraque processio diceretur generatio et uterque genitus; ergo etc. [26] Item, ut natura est principium generationis et non alterius emanationis; sed per te natura in divinis, aliis circumscriptis, est principium omnis emanationis vel processionis; ergo omnis emanatio est generatio. Sed ista est tantum una in divinis; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia sicut sola generatio est via in naturam, ita est a natura ut a principio. [27] Item, secundum Augustinum, Filius in divinis est proprie verbum et vere verbum, unde concludendo III De Trinitate dicit quod “eo verbum quo Filius”; sed verbum ut verbum necessario respicit intellectum ut principium, et non naturam absolute sub ratione naturae, similiter amor voluntatem; ergo principium productionis Filii, qui est vere verbum, et Spiritus Sancti, qui est amor, est intellectus sub ratione qua intelligit et voluntas. [28] Item, secundum doctorem/s et Augustinum, in divinis sunt duplices actus, quidam essentiales, ut scire, velle, et22 intelligere, et huiusmodi, quidam notionales vel personales, sicut generare vel dicere verbum, spirare; sed dicere necessario praesupponit intelligere, cuius principium est intellectus; ergo spirare amorem, qui est Spiritus Sanctus, necessario praesupponit velle, cuius principium est voluntas. Sed sic principia istarum emanationum erit essentia sub ratione intellectus et voluntatis. 21. sed] secundum N 22. velle et] inv. N

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[29] Item, Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio ratione unius quae est propria ratio spirandi ipsum, quae non convenit Spiritui Sancto, quia per hoc distinguitur ab eo; sed illa non potest esse natura, quia ista erit communis tribus personis sub ratione naturae; ergo sub vel per rationem alterius principii spirant Spiritum Sanctum, scilicet voluntatis cum proprietate adiuncta. [30: ~16] Contra secundum quod dicunt, quod si comparentur istae processiones ad supposita producentia et productiva, sic Filius dicitur procedere per modum naturae, et talis dicitur generatio, quia est unius ab uno, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis, quia a duobus, sic tamen quod non per actus istorum, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis, videntur sibi contradicere, quia dicunt quod duo agentia sufficientia agentia per naturam, quia quilibet agit totum suum posse, non possunt concurrere ad productionem unius effectus; sed Pater et Filius sunt agentia perfecta et sufficientia, et tamen producunt unum | Spiri- N 49vb tum Sanctum; ergo duo agentia per principium quod est natura concurrent ad \suum/ effectum, Spiritum Sanctum scilicet, quod est contra dictum. [31] Vel si tu dicas quod principium productionis quo producunt Spiritum Sanctum non est natura, sed voluntas, propositum: quod principium emanationis Spiritus Sancti erit voluntas. [32] Item, contra maiorem, ponantur duae ignes in aliqua distantia, quorum quilibet sit sufficiens producere vel comburere stuppam. Ponatur stuppa in medio. Ambo causabunt ignem in stuppa unum qui movebitur sursum. Ergo haec duo agentia naturaliter perfecta et aeque perfecta producunt unum effectum. [33] Item, secundum istos, circumscriptis intellectu et voluntate in divinis, adhuc natura esset principium istarum emanationum; sed id quod potest esse per se, circumscripto alio, nullum per se habet ordinem ad ipsum; ergo emanationes istae ad supposita producta vel producentia debent dici una per modum naturae vel intellectus et voluntatis. Vel si hoc dicatur, est tantum metaphorice, sicut Philosophus dicit X Metaphysicae quod semen se habet per modum artis vel artificis, qui rationem disponit introducendo formam artificiati non intrans in compositionem artificiati, quod videtur inconveniens.

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[34: ~17-18] Contra tertium, quod istae emanationes vel processiones secundum ordinem ad modum ordinis qui23 est inter actum intellectus et actum voluntatis, data una per modum intellectus, altera per modum voluntatis, quia actus voluntatis est secundus respectu actus intellectus, qui est primus, sit processus: Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, cum sint in natura divina, quae est natura intellectualis, in qua sunt duae actiones immanentes sic habentes ordinem – secundum nostrum modum intelligendi – una dicitur per modum intellectus et altera voluntatis. [35] Contra. Sicut natura est quoddam attributum in divinis absolutum, ita et sapientia et bonitas etc.; sed sapientia in Patre non communicata, in Filio communicatur ab uno, in Spiritu Sancto a duobus, non est principium diversarum emanationum ut personarum; ergo nec natura ut natura absolute. [36] Item, in creaturis omnium praedictorum sive producantur ab uno sive a duobus, dum tamen principium formale quo producuntur sit unum secundum speciem, inter illas productiones sive producta nullus est ordo nisi forte temporis, quod non habet locum in divinis; sed secundum istos principium productionis Filii et Spiritus Sancti est unum, scilicet natura ut natura est; ergo nullus ordo primi vel secundi potest intelligi inter istas productiones, quod est contra dictum ipsorum.

[37] Ideo est alia opinio quod essentia divina est principium primum et radicale24 omnium quae sunt in divinis, et ideo divinarum emanationum, tamen secundum quod ipsa considerantur a nobis sub ratione talis vel talis attributi est principium talis vel talis emanationis. Et sic essentia ut essentia est solum primo et immediate principium essendi, sed ut intellectiva est principium omnium operationum intelligibilium vel intellectualium,25 et ut volitiva principium volibilium26 actuum, et sic verbi et amoris. Tamen quia intellectus, natura, voluntas in divinis sunt idem realiter, sufficit dicere scilicet quod natura divina, quia tunc includitur totum, vel natura intellectiva sit principium omnium quae 23. qui] quae N 24. radicale] radicare N 25. intellectualium] intelligibilium N 26. volibilium] vo(-)rium N

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sunt in divinis, non tamen accipiendo naturam ut distinguitur contra intellectum et voluntatem, sed ut idem et sub ratione intellectus et voluntatis, quia distinctiones aliquorum non fiunt per communia, sed per propria; natura est communis; quod est notionale, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, sunt tantum propria. Et ideo ponit Thomas in Scripto, VI distinctione, quod natura non est principium processionis Spiritus Sancti ut natura, sed sub ratione voluntatis. Unde essentia divina–natura–intellectus cum proprietate adiuncta paternitatis est principium emanationis verbi, et similiter respectu Spiritus Sancti. Unde non sequitur: ‘quamvis Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor, procedat per modum voluntatis sic, et voluntas sit principium Spiritus Sancti, quod propter hoc Spiritus Sanctus sit sic creatura’, quia ipsa voluntas comparatur ad ipsum amorem ut principium tamquam ad illud quod est ratio principiandi alia, sicut intellectus ad formam artis quae est principium artis, sed ad creaturas comparatur voluntas divina ut principium ad principiatum. [38] Unde Petrus dicit, VI distinctione, aliquid fieri a natura et voluntate tripliciter: vel a natura cum intellectu, et sic per modum naturae, quia immutabiliter et voluntate complacente vel concomitante, et sic Filius procedit; vel a voluntate solum ut voluntas, et sic creatura; vel a voluntate et natura, et sic Spiritus Sanctus. Principium igitur huius emanationis, scilicet verbi, non est natura absolute, sed intellectiva, et voluntas respectu amoris. [39] Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod inter omnia entia primum ens est natura, non absolute, sed natura intellectualis, et per consequens primae processiones, quae sunt personarum divinarum, erunt naturae ut intellectualis, nec quatenus natura, circumscripto intellectu. Probatio: quia secundum Philosophum, IX Metaphysicae, in entibus27 est invenire potentiam et actum, et actus est prior potentia, quia causa eius est, quia potentia numquam fit actu nisi per actum, scilicet potentiam activarum; sic est invenire naturam non intellectivam et intellectivam; sed impossibile est quod natura ut natura sit principium intellectivae, quia iam effectus excederet gradus et perfectionem suae causae; ergo e converso intellectiva est principium naturae; ergo prima; ergo etc. Et ideo voluerunt philosophi quod primum ens simpliciter esset intelligens et volens. 27. in entibus] mentibus N

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[40] Item, natura omni prima est separata, quia da quod non sit separata, est contracta ad aliquod genus determinatum, ergo non prima; omne autem actu separatum per se subsistens est intelligens, quia eo quod est separatum nec contractum vel sensibile est intellectuale. Sed Deus est omnino prima natura: hoc intelligimus per ‘Deum’; ergo etc. [41] Item, primo intellectui correspondet primum obiectum; primum autem obiectum intellectus divini non potest esse aliquid supra se nec infra se. Probatio: quia si aliquid supra se, ergo illud est ens primum; ergo intellectus, quem tu ponis primum, non est primus. Nec N 50ra aliquid infra se, quia iam sua intellectio dependeret | ab aliquo alio; ergo est imperfecta; si imperfecta,28 ergo intellectus imperfectus; si imperfectus, ergo nec primus intellectus. Ergo cum Deus sit simpliciter primus intellectus, habebit suam actionem intellectivam infra se. Ergo impossibile est quod in ea intelligantur aliquae productiones nisi quae competunt naturae intellectivae ut intellectiva. [42] Item, quicquid convenit naturae ut natura est convenit ei quod est vere natura; sed nulli naturae convenit, ut patet in creaturis, aliqua operatio infra se ipsam nisi naturae intellectivae qua intellectiva, quae sunt velle et intelligere, ut patet IX Metaphysicae; ergo etc. Unde in nobis est emanatio intellectiva infra intellectum per hoc quod intellectus habet obiectum suum in se vel per aliquid sui. Unde res extra intellectum non est principium verbi nisi secundum quod intelligibilis et factibilis, unde cum intellectu in actu intelligendi. Unde ex hoc una intellectus cum intelligibili in actu intellectus reflectit se super suum actum, concipit in se conceptionem verbi. Unde secundum Augustinum, verbum est conceptus simillimus de re intellecta formatus, scilicet per actum intelligendi in quo, secundum Commentatorem, maior est identitas intellectus cum intelligibili quam materiae cum forma, quia spiritualior et intentionalior, respectu cuiuscumque scilicet actus quo formatur verbum. Secundum igitur quod res intellecta est idem intellectui, est causa verbi, quia identitatem; ita de voluntate respectu amoris.

[43: ~10] Ad rationes aliorum in contrarium. Ad primam, quod natura est sui communicativa, super hoc fundatur, non sic intellectus: dico quod communicat se natura non secundum quemcumque modum, sed 28. imperfecta] infacta N

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per talem modum, quia intellectiva, et ideo per modum intellectus et voluntatis. Unde est fallacia consequentis: ‘natura est sui communicativa, ergo per modum naturae’; non sequitur nisi quatenus intellectiva, quia hoc convenit ei quatenus intellectiva, non natura absolute, secundum actionem dico immanentem manens eadem numero. [44] Item, productiones personarum divinarum, de quibus communicatur natura, sunt quaedam relationes; natura autem ut natura numquam est communicativa sui per actus respecti[onis], sed magis absolutos; ergo ibi numquam est natura principiorum personarum in quantum intellectiva vel divina. [45] Item, videmus quod natura quae capitur tota in uno supposito, ut sole, luna, numquam est communicativa in alio vel altero; sed tota natura divina capitur a quolibet supposito; igitur communicatio convenit ei quatenus intellectiva. [46] Item, si natura ut natura esset principium personarum divinarum, cum philosophi deveniunt in cognitio naturae divinae et absolutorum, devenissent in cognitio personarum in Trinitate, quod falsum est. [47] Item, in creaturis natura communicabilis in diversis suppositis est abstrahibilis per intellectum; natura autem separata et divina, cum sit prima et simplicissima, non potest esse abstrahibilis per intellectum; ergo ut natura non est communicabilis, sed ut intellectiva. [48: ~11] Ad secundum, quod “principium illius est natura qua producens de necessitate producit” etc., dico quod ista necessitas immutabilitatis productionis non competit naturae ut natura est, quia natura ut natura non est prima causa, sed effectus, sed intellectiva; sed necessitas immutabilitatis productionis effectus competit naturae ratione limitationis sui gradus, quia non potest nisi unum producere. Sed vera actualitas immutabilitatis competit naturae ut intellectiva, et ideo ex eo quod est productio immutabilis, non limitatur, sed simpliciter prima; ideo est per modum intellectus et voluntatis. [49] Et quod dicunt de voluntate, patet quod arguunt de voluntate quae comparatur ad res non immutabiliter, saltem ex parte rei, etiam sicut voluntas. Sic autem nihil procedit in divinis. [50] Quod etiam addunt, quod agens per naturam agit se toto, non sic autem agens per voluntatem, verum est de agente per voluntatem quod comparatur ad id quod non vult voluntas immutabiliter. Sed quicquid est in divinis Deus vult voluntate immutabili, ideo non valet. Unde Pater toto suo intellectu producit Filium et uterque Spiritum Sanctum.

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[51: ~12] Ad tertium, “productionis quae est ab intellectu et voluntate ut sunt natura principium est natura,” quia reduplicatio cadit super formam quae est principium, ratio solvit se ipsam, quia voluntate ut natura, quia immutabili. Unde ratio immutabilis et sic naturae non excludit voluntatem esse principium. Sicut volo finem ultimum naturaliter et immutabiliter cum voluntate, unde voluntas libera et ut voluntas est respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, sic voluntas divina respectu creaturarum. Sed respectu sui actus intrinseci immutabilis rationem naturae induit. Plus etiam ratione naturae servatur in omni re. Et quia voluntas principium, ideo ut natura per modum naturae, non excludendo rationem voluntatis. [52: ~13] Ad quartum, “illud est principium naturalis productionis in quo productum assimilatur producenti,” solvitur communiter quod verum est de principio primo, non tamen immediate. Et ideo, licet natura sit primum radicale principium, non tamen immediatum, sed intellectiva. [53] Vel aliter dicendum quod argumentum bene procedit in creaturis in quibus natura differt ab intellectu, sed in divinis non, quia ibi non differt. Unde sicut ibi est assimilatio in natura, ita et in natura divina vel intellectiva. [54: ~14] Ad quintum, “illud est principium productionis virtute cuius fit productio” etc., dicendum quod in creaturis, ubi acquiritur aliquid diversum a natura ut propria passio, veritatem habet, sed in divinis non valet, quia ibi est omnimoda identitas, quia ipsemet intellectus est natura et e converso, similiter de voluntate. [55] Item, Filius non solum est Filius, sed verbum, non eo quod Filius habet naturam, quae tamen est intellectus, eo autem quod verN 50rb bum assimilatur intelligenti, ideo | quia intellectus est natura per identitatem; ideo etc. Et ideo dicit Petrus quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, quia capit totam voluntatem, capit naturam et omnia; et similiter de Filio respectu verbi.

[1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit proprium nomen personae in divinis. [2] [W: Dicendum quod sic.] Quadruplex ratio assignatur. Prima propter nominum penuriam. [W: Abundant enim magis nominibus ad generationem pertinentibus quam quae ad productionem Spiritus Sancti pertinent.]

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[3] Secunda propter communitatem huius personae, quia a duabus procedit tamquam communis, ideo nomen commune accepit. Nomen enim Spiritus Sancti cuilibet personae attribui potest, a proprietate autem Spiritui Sancto ratione iam dicta. [4] Tertia ratio, quia plures rationes unitatis attribuuntur Spiritui Sancto, quia et Spiritus Sanctus unus est quia relatione propria a Patre et Filio distinguitur, et est etiam ratio uniendi Patrem et Filium. Unde amor et nexus amborum29 dicitur. [5] Quarta, quia ‘Spiritus’ ab impulsu dicitur, ‘Sanctus’ vero dicit ordinem in finem, quod appropriatur tertiae personae, scilicet ducere et impellere nos ad finem ultimum et optimum.30 Unde et bonitas sibi appropriatur.

29. amborum W] om. T 30. ultimum et optimum W] om. T

[1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo.

[1] Circa XI distinctionem quaeritur utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo. [9] Videtur quod sic, quia quae habent repugnantiam ad invicem distinguuntur, dato quod unum ab alio non procedat; sed Filius et Spiritus Sanctus repugnantiam vel oppositionem habent ad invicem; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia de ratione Filii est quod non sit spiratus, quicquid enim Filio potest convenire communicatum est sibi a Patre; non autem communicatum est sibi quod sit spiratus; ergo esse spiratum non potest sibi convenire.

[2] Item, sicut se habent generare et spirare, sic generari et spirari; sed generare distinguitur realiter; ergo generari et spirari.

[9] Quod sic: quae habent oppositionem ad se invicem distinguuntur, dato quod unum ab alio non procedat; sed Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Minor detur, quia Filius de ratione sua habet quod non sit spiratus, quicquid enim potest communicari Filio sibi a Patre communicatum est; non autem quod sit spiratus; ergo esse spiratum sibi convenire non potest.

B: I Sent., d. 11, redactio mixta (W)

A: I Sent., d. 11, redactio 1 (T)

[2] Videtur quod sic, quia sicut se habet generare ad spirare, sic generari ad spirari; sed generare et spirare distinguuntur re; ergo generari et spirari

[1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio, dato quod non procederet ab eo.

C: I Sent., d. 11, redactio 2 (GKLMNPV)

[2] Et videtur quod sic, quoniam sicut se habet generare ad spirare, sic generari ad spirari; sed generare et spirare distinguuntur realiter; ergo simili-

[1] Circa distinctionem XI quaeritur utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio, dato quod non procederet ab eo.

D: I Sent., d. 11, additiones (A)

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[5] \Solutio/ Tria videnda sunt, primo positio quae reputatur vera.

[10] Item, sicut se habet innascibilitas ad generare, sic inspirabilitas ad spirare; sed si Patri non attribueretur generare, adhuc distingueretur a Filio, secundum intellectum, quia innascibilis; ergo, dato quod Filius non spiraret, adhuc distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto, quia inspirabilis est. [4] Contra: Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti: In divinis personae tres per omnia idem sunt ubi relationis oppositio non distinguit; [T 40va] sed Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non distinguuntur per oppositas relationes nisi Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio; ergo idem sunt.

Si sic, ergo Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, qui per illa constituuntur. [10] Item, sicut se habet innascibilitas ad generare, sic inspirabilitas ad spirare; sed si Patri non attribueret generare, adhuc distingueretur a Filio; quare dato quod Filius non spiraret, adhuc distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto, quia inspirabilis. [4] Contra: Anselmus, De processione [W 23vb] Spiritus Sancti: “In divinis sunt tres personae penitus idem ubi relationis oppositio non distinguit”; sed Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non distinguerent per relationes oppositas nisi Spiritus Sanctus procederet ab eo; ergo essent idem. [5] Respondeo. Tria sunt hic videnda: primo opinio minus vera; secundo verior; tertio solutiones rationum primae opinionis; quarto (!) rationes principales. [5] Respondeo. Hic sunt tria videnda: primo opinio minus vera, quae ponit Spiritum Sanctum distingui personaliter a Filio, dato quod non procederet ab eo; secundo opinio opposita et verior; et tertio solventur rationes primae opinionis.

[4] Contra. Anselmus, sicut in alio quaterno.

[4] Contra. Dicit Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti: “In divinis personae tres per omnia sunt idem ubi relationis oppositio non distinguit”; sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non distingueretur ab eo per oppositas relationes; ergo etc. [5] Tria sunt videnda: primo opinio minus vera, secundo opinio verior, tertio solutio rationum primae opinionis.

ter generari et spirari. Si sic, ergo Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, qui per ista constituuntur. [3] Secundo sic, quia ab eo a quo aliquid habet esse, habet esse distinctum, ergo Spiritus Sanctus, qui in se est distinctus, a Filio distinguitur dato quod non procederet ab eo.

distinguuntur re, et per consequens Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, qui per ista constituuntur. [3] Item, a quo aliquid habet esse, habet esse distinctum; sed dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, adhuc procedere posset a Patre et sic haberet esse; ergo et esse distinctum a Filio, ergo etc.

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[6] Pro prima opinione adducuntur rationes.

[6] Dicunt enim quidam quod Filius distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto etiam si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet ab eo. Et hoc probant tripliciter. [I] Primo sic: ubicumque est reperire duas causas per se sufficientes alicuius effectus, ablata una causa, adhuc remanet effectus ut est ab altera; sed duplex causa potest assignari productionis distinctae Spiritus Sancti: una quia Filius a Patre, Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, alia quia Filius per modum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis; ergo, ablata prima, scilicet quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a Filio, adhuc remanet secunda, scilicet quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio quia Filius per modum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis.

[7] Prima est: ab eodem aliquid habet esse personale et distinctum; sed per filiationem Filius habet esse personale, per spirationem Spiritus Sanctus; ergo per illud distinguitur. Maior patet, quia per illud quod Sortes est in se est distinctus ab omni alio. Minor detur, quia filiatio et spiratio sunt proprietates personales constituentes personas et Spiritus Sancti; ergo etc.



[6] Prima opinio dicit quod Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur personaliter a Filio, dato quod non procederet ab eo. Quod probant sex rationibus. [7] Primo sic: per idem constituitur aliquid in esse personali et distinguitur ab omni alia persona eiusdem naturae; sed Filius constituitur in esse personali per filiationem, quam haberet dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet ab eo; ergo per filiationem distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto. Maior patet, quia per idem Sortes est in se et distinguitur a Platone. Minor, quia Filius constituitur in esse personali per filiationem, sicut Spiritus Sanctus per spirationem passivam.

[7] Prima est: per idem constituitur aliquid in esse personali et distinguitur ab omni alia persona eiusdem naturae; sed Filius constituitur in esse personali per filiationem, quam haberet esto quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet ab eo; ergo per filiationem distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto. Maior patet, quia per illud idem Sortes est in se et distinguitur a Platone et ab omni alio. Minor declaratur, quia Filius constituitur in esse personali per filiationem et Spiritus Sanctus per spirationem passivam; ergo etc.

[6] Prima opinio probatur sex rationibus.

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[8] Secundo sic: ubi rationes productionum sunt distinctae, oportet producentia esse distincta; sed in divinis productiones Filii et Spiritus Sancti distinctae; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia emanationes distinctae realiter debent habere distinctos terminos. Minor detur, quia generare et spirare distinguuntur realiter.

1. patet P] s.l. K; om. AGLMNVW 2. patet GP] declaratur A; s.l. K; om. LMNV; detur W 3. patet G] declaratur A; om. KLMNPV; detur W 4. ergo etc. NVW] om. GKLMP

[8] \Secunda ratio/ Secundo, quia distinctae emanationes realiter debent habere distinctos terminos realiter, quia \emanatio/ realis ad terminum realem ordinatur; sed quamvis Spiritus Sanctus a Filio non procedat, tamen generare et spirare sunt distinctae emanationes realiter. Sicut enim in absolutis aliqua distinguuntur quia opposita, \sicut albedo et nigredo, aliqua quia disparata, ut albedo et dulcedo, sic in relativis aliqua distinguuntur quia opponuntur, ut/ generare et generari, aliqua quia disparata, generare et spirare. Item, si generare et spirare non sunt diversa realiter, eodem modo nec generari et spirari, per quae tamen constituuntur supposita Filii et Spiritus Sancti, ergo termini istarum emanationum sunt distincta realiter, licet unum non procedat ab alio.

[8] Secundo sic: quae habent emanationes distinctas et incompossibiles eo ipso sunt sufficienter distincta; Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet,1 quia distinctae emanationes realiter debent habere distinctos terminos realiter. Minor patet,2 quia dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a Filio, adhuc potest Filius esse a Patre per modum intellectus vel naturae, et Spiritus Sanctus ab eodem per modum voluntatis vel amoris; istae autem emanationes sunt incompossibiles; ergo etc. [9] Tertio sic: quae habent oppositionem et repugnantiam distinguuntur ab invicem, dato quod unum non procedat ab alio; sed sic est hic; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia omnis distinctio est per oppositionem aliquam. Minor patet,3 quia Filius habet esse non spiratum, Spiritus Sanctus esse spiratum, ergo etc.4 [9] Tertio sic: quae habent oppositionem et repugnantiam distinguuntur ad invicem, dato quod unum non procedat ab alio; sed Filius et Spiritus Sanctus habent repugnantiam, dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia omnis distinctio est per oppositionem aliquam. Minor declaratur, quia Filius habet esse

[8] Secundo sic: quae habent emanationes distinctas et incompossibiles eo ipso sunt distincta sufficienter; Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia distinctae emanationes realiter debent habere distinctos terminos realiter. Minor declaratur, quia dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a Filio, adhuc potest esse Filius a Patre per modum intellectus vel naturae, et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis vel amoris; et istae emanationes sunt incompossibiles; ergo etc.

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5. spiraret AV] spiret GKLMNP

[7] \Tertia ratio/ Tertio, quia per idem aliquid est tale in se et distinctum a quocumque alio, sicut per id quod Sortes est in se est distinctus a quocumque alio; sed Filius est id quod est per filiationem, quia filiatio est proprietas personalis constituens personam Filii; ergo per filiationem distinguitur Filius non solum a Patre, sed etiam a Spiritu Sancto, dato etiam quod non procedat ab eo.

[11] Item, ab eo in quo est omnipotentia non existente in eo opposita relatio, produci potest quodcumque; ;

[10] Quarto sic: sicut se habet innascibilitas ad generare, sic inspirabilitas ad spirare; sed si a Patre removeretur generare, adhuc distingueretur a Filio, quia Pater est innascibilis, Filius autem non; ergo dato quod Filius, qui est inspirabilis, non spiraret5 Spiritum Sanctum, adhuc distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto, qui est spirabilis. [11] Quinto sic: quod habet omnem potentiam productivam, nec habet respectum oppositum, potest omnia illius generis producere; sed Pater

inpirabile vel non spiratum, Spiritus Sanctus esse spiratum. Quod autem Filius habeat esse non spiratum probatur, quia quicquid potest Filio communicari a Patre totum sibi communicatum est; non est autem communicatum sibi quod sit spiratus, sed quod sit genitus; ergo non potest sibi communicare. Filius ergo est non spiratus et Spiritus Sanctus spiratus, quare etc. [10] Quarta ratio est: sicut se habet innascibilitas ad generare, sic inspirabilitas ad spirare; sed si a Patre amoveretur generare, adhuc distingueretur a Filio, quia Pater est innascibilis, Filius autem non; ergo dato quod Filius non spiraret Spiritum Sanctum, adhuc distingueretur Filius, qui est inspirabilis, a Spiritu Sancto, qui est spirabilis, ergo etc. [11] Quinto sic: quod habet omnem potentiam productivam, nec habet respectum oppositum, potest omnia illius generis producere; sed Pater habet

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[12] Item, prius potest absolvi a posteriori; sed Pater prius producit Spiritum Sanctum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi quam Filius; ergo Filius potest absolvi Spiritus Sancti, ita quod Pater spirabit Spiritum Sanctum non concurrente

ergo etc. Minor patet, quia in Filio, quamvis sit omnipotentia, tamen Patrem producere non potest, quia in eo existit relatio opposita paternitati, scilicet filiatio. Minor detur, quia in Patre est omnipotentia, secundum Athanasium, nec in eo est opposita relatio, quia nec filiatio nec spiratio passive; ergo etc.

habet omnem potentiam productivam, nec habet relationem oppositam productioni Spiritus Sancti; ergo potest Spiritum Sanctum absque Filio producere, et sic distingueretur Filius a Spiritu Sancto, licet non procedat a Filio. Maior patet, quia licet Filius sit omnipotens, tamen non potest Patrem generare, quia habet respectum oppositum generationi, scilicet filiationem. Minor patet, scilicet quod in Patre sit omnipotentia, quia “omnipotens Pater,” dicit Athanasius in Symbolo. Item, non est in eo opposita relatio, quia non habet spirationem passivam, quae est opposita spirationi activae Spiritus Sancti, ergo etc. [12] Sexto sic: prius potest absolvi secundum nostrum modum intelligendi a posteriori; sed secundum nostrum modum intelligendi prius producit Pater Spiritum Sanctum quam Filius; ergo dato quod Filius non producat Spiritum Sanctum, adhuc Pater [12] Sexto sic: prius potest absolvi secundum nostrum modum intelligendi a posteriori; sed secundum nostrum modum intelligendi prius producit Pater Spiritum Sanctum quam Filius; ergo dato quod Filius non producat, adhuc Pater poterit producere, ita quod Pater

omnem potentiam, nec habet relationem oppositam respectu Spiritus Sancti; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia Filius, etsi sit in eo omnipotentia sicut in Patre, tamen non potest Patrem generare vel producere, quia habet relationem oppositam paternitati, scilicet filiationem. Minor declaratur, quia in Patre sit omnipotentia: “Omnipotens Pater,” dicit Athanasius. Item, non est in eo opposita relatio, quia nec filiatio nec spiratio passiva; ergo etc.

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[14] Sed unum dubium est hic, scilicet quomodo potest esse quod generari et spirari, secundum eos, constituunt diversa supposita, et tamen generare et spirare non.

[13] \Anselmus/ Hoc est quod videtur dicere Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, dicens: “Si non esset alia causa nisi quia Filius procedit nascendo, Spiritus Sanctus spirando, adhuc essent plures Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.”

[I] Item, ubicumque est reperire duas causas per se sufficientes alicuius effectus, ablata una, adhuc remanet alia et effectus; sed duplex causa potest assignari distinctae productionis Spiritus Sancti, una quia a Patre et Filio, Filius tantum a Patre; alia quia Filius per modum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis; ergo ablato quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a Filio, adhuc remanet, quia Spiritus Sanctus distinguatur a Filio, quia Filius per modum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis. [14] Sed unum dubium est hic, scilicet quod generari et spirari constituunt diversa supposita, secundum eos, et generare et spirare .

actione Filii. Et sic Spiritus Sanctus erit distincte productus sine Filio, et per consequens distinctus a Filio absque hoc quod ipsum spiret.

[14] Sed unum dubium est contra eos, scilicet quomodo potest esse quod generari et spirari secundum eos constituunt diversa supposita, scilicet Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, et

[13] Adducunt ad hoc auctoritatem Anselmi, dicentis in libro De processione Spiritus Sancti, quod “si non esset alia causa nisi quia Filius procedit nascendo et Spiritus Sanctus spirando, adhuc Filius et Spiritus Sanctus essent plures.”

poterit ipsum producere vel spirare distinctum a Filio, ergo etc.

spirabit Spiritum Sanctum non concurrente actione Filii. Et sic Spiritus Sanctus erit distincte productus a Patre sine Filio, et per consequens erit distinctus a Filio, dato quod ipsum non producat vel spiret. [13] Adducunt ad hoc auctoritatem Anselmi sicut in alio quaterno. Et movetur dubium sicut in alio quaterno per totum.

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[15] Ideo ipsi dicunt quod oportet maiorem distinctionem esse in principiato quam in principio. Unde in eodem supposito [W 24ra] possunt esse principia respectu diversorum principiatorum, sicut idem homo per naturam potest esse principium filii et alicuius artificiati, ut domus.

[16] Alia opinio dicit quod Spiritus Sanctus non distingueretur a Filio nisi procederet ab eo. Ponuntur tres rationes. Prima sumitur ex parte intellectus et voluntatis sic: in communicatione eiusdem naturae distinguuntur personae divinae per rationes oppositas; sed hoc non potest esse in Filio et Spiritu Sancto nisi Spiritus Sanc-

[15] Ipsi dicunt quod oportet maiorem esse distinctionem in principiato quam in principio. Unde in eodem supposito possunt esse diversa principia respectu diversorum et distinctorum principiatorum, sicut idem homo numero et est principium filii per naturam et alicuius artificiati per artem, puta domus.

[16] \Vera opinio/ Alii dicunt contrarium, quod Spiritus Sanctus non distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab ipso. Et hoc declaratur tripliciter.

[16] Secunda opinio dicit quod Spiritus Sanctus non distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo. Quod probant tripliciter, primo ex parte intellectus et voluntatis sic: secundum Boethium, tota distinctio personalis in divinis est per relationes originis; sed distinctio originis non posset esse inter Filium et Spiritum

tamen generare et spirare sunt in eodem, scilicet in Patre. [15] Ipsi respondent quod oportet maiorem esse distinctionem in principiato quam in principio, et ideo idem homo est principium filii per naturam et artefacti, ut domus, per artem. Et ideo Pater idem existens potest duo, scilicet Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, producere distinctos per generari et spirari, licet in eo non distinguantur generare et spirare. Hoc est primum.

[16] Secunda opinio est quae est opposita. Ponit enim quod si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non distingueretur ab eo. Et adducunt ad hoc tres rationes. Prima sumitur ex parte intellectus et voluntatis sic: sicut dicit Boethius, tota distinctio personalis in divinis est per relationes originis; sed haec distinctio non posset esse in Filio et Spiritu

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[18] Alio modo quia natura communicatur immediate uni et alteri mediate, ut avus communicat suam naturam immediate patri et filio mediante patre. Et

[17] Prima via sumitur ex parte intellectus et voluntatis sic: in communicatione eiusdem naturae non possunt fundari distinctae relationes realiter nisi altero trium modorum: uno modo quando relationes sunt directe oppositae, puta natura in uno est ut communicans, in altero ut communicata, quo modo scilicet Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio – habeo propositum.

[17] Minor detur. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod non possumus intelligere naturam communicari nisi altero trium modorum: vel quod communicatur uni ab uno tantum, et hoc non potest esse Spiritus Sanctus a Patre. Et Pater etiam naturam Filio, nec Spiritus Sanctus a Patre, quia tunc esset communicatio pluribus ab uno. Restat ergo Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Filio, et tunc per illud membrum Spiritus Sanctus procedet a Filio. [18] Item, si communicatur pluribus natura ab uno tantum, secundum quandam naturam, sicut avus patri et filio communicat, ita quod Pater commu-

tus procederet ab eo; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia personae divinae distinguuntur per relationes originis quae directe opponuntur.

[18] Secundo, quia communicatur uni a pluribus secundum quendam ordinem, videlicet uni immediate, alii mediate, ut avus primo com-

[17] Probatio minoris. Ad cuius evidentiam notandum quod, si est distinctio in divinis per communicationem naturae divinae, oportet quod hoc sit altero trium modorum: vel quia natura communicatur uni ab uno, vel uni a pluribus, vel pluribus ab uno. Uni ab uno ut Filio a Patre, et si sic communicaretur natura divina Spiritui Sancto a Filio, tunc procederet ab eo, et sic haberem intentum.

Sanctum nisi Spiritus Sanctus procederet a Filio; ergo etc.

[18] Secundo, quia communicatur uni a pluribus ut in creaturis secundum ordinem, ut in creaturis communicatur natura filio alicui a

Sancto nisi Spiritus Sanctus procederet a Filio, ut probabo; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia in communicatione eiusdem naturae, personae divinae non distinguuntur nisi per relationes oppositas, ut paternitas et filiatio, spiratio activa et passiva, quae directe opponuntur. [17] Minor declaratur. Ad cuius evidentiam nota quod, si est distinctio in divinis per communicationem naturae, oportet quod hoc sit vel quia uni ab uno, vel uni a pluribus, vel pluribus ab uno. Non enim possumus intelligere naturam communicari nisi altero istorum trium modorum. Primo, uni ab uno sicut Filio a Patre, et si sic communicaretur natura divina a Filio Spiritui Sancto, tunc distingueretur, quia procederet ab eo.

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[19] Si communicetur ab uno pluribus immediate, hoc non potest esse secundum eundem modum nisi ponendo quod possent esse plures filii in divinis, quod falsum est. Ergo secundum alium et alium modum communicatur natura ab uno pluribus et uni per modum intellectus, alii per modum voluntatis, puta Spiritui Sancto. Et hunc modum forte concederent illi de prima opinione.

[19] Tertio, quia una et eadem natura diversis viis vel modis communicatur, ut natura humana communicata est Adam per voluntatem divinam et Abel per generationem humanam, et ideo alia relatione refertur Abel ad [40vb] Adam et Adam ad Deum. Et hoc modo dicis quod natura divina communicata est Filio per modum intellectus, Spiritui Sancto per modum voluntatis, et ideo alia refertur Filius relatione a Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum, ex quo etiam sequitur quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguatur a Filio. [20] \Nota/ Ostendo quod hoc non sufficit, quia non maiorem convenientiam habent intellectus et voluntas in Patre

[20] Sed hoc non sufficit, quoniam intellectus et voluntas non sunt magis distincta in Patre quam in Filio et Spiritu

nicet Filio naturam et Filius Spiritui Sancto, habeo propositum, scilicet quod Spiritus Sanctus procedet ab eo.

ideo alia relatione refertur filius ad patrem et ad avum – et hoc etiam modo habeo propositum. Sic enim dicam quod Spiritus Sanctus immediate procedit a Filio et a Patre mediate.

[20] Sed hoc est falsum, quia intellectus et voluntas non sunt magis distincta in Patre quam in Filio et Spiritu Sancto, quia

municat naturam suam patri meo et deinde pater meus mihi. Et si sic natura divina communicaretur duobus a Patre, scilicet Filio immediate et Spiritui Sancto mediante Filio, haberem propositum quod Spiritus Sanctus procederet a Filio. [19] Tertio communicari potest natura pluribus ab uno immediate, ut Filio et Spiritui Sancto immediate a Patre. Et tunc vel erunt duo filii in divinis, quod non ponitur, vel oportet quod distinctio eorum accipiatur a modo procedendi secundum intellectum et voluntatem, ita quod Filius procedat per modum intellectus vel naturae et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis.

[20] Sed hoc non valet, quoniam intellectus et voluntas non sunt magis distincta in Patre etc. sicut in alio quaterno. Patet ergo

[19] Tertio modo ita quod pluribus ab uno immediate, ut Filio et Spiritui Sancto immediate a Patre. Et tunc, si non debent esse duo filii, \quod non ponitur in divinis/, oportet quod distinctio eorum accipiatur a modo, scilicet intellectus (vel naturae) vel voluntatis, [A 14vb] ita quod Filius procedat per modum intellectus vel naturae, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis. Et hunc modum forte concederent illi de prima opinione.

diversis, ut ab avo primo, a patre immediate. Si sic communicaretur duobus natura divina, scilicet Filio a Patre et Spiritui Sancto a Filio, adhuc Spiritus Sanctus procederet ab eo, et per consequens distingueretur.

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quam in Filio et Spiritu Sancto, quia utrobique differunt solum secundum rationem attributalem; sed habere se per modum intellectus et habere se per modum voluntatis non facit distinctionem suppositorum in Patre. Unde generare et spirare in Patre, quae sunt principia processionum per modum intellectus et voluntatis, non distinguunt Patrem in duo supposita; ergo eodem modo procedere per modum intellectus in Filio et per modum voluntatis in Spiritu Sancto, puta generari et spirari, non distinguunt sufficienter supposita Filii et Spiritus Sancti in duo supposita. Ad distinctionem ergo Filii et Spiritus Sancti requiritur habitudo relativa quae est per hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio; ergo etc. [21] \Secunda/ Secunda via sumitur ex parte relationum, quia supposita divina distinguuntur per relationes.

[21] Secunda via sumitur ex parte relationum sic: in divinis personae distinguuntur per relationes oppositas; sed hoc supponit Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Filio; ergo etc.

Sancto, quia utrobique differunt secundum rationem attributalem, sed habere in se per modum voluntatis et intellectus non facit distinctionem suppositorum in Patre. Unde generare et spirare, quae sunt processiones per modum intellectus et voluntatis, non distinguit Patrem in duo supposita; ergo eodem modo procedere per modum intellectus in Filio et per modum voluntatis in Spiritu Sancto, puta generari et spirari, non distinguit sufficienter suppositum Filii et suppositum Spiritus Sancti. Requiritur ergo habitudo relativa qua Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio.

utrobique differunt solum secundum rationem attributalem; sed habere se per modum intellectus et habere se per modum voluntatis non facit distinctionem suppositorum in Patre, unde generare et spirare, quae sunt principia processionum per modum intellectus et voluntatis, non distinguunt Patrem in duo supposita; ergo eodem modo procedere per modum intellectus in Filio et per modum voluntatis in Spiritu Sancto, puta generari et spirari, non distinguunt sufficienter suppositum Filii a supposito Spiritus Sancti. Ad distinctionem ergo Spiritus Sancti a Filio requiritur habitudo relativa, quae est per hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio, ergo etc. [21] Secundo ex parte relationum sic: personae divinae distinguuntur relationibus secundum distinctionem proprii generis; sed Spiritus Sanctus non potest distingui a Filio per [21] Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte relationum sic: personae divinae distinguuntur relationibus secundum distinctionem proprii generis; sed Spiritus Sanctus non potest distingui a

quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio quia procedit ab eo; ergo etc.

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[22] Minor detur, quia relationem distinguere in divinis supposita potest intelligi dupliciter, vel ratione sui generis vel ratione sui fundamenti.

6. etiam patet P] patet G; s.l. K; om. LMNPV

[22] Et arguitur sic: una relatio non distinguitur ab alia nisi vel secundum rationem sui generis vel ratione fundamenti. Si primo accipiatur distinctio relationum in divinis ad constituendum supposita, habeo propositum, quia relatio secundum rationem sui generis, cum non dicat nisi ordinem ad aliud, non distinguit nisi a directe

Maior patet, quia in divinis sunt quaedam relationes disparatae, ut generare-spirare, quae constituunt supposita diversa, sicut patet in Patre, qui utramque habet; aliae sunt relationes directe oppositae, quae constituunt diversa supposita, sicut generari et generare, spirare et spirari. [W 24rb]

[22] Maior etiam patet,6 quia una relatio non distinguitur ab alia nisi secundum rationem sui generis vel ratione fundamenti. Si primo modo accipiatur distinctio relationum in divinis ad constituendum supposita, habeo propositum, quia relatio secundum rationem sui generis, cum non dicat nisi ordinem ad aliud, non distin-

relationem secundum proprium genus nisi procedat ab eo; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia in divinis sunt quaedam relationes disparatae, sicut generare et spirare, quae scilicet non constituunt diversa supposita, quia possunt esse in eodem, ut in Patre, et ideo per istas non distinguuntur personae divinae secundum distinctionem proprii generis, sed per illas quae sunt directe oppositae, ut generare–generari, spirare–spirari.

Filio per relationem secundum proprium genus nisi procedat ab eo; quare etc. Maior patet, quia in divinis sunt quaedam relationes disparatae, sicut sunt generare et spirare, quae non constituunt diversa supposita, sicut generari et generare, quae sunt relationes oppositae secundum proprium genus, quia ut sic relatio non est nisi ad aliud, et ideo ut sic non distinguit nisi a proprio correlativo. Et istae relationes constituunt diversa supposita, non primae, quia possunt esse in eodem supposito, sicut in Patre est generare et spirare. [22] Minor declaratur, quoniam relationem distinguere supposita in divinis potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ratione sui generis, alio modo ratione sui fundamenti.

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7. forte NTV] om. GKLMP 8. relatione MNT] ratione GKLPV

[23] Alio modo distinguitur una relatio ab alia ratione fundamenti. Quod contingit dupliciter: uno modo quando relationes habent diversa fundamenta, ut similitudo et aequalitas, in creaturis saltem. Et hoc modo non accipitur in divinis distinctio relationum ad constituenda supposita, quia essentia est unicum fundamentum. Alio modo quando fundamentum est unum, sed habet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta, ut super unam quantitatem prout habet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta fundatur relatio aequalitatis et inaequalitatis, ut etiam forte Sortes generatus alia relatione refertur a patrem et alia ad solem vel ad Deum. Et hoc modo non potest dici quod

\opposito/.Oppositio in divinis accipitur secundum originem, ut dictum est supra. Unde secundum hoc oportet quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio, si distinguitur ab eo.

[23] Non ratione fundamenti, quia vel hoc quia diversa fundamenta responderent diversis relationibus, quod non est in divinis, quia omnium relationum est unum fundamentum, tamen haberet habitudinem ad diversa, ut super unam quantitatem ut habet habitudinem ad diversa fundamenta ratione aequalitatis et inaequalitatis. Sic non possunt relationes constituentes personas Filii et Spiritus Sancti, quia tunc oporteret quod divina essentia per huiusmodi relationes haberet habitudinem ad diversa, quod falsum est, quia per generari et spirari, secundum eos, non habet essentia divina relationes nisi ad Patrem qui a se non est distinctus.

guit nisi a directe opposito. Quae oppositio accipitur in divinis secundum originem, ut dictum est supra. Unde secundum hoc oportet quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio, si debeat distingui sic ab eo. [23] Alio modo distinguitur una relatio ab alia ratione fundamenti, quod contingit dupliciter, uno modo quando relationes habent diversa fundamenta, ut similitudo et aequalitas, in creaturis saltem. Et sic non accipitur in divinis distinctio relationum ad constituendum supposita, quia essentia est unicum fundamentum. Alio modo quando fundamentum est unum, sed habet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta, ut super unam quantitatem prout habet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta fundatur relatio aequalitatis et inaequalitatis, sicut etiam forte7 Sortes generans alia ratione8 refertur ad patrem et alia ad solem vel ad Deum. Et [23] Modo ratione fundamenti non possunt distingui supposita in divinis, quoniam hoc potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo sic quod diversis relationibus responderent diversa fundamenta, quod non potest esse in divinis, quoniam omnibus relationibus divinis respondet unum et idem fundamentum, scilicet essentia divina, quae est simplicissima. Alio modo sic quod, licet fundamentum sit unum, habet tamen relationem ad distinctos terminos, ut aequalitas et inaequalitas in eodem ligno habet idem fundamentum, scilicet quantitatem, quae habet comparationem ad lignum aequale, et sic relatio aequalitatis, vel maius vel minus, et sic relatio inaequalitatis, et eadem

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distinguantur relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti, quia oporteret quod essentia divina per huiusmodi relationes haberet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta, quod falsum est, quia per generari et spirari, etiam secundum eos, non habet essentia divina habitudinem nisi ad Patrem. Oportet ergo dicere quod huiusmodi relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti distinguantur secundum rationem sui generis. Ex quo habetur propositum, ut visum est.

hoc modo non potest dici quod distinguantur relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti, quia oporteret quod essentia divina per huiusmodi relationes haberet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta, quod falsum est, quia per generari et spirari, etiam secundum eos, non habet essentia divina habitudinem nisi ad Patrem. Oportet ergo dicere quod huiusmodi relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti distinguantur secundum rationem sui generis, quae erat maior. Et sic habetur propositum, ut visum est.

albedine aliquis est similis albo et dissimilis nigro. Et sic diversae relationes possunt esse in eodem fundamento propter diversos respectus quos potest habere ad distinctos terminos, immo plus, eadem res ut est a diversis agentibus diversarum rationum adhuc habet relationes diversas propter diversum modum agendi sive producendi, ut asinus alia relatione reali refertur ad asinum et alia ad solem, II Physicorum. Sic autem non possunt distingui relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti, dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio, quia tunc oportet quod essentia divina per huiusmodi relationes haberet habitudinem ad diversa et distincta, quod falsum est, quia per generari et spirari, etiam secundum eos, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non habet habitudinem nisi ad unum, scilicet ad Patrem, \qui esset generans et spirans/, quod non est a se ipso distinctum.

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[II] Vel si des unum fundamentum in quo fundentur diversae relationes, dico quod per hoc non habes intentum, quoniam illae relationes non constituent diversa supposita. Cuius ratio est quia non plus differrent quam earum termini, scilicet generare et spirare, quae non constituunt diversa supposita, licet sic realiter differant. Oportet igitur redire ad primum, scilicet quod huiusmodi relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti distinguunt secundum rationem sui generis. Et tunc habeo propositum, quoniam, cum relatio secundum suum esse non dicat nisi ad aliud, non distinguit nisi a ratione directe opposita. Unde secundum hoc oportet quod aliquid procedat a Filio, si debeat distingui ab eo.

[II] Vel sic: des unum fundamentum in quo fundentur diversae relationes. Dico quod per hoc non habes intentum, quoniam illae diversae relationes non constituerent diversa supposita. Cuius probatio est quia ex illa diversa operatione non habetur maior distinctio vel differentia inter se, scilicet generari et spirari, in Filio et Spiritu Sancto quam sit inter generare et spirare, quae non constituunt diversa supposita, sed sunt in Patre, licet differant realiter, non suppositorum persona. Non enim Pater est duplex persona quia generans et spirans. Ergo similiter nec generari et spirari [non] constituent diversa supposita, licet differant realiter. Ergo oportet redire ad primum, quod huiusmodi scilicet relationes constituentes personam Filii et Spiritus Sancti distinguantur secundum relationem sui generis et rem: Spiritus Sanctus distinguetur a Filio sicut spiratum a spirante, quoniam, cum relatio secundum suum ge-

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[24] \Tertia/ Tertia via sumitur ex distinctione generationis et processionis sic: illud quod supponit distinctionem Filii et Spiritus Sancti per relationes oppositas non est per se causa sufficiens distinctionis Filii et Spiritus Sancti, quia nihil supponit illud cuius est causa; sed generari et spirari supponunt distinctionem Filii et Spiritus Sancti per relationes oppositas; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: in divinis aliqua dicuntur directe opposita, ut generare et generari, spirare et spirari, aliqua indirecte, quando scilicet duo stant simul, sed distinguuntur realiter, quia unum potest stare com opposito alterius, ut generare et spirare simul stant in Patre et distinguuntur realiter ut indirecte opposita, quia spirare stat cum opposito huius quod est generare, scilicet cum generari in Filio. Et idem dic de genera-

[24] Tertia ratio sumitur ex parte processionis sic: illud quod supponit distinctionem Filii et Spiritus Sancti non est causa sufficiens distinctionis eorum, quia nihil supponit illud cuius est causa; sed generari et spirari praesupponunt distinctionem Spiritus Sancti per relationes oppositas; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: aliqua dicuntur in divinis opposita directe, ut generare–generari, spirare–spirari, alia indirecte, scilicet quando duo stant simul, sed [W 24va] distinguuntur realiter, quia unum potest stare cum opposito alterius, ut generare–spirare stant simul et distinguuntur ut \in/directe opposita, quia spirare stat cum opposito eius quod est generare, scilicet generari. In eodem ergo modo generari et spirari distinguuntur rea-

[24] Tertio ex distinctione generationis et processionis sic: illud quod supponit distinctionem Filii et Spiritus Sancti per relationes oppositas non est per se causa sufficiens distinctionis Filii a Spiritu Sancto, quia nihil supponit illud cuius est causa; sed generari et spirari supponunt distinctionem Filii et Spiritus Sancti per relationes oppositas; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia in divinis aliqua dicuntur directe opposita ut generare et generari, spirare et spirari, aliqua indirecte, quando scilicet duo stant simul sed distinguuntur realiter, quia unum potest stare cum opposito alterius, ut generare et spirare simul stant in Patre et distinguuntur realiter ut indirecte opposita, quia spirare stat cum opposito huius quod est generare, scilicet cum generari

nus non dicat nisi ordinem ad aliud solum, non distinguit nisi a directe opposito, puta a directe opposita relatione, quare etc. [24] Tertia ratio sumitur ex distinctione generationis et processionis, et vide deductionem in alio quaterno.

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[25] Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti: “Spiritus distinguitur a Filio, quia respectu eius est Deus de Deo.” Unde secundum ipsum: “Essentia in Patre communicat, non communicatur; in Filio communicat et communicatur; in Spiritu Sancto communicatur et non communicat.” Item: “Pater est a quo ambo, Spiritus Sanctus qui ab ambobus, Filius qui ab uno a quo alter.”

[25] Hoc autem est quod dicit Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti: “Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio quia respectu eius est Deus de Deo.” Unde secundum ipsum ibidem: “In Patre essentia communicat, non communicatur; in Filio communicat et communicatur; in Spiritu Sancto non communicat, sed communicatur.” Item: “Pater a quo ambo, Spiritus Sanctus qui ab ambobus, Filius qui ab uno et a quo alter.”

9. dic GKPT] dico MN; dicit NV

liter, quia generari stat cum opposito huius quod est spirari, quia cum spirare. Distinctio ergo quae est inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum per generari et supponit distinctionem eorum per spirare et spirari, quae sunt relationes directe oppositae.

ri et spirare in Filio. Ergo eodem modo generari et spirari propter hoc distinguuntur realiter quia generari stat cum opposito huius quod est spirari, videlicet spirare. Distinctio ergo quae est inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum per generari et spirari supponit [T 41ra] distinctionem inter eos per spirare et spirari, quae sunt relationes oppositae.

in Filio. Et idem dic9 de generari et spirare in Filio. Ergo eodem modo generari et spirari propter hoc distinguuntur realiter, quia generari stat cum opposito huius quod est spirari, videlicet cum spirare. Distinctio ergo quae est inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum per generari et spirari supponit distinctionem inter eos per spirare et spirari, quae sunt relationes oppositae. [25] Hoc autem idem dicit Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti, dicens: “Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio quia respectu eius est Deus de Deo.” Unde secundum ipsum ibidem: “In Patre essentia communicat, non communicatur, in Filio communicatur et communicat, in Spiritu Sancto communicatur et non communicat.” Item, “Pater est a quo ambo, Spiritus Sanctus qui ab ambobus, Filius vero qui ab alio et a quo alter.” [25] Item, ibidem auctoritatem Anselmi quae concludit pro opinione ista.

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[26: ~7] \Tertium principale/ Tertio solvendae sunt rationes opinionis primae. Unde ad primam dicendum quod secunda causa quam assignant, quod Filius procedat per modum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis, non est sufficiens, ut visum est.

[26: ~7] Tertio solvendae sunt rationes istius opinionis. Ad primam, cum dicitur, “per idem habet aliquid esse personale est esse distinctum,” solvunt quidam quod maior non est omnino vera, quoniam aliquid distinguitur per sua accidentia, per quae non habet esse simpliciter. [27: ~26] Sed haec solutio non sufficit, quia dato quod per accidentia sua aliquod suppositum habeat distingui, circumscribamus per intellectum accidentia illa, adhuc verum erit dicere quod per illud per quod unumquodque constituitur in esse, per illud habet distingui, licet per alia possit.

[28] Ideo dicunt alii quod persona divina non constituitur in esse personali per unicam relationem.

[26: ~7] Tertio solvendae sunt rationes alterius opinionis. Ad primum, cum dicitur “per idem constituitur aliquid in esse personali et distinguitur a quolibet alio,” dicunt aliqui quod non, quia aliquid distinguitur per sua accidentia, per quae tamen non constituitur in esse personali. [27: ~26] Sed ista solutio non valet, quia dato quod aliquid aliqualiter differat ab alio per sua accidentia, si tamen nulla essent omnino accidentia, adhuc vera esset maior, scilicet quod per illud aliquid distinguitur per quod aliquid in esse constituitur, ita quod istud sufficit, licet aliud possit concurrere de bene esse.

[26: ~7] Tertius articulus est solvere rationes primae opinionis. Ad primam, quando dicitur, “per idem constituitur aliquid in esse personali et est distinctum” etc., solvunt aliqui quod ista maior non est omnino vera, quoniam aliquid distinguitur per sua accidentia per quae non habet esse simpliciter. [27: ~26] Sed haec solutio non sufficit, quia dato quod per accidentia sua aliquod suppositum possit distingui, circumscriptis tamen per intellectum illis accidentibus, adhuc erit verum dicere quod per illud per quod constituitur in esse personali, per idem distinguitur. Licet persona per alia possit, illud tamen per quod constituitur sufficit ad distinctione. Nec oportet de necessitate quod per aliud distinguatur quam per illud per quod constituitur in esse personali. [28] Ideo dicunt alii quod persona divina non constituitur in esse personali \distincto/ per unicam relationem.

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[30] Ideo aliter solvendum est. Quando dicitur, “per illud” etc., verum est, si id constituens sit absolutum. Et causa est quia absolutum aliquid ponit per quod potest illud cui imponitur differre ab omni alio. In relativis autem non est ita, quia nihil ponit nisi formam relativam, quae nihil ponit nisi ordinem ad aliud. Ideo solum constituit in esse personali, quia solum distinguit a relativo opposito. Et quia generari et spirari non opponuntur directe, ergo etc.

[29: ~28] Hoc etiam non valet, quia tunc duae relationes concurrerent ad constitutionem distinctam Filii; sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet ab eo, ipse Filius non haberet nisi unam relationem, scilicet filiationem, ergo non distingueretur a Patre, si duae relationes requirerentur ad esse distinctum personae, sicut tu dicis. [30] Propter quod dicendum est aliter. Quando dicitur, “per idem constituitur aliquid in esse personali et distinguitur a quolibet alio,” verum est, si illud constituens sit absolutum, sed si relatum, non oportet. Et causa est quia absolutum aliquid ponit per quod potest illud cui apponitur ab omni alio distingui, quia sic ponit in isto quod in nullo alio. In relativis autem non est ita, quoniam relatio nihil ponit nisi formam relativam, quae nihil ponit nisi ordinem, vel in [30] Propter quod dicendum est aliter. Quando dicitur quod “per idem constituitur aliquid in esse personali et distinguitur ab omni alio,” verum est, si illud constituens sit absolutum, sed si sit relatum, non oportet. Et causa est quia absolutum aliquid ponit per quod potest illud cui apponitur ab omni alio distingui, quia sic ponit in isto quod in nullo alio. In relativis autem non est ita, quoniam relatio nihil ponit nisi formam [A 15ra] relativam, quae nihil ponit nisi ordinem, vel in ordine ad aliud,

[29: ~28] Adhuc non valet hoc, quia tunc duae relationes concurrerent ad constitutionem distinctam personae Filii; sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet, non haberet nisi unam relationem, scilicet filiationem; ergo non distingueretur a Patre, si duae relationes requirerentur ad esse distinctum personae.

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[31: ~8] Ad secundam, quando dicitur, “emanationes” etc., volo. –Et tu dicis: processiones in divinis sunt distinctae, quia per modum intellectus et voluntatis. –Dico quod si intelligit per modum voluntatis quod [W 24vb] procedit a duobus, ut declaratum est, sic Spiritus Sanctus non erit productus nisi procedat a Filio; quare etc.

[32: ~9] Ad , cum dicitur, “quae habent oppositionem” etc., verum est, si ha-

[31: ~8] \ secundam/ Ad secundam dicendum quod generare et spirare sunt distinctae emanationes realiter, quia supponunt priorem distinctionem inter generare et generari, sine qua non distinguerentur realiter, et eodem modo generari et spirari supponunt spirare et spirari. –Tu dicis: de absolutis. –Dico quod aliter distinguuntur absoluta, aliter relativa. Absoluta enim quia sunt aliquid in se distinguuntur et ab oppositis et a disparatis per rationem sui generis, sed relativa per relationem solum ab opposito, ut visum est.

[32: ~9] \ tertiam/ Ad tertiam potest dici quod maior non est usquequaque vera. Aliquid

[32: ~9] Ad tertium, concedo maiorem, si sit ibi sufficiens repugnantia. Ad mino-

ordine ad aliud, propter quod relatio solum constituit in esse personali in divinis, quae solum distinguit a relative opposito. [31: ~8] Ad secundum concedo maiorem. Ad minorem, dico quod si intelligas Filium procedere per actum intellectus et Spiritum Sanctum per actum voluntatis, male intelligis, ut visum est supra. Sed si intelligas quod Filius procedit per modum intellectus quia ab uno et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis quia a duobus, verum est. Et sic intelligendo bene concedo quod si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non haberet talem modum procedendi per modum voluntatis, quia scilicet a duobus. Sed nihil contra me.

propter quod relatio solum constituit in esse personali in divinis, quae solum distinguit a relative opposito. [31: ~8] Ad secundum, quando dicitur “emanationes sive productiones sunt distinctae” etc., concedatur maior. –Tu dicis: dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio, adhuc erunt emanationes distinctae et incompossibiles, scilicet per modum intellectus et voluntatis.-Dico quod, si intelligas Filium procedere per actum intellectus et Spiritus Sanctus per actum voluntatis, male intelligis, ut improbatum est superius. Sed si intelligas quod per modum intellectus quia ab uno et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis quia a duobus procedit, vel duo producunt ipsum, sic Spiritus Sanctus non erit productus nisi procedat a duobus, et sic procedet a Filio, et hoc conceditur. [32-34: ~9] Ad tertium, quando dicitur, “quae habent repugnantiam inter se sufficienter

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enim distinguitur ab altero per sua accidentia per quae non habet esse, sed esto dico quod filiatio distinguit directe Filium a Patre, indirecte vero, quia scilicet stat cum spirare, distinguit a Spiritu Sancto, non distingueret autem nisi Filius posset spirare, quia relatio solum distinguit a directe opposito.

rem, cum dicis quod Spiritus Sanctus haberet repugnantiam ad Filium, dato quod non procederet ab eo, dico per interemptionem.

[33] Et tu probas quod immo, quia esset spiratus et Filius non. [34] Dico quod falsum est, immo Spiritus Sanctus non esset spiratus, quia spirari est produci a duobus, scilicet per modum voluntatis, quorum quodlibet sufficit. Ideo si Spiritus Sanctus non esset a Filio, non esset spiratus, quia non esset a duobus. Unde nomen spirationis provenit a productione per viam communis spirationis.

beant sufficientem. Ad minorem, per interemptionem.

[33] Tu probas: Spiritus Sanctus est spiratus, Filius non est spiratus. [34] Dico quod Spiritus Sanctus non est spiratus nisi procedat a duobus, ut dictum supra. Spiratum enim esse est a duobus procedere, quo dato, oportet quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio.

sunt distincta” etc, verum est, si habeant sufficientem repugnantiam. Ad minorem, quando dicitur, “Spiritus Sanctus, dato quod non procedat a Filio, habet repugnantiam, quia est spiratus, Filius non,” dico per interemptionem, quia si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non esset spiratus, quia idem est spirari et produci a duobus per modum voluntatis, quorum quodlibet sufficit. Ideo si Spiritus Sanctus non esset a Filio, non esset spiratus, quia non esset a duobus. Unde nomen spirationis provenit a productione per viam communis spirationis.

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[35] Vel potest dici quod distinctio realis semper fundatur super aliquid positivum, non negativum solum. Ideo praeter negativum oportet ponere positivum super quod fundaretur ista distinctio quae accipitur penes spiratum et non spiratum. Et tunc quaeram de illo positivo. Nec videtur posse dari nisi Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio. [36: ~10] Ad quartum, dico quod si Pater non generaret, verum est quod adhuc esset innascibilis et Filius nascibilis, sed tamen per hoc non distingueretur a Filio, quia solum distinguitur ab eo paternitate, quae non esset in Patre nisi generaret. Et ideo Pater non distingueretur a Filio sicut suppositum a supposito, quia esse personale prius est quam proprietas personalis cuius est generare. Similiter dico quod esse inspirabile vel non spiratum non distingueret Filium a Spiritu Sancto, qui est spiratus,

[35] Vel potest dici quod distinctio realis semper fundatur super aliquid positivum, non negativum. Ideo praeter negativum oporteret ponere positivum super quod fundaretur ista distinctio quae accipitur penes spiratum et non spiratum. Et tunc quaeram de illo positivo, et non videtur posse dari nisi Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio. [36: ~10] Ad quartum, “sicut se habet innascibilitas ad generare etc., remoto generare a Patre, adhuc remanet innascibilis et Filius nascibilis,” dico quod licet Pater non generaret, esset innascibilis et Filius nascibilis, sed per hoc non distingueretur a Filio, quia non distinguitur a Filio nisi paternitate, quae non esset in Patre nisi generaret. Et ideo Pater non distingueretur a Filio sicut suppositum a supposito, quia esse personale prius quam proprietas personalis. Unde si Pater non generaret, esse innascibile non distingueret ipsum a Filio. Ita esse inspirabile

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[37: ~11] Ad quartam, quando dicitur, “in eo in quo est omnipotentia sine coniunctione intellectus oppositi potest producere quamcumque personam in divinis,” hic dico quod quaedam sunt actiones quae de suo nomine dant intelligere medium, sicut dolare dolabram, mediante qua dolatione, et in talibus actionibus Deus non posset facere effectum actionis sine medio, ut ab actione dicitur, sicut quod oculus videat sine potentia visiva, sicut nec album sine albedine.

[37: ~11] Ad quintum, dico quod quaedam sunt actiones quae de sui nomine vel ratione exprimunt medium per quod fiunt, ut dolare incisionem ligni per talem modum, scilicet cum dolabra. Et in talibus actionibus Deus non posset producere effectum actionis, ut ab actione dicitur, sine medio, ut dolare sine dolabra, licet habeat omnipotentiam, sicut nec oculus videret sine potentia visiva.

nisi ipse Filus spiraret ipsum, et per consequens nisi procederet ab eo. Ideo non valet.

non distingueret Filium a Spiritu Sancto, dato quod Spiritus Sanctus sit spiratus, nisi Filius esset spirans; ideo etc.Vide aliam solutionem in quinto argumento ad quaestionem in alio quaterno. [37: ~11] Ad quintum argumentum, quando dicitur, “quod habet omnem potentiam productivam et non habet respectum oppositum et potest producere quamcumque personam in divinis,” hic dico quod quaedam sunt actiones quae in suo nomine vel in sui ratione dant intelligere sive exprimunt medium, sicut dolare includit incisionem ligni per talem modum, cum dolabra, mediante qua dolatur. Et dico quod in talibus actionibus Deus non posset producere effectum actionis, ut ab actione dicitur, sine medio, sicut dolare sine dolabra, licet habeat omnipotentiam, sicut nec sensus sine potentia sensitiva, sicut nec videre oculis sine potentia visiva, sicut nec album facere sine albedine.

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[38] Et ideo quaerentes aliqui utrum Deus possit facere quod aliquis videat sine obiecto visibili dicunt quod obiectum facit in potentia duo, scilicet actum videndi, in quantum imprimit speciem in oculo; iterum terminat actum. Modo quantum ad primum potest Deus facere visum sine visibili, quia Deus potest supplere vicem cuiuslibet agentis, et ideo potest facere sine obiecto quod species sit in oculo, et per consequens elicere actum videndi sine visibili. Sed quia visio debet terminari ad obiectum, non potest facere quantum ad hoc visionem sine visibili, scilicet quantum ad terminum. Et ideo ubi forma vel operatio determinat sibi medium agendi, non puto quod Deus possit exercere actum sine illo medio, ut dolare sine dolabra vel videre sine potentia visiva.

[38] Ideo dicunt aliqui quaerentes utrum Deus possit facere quod aliquis videat sine obiecto visibili, quod obiectum facit in potentia duo, scilicet actum videndi, in quantum imprimit speciem in oculo; iterum terminat actum. Modo quantum ad actum, potest Deus facere videre aliquem sine visibili, quia Deus potest supplere vicem cuiuslibet agentis. Ideo sine obiecto potest facere quod species sit in oculo, et per consequens elicere actum videndi. Sed quia tamen visio debet terminari ad obiectum, non potest facere visionem quantum ad terminum sine visibili in actionibus quae denominant sive exprimunt medium \actionis/ de modo agendi, sicut videre determinat sibi potentiam visivam et visibile. Ideo ubi forma determinat sibi medium agendi, non puto quod Deus possit exercere actionem illam sine medio, ut dolare sine dolabra nec videre sine potentia visiva.

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[40: ~39] Hic dico quod, si intelligis virtutem embryonis esse animae sensitivae, id est, ab anima sensitiva, male intelligis, cum talis anima non sit in eo. Si autem intelligis quod sit animae sensitivae illa virtus, id est, ad animam sensitivam, bene intelligis.

[39] Sed forte dices: virtus quae est in embryone est animae sensitivae sine anima sensitiva.

[39] Nec valet si dicas: contra, quia virtus quae est in semine et embryone habet actum animae, et tamen non habet animam. [40: ~39] Solutio: aliquid potest dici actus animae dupliciter: vel quia est ordinatum ad animam, et sic virtus quae est in semine et embryone habet actum animae – hoc tamen est improprie dictum; vel quia ille actus est elicitus ab anima, sicut videre a potentia visiva sive sensitiva ab anima sensitiva. Et sic intelligitur quod supra dictum est, scilicet quod Deus non potest facere actum qui ex sua ratione exprimit potentiam mediante qua exercetur sine illa potentia. [41] Ita dico in proposito quod, licet Pater sit omnipotens, attamen non potest spirare Spiritum Sanctum sine Filio, quia spiratio ex modo suae productionis, cum sit per modum voluntatis, id est, a duobus, requirit Patrem et Filium simul. [41] Ad propositum, dico quod sicut Deus non potest facere quod disgreget nigredo, nec quod actus animae sit sine anima, sic[ut], licet Pater habeat omnem potentiam nec habeat respectum oppositum, quia tamen spirare requirit con-

[39] Nec valet si dicas: virtus quae est in semine vel in embryone habet actum animae sensitivae, et tamen non habet animam sensitivam. [40: ~39] Dico quod actus aliquis potest dici animae vel quia ordinatus ad animam, et sic virtus quae est in semine et in embryone habet actum animae – hoc tamen est improprie; alio modo dicitur actus animae quia est actus elicitus ab anima, sicut videre, et si sic intelligas quod embryo habet actum animae, cum anima non sit in eo, falsum est.

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[42: ~12] Ad primum, dico quod spiratio Spiritus Sancti a Patre dat medium Filium, et ideo impossibile est quod Pater spiret Spiritum Sanctum. Et cum dicitur “prius potest absolvi a posteriori,” dico quod Pater et Filius sunt unum in spirando, quia per unam virtutem numero spirant. [III: ~I] Ad secundum, dicendum quod secunda causa quam assignant, quod Filius procedit per modum intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum intellectus, non est sufficiens, ut visum est. [43] Simile etiam quod adducunt non valet. Quando dicunt quod non oportet esse tantam

[42: ~12] Ad sextum, dico quod quando aliquid est a duobus, ab uno sicut a principali, ab alio sicut ab instrumentali, non potest esse a principali sine alio. Modo Spiritum Sanctum spirari includit Patrem principaliter et secundum nostrum modum intelligendi Filium instrumentaliter, et ideo Spiritus Sanctus non potest spirari a Patre sine Filio, et ideo non potest semper esse prius in re sine posteriori.

Ideo nisi Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio, non erit spiratus a Patre.

[43] Simile quod adducunt non valet. Quando dicunt quod non oportet esse tantam distinctio-

iunctum ex Patre et Filio respectu Spiritus Sancti ex modo productionis per modum voluntatis, quia ista productio est a duobus, ut declaratum fuit, ideo si subtrahatur Filius, Deus Pater non poterit spirare Spiritum Sanctum. [42: ~12] Ad sextum, quando dicitur, “prius potest absolvi secundum nostrum modum intelligendi a posteriori,” hic dico quod quando aliquid est a duobus, ab uno sicut a principali, ab alio sicut instrumento, non potest esse a principali sine instrumento. Modo Spiritum Sanctum spirari includit Patrem et Filium, Patrem principaliter et Filium instrumentaliter, secundum modum intelligendi. Ideo non semper potest prius absolvi a posteriori.

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[46: ~13] Ad auctoritatem Anselmi, ipse intendit quod distingui nascendo et spirando de necessitate supponit distinctionem quae est inter Filium

distinctionem in principio sicut in principiato, dico quod quando non est distinctio inter principium et illud quod est a principio nisi per relationes, oportet tot esse relationes et ita reales in principio sicut in eo quod est a principio. [44] Et tu dicis quod non, quia idem homo potest producere et filium naturalem et artificialem, quae sunt diversa, et tamen ab eodem principio. [45] Dico quod illa diversitas est ex natura fundamentorum diversorum, non principii, sed eius quod est a principio, scilicet quia materia filii naturalis et artificialis numquam communicant in eodem fundamento. Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non essent ibi diversa fundamenta relationum oppositarum, et ideo non valet. [46: ~13] Ad auctoritatem Anselmi, quando dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus est a Filio quia procedit per modum voluntatis etc., dico quod iste modus [46: ~13] Ad auctoritatem Anselmi, quando dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus a Filio per modum voluntatis etc., dico quod iste modus non est causa

[45] Dico quod hoc est ex natura fundamentorum diversorum, non principii, sed eius quod est a principio, quia materia filii naturalis et instrumentalis numquam communicant in eodem fundamento. Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non essent ibi fundamenta diversa relationum oppositarum.

nem in principio sicut in principiato, dico quod quando non est distinctio inter principium et illud quod est a principio nisi per relationes, oportet esse tot relationes et ita reales in principio sicut in eo quod est a principio. [44] Tu dicis: produco filium naturalem [A 15rb] et artificialem, ita quod ista diversa producuntur ab eodem principio.

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Spiritum Sanctum per spirare et spirari, et secundum hoc potest esse vera auctoritas. [43] \Dubitatio/ Dubium etiam non solvunt. Non enim est verum quod oportet semper esse maiorem distinctionem in principiato quam in principio. Considerando enim solas relationes, tanta distinctio est relationum in principiatis sicut in principiis et e converso. Tot enim relationes in principiatis sicut in principiis et e converso, et tanta distinctio, cum relatio non distinguat nisi a directe opposita relatione. Sed ratione fundamenti propter compossibilitatem fundamentorum, quandoque maior est distinctio in principiatis quam in principiis, ut in exemplo eorum, quandoque e converso, ut stannum: et est factum lignum et stannum et simul stant esse lignum et esse stannum, et tamen principia non stant simul, sed supposito sunt distincta, scilicet virtus caelestis dans esse lignum et artifex dans esse stannum.

non est causa sufficiens distinctionis tanquam faciens distinctionem et causans, sed est solum aliquid arguens distinctionem. Sicut dormire vel non dormire non facit vel causat distinctionem inter hominem et hominem, sed requirit vel arguit, ita Spiritus Sanctus eo ipso distinguitur a Filio quia procedit per modum voluntatis, eo ipso sicut arguente, non sicut causante.

sufficiens distinctionis, sed causa requirens et arguens distinctionem. Ut dormire et non dormire arguit et non facit distinctiones inter homines, ita Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur a Filio eo ipso quia procedit per modum voluntatis, eo ipso sicut arguente, non sicut causante.

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[IV: ~9] Ad rationes in contrarium, prima soluta est in toto loco. [47: ~2] Ad aliud, “sicut se habet,” concedo. Ad minorem, cum dicitur, “generare–spirare differunt realiter,” concedo, sed non secundum supposita.

[V: ~10] Ad tertium, dico quod in Patre non est innascibilitas nisi quia in eo paternitas est, quae est sua personalis proprietas. Ergo dico quod Filio non detur inspirabilitas nisi quia spirat.

[IV: ~9] \Ad rationes/ Ad rationes in oppositum, ad primam, dicendo quod esse non spiratum non est proprium Filio nisi in quantum spirat. Si enim non spiraret, idem posset esse spiratus et genitus sicut idem spirans et generans.

[V: ~10] \ secundam/ Ad secundam, dico: in Patre non est innascibilitas nisi quia in eo est paternitas, quae \est/ sua personalis proprietas, ut si Filius a Patre non generaretur, posset dici innascibilis ut Pater, \sic/ dico quod Filio non debetur inspirabilitas nisi quia spirat.

[48: ~3] Ad secundum, dico quod in Patre non est innascibilitas nisi quia in eo est paternitas, quae est sua personalis proprietas. Unde si Filius a Patre non generaretur, posset dici innascibilis sicut Pater. Sic dico quod Filio non debetur inspirabilitas nisi quia spirat.

[47: ~2] Ad rationes principales, dico ad minorem quod generare et spirare non differunt secundum supposita, sed solum realiter. Et ideo non probat quod generari et spirari distinguantur supposito vel persona, sed solum re.

[47: ~2] Ad rationes in oppositum, quando dicis, “sicut se habent spirare et spirari,” concedo. Et ad minorem, dico quod spirare et generare non differunt secundum supposita, sed solum realiter, ideo non probat quod spirari et generari distinguantur supposito vel persona. [48: ~3] Ad secundum, quando dicis, “ab eodem habet aliquid esse et distingui,” verum est.

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[1] Utrum Pater et Filius sint duo spiratores. [2] Respondeo. Illa quae important actus in divinis, sive sint31 verba sive participia sive nomina verbalia, plurificantur in divinis secundum plurificationem suppositorum, quia actus sunt suppositorum. Ideo Pater et Filius sunt duo spiratores. [W: Si autem dicat essentiam, sic sunt unum.]

[1] Circa XII distinctionem quaeritur utrum generatio sit prius in divinis quam processio. [2] Videtur quod sic, | quia principium prius est principiato; sed W 25ra generatio est principium processionis, sicut et Filius principium Spiritus Sancti; ergo etc. [3] Item, imago Trinitatis in creaturis imitatur | Trinitatem incre- T 41rb atam; sed in imagine Trinitatis in creaturis processio per modum verbi, quae appropriatur generationi in divinis, prius est processione per modum amoris, quae appropriatur spirationi vel processioni; ergo generatio prius est quam spiratio vel processio. [4] Tria sunt videnda.

[5] Primo, modi relationum in divinis. Unde sciendum quod in divinis, cum non reperiatur nisi essentia et relatio, quia persona constituitur per relationem, ibi reperiuntur sex modi vel genera relationum. Primo relationes oppositae, ut32 generare–generari, et haec constituunt supposita. [6] Secundo aequiparentiae, ut aequalitas et similitudo. Intelliguntur enim personae divinae consimiles quando attribuuntur eis aliquae perfectiones ad genus qualitatis pertinentes secundum quod in creaturis reperiuntur, ut esse sapiens, coaequales quando illud quod ad genus quantitatis pertinet. [7] Tertio disparatae, ut aequalitas et paternitas: una respicit essentiam, aequalitas; alia personam, paternitas. 31. sint W] om. T 32. ut W] om. T

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[8] Quarto rationis tantum, quibus Deus refertur ad se ipsum, ut quando intelligit se ipsum, quia idem est intelligens et intellectum. [9] Quinto partim reales et partim rationis sunt relationes quibus Deus refertur ad creaturas, ut esse creatorem et33 redemptorem, quae realiter dicunt aliquam productionem vel aliquid realiter actum in creatura, sed nihil in Deo nisi secundum rationem intelligendi, ut in sequentibus videbitur. [10] Sexto mixtae ex oppositis et disparatis, ut generare–spirare, generatio–processio, quae dicuntur ‘mixtae’ quia non sunt directe oppositae, cum possint stare simul, nec penitus disparatae, cum habeant ordinem ad invicem, quia spirare supponit generare. Unde in tantum sunt oppositae in quantum una habet rationem principii respectu alterius.

[11] Secundo videndum quomodo huiusmodi relationes se habent ad prius et posterius, cum secundum essentiam in divinis non sit prius et posterius. Sciendum igitur quod relationes oppositae directe non se habent secundum prius et posterius, cum sint simul natura et naturali intelligentia.34 Unde personae per huiusmodi relationes constitutae non se habent secundum prius et posterius. [12] Sed relationes aequiparentiae habent in creaturis prius et posterius ex ordine fundamenti, sicut quandoque contingit unum album prius esse35 album quam alterum. Et tunc fundamentum similitudinis prius est in eo, quod non est in divinis, ubi est unicum fundamentum. [13] Disparatae etiam relationes habent prius et posterius ratione fundamenti, ut quia in creaturis36 quantitas prior qualitate, aequalitas prior similitudine, quod non est in divinis, cum sit unicum fundaW 25rb mentum, nisi secundum modum nostrum intelligendi quo | praeintelligimus essentiam personis divinis, quia personae includunt essentiam, non e converso, secundum nostrum modum intelligendi. Unde secundum hoc similitudo, quae respicit essentiam, vel aequalitas, sunt prius paternitate, quae respicit personam.37

33. et W] om. T 34. intelligentia] coexistentia W 35. esse W] est T 36. in creaturis W] post aequalitas T 37. quae respicit personam W] om. T

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[14] Relationes vero rationis in creaturis habent prius et posterius secundum ordinem diversorum actuum, ut quando creatura intelligit se prius et postea diligit, relatio rationis prius fundatur super intellectionem, postea super dilectionem. Sed e converso est in Deo, quia in eo non est talis ordo, nisi forte secundum modum nostrum intelligendi, quo modo dicimus vel praeintelligimus Deum se intelligere et postea intelligamus Deum se diligere. [15] Relationes autem partim reales et partim rationis sunt in Deo secundum prius et posterius, etiam tempore. Huiusmodi enim sunt in Deo secundum rationem ex eo quod creatura realiter dependet a Deo, vel secundum suum esse reale vel secundum substantiam38 suam, sive secundum aliquid aliud quod potest esse in39 diversis partibus temporis. [16] De relationibus autem mixtis est principalis quaestio, sicut | T 41va sunt generatio et processio.

[17] Unde tertio videndum est principale quaesitum, utrum generatio praecedat processionem. Sciendum igitur quod generatio non est prior tempore processione, quia utraque ab aeterno.40 Nec natura, quia una non est perfectior alia. Sed solum secundum intellectum processio supponit generationem et ideo ordo est inter generationem et processionem. Non propter hoc est ibi prius et posterius, quia secundum beatum Augustinum, ubicumque est prius et posterius, ibi est ordo, non e converso, quia ordo est in relationibus originis, ut inter paternitatem et filiationem, et tamen non est ibi prius et posterius. [18] Unde dico quod generatio et processio non sunt simul secundum intellectum. Secundo, quod non est tamen ibi prius et posterius. Quod non sunt simul secundum intellectum patet, quia non sunt relationes directe oppositae. Tales enim solae simul sunt naturali intelligentia. Quod autem non se habeant secundum prius et posterius declaratur, quia illae relationes quae sic se habent quod una supponit aliam solum secundum rationem originis non se habent secundum prius et posterius, quia relationes originis simul sunt et non sunt. Numquam enim41 est paternitas sine filiatione nec e converso. Sed processio supponit generationem solum secundum rationem originis. Generatio 38. substantiam W] salutem T 39. in W] om. T 40. aeterno W] aeterne T 41. enim W] om. T

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enim non est aliud realiter quam Filius, quamvis alio modo significetur. Filius autem est principium Spiritus Sancti secundum originem, et per consequens processionis, quae nominat originem Spiritus Sancti. Unde sequitur quod generatio sit principium originis Spiritus Sancti, W 25va quamvis42 non significetur | ut principium, et ideo non est prius etiam secundum intellectum.

[19: ~2] Ad argumenta. Ad primum, dico quod in principio possumus duo intelligere: illud quod est principium, et hoc est prius frequenter in creaturis quam principiatum; vel rationem principii, et sic principium simul est cum principiato. Quia igitur in divinis id quod est principium constituitur in esse supposi per rationem principii, ideo nullo modo prius est quam principiatum. Unde quia Pater in esse constituitur per paternitatem, ideo non est prius Pater quam Filius. [20: ~3] Ad secundum, dico quod quia imago creata est imperfecta, ideo est ibi realiter prius et posterius. [W: Non in divinis, ubi est imago perfecta Trinitatis.]

[1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus per prius et perfectius procedat a Patre quam a Filio. [2] Videtur quod sic, quia propter quod unumquodque est tale et illud est magis; sed Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio propter Patrem, quia scilicet Filius virtutem accepit a Patre; ergo etc. [3] Item, omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum effectum quam causa secundaria. [4] Contra. Ubi est summa aequalitas, non est prius et posterius, perfectius et minus perfectum; sic est in Patre et Filio; ergo respectu Spiritus Sancti producti non est prius et posterius, perfectius et minus perfectum. [5] Duo sunt principaliter videnda. Primum est utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre prius, perfectius, vel principalius. Secundo utrum mediante Filio. 42. quamvis W] scilicet quam \prius/ T

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[6] Adhuc circa primum duo, primo quod prius neque perfectius, secundo quod tamen principalius. [7] Primum probatur: ad unam actionem non concurrunt duo agentia ordinata43 nisi altero trium modorum: uno modo sic quod agens primum suam virtutem communicat44 agenti secundo non aeque perfectam, ut principale instrumentali, et tunc effectus per prius et perfectius producitur a primo agente quam a secundo. Ratio est quia quod agit solum virtute alterius supponit agens in cuius virtute agit tamquam prius et magis perfectum; tale est agens instrumentale; ergo etc. Maior declaratur, quia agens virtute alterius non attingit secundum se effectum, sed quia est virtus alterius sive per virtutem alterius. Unde secundum hoc intelligitur illa propositio: ‘omnis causa primaria’ etc. [W: Dico etiam in commento quod causa prima prius advenit et tardius recedit.]

[8] Quandoque vero agentia sic se habent quod agens primum perfecte virtutem suam communicat secundae causae, ut avus patri, et effectus per prius procedit ab agente primo, sed non perfectius, immo magis forte e converso, ut filius a patre quam a avo. [9] Tertio | agentia sic se habent quod agens primum illam unam W 25vb virtutem | quam habet communicat agenti secundo eandem numero, T 41vb et tunc effectus vel magis productum non prius vel magis procedit ab uno quam ab altero. Non scilicet quidem prius, quia una virtus numero non est prior se ipsa. Nec perfectius, quia agens tanto perfectius quanto agit per formam magis perfectam; quae autem agunt per unam formam numero non agunt vel producunt per formam magis perfectam. Ergo unum perfectius non est altero. Sed Pater et Filius per unam virtutem spirativam numero producunt Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo unum non est prius altero nec perfectius. [10] Pater tamen dicitur principalius producere Spiritum Sanctum quam Filius. Quod declaratur: per duos qui aeque perfecte penitus habent unam scientiam, tamen unus per inventionem, alius per doctrinam eius qui invenit, licet igitur unus non habeat perfectius scientiam altero, tamen principalitas debetur inventori. Sic in proposito. Et ideo, secundum beatum Augustinum, in productione Spiritus Sancti auctoritas est in Patre, subauctoritas in Filio.

43. ordinata] determinata W 44. communicat W] communicet T

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[11] Circa secundum principale videnda sunt duo: primo quomodo Pater producit Spiritum Sanctum mediante Filio; secundo quomodo per Filium. [12] Circa primum, sciendum quod in Patre et Filio est duo considerare: virtutem spirativam et personas spirantes. Si consideretur primum, sic Pater non spirat mediante Filio, sed simul spirant una spiratione. Si secundum, sic, cum Filius in divinis sit media persona, potest dici quod Pater producit Spiritum Sanctum mediante Filio, id est, cum media persona, quae est Filius. [13] Circa secundum, sciendum quod, cum praepositio ‘per’ dicat habitudinem causae, cum dicitur ‘Pater producit Spiritum Sanctum per Filium’, li ‘per’ potest dicere habitudinem causae respectu agentis, et sic falsum est quod Pater producat Spiritum Sanctum per Filium. Sensus enim est quod Filius est Patri ratio producendi Spiritum Sanctum, ut cum dico ‘ignis agit per calorem’, calor est igni ratio agendi. Vel potest li ‘per’ dicere habitudinem causae in ordine ad effectum, et verum est quod Pater producit Spiritum Sanctum per Filium, quia Filius eo modo quo est ibi actio agit ad productionem Spiritus Sancti, sicut cum dicitur ‘Deus agit in istis inferioribus mediantibus causis secundis’.

[14: ~2] Ad rationes. Ad primam, dico quod illa propositio ‘propter quod unumquod est tale’ etc., quantum spectat propositum, intelligitur de agentibus per se ordinatis, item, habentibus necessariam connexionem, item, habentibus aliam et aliam virtutem in agendo. Quod non est in proposito. [15: ~3] Secunda ratio est soluta.

[1] Circa XI distinctionem quaeritur utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio. [2] Videtur quod non, quia ab illo non videtur procedere Spiritus Sanctus quo non existente in divinis adhuc45 procederet; sed non 45. adhuc] ad hunc T

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existente Filio in divinis nihilominus adhuc46 procederet Spiritus Sanctus a Patre; ergo Spiritus Sanctus in divinis solum procedit a Patre. Maior patet, quia in divinis non differt esse et posse minus quam in perp\e/tuis. Unde si Spiritus Sanctus potest procedere sine Filio, necessario procedit sine Filio, ut dicitur. Minor declaratur a quibusdam sic: dicunt quod licet forma quae est una in duobus in utroque habeat operationem suam, tamen si in altero solum esset, adhuc in illo suam operationem haberet, ut si calor unus numero posset esse in duobus suppositis, in utroque calefacere posset, sed si postea in altero solum esset, adhuc in altero calefacere posset. Ita si potentia spirativa est in Patre et Filio, uterque spirat. Si vero non sit potentia spirativa in Filio, puta quia non esset Filius in divinis, adhuc potentia spirativa in Patre produceret47 Spiritum Sanctum. [3] Item, Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, capitulo 5, dicit quod “Pater est fontana deitas, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus deigenae pullulationes48 divinae et quasi flores”; sed pull

ationum et florum non est origo ab invicem sic quod flos originetur a flore; ergo etc. [4] Item, Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit quod “radii solaris luminis non separatur, sed usque ad nos emittunt , sic Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, geminus Patris radius usque ad nos miserunt lumen claritatis”; sed duorum radiorum unus non procedit ab alio; igitur etc. [5] Item, Damascenus, primo Sententiarum suarum, capitulo 10: “Credimus,” inquit, “in unum Spiritum Sanctum Deum ex Patre procedentem et in Filio quiescentem”; sed non est idem principium emanationis et terminus in quo emanatio terminatur; ergo etc. [6] Contra. Athanasius: “Spiritus Sanctus a Pre et Filio usque sed procedens.” [7] Item, ratione: in creaturis amor a notitia procedit, ergo et in divinis a verbo Spiritus Sanctus. [8] Respondeo. Duo sunt hic videnda: primo, quod absque dubio Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio; secundo qualiter excusabiles sunt Graeci49 dicentes oppositum.

46. adhuc] ad hunc T 47. produceret] procederet T 48. pullulationes] plantationes T 49. graeci] gradi T

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[9] Primum declaratur tripliciter, primo ex divina perfectione sic: divina perfectio requirit quod Pater Filio communicaverit omnia nisi ubi obviat oppositio relativa; sed Filius non habet oppositionem aliquam ad spirationem activam; ergo Pater eam sibi communicavit. Maior patet, quia aliter persona Filii videretur imperfecta, si scilicet esset aliquid communicabile quod non esset communicatum. Minorem probant aliqui sic: dicunt quod Pater in divinis ex opposito se habent quantum ad ea quae sunt intellectus, quia intellectus est in Patre et Filio cum oppositis respectibus, in Patre cum respectu producentis verbum, in Filio cum respectu verbi producti. Sed quantum ad ea quae sunt voluntatis non se habent modo opposito, quia id quod ad voluntatem pertinet non est in eis cum oppositis respectibus; sed spirare ad actum voluntatis pertinet, ut dicunt; ergo Filius non opponitur Patri in spirando. [10: ~9] Sed ista probatio parum valet, propter duo. Primo, quia spirare non est actus voluntatis divinae magis quam intellectus, ut supra visum est. Nulla enim realis distinctio est in divinis penes intellectum et voluntatem, ut visum est et ipsimet confitentur. Secundo, quia Filius habet ea quae sunt voluntatis cum opposito respectu sicut ea quae sunt intellectus. Quicquid enim habet Filius, sive intelligere, sive velle, sive esse, totum habet ut productus per generationem; sed constat quod Filius habet voluntatem et velle; ergo ista sunt sibi communicata per generationem sicut et intellectus. Quando ergo dicunt quod intelligere est in Patre et Filio cum oppositis respectibus et non velle, falsum est. Probatio: quia aut intelligunt per hoc quod intelligere Filii sit productum et non eius velle, et hoc erroneum esset, quia nullum absolutum in divinis est productum; sicut enim essentia Filii non est producta, ita nec eius intellectus vel voluntas. Aut intelligunt quod per generationem communicatur Filio intelligere et non velle, et hoc etiam est erroneum. Aut intelligunt quod fundamentum per se harum relationum quae sunt paternitas et filiatio est divina essentia ut est intellectus et non ut voluntas, accipiendo utrumque quantum ad id quod dicit absolutum, et hoc etiam esse non potest, ut supra visum est, quia principalius productivum in Patre respectu Filii est divina essentia secundum suam totam infinitatem, comprehendens omne id quod communicatur Filio virtute T 30ra suae | productionis, quod non est solum velle vel intelligere, sed omnis perfectio absoluta, quia omnis perfectio absoluta sibi per se virtute generationis communicatur. Ideo notandum quod, licet Pater et Filius

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non plus distinguantur quam ad intelligere quam quantum ad velle, distinguuntur tamen plus penes modum intellectus quam penes modum voluntatis, ut supra tactum est. [11] Ideo aliter probatur illa minor, scilicet quod Filius non habeat aliquam oppositionem ad spirationem activam, quia nihil habet oppositionem ad spirationem activam nisi quod est spiratum; sed Filius non est spiratus; ergo spiratio activa sibi potest competere; ergo communicata est sibi a Patre. [12: ~11] Sed contra, dicam eodem modo quod Spiritus Sanctus potest generare. Probatio: quia non habet oppositionem nisi ad spirans et ad spirationem activam, ergo generatio active sibi potest competere, cum non sit genitus. Unde arguam sic: generans non habet oppositionem nisi ad genitum; sed Spiritus Sanctus non est genitus; ergo potest esse generans. [13] Dico: Spiritus Sanctus, quia spiratus, habet oppositionem ad generans, licet non immediatam. De ratione spirati in divinis est quod procedat a producto et quod procedat per modum voluntatis, supposita prima processione. Aliter non haberet modum spirati. Quod autem procedit a producto necessario procedit a producente, quia quicquid est causa causae est causa causati, et ideo spiratus, quia procedit a generato, necessario procedit a generante. Unde realem oppositionem, licet mediatam, habet ad generantem. Sed genitus in divinis nec mediatam nec immediatam habet oppositionem ad spirare. Ideo imperfectionis esset in genito si non spiraret, quia cum non sit defectus ex parte oppositionis relativae, defectus esset ex parte naturae. Et ideo necesse est ponere in divinis quod Filius spiret Spiritum Sanctum. [14] Haec ratio confirmatur, quia dicit in Iohanne: Omnia quae habet Pater mea sunt. Propterea dixi quia de meo accipiet, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus, procedendo a me. Si enim intelligeretur Spiritus Sanctus a Filio accipere, quia habet eandem naturam cum ipso, posset dici e converso quod Filius acciperet a Spiritu Sancto, quod tamen nusquam legitur. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus a Filio accipit quod procedit a ipso. [15] Ista autem via procedit Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti. Probat enim quod Filius spiret Spiritum Sanctum, praecipue per hoc quod in divinis omnia sunt idem ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. [16] Secunda ratio sumitur ex divinarum personarum origine sic: ab eodem principio per omnimodam aequalitatem impossibile est plura procedere absque ordine nisi in differentibus solum naturaliter, sicut unus faber facit duos cutellos non habentes ordinem ad invicem; sed

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Filius et Spiritus Sanctus procedunt a Patre, ut omnes concedunt; igitur oportet quod sit aliquis ordo inter ista duo producta. Nullus autem ordo est in divinis nisi naturalis originis; ergo, cum Spiritus Sanctus non producat Filium, necesse est ponere e converso quod producatur a Filio, aliter non inter ipsos esset ordo originis. [17] Et confirmatur ratio, quia Filius est imago perfecta Patris, quod non est propter assimilationem in natura tantum, quia Spiritus Sanctus esset imago Patris. Ergo propter assimilationem in aliqua notione; non innascibilitatis vel paternitatis; ergo spirationis. Unde Richardus de Sancto Victore, IV De Trinitate: “In hoc,” inquit, “Filius expressam imaginem Patris tenet, quod sicut plenitudo divinitatis manat de uno, ita de alio.” [18] Tertia ratio ex divinarum personarum connexione sic: maior est connexio quae est secundum naturam et originem quam quae est secundum naturam tantum; sed in divinis est maxima connexio ponenda; ergo non solum secundum naturam, sed50 secundum originem ponenda est connexio in divinis. Sed inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum non esset talis connexio nisi Spiritus Sanctus a Filio procederet; ergo etc. [19] Et confirmatur ratio, quia Athanasius dicit quod tres personae se habent quasi una catena. Ista autem catena in hoc consistit quod Filius a Patre, Spiritus a Filio procedit. Hanc etiam rationem tangit Richardus de Sancto Victore in libro suo De Trinitate, dicens quod non potest in divinis deesse summa germanitas. Per hoc autem probat, V De Trinitate, capitulis 10 et 12, Filium spirare Spiritum Sanctum, scilicet quia alias non essent summa germanitate coniuncti, quia ut sit summa germanitas oportet singulam singulae immediate coniungi ut sint a prima duae et tertia a duabus, et media ab una et ab ipsa sit tertia, ut sit ibi quasi triangulus clausus in tribus lineis cui nihil addi vel subtrahi possit.

[20] Secundo videndum qualiter Graeci excusabiles possunt esse. Excusantur dupliciter. Primo modo, quia ‘procedere’ in Graeco non solum significat egressum vel emanationem ab alio, sed etiam progressum in alium in quo quiescit qui procedere dicitur. Et ideo, licet intelligerent Spiritum Sanctum esse Patris et Filii, sicut a quibusdam emanat, verbo 50. sed] secundum T

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tamen ‘processionis’ non usi sunt propter vocabuli proprietatem dicendo quod a Filio procederet, sed a Patre solo. Si enim a Filio, secundum eos, procedere diceretur, videretur ad Patrem procedere et quod vis spirativa esset a Filio in Patrem, quod nullus dicit. [21] Aliter melius excusantur. Doctores enim Graeci, quamvis non dicant Spiritum Sanctum esse a Filio, tamen hoc non negant sic quod dicant contrarium esse haeresim, quod patet per Damascenum, qui dicit pro se et suis in principio Sententiarum suarum, in quibus ter concordat cum Dionysio, quod nihil au|dendum est dicere de Trinitate T 30rb praeter ea51 quae nobis divinitus tradita sunt per legem, per prophetas, apostolos, et evangelistas. In sacris vero eloquiis non invenitur expressum quod Spiritus Sanctus a Filio procedat sicut a Patre, Iohannis 15: “Spiritum Veritatis quae a Patre procedit.” Ideo, licet non auderent exprimere, tamen hoc non negabant. [22] Item, quia synodus Nicaena super professione fidei habita hoc non52 exprimit, ubi legitur sic: “Credimus in Spiritum Sanctum, scilicet ex Patre procedentem, cum Patre et Filio orando.” Ideo non dicebant Spiritum Sanctum a Filio procedere, nec etiam hoc expresse negabant nisi illi qui inter eos erant haeretici. [23] Sed contra, Romanos 4 dicitur quod corde creditur ad iustitiam; ore autem confessio fit ad salutem; ergo non sufficiebat Damasceno et suis quod crederent nisi ore confiterentur. [24] Dicendum quod de his quae non sunt expressa in canone nec per apostolos declarata vel tradita licet opinari contraria quousque veridica ratione et auctoritate Ecclesiae sint decreta. Ideo excusatur Damascenus et sui qui non confitebantur Spiritum Sanctum ex Filio procedere ante approbationem Ecclesiae.

[25: ~2] Ad argumenta. Ad primam, dicendum quod aliqui semper rationem illam dicunt: si Pater non generaret Filium, adhuc53 spiraret Spiritum Sanctum, quia adhuc54 fontana deitas manet in Patre respectu Spiritus Sancti. Sed non videtur verum, quia si Filius non esset in divinis, non posset ibi esse spiratus, cum de ratione spirati sit quod procedat a producto prima productione, ut supra visum est. 51. praeter ea] prepee T 52. non] enim T 53. adhuc] ad hunc T 54. adhuc] ad hoc T

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[26] Item, producatur a duobus, aliter non haberet modum voluntatis nec per consequens posset dici spiratus; immo,55 si non esset Filius in divinis, productio Spiritus Sancti diceretur generatio, non processio vel spiratio, quia esset unius ab uno et prima productio in substantia intellectuali. Unde persona Spiritus Sancti vere diceretur Filius, non Spiritus Sanctus. Ideo dico quod si non esset Filius in divinis, Pater non spiraret Spiritum Sanctum. [27] Et quando dicitur de forma quae est principium operandi in duobus suppositis, quando est in duobus, ita est principium operandi in altero supposito, quando est solum altero, dico: quaedam sunt operationes quae indifferenter exerceri possunt ab uno agente vel duobus, sicut duo calida calefaciunt et unum calidum calefacit. De tali 56 est quod forma potest habere operationem suam in uno supposito sicut in pluribus. Aliae sunt operationes quae de ratione sua requirunt duo agentia, sicut dolare ex necessitate est mediante dolabra, quia etiam si lignum posset vel potest fieri planum sine dolabra,57 non tamen dolando sive per modum dolationis. Sic autem est de spiratione, quia ratione spirationis per se est quod sit a pluribus, aliter non haberet modum voluntatis, ut dictum est. Ideo de ratione spirati est quod procedat a Filio, nec esset spiratus si non esset Filius. [28: ~3-4] Ad secundam et tertiam simul, dicendum quod similitudines debent intelligi secundum originem Filii et Spiritus Sancti a Patre, non autem quantum ad hitudinem inter se. [29: ~5] Ad quartam, dicendum quod Iohannes Damascenus sequebatur opinionem illam, ideo dicto non est in hoc adhaerendum. Vel dicendum: per hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus dicitur quiescere vel manere in Filio non excluditur quin58 procedat ab ipso, quia et Filius in Patre manere dicitur, cum tamen a Patre procedat. Dicitur autem Spiritus Sanctus in Filio manere sicut amor amantis in amato vel propter humanitatem vel propter id quod scriptum est Iohannis 1: Super quem videritis Spiritum quiescentem et manentem, hic est qui baptizat.

55. immo] in uno T 56. operatione] lacuna T 57. dolabra] dolabro T 58. quin] quoniam T

DOMINICAN DEBATES ON THE INTENSIFICATION OF QUALITIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 14TH CENTURY: HERVAEUS NATALIS AGAINST JAMES OF METZ AND DURAND OF SAINT-POURÇAIN Jean-Luc Solère The theory of the succession of qualitative forms in processes of intensification or remission did not emerge suddenly in the early 1320s with Walter Burley, probably its most well known proponent. Despite the doubt cast by Anneliese Maier, it has been recently demonstrated that Godfrey of Fontaines did set forth this theory in the 1290s.1 Still more recently, Brian Conolly has shown that Dietrich of Freiberg too had defended a similar solution.2 With the present contribution, I would like to add James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain to the list of those who upheld, albeit with some perplexity, the succession theory before Burley.3 I also document that James and Durand bear witness to Godfrey’s influence on some Dominicans at the beginning of the 14th century, as they receive the principles and arguments that support the theory directly from him. On the other hand, Hervaeus Natalis and some other Dominicans tried to counter this influence and the criti1. See J. Céleyrette – J.-L. Solère, “Godefroid de Fontaines et la théorie de la succession dans l’intensification des formes,” in: P. Bakker et al. (eds.), Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza, Turnhout 2002, pp. 79-112; S.D. Dumont, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in: S.F. Brown – T. Dewender – T. Kobusch (eds.), Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, Leiden 2009, pp. 39-125; J. Céleyrette – J.-L. Solère, “Edition de la question ordinaire n° 18, De intensione virtutum, de Godefroid de Fontaines,” in: J. Meirinhos – O. Weijers (eds.), Florilegium Medievale. Etudes offertes à Jacqueline Hamesse, Turnhout 2009, pp. 83-107. Medieval authors were well aware that Godfrey had introduced this theory. See Dumont, “Godfrey of Fontaines,” and C. Schabel, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol’s Sentences Commentary,” in: Vivarium 38/1 (2000), 117-161, p. 119. 2. “Dietrich of Freiberg on the Succession of Forms in the Intensification of Qualities,” in: Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievale 81/1 (2014), pp. 1-35. 3. The list also includes Thomas of Bailly (see Dumont, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory,” pp. 95-102), and, as I hope to show elsewhere, John of Pouilly.

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cism of Thomas Aquinas it entailed. A number of texts echo the lively debates that ensued. Thus, the question of intensification/remission opens a window on the complex intellectual situation of the Dominican order in Paris in the first decade of the 14th century. 1. The Competing Theories Before proceeding, it will be useful to review the main positions, each of which is best understood with reference to the others. Three theories in the Middle Ages were competing to explain processes such as a thing becoming warmer, or whiter, or a soul becoming more virtuous—in brief, what is known as the augmentation and diminution of qualities, and, because the magnitudes in question are intensive magnitudes, is more aptly called intensification or remission of qualities.4 A. The addition theory, popular among the Franciscans, rests on the principle that intensification and remission are like augmentation or diminution inasmuch as they can happen only in wholes where parts can be distinguished and added to or subtracted from each other. Bonaventure, Richard of Menneville (Mediavilla), Olivi, and Duns Scotus all say that forms that intensify acquire something really new which is added to what they already had, that is to say, a new degree is added to the degrees previously contained in the essence of those forms, and constitutes with them a new whole. The problem with this theory may be that these degrees or parts of essence that can be dissociated or welded together do not have a clearly defined ontological status. What does it mean for an essence to be divisible into parts that, obviously, are not its “subjective” or logical parts such as genus or specific difference? Greater whiteness or greater

4. See A. Maier, “Das Problem der intensiven Grösse,” in: ead., Zwei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen NaturPhilosophie, 3rd ed., Rome 1968, pp. 3-43; J.-L. Solère, “Plus ou moins: le vocabulaire de la latitude des formes,” in: J. Hamesse – C. Steel (eds.), L’Elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age, Turnhout 2000, pp. 437-488; id., “D’un commentaire l’autre : l’interaction entre philosophie et théologie au Moyen Age, dans le problème de l’intensification des formes,” in: M.-O. Goulet (ed.), Le Commentaire entre tradition et innovation, Paris 2000, pp. 411-424; id., “The Question of Intensive Magnitudes according to some Jesuits in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in: The Monist 84/4 (2011), pp. 582-616.

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wisdom still are whiteness and wisdom, which is to say that the intensification/remission remains within the limits of a given species, with the same genus and the same specific difference. What are, on the other hand, these parts of an essence which can be acquired or lost, and which are therefore not essential? B. On the opposite side, Thomas Aquinas upholds the principle that forms are indivisible (other than logically), and therefore cannot undergo any change.5 This principle has a Neoplatonic ring to it and was indeed transmitted by Boethius in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Accordingly, Boethius’ response to the question of intensification is that, since essences in themselves cannot change, only the qualia, that is, participations in a quality Q, can be more or less q, while Q in itself is not modified.6 Thomas follows suit and argues along the same lines: differences in intensity cannot affect the nature of the form that goes through this kind of change. Therefore, a qualitative variation has to come from an extrinsic factor, which can only be the way in which this form is received in a subject. William of Peyre of Godin, an influential Dominican towards the end of the 13th century (he probably lectured on the Sentences in Paris in 1299-1300), faithfully summarizes Aquinas’s theory in his Lectura Thomasina: […] augetur per intensionem vel secundum accessum ad terminum sicut qualitates prime. Circa quod notandum quod est augmentum primarum qualitatum ex causis suis, scilicet agente et recipiente. Ex agente autem in quantum ipsum agens per formam suam intendit reducere ipsum patiens de potentia in actum sue forme quantum possibile est sibi. Sicut autem non-calidum est in potentia calidum, ita minus calidum est in potentia respectu magis calidi; unde sicut per actionem calefaciendi efficitur aliquid de non-calido calidum, non quia ponatur ibi alius [ms. aliquis] calor, sed quia calor qui est in potentia reducitur in actum, ita etiam de minus calido efficitur magis calidum inquantum educitur calor qui erat in minus calido ut actus imperfectus in maiorem perfectionem et 5. See J.-L. Solère, “Thomas d’Aquin et les variations qualitatives,” in: C. Erismann – A. Schniewind (eds.), Compléments de Substance (Études sur les Propriétés Accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera), Paris 2008, pp.147-165. 6. “Sed hoc solum dicere possumus magis habere sanitatem aliquem, id est esse saniorem, et magis sanum, et minus sanum. Dicimus ergo quod ipsae quidem qualitates non suscipiunt magis et minus” (In Categorias Aristotelis, III, PL 64, 257 C). Aristotle himself left unanswered this question that he raised in the Categories, namely, whether the qualities or the qualia are susceptible of being more or being less what they are (Cat. 8, 10b 30 - 11a 2).

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assimilationem agentis. Et hoc contingit etiam in minus calido ex parte subiecti secundum quod subiectum quod est in potentia et indeterminatum ad multa magis ac magis unitur et determinatur sub actu illo quod actingit in subiecto illo, secundum quod disponitur dispositione magis convenienti illi actui, secundum quam dispositionem sit susceptibilis illius actus et magis subicitur, sicut cum dyafanitas sit congrua dispositio ad luminis receptionem, quanto ergo aer plus attenuatur tanto plus sit dispositus et susceptior luminis […] Aduertendum ulterius quod quedam sunt forme que in natura sua habent partes, sicut quantitas et sciencia que habent partes penes aliam; quedam autem non habent partes, ut calor, caritas et omnes qualitates que sunt in tertia specie qualitatis, et tales augentur per maiorem dispositionem subiecti […].7

This theory sees intensification and remission as a particular case of alteration: a limited alteration that stays within the limits of a given species of quality instead of totally removing that quality and bringing about its contrary.8 As a consequence, it must be understood in the same terms as a wholesale alteration, that is, as the progressive actualization of the form of the agent in the patient. The process is the same whether it is from one contrary to another (for instance, from black to white), or from a lesser actuality of this form to a greater actuality (for instance, from a less intense white to a more intense white). This process can also be described as an “accessus ad terminum,”9 in which the form gets closer and closer to a maximum of actualization (or the opposite of it). The actualization of the form in the patient can vary either because of the action of the agent becoming stronger or weaker (as when one moves away from, or closer to, a source of heat), or, supposing that the action of the cause is uniform, because of a difference in the disposition of the receiving subject (at the same distance from the source of heat, a wet item will be heated less easily than a dry one; or, as Godin submits, air becomes more luminous when it gets thinner, while the illumination by the sun remains the same). 7. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, Lect. Thom. I, d. 17, ms. Universitätsbibliothek Graz 475, f. 13 rb-va. The transcriptions of this manuscript and of the other manuscripts of other authors quoted hereafter have been made in collaboration with Jean Céleyrette for an edition project. 8. See the analysis of alteration in Aristoteles, Physica, V.2, 226b 1-2. 9. The expression comes from the Liber Sex Principiorum (ed. L. Minio-Paluello – B.G. Dod, in: Aristoteles latinus, I, 6-7 [Categoriarum supplementa], Bruges – Paris, 1966, n° 89-90, p. 56).

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However, Aquinas’s response is not entirely satisfying. He contends that to be more “established” or “rooted” in a subject means, for an accidental form, to augment “in essence” (essentialiter). But this does not account sufficiently for canonical expressions such as “charity deserves to be augmented” (caritas meretur augeri), which seems to imply that charity itself can be intensified, and not just that an immutable form of charity can become more established in a soul, or is more participated in that soul.10 The inherence of an accidental form in a subject certainly can increase or decrease, but inherence is a property that is common to all accidents and is different from their quidditative content or specific nature. What we want to be able to say is that the quidditative content itself varies, not just the “being in” of the form; and what we want to know is why certain accidental forms only (those of the third kind of qualities)11 can be intensified and diminished, and not the others, whereas all are “in” a subject. Must not this be related to their intrinsic nature? We shall see that, as a result of this problem with Aquinas’s solution, some self-styled followers of Aquinas such as Hervaeus Natalis are inclined to admit a “latitude” within intensifiable forms.12 These forms must have a certain margin of indetermination to make possible their being participated in more or less by the subjects in which they are received. The novel point is that the variation in reception is conditioned not only by the receptivity of the subject, but also by this relative indetermination of the form, instead of the form being absolutely rigid and not modifiable. This represents a departure from Aquinas’s original position, even though Aquinas himself seems to say as much in a few texts.13 C. On the other hand, other followers of Aquinas on this count strictly maintain the absolute determination and immutability of the forms. This is the case with both Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines. For Giles, the esse of the form can vary (in accordance with the way it is received in a subject), while its essence remains what it is without 10. The expression comes from Augustine and Alypius, Epist. 186 (ad Paulinum), 3.10 (CSEL t. 57, p. 53). It is most often adduced in discussions about charity in commentaries on d. 17 of book I of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, which is the locus classicus for theologians to discuss the intensification/remission of qualities. 11. See Aristoteles, Categoriae 8, 10b 27-29. 12. See J.-L. Solère, “Les variations qualitatives dans les théories post-thomistes,” in: Revue Thomiste 1 (2012), pp. 157-204. Cf. a similar remark about the too simple image of Nédellec as “champion of Thomism” in: I. Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas, Oxford 2005, p. 92. 13. See J.-L. Solère, “Thomas d’Aquin et les variations qualitatives,” p. 155-157.

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any variation.14 For Godfrey, essences are likewise incapable of variation, and their intensification or remission consists in a succession of individually distinct forms. Naturally, they are tokens of the same species or nature; but each is a different “individual contraction” of that nature, as Godfrey puts it. Each form is in itself non-intensifiable and represents a fixed degree of a quality. When they succeed each other, a variation in degree occurs, each being more intense (or less) than the previous one.15 However, the introduction of a new form or degree presupposes that the previous one is destroyed, since two forms of a same species cannot be actualized at the same time in the same subject; nor can the new one merge with the previous one or combine with it. Consequently, the apparent continuous increase or decrease of one and the same quality is in fact, for Godfrey, a series of instantaneous replacement of one form by another of the same species but of a different intensity, that is to say, a series of corruptions and generations of different accidents. Transitory forms unceasingly succeed each other in the same subject until the end of the process. As I will show in the following pages, Godfrey’s solution was favorably received by James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain as an alternative to both Giles’ theory and Godin’s mere repetition of Aquinas. This led them to steer away from the official Thomistic orthodoxy sought by the Dominican order, and triggered the intervention of Hervaeus Natalis (even though he himself was not completely faithful to Aquinas, as noted above and as we will see again below). 2. Godfrey’s Arguments for the Succession Theory Let us first review some of Godfrey’ arguments, since they will be tirelessly discussed by those who support his view as well as those who push back against it. 14. Egidii .... Primus sententiarum ... correctus a .... Augustino Montifalconio ..., Venise 1521, d. 17 p. II, q. 1, a. un., f. 95 va – 96 vb. 15. “Quare cum non possit attendi magis et minus in qualitatibus secundum rationem speciei quia in indivisibili consistit, oportet quod attendatur secundum rationem individuorum. Et quia etiam esse individui in quantum individui est, simplex est, si fiat transmutatio in individuo secundum magis et minus, sit etiam transmutatio ipsius individui, manente tamen specie eadem” (Quodlibet II, q. 10, éditée par ed. M. De Wulf – A. Pelzer, Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain 1904, p. 145. See the studies mentioned in fn. 1.

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G1: An action has a form for end point (terminus), that is, it is directed at the actualization of a form. Two different actions must have two different end points.16 For instance, as Aristotle remarks, the health (which is an accidental form) restored after a disease is not the same health that was had before the disease, because each of them results from a different action.17 Now, if we warm up something to a certain degree of heat, stop for a moment, then warm it up again to a higher degree, two actions have been successively carried out. Therefore, two different end points have been successively reached; two forms have been successively actualized.

This is to say that the second degree is not the first degree intensified, but another form, distinct from the first one. The first form has been actualized, then destroyed and replaced by another more intense form. G2: If the higher degree of the quality is not a form that is other than the lower degree of the same quality, the higher degree is not really different from the lower degree, which is absurd. There must be in the higher degree something that was not in the lower degree. But if there is in the higher degree something that was not in the lower degree, they are two different forms, because forms are indivisible.18 G3: The starting point and the end point of a change process, i.e. the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem, must be really distinct from each other, otherwise there would be no change.19 This is obvious in local motion (one has to leave a place in order to arrive at another), and also in alteration in the 16. Q. Ord. 18, ed. J. Céleyrette – J.-L. Solère, p. 96: “duo actiones non terminantur ad unam formam, sed contingit calidum factum fieri postea magis calidum et constat quod alia actione; ergo corrumpitur calor primus et generabitur nouus et sic idem calor non poterit intendi et remitti.” 17. Q. Ord. 18, p. 97: “sanitas in mane et vespere non est una, sicut videtur philosophus innuere quinto physicorum, et hoc quia pluribus actionibus conseruata, ergo a simili et multo plus, calor intensus et remissus ad quos terminantur diuerse actiones non possunt esse unus calor.” 18. Quodl. XIV q. 5, ed. J. Hoffmans, Les Quodlibets treize et quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain 1935, p. 416: “impossibile est quod magis album differat a minus albo aliquo modo realiter, et tamen magis album non sit res alia a minus albo, vel in magis albo non sit res aliqua quae non erat in minus albo.” 19. Quodl. XIV q. 5, p. 415: “nulla transmutatio realis est in qua terminus ad quem realiter non differt a termino a quo.” Q. Ord. 18, p. 97: “in motu intensionis fit motus a minus calido ad magis calidum, sed nunquam mobile pertingit in aliquo motu ad terminum ad quem nisi prius totaliter ablato termino a quo; ergo nunquam aliquid potest moueri ad acquirendum calorem intensum nisi prius corrupto calore remisso et sic idem quod prius.”

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strict sense, for instance in a change of color (from white to black, say).20 The same rule applies to intensio/remissio changes, like a change from white to whiter. This entails that the more intense whiteness is really distinct from the less intense whiteness that was in the same subject; it has to be another form.

In other words, the two forms are numerically distinct, although they belong to the same species. Their subject is not determined by the same contractio of the accidental quality before and after the change.21 Through the intensification process, the same specific nature remains, but the individual occurrences of this nature succeed each other. An ever more intense occurrence of this nature replaces the previous ones. 3. James of Metz An early witness to the influence of Godfrey on some Dominicans at the beginning of the 14th century is James of Metz.22 It is believed that the manuscript 992 kept in the “Médiathèque du Grand Troyes,” as the town library is now called, contains his first round of lectures on the Sentences, probably given in Reims before 1300, and “Additions” which are believed to derive from a James’s secunda lectura, probably given in Paris in 13001301, just after Godin, according to Chris Schabel’s latest research.23 The 20. Quodl. IX q. 11, ed. J. Hoffmans, Le Neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain 1928, p. 249: “ut manifeste patet in motu locali, mobile toto tempore habet semper esse in alio et alio nisi secundum rem, licet non in actu; iam enim non esset motus.” 21. Quodl. XIV q. 5, p. 416: “Et sicut ibidem declaratum fuit, non sufficit dicere quod magis et minus dicunt diversos modos reales eiusdem formae secundum quos fieri potest talis variatio realis, quoniam impossibile est quod magis album differat a minus albo aliquo modo realiter et tamen magis album non sit res alia a minus albo vel in magis albo non sit res aliqua quae non erat in minus albo (...)” (modified punctuation). 22. Cf. M. Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis, Münster in W. 2010, p. 334. 23. C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” in: R.H. Pich – A. Speer (eds.), Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought. A Tribute to Kent Emery, Jr., Leiden 2018, pp. 342-426; id., “James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin on the procession of the Holy Spirit (and the generation of the Son),” in the present volume. W. Duba – C. Schabel, “Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year Sentences lecture at Paris,” in: Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévales 84/1 (2017), pp. 143-179, convincingly show that in general lectures on all four books of the Sentences were delivered within the span of a single academic year, rather than over two years, which implies a revision of all timelines (see the list of the Dominican sententiarii ibid., p. 157, and also C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” p. 355).

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other manuscripts of James’s work reflect another version of this secunda lectura. I will rely mostly on the Troyes manuscript, which, with its Additiones, offers a fuller picture of James’s thinking about the intensification and remission of qualities. On that topic, James’s main target in book I, d. 17, p. 2, q. 1, is Giles of Rome. However, he significantly departs from Aquinas’s position too, insofar as Giles and Thomas, while they think that in general essences cannot vary in any way, both make an exception for those that derive their species from something to which they are related. The argument brought up by Giles to make room for this sole exception is directly borrowed from Aquinas. So when James criticizes this argument, it is in effect a passage of the Summa Theologiae (IaIIae, q. 52, art.1) that he is taking to task. No type of accidental form has a special status, he objects, and what is said of one must be said of the others. If some accidental forms cannot vary in essence by intensification, none can. But this is belied by obvious examples, including motion. Conversely, if some accidental forms can have a variation in essence, then all can, contrary to Thomas’s and Giles’s claim. In the next question (q. 2), James turns to the way in which intensification or remission are carried out. After first gainsaying the addition theory with the standard argument that no addable or subtractable distinct parts can be isolated in an essence, and then presenting a theory of Thomistic inspiration which might be Thomas of Sutton’s, James introduces Godfrey’s theory of succession and supports it with four arguments. The first one is directly borrowed from Godfrey’s own first argument. It rests on the relation between an action and the terminus of the action: J1: Any new action, and therefore any augmentation or remission, has a new end point, that is to say, results in the actualization of a new form, which presupposes the corruption of the previous form; hence, the process is a succession of different forms.24

However, James develops this argument in an interesting way. The end point of an intensification or remission is either an essence, or some esse, or a mode of being (this tripartite division is supposed to exhaust all the possibilities).25 24. Ms. Troyes Bibl. Munic. 992 (hereafter T) f. 45ra l. 42 – f. 45 rb l. 19. 25. In this question James again principally targets Giles of Rome.

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a) If the end point of the action is a new essence, either the previous essence has been corrupted, which is what had to be proven, or it has not been corrupted. If the second, then the previous essence remains while the new end point is acquired. This new end point must be aggregated to the essence previously held, because two essences of the same kind cannot coexist in the same subject. Therefore, the augmented nature has parts and is not simple—which cannot be admitted. b) If the end point of the action is a new esse (which is specifically Giles’s view), the same demonstration ensues: either this esse subsists together with the new esse of the acquired form, but this is impossible because the esse of a form must be as simple as its essence is; or the esse of the initial form is destroyed, and so its essence is destroyed too, QED. c) If the end point is a mode of being (modus essendi) of the form, two alternatives branch out. First, this mode might be something absolute, that is, a form. But then, by the same reasoning as before, the previous mode must be corrupted, and so why not admit that the previous form itself (not just its mode) is corrupted? Or, second, one might claim that this mode is something relative. But this is impossible because the intensification or remission, which is a real action, cannot have for its end point something which is not absolute.

James’s second argument rephrases Godfrey’s second argument: J2: In any change whatsoever, and at every instant, that according to which there is change is always different. For instance, in a local motion the place (ubi) of the body in motion is constantly different. But that according to which there is change is always a form; such is the case for the ubi, or for a quality of the third kind in an intensification/remission. In fact, any change whatsoever always involves a modification of one of the forms that the subject of the change has. Whereas the subject itself remains the same through an accidental change, one of its accidental forms varies, and this is why the subject can be said to be now otherwise than it was. But if the accidental form is modified, it has to become radically other, because this form is the instantiation of a certain essence, and as such is simple. This particular form is the quality obtaining in a certain degree, and another degree has to

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be another form, another instantiation of the same quality. Therefore, the previous form must be corrupted and a new one introduced.26

James’s third argument rests on the nature of change itself, in accordance with Godfrey’s third argument: J3: In any change whatsoever, the initial condition (terminus a quo) and the end point (terminus ad quem) must be different and cannot occur simultaneously: the very nature of change is the passing from one to the other, the subject leaving the initial condition to acquire a new state. Therefore, the same form cannot obtain at the start and at the end of the change.27

The Additions of the Troyes manuscript offer a fourth argument, described as “trickier” (difficilior). Let us note first that this argument seems to be James’s creation, and second that it is found only in the version of the secunda lectura given by the Troyes Additions, and not in the other manuscripts of the secunda lectura. J4: Suppose that a fire just starts warming up water. This is the very beginning of an alteration, but no form of heat is actualized yet, for if one immediately stops the process, the water is still cold, and the form coldness cannot coexist with the form of heat (we’ll get back to this point momentarily). However, the fire did act, and therefore did cause something in the water. The only possibility left is that it caused a lesser coldness, rather than some heat. But this lesser coldness cannot be the initial form of coldness that would have been simply diminished, because such weakening would only be a privation, whereas the action of the fire, which is a real and positive action, must have a positive result. Thence, one must conclude that the fire actualized a new form, which is a token of coldness at a lesser degree. This, in turn, implies that the initial form of coldness has been destroyed, for the reasons we saw above.28

However, one might ask, why would cold and heat not be able to coexist in the same subject? James notes that some people maintain that this is 26. T f. 45 rb l. 19-29. Cf. C. Schabel, “Place, space, and the physics of grace,” pp. 127-130. 27. T f. 45 rb l. 29-35. 28. T f. 16 rb l. 13-37.

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not impossible if cold and heat are not in their maximum degrees, but are each in an intermediary degree.29 But he rejects this idea. Even if cold and heat are attenuated qualities and are not maximally contrary to each other, they have respectively the status of terminus a quo and ad quem and are therefore incompatible in the same instant. This again is the thrust of Godfrey’s second argument: the two limits (termini) of change, the starting point and the end point, cannot coexist. The first state of affairs must have ceased to exist before the second can be reached. In other words, the first form must be destroyed for another one to be actualized. In a somehow endearing manner, James does not rest his case but raises four doubts about the theory he has just defended, and in the end candidly admits he has no response for one of them, namely the difficulty that arises from the fourth argument I have just presented. The problem with the idea that, by a brief application of heat to cold water, a diminished cold succeeds to a more intense cold, is that it looks absurd that something hot should cause coldness, albeit a diminished one. Something hot can only actualize heat, because every agent produces something similar to itself. James envisions two ways of solving this difficulty.30 The first way distinguishes between production of the last effect of a process and production of an intermediary effect, that is a step towards the last effect. An example of this is the production of sperm, which precedes the production of the end effect, a new living being. This example is supposed to show that it is possible for an agent (a living being) to produce first, as an intermediary effect, an effect that does not resemble it (the sperm, which is not a living being), before producing the end effect, which does resemble it (another living being). Likewise, heat may begin its action by producing something opposite to its nature (remitted coldness), provided that this is only a step towards the end of the action, which is to cause heat in the water. James, however is reluctant to accept this solution. It defies our imagination, he says, to admit that heat could cause coldness in any way whatsoever. 29. This is what Duns Scotus, for instance, objects against Godfrey in Ordinatio, l. I, d. 17 pars 2, q. 2, in: Opera Omnia, t. V, Vatican 1959, § 242, p. 255. 30. T f. 16 rb l.60 - 16 va l.44. Cf. Iohannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, l. I, d. 17 pars 2, q. 1, in: Opera Omnia, t. V, Vatican 1959, § 212, p. 243. We will review below another difficulty raised by James, together with the objection made by the Correctorium fratris Iacobi Metensis (see, below, CO1, p. 314).

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The second way relies on the idea that two agents, one hot and the other cold, for instance fire and air, can act on the same patient and produce one shared effect. Thus, the fire heats the water while the surrounding air cools it down, and their common effect that is first produced is a diminished coldness, because at that moment the action of the air is still more powerful than the action of the fire. In this process, the fire produces nothing but heat; but the action of the air explains that the result is for now only a diminished coldness. However, James rejects this solution too. Suppose that the water is heated up in an oven. There, the air is hot too. Take the water container out of the oven just after having put it in: the water is still cold, even if it is cold in a lesser degree. Nonetheless, both the fire and the hot air must have had an action, however brief, and this action cannot be but the actualization of some heat. What happened to this heat? “I do not see any solution to this,” James confesses. What perplexes him is that instead of simply admitting that the action of heat is to destroy some degrees of the form of coldness (as the addition theory wants it), he is committed to show that it causes a whole new form of coldness, and he cannot explain how this is possible. This is a serious blow to the succession theory, which James leaves unanswered. In his wake, opponents and supporters of the theory will fiercely discuss the case at hand.31 4. Hervaeus Natalis and the CORRECTORIUM FRATRIS IACOBI METENSIS

James quickly was the target of reprehensions emanating from his own order. On the one hand, in his commentary on the Sentences Hervaeus Natalis criticizes James. On the other hand, a text known as the Correctorium fratris Iacobi Metensis, today preserved in a single manuscript, Le Mans Bibliothèque Municipale 231, discusses forty-three contentious theses of James. In both works, the succession theory is part of what James is blamed for. Hervaeus likely commented on the Sentences in 1302-1303,32 that 31. Peter Auriol still uses the same example around 1317. See the passage of the Reportatio quoted by C. Schabel, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol’s Sentences Commentary,” in: Vivarium 38/1 (2000), 117-161, pp. 119-120. 32. According to W. Duba – C. Schabel, “Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year Sentences lecture at Paris,” p. 157 (see also C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” p. 355). Earlier, it was generally believed that Hervaeus lectured in Paris from 1302 to 1304.

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is, shortly after James. In a recent book, Mikolaj Olszewski has identified the manuscripts Bordeaux Bibliothèque Municipale 147 and Troyes Bibliothèque Municipale (“Médiathèque du Grand Troyes”) 262 as witnesses of a first version (a reportatio? an ordinatio?) of Hervaeus’ commentary, whereas the second version, a later redaction, is more common and well-known.33 However, as far as the question on how intensification and remission occur is concerned (l. I, dist.17, “Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem”), the first version34 does not differ much from the second version,35 which I have consulted in the 1647 edition checked with the manuscripts Basel Universitätsbibliothek B IV 13 and Firenze Bibl. Naz., conv. sopp. B I 569. As I will show, in both versions Hervaeus discusses James’s secunda lectura.36 As for the Correctorium, it was probably written about the same period. James likely disappeared from the stage shortly after having commented on the Sentences for the second time (in any case, we have no other trace of him whatsoever.) But Josef Koch has noted that the following passage of the Correctorium talks about James as if he were still alive: “Sed iste [James] dicit quod non videt hanc solutionem. Roget ergo Deum ut aperiat sibi oculos, ut possit videre; non video aliud remedium.”37 If that is correct, the Correctorium, which refers also to James’s secunda lectura (as I’ll show momentarily), must have been compiled not too long after 1301, that is to say, around the time Hervaeus was commenting on the Sentences in his turn. In fact, Koch attributed the Correctorium to Hervaeus himself, on the grounds that there are numerous parallel passages in Hervaeus’ Commentary.38 This ascription has recently been challenged by Olszewski because the conception of theology as a discipline that the Correctorium attacks 33. Olszewski, Dominican Theology at the Crossroads, p. 11. 34. Troyes BM 262, f. 46vb – 48ra; Bordeaux BM 147, f. 47r-48r. 35. Except that in the Bordeaux manuscript, the question suddenly ends after the presentation of the third opinion, with the result that it includes neither Hervaeus’ answer nor the replies to others’ arguments. 36. This counterbalances Olszewski’s remark (Dominican Theology, p. 3) that Hervaeus used James’s prima lectura to write the prologue to his Commentary. To be clear: I do not deny that Hervaeus knew the prima lectura; I will just point out that he discusses an argument that is probably James’s and is found only in the latter’s secunda lectura. 37. Ms. Le Mans 231, f. 170 va. See J. Koch, “Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.,” in: Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 4 (1929-30), 169-232, pp. 206-207, and id., Durandus de S. Porciano O. P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. I. Teil : Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung, Münster in W. 1927, p. 271. 38. See Koch, “Jakob von Metz,” pp. 194-202.

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is not only James’s but also Hervaeus’39 – unsurprisingly so, because, as Oslzewski has shown too,40 Hervaeus extensively reproduced passages of the prologue of James’s Commentary on the Sentences in his own Commentary. As for the latter point, however, I’ll note that, as strange as it may be, it would not be the only time that a censor plagiarized (to use an anachronistic concept) the very victim of his censorship. Even though James of Lausanne was, as a baccalaureus sententiarius, a member of the Dominican commission presided over by Hervaeus that investigated Durand of Saint-Pourçain’s alleged errors in 1314, he felt free to copy extensively from Durand’s Commentary when, in the same year or the following one, he wrote his own Commentary (hopefully on topics that were not among the articles censored; at least, that is the case for the issue of intension/remission.)41 So the fact that Hervaeus took advantage of James’s prologue may be not conclusive regarding Hervaeus’ noninvolvement in the Correctorium. Perhaps Olszewski’s other argument, based on the conception of theology attacked by the Correctorium and shared by James and Hervaeus, is more decisive. However, as far as the two questions on the intensification/remission of forms are concerned, not only is the Correctorium perfectly in phase with Hervaeus’ position, but q. 6 contains two passages that are word for word identical with Hervaeus’ Commentary on the Sentences, book I, d. 17, q. 4, a.1. These passages constitute the core of the responsio in the Correctorium, and they are respectively 38 and 47 lines long, out of the 137 lines of the whole question. Furthermore, q. 7 contains four shorter passages that are nearly identical with passages of q. 5 of Hervaeus’ Commentary. This raises the question of whether the author of the Correctorium copied from Hervaeus, or Hervaeus from the author of the Correctorium, in case they are not one and the same person.42 I shall leave at that the question of the authorship of the Correctorium, which still requires much research. Whatever the case may be, it is certain that the author, as Hervaeus in 39. Dominican Theology at the Crossroads, p. 315. 40. Ibid., p. vi, 3, 11, and passim. 41. See J. Céleyrette – J.-L. Solère, “Jacques de Lausanne, censeur et plagiaire de Durand de Saint-Pourçain: édition de la q. 2, d. 17 du l. I, de son Commentaire des Sentences,” in: K. Emery – R.L. Friedman – A. Speer, Medieval Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, Leiden 2011, pp. 855-890. 42. Another possible explanation would be that the Correctorium has in fact several authors. Hervaeus would have taken care of the part on intensification/remission (among other topics), while the nature of theology would have been dealt with by someone else, who happened to be in disagreement with Hervaeus too.

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his Commentary, was using James’s secunda lectura,43 at least for book I, since he mentions some dubia about James’s d. 17, p. 2, q. 1 that are only in the Troyes Additiones, and discusses the meaning of the passage of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae quoted by James solely in the Troyes Additiones. Very likely, the author of the Correctorium worked on a text close to the one we know through the Troyes manuscript under the form prima lectura plus Additiones. 4.1. The Latitude of Forms according to Hervaeus and the CORRECTORIUM Even though they criticize James, let us note that, in the matter of why certain qualitative forms can vary in intensity and whether this variation affects their essence, both the Correctorium (f. 151 vb – 152 rb, ) and Hervaeus’ Commentary (Sent. I, d. 17, q. 4) substantially modify Aquinas’s position, inasmuch as they abandon the fixity of the forms that are intensifiable.44 These forms are not exactly like numbers, contrary to Aristotle’s dictum; they comprise a certain margin of indetermination, a range of possible degrees.45 Aristotle only wanted 43. As J. Koch had noticed (“Jakob von Metz,” pp. 202-207). 44. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sum. Theol. IaIIae, q.52 a.1 c.: “(…) species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei, necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor et albedo (…).” 45. See Aristoteles, Metaphysica, VIII.3, 1043b33- 1044a9; cf. James of metz, Secunda lectura, T f. 15 vb l. 29-35, and Hervaeus Natalis, In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria, l. I d. 17 q. 4 a. 2, ad 3m, Paris 1647, p. 95a C-D. Ibid., pp. 93b D - 94a A: “(…) videtur mihi quod ratio quare aliqua forma suscipit magis et minus, est indeterminatio formae specificae, secundum quam est indeterminata ad hoc quod in sua essentia, vel saltem in suo esse ut alii dicunt, sit magis perfecta vel minus perfecta: quam indeterminationem alii latitudinem vel in essentia vel in esse nominant.” Cf. Subtilissima Heruei Natalis Britonis (…) quolibeta undecim (…), Venise 1513, reprint Ridgewood (N.J.) 1966, Quodl. VI q. 11, f. 135 vb: “in formis suscipientibus magis et minus, est quedam latitudo graduum, ita quod albedo intensa est quantum ad essentiam suam perfectior quam albedo remissa, non ita quod ista differentia graduum sit secundum absolutam rationem forme, quia differre secundum absolutam rationem forme est differre specie. Sed quia in natura forme est habilitas ad istam latitudinem graduum habendam in sua essentia, ex hoc quod non determinat sibi gradum indivisibilem et precisum quo participetur a suo subiecto, siue sit accidens separabile siue non, siue habeat esse in pluribus speciebus siue non.” I take this occasion to say that, although the authenticity of this 6th Quodlibet (one of the Quodlibeta minora) ascribed to Nédellec has been doubted, its q. 11 presents no doctrinal difference with Nédellec’s other texts and is extremely close in the language, as can be seen in the previous passage and other quotes below. See also Amerini’s article in this volume p. 173 fn. 19.

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to say that their indetermination has limits, which cannot be exceeded without the intensification becoming a true alteration, that is, a change of species. In this, the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary are in agreement with James. The doctrine that all forms are totally rigid (i.e., that there is no latitude in intensifiable qualities) proved to be untenable for these Dominicans of the beginning of the 14th century.46 Nevertheless, the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary try to interpret Aquinas in a way that aligns him with this view. Thomas’s thought is misinterpreted, they claim, if one makes him say (as Giles of Rome does) that absolute accidental forms such as qualities do not have in themselves a latitude of degrees.47 A more intense whiteness is not just the same form received more perfectly. It is in itself (as opposed to: qua received) a more perfect whiteness than a less intense whiteness. Admittedly, the participation of the form by the subject can be greater or lesser, but the condition for this is that there must be a greater or lesser perfection in the essence of the accidental quality itself (“maioritas vel minoritas quantum ad perfectionem forme”).48 Thus, a more intense whiteness has a greater perfection in essence than a less intense one. Both the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary invoke the ad tertium of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 4, where Thomas writes that for an accidental form, to be more rooted in its subject is to be augmented in essence. This expression must be taken literally, which implies that something has changed in the essence itself. And when Aquinas writes (IaIIae, q. 52 a. 1) that that from which things have their species must be indivisible, one must understand that he is not speaking of some indivisibility in degrees within a form, but only of the formal differences that divide a genus. This is why Thomas does not say that that from which things have their species is strictly indivisible, but that it is “quasi indivisible,” the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary contend. However, our authors do not lapse into the Franciscan conception of the composition of forms. The linchpin of their thesis consists in admitting, not distinct degrees in this latitude, as in the Franciscan 46. Cf. already Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort), Commentaire sur les Sentences, ed. J.-P. Müller, Rome 1961, vol. 1, p. 207 l. 136-137: “Dicendum ergo quod forma accidentalis habet latitudinem infra quam sunt diversi gradus secundum quos potest augeri et minui” (see also p. 201 l. 61, p. 202 l. 82). 47. See Hervaeus Natalis, I Sent., d. 17 q. 4 a. 1, p. 93a. 48. See Hervaeus Natalis, ibid., p. 94a-b.

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theory, but “virtual parts,” which are not determinable (signabiles) and cannot be added to each other properly speaking, but have a lesser or greater perfection in such a way that an inferior degree is virtually contained in a higher degree.49 As for the exception Aquinas makes regarding relative forms (Sum. Theol. IIaIIae, q. 24, a. 5), his thinking may have been poorly explained by some (probably Giles again), the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary claim.50 James is right, they both concede, when he points out that the terminus ad quem of a process, which is the form acquired by that change, is not different from the change itself. Change, in fact, is the very same form on the way towards actualization; complete actualization is the end of the process. James is also right to say that it is impossible that something obtains its intrinsic essence by reference to something extrinsic, especially in the case of forms that belong to an absolute category of being (in contrast to the category of relation), such as qualities are. However, a specific nature may include something extrinsic in obliquo, for instance a final cause (at least the proximate final cause) or an efficient cause. This is how, for instance, a habit is specified by that towards which it is directed. Although they have by themselves their own nature, this nature includes a reference to their object. It is in that sense, the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary contend, 49. Correctorium q. 7, ms. Le Mans 231, f. 152 va: “Modo dico quod forma intensa non est diversa a remissa sicut totum a toto, sicut albedo a nigredine, sed magis sicut totum a parte, ita quod forma remissa se habet sicut pars et sicut id quod exceditur, sed intensa se habet sicut totum, non quidem secundum partes signabiles sed secundum partes virtuales.” Nédellec, I Sent. d. 17 q. 5, p. 98a, A-C: “Quarta opinio quae videtur mihi ad praesens magis probabilis, est quod illud augmentum non fiat per additionem gradus ad gradum, ita quod sint ibi duo gradus distincti, quorum unus addatur alteri, et unus possit distincte signari ab altero: sed fit tale augmentum per hoc quod forma eadem quae prius erat imperfecta fit perfectior, ita quod ipsa facta intensa, habet plus quam prius, non secundum diversas partes signabiles, sed virtuales: ita quod primus gradus continetur in secunda virtute: sicut si aliqua aqua bicubita rarefiat et fiat tricubita, quantitas aquae rarefactae continet plus quam prius (...) non quidem secundum partem signabilem quae posset divisim signari ab aliis duobus cubitis praecedentibus, sed secundum partes virtuales.” Nédellec perhaps shows here some hesitation, as he submits, he says, “the opinion which presently seems to me more probable.” However, as we will see in his Quodlibet II, this solution will become definitive. For the sake of room, I cannot explore more this notion of virtual parts here, but I intend to show elsewhere that Nédellec probably took this idea from Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort), I Sent. (ed. Müller, vol. 1, q.71 [= d.17 q.3], pp. 208-209) or Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibet III. On the example of rarefactions, cf. Peter Auriol as explained by C. Schabel, “Place, space, and the physics of grace,” p. 123. 50. Correctorium, q. 6, f. 151 vb – 152 ra; Hervaeus Natalis, I Sent. d. 17 q. 4, p. 93ab. The two passages are nearly identical.

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that the whole of Aquinas’s remark must be understood. Let us note, however, that the point is moot: Thomas introduced this remark to accommodate the exceptional case of motion and like realities that do intensify or increase in essence, but the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary admit as much for all intensifiable natures. 4.2. Refutation of James of Metz On the other hand, the question of how intensification occurs is the real bone of contention between James and his fellow Dominicans. Both the Correctorium (f. 152 rb – 152 vb ) and Hervaeus’ Commentary (I, d. 17, q. 5) strenuously oppose the succession theory. However, the Correctorium focuses on James, as one would expect, whereas Hervaeus’ Commentary takes a wider view: “Ista positio, licet sit magnorum et subtilis …,”51 Hervaeus writes, by which he surely alludes not to James, but more likely to the venerable Godfrey, and to Thomas of Bailly, who resolutely defended Godfrey’s thesis.52 Nevertheless, after presenting in support of the succession theory two arguments that can be traced back

51. P. 97a, D. 52. See the note in the margin: “Contra opinionem Thomae” (p. 97a C), which refers, not to Thomas Aquinas, who does not hold this position, as we saw, but to Thomas of Bailly, who does sustain it in q. 15 of his Quodlibet III (see below p. 315). See also Bailly’s Quodl. III q. 16 and Quodl. IV q. 11. Licensed in theology around 1300, Bailly disputed as master actu regens six quodlibetal questions between 1301 and 1307. He became chancellor of the University in 1316. Dumont suggests that he jumped into the defense of Godfrey’s theory after Scotus’s extensive attack against the latter (“Godfrey of Fontaines and the succession theory,” p. 102). Additionally, let us note that Godfrey was back to teaching in Paris around 1303-1304. R. Lambertini, “Political Quodlibeta,” in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta, t. I, p.459, has shown that the date of his Quodlibet III must be moved earlier than the year 1305 suggested by Glorieux (P. Glorieux, Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie, Paris 1933, notice 214; La Littérature quodlibétique II, Paris 1935, pp. 273-277). Given that it is certain that Bailly’s Quodlibet IV was held at Lent 1304 (since Bailly mentions the bull Inter cunctas, dated Feb. 17, 1304, and speaks of Benedict XI as being alive, whereas the latter died on July 7, 1304), his Quodlibet III must have been disputed in 1303 (Lent or Advent), which makes quite likely a dialogue with Nédellec, who was commenting or had just commented the Sentences at that time. This is confirmed, I think, by the fact that Bailly discusses and rejects at length the case of nutrition as a suitable comparison for intensification processes (Quodl. III, q. 15, ed. P. Glorieux, Quodlibets, texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, Paris 1960, pp. 211 and 216-217), which precisely is used by Nédellec and the Correctorium (see below pp. 317-318). The fourth opinion that Bailly attacks in q. 11 of his Quodl. IV (ed. Glorieux, pp. 284-285) is also probably Nédellec’s (cf. CR2/NR2 and CR3/NR3 below, p. 318).

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to Godfrey (see arguments G3 and G2, above),53 Hervaeus adds a third one, which I have found only in James: J4 (see NO2 hereafter). Unless this argument has in fact another origin, this seems to imply that James was important enough for Hervaeus to take him into account in his Sentences commentary. Moreover, discussions about this argument recur in the debate between Hervaeus and Durand of Saint-Pourçain that we will review next. As for the Correctorium, it reports, naturally enough, only the arguments found in James, namely, the three arguments that were already in the prima lectura (J1, J2, J3), plus the additional argument introduced by the secunda lectura (J4). Interestingly, the Correctorium presents them in the following order: J1, J4, J2, J3. This is perhaps the sign that the author had a version of James’s secunda lectura in which J4, known to us from the Additiones in the Troyes manuscript, was included in the main text as the second argument (as it should if one follows the instructions given by the Additiones, T f. 16 rb l. 10-13). If so, this version of the secunda lectura was different from what we have, since J4 is found in no other manuscript than Troyes, as I said earlier. Further, perhaps as another indication of a different version of James’s secunda lectura, it is noteworthy that in J4 as reported by both the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary the example offered is the opposite of the example proposed in the Troyes Additiones: instead of an intensification of heat, the talk is of a diminution of heat. Let us first examine the objections presented by the Correctorium and Hervaeus’ Commentary against the succession theory. The Correctorium notes with irony that James himself raised enough objections against his own position.54 Hence, the author decides that he does not have to add more objections (contrary to what Hervaeus does in his Commentary), but only to refute James’s arguments in favor of the succession theory. However, after rejecting these arguments (as we’ll see momentarily), the Correctorium lingers on the third doubt that James formulated against his own solution.55 If in each instant of an intensification the previous form is destroyed and a new form generated, this change is in reality a discontinuous series of mutations, or, rather,

53. Also argument 2 in Bailly’s Quodlibet III q. 15, p. 209. 54. Ms. Le Mans 231, q. 7, f. 152 va. See above p. 310. 55. Correctorium f. 152 vb.

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of mutata esse, or again, if you will, a series of leaps from degree to degree, whereas an essential characteristic of change, in the framework of Aristotelian natural philosophy, is its continuity.56 A first answer to this difficulty, which James reports, was given by Godfrey himself.57 During a local motion, the mobile is at no time totally in actuality in a place (this would be rest); it is only in a place in actuality mixed with potentiality, passing through this place and tending to another one. This, according to Godfrey, makes its motion continuous. Likewise, in an intensification/remission the mobile never is in complete actuality under any of the intermediary forms. As each of these forms only has an imperfect being (esse imperfectum), their distinction and succession does not prevent the change from being continuous. However, James is not convinced by this response. At every moment of the process, he thinks, the subject of change must be under a form in full actuality: it has a certain degree of heat or a degree of whiteness, for instance. Instead, James proposes giving up on the requirement of continuity for changes in the category of quality, as opposed to other changes.58 Local motion is continuous because of the continuous quantity (magnitudo) in which it takes place. In a qualitative change, there may be continuity too with respect to the subject, due to its extension, that is to say, in case its parts are affected one after the other, without interruption. But as far as intensification as such is concerned (i.e. the intensification of a quality in one and the same part), continuity is not necessary. The model to follow is not that of local motion, but that of illumination. The whole volume of air is instantaneously illuminated (or so the Aristotelians believed) as soon as the source of light is actualized, at least if all the parts of air are equally disposed to receive this illumination. Likewise, in an alteration, when a subject is in the ultimate state of preparation, it receives a quality instantaneously. But, 56. T f. 45 rb l. 48 – 45 va l. 2: “Aliud dubium est quod mutatio ad formam accidentalem que est alteratio non erit continua set componeretur ex tot mutatis esse quot sunt gradus in essencia forme, puta albedinis uel caritatis.” T f. 16 va l. 45-49 (Addition, secunda lectura): “Tertium dubium est quod secundum hanc positionem alteracio non esset motus continuus sed agregatio mutatorum esse, quoniam videmus mutatio est corruptio unius et generatio alterius. Set per te in alteratione non est nisi corruptio gradus imperfecti forme et generatio gradus perfecti. Ergo non sunt ibi nisi mutata esse, quod est contra philosophum 6° physicorum.” 57. T f. 45 va l. 2-12. Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, Quodl. IX q. 11, p. 249. 58. T f. 45 va l. 12-23.

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in an intensification/remission, each degree is the ultimate preparation for the next degree. Therefore, passing from one to the other is instantaneous, that is, is a mutation rather than a continuous change. The Correctorium staunchly rejects this idea: CO1: Continuity is essential to any kind of change (“est passio motus in communi”). When Aristotle says that something can be instantaneously altered (like the air illuminated), he is not speaking of an alteration as a process, but of the result of this process, the resulting state (alteratum esse), which obtains immediately. When there really is a process, this change cannot be but continuous, and if there is an interruption at some point, what happens next is another process, not the continuation of the same process. It is therefore impossible that an intensification or a remission be a series of leaps or instantaneous changes.59

On the other hand, Hervaeus’ Commentary, probably due to the reference to the “magni,” discusses the succession theory rather reverenter. Hervaeus does not declare it absurd, or even false, but only warns that it is open to serious objections. He presents three of them. NO1: A change made of successive, numerically different forms, would require an infinite number of such forms. The reason behind this is that in the span of time in which this change takes place, there is an infinity of instants. Accordingly, there must be an infinity of degrees of the quality, because if the change is not interrupted, there are no two instants in which the quality has the same degree, the intensity of that quality changing constantly. Moreover, given that changes are distinguished by the forms that are acquired, one would in reality have an infinite number of changes (mutationes) in what is apparently one change, and there would accordingly be an infinity of states (mutata esse) of the subject of change.60 59. Correctorium q. 7, f. 152 vb. 60. I Sent. d. 17 q. 4, pp. 97a D – 97b A: “(...) quot sunt quae differunt secundum intensum et remissum, tot sunt formae differentes numero ab inuicem. Sed in qualibet alteratione successiua sunt infinita talia. Ergo in qualibet alteratione sunt infinitae formae differentes numero. (...) Minor probatur, quia quot sunt nunc in toto tempore alterationis, tot sunt differentes gradus secundum intensum et remissum, quia in toto tempore alterationis non est dare duo nunc in quibus forma secundum quam alteratio sit, sit in eodem gradu. Sed in quolibet tempore sunt infinita nunc. (…) Hoc autem est inconueniens, quia motus et mutationes plurificantur secundum formas quae acquiruntur per motum; et sic in qualibet alteratione essent infinitae mutationes in actu et infinita mutata esse.”

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Although this objection may be related to CO1 and James’s third doubt because of the expression “mutata esse,” Hervaeus does not place the emphasis on the discontinuity that would ensue, but on the infinity of steps that an intensification would have to go through—which, implicitly, makes it impossible, since going through an infinity is not a task that can be ever completed. The thrust of the objection is made explicit by Thomas of Bailly, who addresses it in his Quodlibet III, q. 15.61 Hervaeus does report that the defenders of the succession theory answer that this infinity is in fieri and in potentiality.62 But their response is not tenable, he claims. If the forms are numerically distinct, they cannot be in continuity with each other; therefore, there is an actual infinity of such forms, and consequently an actual infinity of mutata esse. Interestingly, Hervaeus’ second objection turns James’s fourth argument (J4) on its head: NO2: When something cold diminishes heat, it does not actualize coldness in the patient, because coldness cannot coexist with heat. It does not actualize a lesser heat either, because coldness cannot produce heat.63 Therefore, the agent does nothing. However, this cannot be taken in an absolute sense, because its action is real. Rather, it must be understood literally, so to speak, in the sense that the cold does not produce anything but simply takes away some of the heat (which is the “privative” action that James does not admit.) Now, this entails that the same form of heat is diminished, rather than another form of a lesser degree produced.64

61. “First difficulty,” ed. Glorieux, p. 212. Pace Dumont (“Godfrey of Fontaines and the succession theory,” pp. 101-102), I do not think that the two objections, on discontinuity and infinity, raised by Scotus in his Parisian lecture are exactly the same as the one at hand. Moreover, the Oxford Lectura does raise the discontinuity objection, in terms that, in the end, are closer: “si per recessum a quocumque gradu generetur aliud suppositum, igitur supposita sibi invicem continue succedunt secundum successionem motus. Quaero igitur an quodlibet illorum suppositorum persistit in indivisibili, aut divisibiliter et in divisibili temporis. Si in indivisibili, tantum manens per instans, igitur motus componeretur ex mutatis esse (...)” (Lectura, l. I d. 17 p. 2, q.1, Opera Omnia t. XVII, Vatican 1966, n° 143, p. 226). 62. I Sent., d. 17, q. 4, 97b A. The potential infinite reply is in Thomas de Bailly (Quodl. III q. 15, pp. 213-214), but for the in fieri reply one probably has to go back to Godfrey himself (Quodl. IX, q. 11, p. 249). 63. On these two counts, then, Hervaeus thinks that James is right. 64. I Sent. d. 17 q. 4, p. 97b B.

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Finally, Hervaeus lodges a third objection: NO3: When a greater quantity succeeds a smaller quantity because one subject succeeds another, one does not say that this is an augmentation of the smaller quantity. For instance, when fire, which expands more, is engendered from air or water, which take less room, this is not a process of augmentation. It is a process of generation, and correlatively a new, greater form of quantity has replaced the lesser form of quantity. On the contrary, in a process of augmentation of the same thing, numerically the same accidental form of quantity is augmented. Likewise, if an intensification is really an increase, then it must be the same form that, initially imperfect, becomes perfect. If, on the contrary, a more perfect form replaced a less perfect form (as the succession theory wants it), one could not say that there is an increase.65

After this array of objections to the succession theory, we still have to survey the rebuttal of the arguments that support the theory. As expected, the Correctorium refutes each of James’s four arguments. These refutations all have parallel passages in Hervaeus’ Commentary. Although the latter does not report, and therefore does not discuss, G1/J1, the Correctorium gainsays J1 in the same way as one of the Commentary’s rebuttals of the addition theory. The ad tertium of the Commentary’s q. 566 is supposed to respond to the third argument quod sic at the very beginning of the question, and this argument supports the addition theory (the incipit of the question being: “Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem.”) However, there is in fact a common point between the addition theory and the succession theory: both argue that if a change is real, it must bring something new, which was not already present (a “part” or degree of the form according to the addition theory; a new form of a different degree for the succession theory).67 This is why the Correctorium can use against J1 the same response as the one given by the Commentary’s ad tertium:

65. Ibid., p. 97b B-D. 66. Ibid, pp. 98a D - 98b A. 67. Cf. G2 above and the third argument quod sic in Hervaeus’ question: “Praeterea aut aliquid acquiritur de novo in eo quod movetur motu intensionis, aut nihil; si nihil, ergo motus realis est ad nihil; si aliquid, ergo illud est additum de novo ei quod praeexistebat” (p. 96b B).

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CR1: The fact that every action brings about something that is new and different from the starting point can be understood in two ways. Either the terminus ad quem differs entirely from the terminus a quo; or it differs from it in part only. But a more intense quality differs from a less intense that preceded it not in totality (like white differs from black, for instance), but in such a way that the less intense becomes included in something greater, like a part in a whole. The new quality is not something altogether different; it is the same as the less intense one, but completed, more perfect.68

Of course, the talk is here about “virtual parts,” as we saw earlier, and not distinguishable (signabiles) parts within the intensified form as if one could really differentiate (signari actu distincter) what the initial degree was and what has been brought about by the intensification. Another response in q. 5 of Hervaeus’ Commentary, the ad quintum,69 which directly answers G2 (and therefore J2, as we’ll see momentarily), can also indirectly rebut J1. The Correctorium does use it to provide an alternative refutation of J1 (“Vel potest dici…”): CR1’: True, something must be acquired during an intensification, but this something can be aggregated to what was before, not as a part actually distinct, but as a part distinct by disposition (habitu).70

As an illustration of this kind of distinction, the Correctorium, like Hervaeus’ Sentences commentary,71 points to the paradigm of nutrition. Food is aggregated to the matter of the body; however, the food remains somehow distinct, not in actuality, but by disposition, because it could exist just by itself if it were taken away.72 Likewise, what is brought about by the intensification becomes one with the quality that preexisted, and nevertheless is different from it. The increased quality 68. F. 152 va. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl., VI q. 11, f. 135 vb: “(…) dico quod motus intensionis terminatur ad aliquid reale habendum, quod quidem reale est aliquis gradus forme que prius non habebat, sed ille gradus cedit in eandem essentiam cum preexistente albedine, que eius adventu efficitur perfectior quam prius, et ideo dicitur quod subiectum per modum intensionis reducitur in perfectiorem actum (…).” 69. P. 98b A-B. 70. F. 152 va. 71. Ad 5m, p. 98b A-B. 72. Medieval discussions occasioned by De generatione I.5 revolved around the problem of how an alien matter can be merged with matter already existing under a specific form. See P.L. Reynolds, Food and the Body: Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology, Leiden 1999.

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“has” more than before, but, the Correctorium adds, it becomes in fact more simple, not more complex, because it becomes more actualized. The initial degree is contained virtually in the higher degree. If the initial degree did not somehow subsist, the agent would not be intensifying a given quality properly speaking, but producing instead a quality that is altogether different. To James’s second argument (J2), Hervaeus’ Commentary (ad quintum, more likely against G2, but applicable to J2), and, in a much shorter way, the Correctorium (ad tertiam rationem),73 respond that: CR2/NR2: The accidental form which is that according to which change occurs only has to be, in the terminus ad quem, different from what it was in the terminus a quo in the same manner as a completed form differs from an incomplete form, as we saw above in the responses to J1. It need not be a different form.74

To James’s third argument (J3), the Correctorium (ad quartam rationem)75 and Hervaeus’ Commentary (ad quartum, more likely against G3, but applicable to J3) answer that: CR3/NR3: The terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem are not incompatible with each other in regard to the positive essence of the quality, which they share. They are opposed to each other only with regard to the privation of perfection (in the case of an intensification), which is present at the beginning and then eliminated by the change (and conversely for a remission).76

Finally, to James’s fourth argument (J4), both the Correctorium (ad secundam rationem) and Hervaeus’ Commentary (ad sextum) answer the following: CR4/NR4: An agent that cools down a hot thing acts inasmuch as it obstructs the power that conserves heat, preventing this power from maintaining the heat in the same state. The same goes for local motion: an 73. Recall that the Correctorium inserts J4 between J1 and J2 (see above, p. 310), which means that the latter becomes third. 74. Hervaeus Natalis, Sent., p. 98b A-B; Correctorium, f. 152 vb. 75. Recall again that the Correctorium inserts J4 between J1 and J2. 76. Hervaeus Natalis, Sent., p. 98b A; Correctorium, f. 152 vb.

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obstacle that prevents a thing that is falling from moving further down does not subtract something from the accidental form of motion, nor introduces something in this form, but, simply, resists the motion by opposing its own action to that of the moving power.77

As we can see through the above analysis of Hervaeus’ Commentary and the Correctorium fratris Iacobi, the first infiltration of Godfrey’s theory in the Dominican order, in the person of James of Metz, was opposed by a strong barrage. The fight was not over though, as another supporter of the succession theory, or at least a variant of it, was looming within the Dominican order: Durand of Saint-Pourçain. 5. Hervaeus’ QUODLIBET II and Durand of Saint-Pourçain In the second of the quodlibetal questions he disputed a few years later as regent master (1308 or 1309),78 Hervaeus Natalis had to address again the matter of intensification and remission in q. 13 (“Utrum in qualibet alteratione infinite forme differentes sint, siue si remissus et intensum realiter different”).79 Godfrey’s theory had found defenders other than James of Metz. As Walter Burley will later point out, “many” endorse this solution.80 Among those was, as we saw earlier, Thomas of Bailly, a prominent actor on the Parisian stage,81 and Hervaeus deals with some of his arguments in the first part of the question. On the evi77. Correctorium, f. 152 va-vb; Hervaeus Natalis, Sent., p. 98b B-C. 78. 1308 for J. Koch (1927), pp. 61-64, 269, followed by Glorieux II, p. 138. A. de Guimarães (“Hervé Noël (m. 1323): Etude biographique,” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 8 (1938), 5–81, p. 48) proposes Lent 1309 in order to allow some more time for Hervaeus’ reaction to Durand’s teaching (more on this below). He is seconded by P.T. Stella, “A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1): la questione inedita ‘Utrum Deus esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari’ di Erveo Natalis,” in: Salesianum 22/2 (1960), 245-325, p. 252, who adds an argument based on the fact that John of Pouilly’s Quodlibet II, q. 2, to which Hervaeus seems to reply in q. 1 of his own quodlibet, was held in the Advent of 1308. After discussing this secondary literature, R.L. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330,” in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, Leiden 2007, p. 435, concludes that with this sparse information one cannot exclude either date. 79. Quodlibeta, ff. 58 vb – 61 rb. 80. Gualterus de Burley, De intensione et remissione formarum, c. 4, Venice 1496, f. 11 rb. 81. See above fn. 52. For other reactions to Bailly’s defense of the succession theory in his Quodlibet III, see Dumont, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the succession theory,” pp. 102-105.

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dence I present below, however, I submit that the succession theory had also found a defender in the person of Durand of Saint-Pourçain. I also submit that Durand, who was baccalareus sententiarus at the time, was involved in the debate when this quodlibetal question was disputed. The general outline of the question is somewhat peculiar. It comprises two main parts: A) Discussion of the validity of the following inference: “If an intensified form is numerically different from the remitted form, there is an infinity of successive forms in an intensification.”82 B) Discussion of the premiss of the inference, i.e., whether an intensified form is numerically different from the remitted form.83

So, before coming to the core of the issue, namely, whether the succession theory is true, the whole first part is about the legitimacy of a deduction which, as we saw, amounts to an objection to the succession theory (see NO1, above), since going through an infinity of forms was thought to be an impossibility. This shows that the question put to Hervaeus is highly contextualized, and that the reader, so to speak, jumps in the middle of an ongoing discussion about the fairness of that objection, which had been raised by Hervaeus in his commentary on the Sentences and addressed by Thomas of Bailly in his Quodlibet III in 1303. Hervaeus intends here to demonstrate that the succession theory proponents do have to concede that an intensification comprises an infinity of successive forms (which makes the theory untenable), and he refutes two responses given by Thomas of Bailly: (1) even though all the forms of different degrees are numerically different within a given change, these forms nevertheless are one by continuity; (2) their infinity is only infinite in potentiality.84 For the sake of brevity, I will leave aside this discussion. The second part of the question begins with (1) a refutation of the premise of the inference, that is, the very thesis of the succession theory, thanks to a number of objections and the refutation of counterobjections. Then, (2) Hervaeus explains how it is possible that a form remains numerically the same throughout the process while acquiring what it did not first possess. I will leave these points aside too. Finally, 82. Ff. 58 vb – 59 va. 83. Ff. 59 va – 61 rb. 84. See Thomas de Bailly, Quodlibet III q. 15, ed. Glorieux, p. 214.

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(3) the discussion flares up again with the presentation of twelve objections to Hervaeus’ thesis (which are so many arguments in favor of the succession theory), followed by their systematic refutation.85 The addition of these twelve objections at the end makes the structure of the second part peculiar too and gives the impression of a live debate, in which a participant launches a new attack on the respondens with a new set of objections. There are reasons to think that this objector was Durand. Bernard Lombardi, a Dominican who wrote a Sentences commentary in the late 1320s,86 reports very extensively Durand’s discussion of the intensification of forms. Durand’s solution on the “how” of intensification/ remission, as Lombardi presents it, is a variant of the succession theory, and the arguments in favor of this theory attributed to Durand by Lombardi correspond to eight of the twelve final objections in Hervaeus’ question. There is no room for uncertainty about their ascription to Durand: instead of the usual “quidam dicunt” with at best an abbreviated name in the margin, the main text in one of the manuscripts reads in full letters: “Alia opinio est Durandi qui ponit quod forma non subscipit magis et minus sic quod gradus remissus remaneat adueniente intenso, ymo corrumpitur.”87 Moreover, after rebutting Durand, Lombardi provides a solution which is (without him saying it) mostly a long summary, sometimes a paraphrase, sometimes even word for word excerpts, of q. 13 of Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II88 – not only of the core of his solution, but also of the objections and responses that his question 85. Ff. 60 rb (“Contra hoc objicitur multipliciter…”) – 61 rb. 86. See S.A. Porebski, “La question de Bernard Lombardi concernant la différence réelle entre l’essence et l’existence,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum XVII (1973), 157-185, pp. 158-160, and T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, Rome 1970, t. I, p. 228, n. 640: Lector in the convent of Beziers before 1323, prior of the Provence province in 1322, baccalaureus sententiarum in Paris in 1327-28, and magister theologiae in Paris in 1331-32. Distinction 17 of book I of his Sentences commentary is found in three manuscripts: Naples Naz. VII G 98 on the one hand, Leipzig Univ. 542 and Erfurt CA 2° 368 on the other hand. The differences between them point to two different lecturae, or perhaps at least one reportatio. See also C. Schabel – R.L. Friedman – I. Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents,” in: Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 71 (2001), 182-300, pp. 218 and 247-248. Contrary to the case of book I dist. 38 that they examine, Bernardi’s report of Durand’s opinion cannot have been derived from Peter of Palude, as the latter’s q. 2 of dist. 17 is very different. 87. Book I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, Naples ms., f. 27ra. Durand’s name is in the margin of the Erfurt manuscript, f. 91va. 88. Leipzig f. 37rb-38ra, Erfurt f. 91vb-92vb.

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contains. This may indicate that Lombardi was well aware of the debate between Hervaeus and Durand, and probably presented their two positions as they were, historically, pitted against each other. In itself, the ascription of the succession theory to Durand should not come as a surprise. It might only confirm the intellectual affiliation between James of Metz and Durand that has been highlighted by Koch.89 Since James probably lectured on the Sentences in Paris in 1300-01, Durand, who started around that time the three-year lectorate program (see below), may well have attended his lectures and paid heed to his criticism of the Thomist conception of intensification and his move in favor of Godfrey’s solution. However, let us note that a long passage of Durand’s early version of his commentary on the Sentences that was not included in the final version shows that Durand knew first hand Godfrey’s Quaestio ordinaria 18, which he analyzes and criticizes at length as far as the indivisibility of forms is concerned (Durand, instead, admits the existence of degrees in forms).90 Besides, we saw there were at the time other supporters of the succession theory. Thus, even if James did not hand down to Durand this theory, the latter had other possible sources of information. What may seem to pose a problem, however, is that Durand’s succession theory as presented by Bernard Lombardi is not straightforwardly identical to Durand’s solution in the last and “official” redaction of his Commentary on the Sentences.91 Furthermore, no theory at all can be found in the extant manuscripts of the earlier version(s) of book I either, as they do not tackle at all the question of how intensification takes place (“quomodo augeatur”). They contain a single question on intensification: “Utrum caritas augeri,” which only discusses in which forms intensification can take place. So, isn’t Lombardi mistaken when he presents Durand as a proponent of the succession theory? In fact, this discrepancy can be explained. But first, let me summarize the status quaestionis concerning the stages of the writing of Durand’s Sentences commentary. 89. J. Koch, “Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.” 90. Book I, d. 17, q. 3, ed. M. Perrone – F. Retucci, Scriptum super IV Libros Sententiarum. Distinctiones 4-17 primi libri, Leuven 2017, pp. 236-245. How this acknowledgement of degrees in the essence of qualities is compatible with some variant of the succession theory will become clearer below. On the other hand, the explanation of why only qualities can be intensified or remitted (ibid. pp. 246-249) is borrowed from Godfrey. Additionally, this early version contains (pp. 227-236) a presentation and refutation of Giles of Rome’s theory, which was also left out in the final version. 91. See below p. 339.

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According to the reconstruction of Durand’s early career provided by William Courtenay,92 Durand received at the Dominicam studium generale in Paris, probably from 1300 to 1303, the three years training required for being a conventual theology lector, and then returned to the vicariate he was coming from, that of Burgundy, probably in the convent of Lyon. He was sent back to Paris to follow the curriculum leading to the theology doctorate. He was there in 1307 for a preparatory year,93 and lectured on the Sentences as baccalaureus sententiarum in the academic year 1308-1309.94 Whether he had already commented on the Sentences in a provincial convent95 (if so, probably in Lyon), or simply had prepared his lecture notes in 1307-1308,96 there was a first version of his commentary, named redaction A by Koch, when Durand began lecturing in Paris. However, Durand’s teaching came immediately under attack by Hervaeus Natalis, who was since 1307 the Dominican regent master. As Koch has shown, Hervaeus, in several questions of his Quodlibet II, held during Advent 1308 or Lent 1309, criticizes ideas contained in Durand’s book I.97 Moreover, in 1309 (Sept. 17) 92. W.J. Courtenay, “Durand in his educational and intellectual context,” in A. Speer – F. Retucci, T. Jeschke – G. Guldentops (eds.), Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences commentary. Historical, Philosophical and Theological Issues, Leuven 2014, pp. 13-34. 93. His name appears in a document related to the Templars affair, dated October 26 of that year, but after the names of those presented as doctors and bachelors in theology, which means he was not yet baccalaureus. 94. 1308-1309 only, if one accepts Duba’s and Schabel’s conclusion that the lectures on all the books of the Sentences spanned a single academic year (see above, fn. 23, and in particular W. Duba – C. Schabel, “Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year Sentences lecture at Paris,” p. 157; see also C. Schabel, “James of Metz’s Lectura on the Sentences,” p. 355). Courtenay’s chapter, which predates Duba’s and Schabel’s paper, proposes 1308-09 and 1309-10. 95. As it is believed by R.L. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320,” in: G.R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Leiden 2002, p. 71. 96. See Courtenay, “Durand in his educational and intellectual context,” pp. 28-30. The second hypothesis, Courtenay notes, fits better with Durand’s famous remark, in the conclusion of his “official” version, that his early version had been circulated prematurely and without his consent: “Scripta super quatuor Sententiarum libros iuvenis inchoavi, sed senex complevi; siquidem quod in primis dictaveram et scripseram fuit a quibusdam curiosis mihi subreptum, antequam fuisset per me sufficienter correctum (…)” (In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentarium libri IIII [= Sent. C], 2 vols., Venice 1579; repr. Ridgewood, NJ 1964, f. 423rb). It would be hard to make sense of this, Courtenay thinks, if Durand had already lectured in a provincial convent, that is, publicized his views. On the other hand, let us keep in mind that Durand left in the final redaction a hint about the fact he gave several lecturae, since he speaks of his “first lecture”: “Unde quod dixi alias in fine secundi libri sententiarum primae lecturae…” (II Sent. C, d. 44, q. 5, n. 10, f. 208 ra). 97. See J. Koch, Durandus, pp. 60-72, 214-215 and B. Decker, Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Münster in W. 1967, pp. 85-88, who showed that Hervaeus’ qq. 3, 7 and 8 respectively attack d. 36 q.

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Hervaeus was elected provincial of France (he will become general master of the order in 1318), and the same year the General Chapter of the order at Saragossa required Dominicans not to hold positions opposed to what was generally taken to be Aquinas’s doctrine.98 Under this pressure, and probably in view of securing his chances to be promoted to the doctorate, Durand soon started to modify his commentary. This revision process, carried out before 1312, resulted in redaction B, in which Durand mitigated his criticism of and departure from Thomas Aquinas.99 Later, when he entered an episcopal career (from 1317 on), and was thereby free from the jurisdiction of the Dominican order, Durand wrote a third and final version of his commentary (redaction C), in which he returned to many of his original views, modified at times on the basis of criticisms he had received.100 Let us now go back to Bernard Lombardi. As I said, the succession theory he ascribes to Durand is not that of redaction C and is nowhere to be found (as, for that matter, any theory whatsoever on the “how” of the intensification/remission) in the manuscripts we have of Durand’s early versions of his commentary. However, as far as book I is concerned, all those manuscripts transmit the same redaction. This means that one of the two pre-1317 versions, either redaction A or redaction B, has disappeared. It is quite possible, then, that Lombardi discloses an otherwise unknown stage of Durand’s thought. In which version might he have presented this theory? Koch believed that the extant non-C manuscripts of book I contain redaction 3, d. 33 q. 1, and d. 27 q. 2 of Durand’s book I. For q. 7 and his attack on Durand’s conception of relation in divinis, see I. Iribarren, Durandus, pp. 149-155. 98. “(…) inhibemus districte quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo, audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius quod communiter creditur de opinione doctoris praedicti (…)” (Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. B.M. Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica 3 and 4, Rome 1889-1899, t. II, p. 38). See Iribarren, Durandus, p. 182, fn. 3, for whom the Saragossa regulation specifically targets Durand. 99. As a result, he received the doctorate and was appointed magister actu regens in 1312, probably thanks to the intervention of pope Clement V. Nonetheless, Durand was subjected to an investigation of the Dominican order, entrusted to a commission presided by Hervaeus, in 1313-1314 (decision of the General Chapter of Metz in 1313), and again in 1316-1317 (decision of the General Chapter of Montpellier in 1316). See Koch, Durandus, pp. 68-72, 200-207, 410-417, and id., ‘Philosophische und theologische Irrtumslisten von 1270–1329: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Zensuren’, in Kleine Schriften, Rome 1973, t. II, pp. 439-41; C. Schabel – R.L. Friedman – I. Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents,” pp. 184-215. Cf. the reflections on this censure in Iribarren, Durandus, pp. 182-186. 100. Probably between 1318 and 1328. Cf. Koch, Durandus, p. 16 sqq.

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A. Moreover, he believed that Durand did not issue a second redaction of book I. However, in their recent edition of the early version of distinctions 4-17 of book I, Massimo Perrone and Fiorella Retucci have reached the opposite conclusion: all the extant non-C manuscripts of book I contain redaction B (in two different stages of revision), and even for book I redaction A was different from redaction B.101 Redaction A of book I, therefore, is no longer accessible to us. Thence, we can surmise that what Bernard Lombardi reports is the content of a question of the now lost redaction A of distinction 17 in which Durand was adopting the succession theory.102 As a matter of fact, the reversal of Koch’s conclusion gives grounds for a very plausible scenario. It would be only logical that the young Durand, while he was first studying in Paris between 1300 and 1303, under the influence of James of Metz, adopted the succession theory. When he came back to Paris to comment on the Sentences, at the beginning of the academic year 1308-09, he held the same position while lecturing on d. 17 of book I and immediately clashed with Hervaeus on the topic of intensification among others. As noted above, Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II was probably disputed either during the Advent of 1308, 101. Pp. 20*-75* (see summary in Andreas Speer’s “Vorwort,” pp. 10*-11*). See also F. Retucci, “Selected Problems in Books I-II of Durand’s Sentences Commentary,” in A. Speer – F. Retucci – T. Jeschke – G. Guldentops (eds.), Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences commentary, pp. 71-96, and M. Perrone, “Alcune osservazioni sulle fasi redazionali del Commento al I libro delle Sentenze di Durando di San Porciano (1270/75-1334),” Studi Filosofici XXXIX (2016), pp. 49-68. On pp. 59-60 of this article, Perrone shows that, because of an implicit quote from the second redaction of Alexander of Alexandria’s commentary on the Sentences, Durand must have revised book I after 1308. 102. I should add that Lombardi does not always report the content of redaction A. Immediately after this passage, art. 2 of the same question (“Quae est causa precisa susceptionis magis et minus”) is nothing but a transcription word for word of q. 6 of Durand’s redaction C (probably because in this final version, Durand criticizes the explanation he had given earlier—i.e., redaction B, book I, d. 17, q. 3, ed. Perrone – Retucci, pp. 246249—about the reasons why certain forms are intensifiable and remittable). I’ll comment more on this fact in the conclusion. For now, let me just emphasize that Bernard had access to different redactions of Durand’s commentary (Durand’s concern over leaving a definitive version that would be clearly recognizable probably shows that he feared that the earlier drafts were still in circulation—see above, fn. 96, the quote from the conclusion of Durand’s Commentary, which is to be completed by these words: “propter quod hoc opus solum, quod per omnes libros incipit ‘Est Deus in caelo revelans etc.’ tanquam per me editum et correctum approbo”). Incidentally, this means that, for the discussion of the “how” of intensification/remission (art. 1), Lombardi chose Durand’s solution in redaction A, while he knew redaction C (in which Durand has somehow modified his view; see below p. 339). Why? Probably because Bernard, who rallies to Hervaeus’ solution in Quodlibet II which he copies extensively in art. 1, wanted to give the whole context of Hervaeus’ question 13, in which Durand was involved.

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or Lent of 1309. Admittedly, Hervaeus, in the question on intensification (q. 13), first addresses a more important adversary: Thomas of Bailly, as I noted above. But recall the peculiar structure of the question: towards the end of the second part, it appears that an opponent (or several opponents) raises a series of twelve new objections that favor the succession theory. Now, eight of these objections are arguments for the succession theory that Bernard Lombardi ascribes to Durand (from the corresponding question in redaction A, if my hypothesis is correct). So it is not too far-fetched to imagine that Durand himself, or perhaps a student of his who had taken notes on his recent lecture on the intensification and remission of qualities, might have intervened in the discussion of Hervaeus’ quodlibetal question and put forward these objections. It wouldn’t be the only time that Durand would have debated with Hervaeus: together with an important question on cognition from Durand’s early version of the Commentary on the Sentences, Koch has edited a disputed question presided over by Hervaeus in which, Koch says, Durand, defending the same theses as in his Commentary, played the role of the opponent.103 And as we know, a number of other questions of Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II were specifically targeting Durand.104 To these questions that reveal the increasing tension between Hervaeus and Durand, it seems permissible, therefore, to add the end of q. 13. Furthermore, as said above, Durand had to modify his commentary on the Sentences to align it more with Dominican orthodoxy, that is to say, with Thomas Aquinas’s teachings. During this process, which resulted in redaction B, Durand omitted whole questions that were too controversial, with the consequence that redaction B is generally a shortened text compared to the initial version.105 That is exactly what happened with the question on the “how” of the intensification, where Durand had to criticize Aquinas in order to promote the succession theory: he purely and simply eliminated it from redaction B, with the result that, as noted above, redaction B does not offer any explanation about the manner in which an intensification or remission takes place.

103. Durandus de S. Porciano, Quaestio de natura cognitionis (II Sent. [A] D. 3 q. 5) et Disputatio cum anonymo quodam nec non Determinatio Hervei Natalis OP. Altera editio emendatior, ed. J. Koch, Münster in W. 1935. 104. See above, fn. 97. 105. See Perrone’s and Retucci’s introduction to their edition of book I d. 4-17, pp. 20*-26*.

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One manuscript of redaction B mentions this disappearance. BnF lat. 14454, f. 62 vb, at the end of d. 17 (after the question “Utrum caritas possit minui”), has in the lower margin, apparently from the same hand as the main text, the following note: “due questiones deficiunt hic, scilicet utrum caritas augeatur per additionem aut alio modo et utrum possit augeri in infinitum.” This note does not result from a comparison made by the scribe with the text of redaction C, for the latter includes not just two more questions on the increase of charity than the non-C (i.e. redaction B) manuscripts have, but four more—and indeed many more as far as the whole distinction 17 is concerned.106 The annotator of BnF lat. 14454, therefore, had a source of information other than a redaction C manuscript. Like Bernard Lombardi, he probably had access to redaction A and reported that these two questions were missing in Durand’s revised version. It seems that all the elements fit nicely in the scenario I have proposed. Let us now turn to the arguments ascribed to Durand by Bernard Lombardi. The first argument is the 8th final objection in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II q. 13. It is formally identical to Godfrey’s third argument (G3 above), and James’s third argument too (J3 above): DBL1: In all processes, the terminus a quo disappears when the terminus ad quem is reached.107

This argument is the cornerstone of Godfrey’s position, and it is used by all of his followers, who also believe that intensification and remission are processes like any other process. These limited alterations obey the laws that apply to all natural changes, therefore they must be seen 106. See the chart in Perrone’s and Retucci’s introduction, pp. 71*-73*. One should note, however, that the content of what is q. 6 in redaction C is part of q. 3 in redaction B. The count of the number of questions, by the way, may provide another confirmation that the extant non-C manuscripts of book I carry its redaction B version, not the redaction A version: see the Appendix, below. 107. Lombardi, I Sent., d. 17 q. 1, a. 1, mss. Leipzig Univ. 542 f. 37 ra, Erfurt CA 2° 368, f. 91 va-vb: “Primo sic: secundum Aristotelem 5° Physicorum, habito termino ad quem terminus a quo abiicitur in omni motu. Tunc sic: motus alterationis est unus motus, sed in isto motu forma remissa habet rationem termini a quo, forma intensa rationem termini ad quem; ergo adueniente gradu intenso remissus abiicitur.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60 va, 8°: “in omni motu abiicitur terminus a quo; sed in motu intensionis terminus a quo est forma remissa; igitur in tali motu forma remissa abiicitur, et per consequens non manet eadem cum intensa.”

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as a succession of transitory states between the initial and final states of rest, which are contrary to each other and mutually exclusive. However, the conclusion of DBL1 talks of degrees, rather than forms, replacing each other. Recall that Durand, contrary to Godfrey, affirmed that essences are divisible in degrees. This is why his theory is that of a succession of degrees, strictly speaking, instead of forms. The nuance is not always perceptible in Lombardi’s account, but it will become much clearer in redaction C, as we’ll see below. Next, Lombardi ascribes to Durand a confirmation of the previous argument, which is identical to the 4th final objection in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet: DBL1’: Either a new degree succeeds to the previous one (instead of being an addition), which was to be demonstrated; or the previous one stays, and thus the form remains unchanged, which is false.108

The next argument of Durand reported by Lombardi, related to Godfrey’s second argument (G2 above), is identical to the 1st final objection in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet: DBL2: An agent that intensifies heat in a patient either acts and actualizes (“imprints”) something in the patient, or not. The second alternative is impossible, because this would mean that nothing happens in reality. However, if the agent does act, it imprints something that was not there already, otherwise there would be no change either. But if what is imprinted is a new degree or form, the degree or form that was previously in the patient cannot subsist.109 108. Lombardi, Leipzig f. 37 ra, Erfurt f. 91 vb: “Et confirmatur: si intensum habet plus quam remissum, aut hoc est succedente gradu gradui, aut manente forma. Si primo modo habetur propositum quod sunt diuerse. Si secundo modo nulla erit uariatio, quod est falsum.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60 va, 4°: “si intensum habet plus quam remissum, aut est hoc succedente forma forme, aut manente eadem forma. Si primo modo, habetur propositum, scilicet quod intensum et remissum sunt diverse forme. Si secundo modo, tunc nulla est ibi variatio.” 109. Lombardi, Leipzig f. 37 ra, Erfurt f. 91 vb: “Secundo sic: intendens calorem aut aliquid imprimit aut nihil. Non potest dici quod nihil, quia per nihil calor non dicitur augmentari; ergo aliquid imprimit. Sed non illud quod iam erat. Ergo aliud.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60 rb, 1°: “agens intendens aut imprimit aliquid diuersum a precedente, aut non. Si non, igitur nulla variatio est in intensione, quod est contra sensum. Si sic, igitur forma intensa quam imprimit est diversa a precedente, et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod ista remissa corrumpitur, quia due forme eiusdem speciei non simul sunt in eodem subiecto.”

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This argument is followed by a variant, which should be compared to James of Metz’s 4th argument (J4 above), and is identical to the 7th final objection in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet: DBL2’: Suppose that something cold diminishes heat in something else. Either the first thing imprints something, or not. The second is impossible, because the agent does act. But what it imprints can only be a diminished heat, which cannot coexist with the initial heat.110

However, as we saw above, James eventually found that this argument entailed an unsolvable problem: it is impossible for the property actualized in the patient to be the opposite of that possessed by the agent, and both the Correctorium fratris Jacobi and Hervaeus in his Sentences commentary exploit the concession made by James (NO2 and CR4/ NR4 above). The same objection to the succession theory figures also at the beginning of the second part of Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II q. 13 (before the twelve final objection),111 with the discussion of counterarguments. One of these counter-arguments is that there is an order in which forms have to appear, with the consequence that a subject cannot change immediately from one extreme to the other but has to go through intermediaries. Thus, in the example above, cold cannot be introduced immediately in the patient; a less intense heat must be first imprinted by the agent. This counter-argument seems to echo the second solution envisioned by James, as we saw above, to solve the “ratio difficilior” (the example given was that of the semen).112 Hervaeus gives immediately three replies to this counter-argument:

110. Lombardi, Leipzig f. 37 ra, Erfurt f. 91 vb: “Vel potest sic formari ratio: frigidum remittens calidum aut aliquid imprimit aut nihil. Si imprimit aliquid, hoc non potest esse nisi calor remissus, quia si imprimeret intensum, tunc non remitteret primum sed intenderet, vel duo calores simul essent intensi, quod est falsum, sic autem non maneret calor intensus. Si autem nihil imprimeret, ergo nihil ageret quod est falsum.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60 va, 7°: “frigidum remittens calidum aut aliquid imprimit aut nihil. Si aliquid, hoc non potest esse nisi calor remissus, nec potest de nouo imprimere calorem remissum nisi remouendo calorem intensum , quia aliter duo calores simul essent. Si dicatur quod nihil imprimit, contra : quia si nihil imprimit, nihil agit, et sic agens remittens nihil agit.” 111. Ff. 59vb – 60ra. 112. See above p. 304.

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– A univocal agent must be proportioned to its effect; but cold is not suited to actualize heat, albeit a diminished heat at the first stage of its action. – Is the more intense heat expelled in an instant or progressively? If the second, then some of the intense heat remains together with the less intense heat that is being introduced; but these forms belong to the same species and therefore cannot be numerically different and be in the same subject at the same time; therefore, they are in reality one and the same form. If, on the contrary, the more intense heat is expelled in an instant, then the diminished heat is introduced in an instant too, and this alteration is not continuous. – Likewise, is the very introduction of the lesser degree of heat successive or not? If not, this is contrary to empirical evidence. But if it is successive, does this lesser degree of heat, while it is being introduced, remain equal (eque remissa) or not? If yes, this again is contrary to empirical evidence. If not, then this means that the intensity of one and the same form can diminish. Therefore, why couldn’t this be extended to the whole process of remission (or intensification), from lesser heat to lesser heat?

Now, the same discussion re-occurs at the end of Hervaeus’ question, since, as we just saw, the 7th objection to Hervaeus’ position (identical to DBL2’ in favor of the succession theory) reactivates James’s argument (J4). This reappearance of the problem confirms, I believe, that the series of the twelve final objections is superadded and that a new opponent has entered the lists.113 The next argument attributed to Durand by Bernard is, like the 5th and 6th final objections in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet, a direct attack on his own theory. Since Hervaeus thinks that degrees do not succeed each other, and do not add up cumulatively either (as in the addition theory), he has no other avenue left but saying that, in an intensification process, the degrees acquired do not complement the previous degrees like parts added to parts in order to constitute a new whole, but, rather, include them “virtually” (this is also true of remission: the initial, higher degree being virtually contained in the lower degree too). As we saw, this notion of “virtual inclusion” was already the linchpin of Hervaeus’ solution in his Sentences commentary. All his responses to arguments supporting

113. Hervaeus gives in the Quodlibet (f. 60 vb) the same response to this objection as in his Sentences commentary (p. 98b), namely, CR4/NR4 above.

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the succession theory hinge on it too.114 As already explained, the model Hervaeus offered is that of nutrition: the nutrients are assimilated, but they remain distinct virtually or by habitus from the body, in the sense that they still could exist apart.115 In his Quodlibet III q. 15, Thomas of Bailly challenged the appropriateness of this model, probably in reaction to Hervaeus’ lecture on the Sentences. Nevertheless, in his Quodlibet II (before the final twelve objections), Hervaeus retains the same solution. The intensified differs from the remitted, he says, as being the same entity plus something else, not as if these were two actually distinguishable parts, but as a more perfect whole comprises a plurality.116 From DBL3 and the 5th-6th final objections in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II, we learn that Durand questioned the very principle of Hervaeus’ solution, namely, that because their relation is a virtual inclusion, the initial degree and the final degree of a quality do not differ really as two distinct entities do: 114. See above, pp. 310, 317, at fn. 49 and 68. The same notion is also part of Hervaeus’ defense against arguments in favor of the addition theory. For instance, the first objection in I Sent., d. 17 q. 5, p. 96b, contends that if A is “more” than B, A can be divided into two parts, the part that is equal to B and the part by which A exceeds B; but what can be divided into two parts must be constituted by the addition of these two parts. The conclusion, Hervaeus responds (ad 1m, p. 98a), is true only when the two parts can be distinguished in actuality, either by their subject or by their situs; not so in the case of qualities, where the parts differ only virtualiter. 115. See above CR1 and CR1’, in the discussion of James of Metz by the Correctorium. Hervaeus, Sent., p. 98a: “(…) si non fuisset praecedens habitus gradus, agens fecisset qualitatem aliam: sicut quando alimentum est conversum in illum qui nutritur, materia alimenti facta conversione, non est aliquid distinctum actu ab ista materia, sed habitu potest alia dici, quia si per se fuisset, habuisset per se distinctum.” See also Hervaeus, Quodl. VI q.11, f. 135 vb: “materia alimenti, facta conuersione eius in nutritum, non distinguitur a reliqua materia nutriti et essentialiter, sed habitu potest dici distincta pro tanto quia fuit uel potuit esse alia. Ita dico de illo gradu acquisito in forma intensa quod est quidem distinctus habitu a forma preexistente, in quantum si agens inuenisset subiectum carens illa forma, causasset ibi gradum quemdam qui non fuisset illa forma sed alia, sed presupposita ibi consimili forma actu non potuit distingui ab ea.” 116. F. 60 rb: “Qualiter autem precedens et sequens sint unum vel etiam differant, dico sicut alius dixi, quod ipsum intensum differt a remisso precedente sicut ipsum habens et plus, non secundum partes singulares ita quod una possit signanter distingui ab alia, sed sicut totum perfectionale comprehendens aliqua, non sicut partes signabiles distinctas. Et de hoc posui duo exempla alibi. Primum est de conversione materiae alimenti in nutritum, ubi materia adveniens non potest signanter distingui a precedente. Et similiter quando pellis efficitur maior per extensionem, maioritas adveniens non potest distingui a precedente, et idem est si hoc fiat per rarefactionem, quia corpus rarefactum fit maius, et maioritas adveniens non potest distingui secundum quantitatem.” Note that Hervaeus says that he has already offered two examples elsewhere. The first one, nutrition, is in his Sentences commentary, as I just said. I don’t know where else he offered the example of the stretching of a skin. However, this model is akin to that of rarefaction he used in his Sentences commentary (see above, fn. 49), because in both cases what is added cannot be distinguished in actuality from what it is added to.

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DBL3: What is virtually included in a thing is really distinct from that thing. For instance, an effect, which is virtually contained in its cause, is really distinct from the latter; such is obviously the case for creatures with respect to God.117

Then, Bernard Lombardi ascribes to Durand an argument that is related to the 10th final objection in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet based on the notion of “incompatible changes.” Whereas the phrasing of DBL4 is obscure, though, the thrust of the 10th objection is clear: DBL4: Incompatible changes are linked to incompatible forms, given that a change is defined by the form that is acquired at the end of the process. But intensification and remission are completely incompatible changes. Therefore, the remitted form and the intensified form must be incompatible too. As a consequence, they cannot be the same form.118

The next argument too appeals to the principle of non-contradiction: DBL5: In an intensification, one goes from the “non esse intensum” to the “esse intensum,” which are the two extremes of the change. If the lower and the higher degree were the same form, the “non esse intensum” and

117. Lombardi, Leipzig f. 37ra, f. Erfurt f. 91vb: “Tertio sic: si forma remissa et intensa sunt eadem, aut intensa remanet virtualiter in remissa aut formaliter. Non formaliter quia falsum est quod intensum sit remissum formaliter; nec virtualiter quia illa que continentur in aliquo virtualiter differunt realiter ab illo, sicut patet de effectu qui realiter differt a causa in qua continetur. Et sic habetur propositum, scilicet quod remissum differt ab intenso.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60 va, 5°: “si forma remissa manet in intensa, aut manet in propria forma, aut non. Si manet in propria forma, non manet virtualiter in intensa, quod est contra me. Si autem non manet in propria forma, igitur differt realiter a forma intensa in qua non manet secundum propriam formam.” Ibid., 6°: “et est confirmatio precedentis, quia quod continetur virtualiter in aliquo differt ab eo realiter, sicut patet de creatura et deo in quo continetur virtualiter creatura, et de miscibilibus et mixto in quo continentur virtualiter miscibilia; sed, ut videtur, secundum me remissum remanet virtualiter in intenso; igitur, etc.” 118. Lombardi, Leipzig 37ra, Erfurt 91vb: “Quarto sic: si intensum et remissum essent idem, tunc sequeretur quod motus incompossibiles essent simul, scilicet intensionis et remissionis. Sed per nullam potentiam motus incompossibiles possunt esse simul; ergo. Maior patet quia tunc motus intensionis et remissionis essent simul.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60va, 10°: “motus incompossibiles debent esse secundum formas incompossibiles; sed motus intensionis et remissionis sunt incompossibiles secundum se totos; ergo et forma intensa et remissa sunt incompossibiles, et per consequens non potest esse eadem forma.”

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the “esse intensum,” which are opposites, would be the same thing. This would violate the principle of non-contradiction.119

A variant of this argument is identical to the 9th final objection in Hervaeus’ Quodlibet II: DBL5’: A remission unfolds in the direction of the non-being of the form that is diminished. Correspondingly, an intensification moves away from this non-being. But this non-being precisely is the remitted form. The latter, therefore, cannot be the same form as the one that is acquired by the intensification.120

The correspondence between these eight arguments in the total ascribed to Durand by Bernard Lombardi, and eight of the objections met by Hervaeus Natalis in his quodlibetal question shows sufficiently, 119. Lombardi, Leipzig 37ra-rb, Erfurt 91vb: “Quinto sic: quando in motu intensionis receditur a non esse intenso, fit accessus ad esse intensum. Si ergo idem essent intensum et remissum, idem essent non esse intensum et esse intensum, quod implicat contradictionem.” 120. Lombardi, Erfurt f. 91vb: “Vel formatur sic: sicut in remissione tenditur ad priuationem et ad non esse forme que remittitur, ita in intensione receditur a priuatione et a non esse forme que intenditur. Sed in remissione tenditur ad non esse forme que remittitur, ergo in intensione forme tenditur ad esse forme que acquiritur; et per consequens illa que acquiritur per intensionem non preexistebat. Sed huius non esse est forma remissa, ergo ipsa per intensionem non est que acquiritur.” Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. II q. 13, f. 60va, 9°: “sicut in remissione tenditur ad privationem et non esse, ita in intensione receditur a privatione et non esse. Sed in remissione tenditur ad non esse forme que acquiritur, et per consequens illa forma que acquiritur per intensionem non preexistebat, nec est eadem cum preexistente, nec per consequens cum forma remissa.” This argument may help illuminating the strange opening of John (Quidort) of Paris’ Quodlibet I q. 8 (ed. A. Heiman, “The First Quodlibet of Jean Quidort,” in: J.R. O’Donnell (ed.), Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, Toronto 1955, pp. 284-286). The question asked is: “Utrum aliquid positivum possit produci a non ente.” John begins his reply with the explanation that the real question that was hiding behind the formulated question is whether a quality intensified is numerically the same as the remitted quality (“Ex verbis argumentis non apparebat ejus intentio; sed, ut dictum fuit mihi, intendit quaerere utrum qualitas intensa et remissa sit eadem numero vel diversa.”) At first sight, the connection is not obvious (all the more that John does not directly respond to the question as formulated, but only to the background question and the classical arguments for the succession theory), but in the light of Durand’s argument against Hervaeus, it makes sense that someone who roots for the succession theory would launch an attack on John by asking him whether the being of an intensified form can come from the non-being of that same form, assuming that numerically the same form remains along the process of intensification. Given that John’s Quodlibet was held in 1304 or 1305, and clearly replies to Thomas of Bailly’s Quodl. III q. 15 and his response to the infinity objection, this shows that the argument was in circulation before Durand’s Parisian lectures on the Sentences.

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I think, that Durand was involved in the debate, and that his take on the intensification/remission problem before and around 1308 was close to the succession theory, even though Durand gave it a twist of his own. Lombardi’s report points to Durand as the source of opposition at the end of Hervaeus’ dispute; conversely, the historical plausibility of Durand disputing with Hervaeus validates Lombardi’s report of Durand standing for the succession theory. The two presumptions reinforce each other, so to speak. This stage of Durand’s thought can be known only indirectly (so far), and must have been contained in a question of the lost redaction A, that was left out of redaction B. 6. Durand’s Redaction C Now, Hervaeus Natalis did perhaps not argue totally in vain. The final version of Durand’s Sentences commentary seems to indicate that he somewhat changed his mind on the topic. Following Koch’s conclusions, it is generally held that in redaction C, bishop Durand, freed from the Dominican order’s control, went back to the boldness of redaction A and reasserted his controversial theses. This may be mostly true, but it is not always the case. One example is Durand’s position on the generation of the Son in the Trinity (book I, dist. 5).121 The way in which intensification or remission occur is another case in point. Q. 7 of dist. 17, in redaction C, “Utrum eadem forma possit esse intensa et remissa,” begins with five quod non arguments for the succession theory, which are exactly those ascribed to Durand by Lombardi; but Durand is going to respond in the affirmative and maintain that the same form remains along the process. Moreover, the sed contra repeats nearly word for word some of Hervaeus’ arguments in his Sentences commentary and his Quodlibet II!122 This is why Bernard Lombardi’s report on Durand’s position cannot have been derived from redaction C: in the final version, the arguments have been reshuffled. Nonetheless, in the end Durand still defends a form of the succession theory. But he has made a major adjustment—or clarification. Let us see how. 121. See F. Retucci, “Selected problems…,” p. 95, fn. 51. 122. The second argument of the sed contra comes from Quodl. II, f. 59 vb, the first one is the infinity problem (see NO1 above), the third one is the cooling down problem (see NO2 above).

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Durand breaks down the discussion into three questions: 1. Does an intensified form remain numerically one (nn. 10-12)? 2. If it remains numerically one, is it one because of a unity of indivisibility, or because of a unity of continuity (nn. 13-15)? 3. If it is because of a unity of continuity, are its parts distinguishable (signabiles) or not (nn. 16-39)? 1. Durand immediately concedes that if the alteration by which a form is intensified is a real, i.e. continuous change, necessarily this form is numerically one. As a matter of fact, within one and the same process of change, four parameters, namely, the mobile, the duration, the form in flux (forma fluens), and the end point of the change, must each be numerically the same. Otherwise, the alleged change would actually be a series of mutations. Thus, Durand clearly distances himself from Godfrey’s or James’s thesis of numerically distinct forms replacing each other. This is the essential modification introduced in redaction C, unless it is only a clarification, since, as we saw above, there was in redaction A some ambiguity (at least according to Lombardi’s report) on whether the degrees that succeed each other are taken to be distinct forms. Nonetheless, even if it is a mere clarification, it amounts, from Godfrey’s perspective, to a major concession to the opponents of his theory: one and the same form remains through the whole change. 2. Next, however, Durand specifies that indivisibility is not the reason why the intensified form is one. Rather, the form is one by continuity. He argues that the intensified form cannot be indivisible because an indivisible cannot be acquired successively, but only at once (“tota simul”), whereas it is clear that an intensification or remission is progressive. Therefore, an intensifiable form must allow for parts or degrees that are actualized progressively. Nonetheless, the numerical unity of this form is guaranteed by the continuity of the progress. The unity of the forma fluens is the same as that of the change itself (fluxus formae); but change is one by the continuity of its parts; therefore, the same must apply to the form that is acquired. 3. So far, Durand has manifested not so much his disagreement with Hervaeus as with the older Thomist view (i.e., that of Giles of Rome and Godfrey), on which all forms are simple and indivisible entities. But how are these forms divisible? Here the difference with Hervaeus becomes visible. For the latter, these forms are divisible into degrees that contain each other virtually, as we know. For Durand, they are divisible into degrees that succeed each other.

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Durand first summarizes Hervaeus’ answer: the intensified form differs from what it was previously by being what it was plus something more that it has acquired; however, these parts are not determinable (signabiles) parts, such that one can be distinguished from the other.123 Durand harshly criticizes this idea. First, it contradicts Aquinas’s doctrine, which it is supposed to defend, as Durand is happy to emphasize (and he certainly has a point, here).124 It comes down to admitting that the intensification of the form happens by addition of something new, which is precisely what Aquinas disagreed with. Second, this idea is erroneous. An addition, or even more simply a composition, can happen only between things that are distinct by a distinction stronger that a distinction of reason.125 But two accidents of the same kind cannot be in the same subject at the same time. They cannot merge, because all forms are actuality, and actuality separates and distinguishes. There would be a multiplication of qualities, instead of the augmentation of a quality.126 Ironically, Durand uses fundamental tenets of Aquinas’s ontology against Hervaeus, self-proclaimed defender of the Thomistic orthodoxy. It is worth noting that Thomas of Bailly employs the same argument, and this might have been directed against Hervaeus, or at least against a theory that tries to explain how new degrees could coexist with previous degrees and somehow merge with them.127 Admittedly, all this does not apply to nutrition, but this is precisely why nutrition cannot be a paradigm for the intensification/remission process, contrary to what Hervaeus claims. As opposed to forms, a part of matter doesn’t distinguish itself from another part of matter (both being per se mere potentiality). This is why the matter of a nutrient can unite to the matter of the body.128 123. See above p. 310, and DBL3, p. 332. 124. I Sent. C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 18, f. 59 va. 125. Ibid., n. 19, f. 59 va: “realis additio est realiter diversorum. Idem enim non additur sibi ipsi, nisi forte secundum rationem.” 126. Ibid., n. 20, f. 59 va: “Cum ergo omnis forma sit aliqua actualitas, impossibile est quod transeat in quodcumque nisi per sui corruptionem (…) Et causa est, quia actus distinguit et separat. Et ideo impossibile est quod actus adveniat actui si maneat quin sit res distincta et signabilis aliquo modo.” See Aristoteles, Metaphysics, book VII, chapter 13 (= recensio Guillelmi, 1039a7, AL 25.3.2, p. 159, l. 755): “Actus enim separat”; cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J. Hamesse), p. 130, n. 187 (“Actus separat et distinguit”). 127. Thomas de Bailly, Quodl. III q. 15, p. 211: “ex pluribus in actu secundum quod huiusmodi, non fit unum.” Id., Quodl. IV q. 11, p. 285: “actus enim est per se distinguere et separare.” 128. I Sent. C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 20, f. 59 va.

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The other example given by Hervaeus, the stretching of skin, is inadequate as well. A greater extension results from the stretching, but not because a new quantity is added to the previous quantity. As in melting wax, the parts that beforehand were superposed now touch each other by their sides (this is why the skin or the wax become less dense and thinner).129 In sum, Durand objects that if the first degrees of the intensified form remain when new degrees are acquired, they will not be able to unite with each other, and the numerical unity of the form will not be preserved (an argument that could be directed against the addition theory as well). On this count too, Durand is on the same line as Thomas of Bailly, against Hervaeus.130 The only solution, therefore, is that these parts replace each other in a succession. Paradoxically, the succession theory comes to the help of the numerical unity of the whole form. How distinct are these degrees of a form? If by signabiles one means continuous parts that can co-exist together, then the degrees of a form are not signabiles, because it is impossible for the same form to be at the same time less intense and more intense, that is to say, to have simultaneously two degrees. In a broader sense, though, signabiles parts are parts that have real differences: one is not the other, even though they are parts of a same whole numerically one—without, naturally, existing simultaneously. In that sense, the successive degrees in an intensification are the signabiles parts of one and the same form, which, with respect to the totality of the change process, is one by continuity of these parts.131 (I am not sure, however, that this notion of parts or degrees of a form is any better defined than in the addition theory.) Thus, Durand keeps the idea of succession, even though for him there is corruption and replacement not of individual forms, but only of successive degrees within the same, numerically one form. This is why, perhaps surprisingly at this point, he eventually offers three arguments in favor of the succession thesis—two of which are traceable to redaction A, James of Metz, and Godfrey—followed by the answers that Hervaeus had given to each and by a rebuttal of these answers.132 129. Ibid., n. 22, f. 59 va-vb. 130. See Thomas de Bailly Quodl. III q. 15, p. 216. 131. I Sent. C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 23, f. 59 vb. See ibid., n. 39, f. 60 rb: “Tenendum est ergo quod forma intensa et remissa acquisitae per motum possunt esse partes unius formae numero, et quae non est una indivisibilitate, sed continuitate suarum partium quae non sunt simul, sed successive et una superveniente alia desinit esse et hoc modo signari possunt.” 132. Ibid., nn. 26-38, f. 60 ra-rb.

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The first argument is identical to G3/J3/DBL1: “In omni motu terminus a quo abiicitur et terminus ad quem acquiritur.” Hervaeus had answered that in an intensification the terminus a quo is not the form itself, but the privation of the perfection that constitutes the terminus ad quem; obviously, this privation is eliminated, but this does not mean that the form is eliminated too and has to be replaced by another.133 This reply, Durand objects, is worthless. His first two objections emphasize the fact that the intensification process acts on the preexisting form, not on the privation.134 His third reason is that the terminus a quo of an intensification is the terminus ad quem of a remission, and this terminus ad quem cannot be a privation, but has to be an existing form. The second argument is identical to G2/J2/DBL2: the agent must imprint something other than what existed beforehand. Hervaeus had answered that the agent makes the form that existed beforehand more perfect; the result is only a difference between the less perfect and the more perfect, not of a difference between two forms.135 As we saw with DBL2, Durand objects that this argument is inconsistent with Hervaeus’ own affirmations. Hervaeus argued that in nutrition, the matter of the nutrient does not just perfect the matter of the body, but is added to it. According to the parallel drawn by Hervaeus himself, the intensified form should likewise not just perfect the previous form, but be added to it (or a new degree be added to the same form in a lesser degree). Moreover, if the agent does not actualize anything new, it makes the patient more perfect while doing nothing, which is absurd.136 The perfection is nothing but the form; if some perfection is added, this means that the essence is modified.137 The third argument reiterates the fundamental principle that a variation in perfection is a variation of the essence, which entails that an intensified or remitted form is not the same form that existed before.138 Hervaeus replied that the form remains what it is, even though the form as more intense contains more perfection than the same form 133. See CR3/NR3 above, p. 316, and Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 13, ad 8m, f. 61 ra. 134. I Sent. C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 29, f. 60 ra: “motus intensionis non potest esse in non habente formam.” 135. See CR2/NR2 above, p. 318, and Hervaeus, Quodl. II q. 13, ad 5m and ad 6m, ff. 60 vb – 61 ra. 136. I Sent. C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 24, f. 60 rb: “(…) perficit per nihil, et agit nihil agendo (…).” 137. Ibid., n. 35, f. 60rb: “(…) quod causat novam perfectionem causat novam formam quantum ad essentiam formae (…).” 138. Ibid., n. 36, f. 60rb: “(…) essentia essentialiter variata non est eadem essentia (…) ergo forma intensa et remissa non sunt eadem essentia.”

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as less intense. Durand becomes caustic here. This response is evasive, frivolous, and purely verbal, he says.139 Again, the perfection of the form is equivalent to the very essence of the form; modifying one is modifying the other. Here too, Durand may have taken note of Bailly’s earlier rebuttal of Hervaeus.140 However, after this development that might pass for an unconditional defense of Godfrey’s theory, Durand takes care to give his considered position on the succession thesis, in response to the opening arguments of the whole question (the five arguments that were reported by Lombardi as being Durand’s own and are now in the quod non): “The main arguments submitted to establish that a remitted form and an intensified form are not numerically the same, must be accepted insofar as they prove that the intensified form and the remitted form exclude each other, like the parts of a successive continuity (…) but they do not prove that the total form of which they are parts is not numerically one by continuity.”141

In other words, Durand continues to endorse the argumentative core of the succession theory, but makes clear that he places the succession within the same form, as a succession of degrees of intensity of that form (a succession, not an accumulation or addition of degrees), rather than between fully-fledged individual forms. Again, this may be a mere clarification of what he was already writing in redaction A or objecting to Hervaeus at the time of the latter’s Quodlibet II, although nothing in the extant texts or testimonies clearly confirms this possibility. Alternatively, it may be an important modification, due to Hervaeus’ or others’ criticisms. Nonetheless, because he endorses a form of succession, Durand has to respond to the objections raised against the tenets of Godfrey’s theory, even though these responses must be understood within the framework of Durand’s own solution. 139. Ibid., n. 38, f. 60 rb: “Ista autem evasio et omnes consimiles frivolae sunt, et stant in verbis sine re.” 140. See Thomas de Bailly, Quodl. III q. 15, Contra, p. 208: “(…) essentia caritatis non differt realiter a gradibus eius,” and 3rd argument, p. 210: “(…) album in minus albo est idem realiter cum minus albo, et eodem modo album in magis albo est idem realiter cum eo; ergo non potest intelligi, cum aliquis mouetur de minus albo in magis album, quod fiat uariatio secundum magis et minus album quin etiam fiat secundum essentiam albedinis (…).” 141. I Sent. C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 41, f. 60 va.

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1. To the infinity objection:142 Just as in any motion and any continuum there is an infinity of parts in potentiality, likewise, in a form that is intensified there is an infinity of partial forms which, by their continuity, compose the total form that is acquired by the totality of the motion. 2. To the discontinuity objection:143 The remitted form that was in the subject before the beginning of change is expelled in an instant, but the next form is introduced not in an instant, but progressively. 3. To the active agent objection:144 The cold that diminishes heat does imprint something; it does not do so just by itself, however, but with the heat which co-acts and preserves the diminished degree of heat. Conclusion The previous pages have depicted the liveliness of some of the debates about the intensification/remission of forms at the very beginning of the 14th century. Even though the topic seems today obscure and idle, it was obviously of great interest to the medievals, since they did not hesitate to return to it tirelessly and were keen on criticizing each other’s errors on the matter. The influence of Godfrey of Fontaines has been highlighted. Hervaeus did all he could to push back against it, but James of Metz and Thomas of Bailly, among others, spread his thesis. Durand too defended it against Hervaeus, and I have shown that he probably did so directly as an interlocutor in Nédellec’s second Quodlibet, in concordance with a question of the first redaction of his Sentences commentary, which has now disappeared but is echoed by Bernard Lombardi. Durand’s considered position in the third redaction of his Sentences commentary, however, is unique. Even though some of his views seem close to Bailly’s, in the end his theory is quite different. For Bailly, as for Godfrey, there is no doubt that the intensified form does not remain numerically the same, and that each degree corresponds to a distinct form which is actualized and then eliminated as long as the process goes on.145 By contrast, 142. See NO1 above, p. 314. 143. See CO1 above, p. 314. 144. See NO2 above, p. 315. 145. See Thomas de Bailly, Quodl. III q. 15, 4th argument, p. 210: “Ergo patet quod illa forma secundum quam est motus est alia et alia realiter secundum diuersas partes motus, que tamen non possunt esse simul; adueniente secunda corrumpitur prima (…).”

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Durand offers a sort of compromise, in which he abandons Godfrey’s most controversial claim, namely, that the same form does not remain throughout its intensification or remission. He seems to have accepted some of the criticisms that had been addressed to Godfrey’s theory. Nevertheless, Durand uses Godfrey’s, James’s, and Bailly’s arguments to support his own view of a succession of degrees in the same form. In closing, it is worth mentioning a fact that highlights Durand’s influence within the Dominican order despite the troubles he ran into. At the end of his account of Durand’s position, Bernard Lombardi confesses that the succession theory once strongly appealed to him and that he eventually rejected it only for a theological reason that involves the transubstantiation dogma.146 Furthermore, the next article of Lombardi’s question (art. 2: “Que est causa precisa susceptionis magis et minus”), is, as I noted above,147 nothing but the transcription, word for word, of Durand’s q. 6 in redaction C.148 As in the case of James of Lausanne,149 one of the Dominicans who was supposed to be Durand’s nemesis does not hesitate to copy him from start to finish, just short of presenting him as an authority on the question. This fact may encourage us to look more carefully at Durand’s very special place in the Dominican order.150

146. Dist. 17, q. 1, Leipzig f. 38 ra: “Ista opinio que est ultimo posita [i.e. Hervaei Natalis] tenetur propter illam rationem fidei supra predictam de speciebus sacramentalibus adductam alias [contra Durandum add. Naples). Tamen fuit visum mihi oppositum, scilicet quod forma intensa et remissa distinguantur realiter (…).” Bernard refers to an earlier passage of the question (Leipzig f. 37rb): “Istam opinionem [i.e. Durandi] non teneo propter unam rationem que sit de speciebus in sacramento altaris que talis est: variatis speciebus in sacramento altaris secundum numerum desinit ibi esse corpus Christi. Hoc patet per fidem. Sed stante corpore Christi vero in speciebus potest fieri in speciebus raritas et densitas, vel densatio et rarefactio que sunt passiones quantitatis. Ergo rarum et densum non differunt secundum numerum et per consequens nec intensum nec remissum.” 147. Fn. 102. 148. At least in the Erfurt and Leipzig manuscripts. The Naples manuscript purely and simply refers the reader to Durand’s text: “vide Durandum et dic sicut ipse.” 149. See above, p. 307, at fn. 41. 150. For more remarks in the same vein, see M. Brînzei – R.L. Friedman – C. Schabel, “The Late-Medieval Reception of Durand’s Sentences Commentary, with Two Case Studies: Peter Auriol († 1322) and Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl († 1433),” in: A. Speer – F. Retucci – T. Jeschke – G. Guldentops (eds.), Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences commentary, pp. 295-341, esp. pp. 296-298.

Appendix: The Additions of Ms. BnF Lat. 15364 and the Question of the Three Redactions of Durand’s Commentary on the SENTENCES. Josef Koch has shown that the manuscript kept in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France under the shelf mark Lat. 15364 does not contain the Additiones to the first redaction of Durand’s commentary on book I of the Sentences mentioned by Durandellus151 but that both the main text of book I (f. 2va-66va) and the Additiones (f. 67ra-91ra) are part of redaction C.152 Therefore, for Koch, this manuscript was at most a witness of Durand’s composition method: while preparing the third redaction, Durand added a series of additional questions to a first draft of the first book. However, P.T. Stella has shown that Koch was mistaken when affirming that these Additiones were additions to the “new scriptum on the first book of the Sentences,” as the explicit of the main text (end of book I) calls it153 —which is to say, additions to the third redaction. Rather, as the explicit of the Additiones themselves states, they are additions to the “lecture” that Durand “copied and composed in Paris.”

151. J. Koch, Durandus, pp. 44-49. Cf. Nicolaus Medensis (Durandellus), Evidentiae contra Durandum, ed. P.T. Stella, Tübingen 2003, vol. 1, p. 56 (NB: W. Duba, “Aristotle in Hell and Aquinas in Heaven: Hugo de Novocastro, OFM and Durandus de Aureliaco OP,” in: Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 56 [2014], pp. 183-194, has recently proposed to re-identify re-identify Durandellus with Durand of Aurillac). 152. See p. 47 the criterion used by Koch: redaction C contains questions taken from the Quodlibet held by Durand in Avignon in 1314: I Sent. C, d. 17 q. 1 = Quodl. Aven. I q. 6; d. 33 q. 1 = in part Quodl. Aven. I q. 1. These two questions are present in the first part or main text of BnF Lat. 15364. Therefore, this text offers right away redaction C, and the Additiones are not additions to an earlier version. Moreover, the preface of the main text mentions Durand’s presence in Avignon as a past fact. 153. F. 65 va: “Explicit novum scriptum super primum Sententiarum compilatum per fratrem Durandum de Sancto Porciano ordinis predicatorum episcopum Meldenensis et doctorem sacre theologie.” See P.T. Stella, “A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1) : la questione inedita ‘Utrum Deus esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari’ di Erveo Natalis”, Salesianum 22 / 2 (1960): 245-325, p. 312.

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Here is the full passage: /91ra/ Expliciunt tituli 61 correctorii qui sunt additiones et declarationes Magistri Durandi ordinis predicatorum doctoris venerabilis, quos super lecturam suam Sententiarum addidit quam Parisius copiavit et compilavit. Unde 100 et 9 et 61 faciunt 170, et tot sunt questiones summatim primi Durandi. Unde primus Durandi habet centum et septuaginta questiones.

Nonetheless, it is correct that the main text, to which the Additiones are appended, offers the text of redaction C, minus the said additions. All in all, the total content of the manuscript looks to be that of redaction C, once the additions are inserted in their definitive place. Why, then, are we told that the Additiones are additions to an earlier version? It is as if the content of redaction C of book I had been broken down: first the questions that have a match in the questions that Durand had discussed in Paris, then the questions that have on the contrary no match, and therefore are additional questions compared to the Parisian lectures. In other words, the layout dismembers redaction C and distinguishes what corresponds, at least formally, to the Paris lectures, and what is only in redaction C. When one of the questions has its equivalent in the Paris lectures, the main text gives the redaction C version of that question; when one of them has not been discussed in Paris, the main text refers to the Additiones, saying that one will find below the text of that question (in its C version too).154 Let us see what this system reveals about distinction 17. At the end of the main text of book I (f. 65va-66va), one finds the complete list of the questions contained in redaction C, which is repeated at the beginning of the Additiones (f. 67ra-vb). I transcribe in italics the titles of the questions of dist. 17 that are present in the first part or main text of the manuscript (f. 28vb to 31ra), that is to say, the topics that had been discussed in the Parisian lectures. I transcribe in normal font the ques-

154. It is worth noting that the manuscript is rather carefully written and amended, once belonged to the College of Sorbonne, and has traces of the pecia system. Its peculiar composition must have served a purpose. Perhaps the Additiones were first a self-standing compendium of the questions that were in redaction C but not in the Paris lectures, and were available in other manuscripts; then, someone who wanted to have the full text of redaction C had the other questions of redaction C copied and placed first, with references to the already existing Additiones as a complement.

DOMINICAN DEBATES ON THE INTENSIFICATION

345

tions contained in the Additiones, that is to say, the questions that are additional in the third version by comparison with the Paris lectures. Utrum necessarium sit caritatem esse habitum creatum in homine ad hoc quod homo sit Deo carus Utrum necessarium sit ponere caritatem habitualem ad hoc ut possumus aliquid mereri apud Deum Utrum caritas detur secundum proportionem naturalium Utrum ille qui est in caritate possit cognoscere certitudinaliter se habere caritatem .155 Utrum caritas possit augeri156 Que sit causa suscipiendi magis et minus Utrum eadem forma numero possit esse intensa et remissa sive suscipere magis et minus < cf. f.30rb: Ista questio aliter patet infra = Add. f. 81rb-82rb> Utrum caritas augeatur per quemlibet actum Utrum possit augeri in infinitum Utrum caritas possit diminui. These ten questions are indeed present in redaction C as we know it from other manuscripts and the printed editions. Let us subtract the questions in normal font. This leaves four questions (in italics), which are therefore, according to the explicit of the Additiones, the only ones that Durand discussed in Paris. These are exactly the four questions that are found in all the non-C manuscripts of book I. Therefore, the non-C manuscripts give us a text that is at least structurally identical to the version that Durand had reworked in Paris, i.e. redaction B. Might

155. The reference to the Additiones is missing in the main text. 156. This question is in fact absent in the main text (and is not in the Additiones either). Its omission is easily explainable. This question is supposed to be the first of the second part of the distinction (“de caritatis augmento,” qq. 5-10). When finishing the first part of the distinction (“de necessitate caritatis,” qq. 1-4), the scribe jumped by homoeoteleuton to the “Ad secundum” that introduces the second question of the second part, i.e. q. 6, f. 30rb.

346

JEAN-LUC SOLÈRE

they nevertheless transmit redaction A, in case Durand had not issued a redaction B of book I, as Koch believed? No, because one of the non-C manuscripts indicates that two questions are missing in dist. 17, and this cannot be by comparison with redaction C, since there are six additional questions in redaction C, not two (see above, p. 327). Therefore, it has to be by comparison with redaction A. Thus, redaction A was different from redaction B, since in redaction B dist. 17 has four questions, whereas in redaction A it comprised six questions (the four of redaction B plus the two reported as missing). Conclusion: the non-C manuscripts of book I contain redaction B. As a consequence, we do not have direct access to redaction A of book I.

INDEX OF NAMES Aegidius Romanus 9, 19, 25, 35-36, 40, 59, 64, 78, 80, 82-83, 85-89, 91-93, 98-101, 111-114, 124, 126, 128, 160, 176, 179, 186, 188-189, 193, 214, 228, 231, 298, 301, 302, 309, 335 Aertsen J.A. 16, 32, 36, 67, 122, 123 Albertus Magnus 32, 78 Alexander de Alexandria 325 Algazel vide Ghazālī (al-), Abū Ḥāmīd Muḥammad Alliney G. 126 Alypius Tagastae episcopus 297 Ambrosius Mediolanensis 167-168 Amerini F. 9, 25, 39, 50, 122, 161-188, 308 Anselmus Cantuariensis 211, 224-225, 253, 258, 268, 278, 289 Apuleius Madaurensis 141 Aristoteles 22, 25, 31, 54-55, 62-63, 85, 89, 91, 95, 97, 99-100, 102-103, 107-108, 133, 135-136, 138, 154-155, 158, 161162, 177, 204-205, 207-208, 214, 224, 244-245, 247, 295-297, 299, 308, 314, 327, 336 Arnaldus de Villanova 22 Arnzen R. 55 Athanasius de Alexandria 224, 236, 257, 287, 290 Atucha I. 34 Aubert R. 15 Augustinus Hipponensis 23, 31, 52, 62, 82, 95, 136, 145-146, 161, 166-169, 224, 244, 248, 283, 285, 297 Augustinus Montifalconius 298 Averroes vide Ibn Rushd, Abū l-Walīd Avicebron vide Solomon ibn Gabirol Avicenna vide Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAli Bakker P.J.J.M. 34, 293 Balcayiannopoulou I. 321, 324 Basilius Caesariensis 167-168

Bazán B.C. 126 Benedictus Caetani (Bonifacius VIII) 227 Bernardus de Alvernia 213 Bernardus de Trillia 23 Bernardus Lombardi 321-322, 324, 326330, 332-334, 339, 340-341 Bertrand de Got (Clemens V) 324 Bianchi L. 20, 122 Biffi I. 21 Boethius, A.M.T. Severinus 15, 224, 237, 259, 295 Boland V. 129 Bombolognus de Bononia 225 Bonaventura de Balneoregio 33, 60, 63-64, 126, 131, 147, 150, 191, 294 Bonini F. 7-11, 15-34, 37-38, 123-124, 211, 213 Bonino S.-T. 21, 33 Bornholdt J. 133 Bouhot J.-P. 83 Boureau A. 125 Boyle L.E. 7, 16, 36-37, 67, 123, 164 Briggs C. 82 Brînzei M. 34, 211, 341 Brower J.E. 163 Brown S.F. 10, 293, 307 Bucossi A. 227 Burr D. 79 Buytaert E.M. 133 Caldera F. 131 Callus D.A. 35 Calma D. 34 Carmody F.J. 55 Céleyrette J. 293, 296, 299, 307 Chirac Jacques 212, 216 Christ K. 68 Colli A. 7-11, 24-25, 29, 34-66, 68, 105119, 125, 188, 197 Commentator vide Ibn Rushd, Abū l-Walīd

348

INDEX OF NAMES

Conolly B. 293 Conradus de Megenberg 33 Courtenay W.J. 323 Cova L. 126 Craig W.L. 133, 147 Crisciani C. 122 Dante Alighieri 161-162 Darricau R. 15, 123 Davies B. 163 de Bonfils Templer M. 161 de Guimarães A. 16, 77, 319 de Libera A. 79 De Poorter A. 67 De Wulf M. 298 Decker B. 8, 16, 20, 26-27, 37-38, 67-69, 71, 73-74, 76-78, 80, 123-124, 164, 213214, 323 Delorme F.M. 162, 175 Denifle H. 19 Dewender T. 291 Dionysius Areopagita (pseudo-) 23, 149, 287 Dod B.G. 296 Donati S. 82, 87, 89 Dondaine A. 67, 72 Dooland G.T. 129 Douais C. 15, 23 Duba W.O. 213-215, 300, 305, 323, 343 Duhem P. 82, 86 Dumont S.D. 194, 293, 311, 315, 319 Durandus de Aureliaco 214, 343 Durandus de Sancto Porciano 10, 22, 26, 75, 181, 213-214, 293, 297-298, 306-307, 312, 319-328, 329, 332-341, 343-346 Eardley P. 82 Eckert W.P. 193 Ehrle F. 22, 79 Emery K. 16, 36, 68, 122-123, 211, 300, 307 Empedocles 97 Erismann C. 295 Ernst J.T. 67 Etzkorn G.J. 63 Evans G.R. 34, 79, 215, 323 Fabian C. 15 Faes de Mottoni B. 145 Falà J.F. 129

Fioravanti G. 161 Fløistad G. 122 Fournier P. 7, 15, 58, 123 Francisco Suarez 133 Franciscus de Marchia 82, 84-85 Franciscus de Prato 122, 163, 180 Friedman R.L. 79, 173, 211, 213, 215, 224225, 228-229, 307, 319, 321, 323-324, 341 Gauthier R.A. 124 Gauvard C. 79 Genest J.-F. 83 Genet J.-P. 79 Gentili S. 162 Gerardus de Bononia 159 Gerwing M. 15 Ghazālī (al-), Abū Ḥāmīd Muḥammad (sive Algazel) 90, 103, 140 Ghisalberti A. 20, 122 Glorieux P. 35-36, 43, 76, 79, 81, 121-122, 124, 131, 135, 138, 162, 183, 197, 311, 315, 319-320 Godefridus de Fontibus 76-77, 83-84, 293, 297-304, 311-313, 315, 319, 322, 327328, 335, 337, 339-341 Goris H. 129, 147 Goris W. 7-8, 10, 16-17, 19, 24-25, 27, 37, 67-68, 73, 76-77, 80, 123-125, 164, 191209 Gottlieb T. 19 Godescalcus de Pomuk 221 Goulet M.-O. 292 Grabmann M. 7, 15, 19, 70, 123-124, 163 Gracia J.J.E. 181 Gregorius Nazianzenus 287 Griewank K. 71 Gualterus de Burley 293, 319 Gualterus de Chatton 133 Guillelmus de Alvernia 43 Guillelmus de Brena 215 Guillelmus de la Mara 9, 35, 39, 40-48, 50, 52-54, 56, 58-61, 80, 121-122, 124, 130138, 141-142, 144, 148, 150-155, 159, 162, 193 Guillelmus de Macclesfield 36, 45, 143 Guillelmus de Moerbeka 336 Guillelmus de Ockham 189 Guillelmus Petri de Godino 7-10, 15-16, 18-21, 23-28, 32-34, 37-41, 43-56, 58-61,

INDEX OF NAMES 64-69, 74-75, 77-78, 80, 84, 91-94, 121, 123-127, 131-132, 136, 139, 147-157, 159-161, 163-167, 170, 172-189, 191-205, 207-209, 211, 213-219, 222-228, 230-231, 295-297, 298, 300 Guldentops G. 10, 211, 323, 325, 341 Hamesse J. 16, 36-37, 67, 97, 123, 164, 294, 336 Haubst R. 67, 214 Heiman A. 333 Henninger M.H. 181 Henricus de Gandavo 9, 19, 25, 60, 64, 80, 87, 121, 124, 160, 162, 173-175, 188, 192, 193, 229 Hervaeus Natalis 10, 16, 26, 75, 77, 159, 173, 181, 212, 214, 219, 229-231, 297298, 300, 305-312, 314-340, 343 Hilarius Pictaviensis 218, 233 Hissette R. 36, 42, 131 Hocedez E. 82, 202 Hödl L. 68, 77-80, 122, 211, 224-225 Hoenen M.J.F.M. 10, 20, 33, 36, 38, 46, 122, 130, 133 Hoffmann T. 121, 129, 191 Hoffmans J. 77, 84, 299-300 Hufnagel A. 197 Hugo de Novocastro 214, 343 Hugo de Sancto Victore 219-220, 241 Iacobus de Altavilla 223 Iacobus de Lausana 214, 307, 341 Iacobus Metensis 8, 10, 16, 26, 37-38, 46, 61, 67, 73, 75-76, 80-81, 123-124, 164, 191, 197, 211-219, 222-233, 243, 246, 248, 293, 298-299, 301-310, 312-313, 315-316, 318-319, 322-323, 325, 329, 331, 335, 337, 340-341 Ibn Rushd, Abū l-Walīd (sive Averroes sive Commentator) 47, 54-55, 84, 113, 115, 224, 248 Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAli (sive Avicenna) 23, 84, 96, 108,140, 146, 192, 208, 224 Imbach R. 15, 20, 122 Iohannes Chrysostomus 167-168 Iohannes Damascenus 133, 135, 137, 146147, 218, 224, 291-292 Iohannes de Basilea 27 Iohannes de Neapoli 42, 212

349

Iohannes de Polliaco 133, 293, 319 Iohannes de Sterngassen 24, 214-215 Iohannes de Vercellis 191 Iohannes Duns Scotus 10, 133, 164, 175, 191-200, 202-209, 211, 213-215, 294, 300, 304-305, 311, 315, 323 Iohannes Parisiensis (Quidort) 10, 24-27, 31, 34, 36, 60, 75-76, 83, 123, 139-142, 144, 156, 159-160, 162, 186, 188-189, 197, 214-215, 309-310, 333 Iohannes Peckham 9, 35, 63-64, 162, 175, 178, 188 Iohannes Vigorosus 22 Iribarren I. 22, 121-122, 126, 297, 324 Jellouschek C. 42 Jeschke T. 10, 26, 323, 325, 341 Jordan M.D. 79, 122, 131, 134, 137, 139, 143 Kaeppeli T. 15, 26, 74-75, 164, 321 Kaluza Z. 32 Kelly F.E. 134 Kenny A. 133 Kilmer C. 22 Knuuttila S. 133 Kobusch T. 291 Koch J. 9, 26-27, 67-78, 80-82, 213-214, 306, 308, 319, 322-326, 334, 343, 346 Kohlenberger H. 197 Köhler T.W. 26, 35, 67, 79, 122, 191, 205, 212 König-Pralong C. 10, 20, 34, 122, 189 Koridze G. 163 Kraml H. 60 Kretzmann N. 133 Krüger S. 33 Lambertini R. 311 Laurent M.-H. 23, 123 Lehmann P. 19 Leibold G. 60 Lenz M. 121, 126 Lotharius di Segni (Innocentius III) 227 Lottin O. 83 Lowe E. 21 Luna C. 25, 89, 101 Macken R. 60, 162 Maier A. 293-294

350

INDEX OF NAMES

Maierù A. 33 Mandonnet P. 39, 82, 127, 163 Marabelli C. 21 Maramo C. 126 Marmursztejn E. 22 Martin R.J. 27, 71 Martin R.M. 210 Mauriège M. 9, 29, 67-104 Mazzatinti G. 25 McCready W.D. 15, 32 Meersseman G. 19, 27, 71-72, 76, 80-81 Meirinhos J. 293 Meister Eckhart 9, 26-27, 67-78, 80-81, 84, 87-90, 92-96, 99-104, 124, 158, 215 Melchiorre V. 15 Meliadò M. 34, 37, 68 Minio-Paluello L. 296 Mollat G. 15 Moreschini C. 141 Moses Maimonides 96 Muckle J.T. 103, 140 Mulchahey M.M. 24, 122, 189 Müller J.-P. 35-36, 76, 79, 83, 122, 139140, 143, 162, 186, 197, 309-310 Negri S. 34, 37, 68 Nicolaus Boccasini (Benedictus XI) 311 Nicolaus Copernicus 82 Nicolaus de Dinkelsbühl 341 Nicolaus Medensis 343 Nicolaus Trivet 215 Niehaus D. 15 Noone T.B. 126, 150, 193-194 Normore C. 133 O’Donnell J.R. 333 Olszewski M. 212, 229-230, 232, 300, 306307 Origenes Alexandrinus 165 Ott L. 26 Palazzo A. 9, 24-25, 121-160 Panaccio C. 126 Panella E. 162 Paravicini-Bagliani A. 129 Pasnau R. 173 Paulus Apostolus 22 Peck J.W. 46, 61, 123, 212 Pelster F. 79

Pelzer A. 84, 298 Perler D. 126 Perrone M. 322, 325-327 Petagine A. 20, 122 Petrus Aureoli 122, 133, 213, 293, 300, 305, 310, 323, 341 Petrus de Alvernia 202, 310 Petrus de Palude 32, 214, 319, 321, 324,343 Petrus de Tarantasia 83, 87, 131, 229 Petrus Iohannis Olivi 22, 27, 79, 121, 125, 294 Petrus Lombardus 16, 34, 79, 212, 215, 223, 297, 300, 323 Pfeiffer F. 101 Philippus lector 27, 71 Philosophus vide Aristoteles Pich R.H. 211, 300 Piché D. 40-41, 159, 185, 189 Pickavé M. 7-8, 16-17, 19, 24-25, 27, 34, 37, 67, 76-77, 80, 89, 123-125, 164, 181, 193, 197 Pinborg J. 133 Pini G. 176, 191, 194 Piron S. 22 Plato 82, 91, 97, 200, 203-206, 254 Podolak P. 227 Porebski S.A. 321 Porphyrius 179-180 Porro P. 15, 36, 122, 124 Putallaz F.-X. 32 Quint J. 68 Rambertus de’ Primadizzi 36, 148, 212, 218221, 230, 235, 241 Raymundus de Medullione 22 Reichert B.M. 21, 23, 324 Reina M.E. 122 Remigius de’ Girolami 162-163, 173, 211, 215, 300, 305, 323 Retucci F. 10, 322-323, 325-327, 334, 341 Reynolds P.L. 317 Richardus de Mediavilla 25, 61-62, 64-65, 124, 180, 294 Richardus de Sancto Victore 219, 290 Richardus Knapwell 36, 134-137 Rizzello R. 20, 122 Robertus de Orford 10, 36, 48, 51, 59, 137, 179, 181-183, 185, 188, 228

INDEX OF NAMES Robertus Holcot 214 Robertus Kilwardby 35, 60 Robiglio A.A. 20-23, 37, 122 Roensch F.J. 20-21, 122, 163 Roling B. 126 Romanus de Roma 231 Rosemann P.W. 34 Rucquoi A. 15, 27 Salomon rex 96 Sasso G. 161 Schabel C. 10, 34, 46, 61, 123, 133, 176, 181, 193, 211-293, 300, 303, 305, 310311, 319, 321, 323-324, 341 Schaller T. 68 Schmaus M. 213-214 Schneider N. 82, 84-85 Schneider T. 79 Schniewind A. 295 Schulthess P. 15 Seeberg E. 73 Senner W. 24 Sigerus de Brabantia 87, 111 Sileo L. 193-194 Socrates 200, 203-207, 264 Söder J. 133 Solère J.-L. 10, 173, 212, 293-344 Solomon ibn Gabirol (sive Avicebron) 84, 96 Sorbelli A. 25 Speer A. 7-11, 16, 32, 36, 68, 73, 122-123, 211, 300, 307, 323, 325, 341 Spettmann H. 63 Spruit L. 129, 137 Steel C. 294 Stella P.T. 319, 343 Stephanus Tempier 35, 38, 40, 43 Stroick C. 193, 195 Stump E. 163 Sturlese L. 73, 158 Suarez-Nani T. 42, 121-122, 125-126, 128129, 147 Testi Cristiani M.L. 23 Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg 293 Thijssen J.M.M.H. 35-36 Thomas Anglicus 214 Thomas de Aquino 7-10, 20-25, 31, 33-46, 49-50, 52, 55-56, 58-61, 64-66, 69, 75-76, 78-80, 82, 84-86, 88-92, 94-100, 102-103,

351

106-108, 110-111, 119, 121-124, 126-131, 133-134, 137, 141-145, 147-152, 155, 159-160, 162-167, 170, 172, 174-175, 177-179, 181, 183, 188-189, 191, 193, 196, 200, 212, 214, 217-222, 224-225, 229-230, 232, 235, 237, 241, 247, 294295, 297-298, 301, 306, 308-311, 324, 326, 336, 343 Thomas de Balliaco 293, 311-312, 315, 319320, 326, 331, 333, 336-337, 339-341 Thomas de Suttona 301 Thomas Wylton 133 Trapp D. 34 Trifogli C. 82 Tsougarakis N. 227 Ubertinus de Casale 27 Ullrich L. 8, 26, 67, 81, 123, 191, 197, 212 Van Riet S. 140 Vasoli C. 161 Vernet A. 83 Vicaire M.-H. 23 Viola C. 122 Vos A. 191 Vosto I.M. 32 Weber D. 161 Weijers O. 193, 293 Wielockx R. 36 Wippel J.F. 35-36, 77, 129 Wissink J.B.M. 36, 122 Young S.E. 215 Zahnd U. 34 Zavattero I. 34, 129 Zimmermann A. 35, 82, 158 Zink M. 79 Zycha I. 146, 161

INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS Arras, Bibliothèque municipale 751 (1032): 18 Basel, Universitätsbibliothek B III 6: 17-18, 24, 29-31, 41, 105-119 B IV 13: 306 Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz Theol. lat. Fol. 557: 17, 24, 29-31, 39, 41, 105-119 Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A 986: 17, 25, 29-31, 39, 41, 53, 105119 Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale 147: 306 Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek 491: 9, 28-30, 67-104, 112, 117, 123 Cesena, Biblioteca Malatestiana Plut. XVI dextr. 1: 19 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Borgh. lat. 122: 216, 233-292 Palat. lat. 373: 216, 233-292 Vat. Lat. 869: 18, 30 Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek 722: 19 Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek (olim Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek der Stadt) Bibliotheca Amploniana CA 2° 368: 321, 327-329, 332-333, 341 CA 2° 369: 164, 192, 195 Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek 505: 17-18, 29-31, 39, 53, 105-119 Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale conv. soppr. B I 569: 306

Graz, Universitätsbibliothek 475: 17-18, 24, 29-31, 38-43, 47-52, 54-56, 58-60, 64, 105-119, 147-153, 155157, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 174-176, 178-179, 182, 184-188, 197, 215, 233292, 296 Helsinki, Kansallis Kirjasto (olim Yliopiston kirjesto) F.m. V.TH.AA.69: 18 Kremsmünster, Stiftsbibliothek 83: 75 Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek 281: 17-18, 29-31, 39, 41, 53, 105-119 Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1583: 18-19, 215, 233-292 Le Mans, Bibliothèque Municipale (Médiathèque Louis Aragon) 231: 229, 305-306, 310, 312 Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 542: 321, 327-329, 332-333, 341 München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Clm. 3749: 216, 233-292 Clm. 14383: 18, 216, 229, 231-292 Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale VII C 30: 17-18, 29-31, 39, 41, 53, 105-119 VII G 98: 321, 341 Oxford, Merton College 267: 36, 143 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France Lat. 3039: 17-18, 29-31, 39, 53, 105119

354

INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS

Lat. 12331: 216, 233-292 Lat. 14454: 327 Lat. 15364: 343-346 Lat. 17266: 18, 30 Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile di S. Caterina 44: 17-18, 29-31, 39, 41, 53, 105-119 Soest, Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek 21a: 19 Troyes, Bibliothèque Municipale (Médiathèque du Grand Troyes/ Médiathèque Jacques Chirac) 145: 83-84, 88, 98-102 262: 306 992: 212, 216-217, 220, 229-230, 232292, 300-301, 303-304, 308, 312-313 Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 1590: 16-17, 29-31, 39, 41, 53, 105119 2165: 18, 25 1321: 216, 219-220, 229, 233-292

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