The Judiciary: Tenth Edition 9780814707449

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The Judiciary

T E N T H E D I T I O

N

The Judiciary The Suprem e Cour t i n th e Governmenta l Proces s

Henry J. Abraham

New York University Press o

Ne w York and Londo n

NEW YOR K U N I V E R S I T New York and Londo n

Y PRES

S

Copyright © 1965,1968 , 1973 , 1977, 1980, 1983, 1987 by Allyn and Bacon , Inc . Copyright © 1991 , 1994 by Wm. C. Brown Communications , Inc., A Times Mirror Compan y Copyright © 199 6 by Henry J. Abraha m All rights reserve d Library o f Congress Cataloging-i n Publicatio n Dat a Abraham, Henr y Julian, 1921 Tlie judiciary : the Suprem e Cour t i n th e governmenta l proces s / Henry J. Abraham. — 10th ed . p. cm . Includes bibliographical reference s an d index . ISBN 0-8147-0652-5 (clot h : alk. paper).—ISBN 0-8147-0653- 3 (pbk. : alk. paper ) 1. Unite d States . Suprem e Court . 2 . Civi l rights—United States . 3. Judicia l power—Unite d States . 4 . Courts—Unite d States . I. Title . KF8748.A2 199 6 347.73'26—dc20 96-2526 7 [347.30735] CI P No par t of thi s publication ma y be reproduced , store d i n a retrieval system , or transmitted , i n an y form o r by any means , electronic, mechanical , photocopying , recording , o r other wise, without th e prio r written permissio n o f the publisher . Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s of Americ a New York University Pres s books are printe d o n acid-fre e pa per, and thei r bindin g material s ar e chose n fo r strengt h an d durability. 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3

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To Peter

C O N T E N T S

Preface xi

To the Tenth Edition, x To the First Edition, xii O N E American

i i

Courts in Practice 1

The Dua l Syste m o f Court s i n th e 3 United State s The State Judiciary, 4 Th e Federal Judiciary, 8 Federa l Legislative Courts, 11 Federal Constitutional Courts , 12 Overal l Jurisdiction, 12 The Suprem e Cour t o f the United State s 2

0

Jurisdiction, 24 Suprem e Cour t Workload, 28 Th e Institutional Setting , 30 Notes 4

5

T W O Courts and Public Policy: Personnel, Judicial Review, and Activism vs. Restraint 56 Judges an d Justices 5

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Selection and Tenure, 56 Qualification s and Nominations, 63 Judicial Revie w 6

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Genesis, 69 Line-Drawin g and Judicial Policy, 79 Guideline s of the Taught Tradition of the Law, 82 vii

Contents Judicial Activis m an d Judicial Restrain t 8

8

The Cour t a n d Public Polic y 9

4

Notes 9

7

T H R E E Fundamental

Freedoms: I Basic

Considerations 108 A Changed Emphasi s 10

9

The "Doubl e Standard " 11 Justification, 111

1

"Incorporation," Du e Process o f Law, Privacy , 11 and Crimina l Justic e

8

Two Types of Due Process of Law, 118 Som e Historical Considerations, 12 3 T o Incorporate or Not, and If So, How?, 12 7 Notes 14

6

F O U R Fundamental

Freedoms: II Religion and Expression 163

Religion 16

3

Free Exercise of Religion, 164 Separatio n of Church and State, 167 Freedom o f Expression, Generall y 17

7

The Court and National Security, 187 Notes 19 F I V E Fundamental

2 Freedoms: III Political,

Racial, and Sexual Equality 204

viii

Political Equalit y 20

4

Racial Equalit y 20 History and Progress, 210 Ente r Busing, 216 Applying Discrimination Remedies , 222

9

Contents Sexual Equalit y 24

6

The Stat e Action Proble m 25

4

Notes 26

2

Epilogue 275 Notes 27

7

For Further Reading 2

79

Appendix A: Statistical Data on Supreme Court Justices 285 Appendix B: The Constitution of the United States of America 291 Case Index 311 Subject Index 323

ix

P R E F A C E

TO T H E T E N T H E D I T I O N

The continue d us e o f The Judiciary an d it s broadl y approbator y reception b y th e professio n prompte d me , encourage d b y m y ne w publisher, th e Ne w Yor k Universit y Press , t o mov e t o th e tent h edition—more tha n thre e decade s afte r th e appearanc e o f th e first . All chapter s hav e bee n thoroughl y revise d an d update d throug h the Suprem e Court' s 1995-9 6 ter m (a s o f July 1996) . Once agai n I a m happ y t o recor d m y profoun d gratitud e t o a host o f colleague s an d student s wh o hav e bee n supportiv e o f m y efforts, an d thi s gratitud e als o applie s t o th e man y kindnesse s ex tended t o m e b y pas t an d presen t member s o f th e Court , especiall y Chief Justice Rehnquis t an d Justice s Brennan , Powell , Souter , an d Ginsburg. M y researc h assistants , Ric k Mayes , Jason Robinson , Ji m Staab, an d Jac k Yellot t wer e enormousl y helpfu l i n sundr y mode s and s o wa s J o hn Dinan , wh o rea d an d critique d th e manuscrip t meticulously. Like th e nin e othe r editions , thi s tent h i s dedicated wit h renewe d love an d prid e t o ou r younge r son , Peter , wh o wa s tw o year s o f ag e when th e firs t editio n appeared , an d who , no w i n th e cosmo s o f hi s own life , happil y marrie d t o Anne, an d prou d fathe r o f Marni e Lee , still approve s o f his book. xi

To The First Edition TO TH E FIRS T E D I T I O N

Despite a growin g awarenes s b y th e America n publi c o f th e signifi cant rol e playe d b y th e judiciary, th e latte r i s stil l th e leas t known , the leas t understood , an d th e mos t maligne d o f th e thre e branche s of th e Unite d State s government . Tha t thi s i s no t a surprisin g stat e of affair s doe s no t gainsa y th e nee d t o tr y t o provid e insigh t an d material tha t ma y hel p t o alleviat e th e problem . Ther e i s som e evidence o f a growin g bod y o f seriou s commentar y o n th e judiciary, in general , an d th e Suprem e Court , i n particular—bu t muc h o f i t has bee n produce d wit h eithe r littl e o r n o regar d fo r th e nonprofes sional reade r o r student , an d a goo d dea l o f i t i s difficul t o r expen sive t o obtain . Th e purpos e o f thi s littl e boo k i s t o avoi d thes e problems b y presentin g a brie f bu t meaningfu l analysi s o f th e judi cial functio n a s see n throug h th e rol e o f th e Suprem e Cour t o f th e United State s i n th e governmenta l process . I t is both a n explanator y and a n evaluativ e presentation , bu t I hav e endeavore d t o b e objec tive i n a n are a wher e fa r to o muc h reactio n i s stil l base d upo n th e answer t o th e question , "Whos e o x i s being gored ? " This wor k i s b y no mean s a wholl y uncritica l stud y o f th e Suprem e Cour t an d it s functions, bu t I happe n t o believ e strongl y that , o n th e balance , th e Court ha s playe d no t onl y a crucia l bu t als o a n indispensabl e rol e i n the growt h an d evolutio n o f ou r republic . Designed fo r us e b y th e genera l publi c a s wel l a s b y student s o f government an d politic s a t all levels, this book tell s its essential stor y in thre e chapters . Th e first treat s th e dua l syste m o f court s i n th e United State s an d th e jurisdictio n an d institutiona l settin g o f th e Supreme Court . Th e secon d deal s extensivel y wit h wha t ha s clearl y become th e Court' s mos t importan t function , it s role i n th e delinea tion an d preservatio n o f basi c individua l freedom s i n ou r demo cratic society . Th e chapte r doe s thi s topicall y b y a n analysi s an d explanation o f bot h historica l an d lega l aspects , i n particula r stress ing th e judicial rol e i n th e interpretatio n an d applicatio n o f consti tutional mandate s t o th e nationa l governmen t a n d th e state s in suc h vital area s a s religion , expression , an d politica l an d racia l equality , with a thorough consideratio n o f the genera l proble m o f substantiv e

xiii

To The First Edition and procedura l du e proces s o f law . Th e thir d chapter , afte r ex plaining th e selectio n o f judges an d justices, concentrate s o n thre e significandy difficul t an d vexatiou s problem s i n th e Suprem e Court's function : it s ultimat e powe r o f judicial review , it s rol e a s a "line-drawer," an d tha t o f a grea t policymaker . My greatest deb t i n th e writing o f this work is to Professor Willia m M. Beane y who , a s edito r o f th e Ally n an d Baco n Serie s o f whic h this i s th e first publication , provide d bot h th e essentia l encourage ment an d necessar y criticism ; I a m deepl y gratefu l t o him . Amon g the man y other s wh o stimulate d an d aide d i n a variet y o f ways , I should lik e t o singl e ou t Professor , no w Congressma n fro m Iowa , J o h n R . Schmidhauser , wh o rea d th e entir e manuscript ; Mrs . Hele n White, wh o type d i t wit h he r usua l efficiency ; Mr . J o hn R . DeRem igis, who conceive d th e Ally n an d Baco n Series ; th e Oxfor d Univer sity Press for it s generously grante d permissio n t o adap t fo r chapter s 1 an d 3 materia l use d i n m y The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France (Ne w York, 1962) ; Mis s Nanc y L . Schner r an d Mrs . Sylvi a G . Bali s o f th e Statistics Department , wh o provide d a necessar y "hidin g place " fo r me t o writ e i n peace ; m y faithfu l an d hard-workin g researc h assis tants, Rocc o D'Amic o an d Pau l Lutzker ; and , bien entendu, m y wife , Mildred, wh o ha s bee n loyall y a t m y sid e throug h man y a comple x writing episode . And, lik e a n earlie r on e t o hi s olde r brother , th e boo k i s cheer fully dedicate d t o a ver y youn g ma n wh o helped , too—i n hi s ow n manner.

xiv

American Courts in Practice issues were no t resolve d b y the executiv e a n d / o r legislativ e branche s of th e government , especiall y b y th e latter ; bu t thes e tw o politica l bodies ha d eithe r purposel y faile d t o act , wer e unabl e o r unautho rized t o act , o r fo r a variet y o f reason s ha d bee n unsuccessfu l i n acting. Th e responsibilit y fel l t o th e judiciary o f th e Unite d States , with th e Suprem e Cour t a t it s zenith—that institutio n which , i n th e words o f Chie f Justic e Ear l Warren , "mus t alway s stan d read y t o advance th e right s of . . . minorities, i f th e executiv e a n d legislativ e branches falter." 11 An d falte r the y hav e o n sundr y occasions—and , arguably, s o has th e Court . Let u s no w briefl y examin e th e structur e an d operatio n o f th e judiciary i n th e Unite d States , wit h particula r emphasi s o n th e fed eral bench .

THE DUA L SYSTE M O F COURT S I N TH E U N I T E D STATE S

Because we ar e governe d b y a federal system i n th e Unite d States , th e fifty stat e governments , a s wel l a s th e nationa l government , mak e and enforc e law . Consequently , ther e exist , sid e b y side , eithe r tw o separate system s o f court s o r fifty-one , dependin g upo n one' s vie w of how separate an d distinc t th e severa l stat e systems are. For presen t purposes, however , w e will adop t th e concep t o f tw o distinc t judicial systems tha t ar e create d b y th e tw o basi c authoritie s u n d e r ou r federal structure , th e nationa l an d stat e constitutions . Althoug h these tw o system s may , an d ofte n do , com e togethe r a t th e ba r o f the fina l interpretativ e authorit y o f th e federa l Suprem e Court , the y are nonetheles s wholl y distinc t bodies , eac h applyin g it s ow n basi c constitution an d law s an d action s base d thereon . Thi s ma y mean , on occasion , tha t bot h th e federa l governmen t an d th e state s pass , for example , th e sam e law s militatin g agains t certai n crimina l activ ity—thus necessitatin g a n agreemen t a s t o whic h o f th e tw o shal l have origina l jurisdiction. (Se e als o p . 8 ) Legal procedure s var y no t onl y betwee n civi l an d crimina l case s but als o amon g th e severa l jurisdictions . Generally , however , th e following represen t typica l procedura l steps : 3

American Courts in Practice Civil Cases Criminal 1. Plaintif f bring s sui t agains t 1 defendant governmen 2. Summon s 2 3. Pleading s 3 4. Tria l 4 5. Verdic t 5 6. Judgmen t an d sentencin g 6 7. Appea l 7 8. Enforcemen t 8

Cases . Apprehensio n b y agents o f t . Preliminar y examinatio n . Gran d Jury o r "Informa tion" . Arraignmen t an d pleadin g . Tria l . Verdic t . Judgmen t a n d sentencin g . Appea l 9. Executio n o f sentenc e

When th e tw o judicial system s d o "converge " a t th e leve l o f th e United State s Suprem e Court , the y do s o onl y because litigant s hav e been abl e t o rais e a substantia l federa l questio n i n th e stat e courts . (The Suprem e Cour t itsel f determine s wha t i s "substantial." ) More over, litigant s mus t hav e exhauste d al l prope r remedie s a t th e stat e level i n orde r t o hav e prope r "standing " befor e th e Suprem e Court . In al l bu t a handfu l o f cases , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s complet e discretionary authorit y t o accep t o r rejec t a petitio n fo r review . With th e exceptio n o f thi s appellat e pathwa y t o th e Court , an d th e technical an d confusin g matter s o f injunctive relie f and habeas corpus proceedings, th e tw o system s constitut e separat e entitie s tha t must , and almos t invariabl y do , respec t eac h other' s jurisdictiona l lines . These line s ma y be , bu t onl y infrequentl y are , reinforce d b y Con gress i n accordanc e wit h it s constitutionall y grante d powe r t o estab lish "inferio r courts, " tha t is , lower federa l courts. 12

The State Judiciary Each an d ever y stat e constitutio n eithe r establishe s a judicia l branch, wholl y o r partly , o r i t authorize s it s legislatur e t o provid e one. However , s o muc h variatio n i n nomenclatur e a s wel l a s struc ture exist s amon g th e judicia l system s o f th e fifty state s tha t i t i s necessary t o creat e a composit e tha t wil l giv e a pictur e o f a typica l 4

American Courts in Practice state system . Th e well-structured , unifie d cour t syste m o f Florid a or th e simpl e four-tiere d on e o f Virgini a migh t wel l serv e a s a commendable "model " stat e cour t system . (Se e char t 1-1. ) I n prac tice, however , ther e ar e mor e subdivisions . The Justice of the Peace. The subdivisio n a t th e botto m o f th e typica l state judicial hierarch y i s th e legendar y J.P, th e justice of the peace, also know n a s magistrate o r squire. Although usuall y elected , h e o r she ma y b e appointed , an d generall y serve s fo r a ter m o f tw o t o si x years in a jurisdiction, normall y a county , city , township, o r town . H e or sh e i s a judicial "jack-of-all-trades " wh o handle s a hos t o f mino r civil matter s an d crimina l misdemeanors . Sinc e much , i f no t all , o f the J.P.' s incom e mor e ofte n tha n no t depend s upo n th e fee s re ceived fo r hi s o r he r labors , th e averag e justice o f th e peace , wh o i s not necessaril y always trained i n th e law , has demonstrated a remark able tendenc y towar d convictions . For example, Pennsylvania convic tions i n 198 8 averaged 9 3 percent i n civi l and 8 3 percent i n crimina l cases—by n o mean s atypica l percentage s fo r thes e courts. 13 Ther e are indication s tha t genuin e concer n exist s wit h th e curren t statu s of thi s mino r court; 1 4 reform s hav e bee n effecte d i n a numbe r o f states, bu t i t i s doubtfu l tha t the y wil l soo n tak e plac e o n a genera l scale. Lik e s o man y time-honore d traditions , tha t o f th e J.P . ha s been abl e t o surviv e a s much becaus e o f inerti a a s of tradition . The Municipal Court. A t th e nex t highe r subdivisio n i n th e stat e judicial hierarch y i s the municipal court, sometimes calle d traffic court, court of small claims, night court, o r police court. Whatever i t i s called , the municipa l cour t i s generall y a cour t o f original , rathe r tha n appellate, jurisdiction, an d i s the first officia l stat e "cour t o f record " (a ter m designe d t o identif y thos e tribunal s preside d ove r b y judges rather tha n magistrates) . It s jurisdiction i s relatively restricted, ofte n with a ceilin g o f $1,20 0 (Louisiana ) t o $15,00 0 (Tennessee ) i n civi l cases an d mino r crimina l cases , bu t thi s varie s fro m stat e t o state , as doe s it s basi c jurisdiction . It s judge s ar e almos t alway s traine d lawyers. The County Court. Third i n ascendin g orde r i n th e judicial hierarch y lies a cour t o f fairl y genera l jurisdiction, ofte n know n a s th e county 5

American Courts in Practice CHART 1- 1

Virginia Court Structure, 1996 SUPREME COUR T A

7 justices sit on benc h an d in panelst CSP case types: • Mandator y jurisdiction in capital criminal, administrative agency, disciplinary cases. • Discretionar y jurisdiction in civil, noncapital criminal, administrative agency, juvenile, disciplinary, original proceeding, interlocutory decision cases.

Last resort

COURT OF APPEALS A

10 judges si t in panel s CSP case types: • Mandator y jurisdiction i n some civil, some administrative agency , som e original proceeding cases . • Discretionar y jurisdiction i n noncapital crimina l cases .

CIRCUIT COUR T (3 1 circuits, 12 2 courts )

141judges CSP case types: • Tort , contract, rea l property right s ($0-1,000/n o maximum) , menta l health, administrative agenc y appeals, miscellaneous civil , domestic relations, civil appeals from tria l courts, estate jurisdiction. • Misdemeanor , crimina l appeals . Exclusive felony jurisdiction. • Ordinanc e violation . Jury trials .

Intermediate appellate court

A

DISTRICT COURT (204 general district, juvenile, and domestic relations courts)* 118 FTE general distric t and 8 4 FTE juvenile an d domesti c relation s judges CSP case types: • Tort , contract, rea l property rights ($0-7,000) , support/custody, URESA , domestic violence, miscellaneous domestic relations , mental health , small claims in Fairfax County . • Felony , misdemeanor. Exclusiv e DWI/DUI jurisdiction. • Ordinanc e violation. Exclusive moving traffic, parking , miscellaneou s traffic jurisdiction . • Exclusiv e juvenile jurisdiction. • Preliminar y hearings . No jury trials .

Court o f general jurisdiction

Court o f limited jurisdiction

NOTE: A family cour t pilo t projec t authorize d b y legislation passe d i n the 1989 session o f the genera l assembl y became operationa l o n January 2 , 1990 , and concluded it s two-year pilo t operatio n o n December 31 , 1991. * Th e distric t cour t i s referred t o as the juvenile an d domestic relation s cour t whe n hearin g juvenile and domestic relation s cases , and as the general distric t cour t fo r the balanc e o f the cases . f On e senio r justice wa s available fo r assignments i n 1995 . SOURCE: Nationa l Cente r fo r State Courts , Williamsburg , V A 1996 .

6

American Courts in Practice court, becaus e it s broad , origina l civi l an d crimina l jurisdictio n i s customarily limite d t o on e o r mor e counties . Juries ar e usuall y pres ent i n thi s court . Som e o f th e hos t o f associate d tribunal s a t th e county cour t leve l are : quarter sessions, common pleas, oyer and terminer, orphans, probate, domestic relations, juvenile, equity, surrogate, and chancery. Al l thes e court s a t th e count y leve l hav e origina l jurisdiction i n the variou s area s roughl y indicate d b y their names. 1 5 The Intermediate Court of Appeals. Althoug h i n man y state s appeal s from th e count y cour t g o directl y t o th e stat e suprem e court , th e pressure o f wor k a t th e latte r tribunal' s leve l ha s ofte n necessitate d the creatio n o f a n intermediat e cour t o f appeals . Tha t cour t ma y also b e know n a s th e appellate division (suc h a s i n Ne w York) o r th e superior court (suc h a s i n Pennsylvania) . Very muc h i n th e fashio n o f the Unite d State s Cour t o f Appeals , i t i s th e first, an d usuall y final, stop fo r appeal s tha t com e u p fro m th e court s belo w i n accordanc e with statutor y requirements . I n th e large r states , suc h a s Ne w York , Pennsylvania, an d California , i t performs a valuable j ob o f disposin g of appeal s wit h considerabl e dispatch. 16 The Final Court of Appeals. I n almos t al l states th e highes t cour t i n th e judicial hierarch y i s know n a s th e supreme court. I n Ne w Yor k an d Maryland, however , i t i s calle d th e court of appeals', in Main e a n d Massachusetts i t i s know n a s th e supreme judicial court, an d i n Wes t Virginia a s th e supreme court of appeals. Whatever it s name , it s deci sions constitut e th e la w o f th e stat e an d ar e thu s final an d bindin g on th e hierarch y below , which, a s already described , i s comprised o f local a s wel l a s statewid e tribunals . Onl y i f al l thes e remedie s hav e been exhausted , a n d i f a substantial federal questio n i s present , d o litigants hav e a n opportunit y t o appl y for , bu t no t t o coun t upon , review b y th e highes t cour t o f th e land . Th e pathwa y o f appeal s from th e stat e court s t o th e federa l court s omit s an y wa y statio n in th e lowe r federa l hierarch y (excep t i n a ver y fe w complicate d jurisdictional situation s tha t nee d no t concer n u s here) . If th e United State s Suprem e Cour t i s willin g t o hea r a case , or , i n thos e now very rar e instances , when i t must, tha t cas e will move directl y t o it fro m th e highes t stat e court—al l remedie s belo w havin g bee n duly exhausted .

7

American Courts in Practice The Federal Judiciary Two Types. There ar e tw o type s o f federa l courts , th e constitutional courts an d th e legislative courts . Ou r chie f concer n i s with th e for mer, an d particularl y wit h th e thre e original 17 constitutiona l courts , the United States district courts, the United States courts of appeals, a n d the United States Supreme Court. The distinctio n betwee n th e tw o type s o f federal court s i s in thei r functions a s well a s in th e constitutiona l authorit y unde r whic h the y were o r ar e created . Broadl y speaking , th e constitutiona l court s ar e established b y Congres s unde r th e judiciar y articl e o f th e Unite d States Constitution , Articl e III ; th e legislativ e courts , o n th e othe r hand, ow e thei r existenc e t o Articl e I , th e legislativ e articl e o f th e Constitution. What , then , ar e th e severa l significan t difference s be tween thes e tw o type s o f tribunals ? Distinctions. O n e ke y differenc e i s tha t th e legislativ e court s posses s certain function s o f a nonjudicia l o r a t leas t quasi-judicia l nature , such a s administrativ e an d quasi-legislativ e a s wel l a s judicial tasks , whereas th e constitutiona l court s ar e presumabl y confine d t o strictl y judicial roles . A secon d differenc e i s tha t althoug h th e legislativ e courts ar e par t an d parce l o f th e constitutiona l appellat e structur e for certai n specifi c purposes , thei r raison d'etre is to ai d i n th e admin istration o f particula r congressiona l statutes . A thir d differenc e betwee n th e tw o type s o f court s i s tha t unlik e the constitutiona l courts , th e legislativ e tribunal s ar e empowere d to rende r advisory opinions, tha t is , ruling s upo n th e propriet y o r constitutionality o f governmenta l actio n i n th e absenc e o f a bon a fide cas e o r controvers y requirin g suc h a rulin g fo r a case' s disposi tion. I n effect , thi s functio n wa s establishe d a s earl y a s 1793 , whe n President Georg e Washingto n addresse d a lette r t o th e member s o f the Suprem e Cour t askin g the m fo r a n opinio n o n th e authorit y given t o hi m b y th e Constitutio n t o decid e certai n question s involv ing th e Unite d States' s polic y o f neutralit y i n th e wa r the n i n prog ress i n Europe . Chie f Justice J o hn Jay , th e Court' s first an d rathe r reluctant head , responde d fo r hi s Cour t tha t no t onl y woul d i t not , it could not, tende r lega l advice, and tha t it s rol e wa s confine d t o th e 8

American Courts in Practice adjudication o f case s tha t aros e i n th e cours e o f bona fide litigation . However, bot h type s o f court s (th e constitutiona l court s onl y sinc e 1934) ar e statutoril y empowere d t o rende r so-calle d declaratory judgments. Declarator y judgments diffe r fro m advisor y opinion s i n tha t there exist s an actua l controversy ; a n advisor y opinio n deal s with a n abstract o r hypothetica l question . A declarator y j u d g m e nt enable s courts o f al l type s t o ente r a final j u d g m e n t betwee n litigant s i n a n actual controversy, a nd define s thei r respectiv e right s unde r a law , contract, will , o r an y othe r officia l document , without, however , attracting an y consequentia l o r coerciv e relie f t o tha t otherwis e binding j udgmen t.18 A fourth , an d theoreticall y th e mos t crucial , differenc e betwee n constitutional an d legislativ e court s relate s t o th e constitutionall y expressed safeguard s o f tenure , salary , a n d — b y implicatio n an d effect—independence tha t accru e t o th e constitutiona l court s b y virtue o f th e provision s o f Article III , Sectio n I , o f th e Constitution , which reads : "Th e judges, bot h o f th e Suprem e an d inferio r courts , shall hol d thei r office s durin g goo d behavior , an d shall , a t state d times, receiv e fo r thei r services , a compensation , whic h shal l no t b e diminished durin g thei r continuanc e i n office. " N o suc h safeguard s exist for th e court s created unde r th e legislativ e articl e o f the Consti tution, whic h simpl y say s i n Articl e I , Sectio n 8 , Claus e 9 , tha t Congress shal l hav e th e powe r "T o constitut e tribunal s inferio r t o the Suprem e Court. " Judges o f th e constitutiona l courts , then , ar e removable onl y when the y n o longe r "behav e well, " which, i n effect , clothes the m wit h lif e tenure . Removal , othe r tha n b y death, resigna tion, o r retirement , ca n thu s com e abou t solel y vi a th e impeach ment an d convictio n process , a n unlikel y bu t certainl y no t unheard of o r unresorted-t o procedure . T o date , a s a resul t o f sixtee n bill s o f impeachment dul y vote d b y th e Hous e o f Representative s an d sen t on t o th e Senat e fo r trial , eleve n impeachmen t trial s hav e bee n held involvin g federa l judge s (an d tw o resigne d befor e thei r trial s commenced). Nin e o f thes e wer e agains t judge s o n th e Unite d States District Court , on e agains t a judge o n th e now-defunc t Unite d States Commerce Cour t ( a legislative court) , and one , in 1804-1805 , against a n associat e justic e o f th e Suprem e Cour t o f th e Unite d 9

American Courts in Practice States, Justice Samue l Chase . O f these , fou r resulte d i h acquittals , seven i n convictions. 19 I f Congres s choose s t o d o so , as indeed i t ha s frequently see n fit , i t ma y exten d "goo d behavior " tenur e t o legisla tive cour t judges a s well, but i t is under n o constitutiona l obligatio n to d o so . This congressiona l discretionar y authorit y als o applie s i n th e cas e of th e constitutiona l injunctio n agains t reductio n o f judicial salarie s while i n offic e (Articl e III , Section 1) , but Congres s would hardl y b e likely t o reduc e thes e i n an y case. 20 No t b y an y mean s minuscule , the earl y 199 6 salaries of federal judges were tie d t o th e cost-of-livin g index a s o f 1975 , bu t limite d t o a n annua l incremen t o f 4. 8 t o 8. 6 percent—although 199 1 sa w a majo r increas e o f 2 5 percent , bring ing salarie s o f federa l judges roughl y i n lin e wit h th e salarie s o f th e President ($200,000 ) an d member s o f Congress ($133,600) . Salarie s in 199 6 range d fro m $133,60 0 forjudge s o f th e Unite d State s Dis trict Cour t t o $171,50 0 fo r th e Chie f Justice o f th e Unite d States . His associate s o n th e Suprem e Cour t receive d $7,40 0 less . In vie w o f th e constitutiona l prohibitio n agains t "diminishin g compensation" durin g thei r ter m i n office , a n intriguin g proble m by implicatio n soo n face d th e justices o f th e highes t constitutiona l court i n th e lan d i n connectio n wit h th e matte r o f intergovernmen tal ta x immunity , tha t is , th e proble m o f clarifyin g th e exten t o f implied restriction s upo n th e taxin g powe r whic h deriv e fro m th e nature o f ou r federa l syste m o f government . I n othe r words , di d th e Constitution plac e limitation s upo n th e powe r o f th e tw o prong s o f the federa l system , th e nationa l (federal ) governmen t an d th e sev eral states , to ta x eac h other' s instrumentalities , property , an d activi ties? Thi s i s no t th e plac e t o g o int o th e detail s o f thi s complicate d problem, bu t a s th e immunit y doctrin e bega n t o develo p (it s initia l a n d grea t pronunciament o cam e i n Chie f Justice Marshall' s decisio n in th e monumenta l cas e of McCullochv. Maryland), 21 i t became quit e clear tha t th e jurists woul d no t onl y not view with favo r th e taxatio n of federa l official s b y th e states , no r tha t o f stat e official s b y th e federal government, 2 2 bu t no t eve n tha t b y th e federa l governmen t of it s own officials. Thi s immunit y doctrin e wa s continued, an d eve n enlarged, unti l th e 1930s . Bu t b y the n th e lon g an d stron g protest s 10

American Courts in Practice by Justice Olive r Wendel l Holmes , Jr. , an d Justic e Loui s D . Bran deis—who ha d voluntarily pai d t o th e federa l governmen t wha t the y would hav e t o pa y ha d thei r salarie s bee n considere d taxable , an d who were late r joined b y Justice Harla n F . Stone—coupled wit h ne w congressional legislatio n a n d ne w personne l o n th e Court , brough t about th e cessatio n o f intergovernmenta l ta x immunit y fo r th e sala ries o f both federa l an d stat e employees. 23 Federal Legislative Courts As indicate d earlier , al l o f thes e court s ar e create d unde r th e legislative articl e o f th e Constitution , whic h expressl y extend s tha t enabling power t o Congres s (Articl e I , Section 8 , Clause 9) . Utilizin g that power , Congres s ha s thu s see n fi t fro m tim e t o tim e t o establis h sundry legislativ e courts . Thes e wer e create d partl y t o hav e "mor e flexible" tribunal s tha n th e thre e majo r constitutiona l court s (th e United State s Suprem e Court , th e Court s o f Appeals , a n d th e Dis trict Courts) ; partl y t o remov e som e o f th e crushin g workloa d o f cases fro m th e latte r tribunals ; an d partl y a s a resul t o f technica l needs i n particula r area s o f publi c life—th e rational e fo r th e United States Court of Military Appeals, fo r example . Wha t Congres s does , then, i s t o combin e thi s basi c legislativ e powe r t o establis h tribunal s inferior t o th e Suprem e Cour t wit h th e famou s "implie d powers " o r "elastic clause " (Articl e I , Sectio n 8 , Claus e 1 8 o f th e Constitution ) and th e specifi c congressiona l authorit y i n which i t may establish th e legislative court . Fo r example , i n th e cas e o f th e Cour t o f Militar y Appeals, Congres s coul d hav e use d an y on e o f th e half-doze n o f its overal l wa r power s (1-8-1 1 throug h 16) , bu t i t chos e t o rel y predominandy upo n it s powe r "T o mak e rule s fo r th e governmen t and regulatio n o f th e lan d an d nava l forces " (1-8-14) . Congres s employed it s powe r "T o regulat e commerc e wit h foreig n nations , and amon g th e severa l States , an d wit h th e India n tribes " (1-8-3 ) t o create th e now-defunc t United States Commerce Court, th e taxin g power (1-8-1 ) fo r th e United States Customs Court (sinc e 198 0 know n as th e Court of International Trade), th e statu s o f which i t change d i n 1956 t o tha t o f a constitutiona l court , an d fo r th e Unite d State s Ta x 11

American Courts in Practice Court, whic h i t transforme d fro m a n administrativ e agenc y unde r the Interna l Revenu e Servic e t o a legislativ e cour t i n 1969 ; an d it s special powe r ove r territorie s an d othe r propert y belongin g t o th e United State s (IV-3-2 ) t o establis h th e variou s territoria l courts. 24 The United States Claims Court (se e n . 24 ) i s a recen t illustratio n o f a legislative tribunal . Th e newes t i s th e U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals, created i n lat e 198 8 unde r th e sam e authorit y a s th e Cour t o f Military Appeals . I t ha s exclusiv e jurisdiction t o revie w decision s o f the Boar d o f Veterans Appeal s an d give s every promise o f becomin g a bus y court . Federal Constitutional Courts The thre e mos t important , an d presumabl y best-known , federa l courts ar e th e thre e origina l constitutional courts , th e Unite d State s District Courts , th e Unite d State s Court s o f Appeals, an d th e Unite d States Suprem e Court . Create d unde r Articl e II I o f th e Constitutio n (the Suprem e Cour t i s th e onl y on e expressl y mentione d i n th e basic document) , th e thre e remaine d th e onl y constitutiona l court s in th e America n judicial hierarch y unti l th e "transformation " o f th e three erstwhil e legislativ e courts. 25 The federa l constitutiona l court s remain the basi c court s i n ou r system , an d the y adjudicat e b y fa r the majo r proportio n o f case s arisin g unde r th e Constitution . Th e Supreme Cour t wa s establishe d b y Article II I o f th e Constitution ; i t remained fo r Congres s t o creat e th e balanc e o f th e basi c hierarch y under power s give n t o i t b y Articl e I . I t di d thi s i n on e o f th e first pieces o f legislatio n o f th e Firs t Congress , th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 . It wa s passe d unde r th e leadershi p o f Senato r Olive r Ellsworth , who ha d bee n a delegat e fro m Connecticu t t o th e Constitutiona l Convention, an d wh o wa s destine d t o succee d Chie f Justice Jay a s the secon d Chie f Justice o f th e Unite d States . Overall Jurisdiction It i s a tribut e t o th e succinctnes s an d comprehensivenes s o f th e Constitution i n general , an d Articl e II I i n particular , tha t th e gen eral jurisdiction o f th e federa l judiciar y i s spelle d ou t i n consider 12

T A B L E 1-

1

The Jurisdiction of the Three Major Federal Constitutional Courts of the United States (Courts Created under Article III of the Constitution) SUPREME COUR T OF THE UNITE D STATES , 9 JUDGES, HAS:

Original Jurisdiction in Actions or Controversies: *1. Betwee n th e Unite d State s and a state. 2. Between tw o or more states . *3. Involvin g foreign ambassadors , othe r foreig n publi c ministers , an d foreig n consul s or thei r "domesti c servants , not inconsisten t with th e la w of nations. " *4. Commenced by a state against citizens o f anothe r stat e o r agains t aliens , or against a foreign country . (Note : if these actions are commenced by the citizen or alien against a state, or b y a foreign countr y against a state, th e sui t must begin in state court, accordin g t o th e provisions of Amendment Eleven. ) Appellate Jurisdiction from: 1. All lower federal constitutional courts; most, bu t no t all , federal legislative courts; an d the territorial courts. 2. The highes t stat e court s when a "substantial federa l question " is involved. THIRTEEN UNITED STATES (CIRCUIT) COURTS COUNTING "SENIOR, " I.E. , RETIRED ) HAVE :

OF APPEALS, 17 9 JUDGE S (NO T

Appellate Jurisdiction Onl y from: 1. U.S. district courts . 2. U.S . territorial courts , th e U.S . Tax Court , th e U.S . Claims Court , an d som e Distric t of Columbia courts . 3. Th e U.S . Cour t o f Internationa l Trade , th e U.S . Cour t o f Militar y Appeal , an d th e U.S. Cour t o f Veterans Appeals. 4. The U.S . Independent Regulator y Commissions . 5. Certai n federa l administrativ e agencie s an d department s (fo r review , bu t als o fo r enforcement of certain o f their action s an d orders) . NINETY-FOUR UNITE D STATE S DISTRIC T COURTS , 6 4 9 JUDGES (NO T COUNTIN G "SENIOR," I.E. , RETIRED ) HAVE :

Original Jurisdiction Only f Over: 1. Al l crimes agains t th e Unite d States . 2. Al l civi l action s arisin g unde r th e Constitution , laws , o r treatie s o f th e Unite d States, wherei n th e matte r i n controvers y exceed s $50,00 0 (unles s th e U.S . Suprem e Court ha s jurisdiction a s outlined above) . *3. Case s involving citizens of different state s o r citizen s and aliens , provided th e valu e of the controvers y i s in exces s of $50,000. 4. Admiralty , maritime, and priz e cases . *5. Revie w an d enforcement of order s an d action s o f certai n federa l administrativ e agencies and departments . 6. Al l such othe r case s as Congress may validly prescribe b y law. J *Jurisdiction not exclusive—that is , while cases , according t o Articl e II I o f th e Constitution , are t o originate here , legal arrangements may be mad e t o have the m handle d b y a differen t leve l court. For example, Congres s has the powe r t o giv e the federa l distric t courts concurrent original jurisdiction over cases affectin g foreig n ambassador s and some cases in whic h a stat e i s a part y t o th e suit . Se e United States v. Ravara, 2 Dallas 297 (1793) ; Borsw. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884) ; and Amesx. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884) . And i n 1964 , the Suprem e Cour t decline d t o revie w a Nint h Circui t Court decisio n tha t federal distric t courts have jurisdiction over suits by the United States against a state (California v . United States, 379 U.S. 817). f A cas e ca n b e mad e for th e contentio n tha t thes e courts also have a measur e o f appellate jurisdiction, involvin g certain actions tried befor e U.S . magistratejudges (a t least one o f whom i s authorized for eac h federal district). JAs Congres s di d i n 1984 , for example , when i t restructure d th e bankruptc y courts . Among th e changes wa s the assignmen t of jurisdiction ove r Tide I I o f th e U.S . Code t o th e U.S . District Courts. The 29 7 bankruptcy judges (1995 ) ar e distributed over the 9 4 district courts; they are not included in the abov e total number of judges, nor are the 453 magistrate judges.

American Courts in Practice able detai l i n direc t an d understandabl e language . It s secon d sec tion make s clea r tha t th e judicial powe r o f th e Unite d State s "shal l extend t o all Case s [italic s added] , i n Law, 26 an d Equity, 27 arisin g under thi s Constitution , th e Law s of th e Unite d States , an d Treatie s made, o r whic h shal l b e mad e unde r thei r Authority." Th e italicize d portion emphasize s on e o f th e mos t significan t aspect s o f th e judi cial process—alread y mentione d i n connectio n wit h th e discussio n of advisor y opinions 2 8 —namely, tha t federa l constitutiona l cour t jurisdiction i s limited t o bon a fide case s an d controversies . I n brief , this requiremen t signifie s tha t ther e b e a genuin e cas e o r contro versy involvin g tw o o r mor e litigant s o n opposit e side s o f a genuin e legal issue , characterize d b y a tru e clas h o f interests . I n th e absenc e of thes e fundamenta l requirements , ther e ca n b e n o resor t t o th e federal constitutiona l courts . With it s decision i n Hayburn's Case 29 i n 1792, th e Suprem e Cour t wasted littl e tim e i n officiall y apprisin g th e fledgling Republi c an d it s citizenr y o f thi s significan t judicial fac t o f life—one tha t applie s t o al l claimants . I n Hayburn, th e Cour t hel d unanimously tha t i t coul d no t legall y carr y ou t a congressiona l stat ute tha t i t deemed no t "judicia l i n nature, " althoug h th e justices di d not readil y explai n t o a displease d Congres s ho w it s intent coul d b e effectuated, tha t is , by having President Washington's cabinet , rathe r than th e judiciary , pas s o n dispute d pensio n claim s o f invali d wa r veterans. Having spelle d ou t th e basi c jurisdictiona l cas e o r controvers y requirement, th e judiciary articl e the n explain s th e variou s kind s o f jurisdiction availabl e t o th e courts . Broadl y speaking , thes e ma y b e grouped unde r tw o major headings : one , accordin g t o th e natur e o r character o f th e subject matter of th e case ; the other , accordin g t o th e nature o r characte r o f the parties to the suit . Under th e first category , the court s ar e empowere d t o adjudicat e case s an d controversie s i n law an d equit y arisin g unde r (1 ) th e Constitution , a federa l law , o r a treaty ; o r (2 ) admiralt y an d maritim e laws . Unde r th e secon d category, a considerabl y large r an d mor e comple x one , th e court s may adjudicat e case s an d controversie s i n la w an d equit y if : (1 ) th e United State s i s a part y t o th e suit ; (2 ) on e o f th e fifty state s i s a party t o th e sui t (unless , i n accordanc e wit h th e injunction s o f th e 14

American Courts in Practice Eleventh Amendment , th e sui t wa s commence d o r prosecute d against a state b y any individual o r eve n a foreign country) ; (3 ) th e disputes ar e betwee n citizen s o f different states (know n a s "diversit y of citizenship" cases); (4 ) the y affect foreign ambassadors an d othe r duly accredite d representative s o f a foreig n land ; o r (5 ) the y aris e between citizen s o f th e same state becaus e o f a disput e involvin g land grant s claimed unde r titl e of two or more states. These seve n grant s o r mandate s o f powe r d o no t necessaril y signify thei r executio n exclusivel y b y th e federa l constitutiona l courts. Congress ha s implied authorit y t o delegate o r assig n certai n aspects o f the m t o th e severa l state s o f th e Union , eithe r o n a concurrent or eve n a n exclusive basis. An exampl e o f thi s i s the con gressional requiremen t tha t a civi l diversit y o f citizenshi p suit— a suit between tw o or mor e citizen s o f different states—mus t encom pass at leas t $50,000 in value i n orde r t o qualif y fo r origina l federa l constitutional cour t jurisdiction. I f it falls belo w tha t figure , i t mus t go to th e stat e tribunals . Even when i t does meet th e state d amount , Congress ha s seen fit t o permit concurrent state an d federa l jurisdiction a t th e parties ' discretion . Thi s doe s not , however , remov e th e superior clai m to federal jurisdiction shoul d th e parties disagree . Also, Congres s ha s deeme d i t advisabl e t o distribut e area s o f federal jurisdictio n amon g th e severa l courts , a commendabl y or derly arrangemen t tha t bega n wit h th e creatio n o f th e judicial sys tem itsel f i n th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 . Almost al l federa l case s o f original jurisdiction (othe r tha n thos e involvin g tw o or mor e state s as litigants, where th e Suprem e Cour t retain s original jurisdiction) are assigne d t o th e Unite d State s Distric t Courts , wherea s appellate jurisdiction fro m practicall y al l district cour t adjudication s lie s with the Unite d State s Court s o f Appeals . Moreover , ther e ar e certai n realms where th e sovereignt y o f th e federa l an d stat e system s over lap. In more areas, such as in cases dealing with theft involvin g fligh t in interstat e commerc e o r i n case s concernin g embezzlemen t o r robbery of federally insured banks, both federal an d state jurisdiction may exist . A s of earl y 1996 , th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t ha d resolutely decline d t o view the inheren t possibilitie s o f prosecutio n and punishmen t b y both federal an d stat e governments a s constitut 15

American Courts in Practice ing a violatio n o f th e "doubl e jeopardy " safeguard s o f th e Fift h Amendment o r thos e o f "du e proces s o f law " under th e Fourteenth , regardless o f whic h sovereignt y migh t hav e commence d th e action , and regardles s o f whether th e cas e resulte d i n a n initia l acquittal. 30 But, b y and large , th e federa l governmen t make s i t a practic e no t t o try a cas e wher e ther e ha s alread y bee n a stat e prosecutio n fo r "substantially th e sam e ac t o r acts"— a polic y tha t wa s judiciall y confirmed b y the Cour t i n a per curiam 6:3 decision i n 197 7 tha t ma y contain th e seed s fo r a possibl e reversa l o f it s erstwhil e federalis t stance o n th e issue. 31 (Tabl e 1- 1 outline s th e jurisdictio n o f th e three federa l constitutiona l court s unde r discussion. ) United States District Courts. Th e ninety-fou r Unite d State s distric t courts, staffe d b y th e statutoril y authorize d 64 9 judges (1996) , ar e the basi c tria l court s o f th e federa l judiciary . The y ar e primaril y concerned wit h settlin g questions of fact (suc h a s liability o r guilt) . I n that rol e the y ar e th e busies t o f th e thre e cour t levels . Fro m som e points o f view th e wor k o f a tria l cour t i s both mor e interestin g an d more creativ e tha n tha t i n th e tw o appellat e tiers . Th e battl e o f opposing platoon s o f counsel—unfortunately an d frequentl y viewe d as a lega l gam e b y som e practitioner s a s wel l a s laypersons—take s place here . An d i t i s here tha t w e find th e tria l jury, tha t intriguing , albeit controversial , institutio n o f citize n participatio n i n th e judi cial process . Thus , i t i s no t surprisin g tha t som e distric t judges, fo r example, U.S . Distric t Cour t Judg e Charle s E . Wyzanski , Jr., hav e refused th e hono r o f promotio n t o on e o f th e tw o highe r level s o f the federa l judiciar y i n favo r o f continue d presenc e a t th e combat ants' level . In recen t years , some 1,000,00 0 civil, criminal, an d bank ruptcy case s hav e bee n file d annuall y i n th e distric t an d bankruptc y courts—a tota l o f 1,119,66 1 in 1994. 32 No wonder tha t delay s averag ing fro m on e t o sevent y month s (1996 ) hav e plague d court s an d litigants a t thi s level, where almos t al l federal civi l and crimina l case s necessarily commence . It i s als o a t th e distric t leve l tha t th e federa l governmen t bring s suit t o prosecut e violation s o f federa l laws . Typica l example s o f this woul d b e tamperin g wit h th e Unite d State s mail , contemp t o f 16

American Courts in Practice Congress, an d conspirac y t o violat e th e Interna l Revenu e Code . United State s distric t court s functio n i n on e o r mor e delineate d districts i n eac h o f th e fifty states , th e Distric t o f Columbia , Guam , Puerto Rico , th e Virgi n Islands , a n d th e Norther n Marian a Islands ; all hav e on e o r mor e judges. Ne w York State , fo r example , ha s fou r districts (Western , Northern , Southern , an d Eastern) . Th e Souther n District, encompassin g Manhattan , th e Bronx , an d adjacen t coun ties t o th e north , ha d th e larges t numbe r o f judges (twenty-eight ) i n a singl e distric t i n 1992 . Wyoming, o n th e othe r hand , ha d just tw o judges fo r it s singl e district , an d Gua m an d th e Norther n Marian a Islands, ha d onl y one . (Figur e 1- 1 show s th e variou s location s o f th e district court s an d th e twelv e geographicall y designate d court s o f appeals.) United States Courts of Appeals. Th e thirtee n Unite d State s court s of appeals 3 3 ar e essentiall y appellate courts. Lik e th e Unite d State s Supreme Court , thes e appellat e court s concer n themselve s primaril y with settlin g questions of law, suc h a s whethe r an y procedura l viola tions o f th e Constitutio n wer e committed . The y stan d directl y abov e the Unite d State s distric t court s i n th e federa l constitutiona l judicial hierarchy. (The y ar e als o referre d t o a s "circui t courts"— a vestig e of th e day s when individua l justices, includin g thos e o f th e Suprem e Court, woul d literall y "rid e circuit " i n pursui t o f thei r judicial tasks , and a s a referenc e t o th e thirtee n judicia l "circuits " int o whic h th e United State s i s divided fo r purpose s o f thes e tribunals. ) A s table 1 1 indicates , th e circui t court s als o hav e certai n statutor y authorit y regarding revie w an d enforcemen t o f numerou s federa l administra tive agencies . Appeal s fro m th e highes t stat e court s bypas s bot h district an d circui t courts , assumin g tha t appellant s hav e properl y exhausted al l remedie s a t th e stat e leve l below , an d g o direcd y t o the Unite d State s Suprem e Court , whic h ha s al l but complet e discre tion t o accep t o r rejec t a petitio n fo r review . Ther e ar e als o som e instances i n whic h i t i s possibl e t o bypas s th e leve l o f th e cour t o f appeals an d g o directly t o th e Suprem e Cour t from a district court. 34 Nonetheless, th e usua l appellat e pat h o f th e judicial proces s be gins i n th e court s o f appeals. About 50,00 0 case s annually reac h tha t 17

American Courts in Practice level fro m th e severa l distric t court s an d othe r subordinat e tribu nals. A well-know n exampl e i s th e famou s cas e o f Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha 35 i n whic h J. R . Chadh a successfull y challenged hi s deportatio n orde r b y Congressiona l actio n i n th e U.S. Cour t o f Appeal s fo r th e Nint h Circuit . Th e U.S . governmen t appealed i n vai n t o th e U.S . Suprem e Court , whic h affirme d th e lower tribuna l b y a 7: 2 vote. 36 The thirtee n circuit s illustrate d i n figure 1- 1 (ther e wer e nin e when th e court s o f appeal s wer e establishe d i n 1891 ) togethe r wit h the district s tha t li e i n eac h circuit , hav e a statutoril y authorize d total o f 17 9 judges (mid-1996) . Eleve n o f th e thirtee n circuit s corre spond t o geographica l jurisdictions. Th e twelfth , th e U.S . Cour t o f Appeals fo r th e Distric t o f Columbia , ofte n referre d t o as the secon d most importan t federa l court , handle s a hos t o f significan t federa l cases involving governmentally base d matter s o n appeal , an d i s natu rally locate d i n th e District . Th e thirteenth , th e U.S . Cour t o f Ap peals fo r th e Federa l Circuit , wa s create d i n 1982 ; i t hear s appeal s from lowe r federa l court s chiefl y i n suit s agains t th e government , primarily i n tax , patent , an d internationa l trad e cases . Groups o f thre e circui t judges customaril y hea r cases , althoug h there ma y b e a s man y a s fifteen judges . Ther e i s a chie f judge fo r each Cour t o f Appeals . Lik e th e distric t cour t judge s below , bu t unlike th e Suprem e Cour t justice above , h e o r sh e ma y no t becom e chief judg e i f ove r th e ag e o f sixty-fou r an d mus t relinquis h tha t chief judgeship upo n havin g serve d seve n years , while permitte d t o remain a s an otherwis e full-fledge d membe r o f th e tribunal . Eac h o f the thirtee n circuit s i s theoreticall y "headed " b y a justic e o f th e United State s Suprem e Court , a throwbac k t o th e origina l day s o f "circuit riding. " Th e junio r member s i n servic e o f th e Cour t ar e usually, althoug h no t always , assigne d th e fou r "extra " circuits . Th e role o f th e Suprem e Cour t justices assigne d t o th e variou s circuit s i s today littl e mor e tha n a toke n i n vie w of th e demand s o f time , but i t does becom e a rea l on e i n instance s suc h a s petition s fo r extraordi nary procedure s i n appeal s an d plea s fo r stay s o f executio n o r i n national securit y cases . Thus , Justice Charle s Evan s Whittake r wa s involved i n th e procedura l "speedup " in th e Little Rock Case, 37 Justice 18

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Administrative Office of the United State s Courts January 1989

Figure 1-1. Th e United States Courts of Appeals and the United States District Courts

Number and Composition of Circuits Set Fort h b y 28 US C §4 1

Geographical Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts

Legend — Circuit boundaries --State boundaries — Distric t boundaries

Federal Circuit Washington, D.C.

D.C. Circuit Washington, D.C.

American Courts in Practice William O . Dougla s i n th e delay s i n th e cas e o f th e convicte d spies , Ethel an d Juliu s Rosenberg , an d agai n Justic e Dougla s a s wel l as Justic e Thurgoo d Marshal l i n th e Cambodi a bombin g contro versy.38 In th e norma l cours e o f events , appeal s fro m th e Unite d State s district court s ar e dul y hear d an d adjudicate d finally a t th e ba r o f the circui t court s o f appeals . Her e n o ne w factual evidenc e ma y b e presented, a s the recor d i n th e court s belo w constitute s th e basi s fo r judgment. I n som e instances , o f course , i t i s possible t o appea l case s from thes e lowe r federal tribunal s t o th e ultimat e appellat e tribunal , the Unite d State s Suprem e Court . T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E U N I T E D STATE S

There i s no gainsayin g th e importanc e an d th e majest y o f thi s mos t powerful o f courts , no t onl y o f th e Unite d States , bu t o f th e entir e free world . I n th e Unite d State s ther e i s n o appea l fro m th e Su preme Court' s "No, " othe r tha n appea l t o th e publi c a n d / o r it s representatives i n Congress . Congres s ha s th e powe r an d ability , within th e limit s o f th e Constitutio n an d th e realitie s o f th e politica l process, t o revers e th e Cour t b y remedia l legislation 39 or , joinin g with th e states , b y constitutiona l amendment. 4 0 Bu t thes e ar e diffi cult an d uncertai n pathways , a t leas t i n th e short run . I n th e long run, however , chang e i s no t onl y possible , bu t ma y wel l ge t a h a n d from th e Cour t itself . Moreover , a s a grea t studen t o f th e Constitu tion, Edwar d S . Corwin, wa s fond o f putting it : "[T]he ru n mus t no t be to o lon g a ru n either!" 4 1 I n th e lon g run , th e Suprem e Cour t o f the Unite d State s i s "th e chil d o f it s time. " I t does , indeed , posses s considerable educationa l powe r but , a s Alexi s d e Tocquevill e ob served five generation s ago , ultimatel y "i t i s th e powe r o f publi c opinion." Decision s runnin g counte r t o th e broa d consensu s simpl y do no t las t i n th e long run. Still , th e Cour t mus t be , an d ofte n ha s been, th e leade r o f publi c opinion , no t merel y it s register—a s wa s true, i n considerabl e degree , o f th e Warre n Court . Finally , a s Justice Robert H . Jackso n observe d s o wel l i n 1955 , "Th e peopl e hav e seemed t o fee l tha t th e Suprem e Court , whateve r it s defects , i s stil l 20

American Courts in Practice the mos t detached , dispassionate , an d trustworth y custodia n tha t our syste m afford s fo r th e translatio n o f abstrac t int o constitutiona l commands." 4 2 An d so , in th e final analysis , a s the y di d s o notabl y i n United States v. Nixon i n th e trouble d day s o f 1974, 43 th e people — although assuredl y no t withou t som e significan t exceptions—ulti mately tur n t o th e Cour t expectantl y fo r constitutiona l resolutio n and sustenance . Hence, th e publi c look s t o th e Cour t t o be it s guide—depending , of course, in par t upo n it s perception o f th e hig h tribunal' s jurisprudential postur e an d complexion—n o matte r ho w majo r o r mino r the constitutiona l o r statutor y issu e involved . Thus , ther e appeare d in a prominen t spo t i n The New York Times in th e summe r o f 195 9 the followin g breathles s advertisement : Starts Friday at the Little Carnegie b y Decisio n o f Th e Unite d State s Supreme Court : D . H . Lawrence' s controversia l masterpiece , Lady Chatterley 's Lover, th e motion pictur e version o f the most talked abou t book of the year. 44 Or, t o cit e a differen t kin d o f adjudication : Leo F. Koch, biology teache r a t th e Universit y o f Illinois , was denie d today a Suprem e Cour t hearin g o n hi s protes t agains t dismissa l fo r advocating [premarital ] sexua l intercourse among students. 45 Or, t o poin t t o a delicat e proble m o f societa l morals : The principl e tha t sustain s compulsor y vaccinatio n i s broad enoug h to cove r cuttin g Fallopia n tubes . . . . Three generation s o f imbecile s are enough. 46 Or, t o adjudicat e th e mos t pressin g socia l issu e o f ou r time : We conclud e tha t i n th e field o f publi c educatio n th e doctrin e o f "separate bu t equal " has no place . Separate educationa l facilitie s ar e inherently unequal. 47 Or, t o embar k upo n th e mos t sensitiv e o f matter s o f conscience : It i s neithe r sacrilegiou s no r antireligiou s t o sa y tha t eac h separat e government i n thi s country should sta y out o f the business of writing or sanctioning official prayer s and leave that purely religious functio n to th e peopl e themselve s an d t o thos e th e peopl e choos e t o loo k t o for religious guidance. 48 21

American Courts in Practice Or, this front-pag e headlin e appearin g i n newspaper s al l ove r th e land o n January 16 , 1968 : Supreme Cour t Authorizes Pennsylvani a an d Ne w York Central Rail roads to Carry out Merger. 49 Or, the upholdin g o f th e publicatio n o f th e 7,000-pag e serie s o f secret government document s dealin g with th e origin s o f the Unite d States involvemen t i n th e Indochin a war , evokin g thi s 197 1 front page headline : Supreme Court , 6-3 , Uphold s Newspaper s o n Publicatio n o f th e Pentagon Report ; Times Resumes Its Series, Halted 1 5 Days.50 Or, the attempte d identificatio n cum resolutio n o f on e o f th e mos t contentious, mos t emotiona l issue s o f th e century—abortion : A stat e crimina l abortio n statut e . . . tha t except s fro m criminalit y only a lifesaving procedur e o n behal f o f th e mother , withou t regar d to pregnanc y stag e an d withou t recognitio n o f th e othe r interest s involved, i s violativ e o f th e Du e Proces s Claus e o f th e Fourteent h Amendment.51 Or, th e front-pag e New York Times headline , "OK " fo r th e hod y contested righ t t o land th e supersoni c Concord e airline r a t Kenned y International Airport : Supreme Cour t Lifts Kennedy Ban on SST ; Jet Due in Tomorrow. 52 Or, Time magazine's commen t o n th e startlin g 198 0 announcemen t cum holding : Court allow s patentin g o f ne w manufacture d form s o f life , whic h should spaw n eve n mor e laborator y activit y i n a field whos e [sic] boundaries ca n onl y be imagined. 53 Or, the Court' s 9: 0 stam p o f approva l o n th e Unite d States-Irania n agreement fo r th e releas e o f American hostages : Iran Hostage-Releas e Bargain I s Upheld b y Supreme Court. 54 Or, th e Court' s ringin g 7: 2 declaratio n o f unconstitutionalit y o f the the n fifty-year-old congressiona l resor t t o th e "one-or-two-hous e legislative veto " over executiv e action : Court Limits Congress's Veto: U.S. Ruling Restricts Legislative Powe r over Executive. 55

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American Courts in Practice Or, th e hig h tribunal' s stunnin g 9: 0 orde r t o Ne w York Cit y to devis e a ne w government, rulin g tha t it s present structur e violate s th e "one person-one-vote" principle : Justices Void Ne w York Cit y Government; Deman d a n En d t o 5 Borough Inequality. 56 Or, the Court' s 5: 4 affirmatio n o f th e broa d powe r o f Congres s t o aid minorit y broadcastin g i n wha t woul d b e Justice Brennan' s final opinion prio r t o retirin g i n June, 1990 : Justices Bolster Race Preferences a t Federal Level. 57 Or, the Court' s 5: 4 adoptio n o f a middle-groun d approac h t o th e state's authorit y ove r abortio n regulation s b y reaffirming th e "essen tial holdin g o f Ro e v . Wade" whil e allowin g restriction s unles s the y impose "a n u n d u e burden " o n a woman's righ t t o choose : Justices Allow New Limits on Abortion: Roe Upheld but Ruling Curb s Right.58 These decision s represen t a tin y sampl e o f th e far-reachin g deci sions b y th e tribunal , whic h ar e th e la w o f th e lan d an d which , i n the absenc e o f prope r an d permissibl e remedia l action , mus t b e obeyed. I n th e admonitio n o f Justice Feli x Frankfurter : Even thi s cour t ha s th e las t sa y only fo r a time . Bein g compose d o f fallible men , i t may err. Bu t revisio n o f it s errors mus t b e b y orderl y process of law. The cour t may be asked to reconsider it s decisions, and thi s has been done successfull y agai n an d agai n throughou t ou r history . Or , wha t this cour t ha s deeme d it s duty t o decid e ma y be change d b y legislation, as it often ha s been, and, o n occasion , by constitutional amend ment.59 There i s n o doubt , however , tha t th e Cour t ha s a dut y t o decide , a duty t o pas s j u d g m e nt o n issue s tha t properl y com e befor e it . For, t o quote agai n fro m Justice Frankfurter , "i n th e end , j u d g m e nt canno t be escaped—th e j u d g m e nt o f thi s court." 6 0 I t i s simply a fac t o f lif e that i n th e Unite d State s all social an d politica l issue s sooner o r late r seem t o becom e judicial.

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American Courts in Practice Jurisdiction The highes t tribunal , compose d o f nin e justices 6 1 —who ar e ap pointed b y th e Presiden t wit h th e advic e an d consen t o f th e Sen ate—possesses bot h original an d appellate jurisdiction. However , i t exercises th e forme r onl y rarely , i n par t becaus e o f th e scarcit y o f that typ e o f case ; in par t becaus e o f it s ow n an d Congress' s desir e t o share it s power wit h th e lowe r federa l judiciary; an d i n par t becaus e of th e stricture s o f th e Elevent h Amendment . Indeed , i t ha s ha d occasion t o adjudicat e case s i n it s origina l jurisdictio n onl y abou t 165 times . A n exampl e o f th e Court' s refusa l t o hea r suc h a cas e i s Massachusetts's challeng e i n 197 0 t o th e constitutionalit y o f th e Indochina war. 62 I n theory , ther e ar e fou r area s o f origina l jurisdiction a t th e ba r o f th e highes t tribuna l (se e tabl e 1-1) ; bu t becaus e o f the grant s o f concurren t jurisdiction t o othe r courts , th e Suprem e Court no w exercise s it s origina l jurisdictio n exclusively onl y i n in stances involvin g tw o o r mor e states . On e illustratio n i s th e hotl y contested, lon g drawn-ou t wate r disput e betwee n Californi a an d Arizona, whic h cam e t o th e Suprem e Cour t a s a matte r o f jurisdictional fac t an d right . Afte r length y litigatio n involvin g reargument s and rehearings , an d th e employmen t b y th e Cour t o f th e specia l services o f a fact-findin g "master, " th e Cour t rule d 7: 1 i n favo r of Arizon a (Chie f Justic e Warren , a n ex-governo r o f California , abstaining) .6 3 Other case s o f origina l jurisdiction, i n differen t area s of concern , wer e Delaware' s unsuccessfu l attemp t t o hav e th e Cour t declare unconstitutiona l th e electora l college , an d rive r boundar y disputes betwee n Louisian a an d Texa s an d betwee n Ohi o an d Ken tucky. 64 Appellate Jurisdiction. B y far th e primar y tas k o f th e Suprem e Cour t i s in th e real m o f appellate jurisdiction. Her e th e Cour t serve s a s final arbiter o n th e constructio n o f th e Constitutio n and , withi n th e confines o f th e taugh t traditio n o f th e la w an d adherenc e t o prece dent (dul y modifie d b y it s judicial prerogativ e t o chang e it s mind) , it provide s u s wit h a n authoritativ e an d unifor m interpretatio n o f the la w o f th e land . A s tabl e 1- 2 shows , appellat e case s reac h th e Supreme Cour t fro m bot h th e constitutiona l an d th e legislativ e

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American Courts in Practice T A B L E 1- 2

United States Supreme Court Review Cases Normally Reac h th e U.S . Supreme Cour t fo r Purpose s o f Revie w (A s Distinct fro m Original Jurisdiction) i n On e o f Three Principa l Ways: 1. on APPEAL, i.e., as a matter o f right ; 2. on a writ of CERTIORARI, as a matter o f Court discretion ; 3. b y CERTIFICATION . I t i s rarel y used , presentin g th e Cour t wit h eve n fewe r case s than thos e o n it s original jurisdiction docket . I t cover s "an y question o f law in an y civil or crimina l cas e a s t o whic h instruction s ar e desired " b y th e lowe r court , usuall y a United State s Court o f Appeals. (The ol d wri t o f ERROR , a commo n la w proces s strongl y aki n t o (1 ) above , wa s statutorily discontinue d i n th e federa l court s i n 1928 . It brought th e entir e recor d o f a case proceedin g i n a lowe r cour t befor e th e Suprem e Cour t fo r it s consideratio n fo r alleged "error s o f law" committed below. ) I. CASE S R E A C H I N G T H E U . S . SUPREM E C O U R T O N APPEA L

(i.e., the Cour t review s because i t must): A. When a special three-judge district court (which mus t includ e a t least one circui t judge) has grante d o r denie d a n interlocutor y o r permanen t injunctio n i n an y proceedin g required t o be hear d b y such a court . (f 1252. ) (Thes e three-judg e court s si t onl y i n suit s brough t t o restrain, on grounds of unconstitutionality, enforcement, operation, or execution of federal or state statutes dealing with apportionment or reapportionment of legislative districts, an d similarly , in instances i n whic h such a court i s required b y specific act s o f Congress—e.g. , th e Civi l Rights Act o f 196 4 and th e Votin g Right s Ac t o f 1965 , a s amended , an d th e Presidentia l Electio n Cam paign Fun d Act of 1974. ) I I . CASE S R E A C H I N G T H E U . S . SUPREM E C O U R T O N A W R I T O F C E R T I O R A R I

(i.e., becaus e a minimu m o f four Suprem e Cour t justices hav e agree d t o a review) . Writs of Certiorari are grante d o r denie d a t th e discretion of the Court —subject alway s t o th e latent powe r o f Congress t o define an d limi t th e appellate power o f a Court . A. From the state court of last resort having statutory jurisdiction i n an y particula r cas e (usually, bu t no t always , "the highest court of a state," which normally , bu t no t always , i s the stat e supreme court) . 1. I n case s wher e th e validit y o f a treat y o r statut e o f th e Unite d State s i s draw n i n question o r wher e th e validit y o f a statut e o f an y Stat e i s drawn i n questio n o n th e ground o f it s bein g repugnan t t o th e Constitution , treaties , o r law s o f th e Unite d States, o r wher e an y title , right , privilege , o r immunit y i s specially se t u p o r claime d under th e Constitutio n o r th e treatie s o r statute s of , o r an y commissio n hel d o r authority exercise d under , th e Unite d States . ( / 1257. ) B. Fro m U.S . (circuit ) court s o f appeal s and , i n al l pertinen t cases , fro m othe r lowe r courts o f the Unite d States , such a s legislative courts . ( / 1254. ) 1. B y writ o f certiorar i grante d upo n petitio n o f an y part y t o an y civi l o r crimina l case, before o r afte r renditio n o f judgment o r decree . 2. By certification a t any time b y a court o f appeals o f any question o f law in an y civil or criminal cas e as to which instruction s ar e desired , an d upo n suc h certificatio n th e Supreme Cour t ma y give binding instruction s o r requir e th e entir e recor d t o be sen t up fo r decisio n o f the entir e matte r i n controversy , ( f 1254. ) NOTE: Titl e 28 of the United States Code, formulated a s a result of congressional legislation, governs the types of review available to an appellant. (Se e Sees. 1252, 1254, and 1257).

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American Courts in Practice lower federa l court s an d th e highes t stat e courts . Ther e ar e thre e principal avenues , calle d writs, b y which matter s fo r appellat e jurisdiction reac h th e Cour t (1 ) b y certification; (2 ) o n wha t lawyer s ter m appeal, that is , a writ issued a s a matte r o f right; an d (3 ) o n certiorari, that is , granted b y the Cour t a s a matter o f discretion. 65 Certification. Thi s ma y b e dispose d o f quickly , fo r i t i s seldo m used . Essentially a n "inquiry " o f o r a reques t t o a highe r cour t b y a lowe r one, certificatio n presumabl y reache s "an y questio n o f la w i n an y civil o r crimina l cas e i n whic h instruction s ar e desired " b y a lowe r court, customaril y a Cour t o f Appeal s o r th e Cour t o f Claims . On e of th e ver y infrequen t moder n example s o f it s us e wa s tha t b y th e Fifth Circui t Cour t o f Appeal s i n 1963 , which "certified " th e ques tion o f whether it s criminal contemp t citatio n o f Mississippi's Gover nor Ros s R . Barnet t an d Lieutenan t Governo r Pau l B.Johnson , Jr. , necessitated a tria l b y jury. Th e Cour t o f Appeals wa s evenl y divide d on th e delicat e question , 4:4 , an d i t eagerl y turne d t o th e Suprem e Court 6 6 t o decid e th e ticklis h matte r arisin g ou t o f th e federall y enforced admissio n o f James H . Meredit h t o th e (unti l then ) en tirely segregate d Universit y o f Mississipp i a t Oxford . (Th e Suprem e Court ultimatel y hel d 5: 4 tha t th e Constitution' s jury tria l require ments d o no t appl y t o suc h contemp t cases , but i t indicated tha t an y nonjury criminal sentenc e impose d mus t b e limite d t o on e aki n t o a "petty offense.") 67 Writ of Appeal. Thi s i s theoretically grante d t o a dul y qualifie d appli cant, know n a s th e appellant, a s a matte r o f statutoril y grante d right, with th e answerin g part y know n a s th e appellee or respondent. Unti l Congress i n 198 8 bowe d t o th e plea s o f th e judiciary an d dramati cally limite d thi s writ , i t wa s use d frequently. 68 Today , however , i t i s confined t o thos e situation s i n whic h a Unite d State s three-judg e district cour t (whic h include s a t leas t on e judg e fro m a Unite d States cour t o f appeals ) ha s grante d o r denie d a n interlocutor y o r permanent injunctio n i n an y proceedin g require d b y a n Ac t o f Congress t o b e hear d b y such a tribunal . An exampl e wa s th e 196 4 decisio n i n Schiro v. Bynum 69 i n whic h 26

American Courts in Practice the Cour t unanimousl y an d summaril y affirme d a three^judg e dis trict cour t decisio n strikin g dow n a Louisian a la w requirin g racia l segregation a t sport s event s an d entertainment s ope n t o th e genera l public. The constitutiona l issu e thu s adjudicated her e was the mean ing o f th e equa l protectio n o f th e la w claus e o f th e Fourteent h Amendment. Writ of Certiorari. Thi s i s th e usua l mod e o f acces s t o th e Suprem e Court. A Lati n term , translatabl e a s "mad e mor e certain " o r "bette r informed," i t signifies th e willingness o f the Cour t t o revie w the case , but no t necessaril y hea r ora l argument . Strictl y a discretionar y writ , it i s grante d whe n a minimum of four justices agre e tha t "ther e ar e special an d importan t reasons " ( a requiremen t o f th e Court' s ow n famous Rul e 1 9 o f th e Court' s Revise d Rule s o f 1967 ) tha t warran t an orde r t o th e cour t belo w t o "sen d up " th e recor d fo r review. 70 More tha n 9 0 percen t o f al l petition s fo r writ s o f certiorar i ar e denied, an d normall y dismisse d wit h onl y th e ters e orde r "petitio n for wri t o f certiorar i denied. " O n occasion , however , tha t orde r wil l carry a not e tha t on e o r mor e o f th e justices—but les s tha n four — believe tha t certiorar i shoul d hav e bee n granted ; thes e justices ar e usually identified. 71 An intriguin g an d ever-contentiou s questio n i s just what denia l o f a wri t o f certiorar i means . I t i s clea r enoug h wha t i t mean s t o th e disappointed litigant : h e o r sh e lost . But th e justices disagre e amon g themselves o n th e matte r a t issue . Fo r example , Justic e Jackso n viewed "uncert-worthiness " a s a taci t agreemen t b y a quoru m o f th e justices tha t a decision belo w i s good enoug h t o stand , a n d tha t "th e fatal sentenc e tha t i n rea l lif e write s finis t o man y case s canno t i n legal theor y b e a complet e blank." 7 2 O n th e othe r hand , Justic e Frankfurter alway s insisted durin g hi s almost quarte r o f a centur y o n the Cour t tha t n o significanc e attache s t o th e denia l o f certiorari , that i t "i n n o way " implie s Suprem e Cour t approva l o f th e decisio n below. O n numerou s occasion s h e stoutl y defende d hi s contentio n that al l the denia l mean s i s that for reason s seldom , i f ever, disclosed , four justice s evidentl y d o no t believ e tha t th e cas e ough t t o b e reviewed, tha t a denia l i s thu s simpl y a n avoidanc e o f adjudicatio n

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American Courts in Practice on th e merit s o f th e case .73 O f course , i t i s possible , bu t highl y improbable, t o obtain a reconsideration o r a rehearing b y the Court . A fe w example s o f acceptanc e an d rejectio n wil l indicat e th e diversity o f petition s fo r certiorar i (se e tabl e 1- 2 fo r th e overal l jurisdictional field). I n recen t years , amon g th e mor e famou s case s to com e befor e th e Cour t o n certiorar i fro m a lowe r federa l cour t was th e Steel Seizure Case, 14 which involve d question s o f separation o f power. Another cas e from a stat e cour t o f las t resor t wa s th e success ful clai m o f polic e brutalit y i n violatio n o f Fourteent h Amendmen t due proces s o f la w guarantee s o f on e Rochin , a Californi a citizen. 75 An instanc e o f rejectio n fro m th e stat e leve l wa s th e unsuccessfu l due proces s ple a b y on e Hirshhor n i n oppositio n t o a Ne w Yor k statute tha t make s i t illega l fo r a ma n t o masquerad e a s a woman i n public. 76 Another denia l o f certiorar i sa w th e Cour t leavin g intac t a lower cour t rulin g tha t uphel d compulsor y dru g testin g for al l appli cants fo r federa l jobs. 7 7 Anothe r i s th e denia l o f a la w professor' s claim tha t th e Rutgers Law Reviews rejectio n o f hi s manuscrip t fo r a proposed articl e constitute d stat e actio n denyin g hi m th e equa l protection o f th e law s unde r th e Fourteent h Amendment ! (H e al leged tha t irrelevan t persona l bia s ha d dictate d th e refusal.) 78 O n e it di d agre e t o hea r i n 1992 , bu t dismisse d afte r ora l argumen t as "improvidentially " granted , wa s th e clai m b y convicte d sexua l offenders tha t forcin g the m t o atten d therap y programs , tha t re quire the m t o admi t thei r guilt , violate s thei r constitutiona l right s against self-incrimination. 79 Supreme Court Workload That th e Suprem e Cour t o f th e Unite d State s i s a bus y tribuna l i s axiomatic. I t remain s indee d considerable , despit e th e muc h needed an d desire d wid e discretionary power s o f revie w bestowe d upon i t b y th e so-calle d Judge s Bil l o f 1925. 80 Whethe r o r no t formal ora l argument s ar e grante d an d writte n opinion s ar e issued , whether o r no t petition s fo r certiorar i ar e grante d o r denied , merel y to sa y "no " require s considerabl e tim e an d energy . O n e o f th e leas t understood, ye t mos t importan t aspect s o f th e Court' s wor k i s tha t 28

American Courts in Practice every justice participates in each and every action of the Court, no matte r wha,t it s dispositio n ma y ultimatel y be . Th e Suprem e Cour t i s a collegial body ; bu t i t i s no t onl y a join t grou p o f equipowerfu l individuals, it is also a group o f nine individua l jurists who ar e joined together fo r th e purpos e o f arrivin g a t decision s an d judgment s growing ou t o f thei r ow n judicio-philosophica l perspective s tha t frequently d o no t permi t agreemen t an d thu s resul t i n concurrin g or eve n dissentin g opinions . Th e chie f justic e i s primus inter pares (first amon g equals) , but hi s primus i s confined largel y to administra tive aspect s o f th e Court' s wor k a s wel l a s th e perhap s mor e crucia l but undefinabl e on e o f "settin g th e tone. " Without burdenin g th e reade r wit h excessiv e statistic s (thes e ar e readily availabl e i n th e Annua l Repor t [s] o f th e Administrativ e Of fice o f th e Unite d State s Court s an d Unite d State s La w Week , fo r example) th e 1994-199 6 ter m o f th e Suprem e Cour t sa w 8,100 case s on it s docket s (th e Original , Appellate , an d Miscellaneous) , wit h 7,170 dispose d of ; th e balanc e o f 93 0 wa s carrie d ove r t o th e 1995 1996 term. O f thos e dispose d of , 16 0 were decide d o n th e merits ; 9 1 of thes e wit h ful l signe d written opinions, thre e per curiam, sixty nine memorandum orders (the latte r featurin g a ters e order , suc h a s "affirmed," "dismissed, " o r "reverse d an d remanded") , an d non e were se t fo r reargumen t i n th e 1995-199 6 term . Th e remainde r o f the larg e numbe r o f case s o f whic h th e Cour t dispose d represent s denials o f revie w an d assorte d othe r dispositions . Again , i t mus t b e stressed tha t eve n a denia l o f certiorar i call s for stud y an d a positio n by eac h an d ever y justice. Eac h sittin g justice ma y no w (1996 ) b e assigned u p t o fou r la w clerks , thos e brigh t youn g la w schoo l prod ucts. Retire d justices ma y hav e on e each , an d th e chie f justice ma y have u p t o five (bu t Chie f Justice Rehnquis t an d Associat e Justic e Stevens use onl y thre e each) . There wer e a total o f 3 8 clerks in 1996 , salaried a t $42,214 . The y ca n b e trul y helpful , an d indee d are . For example , the y pla y a significan t rol e i n analyzin g petition s fo r certiorari. Ye t the y canno t an d d o no t ac t fo r thei r justices i n an y sense o f th e term . The y ar e hardl y th e judicial Rasputin s the y ar e sometimes picture d t o b e b y certai n critic s o f th e Court , notwith standing thei r closenes s t o thei r justices. I t i s th e justice wh o mus t 29

American Courts in Practice and doe s decid e i n hi s o r he r responsibl e an d authoritativ e role , and i n a capacit y that , i n th e memorabl e characterizatio n o f Justice Frankfurter, call s fo r th e combine d abilit y an d wisdo m o f a philoso pher, historian , a n d p r o p h e t — t o whic h characteristic s Justice Wil liam J . Brennan , Jr. , wistfull y added , "inordinat e patience." 8 1 Hi s predecessor an d colleagu e Justice Holme s use d t o sugges t that , t o succeed, a justice woul d hav e t o be a combination o f Justinian, Jesus Christ, an d J o hn Marshall . The Institutional Setting Unless i t i s convoke d int o specia l sessio n b y th e Chie f Justice, i n consultation wit h hi s colleagues—a s wa s don e durin g th e Littl e Rock, Arkansas , 1957-195 8 high-schoo l desegregatio n crisis 8 2 —the United State s Suprem e Cour t i s i n forma l sessio n thirty-si x week s annually, normall y fro m th e firs t o r secon d Monda y i n Octobe r unti l the en d o f J u ne o r firs t wee k o f July. Occasionall y i t meets somewha t longer, a s it di d t o adjudicat e th e Pentagon Papers 83 cas e i n 1971 , the Nixon Tapes 84 cas e a t th e en d o f it s 1973-197 4 term , an d th e arme d forces registratio n case , Rostker v. Goldberg, at th e conclusio n o f it s 1980-1981 term. 8 5 (Bu t ther e i s mor e tha n enoug h "homework " t o keep th e jurists occupie d o n a year-round basis. ) Sinc e it s construc tion i n 1935 , th e hom e o f th e Cour t ha s bee n th e magnificen t Corinthian-columned, white-marble d structur e a t 1 First Street N.E. , Washington, D.C. , 20543 , full y guarde d aroun d th e cloc k b y a spe cial Suprem e Cour t polic e force . Th e beautiful , imposin g structur e was patterne d afte r th e Templ e o f Dian a a t Ephesu s (on e o f th e seven wonder s o f th e ancien t world) , an d th e nobl e word s "Equa l Justice Unde r Law " are carve d abov e th e majesti c entrance , which i s enhanced b y great bronz e doors . The Cour t convene s i n a larg e an d resplenden t forty-four-foot , high-ceilinged courtroom , seatin g thre e hundre d people . It s nin e justices ar e cla d i n blac k robes—thos e judicia l vestment s Judg e Jerome Fran k alway s wante d t o se e b a n i s h e d 8 6 — a n d ar e seate d i n tilt-back chair s no w o f unifor m height , behin d a raise d benc h (fo r 181 year s a simpl e straigh t one , bu t sinc e 197 2 shape d i n th e for m 30

American Courts in Practice Courtroom Seating of the Justices, Marshal, Clerk, and Counsel T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d State s

r ^ r x \ 1211 1 s To] © 2 A^ 12 1l l

0

1. Chie f Justice Rehnquis t 2. Justic e Steven s 3 . Justice O'Conno r 4. Justic e Scali a 5 . Justic e Kenned y 6. Justice Soute r 7 . Justice Thoma s 8. Justic e Ginsbur g 9 . Justic e Breye r 10. Cler k of the Court 11 . Marsha l of the Cour t 12. Counse l

Figure 1-2 The 1995-1996 Supreme Court

of a half-hexagon , o r shallo w L) . Whe n th e Cour t i s i n session , th e Chief Justice i s th e firs t t o ente r throug h th e purplish-re d draperie s behind th e bench , followe d b y th e eigh t associat e justices i n orde r of seniority . Th e Cour t an d th e audienc e remai n standin g unti l th e marshal ha s complete d hi s traditiona l introduction : "Oyez , Oyez , Oyez! Al l person s havin g busines s befor e th e Honorable , th e Su preme Cour t o f th e Unite d States , are admonishe d t o draw near an d give thei r attention , fo r th e Cour t i s no w sitting . Go d sav e th e United State s an d thi s Honorabl e Court"— a remar k tha t ha s bee n the but t o f a numbe r o f tasteles s jokes. Th e seat s o f th e nin e justices are arrange d accordin g t o lengt h o f continuou s servic e o n th e bench: th e chie f justice i n th e center , flanked b y the senio r associat e justice o n hi s right , th e second-rankin g o n hi s left , an d continuin g alternately i n declinin g orde r o f seniorit y (se e figure 1-2) . Oral Argument Th e assemble d Cour t hear s ora l argumen t normall y for th e first thre e (bu t occasionall y four ) day s i n tw o week s o f eac h month, i n thos e fe w cases—no w les s tha n on e h u n d r e d — t h a t i t ha s 31

American Courts in Practice agreed t o hea r i n thi s formal an d impressiv e setting . (Th e othe r tw o weeks ar e spen t behin d close d door s considerin g case s an d writin g opinions.) Fo r th e ora l arguments , fort y copie s o f th e printe d briefs—with on e se t goin g t o eac h justice—mus t hav e bee n filed with th e Cler k o f th e Cour t wel l i n advance , i n accordanc e wit h prescribed format . Bon a fide paupers , however , ma y file handwrit ten o r typewritte n briefs. 87 A n importan t illustratio n o f suc h a n in forma pauperis actio n i s th e handwritten , pencille d lette r tha t Clar ence Ear l Gideo n use d t o petitio n th e Cour t fo r a wri t o f habea s corpus—the sacre d commo n la w wri t tha t date s a t leas t t o th e Magna Cart a o f 1215—resultin g i n th e momentou s overrulin g o f Betts v. Brady 88 i n th e landmar k decisio n o f Gideon v. Wainwright 89 (The latte r "incorporated " th e Sixt h Amendmen t righ t t o counse l in al l crimina l case s vi a th e du e proces s o f la w claus e o f th e Four teenth Amendment. ) Brief s generall y cit e th e facts , issues , question s presented, action s o f lowe r courts , an d al l necessar y lega l argu ments, togethe r wit h th e statute s an d citation s o f case s o n whic h they rely . Oral argument 9 0 i s hear d o n designate d day s fro m 10:0 0 a.m . t o noon an d fro m 1:0 0 unti l 3:0 0 p.m. 9 1 Infinitel y mor e tha n th e "perfunctory windo w dressing, " a s i t ha s bee n viewe d b y some , i t i s both a fascinatin g an d extremel y significan t aspec t o f th e Court' s public function , an d i t i s a trea t fo r thos e fortunate s wh o hav e succeeded i n obtainin g on e o f th e 30 0 availabl e seats . (Th e medi a i s allotted betwee n 1 9 an d 3 3 seats , 7 9 t o 9 3 seat s ar e reserve d fo r th e justices' familie s an d member s o f th e Bar , an d th e remainin g 18 8 are availabl e t o th e public , largel y o n a "first-come , first-served" basis.) Despit e th e carefull y draw n briefs , ther e i s a t leas t a chanc e that, i n supplementin g th e printe d brief s b y ora l emphasi s an d i n the give-and-tak e o f th e questionin g b y th e justices , on e o r mor e members ma y tak e a differen t vie w o f th e cas e tha n th e on e h e o r she migh t hav e forme d upo n initiall y readin g th e briefs. 92 Indeed , Justice Dougla s publicl y state d repeatedl y tha t "ora l argument s wi n or los e th e case." 93 Thi s i s probabl y to o drasti c a view , fo r w e hav e more tha n on e pronouncemen t o n recor d i n whic h justice s mad e clear tha t th e loser' s argumen t wa s bette r tha n th e winner's—fo r 32

American Courts in Practice example, th e Court' s hig h complimen t publicl y pai d t o th e the n chief counse l fo r th e AFL-CIO , Arthur Goldberg , o n th e losin g en d of th e Taft-Hartle y Ac t injunctio n tes t cas e o f United Steel Workers of America v . United States 94—but ther e i s n o doub t tha t a n ora l argu ment ma y indeed prov e t o b e bot h persuasiv e an d decisive . The lawyer s wh o presen t thei r case s durin g ora l argumen t ar e usually limite d t o one-hal f hou r fo r eac h side , sometime s t o a n hour i n thos e instance s deeme d b y th e Cour t t o requir e a longe r presentation. Ther e are , however , notabl e exceptions , suc h a s th e desegregation implementatio n cas e o f 195 5 whe n fourtee n hour s were allowed. 95 Opposin g counsel , al l o f who m mus t a t som e tim e have bee n admitte d t o practic e befor e th e Suprem e Court—i n th e 1991-1992 ter m 4,03 4 wer e thu s admitted—us e a specia l lecter n from whic h the y addres s th e justices "o n high, " full y expecting , an d rarely disappointe d i n tha t expectation , t o be frequentl y interrupte d with searchin g question s fo r whic h n o "tim e credit " i s given . Attached t o th e lecter n ar e tw o lights, the firs t o f which give s a whit e warning signa l five minute s prio r t o tim e expiration ; whe n a re d light flashes, counse l mus t sto p instantly , unles s th e Chie f Justic e permits hi m o r he r t o continue . Edwi n McElwain , a t on e tim e Chie f Justice Charle s Evan s Hughes' s la w clerk, relate s tha t th e formidabl e Chief Justice onc e stoppe d a distinguishe d Ne w York attorne y i n th e middle o f th e wor d if, and that , o n anothe r occasion , whe n aske d b y the sam e attorne y ho w muc h o f hi s tim e remained , Hughes , whit e beard shaking , replie d sternly , "Fourtee n seconds , Mr . Counsel." 9 6 The "government' s lawyer " a t th e ba r o f th e Suprem e Cour t i s no t the Attorne y Genera l o r hi s o r he r deputy , bu t th e numbe r thre e person i n th e Departmen t o f Justice , th e Solicitor-General . I n charge o f al l th e federa l government' s litigatio n befor e th e Court , litigation tha t comprise s roughl y one-hal f o f it s entire workload , th e Solicitor-General ha s ofte n bee n a distinguishe d facult y membe r o f a prestigiou s la w school—fo r example , Professo r Archibal d E . Co x (1961-1965) o f Harvard ; hi s Dean , Erwi n N . Griswol d (1967-1973) ; Professor Rober t H . Bor k o f Yale (1973-1977) ; Dea n Re x E . Le e o f Brigham Youn g Universit y (1981-1985) ; Professo r Charle s Frie d o f Harvard (1985-1988) ; forme r federa l Judg e Kennet h W . Star r 33

American Courts in Practice (1989-1993); an d forme r Justic e Departmen t official , Dre w Day s (1993-) i n th e Clinto n Administration . The Conference. The highl y importan t weekl y Frida y Conferenc e o f the justice s take s plac e usuall y fro m 9:3 0 o r 10:0 0 A.M . t o 5:3 0 o r 6:00 P.M. , aroun d a larg e mahogan y tabl e behin d securel y locke d doors. (Increasingly , th e Frida y Conferenc e i s bein g supplemente d by post-3:0 0 P.M . Wednesday meeting s an d others. ) Sinc e 1910 , when a "leak" was attributed t o on e o f them, no t eve n th e page s hav e been present . N o officia l recor d o f th e discussion s i n Conferenc e i s kept; message s fro m clerk s ar e receive d a t th e doo r b y th e mos t junior associat e justice present . W e kno w littl e o f wha t happen s i n Conference sav e what we hav e learne d fro m memoir s o f th e justices and fro m thei r biographers . Ye t i t i s entirel y prope r tha t suc h se crecy shoul d exist—th e Cour t canno t i n goo d conscienc e ope n it s deliberations t o th e glar e o f publicity , no r ca n i t hol d pres s confer ences. Th e Cour t stil l suffer s from , an d ha s neve r forgotten , th e on e truly disastrou s lea k tha t occurre d i n it s histor y (althoug h allegedl y there hav e bee n a hal f doze n o r s o others) : I n th e Dred Scott case,97 not onl y di d th e proslaver y Justice J o hn Catron—aide d an d abette d by hi s colleague , Rober t C . Grier—evidentl y infor m President-elec t James Buchana n o f th e probabl e "lineup " (7:2 ) o f th e Cour t i n tha t crucial decisio n on e mont h prio r t o it s officia l announcement ; bu t also segment s o f th e Norther n pres s publishe d th e dissen t o f Justice Benjamin R . Curtis . Th e secrec y o f th e Court' s work—behin d it s "Purple Curtain"—i s a n indispensabl e aspec t o f it s labor s an d it s posture a s an independen t branc h o f th e government . In Conference , th e justices , unde r th e leadershi p o f th e Chie f Justice, hav e a s thei r mai n functio n th e discussio n o f th e severa l cases the y hav e recentl y hear d i n ora l argument . A secon d (an d secondary) tas k i s t o discus s petition s fo r certiorari . Prio r t o eac h weekly Conference , th e Chie f Justice circulate s tw o lists of case s tha t establish th e basi s fo r th e Conferenc e discussio n o f th e "pets , fo r cert.," a s the y ar e known . O n th e first, th e "Discus s List, " ar e thos e few deeme d worth y o f Conferenc e time . O n a fa r longe r one , th e "Dead List, " ar e thos e deeme d unworthy , an d the y ar e usuall y de 34

American Courts in Practice nied review . A n averag e Conferenc e agend a cover s abou t seventy five items . Al l member s o f th e Court , havin g bee n advise d i n ad vance whic h case s wil l b e discussed , not e thei r tentativ e stan d o n their cop y o f th e agenda . Application s fo r writ s o f certiorar i ar e disposed of , eithe r wit h verv e an d controlle d dispatch , a s used t o b e so characteristi c o f Chie f Justic e Hughes' s regime , o r wit h muc h deliberation an d discussion—whic h wa s th e practice d preferenc e of Chie f Justice Stone . N o on e ca n sa y with finality, however , whic h of thes e tw o approaches i s "better" o r mor e "just. " The nin e justices, who hav e shake n hand s wit h eac h othe r upo n entering , ar e seate d around a large , rectangula r conferenc e table . Th e Chie f Justic e gives hi s ow n vie w first i n eac h case , followe d b y tha t o f th e othe r justices, al l o f who m ar e prepare d t o "recite, " i n descendin g orde r of seniority . Fo r man y years , whe n i t cam e t o takin g a tentative vot e on th e case , however , th e votin g commence d wit h th e junior justice , the somewha t debatabl e rational e havin g bee n tha t h e o r sh e woul d thus spea k up , fre e fro m th e influenc e o f mor e experience d breth ren. Bu t sinc e th e earl y 1970s , the votin g ha s proceede d i n th e sam e order o f seniorit y a s th e discussio n (excep t tha t a justice wh o add s a case t o th e "Discus s List " wil l discus s an d vot e o n i t first). 98 Eac h justice record s al l vote s i n a hinged , lockabl e red-leathe r docke t book, an d th e Cour t i s now set for th e nex t stag e o f its task—writin g the opinions . Diverse Opinions. First , afte r ora l argument , case s mus t b e assigned . Here, th e Chie f Justice wil l cal l upo n al l o f hi s power s o f diplomacy , strategy, an d persuasio n t o achiev e written decision s tha t will be: (1 ) understandable; (2 ) comprehende d b y th e public ; (3 ) persuasive ; (4) eloquent ; an d (5 ) leav e a s few ruffled feather s a s possible amon g the justices. Abov e all , o f course , decision s mus t promot e th e end s of constitutiona l government , appropriatel y interpre t constitutiona l principles, an d sho w proper regar d fo r cas e law . They must, i n short , first an d foremos t serv e constitutiona l democracy . Gon e ar e th e day s when, partl y t o achiev e th e abov e aim s a s he sa w them, Chie f Justice J o h n Marshal l wrot e mos t o f th e opinion s himself , and , mor e ofte n than not , fo r a unanimou s Court . H e believe d tha t th e Court' s 35

American Courts in Practice power an d prestig e woul d b e enhance d i f i t wer e t o spea k wit h a single voice . "Justice s mus t writ e dow n thei r reason s fo r a decision, " as Dea n Rosto w o f th e Yale La w Schoo l observed , "becaus e the y ar e partners wit h us , th e citizens , i n a n agree d procedur e fo r reachin g responsible decisions." 99 Prio r t o Marshall' s time , decision s custom arily, althoug h no t always , wer e rendere d seriatim 100—that is , eac h author writin g an d deliverin g hi s opinio n separately— a practic e still prevalen t wit h th e La w Lord s o f Britain' s Hous e o f Lords , an d one tha t Thoma s Jefferson, a s president , wante d t o institutionaliz e to counterac t th e powerfu l influenc e o f hi s politica l enemy , J o h n Marshall. Today , i n al l case s hear d o n th e merits , forma l writte n opinions ar e rendered , sav e fo r thos e decide d b y m e m o r a n d u m orders, an d thos e fe w i n whic h a ti e vote ha s resulte d becaus e o f th e absence o r voluntar y disqualificatio n o f on e o f th e justices. (A ti e vote ha s th e effec t o f upholdin g th e decisio n o f th e highes t cour t below.) 1 0 1 Excep t i n case s o f seriou s illness , th e benc h ma y confi dently b e expecte d t o b e a t ful l strengt h fo r practicall y al l o f it s decisions. O n occasio n a judicial turnover , resultin g fro m deat h o r retirement, ma y cause th e ne w membe r t o abstai n becaus e h e o r sh e had no t bee n presen t a t th e ora l argument , as , e.g., Justice Byro n R . White di d i n th e New York Prayer case.102 Moreover , unlik e member s of th e legislature , th e justices ar e extremel y sensitiv e abou t eve n th e faintest possibilit y o f a conflic t o f interest , and , a s the the n Associat e Justice Rehnquis t di d i n United States v. Nixon, 103 wil l abstai n fro m participation rathe r tha n caus e s o muc h a s a questio n o f it . Thi s principle di d no t greatl y troubl e Chie f Justice Marshal l i n hi s day , a s he wa s directl y a n d personall y involve d i n Marbury v . Madison! 104 "When i n doubt , d o no t sit " i s no w a firm polic y o f th e member s o f the Court . Justice To m C . Clar k eve n resigned from th e Cour t whe n his son , Ramsey , becam e U.S . Attorney Genera l i n 1967 . The sol e opinion-writin g proble m whe n th e Cour t i s unanimou s is th e selectio n o f th e author , wh o i s alway s chose n b y th e Chie f Justice i n thos e instances. 105 Dependin g o n th e publi c significanc e of th e decisio n an d o n th e natur e o f th e subjec t matter , th e "Chief " may "self-assign, " i.e. , h e assign s himsel f t o writ e th e opinion , a s Chief Justic e Ear l Warre n di d i n th e unanimou s decisio n o f th e 36

American Courts in Practice contentious an d significan t Segregation Cases of 1954, 106 a s Chie f Justice Warre n Burge r di d i n th e Nixon Tapes case o f 1974, 107 and a s Chief Justic e Rehnquis t di d i n th e "Specia l Prosecutor " cas e o f 1988. 108 But when th e Chie f Justice i s on th e minorit y sid e i n a case , the assignmen t fo r th e writing o f th e majorit y opinio n wil l ordinaril y be mad e b y th e senio r associat e justice o n that side . Fo r example , Justice Frankfurte r assigne d Justice Clar k t o write th e majorit y opin ion fo r th e 5: 4 Cour t i n a dua l cas e involvin g th e powe r o f congres sional investigatin g committees. 1 0 9 Th e Chie f Justic e a n d / o r th e senior associat e justice wil l als o alway s tak e int o accoun t th e philo sophical "bent " o f a n assigne e i n case s tha t ma y b e expecte d t o evoke considerabl e publi c agitation . Thus , Chie f Justic e Ston e as signed on e o f th e Court' s leadin g "liberals," 110 Justic e Black , t o write th e majorit y (6:3 ) opinio n i n th e highl y controversia l Japanese Relocation case. 111 Similarly , Chie f Justic e Warre n assigne d on e o f the Court' s leadin g "conservatives, " an d a deepl y religiou s man , Justice Clark , t o writ e th e hotl y denounce d opinio n (8:1 ) outlawin g state-sponsored Bible readin g an d recitatio n o f th e Lord' s Praye r i n public schools. 112 Thi s doe s not , o f course , alway s bal m th e woun d or lesse n th e publi c outcry , bu t ther e i s a t leas t a chanc e tha t i t might d o so , and i t i s unquestionably soun d judicial strategy . Concurring Opinions. Th e Suprem e Cour t ma y b e expecte d t o b e unanimous i n abou t one-quarte r t o one-thir d o f it s decisions . Th e others ar e decide d chiefl y b y a n absolut e majorit y o r b y a mer e plurality; th e latte r occur s whe n n o absolut e majorit y i s attainabl e for th e Court' s decision , bu t when a particular pluralit y commande d more vote s tha n an y othe r combination . A less-than-happ y syn drome, "plurality " opinion s hav e bee n resorte d t o wit h increasin g frequency o f late . Th e Warre n Cour t provide d fort y pluralit y opin ions betwee n 195 3 a nd 196 9 an d th e Burge r Cour t rendere d eighty eight betwee n 196 9 an d 1981 . Bot h "concurring " an d "dissenting " opinions ar e frequent , an d thei r lengt h sometime s exceed s tha t o f the majorit y o r pluralit y opinion . A concurring opinion i s on e which , while concurrin g i n th e result, doe s no t agre e wit h th e reasoning o r the lin e o f logi c tha t brough t th e decisio n about . Bu t a concurrin g

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American Courts in Practice opinion count s a s a vot e o n th e sid e o f th e majority . Thus , Justic e Clark agree d wit h th e (6:2 ) decisio n i n Bakery. Carr 113 i n whic h th e court too k th e momentou s ste p o f holdin g tha t allege d illega l o r "invidiously discriminating " districtin g an d redistrictin g b y state leg islatures was a federally justiciable controversy , bu t h e disagree d wit h aspects o f th e rational e employe d b y th e majority . (I n tha t sam e case, Justice Frankfurte r wrot e a sixty-eight-pag e dissenting opinion , in whic h Justic e J o h n Marshal l Harla n joined. ) Ther e ar e thos e who ar e quit e critica l o f concurrin g opinions , whil e approvin g o f dissenting opinions , fo r the y believ e tha t a concurrin g opinio n i s essentially meaningless : tha t i t represents verbiag e tha t ha s n o effec t upon th e vot e i n th e case , an d tha t i t i s henc e bot h confusin g an d unnecessary an d woul d mor e profitabl y b e confine d t o footnote s t o the majorit y opinion . Still , i t i s a demonstrabl e fac t tha t man y a concurring opinio n ha s lef t a n importan t mar k o n th e cours e o f constitutional law ; fo r example , Justic e Clark' s i n th e Steel Seizure case (i n whic h h e pointe d th e finger a t th e President' s refusa l t o utilize availabl e statutes ) an d Justic e Harlan' s i n Estes v. Texas (i n which h e limite d th e Court' s holdin g t o "notorious " cases). 114 Som e concurring opinion s rea d lik e dissentin g ones—and , indeed , tha t i s sometimes thei r genesis ; for example , Justice Brandeis' s concurrin g opinion i n Whitney v . California an d Chie f Justice Burger' s i n Roe v. Wade.115 Dissenting Opinions. Thes e opinions—whic h ma y b e assigne d b y th e most senio r justice o n th e dissentin g side—ar e no t normall y subjec t to th e sam e criticism , althoug h o n occasio n i t ma y wel l b e appro priate. Th e dissentin g opinio n b y Justice Clar k i n th e coerce d con fession cas e o f Rogers v. Richmond 116 i n whic h Justice Potte r Stewar t joined, i s a cas e i n point . While i n disagreemen t wit h certai n techni cal aspects , tha t dissentin g opinio n wa s actuall y fa r mor e o f a con currence wit h th e majorit y tha n a bon a fide dissentin g opinio n o n the clai m o f coercion . Anothe r rathe r unhelpfu l practic e i s a simpl e dissent without an y explanation , whic h leave s th e observe r guessin g as t o th e motive s o f th e jurist—a n intriguing , sometime s nasty , but hardl y ver y professiona l sport . Th e bar e announcemen t i n th e 38

American Courts in Practice landmark cas e o f Palko v. Connecticut, 117 "Mr . Justice [Pierce ] Butle r dissents," i s meaningles s othe r tha n tha t i t count s a s a vot e o n th e negative sid e o f th e decision . Bu t whateve r one' s persona l appraisa l of th e merit s o f a particula r dissentin g opinion , renderin g suc h a n opinion i s a practic e tha t i s frequent , an d generall y desirable , a s a beacon o f a profoundl y hel d conviction . Hence , i t ma y wel l strengthen rathe r tha n weake n a particula r issue , althoug h ther e i s no doub t tha t i t ma y b e a n exasperatin g practic e i n th e eye s o f th e public and , indeed , tha t i t ma y hav e a tendenc y t o mudd y th e judicio-political waters . B e tha t a s i t may , ther e i s n o gainsayin g th e memorable evaluatio n o f th e dissentin g opinio n b y Charle s Evan s Hughes, the n writin g a s a n ex-associat e justic e o f th e Suprem e Court an d soo n t o b e it s elevent h Chie f Justice : " A dissent[in g opinion] i n a cour t o f las t resor t i s a n appea l t o th e broodin g spiri t of th e law , t o th e intelligenc e o f a futur e day , whe n a late r decisio n may possibl y correc t th e erro r int o whic h th e dissentin g judge be lieves th e cour t t o hav e bee n betrayed." 1 1 8 Althoug h Hughe s rarel y either dissente d o r wrot e dissentin g opinions , an d nex t t o J o h n Marshall, an d perhap s Ear l Warren , wa s unquestionabl y th e mos t dominant "Chief " t o si t o n th e Court , h e ofte n expresse d th e poin t of view that ther e i s no reaso n t o expec t mor e unanimit y o n difficul t problems o f law than i n th e "highe r reaches " o f physics, philosophy , or theology . Proving Rosco e Pound' s wis e observatio n tha t "dissentin g opin ions ma y b e th e sympto m o f lif e i n th e la w o f time," 1 1 9 man y a memorable dissentin g opinio n ha s gon e o n t o become , i n du e course, th e voic e o f th e majorit y o f th e Cour t o r eve n it s unanimou s voice. Example s ar e legion ; tw o opinion s b y Justice Holmes , on e of th e grea t dissenters, 120 serv e ampl y t o illustrat e thi s significan t phenomenon. I n hi s angr y an d anguishe d dissentin g opinio n i n Hammer v. Dagenhart121 (th e chil d labo r case) , h e vainl y crie d out 1 2 2 against th e 5: 4 majority' s declaratio n o f unconstitutionalit y o f th e Keating-Owen Chil d Labo r La w o f 191 6 o n ground s o f it s illega l interference wit h th e power s reserve d t o th e state s unde r th e Tent h Amendment unde r th e guis e o f th e congressiona l powe r ove r inter state commerce . Thi s decisio n wa s unanimousl y an d specificall y 39

American Courts in Practice overruled b y th e Hughe s Cour t i n United States v. Darby 123 i n 1941 . And ther e i s Holmes's earlier , perhap s eve n better-known , dissentin g opinion i n th e Ne w Yor k bakesho p case , Lochnerv. New York. 124 I n the fac e o f th e majority' s positio n tha t Ne w York state' s attemp t t o limit b y statute th e hour s o f bakeshop employee s t o te n pe r da y a n d sixty pe r wee k wa s a n unconstitutiona l infractio n o f th e liberty-of contract phras e o f th e du e proces s o f la w claus e embodie d i n th e Fourteenth Amendment , h e declaime d wit h ic y majest y an d scorn : "The Fourteent h Amendmen t doe s no t enac t Mr . Herber t Spencer' s Social Statics." Holme s wa s ninety-thre e year s ol d an d n o longe r o n the Cour t whe n Lochner's fate wa s seale d wit h th e upholdin g o f Ne w York's Mil k Contro l La w i n 1934 , i n th e narrowl y decide d (5:4 ) Nebbiav. New York. 125 H e wa s delighted . No discussio n o f ho w dissentin g opinions , n o matte r ho w lonely , may become majorit y opinion s woul d b e complet e withou t mentio n of th e historic , lon e dissentin g opinio n b y Justice J o h n Marshal l Harlan fro m th e 8: 1 Cour t decisio n upholdin g th e "separat e bu t equal" concep t i n Plessy v. Ferguson 126 i n 1896 . Hi s solitar y an d mov ing exhortation , "ou r Constitutio n i s color-blind, an d neithe r know s nor tolerate s classe s amon g citizens, " ha d t o wai t fifty-eigh t year s t o become th e unanimou s opinio n o f th e Cour t i n Brown v . Board of Education ofTopeka. 127 Creating Opinions. Wit h ever y justice participatin g a t eac h an d ever y stage o f ever y opinion , th e actua l draftin g o f opinion s i s a laboriou s and time-consumin g task , mor e ofte n tha n no t steepe d i n compro mise. Aide d b y thei r clerk s i n researc h tasks , an d b y th e privat e Supreme Cour t Librar y wit h it s staf f o f fourteen , th e justice s i n general, an d thos e wh o hav e bee n assigne d opinion s i n particular , go abou t thi s crucia l stag e o f thei r wor k wit h deliberat e diligence . Opinions ar e drafte d an d proo f copies—printe d behin d locke d doors b y th e Court' s ow n privat e professiona l printer s i n th e base m e n t — a r e circulate d amon g th e members— a practic e com menced b y Chie f Justice Melvi n W . Fulle r (1888-1910)—unti l suc h time a s give-and-take (an d no t a little "bargaining" ) ma y produce a n acceptable en d result . Justice Brenna n reporte d tha t once , afte r h e 40

American Courts in Practice was assigne d th e writin g o f a n opinio n b y Chie f Justice Warren , h e had t o compos e ten printed draft s befor e on e prove d t o b e accept able a s the opinio n o f th e Court. 1 2 8 Bu t th e sam e justice, o n anothe r occasion, tol d th e worl d i n a separat e m e m o r a n d u m tha t h e attached t o a n opinio n h e ha d writte n fo r a closel y divide d Court : "It canno t b e suggeste d i n case s wher e th e autho r i s th e mer e instrument o f th e Cour t h e mus t foreg o expressio n o f hi s ow n conviction." 129 O n th e othe r hand , th e judicial gam e o f persuasio n cum bargainin g ma y be blun t an d direct , a s is evidenced b y a memo randum sen t b y th e usuall y gend e Chie f Justic e Ston e t o th e no t always professionall y gentl e Justice Frankfurter : "I f you wis h t o writ e [the opinion ] placin g th e cas e o n th e groun d whic h I thin k tenabl e and desirable , I shal l cheerfull y joi n you . I f not , I wil l ad d a fe w observations fo r myself." 130 An d Justic e Jame s F . Byrnes' s pric e t o his "Chief " (Stone ) i n 194 1 fo r refrainin g fro m dissentin g i n th e important California Migration Case, "Edwards v. California" 131 wa s t o be permitte d t o writ e th e Court' s unanimou s opinio n i n favo r o f Fred Edwards—bu t o n ground s o f th e interstat e commerc e rathe r than th e "privilege s o r immunities " clause . Thi s cause d fou r justice s to join i n a concurrin g opinio n statin g a preferenc e fo r th e latte r ground, ye t i t did no t rende r th e tribuna l an y th e les s unanimous i n votes. I n short , i t i s clea r tha t althoug h th e publishe d opinion s o f the Cour t ar e ostensibl y th e produc t o f on e person , the y are , i n effect, tha t o f man y mind s (a s is so abl y detaile d i n Richar d Kluger' s Simple Justice) ,132 Whoever i s charged wit h th e writin g o f a n opinio n more ofte n tha n no t i s oblige d t o ad d to , delete , modify , o r eve n throw ou t th e origina l draf t i n orde r t o retai n a n d / o r secur e th e acquiescence o f th e necessar y numbe r o f colleagues . Because eac h membe r o f th e Suprem e Cour t o f th e Unite d State s takes par t i n eac h an d ever y stag e o f th e consideratio n o f a case , i t should no t b e surprising , then , t o find certai n ambiguitie s o r eve n contradictions i n a give n opinion . Thi s fac t o f judicia l lif e lend s itself t o th e favorit e parlo r gam e o f many vocal Cour t critic s (notabl y the lega l fraternit y wh o ough t t o kno w better)—stickin g pin s an d throwing dart s int o th e en d produc t with , o f course , th e delightfu l advantage o f 20/2 0 hindsight . 41

American Courts in Practice Opinion Days. O n thos e day s durin g eac h mont h whe n th e Cour t i s in session , i t formall y an d publicl y announce s it s writte n opinion s from th e collegia l bench . The y ar e the n dul y recorde d an d immor talized i n th e serie s o f officia l volume s know n a s th e United States Reports.133 (Per curiam opinion s an d routin e memorandu m order s are no t announce d publicl y o n thes e Opinio n Days , bu t the y ar e made a par t o f th e permanen t recor d i n th e Reports.) Th e variou s authors o f th e ful l opinion s ma y rea d them , paraphras e them , sum marize them , excerp t them , o r simpl y stat e the m a s a matte r o f fact . The metho d o f presentatio n i s lef t entirel y t o th e discretio n o f th e justices concerned , althoug h ther e i s som e pressur e fo r brevity . Hence, a listene r ough t t o b e prepare d fo r anythin g fro m a brie f announcement o r ten-minut e synopsi s t o a word-by-word lecture , a s it were, runnin g perhap s int o a n hou r o r more , althoug h th e latte r is uncommon . O n occasion , extemporaneou s outburst s accompan y the readin g o f a particula r opinion , whic h ma y resul t i n a war m or not-so-war m exchang e betwee n autho r an d commentator . Thus , Justice Dougla s di d no t hesitat e t o charg e tha t th e fifty-two-pag e Arizona v . California 134 majorit y opinion , writte n b y hi s usuall y clos e collaborator o n th e Court , Justic e Black , sounde d "mor e lik e a Congressional committe e repor t tha n a judicial opinion"— a com ment h e di d no t writ e i n hi s dissenting opinion . Dougla s adde d wit h biting sarcasm : "Th e advantag e o f a lon g opinio n suc h a s th e on e Justice Blac k ha s file d i s that i t is very difficul t t o se e ho w i t failed t o reach th e righ t result , becaus e on e get s los t i n words." 135 In th e word s o f Chie f Justice Ear l Warren : I don' t believ e i n fillin g lega l opinion s wit h rhetoric . Som e justices write thei r opinion s i n a rhetoric styl e and thes e ar e th e justices an d the opinion s whic h ar e mos t ofte n quoted , an d the y ar e quote d because of the rhetoric an d no t th e soundness of the legal reasoning . Learned Han d kne w to use a good dea l of rhetoric i n his opinions. It was said tha t i f one wante d t o rea d interestin g opinions , on e shoul d read Learne d Hand . I f on e wante d t o rea d a goo d legall y soun d opinion, one should rea d th e opinions of his cousin, Augustus Hand . Another thin g I didn' t believ e i n wa s criticizin g o r degradin g other justice s i n m y opinions . Suc h phrase s a s "legall y unsound, " "unsupported i n la w or history " o r "devoi d o f logic " were distastefu l 42

American Courts in Practice to me, an d I never use d them . Thei r effect , I think, i s to undermin e the prestige of the court. 136 Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum. I t i s importan t t o distinguis h be tween th e ratio decidendi an d th e obiter dictum o f a n opinion . Th e former become s re s judicata, tha t is , th e settle d poin t o f la w o f th e case. I t i s th e lega l rul e t o b e complie d wit h an d adhere d t o i n perpetuity, unles s altere d o r abolishe d b y judicial , legislative , o r amendment processes . Th e obiter dictum, o n th e othe r hand , i s actu ally a gratuitou s statement , on e tha t expresse s a belief , a warning , an exhortation , a viewpoint , o r simpl y a sentiment , no t essentia l t o the holdin g i n th e cas e bu t somehow , howeve r vaguely , relate d thereto. Obiter dicta o r dicta, a s the y ar e simpl y called , ar e presen t frequently an d ma y sugges t possibl e futur e developments . Chie f Justice Marshall , man y o f whos e famou s opinion s wer e replet e wit h dicta, was a past maste r o f th e practice . On e controversia l dictumwas raised i n a se t o f deat h penalt y cases: 137 Ther e Justic e Arthu r J . Goldberg, joined b y Justices Dougla s an d Brennan , suggeste d tha t the impositio n o f th e deat h penalt y fo r rap e migh t wel l constitut e the kin d o f "crue l an d unusua l punishment " proscribe d b y th e Eighth Amendmen t t o th e Unite d State s Constitutio n ( a questio n not raise d b y eithe r petitione r i n th e briefs) . Bu t th e ratio decidendi of tha t opinion , i n whic h th e si x othe r justices joined, wa s tha t th e doomed petitioners ' du e proces s claim s di d not warran t Suprem e Court review—a t leas t no t then. 1 3 8 Anothe r example : th e concur ring opinion s o f Justices Powel l an d O'Conno r i n th e 198 5 Alabam a "moment o f silen t praye r o r meditation " case. 139 Whil e joining Justice Stevens' s majorit y opinio n declarin g th e Alabam a la w unconsti tutional, the y gav e notic e tha t the y woul d uphol d a "momen t o f silence" law. Compliance and Noncompliance. Onc e decide d a n d announced , th e Supreme Court' s decisio n i s presumabl y th e la w o f th e land , an d i t should, consequently , automaticall y fin d read y complianc e b y th e jurisdictions below . Normally, thi s is the case ; indeed, i t must be if ou r system o f governmen t unde r la w mean s anythin g a t all . However , compliance i s b y n o mean s alway s automatic , an d eve n whe n i t 43

American Courts in Practice seems t o tak e place , evasion s o f th e spiri t o f th e decisio n b y "reinter pretation" i n th e lowe r court s ar e no t uncommon . Asid e fro m th e rather rar e outrigh t defiance o f a Suprem e Cour t orde r b y court s below, noncomplianc e o r snail-lik e complianc e usuall y take s plac e because o f on e o f severa l reason s o r peculiaritie s inheren t i n ou r judicial process . O ne i s that give n th e Court' s unmistakabl y sweepin g general orde r i n a decision—suc h a s it s pronouncemen t agains t state-imposed o r state-prescribe d prayer s i n th e publi c school s i n Engelv. Vitale 140—the decisio n i s in fac t applicabl e solel y t o th e cas e or controvers y in that particular case (in Engel v . Vitale th e Stat e o f New York)—unles s i t i s a "clas s action " suit. 141 Th e fac t tha t th e majority opinio n b y Justice Blac k mad e clea r tha t n o suc h limitatio n was eithe r intende d o r implie d wa s thu s "legally " ignore d b y certai n jurisdictions i n a host o f states, for example , New Jersey an d Pennsyl vania, despit e ruling s b y th e tw o attorney s genera l involve d tha t th e case di d appl y t o all suc h practice s throughou t th e Unite d States . Yet a 196 9 surve y b y th e New York Times demonstrate d tha t 1 3 percent o f the nation' s schools—an d full y 5 0 percent o f those i n th e South—continued t o emplo y som e typ e o f devotiona l readings. 142 Similar noncompliance , i n th e absenc e o f ne w suit s specificall y brought t o cove r additiona l jurisdictions, occurre d afte r th e Court' s decision i n 194 8 barrin g th e practic e o f "release d time " i n publi c school buildings. 143 Th e mos t obviou s illustratio n o f al l i s th e re gion-wide initia l noncomplianc e and , i n som e cases , outrigh t defi ance o f th e Court' s decisio n i n th e publi c schoo l segregatio n case s of 195 4 an d 1955 1 4 4 an d thei r progen y (no t t o mentio n th e inge niously an d ingenuousl y propounde d stat e an d loca l legislativ e an d executive circumventions) . Another tene t o f th e judicial proces s tha t invite s noncomplianc e in certai n instance s i s tha t th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t ha s n o power t o mak e a final determination o f an y case s i n whic h i t review s j u d g m e n t o f stat e courts . Al l i t ca n d o i s t o decid e th e federal issue involved an d remand th e cas e t o th e stat e cour t below , usuall y it s highest appellat e court , fo r a fina l adjudicatio n "no t inconsisten t with thi s opinion. " Sinc e th e stat e court s ma y the n rais e ne w issue s on remand , i t is not terribl y difficult , i f the desir e exists , thus t o alte r 44

American Courts in Practice "legally," o r eve n evade , th e substantiv e inten t o f a Unite d State s Supreme Cour t decision . A notoriou s illustratio n i s th e cas e o f Virgil Hawkins , a blac k residen t o f Florida , wh o ha d bee n denie d admission t o th e Universit y o f Florid a La w Schoo l i n 194 9 becaus e of hi s race . Afte r length y lega l stratagem s an d delays , commencin g in 1950 , an d assorte d maneuver s o n al l level s o f th e Florid a Stat e judiciary ove r a perio d o f almos t te n years , Hawkin s wa s finally ordered admitted b y th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t afte r th e Flor ida Suprem e Cour t continue d t o stal l i n th e mos t paten t manner ; yet Hawkins neve r was , in fact , abl e t o enter . Instead , h e receive d hi s law degree a t th e Ne w Englan d Schoo l o f La w in 1965 . Eleven year s later, sevent y years old , h e wa s at las t admitte d t o th e Florid a bar. 145 It would b e a disservice , however , t o leav e th e impressio n tha t th e Court's decision s ar e regularl y an d predictabl y evade d o r defied . The vas t majorit y ar e complie d wit h promptl y an d properly—eve n when the y ar e highl y unpopula r an d contentious . Thi s fac t o f judicial lif e i s clearl y illustrate d b y suc h emotiona l an d far-reachin g matters o f publi c polic y a s legislativ e apportionmen t an d th e grant ing o f counse l i n al l crimina l cases , as a resul t o f th e Suprem e Cour t decisions i n Baker v . Carr 146 an d Reynolds v . Sims, 147 an d Gideon v. Wainwright148 an d Argersinger v. Hamlin, 149 respectively . Thes e deci sions prompte d meaningfu l complianc e i n mos t instances . Thus , a s a resul t o f Baker, b y th e en d o f 1966— a mer e fou r year s later — forty-one state s ha d reapportione d on e o r mor e house s o f thei r legislatures. 150 An d thi s i s a s i t shoul d be . Informed , serious , con structive criticis m o f th e Cour t i s bot h desirabl e an d necessary ; defiance o f th e ultimat e tribunal , however , mus t b e barred—whic h does not , o f course , mea n tha t i t will no t b e attempted .

NOTES

1. Throughou t thi s work , reference s t o "th e Court " wil l signif y th e United State s Supreme Cour t unless otherwise specified . 2. 34 7 U.S. 483 (1954). 3. 36 9 U.S. 186 (1962) . 4. 34 9 U.S. 294(1955). 45

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5. Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, Kansas, 34 9 U.S . 294 (1955) . 6. E.g. , Sweattv. Painter, 33 9 U.S . 62 9 (1950) , Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S . 1 (1948) ; Morgan v . Virginia, 32 8 U.S . 37 3 (1946) ; Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80(1941) . 7. E.g. , Cooper v. Aaron, 35 8 U.S . 1 (1958) ; Watson v . Memphis, 37 3 U.S . 526 (1963) ; Peterson v. Greenville, 37 3 U.S. 244 (1963) ; Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 37 7 U.S . 21 8 (1964) ; Gre m v . School Board of New Kent County, 39 1 U.S . 43 0 (1968) ; Alexander v . Holmes County, Miss., Board of Education, 39 6 U.S . 1 9 (1969) ; Norwood v. Harrison, 41 3 U.S . 45 5 (1973) ; Keyesv. School District #1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 18 9 (1973) . 8. 37 6 U.S . 1 (1964) . 9. 37 7 U.S. 533 (1964) . 10. E.g. , Avery v . Midland County, 39 0 U.S . 47 4 (1968 ) an d Hadley v . Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 39 7 U.S . 5 0 (1970) . Bu t elected judicial bodie s wer e exemp t ( Wells v. Edwards, 40 9 U.S . 109 5 [1973] ) and s o wer e certai n bu t no t al l special-purpos e governmenta l bodies , suc h as som e schoo l boards ; e.g. , Rosenthal v. Board of Education of Central High School, 420 U.S . 985 (1975 ) an d Bally. James, 45 1 U.S . 35 5 (1981) . Not e th e "bombshell" 9: 0 rulin g i n 1989 , declarin g Ne w Yor k City' s government , headed b y th e powerfu l Boar d o f Estimate , t o b e a n unconstitutiona l infringement o f th e principl e o f one-person-one-vote , a s require d b y th e equal protectio n o f th e law s provisio n o f th e Fourteent h Amendmen t (Board of Estimate of the City of New York, et al v . Beverly Morris, et al, 48 9 U.S . 688). 11. A s quoted i n The Philadelphia Inquirer, October 4 , 1968 , p. 1 . 12. Articl e III , Section 1 , Paragraph 1 . 13. Se e m y The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France, 6t h ed . (Ne w York : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1993) , pp. 138-43 . 14. I n 1975 , th e Cour t grante d revie w o n th e questio n o f whethe r a non-lawyer juris t coul d constitutionall y si t i n a jail-carrying crimina l cas e (North v . Russell, 42 2 U.S . 1040) . I t rule d "yes " som e month s late r (6:2 — provided tha t th e defendan t hav e a n opportunit y throug h a n appea l t o obtain a secon d tria l befor e a judge wh o i s a lawyer : North v . Russell, 42 7 U.S. 32 8 [1976]) . 15. Oye r an d termine r i s a crimina l cour t wit h jurisdiction ove r capita l crimes an d othe r felonies ; quarte r session s i s a cour t tha t meet s fou r time s a yea r fo r crimina l case s belo w th e felon y level ; chancer y specialize s i n equity matters ; an d surrogat e i s a cour t simila r t o probate , whic h adjudi cates matter s involvin g wills, deeds, an d estates . 16. Som e state s us e certai n specialt y court s tha t functio n separatel y from th e regula r judicial hierarchy , e.g. , Pennsylvania' s Commonwealth Court.

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Created i n 1970 , it s sol e functio n i s t o hea r case s relatin g t o th e task s o f government agencies . 17. Th e Suprem e Cour t i s stipulated specificall y i n Article II I of th e U.S . Constitution. Th e othe r tw o court s wer e establishe d b y th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 unde r th e authorit y o f Article III . 18. Fo r example s o f declarator y j u d g m e n t actio n b y constitutiona l courts, se e Nashville, Chicago & St. Louis Railway v . Wallace, 28 8 U.S . 24 9 (1933); Tilestonv. Ullman, 31 8 U.S . 4 4 (1943) ; Steffelv. Thompson, 41 5 U.S . 452 (1974) ; and Roev. Wade, 410 U.S . 11 3 (1973) . 19. Fo r a fuller descriptio n an d discussion , se e m y The Judicial Process, n. 13, supra , pp . 42-48 . T o convict , a two-third s majorit y o f th e member s o f the Senat e presen t an d votin g (ther e bein g a quoru m o n th e floor) mus t find th e accuse d guilt y o n a t leas t on e coun t o f th e offens e (s) charged . Bu t only a majorit y o f member s o f th e Hous e i s neede d t o vot e a bil l o f impeachment fo r subsequen t Senat e trial . 20. A n intriguin g developmen t i n thi s connectio n wa s the partl y success ful sui t by 14 0 federal distric t an d appellat e judges i n 197 6 and 1978 , which charged tha t du e t o inflation , thei r constitutiona l safeguar d agains t salar y reduction durin g tenur e ha d bee n violated . Th e appea l wa s initiall y re jected b y th e Unite d State s Cour t o f Claim s i n 197 6 (Atkins v . United States, 556 F . 2 d 1028 ) an d b y th e Suprem e Cour t i n 197 7 (ibid. , 42 9 U.S . 939) . However, th e 197 8 suit was adjudicated b y the Suprem e Cour t i n Decembe r 1980, which provide d a partia l victory : Th e 197 7 an d 198 0 increases , rule d the highes t tribunal , 8:0 , coul d stan d becaus e th e statute s involve d had already taken effect, but thos e merel y promised i n 197 8 an d 197 9 coul d no t because Congres s ha d properl y acte d t o cance l the m er e the y ha d take n effect (United States v. Will, 449 U.S . 200) . 21. 4 W h e a t o n 3 1 5 (1819) . 22. The Collector v. Day, 1 1 Wallace 11 3 (1871) . 23. Se e Helveringv. Gerhardt, 304 U.S . 405 (1938 ) a n d Graves v. New York ex re l O'Keefe, 30 6 U.S. 466 (1939) . 24. A s wil l hav e becom e apparent , th e numbe r o f legislativ e court s ha s declined wit h th e passin g o f th e years : som e hav e bee n discontinue d (th e Commerce Cour t i n 1915) ; some hav e bee n transforme d int o Unite d State s district court s o n attainin g statehoo d (Alask a an d Hawai i i n 195 8 and 1959 , respectively); other s wer e transformed—sometime s temporarily—int o constitutional court s (i n additio n t o th e alread y mentione d Custom s Court , the United States Court of Claims an d th e United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, i n 195 3 an d 1958 , respectively) . (Not e als o th e specia l Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, create d i n 1978. ) Bu t unde r a 198 2 reorganization, th e Cour t o f Claim s tria l function s wer e place d int o a new United States Claims Court of 1 6 members . It s appellate jurisdiction wa s

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transferred t o th e ne w United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit o f twelve members . Th e forme r wa s constituted a s a legislative court , th e latte r as a constitutiona l one . A poin t o f additiona l interes t her e i s tha t i n 193 3 the Suprem e Cour t rule d tha t th e Unite d State s Distric t Cour t fo r th e District o f Columbi a and th e Unite d State s Cour t o f Appeals fo r tha t distric t are t o b e regarde d "a t th e sam e time " constitutiona l and legislativ e court s (O'Donoghue v . United States, 28 9 U.S . 516)—bu t m y analysi s will , fo r th e sake o f orde r an d clarity , trea t the m a s component s o f th e constitutiona l hierarchy. I n effect , th e territorial courts might als o b e regarde d a s a combi nation o f th e tw o type s o f courts ; bu t the y ar e commonl y viewe d a s legisla tive court s becaus e o f thei r diversifie d ye t specifi c jurisdiction . The y wer e created for , an d ar e locate d in , suc h divers e area s a s Gua m (1900) , Puert o Rico (1900) , th e Virgi n Island s (1917) , an d th e Marian a Island s (1978) . For additiona l dat a o n legislativ e court s se e m y The Judicial Process, n. 13 , supra, pp . 144-53 . 25. Se e pp . 8-1 2 an d n . 24 , supra . 26. Law —broadly speaking—represent s th e rule s o f conduc t tha t per tain t o a give n politica l orde r o f society , rule s tha t ar e backe d b y th e organized forc e o f th e community . A s it ha s evolve d throug h th e centuries , law ha s bee n mad e eithe r b y th e politica l representative s o f th e peopl e o r by jurists. Th e forme r typ e o f la w i s generall y know n a s statutory law, th e latter a s common law. The crucia l distinctio n betwee n the m i s tha t betwee n codified, writte n (statutory) la w an d unwritte n (common) la w base d o n cus tom an d tradition . 27. Equity i s a supplemen t t o th e commo n law . I t begin s wher e th e la w ends, takin g th e for m o f a judicial decre e (no t a j u d g m e nt o f "yes " or "no") . 28. Se e pp . 8- 9 o f thi s text . 29. 2 Dalla s 409 . Se e th e opinion s o f Associat e Justices J o hn Blai r an d James Wilson . 30. Bartkusv. Illinois, 35 9 U.S . 12 1 (1959 ) a n d A i t e v . United States, 35 9 U.S. 18 7 (1979) . Bu t cf . Rinaldiv. United States, 434 U.S . 22 (1977) . 31. Rinaldiv. United States. Th e issu e reache d th e Cour t agai n i n 198 6 and 1991 . 32. I n 199 5 the y receive d 248,33 5 civil , 45,78 8 criminal , an d 608,98 1 bankruptcy cases—whic h ar e handle d a t th e distric t cour t leve l b y th e 28 4 bankruptcy judges—fo r a tota l o f 903,104 . (Bankruptc y action s ar e rou tine; however , th e j u d g e normall y accept s th e findings o f specia l "refer ees.") Se e Annual Report(s) of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Th e numbe r o f civi l lawsuit s filed annuall y i n th e federa l court s increased fro m 59,28 4 i n 196 0 t o 239,63 4 i n 198 8 (68,22 4 o f thes e b y virtu e of diversit y o f citizenship) . N o reductio n i s likely ! 33. Th e hug e Fift h Circui t (Dee p South ) wa s halve d i n lat e 1980 ,

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thereby increasin g fro m eleve n t o twelv e th e numbe r o f Unite d State s Courts o f Appeals. October , 1982 , saw the creatio n o f a thirteenth , th e U.S . Court o f Appeal s fo r th e Federa l Circuit , whic h merge d th e appellat e jurisdiction o f th e U.S . Cour t o f Claim s an d th e U.S . Court o f Custom s an d Patent Appeal s an d grante d additiona l jurisdiction whe n th e Unite d State s is a defendant . 34. Three , t o b e exact : (1 ) i n decision s b y specia l three^udg e Unite d States distric t courts , whic h ar e convene d i n certai n statutoril y provide d cases, frequentl y involvin g question s o f unconstitutionality ; (2 ) wher e a direct appea l i s statutorily authorize d t o th e Suprem e Cour t fro m a limite d number o f ordinar y distric t cour t cases ; and (3 ) upo n a showing tha t a cas e is "o f suc h imperativ e publi c importanc e . . . a s t o requir e immediat e settlement"—e.g., th e 195 2 stee l seizur e cas e (Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S . 579) ; th e Amchitka nuclea r tes t cas e o f 197 1 (Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v . Schlesinger, 404 U.S . 917); an d th e dramati c 197 4 Nixon tape s cas e (United States v . Nixon, 41 7 U.S . 683) . Prio r t o 198 8 additional avenue s o f direc t acces s existed , bu t Congres s reduce d the m i n response t o repeate d appeal s b y th e judiciary. 35. 63 4 F. 2d 40 8 (1980) . 36. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 46 2 U.S . 919 (1983) . 37. Cooperv. Aaron, 35 8 U.S . 1 (1958) . 38. Rosenberg v. United States, 34 6 U.S . 27 3 (1953 ) a n d Holtzmanv. Schlesinger, 414 U.S . 1304(1973) . 39. E.g. , certai n provision s o f th e Omnibu s Crim e Contro l an d Saf e Streets Ac t o f 1968 , th e Organize d Crim e Contro l Ac t o f 1970 , an d th e Civil Right s Restoratio n Ac t o f 1988 , and th e Civi l Right s Act o f 1991 . 40. E.g. , th e enactmen t o f th e Twenty-Sixt h Amendment , ratifie d i n record tim e i n 1971 , whic h enfranchise d eighteen-year-old s a t th e state level—after th e Cour t ha d struc k dow n tha t portio n o f th e Votin g Right s Act o f 197 0 (Oregon v . Mitchell, 40 0 U.S . 112) . (Th e Cour t i n tha t sam e opinion ha d uphel d thei r enfranchisemen t a t th e federal level. ) 41. Court over Constitution (Princeto n N.J. : Princeto n Universit y Press , 1938), p . 127 . 42. The Supreme Court in the American System of Government (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press , 1955) , p . 23. 43. 41 7 U.S . 683. 44. The New York Times, ]\x\y 5 , 1959 , referring t o th e decisio n i n Kingsley Corporation v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S . 684 (1959) . 45. The New York Times, January 14 , 1964 , Koch v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 37 5 U.S . 989 (1964) . 46. Justic e Holmes , deliverin g th e majorit y opinio n i n Buck v . Bell, 24 7 U.S. 20 0 (1927) .

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47. Chie f Justice Ear l Warren fo r th e unanimou s Cour t i n Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, Kansas, 34 7 U.S . 483 (1954) . 48. Justic e Black , deliverin g th e majorit y opinio n i n Engel v. Vitale, 37 0 U.S. 42 1 (1962) . 49. E.g. , The Philadelphia Inquirer an d The New York Times, referrin g t o the Penn-Central Merger and N & * W Inclusion cases, decided o n January 15 , 1968. 50. The New York Times, July 1 , 1972 , p . 1 , referrin g t o th e "Pentago n Paper" cases : The New York Times v . United States an d United States v . The Washington Post, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) . 51. Justic e Harr y Blackmun , renderin g th e 7: 2 majorit y opinio n i n Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S . 11 3 (1973) . 52. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v. British Airways Board, 434 U.S. 89 9 (1977) . 53. Diamand v . Chakrabarty, 44 7 U.S . 303 . (A n excellen t exampl e o f statutory construction , th e vot e wa s th e closes t possible , 5:4. ) 54. Dames and Moore v. Regan, 45 3 U.S . 654 , a s reporte d o n th e fron t page o f The Washington Post, July 3 , 1981. 55. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 46 2 U.S . 919 (1983) , J u n e 2 , 1983 , p. 1 of The New York Times. 56. Board of Estimate of the City of New York, et al v . Beverly Morris, et al., 489 U.S . 68 8 (1989) . Announce d b y wa y o f tw o ful l large-typ e headline s atop p . 1 of The New York Times, March 23 , 1989 . 57. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S . 547 (1990) . 58. Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 52 7 (1992) , a s featured o n pag e A l o f The Washington Post, J u ne 30 , 1992 . 59. Concurrin g opinion , Cooper v. Aaron, 35 8 U.S . 1 (1958) , quotin g himself i n United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S . 258 (1947) . 60. Concurrin g opinion , Sweezy v. New Hampshire, by Wyman, AttorneyGeneral, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) , a t 266-67 . 61. Ther e hav e bee n a s man y a s te n (1863 ) an d a s fe w a s fiv e (1801 ) justices o n th e bench , sinc e th e numbe r o f member s o f th e Court , unlik e the creatio n o f th e bod y itself , i s subjec t t o statutor y discretion , provide d the variou s constitutiona l safeguard s (discusse d earlie r i n th e chapter ) ar e observed. 62. Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S . 886. 63. Arizon a v. California, 37 3 U.S. 546 (1963) . 64. Delaware et al v . New York et al, 38 5 U.S . 89 5 (1966 ) an d Texas v. Louisiana, 41 0 U.S . 70 2 (1973 ) an d Ohio v. Kentucky, 44 4 U.S . 33 5 (1980) , respectively. 65. Th e ol d wri t o f erro r wa s discontinue d i n 1928 ; it s plac e wa s take n

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by th e wri t o f appeal . Anothe r wa y fo r case s t o reac h th e Cour t i s b y "extraordinary writ, " such a s habeas corpus or quo warranto. 66. 37 5 U.S. 805(1963) . 67. United States v . Barnett, 37 6 U.S . 68 1 (1964) . O n e yea r late r th e Court o f Appeal s cleare d th e tw o becaus e o f "change d circumstance s an d conditions." (Ibid. , 34 6 F. 2d 99. ) 68. Public Law 100-352—Jun e 27 , 1988 : "An Ac t t o improv e th e admin istration o f justice . . . and fo r othe r purposes. " 69. 37 5 U.S. 395. 70. A filin g fe e o f $200.0 0 mus t accompan y al l petition s excep t thos e coming t o th e Cour t i n forma pauperis. 71. E.g. , Justices Dougla s an d Stewart , dissentin g fro m th e Court' s 196 7 refusal t o gran t th e wri t i n Mora v . McNamara, 38 9 U.S . 934— a Vie t Na m war legalit y case ; a n d Douglas , thi s tim e joined b y Brennan , di d s o agai n in anothe r Vie t Na m wa r legalit y case , on e tha t invoke d Congressiona l appropriations o f fund s (Sarnoffv. Schultz, 40 9 U.S . 92 9 [1972]) . Th e tw o had similarl y lost a year earlie r i n Orlando v. Laird, 404 U.S . 869. 72. Brown v . Allen, 34 4 U.S . 44 3 (1953) , a t 543 , concurrin g opinion . Elsewhere (a t 540 ) h e ha d uttere d th e often-quote d statement , "W e are no t final becaus e w e ar e infallible , bu t w e ar e infallibl e onl y becaus e w e ar e final." 73. Sheppardv. Ohio 352 U.S . 910 (1956) , certiorari denied. (Howeve r th e Court too k u p th e cas e a decad e later—ultimatel y resultin g i n Dr . Shep pard's victory , Sheppardv. Maxwell 384 U.S . 333. ) 74. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) . 75. Rochinv. California, 34 2 U.S . 16 5 (1952) . 76. Hirshhornv. New York, 386 U.S . 984 (1967) . 77. Willnerv. Barr, 502 U.S . 102 0 (1991) . 78. Avinsv. Rutgers, 39 0 U.S . 920 (1968) . 79. Montana v. Imlay, 11 2 S . Ct . 126 0 (1992) ; certiorar i denie d a s "im providentially granted " followin g ora l argumen t 11 3 S. Ct. 44 4 (1992) . 80. Thes e power s wer e increase d eve n furthe r b y th e above-discusse d changes enacte d b y Congress i n 1988 . (Se e pp . 28-29. ) 81. Commen t t o th e author , Philadelphia , Pa. , Ma y 24, 1962 . 82. Cooper v. Aaron, 35 8 U.S. 1 (1958) . 83. The New York Times v. United States and United States v. The Washington Post403 U.S. 71 3 (1971) . 84. United Statesv. Nixon, 41 7 U.S . 683 (1974) . 85. 45 3 U.S. 57 (1981) . 86. Se e hi s amusin g "Th e Cul t o f th e Robe, " i n hi s Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (Ne w York: Atheneum, 1967) , chap . 18 . 87. A brief ma y als o b e submitted , wit h Court-permissio n b y a "frien d o f

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the Court. " Thi s i s know n a s a brie f amicus curiae, a burgeonin g phenome non, especiall y i n civi l right s cases , e.g. , 12 0 suc h brief s i n Regents of the University of California v . Bakke 43 8 U.S . 26 5 (1978 ) an d 7 8 i n Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S . 490 (1989) . 88. 31 6 U.S . 455 (1942) . 89. 37 2 U.S . 33 5 (1963) . Se e Anthon y Lewis' s excitin g accoun t o f th e story o f thi s significan t cas e i n hi s Gideon's Trumpet (Ne w York : Rando m House, 1964) . Gideo n observe d later : " I didn' t star t ou t t o d o anythin g fo r anybody bu t myself , but th e decisio n ha s don e a helluva lo t o f good " ( Time, December 17 , 1965 , p . 39) . H e die d si x year s later , a significan t figur e i n the annal s o f crimina l justice. 90. Th e Cour t doe s no t hav e t o hea r ora l argument , o f course , i n orde r to decid e a case . Thu s i n 1978 , withou t hearin g i t an d basin g thei r judg ment o n th e lega l paper s submitte d ( a procedur e use d infrequently) , th e justices rule d tha t reducin g th e benefit s o f welfar e recipient s wh o mov e from th e Unite d State s t o Puert o Ric o i s not a violatio n o f thei r constitu tional right s (Califanov. Torres, 43 5 U.S . 1) . 91. Unti l 1970 , there wa s only one-half hou r fo r lunch ; bu t Chie f Justice Burger, cheere d o n b y the pres s corps , determine d tha t t o b e inhuma n an d altered it . 92. Se e J o hn Marshal l Harlan , "Wha t Par t Doe s Ora l Argumen t Pla y i n the Conduc t o f a n Appeal ? " 41 Cornell Law Quarterly 6 (1955) . 93. The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 9 , 1963 , p. 3 , and The (Charlottesville , Va.) Daily Progress, Octobe r 7 , 1972 , p. 2 . 94. 36 1 U.S . 49 (1959) . 95. Brown v . Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S . 29 4 (1955) . Bu t th e record i s held b y the sixtee n hour s allotte d t o th e wate r controvers y cas e o f Arizona v. California (n . 63 , supra). 96. "Th e Busines s o f th e Suprem e Cour t a s Conducte d b y Chie f Justic e Hughes," 6 3 Harvard Law Review 6 (1949) . 97. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 1 9 Howard 39 3 (1857) . 98. Fo r a controversial , largel y undocumente d accoun t o f th e proceed ings, se e Bo b Woodwar d an d Scot t Armstrong , The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (Ne w York: Simo n an d Schuster , 1979) . A far mor e reliabl e an d authoritative on e ma y b e foun d i n Chie f Justic e Rehnquist' s The Supreme Court: How It Was —How It Is (Ne w York : Willia m Morro w an d Co. , Inc. , 1987). 99. Eugen e V . Rostow, The Sovereign Prerogative: The Supreme Court and the Quest for Law (Ne w Haven , Conn. : Yale University Press , 1962) , p. 89 . 100. A well-know n illustratio n i s th e grou p o f seriati m opinion s b y Justices Chase , Paterson , an d Iredel l i n th e earl y 179 6 cas e o f Hylton v . United States, 3 Dallas 171 .

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101. E.g. , Bailey v . Richardson, 34 1 U.S . 91 8 (1951)—4:4 , a loyalty-secu rity case; Grove Press v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1941 ) — 4:4, upholdin g Maryland' s ba n o n th e showin g o f th e movi e " I Am Curiou s Yellow" in 1971 ; a nd Bradley v. State Board of Education of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 41 1 U.S . 91 3 (1973)—4:4 , upholdin g Virginia' s refusa l t o orde r cross-county busing . 102. Engelv. Vitale, 370 U.S . 421 (1962) . 103. 41 7 U.S . 68 3 (1974) . Prio r t o hi s appointmen t t o th e Cour t Rehn quist ha d bee n a n Assistan t Attorne y Genera l i n th e Nixo n Administra tion. 104. 1 Cranch 13 7 (1803) . 105. A specia l situatio n wa s th e Court' s uniqu e multipl e authorshi p i n the semina l desegregatio n enforcemen t cas e o f Cooper v. Aaron, 35 8 U.S . 1 (1958), whe n al l justices, beginnin g wit h Chie f Justic e Warre n a n d the n listing th e eigh t associat e justice s i n descendin g orde r o f seniority , "oversigned" it s unanimous opinio n (se e chap . 5 , n. 46) . 106. Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 34 7 U.S . 483. 107. 41 7 U.S . 683. 108. Morrison v . Olson, 487 U.S . 654 (1988) . 109. Wilkinson andBradenw. United States, 365 U.S. 399 an d 43 1 (1961) . 110. A caveat i s in orde r regardin g thes e labels , a nd thi s author, fo r one , does no t approv e o f them , especiall y no t i n s o comple x a settin g a s th e Supreme Court . 111. Korematsuv. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) . 112. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp a n d Murray v . Curlett, 374 U.S . 203 (1963) . 113. 36 9 U.S . 186(1962) . 114. 34 3 U.S . 57 9 (1952 ) a n d 38 1 U.S . 53 2 (1965) , respectively . Th e Court qualifie d Harlan' s Estes opinio n i n it s 198 1 decisio n i n Chandler v . Florida, 44 9 U.S . 560. As o f mid-1996 , al l states , excep t Indiana , Mississippi , and Sout h Dakot a (an d th e U.S . Cour t o f Militar y Appeal), authorize d th e use o f a t leas t som e T V i n som e o f thei r courtrooms , althoug h th e Judicia l Conference declined , b y a 2: 1 majorit y vot e i n 199 4 t o adop t T V fo r federal tribunals, followin g a three-yea r tria l ru n i n selecte d federa l courtrooms . I t reconsidered it s negativ e vot e i n 199 5 a n d provide d th e prospec t o f ne w pilot program s i n th e future . 115. 27 4 U.S . 357 (1927 ) a n d 41 0 U.S . 11 3 (1973) , respectively . 116. 36 5 U.S. 534(1961) . 117. 30 2 U.S . 319 (1937) . 118. The Supreme Court of the United States (Ne w York: Columbi a Univer sity Press, 1928) , p. 68 . 119. "Preface " i n Justice Musmanno Dissents (Indianapolis , Ind. : Bobbs -

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Merrill Co. , 1956) . Se e als o justic e Brennan' s Hasting s Colleg e o f La w Lecture, "I n Defens e o f Dissents, " November 18 , 1985. 120. Actuall y h e wrot e onl y 7 2 dissentin g opinions , rankin g hi m elev enth i n dissents ; th e "champion " s o fa r (a s o f mid-1996 ) i s stil l Justic e Douglas wit h 58 6 writte n dissentin g opinion s durin g hi s recor d tenur e from 193 9 t o 1975 . (Thes e statistic s exclude dissents without opinions. ) 121. 24 7 U.S. 251 (1918) . 122. "I t is not fo r thi s Cour t t o pronounc e whe n prohibitio n i s necessar y to regulatio n i f i t eve r ma y b e necessary—t o sa y tha t i t i s permissibl e a s against stron g drink , bu t no t a s agains t th e produc t o f ruine d lives " (ibid. , at 280) . 123. 31 2 U.S . 100 . 124. 19 8 U.S. 45 (1905) . 125. 29 1 U.S. 502. 126. 16 3 U.S. 537. (Se e chap . 5 , p. 21 0 for a discussio n o f th e case. ) 127. 34 7 U.S . 483 (1954) . (Se e chap . 4. ) 128. "Insid e Vie w o f th e Hig h Court, " The New York Times Magazine, October 6 , 1963 , p. 102 . 129. Abbatev. United States, 35 9 U.S . 18 7 (1959) , a t 196 . Simila r illustra tions o f thi s practic e ar e Justic e Jackso n i n Wheeling Steel Corporation v . dander, 33 7 U.S . 56 2 (1949) , a t 576 , Justice Cardoz o i n Helveringv. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) , at 639 , and Chie f Justice Burge r i n th e Pentagon Papers case, 40 3 U.S. 713 (1971) . 130. Cite d b y Alpheu s T . Mason , Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New York: The Vikin g Press , 1956) , p . 501. 131. 31 4 U.S. 160 . 132. Simple Justice: The History o^Brow n v. Board o f Educatio n and Black America's Struggle for Equality (Ne w York: Alfred A . Knopf , 1976) , especiall y chap. 25 . 133. Th e Reports a n d thei r forerunner s (th e latte r kep t b y officia l cour t reporters unde r thei r names ) ar e boun d bac k t o 1790 . There ar e als o thre e unofficial publication s o f opinions : The Lawyers' Edition; The Supreme Court Reporter, an d United States Law Week. (The Reports, however , constitut e th e sole officia l ones. ) 134. 37 3 U.S. 546 (1963) . 135. The New York Times, J u ne 4 , 1963 , p. 22 . 136. "Seminar " wit h Mr . Chie f Justice Ear l Warre n (retired) , Universit y of Virginia Schoo l o f Law , April 25 , 1973. 137. Snider v. Cunningham an d Rudolph v . Alabama, 37 5 U.S. 889 (1963) . 138. Bu t not e Furman v . Georgia, 408 U.S . 23 8 (1972 ) an d subsequen t developments i n th e capita l punishmen t realm , cappe d b y Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S . 15 3 (1976) , affirmin g it s constitutionalit y unde r carefull y guarde d

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American Courts in Practice conditions. Fo r additiona l developments , se e Roberts v. Louisiana I (1976 ) and I I (1977) , 42 8 U.S. 32 5 an d 43 1 U.S. 633 , respectively ; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 45 5 U.S. 104 (1982); Cokerv. Georgia, 43 3 U.S. 584 (1977) ; Fordv. Wainwright, 47 7 U.S. 399 (1986) ; McCleskeyw. Kemp, 478 U.S. 101 9 (1987) ; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 48 7 U.S. 81 5 (1988) ; Simmons v. South Carolina, 6 2 LW 4509 (1994 ) an d Felkerv. Turbin, 6 4 LW 4677 (1966) . By late June 1996 , 335 individuals had been execute d (followin g th e above Gregg decision). 139. Wa//a^v./^r^,472U.S . 38. 140. 37 0 U.S. 421 (1962) . 141. Se e pp. 83-87 for elucidation . 142. March 26 , 1969, p. 1. 143. McCollumv. Board of Education of Champagne, 33 3 U.S. 203. 144. Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954 ) an d 34 9 U.S. 294(1955). 145. Florida ex re l Hawkins v. Board of Control, 34 7 U.S. 471 (1954) ; 350 U.S. 41 3 (1956) ; 35 5 U.S . 83 9 (1957) . Fo r account s o f th e Hawkin s di lemma, se e Walter F . Murphy an d C . Herman Pritchett , Courts, Judges, and Politics (New York : Rando m House , 1961) , pp . 606-18 ; m y The Judicial Process, n . 13 , supra , p . 240 ; an d Barbar a Stewart , "Th e La w an d Virgi l Hawkins," Florida Magazine of th e Orlando Sentinel, March 8 , 1987 , pp. 14 17. See also the grisly history of the cas e of Williams v. Georgia, 34 9 U.S. 375 (1955); Williams v. State, 8 8 S.E. 2 d 37 6 (1955) ; and Williams v. Georgia, 35 0 U.S. 950 (1956) , certiorari denied. For a partial account of Williams's travail, see Murph y an d Pritchett , Courts, Judges, and Politics, 3 d ed . (1979) , pp . 390-93, and 1 2 Florida State University Law Review 1 (Spring 1984). 146. 36 9 U.S. 186(1962). 147. 37 7 U.S. 533 (1964). 148. 37 2 U.S. 335 (1963) . 149. 40 7 U.S. 25 (1972). 150. 2 4 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 2055. Th e 97t h Congres s (1981-1982) ha d a n averag e deviatio n fro m th e idea l distric t siz e o f les s than one-hal f o f 1 percent , wherea s i n th e 88t h (1963 ) i t ha d bee n 1 7 percent.

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O

Courts an d Publi c Policy : Personnel, Judicial Review , an d Activism vs . Restraint The Court' s genera l rol e o f judicial review , o f constitutiona l an d statutory interpretation , a s wel l a s th e me n an d wome n wh o staf f i t and th e lowe r court s wil l no w b e addressed . T o bette r understan d the rol e o f th e judiciar y i n polic y making , severa l aspect s o f th e judicial proces s mus t firs t b e analyzed . Som e o f thes e ma y hav e already becom e mor e o r les s apparen t t o th e reade r a s a resul t o f the precedin g discussion s o f th e characteristic s o f ou r courts , i n general, an d th e Unite d State s Suprem e Court , i n particular , a s institutions a t onc e governmental , human , an d political . Nonethe less, the y need additiona l amplification , an d an y meaningful consid eration o f the m wil l thu s naturall y commenc e wit h a glanc e a t th e individuals wh o compris e th e judiciary.

JUDGES AN D JUSTICE S

Selection and Tenure The proces s o f staffing th e court s i s neither mysteriou s no r partic ularly Machiavellian , folklor e t o th e contrary . Essentially , ther e ar e just tw o way s o f "gettin g o n th e bench" : b y election or appointment 56

Courts and Public Policy (although, a s explaine d below , combination s o f th e tw o d o exis t i n a goo d man y states. ) Al l federa l jurist s ar e appointed ; bu t stat e jurists ma y be eithe r electe d o r appointed , dependin g upo n a state' s constitutional o r statutor y provisions . I n 1990 , th e fifty state s picke d their Supreme Court (o r it s equivalent ) jurist s a s follows : b y partisa n election (ten) ; b y nonpartisa n electio n (thirteen) ; an d b y appoint ment (twenty-seven) . Election. Th e severa l state s o f th e fledglin g Unio n turne d t o th e elective metho d largel y a s a resul t o f th e post-Constitutio n Conven tion tren d t o "democratize " government . Electio n wa s eithe r b y ballot b y th e electorate , or , les s frequently , b y th e legislature . Elec tion remain s a widel y practiced , i f hardl y universall y applauded, 1 approach t o cour t staffin g throughou t th e state s fo r a t leas t some members o f th e judiciary, thei r term s varyin g greatl y i n lengt h fro m four year s t o lif e (Rhod e Island). 2 Th e basi c requiremen t i s t o obtain one' s politica l party' s nominatio n an d the n hop e fo r th e bes t in th e genera l election . However , real contests ar e mor e ofte n th e exception tha n th e rule , an d activ e "politicking " b y judicial candi dates, especiall y incumbents , i s usually , albei t certainl y no t always , regarded a s improper . Moreover , ther e ar e som e instance s i n whic h certain judicial nominee s ma y run o n bipartisa n (Ne w York) o r eve n nonpartisan (Washington ) ticket s fo r a t leas t som e judicia l posts ; and i n severa l state s th e "sittin g judge " principl e i s i n vogue , whereby bot h politica l partie s a t leas t theoreticall y ar e pledge d t o support th e incumbent , n o matte r wha t hi s o r he r politica l affilia tion ma y be . Sinc e th e enactmen t o f th e Votin g Right s Ac t o f 1965 , particularly a s a resul t o f it s expansiv e 198 2 amendments , th e com position a s wel l a s th e geographica l stat e bas e o f judicial district s have com e unde r heav y federal scrutiny . Appointment. I n th e states , appointmen t o f a t leas t som e jurists fo r terms o f varyin g lengt h i s usuall y b y gubernatoria l selectio n plu s senatorial confirmation ; bu t ther e ar e als o judicial appointment s b y commissions, legislatures , an d courts . O n th e federa l level , however , every prospectiv e judge an d justice ( a titl e reserve d fo r member s o f the Suprem e Court ) i s nominate d b y th e presiden t an d submitte d 57

Courts and Public Policy to th e Senat e fo r approva l b y simpl e majorit y vote . A t level s belo w the Suprem e Court , judicial selectio n b y th e chie f executiv e i s cus tomarily delegate d t o th e attorne y genera l an d hi s deputy , althoug h President Carte r institute d th e practic e o f a n initia l nominatio n b y citizen-staffed commission s comprise d o f la y a s wel l a s professiona l persons fo r al l U.S. circuit cour t o f appeals vacancies. 3 This arrange ment wa s terminate d b y Presiden t Reaga n i n May , 1981 . Carter ha d also successfull y persuade d a numbe r o f senator s t o creat e simila r bodies fo r U.S . distric t cour t vacancies. 4 O f course , whe n i t come s to th e choic e o f a ne w Suprem e Cour t justice, th e selectio n proces s turns int o a muc h mor e persona l on e fo r th e president . Bu t n o matter whic h leve l o f th e federa l judiciary ma y b e involved , a t leas t three significan t fact s o f politica l lif e mus t b e understoo d an d con sidered i n orde r t o obtai n a realisti c pictur e o f tha t selectio n pro cess. The first fac t i s tha t i t i s no t practicall y possibl e fo r th e chie f executive t o designat e a membe r o f th e federa l benc h an d se e hi m or he r confirme d withou t a t leas t th e grudgin g approva l o f th e United State s senator s fro m th e nominee' s hom e state . Indeed , some powerfu l senator s o f th e president' s politica l part y wil l insis t not onl y o n th e righ t o f approva l o f hi s choic e bu t o n th e righ t t o have particula r candidate s o f thei r ow n appointed . Thi s la w o f poli tics applie s mos t acutely , bu t no t exclusively , t o th e judge s o f th e United State s distric t bench . I n th e cas e o f th e Suprem e Cour t nominees, however , th e la w o f politic s govern s mor e a s a matte r o f courtesy tha n necessity , for i t is generally agreed tha t Suprem e Cour t justices ough t t o b e regarde d a s th e president' s persona l choices — despite thirt y significan t illustration s t o th e contrary , suc h a s th e Senate's rejectio n o f Cleveland' s nomination s o f Willia m B . Horn blower an d Wheele r H . Peckham ; Grant' s choice s o f Ebeneze r R . Hoar an d Georg e R . Williams ; th e 193 0 rejectio n b y 39:4 1 o f Hoo ver's selectio n o f U.S . Cour t o f Appeal s Judg e J o h n J . Parker ; th e 1968 filibuster agains t Johnson's attempte d promotio n o f Abe Forta s to Chie f Justice;5 th e Senate' s 45:5 5 rejectio n o f th e Nixo n nomina tion o f Clemen t F . Haynsworth, Jr., an d tha t o f G . Harrol d Carswell , 45:51, i n 196 9 an d 1970 , respectively; an d th e dramati c rejectio n o f 58

Courts and Public Policy President Reagan' s controversia l nominee , Rober t H . Bork , afte r a bitter, protracte d politica l battle , 58:42 , i n 1987 . Th e reason s fo r these rejection s varied , bu t the y comprise d politica l oppositio n t o the appointin g president ; th e candidate' s persona l involvemen t wit h a delicat e politica l problem ; "senatoria l courtesy"; 6 th e questionabl e ability o f th e nominee ; hi s politica l "unreliability"; 7 hi s ethics ; o r "getting" a t th e Cour t itself—tha t is , th e 196 8 anti-Forta s filibuster , which wa s reall y directe d agains t th e Warre n Court' s judicia l pos ture. Presiden t Bush' s hotl y conteste d nominatio n o f Clarenc e Thomas i n 199 1 barely survive d 52:48 . The second important facto r i n th e selectio n proces s i s th e signifi cant rol e playe d b y th e fiftee n m e m b e r 8 Committe e o n Federa l Judiciary o f th e America n Ba r Associatio n (ABA) . It s function s be gan t o receiv e maximu m attentio n an d presidentia l cooperatio n during th e Truma n administration . Althoug h som e observer s ques tion th e wisdo m o f delegatin g t o a privat e group—whic h i s no t without certai n specifi c professiona l an d perhap s persona l interest s and biases—th e righ t t o evaluat e al l federal judicial personne l prio r to th e forma l nominatio n stage , th e Committe e ha s develope d int o a respecte d an d powerful , albei t controversial , elemen t o f th e nomi nating process . It s procedur e i s t o evaluat e th e qualification s o f al l persons considere d fo r appointmen t t o th e U.S . Supreme Court , th e U.S. Court s o f Appeals , th e U.S . Distric t Courts , an d th e Cour t o f International Trade. 9 Th e Commissio n doe s s o usuall y ove r a six - t o eight-week period , an d the n "rates " the candidate s fo r th e attentio n of th e Attorne y Genera l i n on e o f thre e categories : "WQ " (Wel l Qualified); "Q " (Qualified) ; o r "NQ " (No t Qualified) . I t shoul d b e noted here , however , tha t th e lowes t rankin g i s no t necessaril y a reflection o n th e nominee' s characte r o r ability . Fo r instance , al though th e "No t Qualifie d b y Reaso n o f Age " categor y wa s discon tinued a s a matte r o f polic y i n 1981 , th e ABA' s Committe e stil l hesitates t o approv e anyon e wh o ha s reache d th e ag e o f sixty-four , arid n o on e abov e sixt y unles s ratabl e a t leas t "WQ. " I t i s loat h t o recommend lawyer s without tria l experience ; an d i t generally insist s on twelv e t o fiftee n year s o f experienc e i n th e roug h an d tumbl e o f legal practice . However , it s 199 1 manua l expressl y "recognize s tha t 59

Courts and Public Policy women an d member s o f certai n minorit y group s hav e entere d th e profession i n larg e number s onl y i n recen t year s an d tha t thei r opportunities fo r advancemen t i n th e professio n ma y hav e bee n limited." 10 T o cit e on e yea r o f th e Committee' s activities , i n 196 2 President Kenned y nominate d an d sa w appointe d 10 0 federa l judges; o f these , th e Committe e ha d rate d 1 6 "EWQ " ("Exception ally Wel l Qualified, " a categor y abandone d b y th e Committe e i n 1989), 4 5 " W Q " 3 1 " Q " an d 8 "NQ. " Tha t th e name s o f 8 "NQ " judges wer e nevertheles s forwarde d t o an d approve d b y th e Senat e is proo f o f th e politica l pressure s tha t pre y upo n th e chie f execu tives—especially a t th e star t o f a ne w administratio n tha t represent s a chang e i n party . Still , a numbe r o f othe r "NQ " ratee s wer e neve r nominated b y Presiden t Kennedy , a testimonia l t o th e importan t role o f th e ABA' s influentia l Committee . N o "NQ" s a t al l wer e approved betwee n 196 5 an d 1975 , unti l Presiden t For d succeede d in pushin g throug h th e Senat e Lowel l P . Weicker's (R.-Conn. ) nomi nation o f th e state' s ex-governor , Thoma s J. Meskill , a fellow Repub lican, t o th e U.S . Cour t o f Appeals—notwithstandin g th e ABA' s unanimous "NQ " ratin g o f th e nominee. 1 1 Presiden t Carte r sen t u p 6 "NQ"s , o f who m 3 wer e confirmed . Presiden t Reaga n forwarde d only on e " N Q " bu t th e nomine e die d prio r t o Senat e action . Reagan's ABA rating s wer e 15 7 "EWQ " an d "WQ " combined , an d 133 "Q. " Presiden t Bus h nominate d n o "NQ " candidates . Thos e approved b y mid-199 1 ha d receive d 2 8 "WQ" s an d 2 0 "Q"s, 12 with a very larg e numbe r o f other s stil l unconfirme d on e yea r later , an d a staggering tota l o f 10 2 judgeships remaine d unfille d whe n h e lef t office i n January 1993 . The third factor i s a rathe r subtl e bu t increasingl y demonstrabl e one: 1 3 th e role , difficul t t o asses s but clearl y present, tha t incumben t and retire d member s o f th e tribunal—especiall y a t th e highes t leve l in th e perso n o f th e Chie f Justic e o f th e Unite d States—pla y i n suggesting nominee s t o th e president . W e know , fo r example , tha t Chief Justice Taf t wa s no t a t al l reluctan t i n expressin g hi s thought s to president s Harding , Coolidge , an d Hoover—"bombarding " th e chief executive s wit h suggestion s i s a mor e ap t description ; tha t hi s successor, Hughes , followe d a simila r cours e o f actio n wit h Hoove r 60

Courts and Public Policy and F.D.R. ; tha t Associat e Justic e Ston e wen t s o fa r a s t o writ e t o President Hoove r tha t h e woul d b e willin g t o resig n an d relinquis h his sea t i f i t woul d tak e tha t sacrific e t o prope l th e presiden t int o nominating Justice Cardoz o t o th e Suprem e Court ; tha t Presiden t Kennedy apparentl y consulte d wit h Chie f Justice Warre n an d Justice Frankfurter i n 196 2 regardin g Arthu r J . Goldberg , Frankfurter' s successor t o th e bench ; tha t Presiden t Johnson approache d Warre n concerning hi s successo r a s Chief Justice; an d tha t Justice Rehnquis t urged Presiden t Reaga n t o nominat e Sandr a Da y O'Connor i n 1981 . "Mixed" Appointment and Election. I n orde r t o comba t criticis m o f both th e electiv e an d appointiv e methods , ye t stil l retai n th e virtue s of thes e methods , differen t version s o f a compromis e pla n hav e evolved i n mor e tha n a thir d o f th e states, 14 wit h Californi a an d Missouri a s th e pioneers . The California Plan, adopte d b y referendum vot e i n 1934 , extend s to some, 1 5 bu t no t all , o f California' s judges. Unde r it , th e governo r nominates on e prospectiv e juris t t o a Commissio n o n Judicia l Ap pointments, compose d o f th e Chie f Justic e o f th e Stat e Suprem e Court, th e Presidin g Judg e o f th e pertinen t Distric t Cour t o f Ap peals, a n d th e Attorne y General . I f th e Commissio n accept s th e governor's n o m i n e e — a n d s o far onl y onc e (i n 1940 ) ha s a commis sion rejecte d o n e — h e o r sh e i s declare d appointe d unti l th e nex t general electio n a t whic h h e o r sh e mus t fac e th e electorat e eithe r for th e ful l twelve-yea r ter m o f offic e tha t i s statutoril y assigne d t o each slo t o n th e tribunal , o r t o whateve r ter m o f year s remain s i n the twelve-yea r cycle . Th e candidat e run s unoppose d o n a ballo t that simpl y ask s th e questio n "Shal l [name ] b e electe d t o th e offic e for th e ter m prescribe d b y law?" 16 The Missouri Plan use s a somewha t differen t method . Here , non partisan nominatin g boards , know n a s appellat e commission s an d operating o n differen t cour t levels , selec t three candidates fo r ever y vacant judgeship, fro m who m th e governo r appoint s one until th e next genera l electio n bu t n o les s tha n fo r on e year . Thereafter , similar t o th e syste m i n California , th e incumben t face s th e elector ate fo r a full twelve-yea r term , runnin g unoppose d o n a nonpartisa n 61

Courts and Public Policy ballot containin g th e question , "Shal l Judge [name ] o f th e [name ] Court b e retaine d i n office ? " 1 7 Member s o f th e nonsalarie d appel late commission s ar e designate d fo r staggere d six-yea r term s o f of fice; the y may hol d neithe r publi c no r politica l part y office . A typica l commission, suc h a s tha t fo r th e Missour i Suprem e Cour t an d th e lower appellat e courts , consist s o f th e chie f justice o f th e forme r a s chairperson; thre e lawyer s selecte d b y th e stat e ba r (on e fro m eac h of th e thre e court s o f appeals) ; an d thre e citize n laypersons , ap pointed b y the governo r fro m th e thre e appellat e districts . On th e whole , thes e mixe d system s hav e prove d t o b e bot h popu lar an d successfu l i n th e jurisdictions wher e the y hav e bee n tried , for the y combin e th e democrati c notio n o f accountabilit y t o th e electorate wit h a n appealin g metho d o f selectin g prospectiv e judi cial personne l base d upo n a typ e o f separatio n o f power s tha t stresses judicia l independenc e vi a th e appointiv e process . Fo r a question arise s a s t o ho w muc h effor t wil l b e engendere d b y a sitting judge t o establis h a "popular " recor d fo r th e benefi t o f th e electorate. Still , a s i t stands , o n balanc e ou r judicia l syste m repre sents primaril y a compromis e betwee n representativenes s an d neu tral competence . Tenure of Office. O n th e stat e leve l tenur e i s eithe r o f substantia l length o r fo r "goo d behavior"—tha t is , life . However , th e Suprem e Court rule d i n 199 1 that , i f state s choos e t o d o so , the y ma y forc e judges t o retir e whe n the y reac h a certai n age. 18 O n th e federa l level, "goo d behavior " tenur e i s constitutionall y mandate d fo r al l constitutional cour t judges ; legislativ e cour t jurist s ma y b e give n term appointments , an d ofte n are , but ther e ha s bee n a n increasin g tendency fo r Congres s t o accor d the m lif e tenur e a s well . Retire ment provision s ar e differen t fo r th e stat e an d federa l governments . Under th e federa l plan , adopte d i n 1937 , federa l judge s ma y (bu t are no t require d t o ) 1 9 retir e o n ful l pa y a t ag e sevent y i f the y hav e served te n year s o n th e federa l bench , an d a t ag e sixty-fiv e afte r fifteen year s o f such service. 20 Removal o f state judges use d t o b e possibl e onl y b y impeachmen t and conviction ; no w i n som e state s the y ar e removabl e b y join t 62

Courts and Public Policy gubernatorial-legislative actio n (Ne w Hampshire) ; i n som e b y legis lative resolutio n (Utah) ; i n som e b y recal l b y popula r vot e (Ari zona); i n mos t b y judicial commission s (California) ; an d i n other s by specia l tribunal s suc h a s th e Commissio n o n Judicial Conduc t i n New York. 21 On th e federal level , however , judges (othe r tha n magistrate s an d bankruptcy judges ) ar e involuntaril y removabl e onl y vi a impeach ment b y a simpl e majorit y vot e o f th e Hous e o f Representative s and convictio n thereafte r b y th e Senat e b y a two-third s vot e o f th e members presen t an d voting , ther e bein g a quoru m o n th e floor. Except fo r th e member s o f th e Suprem e Court , federa l judge s are , however, subjec t t o disciplinar y procedure s shor t o f remova l b y th e judicial council s o f th e twelv e judicial circuit s a s a resul t o f a 198 0 congressional statute. 22 O f th e sixtee n impeachmen t proceeding s formally initiate d b y th e Hous e t o date , thirtee n wer e directe d against federa l judges; 2 3 nin e othe r judges resigne d befor e forma l charges coul d b e lodge d agains t them . O f th e eleve n impeachmen t trials involvin g federa l judges, fou r resulte d i n acquittals, 24 seve n i n removals. 25 Amon g th e forme r wa s th e sol e on e involvin g a justic e of th e Suprem e Court , Associat e Justic e Samue l Chase , wh o wa s acquitted b y a four-vot e margi n i n 1805 , with Vice-Presiden t Aaro n Burr presidin g ove r th e Senat e proceedings , an d wit h Chie f Justic e Marshall a s an importan t defens e witness . Qualifications and Nominations Judicial Qualifications. O n th e whole , th e onl y statutor y requiremen t for judicial nominatio n presen t i n th e states for mos t court s i s a la w degree (or , a s wa s stil l possibl e i n a fe w state s i n 1996 , th e comple tion o f thre e o r fou r year s o f readin g la w plu s a stif f examination) ; for other s no t eve n a n LLB . or J.D. is required fo r certai n magistrat e positions. N o statutor y o r constitutiona l requiremen t whatsoeve r exists o n th e federal level, but ther e i s unquestionabl y a n unwritte n law concerning th e nee d fo r a law degree: no nonlawye r stand s eve n the slightes t chanc e o f nomination , n o matte r ho w learne d h e o r she ma y b e otherwis e (althoug h Justice Black , amon g others , ofte n 63

Courts and Public Policy suggested tha t a t leas t on e nonlawye r serv e o n th e Suprem e Cour t of th e Unite d States) . The matte r of judicial experience is i n a differen t category : consid erable li p servic e i s pai d t o it , an d som e chie f executive s hav e insisted upo n i t for certai n level s (e.g. , Presiden t Eisenhowe r fo r hi s nominees t o th e Suprem e Cour t afte r Ear l Warre n an d Presiden t Reagan fo r al l o f his) ; but it s absence ha s b y no mean s bee n a bloc k to nominatio n eve n t o th e Unite d State s Suprem e Court . O f th e 10 6 men an d 2 wome n wh o ha d serve d o n tha t tribuna l betwee n 178 9 and earl y 1996 , onl y 2 5 ha d ha d te n year s o r mor e o n an y lowe r court level s a t th e time s o f thei r appointments . Th e las t on e wit h that muc h experienc e prio r t o Chie f Justice Burger' s appointmen t in 196 9 wa s Justice Cardozo , wh o ha d serve d fo r eightee n year s o n New Yor k benche s whe n Presiden t Hoove r nominate d hi m t o suc ceed Justice Holme s i n 1932 . Som e 4 3 justices ha d ha d non e a t all . Yet among thes e ar e som e o f th e mos t revere d an d illustriou s name s in America' s judicial annals : 5 o f th e 1 5 chie f justices—Taney, S . P. Chase, Waite , Fuller , an d W a r r e n 2 6 — a n d suc h associat e justices a s Story, Miller , Bradley , Brandeis , Sutherland , Roberts , Frankfurter , and Rober t Jackson. I n th e oft-quote d word s o f Justice Frankfurter , neither judicial experienc e no r geographi c consideration s no r polit ical affiliatio n shoul d pla y th e slightes t rol e i n th e consideration s leading t o appointmen t t o eve n th e highes t benc h i n th e land ; suc h selection shoul d b e "wholl y o n th e basi s o f functiona l fitness." T o him, th e essentia l qualitie s o f a Suprem e Cour t justic e wer e bu t three: thos e o f th e philosopher , historian , an d prophe t (t o which , as alread y noted , Justic e Brenna n adde d a fourth : "inordinat e pa tience"). T o sea l furthe r hi s basi c contention , Frankfurte r onc e tol d an attentiv e audienc e o f lawyer s an d la w students : One i s entitle d t o sa y without qualificatio n tha t th e correlatio n be tween prio r judicial experienc e an d fitness fo r th e Suprem e Cour t is zero. Th e significanc e o f th e greates t amon g th e Justices wh o ha d such experience, Holmes and Cardozo , derived not from tha t judicial experience bu t fro m th e fac t tha t the y wer e Holme s an d Cardozo . They were thinkers, and mor e particularly, legal philosophers. 27 Nonetheless, th e issu e o f judicial experienc e i s neve r quit e dor mant, an d ther e i s n o doub t tha t a t leas t som e consideratio n i s 64

Courts and Public Policy given t o it , dependin g upo n th e stanc e o f th e nominatin g authority . Individual member s o f Congres s cal l sporadicall y fo r som e statutor y requirement—usually providin g fo r upward s o f five year s o f servic e on a lowe r cour t b e n c h — b u t n o suc h legislatio n ha s eve r bee n passed. An d i t i s not likel y t o be , give n continue d oppositio n b y th e bar, th e executive , an d th e judiciary itself . Motivations behind Presidential Nominations. A favorite indoo r spor t o f the practitioner s o f th e la w an d politics , a s wel l a s th e publi c a t large, i s t o speculat e upo n th e reason s wh y a n individua l i s nomi nated b y a chie f executiv e t o serv e o n a tribunal . Thi s become s a particularly intriguin g guessin g gam e a t th e leve l o f th e Suprem e Court o f th e Unite d States , whos e appointee s obviousl y ar e mor e prominent tha n thos e a t lowe r levels . Presidential motivation s i n selectin g a futur e justic e o f th e Su preme Cour t ar e bot h comple x an d multiple , an d var y wit h eac h president. Ther e is , however , a fairl y reliabl e quinte t o f factor s tha t is presen t i n mos t presidentia l choice s t o th e augus t tribuna l (and , for tha t matter , t o th e lowe r federa l benches) . I n n o particula r order, the y ar e th e nominee's : 1. objectiv e professiona l meri t (includingjudicia l experience) ; 2. politica l "availability" ; 3. ideologica l "appropriateness" ; 4. persona l "attractiveness " t o th e president ; 5. geographical , religious , racial , sexual , an d othe r socio-politica l background. Not al l o f thes e consideration s necessaril y pla y a rol e i n eac h selec tion, bu t a majorit y o f the m unquestionabl y does ; on e o f the m i s usually upper-mos t i n significance ; an d probabl y al l ar e give n a t least som e though t b y th e presiden t an d hi s advisers . Thus, th e merit factor prove d t o b e decisiv e i n Presiden t Hoover' s reluctant designatio n o f Justice Cardozo , bu t th e othe r fou r factor s also playe d ke y roles , affirmativel y o r negatively . Hoove r di d no t really wish t o nominat e Cardozo , althoug h h e recognize d clearl y th e judicial greatnes s an d persona l integrit y o f thi s dedicated , experi enced, principled , learned , an d brillian t Ne w York jurist—a bache lor, a Democrat , an d a Sephardi c Jew. Publi c an d privat e demand s 65

Courts and Public Policy for Cardozo' s nominatio n t o succee d t o th e Holme s sea t o n th e Court wer e clea r an d persistent ; an d the y were spearheade d b y suc h important figures a s Idaho' s influentia l an d powerfu l Republica n Senator Willia m E . Borah—no t commonl y know n fo r hi s lov e o f Easterners—and b y Justice Stone , who offere d t o relinquis h hi s sea t in favo r o f Cardoz o whe n Hoove r raise d th e argumen t tha t th e Court alread y ha d tw o Ne w Yorkers o n th e benc h (Ston e an d Chie f Justice Hughes) . Whe n Hoove r suggeste d possibl e "religiou s an d sectarian" repercussions—sittin g Justice Brandei s als o wa s Jewish— Borah tol d th e presiden t tha t "anyon e wh o raise s th e questio n o f race [sic] is unfit t o advis e yo u concernin g s o importan t a matter." 28 Amidst universa l publi c applause , Hoove r the n surrendered , an d the Senat e unanimousl y confirme d Cardoz o withi n moment s afte r his nominatio n reache d th e floor. Political "availability " includes bot h th e officia l part y allegianc e o f the designe e an d hi s o r he r acceptability . Thus , car e mus t b e take n that th e nomine e i s no t "personall y obnoxious " t o a hom e stat e senator, o n pai n o f havin g th e latte r invok e th e age-old , almos t invariably honore d custo m o f "senatoria l courtesy"—a n almos t cer tain death-knel l t o confirmatio n b y th e Senate—especiall y i f th e home stat e senato r i s o f th e President' s ow n party . B y and large , a n old politica l maxi m govern s here ; namely , tha t "ther e ar e jus t a s many goo d Republican [o r Democratic, as th e cas e ma y be ] lawyers — so wh y appoin t someon e fro m th e enem y camp ? " 2 9 Ther e hav e been deviation s fro m thi s concept , an d ther e ar e alway s a few "sops " thrown t o th e opposition , bu t ther e i s n o mistakin g th e pattern . T o illustrate: Presiden t Wilso n appointe d 7 3 Democrats an d 1 Republi can a s federal distric t an d appellat e jurists; Harding , Coolidge , an d Hoover a tota l o f 19 8 Republican s an d 2 0 Democrats ; F.D.R. , 19 4 Democrats an d 8 Republicans ; Truman , 12 8 Democrat s an d 1 3 Republicans; Eisenhower , 17 8 Republican s an d 1 1 Democrats ; Ken nedy, 10 5 Democrats , 1 0 Republicans , 1 Independent, an d 1 mem ber o f th e Ne w York Libera l Party ; Johnson, 15 5 Democrat s an d 1 2 Republicans; Nixon , 20 5 Republicans , 1 6 Democrats , an d 2 Inde pendents; Ford , 4 1 Republican s an d 1 1 Democrats; Carter , provide d by th e Omnibu s Judgeship s Ac t o f 197 8 wit h th e opportunit y t o 66

Courts and Public Policy appoint 11 7 ne w distric t an d 3 5 ne w circui t judges, in addition t o some 14 0 attritio n replacements—a n opportunit y unequalle d i n the country' s history—selecte d a mer e 9 non-Democrats ; Reaga n chose 35 1 Republicans , 1 4 Democrats , a n d 7 Independents ; Bush , 164 Republicans , 1 0 Democrats , an d 1 1 Independents ; an d durin g the firs t tw o year s (199 3 an d 1994 ) o f hi s presidency , Clinto n ap pointed 12 1 Democrats, 4 Republicans, an d 1 0 Independents. Thus , the patter n i s clear . I t i s tru e tha t 1 3 Suprem e Cour t justice s o f opposite part y allegianc e hav e bee n appointed, 3 0 ye t read y explana tions governe d eac h instance. 31 Th e overal l percentag e o f same-as president's-party appointment s ha s range d fro m a lo w of 82. 2 (Taft ) to 98. 6 (Wilson) . Ideological "appropriateness" playe d a rol e i n mos t o f th e abov e thirteen cases . Thi s concep t i s als o know n a s a nominee' s "rea l politics"—that is , what is surmised t o be, on th e basi s of an educate d guess, th e candidate' s actua l persona l philosophy , regardles s o f for mal part y adherence , a philosoph y tha t th e appointin g authorit y presumes, wit h fingers crossed , wil l expres s itsel f o n th e bench . As Presiden t Theodor e Roosevel t pu t i t succinctl y i n a well-know n statement t o Henr y Cabo t Lodg e (R.-Mass. ) concernin g th e "appro priateness" o f Horac e H . Lurton , "th e nominal politic s o f th e m a n has nothin g t o d o wit h hi s action s o n th e bench . Hi s real politics ar e all important." And h e the n proceede d t o outlin e ho w "right" he wa s on sundr y publi c questions. 32 Presiden t Reagan' s fou r appointment s (O'Connor, Scalia , Rehnquist' s promotion , an d Kennedy ) a s well a s Bush's tw o (Soute r an d Thomas) , an d Clinton' s tw o (Ginsbur g an d Breyer) al l ha d ha d judicia l experience , thu s arguabl y providin g a fairly reliabl e guid e t o ideologica l "appropriateness. " Bu t mor e tha n once a chie f executive' s hope s an d advanc e analysi s hav e prove d t o be erroneous . Th e cas e o f Madison' s appointmen t o f Joseph Story , Theodore Roosevelt' s o f Holmes , Wilson' s o f James C . McReynolds , Eisenhower's o f Ear l Warre n an d Willia m J. Brennan , Jr., Nixon' s o f Harry A. Blackmun, an d Bush' s o f Davi d Soute r ar e obviou s illustra tions o f th e point . Consequently, i t i s not eas y t o "pack " th e Court—althoug h man y have tried . Perhap s th e mos t famou s cas e wa s Presiden t Frankli n D .

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Courts and Public Policy Roosevelt's abortiv e effor t i n 1937 ; bu t th e firs t t o "pack " was , i n fact, Presiden t Washington , wh o insiste d o n a se t o f seve n criteria 3 3 for hi s nominees . 'Yo u shoo t a n arro w int o a far-distant futur e whe n you appoin t a Justice," aptl y commente d Alexande r M . Bickel , "an d not th e ma n himsel f ca n tel l yo u wha t h e wil l thin k abou t som e o f the problem s tha t h e wil l face." 34 I n characteristi c languag e an d with candor , Presiden t Truma n observe d tha t "packin g th e Suprem e Court can' t b e done , becaus e I'v e trie d i t an d i t won' t work . . . . Whenever yo u pu t a ma n o n th e Suprem e Cour t h e cease s t o b e your friend . I am sur e o f that." 3 5 A nominee' s personal "attractiveness" to the president ma y pla y a decisive rol e i n a president's decisio n t o selec t a n individual , regard less o f th e othe r factor s a t issue . Clos e persona l friendshi p thu s unquestionably accounte d i n larg e measur e fo r th e Suprem e Cour t nomination o f Messrs . Vinson, Clark , an d Minto n b y Presiden t Tru man, tha t o f Byro n R . Whit e b y Presiden t Kennedy , an d o f Ab e Fortas b y President Johnson . The las t amon g th e five outstandin g factor s embrace s th e Ameri can "melting-pot"—o r "not-so-meltin g pot"—consideration s o f religion, geography, and now , insistentl y an d increasingly , race and sex. They ar e usuall y present—eithe r negativel y o r positively . Th e cas e of Justice Cardoz o illustrate s th e first: neithe r th e presenc e o f tw o other Ne w Yorker s no r tha t o f hi s coreligionist , Brandeis , wa s per mitted t o stan d i n th e way , althoug h Presiden t Hoove r sa w the m a s genuine an d overridin g barriers . I n th e "positive " sense , Presiden t Eisenhower's designation s o f Charle s Eva n Whittake r o f Illinoi s an d Potter Stewar t o f Ohi o reflecte d hi s concer n wit h th e absenc e o f th e Midwest o n th e Court . An d th e fac t tha t thirty-on e state s ha d sen t justices t o th e Suprem e Cour t a s of its 1995-199 6 ter m would appea r to bea r ou t th e regiona l facto r consideration . Th e sam e i s tru e fo r religion: tha t Willia m J . Brenna n wa s fro m Ne w Jersey (ke y state ) and a Roma n Catholi c ( a religio n the n no t "represented " o n th e Court) wa s surel y no t los t o n Presiden t Eisenhowe r an d hi s adviser s when Brenna n wa s nominate d t o th e Suprem e Cour t durin g th e presidential electio n yea r o f 1956 . Althoug h Presiden t Truma n ig nored th e "religious " facto r whe n h e appointe d To m C . Clar k t o 68

Courts and Public Policy succeed Justice Murph y i n 1949 , an d Presiden t Nixo n di d likewis e with hi s appointmen t o f Harr y A . Blackmu n t o replac e Justice For tas, it has become a n accepte d axio m o f American politic s tha t ther e should b e a Jew an d a Roma n Catholi c o n th e highes t benc h a t al l times. As of th e 1995-199 6 term , nin e Roma n Catholics 3 6 and seve n Jews 3 7 ha d serve d o n th e Court ; th e othe r ninety-tw o hav e bee n Protestants. 38 Th e pressur e t o establis h a nich e fo r anothe r minorit y group, th e African-Americans , culminate d i n 196 7 wit h Presiden t Johnson's appointmen t o f Thurgood Marshall—th e great-grandso n of a slav e an d th e so n o f a Pullma n steward . Tha t fac t wa s no t los t on Presiden t Bus h who , followin g Justic e Marshall' s retiremen t i n 1991, appointe d a fello w blac k jurist , Clarenc e Thomas , i n hi s place—albeit thei r jurisprudentia l philosoph y wa s hardl y similar . And a "woman' s seat " was al l bu t institutionalize d wit h th e appoint ment o f Sandr a Da y O'Conno r i n lat e 1981 . (I t wa s no t unti l 197 9 that ever y state ha d a t leas t on e woma n judge. ) The Typical Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. A composit e of th e typica l jurist o n th e highes t benc h o f th e land , reflectin g th e various aspect s an d factor s o f th e selectio n proces s a s well a s statisti cal facts o f th e past , would loo k a s follows a t th e tim e o f accessio n t o the Court : A 50-55-year-ol d male ; white ; generall y Protestant ; o f Anglo-Saxo n stock (al l excep t fiftee n t o date) ; upper-middle t o hig h socia l status ; reared in a nonrural bu t not necessarily urban environment ; membe r of a n economicall y comfortable , civic-minded , politicall y activ e fam ily; with BA . an d LLB . or J.D. degree s (one-thir d o f thes e fro m "Iv y League" institutions); experienced i n some public or civic office. 39 We shal l no w examin e th e jurist' s rol e i n th e Court' s ultimat e power o f judicial review . J U D I C I A L REVIE W

Genesis Judicial Review Defined. Th e powe r o f judicia l revie w i s th e mos t awesome an d potentiall y th e mos t effectiv e powe r i n th e hand s o f 69

Courts and Public Policy the judiciar y o f th e Unite d States , i n general , an d th e Suprem e Court, i n particular . Peculia r t o countrie s that , lik e th e Unite d States, operat e unde r a federa l system , i t i s a powe r a t onc e contro versial an d misunderstood , maligne d an d applauded . An y definitio n would hav e t o stat e a t leas t th e following : Judicia l revie w i s th e ultimate powe r o f an y cour t t o declar e unconstitutiona l an d henc e unenforceable: (1 ) an y law ; (2 ) an y officia l actio n base d upo n a law; and (3 ) an y othe r actio n b y a publi c officia l tha t i t deem s t o b e i n conflict wit h th e Constitution . A cour t als o practice s judicial review , o f course , whe n i t upholds a law o r action . Wha t a cour t doe s accordingl y i s t o appl y th e superior of tw o laws—here , th e Unite d State s Constitution—agains t a stat ute, som e actio n o r activit y by a public official , o r eve n a segmen t o f a stat e Constitution . Bu t a Cour t doe s no t d o thi s lightl y o r fre quently; i t does s o only after careful , minut e analysis , reflection, an d weighing o f alternatives , i n lin e wit h th e canon s o f th e taugh t tradi tion o f th e law , agains t a backdro p o f judicial self-restraint . Ever y court o f recor d i n th e Unite d States , n o matte r ho w hig h o r low , possesses thi s fascinating power , thi s "principle d proces s o f enunciat ing an d applyin g endurin g value s o f ou r society." 40 Ou r concer n here i s with th e exercis e o f this power b y the federa l Suprem e Court . Judicial revie w i s a powe r no t lightl y o r frequentl y exercised , an d whenever th e Cour t ca n find it s wa y clea r t o d o so , i t avoid s th e drastic remed y o f meetin g th e constitutiona l issue—fo r meetin g i t may wel l mea n th e exercis e o f th e ultimat e "no-saying " power . Th e Court woul d muc h rathe r handl e a delicat e proble m b y statutor y interpretation tha n b y going t o th e constitutiona l jugular, especiall y since i t i s ofte n possibl e t o achiev e simila r results . Suc h Suprem e Court decision s a s thos e dealin g wit h th e loyalty-securit y field, 41 th e range an d exten t o f th e Smit h Ac t o f 1940, 42 an d th e Ira n Hostag e Release Bargain 4 3 ar e obviou s case s i n point . Other s ar e legion . Conscious o f it s conservativ e rol e a s th e theoreticall y weakes t o f th e triumvirate o f governmenta l branches , an d awar e o f publi c sensitiv ity i n th e fields a t issue , th e Cour t ha s chose n a cours e o f actio n i n all thos e instance s tha t come s clos e t o havin g th e proverbia l cak e (judicial judgment ) an d eatin g i t to o (actin g a s a restrainin g an d explanatory agency , yet avoiding nullification) . 70

Courts and Public Policy Some Examples. The Court , o f course, does from tim e t o tim e exercis e judicial revie w i n it s ultimat e sense . A s o f July 199 6 i t ha d don e so , since it s firs t session , som e 1,25 0 time s i n th e instanc e o f state legislation an d stat e constitutiona l provision s (mor e tha n 1,10 0 o f these cam e afte r 1870) , an d 14 9 time s i n th e cas e of federal enactments.44 (It is noteworthy that only 12 of the 76 post-193 7 declarations of unconstitutionality were of the economic-proprietarian variety: the others all dealt with civil rights and liberties.) An exampl e o f th e exercis e o f judicial revie w vis-a-vis state legislatio n i s the declaratio n o f unconsti tutionality o f a Texa s la w tha t prohibite d abortion s unles s necessar y to sav e a woman' s life—th e fame d cas e o f Roe v. Wade —the Cour t ruling 7: 2 tha t th e prohibitio n violate d th e Nint h Amendment' s implicit righ t t o privac y an d th e Fourteenth' s du e proces s o f la w guarantees. 4 5 A n exampl e dealin g wit h a sectio n o f a stat e constitu tion i s th e voidin g o f a provisio n o f th e Marylan d Constitutio n that compelle d al l officeholder s t o declar e thei r belie f i n Go d a s a condition o f employment , becaus e suc h a requiremen t wa s hel d to constitut e a "religiou s tes t fo r publi c office, " thu s invadin g th e individual's righ t o f freedo m o f religion. 46 O n th e federa l level , involving a n act of Congress, th e cour t struc k dow n 5: 4 a s a violatio n of th e Firs t Amendment' s freedo m o f expression , th e federa l Fla g Protection Ac t o f 1989 , authorizing th e prosecutio n o f anyon e dese crating th e America n flag. 47 A famou s exampl e o f judicial revie w over a n ultra vires action of an official of the United States wa s th e Supreme Court' s ringin g "no " t o Presiden t Truma n whe n h e seize d the stee l mill s i n 1951 . The "no " was base d o n th e chie f executive' s alleged usurpatio n o f legislativ e power. 48 A mor e recen t exampl e was th e Court' s unanimou s orde r t o Presiden t Nixo n i n July 197 4 t o surrender certai n o f th e notoriou s "Watergat e Tapes." 49 An d a far reaching "no " to Congres s cam e i n 198 3 with th e Court' s 7: 2 declara tion o f unconstitutionalit y o f th e one - a n d / o r two-hous e congres sional (o r legislative ) veto , a practic e the n imbedde d i n 21 2 law s enacted sinc e 1932. 50 The mos t contentiou s o f thes e variou s mode s o f judicial revie w has always been th e strikin g dow n b y the Cour t o f an ac t o f Congres s or a portio n thereof . (Respectin g th e principl e o f "separability, " th e Court wil l tr y har d t o sav e a s muc h o f a law' s framewor k a s i s 71

Courts and Public Policy constitutionally feasibl e i n a give n case.) 5 1 I t i s in sayin g "no " to th e legislature tha t th e issu e o f majoritaria n rul e woul d appea r t o b e most clearl y a n d perceptibl y joined—for ther e th e highes t echelo n of th e judicia l branch , i n th e ultimat e authorit y o f nin e appointed individuals, say s t o a majorit y o f th e highes t echelo n o f elected and, presumably, representative legislative branch , tha t i t ha s violate d th e basic la w o f th e land . I n othe r words , i t i s her e tha t on e branc h o f government become s the authoritative interprete r o f th e Constitu tion, th e protestation s o f another "equal " branch o f th e governmen t to th e contrar y notwithstanding . The Arbiter. Obviously , ther e mus t b e a n arbiter . Theoreticall y i t i s both plausibl e an d attractive—t o some , bu t certainl y no t t o all , citizens o f th e republic—t o conten d tha t i n a bon a fide democrac y what th e majorit y want s th e majorit y shoul d get , givin g du e regar d to th e right s o f th e minorit y a s spelle d ou t i n th e basi c documen t that govern s th e bod y politic . Certainly , o r s o th e argumen t goes , majoritarian governmen t become s a hollo w shel l indeed , i f a dul y elected, legall y constitute d bod y o f th e people' s representative s i s denied th e righ t an d th e abilit y t o respon d t o people' s majoritaria n wishes, a s expresse d b y their representative s assemble d i n Congress . Why shoul d a n undemocraticall y constitute d bod y o f nin e elitists , who ar e no t responsibl e t o th e peopl e vi a th e ballo t box , b e ac corded th e overridin g powe r t o strik e dow n wha t th e peopl e want ? Is no t Congress , an d i s no t th e executiv e branc h o f government , equally capabl e o f judging an d interpretin g th e constitutionalit y o f a propose d measur e o r cours e o f action ? Ar e the y no t equall y de voted t o th e principl e o f governmen t unde r law ? I t ma y b e quit e al l right, s o th e argumen t continues , fo r th e judiciar y t o "interpret " and t o "adjudicate, " bu t no t t o strik e dow n a s unconstitutiona l anything tha t a majorit y ha s enacte d withi n th e confine s o f th e la w and th e Constitution . This , i n substance , wa s Thoma s Jefferson' s argument onc e h e ha d turne d agains t judicial review . (H e ha d bee n a supporte r o f tha t powe r unti l th e judiciary bega n t o sanctio n th e hated Alie n an d Seditio n Act s o f 179 8 rathe r tha n declar e the m unconstitutional.)

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Courts and Public Policy The answe r t o thi s argumen t i s obviou s an d complicated . I t i s obvious becaus e ou r Foundin g Father s neve r intende d ou r govern mental organizatio n an d bas e t o b e a pure democracy . The y wer e afraid o f th e excesse s o f democracy , a s the y sa w it , a n d the y consti tuted th e basi c documen t wit h safeguard s agains t an y potentia l "tyr anny o f th e majority. " Thi s wa s don e no t onl y vis-a-vi s th e relation ship betwee n th e individua l an d th e government , bu t als o vis-a-vi s the relationshi p o f th e variou s governmenta l branches . Thu s wa s born a federal syste m o f government , wit h no t onl y a divisio n o f powers betwee n i t and th e states , but a centra l governmen t i n whic h the thre e mai n branche s wer e separated , ye t stil l checke d an d bal anced b y on e another . An d th e ne w forma t wa s spelle d ou t i n a written d o c u m e n t — t h e Constitutio n o f th e Unite d State s o f America. Fa r from wantin g t o se e a governmental for m lik e th e pur e democracy o f Athenian days , o r eve n a fusio n o f power s lik e tha t o f our Britis h cousins , th e Foundin g Father s determine d tha t majori ties mus t b e checke d an d observe d a t almos t ever y turn . Wh o woul d be mor e qualifie d tha n th e judiciar y t o b e bot h legitimato r an d arbiter, t o rende r a final j u d g m e nt regardin g infraction s o f th e basi c law? Hence , th e Foundin g Father s widel y recognize d th e ide a o f judicial revie w a s th e sures t too l fo r th e arbiter , an d althoug h the y failed t o spel l ou t th e power , i t i s clea r tha t the y agree d wit h th e Father o f th e Constitution , Jame s Madison , wh o wrot e tha t th e " [Judiciary] i s truly th e onl y defensiv e armo r o f th e Federa l Govern ment, o r rathe r fo r th e Constitutio n an d law s o f th e Unite d States . Strip i t o f tha t armo r an d th e doo r i s wid e ope n fo r nullification , anarchy, an d convulsion." 52 As the year s went by , however, an d despit e th e Marshallia n strok e of judicial statesmanshi p an d statecraf t i n Marbury v . Madison 5^ (se e below), doubt s abou t th e exten t o f th e rol e o f th e legitimato r an d arbiter hav e neve r completel y bee n lai d t o rest , eve n i n th e mind s o f some o f th e mos t famou s jurists , especiall y sinc e th e Cour t ha s a t times patentl y engage d i n prescriptiv e polic y making. 5 4 Thu s bot h Justice Holme s an d Judg e Learne d Hand , tw o towerin g figures i n American jurisprudence , althoug h recognizin g th e nee d fo r a fed eral legitimato r an d arbiter , consistentl y wondered whethe r i t woul d 73

Courts and Public Policy be absolutel y essentia l a t th e leve l o f th e operatio n o f th e nationa l government. The y wer e convince d that , althoug h th e framer s in cluded man y othe r device s for checkin g majorit y rul e i n th e origina l document, a legitimato r and , assuredly , a n arbite r wer e indee d needed t o hav e th e las t wor d i n dispute s involvin g th e mechanis m of th e federa l system, that is , in dispute s betwee n th e centra l govern ment an d th e states . Fo r the y recognize d tha t th e Unio n coul d no t survive otherwis e i n th e imag e o f it s creation . But the y di d no t believe tha t th e "Republi c woul d com e t o a n end " i f the court s wer e deprived o f th e powe r o f judicial revie w regardin g othe r legislatio n passed b y Congress . This position , howeve r laudabl e i n term s o f judicial self-restraint , ignores tha t rol e o f th e judiciary, i n general , an d o f th e Suprem e Court, i n particular , whic h cast s i t a s th e guardia n o f ou r individua l liberties—a rol e tha t ha s occupie d i t increasingly durin g th e cours e of thi s turbulen t century . A s such i t ha s becom e th e greates t institu tional safeguar d fo r th e individua l an d th e smal l group . Here , i n saying "no " t o government—bot h nationa l an d state—i t ha s be come th e las t bulwark agains t majoritaria n excesses . In bein g willin g to stan d u p an d b e counted , i n refusin g t o b e cowe d b y criticis m and opprobrium , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s acte d a s a "mora l goad " t o the othe r tw o branches . Unlik e th e legislativ e an d executiv e wings , the judiciar y doe s no t coun t constituents ; i s neithe r engage d no r interested i n a popularit y contest ; an d i s far fro m tha t aren a tha t s o frequently ha s see n th e othe r two , an d notabl y th e legislature , clos e to wha t Judg e Learne d H a n d himsel f viewe d a s "th e pressur e o f public hysteria , publi c panic , an d publi c greed. " An d eve n i f a transfer o f th e judicial guardianshi p t o othe r institution s o f govern ment wer e theoreticall y desirable , whic h fe w thoughtfu l citizen s believe, i t woul d b e politicall y impossible . Wha t san e citize n o f th e United State s would wis h t o hav e th e ultimat e exercis e o f hi s o r he r individual liberties , includin g th e provision s o f th e Bil l o f Rights , b e at th e merc y o f partisan politica l bodies ? Historical Justification. Th e othe r pron g o f th e basi c argumen t i s fa r more complicated , fo r eve n i f we accep t th e Court' s necessar y rol e

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Courts and Public Policy as arbiter an d legitimator—a s mos t Americans do , depending some what upo n whos e o x i s being gored—wha t o f th e historica l justifica tion o f th e practice ? Thi s quer y ha s bee n a constan t on e eve r since Marburyv. Madison —and eve n prio r t o tha t histori c decision — because th e Foundin g Father s did not spell ou t th e powe r o f judicial review i n s o man y words , an d it s presenc e toda y result s fro m a combination o f historica l experience , judicia l interpretation , an d rather obviou s necessity . Little woul d b e gaine d b y a length y rehashin g o f th e historica l argument an d evidence . I t i s a fac t tha t th e Constitutio n make s n o specific reference t o judicial review . I t i s also a fact tha t th e Foundin g Fathers clearl y envisage d it ; tha t i t wa s debate d a t lengt h i n th e Constitutional Conventio n i n Philadelphi a i n 1787 ; tha t th e mos t authoritative historica l researc h availabl e o n th e point , b y Charle s Beard, 55 indicate s tha t betwee n twenty-fiv e an d thirty-tw o o f th e fiftyfive delegate s t o th e Constitutiona l Convention , includin g three fourths o f th e Convention' s leaders , generall y favore d judicia l re view; that such significan t framer s a s Madison, Hamilton , an d Gover nor Morri s wen t publicl y o n recor d a s so holding ; an d that , indeed , the supremac y claus e o f Articl e V I o f th e Constitutio n an d Articl e III, Sectio n 2 , o f th e basi c documen t strongl y impl y th e powe r a t issue. I t i s fai r t o conclud e tha t th e debat e ove r th e legitimacy o f judicial revie w has bee n settle d b y history. 56 'Marbury v. Madison! W e canno t pas s o n t o conside r som e o f th e ramifications o f judicia l revie w i n th e judicia l an d governmenta l process withou t pausin g t o glanc e a t it s judicial "birth, " a s i t were — with Chie f Justice Marshal l i n th e rol e o f midwife—i n th e hallowe d case o f Marbury v . Madison? 1 Althoug h a spat e o f recen t scholarl y commentary ha s chose n t o vie w i t a s o f exaggerate d significanc e i n interpretative terms, 58 i t i s a cas e tha t ha s bee n aptl y calle d "th e ri b of th e Constitution," 5 9 an d whic h Justice Frankfurte r characterize d as "indispensable " t o th e "characte r o f a writte n constitution." 6 0 Marshall, wh o ha d bee n a delegat e t o th e Ratifyin g Conventio n o f Virginia, a one-ter m congressma n fro m tha t state , J o h n Adams' s Secretary o f State , an d a brillian t lawyer , understoo d th e Constitu 75

Courts and Public Policy tion an d th e need s o f hi s land . H e wa s determine d t o mol d the m a s he deeme d wis e and appropriate . Hi s chanc e cam e i n what, with th e possible exceptio n o f hi s decisio n i n McCulloch v . Maryland 61 som e sixteen year s later , i s th e mos t significan t decisio n o n constitutiona l law eve r rendere d b y th e Court . Tha t h e shoul d hav e disqualifie d himself fro m sittin g i n th e case ; tha t i t coul d readil y hav e bee n disposed o f withou t meetin g th e constitutiona l issue ; an d tha t th e construction itsel f wa s unnecessaril y tortuou s an d arguabl y decep tive—none o f thes e consideration s no w matter s i n th e fac e o f Mar shall's momentou s holdin g tha t "a n ac t repugnan t t o th e Constitu tion i s void " an d tha t i t lie s wit h th e court s t o determin e th e question o f validity . The backgroun d o f Marbury v . Madison i s sufficientl y wel l know n to obviat e an y length y discussion. 62 Briefly , J o h n Adams , secon d president o f th e Unite d States , ha d bee n defeate d fo r reelectio n i n 1800 by his arch politica l rival , Thomas Jefferson. I n orde r t o salvag e at leas t somethin g fo r hi s thoroughl y trounce d Federalis t Party , Adams, i n 1801 , wit h th e ai d o f a n obligin g lame-duc k Federalis t Congress, cause d t o hav e tw o statute s a d o p t e d — t h e Circui t Cour t and th e Distric t o f Columbi a Acts—tha t enable d hi m t o nominate , and hav e hi s Senat e confirm , fifty-nine federa l judges—includin g his ow n secretar y o f state , J o h n Marshall—an d thu s "pack " th e judicial branc h wit h "saf e an d loyal " Federalists . Presumabl y the y would se e t o i t tha t an y excesse s o f th e incomin g Republica n "radi cals" an d "Jacobins " woul d b e hel d t o a minimum . Prophetically , i t became Marshall' s job, a s th e outgoin g secretar y o f state , t o delive r the commission s o f thes e last-minut e appointees , ofte n calle d th e Adams "Midnigh t Judges. " Bu t becaus e o f th e pressur e o f tim e and last-minut e preparation s fo r th e inauguration—whe n h e woul d have t o swea r i n hi s cordiall y dislike d distan t cousi n a s chie f execu tive o f th e Unite d States—Marshal l faile d t o delive r seventee n o f the judicia l commissions , literall y leavin g the m o n th e des k o f hi s successor, James Madison . Whe n Jefferson an d Madiso n foun d thes e undelivered commissions , th e ne w presiden t exclaimed : "Th e nomi nations crowde d i n b y Mr. Adams afte r h e kne w h e wa s no t appoint ing fo r himsel f I trea t a s mer e nullities." 63 And , accordin g t o on e

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Courts and Public Policy account, th e commission s wer e "dispose d o f with th e othe r wastepa per an d rubbis h o f th e office." 64 Among th e disappointe d appointee s wer e Willia m Marbur y an d three colleagues, 65 who ha d bee n dul y nominate d an d confirme d a s justices o f th e peac e fo r th e Distric t o f Columbia . The y hire d Ad ams's Attorney General , Charle s Lee , t o tak e thei r cas e t o court . Le e saw hi s bes t chanc e i n Sectio n 1 3 o f th e Judiciary Ac t o f 1789 , th e basic statut e tha t ha d organize d th e federa l judiciary . Thi s gav e t o the Suprem e Cour t th e authorit y t o issu e writs of mandamus (Lati n for "w e command") , writ s commandin g a publi c office r t o perfor m his o r he r official , ministerial , nondiscretionar y duty . I n 1803, 66 the cas e o f Marbury v . Madison thu s reache d th e origina l docke t jurisdiction o f th e highes t cour t o f th e land , wit h Chie f Justice J o h n Marshall presiding . Marshal l promptl y issue d a n orde r t o Madiso n to sho w caus e wh y th e requeste d wri t shoul d no t b e issue d agains t h i m — a n orde r tha t wa s ignored b y th e secretar y o f state . The stag e was now se t for th e momentou s opinio n an d decision . Marshall, shrew d an d wise—an d full y aliv e t o th e struggl e be tween tw o politica l faction s tha t informe d th e case—recognize d that h e wa s confronte d wit h a Hobson' s choice : i f h e wer e t o grant the wri t o f mandamu s i n th e fac e o f almos t certai n disobedienc e by Madiso n (actin g upo n Jefferson' s instructions) , th e fledglin g Supreme Cour t woul d b e powerles s t o d o anythin g abou t enforcin g its order ; ye t i f h e wer e t o refuse to gran t th e writ , Jefferson woul d triumph. Facin g tha t unenviabl e choic e squarely , Marshal l inge niously manage d t o hav e hi s cak e an d ea t i t too . I n wha t hi s biogra pher, Senato r Albert J. Beveridg e o f Indiana , describe d a s "a coup a s bold i n desig n an d darin g a s tha t b y whic h th e Constitutio n ha d been framed," 6 7 Marshall—consciou s o f an d delightin g i n wha t wa s indubitably a n emotion-charged , fascinatin g politica l situation— declared Section 13 of the Judiciary Act unconstitutional I t was unconstitu tional, h e wrot e fo r hi s unanimou s Court, 6 8 becaus e Congres s ha d given t o th e Suprem e Cour t a powe r whic h i t coul d no t legall y receive: fo r tha t powe r represente d a statutory additio n t o th e Court's original jurisdiction— a jurisdictio n tha t coul d b e altere d only by constitutional amendment (a s indee d i t ha d bee n b y th e Elev -

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Courts and Public Policy enth Amendmen t i n 1798 , following th e cas e o f Chisholmv. Georgia? 9 of 1793) . "A n ac t repugnan t t o th e Constitutio n i s void," crowe d th e Chief Justice, explainin g tha t i t i s "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those wh o appl y th e rule t o particula r cases , mus t o f necessit y expoun d an d interpre t that rule . . . . A law repugnan t t o th e Constitutio n i s void; . . . court s as well a s other department s ar e boun d b y that instrument." 7 0 True, sai d Marshall , Marbur y an d hi s friend s wer e clearl y entitle d to thei r commissions , an d h e denounce d Jefferso n an d Madiso n from th e benc h i n scathin g terms . Proceedin g wit h dicta tha t con sumed twent y o f th e twenty-seve n page s o f th e case , h e announce d that no t onl y di d th e lega l righ t t o th e commissio n exist , bu t tha t Lee ha d bee n correc t i n assumin g tha t th e law s o f th e countr y afforded a remedy. Unfortunately , tha t remed y was unconstitutional . And thu s judicial revie w wa s bor n formall y a s th e poten t powe r we kno w today , althoug h i t ha d actuall y alread y bee n applie d i n fiv e minor instance s prio r t o Marbury, i n effec t a s earl y a s 179 2 an d 1794. 71 Bu t Marshal l ha d no w give n i t th e dignit y o f bot h ful l dres s and ful l explanation . An d h e delighte d i n th e knowledg e tha t b y his coup de main, blendin g apparen t rathe r tha n rea l judicia l self abnegation wit h a ver y rea l judicial branc h clai m t o equipowerfu l partnership i n th e tripartit e governmenta l system , h e ha d attaine d a major goa l o f th e democracy-distrustin g Federalists . Although Marshal l evidentl y straine d th e judicial proces s b y mak ing Marbury v . Madison th e catalys t fo r th e pronunciament o o f th e judicial veto , ther e i s no t th e slightes t doub t tha t judicial revie w i s crucial t o th e federa l characte r o f th e governmenta l proces s i n th e United States , th e principle s o f separatio n o f powers , an d thos e o f limited government . Whateve r hi s motive s w e r e — a n d the y wer e a t once nobl e an d crafty—th e grea t Chie f Justice rendere d a monu mental servic e t o th e republi c i n expoundin g th e doctrine . Fa r from bein g a usurpation , judicial review , a produc t o f ou r commo n Western histor y an d th e "logica l resul t o f centurie s o f Europea n thought an d colonia l experiences," 7 2 ha s conclusivel y powerfu l claims t o authenticity , buttresse d b y a stron g lin e o f precedent s an d convincing contemporar y literature . Tha t it s exercis e ha s inevitabl y

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Courts and Public Policy become a "ca n o f worms " i s bot h understandabl e an d fascinating , and ver y much a matte r o f line-drawing . Line-Drawing and Judicial Policy Judging and Legislating. Eve n thos e wh o ar e philosophicall y oppose d to th e principl e o f judicial revie w gran t tha t court s mus t posses s th e authority t o interpre t an d t o adjudicate , bu t tha t the y mus t no t "legislate." I n tha t vie w the y d o no t diffe r significantl y fro m thos e who favo r th e principl e o f judicial review . Th e difficul t problem — and i t i s on e tha t i s crucia l t o a n understandin g o f th e continuin g controversy tha t ha s embroile d th e judiciary , i n general , an d th e Supreme Court , i n particular—i s wher e t o dra w th e lin e betwee n "judging an d "legislating" especiall y sinc e ther e i s no agreemen t o n these definitions . In a sense , al l judging i s "legislating " an d al l legislatin g i s "judg ing." What th e basi c indictmen t o f th e Cour t refer s to , o f course , i s its allege d makin g o f policy , it s "la w making, " it s prescriptiv e polic y making, eve n give n it s ultimat e powe r o f judicial review—fo r thes e are presumabl y matter s reserve d t o th e legislature . I n fact , ther e i s little o r n o disagreemen t wit h thi s basi c premise . Th e difficultie s arise i n wha t on e view s as proper adjudicatio n an d ho w on e regard s judicial decisions . What appear s t o be a bona fid e exercis e o f judicial power t o som e wil l appea r t o other s a s a n unjustifiabl e judicia l assumption o f legislativ e authority—o f "la w making" instea d o f "la w finding." In chapte r 4 , th e Suprem e Court' s decisio n o n th e us e o f th e twenty two-wor d Ne w Yor k State-compose d nondenominationa l prayer i n th e publi c schools , whic h th e hig h tribuna l rule d t o b e a violation o f th e principl e o f separatio n o f churc h an d state , an d hence a n unconstitutiona l infringemen t o f th e Firs t Amendment, 7 3 will be discussed . Thos e wh o favore d th e decisio n regarde d i t a s no t only a prope r bu t als o a necessar y exercis e o f th e judicial function . Those wh o oppose d it , on th e othe r hand , castigate d th e decisio n a s unwarranted judicia l legislatio n tha t denie d th e legislativ e majorit y the righ t t o se t publi c policy . When , afte r lon g year s o f refusin g t o 79

Courts and Public Policy hear th e questio n o f legislativ e districtin g o n ground s tha t i t was o f a "politica l nature " and thu s beyond it s jurisdiction, th e Cour t finally reversed itsel f i n 196 2 i n Baker v . Carr 74 an d declare d th e issu e justiciable i n lin e wit h th e requirement s o f th e Fourteent h Amend ment (an d late r Articl e I o f th e mai n bod y o f th e Constitution), 7 5 there wer e thos e wh o agree d wholeheartedly , an d those—includin g Justice Feli x Frankfurter , wh o wrot e a sixty-eight-pag e dissentin g opinion i n th e case—wh o though t th e Cour t ha d venture d int o the spher e o f legislating . An d i t goe s withou t sayin g tha t similarl y opposing views extended t o th e Court' s dramati c post-Gideon 76 right to-counsel extensio n case s o f th e 1960s; 77 greete d wha t i s probabl y the mos t far-reaching socia l polic y decision o f th e century , th e unan imous desegregatio n cas e o f Brown v . Board of Education;78 an d en gulfed th e Court' s contentiou s holding s i n th e emotion-charge d Abortion Cases of 197 3 an d thei r subsequen t interpretations , cappe d by th e controversia l 5: 4 ruling s i n Webster v. Reproductive Health Services i n 1989 , Rust v . Sullivan i n 1991 , an d Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v . Casey and Ada v . Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in 1992. 79 Ox-Goring. Th e Brown cas e raise s th e intriguin g poin t tha t muc h of th e criticis m directe d a t th e Cour t ove r th e judging-legislatin g dichotomy i s a direc t reactio n t o th e gorin g o f persona l oxen . Th e emotion-charged problem s o f racia l desegregatio n an d integratio n are tailor-mad e fo r suc h a charge . Thus , th e earlie r counterpart s o f those mos t vehemen t i n thei r attac k o n th e Cour t fo r "outrageou s judicial usurpatio n o f legislativ e power " i n 195 4 ha d laude d th e Court a centur y befor e whe n i t decided th e famou s cas e o f Dred Scott v. Sandford 80 "their " way . Conversely , th e earlie r counterpart s o f th e backers o f th e 195 4 Brown decisio n ha d bee n denunciator y o f Dred Scott in 1857 . A myriad o f simila r illustration s quickl y com e t o min d to len d substanc e t o th e basi c charg e tha t muc h o f th e criticis m o f the Cour t i s sheer sophistr y an d ax-grinding . On e nee d onl y look t o the avalanch e o f declaration s o f unconstitutionalit y o f Ne w Dea l legislation b y th e pre-193 7 Cour t o n sundr y constitutiona l ground s (thirteen o f thes e comin g betwee n 193 4 an d 1936 ) whe n th e major 80

Courts and Public Policy ity o f th e justices, backe d b y th e foe s o f th e Ne w Deal , insiste d tha t all the y di d wa s "t o la y th e articl e o f th e Constitutio n whic h i s invoked besid e th e statut e whic h i s challenged " an d the n decid e "whether th e latte r square s wit h th e former. " I n th e thirtee n case s just allude d to , th e Ne w Dea l law s neve r seeme d t o "square " i n th e eyes o f Justices Va n Devanter , Sutherland , McReynolds , a n d Butler , and frequentl y no t i n thos e o f Chie f Justic e Hughe s an d Justic e Roberts. Yet the y almos t alway s di d see m t o "square " i n th e eye s o f Justices Brandeis , Stone , an d Cardozo . Who ha d th e bette r "eyes " an d wha t doe s th e ver b "t o square " mean? Considerabl e subjectivit y attend s th e problem , primaril y o n the par t o f thos e whos e ow n o x i s being gored , bu t als o o n th e par t of th e justices themselves . Still , any interpretatio n tha t dismisse s th e basic argumen t a s on e bottome d o n purel y persona l value s i s guilt y of considerabl e over-simplificatio n o f a highl y vexatiou s a n d signifi cant issue . Judicial "Monks or Scientists" On e thin g i s clear : judges ar e judges , but the y ar e als o "me n [an d women] , no t disembodie d spirits. " I n the word s o f Justice Frankfurter , a principa l apostl e o f judicial self restraint, "a s me n [an d women] , the y respon d t o h u m a n situations . They d o no t resid e i n a vacuum. " Justice McReynold s insiste d char acteristically tha t a jurist canno t an d shoul d no t b e "a n amorphou s dummy, unspotte d b y h u m a n emotions"—an d h e wa s assuredl y "spotted!" As Chief Justice Warre n wrote , "ou r judges ar e no t monk s or scientists , bu t participant s i n th e livin g strea m o f ou r nationa l life, steerin g th e la w betwee n th e danger s o f rigidit y o n th e on e h a n d an d formlessnes s o n th e other." 8 1 H e thu s echoe d th e realisti c appraisal fou r decade s earlie r b y Thoma s Ree d Powell , wh o ha d observed tha t "[j]udge s hav e preference s fo r socia l policie s a s yo u and I . They form thei r judgments afte r th e varying fashions i n whic h you an d I for m ours . The y hav e hands , organs , dimensions , senses , affections, passions . The y ar e warme d b y th e sam e winte r an d sum mer an d b y the sam e idea s a s a layman is." 82 In interpretin g ou r basi c document , judges do , o f course , "legis late," a fact o f judicial lif e recognize d "withou t hesitation " b y Justice 81

Courts and Public Policy Holmes whe n h e wrot e that , indeed , jurists "d o an d mus t legislate. " He, lik e hi s successors , Cardoz o an d Frankfurter , full y believe d i n judicial self-abnegation . But , h e a d d e d — a n d i t i s a "but " crucia l t o the issu e unde r discussion—the y ca n legislat e "onl y interstitially ; they ar e confine d fro m mola r t o molecula r motions." 8 3 Thes e mo tions ar e rigidl y circumscribed b y walls that ar e unsee n b y the layper son, walls built o f th e heritag e o f th e taugh t traditio n o f th e law . N o one expresse d thi s a t onc e mor e pungentl y an d beautifull y tha n Justice Cardoz o who , afte r acknowledgin g tha t "th e grea t tide s an d currents whic h engul f th e res t o f men , d o no t tur n asid e i n thei r course, an d pas s th e judges idl y by," 84 wisely explained tha t a jurist is not t o innovat e a t pleasure . H e i s not a knight-errant , roamin g a t will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiratio n fro m consecrate d principles . H e i s no t t o yiel d t o spasmodic sentiment , t o vagu e an d unregulate d benevolence . H e i s to exercis e a discretio n informe d b y tradition , methodize d b y anal ogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated t o "the primordial necessity of order in the social life." 85

Guidelines of the Taught Tradition of the Law The "consecrate d principles " o f whic h Justice Cardoz o spok e ar e part an d parce l o f th e taugh t traditio n o f th e law , which guide s an d motivates th e judge s i n thei r decisions . Man y facet s combin e t o bring thi s traditio n an d thes e principle s t o life , an d althoug h the y are almos t inevitabl y interprete d alon g somewha t divergen t line s b y different judges (o f whom th e duo s o f Justices Blac k and Frankfurte r in th e 1940s , 1950s , an d 1960s , an d Brenna n an d Rehnquis t i n th e 1970s an d 1980 s ar e excellen t illustrations) , the y ar e ascertainable . There i s tha t abidin g sens e o f judicial integrit y tha t come s wit h th e robe; a consciousnes s o f precedent ; rule s o f procedure ; recognitio n of th e Court' s threefol d rol e a s a governmental , political , an d lega l institution; th e presumptio n o f constitutionalit y o f legislation ; a n awareness o f membershi p i n th e bod y politic , o f th e responsibilit y of not bein g to o fa r ou t o f step with consensus—certainl y no t i n th e long run; th e concep t o f equality befor e th e la w and a t th e ba r o f th e Supreme Court . A fe w word s o f explanatio n fo r som e o f thes e 82

Courts and Public Policy guidelines, particularl y thos e o f a policy - procedur e nature , ar e i n order. Adherence to Precedent. A s a principl e o f judicial policy , adherenc e t o precedent—the doctrin e o f stare decisis et quieta non movere ("let th e decision stan d a n d d o no t distur b th e calm")—i s bot h necessar y and desirable . I t i s normall y accepte d a s a rul e o f thum b unles s there i s clea r reaso n fo r change . This , o f course , require s a carefu l weighing o f alternative s available , fo r i t ofte n come s dow n t o a choice o f precedents . Precedent s abound , an d no t al l precedent s are o f equa l rank . Lor d Cok e laude d "th e know n certainti e o f th e law [which ] i s th e safti e o f all " bu t h e wa s neithe r advers e t o over turning preceden t no r t o manufacturin g one . Indeed , w e mus t no t expect wha t Chie f Justic e Hughe s calle d "th e ic y stratospher e o f certainty." According t o Justice Brandeis : stare decisi s i s usuall y th e wis e polic y becaus e i n mos t matter s i t i s more importan t tha t th e applicable rul e o f law be settled tha n tha t i t be settle d right . . . . This i s commonly tru e eve n where th e erro r i s a matter o f serious concern , provide d correctio n ca n b e had b y legislation. Bu t i n case s involvin g th e Federa l Constitution , wher e correc tion throug h legislatio n i s practically impossible, this Court ha s ofte n overruled it s earlie r decisions . Th e Cour t bow s t o th e lesson s o f experience an d th e forc e o f bette r reasoning , recognizin g tha t th e process of trial and error , so fruitful i n th e physical sciences is appropriate also in the judicial function. 86 And, i n s o doing , th e Cour t bot h "judges " an d "legislates. " In th e wistful word s o f Justice Stewart , endeavorin g t o explai n hi s chang e of min d vis-a-vi s precedent i n a n importan t labo r case : "Wisdo m to o often neve r comes , a n d s o on e ough t no t t o rejec t i t merely becaus e it comes late." 8 7 Procedural Guidelines. Organized , predictabl e procedur e i s o f th e essence t o an y judicial body , and particularl y t o th e highes t tribunal , for th e vas t majorit y o f it s work , an d certainl y it s raison d'etre, i s appellate. Hence : 1. A definit e "cas