The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh 9781032316383, 9781032316390, 9781003310679

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‘This collection of essays on Bangladesh’s place in the world stands out in the crowded field of writings on political Islam. The editors offer a comprehensive survey and analysis of Islam’s political role in the Muslim world’s third most populous nation.’ Shabbir Akhtar, Regent’s Park College, University of Oxford

‘The Jamaat Question offers a nuanced exploration of Bangladesh’s sociopolitical landscape, focusing on Jamaat, its largest Islam-based party. Bridging multiple disciplines, this insightful volume sheds light on Jamaat’s controversial and constructive role in Bangladesh’s tumultuous politics. An essential read for scholars probing the complexities of Islam, politics, and society in modern Bangladesh.’ Mohammad A Auwal, Department of Communication Studies, California State University, Los Angeles

‘The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh is a marvellous compendium, a sparkling collection of gems from the established authors of political Islam in Bangladesh. Destined to become a masterpiece in the field, the volume, for the first time, delves deep into the local politics in Bangladesh with global relevance. Empirically rich and theoretically sophisticated, this dazzling collection of essays will mark a new era of reconciliation between Islamic and secular politics in Bangladesh and beyond.’ Md Yousuf Ali, Islamic Philosophy and Islamic Thought, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM)

The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh

The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh addresses the complex intersection of global politics and local dynamics in Bangladesh, particularly in relation to Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat). With multidisciplinary insights and perspectives, the contributors to this volume provide an objective socio-historical analysis of Islam, politics and society in Bangladesh. Separating fact from fiction, they attempt to uncover the truth about Jamaat, the largest Islam-based political party in the country. Suppressed and marginalized by the BAL regime, Jamaat remains active in the social landscape of Bangladesh. What makes Jamaat so resilient against all odds? Can it peacefully coexist with rival political parties in a polarized nation such as Bangladesh? This book seeks to answer these crucial questions. An essential read for those interested in Bangladeshi politics and political Islam. Syed Serajul Islam is Professor and Former Chair of the Department of Political Studies at Lakehead University, Orillia, Canada. Md Saidul Islam is Associate Professor and the Post-graduate Coordinator of Sociology at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Politics in Asia

Substantive Representation of Women in Asian Parliaments Edited Devin K. Joshi and Christian Echle Activism and Authoritarian Governance in Asia Edited by Amy Barrow and Sara Fuller Japan’s Security Policy Keiji Nakatsuji India’s Southeast Asia Policy During the Cold War Identity, Inclination and Pragmatism 1947–1989 Edited by Tridib Chakraborti and Mohor Chakraborty Contemporary Japanese Politics and Anxiety Over Governance Ken’ichi Ikeda Comparative Federalism in Asia Democracy, Ethnicity and Religion Baogang He, Michael G. Breen and Laura Allison-Reumann Taiwan and Southeast Asia Soft Power and Hard Truths Facing China’s Ascendancy Karl Chee Leong Lee and Ying-kit Chan The Political Economy of China–Myanmar Relations Yizheng Zou The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh Islam, Politics and Society in a Post-Democratic Nation Edited by Syed Serajul Islam and Md Saidul Islam For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Politics-in-Asia/ book-series/PIA

The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh Islam, Politics and Society in a Post-Democratic Nation

Edited by Syed Serajul Islam and Md Saidul Islam

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Syed Serajul Islam and Md Saidul Islam; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Syed Serajul Islam and Md Saidul Islam to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-31638-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-31639-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-31067-9 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679 Typeset in Galliard by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of Illustrations List of Contributors Acknowledgements   1 Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh

ix x xv 1

MD SAIDUL ISLAM

  2 Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim ­Society in Bangladesh

15

MD NAZRUL ISLAM

  3 Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat

43

SYED SERAJUL ISLAM

  4 Jamaat and Shibir: From Islamic Revolutionary to Ideal Citizen

63

NAZMUS SAKIB

  5 Jamaat and Democracy: Constitutionalism, Electoral Politics and Complacency

75

M. MONIRUZZAMAN

  6 Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat in Bangladesh: A Social Movement Theory Perspective

100

FAROQUE AMIN

  7 Behind the Story: Birth of Islami Bank Bangladesh ­Limited and the Role of Jamaat MOHAMMAD NAKIBUR RAHMAN AND ABDULLAH M. NOMAN

127

viii

Contents

8 Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh

145

ANWARUL WADUD AND MD SAIDUL ISLAM

9 Execution of Jamaat Leaders: National Villain or Fallen Heroes?

182

MARUF BILLAH

10 The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh: Courting Controversy

206

TOBY CADMAN, CARL BUCKLEY AND JACK SPROSON

11 Jamaat and Bangladesh: Towards a Cohesive Narrative

238

MD SAIDUL ISLAM AND MD NAZRUL ISLAM

Index

249

Illustrations

Figures 7.1 IBBL daily stock return compared with emerging market indices

138

Tables .1 Charity Medical Services of ISWCC 6 112 6.2 Financial Aid Given by the Jamaat City Office 120 6.3 Number of Recipients of One-off Financial Aid From the ISWCC 121 7.1 Number of Branches, Number of Employees and Asset Owned by Banks Operating Under Islamic Principles 131 8.1 BAL’s Election and Post-election Carnages (2014) 156 8.2 Political Violence in Bangladesh (2012–2016) 162 8.3 Victims of Enforced Disappearances (Missing Till Today) 164 8.4 Treatment of Jamaat by BAL Regime (January 2009–March 2021)166 8.5 List of Jamaat-Shibir Activists Killed by BAL-Regime (2009–2020)167

Contributors

Faroque Amin is Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Social Sciences in Western Sydney University, Australia. Additionally, he serves as Research Fellow in Politics and Religion at The Future Institute, UK. He also holds the position of Treasurer at the South Asian Policy Initiative, besides serving as the Editor of Suprovat Sydney, a community newspaper published in Australia. Dr. Amin completed his doctoral research on Islamic politics at the School of Social Sciences at Western Sydney University. Prior to that, he pursued a master’s degree in Usul al-Din and Comparative Religion at the International Islamic University Malaysia. He also studied Arabic language at Al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, following his undergraduate studies in Da’wah and Islamic Studies at the International Islamic University Chittagong, Bangladesh. His research interests encompass various areas such as Islamic politics, Islamic theology, sociology of religion and contemporary political thought. He has contributed to these fields through the publication of several journal articles. Maruf Billah is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University Technology MARA (UiTM), Malaysia. He’s also serving as the Deputy Managing Editor of the UiTM Review on Human Rights and Sustainability Law. He did his PhD and LLM from Nagoya University, Japan, with the Japanese government’s specialized research grants Leading Daigaku and completed his LLB. from International Islamic University Malaysia with the Malaysian International Scholarship under the Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia. He’s a former Visiting Scholar of the Institute of Legal Studies, Chandigarh University, India, and a Shariah Expert in the halal auditing committee of Japan Islamic Trust. Dr. Billah’s research interests include international criminal law, human rights law, treaty law, International Criminal Court, and Islamic law and jurisprudence. He has published several peer-reviewed journal articles on these topics and presented many papers at international seminars and conferences in Malaysia and Japan. He’s currently working as a regular reviewer of several international law journals. He’s also a member of the Asian Society of International Law. Carl Buckley is a member of the 33 Bedford Row Civil and Commercial Practice Group, the International Practice Group and the Public Law Practice

Contributors xi Group. He is experienced in all aspects of civil litigation with a particular focus on actions against the police and public authorities, claims under the data protection, and the European convention on human rights. In terms of international law, Carl is a specialist in the areas of international criminal and public law, international humanitarian law, human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law. Carl has brought numerous claims for judicial review against a number of public authorities. Toby Cadman is a London-based barrister and an international law specialist in the field of international criminal and  humanitarian  law, international human rights law, extradition and mutual legal assistance, anti-corruption, whistleblower protection, business and human rights, international  commercial law, arbitration and international climate justice law. Co-founder of The Guernica Group and Joint Head of Chambers at Guernica 37 International Justice Chambers, Toby also serves as Associate Counsel to The Guernica for International Justice. Md Nazrul Islam is Professor of Political Studies at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet-3114, Bangladesh. He received PhD in Sociology at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He also did MSc in International Relations at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Earlier, he completed master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. His works have appeared in various international peer-reviewed journals including International Area Studies Review; Bandung: Journal of the Global South; Religions; Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies; Social Sciences; Politics, Religion & Ideology; and Contemporary Islam. He is the co-author of the book Islam and Democracy in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). His most recent publication is ‘Faithful Participation: The ‘Ulama in Bangladeshi Politics’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 23:2 (2022): 177–203. Dr. Islam’s research interests include religion, politics and governance; democracy and political Islam; religion, environment and development; poor and marginalized communities; and Bangladesh studies. Md Saidul Islam is Associate Professor and the Post-Graduate Coordinator of Sociology, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He’s also serving as an elected member of the NTU Senate. He did his MA and PhD from York University in Canada with Graduate Fellowship for Academic Distinction and received his bachelor’s degree in Sociology and Anthropology from International Islamic University Malaysia with the Royal Education Award. He’s a former Visiting Scholar of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a research associate of the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus. Dr. Islam’s research interests include international development and environmental sociology, and he has published seven books and over four dozen peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters on these topics. He is the co-author of the book Islam and Democracy in South

xii  Contributors Asia: The Case of Bangladesh (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). As a top emerging scholar in sociology, he received the Early Investigator Award (Prix de jeune chercheuse ou chercheur) in 2015 from the Canadian Sociological Association (CSA). He is the past Chair of the Sociology of Development Cluster, CSA. He also taught at York University in Canada, the College of William and Mary in the United States, and Nankai University in China. Syed Serajul Islam (PhD, McGill, Canada), a Canadian political scientist, is currently Professor in the Department of Political Science at Lakehead University, Canada. He taught at the University of Dhaka, McGill, Concordia, as well as universities in USA, Malaysia, Singapore, and many other countries. He has written nine books and more than 80 refereed articles. He is a member in the editorial boards of several international journals. Dr. Islam received several grants, including SRC and Fulbright Research grants. He received Lakehead’s 2008 Distinguished Researcher Award, the 2005 Contribution to Research Award, as well as the Merit Increment Award every two years. He is also recognized as one of the top 40 researchers at Lakehead University. Dr. Islam is a specialist in international politics, international law, global terrorism & security, global governance, international environmental sustainability, Asian and Third World politics, new public management & policy, and international political economy. Besides research, Dr. Islam received Lakehead’s 2009 Distinguished Instructor Award and 2005 Contribution to Teaching Award. In the TVO’s Best Lecturer competition 2008, Dr. Islam was selected as one of the best (top) 38 lecturers in all Ontario universities and colleges. M. Moniruzzaman is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sharjah, UAE. Earlier, he received his PhD from Nagoya University, Japan, and subsequently taught at Northern University Bangladesh and International Islamic University Malaysia, where he headed the department during 2013–2014. His research interests cover comparative politics, political economy of the Muslim world and Islamic political thought. He has published over 40 articles in journals such as Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, South Asian Survey, Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, South Asian Development, Intellectual Discourse and Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. Currently, he is working on a book entitled Minority at Home and Abroad: Islamic Theories of Minority Rights. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, the Association for Asian Studies, and the Asian Political Science Association. Apart from academic research, Moniruzzaman also publishes creative writings in his native Bengali language. Dr. Abdullah M. Noman, PhD, CFP®, is Associate Professor of Finance in the Thomas College of Business and Economics at the University of North Carolina at Pembroke. He obtained his PhD from the University of New Orleans in Louisiana. Previously, he studied economics at the International

Contributors xiii Islamic University, Islamabad, and finance at the University of Bristol, UK. He is Certified Financial Planner (CFP®) and is actively involved in Pro Bono financial advising. Dr. Noman’s research interest includes behavioural and personal finance, socially responsible investing and asset pricing. He has published in several academic journals, such as Review of Accounting and Finance, Journal of Risk and Financial Management, Journal of Financial Economic Policy, and Banking and Finance Review. His research has also been presented in several academic conferences, including Southwestern Finance Association, Southern Finance Association, Eastern Finance Association and Academy of Economics and Finance annual meetings. Mohammad Nakibur Rahman is Associate Professor of Finance at the College of Business and Economics at the University of North Carolina at Pembroke. He received his PhD in Finance from the University of New Orleans. Dr. Rahman’s teaching interests span the areas of international finance, investment, financial management and entrepreneurial finance. His research interests include contemporary issues related to international business, technology, risk management, financial derivative and stock markets. He has authored and co-authored research papers that have been published in refereed journals and in the proceedings of national and international academic conferences. His publications have appeared in the Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Journal of Derivatives  & Hedge Funds and Journal of International Business Research and Practice. Dr. Rahman has received research awards for several papers presented at national and regional academic conferences and chaired sessions and served as a discussant. Dr. Rahman’s latest book titled Doing Business in Chile and Peru: Challenges and Opportunities was published by Palgrave Macmillan. Nazmus Sakib is Lecturer at the Lewis Honors College, University of Kentucky. He also has a secondary appointment as an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the same university and an associate faculty in the international studies programme. He holds an MA and a PhD in Political Science from Texas Tech University and an MSSc and a BSSc in Economics from the University of Dhaka. His primary field of research is international relations with an emphasis on the peace science tradition. His academic works have appeared in International Interactions, Politics and Policy, European Politics and Society, Foreign Policy Analysis (forthcoming) and other journals. His teaching and research interests include studying the causes of war and peace, international security, civil–military relations, immigration, foreign policy, etc. His public scholarship-oriented opinion pieces have appeared in Newsweek, Daily Sabah, Forbes, TRT World, the National Interest, OpenDemocracy, etc. Jack Sproson is a Member of the Bar of England and Wales and a Member of G37 Chambers. Jack accepts instructions in all of Chambers’ practice areas, principally in public/private international law, international human rights

xiv  Contributors Law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law. As part of his international practice, Jack conducts litigation and supports individuals in matters before several international courts and tribunals, including, inter alia, the European Court of Human Rights, UN special procedures, the International Criminal Court and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers. He has supported several individuals in respect of their appeals against INTERPOL Red Notices and is an experienced practitioner in the area of business and human rights. He also has experience at the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals and in matters relating to the International Court of Justice.  Jack has extensive expertise in humanitarian and legal issues pertaining to conflict- and climate-related insecurity and displacement in Africa and the Middle East, most recently as lead counsel for a major project advocating for the continuation of UN cross-border humanitarian access in Syria. He has previously published on the protection of human rights both domestically and internationally, including in works published by Bloomsbury Professional. Anwarul Wadud is a distinguished educator and researcher. He obtained his PhD in Development Administration from the esteemed Philippine Christian University, where he focused on studying and understanding the intricacies of effective administration within development contexts. He earned a postdoctoral degree in Strategic Management and Leadership from the same university. He has actively engaged in research and has made significant contributions through his research publications and other scholarly works. At present, Dr. Wadud serves as a professor at the Graduate School of Jose Razol University in the Philippines, where he imparts his knowledge and experience to aspiring professionals. In addition to his role at Jose Razol University, Dr. Wadud is also a faculty member at the Graduate School of the Philippine Christian University. This dual position allows him to engage with a diverse range of students and contribute to developing academic programmes, fostering an environment of intellectual growth and exploration. He is a fellow of the prestigious Royal Society of Arts (RSA) in London, the United Kingdom, and the Royal Institution of Singapore, Singapore. These affiliations highlight his standing as a respected scholar and educator and his commitment to promoting excellence in education and research.

Acknowledgements

The Jamaat Question in Bangladesh was made possible by support from Lakehead University in Canada and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. We would like to acknowledge our debts to these two great institutions of higher learning. We are thankful to our contributors and reviewers who took this project seriously, especially Md Yousuf Ali, M. W. Islam, Md Mosharrof Hossain Shaikh, Bilkis Begum, Md Emdadul Islam, Muhammad Hedayatul Islam, Mahmudul Hasan and many more. We are grateful to the Routledge team—Simon Bates, Khin Thazin and Chelsea Low—for their diligent work, which included providing insightful comments, finding critical and constructive external reviews, and moving the project in a timely manner. We also thank Nageeb Gounjaria for his excellent copy editing. Our friends and family members have been a constant source of encouragement and enthusiasm throughout our life, particularly during this study. We believe this work could not be made possible without the continued emotional support from our family members: our parents, siblings, children and our spouses. We would like to express our heartfelt thanks to them. We also say a big ‘thank you’ to all our friends, colleagues and well-wishers. The contributors, not publisher and editors, are solely responsible for their views and analysis in this volume.

1 Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh Md Saidul Islam

Introduction Since 9/11, conversations about Islam, Muslims and Islam-based politics have gained renewed interest across the world, insomuch that it has become a pivotal factor in international relations. Following an increasingly securitized neoliberal order, this interest is, ironically, more pathological than genuine, shaped as it is by ‘a culture of fear and terror’. Besides becoming new ‘objects of analysis’, Islam, politics and Muslim societies have often been misrepresented through an amalgam of facts and fiction in order to create and then justify regimes of control, surveillance and interventions (Muscati 2003; Islam 2005, 2013). The study of Islam, politics and society in Bangladesh is no exception to this trend; hence, offering an objective analysis on these subjects through a rigorous investigation is no easy yet necessary task. With multidisciplinary insights and perspectives, this volume addresses this challenge through a series of contributions that speak to the complex intersection of global politics and local dynamics. While aiming to uncover facts from myths through an in-depth socio-historical analysis of Islam, politics and society in Bangladesh, the volume interrogates Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (henceforth Jamaat), the largest Islam-based political party in Bangladesh with about 10% support base.1 It explores whether a plural yet cohesive national narrative for peaceful coexistence is possible for Bangladesh, which is perpetually mired in political tensions and violence. Originally established in 1941 by Maulana Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Maududi (1903–1979), a South Asian Islamic revivalist in British India, Jamaat morphed into an independent political party after Bangladesh gained independence in 1971 (Amin 2016; Banu 1994). For disagreeing with some secular ideals and supporting the idea of a united Pakistan during the war of Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971, Jamaat’s positions and roles have always been a subject of heated debate in Bangladesh politics. Despite its participation in and contribution to most democratic and social justice movements in Bangladesh since independence (Islam, Önder, and Nyadera 2020), Jamaat is detested by a large segment of people in Bangladesh (Mostofa 2021; Fahim 2022). An upsurge of the so-called Shahbag Movement, backed by the current BAL (Bangladesh DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-1

2  Md Saidul Islam Awami League) regime, erupted in 2013; they called for a total extermination of Jamaat from Bangladesh (Parvez 2022). Thereafter, the top five leaders of Jamaat were hanged for their alleged crimes against humanity during the war of liberation in 1971. Since then, an unofficial ban was imposed on Jamaat with a massive crackdown on its activists and social institutions, and the party wasn’t allowed to participate in subsequent national elections (Al Jazeera 2013). Various reports estimate thus: [O]ver 35,000 cases have so far been instituted against more than 7,500,000 Jamaat leaders and workers across the country. . ., though the current internal report by BJI showed that in 2020, the individual cases instituted against more than three hundred thousand Jamaat members where about ten thousand members are in the prison. (Islam, Önder, and Nyadera 2020, 294) Interestingly, despite the consequent loss of its business and social institutions, Jamaat remains very active in the social landscape of Bangladesh (Amin 2016; Islam, Önder, and Nyadera, 2020). The questions arise: What makes Jamaat a political nemesis of the current BAL regime? How does Jamaat remain resilient despite tremendous repression, discrimination and scrutiny from the ruling regime? Admittedly, while many movements within and beyond Bangladesh have resorted to various forms of extremism, sometimes in the name of religion, by and large Jamaat propagates and upholds moderation and tolerance, adherence to the rule of law and democratic principles (Amin 2016). The resilience of Jamaat in the face of hostility and repression, its distinct place in liberal democracies and debates surrounding it, and its controversial role in 1971 and ramifications in post-independent Bangladesh comprise what I call ‘the Jamaat Question’. I use this phrase because, to some extent, it echoes what Kazemipur (2014) has framed as the ‘the Muslim Question’ in the context of Canadian multiculturalism. While Canada is portrayed as a model of successful integration, Muslims in Canada are often perceived as ‘different’ and unwilling to integrate. This ‘difference’ is not presented as a simple marker of cultural diversity; it is often branded with inferiority and negativity by the dominant discourse. At the heart of the Jamaat question lies a perception of an uneasy relationship between Jamaat and the rest (mainly the dominant secular discourse), its place in independent Bangladesh and the future of political Islam in the neoliberal world order. Representation of Jamaat in the Dominant Discourse Why has Jamaat been largely misunderstood, grossly hated and politically demonized, especially by the ruling regime and its cultural and intellectual allies? The answer to this question lies, in part, in the discursive formation of national identity as well as the historical representation of Jamaat in the dominant discourse in Bangladesh. The national identity of Bangladesh in

Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 3 the post-1971 era has been shaped not only by some political ideologies such as secularism and communism but also by erecting an ‘other’ against which the nation could articulate its future progress. With less than 1% support base in the then East Pakistan, Jamaat was only a tiny fraction among many other political parties and factions supporting a united Pakistan. However, being on the wrong side of history, it was expediently framed as the ‘other’ in the postliberation national identity of Bangladesh. This is not an experience unique to Jamaat or third-world politics; formation of national identity in the West also followed almost the same modus operandi by constructing a convenient ‘other’. French national identity, for example, was formed in reaction to Protestantism, and British identity in opposition to Roman Catholicism (Marx 2003). Kazemipur (2014, 21) aptly explains the genesis of this otherness: Historically, such processes were often triggered when something managed to undermine a country’s shared national identity. As soon as it appears as though an “us-versus-them” will be useful, people start looking for a group that can be transformed into a “them”, against which a “we” can shape itself. Sometimes this other is another country; but, more frequently, it is comprised of religious minorities within the same country (this being a less costly alternative). In the context of post-liberation anti-Pakistani and anti-Islamic secular and communist ideologies and pro-Indian geopolitical realities, Jamaat appears as a ‘religious minority’ representing Islam in the political landscape amid a Muslim majority Bangladesh (Islam 2011b); hence, it conveniently served as the ‘other’ in the official discourse of identity formation. This otherness was constructed through at least three conspicuous routes: (a) problematization (producing knowledge in order to construct Jamaat as a ‘national problem’ to deal with, a potential enemy to fight against, a possible adversary to blame for all national owes, and an easy and less costly ‘trash bin’ to externalize and dump in all the national failures); (b) institutionalization (releasing new discoveries and concoction of knowledge from powerful public and private institutions to ‘represent’, while denying the agency of, Jamaat through mechanisms of, for example, bureaucratization and managerialism); and (c) normalization of power (in which people accept these discursive constructions of, and new concoction of, knowledge about Jamaat as ‘truths’ without any protest or scrutiny and eventually feel obliged to hate Jamaat for both mental solace and national progress). This is how Michel Foucault (1979, 1986) explicates the relations and exercise of power in modern society, a process that he terms ‘governmentality’. The techniques of this discursive formation of otherness in post-liberation Bangladesh through ‘rationalization’—in which power remains uncontested and subjectivity is effectively created—are what I call ‘the Jamaatgovernmentality’. One apparent implication of this governmentality is privileging certain actors while marginalizing others (Escobar 1995); one entity becomes a sole authority to construct ‘realities’ that are taken seriously and

4  Md Saidul Islam acted upon, while the other entity is denied equal degrees or kinds of agency (Doty 1996). Central to the otherizing relationship between Jamaat and the rest is the politics and practices of representation of Jamaat in the dominant pro-liberation secularist discourse in Bangladesh, which is comprised mostly of pro-Indian Bengali nationalists, policy makers, politicians, scholars, journalists and others (Fahim 2022; Islam 2021). By representation, I mean the ways in which the dominant discourse has discursively represented Jamaat, designating them as patients to be diagnosed, examined, studied, problematized and surveilled. It does not refer to ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ that the dominant discourse has discovered and amassed about Jamaat but rather to the ways in which regimes of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ have been produced and constructed so as to justify and normalize governance and interventions over Jamaat. This regime of representation can be analysed as, to quote Arturo Escobar, ‘places of encounter where identities are constructed and also where violence is organized, symbolized, and managed’ (1995, 10). This is akin to what Chandra Mohanty (1991) calls ‘the colonialist move’ to construct colonial subjects in ways that justify the exercise of power over them. The predominant strategic function is, to quote Homi Bhabha (1990, 75), ‘the creation of a space for ‘subject peoples’ through the production of knowledge in terms of which surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited’. This representation is hegemonic since it blocks all other forms of knowledge and other models of knowing (Islam 2005, 2013). It erodes in a deeper manner Jamaat’s ability to define itself and chart its own future. In other words, Jamaat is represented not by itself but by its worst critics and political nemesis. Due to these politics and practices of representation of Jamaat, when the pro-Indian Bengali nationalists (academics, journalists and left-wing civil society) talk or write about it, they do not do it from a position of neutrality; on the contrary, they approach it from a deep psychological reality of bias, something they are not willing to acknowledge (Jalil 2010; Islam, Önder, and Nyadera 2020). This is nothing but a ‘clash of ignorance’ in which opinion is formed and judgement on Jamaat is produced through pure prejudice and sheer rhetoric based on utter ignorance (Islam 2011a, 2011b). By ignorance, I do not mean that they do not know about Jamaat but that they are either hesitant or unwilling to acknowledge anything positive about Jamaat. It is not about knowing but sheer incapacity to appreciate the difference. Therefore, when Bengali nationalists talk or write about Jamaat in the mainstream media, they stereotype and caricature in the most racist fashion (Fahim 2022). Taking an erroneous cherry-picking approach, they erect a strawman version of Jamaat that they can easily beat down and then accuse its leaders of the crimes that they themselves are often guilty of. The dominant discourse in Bangladesh can be likened to a factory that endlessly churns out guilt that Jamaat is expected to carry forward from generation to generation. However, branding Jamaat as razakars (who collaborated with the Pakistani army in 1971) is inherently misleading. The image of the pro-Pakistani Jamaat cherishing a

Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 5 nostalgic past with united Pakistan is a myth that most current Jamaat leaders and activists do not subscribe to after 51 years of Bangladesh’s independence. This inaccurate, misleading and stereotyped cultural representation of Jamaat has sadly crept into academia, where a biased perception hinders a true understanding of Jamaat. Although the academic treatment of Jamaat is surprisingly scant, whatever meagre academic literature is available has been contaminated by the politics and practices of representation of Jamaat by the dominant Bengali nationalist discourse in Bangladesh. The academics are, to a large extent, associated with, and not completely disconnected from, the system of political power and discourse. They have effectively collaborated with the political and cultural establishments to advance the construction of Jamaat’s image through negative stereotypes rather than problematizing the construction itself. Right from the start, most studies on Jamaat have been carried out through the lens of hate rather than open-mindedness, subjective judgement rather than objectivity, and using a cherry-picking approach rather than a holistic and comprehensive methodology. Edward Said’s ‘orientalism’ (Said 1979) is manifest in Bangladesh, albeit in different form. When pro-Indian journalists, politicians and cultural groups accuse Jamaat of sensuality (rape, nakedness and filth) and violence which they themselves are responsible for, they assume themselves to be free of those crimes. Indeed, they are not doing this from a neutral point of view; their negative construction is aimed at justifying intervention, invasion and emasculation of Jamaat by the state authority and state-supported entities. The past three decades of the brutal physical crackdown and massive cultural genocide of Jamaat in Bangladesh is a clear testimony (Islam 2011b; Islam, Önder, and Nyadera 2020; Fahim 2022). Jamaat in Post-Democratic Bangladesh Although Bangladesh has had a tumultuous past and diverse experiences with different forms of totalitarian regimes since 1971, the nation—following credible elections held under neutral caretaker governments—has relished democracy under at least three successive periods from 1991 to 2006. The post-2014 era of Bangladesh, however, has witnessed a complete U-turn from democracy, rule of law and political pluralism. Not surprisingly, this period is widely known as the post-democratic era in Bangladesh. Led by BAL under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, the country has moved towards not only totalitarianism, but also, eclipsing and surpassing previous records, a kleptocratic fascism (Khan, Husain, and Chowdhury 2022). The rise of this new form of kleptocracy is accompanied by a repressive response using brute force against democratic norms, rule of law and political pluralism. Jamaat, along with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), became the ultimate victim of state repression. Decades-long discursive constructions and negative stereotyping of Jamaat have been consistently and systematically used by the state authority to justify its oppression of this religious political party.

6  Md Saidul Islam The false representation of Jamaat by the dominant pro-Indian Bengali nationalist secular discourse was driven by what The Economist (2010) calls the ‘politics of hate’. Followers of Jamaat and its student wing Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir (Islamic Student Association of Bangladesh, henceforth Shibir) almost overnight were turned into pariahs, if not ostracized species and alien creatures. Stripped of their liberty, freedom and human dignity, they were subjected to others’ contempt, hatred, exclusions, and various forms of symbolic and physical violence. Symbolic violence was meted out to Jamaat through various means; for example, the publication of caricatured images of Jamaat leaders in newspapers, endless portrayal of Jamaat as the ultimate villain in cultural shows such as dramas and movies, and provocative speeches against Jamaat in almost every single political gathering of the ruling regime in Bangladesh. This violence eventually generated a deep-seated hatred with the intention to contain, suppress and exterminate Jamaat from the political and social landscape of Bangladesh. As symbolic violence justifies physical violence, followers of Jamaat and Shibir not only faced gross discrimination in educational institutions and job markets, but they were all too often objects of violence, torture and sometimes gruesome murder (Almamun 2020; Petersen, Ellis, and  Rahman 2023). Beating or torturing a Shibir supporter in educational institutions by rival pro-Indian political factions such as Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), the student wing of BAL, became commonplace; it is often regarded as an anger-management mechanism not only to extinguish smouldering discontent against Jamaat-Shibir but also to gain mental solace and pleasure as well as eventual promotion in political careers (Khan, Husain, and Chowdhury 2022). As reported in the 2009 Human Rights Report: Bangladesh (US Department of State 2010), the regime created a reign of terror throughout the country wherein wild political vendetta, the setup of torture cells in educational institutions to torture and kill political opponents, rapes, mounting violence and murders became a common phenomenon since 2007. For being perceived as a ‘Shibir supporter’, Abrar Fahad was tortured to death at the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) on 7 October 2019. A similar fate awaited four Shibir activists on 28 October  2016: they were beaten to death with boat oars, with the perpetrators dancing gleefully on their dead bodies in broad daylight. These are just two of many examples of a wild paradox: extinction of anger and hate and fulfilment of ecstasy. This wild paradox is manifested in and expressed through a daily slogan chanted in most higher educational institutions in Bangladesh: ‘ekta shibir dhor, sokal bikal nasta kor’ (grab Shibir one by one, kill them, and eat [them] as snacks in the morning and afternoon). When Shibir followers occasionally fight back for their survival, their actions are immediately condemned as ‘religious extremism’ by the armies of proIndian newspapers often acting in collusion with the US-led war on terror. Born in 1977, Shibir is a post-1971 generation; nevertheless, merely due to its association with Jamaat, it is often derided as ‘razakars’. Their normal religious practices, which in the West are the fundamental rights of every citizen, are constructed as ‘jongi’ (violence motivated by religion) while

Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 7 their usual religious texts are presented as ‘jihadi’ books as if they were waging a holy war against the regime. Romanticization, exaggeration and discursive linkage of the Jamaat with the ‘terrorists’ are among the ploys of the state authorities, which are known as the ‘Jongification of Islamic political parties’ (Islam 2011b): At the very beginning an aggressive attempt was taken by the current regime to link the Islamic political parties with militancy (jongi). A massive propaganda was launched by some ministers and some media portals at home and abroad to brand Bangladesh as a ‘Jongi State’, perhaps to woo the Superpowers who are hostile to Islam and thereby to earn an unequivocal support for the regime’s action against Islamic political forces. (p. 128) Along with razakarization and jongification (Islam 2011b), the representation of Jamaat in the dominant discourse creates a ‘political pathology’ in which Jamaat is blamed for all national woes and failures. Here, Jamaat is treated not only as a ‘trash-bin’ to dump in or externalize all the social odds and problems, but it is also used as a ‘semantic cover’ to displace and occlude the major issues and problems of the nation such as the deficit in democracy, poor governance, endemic corruption, grinding poverty and pervasive inequality. These major problems facing the nation are therefore of little or no importance to the regime compared to opposing and emasculating Jamaat. This blame syndrome is both occluding and deceiving on one hand and reductionist and essentialist on the other. The main purpose is basically to hide the regime’s corrupted face and divert the people’s attention from the actual perpetrators to a fake and constructed adversary. (Islam 2022, xix) It works in two interesting ways: destruction through distraction, and distraction through destruction. Destruction of Jamaat-led social institutions such as hospitals, schools and business centres through violence, not to mention looting and plundering by the ruling regime, is often carried out and justified through distracting people’s attention from the actual perpetrators to the constructed adversary. Thus, blaming the victims and sanctifying the oppressor becomes not only an acceptable but also a desired modus operandi by the dominant discourse and the ruling regime. Distraction through destruction is applied when the nation faces some severe setbacks such as natural disasters or political scandals or serious social upheavals that have potential political ramifications. People’s distraction from these setbacks is usually made through blaming Jamaat, demolishing its institutional apparatuses, mass arrest and using it as a bogeyman. Amid unprecedented symbolic and physical violence, Jamaat seems to remain defiant and resilient in the social, even if less so in the political, landscapes of Bangladesh.

8  Md Saidul Islam Approach of the Book With substantial background on Islam, politics and society in Bangladesh, the book sketches out the central theme, that is, ‘the Jamaat Question’: Why is Jamaat so resilient despite tremendous repression, discrimination and scrutiny by the ruling regime? How does Jamaat negotiate between its questionable past in 1971 and its call for positive social change in post-independent Bangladesh? Where and how do we situate Jamaat in the liberal democracies and the neoliberal world order? To address these critical questions of our time, this volume takes a non-partisan, objective approach with analytical rigour, making it suitable for both the academic community and the general readers. It brings ‘the Jamaat question’ in Bangladesh politics into a wider discursive, analytical narrative in order to take the debate a step further. As alluded to earlier, there is hardly any academic work on Jamaat based on an impartial and objective investigation; therefore, a well-researched academic book on this Islamist party is a crying need. Realizing this apparent gap in the literature, over the past five years, the editors approached dozens of well-established scholars in this field across the world to come up with this exclusive project. The volume, therefore, intends to make a novel, substantial and sustained intellectual and academic contribution to the field. Drawing powerful insights from the literature on governmentality and orientalism, the volume seeks to problematize and deconstruct the decades-long discursive formation and pervasive stereotypes of Jamaat. Since the question of Jamaat is relatively new in the literature, therefore, the volume may generate controversies and some potential backlashes. Some readers may even find materials in this volume ‘politically biased’. This is not unlikely, given that the ‘Jamaat Question’ is highly controversial and misunderstood in Bangladesh after decades of sustained negative propaganda and political persecution (Almamun 2020; Fahim 2022). Third-world politics in the post-9/11 context further complicated the situation. However, as the editors are committed, the objective of this volume is to extract facts from fiction using ‘multi-disciplinary insights and perspectives’. It’s certainly a challenge to ‘show’ objectivity when both the people and intellectuals are sharply divided on this topic. Since the Jamaat issue is both controversial and misunderstood and the public opinion is sharply and often antagonistically divided, the question of ‘objectivity’ may remain a perennial issue. Because of Jamaat’s controversial role in 1971 in opposing the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan (now Pakistan), the party was subjected to political persecution and negative propaganda. The upshot is that people tend to view the party from the retrogressive and reductionist lens of 1971. As explained before, thanks to the collusion of ‘the politics of hate’ with post-9/11 geopolitics, a strong anti-Jamaat discourse has been constructed by the ruling regime and its cultural and intellectual allies. As the people and intellectuals are sharply divided on the Jamaat question, the project has a clear objective to delve deeply into the issue at hand and extricate facts from fiction using

Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 9 some of the established social science methodologies such as discourse analysis and deconstruction. Due to the editors’ commitment to maintaining academic rigour, the book may sometimes appear pro-Jamaat, and at other times antiJamaat. The main focus here is to maintain an impartial and non-partisan stance in addressing the subject matter, and then leaving it to the readers to make their own judgement. In order for the book to come from a perspective of open-minded investigation rather than political propaganda, the editors approached a bunch of well-established intellectuals in the field across the world and invited them to write the chapters. Again, to maintain academic rigour and objectivity, the editors ensured that each and every chapter was peer-reviewed and cross-checked before the final submission. Organization of the Chapters Before delving into the Jamaat Question, there is a need to provide sufficient background on Islam, politics and society in Bangladesh. Chapter  2 ‘Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society in Bangladesh’ serves this purpose. This chapter posits that Islamization and the formation of Muslim societies around the world can be explained by several theories: the force theory, social liberation theory, patronization theory and immigration theory. By critically engaging with these theories, this chapter explains the rise of Islam and the formation of Muslim society in Bangladesh. In effect, it shows that Islam emerged in Bengal/East Bengal/East Pakistan (which is now Bangladesh) long before the political conquest of the country by Muslims. Arab Muslim merchants, missionaries and preachers were the primary agents engaged in peaceful missionary activities that eventually resulted in a majority Muslim population and the development of an overwhelmingly Muslim society in Bengal/East Bengal. The Muslim conquest of the territory was expedited through Muslim migration from abroad and other parts of India to Bengal. Chapter  3 provides a succinct account of the politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the role of Jamaat. It explains how Islam has been exploited in the Muslim world as a means of extending authority and earning legitimacy rather than giving true meaning to its principles. In Bangladesh, the regimes have consistently used Islam to secure legitimacy being fully aware of the grip of religion on people’s lives, identity and social consciousness. Indeed, each regime has successfully manoeuvred the minds of the Muslims during periods of crisis because they know that Islam is the moral compass guiding beliefs and behaviour in the country. Not surprisingly, despite more than half a century of colonial rule, Islam is as alive in Bangladesh today as it was in the past. In this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the questions: Why and how has Islam been used? Why does Islam still hold sway in the politics of Bangladesh? How has Jamaat, among other Islamic institutions, kept Islam alive in the society and politics of Bangladesh? To answer these questions, this chapter explores the inextricable relationship between Islam and politics.

10  Md Saidul Islam Chapter 4, ‘Jamaat and Shibir: From Islamic Revolutionaries to Ideal Citizens’, investigates how the idea of Islamic revolution has evolved and to some extent been purged from the discourse, vocabulary and practice of Jamaat and Shibir in the post-9/11 era. This chapter argues that the horrific 9/11 attacks and the subsequent unending war on terror pushed Jamaat and its student wing Shibir to recalibrate and finetune their image. This resulted in the adoption of more moderate vernaculars in the party constitutions while expunging words and discourses that could hint at bad Muslimness or closeness to terrorism. Using Jamaat and Shibir literature, constitutions and interviews with the leadership, this chapter demonstrates that the turn from the Islamic revolutionary worldview to a more civil-democratic image to fit neatly into the moderate Muslim category—one that is tolerable and attractive to the West— is one of Jamaat and Shibir’s ways of coping with and responding to the overpowering threat of the war on terror as well as mounting domestic pressures. Chapter  5, ‘Jamaat and Democracy: Constitutionalism, Electoral Politics and Complacency’, assesses Jamaat’s democratic role in Bangladesh politics. It argues that Jamaat’s democratic credentials are overshadowed by some major shortcomings that call into question its institutional framework. First, in spite of maintaining a consistent position on constitutionalism and competitive electoral democracy since its registration as a party in 1979 in independent Bangladesh, Jamaat has failed to present a more modern, rational and adaptable framework of the Islamic state that goes beyond its traditional dogmatic/ static views. Second, despite remaining arguably a highly democratic party in the context of Bangladesh, Jamaat has failed to resolve its legitimacy crisis that originated in its position on and role in the liberation war of Bangladesh. This failure can be attributed to its leadership complacency and its internal party-orthodoxy. And third, Jamaat has remained excessively bound by idealistic orthodoxy, which prevented it from developing a popular electorate base, thereby failing to popularize itself as a democratic force. For these three reasons, this chapter contends that Jamaat still remains a political outcast in the context of realpolitik in Bangladesh. Chapter 6 adumbrates the political progress of Jamaat through social welfare, with a focus on its contribution to education and healthcare. Since its inception in the Indian subcontinent in 1941, one of Jamaat’s focal points has been its social welfare programmes. While the ultimate success or failure of Jamaat in Bangladesh is still unknown, the influence and significance that this party currently holds in the country’s political and religious spheres cannot be underestimated. Since Bangladesh was set up five decades ago, Jamaat has been developing a complex organizational structure that provides social welfare to the needy. This chapter argues that Jamaat, through its religiously motivated social welfare programme, has been exercising parallel state functionality. This has played a subliminal yet significant role in cementing its status as a religious political party in Bangladesh. Through an analysis of empirical data gathered via semi-structured interviews, the chapter demonstrates that Jamaat in Bangladesh was able to make political gains, thanks, in large measure, to its social welfare programmes, more concretely its educational and medical welfare

Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 11 activities. This indicates its success in the opportunistic utilization of the political structure in Bangladeshi society. Chapter 7 reveals the story behind the emergence of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) and the role of Jamaat. It maintains that the success and prosperity of the bank can be attributed to the dedication and conviction of its employees, many with a background in the Jamaat organization. In line with their core beliefs to promote social welfare, Jamaat members built institutions such as hospitals, schools, relief organizations and businesses, among which IBBL became the most impactful establishment. IBBL has been a leader in the finance and welfare industry, with an impressive track record in both deposits and investments. The bank has also made remarkable contributions to education, healthcare and the welfare of marginalized groups through its Rural Development Scheme and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Unfortunately, in 2017, a change in the ownership and management of IBBL with direct interference of the BAL regime led to massive corruption and caused the bank to reverse course in terms of performance. Chapter 8, ‘Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh’, investigates the state and practice of democracy and grave violation of human rights with a focus on the treatment of Jamaat in post-democratic Bangladesh. After the BAL regime ascended to power in early 2009, the party leader Sheikh Hasina didn’t take long to launch a countrywide witch hunt. Violent attacks on opposition parties’ peaceful rallies and gatherings, the judicial killing of opposition leaders, crossfires, enforced disappearances, arrests and tortures of the opposition activists became a regular scenario. Another noteworthy trend was the forced closure, occupation, seizure or arson of opposition activists’ houses, offices and properties, not to mention an unprecedented attack on print media and electronic media channels and journalists. While rape, gang rape and murder after rape were normalized and access to justice was denied, corruption reached epidemic proportions as state funds were looted. This chapter details how thousands of people—including former high-rank military and law enforcement personnel as well as Jamaat-Shibir activists—were arrested, tortured, killed or kidnapped by the government forces during the period of 2009 to 2014. BAL’s political vendetta and oppression continue unabated to date. Chapter 9 examines the execution of Jamaat leaders by the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh (ICTB) for alleged heinous crimes committed in the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. Although the ICTB claimed indisputable proof of Jamaat leaders’ involvement in committing heinous crimes in 1971 as collaborators with the Pakistani Army, they failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt Jamaat leaders’ direct involvement in perpetrating any crimes during the War. This chapter first analyses the historical background in the formation of the ICTB. It then examines the exact role of Jamaat and its leaders in the Liberation War to determine which label is more fitting for the executed Jamaat leaders: national villain or fallen heroes. Third, it examines the overall trial process of ICTB, looking at its legal merits and demerits in applying domestic and international criminal law standards, which

12  Md Saidul Islam are crucial when implementing death sentences of the accused in a criminal tribunal. Fourth, several international, internationalized and domestic criminal tribunals’ jurisprudences are examined to evaluate whether the ICTB correctly applied international criminal law standards when prosecuting Jamaat leaders. The chapter closes with a critical discussion on whether Jamaat leaders were victims of ‘political killing’ or if they actually committed atrocious offences in 1971 that justify the punishment meted out to them. Chapter  10, ‘The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh: Courting Controversy’, provides an in-depth analysis from a legal point of view. Following the nine-month War of Liberation in 1971, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh emerged from a brutal conflict as an independent, albeit broken, state. Undoubtedly, some of those who engaged in conflict, on all sides, committed acts that constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity—crimes of an ‘international character’ on a truly horrific scale. In 1973, the International Commission of Jurists advocated for the creation of an international tribunal. The Tribunal was established in March 2010 and the Executive appointed the Judges, Prosecutors and Investigators. There was no independent judicial commission, and this was far from a transparent process. Many of the judges and prosecutors were closely aligned to the politics of the ruling BAL party and have engaged in what can only be described as prosecutorial and judicial misconduct that amounts to a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. What follows is an account of the circumvention of the rule of law by the national authorities to use justice as a political tool of retribution, and where Bangladesh goes from here. Where should Jamaat go from here? Is political pluralism in Bangladesh a thing of the past or are there still spaces for peaceful coexistence? Is the annihilation of Jamaat from the political and social landscapes of Bangladesh the only viable solution, as the actions of the current regime seem to imply? Chapter  11, ‘Jamaat and Bangladesh: Towards a Cohesive Narrative’, concludes this study by addressing these central and critical questions of our time. A strong discourse, largely orchestrated by the current BAL regime, is now in place, where a discursive binary opposition has been constructed between Jamaat and the rest such that survival of one increasingly depends on the emasculation and annihilation of the other. This sort of intra-inflicting discourse must be deconstructed, subverted and reconstructed into a cohesive narrative for Bangladesh where political pluralism, democratic principles, rule of law, and social cohesion with peace and harmony thrive and take a strong root. There is no doubt that the ‘Jamaat Question’ in Bangladesh will have strong and broader implications for other conflicting Muslim and non-Muslim states across the world. Note 1 While no credible census is available to determine the exact support base of any political party in Bangladesh, multiple estimations exist based on different facts and figures. In case of Jamaat, the support base ranges from 5 to 25%. The 5% figure is

Jamaat Question in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 13 based on Jamaat’s popular vote in one of the past elections, but we cannot rely on this figure as the party—being a part of the four-party alliance—did not contest in all constituencies in Bangladesh. Interestingly, the critics of Jamaat use the 5% figure while the supporters use 15%. From the range of 5 to 15%, we put ‘about ten percent support base’ as a mean between two extremes. Nonetheless, according to former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the proportion of Jamaat supporters in Bangladesh is 25% (see bdnews24.com, 1 July 2011).

References Al Jazeera. 2013. “Bangladesh Court Declares Jamaat Illegal.” August 1. Accessed March 25, 2021. www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/1/bangladesh-court-declaresjamaat-illegal. Almamun, Zunaid. 2020. “Political Violence in Bangladesh: Explaining the Role of State.” Theses and Dissertations 1280. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/1280. Amin, F. 2016. “Social Welfare Program of Islamic Political Party: A Case Study of Bangladesh Jamat-e Islami.” A  PhD thesis submitted to the Religion and Society Research Centre, School of Social Science and Psychology, University of Western Sydney. Banu, U. A. B. R. A. 1994. “Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and Prospect.” In Islam, Muslims and the Modern State, edited by Hussain Mutalib and Tajul-Islam Hashami, 80–99. St. New York: Martin’s Press. Bdnews24.com. 2011. “Manmohan’s ‘Anti-India’ Comment Startles Many.” July  1. Accessed January  23, 2023. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/manmohan-santi-india-comment-startles-many. Bhabha, Homi. 1990. “The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism.” In Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures, edited by Russel Ferguson Martha Gever, Trinh T. Minh-ha, and Cornel West, and illustrated by Gonzales-Torres, 71–89. New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art. Doty, R. L. 1996. Imperial Encounters. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. The Economist. 2010. “The Politics of Hate: An Ancient Vendetta Continues to Eat Away at Public Life.” November 18. www.economist.com/node/17525830. Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering Development: Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fahim, M. Ashraf Aziz Ishrak. 2022. “Inventing Islam(ism): De-Islamization Under Secular Authoritarianism in Bangladesh.” ReOrient 7 (2): 158–81. Foucault, Michel. 1979. “On Governmentality.” Ideology and Consciousness 6: 5–21. ———. 1986. The Use of Pleasure. New York: Pantheon Books. Islam, M. Nazmul, Murat Önder, and Israel Nyaburi Nyadera. 2020. “Islam, Politics and Bangladesh: A  Qualitative Content Analysis on the Democratic and Political Culture of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI).” ADAM AKADEMİ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 10 (2): 291–317. Islam, M. Nazrul. 2021. “Political Islam in South Asia: A  Critical Appraisal of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” International Area Studies Review 24 (4): 314–34. Islam, M. Saidul. 2005. “Muslims in the Capitalist Discourse: September 11 and Its Aftermath.” The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 25 (1): 3–12. ———. 2011a. “Trampling Democracy: ‘Islamism,’ Violent Secularism, and Human Rights Violation in Bangladesh.” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 8 (1): 1–33. ———. 2011b. “Minority Islam in Muslim Majority Bangladesh: The Violent Road to a New Brand of Secularism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31 (1): 125–41.

14  Md Saidul Islam ———. 2013. Development, Power and the Environment: Neoliberal Paradox in the Age of Vulnerability. New York and London: Routledge. ———. 2022. “Bangladesh as the Epitome of a Double-Risk Society: A Foreword.” In Bangladesh Under Awami Tyranny, edited by Q. M. Jalal Khan, Zoglul Husain, and R. Chowdhury, xvi–xxii. New Jersey (NJ): Writers Republic. Jalil, A. 2010. “War Crimes Trial in Bangladesh: A Real Political Vendetta.” Journal of Politics and Law 3 (2): 110–20. Kazemipur, A. 2014. The Muslim Question in Canada: A Story of Segmented Integration. Vancouver, BC: The University of British Columbia Press. Khan, Q. M. Jalal, Zoglul Husain, and R. Chowdhury, eds. 2022. Bangladesh Under Awami Tyranny. New Jersey (NJ): Writers Republic. Marx, A. W. 2003. Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Mohanty, Chandra. 1991. “Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism.” In Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, edited by Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, 1–47. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mostofa, Shafi Md. 2021. “Jama’at-e-Islami and Trust Building in Bangladesh.” Politics & Policy 49 (3): 708–39. Muscati, Sina Ali. 2003. “Reconstructing ‘Evil’: A Critical Assessment of Post-September 11 Political Discourse.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23 (2): 249–69. Parvez, S. 2022. “Understanding the Shahbag and Hefajat Movements in Bangladesh: A Critical Discourse Analysis.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 57 (4): 841–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096211038657. Petersen, Hannah Ellis, and  Shaikh Azizur Rahman. 2023. “ ‘They Beat Me with Sticks’: Bangladesh Opposition Reels Under Crackdown as Thousands Arrested.” January  22. www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/22/bangladesh-oppositioncrackdown-thousands-arrested. Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. US Department of State. 2010. “Bangladesh: 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Report. https://20092017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136085.htm.

2 Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society in Bangladesh Md Nazrul Islam

Introduction The Arabic word “Islam” is too often literally translated as “surrender,” “submission,” “wholehearted self-giving,” or “peace.” As a faith, Islam, therefore, refers to the attainment of peace through wholehearted surrender and obedience to Allah (Ahmad 2010). The Oxford Dictionary of English defines Islam as “the religion of the Muslims, a monotheistic faith regarded as revealed through Muhammad as the Prophet of Allah” (Stevenson 2010, 926). Ramadan (2007) has said that a Muslim is a person who desires to attain peace through the wholehearted gift of Self to Allah. Lewis and Churchill (2009) have observed that Islam is the act or state of submission; Muslim is the one who submits. It is, of course, a total submission to the will of God. As the Qur’an, the central religious text of Islam, has commanded the community of Muslims: “Enter into Islam wholeheartedly” (2:208) and “Yet by your Lord, they will never believe until they make you a judge concerning what they are disputing among themselves; then they will find no inconvenience for themselves concerning whatever you have decided and submit completely” (4:65). Thus, Muslims consider Islam a total system and a complete way of life that provides guidance for all aspects of life—individual and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, and national and international (Esposito and Voll 1996; Sayyid 1997; Ahmad 2010). Muslims claim that the path of Islam is simple and correct (Morgan 1993). The Qur’an has also stipulated on various occasions: “And that this is My path, straight; so do you follow it, and follow not diverse paths lest they scatter you from His path” (6:153); “And follow Me. This is the straight path” (43:61); “It guides to the truth and the straight path” (46:30). John Esposito (1988), a prolific scholar of Islam and Muslim society, thus appropriately titles one of his books as Islam: The Straight Path. Islam is an Abrahamic monotheistic religion followed across the world. It is the youngest of all Abrahamic faiths. Yet it is the world’s second-largest religion, with over 1.9 billion followers that constitute 24.9% of the global population (Pew Research Center 2020). Muslims make up a majority of the population in no less than 49 countries (Kuru 2019, 1). They are split into two religious denominations: Sunni and Shiite. The Sunnis DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-2

16  Md Nazrul Islam constitute the vast majority of the world’s Muslims (85–90%), while the Shiites constitute only 10–15% of them (McHugo 2017, 16). As Esposito (1988) holds, for over 1,400 years, Islam has grown and spread from the 7th-century Arabia of the Prophet Muhammad to a leading world religion whose followers are found in every part of the world. It has given birth to Islamic empires and states as well as a great world civilization that extended from North Africa to South and Southeast Asia. Characterized by an uncompromising belief in the one and only transcendental entity, Allah, and His revelation and Prophet, Islam has developed a spiritual path. Islamic law, ethics, theology, and mysticism have made it one of the most rapidly growing religions. Lapidus (2014, xxi) points out: [I]n ethnic background, language, customs, social and political organization, and forms of culture and technology, they [Islamic people] represent innumerable variations of human experience. Yet Islam unites them. Although Islam is not often the totality of their lives, it permeates their self-conception, regulates their daily existence, provides the bonds of society, and fulfills the yearning for salvation. For all its diversity, Islam forges one of the great spiritual families of mankind. For Gibb (1962, 3), Islam is a concept that covers an immense area in space and time. In South Asia, there are approximately 600 million Muslims, accounting for over one-third of the region’s population and roughly one-third of the entire Muslim population worldwide (Metcalf 2009, xvii; Yusuf and Goff 2017). Of them, Bangladesh alone is inhabited by 150 million (Hasan 2020, 6), out of 170 million of its overall population (Islam, Inan, and Islam 2020, 283). It is the third-largest Muslim population living in a single Muslim country behind Indonesia and Pakistan. According to a population census in 2011 regarding Bangladesh’s religious demography, Muslims constitute 90.39% of the population, Hindus 8.54%, and others 1.07% (Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh 2019–2020, 51). This chapter discusses how Islam, brought from the Middle East and other parts of Asia, gained a strong foothold in Bengal/ East Bengal. Then this chapter considers how the Bengal Muslim society, based in an overwhelming majority Muslim population, was formed and developed. Bangladesh became independent in 1971. It was a part of Bengal or identified as East Bengal and East Pakistan, respectively, during the British colonial and Pakistani periods. This chapter, noting that Bengal/East Bengal, East Pakistan, and Bangladesh are the same territory, uses them interchangeably. Scholars of South Asian history have shown keen interest in the study of the advent of Islam and growth of Muslim society in Bangladesh (Karim 1959; Qureshi 1962; Rahim 1963, 1995; Sarkar 1972; Majumdar 1973; Haq 1975; Hardy 1977; Talib 1980; Rasul 1986; Eaton 1993; Al-Ahsan 1994; Islam 2011; Islam and Islam 2020; Elius et  al. 2020). This chapter critically examines these and other related published literature and shows

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 17 that Islam emerged in Bengal/East Bengal (which is now Bangladesh) long before its political conquest by Muslim rulers. The Arab Muslim traders and the Islamic missionaries and preachers—Sufis and saints—were the primary agents in the peaceful proselytizing activities, which ultimately resulted in the large Muslim percentage of the population and the development of an overwhelming Muslim-majority society in Bengal/East Bengal. The Muslim conquest of the territory expedited these processes: the Muslim rulers generously patronized the Muslim missionaries and Islamic preachers to continue their holy efforts of massive conversion to Islam and Muslim socio-political formation. Furthermore, Muslim migration from other parts of India and elsewhere to Bengal also significantly contributed to the Muslim majority. After the Muslim conquest of Bengal, Muslims poured into the region and settled there. In short, peaceful conversion, political patronization, and immigration were fundamentally responsible for the rise of Islam and growth of Muslim society in Bangladesh. Theories of Islamization in Bengal or East Bengal Scholars and historians within Bangladesh and beyond have pointed to four major Islamization theories in Bengal. These include (i) the “sword or force theory,” (ii) the “social liberation theory,” (iii) the “immigration theory,” and (iv) the “patronage theory.” These theories, except the immigration theory, have been developed to explain religious conversion to Islam and the growth of Muslim society in Bengal or East Bengal. The sword or force theory has emphasized the role of military force in the rise of Islam and the growth of Muslim society. It has promoted the idea of forced conversion to Islam. Many Orientalist scholars and administrator-historians, such as Henry Elliot (1853), William Hunter (1881), James Wise (1883), William Muir (1891), Murray Titus (1930), and Will Durant (1935), as well as Hindu scholars and historians, such as Suniti Kumar Chatterji (1963) and R. C. Majumdar (1973), have underscored the importance and relevance of this theory. Elliot (1853, 1), referring to the Muslim conquerors, wrote: Their energies, at all times impetuous, were now solely concentrated upon executing the injunctions of the ‘king of fierce countenance, understanding dark sentences’ that they should enforce belief at the point of the sword, which was emphatically declared to be ‘the key of heaven and of hell.’ Hunter (1881, 18) writes: “The whole conception of Islam is that of a church either actively militant or conclusively triumphant—forcibly converting the world or ruling the stiff-necked unbeliever with a rod of iron.” Durant (1935) has said that the Muslim conquest of India is the bloodiest story in history: because millions of Hindus were converted to Islam by threat of death during the period 800–1700.

18  Md Nazrul Islam However, many other Western scholars and Orientalists, such as Thomas Arnold (1913), De Lacy O’Leary (1923), Marshall Hodgson (1974), and Ira Lapidus (2014), have rejected the narrative of forced conversion to Islam. O’Leary (1923, 8) writes: “The legend of fanatical Muslims sweeping through the world and forcing Islam at the point of the sword upon conquered races is one of the most fantastically absurd myths that historians have ever repeated.” Lapidus (2014, 271) articulates: Earlier generations of Western scholars believed that conversions to Islam were made at the point of the sword and that conquered peoples were given the choice of conversion or death. It is now apparent that conversion by force, although not unknown in Muslim countries, was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished to dominate rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam were voluntary. The Qur’an has prohibited forced conversion to Islam: “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion” (2:256). Muslim historians and scholars (Habibullah 1945; Karim 1959; Qureshi 1962; Rahim 1963; Ahmad 1964; Ikram 1964; Nizami 1966; Mujeeb 1967; Haq 1975; Talib 1980) have also rejected the sword theory and the idea of forced conversion. Bangladesh’s socio-political history has posed a severe challenge to the “sword theory.” Historians unanimously agree that the first Muslim conquest of Bengal was done in the beginning of the 13th century by none other than Turkish commander Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji; most have referred the year as 1203–1204 A.D. (Karim 1959; Sarkar 1972). By contrast, Bengal came in touch with the Muslims much earlier than its political conquest by Muslims (Sarkar 1972). The Arab Muslim traders created business relations with Bengalis through seaports and settled mainly in the port city of Chittagong in the 9th century (Rahim 1995). Historian Jagadish Narayan Sarkar (1972) reports that many Muslim missionaries, commonly known as Sufis, came to Bengal even before the Muslim conquest. He also states that “often the missionary preceded the soldier, and the activity of the former was no less significant than that of the latter” (Sarkar 1972, 20). The religio-geographical composition of contemporary South Asia has also shown the basic infirmity of the sword theory (Eaton 1993). Although Hunter (1888) speaks of forced conversion, he shows that the centers of the Muslim power, such as Delhi and Agra, had far less Muslim population compared to that of the far-flung areas; the Muslims in Delhi hardly exceeded one-tenth, and in Agra they did not constitute one-fourth of the population in the 1880s. S. M. Ikram argues that: If the spread of Islam had been due to the might of the Muslim kings, one would expect the largest proportion of Muslims in those areas which were the centers of Muslim political power. This, however, is not the case.

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 19 The percentage of Muslims is low around Delhi, Lucknow, Ahmadabad, Ahmadnagar, and Bijapur, the principal seats of Muslim political power. (Ikram 1964, 123) Similarly, the centers of the Muslim rule in Bengal, such as Dhaka or Murshidabad, are said to have had a smaller proportion of Muslim population than the far remote places. Sarkar (1972) reveals that in East Bengal, Islam predominated largely in rural areas. Arnold (1913) asserts that the Muslims of Bengal are found in large proportion not in the ancient centers of the Muslim rule but in the countryside where there is no record of settlers from outside and in places where the lower-caste and outcast Hindus most abound. Based on the Bengal Census in 1872, Roy (1983, 20) states that “the Muslim preponderance was not even found within or about the centers of Muslim power. None of the districts containing a very high proportion of Muslims in the population held any of the important centers of Muslim power in Bengal.” The Census of India in 1901 also reveals that the headquarters of Bengal Nawabs, for example, Dhaka—the site of the Nawab’s Palace for about a century, and Malda and Murshidabad—the capitals of Muslim kings and Nazims for over four centuries, were less Islamic than the adjoining districts of Rajshahi, Dinajpur, and Nadia (Eaton 1993). Therefore, according to Robinson (2003, 23), “the argument that Islam in India spread everywhere by “force” or the “sword” is almost too hackneyed, apart from being in most cases plainly untrue, to be dwelt upon.” Historian Peter Hardy (1977) seems to have rightly commented that those who argued that Indian Muslims had been forcefully converted have actually failed to define their understanding either of “force” or of “conversion.” The social liberation theory indicates that conversion to Islam occurred voluntarily, at the free will of the converts. It shows that the predominant social structure of the Hindu society, based on a rigid caste system, produced massive inequality in the socio-religious and cultural landscape. The victimized masses thus sought to escape discrimination, disrespect, and social oppression by high-caste Hindus and were attracted to the egalitarian principles of Islam; hence, they embraced Islam of their own choosing. Hardy (1977, 187–88) writes that the contemporary Hindu society was seen as essentially a hierarchy of social aggregates, each endogamous, each with its own rules of commensality, its own hereditary occupations and common ritual practices, and divided, the one higher from the other lower, by walls at best of mild distaste and at worst of brutally-expressed contempt. “It is this absence of class prejudices,” to quote Arnold (1913, 291), “which constitutes the real strength of Islam in India and enables it to win so many converts from Hinduism.” Muslim historians, as well as many British colonial

20  Md Nazrul Islam administrators-scholars, have put emphasis on the theory of social liberation. Henry Beverley (1872, 132), who was the commissioner of the Bengal census in 1872, reports that “the exclusive caste system of Hinduism naturally encouraged the conversion of the lower orders from a religion [Hinduism] under which they were no better than despised outcasts, to one [Islam] which recognized all men as equals.” William Cornish (1874, 109) reported in the mid-1870s: To this day proselytism is going on among the lower orders of [Hindu] society. . . . The slave castes of Hindus are numerous and treated with the utmost contumely by the superior castes. Conversion to Islam in their case means a distinct advance in the social scale. William Crooke (1897) accords that Islam provides the converts with the guarantee of freedom from the bondage of caste. The following passage from the writing of William Crooke even more clearly discloses the sociological dimension of conversion to Islam in the predominantly Indian Hindu society: The outcast groups of Hindus, popularly known as the ‘Untouchables,’ have begun to realize that as objects of contempt to all who follow the strict rule of Brahmanism, their position is intolerable. To such people Islam offers full franchise after conversion, and the number of converts is increased by those who, on account of the breach of Hindu social observances, such as the eating of forbidden blood, association with people considered to be impure, violation of some rule of marriage or sexual connection, have been expelled from the community, or to use the popular phrase, have been deprived of the right of smoking tobacco or drinking water with their co-religionists. (Crooke 1921, 4) The Muslim population thus grew quickly mainly as a result of conversion of these lower Hindu castes, who eventually freed themselves from their degrading social position and raised themselves and their descendants in the social scale by becoming Muslims (Arnold 1913). Muslim historians and writers, such as Habibullah (1945), Karim (1959), Qureshi (1962), Rahim (1963), Ahmad (1964), Ikram (1964), Tarafdar (1965), Nizami (1966), Mujeeb (1967), Haq (1975), and Talib (1980), have shown that the peaceful missionary work of the Islamic missionaries resulted in voluntary conversion of a large part of India’s Hindu population, particularly Hindus of lower castes to Islam. However, some 19th-century Bengal Muslim elites and writers, such as Abu A. Ghuznavi and Khondkar Fuzli Rubbee, rejected the “social liberation theory” and the narrative of lower-caste Hindus’ conversion to Islam. Soon after Beverley’s publication of the 1872 census findings, Ghuznavi submitted a report to his District Collector strenuously challenging Beverley’s argument of mass conversion of lower orders from Hinduism. He argued that the majority of modern Muslims were not the descendants of lower-order Hindus but were

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 21 of foreign extraction, albeit in many cases it may be of more or less remote degree (Eaton 1993). Although Ghuznavi conceded that there had been some conversions, he insisted that they had not been from the despised low castes but from the upper orders of Hindu society. He, instead, identified the Arab migration before the Turkish conquest, Bengali Muslim rulers’ welcoming attitudes to foreigners especially land grants by Sultan Alauddin Husain Shah (1493–1519) to them, the dispersion of Afghans “in every hamlet” after the Mughal conquest, the greater fertility of Muslims because of their practices of polygamy and widow remarriages, their greater longevity, and the absence among Muslims of a caste system or institutionalized celibacy as reasons for the legion of Bengali Muslims (Eaton 1993). Similarly, Rubbee (1895) also rejected the argument that the natives of Bengal, either from compulsion or from free will, were converted to Islam, in any appreciable number at a time. Rubbee (1895, 53) asserts: [T]he ancestors of the present Musalmans of this country were certainly those Musalmans who came here from foreign parts during the rule of the former sovereigns, and that the present generation of Musalmans are the offspring of that dominant race who remained masters of the land for 562 years. Abu Ghuznavi, Khondkar Rubbee, and the like who were members of the ashraf (upper) class in contemporary Muslim society were reluctant to share common Muslim identity with the converted Muslims and their descendants originating from the lower and despised class of the Hindu society. Ghuznavi’s and Rubbee’s claim of the rarity of conversion, and their insistence that the converts were drawn from the upper echelons of Hindu society, along with their stress of the immigration theory of Islamization, was, as Eaton (1993) opines, the predominant view, also propagated by the Muslim elite classes all over India. Yet Eaton (1993) has critiqued the “social liberation theory” from social and historical perspectives. His first reservation is that this theory attributes present-day socio-political values to the peoples of the past. He contends that so-called social liberation implies that even before their contact with Muslims, India’s lower castes were, as if, familiar with the writings of the Western and European Enlightenment scholars and the modern social and political value of fundamental equality of all human beings denied them by an oppressive Brahmanical despotism. He also shows that Muslim scholars in the past did not refer to their religion’s ideal of social equality as contrasted with Hindu inequality but rather Islamic monotheism as contrasted with Hindu polytheism (Friedmann 1975). The idea of Islamic social equality, Eaton (1993) further holds, is a recent one evolved only from the era of the Enlightenment and more specifically from the legacy of the French Revolution among 19th-century Muslim modernists (Hourani 1983; Lewis 1953). Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that India’s despised classes were never related to the thoughts of Enlightenment philosophers and were ignorant of the concepts of

22  Md Nazrul Islam “equality” or “inequality.” Yet it is also not inconceivable that these classes had undergone socio-cultural and structural repressions in their own experience and thereby sought freedom from them without any ideology or other goals. Second, Eaton contends that even after conversion to Islam, the converts failed to scale up their position in the social hierarchy. After joining the Muslim society, they as well as their offspring still carried the same birth-ascribed rank, which they previously held in the Hindu society. Citing an example, he says, the Bhuinmali in the Hindu society turned to the Beldar in the Muslim society, whose ancestors were from the same low caste as the Bhuinmali (Eaton 1993). However, available literature suggests that social stratification in Indian and Bengal Muslim society was extremely complex (Ahmad 1966; Mandelbaum 1970; Mines 1972). Ample demographic studies on Indian rural and urban locations in which Muslims constitute a significant percentage of the population show that an overemphasis on ashraf-ajlaf (upper-lower) class dichotomy has generated “a wrong and distorted picture of the nature and complexity of Indian Muslim social stratification” (Ahmad 1966, 273). Therefore, the conceptualization of a mere binary stratification of Muslim society—ashraf-ajlaf— is, what sociologist Imtiaz Ahmad (1966, 273) calls, “a gross over-simplification of the existing reality.” Although Hindu caste system is incompatible with Islam, Indian Muslim society has not been freed from its own caste-like hierarchy (Ahmad 1973; Khanam 2013). Yet studies show that unlike Hindu caste society, social mobility within Muslim social stratification was somewhat relaxed and swift (Mandelbaum 1970; Mines 1972). The Hindu caste order was a matter of birth: social mobility was impossible. The most intelligent, honest, and hard-working Sudra remained garbage until his/her death. However, while Hindu caste was a matter of identity, Muslim social status was clearly ascribed, as everyone was born equal. The emphasis on compliance with the Qur’an meant that one could earn their social status by being a better or worse Muslim. Yet, as a community of traders, for Indian Muslims, social status could be earned by other means than piety. An often-quoted axiom in the contemporaneous Indian Muslim society supports this assertion: “We used to be butchers and now we are Shaikhs. Next year, if the harvest prices are good for us, we shall be Sayyeds” (Mandelbaum 1970, 555). Eaton’s (1993) final argument against social liberation is that Muslim converts in Bengal were drawn mainly from Rajbansi, Pod, Chandal, Kuch, Kaibarta, and other indigenous groups of people which were not considerably exposed to Brahmanical culture and authority. Beverley (1872), Arnold (1913), Mukherjee (1972), Sarkar (1972), Roy (1983), and others, notably Muslim scholars, such as Habibullah (1945), Karim (1959), Qureshi (1962), Rahim (1963), Ahmad (1964), Ikram (1964), Tarafdar (1965), Nizami (1966), Mujeeb (1967), Haq (1975), and Talib (1980), support this argument, by showing that most converts were drawn from Hindu lower orders, including the aborigines who had largely been subjugated under the Brahmanical hegemonic socio-religious and cultural framework. To further note, Edward Dalton, a colonial administrator in Bengal, reports many instances of

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 23 aboriginal lower caste Hindus’ voluntary conversion to Islam, what Saberwal (2006, 240) calls the “Muslim method of tribal absorption,” to free themselves mainly from the tyranny of their co-religionists. Dalton wrote in 1872: “The weavers of cotton piece-goods are deemed vile, and in consequence I believe of the low position assigned to them by their co-religionists, great numbers embraced Islam and are now called Jolahas” (Dalton 1872, 324). Indian sociologist Ramkrishna Mukherjee (1972, 266) reflects that, after the caste organization was imported and developed by the immigrant Brahmins in Bengal, the indigenous people of Bengal were labelled as sudra, antyaja, mlechha, and yabana, and they went under the Brahmanical way of life as the lowest caste. Brahmanical order alienated them, and “when in the wake of Muslim conquest the zeal for conversion to Islam was felt in Bengal society, the people of East Bengal were converted in great majority.” The reflections of Historian Jagadish Narayan Sarkar (1972, 23) in this respect are similar: Those who embraced Islam came from different ranks in society, mainly the lower classes and occasionally from the higher. The lower classes adopted Islam to escape from social injustice or secure social status. To the poor aborigines of eastern and deltaic Bengal,—fishermen, hunters, pirates and peasants,—the impure or unclean outcastes, popularly called the untouchables, spurned and neglected by the caste-proud Brahmanical Hindu society, Islam came as a revelation with its message of monotheism and social equality and offered ‘full franchise,’ an escape from the social disabilities and humiliations and opened avenues of progress. So they readily responded to the preaching or persuasions of the mullahs, often backed by varying degree of compulsion. Thus, Eaton’s critiques of social liberation theory of conversion to Islam are inconsistent with historical evidence. The socially degraded and despised Indian people found Islam’s egalitarian principles a practical way of restoring and safeguarding their human dignity and freedom in life. The immigration theory emphasizes Muslim immigration from abroad to Bengal as the cause of Muslim predominance in the population. It shows that Muslim immigrants and their descendants vastly contributed to the multitude of Muslims in this region. It is not a conversion theory, however, scholars, particularly the Muslim scholars throughout history, have greatly underscored it to explain the rise of Islam in South Asia and Bengal. Muslims from other parts of the world, such as Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia, and Arabia, as well as from other parts of India, especially northern India, migrated to and settled in Bengal at different points of time (Ahmed 1981). Historians have highlighted several reasons for their immigration to Bengal; for example, some immigrants arrived after Muslim conquests, some found work or trade in prosperous Bengal, some followed the new Governors appointed from Delhi, and some were missionaries (Karim 1959). The contemporaneous international milieu was also an important factor for voluminous Muslim immigration to Bengal and other parts of Muslim India. The Mongol invasions of Muslim

24  Md Nazrul Islam lands, especially the Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia, produced a wave of Muslim refugees (Ojha 1991). Karim (1959) informs that many ousted families from Central Asia sought refuge in India; many of the kings thrown out of power took the garb of royal saints and moved to India as new missionaries; many artisans, architects, poets, and painters fled the raging scourge and found asylum in the Indian subcontinent. British administrator in India Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote in 1841 that Muslims, in Bengal, were more than one-half of the population, and in India, the number was almost oneeighth of the total population. The vast number of Muslims, he conceives, was the result of “the great and long continued immigration and the natural increase during eight centuries” of Muslim reign (Elphinstone 1841, 239). Arnold writes that the foreign settlement constituted the immigrants from across the northwest frontier, the descendants of the court and armies of various Muslim dynasties, and the Arab ancestry. He further explains that “more than half the Muslim population of India has indeed assumed appellations of distinctly foreign races, such as Shaykh, Beg, Khan, and even Sayyid” (Arnold 1913, 255). Luke Scrafton (1763), a member of Lord Clive’s Council, informs that the immigrant Muslims had intermarried with the local Muslims. Sarkar (1972, 22) reports that the immigrant Muslims “married Hindu wives and there were children of mixed marriages.” Arnold (1913) shows that from very early times, Arab merchants made their visits to towns, and in the 10th century the Arabs had large settlements there, having intermarried with the local women, and were living under their Islamic laws and religion. Crooke (1897) says that, within the Muslim community, there was the practice of widow remarriage as well as a greater prevalence of polygamy, which spurred population growth, while Hindu widows did not re-marry, were under some social stigma and technically required by their religion to sacrifice themselves (suttee). There was also a relatively higher Muslim birth rate (Arnold 1913). Therefore, the immigrant Muslims and their descendants contributed significantly to the increase in Muslim population and the constitution of a diverse Muslim society in South Asia and in Bangladesh. According to the Census of Bengal 1872, out of the total Muslim population in Bengal, around 30% were immigrants and around 70% were converted Muslims (cited in Rahaman 1995, 433). Muslim migration and voluntary conversion are said to be the primary methods of Islamization there (Rahim 1963). The patronage theory holds that Muslim rulers use to patronize non-Islamic people with political and financial concessions so that they would embrace Islam. This theory posits that Muslim conversion in Bengal occurred owing to the motivation of material interests of the converts rather than the doctrinal forces of their embraced faith. The Muslim rulers and their officers tried to effect conversions by offering non-religious favors, such as jobs, promotions, and tax relief, to the converts (Eaton 1993). They also married the converts to Muslim women to consolidate the conversion (Sarkar 1985; Rahaman 1995). It is also reported that the Khilji dynasties would encourage their non-Muslim

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 25 subjects to embrace Islam. Quoting from Ibn Battuta, Arnold (1913, 258) writes: [T]he Khiljis offered some encouragement to conversion by making it a custom to have the new convert presented to the sultan, who clad him in a robe of honor and gave him a collar and bracelets of gold, of a value proportionate to his rank. Sultan Firuz Shah Tughlaq has often been quoted in regard to his own experience of inducing the infidel subjects to become Muslims. In his short autobiography, containing less than 50 pages, The Futuhat-i-Firuz Shahi, he wrote: Due to my endeavors, the Zimmis [dhimmis] had the opportunity to embrace the true religion. I proclaimed that whoever among the infidels recited the Testament of Faith and followed Islam would, according to the principles of the faith of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him and his descendants) be exempt from the payment of jiziyah. When this proclamation reached the ears of the people, group after group of Hindus began to embrace Islam. Even to the present day, these people come from different parts, and on accepting Islam, are freed from the jiziyah and bestowed with rewards and robes. (Tughlaq 2009, 31–32) However, this is said to be a rare occasion in the history of Muslim rule in India. As Arnold (1913, 258) has clarified, the monarchs of the earlier Muslim dynasties as a rule showed very little missionary zeal, and it would be difficult to find a parallel in their history to this passage from the autobiography of Sultan Firuz Shah Tughlaq. The patronage of political elites had undeniably some significance for Muslim conversion. It is, however, incapable of interpreting the large-scale conversion of the Indian and Bengali masses. Eaton (1993) thus appropriately remarks that political patronage is likely to help explain the relatively low incidence of Islamization in India’s political heartland. Yet it cannot explain the massive conversions that occurred along the political fringe—as in Bengal. Political patronage, like the influence of the sword, he continues, would have decreased rather than increased as one moved away from the centers of that patronage. The Social Context of Bengal at the Arrival of Islam As the previous discussions have emphasized voluntary and peaceful conversion as the most significant and pervasive mode of Islamization in Bengal, we need to understand why so many Bengalis fled their own religions and customs to choose those of the conquerors. Bengal in 1200 A.D. was a corrupt

26  Md Nazrul Islam place of immorality and, for most people, oppression, humiliation, religious persecution and/or economic exploitation. It was truly an “age of ignorance.” Islam, as the last and final revelation from Allah, according to the Muslim belief, emerged in Arabia at the beginning of the 7th century through the Prophet Muhammad. Pre-Islamic Arabia had been marked as “the age of ignorance,” al-jahilliya (Hitti 1970; Khalidi 1994; Hawting 1999). Yet soon after the emergence of Islam, the Arabs founded a great world civilization based on Islamic monotheism (Esposito 1988; Voll 1994; Mazrui 1997). Around that time, the socio-political and religious life of people in India, including Bengal, was plagued by discord and strife and had been for centuries. Two major religions— Hinduism (to be precise, Brahmanism) and Buddhism—dominated the Subcontinent. They were also constantly in mutual conflict. B. R. Ambedkar, a noted Indian jurist, social reformer, and the chief architect of the Indian constitution, has reported that the history of India before the Muslim conquests was marked by conflicts between Brahmanism and Buddhism. He also argues that the Untouchables of the Indian Hindu society originated from the conflict of Buddhism with Brahmanism: Buddhism denounced the Brahmanical system of “caste and sacrifice,” which eventually resulted in conflict with Brahmanism; this gave birth to the Untouchables, because they were a people who followed egalitarian Buddhism, lost their caste, and thus were to be shunned by Hindu society (Ambedkar 1948). The followers of Buddhism were persecuted under the prevalent Brahmanical socio-political order (Rahim 1995). Yet scholars have suggested that the Buddhist tradition survived for a longer time in Bengal and Bihar (Kabir 2004). The Buddhist Pala Dynasty ruled Bengal and Bihar for over four hundred years from the middle of the 8th century (Tyagi and Jha 2017). Buddhist rule ended only in the middle of the 12th century when Brahmanical Hindu mercenaries from south India, serving the Buddhist King, seized power as the “Sena Dynasty.” They were defeated in a rout when Bakhtiyar Khilji’s Ghurid Cavalry from Central Asia suddenly seized Bengal in a blitzkrieg in 1204 A.D. During the Sena Dynasty, Brahmanism, with its rigid caste system, became official policy and the lower-order Hindus and Buddhists, who may indeed have been the majority of the population, were subjected to inequalities and suppression (Chakma 2011; K. N. Islam 2011; Khan 2013). Historians have called that situation “a systematic policy of persecution” by the Brahmans (Rasul 1986, 101). In the 7th century, there had been three major religions in Bengal: Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Yet Jainism subsequently nearly disappeared from Bengal (Mandal 2011), and thus, the interplay of the other two religions— Hinduism and Buddhism—fashioned the socio-political and cultural history of Bengal before the advent of Islam. Buddhism thrived in India and particularly in Bengal mainly because of royal support at different times by the incumbent Buddhist kings and administrators. The royal support included the

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 27 building of monasteries, stupas and caityas (votive monuments), and rockand pillar-edicts, the founding of Buddhist seminaries, the patronization of Buddhist scholars and educators, and so on. Some rulers also sent Buddhist missions to foreign lands (Chakma 2011). Buddhism saw its golden age in Bengal under the Pala Dynasty. Yet its internal division and ritualistic revision, which were influenced by Hinduism, and the lack of royal support eventually culminated in its virtual fall in India and in Bengal (Rahim 1995; Chakma 2011). Jawaharlal Nehru, in his widely read Discovery of India, observes that “the rational ethical doctrine had become overlaid with so much verbiage, so much ceremonial, canon law, so much, in spite of the Buddha, metaphysical doctrine and even magic” (Nehru 1985, 130–31). One major corruption was Tantric Buddhism. Sir Charles Eliot regarded it as degenerate, decadent, and corrupt (Eliot 1998 [1921]). Historians and philosophers have argued that Tantric Buddhism, which emphasized “mystic syllables (mantras), magical diagrams (yantras), ritualistic circles (mandalas), physical gestures (mudras), spells (dharanis) and other strange and sexo-yogic practices” (for obtaining eternal bliss—mahasukha), drifted away from the classical form and purity of Buddhism, and “the Buddhists were degraded into the lower strata of the society” (Rahim 1995, 5; Chakma 2011, 41). Buddhism’s intrinsic elements were also in part responsible for its fall. Buddhism renounced mundane life and opted for seclusion as well as monastic life. It had no scheme for developing a social system, nor did it have a well-defined and well-organized structure of domestic rituals to fulfill the desires and aspirations of the ordinary people (Rasul 1986; Chakma 2011). As Rasul (1986) observes, renunciation of the world while choosing a secluded monastic life is not appropriate for every individual. Furthermore, persecution of its followers by the Brahmanical Hindu rulers such as Emperor Sasanka and subsequently the Sena Dynasties also had a share in the collapse of Buddhism in Bengal. Professor Niru Kumar Chakma informs: [T]he atrocities that Sasanka carried out against Buddhism . . . included the king’s standing order to exterminate the Buddhist monks, cutting down the holy Bodhi tree at Gaya, removing the Buddha image there and replacing it with the image of Shiva [a Hindu god]. (Chakma 2011, 39) Professor Kazi Nurul Islam also notes that “the Sena kings suppressed and oppressed the Buddhists” (K. N. Islam 2011, 26). Noted Bengali writer and researcher Dinesh Chandra Sen confirms Brahmanical persecution of the Buddhists pointing to a Sanskrit poem which reads: Many of the chief princes, professing the wicked doctrines of the Buddhist and the Jain religions, were vanquished in various scholarly controversies. Their heads were then cut off with axes, thrown into mortars,

28  Md Nazrul Islam and broken to pieces [reduced to powder] by means of pestles. So these wicked doctrines were thoroughly annihilated, and the country made free from danger. (Sen 1911, 6) In a recently published book, eminent Indian historian D. N. Jha has also noted the desecration, destruction, and appropriation of Buddhist stupas, monasteries, and other structures by Brahmanical kings and forces (Jha 2018). Historians have also reported that the social and cultural fabric of the Hindu society was characterized by severe division and demoralization before the Muslim conquest of Bengal. Brahmanical Hinduism was not only tyrannical toward the non-Brahman co-religionists, but corruption and immorality were also prevalent in social and cultural life (Rahim 1995). The sexuality of the society, especially of the people of the higher echelons, including the members of the ruling families, was so vulgar and immoral that the people beyond Bengal had an extremely low conception of the moral standard of Bengal’s upper and aristocratic classes. The vivid description of the amorous activities of fashionable young men and women in Vatsyayana’s Kama Sutra and King Lakshmana Sena’s court-poet Dhoyi’s Pavanaduta presents the sexual immorality of Bengali society under the Hindu Kings. The doctrine of tantrism and practices of sexual yoga as well as the Devadasi tradition, where young girls were dedicated to worship and serve the deities in temples, popularly called Devadasi, dancing, singing, etc. and in whom the higher class and aristocratic Hindus would find amusement, were also contributory factors for the demoralization and decadence of Hindu society (Rahim 1995). Thus, on the eve of the Muslim conquest of Bengal, the Bengal society was a place of social inequality, injustice, immorality, and persecution. The lower-order Hindus and the Buddhists encountered the Brahmanical tyranny and injustice most. The Buddhists in particular were in such a state of persecution that, as a scholar has described, “when the Muslim conquerors came to Bengal, the Buddhists not only welcomed them, but felt as if the Muslims were sent by the gods and goddesses to save them” (K. N. Islam 2011, 26). Most Bengalis were ready to accept Islam’s message of equality, justice, and strict morality to clean up the mess in their society—not only as a political policy but as a way to live their own lives. Bengal’s Contact With Islam and the Growth of Muslim Society Islam is a great missionary religion (Haines 1889). Professor Max Muller, a noted Orientalist, writes that a missionary religion is “the spirit of truth in the hearts of believers which cannot rest, unless it manifests itself in thought, word and deed, which is not satisfied till it has carried its message to every human soul” (cited in Arnold 1913, 10). It is said that whenever and wherever Muslims step, they carry their religion with them. They do not observe their religion in isolation. D. A. Chowdhury (1928), an eminent Christian

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 29 leader in Bengal of his time, observes that every Muslim is a zealous preacher of his religion. He has also stated that “the permanent result of Islam has not depended so much on the sword as on the peaceful penetration by shopkeepers and camel-drivers, merchants and beggars, rich and poor all alike” (Chowdhury 1928, 147–48). Edward Wilmot Blyden, a prominent African scholar and politician, reports that he had met Muslim missionaries travelling from town to town and village to village in Africa with nothing but a prayer mat and a Qur’an, dependent for their daily meal on the charity of the natives (Blyden 1994 [1887], 194). Therefore, Islam has been spread around the world through the peaceful missionary work of its followers. Its creed is precise and simple and has easily influenced the hearts and minds of people: “Islam is very definite in its creed and simple too. It is the shortest creed in the world . . . and this is one of the reasons, which has contributed much to its success among Bengalis” (Chowdhury 1928, 148). The social context of Bengal, as discussed earlier, had produced a society ready to embrace the emergence of Islam and the building of a Muslim society in Bengal. In that process, various actors such as the Arab traders, Muslim rulers, and the Sufi preachers made complementary efforts and shared contributory roles right from the beginning of the journey of Islam in 7th-century Arabia. A. The Arab Traders: Bengal’s Earliest Contact With Islam

The exact date and time of the arrival of Islam in Bengal was never recorded. Yet historians and scholars have persuasively argued that Islam arrived in Bengal long before the political conquest of the country by Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji in the first decade of the 13th century (Karim 1959; Rahim 1995; Khan 2013). Some scholars argue that Bengal’s contact with Islam began in the 8th century (Talib 1980; Burman 2005; Khan 2013). It is also reported that Arab traders around that time were renowned for maritime trade. The accounts of the Arab and Persian geographers and historians such as Ibn Khordadbeh, al-Masudi, al-Idrisi, and others suggest that the Arabs founded a well-established and successful trade network with the Eastern lands, including India, Sri Lanka, Bengal, and Arakan up to the Malay peninsula (including Malaysia and Indonesia) and some other regions of Southeast and East Asia around the 8th century (Rahim 1995; Wade 2009). In the process of that Arab trade, all major routes in the Indian Ocean were used to such an extent that historian Andre Wink called the Indian Ocean the “Arab Mediterranean” (Wink 2002, 65). The Bay of Bengal was one of those routes that had a significant part in that course of sea-trade in particular. East Bengal’s prime seaport, Chittagong, situated on the Bay of Bengal, was a hub for Arab-Bengali trade. Historians argue that the Arab Muslims’ relations with Chittagong are ancient, and several scholars even claim that it was the Arabs who gave the port the name “Chittagong.” During their sea-trade across the Bay of Bengal, the Arab traders landed in this area and identified it in Arabic as Shati al-Ganga (the bank of the Ganges) or subsequently Shati-Jam.

30  Md Nazrul Islam The expression was gradually Bengalized as Sadkawan, Chitagang, or Chatgaon (Rahim 1963; Talib 1980; Siddiq 2015; Islam and Islam 2020). During the reign of Bengal’s Sultan Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah (r. 1338–1349), the famous Moroccan explorer Ibn Battuta visited Chittagong and described it as a port near the mouth of the Ganges. The Ain-i-Akbari of Abul Fazl Allami, the courtier-historian of Akbar’s reign, as well as 15th-century Chinese chronicles, have also provided similar descriptions (Siddiq 2015). These accounts confirm that the Arabs and Chinese had early contact with the region. Scholars also refer to some Arakanese chronicles that support the existence of Arab settlements in Chittagong in the earliest centuries of Islam (Karim 1980; Talib 1980; Rahim 1995; Islam and Islam 2020). The close contacts between the Arabs and the local people in the Chittagong region from the earliest period of the stretch of Islam are also supported by the facts that the Chittagonian language includes a plethora of Arabic words, idioms, and phrases. Chittagong and its adjacent areas also predominate in Arabic names of people and places. Scholars contend that contacts with Muslims in other parts of Bengal were land-based and predominantly Turko-Persian; however, coastal zones were influenced more by Arab links. Chittagong had been under the reign of Buddhist kings before it came under Muslim rule. The first Muslim conquest of Chittagong took place in the middle of the 14th century by Sultan Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah of Sonargaon (Dhaka). Yet effective control of the region was not acquired until the early 16th century (Siddiq 2015). European travelers such as Ludovico Varthema and Duarte Barbosa travelled to Bengal in the early 16th century and observed numerous Arab and Persian settlements there (Barbosa 2010 [1518]; Varthema 1863; Rahim 1995). Barbosa described Chittagong as the most prosperous city of Bengal, inhabited mainly by wealthy Arabian, Persian, and Ethiopian Muslim businessmen. Barbosa’s accounts also suggest that these businessmen possessed large ships and exported goods and commodities to what is now India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, and New Zealand (Siddiq 2015). The archaeological evidence also supports early Muslim contact with Bengal. A couple of coins from the reign of Arabian Abbasid Caliphs were discovered in Paharpur, Rajshahi Division, and Mainamati, Comilla Division, in Bangladesh in the mid-20th century. The coin found in Paharpur is dated 788 A.D., minted during the reign of Caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809). The coin discovered in Mainamati was commissioned during the reign of Caliph al-Muntasir Billah, who reigned from 861 to 862 A.D. (Khan 1955; Karim 1959; Rahim 1995; Khan 2013). The discovery of these coins shows that Arab Muslims travelled to East Bengal right from the start of the 8th century (Karim 1959; Husain 1982; Rahim 1995; Khan 2013). Noted Bengali researcher Professor Enamul Haq believes that the coin discovered in Paharpur’s ancient Buddhist monastery was brought by some Muslim missionary. It is not impossible that the missionary was in Bengal to preach Islam. He could have been murdered by the Buddhist monks, who seized the coin from his corpse (Haq 1948). Beyond this, dozens of Umayyad and Abbasid silver coins were discovered, from excavation or by other means, in different parts of Bengal, which

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 31 are now preserved in the Bangladesh National Museum (Islam and Hoque 2017). These discoveries lend credence to the theory that Bengal had contact with the early Arab Muslims, who were mostly merchants and/or preachers. Karim (1959) believes that Muslim merchants may have created, through their honesty in commerce, an environment favorable to the reception of Islam in Bengal. Thirteenth-century Persian historian Abu Umar Minhaj alDin, in Tabakat-i-Nasiri, writes in detail about the early Muslim campaigns in Bengal. He informs that, when Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji arrived at the gates of Nadia, in 1204, the capital of the then-Bengali King Lakshmana Sena, with just a handful of cavalry, the King’s forces guarding the gates of the city thought that they were only a party of Muslim horse traders and simply opened the gates to them (Minhaj al-Din 1881; also quoted in Karim 1959). Thus, by then, Bengalis had already learned to trust Muslims as welcome traders. The early Muslim traders had a major role, merely as traders and settlers, in preparing Bengal to accept a significant influence of Islam in their society (Rahim 1995). B. The Muslim Conquest: Bengal’s Islamic Consolidation Begins

Islam emerged in Bengal primarily as a social and cultural force. For many centuries, it remained purely as a “social religion” in the Bengal society. As a political force, Islam emerged in Bengal through the political conquest of Turkish commander Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji at the outset of the 13th century. By that time, Islam already had a firm foothold in the social and cultural landscape of Bengal. Yet the military victory of Bakhtiyar Khilji soon changed the social, cultural, political, and demographic makeup of the region (Siddiq 2015). Apart from conversions of non-Muslims to Islam, the number of Muslims gradually increased continuously as a result of Muslim immigration to Bengal from other parts of India and the world. A large number of Turkish Muslims accompanied Bakhtiyar Khilji during his conquest of Bengal. Many of them were also explorers and fortune seekers. These conquerors, soldiers, explorers, or fortune seekers were soon joined by their families (Minhaj al-Din 1881; Rahim 1995). Bakhtiyar Khilji distributed captured land among the nobles and aristocrats of his tribesmen. These new Khilji elites consolidated and further expanded their territories through military campaigns against the neighboring non-Islamic zones. The Khilji Dynasty saw the continued influx of Muslim immigrants, mostly Turks and Afghans, into Bengal. Like Khilji and his Ghurid tribesmen, they were mostly refugees from the relentless incursion of Mongol hordes under Genghis Khan into Central Asia, Persia, and Afghanistan in the 13th century. Muslim immigration to Bengal also continued under the subsequent Muslim rulers (Karim 1959). Muslim rulers also liberally granted lands and allowances to Muslim immigrants to Bengal. Mahmud Lodi, brother of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, the last Lodi Sultan of Delhi, and his family and confederates were ousted from Northern India by Emperor Babur and took refuge in Bengal. Sultan Nasiruddin Nusrat Shah granted lands and allowances to these Lodis and their troops, so they

32  Md Nazrul Islam could settle in Bengal, perhaps because Nusrat Shah’s Queen was a Lodi. After the end of the Lodi Dynasty in Delhi and the fall of Northern India to the Mughals, during the relatively short-lived Karrani Afghan dynasty in Bengal, large numbers of Afghans immigrated to Bengal (Rahim 1995). Mughal records are full of land grants. Many officers and soldiers settled in Bengal under Mughal rule. Abul Fazl’s Akbarnama, a chronicle of Emperor Akbar, shows that Akbar generously granted lands to officers and soldiers. It also reports that the Emperor once assigned a few hundred cases of land grants to the soldiers in Bengal. The other Mughal rulers also followed this example. The Baharistan-i-Ghaibi, a chronicle on the history of Bengal and the adjoining area under the reign of Emperor Jahangir, written by Mirza Nathan, recorded that Emperor Jahangir continued his father’s liberal policy of land grants to Mughal officers and soldiers in Bengal. Many of these landholding families created permanent settlements in Bengal (Rahim 1995). It is also related that, during the Mughal rule, many Persian Sufis and saints, scholars and teachers, officers and soldiers, and physicians and traders poured into this region. They enjoyed royal patronage, and many of them finally chose to settle there. From the beginning, the Bengal Muslim rulers focused on building institutions and consciously pursued those efforts that promoted Muslim culture in the society. These efforts included the construction of mosques, madrasas, and khanqahs; the promotion of Islamic values and spirit, the support of Muslim teachers, scholars, and Sufis; the encouragement of learning and knowledge; and benevolent work (Karim 1959). Historian Minhaj al-Din (1881) reports that Bakhtiyar Khilji founded mosques, madrasas, and khanqahs soon after making Lakhnauti the seat of his government. Other Bengal Muslim rulers, such as Sultans Ghiyas-ud-din Iwaz Khilji, Rukn-ud-din Kaykaus, Shams-ud-din Firuz Shah, and Alauddin Husain Shah, just to name a few, constructed a huge number of mosques and madrasas in different parts of Bengal to spread Islamic knowledge and culture. Abundant inscriptions recording the construction, reconstruction, or repairing of mosques have been discovered from across Bengal (Dani 1957). Historians have held that the Muslim leaders in Bengal consciously built mosques not only for simple pomposity and spectacle but also in fulfillment of their religious duty (Karim 1959). Professor Eaton (1993, 230) correctly observes that the mosque is the “physical embodiment of the social reality of Islam,” playing a key role in shaping the social and cultural fabric of Muslim society in Bengal. The Muslim rulers of Bengal also built numerous maktabs alongside mosques and madrasas for providing elementary education in Islamic religion. The Sultans of Bengal did a great deal to promote the Islamic spirit. In this regard, they deliberately implemented Islamic practices that benefitted and promoted harmony in the Muslim Ummah while reinforcing the spiritual fabric of society. They recognized the caliphs in Baghdad as Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) by inscribing their names on Bengali coins from the start of their reign. Sultan Ghiyas-ud-din Iwaz Khilji is believed to have started this practice (Thomas 1873). Conversely, the Sultans occasionally

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 33 asked for the caliphs’ recognition. Sultan Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah is widely referred to this case. The Sultans used to send gifts to the caliphs. They also built buildings for charity and education in the sacred towns of Mecca and Medina and sent them sumptuous gifts. Historians have especially noted two Sultans, Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah and Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah, for their benevolent efforts to construct and maintain madrasas in Mecca and Medina. Both Bengal Muslim rulers are also recognized for their generous support for education and other charitable works for the residents of these holy cities. The Sultans of Bengal would also offer royal support to ordinary Muslims as well as religious scholars for making their pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina (Karim 1959). They also greatly patronized the promotion of Bengali language and literature. Historians have especially recognized Sultan Alauddin Husain Shah for his remarkable contributions to the development of Bengali literature (Majumdar 1973). Sultan Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah exchanged letters and poetry with the famous Persian poet Hafiz. Sultan Nasiruddin Nusrat Shah had the Mahabharata and Ramayana, two major Sanskrit epics of ancient India and a part of Hindu religious texts, translated into Bengali. Poet Maladhar Basu also translated the Srimad Bhagavata, one of Hinduism’s 18 great Puranas, under his patronage (Chandra 2007). The Sultans in Bengal generously supported the Sufi, saints, and scholars from the conquest of Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khilji until the end of the period. Supported by the rulers, the Sufis, saints, and scholars of Islam contributed greatly to the spread of Islam and the strengthening of Muslim society and culture in Bengal. Historian Abdul Karim classified such support as follows: (i) making allowances or gifts of money or clothing or edible products; (ii) free transportation for Sufis; (iii) encouraging poets and scholars to write books; (iv) construction of siqayah or reservoirs next to the Sufi shrines; (v) grants of land to maintain shrines; (vi) construction of tombs or other sacred structures such as mosques attached to the Sufi shrine; and (vii) providing facilities for Sufis, scholars, or others to visit the holy sites (Karim 1959, 56–57). Scholars have significantly recognized the benevolent activities implemented by the Muslim leaders of Bengal. This included, among others, building dams and dikes to prevent flooding and building roads and highways to facilitate transport, the construction of wells and the excavation of reservoirs to promote the supply of water, the construction and maintenance of almshouses, and the allocation of immense treasures to the poor and the disadvantaged. These caring, people-friendly activities were designed to support the people and popularize the Muslim administration in Bengal, as well as, indirectly, to popularize the State religion (Karim 1959). C. Sufi Missionaries and Preachers: Islam Gets Deep-Seated in Bengal

Historians have paid significant attention to the role of the Sufi missionaries and preachers in the spread of Islam and growth of Muslim society in Bengal (Karim 1959; Rahim 1963; Haq 1975; Talib 1980; Siddiq 2015). These Sufi preachers arrived in Bengal at different periods from different parts of the

34  Md Nazrul Islam world, particularly from Western and Central Asia, Middle East, and Northern India. They strongly influenced the Bengali people and drew them toward Islam through their religious commitment, missionary zeal, charismatic personality, and humanitarian actions (Rahim 1995). They set up their khanqas and seminaries across Bengal, which became the centers of their religious propagation and spiritual development. Sufi missionaries began to arrive in Bengal in the 11th century, much earlier than the conquest of the country by Muslim warriors (Haq 1975; Talib 1980). They came mostly with the Arab traders, by sea. Over time, a vast number of Sufis poured into Bengal. The noted early Sufi preachers in Bengal included Baba Adam Shahid, Shah Sultan Balkhi Mahisawar, Shah Muhammad Sultan Rumi, Makhdum Shah Daulah Shahid, and Ni’matullah Butshikan, just to name a few. Baba Adam Shahid came to Rampal from Mecca during the reign of King Ballal Sena (1158–1179), on information that Muslims there had been persecuted for sacrificing cows. After arrival at Rampal, Adam Shahid settled and sacrificed cows, which infuriated the king and triggered a conflict with the saint. Baba Adam Shahid was martyred while in prayer, but strangely, the king and his family committed suicide by jumping into a pit of fire (Karim 1959). Baba Adam Shahid’s heroic and spiritual acts greatly influenced the people of the area. Upon his teacher’s order, Shah Sultan Balkhi came to Hariram Nagar, near Dhaka, to preach Islam. He encountered a Hindu king, Balarama, who worshipped the Hindu goddess Kali. The saint beat him and then advanced to Mahasthan, Bogura, where another Hindu king, Parasurama, was persecuting his subjects. In a fight with the saint, Parasurama was killed and his sister Shila Devi, a magician practicing tantricism, drowned herself in the river Karatoya. Many Hindus, including the king’s commander, who escaped death, accepted Islam (Talib 1980). The saint’s tomb still exists at Mahasthan, Bogura. Shah Sultan Rumi arrived in Bengal in the middle of the 11th century and preached Islam in Netrakona (Haq 1935). A Persian document, issued by Bengal subadar Shah Suja in 1671, confirms that the local Koch King offered the saint poison to drink, to test his spiritual power. The saint unhesitatingly took it, saying bismillah (invoking the name of Allah), and he suffered no harm. Being overwhelmed by the saint’s spirituality, the king converted to Islam and gifted the entire village to the saint to serve Islam (Talib 1980; Karim 1959; Rahim 1995). The authenticity of this account has been confirmed by historians referring to the fact that, in 1829, when the British administration attempted to seize the assets associated with the Dargah of the saint, the Khadim (custodian) presented the aforementioned Persian document and thereby saved the estate. Makhdum Shah Daulah Shahid came all the way from Yemen to Pabna, Bengal, with numerous followers. There he constructed mosques and preached Islam. Many people accepted Islam at his hands. The local king learned of these activities of proselytizing and converting people to Islam and attacked

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 35 the saint and his followers. He lost the ensuing battle. The saint, along with 21 of his disciples, became martyrs. The surviving disciples continued to propagate Islam with greater inspiration, and, Islam spread rapidly in the areas of Pabna and Bogura (Talib 1980). Ni’matullah Butshikan came to preach Islam in the Dhaka area. Yet, as tradition relates, the local Hindu influence went on opposing his mission. Once, during his prayers, the Hindus marched with idols and beat drums. When they arrived at the saint’s astana (meditation place) they made a great deal of noise to trouble him. The saint became irritated by this behavior, and glancing angrily, he pointed his finger at their idols, which were instantaneously shattered. The marchers, frightened, ran away. The spiritual power of the saint greatly affected the Hindus and soon they embraced Islam (Talib 1980). His tomb still exists in Dilkusha Bagh of Dhaka city. Among others, Bayazid Bastami (d. 874 AD) is believed to have come to Chittagong to preach Islam (Rahim 1995). Following the Muslim conquest of the land, many other Sufis and spiritual figures travelled to Bengal for preaching Islam. Some even had a major impact on authority. Shaikh Jalaluddin Tabrizi was one of the first saints to arrive in Bengal under Muslim domination. Upon instructions from his teacher, Shaikh Tabrizi came from Persia to India and Bengal to serve Islam. He settled in Pandua and became a missionary. He established khanqah and langar khana (alms-houses) and used to feed the poor and destitute. His eminent spiritual personality, missionary zeal, and humanitarian works contributed to Islam’s rapid spread in Bengal (Rahim 1995). Shah Makhdum Rupos arrived in Bengal from Baghdad at the end of the 13th century and preached Islam in the Rajshahi region. His tomb exists at Dargahpara in Rajshahi town. There are plenty of legends around him. According to a popular tradition, a group of fishers in the river watched as Shah Makhdum Rupos walked across the river. The fishermen were overcome by the spiritual power of the saint and became his disciples. By his attractive character and spiritual personality, the saint brought a great number of people from Rajshahi and the adjoining areas to Islam (Talib 1980). Shaikh Shah Jalal came from Yemen or Turkistan to Bengal in the beginning of the 14th century and preached Islam in Eastern Bengal and Assam. Ibn Battuta suggests that the majority of the people of Sylhet and Assam accepted Islam at his hands (Rahim 1995). His tomb is located in the heart of Sylhet city. A  19th-century work, Suhl-i-Yemen, reports that Muslims were persecuted, for sacrificing cows, by the tyrannical Hindu king of Sylhet, Gour Govinda. On information of this persecution, Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz Shah of Gaur ordered his commanders to invade Sylhet. Shaikh Shah Jalal and his 360 disciples helped them and eventually Gour Govinda lost and escaped (Rahim 1995). The saint settled in Sylhet, and through his spiritual power, humanistic qualities, and philanthropic activities, he converted a large number of people to Islam. Ibn Battuta has recorded many miracles of this celebrated Sufi. Khan Jahan Ali was of Turkic origin and a saint-ruler who preached Islam in Barisal, Bagerhat, Khulna, and Jessore. Inscriptions suggest that he was a

36  Md Nazrul Islam commander of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud Shah (r. 1435–1459) and laid the foundation of Muslim rule in these regions. He did many benevolent works such as cleaning up forests for settlements, building roads, highways and bridges, digging ponds and dighis (reservoirs) for water supply, and constructing mosques and madrasas. Due to his welfare activities as well as his spiritual personality, many Buddhists and Hindus converted to Islam (Talib 1980). The historic Sixty Dome Mosque at Bagerhat, which is now a UNESCO World Heritage Site, was built by this saint-ruler. His grave exists on the premises of this mosque. Shaikh Sharfuddin Abu Tawwama arrived in Bengal from Bukhara, Uzbekistan. He was a Hanafi jurist and an expert in Hadith. He settled in Sonargaon, near Dhaka, and attracted a large body of non-Muslims to Islam by his moral character, spirituality, and educational contributions. He founded a large madrasa at Sonargaon where students came even from other parts of Bengal and beyond. This madrasa contributed remarkably to the dissemination of Islamic education and the formation of a Muslim society in Bengal. He died in 1300 A.D. and was interred at Sonargaon (Rahim 1995). Shaikh Sharfuddin Yahya Maneri arrived in Sonargaon with his teacher Shaikh Abu Tawwama. He was also a great scholar of jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, and logic. He also lived in Sonargaon and was instrumental in spreading Islam and growing Muslim society in this region (Karim 1959). Numerous other noted Sufi missionary preachers came and were spread across Bengal. They devoted their entire life to zealous missionary work and brought about massive numbers of conversions to Islam. They included Shah Turqan Shahid of Bogura, Taqiuddin Arabi of Rajshahi, Pir Badruddin and Sayyid Nasiruddin Shah Nekmardan of Dinajpur, Shah Badruddin Allama and Qattal Pir of Chittagong, Sayyid Ahmad Tannuri and Shaikh Bakhtiyar Maisur of Noakhali, and Sufi Sayyidul Arefin of Barisal (Talib 1980). The whole of Bengal came under Muslim rule by the mid-15th century. Thousands more Sufi preachers continued to come to Bengal. They significantly contributed to the Islamization of Bengal. The influence of the Sufis on the growth of the Muslim community in Bengal may be summarized as follows: (i) the expansion of Muslim power, (ii) influence over the ruling class, (iii) imparting of religious instruction, and (iv) influence over the society and missionary work (Karim 1959, 124). Conclusion Islam emerged in Bengal centuries before the political conquest of the territory by Muslims. The Muslim missionaries and preachers, mostly Arab merchants, as well as the Sufis and spiritual men, were the main contributors to the spread of Islam and formation of a Muslim society in Bengal. The Muslim conquest of the territory expedited the missionary process. The Sultans consistently patronized the Sufis in their proselytizing efforts. The contemporary

Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 37 Hindu and Buddhist socio-religious and cultural contexts alienated their masses, who readily accepted Islam to end their social oppression. Muslim immigrants, during Muslim rule, also poured into Bengal. Thus, peaceful conversion and immigration largely explain Bengal’s becoming an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority land over a few centuries. Among the Islamization theories such as the theories of force, social liberation, immigration, and patronage, social liberation and immigration theories can convincingly interpret the rapid Islamization of Bengal. During the Islamization of Bengal, Brahmanical Hinduism was the dominant religion in Bengal. The Hindu and Buddhist societies were extremely divided and demoralized (Rahim 1995). Inequality, injustice, immorality, and repression were endemic in the society and the despised classes of Hinduism and Buddhism were subjected to these social evils. Here, Islam found a fertile ground for growth, especially among the majority who thought they had nothing more to lose. A large number of Sufi missionaries travelled to Bengal to preach Islam at different periods. Their spiritual power, great moral character, and humanitarian works attracted the people to find refuge in Islam. The Muslim rulers and the Sufi preachers built numerous social, cultural, and religious institutions, which further expanded and consolidated the social and cultural fabric of the Muslim society. In short, Islam was spread at the point of not the sword but of many other reasons. First and foremost, it was the right idea in the right place at the right time. It brought an egalitarian message to a society riven with class and religious distinctions and conflicts, as well as massive social, political, and legal injustice. It rode, and was associated with, a wave of trade with the Middle East and other parts of Asia, which was bringing new prosperity. It was energized by massive immigration of Muslims whom the Bengalis, both officially and on a personal level, not just tolerated but warmly welcomed, without a hint of racism or nationalism. Sufi missionaries were killed by Hindu kings because they were religious and political competitors but never because they were foreign. Precisely because, unlike the Hindus, it did not try to convert or crush its opponents by force, Islam was welcome, reminiscent of the old, tolerant Buddhist monarchy, which had united the nation for four hundred years and brought peace: before it became hopelessly corrupt and politically, financially, and morally bankrupt. Especially, in a nation which had endured 1,000 years of fighting between the same old Hindu and Buddhist religions and resolving nothing, Islam offered something truly new: monotheistic, deliberately non-formalistic, open to and inviting everyone, respecting every human as an individual, to be judged on his/her actions, not his/her family of birth or vague rejection of everything material, emphasizing social progress and unity through education, philanthropy, justice, and morality. Bengal had never seen anything like it. Over the centuries of invasion, famine, and revolutions, Islam was loose enough, with its minimalist dogma, to accommodate almost everyone and the united, supportive community it created got everyone who joined it through. Such that today,

38  Md Nazrul Islam it is still strong, arguably stronger than it has ever been. Today is not Islam’s denouement, at least in the part of Bengal, which is Bangladesh, but its zenith. British historian Thomas Carlyle said: The sword indeed: but where will you get your sword? Every new opinion, at its starting, is precisely in a minority of one. In one man’s head alone, there it dwells as yet. One man alone of the whole world believes it; there is one man against all men. That he takes a sword, and tries to propagate with that, will do little for him. You must first get your sword! On the whole, a thing will propagate itself as it can. (Carlyle 1899, 84) In other words, if you have a good idea, you do not need a sword. And Islam, in Bengal, was a good idea. References Ahmad, Aziz. 1964. Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment. New York: Oxford University Press. Ahmad, Imtiaz. 1966. “The Ashraf-Ajlaf Dichotomy in Muslim Social Structure in India.” Indian Economic & Social History Review 3 (3): 268–78. ———, ed. 1973. Caste and Social Stratification Among Muslims in India. New Delhi: Manohar Book Service. Ahmad, Khurshid. 2010. “Islam: Basic Principles and Characteristics.” In Islam: Its Meaning and Message, edited by Khurshid Ahmad, 27–44. London: The Islamic Foundation. Ahmed, Rafiuddin. 1981. The Bengal Muslims 1871–1906: A Quest for Identity. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Al-Ahsan, Abdullah. 1994. “Spread of Islam in Pre-Mughal Bengal.” Intellectual Discourse 2 (1): 41–55. Ambedkar, B. R. 1948. The Untouchables: Who Were They and Why They Became Untouchables. New Delhi: Amrit Book Company. Arnold, T. W. 1913. The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith. London: Constable & Co. Barbosa, Duarte. 2010 [1518]. The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and Their Inhabitants. London: Routledge. Beverley, Henry. 1872. Report on the Census of Bengal, 1872. Kolkata: Secretariat Press. Blyden, Edward Wilmot. 1994 [1887]. Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race. Baltimore: Black Classic Press. Burman, J. J. Roy. 2005. “Syncretism and Communal Harmony in Bengal.” In Religion, Power and Violence: Expression of Politics in Contemporary Times, edited by Ram Puniyani, 108–23. New Delhi: Sage. Carlyle, Thomas. 1899. Heroes and Hero Worship. Philadelphia: Henry Altemus. Chakma, Niru Kumar. 2011. “Buddhism in Bengal: A  Brief Survey.” Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology 8 (1): 37–44. Chandra, Satish. 2007. History of Medieval India. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan. Chatterji, Suniti Kumar. 1963. Languages and Literatures of Modern India. Kolkata: Bengal Publishers.

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Emergence of Islam and the Formation of Muslim Society 41 Mandelbaum, David G. 1970. Society in India. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mazrui, Ali A. 1997. “Islamic and Western Values.” Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 118–32. McHugo, John. 2017. A Concise History of Sunnis & Shi’is. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Metcalf, Barbara D. 2009. “Preface: Islam in South Asia in Practice.” In Islam in South Asia in Practice, edited by Barbara D. Metcalf, xvii–xxv. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mines, Mattison. 1972. “Muslim Social Stratification in India: The Basis for Variation.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 28 (4): 333–49. Minhaj al-Din, Abu Umar. 1881. Tabakat-i-Nasiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia Including Hindustan. Translated by Major H. G. Raverty. London: Gilbert & Rivington. Morgan, Kenneth W., ed. 1993. Islam—The Straight Path: Islam Interpreted by Muslims. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Muir, Sir William. 1891. The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall. London: Smith, Elder & Co. Pew Research Center. 2020. “Religious Composition by Country, 2010–2050.” Religion  & Public Life. Accessed May  3, 2021. www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/ religious-projection-table/2020/percent/all/. Mujeeb, Mohammad. 1967. The Indian Muslims. London: George Allen & Unwin. Mukherjee, Ramkrishna. 1972. “Social Background of Bangladesh.” Economic and Political Weekly 7 (5–7): 265–74. Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1985. The Discovery of India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nizami, Khaliq A. 1966. Studies in Medieval Indian History and Culture. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal. Ojha, Archana. 1991. “Impact of Mongol Invasions on the Delhi Sultanate.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 52: 245–48. O’Leary, De Lacy Evans. 1923. Islam at the Cross Roads: A Brief Survey of the Present Position and Problems of the World of Islam. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Qureshi, Ishtiaq H. 1962. The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 610–1947. The Hague: Mouton & Co. Rahaman, M. Shah Noorur. 1995. “Islam and Its Early Introduction in Bengal.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 56: 425–34. Rahim, M. A. 1963. Social and Cultural History of Bengal, vol. 1: 1201–1576. Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society. ———. 1995. “The Advent of Islam in Bangladesh.” In Islam in Bangladesh Through Ages, edited by A. K. M. Ayub Ali, M. A. Aziz, and Shahed Ali, 1–32. Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh. Ramadan, Tariq. 2007. In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad. New York: Oxford University Press. Rasul, Muhammad Ghulam. 1986. “The Advent of Islam in Bengal: Its Socio-Cultural Impact.” In Society and Culture in Islam, edited by M. Inamul Hoque, 100–16. Chittagong: University of Chittagong. Robinson, Rowena. 2003. “Modes of Conversion to Islam.” In Religious Conversion in India: Modes, Motivations, and Meanings, edited by Rowena Robinson and Sathianathan Clarke, 23–28. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Roy, Asim. 1983. The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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3 Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat Syed Serajul Islam

Introduction One of the most important crises of the Muslim World is the use of religion for political purposes by a regime. Islam has been exploited in many of these countries as a means of extending authority and earning legitimacy rather than giving true meaning to its principles. In Abu Sulayman’s words, today, “the Muslim World, which is internally weak, relatively backward, frustrated, suffering from internal tensions, full of conflicts and often controlled and abused by powers, is in a state of crisis. Its modern history is a tragedy” (Abu Sulayman 1987, 1). Bangladesh, being the third-largest Muslim country in the world, is no exception to this pattern. In Bangladesh the regimes have used Islam as one of the most important ingredients of legitimacy because “as a religion and a stable value system in Bangladesh, Islam has always been a guiding force for the people. Islamic traditions, customs, institutions, and beliefs are part of everyday life and are often the only familiar forms of social being and consciousness” (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990, 87). Each regime has successfully maneuvered the minds of the Muslims during periods of crisis because Islam is the predominant value system in the country. Therefore, even more than half a century after the end of colonial rule, religion is as much alive in Bangladesh as it was in the past (Coleman 1960, 537). In this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the question: why and how has Islam been used and remained alive again and again in the politics of Bangladesh? In keeping Islam alive how has, in addition to other Islamic institutions, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (henceforth “Jamaat”) played the role of keeping Islam alive in the society and politics of Bangladesh? However, before going into that analysis, it is essential to briefly explain the connections between Islam and politics. Islam and Politics In Islam, religion and politics are not considered to be two sides of a single coin. Islam is holistic, integrating religion and politics. John Esposito points out “the traditional Islamic world view provided a holistic approach DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-3

44  Syed Serajul Islam towards life, a life in which religion was intimately and organically related to politics, law and society” (Moten 1995, 20). Similarly, Ka’b has eloquently expressed, “Islam, the government, and the people are like the tent, the pole, the ropes and the pegs. The tent is Islam; the pole is the government; the ropes and pegs are the people. None will do without the others” (Moten 1995, 20). The state from the Islamic point of view is an institution for enforcing and implementing the fundamental principles of Islam. None is entitled to make laws on his own authorities, and none is obliged to abide by them. The Holy Qur’an says, “the authority rest with none but Allah, He commands you not to surrender to anyone saves Him. This is the right way” (12:40). “They ask: have we also got same authority? Say: all authority belongs to Allah alone” (3:154). “Who saw does not establish and decide by that which Allah has revealed, such are dis-believers” (5:44) (Moten 1995, 20). Islamic state is supposed to be free from all forms of racism and nationalism. It is a state built exclusively on Islamic principles. According to Abul A’la Maududi, “Each member renders his responsibilities to Allah who commands social justice, and forbids all kinds of exploitation, injustice, disorder and inequalities” (Moten 1995, 21). Consequently, in any society that is largely dominated by Muslims, it is very difficult for any regime to ignore the values of Islam or to do anything that is prohibited by Islam, even though the country is not formally declared an Islamic republic. Although at some point in history, few Muslim countries adopted measures to separate religion from politics largely in a Muslim-majority country, political life has to be situated within the larger frame of religious and spiritual life. Any serious deviation from basic Islamic tenets may endanger the very existence of the regime. In particular, in South Asia, despite 200 years of British colonialism, traditionalism pervades the villagers, where majority people live. The minority of South Asians are the ruling elite and that is the result of European colonialism. Gunner Myrdal observed that religion is so deeply rooted in South Asia that “even the communists do not dare speak against the religion” (Myrdal 1977, 141). Even some nationalist leaders like Gandhi said, “for me there is no distinction between politics and religion” (Myrdal 1977, 142). With specific context of Bangladesh, Rashiduzzaman comments: When East Pakistan broke away from Pakistan to become an independent and sovereign nation of Bangladesh, many observers believed that South Asia was irrevocably on its route to a secular nationalism, beyond religious tribalism and parochialism which purported the 1947 partition of British India. As later events proved, they were sadly mistaken. The primacy of Islamic traditions and sentiments, cast aside by the Bengalis in East Pakistan in 1971 to fight the Pakistani crackdown, and later deliberately exercised by the new Bangladesh government, subsequently returned as a resilient and widespread political phenomenon. (Rashiduzzaman 1994, 55)

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 45 Against this backdrop, this chapter tries to examine how and why Islam has been used in Bangladesh by every regime as a core value for earning legitimacy and also the role of Jamaat in this regard. Islam and Politics in Bangladesh Bangladesh is a country where 90% people are Muslims and therefore every regime had to be particularly careful about pleasing the majority by not doing anything that may affect the sentiment of the Muslims. In the following analysis, we will try to examine the steps taken by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1972 to Sheikh Hasina to date to appease the Muslims of Bangladesh. The Mujib Regime (1972–1975)

After independence, the Awami League, which led the nationalist movement of Bangladesh in 1971, formed a government under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The regime’s stand on religion was clearly enunciated in the constitution of Bangladesh. Secularism was declared one of the fundamental principles of state policy. The constitution abolished all kinds of communalism, political recognition of any religion by the state and the exploitation of religion for political ends (Ahmed 1983, 2). It was stated, in Article 12 of the Constitution, Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subjects to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of morality or public order; provided that no person shall have the right to form or be a member of any communal or other association or union which in the name of or on the basis of any religion has for its object, or purposes, a political purpose. (The Constitution of Bangladesh 1972, 2) In order to implement the principle of secularism, the Mujib government took a few steps. First, school textbooks were revised. All Islamic stories in the primary and secondary school textbooks were removed. Second, the subject “Islamiat” (Islamic studies) was withdrawn from the secondary school syllabus. Third, though Madrassah (religious schools) education was not abolished, no attempt was taken to upgrade them. Rather, government grants were cut. Fourth, all the Islamic names of public places were removed. The Islamic Intermediate College of Dhaka for example was renamed Kazi Nazrul College. The Dhaka University students’ residences names were changed from Fazlul Huq Muslim Hall to Fazlul Huq Hall, Salimullah Muslim Hall to Salimullah Hall, Allama Iqbal Hall to Zahurul Huq Hall, Jinnah (Founder of Pakistan) Hall to Surjasen (a Bengali Hindu hero during nationalist movement in British India) Hall. Fifth, the government renamed and changed the logo/monogram of Dhaka University, whereby it removed the Qur’anic words rabbi zidni ilma

46  Syed Serajul Islam (O lord, increase my knowledge). Sixth, the tradition in Bangladesh of initiating public gatherings or ceremonies with a recitation from the Holy Qur’an was eliminated by the regime. Even the radio and television station openings had to stop reciting from the Quran. Seventh, Friday was the weekly holiday for the first 25 years of united Pakistan (47–71) era which was changed to Sunday. Finally, and most importantly, by virtue of Article 12 of the Constitution of 1972, the Mujib regime prohibited any religious activities that had a political agenda. By this token, all political parties that had religious names were banned on the plea that religion should no longer be used as a political weapon as it had been used during united Pakistan (The Constitution 1972, 2). Despite the government’s commitment to eliminate the influence of Islam, the Islamic sentiment was running high in the minds of the people. In a survey, the Education Commission found that, while about 21% supported secular education, about 75% were in favor of having religious education as an integral part of general education (Rashiduzzaman 1994a, 41). In another survey, it was found that 50.6% and 62.1% of rural and urban respondents, respectively, held orthodox Islamic beliefs (Islam 1997a, 224). It is true that Bangladesh was constitutionally secularized, but the deep-seated Islamic culture of the society could not be altered. Within two years of Mujib’s rule, many Bangladeshis started openly criticizing the government’s secularization programs. Many people felt that in the name of secularism, the regime was particularly hostile to Islam rather than to all religions in Bangladesh (Islam 1988, 71). As Hashmi observed, “not a single Hindu, Christian, or Buddhist organization having religious identity or name [were] affected by the Mujib government’s secularization program. Many began to call the Mujib government a ‘puppet regime’ of Hindu India” (Hashmi 2004, 36). By 1974, also as a consequence of Mujib’s development policy, Bangladesh’s economy faced a grave crisis. The economy became heavily dependent upon the Indian economy. There was a continued low rate of production, excessive money supply, deficit financing, and a high rate of unemployment. Meanwhile, the leftist parties, especially the underground parties, challenged the existence of the regime. According to them, the independence of Bangladesh had not brought about the emancipation of peasants and workers; rather a puppet government of the Awami League “representative of exploiting classes of Bangladesh, agents of Indian expansionists, Soviet and American imperialists” had come to power. The puppet had, therefore, to be uprooted by the proletariat through an armed struggle under the leadership of a communist party that complete the “unfinished” revolution of Bangladesh started in March 1971. With this ideological orientation, the underground party had begun training their political cadres in the spirit of a “second revolution” in Bangladesh and launched three types of violent activities (Maniruzzaman 1975, 891). First, they started killing leaders of the Awami League on large scale. Second, they attacked the houses of rich peasants. Third, in addition to secret killing and looting the property of Awami League leaders, revolutionary cadres attacked the local law and order enforcing machinery—police outposts and police

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 47 stations. The revolutionary, thus, posed a serious and direct challenge to the authority and security of the states. In order to face the challenges and to convince the majority people that the regime was not pro-Indian or anti-Muslim, despite its adherence to secularism, the regime turned to religion. Mujib declared that in Bangladesh “the favored religion of the vast majority of population is Islam. No law will be formulated or enforced in Bangladesh contrary to the laws of Islam, well established in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah” (Islam 1988, 71). Mujib’s first manifestation toward Islamic sentiment was the declaration of general amnesty for all politicians who collaborated with the Pakistani army during the 1971 liberation war. Second, the government declared its confirmation to make the study of Islamiat and Arabic compulsory in secondary schools. Third, the government released more funds for Madrassah education. In 1971, the allocation of Islamic education was 2.5 million taka, which went up to 7.2 million taka in 1973. Fourth, the practice of beginning radio and television broadcasts and state functions with recitations from the Quran, which discontinued, was reintroduced. Fifth, the government formed Sirat Committees (the celebrating committee) for the observance of Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi (Prophet Mohammad’s birthday) throughout the country. Sixth, the Islamic Academy, which had been abolished in 1972, was revived; and in March  1975, five months before Mujib’s assassination, it was upgraded to a Foundation. Finally, and most importantly, Mujib himself Islamized his speeches by using Islamic terms such as “Allah,” Insha Allah (if God wishes). He started attending Islamic gatherings and began to conclude his speeches with Khuda Hafiz (God is all-conscious), instead of secular slogan Joi Bangla (victory of Bengal). Mujib also participated in the Summit of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1975 to gain the support of the Muslim world (Islam 1988, 71). All the aforementioned steps, however, did not mean that the Mujib regime was Islamizing Bangladesh; rather in front of tremendous unpopularity, he was trying to earn the loyalty of the masses in order to prolong his rule. In fact, all this was too late because the masses were already disenchanted with his corruption, inefficiency, dictatorial disposition, and pro-Indian stand, which culminated in his assassination in August 1975 in a military coup d’état. Khondakar Mushtaq Ahmad, a former member in Mujib’s cabinet, believed to be anti-Indian and pro-Islamic, was declared the president of Bangladesh after the August coup in 1975. The Zia Regime (1976–1981)

After a very brief interlude of the government of Khondakar Mushtaq Ahmad, the Chief of the staff of the army, General Ziaur Rahman, became the President of Bangladesh in April 1976. Although there was no resentment in the public for Mujib’s assassination, the Zia regime did not have any electoral legitimacy. Since Zia usurped power through non-electoral process, he was

48  Syed Serajul Islam suffering from a lack of legitimacy. Therefore, besides adopting many political strategies for earning legitimacy, he tried to gain popularity by resorting to Islamic slogans (Islam 1984, 577). He stated: [R]eligious belief and love for religion are great and imperishable characteristics of the Bangladesh nation. The long mass struggle against the cruel and unscrupulous foreign rule and domination has given the most sublime and tolerant character to and stabilized our religion. (BNP 1978, 3) The Zia regime adopted a number of steps toward Islamicization of Bangladesh. First, the regime declared all Islamic parties legal and allowed their activities and appointed many leaders who were allies/supporters of Islamist to his cabinet. For example, Shah Azizur Rahman was made the Prime Minister who had been to the United Nations representing Pakistan during the war of independence in 1971. Second, in April 1977, through an ordinance, Zia amended the constitution by dropping the word “secularism” and replacing it with “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah.” Third, “Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim” (In the name of Allah Beneficial, and the Merciful) was inserted in the Preamble of the constitution. Fourth, several symbolic measures were adopted, such as the hanging of wall posters in public offices, with Qur’anic verses and Prophet Mohammad’s Hadith (sayings); the flying of Eid Mubarak (happy Eid); festoons beside the national flags on the Eid day (the largest annual festival of the Muslim), the issuance of messages by the head of the state on religious occasions, and offerings of munajat (prayers) on special occasions. Fifth, attempts were made to propagate the principles of sharia (Islamic Laws), and to introduce Azan through radio and television five times a day. Finally, Zia personally popularized the term Bangladesh Zindabad (Long live Bangladesh) instead of Joi Bangla, which was considered to be unIslamic (Rashiduzzaman 1994, 38). In concrete terms, the Zia government also made attempts to introduce Islam to the general education system of the country. A new “syllabi committee” was formed, which declared: Islam is a code of life, not just a sum of rituals. A Muslim has to live his personal, social, economic and international life in accordance with Islam from childhood to death. So, the acquiring of knowledge of Islam is compulsory for all Muslims—men and women. (Government of Bangladesh 1977, 187) The committee suggested the introduction of a compulsory course on Islamiat in all grades from I to VIII (with options for the student of minority communities to have similar courses on their religion). The government accepted the recommendations, ordering the Ministry of Education to implement the policy immediately (Islam 1997, 225).

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 49 Furthermore, the government opened a new Ministry for Religious Affairs. Moreover, the Islamic Academy was given an extensive network of research facilities. An Islamic University, along with an Islamic Research Center, was also set up. Finally, during the Zia regime, Bangladesh became an influential member of the OIC, the three members of the Al-Kuds Committee, and Islamic Solidarity Front with its constitutional declaration for “stabilizing, preserving and strengthening fraternal ties with the Muslim states on the basis of Islamic solidarity” (Maniruzzaman, 1980, 217). Every step taken by the Zia regime made the majority happy, but he did not declare Bangladesh an Islamic state. Rather, he said that Bangladesh, with a 90% Muslim population, is a de facto Muslim state and therefore it was redundant to declare it an Islamic state (Rashiduzzaman 1994, 38). In fact, this was nothing but a political stand of the regime in the wake of rising Islamic sentiments. Thus, Rashid comments, “as the revolutionary fever ended in August 1975, the Bangladesh polity regained its original traits and Islam, which was muted, reappeared on the Bangladesh political scene” (Rashid 1982, 15). The Ershad Regime (1982–1990)

President Zia-ur-Rahman was assassinated in 1981 in an abortive military coup d’état, and Vice President Abdus Sattar became acting President of Bangladesh. A  fresh presidential election was held in 1981 in which Sattar won a landslide victory. Within three months of his rule, army’s chief of staff General Hossein Mohammad Ershad demanded participation of armed forces in the administrative machinery of the government. President Sattar disagreed with this proposal. Consequently, on March 24, 1982, General Ershad assumed full power under Marshal Law and suspended the constitution. Immediately after capturing power, Ershad declared, “Sattar had lost sight of Islamic nationalistic goal, previously set by Zia-ur-Rahman” and stated further, “Islam will be given the highest place in the country’s future constitution and Islamic provisions wherever necessary” (Islam 1988, 182). The seizure of power by Ershad led the opposition political parties, despite their differing ideologies and orientations, to be united against the regime. They demanded, “immediate withdrawal of martial law, restoration of fundamental rights, parliamentary elections preceding any other election, release of political prisoners, and the trial of persons responsible for student killings” (Islam 1986,184). By 1988, the government made several attempts to reach a compromise with the politicians but by then Ershad alienated all the major sections of the community—students, professionals, intellectuals, trade unions, etc. (Maniruzzaman 1992, 203). Therefore, he thought that “Islamic slogan” might be the easiest way to gain the support of the masses. He began to appeal to the sentiment of the Muslim masses by adopting steps toward the further Islamization of Bangladesh. He declared, “Bangladeshis are good Muslims who offered their prayers five times a day and whom Allah would certainly help” (The Bangladesh Times, 1992).

50  Syed Serajul Islam First, Ershad himself began to visit Mazars (tombs/shrines) and Masjids (mosques) in order to show his religious commitment. He also addressed people at Jumma (Friday) prayer and asked them to follow the true path of Islam. Second, the government adopted an education policy in which the study of Arabic and Islamiat was made compulsory from grade one (The Government of Bangladesh 1982, 2). Third, the government established a Zakat Fund (poor fund) headed by the President himself in order to distribute money to the needy. Fourth, the regime also established a separate directorate under the Ministry of Education for madrassah education. One remarkable feature of these institutions had been their large-scale expansion and development. In 1975–1976, there were 1,830 government-approved madrassahs in Bangladesh, which in 1988 increased to 2,700 (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990, 79). Fifth, the government offered financial grants to many madrassahs and mosques for repair, reconstruction, and beautification of their buildings. Finally, and most importantly, the Ershad government passed an amendment (Eighth Amendment) to the constitution on June 7, 1988, declaring Islam the state religion of Bangladesh (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990, 78). All these steps, however, did not help General Ershad to stay in power. Even the Islamic political parties did not believe Ershad. Jamaat chief held that the people wanted an Islamic state not a mere declaration of Islam as state religion. Mowlana Muhammad Ullah, the chief of Khilafat Andolan (Islamic leadership movement) gave a fatwa (religious decree) condemning the Ershad regime as anti-Islamic as it did not rule according to the Qur’an and Sunnah (teaching of the Prophet Mohammad) and as illegitimate for seizing power without consent of the people (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990, 799). In fact, there was no specific measure for the realization of state religion. Thus, General Ershad’s frequent and emphatic Islamic steps did not last long. Ultimately, he had to face a violent protest movement in 1990, which resulted in his removal from the office of the Presidency of Bangladesh. The Khaleda Zia Regime (1991–1996 and 2001–2006)

In the post-Ershad era, Khaleda Zia pursued all the symbolic measures taken by the previous governments of Zia and Ershad. Khaleda’s party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), formed the government though it did not have an absolute majority of seats in the 1991 election. Consequently, she could not take any steps that would have displeased the Jamaat, which had 18 seats. Although Khaleda did not keep all the promises that she made before the formation of the government (Islam 1997), there were at least three challenges that forced Khaleda’s government to take a stand. First, Professor Ghulam Azam, Chief of the Jamaat, was alleged to have collaborated with the Pakistan army during the Liberation War of 1971, and whose party was outlawed by Mujib until the ban was lifted by Zia in 1976. Ghulam Azam remained in Pakistan until he returned to Bangladesh in the mid-1970s. As soon as he

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 51 came to Bangladesh on a Pakistani passport, he became the de facto leader of the Jamaat and emerged as a power broker after the 1991 election. By then, Ghulam Azam did not have Bangladesh citizenship, as it was revoked by the Mujib government in 1972. Consequently, the opposition party, the Awami League, and a coalition of secular and liberal groups complained to the government that Ghulam Azam had violated the law, since a foreigner could not be the head of a party. Under the pressure, the government sent him to jail. While Ghulam Azam was in jail, there were protests and counterprotests both supporting and opposing Ghulam Azam’s claim to citizenship. Ultimately, the government could not go against the popular demand. Public sympathy for Ghulam Azam was felt at the informal groups, family dinners, schools, mosques, and social gatherings. In 1993, the Bangladesh High Court rendered the judgment in favor of Ghulam Azam, restoring his Bangladeshi citizenship (by birth), a decision that was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (Rashiduzzaman 1994, 56). The second issue was the case of Taslima Nasreen, a feminist writer from Bangladesh, who became the target of attack by Muslim zealots for her controversial view of Islam. In her book Lajja (Shame), she made offensive comments against Islam, which included suggestions for a thorough revision of the Qur’an. Although she claimed that she had the freedom of expression, Islamists attacked her as an enemy of Islam and agent of Hindu India. She was nothing but an “Indian discovery.” Begum Khaleda Zia was compelled to order her arrest, but she fled and took asylum in a Western country (Islam 1997, 224). The third issue that Khaleda had to tilt her political balance in favor of the opinions of the Muslim majority was during the public reaction in Bangladesh to the demolition of the Babri mosque in India. The government issued a press statement that condemned the barbarous action: “the government is equally concerned and deeply shocked at the demolition of the Babri Mosque along with the people of the country” (Ghosh 1993, 707; Islam 1997, 395). Thus, though the Khaleda regime did not need to take any new steps in Islamizing Bangladesh in the wake of Islamic revivalism, the government had to side with the popular sentiments of the majority Muslims. During her term (2001–2006) Khaleda Zia introduced various measures that benefitted Islamist parties and conservative madrassahs (Riaz 2007, 39). She led a coalition government with Jamaat-e-Islami and in the coalition government, Jamaat Ministers headed the Ministry of Social Welfare, and, also temporarily, the ministries of agriculture and industry. Due to the influence of the Jamaat and the Islami Oikko Jote (IOJ) in the ruling coalition, the Khaleda government-initiated steps to grant official recognition of the degrees of Qaumi madrassahs (Masud 2006), orthodox education institutions that mostly adhere to the Deobandi faith and operate largely outside state control (Riaz 2007, 37–40). Also, in order to please the Islamists, Khaleda Zia banned the movie “Matir Moina” as it portrayed some scenes of anti-Madrasah education system in Bangladesh (Hashmi 2004).

52  Syed Serajul Islam Sheikh Hasina Regime (1996–2001 and 2008 to Date)

The departure of Khaleda in 1996, in the midst of the opposition’s continued strikes and protests, opened the possibility of a return of the Awami League to power. However, that was possible only if the party could use Islamic symbols and brainwash the Muslims. During the election campaign, the Awami League, therefore, used as many Islamic symbols as possible. First, it posted its electioneering campaign banners with Allah Akbar (God is the greatest), which it never did in the past. Some banners were written with Quranic words. Second, during her national election campaign speech in public meetings as well as on television, Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League, appealed to the masses with all kinds of examples from Islamic history. Third, during the election campaign, Sheikh Hasina was very careful to cover her head with a veil. Not only Hasina but other political leaders changed their political dress, Mujibcourt, for the traditional Muslim dress. Fourth, all the leaders addressed public meetings with recitations from the Qur’an, which is against the party’s principle of secularism. Finally, Sheikh Hasina performed her Hajj (pilgrimage) just before the election and visited Saudi Arabia to show her ties to the Muslim world (Kochanek 1998). All these steps were taken to win the minds of the rural Muslim masses, and so the party was successful in winning the election. After coming to power, Sheikh Hasina did not take any drastic measures to eliminate the Islamic forces despite her party’s policy of secularism. She had been able to neither bring back the principle of secularism as one of the state principles nor eliminate the clause of the declaration of Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh. Rather, by paying frequent visits to Saudi Arabia for omra hajj (semipilgrimage), she assured the people of Bangladesh that she is also an Islamist. During her term starting from 2008 to date, Sheikh Hasina has adopted many actions to please the Muslims. Before the election, in 2006, Hasina formed an alliance with Hefazat Majlis to count the votes of its supporters promising that if she would come to power, she would never pass any law against the Qur’an (Salehin 2013; Pattanaik 2009). After forming government, on the one hand, she started the trial of Jamaat leaders for war crimes of 1971 but on the other hand, she kept “Islam” the state religion of Bangladesh to keep the Islamists happy. Also, to make other religious people happy, it was added that “the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal right in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions” (The Constitution of Bangladesh 2011). On the one hand, the regime omitted the constitutional principle “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah,” and in its place restored secularism; but, on the other hand, it retained bismillah-ar-rahman-ar-rahim (In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) (The Constitution of Bangladesh 2011). At some point, Prime Minister Hasina said that Bangladesh will be run in line with the Charter of Madinah (Salehin 2013). In 2013, on the war crimes trial of a few Jamaat leaders, a pro-government movement was organized at Sahabag of Dhaka demanding capital punishment.

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 53 In response to this demand, the Hefazat-e-Islam, considered by the government to be close to Jamaat, organized a massive rally in Dhaka in April 2013. The Shahbag movement created large-scale counter-demonstrations by Hefazat (Kabir 2015, 68–69), which considered the activists of the Shahbag movement as “anti-Islamic” and “atheist.” Moreover, it now began to raise 13 demands (see Notes: 13-point demands) including the passage of a blasphemy law, the scrapping of the women’s development policy, and making Islamic education mandatory (Kabir 2015, 70). The Hefazat blocked entire parts of Dhaka (Islam 2016, 64, 83, 227) by bringing around 500,000 followers to Dhaka (Bouissou 2013), which posed a serious challenge to the stability of the regime. In order to push for their 13-point demand, Hefazat-e-Islam organized a long march on April 6, 2013, toward the Motijheel area in Dhaka from all over Bangladesh. This long march fueled Hasina’s fear of being considered as “anti-Islamic,” which is grounded in the Awami League’s (AL) experience of losing the 1991 and 2001 elections. In particular, Hasina was afraid of being viewed as antiMuslim. While in 2011 she did not make any concessions to Hefazat, Hasina started changing her strategy from 2013 onward (Jahan and Shahan 2014). Her government adopted a mixed strategy, having both the tactics of pressure and appeasement—“a carrot and stick” policy. It penetrated Hefazat with security forces and put its workers under surveillance by the intelligence agencies having serious repression and harassment of the followers. Concurrently, however, the regime also established communication channels to Hefazat. It started a dialogue with Hefazat’s top leaders over their demands. In early 2017, the regime reached a compromise with the top Hefazat’s leader, Moulana Safi. As part of the compromise between the two sides, the regime allowed Hefazat to keep operating on a condition that the movement would refrain from staging any major demonstrations (Lorch 2018). While the government took serious actions in which many Madrassah students in the protests were killed, gradually before the 2018 elections the government made a strategic compromise with Hefazat Islam for political purposes. The government accepted many demands of the Hefazat. The most important among them was approving the highest Qaumi Madrasah degree as equivalent to master’s degree of the University in Arabic and Islamic Studies, in return for which Hasina was given by the Hefazat honoring the title of “mother of Qaumi” (Bdnews24, April 13, 2017). Subsequently, in February 2021, the Hasina government brought all Qaumi madrassahs under the protection and control of the government (The Bangla Tribune, February 16, 2021). While the measure will provide some control of the government over the Madrassahs, it will help Islamize the bureaucracy. The second most important one is that the Hasina government omitted educational content of schools considered by Hefazat as un-Islamic. The regime also removed content related to non-Muslim authors from primary and secondary school textbooks. The Hasina government agreed to changes in public school textbooks as well to make them more “Muslim-friendly” (Chowdhury 2017).

54  Syed Serajul Islam The success of the regime was that in July  2017, several Islamist parties announced their readiness to join the AL’s electoral coalition (Chowdhury 2017). Of a total of 70 Islamist political parties (though only ten are registered with the EC), 63 are now with the Awami League-led Grand Alliance (The New Age Islam, December 4, 2020). Furthermore, the intelligence services were reportedly negotiating with both Hefazat and other Islamist parties, except Jamaat, to form a united electoral platform to weaken the BNP. The regime reportedly gave between 250  million and 500  million taka to various small Islamist organizations as a part of these “negotiations” (Lorch 2018). Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) chairman Al-Hajj Misbahur Rahman Chowdhury said they have joined hands with the Awami League for “strategic reasons.” “Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has done a lot for Islam, so ideologically we have no problem supporting her party politics. At this point, it seems, we will be benefited more if we endorse her alliance in the upcoming election” (Lorch 2018). Ataur Rahman, a former political science professor at Dhaka University, said, “as 80 percent of the voters are Muslims, Awami League cannot ignore the popular sentiment, so they must portray themselves as pro-Islamic and secular at the same time” (Lorch 2018, 24). The biggest challenge before the Hasina government has been the installation of the statue of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, for his 100 years in 2021. The regime has planned to instill a grand statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka and throughout the country. Junaid Babunagri, the head of Hefazat Islam and other top leaders, had held a few rallies throughout the country to stop building statues of Mujib as un-Islamic (The New Age Islam, December 4, 2020). Earlier in 2017, the government had removed the statue of the Greek Goddess of Justice Themis from the precincts of the Supreme Court after the Hefazat had staged demonstrations against the statue. The Hefazat Islam has issued four demands in 2020 to the government: (1) closure of all activities of International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in Bangladesh, (2) banning religious activities of the Ahmadiyya community and declaring them un-Islamic, (3) expulsion of the French Ambassador, and (4) closure of the French Embassy in Dhaka (The New Age Islam, December 4, 2020). The regime has not been harsh on the Hefazat from preventing the followers to stop the demand. Simultaneously, rather in order to please the Islamists, the government has planned to spend around 70,000  million taka on constructing a huge mosque with an adjunct Islamic studies center in Dhaka, along with similar, smaller mosques and study centers at all tiers of the local government system around the country. Around 170 model mosques, out of a total 560, would be inaugurated across the country in three phases by December 2021, marking the “Mujib Year” aiming at preaching the true message of Islam to eliminate religious misconceptions. Of those, 50 mosques would be inaugurated in the first phase before Ramadan in May 2021 while 60 more are being prepared for inauguration in September and another 60 in December (The Bangla Tribune, February 16, 2021). Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina hoped that the model mosques will help spread the essence of Islam

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 55 and its inspirational practices and culture to all. She said, “[T]hrough these model mosques, the culture and messages of Islam will draw the attention of all. The people of the country, irrespective of their religions and castes, will be able to comprehend the essence of Islam” (The New Nation, March 1, 2021) The Role of Jamaat The previous discussion indicates continuous use of Islam by every regime in Bangladesh to further their political interest. Hence, the question arises: why has Islam been revived again and again in the politics of Bangladesh? What has been the role of Jamaat in this regard? The continued survival of Islam, as the dominant value system, as well as a social force, in Bangladesh has been possible due to the existence of various social, charitable, economic, and political organizations. A  large number of religious institutions and organizations, such as masjids, madrassahs, and tablighi Jama’at; the mazars (tombs) of famous sufis; and cultural-religious organizations such as the Islamic Foundation, Masjid Mission, have thus always existed in Bangladesh, which upheld the cause of Islam and trained a number of persons in the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah (Ahamed and Nazneen 1990, 89). In the political domain, political organizations based on religion, that is, the political parties which pledge to serve the cause of Islam, also have kept Islam alive in Bangladesh. Of the Islam-based parties, the most famous and organized political party is Jamaat. In August 1941, Sayyid Abu A’la Maududi founded Jamaat-e-Islami in India in order to offer institutional shape to his ideas on the reconstruction of Muslim society based on Islamic principles. With the emergence of two independent states—India and Pakistan—in 1947, the organization had to be divided, and, again, with the separation of East and West Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami had to be sub-divided into Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (Moten 1994). The Jamaat focuses on achieving power through a constitutional process and democratic elections. It emphasizes both Islamic democracy and “Bangladeshi” nationalism. It claims that its goal is to “democratically enforce God-fearing, honest, and efficient leadership” (Moten 1994, 4).  It aims to create national unity and rejuvenate Islamic values in every sphere of people’s life. In order to do this, the Jamaat follows four principles: (1) educate the people with proper Islamic knowledge and organize them; (2) instill moral values among them; (3) offer social services on the basis of Islamic values; and, (4) finally, enhance the system of governance by replacing “the secular and oppressive leadership with God-fearing, honest, and qualified leadership” at all levels through democratic means (Kumar 2017, 146). The Jamaat, being the largest functioning Islamic party in Bangladesh, is active among peasants, workers, students, academics, civil servants, the military, and other various segments of Bangladeshi society. The Jamaat now stands as the third-largest political party in Bangladesh next to Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (Hasan 1993, 64).

56  Syed Serajul Islam A fundamental difference of the Jamaat with other Islamic parties and groups in Bangladesh today is that the Jamaat seeks total transformation of the society in accordance with the principles of Islam. In the conventional sense of the term, the Jamaat is not a religious political party but an ideological movement for transforming the society based on the tenets of Islam (Rahim 2001, 148). The Jamaat is simply neither a political party nor merely a religious organization. It considers Islam to be a complete and balanced code of conduct. The Jamaat is political to the extent Islam is political (Islam 2015). The cadres and workers in Jamaat are recruited through a highly selective process. In order to become a full member, one has to receive lessons in party ideology for a certain period of time. Unlike other parties, Jamaat has a stable party fund collected from the regular contributions of its members and supporters. Moreover, the party has a student front, Islami Chhatra Shibir (Islamic Student Front), which is steadily making its bases among students, and this is one of the strongest student organizations in the universities of Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Jahangirnagar. Since Jamaat emphasizes character building and disciplined action, the front organizations are increasingly drawing the attention of the people in Bangladesh (Islam and Islam 2018). After independence in 1971, the Jamaat was banned in Bangladesh as a political party though it operated underground.  In 1976, after the change in the government, the Jamaat resumed its activities under the leadership of Maulana Abdur Rahim when he formed the Islamic Democratic League (IDL). In 1979, six leaders from the Jamaat ran on the IDL ticket and won seats in Bangladesh’s parliament (Islam 2015). As soon as the ban on religionbased political parties was withdrawn, the Jamaat was then revived and began operating in Bangladesh under its acting Ameer, Abbas Ali Khan. The Jamaat emerged as a legitimate organization in Bangladesh. The golden era for the Jamaat began during the 1980s through the early 1990s. By then the Jamaat’s student wing became popular and captured student unions at universities in Chittagong and Rajshahi. It was not only in the campuses but also at the national level in the parliamentary elections of 1991 that the Jamaat captured 18 seats and more than 12% of the votes (more than four million votes) while it won ten seats and slightly more than one million votes in the elections of 1986. The Jamaat emerged as the third-largest party in terms of its share in total votes cast in the 1991 elections. Surprisingly, the Awami League asked the Jamaat leaders to “forget the past and look forward to the future” (Ajker Kagaj, April 1992). In early 1991, the AL sent its presidential candidate to the Chair of Jamaat, Ghulam Azam, for his “blessings,” as the members of the parliament elect the president of Bangladesh. The Jamaat then had 20 members (including two women) in the parliament with unequivocal loyalty toward Ghulam Azam. The gradual transformation of the cold war between the Islamists (mainly the Jamaat) and secular forces also witnessed open confrontation during the 1980s and early 1990s. The latter was considered to be “pro-Indian” and “pro-socialists.” They had been opposing the Jamaat in the name of championing the cause of Liberation and secularism. In the fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth parliamentary

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 57 elections, the Jamaat received 12.13%, 8.61%, 4.28%, and 4.70% votes, respectively. The Jamaat competed for 122, 300, 31, and 39 seats in those four elections, respectively, and won 18, 3, 17 and 2 seats, respectively. It appears that though in the fifth and the eighth elections, the Jamaat received 8% less votes, its share of seats was almost equal. On the other hand, in the seventh and ninth elections though the Jamaat received 4% less votes, its share of seats was almost equal (Ahmed 2020). Since 2009, the AL government has severely repressed the BNP and the Jamaat. In June 2011, the Awami League government abolished the “caretaker system” that guaranteed the conduct of national elections under a non-partisan interim government. After staging violent demonstrations in which over 300 people were killed, the BNP boycotted the 2014 polls. The Jamaat was not allowed to compete due to the cancellation of its registration in 2013 by the High Court on the basis that the Jamaat’s charter went against Bangladesh’s constitution (Lorch 2014). Thus, the AL won the government in the 2014 election, leading to an unprecedented concentration of power in its hands. Despite the fact, the Jamaat did not participate in the tenth controversial parliamentary election, in the post-election period it participated in the Upazaila (subdistrict) elections. Although there was also a question of neutrality in those elections, the Jamaat received 20% votes. While Jatiyo party and other leftist parties allied to the ruling AL did not do well, the Jamaat won a massive number of seats (Ahmed 2020). It appears from the results of these elections that the Jamaat has a deep root at the grassroots level in Bangladesh, keeping Islam alive. On March  1, 2021, the Jamaat Ameer (Chair), Dr  Shafiqur Rahman, addressed the nation for celebrating 50 years (Golden Jubilee) of the glorious Independence of Bangladesh, where he mentioned about the weaknesses in the role of present government and urged the necessity for keeping Islam as a moral principle for ruling Bangladesh. He acknowledged Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the founding leader of the Bangladesh independence but cited the fact that the government has failed to establish democracy, rule of law, human rights, and economic emancipation of the people. The Jamaat has been vigilant for the protection of sovereignty of Bangladesh and for the guarantee of fundamental rights of the people and for ensuring Islamic morals in the society. Dr. Shafiqur Rahman declared that the Jamaat looks forward to establishing welfare state and guaranteeing Islamic morals in Bangladesh; “personal lives, country and nation must be built according to the Islamic lifestyles, rules, and regulations” (The New Nation, March 1, 2021). Again, in mid-April when the government declared lockdown due to Covid-19 and asked the people not to pray in the mosque, the Jamaat Chair, who himself is a medical doctor by profession, urged the authority to allow prayer in mosques under health rules and regulations adding: [P]rayer is one of the major means to establish relations between Allah and His servants. By offering prayers 5 times in a day, the Muslim devotees create a spiritual link with Almighty Allah. The government must

58  Syed Serajul Islam think that whether the decision of depriving the Muslim devotees from those chances reasonable or not. Islam loving people firmly believe, for the materialistic development and economic stability if the government can keep the mills and factories open then the Muslim devotees should be allowed as well to offer prayer inside the mosques maintaining all health disciplines. (The New Nation, April 14, 2021) Thus, the Jamaat has been continuously active to keep Islam alive in Bangladesh. Conclusion The analysis above indicates that Islam is a dominant force in the socio-economic life of Bangladesh. Despite the initial commitment of the government to establish secularism in Bangladesh, the constitution was amended in 1976 to eliminate the term “secularism” and replace it with “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah.” Islam and Muslim roots are pre-existing conditions in Bangladesh, which has in recent years gained a fresh impetus. The secularist forces are in the minority, and therefore, Bangladesh has never had a truly secular society in the Western sense of the term. Although there exists conflict between religious and cultural predominance, Islam has never lost importance in the public sentiment of Bangladesh. Given the history of its Islamization, the development of Islamic institutions and the resistance to anti-Islamic forces, it is quite obvious that most people in Bangladesh maintain their identity as Muslims. Constitutionally, though Bangladesh is not declared an Islamic state, Islam has remained the state religion of the country. Bangladeshis are personally religious. In a 2016 survey conducted by NielsenBangladesh, 74% of the respondents said that religion was “very influential” (39%) or “somewhat influential” (35%) on their “day-to-day views and opinions” (Lorch 2018, 24). There is no doubt that though Islam remains a stable value system due to the existence of various social and religious institutions, it has failed as politics in Bangladesh. Primarily there is no strong Islamic political party with an intellectual leadership and wide base of support throughout the country. The strongest Islamic party, Jamaat has tried its best to keep Islam alive in both social and political lives of Bangladesh despite attacks from various fronts. Hashmi noted that “Jamaat faced a three prolong attack: from the government, secular/ socialist/liberal groups, and the Ulema” (Hashmi 2004, 35). A recent study of Banu shows that more Bangladeshis want to vest political power in Western educated-cum-religious minded people rather than with purely religious leaders. In a survey, she found 53% of the rural and 78% of the urban responded to their willingness to elect Western educated-cum-religious minded people as their representative while only 39% and 7% of the rural and urban responded, respectively, to vote for purely religious leaders (Banu 1992, 147). Similarly, Hashmi expressed most of the Bangladeshis prefer “Islam loving western

Politics of Islam in Bangladesh and the Role of Jamaat 59 educated, the Anglo-Mohamedans, to the Mollahs (spiritual leaders)” as their preferred candidate in the elections (Hashmi, November 14, 2006). The majority of Muslims still think the religious leaders from Islamic parties are not capable of ruling the state since the majority of the leaders have no background in modern education. Furthermore, all the Islamic political parties are still seen as collaborators with the Pakistani army in 1971 War of Liberation. Moreover, among the population in Bangladesh, 13% are non-Muslims; a majority of them are Hindus. Therefore, though each regime propagated Islamic values at the state level, each of them has been very careful about the sensitivity of non-Muslims in Bangladesh. Thus, while Zia replaced secularism with “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah,” he retained the clause, “no discrimination against any citizen on ground on religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.” Ershad declared Islam as the state religion but added a subclause that “all other religions will have the freedom to practice peace and harmony,” even the Jamaat chief Ghulam Azam stressed that in accordance with the tenet of Islam, all human beings are related to one another, and fellow citizens of Bangladesh; all non-Muslims will be given their full rights if Jamaat comes to power (Moten 1995, 20). Thus, one could say in conclusion that Islam has been successful as a social value system and has continued to be alive in the political domain in Bangladesh. Notes On March 9, 2013, Hefazat-e-Islam leader Shaykh-ul-Islam Allama Shah Ahmad Shafi put forward a 13-point demand at the Olama-Mashayekh Convention organized at Darul Uloom Hathazari Madrassah Convention Hall: 1) Reinstatement of “Absolute trust and faith in Allah” in the constitution of Bangladesh and abolishing of all laws that are in conflict with the values of the Qur’an and Sunnah. 2) Enactment of (anti-defamation) law in the parliament, keeping death penalty as the highest form of punishment to prevent defamation of Allah, Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w), and Islam, and prevent spreading hate against Muslims (highest penalty prevalent for defamation is two years). 3) Immediate end to the negative propaganda by all anti-Islamic bloggers in a leading role in the so-called Shahbag movement who have defamed Allah, Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w), and Islam. 4) End to all alien cultural practices like immodesty, lewdness, misconduct, culture of free mixing of the sexes, and candle lighting in the name of personal freedom and free speech. 5) Abolish the anti-Islamic inheritance law and the ungodly education policy. Making Islamic education compulsory at all levels. 6) Declaration of Ahmadis (Qadianis) as non-Muslims by the government and put a stop to their negative and conspiratorial activities. 7) Stop instating more statues in the name of sculpture at road intersections and educational institutions to save Dhaka, the city of mosques, from becoming the city of statues. 8) Remove all the hassles and obstructions at Baitul Mukarram and all mosques in Bangladesh that prevent Musallis from offering prayer. Also, stop creating obstruction for people to attend religious sermons and other religious gatherings.

60  Syed Serajul Islam 9) Stop the spread of Islamophobia among the youth through depiction of negative characters on TV plays and movies in religious attire and painting negative stereotypes of the beard, cap, and Islamic practices on various media. 10) Stop anti-Islamic activities in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) propagated by several NGOs and Christian missionaries under the guise of religious conversion. 11) End to the massacre, indiscriminate firing, and attacks on the prophet-loving Muslim scholars, Madrasah students, and the general public. 12) End to all threats against Islamic scholars, Madrasah students, and Imams and Muslim clerics of mosques throughout the country. 13) Immediate and unconditional release of all detained Islamic scholars, Madrasah students, and members of the general public and withdrawal of all false cases filed against them. Compensation to families of all injured and deceased and exemplary punishment to all those responsible.

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4 Jamaat and Shibir From Islamic Revolutionary to Ideal Citizen Nazmus Sakib

Introduction This chapter presents three interrelated arguments about the moderation process of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (henceforth Jamaat) and Bangladesh Islami Chatra Shibir (henceforth Shibir). First, it argues that in the post-9/11 era, Jamaat and Shibir have purged the idea of Islamic revolution from their discourse and activities. Second, although this purge is symptomatic of a larger moderation process, this is very specific in the sense that it reveals an interesting tendency or metamorphosis that perfectly overlaps with the global process that transforms “bad Muslims” into “good Muslims” (Mamdani 2002) within the logic of the war on terror. Third, one of the factors that contributed most toward the moderation of the ideology of Jamaat and Shibir is rather an exogenous shock. It is neither necessarily a spontaneous, organic, and indigenous metamorphosis nor a seasoned ideological transformation. This was the unexpected shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, which culminated in an infinite War on Terror that blacklisted and made war against many of the Islamist groups. These Islamist groups were not generally the kind that would take part in elections; however, these exogenous events, this chapter argues, played the determining role in the moderation process of the Islamists parties. Owing to the Bush doctrine of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” many of the Islamist parties chose to reframe and rephrase some of their now controversial agendas and platform positions to fit into the tolerable moderate category and thus eschew being branded as the “terrorists” in the eyes of the US foreign policy. By presenting a comparative analysis of the literature of Jamaat and Shibir in pre- and post-9/11 times, documenting a key amendment in Shibir’s constitution, and interviewing the then-top leadership of Shibir, this chapter demonstrates that the logic of war on terror has successfully transformed the Islamic Revolutionaries into ideal citizens compliant with “Good Muslimness,” unquestionably loyal to the nation state, and complicit in the international security order led by the United States.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-4

64  Nazmus Sakib Literature and Theory Adopting moderate rhetoric more befitting the characteristics of “Good Muslims” was a key phenomenon in the post-9/11 world. Mamdani (2002) argued that following 9/11, the link between Islam and terrorism became a major security concern, resulting in fresh sagas of “culture talk,” which had reframed religious experience into a political category, rather than distinguishing terrorists from civilians, it tried to differentiate the “good Muslims” from the “bad Muslims.” The meaning here was clear, according to Mamdani: in all Muslim-majority counties, Islam must be quarantined as a threat and should be “exorcized from it by a civil war between good Muslims and bad Muslims.” Somer (2014) argues that the content of moderation varies across countries depending on its domestic as well as international context. A rich literature on the Islamist moderation attributes the moderation to domestic contexts such as inclusion (Schwedler 2006, 2011), inclusion and social learning (Wickham 2004), inclusion and political liberalization (Brooks 2002), participation (Hwang 2009; El-Ghobashy 2005), spirit of compromise, more than a mere tactical compromise, and intra-organizational discussion of compromise (Clark 2006), organizational self-interest (Robinson 1997), party autonomy (Wegner and Pellicer 2009), state repression (Somer 2007), capitalist shift (Nasr 2009), economic liberalization (Zakaria 2004), and exclusion (Cavatorta and Merone 2013). Since these factors are oftentimes, in specific contexts, contradictory, Tepe (2019) argued that given the contradictory evidence, the inclusion moderation model’s insights cannot be used as a universal model, but rather aid in understanding how the inclusion process functions by outlining a model of the ideal party and electoral behavior, while both adherence to and departure from the model provide crucial information about democratic processes and democratization. Pointing at the weakness in the existing literature on the question of when and where precisely the moderation of the Islamist parties takes place, Hamid (2014) argues that moderation can happen both due to the “stick” of repression or due to the “carrot” of accession. However, in an important non-Arab case, for example the Turkish case, contrary to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (Schwedler 2011) that the moderation happened due to the Islamically rooted Justice and Development Party-AKP’s inclusion into the political process, Yücesoy (2015) also highlighted the role of repression. Hamid (2014) underscores the critical role of Western democracies in pressing the Islamists to become more moderate. He also documents that in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it became a matter of necessity for Islamists to present themselves in the most moderate light possible. He added how the Arab autocracies were using war on terror to legislate draconian antiterrorism legislation to scapegoat Islamist parties. Not only the Muslim Brotherhood1, this urge and tendency to disassociate from the armed Islamist/Jihadist groups and chiefly the nemesis of the War on

Jamaat and Shibir 65 Terror, Al Qaeda, is also a common theme and occurrence almost invariably present in Islamist party programs across the world. This could be found even in those Islamist party manifestos that engaged in wars or armed Jihad before. Due to the eminent and overarching threat of being identified as a terrorist group within the context of the War on Terror, the Islamist parties across the board come to the belief that to distant themselves from any armed activity and to unambiguously state their commitment to non-violent democratic values is an existential necessity. Not coincidentally, as Hamid (2014) documents, the Muslim Brotherhood released its “reform initiative” in March 20042, just as the Bush administration was about to unveil its own “Broader Middle East Initiative.” Even though the Bush administration later dropped democracy promotion from its list of priorities within this initiative, Hamid argues that the Islamists continued to double down on their obsession to make the world believe that they are genuinely democrats (p. 60). Thus, Ashour (2009), in his book The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements examines the cases of both behavioral and ideological moderation in Egyptian and Algerian armed Islamist groups and concludes that “domestic and international structural constraints forces [sic] several armed Islamist movements to initiate the aforementioned endogenous processes of change” (p. 12). Hwang’s (2009) essay on “what went right” about the Islamists provides detailed case studies of Islamist movements in Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and brief case studies on Kuwait, Bahrain, Bangladesh, and Yemen. The central theme of the author’s argument is that states matter, for good or bad, and that states can enact policies that can have moderating or radicalizing impacts on Islamist groups. Somer (2014) hypothesized that moderation may happen in two cases: (a) through a hegemonic dominant political actor implementing moderation and (b) through collaboration between religious and secular actors. Somer referred to hegemony of nation states, however, this chapter extends that framing to a global scale, the impact of which will be examined in our subsequent discussion. Karakaya and Yildirim (2013) document that shifts in international power balance, international political economic constraints, and an eagerness to gain international legitimacy can drive moderation in ideological parties (e.g., the case of the Italian Communist Party, the French Communist Party). They argue that international constraints and environment compelled the Italian Communist Party to abandon the “militant liturgy” and to be domesticated within electoral democracy in the 1940s. The authors provide a comparative study of Italian Communist Party moderation and the Moroccan Islamist party—the Party for Justice and Development. Although the authors talk about wide-ranging domestic politico-economic factors, they do not mention the impact of any international factors on Islamist party moderation. On the other hand, analyzing the communist party moderation literature, SánchezCuenca (1999) showed that the decline of the Soviet Union was a major moderating force behind communist moderation.

66  Nazmus Sakib Tezcür (2010) compares the reformists in Turkey (Justice and Development Party) and Iran (Reform Front). In doing so, the author carefully details the distinguishing features of these two political systems and circumstances that saw the death of the Reform Front in 2002 and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the same year. Tezcür briefly talks about the difference between these two contexts in terms of international support. The Turkish establishment was affiliated and supported by Western institutions such as NATO and the EU whereas the Western support for the Shah of Iran was followed by sanctions and a diplomatic standoff since the revolution in 1979. Tezcür’s focus is primarily the domestic factors; however, how the friendly relations of the Western powers with the guardians in Turkey (as Tezcür defines the secular deep state in pre-AK Party era, namely the military and judiciary) vis-à-vis the hostile relations with the guardians in Iran (the clergy) mediated the moderation process and produced two different trajectories in these two countries was not discussed in detail. Following this rich literature on other Islamist movements’ moderation, which however lacks a robust work on Bangladesh, this chapter argues that Jamaat and its student wing Shibir too tried to make some reforms in its literature, constitution, and narratives to comply with the good Muslimness as defined by the logic of war on terror. I argue that this is demonstrated through Jamaat and Shibir’s efforts to purge the vocabulary associated with its limited former revolutionary character. In particular, Jamaat and Shibir specifically avoided using revolutionary vernacular. Jamaat in Bangladesh is not alone in its attempts to comply with the good Muslimness. For example, the Jamaat-e-Islami movement in Pakistan was signatory to a manifesto3 that explicitly supported the “Afghan Jihad” against the Soviets during the ending episodes of the Cold War. However, Pakistan Jamaat and other Islamist parties coalition—Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal—published another manifesto in 2002, one year after the events of 9/11 attack on the United States and subsequent US war in Afghanistan shied away from mentioning the word “Jihad” and merely mentioned supporting Afghanistan once only after two other long-standing Muslim issues: Kashmir and Palestine: “To extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, Afghans and Chechens.”4 In light of the previous literature reviewed, this research provides three interconnected arguments regarding Jamaat and Shibir’s moderating process. First, it claims that in the post-9/11 age, Jamaat and Shibir have eliminated the concept of Islamic revolution from their rhetoric and activities. Second, while this purge is part of a broader moderation process, it is unique in that it displays an intriguing trend or transformation that precisely aligns with the worldwide process that turns “bad Muslims” into “good Muslims” under the logic of the war on terror. Third, rather than a spontaneous, organic, and indigenous metamorphosis or seasoned ideological shift, one of the elements that contributed most to the moderation of Jamaatideology and Shibir’s is an external shock. The next section will present an analysis of evidence to support the argument, using the Jamaat and Shibir party literature and interviews.

Jamaat and Shibir 67 Analysis This section presents evidence of moderation in Jamaat and Shibir in the context of the post-war on terror world. To provide a little context, first, this section will present a very brief review of how Jamaat and Shibir used to perceive revolutionary politics when they talked about Islamic revolution. Next, the section will document how the ideological narrative on the question of Islamic revolution has evolved after 9/11 and has taken a more moderate turn. This section presents relevant discussions of Jamaat and Shibir literature, constitution, and interviews to support this claim. It must be made clear upfront that democratic practices, for example, participation in elections and legislating as members of parliaments are not new for the Jamaat. Jamaat has participated in every single participatory election after the birth of Pakistan as well as that of Bangladesh. Jamaat has consistently tried to articulate its democratic credentials within the constitution of Bangladesh.5 At the same time, however, in a stark contrast to the Westphalian model of separation between the Church and the State, the Jamaat literature and platform has aspired for a polity based on God’s law—the Shariah. The bumper sticker version of Jamaat slogan was Allah’r ain chai, shot loker shashon chai (God’s law and rule of the righteous is what we want). Ultimately, Jamaat was founded to establish the reign of God (Iqamat-e-Din6) and not to cherish Western-style secular democracy. While distinct from the European style premodern theocracy, Mawdudi’s conception of the sovereignty between God’s exclusive prerogative to legislate and absolute popular agency is best termed as theodemocracy, which, as Iqtidar (2020) argues, presents a useful window for contemplation on the interplay between popular and state sovereignty and makes a significant contribution to the worldwide conversation about state sovereignty. Using Freeden (2003), al-Azami (2021) argued that Mawdudi’s conception of sovereignty (hakimiyya) could be better understood as a fundamentally disputed concept, much like the idea and categorization of democracy itself. According to al-Azami (2021), Mawdūdī and his colleagues were decontesting, that is, they were discursively arguing for the preference of one particular conception of sovereignty in which men’s legislative prerogative is subservient to that of God’s. In simpler terms, Jamaat’s conception of shariah and procedural democracy could go hand in hand in the sense that a collectivity of people can choose to select God’s law as the supreme law of the land. For example, according to Jamaat’s official explanations, Jamaat accepted the 1956 draft of Pakistan’s constitution that was Islamic in name only, however, Jamaat accepted it by virtue of it being democratic, because Jamaat hoped that it will be able to persuade the Muslim masses and change the constitution according to its cherished ideals of Shariah later (Azam 2005) through the democratic process. It is evident that although Jamaat accepted procedural democracy as its strategy, it always aspired to transform the polity into a theodemocracy. One significant exception, which is very important for the current discussion, is that Jamaat’s official literature briefly touched on the necessity and

68  Nazmus Sakib possibility of popular revolution when and if necessary. For example, Motiur Rahman Nizami—the ex-Ameer (chairman) who was later hanged to death by a controversial tribunal set out by the Awami League regime—wrote in 1987 that if the domestic and foreign forces create an environment that does not allow the Islamic movement to assume power through democratic means, the responsibility of the leadership becomes to direct the movement toward organizing a popular revolution (Nizami 1987, 40–41). As this book was written partially as a response to another book by a veteran ex-Jamaat leader and scholar Abdur Rahim’s book (1985) Gonotontro Noy Purnango Biplob (Not Democracy Total Revolution), Nizami presented detailed arguments in favor of Islamic democratic activism in this book. However, it is very important to note that he also categorically wrote that if the situation demands and the Islamic movement has the required capability, popular aspirations for Islamic governance can be translated through electoral process as well as through revolution led by the Islamic movement (Nizami 1987, 45). In other words, Nizami—reflecting the official ideological position and party line of Jamaat— was nuanced in his operationalization of how exactly the formation of the ideal Islamic state should come about. The only difference he made from Rahim’s (1985) ideas, which argued for an all-out revolution, was that he did not oppose participation in the democratic process as one of the means. Nizami did not rule out the possibility and validity of popular revolution as a legitimate means of the formation of the Islamic state either. However, the discussion of Islamic revolution within Jamaat is much older. A  booklet originally adopted from a speech given by Abul A’la Mawdudi in 1940 (Mawdudi, 1991) used to be titled Islami Biplober Poth (The Path toward Islamic Revolution) and was first published in Bangla in 1991. More than 20 years later, the current title (21st edition, 2014) stands: Islami Rashtro Kivabe Protishthito Hoy (How Is the Islamic State Established?) (Mawdudi, 2014). The current title’s careful purge of the word “revolution” is something one cannot but notice, especially when read along with other similar incidences. The translator’s justification behind this change is that the current title is a more literalist translation of the original title; however, why he felt this urge more than 20 years later and why he did use the word “revolution” in the first edition and subsequent editions is not mentioned. Moreover, even the title of the English translation of this piece was “The Process of Islamic Revolution”7. It is not unlikely that the then revolutionary zeal of Jamaat and Shibir in the eighties influenced the translator to use revolution and now that not only that zeal has died down but also there is an active domestic and international threat present against such discourse, the author felt the necessity to use more moderation. Another book (1990) written by a senior leader of Jamaat Muhammad Kamaruzzaman—who too was hanged by the Bangladeshi domestic tribunal formed to adjudicate international crimes—is titled Adhunik Juge Islami Biplob (Islamic Revolution in the Modern Age). In this book, the author made a clear distinction between the substantive models of Western democracy and Islamic polity (p 63–66). Moreover, he warned the Islamic state aspirants to not follow the practices of the traditional political parties in a democracy and

Jamaat and Shibir 69 expressed skepticism about whether the electoral process is always the best way to achieve Islamic revolution (p 67). He blamed institutional weakness and external interventions as impediments for an effective democracy, which in turn works against Islamic aspirations. He used the examples of Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, and Syria to demonstrate how the Western-backed despotic leaders not only manipulated the elections but also brutally crushed the Islamic movement’s ranks and files. After negating militant revolution, coup, joining a ruling government, as lacking any possibility of bringing the desired Islamic revolution, like Nizami (1987), Kamaruzzaman too approved of electoral democracy and popular revolution as two legitimate means. Although Nizami (1987) expressed skepticism about the ultimate success of the Iranian revolution in terms of achieving the ideal Islamic state, Kamaruzzaman categorically praised the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979. In 2008, Islami Chhatra Shibir made changes in the fifth program in its constitution. The fifth program has hitherto been: “To strive to bring about  Islamic revolution  for freeing humanity from all forms of economic exploitation, political oppression and cultural servitude.” The amendment expunged the phrase Islamic revolution and replaced it with Islamic social reformation. When I interviewed one of the then top leaders (who chose to remain anonymous) of Shibir and asked why they replaced revolution with social reformation, he said that it was a time in which words like Jihad and revolution were being stigmatized in the international and domestic media. In 2005, when Shibir initiated such rebranding, Jamaat was still part of the BNP-Jamaat coalition government and thus, according to the Shibir leader, the stigma about those words was less of a domestic concern rather it was more of an international pressure. He recalled that several international think tanks and media houses published reports linking Shibir with “Jihadi” groups. The then Shibir leadership saw this as an imminent threat and felt it necessary to make amendments in Shibir’s constitution to distance itself from the Jihadi or revolutionary image these reports were trying to attach to Shibir. Additionally, mimicking corporate culture, Shibir adopted a vision statement at roughly the same time. The vision statement could be translated as: “To nurture honest, skilled, and patriotic citizens to build a prosperous Bangladesh.” The vision statement, although adopted during the same time, was geared toward a domestic audience, said the Shibir leader. He added that they designed the vision statement as a buffering springboard to introduce Shibir to the general students before they can ultimately be initiated with the more theologically oriented goal and objective of Shibir that proposes molding the entire human life in accordance with Shariah. Lauding the idea of the vision statement, the Shibir leader hinted that the subsequent caretaker government had also adopted a similar slogan. When asked about what ideological changes in Shibir’s perception of Islamic revolution took place during that time, especially once compared with the Jamaat and Shibir literature written in the eighties and nineties regarding Islamic revolution, the Shibir leader explained that those previous conceptions were highly contextual and bound by the domestic politics of that time. Without any

70  Nazmus Sakib hint, he also pointed to the fact that many of Jamaat and Shibir literature, written by a few key figures, have undergone significant reform after 20018. During a conversation with me, another junior but influential leader from Shibir’s the then-executive committee slightly differed about the motivations behind these reforms. The international factor, for example, the negative framing of Islamic revolution as a characteristic of “bad Muslimness” within the logic of war on terror, according to this leader (who chose to remain anonymous as well), had accelerated the process of reformation but not necessarily was the only or even the primary causal factor. According to this leader, domestic framing by the opposition and an overall modernization of the society had also contributed to this process. It is to be noted that along with the events of 9/11 in the international sphere, another event significantly shaped the moderation process and thus the distancing of Jamaat and Shibir from anything resembling of the Jihadi discourse is the emergence of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) group and the “Bangla Bhai” phenomena in which a militant group carried out terrorist attacks all across Bangladesh to establish their version of Islamic state. Despite a syndicated effort by Awami League and its affiliate leftist media conglomerates to establish a link between Jamaat and JMB, Jamaat came out very proactive and vociferous in its campaign against armed revolution at that time. Two days after the August 17, 2005, countrywide bombing by JMB, the Ameer of Jamaat told the parliament that his party does not believe in revolutions that involve violence9. As many media outlets were trying to establish that many of JMB operatives in the past were affiliates of Shibir, it is not unlikely that the overarching fear that being tagged with JMB makes Shibir’s stature vulnerable internationally also contributed toward Shibir’s rebranding. My conversations with Shibir leaders broadly confirm the argument of this chapter that the moderation in Shibir, specifically the purge of Islamic revolution from Shibir’s constitution, was influenced by the international logic of the war on terror. The very fact that one of the top Shibir leaders lauds that a similarity exists between their vision and that of an unelected military-backed (Haque 2008), pro-Indian (Hagerty 2007), and pro-Western government is significant information to understand the type of reform Shibir was undergoing in the hands of these leaders. The purge of Islamic revolution on the one hand and the introduction of a corporate-style vision statement that promises a production line of ideal citizens on the other hand manifest the actual nature of the metamorphosis Shibir went through during the post-9/11 era. In a literal sense, the logic of the war on terror, along with other factors, was able to transform the Islamic Revolutionaries of Shibir into ideal citizens loyal to the nation state first, and second to the international state system and international order under the shadow of the US-dominated neoliberal global hegemon. A similar pattern can be observed in the constitution of Jamaat-e-Islami as well (Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, 2017), which abandoned using terms like “Jihad,” “Islamic Republic,” and “Islamic Revolution” following the post2001 scenario. However, it is to be noted that the unelected pro-Indian civilmilitary hybrid regime of 2007–2009 made changes in the electoral rules, which compelled Islamist parties to abandon explicit Islamist agendas from

Jamaat and Shibir 71 their platform and constitution. But change in Shibir’s constitution shows that it was not due to any immediate coercion rather a genuine will to comply with the global war on terror’s logic. The youthful dynamism and entrepreneurship of some of its overzealous modernist leaders paved the way for this. After the sudden rise of JMB, when the possibility that the war on terror’s reach inside Bangladesh might be imminent, Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami—the then Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami—wrote two books on terrorism: Islam o Antorjatik Sontrashbad (Islam and International Terrorism) (2006) and Islam o Sontrashbad (Islam and Terrorism) (2007). The first book—a 108-page manuscript—was published from Adhunik Prokashoni, which is Jamaat’s biggest publishing house, and the second one is a much smaller 17-page pamphlet published as a party document from Jamaat’s party press. These books were written as making clear demarcations between Jamaat’s democratic methodology and that of terrorist groups like JMB and al-Qaeda. In doing so, the key argument forwarded by Jamaat was that in Islam’s history, the armed struggle was ordained only after the establishment of a state in Medina and any armed activity without the organized state approval is illegitimate (Nizami 2006, 53). It is theoretically interesting from the perspective of international relations that by drawing an analogy of the state of Medina, the argument Jamaat made is essentially a statist argument and is disapproving of non-state actors operating in the peripheries of the international state system. Moreover, this book tried to qualify and restrict Jihad as only a means of statist, defensive, and a very limited mechanism. This framing of Jihad is in stark contradiction with the elaboration of Jihad by the founder of Jamaat Maulana Abul A’la Mawdudi. Mawdudi in one of his most famous academic contributions, a treaties on Jihad, al-Jihad fil Islam (Mawdudi, 1948), categorically defended reformist or offensive Jihad (page 183 of the Bangla translation). Arguably, this qualified re-interpretation too was a coping mechanism adopted by Jamaat. It is to be noted that, if one tries to buy the Bangla translation of Mawdudi’s treaties on Jihad, s/he will be disappointed because the bookstores that sell other Jamaat literature simply stopped selling this book in Bangladesh. The latest edition was published in July 2002–2009 months after the 9/11 events and to the best of the author’s knowledge it was never reprinted again. In sum, the comparative analysis of Jamaat literature as well as the interviews with the Shibir leadership reveals that Jamaat and Shibir actively sought to distance themselves from their former revolutionary self, as a coping mechanism in face of the international war on terror. Obviously, there were domestic factors, for example, pressure from the opposition secularists and the responsibility that came along with assuming two cabinet positions in the government responsible behind this moderation. However, those factors too were operating under the shadow of the overarching logic of global war on terror. Conclusion This chapter argues that—as an after-effect of post-9/11 war on terror, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and Bangladesh Islami Chatra Shibir have undergone a

72  Nazmus Sakib moderation process in terms of their rhetoric and activities. This moderation is most visible in these movements careful avoiding of the hitherto-used vernaculars like Islamic revolution and Jihad. By presenting a comparative analysis of Jamaat and Shibir’s pre- and post-9/11 literature on these key areas, documenting a key amendment in Shibir’s constitution, and through interviews with Shibir’s then-top leadership, this chapter presents evidence to support this argument. On the one side, the purging of the Islamic revolution from the literature and, on the other, the adoption of a corporate-style vision statement that promises a production line of perfect citizens demonstrate the true character of Shibir’s transformation in the post-9/11 period. Under the shadow of the global dominance of the war on terror coalition, led by the United States, the Islamic Revolutionaries of Shibir moderated themselves into ideal citizens loyal to the nation-state first, and then to the world state system and international security order. Notes 1 The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Islamic movement that was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It is one of the world’s oldest and largest Islamist organizations with a presence in one form or other in most Muslim countries and among Muslim diasporas. 2 The full text of the initiative can be accessed here at www.ikhwanweb.com/article. php?id=797. 3 Manifesto of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 1988, https://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/ 06/IJI-1988.pdf. 4 Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal 15-point manifesto, https://kurzman.unc.edu/files/ 2011/06/mma-manifesto-2002.doc. 5 Sections  3(3), 4(3) and 6(4) of the Constitution of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (pre-2008). 6 Iqamat-e-Din is a term popularized in Bangladesh by the prominent Jamaat leader Ghulam Azam in a pamphlet published by Jamaat-e-Islami. The publication date is not available. It is the author’s reconstruction that it must have been published in the 1980s. Here is a pdf link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/18gmwdwVI6Qkn8Tg kX8BmHQQn8d40OEH1/view. 7 The English title is mentioned in Azam, Ghulam (2017 [1992]). Jamaat-e-Islamir Rajnytik Vum-ka (p. 27). Adhunik Prokashoni. 8 It is worthwhile to mention that this is not the only Shibir leader I wanted to interview. I reached out to five consecutive Shibir central presidents who were contemporary of the time of the change for interview; three expressed willingness to answer my questions and one ultimately answered my questions. 9 https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2005/09/20/Jamaat-doesn-t-believein-armed-revolution-nizami1.

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5 Jamaat and Democracy Constitutionalism, Electoral Politics and Complacency M. Moniruzzaman

Introduction Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (henceforth Jamaat), as a political party, has been an inseparable part of the country’s political landscape for the past 50 years. However, its political legacy dates as far back as to the 1940s during the prepartitioned Indian sub-continent. Being an exemplary mix of Islamic traditionalism and modernism, the party has maintained a steady political view of democratic constitutionalism, albeit in an Islamic framework. Its contribution to systematic electoral competitive democracy and constitutionalism could arguably outweigh that of any other popular political parties in Bangladesh. However, in the context of realpolitik of Bangladesh, Jamaat’s democratic credentials are largely overshadowed by some major deficiencies that question its institutional framework. These issues of Jamaat are critically assessed in this chapter in analysing the party’s democratic role in Bangladesh politics based on three major arguments. First, since its registration as a party in 1979 in independent Bangladesh, Jamaat has maintained a persistent position on constitutionalism and competitive electoral democracy. However, the party failed to present a more modern, rational and adaptable framework of Islamic state going beyond its traditional dogmatic/static views. Second, the Jamaat, despite remaining arguably a highly democratic party in the context of Bangladesh, has failed to overcome its legitimacy crisis originated in its position on and role in the liberation war of Bangladesh. Its failure to overcome the legitimacy crisis can be attributed to its leadership complacency and its internal party orthodoxy. And third, the Jamaat has remained excessively bound by idealistic orthodoxy, which prevented it from developing a popular electorate base, an implication of which is that it has failed to popularize itself as a democratic force. As a consequence, the Jamaat being a highly democratic party with a strong legacy of constitutionalism and competitive electoral politics still remains politically outcast. Islam and Politics Religion and politics have long been seen as incompatible in the modern state system. The European modernity project adopted the institution of the state as DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-5

76  M. Moniruzzaman a secular public space where religion was kept consciously, deliberately and systematically at bay (Taylor 2010; Vahanian Gabriel 2008; Coles 2001). This was the consequential distaste that the modernity project developed for religion due to the latter’s harsh, repressive and astute disapproval of human rationality and scientific empiricism in mediaeval Europe (Bruce 2002; Chadwick 2008). As the emerging democratic political system in Europe under the ever-expanding shadow of modernity was progressively overpowering the Divine twins, the church and the monarchy, the role of religion in public life and politics was shrinking proportionately. By the end of the 18th century, the powerful force of nationalism reinforced the emerging structure of the modern secular state and sealed the fate of the public role of religion in politics (Somerville 1992). Over the subsequent two hundred years, democratic development contributed further to separate religion from politics (Kors 1990). Broadly speaking, the accepted and popular structure of political system in the contemporary world is a secular public state and a private religion. The relation between the two is mutual exclusion of each other—the state does not patronize a particular religion and religion does not influence the state and politics. This overall design of the Western state system overwhelmed the nonWestern state structure that developed following the end of colonialism. The earlier traditional societies of postcolonial Asia and Africa adopted the Western secular model of the state system, where the more intimate, complimentary and permeating role of religion in society and politics was forcefully alienated or snuffed off (Ozoglu 2011). This was most obviously noticeable in the Muslim world. Egypt, Iran, and Turkey as the first batch of modern independent Muslim states adopted secularism of various degrees in the early 1920s. The later batches of Muslim states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Sudan, Algeria, Bangladesh and the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) that gained independence during the 1940s through the early 1990s adopted various forms of state secularism (Philpott 2019). However, societies in most of the Muslim states are less dependent on the state authority, which prevents the state from interfering with their religious life and practices. The political systems in the Muslim world are diverse, which requires different degrees of relationship with the people. The nature and degree of relations define the ways the ruling authorities deal with religion, which range from a complete de-religion drive (early Turkish republic) to complete religious mobilization (Iran). This means that religion remains at the centre of politics in Muslim countries irrespective of the political system in place. Therefore, separation between state and religion in Muslim countries has largely been impractical (Brown 2000). However, recently, the return of religion in politics is increasingly being discussed and recognized even in Western secular states (Cohen and Cecile 2016; Calhoun, Juergensmeyer, and VanAntwerpen 2011; Cady and Hurd 2010). The discourse on post-secular society has been emphasizing the importance of religion in politics, which warrants renewal of the study of the relationship between religion and politics (Asad 2018; Manent 2016; Keddie 2003; Carroll 1984). In the post-colonial Muslim world, not only religion never left

Jamaat and Democracy 77 politics but rather religion also intensified political engagement in many ways. In some countries, religion generated politics, while in some others, religion intensified the democratic process, and yet in some other countries, religion legitimized politics. However, interactions between religion and politics in every Muslim country are defined by the local dynamics of politics. Yet, a general trend of secular-religious tension is registered in all non-monarchical Muslim states (Verma 2020; Turam 2011; Michael and Ten 2010). The experience of secular-religious tension in Bangladesh is to be seen from these perspectives. This is because, even if a society is highly shaped by the religious (Islamic) belief system, the ‘state’ has created a tension with it by a deliberate adoption of ‘secularism’ as a state principle. So, religion (Islam) and secularism in Bangladesh are made to face each other—one as natural normal and the other as artificial anomalous. Therefore, one needs to keep two basic points in perspective when one discusses the relationship between religion and state in Bangladesh. One, the emergence of independent Bangladeshi nationalism and the state is a result of breakup of religion-based (Islamic) Pakistani nationalism and the state. Religion (Islam) was used, and (Islamic) religious parties were instrumental to deny the emergence of Bangladeshi nationalism. Two, since religion (Islam) was perceived to be the chief cause of brutalities perpetrated on the seekers and fighters for independence, religion and politics were formally separated in independent Bangladesh by banning Islamic political parties. Yet, in postindependence Bangladesh, secularism and secular politics had to face Islam as a political factor and a force to the point that even secular politics progressively took up the Islamic religious outfit in political contestation. Secular political parties resorted to Islam to counter the Islamic political opponent, a fact that recognizes the strong presence of Islam in Bangladesh politics. The subsequent sections present an analysis of religious politics of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) in Bangladesh. The analysis covers two dimensions of JI politics in Bangladesh: first, the party’s democratic politics, adjustment with the national political dynamics, and compromise and confrontation with political challenges. And second, the chapter looks at the internal dynamics of policy, leadership patterns, and ideological tensions of the party. By looking at these issues, the chapter substantiates the three arguments mentioned earlier. Democratic Constitutionalism and Competitive Electoral Politics Popular modern liberal ideas, such as democracy and constitutionalism, are comparatively new to sub-continental political culture (Tan and Ridwanul 2021; Keith 2018). Until the 1920s, the masses were only familiar with the pre-Mughal and Mughal monarchical despotism, British repressive colonial rule, and feudal-Zamindari economic system. The educated and political elites of the time, due to their European educational background, were introduced to these ideas but had little leverage to put these into practice. However, from

78  M. Moniruzzaman the 1930s, constitutionalism and electoral politics were clearly making inroads into the sub-continental political landscape as the prospect of the end of British colonialism was approaching fast. Even though the politics of the time was dominated by the overwhelming concern of how to make the partition of the subcontinent realistic based on the ‘two nations’ theory, the nature of the postindependence political system was also clearly taking its shape in favour of constitutionalism and competitive electoral democracy (Chadda 2000). Among the numerous parties and conventions, the three most important political parties of the time, namely, the Indian National Congress, the All-India Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami, survived the partition, and remained active in politics. These are the three parties that eventually settled with constitutionalism and competitive democracy once partition became the only course of political action. The socialist and communist political parties were strongly institutionalized but were still illusioned by all-out revolution rejecting constitutionalism and competitive electoral democracy (Gupta 2008; Malik 1967). The Jamaat, as both a political party and an Islamic political organization, had maintained its strong constitutionalism from the very beginning of its establishment. This was the only Islamic political party, among numerous other Muslim and Ulama-led ones that emerged in the context of ‘partition’ debate, which was based on a well-thought-out political objective, strategy of action, and tightly structured organizational framework (Ahmad 2010). Its ultimate objective was to establish an Islamic state or, to state it more accurately, to make future Pakistan an Islamic one. But in any case, it held the view that to establish an Islamic state, a revolutionary change in the mindset and conscience of the Muslims was inevitable. This was based on the revisionist political reading of the Qur’an, and the life and mission of Prophet Muhammad by Jamaat’s founder Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Maududi (Jackson 2011; Ahmad 1976; Maududi 1955). However, even though the objective was revolutionary in nature, the strategies that Maududi chalked out to achieve it were absolutely ‘non-revolutionary’. Organizationally, while Jamaat had its own internal party strategies to produce qualified Islamic leaders and workforce, publicly it adopted democratic political strategy as a method to bring about the change. So, being true to its belief that Islam is democratic enough, Jamaat adopted democratic procedures as political actions (Afridi et al. 2016). The two most fundamentals of democracy that Jamaat adhered to were constitutionalism and competitive electoral politics. As such, Jamaat was highly instrumental in proposing an Islamic constitution for Pakistan, it played a significant role in keeping the Pakistani government under constant pressure to draft a constitution and run the country accordingly. This was further evidenced by its expansion as a party and taking part in national elections during the 1950s and 1960s. Democratic Constitutionalism and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami

Critics of democratic deficit in non-Western countries often identify the absence of constitutionalism as the fundamental problem (Dobner 2010; Zakaria 2004). The most important political institutions—the executive, the

Jamaat and Democracy 79 legislature and political parties—remain invariably perfidious to constitutionalism, a fact that is substantiated by the rate of frequency in constitutional change in those countries. There is a cyclical relationship between the executive and constitutional change. An ambitious executive, with the party and legislative support, takes advantage of power and brings controversial changes in constitution in favour of its continuity in power. The authoritarian executives enjoy almost a free-ride in such changes in the absence of credible opposition, and the popular executives make use of cheap popularity in so doing (Beer 1988). This tendency of the executive to bring frequent changes in constitution is dictated by two imperatives: one, the desire to perpetuate their stay in power, and, two, the perception about themselves as the only legitimate heir to power. This tendency is maintained by every new set of executives that replaces the old one. So, frequent change in constitution becomes a norm. It is not the constitution that controls the executive, but the opposite happens. Bangladesh offers an ideal example to the practice (Rizvi 2005; Islam 1999; Ziring 1992). The first five years of independent Bangladesh (1971–1975) demonstrated a very high frequency (five amendments in three years) in constitutional changes moving back and forth between presidential and parliamentary systems, and it continued until it got settled in favour of parliamentary system in 1991. However, post-1991 governments spared no opportunity to bring multiple amendments to the constitution at their own convenience (Hoque 2017). One clear example is the issue of Caretaker Government (CG), a new formula that was adopted in the constitution in the mid-1990s for the sake of conducting impartial national elections, was removed in 2013. The constitutional amendment to adopt the CG system, in the first place, was believed to have happened due to enormous pressures from the opposition parties, and at a considerable reluctance to the ruling party (Ahmed 2004; Islam 2013). Its abolition in 2013 clearly happened, with judicial backing, at the obsession of the ruling party (the opposition in the early 1990s), and in the face of fierce and violent opposition by the opposition parties that included the ruling party of the early 1990s (Ahmed 2011). In Bangladesh, Jamaat meticulously maintained its Pakistan-time tradition of constitutional politics. The Jamaat during united Pakistan was a fiercely opposing party to unconstitutional military rule, and it took every opportunity to be part of any efforts, such as taking part in 1965 presidential elections, and 1969 parliamentary elections, to bring constitutionalism back. Following its earlier party legacy, the Jamaat in Bangladesh remained vigilant in its politics of democratic constitutionalism until constitution was turned against it (BJI 2015). The Jamaat participated in almost all the national elections during the 1980s–2000s. The Jamaat, as an Islamic ideology-based party, naturally maintained that the constitution be Islamic and democratic. The very first instance of the Jamaat’s constitutional politics in Bangladesh was its arguments for an appropriate constitution for the nation. The party claimed to have disagreed with the first constitution of independent Bangladesh adopted in 1972. That

80  M. Moniruzzaman constitution being based on secularism and socialism, Jamaat found it to be in the opposite pole of its ideology. Moreover, Jamaat maintained that the Constitution failed to reflect the cultural, social, religious and national values and sentiments of the nation. Being a believer in Islamic liberal democracy, Jamaat held the view that the constitution of Bangladesh must be an Islamic democracy, because the majority of the population is Muslim and the culture is highly Islamic. However, if not Islamic democracy, then at least, the constitution cannot be based on secularism and socialism or communism, simply because these neither fit to nor reflect the values, attitude and preferences of the people. The Jamaat, thus, opposed the constitution of 1972 on the ground that it reflected the secular/socialist top party leaders of Awami League, which until as recent as in 1969 national election, never promised to establish a secular and socialist state (Azam 2007). The ideological issues in the constitution apart, Jamaat in Bangladesh remained strict to the constitutional rule in the country. Being officially banned during most of the 1970s, the party had no official position on the frequent changes in the constitution in the first few years of independence; however, it never supported any form of undemocratic and one-party authoritarian rule. An analysis of Jamaat’s politics in Bangladesh is likely to confirm that it maintained three positions on constitutionalism. First, Jamaat as an Islamic ideology-based party always wanted an Islamic constitution for an Islamic state in Bangladesh. Second, Jamaat always advocated for a democratic constitution. And lastly, the party always opposed a military, authoritarian, secular and socialist state. By the time Jamaat became a legal entity in 1979, the country was moving away from the constitutional orthodoxy of 1973 and the military regime of 1976. The constitutional amendments during the second half of 1970s and 1980s were in line with Jamaat’s position as an Islamist party. The inclusion of ‘Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim’, and ‘absolute faith in Almighty Allah’ in the constitution and omission of ‘secularism’ from it during Zia’s rule, and inclusion of Islam as ‘state religion’ during the Ershad regime were all welcoming constitutional changes to Jamaat (Azam 2007). However, at the same time, Jamaat’s non-compromising position against Ershad’s military rule exemplified its politics of democratic constitutionalism. The eventual downfall of Ershad’s direct, and later shadow-military, rule after nearly a decade was brought about by a series of fierce, violent and concerted protest movements led by all opposition parties to which the Jamaat was one of the front runners. The Jamaat was one of the four political parties that made individual televised address to the nation following Ershad’s downfall (BJI 2015). Another credit of democratic constitutionalism that Jamaat is entitled to and has contributed enormously for is the idea and institutionalization of the Caretaker Government (CG) system in Bangladesh. The Jamaat reportedly floated the idea of the CG as early as in mid-1980 to create an exit path to free elections from President Zia’s ruling party’s control and to bring back democratic constitutionalism (Azam 2005). The idea was later used to counter

Jamaat and Democracy 81 Ershad’s attempt to civilianize his military rule through manipulated elections in Ershad’s favour. The idea of the CG was that it would be a small transitional government for three months, led not by political parties, rather by non-partisan retired judges and non-political professionals. The main task for the transitional government would be to run the regular administration but without having any major decision-making power and to help the Election Commission conduct a reliable, free and fair national election. The formula was to do away with the distrust associated with the sitting government’s intention and ability to conduct free and fair elections. Later, the idea was much elaborated and systematized. And indeed, the first-ever election conducted under the first CG in 1991 turned out to be the most free and fair in Bangladesh. Five years later in 1996, the CG system became constitutional, in the process of which the Jamaat played a leading role. However, it could play little or no role against the abolition of the CG system in 2011 due to excessive repression and violence mounted on the party by the government and its machineries. As its top leaders were arrested on 1971 war crime allegations, and many other regional leaders and activists were either put behind bars or forced to go into hiding, unofficially the party’s activities were shut down by the government, though the party was not officially banned (Mollah 2020). So, even though the Jamaat remained highly active in and contributing to constitutionalism movement in Bangladesh since 1979, it became a victim of constitutional change in 2011 (The Guardian 2013). Electoral Politics of Jamaat

In support of Jamaat’s politics of democratic constitutionalism, electoral politics remained its main vehicle. Jamaat’s position on elected government achieved such a canonical status since the Pakistan time that it abandoned the idea of an all-out revolution later. It is probable that the original Jamaat of the 1940s could have been influenced or at least been inspired by the contemporary Russian and Chinese revolutions for an all-out social and systemic change, as this is what the party aims to achieve; the Jamaat, however, adopted electoral politics as a vehicle. The principle of electoral politics prevailed as Jamaat’s means for democratic representation even after the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. The Islamic revolution did, in fact, create a strong inspiration in the party initially, but it dwindled almost quickly due to alleged Jamaat’s putative Saudi connection, which disapproved of the revolution (Kabir 1990). Faithful to its electoral politics, Jamaat supported and participated in all the national elections except three. Its first-ever electoral participation in Bangladesh was in February 1979 under the shadow of a flagship party called Islamic Democratic League (IDL), as Jamaat was yet to be formally re-launched following the ban imposed on it in 1973. This was the first opportunity for the party for a political comeback as well as to contribute to the advancement of electoral democracy.

82  M. Moniruzzaman The most innovative contribution of Jamaat to electoral politics is its idea of a transitory Caretaker Government (CG) to ensure and conduct free and fair elections, as mentioned earlier. Convinced by Zia’s practice of controlled elections, Jamaat floated the idea of a Caretaker Government to hold credible free and fair elections. But the idea was overshadowed by the political events of the time—assassination of Zia, and later suspension of the constitution and political activities by a military coup. However, the demand for CG made a comeback as early as 1984 sensing the ill-motive of General Ershad that his ambitious political rehabilitation was likely to be done through a manipulated and controlled election. Jamaat popularized the innovative CG idea to save the electoral process. Even though the idea was not entertained by the Ershad regime, it was picked up by other political parties. Following two manipulated and unfair elections under Ershad and one under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in 1995, the CG idea received such a strong political currency that it was made constitutional in 1996 (Ahmed 2004). The system received a credible reputation for free and fair electoral politics for some time till it started to be politicized both by the two major parties, the AL and BNP, and eventually met with constitutional elimination in the hand of AL, in favour of absolute destruction of free and fair electoral politics in 2011 (Sarkar 2011). All the national and local elections conducted under the ruling AL since 2013 left no trace of competitive free and fair electoral politics (Fair 2019; Lorch 2014). Jamaat’s first electoral participation was in 1986 parliamentary election under the Ershad regime, and it secured ten parliamentary seats. The occasion offered the party an opportunity to gain a national familiarity in the absence of BNP in the electoral race. Jamaat’s electoral and legislative politics role became strong enough to impact the sitting government of Ershad. It was through taking part in electoral politics in 1986 that Jamaat put Ershad’s regime under pressure when its parliament members resigned en masse in protest to Ershad’s policies, leading the parliament to collapse. The next election in 1988 was boycotted by Jamaat along with other political parties, a sign of complete distrust in Ershad’s election mechanism. So, taking part in elections as well as boycotting them were parts of Jamaat’s electoral politics. The subsequent electoral politics of Jamaat till 2014 elections was mired by miscalculation, false complacency and de-emphasis on its ideological core. From its first electoral competition in 1986, Jamaat’s party attention weighed more on electoral politics, being overwhelmed by its recent popularity and strategic political weight that it held, neglecting its in-house matters of higher importance, such as improving its workforce’s quality. The party’s electoral competitions in 1986 and 1991 were a miscalculation in the first place of its complacent political popularity. In 1986, the party won 10 out of 77 seats contested, and in 1991 it won 18 out of 222 seats contested. However, the credits it earned in 1986 (through contesting) and 1988 (through boycotting) elections, and the clear king-maker position that it held with its 18-seat win in the 1991 election, made the party even more

Jamaat and Democracy 83 derailed by electoral politics. This was probably due to the party’s continuous better performance in each subsequent election during 1986–1991. Its miscalculation of electoral strength and politics reflected in the subsequent election contests in 1996, 2001, 2008, 2014 and 2018. The party recorded winning of 3 seats only out of 300 contested in 1996, even after its leading role in constitutional politics of the time. As a result, the party had to abandon its policy of 300-seat electoral contest and adopted seat-sharing strategy with its coalition partners instead. Through this arrangement, it won 17 out of 31 seats contested in 2001, and 2 out of 39 contested in 2008 elections. The decline in its electoral performance since the 1996 election was even further exacerbated by a ban on the party in election contest altogether since 2013. The party was not allowed to contest in 2014 and 2018 elections. During these three decades of electoral politics, Jamaat’s organizational base expanded exponentially but its ideological core declined. As Jamaat’s political involvement and importance were getting ever increasingly higher, the party fell prey to increasing political vendetta and vengeance to the point that institutionally it was made socially and politically illegitimate since 2010. As a strong and consistent supporter of electoral politics, Jamaat clearly failed to play politics since the 1990s. Three obvious trends became highly institutional in Bangladesh politics since 1991 when the parliamentary system of government was adopted and elected governments were in place. First, the election system became increasingly very corrupt to the point that the latest elections since 2014 turned practically voter-less (Abedin 2020; Moniruzzaman 2019; Rahman 2013). Second, the administration became increasingly corrupt to the point that the country often topped the Transparency International’s most-corrupt country list (Asadullah and Chakravorty 2019; Khan 2017; Zafarullah and Siddiquee 2001). And third, the country increasingly came under political, economic, cultural and security control by India, especially since 2008 (Kaura and Meena 2020; Ahsan 2018; Kashem and Islam 2016). Jamaat being a politically uncorrupt and most democratic as a party could have utilized its democratic credentials and image to exploit the electoral support against those three undemocratic political trends. However, it failed to do so in its electoral politics. Jamaat’s Complacency and Internal Policy Dynamics Jamaat has been the only political party in Bangladesh that maintained relatively stricter party discipline, internal cohesiveness, leadership stability and party integrity. Unlike any of the mainstream parties in Bangladesh, Jamaat never had internal party factionalism (until recently), which prevented it from facing splinter Jamaat parties. This single fact testifies to the party’s internal stability and functioning even during its exponential growth time and external pressure. Yet there are issues, both internal and external to the party, which reveal serious internal tension with policy implications.

84  M. Moniruzzaman 1.  Nomenclatures and Political Strategy

As Jamaat remained officially banned during the first half of the 1970s, its public presence remained invisible for practical reasons. Politically it was illegal to the state, and socially it was an outcast. But yet as an Islamic ideological movement, Jamaat in secret maintained its internal activities from as early as June 1972, merely five months after the party was banned. During the ban period, the party’s priority was regrouping and re-establishing the internal network disrupted by the hostile political and social environment following independence (Rahman 2007). Besides, the leadership vacuum did not allow the party to adopt any major policy shift under the new political context in a new country. During this time, the party maintained its underground activities with the same nomenclature: Jamaat-e-Islami. The party’s transition period during 1976 to 1979 was a mixture of rehabilitation, contestation and self-identity. Even during this period, the party was self-conscious enough to adopt strategies that yielded advantages for its immediate return to politics and adjust with the leadership vacuum. The formation of Islamic Democratic League (IDL) in 1976 by the like-minded Islamic political parties, which faced ban in 1972, was a smart strategic move for Jamaat to initiate its formal politics but it was a clear makeshift arrangement to counter its temporary internal constraints. On the one hand, Jamaat supported IDL and contested in the general elections in 1979, in which most of IDL’s elected members were Jamaat leaders. And on the other, the party carefully maintained its own identity within IDL to stand out as an influential component of the alliance. In effect, Jamaat’s support for IDL was a temporary strategic move to allow the former enough time for its own internal reorganization (Azam 2007). The transition period was productive enough for Jamaat to have a favourable breathing space in an alternative tent under a different label but it was bent on returning with its own as a separate party as soon as its own house was put in order. This is evident from the fact that the formation of IDL was predicated on the understanding of dissolving the internal structure of the component parties. However, Jamaat, while being part of IDL, continued to maintain its own separate party existence and, moreover, it was believed to have tried to take over IDL’s control over time (Kabir 1996, 2006). The fact that IDL was Jamaat’s makeshift parking space became clear in 1979, merely four months after the parliamentary elections, when Jamaat had its own full-fledged party conference for two days during May 25–26 and returned to politics publicly as an independent party under the name Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. The IDL reportedly advised Jamaat to contain its activities in Islamic preaching and welfare activities while IDL functions as a collective Islamic political frontier went unheeded by the Jamaat (Azam 2007). The party’s long-time nomenclature, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, clearly remained a party orthodoxy due to historical, emotional and symbolic reasons. The nomenclature had a historic tradition, as it was transformed from

Jamaat and Democracy 85 Jamaat-e-Islami Hind to Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan to Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. The nomenclature was associated with its original founder Sayyed Abul ‘Ala Maududi to whom the key party leaderships of the time were emotionally attached since the mid-1950s, and the very simplicity of the term carried yet a deep all-encompassing sense of Muslim unity. However, the nomenclature was to face a strong and unavoidable setback more than 30 years later in 2013 when the party faced severe political and existential threats. Firstly, the ruling Awami League played the Muktijudhdho (war of independence) politics in full and made Jamaat an extreme political outcast to the new generation since 2010 as an anti-muktijudhdho element. Jamaat became a stock of social abhorrence. Secondly, a determined move to convict the top brass of the party for the alleged war crimes committed in 1971 and put them to death by the special tribunal came as political and ideological blows. And finally, the high court ruling in 2013 banning the party in 2014 national elections was tantamount to the political death of the party. Even though the party is not banned legally for reasons of tactical local politics, its formal organizational activities are completely in check by the government. Under such circumstances, the party’s struggle for survival forced it to compromise with its long-standing nomenclatures by 2016 (The Daily Star 2016). Such major compromises are related to its name, logo, slogan and central objectives. The party’s name changed from Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh to Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami; the landscape of the party’s standard changed into two horizontally drawn parallel blocks in red and green representing the country’s flag; the earlier logo containing a fraction of a Qur’anic verse ‘an aqimuddeen’ (to establish the deen— Islamic way of life) and the scale (symbol of justice) went missing; and, finally, the party’s slogan changed from establishing an Islamic state to establishing a just and welfare society. These changes are indicative not only of the shifting strategies adopted by the party for political survival but also of changes in ideological orthodoxies that the party has retained for so long. 2.  Leadership Orthodoxy and Party Liability

Jamaat for a long time remained entrapped by leadership orthodoxy for which the party had to bear severe unintended costs. The extent of the orthodoxy included almost the entire period of independent Bangladesh. During the first three decades, 1970s–1990s, the party’s fixation with one leadership personality prevented the party from any noticeable change within even under a stained political past. Jamaat is the second-only major party after AL that survived the independence war (other communist/socialist parties disintegrated). Yet being branded as an anti-independence party, it failed to reflect any internal change to adjust with the new national political dynamics. This inability of the party can largely be attributed to the towering personality of a single leader named Ghulam Azam (1922–2014). Being a direct associate of Abul ‘Ala Maududi and the East Pakistan Jamaat chief for a long time, Ghulam Azam commanded a strong reverence

86  M. Moniruzzaman and veneration among his party cadres, loyalists and supporters. His political contemporaries included all the key Pakistani and Bangladeshi frontline leaders such as Yahya Khan, Zukfiqar Ali Bhutto, Huseyn Shaheed Shuhrawardy, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Strong personal intelligence and leadership capacity, rich political experience, and direct exposure to key Pakistani and Bengali political leaders made Ghulam Azam an exception to the party, where he outlived all these political leaders by about 45 years. Therefore, the party not only waited for his return from overseas, as he was in self-exile due to cancellation of his citizenship by the Bangladesh government in 1973, but also could not think about an effective permanent alternative. It is not impractical to argue that even Ghulam Azam, as the party leader during the time Bangladesh achieved independence, had his own personal desire, out of moral obligation, to take the helm of the party at any cost possible and as soon as possible. So, it is very possible that despite being in exile he was still overseeing the party activities from 1972 onwards, which started to become clear during the transition period of 1976–1979 discussed earlier. Jamaat’s strategic political partnership with IDL was engineered by his Islamic contemporaries and one one-time associate Maulana Abdur Rahim. However, the IDL formula of Islamic political parties’ arrangement was probably going so far as to overshadow the future of Jamaat and was sensed by Ghulam Azam perfectly. The new political regime of General Ziaur Rahman allowed Ghulam Azam to return with a foreign passport on family ground, but his physical presence provided Ghulam Azam with the opportunity to fine-tune the IDL politics in favour of Jamaat forever. While the IDL was predicated on the understanding that Islamic politics was to be brought in back, the stain of the 1971 stigma was to be washed out, and the component parties would dissolve their own parties. However, IDL leadership was dominated by personalities such as Maulana Abdur Rahim under whose Ameership Ghulam Azam was the Secretary General of Jamaat earlier, and compared with Jamaat’s political standing and influence, most of the other component parties were insignificant. Yet, the IDL viewed that Jamaat should keep itself limited to Islamic preaching and social welfare activities, and not directly involve in political activities. However, Ghulam Azam found this suggestion absurd as such a policy would eliminate Jamaat as a long-standing political party. Therefore, it was logical that Ghulam Azam did not want to see a reputed Islamic party get dissolved, as proposed by IDL (Azam 2007). So, on issues of political strategies, Ghulam Azam differed with IDL and eventually formalized its breakaway in 1979. Ghulam Azam was Ameer of the party earlier until it was banned in 1973. So, naturally, the popularity, influence and experience of Ghulam Azam and the party’s obsession with him made the party elect him the Ameer (party chief) in the 1979 party convention. However, for legal reasons (as he was officially a foreign citizen), the party officially decided to go with an acting Ameer, which was to continue with periodic renewal until 1991. Besides Jamaat’s

Jamaat and Democracy 87 tactical claim and the party’s internal belief, the entire nation knew that both Jamaat and Ghulam Azam were synonymous in their anti-independence stand. Yet, the party maintained its leadership orthodoxy. Why was it necessary for the party to continue with a leadership who was publicly known as opposed to the independence of Bangladesh? And now by electing him, as a person of serious controversy and non-citizen, as the Ameer in 1991, both the party and the leadership become institutionally liable to the state, its political system and the nation. According to Ghulam Azam’s own account, his self and Jamaat were indispensable for each other for two reasons. First, ‘the Jamaat was not prepared either to elect anyone but me as the Ameer’ (Jamaat amake baad diye ar kono biyaktike Ameer nirbachita korteo prostut chilona (trans. by the author)), and the motive behind government’s denial of his citizenship was to prevent Jamaat from growing stronger—‘the Jamaat realised that the government was not reinstating my citizenship in order to prevent the growing influence of Jamaat’ (Jamaat upolobdhi korlo, Jamaater agrogoti rodh korar uddesshei Sarkar amar nagarikatta bohal korche na (trans. by the author)) (Azam 2007, 202). Even though President Zia’s government tolerated the move of Jamaat in electing Ghulam Azam as its Ameer, the party was myopic enough to foresee the implications. Encouraged by the favour extended by the government, the party even further conflated with the leadership’s personal political identity. Ghulam Azam applied for reinstating his citizenship three times earlier in 1976, 1977 and 1978 but was unsuccessful. The party, therefore, in early 1980 formed Committees for the Restoration of Citizenship (Nagarikatta Punaruddhar Committee) all over the country and demanded the government reinstate Ghulam Azam’s citizenship. This makes one ask a second question: why was it necessary for the party to take up a personal matter of the leader and make it a party-political agenda? Even a third legitimate question can further be asked: was not the party serving the leadership’s personal interest instead of serving its own public interest? That the public interest of the party was heavily compromised became immediately clear when a parallel and sustained public agitation program against Jamaat and Ghulam Azam as ‘antiliberation forces’ was launched by the Freedom Fighters’ Association (FFA) (Mukti Joddha Sangshad) at the same time. Even president Zia also reportedly concurred with the demands of the FFA. A countrywide purge on Jamaat and its student wing Shibir continued for two months during April and May 1981 (Azam 2007, 200). A politically sensitive issue—the role of Jamaat and Ghulam Azam in 1971—resurfaced in political contestation and with institutional discourse a decade later. However, Jamaat clearly did not go for soul-searching for another decade on the question of party and leadership’s personal dimension of relations. The decade of the 1980s was spent on an anti-military democratic movement in which Jamaat’s involvement matched that of any other political party. A number of factors contributed to boosting Jamaat’s apparent political acceptability during 1984–1991. Firstly, Jamaat was a front runner in the anti-military democratic

88  M. Moniruzzaman movement. Secondly, Jamaat secured ten parliamentary seats in 1986 elections, suggesting its further popularity, which was consolidated further— as mentioned earlier—by its parliament members’ en masse resignation a year later in favour of a democratic movement. Thirdly, Jamaat received 18 seats in 1990 parliamentary elections, which denied the other two largest parties, AL and BNP, the required majority to form the government. Jamaat emerged as the kingmaker, which further boosted its image. And finally, the two major parties had no way but to depend on Jamaat’s support for the presidential election in 1991, which made Jamaat even politically more important. The resultant democratic popularity of Jamaat apparently suppressed its ‘anti-liberation’ label temporarily, which lured the party to repeat the first political mistake for the second time. Assuming that Jamaat was now an indispensable factor in Bangladesh politics, it officially declared Ghulam Azam, in December 1991, the party’s Ameer. His citizenship question was still neither legally approached by himself or the party, nor was it solved by the state politically. Once again, the party was overwhelmed by the personal issue of its leadership at the expense of its public interest. As such, Jamaat had to face an unprecedented concerted and fierce opposition on a number of fronts simultaneously. This time the opposition emanated from secular political parties like AL, leftist and secular civil societies, the Freedom Fighters’ Association, and the Sector Commanders’ Forum. The most vehement public mobilization was done by a newly created civil society organization called Ekattorer Ghatok-Dalal Nirmul Committee (committee for the elimination of the killers and collaborators of 1971) or more popularly known as Ghadanik or Nirmul Committee. The Jamaat’s attempt to counter the Ghadanik by a similar newly created rival front called Bharatiya Dalal Nirmul Committee (committee for the elimination of the Indian collaborators) was overpowered by the former’s muscle power and ruthless violence. After a sustained three-month public campaign and agitation, the Nirmul Committee set a Kangaroo Court (Gana Adalat) on 26 March 1991 to try Ghulam Azam and sentence him to death. All the supporting fronts welcomed the verdict. Even though Ghulam Azam’s citizenship issue was later settled by the court in his favour in 1994, and he assumed party leadership as a legal citizen, the antiJamaat and anti-Ghulam Azam campaign did not abate till he left the party leadership in 1998. A careful analysis of the Ghulam Azam factor in Jamaat for 20 years since his return to the country in 1978 would clearly suggest that his association with Jamaat and its declared and undeclared leadership became a political liability for the party. The party had clearly forsaken its institutional public interest in favour of Ghulam Azam’s personal political identity. 3.  Ideological Shift and Policy Difference

According to its internal literature, party objectives and strategies, Jamaat is an ideological movement per se. It believes in the total change and transformation of society based on the Islamic ideals and models found in the lives and

Jamaat and Democracy 89 times of Prophet Muhammad and the subsequent four rightly guided caliphs (Khulafa alRashidun). The essence of these ideals and models is revolutionary transformation of human life and society from revolt and disobedience to total and conscious submission to God. Such a change is revolutionary even though it may not always come through revolution per se. Jamaat anchors its Islamic political philosophy on the revolutionary or total transformative understanding of Maududi who believed that the true mission of Prophet Muhammad (and all other prophets for that matter) was to bring this revolutionary and total transformative change in human thought and practical life (Maududi 1981). Jamaat continued with the same political philosophy from its predecessor Jamaat established by Maududi. However, Maududi was pragmatic enough to think that an Islamic revolution in a literal sense cannot be possible unless a well-qualified generation with solid conviction in a total transformative change is developed through a high standard of moral training and knowledge. A  must-read book for Jamaat activists by Maududi titled ‘Islamic Revolution: Preconditions for Its Success’ outlined for a well-qualified Islamic vanguard generation who can bring about the expected sociopolitical change by a revolution per se, if the context allows, or by following the democratic means of electoral competition. While revolutionary zeal was fostered in the heart, competitive electoral politics as a more practical approach was also adopted. In Ghulam Azam’s words in 1980, ‘Jamaat wishes to transform the country into an Islamic welfare state by gaining people’s trust and support through democratic means’ (Jamaat ganatantrik padhdhatitey janagoner astha arjan korey deshke Islami kollyan rashtrey unnito kortey chai (trans by the author)) (Azam 2007, 190). In fact, an analysis of the entire political profile of the undivided Jamaat (united Pakistan and Bangladesh) would testify that the party actively participated in procedural democracy and contested in every election. This implies that non-revolutionary means to achieve total transformative change are accepted as strategies provided that the revolutionary objectives are maintained. In other words, revolution remains the singular highest symbolic goal. Indeed, the term ‘Islamic revolution’ fairly inundated the internal literature, in-house Islamic discourse, public rallies and conventions of Jamaat during the 1980s. The Jamaat workforce was routinely encouraged to dream of an imminent Islamic revolution in Bangladesh as the party was growing exponentially. A second element that reinforced the Islamic revolutionary zeal and dream of the party was the February  1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. A  merely three months after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Jamaat resurfaced as a political party. Yet a third element was at work, which cannot be discounted to draw a larger picture. It was the student wing of Jamaat that reemerged two years earlier in 1977 with a new label Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir replacing its earlier pre-independence Pakistani name Islami Chhatra Shangha. The young and energetic Shibir generation was inspired further by the Iranian revolution, and the resurrection of the Jamaat almost coincided with the Iranian Islamic revolution. These three factors were at play in setting

90  M. Moniruzzaman the revolutionary ideological zeal of Jamaat during the early 1980s. One can even add a fourth factor—the heroic performance of the Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, which inspired the prospective Islamic revolution in Bangladesh. The idea of revolution was so passionate that Jamaat officially made a ‘Seven-Point Demands on Islamic Revolution’ to the government on 30 January 1981 (Azam 2007, 194). The revolution factor was so much ideologically charging that it generated severe internal tension within Shibir, and between Shibir and Jamaat during 1982–1983. The Shibir’s impressive record of sweeping popularity among meritorious students in major colleges and universities (Shibir won 23 out 26, including Vice-President General Secretary, posts in Chittagong University Students Union in 1981) all over Bangladesh in its first five years made a section of its central leaders to carve out a new beginning. This thought of a new beginning was reasoned on two contemporary factors: first, the moral boost generated by the Iranian revolution; and second, the moral guilt perpetrated by the Jamaat’s anti-independence role in 1971. So, the new beginning was an attempt in 1982 to put Shibir on a complete independent footing as a revolutionary force but disassociated from Jamaat. The justification to disassociate was reasonable, given the fact that Jamaat as a party conflated its public role with the personal political status of its de facto Ameer, a move that generated countrywide institutional and public agitations against Jamaat. However, Jamaat reportedly ruled out any prospect for an immediate Islamic revolution, and it had a command over the majority of the Shibir leadership. The new beginning initiative failed to achieve its expected goal but it did split the Shibir. However, the majority of the Shibir leadership sided with Jamaat. Even though Jamaat maintained a revolutionary zeal in its political activities and goals, it toned down its revolutionary rhetoric in public progressively as the Iranian revolution was increasingly being downgraded by a Saudi Arabia-led anti-Iran coalition with which Jamaat was politically and financially tied up (Kabir 2006, 1990). Over time, Jamaat became so much absorbed with the procedural and competitive electoral democracy, which brought incremental success during 1986–1991, and the party made a clear ideological shift from revolution to gradual change, from ideological orthodoxy to liberalism (Islam 2015; Shehabuddin 2008; Rahman 2007). This shift has become clearer since 2010 when it made sweeping revisions to its party constitution adopting drastic policy changes to remain floated and relevant to national politics. Some of the fundamental changes concern party standard and logo, party motto, membership extension to non-Muslims, and female representation in the decision-making body. 4. Obsession With the 1971 Orthodoxy: Leadership Set, Role Perception and Implications

If Ghulam Azam was Jamaat’s first obsession with the party leadership, then the leadership set of 1971 could be considered its second obsessive orthodoxy. For straight 35 years since its formal return to politics in 1979, Jamaat’s top

Jamaat and Democracy 91 brass of national leadership remained the same set of leaders who were leading the party and its student wing in 1971. Despite being highly democratic internally and free from the symptoms of one-man or dynastic party leadership, Jamaat could see only two national leaders for 35 years. Apart from the central party leadership, the Ameer, the top office holders (the 15-member executive committee) of the party such as three Deputy Ameer, the Secretary General, and five Assistant Secretary Generals also belonged to the same 1971 set of leadership continued well into the 1990s. Moreover, the majority of the top decision-making body, the Majlish e Shura, was populated by national and regional leaders who had direct experience with 1971 politics nationally or regionally. All 43 members of the first Majlish-e-Shura elected, and all 11 Central Working Committee members appointed in December 1979 were of the 1971 generation of politicians, most of who were re-elected and re-appointed till the mid-1990s or beyond (BIJ 2016). Not even Awami League, the only pre-independence political party, and the party that brought independence and still survives, could maintain such a history of continuation with its 1971 set of leadership. It is not unusual for a strict cadre-based and ideological party like Jamaat to continue with a particular set of committed leaderships for long. However, what makes its legacy particularly important is its political implications. Jamaat is one of the few Islamic political parties that opposed independence in 1971, though all of them accepted the independence once it was achieved. Of those, only Jamaat survived in national politics with full force as it was before the independence. However, as Jamaat was the second-only strongest party before independence, the entire blame of ‘anti-independence force’ squarely fell on it. And since national politics over the past 50 years chiefly remained divided over pro- and anti-independence discourse, the blame developed into an institutionalized social and political stigma. This stigma later received institutional and legal recognition, which put the validity and relevance of Jamaat’s politics into question. Institutionally, the party was delisted in 2013 by the Election Commission and denied re-registration on the ground of it being an ‘antiindependence force’, and legally, five of its top leaders were allegedly found to be guilty of committing crimes against humanity in 1971 war of independence by a special tribunal and were hanged successively since 2013. One can argue that the political, legal and social stigma that Jamaat has been formally labelled with after 2010 is a direct consequence of the orthodoxy with its 1971 set of leadership, and political role perception since 1979. As the party’s top leadership set remained dominated by the 1971 generation of politicians, its unapologetic role perception in 1971 also remained equally naive, undiplomatic and unchanged. The war of independence had been costly, painful and a requiem of horror for those who fought directly or indirectly. So informally, the civil society, and especially the urban upperclass and political parties in post-independence Bangladesh, have been firmly socialized with the knowledge that Jamaat is an ‘anti-independence force’. So, the public sentiment against Jamaat has been strongly negative, which was

92  M. Moniruzzaman capitalized by anti-Jamaat parties in electoral politics, making Jamaat politically more controversial, hated and alienated. Yet, amidst such strong popular social and political disapproval, the party persistently put forward the same familiar ‘anti-independence’ set of leadership to the electorate throughout the post-independence period. This leadership orthodoxy was even further reinforced by a deadlier political stand of the party on its role perception in the 1971 war of independence. Officially, Jamaat opposed independence of Bangladesh on ideological and political grounds. Jamaat believed that the breaking of the united Pakistan was against the philosophy of the Muslim Pakistan Movement. Second, it was being utilized in a regional power-play by the rival India that breaking up of Pakistan would reduce security threats for India. Third, the facts that the provisional Bangladesh government was supported by India and hosted on its soil were clear indications that a Muslim-majority independent Bangladesh would be absolutely controlled by or even forcefully annexed with Hindu majority India (as this is how India annexed Goa, Sikkim and Kashmir earlier). So, instead, Jamaat preferred to side with the united Pakistan as a lesser evil and cooperated with the East Pakistan government to save Pakistan’s unity (Azam 2007). Whether this stand of the party was right or wrong, it was taken as politically incorrect by society. Yet, the party persistently and consistently maintained its declared position since 1979 that it ‘did not make any mistake in 1971’. A critical analysis of this standing of the party would not spare the party of a number of criticisms. First, the party failed to recognize the gravity of such affirmation in a highly charged national emotional issue—the independence war. Such a claim directly legitimized the violence and atrocities that the armed forces inflicted on the nation. Furthermore, it affirmed the complicity of Jamaat in the atrocities committed. Second, the party failed to substantiate its denial of making any mistake with credible evidence. Therefore, the claim remained a mere political statement. Such a mere statement might have been enough for the supporters and party loyalists, at least publicly, but for the vast majority of the opponent it was rather sheer disrespect and arrogance. As far as independence is concerned, the vast majority of people justify it more with emotion, experience and conventional beliefs if not critical reflections. However, Jamaat in its political campaign and public outreach could never sufficiently prove the rationales of its ‘non-mistaken’ policy in 1971 that the war of independence was an opportunity that India wanted to take advantage of against its archrival Pakistan, and an Independent Bangladesh achieved with the help of India would give India leverage to control the internal politics of Bangladesh. Indeed, Jamaat’s suspicions about India’s motives started to become realities immediately after independence through numerous policies towards Bangladesh such as 25-Year Friendship Treaty, water-sharing treaties, trade policies, cultural aggression, and control over internal politics of Bangladesh. It is widely believed that the elections in 2008, 2014 and 2018, and the AL governments since 2009 have all been under the increasing control of the Indian government (Kaura and

Jamaat and Democracy 93 Meena 2020; Ahsan 2018; Kashem and Islam 2016; Pant 2007). Despite such obvious evidence, the Jamaat failed to capitalize on its justification of antiindependence war in 1971. Third, Jamaat as an idealistic and knowledge-based party has failed to create a public intellectual discourse in the independent Bangladesh on its position in 1971. The entire narrative of the issue of independence is constructed and dominated by the strong secular and anti-Islamic intelligentsia against which Jamaat’s counter-narrative is almost non-existent. Its limited effort has failed to create any impact. So, its ‘non-mistaken’ position remains neither explained nor understood publicly. And finally, the party’s top rank and file apparently suffered from a selfaccomplished complacency that their unapologetic stand would face no serious political consequence in future. There are indications that some party insiders belonging to the top layers of decision makers were in favour of doing away with the stigma of 1971 politically and legally. This was based on the fact that all the legal instruments were readily available to, at least officially and legally, do away with the popular label of ‘anti-independence’. One may refer to such evidence as the first International Crimes Tribunals Act (ICTA) 1973 by the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and its findings, and the general amnesty in 1973, as legal evidence to challenge the political stigma. However, the assertive revisionism of some party insiders was reportedly aborted by the feeling of complacency of the highest decision-making body—the Majlish-e-Shura. The price of such complacency was paid by the party with the surviving set of 1971 leadership’s lives in the gallows, legal stamping on the party’s 1971 role, de-registration of the party by the Election Commission and wider social stigmatization. The anti-Jamaat Shahbagh Movement of 2013 sealed the fate of Jamaat’s public politics politically, legally and socially (Shariff 2019; Khan 2015; Islam 2014). 5.  Lack of Intellectual Support Base

Jamaat has four-dimensional identity: it is an ideological organization; it is an Islamic movement; it is an Islamic political party; and, finally, it is a political party. Its ideological identity is the most universal one that it is based on Islam. Islam is a religion, a life system (sociopolitical, economic and legal), and a civilization. All these are heavily dependent on human intellectual exercise, capability and productivity to prove the utility of the ideology for human society. As a civilization, Islam is dependent on creativity, innovation and reproduction of its originality in new contexts to prove its relevance. This dimension of Jamaat’s identity warrants the creation and patronization of a dedicated intellectual community that will remain engaged in the production of knowledge that can sustain the other dimensions of the party. As an Islamic movement, Jamaat is based on a much higher philosophy of life than that of any other social or political movement. The revolutionary paradigm of Islamic civilization, which combines the transcendental and the

94  M. Moniruzzaman temporal, is reflected in the movement of Islam to address the entire humanity’s wellbeing. Thus, as an Islamic movement, Jamaat’s philosophical scope of operation is universal—beyond space and time. As an Islamic political party, Jamaat embodies in it a specialized political framework reflective of the philosophy of Islamic ideology and movement. As an Islamic political party, its framework of operation, scope, structure, model, means and objectives are defined, controlled and monitored by strict ideological parameters. And finally, as a political party, Jamaat functions as an institution within the particular national political settings of Bangladesh. Its objectives, programs, policies, strategies and actions are shaped by the peculiarities of local politics and sensitivities. It operates within the framework of the national political system and institutional structure, which puts limitations on its actions, behaviours and policies. Even though Jamaat has these many dimensions of identity, a closer observation might reveal that the party has apparently failed to reflect them in it. During the 80 years of its existence (30 years of Pakistan time included), the party has failed to create a generation of Islamic intellectuals who are capable and dedicated in the production of knowledge, in creativity and in innovativeness. The Jamaat in the context of Bangladesh has been impressively successful in developing professional and service institutions such as banking and healthcare (Amin 2016; Bano 2012) but has remained equally unsuccessful in creating an intellectual community that works beyond the boundary of its party-political structure. The institutions of higher education in Bangladesh host only a handful of intellectuals who may be supportive of Jamaat’s political ideology but are not productive enough to provide intellectual backing to support with innovative policy advice and directions. As such, Jamaat has remained trapped in its traditional and obscure idea of an Islamic state with no elaborate and dynamic explanation so as to make it attractive and acceptable to the electorate. The traditional idea of an Islamic state often offers the medieval image of a society that suggests strict gender segregation, limitations on women’s liberty, capital punishment with stoning and chopping of hands, prohibition of music and entertainment, and treating the non-Muslim citizens as unequal and ‘second-class’. Jamaat has not offered any new interpretation of its idea of an Islamic state that the electorate may find comfortable with and desirable to. This limitation of Jamaat is due to the lack of its intellectual community, and this lacking is in turn due to Jamaat’s obsessive engagement with electoral politics. Pressured by realpolitik since 2010, Jamaat has revised its party motto, slogan and objective with new terms and wordings, but such cosmetic changes are hardly enough to explain its Islamic political ideology (Islam 2021). Conclusion Islam and politics are natural allies in Bangladesh, but they are perpetually made hostile to each other by the factor of ‘secularism’ adopted as a state policy since independence. Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh is a political party that has epitomized the tension between the three factors. Proponents of secularism

Jamaat and Democracy 95 and anti-Islam groups conveniently label or try to project Jamaat-e-Islami as a terrorist, violent and anti-democratic Islamist political party (Kumar 2017; De 2015; Hasan 2012, 2011; Ganguly 2006; Riaz 2008, 2004; Bahadur 1994) while others find the party as modernist, non-violent and highly democratic (Islam and Islam 2020, 2018; Islam 2011a, 2011b; Rahman 2007; Shehabuddin 2008). An objective analysis would show that the Jamaat in Bangladesh has been a controversial political party. It is a strong-principled and cadre-based democratic party without intra-party factionalism and with a credibly corruptionfree leadership. No other party in Bangladesh can withstand such public reputation of the party. Nevertheless, the party cannot overcome certain limitations that make it highly controversial. Firstly, it is an Islamic ideology-based party which makes it highly disapproved by the secularists. Secondly, it is a party that opposed the independence war of Bangladesh which makes it highly questioned or rejected in local politics. Thirdly, beyond these domestic factors, Jamaat being Islamic is also seen as something ‘bad’ or ‘unwanted’ by regional and international forces. Therefore, the portrayal of Jamaat can vary depending on the protagonists or antagonists in question. However, keeping democratic constitutionalism and electoral politics in perspective, this chapter has found that Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh has always been an unfettered and avid supporter of constitutionalism and electoral democracy. The party has not only actively opposed non-democratic system in Bangladesh in support of constitutional and electoral democracy but also made original contributions to strengthen constitutionalism and electoral democracy. The analysis, however, also found that the party has suffered from internal ideological and political orthodoxies related to policies, views and strategies of actions that have turned its democratic image, credits and contributions useless to the point that the party not only has come to meet its existential threat but has also been politically, legally and socially made an outcast. References Abedin, Md Jaynal. 2020. “Legitimacy Crisis in Bangladesh: A  Case Study of 10th General Election.” European Journal of Social Sciences Studies 3 (2): 1–19. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3612187 Afridi, Manzoor Khan, Tabi Ullah, and Uzma Gul. 2016. “Electoral Politics of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan (1987–2009).” Global Social Sciences Review 1 (1): 58–76. Ahmad, Irfan. 2010. Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ahmad, Sayed Riaz. 1976. Maulana Maududi and the Islamic State. Islamabad: People’s Publishing House. Ahmed, Nizam. 2004. Non-Party Caretaker Government in Bangladesh: Experience and Prospect. Dhaka: UPL. ———. 2011. “Abolition or Reform? Non-Party Caretaker System and Government Succession in Bangladesh.” The Round Table 100 (414): 303–21.

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Jamaat and Democracy 97 Ganguly, S. 2006. The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 171. The Guardian. 2013. “Bangladeshi court bans Islamist party from elections.” Online: www. theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/01/bangladesh-bans-islamist-party-elections, Gupta, DN. 2008. Communism and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1939–45. New Delhi: Sage Publication. Hasan, M. 2011. “Democracy and Political Islam in Bangladesh.” South Asia Research 31 (2): 97–117. ———. 2012. “Historical Developments of Political Islam with Reference to Bangladesh.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 47 (2): 155–67. Hoque, Ridwanul. 2017. “The risk of abusive constitutionalism,” The Daily Star, November  07. Online: www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/law-interview/ the-risk-abusive-constitutionalism-1487266 Islam, M. 2015. Limits of Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Islam, M. Nazrul. 2021. “Political Islam in South Asia: A  Critical Appraisal of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” International Area Studies Review (May 28), OnlineFirst. https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659211018320. Islam, M.R. 1999. “Constitutionalism and Governance in Bangladesh”. In: Alauddin M., Hasan S. (eds) Development, Governance and the Environment in South Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, London. pp 161–180. Islam, M.N., and M.S. Islam. 2018. “Islam, Politics and Secularism in Bangladesh: Contesting the Dominant Narratives.” Social Sciences 7 (3): 1–18. ———. 2020. Islam and Democracy in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Islam, M. S. 2011a. “ ‘Minority Islam’ in Muslim Majority Bangladesh: The Violent Road to a New Brand of Secularism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31 (1): 125–41. ———. 2011b. “Trampling Democracy: Islamism, Violent Secularism, and Human Rights Violations in Bangladesh.” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 8 (1): 1–33. Islam, M. Nazrul. 2013. “Non-Party Caretaker Government in Bangladesh (1991– 2001): Dilemma for Democracy?” Developing Country Studies 3 (8): 116–27. Islam, M. Morshedul. 2014. “The Shahbagh Movement of 2013 and Its Impacts on the Politics of Bangladesh: A  Modest Review.” Public Policy and Administration Research 4 (9): 67–78. Jackson, Roy. 2011. Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State. London: Routledge. Kabir, BMM. 1990. “The Politics of Religion: The Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh,” in Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. pp. 168–197. ———. 2006. Politics and Development of the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. Dhaka: A. H. Development Publishing House. Kashem, M., and M. Islam. 2016. “Narendra Modi’s Bangladesh Policy and India– Bangladesh Relations: Challenges and Possible Policy Responses.” India Quarterly 72 (3): 250–67. Accessed July 14, 2021. www.jstor.org/stable/48505505. Kaura, Vinay, and Meena Rani. 2020. “India’s Neighbourhood Policy During 2014– 2019: Political Context and Policy Outcomes.” Indian Journal of Public Administration 66 (1): 10–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019556120906072. Keddie, Nikki Ragozin. 2003. “Secularism & Its Discontents.” Dædalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (Summer): 14–30.

98  M. Moniruzzaman Keith, Arthur Berriedale. 2018. A Constitutional History of India, 1600–1935. London: Routledge. Khan, Ahmed Abidur Razzaque. 2015. “Public Space, Virtual Space and the Shahbagh Movement in Bangladesh: A Critical Review.” ICT for Development, Working paper Series, vol. 5, no. 2. www.researchgate.net/publication/315708437. Khan, Mushtaq. 2017. “Anti-Corruption in Bangladesh: A political settlements analysis,” SOAS, University of London, online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24855/1/ ACE-WorkingPaper003-BD-AntiCorruption-170907.pdf Kors, Alan Charles. 1990. Atheism in France, 1650–1729: The Orthodox Sources of Disbelief, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kumar, Upendra. 2017. “Religion and Politics: A Study of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities 7 (5): 146–65. https:// doi.org/10.5958/2249-7315.2017.00304.5. Lorch, Jasmin. 2014. “Elections in Bangladesh: Political Conflict and the Problem of Credibility.” E-International Relations, online: www.e-ir.info/2014/02/02/ elections-in-bangladesh-political-conflict-and-the-problem-of-credibility/ Malik, Hafeez. 1967. “The Marxist Literary Movement in India and Pakistan.” The Journal of Asian Studies 26 (4): 649–64. Maududi, Sayyid Abul Ala. 1955. Islamic law and constitution. Karachi: Islamic Publications. ———. 1981. Towards Understanding Islam. Translated and edited by Ahmad, Khurshid, Markfield, UK: The Islamic Foundation. Manent, Pierre, (Ralph C. Hancock, Trans.). 2016. Beyond Radical Secularism: How France and the Christian West Should Respond to the Islamic Challenge. Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press. Michael, Siam-Heng Heng, Chin Liew Ten. 2010. State and Secularism: Perspectives from Asia. Singapore: National Univ. of Singapore Press. Mollah, M. Awal Hossain. 2020. “War Crimes Trials in Bangladesh: Justice or Politics?” Journal of Asian and African Studies 55 (5): 652–65. Moniruzzaman, M. 2019. “Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization of Authoritarian Democracy in Bangladesh.” In Ryan Merlin Yonk (ed.), Elections—A Global Perspective, London: IntechOpen Limited, pp.  57–71. DOI:10.5772/intechopen.80929 Ozoglu, Hakan. 2011. From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic. Westport, USA: Praeger Publishers Inc. Pant, Harsh V. 2007. “India and Bangladesh: Will the Twain Ever Meet?” Asian Survey 47 (2): 231–49. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2007.47.2.231. Philpott, Daniel. 2019. ‘Secular Repressive States in the Muslim World,’ in Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom in Islam: The Fate of a Universal Human Right in the Muslim World Today. London: Oxford Scholarship Online. Rahman, Mahbubur. Dec 30, 2013. “Voter-less election and the crisis of legitimacy.” The Daily Star, Online: www.thedailystar.net/voter-less-election-and-the-crisis-oflegitimacy-4557 Rahman, M. M. 2007. “Islamic Activism in Bangladesh: A Case Study of the Jamaate-Islami Bangladesh.” PhD thesis, Clark Atlanta University. ETD Collection for AUC R.W. Woodruff Library. Accessed May  15, 2021. https://radar.auctr.edu/ islandora/object/cau.td:2007_rahman_md_m. Riaz, Ali. 2004. God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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6 Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat in Bangladesh A Social Movement Theory Perspective Faroque Amin Introduction Jamaat-e-Islami, one of the oldest and largest transnational Islamic movements, introduced a modern political revivalist reading of Islam to the Southeast Asian region. The party was officially initiated in August 1941 by theologian-scholar Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi1 in undivided India under the British colonial rule.2 It was initially founded as a religious movement aiming at the socio-religious development of the Muslim community in the colonised Indian subcontinent. After the independence and partition between Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India in 1947, Maududi migrated to Pakistan and started his organisational activities there. The movement also continued to function in India, with autonomous and independent leadership along with a solid ideological influence by Maududi’s writings. Similarly, Jamaat in Bangladesh has also been functioning with independent policies and leadership since it began activities in Bangladesh in 1979, eight years after independence from Pakistan in 1971. During the initial years, Maududi preferred to refrain from participating in political activities and keep his organisation an education-based and preachingcentred religious movement. However, he changed his opinion and adopted political participation as a medium for establishing Islam in society during the early fifties,3 which eventually resulted in the Jamaat being the most prominent Islamic political party in the countries located in the Indian subcontinent and one of the significant transnational movements adhering to the modern political trend of contemporary Islamic revivalism worldwide. The Jamaat is currently the most influential and challenged Islamic political party in Bangladesh, a Southeast Asian country with the fourth-largest Muslim population. The Jamaat’s organisational growth and political participation in Bangladesh over the past four decades demonstrate its conventional sociopolitical power. However, the controversies around Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami are generally more related to local political conflicts and nationalist contexts than any of its alleged associations with religious extremism. The Jamaat leaders in Bangladesh have faced war crime charges due to their association with DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-6

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 101 the Pakistani military during the 1971 Liberation War, and most of them were executed over the past decades. The party has been barred from participating in any local or national elections by a court verdict since 2013, as judges considered this party ineligible for registration as a political party. Yet, the Jamaat remains at the centre of most of Bangladesh’s political debates and discussions. There is a critical need to examine Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami by looking into its significant characteristics and activities with a larger objective of understanding Islamic politics in Bangladesh. Social welfare activities have emerged as one of the core activities of Islamic political parties worldwide, especially in various Muslim-majority countries over the last half-century. Researchers have attributed this novel aspect of modern Islamic political parties to their political development and success in countries such as Egypt, India, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Turkey and Yemen (Apaydin 2013; Gocmen 2014; White 2012; Clark 2004; Zubaida 1992; Jawad 2009; Seesemann 2002; Levitt 2006; Robinson 2004; I. Ahmad 2009; Harris 2010). This chapter explores this claim in relation to Jamaat-e-Islami in the Bangladesh context. It examines the place of social welfare activities in the politics of Jamaat in Bangladesh with an in-depth look into its organisational structure. It is in this context that the chapter seeks to present a study of major social welfare activities of the Jamaat, focusing on the perception and experience of the welfare providers inside the party’s welfare structure in light of two social movement theories: resource mobilisation theory and political process theory. The chapter reflects and reviews data obtained through communicating with people actively involved in Jamaat’s social welfare provision in Chittagong City4 through interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation, including informal conversations. All interviewee names were changed into fictitious names throughout this chapter to protect the identity of the individuals who participated in this study. The primary goal of this research was to explore the roles played by the actors at different levels in this collective action and their relationships with each other and to understand the objectives and outcomes of this welfare provision. The study attempts to understand participants’ responses, including their aspirations, experiences, frustrations, achievements and expectations to achieve this goal. Finally, a critical analysis from an observer’s perspective, supported by the ethnography presented in the core, will holistically answer the research question of why and how this particular welfare phenomenon exists in Bangladesh. Social Welfare Spectrum in Modern-Day Islamic Politics The dynamics of social welfare programmes are not necessarily identical among the multitude of contemporary Islamic political movements in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies. However, the existence and, more importantly, the recent ‘effectiveness’ in gaining popularity and socio-political achievements of

102  Faroque Amin these programmes are undeniable. The practical measures of social welfare provision undertaken by the religion-based political parties are now manifested in some major Muslim countries, such as in the cases of AKP (Justice and Welfare Party (Turkish: Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi))5 in Turkey, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement (Arabic: Harakah al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmiyyah)) in ˙ Palestine, Muslim Brotherhood (Arabic: Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in Egypt and the Middle East, and Hizbullah (Arabic: lit. Party of God) in Lebanon. The scholars who have studied those movements commonly acknowledge this undertaking in their analysis. As illustrated by Rabasa and Larrabee (2008, 19): The Islamist political parties, from Refah to Saadet, and above all, the AKP, have been especially active in this area. In a very real sense, these charitable and social-welfare activities have been the basis for the party’s success at the municipal and national levels. From her study of health clinics in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, Janine A. Clark believes that much of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood can be attributed to its history of serious involvement in social welfare from its early days. She asserted: [I]t established numerous private schools, medical services, and charity services—which provided money, food, and clothes—for the poor, aged, orphaned and homeless, to name just a few; it also established a bureau of charity and social services that was responsible for these initiatives. (Clark 2004, 15) Levitt’s (2006, 242) statement about the Palestinian Hamas movement depicts a similar situation there: ‘Palestinian moderates argue that it is Hamas’ social welfare activities, not its suicide bombings, which translate into grassroots and electoral support for the organisation at the expense of moderate Palestinian groups’. Hizbullah in Lebanon is not much different from its counterparts in other countries, as Rana Jawad wrote: ‘The Hizbullah organisations placed most emphasis on religious welfare as in initiative arising from among the people and remaining with the people’ (Jawad 2009, 115). The Jamaat in Bangladesh also has a long history of being involved in social welfare activities, dating back to the late 1970s. People associated with the Jamaat are widely connected with establishing schools and medical centres all over the country. Most of these endeavours are on a commercial basis, with their instigators attempting to earn their livings as well. However, the Jamaat also operates numerous charity schools and charity medical centres through various Islamic NGOs for welfare purposes. There are differences between these two categories, apart from being commercial or non-commercial operational methods. Although schools and medical centres in the commercial category generally bear an Islamic name and are commonly known to be run by the people of the Jamaat, they generate revenue for the entrepreneurs.

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 103 Therefore, regular attempts are made to improve them in order to compete with other private schools and medical centres. On the other hand, schools and medical centres in the non-commercial category are run by assigned Jamaat leaders and activists who work there as part of their organisational commitment. Being not-for-profit and charity-based, these organisations are not generally well-equipped or modernised, as was found during the fieldwork for my doctoral thesis.6 These charity schools and medical centres represent most of the institutional welfare activities of the Jamaat in Bangladesh. Besides, the party regularly spends a large sum of its funds on various social welfare programmes, as will be discussed in sections afterwards. The relative success of the Jamaat in becoming an influential religious segment in the country has apparently motivated many other Islamic groups. In a country like Bangladesh, where the government cannot provide a comprehensive welfare support system for its citizens, various religious organisations and groups are now actively involved in social welfare activities, filling in the welfare vacuum in society to some extent and at an increasing rate more than ever. Organisational Welfare Structure of the Jamaat ‘Social Reformation and Social Welfare’ had been the third among the four officially proclaimed agendas in the party’s constitution (Jamaat-e-Islami 2011). However, the other three—the preaching of the ideology, organisation of the activities and political reformation—dominated the Jamaat’s activities in its early days in the 1970s. The Jamaat’s first organised effort involving social welfare activities in this region was to distribute relief support to the poor and homeless around the coastal area, who were affected by the devastating cyclone of 1969 (Abdur Rahim, an ISWCC7 leader, interviewed in his office on 27 December 2012). The significance of social welfare programmes in the framework of Jamaat activities was manifested later when the Jamaat was banned in independent Bangladesh. It was not until 1979 that the Jamaat started working again in Bangladesh using its official name, although its members had continued working during the years between 1975 and 1979 under the names of different local organisations, such as the Islamic Social Welfare Council, Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation, Islamic Farmers Welfare Organisation and Ideal Teachers Association, among others (Majidi 2003; Khan 1996). These were either nonpolitical social welfare or non-political religious organisations, quietly mobilising pro-Jamaat people and carrying out their activities, mostly religious, social and educational, without being involved in national politics. The Islamic Social Welfare Council of Chittagong (ISWCC) was established in 1977 by people who had been Jamaat activists in the 1960s. Almost all of them had been forced to flee the country or go into hiding for a long time after the liberation war ended in December 1971. They started coming back gradually when the political situation eased after the regime change in

104  Faroque Amin 1975. Instead of entering into politics directly, during the military rule of the late 1970s, they formed ISWCC, a non-political social welfare organisation, in Chittagong in order to continue advocating their ideology. Asaad Mahmud, an ISWCC leader, recounted his involvement with the organisation: I joined the Jamaat in 1966, I was a college student at that time . . . however, many events took place. . . . It was a time of turmoil, socially and politically. So, ISWCC was established at a later time. It started its formal activities in around 1977. I was assigned to work here. . . . I always have a personal tendency to socialise with generally poor people. Since then, I worked mostly in Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation in different cities, and now I’m back in the ISWCC since 1997 . . . we had very limited funds and activities in the eighties, and all offices were located in the same compound. This office building of the ISWCC—as you can see now—we moved here after 2001 . . . however, our focus is now on social welfare activities, such as organising religious programs, schools, clinics and so on, nothing political. (Interviewed in the ISWCC office on 1 December 2012) The establishment of ISWCC in Chittagong was a revolutionary milestone in the history of the Jamaat in the new country of Bangladesh. It was undoubtedly an ingenious decision that paved the way for the Jamaat’s return to the political arena in later years. Initially, ISWCC concentrated on establishing a few schools that then became the nucleus for the movement in those days. This created an opportunity for the party leaders, who were previously student leaders with excellent academic merit, to be employed in the teaching profession. Besides, it helped them to regain an honourable and acceptable place in the local society. During the following years, the activities of ISWCC were extended into offering free education for the children of poor families, establishing orphanages, providing underprivileged people with basic medical services and distributing relief assistance during natural disasters, such as cyclones and floods. Considering the country’s socio-economic condition, these activities successfully gave the party a foundational status in local society. Moreover, it was naturally convenient for pro-Jamaat people to proclaim that the motivation for these social welfare activities came from religious aspiration. However, a leader of the Chittagong City Jamaat with a designated role in the welfare provision, Rafiqul Islam, agreed that his party has a ‘pragmatic motive’, alongside religious aspiration, driving these social welfare activities: Our first and primary motive behind all these social welfare activities is to serve our Islamic perspective. Our religion ordered us to serve humanity, to serve people in need. Islam is to guide people, as it is said in the Qur’an, ‘Hudallinnas’, guidance and welfare of all human beings. It didn’t say that it is for Muslims only . . . every person should help elderly

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 105 people, children, people who are facing troubles, and so on. So, the Jamaat also tries to work for this cause as it can. I know these activities can be explained as a way to gain popularity, and I wouldn’t deny the fact that they help our party sometimes, but that’s not our objective. . . . I  would rather consider success from another perspective. If we can encourage our people to help needy people for the cause of Islam, that is a success to me. I can say that ninety per cent of the Jamaat manpower, if not a hundred per cent, is somehow associated with social welfare activities, whatever little or big the extent of those activities is. (Interviewed in Chittagong on 1 January 2013) On the other hand, one of his deputies in the welfare division of Chittagong City Jamaat Executive Committee, Yeasinul Kabir, argued that there is no political or ‘worldly’ motive for these welfare activities. Rather it has merely a religious motive. He said: As I  see it, there is a Hadith (prophetic tradition) ‘help your brothers whether they are oppressed or oppressors’. When it comes to the social welfare activities of our party, we don’t see who supports which party. I  want to give an example. After the devastating cyclone on 29 April 1991, we built around two hundred houses in Parua Para village. This is my own village in South Chittagong. It was a great disaster, thousands died, and village people were helpless for weeks. They had nothing. We started with emergency food and clothes, then provided materials to build houses for the neediest families. This was one of the biggest relief works in our history, supported by the overseas fund. . . . In the National Election of 1996, Advocate Shamsuddin Mirza (a Jamaat candidate for parliament membership) received a total of 66 votes in the same village. (Interviewed in Chittagong on 5 January 2013) The Jamaat leader went on to explain how his party helped those in need without expecting any political gain. As a result of this ‘intention’, they did not follow up with the people who received their support. This stance may seem too idealistic and unrealistic, particularly because the party is actively involved in politics. When questioned about this, the leader persisted in explaining the distinction between the social welfare activities and political activities of the Jamaat. He further argued that poor people vote for a variety of reasons, similar to those of the middle class, and not solely in exchange for the assistance they receive. In his own language: Think about it. Each house cannot contain one person only, there are several family members in every house. If we would get two votes only from each house we built just five years ago, there would be four hundred votes for Mr Mirza from my village. But it didn’t happen that way. The vote in politics is a different issue, and we do not work for worldly gain.

106  Faroque Amin If we focus on that in our social welfare activities, we will not remain an ideal Islamic movement . . . there were families who were in a better situation and therefore, we provided less support for them, but I know that they voted for us . . . so, it’s a complex issue, and you shouldn’t judge our political condition from the viewpoint of our social welfare activities. (Interviewed in Chittagong on 5 January 2013) Both leaders are true in their statements regarding the motive of Jamaat’s welfare activities. During the fieldwork, it became clear that the Jamaat people focused more on religious motivation and idealistic aspiration. However, they have also been becoming more concerned about their practical and political outcomes. The success of ISWCC in Chittagong inspired like-minded people all over the country. Hospitals, clinics, schools and research centres were formed in the early 1980s in almost all regions of the country by people who were both non-officially and officially associated with the Jamaat (Aref Haidar, a leader and member of the Executive Committee of Chittagong City Jamaat, interviewed in Dhaka on 24 and 25 September 2012). Thus, the establishment of ISWCC was a pioneering step in the history of the political comeback of the Jamaat. The Jamaat was officially re-established in Bangladesh in 1979 when the government allowed it to start working again. It took the name Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh instead of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan as it had been called before independence in 1971. After 1979, the Jamaat started to directly employ its resources for its fourth agenda, social welfare, in Chittagong City and simultaneously continued to administer the ISWCC. The party has its own activities for social welfare purposes as well as passive involvement with the ISWCC in Chittagong City, where the ISWCC works as the principal outlet for this specific objective. Moreover, several other organisations, such as the Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation, the Islamic Farmers Welfare Organisation, and the Ideal Teachers Association, have been established and run by Jamaat members. This network of organisations and activities has formed a complex web of social welfare activities. Understanding this structure is important when analysing the social welfare programme of Jamaat, as all social welfare activities are administered through this network. All of those organisations embody a larger perspective of social welfare activities while relating to the Jamaat as the mother organisation, with ISWCC as the primary outlet. These secondary organisations have their own functions as well. One of the major characteristics of the Jamaat is its organisational structure and working procedures. It is a cadre-based organisation, where everyone has to climb up the organisational ladder by fulfilling certain criteria. The journey starts from the micro level in a specific locality. A ‘block’ of members carrying out Jamaat’s activities is called a unit. This is usually composed of 10 to 20 activists, with a committee comprising Unit President and Secretary, plus other secretaries for finance, preaching, social welfare, etc. Each administrative subdivision (Thana) is divided into several units according to the manpower

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 107 in that subdivision. All subdivisions also have similar administrative committees that work under the divisional or city committees. Finally, all divisional and city committees are accountable to the central committee of the Jamaat in Bangladesh. My ethnography of the Jamaat’s welfare structure is limited to the party’s activities in Chittagong City. Unlike the Jamaat, the Islamic Social Welfare Council of Chittagong (ISWCC) works as a non-political organisation and is registered under the social welfare ministry of the Government of Bangladesh. This organisation is administered by its own committee, comprising President, Secretary, other secretaries and 60 members who have the right to elect the committee biannually (Asaad Mahmud, an ISWCC leader, interviewed in the ISWCC office on 1 December 2012). The association between the Jamaat and the ISWCC is not officially proclaimed—the ISWCC is registered as a non-political social welfare organisation and the Jamaat is a political party. However, it is common knowledge that the Council works as the primary social welfare outlet for the party. At the same time, these two organisations maintain a safe distance from each other, at least officially, as the Council is bound to submit annual reports and audit reports to the government. The members of the ISWCC are usually Jamaat leaders and activists or like-minded people with contributions to make in philanthropy and social welfare. A previous president of the ISWCC was the Chittagong City president of the Jamaat in the eighties. He started working for the ISWCC after another elected president took charge of the Jamaat city committee. Similarly, the current president of the ISWCC was previously a member of the city Consultative Committee of the Jamaat. Moreover, the current Secretary-General of the ISWCC was the president of the Chittagong City committee of the Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation, another organisation that works as a sister organisation of the Jamaat, especially for the labourers. Jamaat’s method of organising social welfare activities through different non-political organisations has intriguing similarities with the social welfare administration of another Islamic political party in Turkey. Jenny White (2012, 61) explained: A major reason for the success of WP8 (and, after it, VP and AKP), however, was its style of mobilising supporters. The party perfected a face-to-face, personalised style of mobilising ‘cells’ of neighbors on the basis of local solidarities. In other words, in addition to the business-as-usual patron– client relations common to all political parties in Turkey, WP relied on networks and horizontal relations, that is, relations among neighbors. These personal networks were mediated by a system of associations, foundations, and informal organisations formally unconnected to a party. It also allowed the system to continue to accumulate support even when a party was closed down. The networks made the Islamist movement independent of the party and encouraged the enthusiasm of activists, who saw this as ‘their’ social movement.

108  Faroque Amin Social welfare organisation by Islamic political parties in Turkey is considered one of the most successful cases worldwide, as Islamic parties started to join the government there in the 1990s and the AKP formed a single-party government in 2002. However, although the Jamaat has also formed a complex network of organisations, there are fewer officially unconnected social organisations in Bangladesh, and unlike Turkey, the Jamaat maintains a very close relationship with those sister organisations to keep more control over them. Besides ISWCC, the Jamaat established two autonomous organisations: the Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation and the Islamic Farmers Welfare Organisation (Aref Haidar, a Chittagong City Jamaat leader, interviewed in a hotel in Dhaka on 24 and 25 September 2012). The activities of these organisations are limited to their respective target groups, and despite having been run for more than three decades, their influence is insignificant. The Chittagong City offices of both of these organisations are located on the same premises in the Chittagong City Jamaat office. The ISWCC has its own office building in a different location, indicating that it has relatively more autonomous administration power than these two organisations. However, the presidents of both the labourers’ and the farmers’ organisations were also interviewed during this study. It was perceived that they were more concerned about their individual and collective obligations towards the Jamaat instead of administering their organisations independently. In summary, the Jamaat carries out social welfare activities under the party name at all levels of the party structure. Unit-level activities are intense, regular and close to the people of the small area that the particular unit covers. All of the units under a subdivision branch also occasionally organise social welfare activities for the poor people of that subdivision. The City of Division branch also organises such programmes from time to time on a larger scale, incorporating several subdivisions. These activities are generally event-oriented rather than being regular and continuous programmes, for instance, helping the people affected by a natural disaster, distribution of zakat (alms) during Ramadan (Arabic: month of fasting), distribution of financial help, clothes and food during the two religious festivals (Eid) of the year and assisting poor people with their marriage ceremonies and so on (Annual Welfare Reports of Chittagong City Jamaat 2011, 2013, 2012). On the other hand, more institutionalised and ongoing welfare programmes of the Jamaat in Chittagong City are generally administered by ISWCC, which does not carry the name of the party. However, it is commonly known that actual authority belongs to the party structure. ISWCC runs three fully operational schools, three orphanages, three religious schools (madrasahs), two mosques and three charity clinics in the city. Moreover, ISWCC is also involved in partially administering a private university and a fully equipped hospital with a medical college (Asaad Mahmud, an ISWCC leader, was interviewed in the ISWCC office on 1 December 2012). The Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation has comparatively little effect in the field. It occasionally distributes zakat and other financial help among

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 109 the poor and needy labourers. It also organises protest events against government policies and actions that are harmful to labourers. But its role and influence are much less than those of the active leftist labour organisations. Similarly, the Islamic Farmers Welfare Organisation has some occasional activities, such as distributing financial help among needy farmers, distributing seasonal seeds and fertilisers and so on (Aref Haider, a Chittagong City Jamaat leader, interviewed in Dhaka on 24 and 25 September 2012). A more detailed description of Jamaat’s major social welfare activities is provided in the following section. Welfare Activities of the Jamaat When asked about the social welfare programmes of the Jamaat, the Chittagong City Secretary of the organisation began his response by emphasising that social welfare is one of the four permanent principal programmes of the party. The Jamaat has declared these programmes in Article 6 of the party manifesto (Jamaat-e-Islami 2011) as follows: 1. Introducing the authentic form of Islam to all citizens of Bangladesh 2. Organising interested people and educating them 3. Social reformation and service for humanity based on Islamic principles 4. Reformation of the government and policies through constitutional means According to a city Jamaat leader, Shafiul Azim, the party inspires and encourages everyone, from the leaders to the field-level activists and supporters, to become social workers, and therefore one of the five conditions of joining the party as an activist is a degree of involvement in social work.9 He said: A complete calculation of the social welfare activities undertaken and initiated by our organisation is impossible to estimate. You will get a comprehensive idea of these activities by looking into both our monthly and yearly reports. But the actual work done is spread from the root level of the society. The reports will show the declared tasks that were done officially and reported at the unit level in every suburb and finally combined together for the city-level report. However, that report does not always include, for instance, a Jamaat worker who helped his ill neighbour due to the inspiration by the party. The party always teaches its manpower to practice Qard-e-Hasana10 with relatives and neighbours in need. Usually, this kind of personal level activity is supposed to be included in the report, but many a time it is not. (Interviewed in the Jamaat office on 16 November 2012) It was clear from numerous conversations with the interviewees that the city-level leaders of the Jamaat and the top officials of its welfare organisation, ISWCC, have thorough control and knowledge of the social welfare activities

110  Faroque Amin administered by the party. This has been made possible by their having regular access to the reports of the party and their ongoing involvement in party activities all over the city. Local activists start to gain theoretical knowledge of relevant tasks by reading the party literature, joining in the party training programmes and various welfare activities at the local level. Individual local units have their own priorities and involvement in various types of welfare tasks, primarily meeting the practical needs of their local areas and, sometimes, special efforts prioritised by the local leaders. In the next section, the social welfare activities of the Jamaat will be described, as revealed through the interviews and party reports. The city-level report of the entire activities programme undertaken by the Jamaat in 2012 is divided according to the party’s four permanent programmes. Under each programme, several tasks carried out in 2012 were reported within five categories: 1. Planning at the beginning of the year 2. Implementation throughout the year 3. Increase or decrease in the number of activities 4. Increase or decrease in the percentage of activities 5. The target for the following year The third of the four permanent programmes covered in this report is titled ‘Social Reformation and Service’. This programme contains five subsections: 1. Prayer organisation and lectures in the mosques 2. The organisation of local libraries and social clubs 3. Participation in local community organisations 4. Community activities 5. Welfare for all people There are a total of 43 tasks reported under these subsections, and the characteristics of those tasks are diverse. Some of these tasks are giving lectures in the mosques; maintaining a library for the local people and offering education services, including education in writing and literature; providing agricultural training and tree planting in public places; helping to organise and participating in funeral prayers and visiting sick people; providing unconditional loans (Qard-e-Hasana) and giving financial support to the poor; providing medical services, such as eye treatment camp, circumcision camp and blood donation camp; organising and implementing relief distribution for the victims of natural disasters and clothes distribution on various occasions; running programmes to increase social awareness of various issues (Annual Welfare Reports of Chittagong City Jamaat 2011, 2012, 2013). Among these many tasks, major welfare activities will be discussed here based on the proportion of the report dedicated to them and their relative importance in the bigger picture of party activities. Most of the interviewees mentioned these four tasks as their primary social welfare activities, and the

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 111 data in the party report and participant observation during the fieldwork support this claim. These tasks are as follows: • • • •

Medical services Educational services Financial and material support Relief distribution

Medical Services Within the overall social welfare programme of the Jamaat, the party’s main focus is on providing medical services to the poor and underprivileged people in the community. When asked about Jamaat’s welfare activities, most respondents immediately mentioned two sectors: medical and educational. The medical service also provides huge benefits for women, and the number of female patients in the Jamaat charity clinics is considerably larger than the number of male patients. The overcrowded environment, sub-standard living conditions, malnutrition and other factors which usually exist in underdeveloped countries are commonplace also in Bangladesh. Moreover, gender-discriminating socio-economic circumstances make it harder for women to have their medical needs met. Given this situation, it is understandable that large numbers of female patients benefit from the Jamaat charity clinics. Of the 17 providers interviewed—Jamaat leaders, ISWCC leaders and officials—eight singled out medical services as their primary sector of welfare provision. The ISWCC President said: Although the education sector should be prioritised in theory, as this would be the most important issue to develop our society and the country in the long run, the prevailing situation has compelled us to work more in the medical sector. In our annual report and planning papers, you will find education at the beginning. In the same report, you will see that the medical sector is the largest in terms of funds spent and the number of people who benefit. The need for education is an ideal matter, but we have to comply with the demand of the practical situation. (interviewed in the ISWCC office on 27 December 2012) Currently, ISWCC runs one allopathic/general charity clinic and two homeopathic charity clinics in Chittagong. Apart from that, the organisation actively participates in administering a fully operational hospital. Clinics are smaller primary healthcare centres where patients can visit a doctor to get prescriptions and medicines. The one hospital that ISWCC has been administering since 1989 was recently transferred to another authority and developed as a medical college hospital with a medical school attached. The new authority is called the International Islamic University Chittagong Trust (IIUC Trust),

112  Faroque Amin another venture of the Jamaat. The IIUC Trust President is the city president of the Jamaat,11 and ISWCC has three representative members on the Trust Committee. This administrative change was undertaken to ensure more funds and resources for the hospital, as the available manpower and annual budget of the ISWCC are not enough to run a fully functioning hospital, along with a medical school. A brief overview of the contributions made by these charity medical services run by ISWCC from 197712 to 2003 is presented in Table 6.1. Apart from these small-scale but permanent medical centres, some other occasional medical services are provided for the poor by the Jamaat, sometimes under its own name and sometimes through ISWCC. These services are infrequent, but the practical situation of the local society and the immense unmet needs of the poor have made the services indispensable to the masses. One of the city-level leaders of the party, an elected councilman in Chittagong City Corporation who is considered as one of the most active Jamaat leaders in welfare activities at the city level, described this situation as follows: We do social work through our own party and sometimes through other organisations. You need to understand the political situation of different areas of the city. In some areas, the Awami League or BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] have a stronghold, and they would not like banners

Table 6.1 Charity Medical Services of ISWCC13 Name

Jebunnessa Jhautola Homeopathy Homeopathy Clinic Clinic (closed down in 1989)14

1979 Year of establishment Number of 111,543 patients who received treatment and medicine Circumci– sion Vaccination – Eye – treatment Birth – delivery Pathological – services

Madarbari Darush Homeopathy Shefa Allopathic Clinic Clinic

Total ISWCC Hospital (transferred to IIUC Trust 2011)

1980

1982

1987

1989

1979–2003

1,2141

85,365

65,581

261,568

536,201

–

4,085

–

1,978

6,063

– –

– –

– –

19,139 6,489

19,139 6,489

–

–

–

90

90

–

3,168

–

8,410

11,578

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 113 with the word ‘Jamaat’ on them. So, our people build social and community clubs, but you will not find their activities in our party report. However, even the Awami League or BNP people know that our people administer these organisations. The patients going there to receive the services know that they are Jamaat people. Because we always talk about our Deen [religion], we try to motivate them to read the Qur’an. For others, as long as it does not bear the party’s name [Jamaat], they do not object. As far as we are concerned, the work is more important at the moment. (Interviewed in his local council office on 17 December 2012) The councilman is an active political leader at the field level who is well aware of the real-world situation. He believes that rival political parties tolerate the social welfare activities of the Jamaat on their own turf as long as the party does not publicise its name due to the prevailing economic situation. Nevertheless, he remains hopeful that the social welfare activities carried out by his own party will help establish a strong political presence in various suburbs in the future. The councilman expressed his satisfaction with the amount of social welfare work that his party has accomplished in Chittagong. He said: We will put our names when an appropriate time comes. I am happy to tell you that we have around 86 suburb-based social organisations in this city. Some of them are regularly active; although most are occasional. They collect funds from the local rich people and distribute help among the poor. . . . They also organise medical camps all year round. There may not be many, but if each club organises one event a year, that adds up to a large number with many contributions by the end of the year. They do circumcision camps, dental treatment camps, blood donation camps, free medical camps and special medical camps for women run by female doctors. They provide weekly or monthly free medical prescriptions and basic medicine for poor people in a few places. In Potenga [a suburb in the outskirt of Chittagong], we provide this medical camp on the last Friday of every month. (Interviewed in his local council office on 17 December 2012) On the last Friday of the month of this interview, I visited the premises of this medical camp in Potenga, which was found to be a one-room club office in a densely populated slum. The signboard in front of the club office read ‘Mukto Kafela’ (Bengali: lit. Free Caravan).15 One physician was present, along with several volunteers coming and going throughout the day. Around 50 patients, more than half of the women present with children, visited the physician up until 5 pm. They received prescriptions and were told to go to a particular local pharmacy to get the medicine free. One volunteer assistant kept records of the medicines prescribed and consulted with the doctor during the day. I learnt that the club received 10,000 taka (around 122 USD) every month from the

114  Faroque Amin party and that the total expenditure of medicines prescribed that day should not exceed that limit. As a student, the attending doctor had been an activist leader of the student wing of the Jamaat. He worked in these medical camps voluntarily, twice a month—once in Potenga and once in Halishahar. The party organised five circumcision camps in Chittagong in 2011. That same year, ISWCC organised three similar camps in Chittagong City. This daylong event takes place in lower-income suburbs, usually in a school or community centre, where the necessary facilities for circumcision are made available for poor parents who bring their boys there for free surgical procedures. On 12 November 2013, I attended one such circumcision camp in the Bakalia suburb. It was organised in a local school at the weekend; a total of 48 boys were circumcised between 9 am and 4 pm. Two physicians and two medics with the relevant basic medical instruments, desensitisers and medicines and around ten volunteers were organised by ISWCC. Local activists of the Jamaat had circulated the news in that area prior to the event, had listed the boys and their parents and given them coupons with serial numbers. Similarly, the activists of the Jamaat also organise vaccination camps from time to time and actively participate in government-announced national vaccination day programmes. A city Jamaat leader with a special role in social welfare activities explained: We are a political party, but I  am grateful to Allah that this party has given us some avenues to serve humanity. After each big natural disaster in the last two decades, we have exhausted all our resources to help the people left with nothing but their lives. I  can remember some events where the person’s life was changed forever. There was a widow who was utterly helpless and about to become a street beggar. One of our activists communicated with her, and we provided her with a sewing machine and some training. Now, she is financially secure and a respected working woman. The most important contribution made by us, in my opinion, is the medical service. I do not know whether you can imagine the actual condition of the poor people. Some of them would simply die without any treatment. If we were not there on time, some of the children would not be given vaccines for polio or other dangerous diseases. We do organise circumcision camps in the slums. Usually, the boys are young but sometimes older. Once I found a teenage boy of around 17 or 18 years old who was not circumcised and felt unable to tell anyone due to shyness and social stigma. We try to organise these services for such needy people. It benefits their health as circumcision is not only a religious issue but also a health issue. We try to raise their awareness about health issues. (Interviewed in Chittagong on 1 January 2013) The Jamaat’s contribution to charity medical services is an integral aspect of the discourse of Islamic social welfare in Bangladesh. Shibir, the student

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 115 wing of the Jamaat, is well known for its stronghold among medical students all over the country. Apart from Jamaat’s charity medical services, vast numbers of physicians associated with the party run hundreds of clinics, hospitals, pathology centres and other service-oriented businesses related to the health sector. In every city of Bangladesh, private and commercial hospitals are publicly known to be administered by Jamaat members. Although these hospitals do not provide free service, they are usually known to charge less than those run by the government and offer better service and exhibit ethical behaviour. As a result, they have a good reputation, and the Jamaat also gains some degree of acceptance for being behind these endeavours. Education Education is considered to be one of the primary services provided by the Jamaat. According to the official manifesto, the party’s second permanent objective is to educate people. The first objective, preaching Islam and introducing it to the people in its authentic form, is also strongly related to education. The educational activities of the Jamaat consist of several regular programmes, such as lecture programmes in the mosques, maintaining small-scale public libraries in different suburbs through party units, literature programmes, study circles, discussion and lecture programmes on different occasions and so on. I joined a mass event called Qiyam al-Layl (Arabic: lit. night-stay) organised in a local mosque and had around 60 participants. It started at 11 pm with a two-hour workshop on a chapter of the Qur’an—participants were divided into three groups, and each group was moderated by a Jamaat Rukon (full member). After a short interval of sleep, everyone woke up at 4 am for Tahajjud (complementary prayer) followed by Fajr (morning prayer). On another occasion, I joined a local unit programme where 14 local activists sat together in their unit office and listened to the guest lecturer’s presentation on the topic of the importance in Islam of unity and obedience to the leadership. Another big event, called TC (Training Camp), was organised in Dhaka for selected local leaders from different districts. It was organised on the weekend in a school building and was kept secret due to the country’s political situation. I visited the event on its last day for one hour. The event schedule showed that the whole two days were packed with lectures on different religious and political topics. The Jamaat has slowly advanced in the formal education sector of the country and after around four decades of continuous endeavour, party members are now associated with various schools and colleges in every district and sub-district in Bangladesh. The most notable achievement, to date, by the Jamaat in the education sector in the whole of the country is the establishment of a private university, the International Islamic University Chittagong (IIUC). Established in 1995, this is currently the largest private university in Bangladesh, with around 15,000 students in 14 departments. One of the

116  Faroque Amin longest-serving staff members of the ISWCC, who has been working with the organisation for the last 22 years, said: ISWCC had a core role to play in establishing IIUC in 1995. During the first two years, and until it was able to employ sufficient people and build an autonomous structure, we maintained everything to do with the finance, construction, employment, curriculum, government inspections and approvals, etc. The president of the ISWCC at that time, the late Mr Shamsuddin, was the vice president of the IIUC Founding Syndicate. The president of that syndicate was the late Sheikh Abdul Jabbar. Other renowned and philanthropic people like him were on that committee and all of them played vital roles in the early years of the university. However, you cannot detach ISWCC or our party [the Jamaat] from this university, which is now internationally known. The current properties of the university would be worth more than one billion takas now. They have their own large campus with so many buildings and hostels, students and teachers from different countries, but the first office in 1995 was a building with nine rooms only, and the ISWCC paid the rent. The founding secretary of this university was the late Mr. Badiul Alam, who was then secretary of the ISWCC also. We have three representatives in the syndicate committee now; one of them is the current president of Chittagong City Jamaat. (Interviewed in the ISWCC office on 28 November 2012) Among the private universities in Bangladesh, IIUC is well known for its quality education with low tuition fees and lenient fee-charging schedule and the substantial financial aid available for students with good results who are experiencing a financial crisis. The high cost of tuition fees in private universities led to a social situation in Bangladesh where only students from affluent families could afford to study at them. Conversely, many IIUC students come from middle- and lower-income families. However, this university is not a welfare project, although it contributes passively to the community’s social welfare. Regarding the Jamaat’s involvement in establishing private universities in Bangladesh, a city Jamaat leader said: The IIUC is a great success; we hope that this university will contribute to the future that we cannot even conceive of right now. Three other private universities were established later and the people associated with the Jamaat had roles to play in their establishment: Manarat University and Bangladesh Islamic University in Dhaka, and Leading University in Sylhet. But they are more private enterprises and the party never gets directly involved in administering those universities, unlike the IIUC. (Interviewed in Chittagong City Jamaat office on 16 November 2012) Apart from these private universities, the Jamaat is involved, with varying degrees of influence, with several hundred schools in the country. In almost

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 117 every city and rural area, it is publicly known that these schools are being run by people associated with the Jamaat. In Chittagong, ISWCC is currently running five such secondary schools. However, like the IIUC, these are also private schools where the students have to pay tuition and other fees. To provide welfare or charity-based education, the Jamaat runs a religious education complex in the suburb of Nasirabad and a religious school in Agrabad. The religious education complex is called the Abu Huraira Complex, named after a scholar companion of the Prophet of Islam. This complex includes a secondary-level religious school with 850 students, a Hifzkhana (a specialised boarding school for the memorisation of the Qur’an only) with 82 students, a technical institute where the students from low-income families get vocational training, and an orphanage for 200 boys, who are also students in the aforementioned religious school and technical institute. The other religious school, in Agrabad, is not a government-approved institute but a religious education centre, teaching around 250 young boys and girls in the morning and around 40 adult males at night (Secretary of the ISWCC, interviewed in the ISWCC office on 1 December 2012). Apart from these charity-based educational services, the ISWCC also runs several morning schools in different suburbs in Chittagong, of which I visited three. Each of these had more than 150 students, both boys and girls. An ISWCC leader said: We have several Maktab [religious morning schools] in various places in the city. We pay the local Imams [appointed leaders of the prayer in the mosque] to spend one to two hours in the early morning on this, and we provide the syllabus and curriculum. These schools are free and open for all children in the locality, seven days a week. We try to educate the children with the proper recitation of the Qur’an, basic Arabic, religious rulings that are appropriate for children, good moral character development through story-telling, basics of daily prayer and other Islamic rituals, and so on. We regularly communicate with the parents as well. We try to listen to their problems and help them through consultations. Most children come from very poor families whose parents are rickshaw pullers, daily labourers, housemaids and even beggars. There are some children from solvent families as well. They go to general schools. However, some poor children remain there after the Maktab-time, and we appoint another teacher to teach them basic writing, reading and math. These venues are called Child Education Centres. Among the approximate 30 Maktabs we organise in this city, there are 6 such Child Education Centres currently operating. (Interviewed in the ISWCC Office on 27 December 2012) This Jamaat leader is employed as a full-time staff member at the ISWCC, overseeing the education sector’s operations. He seems to be aware of the significance of propagating his ideology, in his own words—Islamic teachings,

118  Faroque Amin through these social welfare initiatives. According to him, the religious aspect of these welfare programmes requires greater attention. He stated: There is another program that we organise on a regular basis. Each year, we organise at least two training programs for all the teachers from all of our educational institutes. We listen to their problems, experiences and expectations and motivate them to instil Islamic values into the students. While talking to you about our charity medical and educational services, I feel a need for organising such a program for our doctors and other medical staff. Unfortunately, we don’t have anything like that for them. I know that they, along with the environment of our medical centres, encourage the patients to learn and practise Islam. But a regular training program might make it more effective. (Interviewed in the ISWCC Office on 27 December 2012) Many Jamaat activists believe that charitable educational services should receive priority over all other welfare activities. They view education services as the most impactful work, as it has a lasting impression on an individual’s life. During an interview, one of the local Jamaat leaders, who works full-time as a school teacher in a public school and volunteers at a Child Education Centre operated by the ISWCC, expressed the same view. In many cities, the Jamaat started their work through educational activities in the early days after independence. For instance, in my home city Bandarban16, this is true. Before being involved in any political activities, the then-president of the Jamaat in Bandarban City was a school teacher. Along with some like-minded friends, he started an orphanage and a religious primary school where many homeless children got refuge. Many children were living on the streets, both of their parents or one of them died at the hands of the rebel group ‘Shanti-Bahini’, and they had no one. These people collected funds from wealthy people in society and sometimes from some Middle-Eastern countries, and now they are operating three orphanages in the Bandarban area. This morning, I met a person who grew up in an orphanage and now works at the IIUC as a lecturer. He has a wife and two children. I  remember him being taken out literally from a roadside paddy field to an orphanage run by the Jamaat. (Interviewed in his school office in Chittagong on 28 January 2013) Financial and Material Support One of the major outlets of Jamaat’s welfare activities is providing one-off financial aid and material support to people in need. The city committee of the Jamaat has 18 local units, which are called Thana. According to the Jamaat

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 119 city secretary, each Thana spends 40% of its collected funds for welfare purposes in its own locality. This amount is usually around 20,000 Bangladeshi taka (BDT) per month, which equals around 300 US dollars (USD). For some Thanas, the amount would reach up to 50,000 BDT (around 700 USD) every month. Apart from occasional welfare distribution, most of this fund is spent through direct financial aid to the poor. Additionally, the city office of the Jamaat also spends a minimum of 200,000 BDT (around 3,000 USD) every month in providing people with direct financial aid (Shafiul Azim, a city Jamaat leader, interviewed in Chittagong City Jamaat office on 16 November 2012). This support also includes several types of material aid, including warm clothes and blanket distribution during the winter season, clothes distribution during the Eid al-Fitr (religious festival at the end of Ramadan), sacrificed meat and food distribution during the Eid al-Adha (annual religious festival when the animals are sacrificed) and the intermittent distribution of sewing machines among widows and other poor women (a city Jamaat leader, Interviewed in the city Jamaat office on 16 November 2012). During the fieldwork, I was able to attend all four of the programmes mentioned earlier, organised by both the Jamaat under its own name and the ISWCC as well. These programmes are organised through a system that has been developed through years of practice. Local Jamaat activists receive the budget estimation from their city office or the ISWCC office or the local offices and visit the slums prior to the programme, where they communicate with their contact people, make announcements, assess the situation of the potential recipients, make lists of those receiving aid at the upcoming event and give them coupons with a serial number. According to the annual reports of the Chittagong City Jamaat, the party distributed 4,535 blankets, 10,334 items of winter clothing and 17 sewing machines in 2011 (Annual Welfare Report of Chittagong City Jamaat 2012). The clothes and food distributed during the yearly religious festivals were not specified in the annual report. However, around 100 people received clothes on the 2013 Eid al-Fitr in Bakalia Thana, when I  was present. A city Jamaat official told me that a total number of 15 Thanas organised such programmes on the evening before that day. In addition, the ISWCC also organises similar programmes on these occasions. According to its annual report, it distributed 32 sewing machines and 2,650 articles of winter clothing in 2012 (annual report of the ISWCC, Chittagong 2013a). Financial aid is given under various conditions. Qard-e-Hasana (unconditional loan) is highly encouraged through party study materials and activities. A person in need of a large amount of money, usually for the marriage of one of his or her children or for setting up a small business or for the medical treatment of a severe long-term illness, would receive this loan without any interest or time limit imposed. Most importantly, it would be forgiven and forgotten if the person were unable ever to repay it. Also, any poor person in need can apply to the Jamaat city office or local offices for Sadaqah (lit. donation), which is a one-off non-refundable financial aid. After assessing the application,

120  Faroque Amin the Jamaat usually gives 2,000 to 5,000 taka, according to the situation. A city Jamaat leader elaborated this: Our financial aid is primarily of two types, sadaqah and qard-e-hasana. Many receivers will never be able to return that loan, they are really poor. In some cases, we simply waive it after a long time. Some return it after they get better in business or job. Sadaqah is consistently given to random poor people every month. However, qard-e-hasana is encouraged more within us. This is an important Islamic tradition as well . . . many of our people are not very poor, they are from the lower middle class or middle class. They don’t want to receive a donation, but sometimes some of them fall into dire financial need. In those cases, we manage personal loans from our own people if the payback is guaranteed. Sometimes we raise funds to provide a loan if it is long-term or uncertain, considering the financial condition of the receivers. In some rare and important cases, we provide that loan from the party fund as well. All these decisions are made after much discussion in the relevant committee meetings. (Interviewed in the Chittagong City Jamaat office on 16 November 2012) Table 6.2 shows the reports of financial aid provided by Chittagong City Jamaat, including all 34 Thanas under the city office, in 2010 and 2011. The ISWCC office also carries out this task regularly alongside the Jamaat city office and local units. In ISWCC, this financial aid is collected through zakat (Islamic alms) and spent on people who are eligible to receive zakat according to Islamic rulings. Table  6.3 shows the areas where the ISWCC contributed and the number of people who benefitted during the period from 1977 to 2003. The individual amount of aid is not mentioned in this report. However, it was understood during the fieldwork that, currently, each applicant would usually receive 4,000 to 5,000 BDT, an amount which is certainly greater than it would have been in the early years. During the fieldwork, I  attended clothes and food distribution programmes organised by different local units of Chittagong City Jamaat. The

Table 6.2 Financial Aid Given by the Jamaat City Office17 Name

2010 (in BDT)

2011 (in BDT)

Qard-e-Hasana (unconditional loan) One-off financial aid One-off financial aid, particularly for medical treatment purposes

9,757,156

9,279,515

2,996,064 96,517

7,287,000 711,277

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat

121

Table 6.3 Number of Recipients of One-off Financial Aid From the ISWCC18 Cause of need for financial assistance

Number of recipients

Total Number

1977–2002

2003

Medical treatment Marriage Students’ admission and exam fees Monthly scholarship for poor students House renovation Supporting converted Muslims Burial of unclaimed bodies Miscellaneous

4,987 1,763 939

110 120 36

5,097 1,883 975

315

16

331

997 706

31 11

1,026 717

110

11

121

1,023

65

1,086

last ten days of Ramadan (the ninth month of the Islamic calendar and the holy month of fasting), followed by Eid day, are considered the most valuable times for religious charity in Islam. I was present at the events where the Jamaat distributed food such as rice, semai (a particular sweet food item of local culture that is cooked for the Eid festival) and clothes among the poor people. I  also witnessed winter clothes and blanket distribution programmes. Local units of the Jamaat organise campaigns to collect used clothes and blankets and then distribute them among the homeless people in the streets at night-time. Relief Distribution Bangladesh is a country prone to natural disasters and full of underdeveloped infrastructures. Since independence in 1971, the country has endured five major cyclones, five great floods, ten tornados and several earthquakes and landslides. In all of those disasters, thousands died, and millions lost their homes and everything they had. Additionally, accidental fires in slums are commonplace every year. Due to the deficiency in natural disaster management and the lack of government resources, NGOs and international aid organisations play a significant role, even proportionately bigger than that of the government itself, in relief distribution after each of these natural disasters. Other political parties also attempt to reach out to the poor at these times. The Jamaat members are noted for their relief distribution during natural disasters, as they are generally known to be corruption-free due to their religious attachment, whereas most regular politicians are known to extract profit from the situation and get rich during these times.

122  Faroque Amin According to the annual reports of the ISWCC, the organisation distributed relief to 13,576 people between 1977 and 2002 and 649 people in 2003, all of whom were victims of various natural disasters (annual reports of the ISWCC 1977–2003, Chittagong 2013b). After the cyclone of 1991, the ISWCC organised a massive relief distribution, house renovation programme and medical treatment for the wounded, provided by several mobile medical teams. This effort was funded jointly by several national and international organisations, such as Rabita al-Alam Islami of Saudi Arabia, International Islamic Relief Organisation of Kuwait, ISRA of Sudan, Muslim Aid of UK, Islamic Relief London, Al Faisal Foundation of KSA and Islami Bank Bangladesh Foundation. The ISWCC also organised large-scale medical support for the Rohingya Muslim refugees in 1992, who migrated to Bangladesh due to ethnic cleansing and communal riots in neighbouring Myanmar (an ISWCC leader, interviewed in the ISWCC office on 27 December 2012). According to the annual report of the Jamaat, the party distributed 2,380 pieces of clothing and 300,000 taka among fire victims in different slums in 2011 (Annual Welfare Report of Chittagong City Jamaat 2012). Both the Jamaat and the ISWCC organise numerous relief distribution programmes around the year. After any natural disaster, it is common for the Jamaat people to provide relief support in the affected areas. All interviewees discussed their experience of participating in relief distribution programmes organised by the party; almost all of them mentioned the relief work carried out in Chittagong after the great cyclone of 1991. Older leaders recounted the experience of relief work after the 1969 cyclone as well. Besides, the party organises several relief distribution programmes all year round when a slum is destroyed by fire. It is a regular incident in Bangladesh. During the fieldwork, I attended such relief distribution programmes where I informally talked with the recipients to inquire about their situation. Some of their slum houses were burnt entirely, and the food and clothes provided by the Jamaat were indeed great support for them. Conclusion In sociological terms, social movements are initially informal and mostly without any organisational structures; rather, they are formed by interactions between different actors of collective actions with a distinct collective identity, acting to resolve or influence clearly identified political and/or cultural conflicts (Porta and Diani 2006). However, modern social scientists have extended social movement theories to examine and study various aspects of formal and organised religious, political and social organisations. In the case of social welfare provision by the Jamaat in Bangladesh, the actors are identified in two phases. The broader phase includes different social welfare organisations that work under the umbrella of the mother organisation of the Jamaat. In a narrower context, the participants in these social welfare activities, both the providers and recipients,

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 123 play roles in shaping the whole phenomenon. However, this welfare provision is administered through an organised structure, with informal interactions between the actors facilitating their motives and agendas. In providing these services, the party faces many challenges, most of which are associated with funding and the country’s political instability. However, it would appear that the party is not focusing on improving the management of its social welfare provision at this time; rather, it simply wants to keep these activities operational while focusing on other, primarily political, issues of the country. Recipients of these welfare services are presumed to belong to the lower-income classes of society. Although this may be the case for most services, such as charity schools or activities offering occasional financial assistance, for the medical welfare service, there are some exceptions in this regard. I found that some beneficiaries in those charity clinics were from the middle and lower-middle classes through participant observation. The welfare provided by the Jamaat is greatly appreciated by the people who benefit from it. Although it is not sufficient to meet all their needs, it helps them face their immediate problems and, generally, there are no complaints about the shortfalls. However, it is evident that the Jamaat has not fully utilised its potential to enhance its welfare services, primarily due to insufficient emphasis on this specific area. This is reflected in their outdated approaches to organising social welfare programmes. Despite the party’s existence for over four decades, party leaders and activists typically engage in welfare activities as part of their routine work without actively striving to enhance their reach and effectiveness. It is obvious that social welfare provision holds significant potential in Bangladesh, with two crucial factors warranting consideration. First, the country’s weak economy creates opportunities for private initiatives in the welfare sector. Second, despite the state being officially declared secular, the majority of Bangladeshis strongly identify with their religious beliefs, and religion has consistently played a pivotal role in the country’s political landscape. In light of this context, the success of a social welfare movement necessitates enhanced resource mobilisation and sophisticated engagement with the influential political elements within society. Unlike certain other Muslim nations, the Jamaat in Bangladesh may not have fully realised its potential in this domain, despite the presence of a vision for such endeavours in the post-independence era during the 1970s and 1980s. An investigation into the social welfare activities of the Jamaat proves that socio-political connectivity is also vital for organising social movements. The Jamaat provides a socio-political platform for people from various parts of society to communicate and negotiate their demands. In this negotiation process, both moral and cultural resources play essential roles. Interpretation of religion, socio-economic condition of the country, organisational structures and material resources, participation of the organisers in these welfare activities, and the varying influence of these programmes on their receivers; all these factors constitute the construct of this social movement.

124  Faroque Amin Notes 1 For a brief description of the life and thought of Maududi, and his contribution to Islamic revivalism through establishing the Jamaat, please refer to (Nasr 2005, 98–121). 2 ‘Revivalist Islam in today’s Bangladesh is represented by two distinct and opposing streams: the politically activist revivalism is represented by the Jamaat-i-Islam, and the quietist, non-political da’awa-oriented revivalism is represented by the Tablighi Jamaat’ (M. Ahmad 2008, 61). 3 This was due to the earlier theological reasoning by Maududi, the founder of the party, and his fellow religious scholars, who regarded participation in Western-style politics as prohibited by Islam. But in 1951, Maududi came to the conclusion that political participation would be an acceptable way to further establish Islam in the people’s personal lives (Iqamat-e-Deen) and to reassert the governance of God in their collective lives (Huqumat-e-Ilahiyyah)—his two primary agendas. For details, please refer to (Nasr 1996, 43). 4 Chittagong is the second-largest city and commercial capital of Bangladesh. Many historians view that Islam came to the Bengal region through the ports of Chittagong when Arab traders arrived there in the 9th century. This region is also considered a stronghold of the Jamaat in the country. 5 Though defining AKP as an Islamic revivalist movement is debatable, most intellectuals and political analysts regard it as a political party of moderate Muslims, considering the situation and the nature of Turkish secularism as well as the wide spectrum of the concept of transnational Islamic revivalist movements. For details, please see (Fuller 2007, 74–75). 6 The topic of my PhD research was ‘Social welfare program of Islamic political party: a case study of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’, which was approved by the School of Social Science and Psychology in the University of Western Sydney in 2016. 7 Islamic Social Welfare Council Chittagong, a non-government organisation administered by the Jamaat in Chittagong. 8 Welfare Party, Currently AKP or Justice and Development Party. 9 The organisational structure of the Jamaat categorizes its manpower into four levels: Associate Member, Active Associate Member, Worker and Member (Rukon). According to the party’s constitution, a person has to fulfil five conditions to achieve the status of a worker, which is the most common rank of the Jamaat activists. The first two ranks listed indicate the supporter and active supporter classes. The conditions are to join in the party activities regularly, to provide a monthly financial contribution, to maintain a report of personal daily activities, to preach Islam among people generally, to participate in social services (Jamaat-e-Islami 2011, 12). 10 ‘Qard-e-Hasana’ is an Islamic term denoting an unconditional loan. 11 This was the case during the fieldwork of this study in 2013. However, the Awami League government occupied and took over this private university through a hostile takeover, in a similar fashion to what it did with the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited. On 1 March 2021, an Awami League MP took control of this private university with the support of the Education Ministry and other government officials. 12 According to the ISWCC President, the organisation provided free medical services to the poor in its organisational office for two years, prior to the establishment of its first separate charity medical centre in 1979. 13 Based on Annual Reports of the ISWCC, 1977–2003. 14 The clinic was established in a slum with the support of a local philanthropist named Abdul Hamid. After his demise, his descendants wanted the land back. ISWCC did not have enough funds to continue the service in that area. According to the ISWCC President, it was therefore shut down and never reopened.

Social Welfare Programmes in the Politics of Jamaat 125 15 ‘Kafela’ is an Arabic word that has been adopted into Bengali. Its intentional use in the name implies an association with Islam. 16 Bandarban is a hill-tract city under the greater Chittagong division, situated around 46 km from Chittagong CBD. 17 Based on Annual Welfare Report of Chittagong city Jamaat, 2011 and 2012. 18 Based on Annual Reports of the ISWCC, 1977–2003.

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126  Faroque Amin Rabasa, Angel, and F. Stephen Larrabee. 2008. Rise of Political Islam in Turkey. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Robinson, Glenn E. 2004. “Hamas as a Social Movement.” In Islamic Activism: A  Social Movement Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, In Indiana Series in Middle East Studies, 112–42. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Seesemann, Rudiger. 2002. “Sufi Leaders and Social Welfare: Two Examples from Contemporary Sudan.” In Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa, edited by Holger Weiss, 97–115. Upsala: The Nordic Africa Institute. Welfare, Office of Social. 2011. Annual Welfare Report. Chittagong: Bangladeshi Jamaat-e-Islami Chittagong Division. ———. 2012. Annual Welfare Report. Chittagong: Bangladeshi Jamaat-e-Islami Chittagong Division. ———. 2013. Annual Welfare Report. Chittagong: Bangladeshi Jamaat-e-Islami Chittagong Division. White, Jenny B. 2012. “Islamist Social Networks and Social Welfare Services in Turkey.” In Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change, edited by Samer S. Shehata, 59–67. London and New York: Routledge. Zubaida, Sami. 1992. “Islam, the State and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt.” Middle East Report 179: 2–10.

7 Behind the Story Birth of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited and the Role of Jamaat Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman Introduction On November 25, 2021, the Managing Director of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) is seen taking an award from the Chairman of National Board of Revenue (NBR) for being the highest taxpayer in the sector in the 2020– 2021 tax year (TBSnews 2021). This is a familiar scene in the financial media. IBBL won “The Strongest Islamic Retail Bank in South Asia 2022” and “The Strongest Islamic Retail Bank in Bangladesh 2022” awards conferred by the UK-based financial services intelligence house Cambridge IFA (The Daily Star 2022). IBBL, incorporated on March 13, 1983, as a public limited company under the Companies Act 1913, operates through 16 zonal offices and 384 branches, including 70 authorized dealer branches, 219 sub-branches, 2,676 agent banking outlets, and three offshore banking units according to S&P capital IQ company profile. This Giant Financial Institution was not built out of thin air, but a solid ideological and organizational support was behind the success that separated IBBL from the rest of the pack (Islam 2016). In this chapter, we explore how dedication and support from a group of people who had a clear vision could build a financial giant that defied the traditional profit maximization capitalist vision. According to Nasr (1996), Maulana Maududi was not the only Islamic scholar calling for an Islamic renaissance in post-British India, nor was the Jamaat the only Islamic revivalist movement. In the Bangladeshi context, the Jamaat has been the largest and most organized political movement inspired by Islam (Islam 2021, 313–34). The Jamaat faced considerable difficulty in the new country, Bangladesh. Even before the war of independence in 1971 was over, the provisional Government of Bangladesh banned religion-based political parties. The prohibition was retained in the constitution that came into effect in December  1972. At the local level, party members abstained from direct political activities, concentrating on social work instead. Bangladesh politics was jolted in 1975. Responding to economic dislocation and political instability caused by the war and natural disasters, Mujibur Rahman1 imposed a draconian one-party rule and then was killed in a military coup in August of the same year. This was followed by several countercoups and DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-7

128  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman mutinies, until Major General Ziaur Rahman2 emerged as the country’s de facto ruler. Zia gradually reintroduced electoral politics and lifted bans on all parties, including Jamaat. From then on, the Jamaat has sought to regain legitimacy. After several rounds of internal debates, the party entered electoral politics in the 1980s. It had made tactical alliances with each major political actor in the country in the decades since. During the same time, members of Jamaat concentrated on building institutions that reflected their core beliefs. They built hospitals, schools, relief organizations and businesses. In this chapter, we examine how IBBL became their most impactful establishment. For our study, we interviewed individuals who played critical roles in establishing IBBL. The chapter reflects and reviews data obtained through communicating with people actively involved in establishing IBBL through interviews, and participant observation that includes informal conversations. The primary goal was to explore the roles played by the actors at different levels in this collective action and their relationships with each other and to understand the role of Jamaat in the success of IBBL. The study attempts to understand participants’ responses, including their aspirations, experiences, frustrations, achievements, and expectations to achieve this goal. From these interviews, we learned how the entire project came into being. We interviewed officials of IBBL who played critical roles in the success of IBBL and learnt about the critical factors that contributed to all the achievements. We interviewed individuals who served as members of the board of directors of IBBL and learnt about the process of the formation of the board and executive committee. We also interviewed the leadership of Jamaat to find out the nature of organizational direct and indirect support for IBBL. We structure the chapter with introduction, followed by a theoretical foundation. Then, we present the result of the interview in a form of a story of the birth of IBBL. Thereafter, we present the historic performance and achievement of IBBL, followed by the current state of the Bank and conclusion. Theoretical Foundation Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Maududi (1903–1979) is a familiar name among Muslims in South Asia and beyond. He has authored numerous books and articles and established a political party, Jamaat-e-Islami, which is still in existence in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and other South Asian countries. Many consider him a revolutionary thinker, political activist, and revivalist (Mujaddid) of the religion. Roy Jackson in his book Fifty Key Figures in Islam (2006) has put him among the 50 most important figures in the entire Islamic history. Maulana Maududi, as he was known among his followers, wrote and lectured extensively on almost all areas of Islam, including economic principles of Islam and Islamic economic system. He can be considered a pioneer in reviving the scholarship in Islamic economic system in early 20th century when the modern and complex economic societies were in the making. He began his writing career when Muslims around the world were mostly under

Behind the Story 129 colonial rule. The Indian subcontinent, the birthplace of Maulana Maududi, was still under British rule and couldn’t even imagine a basic Islamic society, let alone an Islamic economic system (Nabi 2017; Aziz and Mahmud 2009; Zaman 2011). Most important books on the subject of Islamic economic ideology authored by Maulana Maududi include First Principles of Islamic Economics (Ma’ashiyat-i-Islam), Interest (Sood), Islam and Modern Economic Ideologies (Islam aur Jadid Ma’ashi Nazariyat), The Question of Land Ownership (Masala-i-Milkiyat-i-Zamin) and Islam and the Issue of the Birth Control (Islam aur Dabt-i-Wiladat). A distinguishing feature of Maududi’s thoughts on Islamic economic system is that he would write in terms of human wellbeing and social welfare, not in terms of technicality and complexity of the system. In other words, Maududi would see an economic system to enhancing social equity and eliminating economic injustice. This is reflected in his writings on Islamic economics through the enshrined ideals like absolute sovereignty of Allah SWT, freedom of ownership, moral excellence and honest dealings among fellow human beings (Nabi 2017). As mentioned before, Maulana Maududi’s work in economics was mainly concerned about human welfare. He did not attempt to develop an economic model or expound an economic system. He understood that Islam is a complete way of life that governs all aspects of human life, including private, social, and state affairs. He was primarily preoccupied with the idea of revival of Islamic thoughts in all the aforementioned domains. He realized that such a revival would not be possible without having an economic system that would ensure human equality and promote shared responsibility across Muslim communities. Maulana Maududi already studied and experienced the rise of capitalism in the West and communism in some parts of the World. He clearly understood that neither capitalism nor communism would be able to deliver economic justice and equity to the humanity. Instead, he preached that only an Islamic society and its associated principles would be able to ensure just and equitable outcome in the economic and financial affairs. There exists an inseparable link between an economic ideology and a financial system. For example, an economic ideology based on pure capitalism would find an interest-based financial system as favorable and conducive to flourish. It is in the same spirit an Islamic economic ideology could not be put into practice without an accompanying interest-free financial system. Maulana Maududi, therefore, spent considerable amount of energy discussing the impact of interest on a society and consequences of an interest-based financial system (Aziz and Mahmud 2009; Zaman 2011). When decolonization began in the middle of the 20th century, Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, like those in the rest of the world, started to think about reorganizing their personal, social, and political affairs in accordance with Islamic principles. This process continued at a differing speed and resulted in varying degrees of success. In an effort to organize their financial affairs in line with the teachings of Islam, Muslims around the globe stepped forward

130  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman to establish Islamic financial institutions. It is in this spirit, after the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country, an effort was organized to establish a formal organization to explore possibilities of implementing elements of an Islamic economic system. And, again, the inspiration for this came from the scholarly discussion laid out in many lectures, forums, and books by Maulana Maududi. Specifically, Islamic Economics Research Bureau was established in Dhaka in 1976 by a handful yet visionary scholars of Islamic economics and finance. The organization tried to implement the ideas and concepts in the context of Bangladesh. Their relentless efforts through numerous round-table discussions, seminars, symposiums, and journal articles paved the way for the first Islamic financial institution in Bangladesh, which was named Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd (Aziz and Mahmud 2009; Nabi 2017; Zaman 2011). Creation of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited According to Roy (1991, 427–56), the first attempt to establish an Islamic financial institution took place in Pakistan in the late 1950s with the establishment of a local Islamic bank in a rural area. Borrowers of the bank did not pay interest on the credit advanced, but a small charge was levied to cover the bank’s operational expenses. Although the experience was encouraging, it failed. Roy mentions that the second experiment with Islamic banking was conducted in Egypt between 1963 and 1967 through the establishment of the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank in a rural area of the Nile Delta. The bank’s operations were based on the same Islamic principles of no-interest to depositors or from borrowers. The project suffered a setback due to political unrests in the country but was revived in 1971 under the name of Nasser Social Bank, which became the first Islamic bank in the urban setting based in Cairo. According to Chachi (2005), following the example of Egypt, Islamic banking emerged in Malaysia in 1963 and in Dubai in 1975. A  significant development in Islamic banking was the granting of a license to Islamic Bank in Saudi Arabia. This bank was established by the 50-year-old Al-Rajhi Company, a firm with assets valuing more than $5 billion and noted for its currency, exchange, and commercial activities. The bank started operations in 1985 under the name of Al-Rajhi Banking Investment Corporation and, later, developed active relationships with major manufacturing and trading companies in Europe and several US corporations. The success of Al-Rajhi in operating profitably in different regions of the world motivated the Saudi government to go for full-fledged Islamic banking. In 1975, Muslim countries founded Islamic Development Bank as a multinational corporation to support social and economic development in Muslim nations within an Islamic Framework. Bangladesh is a member of the Islamic Development Bank. According to Alam (2000, 10–29), Islamic banking started in Bangladesh through the establishment of the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), which is the first interest-free bank in Southeast Asia. It was incorporated on March 13, 1983, as a public limited company under the companies act 1913.

Behind the Story 131 In December 2010, IBBL had 237 branches, its authorized capital was BDT 1,000 million and paid-up capital BDT 640 million. Al Baraka Bank Ltd, often called the second Islamic bank of Bangladesh, commenced banking business on May 20, 1997. Currently, Bangladesh has 11 Banks based on Islamic principles. Those are about 25% of the total banking sector. They have excess liquidity of about BDT 9733 crore (BDT 97.33  billion), which is 9.2% of the total banking sector. They have about 1,380 branches and about 35,900 people work there (Oikosmist n.d.). List of all Islamic banks of Bangladesh is as follows (Table 7.1). Out of all the banks based in Bangladesh and around the world, IBBL stands out as the most successful one and warrants a closer look. That is where the story began. For our study, we asked many respondents this question: “Absence of which one individual would make it impossible for IBBL to happen.” The answer was not unanimous. But the answer would have been unanimous had there been information asymmetry. The information was kept within a close circle for the greater good. We try to bring that information to light. According to the individuals who played a critical role in establishing IBBL, Ambassador Fouad Al-Khateeb’s name stands out. He contributed to the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Bangladesh in 1983 and also helped attract other Saudi and Arab investors from the Persian Gulf area to contribute to its establishment. According to respondents with knowledge, without Al-Khateeb, IBBL wouldn’t see the light of day. Arab News (Wahab 2006), in June 2006, commented on the role of Ambassador Al-Khateeb:

Table 7.1 Number of Branches, Number of Employees and Asset Owned by Banks Operating Under Islamic Principles3 Bank Name

Number of Branches Number of Employees Asset Owned (in BDT)

Islami Bank Bangla- 1,569 desh Ltd EXIM Bank Ltd 132 Al Arafah Islami 189 Bank Ltd First Security Islami 195 Bank Ltd Social Islami Bank 168 Ltd Shahjalal Islami Bank 132 Union Bank 97 ICB Islamic Bank 33 Ltd Standard Bank 138 NRB Global Bank 111 Jamuna Bank 2

14,000

1,636,669,574,064

3,242 3,070

541,665,000,000 462,687,049,884

4,196

7,800,000,000

4,000

408,200,000,000

557 1,658 497

291,352,454,341 242,418,200,000 11,580,000,000

2,002 774 612

5,903,900,000 106,405,310,000 48,731,000,000

132  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman The brain behind the bank was the late Fouad Abdul Hameed Al-Khateeb, Saudi Arabia’s first ambassador to Bangladesh (1977–1982). He mobilized a group of entrepreneurial Saudis and other industrialists from the Gulf to launch the financial institution. It was certainly not a commercial venture. All those businessmen who came forward at the urging of Fouad Al-Khateeb did so out of their love and responsibility toward their religion and their brethren in Bangladesh. Material benefit was not on anybody’s mind. According to respondents, Al-Khateeb was the first Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the then-newly independent People’s Republic of Bangladesh in 1977. Through his tenure in Bangladesh, Al-Khateeb left a lasting impression on the young nation’s economic, religious, and humanitarian affairs. In 1981, he founded the Ibn Sina Trust and the Ibn Sina Medical Group in Bangladesh, which has grown to become one of the largest medical groups in Bangladesh today, operating multiple hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, medical equipment manufacturers, medical colleges, and universities within Bangladesh. If we investigate the background of Ambassador Al-Khateeb, the picture becomes clearer. He was married to Mahasin Alzaraa Al-Khateeb, who was originally from Egypt and had close association with Amineh Qutub, sister of Syed Qutub.4 After the marriage, Mahasin Alzaraa Al-Khateeb continued to support Islamic movements worldwide. When Ambassador Al-Khateeb was chosen to be the first Saudi Ambassador in Bangladesh, the couple wanted to help the Islamic movement in Bangladesh and participate in the socio-economic development of a Muslim country that was struggling at that time. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where they were residing, they connected with a young pediatrician named Dr. Abdus Salam5. They came to know through communication that Dr. Abdus Salam was involved with the Islamic movement in Bangladesh. So, they approached Dr. Abdus Salam to provide them with a trusted contact person from Jamaat-e-Islami with whom Mahasin Alzaraa Al-Khateeb could initiate communication. Dr. Abdus Salam provided the contact information of Mrs. Shamsun Nahar Nizami.6 When Ambassador Al-Khateeb arrived in Dhaka, Mrs. Al-Khateeb initiated contact with Mrs. Nizami and slowly they shared the common goal to uplift the socio-economic development of Bangladesh. Their first project was to establish an affordable English-medium Islamic school where middle-class children can get quality education as well as Islamic enlightenment. Mrs. Nizami became the founding principal of the school, which eventually became a university and remained a premier educational institution in Bangladesh. During the same time, Ambassador Al-Khateeb was introduced to the leadership of Jamaat, and their vision about socio-economic development matched the vision of Ambassador Al-Khateeb. Soon Ibn-Sina Trust was established which remains a major healthcare provider and pharmaceutical company in Bangladesh.

Behind the Story 133 During the same time, a research organization was established in 1976; a small group of dedicated Islamic thinkers founded what is now known as the “Islamic Economics Research Bureau” (IERB). Professor Sharif Hussain, who was a central executive committee member of Jamaat, was the head of IERB. Their vision was to start an “Interest-free Bank” in Bangladesh, and they started getting all the help from Ambassador Al-Khateeb (IERB 2022). On July 3, 1979, Islamic Economics Research Bureau organized a threeday seminar in Dhaka University TSC auditorium on “Islamic Economics.” The finance minister of that time Dr. M.N. Huda inaugurated the seminar and said the conventional Interest-based system is not right and advocated for Islamic banking (Daily Shangbad 1979). On December 15 and 17, 1980, IERB organized the second seminar held at Teacher’s Training College. The Governor of Bangladesh Bank Nurul Islam urged private entrepreneurs to start Islami Bank urgently. Ambassador Al-Khateeb made sure the representative from Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the representative from Saudi Monetary Agency were present at the seminar. As a result, the need for a private Islamic Bank was discussed in OIC summit as well as OIC meeting with the governors of all central banks in Khartoum in 1981. Finally, on April 4, 1981, the Banking Division of the Ministry of Finance wrote a memo to the Bangladesh Bank urging them to start opening Islamic banking counter for all national banks. This memo opened the door for establishing a private Islami Bank in the country. Former Managing Director of IBBL Mohammad Abdul Mannan gave his recollection about the formation of IBBL: The Bangladesh Islamic Center (BIC) was established in Dhaka in 1976 under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Abdur Rahim7. I  was a young journalist then, Daily Azad’s staff reporter. I was the youngest and ninth member of the forty trustees of BIC. Inspired by the Center, several civil, cultural and economic organizations were formed. One of them was the Islamic Economic Research Bureau (IERB). In a room of the Centre’s Elephant Road office, Maulana Muhammad Abdur Rahim presided over a regular discussion round on Islamic economics on Sunday mornings, a weekly holiday organized by the IERB. Interested people from Dhaka and surrounding areas used to participate. Sometimes the great scholars of economics also used to attend that meeting. From there a nucleus of Islamic economics and Islamic banking began to emerge. I was active in various literary and cultural activities of BIC. Although I am not a student of economics, I tried to benefit from attending IERB’s economics programs as my personal interest. From there, Islamic banking with Islamic economics started working in my head. Mohammad Abdul Mannan also adds: In 1980, ASM Fakhrul Ahsan, the research director of Bangladesh Bank, observed the work of various Islamic banks and recommended the

134  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman introduction of similar Islamic banking in Bangladesh. It was officially decided to introduce Islamic banking in state-owned banks. In addition to these initiatives, IERB, Biba, Sonali Bank Training Institute (later Staff College), Baitush Sharaf Islamic Research Institute, Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, BIBM, etc organized seminars, workshops, orientation and training courses and discussion programs. By From March to December 1982, BIBA8 organized orientation courses for 211 mid-level executives and officers of various banks at Bangladesh Bank Training Academy, Sonali Bank Staff College, Janata Bank Training Institute and Krishi Bank Training Institute. Apart from BIBA, a total of 311 bankers and economists received training in Islamic banking through training at IERB, BIBM, Sonali Bank Staff College. BIBA also works on the principles of Islamic banking. During the same time, another influential religious figure Sheikh Abdul Jabbar (also known as the peer of Baitush Sharaf) played a critical role in the formation of Islami Bank. He was a big supporter of Jamaat. Sheikh Maulana Abdul Jabbar Saheb gave a very emotional two-day lecture on Islamic banking in Bangladesh at the auditorium of the Chittagong Baitush Sharaf Islamic Research Institute on Sunday, April 26, 1981 (Daily Bangladesh Observer 1981). The chief guest was the then Deputy Governor of Bangladesh Bank M Khalid Khan, who came from Dhaka. The country’s top respected bankers, economists, university economics professors, Islamic thinkers, ulema, journalists and well-wishers were present. In the seminar, the main article was read by Professor Ataul Haque, a distinguished economist of the university. The then Principal of Sonali Bank Staff Training College Mr. Azizul Haque gave an important speech. Various government initiatives and various seminar discussions and training programs have created optimism among the common people only about the Islamic Sharia-based banking system. During this time, various surveys were conducted. In a survey, it was seen that at least 12 crore taka (120 million) of deposits in old debt-based banks have been calculated by the customers with the condition of accepting no interest against their account. Besides, many people avoid all types of banking to avoid interest (Mannan 2016). In the year 1981, various initiatives were taken by the private sector Islamic bank institutions, one of them overcame various obstacles and achieved some progress. This initiative was led by Abdur Razzak Naskar, Managing Director of Industries Limited, one of the pioneers of modern printing in the country. He was accompanied by the Managing Director of Bogura Mill and Dhaka Exchange. The owner of the petrol pump is Mofizur Rahman. Both were connected to Jamaat and the person who coordinated the initiative with Ambassador Al-Khateeb was Mohammad Younus, who was a successful businessman and member of Jamaat’s highest advisory body (Mannan 2016).

Behind the Story 135 On the ground floor of 71 Motijheel commercial area was Abdur Razzak Lashkar’s Eastern Regal Industries office. For about one and a half years, this office was used as a project headquarter of the proposed Islami Bank. During that time, the officers of Regal Industries cooperated with all the official paperwork of the Bank. Pir Saheb Maulana Abdul Jabbar, Haji Bashiruddin of Jamil Group of Industries, Mohammad Yunus of Redwan International, Alhaj Md Sharif Uddin Dewan of Dewan Textiles, Abul Kashem of Salt Crashing Industries of Cox’s Bazar, Mohammad Hossain of Jessore Cold Storage, Zaki Uddin Ahmed and Mohammad Mosharraf Hossain from Zaki-Mosharraf Group, Rashid Chowdhury from Bangladesh Packing Press Limited, Malek Minar from Minar Insecticide Enterprise, Engineer Mustafa Anwar Civil and General Construction Limited, Saudi Arabian Expatriate Engineer Daud Khan of Chittagong, King South University of Arabia Librarian AKM Fazlul Haque from Mymenshigh, Professor of Chandpur Mohammad Abdullah, Dubai expatriate from Sylhet Md Nuruzzaman, Sirajuddaula from Mohammadi Housing limited, Barrister Tamizul Haque from Haque Biscuit & Bread Factory, and Mohammad Nasiruddin of Park Industries Enterprise responded to the call of the Islami Bank initiative. All these individuals had high respect and trust for Jamaat (Mannan 2016). It was very difficult to get entrepreneurs to give BDT 5 lakhs (500,000) for the establishment of a new Islami Bank. There was no hope of profit. Islamic banking has yet to show systematic success anywhere in the world. Islamic banking has not been introduced in any of the public sector banks in Bangladesh. In this situation, when it was difficult to recruit entrepreneurs inside the country, the search for entrepreneurs outside the country began. Bangladesh was not so attractive for foreign entrepreneurs then. There was uncertainty about whether the Islami Bank would see the light of day. Even if it starts, no one was certain if it would be managed properly. Abdur Razzaq Laskar encouraged everyone to consider giving charity for salvation. In this way, a promise of 1 crore five lakh taka (BDT 10.5 million) was obtained out of the then required paid-up capital. Besides these, individual Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, Islamic Economic Research Bureau, Bangladesh Islamic Center and Ibn Sina Trust also agreed to pay 5 lakh taka (BDT 500,000) each, 15 lakhs (BDT 1.5 million) in total. Thus, the local entrepreneurs paid up stands at only 15% (Mannan 2016) At that time, 8 crore taka (BDT 80 million) paid-up capital was required to establish a bank. Among the Bangladeshi entrepreneurs, Baitush Sharaf Foundation was the only one that was able to provide 10 lakhs (one million) of entrepreneurial capital. Other entrepreneurs promised to provide capital of 5 lakh taka (500,000) each. In addition, the rule at that time was that the Bangladesh government will provide 40 lakh taka (four million) as 5% of the entrepreneurial capital, resulting in 25% of the total capital in Bangladesh coming from the government of Bangladesh. In order to collect the paid-up capital of 8 crore (80  million) taka required for the establishment of Islami Bank, it was necessary to pay special attention to the collection of

136  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman entrepreneurs in the country, as well as to attract foreign entrepreneurs. In the situation at that time, the collection of foreign entrepreneurs was very difficult. During the time, Mohammad Younus with the active support from Ambassador Al-Khateeb played a critical role in bringing in foreign investors. Leading foreign investors were Kuwait Finance House led by Sheikh Ahmed Razia Yasin, Dubai Islami Bank led by Sheikh Saeed Ahmed Luthar, and Islami Bank of Bahrain led by Sheikh Abdul Latif Abdur Rahim Janahi. The three ministries of Kuwait responded to this initiative (Mannan 2016). Consequently, Luxembourg Islamic Bank, Jordan Islamic Bank led by Dr. Samih Hamood, Qatar’s Islamic Investment and Exchange Corporation, AlRazi group from Saudi Arabia led by Sulaiman Abdul Aziz Al Raji responded in various stages. Bangladesh Saudi Arabia’s first ambassador Al-Khateeb and former commerce minister and prominent businessman of Jeddah Sheikh Ahmed Salah Zamzum participated as individual investors. None of this would be possible without active support from ambassador Al-Khateeb. That is why individuals, familiar with the process at the time, unanimously conclude that without the presence of Ambassador AlKhateb, Islami Bank would not have happened. An observation team of Islamic Development Bank came to Dhaka on November 1, 1982. The purpose of the visit was to verify the possibility of establishing an Islamic bank in the private sector of Bangladesh and IDB’s participation in it. The IDB delegation met Bangladesh Bank and the Ministry of Finance and left Dhaka in November with a positive attitude. As a result of association with this initiative, this bank became a proper international Islamic bank (Mannan 2016). In the first stage, the share of the paid-up capital of the bank was 70% for the foreign investors, and from the remaining 30%, 10% was allocated for the general public, that is, 80 lakh taka, among the entrepreneurs, the entrepreneur share of Baitush Sharaf Foundation was 10 lakh taka (BDT one million), and each share price was five lakh taka (half a million). The share of Government of Bangladesh is one-quarter of the local investors, which is 40 lakh taka (four million)9 (Mannan 2016). The proposed name of the first Islamic Bank of Bangladesh was International Islamic Bank of Dhaka Limited. In this name, the bank’s identity and pad were printed on June  14, 1982. After many ups and downs, on March  30, 1983, Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd., the first Islamic Shariah-based bank in South Asia, started its journey on the three floors of 75 Motijheel commercial area of the capital Dhaka. On August  11 of the same year, the bank was officially inaugurated under a huge canopy on the Motijheel main road in the presence of domestic and foreign guests and thousands of eager people from remote areas of the country. The opening ceremony of any bank in former East Pakistan or Bangladesh has never seen such a large crowd (Hasan 2016; Mannan 2016). Historical Performance and Achievements of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited IBBL was established on March  13, 1983, and got Certificate for Commencement of Business on March 27, 1983. Inauguration of the first branch

Behind the Story 137 took place on March 30, 1983. Formal inauguration was held on August 12, 1983. IBBL’s initial public offering took place in 1985, got listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. on July  2, 1985, and got listed in Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd. on March  7, 1996. IBBL issued 1st Rights Share in 1989, Rights Share issue in 1996, 3rd Rights Share in 2000, and 4th Rights Share in 2003. IBBL opened its 100th Branch on June 12, 1997, 200th Branch on June 21, 2009, and 250th Branch on December 15, 2010. IBBL inaugurated its Broker House on January 1, 2008, and started its subsidiary Islami Bank Securities Limited (IBSL) on March 22, 2010, and Islami Bank Capital Management Limited (IBCML) on April 1, 2010. IBBL ranked in the 1st position in Inward Remittance in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. IBBL achieved 100% Branch Online Banking on January 7, 2011, and launched i-Banking on June 21, 2007 (IBBL 2022). S&P Capital IQ has data about the market-adjusted share price of IBBL from April 22, 1997. The data range in Figure 7.1 is from April 22, 1997, to December  28, 2022. During this period, the daily return of IBBL outperformed all emerging market return data. During the time, IBBL stock return was an amazing 628%. During the same period, the OMSCI11 emerging market index, which captures large and mid-cap representation across 24 Emerging Markets (EM) countries with 1,386 constituents and covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each country, had a return of 97.25%. This performance is out of the world. It cannot be explained using common sense or any capitalist philosophy. We interviewed many employees of IBBL, including former Managing Director, Executive Vice Presidents, mid-level officers, support staff, guards, and drivers. There is a common theme we observed, although IBBL pays competitive salary and benefits, it was not outlandish. IBBL did not have superstar employees who were lured in the bank from other financial institutions. Rather, the opposite was true. Many IBBL officers joined other financial institutions because of better benefits. So, the question remains how IBBL managed to outperform every financial institution in the country even in the emerging market with at best average talent. We found the answer lies in the composition of the employees. Most of the employees (until 2017) had an ideological conviction where they did not just earn to make a living; they consider the work as a service to God (Akter 2018; IBBL 2022). The recruitment of IBBL is done through a rigorous written test and followed by oral interview. The written test covers questions related to religious belief and conviction that matches the curriculum and training of Jamaat. That is why most of the employees who were hired had a strong background of Jamaat and when they work for the bank, they don’t see it as just another job, their dedication and sacrifice for the Bank goes beyond anything. Most past and present IBBL employees attribute the success of IBBL as a blessing from the Almighty, but the dedication and sincerity of the workforce also contributed to the success of IBBL. Moreover, through speaking with the leadership of Jamaat including the current president (Ameer) Dr. Shafiqur Rahm, who also served as a Board of Directors for IBBL, we were informed that during

138  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman

Figure 7.1  IBBL daily stock return compared with emerging market indices10

Behind the Story 139 the early stage of IBBL (1982–1988), members of Jamaat actively solicited for IBBL. In the regular monthly chapter reports, members would report how many IBBL accounts they helped to open. This volunteer effort was a game changer for the success of the bank. Until 2012, Jamaat had absolute control of the Board of Directors and the Chairman of the Bank was always elected through communication with Jamaat. But when the current Government in Bangladesh came to power in 2008, they made it clear to eliminate Jamaat from the political process by executing its top leadership. At the same time, the Government tried to destroy and take over all institutions built by Jamaat. Initially, the government tried to destroy IBBL, but the impact of IBBL in the economy was huge, so it tried to take over the Board. The process started in 2012, but in 2017 with the help of state security forces, the government managed to finally completely take over the Board and sacked a lot of officers for their ties with Jamaat. Current State of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited The Islamic banking sector of Bangladesh, due to popular support and market demand, continued to grow at a rapid pace, which is reflected by the increasing branch network of Islamic Banking Institutions. Islamic Banking Industry in Bangladesh has significantly contributed to spurring economic growth and generating employment in the country to fulfill the vision of the government to bring the country at middle-income level. Therefore, this banking industry with more than 20% market share and 28,543 employees have been playing a very pivotal role in mobilizing deposits and financing in the real estate industries, services, and other key sectors of the economy, and collecting about a one-third portion of total foreign remittances in Bangladesh. At present, 43% of existing commercial banks are directly involved with running their shariahbased banking. IBBL shows an overall success in both deposits and investment positions since it started its banking activities. The total deposits increased over the past ten years, even though the average deposit growth rate from 1988 to 1994 is only 23% (Alam 2000, 10–29). From 1983 to 2013, Islami Bank has contributed BDT 531.49 million for 1,495,923 vulnerable persons. As the market leader of the banking business, IBBL led the way. IBBL’s contribution in the educational sector is significant since its inception. In 2013, the bank contributed BDT 628.37 million to that sector. In 2013, IBBL’s contribution was BDT 135.26  million, which was 1.50 times higher than in 2012. Every year IBBL has been providing scholarship to 800 very poor students (400 in HSC and 400 in Graduation level) securing GPA 5 in SSC and HSC examinations under its direct Scholarship program. The scholarship is provided to the students at BDT 1,000 and BDT 1,500 per month for two years and three to five years for HSC and graduation levels, respectively. In addition, scholarship is provided to 400 meritorious but poor students in different educational institutions. In this regard, IBBL spent an amount of BDT 28.33 million in favor of 1,800 students in 2013.

140  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman A 10-year plan was taken up where 10,800 students will enjoy the scholarship of BDT 356.22 million. In its 30 years of operations, IBBL has contributed BDT 1,074.76  million as student scholarship. In 2013, the bank contributed BDT 71.50  million, which is 1.5 times higher than 2012. Moreover, IBBL took long-term steps to develop Medicare systems for the country. IBBL established seven fully owned hospitals and seven community hospitals of total 1,032 beds, creating employment of 353 doctors, 582 nurses, and 2,932 other employees. Several Charitable Dispensaries, Arsenic Mitigation Program, Circumcision Camp, Mobile Eye Camp, and Midwifery Training Program are also operated by IBBL for developing the national health sector. IBBL had contributed BDT 100 million to beautify Dhaka City during the Cricket World Cup in 2011 (Bankinfobd 2011). In that year, IBBL contributed BDT 248.75  million, which was the largest amount among banks Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Sports sector occupying 69%, though there was a steep fall in the subsequent year. However, in 2013, Bank contributed BDT 78.97  million. IBBL sponsors various sports and cultural events every year. An amount of 558.79 million taka was spent by IBBL from 1983 to 2014 for these purposes. During the year 2010, BDT 10.00 million was donated to Bangladesh Olympic Association for organizing South Asian Olympiad in Dhaka. The Bank contributed BDT 2.00 million to Bangladesh Association of Banks (BAB) for taking initiatives to encourage the members of Bangladesh National Cricket Team for winning against New Zealand. Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited is a living revolution in the banking world of Bangladesh and South Asia. This bank is the result of the sacrifice of some God-fearing depositors, faithful, hardworking, brave, and visionary people. Most of the entrepreneurs are no longer alive in the world. Many of the world’s most prominent personalities and organizations are among its entrepreneurial members, including Kuwait Finance House and Saudi Arabia’s famous Islamic Bank Al-Raji. The bank had to overcome many challenges to make the Muslims of Bangladesh trust the Quran-Sunnah-based banking system against interest. The servants of Almighty Allah who built this banking system had no intention of taking any financial benefits through this bank. They have been constantly running around the country and the world to showcase how interest-free banking can be successful. IBBL is the only one among the large number of banks in Bangladesh that has repeatedly won the Global Finance Award as one of the best and cleanest banks in the world. Today, the entire country is worried about the security of shares and deposits of millions of investors. IBBL is the only bank that was at the top of the trust of all public and private banks. The position of this bank was at the top of all banks in deposits, investments, reserves, and remittance collection (foreign currency), imports, and exports. One-third of the total remittances in Bangladesh used to come through IBBL. The bank had many excellent initiatives to improve the service and quality of life of the public and marginalized groups by coming out of the traditional banking concept. This includes empowering the marginalized poor by providing loans on easy terms. The bank used

Behind the Story 141 to do this work through the Rural Development Scheme (RDS). Within a short period of time, this initiative became very attractive and popular among the marginalized people all over the country. Besides, private medical colleges and hospitals, quality hospitals/community hospitals for middle-class and lowincome people started spreading across the country in the fastest time. The bank has several technical and vocational institutes to convert the unskilled and educated unemployed manpower into skilled manpower. Also, through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), the bank has made a major contribution in helping the country and the nation to cope with calamities and hardships. On January 5, 2017, there was a big change in the ownership and management of IBBL (The Economist 2017). At that time, Mustafa Anwar was the chairman of the bank and Abdul Mannan was the Managing Director of IBBL. Mustafa Anwar was one of the founders of the bank and was also an entrepreneurial shareholder. After the change in ownership, Ibn Sina Trust sold all the shares in the bank. Six years after the change of ownership, Mustafa Anwar has sold almost all the shares of the bank. He sold almost all his shares through the stock market. IBBL informed Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) that Mustafa Anwar’s shares were 2 lakhs 26 thousand 332 (226,322) in August. His shares fell by 332 in September 2017. That is, he sold 2 lakh 26 thousand (226,000) shares in his hands in one month, through which Mustafa Anwar was basically wrapping up his relationship with Islami Bank. Islami Bank also stated that in July 2017 Uniglobe Business Resources held shares of the bank, which were around 7.52 million; in August it decreased to 3.22 million. That is, the company has sold more than half of the shares. At present, the company has 2% shares of the bank. Abdul Mateen is a director on behalf of Uniglobe in IBBL. The concerned people said that major changes were made in Islami Bank in 2017 to get itself free from Jamaat. The Jamaat-free bank started running from June 2016. In the 33rd Annual General Meeting of the bank on June 2 of that year, it was decided to appoint new shareholder directors and independent directors. Besides creating a new company, a Chittagong-based company bought the bank’s shares from the stock market. Directors are appointed in the bank on behalf of these companies. At present, most of the directors of the bank are representatives of various institutions in Chittagong. After the change in ownership, former secretary Arastu Khan, who was the appointed director of Armada Spinning Mills, an S Alam Group company, was made the bank’s chairman. He resigned because he could not accept the various decisions of the bank. Later, Nazmul Hasan, a former teacher at the Institute of Nutrition and Food Science of Dhaka University, was appointed as the Director from the same institution. It is known that since its establishment in 1983, various persons and organizations related to Jamaat were running the bank without any problems until 2011. In November 2011, the capital market regulatory body Dhaka Stock Exchange Commission (DSEC) made new rules: to be a listed director, the director must hold at least 2% of the company’s shares. After

142  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman making this provision, the exclusive dominance of Jamaat-related individuals and institutions in the bank has somehow declined. A Chittagong-based group bought shares from the stock market in 2017 and took ownership of the bank by using the opportunity to hold 2% shares. After that, various incidents of loan irregularities started in the bank.12 According to Dr. Asif Nazrul13: Islami Bank was the most powerful bank in Bangladesh. After raising the voice that the people of Jamaat are under control, the Board of Directors of the bank was changed and people chosen by the government were inserted there. After a few days, the attempt to loot the bank’s money started in the name of loan sanction. This anarchy has now reached such a level that in the month of November [2021] alone, several thousands of crores of loans have been sanctioned in the name of institutions with fake addresses. These questionable activities took place at the initiative of the Awami League government after people chosen by the Awami League came to the leadership of Islami Bank. When Islami Bank was managed by Jamaat people, the customer’s money was safe and profitable here. After the arrival of Awami League people, customer deposits have become uncertain and unsafe. Does it not send the message that Awami League is inferior to Jamaat in terms of financial management? Shame on those involved in malpractices in Islami banks. Conclusion The study overwhelmingly suggests that IBBL is the brainchild of Jamaat. There is no way to hide the truth. A group of dedicated individuals ventured to introduce Islamic banking system in Bangladesh in the light of organizational decisions, under the direct advice of top Jamaat leaders. All over Bangladesh, Jamaat leaders and activists have been campaigning for Islamic banks. They campaigned from district to district, chapter to chapter, and this is how the bank has been delivered to people’s homes. Jamaat built IBBL with its blood and sweat. The people of Bangladesh are a witness—what a great banking system was created, what a unique system was developed. IBBL has brought honor to Bangladesh as one of the best banks in the world. Other banks of the world came and learnt from the experience of IBBL. Many banks around the world even hired the officials of IBBL. Now, the founders were kicked out from the bank one after another. When the anti-Jamaat cohort in the name of Gana Jagran Manch14 in 2013 started vandalizing the ATM booths of Islami Bank (Bankinfobd 2013), a group of daring youths kept vigil at night and guarded the bank. Unfortunately, those young people were banned from the bank. Yet, there is still a great sense of optimism among the public, particularly among the members of Jamaat. They believe IBBL will one day be free of forced occupation. A beautiful garden is being destroyed by force. A gardener can be appointed again, and the garden will bloom once again with flowers and fruits.

Behind the Story 143 Notes 1 First Prime Minister of Bangladesh and father of the current prime Minister of Bangladesh. 2 Founder of Bangladesh Nationalist party and President of Bangladesh from 1975 to 1981. 3 Data collected from Annual Report of 2021 for all the banks. 4 Syed Qutub is the intellectual and religious guide of many of the Islamic movements around the world and author of “Milestones.” 5 Dr. Abdus Salam, a former student leader of Dhaka Medical College, was working as a physician in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He returned to Bangladesh in 1990, was involved with Jamaat and died in 2021. 6 Mrs. Shamsun Nahar Nizami was a leader of Jamaat-e-Islami and wife of Motiur Rahman Nizami, who eventually became the head of jamaat, became Minister of Agriculture and Industries, and was eventually executed by the current government of Bangladesh. 7 Mawlana Abbur Rahim was the vice president of Jamaat and a prominent Islamic thinker and author. 8 BIBA stands for Bangladesh Islamic Bankers Association, which was established in 1979 as a working group for Islamic Banking and on March 1, 1982, was renamed BIBA. 9 Foreign holding of IBBL was 70%, public holding was 10%, Government of Bangladesh holding was 5% (one-quarter of local entrepreneur), and rest of the local entrepreneur had 15% holding. 10 Data Source: S&P capital IQ. 11 The OMSCI Emerging Markets Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index, which is designed to represent equity market performance of emerging markets. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index comprises of 21 emerging market country indices, which include Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The Index was launched in 1988. 12 Collected from several daily newspaper including Daily Star and Prothom Alo between December 20, 2022–December 25, 2022. 13 Dr. Asif Nazrul is a professor of Law at Dhaka University and a well-regarded intellectual in Bangladesh. 14 Gana Jagaran Manch was orchestrated by ultra-secularist wing of Bangladesh Government that pressured the government to execute the top leadership of Jamaat.

References Akter, Modina. 2018. “Investment Risk Management and Performance Analysis of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited.” Accessed May 9, 2023. http://dspace.daffodilvarsity.edu.bd:8080/handle/123456789/3246. Alam, M. Nurul. 2000. “Islamic Banking in Bangladesh: A Case Study of IBBL.” International Journal of Islamic Financial Services 1 (4): 10–29. Aziz, Farooq, and Muhammad Mahmud. 2009. “Islamic Economics System in the Eyes of Maulana Maududi: An Analysis.”  Indus Journal of Management  & Social Science (IJMSS) 3 (2): 45–50. Bankinfobd. 2011. “BCB Islami Bank Sign Record Deal.” Accessed December  19, 2022. http://bankinfobd.com/blog/bcb-islami-bank-sign-record-deal/.

144  Mohammad Nakibur Rahman and Abdullah M. Noman ———. 2013. “Islami Bank Seeks BB Help Against Attacks on Branches, ATM Booths.” Accessed December 22, 2022. http://bankinfobd.com/blog/islami-bank-seeks-bbhelp-against-attacks-on-branches-atm-booths. Chachi, Abdelkader. 2005. “Origin and Development of Commercial and Islamic Banking Operations.”  Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics  18 (2): 3–25. Daily Bangladesh Observer. 1981. Dhaka, Bangladesh, April 27, 1981. Daily Shangbad. 1979. Dhaka, Bangladesh, July 4, 1979. The Daily Star. 2022. “Islami Bank Wins Cambridge IFA Awards.” December  19. Accessed December  22, 2022. www.thedailystar.net/business/economy/news/ islami-bank-wins-cambridge-ifa-awards-3199526. The Economist. 2017. “The Government Initiates a Coup at Bangladesh’s Biggest Bank.” April 6. Accessed December 22, 2022. www.economist.com/asia/2017/04/ 06/the-government-initiates-a-coup-at-bangladeshs-biggest-bank. Hasan, Zulfiqar. 2016. “Conversion of Conventional Banks into Islamic Banks: The Case of Bangladesh.” International Journal of Ethics in Social Sciences 4 (1): 63–78. IBBL. 2022. “Milestones: Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited.” Accessed December 28, 2022. www.islamibankbd.com/abtIBBL/abtIBBLMilestone.php. IERB. 2022. “About the International Education Research Board.” Accessed December 12, 2022. www.ierb-bd.org/about/. Islam, K. A. 2016. “Rural Development Scheme: A Case Study on Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited.” International Journal of Finance and Banking Research 2 (4): 129. Islam, M. Nazrul. 2021. “Political Islam in South Asia: A  Critical Appraisal of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” International Area Studies Review 24 (4): 314–34. Jackson, Roy. 2006. Fifty Key Figures in Islam. London: Routledge. Mannan, Abdul. 2016. Islami Bank Protishtar Itikotha [The History of the Establishment of Islami Bank]. Dhaka: Protiti Publisher. Nabi, N. 2017. “The Economic Thought of Sayyid Abul A‘la Mawdudi.” Insight Islamicus 17 (17): 61–67. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1996. Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand. Oikosmist. n.d. “Islamic Banks in Bangladesh.” Accessed December 20, 2022. https:// oikosmist.com/islamic-banks-in-bangladesh/. Roy, Delwin A. 1991. “Islamic Banking.” Middle Eastern Studies 27 (3): 427–56. TBSnews. 2021. “Islami Bank Receives Highest Taxpayer Award.” Accessed December 22, 2022. www.tbsnews.net/economy/banking/islami-bank-receives-highesttaxpayer-award-334789. Wahab, Siraj. 2006. “Islamic Bank’s Success Story—in Bangladesh.” Arab News, June 27. Accessed December 1, 2022. www.arabnews.com/node/286858. Zaman, Arshad. 2011. “Sayyid Abu’l A‘la Maududi on Islamic Economics: A Review Article.” Islamic Studies 50 (3–4): 303–23.

8

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Introduction Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (henceforth Jamaat) is a successor of Jamaat-e-Islami, one of the oldest political organizations in the Indian subcontinent. The party was founded in British India on 26 August 1941 by prominent Islamic scholar and writer Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Maududi (Jamaat-e-Islami Hind 2022). As British rule in the Indian subcontinent ended in 1947 with the creation of the Hindu majority state of India and the Muslim majority state of Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami also split into Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan to cover the two new states. Following its liberation from Pakistan in 1971, Jamaat-e-Islami East Pakistan became Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and later Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islam (Khanyari 2014). Since its inception, Jamaat has been practising democracy in all tiers of its organizational system. It is perhaps the only organization in Bangladesh that trusts in and practices the democratic process to run its organization; it also wishes to run the country democratically. Over its decades-long political history, the party played a crucial role in all democratic movements. Jamaat not only promoted democracy internally within the organizational processes but also practised democracy through participating in most local and national elections, thereby contributing to the democratic practice in Bangladesh (Mostofa 2021; Islam 2021). Although Jamaat participated and launched a number of democratic movements alongside Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), it became a rival nemesis of BAL when it formed a four-party alliance with Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and came to power in 2001. The election defeat made BAL and its leader Sheikh Hasina angry with Jamaat. BAL blamed Jamaat for their failure because the Jamaat coalition with BNP was the primary reason for its defeat. Before the four-party alliance ended its term, BAL started a violent movement on the streets. After various twists and turns in the rollercoaster political games in Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina eventually ascended to power; she was declared the winner in the 9th parliamentary election held on 29 December 2008 under the army-backed caretaker government. Subsequently, she abolished the provision of the election under the caretaker government and remained in power DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-8

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through rigged and engineered elections. Although her reign brought some economic prosperity in Bangladesh, it was defined by crushing authoritarianism and blatant human rights abuses at the hands of the state, particularly by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), with numerous extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances (Petersen and Rahman 2023). Although the entire opposition camp was severely affected, Jamaat and its student wing Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir (henceforth Shibir) became the ultimate victims. This chapter provides a brief sketch of the crackdown meted out to Jamaat and Shibir by the current BAL-led post-democratic authoritarian regime. For our analysis, we rely on a number of databases such as South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) and its Bangladesh Timeline. Along with secondary sources, we recorded testimonies of eyewitnesses, interviewed informed subjects and conducted participant observations for our study. Philkhana Tragedy and the Aftermath Soon after BAL took over power, a series of torture, murder and rampage rocked the country. Philkhana tragedy, also known as the BDR Massacre, happened on 25–26 February  2009. BDR (Bangladesh Rifles) director general Shakil Ahmed and his 56 officers, together with 17 civilians, were brutally murdered. To divert people’s attention from this gruesome incident, BAL student wing Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) initiated massive attacks on Shibir activists in various universities and colleges across the nation, namely Rajshahi University, Chittagong University, Shajajal Science and Technology University, Islamic University in Kushtia, Dhaka University, Modon Muhon College in Sylhet, Carmichael College in Rangpur and Government Azizul Haq College in Bogura. A total of at least 141 cases of student violence were recorded, with three deaths and 1,463 injured (Suykens and Islam 2015; Bangladesh Timeline 2009). On 13 March 2009, BCL brutally killed Sharifuzzaman Nomani, an MBA student who was also Shibir’s secretary at Rajshahi University. Another Shibir leader, Hafez Romjan Ali, was killed in Jamalpur District by BCL. In 2010, BAL launched a ‘combined operation’ against Shibir across the country.1 More than ten thousand Jamaat and Shibir activists were arrested from February to June 2010. From 2009 to June 2010, at least nine Shibir activists, including Mohiuddin Masum and Harunur Rashid Kawsar at Chittagong University, were killed in different institutions by BCL. During this period, thousands of Jamaat and Shibir activists were arrested by the police and RAB; they were badly tortured by law enforcement agencies. In some cases, police arrested family members as they could not find the party members. Four universities, including Rajshahi, Chittagong and Comilla universities, had to be closed for 287 days. From July to August 2010, more than one thousand violent cases occurred in different institutions. At least ten students were killed in these incidents. In Jahangirnagar University alone, over 60 clashes erupted within nine months (Odhikar 2011; Almamun 2020).

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 147 BCL not only killed and tortured the opposition activists on the campuses but also set a new record in its intraparty conflict. Within one and a half years of the BAL-led government, nine students were killed, of which six got killed in intraparty clashes. At that time, being deeply embarrassed at the atrocities committed by BCL, Mr. Obaidul Qadar, Secretary General of BAL and a former president of BCL, said that he felt ashamed to introduce himself as the former central president of BCL.2 Jamaat Leaders Arrested and Stripped of Their Political Rights On 29 March  2010, Jamaat Ameer (Chief) and a former minister Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami, Secretary General and a former minister Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, and party Naeeb-e-Ameer (deputy president) and a prominent Islamic scholar and preacher Maulana Delwar Hussain Sayeedi were arrested by the Awami regime. This happened after they were slapped on ridiculous blasphemy charges filed by a grand alliance coalition member of the regime Bangladesh Tariqat Federation. This undue arrest drew a huge country-wide protest against the regime. According to Odhikar (2011), in the year 2010 alone, the BAL-led regime killed 220 people, and a total of 13,999 were injured in political violence. Furthermore, 127 people were killed extra-judicially, implying that on average one person was a victim of extrajudicial killing every three days. Out of those murders, 68 were attributed to RAB; 43 to the police; nine jointly by RAB and the police; three jointly by RAB and the Coast Guard; three by the joint operation of RAB, Police and Coast Guard; and 1 by BDR. Even though Bangladesh was a democratic country by a democratic government (2008–2014), Jamaat and Shibir were stripped of their democratic rights since the Awami regime came to power. The Bangladesh Constitution (Articles 27, 31, 32, 37, and 38) guarantees fundamental rights to all citizens3, yet Jamaat and Shibir were deprived of their democratic and civil rights. Business institutions and other establishments operated by Jamaat and Shibir members were forcefully occupied or severely vandalized by the ruling party activists. All meetings, rallies and programmes of Jamaat and Shibir were unofficially banned. Since 11 September 2011, central and local offices of Jamaat and Shibir have been closed countrywide. On 11 September  2011, Jamaat announced a countrywide protest against Awami oppression. Police, BAL, Jubo League (JL) and BCL attacked rallies in different parts of the country. Police used excessive force against peaceful demonstrations; using sticks, rifle butts and bullets, they dispersed thousands of Jamaat and Shibir activists. At least 150 were injured, and 87 activists were arrested throughout the country. Many Jamaat and Shibir supporters were either tortured or shot to death while they were held on remand or in police custody. In 2011, it was reported that a total of 84 people had been extra-judicially killed by law enforcement officials (Odhikar 2011).4 All access to secure permits for rallies or processions for Jamaat and Shibir and its affiliated organizations were blocked. The police even started arresting people from indoor gatherings and meetings.

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Suppression Continues After seizing the political rights of the opposition parties, specially Jamaat, the regime started a War Crime Tribunal (WTC) and filed cases against Jamaat and BNP leaders. The BAL-led regime used every atrocious means available to suppress opposition parties and silence social organization’s voices against the government’s unjust conduct. ‘The modus operandi includes false and concocted case filings, threats, physical assaults, arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, kidnappings and extra-judicial killings’, said a political analyst during our interview. The regime blatantly violated human rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). To establish their dominance on campus, BCL and police attacked a Shibir’s rally on 8 February 2012 and killed two Shibir leaders at Chittagong University: Masud Bin Habib, a fourth-year English major, and Mujahidul Islam Jahid, a second-year zoology student. Another 42 Shibir activists were injured, while many were arrested (Bangladesh Timeline 2012).5 On 13 April, local BAL leader Badsha’s two sons Faruq and Rubel, accompanied by their allies, attacked the House of Panti Degree College first-year student Abdulah Al Monju’s house in Kumarkhali Upazila, Kushtia district. The latter was seriously injured in the attack, and eventually died in hospital. BCL and JL set fire at the century-old Sylhet MC college hostel on 8 July 2012, burning down at least 48 rooms in its three blocks and injuring ten Shibir activists. Following these incidents, instead of arresting the perpetrators, police arrested 12 Shibir activists. Even though video footage of BCL’s direct involvement was viral right after the incidents, on 10 November police openly fired in a rally of Shibir and shot a Fazil student of Koroi Nurul Huda Madrasa dead. On 3 December, Jamaat called for a countrywide general strike to demand justice. Police attacked the peaceful rallies supporting the strike in Ranibandar, Dinazpur, and brutally killed Gulam Rahman Shah, an Alim student, and Muhammad Mujahidul Islam, a Dakhil candidate (Bangladesh Timeline 2012). BCL prohibited all activities of any other student organizations at universities and colleges across the nation. They launched brutal attacks on the students of rival political camps even in classrooms and exam halls. In most of these cases, victims were sadistically tortured and later handed over to the police who subsequently filed concocted criminal cases against them. According to an informant, ‘the arrest and extorsion of innocent students, especially from Shibir, became a custom within the police force. Many police all too often were running illegal businesses by misusing political power’. Apparently, Shibir and other opposition organization members and supporters were almost entirely banned from entering their own academic institutions. According to Odhikar (2013), from January to December 2012, 169 people were killed and 17,161 were injured in political violence. Three hundred eightytwo incidents of internal violence in the Awami League and 146 in the BNP were also recorded during that period. In addition, 37 people were killed and

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 149 4,330 were injured in BAL’s internal conflicts, while six were killed and 1,619 were injured in those of BNP’s. No internal conflict within Jamaat and Shibir was recorded. During that period, a total of 52 hartals (strikes) took place, among which 12 nationwide hartals were called by BNP. The rest were called by the 18-party alliance led by BNP, the 12 Islamic Parties, left-wing political parties and Jamaat. Many of those hartals were accompanied by violence and vandalization. As violence, intimidation and terror became the governing strategy of the ruling regime, there were practically no rights for oppositions and no scope for practising democratic rights peacefully. The government arbitrarily used section  144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and repressed most of the meetings, mobilizations and protests of the opposition political parties (US Department of State 2013). ‘In 2012, the section 144 was imposed a total of 105 times by the government to stop opposition activities. There are no rights for Jamaat and Shibir to have a peaceful rally or demonstration in the streets across the country. Police used all means—batons, teargas shells, rubber bullets, bullets and arrests of the activists—to diffuse the demonstration’, said a journalist. Even for Jamaat and Shibir, it became extremely risky to conduct indoor meetings. ‘Thousands of Jamaat and Shibir activists were arrested whilst attending indoor meetings. Police and RAB actively collaborated in oppressing them. No constitutional and human rights exist for the opposition parties in Bangladesh under the Awami regime. Human rights are privileges reserved for those who are with the regime ideologically and politically’, added the respondent. The regime: produced a dangerous culture of disappearances and extrajudicial killings, infringements on freedom of speech and the stifling of dissenting voices, and the interception of opposition programs and the torture of opposition leaders and activists. The regime has also made a mockery of the law and the country’s judicial system. Many commentators believe that the country’s law courts are now simply an extension of the regime’s political clout. In these circumstances, political repression continues unabated, and victims of persecution are left with inadequate legal recourse. (Islam 2011, 2) 2013: The Year of Extreme Oppression In the year 2013, the people of Bangladesh witnessed brutal and cruel aggressions on the opposition political parties. It is reportedly the most aggressive year in the history of post-independent Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina and her government took all necessary steps to cling to power again. She proceeded to brutally eliminate her opponents; the pre-election and election phases were marked by widespread arrests, forced disappearances, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings of opposition political activists across the country. More than 98,000 opposition leaders and activists were arrested, and over 300

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people were savagely killed in 2013 (Odhikar 2013; Suykens and Islam 2015). A respondent explained the brutality: As in the previous years, Sheikh Hasina managed to use police, RAB, BGB, DB other agencies in favor of her government and used them with excessive force, killing protesters and bystanders. Security forces used rubber bullets and live ammunition improperly or without justification, killing some protesters in chaotic scenes and executing others in cold blood. Many of the dead were shot in the head and chest, indicating that security forces fired directly into crowds. Others were beaten or hacked to death. As it was the last year of the BAL government before the 2014 parliament election, Sheikh Hasina became even more aggressive in eliminating her political opponents at any cost. She used law enforcement agencies to ensure that her rivals could not protest or raise their voices against government irregularity, rampant oppression, and corruption (Almamun 2020). ‘Extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearances; brutal attacks on oppositions rallies, houses, businesses, and offices; false cases against opposition activists; arrests without warrants; and police remands with sadistic torture were a staple of her regime’, said a respondent. Violation of human rights and constitutional rights became normal under her reign of terror. ‘Bangladesh became a repressive and lawless country, where might is right’, added the respondent. On 5 February  2013, ICT issued a verdict on Abdul Kader Mullah, the assistant secretary general of Jamaat, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Right after this controversial decision, Jamaat arranged a countrywide protest against this politically motivated judgement. Police fired in one of the protest rallies and killed Muhammad Imran Khan, a student of Chittagong Polytechnic Institute. Chittagong City Shibir arranged a rally in protest of Muhammad Imran’s cold-blooded killing. Unfortunately, the police and BCL together attacked the rally and killed another student, Abid Bin Islam (Chittagong City College). The perpetrators also gouged both eyes out of the victim. Police arrested 20 activists, leaving 53 severely injured. While protesting the ICT verdict, another Jamaat activist was killed, about 150 people were injured, and over 182 were arrested (Ahmed 2013). After the trial date to give judgement on Moulana Delwar Hussain Sayeedi was announced on 15 February, Jamaat arranged a protest rally in Cox’s Bazar. However, police attacked the rally and shot three Jamaat activists dead; more than 200 were injured (BBC News, February 15, 2013). On the following day, 16 February, Shibir called for a countrywide rally in protest of these incidents to demand justice for the victims. Shibir of Sylhet Metropolitan City branch, for example, arranged a protest rally as part of this protest. Without provocation, police attacked the peaceful rally from the back and fired bullets, injuring six activists. Among the injured, Ali Asgor Khan Rahath, a student of Modon Mohan College, died while under treatment on 25 February 2013

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 151 (Daily Nayadiganto, 25 February  2013). On 18 February, Jamaat called a dawn-to-dusk strike in Choddagram, Comilla. Police fired in the demonstration in support of the strike, killed Muhammad Ibrahim, and detained another 13 Jamaat and Shibir activists (Bdnews24.com, February 18, 2023). On 22 February, Friday, after Jumma prayer, Ulama Masaiakh Parisad arranged countrywide protest rallies against the oppression of Ulama (Islamic scholars) and religious groups in the country. In Rajshahi District, the police, BCL and BAL attacked and fired in a protest rally where Hafiz Rashedul Islam was shot dead, another 56 were badly injured, and 12 were detained by law enforcement agencies. On the same day (22 February), a platform of 12 Islamic parties called for nationwide rallies after Jumma prayers and asked the government to arrest anti-religious bloggers who were committing hate crimes against Islam. Without provocation, police, BAL, BCL and JL attacked the rallies in different places in the country. In Dhaka, protestors gathered at Baitul Mukarram Masjid after Jumma prayers. While the protestors were getting ready to take to the streets, law enforcement agencies intercepted and arrested them, besides charging at them with sticks, rubber bullets and gunshots. Many protesters and journalists were injured. Over 70 people were injured, and 27 were detained (Bangladesh Timeline 2013). In Sylhet, after the demonstration started, the police launched an attack from the back of the procession. Over 50 activists were injured and 35 were arrested. Police used some 426-shotgun shells, 40 rubber bullets, 28 teargas shells and 18 sound grenades on the procession. Other sources confirmed that police killed Mustofa Murshed Thamid, a student of MC college, injured over 100, and arrested another 56 activists. In the afternoon, BAL, BCL and JL set fire to different business institutions owned by or associated with Jamaat (such as the Al-Hamra Shopping City, Ibn Sina Hospital, Women’s Hospital, and Retina Coaching Centre). The estimated loss was over five million taka (Bdnews24. com, February  22, 2023). Police and BCL attacked rallies in Chittagong, injuring more than 50 and detaining 25 protestors, while in Rajshahi, 30 were injured and 26 were arrested. Six journalists were badly injured in Chittagong. In Khulna, Bogura and other parts of the country, more than 100 activists were injured and 40 were arrested (Bangladesh Timeline 2013). On 28 February  2013, ICT sentenced the famous Islamic preacher and Nayeb-e-Ameer (Vice President) of Jamaat Allama Delwar Hossain Sayeedi to death by hanging. According to the defence lawyer as well as domestic and international experts, the judgements were controversial, and none of the allegations could be proven without reasonable doubt. The defendant’s witness, who was scheduled to appear for him in court, was abducted from the court premises on 5 November 2012. He hasn’t been seen since then. The whole procedure of the trial was a farce. By the afternoon, thousands of people across the country took to the streets to protest against this miscarriage of justice. BAL, BCL, JL and other allies of the government, along with police, RAB and BGB (the  Border  Guard  Bangladesh)6 attacked the peaceful demonstration on 3 March 2013. A total of 170 people were killed, over 2,000 were injured

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and more than 5,000 Jamaat and Shibir activists were arrested. Although the police was responsible for killing the protestors in most of these cases, the victims were the ones to be blamed. Thousands of cases were filed against Jamaat, Shibir and other opposition party members. After their arrest, according to eye-witness testimonies, police began to beat and torture them barbarically, and consequently a number of them died in police custody (Almamun 2020; Bangladesh Timeline 2013).7 On 29 March, BAL, BCL and JL supporters along with the police, RAB and BGB attacked a village named Gupalnagor in Shampur Union, Shibgonj located in Chapinababgong district. They burnt down and destroyed the whole village. During their heinous attack, Waliullah, a student of Shorothpur Dakhil Madrasa, was shot dead while over 50 villagers including females, elderly and children were injured. On 31 March, DB police detained Shibir’s central president Muhammad Delwar Hussain from Dhaka and took him to the DB Headquarter in Minto Road. Before handing him over to the court, they viciously tortured him. His fingernails and toenails were pulled out.8 After this barbaric treatment, he could not walk from the police van to the courtroom. He was in police remand for 45 days in 17 cases, arrested in 43 cases, and a total of 120 cases were filed against him. The cases were all either fabricated or politically motivated. According to an observer, ‘they used torture techniques of the dark ages by confining him in an unknown place. Repeated police remands and sadistic tortures left the Shibir president disabled forever’. In protest of his arrest and inhuman treatment, Shibir called for a countrywide protest rally and strike. Police arrested more than 300 Shibir activists across the country and over 110 were injured as a result of attacks by the police, RAB and BAL, BCL and JL (Bangladesh Timeline 2013). On 24 April, it was the second day of a 36-hour nationwide hartal by the 18-party alliance. At around 11:00 am, while Shibir activists were on the road for picketing, police fired rubber bullets targeting the picketers and shot dead Muhammad Asgor Ali Limon. On 12 May, RAB killed Shibir leader Abdullah Omar Nasif Shadath, a second-year student of Adarsho College in what they claimed to be a crossfire (henceforth, in the name of crossfire or crossfire drama). In fact, on 4 May 2013, Shadath went to Dhaka to join the 18-party alliance programme. When the programme was over, Shadath went missing. He was kidnapped by RAB, who eventually killed him near his house in Rajshahi eight days after his disappearance. On 24 June, BCL kidnapped Shibir activist Muhammad Abdul Aziz, a second-year student of Feni Degree College, and killed him with a sharp knife in a gruesome way (Suykens and Islam 2015; Bangladesh Timeline 2013). On 15 July, ICT issued a verdict to sentence former Jamaat Ameer (Chief) Professor Gulam Azam to a 90-year imprisonment. Seeing it as a politically motivated verdict, Jamaat called for a dawn-to-dusk strike in the country. BCL attacked a protest rally in Halsa, Kushtia, and killed Shobuj Ahamed (a grade 9 student of Halsa High School) and Al Mukith Tohrun (a first-year student of Kushtia Government College) and injured another 11 activists. During the

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 153 picketing, police fired on the protesters and killed Ziaur Rahman, a student of Gobindopur Degree College in Kushtia. On the following day in the Sathkira district, police fired in a protest rally and killed Sheikh Mosthofa Arifuzzaman, a ten-grade student of Kaligong Pilot School, and left another 26 injured. Against this verdict, Jamaat supporters protested across the country. Clashes ensued in Chittagong, Rajshahi, Sylhet, Khulna, Barisal, Cox’s Bazar and many other places in the country, leaving a total of another five deaths and over 1,000 injured, and more than 80 were detained (Bangladesh Timeline 2013). On 17 July, ICT declared the death penalty for the former social welfare minister and Jamaat secretary general Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid. Against this verdict, which most of our respondents think is ‘nothing but a travesty of justice’, Jamaat supporters arranged a protest rally across the country. Law enforcement agencies attacked the protest rallies in Sylhet and Chittagong and detained 21 protestors and injured 11 people. On 18 July, Jamaat called a countrywide dawn-to-dusk strike to protest against the judgment which they believe was unjust and politically motivated. During this strike, police killed Jahidur Rahman, a fourth-year Geography and Ecology student of Bogura Azizul Haque College. Nation-wide massive protests against this verdict led to clashes that left five dead and 187 injured, and over 200 were detained across the country (Bangladesh Timeline 2013). In order for BAL to clear its path to win the next election, it got the High Court to cancel the Jamaat registration as a political party at the Election Commission. Against this unfair judgment, Jamaat called a dawn-to-dusk strike on 14 August. During this strike, police shot dead Khalilur Rahman Molik, a Fazil first-year student of Tamirul Millat Kamil Madrasa (CNN, August  1, 2013). On 10 October, Shibir called a countrywide protest rally against the prolonged remand and barbaric torture of central president Delwar Hossain and demanded his immediate release from jail. During the protest rally in Chuadangah district, BCL together with the police attacked the rally and killed Shibir activist Muhammad Rafiqul Islam, a first-year Economics student of Chuadanga Government College. Police also attacked peaceful rallies in Jahore, Sylhet, Dhaka, Rajshahi and Chittagong, Khulna, Rangpur and Bogura, leaving 21 injured and 11 convicted (Bangladesh Timeline 2013; Suykens and Islam 2015). On 12 October, police fired in a protest rally at Elephant Road, Dhaka, and killed Shibir leader Shah Jamal and injured 15 others. On 25 October in Nowakhai town, police fired on a peaceful demonstration organized by Jamaat and injured over 21 activists. Among the injured, Al Madrasatul Diniar Alim and Mahmudul Hussen died while under treatment on 20 November, and another one became permanently blind. On 26 October, during the 18-party alliance countrywide strike for demanding the caretaker system of government for free and fair election, RAB fired on the meeting in Rajshahi and shot dead Rashedul Islam Rantu, a second-year degree student in Rajshahi Islamiah College. As Sheikh Hasina’s administration declared that the national parliament election would be held on 5 January  2014 under her administration,

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the opposition BNP and Jamaat-led 18-party alliance refused to accept any election under Hasina. The alliance wanted to have an election under a neutral Caretaker Government similar to the previous year’s elections. On 26 November, the alliance called for a 48-hour-long road blockade across the nation. During this blockade, six opposition activists were killed by security forces and law enforcement agencies in different parts of the country, and at least 60 were left injured. Serious violence took place in Bogura, and opposition supporters were killed in Rajshahi, Khulna, Sirajgonj, Sylhet, Gazipur, Comilla and Sathkira (BBC News, November 26, 2013). During another blockade on 30 November, police fired on the Jamaat demonstration in the Jehnaidah district. Police killed Israel Hussain, a secondyear student of Chandpur Degree College, leaving 15 injured. On 3 December, during the 20-party alliance’s countrywide road blockade programme, law enforcement agencies together with BAL, BCL and JL attacked a blockade spot in Satkhira and killed Hussen Ali (a student of Parulia Kawmi Madrasa) and Muhammad Arizul Islam (grade 8 student of Shokipur Secondary School), while leaving 15 others severely injured. Furthermore, during this programme in Chandpur district, police fired in the road blockade spot and shot dead Monwar Jawath Shiam, a grade 8 student of Al Amin Model Madrasa. Across the country, at least 50 opposition activists were injured and over 100 detained. On 10 December, ICT declared the execution date of Jamaat Assistant Secretary General Abdul Kader Mulla, reversing his life-imprisonment sentence. In a protest rally of Jamaat in Feni district, the police fired bullets and killed Hafez Abdullah Al Salman, a student of Al-Jameatul Falahia Kamil Madrasa, and left another seven badly injured. Across the country, Jamaat and Shibir protested against this judgment but faced police brutality in many places. A total of 86 were arrested and 50 were injured (Bangladesh Timeline 2013; Suykens and Islam 2015). Jamaat claimed that the judgement was politically motivated, and Abdul Kader Mullah was not involved in 1971 war crime at all. BAL substituted Abdul Kader Mullah for someone locally known as Koshai Qader, who was actually the one indicted on those charges. On 11 December 2013, the Appellate Division rejected the review appeal of Abdul Kader Mullah. In protest of this judicial killing procedure, Jamaat launched a countrywide demonstration. Police killed Anwar Hussen, a first-year Fazil student of Natherpetua Fazil Madrasa. There were widespread protests across the nation. Several hundred people were injured and over 200 were detained. Right after his execution on 12 December 2013, police also went to his house in Dhaka and tortured his family members mentally and physically, preventing them from joining his funeral programme. On 13 December, Jamaat had a protest rally in Sinapur Bazar Noakhai against the execution of Abdul Kader Mullah. On the way back home, BCL carders kidnapped Hafez Jubaer Ahamed (a student of Khalilur Rahman Fazil Madrasa) and shot him in the chest. He died on the spot (Suykens and Islam 2015; Bangladesh Timeline 2013). On 14 December, Jamaat called the countrywide dawn-to-dusk strike. During that day, security forces used shotguns to open fire; they killed six Jamaat and Shibir men in Noakhai while they were in a protest rally. BAL carders

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 155 along with law enforcement agencies killed Abdus Sattar (a student of Sarputia Fazil Madrasa), Saiful Islam (a student of Bamni Degree College), Motiur Rahman Shojib (a student of Bosurhat Fazil Madrasa) and Abdul Aziz Rayhan (a student of Bosurhat Fazil Madrasa). ‘It was clearly a targeted killing. All of them were shot dead either in the chest or the head’, confided a respondent. Around 50 people died in blockade-related violences (Bangladesh Timeline 2013). According to Odhikar (2014), a total of 506 were killed and 24,176 were injured in political violence in 2013. Death of Democracy BNP and Jamaat-led coalition rejected the 5 January 2014 election. The election was controversial due to boycotting by the opposition political parties, with 153 of the total 300 seats being uncontested. Most opposition leaders were arrested, and even BNP chief Begum Khaleda Zia was put under house arrest during the election. The election was not free and fair at all. On 29 March 2013, the BNP and BJI-led 18-party alliance called for a ‘March for Democracy’ towards Dhaka in demand for a free and fair re-election under the caretaker government and to cancel the 5 January 2014 national election. Thousands of security forces, mainly police and RAB and BAL activists, were present to prevent the opposition activists from rallying. Thousands of opposition activists were arrested in Dhaka and all over the country. More than 400 opposition activists were injured and three reportedly killed. On 30 December  2014, the 18-party alliance announced a non-stop blockade of roads, railways and waterways across the counter from 1 January in order to prevent the scheduled election. The decision came after they were banned from holding a national demonstration the previous day. A countrywide general strike was called for 4 and 5 January by opposition parties. On 4 January, police shot at a protest rally arranged by the Jamaat Datuty Bazar unit in Rangpur district and killed Hadiuzzaman Suzon, a meritorious student. During the general strike, BAL and law enforcement agencies killed 21 opposition activists and arrested thousands (Suykens and Islam 2015). The wave of pre-and-post election violence killed at least 275 people (AP News 2014). ‘These were the bloodiest elections since independence, and unless concrete steps are taken to address what happened, the situation in Bangladesh is likely to worsen’, said Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, April  29, 2014). During the election day, 5 January 2014, Sheikh Hasina and her administration took a zero-tolerance policy for the opposition parties’ activists, especially BNP and Jamaat, and ordered her puppet law enforcement agencies and her supporters to restrain oppositions at any cost. To obey her order, law enforcement agencies and her supporters unleashed their fury against the opposition parties. A  respondent described the dire situation: They killed, tortured, attacked, and burned the houses and businesses of the opposition leaders. From the capital to remote villages, no opposition activists could stay at home due to the fear of arrest, torture or

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killing. BAL supporters even threatened women supporters of opposition political parties that they will be raped or harassed and tortured if they leave their home. On election day, BAL supporters gang-raped a woman in the Noakhali district polling centre in front of the police. Bangladesh experienced a day of nationwide violence and oppression by the Awami regime. Table 8.1 provides a brief sketch of the election and post-election atrocities of BAL on Jamaat and Shibir. Table 8.1 BAL’s Election and Post-election Carnages (2014) Date

Carnages on Jamaat and Shibir

January 5

• Police killed Raipur Alia Madrasa student Hafez Muhammad Nazmus Sadat in Laximpur district. • Police and BAL activists killed Boro Hathiah Eshatul Ulum Fazil Madrasa student Anamul Haq Lulu at Luhagora upazila, Chattagram. • BAL thugs killed Katgor Dakil Madrash and Muraripur Dakil Madrash students Salauddin Ahamed and Muhammad Asaduzzaman in Birgonj Upazila, Dinajpur. • Police fired at a Jamaat rally and killed Jahangir Alom and Momtazuddin in Nifamari district. • In Rangpur district, police killed Mearazul Islam and Hadiuzzaman. • In Ghibanda district, police killed Shabul Islam. • In Chadpur district, police and BAL supporters killed Nazmus Shadath Rubel. • In Ghibanda district police and BAL cadres attacked a peaceful rally and killed Shabul Islam; 22 activists were left seriously injured. • Houses and businesses were burned, vandalized and looted in many places across the country. • During 18-party alliance strike, police killed Asaduzzaman and Salah Uddin Ahmed in Dinazpur district. • BAL cadres killed Nazmul Hasan Sakib in Plasbari, Ghaibanda district. • BCL cadres, along with police and RAB, attacked a student hall in Chittagong University and killed Shah Amanath Hall resident Mamun Hussain. Another 30 were barbarically tortured, while 18 students were arrested. • Joint taskforce arrested Anwarul Islam in Debhata upazila, Sathkira district, and later killed him in the name of crossfire. • Police raided different places and arrested 14 Jamaat and Shibir activists in Laximpur district, 11 in Rangpur district, 10 in Jaypurhat district, 9 in Jhenidah district, 6 in Shithakundo, and 9 in Sathkania. • Police arrested another 11 Jamaat and Shibir activists in Sathkania. • Police arrested 23 activists in Rangpur district, 20 Jhenaidah district, and 10 in Joypurhat district. • Plain-clothed DB police arrested Md Abu Hanif Chuton (9th-grade student in Bumra Union Dakil Madrasa, Satkhira) from his village home and on the next day, the joint taskforce killed him in the name of crossfire. • Law enforcement agencies arrested 25 in Jaipurhat, 14 in Chittagong, 13 in Sylthet, 11 in Rangpur, 8 in Comilla, and 8 in Sunamgonj.

6 January 11 January 12 January

14 January

15 January 16 January 17 January

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 157 Date

Carnages on Jamaat and Shibir

19 January • Joint task force arrested Shitha Kundo Alia Madrasa Fazil second-year student Muhammad Musharraf Hussain at his sister’s house and killed him later in the name of crossfire. • In Sundorgonj, Ghaibandah district, police fired in a peaceful procession and severely injured more than 55 people with lethal rubber bullets. • In Meherpur district, police arrested Jamaat district assistant secretary Tariq Muhammad Saiful Islam, mercilessly tortured him, and finally killed him in custody. 20 January • Md Shuhanur Raman Kazi, an eighth-grade student of Thanabari Dimubi Dakil Madrasa, died in hospital; he was shot by a joint task force during a protest rally. • BAL vandalized the houses of Jamaat activists at Sundorgong Upazila. • Pabna district secretary of Jamaat Abu Taleb Mondol was arrested by law enforcement agencies. 21 January • BAL cadre killed Abdul Baki in Bogura town. • Police arrested 6 from Rangpur and 2 from Khulna district. 26 January • Joint task force killed Abul Kalam Azad, an economics student of Sathkira Government College. • Maruf Hussain, a Shibir leader, was arrested and taken to Debhata police station and later killed in the name of crossfire. • Law enforcement agencies arrested Anamul Haq, a Jamaat leader in Kotchanndpur upazila, Jinidah district, at his house; and the following night, he was brutally killed in the name of crossfire. • In Sylhet Shahajal University of Science and Technology campus, BCL and local JL cadres attacked Shibir activists at Hazrat Shajalal and Hazrat Shahporan Hall. They tortured more than 30 students, burned their rooms, and looted all their belongings. • At Barisal University campus, BCL badly injured scores of Shibir activists. • Police arrested 4 Jamaat activists in Chittagong district. 8 February • Police arrested Mahhidul Islam, a Persian Language and Literature student at Rajshahi University, tortured him and eventually killed him. Source: Authors’ investigation based on content analysis of local, national and international newspapers and documents (e.g., Bangladesh Timelines 2014) substantiated by interviews.

During an upazila election day on 15 March 2014 in Bagerhat Sadar, BCL, AL and JL forced the voter not to go voting in the Karapara Union Council polling centre. The general public and Shibir activists condemned their illegal efforts. BCL, BAL and JL then attacked the polling centre and killed Manjarul Islam Tuhin, a student of Bagerhat Government PC College. On 27 April 2014, police and DB police raided an indoor programme of Shibir activists in the Satkhira district. They arrested eight activists, including Satkhira city Shibir secretary and Satkhira Law College student Aminur Rahman. Upon their arrest, police blindfolded them and shot them in the legs, but in the case of Aminur, police shot him on both legs and his chest, and he died on the spot (Bangladesh Timeline 2014).

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On 29 October  2014, ICT declared the death sentence for Jamaat Chief Motiur Rahman Nizami. Jamaat opposed this controversial tribunal and its judgement and called for a countrywide protest. In Chapai Nawabgonj, police fired a rally from the back, injured almost 20 demonstrators, but unfortunately, Thohurul Islam, a first-year student of Fazil from Shibgonj Fazil Madrasa, was seriously injured and later died at a hospital on 13 November  2014. During the countrywide peaceful protest, police arrested Jamaat and Shibir activists in different parts of the country including 16 from Bogura district, 13 from Satkhira district and 7 from Dhaka city. Perceiving the verdict as a ‘manipulated, controversial judgement by the BAL-controlled Kangaroo court of ICT’, Jamaat called for a countrywide dawn to dusk hartal (strike) on 30 October and 2–3 November 2014. During the strike, police, BCL, BAL and JL cadres attacked Jamaat rallies in Dhaka. Ten people were injured and 35 were arrested in Dhaka. On 3 November, police arrested another 33 activities from Dhaka and 18 from Chittagong. Moreover, three female students from Shamsunnahar Hall at Dhaka University were arrested by police. During these three days of hartal, police filed more than 100 fabricated lawsuits against Jamaat and Shibir leaders across the nation. On 9 December, Chittagong University BCL cadres abducted a third-year Anthropology student Nurul Amin Bitu and tortured him badly. Later, the police rescued but arrested him. On 16 December, Shibir activists had a victory day celebration rally in Chapainawabgong but were attacked by BAL cadres with sharp weapons, firearms and bamboo sticks; this triggered a clash that left ten Shibir activists severely injured. In Dhaka, police attacked the victory day rally and arrested six activists. In Rajshahi, police arrested two Shibir leaders. On 30 December, police arrested five activists from a peaceful rally in Gazipur district and two from Sylhet city (Bangladesh Timeline 2014; Almamun 2020). Awami Judicial and Extra-Judicial Killing at Its Peak 2015 was another year full of oppression faced by Jamaat and Shibir activists, its supporters, and other political opponents of BAL. As BAL managed to cling to power without a proper public mandate, Sheikh Hasina’s government reinforced her political oppression of every single opponent political party by utilizing the police, RAB and other government agencies. According to a respondent, ‘To remain in power, Shaikh Hasina and her regime chose all means of oppression such as arresting without any warrant, extrajudicial killing, forced disappearing, kidnapping, and murder’. Human Rights Organization Odhikar reported that in 2015, on average, 16 persons were killed in political violence every month. From January to December 2015, a total of 197 persons were killed and 8,312 injured in political violence (Odhikar 2015). Due to unbridled atrocities by the Hasina regime, social media branded her with titles such as ‘Mother of Mafia’, ‘Lady Hitler’ and ‘Kleptocratic Fascist’.

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 159 On 14 January 2015, seven died during the non-stop countrywide blockade called by BNP-Jamaat-led 20-party alliance. Some examples of rampant extrajudicial killings in early 2015 are as follows: • In Rangpur district, police arrested 17 Shibir activists. Jubairul Islam, an applicant for Moshin College entrance exam, became a victim of pre-meditated killing by BAL cadres in Chittagong on 14 January. • On 26 January, RAB arrested Assadullah Tuhin, a second-year student of Chapainawabgonj City College, at his house in front of his parents. He was killed under RAB custody through inhuman torture. • Chittagong University student Muhammad Sakibul Islam died following severe torture by the police on 28 January. • Muhammad Emdadullah, a first-year student at Dhaka College, was arrested at his house in Mirpur, Dhaka, by the Mirpur Thana police on 31 January, and was brutally tortured and killed in police custody. • On 6 February, DB police arrested Shabuddin, a Crop Science and Technology student of Rajshahi University (RU), and on the same day, he became a victim of extrajudicial killing. Two other RU students, Shoid Habibur Rahman and Mofizur Rahman, were shot and killed by the police. In Jashore, Shohidul Islam was shot dead by the police in cold blood. • On 7 February in Nesarabad Thana in Perujpur district, police arrested Muhammad Baschu and later on killed him in the name of an encounter. In Ghaibanda district, RAB arrested Mostafa Manzil, a Jamaat activist, and later he was found dead with a gunshot in both his chest and head. On the same day, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar Thana police arrested Jasim Uddin, a student of Kazipara Siddiqiah Fazil Madrasa, and killed him extrajudicially in Agargaon area. • In the afternoon of 14 February, police arrested Motiur Rahman, a thirdyear Philosophy student at Dinazpur government college and shoot his legs and hands and admitted him to the hospital. Later, police took him from the hospital for supposedly better treatment in Dhaka, but instead tortured him to death. • On 18 February, police fired on Shibir demonstrations in Dhaka city and badly injured 4 in the Mirpur and Dhanmondi area of the capital. • On 11 March  2015, BAL cadre killed Forid Ahmed, a meritorious student at Kazi Azim Uddin College in Gazipur district (Bangladesh Timeline 2015). On 17 March, during the countrywide blockade, police in the Kurigram district attacked and opened fire on a peaceful Jamaat demonstration, leaving eight severely injured. Arrests and tortures were rampant under Sheikh Hasina’s regime. In Rowmari, police arrested 16 Jamaat women activists from a house while they were gathered in an indoor programme. In the Khulna district, police arrested 35 Shibir activists without any arrest warrant. On 18 March, police

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raided and arrested 72 Shibir activists from Suhrawardy Hall of Chittagong Government College, 8 from Hazi Muhammad Mohsin College, and 13 from Lalmonirhat district. On 5 April in Noakhali district, police opened fire on a protest demonstration that killed Maijdi Public College student Muhammad Faruq Chowdary and left 12 badly injured (Bangladesh Timeline 2015; SATP 2015). On 11 April 2015, the Sheikh Hasina government executed Assistant Secretary General of Jamaat Muhammad Kamaruzzaman despite widespread calls from various national and international authorities to stop this farcical tribunal. Jamaat perceived this execution as a ‘politically motivated judicial killing of its leader to weaken the party politically’. On 12 April, Jamaat carried out a countrywide Gaheabana Janaza (funeral prayers without a dead body). There were massive protests against this judicial killing across the nation. During these protests, police arrested Jamaat activists from different parts of the country, for example, 11 from Jaypurhat district, 8 from Bogura, 7 from Rangpur, 10 from Sirajgonj, 3 from Kulna, 10 from Dhaka, 13 from Chittagong, 5 from Sylhet, and 6 from Nifamari. On 13 April, Jamaat called countrywide dawn-todusk strike against the controversial judicial killing of its Assistant Secretary General. From demonstrations, police killed Muhammad Anisur Rahman Anis, a student of Mawlana Bhasani College, and Shaidul Islam from Rajshahi city. Police arrested 15 Shibir activists from Mirpur, Dhaka, without any arrest warrant. Mass arrests continued across the nation, such as 64 activists from Satkhira on 10 May, 23 from Chittagong on 23 May, 8 from Rangpur on 27 May, another 18 from Chittagong and 34 from Gazipur on 30 May, and 53 from Rajshahi on 17 June 2015 (Bangladesh Timeline 2015; Almamun 2020). The wave of mass arrests and extra-judicial killings in Bangladesh continued as the date for the execution of Jamaat Secretary General Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed was drawing close. Although different international agencies, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, expressed their concerns about the ICT judgements, the regime paid no attention to them. Police arrested Salauddin Saju on 28 June at his residence in Chittagong and fired at his legs. The same fate befell Ruhul Amin Gazi when police arrested him on 25 July from his residents in Satkhira. Both became permanently paralysed. On 30 August, police arrested 64 people in Rajshahi and detained 41 Jamaat and Shibir leaders on 11 September from the Farmgate area in Dhaka. Police arrested 15 activists on 17 September from Chapainawabgonj at an indoor meeting, 14 in Sathkania and 4 from Chittagong district on 4 October, 25 from Hobigonj district on 5 October, 46 from Rangpur district and 18 from Chittagong on 18 October, another 7 from Chittagong on 19 October, and 39 from Bandarban on 23 October. On 28 October, Jamaat declared a countrywide protest demanding justice for the victims beaten to death by BAL thugs with oars in broad daylight on 28 October 2006. Police opened fire on the demonstrators in Dhaka, which left 15 severely injured and 22 arrested on the spot. In the different raids, law enforcement agencies arrested 11 in the Potuakhali district and 4 in the Kushtia district (Bangladesh Timeline 2015; SATP 2015; Almamun 2020). As the regime decided to execute Jamaat’s Secretary General Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed, a former highly successful and corruption-free

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 161 minister, by November 2015, the mass arrest, torture and extra-judicial killings reached a new height. Police arrested 47 activists (Jhenida district: 15, Pirijpur district: 15, Hobigonj district: 10, Kushtia district: 5, and Bogura district: 2) on 2 November; 4 in Chittagong on 4 November; 8 in Rangpur, as well as Bogura district Nayeb-e-Ameer Tayeb Ali on 5 November; 10 in Savar, Dhaka, on 10 November; 27 in Satkhira, 20 in Nifamari, 11 in Thakurgaw, and 7 in Jhenaidah on 11 November; another 26 in Satkhira on 12 November; 124 people on 16 November (Chittagong: 60, Chapinawabgonj district: 42, Satkhira district: 12 and Jhenaidah district: 10); and 60 activists (Jhenaidah district: 16, Gahibanda district: 15, Chapainawabgonj: 3, Bogura: 3, and Chittagong: 23) on 17 November 2015 (Bangladesh Timeline 2015; SATP 2015). Most of them were inhumanly tortured and detained. On 18 November, the High Court rejected the review petition of Jamaat Secretary General Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujaheed. He was sentenced to death by ICT on 17 July 2013. A defence team lawyer during our interview opined: [I]t was a controversial judgement, and the judgement was politically motivated. As the current regime wants to stay in power forever by any means, they need to eliminate Jamaat from politics and this was the way. In the name of a war crime, it was a judicial killing. Right after the final verdict was announced, police and other law enforcement agencies started to raid and arrest Jamaat activists throughout the country. Police and Jamaat supporters had clashed in different places across the nation leaving over a thousand of them severely injured. Against the judicial killing of the former Social Welfare Minister and Jamaat Secretary General, Jamaat called for a countrywide dawn-to-dusk strike on 23 November. A total of 68 activists were arrested from different parts of the country (Jhenaidah district: 24, Chapainawgongj district: 17, Satkhira district: 12, Sylhet: 5, Chittagong: 8, and Barisal: 2). On the same day, BCL cadres in Jashore MM College kidnapped Habibullah Hussain, Abdullah Al Mamun and Kamrul Hasan and began to torture them until they all lost their senses. Habibullah and Abdullah eventually died, while Kamrul became permanently disabled (Bangladesh Timeline 2015; SATP 2015; Almamun 2020). A respondent commented: The perpetrators in this heinous incident were later rewarded instead of being punished by the regime. After this incident, police harassed the victims’ family members, arrested Shibir activists and not the BCL thugs. . . . There is no justice and no constitutional rights for Jamaat and Shibir activists under Shaikh Hasina. Oppositions Have No Human Rights! The international community rejected the general election held on 5 January  2014 due to numerous irregularities and the absence of the opposition parties, who were barred from participation. The dreadful impact of the

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controversial and farcical election continued in 2016. As Hasina wanted to remain in power at any cost, her BAL regime was more desperate than ever, and eliminating the opposition was the only pathway. According to the U.S. Department of State (2016), the most significant human rights violations were extrajudicial killings, arbitrary or unlawful detentions, and forced disappearances by the security forces of the government. People in general lost their fundamental constitutional rights to vote, and the opposition parties lost their rights to live peacefully. Table 8.2 provides a snapshot of the overall political violence in Bangladesh carried out by the BAL regime. The statistics in Table  8.2 indicate that the BAL regime and its puppet law enforcement agencies continued human rights violations and oppression of opposition political parties on a massive scale in 2016. Police and other law enforcement agencies arrested 16 in January, 82 in February and 44 in March 2016. The arrested were all thrown into jail on fabricated charges. On 12 April, two abducted Shibir activists’ bullet-riddled dead bodies were found. Another victim, Shamim Mahmud, a management student at Government KC College, suffered the same fate. Ununiformed personnel abducted him in the name of DB police from the east side of Matabuddin College on 24 March. His family went to the local police station to file a general dairy, but the police refused. Mahmud was tortured, and his bullet-riddled dead body was discovered in Maizdia village at Hoibothpur Union. Plain-clothed police abducted Mohiuddin Shuhan, a first-year student of Shoid Nur Ali College. After ten days of abduction, on 20 April, his dead body with broken hand and gouged eyes was found in Vulatiarmat, Chuadanga Sadar thana (Bangladesh Timeline 2016; SATP 2016). Although the highest court of the country issued rules against extrajudicial executions, many incidents of extrajudicial killings took place in 2016 in stark violation of Article 32 of the Bangladesh Constitution and Article 6 of the ICCPR.9 As law enforcement agencies termed such incidents deaths in ‘gunfights’ or ‘crossfire’, they could enjoy impunity in most cases, despite allegations from victims’ families. Jamaat Chief (Ameer-e-Jamaat) Motiur Rahman Nizami has been languishing in jail since 29 March 2010. On 29 October 2014, ICT announced the death sentence verdict for alleged war crimes committed during the 1971 independence war. On 5 May 2016, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal

Table 8.2 Political Violence in Bangladesh (2012–2016) Types of Violence

Extra Judicial Killing Enforced Disappearance Death In Jail Source: Odhikar’s documentations

Year(s)

Total

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

70 26 63

329 53 59

173 39 54

185 66 51

178 90 63

934 274 290

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 163 and upheld the death sentence. Jamaat called for a strike across the country on 8 May. During the strike, police attacked rallies, leaving 31 activists badly injured while 26 were arrested across the country. On 10 May, finally, Nizami’s appeal against the death sentence was rejected by the court. As he refused to seek pardon from the President of Bangladesh, on 11 May at 12:01 am, he was hanged to death at Dhaka central jail (Al-Jazeerah 2016; SATP 2016). Sheikh Hasina’s regime deployed police, RAB and BGB in Dhaka and across the country to control the protest rally against the judicial killing of the Jamaat chief. Law enforcement agencies raided house after house and arrested around 256 activists across the country (Bangladesh Timeline 2016). According to a Jamaat leader, ‘Jamaat and Shibir activists became refugees in their own country. Top, midlevel leaders and even general activists were flown from their homes to avoid arrest, abduction, torture, and killing’. Jamaat observed Gahebana Janaza (absentee funeral prayers) around the country. Even the funeral prayers were attacked for example in Chittagong by the police and BCL, JL and BAL, leading to 30 injuries and 11 arrests. Across the country, police detained 53 activists. Nizami was buried in his hometown. Jamaat called for a 24-hour countrywide general strike against the judicial killing of its chief and a former corruption-free successful Minister of the nation. Law enforcement agencies arrested 12 activists from Bogura, 7 from Sathkira, 4 from Khulna, 10 from Sylhet, 6 from Comilla, 7 from Lakshampur, and 3 from Rangpur. Many were injured (Bangladesh Timeline 2016). On 24 April, police detained Rajshahi University student Hafizur Rahman. He was suffering from thalassemia and used to have his blood changed every three months. His family made sure that the police and the jail authority were duly informed about his physical condition. However, they didn’t take any initiative for his treatment. Deprived of treatment, Hafizur Rahman died an avoidable death in jail on 19 May without any treatment. In June, police arrested 18 from Kushtia, 6 from Dhaka, 4 from Jessore, and 15 from Chapainawabgonj. Shoid Al Mahmood, a Kamil student of Jhenaidah Siddiqia Kamil Mardasha, was arrested on 13 June from Bodunpur village, Jhenaidah. According to locals, police sub-inspector Aminur and Uzzal led the police force while Mahmood was arrested. After 17 days of abduction, his bullet-raddled dead body was found in the Teatulbariah area at Jhenaidah town. Police killed him in the name of gunfight. There is no investigation and no justice for this innocent student who was mercilessly murdered. On 16 June, police arrested Shibir central joint literature secretary Ibnul Islam Parvez, Jhenaidah Polytechnic Institution Student Anisur Rahman, and Anamul Haq from Muhmamadpur, Dahaka. Police brought Anamul Haq to the court and denied the arrest of Parvez and Anisur. The victims’ family went to Adabor police station, but the police refused to take any general diary. The family had a press conference where they pleaded for help from the prime minister and law enforcement agencies about their whereabouts. On 2 July, police killed them in the name of crossfire. The bullet-riddled and tortured dead bodies of Ibnul Islam Parvez and Anisur Rahman were discovered in Jhenaidah town. On 3 July,

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police arrested Saiful Islam, a student of Arabic Literature at Islamic University Kushtia, at his house and, as usual, they refused to declare his arrest. On 19 July, police killed him in the name of crossfire in Jhenaidah town. Police arrested 76 activists in July, and 45 in August (Bangladesh Timeline 2016). On 4 August, plain-clothes policemen kidnapped Madrasa teacher and twotimes union council chairman candidate Idris Ali on his way back home from Ramchanropur Bazar. His family went to the police several times to find out about his whereabouts. Police denied his arrest, threatened his family members and advised them not to go to the police station. In fact, the police were hiding him and torturing him barbarically. On 12 August, his dead body was found in Jorunakundo on the Harinakundo-Jhenaidah road with obvious signs of torture, including broken hands and legs, and cut tendons (Daily Sun 2016). On 27 September, police detained five Islami Chatrisangtha (female students wing of Jamaat) activists from Chittagong. On 25 October, police killed two innocent Jamaat leaders, Jahurul Islam and Sajib Ahmed Tariq, in the name of crossfire (New Age 2016). Jahurul Islam was a lecturer at Keyarbazar College in Kaligoani and a familiar political face in Jhenaidah town. On 14 December, police detained 27 activists from Chittagong (Bangladesh Timeline 2016). Table 8.3 gives a list of eight victims of enforced disappearances (goom). Table 8.3 Victims of Enforced Disappearances (Missing Till Today) No. Names

Date of Missing

Identity and Place of Missing

Kidnapped By

1.

Muhammad Waliullah

04 Feb 2011

2.

Al Mukaddas

04 Feb 2011

3.

Muhammad Jakir Hussain

2 April 2013

He was a student at Islami RAB University Kushtia. While returning to his campus by Hanif Bus (No. 3750) from Dhaka, RAB stopped the bus at Nobinagor, Ashulia, and arrested him. Since then, he has been traceless. He was a student at Islami RAB University Kushtia. While returning to his campus by Hanif Bus (No. 3750) from Dhaka, RAB stopped the bus at Nobinagor, Ashulia, and arrested him. Since then, he has been traceless. He was arrested from his DB with plain residence at House No. clothes 19/6 Tikapara, Shamoli, Dhaka. He was a student of a dental institution.

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 165 No. Names 4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

Date of Missing

Muhammad 4 April 2013 Anwarul Islam

Identity and Place of Missing

He was an MA Mathematics student of Rajshahi College. He was arrested by RAB at around 2:25 am from House No. 175, Bil-Shimla Moholla (Rajpara PS, Rajshahi). When family members contacted the RAB-5 office, RAB denied its involvement. Nazrul Islam 11 April 2014 He was a teacher of Joypurhat Talimul Islam School and College. He was believed to be picked up by RAB from his locality. Md. Rezwan 4 August 2016 He was arrested by RAB Hussain from Durghapur Bazar, Benapole Port area. Mir Ahmad Bin 9 August 2016 He was a lawyer and son Quasem of Jamaat leader Mir Muhammad Quasem. On 5 August, 4 RAB men came to his apartment and interrogated him regarding his family, and left. On 9 August, at around 11:00 pm, 9 plain-clothed people, believed to be RAB members, came, and forcefully took him from his apartment in Dhaka. Abdullahil Aman 22 August 2016 He was a retired army Azmi officer and son of Professor Ghulam Azam, former Ameer of Jamaat. About 30 men came to his residence with DB identity and forcefully took him with them in front of his mother, wife, and other family members.

Source: Various sources.10

Kidnapped By RAB

RAB

RAB RAB

DB, police, and DGFI

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Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Oppressions Continued The people’s right to vote was taken away through the non-transparent, controversial and farcical 10th parliamentary election, which led to a one-party rule in the country with further human right violations and persecution of rival political leaders and activists. In 2017, the BAL regime completed a total politicization or awamification of all government, constitutional and autonomous institutions, and resorted to a kleptocratic fascism (Khan, Husain, and Chowdhury 2022). To prolong her one-party undemocratic rule, the fascist BAL government continued its harassment, oppression, arrests, kidnapping, forced disappearance and killing of all opposition political parties (Islam 2022). As 2018 was the next parliament election year, BAL both blatantly and strategically weakened the opposition force by all means to remain in power. From January to December 2017, Awami-law enforcement agencies arrested 347 activists from different parts of the country. Oppression continued beyond 2017. Table  8.4 gives a comprehensive picture of the treatment of Jamaat by the BAL regime from 2009 to 2021, while Table  8.5 provides the list of Jamaat-Shibir activists brutally killed by the regime. BNP too got grossly affected by the tyranny of the BAL regime. Table 8.4 Treatment of Jamaat by BAL Regime (January 2009–March 2021) No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Description Jamaat members murdered Students murdered Killed in crossfire drama Arrested Jamaat members (male) Arrested members (female) Arrested students (male) Arrested students (female) Total police cases (students) Total police cases filed Injured Disabled Police remand Kidnapped and disappeared

Number (2009–2015)

Number (2016–2020)

Total

124

05

129

108

09

117

80

06

86

88,500

2,746

91,246

900

187

1,087

15,000

2,463

17,463

600

76

676

9,000

584

9,584

13,000

1,437

14,684

75,000 5,200 95,000 9

35 04 1,093 16

75,035 5,204 96,093 25

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh No

Description

14

Vandalism, loot 5,000 Total Damaged Property Worth 200 and arson Crore Taka (houses) Shutting down of 3,000 21 50 Crore Taka Jamaat offices Attacks and loots 200 20 150 Crore Taka on business (places) Jailed Jamaat members (male) in March 2021 200 Jailed Jamaat members (female) in March 2021 00 Jailed male students in March 2021 57 Jailed female students in March 2021 00 Total Jailed members in March 2021 187 Enforced disappearances in March 2021 5

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Number (2009–2015)

Number (2016–2020)

167

Total

Source: Authors’ investigation based on content analysis of local, national and international newspapers and documents (e.g. Bangladesh Timelines 2014) substantiated by interviews.

Table 8.5 List of Jamaat-Shibir Activists Killed by BAL-Regime (2009–2020)11 In Panchagarh District 1. Abu Talib, son of Late Sadek Ali, killed on 11/04/2011 by police (crossfired) In Thakurgaon District 2. Saiyed Rubel, son of Ruhul Islam, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR) 3. Monir Hossen, son of Mominul Islam Shukur, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR) 4. Firoz Islam, son of Robiul Islam, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR) 5. Dulal Islam, son of Rofikul Islam, killed on 04/03/2013 by RPB (DPR) 6. Daymul Islam, son of Md Moyeen Uddin, killed on 04/03/2013 by RPB (DPR) In Dinajpur District 7. Asaduzzaman, son of Selim Uddin, killed on 06/01/2014 by RAB (kidnapped and crossfired) 8. Foyez Uddin, son of Khalilur Rahman, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR) 9. Motiyar Rohman, son of Abdur Rahman, killed on 06/12/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 10. Md Muzahidul Islam, son of Md Ataur Rahman, killed on 03/12/2012 by RPB (DPR; kidnapped) 11. Md Masud Rana, son of Md Golam Rasul, killed on 05/01/2014 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 12. Salah Uddin Ahmed, son of Md Abul Kalam Azad, on 06/01/2014 by RAB 13. Rezaul Karim, son of Habibur Rahman, killed on 27/02/2015 (kidnapped and crossfired) In Nilfamari District 14. Moslem Uddin, son of Md Abul Kashem, killed on 25/10/2013 by RPB (DPR; kidnapped and killed) 15. Abu Bokor Siddik, son of Md Batashu Mamud, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR; kidnapped) (Continued)

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Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Table 8.5 (Continued) 16. Jahangir Alam, son of Late Isamuddin, killed on 04/01/2014 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 17. Momtaz Uddin, son of Late Hasim Uddin, killed on 05/01/2014 (kidnapped) 18. Mohidul Islam, son of Md Anwar Hossen, killed on 01/02/2015 (kidnapped and crossfired) 19. Atikul Islam Apon, son of Dr Md Anisur Rahman, killed on 02/03/2013 by RPB (crossfired) In Lalmonirhat District 20. Mominul Islam Moni, son of Alhaj Md Komor Uddin, killed on 15/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 21. A Rahim, son of Md Abdul Karim, killed on 15/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 22. Shaju Islam, son of Md Moktar Ali, killed on 15/12/2013 by RPB (DPR) In Rangpur District 23. Jahangir Alom, son of Late Abet Ali, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 24. Mamun Ar Rashid, son of Late Abdul Hai, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB and BCL (DPR, kidnapped) 25. Sadekur Rahman, son of Mokaddes Ali, killed on 28/02/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 26. Shaheb Mia, son of Late Abul Hossen, killed on 28/02/2013 RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 27. Moshiur Rahman, son of Anwar Hossen, killed on 28/02/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 28. Mahmudul Hasan, son of A Hi, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 29. Ashikur Rahman, son of Atab Uddin, killed on 28/02/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 30. Merazul Islam, son of Late Azim Uddin, killed on 05/01/2014 (crossfired) 31. Abdur Rahim, son of Late Kefatullah, killed on 30/07/2019 by RAB (crossfired) 32. Nazmul Huda Lablu Shah, son of Shah Nurunnobi, killed on 09/03/2015 (kidnapped) 33. Akmal Hossen, son of Md Mosharof Hossen, killed on 02/03/2013 (kidnapped) 34. Hadiuzzaman, son of Late Mawlana Ozayer Gol, killed on 05/01/2014 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Gaibandha District 35. Zuel Rana, son of Md Khoka Mia, killed on 28/02/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 36. Foridul Islam, son of Asgar Ali, killed on 28/02/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 37. Moznu Mia, son of Md Mansur Ali, killed on 22/02/2013 (kidnapped) 38. Shahabul Islam, son of Late Khizir Uddin, killed on 05/01/2014 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 39. Nazmul Hasan Shakib, son of Dr Jahidul Islam, killed on 11/01/2014 40. Shohanur Rahman Shohan, son of Kazi Shofikul Islam, killed on 19/01/2013 (kidnapped) 41. Mostafa Monzil, son of Md Josijar Rahman Shorkar, killed on 16/02/2015 (kidnapped) 42. Shaharul Islam, son of Abdur Razzak, killed on 03/04/2015 (kidnapped)

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 169 In Joypurhat District 43. Forman Ali, son of Razib Uddin, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 44. Heshab Uddin, son of Late Hafiz Uddin Mondol, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 45. A Hakim, son of Nazir Uddin Mondol, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 46. Nasir Uddin, son of Mozaharul Islam, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 47. Moznu Mia, son of Azahar Ali, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 48. Mazidul Islam, son of Mofiz Uddin, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 49. Bodiuzzaman, son of Abbas Mondol, killed on 10/11/2012 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 50. Shamim Hossen, killed on 15/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 51. Insan Ali, son of Moslem Uddin, killed on 15/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 52. Abdur Rohman, son of Rifat Ullah, killed on 16/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Bogura District 53. Monzila Begam, wife of Hazrat Ali, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (attack on village, kidnapped) 54. Mst Arzena Khatun, wife of Meraz Ali, killed on 03/03/2013 by RPB, BCL (attack on village, kidnapped) 55. Abdul Kafi Prang, son of Alhaz Abu Zafor Prang, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (attack on village) 56. Sabet Ali, son of Late Monir Uddin, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (attack on village, kidnapped) 57. Abdus Shohid, son of Azadul Islam, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (attack on village, kidnapped) 58. Afaz Uddin Torofdar, son of Saiyad Ali Torofdar, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (attack on village) 59. Aklima Begum, wife of Monser Ali, killed on 03/03/2013 by BCL, RPB (attack on village, kidnapped) 60. Abdul Baki, son of Md Yakub Ali, killed on 21/03/2013 (kidnapped and crossfired) 61. Ziaur Rahman, son of Lutfor Rahman, killed on 03/03/20 by RAB (kidnapped) 62. Dulu Mia, son of Late Dobir Uddin, killed on 03/03/2013 BCL, RPB (attack on village, kidnapped) In Shirajgonj District 63. Ruhul Amin, son of Abdul Jolil, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 64. Moktar Hossen, son of Alomgir Hossen, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped, crossfired) 65. Wares Ali, son of Wazed Ali, killed on 09/12/2012 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 66. Mahfuzur Rahman, son of Azizul Haque, killed on 04/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 67. Yunus Ali, son of Abdul Hamid, killed on 29/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped and crossfired) (Continued)

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Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Table 8.5 (Continued) 68. Fodirul Islam, son of Abdul Mozid, killed on 29/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 69. Md Abdul Jolil, son of Riaz Uddin Fokir, killed on 27/11/2013 (kidnapped) 70. Alomgir Hossen Shumon, son of Anwar Hossen, killed on 13/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Chapainababganj District 71. S M Shariful Islam, son of Abdur Rahman Sheikh, killed on 19/04/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 72. Abdur Rahim, son of Mokbul Hossen, killed on 01/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 73. Nasir Uddin, son of Md Mofiz Uddin, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 74. Robiul Islam Robu, son of Md Vodu, killed on 29/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 75. Motiur Rahman, son of Zillur Rahman, killed on 29/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 76. Waliullah, son of Md Abdul Hakim, killed on 29/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 77. Ziarul Haque, son of Md Rofikul Islam, killed on 15/07/2013 by the police (Kidnapped) 78. Nurul Islam, son of Md Sazzad Ali, killed on 15/07/2013 by plainclothes DB officers (kidnapped) 79. Ebadot Ali, son of Md Mohsin Ali, killed on 12/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 80. Tohurul Islam, son of Ayesh Mohammad, killed on 29/10/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 81. Asadullah Tuhin, son of Md Enamul Haque, killed on 26/01/2015 by DB (crossfired) 82. Imtiaz Ali, son of Kolim Uddin, killed on 04/04/2012 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 83. Mawlana Bashir Ahmed, son of Abu Bakar Siddik, killed on 28/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 84. Asgar Ali Limon, son of Md Lokman Hossen Mia, killed on 24/04/2013 by RAB (crossfired) In Rajshahi District 85. Shofikul Islam, son of Sheikh Abdur Rahim, killed on 29/01/2012 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 86. Hafez Rashidul Islam, son of Md Anwarul Islam, killed on 22/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 87. Nurul Islam Shahin, son of Md Abdur Rahman Munsi, killed on 27/01/2015 by RAB (crossfired) 88. Shohidul Islam, son of Md Jalal Uddin, killed on 13/04/2015 RAB (kidnapped) 89. Hafizur Rahman, son of Md Hasen Ali, killed on 19/04/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 90. Shorifuzzaman Nomani, son of Late Hobibullah Master, killed on 13/03/2009 by BCL (kidnapped) 91. Hafizur Rahman Shaheen, son of Md Abdul Mannan, killed on 10/02/2010 by BCL (kidnapped) 92. Abdullah Omar Nasif, son of Md Akhtaruzzaman, killed on 12/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped)

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 171   93. Rashidul Haque Rantu, son of Late Aminul Haque Tuku, killed on 27/10/2013 by the police (kidnapped)   94. Mohidul Islam, son of Mir Anwar Hossen, killed on 02/02/2014 by RAB (kidnapped)   95. Shahabuddin Ripon, son of Md Rofikullah, killed on 06/02/2015 by RAB (crossfired)   96. Hafez Md Amirul Islam, son of Md Omar Ali, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped)   97. Muzahid Ali, son of Md Siddik Molla, killed on 03/03/2013 by RPB (DPR)   98. Rofikul Islam, son of Md Golam Mostafa, killed on 03/03/2013 by RPB (DPR) In Nator District   99. Shahasbuddin Ripon, son of Rofikullah, killed on 06/02/2015 by RAB (kidnapped and crossfired) 100. Abu Shaheen Ronzu, son of Late Aksed Ali, killed on 12/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 101. Tojer Uddin, son of Late Mozer Pramanik, killed on 15/11/2015 by RAB (kidnapped and crossfired) In Meherpur District 102. A Jobbar Member, son of Late Abdullah Malikha, killed on 31/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 103. Tarik Md Saiful Islam, son of Alhajj Somir Uddin, killed on 19/01/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 104. Md Delowar Hossen, son of Shamsuddoha, killed on 19/09/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) 105. Sulaiman Sheikh, son of Saiyad Ali, killed on 16/08/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Kushtia District 106. Al Mukit Torun, son of Shofiul Alom, killed on 15/07/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 107. Shobuz Ahmed, son of Md Khobir Uddin Ahmmed, killed on 15/07/2013 by RPB (DPR) 108. Abdullah Al Monzu, son of Md Abdur Rashid, killed on 13/04/2012 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 109. Ishak Ali, son of Late Soleman, killed on 05/05/2013 by RPB (DPR) 110. Anisur Rahman, son of Sabdar Rahman, killed on 01/07/2016 by the police (crossfired) 111. Hafez Zakir Hossen, son of Taz Mohammad, killed on 03/04/2015 by RAB (crossfired) In Chuadanga District 112. Rofikul Islam, son of Delowar Islam, killed on 10/10/2013 by RPB (DPR) 113. Hafez Rashedul Islam, son of Md Anwarul Haque, killed on 22/02/2013 by RPB (DPR) In Jhinaidah District 114. Anamul Haque, son of Abdul Malek Bis, killed on 25/01/2014 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped and crossfired) 115. Hafez Abul Kalam Azad, son of Late Md Ali Mondol, killed on 21/04/2014 by RPB (DPR) 116. Israil Hossen, son of Md Shohidul Islam, killed on 30/12/2013 by RPB (DPR) (Continued)

172

Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Table 8.5 (Continued) 117. Abdus Salam/Aslam Hossen, son of Late Abdul Mozid, killed on 22/02/2013 by RPB (DPR) 118. Abu Zor Gifari, son of Nur Islam, killed on 13/04/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 119. Al Mahmud, son of Rozob Ali, killed on 01/07/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 120. Dr. Tarek Hasan Shojib, son of Khondokar Abdul Latif, killed on 25/10/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 121. Ibnul Islam Parvez, son of Jahangir Hossen, killed on 02/07/2016 by RAB (kidnapped). 122. Abu Hurayra, son of Ashiruddin Malit, killed on 29/02/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 123. Hafez Joshim Uddin Jihad, son of Md Kholilur Rahman, killed on 04/03/2006 by RAB (kidnapped) 124. Shamim Mahmud, son of Md Ruhul Amin, killed on 13/04/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 125. Mohiuddin Shohan, son of Md Mohasin Mia, killed on 21/04/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 126. Saiful Islam Mamun, son of Lutfor Rahman, killed on 19/07/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 127. Md Idris Ali Panna, son of Md Kawsar Ali, killed on 12/08/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 128. S M Johurul Haque, son of Shomsher Ali Molla, killed on 25/10/2016 by RAB (crossfired) 129. Nozrul Islam, son of Abdus Salam, killed on 25/06/2020 by RAB (kidnapped) In Jashore District 130. Moyazzem Hossen Nan, son of Late Shohidul Islam, killed on 11/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 131. Abdul Siddik Hi, son of Late Alhaj Dr Wazed Ali, killed on 27/11/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 132. Md Mustafa Zaman Uzzol, son of Md Abdul Wahab Gazi, killed on 01/08/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 133. Anisur Rahman, son of Md Ibrahim Gazi, killed on 22/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 134. Ashraful Islam, son of Mokbul Hossen, killed in 2012 by RAB/police during a protest rally (kidnapped) 135. Md Motiur Rahman, son of Md Abdul Mozid, killed on 5/1/2014 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 136. Md Akkas Ali, son of Late Momtaj Sheikh, killed in 2011 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 137. Kamrul Hasan, son of Mohammad Ullah, killed on 24/11/2015 by BCL (kidnapped) 138. Md Habibullah Khan, son of Md Neyamot Ali Khan, killed on 23/11/2015 by BCL (crossfired) In Narail District 139. Imrul Kayes, son of Anwar Hossen, killed on 19/01/2015 by BCL (crossfired) In Bagerhat District 140. Qari Masudur Rahman, son of A Hakim Sheikh, killed on 15/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 141. Abu Sayed Morol, son of Late Mosiuddin Morol, killed on 06/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped)

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 173 142. Manzarul Islam Tuhin, son of Sheikh Afzal Hossen, killed on 15/03/2014 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Khulna District 143. Mia Akramuzzaman, son of Md Idris Mia, killed on 11/10/2015 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 144. Monsur Ali Gazi, son of KhanJahan Ali Gazi, killed on 11/04/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 145. Jahidul Islam, son of Late Jalal Uddin, killed on 15/07/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 146. Golam Rahman, son of Late Belayet Sana, killed on 26/05/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 147. Saifuddin, son of Shamsur Rahman Sana, killed on 16/09/2014 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Satkhira District 148. Haji Abdus Salam, son of Late Haji Shabuddin Molla, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 149. Ali Mostafa, son of Abdul Mozid, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (crossfired) 150. Mahbubur Rahman, son of Late Haji Mofiz Uddin, killed on 03/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 151. Saiful Islam, son of Habibur Rahman, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 152. Robiul Islam, son of Anarul Islam, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 153. Shaheen Alom, son of Azizur Rohman, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 154. Mahmudul Hasan, son of Abdur Razzak, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 155. Iqbal Hossen Tuhin, son of Abdul Bari Dofadar, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 156. Shamsul Haque, son of Abdul Mazed, killed on 27/11/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 157. Arif Billah, son of Late Rohim Box Morol, killed on 04/03/2013 by the police (kidnapped) 158. Ruhul Amin, son of Late Rohim Box Morol, killed on 04/03/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 159. Ruhul Amin Gazi, son of Nur Islam Gazi, killed on 16/07/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 160. Sheikh Mostafa, son of Md Aftab Uddin, killed on 16/07/2013 by RAB (crossfired) 161. Shamsur Rahman, son of Abdul Mazid, killed on 05/03/2013 by the police (crossfired) 162. Arizul Islam, son of Sabet Ali, killed on 03/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 163. Hossain Ali, son of Fazar Ali, killed on 03/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 164. Shofikul Islam, son of Aftab Uddin, killed on 25/10/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 165. Abdus Sabur, son of Late Zaker Shordar, killed on 05/11/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 166. Atiyar Shordar, son of Late Abdul Zabbar, killed on 25/11/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) (Continued)

174

Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Table 8.5 (Continued) 167. Jahangir Hossain, son of Abdul Wahed, killed on 16/12/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 168. Shohidullah, son of Iliyas Hossain, killed on 16/12/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 169. Hafizul Islam, son of Lokman Dofadar, killed on 24/12/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 170. Anarul Islam, son of Abdul Hannan, killed on 14/01/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 171. Abu Hanif Choton, son of Md Shohor Ali, killed on 18/01/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 172. Maruf Hossen, son of Qari Ashraful Alom, killed on 26/01/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) 173. Abul Kalam Azad, son of Akbar Ali, killed on 26/01/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) 174. Aminur Rahman, son of Mofizuddin Shordar, killed on 27/04/2014 by DB (kidnapped) 175. Shirajul Islam, son of Late Babor Ali Shordar, killed on 29/04/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) 176. Md Ashraful Islam, son of Late Adom Ali Morol, killed on 07/05/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 177. Md Aktar Hossen, son of Fazle Kobir Karigor, killed on 03/04/2014 by RAB (kidnapped and crossfired) 178. Habibullah, son of Sofor Uddin Sheikh, killed on 18/02/2016 by RAB (crossfired) 179. Kamal Uddin Gain, son of Late Rohmotullah Gain, killed on 09/01/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Borguna District 180. Shofikul Islam, son of Jalal Ahmed, killed on 02/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Potuakhali District 181. Mawlana Md Sikandar Ali, son of Md Rustom Ali, killed on 15/01/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 182. Md Ibrahim, son of Moulavi Abdul Rashid Ali, killed on 05/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Barishal District 183. Yunus Molla, killed on 05/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 184. Joshim Uddin, son of Abdur Razzak Hawladar, killed on 07/02/2015 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Pirojpur District 185. Shukkur Ali, son of Siddikur Rahman, killed on 12/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Mymensingh District 186. Abdur Razzak, son of Somir Uddin, killed on 13/05/2009 by BCL In Dhaka District 187. Hafeez MD Monsur Ahmed, son of Abdur Razzak Prodhaniya, killed on 29/12/2013 by police (DPR) 188. Md Shah Jamal, son of Mohammdas Shah Jalal, killed on 12/10/2013 by RPB (DPR) 189. Kholilur Rahman Mollik, son of Abdul Baten Mollik, killed on 14/08/2013 by police (DPR)

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 175 190. Md Khalid Mahmood Saifullah, son of Abdul Jolil, killed on 06/06/2023 by RAB (DPR) 191. Imdamullah, son of Late Jalal Uddin, killed on 31/01/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) In Manikgonj District 192. Mawlana Nasir Uddin, son of Yusuf Ali Bepari, killed on 24/02/2013 by BAL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 193. Hafez Shah Alom, son of Nasir Uddin, killed on 24/02/2013 by BAL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 194. Alomgir Hossen, son of Rezzaz Molla, killed on 24/02/2013 by BAL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 195. Nazim Uddin, son of Moznu Molla, killed on 24/02/2013 by BAL, RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 196. Shamsul Alom, son of Late Solaiman Mondol, killed on 05/05/2014 by BAL, RPB (DPR) 197. Muhammad Asgor Khan Rahat, son of M. Soleman Khan, killed on 25/02/2013 by police (crossfired) In Sylhet District 198. Golam Robbani, son of Mohibur Rahman, killed on 20/03/2013 by the police (DPR, crossfired) 199. Lokman Ahmed, son of Abdul Mannan, killed on 28/02/2013 by the police (DPR) 200. Jalal Ahmed, son of Late Motrup Ali, killed on 24/03/2015 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Comilla District 201. Mohammad Ibrahim Kholilullah, son of Md Abul Kashem, killed on 18/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 202. M. Shahabuddin Patowari, son of Mawlana Joynal Ahmed Patowari, killed on 06/02/2015 (kidnapped) 203. Anwar Hossen, son of Mohammad Abu Taher, killed on 12/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 204. M. Abdul Kaiyum Bacchu, son of M. Amir Uddin Molla, killed on 25/03/2011 by the BCL (kidnapped) 205. M. Mizanur Rahman, son of Late Abdul Kalam, killed on 31/01/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 206. Mohammad Main Uddin, son of Mohammad Abdul Mozid, killed on 31/05/2011 by the BCL (Kidnapped) 207. M. Alauddin, son of Late M. Delowar Khondokar, killed on 13/10/2012 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 208. M. Abdul Aziz, son of M. Ibrahim Bhuiya, killed on 24/06/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 209. M. Ruhul Amin Dulal, son of Late M. Ali Akbor, killed on 22/10/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 210. Md Naim Uddin Murad, son of Late Iqbal Ahmed, killed on 09/05/2010 by the BCL (kidnapped) In Chandpur District 211. Monowar Jawad Siam, son of Md Mozibor Rohman Shumon, killed on 03/12/2013 by RPB (DPR) 212. Hafez Md Najmus Shahadat, son of Late Md Boshir Ulla Member, killed on 05/01/2014 (kidnapped) (Continued)

176

Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Table 8.5 (Continued) In Noakhali District 213. Shohidullah Liton, son of Mahadullah, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 214. Khokon, son of Mozibul Haque, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 215. Nur Uddin, son of Nurul Amin, killed on 01/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 216. Harunur Rashid, son of Shiraj Mia, killed on 01/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 217. Ismail Hossen Shumon, son of Oli Ahmed, killed on 18/08/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 218. Abdus Sattar Chan Mia, son of Abdul Khalek, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 219. Abdul Aziz Rayhan, son of Abdur Razzak, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 220. Saiful Islam, son of Nurul Islam, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 221. Sadek Hossen Saddam, son of Jahangir Khokon, killed on 27/02/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) 222. Mahmudul Haque Nishu, son of Mahbubul Haque, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 223. Motiur Rahman Shojib, son of Abdur Rahman, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 224. Saiful Islam Babul, son of Abul Kashem, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 225. Hafez Jobayer Rahman, son of Johirul Islam, killed on 13/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 226. Omor Faruk, son of Md Nur Alom, killed on 06/04/2015 by RAB (crossfired) 227. Korban Ali, son of Md Lokman Ali, killed on 01/03/2013 by the police (crossfired) 228. Mahmudul Hossain, son of Khorshed Alom, killed on 20/11/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 229. Abdun Nur Rasel, son of Shofiullah, killed on 14/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 230. Mamun Haydar, son of Mawlana Rofikuddin, killed on 12/01/2014 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) In Lokkhipur District 231. Shihab Uddin, son of Humayun Kabir, killed on 12/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 232. Dr. Foyez Ahmed, son of Late Joynal Abedin, killed on 14/12/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) In Chittagong District 233. Emran Khan Razib, son of Babul Khan, killed on 05/02/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 234. Afzal Ahmed, son of Zamir Ahmed, killed on 05/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 235. Shofikul Islam, son of Jalal Ahmed, killed on 05/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 236. Harunur Rashid Kaysar, son of Md Didarul Haque, killed on 28/03/2010 by the BCL (crossfired)

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 177 237. Masud Bin Habib, son of Md Habibur Rahman, killed on 08/02/2012 by the BCL (crossfired) 238. Muhammad Mamun Hossain, son of Muhammad Rofiuddin, killed on 10/01/2014 (crossfired) 239. Muzahidul Islam Jahed, son of M. Humayun Kabir, killed on 08/02/2012 by the BCL (crossfired) 240. Mohiuddin Masum, son of Fazlul Kader, killed on 11/03/2010 by the BCL (kidnapped) 241. Abid bin Islam, son of Monirul Islam, killed on 05/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 242. Advocate Jahed Mahmud, son of Late Sultan Ahmed, killed on 10/02/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 243. Rezaul Hayat Roman, son of Aiyub Ali, killed on 31/03/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 244. Hafez Muhammad Harun, son of Fazal Karim, killed on 01/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 245. Abdullah Al Rasel Babu, son of Shamsul Alom, killed on 07/08/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 246. Rasel, son of Jafor Ahammod, killed on 13/09/2013 by RAB. 247. Abu Bakr Siddik Parvez, son of Jamal Ullah, killed on 07/08/2010 by the BCL (kidnapped) 248. Md Usman, son of Abul Kashem, killed on 15/12/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 249. Aminul Islam Amin, son of Shahabul Islam, killed on 20/11/2013 by the police (kidnapped) 250. Shofikul Islam Rasel, son of Mohammad Dulal, killed on 05/01/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) 251. Mosharrof Hossain, son of Mawlana Mahmudullah, killed on 19/01/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 252. Enamul Haque Lalu, son of Muhammad Kamal Uddin, killed on 05/01/2014 by RPB (DPR) 253. Shakibul Islam, son of Late Mawlana Osmanul Haque, killed on 28/01/2015 by RAB (kidnapped) 254. Misbah Uddin, son of Ahmed Sofa Prokash Badshah, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 255. Aktar Kamal Shagor, son of Abul Kashem, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 256. Mahfuzur Rahman Shikdar, son of Late Hafizur R. Shikdar, killed on 21/03/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 257. Ahmed Saleh, son of Late Hamid Ali, killed on 15/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 258. Abu Taher, son of Late Abdur Rashid, killed on 02/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 259. Osman Goni, son of Abu Saiyad, killed on 02/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 260. Shohidul Islam, son of Abu Taher, killed on 02/03/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 261. Joshim Uddin, son of Late Fazal Karim, killed on 12/02/2014 by RAB (crossfired) 262. Moin Uddin Munna, son of Abdur Rahman, killed on 22/03/2013 by the police (kidnapped) 263. Abdul Hakim, son of Late Abdul Hakim, killed on 02/09/2011 by the BCL (crossfired) (Continued)

178

Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

Table 8.5 (Continued) 264. Kamal Uddin, son of Late Muhammad Islam, killed on 03/09/2011 by the BCL (crossfired) 265. Abul Bashar, son of Late Dudu Miya, killed on 14/10/2016 by RAB (kidnapped) 266. Zubairul Islam, son of Mawlana Mohammad Yunus, killed on 15/01/2015 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Cox’s Bazar District 267. Abdur Rashid, son of Haji Iliyas, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, crossfired) 268. Sajjad Hossen, son of Jamal Uddin, killed on 28/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 269. Mohammad Ismail, son of Abu Bakar Siddik, killed on 29/10/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 270. Abu Bakar Siddik, son of Ismail, killed on 29/10/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 271. Tofayel Ahmed, son of Kolim Ullah, killed on 15/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 272. Nurul Haque, son of Nurul Amin, killed on 15/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 273. Hamidul Haque, son of Abul Khayer, killed on 13/08/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 274. Abdul Aziz, son of Alomgir Majhi, killed on 29/10/2013 by RAB (kidnapped) 275. Mohiuddin Masum, son of Fazlul Kader, killed on 11/02/2010 by the BAL (crossfired) 276. Ahmed Saleh, son of Hamid Ali, killed on 15/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Brahmanbaria District 277. Hafez Mawlana Abu Taher, son of Md Ansar Ali, killed on 09/11/2014 by RAB (kidnapped) In Faridpur District 278. Md Saddam Hossen, son of Md Rofiqul Islam, killed on 05/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) 279. Hafez Al Amin, son of Abdur Jabbar Sheikh, killed on 05/05/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Feni District 280. Hafez Abdullah Al Salam, son of Mawlana Sultan Ahmed, killed on 10/12/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) In Jamalpur District 281. Hafez Romjan Ali, son of K M Moin Uddin, killed on 09/03/2009 by the BAL, BCL (crossfired) In Razbari District 282. Abdus Salam, son of Late A. Mojid, killed on 20/02/2013 by RPB (DPR, kidnapped) [RPB = RAB, Police and BGB together; DPR = During a Protest Rally]

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 179 From 2009 to May  2023, the regime filed 111,567 cases, largely false and concocted, against 398,826 BNP leaders and activists. In the last 14  years, 1,537 BNP leaders and activists got killed; among them, 799 were murdered by the law enforcement agencies. A total of 72 leaders of BNP faced forced disappearance (goom). From 22 August 2009 to May 2023, a total of 1,790 BNP leaders and activists became seriously injured by the police and BAL thugs (Manabzamin, May 23, 2013). The government used law enforcement agencies and its party activists to attack and stop meetings and assemblies conducted by Jamaat and Shibir and other opposition parties. The regime made permission from the police mandatory before holding any public meeting, rally, or even indoor meetings— violating Article 37 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Attacking, kidnapping, charging with criminal cases, torturing and killing of Jamaat and Shibir activists have not only become normalized but also eulogized in the official discourse and BAL-controlled media. Bangladesh under the current BAL regime led by Sheikh Hasina is a horrific nightmare and a death-zone for the Jamaat and Shibir. Notes 1 See national dailies such as the Daily Nayadiganta, February  16, 2010; 51 the Daily Prothom Alo, 15 February 2010. 2 See the Daily Nayadiganta, April 24, 2010. 3 Article 27, Equity before the law: All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal right protection of law. Article 31, Right to protection of Law: To enjoy the protection of the law and to be treated in accordance with law, is the inalienable right of every citizen, where he may be and of every other person for the time being within Bangladesh, and in particular no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law. Article 32, Protection of right to life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance with the law. Article 37, Freedom of assembly: Every citizen shall have the right to assemble and to participate in public meetings and processions peacefully and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public order or public health. Article 38, Freedom of association: Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or public order. 4 See also the Daily Ittefaq, January 27, 2011; the Daily New Age, February 1, 2011; the Daily Star, February 5, 2011. 5 See also the Daily Prothom Alo, January  30, 2012; the Daily Star, February  9, 2012. 6 After the Pilkhana Tragedy, BDR was officially renamed as the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) on January 23, 2011. 7 On September 17, 2014, the Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court reduced the sentence of Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, revising the death sentence to life imprisonment. Since then, he has been in jail. 8 See Daily Jugantor, April 10, 2013. 9 Article 32: No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law. Article 6: Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

180

Anwarul Wadud and Md Saidul Islam

10 See (a) Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/03/ bangladesh-man-released-from-long-secret-detention/; (b) Aljazeera, www.aljazeera. com/news/2016/8/29/concern-over-missing-sons-of-bangladeshi-politicians; (c) Jamaat, https://jamaat-e-islami.org/en/news-details.php?category=1&news=1252; (d) Daily Star, www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-223251; (e) Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/001/2012/en/; (f) Daily New Nation, https://thedailynewnation.com/news/135712/barisal-family-members-ofmissing-students-of-islamic-university-waliullah-and-al-muqaddas-arranged-a-pressconference-in-barisal-on-tuesday.html; and (g) Dhaka Tribune, https://archive. dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2014/03/04/rise-in-forced-disappearance. 11 Source: Physical investigation with content analysis of various authentic sources.

References Ahmed, Anis. 2013. “Bangladesh Islamist Sentenced to Life in Prison for War Crimes.” YAHOO News, February  5, 2013. https://archive.ph/20130412051443/news. yahoo.com/bangladesh-islamist-sentenced-life-prison-war-crimes-123137810.html. Al-Jazeerah. 2016. “Bangladesh Executes Motiur Rahman Nizami for War Crimes.” May  11. www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/5/11/bangladesh-executesmotiur-rahman-nizami-for-war-crimes. Almamun, Zunaid. 2020. “Political Violence in Bangladesh: Explaining the Role of State.” Theses and Dissertations 1280. https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/1280. AP News. 2014. “Violence, Boycott Mar Elections in Bangladesh.” January 5. https:// apnews.com/article/31abd84f6ae849b48a32540e535c2f86. Bangladesh Timeline. 2009. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2009.htm. ———. 2012. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2012. htm. ———. 2013. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2013.htm. ———. 2014. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2014.htm. ———. 2015. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2015.htm. ———. 2016. www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2016.htm. BBC News. 2013. “Deadly Violence Over Bangladesh Poll Date.” November  26. www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25099474. ———. 2013. “Three Killed in Bangladesh Clashes Over War Crimes Trials.” February 15. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21477499. Bdnews24.com. 2023. “One Killed in Comilla Clashes.” February  18. https:// bdnews24.com/politics/one-killed-in-comilla-clashes. ———. 2023. “Sylhet Jamaat Businesses Burnt,”, February  22. https://bdnews24. com/bangladesh/sylhet-jamaat-businesses-burn. CNN. 2023. “Bangladesh High Court Declares Rules Against Islamist party.” August 1. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/01/world/asia/bangladesh-islamist-verdict. Daily Sun. 2016. “Missing Jamaat Leader’ Found Dead in Jhenidah.” August 12. www. daily-sun.com/post/158533/%E2%80%98Missing-Jamaat-leader%E2%80%99found-dead-in-Jhenidah. Human Rights Watch. 2014. “Bangladesh: Elections Scarred by Violence: Government and Opposition Responsible for Abuses Before, During, After Polls.” April 29, 2014. www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/29/bangladesh-elections-scarred-violence.

Treatment of Jamaat and Shibir in Post-Democratic Bangladesh 181 Islam, M. Nazrul. 2021. “Political Islam in South Asia: A  Critical Appraisal of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” International Area Studies Review 24 (4): 314–34. Islam, M. Saidul. 2011. “Trampling Democracy: ‘Islamism,’ Violent Secularism, and Human Rights Violation in Bangladesh.” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 8 (1): 1–33. ———. 2022. “Bangladesh as the Epitome of a Double-Risk Society: A Foreword.” In Bangladesh Under Awami Tyranny, edited by Q. M. Jalal Khan, Zoglul Husain, and R. Chowdhury, xvi–xxii. New Jersey (NJ): Writers Republic. Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. 2022. “Our Legacy.” March 1. https://jamaateislamihind.org/ eng/our-legacy/. Khan, Q. M. Jalal, Zoglul Husain, and R. Chowdhury, eds. 2022. Bangladesh Under Awami Tyranny. New Jersey (NJ): Writers Republic. Khanyari, Ayesha. 2014. “Jamaat-e-Islami Hind: Changed Political Outlook?” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, May  20. www.ipcs.org/comm_select. php?articleNo=4453. Manabzamin. 2023. “Dhorpakor [Mass-Arrest].” May  23. https://mzamin.com/ news.php?news=56802. Mostofa, Shafi M. 2021. “Jama’at-e-Islami and Trust Building in Bangladesh.” Politics & Policy 49 (3): 708–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12403. New Age. 2016. “Two ‘Jamaat Men’ Killed in Jhenaidah ‘Gunfight’.” October  25. www.newagebd.net/article/1417/article/index.php. Odhikar. 2010. “Human Rights Report 2010, January  1, 2011.” https://odhikar. org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Annual_Human_Rights_Report_2010.pdf. ———. 2013. “Human Rights Report 2012.” https://odhikar.org/wp-content/ uploads/2013/01/report-Annual-Human-Rights-Report-2012-eng.pdf. ———. 2014. “Human Rights Report 2013.” https://odhikar.org/wp-content/ uploads/2014/08/Annual-Human-Rights-Report-2013-eng.pdf. ———. 2015. “Bangladesh: Human Rights Report 2015.” www.humanrights.asia/ wp-content/uploads/2018/09/BANGLADESH-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT2015-BY-Odhikar.pdf. Petersen, Hannah Ellis, and  Shaikh Azizur Rahman. 2023. “ ‘They Beat Me with Sticks’: Bangladesh Opposition Reels Under Crackdown as Thousands Arrested.” January  22. www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/22/bangladesh-oppositioncrackdown-thousands-arrested. SATP (South Asia Terrorism Portal). 2015. www.satp.org/terrorist-incident-text/ bangladesh/islami-chhatra-shibir-ics_Nov-2015#. ———. 2016. www.satp.org/terrorist-incident-text/bangladesh/islami-chhatra-shibirics_Apr-2016. Suykens, Bert, and Aynul Islam. 2015. The Distribution of Political Violence in Bangladesh (2002–2013). Ghent: Conflict Research Group, Ghent University. US Department of State. 2013. “2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— Bangladesh.” Accessed April  19, 2013. www.refworld.org/docid/517e6e6618. html. ———. 2016. “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bangladesh.” www. state.gov/reports/2016-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bangladesh/.

9 Execution of Jamaat Leaders National Villain or Fallen Heroes? Maruf Billah

Introduction Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (hereinafter ‘Jamaat’) is the biggest Islamic political party of Bangladesh. The original party was formed in  Lahore, in the then British-controlled India (now Pakistan) in 1941 by Maulana Abul ‘Ala Maududi (1903–1979), who was one of the great Muslim theologians and socio-political philosophers in the 20th century. The party was founded to modify the society according to the faith of Islam, and it sketched its motivation from the example of the Islamic Prophet  Muhammad’s novel Muslim community in Medina. The party had aimed for ethical reform and political accomplishment in the Indian Subcontinent but was not active in nationalist movements due to the universality of Islam. Jamaat aimed to offer an alternate to the practices of Sufism and intended to generate educated and sincere Muslim leaders who could lead the Muslims towards a revitalisation of Islam in the 21st century (Britannica 2020). To date, Jamaat is considered as one of the most significant religio-political groups of the Muslim world, predominantly in South Asia (Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Muslim World 2021). Jamaat primarily focused on social activities in a variety of fields and inspired the Muslims in setting up a better humanity through social, political, ideological and intellectual developments. It played active roles in ending the British rule in India and making political reforms in Pakistan and later in Bangladesh. Since its inception, Jamaat has been facing numerous political challenges and confrontations from the ruling political regimes. One such challenge is the war crimes tribunal because of its controversial roles in Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971. The central aim of this chapter is to critically examine and legally scrutinize the recent execution of the top Bangladeshi Jamaat leaders. In a democratic system of government, any political party has the right to oppose any decision made by the political regime. Jamaat, following this democratic norm, opposed the partition of Pakistan and remained committed to a united Pakistan. Although it was a mere political decision, after the independence of Bangladesh the decision itself was regarded as a huge political blunder and later ‘crimes against humanity’ by the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh (ICTB) set up by the current Bangladesh Awami League DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-9

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 183 (BAL)-led regime. The international offences such as genocide and crimes against humanity charged against Jamaat leaders are yet to be established beyond any reasonable doubt in both domestic and international criminal laws. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the recent execution of Jamaat leaders by the ICTB for the alleged heinous crimes perpetrated during the war of independence of Bangladesh in 1971. While the ICTB has proved that Jamaat leaders were involved in committing heinous crimes in 1971 as collaborators to the Pakistani army, it is subject to controversy. Hence, this chapter first examines the exact role of Jamaat (as a political party) and its leaders played in 1971. Second, the chapter analyses the historical background in the formation of the ICTB in 1973, its postponement up to 2009 and the reopening of the Tribunal in 2010. Third, the overall trial process of the Jamaat leaders in a domestic tribunal, that is, the ICTB, is examined by discussing its legal merits and demerits in applying domestic and international criminal law standards, which are crucial for the implementation of death sentences of the accused. Fourth, this study examines whether Jamaat leaders were victims of political killing. Then, this study lastly concludes whether the execution of Jamaat leaders for the so-called atrocious offences in 1971 will characterize them as ‘villain’ or ‘fallen’. Role of Jamaat and Its Leaders in the War of Liberation in 1971 The war of Bangladesh’s liberation started with the military crackdown ‘Operation Searchlight’ of the Pakistani army on 25th March night 1971. In the liberation war, while the majority of the people from East Pakistan (current Bangladesh) supported an independent Bangladesh, a group of people were against the partition of the united Pakistan. According to the ICTB, among them were some sections of Bangalees, Biharis, other pro-Pakistanis, as well as members of a number of different religion-based political parties, particularly Jamat[-e-]Islami, Muslim League, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Council Muslim League, Nejam E Islami who joined and/or collaborated with the Pakistan occupation army to aggressively resist the conception of independent Bangladesh (Chief Prosecutor v. Molla, para. 12). From the statement of the Tribunal, it is clear that Jamaat certainly opposed the Liberation War with many other Islamic Political parties in the united Pakistan who wanted to protect the identity of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. However, any claim that the Jamaat leaders played a vital role in suppressing the Freedom War and committed heinous crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity is still controversial and subject to scrutiny. First, a scrutiny to the Collaborators Order 1972 is relevant here in examining the role of Jamaat leaders in 1971. Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order 1972 was promulgated through the Bangladesh Parliament in 1972, as the initial attempt to try and penalize local culprits, who aided the Pakistani military in facilitating international offences throughout the 1971 War. The Collaborators Order1 was enacted on 24 January 1972 to bring the

184  Maruf Billah Pakistani army’s local collaborators to trial. It was passed with a retroactive effect from 26 March 1971, to cover the crimes perpetrated throughout the nine months of the Liberation War (26 March–16 December 1971). A Distinct Tribunal was formed with exclusive jurisdiction to try the collaborators as defined in the Order. Though the Order defined the term ‘collaborator’, it did not contain any unique offences under the Order. A schedule, which referred to offences defined under the Penal Code and increased the penalties, was attached to it. For instance, under the Bangladesh Penal Code, an attempt to commit culpable homicide under Section 308 can be punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years or a fine or both. The same offence committed as a collaborator with the Pakistani army under the Collaborators Order could be punished with severe detention of up to ten years under Section 9(b). The definition of ‘collaborator’ given in Section  2 was too general and included nearly any kind of behaviour that supported the Pakistani army.2 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) strongly objected to this broad definition and the retroactive enactment of the Order (International Commission of Jurists 1972, 8). The Collaborators Order had several procedural shortcomings that impeded the due process. For instance, a person suspected of being a collaborator could be arrested by the police on mere suspicion, without a warrant. The magistrate could then order his or her detention for six months, and the government was empowered to extend the period of detention indefinitely if additional time was required for the police inquiry. Also, the right to be released on bail was excluded without exception. Further, the government could seize any property belonging to a suspect or his family if the person was escaping or otherwise hiding himself to keep away from an appearance.3 Upon the enforcement of the Order, on 3 October 1972, The Ministry of Home Affairs announced that 41,800 persons had been arrested under the Order (Mascarenhas 1986, 25) and that the trials against some 2,000 people had started (International Commission of Jurists 1972, 9). In total, 2,848 were brought to trial, and 752 of those were sentenced (Hossain 2008, 53). However, at this stage of the proceeding, the government took a new direction. On 30 November 1973, it decided to release most of the detainees and convicts through a presidential order, the General Amnesty Order (Oette and Ferstman 2004, 27). The amnesty applied to all perpetrators except those who were charged with murder, rape or arson. It is said, however, that many perpetrators belonging to these categories were also released (Ziauddin 1996, 103), but their names were never announced publicly, and the reasons are unknown. The ICJ welcomed the decision and anticipated that nearly 35,000 people benefitted from this clemency (International Commission of Jurists 1972, 11). From the above historic and documented facts, under Collaborators Order, many Jamaat leaders might have been arrested and prosecuted if they were actively involved in aiding and abetting the Pakistani army and committing international crimes against the civilian population according to the ICTB finding as outlined earlier. Several arguments might be strengthened in this instance. (a) The Collaborators Order was very loose and general law that was

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 185 pervasive and included nearly any kind of behaviour that abetted the Pakistani army, so any Jamaat leaders could have been arrested easily for their act of collaboration with the Pakistani army. (b) Under this law, a person suspected of being a collaborator could be arrested by the police on mere suspicion without a warrant, which is more likely to detain and arrest any opposition party leaders (including Jamaat) due to their aid and abetment to the Pakistani army. (c) At the material time of the operation of the Collaborators Order 1972, it is fair to believe that anyone could have been arrested because fresh evidences against all the perpetrators were in hand. (d) It was a fact at that time that no Jamaat leaders who have been imposed death penalty by the ICTB recently did hide or abscond from Bangladesh. However, the situation is totally opposite. Neither the Tribunal nor the Prosecution has presented evidence against any Jamaat leaders showing that they were involved in abetting and aiding Pakistani army and were convicted or even arrested under Collaborators Order 1972. Furthermore, as outlined earlier that the Collaborators Order 1972 was promulgated to try and punish the anti-liberation persons who had aided the Pakistani army, under this domestic criminal proceeding, 752 suspects were found guilty and were punished. However, no Jamaat leaders or members were among the 752 who were convicted and punished (Jalil 2010, 112). This proves that no one from Jamaat’s leadership or members was detected as collaborator, abettor or war criminal throughout the ruling period of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972–1975). Hence, it would be difficult to believe that Jamaat leaders who are prosecuted by the ICTB committed international crimes in 1971 Liberation War for which they are being executed now. A recent study shows that it is proved beyond any reasonable doubt and unchallenged until today that no single case has been filed against any leaders and members of Jamaat between 1972 and 1975 in any police stations of Bangladesh (Jalil 2012, 335). As a result, it is difficult to articulate legally and historically that the Jamaat leaders played any vital role in aiding and abetting the Pakistani army to commit heinous crimes against civilian and unarmed Bengali population, although they were against the idea of separation of Pakistan. Second, an examination of some recent cases of the ICTB is also relevant in reaching a plausible conclusion on the actual role of Jamaat leaders in the 1971 War. In the case of Aziz and Others, the ICTB observed: [A]n ‘individual’ or a ‘group of individuals’ or ‘organization’ under the Act of 1973 . . . have been arraigned for committing the alleged offences in exercise of their membership in and potential affiliation with the ‘auxiliary force’—the Razakar Bahini. (Chief Prosecutor v. Abdul Aziz and Others, para. 5) In this case, the Tribunal was saying that the addition of ‘individual’ or a ‘group of individuals’ in the ICTB’s personal jurisdiction was aimed at proving that the perpetrators were affiliated with the ‘auxiliary force’ or Razakar Bahini. However, no definition of the auxiliary force was given by the ICTB

186  Maruf Billah and the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Act 1973. In Amir and others’ case, the defence contended that tribunal failed to establish the association of the accused with the Razakar Bahini and therefore the defendant shall be freed from the alleged charges (Chief Prosecutor v. Amir and Others, para. 49). Nevertheless, the ICTB concluded that it possessed the jurisdictional power to prosecute any ‘individual’ or ‘group of individuals’ then stated its jurisdictional power over a defendant for not being a member of the Razakar groups merely as an individual (Ibid., para. 50). It reasoned: [Because of] mere failure to prove membership in Razakar Bahini an accused cannot be exonerated if he is found to have had participation and complicity with the commission of the offences alleged even in the capacity of an ‘individual (Ibid.). Without any affiliation into an organization, how an individual’s criminal activity would have been carried out massively that shocked the conscience of the humanity was never analysed by the Tribunal and the Prosecution. Furthermore, in this case, the reasoning of the Tribunal does not seem logical as someone cannot escape from being convicted by the ICTB even if he is not involved with Razakar Bahini. It means anyone can be convicted in the ICTB without clearly showing his involvement in the atrocity (Islam 2011). In most of the cases, there are no evidences forwarded by the prosecution to prove that the Jamaat leaders were affiliated with Razakar Bahini. For example, the accused Nizami was charged with genocide and crimes against humanity for his membership in the Razakar Bahini. One of the factors for this accusation was that he was the leader of Jamaat in 1971 (Chief Prosecutor v. Nizami, para. 53). The Tribunal has a strong tendency to presume that if someone was involved in the politics of Jamaat, automatically he was part of the Razakar force, while this was not the case at that time. The same erroneous presumption is also maintained by many anti-Jamaat scholars who view the members of Jamaat as a political organization and its affiliated groups as belonging to the auxiliary Razakar forces (Islam 2019, 52). However, they could not produce any historical evidence or document to show that Jamaat was directly involved with the atrocities, except by referring to the ICTB cases, which too missed any cited authority or evidentiary proof. Needless to say that it is historically true that Jamaat opposed the Liberation War along with many other religion-based political parties in the united Pakistan, as mentioned earlier. However, the fact that the Jamaat leaders committed heinous crimes being involved in the Razakar Bahini created by the Pakistani Army has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The historical and circumstantial evidences show that the Collaborators Order 1972 was promulgated to try and punish the anti-liberation persons who had aided the Pakistani Army; however, not even a single leader or member of the Jamaat was charged and found guilty for being Razakars. Therefore, it is difficult to reasonably prove that the Jamaat members committed any crime during the

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 187 war of 1971. Furthermore, in many cases, the ICTB used very generic word through contending that ‘Jamat-e-Islami actively aided, abetted, facilitated and substantially assisted, contributed and provided moral support and encouragement in committing appalling atrocities in 1971 in the territory of Bangladesh (Chief prosecutor v. Molla, para. 17)’. Hence, the actual role of Jamaat leaders was that they opposed the Liberation War, but there was no proven evidence that they committed any crime as individuals or at the organizational level. Judicial Initiative to Prosecute and Punish Jamaat Leaders Although the Jamaat leaders were not actively or passively involved in committing any atrocious acts in the Liberation War, they were subjected to face trial by the present Bangladeshi regime and sentenced to death by the governmentcontrolled ICTB. This section of the chapter outlines the first legal proceeding to try and punish the alleged war criminals in 1973, its postponement in 1974 and its re-emergence in 2010, which is continuing now. Soon after the Liberation War, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was sent back to Dhaka from West Pakistani prison, he expressed his desire to form a tribunal to prosecute the offenders of war crimes through an international trial process (McDermott 1973, 483). There were several mandates on this initiative confirmed by the international stakeholders. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights encouraged this idea (Ibid.). The ICJ also voiced concerns regarding establishing a national tribunal and instead recommended trials through an international judicial mechanism via the authority of the United Nations by suggesting the appointment of judges from neutral countries. One of the motives of this suggestion was due to the experience with the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, which was criticized for having judges exclusively from the victorious nations (International Commission of Jurists 1972, 63). Despite the recommendations from the international community, the project of punishing the war criminals was held at the domestic level; the reason was not revealed by the then Bangladeshi authority. A law was proposed for the prosecution of high-level criminals from the Pakistani military. The details of the ICT Act 1973, several constitutional amendments to secure this legal mechanism, and political circumstances of post-war Bangladesh that finally contributed to the ICT Act’s deferment in 1974 are discussed next. The International Crimes Tribunals Act, 1973

Before passing the ICT Act 1973, the ICT Bill was positioned for attention in the Parliament of Bangladesh on 17 July 1973, and followed by three days of discussion, the ICT Act was adopted to prosecute the culprits of international offences committed in Bangladesh’s ‘historic struggle for national liberation’ so that the morality of humanity could be paid off.4 Serajul Huq, a member of the Parliament explained the necessity of passing the ICT Act 1973 during the parliamentary debates:

188  Maruf Billah If we were revengeful on them, we could bring 70,000 for trial, but only 195 persons will be tried only to vindicate our sense of justice. ‘The rarer action is in virtue than in vengeance.’ Mr. Speaker, we believe that we are going to bring these people into punishment not because they devastated our land but because we have a responsibility towards suffering humanity and the entire population of the world is looking to us.5 It was a clear indication that the original Act was promulgated to prosecute and punish only 195 Pakistani army personnel, not even any of the local collaborators, because, at that time, the Collaborators Order 1972 was in effect. With the help of local and global criminal law experts, the ICT Act was passed on 20 July 1973 in Bangladesh Legislative Assembly. Unlike the Collaborators Order, the ICT Act was aimed at bringing the main perpetrators to trial, which means it was only designed to indict and penalize 195 Pakistani criminals who committed heinous crimes in Bangladesh Freedom Fight (Beringmeier 2018, 45). Section 3(1) of the ICT Act 1973 says, ‘[a]ny person irrespective of his nationality who, being a member of any armed, defense or auxiliary forces’ could be tried under the 1973 Act. The ICT Act was given jurisdiction over international crimes. Section 3(2) of the 1973 Act says: [T]he Tribunal has power to try and punish crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide, war crimes, violations of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and any other crimes under international law. To give immediate effect to the ICT Act 1973, following Constitutional Amendments took place in 1973. Constitutional Amendments

Accordingly, the Constitution of Bangladesh 1972 was amended through the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1973 (Act XV of 1973), to guard the ICT Act 1973 against being challenged due to any inconsistencies with any other laws of Bangladesh. The amendment inserted a new sub-section (3) into Article 47 and precluded the possibility to declare any law for the trial of war criminals as unconstitutional. The intention behind this amendment was to overcome conflicts that arose concerning the retroactivity of the law, which was discussed broadly during the drafting process (Islam 2009, 128). Hitherto, Article 47(3) not only refers to retroactivity but also excludes challenges based on any constitutional ground. It states the following: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed or defense or auxiliary forces (or any individual, group of individuals or organization) or

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 189 who is a prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law shall be deemed void or unlawful . . . of this Constitution. It is indispensable mentioning here that the constitution used the same words and phrases used by the ICT Act’s Section 3(1). The above modification also inserted Article 47A into the Constitution, which disregards some basic rights of an accused in the ICT Act, among them the right to equal protection of the law (Art. 31), right to prohibit retroactive criminalization (Art. 35), and the right to move for any criminal cases to the Supreme Court (Art. 44). Article 47A of the Constitution reads: (1) The rights guaranteed under Article 31, clauses (1) and (3) of Article 35 and Article 44 shall not apply to any person to whom a law specified in clause (3) of Article 47 applies. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no person to whom a law specified in clause (3) of Article 47 applies shall have the right to move the Supreme Court. All of these constitutional amendments treat the accused of the ICTB as the second category of citizens, violating some of their fundamental rights that cannot be derogated even in an emergency. To date, these constitutional amendments continue to be in force and have a substantial impact on the trials and the ICTB’s legal framework. However, the Act was never implemented at that time, and international as well as national political decisions led to decades of impunity by the postponement of the ICT Act 1973. Postponement of the ICTB

After the War, regional and international politics played a vital role in Bangladesh agreeing to abstain from legal action against high-level perpetrators from the Pakistani army in the post-war period. Due to the Pakistani army’s surrender on 16 December 1971 to the Indian Joint Forces, India seized roughly 92,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War (POW) (Pakistan v. India, p.  3). Among them were 195 alleged war criminals who were supposed to be sent to Bangladesh for trial (Ibid.). Pakistan filed a case against India on 11 May 1973 at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) seeking the repatriation of POW to Pakistan, including the 195 alleged war criminals (Ibid.). The case before the ICJ was never decided because the conflict was resolved through several agreements between the two countries. Due to international pressure and for recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state, Bangladesh finally agreed to the repatriation of the 195 prisoners from India to Pakistan, without any commitment from Pakistan to prosecute them (Linton 2010, 203). In adjourning the ICTB in 1973, several treaties surfaced the way for this outcome. Pakistan and India executed a deal on the

190  Maruf Billah peaceful settlement of the conflict on 2 July 1972, by the historic Simla Agreement.6 As a second deal, The Delhi Agreement7 was reached on 28 August 1973 and concretized the actions to be taken. Although Bangladesh was not a party to this agreement, it corresponded with it (Delhi Agreement, para. 10). Pakistan still refused to recognize Bangladesh as an independent state, but Bangladesh set on the table the issue of its recognition as a condition for any further negotiations (Ibid., para. 5). Through the Delhi Agreement, the deportation of all Bengalis imprisoned in Pakistan and all Pakistanis detained in Bangladesh was decided. Bangladesh agreed not to initiate any trials against the 195 prisoners held in India during the process of repatriation (Ibid.). The recognition of Bangladesh in the meantime led to a third and final agreement to settle the POW issue. On 9 April 1974 among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, a treaty called the ‘Tripartite Agreement’ was signed that became the legal foundation for the repatriation of the 195 alleged war criminals from India to Pakistan without any trials.8 A policy of forgiveness and oblivion was pursued. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as the Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, requested people to overlook the past and go forward, also swaggering that the people of Bangladesh knew how to pardon (Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees 1974, para. 14). The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh acknowledged that ‘the Government of Bangladesh had decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency (Ibid., para. 15)’. Many people considered this as a betrayal (Ziauddin 1996, 105). By the Tripartite Agreement, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman granted ‘clemency’ to 195 Pakistani POW who allegedly committed atrocities in the Liberation War. Furthermore, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman informed P. N. Haksar, the Principal Secretary of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, due to the complications of assembling evidences, he was not interested in initiating any criminal trials as they remained a ‘waste of energy and time’ (Dixit 1999, 105). It was one of the reasons that justified the postponement of any criminal sanction to be taken against Pakistani PoWs, in addition to the implementation of the Tripartite Agreement. As a result, the initiation of bringing the war criminals before a trial was postponed indefinitely until reinitiated in 2010. It transpires from the earlier discussion that the original ICT Act 1973 was passed to prosecute 195 Pakistani war criminals against whom fresh evidence of committing atrocious acts were identified by the Bangladesh and Indian authorities at that time, and not Jamaat leaders or members who sided with Pakistani regime in 1971. Reopening of the ICTB in 2010

As discussed earlier, the idea of establishing the ICTB was frozen in 1974. However, there was an ongoing demand in Bangladeshi society to end impunity by punishing war criminals. In this case, the present political regime of BAL election in 2008 was crucial for establishing the ICTB in 2010. To prosecute and punish war criminals was part of BAL’s election commitment and inordinate

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 191 interest for the party because the party was one of the core targets of the Pakistani military operations during the 1971 War. Accordingly, the ICTB was created in 2010. The following discussion focuses on some essential characteristics of the ICTB, which is still in operation. The ICTB officially commenced on 25 March 2010,9 shortly after the BAL’s election victory. The date was the anniversary of ‘Operation Searchlight’ and was undoubtedly not selected at random (Robertson 2015, 60). It consisted initially of one tribunal, but a second tribunal (ICTB 2) was established two years later, on 22 March 2012, to reduce the workload and speed up the proceedings. Nevertheless, in August 2015, it was decided to merge both tribunals, allegedly due to a decrease in cases. Tribunal 2 was therefore deactivated on 15 September 2015, and only one tribunal continues functioning today. Section  3 of the 1973 Act sanctioned the ICTB ‘to try and punish any person . . . who [is] being a member of any armed, defense or auxiliary forces, commits or has committed’ [certain specified international crimes in Bangladesh]’. However, to include the Jamaat leaders and any other civilians, there was an amendment to the ICT Act 1973, which took place in 2009 that replaced the term ‘person’ with the addition of ‘individual or group of individuals’. This addition of ‘individual’ or ‘group of individuals’ to the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is regarded as an extension of the scope of finding the perpetrators of the 1971 atrocities, which is decided in many cases of the ICTB (Molla v. Chief Prosecutor, p. 17). None of the ICTB cases identified the legal difference between ‘person’ and ‘individual’ and how the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal was expanded. All of the accused and convicts are Bangladeshi citizens who allegedly cooperated with the Pakistani army as Razakars during the Liberation struggle. Although Section 3(1) of the ICT Act provides for the trial and punishment of ‘any individual or group of individuals . . . irrespective of his nationality’, no intention to try Pakistani nationals has been expressed. The Tribunal passed its first charge framing order on 3 November  2011 and the first judgment approximately three years after its establishment on 28 February 2013. From the ICTB cases, it is elucidated that though the original Act of 1973 was promulgated to try and punish only 195 Pakistani army personnel, 40 years later the same Act was amended to include any civilian, and most of the civilians were from Jamaat. So, it can be inferred that the ICT Act departed from its original spirit, which is to try and punish high suspect Pakistani army officers for their dreadful actions against the unarmed Bengali civilian in the 1971 war, which advances questions on the real intention of the Bangladesh government in punishing the perpetrators of 1971 war. Trial Process of Jamaat Leaders Through the ICTB In this part, the legal nature of the ICTB as the criminal tribunal and overall legal performance of the Tribunal are examined in evaluating the legal credibility of the ICTB as the competent judicial institution.

192  Maruf Billah Legal Nature of the ICTB

The ICTB is trying to punish the heinous acts performed throughout the Bangladesh Independence War of 1971 and operates domestically without any involvement of the UN and other international organizations. Legally, the 1973 Act creates a particular trial mechanism through two particularly constituted international tribunals (ICTB-1 and ICTB-2) in a distinct legislation, autonomous of and different from the country’s prevailing criminal law and court. It is aimed to sue and penalize those responsible for performing intercontinental crimes in the Bangladesh Independence Struggle of 1971 (Islam 2019, 213). The ICTBs are precisely assigned to prosecute dreadful ‘international crimes’ while contrasting with regular ‘national crimes’ and therefore named as ‘international crimes tribunals’ to separate them from national penal court and their criminal proceeding (Ibid., 214). In all cases, the defence counsel reiterates that the ICTB is categorized as one of the international trials due to the nature and scope of offences it is prosecuting and punishing. Hence, there shall be adherence to internationally recognized fair trial standards and due process enshrined by international laws. However, the ICTB has repeatedly asserted in many judgments that its rank is entirely domestic using jurisdiction on international crimes. They adequately specified that ‘the Tribunal is preceded by the word ‘international’ and possessed jurisdiction over [international] crimes, does not change their status from ‘domestic’ to ‘international’ tribunal’.10 Some vitiating factors reiterate that the Tribunal is domestic in nature. For example, the formation background of the Tribunal treats it solely a national tribunal because there was no treaty signed between the Bangladesh government and the UN or its organizations and no UN Resolution on the question of making an accountability machinery on abuse of human rights in the Bangladesh Independence War was conceded, while these international devices were used in the establishment of hybrid criminal trials of Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in East Timor (Billah 2021, 1). In addition, the judicial structure of the court is also tantamount to a domestic setup as there was no involvement of global judges, members and public prosecutors in the operation process of this tribunal, which is different from the hybrid criminal courts of the ECCC, SCSL and SPSC in East Timor (Ibid.). Although the ICTB was created solely to prosecute international crimes, yet it is apparently a domestic court or tribunal for the above reasons. Nevertheless, the tribunal lacks some basic characteristics that a regular domestic court must have. First, the Tribunal is specifically proscribed and precluded from applying or following the regular procedural laws of Bangladesh including the evidence law and criminal procedures law. Second, it is only operated to try and penalize international offences perpetrated throughout the 1971 Independence War of Bangladesh. Lastly, the right to protect from retroactive criminalization of the accused enjoyed by the defendant before a domestic

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 193 court all over the world and protected by the constitution is outlawed in the ICTB.11 One of the following remarks of the ICTB testify to that effect: The Act of 1973 is a special law, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act are made not applicable in the proceedings. Rather, it was provided that the provisions of the Act of 1973 shall affect anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. (Molla v. Chief Prosecutor, pp. 193, 196, 270) Once the ICT Act is considered as a particular law, the Tribunal is also automatically considered as a special court since the principal legal document is the ICT Act 1973. It may be inferred from the manner in which the substantive and procedural laws are designed, the way the tribunal is structured and the political background of the ruling party’s election manifesto under which everything is organized that the ICTB was formed to prosecute the political arch-enemies of the ruling BAL, especially the Jamaat leaders for their alleged atrocities in 1971. As the ICTB has obligation in applying the ICT Act 1973, it suffices to quote the preamble of this ICT Act to understand the draconian nature of this law and the arbitrary nature of the Tribunal as it says: An Act to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law. (Preamble, International Crime Tribunal Act 1973, 1) The preambular paragraph certainly sketches out that though the ICT Act is a national legislation, its subject matters (i.e., prosecutable international misconducts such as crimes against humanity, genocide, crimes against peace and war crimes) are originated from international penal law. Since the crimes prosecuted under the Tribunal are all international crimes, it is relevant to scrutinize whether the trial process of the Jamaat leaders was fully compliant and in congruence with international substantive and procedural criminal laws. Is There Any Legal Failure of the ICTB?

The current Bangladesh tribunal has already created a huge shadow of doubt by indicting the alleged offenders of intercontinental crimes at the national level insofar as disregarding the well-recognized substantive body of international penal law and the procedural due process mandated for the validity and constitutionality of such trial. The overall judicial function of this Tribunal, on the one hand, does not fully comply with the jurisdictional legality of a

194  Maruf Billah criminal tribunal. One of the reasons is that it omits to adhere to customary law definitions of crimes against humanity and genocide in 1971 (the material time of the commission of these offences), and 2010 (the material time of the operation of the tribunal). Another reason signifies that the tribunal is prosecuting Jamaat leaders through retrospective criminal law (the law enacted after the commission of the crimes) that is, the crimes were perpetrated in 1971, while the ICT Act was promulgated in 1973, which is prohibited in international and regional human rights laws. Hence, ICT Act 1973 is the direct violation of one of the fundamental rights preserved in the regional and international human rights laws.12 The prohibition of retrospective criminal law or ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ (if there are no crimes, no law can be imposed) is also enshrined in Art. 35(1) of Bangladesh Constitution.13 However, the ICT Act infringes on this essential right protected by the Bangladesh Constitution. Furthermore, this is a judicial process that risks setting a very dangerous precedent in an extremely volatile part of the world and is merely crying out for international intervention to afford penal justice to the parties involved. Hence, some of the extreme legal consequences involving serious discrepancies between the ICT law vis-à-vis international criminal law indispensably require a thorough overhaul of the jurisdictional bottoms of the Tribunal. First, from the personal jurisdiction of the ICTB, it is elucidated that the Tribunal so far tried and punished the accused, who are initially Bangladeshi nationals, and most of them are from the Jamaat, an opposition political party. To date, all of the Tribunal defendants were civilians who allegedly committed international offences throughout the 1971 War. Generally, in an armed conflict, many parties are involved in the commission of criminal acts. Throughout the Bangladesh Freedom War, international crimes were committed predominantly by the Pakistani army officers, political leaders of Pakistan, paramilitary forces of Pakistan, that is, Al-Badr, Razakars, freedom fighters from Bangladesh, and civilians from Bangladesh whether both pro- or antiPakistanis and non-Bangladeshi citizens such as Biharis (Linton 2010, 228). Nevertheless, due to the addition of ‘individual’ or ‘group of individuals’ in the ICTB’s personal jurisdictions through an amendment in 2009, the ICTB has prosecuted and punished some individuals who belonged to some political opposition party and who allegedly committed heinous crimes in their capacity as civilians. Hence, some blatant legal errors have occurred in identifying the personal ‘jurisdictional reach’ of the ICTB. Though the Tribunal used some narratives by saying that the Jamaat leaders were considered as ‘auxiliary force’ because they were affiliated with Razakars Force, no legal definition is given in the 1973 Act or by the ICTB to ascertain who belonged to the ‘auxiliary force’. Second, though the ICT Act 1973 is a national law to try and indict the offenders of international wrongdoings domestically in a superior court, its subject-matter jurisdiction finds its origin exclusively in international law (Bergsmo and Novic 2011, 504). Hence, a series of legal flaws is identified according to international criminal law in the ICTB’s material jurisdiction. For

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 195 example, in the ICTB’s subject-matter jurisdiction, crimes against humanity remain the major prosecutable crime. To date, against 51 persons the alleged verdicts have been given by the ICTB, in all these cases accused were found guilty of perpetrating crimes against humanity. Nonetheless, the characterization of the alleged offences repetitively violates the established international customary rule as prevailing in 1971 and 2010 (Billah 2021, 3). In 1971, commission of crimes against humanity necessitate the link of an ‘international armed conflict’ as the condition of customary rule. It is meant the offences need to be executed in the armed conflict classified as an international conflict. This principle of customary law was first disseminated in the IMT Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c).14 The same prerequisite is also pertinent to the Bangladesh Tribunal because the same criminalities were allegedly performed throughout the relevant international timeframe of the Bangladeshi Independence War (Billah 2020, 188). In addition, the ICTB’s vibrant legal failure to define the above crimes is that it neglects to apply the up-to-date criminal law condition of crimes against humanity. The crime in question requires to be done as the ‘widespread and systematic’ attack against the non-combatant populace. It was established in the 1990s through the UN-directed ad hoc international criminal courts (the ICTY and the ICTR), hence considered as the latest principle of international customary law.15 Later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 1998 approved it as evolving principle of customary rule with several internationalized criminal courts, which are trying and penalizing crimes against humanity recently.16 However, the description of crimes against humanity in the Bangladesh Tribunal does not comply with the current and previous developments of customary laws, while they are crucial for recognizing and segregating the crimes against humanity from the regular national criminalities. Then, in indicting genocide, the Tribunal applies the essentials of the meaning of genocide as categorized under international legislation; it extended the description of genocide through adding of ‘political group’ as one of the threatened sets of victims, which was absent in the 1948 Genocide Convention and ICC Statute 1998. Since Bangladesh is a signatory State to the Genocide Convention 1948 through accession in 1998, it is obliged to define genocide as per definition prescribed by the said convention. However, as discussed earlier, it is unfortunately true that ICTB departs from the spirit of the 1948 Convention in categorizing genocide as an intercontinental crime. The cases of the Tribunal reveal an imprecise submission to prove the precise intention of the offence of genocide, which is indispensable in proving the offence of genocide. In many cases, the ICTB did not prove the exact intention to commit genocide (Chief Prosecutor v. Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, para. 88). Lastly, in the temporal jurisdictional capacity of the ICTB, crimes against humanity undoubtedly emerged as the new category of offence, which was inserted in 1973, with backdated effect afterwards the heinous crimes performed in 1971. The Bangladesh Tribunal is legalized to prosecute perpetrators

196  Maruf Billah of crimes against humanity in 2010, while parallel criminalities were committed in 1971 and were not criminalized at the appropriate time, that is, in 1971. Therefore, in many cases, the defence counsel objected that the ICT Act 1973 is retroactive statute, as it violates of basic human rights.17 However, the Tribunal observes, in many cases, that ‘[e]ven under retrospective legislation initiation to prosecute crimes against humanity . . . committed in violation of customary international law is quite permitted (Chief Prosecutor v. Sayeedi, para. 52)’. In many circumstances, the ICTB likewise stated that, ‘it is to be noted that the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL the judicial bodies backed by the UN have been constituted under their respective retrospective Statutes’ (Chief Prosecutor v. Azad, para. 14). All the opinions put forward in the ICTB judgements advance a legal issue on whether the application of retroactive criminal laws needs to conform with the customary rule of international law of 1971 (such as crimes essentially require to be perpetrated in an international war), the material time of the performing of the heinous crimes. The Tribunal solely examined the applicability of the retroactive legislation in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTB. However, the Tribunal has not examined why international offences can be tried and punished beforehand the Tribunal through retroactive legislation and in what circumstances the underlying crimes can be charged, in violation of the domestic law on the rule of nullum crimen sine lege (if there are no crimes, no law can be imposed). Furthermore, though the Tribunal has copied the meaning of crimes against humanity from the IMT Charter, it missed out on analysing the ex post facto penalization of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Tribunal. Then, it also failed to discuss the validation of the retrospective prosecution of the alleged global offences at the Nuremberg Tribunal and how it was crystallized later in the international laws. All of these legal failures amount to a vital problem in the temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Without any legal justification and fulfilment of international criminal law requirements, retrospective law occasionally enables miscarriage of criminal justice. For instance, through a heightened state of matters, a new government may indorse retroactive legislation to prosecute its opponents unpredictably due to their previous political activities (Clarke 2003, 10). The retrospective penalization of genocide and crimes against humanity can be considered as the arbitrary imprisonment and governmental maltreatment through the victorious party, which is identical to the Bangladesh Tribunal, because it is prosecuting and punishing only the opposition party leaders, that is, Jamaat. To conclude this part, it is important to ponder that in the ICTB cases, most of the Jamaat leaders were given death penalty as the capital punishment, some of them already got executed, while the rest of them are waiting for the final execution. It raises the question whether the execution of the Jamaat leaders under this imperfect system is somehow allowed in global criminal justice mechanism. It is a very obligatory norm of worldwide criminal justice that the safeguarding of the individuals’ rights is adequately significant, plus it necessitates an even extraordinary level of procedural guarantees in

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 197 circumstances that competently award the capital punishment. One of the reasons is that the capital punishment is the last and highest penalty for the perpetrators of international crimes. According to Professor Schabas (2002, 369), ‘procedural safeguards must be respected in all capital trials is without doubt a norm of customary international law’. However, this customary international law right was rigorously violated in the Bangladesh Tribunal. As a result, the current tribunal seriously undermines the substantive and procedural norms of international criminal law, in delivering criminal justice by internationally recognized fair trial and due processes rights of the executed Jamaat leaders. In the trial process of the Jamaat leaders, neither domestic nor international criminal law principles were fully adhered to by the ICTB, and there is no plausible reason postulated by the Tribunal as to why it deliberately failed to apply such international criminal law standards. So, there might be a genuine question of the political motive of the current Bangladesh government in the prosecution of the Jamaat leaders by this fatally defective and draconian law and system, that is examined in the subsequent discussion. Are Jamaat Leaders Victims of ‘Political Killing’? Bangladesh is a signatory state to the Genocide Convention 1948 and the Rome Statute of the ICC 1998.18 These two multilateral treaties certainly impose some legal obligations to define international crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity as per the treaty definitions before trying them under any competent criminal tribunal. However, the ICTB has failed to define crimes against humanity and genocide according to international treaty laws. So, it is not unusual to raise an issue of the political motive of the Government of Bangladesh, in addition to the aforementioned legal failure, in the prosecution of the Jamaat leaders. Are the Jamaat leaders victims of ‘political killing’? One of the reasons that justifies posing this question is that the law and politics cooperate equally at the international and national stages of criminal prosecutions, and this interaction seems mainly thrilling in international penal law, where at the bottom level, a nascent lawful government aims to control the longstanding power of states to describe and manage international crimes and their trial (Cullen 2018, 907). Therefore, it is crucial to examine whether prosecutors of the ICTB acted under any political pressure and whether the Bangladesh Government has any hidden political intention other than punishing those who are responsible for the heinous crimes committed in the 1971 conflict. From the beginning of the ICTB operation, one of the leading criticisms against the ICTB advanced by the defence counsel as well as the domestic and international policymakers was that it was a ‘politically motivated Tribunal’. The Jamaat, the most prominent Islamic political party in Bangladesh, has accused the current Government of taking political vengeance through the trials before the ICTB because most of the accused and convicts are high-ranking party leaders.19 The party denies its members’ involvement in crimes committed during the Liberation War and

198  Maruf Billah argues that its leaders were not among those hundred and ninety-five (195) war criminals from the Pakistani army officers. They were also not tried under the Collaborators Order, a local initiative to punish those involved in collaborating with the Pakistani army in 1971, as discussed earlier. Some academic works also support the above criticisms by inferring that the ICTB was to prosecute the political opponents of the ruling party in Bangladesh by any means, to suppress them politically (Cammegh 2011, 4; Jalil 2010, 111–12). From the perspective of the ICTB, this is not merely condemnation, rather it has some practical consequences that are analysed later. First, the allegation against the ICTB that it is a ‘politically motivated tribunal’ has been evident in the appointment of the Tribunal’s judges, members and prosecutors who are all ardent supporters of the ruling BAL (Hossain 2019, 661). It is relevant to note that section 6(8) of the ICT Act 1973 (as amended in 2009 and 2013) says, ‘[n]either the constitution of a Tribunal nor the appointment of its Chairman or members shall be challenged by the prosecution or by the accused’. This Section of the 1973 Act openly begets questionings on the impartiality of the Tribunal, while it is operated under the powerful regime. Hence, it suffices to infer that the exceeding provision of the 1973 Act extremely casts doubt on the selection of adjudicators and affiliates of the ICTB without governmental intrusion of the current BAL administration (Robertson 2015, 12). Second, the government interference and dictation over the Tribunal was also condemned in a press statement by Human Rights Watch in 2009, after the ICT Act was amended.20 The statement detected that the ICT Act had not necessitated the adherence of Bangladesh’s domestic laws connecting to evidence or criminal procedure code and voiced apprehension that the tribunals operated in it ‘may not meet international fair trial standards and . . . be subject to political influence’ (Human Rights Watch 2009). In 2011, Amnesty International (2011) addressed several issues in a letter sent to Justice Nizamul Huq, the Chairman of the ICTB 1 until 2012. The organization accused the ICTB of implementing a ‘victor’s justice’ because the trials had been initiated mostly against Jamaat leaders. Both allegations of the international human rights bodies have already become true as there was direct political interference of the Bangladeshi executives proven through arbitrary conviction and execution of the accused through apparent miscarriage of justice and by utterly denying the accused’s rights under the Bangladesh Constitution, domestic penal justice mechanism of the country and under the customary international law. Third, the ICTB confronted a huge amount of condemnation due to the straightforward invasion of the BAL regime in it. In December  2012, The Economist published news on the ICTB’s activities on the basis of 230 email communications and more than 17 hours of Skype conversations between Justice Nizamul Huq-the Chairman of ICTB-1 at that time and Ahmed Ziauddin, a Bangladeshi-born attorney who was living in Brussels (The Economist 2012). Throughout these online chats, Justice Huq described that the current

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 199 Bangladeshi regime forced him in delivering the judgment against Sayeedi prior to the ‘National Victory Day’, that is, 16 December (Ibid.). Additionally, Mr. Huq revealed to Mr. Ziauddin by saying ‘the Chairman of the Appellate Division held out the prospect of promotion if he would deliver fast verdicts’ (Ibid.). The Skype conversations or dialogues moreover signify that Mr. Ziauddin’s position exceeded that of a regular mentor to the ICTB who, as one of the attorneys, contributed directly to the preparation of judgments and orders and counselled the prosecutorial body. There had been exchanges and agreements taken place regularly among Mr. Ziauddin, Justice Huq and the Prosecution, but it had never been exposed to the defence. Such association advances to partiality of the Tribunal due to the conflicts of interest. Once Bangladeshi media personnel approached to Justice Huq and Mr. Ziauddin after getting the confidential resources, they equally declared that they were used to communicate regularly (Ibid.). These circumstances cast serious uncertainties about the impartiality of the ICTB. Although Justice Huq was advised to resign, and he did resign from the ICTB 1, the Tribunal harshly suffered from massive blames globally and lost the credibility and impartiality. The Skype scandal undeniably demonstrated the straight intrusion of the ruling regime in announcing the Tribunal’s first death verdict on Jamaat Deputy Ameer Mr. Delwar Hossain Sayeedi. Fourth, based on the Skype outrage, criticisms were triggered out rapidly on the impartiality of the Tribunal before announcing the subsequent verdicts on the other accused (Chopra 2015, 213). For example, in October  2013, prior to the pronouncement of Mr. Salauddin Quader Chowdhury’s verdict ‘a digital copy of the judgment’ appeared on the website of the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, the Government of Bangladesh, which, later discovered by press, revealed that it was dripped from the Ministry’s website (Fazi and Tehrani 2018, 15). Before delivering the verdict of the accused by the ICTB, any disclosure of the judgment by any means is seriously dubious on the confidentiality of the trial system and is amounted to political control because the judgement appeared in the Law Ministry’s website. Lastly, how much the criminal law and justice systems in Bangladesh are controlled by the current regime can be witnessed straightforwardly by giving an example here. Due to the effective formation of the ICTB-1, the Bangladesh government intended to form the ICTB-2. Hence, the government did invite Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha, a Justice from the Appellate Division, who lately became the Bangladesh Supreme Court’s Chief Justice in 2017. Throughout a dialogue with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Mr. Sinha persuaded the Prime Minister in opening the ICTB-2, by any costs. Some parts of his conversation with the current Prime Minister are summarized by him as follows: [In opening second Tribunal] in respect of offenses of crimes against humanity, the procedure is different. The prosecution for that purpose the government needs not take so much pain in collecting evidence to

200  Maruf Billah prove a charge in the manner she [Prime Minister] had collected evidence in her father’s assassination trial. I further explained to her, in brief, the process of trial of the cases, mode of recording evidence, and the admissibility of evidence which are distinct from the earlier trial. Under the new system, affidavit evidence is admissible, newspaper reports are available, video reports and photographs are also admissible, no matter from where it was collected. Most of the evidence can be collected from the national archives and some of them can be collected from freedom fighters’ possession. The process can be expedited if the government provided enough money, and the right persons were selected for the purpose. (Sinha 2018, 50) The above discussion of the former Bangladeshi Chief Justice with the present Prime Minister is sufficient to understand that Tribunal is wholly under control and directed by the current regime, with some existing members of the Bangladesh judiciary. Also, unlike the independent judicial systems in the civilized nations, it is quite clear that desired legal verdict or outcomes is possible in a politicized system through spending money and appointing government supporters. Therefore, it can be concluded that the ICTB is a highly politicized tribunal in addition to the legal inconsistencies, as discussed earlier. As such, the execution of the Jamaat leaders under the defective judicial mechanism in violating the domestic and international criminal law standards adequately proves that the convicts are victims of ‘political killing’ by the current regime. Conclusion: Are the Executed Jamaat Leaders Villain or Fallen? It is pertinent to question whether the execution of Jamaat leaders makes them ‘villain’ or ‘fallen’ from a neutral viewpoint. To declare someone, by virtue of his/her activity, as villain or fallen is dependent on how his/her performance is evaluated. So, before asserting the activities of Jamaat leaders in 1971 Liberation War as villain or fallen, it is crucial to evaluate their overall activities in 1971, under an impartial scrutiny. Although the current regime of Bangladesh somehow managed to prove that Jamaat leaders were villains in 1971, by ensuring capital punishment to all of them, many people in Bangladesh regard them as the ‘fallen heroes’ in Bangladesh politics. The Jamaat as a political party has the right to disagree with any powerful regime. Similarly, in 1971 Liberation War, Jamaat opposed the decision of the separation of East Pakistan as an independent nation with the help of India because India always wanted to supress Pakistan by weakening her politically and strategically. So, merely by supporting a united Pakistan, Jamaat as a political party did not commit any mistake unless it directly committed any crimes against the freedom fighters and civilians. In most of the ICTB cases, no single connection of the Jamaat leaders with crimes against humanity in 1971 was established with evidence. Most of the allegations against the Jamaat leaders

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 201 were media propaganda that have no circumstantial and historical evidences, due to some irrefutable reasons. From the legal viewpoint, as alluded to earlier, the trial process that executed Jamaat leaders is considered as imperfect judicial system that has fallen below the domestic and international criminal law standards. Then, the tribunal has failed to prove the so-called allegations (of committing international crimes) against Jamaat leaders before the tribunal even in such an imperfect judicial system. In most of the cases, the Tribunal used some narratives by saying that the Jamaat leaders were considered as ‘auxiliary force’ because they were affiliated with Razakars Force, no legal definition is given in the ICT Act 1973 and by the Tribunal to ascertain who belonged to the ‘auxiliary force’. Though it is true based on the political situations in 1971 that Jamaat as the political party disagreed with the Bangladeshi Liberation movement, it cannot be justified that due to such a disagreement they had committed atrocities against Bengali civilians without any legitimate evidence that has been proved in the court or tribunal. As the execution of Jamaat leaders was implemented through defective trial process with incomplete procedural laws as discussed earlier, it is very difficult to infer that they are the real villain in Bangladeshi society and politics. In fact, the nationwide demonstration against the verdicts of the Tribunal and the widespread global condemnation against the faulty trial process made the executed leaders fallen heroes for many. For example, once the Tribunal announced the death verdict against Sayeedi, one of the top Jamaat leaders, on 28 February 2013, there were huge demonstrations across the nation by countless people. The clashes of the demonstrations with security forces resulted in more than 200 dead and more than 3,000 injured (Human Rights Watch 2013). It is one of the examples of how ordinary citizens of Bangladesh reacted and protested against the judicial killing of Jamaat leaders. From the overall analysis, it is clear that the judges and prosecutors of the Tribunal proceeded under governmental pressure and the current regime of Bangladesh has a concealed political objective to suppress the Jamaat and its leaders instead of punishing the actual perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity in the 1971 war. If a criminal trial is operated under a biased political regime, the latter will undermine the former’s capacity to show impartiality needed for the rule of law, trial’s suitability and efficiency (Weiner 2013, 548). Likewise, the ICTB is one of such criminal tribunals that have no ability to secure criminal justice to the Jamaat leaders, hence it has been labelled as the ‘political vendetta’ of the BAL regime. Notes 1 The text of the Order can be found in Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 540–45; Alimuzzaman Chowdhury, “Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order, 1972,” International Crimes Research Foundation, 2015, http://icrfoundation.org/wpcontent/ uploads/2015/02/57_AlimujjamanaCaudhuri1972-2.pdf.

202  Maruf Billah 2 Section 2 of the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order says, ‘[i]n this Order “collaborator” means a person, who has-(i) participated with or aided, or abetted the occupation army in maintaining, sustaining, strengthening, supporting or furthering the illegal occupation; (ii) rendered material assistance in any way whatsoever to the occupation army by any act; (iii) waged war or abetted in waging war against the People's Republic of Bangladesh; (iv) actively resisted or sabotaged the efforts of the people and the liberation forces of Bangladesh; (v) by a public statement or by voluntary participation in propagandas within and outside Bangladesh’. 3 See, for example, Sections 3(1), 3(4), 14, and 17(1)(b) of the Collaborators Order 1972. 4 See the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Preamble; Parliamentary Debate on the International Crimes (Tribunals) Bill 1973, vol. 2, part 37, 2356. 5 Parliamentary Debate on the International Crimes (Tribunals) Bill 1973, vol. 2, part 37, 2356. 6 See for the full text of the Simla Agreement, International Legal Materials 11, no. 5 (1972): 954–57. 7 See for the text of the Delhi Agreement, International Legal Materials 12, no. 5 (1973): 1080–84. 8 For the full text of the Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, see International Legal Materials 13, no. 3 (1974), 501–5. 9 See the official website of the ICTB -1, www.ict-bd.org/ict1/. 10 See a series of cases from the ICTBs Chief Prosecutor v. Abdul Quader Molla, supra note 10, para. 5; Chief Prosecutor v. Abul Kalam Azad, ICTB Case No. 05 of 2012, Judgment, January 21, 2013, para. 17; Chief Prosecutor v. Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, ICTB Case No. 04 of 2012, Judgment, July  17, 2013, para. 4; Chief Prosecutor v. Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, ICTB Case No 01 of 2011, Judgment, February 28, 2013, para. 16. 11 See in Chief Prosecutor v. Mir Quasem Ali, ICTB Case No. 03 of 2013, Judgment, November 2, 2014, para. 87. 12 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Art. 15; European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Art. 7; American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Art. 9. The rule also recognized in: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 11(2); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, Art. 7(2). 13 Article 35 (1) of the Bangladesh Constitution 1972 says, ‘[n]o person shall be convicted of any offense except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act . . . of the offense’. 14 Article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg 1945 says, ‘[c]rimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination . . . before or during the war . . . country where perpetrated’. 15 See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1993, Art. 5; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 1994, Art. 6. 16 See in Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute, Article 5 of the ECCC Statute, and Article 2 of the SCSL Statute. 17 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Mir Quasem Ali, Case No. ICT-BD 03 of 2013, para. 87; Prosecutor v. Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, Case No. ICT-BD 01 of 2011, para. 53. 18 Bangladesh has ratified the Genocide Convention 1948 on October  5, 1998, see ICRC, accessed October  29, 2021, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=357; Rome Statute on March 23, 2010, see accessed May 25, 2021, www. icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=bangladesh+ratifies+the+rome+statute+of+t

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 203 he+international+criminal+court&ln=en#:~:text=On%2023%20March%2C%20 2010%2C%20the,the%20Rome%20Statute%20to%20111. 19 “Allegations of War Crimes Against the Leaders of Jamaat.” The official statement by Jamaat-e-Islami, www.jamaateislami.org/en/articlepdf/105_Allegations%20of War%20Crimes%20against%20the%20leaders%20of0/o20Jamaat.pdf. 20 Henrik Alffram, “Ignoring Executions and Torture Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces,” Human Rights Watch, May  18, 2009, www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/bangladesh0509web.pdf.

References Abdul Quader Molla v. Chief Prosecutor, ICTB Criminal Appeal No. 24–25 of 2013, Appeal Judgment, September 17, 2013, pp. 177–79. Bergsmo, Morten, and Elisa Novic. 2011. “Justice After Decades in Bangladesh: National Trials for International Crimes.” Journal of Genocide Research 13 (4): 503–10. Beringmeier, Miriam. 2018. The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh. Berlin: Berliner Wissenshafts-Verlag. Billah, Maruf. 2020. “Non-Retroactivity in Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity and International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh.” Journal of Politics and Law 13 (2): 180–95. https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v13n3p180. ———. 2021. “Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide at the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh: An Approach to International Criminal Law Standards.” Laws 10 (4): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws10040082. “Blood on the Streets: The Use of Excessive Force During Bangladesh Protests.” 2013. Human Rights Watch, August 1. www.hrw.org/report/2013/08/01/blood-streets/ use-excessive-force-during-bangladesh-protests. Cammegh, John. 2011. “In Bangladesh: Reconciliation or Revenge?” The New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/opinion/in-bangladesh-reconciliation-orrevenge.html. Chief Prosecutor v. Abu Saleh Md. Abdul Aziz Miah and Others, Case No. ICT-BD [ICTB-1] 3 of 2017 (ICTB, Judgment delivered on November 22, 2017), para. 5. Chief Prosecutor v. Md. Amir Ahmed and Others, Case No. ICT-BD [ICTB-1] 5 of 2015 (ICTB, Judgment delivered on November 22, 2017), para. 49. Chief Prosecutor v. Motiur Rahman Nizami, Case No. ICT-BD, 5 of 2011 (ICTB, Judgment delivered on October 29, 2013), para. 53. Chief Prosecutor v. Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, ICTB Case No. 3 of 2012 (Judgment, May 9, 2013), paras. 110–11. Chief Prosecutor v. Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, ICTB Case No. 2 of 2011 (Charge Framing Order, April 4, 2012), p. 16. Chopra, Surabhi. 2015. “The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh: Silencing Fair Comment.” Journal of Genocide Research 17 (2): 211–20. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14623528.2015.1027080. Clarke, Ross. 2003. “Retrospectivity and the Constitutional Validity of the Bali Bombing and East Timor Trials.” Australian Journal of Asian Law 5 (2): 1–32. Cullen, Holly. 2018. “Introduction: The Politics of International Criminal Law.” International Criminal Law Review 18 (6): 907–27. Dixit, Jyotindra N. 1999. Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations. Dhaka: The University Press Limited. The Economist. 2012. “The Trial of the Birth of a Nation.” December 15. http:// tribunalleaks.blogspot.de.

204  Maruf Billah The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2020. “Jamaʿat-i Islami.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 26. Accessed November 24, 2021. www.britannica.com/topic/ Jamaat-i-Islami. Fazi, M. Abdullah, and Pardis M. Tehrani. 2018. “Historical Background of the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh, Unveiling the Truth.” Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society 31 (1): 121–26. Henrik, Alffram. 2009. “Ignoring Executions and Torture Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces.” Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/18/ ignoring-executions-and-torture/impunity-bangladeshs-security-forces. Hossain, M. Awal. 2019. “War Crimes Trials in Bangladesh: Justice or Politics?” Journal of Asian and African Studies 55 (5): 652–65. Hossain, Sara. 2008. “A  Long and Winding Road: Justice and Accountability for War Crimes in 1971.” In International Conference on Genocide, Truth and Justice. Dhaka: Liberation War Museum, March 1–2. https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_95I/ga_95-I.html#:~:text=On%2011%20December%201946%2C%20the,Law%20 and%20its%20Codification%20to. International Commission of Jurists. 1972. The Events in East Pakistan 1971: A Legal Study. Geneva: ICJ Publication. Islam, M. Amir-Ul. 2009. “Bringing Perpetrators of Genocide to Justice.” In Bangladesh Genocide 1971 and the Quest for Justice: Papers Presented in the Second International Conference on Genocide, Truth and Justice, edited by Mofidul Hoque. Dhaka: Genocide Conference Papers. Islam, M. Rafiqul. 2019. National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: Transitional Justice as Reflected in Judgments. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff. Islam, M. Saidul. 2011. “Minority Islam in Muslim Majority Bangladesh: The Violent Road to a New Brand of Secularism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31 (1): 125–41. Jalil, M. Abdul. 2010. “War Crimes Trial in Bangladesh: A Real Political Vendetta.” Journal of Politics and Law 3 (2): 110–20. ———. 2012. “War Crimes Tribunals in Bangladesh: A  Socio-Political and Legal Impact Analysis.” Journal of Sociological Research 3 (2): 333–56. “Jamaat-e-Islami.” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Accessed October 26, 2021. www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ jamaat-e-islami. Letter to the Chairman of the ICTB. 2011. “Amnesty International.” June  21. http://ictbd-defenceteam.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Am­ nesty_Letter_­ Tribunals.pdf. Linton, Suzannah. 2010. “Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation.” Criminal Law Forum 21 (2): 191–311. Mascarenhas, Anthony. 1986. Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood, 1st ed. London: Hodder and Stoughton Publishing House. McDermott, Niall. 1973. “Crimes Against Humanity in Bangladesh.” International Lawyer 7, (2): 476–84. www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Bangladeshcrimes-against-humanity-1973-eng.pdf. Oette, Lutz, and Ferstman, Carla. 2004. “Torture in Bangladesh 1971–2004: Making International Commitments a Reality and Providing Justice and Reparations to Victims.” REDRESS. www.redress.org/downloads/publications/bangladesh.pdf. Pakistan v. India, International Court of Justice (ICJ) Reports 1973, Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War, Application, May 11, 1973.

Execution of Jamaat Leaders 205 Rahman, Wali-ur. 2009. A Brief History of the Framing of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. Dhaka: Bangladesh Heritage Foundation. Robertson, Geoffrey. 2015. “Report on the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh.” International Forum for Democracy and Human Rights. www.barhumanrights. org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/REPORT-ON-THE-INTERNATIONALCRIMES-TRIBUNAL-OF BANGLADESH.pdf. Salauddin Qader Chowdhury v. Chief Prosecutor, Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 2013, Appeal Judgment, July 29, 2015, pp. 147, 150. Schabas, William A. 2002. The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sinha, S. Kumar. 2018. A Broken Dream: The Status of Rule of Law, Human Rights and Democracy. Lalitmohan-Dhanabati Memorial Foundation. https://jagaron.com/ wp-content/uploads/2018/09/A-Broken-Dream_-Rule-of-Law-Human-RightsJustice-Surendra-Kumar-Sinha.pdf. Weiner, Allen S. 2013. “Prudent Politics: The International Criminal Court, International Relations, and Prosecutorial Independence.” Washington University Global Studies Law Review 12 (3): 545–60. Ziauddin, Ahmed. 1996. “The Case of Bangladesh: Bringing to Trial the Perpetrators of the 1971 Genocide.” In Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, edited by Albert J. Jongman, 95–115. Leiden: PIOOM Foundation Publishing.

10 The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh Courting Controversy Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson

Introduction March  1971 marked the culmination of protests and demands for selfdetermination and independence for the people of East Pakistan. It also marked the commencement of a conflict that would culminate in the birth of a new nation; East Pakistan would no longer be recognized, and in its place, the state of Bangladesh would be born. However, while bringing forth a new nation and the hopes and freedoms associated with it, that conflict also brought months of hostilities that entailed the commission of terrible international crimes, including a massive campaign of rape, indiscriminate killing of civilians, massacres, and an arguable case for genocide. The undoubted crimes committed during that conflict remained unaddressed for almost 40 years, during which the frustration and anger of victims proliferated in and permeated throughout Bangladesh society, with the pent-up resentment of numerous individuals only festering further as the years passed and impunity further entrenched. It wasn’t until the 2009 general election1 that there was a real chance for accountability and justice, with the Awami League party committing, as part of its election commitment to the establishment of a court to provide justice for those crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War. Having secured a victory in that election, the Government, in order to deliver on that manifesto promise, effectively promoted the creation of a new International Crimes Tribunal (hereinafter ICT or Tribunal), with a first tribunal ‘ICT-1’ being established in 2010, and a second ‘ICT-2’ in 2012. That willingness to bring an end to the culture of impunity and to bring justice to victims is a principle that ought to be applauded and supported entirely. However, the abstract or theoretical appeal of justice processes is not, nor has it ever been the test of success or otherwise; it is the practical application and efficacy of those processes that must serve as the metric by which an institution or process is judged, and it is here that the ICT has been found wanting. Despite there being a pressing need to provide justice for the crimes committed during the Liberation War and the hopes placed on the potential of the ICT to serve as a tool of meaningful accountability, the trials being conducted before this tribunal have been, and still are, deeply flawed, and fall far below DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-10

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 207 international standards of due process. Instead, a litany of grave violations of human and procedural rights has characterized both the legal framework and practice of the ICT. Those violations are not merely a question of ‘victors justice’ as is often the criticism of such tribunals. Instead, trials at the ICT go far beyond this concept, tipping into ‘victors’ revenge’, or perhaps ‘rulers’ revenge’, in other words, the incumbent Awami government’s vengeance in the pursuit of vendetta against its current political archenemies. First, throughout the operation of the Tribunal, charges against the accused have been neither clear nor specific, and defendants have been deprived of both their right to appoint counsel of their own choosing and of sufficient time to prepare a defence. In many cases, the prosecution has had no duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, while the defence have been precluded from presenting important evidence and calling essential witnesses. Communication between the accused and the defence has been limited, and there have been instances of witness perjury and falsification of evidence, with key defence witness being abducted from the ICT gate in the daylight just before the testimony, and witnesses and lawyers suffering grave threats, intimidation, and even physical assaults. During trials, the most basic principles of international and criminal law have been consistently and severely violated, including as a result of the burden of proof being transferred from the prosecution to the defence; the presumption of innocence being non-existent; media and political trial being tacitly permitted; double jeopardy being infringed; the retroactivity of the tribunal’s act being insufficiently analysed, impeding the correct definition of the crimes; some trials being conducted in absentia; and amnesties and processes that took place during the 1970s being completely disregarded. Further, the Government encouraged legal and constitutional reforms that not only deprived defendants of some of their most basic human rights but also forced the ICT to revise its judgements and impose the death penalty. These reforms violated the jurisprudential principle of ‘retroactive law’ and ‘ex post facto law’, and breached international human rights treaties and showed a blatant disregard for the concept of human dignity. In general, it is possible to argue that the proceedings before the ICT have been driven by politics, not by justice, as trials have been conducted by judges that received instructions and pressure from the Government and third-party actors, as the so-called ‘Skypegate’ scandal demonstrated. Consequently, there can be no suggestion that the principle of judicial impartiality has been upheld. It is particularly worrying in this regard that despite this lack of impartiality and independence, defence lawyers were deprived of recusal of judges for apparent conflict of interest and lack of impartiality and precluded from challenging the composition of the tribunal. The Government has held a significant degree of control over the judicial process and has sought to use the ICT as a political tool, limiting the jurisdiction of the court to the crimes committed by just one side of the conflict and encouraging the prosecution of members of the political opposition. The construction of a narrative that collectively criminalized

208  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson members of the political opposition—particularly of Jamaat-e-Islami—seemed to take priority over the individual responsibility of the defendants. Given the unfairness of the proceedings and the gravity of the due process violations, the verdicts of the ICT could be considered contrary to the standards set out in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) and in the Rome Statute. The death penalties imposed could, therefore, amount to summary or arbitrary executions. At the outset, prior to discussing the salient issues, it is appropriate to highlight that at no stage do the authors seek to suggest that the ICT, in principle, or any other form of transitional justice mechanism should not be developed; it is clearly essential that impunity is not allowed to flourish further. However, the mechanics of the processes pursued in Bangladesh in an apparent attempt to combat that impunity can and should be condemned. Fundamental Principles of Fair Trial

The right to a fair trial is a fundamental human right. It is recognized by articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR) and articles 14, 15 and 26 of the ICCPR, to which Bangladesh is (and since 2000 has been) a state party. Article 2.1 ICCPR demands that the rights contained within the covenant must be ensured to all individuals within the Bangladeshi territory and jurisdiction ‘without distinction of any kind’. According to the fundamental principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda,2 all Bangladeshi institutions and authorities must comply with the contents of all treaties ratified by the state. Human Rights and Fair Trial Standards contained in international treaties have been adapted to domestic regulations through national constitutions. The Bangladeshi Constitution is no exception to this rule and includes fair trial guarantees and a clear commitment to human rights in its articles 11, 26.2 and 27. As such, as a result of both its domestic and international obligations, Bangladesh was and is obliged to initiate a process of investigation, justice and accountability for the crimes committed during 1971 consistent with international standards of due process and the minimum guarantees of a fair trial. Higher Standards of Procedural Safeguards in Capital Cases

Higher standards of procedural protections are normally required in cases that could potentially lead to the imposition of the death penalty and are thus of relevance to all of those matters proceeding before the ICT, given that the default position appears to be to impose the death sentence on conviction, as noted in most, if not all, cases before it. This special degree of procedural correctness and protection of a defendants’ rights is recognized by article 6 of ICCPR, which establishes certain additional standards and safeguards to protect the life of an individual subject to criminal procedures and limit the use of death penalty, and pursuant to which:

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 209 [I]n countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court (emphasis added). The same article of the ICCPR also recognizes a right to ‘seek pardon or commutation of the sentence’ and forbids the application of capital punishment on both pregnant women and persons under the age of 18. These higher standards are mirrored in Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which limits the activities that parties could lawfully undertake during a non-international armed conflict and sets minimum standards of human rights protection that cannot be circumvented in any circumstances, and although Bangladesh has not ratified the Geneva Conventions at the time of the Liberation, it did so subsequently. Arguably, it was bound, as a successor State to those treaties ratified by both Pakistan and India as High Contracting Parties. It is notable at this stage to mention that despite challenges being brought in a number of cases on the basis of ex post laws being applied by the ICT, there was no consideration as to what was considered to be the state of law, either treaty-based or customary, at the time of the conflict. The inability, or the refusal, to rule on what was understood to be customary law in 1971, caused serious difficulties in knowing what the applicable legal framework for the proceedings before the ICT was. Legal Framework In considering the legal framework of the ICT, we must consider both the enabling legislation itself and the constitutional amendments deemed necessary to facilitate the creation of the Tribunal. Although highlighted in more detail later, it is submitted at the outset that much of this framework is patently discriminatory and capable of being characterized as little more than ‘revenge justice’, a fact perhaps best highlighted by the adoption of an enactment that gave those who fought with the Liberation forces, who were predominantly supporters of the Awami League party, immunity from prosecution, irrespective of their conduct. First and Fifteenth Constitutional Amendments

The first constitutional amendment added article 47.A to the Constitution of Bangladesh, which reads as: (1) The rights guaranteed under article 31, clauses (1) and (3) of article 35 and article 44 shall not apply to any person to whom a law specified in clause (3) of article 47 applies.

210  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no person to whom a law specified in clause (3) of article 47 applies shall have the right to move the Supreme Court for any of the remedies under this Constitution. This article had the effect of depriving those suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide from some of their most basic constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to enjoy the protection of the law, the prohibition of retrospective prosecutions, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to appeal to the Supreme Court in case of violation of these rights. This discriminatory measure was in breach of article 26 of the ICCPR (pursuant to which ‘[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law’) as it targeted a particular group, namely those members of the political opposition, most notably members of Jamaat-e-Islami, who may have opposed liberation from Pakistan. By imposing these severe restrictions prior to conviction, it also contravened the principle of equality of arms and the presumption of innocence contained within article 14.2 of the ICCPR. Further, given its suspension of the right to a fair and speedy trial, the provision of 47.A seems to contradict article 14.3.c of the ICCPR, which recognizes everyone’s rights ‘to be tried without undue delay’. In addition to adding article 47.A, the first and fifteenth constitutional amendments also incorporated and re-shaped, respectively, article 47.3 to the Constitution of Bangladesh, declaring that: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed or defence or auxiliary forces or any individual, group of individuals or organisation or who is a prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law shall be deemed void or unlawful, or ever to have become void or unlawful, on the ground that such law or provision of any such law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any of the provisions of this Constitution.3 This article prevented any analysis of the constitutionality of the law and obstructed any challenges to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the crimes alleged. More particularly, this article impeded any challenge to the ex post facto nature of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 1973 (hereinafter IC(T)A), precluding the defence from presenting any allegation of retroactivity during the trial. The amendments were, therefore, contrary to basic principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in that they effectively stripped those charged of their constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms.

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 211 ICT Statutory Framework

The legal framework of the ICT is comprised of the IC(T)A, the Rules of Procedure (hereinafter RoP), and the Constitution of Bangladesh, the latter limiting the rights of the accused and the potential allegations from the Defence, as explained in the previous section. Due to the fact that the ICT is a special tribunal set up outside of the ordinary judicial system of Bangladesh, the rest of the domestic criminal regulation did not apply to the trials. The IC(T)A was a modern and advanced statute in 1973. International experts had contributed to the drafting of the IC(T)A in 1973, and the statute succeeded in upgrading the substantive law from Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. Yet, the IC(T)A was considered completely outdated by the start of the proceedings in 2009, as it did not reflect any of the improvements and developments either from the Rome Statute or from the work of the ad hoc tribunals created to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed in the conflicts of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The 1973 legislation did not deal with the modern rules of evidence, nor did it ensure that defendants were properly represented or had their modern-day fair trial rights upheld. The US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp, wrote an extensive analysis of the ICT legislation and listed several proposals to adapt the regulation to international standards of fairness and due process. Although some of his proposals for regulatory improvement were accepted by the Bangladeshi Government and partially incorporated into the ICT regulation, the amendments finally implemented were insufficient and provided a mere theoretical protection that proved to be ineffective in the practice of the Tribunal. To consider and analyse all amendments would render this chapter too academic in nature, however, special mention of the 2013 amendment ought to be made, given its direct prejudicial effect on one defendant in particular. The 2013 amendment, rapidly approved after Abdul Quader Mollah’s sentence to life imprisonment, confirmed the outraging level of politicization of the ICT. It allowed the prosecution of ‘organizations’ by the tribunal and modified the right to appeal of article 21, permitting the prosecution to appeal an order of sentence when such appeal was previously prohibited. The immediate result was that the life sentence imposed upon Mollah was immediately appealed by the Prosecution, and he was accordingly sentenced to death and executed shortly thereafter. Therefore, even after the amendments, the legislation in force for the ICT failed to meet the requirements of International Criminal Law and Human Rights Law, and fell woefully short of principles of the Rome Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which represents the most universalized agreement of the standards applicable to the prosecution of international crimes. Further Critique of the ICT Legal Framework in Light of Relevant Human Rights Standards The whole legislative framework of the ICT received widespread criticism for failing to comply with recognized international standards of due process and

212  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson human rights norms. Aside from the deprivation of fundamental rights by the aforementioned amendments of the Constitution, the regulation of the IC(T) A undermined the position of the defendants and deprived them of basic procedural protections, a fact echoed by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (hereinafter WGAD),4 which recognized that the legislative framework failed to effectively address the requirements under the ICCPR concerning disclosure and defence rights during the course of investigation. The list of the potential non-conformities of the ICT’s procedures and practices in light of relevant international standards is long, and includes the fact that: a) Insufficient information as to the nature of the allegations was given following arrest; b) Information concerning the investigation was provided to the Tribunal but not the defence; c) The investigative report and Case Diaries have never been disclosed to the defence; d) The investigation is effectively conducted in a shroud of secrecy; e) The Prosecution is not required to serve unused or exculpatory material to the defence; f) The Accused-Petitioner is not afforded privileged communication with a legal representative of his own choosing during the course of the investigation; g) The Accused-Petitioner was not served copies of Prosecution Motions or Tribunal orders during the course of the investigation; h) The Accused-Petitioner was interrogated in the absence of counsel; and i) Members of the investigative agency subsequently informed the media that the Accused-Petitioner had confessed during the course of the investigation. That said, it is helpful to highlight in particular three groups of critique that can be raised in light of these standards, which include: a) The ICT’s discriminatory and biased frameworks, procedures, and practices; b) The ICT’s lack of independence and impartiality; and c) The retrospective and targeted application of the death penalty. Discriminatory and Biased Frameworks, Procedures, and Practices

By way of further, and considered breaches, first, the regulation was biased and discriminatory as it exclusively focused on the crimes committed by one side of the conflict, namely, those who opposed liberation in the 1971 war. In contrast, all former supporters of the separation from Pakistan were granted immunity from prosecution irrespective of their conduct during hostilities. This partiality on the proceedings, based on Presidential Decree No. 16 of 1974, impeded the delivery of justice to all the victims of international crimes and hampered the creation of a complete system of accountability. It also

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 213 contributed to the politicization of the process and caused further division in the country, as it differentiated between kinds of victims and prolonged the ‘victors and losers’ narrative. Further, providing de facto immunity to the supporters of the Liberation Forces for international crimes was contrary to the most basic conceptions of justice and to article 26 of the ICCPR, which guarantees equality before the law. The partiality is so acute that the mere act of arguing about the potential criminality of the liberation forces has been considered seditious or contemptuous by Bangladeshi authorities. Indeed, the journalist David Bergman was indicted with contempt of court charges after questioning the number of victims of the conflict and reporting flaws in the ICT proceedings. Astonishingly, judges justified this indictment saying that Mr. Bergman had ‘hurt the feelings of the nation’ (The Guardian 2014). Second, the ICT followed special rules of procedure and evidence and argued that it was not bound by the domestic rules that regulate the ordinary criminal procedure. Indeed, article 23 of the IC(T)A explicitly excluded the application of the provisions contained within the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act. Given the domestic nature of the Tribunal, there was absolutely no justification for departing from the established norms of due process and fair trial that were consistently applied in other criminal cases. This measure was unlawful and discriminatory, as the special rules applied by the ICT to regulate its trials provided less guarantees for the rights of the accused and fell short of international standards. As a matter of fact, these special rules, according to the UN WGAD, were in breach of the ICCPR concerning disclosure and defence rights during the course of the investigation. On certain occasions, the information provided to the Defence as to the nature of the allegations was insufficient, and some of the information, including the investigative report and case diaries, was given to the Tribunal but not to the Defence Counsel. Indeed, the Prosecution is not required to serve unused or exculpatory material to the Defence as required under the wellestablished principle of procedural criminal justice. Moreover, the deadline for the Prosecution to disclose its case to the Defence is only three weeks before the commencement of the trial, which leaves an extremely short period of time for the defendants to review the prosecution case and prepare the defence for crimes allegedly committed 40 years ago. In contrast, the Defence is obliged to disclose its entire case to both the Tribunal and Prosecution on the initiation of trial, a practice that is patently contrary to article 14.3.b ICCPR, which guarantees ‘adequate time and facilities’ for the preparation of the defence and the equality of arms. Lack of Independence and Impartiality

As noted earlier, the ICT’s operation has been subject to heavy government interference. One of the most blatant interferences in this regard took place with regard to the regulation of appeal in the IC(T)A. After the conviction

214  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson of Abdul Quadar Mollah, the Assistant Secretary-General of Jamaat-e-Islami party, to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity on 5 February 2013, several demonstrations were organized, with the support of the Government, to protest about the ‘lenient’ sentence and demand the death penalty. At the time of Mollah’s conviction, the IC(T)A did not permit the prosecution to appeal a sentence in search for a more severe punishment. As a result, the Government forced a rapid amendment of the IC(T)A. That amendment, approved on 14 February 2013, was exclusively designed to allow a prosecutorial appeal and the imposition of a death sentence in Mollah’s particular case. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stated that she would attempt to convince the ICT judges to listen to ‘the sentiment of the people’ (Hossain 2013) when taking their decisions, and cabinet secretary Mr. Md Musharraf Hossain defended the amendment as a tool to fight against what he termed ‘inadequacy of sentence’ (BSS 2013), statements that reflect an explicit intromission of the executive on the work of the ICT. After the amendment, article 21.2 of the IC(T)A reads: ‘the Government or the complainant or the informant, as the case may be, may appeal, as of right, to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against an order of acquittal or an order of sentence’ (emphasis added). This permitted the prosecutor to appeal Mollah’s sentence, and he was finally sentenced to death and quickly hanged on December  2013. Geoffrey Robertson Q.C., first President of the UN War Crimes Court in Sierra Leone and jurist member of the UN’s Internal Justice Council, described this legal reform as a ‘lynch law’ that proved the tribunal’s dependence on popular pressure and politicization. The modification indicated that the ICT had only limited possibilities to decide on the appropriate sentence and retrospectively deprived a person convicted ‘of a legitimate expectation that his sentence would not be increased’. This retrospective change with capital consequences confirmed the political nature of the tribunal and the enormous influence of the executive on the trials (Robertson 2015). The amendment of 14 February  2013 also modified article 3.1 of the IC(T)A, permitting the ICT to try and punish ‘organizations’ for their role in the 1971 War of Liberation. This movement, designed to prosecute Jamaate-Islami—a mainstream political party in the opposition—was contrary to the criminal law principle of individual responsibility. This disregard for international law, rules, and customs also affected the definition of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which failed to provide a detailed definition of crimes against humanity as it existed in 1971 and did not accept the application of recognized definitions under customary international law. Another of the most controversial issues surrounding the regulation of the ICT was the regulation of interlocutory appeals: although the Rules of Procedure were modified to improve the fairness of the proceedings, the reform was insufficient as it allowed the very same judges to review its own decisions. Therefore, challenges to the decisions of the Tribunal cannot be subjected to an impartial review and decision. It is worth mentioning that the same judges lead the different stages of the proceedings: from the pre-trial

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 215 stages—including bail, legal representation, disclosure, and evidence—to the verdict, they control the development of the main trial and even review their own decisions. This lack of impartiality is further confirmed by article 6.8 of the IC(T) A, which prohibited challenging ‘neither the constitution of a Tribunal nor the appointment of its Chairman or members’. This prohibition curtailed the guarantee of an independent and impartial tribunal as recognized by article 10 UDHR and article 14.1 ICCPR and deprived article 6.2A of the IC(T) A—which is designed to ensure an independent and fair trial—of substantive content. Indeed, preventing the ability to question the impartiality of the tribunal members had direct implications in the conduct of the trials. The Chairman of the first ICT Tribunal, Justice Md Nizamul Huq, participated in the Peoples’ Inquiry Commission that judged the events that occurred in 1971 and the crimes regulated by the IC(T)A. Thus, several experts brought his partiality into question. Although the Defence counsel of Delowar Hussain Sayedee applied for the recusal of the Chairman after his notorious involvement in the Skypegate scandal had come to light (illustrated later), the two remaining judges that decided on the issue ruled that there was no recusal provision in the IC(T)A and, thus, pretended that the Tribunal had no power of recusal. The judges left the decision to the ‘good conscience of the Chairman’ (WBWCT 2011), who finally decided to remain in his position despite his clear and public preconceptions on the responsibility of the accused. Adding to the legal scandal, the ICT defined this recusal application as ‘outrageous’ and ‘contemptuous’, threatening to initiate judicial proceedings for contempt of court charges (Bdnews24.com 2011). This decision has arguably negatively affected the integrity of the Tribunal, its legitimacy, and the required level of impartiality. Although this episode created serious concerns, it was only one of a series of judicial scandals that ruined the perceived independence and impartiality of the ICT. First, Prosecutor Mr. Zead-Al-Malum had a clear opinion on the responsibility and the guilt of the accused, as expressed in his paper ‘Trial of the 1971 War Crimes in Bangladesh under the International War Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973’, and in his presentations at both the XVII Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL 2009) and the European Parliament in the Southeast Asia Committee. Another prosecutor, Ms. Tureen Afroz, also campaigned publicly for the conviction and punishment of the persons she had prosecuted, making statements that presumed the guilt of the accused (Afroz 2014). These statements are acceptable from political activists but not from the prosecutor of a case that could entail a death penalty, as such statements risk compromising the integrity of the process and contravene the principle of ‘impartial prosecution’. The appointment of Justice Md Nizamul Huq and of prosecutors Mr. Zead-AlMalum and Ms. Afroz raised serious questions regarding the level of commitment that the ICT had to the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence, a principle further curtailed by several statements coming from

216  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson Bangladeshi authorities. Members of the government, for example, described the accused, and certain Jamaat members, as ‘war criminals’ (BDnews24.com 2014; The Daily Star 2014), whilst a justice of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh also distinguished between the rights of ordinary citizens and the rights of alleged war criminals (Al-Ghamdi 2012). The independence and impartiality of the tribunal were threatened not only by the participation of judicial and prosecutorial experts with strong preconceptions on the final verdict of the trials but, even more importantly, by the Government’s influence on the Court. This influence was firstly manifested by the changing composition of the Tribunal, as judges have been constantly transferred and replaced in the proceedings of the ICT. For example, Justice ATM Fazle Kabir was transferred from the first Tribunal (ICT-1) to the second tribunal (ICT-2) without any apparent reason that could justify this transfer, leading to some international voices considering that transfer as an inappropriate and unlawful intervention from the Government of Bangladesh seeking to influence the outcome of a certain trial (ICLB 2012). Those concerns may have merit. Indeed, Justice ATM Fazle Kabir was hearing evidence on the case against Mr. Sayedee when he was transferred, and the newly appointed judge for ICT-1 appeared in the final stages of the process. As such, he could not familiarize himself with the evidence already presented in the trial and was not in a convenient position to issue a verdict on the particular case. This was particularly so given that article 6.6 of the IC(T)A clearly states: [A] Tribunal shall not, merely by reason of any change in its membership or the absence of any member thereof from any sitting, be bound to recall and re-hear any witness who has already given any evidence and may act on the evidence already given or produced before it. Consequently, the transfer of Justice ATM Fazle Kabir caused intolerable and irremediable prejudice to the fairness of proceedings in the trial against Mr. Sayedee and constituted a clear violation of due process rights and of international standards of justice. It is very illustrative that by the end of the proceedings, none of the judges in Mr. Sayedee’s case had been present during the whole trial. Nonetheless, perhaps an even clearer example of the blatant intervention of the Bangladeshi executive in the trial came with the so-called Skypegate scandal, which occurred when The Economist (2012) published the contents of more than 17 hours of recorded telephone conversations and over 230 emails between the Chairman of the ICT-1, Justice Md Nizamul Huq—the same judge whose impartiality was compromised by his participation in the Peoples’ Inquiry Commission—and Dr. Ahmed Ziauddin, the director of the Bangladesh Centre for Genocide Studies in Brussels. The communications published by The Economist also showed evidence of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct; of collusion between prosecutors, judges, government officials and third

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 217 parties; and, importantly, of the immense influence of the Government to remove and appoint ICT judges in order to force summary trials and secure convictions at the expense of international standards and with the complete disregard of due process and fundamental rights. Justice Md Nizamul Huq held constant communication with Dr. Ahmed Ziauddin, who provided the judge with drafts of important court documents— including a rejection to a recusal application and the final draft of the indictment—and urged him to undertake certain judicial decisions. In some emails, the judge even seemed to be waiting for orders from Mr. Ziauddin and gave his arguments primacy over his own. What is clear is that Mr. Ziauddin’s role, sitting in Brussels, surpassed all the limits expected from an ordinary advisor to the court: first, his advice, far from being limited to his area of expertise, expanded to every aspect of the trial; second, his collaboration was clandestine, unofficial and unknown to certain parties of the proceedings; and, third, from the behind-the-scenes conversations it is inferred that he was cooperating with the prosecution as well, which presented a serious conflict of interest. Mr. Ziauddin’s intervention therefore constituted an unlawful and inappropriate external influence on the trial, evincing the existence of high-level collusion and political interference on the process. In fact, that intervention and influence were so great that he was even able to suggest the dismissal of a judge after Justice Md Nizamul Huq expressed concerns over the commitment of this judge to international standards: I am a bit afraid about Shahinur [Shahinur Islam, a tribunal judge]. Because he is too inclined to the international standard. It . . . was in my mind—and prosecutors also complained to me—that he brought the references of foreign tribunals in every order. (The Economist 2012) This conversation was explicit confirmation that the ICT’s neglect for international human rights and criminal standards was a politically motivated, wilful, and purposeful decision aimed at ensuring convictions and executions of political opponents. In addition, Justice Md Nizamul Huq shared important information about the trial with Dr. Ahmed Ziauddin, undermining the independence of the whole process. Judges are normally expected to abstain from discussing certain details of their cases in order to ensure impartiality and avoid external influences that could prejudice the trial. However, in this case, ‘Mr Ziauddin was involved in aspects of the trial that go beyond what would be permitted to a court adviser or anyone else’ (The Economist 2012). According to The Economist (2012), the material it disclosed suggested three things, which included: that Mr Ziauddin had an influence over how the prosecution framed its case and how the court framed its indictment; that Mr  Ziauddin told

218  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson the judge in his December 2011 e-mail about how prosecutors might develop their case; and that after the prosecutors laid their charges, the judge accepted guidance about the formal accusations from Mr Ziauddin directly. Moreover, from the documents attached in the written communications between these actors, it was possible to infer that the tribunal was preparing a guilty verdict even before it had finished hearing the evidence or the witnesses’ testimony presented by the defence. Therefore, these conversations and documents invite us to question whether the verdicts of the ICT are predetermined. Although the Government of Bangladesh defended the role of Mr. Ziauddin as a mere judicial advisor, the contents of the disclosed conversations went far beyond that of an advisor and may lead the reader to the conclusion that Mr Ziauddin, having the remote control in his hands while living in Brussels, was in fact directing proceedings from behind the scenes. After the disclosure, the legitimacy of the whole process was compromised and presiding Judge Nizamul Huq was forced to resign. Yet, the government has recently appointed Judge Nizamul Huq as a judge of the appellate division of the Supreme Court, despite complaints from the opposition claiming that such appointments violated the ‘seniority’ criteria (The Daily Star 2016). The ICT has also threatened contempt of court charges against The Economist’s journalists (The Bangladesh Chronicle 2013) and ordered Amar Desh, the local news agency, which first published the conversations, to stop publishing. The editor of Amar Desh also faced charges of sedition (BBC News 2013). The Retrospective and Targeted Application of the Death Penalty

A final problem deriving from the legal framework of the ICT arose from the judicial interpretation of article 20.2 IC(T)A: ‘upon conviction of an accused person, the Tribunal shall award sentence of death or such other punishment proportionate to the gravity of the crime as appears to the Tribunal to be just and proper’. This provision allowed the ICT to impose the death penalty. This was understandable in the context of 1973, the date of the creation of the initial IC(T)A, as capital punishment was still common in comparative law. Moreover, the death penalty was expected to be applied to the senior Army Officers of the Pakistani Army, who bore the greatest responsibility for the crimes yet never been charged or brought to justice. In 2009, the application of the death penalty, however, especially to mere assistants of the Pakistani troops, was highly inappropriate, particularly when the trial of the principal perpetrators—the Pakistani Army Officers—has been precluded from the ICT proceedings. Of special concern is that, instead of abstaining from applying the death sentence, some judges of ICT and the Supreme Court interpreted article 20.2 IC(T)A as obliging the imposition of the death penalty, by default, in case of a guilty verdict:

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 219 A plain reading of sub-section (2) shows that if the tribunal finds any person guilty of any of the offences . . ., awarding a death sentence is the rule and any other sentence of imprisonment proportionate to the gravity of the offence is an exception. . . . In awarding the appropriate sentence, the tribunal must respond to the society’s cry for justice against perpetrators of Crimes against Humanity5. This interpretation was contrary to the fundamental principle of proportionality of sentencing, which makes sentences dependent on the gravity of the crime, on the role of the accused in the commission of the offence and on the degree of criminal responsibility of the offender without regard to the so-called society’s cry. Moreover, it contradicted the minimum standards of justice and fairness and the growing international tendency towards disallowing the death penalty. The First Arrests and the First Trials Following the establishment of the Tribunal, its judges issued the first arrest warrants: between June 2010 and June 2012, nine people were arrested. They remained detained for a prolonged period without being charged with a crime under the 1973 Act, and as a result filed a communication with the WGAD. After an exhaustive examination of the facts, the WGAD concluded in Opinions No. 66/2011 (UN Working Group of Arbitrary Detention 2011) and No. 66/2012 (UN Working Group of Arbitrary Detention 2013) that these long pre-trial detentions were arbitrary and contrary to article 9 of the ICCPR. The opinions stressed that presumption of innocence was a fundamental right of judicial processes and, consequently, detention prior to conviction should be an exception rather than a rule. Moreover, the WGAD did not find any ground to deny the accused bail. In addition, the WGAD found several violations of the defendants’ rights during pre-trial detention. For example, the accused were not afforded privileged communication with a legal representative of his own choosing and, further, defence counsel were not allowed to be present during interrogations that, allegedly, led to confessions. Defendants also faced impediments to access evidence and, after one year in pre-trial detention, had not yet been formally informed of the charges. The WGAD condemned these violations of due process rights and called upon the Government of Bangladesh to take the necessary steps to stop arbitrary detentions and adhere to the principles of the ICCPR. As a matter of fact, given the gravity of the violations and the allegations of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, the WGAD decided to refer the situation to the Special Rapporteur on Torture. Trials in Absentia Under International Law Trials in absentia are generally prohibited in comparative and international law. Indeed, as noted in article 14.3.d of the ICCPR, a defendant generally has

220  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson a right ‘to be tried in his presence’. There are, nonetheless, some exceptions. In certain countries and international organizations, such as France and in the statute regulating the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, trials in absentia are permitted. That said, even where such trials are permitted, they are nonetheless generally contingent upon an obligation to retry the person in case they are found or apprehended, in which case the retrial remedies the initial violation of the defendant’s right to be tried in their presence (Human Rights Committee 1999). However, this is not the case with the ICT, whose legislation permits trial in absentia if the Tribunal has reason to believe that the accused person ‘has absconded or concealed himself  ’6 but does not allow the trial to be revisited in a case where the person convicted is found or apprehended. The ICT has already conducted trials in absentia against Abdul Kalam Azad—the first defendant to be convicted by the ICT—Ashrafuzzaman Khan, Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin, Zahid Hossain Khokon, Md. Abdul Jabbar Engineer and Syed Md. Hachhan. Khan and Mueen-Uddin live outside the borders of Bangladesh, and there are reasons to believe that both Azad and Khokon are currently living abroad as well. The ICT interpreted their failure to appear at the tribunal as if the accused had absconded or concealed themselves. Five out of the six trials held by the ICT in absentia ended with death sentences after deeply flawed judicial processes in which they were not able to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses. Indeed, in the trials of Khokon, Jabbar and Hachhan, the prosecution presented more than 20 witnesses in each case to support its position, while none testified for the defendants (Bdnews24.com 2014; New Age 2014, 2015). Convictions were based on hearsay evidence that established insufficient and very superficial connections between the individuals and the crimes allegedly committed. Generally, the evidence could not determine the specific degree of responsibility of the accused and consequently guilt was, in the main, established by association with the Pakistani Army. The case of Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin, who currently lives in the United Kingdom, is especially relevant. First, it is noteworthy that although British authorities had already investigated his responsibility for crimes committed during the 1971 conflict, the Crown Prosecution Service, Metropolitan Police and the FCO Legal Department decided not to prosecute Mr. Mueen-Uddin, as there was no proper basis upon which to charge him under English law. Second, despite the promise of Bangladeshi authorities to only initiate a trial in absentia if an extradition request to British authorities was unsuccessful, the trial against Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin started in July 2013, after Bangladeshi authorities failed to submit any such formal application for extradition. One month later, on 22 August  2013, members of the Ekattorer Ghattak Dalal Nirmul Committee (Committee for Exterminating Killers and Collaborators of Bangladesh Liberation War) sent a memorandum to the British Prime Minister requesting him, in order of preference, to (a) hand over Mr. Mueen-Uddin to Bangladesh authorities, (b) try him for the alleged crimes, (c) or enforce the future sentence handed down by the ICT in absentia.

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 221 Nevertheless, Bangladeshi authorities consistently failed to initiate an official process of extradition. Even though judicial proceedings in absentia do not provide the necessary guarantees for a fair trial, the ICT imposed the death penalty on Mr. MueenUddin, Mr. Kalam Azad, Mr. Ashrafuzzaman Khan, Zahid Hossain Khokon and Syed Md. Hachhan. It is acknowledged that the state of Bangladesh made a reservation to article 14.3.d ICCPR in respect to trials in absentia, but these sentences were so obviously unfair and so contrary to fundamental rights and to the most fundamental principles of due process, that they should have been declared null and void. In fact, on 7 February 2013, Mr. Heyns, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, jointly with Gabriela Knaul, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, issued a statement finding that the trial conducted in absentia against Mr Abdul Kalam Azad did not provide for the guarantees of a fair trial and due process (OHCHR 2013a, 2013b). The willingness to continue to try individuals ‘in absentia’ has continued, and those absent from Bangladesh are consistently tried in their absence. International Crimes Tribunal in Practice If the legal framework of the ICT was already in contravention of the international rules of due process, its practical application definitively negated every attempt to achieve justice. The trials before the ICT have been conducted in a deeply flawed manner, completely depriving the institution of legitimacy, and thus depriving Bangladeshi society of anything other than revenge and victor’s justice. Particular concerns in this regard include the following: a) Restrictions on legal representation; b) Low standards of evidence and reverse burden of proof; c) Witness intimidation and unreliability; d) Double jeopardy and ignorance of previous proceedings/amnesties; e) Opaque and potentially inappropriate sentencing; and f) Other procedural misconduct. Restrictions on Legal Representation

Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem Arman is a British-trained barrister who was the son of the executed Jamaat leader Mir Quasem Ali. He was one of the defence team members, especially in the case of his father at a critical stage during the appeal and review petitions. When his father’s review petition was pending in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and just before his father’s execution, he was a victim of enforced disappearance and is believed to have been abducted by the security forces of the government whose whereabout is yet to be known as of today. His father was deprived of his legal representation during the review proceedings and was deprived of the last meeting with

222  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson the eldest son along with the other family members before his execution. The family, especially Barrister Arman’s mother, wife and minor child/children have been undergoing tremendous mental distress not knowing whether he is still alive or dead. This is a serious violation of an entire family’s rights and obstructions of legal representation in the defence of the accused. Although the accused are theoretically afforded the right to counsel of their own choice, it is practically impossible for foreign counsel to represent their clients in an adequate manner due to travel restrictions by the Government. Moreover, defence counsels have suffered arbitrary limitations on the number of witnesses they could call and on their interventions during interrogations. Generally, defendants have insufficient communication with their counsel, and some of them were interviewed in the absence of a lawyer (OHCHR 2013), which constitutes a clear breach of articles 14.3.b and d of the ICCPR. Low Standards of Evidence and Reverse Burden of Proof

Second, the ICT observed very low standards of evidence. On several occasions, death sentences were based on insufficient or unsatisfactory evidence that failed to meet the standards set in either international law or comparative domestic law. Indeed, given the exclusion of domestic rules of criminal procedure, the only provision that regulated evidence in the ICT was article 19 of the IC(T)A. This article states that the court would follow a ‘non-technical procedure’ and that it may admit any evidence, ‘including reports and photographs published in newspapers, periodicals and magazines, films and tape-recordings and other materials as may be tendered before it, which it deems to have probative value’. This provision seemed to establish very low requirements of evidence, which eased the case of the prosecution. In this line, the ICT expeditiously admitted evidence of 40-year-old crimes, disproportionally took judicial notice of relevant facts—including facts that were part of the definition of the crime, as the existence of a policy or plan to commit genocide—and secured convictions on hearsay evidence without establishing the necessary cautions or guarantees to secure its credibility. According to Geoffrey Robertson QC: [T]he result is that convictions can be based on guilt by association: findings of genocide or war crimes are made on the basis of newspaper reports or local gossip that a defendant was associating with an army battalion committing war crimes, without any direct evidence that he was actually participating in them. (Robertson 2015) Amnesty International criticized the ICT’s grave shortcomings on evidence standards, as ‘statements from prosecution witnesses shown by the defence to have been false were still used as evidence in court’ and ‘affidavits by defence

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 223 witnesses that the accused was too far from the site of the offence to be involved were not admitted’ (Amnesty International 2016). The low evidential standard of the ICT was severely criticized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, who in Mir Quasem Ali’s appeal held that the prosecution had been ‘incompetent’ in its functions and failed in its duty to prove the case. He declared to be ashamed when reading ‘the prosecution evidences’ and complained that despite the great number of facilities and resources at the Prosecution’s disposal, the evidence presented was scarce and superfluous, and insufficient to justify a conviction, that evidence was often being based upon unfounded assumptions, documentary submissions not directly related to the accused, or insufficient witnesses’ testimonies. Moreover, according to article 19.4 IC(T)A, the Tribunal shall take judicial notice of all Governmental documents, meaning that the Tribunal accepts the Bangladeshi Executive’s version of events without a close examination of the materials. In relation to evidence, as recognized by WGAD’s Opinion No. 66/2012, it also must be noted that the burden of proof in the procedures before the ICT was reversed from the Prosecution to the Defence. In this regard, it is noted that in practice, and despite the compulsory nature of rule 50 of the RoP, the ICT has required the prosecution of the ICT to prove that his case was reliable or probable7 while the defendant needs to prove his alibi with absolute certainty8. This reversal of the onus of evidence goes far beyond what is ordinarily required in international criminal law, which ordinarily places the burden of proof on the prosecution, and in practice obliged the accused to prove 40-year-old facts to prove his innocence, posed an insurmountable difficulty on the Defence and wilfully ignored the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence, guaranteed in article 14.2 of the ICCPR. Witness Intimidation and Unreliability

Third, several defence witnesses reported threats and intimidation, and some of them were too afraid to appear in Court due to future reprisals. Indeed, Shukharanjan Bali, one of the defence witnesses in the trial of Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee, was abducted on 5 December 2012 outside the gates of the Tribunal, on the morning he was due to give testimony that exculpated Mr. Sayedee for the assassination of Bali’s brother. He was also going to testify that the Investigative Agency and Prosecution were providing false statements (Bergman 2012a, 2012b). All indications pointed to the fact that the Bangladesh law enforcement agencies organized and executed the kidnapping. Bali remained in custody for several weeks, suffered torture and was then forced across the border into India (Human Rights Watch 2013e). The ICT, which lacks a proper system of witness protection, did not initiate sufficient investigations into the threats and pressures that the defence witnesses were allegedly experiencing (Human Rights Watch 2013b, 2013e). Nevertheless, defence witnesses are not the only actors intimidated: judges (The Economists 2012),

224  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson prosecution witnesses (Human Rights Watch 2013c) and lawyers (Bdnews24. com 2013) were also pressured and targeted. Double Jeopardy and Ignorance of Previous Proceedings/Amnesties

Fourth, the ICT did not respect the fundamental legal principles of res judicata  & double jeopardy. Although several of the accused had already been either convicted or investigated under the 1972 Collaborators Order 40 years ago, they were re-tried, on the same facts, by the ICT. The Collaborators Order was designed to prosecute the crimes of those who supported the Pakistani Army and opposed liberation. Several thousands of citizens were either arrested or tried under this order by domestic tribunals (Jalil 2010). However, in order to further the process of national reconciliation, the Government of Bangladesh issued an amnesty with certain exceptions depending on the nature of the crime (Reiger 2010). As mentioned in previous sections, there were successive amnesties in Bangladesh during the 1970s. Some of which were conditional and affected people either tried or convicted for lesser crimes under the Collaborators’ Order; and others, in contrast, affected those who were going to be tried under the 1973 IC(T)A once they were established. These different types of amnesties should have been the subject of analysis by the ICT, differentiating between their degrees of validity and their potential effect on current prosecutions. While general and unconditional amnesties, issued by non-democratic governments, that completely preclude the investigation of crimes are generally rejected by International Law institutions,9 conditional amnesties, conceded in the interest of peace and reconciliation by democratically elected governments, have received acceptance. Indeed, authors such as Louise Mallinder defend the validity, necessity, and adequacy of certain types of amnesties to achieve meaningful peace and reconciliation (Mallinder 2007). However, the ICT ignored these processes and amnesties and decided to prosecute several citizens who had already been either investigated or convicted, for the same actions, under the Collaborators Order, regardless of whether they had already served part of their sentences or received amnesties from the Government. In Mir Quasem Ali’s appeal, the Attorney General accepted not being aware of the fact that ‘there was a tribunal set up in 1971 to try the local collaborator’, and in a number of cases before the ICT, including in Ali’s trial, the defence presented evidence showing that in the original prosecutions in the 1970s, the defendants’ names did not appear on the files, when the conflict was still recent and the evidence abundant. Maulana A.K.M. Yusuf, leader of Jamaat-e-Islami, died in prison in 2014 while there was an open process against him, despite the fact that he had already been convicted under the Collaborators Order 40 years previously and subsequently amnestied. This constituted a flagrant violation of the principles of res judicata and double jeopardy, which relies on the concept of non bis in idem and prevents the legal system from punishing a person twice for the

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 225 same offence or on the same facts. This fundamental principle in criminal law is recognized by article 35.2 of the Bangladeshi Constitution and should have precluded the ICT from prosecuting events already judged during the 1970s and from establishing a double punishment. The ICT has justified its decision to prosecute these citizens for a second time arguing that the crimes under the Collaborators Act are different to the crimes under the IC(T)A: [T]he Collaborators Order 1972 was a different legislation aiming to prosecute the persons responsible for the offences enumerated in the schedule thereof. It will appear that the offences punishable under the Penal Code were scheduled in the Collaborators Order 1972. While the 1973 Act was enacted to prosecute and try the crimes against humanity, genocide and other system crimes committed in violation of customary international law. There is no scope to characterize the offences underlying in the Collaborators Order 1972 to be the same offences as specified in the Act of 197310. Nevertheless, several authors reject the legal validity of this argument, as the nature of the crimes in both acts is fundamentally the same, that is, murder is a murder, even if it is later considered to have an international criminal character (Robertson 2015). Opaque and Potentially Inappropriate Sentencing

Fifth, the ICT often fails to specify the particular conduct justifying the imposition of the sentence. For example, in Mr. Mir Quasem Ali’s sentence, the ICT mentioned in different parts of the text, that he had ‘planned and instigated’, ‘abetted and facilitated’, and finally that he was ‘complicit’ of the same crime. Consequently, we cannot legally determine the particular role of the accused in the crime, and therefore, his degree of criminal responsibility. It is difficult there to ascertain that the sentence passed was one proportional with the evidence; a further reason upon which it suggested that regardless of the legitimacy of the conviction, the sentence imposed in this case cannot be justified, given the lack of certainty as far as the level of involvement is concerned. Finally, it is necessary to mention that the overwhelming majority of the accused and convicted are members of either Jamaat-e-Islami or the Bangladesh National Party, the two main opposition parties to the Awami League. Indeed, the tribunal convicted high-ranking members of Jamaat-e-Islami, such as President Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami, Secretary General Ali Ahsan M. Mujahid, Vice-President Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee et al. The narrative of the judgments seems to be biased in favour of one side of the conflict and places major attention on the role of Jamaat-e-Islami during the war. On most occasions, the evidence presented by the prosecution has not been capable of demonstrating more than a limited responsibility for the crimes

226  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson committed, if any. The majority of the cases have relied upon circumstantial evidence or hearsay that could not link the specific defendant to any particular offence, but the ICT, in its case against Ghulam Azam, held that such ‘ “nexus” is not required to prove genocide and widespread killing when attack was directed against unarmed civilian population’11. Finally, the majority of defendants, although assumingly aided the perpetrators, were not the main culprits of the crimes, those persons expected to be the main target of a process like the ICT. The process before the ICT has, therefore, been conceived as a tool of political vendetta and oppression that permitted the Government not only to execute some of its main political opponents but also to create a narrative that demonized political adversaries (Jalil 2010). The Chief Justice of Bangladesh, in Mir Quasem Ali’s appeal before the Supreme Court, loudly confirmed the political character of the ICT trials (Free Mir Quasem Ali 2016). In a heated and unprecedented discussion with the Attorney General, the Chief Justice declared to be feeling ‘really ashamed’, shocked and frustrated about conduct of the prosecution in the proceedings before the ICT. During this discussion, the Chief Justice held that the trials ‘are being used for political interests’ and added that the Prosecution manipulates the ‘sentiments’ in the press and television and pushes the ICT trials into the background, thus prioritizing the publicity of the trials over the evidence and the appearance of justice over the reality of it. The Chief Justice even declared that it hurt the Supreme Court ‘to hear this kind of appeals’ and made reference to Sayedee’s case to complain about the impunity of certain prosecutors that had been signalled by the Supreme Court in previous proceedings. Responding to these criticisms, the Minister for Food stated, ‘I think there should be a rehearing of Mir Quasem’s appeal without the chief justice’, so finally, despite having acknowledged serious deficiencies and injustices in his case, the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty for Mir Quasem Ali, who was later executed. This point, quite aside from any other, highlights that there is political influence over the trials. It is unconscionable that the Chief Justice having been so vocal about the deficiencies in the Prosecution case would dismiss the appeal, unless there was another factor at play. Moreover, there are two ongoing trials, five completed investigations, and in August 2015, the coordinator of the investigation agency told Bangladesh media that 30 cases more were at the pre-trial stage and that the agency had received 600 complaints (The Daily Star 2015). Apart from the aforementioned trials in absentia, certain cases judged by the ICT stand out for the seriousness of the human rights violations committed during trial. One such case is the aforementioned trial of Abdul Quader Mollah, Assistant Secretary General of Jamaat-e-Islami, who was first sentenced to life imprisonment by the ICT but, after a rapid modification of the IC(T)A promoted by the Government, was condemned to death on appeal for five counts of crimes against humanity. Despite the unanimous calls from the international community— including from John Kerry, Ban Ki Moon, William Hague and Navi Pillay—to commute the sentence, Mollah was hanged on 12 December  2013, on the

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 227 eve before the Victory Day celebrations. The date reflects the symbolism of his death, a death that the Government of Bangladesh urged and used for political and electoral purposes. His punishment, after a judicial process with such irregularities and disregard for due process safeguards, amounted to an instance of summary execution. Another case dominated by procedural unfairness and judicial deficiencies was that of Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee who, on 28 February  2013, was found guilty of eight counts of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death. Yet, on 17 September 2014, the Supreme Court reduced his sentence to life imprisonment on appeal. Mr. Sayedee was a Member of Parliament and the vice-president of Jamaat-e-Islami. His trial was tainted by disproportionate and arbitrary restrictions on the defence to produce evidence before the court and to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Moreover, the conviction was based on weak, limited and unconvincing evidence. Indeed, the tribunal failed to take into consideration fundamental exculpatory documents provided by the Defence, such as the certified copy of the initial charge sheet, or the certified copy of the initial complaint lodged by the widow of Ibrahim Kutti—who was allegedly assassinated by Mr. Sayedee. Both documents demonstrated that Mr. Sayedee was not mentioned in the initial investigations of the crime and that Ms. Momtaz Begum, Ibrahim Kutti’s widow, had testified, in a period of time contemporaneous to the commission of the crime, that Pakistani troops were responsible for the abduction and murder of her husband. Despite the fundamental importance of her testimony and its potential exculpatory nature, Ms. Momtaz Begum was prevented from being called as a defence witness, and the ICT refused to look into the record of the case filed by her. In addition, due to changes in the composition of the court, none of the judges who imposed the death penalty had heard the complete evidence and testimonies of the case, and Shukharanjan Bali, the defence witness, allegedly abducted by law enforcement agencies, was a witness supporting Sayedee’s position. Therefore, the case was characterized by prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, a blatant disregard for international standards of justice and due process, and a lack of substance. The same type of severe procedural deficiency and scandal took place during the trial of Muhammed Kamaruzzaman, senior assistant Secretary General of Jamaat-e-Islami. All of the charges presented against him were based on either hearsay or circumstantial evidence: witnesses could identify him in the scene of a massacre in a village, but his degree of responsibility could not be established. His guilt was assumed, mainly, from the allegation that he held a position as an Al-Badr leader. Moreover, his application to recuse two judges due to their clear partiality was, once again, rejected. Kamaruzzaman was sentenced to death on two counts and executed on 11 April 2015. Professor Ghulam Azam, co-founder of Jamaat-e-Islami and its leader during the conflict, was sentenced to capital punishment in July 2013, although his sentence was commuted to 90  years imprisonment due to his advanced age. He died in custody in October  2014. The death penalty was imposed

228  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson even if the case absolutely lacked evidence that could serve as the basis of the charges or the conviction. Paradoxically, the judges of the trial admitted that the evidence was insufficient, and yet, he was convicted on all counts. The verdict relied, mainly, on Prof. Ghulam Azam’s affiliation with the political party Jamaat-e-Islami during the conflict and, according to Human Rights Watch, ‘the prosecution neither alleged nor offered any evidence showing Azam personally committed or ordered violence’ (Human Rights Watch 2015). In addition, this case continued the ICT’s established practice of placing disproportional limitations on the Defence—the tribunal only heard the testimony of one defence witness in this case—and Human Rights Watch reported witnesses disappearances and interference: ‘members of the prosecution and government security agents intimidated defense witnesses, including by threatening their arrest should they cooperate with the defense’ (Human Rights Watch 2015). Other Procedural Misconduct

The aforementioned issues represent just some examples of the procedural misconduct and the deep flaws that tainted the processes before the ICT, and it is necessary to note that the rest of the trials, including those of Mr Nizami, Mr  Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, Mr  Salauddin Quader Chowdhury or Mr Abdul Alim were also characterized by arbitrariness, blatant violations of due process rights and judicial misconduct. For example, in Nizami’s case, the Prosecution were allowed 22 months to undertake their investigations while Nizami’s legal team were afforded only three weeks to prepare for trial, which is woefully contrary to the right to equality of arms to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, recognized under 14.1 and 14.3.b of the ICCPR, respectively. In this vein, the Prosecutor in Nizami’s case was allowed to call 26 witnesses; in contrast, Nizami was arbitrarily prevented from calling any more than four witnesses in his defence. Moreover, the defence were prevented from cross-examining any investigating officer in respect of the 260 documents exhibited by the prosecution, and, thus, the documents were admitted without challenge. This impacted on Nizami’s right to receive a fair trial, as it prevented the defence from putting an element of their case to the court. Further, it is arguable that in adopting such a stance, the defendant was prevented from taking an active part in the trial, thus again infringing accepted international standards of what constitutes a fair trial. Furthermore, one of these prosecution witnesses openly admitted to having been forced and bribed to testify against Nizami, and at the end, the ICT found Nizami guilty of charges despite no witness actually naming or identifying him as being present at the scene of the allegations or as being responsible for any of the offences. He was convicted for being the Commander of Al-Badr forces, despite relevant evidence to the contrary. As a matter of fact, during the hearing in the Bangladeshi Supreme Court, the Chief Justice asked the Attorney General which evidence existed to show that Nizami, particularly, was responsible

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 229 for the crimes alleged, as the court had the impression that there was none or at least it was insufficient to substantiate the charge. Nevertheless, the ICT’s verdict was confirmed and Nizami, who was the president of Jamaat-e-Islami party, was sentenced to death. Finally, Nizami’s case was the object of several conversations from the Skypegate scandal. Notably, Dr. Ziauddin emailed an entire charge framing order on the killing of certain group of intellectuals to the former Chairman of the Tribunal in 2012. According to Human Rights Watch (2015), the cases of the two latter convicted ‘follow a disturbing pattern from previous ICT cases’ and were marred by ‘arbitrary limitations on witnesses and documents’. Mujahid, the Secretary General—the second in command of Jamaat-e-Islami party—was unreasonably and arbitrarily allowed to call only three witnesses for his defence, and not even the most relevant ones. None of the alleged subordinates he apparently ‘instigated’ testified, no clear evidence was ever presented to demonstrate that he was a paramilitary commander, and his lawyer suffered threats and was forced into hiding. The case of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury suffered from similar deficiencies, as he was prevented from calling witnesses that would support his alibi ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’: only four witnesses were allowed to testify, as compared to the 41 that testified for the prosecution, and six additional defence witnesses crucial for proving the accused alibi were banned from even entering Bangladesh. Former US Ambassador for War Crimes, Stephen Rapp, issued a statement on these convictions concluding that ‘under the provisions of international law that Bangladesh has bound itself to uphold, the imposition of sentences of death in these cases is not justified’ (Rapp 2015). Despite the gravity of these criticisms, two days after Mr. Rapp’s declarations, Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid and Salauddin Quader Chowdhury were hanged in Dhaka Central Jail. International View of the ICT—Support or Condemnation The first reactions to the announcement of the forthcoming trials were generally positive. Given the obsolescence of the IC(T)A, numerous international personalities offered their collaboration and support to the Government’s initiative. International experts assisted the tribunal and gave valuable recommendations to improve the fairness of the process. As mentioned earlier, Stephen J. Rapp, US War Crimes Ambassador drafted some proposals for legislative amendments that received popular applause. The UN and several international NGOs congratulated the Bangladeshi government for the creation of the Tribunal, a ‘brave’ measure to fight against impunity on which they placed great expectations. The UN offered technical assistance to the Government of Bangladesh (Wlosowicz 2014); Human Rights Watch (2011) called the trials ‘an important and long overdue step to achieve justice for victims’, and the European Union’s resolutions expressed support for the trials. However, this international support and praise was short-lived. Soon it became evident that both the legal framework and the practice of the tribunal

230  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson were deficient and that the trials would prioritize politics over legality, vengeance over justice and retribution over judicial independence. The Government of Bangladesh rejected the financial and technical support offered by the United Nations and several NGOs, consequently, numerous institutions withdrew their previous offers of collaboration. This refusal of external support indicated that the Bangladeshi executive prioritized the ability to impose the death penalty over the tribunal’s compliance with international standards of fairness and due process. Indeed, the majority of the legal and technical recommendations from the international community were largely ignored and for the reasons noted earlier, the ICT judicial process, once perceived as a victory over impunity, was suddenly regarded with scepticism by the international community. Several international organizations, such as the International Bar Association (Kozlovski n.d.), Human Rights Watch (2013a) and Amnesty International (2014), criticized the shortcomings of the ICT. The fact that the Tribunal exclusively prosecuted perpetrators from one side of the conflict and that it systematically targeted members of the political opposition invited the belief that the process, far from being guided by the principles of individual criminal responsibility and reliable evidence, was a political show trial designed to support the historical rhetoric of the Awami League, suppress and demonize an Islamist political party and execute political opponents. Indeed, Chatham House defined the ICT as ‘deeply flawed and a ploy by the prime minister to rid herself of political rivals’ (Lata Hogg 2013). It added that the executions did not deliver justice to the victims, instead it ‘inflamed violence while violating international standards for a fair trial’ (Tmcadvisorygroup.com 2013). International experts and Members of the British Parliament wrote a letter to the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, calling for immediate action on the ICT. The letter expressed serious concerns about the misconduct of prosecutors and judges and about the stability of the country. It added that the process had been hijacked by the Government and placed into the political arena and that the court had ‘not adhered to the most fundamental of legal principles’ (Tmcadvisorygroup.com 2013). Signatories included Lord Carlile QC, sponsor of the letter and Vice-Chair of UK Parliament’s All Party Parliamentary Group on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, Sir Desmond De Silva QC, the United Nations Chief Prosecutor in Sierra Leone, Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, Deputy Prosecutor of Slobodan Milosevic at International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Kirsty Brimelow QC, International Human Rights lawyer, Chair of Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales, Karim Khan QC, legal adviser to the UN Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and Sir Henry Brooke, former Vice-President, Court of Appeal of England and Wales. Further, Lord Avebury and the Lord Carlile of Berriew QC sent an additional letter to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, requesting a joint delegation from the Commissioner’s office to visit Bangladesh as a matter of urgency ‘with the objectives of assessing the procedures of the Tribunal and seeking

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 231 access to those concerned, including the defendants in their place of incarceration’ (Progressbangladesh.com 2013). Amnesty International opposed the governmentally promoted amendment to allow the prosecution to appeal Mr. Mollah’s life imprisonment sentence (Amnesty International 2013); Human Rights Watch joined in this respect: ‘a government supposedly guided by the rule of law cannot simply pass retroactive laws to overrule court decisions when it doesn’t like . . . Convictions of those responsible for the 1971 atrocities is important for the country, but not at the expense of the principles that make Bangladesh a democracy’—said Brad Adams, the Asia Director of the organization (Human Rights Watch 2013d). United Nations institutions also expressed their condemnation of the trials. Several UN Special Rapporteurs and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention criticized the flawed work of the ICT and described the process as arbitrary and a breach of international law. The Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights issued a press release expressing its concern about the conduct of the International Crimes Tribunal and urging the ICT ‘not to proceed with the death penalty in cases before the Tribunal, particularly given concerns about the fairness of the trials’ (OHCHR (2013). Gabriela Knaul, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, and Mr. Heyns, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, stated their concerns about the apparent partiality of judges and prosecution services of the Tribunal, as well as their lack of independence from the executive. They added: [W]itnesses and lawyers for the defence have also complained about an atmosphere of hostility, intimidation and harassment. Due process requires at a minimum that defendants are able to speak freely with their counsel, have adequate time to conduct their defence, and the ability to call witnesses to speak on their behalf. The principle of equality of arms should be respected at all stages of the proceedings. (OHCHR (2013) The International Centre for Transitional Justice (2013), No Peace Without Justice (2014), Members of the United States Congress, Members of the British Government, the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (2012) and the Centre for Justice and Accountability (2014) all criticized the practice and regulation of the ICT and raised serious concerns as to procedural and substantive flaws in the conduct of the trials. The European Union joined the general criticisms of the Tribunal. The European Parliament resolution of 18 September 2014 highlighted the human rights and due process violations of the Tribunal, criticized the lack of compliance with international standards and emphasized ‘the importance of an independent, impartial and accessible judicial system to enhance respect for the rule of law and for the fundamental rights of the population, and of reforming the International Crimes Tribunal’ (European Parliament 2014). However, and despite the general consensus

232  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson on the criticisms towards the ICT, the international community still shows reticence to express a stronger support for the members of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, perhaps due to their Islamist stance. This discriminatory approach to human rights violations differentiates between types of victims and inadvertently sends a message of selective impunity. Bangladeshi Government Reaction to Criticism The Government of Bangladesh has completely disregarded the criticisms raised by these institutions and organizations. It rejected the veracity and relevance of these criticisms insisting that the ICT met the highest international standards, that the judicial process was non-political, and that it was aimed at justice. The Government responded with denial to the critical opinion of the WAGD claiming that the decision was incorrect because the detention was in accordance with domestic law and therefore lawful: ‘this Tribunal is not an international war crimes tribunal. This Tribunal is a domestic tribunal. Those that have been arrested are facing trial—so it is not an illegal detention’ (Bergman 2012)—said Shaffique Ahmed, Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. This response was both insufficient and wrong. It indicated that the Government of Bangladesh was not willing to make a constructive reading of the WGAD’s decision and promote changes, and the response was incorrect from a legal point of view. This position of passivity and wilful ignorance was further confirmed by the Government’s resistance to investigate and clarify the allegations of malpractice, deficiency and misconduct raised not only by the defence but also by international voices. Scandals such as the so-called ‘Skypegate’ disclosures were not the subject to an impartial investigation. However, from this passive stance towards criticism, the Government of Bangladesh quickly developed a more aggressive position in respect to critical judgements, attempting to silence the opposition and prevent public discussion. The Government responded with arrests and threats to condemnations of the tribunal: Human Rights Watch faced contempt of court charges for reporting the judicial misconduct of the Tribunal as its reports were considered ‘biased, baseless, utterly false, fabricated and ill-motivated allegations’ by the Tribunal (BSS 2014). The attacks against The Economist, Amar Desh and the journalist David Bergman are also examples of the ICT’s witch-hunt against criticisms in the media. This confrontation with the press became explicit when the ICT ruled that ‘both press and electronic media should restrain themselves in circulating an ordinary news as a big sensational news about the court proceedings’ (Robertson 2015). Conclusion The response of the Government of Bangladesh to criticism of the practice of the ICT is merely a further example of the contempt with which it views due

The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh 233 process rights, the fair trial rights of individuals, and the international community generally. As a consequence, what ought to have been an opportunity to end impunity, to bring about accountability, and to further develop international jurisprudence, has instead been forever tarnished by a Government and institution that has sought to put the need for conviction, for retribution, and for revenge, over justice. The two are not the same. Any process, particularly one which seeks to provide accountability for historical crimes will always face its difficulties, and no process can be said to be perfect; however, any process must have principles of fairness at its core. The right to a fair trial is a right from which there can be no derogation, it is fundamental. To seek to limit, or otherwise undermine this right, removes any and all credibility from the process itself; the actions and omissions of the ICT and therefore by extension, the Government of Bangladesh, have done precisely this. What began as a justified step to end impunity and to extend access to justice has resulted in a politicized tool of revenge and retribution. The Government of Bangladesh has sought to suggest that in the ICT they have developed a new ‘Blueprint’ for the administration of justice for international crimes domestically, and indeed they have. However, the legacy of the ICT is not one that ought to be copied, but rather, it is an example of what ought to be avoided at all costs, it is the Blueprint for ‘what not to do’. Notes 1 It is acknowledged that there was an attempt to address the issue in 1973 that did not come to fruition, this attempt being considered in subsequent parts of this chapter. 2 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is recognized by article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (hereinafter VCLT). Although Bangladesh is not a state party to the VCLT, many of its provisions are binding as a matter of customary international law—Case Concerning the Gabčikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) (1997) ICJ Rep 7, para. 46. It is submitted that this includes the principle of pacta sunt servanda which ‘has been applied since time immemorial and is seen today as the cornerstone of international relations’ and for which ‘[t]here can be no doubt as to [its] basis in customary law. . . . The third preambular para . . . emphasises that the rule is “universally recognised” [and] at the Vienna Conference in 1968/1969, the principle was never called in question; indeed, all States emphasised its importance’ see, Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 363, 368. 3 The Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment incorporated the sentence ‘or any individual, group of individuals or organisation’ to expand the subjective scope of article 47.3. 4 See www.criminalinternationallaw.com/12/records/153/Opinion%2066-2012% 20Bangladesh-2.pdf. 5 See Supreme Court of Bangladesh, “Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla,” Criminal Appeal n. 24–25 of 2013, September 17, 2013, p. 247. 6 See article 10.A.1 of the IC(T)A. 7 See Supreme Court of Bangladesh, “Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla,” Criminal Appeal n. 24–25 of 2013, September 17, 2013, pp. 202–3.

234  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson 8 See ICT-2, “Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali,” Case No 3 of 2013, November  2, 2014, par. 695–98. 9 See InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, “Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras,” (ser. C) No. 4, 1988; and InterAmerican Court of Human Rights “Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru),” (ser. C) No. 74, 2001. 10 See ICT-2, “Prosecutor v Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad,” Case No. 5 of 2012, January 21, 2013, par. 69. The same argument was held on ICT-2, “Prosecutor v Syed Md. Qaiser,” Case No. 4 of 2013, December 23, 2014, par. 58–62; and “Prosecutor v Md. Abdul Alim,” Case No. 1 of 2012, October 9, 2013, par. 103. 11 See ICT-1, “Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam,” Case No 6 of 2011, July 15, 2013, par. 288.

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236  Toby Cadman, Carl Buckley and Jack Sproson Human Rights Watch. 2011. “Bangladesh: Unique Opportunity for Justice for 1971 Atrocities.” May  19. Accessed September  18, 2015. www.hrw.org/news/2011/ 05/19/bangladesh-unique-opportunity-justice-1971-atrocities. ———. 2013a. “Bangladesh: Halt Execution of War Crimes Accused.” December 8. Accessed September  18, 2015. www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/08/bangladeshhalt-execution-war-crimes-accused. ———. 2013b. “Bangladesh: Azam Trial Concerns.” August  16. Accessed September 18, 2015. www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/16/bangladesh-azam-trial-concerns. ———. 2013c. “Bangladesh: Investigate Killing of Witness.” December  23. Accessed September  18, 2015. www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/23/bangladeshinvestigate-killing-witness. ———. 2013d. “Bangladesh: Post-Trial Amendments Taint War Crimes Process.” February 14. Accessed September 18, 2015. www.hrw.org/node/248833. ———. 2013e. “India: Protect Bangladesh War Crimes Trial Witness.” May  16. Accessed September  18, 2015. www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/16/india-protectbangladesh-war-crimes-trial-witness. ———. 2015. “Bangladesh: Halt Imminent War Crimes Executions.” November  20, 2015. Accessed March  8, 2016. www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/20/ bangladesh-halt-imminent-war-crimes-executions. IADL (International Association of Democratic Lawyers). 2009. “List Interventions in Commissions at 17th IADL Congress.” Accessed September 17, 2015. www.iadllaw. org/en/node/364. ICLB (International Criminal Law Bureau). 2012: “The Moving Judge and the Replacement Judge—Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal and Interference by the Government with the Legal Process.” April 23. Accessed September 17, 2015. www.internationallawbureau.com/index.php/the-moving-judge-and-the-replacement-judge-bangladesh-international-crimes-tribunal-and-interference-by-the-government-with-the-legal-process/. ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice). 2013. “ICTJ Concerned by Retroactive Sentencing in Bangladesh Genocide Trial.” September 19. Accessed September 18, 2015. www.ictj.org/news/ictj-concerned-retroactive-sentencing-bangladesh -genocide-trial. Jalil, A. 2010. “War Crimes Trial in Bangladesh: A Real Political Vendetta.” Journal of Politics and Law 3 (2): 110–20. Kozlovski, M. n.d. “Bangladesh’s Way: Dhaka’s Controversial International Crimes Tribunal.” International Bar Association. Accessed September 18, 2015. www.ibanet.org/ Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=AA9E9993-62BA-4E44-A177-DF51CA884C19. Lata Hogg, C. 2013. “Bangladesh Pays for a Lack of Justice.” Chatham House, December 31. Accessed September 18, 2015. www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/ view/196505. Mallinder, L. 2007. “Can Amnesties and International Justice Be Reconciled?” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 1: 208–30. New Age. 2014. “ICT Concludes Hearing on Jabbar’s War Crimes Accounts.” December  3. Accessed September  25, 2015. http://newagebd.net/73122/ ict-concludes-hearing-on-jabbars-war-crimes-accounts/. ———. 2015. “Hachhen Sentenced to Death.” June  10. Accessed September  25, 2015. http://newagebd.net/127887/hachhen-sentenced-to-death/. No Peace Without Justice. 2014. “Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal: Unfair Trials and Death Penalty Will Not Bring Justice.” November  6. Accessed

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11 Jamaat and Bangladesh Towards a Cohesive Narrative Md Saidul Islam and Md Nazrul Islam

Jamaat in Local and Global Geopolitics Since its inception in British India in 1941, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (or Jamaat) has been actively mobilizing people, organizing and participating in sociopolitical movements while attempting to reorganize and reshape the sociopolitical and cultural landscape of Bangladesh. Both as an Islamic movement and as a political party, Jamaat’s roles have not always been consistent with the hopes and aspirations of the Bangladeshis in general and the Bangladeshi Muslims in particular. As illustration, Jamaat has not been able to woo the majority support of the respective population in constitutional and electoral politics and capture power alone or even making alliances with other parties and movements (Islam and Islam 2020; Mostofa 2021). Although it had an alliance with BNP and got a taste of power, perhaps for the first time, in 2001, it faced devastating consequences from the successive BAL regime. Despite being remote from the helm of power, Jamaat has been able to command and create a large support-base among the Muslim population for their programmes and movements over the past several decades. Indeed, Jamaat has been so relevant and significant in Bangladesh politics that scholars describe them as ‘kingmakers’ (Karim and Fair 2007; Islam and Islam 2018a). Jamaat is now a leading and mainstream Islamist movement not only in South Asia but also the world over. However, since the journey of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971, Jamaat has been ostracized at least politically due to their political position on the question of Pakistan’s disintegration and Bangladesh’s independence with the help of the ‘secular’ Hindu majoritarian India (Islam 2022). Until the mid-1970s, Jamaat was banned. Thus, it concentrated more on the economic, social and cultural fronts rather than politics and elections. Having been revived in the late 1970s, it now engages in politics and elections vigorously and has gradually turned to become a vital component of Bangladesh state and politics. Jamaat’s around 5–10% vote-count begins to determine electoral outcome and the assumption of political power (Islam and Islam 2018a). Political opponents, particularly the secular camp, started feeling threatened to be wiped out at least politically from politics and elections, and thus orchestrated DOI: 10.4324/9781003310679-11

Jamaat and Bangladesh 239 policies of annihilation and emasculation of Jamaat and Islamist forces from Bangladesh’s social, political and cultural landscapes (Islam 2011a). The international contexts such as the growing negative perceptions towards Islam and Muslims in the West after the tragic incident of 9/11 in the United States, the emergence of al-Qaeda and ISIS or IS in the Middle East, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, and the growing Islamist revivalist movements across the Muslim world became a boon for the secularists in shaping their strategies and implementing agendas such as criminalization and emasculation of Islam, political Islam and Islamic forces. Particularly since the 2010s, the secularist ruling regimes have obviously narrowed down the public sphere of the Islamists and people sympathetic to Islam. Political Islam and Islamic visibility in the public sphere have been considered an existential threat to their hegemonic power and political survival (Islam 2011b). As such, the Islamists have been well targeted and eliminated in two ways: (i) Islamists’ as well as oppositional forces’ democratic and constitutional rights of politics and movements have been harshly and violently suppressed using the state machinery, and (ii) Islamists of social and political prominence have been eliminated in the name of war crimes trial and keeping the sword on the arm of the judiciary according to pro-Islamist political actors and intellectuals. As the largest and the most influential Islamist party in Bangladesh, Jamaat has become the worst victim in its history (Islam 2021), and hence faced a great dilemma as well as an existential crisis. Jamaat Dilemma and Its Existential Crisis Since its inception in 1941, Jamaat is currently facing perhaps the worst crises ever, most of which are, according to many, of its own making. Despite various efforts including local vibrant political response, legal battle and international lobbying, Jamaat had not only failed to evade or challenge the jurisdiction of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) but also, to some extent, made the matter even worse. Most top brass of its leadership faced either death penalty or life term imprisonment. Five top leaders already faced execution, while another three died in prison/custody. In the past five years alone, according to one estimate, over three hundred activists of Jamaat and its student wing Shibir got killed, more than ten thousand became physically disabled and about forty thousand cases have been filed against its leaders and activists. Jamaat-controlled institutions also faced a huge financial debacle. Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd., the largest and the most successful financial institution in Bangladesh established and run by Jamaat, has been ransacked, looted and occupied by a handful of corrupt supporters of the BAL regime. With public sentiment being mobilized through, for example, governmentcontrolled media and the court ruling against Jamaat, the current regime has been successful in denying the political rights of Jamaat from the political landscape of Bangladesh. The prevalent discourse infused with ‘the politics of hate’ (The Economists 2010) against Jamaat is so powerful that identifying

240  Md Saidul Islam and Md Nazrul Islam one with the ideologies of Jamaat is now regarded as a ‘public shame’ in the popular culture of Bangladesh. In short, Jamaat is now socially ostracized, politically targeted and dismantled, economically bankrupt and morally weak. All these certainly pose an existential crisis for Jamaat. While many Jamaat leaders and activists perceive this current situation as a ‘Test of God’, we would instead argue that many of its current disasters are of its own making. One of the very first reasons for Jamaat’s current debacle is its inherent arrogance and monolithic stance concerning its role in 1971 and a massive failure to understand the pulse of the public. Although current Jamaat is largely dominated by post-liberation generation, it has yet to cleanse itself from the 1971 baggage and stigma. Bangladesh had to pay a huge price to get independence; hence, its national narratives and identities are largely drawn from this history of liberation. In this conjecture, arrogantly justifying the anti-liberation role or even remaining silent over this critical question for the past few decades generated both public rebuff and unprecedented backlash. The public reaction, fuelled by political rivalry with the BAL-led ruling coalition, culminated into, for instance, open killing publicly in broad daylight on 28 October  2006 and subsequent violence and combing operations against Jamaat and Shibir. Every effort from the younger and pragmatic leadership within Jamaat to cleanse itself from its 71 baggage was not only halted but also branded as ‘conspiracy’ by its central leadership. So, the party with about 95% pro-liberation supporters is now a mere victim of its 5% anti-liberation leadership. Despite having some commendable social welfare activities and a record of honesty and integrity, Jamaat’s 1971 baggage is costing almost everything. Most people find little or no confidence to support this party (Mostofa 2021). The second dilemma is something to do with its relationship with India. Both politically and ideologically, Jamaat is known as a die-hard anti-Indian. Rather than being sensible about the geo-political realities in the region, Jamaat vociferously opposes India for anything and everything in order to garner cheap public support. This policy backfires in two ways: Even if some people find this anti-Indian rhetoric sensible, they have trust-deficit in Jamaat due to its controversial role in 1971. Second, it allows itself to become an apparent ‘adversary’ of India at a time when India is emerging as a global power. India simply cannot afford to tolerate any adversary among its neighbours especially in Bangladesh because of its own diverse economic and political interests. Economic corridor inside Bangladesh—currently framed as ‘connectivity’—is crucial for India, while politically a pro-Indian power in Bangladesh is of paramount need for India to emasculate the uprising for independence in its seven sisters, which are largely surrounding Bangladesh. This geopolitical reality appears as a blessing for the current BAL-led regime, which is historically a pro-Indian that India can trust. The current regime has managed to exploit these geopolitical realities in South Asia by making an uncontested critical alliance with India and galvanizing the antiIndian rhetoric of Jamaat and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The ruling regime of Bangladesh has been using every effort to gain international

Jamaat and Bangladesh 241 support through the discourse of terrorism and Islamic militancy, a brand that they often attribute to the Jamaat-BNP alliance (Islam 2011a). Jamaat is now caught and tossed in these complex triple alliances (Bangladesh, India and the United States) driven by various political and economic interests. While these complex local and global geopolitics and their impacts on Jamaat to the extent of facing an existential threat were clear, Jamaat leadership failed to both comprehend and apprehend them. This apparent existential threat will  perhaps continue unless and until Jamaat cleanses itself from the 1971 baggage and change its relationship with India from being an adversary to a partner in progress. Rooms for Peaceful Coexistence In contemporary Bangladesh, politics seems to have become a zero-sum game for politicians and their supporters: one’s rise is considered another’s not only fall but also non-existence. Particularly, Bangladesh has, in a broader term, been sharply divided into pro-secularists and pro-Islamists, mutually conceived as enemies to each other, where the survival of one increasingly depends on the emasculation and limiting authority of the other. Under this circumstance, politics of reconciliation and national unity is quintessential for the survival and development of the Bangladeshi nation-state. The elements of sociopolitical cohesion and peaceful co-existence are present within all parties and camps, and they need to be worked out through the genuine expression of political will of the mainstream political actors and stakeholders concerned. We have discerned a number of avenues for a peaceful coexistence. First, all mainstream secular parties and ideological groupings, including the mainstream Islamists such as Jamaat believe in democracy and pluralism and constitutional exercise. Since Islam and democracy are not necessarily incompatible (Islam and Islam 2017; Islam 2012), Jamaat’s political Islam is democratic and pluralistic. They have always engaged in constitutional politics and electoral competition. Its ideologies and programmes do not match with what is often called radical Islam and revolutionary activities (Islam and Islam 2018b; Sayedee 2006). Jamaat, though socially conservative, is politically moderate and economically sensible, adhering to liberal democracy. Yet their social conservatism does not pose any threat to other communities and groups. Thus, the ‘democratic Islamism or political Islam’, what Jamaat believes in and has been practising over the years (Islam and Islam 2020), has seemingly no tension with a liberal democratic order and democratic polity. Second, despite the presence of ultra-secularism, Bangladesh, since its inception as an independent nation in 1971, has been following secularism of Anglo-American model that allows religious symbols and expressions even in the public sphere and does not intervene into the private domain of any religious denominations as opposed to the French model of secularism or Laicité that does not tolerate religion in the public sphere and rather interferes in the private religious domain (Kuru 2007, 2008; Islam and Islam 2020). Islamists

242  Md Saidul Islam and Md Nazrul Islam and Jamaat have no tension with secularism of Anglo-American model that Bangladesh widely practise. As appears from the chapters of this volume, Jamaat firmly believes and recognizes people of other faiths or even people without faiths. It strongly holds that people of every religion and even nonreligion have rights to believe, express and practice their faiths and ideologies independently and fearlessly and none has any rights to intervene in them. This political and ideological tolerance and pluralistic attitude are a significant source of and a way forward for peaceful coexistence in a nation of diverse cultures and population. Third, although Jamaat opposed Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971 politically, it has acknowledged the independent existence of Bangladesh right from its being and has been engaging in social, political and economic endeavours. It has elected representations in almost all the parliaments and even became part of the government as members of its cabinet. Terming Jamaat as an ‘anti-liberation force’ is a political misrepresentation and rhetoric and a virulent strategy of ‘Othering’ them by their political opponents, particularly the pro-Indian secularists and the leftist forces, who have in fact a very little support-base within the Bangladeshi people and society. Opponents have no evidence but a mere propaganda against Jamaat as being an enemy of national sovereignty and independence and active for reintegrating Bangladesh with Pakistan (Ciovacco and Wazed 2008). The significant political parties and organizations especially the secular forces require stopping ‘Othering’ their political opponents including Jamaat and the Islamists and rather broadly engaging in politics of pluralism and reconciliation instead of politics of hatred and vengeance for the sake of political stability, social and cultural cohesion, and economic prosperity in Bangladesh. Fourth, Bangladesh throughout its independent existence has opted for democracy and pluralism, both politically and constitutionally. All mainstream parties and groups are in agreement with democratic political exercise and pluralistic aspirations. The most significant spirit of Bangladesh’s liberation war was aspiration for and restoration of democracy (Islam and Islam 2020). The post-democratic regimes since the 2010s have clearly deviated from this spirit and eventually turned Bangladesh into chaos and confusion and sociopolitical and economic disorder and neopatrimonialism often academically described as ‘hybrid regime’ (Brownlee 2009; Diamond 2002), ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2002), ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2002, 2006), ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 1997), ‘secular authoritarianism’ (Fahim 2022) or even ‘kleptocratic fascism’ (Islam 2011b). The non-democratic and authoritarian global powers tend to support and promote these regimes and thereby making democracy and pluralism threatened not only in the context of a particular region or country but also throughout the world. The restoration of democracy is thought to be a single-most important factor for peaceful coexistence in Bangladesh. The international communities and pro-democracy forces need to play an active role in this effort.

Jamaat and Bangladesh 243 Finally, Jamaat has tremendously succeeded particularly in the fields of education, business, economy and employment. Over the past few decades, they have privately established many educational institutions and provided quality and higher education to millions of people; created many economic and financial institutions including banks as well as medical institutions including medical colleges, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies; and generated a huge number of employment and income opportunities, which have eventually made enormous contributions to Bangladesh’s society, economy and development. These contributory efforts and private initiatives by Jamaat need to be protected, sustained and further advanced broadly for the sake of Bangladesh’s interests and future development, which can be a significant source of sociopolitical cohesion and peaceful coexistence of the Bangladeshi people. Jamaat and a Prosperous Bangladesh Our analysis shows that Jamaat is not merely a political party, it’s an organization for human welfare and idealism. Its aim and objective, as stated in its constitution, is to make Bangladesh an ideal welfare state through following the rule of law, democratic principles and constitutional processes. Jamaat is always committed to establishing this objective through peaceful and nonviolent means. Along with the realm of politics, it has been working tirelessly in the educational and humanitarian landscapes as well. Motivated by Islam and patriotism, Jamaat has established itself as a unique political party known for its zero-corruption, strong principles, moderation and pragmatism. It has been working as a vanguard to protect the nation’s independence and sovereignty during any crisis (Jamaat 2022; Amin 2016). Jamaat has always been a target of criticism and attack from regimes and parties that are grossly oblivious about or hostile against socio-economic and political roles of Islam. Therefore, Jamaat is a victim of violence, legal sanctions with false charges, false representation and negative propaganda (Islam 2011a). Despite these apparent obstacles, Jamaat since its inception has been determinedly fighting against corruption, injustice and oppression in order to establish rule of law and social justice. This is possible only through popular public support and mandate and therefore Jamaat put utmost importance to credible election. With this aim in view, Jamaat has been—through presenting the beauty of Islam and need for a welfare state to the public—working to build up a strong cohort of competent, patriot and morally upright human resources (Amin 2016). To actualize its vision, Jamaat has an organizational structure with a disciplined manpower, pragmatic agenda, high transparency and full accountability. Compared to other political parties in Bangladesh, Jamaat maintains far clear and transparent monetary transactions. Donations by its manpower specially by its members (rukn) and well-wishers as well as Zakat constitute the bulk of its income. All incomes are stored in its well-maintained treasury and spent for human welfare according to shariah (Amin 2016). Despite all these ideological commitments and active social engagements, Jamaat’s current

244  Md Saidul Islam and Md Nazrul Islam precarious situation is largely a product of, and cannot be overcome unless addressing, some of its inherent paradoxes. Jamaat as an Islamic movement and political party needs to revisit and rethink its age-old modus operandi and modus vivendi for further flourishing and contributions to Bangladesh and the international arena. This volume thus suggests a few important insights. (a) Social before political: Jamaat’s designation of politics as jihad remains problematic. This was first done by Maulana Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat. In the context of current sociopolitical, demographic and cultural landscape of Bangladesh, the broader meaning of jihad should not be reduced to only politics. It also needs to redefine the concept of ekamat-e-deen (establishment of religion). The meaning of ekamat-e-deen should not be reduced to and equated with only the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’. The focus should be more on reshaping the society than the state first. The concept of ekamat-e-deen is more related to the establishment of religion in the society. When a society matures for Islam, the state is very likely to be shaped in line with Islamic teachings. Thus, a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down one is considered feasible and viable: a social and cultural revolution well before a political revolution is necessary. Jamaat also needs to look at long-term national interests rather than mere shortterm petty benefits: it should not concentrate more on power politics and become part of power by allying with secular parties and forces. Since Jamaat is primarily an Islamic organization, it needs to be more ‘social’ than ‘political’. Unfortunately, political agendas of the party exhaust maximum of its energy and time. Social welfare programmes exist in Jamaat. However, Jamaat has often politicized Islam rather than Islamize politics (Iqtidar 2011). It can make a clear-cut division of labour in which social aspects (welfare, dawah etc.) will dominate, and not be dominated by, politics. Islam demands a social revolution before any political revolution takes place. Jamaat’s activities are largely dominated by ‘reactive’ (e.g., opposing the ruling regime) rather than ‘pro-active’ approaches (working for positive changes regardless of any social dynamics). (b) Structural reform: Jamaat is often referred to as a closed system. Jamaat’s methodology was adopted by Mawdudi more than eight decades ago, and there remains hardly any alteration or reformation in it till now. When the party was formed in 1941 in British India, the Muslims were a religious minority and were under foreign occupation and the society was largely Hindu dominated. Thus, the sociopolitical contexts of Muslims in British India were significantly distinct from those of united Pakistan and current Bangladesh. Mawdudi’s thoughts and conceptions were mostly affected by these contemporary sociopolitical and demographic conditions. Yet Jamaat continued to stick to the same methodology and organizational structure even in the altered environment and contexts. Jamaat as a mass organization should rethink practising its strict structural and bureaucratic stereotype. Jamaat is structurally monolithic but wants to be a mass

Jamaat and Bangladesh 245 political party. It therefore needs to rethink how to make the structure more accommodative than exclusionary. Within its structure, it often promotes loyalty over talent (Islam 2015). Jamaat can have some ‘invited spaces’ for the experts to participate in its policy making. (c) Intellectual revolution: A scholarly workforce is quintessential for the success of an ideological movement. Jamaat has not succeeded in making such a scholarly workforce. Most of their grassroots leaders do not possess intellectual ability to successfully operate the party as an ideological movement in this 21st-century world. Except for a few, most of the national leaders seem to lack the requisite intellectual and scholarly exposure in social and political thought. The leaders and workers are merely restricted to the idea and study of only Mawdudi’s or Mawdudi-centered books and materials. They are not well informed about the enormous body of literatures that the contemporary global Islamic movements have produced in recent decades. Even Mawdudi’s literatures need to be revisited and revised in line with the changed circumstances, which Jamaat have not yet considered and attempted to. As a result, the party’s decision-making processes have remained parochial and nonqualified. (d) Proactive and pragmatic: As far as politics and people’s affairs are concerned, a political party or group must need to be proactive in its approach. Yet Jamaat has always tended to be rather reactive in politics. Jamaat seemingly failed to be a pro-people organization but strictly followed its ideal frame of thinking devoid of social and political pragmatism. In the most notable political-historical junctures of the Bangladeshi populace such as the creation of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1947 and 1971 respectively, which were mainly led and joined by the Bangladeshi Muslims, the Jamaat’s ideological and political position was largely against the aspirations and will of the majoritarian population. Whatever explanations and justifications it had, the fact is that Jamaat lacked political pragmatism and far-sightedness and thereby alienated itself from the people and society. This political-historical trajectories have prevented Jamaat from building a mass organization with a large political and social support-base. The event of 28 October  2006 as well as the recent war crime tribunal and political and media propaganda surrounding it show that Jamaat is internally well-disciplined, but externally it is extremely vulnerable, being dangerously hated by many people of Bangladesh. These events show people’s extreme rejection of Jamaat. Jamaat needs to understand the ‘pulse’ of these people. Why do so many people hate Jamaat more than anything? How to mitigate this extreme hatred and antagonism? Jamaat needs to rethink seriously whether to counter this extreme hatred through hatred (tit for tat approach) or to face and address these problems through wisdom, love, patience, political pragmatism and social welfare. If Jamaat takes the former approach, there will not be any difference between Jamaat and its extreme counterparts. Currently, Jamaat is inherently anti-Indian, but because of geo-political reality it needs India

246  Md Saidul Islam and Md Nazrul Islam to survive. Regarding Jamaat’s relation with India, it needs to find out ways to become a constructive ‘partner in progress’ and not an ‘adversary in conflict’, as alluded to earlier. If Jamaat continues its anti-Indian stance openly breaking diplomatic norms, it will continue to pay prices as it is paying now. Currently, Jamaat is nowhere in terms of moral/spiritual, political, social (media, cultural, lobbying etc.), and economic powers to face India. (e) Cleansing the 1971 baggage: Bangladesh was created through a liberation war that was actively opposed by Jamaat. Yet in post-liberation Bangladesh, Jamaat have not earnestly thought and pursued to minimize its anti-liberation and anti-national role during Bangladesh’s War of Liberation in 1971. Jamaat’s active role against the liberation war and collaboration with the Pakistani military in 1971 seems to be the single most controversial legacy of the Party. It has encountered war crimes trial, and most of its national leaders have been executed. Jamaat leaders continue to assert that they were not involved in any crimes during the liberation war (Hasan 2011). Yet they have not yet officially clarified their position and role in the liberation war. To make it clear, they have not even published an article or a booklet on this, nor were they able to seek clemency for their anti-liberation role in Bangladesh’s War of Liberation. Instead, Jamaat has opted for a ‘hide-and-seek policy’ on the liberation war, which has perplexed most people in Bangladesh regarding both the party and its leadership. Perhaps, Jamaat has believed that people would forget the Jamaat’s chapter of 1971, which has never happened. Jamaat’s ‘71 backlash’ thus has been their inherent enemy in post-liberation Bangladesh. Their opponents have successfully branded them as an ‘anti-liberationist force’ and the ‘enemy of the State’, which has largely contributed to their social and political marginalization in contemporary Bangladesh. The current social and political realities in Bangladesh demand from Jamaat a new face totally free from the 1971 stigma. (f) Relationship with other Islamic parties: Jamaat’s relationships with coIslamist parties and groups have been another source of their severe organizational and political weakness. The influential Deobandi-aligned Islamists are critical of Jamaat. This contentious relationship between them goes back to Mawdudi’s critical appraisal of the Deobandi School of Thought, particularly the religious and political thoughts and ideas of Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani in British India, and vice versa (Metcalf 2017). Although Jamaat in Bangladesh has never at least overtly criticized other Islamists including the Deobandis, it has seemingly failed to offer ample and significant attention to cultivating warm relations with them. For this, Jamaat needs to go beyond its occasional ‘spiritual arrogance’ (thinking that they alone are the ‘only’ true Islamic party and will alone establish Islam) and needs to have effective initiatives and programmes for fruitful dialogue with other Islamic groups. It can, for example, help Tabligue Jamaat to organize its programmes like Bishwa Ijtema.

Jamaat and Bangladesh 247 (g) Real image and future vision: Although Jamaat faces a real threat from BAL, it should not consider the regime as its real enemy. The real enemy is ‘ignorance and arrogance within BAL’. Rather than countering BAL as an enemy entity, Jamaat needs to have effective strategies to make BAL know what Jamaat is. Although some hardcore BAL out of arrogance may never embrace Jamaat even after they know it, Jamaat’s efforts should not be halted. Wrong image and misrepresentation of Jamaat in the mainstream discourse is the Jamaat’s main enemy. It needs to pay maximum attention to media, public relation, talk show, more dialogue and other technological means to give people the ‘real’ image of it. Jamaat needs to make proper avenues to reclaim its own agency to represent itself leaving no space for its ideological nemesis to represent it. It needs to have a full and attractive vision as well as long-term agendas for the young generations, an alternative nationalism based not on anti-Indian rhetoric and sentiment but on environmental, social and economic justice (e.g. rights of women, labour, child and elderly in particular). It needs to make a bridge with secular camps and think tanks for these common goals and to maintain cordial relationship with non-Muslims as well. References Amin, F. 2016. “Social Welfare Program of Islamic Political Party: A Case Study of Bangladesh Jamat-e Islami.” A PhD thesis submitted to the Religion and Society Research Centre, School of Social Science and Psychology, University of Western Sydney. Brownlee, Jason. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 515–32. Ciovacco, Carl, and Sajeeb Wazed. 2008. “Stemming the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh.” Harvard International Review, November 19. Accessed January 1, 2016. http://hir.harvard.edu/stemming-the-rise-of-islamic-extremism-in-bangladesh/. Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21–35. The Economist. 2010. “The Politics of Hate: An Ancient Vendetta Continues to Eat Away at Public Life.” November 18. www.economist.com/node/17525830. Fahim, M. Ashraf Aziz Ishrak. 2022. “Inventing Islam(ism): De-Islamization Under Secular Authoritarianism in Bangladesh.” ReOrient 7 (2): 158–81. Hasan, Mubashar. 2011. “Democracy and Political Islam in Bangladesh.” South Asia Research 31 (2): 97–117. Iqtidar, Humeira. 2011. Secularizing Islamists? Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Da’wa in Urban Pakistan. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Islam, Maidul. 2015. Limits of Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Islam, M. Nazrul. 2012. “Understanding Good Governance in Islam: A Conceptual Analysis.” International Journal of Islamic Thought 1 (1): 49–62. ———. 2021. “Political Islam in South Asia: A Critical Appraisal of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” International Area Studies Review 24 (4): 314–34. ———. 2022. “Faithful Participation: The Ulama in Bangladeshi Politics.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 23 (2): 177–203.

248  Md Saidul Islam and Md Nazrul Islam Islam, M. Nazrul, and M. Saidul Islam. 2017. “Islam and Democracy: Conflicts and Congruence.” Religions 8 (104): 1–19. ———. 2018a. “Islam, Politics and Secularism in Bangladesh: Contesting the Dominant Narratives.” Social Sciences 7 (37): 1–18. ———. 2018b. “Politics and Islamic Revivalism in Bangladesh: The Role of State and Non-State/Non-Political Actors.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 19 (3): 326–53. ———. 2020. Islam and Democracy in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Islam, M. Saidul. 2011a. “ ‘Minority Islam’ in Muslim Majority Bangladesh: The Violent Road to a New Brand of Secularism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 31 (1): 125–41. ———. 2011b. “Trampling Democracy: Islamism, Violent Secularism, and Human Rights Violations in Bangladesh.” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 8 (1): 1–33. Jamaat. 2022. “Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami.” Accessed December 29, 2022. https:// jamaat-e-islami.org/en/article-details.php?category=44&article=75. Karim, A. Tariq, and C. Christine Fair. 2007. “Bangladesh at the Crossroads.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 181: 1–10. Kuru, Ahmet T. 2007. “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies Toward Religion.” World Politics 59 (4): 568–94. ———. 2008. “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe: Analyzing French Exceptionalism.” Comparative Politics 41 (1): 1–19. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. Metcalf, Barbara D. 2017. “Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani and the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind: Against Pakistan, Against the Muslim League.” In Muslims Against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan, edited by Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb, 35–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mostofa, Shafi M. 2021. “Jama’at-e-Islami and Trust Building in Bangladesh.” Politics & Policy 49 (3): 708–39. Sayedee, Moulana Delawar Hossain. 2006. Islam in Subduing Terror and Militancy. Dhaka: Islamic Foundation Bangladesh. Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “Electoral Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 36–50. ———, ed. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76 (6): 22–43.

Index

Abdullah, Mohammad 135 Abdul Mannan, Mohammad 133 – 4 Abdur Rahim Janahi, Abdul Latif 136 Abdur Rahim, Maulana Muhammad (leadership) 56, 133 Abrahamic faiths 15 Abul ‘Ala Maudid, Maulana Syed 1, 55, 78, 100, 145, 182 acting Ameer 86 – 7 Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Welfare Party) (AKP) 102; success 107 Adams, Brad 155, 231 Adhunik Juge Islami Biplob (Islamic Revolution in the Modern Age) 68 – 9 Adhunik Prokashoni (publisher) 71 Afroz, Tureen 215 Ahamed, Hafez Jubaer (BCL murder) 154 Ahamed, Shobuj (BCL murder) 152 – 3 Ahmadabad (Muslim political power) 19 Ahmad, Imtiaz 22 Ahmad Madani, Maulana Husain 246 Ahmadnagar (Muslim political power) 19 Ahmad Tannuri, Sayyid 36 Ahmed, Forid (BAL murder) 159 Ahmed, Shaffique 232 Ahsan, Fakhrul 133 – 4 Ain-i-Akbari (Allami) 30 Akbarnama (Fazl) 32 A’la Maududi, Abul 44 A’la Mawdudi, Abul 68 Alam, Badiul 116 al-Din, Minhaj 32 Al Faisal Foundation 122 Ali, Hussen (murder) 154 Ali, Idris (police kidnapping/torture/ murder) 164

Alim, Abdual (trial arbitrariness/ violation) 228 Ali, Mir Quasem: abduction 221 – 2; appeal 223, 226 al-jahilliya (age of ignorance) 26 al-Jihad fil Islam 71 Alkhateeb, Fouad Abdulhameed 131, 132, 136 Al-Khateeb, Mahasin Alzaraa 132 Al-Kuds Committee 49 Allah Akbar (God is the greatest) campaign banners 52 Allah’r ain chai, shot loker shashon chai 67 Allama, Badruddin 36 Allama Iqbal Hall (Zahurul Huq Hall) 45 Allami, Abul Fazl 30 Al Mamun, Abdullah (BCL kidnap/ torture) 161 Almighty Allah: servants 140; spiritual link 47 – 8 Al Monju, Abdulah (house attack) 148 almshouses, construction/ maintenance 33 Al-Rajhi Banking Investment Corporation 130 al-Rashid, Caliph Harun (reign) 30 Al Salman, Hafez Abdullah (police murder) 154 Amar Desh, publication (cessation order) 218 Ambedkar, B.R. 26 Ameer, Jamat 147 Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami 71 Amin, Faroque 100 Amir al-Mu-minin caliphs, recognition 32 – 3 anti-independence force 91 – 2 antyaja (Bengal indigenous label) 23

250 Index Anwar, Mustafa 141 Arabian Abbasid Caliph, reign 30 – 1 Arabi, Taqiuddin 36 “Arab Mediterranean” 29 Arab traders 29 – 31 Arefin, Sayyidul 36 Arman, Mir Ahmad Bin Quasem 221 Army Officers of the Pakistani Army, death penalty (application) 218 Arnold, Thomas 18 ashraf-ajlaf (upper-lower) class dichotomy 22 ashraf (upper) class, membership 21 Astana (meditation place) 35 Awami judicial/extra-judicial killings (peak) 158 – 61 Awami League (AL): connections, strategic reasons 54; government, initiative 142; justice, establishment 206; leaders, killing 46 – 7; losses, experience 53; rhetoric, support 230; stronghold 112 – 13; syndicated effort 70 Azad, Abdul Kalam: death penalty, ICT imposition 221; trial in absentia 220 Azam, Ghulam 50 – 1; Ameer, declaration 88; blessings/loyalty 56 – 7; citizenship claim 51; IDL, differences 86; imprisonment 152 – 3; law, violation (Awami League complaint) 51; life imprisonment 227 – 28; personality 85 Azim, Shafiul 109 Aziz Al Raji, Abdul 136 Aziz and Others (case) 185 Aziz, Muhammad Abdul 152 Babunagri, Junaid 54 Badruddin, Pir 36 Baharistan-i-Ghaibi 32 Baitul Mukarram Masjid, protestor gathering 151 Baitush Sharaf Foundation 136 Baitush Sharaf Islamic Research Institute (initiative) 134 Bakhtiyar Khilji, Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin 29, 32; conquest 33 Bandarban orphanages, operation 118 “Bangla Bhai” phenomena 70

Bangladesh: creation 145; democratic practice 145; independence 238; independence, resistance 183; Islam, emergence 15; Islam, introduction 109; Islamization 47, 49; Islam, politics 43; Islam, relationship 45 – 55; Jamaat-e-Islami, democratic constitutionalism (relationship) 78 – 3; Jamaat politics, social welfare programmes (impact) 100; Jamaat, role 43; Jongi State, branding 7; Muslim society, formation 15; Muslim society, growth 16 – 17; narrative, cohesiveness 12, 238; national identity 2 – 3; national liberation, struggle 187 – 188; nation, religious belief/love characteristic 48; political parties, coexistence (peacefulness) 241 – 3; political violence 162; politics, relationship 45 – 55; prisoners, repatriation (agreement) 189 – 90; prosperity, Jamaat (connection) 243 – 7; realpolitik, context 75; second revolution 46 – 7; war of independence, Jamaat opposition 242 Bangladesh Association of Banks (BAB) 140 Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) 145 – 6; election 156 – 7; election (2008), importance 190 – 1; ignorance/arrogance, problem 247; judicial/extra-judicial killings (peak) 158 – 61; postelection carnages 156 – 7; power, ascendancy 11; regime, backing 1 – 2; ruling coalition, political rivalry 240; threats 156 Bangladesh Bank Nurual Islam 133 Bangladesh Bank Training Academy 134 Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) 146; beatings 6; kidnappings/torture 148, 161; murders 146 – 8, 150, 152 – 4; rally attacks 147 Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order (1972) 183 – 4 Bangladesh Constitution (Constitution of Bangladesh): amendments 188 – 9; Article 32 violation 162; Article 47/47A 188 – 9,

Index  251 210; fair trial guarantees 208; first/fifteenth constitutional amendments, impact 209 – 10; perspective 80 Bangladesh High Court, Azam judgment 51 Bangladesh Independence Struggle 192 Bangladesh Islamic Center (BIC): establishment 133; literary/ cultural activities 133 Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir 6, 63, 89, 146 Bangladesh Islamic University, establishment (Jamaat role) 116 Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) 43, 63, 75, 85; religious politics, analysis 77 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 145; antirhetoric, galvanizing 240 – 1; government formation 50 – 1; Hasina attacks 155 – 6; Jamaat, alliance 238; repression 57; state repression 5; stronghold 112 – 13; weakening 54 Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) Massacre 146 – 7 Bangladesh Timeline 146 Bangladesh Tribunal, international law violations 197 Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) 6 Bangladesh Zindabad (Long live Bangladesh) 48 bank branches/employees/asset ownership, Islamic principles (basis) 131 Bank Ki Moon (sentence commutation appeal) 226 – 7 Barbosa, Duarte 30 Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales 231 Baschu, Muhammad (police murder) 159 Bashiruddin, Haji 135 Bastami, Bayazid 35 Basu, Maladhar 33 Begum, Momtaz (defence witness call, prevention) 227 Bengal: Arab traders, contact 29 – 31; Bakhtiyar Khilji conquest 33; Islam, arrival 25 – 8; Islam contact 28 – 36; Islamic consolidation, initiation 31 – 3; Islamization

theories 17 – 25; social context 25 – 9; Sufi missionaries/ preachers, impact 33 – 6 Bergman, David (indictment) 213, 232 Beverley, Henry 20 Bhabha, Homi 4 Bhutto, Zukfiqar Ali 86 Billah, Maruf 182 Bishwa Ijtema (Tabligue Jamaat programme) 246 bismillah (Allah name, invocation) 34 Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim 48, 52, 80 Bjapur (Muslim political power) 19 BJI 155; internal report 2 Blyden, Edward Wilmot 29 Bogra Mill 133 Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB): demonstration attack 151 – 2; Hasina usage 150; village attack 152 Brahmanical culture/authority, exposure 22 – 3 Brahmanical despotism 21 – 2 Brooke, Henry 230 Buckley, Carl 206 Buddhism 26 – 7; Brahmanism, conflict 26; elements 27; Sasanka atrocities 27 Buddhist Pala Dynasty, Bengal rule 26 – 7 Buddhists, Brahmanical persecution 27 – 8 Butshikan, Ni’matullah 34 – 5 Cadman, Toby 206 caityas (votive monuments) 27 Cambridge IFA 127 capital cases, procedural safeguards standards 208 – 9 Caretaker Government (CG): election 154; issue 79 – 81; transition 82 caste and sacrifice (Brahmanical system), Buddhism denunciation 26 Central Working Committee members, appointment 91 Centre for Justice and Accountability 231 charity medical services (ISWCC) 112, 118 charity medical services, Jamaat contribution 114 – 15 Chatgaon 30 Chatterji, Suniti Kumar 17 Child Education Centres 117; volunteers 118 Chitagang 30

252 Index Chittagong, Arab settlements (existence) 30 Chittagong Baitush Sharaf Islamic Research Institute 134 Chittagong City Corporation, impact 112 Chittagong City Jamaat leader, designated role 104 Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) 141 Chowdary, Muhammad Faruq (police murder) 160 Chowdhury, D.A. 28 – 9 Chowdhury, Rashid 135 Chowdhury, Salauddin Quader: hanging 229; verdict, pronouncement 199, 228, 229 circumcision camps 113; organisation 114 Code of Criminal Procedure: provisions, applicability (absence) 193; section 142 149 Collaborators Order 1972, operation 184 – 8, 224 – 5 competitive electoral politics 77 – 83 complacency 75; Jamaat complacency 83 – 94 Constitution see Bangladesh Constitution constitutional amendments 188 – 9 constitutionalism 75; democratic constitutionalism 77 – 83 Constitution of Bangladesh see Bangladesh Constitution Cornish, William 20 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): contributions 141; initiatives 11, 140 crimes against humanity 196; offenses 199 – 200; perpetrators, justice 219 Criminal Procedure Code 213 Crooke, William 20 Dalton, Edward 22 Dargah 34 death penalty, retrospective/targeted application 218 – 9 decolonization, initiation 129 – 30 Deen (religion), discussion 113 democracy: death 155 – 8; Islamic democracy 80; Jamaat, relationship 75 democratic constitutionalism 77 – 83; Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, relationship 78 – 81

Deobandi faith 51 De-Radicalization of Jihadists, The (Ashour) 67 Desh, Amar 232 De Silva, Desmond 230 Detective Branch (DB), Hasina usage 150 Dewan, Sharif Uddin 135 Dhaka Exchange 134 Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 141 Dhaka Stock Exchange Commission (DSEC) 141 – 2 dharanis (spells) 27 dighis (reservoirs) 36 Divine twins, overpowering 76 double jeopardy 221, 224 – 5 Durant, Will 17 East Bengal Islamization 23; theories 17 – 25 educational services (social welfare activities) 111, 115 – 8 Eid al-Fitr, clothes distribution 119 Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi (prophet birthday), observance 47 ekamat-e-deen concept 244 Ekattorer Ghattak Dalal Nirmul Committee 88, 220 – 1 electoral authoritarianism 242 electoral politics 75; competitive electoral politics 77 – 83 Elephant Road protest rally (police attack) 153 – 4 Eliot, Charles 27 Elliot, Henry 17 enforced disappearances, victims 164 – 5 Enlightenment 21 – 2 Ershad, Hossein Mohammad regime 49 – 50; downfall 80 Esposito, John 15 – 16, 43 – 4 European Union, criticisms 231 – 2 Evidence Act 213; applicability, absence 193 evidence, low standards 221, 222 – 3 ex post facto law, jurisprudential principle 207 extra-judicial killings 158 – 62; examples 159 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), criminal trials (establishment) 192 extreme oppression (2013) 149 – 55

Index  253 Fahad, Abrar (torture/murder) 6 – 7 Fajr (morning prayer) 115 Fazl, Abul 32 Fazlul Huq Muslim Hall (Gazlul Huq Hall) 45 feudal Zamindari economic system 77 – 78 Fifty Keyh Figures in Islam (Jackson) 128 financial aid (Jamaat City Office) 120 financial/material support (social welfare activities) 111, 118 – 21; types 120 First Principles of Islamic Economics (Ma’ashiyat-i-Islam) 129 Firuz Shah, Shams-ud-din 32 Fouad Al-Khateeb, Abdul Hameed 132 Foucault, Michel 3 French Revolution, legacy 21 – 2 Futuhat-i-Firuz Shahi (Tughlaq) 25 Fuzli Rubbee, Khondkar 20 Gaheabana Janaza (funeral prayers) 160, 163 Gandhi, Indira 190 Gazi, Ruhul Amin (police arrest) 160 General Amnesty Order (1973) 184 Geneva Convention 188; Bangladesh nonratification 209; Common Article 3, relationship 209 genocide: case 206; detention/ prosecution/punishment 193; findings 222 Genocide Convention (1948), Bangladesh (signatory state) 197 Ghurid Cavalry, attack 26 Ghuznavi, Abu A. 20 – 1 Gonotontro Noy Purnango Biplob (Not Democracy Total Revolution) (Rahim) 70 good Muslims, bad Muslims (differentiation) 66, 68 Good Muslims, characteristics 66 – 8 governmentality 3 – 4 Govinda, Gour 35 Gupalnagor, police/RAB/BGB attack 152 Habibur Rahman, Shoid (police murder) 159 Hachhan, Syed: death penalty, ICT imposition 221; trial in absentia 220 Hadith: prophetic tradition 105; sayings 48

Hague, William 230; sentence commutation appeal 226 – 7 Hamood, Samih 136 Haq, Enamul 30 – 1 Haque, Azizul 134 Haque, Tamizul 137 Harakah al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmiyyah ˙ (Islamic Resistance Movement) 102 Hardy, Peter 19 Hasan, Kamrul (BCL kidnap/ torture) 161 Hasina see Wazed Hinduism 26 – 7; caste system 20 Hodgson, Marshall 18 Holy Qur’an 47; recitation 46 Hossain, Mohammad 135 Hossain, Musharraf (amendment defense) 214 Hudallinnas guidance/welfare 104 – 5 Huda, M.N. 133 human beings, guidance/welfare 104 – 5 Human Rights and Fair Trial Standards 208 Human Rights Report: Bangladesh report (2010) 6 human rights standards 211 – 19 Human Rights Watch 228, 229; condemnations, press statement 198 Hunter, William 17 Huq, Nizamul (judge): appointment 215 – 16; dismissal 217; Skype conversations 198 – 9; telephone conversations 216 – 17; Ziauddin communications 217 Husain Shah, Alauddin 21, 32 Hussain, Habibullah (BCL kidnap/ torture) 161 Hussain, Israel (police murder) 154 Hussain, Muhammad Delwar 152 Hussain Sayeedi, Moulana Delwar 147, 150 – 1 Hussen, Anwar (police murder) 154 Ibn Battuta 25, 35 – 6 Ibn Khordadbeh 29 Ibrahim, Muhammad (police murder) 151 ideological shift (Jamaat) 88 – 90 Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) 102 Ikram, S.M. 18 – 19

254 Index immigration theory 17, 23 – 4 Indian Muslims, conversion (forcing) 19 Indian National Congress 78 institutions, BAL politicization/ awamification 166 intellectual support base, absence 93 – 4 interlocutory appeals, regulation 214 – 15 internal network, regrouping/ re-establishing 84 internal policy dynamics (Jamaat) 83 – 94 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ): advocacy 12; objections 184 International Court of Justice (ICJ), prisoner of war repatriation 189 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): Article 6 162, 208 – 9; Article 6 violations 162; article 26, breach 210; BAL violations 148; trials in absentia 219 – 21 International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Act (1973) [IC(T)A]: arrests/ trials 219; article 6.6, impact 216; article 20.2, Supreme Court interpretation 218 – 9; auxiliary force definition 186 – 7; considerations 193, 201; criticisms 231 – 4; discriminatory/ biased frameworks 212 – 13; enactment 225; evidence 93; ex post facto nature 210; independence/impartiality, absence 213 – 18; international view, support/condemnation 229 – 32; Jamaat leader executions 11; jurisdiction, evasion/ challenge (Jamaat failure) 239; legal framework 209 – 11; legal framework, critique 211 – 19; legislative framework, criticism 211 – 12; non-technical procedure 222; obsolescence 229; passage 188; politicization, outraging level 211; practice 221 – 29; preamble 193; procedures/ practices 212 – 13; procedures/ practices, non-conformities 212; proceedings, unfairness 208; processes/amnesties, ignoring 224; Section 3(1) 189; shortcomings, criticism 230;

statutory framework 211; subjectmatter jurisdiction 194 – 5 International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh (ICTB): accused treatment 189; commencement 191; controversy 206; creation, reason 192 – 3; ‘crimes against humanity’ 182 – 3; death penalty imposition 185 – 7; establishment 190 – 1; Jamaat leader executions 11 – 12; Jamaat leader trial process 191 – 200; jurisdictional power possession 186; legal failure 193 – 9; legal nature 192 – 3; personal jurisdiction 194; postponement 189 – 90; reopening 190 – 1; temporal jurisdictional capacity 195 – 6 International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh 2 (ICTB-2), opening 199 – 200 International Crimes Tribunals Act (173) 187 – 88 International Islamic Relief Organisation 122 International Islamic University Chittagong (IIUC) 118; establishment 115 – 16 International Military Tribunal (IMT): experience 187; Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) 195 International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) activities, closure 54 Inward Remittance 137 Iqamat-e-Din (reign of God) 67 Islam: acceptance 34; arrival 25 – 8; authentic form, introduction 109; Bangladesh, relationship 45 – 55; code of life 48; conception 17; deep-seatedness 33 – 6; embracing 325; emergency 15; introduction, syllabi committee (formation) 48; learning/practising 118; non-Muslims, conversions 31; permeation 16; politics 43; politics, relationship 43 – 5, 75 – 7; revelation 23; spread 18 – 19, 33 – 4; Superpower hostility 7 Islam, Abid Bin (police/BCL murder) 150 Islam conversions 21; myth 18; result 20; zeal 23

Index  255 Islamiat (study) 47 Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL): achievements 136 – 9; birth (Jamaat role) 127; creation/ establishment/formation 130 – 6, 239; daily stock return, emerging market indices (contrast) 138; emergence 11; historical performance 136 – 9; status 139 – 2; success 128; theoretical foundation 128 – 30 Islami Biplober Poth (A’la Mawdudi) 70 Islamic consolidation, initiation 31 – 3 Islamic Democratic League (IDL): formation 56, 84; impact 81 Islamic Economics Research Bureau (IERB) 135; establishment/ formation 130, 133 Islamic Farmers Welfare Organisation 106, 108 – 9 Islami Chhatra Shangha 89 – 90 Islamic Labourers Welfare Federation 104, 106, 108 Islamic NGOs, impact 102 – 3 Islamic politics, social welfare spectrum 101 – 3 Islamic revolution 70, 89 – 90; question 67; Shibir perception 69 – 70 Islamic revolutionary: citizen 63; transformation 70 Islamic social equality, idea 21 – 2 Islamic Social Welfare Council of Chittagong (ISWCC) 103 – 4; charity medical services 112; establishment/formation 103 – 4; Jamaat leader, full-time employment 117 – 18; leaders, interview 111; non-political organisation 188; success 106 Islami, Nejam E. 184 Islami Oikko Jote (IOJ) 51 Islami Rashtro Kivabe Protishthito Hoy 70 Islamization: incidence 25; theories 17 – 25 Islam, Janurul (police murder) 164 Islam, Jubairul 159 Islam, Kazi Nurul 27 Islam, Muhammad Arizul (murder) 154 Islam, Muhammad Rafigul (police murder) 153 Islam, Muhammad Sakibul 159 Islam, Nazrul 15, 238

Islam o Antorjatik Sontrashbad (Islam and International Terrorism) 71 Islam o Sontrashbad (Islam and Terrorism) 71 Islam, Rafiqul 104 – 5 Islam, Saidul 1, 145, 238 Islam, Saiful (law enforcement murder) 155, 164 Islam, Shahinur (international standard) 217 Islam, Syed Serajul 43 Islam: The Straight Path (Esposito) 15 Islam, Thohurul (police murder) 158 Iwaz Khilji, Ghiyas-ud-din 32 – 3 Jabbar, Abdul 134; trial in absentia 220 Jackson, Roy 128 Jainism 26 – 7 Jain religions, wicked doctrines (professing) 27 – 8 Jalal, Shah 35 Jamaat: 9/11 attacks, impact 10; activists, arrests 161; activists, BAL regime murder 167 – 78; activities, popularity 105; analysis 67 – 71; arrogance 240; BAL regime treatment 166 – 7; ban 238; basis 93 – 4; branding 246; characteristics 106 – 7; complacency 83 – 94; crises 239; democracy, relationship 75; demonstrations 201; dilemma/ existential crisis 239 – 41; disappearances/extrajudicial killings 149; electoral competition 82 – 3; electoral participation 82; electoral politics 81 – 3; elimination, need 161; false representation 6; freedom of speech, infringements 149; Hasina attacks 155 – 6; hide-andseek policy 246; human rights, absence 161 – 4; ideological movement 88 – 1; ideological shift 88 – 90; image, reality 247; institutional function 94; intellectual revolution 245; intellectual support base, absence 93 – 4; internal policy dynamics 83 – 94; Islamic parties, relationship 246; knowledgebased party, failure 93; leadership orthodoxy 85 – 88, 92; legal

256 Index sanctions 243; literature/theory 66 – 8; local/global geopolitics 238 – 9; local units (Thana), presence 118 – 19; manpower, social welfare activities (association) 105; methodology, adoption 244 – 5; monolithic stance 240; monolithic structure 244 – 5; narrative, cohesiveness 12, 238; negative propaganda 243; nomenclatures 84 – 5; organisational welfare structure 103 – 9; orthodoxy (1971), obsession 90 – 3; partner in progress 246; party liability 85 – 88; policy difference 88 – 90; political-historical trajectories 245 – 6; political progress 10 – 11; political strategy 84 – 5; politics, social welfare programmes (impact) 100; post-democratic Bangladesh treatment 145; proactivity/pragmatism 245 – 6; re-establishment 106; representation 2 – 5; representation, politics/practices 4; role 43, 55 – 8, 127, 183 – 7; sensuality accusation 5; spiritual arrogance 246; state repression 5; structural reform 244 – 5; suppression, continuation 148 – 9; transition period 84; unofficial ban, imposition 2; violence accusation 5; vision, actualization 243 – 4; vision, future 247; welfare activities 109 – 11 Jamaat Allama Delwar Hossain Sayeedi 151 Jamaat amake baad diye ar kono biyaktike Ameer nirbachita korteo prostut chilona 87 Jamaat City Office, financial aid 120 Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) 63, 84 – 5, 145; democratic constitutionalism, relationship 78 – 1; founding/ formation 55, 182 Jamaat leaders: arrests/political rights loss 147; execution 182; execution, perspective 200 – 3; ICTB trial process 191 – 200; political killing victims 197 – 200; prosecution/punishment, judicial initiative 187 – 91; role 183 – 9

Jamaat Maulana Abul A’la Mawdudi 71 Jamaat Muhammad Kamaruzzaman 70 – 1 Jamaat Question 2, 8, 12 Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB), emergence 70 Jamaat upolobdhi 87 Janata Bank Training Institute 134 Jatiyo party, AL alliance 57 Jha, D.N. 28 jihad: Jamaat designation 244; word, mention 68 jiziyah, payment exemption 25 Joi Bangla (victory of Bengal) 47 – 8 Jolahas 23 jongi (religion-motivated violence) 6 – 7 Jubo League (JL), rally attacks 147 justice: need 206 – 7; sense (vindication) 188 Justice and Development Party (AK Party), rise 68 Justice and Welfare Party (Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi) (AKP) 102; success 107 Kabir, Fazle (transfer justification, absence) 216 Kabir, Yeasinul 105 Kamaruzzaman, Muhammed (guilt assumption/execution) 227 Kama Sutra (Vatsyayana) 28 Kamil Mardasha, Jhenaidah Siddiqia (arrest/murder) 163 Kangaroo Court 88, 158 Kashem, Abul 135 Kawsar, Harunur Rashid (BCL murder) 146 Kaykaus, Rukn-ud-din 32 Kerry, John (sentence commutation appeal) 226 – 7 Khaleda Zia, Begum 51; regime 50 – 1 Khalid Khan, M. 134 Khan, Arastu 141 Khan, Ashrafuzzaman: death penalty, ICT imposition 221; trial in absentia 220 Khan Bhashani, Abdul Hamid 86 Khan, Daud 135 Khan, Karim 230 Khan, M. Khalid 134 Khan, Muhammad Imran (police murder) 150

Index  257 khanqahs: construction 32; establishment 35 Khan, Yahya 86 Khilafat Andolan (Islamic leadership movement) 50 Khilji, Bakhtiyar 26 Khilji Dynasty 31 Khiljis, conversion encouragement 25 Khokon, Zahid Hossain: death penalty, ICT imposition 221; trial in absentia 220 Khuda Hafiz (God is all-conscious) 47 Khulafa alRashidun (guided caliphs) 89 Knaul, Gabriela 221, 231 Koch King, poison (offering) 34 Krishi Bank Training Institute 134 Kumar Chakma, Niru 27 Kutti, Ibrahim (widow complaint) 227 Lajja (Nasreen) 51 langar khana (alms-houses), establishment 35 Lapidus, Ira 18 leadership: orthodoxy (Jamaat) 85 – 88; set (Jamaat) 90 – 3 legal representation, restrictions 221 – 2 Liberation Forces, supporters (de facto immunity) 213 Liberation War see War of Liberation local/global geopolitics, Jamaat (connection) 238 – 9 local libraries, organisation 110 Lodi Dynasty, cessation 32 Lodi, Ibrahim 31 – 2 Lord Avebury 230 – 1 Lord Carlile 230 – 1 Luthar, Saeed Ahmed 136 madrassah (religious schools) education 32 – 3, 45, 55, 108; funds 47 Mahabharata 33 mahasukha (eternal bliss) 27 Mahisawar, Balkhi 34 Mahmud, Asaad 104 Mahmud Shah, Nasiruddin 36 Mahmud, Shamin (torture/murder) 162 Maisur, Bakhtiyar 36 Majlish-e-Shura 932 Majumdar, R.C. 17 Maktab (religious morning schools), presence 117 maktabs: construction 32; organisation 118

Manarat University, establishment (Jamaat role) 116 mandalas (ritualistic circles) 27 Mannan, Abdul 141 Mannan, Mohammad Abdul 133 mantras (mystic syllables) 27 ‘March for Democracy’ 155 masjids (mosques) 55; visitation 50 Masum, Mohiuddin (BCL murder) 146 Mateen, Abdul 141 “Matir Moina” (movie) 51 Maududi, Maulana 127, 129 Maulana Abdul Jabbar, Pir Saheb 135 Mawdudi, Maulana 244 mazars (tombs) 55 Mazars (tombs/shrines), visitation 50 medical services (social welfare activities) 111 – 15 Minar, Malek 135 Minhaj al-Din, Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad 31 Ministry of Home Affairs, arrests 184 Mirza, Shamsuddin 105 – 6 Mit Ghamr Savings Bank, establishment 130 mlechha (Bengal indigenous label) 23 Mollah, Abdul Quader (life imprisonment sentence/ execution) 211, 214, 226 – 7 Mongols, incursion 31 – 2 Moniruzzaman, M. 75 mosques: construction 32; prayer organisation/lectures 110; Sufi shrine attachment 33 Mubarak Shah, Fakhruddin 30 mudras (physical gestures) 27 Mueen-Uddin, Chowdhury: death penalty, ICT imposition 221; trial in absentia 220 Muhammad Mujaheed, Ali Ahsan 153, 160 – 1, 225 – 6, 228, 229 Muhammad Shah, Jalaluddin 33 Muhammad Ullah, Mowlana 50 Muir, William 17 Mujaddid 128 Mujahideen fighters, performance 90 Mujibcourt (political dress), change 52 Mujib development policy, consequence 46 – 7 Mujib regime 45 – 7 Mujib Year 54 – 5 Mukherjee, Ramkrishna 23

258 Index Mukti Joddha Sangshad (Freedom Fighters’ Association) (FFA) 87 – 88 Muktijudhdho (war of independence) 85 Mullah, Abdul Kader 150, 154 mullahs, preaching/persuasions (response) 23 Muller, Max 28 – 9 Mushtaq Ahmad, Khondakar 47 – 8 Muslim Aid 122 Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) 102; impact 66 – 7; reform initiative 67 Muslim Pakistan Movement, philosophy 92 Muslims: conquerors, characteristics 17; conquest 9, 31 – 3; devotees, deprivation 57 – 8; life 48; political power, centers 18 – 19; sociopolitical context 244 – 7 Muslim society: formation 15; growth 28 – 36; Islamic political movements 101 – 2 Muslim Ummah, harmony (promotion) 32 – 3 Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal (coalition) 68 Nagarikatta Punaruddhar Committee (Committee for the Restoration of Citizenship) 87 Narayan Sasrkar, Jagadish 18 Nasiruddin Shah Nekmardan, Sayyid 36 Naskar, Abdur Razzak 133 Nasreen, Taslima 51 Nasser Social Bank 130 Nathan, Mirza 32 Nayeb-e-Ameer (ICT sentencing) 151 Nazrul, Asif 142 Nice, Geoffrey 230 Nizami, Motiur Rahman 158, 162 – 3, 225 – 6, 229 Nizami, Shamsun Nahar 132 Noman, Abdullalhl M. 127 Nomani, Sharifuzzman (BCL murder) 146 non bis in idem concept 224 non-Muslims: conversion 31; Islamic political movement 101 – 2 non-Western countries, democratic deficit 78 – 9 No Peace Without Justice 231 nullum crimen sine lege (retrospective criminal law, prohibition) 194, 196

Nuremberg Charter Article 6(c) 195 Nuremberg Trial, crimes against humanity 196 Nuruzzaman, Sylhet 135 Nusrat, Nasiruddin 31 – 2 O’Leary, De Lacy 18 omra hajj (semipilgrimage) 52 OMSCI emerging market index 137 one-off financial aid, recipient numbers (ISWCC) 121 opposition: human rights, absence 161 – 164; leaders/activists, torture 149; political parties, women supporters (BAL threats) 156; programs, interception 149 oppression: Awami oppression 147; continuation 166; extreme oppression (2013) 149 – 55 organisational welfare structure (Jamaat) 103 – 9 Othering, stopping 242 pacta sunt servanda (international law principle) 208 Pakistan: creation 245; East Pakistan, breakaway 44 Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Council Muslim League 183 Pakistani crackdown, fight 44 Pala Dynasty see Buddhist Pala Dynasty Parasurama (murder) 34 party: leadership, Jamaat obsession 90 – 1; liability (Jamaat) 85 – 88 Party for Justice and Development 67 Party of God 102 Parvez, Ibnul Islam (arrest/torture/ murder) 163 – 4 patronage theory 24 – 5 Pavanaduta (Dhoyi) 28 Penal Code, offences (punishment) 225 Philkhana, tragedy/aftermath (BDR Massacre) 146 – 7 Pillay, Navi (sentence commutation appeal) 226 – 7 Pir, Qattal 36 police: Hasina usage 150; murders 150 – 1, 153, 157, 160; village attack 152 policy difference (Jamaat) 88 – 90 politics: Bangladesh, relationship 45 – 55; competitive electoral politics

Index  259 77 – 83; Islam, relationship 75 – 7; Jamaat jihad designation 244 post-democratic Bangladesh: Jamaat question 1; Jamaat treatment 145; Jamaat, victimization 5 – 7; Shibir, treatment 145 post-independence Bangladesh, society/ parties (socialization) 91 – 2 post-secular society, discourse 76 – 7 Potenga medical camp, operation 113 – 14 power: continuity 79; normalization 3 prayer: impact 57 – 8; organisation/ lectures 110 Presidential Decree No. 16, basis 212 – 13 Prisoners of War (POW): clemency 190; issue, settlement 190 pro-Indian Bengali nationalists, political/ practice discussion 4 – 5 proof, reverse burden 221, 222 – 3 pro-Pakistani Jamaat, image 4 – 5 Qadar, Obaidul 147 qard-e-hasana (financial aid) 120 Qard-e-Hasana (unconditional loan): encouragement 119 – 20; practice 109; unconditional loans 110 Qiyam al-Layl (night-stay), organisation 115 Quami, mother 53 Question of Land Ownership, The (Masala-i-Milkiyat-i-Zamin) 129 Qur’an, recitation 117 rabbi zidni ilma (O lord, increase my knowledge) 45 – 6 Rabita al-Alam Islami 122 Rahath, Ali Asgor Khan (death) 150 – 1 Rahim, Abdur 70 Rahman, Aminur (arrest/murder) 157 Rahman Anis, Muhammad Anisur (police murder) 160 Rahman, Anisur (arrest/torture/ murder) 163 – 4 Rahman, Ataur 54 Rahman, Azizur 48 Rahman, Hafizur (imprisonment/ murder) 163 Rahman, Jahidur (police murder) 153 Rahman, Mofizur 134; police murder 159 Rahman, Mohammad Nakibur 127

Rahman Molik, Khalilur (police murder) 153 Rahman, Motiur (police torture) 159 Rahman, Muhammad Anisur (police murder) 160 Rahman, Mujibur 54, 86, 93; imprisonment 187; leadership 45; rule 185 Rahman Nizami, Maulana Motiur 147 Rahman Nizami, Motiur (death sentence) 158 Rahman, Shafiqur 57 Rahman Shojib, Motiur (law enforcement murder) 155 Rahman, Ziaur 47 – 8, 86, 128; police murder 153 Rahm, Shafiqur 137 Rajshahi University (RU) 159 Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 146; Hasina management 150; murders 147, 159; Police, active collaboration 149; Police/Coast Guard, joint operation 147; village attack 152 Rapp, Stephen 211 Rayhan, Abdul Aziz (law enforcement murder) 155 Razakar Bahini, membership proof (failure) 186, 191 razakarization 7 razakars, derision 6 – 7 Razakars Force 194, 201 receivers, financial condition (considerations) 120 relief distribution (social welfare activities) 111, 121 – 2 religious-based political parties, government ban 127 res judicata principles, violation 224 – 5 retroactive law, jurisprudential principle 207 Robertson, Geoffrey 214, 222 Rules of Procedure and Evidence 211 Rules of Procedure, modification 214 – 15 Rupos, Makhdum 35 Rural Development Scheme initiatives 11 sadaqah 119 – 20 Sadkawan 30 Said, Edward 5 Sakib, Nazmus 63 Salah Zamzum, Ahmed 136

260 Index Salam, Abdus 132 Salimullah Muslim Hall (Salimullah Hall) 45 Sarkar, Jagadish Narayan 23 Sasanka atrocities 27 Sattar, Abdus 49; law enforcement murder 155 Sayedee, Maulana Delwar Hossain 225 – 6; abduction 223 – 4; life imprisonment 227 Sayeedi, Tribunal death verdict (impact) 201 Scrafton, Luke 24 Sector Commanders’ Forum 88 secularism 47; adoption 77; constitution/omission 80; principle, declaration 45 Sena Dynasty 26 – 7 Sena, Lakshmana 28 Sen, Dinesh Chandra 27 sentencing, opaqueness/ inappropriateness 221, 225 – 8 Seven-Point Demands on Islamic Revolution 90 Shabuddin, arrest 159 Shahbag Movement: anti-Jamaat Shahbagh Movement 93; upsurge 1 – 2 Shah Daulah Shahid, Makhdum 34 – 5 Shahid, Baba Adam 34 Shahid, Turqan 36 Shanti-Bahini 118 Sharaf, Baitush 134 shariah-based banking 139 Shariah ideals 67 sharia (Islamic laws), principles (propagation) 48 Shati al-Ganga (bank of the Ganges) 29 Shati-Jam 29 Sheikh Hasina regime 52 – 5 Shiam, Monwar Jawath (police murder) 154 Shibir: activists, BAL regime murders 167 – 78; analysis 67 – 71; human rights, absence 161 – 4; Islamic Student Association of Bangladesh 6; literature/ theory 66 – 8; metamorphosis 70; popularity 90; post-democratic Bangladesh treatment 145; protest 153 Shibiractivities, arrests 161 Shiva, image (usage) 27

Shorothpur Dakhil Madrasa, student murder 152 Shuhan, Mohiuddin (abduction/ murder) 162 Shuhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed 86 shyness, impact 114 Sinapur Bazar Noakhai, Jamaat protest rally 154 Sinha, Surendra Kumar 199 siqayah (reservoirs), construction 33 Sixty Dome Mosque (UNESCO World Heritage Site) 3636 Skypegate scandal 207 – 8, 215 slums, circumcision camps (organisation) 114 social aggregates, hierarchy 19 social clubs, organisation 110 social liberation theory 17, 19; arguments 22 – 3; critique 21 – 2 ‘Social Reformation and Service’ report 110 social reformation/service, Islamic principles basis 109 social religion 31 social stigma, impact 114 social welfare: involvement, history 102; organisation 108; programmes, impact 100, 103; spectrum 101 – 3 social welfare activities 102 – 3, 106; calculation 109; city Jamaat leader role 114; city-level report 110; educational services 111, 115 – 18; financial/ material support 111, 118 – 21; medical services 111 – 115; relief distribution 111, 121 – 2; satisfaction 113 social work: execution 112 – 13; involvement 109 society, development issue 111 socio-cultural repression 22 Sonali Bank Staff College 134 Sonali Bank Training Institute (initiative) 134 Soon Ibn-Sina Trust, establishment 132 South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) 146 S&P Capital IQ data 137 Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL), hybrid criminal trials (establishment) 192 special medical camps 113

Index  261 Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) (East Timor), criminal trials (establishment) 192 spiritual arrogance (Jamaat) 246 Sproson, Jack 206 Srimad Bhagavata, Basu translation 33 state policy, secularism principle 45 state repression 5 story-telling, usage 117 “Strongest Islamic Retail Bank in South Asia 2022” 127 structural repression 22 stupas (votive monuments) 27 sudra (Bengal indigenous label) 23 Sufi missionaries/preachers, impact 33 – 6 Sufis (Bengal arrival) 18 Suhl-i-Yemen 35 Sulayman, Abu 43 sultan, convert presentation 25 Sultan Rumi, Muhammad 34 Summit of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), participation 47, 49 sword or force theory 17, 18 Tabakat-i-Nasiri 31 tablighi Jama’at 55 Tabligue Jamaat, Bishwa Ijtema programmes 246 Tabrizi, Jalaluddin 35 Tahajjud (complementary prayer) 115 Tantric Buddhism, emphases 27 Tariq, Sajib Ahmed (police murder) 164 Tawwama, ABu 36 terror, culture 1 Testament of Faith, reciting 25 thamid, Mustofa Murshed (police murder) 151 Thana (Jamaat local units) 106 – 7, 118 – 19 Themis (Goddess of Justice) statue, removal 54 third-world politics, post-9/11 context 8 Titus, Murray 17 Tohrun, Al Mukith (BCL murder) 152 – 3 Training Camp (TC) 115 ‘Trial of the 1971 War Crimes in Bangladesh . . . ’ (Zead-AlMalum) 215 tribal absorption, Muslim method 23

true religion, embracing 25 Tughlaq, Firuz Shah 25 Tuhin, Assadullah (RAB murder) 159 Tuhin, Manjarul Islam (police murder) 157 ulema 134 Uniglobe Business Resources, bank shares 141 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), fair trial right (recognition) 208 Untourables: neglect 23; position, intolerance 20 Upazaila (subdistrict) elections 57 U.S. Congress, members (criticisms) 231 us-versus-them 3 Varthema, Ludovico 30 victor’s justice, implementation 198 victors revenge, impact 207 VP, success 107 Wadud, Anwarul 145 war crime: findings 222; judicial killing, connection 161 War Crime Tribunal (WTC), initiation 148 War of Liberation (1971): atrocities 187; cleansing 246; crimes 11; crimes, justice (need) 206 – 7; Jamaat leaders, role 183 – 7; Jamaat leaders, villain (perception) 200 – 1; organizations, trial/ punishment 214; Pakistan army, collaboration 50 – 1 War on terror (war on terror) 63 – 5, 71 Wazed, Hasina 45; anger 145 – 6; head coverage 52; leadership 5; ‘Mother of Mafia’ (‘Lady Hitler’) (‘Kleptocratic Fascist’) 158; oppression 158 – 9; parliament election 153 – 4; police, deployment 163; police/RAB/ BGB/DB usage 150; power, holding 149 – 50, 162 welfare activities (Jamaat) 109 – 11 White, Jeny 107 widow remarriages, practices 21 witness: intimidation/unreliability 221, 223 – 4; protection, absence 223 – 4

262 Index Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) 212 – 13; opinion 232; Opinions No. 66/2011 219; Opinions No. 66/2012 223 WP, success 107 yabana (Bengal indigenous label) 23 Yahya Maneri, Sharfuddin 36 yantras (magical diagrams) 27 Yasin, Ahmed Razia 136 Younus, Mohammad 134, 136 Yunus, Mohammad 135 Yusuf, Maulana A.K.M. (imprisonment/ death) 224 – 5

zakat (Islamic alms), financial aid collection 120 Zakat Fund (poor fund), establishment 50 Zead-Al-Malum, accused guild/ responsibility opinion 215 Zia, Begum Khaleda (house arrest) 155 Zia regime 47 – 9 Ziauddin, Ahmed 198 – 9, 216; Huq communications 217; role, government defense 218; trial involvement 217 – 18 Zia-ur-Rahman (assassination) 49 Zimmis (dhimmis), true religion (embracing) 25